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THOMÆ
BRADWARDINI
ARCHIEPISCOPI OLIM
CANTVARIENSIS,
DE CAUSA DEI,
CONTRA PELAGIVM,
ET DE VIRTUTE CAUSARVM,
Ad suos MERTONENSES,

LIBRI TRES:

IVSSV REVERENDISS. GEORGII
ABBOT Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi;

OPERA ET STUDIO Dⁱ HENRICI
SAVILLII, Collegij Mertonensis in Academia
OXONIENSI Custodis,

Ex scriptis Codicibus nunc primū editi.



LONDINI,
EX OFFICINA NORTONIANA,
Apud IOANNEM BILLIVM.
MDCXVIII

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THOMAS BRADWARDINE, FORMERLY ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, ON THE CAUSE OF GOD AGAINST PELAGIUS, AND ON THE POWER OF CAUSES, TO HIS MERTONIANS, IN THREE BOOKS.

BY THE COMMAND OF THE MOST REVEREND GEORGE ABBOT, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY; BY THE LABOR AND STUDY OF DR. HENRY SAVILE, WARDEN OF MERTON COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

Now first published from manuscript codices.

LONDON, FROM THE NORTON PRESS, AT THE SHOP OF JOHN BILL. 1618.

TO THE MOST SERENE AND MOST POWERFUL PRINCE JAMES, BY THE GRACE OF GOD KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND IRELAND, ASSERTOR AND DEFENDER OF THE TRUE FAITH, THE BEST, GREATEST, AND MOST INDULGENT PATRON OF GOOD LETTERS:

THIS WORK OF THOMAS BRADWARDINE, FORMERLY ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, RESCUED FROM NEGLECT,

HENRY SAVILE, MOST DEVOTED TO HIS MAJESTY, DEDICATES AND CONSECRATES AS A MONUMENT OF PERPETUAL OBEDIENCE.

TO THE READER.

Wishing to say a few words by way of preface about the author, the first thing that presents itself is his **name**, which is written variously in our old books: Thomas de Bradwardina, and de Bredewardina — the latter being how it is consistently written in the Public Records. Foreign writers almost all call him Bravardinus, with the name deflected for the sake, I think, of euphony. Gerson, in Book III of *On the Spiritual Life*, writes Bragwardinus; the author of the *Catalogue of Witnesses* and Gesner write Branduardinus. In John Bacon (or Baconthorpe, as others prefer), on *Sentences* IV, distinction 1, question 4, folio 86 of the Venice edition of 1527, he is called Bradinkardin — by a disgraceful error of the printer, not of Bacon himself, who, being a contemporary of Bradwardine (for both came from the same hive, namely Merton College), could not have been ignorant of the correct spelling of his fellow's name.

Concerning his **place of birth**, I once thought he was born at Bradwardin castle and village (that castle is situated, as our most learned and diligent Camden attests, on the bank of the river Wye, some miles above Hereford). But I was recalled from this not improbable opinion by the express words of Bradwardine himself, Book III, chapter 22, page 559 of this edition, where he hints, not obscurely as it seems to me, that he was a native of Chichester. The words are: "By a similar reasoning, whatever I now write at Oxford, my father would write at Chichester, because he

begot me the writer — indeed my grandfather and great-grandfather," etc. So that Bale and the author of *British Antiquities* seem not to have erred greatly in asserting he was born at Hartfield in the diocese of Chichester — on what authorities or moved by what arguments, I do not know. With me, certainly, the author's own words will outweigh others, until something more certain is brought forward by others. In the meantime, it seems likely to me that his ancestors were born at the castle or village of Bradwardin, and thence acquired the surname for themselves and their posterity, even when they migrated elsewhere (which is very common among our countrymen) — and that some one of these Bradwardine folk, having thus established himself in new quarters at Chichester, passed on to his son, our Thomas, that name which was already established and hereditary.

In what **year he was born**, just as I would assert nothing for certain (for the beginnings of great men are often obscure, whose endings are most renowned), so since it is established that he was Proctor of the University of Oxford in the year 1325, I would believe he was born around the year of our Lord 1290, in the middle period of King Edward the First.

After completing his boyhood studies, he was admitted to **Merton College**, Oxford, in the time of Edward the Second, where he was Proctor of the University, as I said; for I found it thus written in the Catalogue of Chancellors and Proctors of that University: "Year 1325. William de Alburwike, Chancellor of Oxford, and Richard de Kamshall his Commissary; Proctors: William de Harington and Thomas de Bradwardina."

In that University, at a more mature age — in the time, I think, of Robert Trengre as Warden — he attained, says Bale in his first edition (which some think was wholly copied from Leland), "such an increase of learning that he was made Master of the highest faculty, and finally supreme Chancellor" (about which, with the good leave of Bale and Leland, I may be permitted to express doubt), "in which office he so conducted himself," he says, "that he earned great praise from all."

In this scholarly career he drew a solid philosophy from the fountains of Aristotle and Plato, but his industry shone forth chiefly in the **mathematical arts** and in **theology**. In mathematics he so excelled that that age produced perhaps no one equal to him. Witness are the astronomical tables, exquisitely drawn up, of the equations of the planets and the conjunctions and oppositions of the luminaries, which I have in my possession, carefully written out by hand in a rather thick volume. Witness his treatise on the proportions of velocities; another on speculative arithmetic; another on speculative geometry (which book Vives praises in Book IV of *On the Handing Down of the Disciplines*) — all published long ago in Paris.

In theology, however, the palm is held — for he composed very many other works in every kind of discipline, if we believe Bale, which I have not handled — the palm, I say, is easily held by this book which we now publish from six manuscripts against the treachery of the Pelagians, a heresy continually springing up in the Church in every subsequent age, as experience teaches. This work, largely put together and woven from his Oxford lectures (as he himself tells us in the

preface), he polished and published at the request of his Mertonians, when he was Chancellor of London.

The **title** is that which I have placed at the head, in nearly all the manuscripts I have seen. In the book of New College, Oxford, however, the title is: "The Summa of the Profound Doctor on the Cause of God against the Pelagians, and on the Power of Causes, the Power of God the Cause of Causes." In the Vatican Library, in nearly the same manner: "The Summa of the Profound Doctor Thomas Bradwardine on the Cause of God against the Pelagians, and on the Power of God the Cause of Causes."

This book, as soon as it was published, was received with such **applause** from all the Doctors that it was copied into nearly every library in all of Europe. Gerson, as to a well-known author, frequently refers to it in his books *On the Spiritual Life*. Gregory of Rimini cites it in his commentary on *Sentences* II — to say nothing of Pico, Volaterran, Cassander, the author of the *Catalogue of Witnesses* (who poured the whole preface of this book into his own compilation), and more recently Luther, Perkins, and others — while it still lay hidden in the dust and neglect of libraries.

For concerning **Geoffrey Chaucer**, almost a contemporary of those times, the prince of our poets, a man of keen judgment and not merely of witty genius — who did not keep silent about our Thomas — it would be wrong for us to be silent here. He, being not inconsiderably versed in philosophical and theological matters, and having apparently perused these recently published lucubrations of the Archbishop of Canterbury, mixing, as was his custom, the serious with the jocular, in a certain Canterbury tale touches in passing on the difficult question of God's foreknowledge and the contingency of things, and ranks Bradwardine with Augustine — as one, namely, of those who in debating this difficult controversy "sifted the flour down to the bran" (for such is his familiar and elegant expression), that is, drew forth the truth sunk in the depths. Let us bring him forth, if you please — and it does please to hear the old English simplicity, even of his style — in his own comic buskin:

But what that God afore wote, must needs bee, After the opinion of certaine clerkis. Witenesse of him that any clerke is, That in Schoole is great altercation In this matter, and great disputation, And hath been of an hundred thousand men. But I ne cannot boult it to the bren, As can the holy doctour S. Austin, Or Boece, or the Bishop Bradwardin. Whether that Gods worthy foreweting Straineth me needly to doe a thing, (Needly clepe I simple necessite) Or if the free choice be granted me To doe the same thing, or do it nought, Though God forewot it or it was wrought. Or if his weting straineth neuer a dele But by necessite conditionele. I woll not haue to done of such matere.

[Savile provides a Latin verse translation of the Chaucer passage.]

To return to our Bradwardine: the cognomen of "**the Profound**" — whether imposed by the Pope, as is recorded in an old Merton register, or received by the common vote of Doctors

throughout the Christian world — so prevailed regarding him that Bradwardine is no less known by the cognomen of "the Profound Doctor" than Scotus by "the Subtle Doctor" or Aquinas by "the Angelic Doctor."

And so that the character of this book may be better known to the Reader, it will not be beside the point to offer a few preliminary observations.

First, our Thomas, being a supreme mathematician — as appears from the foregoing — **did not depart from his art even in treating theological matters**. And so he was the first, as far as I know, and the only one to attempt this method in theology: to weave theological matters on a mathematical thread — namely by positing first two hypotheses, as it were principles, and from them demonstrating the next propositions and deducing corollaries, even drawing proofs from Euclid; then from the hypotheses and what has been previously demonstrated, weaving together all the rest in a continuous series to the end of the work. The result is that his conclusions may perhaps seem to some to be drawn from too high. But if in his lemmas and propositions he could not always achieve that mathematical exactitude in every respect, the Reader should remember that this is not to be imputed to the author but to the subject matter he treats. For as the Philosopher most rightly teaches, [one must not demand the same precision in all inquiries].

There is also another thing that may perhaps somewhat offend delicate ears: the **citation of certain apocryphal or plainly spurious books** — such as the *Secret of Secrets* attributed to Aristotle, the *Cow of Plato*, Ovid's little book *On the Old Woman*, the *Poimandres* of Hermes, and other rubbish of this kind. But this must surely be forgiven to the great virtues of our Bradwardine, and indeed to the times themselves — for that age was the least critical of all. Add to this that he himself more than once calls into question the reliability of these books.

If anyone should have enough leisure from his own affairs to inspect the passages cited throughout from the Fathers and correct them from the sources, and to shed light on the passages drawn from Aristotle and Plato — either by appending the Greek or by supplying another somewhat more tolerable translation — he would indeed render a good and useful service to our Bradwardine, and certainly earn great gratitude from his studious readers. But let that be the concern of those who will publish this work anew; let it be enough for me, at this advancing age, to have faithfully not begrudged to posterity such a Bradwardine as we found him in the manuscript codices.

Now, to touch briefly on his **civil and public life**: after holding the office of Proctor in the University of Oxford, and (if we believe Bale) administering the dignity of supreme Chancellor there with great praise, after a theological professorship at Oxford for many years, he attached himself to **Richard de Bury**, Bishop of Durham — easily the most learned man of that age, and a singular patron of all learned men, who (as he himself testifies in a little book he published entitled *Philobiblon*) was carried away by a certain mad love of collecting books from everywhere, as that age allowed. In this man's household, as I said, Bradwardine lived for some time, together with seven others largely from the Merton fellowship — men of the greatest

genius and the greatest learning. On this matter it will be worthwhile to hear the words of the Durham history, most worthy of record for more than one reason:

"He [Richard de Bury, Bishop of Durham] always had many clerks in his retinue, among whom were Thomas Bradwardine, afterward Bishop of Canterbury; Richard FitzRalph, afterward Archbishop of Armagh; Walter Burley; John Mauduit; Robert Holcot; Richard Kilwington (alias Kilmington) — all Doctors of Theology; Richard Bentworth, afterward Bishop of London; and Walter Seagrave, afterward Bishop of Chichester. And every day at table he was accustomed to have a reading, unless it was prevented by the arrival of magnates; and after dinner every day, a disputation with the aforementioned clerks, unless a greater cause prevented it."

Our Bradwardine was then made **Chancellor of London** (which perhaps gave occasion to Bale's error), and was of such integrity and innocence that to this not exactly rich benefice he scarcely and reluctantly allowed a Lincoln canonry to be added. At which time, not for his learning alone but much more for the holiness of his character and life, he was chosen by Archbishop Stratford of Canterbury to be **confessor** to King Edward the Third. Accompanying the King constantly in the French war — which was waged with such great resources of two most powerful kings, with such spirit, and with such variety of events, things generally inclining toward the English — he so tempered the King's spirits, fierce with victories, and restrained military insolence by frequently preaching before the army with such prudence and gentleness of words, that there were not lacking among the writers of those times those who thought that those famous victories of Edward should be attributed to this man's sanctity and virtues rather than to anyone's either courage or prudence.

After the death of Stratford, the monks of Canterbury postulated our Thomas as **Archbishop** — but this postulation was in vain, King Edward refusing to release such a man from his retinue. But when John Ufford was nominated and immediately died, and the monks had postulated Bradwardine by a repeated election, with the King's consent and the Pope's, by the supreme agreement of all orders, without canvassing and with no one dissenting — which was rare in those times — he was declared Archbishop and consecrated in the Church of the Friars Minor at Avignon. There, since he did not well know the manners of the Curia — a man who had spent his life from youth in the schools and in military camps — he was mocked by those foppish courtiers, though not without the displeasure of grave and modest men, as a rustic.

After his consecration, returning home, he had his temporalities restored and did fealty to the King in the customary manner, as is evident from the records of August 22, 1349, in the 23rd year of Edward III. He survived not many weeks thereafter, **dying at Lambeth** in the following October, without having completed the enthronement ceremonies — a man most worthy of a longer life, whether we regard the uprightness of his character or his learning, singular for that age.

PREFACE OF THOMAS DE BRADWARDINE, CHANCELLOR OF LONDON, TO THE THREE BOOKS ON THE CAUSE OF GOD AGAINST PELAGIUS, AND ON THE POWER OF CAUSES.

I am unceasingly solicited by the accumulated requests and repeated petitions of many great men to commit to an enduring written record what I recently set forth in a passing voice while doing battle in the scholastic camps on the cause of God against Pelagius and on the power of causes. But without doubt, just as God's friends in God's cause urge me forward and encourage me to undertake this, so the friends of Pelagius — far more numerous than the former — call me back and deter me.

For behold — and I report this only because I am touched with grief of heart within — just as of old against one single Prophet of God, 850 prophets of Baal and the like were found, to whom an innumerable people adhered, so also today in this cause. How many, O Lord, today fight with Pelagius for free will against Your gratuitous grace, and against Paul, the spiritual champion of grace! How many also today disdain Your gratuitous grace, and protest that free will alone suffices for salvation! Or if they use grace, they pretend perfunctorily that it is necessary, and boast that they merit it by the powers of their own free will — so that it may seem at least not freely given but sold! How many also, O omnipotent God, presumptuously trusting in the power of their own will, refuse the help of Your cooperation in their works, saying with the wicked: "Depart from us"! How many furthermore, O Lord, exalting the freedom of their own will, flee from Your service! Or if they confess at least with their lips that You cooperate with them, with those proud and hateful citizens of Yours of old, they refuse to have You reign over them — indeed, more proud than Lucifer, not content with equality with You, they most shamelessly strive to reign over You, the King of Kings! For they do not shrink from asserting that in their common action, their will goes before as mistress and Yours follows as handmaid; that they go before as lords and You follow as a servant; that they command as kings and You obey as a subject. Indeed, they attribute to their own will in contingent future things every kind of freedom — to such an extent that even against the prophetic voice they claim exemption from Your subjection, and endeavor to cast down Your most free, most omnipotent, and most immutable will, when these things shall have passed into the past, from the supreme citadel of its ancient freedom and to subject it to the irreparable servitude of a novel necessity.

O Lord my God, only with groaning do I recall how many and how great lawless judges plot to absolve and reconcile the pestilent Pelagians, long ago condemned and banished from the borders of the whole Church! How many swollen advocates shout on their behalf! How many unconscionable proctors manage their case! How many furthermore, O Lord, not having artificial arguments, turn to inartificial ones, and to exalt the Pelagians' side at least with clamors, horrible insults, abuse, laughter, and gestures, strive to depress Your side! And how many and how innumerable favor them! For nearly the whole world has gone after Pelagius into error.

Arise therefore, O Lord, judge Your own cause, and sustain the one who sustains You; protect, strengthen, and console him. For You know that I have undertaken so great a cause — I, so small — trusting not in my own strength but in Yours.

But as I was supplicating and praying thus for a long time and anxiously, behold recently, in the silence of a certain night, after I had poured out my heart before the Lord, falling asleep I learned and found that He is the one who after the tempest makes calm, and after weeping pours in exultation, and is near to all who call upon Him truly.

For I seemed to see myself, surrounded by the light of day, lifted up far above the earth into the air, and thus proceeding fearlessly from the east toward the western parts, ascending. And Pelagius, coming from the opposite direction, seized my left hand and interlocked his fingers with mine, and tried with all his violence to drag me down to the earth. And I, girded with confidence in my own strength, resisted him greatly, and such a struggle, not a little anxious, lasted for a long time. But with Pelagius continually prevailing and almost dragging me down to the lowest depths, I received in myself the answer of despair. Yet resisting with all my might, I fled to divine help with my whole heart — and immediately Pelagius, his hand released, was thrust headlong down, and with broken neck fell upon the earth, and with closed eyes lay dead on his back. But I remained above the earth, ascending and proceeding in the air as before, rejoicing more pleasantly and marveling.

Hence, strengthened by the spirit of fortitude, I drew hope that I — Christ's little one — would triumph over the proud Pelagius, the pestilent prince of the Pelagians (and therefore over his entire army): not I, however, but his grace with me — though I labored with it according to my powers. For it is not my cause, nor my war, but God's — the Lord of knowledge, of hosts, and of powers — and I under Him sustain His side. From whose faces, then, from whose assaults, from whose furies or terrors shall I tremble, fortified by the most secure protection of so great a Patron? Wherefore let whoever is the Lord's join himself to me — indeed not to me, but let us both be joined to the Lord; let us stand together — who shall stand against us? For I know that one man, with whom the Lord is, will pursue a thousand adversaries, and two will put ten thousand to flight.

Moreover, just as the ancient Pelagians, puffed up with the windy name of secular learning, despised the theological court and demanded the philosophical one, so also the moderns. For I have heard certain advocates of Pelagius — though far advanced in sacred studies — affirming that Pelagius could never be refuted by natural and philosophical reason, but was barely argued against somehow by certain rather bare theological authorities, and chiefly by the authority of the Church, which did not please the grandees.

For this reason I resolved to reform them through philosophical reasons and authorities.

And because furthermore all Pelagians commonly, both old and new, strive to pervert the canonical Scriptures and the writings of the Catholic Doctors to the ruin of their own perversity, I thought it right to elucidate more sincerely a solid understanding of the same. And because they

come in immoderate multitudes and try to overwhelm God's side, I resolved to restrain them with a great throng of God's witnesses, lest I too should seem solitary against so many beasts — especially in a cause so uncertain and sublime.

And who could accomplish this in a few words? For in how many volumes have the holy Fathers cut down the forest of Pelagian heresies! And how many poisonous shoots from the old roots still multiply and grow afresh! For as it was anciently, so it is now.

For first, when their Heresiarch Lucifer — refusing to be subject to God, but wishing to be co-equal — was cast down by Michael, there arose **Cain**, thinking that the sinner is by no means justified freely by God through grace freely given, but through antecedent merit. When he was struck down by divine vengeance, there arose **Nimrod** — who, as Josephus recounts, persuaded men that they should by no means ascribe to God the fact that happiness befell them, but that this was furnished to them by their own power, and that they should place their hope in their own strength, not in God. The multitude too was inclined to obey his commands, regarding service to God as a heavy servitude. And so he drew men away from the fear of God, made them arrogant, and brought them to injury and contempt of God and to tyranny.

When his sacrilegious presumption was checked by Abraham the Patriarch, there arose those **vain and grandiose speakers** who thought that their lips and words were their own, and therefore disdained to have God as lord. Their children, the **Sadducees**, according to Josephus, seem to affirm that good and evil are set before men's choice, and that each chooses this or that by his own will, without God. When these were corrected by the Prophet, there arose certain **Hebrew, Greek, and Roman Christians** who said they had received the grace of faith by their own merits. When these were refuted by the Apostle, there arose **Pelagius the Briton**, who waged proud wars against the grace of God and His help. When he was condemned by the Catholic Fathers, **Julian and Celestius** renewed the same heresy — which, extinguished by the orthodox Fathers, was raised again by **Cassian**, whom Prosper successfully chastised.

But around the same time the same heresy began to sprout most widely in Britain. On account of which — as the Venerable Bede in his *Ecclesiastical History of the English People* and Henry of Huntingdon in his *History of the English* relate — **Germanus of Auxerre** and **Lupus of Troyes**, bishops, crossed the ocean (despite the demons stirring up a most savage storm at sea) and vigorously demolished it with arguments not only vocal but also real — namely with manifest miracles. But behold, shortly afterward the pestilent shoots of the heresy already cut down grew green again, as the same chroniclers recorded — and the same Germanus and **Severus**, Bishop of Trier, coming to Britain, took care to cut them down again. Still before and after the passage of time, the diligence of the Roman See purged Scotland, infected with the remnants of this pest, with salutary letters — as the same Venerable Bede attests. Saint Prosper also mentions these things.

And although this barren fig tree has been cut down so many times, uprooted so many times, burned, incinerated, and trampled to nothing so many times — how broadly and densely it still

does not cease to germinate, and to propagate its vicious suckers, the more subtly than before, the more dangerously!

Burning with zeal, therefore, for the cause of God, knowing what I do, I put my hand into a terrible flame. For I am not ignorant how the pestilent Pelagians will bark against me with seething spirit and tumultuous clamors, and will endeavor to tear this little paper with savage teeth — and those especially are accustomed to criticize others' work most freely who have produced nothing of their own.

But did not the Chaldeans and Mesopotamians rise up against Abraham for this cause, as Josephus reports? Did not the ancient true Prophets suffer very many things from the pseudo-prophets for the cause of God? Did not certain unlearned men charge the most learned Paul with madness, and distort his illustrious Epistles? Did not Julian, Pelagius's pupil, snarl at the most glorious Augustine — imitator of the Apostle and most valiant defender against the ungrateful Pelagians against grace — even while he was still living, with how many many accusations, and boasted that he would winnow his books and lay bare and pierce the impiety of his opinions? Did not other defenders of Pelagius in Gaul, after Augustine had passed from death to life, presume to criticize the same man's writings? And who or what manner of man am I? I know that I am not better than such great Fathers of mine, nor greater than my Lord. **Nevertheless, with all my heart I always desire a just corrector** — not the oil of the sinner — who mercifully rebuking, persecutes not the person but the vice, not the man but the error. For this is what I would wish, and I believe I do, for myself and for others — God is my witness.

Furthermore, whoever wishes to treat this one cause thoroughly, it seems necessary that, beginning from a higher point, he should discourse carefully on the power of all causes. But considering my own measure, I am greatly deterred by the inaccessible sublimity of these matters, the impenetrable depth, the impassable immensity, and the inextricable difficulty.

Is it not regarded among the philosophers as most difficult, and therefore fitting for the wise man alone, to know the causes of things? Wherefore the Poet says:

Happy is he who has been able to know the causes of things.

For to investigate the natural and proximate causes of beings involves no small difficulty and labor. How much more to transcend the whole universe of these causes by the flight of a mind weighed down by the corruption of the body, and to penetrate even to the impenetrable sanctuary of supernatural, most lofty, inaccessible, and invisible causes — and to behold them penetratingly, as it were with the blinking eye of a night-owl — and to elevate others in similar fashion, and to purify their eyes so that they too may similarly contemplate them!

Does not this inquiry involve the investigation of the universality of causes, of the one first cause, of the production, preservation, and every action of things; of divine power, knowledge, and will; of foreknowledge and providence; of predestination, election, reprobation, and grace;

of fate, chance, and fortune; of free will, merit, and sin; of the necessity or contingency of future things — with so many and such great dependent and emergent anxieties?

This theory, therefore, comprehends the more recondite mysteries of all Logic, Physics, Astronomy, Ethics, and Metaphysics or divine science. Here also is the most debated problem of all nations and languages, degrees, sexes, and persons — from whose noisy ventilation not even the unlearned, nor even the old woman, restrains herself.

Let your discretion consider, I beg, how perfunctorily all those glorious Philosophers scarcely greeted from the threshold this so talkative Muse. Wherefore Wisdom herself, responding to a certain pupil of hers who was anxiously inquiring about these things, said: "You call me to a matter the greatest of all in seeking, for which scarcely anything exhausted is enough."

Did not the Prophets, seeing most clearly the excellence of certain of these secrets, with dazzled gaze marvel at them as though bleary-eyed and unknowing, and therefore complaining? Did not he whose like was not on earth, not explaining but complainingly wondering at one small article of divine providence, say: "Bear with me, that I too may speak; and after my words, if it seems good, laugh. Is my disputation against a man, so that I should not rightly be saddened? Attend to me and be astonished, and place your finger upon your mouth. For when I remember, I am afraid, and trembling seizes my flesh: why do the wicked live, are they elevated and strengthened with riches?" (Job 21).

Did not he who was found after God's own heart, who rejoiced that he understood above all who taught him, even above the elders — did he not, being zealous over the prosperity of sinners, with feet almost moved and steps nearly spilled, conclude that he had justified his heart in vain and castigated himself uselessly — and immediately rebuking himself for this, because he would thus condemn God's children, added that he had tried to understand, but that this was labor, until entering the sanctuary of God he might there attain understanding? (Psalm 72)

Did not that beloved of the Lord who surpassed all in wisdom complain greatly that all things happen equally to the just and the unjust, and declare this to be the worst of all things — indeed, judging it most vain that the just are shaken by adversities as though they were wicked, and the wicked are fostered by prosperity as though they were just — and profess that man, even a wise one, can attain no reason for all the works of God? (Ecclesiastes)

Did not that Apostle, that most brilliant vessel of election and so great a secretary of God — who was even caught up to the third heaven and made privy to divine secrets — searching a certain gulf of this abyss, swallowed up by its depth, cry out: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and how unsearchable His ways!" (Romans 11)

Here, then, is the infinite Chaos of Anaxagoras; here the inextricable Labyrinth of Daedalus; here the monstrous miracle of the Hydra — indeed a thing more monstrous than the Hydra. For in the Hydra, when one head was cut off, three immediately grew back; but here, as both experience

and Wisdom attest, when one doubt is cut away, innumerable others are born. Who, then, will unravel so many and such sinuous involutions of things in a brief volume?

Is not this also the place which the wise call "the Fall of the Wise"? Are not the perils of Charybdis and Scylla here to be dreaded by anyone? For how many, desiring to pass by Charybdis, have struck upon torn Scylla! And how many, seeking to avoid Scylla, have fallen into the whirlpool of Charybdis! Who then will presume to navigate safely through the middle?

But I know what I shall do: **I shall commit myself to that ship which cannot perish — the ship of Peter.** For in it our one Author and Master, Christ, sitting most securely, is recorded as having taught — mystically indicating to us that with Peter's little boat, with the Roman Church, the authority and mastery of all Christian doctrine would remain.

To the judgment of this so authoritative and great mistress, therefore, I fully subject and entirely submit myself and all my writings, written or to be written. And I most urgently beg with all my vows for her protection, where I have fought against God's enemies; her correction, where I have erred; her approbation, where I have judged rightly.

Against all these difficulties, each and every one, that strong Helper sweetly encourages me, with whom no word is impossible or difficult. For I know, O Lord God, I know that You do not despise, desert, or abandon those who sustain You; but You sustain, teach, cherish, surround, strengthen, and confirm them. Trusting therefore in this confidence, I take up Your cause, about to serve continually under Your most unconquerable standards.

For those who deign to inspect this little work: concerning the citations of Aristotle's text, it should be noted that where Averroes expounds by commentary, the citation follows his divisions and sections of the commentaries; but elsewhere it follows the divisions of chapters customary among others.

CHAPTERS OF THE FIRST BOOK

CHAPTER I. First, he sets forth two suppositions: the first is that God is supremely perfect and supremely good, to such a degree that nothing more perfect or better can exist. The second is that there is no infinite regress in beings, but in every genus there is one first.

COROLLARY

Part I. It has a moral corollary containing 40 parts, against 40 errors, the first of which is against Protagoras, who doubted that God exists.

II. Against Diagoras and the fool who deny that God exists.

III. Against those who doubt or deny that God really, equivalently, or supereminently possesses every virtue and every goodness, and universally whatever it is better to have than not to have; and that He is good in every way and in every manner, and possesses every kind of goodness that it is better to be and to have than not to be and not to have; and that He possesses no vice or wickedness; and universally does not possess anything that it is better not to have than to have, nor possesses anything in any manner such that not having it would be better than having it, nor possesses anything in vain or superfluously; and that He is always supremely happy, blessed, and actual or in act, so that nothing happier, more blessed, or more actual could exist.

IV. Against those who deny that God is of absolutely infinite virtue and goodness.

V. Against those who say that God does not fully suffice for Himself but needs another.

VI. Against those who believe that God is not necessarily but contingently supremely perfect and God; and that He is mutable, susceptible to anger, appeasable, capable of sadness, joy, or any other new passion; and who hold that "God" is an accidental and not an absolutely essential name.

VII. Against those who deny that God is omnipotent actively, and incapable of being acted upon passively—that is, that He cannot suffer anything from another.

VIII. Against those who hold that God is not a rational substance and power, having intellect and free will, actually knowing and willing; and who think that the divine will is not universally efficacious—that is, not capable of being impeded, frustrated, or deficient in any way.

IX. Against those who believe that God is ignorant of something.

X. Against those who imagine that God is composed of human limbs or any other diverse parts, and who deny that He is the simplest substance, utterly indivisible, having no composition, divisibility, or magnitude—that is, bodily magnitude.

XI. Against the Sabians and their wise men who worship the heavens as God.

XII. Against worshippers of the Sun or Moon, Mars or Jupiter, or any celestial sign or signs, and universally of any part of the sky.

XIII. Against those who fabricate temporal gods for themselves—humans, animals, trees, fire, or any such thing.

XIV. Against the foolish triflers who worship a burdensome multitude of equal gods of the same species or nature.

XV. Against those who imagine many equal gods, differing in nature or species.

XVI. Against those who posit a confusion of many gods of unequal power and disparate dignity, whether of the same or different species.

XVII. Against those who deny that God is one and not many, or who affirm it is possible for there to be many; and who deny that it is absolutely necessary for there to be one and not more, or who affirm it is possible for there to be more.

XVIII. Against those who posit many first principles absolutely contrary to one another, of which none is reducible to another, nor all to something common to them—for example, good and evil—and who consequently dream further of two or more such gods.

XIX. Against the poets who falsely claim that God envies studious or other men.

XX. Against those who fabricate indecent and base gods—eating, drinking, consorting with women, delighting in dishonest, base, and theatrical affairs or games.

XXI. Against idolaters.

XXII. Against the Arians.

XXIII. Against the Donatists.

XXIV. Against the Sabellians.

XXV. Against those who do not distinguish, but simply concede that God is of infinite virtue and infinite power, even intensively.

XXVI. Against the painters of God who depict Him with various qualities, attributes, habits, or accidental acts really diverse from Him, or with any accidents whatsoever.

XXVII. Against despair, whether from the greatness or from the multitude of sins.

XXVIII. Against the Cainites who believe that God admits no sinner to the grace of reconciliation unless he has first made satisfaction by meriting as much or more than he sinned.

XXIX. Against the Pelagians or Cainites who imagine that God gives no benefit freely to anyone, but only for preceding merit.

XXX. Against those unskilled in the art of loving, who do not know that God is to be loved for His own sake, and all other things for God's sake, and that all human acts are to be finally ordered toward Him for His own sake, and that He is to be loved above all things; and who think that a man, for the sake of gaining or preserving however many goods, or of removing however many penal evils already possessed, or of guarding against those not yet possessed—being able not to do these things—ought not, at least knowingly, to do anything, even the slightest thing, against God, against a divine command, against a divine prohibition, offending Him even in the slightest way, against the rule of conscience divinely instituted, or to sin knowingly to any degree however small.

XXXI. Against the unbridled who say that all things happen equally to the good and the wicked; that some evil goes unpunished or some good unrewarded; and who falsely claim that God

punishes someone abundantly—namely beyond what is deserved, or even to what is deserved—and rewards someone sparingly—namely less than deserved, or not beyond what is deserved; and who also imagine that it is never fitting for God's infinite pity and mercy to punish any offense, but always to mercifully leave everything unpunished.

XXXII. Against the philosophers who presume to be able to know God fully and His every action; who therefore mock Christians for believing certain things about God and His wondrous actions, and about the actions of creatures by divine power, which they cannot demonstrate by the way of human reason.

XXXIII. Against the philosophers who deny the possibility of creation, annihilation, and re-creation.

XXXIV. Against the philosophers who deny the possibility of the creation of the world.

XXXV. Against the philosophers and heretics who deny the possibility of the conception and birth from a Virgin, and who say that Christ was in no way born of holy Mary, ever Virgin.

XXXVI. Against the Epicureans and Sadducees who say that no spirit exists, and who irrationally deny the immortality of the rational soul; and against Averroes, who asserts that all men have a single rational soul.

XXXVII. Against the philosophers who deny that the motion of the heavens and the generation of human beings can cease, that the dead can rise again with their own bodies, that the good can ascend to heaven and the wicked descend to hell, and that both can live thus for eternity.

XXXVIII. Against the philosophers and heretics who deny that temporal merit can reasonably be rewarded with an everlasting reward, or that temporal sin can justly be punished with eternal punishment.

XXXIX. Against the philosophers and heretics who deny that there will be a future resurrection of the dead to a blessed or miserable life according to the difference of merits; and who concede that it will happen, either immediately after death or after the space of a great year, in bestial or human bodies, alien or one's own, for a temporal worldly life customary to beasts or humans, lasting through the usual period; and who believe that universally all the dead, both good and evil, will rise to everlasting life and blessedness, and none to everlasting punishment and misery; and who think the good will possess eternal blessedness, but not in heaven, and the wicked will have eternal misery, but not in hell, but that both will remain together on earth; and who say furthermore that the bodies of the good will in no way be transformed to a better, purer, and more heavenly condition in the future blessedness, nor will they then be immortal, but will remain in their former state; and that the bodies of the wicked living in eternal torments will by no means endure eternally; and who shamelessly imagine that the eternal happiness of the good will consist in the customary pleasures of the flesh, or in something or some things other than God.

XL. Against Aristotle, who asserts that the world had no temporal beginning, was not created, that the generation of human beings will not be terminated, and that the world or the present state of the world will never come to an end. Also against Anaximander, Plato, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the vain talkers of the Moors on the same subject.

CHAPTER II. That God is the necessary preserver of all other things. It has a corollary with three parts.

COROLLARY

I. That no created thing suffices to preserve another.

II. That it is necessary for God to preserve every creature through Himself and immediately.

III. That it is necessary for God to preserve every creature more immediately than any created cause.

CHAPTER III. That God is the necessary efficient cause of every thing made. It has a corollary with three parts.

COROLLARY

I. That nothing can make anything without God.

II. That nothing can make anything unless God Himself immediately makes that same thing.

III. That nothing can make anything unless God makes that same thing more immediately than any other maker.

CHAPTER IV. That whenever any creature moves, God necessarily co-moves. It has a corollary of four parts.

COROLLARY

I. That nothing can move anything without God Himself properly co-moving the same thing.

II. That nothing can move anything without God immediately moving the same thing.

III. That nothing can move anything without God moving the same thing more immediately than any other mover.

IV. That no proposition attributing anything created to any secondary cause is absolutely immediate.

CHAPTER V. That God is not mutable in any way. It has a corollary of five parts.

COROLLARY

I. That God essentially and presentially is necessarily everywhere, not only in the world and in all its parts,

II. But also outside the world in the infinite imaginary space or void.

III. Whence He can truly be called immense and uncircumscribed.

IV. Whence the answer to the ancient questions of the Gentiles and heretics seems clear: "Where is your God?" and "Where was God before the world?"

V. Whence it is likewise clearly evident that a void of body can exist, but a void of God, never.

CHAPTER VI. That God has distinct knowledge of all things. It has a corollary: That God has distinct knowledge of all things—not only present, past, and future, but also of all things possible and impossible, imaginable and knowable in any way; whence He can truly be called omniscient, just as He can be called omnipotent.

CHAPTER VII. He objects against the sixth chapter and resolves the objection.

CHAPTER VIII. That God has volition and love both generally and specifically toward all things.

CHAPTER IX. That the divine will is the efficient cause of every thing made, the mover or moving principle of every motion, and universally the most loving mother of all things, nurse, and life-giving preserver. It has a corollary: That all things that have been made were made by the divine will, and all things that will be made will be made by it.

CHAPTER X. That the divine will is universally efficacious, insuperable, and necessary in causing; not capable of being impeded or frustrated in any way. It has a corollary: That when God wills to make or bring about something, through Himself or through any other thing in any way, it necessarily follows that it comes about in that way; nor does He, in our manner of striving, apply other forces; nor is there in Him, beyond the intellect dictating and the will consenting, any other executive power to be posited; nor does He stand differently when acting than when resting; and that the divine will is the first free principle.

CHAPTER XI. That the first necessary and true simple principle is God; and that the first complex principle is absolutely about God—namely, "God exists," "God knows all things," "God wills all things," or something similar.

CHAPTER XII. He shows what that first principle is like—namely, that it is affirmative—and that it is "God exists" or "God is God."

CHAPTER XIII. From these premises he infers, as corollaries, twelve parts:

I. That act is absolutely prior to potency.

II. That being is absolutely prior to non-being.

III. That the necessary is prior to the possible of contradiction.

IV. That the necessary is prior to the impossible.

V. That pure necessary being, or pure necessity, is absolutely prior to everything else, and is the first root and primary foundation of all other things.

VI. That the first complex principle is supremely and purely necessary and firm.

VII. That the necessary is in no way rightly defined through the possible or through the impossible.

VIII. That necessary being cannot be absolutely defined.

IX. That an affirmative proposition is prior to every negative, and that every true negative is reduced to another prior affirmative which is the cause of its truth.

X. That the first cause of every true negation is in God.

XI. That God is the first cause of every non-being.

XII. That the first cause of every impossibility and incompatibility is in God.

CHAPTER XIV. That the divine will is the cause of every future and past thing being such as it is. And it has a corollary: If God ceased to exist, nothing would be past or future, true or false, possible or impossible, necessary or contingent, nor could anything be. From this the opposite evidently follows—namely, that God Himself, and thus something, has existed before, exists now, and will exist. Oh, how necessary is this being, whom it is so impossible ever to cease to be! And that for God in any way not to exist most necessarily contains and implies a contradiction; and that "necessary being" seems to be the most proper name of God.

CHAPTER XV. That the things known are not the causes of divine knowledge.

CHAPTER XVI. Against certain people who say that the things known are a *sine qua non* cause of divine knowledge, but not a true cause.

CHAPTER XVII. He distinguishes the objects of divine knowledge: some in a certain way precede His knowledge, and some follow from it. He shows that the latter are in some way the cause of divine knowledge, the former never. And it has a corollary: that divine knowledge, which is His simple awareness, is truly the cause of every thing made—not merely a *sine qua non* cause.

CHAPTER XVIII. He distinguishes divine knowledge into what is in a certain way simple and complex; he likewise distinguishes complex knowables into those that are in a certain way prior to and those posterior to the divine will; and he shows that the former are in some way the cause of divine complex knowledge, but the latter in no way—rather, God knows those through His will.

CHAPTER XIX. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER XX. He likewise distinguishes the objects of volition into those prior to and those posterior to the divine will, and shows that the posterior objects of volition are not the cause of divine volition, nor a *sine qua non* cause; and that the prior objects of volition are in some way a cause of it.

CHAPTER XXI. He objects and responds, and distinguishes the reasonable and the just into what is prior to the divine will, what is posterior, and what is mixed.

CHAPTER XXII. That God has an actual, distinct volition or nolition toward every object of the will. And it has a corollary: That God wills every truth and does not positively will—that is, rejects—every falsehood. Second, that if God wills any antecedent, He wills whatever follows from it, and does not positively will anything incompatible with it. Third, that of any pair of incompatible things, He has a willing of one and an unwilling of the other. That from God's willing anything, it follows that He does not will its opposite, and conversely, that from God's not willing anything—whether affirmatively or negatively signified—it follows that He wills its opposite. That from God's not being unwilling of anything, it follows that He does not will its opposite. That from God's positively not willing anything, it follows that He also privatively does not will it, and likewise conversely. That whatever is in any way, God wills it to be so; and whatever in any way is not, God does not will it to be so.

CHAPTER XXIII. That both God's knowledge and His will are entirely immutable. And it has a corollary: That God newly loves or hates no one, nor more or less at one time than another; nor do prayers or any good or evil merits bend or change the divine will in the least, this way or that; and that everyone to be saved or damned, rewarded or punished, under whatever degree, He willed from eternity to be saved or damned, rewarded or punished, under that very same degree; and this not only by a conditional or indeterminate will, but by one as absolute and determinate as He wills in the present or final judgment, or will will thereafter.

CHAPTER XXIV. He objects against the immutability of divine knowledge and responds.

CHAPTER XXV. He objects against the immutability of the divine will and resolves the objection.

CHAPTER XXVI. That the entire universe of things is good, and no thing is evil in itself. And it has a corollary: That good and evil in itself, or goodness and pure wickedness, are not contraries but privatively opposed.

CHAPTER XXVII. That all things come about from divine providence.

CHAPTER XXVIII. On fate.

CHAPTER XXIX. On chance and fortune.

CHAPTER XXX. That voluntary things are governed by the laws of divine providence.

CHAPTER XXXI. That voluntary actions are subject to divine providence.

CHAPTER XXXII. That all things come about from God's providence actually disposing, not merely permitting.

CHAPTER XXXIII. That wherever there is God's permission, there is also His actual volition.

CHAPTER XXXIV. Whether and how God wills and does not will sin.

CHAPTER XXXV. Against Pelagius: that grace is given freely by God, not acquired by preceding merits. And it has a corollary against Cassian, who takes a middle position, saying that God gives His grace freely to some without preceding merit, but to others only if they first merit to receive it; and therefore that no servant of mortal sin can be freed by his own powers alone.

CHAPTER XXXVI. Against the agents of Pelagius who assert that even if merits are not the principal cause of the conferral of grace, they are nevertheless a *sine qua non* cause.

CHAPTER XXXVII. Against certain Pelagians who say that a man can from himself alone prepare adequately, and if he does, God will give him His grace freely.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. Against certain Pelagians who say that God anticipates man in the conferral of grace by knocking, and man brings about the acceptance of grace by opening and consenting—from himself alone, however, to the one knocking—and thus in a way merits it.

CHAPTER XXXIX. Against those who think a man from himself alone can merit the first grace *de congruo*, though not *de condigno*. And it has a corollary against certain other very recent defenders of Pelagius, who imagine that although a man can in no way merit the first grace, he can nevertheless obtain it by his own powers alone.

CHAPTER XL. That grace, which is a habit freely given by God, together with the human will, is the proper efficient cause of every good and meritorious act of that will.

CHAPTER XLI. That grace, prior by nature, produces good acts before the human will does. And it has a corollary: That both God and His created grace properly produce, prior by nature, every good act of a rational creature before the creature itself does; and that authors who say God does our good works do not exclude, but include, God's grace likewise doing them; and those who say God's grace does our good works do not exclude, but include, God Himself likewise working them.

CHAPTER XLII. That God, prior by nature, produces every good act of a created will before grace does. And it has a corollary: That God, and the Holy Spirit, is said in a certain way to be the charity and the grace by which not only God loves Himself and man charitably and freely, but also by which man likewise loves God and neighbor.

CHAPTER XLIII. On salvific penance according to various opinions, and on the power of the keys. And it has a corollary: That something is prior in nature, or naturally prior, to another which is the cause of that other—something from which a consequence of existence holds to the other and not conversely—is prior to it in nature. Therefore, not everything from which a

consequence of existence does not convert is prior in nature, but rather prior in superiority or universality according to consequence, or in any other such manner; and not everything that is prior to another in nature can exist without it; nor is everything that can exist without another, and not conversely, prior to it in nature, but in some other manner already mentioned—unless perhaps "prior in nature" is said equivocally in three senses.

CHAPTER XLIV. On predestination according to the meaning of the term.

CHAPTER XLV. That predestination is truly to be affirmed; what it is; in how many ways it is spoken of; that it is not on account of works but according to God's gratuitous will. And it has a corollary: That no one is predestined or reprobated on account of works that he would do if he lived longer; nor is anyone saved or damned on account of works.

CHAPTER XLVI. Against certain people who concede predestination and reprobation to glory and to punishment, but deny that these are to any definite degrees. And it has a corollary: That all degrees of graces, merits, prosperities, adversities, glory, and punishment—in the present and in the future alike—are predestined by God eternally and distinctly.

CHAPTER XLVII. He objects and responds.

CHAPTERS OF THE SECOND BOOK

CHAPTER I. That free will exists, and what it is.

CHAPTER II. On the act of free will and its object. And it has a corollary: That free will is not so called because it can freely will and not-will anything whatsoever, but because it can freely will whatever is a suitable object of its willing, and not-will whatever is a suitable object of its not-willing.

CHAPTER III. That no inferior cause can necessitate a created will to its rational and free act for merit properly speaking, or for sin. And it has a corollary: That the will of a rational creature is not merely passive but active; and that a will most sufficiently disposed by secondary causes to act can at one time not act and at other times perform its free act; therefore, when unequal goods are proposed to the will, it does not necessarily will the greater; indeed, when an honest good and a dishonorable but very delightful or useful evil are proposed, it can knowingly neglect the good and choose the evil. Therefore, with right reason in the intellect, error is possible in the affection. Also, that the irrational appetite does not necessitate a man to act; that the heavenly bodies do not necessitate the will; that the Devil does not necessitate the will; and that no temptation necessitates the will. However, pure evil presented to the will does necessitate it to not-willing, and pure good to not hating positively—that is, to not hating it—and the will by natural necessity necessarily cannot do these things. Here it is also consequently shown that it would perhaps be very fitting and most expedient for theologians and perfect Catholics not to be ignorant of astrology and other such sciences.

CHAPTER IV. That free will, when tempted, cannot by its own powers, without God's help and His grace, overcome any temptation.

CHAPTER V. That free will, even supported by however great a created grace, without another special help from God, cannot overcome any temptation.

CHAPTER VI. That this special help from God is His unconquerable will.

CHAPTER VII. That no one who is not tempted can, by the powers of free will alone, without grace, or with however great a created grace without another special help from God, avoid any sin. And it has a corollary: That the divine will, just as it preserves the tempted from falling, so also it preserves the untempted both from temptation and from sin.

CHAPTER VIII. On perseverance: what it is, and that no wayfarer, however supported by created grace, can, by the powers of free will alone, or even with the help of grace, persevere finally without another special help from God. And it has a corollary: That no wayfarer, by the powers of free will alone, or of grace, or of both together, without another special help from God, can persevere for any period of time at all.

CHAPTER IX. That neither man nor angel, with however great a grace before the fall, could persevere finally or for a time without another special help from God.

CHAPTER X. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER XI. That perseverance is not some created gift of God really different and distinct from charity and grace. And it has a corollary: That the name "perseverance" does not essentially signify any absolute thing, but accidentally and relatively—namely, charity or justice with a relation of future continuous permanence up to the end; and that it could not implausibly be said that perseverance is this very relation.

CHAPTER XII. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER XIII. That the help without which no one perseveres, and through which everyone perseveres, is the Holy Spirit—divine goodness and will.

CHAPTER XIV. That perseverance is given freely by God, not acquired by merits.

CHAPTER XV. On everlasting perseverance—namely, the confirmation of the blessed—and its cause: that it is the eternal charity of God's will.

CHAPTER XVI. On everlasting perseverance, or the obstinacy of the wicked in evil, and its cause.

CHAPTER XVII. That no rational creature can be confirmed or obstinate immutably by nature. And it has a corollary: That no rational creature is or can be immutable, inconvertible, or impeccable by nature.

CHAPTER XVIII. Against certain people who say the act of free will is nothing.

CHAPTER XIX. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER XX. That God is the necessary co-effector of every act of a created will. And it has a corollary: That whatever a created will effects, the uncreated will necessarily co-effects; and whatever the angelic or human will has done, the divine will necessarily cooperates in; and that every act of the created will is wholly effected by the created will, and wholly likewise by the uncreated.

CHAPTER XXI. He recounts six false responses: the first says that God is said to make every act of the created will only because He makes every created will, which alone truly and properly effects its act. The second, that God is said to make the good act of the created will because He makes the charity or grace that effects it. The third, that God preserves the will. The fourth, that God makes the object and all things moving the will. The fifth, that He permits. The sixth, that God properly effects every good act of the will but absolutely no evil act. And he corrects them generally and together.

CHAPTER XXII. He specifically corrects the first of these.

CHAPTER XXIII. The second.

CHAPTER XXIV. The third.

CHAPTER XXV. The fourth.

CHAPTER XXVI. The fifth.

CHAPTER XXVII. The sixth.

CHAPTER XXVIII. He objects against the twentieth chapter and responds.

CHAPTER XXIX. That the uncreated and created wills, in co-effecting the act of the created will, are not co-equal nor coeval in the natural order.

CHAPTER XXX. That in every common action of the uncreated and created wills, the uncreated naturally precedes the created. And it has a threefold principal conclusion: one natural—that in every causation common to God and a secondary cause, God causes prior by nature to the secondary cause; another theological—that God conditionally wills nothing; a third logical—that no proposition attributing any causation to any inferior cause posterior to the divine will, or anything else positive inferior to anything under God, is absolutely first, unless perhaps a proposition is said to be absolutely first by reason of the priority of its subject, not of its cause; however, very many such propositions are first in a qualified sense and in a certain genus.

CHAPTER XXXI. He objects and responds. And it has a notable corollary: That sacred theology requires a pious and prudent reader.

CHAPTER XXXII. That in every instance of non-action common to God and creature, it is naturally prior that God does not act there than that the creature does not; likewise, because God does not perform a certain action through a creature, therefore the creature does not perform it—and not conversely.

CHAPTER XXXIII. He objects and responds. And it has a corollary: That not only do beings need God necessarily for their true being, and non-beings for their non-being, but God most worthily holds sovereignty not only over beings but also over non-beings.

CHAPTER XXXIV. Through the foregoing he draws men toward fear and love, toward trust, patience, and humility, toward prayer and the giving of thanks. And it has a manifold corollary, pleasing to all who are grateful.

CHAPTERS OF THE THIRD BOOK

CHAPTER I. That God can in a certain way necessitate every created will to its free act and to its free cessation and rest from action. And it has a corollary: That a certain kind of necessity and freedom and merit, and also chance and fortune, are not mutually incompatible; and a general statement on the concord of fate, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace with free will and merit.

CHAPTER II. That God in a certain way necessitates every created will to every free act of its own and to every free cessation and rest from action, by a necessity that is naturally prior. And it has a corollary: That a certain kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit are not incompatible; and that no inferior cause, but only the superior one—namely, the will of God—is the antecedent necessity with respect to its effect; and that all things that are, occur, and happen do so from some necessity naturally preceding them.

CHAPTER III. On contingency in either direction according to various opinions, and that it exists.

CHAPTER IV. What contingency in either direction is. And it has a corollary: What the freedom of contradiction is, and what a free act by the freedom of contradiction is.

CHAPTER V. As corollaries from the foregoing, he infers thirteen parts. The first is that propositions about what is equally contingent are converted through opposite qualities.

II. That some valid consequence is not necessary absolutely or as of now, but equally contingent.

III. That some indeterminate cause—that is, one not predetermined to act—does act.

IV. That every and only a free act by the freedom of contradiction is equally contingent.

V. That every and only what is equally contingent is a free act by the freedom of contradiction.

VI. That contingency in either direction and necessity are not incompatible.

VII. That contingency is properly said with respect to the present.

VIII. That freedom is properly said with respect to the present.

IX. That no act of a creature is absolutely equally contingent, but only in an indeterminate genus—namely, with respect to inferior causes.

X. That no act of a creature is free absolutely by the freedom of contradiction, but only in a qualified sense—namely, with respect to all secondary causes.

XI. That only the act of the divine will *ad extra* is absolutely equally contingent.

XII. That only the act of the divine will *ad extra* is free absolutely by the freedom of contradiction.

XIII. That the first and highest freedom of contradiction, and the like contingency in either direction, is in the divine will; and that these are the causes of like freedom and contingency in all other things.

CHAPTER VI. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER VII. He raises the question whether anything is in the power of the created will; and he puts forward one response and corrects it.

CHAPTER VIII. He recounts another six brief responses and amends them.

CHAPTER IX. He responds.

CHAPTER X. He distinguishes concerning necessity and freedom. And it has a corollary: That necessity and freedom and merit are not mutually incompatible, or else they are.

CHAPTER XI. He objects and responds. And it has a corollary: What kind of freedom exists in irrational creatures, and how it differs from and agrees with the freedom of rational beings.

CHAPTER XII. He begins to dispute that most famous question—whether all things that will happen will happen of necessity—and recounts the opinion of the mathematicians or Stoics, who say that all things that will happen will happen of absolute necessity.

CHAPTER XIII. He treats the opinion of Cicero, who says that God does not know the future.

CHAPTER XIV. He treats the opinion which says that many things are future in their own nature, but not with respect to God.

CHAPTER XV. He recounts the fourth opinion of the Sophists, who say that nothing is future.

CHAPTER XVI. He refutes the fifth opinion of the Megarians, who deny all potency regarding future things.

CHAPTER XVII. He corrects the sixth opinion of certain people who think that something is future in either direction or not future in the composite sense, but not the divided sense.

CHAPTER XVIII. He rectifies the seventh opinion which says that something can begin to be future.

CHAPTER XIX. He censures the eighth and ninth opinions, which hold that nothing in the lower world is under divine providence, and that no voluntary or free things are disposed by God's providence.

CHAPTER XX. He corrects the tenth opinion—that God has no volition regarding any effect of the lower world—and the eleventh, that He does not will any voluntary or free effect.

CHAPTER XXI. He refutes the twelfth opinion, which holds that no inferior things are made by God, and the thirteenth, which judges that no voluntary or free things are immediately and properly made by Him.

CHAPTER XXII. He censures the fourteenth opinion—that God does not will anything freely future absolutely, but only conditionally—and the fifteenth, that no evil things, but only good things, are absolutely foreseen, willed, or made by God.

CHAPTER XXIII. He argues against the sixteenth opinion, which holds that God does not will the free act of a creature by an antecedent will, but only by a consequent one, and that God co-effects every free act of a creature with the creature, but posteriorly in the natural order; and the seventeenth, which thinks that although God always in fact acts and pre-acts every act of a creature, it is nevertheless absolutely possible for some creature to act by itself alone.

CHAPTER XXIV. He treats the eighteenth opinion, which says that God's willing and pre-willing is in man's power; and the nineteenth, that it is in man's power to do something from which it follows that God does not will, nor ever willed, nor ever will will, what He nevertheless now wills and always willed to come about; and the twentieth, that as soon as the divine will anticipates the free act of the human will, so immediately can the human will move toward the opposite of that act; and the twenty-first, that when God wills a man to produce a certain future act in a given measure, the man can so dispose himself beforehand that God then does not will this, and therefore he does not have that act; and the twenty-second, that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but is in some way defectible and frustrable; and the twenty-third, that the divine will is not the efficient cause of anything, but only consents to the divine intellect dictating, and some other executive power, posterior and either in God or in secondary causes, effects the things effected; and the twenty-fourth, that although the divine will co-acts and pre-acts every act of the created will, it does this by influencing so weakly that it in no way necessitates the created will to act.

CHAPTER XXV. He touches on the twenty-fifth opinion, which imagines that God does not provide, predestine, will, or bring about the degrees of free acts, merits, or even rewards; and the

twenty-sixth, that no act is anything; and the twenty-seventh, that no non-acting, ceasing, or resting is from God; and the twenty-eighth, that foreknown future things are the cause of God's foreknowledge; and the twenty-ninth, that foreknown future things are a *sine qua non* cause of divine foreknowledge; and the thirtieth, that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode; and the thirty-first, that of the Academics, that no one can search out or know this so deeply hidden miracle of nature, so concealed a secret of God; and the thirty-second, that in all future, present, and past things, with respect to divine knowledge and will, there is always contingency in either direction and freedom, and no necessity at all.

CHAPTER XXVI. He treats the thirty-third opinion, more famous than the others, which affirms that something has always been future and still is future, but it is in no way necessary that it ever was or now is future; and that something never was future nor now is future, and it is possible—with a possibility opposed to all necessity—that it always was and now is future; and correspondingly about God's foreknowledge in every respect. Yet about every past or present thing it says that it is necessary that it was, and that it is necessary that God always foreknew it to be future, or knows it to be now present, and that it is also necessary that God knows it to be past and to have been. And he rebukes this opinion for the insufficiency of its response, because it does not adequately resolve the difficulty.

CHAPTER XXVII. He responds according to the view of the philosophers and theologians: that all future things will happen by a certain necessity with respect to the superior causes, a necessity not contrary to but consonant with freedom.

CHAPTER XXVIII. He recounts one erroneous gloss on the authorities.

CHAPTER XXIX. He objects and responds.

CHAPTER XXX. He argues against it on the falsity of its hypothesis, by a way taken from the necessity and freedom of the divine will, which always necessarily remains uniform and equal.

CHAPTER XXXI. He refutes the same by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge.

CHAPTER XXXII. He reduces the same by way of the immutability of the divine will.

CHAPTER XXXIII. He moves the same by way of revelation in the Word, and sets forth six responses of those who concede revelation in the Word, and argues vigorously against them.

CHAPTER XXXIV. He argues specifically against the first.

CHAPTER XXXV. Against the second.

CHAPTER XXXVI. Against the third.

CHAPTER XXXVII. Against the fourth.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. Against the fifth.

CHAPTER XXXIX. Against the sixth.

CHAPTER XL. He rebukes those who deny revelation in the Word.

CHAPTER XLI. He recounts diverse ways, according to diverse thinkers, of seeing in the Word; and he objects and resolves.

CHAPTER XLII. He further presses the thirty-third opinion and its hypothesis by way of revelation in the proper genus—first concerning the Lord Jesus Christ—and recounts one response which says that Christ could be deceived, and refutes it.

CHAPTER XLIII. He treats another response.

CHAPTER XLIV. He recounts a third response.

CHAPTER XLV. He examines a fourth response.

CHAPTER XLVI. Against the same opinion and hypothesis by way of revelation in the proper genus, concerning pure creatures—namely, angels.

CHAPTER XLVII. Against the same opinion and hypothesis by the same way, concerning pure human beings.

CHAPTER XLVIII. He recounts four responses and corrects them.

CHAPTER XLIX. He recounts a twofold opinion which says that in revealed future things there is an ordained or absolute necessity, but in others none.

CHAPTER L. He responds according to the view of the philosophers and theologians: that God wills and knows necessarily whatever He wills and knows, by a following necessity of immutability, immobility, stability, and order—not a preceding, absolutely simple, natural, violent, or unwilling necessity; not contrary to but consonant with the highest and greatest freedom. And it has a corollary: That every present act of divine volition and knowledge necessarily, by the aforesaid following necessity, always has been and likewise always will be. Therefore, all things that presently are, occur, or happen, by a similar necessity are, occur, and happen in the present; and all things that will happen, by a similar necessity will happen in the future. Indeed, all things that now occur do so from some preceding necessity; and all things that will happen will happen from some preceding necessity in the future.

CHAPTER LI. On eternity. And it has a corollary: That there is a single, identical, and utterly immutable instant in all eternity, and that all eternity is no more multiple or greater than its instant, nor is the instant of eternity simpler or less than eternity itself; therefore eternity and its instant are really the same. Furthermore, notwithstanding this, eternity is called whole, great, long, and even infinite, and is said to have been, to be, and to be about to be; and something is said to have been, to be, and to be about to be in it. Therefore, concerning God and His intrinsic

act, "was," "is," and "will be" are said metaphorically, but concerning His extrinsic actions, "He did," "He does," and "He will do" are said properly and temporally.

CHAPTER LII. By way of eternity he demonstrates the view set forth in the fiftieth chapter. And it has a corollary of thirty notable parts; and he objects and resolves.

CHAPTER LIII. Against hasty accusers, easy judges, and rash condemners. He sets forth thirty-six propositions that seem to him erroneous, humbly imploring the authority of the Church to determine the truth.

Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei contra Pelagium, et De Virtute Causarum, Ad Suos Mertonenses, Books Three. Published by command of the Most Reverend George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury; through the effort and study of Dr. Henry Savile, Warden of Merton College in the University of Oxford, edited for the first time from manuscript codices. (London: From the Norton press, at John Bill's, 1618.)

PRIOR EPISTLE OF THOMAS DE BRADWARDINE TO HIS MERTONIANS.

To his beloved brothers and friends, the Warden and Scholars of Merton Hall in Oxford — may the Holy Spirit grant His sevenfold grace.

I have found that it has sometimes happened in the treatment of difficult matters that either the incompetence of the reporter corrupts the hearer, or the rashness of the hearer brings disrepute upon the reporter. For this reason it seems to me that we must be equally on guard — especially there where nothing else can be held without danger — that we neither presume to assert too readily, nor rashly judge what belongs to others. I know how many dreams the human heart gives birth to, as Blessed Augustine says, and that by the same judgment by which it errs in the knowledge of itself, it also wrongly suspects all other things that exist for its sake. For what do you think it means that men are accustomed to hold such diverse opinions about the truth of things? Is truth not one? Behold — to say nothing of God for the moment — what is it that dialectic has so many diverse and so contrary, not to say perverse, opinions? Surely not all of them knew the one thing that is, and out of love of deception invented diverse things? I do not think so; rather, each tells his own dreams, and those by whose opinion they were first deceived in themselves, they afterward unwittingly lead others astray. And as Blessed Job says to his friends who were arrogant and presumed of themselves more than was fitting, they all now think that wisdom will not only die with them, but also arose from them. It is worthy, therefore, that we see this very thing in our own assertion of truth — that so many of us are already so diverse. For because truth is seen from afar, it gives rise to judgments, and each person can perceive of it only as much as he himself is. For in us, what we perceive by the cognition of day, in that same way the understanding of the heart judges about those things that are outside with respect to the truth, in the manner in which the mind inwardly configures itself in its representation. Hence it is necessary that while the mind is inwardly wrongly disposed, the understanding too is deceived in its judgment of those things that are outside. This is the very cause that sometimes also generates controversy of words even within a unity of meaning — which controversy, however, becomes venial when it is not obstinate. If therefore we, who seem to be handlers of God's word and investigators of truth, sometimes find this among ourselves — as is customary — let us more quickly return to unity, lest if we begin to defend our own words obstinately, we be thought to have held a different view.

That which your charity has deigned to ask of me concerning the cause of God against Pelagius, I have learned was debated long ago among certain wise men; and from those whose judgment we consider more trustworthy, I have come to know what they thought — both from others' reports about them and from their own reports about themselves. But since I am accustomed to be pressed on this matter quite often, I profess myself to be the sort of person who would wish that nothing on this subject be either so curiously and superstitiously inquired into by all, or so confidently asserted. Hence now too I am constrained by a twofold consideration in this matter, since I see that I owe silence to your prudence, and a response to your goodness. Amid these very things, the difficulty of the matter also presents itself — which perhaps cannot be discussed by

me as concisely as is fitting. For if I exceed due measure in speaking, I fear I may seem superstitious. Yet I wish — and much more do I wish — to be sometimes charged with partial ignorance than to seem a contemner of charity; and to have inelegant words rather than a perverse heart.

Farewell always in our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Way leading from the byway, the Truth confirming in the promise, and the Life conforming at the journey's end.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE'S *DE CAUSA DEI* — BOOK I

CHAPTER I

He sets forth two suppositions, of which the **first** is: God is most highly perfect and good, to such a degree that nothing more perfect or better could exist.

The **second** is: There is no infinite process among beings, but in every genus there is some one first.

In the first place, let it be most firmly supposed that God is most highly perfect and good, to such a degree that nothing more perfect or better could exist. This supposition could be evidently demonstrated from the magnitude of His perfection and goodness, which is simply infinite, just as it could be demonstrated in many ways by philosophical and theological reasonings. This supposition also seems to be attested by the father of the Philosophers, Hermogenes — or Hermes, Mercurius the threefold, Trismegistus the threefold, in philosophy thrice greatest, King of Egypt, Philosopher and Prophet — in his work *On the Eternal Word*, chapter 34, saying of God: "He Himself is wholly full and perfect"; and below at chapter 35: "He Himself is holy, and incorrupt, and everlasting, and if anything can be called better: for God is the highest good." His son Aristotle seems likewise to bear witness in *On the World*, chapter 11, saying thus: "That ought rather to be reckoned which is both fitting and most apt for God"; and in another translation: "But that is to be received which is better, and most fitting for God"; and in *Metaphysics* XII.39: "God is one, eternal, of infinite nobility." And Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 10: "Nothing better than God can be thought." Of the twenty-four definitions or propositions concerning God set forth by twenty-four Philosophers, the fifth runs thus: "God is that than which nothing better can be thought." With these in concord, Anselm in *Proslogion* 2: "We believe Thee, O God, to be something than which nothing better can be thought." And in *Monologion* 15: "Just as it is impious to think that the substance of the supreme nature is anything which it would be in any way better not to be, so it is necessary that whatever it is altogether better to be than not to be, that it is." Richard [of St. Victor] also testifies thus in *On the Trinity* I.20: "All men attribute without hesitation to God whatever they judge to be best."

And Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I.4: "All contend earnestly for the excellence of God, nor can anyone be found who believes God to be that than which something is better. And so all consent that God is that which they prefer to all other things." Whence also the Prophet: "Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised; and of His greatness there is no end" (Psalm 144).

Secondly, let it be supposed for the present that there is no infinite process among beings, but in every genus there is some one first. For this has been demonstrated elsewhere, and almost all Philosophers and truly all Theologians attest it. But lest I should seem to suppose suppositions of such weight without even a little proof improbably, behold at least a brief intimation of both. Let A be called, for the sake of brevity, something so perfect and good that nothing more perfect or better could exist. Let "possible" also be taken in the common manner of speaking, or, if it must be taken most absolutely, for that, namely, which through itself and formally simply does not include contradiction or repugnance: namely, from which, when posited and admitted as absolutely possible according to the species of obligations which is called *positio*, in no good and formal consequence simply does there follow what is absolutely impossible — namely, that which through itself and formally simply includes contradiction. For every repugnance imports and produces contradiction. This way of taking "possible" and "impossible" is grounded on this, that everything is either possible or not possible, and so impossible in this manner. It is therefore possible that A is, or A can be, or could be — who would not at once assent? Or who, this being posited and admitted as absolutely possible, would not defend himself from contradiction? But if it is possible that A is, or if A can or could be, A is — nay, it is necessary that A is, and A is "necessary-being," and this through itself. Let "necessary being" be called, in the manner of the Philosophers' speech, that which through itself and of itself is necessary to be, by absolute necessity: that, namely, which could not, cannot, nor will be able not to be; and "possible being" in the opposite manner, that, namely, which could, can, or will be able to be and not to be. For "necessary being" is more perfect and better than "possible being," especially in a perfect good and one most highly perfect. For one could not depart from it except by omitting it either wholly or partly irrecoverably, which no one doubts to be evil. Necessary being is also in a perfect good a perfect good act, complete in good, and pure from imperfect incomplete potentiality and from evil corruptibility. But possible being imports the privation of this pure act, imperfect potentiality, an incomplete aptitude toward evil, and corruptibility. Is not also strong and firm being — nay, supremely strong and firm — especially in a perfect good and one supremely perfect, to be judged better and more perfect than weak and infirm being? Therefore necessary being is to be judged better than possible being, which could be shown by many other reasons. But whose mind does not feel this inwardly? Whose spirit does not assent? But if anyone, out of abundance, desires witnesses, behold Aristotle, who in *Metaphysics* IX.13 and following says diffusely and proves that act precedes potency in three ways: namely, in reason, that is, in definition; in substance, that is, in perfection; and in time, namely in the individual generating — but, on the contrary, in the individual generated. And below at 19, teaching that in goods act is better than potency, and in evils worse, he writes thus: "The act of a serious potency is better and more honorable; but it is necessary that in evils too the end and act be worse than the potency."

And above at 17: "The eternal things," he says, "are prior in substance to the corruptible; but nothing eternal is in potency." And the reason is this: every potency is at the same time of contradiction; therefore what is possible to be, may be and not be. Therefore the same thing is possible to be and not to be; but what is possible not to be, may not be; and what is contingent not to be is corruptible, either simply, or in this very respect that it is said to be contingent not to be. Therefore nothing simply incorruptible is being in potency simply, nor any of those things which are by necessity, and indeed those very first ones. For if these were not, nothing whatsoever would be. Where Aristotle seems to suggest such a reason: that which is through itself, not depending on another, is prior in nature and more perfect than that which is not through itself but depends from elsewhere; that which is necessary being is of this kind, with respect to that which is possible being. Averroes follows him in his *Commentary*; whom Avicenna also followed in *Metaphysics* I.6, saying that necessary being according to itself has no cause, and what is possible being has of itself a cause, and proves that necessary being has nothing else co-equal to it, nor anything prior to it, but it through itself is the first of all others. Who also below in book VIII.6 says that necessary being is perfect and more than perfect. If therefore A can be, A can be; therefore A can be necessary being, since this is more perfect and better than possible being, and it can be necessary being through itself. For to be good through oneself is more sufficient, more worthy, more perfect, and better than to be good through another, to lack another, and to depend from another, as anyone's mind judges, and as the aforementioned Philosophers attest. And if A can be necessary being through itself, then A is necessary being — nay, it is necessary that A be necessary being (for otherwise it would be possible-being). But this is impossible. For let it be put into being, just as it is possible, that A be necessary being, and this through itself, and it follows that it never could, can, or will be able not to be — the opposite of which was being said. Also, what is once possible to be, is always possible to be; and what is once necessary being through itself is always necessary being. For whatever is once through itself and formally simply imports no repugnance, never does it import any; and whatever is once, also is always: for the consequence which is once formal simply, was always so and will be, since it is through itself and absolutely necessary, and so can never fail in consequence. And what at some time is not formal simply, never was nor will be; for if it were at some time, it would be always. Whose mind, moreover, conceives a nature of itself possible turning into a nature of itself necessary, or contrariwise? Again, a little must be tasted in advance: everything that is called possible or able is so called by some power; and this either by its own power, like an existing thing having active or passive power, or by another's power — as non-beings possible to come to be, and future effects, are called possible by the power of those active and passive things, namely because the active can do them and the passive can be acted upon. Whatever, also, is called possible by the power of some passive thing, is called possible by the power of some active thing: for how can anything possible be acted upon by what can do nothing? Or how can some effect come about which nothing can make? And if anyone requires, as it were, a torch to see the sun, let him demand a witness for this self-evident truth: behold Averroes upon the *De Caelo et Mundo* I, comment 124, who says that the possible is not possible

except in respect to an agent and patient, and it is impossible to imagine something to be possible in respect to a patient and impossible in respect to an agent, since it would happen that there would be a patient impossible, and a possible impossible. Therefore every non-being which is called possible or able, is so called through the power of some active thing. If therefore A is not, and can be, by some power it can be — and not by its own power, since it has none, since also nothing whatsoever can make and produce itself from non-being to being. For every maker in some way precedes — at least naturally — its product; but nothing precedes itself. Since moreover, according to the premises, every non-being called possible is so called by the power of some active thing, neither can A be by another's power. For this, according to what was shown earlier, would be by the power of some active thing which could make A: but there is no such thing, since everything other than A is incomparably less than A and impotent to cause it. Also, if A is caused by another, A is not [God]. For it is more perfect to be sufficient through oneself, altogether incausable and independent of another, and the highest and first cause of others, than to depend on another and be subject to another as an effect. Therefore A cannot be from another in any way, which could be shown by many other reasons. Therefore by no power can A be — the opposite of which was being said. Therefore it includes contradiction that A is not and can be; and it is true and necessary that A can be; therefore it is false and impossible that A is not. Wherefore it is true and necessary that A is. Wherefore it is also true and necessary that God is; and that He is so perfect and good that nothing more perfect or better could be.

The second supposition follows from this first: for it follows from it that God is the first and highest of all beings; with this notoriously co-assumed, that to be first and highest is more perfect and better than to be later and inferior to another, or co-equal to another. But if anyone desires a witness, behold the Philosopher who in *De Caelo et Mundo* II.34 expressly attests that the upward is more honorable and divine than the downward, and the prior than the posterior. He, together with the other Philosophers, often teaches that nowhere in the same genus are several principles co-equal and equally first simply found. Whence also Apocalypse 1: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last."

COROLLARY

It has a moral corollary containing 40 parts against 40 errors, of which the first is:

1. AGAINST PROTAGORAS DOUBTING THAT GOD EXISTS

From these things, as it were by way of porism, many men erring in many ways seem capable of being clearly led back to the path of truth, provided that truth herself deigns to go before as a guide.

From these things, then, let Protagoras be made certain — who, as Lactantius recounts in *Divine Institutes against the Gentiles* I.1, called the gods into doubt.

2. AGAINST DIAGORAS AND THE FOOL DENYING THAT GOD EXISTS

Let Diagoras come to his senses, who, as is similarly recounted there, afterward shut out the gods. Let the fool also at some time be wise — who, as the Prophet recounts, foolishly said: "There is no God."

3. AGAINST THOSE DOUBTING OR DENYING THAT GOD HAS REALLY, EQUIVALENTLY, OR SUPEREMINENTLY EVERY VIRTUE AND ANY GOODNESS WHATSOEVER; AND UNIVERSALLY WHATEVER IT IS BETTER TO HAVE THAN NOT TO HAVE; AND IS IN EVERY WAY GOOD IN EVERY MANNER, AND HAS GOODNESS OF EVERY KIND — WHATEVER IT IS BETTER TO BE AND HAVE THAN NOT TO BE AND NOT HAVE; AND HAS NO VICE OR MALICE; AND UNIVERSALLY DOES NOT HAVE WHATEVER IT IS BETTER NOT TO HAVE THAN TO HAVE, OR HAS IN SOME OTHER MANNER THAT WHICH IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE THAN TO HAVE, OR HAS ANYTHING IN VAIN OR SUPERFLUOUS; OR THAT GOD IS NOT ALWAYS SUPREMEPLY HAPPY, BLESSED, ACTUAL OR ACT, SUCH THAT NOTHING HAPPIER, MORE BLESSED, OR MORE ACTUAL COULD EXIST

Let those make progress who confess God to exist but doubt or deny that He has really, equivalently, or supereminently every virtue and any goodness, and universally whatever it is better to have than not to have; that He is in every way good in every manner, and has goodness of every kind — whatever it is better to be and have than not to be and not have; that He has no vice and malice; and universally that He does not have whatever it is better not to have than to have; or has in some manner that which it would be better not to have than to have; or has anything in vain or superfluous; or that He is not always supremely happy, blessed, actual, or act, such that nothing happier, more blessed, or more actual could exist. For otherwise something could be more perfect, better, and more becoming than God is, which the first Supposition forbids. The supreme actuality of God is also specially demonstrated by this: that act is better and more perfect than potency, and especially a good act than its good potency, as appears from the demonstration of the first Supposition. And if any potency be posited in God, it is necessarily good, as the prior particles of this part teach. Therefore no potentiality, but supreme actuality, is in God, as the first Supposition clearly shows; which is similarly demonstrated through the next particle of this part. For if God is supremely blessed and happy, He is supremely actual: for who does not know that these consist not in habit but in act, as the Philosophers also make manifest?

4. AGAINST THOSE DENYING THAT GOD IS OF ANY VIRTUE AND GOODNESS WHATSOEVER SIMPLY INFINITE

Let those who deny that God is of any virtue and goodness whatsoever simply infinite stretch themselves out. For if any virtue of His or goodness were only finite, it could be increased; therefore something better than God could exist, which the first Supposition condemns. These men are also most clearly refuted through the next part of this. Now, according to this infinite

virtue and power of God, and with respect to it — following what was touched upon above concerning power — I deem it true what the Geometers suppose: that a straight line can be extended as far as one pleases in continuum and direct line, and on any center, occupying any space whatsoever, a circle can be designated, as appears in the first book of Euclid's *Elements*; and what the natural Philosophers say, that a medium can be subtilized as far as one pleases, and the like; and universally everything which among the Logicians, or any others, is called through itself and absolutely possible — namely, what through itself does not formally include contradiction — although it is not possible by nature, that is, by natural power.

5. AGAINST THOSE SAYING THAT GOD DOES NOT FULLY SUFFICE TO HIMSELF, BUT NEEDS ANOTHER

Let those be opened up who say that God does not fully suffice to Himself, but needs another. This evidently follows from the two preceding parts and from the first Supposition: for it is notoriously established that sufficiency is a good. Whence the Philosopher also in *De Mundo* 11, speaking of God, says: "He needs no artifice, nor another's support, as our Kings need clientela because of impotence." And in *De Caelo et Mundo* I.100: "He has nothing depraved, nor is needy of any of those things which are His goods." Whence also of the 24 definitions concerning God set forth by as many Philosophers, the 11th says thus: "God is the always-existing, who alone by necessity sufficiently abounds for Himself." This is also attested by *Sadai*, one of the Hebrew names of God, which, as Rabbi Moses says in the *Guide of the Perplexed* I.61, is the same as "sufficiency," because He needs the essence of no being, nor needs anything outside Himself for the firmness of His essence; but His essence suffices Him. Jerome also, expert in the Latin and Hebrew languages, in his letter to Marcella concerning the 10 names by which God is named among the Hebrews, Epistle 99, says that one of these 10 names is *Sadai*, which we may take as "robust and sufficient for accomplishing all things."

6. AGAINST THOSE BELIEVING THAT GOD IS NOT NECESSARILY BUT CONTINGENTLY MOST PERFECT AND GOD; AND THAT HE IS MUTABLE, IRASCIBLE, PLACABLE, ABLE TO BE SADDENED, GLADDENED, OR CAPABLE OF SUFFERING IN ANY OTHER NEW PASSION; ALSO OPINING THAT "GOD" IS AN ACCIDENTAL NAME, AND NOT ESSENTIAL SIMPLY

Let those be changed who believe that God is not necessarily but contingently most perfect and God; and that He is mutable, newly irascible, placable, able to be saddened, gladdened, and capable of suffering newly in any other passion: also opining that "God" is an accidental name, and not essential simply. That God is necessarily most perfect and God evidently follows from the first Supposition, since to be so is more perfect and better than to be contingently so, as appears from what was premised in the demonstration of that Supposition. Moreover, if God is not necessarily most perfect and God, He can be not such; if this be posited, it will be reproved, and its opposite proved, just as the first Supposition was proved. Wherefore neither is God mutable in any way: for not to the better, since He is supremely good; nor to the worse, since He

is necessarily supremely good (as is just now demonstrated); nor to the equally good. For this would seem superfluous, against the third part of this, unless perhaps He should do this for the sake of preserving His own good — and then He would need motion, against the fifth part — or for the good of the creature — and so He would still need motion, nor would He suffice to Himself for doing what He willed. Also, if God could be changed to an equal good, why not to a lesser? If, moreover, God should temporally lose and acquire any goodness, He does not always have goodness of every kind, especially infinite, against the third and fourth parts of this. If, moreover, God were mutable, He would be potential, and not supremely actual or act, against the last part of the third part of this. From these things, further, it is patently inferred that God is not an accidental name, but essential simply: especially if it be imposed from that supreme perfection and greatest goodness; for otherwise God could not be God, and could be changed, against the two prior particles of this part.

7. AGAINST THOSE DENYING THAT GOD IS OMNIPOTENT ACTIVELY, AND NULLIPOTENT PASSIVELY — THAT IS, NOT ABLE TO SUFFER ANYTHING FROM ANOTHER

Let those be denied who deny that God is omnipotent actively, and nullipotent passively — that is, not able to suffer anything from another. That He is omnipotent actively, the third and fourth parts demonstrate. For it is established that active power is a certain virtue and a good; nor can He suffer from another, for then He would be mutable, against the previous part; and His impassibility, like His immutability, can be demonstrated.

8. AGAINST THOSE OPINING THAT GOD IS NOT A SUBSTANCE AND RATIONAL POWER, HAVING INTELLECT AND FREE WILL, ACTUALLY KNOWING AND WILLING; ALSO HOLDING THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT UNIVERSALLY EFFICACIOUS — THAT IS, NOT IMPEDIBLE, NOT FRUSTRATABLE, NOT DEFECTIBLE IN ANY WAY

Let them reason better, who opine that God is not a substance and rational power, having intellect and free will, actually knowing and willing; also holding that the divine will is not universally efficacious — that is, not impedible, not frustratable, not defectible in any way. For from the first Supposition it is patent that God is, and is a substance, since substance is more perfect than accident; and therefore is a substance and rational power, since the rational is reasonably preferred to the irrational; wherefore He has intellect and free will, which the third part also shows; knowing also and willing actually, not however habitually, since this is more perfect, just as a good act is more perfect than its potency toward the good. The divine will is also universally efficacious in the manner stated. For this is more perfect than that it should be impedible, frustratable, or defectible in any way. Also, if God should will anything and not have it, nor have it come about, He would not be supremely blessed and happy, but miserable; especially since He wills nothing, nor can He will anything, except justly, by the third part of this, which also makes Him supremely blessed. For who does not know that happiness and

beatitude are an entire and perfect good, and that it is more blessed to have whatever is justly desired or willed than to lack it? For if, on account of the non-having of one thing willed, anyone were not less blessed, nor on account of the non-having of another, and by the same reason still further, and so on in succession, then neither would anyone be less blessed even if he lacked all and each thing willed and desired. But whose mind feels thus, unless perhaps the senseless? Whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* I.9 says happiness is "a good through itself sufficient and perfect." Boethius also, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 2, says that beatitude is "a good which, when one has obtained it, can desire nothing further; which indeed is the highest of all goods, and contains all goods within itself; if anything were lacking to it, it could not be the highest, since something would remain outside that could be wished for. It is clear, therefore, that beatitude is a state perfect by the gathering together of all goods." Is it not also more joyful, more delightful, and more pleasing to have what is desired and willed than to lack them unwillingly? Who dissents here? Whose mind does not so feel? But in supreme beatitude, supreme joy, delight, and pleasure are contained. Now God is always supremely blessed by the third part of this; therefore He never lacks anything willed unwillingly. Furthermore, who does not know that this excellently follows: "If God can do this and wills this, He does this, since nothing required is lacking" — which Philosophy also often attests? Hence, contrariwise, "If God does not do this, and wills this, He cannot do this," as some possible thing being shown: therefore He is not omnipotent, but to be reckoned impotent, against the seventh part of this — which the 12th of the 24 definitions of God by the 24 Philosophers also attests, saying thus: "God is He whose will is of deifying power."

9. AGAINST THOSE BELIEVING THAT GOD IS IGNORANT OF ANYTHING

Let those be ignored who believe that God is ignorant of anything. Such seem to be certain Philosophers and common folk: for it appears to some that Aristotle in *Metaphysics* XII.51 wishes to assert that God does not know anything outside Himself; and that Averroes there in his comment 51 wishes to construct that God does not know vile things, nor singulars; with which Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* VIII.6 and Algazel in his *Metaphysics* III, sentence 6, seem to consent. Cicero also in *De Divinatione* denies all foreknowledge of future things to God. Of similar persons it is recounted in Job 22 in this manner: "What does God know? And as if through a mist He judges; the clouds are His hiding-place; nor does He consider our things, but walks about beyond the hinges of heaven." And Psalm 72: "And they have said, How does God know? And is there knowledge in the highest?" And below, Psalm 93: "And they have said, The Lord shall not see, nor shall the God of Jacob understand." But all these will easily be corrected through the third and fourth parts. For it is established that wisdom, science, and approving or reproving discretion are most distinguished virtues.

Likewise, by the previous part, God knows actually; and if He knows anything, it most especially seems that He knows Himself. It also seems more perfect to know Himself than wholly to be ignorant. Therefore by the first Supposition He knows Himself. Also, how, according to the third part of this, is God supremely blessed if He in no way feels, perceives, or knows Himself to be

blessed? Therefore God knows Himself, and not imperfectly and diminished, on account of the second Supposition and the third and fourth parts. Therefore He knows Himself perfectly and supremely perfectly, such that nothing more perfect could be known or could know. Therefore He knows Himself according to His essence, and according to all His conditions, relations, and universal circumstances. But there is no thing of which God is not prior, superior, better, and more perfect, as the first Supposition teaches; of which also God is not the cause, principle, and end, as the Philosophers attest. Therefore there is nothing which God does not know properly and distinctly: for this knowledge is more perfect than confused.

Likewise, either God knows that there is something other besides Himself, or He does not know. If He knows, and not confusedly — since distinct knowledge is more actual and more perfect than confused — then He distinctly knows something outside Himself; and by the same reasoning He knows one thing and all things, by the fourth part premised. If He does not know that there is anything besides Himself, this is more wonderful and absurd; for then He could plausibly believe that there is nothing at all besides Himself, and so be shamefully deceived and err, against the third part of this.

Likewise, according to what has been premised, God perfectly knows Himself; therefore He knows Himself to be of infinite power, omnipotent, and of universally efficacious will, according to the fourth, seventh, and eighth parts premised. Therefore He knows Himself able to make, destroy, and move something outside Himself. If this be posited, then He knows it; for He works not rashly but knowingly, and He does not know it newly, on account of the sixth part — and because He previously knew He could and would so do, and would so do: therefore He has known it eternally; and likewise anything else by similar reason.

Likewise, if God did not know certain truths, He could desire and will to know them; for every rational nature naturally desires to know. Therefore, since by the previous part He has a will universally efficacious, He could know them, and not newly; for then He would not always be most actual, most knowing, most perfect, most blessed, and altogether immutable, against the third and sixth parts. Therefore necessarily He knows all truths eternally.

Likewise, although some things are vile, the knowledge of them is precious and noble, as all natural Philosophers attest who treat of animals, of parts, and of the generation of animals — especially in those who through knowledge of vile things do not become vile, nor can become vile. But God, as the sixth part attests, cannot be made vile: therefore He knows all things perfectly and distinctly. But if anyone wished to consider more subtly, he would find that every nature, and every natural thing, and every essence according to that which it is, is good and beautiful, as the Philosophers also attest. Why then does it not befit God, the good and beautiful, to know these things? Or perhaps because they are less good and beautiful than He? How then can He not make and preserve such things, by His omnipotence and most efficacious will, according to the previous parts of this? How also does it befit man, so worthy and noble a nature, to know baser things?

Likewise, how could God fittingly remunerate His worshippers, and His good and bad despisers, if He were ignorant of their merits?

Likewise, why do we pour forth prayers in vain to the Lord God, if He cannot hear them?

Furthermore, who doubts that it is better, more orderly, and more becoming, that God — who, the first Supposition proving (as appears in the demonstration of the second Supposition), presides over the world and all other things — should preside wisely over all things, and be able, know, and will to expedite supplications offered to Him, to reward the good, and correct or punish the evil? Otherwise the spur of hope and love would be less sharp, the rein of fear would be broken, and the audacity to offend would be unbridled. Whence the whole order of human affairs, both toward God and toward neighbor, would be shaken. But if Aristotle should wish to say that God does not understand anything besides Himself, because anything such is vile — at least with respect to the divine dignity it is nothing, as appears from the premises. By the same reasoning, He could do nothing else nor move anything else, against the seventh part of this. That also which Averroes seems to argue — namely, that God does not have knowledge of particulars, and distinct knowledge of particulars and singulars, because these are infinite and are not determined by knowledge — should not move us; because God is simply infinite, and any virtue of His likewise, as the first Supposition and fourth part demonstrate. Indeed, God is more infinite than any infinite multitude which Averroes posits of existing particulars, of whatever species they may be, or even of all species: for than any such infinite multitude of any species, there is another greater multitude, namely, that gathered from it and another similar multitude of another species; even than the whole infinite multitude of all existing particulars, some greater could be — nay, double, triple, quadruple, and so on, simultaneously or successively. But God is so great and infinite that nothing greater or more infinite could be, as the first Supposition and fourth part show; wherefore correspondingly any virtue of His. Therefore the knowability of God and His capacity is not satisfied by any finite or infinite multitude of existing singulars of one species, or even of all together; but exceeds each one of them — even the whole multitude, if posited, gathered from all — somehow infinitely. What some moreover argue — that if God knew singulars, since they are mutable, His knowledge likewise would be mutable — would be true if He knew them as man does, alterably and passibly from them; but He does not know them so, on account of the sixth and seventh parts of this; rather materially and actively, as if a fixed eye through extramission saw the succeeding parts of a river.

10. AGAINST THOSE FEIGNING THAT GOD IS COMPOSED FROM HUMAN MEMBERS, OR OTHERS, OR FROM ANY DIVERSE THINGS WHATSOEVER, AND DENYING THAT HE IS A MOST SIMPLE, MOST INDIVISIBLE SUBSTANCE, HAVING NO COMPOSITION, DIVISIBILITY, OR MAGNITUDE — NAMELY, BODILY MAGNITUDE

Let the composers of God come to their senses, who feign that He is composed from human members, or others, or from any diverse things whatsoever; and let them know that God is a

most simple, most indivisible substance, having no composition, divisibility, or magnitude — namely, bodily magnitude. For if such composition were in God, it would not be repugnant for the parts to be drawn off and separated from one another, nor therefore for the whole to be changed, diminished, or corrupted, which the premises corrupt. How, moreover, would God be supremely perfect, sufficient, or blessed, as the premises attest, if He necessarily depended on others and needed other necessary things? Also, it seems more actual and more potent to exist of itself and through itself sufficiently, than to be supported by another's prop and aid. But God is supremely actual and potent, such that nothing more actual or more potent could be, as the first Supposition and other earlier things demonstrate. Also, if God were composed of parts, any part composing — or at least the form perfecting, uniting, and joining those parts — would be naturally prior to God, against the first Supposition, as appears in the demonstration of the second Supposition. Beyond this, either God is composed from homogeneous parts only, or also from heterogeneous: if from homogeneous only, animals and the heavens are more perfectly composed, against the first Supposition and the third part of this. If from heterogeneous parts He be composed, those parts are of dissimilar office, of disparate dignity, and not equally perfect; therefore some of them is not supremely and infinitely perfect, against the fourth part premised.

Furthermore, if God is composed from parts: either some of them is of infinite perfection simply and in every way, or none. If some, it would itself be God, as the first Supposition shows; it would also be superfluous that God should have several parts, since that one alone would suffice for any purpose, against the third part of this. If none, this strikes against the fourth part of this. By the same token, then, any part could be more perfect, and so could God, which the first Supposition condemns. Moreover, the parts of God are either finite or infinite in number: if finite, the whole God is of finite perfection, against the first Supposition and fourth part. If infinite, the same will follow, since any of them, being only of finite perfection, could be increased; therefore, similarly, the whole God. Infinity also the second Supposition excludes, and all nature together, and any mind, refuses and abhors it. The other particle of this part follows from the prior and from the first Supposition, with the third and fourth parts.

11. AGAINST THE ZABIANS AND THEIR WISE MEN WORSHIPPING HEAVEN AS GOD

Let the Zabians and their wise men blush who worship heaven as God. For these men, by the testimony of Averroes upon *Metaphysics* I, comment 41, believing the heavens to be eternal, judged that the heavens are of themselves of eternal motion, nor must any principle nobler than themselves be posited; whence (as it seems) they worshipped them as God. But these will be corrected by the previous one. Moreover, the heavens are of finite virtue and power; they are also mutable, alterable, illuminable, and obscurable. Many possible perfections and goodnesses are also lacking to the heavens; therefore they are not God, as the preceding parts make manifest. Whence Averroes there premised: "This indeed, namely to find the simply first mover, is exceedingly difficult and concealed; and therefore that place was the slip of the wise."

12. AGAINST THE ADORERS OF THE SUN OR MOON, MARS OR JUPITER, OF ANY HEAVENLY SIGN, OR OF ANY SIGNS WHATSOEVER, AND UNIVERSALLY OF ANY PART OF HEAVEN

Let the adorers of the Sun and Moon, of Mars and Jupiter, of any heavenly sign, or of any signs whatsoever, and universally of any part of heaven, cease, on account of the reasoning given above concerning the whole heaven.

13. AGAINST THOSE FABRICATING FOR THEMSELVES TEMPORAL GODS — MEN, ANIMALS, TREES, FIRE, OR ANY SUCH THING

Let those be struck who fabricate for themselves such gods — men, animals, trees, fire, or any such thing. Such were certain ancient Gentiles, who made themselves gods of certain men, some living, some dead, as many histories attest. Whence Plato in *Timaeus* II.3: "Let our credulity," he says, "be a companion to the assertion of the ancient men, that the offspring of Earth and Heaven are Ocean and Tethys, and from these in turn Saturn and Rhea and Phorcus; and the offspring of Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter and Juno, and the others who are on the lips and in the minds of men, and of whose brotherhood fame is celebrated; and from these others have been born, who are reckoned gods." The Roman histories also attest, as Augustine recounts in *De Civitate Dei* IV.27, that Scaevola, the most learned Pontiff of the Romans, distinguished a threefold genus of gods — the Poetic, the Philosophical, and that of the Princes, or Civil — concerning the second of which he says thus: "The second does not suit cities, since it has some superfluities, some also which it harms peoples to know. Concerning the superfluous there is no great reason: for it is wont to be said by experts that 'superfluities do not harm.' But what are those things which, brought forth among the multitude, do harm? These," he says: "that Hercules, Aesculapius, Castor, and Pollux are not gods. For it is handed down by the learned that they were men and have failed by the human condition." Such were the ancient Babylonians who worshipped the Dragon, as recounted in Daniel 14. Such also were the ancient Egyptians, adoring the Bull as a deity. Whence Solinus, *On the Wonders of the World* 7, treating of Egypt and its affairs, says thus: "Among all the things which Egypt has worth memory, they especially marvel at the Bull which they call Apis, or Apim. They cultivate him as the likeness of a Deity, distinguished by a spot of white mark, which, born on his right side, bears the face of a horned crescent moon. A fixed span is established, which when it has come, immersed in the depth of a sacred fount he is killed, lest he draw the day longer than is permitted. Soon another, not without public mourning, is sought; whom, when found, a hundred priests escort to Memphis, that he may begin there, initiated into sacred things, to be made sacred. The shrines, into which he goes or in which he reclines, they mystically name 'thalamoi.' He gives all things manifesting concerning the future — that especially, if he should take food from the hand of the inquirer. Finally, having opposed the right hand of Germanicus Caesar, he disclosed the calamities pressing in, and not much after Caesar was extinguished. Boys follow Apis in groups, and suddenly, as if struck with frenzy, they prophesy things to come. A female cow is shown to him once a year, and she also is not without certain marks; which, as soon as she is found and offered, on the same day is given to

death. The birthday of Apis they celebrate at Memphis by the throwing of a golden cup, which they cast into a vile whirlpool. This solemnity is conducted for seven days, on which days, with the priests, they have a certain truce with the crocodiles, nor do they harm those bathing. But on the eighth day, the ceremonies now finished, as if license to rage being restored, they resume their accustomed atrocity." This Apis, Papias in his *Elementarium*, and Isidore in *Etymologies* VI.44, say was a Bull of Egypt consecrated to Serapis, whose image they affirm the Jews going forth from Egypt to have fabricated for themselves in the desert. There are also certain more recent persons who, by the testimony of Marco of Venice, *On the Conditions and Customs of Eastern Regions* III.25, in Greater India, in the kingdom of Var, adore the bull, saying the bull is a most holy thing; nor do they kill bulls, nor eat their flesh out of reverence. When bulls die, they anoint their houses with their fat. And below at chapter 28 he says that in the province of Maabar, namely in Greater India, when those who adore the bull go forth to wars, each one carries with him some hairs of the wild bull. For they believe the wild bull to be of such sanctity that whoever carries upon himself any of his hairs will be safe in every danger. Such also were those Indians who, as appears from the Letter of Alexander to Aristotle on the situation and vastness of India, worshipped the trees of the Sun and Moon, which on any matters inquired of — even with silent thought, without any utterance — gave true responses to all; to which an Indian Priest solemnly ministered. Where also concerning Alexander's questioning and the wonderful response of the trees it is written in this manner: "We saw from the West the tops of the trees struck by the radiance of Phoebus' shining rays; and the Priest said, 'Look up, all of you, and let each silently meditate in silence on whatever matter he is going to consult about; let no one pronounce openly.' When I and the friends and the comrades had looked more carefully, lest amid the density of the groves any falsehood should mock us in the manner of men — soon, no such deceit intervening, we looked all the way up to the tops and branches; standing at hand, with divine ears we received the oracles. I was thinking, if, the world having been conquered, I might triumphantly return to my fatherland, to my mother Olympias and my dearest sisters; to which suddenly in a most slender Indian speech the tree responded: 'Unconquered Alexander in wars, as you have consulted the deity, you will be the one lord of the whole world; but living you will not return any further to your fatherland, since the Fates have so determined concerning your head.' Then I, since I knew not what the oracle was, asked the Indian to interpret it, whom partly by gifts, partly by threats, I compelled to declare whatever the trees should say. Wherefore, all having been known, with those who were in my company struck and weeping, openly — so was the custom — I was about to consult something else, and to enter at evening time. But the Moon had not yet risen, when, again invited to the grove, we stood near the sacred trees; soon, by accustomed custom, we adored. I had brought in with me three most faithful friends, Perdiccas, Diconas, and Philotas, since I feared no one further, nor was anything to be feared in me, where it was lawful for no one to be killed. I therefore consulted where I should die; and then at the first rising of the Moon, the horn of the tree being struck and brightness received, the tree answered in Greek: 'Alexander,' he said, 'you have now the full end of your age; but in the following year in the month of May you will die in Babylon — by him from whom you least expect, you will be

deceived.' And below: 'I entered a third time to consult from the same most sacred Tree of the Sun, by what assassin's hand my death is to be guarded against; and what end my mother and my sisters will have.' The tree said in Greek: 'If I should disclose to you the plotter of your death, with him removed you would easily change the impending Fates; the three sisters would also be angry with me, namely, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, that I had betrayed their truthful oracles. Therefore in a year and 8 months you will die in Babylon, not by iron, as you suspect, but by poison. Your mother by a most foul and miserable end will at some time lie unburied in the road, prey to birds and beasts. Your sisters will be called happy by fate. You yourself, even though a brief time remains, yet will be Lord of the world. Now beware, do not question us further; depart from the bounds of our grove.'" All of which Justin and other Historiographers attest to have happened thus.

There were also many who worshipped fire as God, because it seems to conquer and consume other things. But all these can, like the previous ones, be easily chastised: for God, as the premises about the first Supposition attest, is necessary being. Therefore no temporal, generable, corruptible thing is God. Also, if any pure man be God, either man is from himself, or from another. If from himself, why not another man similarly, since he is of the same nature? Or why cannot another make himself God, just as he made himself? If from another, that other rather seems to be God, and is the one of which the first Supposition sings. Who also, unless more irrational than a beast, would have set up a beast, a tree, fire, or any irrational thing as his god — a thing knowing all or other things not at all, having an inefficacious will, a thing not omnipotent but weak, needy, passible, killable, and even destructible, even if it should strive to save itself — against the first Supposition and the parts premised? O miserably wretched, miserable man, if indeed a man — why are you not ashamed to adore and worship as your Lord God an irrational nature naturally baser, more ignoble, more imperfect, and subject to you? For whose mind does not place his God before himself and all other things in the order of dignity, as the first Supposition teaches?

14. AGAINST THE TRIFLERS AND TRIFLING ONES WHO ADORE A BURDENSOME MULTITUDE OF EQUAL GODS OF THE SAME SPECIES OR NATURE

Let the triflers and trifling ones be restrained who adore a burdensome multitude of equal gods of the same species or nature, as if one such did not suffice them. For if the first Supposition is true, one God most fully suffices. For where He did not suffice, some perfection and goodness would be lacking to Him, which could be present to Him or another, as the third and seventh parts of this show. Since therefore He alone in every way suffices, why is another posited superfluously and without cause, or others posited, since any wise philosopher or other — nay, nature itself — refuses and avoids this? And if anyone requires a witness, behold the Philosopher in *De Caelo et Mundo* III.39, who says: "It is not necessary to make the elements infinite: for all these, namely composites, will be rendered finite as existing." And below at 35: "It is manifest, because it is much better to make the principles finite; and these, as fewest, with all things being the same, just as those who in disciplines also judge them worthy." Why then, by worshipping many equal

gods, do they make this one insufficient? Or if they believe this one to suffice, why, to the injury and contempt of Him, do they subtract from this one love, honor, and glory due to Him alone, and bestow them on others? Those also who feign thus concerning the divine nature greatly deviate and err. For it is not multipliable, nor can be plurified into many individuals altogether of similar reason, which would differ substantially and only in number, as natural species do — nay, neither could there be another individual of that nature. For if there could be, it could be supremely perfect and good; therefore it would be so, as was proved above in the conclusion of the first Supposition; and by the same reasoning by which one other could be, another could be, and another, and so beyond number infinite ones; therefore actually they would be so, which any mind refuses, and the second Supposition forbids.

Likewise, it is simply absolutely possible that there be a unique God. Who would not at once consent? Who, with this posited and admitted as absolutely possible, would not easily defend himself from all contradiction? And if it is possible that there be a unique God — namely, that one which according to the premises is necessary to be — and let that one be A, then it is necessary that that unique one be, and that every other God not be. For let B be some other God; and according to the previous things it is possible that B not be God, therefore by the sixth part it is possible that B not be: therefore either it is impossible to be, or possible to be by the possibility of contradiction; therefore it is necessary that B be not God, as the things had above in the demonstration of the first Supposition lucidly make manifest. Or more briefly: every God necessarily is God, as the first Supposition and sixth part demonstrate; B is not necessarily God; according to the premises, therefore, B is not God. Also, a multitude of equal gods, if posited, is it not in some way more perfect than one God? Therefore none of them is supremely perfect; therefore neither God, as the first Supposition shows. This unique true God, moreover, contains the whole essence and perfection possible of His species or nature, as the first Supposition proves. Therefore there is no other such God; nay, there cannot be, because not simultaneously with this one for the cause premised, nor after this one corrupted, or with this one in any way not being [there would be nothing], as the first Supposition shows. This reasoning, concerning any other individual of any other species — whether in natural things, or in artificial, or in any others — is self-evident. If anyone, however, rejoices in testimony, behold the Philosopher in *De Caelo et Mundo* I.92, showing that there is not, nor can be, several worlds, says thus: "Neither is there one necessity that there be several worlds, nor does it happen that they have been made several, since this one is from all the matter, as it is. So perhaps what is said will be more manifest." And it follows at 94: "For if snubness is curvature in the nose or flesh, and the matter is flesh for snubness; if from all flesh one flesh be made and there be in this snubness, nothing else will exist, nor will it be snub, nor does it happen to have been made. Likewise also, if to man are matter flesh and bone; if from all flesh and all bone man be made, with possibly existing things being dissolved, it will not be possible for there to be another man. Likewise also in others." And it follows at 95: "But the heaven is something singular, and of those things which are from matter; but if it does not consist from a part of itself, but from the whole, no other will be, nor will it happen that several have been made, on account of all the matter being comprehended."

Upon which Averroes in comment 95 says that demonstrations to the impossible are of the genus of signs; but this demonstration, proving the world to be unique, is *propter quid*. For it has the cause as its middle term, and therefore gives us knowledge of this thing along with its cause; and this is the most perfect of modes. Who also doubts which is more worthy, more honorable, and more perfect: to be through oneself the supreme and first without peer, or necessarily to have a peer, even though one would not? Therefore God, by the first Supposition, has no peer. Why also could not one of equal gods, differing numerically — like Angels or men — will what another would not, and contrariwise? For there seems no reason why, by absolute power, this could not be, since the volition of any of them does not depend on another, nor is it the same in number as the volition of another, just as he is not the same as another. Therefore any one of them could impede any other, and any others, and make him miserable, and them miserable, and contrariwise — which the first Supposition, third part, and eighth refute. Now of this matter the witnesses are nearly all the natural, divine, and moral Philosophers. For all natural Philosophers (with few exceptions) posit a unique first mover, who according to them is God. The divine ones likewise more expressly posit a unique first being, a unique first cause, a unique highest God. Whence Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, last chapter: "Beings do not wish to be ill-disposed, nor is a plurality of authorities a good. Therefore one Prince" — which Avicenna also proves in *Metaphysics* I.6 and 7, as was touched on above; and Algazel in his *Metaphysics* II.10. The moral Philosophers also, treating of polities, say that Monarchy is the best polity, especially if there be found one sufficiently fit; nor that several should rule simultaneously, except on account of the lack of one fit man to rule uniquely. This the books of *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle, this the Civil Laws of the Nations, this the laws of all cities, communities, and Kingdoms attest. Those treating of military matters and the affairs of war also assert that one supreme leader is always best. All this appears more clearly in the lesser world — namely, in the lesser community of the powers of man (whence also all other human communities are originally derived). For there are collegially associated in man the exterior and interior powers, sense, appetite, will, and reason. But who is ignorant that one of these naturally ought to rule, and the others to serve? Whence the Philosopher in the *Secret of Secrets*, Part III, Chapter 8: "When God most high created man, He constituted His body a certain city, and His Intellect King in it; He constituted for it 5 bearers, namely the 5 Senses, presenting to it whatever things." Thus then in the greater World, also in the most ample City of the world, it must be felt. For thus most worthily, most honorably, and best does it suit God Himself and all others; therefore by the first Supposition it is necessary that it be so. Therefore it is not possible that there be many gods, equal, of the same species, differing only in number. Furthermore, according to the harmonious sentence of many Philosophers and Philosophical men, if there are many gods univocally, none of them is through itself and primarily God; but all by some one nature prior to themselves common to them and inhering commonly, which through itself and primarily is such, and the others secondarily through it. Therefore none of those is God, since He is not first and through Himself; but only that one common nature, as the first Supposition makes manifest. It is also more perfect to be good through oneself and primarily, than through another and secondarily, as no one is ignorant, and

the Philosophers attest. Therefore He who is not through Himself and primarily God, is not God, as the first Supposition and third part demonstrate. Since moreover these are gods who are not most actual, most pure, most simple, and most sufficient through themselves, but constituted through another, against the first Supposition and parts premised?

15. AGAINST THOSE FEIGNING MANY EQUAL GODS DIFFERING IN NATURE OR SPECIES

Let those tremble who feign many equal gods, but differing in nature or species: of whom one presides over the East, another over the West; one over the South, another over the North; one over crops, another over vines; one over peace, another over health; one is set over one species, another over another. These, like the previous ones, will be easily instructed by the virtue of the first Supposition. Who also does not easily see that, if there are many gods differing in species or nature, any of them lacks the specific and proper perfection of any other; therefore is not supremely perfect, since something more perfect could be? Wherefore consequently none of them is God, as the first Supposition and third part demonstrate.

16. AGAINST THOSE POSITING A CONFUSION OF MANY GODS OF UNEQUAL VIRTUE AND DISPARATE DIGNITY, WHETHER OF THE SAME SPECIES OR DIFFERENT

Let those be confounded who posit a confusion of many gods of unequal virtue and disparate dignity, whether of the same species or different. Such were certain ancients, who however posited better in this than those positing equal and simply equally first gods, in that they said all besides one alone — whom they called Jupiter — were subjected to that one alone, as to a Prince or father. Whence the Philosopher in *Politics* I.8: "Well did Homer call upon Jupiter, saying, 'Father of men and of gods,' calling Him father, the King of all these." And above in the same I: "All gods," he says, "are said to be ruled." This was also the old error of the ancient Romans. Whence Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IV.5: "But how in one place of this book can all the names of gods or goddesses be commemorated, which they could scarcely embrace in great volumes, distributing the proper offices of the deities to single things?" And below at 6: "They wish Jupiter himself to be King of all gods and goddesses. This, Varro believes, is also worshipped by those who worship one God alone without simulacrum, but called by another name" — by whom (as I believe) he understood the Jews; whence Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews* XII.2, recounts that a certain Aristaeus, a wise man, said to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt: "I have learned that the Jews worship the God maker of all things, whom we name Zen, that is, Jupiter." The Philosopher also in *De Mundo*, last chapter, showing that God, although one, is yet of many names, says that He is called Zeus and Jupiter; whom Hermes also in *On the Eternal Word* 21 likewise calls Jupiter. Plato also, by the testimony of Ambrose in *On the Good of Death*, called Jupiter both God and the mind of all. The Tartars also, who worship the great and immortal God, by the report of Marco of Venice in *On the Conditions and Customs of Eastern Regions* I.58, also worship a god whom they call Ntagay; whom they consider the god of earth and to bear the care

of themselves and of the fruits of earth, of their sons, and of their flocks; and this one most reverently. But these err horribly. For He is not God who is not supremely perfect, as the first Supposition shows.

17. AGAINST THOSE DENYING THAT GOD IS UNIQUE AND NOT MANY, OR AFFIRMING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE MANY; AND DENYING THAT IT IS NECESSARY SIMPLY THAT THERE BE A UNIQUE ONE AND NOT MANY, OR AFFIRMING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE MANY

Let those revere who deny that God is unique and not many, or who affirm that it is possible for there to be many; and who deny that it is necessary simply that there be a unique one and not many, or affirm that it is possible for there to be many. Such were many famous Philosophers. For as Augustine recounts in *De Civitate Dei* VIII.12, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Apuleius, and the other Platonists — and also Plato himself — judged that sacred rites should be made to many gods. But let all these deign to acknowledge that there are not, nor can there be, many gods equal or unequal, of the same species or different, as the prior parts lucidly make manifest. That one is necessarily simply, namely God, the first Supposition clearly shows; and that He is unique and not many, the first particle of this part shows. For nothing is necessarily simply except God. For God has no cause from which He depends in being, as the first Supposition and fifth part prove; nor has He any part, as the tenth part shows. Therefore anything else besides Himself, God could possibly absolutely destroy and remain. For He could will it not to be; therefore by the eighth part He could make it not to be, as the seventh part by the omnipotence of God shows: especially since anything else besides God is less than He, since not supremely perfect, as the first Supposition was saying — nay, even disproportionally and somehow infinitely less than He, since infinitely somehow distant from the supreme perfection aforesaid. Furthermore, who doubts that it is absolutely possible that there be a unique necessary being simply, namely God? Who would not at once consent? Who, with this posited and admitted as absolutely possible, would not easily defend himself from all repugnance? Therefore anything else besides God can not be simply; therefore anything else is not necessary being simply, as can be evidently shown from the demonstration of the first Supposition. Furthermore, if there is no necessary being simply besides God, neither can there be anything else besides Him, as the demonstration of the first Supposition perspicuously demonstrates; and if a falsifier should posit it to be, it would be continuously destroyed by the premises. This Avicenna also attests in his *Metaphysics* I.6 and 7, and Algazel in his *Metaphysics* II.1.

18. AGAINST THOSE POSITING MANY FIRST PRINCIPLES SIMPLY CONTRARY TO ONE ANOTHER, OF WHICH NONE IS REDUCED TO ANOTHER, NOR ALL TO SOMETHING ONE COMMON TO THEM — AS GOOD AND EVIL — AND CONSEQUENTLY DREAMING OF TWO SUCH GODS, OR MORE

Let those without shame be ashamed who posit many first principles simply contrary to one another, of which none is reduced to another, nor all to something one common to them — as

good and evil — and consequently further dreaming of two such gods, or more. The father of this error seems to be Empedocles. For seeing not only goods coming to be, but also evils, he posited one principle good, from which all goods would proceed; another evil, from which all evils would proceed; which he sometimes also named love or friendship, and strife or hatred. Whence the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* I, chapter 10: "Since contraries seemed to inhere to goods — and not only ordering and good, but disorder and the base; and more evils than goods, and depraved than upright — thus another introduced Love and Strife, each as the cause of those several things. For if one should follow up and take it to its sense, and not to what dictated Empedocles babbles, he will find Love to be the cause of goods, but Strife of evils. Wherefore if one should say that Empedocles in some way first names good and evil as principles, perhaps he will say well: if good is the cause of all goods, and evil of all evils." Pythagoras, following him, is said to have posited two *systichias* — two co-elementations or co-orderings — of 10 principles on one side, and 10 on the other, as is briefly touched in *Metaphysics* XII.37, where in the ninth Translation it has "co-elementation," but in the Translation which Averroes expounds, *systichia*: which word Alexander and Averroes likewise expound briefly to the aforesaid sense. But Eustratius, on that passage of the Philosopher in *Ethics* I.7, "But the Pythagoreans seem more probably to speak about it, positing one in the co-ordering of goods," in his commentary 56, expounding this more fully, says thus: "The Pythagoreans set forth two *systichias*, that is, co-orderings, which by following Eustratius himself can be described thus":

1. Limit Infinite
2. Perfect Superfluous
3. One Multitude
4. Right Left
5. Male Female
6. Straight Curved
7. Light Darkness
8. Square Oblong
9. Resting Moved
10. Good Evil

But following Alexander, it appears that the description ought to be transposed, namely by placing Good and Evil at the heads of the *systichias* as supreme, and the others under them — so that one would be called the *systichia* of good, the other of evil — which also seems to me more fitting, although the text which Averroes expounds says that the things understood through

themselves and the first substance are the last *systichia*: for I understand this in ascending. Alexander also seems to say that these Pythagoreans ordered the first under the genus which is good; and the last in evil. But if this be true, the other two which Eustratius posits ought to be removed, and in their place these two be put. The Philosopher himself, in *Metaphysics* I.12, both in the things ordered and in the order, differs from both. For he says: "Others say there are 10 principles according to the said co-elementation: Finite, infinite; Even, odd; One, plural; Right, left; Male, female; Resting, moved; Straight, curved; Light, darknesses; Good, evil; Quadrangular, oblong." But I think the Philosopher did not weigh much — because it was not much necessary — the order of these in this place. The reason of Pythagoras (as is recounted there) was because the denary is perfect, in that it comprehends the nature of all numbers. Therefore he posited 10. He also posited 10 celestial Spheres; and therefore perhaps he wished to posit 10 gods. Following this reason of Pythagoras, Architas the Pythagorean, as Boethius recounts in *Arithmetic* II.41, before Aristotle constituted the 10 famous Predicaments. To these, certain others succeeding, deceived by the previously touched motivation of Empedocles, said, as Averroes recounts upon *Metaphysics* XII, comment 52: "There are two Gods, of whom one causes goods, the other evils." The inventor — or rather follower — of this error was Manes the Maniac, the father of vain Manichaeans. It seems however more reasonable from the premises that he and his disciples should be called Empedocleans or Pythagoreans. Concerning this Manes, in the *Ecclesiastical History* book VII, chapter 28 (the second-to-last), it is written in this manner: "A certain Manes, raging according to his name, also stirred up by the impulse of the demon, teaches a hateful heresy"; where also many things are written about him. The blessed Augustine also, *On Heresies* 46, treats of this Manes and the Manichaeans and their heresy; and many other books were written against them or any of them. Isidore also, *Etymologies* VIII.9, recounts; and it is recounted in the *Canon*, Cause 24, last Question, last Chapter; where also many heretics with their heresies are recounted. His perverse sect persists in some, although few, parts even up to this day. But all these err in two ways; therefore they must be reduced in two ways. First, because they assert many Gods, against what was just shown. Secondly, because they construct an evil God: for how could there be any evil God, the first Supposition and third part of this most constantly reclaiming? Their motivation also ought to move no one. For any existing thing, insofar as existing, is good, and none simply evil, as invincible reason makes manifest, and the later, more profound, and more famous Philosophers and Catholic Doctors attest; therefore neither is anything inappropriate if it proceeds from a good God. What they argue concerning the denary number is not worth a denarius nor a minutum; for it does not even attain the force of Rhetorical persuasion.

19. AGAINST THE POETS LYING THAT GOD ENVIES STUDIOUS MEN OR OTHERS

Let the Poets be punished who lie that God envies studious men or others. Such were certain ancients, as the Philosopher recounts in *Metaphysics* I, in the Prologue. But these, like the previous ones, will be refuted, since to envy is evil; whom also there briefly the Philosopher refutes, citing the Proverb: "The Poets lie much."

20. AGAINST THOSE FABRICATING DISHONORABLE AND BASE GODS — EATING, DRINKING, MIXING WITH WOMEN, DELIGHTING IN DISHONORABLE, BASE, AND THEATRICAL MATTERS OR GAMES

Let those be honored who fabricate for themselves dishonorable and base gods — eating, drinking, mixing with women, delighting in dishonorable, base, and theatrical matters or games — and all who feign such goddesses for themselves. Such were the ancient Babylonians, who believed their god Bel to eat and drink, as is recounted in Daniel 14. Such also were the ancient Romans and Greeks, who believed their gods to eat and fornicate, and to delight in such matters and gesticulations; therefore they dedicated to them Theatrical Games, as is sufficiently established from their histories. Such also seem to be the Tartars, of whom Marco of Venice in *On the Conditions and Customs of Eastern Regions* I.58 says that every Tartar has in his house an idol of his god Natigay, and idols of his wife and son; and when they go to dinner or supper, first with the fat of cooked flesh they anoint the mouths of these gods of theirs, and they pour out part of the broth outside the house, so that these gods may receive their part. Concerning such gods, as Augustine recounts in *De Civitate Dei* VIII.13, the Gentiles opined that, just as good and honorable Gods are to be placated by sacred honors, that they may help, so also evil and dishonorable gods, lest they harm; therefore they joined Theatrical Games to their divine matters. Concerning such Gods and their Games and pictures, the Philosopher speaking in *Politics* VII, last chapter, writes thus: "The Legislator must, totally, exterminate from the City foul speech, like anything else: for to say easily anything of base things makes one near to doing it. The greatest care, therefore, must be taken from youth, that they neither say nor hear anything such. But if anyone has appeared saying or doing anything forbidden, if free but not yet judged worthy of mention in banquets, with disgraces and beatings he is to be punished; but one of older age in dishonorings unbecoming free men, for the sake of utility. Since therefore we exterminate the saying of any such things, it is manifest that also the seeing — either pictures or dishonorable speeches. The Princes' care, therefore, is that no sculpture or picture be of such actions, except among certain such gods to whom also the law has attributed lasciviousness. Further, the law dismisses those who have age more advanced both for themselves and for their boys with worship to honor the gods. But the younger ought not be set as spectators of Iambics or Comedy, before they receive the age in which it will exist for them to share already in reclining at table, and from drunkenness and from what is done by such, training will make all impassible. Now, therefore, in passing we have made discourse of these things; later, however, insisting we must determine more, whether it is necessary or not. First, whether it is not necessary, doubting; and how it is necessary; according to the present time we have remembered as if necessarily. But perhaps they did not say well, that such was Theodore the gesticulator of Tragedy: for he never permitted any to bring himself in, nor any of the vile actors, as ones appropriate to the first Theaters, to the first hearings. But this same thing happens also in the conversations of men, and in those of things: for we love all the first ones more; therefore we must make all foreign things which are depraved foreign to youths, but most of all whatever of these has the infection or adhering." What also Plato felt concerning Theatrical Games offered to such gods, hear

(Augustine narrating, where above), that he judged the Poets themselves, who composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the gods, must be expelled from the city: with whom Scaevola, the most learned Pontiff of the Romans, also concurs, as their deeds attest, and Augustine recounts in *De Civitate Dei* IV.27, distinguishing a threefold genus of gods, namely the Poetical, the Philosophical, and the Civil. The first he calls trifling, because they feign many things unworthy of the gods: namely because they so deform the gods that they cannot be compared with good men, when they make one steal, another commit adultery; likewise something else basely and ineptly to say or do — as that three goddesses contended among themselves for the prize of beauty; that the two conquered by Venus overthrew Troy; that Jupiter himself was turned into a Bull or Swan, that he might lie with someone; that a Goddess married a man; that Saturn devoured his sons. Finally, no marvels and vices can be feigned which are not found there, and which are far from the nature of the gods. But just as the previous ones are led by the first Supposition and third part to the goodness of the gods or God, so these are led to honesty. Is not honesty to be reckoned a great virtue and goodness?

Likewise, if God eats, this is either on account of necessity, or on account of pleasure: not on account of necessity, as the first Supposition, fifth part, sixth, and seventh clearly teach; for then He could also be corrupted, which the premises corrupt. If on account of pleasure, how is He not to be reckoned intemperate or incontinent? — against the third part of this. God also most fully suffices to Himself for fullest pleasure, joy, gladness, beatitude, and perfect happiness, as the fifth and third parts demonstrate. Everyone also alternately delighted by eating is alternately changed, and has a mouth and other members required for such an act: but God by no means, as the sixth and tenth parts show.

Likewise, it can be shown that God does not touch a woman, especially since God is necessary being, and inimitable, not needing an heir, nor the help of anyone, as the premises attest. Also, if God so generated from a woman or goddess — what worthier thing would He generate than another God? — and so there would be many gods, against the 17th part of this. If also any goddess be posited, it seems that she is in some way God, since "God" is an essential name by the sixth part of this. Therefore there will be many gods of disparate dignity; for it seems that a goddess is of more imperfect condition than a God; against the 16th and 17th parts of this. How, moreover, will such a goddess be honored as a God, since she is of more imperfect condition? Therefore not supremely perfect; therefore not God, as the first Supposition makes manifest.

21. AGAINST IDOLATERS

Let Idolaters cast away all their idols — masculine, feminine, or neuter, of human, bestial, or other figure. Such idols indeed many ancient Gentiles of old worshipped; some also up to this day in the parts of the East are reported to worship such idols. But any idol, if it be of any perfection, power, and virtue, is only of finite, and could be of greater; but God by no means, as the first Supposition teaches. An idol is also fabricable and corruptible: but God is necessary being, as the same Supposition makes manifest. An idol moreover needs a supporter, and many

other things, and is mutable, an irrational power, composed of diverse things: but God by no means, as the fifth, sixth, eighth, and tenth parts teach. Is not man, beast, tree, heaven, Sun, and Moon of more perfect nature than an idol — metal, any wood, stone, or mud? And yet none of these is God, as the 13th, 12th, and 11th parts show. Therefore neither can any idol be. All Idolaters also posit a multitude of idols, therefore of gods, against the 17th part of this. Idols moreover are posited as having sex and diverse members, which can be refuted by the things premised in the demonstration of the next part of this. Idolaters also make their idols from nobler and ignobler, more perfect and more imperfect matter; but, the first Supposition proving, God cannot be that than which something more perfect is found. An idol also made of nobler matter — for example, of gold — could have greater matter, and perhaps purer, and more gems, and better stones; therefore could also be better: but God by no means.

Here perhaps the Idolaters will respond, saying that that material idol is not by itself materially God; but when it has been carmined, dedicated, and consecrated in the due manner, it receives a certain virtue, and so becomes God, and is. But these can be refuted as before; for if it is so, that god is new and not necessary being, mutable, passible, destructible, needy, composed, plurifiable — if such consecration be made in diverse places — but God by no means, as the things had make manifest. Moreover, that virtue which the consecrated idol receives is either God or not. If it is God, and the composite from the material idol and that virtue is God, then either there are many gods, or the same God is part of Himself. To the same point: if that virtue is God, either it is that God of whom the first Supposition speaks, or another. If that one, why is He not more compendiously worshipped without the consecrated idol? — especially since He does not need an idol; since also an idol is said to be a little form formed to the image and likeness of another thing; but God is altogether incorporeal; therefore He cannot properly have any little form or bodily likeness, by the testimony of the tenth part. That true God, moreover, by no incantation or carmination can be drawn to an idol, since He is altogether immutable and impassible. If another, there are many gods, against the 17th part of this. If that virtue is not God, neither is the material idol God; how then from two non-gods is one God made? That virtue also, even if it be not God, is yet finite, and could be greater; and similarly the material idol; therefore also the whole gathered together: but God by no means, the first Supposition and fourth part forbidding. Likewise, if a man makes for himself a God, either he does this by his own virtue, or by another's: if by his own, it seems that he is more worthy than his god, as any maker than his thing made; if by another's virtue, either of another God, or of a non-God: if of another God, therefore that god does not suffice, and there will be many gods; if of a non-God, how can a non-God make one God? And the lesser the greater, and so much greater? Likewise, if a man makes for himself a God, that God is more obliged to the man than contrariwise; like a son to his father, and a thing made to its maker.

Otherwise perhaps it is responded that the material idol, after such consecration rightly performed, is wholly transubstantiated and converted into God. But how can a corporeal thing be immediately converted into an incorporeal thing? For God is incorporeal and altogether

indivisible, by the testimony of the tenth part. This conversion also can be refuted in many ways, according to what is given by them. For it appears to any sense, with all experiment attesting, that there is the same material idol there as before; therefore, if any conversion is made there, it seems rather that God is converted into the idol than contrariwise. That God moreover into whom the idol is converted is either new or eternal; not new, the first Supposition forbidding; if eternal, either it is that God of whom the first Supposition speaks, or another, etc., as against the prior response. And if you should still consequently say that God dwells in the heavens, nor heeds what is done about us on earth, nor furnishes help to us, except through such consecration He descend into the form of an idol to dwell with us — you make God mutable, against the sixth part; nor do you heed that God always knows all things by the ninth part, and that He has a will universally efficacious by the eighth. Is it not so, even if God dwells on the highest summit of heaven, that He sees all things which are done on earth, every necessity of yours, every petition of yours of mouth and heart? Is it not so, also, that if He should will that you be helped on earth and have any petition most efficaciously, immediately it would be done? And is it not so, that the more honorably and better you feel concerning Him, the more willingly will He hear your petitions? And is it not more honorable and better that He, existing in heaven, should know and be able to help you on earth, than that He should not know nor be able, unless having left heaven He descend to earth? Thus then feel concerning God, especially since the first Supposition and parts premised infallibly demonstrate this. Furthermore, to the consecrated idol, either God comes voluntarily, or necessarily and unwillingly. If voluntarily, He recognizes in heaven the consecration made at such time and in such place on earth; why then not similarly all other things? But that necessarily, unwilling and constrained, through such consecration He descends from heaven, who would say it, the first Supposition, third part, and seventh most constantly reclaiming?

Furthermore, who will make such conversion? If a man, by his own virtue, or that of his words — why cannot he more easily make every lesser conversion of any material thing into any other? If God makes this, since in every making and motion the maker and mover are simultaneous with the thing made and moved, God was there simultaneously with the idol now converted, and prior in nature to the conversion that was made; therefore, to have God present there, it was not necessary that such conversion should be made.

Further, Hermes Trismegistus the threefold, in his book *On the Eternal Word*, the maker, worshipper, and defender of idols, says that idols and statues are certain gods — not however the supreme God, but subjected to Him and lesser than He, and which he says are made by men, and that this is the greatest power of men, and that they are composed from souls and bodies; and because men cannot make souls, they call out the souls of Demons, Angels, or men, and clothe them in sacred images, as appears clearly at chapters 25, 40, and following. Whence in chapter 40: "Of all marvels," he says, "this conquers in admiration: that man could find out the divine nature, and effect it. Since therefore our forefathers erred much concerning the reason of the gods, incredulous, and not heeding the divine cult and religion, they invented an art by which

they would effect gods; to this invention they joined virtue agreeing from the nature of the world, and mixing it — since they could not make souls — calling out the souls of Demons or Angels, they put them into sacred images and divine mysteries, through which the idols had powers both of doing good and evil." And below in the same 40, he shows the same concerning human souls. And above at 25, speaking to Asclepius despising statues: "O Asclepius," he says, "do you see how much you yourself distrust statues animated, full of sense and spirit, and doing such great and such things — both statues prescient of futures, and prophets predicting many things, making weaknesses for men, and curing them?" But if Trismegistus speaks univocally of God or gods, by the 16th and 17th parts of this he will be easily corrected. But if he speaks equivocally, it is not too much to be heeded; for things being known, it appears vain to wrangle too much about names.

But concerning religion, very much is to be heeded. Since therefore that one God of Trismegistus, of whom the first Supposition speaks, is supremely knowing, supremely good, supremely pious and clement, supremely generous and powerful, also indeed everywhere present, as the same Supposition and following parts demonstrate, and you yourself in the same book of yours in diverse places confess — why do you feign other gods, or another god, for yourself? Why cannot this one suffice you? — especially since this God in any goodness exceeds any other, and any others, infinitely, as the third and fourth parts evidently show. Why therefore do you reckon Him less sufficient or less propitious to the suppliant? Why also, to His prejudice and contempt, do you bestow upon other gods made by hand the honor of divinity, and procure that it be bestowed by others? Why also, moreover, do you consecrate idols to Demons, reprobate and malignant Spirits, enemies of the true God and of His friends, render cult, and derogate from the cult of the true God? Are not Bel, Astaroth, and the rest of the names of idols, names of Demons and malignant Spirits, as the Necromantic books *On the Office of Spirits* and others make manifest? What, I ask, does the consecration of an idol differ from the magical consecration of a Head of Venus or Saturn? Indeed such a head duly consecrated would seem much more divine than an idol. For very many Spirits are reported to inhabit such a head; but only one inhabits an idol. But who does not know that a head so consecrated — or rather execrated — is not God, nor to be cultivated with divine honor? Why also do you offer Latria — that is, the cult due to God alone — to any creature? For it is not hidden from you, Trismegistus, Father of Philosophers (as I think), that God is the final cause of any creature, as is also easily persuaded by the first Supposition with the second. Therefore no creature is finally to be loved, honored, or cultivated for its own sake; but finally for the sake of God, that thus He may finally and principally be honored in it.

You will perhaps respond, saying that you so honor those Gods and offer them the cult of Dulia, not Latria. But why, I ask, do you so adore the Devil, the enemy of God and all His friends, Angels and men? For never have I heard of an idol dedicated to the name of any holy Angel, but only to the name of Bel, Astaroth, or the like, all of whom it is established are Demons and reprobate spirits.

And if you should still say that some Holy Angel inhabits some consecrated idol, how, I ask, does the idol enter at your consecration — voluntarily or by force? Voluntarily it does not seem. For how would a Holy and blessed Angel willingly leave the most glorious society of Angels and the most glorious heaven, and descend to the dark prison of the idol, and remain there solitary? Also, if voluntarily he comes to the idol, he could not come; therefore even after such consecration rightly performed, the idol could not be God, but only the matter which preceded; and so you would be worshipping not God but only that matter — which (as I think) you yourselves deny. If moreover he should come voluntarily, voluntarily he stays there, and could voluntarily withdraw at any time; and so you, deluded, will adore one trunk. Nor at your consecration does he enter constrained and unwilling. For thus a blessed Angel in heaven would become miserable on earth. How also do your powers exceed the powers of the strongest Angels? Or your prudence theirs? How also do the powers of carmens, aromatics, and herbs transcend natural bounds, ascend to the summit of heaven, and drive out Angels, enclose, imprison, and bind them inseparably?

Moreover, if such consecration could draw one heavenly Angel unwilling from heaven, why not another, and yet another, and all the others, and so empty the whole heaven of Angels? Is it not also so, that at the same hour at which you in your place call out some Angel, another could also elsewhere call out the same one similarly? To which of you therefore would he come? Certainly to neither, and so you both will be deluded, and will adore a pure stone or wood.

Further, if anyone, with your idol consecrated in your place to the name of any Angel, should call out the same Angel to another idol elsewhere through consecration, carmination, herbs, gems, incense, aromatics, and all such stronger things — would he not abandon your idol and go to the other? Furthermore, with your consecration ceasing, and you together with others sleeping, what would detain the Angel unwilling there perpetually? For a continued effect requires a continuing cause. But that any force of characters, herbs, aromatics, or gems would have such dominion over so potent and noble a creature would be altogether dissonant from reason and contrary to the natural order. How also is it not contrary to the natural order, that an inferior man should preside over superior Angels, by commanding, sending, and compelling them as he wishes? For it would more befit contrariwise, as we see in any polity, in any family, in every house duly ordered.

You will say perhaps, Trismegistus, as in your book you sometimes seem to suggest, that man is more perfect and superior to an Angel in the natural order. Why then do you subject yourself to a creature subjected to you, and worship and cultivate it as your God? For it would more befit contrariwise.

Concerning good and holy human souls likewise it is to be argued, especially since, by your own authorship, departing from the body they ascend to heaven.

Furthermore, if you make for yourself a God, it seems that in some way you are greater and worthier than He, as a maker than his thing made; and that your God, if He is grateful, is more

obliged to love, honor, and cultivate you than you Him: for you have done more for Him. For you have given Him being, like a father — nay, more than a father gave to his son, whose being also continually depends on the nod of your judgment. For by something contrary to the prior consecration you can dissolve Him, or by fire, hammer, or axe reduce Him to dust and to nothing. Nor ought your reasoning, Hermes, to conclude anything to any rational animal: for you know well, as also the Necromancers and others know well, that Demons, the reprobate and malignant, are prescient of futures, and work many marvels even in the bodies of men; not however are they gods to be cultivated by men, but to be guarded against as their pestilent enemies and crafty seducers.

Some however responding more subtly, and approaching nearer to true religion, say that the true God, although He is one and incorporeal and simple, yet has many virtues by which and through which He shows Himself, making many corporeal and sensible effects, from which correspondingly He is named with many names. Whence the Philosopher in *De Mundo*, last chapter, says that God, since He is one, is yet of many names according to the multitude of those things which He renews, and of which He is the cause; and that He is called Jupiter, and by many other names. It was also shown above through other testimonies that God is called Jupiter. Whence also Albricius of London, *On the Origin of the Gods*, or in his *Poetaster*, in the Prologue, says that God is called Vituneus, because He furnishes life; Sentinus, because sense: and is called Jupiter in the ether, Juno in the air, Diana on earth, and in diverse sex; for which he also alleges these verses of Valerius Sorianus:

Jupiter Almighty, finder of things and of Kings, Father and mother of the Gods, one and the same God.

Therefore these responders say further that they fabricate an idol only to the true God — although in much dissimilar and unworthy manner, yet in the more similar and worthier manner that they know and can. They say also that they fabricate many idols to the one true God, on account of the multitude of names, effects, and virtues of His; and so they cultivate these idols not on account of the idols themselves in any way, but that through the one true God and His manifold virtue they may manifoldly venerate. And this seems the response of the wise ancient Romans. But would that all worshippers of idols so understood, so felt. But to what purpose, I ask, is it necessary to impose so many names on one God, to fabricate so many and so varied idols — when He could more compendiously, more briefly, more lightly, and more usefully be called by one proper name God, and similarly without an idol be adored? For Him being adored under that name, all His virtues are necessarily co-adored: for these do not really differ from Him, as the fifth and tenth parts teach, and the response confesses. But he who would not adore the virtues of God except severally, and through several idols, will never adore them severally; nay, it is necessary that he not adore many incomparably more than he ever adores, since God has infinite virtues, as the third part demonstrates; but he can know distinctly only finite and few, and fabricate only finite idols.

Is it not also more compendious and useful that, in any necessity, you should have one certain refuge most fully sufficient in every way — as is God, the fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth parts attesting — to which you may always promptly recur by supplication? Than that, according to the doctrine of Varro, in infirmity to Aesculapius, in war to Mars, on the sea to Neptune, for wine to Liber, for water to the Nymphs, and so in single necessities to single Gods, names of Gods, or of God, you should recur? For you can fall into many necessities, whence you might not know to which proper God to flee by entreaty — unless perhaps you should wish to feign for yourself some new God and fabricate a new idol for Him; but before you should do this, perhaps you would perish. Let then the most sufficient and most omnipotent and most clement, the one true God, and the one name of Him, suffice you always, everywhere, and in all things, the multitude of idols being relinquished.

Let also any subtle and learned man take care for himself, while he preaches the many and varied virtues of God, while he names Him variously, and fabricates varied idols — although he himself soundly understands that these virtues in God in no way really differ, but are the same, and God is really only one and simple — lest perhaps he make the rude, simple, and unlearned to believe that these virtues really differ, and also that there are many gods really differing according to the multitude of names and the differences of idols.

22. AGAINST THE ARIANS

Let the arid Arians be converted, who turn aside no small part of Asia — who, by the testimony of Augustine in *On Heresies* 49 and Isidore in *Etymologies* VIII.11, and in the Canon where above, separate the substance of the Divine Persons, and co-affirm them as unequal and not co-eternal: but the Son the temporal creature of the Father, and the Holy Spirit the temporal creature of the Son: since if it were so, there would be a plurality and inequality of Gods against the premises, and against the edict of the first Supposition.

How also would He be God, who would not be eternal and necessary being, as the first Supposition shows, and the preceding things have taught?

23. AGAINST THE DONATISTS

Let the Donatists return, leading away nearly the whole of Africa, similar and dissimilar to the Arians, saying that the divine Persons are of the same substance, but of unequal magnitude — because the Son is less than the Father, and the Holy Spirit less than both — as some Histories, and Augustine in *On Heresies* 69 and Epistle 32 to Boniface, attest. But these let them deign to acknowledge that He cannot be God who is not supremely perfect, as the first Supposition teaches.

24. AGAINST THE SABELLIANS

Let the Sabellians revere, who posit in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit unity and identity of essence and person. For God is necessary to be, and is necessary to be God, as the first

Supposition shows, just as was shown above. But it is impossible that any such thing be; or if it could in any way be, it could not be God. For if Father and Son are the same, this is either with respect to Himself or with respect to another. Not with respect to Himself: for no thing begets, effects, or produces itself (for this includes contradiction), by the judgment of any mind whatsoever, as the preceding things make manifest. If with respect to another, therefore God the Son is from another than Himself — another, I say, personally and essentially. That so other, then, either is God or not. If He is God, there are many gods, against what was shown before. If He is not God, God is begotten and is from a non-God; the opposite of which the first Supposition shows, as the preceding things have declared. Nor can anyone respond for Sabellius by saying that God is not simultaneously Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but successively, when He has wished, severally — now this, then that, at other times that. For when He is Son, He is necessarily Son of some Father or parent: for these necessarily refer to one another, as no mind is permitted to be ignorant. But neither can He be Son of Himself, nor of another, as was shown above, His hypothesis standing: God would also be mutable, against the sixth part premised.

Chapter 25 — Against Those Who Do Not Distinguish, but Concede Without Qualification That God Is of Infinite Virtue and of Infinite Power, Even Intensively

Let those who say that God is of infinite virtue and of infinite power distinguish and separate the pure from the worthless, and the true understanding from the false. For no one seems to have ever wanted such a saying to be understood of infinity according to duration only, or according to extension, or according to those other improper modes which the Philosopher touches upon in *Physics* III, but only according to intension. And according to this kind of infinity it can have a twofold understanding. **One [understanding is] proper**, namely that God is properly intense, and his virtue and power infinitely so — as if some remitted light were intensified until it became infinitely intense; or as though from the beginning it were infinitely intense, just as heat and other natural qualities are intense under certain degrees. But God is not in this way properly infinite intensively, nor is any virtue of his. For whatever is properly intense could without contradiction be remitted. Therefore God and his virtue could be remitted, and could be more imperfect than he now is — which power, together with its act, the fourth Part and the first Supposition forbid.

Likewise, if God were properly intense, it would be without contradiction possible that there should be some remitted suppositum of the same species or nature; and since "God" is an essential name (because otherwise God could be not-God), that more remitted suppositum would be God. Wherefore, according to the fourth Part, it would be supremely perfect, and consequently supremely intense. It was shown above that there cannot be many unequal gods of the same species or nature. And further, why could not the more remitted God be intensified up to the supreme, even to equality with the more intense, since they are of the same nature? And so

there could be many equal gods of the same species, differing only in number. God too would be mutable — which was reprov'd above.

This same point could be demonstrated otherwise and in many ways, but these things ought to suffice for any pure lover of truth. God therefore is not properly intense, nor remitted, neither intensible nor remissible, but of a most indivisible, most immutable, most stable, and most simple nature. Yet he is truly, although in a certain way improperly, of infinite virtue, of infinite fortitude, of infinite power intensively — which can be understood in three modes.

First, with respect to other active powers, namely equivalently, and even pre-eminently. For whatever action or effect this active power can produce — say heat, and twice this, and four times this, and so on — God can produce by his proper power, without the aid of any other, and indeed greater. Indeed, even if there could be a heat infinite intensively that could act so much, God could likewise.

Second, as to the species of action. For God by his proper power can make and create something out of nothing, which no other power, however great, can do.

Third, as to the measure of the extrinsic action or effect. For every effect which another cause produces in some time, God could produce in less time, however much less — indeed, even in an instant. God can also produce some extrinsic operation or effect, and a greater one twofold, fourfold, and so on without end. There is therefore no maximum that he can do, nor minimum that he cannot do; wherefore he can truly be called of infinite power. For according to the Philosopher, *On the Heavens and the World* I [text 116], and through Averroes in his *Commentary*, an active power is defined and bounded by the maximum into which it can do, or — according to those who perhaps look more subtly — by the minimum into which it cannot.

Chapter 26 — Against the Painters of God, Who Depict Him as Affected by Various Qualities, Attributes, Habits, or Accidental Acts, or by Some Accident

Let the painters of God desist from depicting him as affected by various qualities, attributes, habits, or accidental acts really diverse from him, or by any accidents whatsoever, or by some accident. For such qualities and accidents would not be infinitely intense, on account of what was said above; nor finitely, on account of the fourth Part already laid down. Those accidents too would either be infinite in number or finite. They would not be infinite, for it is better to be perfected through finite means and to need fewer rather than many. The first Supposition does not allow this, nor does the second permit it. Nor can they be posited as finite, because then more in number would be worth more. Thus God would not be supremely perfect, nor would he have all power and virtue — which the first Supposition shows.

Furthermore, that God is disposed by no accidents — indeed, that he is not subject to any accident — is clearly evident from what precedes. For if he were subject to some accidents, or to

some accident, he would not be the most pure act, nor maximally actual, contrary to the third Part of this work.

Again, if God has any accident, it is either superfluous, or necessary, or useful: not superfluous, on account of the third Part of this work; nor necessary or useful, on account of the fifth.

Further, since an accident can be present or absent while the subject remains, if God is disposed by some accident, he is mutable, contrary to the sixth Part already laid down.

Chapter 27 — Against Despair Either from the Magnitude or from the Multitude of Sins

Let the Cainites and the Judaics breathe again, who despair on account of however great a magnitude or multitude of crimes. The **Cainites** are so called from Cain, who on account of the magnitude of his iniquity despaired of pardon: "My iniquity is greater," he says, "than that I should deserve pardon" (Gen. 4).

The **Judaics** are so called from the Jews, who despair on account of the multitude of their sins. For they tenaciously believe — and within a short time they steadfastly said this to me myself — that if anyone has sinned a fourth time, pardon is not possible for him, nor any medicine of penance. This is to be understood of the same kind of sin, and of one who has at some time fallen into sin, and risen again through the mercy of God and penance; who, after penance, relapsing, fell a second time, and likewise rose again a second time; who still, relapsing, falls a third time, and a third time also rises; who, according to them, if he falls a fourth time, will not be able to rise, but every hope of salvation is taken from him. Their opinion seems to them to be founded on Amos 1, where the Lord speaks thus: "For three transgressions of Damascus, and for four, I will not turn away from him"; and so concerning the three and four transgressions of Gaza, Tyre, Edom, Ammon, Moab, Judah, and Israel in turn. And when I asked a certain learned Jew what such a one would do if it should happen that anyone among them sinned a fourth time, he replied: "Whatever he pleases, since he is most certainly handed over to the Devil and damned"; and that perhaps in the end he will wander as a vagabond in some grove or desert, and will perish by some wretched death.

But the first Supposition refutes both these and those, and leads them back to the hope of mercy, pardon, and salvation. For if God is supremely good, such that nothing better could be, he is also supremely merciful, such that nothing more merciful could be — or even be conceived. He is likewise supremely pious and clement, supremely rich and powerful, supremely liberal, supremely generous, supremely magnificent, and in all goodnesses supremely good, and beyond what can be understood supremely full, as the third and fourth Parts show. For who even slightly hesitates that mercy, piety, clemency, power, liberality, generosity, magnificence, and other such are most splendid goodnesses? But the sin of a man, however great, is finite and small. For it could be increased, and there could be another sin greater than it; indeed, it is as it were a point, a nothing, a void, with respect to the divine mercy, piety, and clemency, which are most infinitely

infinite — as is anything finite with respect to anything infinite. Why therefore can such mercy and piety, such clemency and power, not overcome, take away, and purge so small a sin? Why cannot such liberality, and such generosity, and so great a magnificence, remit so small a debt to the prodigal and penitent son, humbly supplicating, and having no means to repay? Why not most fully relieve so small a need of his — indeed, also to give him beyond these some great gifts? — especially since from such remissions and bestowals his infinite riches and abundance are diminished by no need, nothing decreases for him, but rather in a certain way it more increases: one inestimable jewel, one most clear pearl, one most precious soul, one most worthy creature, and through it perhaps many others. Since also through this his domestic citizens and friends rejoice with great gladness, and praise him more, glorify him, and adore him.

Is it not more powerful to be able to do these things than not to be able? And is it not more merciful and clement, more liberal and magnificent, for one able so to do, to do this for the wretched, the needy, the truly penitent, the one proposing to desist and humbly supplicating — than to turn away the face, to stop up the ear, to harden the heart without compassion, and mercilessly to block the fount of innumerable mercy prepared for the wretched? Is it not therefore most fitting that the good God be able so to do, and most decent that he so do, as the first Supposition shows? Whoever also will say, "Up to so much, or so much, can God remit, wash away, and purge sin, and beyond he cannot" — does he not absolutely set an end, a limit, and a measure to divine goodness, power, and infinite mercy? And does he not as it were press it together and constrict it under a bushel? Therefore whoever, oppressed by however great a magnitude of sin, securely repents — let him without doubt approach, let him drink certain hope of mercy, pardon, and salvation. Wherefore also whoever, transfixed by however great a multitude of sins, let him confidently return to the hope of life. For any of his sins is finite and small; wherefore the whole multitude likewise of all his sins, especially since all those, as they say, are four, or at least are comprehended under a finite and brief number — and that whole multitude could still further be increased by sinning [in number], and could be increased in malice, and twofold, and a hundredfold, and however much greater you wish, if, namely, each unit of any simple sin were augmented and proportionally increased; and there can be another multitude of sins greater in number, and in malice manifoldly greater than that. This multitude therefore is finite and small, as it were nothing with respect to the divine mercy, and power, piety, and clemency, generosity, and magnificence, most infinitely infinite above every number and measure, as the first Supposition together with the third and fourth Parts clearly show — and the rest as above.

Who moreover dares to say: "Up to so many, or so many in number, can God remit sins and extend the hand of piety, and not beyond"? For the goodness, power, wisdom, mercy, and other virtues of God, just as they are absolutely infinite intensively, so also innumerable, as the first Supposition with the third and fourth Parts manifest. I also specifically address you, O Jews. Is it not so, that someone committing once some light gluttony, pride, or some light sin, and immediately rising again through penance, and so a second and a third and again a fourth time

sinning from depraved custom and human frailty — could not, I say, someone commit on the first occasion one great sin, say a most horrible blasphemy, a most cruel homicide, a most foul incest, or some other sin equally weighing or outweighing this fourth sin or these four sins, and obtain mercy for that, however grave and great, and gain pardon, as the things already established have taught — which you also do well in conceding? Why therefore not concerning that fourth sin equal to this, or perhaps lesser, all circumstances weighed?

Moreover, if some father or master had a son or servant entirely fearful, and he proposed to avoid offense to the father or master as much as he could, and labored manifoldly toward this — yet from ignorance or human frailty he once offended the father or master, and immediately with tears and every possible satisfaction diligently sought and received reconciliation, and so a second and third time consequently; who likewise sins a fourth time, and in like manner, or in a more devout manner if he can, seeks reconciliation, with firm resolve never to offend further — and all this, not from fear of punishment, but from love of justice, not from servile fear, but from most devout filial love. And there were of the same father or master another son or servant, wholly proud, contumacious, and rebellious, who in contempt of his father or master proposed always to sin, never to repent, never to make satisfaction, nor ever to obtain any reconciliation, and so lived most wickedly for many years, ever heaping crimes upon crimes with all his strength: is not the former more apt and disposed than the latter to obtain mercy and to procure full reconciliation? Otherwise indeed, too great an occasion would be afforded for men to lie like swine in their sins until the evening of their lives, and then at last when they could no longer sin, to repent of all sins at once and together, however lukewarmly or remissly. But who, I ask, knows so, save he who is foolish and mad?

You also, O Jew — have you never remitted a fourth time to your son, or to a foreign servant offending, humbly and truly penitent? I think a fifth, sixth, and seventh time, indeed seventy times seven if it was needful, and beyond. And if you have not done it, I know that I have, and many others have done so still more often. And is not also God, supremely good, so merciful as the wretched sinner — indeed incomparably far more merciful, beyond every number and measure, as the twelfth Supposition most clearly manifests? Whoever therefore, burdened by however great a multitude of sins, let him securely repent, cease to sin, and receive certain hope of grace, life, and glory to be obtained.

But the motive of the Jews, if it be understood literally, does not work for them. For the truth is that the Lord sometimes converts certain sinners from very many sins, but others from few, indeed from one actual or original only, sometimes does not convert. If, however, it be expounded morally, it likewise does not work for them. For expounding morally, the first sin can be understood as alluringly and voluntarily to think evil; the second, to consent to evil; the third, to fulfill it in deed. Or: the first is to will to do evil; the second, to seek opportunity for doing it; the third, having gained the opportunity, to consummate it in work. The fourth sin truly is so to remain finally without penance or correction in the present life — from which sin the Lord does not convert in the present life (because then he would not so finally remain), nor even after this

life. For the Jews confess that "If the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in whatever place it shall fall, there it shall be" (Eccl. 11).

Chapter 28 — Against the Cainites Who Believe That God Admits No Sinner to the Grace of Reconciliation Unless He Has First Made Satisfaction by Meriting As Much as or More Than He Has Transgressed, and by Making Satisfaction Has Merited As Much as He Has Transgressed

Let the Cainites beware — those who believe, and therefore perhaps despair, that God admits no sinner to the grace of reconciliation unless he has first made satisfaction by meriting as much as or more than he has transgressed, and by making satisfaction has merited as much as he has transgressed. Did not Cain intend this when he said, "My iniquity is greater than that I should deserve pardon," as if he were saying: "If my iniquity were less and small, I could by making satisfaction proportionally merit pardon. But if it were so, one who had always sinned most gravely for many years, up to old age or senility, would necessarily despair." For he cannot make satisfaction and merit as much as he has transgressed, contrary to what was just shown.

How moreover would God be supremely merciful, such that nothing more merciful could be (as the first Supposition and what was premised testify), if he remitted the offense or debt of sin to no one without full satisfaction first sent ahead? This is not the work of mercy, but of justice and rigor; indeed, not so to do would seem to be impiety and cruelty. Does not even a good and merciful man sometimes remit an injury to one supplicating without prior full satisfaction? How much more God, who, as the first Supposition teaches, is shown to be incomparably better and more merciful?

Chapter 29 — Against the Pelagians or Cainites Who Imagine That God Gives No One a Benefit Gratis, but Only for His Preceding Merit

Let the Pelagians turn pale — or rather the Cainites, the sons and followers of Cain — who imagine that God gives no one a benefit gratis, but only for preceding merit. Did not Cain sufficiently insinuate that pardon is given to no one unless he has first merited it? — and consequently that grace is not pardon, or that by which the pardon of sins is effected. The Pelagians indeed, sons and followers of Cain, what their father said implicitly, they say explicitly: namely, that grace is given according to our merits. And if grace is not given gratis, what else is given gratis? Is it not for this reason that among Hesiod, Homer, Chrysippus, and other ancient Greek poets, the three Graces, daughters of Jove, sisters, with hands intertwined, laughing, young, virgins, are described in loose and translucent garment? And, to be silent of the rest — why virgins, and in loose garment, unless that no price intervening might prostitute or corrupt the gratuitous benefits of the favors? In which also, according to Seneca *On Benefits* I [3], "nothing ought to be bound nor inscribed." And does not the Philosopher, in his *Rhetoric* II

[11], defining favor (*gratia*), say: "Favor according to which one is said to have favor, is to come to the aid of one in need, not for any return, nor that something might come to the helper, but that something might come to him." This Cain, then, accursed, is the author and pestilential father of the pestilential Pelagians in this part. O most perverse generation, and faithless sons. But is it not so that, the first Supposition teaching, God is supremely good, such that nothing better could be; and is supremely liberal, such that nothing more liberal could be — or even be conceived? And is it not more liberal to give than to sell? — to give gratis, than for some merit as a kind of preceding or even subsequent reward? Does not a liberal man bestow many things in this way? Why therefore not God, infinitely more liberal?

Chapter 30 — Against Those Untaught in the Art of Loving, Who Do Not Know That God Is to Be Loved for His Own Sake, and All Else for God's Sake, and That All Human Acts Are to Be Finally Ordered to Him for His Own Sake, and That He Is to Be Loved Above All Things; Who Also Suppose That a Man, for Whatever Goods to Be Gained or Preserved, or Whatever Penal Evils to Be Removed When Had, or to Be Avoided When Not Had — Being Able Not to Do These Things Without Sinning — Ought to Do, At Least Knowingly, Even the Slightest Thing Against God, Against the Commandment, Against the Divine Prohibition, Offending Him Even Most Lightly in Any Way Against the Rule of Conscience Divinely Instituted, or in Any Way However Slightly to Sin Knowingly

If anyone among this people knows not the art of loving, Let him read here, and reading, having learned the song, let him love.

Let every man therefore know that God is to be loved for his own sake, and other things for God's sake, and that all human acts are to be finally ordered to him for his own sake, and that therefore God is to be loved above all things. Wherefore also no man, for whatever goods to be gained or preserved, or whatever penal evils to be removed when had or to be avoided when not had — provided he could refrain from doing these things without sinning — ought knowingly to do even the slightest thing against God, against the commandment or divine prohibition, against the rule of conscience divinely instituted, or in any way to sin knowingly however slightly, by offending him in any way however lightly. For it stands fast that so great a good as God is, is to be loved, and not for the sake of another, by an order congruous and natural; for he is not naturally ordered to anything else. Since according to the natural order, the more vile is ordered to the more worthy, the less perfect to the more perfect, and the less good to the greater; but anything below God is less perfect and good than he is, as the first Supposition shows.

Likewise, it is more worthy, more perfect, and better to be loved for one's own sake than for the sake of another, as appears from what was premised, nor does anyone doubt this. Since therefore God is to be loved, he is to be loved for his own sake, as the first Supposition and the third Part show.

Likewise, if God were to be loved for the sake of another, according to the right order of loving, that other would be more to be loved. For the end is more loved than that which is to the end; and that which is loved for its own sake more than that which is loved only for the sake of another, as anyone's mind experiences. And the Philosopher is also a witness, *Posterior* [Analytics] I [2], saying: "Always, that on account of which a thing is, that thing is more so" — as that on account of which we love, that friend is more so. But what good is more to be loved than the highest and greatest good, God?

Likewise, among things to be loved, this one is to be loved for the sake of that, according to the worthy order of loving, and that for the sake of some other, and so on; and so there is no infinite process, as the second Supposition manifests, as also anyone's own mind says. There is therefore something which for its own sake is finally to be loved, and others for its sake; and what is more worthily such than God?

Likewise, according to these same things, there is some natural end of all beings; but the end according to natural order is more perfect, more worthy, better than those which are to the end, and is to be loved for its own sake, and other things for its sake — as both the things premised here and the Philosophers attest. But what is more perfect, more worthy, and better than all natural beings — except God? He therefore is the natural end of all things, and to be loved for his own sake, and other things for his sake. **The second particle** follows from this first, and from what was already established concerning the first. **The third particle** follows from the second, and from what was already established concerning the first. For it stands fast that man, since he is a rational creature, ought reasonably to order all his acts to some end. But any end intended by man, if it be not the ultimate, ought reasonably to be ordered to a further and ultimate end, which is God. **The fourth particle** follows evidently from the first and second particles of this part. **The fifth particle** seems to follow from the fourth.

Likewise, the offense of a good and great person is to be avoided, and the offense of a better and greater person more so. How much therefore is the offense of the divine Person to be avoided — than whom no better or greater could be, as the first Supposition teaches? Certainly so much, that it ought to be committed knowingly for nothing.

Likewise, let the false-writer (*falsigraphus*) say, if he dare, the opposite part of this, namely, that someone ought, according to the requirement of reason, for the sake of some good to be captured, or some evil to be avoided which he can refrain from doing without sin, knowingly to offend God; let him be supposed thus to offend God by doing act A. Either then, all things weighed, A is rightly done altogether, or it is sin, or an indifferent act, or neither. If rightly done, he does not offend God, who by the first Supposition and the third Part is proved most upright, most just, and most reasonable. How therefore is he offended, if someone placed in any case acts most rightly and most reasonably — that is, according to the requirement of reason most rightly — even as God himself would counsel and dictate? What act, I ask, will please God, if a most rightly done act displease and offend him? Indeed, it rather seems that if he should despise this

most right reason and the very judgment of God, by not so doing, he would offend God; and so on each side of this contradictory two-way, whatever he did, he would of necessity offend God — which does not befit the divine piety, clemency, justice, goodness.

To these matters: if A is rightly done, it is meritorious; wherefore also, according to the first Supposition and the third Part of this work, in no way to be punished by God, but rather to be rewarded. For he who, according to the three Parts premised, sometimes gives goods to certain ones not acting rightly but indeed acting badly — how to those acting rightly will he render evils, or not render goods? And how will he reward act A, which offends him, displeases him, and which he hates? Furthermore: either God is justly offended and angered at A, or unjustly. If justly, A is unjust. If unjustly, God is unjust, contrary to the first Supposition and the third Part of this work. If however A be said to be sin, it ought not to be done, nor is it done according to the requirement of reason. Wherefore if the doer of A, all things weighed, does in everything as he ought, and according to the dictate of most right reason — even as God himself would counsel and dictate — he does not sin. For what is sin, except a certain obliquity from the rectitude of practical reason? Furthermore, it is plain to anyone, and the Philosopher attests in *Topics* III, that necessary things are more to be chosen than non-necessary, even if those should be better. But not to sin against God, and universally not to sin, at least knowingly, is necessary for any rational creature; because it is of the substance of his natural rule — namely, of reason or *synderesis* naturally implanted in him, and divinely instituted to rule him in all things. But other things which can be omitted without sin are by no means to be judged necessary to him. Nor can anyone say that A is an indifferent or neutral act, for then it would not offend the gentle God. Why also would it then offend him, rather than please? If also A is done as it ought to be in every way, according to the false-writer, why is it to be reputed an indifferent act, and not rather rightly done?

Chapter 31 — Against the Unbridled Who Say That All Things Happen Equally to Good and Evil, That Some Evil Remains Unpunished, or Some Good Unrewarded; and Who Lie That God Punishes Anyone Abundantly — That Is, Beyond What Is Worthy, or Even According to What Is Worthy — and Sparingly Rewards Anyone — That Is, Below or Not Beyond What Is Worthy; Imagining Also That It in No Way Befits Divine Piety and Infinite Mercy to Punish Any Offense, but Always to Remit the Whole Mercifully Unpunished

Let the unbridled be bridled — those saying that all things happen equally to good and evil, that some evil remains unpunished or some good unrewarded; lying that God punishes anyone abundantly, namely beyond what is worthy or even according to what is worthy, and sparingly rewards anyone, namely below or not beyond what is worthy; imagining also that it nowhere befits divine piety and infinite mercy to punish any offense, but always to remit the whole mercifully unpunished. These are most rude and gross, weighing only the palpable goods and evils of nature or of fortune. Is it not so, according to the part next preceding, that to evil men

knowingly sinning and offending God however slightly, immediately and inseparably so great an evil, so evil a sin happens, that for whatever goods to be gained or preserved, or whatever penal evils to be removed when had, or to be avoided when not had, they ought not to admit it?

Whereas to good men, on the contrary, knowingly obeying the divine commandment as often as they are bound — immediately and inseparably so great a good, so noble a merit, and so incomparably precious, happens, that for whatever goods not to be gained or preserved, or whatever penal evils not to be taken away or avoided, they ought not to neglect it by passing it over — by what was just now premised concerning the evil men; because then they would knowingly condemn the divine command and sin. And if the merit of one serving God from necessity be so precious, so great, so good, how shall the merit of one serving from spontaneous freedom be nothing? O rude and untaught soul, which easily looks upon earthly and carnal goods and evils, slight and almost nothing, and does not weigh these moral and spiritual ones, the greatest!

Furthermore, no just, discreet, and powerful man permits that all things should happen equally to his good and evil servants or subjects, but differently, according to the differences of merits, providing better things to the better. But God is more just, discreet, and powerful than any man — infinitely so, as the first Supposition and the parts following show. Whence it also evidently appears that no evil remains unpunished. For how great an evil immediately and inseparably follows everyone knowingly sinning, is plain from the thirtieth and the demonstration of the first particle of this part.

Is not also every sinner, by that very fact, made evil and culpable, or worse and more culpable, and does he not lose the pristine liberty, innocence, and immunity which he had before, with respect to that sin — does he not become more unlike to God, and more remote from him? And is this not a punishment, and how great a punishment? And whence this, except from the first justice, from the first rewarder of all, who is God, as the Suppositions show? From which it likewise appears that God permits no good to remain unrewarded. For far be it that God should be more inclined to punish sinners than to reward those meriting. For this would rather seem of cruelty, impiety, and lack of mercy, than of supreme goodness, piety, and mercy — contrary to the first Supposition, the third Part, and the fourth. But God leaves no evil unpunished, as was just now taught.

How great a good also immediately and inseparably follows every one duly serving God from necessity — what precedes manifests. How then does no good follow him who serves God liberally? Is not he who acts well, meritoriously, and laudably, by that very fact better and more praiseworthy, than if he in no way merited? And is not this inseparable reward the fair wage of merit? And whence such reward, such wage, except from the first justice, the first rewarder of all, who is God? — as the Suppositions demonstrate.

How also would it befit the supremely just, liberal, powerful, and abundant lover of inexhaustible treasures to leave his workers, according to the doctrine of the thirtieth,

unrewarded — to cast them off empty, and to make them equal to others, vain, in no way loving him, nor working anything for his sake?

Nor does God punish anyone abundantly beyond what is worthy; for this is unjust, impious, unmerciful, and cruel — but God is in no way such, by the third Part of this work — nor even up to what is worthy. For this would seem of severity, lack of mercy, and rigor, which are far from God; indeed the opposite virtues are most fully in him, by the third and fourth Parts.

For any offense at least knowingly committed against God, however great a punishment of actual loss and sense, even the annihilation of the offender, could justly be repaid; for to avoid however great such a punishment or even annihilation, it ought not to be committed (the thirtieth of this work being witness). But God inflicts on his offenders a finite and small punishment; wherefore he could justly inflict however much greater. He therefore mercifully remits to any offender of his, when punished, an incomparably greater punishment than he inflicts.

Nor does it befit God to reward anyone sparingly, below what is worthy: for this is either of impotence, or of injustice, illiberality, sparingness, tenacity, and avarice — which are far from God; indeed, the opposite virtues are fully in him, by the third, fourth, and seventh Parts of this work. Or perhaps more plainly thus: either God wishes to render to those meriting up to what is worthy and cannot — and then he is impotent, contrary to the seventh; or he can but does not will, and then he is unjust, illiberal, and sparing, contrary to the third Part of this work.

Nor does it befit God to reward anyone only up to what is worthy, and not beyond. For to reward a worker up to what is worthy is of justice and necessity, not of grace or liberality. But he is most super-excellently generous, and most super-abundantly liberal — by the first Supposition, the third Part, and the fourth — nor will his abundance be diminished by however great a magnificent largess. For it cannot be diminished in any way, by the seventh and eighth.

God also, according to the next-preceding particle of this part, gives to whatever undeserving enemies and offenders of his — evil men — how great benefits gratis, by mercifully punishing them not a little less than they deserve, by remitting very much punishment. How then does it befit, that to his lovers and servants, according to the doctrine of the thirtieth, he should make no grace, bestow nothing gratuitously, give nothing liberally — but should scarcely render to them, sparingly, the simple debt?

Does not also a liberal and powerful man sometimes reward his workers beyond what is worthy? But God is more liberal and more powerful than any man — infinitely so, by the third and fourth Parts. Nor does it repugn divine piety and infinite mercy to punish sinners. For he does not do this only out of hatred or zeal of vengeance — for this in no way befits his greatest goodness, piety, and mercy — but out of zeal of correction, chastisement, amendment, and the glorification of the punished if he wills it; or otherwise, of others through him; but always for the sake of the good, for the sake of the beauty and order of the universe. For he is so good and beautiful, so

pure from evil and base, that he can finally intend nothing except the good and beautiful, as the first Supposition and the third Part show.

Is not also God as just and wise as he is merciful and pious, as the first Supposition, the third Part, and the fourth attest? But how does it befit one supremely wise and just to make those sinning and not sinning, those not sinning and sinning, in everything equal?

Is it not also clearly plain from what is above, that every sinner is at once and inseparably and by that very fact, by the necessity of indispensable justice, justly punished — and whence this, except from the first just disposer of all, from the first justice, from the primary truth? This therefore necessarily comes from God, as the Suppositions show.

Who also does not know that in every right polity two things are required, by which citizens are drawn back from vices and advanced to the pursuits of virtues — namely, fear and love: fear of punishments for those sinning, and love of rewards for those meriting? Why therefore does it not befit God, the institutor and ruler of the great worldly polity, to establish like things from like causes for all his subjects? Do we not see many, with the terror of punishments established for sinners despised, run unbridled to the allurements of sins? How much more would they do this, if no punishment were threatened to sinners? Which very many others would likewise do, who now by the fear of punishments alone abstain from sins.

Chapter 32 — Against the Philosophers Who Presume That They Can Know God Fully, and Each of His Actions; Who Therefore Mock Christians for Believing Some Things Concerning God, and Concerning His Marvelous Actions, Concerning Also the Actions of the Creature by Divine Power, Which They Cannot Demonstrate by the Way of Human Reason

Let the Philosophers who presume that they can know God fully, and each of his actions, be repressed; let them cease to mock and condemn Christians who believe some things concerning God and concerning his marvelous actions, and concerning the actions of the creature by divine power, which they cannot demonstrate by the way of human reason. Is not your soul small and finite, but God beyond measure great and in every way infinite? Infinite, I say, in a certain way numerous and extensively, on account of the all-sided infinity of virtues and goodnesses which he has, as the third Part shows; infinite also in a certain way intensively, as the fourth Part says. How then can you fully grasp him, fully discuss him, fully know him? Indeed, blush, O Philosopher, and you who pride yourself in knowledge, scorn to have so small a God that you, small as you are, by your small mind might scrutinize him whole, ransack all his secrets, grasp and know plenary the whole of him. For God, just as he is of infinite entity, so also of infinite truth and knowability; wherefore he is fully known by no finite thing through its finite virtue, but only by himself, through himself, through his own infinite virtue — unless perhaps he should

accommodate to a man his own eye and his own infinite cognoscitive virtue (his whole self, that is), so that thus through the whole God himself, he might in some way know the whole God.

Tell me yet, I ask, Philosopher, what do you fully know? I think you would not dare to say even the smallest creature. I know that you do not perfectly know the smallest atom in the sun, nor the smallest dust of the earth, nor the smallest drop of water. For in every little body there are contained infinite linear, surface, and corporeal figures, diverse in number, quantity, quality, and species. Wherefore correspondingly there are infinite Geometrical conclusions, even following one another in order, such that the latter cannot be known except through the former. In every little body also there are contained infinite species of numbers, and infinite Arithmetical conclusions, also ordinally related to each other. Of these infinite demonstratively knowable conclusions, how many do you know, I ask, Philosopher? I think few and finite. Let me give you more Philosophers as many as you wish, even infinite, all endowed with the highest genius, given to the highest study, for however long a time, even a thousand thousand years, concerning these Geometrical or Arithmetical conclusions disposed in knowability according to the order said above. You all therefore, infinite Philosophers together — how many do you know of these infinite conclusions? Finite without doubt, finite and few. Wherefore there remain infinite, of which on account of their difficulty and your slowness, none of you can know any by himself, nor can all of you together know them. Does not therefore each of you, and the whole multitude of all together, more not-know than know concerning the things and the knowability of any little body? If therefore you cannot fully know the smallest, but on the contrary necessarily and infinitely more not-know it than know it — how can you fully know the greatest? Do not presume; acknowledge yourself a man, and humbly confess that you infinitely more not-know God than know him.

Is it not also so, as it seems through the second Supposition, and according to Philosophical discipline: if something is difficult to know plenarily, and something more difficult, and something still more, and so forth — there is something supremely difficult; and what is this, except God? For in creatures, as in ordered Mathematical conclusions, the latter is always more difficult than the preceding, nor is any most difficult — as also no last — to be found. What therefore is most difficult to know, except God? — which both his immensity and his maximum infinity, in a certain way numerously, extensively, and intensively (attested through the first Supposition, the third and fourth Parts), lucidly manifest. In whatever infinite series of conclusions of this kind, infinite are those of which, on account of their difficulty, none can be properly known demonstratively by any Philosopher or any group of Philosophers. How therefore can God, infinitely more difficult to know than any of those, and than all of them together — who also knows all those perfectly, and others and others infinitely-many-fold infinite (as the ninth Part demonstrates) — be fully known? Let any Philosopher therefore taste soberly, and acknowledge this truth as the highest Philosophy: that nothing this side of God can fully know God, except perhaps through him.

If he does not believe me, let him believe twenty-four men of his own profession — Philosophers who concordantly established as many definitions concerning God, of which the sixteenth runs thus: "God is he whom voices do not signify, nor intellects understand, on account of dissimilitude." And the twenty-first: "God," it says, "is the darkness left in the soul after every light." And the twenty-third: "God is he who is known by the mind alone through ignorance." Whence also Hermes *On the Eternal Word* [35] says: "The understanding of the highest God is truth alone, of whose truth in the world not even the extreme line of a shadow is discerned." Wherefore Plato also in the second prologue of *Timaeus* speaks thus: "It is as difficult to find the maker and begetter of the universe as, having found him, it is impossible to declare him worthily." If therefore the Philosopher incomparably and infinitely more does not know God than knows him, how will he fully know any operation of his? For if he be incomprehensible in being, why not likewise in acting, since action is in a certain way proportioned to the agent? Tell me, I ask, Philosopher: are you not of finite and small genius? Of finite and small knowledge, as what was premised attests? But God is of infinite, and absolutely infinite in every way, as the first Supposition, the third, fourth, and ninth Parts show. How easily then can he excogitate something marvelous to be done, and some marvelous mode of doing it, to whose plenary comprehension your ingenuity will not be able to ascend? And since by the same Supposition, the third Part, and the seventh, God is of equal power for any thing whatsoever to be done in any way whatsoever, as for excogitating that it should be done, or so done — how easily he can do some marvelous work, according to some marvelous mode of doing it, to the full investigation of which your genius cannot extend itself. Indeed, you cannot fully know even the operation of a small natural thing. Does not a small spark of fire, by illuminating and heating, cause infinite luminous circles and Spheres mutually containing one another, and mutually intersecting; infinite luminous Pyramids also, visual Pyramids, according to infinite qualities and differences; infinite radial lines also, and visual rays incident, reflected, and refracted (if the medium be deformed), having other splendid properties and infinite differences — in which (as also according to what was premised) infinite Geometrical and Arithmetical conclusions are contained, so also other infinite perspectival conclusions? And who can fully know all these?

Do you also fully know the action of the magnet on iron, and many such actions, the secret properties of nature, and the modes of such actions?

Furthermore, what thing or what natural action do you certainly and perfectly know? For in that which you suppose yourself to know better, another Philosopher will contradict you, and very many others one against you alone. Indeed, perhaps you yourself today contradict yourself of yesterday, or tomorrow you will contradict yourself of today. Or if perchance many of your contemporaries consent to your opinion, let that period pass, let another come; and perhaps as many or more, as ingenious and studious or more, will reprove your judgment by some probable Sophistical reason perhaps, or true, which was not plain to you, marveling that you have so foully raved and have been ignorant of things so open and so easy. Does not the process of time demonstrate this? To which judgment then shall I adhere with certainty?

Is it not so, that even if two or three Philosophers, your equals or greater, felt the contrary of your judgment, you would adhere less firmly; and if more, less still? Wherefore it seems that if very many or all Philosophers and the common people concordantly felt the opposite, you also would consent and would withdraw from the prior judgment. What then is Philosophy of this natural kind, except faith confirmed by defect of apparent stronger contrary reason, by defect of a multitude of witnesses attesting the opposite — which defect is reduced to the prior? What then is in such matters, except faith? And no sincere certitude of knowledge. Which also a certain not-small sect of Philosophers — namely the Academics — less proudly and more soberly tasting, plainly feels. For they say that it does not happen for anything to be known — which seems to be understood in doubtful matters, where probable contradiction is found.

Is it not also the case that Philosophers, according to the custom of hearing and receiving from boyhood these or those things, and according to the profession of the Sect they hold (say, Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and the like), say very many things gratis without the violence of reason, as all the books of the Philosophers lucidly manifest? Which also is clearly weighed from this: that any of these Sects probably sustains a judgment displeasing to another, just as anyone who knows can probably sustain without evident contradiction, by the indeclinable violence of reason, in matters probably doubtful — sufficient many, and perhaps all.

Wherefore the Philosopher in the *Categories*, treating of those things which are toward something: "Perhaps," he says, "it is difficult to declare confidently concerning such things, unless they be more often handled. To doubt about each, however, will not be useless." What then is in such Philosophical matters, except faith? Wherefore Plato in *Timaueus* II [3]: "To give an account of the divine powers which are called Daemons is a greater task than the genius of man can bear. Therefore let us take a shortcut from believing. Let us therefore believe those who at the previous age" — where Calcidius feels the same thing. Whence also Hermes *On the Eternal Word* [35]: "It happens to men," he says, "that as it were through a fog we see those things which are in heaven, as much as it is possible by the condition of human sense; but this intention for seeing such things is most narrow for us, when it has seen with the felicity of conscience."

Aristotle also in *Metaphysics* II [1]: "Concerning truth, theory is in this way difficult and in this way easy. The sign is that none can attain it worthily, nor are all without share of it." And below: "As the eyes of bats are toward the light of day, so also the intellect of our souls toward those things which are by nature most manifest of all." Who also in *Ethics* VI [9]: "It is necessary," he says, "to attend to the indemonstrable enunciations and opinions of the experienced, the elder, and the prudent — no less than to demonstrations." And *Elenchi* I [2]: "It is necessary that he who learns, believe." And in *On the Heavens* II [34] he says: "That one must see, having and believing first in human manner, or more firmly." And above, in I [22] of the same: "This happens sufficiently, so as to speak to human faith." Behold how these Philosophers in their own Philosophical matters faithfully profess faith. And if Philosophers do this in natural matter, why

do they not allow Christians to do likewise in moral matter? In moral matter, according to the Philosopher, lesser persuasion suffices, and lesser certitude is required.

You err also no little, Philosopher, in believing that you can demonstratively prove every divine operation. For according to the eighth Part, God is a rational power, of free will. There is therefore no demonstrative reason naturally antecedent to his will which compels him to particular things to be done or not done. But just as you can do and omit many things freely, so also God: of which, if he wills to do this, to omit that, it is reasonable that it be so, because it is just that it be so, by the third Part of this work — reasonable, I say, by reason concomitant and following the divine will, not naturally preceding. Nor can you object by saying that God ought always to make the best of possibles, and that this necessary reason precedes his will, and necessarily regulates it in his actions. For God cannot make the best — that is, the optimum — that he can make. For if he could, let it be supposed that A is such. Either A is God or it is not. If it is God, there is some God made and new, and many gods, contrary to the first Supposition, and the seventeenth Part of this work. If it is not God, it is less perfect and good than God, and not indivisibly, but divisibly, by an infinite latitude — as is easy for the Philosopher to demonstrate. Since therefore by the fourth and seventh Parts of this work, God is of infinite power, and fully omnipotent, he can make something better and better and better without end.

Who also doubts that God can make things better than they are? For he is not impeded by defect of knowledge, on account of the first Supposition and the fourth Part; nor by defect of power, on account of the same Supposition, the third, fourth, and seventh Parts of this work. According to this also, God would not be a rational and free power, or at least not supremely free in acting, contrary to the first Supposition, the eighth Part, and the fourth. According to this judgment also, since all things come from divine providence and will, as the Philosophers confess, all things would always come about as God always willed and made them, by absolute simple necessity — contrary to the first Supposition and the third Part of this work — since another mode of acting is more perfect, which the Philosophers themselves deny. You also seem, Philosopher, to be ensnared in your own words. For do you not, in saying that God necessarily makes the better — that is, the optimum of things possible to be made — insinuate that other things are possible to be made, and that God can make others?

If also God always makes the better — since it is better that a good and true law be divinely given to men, than not given — God did give to men such a law; and what law, if not the most holy Christian law?

But since, according to what was premised, God cannot be fully known by man through natural scrutiny — indeed is necessarily infinitely more not-known than known, and his manifold possible operation likewise — why could not God, if he willed, reveal some of his secrets, and even of his operations, when he willed, to whom he willed, and how he willed, through Angels, through Prophets, or even through himself? Cannot you reveal the secrets of your heart and of your actions to others who cannot investigate them, through yourself or through others? Let the

Philosophers therefore cease to condemn Christians who believe certain things divinely revealed to them concerning God, and concerning his works which they cannot demonstrate — provided they know how to defend them from your contradictory demonstrations. Ought it not suffice to any Christian, indeed even to the profane, as a demonstration: "God says it"? For he can neither err nor lie, by the first Supposition and the third Part of this work. And of this kind are the Articles of the Christian Faith.

I know, Philosopher, and I confidently affirm that I know, that there is no Article, great or small, of the substance of the Christian Faith, which God did not first reveal many times before the beginning of this Faith, through the solemn Prophets, as through certain heralds — as the authentic Books of the New and Old Testaments evidently show. For there is no Article of the Christian Faith which, even with the Philosopher as judge — uncorrupted, not sophistical, not impudent, but indifferent, solid, sober, and friend of truth — cannot effectively be founded in the Old Testament, in the old Prophecies, as it stands fast that anciently truly happened.

For — the Histories handing it down — the Emperor Constantine of the Romans was converted at Rome to the faith of Christ through Pope Sylvester, and was gravely rebuked by Helena, the Queen, his mother, who having left idols, believed in the God of the Jews and was then living in Judea, because he had preferred to believe in Christ a crucified man rather than in the God of the Jews. He asked the Queen to bring back with her the wisest masters of the Jews, to dispute with the Doctors of the Christians. She came, bringing with her 140 most learned men of the Jews, of whom 12 most renowned were chosen — Abiathar, Jonas, Godolias, Annan, Doeth, Cusi, Benjamin, Aroel, Iubal, Thara, Silion, and Zambri — and with two most wise Gentile Philosophers, Crato and Zenophilus, established as Judges by consent of the parties, with the Emperor and the Queen sitting nearby, and a great multitude of Christians, Jews, and Gentiles standing around, the business of disputation was hastened forward. With the eleven aforesaid Masters of the Jews objecting one by one and impugning the faith of Christ, Sylvester responding, convinced each one in turn from their own Scriptures, the said Judges deciding. The twelfth, however, refusing to argue by vocal argument, but performing a real magical miracle, was overcome by a true miracle. Wherefore the Queen, the Judges, and the rest of the unbelievers who were present, were equally converted to the faith of Christ.

Nor can anyone say that the Christians newly fabricated the Old Testament and the Books of the Prophets in confirmation of their faith, as if they had anciently predicted their future faith. For the beginning of the Christian Faith stands fast; the Histories of the Gentiles preceding it by much stand fast, evidently witnessing our faith concerning the Patriarchs, Prophets, and matters of the Old Testament. Behold also the famous witness Ptolemy II Philadelphus, King of Egypt, who, as the Histories of the Greeks and the Jews attest — Josephus also testifying in *Antiquities of the Jews* I, in the Prologue, and more fully Book XII [2] — caused to be translated for himself in Alexandria, by 72 Hebrews, the whole Old Testament from Hebrew into Greek, very many years before Christ.

And do not the Jews — capital enemies of the Christian Faith, instituted by Abraham and Moses — through very many times before the beginning of our Faith down to today persevere, having the whole Old Testament and its Prophetic Books, in their own Hebrew tongue or one akin, concordantly attesting that they were issued and written by the ancient Fathers and Prophets in ancient times?

And if you should ask why then they themselves do not believe in all things the faith of Christ — I say that many of them, and those who better understood their Law and the Prophets, most certainly believed, adhered most firmly to Christ, wrote the Gospels, added their own Epistles, founded the New Testament on the Old, held the faith of Christ most constantly, and most fervently preached it, even to consummated martyrdom — as the Apostles and Evangelists, converted Jews, attest. Whence also the Jew Josephus of Jerusalem, a priest from among the priests, who soon after the Lord's Passion wrote those famous Histories — still persisting in Judaism, as is plain from *On the Jewish War* I in the Prologue, and below in Books III and XX *Antiquities*, last; and *Antiquities* XVIII [8] of the same — speaks thus: "There was at those same times Jesus, a wise man (if indeed it is right to call him a man), for he was a worker of marvelous works and a teacher of all those who willingly hear what is true. And he drew to himself many of the Jews, many also from the Gentiles. This man was Christ. When Pilate, by the accusation of the leading men of our nation, had decreed him to be led to the cross, those who from the beginning had loved him did not desert him. For he appeared to them on the third day, alive again, as the Prophets, divinely inspired, had foretold these things and innumerable other miracles concerning him. And to this day the name and the race of Christians who are named from him perseveres."

Many of them too still are converted often. But many on account of the pride and malice of will do not believe, or are unwilling to confess that they believe — unless perhaps with the article of death imminent. Many do not believe expressly, or are not converted, on account of a certain most wicked custom observed in some parts, by which all the goods of converted Jews are confiscated to their Lord.

Many also through ignorance of the Law and Prophets, and through defect of sound doctrine, do not believe — especially since on account of hatred of the Christian Faith, in opposed principles, and in another understanding of the Law and Prophets (although too foreign and very forced, and even contrary to the expositions of the ancient and more solemn Doctors of theirs), they are instructed from their cradles. For it is not hidden from us Philosophers how great a force a custom introduced from boyhood has.

In the same Prophetic Books also it is contained that the Jews, in punishment for their sins, fell into such blindness of mind that they did not see even the most clear things — wherefore they would not be converted commonly to the faith of Christ before the evening and the latest days of the world; and that the eyes of the Gentiles would be illuminated and they would be converted to Christ. For Moses, having promised all goods to the Jewish people, provided they should obey

the Lord's commandments, added: "But if you will not hear the voice of the Lord your God, to keep and do all his commandments, all these curses shall come upon you" (and after reciting many curses, added): "May the Lord smite you with madness and blindness and frenzy of mind, and may you grope at noonday, as the blind man is wont to grope in darkness, and may you not direct your ways." Isaiah also, the most clear herald of Christ and the Christian Faith — indeed, the Lord through Isaiah — speaks thus: "Go and tell this people: Hear, you who hear me, and do not understand; and see the vision, and do not know. Blind the heart of this people, and weigh down its ears, and close its eyes, lest perhaps it see with its eyes, and hear with its ears, and understand with its heart, and be converted, and I heal it." Who also again, speaking in the person of his people in prophetic manner concerning the Messiah: "How," he says, "his face is hidden and despised, whence also we did not reckon him; we supposed him as it were a leper, smitten and humiliated by God."

Does not also the Angel speak thus to Daniel? "But you, Daniel, close the words and seal the book, until the appointed time; when the dispersion of the hand of the holy people shall have been completed, all these things shall be fulfilled." "And I heard, and did not understand, and I said: My lord, what shall be after these things? And he said: Go, Daniel, because the words are closed and sealed until the predetermined time. They shall be chosen and made white, and as it were proved by fire, many; and the impious shall act impiously, nor shall any of the impious understand; but the learned shall understand." With which Isaiah also concordantly: "Be astonished and marvel, waver and stagger, be drunken and not from wine, be moved and not from drunkenness, because the Lord has mingled for you the spirit of slumber; he will close your eyes; he will cover your Prophets and Princes who see visions; and the vision of all things shall be to you as the words of a sealed book, which when they shall give to one who knows letters, they shall say: Read this; and he shall answer: I cannot, for it is sealed. And the Lord said: Because this people draws near with their mouth and glorifies me with their lips, but their heart is far from me, and they have feared me by the commandment of men and doctrines, therefore behold I will add — that I may make a marvel for this people by a great and stupendous miracle. For wisdom shall perish from its wise men, and the understanding of its prudent shall be hidden. And in that day the deaf shall hear the words of the Book, and from darkness and gloom the eyes of the blind shall see. Thus says the Lord: Now Jacob shall not be confounded, nor shall his face now blush; but when he shall see his sons, the works of my hands in his midst sanctifying my name, then they shall sanctify the seed of Jacob, and shall preach the God of Israel, and those erring in spirit shall know understanding; the murmurers shall learn the law."

These and many like things concerning the aversion of the Jews and the conversion of the Gentiles are contained in the Prophetic Books — which also testify that they themselves shall finally be converted to the Lord. For Moses, having prophesied many evils to the Jewish people on account of their future sins, added: "But in the latest time you shall return to the Lord your God, and you shall hear his voice." Concerning whom also David: "They shall be converted at evening." With whom Jeremiah also accords: "In the latest days you shall understand his

counsel"; and again: "In the latest of days you shall understand these things. In that time, says the Lord, I will be God to all the kindreds of Israel, and they shall be to me for a people." With whom also consonantly Hosea: "Many days shall you wait for me, but I also will wait for you. For many days shall the sons of Israel sit without King and without Prince and without sacrifice and without altar and without Ephod and without Teraphim. And after these things the sons of Israel shall return, and shall seek the Lord their God, and David their King, and they shall fear the Lord, and his good thing in the latest of days." David, he says, their King — that is, the Messiah; for it was promised divinely to King David that from his seed he should descend, and should rule his kingdom. Wherefore also the Messiah is frequently figured in the Prophetic Books under the name of David himself.

It was further prophesied to the Jews that on account of their sin to be committed against Christ, their famous City Jerusalem and its noble Temple should be destroyed; that they themselves should irrecoverably lose their land, and should be dispersed through foreign lands, wretched, wandering, and fugitive, round about — which a few years after the beginning of our Faith was effectively fulfilled, and continues to this day, namely for years 1200, indeed almost 1300 — which the Jews themselves concordantly attest. All of which perhaps is therefore done, that you and many others, through them and their Books — free of all suspicion, bearing for us against them true and not feigned testimony — may be converted and confirmed in this faith.

Nor can anyone imagine those Prophets to have been fictioneers and pseudo-prophets. For how does it seem credible that those who so abhorred all manner of vices, who cherished and taught all virtues openly and secretly, and did these things so constantly that they even endured martyrdom, who did so many and such great miracles in life and in death — or the Lord did them through them or for them — should be fictioneers? How also are they fictioneers in those things alone which pertain to us, when in all other past things which they said — both concerning their own nation and land, as well as concerning others (say concerning the Babylonians and the Kings of Babylon and the city itself, concerning the Egyptians and their Kings and their land, concerning the Persians and Medes and Cyrus the King by name, concerning the Greeks, the Romans, and others) — they are proved most truthful Prophets, as the outcome of things demonstrated, as very many sufficiently authentic and famous Chronicles manifest? How also if they had been fictioneers, would they have feigned for their own sons and citizens such great evils, and for us, who are not yet born, such great goods? How also are they fictioneers, since in all past things which pertain to their nation, which also pertain to the Religion of Christ, they are found most truthful predictors, as the outcome of things proves, as was touched on above? Who also doubts that God can illuminate and inspire a man so as to render him a Prophet? Does not the first Supposition, the ninth Part, and the seventh evidently prove this? Why therefore does it not befit God, supremely provident, and moderating all things by his providence (as the first Supposition and the parts following show, and the Philosophers confess), so to do? Indeed it does befit. Therefore it befits that the Prophet be God's Secretary, the counselor of men, the mediator

of God and men, announcing the divine will to men — especially in those things which concern the worship of God and Religion.

All the great Philosophers also whose writings I have looked at concede Prophecies and that there were true Prophets. Whence Aristotle in *Secret of Secrets*, last part [I], says: "That the Prophets are proved of most pure intellect and of true vision" — which Averroes also intends *On Sleep and Waking*, expounding it, where he also alleges Socrates to the same point. Avicenna also in *On the Soul* IV [4], and *Metaphysics* X [1, 2, and 3] concedes Prophets, which Algazel similarly in *Physics* V [6, 7, and last] concedes plainly enough. Ptolemy moreover, Albumazar, Haly, and the other Astrologers likewise confess both Prophets and Prophecies.

Furthermore, all who concede true dreams have true indications of future, past, and present things, and consequently must concede the truth of Prophets and Prophecies. But the truth of Dreams all Philosophers and the common people concede. Aristotle indeed in *On Sleep and Waking* truly concedes true dreams, true indications of things, and true presagings of future things. Where Averroes too: "Of these comprehensions some are called Dreams and Divinations, and some Prophecies. And certain men deny these, and say that they happen by chance. But to deny them is to deny things sensed, and especially to deny dreams. For there is no man who has not seen a Dream that announced to him something future. And when a man has experienced this often, he will see that this does not happen by chance, but essentially. And those other comprehensions, namely of the Philosophies, although they are not seen so commonly, are nonetheless very famous; and things which are famous among all are necessary, either as a whole or in part. For it is impossible that what is famous should be false as a whole. And the discussion of all these is the same; and so the discussion concerning the quiddity of the Dream will suffice, because their causes do not differ except according to more and less, but they only differ according to names and mode."

Afterward indeed he says that the interpreter is he to whom the intellect grants corporeal intentions, to which spiritual intentions are likened in sleep. And he alleges the condition of the interpreter from Aristotle, saying thus: "And it is necessary that the interpreter, as Aristotle says, be always thinking, and clean, not declining to the manners of a brute animal." Algazel also in his *Physics* V [3] determines concerning the interpretation and presaging of Dreams. Avicenna similarly in *On the Soul* IV [2] concedes true Dreams as heralds of future things.

Furthermore, the Philosophers seeking the cause of Prophecy, just as of true Dreams, concordantly say it is God, and that he illuminates and inspires Prophets sometimes when waking, and sometimes when sleeping; and that this is from divine solicitude and care concerning men, that they may thus be able to avoid harmful things and obtain useful ones. Whence the Philosopher in *Secret of Secrets*, last part [I], writes: "If anyone seek the cause of the Prophets — who are proved in this world of most pure intellect and of true vision, with helpful miracles — it comes from the abstraction of the soul from desires and concupiscences and harmful things, when it is dominant over the body; and the flame-like virtue existing in the heart

does not cease." This flame-like virtue, according to him, is the agent intellect, illuminating the possible intellect, not burning. And above, in part II [I]: "God most high and glorious has ordained the mode and remedy for the temperament of humors, and for the conservation of health, and for very many other things to be acquired; and has revealed these to the holy Prophets, his servants and just Prophets, and to certain others whom he chose forth and illustrated by the spirit of divine wisdom, and endowed them with gifts of knowledge. From these following, men of Philosophy received the principate and origin: the Indians and Persians, Greeks and Latins; from these they drew and wrote the principles and secrets of Arts and Sciences. For in their Scriptures nothing false, nothing reprobate, is found, but what is approved by the wise." And below, in [chapter] 26, he says: "That Enoch knew this secret, which is called inestimable glory, and the treasure of Philosophers, through vision."

Avicenna also and Algazel in the places alleged above similarly say that the Prophet is from God, by inspiration and divine illumination — and this from his providence and government. Whence Avicenna in *Metaphysics* X [3] says that the Prophet is from God and from his sending, and that in the wisdom of God it is necessary that he be sent — and whatever he constitutes is nothing other than that which was with God to be constituted.

Ptolemy moreover in the first proposition of his *Centiloquy* says that some, on account of the strength of soul dominant in them, although they have not much knowledge of the art of stars, have from the better part the knowledge of future things, and are nearer the truth than the Astrologer. Concerning which Haly says in the *Commentary* that there is a twofold way of knowing future things: one, that one looks at the motion and works of the stars, and the books of such ancients, joined with the experiences which he has tested; and the other way is when someone has, through divine grace and inspiration, the knowledge of future things. For there are many who give true judgments concerning future things, of which we find neither significations nor reasons in the operator, or in the work, or in the operated; but what they say flows from their hearts; and of these we have seen many. And this way, when it is pure, is by the Philosophers called divine. And therefore Ptolemy says that some of those who are under the circle of the Moon have the knowledge of this Art by teaching; others by divine inspiration. Wherefore also Socrates — Averroes recounting in *On Sleep and Waking* — reasoning to the men of Athens, says thus: "O men, I do not say that your knowledge, that divine knowledge, is false; but I say that I am one making human knowledge."

Furthermore, whoever concede true dreams to be from God, similarly concede prophecies. But all the aforesaid Philosophers concordantly confess true dreams to be from God, as their books in the places already touched evidently indicate. Wherefore also Averroes *On Sleep and Waking* says that the cause of divinatory dreams and of Prophecy is the same, as is recounted above; where also he recounts the common opinion thus, writing: "The common people say that dreams are from Angels, and divinations from Daemons, and Prophecies from God, either with a medium or without a medium." But he himself shows at length that the true cause of true Dreams and of Prophecy is God, who truly knows all such future things and is the true cause of all.

Whence he says that the intellect in act, whose being has been declared in the book *On the Soul* — namely, the agent intellect, which gives and acts the first propositions, namely the first complex principles — gives likewise the cognition in Sleep. And he adds: "But they differ, because in universal cognitions it gives universal principles producing the cognition of that which was unknown. Here, however, in Sleep, it gives the cognition of the unknown thing without a medium; and this mode of giving in a broad sense is very noble, and is attributed to a more noble principle, namely the principle of will. Indeed it is from a divine thing, and from perfect solicitude concerning men. And because Prophecy enters this mode of giving, it is attributed to God and to divine things, namely Angels." And below he says that "Dreams are on account of the solicitude of God concerning men, that they may know future useful and harmful things, that they may be ready against them. And therefore was sustained this virtue with this noble enunciation and spiritual comprehension. And therefore it is said that it is one part of Prophecy. And this is manifest in the dream of Pharaoh, concerning which Joseph was questioned."

From all these things it appears evidently how undauntedly, how securely, how constantly, how firmly we ought to believe true Prophets. For they prophesy nothing to men except what they had seen and learned beforehand with God. Therefore one ought to believe them as God; for it is he who speaks through the Prophets, as what was already laid down has urged.

Do not also disciples to Doctors, lesser Philosophers to greater, and posteriors to priors — not only of Philosophers, but even of non-Philosophers — often give credence, even where they simply assert that it is so, where neither evident argument nor slender persuasion supports? — as was touched on above. Which it does not displease me to recount and confirm again. Plato indeed in *Timaeus* II [3], about to speak of Angels and the posterior or second gods, says: "To give an account of the invisible divine powers, which are called Daemons, is a greater work than the genius of man can bear; therefore let a shortcut from believing be taken. Let us then believe those who at the previous age, since they preferred kinship and propinquity of the divine race from the nature of greater Gods and others, and concerning the births of each ones, left eternal monuments in books to posterity. Certainly, not to believe the sons or grandsons of the Gods is sufficiently irreligious — although they speak by incongruous but necessary arguments — both because they pronounce concerning domestic matters: I think it is to be believed deservedly. Therefore let our credulity also be a companion to the assertion of ancient men." Where also Calcidius, expounding Plato, writes that of Pythagoras it is said that he says, "And therefore one should not seek beyond"; therefore, he says, neither should proofs always be adduced, nor persuading assertion to those things which are said by ancients endowed with a certain divine wisdom.

Aristotle also *Elenchi* I [2]: "It is necessary that he who learns, believe." And *On the Heavens and the World* II [2]: "It is necessary to show oneself well persuasible to the ancients, and especially to believe that the words of our Fathers are sayings." Where the Translation that Averroes has: "It is necessary," he says, "that we believe the Sayings of the ancients, of the most

ancient, the most true, and especially because they are our parents." If therefore such Authors — neither demonstrating, nor persuading, but simply asserting it is so — are to be believed in Philosophical matter, how much more the most splendid and famous Prophets, divinely inspired, divinely taught, throughout the whole world celebrated — as what precedes has taught? But whom shall we reckon to be true Prophets, whom worthily and certainly we may believe in all things, if not those splendid ones famously diffused throughout the whole world? Those, I say, ancients of the Old Testament, of the old Law of the Jews, who in all their sayings concerning so various and so many past matters are proved most truthful. Why therefore in a few articles of the Christian Faith should they not reasonably be believed?

And if you should require prophecies of another nation, behold the Sibyl, most famous Prophetess among the Gentiles, whose fame did not escape either the Philosophers or the Poets. In her book expository of the vision or dream which 100 men of the Senate of the Romans saw, each in one night — namely, 9 Suns variously and diversely manifold — by the 9 Suns, the 9 future generations being understood, and the exposition of the third Sun being dispatched, she adds concerning the fourth: "The fourth Sun is the fourth generation. There shall be men denying what is true. And in those days shall arise a woman of the stock of the Hebrews, by name Mary, having a spouse named Joseph; and there shall be brought forth from her without commixture of man, by the Holy Spirit, a son of God, by name Jesus. And she shall be a virgin before birth, and a virgin after birth. And he who shall be born from her shall be true God and true man, as all the Prophets have preached. And he shall fulfill the law of the Hebrews, and shall add his own things to it; and his kingdom shall remain forever and ever. At his birth, hosts of Angels on the right and on the left shall be saying: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will. For there shall come over him a voice saying: This is my beloved Son, hear him."

And it follows: "There were there from the Priests of the Hebrews, who hearing these words, indignant said to her: These are terrible words; let this Queen be silent." And it is added: "The Sibyl responding said to them: O Jews, it is necessary that these things be done, but you will not believe in him." And they said: "We do not believe, because the Word and the Testament has God given to our fathers, and he will not take away his hand from us." She responded to them again: "The God of heaven shall beget for himself a son, as it is written, who shall be like to his Father; and afterward as an infant he shall grow through the ages; and Kings and Princes of the earth shall rise up against him. In those days there shall be Caesar Augustus of celebrated name, and he shall reign in Rome, and shall subject all the earth to himself. Not many or not few, not three nor two, are gods, but one God alone and immense, who made the Heaven, the Sun, the Stars, and the Moon, and the fruitful Earth and the wavy Sea. They who shall honor him shall inherit eternal life, and shall inherit a perpetual Paradise, also a most pleasant garden. The resurrection of the dead shall be, and the running of the lame shall be most swift; the deaf shall hear, and the blind shall see; those not speaking shall speak; and from five loaves and two sea-fish many thousands of men shall be filled, and they shall gather the remains of the fragments and shall fill twelve baskets thence; in the hope of peoples he shall teach truth; he shall restrain winds with a

word, and shall calm the raging sea; treading the sea with his feet and walking upon the waves, he shall loose the infirmity of men, and shall make even the dead to rise, repelling many griefs; and from one bread or wine there shall be the satiety of the living. But when all these things shall be perfected which I have said, in him shall every law be loosed, and afterward he shall come into the hands of the impious. After these things the Priests of the Hebrews shall convene against Jesus, because he shall do many signs, and they shall apprehend him. They shall also give blows to God, hands being laid on him, and with impure mouth shall spit on him venomous spittle. He, however, shall give his holy back to the scourges likewise, and receiving blows, shall be silent, lest anyone know what Word, or whence it comes. He shall speak to the lower regions, and shall be crowned with a crown of thorns; for food they shall give him gall, and for thirst they shall give him vinegar, and shall hang him on wood and kill him. You yourself, foolish, did not understand your God deluding the senses of mortals; but you crowned him with thorns and mingled horrid gall. The veil of the Temple shall be rent in the middle, and at midday it shall be a dark night for three hours" — or according to another reading, "the day shall be dark for three hours" — "and he shall take the lot of death for three days, sleep being assumed; and then returned from the lower regions to the light he shall come, the first showing the principle of resurrection to mortals, because on the third day he shall rise, and shall show himself to his disciples, and they seeing, he shall ascend into heaven, and there shall be no end of his kingdom. They shall call me an insane and lying Sibyl. But when these things shall have been done, then at last they shall remember me, and no one afterward shall call me insane, but the Magus of God."

These the Sibyl wrote in Greek, having prophesied concerning the course of the world from then on to the end. At the end of her prophecy she set forth certain verses in Greek, the capital letters of which make these five Greek words: ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΘΕΟΥ ΥΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ — which sound in Latin: JESUS CHRIST, SON OF GOD, SAVIOR. The verses translated into Latin according to the sense, and almost according to the corresponding capital letters, are these verses of the Sibyl:

1. The sign of judgment: the earth shall grow wet with sweat;
2. From Heaven shall come the King, to be through the ages;
3. Namely present in the flesh, that he may judge the world;
4. Whence the unbeliever and the faithful shall behold God,
5. Lofty, with the Saints, in the very end of the age.
6. So shall souls with flesh be present, whom he himself judges.
7. When the world lies uncultivated in dense thorns,
8. Men cast away images, and all treasure also.
9. Fire shall burn up lands, and the sea, and the heavens.

10. Searching, it shall break the gates of foul Avernus.
11. But for the Saints there shall be free light to all flesh,
12. The eternal flame shall burn the hidden springs,
13. Uncovering hidden acts; then shall each speak
14. Secrets, and God shall lay open hearts to the light.
15. Then shall be lamentation, and all shall gnash with their teeth.
16. The radiance of the sun shall be snatched away, and the chorus of stars shall perish.
17. The heaven shall be rolled up; the splendor of the moon shall depart.
18. He shall cast down hills, and shall raise valleys from the depth.
19. There shall be no high or lofty thing in the affairs of men.
20. Mountains shall be made level with plains, and the blue depths of the sea.
21. All things shall cease; the broken earth shall perish.
22. Likewise springs and rivers shall be parched with fire.
23. And the trumpet then from on high shall send forth a sad sound.
24. The earth groaning, opening, shall reveal the wretched crime
25. And various labors, and the Tartarean Chaos.
26. And before this Lord all kings shall be set together,
27. And from heaven shall fall a sulphurous river of fire.

The defect of correspondence in the capital letters could easily be corrected, if one wished. And it follows after these verses: "Then God shall judge according to the work of each one. And the impious shall go into the gehenna of eternal fire; the just, however, shall receive the reward of eternal life. And there shall be a new heaven, and a new earth, and the sea now shall be new, and the Lord shall reign with his Saints, and they shall reign with him forever and ever, Amen."

Behold also another Sibyl, a Gentile Prophetess. For ten Sibyl Prophetesses are read of in the Chronicles. Behold, I say, another Sibyl, who about the Advent of Christ — when Octavian Augustus, the first one called Augustus, King of the Romans, was ruling the whole world, according to the Prophecy of the other Sibyl already laid down, and this peacefully for 12 years without wars (as also other Prophets predicted) — when he consulted her whether he ought to permit himself to be adored as God, as the Romans had offered to him, after a three-day fast premised, she responded according to the Prophecy of the other Sibyl premised. And immediately heaven was opened, and an excessive splendor rushed over him; and he saw in

heaven a most beautiful Virgin standing upon an altar, and holding a boy in her arms. He also heard a voice saying: "This is the altar of the Son of God." Greatly marveling, and prostrate upon the earth, adoring, he reported the vision to the Senators, who themselves also marveled exceedingly. In the worthy memory of which vision, at Rome, in the place where it appeared to the Emperor, there was constructed a certain Church of Saint Mary, which is called *Ara Coeli* (Altar of Heaven).

Do not all these things bear testimony to Christ? Behold Balaam, the foreigner, who likewise spoke testimony to Christ. Behold also that one long ago dead and buried, whose tomb in Constantinople, in the first year of Constantine the Emperor, with his mother Irene, was by chance dug up — through the Writing in a golden plate lying with him: "Christ shall be born of the Virgin Mary, and I believe in him. Under Constantine and Irene the Emperors, O Sun, you shall see me again." If you believe the saying of this man as second, since the outcome of the matter showed it most true, why not also the first — since (as it seems) in confirmation of that first, he added this second?

Behold yet another such admirable testimony. In the time of Ferdinand King of Castile, in Toledo of Spain, a certain Jew, by breaking a rock for the enlarging of a vineyard, found in the middle of the stone a hollowness, having no division at all, nor any cleft. And in that hollowness he found one book, having as it were wooden leaves. This Book, written in three languages — namely Hebrew, Greek, and Latin — had as much of letters as a Psalter, and spoke of the threefold world from Adam to Christ, expressing the properties of men of each world, and placed the beginning of the third world in Christ, saying thus: "In the third world the Son of God shall be born of the Virgin Mary, and for the salvation of men shall suffer." In the same Book likewise it was written that in the time of the 80th Ferdinand King of Castile it should be found — and then truly was found in testimony of another truth.

Behold witnesses witnessing Christ to be future, and behold also witnesses witnessing him present: John the Baptist in the womb of his mother, and afterward in adult age. Behold Symeon the Just, the elder; behold also Anna full of years, all most holy and powerful in the spirit of prophecy. Behold also the three Magi of the East, splendid, who, instructed by the doctrine of Balaam aforesaid, with a marvelous Star as guide, brought gifts to the new-born Christ. What Christian corrupted these so many witnesses, suborned them, and taught them, that they should bear such testimonies to our Christ — when neither the name of Christ nor of Christian was known to anyone? Now this star perhaps was that Comet seen by the Romans and Octavian Augustus, in whose reign Christ was born; concerning which Pliny in *Natural History* II thus writes: "A comet is worshipped in one place of the whole world, in a Temple at Rome, judged by Augustus himself to be very fortunate to him, who at his beginning [in 82 BC] opened the games which he was making for Venus the Genetrix, not long after the death of his Father Caesar, in the College instituted by him. For with these words betrayed: On those very days of my games, a haired Star for seven days in the region of the heaven under the Septentrions was beheld; it rose about the eleventh hour of the day, and was bright and seen in all lands. The common people

believed that by that star was signified the soul of Caesar received among the divinities of the immortal Gods — by which name the marker for the Insignia of the head of him, which we soon consecrated in the Forum, was added." Pliny says these things in public, with interior joy interpreting it as illuminated to him, and that he was being born in it; "and to confess what is true, the same was salutary to the lands."

But Calcidius, writing more clearly concerning that splendid star, on *Timaeus* II of Plato, treating of the Stars rarely appearing, announcing diseases and deaths, adds: "There is also another more sacred and venerable history, which holds that by the rising of a certain star, not diseases and deaths were announced, but the descent of a venerable God to the conversation of human and mortal things by grace; which star, when on a nocturnal journey the wise men of the Chaldeans, indeed exercised in the consideration of celestial things, had beheld, are said to have sought the recent rising of God; and that Majesty being found, are said to have venerated the little one and to have proclaimed vows befitting so great a God."

I knowingly pass over here Ovid *On the Old Woman* and Albumazar, speaking of Christ. Do not also the cases of the Temple of Peace and the statue of Romulus seem to attest Christ — at the hour of the Nativity of Christ from the glorious Virgin? — concerning which it had been predicted that they should not fall until a virgin gave birth. Do not also the falling of all the Idols of Egypt, at his entry into Egypt, attest him? Do not many heavenly Angels solemnly attest him, in the very hour of his Nativity, by announcing great joy to the Shepherds, because then was born the Savior, Christ the Lord, in the City of David — by praising God and saying: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will"?

Do not also that glorious appearance on the day of Epiphany, when he had been baptized, attest him? Does not also that eclipse of the Sun seem to attest him — by which, with Christ suffering in the flesh, in the middle of the lunar month, around the customary full moon, from the sixth hour to the ninth, the Sun was darkened? But someone perhaps will think this darkening to have been in a certain way casual, through the interposition of some dense cloud at the time occurring. But if it had been so, it is not in any way verisimilar that so many and so great Historiographers — say Matthew, Mark, and Luke — would have written this concordantly in the foundational books of the Christian Faith; especially because then that cloud would have been very dense, great, and broad — indeed greater and broader than the whole earth shadowed at midday. For what Philosopher does not know that the Sun is greater than the earth? Wherefore also lines drawn from the extremities of the whole earth, or of any part of the earth, to the contingency of the Sun in opposite points, by receding from the earth continuously distance more. Wherefore also no cloud would exclude all that incidence of light, unless it were broader than the whole earth, and any part of the earth totally shadowed. Who is ignorant of any of these things, who has even glanced at the threshold of Astronomy, Geometry, and Perspective? But as the Evangelists testify, with Christ suffering, from the sixth hour darkness was made over the whole earth until the ninth — which perhaps ought to be understood of the whole land of Judea. That cloud therefore had to have been very dense and very broad, and well perceived by all. What therefore

notable and memorable thing would our Evangelists and Historiographers have written by writing these things? Wherefore also Luke, the most diligent investigator and writer, adding the cause to the others: "The Sun," he says, "was darkened." Should it likewise be supposed casual that then also the veil of the Temple was rent into two parts from top to bottom; that the earth was moved; that rocks were rent; that monuments were opened; that the bodies of many Saints arose — as the same Histories attest? Not so, not so were his enemies thinking — the Centurion and those with him; but seeing these things, they said: "Truly this was the Son of God" — as the said Histories do not pass over in silence.

This eclipse therefore was of this celestial luminary, supernatural, insinuating something concerning the author of heaven and nature. Wherefore Dionysius the Areopagite, a Philosopher still a Gentile, seeing these things, said: "Either the God of nature suffers, or the machine of the world is being dissolved." And because he believed the machine of the world was to last, he believed God to be suffering. Wherefore he erected an Altar entitled "to the Unknown God." Wherefore also when Paul preached Christ, the unknown God, to the Athenians and Philosophers, Dionysius received the faith of Christ. The mode of this Eclipse the same Dionysius writes to Polycarp the high Priest, in Epistle 7, where against Apollopheanes the Sophist, denying these things, he says: "Tell him what you say of the defect made at the Cross of the Savior. For we both, then present at Heliopolis, and standing together, beheld the Moon unexpectedly falling on the Sun (for it was not the time of conjunction); and again from the ninth hour till evening, supernaturally restored to the Diameter of the Sun. Recall to him also something else: for he knows that we saw the Eclipse itself begun from the East, and coming up to the Solar terminus; afterward going forth, and again not from the same the defect and repurgation, but from the contrary along the Diameter made. Such things were of that time supernatural, and possible only to Christ who is the cause of all, who does great and marvelous things, of which there is no number. Tell this to himself; and if it is possible, Apollopheanes, refute me, then present with you and at the same time observing, and at the same time pointing out, and at the same time marveling — if anything also of divination."

Then somehow Apollopheanes began, and to me — as it would be useful — said: "These, O good Dionysius, are mutations of divine matters, of such things as are spoken by us in the Epistle. It will be your part both to fulfill sufficiently the things lacking, and to lead perfectly to God a man wise in many things existing, and perhaps not disdaining gently to speak above the wise of the truth of our religion."

If anyone diligently consider, he will see many miracles in this Eclipse: that the Moon was so swiftly moved from opposition to opposition; that in the middle of the lunar month a Solar Eclipse occurred; that the Eclipse of the Sun began from the eastern part of the Sun; that the part of the Sun first eclipsed was last repurged, and that which was last eclipsed first purged; that it had so great a delay, namely for three hours; that the Moon so swiftly returned whence it came; that it came through the East, or returned against its own motion — whether its proper motion be from the West to the East faster than the motion of the Sun, or contrarily under-defecting. That

all these things are against nature, no one is ignorant of, who has even slightly been instructed in such matters. Who therefore could do these things, except he who long ago, with Joshua fighting against the five Kings whom the Lord decreed to destroy, and praying — made the Sun stand still and the Moon: the Sun in the middle of heaven, that it should not hasten to set for the space of one day, until the people might avenge themselves of the aforesaid enemies? Who could do these things, except he who in the time of the Prophet Isaiah invoking the Lord, and of King Hezekiah of Judea, made the Sun return until the shadow on the Sundial returned correspondingly through 10 lines and as many degrees — as the most sacred Histories, and most famous throughout the world, clearly produce? But this sign — Dionysius referring above — fittingly moved the Babylonians to stupor, and without battle subjected them to Hezekiah, as to one equal to God and exceeding men — which is also chiefly conveyed by the priestly memories of the Persians.

Believe therefore, Apollophanes, our Histories, especially the Evangelical, so authentic among us, so famous, especially where they hand down the bare History. For if you do not believe the Histories of our nation, how shall I believe the Histories of your nation? Or how shall anyone believe any History of any nation not his own? Or even of his own nation, which he has not seen with his own eyes fulfilled? But far be from men this poison: for this would render men unbelievable, lawless, unsociable, inhuman, incommunicable, uncivil, and would dissipate almost all the bonds of humanity. For who knows from what land or country, from what nation or kindred he descended; through whom, and from whom his country and kindred, and he himself, received so many goods — except through Histories and the testimonies of elders? And if in this part you do not believe the Histories of our nation, nor do you believe the Histories of the Jews, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks — indeed, neither Dionysius and Polycarp, splendid men, who beheld together that Eclipse — who then will believe you? Why therefore do you not believe the Histories referring that thing to be past, which the Sibyl and the ancient Prophets predicted long ago to be future? The Prophecy of the Sibyl sufficiently expressly is recounted above.

Is not this also what the Prophet Amos predicted, saying: "It shall be in that day, says the Lord, the Sun shall set at midday; and I will make the earth grow dark in the day of light"? — and he speaks there literally of the final extermination of the Jews, as the preceding and following text evidently shows; which soon after the death of Christ, the Gospel having been preached among the Gentiles, even among the Romans through Titus and Vespasian, was plenarily consummated; which also continues to this day. With which all, also other ancient Prophets predicted many like things. But far be it that anyone should so understand it of a natural Eclipse of the luminaries. For how does it seem credible that so many Prophets, by a great prophetic sign, should predict a natural and customary Eclipse — which one boy could most certainly predict with all its circumstances through natural science?

Your subtlety, however, Apollophanes the Sophist, scarcely deserves to be called sophistic: for it is scarcely colored with thin appearance. It sins gravely both in matter and in form. In form indeed: for how does the place hold negatively from authority? "The author does not say, therefore not true." How does it follow: "No one of the Greeks, or of the Barbarians considering

such things, wrote this, therefore so it was not"? — especially since those considering such things never saw or heard anything such happen in the middle of the lunar month, and they knew that nor could it then occur by nature. Wherefore even if such darkness then came to be, they did not consider it diligently, supposing those things to happen from the obstruction of some dense cloud, as is wont often to happen.

You could also similarly cavil against other heavenly signs mentioned above. But pass beyond, I ask, a little, the state of the Sophist, and learn that even a universal Eclipse of the Sun does not appear in every place and to all, as an Eclipse of the Moon appears — and this on account of diversity of aspect, as Theorems not Sophistical, but Philosophical, namely Mathematical, clearly show. Wherefore also an Eclipse of the Sun could happen in some land, even though those in Greece would not see it, even on a clear day.

In matter also you sin, by saying that no one of the Greeks saw that Eclipse, or made mention of it — as what was already laid down manifests. Does not also the Resurrection of Christ from death, the attestation of the Angels, his Ascension into heaven with many seeing it, the attestation of the Angels, the sending of the Holy Spirit promised, with the inspiration of the rude lay disciples — so marvelous, so effective, so strong, that immediately they spoke in the tongues of all and understood the Scriptures — bear testimony to Jesus Christ?

Do not also his other miracles of every kind, so far exceeding the strength of nature — which and how great our authentic and famous Histories attest — make certain faith? For Philosophers are wont to proceed inquiringly from sensed and known effects to unknown causes. But there were with Christ many miraculous effects, and among Christians, in his name, they continue to this day: say, the sudden conversion of water into wine; the satiation of five thousand men from five loaves and two fishes, with twelve baskets of fragments left; the sudden cleansing of lepers; the sudden illumination of the blind; the sudden consolidation of paralytics; and (to comprehend many things briefly) the sudden and perfect cure of any languors whatever — indeed, also the sudden and true revival of those truly dead, as very many sufficiently authentic Histories concordantly attest, as also the ancient Prophets and the Sibyls anciently predicted concerning him; which also our enemies the Jews, and Josephus attest. Therefore, O Philosopher, of these effects say the cause: are not the effects, just as they transcend the powers of all created nature, so also their cause?

I know that by impudent Sophists, who wish to seem Philosophers, to these and like points many things are answered. For some irreligious persons do not fear simply to deny all miracles. But these will be corrected as Apollophanes was above. For it is uncivil and inhuman simply to deny all the Histories of Christians, and even of the Jews. Whoever also denies miracles, has consequently to deny every possibility of doing miracles — and you reckon yourself able fully to know every divine operation, contrary to the prior particle of this part, and contrary to the seventh and eighth Parts already laid down.

Whoever also denies Christian miracles, come and see with your eye, even still in these times in places of the Saints, by turns, glorious miracles. Come into England to the present King of the English, lead with you any Christian whatsoever having the Royal Disease (*morbus regius*), however inveterate, deep, and foul, and with prayer poured forth, hand imposed, and blessing given under the sign of the cross, he will cure him in the name of Jesus Christ. For this he does continually, and has very often done for most filthy men and women, and to those rushing to him in crowds in England, in Germany, and in France round about — as daily deeds, as those who have been cured, as those who were present and saw, as the peoples of the nations and the most celebrated fame, most certainly attest. Which also all Christian Kings of the English and of the Franks are wont divinely to do, as the Books of Antiquities and the concordant fame of the Kingdoms attest. Whence also the Royal Disease has taken its name. Go into Ireland, enter the Purgatory of Saint Patrick, and you will experience a marvel manifoldly admirable — which also some have most certainly experienced.

Furthermore, if you do not believe the Histories of Christians concerning miracles done among them, believe the Histories of Philosophers, Poets, Chronographers, Gentiles, and of those who never received the faith of Christ — and these themselves concerning miracles done among Christians among foreign nations. Behold Aristotle, the famous Philosopher, in *On the World* [12], referring one great marvel: "There was lately, toward the West, an earthquake, which overthrew very many cities. With the greatest rains and rage of winds, in some places it converted the sea into dry land and dry land into sea. And so great fires were made, that all things were enkindled. For fire bursting from the earth, as if the prisons of Etna were broken, was carried in the manner of a river over the earth. Where also a faithful kind of Numen was honored particularly: where, while certain young men, parents and elders being borne on their shoulders, had been taken hold of by the rheum, and the river of fire was terribly approaching them — the river of burning was divided: this part to here, that part to there it turned aside, and preserved the youths with their parents unharmed."

Which also more expressly Solinus *On the Marvels of the World* II testifies, where he treats of Sicily, saying: "Between Catania and Syracuse there is a contest concerning the memory of the illustrious Brothers, whose names diverse parties adopt for themselves. If we hear the Catanians, they were Anapius and Amphinomus; if Syracuse, which they prefer, we shall think Emantia and Crito. The Catanian region, however, gave the cause for the deed: into which when the fires of Etna had burst forth, two youths bore away their lifted-up parents, unharmed by the fires among the flames. Posterity has so rewarded their memory, that the place of their Sepulcher is called the Field of the Pious." And the same below, in the same book, narrates that there in Sicily is the Vulcanian Hill, where two marvels are demonstrated. For when the worshippers are placing green twigs upon the Altars, with no fire applied, it is proved whether God is present propitious by this — that the woods take fire of their own accord, and with no one fanning them, are kindled by a breath from the divinity. Where also after the sacrifice is consummated, with those

feasting, the flame plays — which, wandering with sinuous excursions, does not burn whomever it touches.

A like thing Pliny attests in *Natural History* VII, under these words: "Not far from the city of Rome, in the territory of the Faliscans, are a few families which are called Hirpiae, who in an annual Sacrifice which is made at the Mountain Sorastes — to Apollo, walking upon a burnt heap of wood — are not burned. And on this account, by perpetual decree of the Senate, they have exemption from military service and all other duties."

Aristotle also reports in *Secret of Secrets*, part 3, ch. 14, how with a Magus of the East praying to God, a Jew who had brought to him the mule lent to himself, was cast off it and prostrated, with a tibia broken, and likewise with the neck injured. And the same below in the same, last part, ch. 1, approves the helpful miracles of the Prophets; and above in the same, part 3, ch. 1, alleges Hermogenes — these words: "Our father Hermogenes, who threefold in Philosophy, philosophizing best, said: The truth has itself thus, and there is no doubt that lower things correspond to higher and higher to lower. The worker of miracles is one and only — God, from whom every marvelous operation descends."

Avicenna also in *Metaphysics* X concedes miracles, and likewise in *On the Soul* IV [4], although there he feigns erroneous causes; and likewise Algazel in his *Philosophy* V [5] confesses miracles. Albumazar also *On Conjunctions*, Tract. 1, Difference 3, determines concerning the miracles of solemn Prophets, although, as also Avicenna, he goes astray in their causes. Likewise Josephus *Antiquities* II, last, referring to the passage of Israel through the middle of the Red Sea, in argument of the faith adds these things: "Let no one disbelieve the marvel of the word, if to ancient men, and those deprived of malice, the way of salvation — though through the sea — was made, either by the will of God, or revealed of itself; since also to those who were with Alexander, King of Macedon, long ago and anciently — when they were resisting — the Pamphylian Sea was divided; and when there was no other passage, it gave passage to them, with God willing through him to destroy the principate of the Persians; and this confess all who have written the Acts of Alexander."

The *Historia Scholastica* also, where it treats of Esther, recounts from the same Josephus that Alexander the Great praying the God of Israel that he would enclose the 10 Tribes within the Caspian Mountains, the precipices of the mountains came together, and made the place impassable. Valerius Maximus reports also, Book VIII [1], that a certain Vestal Virgin, suspected of corruption, in argument of her unimpaired integrity, with prayer to the Goddess Vesta premised, carried a sieve full of water from the Tiber into her Temple most intactly. Ovid *On the Fasti* IV, treating of the festival of Cybele which the ancients celebrated on the Nones of April — whom they thought the mother of the Gods and Virgin, and who was named Berecinthia, Idea, Pessimica, Phrygia, the Virgin Goddess, and the Heavenly Virgin (as it appears partly there through Ovid, partly through Augustine *On the City of God* I [29] and II [5, 26], and X [16], and through many others handling Histories and poems) — describing the itinerary by which she

from Phrygia toward Rome, through many seas, to the mouth of the Tiber was conveyed, reports a great and stupendous miracle. The keel (as he says) sat upon the slime of the Tiber now dried up by excessive heat, so firmly that by no ingenuity, nor by any forces, could it be moved.

Claudia Quinta, a Virgin commonly defamed concerning violation, approaching the Goddess, with suppliant prayer poured forth in purgation of her public reputation, drew forth the ship with a girdle or rope, with light effort, whither she wished. And because verses help the minds of some, I repeat a few verses of Ovid, which speak thus:

Verses of Ovid:

The vessel had reached where the Tiber divides itself into the deep, And swims more freely in the field. Every horseman, beside the Senate at the same time with the people, Comes to meet at the mouth of the Tuscan river. The mothers proceed equally, and the sons and the men, And those who tend the holy fires by virginity. The men eagerly slacken their arms by twisted rope; Scarcely does the foreign ship advance against the waters. Long had the soil been dry; thirst had burned the herbs; The keel sat pressed in the slimy soil. Whoever is present, labors at the work more than for his share, And helps the strong hands with sounding voice. She, like a stable Island in the middle of the Sea, sits; Astonished at the prodigy, men stand and tremble. Claudia Quinta traced her descent from ancient Clausus, Nor was her face unequal to her nobility. Chaste indeed she was, but not so believed; unjust rumor Had injured her, and she was made guilty of a false crime. Adornment and variously worn-out hair had hurt, And a tongue prompt to rigid sounds. Her mind conscious of the truth laughed at the lies of fame, But we are a crowd credulous to vice. When she had come forward from the band of chaste matrons, And had drawn pure water from the river with her hands, Three times she sprinkles her head, three times raises her palms to the sky; Whoever beholds her, thinks she is mad. And with knee submitted, she fixes her face on the image of the Goddess, And with hair flowing, gave forth these sounds: "Fruitful Mother of the Gods, gentle, receive the prayers Of your suppliant under a certain condition. I am denied chaste; if you condemn, I shall confess to have deserved; By death I shall pay the penalty, conquered by the judgment of the Goddess. But if the crime is absent, you shall be a pledge of our life by the deed, And chaste, you shall follow chaste hands." She spoke and drew the rope with slight effort: A marvel — but I speak attested on the stage. The Goddess is moved, and follows her leader, and praises her by following. The sound, an index of joy, is borne to the stars.

But lest I should seem to ground myself only on the suspect sayings of Poets — behold Titus Livius, who in Book IX *On the Second Punic War* attests this. Behold Solinus *On the Marvels of the World*, last part, who speaks thus: "A ship from Phrygia, the bearer of sacred things, while it follows the headbands of chastity, conferred on Claudia the principate of modesty." And behold likewise Augustine, who first *On the City of God* [16] both this and the preceding, with certain others, recounts and concedes. And the same Solinus above, in I [2], thus writes: "There is a shrine of Hercules in the Boarian Forum, in which arguments of his banquet and majesty remain. For divinely neither flies nor dogs have entry there. For when he was libating the offering of the

sacrifice, he is said to have invoked the great God; and to have left his club in the entry, the smell of which dogs flee, and which lasts even to this day."

The Histories of the Tartars also report, and Hayton in the book entitled *Flower of the Histories of the Eastern Land* part 3 commemorates concerning Genghis Khan, the first Khan, the first Emperor or King of the Tartars, one stupendous miracle, in these words: "After Genghis Khan had subjected to his empire all the lands and provinces which were on this side of the mountain Belian, and possessed those things peaceably and quietly, on a certain night in dreams he saw another vision: for he saw again a white knight, who said to him: 'Genghis Khan, the will of the immortal God is that you cross the mountain Belian toward the West, and you shall occupy the lands and kingdoms, and there you shall dominate the peoples whom you shall subject to your empire. And that you may be certain that the things which I tell you are from the part of the immortal God, rise and go to the mountain Belian with all your nation, to the place where the sea joins itself with the same; and there you shall descend, and toward the East with nine genuflections nine times shall you adore the immortal God; and he who is Omnipotent shall show you the way through which you can pass through.' Genghis Khan, having seen the vision, joyfully rose, and was in no way doubtful: for the first vision which he had seen of others gave him certainty. Hastily also he gathered his men universally, and commanded that they should follow him with their wives and sons, and all that they had. He proceeded then until they came to the place where the great and deep sea adhered to the mountains; nor was there any passage, or way. Continually, however, Genghis Khan, as had been commanded by the immortal God, descended from the horse: and all doing the same thing universally, toward the East with knees bent nine times adored, imploring mercy and grace from the omnipotent and immortal God, that he would show them passage and way for going. They stood in their prayers that night, and rising in the morning, they saw that the sea had retreated from the mountain by 9 feet, and had left for them a broad way. All were stupefied marvelously seeing this, and to the immortal God unanimously giving thanks most devoutly, they passed through the way which they had seen."

Who therefore, except one too stiff-necked, and an impious striker of the Fathers, alone will contradict so many and such great witnesses? And if to these Histories you accord faith, why not to the much more famous Histories of the Hebrews and Christians? Wherefore also others, acting more humanly, concede Christian miracles, but disagree in the assignment of cause. For some assign a cause not true, others a true one. Those assigning a cause not true vary manifoldly. For some Physicians say the goodness and property of an optimal complexion, tempered, which they call tempered to justice in Christ, was the effective cause of health in other bodies, and of whatever miracles he did. But these will easily be cured. For although they can in some way, with color, assign this cause for some miracles of Christ — say a few of the cures which he did by touching — yet of others they cannot. For Christ healed many not by touching, indeed not by entering the house, but at great distance, when he was asked for the sick, by consenting. But Philosophers and Physicians know that in every action and motion, real and spiritual, mover and moved are together: the great Philosopher Aristotle is witness, *Physics* VII [9], and *On the Soul*

II [74]. That complexion also, and all its property, was only of finite virtue. Wherefore in cleansing a leper, in solidifying a paralytic, and in healing other infirmities, it would require a certain time, a certain alteration and motion, according to the proportion of that healing power to the resistance of the infirmity to be healed. And where there were a more resistant and greater infirmity, there a greater time would necessarily be required, as also the Philosophers and Physicians well know. And there would necessarily be some medium between the infirmity and perfect health, which the Physicians are wont to call convalescence. But Christ — suddenly and perfectly, as not without cause I have recounted above — made those whom he willed, who were sick, well.

Again, according to these same things, if it had been so, an infirmity could have been so great, so incurable, so mortal, that the virtue of Christ's complexion would not have been able to heal it. Yet he is read of as having cured the most grievous and most antiquated diseases, nor in anything to have failed. How also any disease, however mortal, could he not cure, who also raised up the dead?

Furthermore, if such and so great a complexion could do so many miracles, any lesser complexion could similarly do proportionally lesser miracles in proportional patient — as both Philosophers and Physicians attest. What virtue also of complexion could call back a four-day-dead man, already stinking, not by touching but by word alone, suddenly to perfect life — could change water into wine, multiply loaves and fish so vehemently, walk upon waters, as Christ did all these things? What complexion, while Christ was hanging on the cross, made the earth move, monuments open, the bodies of Saints arise — indeed even the Sun be eclipsed in the manner aforesaid? What complexion could rise from death, ascend into Heaven, send down the Holy Spirit, and so effectively inspire the Apostles? Did all Christians through whom miracles are done exist of that one and not more all-sided complexion? Indeed, miracles are done through men and women, through old and young, through the living and the dead. Were also Moses, the ancient Prophets, and all who do miracles of this complexion? What complexion also dried up the sea, kept it dry, transferred mountains, made the Sun stand still and return?

It stands fast also that complexion is an irrational power, wherefore according to the Philosophers, it has effect for one of opposites only; but the power productive of miracles, for both, according to what the miracles to be made require. Is not also complexion an irrational power, wherefore according to the Philosophers it does not act from election and freely, but from the necessity of nature, as fire heats? Wherefore the complexion of Christ, always and necessarily with the patient present, would have done any miracle which it could have done. Yet we read that he, and others also, did their miracles freely and from free will.

What also need would there be for praying to God for miraculous effects, if the natural complexion did nothing there, since natural complexion suffices? Yet the Saints through whom miracles are done pray to God — which would be entirely superfluous, unless he himself worked miracles.

If also any creature can do miracles, God too can — as the first Supposition shows. Why therefore does he not do them, when he is suppliantly entreated? Indeed, more it befits God so to do, and us to believe it is so. Wherefore also the Father of Philosophers, Hermogenes, says that the worker of miracles is one and only God; with which Aristotle in his *Secret of Secrets* consents, as was recounted above. Who also above, in the same, part 1 [22], showing what the foreknowledge of future things avails — say of a winter too cold, of a summer too hot, of years of famine and scarcity — says: "It avails much to foreknow future things, because men can better avoid them when they foreknow what is to come. For also they ought then to implore the most high Destinator with prayers, that through his clemency he may avert future evils from them, and otherwise ordain. For he has not so predestined, that in anything he should derogate from his power. Indeed men can entreat the divine clemency by prayers, devotions, supplications, fasts, services, sacrifices, alms, and many other goods, imploring pardon for things committed, repenting of accusations: and most truly then God Almighty will avert from them what they tremble at and fear." With whom also concordantly Avicenna *Metaphysics* X [10] says that "Because the first true one knows this whole, therefore from him begins to be everything that is done. And on account of these causes, prayers and sacrifices help men, and especially Litanies for rain, and other things of this kind. And one ought to fear to render evil for evil, and study to render good for good. The certitude of which thing will make you flee evil. But the certitude of this thing is the evidence of his miracles." Where also speaking of the disposition and utility of the members of animals and plants, he says: "There is no natural cause there in any way; but the principle of it is from divine care, just as those things depend from care; how much more therefore should one feel similarly in miracles?" And he adds: "Know also that more the common people approach and hold and say it is true, nor do any flee it but those who wish to seem Philosophers, because they are ignorant of the causes and occasions of these things."

The Astrologers, however — say Albumazar, where prior, and others elsewhere — seeing the terrestrial body to be insufficient for doing miracles, ascend to the celestial; saying that diverse conjunctions and virtues of celestial Bodies in diverse signs cause diverse miracles. But the Astrologers, like the Physicians, will be corrected. The Celestial Body also, or any Celestial conjunction, if it does a miracle here on earth — since it cannot do this immediately — requires some medium through which it does this. But this is not only fire or air, but some great man, some saint, conceived in some such great conjunction, born or pre-signified through it. For we see that not only the air works the miracle, but some great man, some holy man — which also these Astrologers confess. Which also Aristotle seems to say in *Secret of Secrets*, last part [I]. But if it were so, such a man would work miracles by virtue of his complexion — as the prior response said.

How also is it fitting to a celestial conjunction and virtue, to break the celestial virtue, to alter the motions of the celestial luminaries, to make the Sun and Moon stand still, return, and the Sun to be eclipsed by the Moon in the middle of the lunar month in the manner aforesaid?

How also could the luminous virtue of a celestial body make some country accustomed to be illuminated by day in the earth, and to be darkened by night, to be (like the region around it) shadowed by perpetual gloom? For Hayton, indeed, in his book entitled *Flower of the Histories of the Eastern Land* part 1 ch. 10, treating of the kingdom of Georgia, writes thus: "In this kingdom of Georgia appears a certain stupendous marvel, and manifoldly monstrous, which I would not dare to say, nor would I have believed by the report of anyone, unless I had first seen it with my own eyes. But because I was personally there, and saw it as it were with the eye, I say that in those parts there is a certain province, Hanissen, which in circuit well takes up three days' journeys; and as much as that province extends, by a certain caliginous and shadowy gloom that place is so dimmed, that there is no one who can behold anything; nor is there anyone who would dare to enter that land, since for returning he is ignorant of the path. The inhabitants of that region assert that they have often heard the voices of men shouting, the songs of cocks, the neighings of horses; and through the channel of a certain river which flows out from that place, certain signs appear that there is a habitation of peoples in it. It is true that, by reading, it is found in the Histories of the Kingdom of Armenia and Georgia, that there was a certain most evil Emperor and dominator of the Persians, who is named by the name Sanoreus. He worshipped idols, and persecuted Christians most cruelly. On a certain day he commanded that all the inhabitants of Asia should come and adore his idols, and that whoever was contrary to the imperial edicts should suffer the penalty of burning. Whence it came about that some faithful Christians chose Martyrdom rather; some adored the idols; some fled to the mountains; some good Christians at that time, however, lived in a certain plain which is commonly called Mogan; and when they were unwilling in any way to sacrifice to idols, they thought of flight; and while they thought to transfer themselves to the parts of Greece, that most evil son of iniquity, the Emperor with his most unhappy army, while they fled, encountered the Christians in that province Hanissen, named above. And when by the order of the Emperor the Christians piecemeal were to be beheaded universally, they cried to the Lord Jesus Christ, and immediately that darkness obscured the lights of the perfidious, and the Christians, going by a straight path, escaped. The wicked, however, in that valley of darkness reside even now, and ought to reside until the end of the age, as is believed and recounted by all."

How also would the virtue of heaven sustain a Church or column standing without foundation, as if upon flowable air, immobile for many times? Marcus of Venice, indeed, who personally circled around eastern Regions for many years, and what he saw and learned there faithfully committed to memory in the book entitled *On the Conditions and Customs of Eastern Regions* book 1 [39], writes in these words: "Samarkand is a noble city and great, in that Region which is tributary to the Nephew of the Great Khan, where together dwell Christians and those who adore Mohammed, who call themselves Saracens. In this city such a marvel was made by the virtue of Christ in these times. A certain brother of the Great Khan, who was called Cygatay, who presided over this Region, induced and instructed by Christians, received baptism. Then the Christians, having the favor of the Christian Prince, built a great Basilica in the city of Samarkand in honor of Saint John the Baptist. By such ingenuity was the Church fabricated by the Architects, that the

whole height of the Basilica was firmed upon one marble column, which column was in the middle of it. While the work was being done, however, they took a certain stone of the Saracens, of which they formed a base under the said column. The Saracens indeed, who hated the Christians, grieved over the stone taken from them; but fearing the Prince Cygatay, dared not to contradict. It came to pass, however, that the Prince died, whose son succeeded in the Kingdom, but not in the faith. The Saracens prevailed upon him, that the Christians should be compelled to restore their stone to them. The Christians offering a great price for the stone, the Saracens refused the price, willing that with the stone taken away, the Church should be destroyed by the falling column. And when there was no remedy for the Christians in this matter, with tearful prayers they began to invoke Saint John the Baptist. Therefore on the approaching day when the stone was to be removed from under the column, and consequently by the Saracens the ruin of the whole roof of the Church was hoped for, by divine nod the column was so much lifted up from the Base, that for the space of three palms it was elevated, sustained in the air; and so without the support of human aid, it perseveres to this day."

Furthermore, how could celestial virtue, for long times, every year, on a certain day, dry up the sea, keep it dried for 7 days, exhibit a little child left in the middle of the waves, after a year completed, unharmed? For a celebrated history far and wide diffuses, how the Blessed Clement, preaching the faith of Christ, was thrown by an unbelieving prince into the sea with an anchor about his neck, lest perhaps being found by Christians he should be held a Martyr; and with Cornelius and Phebus his disciples praying, the sea retreated for three miles. They, with a great multitude of Christians, entering through the dry land, found a habitation prepared in the manner of a marble Temple, and there in a certain ark his body decently composed, and the anchor next to him; in whose Passion also the sea, for 3 miles for 7 days, withdrew with very many shores, offering to those coming a dry path, until on account of the fury of barbarians it was carried to Rome where he had been before; where also in the Church, which is called from him Saint Clement's, he is solemnly venerated.

How also during the recounted miracle, a certain woman led there her little son, and at the end of the solemnity, with the waters of the sea rushing in, on account of excessive haste left him there; and a year having gone round, returning with a multitude of Christians, found the boy sleeping; who, being roused and entirely unharmed, supposed himself to have slept sweetly only the space of one night. Many indeed and other almost innumerable glorious miracles offer themselves in crowds to one turning the pages of Histories, which through the celestial virtue of bodies alone cannot even sophistically be colored.

Tell me, I beg, Astrologer, what so powerful and miraculous conjunction in the making of the prior miracles newly occurred? Are not the motions, conjunctions — small, great, greater, and greatest — oppositions all, aspects, properties, and celestial virtues, known to the faithful as to the unbelieving Astrologers, or rather Sophists of Astrology — who on account of the paucity of those skilled in that science, feign that they know many things which they do not know, and many non-causes as causes, that thus irreprehensibly above others they may exalt themselves? If,

I say, you, learned Astrologer, know how to assign a celestial cause of any miracles, tell me, I beg, what and what kind of miracle, when, and where will it occur, when will it begin, how long will it last? But do not, I beg, deceive me, by saying that at the Pillars of Hercules or in the depths of the Ocean, after 100 years, or after the term of my life, such a miracle shall be — lest perhaps you should seem by sophisticated flight to decline the question. Or tell me when and where this or that miracle was made; or yet tell me, within what future time in a certain place no miracle will be made, or such a miracle will not be made; or within what past time in a certain place no miracle was made, or such a miracle was not made. Or if you do not know how to tell me, I shall tell you: what, of what sort, when, and where God shall have willed or willed, a miracle will be done, or was being done; and likewise negatively. Of the divine will, however — since by the eighth Part and the fourth, it is supremely and maximally free — I cannot assign an antecedent necessary cause, as was shown above. This, however, evidently appears, because these miracles happen with prayer poured forth to God; which would seem entirely superfluous, frivolous, and vain, if heaven did these and not God, as was argued above.

Others, however, seeing no body to be able to suffice for doing miracles, posit a spirit as the cause of these. And these vary further. For some suppose that the spirit of man, the rational human soul, is the sufficient cause of these — yet not any soul disposed in any way; but, as Aristotle says in *Secret of Secrets*, last part [I]: "When the soul shall be surpassing the body, dominant and pre-weighing it, it makes a Prophet with helpful miracles." But this response can be corrected like the prior ones. Furthermore, if the soul from such a habitual disposition alone makes miracles, always and necessarily it makes whatever miracles it can, as long as it is so disposed — like an irrational agent. Just as if the soul, from the species alone of fire in it, would burn, it would always burn, as long as it had that species, sleeping, waking, and doing anything else, with the patient approached and impediment removed. Wherefore Avicenna, following and supplementing Aristotle in this part, *On the Soul* IV [4], says that "the soul, when it shall be noble, constant, similar to the principles, then according to its will not only its own body but also extrinsic bodies, and the matter which is in the world, obey it: so that it heals the sick, weakens the wicked, changes the elements; rain happens, sterility, and absorption from the earth, just as the work of the eye of the fascinator is on a foreign body" — where he also seems to insinuate that the soul does such works from the strength and firmness of the form of the thing impressed in it and of the imagination of it. With which imaginary fiction Algazel agrees, *Physics* V [5], and certain others of the moderns. But the image of this imagination will easily be broken, and reduced to nothing, through the prior responses. For such a soul, willing to heal someone distant — if by this very fact it heals — this would be through some action expanded to him through the whole intercepted medium. For Philosophers know — and Physicians are not ignorant — that nothing acts on the extreme except by acting on the medium, even if not always similar action. Wherefore even if in that medium however many other sick should be placed — at least detained by similar infirmity — all would similarly be healed.

That soul also, that volition and imagination, is only of finite virtue. Therefore there could be such great distance between it and the sick, or in small distance the medium so indisposed by density or other quality, that it could not heal him. There could also be so many sick in some great army, and company, or convention, that if it wished to heal all, it would heal none — or so many enemies in some army, that wishing to weaken or kill all, it would harm none. But is it so with Christ? Did he not, who from few loaves and fishes satiated so many thousands of men with so great abundance of fragments left, have power (had he willed and had it been needful) to satiate more and more thousands, and to multiply loaves and fish more and more, and at greater and greater distance? Wherefore one is to feel similarly concerning other miracles.

Such a soul moreover, however willing and imagining, since it is only of finite virtue, requires a certain time and successive alteration according to the resistance of the patient; and an infirmity could be so great and have so much resistance, that it could not heal it. Both of which are false of Christ, as was argued above.

If also so powerful a soul through such strong volition and imagination can do so great miracles, why cannot any soul through proportional volition and imagination do proportional miracles? How also can a soul, by willing or imagining, raise the dead, and call back souls from heaven or from hell to bodies? Much more easily could it preserve someone from death, and render his own body immortal — indeed all men, and all beasts, immortal. Whose imagination, I ask, enclosed so great an army and so great a country in darkness, as was touched above? Not the imagination of the Christians, for they were not then thought to have been imagining concerning such darkness, but concerning flight; nor the imagination of the persecutors, for they (as it seems) did not imagine themselves to be apprehended by such gloom, but to be persecuting Christians; and that darkness continually perseveres: it has therefore a continuous cause. But who attends to such imagining continually? Who continually perseveres so imagining? Whose imagination would have sustained the said column, with the base subtracted? Not of the Saracens (for they rather imagined the Church about to fall), nor of the Christians (for they (as it seems) rather hoped for some vengeance to be divinely inflicted upon the Saracens, or for the base of the column to be there divinely retained, than one such unexpected miracle unheard of for ages); whose imagination also so continual perseveres, that for so great times it sustains the column, with the Christians even continually sleeping?

Marcus of Venice also reports, *On the Conditions of Eastern Regions* I [18], in this way: "In those regions, namely between Tauris and Baghdad, is a mountain which long ago was translated from its place to another place by divine virtue. For the Saracens wished to show the Gospel of Christ vain — because the Lord said, *If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mountain, Pass thence, and it shall pass; and nothing shall be impossible for you.* They said indeed to the Christians who under their dominion in those parts dwelt, 'Either translate that mountain in the name of Christ, or all be converted to Mohammed, or all perish by the sword.' Then a certain devout man, comforting the Christians, with prayer poured forth faithfully to the

Lord Jesus Christ, with the multitude of peoples seeing, translated the mountain to the designated place; on which account many of the Saracens were converted to Christ."

But whose imagination (I beg) is so strong, that it transfers a mountain? O magnanimous Avicenna, having a great soul — transfer through your imagination this little hill, or the smallest clod of it, and I will give you a mountain of gold to be possessed. Would not also so many contrary imaginations of Saracens have rather retained the mountain there? Indeed, rather are these and other miracles of this kind to be reckoned to have been done by Christ and God, who to help was suppliantly entreated. Whose imagination also was converting Saul the Jew, so skilled in the law, so fervent in the law, so vehement a persecutor of the Christian Faith, so unexpectedly, so powerfully, so marvelously — predicting so much truly concerning him — imbuing him in the Christian Faith so perfectly, so suddenly, that he even confounded unbelieving Jews and Greeks, and converted to the Christian Faith the most wise even among the Philosophers?

Whose imagination concerning the bodies of dead Christian Saints works all manner of miracles? — as our Histories most certainly attest, as was recounted above of Saint Clement, as also Marcus of Venice *On the Conditions of Eastern Regions* III [27] recounts, how about the body of Saint Thomas the Apostle in Maabar, that is, in Greater India, in a certain city buried, many miracles even at these times frequently are done. Wherefore also the Saracens themselves of those parts venerate him most, and say that he was a great Prophet, and call him *Anar nan*, that is, holy man. Whose imagination, I say, makes these things — not the imagination of a dead body, no one is ignorant; if the imagination of the souls which animated those bodies — those souls are powerful, holy, noble, and blessed. Who therefore would have hesitated to believe as they believed? If the imagination of the living worshipping those Saints — why do they not similarly elsewhere, by imagining, receive what they desire? Why (I ask) do they vainly extend prayers to them? Why do they fallaciously believe themselves helped through them, or through God on account of their merits dear to God?

Is it not also among the miracles of Saint Thomas of Canterbury, the Archbishop, recounted, how a certain Lady, for the sake of lasciviousness desiring more beautiful eyes, approaching the tomb of the Saint and praying this, was immediately wholly blinded? Was not her imagination borne to the opposite? Whose imagination moreover did the celestial miracles aforesaid?

Furthermore, if such a soul can do miracles, God also can, as the first Supposition and following parts lucidly manifest. And he is not only powerful and supremely powerful to do miracles; but also supremely clement, pious, and propitious, magnificent, liberal, as the first Supposition and the third Part show. Does it not therefore seem more decent and more credible that when his lovers, in the manner premised in the 30th Part of this work, in their great necessities exceeding their own strength, suppliantly entreat him, he himself miraculously should succor them — especially since he sees this to be expedient for them — than that he should mercilessly turn aside, cast them off, repel them, and permit them to perish?

Did not Hermogenes, or Hermes, your Father, and you yourselves, Aristotle and Avicenna, above affirm this — namely, that God is the maker of miracles? How then do you now dream of another cause? Nor does it escape, as I think, you, Avicenna, that although the eye of the fascinator could marvelously work in a foreign body, yet it in no way is needful that that soul should be able to work miracles of this kind. For you do not wish to say that anyone of any complexion can fascinate in this way, but certain ones having an infected complexion and a certain complexional venomous malice, which through mouth and eyes, by speaking and seeing, they evaporate and emit subtly, or by altering they infect the medium and so injure. Wherefore neither do they do this in every distance, but in a near one — as also the eye of a menstruating woman infects a mirror, and the Basilisk killed living things by sight. But miracles in no way follow the property of complexion, as was shown above. Why therefore, Avicenna, do you assert something so admirable through such a weak reason? And why, Aristotle, without any reason? Why also, contrary to your prior judgment, do you now posit another cause of miracles than God?

Or perhaps it is verisimilarly answered for you by saying that, your sayings being diligently inspected, you assign no other effective cause of miracles. The saying of Aristotle indeed seems able to be understood of a dispositive cause to prophecy and miracles, not properly effective. For according to the judgment of Aristotle in *On Good Fortune*, and *On Sleep and Waking*, prophecy and true dreams, presagings of future things, are from God, and are not from the man himself — which Avicenna also attests *On the Soul* IV and V, and *Metaphysics* X, and Algazel V of his *Physics*, and Averroes *On Sleep and Waking* manifestly; where also he says that the interpretation of dreams is one species of prophecy — which he says is manifest in the dream of Pharaoh, concerning which Joseph was questioned. And he adds: "And it works the interpreter, as Aristotle says, that he should always be thinking and clean, not declining to the manners of a brute animal." The saying of Avicenna also can perhaps similarly be understood and expounded. For the Christians confess that to men of holy life there flows in graciously the spirit of prophecy, and that God willingly works miracles for such. Or perhaps Avicenna, when he says that any soul similar to the principles can work miracles, understands that this it can do by the virtue of these principles, which according to him are God and the Angels: or that these Principles can do this and will it sometimes through it or for the sake of it, on account of the similarity, namely, of holiness and will of this soul and of theirs.

But here I ask, listen kindly, great Philosopher, greatest of the Arabs Avicenna: when you say that a soul similar to the principles can do so much, do you not insinuate that one dissimilar cannot? Since therefore Christ and perfect Christians could and can, as what was premised attests, it follows evidently that they themselves had and have souls similar to the said principles. Mohammed, however, your master — by your own testimony in *Metaphysics* IX, last — could not do miracles, by his own testimony, in a certain book of your law, where to those asking miracles of him he thus replied: "I am not sent with this." The other Saracens also, although they are Monks and lead a most strict life and most holy according to the traditions of Mohammed,

cannot do miracles; this is plainly clear. For it is not fitting that a disciple be above the master, or a servant greater than his lord. Do not therefore Mohammed and all his Saracen and Tartar disciples have souls dissimilar to the said principles? Why therefore do you not become Christians, that thus you may be able more fully to be assimilated to those principles?

Aristotle and Avicenna will perhaps respond to the things premised, saying that they do not deny but affirm God to do certain miracles, and even such a soul to do certain ones. But then, I beg, distinguish reasonably and teach to distinguish between those. Is it not also so, that the greater and more glorious miracles will be most worthily ascribed to God? But what greater or more glorious miracles than those of the precursors and heralds of Christ — namely the ancient Prophets — and than the Christian miracles, as from the things here premised and from our most certain Histories it plainly stands fast? It is therefore God who does those glorious Christian miracles in attestation of the Christian Faith.

The Jews, however, and their Philosophers, enemies of Christ and the Christian Faith, say that Christ did miracles — not true ones, but feigned, by the Magic art and by the power of malign spirits. Certain Magicians also, in approval of their infamous art, say that Christ used certain magisteries written there, as appears in the book which is called *Vacca Platonis* (The Cow of Plato). But how do you not see, you Jews — that the Manichaeans, who reject Moses and the Prophets, saying God to be evil, namely the prince of darkness, the author of the whole Old Testament, can similarly respond to you concerning all the miracles of Moses and of all the Prophets? How then will you show the truth of your miracles against them, and I against you will show the truth of our miracles?

You will perhaps say that you have authentic Scripture which attests the miracles of Moses; and I confidently say that we have Scripture much more authentic, which attests the miracles of Christ. For who wrote those books and miracles of Moses? — was it not he himself? was it not he alone? — and were they not miracles previously nowhere predicted by other prior Prophets? Christ, however, did not write his own miracles, nor did any one alone write them; but four great Scribes, and many other lesser, not at the same time in place or time, as if conspiring and feigning the miracles of Christ concordantly: but some in Judea, some in Italy, some in Achaia, and some in Asia, some in one tongue and some in another, some according to one mode and some according to another, the doctrine, deeds, and miracles of Christ, in concordant judgment they wrote. Of these Scribes and Protonotaries of Christ, witnesses are the Apostles, splendid men, continually assisting Christ, present at his miracles, and most certainly seeing them with their own eyes; and these as well as those, by nature Jews.

Were not also the miracles of Christ prophetically pre-announced both through men, and through the Sibyl? — and the same reason concerning the miracles of the Prophets. Or perhaps you will say that the manner of life of Moses and your Prophets evidently shows that they were not magicians, wherefore also that their miracles were true. And who was ever of holier life than Christ — as not only our Histories, but also those of the Gentiles attest? Look at his deeds, read

his words, attend to his law. What was ever more innocent? what more holy? what more honorable could be found? Did he not, in the end, so live, as your Prophets and the Sibyl prophetically predicted of him? Did not Christ live so, as the Messiah, whom you (according to the prophetic predictions) ought to have lived for from your sins?

You will perhaps object that he was endeavoring to pervert your law — but wrongly. For he did not pervert your law, but expounded and fulfilled it, as also it was divinely prophesied. Furthermore: why do you not attend that the same calumny can similarly be objected to the true Messiah whom you, according to the prophetic prediction of your Hosea, expect for many days — but with an ass yet to come, when he shall do his true miracles? — how then will you defend his miracles, and I shall defend the true miracles of our true Christ.

Furthermore, if Christ had been a magician, a false Prophet, and had only done false miracles, how would he have been by so many and so solemn witnesses, so concordantly prophesied as future, and even at presence attested, and through your Josephus commended, as is recounted above? How also is it verisimilar, if the miracles of Christ had been only feigned and done by diabolical art, that they would have been divinely prophesied — not in reproof, but in total approval? Furthermore, if Christ had been a magician, pseudo-prophet, and subverter of the law, by the precept of your law he ought to have been killed; wherefore also that to kill him was in no way demeritorious or punishable, but rather meritorious and rewardable, who doubts? But you on account of his denial and killing have been and are punished gravely and afflicted — through the great slaughter of you in your land, through the Emperor and the army of the Romans, soon after the killing of Christ done; through the dissipation of your cities and Temple; through your captivity and emigration from your land perfected; through your dispersion, subjection, and miserable contempt round about, as your Histories and ours attest, and especially your Josephus in the seven books *On the Jewish War* written, in which also personally he was — as the present day also indicates. But how would God so good, just, and clement (as the first Supposition and the third Part show) have so excessively punished you then, incomparably more than at any past times — except for some great sin, incomparably graver than any prior sin of yours — especially since God promised to you and gave to you your land to be possessed perpetually, which also he confirmed by oath, *if* indeed, or *while* indeed you should keep his law (as your books most often and most clearly attest)?

What therefore so great a sin did you then commit, by reason of which you incurred so great misery — except that sin against Christ? — for had you not before committed most foul adulteries, killed most holy prophets, abandoned the Lord, and worshipped idols? — and for these and such-like things did not God send upon you now this King, now that, now these enemies, now those, who afflicted you in many ways, but incomparably more mildly and briefly than in the aforesaid affliction? Was not your greatest affliction before — the taking of your City of Jerusalem, the destruction of your Temple, the captivity, the migration into Babylon, and the detention of you there for 70 years? Yet that migration was not perfect, since many remained in their own land; it was not very long-lasting; it was not very bitter, because in it still you had

Prophets divinely consoling you; and after 70 years you were dismissed free, and returned to your own, and rebuilt the City and Temple. But this captivity of yours and emigration is perfect, the dissipation of your City and Temple perfect, very long-lasting, since for almost thirteen hundred years it has been; very bitter, because no Prophet have you had in all that time. On account of what therefore so excessive a sin committed about that time do you suffer this punishment, surpassing all your other punishments so incomparably — if not for that most surpassing sin of yours against Christ, the Holy of Holies, surpassing all other Prophets and Saints incomparably?

Here perhaps you will say that this calamity befell you on account of the unjust killing of Saint John the Baptist, or of James the brother of Christ, each of whom was held among you most holy. But if each was most holy, he was also most truthful and most faithful in right faith. John, however, solemnly attested our Christ, and pointed to him with his finger. James indeed was a Disciple and Apostle of Jesus Christ, who held the faith of Christ most constantly, taught, preached it, even to triumphal Martyrdom — as the Histories manifest. The faith of Christ therefore is most holy and most faithful. Nor did the Jews kill or counsel to kill John the Baptist, but Herod Agrippa — whom the Jews therefore say betrayed his army, as Josephus *Antiquities of the Jews* XVIII [12] plainly reports, which also our Histories produce. Nor did the Jews by common consent kill Saint James, or have his killing pleasing to them; but, Josephus reporting *Antiquities of the Jews* XX [16], a certain Ananus, the Pontiff of the Jews, with a Council of Judges made, handed him over to be stoned. Wherefore the most moderate Citizens of the Jews, and those who had concern for the integrity of the law, took this gravely, and sent secretly to the King, asking that he should command him not to perpetrate such things, since not even before had he acted rightly. Wherefore also King Agrippa deposed him from the Pontificate, which he had held three months. Before too the Jews killed most holy Prophets, nor for that reason did they incur such a misery. Indeed, even if all the Jews of that time had unanimously consented to the death of John and James, and on that account had been expelled from their land, with the homicidal fathers dead, God would have led their sons back — especially if they did not at all approve the paternal deed, nor concordantly held it ratified and pleasing — on account of the divine promise touched above, even confirmed by oath, that namely the Jews and their sons after them should possess that land perpetually, *if indeed*, or *while indeed* they should keep his lawful things. Is not this expressly found in your Law? Is it not read in Numbers, that with your Fathers murmuring against Moses (indeed rather against God), and despairing that they could enter that land promised them, the Lord, in punishment of the sin of their unbelief, established the people in the desert for 40 years, until all the culpable fathers should be consumed by death — and then their sons, the innocent, as he had promised, he led in? Is it not so that after your entrance into your land, on account of your Idolatry, transmigrated by Nebuchadnezzar into Babylon, you were captives only for 70 years, after which, with the Idolatrous Fathers dead, the innocent sons returning to their own, restored the destroyed City and Temple? Did not Moses, truly foreseeing and predicting, and invoking as witnesses Heaven and Earth, that if you sinned against the Lord, he would not wait long, but quickly would blot you out from your land and disperse you among

all the Gentiles, and you would remain few in the nations — add: "And when you shall seek there the Lord your God, you shall find him, if indeed with all your heart you shall seek him, and with all the tribulation of your soul; after all things which are foretold shall have found you, he shall not let you go, nor shall he forget the covenant which he swore to your fathers"? And again: "When therefore there shall come over you all these words, and being led by repentance of your heart in all the Gentiles into which the Lord shall have dispersed you, you shall return to him, and shall obey him and his commands, the Lord shall lead you back from your captivity, and again shall the Lord gather you from all peoples into which he had before dispersed you, and shall bring you into the land which your Fathers possessed; for the Lord shall return that he may rejoice over you in all goods, as he rejoiced in your Fathers — *if indeed* you shall hear the voice of the Lord your God, and shall keep his precepts, and return to the Lord your God." Why therefore now is this calamity of yours incomparably far greater, graver, and more long-lasting beyond measure, than all those past — if not on account of some sin incomparably far greater, graver, and more long-lasting beyond measure? And what is that, except the killing, the approval of the killing, and continual denial of Jesus Christ?

If you do not believe me, believe your most splendid of Prophets Daniel, who (Josephus your witness, *Antiquities of the Jews* X, last), not only predicted future things like other Prophets, but also defined the time when these had necessarily to be fulfilled. But nowhere did he define the time more certainly than where, by the number of 70 weeks fittingly divided, he predicted the Advent of the Holy of Holies, Christ; the killing of Christ the Leader; the negation of you; and that the people who were about to deny him should not be his people; that your City — namely Jerusalem — and the Sanctuary, that is, the Temple, should be dissipated by a people with a leader to come; and that its end should be devastation, and a desolation not transitory, but determined; that sacrifice and oblation should then fail; and that the abomination of desolation should be in the Temple — desolation, I say, not temporary and brief as in past times, but stably persevering even to consummation and unto the end. Was not the time of those weeks, according to the prophetic prediction and division, in the Advent of Christ, in the killing of Christ, in the dissipation of the City and Temple by the people of the Romans with the Leader, most clearly fulfilled? I know that it was so, Jews, I know that it was so — as through the Jewish and Gentile Histories it can perspicuously be demonstrated.

And although some of your Sophists have wished to be impudent, by subtracting or adding something modest to the regal times designated in the Histories, and so cavilling that those Prophetic Weeks were not then precisely fulfilled — by no color, however, can he extend those weeks even up to the present, for almost thirteen hundred years. For no Histories, even if drawn unwillingly, can color this even slightly — speaking of Weeks of days, namely, and of years, as your Fathers, your Prophets, and your Books up to now have spoken. If also those weeks were not then fulfilled, let some skilled Jew tell me, I beg, if they are now fulfilled, and when, and let him show me the Holy of Holies, and Christ, who then came, and the other Prophetic things mentioned above. Or if they are not yet fulfilled, when shall they be fulfilled? And let him

ground himself in the Law, the Prophets, or in true (not feigned) Histories with color. Or if you cannot do this, believe Josephus, believe me knowing how to show most clearly through the Law, the ancient Prophecies, and truthful Histories, that they were plenarily fulfilled at the said times.

Did not also Daniel truly predict the dissipation of your City and Sanctuary by the Leader and people of the Romans aforesaid, the failure of host and sacrifice, and the determined desolation of your City and Temple? Does not your present calamity indicate this? Does not the translation of the city and Temple from its ancient place to Mount Calvary — the place namely of the Lord's passion of the Temple — into which it was never again to be rebuilt at its ancient place (as it seems from the testimony of Daniel premised, and your Scriptures attest) — indicate this? If therefore Daniel truly predicted these things, he predicted also verisimilarly the time of these — the weeks aforesaid. For he had not predicted things only as future, but the time also; truly therefore when these things befell you, the said weeks were fulfilled — wherefore also then truly came Christ — since all these things are prophetically connected. If, however, Daniel did not predict this so great misery of yours — what other of the Prophets predicted it? For it is not in any way verisimilar that your Prophets so diligently predicted to you and left in writings calamities of yours impropotionally less, and yet about this incomparably greatest were entirely silent. Did not one of your Prophets thus speak: "Shall there be evil in the city which the Lord has not done, because the Lord God shall not do a word, unless he reveal his secret to his servants the Prophets"? If moreover Daniel did not predict this aforementioned tribulation of yours, his prophecy remains not yet effectuated; wherefore still you expect a leading-back into your land, the rebuilding of City and Temple, and your habitation there for some times, and after all these things that so great a discord — indeed rather, according to the prophetic voice of Daniel, far be from you so horrible a calamity — far, far, far. Your Doctors also attest in their writings frequently, that your Temple ought not to be rebuilt a third time. The Prophets, however, who seem to prophesy the contrary, namely that Jerusalem and the Temple are still to be rebuilt — they understand of the Jerusalem of the City and Temple not earthly, but heavenly, as your Doctors very many attest. By these things therefore and the like, it not improbably seems persuaded that to sober Jews, friends of truth, it ought reasonably to appear that their nation and land, City and Temple were (as is premised) desolated, on account of the non-reception — indeed denial, blasphemy, and killing of the Messiah and Christ; their sons indeed, and the sons of their sons, even up to the present, sustain so wretched a destruction continually, on account of the approval and continual imitation of paternal crimes. For they continually approve the killing of Christ, nor by believing, loving, and worshipping do they receive him; truly they continually hate, deny, and blaspheme. Who therefore, these things attended, will reasonably or verisimilarly say that our Christ was a magician, a pseudo-Christ, and his miracles feigned?

Furthermore, I beg you Jews, listen a little. Is it not so that the true Messiah, if he has not yet come, but will come, as you hope, when he comes and does true miracles will not be known, will not be received — indeed, he will be denied, will suffer, and will be killed by you? Will not

afterward and on this account your land, city, and sanctuary be dissipated, and you ejected and dispersed round about — as Isaiah and Daniel and the other Prophets and other doctors of yours most clearly predicted? And then no doubt, in your excuse and his accusation, you will compose some lying calumny, saying him to be a magician and his miracles feigned. For that he will do true miracles you will in no way concede. Did not that noble Prophet of yours, speaking in your person to the Messiah, say thus: "When you shall do miracles, we shall not bear it"? Let it suffice therefore I beg you, let it suffice, that thus far you have erred. Return I beg, return, do penance, acknowledge the miracles of Christ, and through them himself the marvelous worker.

Furthermore, from abundance, behold Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, the greatest of your Philosophers, in the book *On Judges* which he wrote, says: "Jesus the Nazarene was seen to be the Messiah, and was killed through the house of Judgment; and he himself was the cause — or merited — that Israel was destroyed by the sword, and that their remains were dispersed, and that they were brought low." For the authority of this Rabbi Moses I once asked of a certain great and famous Jew whether his writings were held authentic among them. He, striking his cheek, replied that whatever this Moses said was as authentic among us as if it had come from the mouth of God. And he added: "Between the first Moses and this one, there has not arisen so great a one among the Jews."

Furthermore, if our Christ had been a magician and not good, merciful, and pious, he would not have wept over this subversion and desolation of yours, foreseeing and predicting it, but would rather have laughed — especially since he most certainly knew and predicted that he was to be crucified by you, and that you would in no way receive his teaching. Yet, drawing near and seeing your city, and predicting the subversion of it and of its sons, on account of the cause premised, future, he wept, having compassion upon it, as all our Histories most certainly attest. Likewise, if our Christ had been a magician and pseudo-prophet, how, for the saving of men and the fulfilling of the Scriptures of the Prophets, would he have endured such a death knowingly and voluntarily? How also when dying would he have prayed for his killers? Yet he did these things, as is clearly plain from the authentic Histories. Did not also your most splendid Prophet predict this? Where, speaking most fully of the future and suffering Messiah, he says: "He was offered because he himself willed it"; and below: "He was reckoned with the wicked, and he himself bore the sin of many, and prayed for the transgressors." If also our Christ had been a magician, pseudo-prophet, an adversary of your law, how would your holy Prophets and others, or the Sibyl, so solicitously have predicted his Passion, the manner and circumstances of the Passion, by venerating it more devoutly, and detesting your blindness and cruelty and frenzy? Did not David, in Psalm 21, very expressly and plainly predict his Passion, manner, and circumstances thus? — and what he did not say there, he supplied in Psalm 68. Did not Isaiah and other Prophets predict it likewise? Did not Christ, about to die, begin in your tongue that Psalm 21, saying: "*Eli, Eli, Lamma sabachthani*" — evidently insinuating that this Psalm had been pre-said and fulfilled concerning him; who also, thirsting and having received vinegar, said it was consummated, as our Histories most certainly attest? The Book also which is called the

Testament of the 12 Patriarchs, very many and most clear testimonies bears to our Christ — if it be true, not feigned. And why could it not be true, since the said Sibyl, alien from your prophetic nation, gave such clear testimonies to our Christ? Why therefore would those 12 Patriarchs, sons of the most splendid Patriarch and Prophet Jacob, after the paternal manner of attesting, in no way bear testimony to the Messiah — as also their father did, by saying: "The rod, or scepter, shall not depart from Judah, nor a giver or bearer of laws from between his feet, or from the middle of his feet, until Shiloh come" (that is, the Messiah, as your ancient gloss there expounds) — which also other glosses of yours elsewhere attest? Whence also your Chaldaic Translation plainly says: "the work, or action of regal power or domination shall not pass from the house of Judah, and a Scribe from the sons of his sons, even into the age, until Massilia come" — that is, the Messiah, or Christ. Which prophecy, with the other parts that follow, in our Christ stands fast as plenarily fulfilled. For, as your Histories attest, from the time of Moses there were always 71 ordinary Judges, or Scribes, having ordinary and regal jurisdiction and power, even of blood, and of exercising all judgments — who also after the transmigration of Babylon, and the taking away of the crown and scepter from the tribe of Judah by King Nebuchadnezzar, with as it were ordinary authority and regal power remaining among them, exercised judgments of this kind, and this most of all in Jerusalem, the Royal city and Metropolis of the kingdom of Judah, even up to Herod and Christ — who also not long after were equally destroyed. Or if this prophecy was not fulfilled in the Messiah and our Christ — since both Scepter and such Judges and jurisdiction or power has long ago plainly receded from Judah — find for yourselves another Messiah who has come.

The said Book moreover, even if perhaps among you it cannot be found anywhere, does not therefore consequently follow that it is feigned. For it could have happened that that book was translated into Greek, as also other books of yours were, before that great destruction of yours by the Romans, and in it was burnt completely or destroyed; or also that some such book among other spoils had been carried to Rome, and into Roman translated, with your other books of this kind being burned or destroyed.

Furthermore, if Christ had been a magician, how is it verisimilar that all the things prophetically said of the Messiah were in him plenarily fulfilled? For if it were so, your Prophets and Doctors had handed down to you a doctrine and notice diminished and too deceptive concerning the Messiah; and certainly whatever you may feign in answer concerning the many things which befell about Christ, of the time of the Advent and Passion of the Messiah predicted by Jacob and Daniel (as was touched above), feign you cannot.

Furthermore, at the same time against the Philosophers and magicians of the Jews aforesaid: if Christ had been a magician, an associate of malign spirits and friend, and through their power had done miracles, he would have used some suffumigations, rings, instruments, characters, incantations, songs, or other such things — as other Necromancers do, and the art teaches — and diverse for diverse effects. Wherefore also a fitting time would have been necessary for him to do miracles. But he almost always did miracles diverse and various by word alone, by command

alone, by his bare imperative, and that suddenly without delay. Sometimes however he prayed the heavenly Father, but the demon never.

If also our Christ had been a magician, it seems that he would more willingly and commonly have done miracles harmful to men — as Necromancers and malign spirits do — than miracles helpful, especially with the article of his Passion impending. Yet he healed all those evilly affected, and at the very time of his Passion and article, the ear of one of his torturers, cut off by Peter, when Peter was rebuked, he touched and healed — as our Histories teach. How also if he had been a magician, would he have departed so most holily, emitting no diabolical or profane word, but always the most holy words? What magician also, or evil spirit, did all those miracles, especially the celestial ones, and the resurrection of the saints which happened at his death — as is recounted above?

Furthermore, if Christ had been a magician and Necromancer, it seems that for preserving and more widely amplifying his sect, he would have taught his disciples his art. Whoever, however, has diligently looked at the whole doctrine of Christ, will nowhere find any such word, will nowhere come upon anything except most pure worship of God, faith, hope, and charity to God; in every necessity, prayer and recourse to God with that most holy prayer dictated by his own mouth: "Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name," and the rest equally holy. Nothing there except integral charity, all-sided sanctity, and perfect honesty — whose teaching also his learned disciples imitating, all magicians with their magical arts as pestilential poisons, and as heretical and contrary to the Christian Faith, condemned. Which also all our Canonical and Civil Laws sanction and confirm. If also Christ did miracles by magic — how do his holy disciples, namely the holy Christians, work similar miracles, as their Master Christ had promised them, by the sole invocation of God, of Christ, of Mary, of any other Saints — without invocation of any malign spirits, and without those things customary in such arts? — indeed even those who learned nothing at all of such arts, but those very arts with their artificers as far as possible they destroyed; and this not only in the present life, but also often after this life. Magicians and Necromancers among Christians do not work miracles, neither in life nor in death; nor other perverse Christians; but only integral Christians, irreprehensibly conversing before God and man. If however anyone shall say that the demons gratis do miracles for such Christians — how is it verisimilar that they should so honor their chief enemies, who themselves, their altars, their idols, their Temples, and universally every honor and worship of theirs, by life, doctrine, deed, and word, with all their powers destroy, annihilate, and confound? Does it not rather seem that they would so honor rather their worshippers, that thus to their worship they might rather provoke men, than to the Christian religion, so hostile, contrary, and inimical to them? Do not also our Histories transmit how Cyprian, from his very boyhood by his parents consecrated to the Devil, the greatest Necromancer, lusted after the blessed Justina of Antioch, the Christian virgin, for himself or for a certain Acladius — and incited her, first through one Demon, second through another stronger, and third through the prince of the Demons, manifoldly, even for seven years, to sin, now invisibly, now visibly, now assuming the species of a virgin, now of a young man,

and entering the bed of the virgin; transforming Cyprian himself sometimes into a woman, sometimes into a bird, and Acladius into a sparrow, and bringing them transformed to the chamber of the virgin — all of whom, fortifying herself with the sign of the Cross, she overcame, and reformed those transformed to their proper form? How also the same Demon, seeing himself unable to profit, turned into the form of Justina, offered himself to Cyprian, that thus at least he might palliate his impotence — and at Cyprian's saying, "Welcome Justina!" immediately at the utterance of the virgin's name he vanished like smoke; wherefore Cyprian, converted to the faith of Christ, at length for the faith of Christ, together with Justina, consummated Martyrdom. Like things also are read of the holy Apostle of Christ James the son of Zebedee, who was converting through miracles Hermogenes and Philetus, the greatest Necromancers, evacuating all their magical workings. If therefore by the virtue of the Christian Faith, all the miracles — indeed magical workings — of demons are destroyed, by what reason ought one to suppose Christian miracles to be done by the power of demons?

Furthermore, if the Devil can do any miracles, God too can — as the first Supposition, the third and seventh Parts demonstrate, etc. — as above against the prior response. Do not also the prayers of Christians loving God show the truth of Christian miracles, according to the doctrine of the third Part of this work — which prayers in their greatest necessities they offer to God, not to demons (indeed against demons), for miraculous help to be obtained? For how would God supremely good and powerful, supremely pious and clement (as the first Supposition and other things preceding manifest), repel such lovers of his fleeing, crying, praying to him in supreme dangers, and commend them to demons? Furthermore, if demons so help Christians praying Christ and God in their great necessities — they do this either voluntarily or unwillingly, spontaneously or coactedly. It does not seem that spontaneously, since Christ and Christians have done and continually do so many things against them. If coactedly — great is the virtue of the Christian Faith, to which the demons even coacted are subject, and unwillingly obey, and reluctantly serve. For there is no power on earth which compares with demons. Wherefore it rather seems that God, through his great omnipotence, compels demons thus when he wills, where he wills, and in what way he wills, that they may serve his worshippers and servants, the Christians — especially since good Christians in their excessive necessities nowhere use any magical document, nowhere is it the Devil, but God they suppliantly entreat. How greatly therefore does God love and approve the faith of Christ?

The magicians, however, will object — or someone for them — that they themselves compel and force demons to certain things. But why can they not similarly compel the good Angels of God, since they are of the same nature, or men, viators good or evil, of weaker nature? It seems moreover that it can be shown by Philosophical and Theological reason that the natural Free Will of a rational substance cannot be compelled or forced to its own acts through any words or songs, seals or signs, aromatics or suffumigations, herbs or characters Celestial or Terrestrial, nor through any inanimate creatures, irrational or rational, even any whatsoever this side of God. For this seems to repugn the natural liberty of the Will. Wherefore demons, invoked by Magicians,

often do not come; sometimes, however, gratis they approach to seduce the unhappy souls, and to confirm the seduced more. Did not also at other times demons, so malicious, cunning, and powerful, compel men, especially sinners, to do all magical workings?

Furthermore, if Christ had been a fictioneer and had done only feigned miracles, why at the time of his preaching and Passion did your true miracles cease, nor are they now renewed — as also your Histories transmit? For from your Histories and ours alike it can be plain that the Romans dissipated your City and Temple, according to the prophetic prediction of Daniel and Christ, in the year 42 after his Passion or Ascension into Heaven. Therefore your Babylonian Talmud also clearly says: "10 signs were done in the house of the Sanctuary: 1. No woman miscarried on account of the smell of the meats of the Sanctuary; 2. The flesh of the Sanctuary never stank; 3. There was never a fly seen in the house of the Butchers; 4. No accident befell the High Priest on the day of propitiation; 5. There was no corruption found in the sheaf or handful, neither in the two loaves, nor in the loaves of presentation: those standing in the rows and adoring were spacious, although withdrawn from the house of the Propitiatory by 11 cubits; 6. Neither serpent nor scorpion harmed in Jerusalem; 7. Never did a man say to his neighbor: Our place for staying in Jerusalem is narrow; 8. Never did rains extinguish the fire of the woods of preparation, nor did the wind overcome the column of smoke: although all the winds in the world should blow into it, they could not divert it; 9. Fragments of earthen vessels were absorbed from their places; 10. The ashes also of the inner altar and of the Candelabrum were absorbed from their place. All these true signs ceased for 40 years before the destruction of the Temple, as it is said: 'Signs we did not see, no longer is there a Prophet, nor is there with us one knowing how long.'"

Another book of yours also, which is called *Iona*, attests that your Masters handed down that "for the 40 years in which Symeon the Just ministered, the lot of the name of the Lord ascended to the right; and for 40 years before the destruction of the house — that is, the Temple — the lot did not ascend to the right, but to the left. The tongue of splendor — namely the lava made red — suspended in the Temple, was changed into whiteness; but from then on by no means. The evening flax also formerly always burned, but from then on not, but was sometimes extinguished. The fire likewise of the preparation, which ought to burn continually on the altar, was always strong, and there was no need that they should put under many woods, but only two armfuls because of the commandment of placing the woods. From then on however and beyond, sometimes it was strong and sometimes by no means; and then the Priests did not cease to put under woods all day. Into the handful or sheaf, moreover, and into the two loaves of faces or position or presentation was sent so great a benediction, that however little the Priest should touch, he ate and was filled, and yet the remains exceeded. From then on however so great a curse was sent in, that whatever thence came to the Priests was not worth what one bean. Wherefore the honest withdrew their hands, and the gluttonous tolerated. Furthermore, in the year in which Symeon the Just died, he predicted to the Jews that he was about to die in that year. To them inquiring whence he knew, he replied: 'Every day on which I entered, namely the Holy of Holies, an old man clothed in white was likened to me, who entered with me and went out

with me. Today, however, an old man, one clothed in black, appeared to me, who entered with me, but did not go out.' Afterward he was sick for seven days and died; and from then on his Priest brethren ceased to bless, namely in the name of the Lord. The doors also of the Temple were always opening themselves spontaneously, until Rabban Johanan son of Zaqgai rebuked them, and said: 'Temple, Temple, why do you destroy yourself? For I know concerning you that your end will be destruction. For of you Zechariah prophesied: *Open, Libanus, your gates, and let the fire devour your Cedars.*'"

These same things your Talmud of Jerusalem also commemorates, "in all the days in which Symeon the Just was existing, the lot of the name of God ascended in the right hand," etc. — judiciously as above; and it follows: "But for forty years when the house was not yet destroyed, the evening light was extinguished, and the tongue of splendor reddened as blood, and the lot of the name ascended in the left, and the doors of the Temple were opening themselves at night, and those rising in the morning found them open. And Rabban Johanan said: 'Temple, Temple, why do you stupefy us? We know that your end will be at devastation, and that of you Zechariah prophesied: *Open, Libanus, your gates, etc., and let the fire devour your Cedars.*'"

Nor is it hidden from you Jews, nor ought it be hidden from others, how, in numbering by greater number — say by the article of as it were the integer number recounted — you are wont frequently to throw away the digits and lesser numbers as it were minutes or fractions, by neglecting them. Although therefore your books affirm that your miracles ceased for 40 years before the destruction of the house or Temple — yet it can be that for 42 years, or 43, 45, or thereabouts before, they ceased, namely at the time of the Baptism, preaching, working of miracles, Passion, or Ascension of the Lord Jesus Christ — as I rather reckon the truth to be. But although then truly your miracles entirely failed, yet before, around 100 years, they began to fail — as also before deep night the light is somewhat thinned, and before perfect blindness the sight is somewhat obscured. For Josephus your countryman *Antiquities of the Jews* III [8] hands down that "God Almighty has left it to the readers to know whether [the High Priest] should come to sacred things, or be unwilling to be." And he adds: "And this God willed to be manifest not only to the Hebrews, but also to foreigners. For while God was present at the sacrifices, the other of the Sardonyx stones, which was carried on the right shoulder of the Pontiff, was sparkling. And from it splendor would come forth so that even to those placed afar it appeared, when previously this had not been in that stone. And this is also marvelous, however, to those who attain wisdom, not the abjection of divine works. What is more marvelous, I shall say. For through the twelve stones which the Pontiff carries above the breast sown into the *Essin* (that is, into the rational), God pre-announced victory to those about to fight. For so great a splendor used to flash in them, when the army was not yet moved, that it became manifest to all the multitude that God was present with their aid. Whence the Greeks also, who honor our solemnities — because in these they cannot contradict — call the *Essin* the rational. Both the *Essin* and the Sardonyx therefore have ceased to shine, for two hundred years before I wrote these things." Nor is it a wonder. For with the Messiah coming, according to the Prophecy of Jacob touched above, the rod or scepter

had to be taken away from Judah, and all the ordinary and judiciary power — which could not, or did not befit, to be done suddenly, but successively through wars succeeding and destroying your power. Successively, that thus your lamp also might be extinguished — because the way and paths of the Messiah about to come in proximity (as you well knew, or ought to have known, from the prophecies and traditions of your forebears) you in no way duly prepared, as is prophetically commanded you. On the contrary, against him as he came, you yourselves prepared yourselves enemies, plotters, contradictors, and impious oppugners — as the outcome of the matter showed; for many years preceding you neglected your lawful things, exercising manifold evils, as the Books of the Maccabees (whom you call sons of Asamonaeus or Asamonaei) and the Books of Josephus *On the Antiquities and Jewish War*, with other Histories, attest. But why at the time of our Christ aforesaid did your miracles entirely cease? Was it not because you depraved his glorious miracles, contemned the Author of miracles himself, denied him, killed him; cast out also his disciples, and his whole doctrine, from your borders? What wonder if, the Author of miracles having receded from you, the miracles likewise have receded? Indeed, also from the recession of miracles from you it can not improbably be argued the recession of their Author the Lord our God, who, by the testimony of the Prophet, "alone makes great miracles" — as also above through prophetic testimonies was shown? Wherefore around that time was heard a voice in your temple of those saying: "Let us migrate hence, let us migrate from these seats" — namely of the holy Angels. Did not therefore at that time the Lord and God of armies with his holy Angels migrate from you and from your seats, and to the people of the Gentiles, who dwelt in darkness, transmigrate — illuminating them, becoming the Father of them, the Father of the future age once, now of the present? For from Christ as from our Father are Christians named, whose paternal presence and present paternity among us his magnificent benefits — namely glorious miracles — clearly indicate, as also formerly with you they indicated his presence.

You will perhaps say that God works for you continually one great miracle among your enemies, by conserving you so long a time, feeding you, and ministering necessities. But this seems rather to be deputed to your misery than to a miracle for you. For even if it is a miracle, yet it is recognized to redound to your misery, in punishment of your sins — as it was anciently prophesied of you. For Moses said: "If, perpetrating evil before the Lord your God, you provoke him to anger, I invoke as witnesses today Heaven and earth that you shall quickly perish from the land which crossing the Jordan you are about to possess. The Lord shall blot you out, and shall scatter you among all the nations, and you shall remain few in the nations to which the Lord is about to lead you. He shall not let you go, nor altogether blot you out." David also, in the person of the Messiah and Christ then about to suffer from you, says: "God has shown me concerning my enemies, slay them not, lest at any time my people forget. Disperse them in your power, and depose them," etc. Which both your execrable lies still continued against Christ, and your punishment, evidently indicate; and how long these will last — until they shall know that God shall rule, not only Jacob, but also the ends of the whole earth, and at evening they shall be converted. Do you not continually live in most grievous subjection and miserable servitude, in

misery and trouble, in manifold sorrow and labor? — which marvel, or what is wondrous, that they live as laborers all-sidedly from their labors, with the Poet saying:

Every soil is a fatherland to fortune, as the sea is to fish, As to the bird whatever empty thing in the world lies open.

Nor are Christians your enemies, as you say — but friends. For in love of Christ, who descended from you, they will, pray, and procure for you good with all their strength — indeed the greatest goods in the present, and similarly in the future — as for themselves. Therefore that you are conserved in this way is in punishment of your sins, that also through you others may be chastised; and lest moreover the lamp and memory of your holy Fathers should be entirely extinguished. For Moses says: "He shall not let you go, nor altogether blot you out, nor shall he forget the covenant which he swore to your fathers." And David: "Slay them not, lest at any time my people forget." Which is also believed not unreasonably to be done — that your prophetic books, remaining among you the enemies of the Christian Faith, may faithfully attest the faith of Christ, as was touched above; furthermore also on account of those who from you daily are converted; further on account of the remnants of Israel, which finally shall be converted.

Others, however, say the Saracens and their Philosophers — confess the miracles of our Christ, and the true cause of their miracles: namely, the true God, and his true power and virtue. But they say further: those miracles do not prove him to have been God, as the Christians estimate, but some great saint, great friend of God, and great Prophet — as Moses and Mohammed were; and this is the tradition of Mohammed. But if Christ was a great saint, a great friend of God, and a great Prophet (as also God demonstrated by such evident miracles), he was not a lying seducer, but a truthful leader and teacher. His doctrine therefore was not lying but true: but in his doctrine it is held that he himself was God; therefore truly Christ was God.

Here you will perhaps respond with the Manichaeian heretics, according to the tradition of Mohammed, saying that the whole doctrine of Christ was true, but his disciples as rude men understood it ill, and from ignorance or from malice in writing corrupted it manifoldly; and that in the doctrine of Christ itself it is in no way contained that he was God — but perhaps in the doctrine corrupted by his disciples. But here I beg, listen peaceably. Do not the authority and uncorrupted truth of our Gospels sufficiently show — against the immediate prior response — what was already laid down? Does it not seem rather to be more reasonably believed that so many, such, and so great disciples of Christ, Apostles, and Evangelists, conversing with him continually in his presence, beholding his life and works continually in his presence, hearing his teaching continually in his presence — concerning these things concordantly wrote — than that Mohammed, alone and absent (because by 600 years and more later than Christ) wrote concerning these things? Indeed our Scripture concerning Christ, which so many and such concordantly wrote, and by faith, life, and doctrine continually attested, seems much more authentic than your law, which Mohammed alone, or any disciple of his alone, or any wife of his alone, wrote. Furthermore, you will perhaps say that Mohammed was a Prophet, wherefore that

the doctrine of Christ was divinely revealed to him. Truly however much he had been a Prophet, many things could have been by no means divinely revealed to him. Is not therefore more to be believed concordant witnesses, present, seeing, hearing, palpating, than Mohammed alone and absent — concerning whose prophecy it does not stand fast specially in this part? Why also is it not to be believed that Christ taught that he himself was God — since the ancient Prophets of Judea and the Sibyl concordantly prophesied him to be God, as from their prophecies it can be perspicuously demonstrated? How therefore shall I believe Mohammed alone, and not believe these many and most clear Prophets? Nor can anyone imagine that we Christians have feigned such Prophecies, as has been shown above. Furthermore, if Mohammed was a Prophet, so were the disciples of Christ writing his deeds — as our Histories teach. Was it not, according to Avicenna, the greatest of your Philosophers (*Metaphysics* X [2]), that prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit? — and how plenarily had the disciples of Christ, gathered equally, the Holy Spirit, or the gift of this Holy Spirit, when on the day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit in the species of fire filled the whole house where they were sitting, and them all so much that, although they were Hebrews, they spoke suddenly in the tongues of all nations? Did not Peter and Paul and other disciples of Christ prophesy? Did not John, the disciple and Evangelist of Christ, in his Apocalypse describe by prophesying the course of the world from the time of Christ to the end of the world — where also concerning your Mohammed and your seduction through him, and the impugning of Christians by you, he was not silent? Did not also many other Christians at many times most clearly prophesy? The disciples of Christ also, the Apostles and Evangelists, in dictating, writing, and by life, doctrine, deed, and word — even unto martyrdom and in the very martyrdom — most constantly attesting our Gospels, did (that is, God did for them) many glorious miracles, both in life and after their life. Wherefore also according to your response premised, they themselves were great saints and great friends of God — indeed greater than your Mohammed, for whom God did no miracles, as was touched above. Their life therefore and doctrine was holy and true, which God by such miracles approves and attests. Furthermore, from the time of Christ till now, miracles have always lasted among Christians — through Christians or for Christians who lived according to this doctrine of Christ which we have. God therefore approves such life and doctrine equally. Did not first the holy Christian Martyrs, men and women innumerable, contending for this faith, shine with very many miracles? Did not afterward the Christian Doctors, against the Heretics for the faith which we hold, in concord with words and writings fighting, shine with very many miracles? Did not Confessors and Virgins, living according to this faith, shine with very many miracles, as very many Histories attest? How also does it seem credible that if Christians erred commonly in believing — especially since they love God according to the doctrine of the next-preceding part of this work — God would not reveal the truth to some Christian, for whom he does so many other and so great miracles, but only to one unbeliever, idolater Gentile, namely your Mohammed? For such was he before he received the gift of Prophecy, as your books attest. For so he revealed to our Christ the Jew, and through him to his Jewish disciples, when their law he willed spiritually to expound and to fulfill.

I beg further attend diligently to the manner of doing miracles of Christ and of all others. Did not all others, through whom or for whom miracles were done, pray to God tacitly or expressly for the miracles to be done — protesting that they could not do miracles by their own power, and that they were not God? Christ however very often, and almost always when doing miracles, did them without the suffrage of prayer; indeed, he pretended to do everything by his own authority, by his own power, and by his own sole will — that thus he might show himself to be God, and might be believed to be God by men. Whence also doing miracles for the most part, he expressed only the will of doing it, and immediately the miracle which he willed was done — that thus he might evidently show himself to have an unfrustratable will, omnipotent and generally efficacious, such as no creature has, since it is only of finite virtue, but only God of absolutely infinite virtue, as the eighth Part teaches. For he said to the dead, paralytics, and other sick: "Rise"; to the blind: "Look up"; to him with the withered hand: "Stretch out your hand"; to the leper: "I will, be cleansed"; and to many asking many things, "Be it done"; and immediately the miracle which he willed was done. Christ therefore was truly God. For how otherwise would God have so approved him? Some sick however he cured by doing certain other things on account of ministry; sometimes however he prayed God the Father for a miracle to be done, that thus he might show that by virtue of the assumed humanity he could not do miracles, but only by divine virtue. Furthermore, Christ was a greater Prophet and more eminent than Mohammed; therefore, as it appears, the law of Christ is also greater than the law of Mohammed. Is not he the greater Prophet who has both the spirit of Prophecy and the power of working miracles, than he who has only one of these? Does not Avicenna, the most renowned of your Philosophers, say in *De Anima* IV.4 that the property of working miracles depends upon the power of desire, which proceeds from the soul of a Prophet worthy of prophecy; and in his *Metaphysics* X.1, that certitude comes from the evidence of miracles? Now Christ possessed both of these in the most excellent degree, as a great many histories make manifest; but your Mohammed scarcely had even tenuously, if at all, one of them—namely, the gift of Prophecy. For he predicted some things truly, but few; and others falsely, as both your books and the outcome of events make plain. But he worked no miracles, as he himself testifies in your Scripture. Has not this same point been shown above, against the fourth response, by the authority of Avicenna in like manner?

Does not he also seem the holier Prophet who enters the world more holily, lives more holily in the world, and departs the world more holily? Now Christ entered the world more holily, because he was conceived through angelic annunciation, by the Holy Spirit, from the Most Holy Virgin Mary, and was born of her, as the book of your law testifies in many places. He lived more holily in the world, as his life, doctrine, and miracles prove, nor do you deny this, as I believe. He departed the world more holily, as those greatest miracles which occurred around his death lucidly manifest: he rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, promised and sent the Holy Spirit to his own. Therefore he was more excellent than Mohammed.

Furthermore, since you Saracen Philosophers are great Astrologers, and you assign all things that occur below to higher causes (so that I may speak to you according to your principles), consider,

I pray, the great conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter that preceded and pre-signified your Prophet and sect, with all its circumstances to be weighed. Consider also the great conjunction—indeed, a greater and the greatest—of these same planets, with all their universal circumstances, which preceded Christ by a few years, and was the signifier of our future Prophet and sect. For both your people and ours know how to calculate these most readily; and consider which ought to be judged more solemn, more excellent, and more worthy. Was not that conjunction Christ's? What Astrologer doubts or is ignorant of this? Therefore, do not our Prophet and our sect surpass and excel your Prophet and your sect in like manner?

Did not Christ and the Christian religion also have very many most clear testimonies before, alongside, and after, as the preceding has taught, and as continued miracles still teach? But your prophet and your religion had none, or at least not so many, not such, nor so great. Furthermore, a law leading to the perfection and felicity of the soul in the present and in the future seems better and worthier than one which leads to the felicity or pleasure of the body in the present and likewise in the future. Now our law leads principally to the perfection and felicity of the rational soul in the present and likewise in the future; but yours leads to the felicity or pleasure of the body in the present, and also in the future, as the institutions and promises of our law and yours testify.

Does not Avicenna, the greatest of your Philosophers, say in his *Metaphysics* IX, last chapter: "Our law, which Mohammed gave, sets forth the disposition of felicity and misery which pertain to the body; but there is another promise which is apprehended by the intellect and by demonstrative reason, and this is the felicity and misery of souls, which is proved by argumentation, although our estimations are too feeble to imagine these now, for reasons which I shall set forth. To wise Theologians, however, the desire was much greater for attaining this felicity than the felicity of bodies; for although the latter were given to them, they did not attend to it, nor did they prize it in comparison with this felicity which is conjoined to the first truth, as I shall show concerning it. Therefore I shall make known the disposition of this felicity and the misery contrary to it; corporeal felicity, however, has already been assigned in the law."

Do not your Caliph and Sultan, and your other great ones according to the tradition of your law, believe and preach that your dead, raised to life, will eat and drink all delicate things—such as wafers, honey, milk, cheese, and butter—and that they will have many beautiful wives with whom they will mingle carnally? But how dishonest this would be in future felicity, how carnal, how bestial, how irrational—what honest Philosopher does not easily perceive? For to what end will it be necessary to eat there? Either from necessity, or from pleasure alone? If from necessity, then the bodies of men there will be alterable to infirmities, blindness, sorrows, and to death, and thus perhaps they will be altered—but this is repugnant to felicity. For felicity, according to all your Philosophers and others, is a stable and perfect good. If from pleasure alone, who will excuse them from gluttony, incontinence, or intemperance? Moreover, if you eat there carnally, will you not also have to evacuate carnally, and thus shamefully pollute the most felicitous place, and produce mutual abomination, stench, and weariness?

Furthermore, if you eat and drink there, will you not afterward sleep, and thus cease from felicity and incur misery? For the Philosophers concordantly teach that act is more perfect than potency, and use than habit; therefore felicity, which is the highest human good, consists in act and use, not in potency or habit. Hence a certain illustrious Philosopher recites in *Ethics* I, last chapter, approving the common saying that "the felicitous differ in nothing from the miserable for half their lives." To what end also would you have wives there—for generation, or for pleasure alone? Not for generation: for here, not there, is the place, time, and necessity for generating, nor will anyone there need an heir, since each one there, as you believe, will live forever in immortality. Furthermore, either you will always generate there, or you will at some time cease. If you will always generate, you will produce an immoderate and burdensome multitude of children, and that society of paradise or heaven will never be perfect, nor finally consummated. If at some time you cease from generating, you will also cease from your felicity, and incur eternal misery.

Your sons also begotten there will either further generate there, or by no means. If they will generate, there will be infinite and immoderate multiplication of children. It also seems that sons who never merited beatitude will be as blessed there as their fathers who multiply merited it here, since there is no time or place there for meriting. If they will by no means generate, they will never attain beatitude, but will always be miserable. Nor will you have wives there for filling pleasure alone—what Philosopher doubts this? What honest man is ignorant of it? What sane man hopes for this, except perhaps a swine of Epicurus?

Likewise, either you will have concupiscence and appetite for venereal acts there before the venereal act, or by no means. If you will have it, you will have sadness and grief there from delay and lack of the desired delectable. For the Philosopher says in *Ethics* III.21: "The intemperate man desires delectable things, on account of which he is also saddened when not obtaining them; for with sadness comes concupiscence." And in *Metaphysics* XII.39, showing that God always has himself in the best way, he proves that he always has the greatest delectation or pleasure, and that this is of some act always presentially existing, because an existing act is per se and maximally delectable; but hope concerning a future act, and memory concerning a past act, is delectable not per se but on account of the act, and insofar as they have, as it were presentially, the act itself.

Concerning which your Averroes says: "Hope and remembrance, although they are pleasurable, nevertheless are of things not existing in act; and they are pleasurable because the one hoping imagines them as comprehended in act, and likewise the one remembering." And he hints that pleasurable comprehension is only of that which is in act, not in potency, and that desire preceding comprehension seems more grief than pleasure—which both your Avicenna and all Philosophers and Physicians attest, and frequent experience makes manifest. But sadness does not befit felicity—rather, it is repugnant to it. If, however, you will have no concupiscence at all, neither will you have delectation in the work, as it appears. To what end also will it be necessary for those not desiring at all to exercise such an act?

And if you men, with so many wives full of pleasures, abound, and this will be your felicity, why will not every woman likewise have many men, so that they too may be similarly satiated with their full pleasures—or will they themselves remain forever unhappy and miserable?

Furthermore, either you will continually exercise the carnal act always, or you will sometimes cease by turns. But far be it that you should even lightly think you will continually exercise such an act; for thus you will be made more vile than the swine, which by you are also unclean and unlawful for eating. Nor will you be able to exercise such an act continually with one wife, since you will have many there; nor with many—how also will many wives of one man be able, for the completion of his felicity, to be continually occupied in such an act, except by committing adultery with various men? And if you cease from such an act at some time, your felicity will be diminished or will cease, as the foregoing testifies.

What Philosopher is ignorant that human felicity consists only in the most perfect operation of man, and who does not know that the most perfect operation of man is the operation according to the most perfect power of man, concerning his most perfect object? And who doubts that the rational soul is a more perfect power than any corporeal power? Therefore, it ought to be certain to anyone that the felicity of man consists in the cognition, conjunction, and most perfect fruition of God, as Hermes, Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, and all Philosophers, both Saracen and others, equally attest. Do not corporeal pleasure and the bestial soul—especially that of venereal acts—greatly impede the spiritual operation of the rational soul and its sincere delectation? Therefore it is repugnant to perfect felicity. For Aristotle says in *Ethics* VII.11: "The impediment to being prudent is the pleasures, and the more one rejoices, especially in those of venereal acts: for no one indeed can understand anything in them."

Why also do you expect human beatitude in such carnal and bestial delectation, and not in spiritual and rational delectation, more perfect, more permanent (because continuous), more honest, purer, better, and greater—especially since you cannot have both at once? For they are repugnant to one another and mutually expel each other, as was just taught above. And what Philosopher does not know that just as for a more perfect power, more untiring, more honest, more holy, and better, concerning its most fitting object, there ought reasonably to be a proportional operation, so also a proportional delectation? But the most perfect power of man, the most untiring (because immaterial and incorruptible), purest, most honest, most holy, most especially Deiform, and universally best—who denies that this is the rational soul? And its proportional object—who doubts that this is God? Therefore no one is permitted to doubt that the most delectable felicity and the most felicitous delectation are to be expected in the most perfect, most continuous, most sincere, and most holy operation of the rational soul concerning God, as the aforesaid Philosophers and very many other Gentiles, Jews, and Saracens unanimously attest, and how reasonably according to the premises!

Is not God, according to the first supposition, third part, and fourth, supremely, most copiously, most abundantly, and most infinitely delectable, pleasurable, delicious, sweet, agreeable, lovable, joyful, felicitous, and good? Why therefore, according to the seventh and eighth parts, can he not

exhibit himself thus to his worshippers in future beatitude, and satiate them with his sincere delights, always continuous, sincerely and continuously and eternally, so that thus he himself becomes for them the most delectable felicity and most felicitous delectation always? Does not this also most beautifully agree with reason?

According to all Philosophers truly Philosophers, and according to the requirement of reason, ought not man to do all things for the end? And since there is no infinite process in ends—as the second supposition and they themselves equally attest—there is some ultimate of all ends, which is sought for itself, and others on account of it. But this is final beatitude and felicity. And in what is felicity itself to be sought, except in God? And what will this felicity be, except God? Otherwise God would have to be loved finally, and venerated by his worshippers, on account of something other than himself—against all who rightly Philosophize, and against the 30th part of this work.

According to the 31st part, will not God recompense his lovers and servants not sparingly but abundantly? And where and when, except in future felicity? But these, according to the doctrine of the thirtieth part of this work, love him above all things—not only existing but also possible and imaginable, on this side of God, however great—and serve him in this manner: that for the sake of obtaining any delectable goods whatsoever, or for avoiding any sad evils, they would never knowingly offend him in any way. Therefore will he not recompense them with a greater good and a greater delectation? And what good, except himself? And what delectation, except his own infinite one? And who does not know that divine delectation is most holy, most sincere, most honest, most continuous, and most abundantly infinite, as the first Supposition, the third, fourth, and 20th parts teach? This most delectable felicity, then, and most felicitous delectation, and most especially Deiform, we Christians according to our law, the doctrine of Christ, all expect concordantly. Therefore is not our law more reasonable, more honest, and holier than yours?

Is it not also held in your Scripture that the sun rises between the two horns of the devil, and therefore that those who adore toward the East adore the devil? That the Ass, when it brays, sees the devil, and therefore makes such a horrible sound? That the Cock, when it crows, sees an Angel, and therefore sings thus? And many similar things which no Philosopher doubts to be empty ravings and fictions? It also seems against the natural order that to a more subtle, more spiritual, and more divine law (such as our law is), a ruder, more carnal, and more bestial law should succeed (such as is your law). For the natural process seems to be from rude to subtle, from carnal to spiritual, from less perfect to more perfect. Do not the most powerful miracles, divinely worked for us against you on many occasions, also show the excellence of our law over yours, as many chronicles relate, of which a few are recited above?

Perhaps you will respond and say that even if our law were better, yours nevertheless is good and sufficient for salvation. But if ours is good, it is true and right; yours, however, is bad, false, and erroneous, for they are repugnant in many things. Even if ours is better, why do you persecute it

so? Why also do you not choose the better? Or if not all of you wish to do so, why do you not allow those who wish from among yourselves to choose and hold it? But if anyone among you should choose it, you continually slaughter him. Hear Avicenna, the greatest of your Philosophers, in his *Metaphysics* X, last chapter, expressly teaching that there ought to be no other law except that which descends from God through the Prophet, whose institution is best, and that this is to be spread through the whole world; and if there be any who disagree from the law, "let them first," he says, "be corrected so that they come to their senses; but if they will not do so, let them be killed."

From this whole long contestation, therefore, such a brief argument is gathered: Whatsoever God revealed and testified is true, as the first supposition and the third part demonstrate; God revealed and testified the Christian Faith, as the foregoing makes manifest; therefore the Christian Faith is true. I know that the obstinate and quibbling will quibble obstinately, either tacitly thinking that the foregoing does not demonstrate that God revealed or testified to this faith. And I confess that there is here no Mathematical demonstration from principles known per se, just as neither in natural Philosophy, nor in Metaphysics, nor in moral Philosophy, but such as such moral matter permits. Does not that great Philosopher rightly say in *Ethics* I.3 that "it will be well said sufficiently if it is made manifest according to the subject matter"? "For certainty is not similarly to be sought in all things; for the goods and just things, with which Civil science is concerned, have so much difference and error that they seem to be by law alone, but not by nature. Speaking lovably, therefore, of such matters, we ought to show the truth in a coarse and figurative way; in the same manner each of the things said ought to be received, for it is the mark of a disciplined man to seek certainty in any genus only insofar as the nature of the matter receives it. For it appears equally close to accept a Mathematician persuading and to demand demonstrations from a Rhetorician."

Indeed, Plato, about to speak of natural things in the second Prologue to the *Timaeus*, thus says: "I tell you now, O Socrates, if while disputing concerning the nature of the universal thing, I am unable to bring forth utterly unshakable and inexplicable reasons, do not marvel; rather, observe whether I bring forth assertions no less consonant than anyone else. For remember that both I, who speak, and you, who judge, are men, and that to give a moderate explanation of such sublime matters is the burden of some great labor."

Let the professor of any other faith come forward, I beg, and let him bring forth for his faith such reasons as he can; and let the Christian bring forth for his faith the reasons set forth above, or other better possible ones; and weigh both these and those, on this side and that, with a just balance, and I know—and I know that I know—that yours will be found to have less.

And if anyone shall think to resist me by arguing that miracles cannot prove our faith, since miracles were sometimes worked among Idolaters and Gentiles (as is recited above), unless perhaps the unfaithful faith of these can likewise be approved by their miracles—it is to be

responded, not improbably perhaps, that before the time of Circumcision and the Law, and likewise during the time when they endured, there were certain ones even among foreign nations, among Idolaters and Gentiles, who—either through divine revelation, or through human teaching, or through their own investigation and discovery—truly knew God (although perhaps tenuously and veiledly), and likewise worshipped him. Did not certain Gentiles most clearly prophesy that Christ would come, as was touched on above? Why then was it not fitting that God, wonderful in his Saints, should work miracles for such persons, that thus he might further advance and confirm them in his cognition and love, and attract others to imitate their Religion?

Such indeed seem to have been certain Just men and Prophets before the flood and after the flood, before Circumcision and the Law. In the time of Circumcision instituted through Abraham, Job, king of Edom, was the fifth from the Patriarch Abraham, who descended after the election of Jacob from the reprobated Esau. In the time of the Law given through Moses, such seem the Queen of the South, and the men of Nineveh, as the sacred letters, even the Evangelists, attest. Such moreover seems to have been Nebuchadnezzar, the most renowned king of Babylon, and the first Monarch of the Chaldeans, after his humiliation and the penance he performed. Darius also, King of the Medes, who took the Monarchy from the Chaldeans. Such likewise seems to have been, while the law was still enduring, also that noble Alexander, King of the Greeks, who took the Monarchy from the Medes—which Cornelius the Centurion, a religious man and acceptable to God, never a Jew nor yet made a Christian, evidently testifies.

Why therefore should it not similarly be believed concerning other similar persons, although divine histories or others make minimal mention of them? Does not God, speaking through the Prophet about his city and citizens, say generally enough: "I shall be mindful of Rahab and Babylon among them that know me; behold, the foreigners, and Tyre, and the people of Ethiopia, these were there"? And did not his Apostle, having experienced the same generality, say: "In truth I have found that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that fears him and works justice is acceptable to him"?

Hence Augustine in his book *On the Time of the Christian Religion against Porphyry*, and in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, to Prosper and Hilary, ch. 11, says: "From the beginning of the human race, sometimes more hiddenly, sometimes more evidently, Christ has not ceased to be prophesied, nor have those who would believe in him been lacking; both from Adam to Moses, and in the people of Israel itself (which by a certain special mystery was a Prophetic nation), and in other nations, before he came in the flesh. For when some are mentioned in the holy Hebrew books from the time of Abraham, neither from the stock of his flesh, nor from the people of Israel, nor from adventitious society in the people of Israel, who nevertheless were participants of this sacrament—why should we not believe that even in other nations on this side and that, others were so, although we do not read them mentioned in the same authorities?" Concerning the just men and Prophets before circumcision or the divinely instituted law, indeed, there are many sufficiently authentic and famous Histories.

Concerning Job also there is a celebrated and well-known History, whence Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XVIII.⁴⁸ says: "Nor do I think the Jews themselves dare to contend that no one belonged to God except the Israelites, from the time when the lineage of Israel began to be, with his elder brother having been reprov'd. For there was indeed no other people which would properly be called the people of God; but they cannot deny that certain men, by no earthly but a heavenly society, belonging to the true Israelites, citizens of the supernal fatherland, were also in other nations. For if they deny it, they are most easily convinced concerning the holy and wonderful man Job, who was neither a native nor a Proselyte (that is, a stranger come into the people of Israel), but drawing his lineage from the Idumean nation, born there, and there having died; who is so praised by divine eloquence that, as far as pertains to justice and piety, no man of his times is equal to him. Although we do not find his times in the Chronicles, we gather, however, from his book (which the Israelites for the merit of it received into Canonical authority) that he was three generations later than Israel. I do not doubt that it was divinely provided that from this one we might know that even through other nations there could have been those who lived according to God and pleased him, belonging to the spiritual Israel—which is to be believed granted to no one except him to whom there has been divinely revealed the one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus."

The same author, *On the Perfection of the Justice of Men*, ch. 32, says "that the just men of old believed in Christ, helped by his grace, so that, rejoicing, they foreknew him, and certain ones even foretold that he would come; some in the people of Israel, such as Moses, and Joshua son of Nun, and Samuel, and David, and others such; some outside that people, such as Job; some before that people, such as Abraham, such as Noah, and whoever others there are whom divine Scripture either commemorates or passes over in silence."

Concerning the salutary penance of Nebuchadnezzar and his conversion to God through the preaching of Daniel and the divine scourge, the History of Daniel teaches; whence Augustine in *On the Predestination and Grace of God* (which is the fifth among his Sermons), ch. 17, says: "That Nebuchadnezzar, after innumerable impieties, having been scourged, did penance, and merited fruitful penance, but Pharaoh by no means; and that these two had different ends"—which is also recited in the Canon, *causa* 23, *quaestio* 4, *Nabuchodonosor*. Concerning Darius also, this seems to appear in the history of Daniel.

Concerning the noble Alexander, this is also reasonably to be estimated, especially because he had been educated in the doctrine of that most renowned Philosopher and his Master, Aristotle, who knew and evidently taught that there is a true God, who is all the highest good, the first efficient cause, the first form, and the ultimate end of all things—as his Philosophical books make manifest. Josephus also in *Antiquities* XI, last chapter, recites how, when Alexander, indignant after the capture of Gaza, hastened toward Jerusalem, God commanded Jaddua the High Priest, after supplication and sacrifices offered to God, by him and the people while sleeping, that he should trust, and adorn the city with garlands, and forthwith open the gates, and that others should go forth to meet him with white garments, but that he himself and the rest of

the Priests should go forth with their lawful robes, hoping to suffer nothing savage, since God was providing—which they did. And he adds: "But the Phoenicians and Chaldeans following the King thought that whatever the imperial fury could permit against the city, he himself would commit, and that he would afflict the High Priest with the highest contumelies; but it happened to fall out otherwise. For Alexander, providing the multitude clad in white garments, the Priests in linen robes, but the High Priest in a hyacinth and golden robe, having on his head a tiara, and on it a golden plate, on which the name of God was written, approached alone, and adored the divinity, and first venerated the High Priest. While all the Jews with one voice were saluting Alexander, the surrounding Kings of Syria and the rest, seeing him doing this, were stupefied, and thought the King's mind was corrupted. But Parmenio alone interrogated him, saying: 'Why, when all are adoring you, do you yourself adore the High Priest of the Jewish nation?' To whom he replied: 'I have not adored him, but the God whose principate of the priesthood he has been made. For I beheld him in such a habit through a dream, while still established in Dios, a city of Macedonia; and when I had been thinking with myself that I could conquer Asia, he urged me not at all to neglect this, but to cross over confidently. For he said that he would lead my army across, and would deliver up the power of the Persians; and therefore, seeing no other in such a robe, when I had perceived this one, having the memory of the nocturnal vision and proof, I saluted him. Hence I judge that I, beloved by divine help, both conquered Darius and broke the strength of the Persians. Therefore I trust that all things which were hoped for in my heart will come to pass.' And after Parmenio had spoken, honoring the High Priest, with the rest of the Priests running up, he came as far as the city, and ascending to the temple, sacrificed to God according to the showing of the Priest; and to the High Priest himself and to the rest of the Priests he munificently gave many things."

It might also perhaps be responded somewhat otherwise, and somewhat similarly, by saying that certain ones adoring idols by no means adored them for their own sake, but only for the sake of God and the divine virtues, according to the last response of the twenty-first part—just as we also adore the images of Christ, of God, of the Trinity, of Angels, and of holy men. Therefore it also seems that God could not unfittingly have heard them in their tribulations crying out, and miraculously aided them if it was necessary.

Furthermore, somewhat otherwise and somewhat similarly perhaps it might be said: that certain Idolaters truly knew and worshipped the supreme God, but under the name and idol of the god Jove, as appears from the premises around the sixteenth part of this work; and nonetheless, besides him, they worshipped certain other idols, dedicated to holy Angels, men, or demons—not, however, finally for the sake of the idols themselves, nor finally for the sake of those of whom they were idols, but because they are creatures and servants and instruments of God, executing his will in prosperous and adverse things concerning men—so that thus in them and through them they might finally adore God, just as we adore God for himself, and his holy Angels and men, and their images, finally for the sake of God. And although perhaps in the manner of worshipping God they erred from simple ignorance, not from certain malice,

nevertheless loving him above all things according to the doctrine of the thirtieth part of this work, and willing to know, and applying due diligence as to what worship and manner of worshipping was pleasing and acceptable to God, and prepared to observe that worship and manner once known, in the meantime they honored him according to their knowledge and conscience—God, regarding these things piously and discretely, spared their ignorance and simplicity, and accepted their sincere love, holy intention, and benevolent will. This seems consonant with reason. For it does not seem that the most just and most pious One (as the first supposition, third part, and fourth attest) requires more from man than he has received, and than is in man's power; rather, that he accepts that, if it is offered with due intention.

Does it not also, according to the common opinion of the Philosophers and according to anyone's natural judgment, seem that one deliberately proposing to give something—say, gold—and applying the requisite diligence, but deceived, gives brass in place of it (which, if he knew, he would by no means do)—does he not seem to give not brass but gold, and is he not deservedly reputed liberal? Just as conversely. For the Philosopher says in *Ethics* IV.2: "That which is liberal is not in the multitude of things given, but in the disposition of the giver." And above, III.4: "But the involuntary being that which is by force and on account of ignorance, the voluntary will indeed seem to be that whose principle is in the one knowing the singulars in which the operation lies." And below, VI.10: "We say that some performing just acts are by no means just, such as those doing the things ordained by the laws either unwillingly, or on account of ignorance, or on account of some other thing, and not for their own sake—although they perform indeed what is fitting and as much as is fitting and what the worthy man does; but it appears that there is a certain manner of being so disposed in performing each thing, as that one might be good. I mean, for instance, on account of choice, and for the sake of the things performed themselves. Right choice, therefore, virtue makes; but whatever things are by nature suited to be done for the sake of that choice are not of virtue, but of another power. We must, however, speak more manifestly to those who know about these things. There is, then, a certain power which they call *deinotēs* [cleverness], and this is such that, with respect to the supposed intention, it can perform the things conducing to it and obtain them. If therefore the intention be good, it is praiseworthy; if perverse, it is craftiness."

Does not the Apostle also seem to mean this when he says: "When the Gentiles who do not have the law naturally do those things which are of the law, they having no law are a law to themselves; who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts among themselves alternately accusing or even defending, on the day when God shall judge the secrets of men"? Does not Truth itself say: "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome"? Whence Augustine in *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount* II.21 says: "By eye here we ought to understand that very intention by which we do whatever we do. If it be clean and right, and looking at that which ought to be looked at, all our works which we work according to it must necessarily be good. He has called all our works the whole body, because the Apostle also calls certain operations our members, which he

disapproves and commands to be mortified, saying: 'Mortify your members which are upon the earth, fornication, uncleanness, avarice,' and other such. Therefore not what each man does, but with what mind he does it, is to be considered." And the same author on the title of Psalm 31 says: "Intention makes a good work; faith directs the intention. Do not greatly attend to what a man does, but to what he looks at when he does it." And in his *83 Questions*, q. 27, he says that the wicked, through whom that which they do not know is brought about, do not receive the reward of justice, which is referred to God, but of their own malevolence; just as it is not imputed to good men that, when they wish to be of profit to themselves, harm comes to someone, but the reward of benevolence is bestowed for a good intention.

Moreover, in his little book *On the Dishonest Familiarity of Women*, he writes thus: "The will prone to do is reputed for the work of the deed." Which the laws also seem to wish, saying: "By will and purpose evil deeds are to be distinguished." Does not Ambrose in *De Officiis* I say: "Your affection imposes a name upon your work"? And Jerome in his epistle to Paulinus on all the books of divine history thus says: "Not what you find, but what you seek, do we consider." For who can rationally say that a sincere will of serving the Lord, according to the doctrine of the thirtieth part, is not right and reasonably to be accepted, even though in the manner of serving an unwilling error creeps in?

Why else would Seneca be placed in the Catalogue of saints? For Blessed Jerome, *On Illustrious Men*, ch. 12, and the preface placed before Seneca's epistle, thus writes: "Lucius Annaeus Seneca of Cordoba, disciple of Photion the Stoic, and uncle of the Poet Lucan, was of most continent life, whom I would not place in the Catalogue of Saints, except that those Epistles, which are read by very many, of Paul to Seneca and of Seneca to Paul, provoke me. In them, although he was Nero's master and most powerful in that time, he says he wishes to be of that place among his own people which Paul is among the Christians. He was killed by Nero two years before Peter and Paul were crowned with martyrdom."

Does not also, according to the Canon Laws, on this account error in person and in condition dissolve a marriage already contracted? Does not also for this reason one approaching another's wife in ignorance, whom he reputes to be his own, become excused from adultery? Is it not written in this manner: "Error of person and of condition does not admit consent of marriage. For if anyone should bargain to sell a field to Marcellus, and afterward Paul should come saying that he is Marcellus, and should buy the field from him, has this man come to an agreement with Paul about the price, or is he to be said to have sold him the field? Likewise, if anyone should promise to sell me gold, and should offer me brass for gold, and thus deceive me—am I to be said to have consented to brass? Did I will to buy brass? Nor at any time did I consent to that, because consent is only of the will. Just as, therefore, here error of matter excludes consent to the purchase, so also in marriage error of person. For he did not consent to this man, but to him whom he thought this man to be."

That error of person also excuses some is proved by that authority by which a wife's sister is reported to have gone (with both, namely the sister and the husband, unknowing) into his bed, and to have been known by her sister's husband: who nevertheless is judged to remain forever without hope of marriage; but he who knew her is excused on account of ignorance. Otherwise also this is proved: The Devil sometimes transforms himself into an Angel of light, nor is the error perilous if then he is believed to be good, when he simulates himself good. If then he should ask of some simple person whether he wished to be a participant of his beatitude, and that one should respond that he wished to pass into his fellowship—is he to be said to have consented to the fellowship of diabolical damnation, or rather to the participation of eternal brightness?

Likewise, if anyone of the heretics under the name of Augustine, or Ambrose, or Jerome, should offer himself to some Catholic, and provoke him to a change of his faith, if he should give consent—into whose faith and opinion would he be said to have consented? Not into the sect of the heretics, but into the integrity of the Catholic faith, which that heretic was lying that he held. Therefore, just as she who, deceived by error in person, did not consent to this man, but to him whom he was lying himself to be, it is plain that she was not his spouse." This same opinion with the same examples the Theological Doctors also profess.

I believe constantly, however, that God, pious and just, reveals the religion due and necessary for salvation—namely, the Christian religion, implicitly or expressly—at some time to everyone loving him above all things and willing efficaciously to venerate him with due worship and manner, and persistently applying due diligence. For many Jews and Gentiles lucidly foresaw that Christ would come, and prophetically foretold it, as not a few histories testify, and as the foregoing has touched upon. For how shall God—who, by the first Supposition and the following parts, and many Philosophers attesting, provides even for the vilest inanimate things and beasts—abandon man without providence? And he who, by the 27th part with the following, and the demonstrations of these, and many histories proving, sometimes graciously provides things necessary for salvation to men nowhere seeking God, but indeed even contemning him—how will he deny necessary things to those who piously and perseveringly seek and worship him according to their knowledge and power, turn his face away, despise, cast off, and repel them?

I also truly think that very many infidels apply no diligence, or none that is due, to inquiring after and knowing the due worship of God; rather, even if to them, while negligent, by divine inspiration, reason, or human preaching, it should gratuitously be revealed and evidently appear that our law is better than theirs—or even that our law is true but theirs erroneous—hardened by a certain pertinacious pride they refuse to bow their proud necks, refuse to abandon the ancient sect, refuse to admit the better, refuse to acquiesce to truth; but they resist with all their power, contradict, and oppose. For I conferred recently with a certain learned and very famous Jew about his conversion to the faith of Christ, and after other matters, asking him to pray to his God devoutly that he might illumine his heart and show him truly which law was better and more acceptable before him. He responded to me that he would never do this, because this would be in some way to doubt his law, and somewhat to hesitate. I asked whether he wished that I should so

pray for him to his God and mine in common, namely the great God, and that I would gladly pray. He immediately responded "no," for the cause of doubt aforesaid. Then I said: "You do not wish to pray for yourself, nor permit, nor have it pleasing, that I pray for you—pray, I beg, for me in the manner aforesaid"—so that thus at least I might provoke his contumacious hardness to the benefit of prayer. He, peremptorily refusing, said, "I know that you will never be a good Jew," and added, "and if you wish to doubt your law, I do not wish to doubt mine."

Furthermore and otherwise, it can also be truly said that certain miracles are fantastical, delusory, and Diabolical; certain ones true. The Magi of Pharaoh in Egypt performed delusory miracles, as is recited in Exodus, and such were the miracles among Idolatrous Infidels—and this is the response of Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* X.16, treating of such miracles. You will perhaps object that in the same way the Infidels can speak of Christian miracles. I confess it, and they have so spoken. And if you should ask, how then can they be refuted? I respond: if they say this universally of all miracles of Christians, they can be refuted as before; if particularly—say, of certain marvelous delusions perhaps reputed for true miracles among certain Christians—they are perhaps not to be refuted. And if you should further ask how these can be discerned, I respond that probably it is by the circumstances, and by the probable conjectures concurring, by the sanctity of life, by the manner of believing, loving, praying, and obtaining the miracle, and by the manner of the obtained miracle, and other such things, which are not easy to enumerate; but with certitude, by divine illumination and inspiration, and by the gift of the Holy Spirit, which by the Apostle is called the discretion of Spirits. For God can do this, by the seventh part of this work; and it greatly befits him to do this for Christians loving and worshipping him according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work; and if not always and generally for all Christians, yet for those whom it concerns to judge concerning miracles—say, the highest Priests and the princes of Priests, when necessity or opportunity requires this, as in performing the Canonization of some saint.

Nor is this to be wondered at: for in many histories we find that God revealed many things concerning themselves and their principates to many gentile princes—concerning Pharaoh King of Egypt, Genesis 41; concerning Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, Daniel 2 and 4; concerning Belshazzar his successor, Daniel 5; concerning Alexander King of the Greeks, *Antiquities* XI, last chapter, as is recited above; concerning Genghis Khan, the first king of the Tartars, in the Histories of the Tartars, as was touched on above; concerning Agamemnon King of the Greeks and the dream which he had seen concerning instituting battle, and which he reported in the Greek Council. Homer writes that Nestor, a man of great prudence, reconciling faith to his report, responded that "concerning the public state, a royal dream is to be believed"; and Macrobius recites this *On the Dream of Scipio*. Did not Caiaphas also, although he was a malign Pontiff of the Jews, touched by the Spirit of God, truly prophesy? How much more worthily, then, is it fitting that God impart such gifts of his Spirit to our supreme Prince, our supreme Pontiff?

Furthermore, the Gentiles and their Philosophers will perhaps respond, saying that even if our law is good, and better than any other positive law whatsoever, the law of nature alone—namely, of natural reason, of conscience or *synderesis*—suffices for anyone to regulate him in all things, for doing all things. But if our law is good and best, it is also true; and in it is contained expressly that "he who has not believed, as it teaches, will be damned." Likewise, if our law is positively good and best, it is also more perfect than the law of nature alone: for it contains the whole perfection of that, and adds to it; it supplies its insufficiencies and corrects its defects. Why then do you not choose and hold it?

Furthermore, if the law of nature alone sufficed for man for whatsoever, why would God (who, by the first supposition and third part, and you yourselves attesting, does nothing in vain) have given another law and other laws—the old and the new—as the premises attest, especially since each is more difficult to know and more laborious to fulfill? For what wise person does anything through more, for which fewer suffice—as natural reason and all Philosophers concordantly attest, and as was touched on above—unless perhaps it be done more becomingly, more usefully, and better through more? But if this is true of positive laws, and especially the Christian, why do you not accept and hold it?

The Gentile Philosophers also, supposing themselves to follow natural reason, were frequently seduced by a thin shadow and fallacious and lying image of phantastical reason, irrationally erring—as the truest reason, and their very frequent contradiction, clearly teaches. How then does so irregular, so disordered a rule, and so fallacious, suffice for man to direct him in all things? Does not God—who by the first Supposition, third part, and second Supposition attesting, is proved to be the sincere, supreme, and first truth—love and accept truth more than falsehood, true rather than false service, rectitude rather than error, especially concerning religion and divine worship? Does not, according to the 30th part of this work, God alone for his own sake be loved above all things most efficaciously, and worshipped most devoutly? How then, on account of the error of irrational reason and seduced conscience, does it make no difference whether one renders this worship to the true God, or to Demons or idols?

Did not the Gentile Philosophers—the true Philosophers—reprove idols, and judge that one true God ought to be worshipped? But to what fruit, if it avails as much to worship an idol as God? Why, moreover, I ask, do the Philosophers spend such laborious diligence concerning the cognition of truth, if falsehood and truth weigh equally, are equally valid, bring forth equal fruit for whomsoever, provided only they act according to their consciences? Where error is worse and graver, is not a rectifying law proved more necessary? And who is ignorant that error toward God and concerning divine worship is worse and graver than toward man, and concerning human polity? And here also through the Gentile Philosophers themselves very many laws are established. How, then, is another law not necessary concerning God and divine worship?

Therefore Aristotle, *Politics* VII.9, enumerating the necessary parts of a city, says: "Especially those things which concern divine care, which they call the Priesthood." And Plato and the other

Gentile Philosophers consent in this part. If also reason alone naturally suffices for man for doing all things, why are so many human laws also vainly established by the Philosophers themselves? Did not Plato write many books on laws? Aristotle on Ethics and Politics many? Tully on the Republic many books? And many other Gentile Philosophers many books on similar matter?

Furthermore, Philosophers, hear me a little patiently. Just as a householder can, in his little house; just as a political Prince in his little city; just as a king in his little kingdom can establish laws for his subjects—laws, I say, positive, arbitrary, and voluntary, which they who shall keep will be rewarded, and they who shall not keep them or shall condemn them will lack rewards and pay due punishments—so also why can not God, the supreme householder in his greatest house, the supreme Prince in his greatest principate, and the supreme King of kings in his greatest kingdom, establish that whoever shall keep the Christian law receive eternal glory, and they who shall not keep it but condemn it lack glory and incur eternal damnation? He could indeed, and did, as the foregoing makes manifest.

You err also, Philosophers, in not seeing original sin, the original ineptitude for future life in all men. Could not God have established for the first man such a law, that if he obeyed the divine commands in all things, he would have eternal beatitude; but if not, both he himself and his whole succession the privation of beatitude and eternal misery, unless he himself or some of his sons should make competent satisfaction? For so can a man, an earthly Prince, promise or give a city to anyone. With which law established, if that first man should sin against the divine command, would not all that progeny become reprobate, and be held unsuited to eternal life? But that this happened thus is gathered from the Christian law. Whatever therefore you may do, according to your natural ingenuity, unless you make satisfaction, you do nothing for obtaining future glory, the aforesaid law obstructing.

You will say perhaps that it is easy to make satisfaction to God for sin. But is not making satisfaction to God for sin knowingly committed against him, to render something as much or greater as the sin ought not to have been committed—especially if one acts strictly and rigorously with the sinner? For otherwise he does not fully restore the honor of God contemptibly violated, nor does he do enough, but less or nothing; therefore neither does he fully placate the offended one. But who can render to God so much, since by the 30th part of this work no sin ought to be committed knowingly against God for any goods whatsoever to be preserved or gained, or any penal evils whatsoever, had to be removed, or not had to be guarded against?

You will say perhaps that the sinner is excused through impotence. But although perhaps through impotence he is excused from a new continually proper sin (in not rendering what he owes), yet not from the ancient debt and sin, nor is he rendered fit for eternal beatitude, the aforesaid law forbidding. What also would the Philosopher say, if God should will that no man have the consortium of Angels in eternal beatitude and incomparable felicity, except one similar to Angels, innocent and virgin from sin, and generated from such innocents and virgins—however

much the sinner might satisfy for sin? For a virgin culpably deflowered, even if she should make satisfaction however much, is not however restored a virgin.

Furthermore, perhaps you will say that God can simply remit every sin without any satisfaction to the sinner; but this does not stand in the way: for although he could do this, nevertheless he will not do this according to the aforesaid law. If he could also do this, he could simply remit sin unpunished, against the 31st part. It also seems not improbably, according to Philosophical reasons, that if man is now a sinner and afterward will be just, this will be brought about by some change—and not in God, on account of the sixth part premised, nor in something impertinent, because this would seem impertinent—therefore in the sinner himself. But this change is satisfaction for sin, or seems to be not without satisfaction.

And according to all who truly Philosophize, every evil—namely, pure malice and sin—is not some positive thing, but a privation or lack of a good thing, or of some goodness; but a privation in a fit subject cannot fully be removed, except through the full positing of the habit which it deprived. For no medium can be found there. And if you should ask, who therefore can or could exhibit so much satisfaction for the sin of man, I say that Christ, simultaneously God and man, is most sufficient in every respect, as the first supposition with the following parts clearly proves, as also the law of the Jews predicted, and the law of the Christians truly professes. What therefore remains, except that you all become Christians, that you may be made participants of this satisfaction?

CHAPTER 33. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS DENYING THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATION, ANNIHILATION, AND RECREATION.

Let the Philosophers repudiate that foolish little Harlot, whom under the appearance of wisdom they have for too long loved cloaked, fallaciously lying that creation, annihilation, and recreation are not possible. For God, according to the first supposition, the fifth part, and the seventh, is supremely perfect, sufficient, powerful, and efficacious, in such measure that nothing more perfect, more sufficient, more powerful, or more efficacious could be. And is it not to be reckoned more perfect, more sufficient, more powerful, and more efficacious to make something by one's own power alone out of nothing, than out of preexisting matter necessarily required? Likewise, if God is of infinitely greater power and efficacy than any created effective cause, why can he not, proportionally, produce a stronger and greater effect, or a stronger and greater mode of effecting, according to natural Philosophical rules? Why therefore can he not create?

Furthermore, according to the eighth part premised, God has a universally efficacious will; therefore, even if there had never been any matter, nor anything besides him, and if he willed something else really to be, it would forthwith be. Furthermore, according to the first supposition and the third part of this work, whatever essential and intrinsic thing worthy of God is attributed to him, if it can be held without contradiction, must necessarily not be denied. And is not the power to create thus attributed to God? And can it not most easily be defended from all

contradiction? Therefore the creation of things is possible; therefore also annihilation and recreation in like manner, the possibility of which can likewise be demonstrated.

Annihilation also, especially, granted creation, is easily persuaded: For far be it that a slender created work should be more powerful for remaining than the omnipotent Maker for destroying, if he willed; which could likewise be demonstrated of any thing of finite entity and power, even if it were not created. And does not, according to the 17th part of this work, nothing other than God necessarily exist, but its being is contingent according to contradiction? Who, therefore, does not easily see that God—since he is necessary being and omnipotent simply in every respect—can, by his absolute power, annihilate anything else?

But the possibility of creation and annihilation being admitted, who will deny the possibility of recreation? Let the Philosophers, I beg, weigh the foregoing arguments and the contrary ones of their own reason in a just balance, and I think that their own arguments will be found wanting. If however they have any arguments, let them, I ask, lay aside the blinding pride and humbly recognize themselves as fallible men—which their frequent contradiction of one another, indeed even of one and the same person against himself at different times, makes manifest—nor let them be ashamed to advance, always embracing the stronger and more beautiful argument before others, lest perhaps they be justly deprived in other matters of the name as well as the substance of Philosophers, and be called *frivophiles* [lovers of trifles]. Let them suppliantly observe, I pray, what valid argument would be required to reprove so great a famous opinion, which is approved by every faith and sect, and by nearly all men, especially since it is supported by such strong arguments. Therefore the Philosopher in *Ethics* X.2, refuting those who deny that the good is what all things desire, says: "What appears to all, this we say is so; but he who removes this faith does not say things more credible." Averroes also, on *De Somno et Vigilia*, says: "Things which are famous among all are necessary, either as a whole or in part." If the Philosophers, however, in this matter have no argument, why do they irrationally speak thus, especially since "God cannot create, annihilate, and recreate" is not known per se? Indeed, the contrary is famous among very many.

CHAPTER 34. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS DENYING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.

Let the Philosophers be put to flight who affirm that God could not have created the world. For according to the next part above, God could create some thing; why then not the world, since the world is of finite entity and power, but God simply infinite, as the first Supposition, the 3rd part, and the 4th demonstrate? God can also annihilate the world, as is plain by the next preceding part and its proof, and by the seventeenth part; and he can likewise recreate it by the same next part of this work and its demonstration; therefore he could also have created it by similar reasoning. The chief thing also which seems to stand in the way is the impossibility of creation out of nothing;

but this does not stand in the way, according to the next part of this work. For who is ignorant how fragile are the other little quibbles of the Philosophers?

Nevertheless, that this may appear more evidently to all, that procedure in *Physics* VIII is to be a little examined, especially because, as I have heard, certain of the faithful proceeding by that procedure of the unfaithful have proceeded into the very abyss of unfaithfulness. But it appears to me—a Christian by Christ's grace—and it would even appear to me, if I were not a Christian nor a follower of any law, but only a lover of truth, that this procedure sins mortally in matter and in form.

It is granted by the Philosophers that "prior" and "before" are taken in two ways for our purpose, namely according to nature and according to time. I posit therefore against you, Aristotle and Averroes, that the world and motion began at instant A, and that there was no time, change, nor temporal succession, nor any true changeable or partible duration, great or small, before that first motion which I shall call B. I posit therefore consequently that nothing whatsoever preceded A by any temporal priority, just as nothing precedes the outermost heaven by local priority or superiority; and that this is consequent is plain through yourself, in chapter 10 of that *Physics* VIII, saying: "How will there be prior and posterior, with no time existing—or time, if there be no motion?" And on the other hand I posit that the eternal God, and his eternal wisdom and will, preceded A by priority of nature, as cause precedes the caused.

When therefore you, Aristotle, throughout that whole procedure, suppose that the non-being of any made thing necessarily precedes its being—and this speaking of temporal precedence, as you intimate in chapter 10—and you, Averroes, expressly say this same thing in your eighteenth comment, and likewise in the fifteenth and others suppose this: behold, how impudently you beg in the beginning what finally you ought to prove, namely that before A and B there was a temporal priority, which necessarily, as you yourself say, follows or imports some motion. Here therefore you sin in the form of proving, and likewise in the matter: for this supposition of yours is repugnant to my true position which I posited first.

And by the same response it can easily be answered to all such things which you argue and ask in arguing: "If God made the world at A and B, then it began, this was through some new volition which he had then and not before, or on account of some new disposition in the agent or patient, or in some other way, or on account of the removal of something, which not being removed, he was unwilling to operate; or at least on account of the presence of the hour or instant in which or at which he disposed before always to make then for the first time the world and motion; and none of these was without change; therefore before B, the first change, another prior change occurred." Behold how you always suppose that before A there was changeable and long temporal succession, which you ought to prove; for I posited the opposite of this in the first place. When also you ask, or it is asked on your behalf, why God made the world at A and not before—behold how you intimate that before A there was something prior by temporal priority,

which is not true. But it is similar as if you should ask why heaven is terminated at its convexity, and not above.

It is plain likewise how that does not follow against me which you reckon a great impossibility, namely "that from an ancient will a new action proceeds immediately." For the eternal will of God, by which he made the world, is not more ancient than the world by an ancientness or property of time, but of nature; nor is the world newer or later by time than this will, but by nature. You will perhaps reply here, saying: "By the same reasoning, God is not more ancient than the world; and the world began to be and is not eternal; therefore neither is God; or if God did not begin but is eternal, the world likewise."

I concede to you that God is not more ancient than the world by an ancientness of actual time. And further when you say, "therefore God began to be," it does not follow. And if you say, "To begin to be is to be now and never before to have been; but God was at A and never before"—here I say, if you intend to define "to begin to be" convertibly through "to be now and never before to have been," and if you understand by "never before to have been" actually—namely, through no actual preceding time—you do not rightly define. Rather, "to begin to be" is "to be now and never before to have been *habitually* or *potentially*"—namely, that even if time had been before, still it would not have been in that time. And thus the world began at A; because although time had actually been before, the world would not have been in it (just as the soul of Peter was not in time before its creation). But God did not thus begin to be at A, because however much time there had been before, God necessarily would have been in it; but the fact that he was not earlier in time is because time was lacking to him, not he to time, if there had been time.

And by the same response it is plain regarding the other part of your conclusion, which is that God is not eternal. For the eternal is what is without beginning and ceasing, in the manner aforesaid. For just as the immensity of God is not determined or restricted by the fact that he is actually only in some determined place, namely in the world and not outside (according to the opinion of certain Philosophers and your own), because he would necessarily coexist universally with however much greater extent if there were any: so neither is his eternity confined by the brevity of time. If, however, you understand "eternal" not as the rest of men do, but in your own way, that is, "through all actual time," it can be conceded that the world is eternal, just as you, Aristotle, seem to define the eternal—or rather to allege the definition of it from the Ancients, in *De Caelo* I.100, saying: "This name 'eternal' was divinely uttered by the Ancients. For the limit which contains the time of each thing, of which nothing is outside according to nature, is called the eternal of each thing. According to the same reasoning, also the limit of the whole heaven, and the perfection containing all time and infinity, is the eternal, taking its denomination from 'always being.'"

I might also, according to your folly, perhaps respond to you otherwise, supposing according to your *Logic* (in *Peri Hermeneias* I) that "the verb consignifies time," and concede to you the

proposition: "God began to be"—namely, to be in time or in an instant, or temporally or instantaneously, just as he began to be Lord of time and of all temporal things whatsoever. For at A, God was instantaneously and not before; nor does it follow from this that God is not eternal but new, nor that he is changed but they (i.e., the things), as is sufficiently established from what was said before.

Furthermore perhaps you will confront me, eager to argue sophistically, that the world is altogether co-eternal with God, as I was speaking, because if God made the world at some first instant, he could have made it not at some first instant but immediately after an instant, if any instant had preceded—just as he made motion and time immediately after the first instant. And if he had thus made the world with motion and time, the world would have been eternal. For it would never have begun intrinsically nor extrinsically: for it would have been in no first instant, nor at any instant would it not have been such that immediately after that instant it would have been; rather, before any instant whatsoever it would have been, as is plain inductively concerning each instant, and now the world is not of less duration than it would have been then; therefore now it is eternal.

To this argument of sophistical folly, it would not be needful otherwise to respond, except for the counsel of the wise man, "lest such a fool, sophisticating, seem wise to himself." For such, according to the Apostle, "saying themselves to be wise, became fools." First therefore I shall chastise you with your own sword: for you posit that surfaces terminate bodies. Let it therefore be posited by the omnipotence of God, and according to the next preceding part of this work, or as you posit similar things, or at least as in many places you argue conditionally from such things, that with the whole heaven preserved its convex surface is destroyed; or let it be argued conditionally in your manner. If that surface were destroyed with the heaven preserved, the heaven would be simply infinite. For it would not be terminated intrinsically nor extrinsically, since by no surface, as is plain.

Further, however, out of abundance, I respond and say that the world is not eternal, but began to be—and this extrinsically, not actually, in the sense that some time or instant actually immediately preceded it; but habitually, as has been said before. Because if there had been eternal time, the age of the world being supposed in some instant of it, the world would necessarily have begun extrinsically; and that it did not thus actually begin is not on account of the antiquity of the world, but on account of the defect of preceding time. But perhaps not even thus will you cease to chatter, but you will say: even if before the world there was no true time, there was at least imaginary time, and the arguments proceed concerning such fictitious time, just as concerning the true.

Here, however, I say (just as you, Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* IV prove) that things do not follow imagination or estimation. Hence however much someone imagines time before the world, no time was thereby any more there before, just as on account of no imagination of anyone is there

any place or time outside the heaven, on your own testimony in *De Caelo* I.100, thus speaking: "It is therefore manifest that neither place, nor void, nor time is outside."

Furthermore, that I may confound you with greater shame, and thus, with truth itself leading, lead you back to the recognition of truth: Let it be posited according to your gross and rude imagination that before the world there was eternal succession of such kind, true or fictitious; I say then that at instant A of that succession God voluntarily produced the world, and that B—the first new change, or first new motion, which no new change preceded except perhaps the parts of that eternal succession posited by you—then began. And when you argue, "therefore God then or immediately before had some new disposition which he did not have before, by means of which he then produced the world and B, and not before; therefore that was acquired by him through some new prior change; therefore before B, the first new change, was another prior new change"—I say that this argument proceeds concerning an irrational agent, but not a rational one, as you, Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* IX.10 taught, where, the distinction of powers through rational and irrational being posited, and one difference between them assigned, you assigned another, namely that when irrational active and passive powers, with their due dispositions, are brought near to each other, it is necessary that this one act and that one suffer; but with rational powers it is not so. Which you, Averroes, there in comment 10 most plainly attest. Therefore a rational and voluntary agent most disposed to acting can wait through time and times, even through eternal time, and at length newly act without any preceding change. Therefore your progress between *Physics* VIII (where you did not see this) and *Metaphysics* IX (where you saw this and revealed it to others to see, and retracted your former defect) I greatly praise and commend.

But lest perhaps your authority on account of variation seem suspect, I shall show this same thing through reason. For if it were not so, there would be no power freely contradictorily for acting. For if there be such, let A be its first free act. Either then, with all things necessarily prerequisite and sufficient for the production of A being posited, A is necessarily produced, or not. If so, since to posit all those is not free—because A is the first free act, and with those posited A will necessarily be posited—neither will the positing of A be free, nor in the free power of the producer. Likewise, if with the free active cause posited, with all the necessary and sufficient prerequisite dispositions, the effect's being produced necessarily follows, since to posit it thus is not in its free power but somehow necessary; and in every necessary consequence, if the antecedent is necessary, the consequent will likewise be necessary, not free, and contingent: no act will freely be produced, nor will rational power be freer than irrational. For a free act is never produced except by a rational disposed cause, as has been said.

If, however, with those posited, A is not necessarily produced, then that free power, with all those things standing always uniformly in every way, can freely wait through time and times, and at length newly produce A without any preceding change which makes anything around itself. For before, it was sufficiently disposed to producing A, and now it is altogether as it was then; therefore even now it can sufficiently produce A, and through the whole intermediate time it could have produced it. And if you ask, "Why then does it produce A now and not before?"—

certain ones respond, "Because it wills." Their response I do not approve. For let A be the first free volition; then it does not produce A because it wills, by the same volition, because then the same volition would naturally precede itself; nor by another volition, because then A would not be the first, and because then the same question would return concerning that other volition, and thus would proceed infinitely.

I say therefore that he who asks "why etc." asks for a cause; the efficient cause, however, is that free power; because therefore it is an active rational and free power, it freely then produces; the final cause, however, is the end which it sets before itself in acting. I know, however, that you seek a cause which you cannot find, namely one which, being posited, determinately and necessarily it would follow—which is not true in active rational powers, as both authority and reason have taught. But supposing this as most true through that whole procedure of *Physics* VIII, you most disgracefully limp from the paths of truth. And Avicenna in *Metaphysics* IX.1, and Algazel in *Metaphysics* IV.1, likewise supposing this, fell into your opinion.

In another respect also you seem to demonstrate to yourselves most certainly, and this universally concerning every power, whether rational or irrational, as you, Averroes, in comment 9 manifestly assert. For, the first change being given, you argue that another was prior to this first one; you, Averroes, formulating Aristotle's argument thus: "Movement and mover are in the category 'in relation to something'; and since at some time this does not move and that is not moved, and after, this moves and that is moved, it is manifest that between these things a relation came to be which was not before; and every relation follows a transmutation: therefore it is necessary that before the transmutation posited there be some transmutation in the mover and in the moved, or in both, or in something extrinsic—for example, that there be some impediment which is removed."

But behold how disgracefully you rave: for when you suppose that every relation follows a prior motion or change, either you understand the consequence of relation and the priority of change as temporal or as natural. If as temporal, you suppose badly: for the relation between a rational agent and a patient does not necessarily follow a temporally preceding change, as the foregoing has taught, but sometimes arises temporally or instantaneously, and rises up together with its first action, or with its first acting, although it naturally follows after. But speaking of natural consequence and priority, you do not have even the color of slender appearance.

I have also specifically against you, Averroes, that no thinking or imagining of the presence of time or instant is necessarily required, as you in comments 8 and 15 seem to suppose. For we do many things when we least think about the presence of time, nor do we count the instants; or if this happens, we do many things not on account of the presence or imagination of this or those, just as we do not act on account of the presence of an ape or any other irrelevant things whatsoever. God however, who does nothing in any way casually, but by his infinite wisdom sweetly disposes all things, never has done, does, nor will do anything at any time or instant unless he disposed from eternity to do that thing then; and therefore from eternity he disposed to

make the world at instant A, and made it at A without any preceding transmutation, except perhaps in that eternal succession or its parts which you posit.

And when you say in comment 8 that "this discourse is not intelligible, because when the will wills to do something at some hour, it is necessary that some concupiscence arise in the will at that hour which was not before, and that concupiscence will be the proximate cause of acting at that hour, and not before; and the cause of this concupiscence is the presence of time; and the presence of time, which was not before, is necessarily a transmutation or follows transmutation; therefore concupiscence brought about through the presence of time is a transmutation outside the first transmutation given. Therefore before the first transmutation posited is another transmutation; and a sane man cannot escape this faith by the supposition of penitence":

Here I say truly that even if I were infirm in faith, or dead from every faith, except from the faith of reason alone, it would seem to me that you, sophisticating so presumptuously and so notoriously sinning impenitently in matter and in form, would be worthy of the greatest penitence. For you sin gravely, supposing that God could not do something at a certain hour which he disposed then to do, unless he then received some new disposition by means of which he then would act, which he did not have before—which is against what was shown before. You sin also mortally against the immortal and necessary truth, intimating in that comment 8 and expressly supposing in comment 15 that "for God to understand or imagine the present time" is a transmutation following transmutation—as if otherwise on his side he understands some time when it is future, and otherwise when it is present—the opposite of which the sixth part shows; and you yourself below in the same comment 8 and elsewhere, and many other Philosophers more often, are witnesses; and that the presence of time is the cause moving the divine intellect, and effecting the intellection of the present time in him—against the 7th part of this work, and against yourself plainly on *Metaphysics* XII, comment 51.

You err likewise, intimating that God otherwise on his side wills some time, or anything else, when it is future, and otherwise when it is present, just as you have erred concerning divine cognition, because then he would be mutable, against the sixth part. You suppose, moreover, that the presence of time is the cause moving the divine will, and effecting concupiscence or volition in it—against the 7th part of this work. It is settled, however, according to the foregoing, that the intellect or will of God is not moved or affected by anything posterior, nor otherwise on its intrinsic side, but in like manner in every way understands and wills something firstly future, secondly present, thirdly past; and therefore just as from eternity, by eternal cognition and volition, he knew and willed to create the world at A, so also he made it through the same cognition and volition altogether unchanged precisely; and so also in time he makes any immediate effect which he makes. And if a Christian desires a Christian witness, behold Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII.17 and 14, treating this matter.

You sin also not little in the form of proving, when you argue that before the first new transmutation given another was prior, because the presence of time which was not is a necessary

transmutation, or follows transmutation; for this is not against me. For I posited at first B as the first new transmutation, with the parts of that imaginary fictitious eternal succession excepted, which—you positing it—I admitted, if however those be new transmutations.

Lest, however, in what I said above—namely that no successive or partible temporal duration preceded the world—I should seem burdensome to Catholics, who are accustomed to hear frequently and to say that "God preceded the world long, eternally, or even infinitely," I shall show that it ought Catholically to be so said. For according to Catholic truth, nothing other than God had been before the world; and by the sixth part, God is altogether immutable; therefore nothing mutable, nor any mutability, was before the world; therefore neither any temporal succession or duration, which without some change cannot be understood. Likewise in every succession, one thing comes and another departs; but to God, on account of his every-mode immutability, nothing comes or departs. In God therefore there was no succession before the world, nor in anything else, since there was nothing else before. Likewise every such succession has greater and lesser parts, prior and posterior; but God, according to the 10th and 26th parts, has no such parts; therefore no such succession was before the world in God, nor in anything else, since there was nothing else before. Likewise, if it had been so, such parts could have been signed there, like hour, day, month, and year, just as in the time now running—although nothing had been before the world, by whose measure or comparison such distinction or measure could be made. Nor can anyone say that all these things—namely, mutability, coming and departing, partibility according to greater and lesser, prior and posterior, and measured distinction—were in pure non-being, since in pure non-being nothing whatsoever can be, except perhaps pure non-being.

Likewise every change, coming, and departing necessarily belongs to something actually changed, coming, and departing. For each of these is necessarily in some actual subject, as natural Philosophy teaches throughout: but no pure non-being is such. Nor does it appear why such things should be posited more in one non-being than in another; and they cannot be posited in any whatsoever; therefore in none. Likewise partibility, greatness, and smallness are properties of quantity and the quantitative; but non-being is not quantitative. Likewise by the same reason there would now be such temporal succession outside the heaven. Likewise it does not appear more that such successive quantity was before the world than permanent quantity; but this latter was not before the world. Likewise if before the world there was such temporal succession, God could have destroyed it before the creation of the world. Who therefore "has so known the mind of the Lord, or has been his counselor," that he can say "he did not destroy it"? Who also (I ask) can prove that it necessarily was so, since it was not necessarily so but could have not been so? Likewise if such temporal succession had been before the world, it would not have been needful to create time with the world; for that ancient succession would have sufficed. Likewise if so, it appears that it still endures with the present created time, and thus two times wholly distinct coexist, against the Philosopher in *Physics* IV expressly.

Likewise eternity alone was before the world, but in it there is no temporal succession, as is plain through Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, last prose, defining it thus: "Eternity is the whole simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life." In the explanation of which he subsequently adds: "That is rightly said to be eternal to which no future is lacking, nor has any past flowed away." Whence he expressly adds what I posited at first, thus saying: "Nor ought God to be seen as more ancient than the things created by quantity of time, but rather by the property of his simple nature."

To which Augustine agrees on that verse of Psalm 101: "Recall me not in the midst of my days; thy years are unto generation and generation," and responding, says: "[They] which do not come and pass away, nor come for this purpose, that they should not be. For all days in this time come for this purpose, that they should not be: every hour, every month, every year—none of these stands; before it has come, it will be; when it has not come, it will not be. Therefore those eternal years of thine, thy years which are not changed unto generation and generation, will be: for thy years are not one thing and thou another; but the years of God are the eternity of God, the eternity of God is his very substance, which has nothing mutable, where nothing is past as if it were not now, nothing is future as if it were not yet. There is not there except 'is'; there is not there 'was' and 'will be': because both what was now is not, and what will be not yet is; but whatever is there, only 'is.' This eternity called us, and the Word burst forth from eternity; now eternity, now the Word, and not yet time. Why not yet time? Because time was made, since 'all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing.'" And below, on that text "In the beginning, thou, O Lord, hast founded the earth," he says: "I know thy eternity, by which thou predest all things which thou hast made."

The same author in *Confessions* I.6, treating that passage of the same Psalm, "Thy years shall not fail," says that the years of God are the present day of God, which is never finished nor passes away, but our years and days pass away through that present day of God. The same author below in the same work, XII.28, says: "That something precedes another by eternity, something by time, something by election, and something by origin: by eternity, as God all things; by time, as the flower the fruit; by election, as the fruit the flower; by origin, as sound the song." The same also in *De Libero Arbitrio* III, last chapter, expounding that verse of Psalm 83: "For one day in thy courts is better than thousands," says: "That a thousand days are understood in the mutability of time, but by the name of one day the unchangeableness of eternity is called."

This whole position also Augustine seems to hold in *De Civitate Dei* XII.15, when he thus says: "These dimensions of temporal spaces—namely, hours and days, months and years, which are usually and properly called times—it is manifest, began from the motion of the stars: whence also God, when he instituted these things, said, 'Let them be for signs and times, days and years.' For where there is no creature by whose mutable motions times are accomplished, times altogether cannot be. Therefore the Angels are said always to have been, because they were at all times; but they are not on that account co-eternal with God, since time, because it runs by mutability, cannot be co-eternal with immutable eternity. Wherefore if God was always Lord, he

always had a creature serving his dominion—but not generated of himself, but made by him from nothing, nor co-eternal with him; he was indeed before it, although at no time without it, preceding it not by a transient space but by an abiding perpetuity." He does not, however, wish to affirm this opinion, which he thought ought to be done so that readers may see from what perils of questions they ought to restrain themselves, nor judge themselves fit for all things—which most learned doctrine of his I venerate and embrace with all reverence.

But here perhaps someone will object that Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XII.12 intimates that before the creation of the world there were infinite times back, in which God ceased from that creation, and afterward newly created the world. And he says in the same place: "That God's cessation from creation, eternal back, is so great, that if there be conferred with it any however great and ineffable terminated numerosity of times, it ought not to seem as great as a very brief drop of water compared to the ocean. For of these one is exceedingly small, the other indeed incomparably great, but each finite; but of those, the other is infinite, namely that cessation of God back."

Likewise by reason: otherwise God could not have made the world earlier than he made it, for nothing had been earlier. I say therefore that these and many similar things which could be adduced should be understood as: that before the world there were many years not actually but potentially, just as outside the heaven there are infinite spaces and miles, because God could have made the world earlier through however much time, and however many years; just as he can make outside the heaven spaces and miles above every terminated number. Whence Augustine himself, in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I.3, to the Manicheans asking, "If God made heaven and earth at some beginning of time, what was he doing before he made heaven and earth, what suddenly pleased him to make what he had not made through eternal times?", responds thus: "To these we respond that God made heaven and earth in the beginning of time, but in Christ, since the Word was with the Father, through whom all things were made; but even let us believe that God made heaven and earth without a beginning of time. We must indeed understand that before the beginning of time there was no time: for God made even times, and therefore before he made times, there were no times. For we cannot say that there was some time when God had not yet made anything. How then was there time which God had not made, since he himself is the fabricator of all time? And if time began to be with heaven and earth, no time can be found when God had not yet made heaven and earth." And in chapter 4 he immediately adds: "When, however, it is said, 'What suddenly pleased him,' it is said as if some times had passed in which God had wrought nothing; time could not pass before, which God had not yet made, because he cannot be the operator of times unless he is before times."

The reason that has been made argues irrationally and takes an irrational cause. For although before the world there was nothing prior by priority of time, there could nevertheless have been something through the creation of God, in which he could have likewise created the world earlier.

The other arguments of yours, Aristotle, and of Averroes, fabricated for the eternity of the world—since they scarcely attain the grade of appearance and sophistical altercation—I have judged it superfluous studiously to discuss; indeed all your arguments speaking for the eternity of the world are scarcely shaded fallaciously by even some thin color of sophistical ostentation; so that they scarcely deserve to enter into the scrutiny of disputation.

Are you not, Aristotle, impudently contemning and procaciously impugning the doctrines of your Master Plato and the rest of the prior Philosophers, and especially in this part—according to your own manner of speaking—deservedly to be called the "beater of the Fathers," as their writings and yours luculently show? Is it not for this reason that Chalcidius, on the second of Plato's *Timaeus*, says of you thus: "This man, by a certain manner of his own, when something seems good to him from a full and perfect dogma, neglects the rest with fastidious carelessness."

I shall also cite you yourself against yourself as a witness, in *De Caelo et Mundo* II.80: "They seem," you say, "to seek up to a certain point, but not indeed up to the point where doubt is possible. For this is customary to all of us: not to make the question relevant to the matter, but to him who speaks contraries." Likewise in your *Topics* I, intimating that the question of the eternity of the world is a "neuter problem," you write thus: "But there are problems concerning which there are contrary syllogisms; they have doubt whether they are so or not so, because there are verisimilar reasons on either side; and concerning which we have no reason, since they are great, judging it difficult to assign one—as whether the world is eternal or not. For someone may ask such a question." Whence Galen, in some book of his treating this matter, as Averroes recites on *De Caelo et Mundo* I, comment 22, says that no one can know whether the world is eternal or new, nor have any certitude concerning this. Whence you yourself, about to pay the debt of death, with your scholars standing by, by no means as before with pompous, garrulous, and inane ostentation, but with sincere conscience affirmed that "in your eight first books of *Physics* are found all the ways of science, by which a man can comprehend and teach principles to the ways of all methods, and know the reasons adduced upon those things which reasonably adhere to disputable matters and which dis-cohere from them, not having a right way through which something true can be known. And reasons of this kind are near to truth, even if they are not true; they are nevertheless useful, that through them may be shown the audacity of the speaker in his science, for weakening the words of his colleague and overcoming the words by the force of his science, with ordered and marvelous reasonings, since the colleague does not have the power of resisting; and this science is useful, like the scorpion in theriac, which, although it is poison, nevertheless if given to the patient, diminishes pain and provides a remedy." These things are most plainly recited in the book that is written about his death, chapter 13.

CHAPTER 35. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS AND HERETICS DENYING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONCEPTION AND BIRTH OF THE VIRGIN, AND SAYING THAT CHRIST WAS BY NO MEANS BORN OF SAINT MARY EVER VIRGIN.

Let the Philosophers and Heretics, corrupted in mind, purify themselves, who deny the possibility of virginal conception and say that Christ was by no means born of Saint Mary ever Virgin. Is not the omnipotent God—through the seventh part of this work, having a universally efficacious will according to the 8th, who can create something out of nothing, indeed even annihilate the whole world and recreate it if he wills, and create a man out of nothing according to the next preceding parts—able also without the help of a man to form a boy in a virginal womb? He also, according to the foregoing concerning the 32nd part of this work, can do and does miracles of every kind; why can he not do this miracle alone?

In the other species of animals also, whose females are accustomed commonly to conceive from the company of the male, it is sometimes found that they conceive and bear without a male, in marvelous ways. Whence Virgil in *Georgics* III thus writes:

Above all, the frenzy of mares is notable. Love drives them across Gargara, and across the sounding Ascanius; they surmount mountains and swim rivers, And immediately, when the flame is set beneath their greedy marrow More in spring, because in spring that heat returns to their bones, All turned face to the West Wind, they stand on high rocks, And catch the light breezes, and often without any Couplings, pregnant by the wind—wondrous to relate.

Nor let anyone reckon this a lie or fiction because written by Virgil the Poet. For in that book of the *Georgics* he is rather to be considered a Philosopher than a Poet, as the matter and procedure evidently show. Many Philosophers also, and Catholic Doctors, are accustomed often to allege the Poets, and even Virgil himself in the same book. Servius also, his commentator, expounding that passage, says that those mares are from Spain, and that those foetuses conceived by the wind are of shorter life than those naturally propagated.

Behold also Pliny, *Natural History* VIII, treating of the natures of horses: "It is established," he says, "in Lusitania around the town of Olisippo and the river Tagus, that mares, with the West Wind blowing, turning toward it, conceive a living spirit; and this becomes their offspring, and is born most swift, but does not exceed three years of life." With which Solinus also, *De Mirabilibus Mundi* IV, treating of Spain and its things, accordingly writes thus: "In Lusitania there is the promontory Artabrum, others call it Olisipponense. This distinguishes sky, lands, and seas; it is the limit of Spain, of the sky on the side, and divides the seas in this manner: that from its circuit begin the Gallic Ocean, and the northern fountain terminating in the Atlantic Ocean and the West. There is the town of Olisippo founded by Ulysses; there they prefer the Tagus to other rivers on account of its golden sands. In the regions near Olisippo, mares wanton, with marvelous fecundity. For with the West Wind blowing, they conceive, and being thirsty, are wedded by the spirit of the breezes." And below, in chapter 10, treating of Cappadocia and its horses, he thus says: "Mares also bring forth those conceived by the winds, but these never extend their age beyond three years."

Behold also the greater Philosopher than these, in *De Animalibus* V.2, thus says: "Partridges, if they have stood with the wind, the females are made pregnant by the males; and frequently also

by voice, if they have shown themselves desirous, and from those flying over by the male's blowing." Behold here a triple conception of the female without a male: by wind, by voice, by blowing. Which Solinus also briefly touches in *De Mirabilibus Mundi* III, where he treats of the third gulf of Europe and the partridges: "Lust," he says, "agitates them so that if a wind has blown from the males, they become pregnant by the odor."

If therefore in other species the female by the power of nature can conceive without a male, why in the human species cannot a pure virgin female conceive without a male, by divine power incomparably exceeding all the powers of created nature? And if it is possible by divine power for a female without a man or virile seed to conceive, who shall presume to deny that Christ was conceived and born by divine power of Saint Mary, ever and continuously remaining Virgin—especially since the most clear testimonies touched on in the demonstration of the 32nd part of this work, and many similar things, most clearly show this?

Did not the heavens also narrate this glory of God, and announce this his justice to the people, when heaven and earth were moved through one most worthy conjunction, a little before the desired Christ came to all the Gentiles? For he who "extends the heaven like a skin, and folds it up like a book"—in which, as the Philosophers attest, future things are figuratively described, in which also nothing is described idly, as no one denies—to designate what other thing did he describe in heaven the figure and sign of the glorious Virgin nourishing a boy?

Concerning this Virgin and her pure boy, Albumasar, following the doctrine of the ancient Chaldeans, in *Maius Introductorium* VI, *differentia* 1, says that "in the first face—namely, the first third—of Virgo, there rises a girl whom we call *Celchinus Dorastora*; and she is a virgin, beautiful, honest, and pure, of long hair and beautiful face, having in her hand two ears of grain; and she sits upon a strewn seat, and nourishes a boy, giving him to eat in a place which is called in Arabic *Ius*, and certain peoples call this boy Jesus; and there rises with her a man sitting upon the same seat."

What do these things signify? What do they portend? For God said in the creation of the heavenly luminaries: "Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, and let them divide the day and the night, and let them be for signs." That constellation also is commonly called the sign of the Virgin. A sign is said relatively with reference to the thing signified; what therefore does this sign signify? What better, what fitter, what more becoming than that one pure virgin, continuously remaining a virgin, would bring forth a heavenly boy and nourish him with her milk? For if a woman, first virgin, afterward according to the course of nature deflowered, should conceive, bear, and nourish a boy—what kind of sign would this be? What great, what marvelous, what extraordinary thing would it designate? By what reason would the sign of such a signified thing be so gloriously placed in heaven, to be contemplated by the eyes of all, when it would figure nothing unusual? For it daily happens thus, nor would that sign reasonably be called "Virgin," but rather "Woman" or "Matron." Therefore this is not the sign of this signified, but of another aforesaid.

Whence also that most sharp-sighted Isaiah: "The Lord himself," he says, "shall give you a sign: behold, a Virgin shall conceive and shall bear a Son, and his name shall be called Immanuel; butter and honey shall he eat." What kind of sign, I pray, would it be if a deflowered virgin should conceive? And why would it be said that "the Lord himself shall give a sign" if he himself were not doing something above the course of nature? For man and woman according to the course of nature would procreate a son. The man, however, sitting upon the seat with her—does he not aptly signify her spouse, who, although she remained perpetual virgin, nevertheless for many honest causes received a husband, according to the prophecy of the Sibyl recited in the demonstration of the thirty-second part above?

Nor is it to be reckoned without mystery that the aforesaid sign of the Virgin is placed sixth in order among the celestial signs. For through this it designates its signified, future in the sixth age of the world. This number, however, is perfect, on the testimony of Boethius in *Arithmetica* I.22; therefore also this age is "the perfect fullness of time." With this drawing nearer, there occurred one greatest and incomparably glorious conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter at the beginning of Aries, with the change of the watery triplicity to the fiery, six years and a few days and hours before the advent of Christ. Which if anyone wishes to have precisely and demonstratively, he can easily by reckoning their motions, or more easily by a table recently made for this and all such conjunctions. Mercury, the Lord of Virgo (which sign was then ascending at that time), presided over that conjunction; through all of which was perspicuously signified the aforesaid signified of the sign Virgo then to be future—namely, a heavenly boy to be born of a virgin, who would be the greatest of Prophets and would deliver a new law.

Nor is it to be passed over wholly in silence that "Mercury" is interpreted as "illuminating the meeting of the sign"—and of what sign more than its own proper sign? But this is Virgo, on account of his many dignities in it, as all Astrologers attest. Mercury is also interpreted "discourse" [*sermo*], and is called "running between," than which figure what is more fitting than the Word of God, the middle Person, the Mediator of God and men?

If however anyone wishes to accept the testimony of that Ovid, *De Vetula*, for authority or for pleasure in this part, behold, in book 3 of *De Vetula*, speaking generally of such great conjunctions, and especially of this one, he writes thus:

One indeed of such kind, in a felicitous time, recently In the twice-twelfth year of Caesar Augustus From the newness of his reign, occurred, which signified That after six years a Prophet ought to be born, Without intercourse of a male, of a Virgin, whose figure is held Where the force of Mercury is most multiplied. Whose first complexion will be concordant with the future Sect: For nowhere among the signs does Mercury so dominate As in the sign of Virgo: there Is his house, exaltation, and triplicity Throughout the whole sign, and also his term In the first seven degrees; and the figure of the said Prophet Is held there, although under enigma; for In those images which are described by the Indians, And by the wise men of the Chaldeans and of Babylon, It is said from the writings of the ancients to ascend first. In the face of Virgo, a Virgin

of long hair, Pure indeed, and of great spirit, and of great beauty, Of much honesty, and in her hands are Ears of grain suspended, and old garments. On a strewn seat she sits, she nourishes a boy, to the boy giving Ius To eat; this boy a certain people calls Jesus. This part of heaven was rising in the hour In which with Saturn the holy conjunction of Jupiter occurred, Signifying the sect, and they changed Their triplicity, and also near the point Of spring, where the greatest conjunction could occur At the beginning of the sign, if perhaps it had been nearer. Then also there were three hundred and five years of the Greeks, And nine months, with nearly thrice six days: Happy he to whom such great conjunction was fully open.

And many other things concerning the excellence of this Prophet and his sect, faith, or law.

Nor is it a marvel if God, about to be born in human form in the manner of human nativity, willed by certain blessed presagings and glorious testimonies to be visibly demonstrated to all from heaven, that thus he might premonstrate to all generally, by a great and admirable indication, so great and admirable an effect, salutary to all generally—just as also a marvelous star indicated the marvelous Nativity of Christ, as the demonstration of the 32nd part touched. Nor is it that, because such a constellation or such a conjunction preceded Christ, therefore Christ was to be born of a virgin or to give a law; but rather the contrary. For these were not the cause of those things, but the sign; nor on that account is the Lord of stars and times subjected to them, but they to him. For by the first supposition, the 8th part, and the Philosophers themselves attesting, all heavenly things together, and singly separately, inviolably always observe the divine statutes, and serve his will in all things.

Nor ought it to move anyone that this Virgin is described among the Chaldeans in one way recited above, and according to the Indians and others otherwise. For the celestial images are variously described by various peoples, according to the assumption or rejection of other stars, or according to other and other ordering of the same stars, as their books on images manifestly indicate. Whence Albumasar, where above, says: "Certain wise men of one region differ from other wise men of another region in the creation of these images, and in the figures and being of them; and we find this in three ways." In the description of the Virgin afore-tasted, however, the Ancients of the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians equally agreed, Albumasar in the same place promising in these words: "And first we shall begin to narrate the images upon which the Ancients of the Persians, and Babylonians, and Egyptians agreed; after these we shall narrate that in which the wise men of the Indians concurred." And the aforesaid description of the Virgin is the first which he narrates, where also, according to the procedure promised, he subjoins: "And according to the Indians there rises in this face a girl, a Virgin, having upon her a linen sheet, and old garments in her hand, and her hands suspended, and she standing in the middle of *Mirceti*, wishing to come to the dwellings of her Fathers, and her friends, to seek garments and ornaments." According to Ptolemy, however, in *Almagest* VII.4, this Virgin is described as standing erect and winged; but as he himself there testifies, in this he discords from the prior ones, positing the longitude of the Virgin which they posited her latitude. For otherwise, as he says, the latitude would exceed the longitude, which is not becoming. Nevertheless, although this

may seem unbecoming in a standing woman, in a woman, however, sitting upon a strewn seat and nourishing a boy, this need not be reckoned unbecoming. The truth is, however, that the description of the Virgin according to the Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians aforesaid he neither recites nor amends. But should it not, I ask, be reasonably presumed that so many and such great wise men, agreeing, would more aptly figure this glorious Virgin than Ptolemy alone, discording from these and others—especially since he seems wholly not to have seen this figuration of theirs? Yet none of the figures premised is empty of great mystery.

That, however, these afore-tasted Astrological things may appear more credible to all, concerning the Inventors, Authors, and Doctors of Astrology, Astronomy, and other such arts, a little must be discoursed. In these arts indeed the sons of Seth shone greatly: Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Solomon, and other Holy Fathers, as very many Histories attest. For Josephus writes in *Antiquities* I.1, that "Seth, when he had been nourished and come to the age in which he could now discern those things which are good, applied himself to virtue; and when he had been an excellent man, he left behind sons imitators of himself. They all, when they had been born good, dwelling in the same land without any vexation, lived most felicitously, and nothing cruel came to them up to the term of life. They first invented the discipline of heavenly things and their adornment; and lest the things which seemed to have been invented by them should slip away from men, or perish before they came to recognition—since Adam had foretold an extermination of all things, one to come by the force of fire, the other indeed by the violence and multitude of waters—making two columns, the one indeed of bricks, the other indeed of stones, they inscribed both with the things they had invented; that even if the one constructed of bricks should be exterminated by rains, the stone one remaining might furnish to men the writings to know; and at the same time, because they had also placed the one of bricks, which along with the stone one remains until now in the land of Syria."

The Philosopher also in *Secretum Secretorum*, part 2, ch. 1, says: "The exalted and glorious God ordained the manner and remedy for the temperance of the humors, and for the conservation of health, and for very many other things to be acquired; and revealed these things to the holy Prophets, his servants, and his just Prophets, and to certain others whom he pre-elected and illumined with the spirit of divine wisdom; and endowed them with the endowments of knowledge. From these the following men had the principate and origin of Philosophy: the Indians, and the Persians, and the Greeks, and the Latins drew from these, and wrote down the principles and secrets of arts and sciences; for in their Scriptures nothing false, nothing reprobable is found, but what is approved by the wise."

And below, ch. 26, he says: "It is worthy, Alexander, that you know the great medicine which is called *gloria inaestimabilis* [the inestimable glory], which is also called the treasure of the Philosophers. I indeed have never perceived nor truly known who invented it. For some assert that Adam was its inventor; others, however, say that Aesculapius and Hermogenes, the Physician Hirfos, and Donastios, and Vatildos the Hebrews, and Dioris and Carans, the glorious Philosophers, who are eight, to whom it was given to know the secrets of the sciences which lay

hidden from all men. These are they who inquired into and disputed concerning those things which are above nature, concerning the Full, the Void, the Finite, the Infinite, and concordantly agreed in the confection of this inestimable Medicine, which they divided into 8 parts. Some indeed affirm this, that Enoch knew this secret through a vision; for they wish to say that this Enoch was the great Hermogenes, whom the Greeks much commend and praise, and to whom they attribute every secret and heavenly science."

Whence in the Prologue to the book of Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus *On the World and Heaven*, it is written in this manner: "We read in the ancient histories of divine things that there were three Philosophers, of whom the first was Enoch, who was also called Hermes, and by another name Mercurius. The second was Noah, who likewise was called Hermes. The third indeed was called Hermes Mercurius Triplex, because he flourished as King and Philosopher and Prophet. For he, after the flood, with highest equity held the kingdom of Egypt, and prevailed in liberal and mechanical arts; and first elucidated Astronomy; and completed with luculent work the golden rod, the book of latitude and longitude, the book of election, the *Ezich* on the equation of the planets, and on the Astrolabe, and many other things."

Josephus moreover in *Antiquities* I.2, speaking of the longitude of the life of Noah and of the other Fathers of those Ancient times, says: "They, since they were religious and made by God himself, and since foods more opportune for a greater time were prepared for them, lived through such circles of years; and afterward, on account of the virtues and glorious utilities which they continually scrutinized—that is, Astrology and Geometry—God granted them ampler spaces of living, which they could never have learned out unless they should live six hundred years; for through so many years' courses a great year is fulfilled."

In the little book *On the Death of Aristotle*, ch. 9, it is also referred according to the opinion of Melon, the disciple of Aristotle, which his Master also greatly commended, that up to the advent of Noah, men estimating the Sun and Moon and other stars to be moved of themselves, and therefore to be the first movers simply, and gods, served them as gods according to various idols (concerning which the eleventh part also touched). Noah however was the first who knew the creator of the spheres, and that he is the principle of every motion; and he himself had the science and highest grade of these things.

Albumasar also in *Maius Introductorium* V, *differentia* 11, says that "in the histories of the ancient divine things it is found that Noah, the Prophet to be venerated, first of all populated Babylon after the flood, and instituted the Babylonians or Chaldeans; and all the Chaldeans were wise in the number of stars and the science of Judgments, and they flowed together to their Doctors from all climates for love of learning; and according to the assertion of certain ones, Shem the son of Noah taught these men first this science of the stars."

This testimony of Albumasar and similar ones, however, seems worthy of greater faith because he knew many histories, as that Introductory book proves in many places. Indeed he himself was one of the Historiographers, Haly saying on the first of Ptolemy's *Quadripartitum*: "We know

that Albumasar, before he read Astronomy, was one of those who made Chronicles, as we find in writings."

Concordantly with this, that Ovid of *De Vetula*, in book 3, *On the Science and Judgments of the Stars*, thus says:

These things wrote that prior Prophet Noah, to be venerated, And his firstborn son Shem taught.

In the little book *On the Death of Aristotle*, ch. 9, it is likewise recited that after Noah was born Abraham, who was wiser than all and attained to the highest grade of Prophecy; and he knew that the Sun and Moon and all the stars had a first mover, and therefore did not follow the way of his Father and his generation, who adored idols. This Abraham himself, as Josephus relates in *Antiquities* I.5, "was exceedingly understanding in all things, and wise in those things which he had heard, and concerning whatsoever he might think anything; on which account also by the power of prudence he was greater than others, and prevailed to renew and change the opinion which all then had concerning God. He therefore first presumed to pronounce God the one Creator of all things; but the rest, although they tend to felicity, he confessed to be given by the precept of him who furnishes each thing, and not to subsist by their own power. These things he conjectured through the passion of earth and sea, and those things which happen around the Sun and Moon, and from all things which around heaven always come about. For with virtue present in them, and the providence of their ordering, he taught that all things were disposed; whichever might be deprived of which would be made manifest, that neither could the things necessary to our utility have been possessed by their own power—which, namely, are ministered according to the strength of the one commanding, to whom alone it is good to give honor and the action of thanks."

Of this noble Abraham also, Berosus and Hecataeus, Historiographers of the Chaldeans, make mention, Josephus saying where above: "But Berosus mentions our Father Abraham, not indeed naming him, but thus saying: 'After the flood in the tenth generation, among the Chaldeans there was a certain just and great man, expert in heavenly things.' Hecataeus also did somewhat more for the memory of him: for composing a book about him he left it behind." And below in the same place: "He conferred Arithmetic upon the Egyptians, and the things which are of Astrology he himself delivered. For before the advent of Abraham into Egypt, the Egyptians were wholly ignorant of these things. For from the Chaldeans these things, planted, are born in Egypt; whence also they are known to have come to the Greeks."

Solomon also, divinely inspired, as is plain from 1 Kings 3 and 2 Chronicles 1, received from the Lord such great wisdom and intelligence and knowledge, that no one before him was similar to him, nor after him. Concerning whom in 1 Kings 3 it is written: "The Lord also gave Solomon wisdom, and prudence exceedingly much; and the wisdom of Solomon surpassed the wisdom of all the easterners and of the Egyptians, and he was wiser than all men." Concerning whom Josephus also in *Antiquities* VIII.2 says: "That God gave him intellect and wisdom, such as no other man had—neither of Kings nor of private men—so that he excelled even the ancient men,

and not even compared to the Egyptians (who are said to differ from all in wisdom) was he little or less, whose wisdom indeed greatly preceded theirs. He composed, however, books five, and four thousand. For no nature unknown or unexamined did he pass over, but he philosophized concerning all things, and excellently expounded their discipline and property."

By the most learned doctrines of these Fathers, divinely illumined, the later Philosophers, informed, wrote down these glorious sciences, and superadded certain other things in some manner not wholly alien, because derived from those first fountains, according to what Aristotle himself recited above. The books of these venerable Fathers, however, perhaps the pride of certain sophistical Philosophers destroyed, or changed the titles, that they might steal the glory of the inventors; or perhaps too great antiquity of time abolished them. Is not also in our sacred books the Prophecy of that very Enoch, the seventh from Adam, solemnly alleged, of which nevertheless the writing is by no means found?

Chapter 36

AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND SADDUCEES, WHO SAY THAT THERE IS NO SPIRIT, AND WHO IRRATIONALLY DENY ALSO THE IMMORTALITY OF THE RATIONAL SOUL; AND AGAINST AVERROES, WHO MAINTAINS THAT ALL MEN HAVE ONE SINGLE RATIONAL SOUL.

Let the Epicureans and Sadducees be cured and healed, who say that there is no incorporeal spirit and who irrationally deny the immortality of the rational soul; and let Averroes be turned aside, who maintains that all men have one single rational soul. These men, however, seem to have been those Ancients—or imitators of those—who, as the Philosopher recounts in various places, posited only material things and matter, and sensibles and sense, denying intellect, or [holding] it to be itself a body or a corporeal form, and therefore affirming it to be corruptible, and on this account placing the highest good in bodily pleasures, just as a pig in mire, so they wallowed themselves in pleasures of this kind. Concerning Epicurus, whom philosophers named "the pig," and concerning his swinish followers, the books of philosophers and grammarians make frequent mention. Concerning the Sadducees, however, it should be known that Josephus, in *The Jewish War* Book 2, and *Jewish Antiquities* Book 18, chapter 3, says that among the Jews there were four philosophies, or species of philosophers: the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes (or Essenoi), and the Judaic [school named] from a certain leader of theirs Judas, or Libertines, because they fought for liberty, who for this reason are also called Sicarii in Book 7 of *The Jewish War*. Concerning the second of these, in Book 2 of *The Jewish War*, he says: "The Sadducees are the second collection," and in *Jewish Antiquities* 18.3: "The Sadducees consider souls to be mortal, and to perish together with the body." Moreover, our sacred books also make mention both of the Epicureans and of the Sadducees. Concerning the aforesaid opinion of Averroes, however, it is sufficiently established in his exposition on Book 3 *On the Soul*, comment 5, and in others following.

But how is there no incorporeal spirit, when according to the eighth and tenth parts God is proven to be an incorporeal spirit? For what should an incorporeal spirit be called, if not an incorporeal rational substance? This spirit, moreover, most omnipotent, having a will universally efficacious according to the seventh and eighth parts—why, according to the thirty-third and thirty-fourth parts, can He not, and could He not have, created and made other spirits like Himself, just as He has created other natures unlike Himself: those indeed loosed from bodies, whom we call Angels; but those joined to bodies, whom we call rational souls; and both species immortal? If therefore this whole thing is possible, why should it be denied to be so, since this is more in accordance with divine bounty and manifold goodness, as the first Supposition and the parts following have plainly taught? Especially since this is renowned among all great philosophers, truly philosophers, among every faith and sect, and among nearly all men, especially since it is fortified by reasons, and is scarcely impugned by the slender shadow of a reason, according to what was said before about the thirty-second and thirty-third parts of this work. How many and how varied are the most certain experiences which prove there are many spirits? Do not even the magic arts, though evil, teach that there are spirits, just as was touched on above concerning the thirty-second and twenty-first parts?

Who, however, does not know that the petty opinion of Averroes is empty, false, foolish, and fabricated, having no verisimilitude or probability? For which reason it is to be labored over with less concern; nevertheless, lest it boast itself altogether untouched, it seems at least to deserve to be refuted in passing. Who therefore, attentive to the prior matters diligently, does not clearly see that God can impart individual souls to individual men? This indeed accords better with God and with nature. For why would God give abundantly to other more imperfect species, which neither know God, nor love Him, nor worship Him, individual souls and proper natural forms to each one, while to men—much nobler, knowing, loving, and worshipping God in nature—to all together He should give most sparingly only one? Why should He ordain it thus rather of men than of vegetables, of other animals, or of the heavenly bodies? What reason or what cause [could there be], when concerning similar things one ought similarly to judge?

Furthermore, according to the thirty-first part, God will reward every one of His worshippers fully and abundantly, which He does not do in the present life, as is plain; therefore He will do so in the future life. And by no means [will He reward] His despisers and worshippers equally, nor all His worshippers equally, just as they have not equally merited. Therefore individual men have individual souls, by which after death they may be rewarded or punished, as is fitting, individually. Do not even you yourself, on that passage of the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1.16, concerning the happy man, [say] that "we all judge a man truly good and wise to bear fortunes becomingly," and so you say, as it is said of Job, "To whom be salvation"? For why would you pray for the salvation of Job deceased, unless you hoped that his soul, and the souls of virtuous men, would after death be saved according to the requirement of their merits?

Further, concerning the rewarding or recompense of men in the present life: that with which God rewards the virtuous in the present life is to be placed rather in the soul than in the body. But if

there is only one soul of all, whatever such reward or punishment one man receives, all the rest receive likewise. According to this senseless opinion also, if one man had perfect happiness or perfect misery in the soul, all would have it together at the same time, and all would simultaneously be perfectly happy and miserable; and consequently neither happy nor miserable—which no one would concede unless he were miserable. How, moreover, would God, wise, just, and powerful, dispense His greatest rewards so improvidently? Does not the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1.14 say thus: "If there is some other gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness too is given by God, and most of all of human goods, the more so as it is the best. But this seems to belong even to the most divine things. For the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best, and something divine and blessed." And below at 18: "We call the gods blessed and happy, and the most divine of men we call blessed." On which passage you yourself, Averroes, [say]: "We refer the deified and the elect among men to happiness." And below, at the end of that first [book], thus you say: "Thanks be to God, the giver of wisdom and the bestower of happiness."

Furthermore, if by the supreme omnipotence of God all men, both happy and miserable, should die with no survivor, the rational soul being preserved, either it would itself be miserable or blessed; why one rather than the other? Nor could it simultaneously be miserable and blessed.

Further, according to the harmonious judgment of the philosophers, Nature is the principle of motion and rest of that whose nature it is, and nature, which is form, is the effective principle of these. The rational soul also is the nature of man and his form; therefore it is the effective principle of all human motions and acts. Who doubts that it is itself of finite power? And therefore of finite and determinate power in acting. If therefore it then moves locally the body of one man as much as it can, and to the utmost of its power, how can it simultaneously move similarly another such body of another man with equal velocity, and a third body, and a fourth, and so on beyond every limit and measure—indeed, infinite bodies, if infinite men were posited? How, moreover, could any finite mover move through itself diverse moved things totally separated and entirely unconnected? Does not Aristotle, your god, and you, his worshipper, in *Metaphysics* 12, argue from the number of celestial motions to the number of moving Intelligences? If, however, one single soul suffices for moving all human bodies—very heavy, very resistant, and very difficult to move, so many, so disorderly, and so unconnected to each other—why, by similar reasoning—indeed by much greater—does not one Intelligence suffice for moving all the heavenly bodies, which are alien to such conditions, since they are few, best ordered to each other and connected? And not only the heavenly bodies now existing, but more and greater however many were posited, just as one soul suffices for moving equally bodies of men beyond every number and measure? According to your judgment, however, if one further star were added to some heavenly orb, its mover would not move it at all, or would move it with fatigue and toil, or more slowly.

In a similar manner one can argue concerning the operations more proper to the rational soul, namely concerning intellection, volition, memory, recollection, syllogizing, and the like. For how

does one finite and small soul suffice all at once for such operations, so many, so varied and diverse, no less for any number of such things at once than for one separately? Does not certain experience teach, and do not all the philosophers attest, that one operation of the soul either impedes or expels another? How then can the same soul perform so many actions, so varied and contrary, all at once and most perfectly? Is not such a soul, finite and very small—just as it is of finite entity and nature—likewise of finite capacity? How then can it at one and the same time take in and hold so many intellections, volitions, memories, syllogisms, and such things without limit, without end?

Further, just as Avicenna, *On the Soul* 5.3, and Algazel, *Physics* 4, last [section], refute this heresy: if there were the same soul of all, there would also be the same knowledge of all, nor would anything be known by one which was not known by another. Indeed, if there were the same soul of all, since all knowledge of man is in the soul as in a subject, and in every man there is a rational soul, in every man there is all human knowledge, every habit, and likewise every act inhering in the rational soul. Therefore every man has every habitual knowledge, and likewise actual, which any other man has—the contrary of which we seem most certainly to experience in ourselves. For why, if I had the brightest light in my house or in my bodily eye, could I not behold it with the eye of the body? Or if I could, why not similarly concerning the brightest light of the sciences in the house or eye of the spirit, and the eye of my mind? For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 1.7: "As sight is in the body, so intellect in the soul." Why, moreover, if I had a manifold treasure in my material treasury, could I not draw out from it what I willed? Or if I could, why from my treasury and treasure incomparably more manifold and spiritual—closer, more proper, and more subject to my power—can I not, if I will, even though I strive with all my strength, draw out one iota? By common experience teaching, and according to the harmonious judgment of Aristotle, of yourself, and of other philosophers, he who has a habit can use it when he wills. Why therefore can not every man, since he has every habitual knowledge and every scientific habit actually, use any one at the pleasure of will?

Does not the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 2, last [chapter], inquiring how principles known to us come about—whether their habits, when they are not present, come to be in us; or whether, when they are present, they lie hidden—reproving the second member, says thus: "If indeed therefore we have them, it is unfitting; for it happens that one having the most certain cognitions of principles in demonstrating may lie hidden." He also seems to think the same in *Problems*, particle 30.2 and 4. He also says in *On the Soul* 3.14 thus: "In some way the intellect is the intelligibles in potency, but in act nothing before it understands; but it is necessary that it be thus, just as in a tablet on which nothing is actually written"—which indeed happens to the intellect. Where the text which you expound has thus: "What happens to the intellect ought to run with a similar course, namely as a tablet which is fitted for painting, not actually painted at all." How great a weight of authority the words of Aristotle have, and especially in this part, you yourself in that comment 14 plainly testify, affirming that all those who hold the intellect to be simple, impassible, abstract, and not mixed with body do not believe except because Aristotle said so,

"since this is so difficult, by God." "If the discourse of Aristotle were not found in him, then it would be very difficult to fall upon this, or perhaps impossible, unless someone such as Aristotle were found. For I believe that this man was the rule in nature, and is the exemplar which nature found to demonstrate the ultimate human perfection in natures." And below, at 36, speaking of the labor of Avempace, on the question of the continuation of the agent intellect with man, [a labor] so diligent and unsparing that the question did not depart from his thought even for the time of one blink of an eye, and of the other difficulties and ambiguities concerning that question, you say thus: "The cause of this ambiguity and labor is that we find no discourse from Aristotle on this intention." You also write thus on *Physics* 1, in the prologue: "The name of the Author is Aristotle, son of Nicomachus, the wisest of the Greeks, who composed other books in this art, and in Logic, and in Metaphysics, and he discovered and completed these three arts. He discovered, because whatever was discovered by the Ancients in this science is not worthy to be a part of this; he completed, because no one of those who have followed him up to this time, which is fifteen hundred years, has added anything, nor found error in his words; and that such virtue should exist in one individual would be miraculous and strange, and this disposition, when it is found in one man, would be more worthy to be called divine than human."

How then do you understand or expound the words of this divine man, of so great an Author, so canonical and so authentic? Do you not, in the aforementioned comment 14, expounding the example of the Philosopher comparing the intellect existing in potency to an unwritten, unpainted tablet, say thus: "When he had made known the manner of passion in the intellect, he began to give an example from sensible things, through which this intention is understood in the material intellect; and although it is not true, nevertheless it is a way to understanding, and that mode of teaching is necessary in such matters, although it is rhetorical." But how viperous a gloss is yours, which gnaws at its own text! How impudent an exposition, which expels its own text! How petulant a son, who says to his father, "You lie!" Who are you? Of what authority? Or of how great, that you should contradict so great a Philosopher, especially since you bring forward neither any greater authority, nor any reason compelling any rational animal—or even probably moving it—on your side, as is very easy to see when the first supposition and the parts following are understood. With what temerity therefore, with what blindness, with what audacity, indeed with what madness, did you presume so impudently to babble against so great a man, so great a Philosopher, so renowned, since (by your own testimony) there is no error in his words? Indeed, how senseless you are made, since you do not perceive yourself contradicting yourself, while you so commend Aristotle and yet contradict him! Who therefore will believe you? For when a greater Author and a lesser contradict, to which is one rather to adhere? Who doubts but that to the greater? And who does not know that Aristotle is greater than you?

I fear therefore that very many in this part have raved very greatly because they looked more diligently upon your writing and neglected the writings of Aristotle. Do you not yourself on *On the Soul* 3, comment 30, speaking of the erring Avempace, say thus: "What made this man err, and us also for a long time, is that the moderns lay aside the books of Aristotle and consider the

books of the expositors, especially in *On the Soul*, believing that this book is impossible to be understood"? Does not the same Philosopher in the same Book 3, in many places, say that the intellective soul is passible and receptive of species, and has all intelligibles, and the species of all things, in potency, not in act? And therefore he proves that it necessarily needs another intellect, namely an agent intellect, which may perfect its potentiality and lead it forth to act. Does he not, in that same Book 3, comment 5, say that the intellective soul has no nature except a passible one, nor is any intelligible actually before it understands it in act? Are not his words these: "Nor does it have its [proper] nature, nor is it one [thing], but it is what is before this called possible; thus is the intellect of the soul. I call intellect that by which the soul opines and understands; it is nothing in act of the things which are, before it understands." Where the text you expound has thus: "It will not have a nature except this, that it is possible. That therefore of the soul which is called Intellect—and I call intellect that by which we distinguish and cogitate—is in act none of the beings before it understands."

And the Philosopher here is speaking of an intellect similar to that below at 37, where he says: "Now, recapitulating what has been said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in some way all the things that are. For [things] either are sensibles, or intelligibles. And science indeed is in some way the knowables, sense the sensibles." And it follows at 38: "How this is, must be inquired. Science and sense, then, are divided according to things; that which is in potency is in those things which are in potency; that which is in act is in those things which are in act. The sensitive part of the soul, and that which can know, are these in potency: this indeed the knowable, that the sensible. It is necessary, however, that they be either the things themselves, or the species. Indeed they are not the things themselves; for the stone is not in the soul, but the species. Wherefore the soul is just as the hand; for the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the intellect is the species of species, and sense the species of sensibles—truly in potency, not in act." Wherefore also above at 6, he says thus: "They are speaking well who say the soul is the place of species; except that not the whole, but the intellective; nor in act, but in potency, the species." And below at 8 he shows that the soul is said to be knowing or to know in potency in two ways: namely, remotely and proximately, that is, by remote or essential potency, such as is in a man before he learns; and by proximate or actual potency, such as is in one having knowledge in habit but not using it in act, from which potency it can by itself proceed to act. Whence he says thus: "When this [intellect], namely, knows individual things, it is said to be knowing indeed according to act; this happens at once when it can operate through itself; it is then in some way still in potency, however not in like manner as before learning or discovering."

He also writes below at 17 thus: "Since, however, just as in every nature there is something—this indeed matter, in each genus, and this is in potency all those things—and another, the cause and effective [principle], which by making all things, like art toward matter, has sustained, it is necessary that these differences also be in the soul." And immediately at 18: "And the intellect is one such, in which to become all things, the other in which to make all things." This whole judgment also Avicenna, Algazel, and almost all other philosophers plainly hold. If therefore

these things are so, how do you presume to assert as false that the Intellect, before it understands, is just as a tablet on which nothing is actually written or painted? Indeed, because this is true, what you say is false and foolish: namely, that all speculative intelligibles, all species, all sciences, all habits, all acts, and universally all and each of the possibles are there written actually and eternally, are there painted actually and eternally, are there actually and eternally. Do you not in that comment 5 say thus: "When it shall have been considered concerning these intelligibles, insofar as they are beings simply, not in respect of any individual, they are truly said to be eternal, and not to be understood at one time and at another not, but always; since [it is held that] for wisdom to be in some manner proper to man is just as for the manner of the arts to be in manners proper to man. It is judged that it is impossible that the whole habitation should flee from Philosophy, just as it is to be opined that it is impossible that it should flee from natural arts. For if some part of it should lack them, namely the arts—for example, the northern quarter of the earth—the other quarters will not lack them; for it has been declared that habitation is possible in the southern part as in the northern part. Perhaps therefore Philosophy is found in the greater part of the substance at every time." And below at 20: "The intellect which is called material, according to what we have said, it does not happen that at one time it understands and at another not, except in respect of the stronger imagination of those existing in each individual, not in respect of the species; for example, that it does not happen to it that at one time it equally understands an intelligible and at another not, except in respect of Socrates and Plato; similarly, however, in respect of the species, it always understands this universal, unless the human species should fail altogether—which is impossible."

Did not Plato in the *Meno* posit similarly in some way that all knowledge is always in the soul of every one, but lies hidden? Wherefore he is reproved by Aristotle. Why therefore are you not similarly to be reproved? If, moreover, it were so, what would be the office of the agent intellect? What would it do concerning the possible intellect? How would it help? For it produces no species, no intention, no cognition in it, since all species, intention, and cognition, just as also all the rest of the things it has, persevere actually and eternally in it. How then do the philosophers, and you yourself, say that it is the [office] of the agent intellect to denude and abstract the material intentions to immateriality, and so to transfer them from order to order, from materiality to immateriality, from the imagination, which is a material power, into the possible intellect, which is an immaterial power, and so finally to make that which is intellect in potency to be intellect in act?

I know that you will say this is true with respect to the individual, not with respect to the species or the human intellect simply. But what, I ask, does the agent intellect operate in the individual demonstrated? For the intention denuded by it is not transferred nor enters into the possible intellect, by what was said before; therefore it remains in the material power; wherefore it is also material as before, although perhaps a little more subtle than before. Which, however, considered subtly, does not seem to be said—since immediately in the very instant of sensation and imagination, anything whatever is understood, as we all commonly experience. And your master

in *On the Soul* 3.28 says: "To sense is similar to mere saying and understanding"—a judgment which you also there most plainly profess. And [is it not so] that with the imagined intention remaining gross and rude, just as it flows in from the object, yet with the intention proper to the thing being had in the intellect, the man could understand? Why could he not? Further, what necessity is there of positing an agent intellect for slightly subtilizing the material phantasmal intention? Why does not, as in other animals, imagination alone suffice? Why do you not in like manner posit an agent intellect for subtilizing the intentions of other powers? Who, moreover, reading and not neglecting the books of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Themistius, Avempace, Avicenna, Algazel, and other philosophers, would say that the agent intellect is necessary to man because it slightly subtilizes the material intentions of the imagination, while yet they remain material, and remain as before in the material phantasmal power, and not rather for the effect recited above?

Further, the intentions, propositions, discourses, and conclusions, and the other habits and acts in the rational soul, which according to you always actually exist, are either finite in number or simply infinite. Not simply infinite, since it itself is simply finite, of finite entity, and of finite capacity. Nor likewise can there be any multitude actually and simply infinite, as your master and you yourself often affirm. If, however, they are only finite, say a hundred or a thousand, it is possible that some men—and some one man among men, by your account simply infinite in past and future—understand and have, make and form, some intention, proposition, discourse, conclusion, act, and habit, different from all and each of those. Who would deny this? Who would doubt? Who would not at once concede it to be so? For just as one standing at the center of a circle can go out through any radius to its proper point situated on the periphery, although not simultaneously nor successively through all to all its points, so he who has a scientific principle stands in the midst of infinite possible discourses leading to infinite proper conclusions, and can go out through individual ones to individual conclusions, even if not through all to all. Infinite men also could proceed through infinite such discourses to infinite proper conclusions, as I reckon does not escape scientific men. Therefore there is some conclusion knowable by man—indeed infinite conclusions knowable by men—which the possible intellect does not actually now have. The same can similarly appear concerning erroneous conclusions and opinions. For who does not know that truth is to be compared to a sign set up for archers, and to a point in the middle of a target, which it happens to attain in few ways or one, but to fail in infinite? Who therefore does not see that erroneous conclusions and opinions can be varied and multiplied in infinite ways, especially among infinite men?

Further, who does not know that, if according to your judgment the world is eternal before and after, according to the common course there have been, and there will be, infinite eclipses of the Sun and Moon, knowable specially by men—indeed known and to be known, as according to your aforesaid assertion seems more apparent? And because this is most certainly possible, let it be supposed: there have therefore been and will be infinite investigations, conclusions, and proper and special sciences concerning them. For who would believe that it is the same particular

and proper science, the same credulity, adherence, and affirmation, now to be that an eclipse will occur (namely, this night or day) and then to be that an eclipse will occur (namely, the seventh month following)? For many know one and doubt and are ignorant of another. Otherwise, moreover, it would be the same to know, believe, adhere, and say, "Then there will be an eclipse"; and "Then, and then, and then," at any time designated—which no one doubts to be false, as also is sufficiently apparent in other such things concerning the future. Moreover, the identity of human immanent acts, according to your judgment eternally remaining uniform, is similarly refuted. For who is ignorant that it is not the same act but a different one, internally to affirm and believe, "There is an eclipse now," "There will be an eclipse tomorrow," "There was an eclipse yesterday," and the like—just as the affirmations and the things affirmed are not the same but different, and are infinitely permuted from true to false, and the contrary? Are not also acts of understanding, believing, loving, and similarly doing, infinitely varied according to the variety of degrees in various men and times? But such great variety cannot actually exist simultaneously in the same soul, as the foregoing has taught.

Perhaps your vicar will respond and say that the intellect, or man through the intellect, understands and wills many varied and distinct things, particularly, properly, and distinctly through the same intention or species, and through the same act, not entirely diverse really. But who does not know that the one understanding through any whatever distinguishes any diverse things properly and distinctly, or can distinguish through the same distinctly and properly between them? And who doubts that the same man through the same power, through the same species, and through entirely the same act, without any added diversity, cannot distinguish those diverse things—namely, cognize them properly, particularly, and distinctly? For otherwise the same man, through the same species, could now cognize one thing distinctly (say A), and not another (say B), and at another time the contrary. But whom does it escape that one as one—especially in natural powers not free—is by nature apt always to make one thing, not another nor a different one, in the same passible thing not diverse? Does not reason perspicuously demonstrate this? For what cause of diversity of effects is there in such cases? Why is now this one, not that one, produced; now the contrary, except in agent or in patient, since in such cases there is no free election, but natural necessity? Does not Aristotle for this reason in *On Generation* 2, penultimate [chapter], say: "The same having itself similarly is by nature apt always to make the same"? The same, however, sometimes makes contraries and diverse things; but this is on account of contrariety and some diversity in agent or patient, as the same Philosopher teaches in *Metaphysics* 9.10, *Metaphysics* 9.11, *Metaphysics* 9.12, *Metaphysics* 5.2, and *Physics* 2.30; which Averroes' exposition in those places likewise confesses. Further, otherwise the intellect could through one general species cognize distinctly all species of genera, or of any genus, and the individual instances of species; sight also through the same and one species of one color could distinguish all the species, differences, and degrees of colors.

Furthermore, if the same intention and the entirely same act signify diverse things properly and distinctly, then let A intention and B act signify C and D diverse things properly and distinctly,

and let a man compose in the mind A with A through B act, for C only saying, "A is A," and that composition will be true; and let him compose similarly for C on the part of the subject, and for D on the part of the predicate, and that composition will be false; and thus the same proposition will be at the same time true and false. According to this judgment also, the intentions of things and natural species in the mind would be purely equivocal; for they would signify diverse things according to the same intention or name, and a different and proper notion. Wherefore they would also signify, or could signify, at pleasure. For why could they not signify some other diverse things, and others, just as these? But who doubts these things to be false, contrary to nature, and dissonant from natural Philosophy?

Does not also the Philosopher in *On the Soul* 2.135 write thus: "Let someone inquire for what cause we have several senses, and not one alone." And he responds: "Or [is it] insofar as the consequents [follow] less broadly?" namely, with respect to proper sensibles and common ones, like motion, magnitude, and number. "For if there were sight alone, and it [were the sight] of white, they would lie hidden more, and all things would seem to be the same, on account of the fact that color and magnitude follow each other simultaneously; now, however, since [these] common things are in another sensible, [reason] makes manifest that each of them is something else." The Philosopher therefore supposes that sense cannot distinguish between diverse things except through diverse [things]. And below at 145, having shown that it is necessary that whoever discerns between diverse things should discern through the same indivisible power, and in indivisible time, that is, in an instant, and the question being raised how the indivisible power could perceive and discern contraries and diverse things, he responds that what senses diverse things—namely, diverse according to being—is divisible, that is, according to a different reason, cognition, or intention; in place or in number, indivisible, that is, according to its proper essence. Where Averroes [says]: "It is possible that this judging power, all simultaneously, be the same in subject, and indivisible, but through the intentions which it receives is divisible, as we say of an apple that it is indivisible in subject and divisible according to the diverse accidents in it—namely, smell, color, and taste; thus the question is dissolved thus, since this power, insofar as it is divisible, comprehends numbered divisible things, and insofar as it is the same, judges them by a single judgment." And on *On the Soul* 3, comment 9, he says it has been earlier declared that whatever power apprehends otherness between two, it is necessary that it be one in one way, and many in another—namely, by two different dispositions. In this judgment also all expositors agree. This response of this vicar therefore, truth reproves, nor does the proper Lord approve, but impugns.

Further, how can in the same indivisible soul, and in the same indivisible power of it, things so opposed, so contrary, so perfect, and so actual be simultaneously, as for example, science and ignorance with respect to the same thing—indeed science and deception, and contrary opinion, both in particular and in act, and simultaneously; willing and not willing, love and hate in particular and in act, and simultaneously, with respect to the same thing; the highest virtues and contrary vices to them; the highest goodness, and the highest privative malice opposed to it, and

the highest positive contrary; the highest happiness, and the highest opposed misery? For I know, and you know, and who does not know, that by common experience teaching, and by the harmonious judgment of the philosophers attesting, things privatively opposed and positively contrary are by nature apt to come to be in the same susceptible of both successively, not simultaneously, especially in complete act. Are you not ashamed to confess that in your soul and in you are all errors and heresies, all vices and sins, concupiscences, malices, and spiritual miseries in act, and that they remain there inseparably?

But I know your fictitious little response: for you say that, although there is the same soul of all, it does not on this account follow that there is the same knowledge of all, because the imaginative intentions, which are related to the intellect as sensibles to sense—of which the intellect therefore necessarily has need in knowing—are diverse in different individuals. This imaginative response of yours, however, even if it can in some way avoid the identity of knowledge in all, cannot avoid the other unfittingnesses adduced above; nay, neither will it be able to avoid identity of knowledge, since at least there will be the same habitual knowledge in all, since all habitual knowledge is in the intellect, which is the same in all. According to what was said before, anyone whatever can therefore actually use any knowledge whatever when he wills, considering actually and knowing whatever, at least by the science of a simply universal proposition, of which the terms (or similars properly) are not had in the imaginary power.

Further, let two be posited: a Philosopher and a layman or a cleric ignorant of demonstrations, similar or equal in the imaginative and in all other material powers and their intentions; and let the Philosopher have a demonstration to some subtle conclusion, but the other none. Then the Philosopher has certain knowledge of that conclusion, and demonstratively knows it; therefore so does the other—since they are similar and equal in the imaginative power and its intentions—which, however, who does not know to be false? Are there not also many things understood to which no true imaginary intentions correspond? That, however, you suppose imaginary intentions to be related to the intellect as sensibles to sense, and the intellect to need them necessarily in cognizing anything, seems true, and is in agreement with the judgment of the philosophers in the beginning, when the intellect is as a bare tablet on which nothing is painted or written, until the species of cognoscibles are acquired. But when they have been acquired, and fully painted and written in the intellect, why can it not read them through them, and cognize things through them, without further action or motion of imaginary intentions? For what is now perfectly generated, perfectly formed, perfectly completed, does not seem to need further a generator, but perhaps a conserver. Further, who doubts that the intellect is a more perfect power than the material powers, the sensitive virtues? But these, when they have been fully informed by the species of objects, always, as long as the species remain, can sufficiently through them cognize those objects, without being moved by those objects or by any others whatever. Who concerning the interior virtues and senses—imaginative, cogitative, and memorative—does not perceive this in himself? Who, moreover, even slightly advanced in natural [philosophy] does not also notice this?

Who has not experienced those experiments recited at the beginning of the *Perspectiva* of Alhacen: namely, that with the sight intuiting strong visibles long and stably, and turning itself away from there, or even closing itself, the prior vision remains, or the appearance and likeness of the previous vision; which vision indeed is necessarily proven? Wherefore the Philosopher in *On Sleep and Wakefulness* says: "When we continually sense something, the passion follows for those who transfer according to sense, as from the Sun to darkness; for it happens that one sees nothing on account of the still subsisting motion in the eyes from the light. And if we look at one color for a long time, whether white or green, of such kind it seems whatever sight we transfer to. And if, looking at the Sun or some splendid thing, we close [our eyes], to those observing—according to the direction in which it happens that the sight sees—it seems first indeed of such color, then it changes into red, then into purple, until it comes into black color and vanishes." Reason also clearly shows the same: for let it be posited that omnipotent God preserves in the eye the species received from an object, the object being destroyed, and any species of it in the medium outside sight; and the sight will have or can have all its intrinsic operation as before; and it will see, or can see, as before; for nothing required is lacking. For object and medium are in no way required, except for the species to be generated in the eye, or, once generated, to be conserved. Why therefore should one not similarly judge concerning the most noble power of the intellect?

The intellect therefore in the beginning, when it is wholly potential, needs such extrinsic intentions moving, informing, and actuating it; but when it shall have stood fully informed and actuated, it does not need them further, but from then on can through itself and its intrinsic [content] sufficiently cognize all things. Indeed, from then on they seem to it to hinder rather than help, in that they distract the intellect from sincere speculation and its perfect operation. Wherefore Avicenna *On the Soul* 3, showing how the animal powers help the rational soul in many things, [says]: "The human soul is helped by the body for acquiring the principles of consenting and understanding; then, when it has acquired them, it will return to itself. If, however, some of the powers which are below it should obstruct, and impede it by some dispositions, they will draw it back from its action; if, however, it has not been impeded, it will not need it afterwards in its proper actions, except in some only, in which there is need to return to the imaginative virtues, and to consider them again, in order that it may perceive a principle other than that which it had had, and they help to represent that which is desired in the imagination, and the representation of it in the imagination be confirmed by the help of the intellect; this, however, happens in the beginning only, and not afterwards, except little. When, however, the soul advances, and is strengthened, it operates its operations alone through itself absolutely; the sensible and imaginative virtues, however, and the other corporeal virtues, draw it back from its action; for example, as a man who at one time needs a beast of burden, and its equipage, by which he may arrive where he proposes; when he has arrived there, the cause which had been [the cause] of arriving is the same that prohibits." The same in *Metaphysics* 9, last [section]: "When a form is described in the soul, the apprehension seen is perfected there; but it does not make [one] delight, nor harm certainly, except this which is described in the soul, not

what is outside; whatever, however, is described in the soul performs its action, although it does not have a cause from outside; for the essential cause is this description, the extrinsic, however, is caused by accident, or cause of cause."

Further, who does not know that every cognitive power cognizes properly through a proper intrinsic immanent act, not through anything extrinsic properly? Why therefore, the layman well disposed in body and in all corporeal powers, having in his soul most clear scientific acts and most clear actual knowledge, cannot use them when he wills, cannot perceive them? Why can he not see so great a light in his house? For he could through the corporeal eye, if he had proportionate light in the corporeal eye; indeed even through the rudest touch, proportionally informed by the senses, he would perceive and feel.

Further, perhaps with hardened forehead you will add to respond, saying that the possible intellect, or rational soul, is not the essential form of man through which he exists, but a certain heavenly intelligence, which perfects man only by cognizing, and through its action only is coupled with man. For in that comment 5 you say thus: "Let us therefore say that it is manifest that man is not understanding in act, except on account of the continuation of the intellect understood with him in act. And it is also manifest that matter and form are coupled to each other, so that what is gathered from them is one—and especially the material intellect and the intellective intention in act. For what is composed from them is not some third thing other than them, as is the case with other things composed from matter and form. The continuation therefore of the understood with man, it is impossible that it be, except through the continuation of one of these two parts with him, namely the part which is of him as it were matter, and the part which is of him, namely the intellect as it were form. And since it has been declared from the aforesaid doubts that it is impossible that the understood be completed in each of the men, and be numbered through the numbering of them, through the part which is of him as it were matter—namely, the material intellect—it remains that the continuation of the understood things with us men is through the continuation of the intentions understood with us. And the imaginative intentions are, namely the part which is in us of them, in some way as form. And therefore to say that a boy is understanding in potency can be understood in two ways, of which one is, because the imagined forms which are in him are intelligibles in potency; the second, however, is because the material intellect, which is by nature apt to receive the understood through the intention of that imagined form, is receiving in potency, and continued with us in potency. It has therefore been declared that the first perfection of the intellect differs from the first perfections of the other powers of the soul, and that this name 'perfection' is said of them in an equivocal mode."

And below at comment 19: "It is to be opined," you say, "according to Aristotle, that the last of the abstract intelligibles in order is this material intellect." And in comment 20, on that word of the text, "The passible intellect is corruptible," you say that "Intellect is taken in four ways: for the material intellect, for the intellect in habit, for the agent intellect, and for the imaginative virtue," intimating that there it is taken for the imaginative virtue. And below at 33 you say plainly: "The action of the intellect is other than the action of the cogitative virtue, which

Aristotle called the passible intellect, and said it to be generable and corruptible; and man is not generable and corruptible except through this virtue." And in that comment 20 you join thus: "And through this intellect which Aristotle called passible, men differ in the four virtues spoken of in the *Topics*; and through this intellect man differs from other animals."

And who does not know that man is constituted in the being and species of man through the same essential form by which he differs essentially from other species? The essential form of man, therefore, by which he is man and differs essentially from other species, is not the rational soul, immaterial and immortal, but another form, material, generable and corruptible—namely, the imaginative or cogitative virtue, as you seem to think. But who would so think, unless perhaps a senseless one? For who, unless irrationally irrational, does not know that man is a rational animal, and that rationality is also his essential difference, by which he is essentially defined in being and placed in the species of man and separated from other animals? Wherefore his essential form is the rational soul—rational, I say, not only by participation and improperly, but essentially through itself and properly, according to the distinction of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, at the end. Further, if the essential and ultimate form of man were a material form and essentially irrational, and rational only according to participation and influence from the lowest of the heavenly intelligences, man would by himself and essentially—namely, through all his essentials—be an irrational animal, nor ought "rational" to be placed in his essential definition. For in an essential definition nothing accidental or extrinsic is to be placed. According to this same irrational reason, moreover, irrational animals could be called rational; for they participate somehow in reason, for they receive discipline from man. Since also their souls are material, and similar to the material souls, or essential and proper forms, of men, and differ only in materiality, in subtlety and rudeness according to more and less—why cannot irrational animals participate in some manner and receive some influence of reason from that intelligence, just as man, and be called rational, just as man? And if you should say that man is not a rational animal before the material intellect is actually coupled with him, you will necessarily say consequently that infants are not men nor rational animals, and that they are changed from one species into another—from the irrational and bestial to the rational and human—wherefore men can also similarly be changed back.

Further, how and through what is the intellect coupled with this singular man? Only through its operation and intellection, by your own testimony. And what other mode could be given? The intellect therefore is the efficient cause of this coupling, wherefore also naturally prior to it. But is not having intellect naturally prior to understanding or operating through it, just as having sight is prior to seeing through it, and so concerning all active forms and powers universally? Do not you yourself in comment 18, speaking of the agent and recipient intellect, say thus: "Since we find ourselves to act through these two virtues when we will, and nothing acts except through its form, it was necessary to attribute these two virtues of intellect to us"?

Further, the immaterial intellect, that is, that heavenly intelligence, is either only in the heaven, in the lunar orb, or in men. If only in the heaven, how does man understand and act through a form

and knowledge so distant from him? If in men, either in men alone, or also in all other things subject to the lunar orb. If in all others, this seems very marvelous and incredible, and contrary to Philosophy and to common opinion. What reason or authority therefore compels to this? Why, moreover, do not other higher and more perfect intelligences similarly fill the whole space subject to their orbs? That intelligence, moreover, is of only finite entity, wherefore also of presentiality, repletivity, and occupativity simply only finite. So great therefore could the space of the lunar orb be that it would not suffice for filling and occupying the whole, indeed not even down to the earth; and if it were so, still it would seem that man is a rational animal and can reason as before. If, however, it is posited only in men, how will it be in men distant from one another, neither coupled to one another nor to some third thing, and not in the medium? Moreover, so many men could be, and have so many bodies and so great, and be so distant, that it would not suffice for occupying them fully, as the foregoing reason touched on.

Further, just as the vegetative soul to the vegetable, and the sensitive soul to the sensible, so also the rational soul to the rational animal: for they seem proportional. Just as therefore the vegetative and sensitive soul to the vegetable and sensible, so the rational soul to the rational animal is related. But each of these is the essential form, substance, act, species, ratio, and "what it was to be" of that of which it is, animating, actuating, and informing the same itself essentially through itself and properly, constituting, perfecting, and inhering, as reason clearly shows, and the Philosopher plainly attests in *On the Soul* 2, investigating the definition of the soul, and showing it when investigated. Wherefore one is to judge similarly concerning the rational soul. Does not the Philosopher, defining soul universally, say that it is "a substance, as the species of a physical body having life in potency," in *On the Soul* 2.4, where the text which you expound says that "the soul is the form of the natural body"? On which, showing that the soul is form, and how it differs from accidental form in two ways, you write thus: "That, however, it is substance according to form is manifest from this, that it is other than accident; since accident is not part of such a composite substance, but form is part of such a composite substance. And also it is said equivocally that form is in a subject, and that accident is in a subject; for the subject of accident is a body composed of matter and form, that is, something existing in act, and does not need accident in its being. The subject of form, however, does not have being in act according as it is subject, except through form, and needs form that it may be in act."

The same judgment also can be had from the Philosopher writing thus below at 7: "Whence one ought not to inquire whether soul and body are one, just as neither wax and figure, nor at all the matter of any whatever, and that of which it is matter. For this 'one' and 'being,' since it is said in many ways, properly is what is act." Which also below at 8 he shows by an example of the axe and its substance, namely its form; and at the ninth, by an example of the eye and sight, which is its substance according to reason, namely its form. Where also he subjoins: "It is necessary therefore to take what is in the part, in the whole living body. For proportionally [the relation] is just as part to part: the whole sense to the whole sensitive body insofar as it is such; wherefore also universally as one soul to its animated [thing], so any other whatever to its [own]."

Wherefore also the Philosopher there at 7: "If," he says, "one ought to say something common in every soul, it will be the first act of an organic physical body." What is in every soul, except in every species, in the threefold species of soul? Does not also the same Philosopher in *On the Heavens and the World* 1.2 say that "the whole and all are determined by three; for those things which we call two we say 'both' and 'two both,' but we do not say 'all'; but of three we first say this predication"? The Philosopher therefore, defining soul, understands universally of any whatever.

But I know your cavilling little response. For you say: "He introduced this discourse in the form of doubt, when he said 'If,' etc." For who does not know that "if" does not always exclude affirmation and include doubt, just as neither does "it seems" or "perhaps," as many places of Philosophy demonstrate? Does he not for this reason at once subjoin below at 8: "Universally therefore it has been said what soul is; for it is the substance which is according to reason; this, however, is what it was to be of such a body"? Where your translation also has: "We have already said therefore what soul is universally, and it is substance according to this intention." Nor ought it to move anyone that the Philosopher says below at 11 that some parts of the soul are not act of the body. For through this he assigns the difference between acts of the soul separable from the body and inseparable [from it], saying that the parts of the soul vegetative and sensitive in animals are not separable from the body, because they are acts of certain parts of the animal—namely, acts inhering properly to certain parts of animals, as material forms coextended with their proper matter; wherefore they cannot be separated from their matter. The rational soul, however, is not such an act of any part of the body, nor of the whole; wherefore it is also separable from them, as the sailor from the ship, as the Philosopher there intimates. Wherefore below at 21, speaking of the intellect, he says expressly that "this only happens to be separated as the perpetual from the corruptible; the other parts of the soul, however, manifestly are not separable." Nor ought it to move that he says above in the same 21: "Concerning the intellect, however, and the speculative power, nothing is yet manifest, but it seems to be another genus of soul"—as though it were not comprehended in the general definition of soul previously [given]. For he understands that nothing special and proper concerning the intellectual soul is yet manifest through some special and proper definition and determination, just as concerning the other souls; indeed, not before the third book following, which is specially about it.

Further, who does not know that nature is the principle and cause of moving and being at rest in that in which it is first per se, and not according to accident, *Physics* 2.3? Wherefore that which moves an animal progressively is its essential form, namely the soul itself essentially and properly informing—which reason proves and the philosophers attest. But man is moved progressively, speaks, eats, and similarly operates through the rational soul—namely through the rational will, which doubtless it is established to be a certain power or part of the rational soul. For he is not moved by the aforesaid motions by other souls, or by another soul. For this would seem most of all from the bestial soul, from the concupiscible and irascible soul or virtue; but then he would not be moved freely by such motions, but necessarily, as a brute. We see,

moreover, and feel, that with the concupiscitive virtue exciting one most strongly to be moved, to pursue allurements, he restrains himself by the judgment and will of free reason; that also with the same concupiscitive, or irascitive, or fugitive virtue drawing one back most strongly from some difficult, sorrowful, terrible, virtuous work, he nonetheless freely does it; otherwise the whole of moral Philosophy would be useless and empty. Moreover, of two men equally affected in all corporeal virtues and sensitive powers, one is moved, the other is not moved; one pursues vice or virtue, but the other flees, according to the difference of their rational wills. For "in the soul or in the rational part of the soul, according to the Philosopher, is will; in the irrational, however, concupiscence and anger"; although also according to the same, "animals also share in will," which is nothing but their sensual concupiscence. The rational will therefore and the rational soul moves man progressively and by the other recalled motions. In this judgment also all the philosophers agree whose writings I have been able to find; nay, also you yourself on *On the Soul* 3, where the Philosopher treats this matter. The rational soul therefore is the nature of man and his essential form, constituting, actuating, and informing him essentially, through itself first and properly.

Further, doubtless this senseless judgment is repugnant to the judgment of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds and teaches that the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter, as other [souls] are, but comes from outside, and is made in each singular man, and does not temporally precede him, but eternally succeeds him, as his various books attest. For in *On the Soul* 1.65, he says: "The intellect seems to be a certain substance existing, and not to be corrupted." Where also the translation which you expound has thus: "The intellect, however, seems to be some substance which is made in you and is not corrupted." And the Philosopher there understands by "intellect" the material intellect—namely, the intellective soul—as his process indicates evidently, which you yourself also attest. Who in *On the Generation of Animals* 2.6, which is *On Animals* 16 in the old translation, and 18 in the new, inquires whether all souls enter in the matter, in the seed, in potency namely and virtue, or none; or whether all come from outside, or none; or whether these in this way, and these not. And responding, having shown that it is not possible for corporeal souls to come from outside, he subjoins: "It remains, however, that intellect alone comes from outside, and is divine alone. For nothing of corporeal operation communicates with its operation." Where he also teaches that corporeal souls are not separable from the body, but the intellect alone. The same in *Metaphysics* 12.17 and 18, setting out the difference between efficient and formal causes, says thus: "Moving causes indeed [are] as previously made, existing; but those which are as ratio [are] simultaneous; for when a man is being healed, then health also is, and the figure of a bronze sphere. If, however, something afterwards remains, it must be examined. For in some it is no impediment, as if there is such a soul—not all, but the intellect; for all, perhaps, [is] impossible." Where you also write: "He said 'perhaps,' because the demonstration concerning this is not [the business] of this art, but of the book *On the Soul*." The same judgment in *Problems* and in the *Secret of Secrets* in various places he seems to affirm. Does not also in the booklet *On the Death of Aristotle* his plain judgment be recited: that the

rational soul is created by God, and that they are individuals of individuals, to be rewarded or punished after death according to the requirement of merits?

This judgment of Aristotle Avicenna and Algazel imitate: Avicenna *On the Soul* 5.3, Algazel *Physics* 4, last [section], showing that rational souls are many according to the multitude of human bodies, nor however are they corporeally impressed on bodies, nor do they precede bodies temporally, but are created in them; where they also reprove and refute this judgment of yours. That also the rational soul does not die with the body, but even after death remains eternally, and is rewarded or punished according to the suitability of merits, the same philosophers plainly teach: Avicenna *On the Soul* 5.4 and *Metaphysics* 9, last [section]; Algazel *Physics* 4, last [section], and *Physics* 5.1. Indeed, this marvelous wisdom of yours all wise philosophers, all wiser prophets, all laws, all peoples and tongues, and all individual men taught by the instinct of nature, except perhaps very few seduced by your unlearned doctrine, harmoniously argue against and condemn.

Further, with the first supposition attended to, and the parts following understood, who doubts that omnipotent God could have given, and could give, individual rational souls to individual men, just as also to other animals individual irrational souls, just as also to other natural things individual proper forms? He could indeed, He could and can; and it more befits God most powerful and most bountiful to have done and to do thus rather than otherwise. Which also similarly more befits men for many natural and moral causes. Why therefore is not this judgment rather than yours to be held—especially since this is so renowned, and the contrary so infamous; this is favorable to all, that hateful to all; this fortified by so many and such great reasons and authorities, that scarcely colored fallaciously by the slender shadow of reason or authority? For the stronger of the reasons which seem to help you—which, however, I do not recall to have come out of your quiver—is such: If it were not as you say, the rational soul would be created from nothing, which all the philosophers deny. But here Plato and the Platonists would respond, by avoiding the consequence though not the consequent, through the circular return of the same souls into diverse or the same bodies through the alternations of times. I, however, confess the consequence and the consequent, as the philosophers above mentioned, as also all the prophets and laws, just as also the parts above demonstrated the possibility of creation from nothing.

You could also argue, according to the Philosophy of certain ones, that if there were any rational souls separated from bodies through death, they would be entirely idle, since they move no body, just as they argue concerning the heavenly Intelligences. But what consequence? Or what color? "The rational spirit does not have this operation, therefore none, but is entirely idle." Are there not many other actions besides corporeal motion? Indeed, the motion of the heavenly body or another is an action of the rational spirit very accidental and extraneous; but its action most essential, natural, and proper, is to understand, love, and contemplate. Indeed, its most natural action, most perfect, and most blessed, is to know and love God fully, to adhere to Him blessedly, and to enjoy Him beatifically—as all who have tasted ever so little of true Philosophy harmoniously profess. Wherefore also the rational heavenly spirits are more appropriately named

not "Movents" or movers, from moving, but "Intelligences," from understanding. Wherefore not improbably could it seem that the more the Intelligences are given over to fewer—indeed lesser—extrinsic operations, the more blessed they exist; for the less are they distracted from divine contemplation, beatific adhesion, and fruition, and the more freely can they be at leisure for it and possess it more integrally.

Further, perhaps you argue that in the Intelligences in the same species there is not, nor can there be, numerical plurality; wherefore neither in rational souls by similar reason. But by what reason? Indeed, by what similarity of reason will you prove the assumption? Are not the essential and accidental actions of Intelligences, of which was touched on above, of the same species? For who will demonstrate in them an essential specific diversity? Could not, according to the seventeenth and thirty-third parts of this work, God annihilate any Intelligence, and create another most similar to it in species and in degree? Wherefore He could similarly, with another intelligence remaining, create another most similar to it, and conserve both equally; and so three and four, and further, however many He willed; otherwise He would by no means seem fully omnipotent.

Further, you do not cease to babble, but say: "If we shall posit that the material Intellect is numbered through the numbering of the individuals of men, it would follow that, if it is something, this would be either body or virtue in body"—namely, a corporeal power corporeally and materially extended, as it is established other souls are. But this consequence, as unconnected as it is unfit, as inartificial and as informal, ought to allure or move no individual of scientific or vulgar men having the congruent virtue of intellect, as the foregoing manifest. For who does not know that omnipotent God can multiply rational immaterial souls according to the multitude of men and human bodies? Many Intelligences also moving the heavenly orbs are, or could be, of the same essential species, as was shown above; wherefore all rightly philosophizing, all prophets and laws, concede the antecedent of your consequence, but deny the consequent. The other arguments of yours, however, as ridiculous, are rather worthy to be despised than gathered up to the care of response, or admitted. For as the Philosopher says: "It is foolish to be solicitous about anyone bringing forth contraries to opinions." And again: "To examine all opinions perhaps is more vain; it suffices, however, [to examine] those which superficially either appear or are judged to have some reason."

37. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS WHO DENY THAT THE MOTION OF THE HEAVENS AND THE GENERATION OF MEN CAN CEASE, THAT THE DEAD CAN RISE AGAIN WITH THEIR BODIES, THAT THE GOOD CAN ASCEND TO THE HEAVENS AND THE EVIL DESCEND TO HELL, AND THAT BOTH CAN THUS LIVE FOR ALL ETERNITY

Let the philosophers cease — those who deny that the motion of the heavens and the generation and succession of men can cease, that the dead can rise again with their bodies, that the good can ascend to the heavens and the evil descend to hell, and that both can thus live for all eternity. For Aristotle and Averroes seem to maintain that the motion of the heavens, and the generation and succession of men, are necessarily eternal. The Epicureans likewise, and many other philosophers, plainly deny the possibility of the resurrection of human bodies and of any reward of men after death. With these Pliny too, in the second book of his *Natural History*, writes in agreement: "But the chief consolations of the imperfect nature in man are that not even God can do all things. For neither can He bring death upon Himself, even if He should wish (which He has granted to man as the best gift in the midst of so many penalties of life), nor can He bestow eternity on mortals or call back the deceased, nor make it that one who has lived has not lived, or that one who has held honors has not held them; nor has He any right over the past except that of oblivion — by which things, beyond doubt, the power of nature is declared, and this it is which we call God."

Whence the blessed Augustine, on that verse of Psalm 88, "as the moon perfect for ever, and a faithful witness in heaven," in the second tractate, says: "In no matter is there such vehement, such pertinacious, such obstinate and contentious contradiction of the Christian faith as concerning the resurrection of the flesh. For concerning the immortality of the soul many of the philosophers of the gentiles also have disputed at length, and have left to memory in many and varied books written that the soul is immortal; but when it comes to the resurrection of the flesh, they do not waver but most openly contradict; and their contradiction is such that they say it cannot come to pass that this earthly flesh should be able to ascend to heaven."

But could not He who, according to the 33rd and 34th parts, was able to create the world, and is able to annihilate it, also make its motion to cease? And how otherwise would He be omnipotent and have a will universally efficacious according to the 7th and 8th parts above, especially since this includes no contradiction, as appears from the 34th part? This therefore must be ascribed to God, as the first supposition proves. Moreover, the celestial mover is either God or not God. If God: since He moves voluntarily, and according to the 8th part has free will — why then can He not cease? If not God, He is inferior and lesser than God; therefore God, of most free and most efficacious will, can make him cease and bring his mobile to rest. He also, according to what was said before in the demonstration of the 32nd part, made the Moon at the customary full moon swiftly turn back to the Sun and so wondrously eclipse it; He made the Sun retreat and stand still — why could He not make the motion of the heavens cease?

Again, if God can make the motion of the heavens cease, why not also the motion of human generation, especially since the former seems more regular, less impeded, and more necessary; and this second particle can be shown as the first. Likewise, if the generation of men is necessarily to remain, this is either from men alone — which does not seem so, since they generate freely; or from celestial motion — which does not seem so, because that can cease; or

from God — which does not seem so, because if He acts in this matter, then since according to the 8th part He is a rational agent, by free will He could not act.

Furthermore, if the creation and re-creation of things — indeed of the whole world — is possible according to the 33rd and 34th parts, and a virgin's conceiving and bearing a son according to the 35th part, why not the resurrection of men and of dead bodies, whose possibility can likewise be demonstrated? Moreover, since God, according to what is said above in the demonstration of the 32nd part, works miracles of every kind, why could He not work this miracle? Indeed He has worked it on several occasions, as was there recounted. Furthermore, God has a power of restoring what has perished, of repairing what has been destroyed, and of reforming what has been deformed — and not merely a finite power but absolutely an infinite one, by the 4th part of this work. He can therefore raise up any dead thing.

Likewise, some created power can put living things to death — such as diseases, swords, and poisons; but God forbid that any small and finite created thing should be more powerful for destroying than God for repairing, on account of the foregoing. And if you should say that these things are true if there were in the matter some power of returning, but it is not so, because there is no possible regression from privation to habit, as the philosophers attest — it appears that you measure divine power according to the manner of the power of created agents. For these in acting require a natural power in the matter subject to them, but God by no means, since He can create from nothing, and since He can recreate every power, matter, and thing destroyed — even annihilated — by the 33rd part of this work. Nor is it altogether most certain that no regression is possible from privation to habit; for in many cases it happens that one who has lost something recovers what was lost. This is therefore not certain, especially in respect of God's great power. Nor do these philosophers bring forward any efficacious argument; and an evident argument has already been brought against them. To which side then ought we rather to adhere?

And who does not know how many histories attest that men, at least according to their bodies, were transformed into beasts? Does not that great book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* testify this in many places? Whence it took its name. But most plainly in book 14, chapter 5, where it is expressly recounted how Circe by her songs transformed the companions of Ulysses, changing them into beasts; and below in chapter 8 of the same, the like is told of the conversion of the companions of Diomedes into birds. Nor can anyone say that these and all such things are poetic fictions and fabulous lies. For many authors make mention of that most famous sorceress Circe and of her marvelous works.

Boethius, in book 4 of *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, meter 3, recounts the aforesaid transformation of Ulysses' companions when they came to this Circe, whom he calls a goddess, by virtue of certain enchanted potions she made. Solinus, in book 2 of *On the Marvels of the World*, says that Circe inhabited the Circaean mountains, falsifying various images by the wickedness of her enchantments. Papias in his *Elementary* says: "Circe, daughter of the Sun, who is said to have changed Ulysses' companions; Circe is an island of the East; the Circaean is

a mountain where Circe dwelt." Pliny too, in book 7 of his *Natural History*, reports a race of the Marsi who descended from Circe and have a natural force against the venoms of serpents.

Concerning whom Solinus also, in book 1 of *On the Marvels of the World*, says: "It is no wonder that the people of the Marsi are unharmed by serpents. They trace their lineage from a son of Circe, and they know that, by the power she possessed, the service of poisons is owed to them."

Girgith too, daughter of Circe, wrote a certain book in *On Magical Images*.

Euvantes, as Pliny recounts in book 8 of his *Natural History*, hands down that the Arcadians used to be led to a certain pool of Italy, and with their clothing hung upon an oak swam across, and went away into the wilderness, and were transfigured into wolves, and gathered with others of the same kind for nine years, during which time, if they had abstained from human flesh, they returned to the same pool, and when they had swum across, they recovered their former shape, with the addition of nine years' aging. Where likewise it is recounted that Fabius says that the same man recovered his clothing; and it is written there too that Ithacopas relates how a certain Demainetus, in a sacrifice which the Arcadians made on the Lycaean mount with a human victim, tasted the entrails of an immolated boy and was turned into a wolf, and the same was restored in the tenth year.

Solinus too, in book 2 of *On the Marvels of the World*, writes thus: "There is an island which faces the shore of Apulia, distinguished by the tomb and shrine of Diomedes, and it alone nourishes the Diomedean birds." Concerning which, after recounting many marvels, he adds: "For this reason they say that the companions of Diomedes were turned into birds." Whence Papias also: "They assert that Diomedes is the Pagan god, and his companions were turned into birds, whence they are called Diomedean birds, in Greek *Erodii*."

The Greeks too attest that the companions of Diomedes were turned into birds, and confirm this not by fabulous and poetic lying but by historical attestation; which Augustine also recounts in *City of God*, book 18, chapter 16. This same thing Varro too strives to confirm in many ways, of which Augustine in *City of God* book 18, chapter 18 says: "This" — namely the aforesaid conversion of the companions of Diomedes — "Varro, in order to establish, mentions other things no less incredible: concerning that most famous sorceress Circe, who likewise changed the companions of Ulysses into beasts; and concerning the Arcadians, who, drawn by lot, swam across a certain pool, and there were converted into wolves, and lived with similar wild beasts in the desert places of that region. But if they did not feed on human flesh, after nine years, having swum back across the same pool, they were reformed into men. Finally he even named expressly a certain Demainetus, who tasted of the sacrifice which the Arcadians used to perform with an immolated boy on their Lycaean mount, and was turned into a wolf, and in the tenth year was restored to his proper figure, exercised himself in boxing, and conquered in the Olympic contest. Nor for any other reason does the same historian think that such a name was attached in Arcadia to Pan Lycaean and Jupiter Lycaean except on account of this transformation of men into wolves, since they would not believe that it could happen unless divinely. For 'wolf' in Greek is *Lycos*,

whence the name 'Lycaean' appears to be derived. The Roman Luperci too, he says, sprang as it were from the seed of those mysteries."

Isidore too, *Etymologies* 11, last chapter, says: "Certain monstrous transformations of men and changes into beasts are written about, as concerning that great and most famous Circe, who is said to have changed the companions of Ulysses into beasts; and concerning the Arcadians, who, drawn by lot, swam across a certain pool, and there were converted into wolves. For they confirm that the companions of Diomedes were turned into birds, not by fabulous lying but by historical affirmation. But some assert that Striges are made from men. For the figures of wicked men are changed for many acts of robbery, and either by magical chants or by the poisons of herbs they pass over with their whole bodies into wild beasts. Indeed, by nature also many things receive change, and corrupted things are transformed into diverse species: as bees from the rotted flesh of calves; as beetles from horses; locusts from mules; scorpions from crabs."

Furthermore, in the *Marvels of Ireland* it is read that in the parts of Ulster certain men and women are turned into wolves and after seven years return. Solinus too, in book 3 of *On the Marvels of the World*, reports that the Neuri in summer are changed into wolves and again changed back. How great, moreover, is the rumor in modern times in England and France about certain men who, by some property or infirmity of constitution, are at times turned into wolves and exercise the works of wolves; and when the passion has subsided, they return again to themselves.

Likewise Augustine, *City of God* 18, chapter 19: "When we were in Italy," he says, "we used to hear such things of a certain region of those parts, where they used to say that women innkeepers, imbued with these evil arts, were accustomed to give in cheese to whomever they wished or could of travelers, by which they would forthwith be turned into beasts of burden and carry whatever was needed; and after these tasks were performed, they would again return to themselves; nor yet was the mind in them made bestial, but the rational and human mind was preserved."

With which agreeing, William of Malmesbury, in book 2 of *On the Deeds of the English*, relates: a certain entertainer named Ephoebus was received in lodging by two old women dwelling on the public road by which one goes to Rome. They made him appear to himself and others as an ass, and as an ass — which nevertheless performed its accustomed gesticulations as best it could — to the great laughter of many; until at last, having rolled in water, he returned to his pristine state.

Does not Apuleius also, in his book of *Metamorphoses*, which he names *On the Golden Ass*, plainly recount about himself: that wishing to learn from a certain sorceress the art by which men were changed into beasts, and this experimentally upon himself, he was changed into an ass; and before he could be changed back, having been wickedly placed in a certain house, he was carried off by certain robbers who came upon it and stripped it, with packs placed upon him; and

afterward, transformed back, he wrote the aforesaid book about that transformation of his, not in meter but in prose, as the same book makes plain to its readers.

Is not also the art of such transformations and reformatations handed down — or feigned to be handed down — in Plato's *Cow*, in which many other shameful, superstitious, and magical things are contained? Moreover, Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 3, relates that a certain Tiresias was changed from a woman into a man; nor is it necessary that this be said to be a lie or a poetic fiction. For Pliny, in book 7 of his *Natural History*, writes thus: "That women are changed into males is not fabulous; we find in the *Annals* that, under the consuls Licinius Crassus and Cassius Longinus, a boy was made out of a girl in his parents' presence, and by the order of the soothsayers was transported to a desert island. Licinius Mucianus reported that he had seen at Argos one Ariston who had married, and presently a beard and virility came forth, and he took a wife. Of the same fate too was a boy he had seen at Smyrna. I myself in Africa saw Lucius, a citizen of Tisdrita, changed into a man on the day of marriage."

Augustine also says, in *Questions on the Old and New Law* 57, that in the time of the Emperor Constantius it is well known that a girl in a part of Campania was changed into a male and brought to Rome.

The *History of the Britons*, in book 8, also relates that, when Uther king of the Britons besieged Gorlois duke of Cornwall in his castle Dimuliot, and Gorlois' wife Igerna, whom the king most ardently desired, was placed in another of his most secure castles, Tintagel; and Uther consulting Ulfin his familiar, and after Ulfin, Merlin the seer then present, how he might obtain his desire — Merlin answered: "That you may obtain your wish, you must use new arts unheard of in your time. I know how by my medicaments to give you the figure of Gorlois, so that you appear in all things to be him. If therefore you obey, I will make you wholly to resemble him, and Ulfin to resemble Iordanus of Tintagel, his familiar, and I myself shall be present as a third in another aspect; and you shall be able safely to enter the town to Igerna and have access." And it follows: "The king therefore obeyed and applied a diligent mind. At last, having committed the siege to his familiars, he committed himself to Merlin's medicaments, and was transfigured into the likeness of Gorlois. Ulfin too was changed into Iordanus, Merlin into Britael, so that none could tell what they had been; and so coming to Igerna, and being received in all respects as Gorlois, he begat upon her that famous Arthur. And while these things were being done, the castle was taken and the duke slain." And it follows: "Messengers came to Igerna who would announce both the death of the duke and the issue of the siege. But when they perceived the king in the figure of the consul sitting beside her, blushing they marveled that one whom they had reported slain in the siege had thus preceded them in safety. For they did not know what medicaments Merlin had compounded. The king then, going forth, sought his army, and having put off the figure of Gorlois, returned to being Uther."

Do not the famous and sacred writings also indicate that a certain rod was turned into a serpent and back again, and certain other rods turned into dragons? And water turned into blood, and the

dust of the earth into gnats? That Nebuchadnezzar was so transformed that his heart was changed from a human one and the heart of a beast was given to him, and he was driven out from men, and ate hay with the beasts like an ox, until seven seasons changed over him, and when these were completed his sense returned to him, and his figure too returned to him? Which transformation Jerome, expounding that place, supports and confirms by many similar examples. Whence Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 10, chapter 9, says: "The king saw in dreams that he was about to fall from his kingdom and to dwell with beasts; and when he had spent seven years in this way in the wilderness, he would receive his dominion again. And Daniel expounded this, and as he had foretold him, so it came to pass. For when he had dwelt the aforesaid time in the wilderness, and no one had presumed during those seven years to retain dominion over affairs, he, supplicating God to receive his kingdom again, returned to him." Therefore let no one blame me for thus narrating each thing as it is found written in the ancient books.

If, therefore, such transmutation of human bodies and of other things is possible by some created power, however small and finite, as many infidels and philosophers confess, why should not the reformation of dead bodies to their former form, and a certain transformation to a certain better form or species — and so the resurrection of the dead — be possible by the power of God, indeed by His omnipotence infinitely infinite, than which none greater can be or even be thought?

Furthermore, according to common report, and according to Avicenna in the demonstration of the 32nd part above alleged, and according to Algazel, *Physics* 5, chapter 5, and according to certain other philosophers and gentiles, fascination is possible by the gaze and speech of certain persons, to the deterioration, wasting, and death of animals. Whence Virgil in the *Bucolics*, Eclogue 3:

Some eye, I know not whose, fascinates my tender lambs.

Witnesses are Isigonus and Nymphodorus, with Apollonides and Philarchus, Pliny in book 7 of his *Natural History* relating thus: "In Africa, certain families of those who fascinate, Isigonus and Nymphodorus hand down, by whose praise sheep perish, trees wither, infants die. Of the same kind, Isigonus adds, are men in Triballia and Illyria, who fascinate also by sight, and kill those whom they look upon for a long time, especially with angry eyes; their evil is more easily felt by the unpubescent; it is notable that they have two pupils in each eye." "Of this kind also are women in Scythia, who are called *Viciae*," reports Apollonides Philarchus; "and in Pontus the race of the Tibii, and many others of the same nature, whose marks he hands down: a double pupil in one eye, in the other the figure of a horse; these moreover cannot be submerged, not even when weighed down with garments." Solinus too, in book 1 of *On the Marvels of the World*, writes thus: "Apollonides reports that in Scythia women are born who are called *Viciae*; these have double pupils in their eyes, and kill by sight if they look upon anyone with anger. These are also in Sardinia."

If, therefore, a feeble creature is so powerful by sight or word alone for the deterioration or mortification of the living, why should not omnipotent God by His infinite omnipotence be

powerful for similar or contrary effects, not just so much, but incomparably more? And who does not know how much necromancy and the other magical arts can do, as the theoretical and practical books of those sciences and the holy books alike attest, as common report and most frequent experience teach, as also was touched on above concerning the masteries of Cyprian in the demonstration of the 32nd part? If, therefore, those arts can do so much through the power of demons, of stars, of images, of characters, or of words, or through any other created power whatsoever — how much more can the infinite omnipotence of God? Why then can He not truly raise the dead?

If therefore, according to the foregoing, omnipotent God can quiet the heavens and raise the dead, He can also lift up those raised to celestial things, and place them with Himself, who dwells in the heavens, in the heavens. For this seems less than that, and can be shown as that. Omnipotent God too, who according to the foregoing about the 32nd part works all kinds of miracles in the heavens and on earth — why should He not be able to do this one? And if God can do this, why can He not also press down the wicked, raised with their bodies, into hell? Furthermore, if God can raise the dead to life, He can also preserve those raised in life as long as He wills; for this seems less than that, and can be shown as that.

38. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS AND HERETICS WHO DENY THAT TEMPORAL MERIT CAN REASONABLY BE REWARDED WITH AN EVERLASTING REWARD, OR THAT TEMPORAL SIN CAN JUSTLY BE PUNISHED WITH ETERNAL PUNISHMENT

Let the philosophers and heretics be corrected — those who deny that temporal merit can reasonably be rewarded with an everlasting reward, or that temporal sin can justly be punished with eternal punishment. Does not a man at times reasonably confer land or a township upon his servant, and upon his heirs, to be possessed in perpetuity? And he would so confer it upon him, even if he were to live forever, in return for his brief temporal service. How much more does it befit God — supremely good, rich, liberal, and most fully filled with every virtue infinitely, as the first Supposition and the third and fourth parts show — similarly, or more abundantly, to reward His servants for their temporal service?

Could not God, supremely liberal and good, reasonably confer upon an angel or a man who would always live some everlasting good, not for any prior merit of theirs, but purely liberally, purely gratis? Why then could He not eternally reward one who has merited well, even if temporally — especially since God rewards everyone beyond what is fitting, according to the 31st part?

Furthermore, it befits any lord who is knowing and powerful to reward his servants according to the quality and quantity of their service and love. But everyone who serves God rightly so loves

and reverences Him that, for any good however great and however lasting, he would not knowingly offend Him by omitting due service or committing anything displeasing to Him, according to the 30th part of this work. Does it not therefore most fittingly befit God, supremely knowing and supremely powerful, to repay such a servant of His with some greater good and some fuller reward, beyond any temporal good and reward whatsoever — namely with an everlasting good and reward?

And if anyone shall say that a certain goodness inseparably following a good act, according to what was set forth above on the 31st part, can be reckoned as sufficient reward — how is it that all laws decree and arrange other rewards for those who merit well? If too God does not otherwise reward one who has merited well, He rewards him sparingly, not beyond what is fitting — against the 31st part. Moreover, whoever duly worships God according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work would never knowingly offend Him in any way for any greater good than that. How then does it befit God, supremely powerful and most copiously liberal, to reward so sparingly, so meagerly, so great a worship of such a worshipper of His? Does not even a good and powerful man more amply reward his worthy servants? Much more fittingly therefore God, infinitely better and more powerful than any man.

Furthermore: a man ought not knowingly to sin for the removal of any punishment whatsoever to be borne, or for the avoidance of any not yet borne; therefore so great a punishment can justly be imposed on him for any sin knowingly committed, and even any infinite one in respect of duration, by the 30th part of this work. Is not even a man, for a temporal offense committed against a temporal prince, condemned to perpetual prison? And if he could live eternally, he would be eternally punished in prison, and forfeits his land or fief for himself and his heirs forever — just as one convicted for a temporal offense and pronounced a forger and perjurer, and so infamous, would, if he lived eternally, be held as such eternally. Why then not similarly concerning a temporal offense committed against the supreme Prince, God?

Is not also an offense knowingly committed against a greater person — for instance, against a father or a prince — worthy of greater and longer-lasting punishment? Is not therefore an offense knowingly committed against God, who incomparably exceeds every father and prince, worthy of incomparably greater and eternal punishment? For if such an offense were worthy only of a temporal finite punishment, say of a year, then a similar offense committed against a greater person could, by a finite increase of the person, be augmented until it were worthy of equal — indeed of greater — punishment.

Furthermore, when one is sent into prison and to punishment for his sin knowingly committed against God, he by no means seems justly to be liberated until he has made satisfaction for what was committed. But how can one — if the matter is dealt with strictly and rigorously — make satisfaction to God for any sin knowingly committed against Him? For according to the 30th part, no sin ought to be knowingly committed against God, for any goods however great to be preserved or gained, or any evils however great to be removed or avoided; and to make

satisfaction for sin is to render as much as, or more than, that for which the sin ought not to have been committed — as the demonstration of the 32nd part argued more fully and amply.

But if anyone shall say that the impotence of making satisfaction excuses him, this will be contradicted by what was set forth concerning the 32nd part of this work. According to this, too, it would seem that every sinner, while he sins, would be excused by the impotence of not sinning. For he cannot then not sin, but necessarily then sins. Did he not also constitute himself debtor and make himself impotent — and this through his fault, not abolished but remaining? It seems just, too, that the thief or robber who ought to make satisfaction by rendering equal or greater goods, if he cannot, should meanwhile suffer by paying penalties. For in the punishment of the sinner the honor of the offended or injured is in some way restored, satisfaction of some sort is rendered, sin is chastised, the occasion of sinning is restrained, and justice is preserved — unless perhaps the glorious indulgence of the offended intervenes.

Furthermore, the culpable impotence of making satisfaction nowhere seems to excuse from the whole, but that one ought to render as much as he can. However greatly, therefore, anyone sins against God, let him always make satisfaction and render to God according to his strength as much as he can; even if he should live eternally, he is never rendered fully excused, but is bound always to do likewise, and meanwhile, in supplement of due satisfaction of whatever sort, to bear the penalties he can. For it does not befit the best polity of the best lawgiver that one knowingly sinning, despising Him and His laws, and one not sinning; one making satisfaction and one not making satisfaction, should be regarded as alike. Is it not for this reason that in all lawful polities, just as rewards are decreed for those who merit well, so also penalties for delinquents and for those who do not make satisfaction?

If, too, satisfaction be remitted on account of impotence to make it for one knowingly sinning against God: either it is remitted necessarily and absolutely, or freely. If necessarily and absolutely — what grace is it to the remitter? For what kind of liberality is to be reckoned, if one remits what he cannot help remitting, what he cannot have, what he cannot exact in any way? And who but an ungrateful man would presume to say that the remission of debt is not a grace? If freely — He can also not remit.

Furthermore, if the sinner is excused from the debt of satisfaction on account of impotence to make it, either he is excused and rendered innocent of sin, or he is held continuously guilty of sin. If he is rendered clean and innocent of sin, he was always so, even while he was sinning, on account of the aforesaid impotence. Or if for some time he is held guilty of sin, the aforesaid impotence notwithstanding, why could he not be so for an eternal time? — especially if at no time satisfaction be made. If he is held and is guilty of sin, how great a punishment he has annexed necessarily and inseparably is taught by the demonstration of the 31st part. How also is any sinner whatsoever, so long as he remains guilty of sin, not worthily relegated from sincere beatitude and the fellowship of the blessed, and held bound in prison?

But if anyone shall answer that the essential punishment inseparably annexed is sufficient for the sin, this does not exclude the intention of this section. For it does not avoid that the sinner, for a temporal sin, is at least eternally punished by this very punishment; wherefore it does not avoid that he is eternally excluded from beatitude and the College of the blessed. This response too can be corrected by the foregoing, as the other similar response previously touched upon.

39. AGAINST PHILOSOPHERS AND HERETICS WHO DENY THAT THERE WILL BE A RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD UNTO BLESSED OR WRETCHED LIFE ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENCE OF MERITS, AND WHO GRANT THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE EITHER IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEATH, OR AFTER THE SPACE OF A GREAT YEAR, INTO BESTIAL OR HUMAN BODIES, ALIEN OR PROPER, UNTO A WORLDLY LIFE CUSTOMARY TO BEASTS OR MEN, TEMPORAL, TO LAST FOR THE ACCUSTOMED PERIOD; AND WHO BELIEVE UNIVERSALLY THAT THE RESURRECTION OF ALL THE DEAD, BOTH GOOD AND EVIL, WILL BE UNTO EVERLASTING LIFE AND BEATITUDE, AND OF NONE UNTO EVERLASTING PUNISHMENT AND MISERY; AND WHO ALSO SUPPOSE THAT THE GOOD WILL POSSESS ETERNAL BEATITUDE — YET NOT IN HEAVEN — AND THE WICKED WILL HAVE ETERNAL MISERY — YET NOT IN HELL — BUT THAT BOTH WILL REMAIN IN COMMON ON EARTH; SAYING MOREOVER THAT THE BODIES OF THE GOOD WILL BY NO MEANS BE TRANSFORMED TO A BETTER, PURER, AND MORE HEAVENLY CONDITION IN THE FUTURE BEATITUDE, NOR WILL THEY BE IMMORTAL THEN, BUT WILL REMAIN IN THEIR PRISTINE STATE; AND THAT THE LIVING BODIES OF THE WICKED WILL BY NO MEANS LAST ETERNALLY IN ETERNAL TORMENTS; FEIGNING ALSO IMPUDENTLY THAT THE FUTURE ETERNAL HAPPINESS OF THE GOOD MUST CONSIST IN THE CUSTOMARY PLEASURES OF THE FLESH, OR IN SOMETHING ELSE, OR IN ANY OTHER THINGS BESIDES GOD

Let the philosophers rise to the hope of life — those who deny that there will be a resurrection of the dead unto blessed or wretched life according to the difference of merits. Let them rise up to the light of a truer judgment — those who grant that there will be a resurrection of the dead, either immediately after death, or after the space of a Great Year, into bestial or human bodies, alien or proper, unto a worldly life customary to beasts or men, temporal, to last for the accustomed period; and who believe universally that the resurrection of all the dead, both good and evil, will be unto everlasting life and beatitude, and of none unto everlasting punishment and misery; supposing also that the good will possess eternal beatitude — yet not in Heaven — and the wicked will have eternal misery — yet not in hell — but that both will remain in common on earth; saying moreover that the bodies of the blessed will by no means be transformed to a better,

purser, and more heavenly condition in the future beatitude, nor will they be immortal then, but will remain in their pristine state; and that the living bodies of the wicked will by no means last eternally in eternal torments; feigning also impudently that the future eternal happiness of the good must consist in the customary pleasures of the flesh, or also in something else, or in any other things besides God.

The Epicureans and Sadducees denied that there would be a future resurrection of the dead, supposing the rational soul to be mortal, as is recounted above. The senseless judgment of these men Pliny too, in book 7 of his *Natural History*, strives to confirm by certain unreasonable reasons, writing thus: "After burial, all the other meanderings of empty things; for everyone, the same things hold from the supreme day as before the first day; nor any more after death is there any sense of body or soul than before birth. For the same vanity propagates itself even into the future, and at the very time of death falsely promises itself life — sometimes by giving immortality to the soul, sometimes by transfiguration, sometimes by giving sense to those below, and worshipping the *manes*, and making a god of one who has even ceased to be a man; or really, in any way, the manner of breathing differs from the rest of the animals, when there are not many things found longer-lived in life, of which no one divines a similar immortality. Now if the body pursues the matter of the soul, where is its thinking? how does it see, hear, or how does it touch? what is its use? or what good is there in it without these? what then is its seat? or how great would be the multitude of so many ages of souls, like the puerile shadows of the elements? Like to this is the vanity, promised by Democritus, of preserving men's bodies and bringing them back to life — who himself did not come back to life. Plague upon that very evil, that life and death should be repeated! Meanwhile there is no rest if the sense of the soul remains on high, and shadows among those below. Truly this sweetness of credulity destroys the chief good of nature, death, and doubles the moment of dying; and even invents the supposition of pains to come thereafter. For if it is sweet to live, for whom can it be sweet to have lived?"

Josephus too, in book 2 of *On the Jewish War*, speaking of the Sadducees, says: "They generally deny rewards or punishments of souls." Of these Epicureans and Sadducees, moreover, and their opinion, even Sacred Letters make mention. Dionysius too, in *On the Divine Names* 6, recounts the madness of Simon, who denied the resurrection of the bodies of the dead, on the ground that it is contrary to nature, as he says.

Those, however, who grant that the resurrection will be in the future are further separated. For some say it will be immediately after death, by the entrance of souls into other bodies, bestial or human, denying any other reward or punishment after death to man. Whence Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 15, prefacing a pompous proem, thus says:

Things great and unsearched out by the genius of the elders, and things long hidden, I shall sing. It pleases me to go through the high stars; it pleases me, leaving the lands and inert seat, to be borne on a cloud, and to stand on the shoulders of stout Atlas; and from afar to look down upon men wandering everywhere and lacking reason, trembling and fearing death, thus to exhort

them, and unfold the chain of fate. O race struck dumb by the chill fear of death, why do you fear the Styx, why the shadows, and the empty divinities, the matter of seers, and the perils of a false world? Whether the funeral pyre with flame, or wasting age take away your bodies, think them able to suffer no evils. Souls lack death, and ever leaving their former seat, live in new homes, and dwell when received. I myself (for I remember) at the time of the Trojan war was Euphorbus, son of Panthous, in whose breast once fixed in the front the heavy spear of the lesser Atrides. I recognized the shield of my left arm, recently from the Anthaeans, in the temple of Juno at Argos. All things change, nothing perishes; the spirit wanders, and from there comes here, hence thither, and seizes whatever limbs it pleases, and from beasts passes into human bodies, and ours into beasts, nor in any time does it perish: and as soft wax is signed with new figures, nor remains as it was, nor keeps the same forms, yet is itself the same — so I teach that the soul is always the same, but migrates into various figures.

Ovid in this part seems to follow Plato, who in *Timaeus* 2, treating of the state of souls after death and speaking of souls that conquer their passions and those conquered by them, thus says: "And as long as they reined them in and subjugated them, life will be just and gentle to them; but if they should be conquered, unjust and rough; the conquered, moreover, change sex, and are relegated to the infirmity of feminine nature in the time of the second generation; and to those who do not desist from vice and intemperance, punishment and rejection into worse things do not cease, until they put on the forms of vast wild beasts congruent to their disposition and merits."

By this occasion perhaps certain philosophers also, as Ambrose touches in *On the Good of Death*, posited the supreme reward of the great philosophers to be this: that their souls after death should pass into bees or fireflies, that those who first had fed others with the sweetness of philosophy should afterward themselves be fed with the sweetness of honey; or that those who first had ministered to others the light of wisdom should afterward themselves be endowed with the gift of light; who consequently posited that the souls of others migrate into other bestial bodies corresponding to them — for example, the souls of musicians into nightingales, of soldiers into wild boars, of princes into lions. From these things too it evidently appears that Plato and Ovid say that the souls of men sometimes transmigrate to other human bodies, female and male.

To these likewise consented those pseudo-poets who said that they had received the spirit of Homer; against whom Persius inveighs, thus saying:

Nor have I washed my lips at the Caballine fount, nor do I remember to have dreamed on the two-peaked Parnassus, that I might thus suddenly come forth a poet.

Such too were certain heretics, asserting that John the Baptist had the spirit and soul of Elijah, and that he was personally Elijah, on the occasion of certain Gospel words which seemed to the eyes of the foolish to sound thus.

Others, namely Plato and his followers, posit a true future resurrection — that is, the return of the soul to its ancient body — after the space of a Great Year. Of this Great Year, Plato in *Timaeus* 1, last chapter, says: "It is easy to understand that the perfect number of times completes a perfect year, only when the courses of all the eight revolutions are completed and return as it were to the origin and beginning of another revolution, which one and the same and uniform motion shall measure." And below, 21:6, speaking of vicious souls and their punishments, and the end of those punishments, he says: "There will be no end of evils, sooner than the firm and ever-the-same winged revolution of the world, following them, has wiped away all their vices contracted from fire, water, earth, and air, and every defilement, with their unconsidered and immoderate errors reduced to the manner and temper of reason; that having put aside their pollutions, expiated and purified, they may at length deserve to come to the honor of their ancient countenance." And above, in the same place, speaking of souls victorious over the passions, he says: "To the victors lies open a return to the seat of a companion star, to do thereafter true and blessed life"; whom Augustine, *City of God* 22, chapter 27, attests Plato said would return to bodies. The folly of this opinion was at one time very common in England among many, who, as our chroniclers attest, when dying caused their treasure to be buried with them, that thus, returning to their bodies, they might recover it.

The quantity of this Great Year, however, is variously set down by various authors. Varro, in *On the Race of the Roman People*, as Augustine in *City of God* 22, chapter 28 recounts, thus says: "Certain genethliacs have written that there is in the regeneration of men what the Greeks call *Palingenesia*, and they have written that this is completed in the number of four hundred and forty years, so that the same body and the same soul which had once been joined together in some man may again return to the same conjunction." Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 1, chapter 2, asserts that the Great Year is fulfilled by the courses of six hundred years, as is recounted above. Others, imitating Ptolemy, *Almagest* 7, chapter 2, who posits the eighth sphere to be moved according to the succession of the signs by one degree in every hundred years, say that the Great Year contains thirty-six thousand solar years.

From these things, however, it evidently appears that Plato thought the punishment of the wicked to be ended temporally, not eternal; with whom Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 9, last chapter, agreeing, says: "Since punishment is from an extraneous accident, and such does not endure nor remain, it follows that the punishment owed to the soul is not perennial, but is removed and effaced little by little, until purified it comes to felicity." With whom Origen too is thought similarly to have agreed.

Some, however, granting a future resurrection unto everlasting beatitude and misery, imitating the philosophers of whom Augustine above alleged speaks, hold that those who rise will receive this and that in common here on earth — not, however, this in heaven and that in hell. With whom certain Jews seem to agree, Theophilus saying on Luke 9, "John has risen from the dead, etc.": "The Jews expected the resurrection of the dead in carnal life, and in feastings and drinks." Whence it appears that those Jews also suppose the future happiness must consist in the

customary pleasures of the flesh, which the Saracens too — or Hagarenes — suppose, as was touched on above; which many Tatars also believe, as evidently appears through Mark of Venice, *On the Conditions of the Eastern Regions*, in various places. They — as the same Mark recounts — so impudently dote, that even when a young man and a young woman die unmarried, they cause them to be solemnly betrothed, that thus in the future life they may more freely enjoy their pleasures.

But why do the philosophers deny the future resurrection of the dead unto life, when its possibility has been shown above; and so great a fame, so many sects or laws — namely the Jews, the Christians, the Saracens or Hagarenes, and the Tatars — many illustrious prophets, and many philosophers too unanimously attest it, as appears from the foregoing and from many other histories; and our most certain histories and certain others evidently report that some dead truly arose, as the demonstration of the 32nd part touched upon? Does not Plato in *On the Laws* or *On the Republic* relate a certain soldier by name, Er, by nation a Pamphilian, slain in battle by wounds — that on the twelfth day, on which he was to be cremated with others slain there, he came back to life, and announced whatever in the days that had passed he had done or seen, professing public judgment to the human race? Nor would anyone suspect so great a philosopher of lying fabulously in such matters; for this is not customary to philosophers who philosophize.

Does not Pliny too in book 7 of his *Natural History* write a great chapter about those who come back to life? Does not also that noble volume of Heraclides among the Greeks expressly recount that a certain woman, lifeless for seven days, returned to life? Does not Varro likewise narrate that certain dead arose, and Pliny in the place above? Does not Democritus too grant the resurrection of the dead, and Plato a return to life, as was touched on above? Whom Porphyry too imitates, the blessed Augustine, *City of God* 22, chapter 27, recounting. Does not Bonellus the philosopher, as is recounted in *The Throng of Philosophers*, say to Pythagoras: "Behold, O Pythagoras, all things die and live by the nod of God"; and adding concerning a certain corporeal and medicinal matter, how it is to be mortified and vivified into something better, and confirming this by the example of man, thus says: "Then, son of doctrine, that thing requires fire, until the spirit of that body is turned over, and is dismissed through the nights, that the man in his tomb may also be made dust. When these things are accomplished, God will return to it its soul and spirit; and the infirmity removed, that thing is strengthened, and after corruption is amended; just as a man after the resurrection becomes stronger, and younger than he had been in this world."

If, therefore, these things are so, why do the philosophers deny the future resurrection of the dead, especially since they bring forward no — or only slender — reason to the contrary? Yet how compelling and how strong a reason would be required to invalidate something so famous in every law and sect — especially since its possibility has been most certainly demonstrated, and its truth more reasonably affirmed than it can be impugned, according to what is set forth concerning the 33rd part of this work?

Is not the rational soul, according to the 36th part, immortal, incorruptible, and eternal — and each individual soul belongs to each individual man — and has it not the aptitude and natural appetite for administering the human body, dwelling in it, and through it exercising its noble operations, just as other natural forms relate to their formed and formable matter? For if the human soul did not naturally desire and love the conjunction and cohabitation with the body, but a solitary, separated mode of being, how is it joined to the body and inhabits it, administering it against the natural order? How also would man be a natural species — and so noble a species, that he seems even more noble than the angels, who do not have bodies in any way, on account of his many noble operations which they do not have?

Whence Hermes too, in *On the Eternal Word* 10, speaking of simple angels and composite men, thus writes: "Some, very few of those aforesaid, have obtained the venerable care of looking after heaven; but whoever, from the confusion of their twofold nature, has settled into the inner intelligence by the bulk of body, are placed over the elements that are in those things which are below, to be cared for. Therefore man is an animal, not because he is on that account lesser, that he is in part mortal, but rather because he is so much the more aptly and efficaciously composed for a certain reason, that he is seen to have been augmented by mortality — namely because he could not have sustained both unless from each kind of matter; he is formed from each, that he might have both the cultivation of earth and the love of his own divinity." And below, 24: "Finally He composed the good man too, who could be immortal, of each nature, divine and mortal; and so by the will of God it has been arranged that man is constituted better than the gods, whom He formed from immortal nature alone, and than all mortals — for which reason man, joined to the gods by knowledge, venerates them by religion, and the gods too by affection guard all human things." Here by "gods" he understands the angels, which manner of speaking is more frequently found in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers.

If therefore these things are so, how is it that the rational soul — eternal, virtuous, and holy — once separated from the body by death, will eternally and naturally desire to be united with the body, and eternally and naturally lack this? How will it eternally and naturally hunger and thirst to be joined with the body, and eternally and naturally lack this? How will it eternally and naturally pant after its natural kingdom, after the body in which — by the teaching of experience and reason, and Aristotle attesting above — it most worthily presides, like a king in city and kingdom, and eternally and naturally be deprived of its kingdom?

Indeed this lack and privation does not seem natural, but rather violent. And how can such a violent state be eternal? Do not the philosophers deny this, and how can such a natural appetite be idle, and eternally idle? How will such a holy soul remain forever hungry and thirsty? Wherefore it will never be blessed, but eternally remain wretched, according to what is set forth concerning beatitude in the 8th part — especially since God, supremely liberal and good, does not sparingly but abundantly reward all, by the 31st part. But how can He abundantly reward such a holy soul, here hungering and thirsting and laboring in many ways for the love and honor of God according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work, if in the future He should permit it

likewise to hunger, to thirst, and always to be wretched? Wretched, I say, always, because always lacking in fact and in hope the body always naturally desired.

Concerning beatitude in hope, the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1, chapter 14, says that "children called happy on account of hope are beatified"; concerning beatitude in fact, however, the same Aristotle and others establish it in many places. And if perchance you should say that God will give to the soul something else for the body which it desires — that something else either soothes that aforesaid appetite altogether and satiates it, or it does not. It does not soothe it, on account of the foregoing; for as long as the soul itself remains, it has a certain natural aptitude and concupiscence for the body, as the foregoing make manifest. How also is that privation or lack which the soul sustains taken away, except by the restitution of the body of which it is deprived? And how will that natural concupiscence cease while that lack remains? If it does not soothe, the inconveniences previously touched on return.

According also to all the philosophers granting the immortality of the soul, the virtuous soul awaits beatitude or felicity as its reward. For what other thing for sufficient reward would it await? Not anything more vile, nor better — this is plainly clear; which the foregoing concerning the 32nd part also attest. And the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1, chapter 14, says that "felicity seems to be the reward of virtue." But beatitude or felicity is the final human good, the ultimate of all human goods, as the foregoing according to the 31st part evidently indicate. With the end attained — and especially such an end — the motion or the mobile rests perfectly; otherwise that end would not be perfect. With such a perfect end attained, therefore, nothing further remains which it might desire as not had — nothing external toward which it tends, nothing which it might further covet — as also the foregoing concerning the 8th part lucidly manifest, which Aristotle's saying there written attests.

Wherefore Boethius too, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* 3, prose 2, thus says: "Every care of mortals, which the labor of multiform pursuits exercises, proceeds indeed by a different path, but strives nevertheless to come to one end of beatitude. That, however, is the good which once attained, no one can desire anything beyond — which is the supreme of all goods, and contains all goods within itself; which if anything were lacking to it, could not be the supreme, since something would be left outside which could be wished for. It is plain therefore that beatitude is a state perfected by the assemblage of all goods." In felicity therefore, and in final perfect beatitude, the soul will have the body it desired.

Furthermore, if the virtuous soul were not beatified together with the body it desires, this would be either because God could not, or because He would not. Not because He could not, on account of the 37th part of this work and the 7th and 8th. Nor because He would not, since He is supremely just, retributive, pious, liberal, and good, by the first Supposition and the 3rd, 4th, and 31st parts.

Furthermore, in any rightly disposed polity, rewards are decreed which provoke to virtues, and punishments which draw back from vices; otherwise very many men would be made slothful

toward virtue and prone to vice — which all the philosophers unanimously attest. God therefore, the most wise instituter and ruler of the whole polity of the world, does not leave it without such rewards. But the good are by no means sufficiently rewarded, nor the wicked sufficiently punished, in the present life. For the wicked frequently abound in delights in the present life, and are consoled by prosperities; the good, on the contrary, are deprived of delights and tormented by adversities. Indeed many beasts also live more delightfully in the present life than many virtuous men.

What worthy thing, I ask, will God repay to a temperate man who, for His love and honor according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work, abstains from delights and sustains tristesses? What more fitting than ampler delights, according to the 31st part — which He nevertheless does not do in the present life? He will therefore do it in the future, especially since He can most easily do this, as the foregoing have taught. If, too, a virtuous man perseveringly through life sustains sad things on account of God, and at last a most sad death on account of Him, on account of preserving His law and honor, and avoiding dishonor according to the doctrine of the 30th part — what except a most delightful life will He render him, according to the 31st part? How otherwise would He animate His soldiers to a terrible death? For either He can render to such soldiers of His sufficient stipends, or He cannot. Who would presume to say He cannot, on account of the 7th, 8th, and 37th parts of this work? But if He can, He either wills or wills not. And who would say He wills not, on account of the 31st part of this work? This too would seem to belong to parsimony and not to fullest liberality and goodness. He can therefore, and He wills; wherefore He will do so abundantly, according to the 8th and 31st parts.

Furthermore, who does not know that man naturally desires good, and the greater more, and most of all the greatest good — namely that which perfectly satiates him, the felicity or beatitude most perfectly satiating and quieting all desires, as was touched on above? But this appetite either ought to be plenarily satiated, or it ought not. And who would say it ought not? For then it would seem idle and unnatural to man. But how is the most natural, most general, and greatest human appetite permitted to be such? How also does God, who, by the first Supposition and following parts — the philosophers also attesting — does nothing in vain, implant such an idle appetite in man, of so perfect a nature, in so noble a creature? The philosophers did not so judge, nor do they so judge unless perhaps they are senseless. If, however, the aforesaid appetite ought to be satiated, and is not satiated in the present life, as frequent experience teaches, it will therefore be satiated in the future. There will therefore be a resurrection of the dead.

Furthermore, who does not know that the whole man, constituted of soul and body, merits, not the soul alone? Who indeed doubts that the actions of natural species are of the whole composite, not of one part only? Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 1, chapter 64, says: "To say that the soul is angry is similar to saying that it weaves or builds. Better perhaps it is not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or understands, but that the man does so by the soul." And below, 66: "To understand or to love or to hate are not the passions of that, but of him who has it, according as he has it." And what is more just, what more equitable, what more becoming, what more

congruous, what more fitting than that he who merited be rewarded? For what justice, equity, or reason admits that one should merit, and not he himself but another be rewarded — and this not for a brief time but eternally, especially since He whom by meriting he served could, if He willed, equally easily reward the very one who merited in himself? What therefore more fitting than that the whole man in soul together and his own body should be blessedly rewarded? For God can most easily do this, and most fittingly it befits Him, as the foregoing have persuaded.

By such reasonings, therefore, Plato, Porphyry, and many other philosophers, persuaded, unanimously held that human souls, separated by death from bodies, would again be given to bodies — as was touched on above. From these things, however, the error of the response and opinion saying that the soul alone, or man according to the soul alone, ought to be rewarded or punished after death evidently appears. Who also with so great diligence would reasonably labor in worshipping virtues and abstaining from vices, for beatitude to be acquired and misery to be avoided — for another, and not for himself?

For this reason, perhaps, it is otherwise responded, by saying that man is sufficiently rewarded for all his good works in the present; and this seems to be the response of the Epicureans, of the Sadducees, and of Averroes, according to what was touched on at the 36th part. But this is refuted by the foregoing.

Furthermore, since according to the 36th part the rational soul is immortal, and each is each man's own, they will remain after the deaths of men, and not without a fitting recompense of joy or sorrow. For it would not befit nature that souls so noble, separated from bodies, should be deprived of every action and passion, like sleeping or dead, eternally; and that things should be altogether equal for good souls and for bad — which would not befit divine goodness, as the foregoing attest, and all who confess the immortality and propriety of souls unanimously confess. And if souls, after the deaths of men, ought to be sufficiently and beatifically rewarded, they ought to return to their bodies, as the preceding things have persuaded.

Does not Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus — illustrious prophet, and so glorious a philosopher that he is called Father of Philosophers, with Aristotle attesting above alleged — in *On the Eternal Word* 13, dialoguing with Asclepius, write thus: "This man, then, so wrought and conformed and set over such a ministry and obedience by the supreme God, both fittingly cleanly preserving the world, and piously worshipping God, worthily and fittingly obeying the will of God in each — by what gift do you believe such a one ought to be gifted? Indeed, since the world is the work of God, he who by diligence preserves and increases its beauty joins his own work with the will of God; since by the daily care and work of his body he composes the species which He formed by divine intention — by what gift, except that with which our parents were gifted, with which we too desire to be gifted, if it should be pleasing to the divine will (we wish for this with most pious vows): namely, that having served and being stripped of the worldly custody, loosed from the bonds of mortality, He might restore us to the higher part of nature — that is, the divine — pure and holy?" "Justly and truly you say, O Trismegistus. For this is the

reward of those who live piously under God, diligently with the world. Otherwise, those who shall have lived impiously, both return to heaven is denied them, and a foul migration into other bodies unworthy of a holy soul is appointed, as this discourse of reason has proceeded, O Trismegistus, by the hope of future eternity. Souls in worldly things are imperilled, but to others incredible, to others fabulous, to others perhaps it may seem to be ridiculed. For the matter is sweet in this corporeal life, who is captured by fruit from possessions. Wherefore it holds the soul, as they say, by a twisted neck, that it may cleave in the part of itself which is mortal, nor allow that part to acknowledge divinity, the malice envying it immortality."

And below, 30: "Concerning the immortal or the mortal we must now discourse. For many the hope and fear of death tormented, ignorant of true reason. For death comes to pass by the dissolution of the body wearied with labor, and of the number completed by which the members of the body are fitted into one machine for vital uses. This therefore is death — the dissolution of the body, and the perishing of corporeal sense. Concerning this there is superfluous solicitude; but there is also another necessary one, which either ignorance or human incredibility despises." "What is it, O Trismegistus, that they either ignore, or distrust to be possible?" "Hear then, O Asclepius. When the soul has departed from the body, then the judgment and examination of its merit will pass into the power of the highest demon. And he, when he sees it pious and just, permits it to remain in places fitting for it; but if he sees it stained with the spots and vices of offenses, he hurls it down from above to the lowest, and delivers it over to the storms and whirlwinds of often discordant air, fire, and water; among heaven and earth, in floods rushing into diverse parts, it is ever rapt, agitated by eternal punishments — so that in this respect eternity is harmful to the soul, in that by an immortal sentence it is subjected to eternal punishment. Therefore, that we be not entangled by these things, know that we must reverence, fear, and beware. For incredible men after their offenses will be forced to believe — not by words but by examples, not by threats but by the very suffering of penalties." "Therefore, O Trismegistus, are not the offenses of men punished by human law alone?" "First, O Asclepius, the things that are earthly are all mortal; and those things too which are exposed to penalties for the merits or offenses of life by corporeal reason are subjected, after death, to the more savage punishments by so much as in life perhaps they had been hidden, until they were found out. For the requitals of all things are rendered by divinity through judgment, as the punishments are according to the qualities of the offenses."

Where also consequently, 31, concerning the remuneration of the good, he subjoins: "On the contrary, for the just man, in the religion of God and in the highest piety, there is a defense. For God preserves such men from all evils. The Father of all, or Lord, both He who alone is all things in all, gladly shows Himself; for not where He is by place, nor of what kind by quality, nor how great by quantity — but illuminating man by the sole intelligence of mind, who, the darkness of errors having been dispelled from his soul, and the light of truth perceived, mingles himself wholly to the sense of divine intelligence; whose love, freed from the part of nature in which he is mortal, conceives confidence in future immortality. This therefore will distinguish

between the good and the evil; for each one shines forth by piety, religion, prudence, worship, and veneration of God — true reason being perceived, and confidence of his belief — as much among men as the Sun stands forth by light over the other stars."

And further below, 41: "Your grandfather, O Asclepius, the first inventor of medicine — namely Aesculapius — to whom a temple is consecrated on the mountain of Libya, near the shore of the Crocodiles, in which the worldly man (that is, the body) of him lies; for the rest, or rather, if he is a man, the whole has gone back to heaven in the sense of the better life."

Does not Plato too in *Timaeus* 2, chapter 4, say that the gods (namely the angels) after the dissolution ought to receive that loan which they had entrusted — namely the soul — by the separation of soul and body being made? And below, 6, he says that to souls victorious over corporeal passions, return and a seat in the company of a companion star lies open — to do thereafter true and blessed life. Whence Ambrose too, *On the Good of Death*, says: "Plato composed for himself that garden which he called the garden of Jove, elsewhere the garden of the mind; for he called Jove both God and the mind of all. Into this he says the soul (which he names Venus) entered, that she might be filled with the abundance and riches of this garden, in which, filled with drink, she would lie, and the drink would pour forth nectar."

Which perhaps too those ancient poets and theologizers wished to understand, who — Aristotle recounting in *Metaphysics* 3, chapter 15 — posited certain ones tasting nectar and manna to be made gods immortal. Whence Socrates too, as Ambrose recounts in *On the Good of Death*, said he was hastening to his gods, to those best men. This judgment of Socrates, his disciple Plato, with not a few others, imitates, as appears from the demonstration of the 13th part of this work, and universally all those who say that men become gods. Whence Pliny, *Natural History* 2, treating of God, says: "What is to men the way to eternal glory: by this the chiefs of the Romans went; by this now with celestial pace passes the greatest ruler of every age, Vespasian Augustus, succoring exhausted affairs. This is the most ancient custom of returning thanks to those who merit well: that such are ascribed to the divinities. Indeed all the names of other gods too — and those of the stars I mentioned above — were born from the merits of men. To call themselves Jupiter, Mercury, or other names variously among themselves." This whole, however, seems to be referred to the souls of the deceased.

Wherefore Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus, *On the Eternal Word* 41, speaking of Aesculapius and Hermes, men, and Osiris, a woman, deified and worshipped through their idols, says: "It happens by the Egyptians these holy animals are named, and through their individual cities the souls of those whose they are consecrated are worshipped, alive — so that they are inhabited by their laws, and named by their names." But the souls conquered by passions and given over to vices, Plato says, *Timaeus* 21:6, are to be punished with due penalties, as was touched on above. And below, 9, speaking of a man instituted in goodness, honesty, and prudence, and of one contrarily disposed, thus he writes: "If the helpful diligence of honest erudition and moderation comes to this state, immune from all perturbation and sickness, he will pass his age; if neglected,

with a lame way of life, he will be revoked at last to the lower world with his familiar foolishness. But these things shall come about most lately, the merits of life having been already settled."

These things, moreover, in his book *On the Laws*, or *On the Republic*, the immortality of the soul having now been asserted, he establishes consequently that the fruit of justice and of virtues is principally to be expected after the death of man, and likewise the harm of injustice. Wherefore — as Augustine recounts, *City of God* 1, chapter 22 — Cleombrotus, having read the book of Plato in which he disputed of the immortality of the soul, threw himself headlong from a wall, that thus he might migrate from this life to that one which he believed better.

Whom Aristotle, his disciple, follows in *On the Secret of Secrets*, third part, 7: "If," he says, "the soul be perfect and complete before its separation from the body, by the universal virtue which is sublimated through it, and is led to the supernal perfection, then it acquires another government, until it comes to the circle or firmament of the intelligence with which it is well pleasing. But if not, the soul slips down to the abyss of the lower regions, then a government receives it, without hope of pleasing God."

He also, when about to die, instructing and consoling his disciples against the fear of death, and concerning the state of souls after death — as is recounted in the little book written about his death, 6 — thus says: "First I will ask you, do you confess and believe that in the science of philosophy, which contains all sciences, that it is true, and that he who inquires into it inquires into truth and rectitude, and the highest and divine grades, and that through it is the difference between men and other animals?" When they confessed it was so, he secondly thus asks: "If it is so as you say, does good come to man, or does it come to man in this age in which we are today, or after death in another age? If you say in this age in which we are before we die — then you have not learned the fitting grades of science. For most men who have not walked in the right way, nor known their Creator, ended their days in good, and their years in their desires; and there are many wise men who have multiplied themselves in sciences and intelligences, and have learned doctrines, and have known their Creator, and have privation of good and of peace. And you, if you are troubled and fearful of death (which is the way and step of the soul going forth from the body, ignorant to comprehend the divine grades and to join itself to the wise and joyful souls), do not give to science its grades nor its reasons, but you are submerged into the bestial soul with other beasts."

Behold, from these things can be elicited the reason previously made — that because virtuous men are not sufficiently rewarded in the present life, they will be rewarded in the future life. To this he confidently relies almost throughout the whole book, and shows that virtuous men — namely studious philosophers — are by no means plenarily rewarded in this life, since others abound in all kinds of desires and delights in the present, and these are deprived of these, indeed are afflicted with many sorrows; especially since final felicity or beatitude requires perfect delight, as the foregoing manifest; which he himself, *Ethics* 1 and 10, clearly proves.

Whence *Ethics* 1, chapter 13: "The best, and most beautiful, and most delightful, is felicity. And these are not diverse, according to the Delian inscription: the best is the most just, the most desirable is to be healthy, the most delightful is what one desires to enjoy. For all these exist in the best operations; and these — or one of them — the best, we say is felicity." Wherefore in the prior little book, 7, he addresses his disciples thus: "I have declared to you that man cannot comprehend the noble sciences except through the grades of the soul, when it is purged and perfect and sanctified from impurities." And below, 8: "Do you not know that the pure and perfect philosopher mortified all his desires in this age — in feasting, drink, clothing, and other delights, and treasures of gold and silver — and condemned all delights?" And below: "The wise man despised all corporeal delights, and hated them, and perfected his soul in inquiring into the science of his Creator, who from nothing made him a being. He it is who ought to have rejoiced in death, which is the departure of the soul from the body. For what use would he have in life, since he mortified all delights which are despicable and vile? Indeed he ought to exult at the time when his soul drew near to its Creator, and is delighted in His brightness; for he does not fear to draw near to Him, nor finds a contradictor or a repulser — like the souls who followed vanities, nor strove for sciences, nor directed their ways. And these are they who cannot draw near, nor come to that place, but find a contradictor and a repulser."

And further below, 13: "Blessed," he says, "is the soul which is not infected by the depraved works of this world, and has understood its Creator; and it is itself which returns to its place in great delights — not however delights of the body, which are despicable. And woe to the sinful soul, which has not the virtue nor the power of returning to its place, nor can ascend to its homeland; in which the foul works of bodily delight impede its ascent on high." His disciples, following his teaching, when he died, thus said: "May He who collects the souls of philosophers collect your soul, and place it in His treasures, as is worthy of the soul of a man directed and perfect such as you are" — as the end of that little book attests.

A similar judgment concerning the souls of the dead after death Avicenna, *On the Soul* 5, chapter 6, and *Metaphysics* 9, last chapter; and Algazel, *Physics* 4, last chapter, and 5, chapter 1, agreeingly profess. With whom Averroes too agreeingly, on that of the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1, chapter 16, *On the Happy Man*: "as we hold the truly good and wise man to bear all fortunes becomingly," thus says: "as is said of Job: To whom be salvation." For why would he wish for him in death — for the merits of patience or fortitude — and pray for salvation, except that he hoped him and similar dead would be saved?

To these still agreeing, Sextus the Pythagorean in his *Sentences* says: "Believe immortal honors and punishments to remain for you in judgment." And again: "Those living evilly, when they have departed from the body, an evil demon will torment, until he exacts from them even the last farthing." "Blessed is the man whose soul, going to God, no one rebukes." And below: "If anyone unjustly should thrust forth the wise man from the body, by his iniquity he confers a benefit on him; for he is loosed as if from chains." And further: "Whatever pursuits the soul has

wrought while inhabiting the body, it shall have such witnesses in judgment. The unclean demons claim the unclean soul for themselves."

This judgment Italian philosophers also attest — Tully, Seneca, Macrobius, Boethius, and many others. Whence in the Prologue of Macrobius on *The Dream of Scipio*, it is written thus: "So hold, that to all who shall have preserved, helped, and increased their country, there is a certain place defined in heaven, where the blessed enjoy everlasting age. For nothing is more acceptable to that prince of God who rules the whole world, of those things which are done on earth, than counsels and assemblies of men joined by right, which are called Cities. The rectors and preservers of these, having gone forth from here, return hither."

Among the doctrines and wisdoms of Ptolemy, written in the first Prologue of the *Almagest*, it is written thus: "In the good which God works, you ought to attend as it were to the goodness of a generous giver, and in adverse evils as it were to the goodness of purgation and eternal remuneration. The more you draw near to the end, the more do you work the good with increase."

Albumasar, too, in *Greater Introductory* 6, distinction 26, treating of the houses of the planets, says: "The 9th house is called the house of pilgrimages and motion, and of faith and good works, on account of its return to Jupiter signifying the second being. For the native, when he goes forth from the womb of his mother, is changed from place to place, and from being to being, and from the nature of Saturn to the nature of Jupiter, and therefore signifies pilgrimage. And as Jupiter is fortune, and signifies from the fortune of the age substance and duration and abundance, as we said already; and the fortune of the future age which is by faith — therefore signifies also faith, and the signification has been made here for this house similar to the same signification. Again too, since Jupiter and Venus are fortunes, and there are two species of fortunes, of which one is the fortune of this world, and the other of the future age; and the fortune of another world is more worthy than the fortune of this world; and that one is sought through faith — and because Jupiter is more fortune than Venus, therefore signification has been given to him over faith, through which the fortune of the future age is sought, which is more worthy; and signification has been given to Venus over the fortunes of this world, of plays, joy, and gladness."

Have not these later philosophers borrowed this judgment of theirs from the more ancient philosophers of the Hebrews, according to what is set forth concerning the 35th part? For the Pharisees — Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 18, chapter 3, reporting — "hold that there will be a future judgment of God; there all men will receive their proper merits, both those who lived according to virtue and those who were depraved by wickedness; and they say souls are immortal." Who also in book 2 of *On the Jewish War*, speaking of Essenes placed in tortures, thus says: "In the midst of torments smiling, and mocking those who applied the torments, they returned constant souls with a certain hilarity — as if those who would receive them again. And some agreeing with the good in this opinion of the Greeks, declare that they dwell beyond the Ocean, where enjoyment is laid up for them. There indeed there is a region which is not weighed

down by rains, nor snows, nor heats, but which the rising Zephyr from the Ocean and breathing gently makes pleasant. To wicked souls, however, they delegate stormy and wintry places, full of groans of penalties to be exercised without end. Now to me they seem, according to this very intelligence, to have set apart for the Greeks too, for those whom they called Heroes and Demigods, the Islands of the Blessed; for the souls of the wicked the place among the Lower Ones of the impious, in which they have invented certain ones too to be tormented — Sisyphus and Tantalus and Ixion and Tityus."

For the Greeks call Heroes the noble and well-meriting souls dwelling above in air or aether. Whence Isidore, *Etymologies* 8, chapter 47, thus writes: "They say the Heroes drew their name from Juno; for in Greek Juno is called *Hera*; and therefore I know not which her son, according to the Greek fable, was called Eros — this fable mystically signifying that the air is appointed to Juno, where they wish the Heroes to dwell, by which name they call the souls of certain meritorious deceased — as it were aerial — and aerial men, and worthy of heaven on account of wisdom and fortitude."

This judgment of the Greeks, fabulous, Aristotle touches in *Physics* 4, chapter 97, where he teaches: "Those not perceiving motion do not perceive time, just as neither do those who are fabled in Sardo to sleep among the Heroes, when they are awake." Nor ought it to disturb that this is given as a fable. For this is not a fable which is fictitious and false both in narration and in signification; but one which under metaphorical, tropic, figurative narration, for the sake of rhetoric, wishes mystically to announce some true fact. For this species of fable seems to fit Rhetoricians and Poets. For many approved men have expounded poetic fables to a solid intelligence. And who does not know that those famous Aesopic and Libyan fables contain a clear sense mystically — as Papias in his *Elementary*, and Isidore, *Etymologies* 1, chapter 95, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2, chapter 25, and others elsewhere attest? Wherefore according to the Philosopher, the place above: a fable is a certain species of rhetorical persuasion, distinguished against the parable on the other side. Where also first he recounts a Libyan fable by which Stesichorus dissuaded the Himeraeans, who wished to choose a foreign emperor as the leader of their army against enemies. He spoke a fable: how the horse alone obtained a meadow; but with a stag coming and corrupting the pastures, wishing to punish the stag, he asked a certain man if he could punish the stag with him. He answered: if he should accept a bridle, and he himself should ride upon him, holding a lance. When he had consented and mounted on him to punish the stag, he served the man. "Thus too you," he said, "see that wishing to punish your adversaries, you do not suffer the same as the horse with the bridle. For what do you have when now you are choosing a leader of the army, an emperor?"

Where also presently adding another species of fable, he says: Aesop, addressing the people in Samos when the ruler of the people was being judged to death, said: "A fox crossing a river was thrust into a hole; and not being able to come out, was afflicted for a long time, and many dog-flies clung to her. A hedgehog wandering, when he saw her, took pity, and asked if he should take away the dog-flies from her; but she did not permit it. When he asked why, she said: 'Because

these are now full of me, and draw little blood; but if you take these away, others coming hungry will drink up the rest of my blood.' Thus also you, men of Samos, this man will harm no further, for he is rich; but if you kill him, others will come, poor men, who will absorb you, stealing the rest." There are, however, fables for assemblies, and they have this good — that to find similar things in real affairs is difficult; but fables more easily. For one must do as in parables, if one can see something similar — which indeed to do is from philosophy.

Wherefore in the Prologue of his *Metaphysics* he says: "And the Philosopher is in some way a Philomath." Does not the Philosopher's *Poetics* clearly teach similar things? Does he not, in *Meteorologica* 1, last chapter, expound the fable of those riddling about Ocean — that it flows circularly around the earth from subtle vapor ascending above and thickened descending below? Does not the same in *On the World*, last chapter, expound that famous fable of the three fatal sisters, who are commonly called Clotho, Lachesis, Atropos, to a true understanding concerning God, thus saying: "The fable too is completed not without order. But these are nothing other than God, just as also the strenuous Plato says."

Does not also in the Prologue of *Timaeus* of Plato, 5, that Ovidian fable of Phaethon get expounded in these words: "That fable too which is known to us, of Phaethon son of the Sun affecting the office of his father, having ascended the chariot of light, nor with the solemn orbits of charioteering preserved, having burned earthly things, and himself having been consumed by celestial flames — it is reckoned a fable, but it is true. For at long intervals there is an excursion of the world's revolution, which a vastness of conflagration must necessarily follow." Which also Aristotle in *On the World* 12, though briefly, in similar manner understands and expounds. Wherefore Macrobius on *The Dream of Scipio* says: "Philosophy does not contend with all fables, nor does it acquiesce in all; and that it can easily be discerned which of these it abdicates from itself, and as profane excludes from the very vestibule of sacred disputation, and which it admits often and willingly — must be unfolded by degrees of division." Which he pursues at length not in one division but in many. Let it suffice to have spoken thus much, not impertinently, of fables.

By the foregoing, however, can easily be known how the Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, Arabian, and Italian (or Latin) philosophers agreeingly profess the rewarding and punishment of souls after death. With whom agreeingly the community of Greek and Latin poets supposes a similar remuneration of good and evil after death. For they say that some good and noble men — for instance, Saturn, Jupiter, and the like — are made gods after death; some, however, are translated to the gods and remain with them; the wicked, however, they affirm are sunk down into the lower world and tormented by infernal punishments. For they posit four or five rivers flowing in the lower world, in which souls are tortured: of which one is burning, one is freezing, but each having its own punishment, as poetic books often show. These, among the poets, are commonly named Styx, Phlegethon, Cocytus or Cocitus, and Acheron, and Lethe.

Concerning which Eberhard the Bithynian in his *Greek Things*, among the Greek names, says: "Styx, hatred; Lethe, oblivion; but Phlegethon, burning; Cocytus, mourning; Acheron sounds sad" — which by others elsewhere are more amply expounded. Lethe, however, by some is therefore called oblivion, because whoever in the lower world drinks from it forthwith forgets all things, and goes happy to those above. This perhaps not ineptly signifies the river of divine clemency, by which souls fully purged, visited, are freed from all sorrow and translated to celestial joys.

Does not, also, as Ambrose touches in *On the Good of Death*, the poets fable that the wicked in the lower world sustain the barkings of Cerberus, and the sad whirlpool of the river of Cocytus, the still sadder Charon, the troops of Furies, or having been snatched from prison; and after these, one whom the more savage Hydra has as her seat; and there too entrails fertile for repaired punishments. There an immense vulture, without any end, feeds; and the perpetual giddiness of the wheel of Ixion under the atrocity of penalty; and even the impending ruin of a rock from above, hanging over the heads of those reclining among the feasts. Cerberus, according to the poets, is the dog of the lower world having three heads; Charon the porter of the lower world; and the Furies are called Goddesses of the lower world, who are also called Eumenides — Alecto, Tisiphone, and Megaera. These three are feigned to be women with hair of serpents; the Hydra a serpent of nine horrid heads, of which when one is cut off, three grow up in its place. Ixion, as they say, after he sought the unlawful embraces of Juno, is bound on a wheel with serpents in the lower world. The remaining words of this fable are clear, in which nothing is alien from mystery.

Furthermore, if man is sufficiently rewarded for good works in the present, what is that reward, what is the wage, what is the good? It will be said perhaps that it is the essential goodness inseparably following a good act; and this judgment seems able to be gathered from the words of the Philosopher, *Ethics* 9, chapter 9, saying: "He himself doing good will be helped, and he will help others; for every intellect chooses the best for itself; the *epieikes* obeys his intellect. For it is true what is said of the studious man, and that he does many things for the sake of his friends, and dies for his country if it is fitting. For he will throw away both monies and honors, and entirely the goods around which there is contention, procuring for himself good. For he will choose to take delight much more for a little time than tranquilly for a long, and to live well a year than many years however; and one good and great action than many small ones. To those dying, however, this perhaps too happens. They choose for themselves the great, and throw away monies, in order that their friends may receive more. For monies become for the friend, and the good for himself; he attributes to himself the greater good."

But this is refuted by the foregoing concerning the next part of this work; and because then likewise any evil act would be sufficiently punished by the malice inseparably accompanying it — against what is shown previously concerning the next part of this work. How also does just God, who according to the 30th part of this work wills to be loved and worshipped by men above all things — namely so that for any goods whatsoever they would not knowingly offend Him in

anything — for so great a love, for so great a service, render so little to them, against the 31st part? How also does true God, who according to the same 30th part wills to be loved and worshipped by men above all things on account of Himself finally, render not Himself but another non-final and beatific reward — according to what was previously touched on in the demonstration of the 32nd part of this work?

Nor is one who works well sufficiently rewarded by the delight connected to his operation, since that is less good than the essential and moral goodness inseparably following it — as no one is ignorant, and as the foregoing show concerning the 31st part. Sometimes, moreover, a lesser delight accompanies a better operation — perhaps none — as is seen of the operations of fortitude, or of certain passions, as Aristotle, *Ethics* 3, chapter 18, expressly attests. Whence also is then evil delightful operation, and sin, sufficiently punished? This little response too will be reproved like the prior. Nor is one praiseworthy working sufficiently rewarded by other voluptuous things, or by other corporeal delights, since these are less good than the goodnesses and delights other above-mentioned, which are proved less to suffice. Many virtuous men too flee such voluptuous things, sustain very many adversities, do not have prosperities, nor enjoy such delights; indeed less virtuous and especially the most vicious men wallow most in such voluptuousnesses, do not feel adversities, abound in prosperities, and enjoy delights — like beasts unbridled. These therefore — as much beasts as bestial men — seem more blessed than virtuous men.

Is not also, according to what is set forth here, beatitude or felicity the final reward of virtuous work, or of the virtuous man? But this does not consist in the foulnesses of swine, and in the voluptuousnesses of Epicurus, as the foregoing concerning the 32nd part of this work show. This little response too can be refuted easily by what is the first.

Furthermore, neither do the external goods of fortune sufficiently reward the virtuous man working virtuously. For the goodness essentially following the good act exceeds all external goods, as can be had from the demonstration of the 31st part; and this by no means sufficiently rewards the virtuous man, as was shown above. Moral virtue too, and virtuous operation, is incomparably better than riches, possessions, dominations, honors, and other external goods, as no one rightly philosophizing denies. How therefore is it plenarily rewarded by these — especially by God, who does not reward sparingly but abundantly, with the 31st part attesting? Is not, with Aristotle as judge, *Ethics* 4, chapter 7: "Honor is the greatest of those things which are external goods"? Wherefore he himself in his *Economics* says: "What each man bears most heavily is to be deprived of his honor." Wherefore also in the *Ethics*, where he first says: "The reward of virtue is honor." But how disproportionate a reward, how shadowy, how empty, how unequal a recompense, how inferior a wage is honor compared to virtue and virtuous work — who does not know? Wherefore the same Philosopher, *Ethics* 4, chapter 8, says: "To perfect virtue worthy honor will not by any means come." Many works too are virtuous secret ones, not patent to another's notice, to which worthy honor is not rendered.

This too will be refuted as the prior. For it is certain that felicity or beatitude is the final reward of the virtuous, and that this does not consist in such goods. Wherefore Averroes too with his followers says: human felicity consists in speculative sciences acquired. For in his Prologue on *Physics* 1, he thus says: "The being of man according to his ultimate perfection — and the grace of him is perfect — is to be himself perfect through speculative sciences; and this disposition is for him final felicity, and supernal life with this science." But this response can be corrected like the priors. Furthermore, it is certain that felicity is not only good but the best, and this not accidentally but essentially and by itself. But perfection through speculative sciences is not such. For many men can be perfect in speculative sciences, and are dishonest and bad — as reason and experience manifest, and Averroes in the Prologue on *Physics* 1, and 8, plainly grants. But better than this perfection is perfection through moral, heroic, or divine virtues.

For it does not escape you, Averroes, that Aristotle, your god, *Ethics* 7, chapter 1, writes thus: "But to bestiality there most fits to say above us a certain heroic and divine virtue — as Homer concerning Hector made Priam to say, that he was very greatly good, nor seemed to be the son of a mortal man, but of God. Wherefore if, as they say, from men become gods, on account of such excess of virtue, there will indeed be a certain habit, namely opposite to bestiality." But moral, heroic, or divine virtues are not only speculative, but practical or active, or more truly operative. Wherefore the same Philosopher, *Ethics* 10, chapter 13, plainly teaches: "For felicity one must aim at works and at life." And he subjoins: "He who works according to intellect, and is concerned for it, and is best disposed, seems to be most loved by God. For if there is some care of human things by the gods, as it seems, it will be reasonable both that they take pleasure in the best and most akin to themselves; this will be intellect, and those who love this most, and honor it, and benefit it as friends caring for them, both rightly and well operating. That all these things most exist for the wise man is not unmanifest. Therefore he is most loved by God; and the same it is fitting also to be most happy."

On which also you, Averroes, say: "If there be care of God for men, as he believes — and as is due — He rejoices in the better, and it is more worthy that He do good to those who love Him more, and honor them, and visit them, as is the disposition of friend with friend." Where also below 14, the Philosopher writes thus: "It is not in operables the end to speculate each, nor knowing nothing sufficient of virtue; but to have and to use, must be tried, that we may be in some way good." And above, *Ethics* 2, chapter 2: "Since the present negotiation is not for the sake of contemplation, as others (for not, that we may know what virtue is, do we scrutinize, but that we may be made good — since otherwise it would be no benefit), it is necessary to scrutinize the things which concern operations, how to operate them; for these are the mistresses. Therefore to operate according to right reason is common."

Wherefore also the Father of philosophers, Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 14, teaches that true philosophy consists in knowing the divinity, and in holy and divine religion. And he subjoins: "Therefore the men who shall be after us, deceived by the cunning of sophists, will be turned away from the true science and pure philosophy. For with simple mind and soul to worship the

divinity, and to venerate its deeds, and to give thanks to the will of God, which is most full goodness alone — this is philosophy uncorrupted by no importune curiosity of the soul." Sextus the Pythagorean too, in his *Sentences*, says: "Understand what are good things, that you may act well."

Who too does not know that, when it is asked: "What kind of man is he?" and it is answered simply: "Good, or evil," it is understood of the goodness or malice of conduct and life, not of speculative knowledge or ignorance — but if he is a good philosopher, or good cleric, the answer is given thus. Which the Philosopher above seems to have intimated when he said: "Not that we may know do we scrutinize, but that we may be made good."

Who, moreover, I ask, is so knowing that he is deceived in nothing, nor errs — that he knows perfectly all things he wishes — that his desire is quieted in all things and plenarily satiated? For this felicity demands, and beatitude requires, as the foregoing attest. Who, moreover, of the men of science is so wholly blessed and felicitous in the present life, that even in soul and in body, and in their powers, he enjoys full beatitude, without labor and pain, without defect and misery, without repugnance or discord? Does not the body and the corporeal powers fail when the soul progresses? Does not the soul fail and languish when the body progresses? Does not continual discord persevere between body and soul? How therefore, with these things being so, is the whole man perfectly blessed to be esteemed, and not rather wretched?

What also, according to that judgment, would be the misery of the vicious? Either it is deception contrary to true science — and then the greater philosophers, on account of their multiple contradiction, are more wretched than beasts, than bestial men, and than simple idiots — or it is the simple lack or ignorance of science. And so the most viciously operating, but learning nothing, and the simply learning nothing nor doing anything evil, would be subject to equal misery.

If, too, speculative science were by itself and essentially the end, felicity, and human beatitude, it seems that man should or could acquire that end by whatever means possible to him, others failing — even by sin. Are also only the speculative philosophers, and none others — however morally and deiformly virtuous — to be reputed capable of being made happy or beatified, when felicity is the common good and end of any natural man, when also many such love and worship God more, and more observe the divine law and the rule of reason? Let Averroes recall, I pray, his sayings, and Aristotle's previously alleged.

Wherefore some perhaps will say that moral or heroic virtue, or its augmentation, sufficiently rewards virtuous works. But this little response, like the first of these and the next, is chastised. Nor does anything sufficiently reward man except felicity, as the foregoing attest. This, however, does not consist in habit but in act, since a good act is more perfectly held than potency toward good — as no one is ignorant, and the demonstration of the first Supposition, and many philosophers, attest; which the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1, chapter 12, clearly proves; and below, the same, last: "They say there is no difference, according to half life, between the happy and the

wretched. This happens fittingly; for sleep is the rest of the soul, according as it is said studious or depraved." Wherefore perhaps one will join both these intellectual and moral virtues together, saying that in both jointly felicity consists, by which man is plenarily rewarded; and thus Averroes in the Prologue on *Physics* 1 of Aristotle seems to have judged. But this, like the priors and the next, will be repelled.

Therefore perhaps someone will say: not the virtuous habit, but the act, is felicity and consummated beatitude of man, and his plenary and perfect reward in the present life; and so Aristotle seems to opine. But this little response will be reproved like the first and the others following. Is not any virtuous act in the present state free, praiseworthy, and meritorious of reward, and a better one of a better reward? What therefore is the reward of that beatific and felicitous act? Not it itself: clear, and especially because it intended another — namely God — finally, according to the document of the 30th part; and because, according to the 31st of this work, God rewards no one sparingly but abundantly. Nor another, lest the process happen to be infinite.

Wherefore Aristotle and Averroes, more subtly and more nearly to truth thinking, said human felicity consists in conjunction or copulation of him with the agent intellect in the present life — though it last for a small time. Whence Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12, chapter 38, speaking of the first principle from which heaven and nature depend, thus says: "An induction such as is best is for us for a short time; thus always is impossible for us." On which Averroes: "From this it indeed appears that Aristotle thinks the fortune of men, in that they are men, is not except by their continuation with the intellect, which is declared in the book *On the Soul* to be the principle agent and moving us. For the abstracted Intelligences, in that they are abstracted, ought to be the principles of those of which they are principles in two ways: as moving, and as end. For the agent Intelligence, inasmuch as it is abstracted and a principle to us, must necessarily move us, according as a beloved moves a lover. And if every motion must be continued with that from which it is, according to the end, we must in the last be continued with this abstracted intellect, so that we shall depend from such a principle, from which heaven depends, although this be in us for a small time, as Aristotle said." He too above 18 hands down a similar judgment to this. He too on *On the Soul* 3, comment 36, thus writes: "It is necessary that the agent intellect be coupled with us, by the continuation of speculative intelligibles. And it is manifest that when all speculative intelligibles shall be existing in us in potency, that he will be coupled with us in potency; and when some shall be in us in potency, some in act, then he will be coupled with us according to part, and according to part not, and then we are said to be moved to continuation. And it is manifest that when the motion shall be completed — when, namely, all speculative intelligibles shall be existing with us in act — then he will be coupled with us according to part, and according to part not — and then they are said to be moved to continuation, and it is manifest that when this motion is completed, immediately that intellect will be coupled with us in all ways. And then it is manifest that the proportion of him to us in that disposition is as the disposition of the intellect which is in habit to us. And since it is so, it is necessary that man

understand by the intellect proper to him all beings, and that he act the action proper to him on all beings — just as he understands by the intellect which is in habit, when it shall be continued with the imaginable forms, all beings by an intellection proper. Therefore man, according to this mode, as Themistius says, is assimilated to God, in that he is all beings in some way, and knows them in some way. For beings are nothing other than His knowledge: nor is the cause of beings other than His knowledge. And how marvelous is this order, and how strange is this mode of being!"

Truly, if this felicity of man last for a small time, as you say — and as must necessarily be said, since all philosophizing men, and others, experience most certainly that they lack this felicity nearly for the whole time of their life — except perhaps, according to your judgment, in the last moment of life, with corporeal powers as it were extinct, and he himself now nearly alienated from body in ecstasy, syncope, or rapture — how is it sufficiently compensated for the labors and virtuous works of a man performed for his whole time, through a hundred, five hundred, or a thousand years? How is so great strenuousness, so great penalty, so great daily duration rewarded by so brief a stipend? Especially by God, who according to the foregoing always rewards beyond what is fitting, and abundantly — who could most easily reward him much more in the present life, by anticipating this reward, or by continuing the present life further; or in the future life according to the 37th and the next part of this work?

Does it befit a man, an earthly prince, that a soldier, who has fought for him and his honor for the whole of his time, in many years most strenuously, despising profits and delights, sustaining hunger and thirst, heat and cold, blows, wounds, chains, prisons, and all kinds of penalties most strongly, should refresh by a momentary delight only, reward only with momentary wage, and render only a momentary crown — especially if he could equally easily reward him much more? Does this befit a good man? Does this befit a just, clement, powerful, retributive, beneficent, magnificent, liberal, or generous man? — and not rather a sparing, niggardly, and tenacious one? But God in all conditions of virtue exceeds any man infinitely, as the first Supposition, the third part, and the fourth demonstrate.

How, moreover, would such a Prince, by such a momentary reward, sufficiently animate soldiers and stir up the slothful to such great and such daily labors, to so wearisome and dangerous a soldiery, to be strenuously exercised for such long times? How therefore God His own? How also is so small, so fluid, so brief a reward compensated to so great a love — by which one taught in the art of loving in the school of the 30th part loves God, by which he loves Him above all things conceivable, so much that for no goods or evils, delightful or sad, however great, however lasting — even through eternal time — would he in any way knowingly offend Him, by omitting due service, or committing some displeasure? — especially since God rewards each according to the quality and quantity of his service, work, and love, and not sparingly but largely, according to the 31st part, as the demonstration of the next part also touches.

Does not anyone naturally desire good, and the greater more, so also desire a durable, daily good, and a more durable or daily one more; and the better or greater the good is, the more does he desire it to remain longer? How therefore is this appetite of the blessed satiated by a beatitude so transitory, scarcely hourly or momentary? Or how will he be blessed, while he is not plenarily satiated, but hungers, thirsts, and desires what he does not have, nor will have in perpetuity — as the preceding things, with Aristotle attesting, taught?

Likewise such a blessed or felicitous man either knows that he will lose so great a beatific good, or believes the contrary, or considers neither. If he knows that he will lose it, it seems he grieves. For who would not grieve at the irrecoverable loss of so great a good, when he would grieve at the loss of a lesser good? Do not also you, Aristotle, *Ethics* 3, chapter 18, speaking of the brave man, thus say: "By how much one has every virtue, and is the more felicitous, the more in death will tristesse be. For to such a one most worthy is to live, and he is deprived of the greatest goods knowingly; this however is sad" — or at least he does not rejoice perfectly. For more fully would he rejoice if he knew, or believed, that good would remain. Wherefore he does not seem perfectly blessed, since perfect beatitude perfectly contains all goods required for beatitude — which joy is established to be.

If he believes the contrary, he is foully deceived, not concerning impertinent things, but concerning the greatest, and his proper good. How therefore felicitous, who is deceived by false hope, is harmed by so great an evil, is blinded by such error, and stained by so great foulness?

How also does the perfectly blessed man not know that he will lose his beatific good, when you, not blessed, know this? When also, according to you, Averroes, the blessed knows all things, like God? If he considers neither, how does he know all things? You too, not blessed, know that you will lose your beatific good — why does not the blessed man himself know it? How, moreover, is it likely to be esteemed that he should consider nothing concerning his great good — whether he ought to lose it or to hold it inadmissibly — when the wise man considers this frequently concerning lesser goods, when also the security of retaining the beatific good acquired, so desirably coveted, so joyfully attained, so lovingly possessed, would seem the most happy and most blessed portion of him? Will not the felicitous, unless perchance he died by the most natural death (as very few or none die), before death sustain pain and tristesse? How therefore is felicity then, and not rather misery, to be expected?

Furthermore, if the beatific reward of man were to be expected in the present life, no young man, ever — and universally no one not yet attaining beatitude — should reasonably expose himself to death knowingly for the preservation of divine religion, for the defense of the Republic, for the salvation of parents or friends, and universally from any cause whatsoever. For who reasonably ought to lose, or not acquire, his greatest good for no good, or for a lesser good — for a small momentary augment of virtue in the present, or for any other whatsoever? Who, too, does not know that beatitude exceeds every other human good? Nor too should one who has attained felicity, from any cause whatsoever, expose himself to death; because by so doing, through the

tristesse of wounds, and by the anticipation of death, he would diminish and curtail his joyful beatitude, and his greatest good.

Do not you, Aristotle, *Ethics* 3, chapter 18, say: "To be struck is grievous if carnal, and sad; every labor is such; and what is around fortitude — death indeed and wounds are sad to the brave"? But for what reason, except a most irrational one, ought a man to make himself worse, to make himself less good and altogether not good? Does not, with the spirit of each judging, and you Aristotle attesting: "Every act and choice seem to desire some good"? "Therefore well they pronounced that good which all things desire; and every intellect chooses the best for itself; and that for the cause of which singulars are to be done, is the good of each one; but the entirely best is in the nature of all." Wherefore also concerning the liberal man you write thus: "If however besides the best and well having him to consume occurs, he will be saddened." No one therefore at all ought to expose himself to death from any cause, nor to mortal danger.

Who therefore will be brave for religion or divine law, who will fight bravely for the Republic or for friends? How efficaciously will anyone be provoked to fight strenuously, to bear death if necessary, if dying he loses all goods, nor receives any wage after death in eternity? Hermes, in *On the Eternal Word*, did not so judge; Plato in *On the Laws* or *On the Republic* did not so judge; Varro did not so judge, nor Tully, nor Macrobius, nor any other wise instituter or rector of the Republic — none so judged, except those who consented to senseless men.

Do not you, Aristotle, *Ethics* 9, chapter 9, affirm that the studious man, for the sake of friends and country, ought, if it is fitting, to die? Do not you, *Ethics* 3, treating of fortitude, teach the same? But how can one efficaciously exhort the timid of death, the slothful and the dispirited, to fight strenuously, not to fear death, but to bear it briskly if needful — if no wage, or only a sparing one, in the present is rendered to them; indeed if dying they lose the beatitude they had, and the possibility of beatitude, and all goods, without any hope of future retribution? Far be such wretched poverty and such poor wretchedness from the nature of things, from the universality of beings, from the great Republic of the great world, from the most powerful and most copious and most generous Prince of the ample world! Far be it that God should so unrewardedly cast off and condemn His lovable lovers, His strenuous soldiers, the defenders of His injury — those who fight inflexibly to death for Himself, His honor, religion and law, for justice and the preservation of the Republic divinely instituted — on account of the 31st part. Nor does He sufficiently reward them in the present; therefore He will do so in the future.

Furthermore, that beatification which you posit is too diminished, since though it perfects man according to soul, not however according to body. For the body then fails, and the corporeal powers. That felicity too, according to your doctrine, is a human act, and not necessary as it seems but free, since it is the most noble act of man, of the most noble rational power, which according to your saying is capable of opposites. It seems therefore praiseworthy and meritorious of reward. But of what? What is that reward? Not the same felicity itself, the same act — clear; nor another felicity, lest perhaps the process in felicities be infinite; nor anything else in the

present — for what? It also seems that the man placed in ecstasy does not have free use of himself.

Do not also you yourself, Averroes, on *Metaphysics* 12, comment 18, say: "If this intellect be denuded near the human perfection from potency, it must necessarily that this action be destroyed by him, which is other than him; and then either we shall not understand at all by this intellect, or we shall understand according to that which his action is his substance — and it is impossible that in any hour we should not understand by him. It remains therefore that, when this intellect shall have been denuded from potency, that we understand by him according as the action is his substance — and this is final prosperity"?

If too such felicity be the final reward of the virtuous man, what is the final misery or punishment of the vicious man? Not only the privation of that felicity. For thus the vicious and the neuter would be reputed equally wretched, and to be punished with equal punishment. What therefore else?

Were not those who were most joined with the principle of heaven and of nature, with the agent intellect, with God, in the present life — those famous and renowned Prophets, who with God and through God, as it were God in some manner, beheld all or most things most marvelously, and prophesied things seen to others not seeing — as was touched on above? Whence too they were called of old "seers" and Prophets. They themselves, however, agreeing attest a future life, rewards and punishments according to the difference of merits.

This response too can be corrected as the priors. But hearken, Averroes, I pray, especially to one word. When you say: "When all speculative intelligibles shall be in us in potency, the agent intellect will be coupled with us in potency; and when some shall be in us in potency, some in act, then he will be coupled with us according to part, and according to part not, and then we are said to be moved to continuation; and when this motion shall be completed — when, namely, all speculative intelligibles shall be with us in act — then he will be coupled with us in act, in all ways" — too manifestly that prior in nature the man will have all speculative intelligibles actually coupled with him, before the agent intellect be coupled with him; and that this is the cause of that coupling. But this is manifest impossible, as the demonstration of the 32nd and 36th parts perspicuously showed. For this would necessarily be by infinite acts or habits, and infinitely infinite — indeed infinitely infinitely without end.

What you also assert — that man then knows all things — who is this? Who in all retroact times has been such? Who ever was found such? How many glorious philosophers preceded — but who of them was found such? Was not Aristotle, your god, and the most famous of philosophers, by his own attestation ignorant of the squaring of the circle? Did he not also ignore very many other mathematical, natural, metaphysical or theological, and moral things, as his books evidently indicate? Have not all philosophers contradicted one another in some things, even to the going forth of their life? How therefore and when did all these know all things? And if not these, who others are these?

What, moreover, you add — that man will then perform a proper action on all beings like God — wonderful! Who ever of philosophers or others has been found such, except perhaps those famous and illustrious Prophets, powerful in deed and word, knowing all or most things divinely, and doing all kinds of miracles in heaven, in fire, in air, in water, in earth, and under earth, in men, in beasts of burden, and as it were in all beings, divinely — as the foregoing concerning the 32nd part evidently indicate? But these unanimously profess a future life after death in glory and in punishment.

The cause of this error of yours, however, seems to be the unity of the intellect and of the rational soul in all men, which you erroneously posited, as is shown above. Nor is it wonder if from one error error breaks forth — nay, from one error innumerable errors are propagated. The cause, however, of Aristotle's error in this part was the error concerning the eternity of the world, and of human generation; therefore he had consequently to posit only the immortal souls to be beatified after death, not the whole composite of soul and body. For he did not posit the return of souls to bodies, nor the same man in number to return, as the Platonists posited.

Nor ought the irrational reason of Simon to disturb anyone — denying the resurrection of the dead, because it is against nature, if omnipotent God, the author of all nature, be considered. Indeed if we follow Plato, who — John of Salisbury reporting, *Policraticus* 2, chapter 12 — asserts nature to be the will of God, the resurrection of the dead will be according to nature, because according to divine will. This Simon too Dionysius, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Origen, and Epiphanius rebuke and refute.

Those, however, positing the return of human souls to bestial bodies — as Plato, Ovid, and the other Platonists — horribly deviate, and monstrously rave. For who of philosophers does not know that proper natural forms desire proper matter disposed according to proper conditions, and do not enter others? Who also does not know that natural species — for example, man and ass — disagree specifically, essentially from one another by substantial differences and forms, essentially, substantially, and specifically differing? How therefore does the form or soul of a man constitute an ass, or contrariwise?

If too the soul of a man, putting off the human body, would immediately put on a bestial one, and the same man would live, but under another form, as Ovid feigns, as Plato also seems to think — that man would never die, but continuously live, since the last of a permanent thing is not given but the first — which Ovid too seems manifestly to grant. For he says: "All things change, nothing perishes." But who, senseless, would grant that man — and universally no man — dies? If too man does not die, he will not rise again, against the prior particle of this part.

You also are repugnant to yourself, Ovid; do you not, below in the same, thus say:

Time devourer of things, and you, envious old age, destroy all things, and the things vitiated with the teeth of age little by little with slow death you consume.

And further below, toward the end, speaking of Julius Caesar, dead, and his nobility, and many others dead, and the elder of Julius's nephews, and Augustus Caesar, then alive, you write thus:

Nor unless when older he shall have equaled like years, will he touch the ethereal seats and the kindred stars. Meanwhile snatch this soul from the slain body, make it a sunbeam, that always our Capitol and forum the divine Julius from his lofty temple may look upon. Hardly had he spoken, when in the midst of the seat of the Senate kindly Venus stood, to none discernible, and from the limbs of her own Caesar snatched it, nor allowed it to be loosed into air; the recent soul, but bore it among the celestial stars. And while she bore it, she felt it take divinity and kindle, and she sent it forth at once; at once it flies higher, and drawing a flame-bearing hair on a spacious path, the star shines, and seeing the well-deeds of her son confesses them to be greater than her own, and rejoices to be conquered by him. He although forbids his own things to be preferred to his father's, yet free fame, subject to no commands, prefers him unwilling, and only in this part is repugnant. So Atreus yields to the great titles of Agamemnon, so Theseus surpassed Aegeus, so Achilles' Peleus. Finally, that I may use examples equating themselves, so Saturn too is less than Jove, Jove tempers the ethereal towers, and the kingdoms of the threefold world. The earth is under Augustus; both are Father and Ruler.

And in the end, concerning yourself you thus say:

When that day shall will, which has right over nothing but this body, may it end the space of my uncertain age. In the better part of me, however, perennial above the high stars I shall be borne.

Do you not here say expressly that well-merited souls are to be lifted up to the stars, and there to be placed in different mansions or places, according to the differences of their merits?

Furthermore, if well-merited human souls immediately return to such bodies, and to such worldly life, when and where are they sufficiently rewarded for their merits? Not when they bore their ancient habitations, their former bodies, and in those — as the preceding things manifest — nor when they are separated from all bodies, since (as this opinion says) immediately after those they enter others; nor in the second bestial bodies, since right rewarding ought to make the rewarded better. But who doubts that a beast is more vile than a man? What melioration or reward, I ask, is to be reputed — that the soul, so noble, so perfect, should from a body so noble and perfect be expelled to a body so much more ignoble and vile, that so noble a creature should be turned into so horrid a monster? How is such a transformation rather to be deemed reward and not punishment? Or if any reward whatever could be feigned, yet not the most generous and beyond what is fitting, according to the judgment of the next and 31st part and their demonstrations.

How, moreover, does just God — who by reason as mistress teaches us that He is to be loved and worshipped by us above all things, so much that for any goods or evils we ought not knowingly to offend Him in any way, as the 30th part attests — render to them so sparing and small a reward for so great a love and so great worship, against the 31st part? How also does true God,

who according to the doctrine of the same 30th part wills Himself to be loved and worshipped by men finally on account of Himself, render to them not Himself but another non-final reward — another, I say, incomparably less than Himself, and as it were nothing and empty? How is such a one plenarily beatified? How is his desire satiated? — as has been argued above.

Nor are virtuous-living human souls, having immediately entered other human bodies for worldly life, thus beatified to the full. For they return to the wonted labor and pain, to the state of meriting newly and sinning, to the wearinesses and miseries customary. But how is such a condition to be reputed sufficient wage of all prior labors, and felicity of man?

Does not also the soul of man, just as it has the natural aptitude and appetite for body — and not indifferently for any body whatever, but for human body — so also, among human ones, for the proper body which it bore, in which and through which it exercised noble acts, and which it loved more than an extraneous and altogether alien human body? Thus the soldier too would more desire and love his own and ancient horse and sword, by which he strenuously bore himself, than others. Wherefore the Poet says: "The soldier honors the horse with which he has grown old."

Pliny too, *Natural History* 8, recounts, and other histories attest, that Alexander, for his horse Bucephalus killed, made solemn obsequies, and committed him to burial; and around his sepulcher, building a city, named it by his name. And what is more fitting, what more becoming, what more congruous to reason, than that the whole man who merited — the same whole, not another — be rewarded in the same soul and body, by which he exercised the works of strenuousness? What more apt, and more fitting to retributive justice, than that the same man who merited — in the same soul and body in which he merited, abstained from delights, sustained sadnesses, hunger and thirst, cold and heat, vigils and toils, blows, wounds, prisons, and squalors, and a most strong death at last — should, reunited together, be rewarded; molestations, harms, sadnesses, and toils removed, be cherished by delights, and softened by joys, and enjoy gladnesses?

This is convinced not only by moral or divine reason, but even by natural reason. For it is held certainly among natural philosophers that the agent or efficient cause precedes its act, its effect, in time; but the formal cause never precedes its formed thing, with Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12, with Averroes attesting — as was recounted in the demonstration of the 36th part.

How also does Ovid feign that some remember to have been other men, or otherwise named, and then to have done and suffered the same things they now do — which other certain ones too feign? But how? By what likely reason? For why could I not concerning myself, and other men concerning themselves, by similar reason? Is it not perhaps therefore feigned by some — because, as the Greek histories attest, Menelaus, Euphorbus having been conquered, placed his shield in the temple of Juno; which Panthoides — who was called Pythagoras — accepted? Wherefore they said the soul of Euphorbus had entered Panthoides, and that he had been Euphorbus.

It will be said perhaps that virtuous souls do not immediately return to bodies, but with a Great Year interposed; nor then to other bodies, but to their own; and that vicious souls alone immediately return to alien bodies, bestial or human — for example, the souls of males to the bodies of females. But how will it come to be so, since God is more prone to bestow rewards than to repay punishments — just as He more abundantly rewards the virtuous than punishes the vicious, as befits His magnificent goodness, with the 31st part attesting — nor is the virtuous soul meanwhile sufficiently rewarded for virtuous works, as is persuaded above?

Furthermore, if a male was incontinent of voluptuous things, how is he fittingly punished if he is changed into a female more incontinent and having greater delight in the acts of voluptuousness, with the doctors and likewise Tiresias attesting — having experienced the male and female lot, with Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 3, recounting? For punishment ought to be sad and contrary to voluptuousness. How also would so delicious a punishment sufficiently terrify men inclined to voluptuousness, and draw them back from sin (according as was perhaps touched on above) — and not rather perhaps incite them?

Nor again will they return into bodies of fierce wild beasts on account of similar reasons, and on account of reasons previously touched on. Furthermore, according to what is set forth concerning the rewarding of the good — what is more consonant to reason than that the same numerically who sinned, the same numerically be punished; than that in the same members in which he enjoyed enticements he be conversely punished; than that in the same body in which he bathed himself in voluptuous things, and conversely be punished?

Furthermore, since rewarding and punishment seem contraries — and contraries according to the doctrine of the philosophers are wont to be done about the same thing — if virtuous souls alone without bodies be rewarded, and vicious souls alone without bodies be punished; or if vicious souls with bodies be punished, and virtuous souls likewise with bodies be rewarded — although those in tabid, corrupt, and wretched bodies, these in glorious bodies.

Furthermore, what shall become of the souls of those who have done nothing good or bad? Either they will immediately be reunited with bodies, and then with what kinds; or they will wait longer, and how shall they bear themselves in the meantime?

Nor is the judgment to be held which affirms that all souls, after the space of a Great Year, will return to their own bodies, and lead the customary worldly life, and so all the same things numerically be repeated infinitely. For when, and where, would virtuous men thus be rewarded to the full? Not in the present worldly life, as is shown above; nor in the celestial life — for there not the whole composite man, but the soul alone, is rewarded, which reward does not suffice the virtuous man and his virtuous works, as is shown above; nor in the second worldly life, after the soul's return to body, as was shown above. How, moreover, does so diminished a rewarding, so cut short, that it does not reward the whole servant but only his half part, reasonably befit God, according to what is set forth here, and the 31st part?

How also in the middle of that part is so curtailed, so brief, so sparing a reward — or any temporal reward — sufficiently repay the integral lover of God, and His sincere worshipper, who according to the doctrine of the 30th part, for any goods however delightful — intensively or extensively, or even in duration to be gained, or these gained to be preserved, or evils penally not yet had to be avoided, or these had to be removed — would never knowingly offend Him in any way, by withdrawing any due service, or doing anything displeasing — as was here above touched on, and concerning the next part of this work?

Nay, more reasonably must it be esteemed that it befits divine justice, generosity, and goodness most amply and most infinitely infinite — that to such a lover and worshipper of His persevering finally, the warfare consummated, in opportune time, retributing abundantly, He repay full delights, all and any kinds of delightful things, exceeding such failing and fluid things, and in duration surpassing them — eternal delights — and relegate and segregate all adversities and penalties, sadnesses and molestations, defects and lamentations, labors and sorrows, and universally all misery.

Such a soul too is not perfectly blessed, on account of the appetite which it has for the body, in no way satiated; and the privation of its noble operations through corporeal organs accustomed; the privation also of its prior kingdom, according to what is shown above; nor will it ever be perfectly blessed, because neither in the body nor separated from the body. Such a soul, moreover, separated and blessed in heaven, either believes and hopes that it will so eternally remain, or knows it will return to the body, and to corporeal miseries; or considers nothing about that, etc., as above against the little response at the end of the preceding particle.

Wherefore — Augustine, *City of God* 22, chapter 27 reporting — Porphyry the Platonist, wishing to correct the opinion of Plato, affirmed the most purified soul, when it has returned to the Father, will never further return to the evils of the world. Avicenna too, *On the Soul* 5, chapter 4, proves that one soul is not transferred to many bodies, nor to another body in any way; and he subjoins: "And let this suffice for him who seeks the judgment of this matter. You ought, however, to know that this can be expounded by many words." Whom too Algazel, *Physics* 4, last chapter, imitating, proves the same. Nor can anyone thus object to the Christians: for we hold that holy souls separated from bodies, even if they do not immediately have their bodies in fact, yet have them in certain hope. For they know most certainly that, in the time fitting and divinely preordained, and on account of a reasonable and just cause delayed, they will receive and hold them eternally glorious.

Let Plato consider, I pray, what manner of things — how absurd — he affirms about men and human souls, without any violence of reason, indeed without even a slight image or thin shadow of reason, and without the support of any authority. Whence, I ask, is authority — or rather temerity — to you of dreaming such things, of prophesying such things, of affirming such things? Especially since you do not profess yourself a prophet, nor son or follower of a prophet, but a pure philosopher.

In this part one thing I know: that if I or any of the Christian philosophers — not a prophet, nor following a prophet — should presume to affirm so great a judgment without so much as the slenderest reason or image of reason, I would exhibit myself a laughingstock to you and to the others of your profession.

Consider further, I beseech, the judgment of the Christians in these articles, strengthened by the concordant judgment of the Prophets — nay, founded on the authority of the supreme Prophet, the Lord Jesus Christ, according to what the foregoing concerning the 32nd part perspicuously demonstrated — confirmed by beautiful and fitting reasons (according as the matter allows), reasonably defended from all contradiction, impossibility, and inconvenience, according to what is set forth concerning the 32nd part of this work. What philosopher, lover of truth and not defender of vanity, guardian of his position or sponsor — would not most joyfully admit, sustain, and defend the more probable or more proven, more reasonable and more reasoned, more desirable, more useful, and more joyful judgment?

According to that judgment, too, the generation of men, and all human acts, would be necessarily subjected to the dispositions of the stars — which how unworthy and contrary to natural order, who does not know? For who is ignorant that the rational soul is of more worthy and more noble essence than any irrational thing — wherefore also than the stars? How then, according to the worthy natural order, is this in all its operations necessarily subjected to be regulated by them? Far be such an ill-regulated regimen, such an incongruous polity, that flesh should rule the spirit, wife the husband, beast of burden the man, and a fool plenarily rule a wise man. Not such a worldly polity did the most wise, most powerful, and best Prince, God, institute — according to what the first Supposition and following parts convince — which all moral and natural philosophers attest.

Marvelous, moreover, concerning Plato and the Platonists thus positing — especially since they posit the world and time to have a beginning, and to be created by God; and man and other species universally — as the first *Timaeus* evidently shows, and the philosophic books often teach; which Ovid the Platonist too, *Metamorphoses* 1, attests. For there he posits the production of higher and lower things from God, according to the order recounted in Genesis. For if at the end of a Great Year men numerically the same returned, by similar reason all other effects too — nor then would there be any other men or effects, or the same otherwise disposed, on account of the omnimodal identity of the higher celestial causes. But how, at the end of the present Great Year — which will be the beginning of the following Great Year — will all things be newly created, just as in its beginning all things were anciently created? For if all things will then be newly created except God, they will be created from non-beings, just as anciently they were created. All beings therefore will be previously non-beings. The world therefore will not endure, nor time with its things, until the end of a Great Year, but before all things will fail, with God alone remaining — the opposite of which was posited.

How also will the second gods (namely the angels), and the rational souls of men, immortal and eternal from their creation according to the judgment even of Plato himself, *Timaeus* 2, return into nothing? Does not Plato, *Timaeus* 2, chapter 3, induce God thus addressing the angels: "Gods, of whom I am workman and Father, you are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet by my will indissoluble. For everything which is joined is dissoluble by nature; but truly that which is joined and modulated by good reason — to wish to dissolve it is not of God. Wherefore, since you have been made and generated, you are by no means immortal, nor altogether indissoluble, nor yet shall you ever be dissolved, nor undergo the necessity of death, because my will is a greater bond and more vigorous to the custody of eternity than those vital bonds from which your eternity has been compacted and composed" — which he wishes also concerning human souls, the heaven, and the world.

If too all these beings will at some time be non-beings, that general non-entity and privation of things will endure for some time — but how much? Through the space of a Great Year? But then there will be no Great Year nor small one, since neither heaven, nor celestial motion. What therefore then will moderate that duration, and tax it — what, I ask, but the divine will? What therefore if He should will to wait further? Can He not? Has He not formerly been able and done so? Has He not free disposition of His own will?

Whence does Plato know that all things will immediately at the end of a Great Year be re-created by God? Unless perchance he should say it is because God always does the best of possibles — and to be is better than not to be. But this is destroyed above. According to this, too, He would never permit things not to be, nor would they ever be except in the best way, since He is fully omnipotent and of universally efficacious will, as the preceding things have taught — and Plato himself does not deny it. If, however, you should respond that not universally all things will then return, but only the corruptibles previously corrupted, and the others will continuously remain — you seem to contradict yourself.

For if all things previously corrupted will then return the same numerically, all and singular creations of all and singular created things in the beginning of a Great Year, formerly corrupted, will then return the same numerically. Wherefore also all and singular beings created in the beginning of a Great Year will at the end of the same be created anew. Will not even the first man then be re-created? For how otherwise will he then return? Not by natural generation, since previously he was not naturally generated but created. Or if then he will be naturally generated and not created, and in the beginning so it was — against the hypothesis. Nor does it seem he is to be naturally generated; for from what parents? Why from these rather than from those? This too would necessarily be from some woman defloured — if previously he was created by God without any woman acting with Him; nor then was there any woman defloured, since by no prior man, since he was the first of men.

That woman, moreover, will then have him in her womb first alive: for if he is born or alive before, he will return before the beginning of a Great Year — against the hypothesis; and if then

he will be in his mother's womb first alive, so was he first created. But it does not seem that the woman preceded the first man.

How also, the hypothesis standing, was he created in his mother's womb alive, from preceding matter and his begetter's seed, just as he will be in the beginning of the future Great Year? If, too, that woman pregnant near the end of this Great Year shall live until the beginning of the following Great Year, why not also after — indeed, why not before — since according to natural reason and the common judgment of philosophers the last instant of a permanent thing is not to be given? And if she will so endure, why not other men and women naturally generated, sufficiently many? So therefore was it in the beginning of a Great Year — against the hypothesis.

Nor does it seem that, in the beginning of the future Great Year, the first man will be created, since men and women, according to the natural course, suffice for perpetuating the species and the supposita of the species. For it does not seem that, at the end of a Great Year, all men everywhere shall suddenly die. For of so general a future mortality, suddenly to come, no natural cause could be feigned except a celestial one — nor on the part of heaven, except by reason of the most slow motion of the eighth sphere. But this — to those who know the natures and forces of the celestial mobiles, motions, orbs, and stars — is plain to be a fable and fiction. Will not men have *Hyleg*, *Alcocoden*, and all the givers or signifiers of life and death then, just as before?

What also was said above — that not immediately, but after the space of a Great Year, souls will return to their own bodies, and the same men numerically will return — if a year be posited to contain 440 or 600 common years, is easily reproved. For it is plain to those positing the celestial reason on earth, that the motion of the eighth sphere and of the planets in no way return in so many common years to their pristine places, order, and aspect. The same is reproved by the lapse of time. For it is plain that Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, Octavianus Augustus, Christ, Hermes, Plato, Aristotle, and very many similar preceded by so many years and more, who have not yet returned, nor have been seen, nor heard. Furthermore, if the dead return in such a time, by similar reason all other effects too: wherefore in such a time too each man, the same as before, from the same parents, the same hour and place, by the same act, is generated again, dies again, and rises again. But, as diverse histories attest, several living beyond so many courses of years continuously have endured — as also some cities, stones, and metals.

But those who assert that a Great Year contains 36,000 solar years can be similarly chastised. For to those who have the discipline of celestial motions, it is easy to demonstrate that there is no return of all celestial mobiles to their primordial places in so many years. Nor is it altogether plain that, when the eighth sphere completes its motion fully, all celestial moved bodies will likewise complete their motions; nor does it seem that the eighth sphere completes its motion in so many years — indeed the contrary will easily be shown. Nor does Ptolemy say that the eighth sphere truly moves through one degree in every hundred years, but "nearly." Nor is this

Ptolemy's tradition about the motion of the eighth sphere held as certain or true, as Albategni, Thebit, and other later astronomers have most certainly discovered.

If however Plato should wish to say that virtuous souls will return to bodies, not however passible and wretched, but impassible and blessed, to a life not temporal and wretched, but perpetual and blessed — and this at the end of the world, when all celestial moved bodies will fully return to their primary state, and so from the origin of the world to its end will perfect one Great Year — he would not seem far from the judgment of truth. For thus too certain theologians opine, and divine: for it seems worthy to them that all things should be performed in a circle, and so the celestial motions and times should end where they began. Yet sufficiently reasonable would it seem that, just as God instituted angels and men in good not best, that thus from good through better to best by progressing they should ascend, and progress by ascending, and so at last in the best should finally remain — so also He should have ordered the celestial moved bodies in places, dignities, aspects, and other such.

By these things, however, it is not impertinent to persuade that, just as the good will rise again to everlasting beatitude, so also the wicked to everlasting misery. For what is more proportionable, what more fitting to equity, what more congruous to reason? For these are recognized as contraries to one another. As therefore eternity in beatitude is reputed the most blessed portion, so in misery it is proved the most wretched portion. What other punishment, worthy in another way, in the most ample polity of this world, could sufficiently recall the wicked from evils committed to penance, and deter from evils not committed — as was touched on above? Nor can anyone say that the threat alone of such punishment suffices. Far be it that God, the most truthful, faithful, and most upright Prince of the world, should need lies, rejoice in perjuries, or exercise fallacies — against the first Supposition and following parts. If, too, in threatening punishments He deceived us, why not likewise in promising rewards? Why too, by reason of the speaker, ought we ever to believe Him in anything?

Do not also the foregoing concerning the next part of this work evidently show that temporal sin can justly be punished by eternal punishment — indeed ought to be eternally punished, if not corrected — unless God shall will to act more graciously and benignly with evil men than with good, with blasphemers than with lovers, with despisers than with worshippers, by spontaneously remitting so great a deserved punishment, and gratuitously bestowing so great undeserved glory.

Do not earthly princes, too, have it in them to establish many just things, and do they not in fact establish them, to which natural demonstrative reason does not altogether compel by precedent, but they are committed to the arbitration of the lawgiver — concerning which the jurists say, "What pleased the Prince has the force of law"? Could not therefore a Prince justly establish, and very consonant to reason, that whoever for the Prince or the Republic over which he presides shall have done strenuously, perseveringly, be perpetually rewarded; and whoever shall do the contrary, be perpetually punished? — which would justly be done eternally in their persons, if

they could live eternally; which because they cannot, in their posterity, as it were in themselves in some way, in perpetuity is exercised, when they are repelled from hereditary succession, and decreed unsuitable to many honors perhaps?

Why therefore could not the most excellent Prince, God, to whom human souls always live, and whole men raised up will likewise always live, as the foregoing attest — establish similar things justly concerning His subjects, and efficaciously fulfill them, as most fittingly, most proportionately, most decently befits reason, justice, equity, as the foregoing have persuaded? Indeed He has so established and sanctioned, as His secretaries, referendaries — most illustrious Prophets — Christ chief of Prophets and Lawgivers, as the foregoing concerning the 32nd part show, and the other divine men of the old Law and the new unanimously attest. With whom Hermes the Philosopher — nay, the Father of Philosophers, *On the Eternal Word* 30 — plainly agrees, as is recounted above. Whom Aristotle too, in *Secret of Secrets*, first part, 18, alleging solemnly, thus writes: "Beware as much as you can to shed the blood of men. Because the egregious Doctor Hermogenes wrote, saying: When a creature kills a creature similar to itself, the powers of the heavens will cry to the divine Majesty, saying to the Lord: 'Lord, Your servant wills to be similar to You.' If unjustly he is killed, the highest Creator answers: 'Permit him who kills, because he will be killed in revenge — and I will repay'; and so often in their praises the powers of the heavens will represent the death of the slain, until vengeance be taken upon the slayer, who will be one of the perseverers in eternal punishments."

Which his authority below, in the third part, 7, recounted above, attests, and certain other authorities of the foregoing. Avicenna too, *Metaphysics* 9, last chapter, says: "An imperfect soul stripped from the body shall fall into a tract of eternal labor." Algazel, moreover, *Physics* 5, chapter 1, expressly teaches: "Certain vicious souls separated from bodies will incur eternal punishments, and will be eternally punished."

What other thing too is more aptly figured by the four other infernal rivers of the poets, ever flowing, and never failing, mentioned above, than eternal infernal punishment? Nor do the philosophers or heretics saying the contrary bring forward any reason — nor can they bring forward, namely, an efficacious reason. But as historians in non-historical, but philosophic and disputable matters, against the nature of things, they weave a bare history — and a history of the future — though they are not Prophets nor sons of Prophets. For to punish sinners is not repugnant to divine mercy and clemency, by the 31st part; nor likewise is it repugnant to the justice of God to punish eternally those who sin temporally, by the next part of this work. Nor is what was said above repugnant to this — that God punishes no one abundantly or to what is fitting. For although He punishes eternally, yet by turns or always continuously He can punish more mildly than fittingly, less than the iniquity of those punished merited — which He does, as the foregoing concerning the 31st part and the next have persuaded.

These men, however, perhaps, although they cannot construct their own part by reasons, will at least try to destroy mine by responding, saying that the privation alone of eternal felicity, without

any punishment of sense, is sufficient punishment for every fault. But this is at once refuted by the foregoing. For thus he who sins more, and he who less, and he too who never operates well but always most evilly, and he who never acts well or evilly, would equally be punished. The same is easily reproved by the next part of this work and by its demonstration. Why, too, if it were so, would it by no means suffice in every right polity to punish any sinners only by privation of reward and honor, and not by various torments and by death? He too who sins knowingly especially against God, seems more to merit torment, than he who acts rightly, wage. For no one ought to sin for some right thing done. For sin is more to be avoided than merit to be acquired — unless perhaps sin cannot be avoided except by meritoriously operating, as the 31st part proves. Beatitude, moreover, and misery are contraries, not only privatively opposed; they are made therefore by positive contraries, not only by privatively opposed.

If, however, according to the foregoing, the good finally raised up are eternally to be rewarded — where more fittingly than in heaven, than in the glorious habitation of God, before the face of God, always with Him whom they have loved above all things, and finally sought? Does not also reason teach this? For the rational human soul is incorporeal and immaterial, neither extended to the extension of matter, nor educed from the potency of elemental or mixed matter, nor having in itself the nature of matter. Wherefore neither is its natural place on the earth, nor among the elements, or these elementals here, but above. For all simples and composites according to their natures naturally require for themselves places, as experience manifests, and the philosophers attest.

Does not also a worthier place befit a worthier nature, as the philosophers and the common folk commonly confess? And who does not know that the rational, immaterial, and immortal soul prevails over material and corruptible things? And what place is worthier than what is above, as no man denies? Wherefore the Philosopher says, *On the Heaven and the World* 2, chapter 34: "More divine is the place which is above, than that which is below." Where the text of Averroes thus has it: "The superior place is more noble than the inferior."

The placed thing too and the place demand a fitting and natural similitude, as reason persuades, experience shows, the philosophers and others confess. But the rational soul is immaterial, spiritual, and immortal; it demands therefore such a place — a place above all these material and mortal things — as also the holy angels demand heaven. For by this reason persuaded, all gentes and peoples, philosophers and common men, agreeingly attribute heaven to the holy angels.

Whence the Philosopher, *On the Heaven* 1, chapter 22, says: "All — both barbarians and Greeks — attribute the place which is above to God; whoever indeed think there are gods. Plain that immortal is fitted to immortal. Otherwise impossible." Where the translation which Averroes expounds thus has: "All men unanimously agree that this first glorious body is the place of spirits — namely the Greeks and the others of the first peoples, who knew God and His dominion, and said: 'That upon which corruption does not fall ought to be in a place which does not corrupt.'"

On which Averroes: "All gentes confessing that there is a God, agree in this: that heaven is the place of God and of the other spirits, who are commonly called angels."

The Philosopher too, *On the Heaven and the World* 2, chapter 2: "Heaven, and the place which is above, the ancients indeed attributed to the gods, as alone existing immortal." Where the translation of Averroes: "All the ancients posited heaven to be the place of the Creator, on account of its incorruptibility and eternity"; on which Averroes: "The place of the eternal is eternal."

Do not also things similar in nature require a similar natural place? But spirits or angels and rational souls are similar in nature, as the foregoing attest, and all gentes and peoples, philosophers and common men, confessing the immortality of the soul equally confess. But the natural place of angelic spirits is heaven, as the foregoing attest.

Furthermore, beatitude or felicity is the most noble, most worthy, most pleasant good, separated from all adversities, and universally integral and perfect, as the preceding things have taught. But such a good requires a fitting place; otherwise it will not be perfect. But where could the rational blessed soul have such a place fitting for it? Not in sublunary things — that is plainly clear, as the foregoing attest; for only in celestials is such a place. Whence also the Philosopher, *On the Heaven and the World* 1, in the ancient translation, and in the translation which Averroes has, frequently calls heaven a "glorious body."

By these, therefore, and such reasons inclined, many philosophers and poets recounted above affirm agreeingly the virtuous and purged soul is finally to be rewarded in celestial things — to have final felicity and beatitude in celestial things. But man to be beatified will not be beatified in his soul alone, but in soul together and body, as is shown above. The whole man therefore in soul and body raised up at the same time is to be beatified in heaven, and there finally rewarded.

And behold how aptly this fits with reason: for certain natural forms naturally desire certain natural places, and likewise the whole composite naturals on account of the forms. Wherefore they are naturally moved to their natural places, and in them naturally rest, as the philosophers attest. The natural place of the rational soul, moreover, is heaven, as is shown above. Therefore it naturally desires that place, is moved naturally to it, and in it naturally rests. Wherefore likewise the whole man.

Is not also the soul worthier and more perfect than the body? What therefore is to be reputed worthier and more natural — that the soul rule the body, that the soul lead the body, that the soul place the body in a place fitting the soul — than the contrary? Therefore, the whole man would more naturally be placed in heaven than on earth. For there he would naturally be placed according to his most natural form, his worthiest and most perfect part, as the foregoing attest; on earth, however, only according to his body and his matter. In final beatitude indeed, just as the soul is naturally placed in heaven, so also the body — otherwise it would not be most natural nor

most apt for the soul thus blessed; nor would the soul or the whole man have perfect felicity and consummated beatitude.

Nor ought it to disturb philosophers, or any others, how this earthly flesh can naturally ascend into heaven and remain. For why should not omnipotent God, the Author of all nature — who according to the foregoing could create and recreate the whole body from nothing, raise the dead, and work all kinds of miracles as He shall have willed — be able marvelously, and to us perhaps small ones incomprehensibly, to alter and subtilize the grossness of this flesh, until it should naturally ascend into heaven and remain — just as the Sun subtilizes those gross and heavy elements; just as also the alchemists subtilize many gross and heavy things by means of fire? Does not also the magnet, a stone very rude, so dispose iron — a body very rude and heavy — that it naturally ascends to it, follows it upward at any distance whatsoever, and remains with it? Why therefore can omnipotent God, who dwells in the Heavens, not so alter the bodies of men, lift them up to celestial things, and place them with Himself eternally in celestial things?

Furthermore, in any rightly disposed polity, the places of those acting properly and improperly, the places of rewards and punishments, are discrete from one another according to higher and lower; honorable and dishonorable; delightful and sad. For who does not know that the virtuous and the upright are honored with the foremost seats? And who does not know that the vicious and improper are cast out from such, thrust into prisons, hanged on gibbets, and consigned to other vile and contrary places?

The good, however, in God's greatest polity, according to what was said before, are above in celestial things to be rewarded, and there finally to be placed. What therefore more fitting than that the wicked, below on earth, and beneath the earth — in some horrible place beneath the earth, and beneath our common habitation, which is therefore called *inferus* and *infernum* — be finally thrust to be punished? So that, just as those who offended the God of heaven are deprived of celestial light, sight, and favor; so that the spirit of man, and the whole man, who according to the foregoing ought naturally to have inhabited in the heavens — because he acted against nature, against the God of nature, against the natural rule of loving which the 30th part handed down — should against nature inhabit in the lower world; so that, besides his other punishments, the place itself, unnatural and horrid, should be penal: that just as for the good all things are turned into glory, so for the wicked all things are turned into misery.

For Hermes says, *On the Eternal Word* 19: "From the fact that they are deprived of sight, in Greek they are called *Ades*; from the fact that they are in the lowest of the sphere, in Latin they are named the lower ones." Plato, too, *Timaeus* 2, chapter 9, says that the negligent man of God will be recalled to the lower world, as is more fully alleged above. With whom Aristotle in *On the Secret of Secrets*, 3rd part, 7, plainly consents, as is recounted above. With these too consent very many histories of the gentiles and Greeks, distinguishing higher and lower gods, and very many songs of the poets, as was touched on above.

Does not, also, with the Philosopher, *On the Heaven* 2, chapter 73, recounting, the Pythagoreans hand down that the prison of Jove is in the middle of the whole, at the center — which they also profess Tartarus, and the spirits or men Tartarean — and Jove inflicts threats and punishments on them? For the Philosopher recounts, *Posterior Analytics* 2, chapter 3, that the Pythagoreans say it sounds or thunders for the cause of threats to those who are in Tartarus, that they may fear.

From these things, however, it evidently follows that the bodies of the blessed are to be transformed to a better, purer, more celestial condition in the future beatitude. For how otherwise will they ascend to heaven, and there naturally rest, as is shown above? If too, according to the foregoing, not one part only of man, but the whole man together in soul and body is to be rewarded and finally beatified — since his soul is then to be changed for the better, and incomparably better — why not also similarly the body? Especially since, according to the foregoing, God can most easily do this; since also it more befits a soul better, more purged, and more celestial, naturally inhabiting in heaven, to have such a body — a body alike and conform; since besides, otherwise he would not be the perfectly blessed man — for how is the whole man to be deemed perfectly blessed whose whole body is subject to customary misery, opposes, contends, and fights against the spirit?

These things being granted, who would deny that the blessed will have immortal bodies? Immortal, I say, either by force of nature to be transmuted for the better, or by the benefit of the Creator and Recreator, the Beatifier and continuous Preserver. For how otherwise does the whole man in soul and body together enjoy eternal beatitude, as the preceding things have persuaded? Do not also forms and bodies need to be naturally conformed, and to agree with a natural similitude? And what is more correspondent, more natural, and more similar than that a corruptible and temporal form should inhabit and inform a corruptible and temporal body? But an incorruptible and eternal form — an incorruptible and eternal body? This was the ancient opinion of many of the ancients, as was touched on above. For all who say that gods come from men say also this; which the Philosopher too, *Metaphysics* 3, chapter 15, manifestly commemorates.

Who too, *Topics* 4, says: "Sometimes they sin, placing the passion in the genus of the patient, as whoever say that immortality is eternal life. For immortality seems to be the passion or the chance of life. That what is said is true, however, will be plain if anyone grants that some mortal becomes immortal. For no one says that this person assumes another life, but a certain chance or passion is begotten in this same one. Wherefore eternity is not the genus of immortality."

I know, however, that Aristotle and Averroes, *Metaphysics* 3 in the place above, deride those saying so — and this perhaps because they by no means understand them, on account of the metaphor of the use of manna and nectar; or because they have no more efficacious argument. For why could not omnipotent God draw away from the human body the intrinsic corruptive causes, or temper all those, proportion them, and equate them to one another, that they should remain incorruptible mutually — as also the doctors assert about the body of optimally natural

complexion, which by them is called "tempered to justice"? Or why could He not so alter all those causes? For we see that many natural actives, multifariously altered, suspend their natural actions.

Is not gold, naturally or artificially generated by natural philosophers — universal and particular, namely Alchemical — affirmed to be unputrefiable and incorruptible? Does not also Pliny, *Natural History* 7, thus write: "They report that a boy wearied by the heat and his journey slept in a cave for fifty-seven years, marveling at the face of things and their change, as if waking up the next day. The same afterward lived the same number of years, as if those in which he slept were not counted, since he endured 157 years." To which other famous histories report similar things. If therefore the body of him and of similar persons did not putrefy in so much time — indeed did not even tend to putrefaction or corruption — why could it not have similarly endured for so much further time, and through however much, even infinite?

Pliny, moreover, in book 2 of the same, thus writes: "Paphos has the celebrated shrine of Venus, in a certain area of which it does not rain. Likewise in it the town of the Troad around the image of Minerva. In the same too the relics of sacrifices do not putrefy."

Among us too in England and Ireland it is most certainly reported that there are certain islands in which no one dies, nor can die, as longest experience manifests; whose inhabitants, however, when about to die, are vexed by an excessive languor, and therefore being carried out, immediately die.

Why therefore can omnipotent God not so alter the bodies of men that they persist immortal? And whatever may be the case concerning the proper power of human bodies, or of the whole universality of created nature, no one doubts that God, of His omnipotence and of His efficacy of will simply infinite, can preserve such glorious bodies of men in blessed life eternally without the divorce of death — as also the 37th part has taught.

Does not Plato profess a similar judgment about the angels recounted above? Who too, *Timaeus* 1, chapter 4, says: "God fabricated that lustrous and visible spotty mass, joined by a friendly reason of equilibrium of parts, which would be immortal and indissoluble against every chance, except by the will of its Fabricator." By these things too can be plain the proposed concerning the bodies of the reprobate. For unless the reprobate as wholes lived eternally in soul together and body, by no means would they wholly sustain eternal misery, as is shown above.

How, however, they can do this, can be persuaded by the preceding things — through the salamander, through Aetna, and through certain other similar things which are by no means consumed by fire — but most of all by the infinite omnipotence of God. From these things, however, it must further be inferred that the future felicity of the blessed will by no means consist in the customary pleasures of the flesh, or in something else, or in any other things besides God. For how is a body so pure, so marvelously purified, and in all things so blessed, that it serves a fully blessed man fully — that he may plenarily enjoy his full beatitude, and in

nothing be drawn back — believed to have its accustomed voluptuous and concupiscent pleasures, wretched and dishonest, drawing the blessed many ways from perfect beatitude, which consists in perfect knowledge of God, love, delight, and adherence — as the foregoing concerning the 32nd part show?

Is not also more perfect, more natural, and more blessed for man to be reputed that he be perfected according to soul, than according to body — in which they are mutually contrary and repugnant? Are not also therefore the virtuous and the studious, abstaining from carnal voluptuous things, more perfect than others, deservedly judged? So therefore will it be in future felicity, nor will there be there repugnance or contrariety of any kind between body and soul. For then there would be there punishment, sadness, and some misery — not consummated felicity.

If too future beatitude and felicity consisted in the customary pleasures of the flesh, beatitude would likewise be possible in the present; and so the Epicureans, the swinish, those given over to all voluptuousnesses, would be more blessed, better, and more virtuous than others in the present, because nearer to the true future beatitude, and to the truly blessed. But who would grant this — except perhaps the impudent swine of Epicurus?

This particle too clearly appears from the foregoing concerning the 32nd part of this work, and concerning the present part — of which some helps still to be briefly recalled. For the said things teach that beatitude or felicity is the final human good, and the ultimate end of man, which is not desired or sought on account of something else, but on account of itself only, and the rest on account of it. But what is so reasonably desired or sought in all beings if not God, as the 30th part has shown?

Furthermore, how does true God, who according to the 30th part of this work has decreed that He be loved and worshipped by men above all other things — whether existing or thinkable — on account of Himself finally, ultimately — render not Himself but another non-final and beatific reward to them? For whatever else He should render to such a lover and worshipper of His, He seems to render nothing, but to defraud — just as if a head of household promised you for your daily work gold, say a talent, and at evening having come, rendered to you dung. Does not whatever is on this side of God, conferred upon Him, seem as dung in respect of the talent? Indeed incomparably much less than nothing and empty.

Wherefore the Philosopher, *Ethics* 9, chapter 1, speaking of just and due recompense in human communication, thus says: "They contend, however, when other things are made for them, and not what they desire. For it is similar — that nothing be made — when one is not in possession of what one desires; for example, to a citharist promising, and the better he should sing, so much the more — but when in the morning to the seeker his promises were paid for delight, he is said to have rendered delight for delight. For if each one wished this, it would suffice. If however this one wished delight, this one wished gain — and this one has, this one not — it will not be that it should be well according to the communication."

By how much more, in such communication of a lover and worshipper of God with God — in which God Himself is intended, sought, and hoped for finally — is it likewise to be judged? Especially since no other good is greater than He, equal, or comparable from near, but any incomparably more vile, and as it were nothing and empty?

Does not also any virtuous man doing all things finally on account of God, according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work, finally intend, seek, and continuously be moved toward God? This motion, however, since it is not circular but rectilinear, ought not to be naturally infinite, just as neither is man naturally imperfect. But how shall this motion be naturally finished and finally perfected, the natural and naturally-intended end being in no way acquired but another?

This motion therefore is to be terminated finally in God, who also according to the philosophers, as a beloved and desired thing moves us — as Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12, chapter 37, and Averroes in his comment, plainly attest. Where also the Philosopher, 38, speaking of the first principle moving as a beloved: "From such a Principle," he says, "depends heaven and nature." On which Averroes thus says: "It has been declared already that heaven and nature are continued with a principle which is intellect, which is in the end of joy and voluptuousness, just as our disposition will be in continuation with the intellect which is the principle. And from this it appears well that Aristotle thinks the fortune of men, in that they are men, is not except by their continuation with the intellect — which is declared in the book *On the Soul* to be the principle agent and moving us. For abstracted Intelligences, in that they are abstracted, ought to be principles of those of which they are principles in two ways — as moving, and as end. For an Intelligence agent, inasmuch as it is abstracted and a principle to us, must necessarily move us according as a beloved beloved. And if every motion must be continued with that from which it is, according to the end, we must in the last be continued with this abstracted intellect, so that we shall depend from such a Principle, from which heaven depends."

Furthermore, if consummated felicity of man consisted in any other thing whatever this side of God — not in Him — it would consist in some finite and small good, since there is no other good this side of Him. But how does most just God, most powerful, most abundant, and most generous, who has decreed that He be loved and worshipped by men so much that for any goods not yet had to be acquired, or had to be preserved; or for any penal evils not yet had to be avoided, or had to be removed, they would in nothing knowingly offend Him in any way, according to the doctrine of the 30th part of this work — for so great a love, for so great worship, for so great service, render so little a reward to them? For it befits that He should not sparingly reward His own, but abundantly, according to the 31st part. What therefore worthy of so great love, fitting to so great worship, or proportionate to so great service, will He at last render — the warfare consummated — except some good greater than all goods which they have hoped for, all evils which they have sustained, at least so far as in them was, namely in the promptness of soul and in the constancy of will, for His love, reverence, and honor — especially since He can most easily do this, and most fittingly it befits both Him and them?

How great a good therefore will He render to such lovers, worshippers, and soldiers of His, except some good greater than all goods even imaginable this side of Himself? And what such good if not Himself? Furthermore, no finite and small good satiates a soul or man desiring greater and better, and capable of greater and better. For we all most certainly experience that we naturally affect good, and the greater more, nor are we plenarily quieted in any finite good — nay, we proceed further, and desire and wish for the greater good more.

And how shall this appetite — so natural, so reasonable, so honest — remain without demerit eternally idle, especially since it has been inserted by God, the Author of all nature, not vainly into men? Therefore God Himself alone, infinitely infinite, will satiate this appetite, this desire, this hunger — this thirst — for Himself, and through Himself, most blessedly. But where and when, if not in future felicity, and in the beatitude which we hope for?

Thee therefore, my God, Thee for Thine own sake, above all other things I love, Thee I desire, Thee I covet finally, Thee on account of Thyself — not anything else — always and in all things I seek finally with all my heart and marrow, with groan and weeping, with continuous labor and pain. What therefore wilt Thou finally render me? If Thou render not Thyself to me, Thou renderest nothing; if Thou give not Thyself to me, Thou givest nothing; if I find not Thyself, I find nothing — Thou by no means rewardest me, but tormentest me vehemently. For before, when I sought Thyself finally, I hoped quickly to find and to hold Thyself finally, and by this honeyed hope was I sweetly consoled in all my labors. Now, however, if Thou deny Thyself to me, whatever else Thou give me — frustrated of so great a hope, not for a small time but forever — shall I not always languish for love, mourn in languor, grieve in mourning, lament and weep in grief, and always remain empty and void? Shall I not therefore inconsolably be saddened, incessantly complain, interminably be tormented?

Is this not Thine, best, most powerful, most clement, most loving God of mine? It by no means befits, nowhere is fitting, that Thou shouldst so unfriendlily — indeed so inimically — pay little regard, despise, cast off, and condemn, beat, wound, torment, and afflict for everlasting time Thy perfect lovers from whole heart, from whole soul, from whole strength — when they hoped for Thee, and in Thee plenary felicity, and expected plenary beatitude.

Thou therefore, true God, beginning and end of those who love, wilt render to Thy perfect lovers finally Thyself, perfect felicity, and consummated beatitude — Thyself desired finally and hoped for, Thyself, every good of all beatitude, in Thyself most blessed, beyond what we suffice to think most blessedly contained — as by the first Supposition, the third part, and the fourth, the most learned Doctor hast Thou taught Thy disciples.

Therefore, good Master, and Lord, that which now Thou teachest us by slender argument, at last I beseech, teach us by full experiment; that which now Thou teachest in perfect knowledge, at last teach in perfect comprehension; that which now Thou teachest by long hope, at last by reality teach by a longer one. Make therefore, best God of mine, that in the whole of present life

always I love Thee for Thine own sake before all things, seek Thee in all things, and at last in the future find Thee, and hold Thee for ever.

A disciple of Epicurus or a son of Mahomet will perhaps object that men in the future life will possess souls together and bodies; wherefore also carnal concupiscences and venereal appetites — and on that account also acts — if they shall remain without any sadness in all the joy of felicity. But this man does not advert how, according to the fifth particle of this part, the bodies of the blessed in future felicity will by no means remain in their pristine state, but will be divinely changed to a better and purer condition.

Do not many men lack many concupiscences? Does not the same man have and not have the same concupiscence at different times? Do not boys, the decrepit, the sick, the bewitched, and the cold not have the concupiscence of venereal things? Does not castration, camphor, the chaste lamb, mouse-dung, and similar things extinguish the appetite of Venus? Why therefore cannot omnipotent God so sincerely purify the bodies of the blessed, and preserve them eternally purified, that no such concupiscence should ever arise in them?

Indeed He will do so, since such concupiscence would be harmful to them, and depriving of perfect beatitude. For He who, according to the foregoing, will lift up these earthly, heavy, and mortal bodies to celestial things — that there they may naturally remain, and persist immortal — will also take from them every carnal appetite, useless and contrary to perfect felicity; that thus the whole man in soul together and body, all sincere, may eternally enjoy a sincere, spiritual, and perfect beatitude.

40. AGAINST ARISTOTLE, WHO MAINTAINS THAT THE WORLD HAD NO TEMPORAL BEGINNING AND WAS NOT CREATED, NOR IS THE GENERATION OF MEN TO BE TERMINATED, NOR THE WORLD OR THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD TO BE ENDED AT ANY TIME. AGAINST ANAXIMANDER ALSO, PLATO, ANAXAGORAS, EMPEDOCLES, AND THE EMPTY-TONGUED OF THE MOORS CONCERNING THE SAME

Let Aristotle be argued against — who maintains that the world had no temporal beginning and was not created, that the generation of men is not to be terminated, nor the world or the present state of the world to be ended at any time. Let Anaximander too, Plato, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the empty-tongued of the Moors be likewise argued against from their errors.

To those considering the sayings of the ancients about the world, two principal opinions present themselves. One, and the most ancient, is that the world is generated and has a temporal beginning; and this is further varied in two ways. Some affirm that the world was created from nothing, and this by God; others, however, that the world was made from something, from some preceding matter — and these are separated in many ways. Anaximander supposes that things, infinite in number, lay hidden among themselves, at rest in a kind of *Chaos*, for an infinite time;

and at last that the Intellect, or God, separated them from one another, and so made the world — which he posits will likewise endure for an infinite time, in the customary and common manner of things. Plato, however, holds that things before the world fluctuated eternally in a disorderly motion, and that God reduced these to order, and so made the world to remain eternally.

To these too another opinion can be added: that the world has been made only once, and is to be corrupted only once — which the Philosopher touches in *On the Heaven and the World* 1, chapter 102, and which Averroes there imputes to Anaxagoras. The earlier one, however, Aristotle himself in *Physics* 1, chapter 32, imputes to Anaximander. Whence it appears that Anaximander and Anaxagoras are diverse, and that the one posited the earlier opinion, and the other this one. But let no one, I pray, be too solicitous about their names: for science is not in names, but in things.

Empedocles, however, says that the world was made from the four elements through Strife, and is again to be corrupted through Friendship; and this he says was done in the past infinitely, and will be done in the future infinitely. The other principal opinion affirms the world to be ungenerated; and this is twofold. For some, speaking in the law of the Moors — Averroes attesting on *On the Heaven* 1, comment 102 — say it is ungenerable but corruptible. Aristotle, however, was the first of all who presumed to affirm the world to be ungenerable and incorruptible. And because his opinion seems more famous than the others, even though it is later, of it nevertheless we must first discourse. With it destroyed too, the others will be easily destroyed.

Is it not therefore, according to your judgment, Aristotle — and according to natural consequence — if the world is anteriorly eternal, that the human species and human generation are likewise so? And is it not, according to the 31st part, and according to your judgment likewise, that the rational human souls are eternal, and each is each man's own; nor is there a circular return of souls, according to the next part of this work, and likewise according to your own judgment in the demonstration of the same part above set forth? Are not therefore now actually souls of this kind simply infinite in number? Wherefore that Algazel, your follower and son in this part, grants the infinity of souls.

For in his *Metaphysics* 1, definition 6, he thus says: "Being is divided into finite and infinite. The infinite is said in four ways; of which two do not exist; but two argument shows to exist. For it is said that the motion of heaven has no end, because it has no beginning, and this argument now grasps. It is said too that the human souls which are separated from bodies are infinite. This, however, is necessarily true if finitude be removed from time and from the motion of heaven, which is the removal of beginning."

And below: "We grant the human souls which are separable from bodies through death to be infinite in number, although they have being together; since there is not among them any natural ordination by the removal of which they cease to be souls — because none of them are causes for

others." But this — so contrary to order, so absurd — does not befit God or nature, which you, Aristotle, and all philosophers — all true philosophers — are wont to reckon impossible.

Is it not, too, according to your judgment, and according to the judgment of truth, that more things are not posited in vain where fewer suffice? To what end therefore are infinite souls posited, when finite ones suffice? You will say perhaps that infinite souls are posited on account of the greater perfection of the universe; otherwise it would not be so perfect. But why infinite souls rather than infinite Angels, infinite spheres, infinite stars, infinite other beings of this kind? Indeed even a finite multitude seems more perfect than an infinite one. For every perfect, spherical, circular, cubic, square, even-times or odd-times, even or odd, digital, articulate, composite number, or of any other praiseworthy disposition, is finite, as Arithmetic clearly shows; whereas an infinite number can be of no such praiseworthy disposition.

In the same way it seems to be of numbers as of bodies and figures; but a finite body is more perfect than an infinite one, if it could exist. For it has a determined and certain figure; an infinite by no means. Indeed every regular body, both with nature and with the geometers and philosophers praiseworthy and famous, is finite. For every body of this kind is a pyramid, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron, or sphere. The spherical figure, however — by reason teaching, and the mathematicians and natural philosophers attesting — is the most perfect of figures. Wherefore the heaven, the most perfect body, has it. The infinite, however, has no figure.

Is not, too, the ordered and determined better and more beautiful than the disordered and confused? For how great a good is order? How much beauty does it bring to things? Do you not yourself, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 13, chapter 2, refuting Aristippus and other such Sophists who say — as you recount in *Metaphysics* 3, chapter 3 — that there is no good in mathematics, thus speak: "But since the good and the best are different — this is in operation, but the good also is in immobile things — saying that the mathematical sciences differ in nothing concerning the good or the best — they lie. For they speak and demonstrate above all. For if they do not name works and reasons, they show; they do not speak about them. The species of good especially are order, commensuration, and the determined, which the mathematical sciences chiefly show. And since these seem to be the cause of many things, I say, for example, order and the determined."

Do you not also, *Politics* 7, chapter 3, say: "Law is a certain order, and good legislation must necessarily be a good ordering. A number greatly exceeding cannot participate in order"? Is it not for this reason too that the Pythagoreans posited *terminus*, or the finite and the perfect, in the co-elementation of the good, and the infinite and the superfluous in the co-elementation of evil — as in the demonstration of the 18th part it was recounted?

Of beauty truly, who does not know that it consists in order, determination, and fitting proportion? This the parts of an animal show; this the parts of a building, of painting, of writing, and of other heterogeneous things of this kind clearly demonstrate. Which Alhazen too, in *Perspective* 2, treating of beauty and its causes, by these and similar things teaches beautifully; where also he thus says: "Position sometimes makes beauty; and many beautiful intentions

appear beautiful only on account of order and position. For all distinctions ordered as it were painted do not appear beautiful except on account of ordering; and writing does not appear beautiful except on account of ordering — since beauty is not except from composition and direction of figured letters, and from their composition with each other. If, however, the composition of letters and their ordering be not according to one proportion, but one great and another small, then the writing will not be beautiful, although the figures of the letters by themselves be well placed. And sometimes a writing appears beautiful when its composition is proportional, although the letters be not in the end of good disposition; and similarly very many forms of visibles do not appear beautiful except on account of disposition and ordering of parts to one another."

And below: "A writing will not be beautiful except when its letters are proportional in figure and quantity, and position, and order; and similarly of all kinds of visibles by which diverse parts are gathered together. And when you shall have considered the beautiful forms of all kinds of visibles, you will find that proportionality makes beauty more than any other intention, or even any others joined by themselves. And when there are considered the beautiful intentions which particular intentions make through their conjunction with one another, it will be found that the beauty which appears from their conjunction does not appear except on account of their proportionality. Beauty therefore is not except from particular intentions, and the perfection of it is from proportionality and the consonance which is made between particular intentions."

Where also he says that number makes beauty, as is plain of the number of stars in the heaven, and of candles in a house. But what number, I ask, makes beauty, except a beautiful one? — except one which by its conditions and properties beautiful, beautifully ordered and proportioned to one another, beautifully presents itself to him who contemplates? But infinite number is not such, as is persuaded above. Indeed by its disordered confusion and confused disorder, indecorous, undelectable, and ugly rather it would seem.

For contraries are regularly the causes of contraries, as you yourself, Aristotle, often confess. If therefore these things are so, how is it to be supposed that God, most wisely arranging all things most wisely (as the foregoing show), would make the celestial city of His, His own house, His special family, constituted from holy souls or men according to the next part of this work, disordered and confused, undisposed, imperfect, uncomposed, undecorous — namely in a multitude actually infinite? Indeed, more reasonably must it be esteemed that He arranges this city most wisely in some number known to His wisdom, perfect, elect, fitting, becoming, beautifully and sweetly ordered.

Do not you yourself, Aristotle, in your *Politics*, show diffusely that a city ought to have a certain mediocre number of citizens? How then will that glorious celestial city have an infinite confusion of citizens? Why, moreover, are there men, or human souls, infinite, rather than infinite Angels, Intelligences, spheres, stars; or now in the world infinite species or infinite supposita? Why, I ask, this marvelous monster only in this species?

Furthermore, if continuous occupation should permit, and prolixity not stand in the way, it seems that this judgment can be by other reasons, as it were quasi-mathematical somehow mathematically, be reproved. Which is therefore briefly to be done by some brief considerations, leaving more exquisite diligence to others, or to another time.

If therefore souls be infinite, they have had, and have, or will have, their own bodies infinite, by the next part of this work. Let those infinite bodies, therefore, or some infinite of them, be posited according to one consequent series — in the manner of speaking of the Philosopher, *Physics* 6, chapter 2 — so that any preceding body has some next body following it, with no body of this kind intercepted. And let that series be ordered along one straight line, true or imaginary, beginning here at the center of the horizon and extending to the west infinitely; or along a line spiraling, from the same center through proportional unequal parts of the diameter or semidiameter of the horizon toward its circumference, infinitely turned around; or further along the proportional unequal parts of some straight, finite line — for instance, the semidiameter of the horizon tending toward the setting.

Nor let the corpulence of these bodies disturb anyone. For let them be posited truly or imaginarily in that infinite straight line, true or imaginary; or, if you wish to situate them in that spiraling line or finite straight line, let them be posited so that the later are always proportionately less than the prior, as is fitting; or let surfaces, lines, or points be posited in their place in the said way — which nevertheless are to be called bodies. The reasoning, too, proceeds only from multitude; and therefore let no one be solicitous about magnitude.

These things, then, being thus disposed truly through the omnipotence of God, or fictitiously through imagination, let the souls also be disposed against their bodies altogether correspondingly. And let A be the whole multitude of all the souls, and B the multitude of bodies. The single units of A, and the single units of B, and all the alls, correspond mutually to one another equally, and the contrary; for any soul has had its single body, and any body has had its single proper soul, as appears from the next part. And this response confesses, which the series exhibited shows, with their units corresponding to one another mutually equally.

Which also, that it may appear more clearly, with these so disposed, let the souls be distributed through the omnipotence of God, or through imagination, in this way: the first to the first body; the second to the second; and so onward. With this distribution completed, any soul will have a single body, and any body a single soul. These therefore singly and conjointly correspond to one another mutually equally.

But how will this stand? For with A and B disposed as before, let the first soul be given to the first body, the second to the third, or the tenth, or to one however far distant from the first; and the third soul to the body as far distant from the second body animated, as that one was from the first; and so onward, until the whole distribution of this kind be completed. With which done, either the singles and the alls of the souls have been distributed to bodies of this kind, or some remain. If the singles and the alls have been distributed to such bodies, the whole multitude A

corresponds to that part of B dividedly and conjointly equally, and the contrary. If any soul remains, since from that to the first there are only finitely many, and all such bodies pre-accepted of the multitude B are just so many, and finite, wherefore also the whole multitude B is likewise finite — which had been posited infinite.

Turning the gaze to the other side, however, with A and B disposed as before, let a thousand souls be given to the first body, and the like to the second, and so onward as long as the multitude of souls suffices. Either, then, this distribution will somewhere cease, or it will extend itself to the singles and the alls of the bodies. If it shall cease somewhere, since between that place or body of that place and the first body there are only finite bodies, there will be just so many. Wherefore only finite thousands of all the souls, and the whole multitude A finite — which had been posited infinite.

If, however, that distribution extends itself to all and singular bodies, to any unit of B corresponds one thousand of the units of A — indeed ten thousand, and a hundred, and a thousand thousands, and any finite number you wish, if so much be distributed in the same manner aforesaid; which can likewise be demonstrated. How then do A and B as multitudes, and their single units one to one, and all to all, mutually correspond equally to one another, as is shown above, nor does the opinion deny it?

Furthermore, that the reasoning may be more openly elucidated, let it be posited that, as the world and the human species are anteriorly eternal, so it eternally has had a single prince of all — for example, an emperor or pope, who and all are called *popes* by way of example. As therefore, by hypothesis, infinite men have preceded, so likewise infinite popes; wherefore now there are alone the souls of popes infinite — which, if they be distributed to bodies in the said manner, suffice to animate single and all bodies; indeed they suffice that to the single bodies a thousand souls, and however many you wish, may be allotted — which can be most clearly demonstrated, as above.

From these things, moreover, it evidently follows that the multitude A would suffice to animate infinite multitudes B; which is also so perspicuously demonstrated. With A and B disposed as before, let the second soul be given to the first body, and the fourth to the second, and the sixth to the third, and so onward, as long as the multitude of souls suffices, always alternating in the multitude A, but in the multitude B continuously proceeding. And so in the end the singles and the alls of the bodies of the multitude B will be animated, and there will still remain infinite souls — which can be demonstrated as above.

Which done, let the multitude B be removed, and another multitude similar likewise placed, and let a distribution be made of the residual souls as before; and in the end the whole of this second multitude of bodies will be animated, and there will remain, as before, infinite souls. Again, let this second multitude be removed, and the third similar likewise placed, and let the distribution be made as before; and so a fourth, and a fifth, and infinitely many times in similar manner. For

that marvelous multitude of souls suffices most fully and abounds — which can be demonstrated perspicuously as above.

Yet that it may appear more elucidated: let it be posited that, with the first distribution made through alternate souls in the said manner, the residual souls be advanced anteriorly by one degree toward the first, until they be situated singly correspondingly to the singles of the bodies, and all to all as before; for to this the remaining souls plenarily suffice, which, with the priors considered, is most easily demonstrated. With which done, let the multitude B be removed, and another multitude similar likewise placed and likewise animated; with that plenarily animated in the said manner, let an anteriorization of the remaining souls be made as before, etc. — as above. Which can likewise be demonstrated of the multitude of papal souls.

From these things too further it is luculently inferred that the multitude A suffices to animate the multitude B, and the double, and the quadruple, and onwards without limit, without rest. Which appears perhaps more expressly, if to the multitude B be added the multitude C equal, with the units mixed alternately on either side, according to the order foretaxed; or also with the units of C posited separately corresponding to the units of B singly. And let a continuous distribution of souls be made in this manner: give the first to the first body of B, the second to the first of C, the third to the second of B, the fourth to the second of C, and so on, as long as you have the sufficiency of souls. With this distribution thus completed, no soul will remain without a body, nor any body without a soul — both of which are most easily demonstrated as above.

If, however, you wish that, with all these bodies plenarily animated, there should remain infinite souls as before, let an alternate distribution of the souls be made as was touched above, but according to the order of bodies just now set forth; and let an anteriorization of the remaining souls be made; and you will most certainly have what you wished. And in this manner you can still likewise add D, another similar multitude, and E and F, and however many you wish; and likewise animate them from A. Which can likewise be demonstrated of papal souls.

In a similar manner too it can be shown that any multitude however great of common bodies, and even of papal ones, corresponds to single units of souls.

But who will bear so great inconveniences and repugnances? Why also, I ask, so great and so excessive a superfluity of souls for animating so many bodies or men, when fewer plenarily suffice — even papal souls, and however fewer still, as the foregoing demonstrate? Why are there infinite souls superfluous there, and infinitely infinite, as appears perspicuously from the foregoing? Why also so great and so excessive a superfluity of bodies for hosting so many spirits, for composing so many men, when fewer would suffice — even papal bodies, and however fewer still? Why, then, are there infinite bodies superfluous there, and infinitely infinite, as appears clearly from the priors? This in no way befits God most wise, as the first Supposition and the parts following show; this does not befit nature; this all the philosophers detest.

Furthermore, with bodies B posited according to the order foretaxed, or without order in one confused heap, let single and all the souls A approach and enter, and let any one assume a single body, no two; and let all alike occupy as many bodies as is fitting, no more. With which done, there will be some infinite multitude of bodies animated, and none. That some — follows evidently. And that none — is proved, because no reason can be assigned why these rather than those. For what reason, why the whole multitude B should be occupied by these souls, since a lesser one suffices — for example, the multitude of papal bodies, which is C, and a still lesser, while infinite — for example D, and so of others infinite, as the preceding things clearly show? Why therefore is the whole B occupied rather than C, and C than D, and so onward — no reason can be given. For it does not necessarily follow that they occupy the whole B, nor the whole C, nor the whole D, and so of all the others, as the preceding things have taught. Indeed if they take no more bodies than is fitting, they will occupy no infinite multitude, since for any infinite multitude a lesser suffices for them, as the foregoing clearly show.

And if a forger should perhaps wish to cavil concerning the greater, let that be called greater than another which contains all that whole and something further, or another quantum beyond or outside.

And if anyone should say that these souls therefore assume all these bodies, because previously they were animating all those — this conflicts with the priors, because they still superfluously take more bodies than is fitting, as is shown above. Nor does this response evacuate the argument: for let all those old bodies be removed, and let so many new ones be created in their place, etc., as before; or let so many denarii be posited in a heap, or according to an ordered series, from which any soul, or any man when he shall be animated, may take to himself one denarius and not more — etc., as above.

But what kind of superfluity is this to be reckoned? For how could the souls take more sparingly of those bodies than for any one a single body — single ones single ones — nor do any of them, nor all together, take any besides their own proper bodies, or one in common?

Furthermore, if there is here a superfluity of souls for animating those bodies, let the superfluous be removed, and the necessary be reserved. How many souls then are reserved? Either infinite, or only finite. If infinite, there is still a superfluity of souls; for from them a thousand souls could be given to any body, and those souls could animate a thousand such multitudes B, as is shown above. There is still therefore an excessive superfluity. If only finite, how would those suffice for animating infinite bodies singularly?

If too there be there a superfluity of souls, there is likewise of co-equal bodies for so great a multitude of men to be integrated; wherefore also of men consequently. But how can so great a multitude of men be without so many men? How is the multitude of those men subtracted from them and that multitude — by any multitude of men, indeed however great you wish, even infinite — yet remain immutably as great as before? And likewise in addition, by similar reason.

If, moreover, beyond necessity there be a superfluity of souls for animating so many men, just so many souls are superfluous as are bodies numbered. For to any body two, indeed a thousand, and however many souls you wish correspond, as the foregoing manifest. With these men, therefore, all existing animated by all these souls, let there be removed as many souls as there are bodies, and any man will be rendered soulless, and any body will remain without a soul. Indeed take away one soul, and you will desoul some man or some body — that is plain. For from whom would you take some soul, except from some man, and some animated body?

Furthermore, if these infinite men, for their daily work according to the convention with God, were to receive in the evening single denarii each, how, according to the foregoing, would they receive superfluously many denarii — indeed infinite denarii? For who has, or who have, those infinite superfluous denarii, when none has except one denarius? Nor have any of them, nor all, any denarii or any denarius in common.

How could any one of those, according to the foregoing, have from those denarii alone — not multiplied, not increased — a thousand denarii, indeed ten thousand, and however many he should wish, even infinite? For if any could thus have, so they have. For all those denarii are distributed among them equally, single. If too the singles of these could have from those denarii alone — not multiplied, not increased — a thousand, or infinite denarii, why do they not so have? Who does to them so grave an injury, so great a damage? Who thus defrauds them of their just labor? Who prohibits them from carrying off advantage, as much as they can without prejudice to another, from their just labor, from their just wage?

This whole, therefore, would seem to happen from the malice and defect of him who renders them their wage. For he could, according to the foregoing, from those denarii alone — not multiplied, not increased — which they have commonly merited by their just labors, hand over to one of them a thousand, or however many denarii, even infinite; and so to another, and onward to the singles singly, or to all those alike. But who would impose fraud or any malice upon God, against the first Supposition, the third part, and the 31st? Furthermore, let it be posited that these infinite operatives stand seriously disposed consecutively, and that infinite denarii likewise be posited in the same order against them, as was posited above of souls and bodies; and let God command that all and singular take their just wage, nor presume to usurp more for themselves; and let them take single denarii consecutively, so that not even one denarius be left behind.

It seems therefore, according to the foregoing, that these are guilty of great fault and penalty. For they take much superfluously, much more — indeed infinitely more — than they ought to take; and the whole treasury, gazophylacium, or treasure-house of the Lord they evacuate, exhaust, and consume, where they could leave behind an infinite treasure, infinite riches, infinite denarii, as the foregoing most clearly demonstrated.

But if God should from this cause condemn them, He would condemn them if they were to take alternate denarii, leaving the rest of threes, fours, thousands, or any others residual, while singles took singles, because then all alike would take infinite ones — wherefore many infinite times

more than the convention requires, or just retribution requires. Always therefore God would, from this cause, accuse and condemn these His operatives — which does not befit His most plenary goodness, justice, and piety, as the first Supposition, the third part, and the 31st teach.

So far by the way of discrete quantity; now, however, by the way of continuous quantity must we proceed.

If therefore there be human souls actually infinite, according to the next part of this work, there are or will be at some time together also human bodies corresponding to them likewise infinite; or at least this is absolutely possible by the absolute omnipotence of God. For by what reason can God simultaneously make human souls actually infinite, He could simultaneously give them all bodies and animate just so many men — which the opinion seems to grant consequently. Let, therefore, B series of infinite human bodies equal here begin, and be infinite simply to the west; or, easier to understand, let B be one quadrangular log, of equal grossness throughout, here beginning, and proceeding into infinity in a certain way to the west. Which is therefore called infinite in a certain way, because it is infinite according to one dimension only — namely length — not all; indeed according to others it is finite. And because still according to that one — namely length — it is infinite to one part only, not the other, but finite. Which therefore, for distinction from a body imagined infinite simply according to every dimension, or a straight line infinite simply on either side, can be called infinite in a certain way fittingly. The other things, however, let be called infinite simply.

This B solid or corporeal quantity, therefore, let be distinguished by cubes, or feet, or footwise quantities, dividing it according to length through the middle through its whole grossness, correspondingly to the bodies of men and the souls aforesaid. Let, then, its first cube, or solid foot, be taken, and let it be placed more meridionally next to its prior position; and the second be placed contiguous to the first from the side of the east, and the third also from the side of the west, and so onward through its single cubes or feet.

With this done, from the same cubes, feet, or parts precisely — not multiplied, not rarefied, not in any way increased — from which B body was constituted, infinite in a certain way, now is constituted a body simply infinite, not according to another dimension but the same — which, like the foregoing, is most easily demonstrated. For this body secondly constituted in this manner is not finite from the side of the east, because then it would be similarly finite from the side of the west, and so from either side; wherefore it would contain only finite feet — wherefore B likewise — the opposite of which was posited.

Indeed, what seems a greater miracle, if its alternate, quaternate, or however many you wish parts be taken — according to the manner concerning souls aforesaid — and joined in the said manner, they will make, according to however many diameters of the world, however many bodies according to length simply infinite, indeed innumerable according to all the diameters of the world; and there will still remain infinite feet, as many as before. Which appears more easily,

if, with alternate or other feet taken away, the residual be advanced anteriorly and joined as before, as was taught above of human souls.

Furthermore, from this there evidently follows one stupendous miracle, and horribly monstrous: namely, that the cubes B or feet suffice for filling the whole place, situ, or imaginary vacuum simply infinite, according to all dimensions simply in every direction whatsoever, without multiplication, rarefaction, or addition of any kind, to make one body simply infinite in every direction. Indeed two such bodies; likewise three, four, and however many you wish, even infinite in number, and infinitely infinite; and that B should still have infinite cubes, as many as before, and remain as great as before. Which is more briefly and easily demonstrated, if the cubes B filling the place, as is plain, be taken continuous or alternate, as is fitting, and through imagination, or through the omnipotence of God, through infinite said instants of a day, or through the proportional unequal infinite parts of a day around some given point — quasi around the center equally — be heaped contiguous or continuous, until the singles and the alls of these be so heaped. With which done, you will have there a body from every part simply infinite. Otherwise it would be in every direction finite, and would contain only finite cubes; wherefore B likewise would have held only finite cubes, and would have been simply finite — the opposite of which was posited. Which is also clear of a thread however slender, infinite in a certain way in length, mutually wound up.

And if you desire to have two, or however many such bodies simply infinite — first make one out of the parts B, with the alternate residual reserved. With which done, and the first having been entirely annihilated through imagination, or through the omnipotence of God, according to the 33rd part of this work — make a second out of the alternate parts still reserved. With this done and annihilated, in like manner make a third, and so onward, as often as you please to operate — even an infinite number of times, indeed infinitely infinite — and there will still remain infinite cubes B, as many as before, and B likewise as great as before. Which is more limpidly clear, if the first part of B remaining always immobile preserved, with the second part of it subtracted, and the fourth, and the residual parts thus alternate — of the residual parts, any later be made contiguous with the next preceding part.

Through these things, however, the error of Epicurus or Democritus feigning infinite worlds is evidently shattered. For this it must be known that Augustine, *City of God* 11, chapter 5, says that Epicurus dreamed of innumerable worlds. John of Salisbury, however, afterward Bishop of Chartres, in his *Policraticus* — which he wrote to the blessed Thomas Archbishop of Canterbury when he was Chancellor of the King of England — in book 8, chapter 5, thus says: "Alexander, whose breast was insatiable for praise, when Anacharsus his companion, on the authority of Democritus his preceptor, reported there were innumerable worlds, said: 'Alas, miserable that I am, that I have not yet possessed even one!'" I suppose, however, that Democritus first invented this judgment, and Epicurus afterward confirmed it — as concerning the judgment affirming all things to be done by chance, Lactantius in book 1 of *Divine Institutions Against the Gentiles*, chapter 1, manifestly recounts, as is more fully recounted in chapter 27 of this first.

And this seems to be the opinion which Aristotle in *On the Heaven and the World* 1, chapter 76 and after, strives to reprove. For the single least bodies — which seem the least dust of earth — taken from single worlds, and heaped together to one another in the said manner, would totally occupy the whole place, situ, space, or vacuum, true or imaginary. Where, then, would other bodies, incomparably more and greater, be hosted? How also would they be content with a lesser space, and not occupy totally the whole universal space? How also do those cubes, parts of the thread, or least bodies of single worlds, now collected and spherically heaped, not previously occupy as much space as now the whole universal space; and how do they now occupy a fuller space than they did then? — especially since, according to the most certain doctrine of the geometers, the sphere is the most capacious of figures.

Furthermore, with B posited as before, let there be added to it according to the right C body altogether equal to the eastern part, and let it be made contiguous at point D; and let any cube or foot of B be rarefied to the west, and C to the east, and the whole BC will be augmented according to rectitude, according to the dimension according to which it is simply infinite; and to that part to which it is finite simply, it will be moved by straight motion, and there will be one infinite simply greater than another simply infinite. Which can also be argued similarly, by condensing the parts toward point D. Which is also more patently shown perhaps, if from BC there be subtracted one or two feet at D, and the residuals — through imagination, and through the omnipotence of God, without addition, rarefaction, or augmentation of any kind — be conjoined to one another by the local motion of one or both parts, and again be disjoined, and be reduced to a similar distance. Which can also be argued of a body posited simply infinite, and condensed as much as you wish toward some given point — also even rarefied.

Furthermore, if a simple infinite can be, why this in one species of things and not in another, and in others to be posited? A man therefore could be simply infinite. For a man could have a soul of natural perfection infinite simply intensively; wherefore also by similar reason, body proportionally adapted, which would necessarily be infinite; wherefore also single members of him, if they were naturally and proportionally adapted — which how great and how multifold a repugnance it implies, who does not see? Which also would subvert the whole of geometry and falsify it, as can easily be demonstrated.

After this, however, by the way of fortitude, power, or vigor of these innumerable souls. Let A therefore be that whole innumerable multitude, and let all be of equal power. Either, then, A is of active power infinite simply, than which a greater could not be — or simply finite — or infinite in a certain way, and in a certain way finite. Not infinite simply, since some greater could be. For it could be augmented by the addition of unity and a finite multitude — even of an infinite equal, or of however much greater — by intensive augmentation of the power of all these souls, and in either way; indeed there is some power greater than that — namely the supreme power and omnipotence of God, than which in no way could any greater be — as the first Supposition and the parts following show.

Nor can anyone say that A is of power simply finite. For then it would have a finite proportion to that simple power of soul B assigned. And some finite multitude, part of A, has a similar or equal proportion to B or its power; and some finite multitude, part of A, has greater proportion, as appears most clearly. For two souls are doubly more powerful than the one B (since all are posited equally powerful), and three triply, and so onward, beyond every finite proportion. Some part of A therefore is equal to A, of equal power and virtue, and some greater.

For the ninth of the fifth of Euclid's *Elements* says: "If of any quantities to one quantity there be one proportion, those are equal; if, however, of one to those there be one proportion, those are necessarily equal." Whose eighth thus says: "If two unequal quantities be proportioned to one quantity, the greater shall obtain a greater, the lesser a lesser proportion; but of that to those, to the lesser indeed greater proportion, to the greater lesser proportion shall there be."

Two souls, moreover, exceed B in double, three in triple, and so onward, beyond every finite proportion. All these infinite souls, therefore, gathered together at once, exceed the one B infinitely. They are therefore of infinite power.

Therefore perhaps it will be said in the first place that A is of power infinite in a certain way, and in a certain way finite. But, according to the foregoing, A exceeds B simply infinitely, since beyond every finite proportion. A therefore is of power simply infinite. Let too be taken imaginarily, or truly by hypothesis, through the great omnipotence of God, C, an active power simply infinite. C therefore and A have an equal proportion to B, since simply infinite, and B to both has an equal proportion. A and C therefore are equal, with the ninth of Euclid foregoing attesting.

Furthermore, either C and A are equal, or by no means. If they are equal, and C is simply infinite, therefore A also; or if they are equal, and A is not simply infinite but in a certain way only, and in a certain way finite, then C likewise — against the preceding hypothesis. If they are not equal, C is greater; otherwise A would be simply infinite and greater. But if C is greater, it is possible through imagination or through the supreme omnipotence of God to take some multitude of such souls equal to it, which is D. D therefore either is a multitude simply infinite, than which a greater or more powerful could not be, or it is not so great, or so powerful.

The first cannot be granted: for to every multitude of souls existing or possible, it is absolutely possible to add another unit, indeed other innumerable units. For there is some multitude greater than that, and incomparably greater than that — namely the multitude gathered from all those souls and all the points of this line, surface, or body; or from all the points of the world; or from all the things of the world. Nor is D so powerful, but that a more powerful multitude could be: for the power of any soul could be doubled, and however much augmented; and to D multitude of souls there could be added another similar multitude of Angels.

If, however, it be said that D is not so great a multitude, nor so powerful, but that some greater and more powerful could be, D is not of power simply infinite. For no greater can be than the

simply infinite, but a greater in a certain way only, and in a certain way finitely. D therefore is not equal to C, or C is not of power simply infinite — the opposite of which was posited.

Furthermore, let C be posited by the absolute possible as one Angel of so great power intensively, that he is equal of active power with A. For two souls of these one Angel could be made equal in fortitude — and three, and so onward; wherefore also all these together. C therefore either is of power simply finite intensively, or simply infinite. Not only finite, since then it would have proportion only finite to B; wherefore also A likewise; and would be finite simply in every way, as is argued above. Nor is C of power infinite simply intensively, because A is not of simply infinite power, as is shown above.

Let too be subtracted from A one soul, or however many you wish — finite or even infinite — say all the souls of males; and let there remain alone the souls of females, or even of popes, or any other multitude however much smaller, while infinite — which is D. And let F be an Angel equal to D, just as C is to A. Either, then, F is of power simply finite intensively, or simply infinite. Not only finite, on account of the foregoing. If simply infinite, it is equal to C — since one infinite simply intensively cannot be less than another such, any more than one straight line infinite simply can be greater or longer than another such straight one. C therefore is equal to D, by the eighth of Euclid's fifth foregoing — and more clearly by the seventh thus saying: "If two equal quantities be compared to any third, of those to that there will be one proportion; likewise of that to both, one proportion." Wherefore D and A are equal, by the ninth of Euclid's fifth above-recited.

In a similar manner can be argued against these by positing A to be however much diminished — not by subtraction of some soul, but by remission of the power of any one of the souls; or also however much augmented by the addition of more souls, or by intension of the power of single ones. Every multitude of souls infinite, therefore, however great or small, however remiss in power, or however intense, is equal to every such multitude.

Furthermore, if not all such multitudes be equal in multitude and power, let A be the multitude as before, and B be — through imagination or through the great omnipotence of God — another infinite multitude of Angels, greater however much you wish in multitude — say for example double — and likewise doubly more powerful. For let it be posited that single Angels, and single souls, are of equal power; and let A and B be multitudes altogether distinct, namely having no unit common to both.

Let, therefore, B be disposed according to one consecutive series, as was supposed before of A, and to any unit of B let one unit of A be distributed — which can be done well, as was shown above. With which done, the single units of A correspond to the single units of B, and all alike to all, mutually equally; and they are mutually as it were supposed equally to one another. These multitudes are therefore co-equal in multitude. For how would equality in such things be better proved? For thus among the geometers in magnitudes equality is demonstrated. Whence the first

of Euclid's *Elements* supposes this principle as self-evident: "If any thing be supposed to another, and applied to it, nor does either exceed the other, those will be mutually equal."

Nor does any reason possible seem to be assignable why and by how much B exceeds A; just as not in the parts of time, according to your opinion, Aristotle, simply infinite; just as also of two straight lines in a certain way, not simply infinite, whose equality through the supposition to one another said above is geometrically demonstrated. A therefore and B — wherefore also any two infinite multitudes ordered or orderable according to one consecutive series altogether distinct — are mutually co-equal in multitude. Wherefore also in fortitude, power, and virtue.

For this follows of A and B manifestly, since single Angels are of co-equal power with single souls. Which also follows evidently if any Angel be posited however much more powerful than a soul — say in double — and all Angels among themselves be of equal power, as was posited above of souls. For if A and B are not of equal power, but are of equal multitude by the foregoing, and all Angels are among themselves of equal virtue, and all souls among themselves likewise, and any Angel is only doubly more powerful than the soul corresponding to him, B is only doubly more powerful than A — with the first of the fifth of Euclid's *Elements* saying: "If there be however many quantities, of others as many equally multiples, or single ones equal to single ones, it is necessary, just as one of those is to its corresponding, so also the whole gathered from these to all those alike accepted similarly to be."

But if B be only doubly more powerful than A, let C be taken as another multitude of souls equal to A in number and virtue, so that single ones are equal to single ones, and all to all in power; to which let further be assumed D, another multitude of souls altogether equal in number and virtue, and let it be joined to C, making the multitude F. C therefore is of equal power with A, and D likewise. Wherefore also by the seventh of the fifth of Euclid foregoing it is of subdouble power to B. F therefore composed precisely from C and D is co-adequated to B in power. F also is co-adequated to A in power. For it is equated to it in multitude by the props, and the single souls of F to the single souls of A in power and virtue, as was posited above; wherefore also by the first of the fifth of Euclid above-prescribed, the whole F altogether to the whole A altogether in power is co-adequated. Wherefore also by the seventh of the same foregoing, A and B are of equal power and vigor.

A therefore by similar reason is equal in multitude and fortitude to any multitude however great, imaginary or absolutely possible, of souls or of Angels of however great virtue intensively. Wherefore also to a multitude of virtue infinite simply numerously and intensively similarly, if it be posited.

Furthermore, of however great power some multitude can be of souls numerable or innumerable, so great can also some one form be, or one thing through intension or extension of power and vigor — and even contrariwise. Who, granting infinity, would not grant this consequently?

Let, then, B be some power infinite simply intensively, than which a greater intensively could not be; and C a multitude of such souls imaginary or true equal to it — equal, I say, of power and virtue. C therefore either is of multitude and fortitude infinite simply, namely so that a greater multitude or stronger could not be, or it is not so great, nor so strong. That it is not so great, nor so strong, is established most certainly through the foregoing. For it is absolutely possible to add to C some unit, or some units, and to augment the fortitude of any soul. And if it be not so great, nor so powerful, it would be absolutely possible that some greater and stronger than that should be. It would be likewise possible by similar reason that to that greater and stronger multitude some one intensive or intense power should be equated, which would necessarily be greater than B power posited infinite simply intensively, than which a greater intensively could not be.

Which can also be argued similarly, if B be posited a heavy body of grossness infinite simply in every way intensively, and likewise extensively, to which C multitude of such souls be posited equal — equal namely of capability.

Furthermore, let A be one form, one Soul, of fortitude infinite intensively, and let B be — through imagination or through the great omnipotence of God — one heavy body of equal grossness and power (that is, of resisting capability), as A is of moving capability. Then A cannot move B, but anything less than it, as the natural rules show.

Of what condition therefore is B? It seems that it is infinite simply intensively, and simply extensively. For any heavy thing less is in a certain way and in some way finite; wherefore also of virtue similarly finitely; A truly of virtue simply infinite, and sufficiently exceeding to motion. Which appears, if B first be posited a heavy body finite simply by grossness, and likewise by quantity, and to be augmented intensively and extensively in every direction through one day, accelerating each motion as much as is fitting, until in the end it be infinite simply in every direction intensively and likewise extensively. For then first B is equal to A of equal power and virtue. For always before it was of less, since finite simply in intension and likewise in extension.

To such a body, moreover, of grossness infinite simply in every way could there be some soul equal of equal virtue, and not more intense than A, since A is of intension simply infinite. B therefore is a body of infinite grossness simply in every way. But this cannot stand. For let C be one heavy body of finite and equal grossness throughout here beginning, and to the west extended into infinity, and so of quantity infinite in a certain way, and let it be of grossness uniform infinite simply intensively — which nevertheless is not of grossness infinite simply, because not intensively and extensively, but in a certain way only, in the manner of speaking foregoing.

A therefore cannot move C. For according to the prior shown, C is co-adequated in quantity to a body infinite simply in every direction. Wherefore also in grossness similarly, if that body be posited of grossness uniform, and infinite simply intensively. For grossnesses follow in such bodies the quantities. For from the parts of C cut from it and spherically heaped, without any addition, can be made one body of quantity infinite simply extensively, as the foregoing

demonstrated. Wherefore also of grossness infinite simply intensively. Indeed two and three such bodies, and however many you wish, of which any is infinite simply extensively, and even intensively. C therefore now is simply of so great grossness and weight, as one such body of grossness infinite simply in every way; indeed as two and three, and as many as you wish to number.

How therefore does A suffice to move C? For neither does it suffice to move B, nor many B's, nor one. Furthermore, if A can move C, A exceeds C. It is therefore possible to take some soul of equal virtue with C — since of greater, since infinite simply, such as God is, and as A is posited; and of lesser. Let, therefore, D be such. D therefore is less than A, of less power and virtue, as this hypothesis posits. But how? For either D is of intension infinite simply, or finite. If infinite simply, it is equal to A. If only finite, it is of power finite simply in every way; not therefore equal to C.

If too it were equal to C, it could lift, or move, anything less than it; wherefore also the half of C as long as C. But how could a soul of intension and virtue finite simply in every way lift or move so heavy a body as much surpassing it disproportionately? Which also through the proportionality of D and another soul of small virtue, and of their objects, through the terms of even powers themselves can easily be confuted.

A therefore does not suffice to lift or move C. Wherefore neither any such body altogether of quantity infinite in a certain way, and of grossness infinite simply intensively. Indeed nor does A suffice to lift any body of quantity finite simply in every direction, while it is of grossness infinite simply intensively. For if it suffices, let F be such a heavy body, which A can lift; then A exceeds F. Possible therefore is it to take some soul equal to F of equal power and virtue, since of greater — as A is posited — and of lesser. Let, therefore, G be such, etc., as above.

Furthermore, F is of equal grossness with K body simply infinite extensively, of finite and uniform grossness intensively, or it exceeds it. Which appears if K first be posited a heavy body uniform finite extensively, and likewise intensively, and be augmented continuously extensively through one day, until in the end it be infinite simply extensively, with the prior intension remaining. F indeed always exceeds it up to the end of the day. Wherefore also then either still it exceeds it, or it is equal to it — of equal grossness, as more it seems. K too in the end exceeds infinitely simply one of its footwise quantities, and F likewise. That footwise quantity also is exceeded infinitely simply by either. They are therefore mutually co-equal, by the ninth of the fifth of Euclid's *Elements* above-recited.

Whence also it is evidently convinced that, however much K shall be more intense or more remiss uniformly than it is now, with F remaining as before, still they would be equal; and however much F shall be in quantity more or less, with the others remaining as before, still they would be equal. Wherefore also the whole and the part, the double and the half would be equal, and equally weigh, by the ninth of the fifth of Euclid's *Elements* foregoing.

Furthermore, if F too were posited of length infinite in a certain way, with the others remaining as before, still it would be equated to K. For if F continuously grew until it were made infinite in this manner, always it would be equated to K up till then. Why therefore not then? Which also appears more expressly, if there be taken L, a part of K of length infinite in a certain way here beginning, and to the west infinitely proceeding, of finite grossness and equal throughout; and there be taken another part of K similar to L and equal, whose grossness be added to L, or as much, or as much further intensified, and let it be made doubly more intense, and so infinitely, of all such infinite parts, until the whole grossness of K, or as much, be conflated and gathered into L. K and L of quantity infinite in a certain way, and of grossness infinite simply intensively, mutually adequate one another. Wherefore also F itself to L; and a finite part to its whole infinite in a certain way; indeed even simply infinite. For from the parts of L without any addition can be made a body infinite simply extensively, and likewise intensively, as was demonstrated above. F therefore would be equated to such a body posited.

F also is equated to K of so great intension; and double, even if it be posited; and triple; and so onward transcending every finite number, as was shown above. Wherefore also if it be posited of grossness infinite simply intensively. For some such heavy thing is the maximum to which F is equated. Which also appears if K be posited first finite simply extensively and intensively, and be augmented extensively and intensively through one day, until in the end it become in either way simply infinite. F namely up to the end of the day continuously exceeded it. Wherefore also then likewise either it exceeds it, or it is equated to it. For it is not exceeded by K then infinitely, since K acquired no quantity or grossness suddenly, nor F ever before exceeded.

If, however, anyone should wish to be obstinate about the foregoing, let recourse be had to the balance, and to the equilibrium placed at equal distance from the horizon, and let there be agreement in the judgment of it concerning the equal or unequal grossnesses of bodies. Let, however, the balance be imaginary, or true, made through the omnipotence of God, or adapted, of such virtue and so great that any bodies in it can be faithfully weighed. For who does not know, according to the rules concerning weights and according to daily experience, that if one F be suspended on one side of the equilibrium, and another F altogether equal on the other, that they will weigh equally; and if a third F equal be added to either one and not the other, the nod will be made; and that the arm will incline from the side of the heavier weight, of doubled weight; and so of other heavy things faithfully weighed.

Furthermore, according to the foregoing, let A be one soul of power infinite simply intensively, and B another equal to it in every way, and C a third equal to both jointly; and either A or B will be of remiss power, and not infinite simply intensively. Or to a power infinite simply intensively there will be another power such more intense and greater — indeed in double greater, in triple, in quadruple, and so onward however much. Wherefore also one infinite simply more by like manner than another simply infinite.

Furthermore, by the way of action and passion: and first by the way of local motion in this manner. Let A be one heavy body of quantity finite simply in every direction, and of grossness infinite simply intensively. If it be posited above, in the middle it will descend, since it is outside its natural place least impeded. But either it will descend suddenly, or successively. Not suddenly, since it has some resistance; and because then in every medium and with every greater and lesser finite resistance it would do so. Every body of this kind moreover, greater and lesser, in the same medium, and with the same resistance, would descend equally quickly.

How also will a natural and rude body, by natural power, transit from extreme to extreme with the medium passed over, and go out from a place closed most strongly in every direction without rupture, opening, co-extension, or compenetration of any kind? Nor successively, because by whatever velocity it would descend, by so much would some body of grossness simply finite in every way descend, and some of greater.

Nor can Avempace, against the judgment of Aristotle, respond by saying that heavy and light bodies have from themselves an inclination determined and only finite to a velocity determined and finite. For although this could somehow be said about the simple elements according to the disposition which they now have — because they have forms only of finite intension — yet of a body of grossness infinite simply intensively it cannot be said. For by how much, according to that response, it has form and grossness more intense, by so much also has it appetite and inclination to motion, and to greater velocity, and so much more swiftly would it be naturally moved.

Consequently by the way of alteration in this manner. Let A be one hot body — for example, fire — of quantity finite simply in every direction, and of heat infinite simply intensively, to which let approach B, contrary, combustible, finite simply in every way. A therefore will burn B — that is plain — but either suddenly or successively will it burn it, etc., as above.

Furthermore, also by the way of locating in this manner. Where would fire infinitely intense and light be naturally located? For according to the judgment of the philosophers — as also seems well reasonable, and is therefore supposed — the more intense and lighter fire is, the higher place or situ does it naturally desire and seek out. It desires therefore a place infinitely distant from the center, from the place of a heavy body — which appears more if earth too be posited of grossness infinite simply intensively. But what place is distant from another simply infinitely, or in a certain way also infinitely? For who does not know that from a point in one place to a point in another, as Euclid says, a straight line can be drawn, which necessarily is finite simply on either side, since at those two points aforesaid finally terminated? The whole distance therefore between those two places taken is finite simply in every way.

Furthermore, by the way of intension simply infinite alone. For let A be one form infinite simply intensively, from which through imagination or through the omnipotence of God let be removed by remission some finite part B; for from every infinite there seems to be able to be removed

some finite part; and let C be the other part remaining. As much B as C therefore are finite simply, and constitute the whole A. Wherefore also the whole is finite simply intensively.

Or otherwise in this manner. Let A be remitted as you will, yet so that it be not totally consumed, and let the part lost be B, and the residue C. If, then, B as much as C be finite simply, also the whole A is finite simply. If indeed C be finite simply (as it is necessary to say) and B infinite in a certain way (as someone perhaps says), still the whole A is finite simply. For finite simply joined to infinite in a certain way never makes simply infinite, as in every other matter clearly is plain — which is also demonstratively proved. For if to infinite in a certain way be added something finite simply, only finitely is it augmented, and is made greater than before, if so it be greater.

Nor can anyone further feign cavilling, that as much B as C in a certain way is infinite, and in a certain way finite — as according to the judgment of Aristotle, the past and future parts of time simply infinite, which the present instant copulates — because an infinite intensively, however little it be remitted, is simply and in every way finite intensively: as appears of heat posited infinite intensively, which if however much remitted, is necessarily simply in every way finite. For it is finished above intrinsically to a certain finite degree, and below extrinsically to non-being of heat, as also any form intensible is terminated. It has too proportion certain and finite simply in every way to every other heat finite simply in intension, as also in velocity of motion and action; as also such grossness would have to every other grossness in intension, and in velocity of local motion. Wherefore also every such heat, however little remitted, in every way and simply is finite, as the mathematical theorems concerning proportions manifest.

Nor can anyone say that B is simply infinite. For it is necessarily finished in the copulation of C with itself. There is then necessarily there some degree which is the common end and term of either, just as also some point would be in the continuation of two such lines. And since B is part of A, wherefore also lesser than that — but no infinite simply is lesser or greater than another simply infinite.

And if anyone still — though not understandingly — should babble against the truth, saying that one imaginary part of heat infinite intensively is infinite simply toward the higher, finite however toward the lower; another partial heat — since it is less and more remiss than heat infinite simply — can be intensified toward the higher (for every intension is ascent); it is therefore not infinite simply intensively toward the higher, as the preceding things have taught.

Furthermore, let D be heat simply infinite, E truly such a part of it, F however the rest part of the same; and let D be remitted to E. For to any of its parts, and to every degree, can it be remitted. Then E is not simply infinite toward the higher, because D was above it; and because part is not equal to its whole; and because then D in nothing would be remitted. E too has proportion finite simply in intension, as also in action, to any other heat finite simply, as is argued above.

Furthermore, if E be finite in a certain way in intension, and F is finite simply (because from every part both above and below) — from E and F is not constituted simply infinite, as is shown above.

Furthermore, by the way of omnipotence and supereminence supreme of God. If God can make infinite numerously and even intensively, He can make some thing once to have, really, equivalently, or supereminently, all virtues, and any of them infinitely, or infinite simply intensively. God therefore can make one other God, indeed and other gods many — against the seventeenth part of this work. How also can there be some recent God, and not necessary being simply, nor eternal — against the first Supposition, and the demonstration of the same?

Therefore perhaps it will be said that God cannot make a creature which is from itself necessary being and eternal — wherefore neither another God. But although He cannot make a creature have these virtues or properties, let Him make it have all other virtues possible to a creature, and any of them simply infinitely. And let A be one creature of this kind. A therefore is the most perfect creature possible — that is plain. But how is A still not of perfection infinite simply in every way, nor of equal perfection with God simply infinite? It is therefore either of perfection finite simply in every way, or infinite in a certain way only, and in a certain way finite. It is therefore not only of less, but even of infinitely less perfection than God simply infinite. Otherwise, infinite simply in every way would not exceed infinite in a certain way only, and in a certain way finite, except by finite simply in every way — which who doubts to be false, as is shown above? A therefore is of less perfection, and of infinitely less, than God.

God therefore can make something more perfect than A. For there is no defect of receptive possibility on the part of the creatable creature, nor effective possibility on the part of the Creator, by the first Supposition and the seventh part of this work. And God can make another creature equal to A, and a third equal to both — wherefore also greater than A. A therefore is not the most perfect creature possible — the opposite of which was said.

Furthermore, if God can make some thing infinite numerously and likewise intensively, He can make some thing omnipotent — some thing omnipotent simply or actively — which is made, and let it be A. A therefore either is equally powerful with God, or not equally, but less. Not equally powerful, as the forger perhaps will say. For how shall a creature be equated to its Creator? For the philosophers know, and theologians do not ignore, that any creature made by God in being always depends on Him, as on its necessary preserver. Wherefore also similarly in doing — nor by itself does it suffice to do anything without God specially co-acting with it; indeed even principally pre-acting. How therefore can A in being or in doing be equated to God?

Nor can anyone say that A, supposing its existence, is so powerful to do something as God. For it cannot of itself and from itself alone do something as God, as is shown immediately above. Indeed even granted by a false position of the forger that A now made could of itself be and act, still God would be more powerful — and not only a little more powerful, but also infinitely. For if A tried to move anything — for example, a wheel or the heaven by one motion — God could

impede A, that it should move not at all, but that the wheel should stand unmoved, or even be turned by contrary motion. Which also He could likewise do, with two such A's striving together, and three, four, and so onward, however many you wish, even infinite. For however much some creature can do, or some creatures, however many, even infinite, can do — God too can do, as the first Supposition clearly shows.

But one A could impede another like itself; and two A's could not only impede that one, but also move its wheel by contrary motion; and similarly three to two, and four to three, and so onward; even an innumerable multitude of such could be impeded from motion by an equal multitude, and by a greater that wheel could be turned by contrary motion. If too A were equally powerful with God, it could impede Him from motion, and two A's could move the mobile of God — namely a wheel or the heaven — against the intention, will, and effort of God. Wherefore also God impotent, of impidable will, and miserably miserable He would be, against the first Supposition, and against the seventh, eighth, and third parts of this work.

Furthermore, let B be created equal to A altogether, and C equal to A and B jointly. For of any two — especially those of which there are or could be any greater things, and some virtue greater — God omnipotent can of His absolute omnipotence make one equal. But of these two, three such are or can be greater; and now actually God is greater, as the foregoing clearly prove. Let, therefore, C be equal to A and B jointly, namely of equal power. C therefore is equal to A and B jointly. It is therefore greater than them dividedly. Neither, therefore, can be called omnipotent. For neither can do as much as C. Nor can one omnipotent be less than another, just as neither one infinite simply than another simply infinite.

If, moreover, C is greater than A — since A and God are posited equal — C is also greater than God, of greater power and vigor, by the seventh of the fifth of Euclid foregoing — which the first Supposition does not permit. If, too, C be greater than God, God is not omnipotent, and of power simply infinite, against the first Supposition, the seventh part, and the fourth.

Furthermore, if A be omnipotent, and equally powerful with God, it can do whatever God can. It can therefore annihilate itself, and again recreate itself; for this God can, as appears by the 33rd and 34th parts and their demonstrations; and A can make all things which are required for the production, preservation, and government of all things. God therefore is not necessarily required for these and such things to be done; how therefore is the existence of God philosophically proved through these?

Furthermore, how can A be called omnipotent, and equally powerful with God, when God omnipotent can destroy it through the foregoing — and because otherwise He would not be omnipotent — but A cannot destroy strong God, as the first Supposition, the sixth part, and the seventh lucidly manifest? If, however, it be said in the first place that A is less powerful than God, then A is not omnipotent through the foregoing. If too A be less than God, there could be some virtue greater — which if it be posited, A is not omnipotent, but defective in virtue with

respect to it. That virtue too could impede A from moving; indeed it could move its mobile against it.

Furthermore, if by absolute possible there be posited another virtue equal to A, that can impede A — however much it strive — from moving; and two not only impede, but also move its mobile against it. A therefore is by no means omnipotent, but to be reckoned impotent — which also through the reasons foregoing can be perspicuously demonstrated.

Nor can the forger be obstinate by saying that to A virtue omnipotent there cannot be made some other virtue equal, since then God would not be omnipotent — and God omnipotent can destroy A, and with it destroyed make B virtue equal to A. Wherefore also He could, with A remaining, preserve A and B alike, since He is plenarily omnipotent in every way.

Furthermore, that in fewer — indeed in one virtue more — it may appear: let A be a creature having only one active power — say motive locally infinite simply intensively. Either then A is equal to God in that power, or less. Not equal, as can be demonstrated as above; nor less, since it is in that species simply infinite, and one infinite simply cannot be less than another simply infinite. If too A be less than God, there could be made some virtue greater than A of the same species, and A could be augmented to equality with that, on this side, or beyond; and God could make another creature equal to A in the same species, and a third equal to both jointly, wherefore also greater than A, etc., as above. A therefore is not of such power infinite simply, but finite simply in every way, as the foregoing have taught — the opposite of which was posited.

Furthermore, many in many ways are eager to respond to such things. For some indeed are not ashamed to deny that the whole is greater than its part, or to grant that the whole is equal to its part. Thus if A be the whole multitude infinite of all souls, and B one of them, but C the whole residual multitude, they say that A is not greater than C, but equal — which also they say, just as they have necessarily to say consequently, of any two infinite quanta compared to one another.

But does not Euclid in the first of his *Elements* suppose this principle as self-evident to anyone: "Every whole is greater than its part" — which he understands of the quantitative part — which all mathematicians and natural philosophers agreeingly profess? To which the mind of any one seems spontaneously to consent with terms known. Which appears too from the significations of the terms. Is not that greater than another which contains that and also more, or another quantum beyond or outside? Whose mind contradicts? Whose mind does not so say?

Wherefore perhaps, as Alhazen says in his *Perspective*, that famous principle is known by such a syllogism: "Every thing containing another and also more is greater than it. Every whole contains its part and also more. Every whole therefore is greater than its part." But because, with the terms known, the premises and the consequence are immediately known, perhaps such syllogizing or discourse is not perceived; and so the conclusion is reckoned a principle known per se.

Is not, also, every multitude — for instance, of all souls — augmented by units always added, just as also it is diminished by them subtracted, especially if there be added another multitude

infinite equal to the first, or also subtracted? For who is ignorant that there is doubling and halving — double and half — when the definitions of them, with terms known, are clear to anyone per se? Whose sense disagrees? Whose conscience does not agree? The whole multitude therefore of all souls is simply double the whole multitude of all the souls of males, and likewise of the whole multitude of the souls of all females, since each of these is infinite; wherefore also equal to the other through the foregoing.

Who too, I ask, would not rather flee a torment lasting from this moment to the age, than a torment to begin after a thousand years, or however many more — and after to last continuously or discontinuously, however much you wish, eternally?

According also to that senseless judgment, A — eternal continuous punishment — and B, half of it intensively, would be altogether equal. For each is infinite. Which also can be shown by similitude, and from the similitude of proportions in this way. Let C be a body infinite in a certain way of equal grossness throughout, and D the half of it as long as the whole, or another body altogether separate from C, as long as C, but doubly less profound or thick throughout. As, then, A is to B, so C is to D. But C is equal to D, as the response seems to confess; and because, according to the foregoing, to any finite measure of C — for example, a solid or cubic foot — there corresponds equally an equal measure altogether of D; and the contrary; and however much place C can fill, also D — without addition, rarefaction, or augmentation of any kind — can fill, and the contrary. C therefore and D are altogether equal: wherefore also A and B, on account of their proportionality aforesaid.

Is not also, just as this finite log to its half, so also C to its own — say, to D — and the contrary? If, therefore, C and D are altogether equal, this finite log too and its half are likewise equal. Or if this finite log be double its half, also C be double its own.

Nor can anyone say D is not the half of C; for it is part of C — that is plain, and the forger confesses it. But of what kind, and how much, except the half? — which also the definition of half shows. For C with another such part altogether equal constitutes integrally that whole.

Furthermore, let A be a heavy body, of grossness infinite simply intensively, but of quantity finite simply extensively — say a foot's; and B of like grossness, but of subdouble quantity. According to this new wisdom, A and B are of equal grossness, and altogether weigh and incline equally. Which yet, that it may more appear, let it be further posited that C be a heavy body of grossness uniform, and finite simply intensively; nevertheless of quantity infinite in a certain way, not simply extensively. A therefore is equal to C — equal namely of grossness, as the preceding things clearly show; which also can be easily demonstrated.

For A is equated in grossness to some body of grossness uniform and finite simply intensively, and of quantity infinite in a certain way, or simply extensively; and any such body is equal to C — namely of grossness equally weighing, as was shown above. Just as, also, this response has to say consequently. For if, as this response says, the infinite part of an infinite body is equal simply

to its whole, it is by the same reason equal to any infinite, and any infinite either in a certain way or simply equal to any in a certain way or simply infinite.

A therefore is equal to C, weighs equally, of equal heaviness; and B likewise by similar reason. A therefore and B are equal in that way. Just as, also, C is to its half, which is D, so A is to B; but according to the foregoing C is equal to D, wherefore also A to B. Or thus: as A is to C, so B to D; wherefore also permutatively, as A is to B, so C is to D; but A is double to B, therefore also C to D — which this response denies; or if C be equal to D, also A and B. For the sixteenth of the *Elements* of Euclid says: "If there be four quantities proportional, permutatively also they will be proportional."

If anyone, however, should grant that A is equal to B — namely of grossness equally weighing — by the equilibrium's just judgment will he be convinced, as was touched above. Likewise, if A and B be of equal grossness equally weighing altogether, since they are of equal grossness intensively, they are also of equal grossness likewise extensively. For in the greater body of this kind there is a greater virtue.

In the same reason, moreover, B is equal to the double of A, and to the quadruple, and to such a body simply infinite. Furthermore, with the others standing as before, let D be a heavy body of quantity equal with C, but of grossness subdouble intensively; and it follows from the foregoing that C and D are equal in the said way. A also is equal to each, which, with the priors understood, is most easily demonstrated.

But if C and D are equally heavy simply, and they are equal extensively, they are also equally heavy intensively. According also to this, however much C be intensified further, with D remaining as before, always equally heavy, equally weighing they would remain; wherefore neither would C become more heavy than before. Whose just balance's judgment, moreover, would tolerate so great injuries of nature?

Furthermore, let A be one innumerable multitude of souls equal in virtue, in fortitude, and in vigor; and B another altogether equal, and altogether distinct from that. If, therefore, the equilibrium be posited at equal distance from the horizon, and A from one side, and B from another, drawing or pulling, each as much as it can — there will be no nod, but all things will stand as before.

If indeed to A be added another similar multitude, and let there be C multitude constituted from those, and to B nothing; and let C draw or pull from one side, and B from another as much as they can — still the equilibrium will stand equally as before. For C, according to this response, is equal to A, wherefore also to B. Even if still to A and C be added another similar multitude, or however many you wish — the whole composed multitude will always be equated to B in fortitude and virtue.

Wherefore likewise even if the single units of A — single souls — be intensified in power and vigor to the double and to the quadruple, even infinitely, with B remaining as before in all

respects — A always will be equal to B altogether, equal namely of capability. But whose equilibrium's equity does this not condemn?

According also to this, A would not grow, nor could grow in virtue, by however much addition of virtue extensively or intensively or in either way jointly. But whose mind grasps this? Whose mind so judges? For A is of multitude finite in a certain way, and of power finite intensively, nor of power equal with God, as the first Supposition clearly shows. It is therefore absolutely possible that A be augmented in power and virtue, and God can do this, as the first Supposition and the seventh part clearly show.

Who would presume to say that omnipotent God could not augment a creature which is not simply infinite, nor has the whole perfection of the capacity of its nature? Nay, however much it has, so much does it lack — and again so much, infinitely too so much.

Furthermore, also according to that judgment senseless and insensitive: since according to the foregoing, the science of God is infinite simply, and if truly or imaginarily there were detracted from it some science finite or infinite which it has — for instance, of some or all theorems of geometry — it would not be less than before, nor He less knowing than before. In the same way concerning His infinite power: if there were detracted from it some power finite or also infinite — for example, of knowing geometricals or of creating — still it would remain equally powerful and omnipotent as before. And so of any of His perfection separately, and of all alike, if there were subtracted from them however much, always He would remain equally and supremely perfect as before — so that nothing more perfect could be.

How therefore and why has He so great superfluity in every virtue of His, and in His virtues universally, against the third part of this work? If, however, anyone should be obstinate concerning God, let it be posited according to this position truly through the omnipotence of God or imaginarily, that something else knows all things which God knows except geometricals — or can do all things which God can do except creation — or has every perfection which God has except one; and it will be equally knowing, equally powerful, and equally perfect with God. For any infinite part is equal to any its whole, wherefore also to any infinite in a certain way or simply.

Indeed, if some thing be posited infinite simply, or even in a certain way, in unique perfection or virtue — like that innumerable multitude of souls, or one soul equal to all those — there will be a creature of perfection equal simply, and of virtue with God. Which crime so blasphemous the first Supposition and the parts following do not allow, but evidently rebuke and refute, as the foregoing by the way of the omnipotence of God perspicuously demonstrated.

Robert Lincoln-Bishop, namely Grosseteste, of subtle and profound genius, in a certain treatise of his on light beginning ("I think the first corporeal form is light"), shows that all proportions found among finite are found likewise among infinite. For the whole multitude of all binaries, as he teaches, is double the whole multitude of all quaternaries; and the whole multitude of all

weeks quadruple to the whole multitude of all months; and likewise in all similar — which seems to be true, if it be supposed, according to common opinion, that there is in act a multitude of such infinite.

Besides these things, however, this forgery, although by such an impossibility granted it could in some way define some reasons foregoing — yet to many it neither truly nor apparently suffices to respond, as is easy to see for those willing to consider. I know that many other little responses, and many little objections — indeed also many objections greatly probable — are possible in this part; but hastening to other things, to others more abundant in leisure, or to another time, I leave these.

These things, therefore, by the way of infinite, against Aristotle and Algazel, this time it suffices to have brought forth.

Furthermore, according to your philosophy, Aristotle, how can a possible being be eternal anteriorly? But the world is a possible being, as the 17th part shows. For your philosophy plainly attests, and the human mind quasi naturally acquiesces, that everything possible to be — just as it does not exist sufficiently from itself, but continuously depends on another causally preserving it — so also is totally produced.

Some, however, suppose that even though the world is new, it would be absolutely possible without any formal repugnance included that it has been and is eternal from God — like an eternal footprint from an eternal foot in coeternal dust, and like an eternal image from an eternal face in a coeternal mirror. Which if it is true, the whole depended on the divine will. Neither was the world's being new, nor eternal, necessary absolutely, nor demonstrable *propter quid* and *a priori* — just as neither was God's having willed eternally this or that, just as too of the divine will to extrinsic effects there is no necessary antecedent cause, as the demonstration of the 33rd and 34th parts has shown.

Wherefore also, if that previously said is true, in similar manner concerning this soul, or some other creature, although it be new, it is yet not necessary absolutely that it be new, but absolutely possible that it be eternal. Neither its newness nor its eternity can be demonstrated simply *a priori*. Each of them depended on the divine will, of which there is no preceding necessary cause absolutely; nor is it itself necessary absolutely, but free with the freedom proper to it in causing.

Approach, therefore, Aristotle, and demonstrate to me by demonstration necessary absolutely that this soul, or another such thing, is not eternal but new; and I will demonstrate to you likewise that the world is not eternal but new. Truly if you wish to demonstrate, beware lest you take some true and necessary by accident in demonstrating. Or if you take such for yourself, permit me to take similar; and I will demonstrate likewise that the world is not eternal but new.

Furthermore, the possibility of the creation and beginning of the world is shown above. All gentes too — Hebrews, Greeks, Latins, and Barbarians; all Prophets, all theologians and poets, and all philosophers before Aristotle — affirmed agreeingly that the world had a temporal

beginning. Which all laws and sects alike confess, just as very many famous histories — even your books — perspicuously attest.

Does not Hermes, whom even with you, Aristotle, attesting, is fitted to be called the Father of Philosophers, hand down that the world and man were created by God, and had a temporal beginning? Does not, in *On the Eternal Word* 2, he thus say: "In the Creator were all things before He created all things"? And below, 3: "Of heaven, and of the soul itself, and of all things which are in the world, He is the governor, who is the effector God. From all the aforesaid, of which the same governor is God, an influencing frequentation is borne through the world, and through the soul of all kinds, and of all species, through the nature of things. The world, however, has been prepared by God as the receptacle of all-formed species."

And 6: "Man passes into the nature of God, as if he himself were God; man knew the kind of demons, as one who recognizes that he had risen with them." And 11: "There is a reason," he says, "incredible to most, but integral and true to be perceived by holier minds. Therefore from this I shall begin: the Lord of eternity is the first God; the second is the World; the third is Man — the effector of the world is God, and of those things which are in it; with all things together to be governed, He composed man with the governor Himself, of which composition the very governor is governed. Which whole, taking up, man makes the proper care his own diligence — that thus both he and the world should be ornamented to himself; that thus, by his every divine composition, the world may seem in Greek to be called *cosmos*, that is, ordered. He knows himself, knows also the world, namely that he should remember what fits his parts, what is to be used by him, and to what he must be subservient — so that he may recognize and give greatest thanks and praise to God, venerating His image, not unaware that he too is according to the image of God; whose images are two — the World and Man."

And below, 15, speaking of the world and worldly things: "They were not when they were not, but in Him then they already were, whence they had to be born." And 24: "God the Father and Lord, after the gods, made men." To whom He also says many similar things in many places. Who too in his *Alchemy*, which Galen, as he says, "*Antrum Hermetis*" entering, in the Smaragdine Tablet between his hands he found written, thus says: "All things were from one, by the mediation of one, and all things were born from this one thing by adaptation."

And below: "This is the strength of every fortitude — strong, because it will conquer every subtle thing, and will penetrate every solid thing, just as this world has been created." Who also in *On the World and Heaven* 1, prefaced with "Of the Principles of Things," thus writes: "From eternity beginning time, into the lap of eternity it dissolves itself, fatigued by a longer circuit." Does he not hand down expressly that time had a beginning, and likewise will have an end? Wherefore also below 2: "Just as a circle to a center, so the temporal world stands related to eternity." And below in the same: "The motion round, by which the firmament moves, is always in one place, from that hour at which it was formed by the reason of the divine mind." And above the same: "Not was that begetting of the world, nor did the world have a certain day of its

beginning, nor did anyone interfere on that day on which the world was formed by the reason of the divine mind, nor up to that point could the intention of human frailty extend itself, or conceive the origin of the world by easy reasoning, or explicate it — especially since after three hundred years a greater *apocatastasis* is made by *hypprosis* or *cataclysm*."

How great, moreover, a throng of philosophers later — how celebrated, how illustrious — agreeingly profess this judgment of their Father, the throng of philosophers shows. Does not also the priests of Egypt — among whom, as is said in the first Prologue on *Timaeus*, is the chief memory of antiquities — indicated the natal day of the world, with the Sun placed in Leo, between the third Calends of August and the eleventh, as Solinus, *On the Marvels of the World* 7, treating of Egypt and its things, manifestly recounts?

Does not your master Plato affirm the world, worldly things, the angel and man had a temporal beginning, as his book which is called *Timaeus* by many things teaches? Which also your books often record. Does not Anaxagoras, does not Pythagoras, does not Empedocles, does not Democritus, does not Parmenides, and Melissus — and that I may name briefly more — does not all your fathers, all the philosophers, prophets, theologians, and poets before your time affirm agreeingly that the world had a temporal beginning, as ancient histories attest, and your natural and metaphysical books are not silent?

Do not you yourself, *On the Heaven and the World* 1, chapter 102, inquiring whether the world is ungenerated or generated, attest this thus saying: "Generated indeed, then, all say it is"? And in the translation which Averroes has: "All the ancients agree that the heaven is generated"; on which your son and devout worshipper Averroes: "All agree in this — that the heaven is generated, and none before him (namely Aristotle) said that the heaven is not generated." Who too above in the same, comment 22, says that you were the first of the Greek philosophers saying that the heaven was ungenerable.

Wherefore Augustine, *City of God* 8, chapter 12, speaking of this matter, says: "Aristotle gathered many disciples to his heresy." Why therefore, with the temerarious assertion of you alone notwithstanding, is it not so constantly to be held? Why is it not so confidently to be believed? Why is it not so confidently to be felt? How could you, the first and alone, Aristotle, presume to babble against so great famousness?

How, against so many gentes, tongues, and peoples — so many and so illustrious fathers and prophets, so many theologians and poets, and so great and so famous philosophers — did you, the first and alone, dare to begin to rebel? By what temerity, by what blindness, by what audacity, by what madness did you, the first and alone, presume to do this? Especially in so worthy a matter, in so great a judgment, pertaining to the knowledge and veneration of God, and to the religion of all men? — especially since you bring forward no compelling, indeed scarcely sophistic reason. The stronger of your irrational reasons scarcely has the shadow of a tenuous appearance, as was demonstrated about the 34th part. Very many of your subtleties indeed which you make against your master Plato and others, *Physics* 8, chapter 1 and 2, *On the Heaven and*

the World, and elsewhere, have no image or shadow even of tenuous reason — as no one is ignorant who has scarcely entered the threshold of logic or philosophy, or who has even small natural logic.

Wherefore I do not deem it worthy to recount them, or to solve them diligently. For nearly all who see them or hear them know how to impugn them reasonably, but no one to defend them reasonably, except perhaps scarcely against the manner of positing of Plato, or of some other. But against the matter itself, and the manner of positing of Hermes, of the Prophets, and of the Christians, no one knows how to color them slenderly — as the 33rd and 34th parts teach.

But how strong reasons, how irrefragable, how insoluble, how compelling, how violent, how clear, how certain would be required to immutate, overturn, and root out from the hearts of all or most — and especially of the wise — so great and so notable a famousness, according to what is set forth concerning famousness about the 33rd part of this work, especially since the ancient judgment ascribes greater honor to God, and ampler religion to men?

Whence it seems to me as a general rule or maxim to be observed: that among equal judgments, the one more honorable to God, more famous, more religious, and more favorable to men, always conquers.

That, however, what I say may more appear: I posit that all men, peoples, nations — every law, sect, or faith — all prophets, poets, all philosophers past and present up till now agreeingly held, and all present philosophers and common men in the present hold agreeingly and constantly that the world was created by God; and that Aristotle without the gift of prophecy or evident miracle, with his contrary subtleties only, should now come to prove the contrary — what or how much would he effect? Which philosophers would he conclude by force of argument? How many of the philosophers would he pervert by force of argument to his heresy? None, I think; nay, rather, I esteem he would exhibit himself a laughing-stock to them, saying: "Is this the great Aristotle, that ancient, that famous one? How is he caught by a small fallacy? How is he played upon by a puerile sophism? How is he tied by a slender thread? And blinded by a feeble trick? How does he err and rave?"

Is it not for this reason that many later philosophers derided your subtleties, and your Peripatetic sect, and you yourself with it as its author, unanimously contemned, nor wished to be called Peripatetics, but Academics — indeed Platonists rather did they prefer? Whence Augustine, *City of God* 8, chapter 12, says: "Therefore I have especially chosen the Platonists, because the better they have judged of the one God who made heaven and earth, the more glorious and more illustrious are they reputed than others, by so much preferred to others by the judgment of those after — that even though Aristotle, Plato's disciple, a man of excellent genius and (in eloquence indeed unequal to Plato but easily surpassing many) had founded the Peripatetic sect, because deambulating he had been accustomed to dispute, and had gathered very many disciples by illustrious fame to his heresy while his preceptor was still living; and after Plato's death Speusippus, son of his sister, and Xenocrates his beloved disciple, had succeeded him in his

school which was called the Academy; and from this both they and their successors were called Academics. The most noble more recent philosophers, however, to whom Plato seemed worthy to be followed, did not wish to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but Platonists. Of whom were greatly nobled Greeks — Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry. In each tongue indeed, that is, Greek and Latin, Apuleius the African was a noble Platonist."

Does not also Calcidius the Platonist in his Commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato repress, despise, and deride your insultations against your teacher Plato, where on the second part he thus writes: "Here, in his own certain manner, with full and perfect dogma elected, what seemed good to him, the rest of the fastidious neglect by inattention." And below: "When these things had been so plenarily, so diligently elaborated by Plato, the younger philosophers, as not the best heirs, dissipating the paternal fortune into pieces, and the perfect and full sentence, fell into mutilated little opinions."

Does not also that great Ptolemy, in the second Prologue of the *Almagest*, allege solemnly you, Aristotle, and in certain rightly said things follows and commends you? In this matter, however, he by no means follows you, but most plainly contradicts. For he says that the science of the stars assimilates man to his Creator. And he adds: "We labor that, of those leading to the love of the science of the eternally remaining things — up to the term which their Maker imposed upon them — we add some in what follows of this our book."

Who also, *Almagest* 3, chapter 1, inquiring the quantity of the solar year, says: "We see that it is fitting that we be content with the quantity of that which is possible for us to add — namely the length of the time which is between the like considerations of the year, in revolutions of near time. Truly the inquisition of the whole time, or the time elongated from the longer times of considerations through long time multifariously — we say it is not from the love of science, nor from the love of truth." And what is that whole time, if not the whole time elapsed from the creation of the world? For who would, by inquiring revolve, or by revolving inquire, the whole time, if it be posited eternal?

Albumasar, too, later than Ptolemy, not him but him followed, in *Greater Introductory* 3, distinction 2, thus says: "The Sun by participation of the planets to it is cause of the temperament of the elements, and of natures, and of the composition of the individuals of the elements, through this that the omnipotent Creator placed in them of natural fortitude. But what we said is this: just as He placed in fire combustion through its nature, and likewise He placed the daily luminary, that is the Sun, the cause of the light of day and of universal heat which is in this world."

And below: "If the Sun should ascend to the circle of the fixed and starred ones, the elements and likewise the elementates would be destroyed; if indeed it should descend to the circle of the Moon, in like manner they would be destroyed, because in length or proximity of it the destruction of elements and elementates is made. For this cause therefore the most high God

placed the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, that there might be made through its natural motion upon this earthly world a temperament of elements and elementates."

And below: "Hippocrates the physician says in the book *Aleceb* — that is, of weeks — that the light of the stars renders the density of night more subtle, because night is very dense, and sight cannot penetrate it; but the brightness of the stars renders that very density subtle, and so the eye penetrates it. And if it were not so, every animated body would be destroyed by the density of night. The Sun, however, in its day makes hot the air, and renders it subtle and rare. For this reason God created the stars mobile and shining, that by their light they may make warm the air, and rendering it subtle, by their motions make it delicate — that is, more subtle."

And below, book 5, distinction 5: "Some say that the planets are placed in houses and degrees of their exaltations, from which degrees they began to move in the beginning of their motion. Some say that the planets began to move from the beginning of Aries, and have proceeded over the being in which they are now, and over this they equate them; and according to my own judgment," he says, "the omnipotent and most high Maker made the planets in the beginning of their creation in the degrees of their exaltations, over being and motion. After this He did not wish to corrupt or change their motions from what they had been."

And below, in the same, distinction 7: "When the first minute of Aries shall be in the middle of heaven over the line of equality, the first minute of Cancer will be ascending; and therefore the ancients said that Cancer is the horoscope of the world, and it is worthy that it be the horoscope in the beginning of the increase of the world — the degree in which Jupiter in Cancer is strengthened. And when the 15th degree of Cancer shall be the horoscope of the world over the line of equality, the 19th degree of Aries will be in the middle of heaven; and when the Sun shall be stronger in the 15th degree of Aries, the 19th degree of Aries will be more worthy of the exaltation of the Sun. And we know now that no cause is in the circle which is not well and wisely disposed, and that of the science of the disposition is, that Jupiter be in the horoscope of the world."

And below, in book 6, last distinction: "Lords of days and hours took beginning from Sunday, and the wise conceded this day to the daily planet — that is, to the Sun. For through the rising of the Sun, or its ascension, the world is illuminated; and through its setting or descent it is obscured by darkness. Beginning was made therefore from the Sun, and they placed it lord of the Lord's day, and the first hour of that day they conceded to it. Furthermore, their beginning in days is from the Lord's day, which the Arabs call the first day. They did this on account of two causes: one, because the beginning of the days of the world which the authors of the Mastery of the Stars used — from the Persians and Indians — was from the Lord's day, and the Sun in the beginning of those days was ascending in the first minute of Aries, in the eastern hemisphere, over the inhabitable place of earth, which is called *Alkankadar*. And from the same hour and day they number the middle course of the planets, and from the same hour and day the ancients number their years. The longitude, however, of *Alkankadar* from the middle of earth is six hours,

and from *Bebilalirac* the ancient — which is where the Euphrates flows — 108 degrees, which constitute six equal hours, and a fifth of one. The second indeed is a cause, that all gentes according to the diversity of their tongues, and the dissimilitude of their sects, named the Lord's day from the name of one which is the beginning of number — and the day following from the name of the second number which is the second day; and likewise they named the other numbers of days according to the order of numbers."

Who too, in *On Conjunctions* 1, distinction 1, says that "from the creation to the night of the day of Venus in which was the deluge, there were 2226 years, one month, three days, and four hours."

Behold how great fame, what exquisite ancient histories of the gentes condemn your little opinion. Do not you yourself too, compelled by truth itself, sometimes seem to affirm the contrary? For *On the World* 2, you thus speak: "World is called every ordering and creation by God, and through God preserved." And below 11: "It remains to be said summarily about the cause containing all things, just as also of others. For it is impious for those speaking of the world — although it has not been done subtly, as in figural doctrine — to pass over the beginning of the world. The ancient indeed and paternal saying is to all men, that from God all things and through God consist." Where another translation thus has: "The ancient saying, and paternal, is to all men, that from God all things, and through God all things, have constituted." And above 10, showing how the World consists of contrary things, and remains incorrupt, alleging Heraclitus — who, as you yourself attest, *On the Heaven and the World* 1, chapter 102, posited the world to be new — thus you write: "The same was for him, also what was said by the obscure Heraclitus: it joined into the converted and the not-converted, the agreeing and the disagreeing, the consonant and the dissonant, and out of all things one, and out of one all things."

And immediately you subjoin: "So therefore the constitution of all things — of heaven I say and of earth — and of the entire mixture, especially of contrary principles, one harmony has adorned"; where another translation: "One harmony has founded; and you add: "the dry mixed with the moist, the hot with the cold, also the heavy with the light, and the straight with the curved, the whole earth and sea, the aether and the sun and the moon, and the whole heaven adorned"; and another translation: "Has founded one virtue passing through all from unmixed and diverse — namely from air and earth, fire and water — creating the whole orb, and disposing of one sphere by superficies; and especially the contrary natures in it, compelling them to agree to one another, and from these contriving for the universe salvation."

Who also in the *Secret of Secrets* of the 30th part, 1, thus you write: "You ought to know, O Alexander, that just as in plants there are diverse natures, and diverse forces divinely innate, so also in stones."

And below 5: "There is justice pertaining to man in the reasoning of himself, and in those things which are between himself and his Creator." And below 6: "Know that that first which the Most High, Glorious, formed, is a simple spiritual substance in the end of perfection and complement

of goodness, in which are the forms of all things, and is called Intelligence; and then proceeded another substance lesser of its degree, which is called soul, and another substance which is called *Hyle* before commensuration, which is extended in length and breadth and depth, in which the body simply was made; then a body having a most noble figure, which surpasses all figures, and is more true comparatively and more ancient, and remained in one place — of the spheres and planets, that which was purer of it, and which was simpler."

And further below 7: "Know that the universal Soul is a spiritual force arisen after the intelligence by divine will, and has three forces running in bodies, like the light of the Sun in parts of air. One of the forces is intellective, the second sensitive, the third vegetative; which the glorious God illustrated with seven forces, which are the attractive force, the retentive, digestive, expulsive, nutritive, generative, informative."

And further 8: "When the most high God created man, and made him most noble of animals, He commanded him, prohibited him, punishes, and rewards him; He constituted his body a certain city, and his intellect King in it." Who too is that Adam, of whom above in the same you had made mention, as is recounted above, except that famous Adam first man created by God in the beginning, when also other things were created?

Nor let anyone murmur that that famous Aristotle did not write this book. For in the little book on the life of Aristotle it is written thus: "That, however, he might do good universally to all men, he wrote to Alexander a book *On Kingship*, teaching him how it is fitting to reign." Philip too, the translator of that booklet, in the first prologue says: "Which book the most expert Prince of Philosophers, Aristotle, composed at the petition of King Alexander, his disciple."

And another certain Doctor in the second prologue thus says: "I gave heed to inquire the book which is called the *Secret of Secrets*, which the Prince of Philosophers, Aristotle, son of Nicomachus of Macedonia, edited to his disciple, the great Emperor Alexander, son of Philip, King of the Greeks." And John the translator in the third prologue: "I translated," he says, "the book of the most expert Aristotle, first from the Greek tongue into Chaldaean, and from this into Arabic, in which is responded to the petition of King Alexander."

This same too celebrated fame holds; nor does the plainness of style oppose it, or its diversity from the customary style of Aristotle. For to a king for many causes plainly was it to be written; and perhaps the translation, not from Greek but from Arabic into Latin, makes the sentence plainer — just as also in certain other books of his, which can also happen on account of the prudence of the translator, transferring not always words but rather sense — as both these patently appear from the first prologue.

Nor is the text here or the style most plain in every way. For who plainly and easily expounds the first chapter of the third part of the same — concerning the stone of the philosophers not a stone, of its division into four elements, of the preparation and reunion of them, and other most abstruse words there written?

Did you not too, when about to die — that vain old appetite of appearance, ostentation, glory, and honor having been laid aside — wisely correct that ancient judgment of yours about the eternity of the world, in the presence of many wise men, humbly confessing your prior pompous error — with you yourself attesting in the booklet written about your death, recounted above concerning the 34th part?

Did you not too, in the seventh of the same booklet, say: "When man dominates his voluptuous things, abhorring the delights of the body, and inquires the delights of the soul in learning the sciences of God, who created by His wisdom the age, and investigates His ways, and understands His secrets — then are opened the eyes of the soul, and they delight much, and are delighted by a delight unlike the delights of the body"?

And below: "The delights of the soul are to understand its Creator, to consider the works of the heavens and His wisdom, and the courses of the spheres and their forms; and that all things are formed and founded in His wisdom and in His science. And if man cannot comprehend such great degrees, let him speculate himself, and the subtlety of his members, his giving them pre-eminence in motion and in pulling the body to rest and motion; and the virtues placed in any one member to the service of the body, in which nothing is addable or mutable; and through this he can recognize his Creator in his mind."

And below 8 you say that "the wise man, who perfected his soul in inquiring the science of his Creator who from nothing made him a being, ought to have rejoiced in death." And below 12 you are recounted to have said: "There is another species of men whose sense and intellect is ready, and powerful, and they see all things in their souls. And there are two sects of these. Of which the first say that the age has no beginning nor end, nor is anything new under the Sun, but generation passes and generation comes; the earth, however, stands eternally, and has no sustainer; and these are they who deny the root."

Wherefore consequently approving the contrary sect, you retracted that prior judgment of yours, this same or similar, as was said above. Nor let anyone dream that this book is a dream and figment. For about the transit of lesser persons booklets are written; and why is it not likely that at the transit of so great and famous a Philosopher and Doctor, other philosophers, especially Peripatetics, and his disciples, and others too for various causes had come together, and the memorable things which they had heard there and seen had written down — which fame celebrated authorizes?

And if anyone desires to hear this judgment of the creation of the soul from books of Aristotle more common and more famous: behold, *On the Soul* 1, chapter 65: "The intellect," he says, "seems to be borne in some existing substance, and not to be corrupted." Where the translation which Averroes has: "The intellect," he says, "seems to be some substance, which is made in a thing, and is not corrupted." To this also accords that of *Metaphysics* 12, chapter 18 above-recounted: namely that the intellective soul does not precede in time the individual whose it is, but remains after it. It is plain therefore evidently that, according to Aristotle in these places, this

soul is made in the animated suppositum, and together with it; and is not educed from the potency of matter, according to him, like other material forms, since then it would be corruptible, just as he himself against the same. How therefore is it made, and from what — except by creation from God? — especially since, according to his judgment in these places now most recently recounted, no circular return of these same souls is made.

Furthermore, the most illustrious Prophets most clearly attest that the world was created by God, and had a temporal beginning. How great authority indeed they have, and how great faith was to be given to their predictions, the demonstration of the 32nd part shows.

From all these things, it can to anyone sober, not obstinate, reasonably appear that the world has not only had a temporal beginning, but also was created from nothing. For from what preceding matter would it have been made? Of what kind would that be — simple or composite, eternal or new? Wherefore also you, Aristotle, very reasonably often prove that the world was not made from preceding matter. What therefore more consequent to natural consequence than, having granted that the world had a temporal beginning, to grant that it was created from nothing consequently?

It is objected, perhaps, by some, that the wise men of the Chaldaeans, and the common folk, according to the doctrine of their law, before the time of Aristotle held that the world is truly eternal, without beginning, without end — as Averroes, on the first of *On the Heaven and the World*, comments 22 and 102, seems to attest.

In the first Prologue of *Timaeus* of Plato, in chapter 5, it is recounted that an Egyptian priest derided Solon, when he was reciting the history of one inundation, saying that infinite preceded. And below, in the same place, the priest is recounted to have said to Solon that the same Goddess founded two cities — one in Greece which is called Athens, almost a thousand years before; the other in Egypt which is called Sais, eight thousand years from its foundation having then elapsed — as is contained in the apices of sacred shrines.

And below 6: "Of these things, O Solon," said the priest, "you will hear from your elders, who lived nine thousand years before, by which laws they used." From which at least it seems to be inferred that the world did not begin in the time designated in our sacred apices, but either much before, or never — which seems to argue and to falsify the sacred codices, and to take from them prophetic authority.

To this concords that Egyptian priest in the Epistle of Alexander to his mother Olympias, asserting that the empire of the Persians and Macedonians had then endured more than eight thousand years.

Some, however, as Augustine recounts, *City of God* 18, chapter 41, say: "From the time when Egypt comprehended the reason of the stars, more than a hundred thousand years are numbered."

Truly, as much as I conjecture from the law, or sayings of old of the old Chaldaeans, by no means did they hold the world to be eternal. For that they had any law or prophecy before the deluge, no one says. For how would it be established, since through the deluge all things perished?

Indeed even Babel and Babylon — whence Babylonia, and those who are called Babylonians — were founded after the deluge by the sons of Noah and so named, where also the Chaldaean tongue was likewise instituted, as certain histories hand down. After the deluge too Noah, Shem, and Abraham taught the Babylonians or Chaldaeans themselves the sciences, as the foregoing concerning the 35th part attest. These, however, knew that the world and heaven were created by God. Wherefore also it seems that they taught this, not the contrary, as the foregoing concerning the 35th part seem to attest.

Wherefore also it seems that their disciples likewise believed this — which more appears from another source. For from the Babylonians or Chaldaeans themselves philosophy was derived to the Egyptians, and from these to the Greeks, as the foregoing concerning the 35th part, and many other histories, attest. And all the Greek philosophers before Aristotle agreeingly held the world had a temporal beginning, as is recounted above. Wherefore also it seems that they received this judgment from the Egyptians, and the latter from the Babylonians, agreeingly. For how — if the philosophers of the Chaldaeans agreeingly or discordantly had held the contrary — would not in like manner their disciples the Egyptians, the doctors of the Greeks?

How therefore is it likely to anyone that all the Greek philosophers up to Aristotle agreeingly held the world had a temporal beginning? Wherefore Aristotle himself confesses that all the ancients agree that the heaven is generated, as is recounted above. The motive of Averroes, however — and which from Aristotle he takes — ought to move no one. For in the first of *On the Heaven*, comment 22, and the second, 2, he says that the Greeks and others of the first peoples agree in this — that the heaven is the place of spirits, and of the Creator — and that these are incorruptible, wherefore also their place. Wherefore as Aristotle and Averroes argue, it too is eternal.

But concerning the spirits this does not move. For just as the spirits began temporally, so the heaven; and as the spirits are incorruptible, so the heaven. Concerning the Creator of both too, this does not move. For He needs no celestial place, nor any other whatever, as the first Supposition and the fifth part manifestly indicate. Indeed the contrary: every place, and every located, and universally every other thing, needs Him for being, since anything else is possible-being, and He alone necessary-being, as the preceding things have taught.

The first Supposition too and the sixth part prove, and the philosophers confess, that God is everywhere. Any place therefore, and any thing located, is incorruptible and eternal by your prior reasoning.

Furthermore, the words of the ancients, if they be strictly weighed and properly understood, seem to sound the contrary. For Aristotle attesting, *On the Heaven* 2, in the translation which

Averroes has: "All the ancients posited the heaven to be the place of the Creator, who with them is God." God therefore according to them is not only the maker of beings, but the Creator. Was not Aristotle just now recounted attesting that all the ancients said the heaven is generated? How therefore do they seem to be alleged to the contrary?

That Egyptian priest, however, affirming to Solon that infinite inundations had preceded at that time — whence took he color and audacity to say so? Not from reasoning seems it: for he touched no reason, but turned himself to histories. But whence to him such a history? Not from sight — that is plain; nor from report. For report does not effect a certain faith that it is so, but that it was so reported; nor from books preserved in their shrines: for who, and with what audacity, could write this confidently?

Has not the general inundation under Noah — which exceeded the summits of the highest mountains, even those near to the Egyptians (since placed in Babylonia) by fifteen cubits, and your Bashan land of Egypt, since it touched it — destroyed its inhabitants, shrines, and books alike — as the most holy, most certain, most famous histories of ours produce? And not only the histories of the Christians, but also of the Indians, even of the Egyptians, and likewise of the Chaldaeans?

Josephus, namely *Jewish Antiquities* 1, chapter 2, after referring to this general deluge, in testimony of faith subjoins thus: "Of this deluge and of the ark, however, all who have written barbarian histories make memory. Of whom one, Berosus the Chaldaean, narrating of the deluge, has thus uttered: 'It is said that his ship, which came to Armenia near the mountain Cardi, has still some part remaining, and that some take from it bitumen, which men chiefly use for expiations.' Of these, moreover, Hieronymus the Egyptian — who is known to have written the antiquity of Phoenicia — makes memory; but also Mnaseas the Damascene, in his ninety-sixth book of histories, thus says of them: 'There is, above Minyas, a high mountain in Armenia, which is called Baris, on which it is said many fled in the time of the deluge were liberated; and a certain one, with him together carried in the Ark, came to the summit of the mountain Sool; and the relics of the woods were preserved for a long time.' This was, moreover, he whom even Moses, the Lawgiver of the Jews, wrote of."

Albumasar too, instructed in the divine histories of the elders, confesses this deluge, as is recounted above; which other astronomers also do, having an *agera*, roots, and tables instituted from the time of the deluge.

Did not also Solon, that famous one of the seven Wise Men, in the assembly of priests, as the first prologue of *Timaeus* of Plato recounts in the place above, make words about the most ancient historicals of the Athenians, Phoroneus, and Moba; and after the inundation of the world, Pyrrha and Deucalion; and pursue the prosapia of the recalled human kind up to the memory of his parents, and recount the number of years?

Furthermore, if Egypt were eternal, and never was devastated by deluges or burnings, as the priest says — why would philosophy and philosophic books not be eternal there, and eternally preserved, just as historic knowledge and historic books are preserved according to the prior priest? How therefore did the Egyptians receive the mathematical sciences from the Chaldaeans and Abraham, as is recounted above, and other histories attest? Do not also other histories hand down by whom and when the Egyptians first received letters? Which, it is established, was done much after that general deluge.

What therefore does this old priest feign to himself? Do not other Egyptian priests too agreeingly profess the natal day of the world, as is recounted above? That which also concerning that marvelous multitude of years, which had been alleged by the same priest or another, by these very things is established most certainly to be false, if he speak of years according to the common manner of speaking. For it is established by the sacred histories of the Jews, the Gentiles, and the Christians, even by the astronomical tables, that from the deluge to Alexander — indeed even to Christ — far fewer years are had.

Yet because it seems shameful and harsh to falsify their histories altogether, and entirely reject — a certain division of years is to be noted. For who does not know that there is a twofold year — solar and lunar? And solar: this one Egyptian without the quadrant, which Ptolemy uses in the *Almagest*, which he wrote at Alexandria in Egypt; another Roman or Latin with the quadrant. Lunar truly: this one Arabic, containing 354 days, and the fifth and the sixth part of a day, which make eleven thirtieths of a day; and in bissextiles there will accrue from these minutes one day; and such years Arzachel uses in his canons, and his astronomical tables.

Another however Hebraic, or Hebrew, and this further is bipartite. For one is non-bissextile, or non-embolismic; another truly is bissextile, or embolismic, which exceeds by one lunar month of 29 days, and by one day non-bissextile, or non-embolismic. And each of these still further is tripartite. The non-bissextile namely: another common or middle, of 354 days; another superfluous or abundant, of 355 days; another diminished, of 353 days. The bissextile too correspondingly is separated in three ways. And these years the Hebrews use, and the whole sacred Scripture in the whole Old Testament. These however are years now and in many retroact times commonly used.

But it must be vigilantly attended to further: that in more ancient times, when men were more rude, the quantities of years were not so subtly perceived; but some at times used much shorter years. For Ovid recounts, *On the Fasti* 3, and other histories attest, that the ancient Romans up to the time of Numa Pompilius had a year of ten months only, because so much time would suffice a woman for parturition; others before, however, had still shorter years.

Whence Solinus, *On the Marvels of the World* 1, chapter 2, thus says: "Before Augustus Caesar they computed the year in an uncertain manner; among the Egyptians it was terminated by four months; among the Arcadians by three; among the Carnani by six." And still see — even shorter. For Pliny, *Natural History* 7, thus writes: "Some determined a year by one summer, and another

by winter; others by quadripartite seasons, like the Arcadians, whose years were of three months; some by the senium of the Moon, like the Egyptians — among whom some also are produced to have lived single thousands of years."

Behold, the age of the moon — that is, a lunar month — was sometimes held for a year among the Egyptians; and their year was a year, namely a lunar one — and reasonably in some way. For *annus* is named from a circuit, as the signification of the name manifests, which Ptolemy too in *Almagest* 3 likewise attests. By this reasoning, perhaps, the recess of the Moon from the Sun, and its return, the Egyptians called a year. Whence Isidore, *Etymologies* 5, chapter 40: "A lunar year," he says, "is of 30 days." And still further, perhaps a year was sometimes taken for a week, since after seven diverse days completed, the return is always made circularly to the first.

These things therefore being soberly considered, what wonder if among the Egyptians so many thousands of years are numbered? From all these things, soberly considered, it seems that the world had a temporal beginning, wherefore also the generation of men is to be terminated. For otherwise, according to the foregoing, by the infinite progress of time the immoderate number of souls and of citizens of the supernal home would grow, which in no way seems to befit the divine city or house, as the foregoing have persuaded. Why too would this be more in men than in Angels, stars, or spheres, as was touched on above?

Does not also, according to the next part of this work, every dead man rise again to life with his soul and body together? But when, except when that number of souls and of men shall have been fulfilled, which God in His wisdom predetermined for the perfection of His house and celestial city? For the dead have not commonly risen from the beginning of the world up till now; nor do they rise singly as they die, as certain experience teaches. When therefore will they rise? What do they wait for, except the fulfillment of the said number?

This same too is persuaded by reason taken from the angels. For the angels frequently exhibit ministry to men in dreams, in prophecies, in wars, or in their other most numerous necessities, by the nod of God. Whence too they are called angels — that is, messengers — as frequent experience teaches; which also many philosophers and many illustrious histories attest. Which also all laws agreeingly profess. Do not Hermes the Father of Philosophers, and Aristotle his son, say the same?

Is it not in the first part of the *Secret of Secrets* of Aristotle, 19, written thus: "Do you not know that, with Hermogenes attesting, two are the spirits which guard you, of whom one at the right and another at the left guarding, and knowing all your works, and rescribing to the Creator whatever you shall have decreed to do."

Perfect beatitude, however, does not permit such extrinsic occupations. For they distract from the perfection of the angelic vacation and contemplation about God; and the beatitude of them at some time will be perfected to the full, and not except with the generation of men terminated.

In such occupations too the angels are in some way changed; but change is repugnant to perfect beatitude, as also to perfect good. For perfection finally attained, motion ceases. For it is the way to perfection, and a potency imperfect to a perfect act, which is established to be better than such a potency. The Philosopher says, *Physics* 3, chapter 15: "Motion indeed seems to be a certain act, but imperfect; the cause however is, because the imperfect is the possible, of which it is the act." And *Ethics* 7, last: "Not always," he says, "is one delightful thing the same, on account of our nature not being simple; but to be one and another, according as we are corruptible. Wherefore if the nature of this be simple, always the same action will be most delightful. On account of which God always rejoices in one and simple delight. For not only of motion is operation, but also of immobility; and delight is more in rest than in motion. Change, however, of all things is the sweetest, according to the Poet — on account of a certain malice. For just as a man easily changeable is bad, so a nature which needs change. For it is not simple, nor *epieikes*. Wherefore also the Pythagoreans posited rest in the co-ordination of good, motion truly in the co-ordination of evil — as their description above-mentioned clearly demonstrates" — etc., as above.

Is it not, also, according to the philosophers, that no unnatural or violent thing is eternal — especially in those who never sinned against the law or Author of nature, that they should merit to sustain such things eternally as a punishment? It is established that the elements are in an unnatural and violent disposition with respect to their forms and places; and when shall they receive a fully natural disposition, except with the generation of men and other animals — which are for the sake of men — terminated?

Furthermore, the 37th part has shown that the generation of men can cease, which prior reasons persuade — indeed prove more evidently — than the contrary judgment can be proved or even persuaded. Which also the most illustrious Prophets, and all laws — though some sects discrepate — agreeingly profess. Is not therefore the world, or the state of the world, customary to be ended? Does not also from this it seem that the celestial motion ought to cease — just as the possibility of its cessation was shown above? For the celestial motion seems to be ordered finally for the generation and preservation of inferior things; and all these to man, just as imperfect things are ordered to a more perfect thing, and instruments to the artificer finally. For man is naturally over all these, and uses them. Whence you yourself, Aristotle, *Physics* 2, chapter 24, say: "We use for ourselves all things which are; for we are in some way too the end."

That, however, Averroes and certain others suppose that the celestial movers move on account of the generation and preservation of inferior things secondarily, but primarily and by first intention on account of the perfection of themselves — is not altogether most certain. For how is the first mover — who according to them is God — by motion or any extrinsic thing reckoned to need for His perfection, against the fifth part of this work? Or how are the Intelligences perfected by such an extrinsic thing, and not sufficiently through intrinsic things — especially since they by no means so move from the necessity of nature, just as neither does the soul of man move his body, since they are naturally free according to contradiction — as appeared with the Sun standing, and on the contrary withdrawn, as is recounted above?

For this was not by the impediment contrary to the will of the Intelligence; for then it would have been miserable not blessed, as appears from the foregoing concerning the eighth part of this work; nor was it then less perfect or blessed than before. For the perfection and beatitude of it consists more in its intrinsic things and in divine contemplation than in any such extrinsic thing must be reputed. I think therefore that the first intention of any Intelligence is to please God, and therefore when it sees God to will that it then move the orb, on account of whatever cause He shall will, then it moves on account of that cause finally — but more finally, that I may so speak, and most finally on account of God. And when it sees Him to will that then it not move, neither then does it move. And in this — namely in this contemplation, and perfect love of God, and in perfect conformation of the angelic will with the divine — consists principally the perfection of the Angels.

Wherefore neither are they more perfectly moving outwardly than wholly resting. Indeed it seems that the celestial motions are principally on account of man, more than on account of the perfection of the Angels, or on account of any cause other except God, on account of whom and to whom all things are principally and finally ordered.

For when the utility of men required that the Sun should stand, or be moved by retrograde motion, and likewise of the Moon, so it was done — as can be gathered from the foregoing concerning the 32nd part of this work. And when the utility of men requires that it be moved continuously and variously, so it is moved — as common experience and philosophy attest.

Nor ought this to be reputed wonderful or absurd, since here below many obsequies, benefits, and labors are spent on men. Wherefore also it is not unreasonably to be esteemed that, with the generation of men ceasing, the celestial motion will cease too. Which also, according to the things touched above, is seen by reason taken from the Angels not improbably to be persuaded.

For who doubts that the angels, just as also men, are or ought to be perfectly blessed? Perfect beatitude, however, of the angels — as also of men, and of any rational creature — consists in the perfect contemplation of God, as can be plain from the foregoing concerning the 23rd part of this work; which also Aristotle and other philosophers confess.

Any rational creature, however, since it is of finite virtue, seems to be able to contemplate God more perfectly, to enjoy Him more integrally, and to inhere to Him more fully, when it whole plenary wholly is at leisure for Him alone, wholly intends, and whole wholly insinuates and infuses itself, than when it is occupied about other extrinsic things — especially if such other things be not most essentially ordered to that end, like moving extra bodies, and to operate extrinsically: which by no means are most essentially ordered to perfect beatitude or felicity. For these in no way consist in extrinsic operation, or in transient action, just as also outside the blessed or felicitous one — but in intrinsic operation, or rather action immanent — since beatitude is the proper and supreme good of the blessed, and felicity of the felicitous; which both Aristotle and the other philosophers alike attest.

For we experience in ourselves that, occupied about extrinsic things, we are less able to contemplate, which the philosophers also attest. Why therefore not similarly to be suspected concerning the angels? Indeed since they are of finite virtue, it seems necessary that it be so. Otherwise they could be occupied about two extrinsic operations, three and four, and however many, in their most accustomed and most full manner, and not less perfectly contemplate God beatifically.

It seems therefore that the operation and motion extrinsic of exterior bodies in some way diminishes the supreme and perfect beatitude of the angels; and that the perfect beatitude of them will be in rest in every way, not in motion. Which from this likely much appears: that the angels more perfect, because superior, and moving the superior or more perfect bodies, by fewer motions move them, and more recede from motion, and more accede to immobility and rest.

The perfect beatitude of the angels therefore excludes every such occupation and motion, and includes a perfect vacation and rest. Not yet therefore is the beatitude of those supremely perfect, nor will it ever be perfected to the supreme, until they shall cease to move, and to be occupied extrinsically.

The heaven therefore at last shall stand. And when more reasonably shall it be supposed to stand than when the number of holy souls and men, predetermined by divine wisdom, shall have been fulfilled, and placed in the celestial palace, according to the judgment of the next part of this work? — that thus that celestial and most glorious city, the house of God, the whole simultaneously in its mansions and citizens, angels and men, may be perfected happily, and beatifically completed, that thus all together about their Prince God may quietly recline; and in His and their most delicious eternal banquet, that He Himself may be their full, perfect, and quiet refection, beatitude, and felicity heaped up, according to the next part of this work.

Furthermore, to the most perfect natural body the most perfect corporeal disposition seems to be attributed; rest however is more perfect than motion, as is shown above. Wherefore also natural bodies acquired natural places rest. Heaven therefore, when it shall be supremely perfect, will rest. To what, too, with the generation of men ceasing, would it be moved? Not on account of any perfection to be acquired, nor even to be preserved. For what perfection by moving would it acquire to itself, or what perfection could it lose by resting, since it is unalterable and incorruptible, both from the intrinsic and from extrinsics universally?

Furthermore, according to the things touched above, when will the inferior elemental world be in its most natural disposition — in figure, in location, in the surrounding of elements from one another, spherical and equal, and in other dispositions — except by the celestial motion ceasing? From all these things, therefore, it is not improbably persuaded that the whole superior and inferior world, celestial and elemental, and the whole number of celestial citizens — angels and men — at the same time will be finally perfected and perfectly beatified all at once.

And perhaps both heaven and the inferior world will then receive from God qualities and conditions multiply better than it has in the present — perhaps so that the elements be pervious to light, but unalterable and incorruptible from one another, and from heaven, in the manner of the carbuncle, or the sapphire, the crystal, or the emerald — just as also of the bodies of the blessed it was said above. Does it not befit the most fitting God to perfect most fittingly His work, His house, His temple, and His celestial city? Nor with omnipotent God is anything to be reputed impossible or difficult, as the first Supposition and the parts above set forth lucidly manifest.

Earth perhaps in some part of itself — namely in Tartarus — will perpetually suffer some violence or unnaturalness, for the punishment of the wicked, who against the Law and Author of nature violently in some manner and unnaturally sinned, that thus both the good and the wicked may be ordered in fitting degrees; and so the glory of the blessed seeing these things may shine forth more amply, please, and delight.

Does not Ptolemy too, above alleged, plainly attest that the celestial motions will cease? For what are those eternal things remaining up to the term which their founder imposed upon them, of which in the book of *Almagest* he considers, if not the celestial motions? For he did not suppose that the heaven or celestial bodies according to their substance would be corrupted, as the same Prologue clearly teaches.

Does not Albumasar too, in *Greater Introductory* 1, distinction 2, where he treats of the adaptation of times, thus write? "The planets are not corrupted, neither do they receive augmentation or diminution, nor defect, nor detriment, until the time which God shall have willed" — which it behooves to be understood not concerning the planets according to their substance, but according to their accidents perhaps imperfect, and motion. Who too below, in the same, distinction 5, treating of the first sect, thus says: "All the philosophers of the ancients said that there is effected from the natural and durable motions of the planets a natural and durable effect, which is made until the time which God shall have willed."

Hermes too Mercurius triplex Trismegistus, *On the Eternal Word* 26: "Then," he says, "neither will the earth stand, nor will the sea be navigated, nor the heaven by the courses of the stars, nor the course of the stars stand in the heaven. Every divine voice will be silenced by necessary taciturnity, the fruits of the earth will be corrupted, nor will the earth be fecund, and the air itself with sad body will languish. This and such is the old age of the world coming — irreligion, disorder, irrationality of all good things."

And it follows, 27, consequently: "When all these things shall have happened, O Asclepius, then that Lord and Father, God omnipotent, and one governor of all, intuiting on the morals and acts voluntary, by His will (which is the goodness of God) resisting vices, and the corruptions of all errors recalling, and every malignity either by inundation washing, or by fire consuming, or by pestilent diseases here and there in diverse places dispersed ending — to the ancient face will recall the world, that the world itself may seem to be adorable and admirable; and that the great

effector and restorer God may be celebrated more frequently with eulogies and benedictions of praise by the men who shall then be. For this is the begetting of the world, the reformation of all good things, and the most holy and most religious restitution of nature itself, by the compelled course of time, which is and was without beginning, eternal."

What, however, he says — that the world will be recalled to the ancient face — can be understood of the eternal face which it eternally had in the divine mind and will, as also his words insinuate. Wherefore consequently 28 thus he says: "For neither does He vehemently will anything who is fullest of all things; but He wills those things which He has. He wills however all good things, and has all things which He wills. All good things however both He thinks and wills; this however is God; whose image is the world of good"; wherefore also below 38 he distinguishes the world into intelligible world in God, and sensible in nature.

Whom also follows the learned Plato, *Timaeus* 1, chapter 2, distinguishing animal and world likewise. Who also below in the same, 9, distinguishes the world into archetype and sensible; and the archetype he says is eternal, the sensible truly to have begun temporally, and to be the image of the archetypal world.

Furthermore, the most illustrious prophets too most clearly attest this judgment, and the Sibyl too the prophetess likewise, as in the demonstration of the 32nd part it was recounted.

Furthermore, all those positing the world not to have been created from nothing, but made from preceding matter, are reformed by the preceding things. All also saying that the world will be corrupted have to say also consequently this concerning the souls and the blessed men; wherefore also they are corrected by the next part.

Behold how many and how great errors this one little Supposition argues, and emends. Indeed, as I think, there is no error possible about God, about the essentials of God, which by the virtue of this Supposition cannot be virilely destroyed and elided. For God, as this Supposition shows, is, and has whatever is better to be and to have; and is not, and has not, whatever is better not to be, and not to have. Any error, however, about God, against some of these errs; wherefore also all such errors and errants through it can be directed to the rule, and reduced.

Although also many erring even commemorated above can be reduced likewise by many other ways which I have not touched above, by reason of brevity, and that the most great virtue of this golden Supposition, at least in the smallest, I might declare — though of its infinite content scarcely have I drawn a small drop. This Supposition therefore, as the corner-stone of philosophers and theologians most virtuous, most precious, most beautiful, proven, elect, and altogether perfect in every way, I have placed in the foundation of the whole structure.

There are nevertheless, as I think, some who will busy themselves to reprove this proven stone — or at least the proof of it — just as also other parts of this little work. For by frequent experience I have learned that, just as Josephus reports concerning the Sadducees of old, who reckoned it glorious to contend and resist the doctors of their philosophy, so also now very many

strive — or at least appear to strive — to destroy what has been constructed by others, glory with the Sadducees, as I fear, hunting.

For what is glory, as authors define it, except frequent fame about something with praise? In which vice those especially are inflamed before others, who have constructed no edifice or hut, and so much the more audaciously they tear apart the things of others, by so much the less they fear any perils to their own (because they have none); that thus, at least while they destroy — or rather while in the eyes of the foolish they seem to destroy — what has been constructed by others, themselves constructing nothing destructible, they may appear more glorious than the constructors of the destroyed.

Would, our Master and Lord, would that as much I as other disciples and servants of Yours, with blinding pride removed, with simple mind we might seek not the appearance of empty vanity, but the existence of solid truth; that thus, with You leading, we may merit truly to find, to know, and to hold it.

For I know, Lord, with You teaching, that frequently the proud and envious studies of the proud You neglect, despise, and deride; You make foolish, mutilate, and eclipse them; the simple things of the simple, however, You look upon, love, and rejoice with; You visit, illuminate, and consummate them.

These things therefore as it were preludial having been pre-tasted, to the cause of God proposed — with divine help always accompanying — confidently must we pass over.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapter II

THAT GOD IS THE NECESSARY CONSERVER OF ALL OTHER THINGS: WITH A COROLLARY HAVING THREE PARTS.

Hitherto, then, having pleaded in a general way in God's cause against various heretics, henceforth, in His special cause against Pelagius — with the patronizing counsel of the supreme Advocate ever assisting — we must plead in a special manner. First, then, let it be shown that God is the necessary conserver of all beings — necessary, I say, by supposition, namely, on the supposition of the entity of things. For nothing which in itself is capable of being and not-being has being except from something which in itself is necessarily, upon which it always depends in being. But anything short of God is in itself capable of being, while God alone is in Himself necessarily. The whole of this appears from the force and connection of causes drawn from the first supposition and from the seventeenth part of the first corollary of this work. For everything

that exists determinately, which is not sufficiently determined of itself to be, is determined to be by something else; but every existent which is in itself capable of being and not-being is an existent of this kind; therefore through another. Now that other is either in itself necessarily — and we have what we intend — or it is in itself capable of being and not-being, and then by the same proximate reasoning it follows that it itself is determined to be by something else; and concerning that other the same divisive inquiry is to be made. And since by the second supposition there cannot in such matters be an infinite process, we must necessarily arrive at something in itself necessarily, by which every existent in itself capable of being and not-being is determined to be. This is the argument in essence of Avicenna and Algazel, by which they consider themselves to demonstrate this same conclusion: Avicenna in *Metaphysics* I and in many chapters of book VIII, Algazel in *Metaphysics* II in his twelfth saying.

Hence Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII, ch. 3 says: "When the first principle is spoken of absolutely, it is necessary that it be one; but when first material cause and first formal cause are spoken of, with these it is not necessary that there be one, as is required in the necessarily existing. For none of these is the first cause absolutely; rather, the necessarily existing is the principle even of these first causes. From this, therefore, and from what we have said before, it is manifest that the necessarily existing is one in number; and it has appeared that whatever is other than this, when considered in itself, is in its own being only possible, and is therefore caused, and is well known to come, in causality, undoubtedly to it. Hence whatever is — except the one which is one to itself, and the being which is being to itself — is acquiring its being from another than itself, by which it has being to itself, not by itself. And this is the meaning of the thing being caused, namely, receiving being from another than itself, and having a privation which is verified in its essence absolutely."

Algazel likewise in *Metaphysics* II, where above, says: "Whatever is other than the necessarily existing must arrive from it and have its being from it. For it has been shown that the necessarily existing is only one; therefore every other is possibly existing and depends upon that necessarily existing." And further in the same place: "It has been shown that the universe is possible and needs a cause, and all causes by necessity proceed from the necessarily existing, which by necessity is one. It is therefore said that this is the first principle of the world."

Wherefore Hermes too, *On the Eternal Word* 21, says that the highest of the governors above and below obeys that highest Lord, "for all things hang and flow from Him." Hence Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* III, last prose, writes thus: "This is, as it were, a certain helm and rudder, by which the worldly machine is preserved stable and incorrupt." Aristotle, too, in *Metaphysics* XII.38, says thus: "The First is necessary, not contingent otherwise, but simple. From such a principle, therefore, depend the heavens and nature." And in *Metaphysics* IX.17: "Things which exist by necessity are themselves indeed first; for if these were not, nothing whatever would be." And in *Physics* VIII.52, he says: "There must be some first mover, immobile and not by accident, if, as we have said, there is to be among existing things some unceasing and immortal motion, and that which is must abide — that is, the whole universe in

itself and in the same. For the principle abiding necessarily, what is continuous with the principle must necessarily abide." Hence God is said to be the necessary principle of all things, both in being and in moving.

This view of the philosophers Augustine, with deserved praise, recites in *City of God* VIII.6: "The philosophers, whom we see deservedly preferred above the rest in fame and glory, perceived that no species in any mutable thing whatsoever, whatever it may be in any way, of whatever nature, can be except from Him who truly is, since He is unchangeably." And he pursues this same view at length in *On Free Will* II.28, showing that all mutable things are reduced to something immutable, by which they are formed, and on which they continually rest in being. Hence the Philosopher in *On the Cause of the Motion of Animals* — which is the twelfth book of *On Animals* in the new translation, ch. 1 and 3, and almost throughout — holds that everything moved rests on something fixed in being moved. And the same is plainly stated by Augustine in *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII.13. Hence Ammonius Hermeas, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*, on the last part of book I, says: "The gods truly exist, and to receive transmutation is not possible even according to the intellect; for that which is altogether immutable must precede that which in any way undergoes transmutation, in order that what is transmuted may abide. Therefore, in the gods, who have the character of principle with respect to beings, it is impossible to consider past or future."

The faithful Abraham, moreover, who deserved to be called the Friend of God, faithfully attests both the production of all things from God and the conservation of those produced by Him, as Josephus reports — as is more fully recited around the thirty-fifth part of book I. And does not the Apostle to the Hebrews 1, saying that "God hath spoken to us in His Son, by whom He made also the worlds, who, being the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power," seem to ascribe both the making and the conservation of all things to God Himself? Hence Chrysostom, expounding this in homily 2, says: "*Bearing*, he says, *all things* — that is, governing; for He upholds the things that fall and tend to nothing. For it is no less to uphold the world than to have made it; nay, if we may say something more boldly, it is even greater. For in making, the essences of things are produced from things not existing; but in upholding, the things which have been made are upheld lest they return to nothing. Here, therefore, while they are governed, and things mutually opposed are fitted together, an indication of great and very wonderful and very abundant power is declared."

Augustine, in *On the Divine Essence of God's Divinity, and on Invisibility and Immutability* I, speaks thus of God: "Without doubt no place is absent from His presence. Above every creature He presides, ruling; beneath all, sustaining and bearing — not by the weight of labor, but by indefatigable power; for no creature founded by Him is able to subsist of itself, unless it be sustained by Him who created it. He is outside all things, but not excluded; within all, but not enclosed." This little book is in some codices ascribed to Jerome, but I rather think that it was Augustine's. Hence also Gregory in *On Ezekiel* II, homily 5: "He Himself is interior and exterior, lower and higher; ruling, He is higher; bearing, He is lower; filling, He is interior; surrounding,

He is exterior. So is He within that He is without; so He surrounds that He penetrates; so He presides that He bears; so He bears that He presides." Wherefore Anselm in *Monologion* 14, speaking of the supreme Essence: "It is clear," he says, "that it is itself which bears and surpasses, encloses and penetrates all other things."

To this saying of the Apostle agrees the saying of the Philosopher in *On the World*, last chapter, where he shows that God, though one, is yet of many names according to the multitude of those things which He newly produces, and of which He is the cause; and he says that He is called Jupiter, wherefore not badly is it said in the *Orphica*: "Jupiter is the foundation of earth, and of starry heaven; Jupiter is the root of the sea." And in Jeremiah 23: "I will fill heaven and earth, says the Lord," or, in another rendering, "I do fill them." And the Wise One in Wisdom 11 wisely teaches the same, where, addressing God, he says: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. For how could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by Thee?"

Again, this same is confirmed by another similar reasoning. For anything you please that is pointed to (e.g., the Earth) either is in itself, or through another and in some way by accident. If by accident and through another, the same inquiry is to be made about that other; and since there cannot thus be an infinite process, by reason of the second supposition, there is something one and first of all in itself, which is God, through which whatsoever else is. Nor can it be said that the Earth exists in itself, because then it would always have necessarily existed. For *in itself* includes "of all" universally, as is plain from *Posterior Analytics* I.4. And "of all," as taken there, imports the universality of time in every way, as appears from Aristotle himself defining it thus: "I say *of all* this — what is not in some thus and in some not, nor sometimes thus and sometimes not, but of all and always."

For this very reason Augustine, in the gloss on Galatians 2 ("And from these, who seemed to be something, of what kind soever they were once, it is no matter to me"), speaks thus: "They themselves are not anything, even if they are good ministers of God; for Christ is something in them, not they themselves. For if they were anything in themselves, they would always have been something; but they were once sinners and ignorant." This same reasoning, and that *in itself* includes the universality of time, appears likewise from Augustine, *On the Immortality of the Soul* 13, where he says: "But this incorporeal force and nature, the producer of the universal body, holds the universe by present power. For it did not make and depart, and abandon what it has made. For that substance which is not body, and is not, so to speak, locally moved, cannot be separated from that substance which occupies place; and that effecting force cannot be at leisure, but must protect what has been made by it, and must not allow it to lack form, in whatever measure it is. For what is not by itself, if it be deserted by that through which it is, certainly will not be. And we cannot say that the body, when it was made, received this — that it should be henceforth contained by itself, even if it were forsaken by its founder. Although if this is so, the soul has it more than the body, as is manifest; and so very nearly the soul is proved to be immortal, if it can be by itself. For whatever is such must be incorruptible, and on this account

cannot perish, since nothing forsakes itself. But the mutability of body is at hand, which the universal motion of the universal body itself sufficiently indicates. Wherefore, to those who diligently inspect — so far as such a nature can be inspected — by ordered mutability, that which is mutable is found mutable; but what is by itself has no need even of any motion, all sufficiency existing for it in itself, since all motion is toward another, of which that which is moved has need. Form, therefore, is present in the universal body by a better nature, sufficient and possessing what it has made; wherefore that mutability does not take from body its being body, but causes it to pass from species into species by most ordered motion. For no part of it is allowed to be reduced to nothing, since that effecting force takes hold of the whole, with neither laboring nor idle power, granting that everything that is by it should be, in the measure that it is."

And in ch. 16 he writes thus: "But if — what is doubtful to no one — the soul is then most wise, when it is intimately joined to truth which is always in the same way, and immovably adheres to it, joined by divine love (and from that one are all things which are in any way), it is from that essence which most highly and greatly is. Either the soul is from that one, in the measure that it is, or it is by itself: but if by itself, when itself is the cause of existing for itself, and never deserts itself, it never perishes, as we have argued above." Nor can anyone say that the Earth is by itself, but yet this proposition — "the Earth is" — is not by itself, in order so to evade the foregoing argument. For according to the truth, and according to the Philosopher in the *Categories*: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a speech is said to be true or false." Therefore, from the fact that a thing is or is not thus or thus, a speech is called thus true or thus false. Hence, in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter: speeches are likewise true as things are.

Furthermore, even if anyone, leaning on certain reasons or authorities, should wish at all costs to defend that some things short of God exist and abide by themselves, yet under no color can he establish that anything short of God exists by itself equally, worthily, primarily, supremely, perfectly, and equally as God, as the suppositions and the parts of the first corollary show. Nay, even if other things are said to exist by themselves in any manner, yet God is incomparably more, more worthily, more primarily, and more perfectly said to exist by Himself. And it is established that, of all things sharing the same name, that to which the name belongs more greatly and worthily is the cause of the rest, in respect of their sharing that name. By this the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII.3 proves that substance is the cause of being for any other category. Where also the text which Averroes expounds, from the fact that substance is more worthy of the name "being" than the rest, concludes thus: "It is therefore manifest that this is the cause of the essence of any of these, and these are because of that." On which Averroes, comm. 3, says: "Since this has been declared concerning substances, it is manifest that substances are the causes of the essences of accidents, and accidents are not except on account of substances; and this is necessary. For when it has been declared that this name *being* is said of the ten categories, and more worthily of substances, and it has been declared that, when several share in the same name, and one is more worthy than certain others, that which is more worthy of this name is the cause of the rest, and the disposition of the rest in respect of causality is as the

disposition of these in that name, then from these propositions it is concluded that substance is the cause of the other categories."

Hence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* II.4: "Each thing itself is most of others, according to which it inheres in others univocally — for instance, fire is hottest. For it is the cause to the others, here causing; wherefore also the most true, because it is the cause to the posterior that they are true. Wherefore the principles of always-existing things must necessarily always be most true; for they are not at any time true, nor is anything the cause to them that they are so, but they are to others. Wherefore each thing, as it is in being, so it stands toward truth." Where the text of the Commentator has it more expressly thus: "Each principle is properly the cause of those things according to which other things are, which agree in name and intention." Where Averroes: "Since it has been declared that the cause in any genus of beings is more worthy in being and in truth than those things of which it is the cause in that genus, it is manifest that, if there is a first cause of all things — as has been declared in natural science — that cause is more worthy in being and in truth than all beings. For all beings do not acquire being and truth except from this cause. It is therefore alone being by itself, and true by itself, and all other beings and truths exist through the being and truth of that one."

Hence Augustine, *Confessions* VII.15: "I beheld certain things, and saw that they ought to be referred to Thee, since they are: in Thee all finite things are, not as in a place, but because Thou holdest all things with hand and truth. And all things are true insofar as they are; nor is anything falsity, except when that is thought to be which is not." With which Avicenna agrees, *Metaphysics* VIII.6: "The necessarily existing is truth; for the truth of any thing is the property of its being, which is established for it. Therefore nothing is more worthy of being truth than the necessarily existing. Now that is called true, of whose being there is a certain judgment. Therefore nothing is more worthy of this certitude than that of whose being there is a certain judgment. And it is always with its certitude, and always with its eternity, by itself, and not by another than itself. The quiddities of other things, as they are in themselves and apart from their relation to the necessarily existing, do not deserve to be, but deserve privation; and on this account, all things, as they are in themselves, are false; but on account of Him is their certitude, and on this account every thing perishes except inasmuch as it is turned toward His face. And therefore He is more worthy that He should be the necessarily existing and the truth."

Concordantly Isaiah 40 writes thus: "All nations are before Him as if they were not, and are reckoned to Him as nothing and emptiness." Hence Job 23: "He alone is." On which Gregory, *Moralia* XVI.14, speaking of Angels and men, heaven and earth, and all other things in general: "All these things are," he says, "but principally are not, because in themselves they do not subsist; and unless they be held by the hand of the Governor, they cannot be at all. For all things subsist in Him by whom they were created; nor do those things which live grant life to themselves; nor do those things which are moved, but do not live, lead themselves to motion by their own motions; but He moves all things, who quickens some, and others, quickened, He marvelously orders and preserves in their final essence. For all things have been made out of

nothing, and their essence would tend back again to nothing, unless the Author of all things held it by the hand of His governance. All things, therefore, which are created, by themselves cannot prevail to subsist nor to be moved, but they subsist insofar as they have received that they should be; they are moved insofar as they are disposed by hidden instinct. For lo, the sinner is to be scourged by human things: in his burnings, the earth grows parched; in his shipwrecks, the sea is shaken; in his sweats, the air is enkindled; in his floodings, the heaven is darkened against him; in his oppressions, men are kindled; in his adversity, even the Angelic powers are moved. Are these things, then, which we have called inanimate, or which we have called living, agitated by their own instincts, and not rather by divine impulses? Whatever, therefore, rages outwardly, through this He must be regarded who inwardly disposes this. In every cause, therefore, He alone is, who principally is, who also says to Moses: *I am who am; thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you.*"

Hence Plato, *Timaeus* II.3, introduces God thus addressing the other gods, namely, Angels: "Gods, of whom I am the maker and Father: works of mine, by nature dissolvable, but by my will indissoluble. For everything that is joined is by nature dissolvable; but what is joined and modulated by good reason — to wish to be dissolved is not of God. Wherefore, although you have been made and generated, and are by no means immortal nor altogether indissoluble, yet you shall not at any time be dissolved, nor shall you undergo the necessity of death; for my will is a greater bond and more vigorous for guarding eternity than those vital bonds out of which your eternity has been compacted and composed."

Furthermore, even the heaven, the firmest of bodies, by no means suffices by itself to be. For Averroes says, *On the Substance of the Orb*, treatise 2: "You ought to know that the celestial body, which is simple and intransmutable by anything extrinsic, does not need a power moving in place only, but also a power bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence. For though it be simple, and not having potency for corruption, yet it is necessarily of finite action, because it is of finite dimensions and of dimensions determined by the surface containing it. And every such thing, when the intellect posits it as existing by itself, without anything else bestowing on it permanence and eternity, must necessarily be in the finiteness of its permanence as it is in the finiteness of its action. And therefore it is necessary in the intellect that there be here a power bestowing eternal permanence on it, even as it bestows on it eternal motion." Hence Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the spirit of His mouth." If, therefore, according to Augustine, Plato, and Averroes, neither soul, nor Angel, nor heaven can abide by itself, without divine conservation and sustentation, what else will be able so to abide?

Wherefore the Father of Philosophers, Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 38: "This sensible world, which is so called, is the receptacle of all sensible species, qualities, or bodies, all of which without God cannot be quickened. For God is all things, and from Him are all things, and all things are subject to His will — which whole is good, becoming, prudent, and immutable, and to Him alone sensible and intelligible — and without Him neither was anything, nor is, nor shall be.

For all things are from Him and through Him, both manifold qualities, and great quantities, and all measures exceeding magnitudes, and all-formed species, which when thou hast understood, O Asclepius, thou shalt give thanks to God."

In agreement with which the Apostle to the Romans 11: "Of Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things; to Him be glory." Whom, as it were expounding, the twenty-second of the *Twenty-four Definitions of as many Philosophers concerning God* says thus: "God is He from whom whatever is, is — without partition; through whom it is, without variation; in whom it is, without commixture." Hence Augustine, *Confessions* I.1, addressing God, says: "I should not be at all, if Thou wert not in me. Or rather, I should not be, unless I were in Thee — *of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things?* Even so, Lord, even so." Who also, on Psalm 113, "Whatsoever the Lord hath willed, He hath done": "In which He himself is, as Containing not as needing; not by them as by needing is He contained."

Dionysius, moreover, *On the Divine Names* II, when Timothy asks what is meant by "God exists by Himself" — whether it means that God exists by Himself as Life, or as Wisdom, or as anything else of the kind — answers: "What we say is no small matter, but is right, and has a simple declaration. For we do not say that any divine or Angelic essence exists by itself, being the cause of being to all things which are. Rather, the cause only of being to all things that are; only the cause of existing to all things that are; and being itself the super-essential principle, and essence, and causal source. Nor do we declare any other deity than the super-divine to be the parent of life, the cause of life and of brought-forth life to all things which live; nor do we say there is any gathering principle of existing things and creative essences and substances, which they have promptly perfected as gods of existing things and creators — gods whom we should truly and properly say neither formed themselves, nor existed, nor were their fathers — but we call 'Being-by-itself' and 'Life-by-itself' deity, principally indeed and god-formedly and causally one super-principal and super-essential principle and cause of all; but participatively, as providential powers brought forth from the non-participated God, vivification by itself (according to another translation, essentification) and deification by itself, in which existing things properly participate in themselves, and are existing, and living, and divine, and are and are called, and the like. And the best substituent of the first ones themselves is said to be the second, then of the whole of these, then of the particulars of them, then of the whole of those that participate in them, then of those that participate in them particularly. And what need is there to speak of these things, since indeed our divine Masters call also that which is by itself the substituent of goodness and divinity 'more than best' and 'more than divine,' calling goodness and divinity by itself a beneficent and deific gift proceeding from God; and form by itself, formific outpouring by itself, and total form, and particular form, and universally good, and other things which according to the same manner have been said and shall be said — declaring providence and goodness participated by existing things, proceeding from the non-participated God."

And further, in ch. 5: "All things," he says, "Goodness turns to itself, as principal gatherer of dispersed things, as principal and life-giving deity; and all things desire it as principle, as containing power, as end. And the best is, as the divine words say, that from which all things subsist, and are, as brought forth from a most perfect cause, and in which all things are constituted, as guarded and comprehended in an omnipotent counsel, and unto which all things are turned, as each into its proper summit; and all things desire it." And further, in the same chapter: "Simply, every *on* — that is, being — is from the Good and the Best, and is turned into the Good and the Best, and all things whatsoever are and come to be, are and come to be through the Good and the Best, and to this all things look, and by it are moved and contained; and on its account and through it and in it is every exemplary, consummative, intellectual, special, formal principle — and simply, every principle, every containing power, every summit; or, that I may speak comprehensively, all things which are, are from the Good and the Best, and all things which are not are super-essentially in the Good and the Best. And this is the principle and end of all, super-principal and super-final; for from Him, and through Him, and in Him, and into Him are all things, as the sacred speech says."

By the same reasoning already made, Anselm, in *Monologion* 3 and in following chapters, shows that there is some being which alone is by itself, and that through this one all the rest are; and that itself is unique, having neither equal nor greater, since whatever is through another is less than it. Wherefore he concludes that it most highly and greatly is of all beings; and afterwards, by the same reasoning, he shows that it necessarily and continuously sustains all other things. Hence in ch. 13 he says thus: "It is therefore established that whatever is not the same as itself has been made through the supreme Nature. Now it can be doubtful to no rational mind that all things which have been made are vigorous, and persevere in being so long as they are, by the very same one sustaining them, by whose making they have, out of nothing, the being which is theirs. For by a reason similar in all respects to that by which it has been gathered that all things which exist through some one thing, and that this one alone is by itself while others are by it — by a similar reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever things are vigorous are vigorous through some one thing, and that one alone is vigorous by itself, while others are by another. Since this cannot be otherwise except that things which have been made are vigorous through another, and that from which they have been made is vigorous through itself, it is necessary that, just as nothing has been made except through the present creative Essence, so nothing is vigorous except through the conserving presence of the same."

And he adds in ch. 14, consequently: "If it is so — nay, since by necessity it is so — it follows that wherever it is not, nothing is. Therefore it is everywhere, and through all, and in all." And further: "It is clear that itself is what bears and surpasses, encloses and penetrates all other things. If, then, these are joined to those things which were found above, the same is what is in all, and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which all things are."

Furthermore, every caused thing is caused by some cause actually now causing — which appears from the mutual relation between them, and from Algazel, *Metaphysics* I, and Avicenna,

Metaphysics VI and VIII, at length. Now anything short of God is caused, and He alone uncaused; therefore whatsoever besides God is in some way caused by God. But this causation, at least of things which are not moved, nor newly produced, can be called nothing but necessary conservation, as is plain from the said philosophers in the said places. Nor can it be said that God is therefore now said to cause some caused thing, because He previously caused it, or the cause which caused it. For this is repugnant to the authors cited; and because then a father would be said now actually to cause a son actually existing — nay, even a dead father a now-living son, because he caused him or his cause.

Wherefore Algazel, *Metaphysics* I, last chapter, shows that no possible-existent has being except through another which is its maker; and that even the world, though it be eternal, may be called a making of God most high. And, distinguishing concerning maker, he subjoins: "Maker is understood doubly: first, that which extracts the made from non-being to being; second, that which makes the being of a thing to be through it, as the being of light is through the sun, and the sun is naturally seen to be the maker of light. But some thought that, when a thing has being, it does not need a maker, but although that one is not, yet its product does not cease to be; and perhaps they presume to say that, although it be posited that God is not, it does not follow from this that the world is not." And they try to show this by example and by reason. By example thus: as, with the builder of a house being dead, the house itself remains. By reason thus: that which is not, needs a giver of being; but that which is, does not so need.

He answers to the example, and says that the builder is not the cause of the house except improperly, but is the cause of the motion of the parts of the house while it is being moved to the form of the house; but, when the form of the house has been induced and the motions have ceased, his causality ceases. Nay, according to the same in the same place, the form of the foundation, of the wall, and of the other parts are the causes of the house. And to the reason he says that what already has being does not need a giver, but a conserver. Which he proves thus: every product depends upon its maker — and this not according to the not-being which it had; therefore according to its being. And he adds: "Therefore that which has begun to be needs a maker only according to its being, since according to this mode it is possibly existing." And further: "After, then, the product does not depend on the maker except inasmuch as it has being, then so long as it remains in being, it needs the maker, and depends on him according to its being, and is on his account, and with him in all its dispositions — as the being of the day is on account of the sun, and with the sun in all its dispositions."

Algazel, in this argument as in many of his sayings, follows Avicenna, who in *Metaphysics* VI.1 most diffusely pursues the same reasoning virtually, where among other things he says thus: "The divine philosophers do not understand by *agent* the principle of motion only, as the natural philosophers understand, but the principle of being and the giver of it, as is the Creator of the world. The natural cause does not acquire being for a thing except by some motion, in some of the modes of motion; therefore that which acquires being in natural things is the principle of motion." And further in the same place: "Perhaps someone will think that the agent and cause is

not needed except that the thing have being after non-being; but, after the thing has been, if the cause be destroyed, the thing will yet be self-sufficient. He will think, therefore, that the thing does not need the cause except for beginning to be; but after it has begun and has had being, it will then no longer need the cause. With them, therefore, causes will be causes of becoming only, and prior to that which is made, not simultaneous with it. Now he has thought what is false, as you know. For the being of the thing, after the thing has been made, must be either necessarily existing or not necessarily existing." And having shown at length that it is not necessarily existing through itself, but depends on the necessarily existing through itself, he says at the end of the chapter: "After it has been clear that the being of the quiddity depends on something, inasmuch as it is being to that quiddity — not inasmuch as it is being after non-being — then that being according to this mode is caused, and so long as it lasts will be caused, depending on another. It is therefore manifest now that the caused needs something which gives to it being itself only by itself; but beginning and other things of the kind are things accidental to it, and the caused needs the giver of its being always and unceasingly, as long as it has being."

In agreement with these, Hermes, *On World and Heaven* I, treating of the principles of things, exploring and inquiring what is the highest and first cause, and what its effect, says thus: "Therefore that cause is *to ouk olos* — that is, a fount having a seed-bed of life," (in Greek)" which is called fullness of knowledge, the good of the divine clemency of goodness, which, placed throughout the whole body of the world after the manner of a circle, and now placed externally, now internally, governs and composes all things, and to procure and conserve all fiery and spherical things, does not cease to perpetuate agitation. There are joined together, in an individual species described in singularity, whatever matter, whatever the world, whatever the machine of the world, whatever time, whatever in temporal things the elements bring forth. There is the text of the work, the chain of fate, the disposition of ages, the goal of all temporal things engraved by the finger of the supreme Disposer. There is the knot of perpetuity. The divine Mind, therefore, by no fatigue lays down its office, but does not cease to sustain itself and the world and all things which are within it by perpetual and indefatigable utility — or, alternatively, stability — of itself."

This same Truth itself most truly attests, when it says: "My Father worketh until now, and I work" (John 5) — which is understood not of that operation by which things are merely newly produced, but of the necessary conservation of things produced, as Avicenna and Algazel above expounded. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV.14, treating how God on the seventh day rested from every work, and how nevertheless with this the Father works continuously even now, says thus: "It can be understood that God rested from founding the kinds of creature; but henceforth even now and beyond He works the administration of those same kinds which were then instituted. Not that on the seventh day even, His power should cease from the governance of heaven and earth, and of all things which He had founded — otherwise they would forthwith fall asunder. For the power of the Creator and the strength of Him who is omnipotent and holds all things is the cause of subsisting for every creature; and if at any time it

should cease from them, at one and the same time their species too would cease, and the whole creature would collapse. Nor, as a builder of houses, when he has built, departs, and his work, with him ceasing and departing, stands — so the World will be able to stand, even for the blink of an eye, if its Lord should withdraw from it the rule of itself. And so what the Lord says, *My Father worketh until now*, shows a certain continuation of His work by which He contains and administers the universal creature. And what is written of His Wisdom, *It reacheth from end to end mightily, and disposeth all things sweetly* — of which it is likewise written that its motion is more agile and swifter than all motions — appears sufficiently to those rightly intuiting, that this same incomparable and ineffable, and (if it could be understood) stable, motion of His He grants to things to be sweetly disposed, which, plainly, being subtracted, if He should cease from operation, they would forthwith perish. And what the Apostle says, when he preached God to the Athenians, *In Him we live and move and are*, clearly known, so far as the human mind avails, helps this view, by which we believe and say that God works unceasingly in those things which He created. For we are not in Him as His substance, in the way it has been said that He has life in Himself; but, since we are something other than He, we are in Him for no other reason than because He works that, and this is His work, that He contains all things, and by which His Wisdom *reacheth from end to end mightily, and disposeth all things sweetly* — by which disposition we live and move and are in Him. Hence it is gathered that, if He should withdraw this His work from things, we should neither live, nor be moved, nor be. It is plain, therefore, that not even for one day has God ceased from the work of governing what He created, lest their natural motions (by which they are driven and quickened, that they may be of the natures of all, and in that which they are, may abide each according to its own kind) should at once lose them, and they should altogether cease to be anything, if there were withdrawn from them the motion of the Wisdom of God by which He sweetly disposes all things." And from this place is excerpted the 277th sentence of the *Sentences* of Prosper.

Furthermore, Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter IX.23*, says that if God should subtract from nature its inmost operation, by which He establishes and continuously makes it, it will remain as if extinct, in nothing. And further, in ch. 23, he says that the formation of woman from the rib was made by that work of God which He worked not through Angels, but through Himself; and He has not let it go; but the works are so continued that neither the nature of any other things, nor the nature of the Angels themselves, subsists, if He does not work. And on Psalm 118, "Thy hands have made me," he says: "If the operative power of God be subtracted from things, they perish." He also, in *On Genesis according to the Letter VIII.19, On Nature and Grace 26*, in the *Sentences* of Prosper 131.285, teaches a sentence similar to this.

Anselm, also, in *On the Fall of the Devil 1*, says: "Since not only is no other essence except by His making, but it cannot in any way remain, after it has been made, except by His preserving. When He ceases to preserve what He has made, what was returns into not-being." Lombard too, in the *Sentences I*, dist. 37, recites certain ones saying: "All places are present to God, and in those things which are in them He does not cease to operate. For also those very places, and

whatever is in them, unless He preserves them, cannot remain. He is therefore said to be in them by substance, because by the power of His own substance He makes that even places be, and all things which are in them" — and he approves and confirms this view of theirs.

Furthermore, no thing having a formal cause can exist without it; but God is the first form of all things, as the suppositions show, and as is also demonstrated in *Metaphysics* II — since in formal causes there is not an infinite process, but there is one first of all, and this is God. In *Metaphysics* XII, near the beginning, the same is plain. Hence Averroes says there in comm. 6 — and Alexander had said it before — that God is the first form of all things, the first efficient, and likewise the first end. The same Averroes, on *On Sleep and Waking*, says thus: "Since these individuals have determinate being, it is necessary that none of them be understood except in the abstract form, whose proportion to that is as the proportion of the form of the artifact to the artifact." For "she is the maker of all things" (Wisdom 7).

This same thing Plotinus also affirms — concerning whom Augustine, *City of God* X.4, writes thus: "Plotinus the Platonist surely disputes concerning providence, and proves it from the supreme God — whose unintelligible and ineffable beauty He is — to reach as far as these earthly and lowest things, by the beauty of little flowers and leaves, which, all though as if cast away, and most swiftly perishing, he affirms cannot have most fitting numbers of their forms, unless they be formed from there, where the intelligible and unchangeable form, having all things at once, perseveres."

Wherefore Augustine, *On the Word of the Lord*, sermon 38: "The Word of God is a certain form, a form not formed, but the form of all formed things, surpassing all things without place, eminent above all, and a certain foundation in which they are, and a summit under which they are. For all things are under God; the Word abiding in itself renews all things; therefore it is the form of all things, a form unfabricated, without time, without spaces of place." And in *Eighty-three Questions* 23, he says that this very likeness of the Father is called the Son, by whose participation those things are alike which in any way are alike — whether to one another, or like to God; and he subjoins: "For it is the first species, by which, so to speak, things are speciated, and the form by which all things are formed."

Chrysostom too, on the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, homily 2, says that the Son is the proper character of the first form. Which Dionysius too, *On the Divine Names* II, cited above, attests. The blessed Hierotheus also — Dionysius reciting in *On the Divine Names* II — writes thus: "The divinity of Jesus, the cause and replenisher of all, joining the parts to the universe, saving — neither part nor whole, and whole and part, embracing every part and whole in itself, and supereminent and excelling, perfect indeed in the perfect, as principal perfection, but imperfect in the imperfect, as super-perfect, and before-perfect — forming form in formless things, as principal form; formless in forms themselves, as super-form; the essence of every essence, and incontaminate, supergrasping, and super-essentially removed from every essence, ordering all

principles and orders, predestining, and super-collocated in every principle and order — and the measure of those things which are."

Of these no ignoble imitator, Robert Lincolniensis the Bishop, in a certain Epistle directed to Master Adam Rufus — who was inquiring whether God were the first form of all things — shows that God is the form of all, and even the first form. And first, having presupposed that He is form, he proves that He is necessarily the first form, because before Him is nothing; for He is the first and the last. Then he proves that He is form, by authorities, and likewise by reasons. The first authority he alleges from Augustine, *On Free Will* I — and so it is, if "Whence Evil" be not numbered, namely, the first book; but if that be numbered, as Augustine himself in *Retractations* I.9 numbers it, it is *On Free Will* II.28. Augustine, then, says: "If you behold whatever is mutable, and either by sense of body or by consideration of mind cannot grasp it unless it be held by some form of numbers, with which removed it must of necessity recede into nothing — doubt not that, where these mutable things are not intercepted, but with measured motions and varied diversity of forms, accomplish, as it were, certain verses of times, there is some eternal and unchangeable form, which is neither contained as it were diffused in places, nor protended and varied through times, through which all these things can be formed, and according to their kind fulfill and perform the numbers of places and times. Now every mutable thing must of necessity be also formable; just as we call mutable that which can be changed, so I will call formable that which can be formed. But no thing can form itself, because no thing can give itself what it does not have; and at any rate, in order that it have form, something is formed. Wherefore, any thing whatever, if it has any form, has no need to receive what it has; if it does not have any form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have. Therefore no thing, as we have said, can form itself. So it is concluded that body and soul, since they are mutable, are formed by some unchangeable and ever-abiding form, to which form it has been said: *Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail* — by years without defect, prophetic speech has put eternity. Of this same form it has been said that *abiding in itself, it renews all things*. Hence also it is comprehended that all things are governed by providence: for if all things which are, with form altogether subtracted, will be nothing, then the unchangeable form itself, through which all mutable things subsist that they may be filled and acted with the numbers of their forms, is itself their providence; for these things would not be, if that were not." This seems to be the reason of Avicenna and Algazel touched above, by which through possible being they found one necessary being.

To this Augustine also alleges from *Confessions* XIII a discourse directed to the Father: "What did the spiritual and corporeal nature, which Thou hast made, deserve from Thee, that they should depend even when not yet begun, and so depend, informed in Thy Word, unless through the same Word they were called back to Thy unity, and were formed, and were from Thee, the one supreme Good, all things very good?" And further: "What did the inchoation of the spiritual creature deserve from Thee, that it should at any rate float dark and like an abyss, unlike Thee, unless through Thy Word it were turned to that from which it has been made — and, illumined

by it, become light, though not equally, yet conformed to a form equal to Thee?" Again, he adduces the same Augustine, *Confessions* II, speaking thus to the Father: "I shall stand and be made firm in Thee, in my form, Thy life."

After these, by four reasons he shows that God is form to Himself; then he manifests how God is the form of creatures, and he holds that form is found in creatures in four ways. First, as a part of the composite, from which and from matter the whole itself is composed, and thus God is not the form of creatures. Second, that is called form to whose likeness something is formed — as a wooden foot is called the form of a sandal, which is formed according to it. Third, that is called form by application, to which matter is figured to its likeness, and thus a seal is the form of wax, and clay of a fusible statue. Fourth, the likeness in the mind of an artificer, looking to which he operates, is called the form, namely, of such an artifact; nor does it differ much from the form of the second mode. And he subjoins:

"Imagine, then, in the mind of an Architect, the form of a house to be fabricated, to which alone he looks, that to its imitation he may make the house; and imagine with this, by the impossible, his will so powerful that by itself alone it applies the matter to be formed into a house; and imagine with these that the matter of the house is fluid, nor can it remain in the form received in itself, if it should be separated from the form in the mind of the Architect — as water figured by a silver seal, when the seal is separated, immediately loses the figure received. Imagine, therefore, the will of the artificer applying the matter of the house to the form in his mind, not only that it be thus formed into a house, but, so long as the house remains in the being of a house, that the formed thing be preserved in being. In that mode, therefore, by which the form of this kind in the mind of the Architect would be the form of the house, the art, or wisdom, or word of omnipotent God is the form of all creatures; for it is at once the exemplar producing, forming, and conserving in the form given." And further he says that the eternal Wisdom of God is so the form of all things, as if you should imagine the figure of a silver seal to be life and intelligence, understanding itself and willing to figure to its imitation and likeness, more or less expressed, the fluid wax — which cannot of itself remain in any received figuration — and that, by this will alone, it should move the formless and fluid wax to itself, apply it to itself, and so impress some of its likeness on it, and preserve the impressed likeness; thus the eternal Wisdom of the Father is the form of all things. Thus Robert Lincolniensis, on the testimony of Grosseteste, of subtle and sharp wit.

This same Aristotle expressly attests, *On the World* 11, thus saying: "No nature suffices for itself by itself, deprived of the safety which is from Him — namely, God." Wherefore some of the ancients were moved to say that all these things are full of gods. Hence Virgil in *Bucolics*, eclogue 3: "From Jupiter the beginning, Muses; all things are full of Jupiter." And Jeremiah 23: "I will fill heaven and earth — or, in another version, I do fill — saith the Lord." And it follows in *On the World*: "That the power which resides in Heaven, and in things most distant — speaking of the one (in another translation, 'in one to say') — to all things should be the cause of safety, this is His omnipotent word, which from Heaven, from royal seats, comes" (Wisdom 18)

— "*who heals all things*" (above 16). Hence the Apostle to the Hebrews 1: "*Bearing all things by the word of His power.*"

Is it not for this reason that Hermes says God to be in some manner all things, and to be named by the names of all — as his authority, *On the Eternal Word* 38, alleged above, partly teaches? Is it not also above, in the same author's 31, that he says: "The Father of all, or the Lord, and He who alone is all things, willingly shows Himself to all"? And in 22, inquiring the name of God, he speaks thus: "I do not hope that the maker of all majesty, and the Father or Lord of all things, can be named by one name, even though composed of many; but rather by no name, or rather by the name of all things — since indeed He is one and all, so that it is necessary either that all things be named by His name, or He by the names of all."

In agreement with which the Philosopher, in *On the World* last chapter, treating of the divine names, writes thus: "Though He be one, He is many-named, named from all the passions which He Himself newly produces" — and, this being extended as it were inductively through each, in the end he says that He is called Savior and Eleutherius (in another translation, Liberator), "and, to speak summarily, He is to be called celestial and terrestrial, by every nature and fortune, as He being the cause of all things; on account of which it is not badly said in the *Orphica*: 'Jupiter, foundation of earth and heaven; Jupiter, root of the sea; Jupiter, sun and moon; Jupiter, king; Jupiter, prince of all.'" Wherefore Lucan: "Jupiter is whatsoever you see."

Or perhaps this is what God answered, veiledly, to Moses inquiring His name: "*I AM WHO AM. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you*" (Exodus 3) — as if He would intimate that He is Himself simply by Himself, and that He also is somehow the whole of being, namely, by giving essence to all other things universally.

Wherefore Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* I, showing the supreme Unity and Divinity to be unnamed and yet named by the names of all, speaks thus: "The knowing Theologians praise it as unnameable, and from every name as unnameable; and when they say that the Divinity itself, in one of the mystical visions of the symbolic divine manifestation, rebuked one saying *what is Thy name?* — and, as it were leading him back from every denominative knowledge, said: *Why askest thou my name?* — and this is wonderful: or, is not this truly that wonderful name which is above every name, which is unnameable? *Multivocal*, however, as when they introduce it again, saying, *I am 'on'* (that is, being) *life, light, God, truth*; and when the Theosophers praise the cause of all multivocally from all causatives — as best, as existing, as cause of ages, as bestower of life, as virtue, as Lord of lords, as King of kings, as Ancient of days, as not aging, as immutable, as salvation. And they say that He is in spirits, and in souls, and in bodies, and in heaven, and in earth, and at the same time in the same — Himself unworldly, around-worldly, above-worldly, supercelestial, super-essential — sun, star, fire, water, spirit, mist of dew, by Himself stone and rock, all things which are, and nothing of these things which are. Thus, then, to the cause and supereminent and unnameable cause of all, they will join also all the names of

those things which are; that diligently there may be the kingdom of all things, and that around all things which are, things depending on it as on cause, as on principle, as on end."

Lo, here he plainly intimates God to be the threefold cause of things — formal, efficient, final. And it follows: "And itself, according to the speech, is *all things in all*; and is truly praised the inchoative, consummative, and containing substance of all." Where the Gloss says: "All things which are, are God — because from Him are all things; nothing of those things which are, because He is not created." And further, in 5: "The divine name of the Best, manifesting all the causal processions of all things, is extended both into existing and non-existing things, and is above existing things, and beyond non-existing things." Where the Gloss: "By procession, however, he means the divine operation by which all things proceed to effect."

God moreover, in Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 22 and 31, is named *Father of all*. Now "Father" — as Papias in his *Elementarium* attests — is Greek, that is, *progenitor*, called from the Greek *pantater*, which is "preserving all things." Wherefore Hermes, as touched above, says of God that He is the Father of all, or the Lord of all, or He who alone is all things — namely, giving essence to all things by producing, and likewise by conserving — as the efficient cause and formal cause of all.

This same view Hermes seems to teach, *On the Eternal Word* 1, where, speaking of the fullness of all goods, as if correcting himself, he subjoins: "If, however, many goods are, and not one in which all are — for one is known to be consequent to the other — all things are of one, or one is all things; for thus each is connected to each, that one cannot be separated from either."

Aristotle, in agreement, *On the World* 12, confirms the same by an elegant example: "They say," he says, "that the sculptor Phidias engraved Minerva (in another translation, Pallas) in the middle of a certain shield, and impressed his own face, and connected it to the statue by some hidden artifice, so that necessarily, if anyone wished to remove it, he would dissipate the whole statue and break it. Such a relation God bears to the World, containing the harmony and safety of all things."

Hence Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VIII.6: "All things perish except inasmuch as it is toward His face; and therefore He is more worthy that He should be the necessarily existing, and the truth, and pure intention." With which Psalm 103 agrees, saying: "When Thou openest Thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness; but when Thou turnest away Thy face, they shall be troubled. Thou shalt take away their breath, and they shall fail, and shall return into their dust" — that is, shall be reduced to nothing.

Was it not also for this reason that some have posited God to be the Soul of the world? — although Plato, *Timaeus* I.2 and 6, seems to maintain that the Soul of the world is produced by God, and placed in the middle of the World. Hence Themistius, as Averroes recites on *Metaphysics* XII comm. 19, speaking of animals generated from putrefaction, and of the industry and intention of nature, says thus: "It is not wonderful that, although nature does not understand

anything of this kind, yet she does this by inducing some intention; and this is shown because something reminds her from the noble causes — as the soul which is in the earth, of which Plato says that it is from the second gods." But this saying of Themistius Averroes consequently rejects, and says that such animals are generated from celestial heat duly measured. And he subjoins: "And this measure proceeds from the divine intellectual art, which is similar to one form of one principal art, under which are several arts. According to this, then, it is to be understood that nature does something perfectly and in order, although it does not understand — as if it were reminded by virtues acting more nobly than those which are called intelligences. And therefore it is said that all proportions and forms which are in potency in first matter are in act in the first mover, and are in some manner assimilated to the being of that which comes to be in the soul of the artificer."

Does not also Avicenna, *On the Soul* IV.4, say that there is one common soul of Heaven and World, whose operation is for the nature of the whole? This soul, however, according to some, is God; according to others, born or produced by God: whose views are not repugnant to one another, nor to the Catholic truth. For this Soul can be understood as the reason, or the will, the word or the willing of God, by which He effects and preserves things, which by no means differ essentially from God, but are God — by the twenty-sixth part of the first corollary of this work.

Hence Aristotle, *On the World* 11, says that God in one saying, or by speaking, is to all things the cause of safety, as is recited above. And further, in 14, treating how God produces things, he speaks thus: "He sent forth out of His nourishing heart, working His thoughts" — in another translation, "out of His great soul." With which Hermes, in agreement, *On World and Heaven* I, teaches that there are three principles of things: namely, Cause, Reason, and Nature. By Cause he understands the first cause simply, in no way caused — namely, God the Father, who first causes the Reason proceeding from Him, namely, the Son, and through Him the universal Nature.

That the Father causes the Son also, and is His eternal cause, Augustine and Chrysostom attest. Wherefore Hermes, where above: "Reason is from Cause, and from both is Nature." And further: "Reason is a certain power proceeding from Cause, ordering all things from the principle." Where also he takes these three — Reason, *Nous*, and divine mind — indifferently, and as if synonymously, for the same. For he says that *Nous* is so called of which nature, qualifying things, inserting natural qualities, is said. And further he says that the divine Mind, without any fatigue, does not cease to sustain the world and all things which are within it — as is more fully recited above.

Hence Papias in his *Elementarium* says: "Nous: the will of God, or the mind which is called providence. It is, however, intelligible essence emulous of goodness, on account of unwearied turning to the supreme God; *Noun*, that is, the Word of God, containing the original species of things."

Does not also that Platonic statement consonant with this view — which Augustine, *Confessions* VII.9, recites that he read in the Platonic books translated from Greek into Latin, although not

under these words, yet in the same sense — agree? "*In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God: all things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made. In Him was life.*" And what Catholic does not know this to be the beginning of the holy Gospel according to John, in the same sentences and words? Wherefore Augustine, *City of God* X.29: "Learned men ought to be ashamed," he says, "to be made disciples of Christ from disciples of Plato — He who taught the fisherman by His Spirit to know and to say *In the beginning was the Word*, etc." And he subjoins that this beginning of the holy Gospel which is named according to John, "a certain Platonist — as we used to hear from holy Simplician, who afterwards presided over the Church of Milan as Bishop — said ought to be inscribed in golden letters, and to be set forth in all churches in the most eminent places. But for this reason God, that great Master, was contemned by the proud, because *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.*"

But because the rational cause does not act through reason alone, without the concomitance of will, the same philosophers, more zealously meditating, joined to God the first cause, or to God the Father and to His Reason, mind, or Word, the will also. Now will, on the testimony of Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV.20, by a certain appropriation, is recognized to belong to the Holy Spirit.

Hence the same Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 22, speaking of God the Father of all, says thus: "He alone, as if of both sexes most fully fertile, always pregnant with His own will, brings forth always whatever He wills to procreate. His will is goodness, all goodness; this same goodness of all things is born from His divinity." And further, in 23: "I say," he says, "that sense, and nature, and the world contain in them nature, and conserve all born things; for both sexes are full of procreation, and the connection of each — or, what is more true, the comprehensible unity — is what you can rightly call either Cupid or Venus or both. This, then, more truly than every truth, more manifestly perceive in mind: that from that God of all nature, this office of procreating eternally has been found and granted to all, in which the highest charity, gladness of joy, desire, and divine love is innate." Now charity, desire, and love properly belong to the will, which, on the testimony of Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV.17 and 20, is in some manner properly attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Wherefore Plato, *Timaeus* I.1: "If anyone should posit the will of God to be the most certain origin of all things, I should rightly agree with him, thinking the same." But this divine will, suited to the Holy Spirit, the same Hermes seems sometimes to call Spirit. For *On the Eternal Word* 15: "Of these things," he says, "thus far has been treated; but of Spirit and things like these let the beginning be taken from this point. There was God and *hyle*, which we believe in Greek to be the world. Spirit accompanied the world, or Spirit was in the world, but not similarly as in God; nor was it in God for that reason that the world was not there when they were not, but in Him they then were, whence they had to be born. Now *Pan*, or the nature of the world, is Spirit, although it appears to be born; from the principle, however, in itself, it possesses the power of being born and procreating, and the nature of fertility. For the beginning is in the quality of

nature, which possesses both conception and birth in itself, by force and matter. Therefore, without another conception, it is by itself generable." And further, in 18: "By Spirit all things are administered and quickened in the world, which is, as it were, an instrument or machine subject to the will of the supreme God. By Spirit are agitated, or governed, all the species in the world, each according to its nature distributed to it by God. Now *Pan*, or the world, is the receptacle and agitation and frequenting of all things, of which God is the governor, dispensing to all things as much as is necessary to each one in worldly things. And by Spirit He fills all things, as the quality of the nature of each is."

Is not this what the Wise One protests, saying: "*The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the orb of lands; and that which contains all things*" (Wisdom 1)? Furthermore, the same Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 28: "The nature of God," he says, "is counsel of the will, supreme goodness; the will is born from counsel, and wills those things which it has; it wills, however, all good things, and has all things which it wills; it both thinks and wills all good things — and this is God; His image is the world of the good." Is not this the view supported by that first of the *Twenty-four Definitions of as many Philosophers concerning God*: "God is *monas*, generating *monas*, reflecting toward Himself the one ardor"? And the seventh, which says thus: "God is principle without principle, process without variation, end without end"?

This view also Porphyry the Philosopher — disciple of Plato, not of Christ — more plainly attests; whom Augustine in *City of God* X.29, addressing, speaks thus: "Thou preachest the Father and His Son, whom thou callest the paternal Intellect or mind, and the medium of these, whom we think thou callest the Holy Spirit; and after your manner thou callest these three Gods." And above, in 28, disputing with the same: "Ignorance," he says, "and on its account many vices — thou sayest these are purged by no rites, but by the *paternal nous* alone, that is, the paternal mind or intellect, which is conscious of the paternal will. Yet thou dost not believe this to be Christ."

Now this *nous*, mind, reason, divine will, or spirit, seems not unfittingly to be called the Soul and life of the world. Hence Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 2: "Although it is varied by the manifold equality of images and the infinity of qualities, although species are known to be at intervals, yet they are united, that the whole may be one, that all may seem to be from one. Therefore, the things by which the World has been formed are entirely one — the World one, the Soul one, and God one." And further at the end: "O true life of all life, O fertile pregnancy of all our things; we have known Thee by Thy conception of all nature most fully; we have known Thee, eternal perseverance."

In agreement, the Philosopher in *On the World* last chapter, treating of the divine Names, says: "We call Him Jupiter and *Zena*, using parallel names — saying *Zena* from the Greek (in non-Latin alphabet) *zen*, which is *to live*, as if we said: through whom we live. Jupiter, the spirit of all; Jupiter, the unwearied movement of fire."

Josephus also reports, *Antiquities of the Jews* XII.2, that Aristaeus the Greek said to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt: "I have known that the Jews worship as the maker of all things God, whom we name *Zena* — that is, Jupiter — because He grants to all (in non-Latin alphabet) *zen*, that is, to live."

To this is consonant Albricius, *On the Origin of the Gods*, or in his *Poetarium*, saying that God is called *Vituneus*, because He grants life; *Sentinus*, because [He grants] sense — as around the twenty-first part of the first corollary of this work is more fully alleged. Hence Servius, that old and not ignoble commentator, on Virgil's *Bucolics*, eclogue 3 — "all things are full of Jupiter" — alleges a similar passage from Lucan saying, "Jupiter is whatsoever you see, wherever you move"; and adds that elsewhere the same says:

The Spirit within nourishes, and Mind, infused through the limbs, Stirs the whole mass.

Of which Servius gives the cause there, saying: "He Himself is the Spirit without whom nothing is moved or governed."

In agreement Ovid, in *Fasti* book VI, says thus:

There is a God in us; we grow warm at His urging; This impulse has the seeds of a sacred mind.

Is not this what the Apostle, disputing with the Athenians concerning God, alleges from the poets and teaches, when he says, "*In Him we live and move and are, as also some of your poets have said*" (Acts 17)? Let no one therefore, I beg, be angry with me if I sometimes — though most rarely — allege any of the poets, since it is established that the holy Apostle of God did this. Thus also blessed Jerome, Epistle 58 to Magnus, Senator of the city of Rome — who objected to Jerome that he polluted the brightness of the Church with the dirt of the Gentiles, because he inserted in his writings the songs of the poets — excuses himself through the Apostle, saying that the Apostle also alleged poets; and he says that he whom the Apostle alleges in this place was Aratus, the Greek poet.

Arator too, subdeacon of the holy Roman Church, in book II *On the Acts of the Apostles*, versifying this place, speaks thus:

O love of sacrilegious novelty! we see that ye have placed An altar to an Unknown God — who founded the stars, Who gave sea and lands; whom Life as Father has, That we may move; from whose fire we breathe; Of whom we are the image; concerning whom the poets sang, That from Him stands the race of men; whom I preach: He has Sanctioned all things from His mouth.

This view also Augustine confirms, treating this authority of the Apostle, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV.14, recited above. Hence Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 6: "Praiseworthy," he says, "is the praiseworthy eternal life, from which by itself is life, and every life, and from which to all things participating life in any way, the proper living of each is ingenerated. Therefore both the life of immortal Angels and immortality, and the imperishability of the always angelic motion, is from itself and through itself, that it subsists. Therefore they are called both ever-

living and immortal, and again not immortal — because they do not have from themselves to be immortally and to live eternally, but from the life-giving and the maker of all life and the continuator-cause; and as in *onte*, that is, in being, we say, because it itself is causal of being; so also there again, because also through itself the divine life of life is the vital and substantial and every life, and the vital motion is from life itself, which is above every life, and every principle of all life. From itself also souls have imperishability, and all animals and germinations have, according to the last consonance of the soul, to live; with which removed, according to the speech, every life fails, and things that fail and pass to the earth, on account of weakness participating in it, are again turned, and again become animals; and there is given indeed first, and through itself, life to be life, and every life — and from it through individuals to be properly, individually estimated, nature subsists."

Who furthermore, above in 1, says that God is the cause and principle and essence and life of all things; and further, in the same place, speaking of God, writes thus: "It is the best tradition and simply to be said, the life of living things and the essence of those which are, the principle and cause of every life and essence, by its active and containing goodness, that they may be what they are. This we have learned from the divine speeches, and you will find that all the sacred hymnody of theologians thus speaks."

Furthermore, all things essentially participating in something necessary, need it. But all beings short of the first are not essentially and purely simply by themselves, in that they participate in the first being, which is purely and essentially by itself. The whole of this appears from the relation of principles and principled, of causes and caused, of beings by themselves and through another, of beings more and less. Which also very many philosophical and theological authors most often attest. For this is, as it were, a kind of general rule, customarily observed both by logicians and philosophers, which no one is ignorant of who diligently considers the writings of the ancients. They very often suppose that everything which is said to be of a certain kind, either is said to be such by essence — and then it is unique — or by participation; and however many participants there are, what is participated by all will be one. Which rule the theologians also embrace.

Hence the venerable Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, *Monologion* 1, showing that there is some first and supreme good of all, says thus: "It is most certain, and perspicuous to all who are willing to attend, that whatever things are said to be something, in such a way as to be said relatively to one another more or less, or equally — they are said through something, which is not understood as one thing in some and another in others, but the same in diverse, whether considered equally or unequally in those things. For whatever things are said to be just relatively to one another, whether equally or more or less — they cannot be understood as just except through justice, which is not one thing in some and another in others." And he says the same of all various goods: that they are good by some one good which exists the same in diverse, and that it alone is good by itself; and no other good is equal or greater than it; wherefore it itself is the supreme.

The same procedure he makes also in ch. 2 concerning *the great*; and in ch. 3 concerning *being* or *to be*, where he says thus: "Everything which is, either is through something, or through nothing; but nothing is through nothing. For it cannot even be thought that anything is not through something. Whatever is, therefore, is not except through something. Since this is so, either it is one or several, through which all things which are exist. But if there are several, either they themselves are referred to some one through which they are, or those several singly are by themselves, or they themselves are through one another. But if those several are through one, then now all are not through several, but rather through that one through which these several are. But if those several singly are by themselves, then surely there is some one power or nature of existing by themselves, which they have, that they may be by themselves; and there is no doubt that through that one they are, by which they have to be by themselves. Therefore, more truly are all through that one one than through several, since without that one they cannot be. But that several be through one another — no reason allows; since it is an irrational thought that any thing should be through that to which it gives being." A similar procedure also Avicenna makes, *Metaphysics* I and VIII; and Algazel, *Metaphysics* II; and Anselm, *On Truth* last chapter, concerning rectitude and truth likewise.

Which also Augustine holds, *On the Trinity* VIII.4, where from many inferior goods he argues for one supreme good of all; and, having numbered many goods, he says: "Why several and several? this good and that good? Take away this and take away that, and see the good itself, if you can; thus you will see God, not good by another good, but the Good of every good." And further, in the same place: "Mutable goods would not be," he says, "unless there were an unchangeable good. Therefore, when you hear *this good* and *that good*, which can otherwise be called even non-goods, if you could — putting aside those which are good by participation in good — perceive the good itself, by participation in which goods are good, you would also at the same time understand it itself, when you hear *this* or *that good*. If, therefore, having put aside those, you could behold by itself the good, you will have beheld God." And in *City of God* VIII.6: "Since in the sight of philosophers body and mind, more or less beautiful, were beautiful — they saw that there was something where there was the first and unchangeable beauty, and therefore not comparable; and that there was the principle of things — they most rightly believed."

Aristotle too, *Metaphysics* IV.18, from the fact that some things are less and more false and true than others, proves that there is one true simply; whom Anselm, *Monologion* 4, most rightly imitates. And Augustine holds the same in many other places. This view also Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, in many chapters, Boethius, *On the Hebdomads*, and many other authors in many places profess — as also the things premised here and in book I a little attest.

Furthermore, *being* is in matter, in form, and in the composite; in substance, and in accident; and not first simply, or not equally first, nor equally is it in them. Therefore in some one thing first and most greatly, by which existing in the rest, it is in them. But this cannot be posited unless it be that which first and through itself is — and this is God. The whole of this is clearly shown by

the things premised in the proximate argument. Hence the Philosopher, *On the Soul* II.68, says: "For not water inasmuch as it is water, nor air inasmuch as it is air, is diaphanous; but because the same nature is in both these, and in the perpetual superior body — namely, Heaven." Where Averroes: "*Not inasmuch as it is air* etc., that is, because diaphaneity is not in water alone or in air, but in the celestial body, it was necessary that diaphaneity should not be in any of these, inasmuch as it is what it is, but according to the common nature existing in all, although it has not a name."

This same is confirmed by the same Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* I.4 and 5, and II.4 and 5, teaching that whatever passion is in many diverse things, has some one subject or cause to which it belongs first, and through it or through her in the rest in which it is — as having three angles equal to two right angles, having horns, contrary or contrary states, the falling of leaves, mutually proportional. And he shows this of all others, whether they be substantial or accidental, whether univocal, analogical, or equivocal — which whole Robert Lincolniensis more elucidates by expounding.

It will perhaps be said that that cause of diverse things in diverse things is one in genus or in species, but in number not at all. But if causes numerically differing be similar in nature and name — either each of them is such by itself, primarily, and essentially, or through another secondarily and by participation, etc., as above in the proximate argument. Others perhaps will say that that one cause of diverse things in diverse things is the universal. But if a universal be something short of God, it seems that there is one universal of men, another of asses, and others of others. Therefore those universals are many, agreeing in nature and name, etc. — as against the prior reply. Yet this is not improbably posited, if by *universal* be understood some universal reason, or divine power unitive of all such things.

Hence Psalm 32: "*By the spirit of His mouth, all the power of them*"; and Aristotle, *On the World* 10: "The whole earth and sea, and ether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole heaven, was adorned by one virtue passing through all." Now this virtue, unitive of all things, is God — "tenacious vigor" — and that principal Unity, which we beseech with the song of praises in hymn-form, whose principality Boethius shows in *Arithmetic* I.6, whose title *On the Principality of Unity* is prefixed.

Hence Avicbron, in the book which he names *Fount of Life*, in ch. 35 of book V, says thus: "All things at all diverse and divided, both in superior and in inferior — namely, individuals, species, genera, differences, properties, and accidents, and at all opposite and contrary — are moved to conjunction, and desire agreement, and seek union; for although they are divided, they are conjoined; and although diverse, they agree in something which retains them and conjoins them and makes them agree. And the root of all this is in this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all, and is the retainer of all."

In agreement, Proclus the Philosopher, in proposition 1, says thus: "Every multitude in some way participates in the One"; and in proposition 14: "Every good is unitive of those participating in it;

and every unition is good; and good and one are the same." This unity, unitive of all, the saying of Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 2, recited above, attests; who also further, in 14, speaking of celestial, terrestrial, and intermediate things: "Of all these," he says, "knowing the effects and nature, let one wonder, adore, and praise the divine art and Mind. To know music is nothing other than to know the order of all the things joined — what each is, allotted by divine reason. For the order of singular things into one, gathered by the reason of the artificer of all, will produce a certain consonance most sweet and most true with divine melody."

Dionysius, moreover, *On the Divine Names* 1: "In nearly every theological action," he says, "we see thearchy divinely praised, and the *monas* and the one — on account of the simplicity and unity of the supernatural impartibility, by which, as by a vivifying power, we are united, and our partitive othernesses being supermundanely complicated, we are gathered into the deiform Monad." And further, in 5, he says that being-itself-by-itself is the principle of existing things, and all existences, and whatever in any way is contained by being — and this immeasurably, and convolutedly, and unitedly. "For in the *monas* every number pre-subsis, and the *Monas* has every number in itself singularly; and every number is united in the *Monas*, but as much as it proceeds from the *Monas*, so much is it discerned and multiplied. And in the center, all the lines of the circle stand constituted according to the first unity, and the sign in itself has all uniformly united to itself and to the one principle from which they proceeded; and in the center itself they are universally united, but a little distant from it, they are a little discerned; receding more, more; and simply, the closer they are to the center, the more they themselves and to one another are united; and the more from it, so much they are distant from one another. And in the whole nature of all things, all the natures of singulars are convoluted, by one unconfused unity."

And further below, last chapter, treating of the One — namely, how the One belongs to God — he writes thus: "*One*, however, because He is universally all, by the excellence of one unity, and is irreversibly causal of all of one. For there is no existing thing not participating in one. But just as every number similar participates in *monas* and in one, and is called *two* and *ten*, and *half*, and *one*, and *third*, and *tenth*: one and multitude is terminated. Thus all things, and all of one, participate, and being one, all things are existences; and the cause of all is not one of many *one*, but before every one. For there is no multitude not participating in something of the one; and nothing of existing things which participates in or is something of the one downward — all singularly all things, and the whole all things, and opposites, and universally comprehending; and indeed without one there will not be multitude, but without multitude there will be one — as *monas* is before every multiplied number — and if anyone shall posit all things united to all, all things will be wholly one. But thus and this is to be known, because according to one of each thing, the species is preconceived; the united things are said to unite, and there is one exemplar of all; and if you should remove the one, there will be neither universe nor anything else of existing things. For all things in itself the One uniformly preambles and circumcomprehends." Theology itself, then, [praises] the whole Thearchy.

Boethius too, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 11, proves through individual genera of beings, inductively, that all things desire unity. He says, then, concluding: "All things, therefore, desire unity. But unity itself, we have shown, is what is good. All things, then, seek good — which indeed you may so describe: that which is desired by all. For either all things are referred to nothing, and as if destitute of one summit, will float without a ruler; or, if there is anything to which the universe hastens, it will be the highest of all goods."

And as many multitudes are thus united, so many such unities of multitudes, unitively and virtually, are in God — out of which indeed the exemplary and archetypal number is, in this most simple unity, in a wonderful manner gathered, by which He forms, numbers, and disposes the rest of the numbered. And this is that intelligible and archetypal world of Hermes and Plato, of which the 40th part of the first corollary touches.

Hence Boethius, *Arithmetic* I.1: "Whatever things have been constructed by the primeval nature of things, are seen to have been formed according to the reason of numbers. For this was the chief exemplar in the mind of the founder. Hence the multitude of the four elements is borrowed; hence the changes of times; hence the motions of the stars and the conversion of the heaven." And above, in the same prologue 2, he holds this same most fully. This luminous saying of Boethius, however, seems to be taken from the obscure words of the first part of Plato's *Timaeus*, ch. 1, which Chalcidius in his commentary I, *On the Generation of the World*, entitles. Hence Eustratius, on *Ethics* I.6, comm. 48, says that the universal exemplars and ideas with Plato are indeed the divine number, by which, as by an exemplar, the founder works the material making; and this view of Plato against Aristotle he approves and defends. Nay, perhaps Plato in this view Aristotle did not wish to reprove. Therefore Eustratius says: "Aristotle perhaps did not wish to oppose Plato, but those who receive his sayings according to what is not fitting."

In agreement, the Wise One says, addressing God: "*Thou hast disposed all things in measure, number, and weight*" (Wisdom 11). Which number, it is established, is not any creature, but that "manifold, unique, and subtle Spirit of Wisdom" (Wisdom 7) — nay, even Wisdom itself, in which all things were made (Psalm 103). Hence Augustine, *On Free Will* II.19: "Far be it that wisdom be found inferior in comparison to number, since the same it is." And *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV.5, expounding the authority of the Wise One adduced, he says thus: "According to that by which measure prefigures to every thing its mode, and number bestows on every thing its species, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability — He primarily and truly and uniquely is who terminates, forms, and orders all." And further, in the same place 6: "Number without number, by which all things are formed, but is itself not formed."

Now of this kind, the unities of number are the proper reasons in the divine mind — creators, nurses, and continuous preservers of all things. And these perhaps are the universals which very many of the ancients dreamed about, but very few saw. Wherefore Porphyry, in his Prologue to the *Isagoge*, as if it were the highest, convolutes this view but does not unfold it; which view, however, is plain from what has gone before evidently. Hence Eustratius, where above, says that

universal exemplars or ideas are the founding reasons, and as it were the markings of the Maker. Robert Lincolniensis too, on *Posterior Analytics* I.7, says that universals are the cognitions of things to be created, which were eternally in the first cause; and they are their reasons and formal and exemplary causes; and they themselves are also creative; and these are what Plato called *ideas*, and the *archetypal world*; and these, according to him, are the genera and species and principles both of being and of knowing. The same Augustine also holds, in *Eighty-three Questions* 46, in his epistle to Nebridius, manifestly.

Item: if universals be posited in the intellect — as Averroes, Boethius, and many others seem to hold — in what intellect more worthily would they be posited than in the first, supreme, and most worthy intellect of all, who most truly understands the universe, who, while others sleep, watches eternally?

Furthermore, it is certainly established that there are some preserving causes of beings, and preservers of existing things, in which (as the second supposition teaches) the process is not allowed to be infinite. Of all those causes, then, there is some first and supreme; this, it is established, must necessarily be God, who (as the first supposition and the fifth part of the first corollary attest) is conserved by no other. God, then, is the first and supreme conservator of all. Either, then, this is by itself or by accident. If by itself, then necessarily; for *by itself* includes necessity. For if it were not necessarily, it could not be, and so it would be by accident — which is plain from the logical definition of accident, sufficiently known from the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and *Topics* I of Aristotle. This is also sufficiently plain from *Posterior Analytics* I.4 and 6, and II.4, where *by itself* with its conditions is defined.

But if this is said to be by accident — every per accidens is posterior to that which is by itself; and therefore *that God is the conservator of all* is reduced to it — then *that God is the conservator of all* is reduced to something prior to Him, by whose virtue He does this. Therefore, not God, but rather that prior thing, would be the first conservator of all.

That every per accidens is reduced to something per se prior, appears: for as substance naturally precedes every accident, and to it any accident is reduced as to a prior cause, so by similar argument or by proportionality, the essential seems to precede every accidental, and every of these is reduced to that.

Item, every caused thing, as it has a determined mode of being, so it seems to have a determined cause of becoming and of being; for otherwise it would no more become or be this rather than that. But the accidental is altogether infinite and indeterminate, as is plain from *Physics* II, ch. *On Chance and Fortune*, almost throughout; and *Metaphysics* VI.4, and afterward at length, where Averroes says, comm. 7: "What comes to be by chance has, from the principle, a terminated nature and a terminated cause; for what is by accident, accidentally happens to that which is by essence."

This is likewise confirmed: something is per se conservative of beings, conserving itself; and that which is by accident is not the principle of that which is per se, but rather the contrary. For what is from that which is by accident is simply by accident — as what is from something by chance is simply by chance. This appears from the Philosopher, *Physics* II.44, refuting those who hold chance to be the cause of the heavens and of all celestial things, by this: that then all inferior things would be by chance. For Averroes says: "Since they posited that chance and fortune was the cause of the renewal of the celestial body, and of the motion which gives to other beings their order, it happens for them that all causes be found by chance; for what is found in that which is found by chance, is found by chance." Otherwise, also, there could be science of beings per accidens; for of all things ordered per se, there can be science. Which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* II, ch. *On Chance and Fortune*, at length proving that such things are not knowable, nor certain, because they are accidental causes, and consequently infinite. And in *Metaphysics* VI.4: "Of being according to accident, there is no speculation; for no science, neither active nor productive, is studious of it; nor theological" — which the whole following process teaches. And in *Posterior Analytics* I.6 the same is shown manifestly.

Furthermore, what is more perfect is to be attributed to God, as appears from the first supposition and the third part of the first [corollary]. But to be per se is more perfect than to be by accident, as no one is ignorant; nor otherwise would God be by Himself good and powerful. God, then, by Himself, not by accident, is the first conserver of all.

Item, in the whole genus of conservers, some one is conserver per se and naturally first; and that which is per se and naturally first in any genus is greater, more worthy, and better than any posterior. For the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* II.10: "Always the prior is more; and that which is posterior, is not." Where the text which Averroes has speaks thus: "The prior is always more worthy in being; the posterior, however, is not so." Who also, *Metaphysics* XII.37: "The best is always — the proportional to the first; wherefore the Pythagoreans posited the first in the elementation of good, and the last in the elementation of evil" — as the demonstration of the eighteenth part of the first corollary touches. Again, to the same point: in any genus the first is most highly such, as is sufficiently plain from *Metaphysics* II and X — as that which is equal by itself is more such than that which is such by accident. As is manifestly plain from the Philosopher, *Topics* III; nor does anyone deny it.

Furthermore, if this is by accident, it can not-be; for everything that inheres in something not per se and essentially, but only accidentally, can be separated from it (separately); for this includes no contradiction. And because anything of beings sufficiently exists when it has all and only those things which are required for its existing per se and essentially — since then nothing is lacking to its existence. This is also plain from the proper definition of accident; and *Posterior Analytics* I.6 is written thus: "Everything, however, is either thus per se in the first or second mode, or by accident; but accidents are not necessary." And it is confirmed by the Philosopher, *Physics* VIII.36, proving that not every mover is moved, because not per se nor by accident: not by accident, because, he says, "if according to accident, it is not necessary that what is moved be

moved. But if this is manifest, that sometimes it happens that nothing of those things which are moved — for the accidental is not necessary, but it happens that it not be" — which is plain there from Averroes more expressly in the comment.

If anyone, however, fears not to concede that, with things existing, God can not be their conserver, he is easily refuted. For the antecedent and the consequents are necessary in the argument by which, through the finiteness of things and their conservation, it is proved that some one — who is God — is the first conserver of all; wherefore the conclusion is established by like necessity.

Item, if things could exist by themselves without divine conservation, they would be conserved by God in vain, according to that maxim of the Philosophers: "More are vainly posited where fewer suffice"; but, according to the Philosopher, *On the Heavens* I.32: "God and Nature do nothing in vain." As also the Apostle argues, *Galatians* 2: "*If by the law*," he says, "*justice, then Christ died gratis*"; where the Gloss of Augustine: "*If by the law*, that is, by the works of the law, in which the Jews trusted, justice is — then Christ died *gratis*, that is, in vain, without cause." Therefore God is the necessary conserver of all beings.

Of this view a witness also is Thomas Aquinas, who in his *Questions on the Power of God*, q. 35, manifoldly shows this; and in q. 36 he asks whether God could communicate to any creature that, by itself, it should be conserved in being without God; and he answers under the words which follow:

"It must be said that it does not pertain to the omnipotence of God that He could make two contradictories be at the same time. But in this — that it is said *that God should make something which does not need His conservation* — a contradiction is implied. For it has now been shown that every effect depends on its cause, in that it is its cause. In this, therefore, when it is said *that it does not need God's conservation*, it is posited as not caused by God; and in this, when it is said *that God should make it*, it is posited as caused. Just as, then, it would imply contradiction if anyone should say *God makes something which is not caused by Him* — so if anyone should say *God makes something which does not need His conservation*. Hence both, by like reason, God cannot."

COROLLARY

From all these things, then, the principal conclusion is manifest. Whence, not unmanifestly, this *porisma* follows: **No created thing suffices to conserve another; and it is necessary that God by Himself and immediately preserve every creature; nay, more immediately than any created cause — immediately, I say, not only by immediacy of place or position, but of nature and cause, and more immediately by the same modes, or at least by the two last said modes.**

1. That no created thing suffices to conserve another.

For if, as the principal conclusion says, God is the necessary conserver of all beings, every created thing necessarily needs divine conservation; therefore no such thing suffices to conserve another.

2. The second is, that it is necessary that God by Himself and immediately preserve every creature.

That God also by Himself and immediately conserves every creature, the foregoing reasonings will evidently show, if they be duly applied to this. For everything potential of itself, if it must be actuated, this will necessarily be by some act, not immediately exteriorly, but actuating and forming altogether interiorly, and diffused through the whole — as appears of matter and form, of accident and subject. That act, then, thus actuating a potential of this kind, either is an act per se pure, actuated by no other at all — and then it is God, and we have what we intend; or it is not an act of this kind, and then that act is of itself potential, necessarily needing another act actuating it immediately. And since, on account of the second supposition, it is not allowed thus to proceed to infinity, finally there will necessarily come to one act per se pure, actuated by no other at all, which actuates and informs every potential of itself posited under act, by itself and immediately — not only by exterior surrounding, but by interior totally penetrating. And anything short of God is potential of itself; God alone is act per se and pure, as the things premised attest.

Item: everything fluxible and formless of itself, in order that it be fixed stably and formed, necessarily needs some fixation and form fixing and forming it immediately. Such a fixation or form, then, either is per se fixed or fixation, formed or form — and then it is God, and we have what we intend; or it is not such, and then necessarily it is immediately fixed and formed by some fixation and form. And since the second supposition does not allow such an infinite process, necessarily one will finally stop at one fixation and form per se and pure, fixed and formed by no other in any way — and this is the disposition of all creatures and of God.

These reasons sufficiently agree with the philosophical and theological authorities recited above.

Item: if it sufficed to any creature to be conserved by God only mediately — namely, only by means of another creature — since that conserving creature would only influence a finite virtue into the conserved creature, God could create some creature of permanence so much more powerful than the creature conserved through another, by however much of virtue that conserving one influences into the conserved. Which, if it be posited as created, will not need the conservation of any creature; for it is of permanence so much more powerful from itself, by however much, if it were weaker, it would need to be strengthened by another creature. Nor will it need the mediate conservation of God, because that would be done through a mediating creature; therefore it would need the conservation of the mediating creature — against the proximate point shown. Nor will it need the immediate conservation of God, because the weaker

creature did not need this either. There would be, therefore, some creature not needing any conservation of the Creator — which the premised conclusion does not permit.

Nay, according to this, God could only strengthen the things of the world, and create this whole world, or another world, both as a whole and according to its single parts, so strong that in no way — neither mediately, nor as a whole, nor in part — would it need divine conservation. Nay, even with God altogether removed by imagination, it would remain sound and entire — which the premises destroy evidently.

Item: as God is everywhere, so He conserves everywhere; but God is per se and essentially everywhere. For if not, either He is nowhere — which no one not denies; or He is somewhere circumscribed — which contradicts His infinity and immensity in every way, which the first supposition teaches, as also certain authorities premised attest. For the first supposition, the third part, and the fourth of the first corollary of this work teach that whatever is of most perfect and most infinite goodness or perfection is in God; but it is of great perfection to be able to be in many places presentially whole at once. Wherefore spirits, who can do this, are judged more perfect than bodies, which cannot. The supreme Spirit, therefore, on account of His infinite simple perfection, is necessarily of replenishing power and presence simply infinite and immense; wherefore He is necessarily presentially present to all places and positions located and placed, essentially filling all things — great above all their measure, and immense — that, just as He is truly called Omnipotent, so He may truly be called Omnipresent. And this, I think, is the reason of holy Scripture and of the Doctors, by which they show the immensity of God. Hence, that I may commemorate one of many: Baruch 3 says: "*O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how vast is the place of His possession; great, and having no end; lofty and immense.*"

If God were anywhere circumscribed, this would most appear in Heaven, since it is the most worthy of places — and further, in the most worthy part of Heaven, or at the most worthy point of Heaven; and then, with Heaven moved, He would likewise be moved — against the sixth part of the first corollary of this work. Otherwise He would sometimes leave a worthier part or point of Heaven, and enter a less worthy. But if it be said, according to the surface of *On the Heavens* II of Aristotle, that God is continually in one most noble position — namely, in the East, in the section of two great circles — this cannot stand, because: why would He be in the East of Oxford rather than in the East of London, or of Cadiz of Hercules, or vice versa? And if it be said that He is continually in the East of the whole habitable earth, in some section of the Amphitrite or Ocean — since, according to the natural disposition of heaven and earth, and according to the same Aristotle, *Meteorology* II — where now there is sea, there will be at some time dry land, and vice versa — there will be some other East of the whole habitable earth which then will be; and then either God will be only in that, and it follows that He is locally moved from one East to another East; or then He will not be in the said East — therefore, by the same reason, neither now is He.

Also, if God be put only in the East, He will not be in the most worthy place, since the middle of the heaven, and the center of the Sun, of Saturn, or of Jupiter, is a more worthy place or position. Item: if God were only in one particular place or position, He could leave that and enter another, and be moved locally.

By this also — that God everywhere acts and conserves — the authors prove that He is everywhere in three ways: namely, essentially, presentially, and potentially, as is plain from *Sentences* I of Peter, dist. 37 — which, however, by no means would follow, unless God immediately made and preserved all things. Hence Anselm, *Monologion* 13, speaks thus: "Since otherwise it cannot be that those things which have been made are vigorous, unless that also from which they have been made is vigorous by itself, it is necessary that, just as nothing has been made except through the present creative Essence, so nothing is vigorous except through the conserving presence of the same." And he adds, in 14, consequently: "If this is so — nay, since by necessity it is so — it follows that wherever it is not, nothing is. It is therefore everywhere, and through all, and in all. It is plain, therefore, that itself is what bears all and surpasses all, encloses and penetrates; and the same is what is in all, and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which all things" — as had been more fully alleged above, and was set forth in the seventh chapter of the same work.

"There is no need to ask whether the universe therefore exists through that supreme substance, because, with another making, or with another matter existing, it has only in some manner aided as much as possible that all things should be — since it is repugnant to those things which now appear, if in the second place, and not principally, all whatsoever exists is through it." Augustine too, *On the Divine Essence of God's Divinity* I, having shown by Scripture that God is uncircumscribed, immutable, and immense, subjoins: "Without doubt no place is absent from His presence; above every creature He presides, ruling; below, sustaining all things — not by the weight of labor, but by indefatigable power; for no creature founded by Him is able to subsist of itself, unless it be sustained by Him who created it. He is outside all things, but not excluded; within all, but not enclosed."

Lo, the causal argument of Augustine, proving God to be everywhere — because, he says, no creature can subsist unless it be sustained by Him — who also in Epistle 39, which is *On the Presence of God to Dardanus*, makes a diffuse process to the same end, where among other things he says thus: "Thus is God diffused through all, that He is not as a quality of the World, but as the substance creating the World, ruling without labor, and containing the World without burden." And in *On Genesis according to the Letter* VI.33 he shows that God is immutable through time and place, although He administers and moves mobiles through time and place, since, he says, "He Himself, by no place, by no interval or space, by an unchangeable and excelling power, is both interior to every thing — because in Him are all things — and exterior to every thing, because He is above all things." Which reasoning, however, would not avail unless God by Himself and immediately administers and moves the universe. For if God by Himself is exterior and interior to every thing whatever, and so moves things moved, it is

manifest that, when He moves anything locally, it does not follow that He Himself is locally moved with it, because He is in every place present.

Nor can anyone say that for this reason it is said only improperly that God is everywhere essentially, presentially, and potentially — because every essence existing in any place, and universally every place, has being from Him; and because all things located, and the places themselves, are present to Him — namely, to His knowledge — and subject to His power — since this fiction is destroyed by the prior arguments, and condemned in *Sentences* I of Lombard, dist. 37.

Item, if God preserves something — say, the earth — only mediately, since He immediately conserves some creature, and by the same reasoning, if He willed, He could immediately preserve the earth, then in its most natural place He could be moved locally to the earth so to be preserved — which is repugnant to what was premised. Item, if God only mediately conserved some things, this would most seem of these inferior things — that He should preserve them by means of the celestial body. But the rational soul is of itself of as much permanence and greater than the celestial body; therefore by no means is it naturally conserved by it. For natural order requires that the weaker be conserved by the stronger.

The same the authorities also show. For the Philosopher says in *On the World* 8: "The whole earth and sea, and ether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole Heaven, was adorned by one virtue passing through all." Ammonius the Armenian also, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*, on the last part of book I, says: "It was more probable that eternal things should not be ruled by providence than those which have a fluxible nature; for the former indeed have determination from their own nature, and immutability of such an existence allotted to them by the gods. But those which are in generation, on account of the fluxibility of their proper matter, born to come about in every change — neither to be, nor to be contained, nor to be ordered — could not be, unless they were allotted much constituting and providential power of those things which always behave in the same way: not only the more total and supereminent, namely, the celestial body, but also some more particular and proximate. Just as, of men, women seem to need fuller care than men, and the senseless than the wise."

And Avicenna, in *Fount of Life* V.35, as was alleged above, showing that all diverse, contrary, superior and inferior things are conjoined by unity, says thus: "And the common root in this is in this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all and is the retainer of all." And further, in 36, he says: "The Word, namely, the will, after it had created matter and form, bound itself with them as is the binding of the soul with the body, and poured itself into them, and did not depart from them, and penetrates them from highest to lowest." And further, in 38, he says thus: "To describe will is impossible; but it is almost described when it is said that it is the divine virtue making matter and form, and binding them, and diffused from the highest to the lowest, like the diffusion of the soul in the body. And it itself is moving and disposing all things." Which he also manifests by example, saying thus: "Matter and form is as body and air; and the soul and

will binding them and infused in them is as the soul in the body, light in air, and intelligence in the soul." And the mode of such infusion he shows thus: "Since the will is a spiritual virtue — but much more excellent than spiritual — doubt not that it is infused into matter and embraces it together with the form, like the penetration of the virtue of the sun (that is, the virtue diffusing light) and its union with light in air. The will, then, will be as virtue, and form as light, and matter as air." And in 39 he says: "The will penetrates all things without motion, and acts all things without time, on account of its great fortitude and unity."

To which the sacred authorities agree. For Wisdom 1: "*The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the orb of lands; and that which contains all things*"; and further, in 8, it is read of uncreated wisdom that "*it reacheth from end to end mightily, and disposeth all things sweetly*." Of which Ecclesiasticus 1 says that "the most high Creator poured it out upon all His works"; and Isaiah 66: "*Heaven is My throne, and earth My footstool*." Of whom Jeremiah 23 says more expressly: "*Do I not fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord?*" Hence the Prophet, Psalm 138: "*Whither shall I go from Thy spirit, and whither shall I flee from Thy face? If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there; if I descend into hell, Thou art present. If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea — even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me*." Blessed Job, also, in 11 says: "*He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? Deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea*." And in 22 he recites the false madness of heretics in these words: "*The clouds are His covert, and He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven*."

Whereon blessed Gregory, *Moralia* XVI.4, says: "Who, even among the foolish, would suppose this concerning God, who, while He is always omnipotent, so attends to all things that He is present to each, so is present to each that at the same time He is never absent from all? Thus, then, He surrounds exterior things, that He fills interior things; thus He fills interior things, that He surrounds exterior; thus He rules the highest, that He does not desert the lowest; thus He is present to the lowest, that He does not recede from the higher."

Holy Thomas, also, in *On the Christian Religion* to Reginald, or *On Faith, Hope, and Charity* 133, says that God immediately ordains all effects through Himself, although He executes them through middle causes; but in the very execution He has Himself in some manner immediately to all effects, inasmuch as all middle causes act in the virtue of the first cause, so that in some manner He Himself seems to act in all, and all the works of secondary causes can be attributed to Him — as the work of the instrument is attributed to the artificer. For it is more fittingly said that *the smith makes the knife* than that *the hammer does*. He has Himself also immediately to all effects, inasmuch as He Himself is per se the cause of being, and all things are preserved in being by Him.

The same too, in his *Questions on the Power of God*, q. 20, where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, in answering proves that God is the cause of every natural and voluntary action in six modes:

First, because He bestows the virtue of acting — as it is said in *Physics* VIII, that the generator moves the heavy and the light inasmuch as it gives the virtue by which such motion follows.

Secondly, because He continually conserves it.

Thirdly, because He moves any agent to acting, and applies the virtue to the action — as a man is the cause of the cutting of the knife. And this is, as he says, because no thing moves by itself, except a mover not moved. Therefore it follows of necessity that God is the cause of the action of any natural thing, as moving and applying virtue to acting.

Fourthly, because He is the principal agent in any action, and any other agent is His instrument, since by His virtue every other virtue acts. And a little after he subjoins: "Thus, then, God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as He gives the virtue of acting, and inasmuch as He preserves it, and inasmuch as He applies action, and inasmuch as by His virtue every other virtue acts. And when we have joined to these that God is His own virtue, and that He is within any thing — not as a part of essence, but as holding the thing in being — it will follow that He immediately operates in any operating thing, with the operation of will and nature not excluded." Hence can be elicited a fifth mode, namely, that God immediately operates everywhere.

Which is also most clearly plain through Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning a certain article under this form: "*That the first cause is the most distant cause of beings* — error, if it be understood with precision, namely, that He is not also most proximate."

3. The third part: that it is necessary that God preserve every creature more immediately than any created cause.

God, then, immediately conserves every thing — and not only immediately, but truly more immediately than any other conserving thing. For if He did not conserve more immediately, since He conserves immediately, then either He conserves equally immediately as the secondary cause conserving, or less immediately than it.

Not equally immediately, because God and the secondary conserving cause are essentially ordered conservative causes of the same thing; and no such causes — and most of all in the same genus of cause — have the same order to their caused; but it is necessary that one be prior, the other posterior in that mode of causing — as reason and philosophy attest. For otherwise, by the same reasoning by which there could be two proximate causes of the same caused thing, equal in order, there could also be two other higher equally co-equal, and so successively. Wherefore there could be two first causes simply, in the same order of causing altogether co-equal; and two first principles simply, and two Gods — although yet all many things in any way ordered to some one are necessarily reduced — as has been manifested in book I, and in book II, where premised.

The Philosopher also teaches in his *Metaphysics* that of any two such causes attributed to the same, one is reduced to the other, or both to a third. Since, then, God and the secondary cause are co-equal causes in the order of conserving, neither is reduced to the other as the proximate to the conserved more remote one; therefore both are reduced to some third prior to both, by whose virtue both conserve — which is impossible of God, as the preceding things have taught, and the suppositions show. But if it be feigned that God and the secondary cause be conservative causes of the same thing accidentally ordered, then much more either one is reduced to the other, or both to a third essential prior — as has been shown above.

Item, every name belonging to God and to a creature more perfectly belongs to God Himself, especially since He Himself is the first in such a genus; and that is the cause why that name is said of all others whatsoever, according to the procedure of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* II and X, alleged above. Therefore the name *immediately conserving* most and most perfectly belongs to God Himself. Wherefore God conserves more immediately than any other conserving thing. Therefore not equally immediately, nor less.

Furthermore, if God conserved less immediately, and consequently so caused the conserved and the caused thing of the secondary cause than it itself does, He would not be the most proximate cause of beings — which is condemned in the Parisian article premised: most proximate, namely, by proximity of causality and nature, not only of position or place. Then, also, God would be more distant in the conservation and causation than the secondary cause; therefore through more means, or at least through some mean, while the secondary cause through none. Therefore God would by no means immediately preserve, nor cause that, the opposite of which has been shown.

Item, every secondary cause, causing or conserving any caused thing, does this through the mediating causation or conservation between them — which therefore is naturally more proximate to the caused or conserved than that secondary cause. But God conserves through Himself and immediately every causation or conservation of this kind, as the proximate part of this corollary teaches; and He couples and conjoins this with the caused or conserved, as the things premised manifest. Therefore between the secondary cause and every caused thing of it, God naturally mediates, by causing it more immediately.

Item, the more essential and more necessary cause in the being of the caused is naturally more proximate to it. But God is a more essential and more necessary cause in the causation of any caused thing than any secondary cause. For there cannot be an equally or less essential cause of any caused thing as or than the secondary cause, as the premised process of *equally immediately* or *less* shows.

Furthermore, that which by itself and by its proper virtue is anything is more essentially and more such than anything which by another and by another's virtue is such — as both logic and philosophy teach in various places, and as was touched above. The first cause causes the common caused by its proper virtue and through itself; the secondary cause, however, by the virtue of the first cause and through it. Therefore the first cause more essentially and more so.

Wherefore the first cause is more proximate, more conjoined, and more intimate to the caused than its matter or form, or any secondary cause. Therefore it is more proximate, more conjoined, more intimate, and more immediate to any created thing than any created thing could be to another. Wherefore also, in any causation of any created or secondary cause, of any caused thing in any way causing, the first cause more proximately, more conjointly, more intimately, and more immediately causes the same.

Hence the Commentator, on this first proposition of the *Liber de Causis* — "Every primary cause is more influential upon its caused than the secondary universal cause" — speaks thus: "The universal first cause acts upon the caused of its cause before the universal secondary cause, which follows it, acts upon it." And further: "It is manifest that the first long-distant cause is more comprehending and more vehemently the cause of the thing than the proximate one; and on this account its operation comes to be of more vehement adherence than that of the proximate cause. And this indeed is not so, except because the thing first does not suffer except from the long-distant virtue; then it suffers secondly from the virtue which is under the first; and the first aids the second over its operation, since every operation which the second cause effects, the first effects there — yet effects it in another higher and more sublime manner. And when the secondary cause is removed from its caused, the first cause is not removed from it; for the first cause is of greater and more vehement adherence with the thing than the proximate cause."

Item, holy Thomas in his *Questions on the Power of God*, q. 20, where it is asked whether God operates in every operation of nature, in answering, among other things, says thus: "God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as any agent is the instrument of the divine virtue operating. Thus, therefore, if we consider supposita acting, any particular agent is immediate to its effect; but if we consider the virtue by which the action is done, thus the virtue of the higher cause will be more immediate to the effect than the virtue of the lower. For the lower virtue is not joined to the effect except by the virtue of the higher cause. Hence it is said in the *Liber de Causis* that the virtue of the first cause acts before upon the caused, and enters more vehemently into it. Thus, therefore, the divine virtue must be present to any acting thing, just as the virtue of the celestial body must be present to any acting elemental body. But in this they differ, that wherever the divine virtue is, there is the divine essence; the essence of the celestial body, however, is not wherever its virtue is. And again, God is His virtue, but the celestial body is not. And therefore it can be said that God in any thing operates, inasmuch as any thing needs His virtue for acting. It cannot, however, properly be said that the heaven always acts in the elemental body, although by its virtue the elemental body acts."

Hence, beyond the five modes of divine operation premised, a sixth mode can be elicited: namely, that God, in any operation, more immediately operates than any other operating thing.

Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the World*, last chapter, speaking of God, speaks thus: "Since He is one many-named, named from all the passions which He Himself newly produces — we call Him Jupiter; He is also called *fulminous* from the lightning, *pluvial* from the rain, *thunderous*,

tempestuous, serene" — and it follows consequently — "and to speak summarily, He is to be called celestial and terrestrial, by every nature and fortune, as Himself the cause of all things. On account of which, it is not badly said in the *Orphica*: *Jupiter is the firstborn; Jupiter is the last; Jupiter is the head; Jupiter is the middle.*"

Lo, how the Philosopher first teaches that God is generally the cause of all things; secondly he shows that He is specially the threefold cause of any whatsoever — namely, the first, the last or final, and the middle. *Jupiter is the firstborn and head*, for the first cause; *Jupiter is the last*, for the last or final cause; *Jupiter is the middle*, for the middle cause of any whatsoever. Therefore he expressly subjoins: "God therefore, as ancient speech testifies, has the beginning, the middle, and the end of all beings." God, therefore, according to the Philosopher, in any way of causing any caused thing of any secondary cause, is in causing prior, posterior, and more immediate in every way.

Hence Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 5, says that He is "the substantifying principle, mean, and consummation of all existing things." Which also the authorities premised, saying that God is more interior to every thing, seem to sound. Nor am I ignorant of the responses of certain ones who feign — or who can feign — that the authors do not therefore say that God conserves all things, because immediately by Himself and properly preserves them, but only by means of Heaven, or some other thing, and through it; or because He prohibits corruptive things; or because He permits the thing to be, or does not destroy the thing when He could. But all these false madneses, which vanity has feigned, the truth of the foregoing will easily shatter.

Some, however, object: It does not seem consonant with reason that any created thing — finite, small, and so tiny — should need so great a form and so great a conserver, simply infinite. Others object differently: If God is omnipotent, He can make something able to exist sufficiently by itself. Furthermore, perhaps someone will object: It does not befit God most worthy, most beautiful, most honest, by Himself and immediately to be mingled with whatever obscenities, just as not to do whatever filthy works, or to exercise whatever vile businesses. Nay, to a majesty so sublime, it would more be fitting in some most worthy place — say, in the highest summit of the heaven — to reside, exercising some most noble operation proper to Himself, with all other works whatsoever, and other secondary causes, gradually assigned to Him as subject ministers.

Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the World* 11, says thus: "It is rather to be considered, and what is fitting and more apt to God, that the virtue residing in the heaven and in things very distant — speaking of one — should be a saving cause to all, rather than that — going forth and arriving where it is neither good nor honest — He should operate per se on earth. For not even to leaders of men is it fitting to insist on every work — as to a prince of an army or city or house — and, if there is need, to mend furniture, or do something more vile, which in a great king no servant whatever would do." Which he proves by similitude through King Xerxes, who dwelt in Susa or

Bastana, who did many things in many provinces, yet not by himself, but through various officers deputed to various tasks.

To the first of these, however, it must be perspicuously responded: because every creature is created, finite, small, and so tiny, therefore by the seventeenth part of the first corollary of this work, it is of itself capable of being and not-being. Wherefore, according to the premises, it necessarily needs something *necessarily existing of itself* continually sustaining it — therefore God, by the testimony of the same seventeenth part.

The second is easily resolved: because, although God is omnipotent, yet He cannot do something simply absolutely impossible. Wherefore He cannot make another God, nor another *necessarily existing*, but only a *possibly existing*, by the said seventeenth part, etc., as above. This response is confirmed by Thomas mentioned above.

The third objection Peter, *Sentences* I, dist. 37, says is so frivolous as not even to be worthy of a response — which yet he resolves by two examples. Of which the first is: that just as a created spirit, namely, the rational soul, by the squalors of a leprous body and however much polluted, is by no means polluted, so neither is God. The second is: that just as a solar ray, diffused through whatever pollution, is by no means polluted, so neither is God. Augustine too, in *On the Christian Combat*, by the same example, in the same way responds. Hence Wisdom 7 it is said of uncreated Wisdom: "*She reacheth therefore everywhere by reason of her purity. For she is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the brightness of Almighty God; and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her. For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness.*" For this is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the disposition of stars; compared to the light, she is found prior — or, alternatively, purer."

This response can be confirmed thus: it is more perfect, to all that is corrupting, to be able to resist, lest it suffer any corruption from it, and consequently, not to be able to be polluted at all, than to be able to be so. The first supposition, then, gives this to God. Otherwise, however, no less reasonably, it can be said: that just as any thing, inasmuch as it is, is good (as all philosophers and theologians together teach), so also every thing, inasmuch as it is, is beautiful. For the beauty of a thing is its natural disposition. Whence the Philosopher, *Physics* VII.17, in the translation which the Commentator expounds, speaks thus: "Beauty and strength are of the head of relation; for they are dispositions of animals in respect of the most noble of animals; and I say the most praiseworthy disposition is that which is the natural sphere." Whereon Averroes says that beauty and strength are praiseworthy dispositions in animals, which are not understood except in respect of the most praiseworthy disposition, as in respect of the most noble animal. For the most praiseworthy disposition of an animal is that, in all its dispositions, it should be according to the course of nature; and beauty in some animal is the disposition in its creation considered according to its disposition, which it has in comparison with the most noble of

animals in that species; and it is that which, in all its dispositions, is according to the course of nature.

Which Avicenna also attests, *Metaphysics* VIII.7, under these words: "The beauty of every thing, and its honor, is that it should be as it befits it." Hence Plato, *Timaeus* I, where, according to Chalcidius in his *Commentary*, he treats of the generation of the world, says thus: "Nor was it lawful for the supreme goodness to make anything except the beautiful." And according to him, the supreme goodness of God made all things; therefore, according to him, all things had been beautiful. By like reasoning, all things which are, inasmuch as they are, are beautiful.

Wherefore Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good* 13, speaking of the various modes of things, speaks thus: "In all these things, whatsoever are small in comparison with greater, are called by contrary names; just as in the form of man, by which beauty is greater, in his comparison the beauty of an ape is called deformity; and it deceives the imprudent, as if this were good and that evil." And further, in 15, he proves that ugliness is not altogether evil, but good — and this specially of the ape, because it itself can become uglier; therefore in it the good of beauty can be diminished; wherefore it has the good of beauty.

What, then, is unbecoming that the beautiful be mingled with the beautiful? and the more beautiful with the less beautiful — that thus the more beautiful may appear, and by its undeformable beauty illumine and adorn it? Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the World* 10, says: "The whole earth and sea, and ether, and the Sun and Moon, was adorned by one virtue passing through all." Hence Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 4: "The good and the beautiful is not to be separated in itself, in the cause comprehending all in one. For dividing this in all existing things into participations and participating things, we say *good* indeed to be participant of the *beautiful*; *beautiful*, however, the participation of the cause beautifying all goods. The super-essential good, however, is called *beautiful*, on account of the beauty given by it to all existing things, properly to each one, and as it were the causal of the good compaction and clarity of all — as light flashing at once on all the beautifying traditions of its fontal ray, and as it were calling all things to itself."

Nay, not only is it fitting that God be everywhere present, but it would be most unfitting and most impossible to Him, with places and located things existing, not so to be — because then God would not be, as is demonstrated in the showing of the second part of the premised corollary. Whereas the Philosopher says God does not operate per se on earth — it is true: not so per se as that He does not [operate] through a secondary cause, and through another inferior agent, as per se, and through none of those does He operate His own proper operation.

This matter I pursued a little more diffusely on account of its great beauty, and because it seems no small foundation for what follows.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapter III

**THAT GOD IS THE NECESSARY EFFICIENT CAUSE OF EVERY THING MADE:
WITH A COROLLARY HAVING THREE PARTS.**

To this, however, must be added: that God is the necessary efficient cause of every thing made. For it seems less for a thing to exist by itself, or to conserve another, than to make something by itself when it was not. But no creature has the power to do less in this respect, as the proximate chapter has taught; wherefore neither the greater. God therefore necessarily lays His hand to every making.

The reasonings made concerning conservation can be made concerning making, the terms being changed; and many of the authorities which speak of conservation speak likewise of making. There are also, besides the authorities alleged above, many which give witness to the truth.

Aristotle, in *On the World* 11: "Ancient," he says, "and paternal is the saying among all men: that all things are from God, and through God they consist." And further: "God is truly the savior and progenitor of all things which in any manner come to be in this world." And it follows, in another translation: "Yet He works through Himself, sustaining the labor of a laboring animal, but using also a power impassible." And further, in the same place, he shows that God by a single action does all the works of this world, saying thus: "As, in a chorus when the choragus begins, the whole chorus of men and women sings together with various voices, sharp and graded, continuing one continuous harmony, so it is also with God, who disposes all things." And it follows consequently: "It seems most to be compared with what is done in things which happen in time of war, when the trumpet signals to the army. For then each one, hearing the clangor — this one indeed takes up his shield, another fits his hip-armor and helmet, and adjusts his belt; this one bridles his horse, that one mounts his chariot, another gives the signal; presently the leader stands in ambush, the prince of the line in the line, the soldier on the wing, but the unarmed runs back to his own. All things are moved under one signaler, by the nod of the Leader who exercises authority. So also of the universe is it to be understood. For from one Mover, with all things stirred up, their proper acts come to be — and this Mover an invisible and hidden Being, who in no way is a hindrance, neither to Himself for acting, nor to us for believing."

Now this single action of God is not the motion of the heaven, as some dream, but God's single speaking or saying — Aristotle himself in the same chapter attesting, as is recited in the proximate chapter. This same thing he shows further by another similitude thus: "For the soul, by which we live and have houses and cities, an invisible Being, is seen through its works. For all

the ornament of life is by it discovered, ordered, and contained — cultivations of land, plantations, the contrivance of arts, the use of laws, ornament and civility, internal businesses, beyond the borders battles or peace. These things must be considered also of God, or understood — according to another translation — being most strong, in species most beautiful, in life immortal, in virtue most powerful, or, according to another translation, best. Wherefore made invisible to every nature, He is seen from the works themselves. For all passions, both those through the air and those above the earth and those in the water, will truly be called the works of God diffusing Himself over the world; from whom — according to the natural philosopher Empedocles — *all things which are and afterwards shall be have proceeded: trees, and men with women, beasts also and birds, and fishes nourished in the waters.*"

Hence the Apostle to the Romans 1: "*The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by those things which are made; His eternal power also and divinity*" — which the holy Fathers hold by literal exposition. Wisdom 13 also disputes against the idolaters by this: "*Vain are all men in whom is not the knowledge of God, and who from the things which are seen as good have not been able to understand Him who is, neither, attending to the works, have they acknowledged who was the artificer.*" And it follows: "*For from the greatness of the species and of the creature, knowably the Creator can be seen.*" And further, in the same place: "*If, however, they could so far know that they could estimate the world, how is it that they have not the more easily found the Lord of it?*"

Furthermore, the Philosopher in *On the World* 11 says of God: "Since He is one, He is many-named, named from all the passions which He Himself newly produces. We call Him Jupiter; He is also called *fulminous* from lightning, *pluvial* from rain, *thunderous*, *tempestuous*, *serene*." And, the induction having been completed, almost through each, in the end he subjoins: "And to speak summarily, He is to be called Celestial and Terrestrial, by every nature and fortune, as Himself the cause of all things; on account of which it is not badly said in the *Orphica*: *Jupiter Argicereaunus*" — according to another translation, *Prince of Lightnings*; and it follows: *Jupiter the Head, Jupiter the Middle; from Jupiter all things have been generated.*

Into this view also consent Hermes, Plato, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, the author of the *Liber de Causis* and his Commentator, and a not-small crowd of philosophers. This view also the series of either testament most often attests. Hence Isaiah 45: "*I am the Lord, who do all these things*"; and further, in the same place, He curses all who say the contrary: "*Woe,*" He says, "*to him who contradicts his maker, a sherd of the earthen pots of Samos.*" And above, in 26: "*Lord, Thou wilt give us peace; for all our works hast Thou wrought, O Lord.*" Wherefore in the *Hymn of the Three Children*, all creatures, as the works of the Lord, are stirred up in order to bless the Lord — as if to give thanks to their Operator. And John 5, the Truth itself says: "*My Father worketh until now, and I work.*" Whence also above, in 1: "*All things were made through Him.*"

Where Augustine, in the first homily: "Receive it then thus altogether, brethren: *All things were made through Him*; the universal creation was made through Him, both greater and lesser. For no

form, no compages, no concord of parts, no substance whatever, can have weight, number, measure, except through that Word and from that Creator, to whom it has been said: *Thou hast disposed all things in measure and number and weight*. God made all things, and placed them in their grades. Therefore *all things through Him*, brethren — altogether all things through Him were made, *and without Him was made nothing*."

The same, further, in homily 8: "Just as," he says, "what the ministers put into the water-pots was turned into wine by the work of the Lord, so also what the clouds pour forth is turned into wine by the same work of the Lord. But we do not wonder at this, because it happens every year; assiduity has lost admiration. For who is he who considers the works of God by which this whole world is governed and administered, and is not astonished? He is overwhelmed by miracles. But because men, intent on other things, have lost the consideration of God's works, in which they would daily give praise to the Creator, God has reserved for Himself certain unusual things which He should do, that, as it were sleeping men, He might rouse them by wonders to worship Him. A dead man rose again — men wondered. So many are born daily, and no one wonders. Yet, if we consider more prudently, it is a greater miracle for him to be who was not, than for him to come back to life who was."

And in *On the Trinity* III, almost through the whole book, he proves the same by very many examples. Hence in ch. 5 he says that the divine power, which administers all spiritual and corporeal nature, every year on certain days makes rain; but when He made rain at the prayers of Elijah as if against the natural disposition of the air, it was called a miracle. So God works lightnings and thunders; but when on Mount Sinai they happened in unusual fashion, they seemed miracles. Who draws moisture through the root of the vine to the cluster, and makes wine, but God, who, with man planting and watering, gives the increase? Yet when at the nod of the Lord water was changed into wine with unusual swiftness, even with fools confessing, the divine power was declared. Who clothes the trees with leaf and flower at the customary times, but God? But when the rod of the priest Aaron flowered, the Divinity in some manner conversed with man who was doubting. And surely, for all woods and the flesh of all animals to be brought forth and formed, the earthly material is common; and who makes it but He who said: *Let the earth bring forth* — and by the same Word of His, by which He created, He rules and acts.

From all these things it sufficiently appears that God, who does rare miracles, likewise does the rest of His customary works. Is not this what the Apostle teaches, Romans 11, saying: "*Of Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things*"? And is not this one article of the faith, as the Nicene symbol testifies, teaching us to believe in God the Father, *maker of all things visible and invisible*, and in the Son, *through whom all things were made*?

Furthermore, God makes every man, and universally every animal whole, both according to body and soul, and not the natural agents alone. Wherefore by like reasoning, every made thing. For the Philosopher says, *On Animals* XI in the old translation: "It must be said that the natures of animals, whether the most noble or the ignoble — the nature which created the animals will be

the cause of great delight in those who can know the causes of nature, namely, in the natural philosophers, when they consider in a vile animal. And on this account we ought to consider their forms, and delight in the Artificer who made them, since the artifice of the worker is manifested in the work — for example, because in the operation of images appears the science of the artificer; and on this account it is fitting that we see, or otherwise not avoid the consideration of the natures of vile animals; nor be this grievous to us, as to children. And in all natural things there is something wonderful; and on this account we ought to inquire the nature of any animal, and to know that in all animals is some noble natural thing — since none of them was naturized otiosely or by chance, but whatever proceeded from the operations of nature was not except for the sake of something, and as a complement; and for this reason, has a noble place and order." With this also agrees the saying of Averroes on *Metaphysics* XII, comm. 19, premised in book II of this work.

Is it not also for this reason that Job 10, addressing God, says: "*Thy hands have fashioned me, and made me wholly round about*" — according to the punctuation of blessed Gregory, *Moralia* IX.26? And further: "*Hast Thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me as cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh; with bones and sinews Thou hast compacted me?*" And the Prophet: "*Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me*" (Psalm 118). Whence also the Lord of the Prophets: "*Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee*" (Jeremiah 1).

Wherefore Augustine, expounding the said verse of Psalm 118, says it can be understood doubly: in one mode, according to Adam — from whom, since all men are propagated, what man, when he was made, can also say himself to have been made, by the reasoning of origin and seed? In another mode: that each one, not without the work of God, is even from his parents — He Himself creating, they themselves generating; for if the operative power of God be subtracted from things, they perish, and nothing at all is born — whether of the elements of the world, or of progenitors, or of seeds — if God do not work it.

The same, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX.23: "What ministry," he says, "the Angels exhibited to God in the formation of woman, who would dare to affirm? Yet most certainly I would say that that supplement of flesh in the place of the rib, and the body and soul of the woman herself, the conformation of members, all the viscera, all the senses, and whatever there was by which she was both creature and human and woman — was made by no other than that work of God which God worked not through the Angels, but through Himself; and He did not let go, but these works are continued, so that neither the nature of those other things, nor that of the Angels themselves, subsists if He does not work."

Furthermore, God makes all vegetables; nor do natural agents alone suffice. Wherefore also all other things, by like reasoning. Is not this what the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 3: "*Neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth, but God who giveth the increase*"? Wherefore Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IX.22, says that farmers are not the creators of crops or trees: for "*neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth, but God who giveth*

the increase." And he says that the farmer makes nothing grow, but He who disposes all things in measure and number and weight, who gives the increase. Nor does the physician applying medicines heal the sick, but Nature does it by an interior motion most hidden to us — yet from which, if God should subtract His inmost operation by which He establishes and makes it, it will at once remain as if extinct, in nothing.

The same, *On the Trinity* III.7: "The Apostle," he says, "discerning interiorly God creating and forming, from the works of the creature which are applied externally, taking a similitude from agriculture, says: *I planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase.* As, then, in our very life, the mind, by justifying, none can form except God — but to preach the Gospel exteriorly, men can — so the creation of visible things God works interiorly; the exterior operations, however, whether of good or of evil Angels or of men, or even of any animals whatever, according to His command, and to the distributions of powers and the appetites of advantages distributed by Him, He so applies to the nature of things in which He creates all things, even as agriculture is applied to the earth."

This same the Truth itself truly attests of the lilies and the hay, which God so clothes — as is recited in Matthew 6 and Luke 12.

COROLLARY (three parts)

- **First:** that no thing can do anything without God.
- **Second:** that no thing can do anything except as God by Himself and immediately does that same thing.
- **Third:** that no thing can do anything except as God does that same thing more immediately than any other doing thing.

Hence it manifestly follows that no thing can do anything without God; and that no thing can do anything except as God by Himself and immediately does that same thing — nay, even more immediately than any other doing thing — immediately, I say, not only locally, but also naturally and causally, and more immediately by the same modes, or at least naturally and causally.

For it is less to preserve a thing made in being than to make it from non-being. But by the corollary of the second [chapter], no thing can preserve another thing in being without God likewise conserving it — and this immediately, nay, more immediately than any other conserving thing. Wherefore neither can any thing make a thing from non-being without God likewise making it — and this immediately, nay, more immediately than any other doing thing.

Item: every thing, just as it can do something, so it can also preserve in being a preservable thing made; for this is easier. But if the opposite of the foregoing corollary be granted, some thing can do something without God, or without God doing the same thing immediately or more immediately. Therefore some thing can thus conserve something — against the corollary of the

second, premised. The reasonings and authorities adduced for that corollary also prove this corollary.

But if anyone presumes to say that God is said to make all things — not because He immediately by Himself and properly makes these things, but only by means of Heaven, and because He has made the natural agents and patients, or conserves them, or because He permits, or does not impede, or defends them against impediments — he will easily be repressed by the foregoing, just as the proximate chapter repressed a similar presumption.

Book I, Chapter IV

THAT WITH ANY CREATURE MOVING, GOD NECESSARILY MOVES TOGETHER WITH IT: WITH A COROLLARY HAVING FOUR PARTS.

These things being foreknown, it cannot be unknown that, with any creature moving, God necessarily moves together with it. For it is less to exist than to move. For some things exist which do not move, and which cannot move; but whatever moves, exists; and (by the second of this work) no creature can exist by itself — therefore neither does it suffice to move by itself, without God.

Item: by the third of this work, no creature can by itself produce any motion; nor (by the second) preserve what is produced. God, then, is required as a necessary co-helper.

Furthermore, all the reasonings — or nearly all — and very many of the authorities adduced for the divine conservation and making of things, can also be adduced for His co-moving, the terms being changed as is fitting.

Furthermore, as it is in the lesser world, so it appears to be in the greater world. But in the lesser world — namely, in man, or in an animal — it is so, that all its motion, as such, proceeds from its formal and essential principle, namely, the soul, as is plain from *On the Soul* II.37. Therefore every motion in the greater world will proceed from its like principle, namely, from God Himself. And this seems to be the response of Aristotle in *On the World* 11, as is plain in that long authority written in the third chapter of this work; wherefore he holds this view. And further, in ch. 13, he shows the same view by a similar reasoning. For he says: "He Himself immobile moves all things and bears them whither He wills, by various ideas and natures, just as — I say — also the law of a city, being immobile, disposes — in the souls of those using it, the soul which is according to citizenship." And he shows this as if inductively through each of the works of the city; and concluding, he says: "Thus we should think indeed of the greater city — I mean of the World — for the law to us, equally inclining, is God."

Furthermore, there is that view premised, positing God as the soul of the great world; and Avicenna's, *Metaphysics* IX.1, who says: "The heaven is an animal obedient to God." Averroes

too, on *Metaphysics* XII, comm. 39, says: "It has been declared by reason that there is some one eternal, very noble — and it is that which moves all"; this, then, is God.

Item: if a creature could by itself move with one species of motion, it could also with every species; wherefore it could by itself alter, generate, and make many new things — which the proximate chapter does not permit.

Item: every thing having a form moves only through it, as the whole of philosophy proclaims. But, as the second of this work shows, God is the form of every form, and is the substantial act by which every form is what it is — which is plain from the same place. He is therefore the substantial form of every form. By this argument it is proved, *On the Soul* II, that the soul is the form of the animated. Therefore no form moves except through God; therefore neither can anything formed move except through Him.

Likewise to the same point: every formed mover moves through the form most essential and most principal to it, according to which it is *such* a formed thing. But God is the form most essential and most principal of any formed thing. For who, with God and a creature existing as causes of one caused thing in the same genus of cause, would attribute to God what is more imperfect and less? Nor do the things premised in the second of this work allow this.

Item: Augustine, *City of God* XXII.20, alleges from Cicero such a definition of God: "God is a certain mind, free and unbound, secret from every mortal commixture, sensing and moving all things, itself endowed with eternal nod" — and he says he found this in the books of the great philosophers.

Item: God is the first cause in the genus of moving causes, just as of formal and final causes, as is shown in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII, and by many philosophers in many places. And from the second supposition it can be had: just as no posterior cause moves except in the virtue of the prior cause — as is plain by the first proposition of *On Causes* with its Commentator alleged above — and because the first in any genus is the cause of any posterior of that genus, as the things premised in the second of this work attest. God, then, necessarily co-moves with every mover. Otherwise, moreover, no way could be taken from the inferior movers to prove some first mover — against Aristotle, *Physics* VII and VIII, *Metaphysics* XII, Alexander, Averroes, Avicenna, and almost all other philosophers, with whom the theological authors agree in this part.

Item: an instrument is not moved artificially except by an artificer. But every posterior mover is the instrument of the first Mover; for otherwise it would not be naturally posterior to it, but prior, or even coeval, or altogether disparate from every order. Hence Boethius says, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* IV, prose 6: "Every generation of things, and the whole progress of mutable natures, and whatever in any way is moved, takes its causes, order, and forms from the stability of the divine mind. For just as an artificer, perceiving in his mind the form of the thing to be made, moves the effect of the work, and what he had foreseen simply and presentially, he

leads through temporal orders — so God by providence indeed singularly and stably disposes the things to be made; but by fate He administers manifoldly and temporally these very things which He has disposed."

This Averroes too attests, on *On Sleep and Waking*, saying: "The causes of future things are not of determined being with us, but with the intellective nature, from which whatsoever the sensible nature receives, and by which it is moved — as instruments are moved by the form of the artifice. And therefore no individual essentially comes to be from nature, except through antecedent science; for the instrument of the artificer, as Aristotle says, is not moved except according to the artificer." Lo, Averroes the Commentator universally so holds, and alleges Aristotle to the same effect. Who also on *Metaphysics* XII, comm. 44, says: "The first Mover and the inferior movers are much assimilated to artificers who serve one another by turn, and aid one another toward one artifice. And they are those of which some are principal over others, and all are reduced to one artifice, and are perfected by one another, and all are reduced to receiving all their principles from the universal artifice containing them. And therefore the proper science of the first God is, as it were, the first Philosophy; and the proper science of the principles which are under Him, is similar to the particular sciences which are under the first Philosophy" — as Nicomachus the Peripatetic said in his *First Philosophy*.

This view also Hermes plainly attests, *On the Eternal Word* 14, as the second of this work has premised. Hence Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI, last: "The Son is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the unchangeable living reasons, and all are one in Him, just as He Himself is one of one, with whom He there knows all as one — God, who made all things through Him; for He is *the artificer of all things* (Wisdom 7)."

It is confirmed by similitude. Because by the Philosopher, *On the Soul* II, where above: "All physical bodies are instruments of the soul." And since God incomparably exceeds any soul, all things are His instruments. Certain things premised in the proximate chapter of this work also seem expressly to attest the artifice of God. Wherefore the divine Isaiah 29 and 45 calls God *potter, maker, and fashioner*; and man, *clay, work, figment, and sherd* — which the Apostle, following him, Romans 9, calls them by the same names. The Lord too, through Isaiah 10, likens King Sennacherib of Assyria to "the rod and staff of His fury," and to the axe with which God cuts, and the saw drawn by God, and the rod which God lifts. Where the Gloss says: "Just as these inanimate things are only instruments, doing nothing of themselves, but through Him who moves them, so neither did Sennacherib operate by himself, but in the virtue of God."

This same — namely, of the artificer and the instruments — Thomas Aquinas, in *On Faith, Hope, and Charity* 133, attests, as the second of this work alleges.

Furthermore, Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, shows at length that God moves every spiritual and corporeal creature, voluntary and otherwise, by all their motions universally. Where also, in 29, having distinguished the work of divine providence into two parts — namely, of creation and of administration, by which He provides for the whole universe and

for individual creatures — he says thus: "The creating Spirit moves Himself without time and place; He moves the created spirit through time without place; and He moves body through time and place."

In agreement, Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* 4, speaking of the good and the best which is praised in God, speaks thus: "This one Best and Good singularly is the cause of all many goods and bests; and from this come all the essential subsistences of existing things, unities, discretions, immutabilities, alterities, similitudes, dissimilitudes, fellowships of contraries, distinctions of united things, providences of superiors, vicissitudes of like-formed things, conversions of all inferiors, the self-guarding and immutable habitations and collocations; and again, the proper fellowships of all in all to each one, and compactions, and unconfused friendships, and harmonies of the universe, and universal concretions, indissoluble continences of existing things, the not-failing receptions of things to be done — all states and motions: some of intellectuals, some of souls, some of bodies. For He is the State and Motion above every motion and every state to all things, collocating each in its own ratio, and moving them in their proper motion."

Where, having consequently shown how Angels and souls are moved circularly, directly, and obliquely, he subjoins: "Of these, then, and of the sensible three motions in the universe, and much before of each one of the abidings, stations, and collocations, the cause and container and end is the good and best, and above every state and motion. Wherefore every state and motion is from itself, and through itself, and into itself, and on its account. For from it and on its account is essence and every life of mind and soul, and of all natures; all conjunctions, consummations, terms, orders; every essence, every virtue, every operation, every habit, every sense, every reason, every intellect, every illumination, every science, every summit; and simply, every *on* — being — is from the good and the best, and is converted into the good and the best, and all things which are and come to be, are and come to be through the good and the best, and to these all things look, and by it are moved and contained, etc." — more fully recited in book II of this work.

The blessed Hierotheus, moreover, in his *amatory hymns*, as Dionysius recalls where above, says thus: "There is one certain simple virtue, moving itself to a certain unity-temperance from the best, even to the last of existing things; and from that one again consequently through all unto the best — and from itself, through itself, and to itself, returning itself, and turning back into itself always in the same way."

Does not the Wise One teach the same, saying: "*Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things; she reacheth everywhere; and being one, she can do all things; and remaining in herself she reneweth all things*"? "*She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily, and disposeth all things sweetly*." Does not Truth itself say: "*My Father worketh until now, and I work*"? And the Apostle of Truth: "*In Him we live and move and are*."

COROLLARY (four parts)

- **First:** that nothing can move anything without God by Himself and properly co-moving the same.
- **Second:** that nothing can move anything without God immediately moving the same.
- **Third:** that nothing can move anything without God moving the same more immediately than any other mover whatsoever.
- **Fourth:** that no proposition attributing any created thing to any secondary cause is immediate simply.

Hence, with sound eyes, I repeat: it is manifest that nothing can move anything without God by Himself and properly co-moving the same, and without God immediately moving the same — nay, more immediately than any other mover whatsoever. Immediately, I say, and more immediately, as the corollaries of the second and third [chapters] expounded.

And from this natural corollary another, logical corollary manifestly follows: namely, that no proposition attributing any caused thing to any secondary cause is simply immediate.

This natural corollary sufficiently appears from the things premised in this chapter, joined to the corollaries of the third and second with their proofs. With which securely supposed, the logical corollary is easily demonstrated. For no proposition having a cause naturally mediating between its extremes — namely, which is the cause naturally mediating the inherence of the extremes — is immediate simply, as the *Posterior Analytics* I shows. But every such proposition is of this kind, as the proximate natural corollary, with the other prior corollaries, clearly proves.

But if anyone respond cavillingly that God moves all moved things, yet not properly, immediately, and through Himself, but only by means of another — say, the Heaven — or because He has made the mover and the moved thing, or because He preserves them, or because He permits, or does not impede, or defends them from things impeding — he will easily be refuted by the foregoing, just as the second and third of this work refuted similar [evasions].

And if anyone object against the chapter that then God would bark, eat husks, lie, steal — with other absurdities better passed over in silence than spoken — and against the corollary, that the Philosopher both in Logic and in Philosophy affirms many such propositions to be immediate: it must be said that the first does not proceed, because those words do not signify such actions absolutely, namely, only according to that which they essentially are or come to be, but with a certain relation to the creature, inasmuch as they flow forth and emanate from it.

For the second, it must be said that the Philosopher in such matters speaks as a natural philosopher — namely, of the immediacy of a secondary cause, that is, of a natural cause. And this is immediacy *secundum quid*, because only in the genus of created things; not, however, of immediacy *simply*, which simply deprives every middle cause.

Book I, Chapter V

That God is Not Mutable in Any Way: It Has a Corollary of Five Parts.

Having shown, then, that God is the effective principle of every change and motion, it remains to show next that God is not mutable in any way. This follows evidently from the sixth part of the first Corollary of this book; and although it seems sufficiently shown there, it is nevertheless to be further fortified here for cause by certain reasons and Authorities.

It is established, indeed, according to what was set forth in the third and fourth chapters of this book, that God makes and moves all things; and in every making and motion there is some maker and mover that is unmakeable and immovable, otherwise there would be an infinite process in such things, contrary to the second Supposition; and certain things set forth in the second chapter of this book attest to this. And who more worthy of being such than the first and supreme maker and mover? — which also certain things set forth in the second, third, and fourth chapters of this book seem to bear witness to. Many Philosophers and Theologians also confirm this conclusion for the reason just given.

Furthermore, if God were mutable in any way, He would not be most pure act, contrary to the second Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary of this book. Whence the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* XII.38: "Since, however, the mover itself is unmoved, being in act, this cannot be otherwise in any way." On which Averroes: "That which moves the first moved, since it is itself unmoved — because it is pure act without any potency — it is impossible that it should have any disposition other than that which it has."

Likewise, if God were changed in any way, He would not be supremely one and simply so, nor supremely necessary being, contrary to the first Supposition, the second part, and other parts of the first Corollary of this book, and the Philosophers and Theologians in many places. Whence the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* V.6, distinguishing the necessary, writes thus: "First and properly necessary is what is simple; for this cannot be in many ways; therefore not now this way and now that, for then it would be in many ways." And in *Metaphysics* XII, distinguishing the necessary, he says thus (XII.38): "But this is not contingent otherwise, but is simple; from such a principle, then, depend heaven and nature." And Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.6: "Necessary being through itself is necessary in all its modes." And below in book IX, ch. 1: "Necessary being is in this way necessary being in all its modes, that there cannot be in it some future disposition that was not."

Likewise, if God could be changed, why could He not be changed for the worse? And how would He in no way be in need of another, contrary to the first Supposition and the parts of the first Corollary of this book? Whence Hermes in the last chapter of *On the Eternal Word*: "Nothing is wanting to Him who is Himself all things, or in whom all things are." And Sextus the

Pythagorean in his *Sententiae* says, "God indeed is in need of nothing." Whence the Prophet: "You are my God, since You have no need of my goods" (Psalm 15). And the Apostle: "He, since He is the Lord of heaven and earth, does not dwell in temples made with hands, nor is He worshipped by human hands as needing anything" (Acts 17:24–25).

Likewise, then He would be passible, as is clear in itself; for every being-changed is a suffering. And so Averroes argues in *Metaphysics* V, comment 6: "If it were possible to be changed into another species — that is, disposition or mode — then His nature would be of the nature of a possible thing receiving many species" — which he holds impossible. And so it appears, since to act is always more excellent than to suffer. Whence Aristotle, *De Anima* III.19: "Always more honorable is the agent than the patient, and the principle than the matter." And *Ethics* IV.1: "It belongs more to virtue to do well than to suffer well." And Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XII.29: "In every way more excellent is he who makes than that thing from which he makes something." And he proves the same at length in *On Music* VI; and in *Eighty-Three Questions* 28: "Every efficient is greater than that which is effected." And he says the same in *On the Immortality of the Soul*.

Likewise, then He would be changed [by another], or at least could be — as is clear from Aristotle, *Physics* VII, and Averroes in his commentary, and Avicenna *Metaphysics* I.3, who agree that everything that is moved is moved by another; and so He would be in potency with respect to another, inferior, and passive — all of which derogate too greatly from the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary. And this seems to be the reasoning of Algazel, *Metaphysics* II, dictum 9: "Necessary being," he says, "cannot be changed, because not by another nor by itself, since no thing acts upon itself in any way."

Aristotle also in *On the Heavens* I.110, briefly comprehending many of these reasonings in his manner, says thus: "In encyclopedic philosophical writings concerning divine things it has many times been declared by reasonings that the divine, intransmutable, necessary being is everything first and supreme; and what has thus been said is testified to: nor is there anything else better that will move it. For that would surely be more divine; nor does it have anything depraved, nor is it in need of any of those things that are its goods."

Many Philosophical and Theological Authorities sufficiently confirm the same. Whence Hermes in *On the Eternal Word*, after showing in chapter 33 that God moves all things celestial and terrestrial, superior and inferior, by a temporal order written by divine law, says thus in chapter 34: "All things being so disposed, then, nothing is stable, nothing fixed, nothing immovable — neither among things being born, nor celestial, nor terrestrial — but God alone, and rightly alone. For He is in Himself and from Himself, and around Himself He is wholly full and perfect; and He is His own firm stability, nor can He be moved by the impulse of anything or by place, since in Him are all things, and in all things He alone is."

Whence also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.51: "God is not transmuted; for transmutation is into something less worthy, and motion is something of that sort." And *Metaphysics* IX.2: "Passibility

is toward the worse and toward corruption." On which Averroes: "Everything that suffers either suffers toward the worse or suffers toward corruption." And *Physics* VIII.36 and following, the Philosopher diffusely shows that the First Mover is not moved at all, since neither essentially nor accidentally in any way; where also (VIII.37) he cites Anaxagoras as positing that intellect, which is the first principle, must necessarily be impassible, unmixed, and immovable.

Boethius too, in *On the Consolation of Philosophy* III, last prose, cites from Parmenides: "By the form of the divine substance He turns the moveable orb of things, while He preserves Himself immovable." Whence also among the *24 Definitions of the 24 Philosophers concerning God*, definition 19 says thus: "God is the always-moving Immovable." Avicenna, Algazel, Ammonius, Averroes, and many other Philosophers many times confirm this same thing.

Sacred Authority teaches the same. Whence in Psalm 43 [Vulg.; cf. 42:2]: "You are my King and my God." On which Augustine: "You are the same; for You have not been changed. I see times changed; the Creator of times is not changed." And Exodus 3: "I am who am." And Psalm 101: "You shall change them, and they shall be changed; but You are the same." Gloss: "But You who said 'I am who am' are the same — that is, immutable and omnipotent. For these things are from You, through You, and in You; yet they are not what You yourself are, who are changing not changed, making not made, moving but remaining."

Whence also Numbers 23: "God is not as the son of man, that He should be changed." Malachi 3: "I am the Lord, and I do not change." James 1[17]: "With whom there is no change nor shadow of vicissitude." 1 Timothy, last chapter [6:16]: "Who alone has immortality" — that is, immutability.

Whence blessed Augustine, *On the Trinity* I.1, says thus: "It was said to Moses, 'I am who am, and *He who is* sent me to you.' But since 'to be' is in some way said both of body and of soul, unless He had wished it to be understood in some proper way, He would surely not have said this. And what the Apostle says, 'who alone has immortality' — since the soul too is in some way said to be immortal, and is — He would not say 'alone has' unless because true immortality is unchangeableness, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone. This is what James says: 'Every best gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, descending from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of a moment.' This too David: 'You shall change them, and they shall be changed; but You are the same.' Therefore to behold and fully know the substance of God making things mutable without any change of Himself, and creating temporal things without any temporal motion of His own, is difficult."

And in *On the Trinity* V.2 he teaches the same more briefly, where he holds that God alone is utterly incapable of being changed; and he adds: "What is changed does not preserve its very being; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can fail to be what it had been. And on this account, it is not only what is not changed, but what utterly cannot be changed, that without scruple comes forth as that which most truly may be said *to be*." And in *On Christian Doctrine* I,

penultimate sentence (37): "He supremely and primally *is*, who is utterly unchangeable." He maintains the same in *City of God* XII.1, 2, 3, and in many other places.

Wherefore blessed Gregory, *Moralia* XVIII.31, on Job 28 ("nor shall they be remembered in comparison with Him"), says: "The Prophet, contemplating the unchangeableness of His essence, says, 'All things shall grow old like a garment, and like a covering You shall change them, and they shall be changed; but You are the same, and Your years shall not fail.' Hence it is said to Moses, 'I am who am, and "He who is" has sent me to you.' For He alone truly *is*, who alone unchangeably remains. For everything that is now thus and now otherwise is next to non-being; for it cannot remain in its state, but in some way it is on the way to non-being, while it is led by moments of time from what it had been ever to something else."

Peter [Lombard] also shows this same thing in the first book of his *Sentences*, distinction 8 and distinction 37, citing more copiously the Authorities of the Saints.

Corollary

From these things, however, it seems probable — if Truth herself truly knows — that the following may be inferred corollarily: that God is essentially and presentially everywhere, not only in the world and in all its parts, but also outside the world in an imaginary infinite place or void. Whence He may also truly be called immense and uncircumscribed — although He may be called immense and uncircumscribed in another way as well. Whence too there appears to come forth a certain clear response to the ancient questions of the Gentiles and Heretics, which they used to put to the faithful: "Where is your God?" and "Where had God been before the world?" — one of which was put metrically thus:

Tell where then He was, when besides Him there was nothing.

Whence likewise it is clearly evident that there can be a void from body, but a void from God by no means.

Thus the corollary has these five parts:

1. God is essentially and presentially everywhere of necessity, not only in the world and in all its parts;
2. but also outside the world, in an imaginary infinite place or void;
3. whence He may also truly be called immense and uncircumscribed;
4. whence also a response appears to the ancient questions of the Gentiles and Heretics: "Where is your God?" and "Where had God been before the world?"
5. whence likewise it is clearly evident that there can be a void from body, but a void from God by no means.

[Demonstration of the parts.]

That God is necessarily everywhere in the world follows manifestly. For if He were not in some place of it, and yet could be in it (since by the seventh part of the first Corollary He is omnipotent), this could be either by motion or not by motion of a creature — since now there is a creature there, and continuously there was before, which by the same reason by which another creature does and did suffice for God's existence there, [now suffices]; nor by motion of Himself, as the chapter has shown. The same is shown evidently from the Corollary of the second chapter of this book, and from the demonstration of it.

For proving the second part, let me suppose that A is the imaginary fixed place of this world, and B is an imaginary place outside the world, distant from A; and that God moves the world from A to B, situating it in B. Then by the first part of the present corollary and by the Corollary of the second chapter of this book and the demonstration of it, God is now in B; therefore either He was there before, or He was not. If He was, then by the same reason He was before, and now is, everywhere imaginarily outside the world. If not, then by the same reason He is now not in A but in B. Therefore God was before in A and not in B, and now is not in A but in B, which is wholly distant; therefore He withdrew from A and approached B; therefore He was moved locally or situationally — as also our soul is moved at the motion of our body.

Here certain men, following the Philosopher in *On the Heavens* I, respond by supposing that every local motion is necessarily upward or downward, or circular — that is, from the middle, to the middle, or about the middle. But if such a motion as I have posited were posited, it would be none of the foregoing; therefore they say that it is not possible for the world to be so moved. But these men gravely mutilate and curtail the divine power — nay, omnipotence. God could also have created this world in B in the beginning; why therefore can He not now place it in B? He can also now create another world in B; why therefore can He not place this world in B? This response is also condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: "[The article saying] that God cannot move the heavens with a rectilinear motion — and the reason is that then a void would be left behind."

Nor does that response evade the difficulty: for let it be supposed that God, without local motion, creates another world in B and annihilates this world in A — and the difficulty returns.

Others also, seemingly following the Philosopher, respond by saying that there is no place or void outside the world; therefore neither is God there, nor can He move the world thither. But these men have to say consequently that God by His omnipotence could in no way have made the world greater in any respect, nor lesser — which would too greatly restrict and constrain His omnipotence. They also have to say that God necessarily made the world in place A, and that before the world there was place A, and no other. But why this and not another? Why so great, and not greater, nor lesser? For either this was from God or [was] of itself, not from Him. If from

God, He could have made another and another place greater without end, on account of His infinite power. But if it was of itself, not from Him, what virtue, what reason, what nature determined this precise and impassable terminus to it inviolably? — since that imaginary place has no positive nature, as no one is ignorant. Otherwise there would be some positive nature that is neither God nor from God — the opposite of which the second and third chapters of this book teach — and it would be coeternal with God, which no Christian admits. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article asserting that "many things are eternal, and God could not destroy them even if He willed it" — by which He would be deprived of omnipotence.

Their reasoning also militates against them: for if, according to the Philosopher and according to their own supposition, there cannot be a void, nor an imaginary place not filled with body, then either the World is eternal — which is heretical, and which they deny — or before its creation its imaginary place existed, void, not occupied by body. The article cited also condemns this response and its irrational reasoning. With these things in no way standing in the way, then, the foregoing reasoning seems to proceed without offense.

Again, God in the beginning, creating the world and any part of it whatsoever, was simultaneously with the World and with any part of it. For as is clear from *Physics* VII.9 and following, and *De Anima* II.74: in every motion and in every action the mover and agent is together with the moved and the patient. Whence Augustine, Homily 2 on John 1, on the words "He was in the world, and the world was made through Him": "How," he says, "was He in the world?" And he answers: "As an Artisan ruling what He has made. For He did not make as a craftsman makes who stands outside the chest he is making, which is placed in another location while it is being fashioned; and although he is alongside it, he himself sits in another place who is making it, and he is extrinsic to that which he fashions. But God, infused into the World, fashions; placed everywhere, He fashions, and does not depart anywhere; not from outside, as it were, does He turn the mass which He fashions; but by the presence of His majesty He does what He does, and by His own presence He governs what He has made. Thus, then, He was in the world in the manner of Him through whom the world was made."

Either, then, God by nature was prior there before He created there and before the creature was there; or conversely. If He was prior there by nature, this was not through the creature, nor through creating, but through Himself, and not anew — for then He would be changed anew through Himself. Therefore He was there eternally through Himself; therefore by the same reason He was eternally through Himself everywhere in the void or imaginary infinite place, and still is everywhere likewise outside the world.

Nor can anyone say the contrary — that prior by nature is the creature's being created than its being here or there; and prior by nature is God's creating there than the creature's being created there. For this is the cause of that. And still prior by nature is God's being there than His creating there — just as He is by nature prior than that He creates, as is also any other agent. For not

because God or any other agent acts, therefore He is; nor because He acts there, therefore He is there; but rather conversely.

To the same point: with the World created in this place, God was here either anew or eternally. If anew, this was through some change or motion in God or in another, namely the world. But not through change in God, as the fifth chapter shows; nor through change in the world, since God by nature was there prior to the world's being created or being changed in any way, as the foregoing manifest. Therefore God was not made there anew, but eternally was there. Wherefore by the same reason eternally He was, is, and shall be everywhere in the imaginary infinite place.

In a similar way, and perhaps a plainer one, the same can be shown by supposing that God creates something — say A — at some distance outside the heaven, since it is clear from what was set forth that He can. For He can move the world to another distant place, and He could have created the World in a distant place; therefore even now He can create there. Let Him therefore create A there. Then God immediately acts on A there and conserves it, as the things set forth here and in the corollary of the second chapter of this book show. Therefore God is there immediately and essentially through Himself. Either then He is by nature prior there than A is there, or conversely, etc., as before.

To the same: with A created there, God is there — either anew or eternally, etc. — as above.

Furthermore, God is in the place of the World; therefore either He needs the creature necessarily — as a kind of leaning or reclining support, or foundation sustaining Him lest He fall, lest He flow away, or rather lest He vanish — or He does not so need the creature. The first cannot be said because of the foregoing. For God is by nature prior in the place of any creature than that creature itself, as has been shown above; nor is He sustained or carried by the creature, nor does He in any way lean upon the creature, but conversely, as the second chapter of this book has shown. God also was in some place before any creature: for this would too greatly repugn His infinite perfection and sufficiency, which the first Supposition with its consequent parts gave to Him. God is therefore the foundation without foundation, founded on no prior thing, but the first and original foundation of all others — upon which all others, since they are unstable in themselves, lean as upon a foundation fixed of itself, stable, and immovable; by which they are continuously sustained and continuously supported, as the second chapter of this book has manifoldly shown. It is therefore not the converse.

God can therefore be in whatever place He wishes, without needing the creature, and not anew — since not through motion of Himself, as the fifth shows — therefore eternally, by remaining at rest. Therefore God essentially through Himself perseveres in every place everywhere, eternally and immovably.

Moreover, it is more perfect to be everywhere in some place, and in many places at once, than to be in only one place. And so a spirit, which can do this, is more perfect than a body, which cannot. But God is an infinitely perfect spirit, as the first Supposition and its demonstration

manifest. Therefore this belongs to Him infinitely — and this without need of the creature, as has been shown above, and without any mutability whatever. Therefore God necessarily, eternally, infinitely is everywhere in the imaginary infinite place. Whence also He may truly be called *omnipresent*, just as also *omnipotent*.

He may also by similar reason be called in some manner *infinite*, *infinitely great*, or of *infinite magnitude* — even in some manner, although metaphysically and improperly, *extensively*. For He is inextensibly and indimensionably extended infinitely. For He coexists wholly and simultaneously, fully, with infinite magnitude and imaginary extension and with any part of it. Wherefore likewise He may be called *immense* — that is, not measured, nor measurable by any measure — and *uncircumscribed*, since He is not circumscribed by anything fully surrounding Him, nor can He thus be circumscribed by anything; but He Himself circumscribes, contains, and encompasses all things.

Whence Sextus the Pythagorean in his *Sententiae* says: "You will not find the magnitude of God, even if you could fly with wings." This sentence is attested by the second of the *24 Definitions of God* posited by the 24 Philosophers, which says: "God is an infinite sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference nowhere." And the eighteenth: "God is a sphere whose circumferences are as many as there are points." And the tenth, saying: "God is one whose power is not numbered, whose being is not enclosed, whose goodness is not bounded."

Theological Authorities also seem to attest this sentence. For Solomon says, speaking to God: "Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain You" (1 Kings 8 and 2 Chronicles 6); "Heaven and the heaven of heavens contain You not." With which the Church accords, singing thus: "Holy Mother of God, who didst worthily merit to conceive Him whom the whole world could not comprehend," etc. And again:

Virgin Mother of God, whom the whole orb cannot contain, In your womb He enclosed Himself, made man.

Wherefore Jerome to Marcella, *On Five Questions*, Epistle 96, responding to the last, says: "You will not doubt that the God-Word so dwelt in the Lord's body that He was both in the Father, and enclosed the orb of heaven, and was infused into all things and around all things, the same Person, so as to penetrate all things from within and to contain them from without. It is foolish, therefore, that the power of Him should be limited by the smallness of one little body — He whom heaven does not contain — and yet He who was everywhere was wholly also in the Son of Man."

Baruch 3 says: "O Israel, how great is the house of the Lord, and vast the place of His possession; great, and having no end; high and immense." Whence also the Prophet: "Great is the Lord, and exceedingly to be praised, and of His greatness there is no end" (Psalm 144). And Job 11, speaking of God, says: "He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? deeper than hell, and how will you know? His measure is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." On

which Gregory, *Moralia* X.8, says that God by transcending all things encloses [them]. And below, in book XVI.12, on Job 23, "If I go to the east, He does not appear" etc.: "The Creator of all things," he says, "is not in part, because He is everywhere; and then He is the less found, when He who is wholly everywhere is sought in part. For an uncircumscribed Spirit has all things within Himself, which He nevertheless surrounds by filling, and fills by surrounding, and transcends by sustaining, and sustains by transcending."

Augustine also, *On the Divine Essence*, IX, says that God alone is uncircumscribed, immutable, and immense; and adds that, of His immensity, in the book of blessed Job it is written: "He is higher than heaven," etc., as cited above. He also, in *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII.33, says that God is in no place either by interval or by space, but by an unchangeable and excellent power; and is interior to every thing, since in Him are all things; and exterior to every thing, since He is above all things.

Is not this what the Prophet — albeit obscurely — seems to insinuate when he says: "Who has measured the waters with a fist, and weighed the heavens with a span?" (Isaiah 40), as if to say, "Has not God?" And the Lord through the Prophet: "Heaven is My throne, the earth is the footstool of My feet" (Isaiah, last chapter). Wherefore Gregory in his second [book] on Ezekiel, Homily V, says: "God is everywhere, and everywhere is wholly. For He says: 'Heaven is My throne, but the earth is the footstool of My feet.' And of Him it is written: 'Who measures heaven with a span, and encloses the earth with a fist.' From which it is necessary that He who presides over heaven as a throne is both above and within; and He who measures heaven with a span and encloses the earth with a fist is exterior, superior, and inferior. Thus, in order that almighty God might indicate that He is both interior and superior to all things, He declared heaven to be His throne; in order to show, however, that He encompasses all things, He claims to measure heaven with His span and to enclose the earth with His fist."

Blessed Augustine, moreover, in *Confessions* VII.5, comparing the whole creature to the Creator, says: "I made one great mass, distinguished by kinds of bodies — Your creature — whether the things which were really bodies, or those which I myself had imagined to be spirits; and I made it great, not as great as it was (for that I could not know), but as great as I pleased — finite indeed in every direction, but with You, O Lord, surrounding it on every side and penetrating it, but everywhere infinite. As if there were a sea everywhere and from every side, through immense reaches, an infinite sea — and only sea — and it had within itself a sponge, however great, but yet finite, full from every part of itself with the immense sea: thus did I think Your creation, finite, full of You who are infinite. And I said: Behold God, and behold what God has created, and God is good; and most strongly and far most distantly is He more excellent than they; but yet, being good, He has created good things; and behold how He surrounds and fills them."

Nor must it be an obstacle that the Authorities of Scripture cited above are often expounded to another sense. For who is unaware that Sacred Scripture, impregnated with the manifold power of the Holy Spirit, contains a manifold sense and brings forth many meanings?

These parts of this Corollary having been made manifest, the remaining ones will become manifest [from them].

If anyone, however, against the possibility of the motion of the whole world along a straight line, of which we touched above, should object the sentence of the Philosopher already touched on — namely, that every motion is from the middle to the middle, or about the middle — it is to be said that he is speaking of the species of natural motions of natural bodies and of the parts of this world.

And if anyone should still object [the Philosopher] reproving the void, it is to be said that perhaps he understands that the void is not necessarily and naturally to be posited within the world, nor even outside the world, on account of the effects for which the Pythagoreans, Democritus and Leucippus, and many of the more ancient Philosophers posit it — namely, on account of local motion, on account of motion of augmentation and diminution, of condensation and rarefaction, on account of motion of alteration, and on account of the distinction of beings, lest they be one, or on account of the breathing of the heaven from an infinite void outside itself, as is clear from *Physics* IV.3 and following, and *On the Heavens and the World* IV, *On the Soul* II, and other places.

This seems to be posited in two ways: in one mode only privatively — namely as the pure privation, or pure absence of the full; in another mode positively, and this in two further ways. In one way, as if it were only a corporeal dimension separated from natural forms, as it were a Mathematical body, or quantity alone separated from other natural things; and so it is sometimes taken in *Physics* IV. In the other way, as if it had also an active power, and a power of moving according to place, as is clear from *On the Heavens* IV. Sometimes, too, the void is defined by him as "a place not filled, but apt to be filled"; place, however, according to him, is the ultimate, namely the ultimate surface of the containing body. But such a void is not outside the heaven, nor is there a place or situation there apt to be filled, according to the natures instituted in natural things.

Yet it is true that his arguments by no means convince by an irrefragable necessity that God could not, by His absolute omnipotence, make a void wherever He willed within the world or outside; nay, even now in fact: let there be an imaginary place outside the world, void — void, I say, of body, and of anything else apart from God — as the foregoing have urged. But those arguments of his are, as also are very many others of his, certain probable subtleties in natural matter, more *ad hominem* against the contrary professor than against the thing itself — which is nonetheless of much value in the scrutiny of truth. Whence he himself in *On the Heavens* II.80: "They seem," he says, "to seek up to a certain point, but not as far as is possible for the doubt.

For in all manners this is the custom: not for the question to be raised concerning the matter, but against him who says the contrary."

It is further objected that, if there were such a void place outside this world, it would be possible for another world to be there — contrary to the same Philosopher, *On the Heavens* I.76 and following, who variously rejects this. But who denies or doubts this conclusion, except perhaps one who also denies or doubts God's omnipotence? And if anyone shall do this, he will be corrected by the help of the first Supposition and the seventh part of the first Corollary of this book. And the Philosopher's arguments in this part are similar to his other subtleties recalled above.

And if anyone still should not cease objecting by saying: if the foregoing are true, then it is necessary that God be in this place however designated, which seems greatly to contravene His infinite omnipotence and most worthy liberty — nay, also to fetter Him unwillingly in prison, and to bind Him irrecoverably — let the objector observe that it can similarly be objected against him: with places and the placed, locations and the located actually existing, it is necessary that God be in any of those; it is similarly necessary that God be in the whole imaginary place, and even in some partial place — for otherwise He could be nowhere, and therefore not be at all.

Therefore this is in God not [a sign] of imperfection, of illiberality, or of any impotence, but of infinite power — just as also that He is necessarily pure act, that He necessarily actually thinks and knows anything whatever, however vile; just as also He necessarily generates, and this not a daughter but a Son, nor another Son, nor many, but this one only Son absolutely necessarily. Therefore it is of perfection and of infinite power that God is necessarily everywhere; for otherwise He would not be supremely perfect and powerful, since not supremely in act, or rather supreme act, but potential and movable; and accordingly imperfect in some respect, as the fifth chapter of this book has more fully shown.

These things are spoken and to be received not by way of rash assertion, but for the sake of sober inquiry.

Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*, Book I

CHAPTER VI. THAT GOD HAS DISTINCT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS.

These things being thus established, it is certain that God has a knowledge of all things present, past, and likewise future — a knowledge supremely actual, particular, distinct, and certain. But who does not see that this shines forth from the ninth part of the first Corollary of this book? Yet to confirm it more fully, by way of cause, with certain reasons and testimonies will not be at all unprofitable. God therefore preserves, effects, and moves all things, as has been shown above, but not without disposing wisdom; for otherwise a prudent man would do his deeds better than the most glorious God does His — as the third part of the first Corollary teaches. Otherwise, too,

God would not naturally preside over wise men as their ruler, but rather the contrary; for according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* I, the wise man ought not to be ordered but to order, and ought not to be advised by another but rather to advise the less wise; and *Ethics* V.11, "We do not allow a man to rule, but reason"; and *Politics* I.1, "What can foresee with mind, this is by nature ruling and by nature lordly"; and Book III.9, "Whoever bids the intellect rule, seems to bid God and the laws to rule; but whoever bids the man rule, adds also the beast." He also says in *On the Secret of Secrets*, Part 1, ch. 4: "Know that the intellect is the head of governance"; and below, in Part 3, ch. 5, speaking of the king, he says: "In this he ought to be made like to God, and the king must therefore be likened to and imitate the Most High in all his works; for God is wise and knowing, and His proclamation and His glorious names are in Himself, and the greatness of His dominion is greater than commendation, and so likewise His wisdom." And below: "It was found written upon a stone in the Chaldean tongue, 'The king and the intellect are brothers, each needing the other, neither one without the other'"; but as is apparent from the first and second suppositions and from the seventeenth part, and is proved at the end of *Metaphysics* XII, He Himself is universally the one Prince of all beings; therefore He has wisdom that disposes all things sweetly.

Again: God knows some present singulars; therefore by the same reasoning He knows whatsoever singulars there are. For He loves and cares for only what He knows; but He loves and cares for those who live rationally, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* X.13: "He who acts according to intellect and cherishes this, and is best disposed, seems to be most beloved of God. For if some care of human affairs comes from the gods, as it seems, it will surely be reasonable that they delight in what is best and most kindred — and this is the intellect — and that they reward most those who love and honor this, as friends well taken care of, working rightly and well." Where Averroes says: "If God has care of men, as is believed and as is fitting, He rejoices in the better, and it is more worthy that He should benefit those who love Him more, and honor them and visit them, as is the disposition of friend toward friend." Aristotle also in *Rhetoric* II.28 speaks thus: "If you speak just things, men will hate you; if unjust things, the gods will; but if you speak just things, the gods will love you; if unjust, men."

Again: otherwise God would not be a just rewarder of the good, nor an avenger of the evil — against many things laid down in the parts of the first Corollary of this book, and against Hermes, who says of God: "Who justifies the work of no evildoer, nor deprives any benefactor of rewards"; and against Aristotle in *On the World*, last chapter, who speaks thus of God: "Vengeance and justice always accompany Him." He also in *On Good Fortune* I says: "We deem God worthy as Lord of such things, that He may distribute to the worthy both goods and ills"; and in *On the Consolation of Philosophy* IV, prose 1, Philosophy thus answers Boethius: "It would be a thing of infinite astonishment, and more horrible than all monsters, if, as you reckon, in the most well-ordered house of so great a paterfamilias, the cheap vessels were cherished and the precious ones grew foul; but it is not so. For with Him, of whose kingdom we now speak, as your Author you will know that the good are always powerful, but the evil always abject and

feeble — that vices are never without punishment, nor virtues without reward." Seneca too testifies to this in many places, and all moral philosophers, together with the poets, unanimously; nay, this is, as it were, the common conception of mind of all peoples living under any law, or even without law.

Further: it would seem superfluous and vain to hope in God and to pray to Him, unless He understood the hope and the prayers; but all men, of whatever sect, hope in God and pray to Him; whence also that pagan Aristotle in *On the World* 12 thus says: "All life grants the highest place to God, and we all stretch our hands to heaven when we pray." With this also accords his saying in *Secret of Secrets*, Part 1, ch. 2; and the saying of Avicenna, *Metaphysics* X.1, recited in the showing of the thirty-second part of the Corollary of the first chapter of this book. Does not Plato also, in the prologue to the *Timaeus*, say: "It is the custom of all, and as it were a kind of religion, that those about to do anything concerning the greatest or the least matters should pray for the help of Divinity, or otherwise pray for divine help" — and immediately he himself does this devoutly there, subjoining: "How much more fitting it is that we, who are about to set forth the rationale of the universal nature and substance, should invoke divine aid, unless we are plainly carried away by some savage frenzy and inexplicable madness! Let it therefore be comprehended in my prayers especially, that those things may be said by us which are pleasing to God, and likewise that we may produce things consistent with ourselves and fitting to the work proposed." And below at 21.17, about to treat of prime matter, he says: "Then also now we shall invoke the helper, the deliverer before the auspicious beginning of speech, from the turbulent and stormy tossing of discourse already begun." With whom Hermes concordantly, in *On the Eternal Word* 9, says: "We ask God to grant us the faculty of rendering this account." And below at the end: "Speaking this, we beseech God that He may will to preserve us persevering in the love of knowledge of Thee, and never separated from this kind of life." Sextus the Pythagorean also says in his *Maxims*: "Take a beginning from God in doing what you do"; and again, "Ask of God those things which it is worthy of God to bestow"; and again, "Seek from God those things which you cannot receive from man"; and below, "Unless you ask of God what you have, you will not perpetually retain it." Wherefore Boethius too, in *On the Consolation of Philosophy* V, last prose, speaks thus: "There remains a watcher above, foreknowing all things — God, dispensing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil; nor are hopes and prayers placed in God in vain, which when they are right cannot be ineffectual."

Further still, the knowledge of God is shown evidently through the glorious miracles done for His worshippers, often performed when they cried to Him in their necessities — concerning which the thirty-second part of the first Corollary of this book treated more fully.

Again: if God did not know any present things whatsoever, then a foolish man would know, and a beast would recognize many things which the most perfect God would be ignorant of. Again: if God knew some present things and not all, it is possible for the most blessed God to be deceived and to err, and to be exceedingly miserable. Wherefore Aristotle in *Metaphysics* III.15 leads Empedocles, who held that anything is known by its like and that God does not have hatred, to

this impossible consequence: that the most blessed God would be less prudent than others. For He does not know all the elements, since He has no hatred; and notice indeed comes from like to like. And in *On the World* 11 he likens King Xerxes, who understood all things through his ministers, to God, who sees and hears all things. The very name of God in the Greek language testifies the same: for God in Greek is called *Theos* from *theoro*, which means "to see," because He sees all things. Wherefore Avicenna also, *Metaphysics* VIII.6, says: "The Necessary Being does not understand whatever is except universally; and yet with this no singular is lacking to Him, and therefore there is not lacking to Him that which is exceeding in heaven and on earth; and this is among the marvels which only one of subtle wit can imagine." Wherefore Sextus also in his *Maxims* admonishes: "Never think the wisdom of God to be insensible"; and again, "The thought of man is not hidden from God; and therefore let your thought be pure from all evil"; and below: "By no means will the one acting unjustly be hidden from God, nor even the one thinking it." With whom Ptolemy also concordantly, as is recited in the first prologue of the *Almagest*, says: "It is fitting that the intelligent should be ashamed before God when he thinks those things which are not pleasing to Him."

Further: there is some agent intellect that produces all our intellectual cognition and the science we have, as the Philosopher proves in *On the Soul* III.17, and Averroes there; and Avicenna *On the Soul* V.5; and al-Ghazali *Physics* V.1. Now this agent intellect, if it be God, the point is gained; but if, with Avicenna *Metaphysics* IX.3 and al-Ghazali *Physics* V.1, it be said to be the lowest intelligence of the heavens, namely of the orb of the Moon, then this knows all things; and if it knows all things, how then should the supreme Intelligence, God, be ignorant of any of these? Further: since any intelligence below God is of itself potential to understanding, just as it is to being, as appears from Book II of this work, who reduces its potentiality to act? Who perfects it and sustains it in act? Who makes it actually understanding, except the supreme Intelligence God, who from Himself and through Himself most actually always perseveres in understanding? This supreme Intelligence God therefore effects and preserves every act of understanding in every inferior intellectual nature, as the third, fourth, and second [parts] of this work plainly manifest. This view concerning the agent intellect — namely, that it is God — is confirmed by the Philosopher in *On Good Fortune* II, who says: "It is plain, just as in the whole God moves all things in some manner, so the divine principle of reason within us is not reason but something better; for what then will be better than science and intellect, unless God? For virtue, namely, is God's instrument of intellect." And below in *Secret of Secrets*, Part 1, ch. 1: "God," he says, "pours forth His riches abundantly into the souls of the wise, and bestows upon students the grace of knowing — to whom nothing is difficult, without whom nothing is possible to be possessed." The same in Part 2, ch. 1, of the same says: "God most high and glorious has revealed many things meditable, and very many other things, to His holy prophets, and to certain others whom He had foreordained, and illumined them with the spirit of divine wisdom, and adorned them with the gifts of knowledge." And Averroes intends the same on *On the Soul* III, comments 25 and 36, and on *On Sleep and Waking*, where he assigns the cause of true dreams; and on *Metaphysics* XII, comments 18 and 38. The Platonists also, as Augustine recites

in *City of God* VIII.7, said that God Himself is the light of minds for learning all things — by whom all things were made. The same is testified by the prayers of Plato and Hermes recited above. For how would they ask of God that knowledge be given them, unless He Himself were the Lord and teacher of knowledge? Wherefore Plato, *Timaeus* II.15, says that "no greater good than philosophy ever passed to the human race by divine munificence." And Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 35: "To Thee, supreme God," he says, "I give thanks, who hast illumined me with the light for seeing divinity." And below at the end: "Thanks," he says, "be to Thee, most supreme, most exalted. For by Thy grace alone have we obtained so great a light of knowledge of Thee, since Thou deignest to bestow upon all paternal piety and religion, love, and whatever sweeter efficacy there is."

From these things it is therefore clear that God knows all things now present; and by the same reasonings it will likewise be shown that He always knew, and will know, all things which were then, or will be, present. And since by the fifth [part] of this book He learns nothing anew, nor loses anything once known, He Himself always knows all things present, past, and future. Whence also Aristotle in *On Good Fortune* II says: "God well sees the future and the present, and the things whose ratio has perished" — that is, the past. With whom Ammonius accords on *Peri Hermeneias* I, last [section], thus writing: "It must indeed be said that the gods know all things made, existing, and future, in a manner befitting gods; and this is by one, determinate, and infallible knowledge — wherefore indeed it must also be said that they comprehend the science of contingents." And below: "It is the nature of the gods themselves," he says, "to know contingent things; and on this account, while these things, having an indeterminate nature, can both happen and not happen, they nevertheless, as it were by a more noble mode than is their own nature, foretaking the cognition of them, know these things determinately. For it is necessary that they know divisible things indivisibly, and things-without-distance, and things multiplied unitively, and temporal things eternally, and generable things ingenerably." Wherefore also Avicenna *On the Soul* IV.2 says: "All things which are in the world — past, present, and future — have being in the wisdom of the Creator." Hermes moreover, *On the Eternal Word* 9, says: "Nor is it credible that what has pleased God should displease Him, since He has long known beforehand the future, and that the same would please." And below at 30, he says that "divinity is the foreknowledge of all things." The foreknowledge of God is also specially proved by clear prophecies, clear visions, and truthful dreams, true presagings of things to come — concerning all of which the thirty-second part of the first Corollary of this book has more fully treated.

In this view all the philosophers of whom I have heard agree, except one, who in this matter is no philosopher but rather a windbag and a sophist — nay, he does not even merit the name of sophist, since he has no semblance of one. For this Cicero wrote a rather large book *On Divination*, in which, by reciting the most truthful dreams of many — or rather the clearest visions — he lucidly demonstrated divination through dreams. But, fallen to the contrary side, he answers all things, solving none, by denying every divination and foreknowledge of any kind

whatsoever; who also, with sacrilegious daring placing his mouth in heaven, broke forth into such blind blasphemy as to deny that God Himself foreknew the future — saying perhaps with the fool, with the fool in his heart, "There is no God"; or otherwise, more foolishly and tastelessly than the foolish, was wise, namely that God is, and that He is foolish and ignorant of the future. Now further: astrologers and physicians often by natural signs prognosticate and predict many future things; how then does God not know any of those future things? How also have geomancers, necromancers, augurs, and other diviners — yes, and the gods of the Gentiles — often spoken many true things, as your many histories, Marcus the Roman, attest, without any knowledge or at least probable conjecture concerning future things? And if they themselves had even a small such knowledge, or some most slender conjecture however weak, yet true, who not knowing — or rather, going mad — will dare to assert that God is ignorant of future things, when, by the first Supposition and the third and fourth parts of the first Corollary of this book, it must necessarily follow that He knows them infinitely more perfectly?

Further: if God, according to what has been laid down, has knowledge of all things present, past, and likewise future — since to know actually and particularly, distinctly and certainly, is more perfect than to know only habitually, potentially and universally, confusedly and uncertainly — God knows all things in those modes; nay, He knows all things supremely, and according to the highest of those modes, as the first Supposition and the third and fourth parts lucidly manifest.

COROLLARY.

It has a corollary, that God has distinct knowledge of all things — not only of present, past, and future, but also of all possibles and impossibles, of all things imaginable and knowable in any way; whence also He may truly be called Omniscient, just as He is Omnipotent.

Whence also it evidently follows that our most wise God not only has knowledge of this kind of all things present, past, and future, but also of all possibles and impossibles, of all things imaginable and knowable in any way whatever; whence also He may truly be called Omniscient, just as Omnipotent. This Corollary, or porism, is easily demonstrated through the foregoing, just as the prior conclusion. These things I have said against those who have not proved that God has in His knowledge — *"The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God of Jacob understand"* — and who believe that all worldly things, destitute of all governance, are driven by chance motions. But because in this no Catholic even slightly hesitates, I have thought no Catholic authority needs to be adduced, although the whole series of both Testaments most fully testifies to this.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters 7–12

CHAPTER VII. HE OBJECTS AGAINST [CHAPTER] SIX, AND RESOLVES [THE OBJECTIONS].

Here perhaps some sophistical sower of words will object in this manner: To every multitude it is fitting at least imaginably to add a unit; therefore [it is fitting to add one] to the multitude of all things known by God. But if such a unit be added, it follows that God does not distinctly know that whole second [C] multitude, since one of its units, namely, that newly added one, He does not know. Likewise, let A be the multitude of all imaginable points known by God, B the multitude of all imaginable souls known by God, C the multitude of all imaginable angels known by God, and D the multitude composed of B and C alone; then A is equal to B and C taken separately, and therefore less than D. It can therefore be increased imaginably to equality with that [D]; but if this be supposed, God does not know that whole multitude A so increased distinctly. Likewise, suppose, according to Aristotle's view, that the world is eternal in the past, and let A be the multitude of all past days in the divine mind, according to that prophetic saying, "I have meditated on the days of old, and have had the eternal years in mind"; and let B be the multitude of all past years, eclipses, or equinoxes; then A is greater than B. This is plain: for as the days of one year stand to that year, so all the days taken together stand to all the years taken together; [D] and the same is to be thought concerning the multitude of eclipses and equinoxes. Otherwise, A would also be equal to B, and so the part to the whole. By the same reasoning also, the multitude of all hours and minutes whatsoever, indeed even of instants, would be equal to the multitude of eclipses, equinoxes, common years and great years, and indeed even to the multitude of myriads of years of any kind whatever; and therefore even the multitude of all past instants simply would be equal to the multitude of equinoctial, eclipsal, annual, and myriadal instants — that is, those which begin or terminate eclipses, lesser or greater years, or myriads of years — which who would concede? Therefore A is greater than B. But if you concede this, let there be distributed, imaginably or truly, in the divine mind, one [unit] of yesterday's day and the next unit of B — that is, one and the next past eclipse — and to the day before yesterday the eclipse next before that, and so onwards always proceeding continuously and retrogressively; and at length, the whole distribution being completed, to each unit of A there will correspond equally one unit of B, and conversely, which is most clearly evident. Otherwise, somewhere in [E] some past day such a distribution of units of B would cease, and since that day is distant from the present day by finitely many days only, B would have only finitely many units. Therefore the units of A and B mutually correspond to one another equally; therefore those whole multitudes are equal. Indeed, B is even greater than A by as much as you please — by double, by tenfold, and so on. For to each unit of A let there be distributed, in the manner described before, two, or ten, or however many units of B you wish, and so on, as above. Therefore God does not distinctly know such whole multitudes, and therefore not any infinite multitude.

Likewise, I can imagine, at least fictitiously, something which God does not understand; and so I do, and I understand it. Therefore I understand something which God does not understand; and so I do, and I understand that which God does not understand. To the same effect: when you hear

something uttered which God does not understand, [A] you understand something by what is uttered; therefore you understand what God does not understand; therefore God does not understand all intelligible things.

Likewise, if God understands all intelligible things, and yet cannot do them all (because He cannot do impossible things), He is more intelligent than He is powerful; therefore He is not omnipotent, nor of infinite power: for everything less than another is finite. To the same: if His power is less than His intelligence, it could at least imaginably be increased to equality with it, and so He could become more powerful than He is now.

Likewise, the multitude of all really existing points, or even of possible or imaginable points, is simply infinite. For otherwise yet one further point could be added to them, and so the first multitude posited as that of all points would not be of all points. Therefore that multitude fills and satiates the whole capacity of the divine intelligence. For it is not in any respect less than it, since otherwise it would be in some way finite, and not simply infinite.

Likewise, if God understands all things, then either confusedly or distinctly. Not confusedly, on account of the preceding chapter; nor distinctly, because then He would have in Himself certain things, and as many things really distinct, as He distinctly knows. For some really distinct things are necessarily required for making any distinction, as appears from the demonstration in part 36 of Corollary 1 of this [book]. [B] Nor can anyone concede a multitude — whether infinite or finite — of really diverse cognitive habits or acts in God, on account of part 26 of Corollary 1 of this [book].

Likewise, the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* XII.51, by many arguments shows that God does not understand anything other than Himself; and there Averroes shows that the knowledge of God is not universal, since universal knowledge implies potency with respect to singulars, and there is no potency in His knowledge, as he supposes; nor is it particular, as he argues, since particulars are infinite, and are not determined by knowledge. Therefore the proposition is plain.

Likewise, the Lord says to certain ones: "Amen I say to you, I do not know you," Matthew 25; and above, in the same [Gospel], chapter 24: "But of that day and hour no one knows, neither the angels of heaven, nor the Son." And Genesis 22: "God tempted Abraham," and after the experience said to Abraham, "Now I know that thou fearest God"; therefore He did not know this beforehand, or He spoke vainly thus. And Exodus 16: "The Lord said to Moses, I will rain bread for you from heaven, and let the people gather, [C] that I may tempt them, whether they will walk in my law, or not." And Deuteronomy 13: "The Lord your God tempts you, that He may openly know whether you love Him or not." And Jeremiah 11 it is written thus: "I did not know, because they had thought up counsels."

Likewise, the saints frequently rouse the Lord that He may know, saying: "Hear, see, understand, remember, O Lord, this or that"; "Be mindful, think upon, recall" — as appears most frequently in Scripture, which would not be so if He always knew all things actually and distinctly. And

Scripture often commemorates God as sometimes remembering some things, and forgetting some things, and repenting of some things.

Likewise, Tobit 12, Raphael said: "I offered your prayer to the Lord."

Likewise, Jerome, on Habakkuk 1, "He shall make the face of man as the fishes of the sea, and as the creeping things that have no ruler," says: "It is absurd to bring down the divine majesty to this — that He should know moment by moment how many gnats are born or die, what number of fleas and flies there is, how many fish swim in the waters, and the like."

Likewise, that God does not know all true contingents concerning the future seems [to follow]; because this would be either necessarily or [D] contingently. Not necessarily, because they are not necessarily true, and therefore not necessarily known. Nor contingently, because then He could not know them; and because nothing not true is known by God, every true contingent contingently is not true; therefore at least, as far as possibility goes, no true contingent is contingently known by God. For the Philosopher teaches in *Prior Analytics* I, where he treats of the mixture of contingent and *de inesse* [premises], that with the major premise *de inesse* (not as "now," or "at this time," but simply), and the minor concerning a contingent in either direction, the conclusion follows concerning a contingent as far as the possible. The same is proved thus: Every true contingent contingently is not true; therefore let it be posited as actual, and the proposition is had. The mode of arguing is plain by the Philosopher in the place above cited, who proves the said mixture by this: that from the opposite of the conclusion (which will be a necessary one), and the minor posited as actual, there follows, in the mixture of necessary and *de inesse* shown previously, a conclusion of the necessary which infers the opposite of the first major premise.

[E] But to this fool sophistically chattering against the divine wisdom, according to the counsel of the Wise One, it is fitting to respond according to his folly, lest he seem wise to himself. It can therefore be said, not improbably, in the first place, that this argument does not impugn the divine knowledge: for if anyone concedes that there is some multitude of all things known by God, he will deny to you the other thing you assume — namely, that to every multitude another unit can be added — and will say that this is true only of a finite multitude, to which infinite units necessarily are lacking, but not of a simply infinite multitude, which contains all units.

Or perhaps, may it not be said in another way, no less probably, that this little argument does not stand against, nor resist, the divine knowledge? For it argues equally that there is no multitude of all imaginable or knowable things, as that God has no knowledge of such a multitude. For that God does not know such a multitude can be conceived in two ways: either because such a multitude exists and God does not know it, which no one suspects unless ignorantly or lightly; [A] or because no such multitude exists in any mode of being, and therefore is not intelligible or knowable in any way — just as it is not knowable that man is non-man, ass, or lion. And this seems to be sayable not implausibly. For if there were any multitude of all imaginable, or

knowable, things simply, there would also be some multitude of all imaginable or knowable points, of all such souls, and likewise of angels, as the following argument touches.

Let A therefore be the multitude of all imaginable or knowable points, B of all such souls, C of all such angels; and D the whole multitude composed of B and C alone, as was posited above. Of these three multitudes, then, each is, as it seems, equal to each: for no reason can be given why this should exceed that rather than the contrary. If, moreover, one of these — say B — be less than another — say C — it can be imaginably increased to equality with it. Therefore B did not from the beginning contain all imaginable souls; and C could be diminished to equality [B] with B and yet still contain all imaginable angels — for nothing would be subtracted from it, since if anything were, how much? Who would reasonably say how much? — which involves a contradiction. Therefore these three multitudes, A, B, C, are each equal to each, and D is double each of them taken singly, as the premises show, near the last part of Corollary 1 of this [book].

It seems therefore possible for A to be increased imaginably to equality with D. For why cannot a lesser number be increased, at least according to imagination, to equality with a greater, just as conversely? Indeed, I imagine A as equal to D. For I imagine each unit of D to have one proper point of its own. Why, I ask, could not the multitude of such irrational unit-points be, or be imagined to be, equal to the multitude of rational units of souls and angels? What hinders? What resists? Indeed, I imagine each soul and angel to have within itself ten, a hundred, or however many species or likenesses of things known you wish. These therefore are more numerous than those; and why can I not imagine as many points? Indeed, I imagine each species [C] to be a point, or to possess its own point. I imagine moreover each soul and angel to be turned into new points, while the prior points remain. Is not therefore the whole multitude of imaginable points augmented? I imagine likewise that each point and each soul is turned into an angel, while the prior angels remain; is not therefore the whole multitude of imaginable angels imaginably increased?

To these things, moreover, let E be the multitude of all imaginable luminous points, and F the multitude of all imaginable dark points, and G the multitude composed from them. Either E is equal to A, or less. Not equal, because it is part of it just as part of G, and because then it would be equal to its whole G. Nor less, because by the same reasoning it would be less than B and C taken separately, which can be destroyed by the previous arguments. I imagine moreover that every point becomes luminous; therefore the multitude E is made equal to the multitude A. The like can be argued concerning souls and angels, supposing some multitude to be of all imaginable wise or good souls, and another to be of all imaginable [D] foolish or evil souls; and concerning the angels in like manner, etc., as above.

Furthermore, a similar prior-argument could be made concerning men whole in body and soul, concerning their hands, fingers, teeth, and hairs; nay, even concerning the points of their bodies. For given the hypothesis, it follows evidently that any multitude of all such imaginable things — say of men, or of human bodies — would be equal to any like multitude — say of hands, of

fingers, of teeth, of hairs, indeed even of points. From these things, as it seems, it can not improbably appear that there is no multitude of all imaginable or knowable things in any species — of points, of souls, or the like — and therefore not universally of all things; just as there is also no multitude of all finite imaginable things, nor any multitude of all those things that are not all, although there are many things which are not all; nor any multitude of all things that are few, even in the divine persons three [in number]; nor any multitude of all things compossible from the number of four signified possible contradictories.

Yet to no one ought it to be doubtful [E] that every multitude of knowable things in any way whatever, and any multitude whatever of knowable things, is most distinctly known by God, as the next preceding [chapter] teaches. And if you still do not cease to chatter on — "therefore God does not know how many points He knows" — nay rather, He does know, for He knows that He knows two; and if you understand by "how many" "however many at the most or greatest, so that no more," there is perhaps someone who will concede this — not because God is ignorant of any multitude of points or any points, but because there is no multitude of all the points He knows, as the previous [arguments] persuaded.

For in like manner you would have to concede that God does not know how many finite points He knows; that He does not know how many sides or angles He knows can be contained in a rectilineal, equilateral, and equiangular figure; that He does not know how many feet He knows can be in the circumference or diameter of a circle; [A] that He does not know into how many equal parts He knows a continuum can be simultaneously and actually divided. Indeed, perhaps — what to some seems more wonderful — that God does not know that finite points can be as many as He knows finite points can be; that God does not know that a finite rectilineal [figure] can have as many equal sides and equal angles as He knows a finite rectilineal [figure] can have; that God does not know that a circle can be as great as He knows a circle can be; that God does not know that a continuum can be divided into as many parts as He knows it can be divided; that God does not know what the common measure is which measures together the side of a square and its diameter — although He knows full well concerning quadrangles; that He does not know which are all things that are not all, which are all the things that are fewer than three, which are all the divine persons fewer than three divine persons, although He knows well that all the many things fewer than three are two. And all this is not on account of any defect of knowledge or cognition in God, but because these things are not knowable, like falsehoods and impossibilities; and therefore they cannot be comprehended by knowledge.

That which is consequently argued [concerning past days, etc.] is solved perhaps by [B] the same point: for it does not derogate from the divine knowledge, but rather rejects [the existence of] such a multitude. For with Aristotle's opinion posited, perhaps no multitude exists of all the days, years, eclipses, or equinoxes prior in the divine mind, nor outside it — just as there is no multitude of all the finite ones of these, nor of all those of them which are not all; yet God most distinctly knows every multitude of these past things, and all these past things. Or perhaps by this argument leading to an impossibility, Aristotle's opinion can be rejected and the opposite

demonstrated; since according to his opinion, just as there is some whole infinite time, so there is also some whole infinite multitude of all days, months, and other such things, as the Corollary of the first [chapter] touches.

Some will perhaps respond by confessing that A and B and all such multitudes are mutually coequal. But this insolence has been refuted before. And when you further propose that you can imagine, at least fictitiously, something that God does not understand, and so proceed further — O you who are less than understanding! Why are you unwilling to understand that by your own sword [C] you can likewise be struck back? For if you can imagine in any way that God does not understand [something], why can you not likewise imagine that you yourself do not understand? Since there are many — and far more — things you do not understand than you distinctly understand. And why do you not further deduce from this that you understand something which you do not understand? And when further with foolish mouth you bubble forth foolishness, saying, "When you hear something uttered which God does not understand, you understand something by what is uttered" — out of your own mouth I judge you by your own words: "When you hear something uttered which you do not understand, you understand something by what is uttered," and so on, as before. But this folly I leave to those men to chew on further, by whom that which is foolish of God is accepted as wiser [than they are].

When it is argued that, if God understands all things, He understands more than He can [do], it must be said that whatever God understands, He can understand. Therefore it does not follow that God is more intelligent than He is powerful. But if you speak of being able to produce externally, in this way — not properly but very improperly — He is more intelligent than He is powerful, because with respect to whatever He is [D] able [to do], He is intelligent, but not conversely. And so it does not further follow that He is not omnipotent. For He is truly called omnipotent because He can [do] every possible thing, not because He can [do] every imaginable thing or what can be feigned to be — as Lombard proves in *Sentences* I, distinction 42. Although there, by the sayings of the saints, he likewise shows that God is called omnipotent because He can do whatever He wills, which can fittingly be understood thus: that He is truly called omnipotent because He can [do] whatever He wills — that is, whatever can be willed by Him to be done; and this is every possible thing, as has been said. And He is likewise said to be of infinite productive power as to the outside, because His power is not bounded to some possible, nor to certain possibles, which He cannot.

The other argument concerning the multitude of all real possible or imaginable points does not proceed. For just as it argues that this multitude fills and satiates the whole capacity of the divine intellect, so it could be argued that the same would fill and satiate the whole capacity of being or possibility of being, so that nothing else could exist. The same is also otherwise solved by the premises.

[E] To the next [argument] I say that God most distinctly understands all things, not by any distinct things in Him, but only by His most singular and most simple clarity, which from the

multitude of His infinite virtue and strength is equivalent — nay, incomparably surpasses — every multitude of likenesses, exemplars, ideas, habits, acts, and accidents whatsoever, as the third and fourth parts of Corollary 1 teach. And this is what most faithful and most eloquent Isaiah testifies in chapter 40, saying: "Lift up your eyes on high, and see who hath created these things; who bringeth out their host by number, and calleth them all by name; by the greatness of his might, and strength, and power, not one was missing" — that is, according to the gloss, alien from his number and knowledge.

The philosophical authorities alleged to the contrary are to be understood concerning beings of finite strength and virtue. Such beings, as it appears, cannot distinctly know anything except through certain [things] correspondingly [A] distinct — unless perhaps this is by that divine clarity, supplying in them, by its infinite virtue, the office of such distinct things.

For the authority of the Philosopher, it must be said that he does not intend to prove that God does not understand anything other than Himself, but he proves these three things: that God does not understand in potency; that God is His own intelligence; and that God does not understand anything other than Himself in such a way that He should be acted upon, and causally perfected by it, like the human intellect — which can be apparent to those who read, and are not negligent of, that chapter with the expositions of Averroes, Thomas, and other Doctors.

For that Gospel saying which follows, it is to be known that God's knowledge is twofold: namely, of simple cognition or notice, and of approbation and complacency, which adds to simple cognition or notice approbation, good pleasure, and complacency of the will. This distinction appears through Blessed Gregory in *Moralia* XXV, last [chapter], treating that text of Matthew 25, "Amen, I say to you, I do not know you"; nor can it be otherwise understood except that He does not approve, or reproves, those whom He thus does not know. For He knows by simple [B] notice those to whom He will so speak. Whence also the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 8: "If any man love God, the same is known by him." This distinction also Lombard alleges, *Sentences* I, distinction 36, from Cassiodorus on the Psalter, and from Augustine likewise, and in his book to Helvidius, where he says: "If you refer it to knowledge, God is not ignorant of those to whom He shall say, 'I do not know you'; but their reproof is insinuated by this word." And in *Eighty-three Questions*, 60: "When God is said not to know, it is said for this — that He does not approve; that is, in His discipline and doctrine He does not acknowledge." And there he subjoins a third sense of the same saying: "It is said, 'I do not know you,' for this reason — that He profitably makes them not to know what it is unprofitable to know"; and so God is said not to know, in the sense of making not to know.

There he likewise expounds the other authorities objected: "Just as," he says, "God is said to know also when He makes someone know, as it is written, 'The Lord your God tempts you, that He may know if you love Him.' For it is not so said because God does not know, but that they themselves may know how much they have advanced in His love, which is not fully known by men except by trials. Therefore it is well taken what is said, that the Father alone [C] knows of

that day, because He alone makes the Son to know; and what is said, that the Son does not know, because He makes men not to know — that is, He does not bring forth to them that which they would know unprofitably." And this last mode of speaking of Scripture he proves in *On the Trinity* I.12 efficaciously, and diffusely in *On Genesis* V.20, and on the title of Psalm 6; and the same exposition appears through the glosses on the places previously alleged. Whence on the text of Genesis 22, "God tempted Abraham," the Gloss says, "that He might make known to him the perfection which He Himself was not ignorant of"; and on the text below, in the same chapter, "Now I know," etc. — that is, "I have made him to know."

For the others which follow, it must be said that God's hearing, seeing, and the like can be understood in three ways. *Properly*, as they import the operations or proper passions of the senses, and so they do not pertain to God: for He is not an animal, nor has He bodily senses. *Transumptively*, and this in two ways: namely, either as they import divine cognition or affection — and the saints do not understand it thus when they say, "Lord, hear, see," or anything similar (for in these things [the divine knowledge] always uniformly remains the same); or as they import the extrinsic work and effect of divine cognition or affection, [D] and so the saints understand it when they pray.

And because, according to the Philosopher in *Topics* VI, "All who transfer [terms metaphorically] transfer them according to some likeness," this likeness was the cause why such things are transferred by men to God. Men, when they see or hear, are angered and appeased; they know and are interiorly affected, whence also they exteriorly operate. Therefore these causes are often figuratively put for their effects: as "hand" for "writing," when we say of good handwriting, "this is a good hand"; and "tongue" for "speech," when we say, "He spoke in the English tongue," or "in Latin" — that is, in such speech. And this is the 33rd rhetorical color of the embellishment of words, as Tully in book II at the end of his *Rhetoric* makes clear, from which the denomination is denominated. There is also in such cases the second mode of equivocation, or amphiboly, since the diction or speech is taken transumptively, when we are accustomed to speak thus, as appears through the Philosopher in *Sophistical Refutations* I, where he ascertains and clarifies the doubtful and obscure meanings of amphiboly. Which mode of speaking in sacred Scripture is sometimes transferred not only to God, but even to inanimate things. For [E] the Lord says in Hosea 2: "I will hear the heavens, and they shall hear the earth, and the earth shall hear the wheat, the wine, and the oil, and these shall hear Israel."

Whence Augustine on the text of Psalm 118, "Be mindful of thy word to thy servant," speaks thus: "Does forgetfulness, as in man, fall upon God? Why then is it said to Him, 'Remember'?" And he answers: "These things are not understood in God as they happen to men. For just as God is said to repent when, beyond the hope of men, He changes things, His counsel not being changed (because the counsel of the Lord stands forever), so He is said to forget when His help, or what was promised, seems delayed, or when He does not requite the worthy to sinners, or anything of this kind — as if that which is hoped for, or feared, has slipped from His memory and is not done. These things are said in this human manner of speech, by which the human

affection is moved, although God does these things by a certain disposition, His memory not failing, His understanding not obscured, His will not changed. When therefore it is said to Him, 'Remember,' the desire of the petitioner is shown, since he asks the promise; and God is not, as if it had slipped from His mind, admonished. 'Be mindful,' he says, 'of Thy word to Thy servant' — that is, fulfil Thy promise to Thy servant." And in *Eighty-three Questions* 52 he shows the same throughout; and at the end of *On the Repentance of God* he says: "We are not accustomed to change something certain, and to transfer it into another, except by repenting; although divine providence administers all things by a most certain order, yet to humble human understanding, those things which begin to be, and do not endure as long as they were hoped to endure, are said, as it were by the repentance of God, to have been removed." The Gloss also on Genesis 6, where the repentance of God concerning the making of men is treated, says: "Repentance does not fall upon God, whose sentence concerning all things is as fixed as His foreknowledge is certain; but Scripture uses customary words, accommodating itself to our littleness, that from the known we may know the unknown. He seems therefore to repent when He changes the work, while His will and disposition remain immovable." [B] In another way also, "God repents" can be expounded — namely, as bearing Himself after the manner of one who repents; for which the Gloss on 1 Samuel 15, "It repents me that I made Saul king," says: "That is, I shall do as one repenting, by destroying his kingdom." And this exposition agrees with Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions* 52, alleged above; with which Anselm also agrees, in *Cur Deus Homo* I.9, expounding the text in Luke 2, "Jesus advanced in wisdom," etc. He says: "Not that it was so, but that He bore Himself thus, as if it were so." And this is what Lombard says, *Sentences* III, distinction 13, last [section].

What is alleged concerning Raphael — that he offered Tobit's prayer to the Lord — does not conclude that the Lord did not know it before, and learned it then from him. Rather, that he offered the prayer before the Lord was nothing else than to consult the divine will concerning such a prayer — whether and how much, when, or how it ought to be heard. Or perhaps Raphael's offering Tobit's prayer to the Lord was to commend it to the Lord by his own prayers. Whence Augustine, on Genesis V.19, says thus: "Not indeed for the knowledge of inferior things does He need messengers, as if through them He should become more knowing, [C] but in that simple and wonderful mode He knows all things stably and unchangeably. Yet He has messengers for our sake, and for their own sake, since to obey and assist God in this manner — to consult Him concerning lower things, and to obey His precepts and commands — is good for them in the order of their proper nature and substance."

The authority of Jerome resolves itself, in this — that he said "moment by moment." For God knows all things at once and always, not by alternations of time; just as the things known begin to be or cease in the human manner — since with Him there is no alteration, nor shadow of vicissitude (James 1, and chapter 5 has demonstrated). It is also resolved by what he subjoins consequently: "Let us not," he says, "be so foolish flatterers of God, that while we thrust His providence even down to the lowest things, we be injurious to ourselves, saying that the same care is for irrational and rational things." Jerome therefore wishes to deny to God the knowledge

by which He provides for irrational creatures as for rational ones; for to these He has appointed laws, and rewards or punishments eternal, but not to those. And this is what the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians [D] 9: "Doth God take care for oxen?" — that is, such care as directs them in merits and crowns them in rewards — although, according to the Wise One, Wisdom 6 and 12, "God's care is over all," that is, by which "He reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly" in His ways. And these are the responses of Lombard, *Sentences* I, distinction 39.

That mixed argument can be easily excluded: for as it argues against the divine knowledge, so it can be argued against the truth of contingents themselves. For nothing not true is true; every true contingent in either direction contingently is not true, therefore it is contingent for the possible; no true contingent is true; therefore it is contingent that neither part of the contradiction in such things is true, but both equally false. So therefore from this logical, not theological, snare the theologians are extricated, and the logicians are entangled.

CHAPTER VIII. [E] THAT GOD HAS VOLITION AND LOVE BOTH GENERALLY AND SPECIALLY TOWARD WHATEVER [EXISTS].

Now it consequently remains to show that God has volition and love generally and specially toward all things; since, according to what has been previously [shown], God conserves, makes, and moves all things, and not without cognition and a wisdom disposing — as the sixth [chapter] of this [book] showed. But these things, without will, conserve nothing, make nothing, nor move anything: for His knowledge alone, by itself, is as much of impossibles as of possibles, and of possibles which will never be done as of things to be done; and as much of past things as of future; and as much of remote future things as of those near at hand; and as much of all future things [A] as of present things, which are now actually being done or are conserved as already done. If therefore knowledge alone, of itself, made or preserved anything, it would always and at once make all the aforesaid things.

Likewise, divine cognition of itself appears indifferent to making or not making; nay, it does not, of itself alone, appear factive. Therefore it can effect nothing unless it be limited by something determining; but this can be posited as nothing other than divine actual volition.

Likewise, it appears thus in the production of things by God, as in the production of progressive motion in an animal. In the latter, knowledge alone does not suffice, but with this, appetite is required, as Aristotle proves in *On the Soul* III, where he inquires the principle of this motion. He proves first that it is not the vegetative power; second, that it is not the sensitive power; third, that it is not reason, nor speculative or practical intellect; fourth, that not even appetite is master of this motion; fifth, that these two — namely, phantasy and appetite, or intellect and will — move the animal progressively. These things appear through Averroes there more expressly, comment 44 and following; and the same is proved in *On the Motion of Animals* [B] manifestly.

Likewise, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* IX.7: "Every artificer loves his work, and every benefactor loves the one who is well-treated, that is, the one to whom he does good — and this more than he is loved in return." And all things are works of God the highest Artificer, as the foregoing have taught, and His benefits most liberally distributed.

Likewise, because otherwise God would not preserve nor act, nor act freely; for no action is free which does not proceed from a free will. And so a peasant or servile man would be freer than God. Otherwise also God would have no will (against the eighth part of Corollary 1 of this [book]), or He could not use His own will — with other infinite absurdities. Moreover, the free and voluntary mode of operating outwardly is better and nobler than the other, and therefore the rational power, which operates in such a manner, is reckoned nobler than the irrational, which operates otherwise. This mode therefore of operating outwardly toward whatever is to be attributed to God, witness the third part of Corollary 1 of this [book].

This same view also certain authorities cited in the second [chapter] of this work clearly attest. And Algazel says, *Metaphysics* III, sentence 7: "The First is willing, [C] and all things flow from Him, and they are pleasing to Him, nor does He hate any of them." This was looked upon from afar by the ancient Empedocles. For he, as Aristotle reports in *Metaphysics* III.15, posited two general principles of things, namely Love and Hatred; but in God he posited love toward all things, without hatred of anything. With which the Wise One agrees in Wisdom 11, addressing the Lord thus: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things that Thou hast made; for how could anything endure if Thou hadst not willed it? Or be preserved which were not called by Thee?"

CHAPTER IX. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF EVERY THING MADE, THE MOVER OR MOTRIX OF EVERY MOTION, AND UNIVERSALLY [D] THE MOST LOVING GENETRIX, NURTURER, AND LIFE-GIVING CONSERVATRIX OF ALL.

To this should be joined, I judge, [the proposition] that the divine will is the efficient cause of every thing made, the mover or motrix of every motion, and universally the most loving genetrix and life-giving conservatrix of all things. This whole follows manifestly from chapters 3, 4, and 2, with the next preceding [chapter]. It can also be confirmed by certain rational arguments and by philosophical and theological authorities.

For in causes of this kind there is no infinite progress, by the second supposition; therefore there is some one first cause of all, which is God, as has been shown above. But this cannot be posited [E] as God in His absolute essence, since this, as far as it depends upon itself, stands equally and indifferently to possibles which will never come to be, as to things to be made; and to remote future things, as to those near; and to things moved, as to things at rest. Therefore all these things would similarly and equally be always [in being] — especially because, if anything were made

by His essence alone, without any will, it would be made by the mode of nature and necessity, like the effects of natural causes (since freedom is placed in the will alone). And such natural causes, when they can [act], with the due disposition of the patient supposed, necessarily and always act. For in this these causes differ from voluntary causes participating reason, as appears in *Metaphysics* IX.10, and likewise in the commentary. Wherefore, since all inferior or secondary causes in any of their causations are necessarily subjected [A] to the first cause, all their causations, as also any causation of the first cause, would proceed from the necessity of nature, and altogether absolute. Therefore universally all freedom, contingency, and merit would be destroyed.

For it does not befit the natural order of causes that the inferior secondary cause should be freer than the supreme first, nor is it possible in any way. For this is the regulator in all things, that the necessarily regulated in all things; this the subjecter, that the subjected; this the preceding and dominating, that the following in all things and the handmaid.

Also, if God acted outwardly purely naturally, He would act according to the utmost of His power, and therefore necessarily of infinite [power]; and every effect of His would be simply infinite and equal to Himself, since He can do more than every lesser thing, as the first supposition shows. Nor can the cause of all such things be posited as the divine cognition alone, as the next preceding chapter showed. Therefore no such sufficient cause remains, unless the divine will be posited.

Likewise, whoever acts something freely, acts it voluntarily; but God acts freely whatever He acts outwardly. For thus to act is more perfect; otherwise also the giving of [B] thanks would be irrational, and the prayers of all toward God vain.

Likewise, otherwise God would have no will, or would not use His own will in all the aforesaid effects which are from Him, as has been shown above — which yet, without doubt, more befits Him.

This same is attested by many philosophers. For learned Plato, *Timaeus* I.1, where he treats of the generation of the world, speaking of God says thus: "He was the best from the best; envy, moreover, was far removed. So consequently He willed all things to be made similar to Himself, in proportion as the nature of each was capable of beatitude. Which will of God, indeed, if anyone posits as the most certain origin of things, I think he rightly judges." Behold, as to the production of things by God; for the conservation of things by God he holds the same view in [Timaeus] II.3, as is more fully reported in chapter 2 of this [book].

With him also his disciple Aristotle agrees, in *On the World* 13, when he says universally that what the sailor or pilot is in a ship — according to another translation, the charioteer in a chariot, the choragus in choruses, the law in a city, the leader in an army or host (according to another translation) — this God is in the world. For He, immobile, [C] moves and bears about all things whither He wills, by diverse ideas and natures.

And below, in the same: "Vines, palms, and Persian fig-trees, sweet [trees] and olives, as the Poet says — and unfruitful ones, whose work is yet for another purpose, like the plane, the pine, the box, the linden, poplars, cypress, and the like; living things also, both domestic and wild, which dwell in the air, on land, or in water, are generated, grow, and are corrupted, obeying divine decrees" (according to another translation, "commands"). But decrees and commands are works of the will.

The same, above, in the same chapter 9: "As when the choragus begins, the whole chorus sings together with various voices, sharp and grave, continuing one continuous harmony, so the case stands with God, who disposes all things. For according to the supernal infusion from the said Choragus, the stars are always moved, and the whole heaven proceeds; the bright Sun, dividing day and night, and the four seasons of the year. There are also rains, and winds, and dews, and passions [of the elements], on account of the first and original cause. There follow from these the flowing of rivers, the inundations of the sea, the rising of trees, the maturing of fruits, the generations of animals, [D] the nourishments and increases of all, and corruptions, the condition of each cooperating to these things. When therefore the Leader of all things (according to another translation, the Prince) and Begetter beckons (according to another translation, commands) to every nature spread between heaven and earth, it is moved continually in its proper circles and bounds (according to another translation, terms); now disappearing, now appearing, showing a thousand ideas (according to another translation, forms), and again hiding, from one principle." To beckon and to command is an operation of the will.

The same in *Secret of Secrets* I, part 23: "The king is in his kingdom as rain in the earth, which is God's grace, the blessing of heaven, the life of the earth, the help of the living; therefore men also praise God, considering the signs of His grace, the gifts of His mercy — namely, rains and winds and other influences which He sends out from the treasury of His mercy, who has unavoidably established by supreme providence the colds and heats of winter and summer." And above [in part] 1, he says that God grants to those who study the grace of knowing. But who does not know that to do grace and mercy, [E] to provide and establish, befits the will?

Nor ought this book to be reckoned among the Apocrypha, because it speaks of the grace and mercy of God, which seem more theological than philosophical terms. For philosophical books well known to all speak of these same things. The Philosopher in *Ethics* X.14 posits a threefold opinion as to how men become good, saying: "Some hold that men become good by nature, some by custom, some by teaching." And he holds that each of these opinions has something of truth; and for the first opinion he subjoins: "That what is from nature, manifestly, does not exist in us, but through some divine cause, and exists in those who are truly fortunate." Where Averroes says: "Some men are thought to be good by nature, and some by teaching; and it is plain that what is in this matter from nature is not from us, but from a certain divine grace; to these also fortune is truly good."

Nor can anyone pretend that by this divine cause, and grace, and fortune, [A] is to be understood only some celestial or stellar influence such as astronomers are wont to dream up in nativities or conceptions; since, according to the same Philosopher in *On Good Fortune* II, "Good fortune is from God, who immediately moves the intellect of the well-fortuned to attaining good fortunes." For he says thus: "What is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? Plainly, as in the whole, namely in the universe. For God moves in some manner all things which are in us; and the divine principle of reason is not reason, but something better. What therefore will be better than knowledge and intellect, except God? For virtue is the instrument of intellect; and on this account those who of old were called well-fortuned are so called who, if they make a rush, succeed without reasoning, and to whom counsel is not expedient — for they have such a principle as is better than intellect and counsel; but those who have reason do not have this, nor have they divine instincts."

Averroes also in the prologue to *Physics* I says that the perfect grace of man is to be perfected by speculative knowledge. And that he understands [this] of the grace which is freely given by God, appears through the same author on *On the Heavens* I, comment [B] 32, where he says that he tarried a long time because he did not understand the explanation of that place where Aristotle proves that there is no motion contrary to circular motion; and he subjoins, "But God led me to the truth." And the same on *On the Soul* II, comment 34, says of the mercy of God: "The divine solicitude, when it could not make the living to remain according to the individual, took mercy in giving it the power by which it can remain according to the species."

This view of the grace of God just mentioned, Hermes also in *On the Eternal Word* at the end attests, as was related in the sixth [chapter] of this [book]; concerning which Sextus the Pythagorean in his *Sentences* says: "The grace of God is not subject to fate."

Furthermore, very many of the ancient philosophers posited the love of God as the original principle of whatever exists; and love is by no means separated from the will. The Philosopher in *Metaphysics* I reports Hesiod and Parmenides as saying that the love of the gods, providing for all, is the principle of the generation of the universe — that love which founded all, which must be in beings and be the cause that moves and assembles things themselves. [C] And Empedocles thought the same, as is reported by the same Philosopher in *Metaphysics* III.15; and in many places of his philosophy he touches on the opinions of those who posit love and hatred, or friendship and strife, as the principles of generation and corruption in beings of any kind. Which is not improbably said, if it be understood that the love or willing of God is the cause why something is generated and endures; and His not-willing is the cause why something is not generated, or does not endure, but the generated is corrupted.

Avicenna also, in the book which he names *Fountain of Life*, proves this same thing diffusely, especially in book 5 from chapter 35 almost to the end, as the second [chapter] of this [book] more fully reported. He also in [chapter] 37 says thus: "All those motions in spiritual and corporal substances are derived from the will; therefore from this it must be that all spiritual and

corporal substances are movable by the will. The example of which is that the will of the soul moves the body, or causes some member of it to rest, as is the rest when the breath is held. And this motion which is diffused in all substances by the will is diverse in strength and weakness on account of the diversity [D] of recipients, not on account of the diversity of the will in itself." And in the last chapter: "Creation is likened to the word which a man speaks; for when a man speaks, by his words his form and understanding is impressed in the hearing of the hearer, and in his understanding. And so it is said that the Sublime and Holy One spoke a word, and His understanding was impressed on matter, and matter retained it — namely, because the created form was impressed on matter and depicted in it."

Likewise, Avicenna in *Metaphysics* IX.7, showing that nothing happens by chance, but that all things proceed from divine care, says thus: "There is no way for you to say that anything is done by chance, since reason induces you to judge that all things are done by governance and disposition. For you must know that the care of these things is from this — that the First knows Himself, and that from Himself is the necessity of the ordering of goodness, and that His essence is the cause of goodness and perfection, in so far as is possible to things, and pleases Him, as has been said." The same in *Metaphysics* X.1: "This whole flows from above, nor does it follow from the imagination of the celestial bodies only, but because the First True knows this whole, therefore from Him begins to be the burden of what is made." And below in the same, [E] of natural and voluntary, celestial and terrestrial things, he says thus: "The collection therefore of all these things proceeds necessarily from the necessity of the divine will." Algazel shows the same in *Metaphysics* III, sentence 7, manifestly: "Because He acts not only from nature, but from knowledge; and every action which is subject to knowledge is subject to the will. Everything therefore that flows from it pleases Him, nor does He hate any of them."

This view also many authorities cited in the second [chapter] of this [book] attest. The same is shown evidently by the Canonical Scripture: for in Apocalypse 4, twenty-four witnesses, beyond all exception, attest this with one voice before Him sitting on the throne, saying: "Worthy art Thou, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power, for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy will they were and have been created." The Psalmist also [A] in Psalm 148, when all the celestial things have been roused in order to praise the Lord, subjoins this cause: "Because He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created"; just as it is also read in Genesis 1, of the works of the six days, "God said, let this be made, and let that be made, and so it was done." But to command is proper to the will, and likewise to say in this place. For Rabbi Moses says in *Guide of the Perplexed* 63: "Word is threefold: that uttered by the tongue, the conception of the mind, and the will. The latter two only befit the Creator." And expounding the text of the Psalm, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established," he says that this signifies that they were brought into being by His intention and will. And after the Psalmist has roused celestial things to praise the Lord together, he likewise next exhorts terrestrial things: "Praise the Lord," he says, "from the earth, ye dragons and all deeps, fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfill His Word" — that is, the precept of His will.

Not only these things, however, but by the same reasoning all other universal things [are caused by the will of God]. [B] Whence Augustine in *On the Trinity* III.8 teaches that of those things which often happen by the customary course of nature — like the risings and settings of the stars, the generations and deaths of animals, the innumerable diversities of seeds and germs, mists and clouds, snows and rains, lightnings and thunders, thunderbolts and hails, winds and fires, cold and heat, and all such things — even of those which happen in the same order, but rarely, like eclipses of the lights, unusual species, monsters of the stars, earthquakes, and all things similar — the first and supreme cause is none other than the will of God. Whence also on the Psalm: "When some things of this kind have been mentioned," says Augustine, "such as fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of tempest, lest anyone should believe these to be done by chance, or only by corporeal causes, or even by spiritual causes existing apart from the will of God, immediately he subjoins: 'which fulfill His Word.'"

Likewise Psalm 134: "All things whatsoever the Lord willed, He has done, in heaven and on earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps." And Judith 9: "This is done, what Thou Thyself hast willed." And many similar [passages] are abundant in Scripture. Likewise Augustine, *On the Trinity* III.4: "The will of God in the heavenly fatherland, in the blessed spirits, as in a lofty seat [C] residing, as in His house and temple — thence indeed by the most ordered motions of the creature, first spiritual, then corporeal, He diffuses Himself through all, and uses all things, according to the unchangeable arbitrament of His sentence — whether incorporeal or corporeal things, whether irrational or rational, spiritual whether good through His grace, whether evil through their own will." And as if through that whole book, in many chapters, he shows that the divine will is the first and supreme cause of all things.

The same in *Enchiridion* 6 says: "It is enough for the Christian to believe that the cause of created things, whether celestial or terrestrial, visible or invisible, is none other than the goodness of the Creator." And the same in *On Genesis Against the Manicheans* I: "The will of God is itself the cause of all things that are. He therefore who says, 'Why did God make heaven and earth?' is to be answered: 'Because He willed it.' For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth." And the same in *On the Questions of Orosius* 39: "Every cause of the creature is the will of the Creator."

Moreover, everything which is, or is made, is and is made by God as Author, He willing it — as appears through Augustine, [D] *Eighty-three Questions* 3, expounding the meaning of the term thus: "When 'by God as Author' is said, it is said 'with His will'; but God is the Author of every thing." For in authors there is not an infinite progress, but there is some first Author of all; and this necessarily will be God. Augustine also says, *On the City of God* XII.5: "There is absolutely no nature of which God is not the Author and Founder." This also is found very often elsewhere; and this is what the whole Church attests in its Paschal joy, hymning thus: "Who is the Author of all things?" etc. Hugh also, *On the Sacraments* book I, part 4, chapters 10 and last, shows that the divine will is the first cause of all things.

From all these things the principal proposition appears in each of its parts. Yet, that I may, from the abundance of reasons already shown, more sensibly manifest [the matter] by a gross example, I imagine that as the weight stands in our small clock, so does God in the great clock of the world. For just as here the weight, while by its single motion it bears around the principal wheel, by all motions moves all moved things, and singly the singulars; and quiets the things that are at rest, and conserves the things at rest, at definite times — so that they correspond to one another, [E] and so the wheel artificially conjoins [them]: so does God in the world, while by His single volition He turns about the primary celestial wheel, [and] all the variously-moved things, and likewise the things at rest, He administers; and this is so much the more regular in the world than in a hand-made clock, in that both its weight and its wheel are more orderly disposed, and in that the other beings are more skillfully bound to one another, to the wheel, and to the weight by virtues which, though more hidden, are more powerful and artificial.

Whence Wisdom 11: "Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight." Wherefore Blessed Augustine, *On Genesis* IV.5, expounding this authority of the Wise One, and inquiring whether these three — measure, number, and weight — are God or not, says thus: "According to that which we know of measure in those things we measure, and number in those things we number, and weight in those things we weigh, God is not these things; but according to that by which measure prefigures to every thing the mode, and number gives to every thing its species, and weight draws every thing to rest [A] and stability — He is, primarily and truly and singularly, that which terminates all things, regulates all things, forms all things, and orders all things; and nothing else is understood by what could be said by the human heart and tongue, 'Thou hast disposed all things in measure, number, and weight,' than that 'Thou hast disposed all things in Thyself.' It is great, and granted to few, to surpass all things which can be measured, that He may seem a measure without measure; to surpass all things which can be numbered, that He may seem a number without number; to surpass all things which can be weighed, that He may seem a weight without weight."

With this imagination Hermes also agrees in *On the Eternal Word* 18: "By the Spirit," he says, "all things are administered in the world, which is, as it were, an organ or machine of the supreme God, subject to His will." And below, [chapter] 26, he writes thus: "This whole world is the immutable work of God, a glorious construction, a good thing composed of a manifold variety of images, the machine of God's will, supporting His own work without envy."

This same can someone imagine more truly, if he imagines a clock having a wheel of perpetual motion by virtue of an inherent weight not depending from outside; for God, [B] according to what has been previously [shown], is the inmost in every thing. But still someone can imagine this most truly, by imagining a wheel of perpetual motion from some attractive or even expulsive virtue eternally at rest — as if the wheel had iron at the extremities of its spokes, or in its periphery, or were itself wholly of iron; and a magnet, attractive or otherwise expulsive, or in different extremities of either virtue, neighboring [it], should from one part of it always openly look upon it; from the other part, however, by some obstacle should be hidden from it, or more

ingeniously in any other way. What therefore the magnet at rest, attracting or expelling, [is] in such a small clock — this God, the immobile, willing or not-willing, [is] in the great clock of the world. Whence Wisdom 7: "Remaining in Himself, He renews all things."

But further, perhaps this whole [matter] could be more closely and similarly conceived by the example proposed, by supposing — according to chapters 2 and 4 of this [book] previously [stated] — that God first moves Himself by a certain immobile and invariable motion, and all other things by all their variable motions consequently. Whence also Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 34, says: "It is credible that God is moved into Himself by the same [C] immobility." This cogitation of God, or motion of His, is to be reckoned an eternal volition.

This imagination, although gross, does not disagree with the subtle science of the natural philosophers, astrologers, and theologians. But lest with certain astrologers I may seem to subject the free wills of men to the necessary servitude of the stars, I imagine still further: that as the greater world is a certain great clock, so man, who according to the philosophers is called a lesser world, is a certain small clock — that one in some way natural, this voluntary; that stable, this portable. And as there the weight or virtue of the divine will, by moving through itself the first motion of it — namely, the first intelligence, with the greatest wheel of heaven — moves all the others by whatsoever natural motions, as is demonstrated in *Metaphysics* XII; so by moving through itself the first motion in man — namely, the rational soul, with the wheel of the heart or head — He moves the rest of man's [organs], and the whole man himself, by whatsoever voluntary motions. And this is what was alleged above by the Philosopher in *On Good Fortune*: namely, that the principle of motion in our soul, [D] just as in the whole universe, is God. For He moves, as he says, "all things which are in us; the divine principle of reason, not reason, He being the virtue of the organ of intellect."

Whence also Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will, He shall turn it." Wherefore there is no doubt that thus it is in the hearts of all others, since "He made the small and the great, and He has equal care of all," as Wisdom 6 says wisely. Wherefore also Isaiah 40 says: "Behold, the nations are reckoned as the moment of a balance before Him"; where the Gloss says, that namely the moment is inclined from nothing into either part. Wherefore also we singularly petition with the Psalmist, saying: "Incline my heart to Thy testimonies, and not to covetousness," Psalm 118. On which Augustine says: "What is it to have the heart inclined to something, except to will it? He prays therefore that he may will, when he says, 'Incline my heart,' etc."

Whence Blessed Augustine, *On Genesis* IV.5, on the said authority of the Wise One — immediately after his exposition above-cited — subjoins: "For neither can measure, and number, and weight be considered and conceived only in stones and in [E] woods, and similar masses, and in corporeal quantities. There is also a measure of acting, lest the progression be irrevocable and immoderate; and a number of the affections of the mind, and of virtues; and there is a weight of will and of love. But this measure of minds and souls is restrained by another measure, and the

number is formed by another number, and the weight is borne by another weight. The measure without measure, however, is that to which is equal what is from it; the number without number is that by which all things are formed, but is itself not formed; the weight without weight is that to which all things are referred that they may rest. And these three are God," as has been alleged from the same place above.

COROLLARY.

IT HAS A COROLLARY: ALL THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE WERE MADE BY THE DIVINE WILL, AND THINGS WHICH WILL BE MADE WILL BE MADE BY IT.

Whence it is evidently known that all things which are made, preserved, or moved, were, are, or will be from the divine will, and this in the modes premised in the corollaries of the third, second, and fourth [chapters] of this [book]. This corollary follows so plainly from the premises that it does not need proof. For if it is necessary that all things presently being made are presently made by the divine will, it is correspondingly necessary concerning past and future things, and likewise concerning things preserved and moved. With these things examined, and the corollaries previously touched understood, I judge the said moderated modes are not concealed. Some little responses also can here be fabricated, like those in the chapters above-said, and likewise refuted.

[B]

CHAPTER X. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS UNIVERSALLY EFFICACIOUS, INSUPERABLE, AND NECESSARY IN CAUSING — NOT IMPEDIBLE NOR FRUSTRABLE IN ANY WAY.

Now it remains to show consequently that the divine will is universally efficacious, insuperable, and necessary in causing — not impedible nor frustrable in any way. This whole is evidently known from the eighth part of Corollary 1 of this [book]; [C] which yet is here for some cause to be confirmed by certain reasons and authorities.

Who therefore would not know how excellently it follows: if God can do something, and wills to do it, He does it, or will do it at the destined time, the power and will remaining? For nothing is wanting in Him to that which is required for doing. The Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* IX.10: "What is potent according to reason — every such thing necessarily, when it desires, [does] that of which it has the power, and as it has [the power], does this." And in *Rhetoric* II.24: "If he could and willed, he did. For all who, being able, will [something], do it." And *Politics* V.7: "What the powerful will, all of them do." Wherefore, by the teaching of the Philosopher in *Prior Analytics* I, from the opposite of the conclusion with the same minor, by inferring the opposite of the prior major, it follows excellently conversely: God does not do this, and wills to do it;

therefore He cannot do this. Therefore He is not omnipotent, but impotent in this part — against the seventh part of Corollary 1 of this [book], and against the general faith of the Church.

Whence also Augustine, *Enchiridion* 76, [D] says: "To the Omnipotent God, just as it is easy to do what He wills, so easy is it not to allow what He does not will to be. Unless we believe this, the very beginning of our confession is in danger, by which we confess to believe in God Omnipotent. For He is not for any other reason truly called omnipotent, except that He can do whatever He wills; nor is the effect of the omnipotent will impeded by the will of any nature."

Likewise, the divine will is the act of a power, as is known, and of no less than infinite power, on account of the first supposition and the fourth part of Corollary 1 of this [book]. It surpasses, therefore, every finite [thing], nor is it surpassed by any [thing]; nor by any infinite [thing], because God alone is such, by the seventeenth part of Corollary 1 of this [book]; nor does He surpass His own will, nor has He anything in Himself contrary to it. Wherefore Augustine says, *On the City of God* V.9: "In His will is the supreme power"; and *Enchiridion* 75: "It is most efficacious."

Likewise, if the divine will were frustrated by anything, or even conquered, this would seem most so by a created angelic or human will. Therefore this would exceed that in virtue, which the first supposition does not concede. And [E] Isaiah 47 says: "Man shall not resist Me," and above in chapter 14: "The Lord of hosts has decreed it, and who can disannul it?" And the Apostle to the Romans 9: "Who shall resist His will?" It is also written in Esther 13, and the Holy Church sings: "O Lord God Almighty, in Thy power are all things placed, nor is there any one who can resist Thy will. If Thou hast decreed to save us, immediately we shall be freed." And Psalm 113: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done." Treating of which Augustine, *Enchiridion* 75, says that this would not be true if He had willed some things and had not done them, and — what is more unworthy — therefore did not do them, because, lest what the Omnipotent willed should be done, the will of man impeded.

Likewise, if God did not always do whatever He willed, He would need help to do certain things — against the fifth part of Corollary 1 of this [book], and against certain things premised in the fifth [chapter] of this [book].

To this also there are very many philosophical and theological authorities. Hermes, *On the Eternal Word* 9, speaking of God, says that all things depend from His will. And he adds: "For from Him is the supreme perfection, [A] inasmuch as in Him willing and accomplishing are completed in one and the same point of time. For necessity follows the pleasure of God; the effect attends the will." And below, [chapter] 22: "He alone, as full of all both sexes by fecundity, ever pregnant with His will, ever begets whatever He shall will to procreate."

Aristotle also, in *On the World* at the end, showing that God, since He is one, is yet of many names, and expounding certain of those names, says thus: "I think also that necessity is called nothing other than the insuperable substance; and Adrastia is the inevitable being-cause." And

Avicenna says, *Metaphysics* X.1: "The collection of all these things proceeds necessarily from the necessity of the divine will." And Augustine, *On Genesis* VI.20: "The will of the Creator of things is necessity"; and shows this there throughout a long process diffusely. And the same in *On Free Will* III.3: "His will is to me necessity." And the same in *Enchiridion* 83: "He is to be asked that He may will, because it is necessary that it be done if He shall will." And Anselm says, *Cur Deus Homo* II.17: "If you wish to know the true necessity [B] of all things which He has done, and suffered, know that all was from necessity, because He Himself willed it."

Likewise Augustine, *Enchiridion* 77, treating that of the Apostle in 1 Timothy 2, "Who wills all men to be saved," and that of Matthew 23, "How often have I willed to gather Thy children, and Thou wouldest not," shows that the divine will is not impeded, nor in any way frustrated in these matters; and in many following chapters he proves the same. Whence also in [chapter] 83 he says that, however many be the wills of angels and of men, good and bad, willing what God wills, or otherwise, the will of God Almighty is always invincible. And [chapter] 84: "The Omnipotent cannot will vainly whatever He shall will." And [chapter] 85: "It is not to be believed that God Omnipotent willed something to be done, and that it was not done. For He who, without any ambiguities, in heaven and on earth, as truth sings, did all things whatsoever He willed, certainly did not will to do whatever He has not done." Wherefore also through Isaiah 46 God says thus: "All My will shall be done"; and below in [chapter] 55: "The word which shall go forth from My mouth, shall not return to Me empty, but shall do whatsoever I have willed."

Likewise, otherwise the purpose of God in some [matter] [C] would be frustrated, and frustratable — which is expressly against Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.4, 20, 26, and II.4 and 8.

Likewise Cyprian, the glorious Martyr and Doctor of God, expounding that of the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven," says thus: "We pray, not that God may do what He wills, but that we may be able to do what God wills. For who resists God, that He may do less than what He wills?" And this is what that leper faithfully professed when he said, "Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean," Mark 1 and Luke 5; which the response of the Saviour indubitably shows when He said, "I will, be made clean." For the effect of cleansing immediately followed this will, as the Evangelist subjoins: "And when He had said this, immediately the leprosy departed from him, and he was made clean." On which Bede, in book I on Mark, chapter 6, says: "The very confession of the leper is full of religion and faith. For in the will of the Lord he attributes the power"; and below: "There is no medium between the work of God and His command, since in the command is the work — for in the end, He spoke, and they were made. You see therefore that it cannot be doubted that the will of God is power"; [D] and below: "And likewise the marvelous thing — that He healed by that kind by which He had been entreated. 'If Thou wilt, Thou canst cleanse me'; 'I will,' He says, 'be cleansed' — Thou hast the will, Thou hast also the effect of piety. Therefore, as most of the Latins think, it should not be joined and read 'I will to cleanse,' but separately, that He first says 'I will,' then commands, 'Be cleansed.'" Who in book II on Luke 5 expounds the same to the same sense. Thomas also in the Gloss on Mark cites from Chrysostom there: "By this He not only did not destroy the opinion of the leper,

but rather confirmed it; for by His Word He puts the disease to flight; and what the leper had said in word, this He fulfilled by work." And on that of Luke 5, the same glossator cites from Ambrose this saying: "By that kind He healed by which He had been entreated. There is no medium between the work of God and His command, that you may understand the effect of healing the virtue of the work." Where he also cites this from Cyril: "From majesty proceeded the imperious mandate; how then is the only-begotten Son reckoned among servants, who, only by willing, can do all things? Of God the Father it is read, that He did all things whatsoever He willed; but He who [E] uses the power of His own Father — how shall He be diversified in nature from Him? Yet marvel in these things at Christ working divinely and corporeally; for divine it is so to will that all things may be made present, but human, to extend the right hand."

This Ecclesiastes 8 testifies more clearly than light, saying thus: "Whatever He shall will, He shall do, and His word is full of power." Damascene, *Sentences* at the end, agrees, saying thus: "He who by will alone transmuted dust into a body, who is the maker of all, who built all these things by His command — so therefore believe also that the future resurrection of the dead is by divine power, and will, and beck. For He has, concurring with His will, virtue."

This also Hugh holds, *On the Sacraments* book I, part 4, chapter 15; and Lombard, *Sentences* I, distinction 45, plainly.

COROLLARY.

IT HAS A COROLLARY: THAT TO GOD'S WILLING TO MAKE OR THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE MADE, BY HIMSELF OR BY ANYTHING ELSE IN ANY MODE, THERE NECESSARILY FOLLOWS THAT IT IS MADE IN THAT MODE; NOR DOES HE, IN OUR MANNER OF STRIVING, APPLY OTHER POWERS; NOR IS THERE IN HIM, BEYOND THE INTELLECT THAT DICTATES AND THE WILL THAT CONSENTS, ANY OTHER EXECUTIVE VIRTUE TO BE POSITED. NOR DOES HE BEAR HIMSELF OTHERWISE WHEN OPERATING THAN WHEN AT REST. AND THE DIVINE WILL IS THE FIRST FREE PRINCIPLE.

From these things, then, it manifestly follows that, to God's willing to make or that something should be made, by Himself or by anything else in any mode, there necessarily follows that it is made in that mode; nor [B] in our manner of striving does He apply other powers; nor is there in Him, beyond the intellect that dictates and the will that consents, any other executive virtue to be posited, as is posited by some; nor does He bear Himself otherwise when operating than when at rest. From which it is no less evidently inferred that the divine will is the first free principle.

For if anything other than God's willing were required for making, His will would not be by itself sufficient for acting, against the previous [arguments]. Likewise, the will of God is in some way operative outside itself, as our will moves the first corporal motion in us, and not only finitely; for this is repugnant to the first supposition, the third part of the first [corollary], and the

fourth. Nor is there any reason why [it should be] under one finite degree rather than under another; therefore [it is operative] infinitely. It does not therefore require any executive power posterior in God, as if a supplement to the defect of its efficacy. Likewise, if such an executive virtue be posited, this naturally mediates between the divine will and the work — against the authorities of Bede and Ambrose alleged above; and it is against Damascene, who says, "He transmuted by will alone," etc.

The other part of this corollary appears from this: that one can will equally when operating and when at rest, and especially [C] God Himself, since by the fifth [chapter] of this [book] He cannot at all be changed. Augustine also says, in the *Sentences of Prosper* 157: "It is not lawful to believe that God is otherwise affected when He is at rest, otherwise when He operates. For he suffers who is affected, and everything which suffers is mutable. Therefore in God neither sluggish leisure nor laborious industry is to be conceived, since He knows both to act when at rest, and to be at rest when acting."

That the divine will is also the first free principle hence appears: because by the second supposition, in free principles there is not an infinite progress, but there is some one first; and that cannot be posited in any second cause, since by the next preceding chapters every second cause in any of its causations is necessarily subjected to the first cause. Also, if the first cause did not act freely but purely necessarily, since all second causes in any of their causations are necessarily subjected to the first cause, as the ninth and tenth [chapters] clearly teach, all their causations, like every causation of the first cause, would proceed purely necessarily; whereby freedom, contingency, and merit totally perish.

Nor does it befit the natural order of causes [D] that the inferior and second cause should be freer than the supreme and first; nor is it possible in any way. This is the regulator in all things, that the necessarily regulated in all things; this the subjecter, that the subjected; this the preceding and dominating, that the following in all things and the handmaid, as the premises in chapters nine and ten manifest.

The first free principle, therefore, is necessarily in God; and not in His essence primarily, since by chapters one and two it is altogether necessary being. Nor in the divine intellect, since He necessarily understands all things. Nor in any power other than the will. For all other powers are purely natural, and, the will being set apart, if they acted, they would act purely naturally and necessarily, as the beginning of chapter nine showed. Liberty therefore is to be placed in the will alone; and the simply first [liberty] in the simply first [will], which is God's.

[E]

[A]

CHAPTER XI. THAT THE FIRST NECESSARY AND TRUE INCOMPLEX PRINCIPLE IS GOD; AND THAT THE FIRST COMPLEX PRINCIPLE SIMPLY IS [SOMETHING] CONCERNING GOD: NAMELY, "GOD IS," "GOD KNOWS ALL," "GOD WILLS ALL," OR SOMETHING SIMILAR.

The first free principle having been found, it remains consequently to inquire the first necessary principle, and the first true of all true things. There is, indeed, among the philosophers a twofold necessary and true: namely, the incomplex and the complex. From the foregoing I reckon it manifest that, just as God is the first being of all beings, and the first cause of being for whatever exists, so He is the first true and necessary incomplex, and the first cause of being for whatever is necessary or true. For, as was alleged in chapter 2: "The first in any genus is the cause of all the others according as they are in that genus, and most worthy of the name of that genus." But God is the first in the genus of true incomplexes, as can easily appear from what has gone before. This same the Philosopher seems clearly to attest in *Metaphysics* II.4, and Averroes in his commentary; and likewise Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII.6, as the second [chapter] of this [book] more fully reported. With which [C] Augustine agrees, *Confessions* VII.15, likewise reported there. Whence also Anselm, *On Truth* 7: "Do you think there is anything, sometime or somewhere, which is not in the supreme truth, and which has not received from it the strength by which it is, in so far as it is, or that it could be other than it is there? It is not to be thought. Therefore the truth is in the essence of all things which are, since these are because they are in the supreme truth."

But since concerning the first true incomplex there seems no doubt, I do not think we should tarry further about it. Concerning the first true complex, however, the difficulty is more dubious. For the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* IV.9, that this is the first principle of complexes: "It is impossible that the same simultaneously be in, and not be in, the same according to the same." But, lest I, so small a person, should seem to chatter against so great a Philosopher, it is to be known that principle is twofold: namely, of knowing and of being, or, as to us and as to nature. He, however, speaks there of the first principle of knowing, and only as to us, by which we are generally regulated in all sciences, as the progress of the text and commentary sufficiently shows. The first principle of complexes simply, however, is concerning God: namely, "God is," or "God knows all," or "God wills all," or anything else of the kind. For the first in the genus [D] of true complexes, just as it is in any other genus, is the cause why all posterior things are true. Therefore it is the cause of being really thus, just as any subsequent truth signifies. For according to the Philosopher in *Categories*, "From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is called true or false"; and no posterior truth is the cause why the first is true. Thus, therefore, to be really thus, just as the first truth signifies, was the cause of being really thus, just as any subsequent truth signifies; and no subsequent truth will be the cause of being really thus, just as the first truth signifies. The cause why it is really thus, as is signified by any truth not said of God, is in God; nor is any of the others a cause of being to God, as appears sufficiently from

what has gone before in this chapter and others. In God, therefore, or concerning Him, is the simply first principle of the whole genus of complexes.

Likewise, God is the first cause of every essence or mode of being; therefore also of every truth. Likewise, a truth which can be true without others, and not [E] conversely, is prior to them. But thus stands "God is" to all other truths whatsoever. Likewise, just as that which is most known in cognition as to us is thus the first principle, as appears through the Philosopher in the place above, so that which is most known simply and as to nature is correspondingly the first principle. But that is "God is," although on account of the corruption of the body weighing down the soul we know this with difficulty.

Whence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* II.1: "Since the difficulty of the contemplation of truth exists in two modes, the cause of it is not in the things, but in us. For just as the eyes of night-ravens stand to the light of day, so the intellect of our soul stands to those things which are most manifest of all in nature." Where Averroes says: "The difficulty in things which are at the limit of truth — namely, in the first principle and in principles distinct from matter, [A] is from us, not from them."

The same could be argued from the firmness of the first principle, since just as it is the first, so it is the firmest, as appears through the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* IV.8; and because all other truths lean upon the truth of that one, as upon an original root and primary foundation. But to no one is it doubtful that "God is" is the firmest of truths.

Likewise, an incomplex truth is naturally prior to a complex truth, just as the simple to the composite, and the cause and principle of it; therefore principle to principle will be proportionally so. But God is the principle of every incomplex truth, as the first part of this chapter has demonstrated.

Likewise, in the order of true things there is not an infinite progress; but there is some first truth, which is the cause of all the others. But that is "God is," since it does not have any prior truth as its cause. Likewise, that truth which is only causing other truths, and not caused by them, is the first; but this is "God is." Likewise, that which is the truest of all is the principle of all; but this is God, since He most of all is, as the foregoing have taught.

Likewise Anselm, *On Truth* 10, says that [B] the supreme truth owes nothing to anything, but all things owe to it; and it is the cause of all other truths, and nothing is its cause. And distinguishing truth into the causing and the caused, he says that the truth which is in the existence of things is the effect of the supreme truth; but it is itself the cause of the truth which is of cognition, and of that which is in a proposition. The same, below, in the same chapter at the end, proves diffusely that there is one truth, and that is the supreme truth, by which all true things are true. The same in *Monologion* 18, and Augustine, *Soliloquies* I.21 and book II.20, prove the eternity of God from the eternity of truth. The eternity of truth, however, they prove thus: "This was always true,

'something is future'; and this was always true, 'something is past'; therefore by some truth; and therefore that truth never began, nor will end; therefore truth is eternal."

This proof, however, does not conclude, if any proposition can be true by itself without a higher truth in God causing the truth in such a proposition, and continually sustaining it. Whence Anselm, *On Truth* 10, expounding this proof, which in his *Monologion* he reports himself to have made, says to his disciple: [C] "Now you can understand how I proved in my *Monologion* that the supreme truth has neither beginning nor end through the truth of speech. For when I said, 'When was it not true that something was to be future?' I did not say so as if that speech which would assert that something was to be future, or that truth, were God without beginning. But because it cannot be understood when, if that speech existed, the truth would be lacking to it; so that, because it is not understood when that truth could not be, if there were a speech in which it could be, that truth is understood to have been without beginning, which is the first cause of this truth. For indeed the truth of speech could not always be, if its cause were not always. For that speech is not true which says that something is to be future, unless something is in fact to be future; nor is anything future if it is not in the supreme truth. Likewise it is to be understood concerning that speech which says that something is past. For if by no understanding the truth would be able to be lacking to this speech if it had been made, it is necessary that no end be able to be understood of that truth which is the supreme cause of this. For therefore is it truly said, that something is past, because [D] thus it is in reality; and therefore something is past, because thus it is in the supreme truth. Wherefore, if it can never not be true that something is to be future, and could never not be true that something is past, it is impossible that there have been a beginning of the supreme truth, or that an end be future."

Likewise Augustine, *Against Faustus* XXVI.2: "Whatever is past, now is not; therefore that which we truly say to have been is not; but it is true that it was, because in our sentence — by which we say that something has been — it is true, because that of which we speak now is not. This sentence God cannot make false, because He is not contrary to truth. But if you ask where this true sentence is — first it is found in our mind when we know it as true and say it; but if it should also be taken away from our mind when we have forgotten that which we knew, it will remain in the truth itself. For it will always be true that what was, was, and is not; and there it will be true that what was already is, where it was true before it came to be, that what was not, was to be. To this truth God cannot be opposed, in whom is the supreme and immutable truth itself, by which it is illustrated that it is true [E] whatever in the minds and souls of any is true."

The same on Psalm 4: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying? Truth alone makes blessed, from which all things are true." The same also on Psalm 55: "In God I will praise my speeches; in God I will praise speeches, because there is the fountain of true speeches."

There is therefore in God truly the first principle of every truth.

CHAPTER XII. HE SHOWS WHAT KIND THIS FIRST PRINCIPLE IS — NAMELY, AFFIRMATIVE — AND WHAT IT IS, NAMELY "GOD IS," OR "GOD IS GOD."

Having found, therefore, that the first complex principle is in God, or concerning Him, it remains further to ask what kind it is, and what it is. First, then, it must be asked of what kind it is — whether affirmative, or rather negative.

That it is not purely negative appears from this: because pure negation posits nothing. The first principle of complexes posits and causes all subsequent true complexes, as the next preceding chapter has demonstrated; [B] therefore it is not purely and totally negative. Nor is it a pregnant or implying negative, since such a negative, by the virtue of the negation alone, posits absolutely nothing; but if perhaps it does posit something, this is by virtue of some prior affirmative which it implies. Therefore that affirmative, by itself, is rather the first principle of complexes. For it, by itself, is the cause of truth in others; but that negative is so only through it; therefore it is prior. But nothing such is the first true complex, and the cause of truth in others, before which there is another truth and another prior cause. Likewise, as chapter 2 showed, everything which is in some way *per accidens* is reduced to something prior which *per se* is such. But such an implicative or pregnant negative posits and causes truth in others only *per accidens*; therefore it is reduced to something *per se* prior, by whose virtue it does this. Therefore that other prior thing more causes truth in others; therefore it is rather the principle of complexes. This other [thing] is also a prior truth, and the cause of the truth of this negative; therefore it is not the first truth, nor the first principle of complexes.

[C] Likewise, according to the Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* I.17: "An affirmative demonstration is more worthy, better, nobler, prior, and more excellent than a negative one; and an affirmative proposition is likewise [more excellent] than a negative one," as he there says and proves. For every negative is proved and known through an affirmative, not conversely. Likewise, just as an affirmative demonstration is to a negative, so an affirmative proposition is to a negative; but an affirmative demonstration excels a negative in the conditions above-said; therefore an affirmative proposition likewise excels a negative one. That an affirmative proves a negative, and not conversely, appears from the book of *Prior Analytics* concerning all syllogisms. And that the negative is known through the affirmative, and not conversely, follows from the same and likewise appears, since privation is known through habit, and not conversely, as the Philosopher proves in *On the Soul* III.25, and likewise appears in the commentary. Whence Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I.5: "Being is more known than non-being; for being is known through itself, but non-being is known through being." With which Augustine also consents, *On the City of God* XII.7, saying that darkness and silence are known [D] not, indeed, in [their own] species, but in the privation of species. Affirmation, however, is being in some manner and habit, or implies these; negation, on the other hand, [implies] non-being and privation.

Likewise, every true negative has a truer prior affirmative, which is the cause of it, as appears through the Philosopher, *On Interpretation* II at the end, saying thus: "If anything that is good is,

both [it] is good and is not evil — this indeed *per se*, namely 'is good'; that, however, *per accidens*, namely 'is not evil.' For its being not evil is accidental to it. That is more true in each thing which is *per se* [such], and likewise [more] false." Therefore "good is good" is truer and prior to "good is not evil." It is also the cause of that, since because good is good, therefore it is not evil, and not conversely; because not being evil posits nothing absolutely, and consequently causes nothing.

Therefore the first principle of complexes is to be most firmly judged in no way negative, but affirmative.

Having shown, therefore, what kind this principle is, it now remains to investigate further what it is — whether namely it is "God is," or "God knows all true things," or "God wills all true things." For any of these could be reckoned [E] such a principle. For as appears from chapter 9 of this [book], the will of God is the first and supreme cause of all things, and therefore of all truths; therefore "God wills" is the first principle of complexes. But this [opinion], I judge, is not true. For that is not the first truth before which is another truth; but "God wills" has another truth naturally prior to it, namely "God knows," since God naturally knows any thing willed prior to willing it. For every volition is necessarily of something pre-known, as is sufficiently agreed by both philosophers and theologians. Therefore "God knows" or "God knows" might appear to be the principle now sought.

But this appearance fails, since [there is] another truth naturally prior to this, namely "God is," "God is cognitive," "God is omnipotent," with similar [predicates] of His — distinguishing and multiplying these in God, and ordering them according to [A] prior and posterior, not essentially altogether or really, but intellectually or imaginably, as both philosophers and theologians are wont to speak, as was alleged above from Aristotle in *On the World*. The same appears through him in *Metaphysics* XII in many places, and through Averroes in commentary 39, declaring this same thing more fully; which also learned Plato, Avicenna, Algazel, and Avicbron concordantly attest, as the things alleged above prove.

So also speaks the Apostle to the Romans 1, when he says: "The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead"; and elsewhere most frequently in sacred Scripture. In the books of Augustine, *On the Trinity*, and others, and of the rest of the Saints, and of all the Doctors, there are distinguished, in some manner, power, knowledge, and will. For He can do, and knows, many things which He does not will. The same is plain concerning justice, grace, and mercy, and many similar things sufficiently known to all.

That this principle, however, may more easily be found, it must be known, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* II, that although God of Himself, and as to nature, is most known, the intellect of our soul nevertheless stands to Him as the eyes [B] of night-ravens to the light of day — namely, the Sun itself — and this equally on account of the muddiness of corporal matter overshadowing the eyes of the soul. As long therefore as the body which is corrupted weighs

down the soul, and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things, man cannot perfectly understand God as He is — He Himself saying to Moses praying: "Thou canst not see My face; for man shall not see Me, and live," Exodus 33.

Wherefore, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* I and elsewhere, "There is innate to us a way from the things more known to us to the things more known to nature, which are simply more known: namely, from the posterior to the prior, and from the caused to the causes." The names, therefore, by which we know God, do not signify Him essentially in Himself and altogether absolutely; since they are transferred from the creatures and effects more known to us to Him less known to us, although simply more known. Therefore the Philosopher says in *On the World* at the end: "Although He is one, He is of many names, named from all the affections which He brings forth. For He is called Jupiter, Zima, son of Saturn, Enicus, lightning-flasher, rainy, thundering, tempestuous, serene, and to speak [C] in summary, celestial and terrestrial — to be appellated from any nature and fortune, as being Himself the cause of all." With whom also Hermes and Dionysius, cited above, agree.

Whence also Rabbi Moses, *Guide of the Perplexed* 58: "All names of the Creator which are found in books are taken from His works, except one name which is appropriated to Him, namely the Tetragrammaton; and therefore it is called the separate name, because it signifies the wisdom of the Creator with pure signification, in which there is no participation."

If therefore, as he says here, the name of the Lord, the Tetragrammaton, or any other, signifies God purely, and be subjected to a verb or predicate most simple or most pure said of God, the proposition thus affirming will be the simply first of all complex truths, and the first intrinsic principle of the whole genus of complexes.

If, however, no created name, nor anything other than the unique Word of God — which is His perfect image — signifies Him purely (which I reckon more probable), let it be supposed that [D] this name "God" — which is the Tetragrammaton, namely of four letters — is imposed on God from His pure essence, and signifies Him most purely as can be comprehended by any creature; and the proposition conjoining most simply and most purely a verb or predicate most pure with this subject is the principle now sought, namely "God is," or "God is God."

That the most proper and most pure name of God is imposed from His pure essence appears from this: He Himself teaches Moses, who wished to know His name, by saying: "I am who am," Exodus 3. Treating which authority, Rabbi Moses, where above, [chapter] 61, holds that this name most befits God Himself, and signifies Necessary Being. And above, [chapter] 58, he says: "That the Tetragrammaton name of God, which is most proper to God, perhaps signifies, beyond reason, Necessary Being." Therefore a name taken from His pure essence seems most properly to befit Him.

It appears, therefore, that "God is," or "God is God," is the first principle of complexes, if the predicate and verb most essentially and most properly correspondingly signify as does the

subject. [E] But true things are twofold: the higher and the lower. The lower truths are all those said of creatable things, or creatures, and universally of any [thing] which is not God, or even of God by relation to another, like "God is Lord of all," or "Creator." The higher truths are those which consist in God alone, like "God is powerful, wise, and good." Of these, indeed, some are in some manner naturally posterior, others prior. For "God wills" is posterior to "[God] knows," and "[God] knows" to "[God] is." For "to be" naturally precedes these and universally all such attributes.

Although this, of itself, sufficiently appears, it can yet be persuaded by a similar [example]. For being simply, in created things, naturally precedes every being of theirs determined to such or such being — as the fourth proposition of *On Causes* says: "The first of created things is being, and there is not, before it, anything created"; wherefore it likewise seems thus concerning the Creator of all.

Likewise, by what has gone before, the first principle of complexes is affirmative; [A] what therefore could it affirm other than being first of being first, the most pure of the most pure, and the most simple of the most simple? For any other affirmation will be posterior to such. It seems, therefore, that "God is," or "God is God," is simply the first principle of complexes. For that truth is the principle of the others, which naturally precedes them itself.

Whence also Anselm, *On Truth* 10: "All things owe to the supreme truth; itself, however, owes nothing to anything; nor is it for any reason what it is, except because it is."

Here perhaps someone will object thus: That is not the first truth before which is another truth; but "God is" has another truth before it, namely "God can be." For from anything whatever, "this is, therefore this can be," follows, and is not converted; therefore by that most known definition of the prior, "God can be" is naturally prior to "God is."

This argument, however, errs in matter. For "God is" is prior to "[God] can be" — which seems wonderful, but is true. For everything possible or able to be is such by some prior existing power; God, however, is not able to be by any other [B] power. For He needs no such [thing], nor by any preceding power, since there is no such. Therefore God is able or possible to be by His own power actually inhering in Him; but power, possibility, or potency is one divine attribute. Naturally prior, therefore, is that to which it is attributed and inheres, namely the pure essence of God; therefore "God is" seems naturally prior to "God can be," as far as priority can there be assigned. This whole appears from chapter 1 of this [book].

The reason, however, why the contrary more appears [to be the case], is that thus it is in all other things below God — from which, as was said above, we ascend to the cognition of God, judging it to be thus in the Creator of all as it is in all creatures. For in all these, "to be able to be" actually precedes "to be." For the whole world was first able to be before it was; and since non-being has no power, the world, when it was not, was not possible to be by its own power, but by the divine [power]. Whence Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 12: "What is altogether nothing has

nothing, and therefore has no power; and without power it is altogether nothing, and [C] the world before it was made was nothing; therefore altogether nothing before it was, was able. Therefore it could not be before it was; wherefore before it was possible, it was even impossible that it should be — to that, indeed, in whose power it was not that it should be, it was impossible; but to God, in whose power it was that it should be made, it was possible. Because therefore God could first make the world, before it was made, therefore the world is — not because the world could be prior."

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters XIII–XVII (with Corollaries)

CHAP. XIII.

From the foregoing he infers, as it were as corollaries, twelve points.

From this many things seem to be inferred as corollaries.

[D] 1. THAT ACT IS SIMPLY PRIOR TO POTENCY.

First, that act is simply prior to potency in things mobile and immobile, temporal and eternal. This is sufficiently clear from what has gone before, when one speaks of the first act simply, which is the most pure, most absolute, and most actual essence of the most high God — from which, as from a root, posterior things sprout forth like shoots: all the divine attributes, by whose mediation, out of His unfailing fecundity, He brings forth the rest of His creatures. Therefore Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 13, and afterwards at length, proves that act in every mover and unmoved thing is prior to potency in three ways: namely in reason — that is, in definition; in wisdom — that is, in perfection; and in time — in one way, and in another way not. For every individual generated is prior in potency than in act, and so potency is prior to act; but that from which the individual is generated must necessarily be prior in act, and so act precedes potency in time, as the Philosopher teaches: For from a being in potency is always made a being in act, by something which is in act, always moving as some first thing; but the mover in act already is. And further on, ch. 17: It is plain that act is prior to potency in substance and in time; for one act is always presupposed to another, up to that which is the first act of the eternal Mover. But still more properly: for the everlasting things are prior in substance to the corruptible. Where Averroes says: The act which is the mover precedes in time the thing moved, and this rises up to the first moved and the first mover. For it has been declared in the [A] *Physics* that all moved things are reduced to the first mover, who is an act in which there is no potency at all — namely no mutability in itself — as chapter five demonstrated.

2. THAT BEING IS SIMPLY PRIOR TO NON-BEING.

Whence also it is shown secondly that being is simply prior to non-being — that is, the being of the first act, as is sufficiently clear from what immediately precedes. Whence Averroes on *Metaphysics* IX, comment 13: Universally, since potency is non-being and act is being, it is necessary that being precede non-being. Again, however, if this is not, it is true, and so it is, that this is not; therefore, according to what was just premised, by some prior truth and entity it is true, and so it is, that this is not. And the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 17, that the affirmative is prior to the negative, as being is prior to non-being.

3. THAT THE NECESSARY IS PRIOR TO THE POSSIBLE OF CONTRADICTION.

Thirdly also, it is gathered from the same that the necessary is prior to the possible of contradiction; for this is plainly evident from the seventeenth point and others of this first book. The necessary, moreover, can exist without such possible, but not the contrary; for by the second point every such possible is necessarily preserved by God. Likewise, if the necessary is not prior to the possible of contradiction, it is therefore equal, or posterior; but it is not equal and coeval with it, because, since two are not equally first simply, those two would have to be reduced to something prior to both, as to a first principle and a first cause common to them — but no such thing can be assigned. Nor can the possible of contradiction be prior to the necessary, because then potency would precede act, and non-being, being — which is contrary to what was just shown. Likewise, if the possible of contradiction were prior to the necessary, since such a possible does not necessarily cause such a necessary, it could be without it, which is contrary to the second point above, as was argued above. Likewise, that which has no cause is prior to that which has a cause; but according to Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 6: The necessary being through itself has no cause, and that which is possible being through itself has a cause; and below in the same chapter 8: Necessary is that which is truth through itself, but the able-to-be is being through another than itself; and chapter 6 proves that the necessary being has nothing equal to itself, nor anything prior to it, but it itself through itself is the first of all others.

4. THAT THE NECESSARY IS PRIOR TO THE IMPOSSIBLE.

Fourthly, from this it can be known that the necessary is prior to the impossible: for the possible is prior to the impossible as affirmation to negation, habit to privation, and being to non-being; and the necessary is prior to the possible, as has just been proved. Likewise, the necessary stands to the impossible as the affirmative to the negative, habit to privation, and being to non-being; and the former precede the latter.

5. THAT PURE NECESSARY BEING, OR PURE NECESSITY, IS SIMPLY PRIOR TO ANY OTHER, AND THE FIRST ROOT AND PRIMARY FOUNDATION OF ALL OTHERS.

Fifthly, from the same it is gathered that pure necessary being, or pure necessity, is simply prior to any other, and the first root and primary foundation of all others. This, however, [D] when the prior points are understood, will be easily known. Yet, from abundance, it can briefly be shown thus: if it is not so, then something else is naturally and necessarily prior, or coequal with it. But nothing non-necessary is prior to it: for since every posterior being is constituted in any of its being through the first being, it would follow that the necessary would be constituted in necessary being through a non-necessary being, but rather a possible or contingent being — which is plainly impossible, because even with the possible destroyed, the necessary would still remain through itself; and because nothing can give to another a more firm being than it has itself. Likewise, if one part of a contradiction is possible, the other is possible; and if one is necessary, the other is impossible. And if the possible should constitute the necessary out of the able-not-to-be, it follows that the necessary is not; therefore, from the possible follows the impossible, and from the true the false. Then also possible or contingent would be prior to necessary, contrary to the foregoing. Nor is anything non-necessary coequal with the necessary, according to the preceding instruction. Therefore necessary being is the principle to all others, and the first cause of all. Perhaps someone will set himself against these things, [E] because according to what has gone before, "God is" is the first principle, and consequently "God simply is" is prior to His being necessarily, or to "necessary being is"; and because just as a part precedes a whole, so does "is" precede "necessary being is." We must say, according to what has gone before, that if "God is" be the first principle, this name "God" signifies the first being most essentially and most properly; therefore for like reason it signifies most necessary being, and the predicate or verb will signify correspondingly as much as it can; and so "God is," if it is the first principle through itself, primarily signifies that necessary being so is. And whatever sort of being the predicate or verb may signify, since the subject is naturally prior to predicate and verb, and itself from itself primarily is necessary being, still necessary being precedes any other being whatever. As for what is then assumed — that "is" precedes "necessary being," as the part the whole — it is not true: for necessary being has no part prior to itself, nor anything prior to it at all by which it might be constituted in such being; rather, it itself through itself and primarily most simply is such being.

6. THAT THE FIRST COMPLEX PRINCIPLE IS SUPREME AND PURELY NECESSARY AND FIRM. [A]

Whence also sixthly it indubitably appears that the first complex principle is supremely and purely necessary and firm. For this complex principle correspondingly enunciates being of the supremely and most firmly necessary being, as the preceding things make manifest.

7. THAT THE NECESSARY IS BY NO MEANS RIGHTLY DEFINED THROUGH THE POSSIBLE OR THROUGH THE IMPOSSIBLE.

Seventhly, it is manifestly concluded that the necessary is by no means rightly defined through the possible, nor through the impossible. For nothing is rightly defined through something posterior to it, as is demonstrated in *Posterior Analytics* II and *Metaphysics* VII; but each of these is posterior to the necessary. Therefore the necessary is not rightly defined through this — that it is not possible not to be — or through this — that it is impossible not to be. And so Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 5, rejects the definitions of the ancients concerning the necessary, the possible, and the impossible, because they defined them through one another in a circle, as is plain from the definitions [B] which he there recites from the ancients. And he says that of these three, that which is most worthy to be understood is necessary being, since "necessary being" signifies the vehemence of being. But "being" is more known than "non-being"; for being is known through itself, but non-being through being.

8. THAT NECESSARY BEING CANNOT SIMPLY BE DEFINED.

Whence also eighthly it can be evidently established that necessary being cannot simply be defined (for it has nothing simply prior to it). It can, however, be made known to us and described in a certain way through a description taken from posterior and less known things, but more known to us, as is most frequently done in nearly all sciences.

9. THAT THE AFFIRMATIVE IS PRIOR TO ANY NEGATIVE, AND THAT EVERY TRUE NEGATIVE IS REDUCED TO ANOTHER PRIOR AFFIRMATIVE WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF ITS TRUTH.

[C]

Hence ninthly likewise it clearly appears that the affirmative is prior to any negative, and every true negative is reduced to a prior affirmative which is the cause of its truth. For the first principle, which is affirmative, is the first cause of any other truth, as the foregoing manifests. Likewise, this is true of the negative concerning which it appears less so — namely, of such a one whose both extremes are impossible to be, such as "A chimera is not a goat-stag." For this is true; therefore it has some cause of its truth. But it is not the terms alone, because they alone of themselves would not render the proposition more true than false — indeed, neither true nor false. Nor can that cause be the chimera, nor the goat-stag, for these are nothing, and consequently cause nothing. Therefore there is some existing thing that is the cause of its truth. Here, however, someone may object, for an immediate proposition has no prior proposition that is the cause of its truth, since then it could be shown a priori through that. But some negative

proposition is immediate, as is plain throughout almost the whole *Posterior Analytics*. We must say that for a proposition to be immediate [D] can be in two ways: namely, simply, or in some determinate genus; or also through privation of a middle simply, or in a certain genus. In the first way, no negative proposition is immediate, as the reasoning seems to persuade. In the second way it is, namely not altogether and simply, but in the genus of negative propositions — as through the privation of a prior negative proposition through which it could be demonstrated a priori — and so the said book can be understood.

10. THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF EVERY TRUE NEGATION IS IN GOD.

And from this it appears tenthly that the first cause of every true negation is in God; for of every true negation some prior affirmative is the cause, as has just been shown, and the first cause of every true affirmative is the first complex principle, namely "God is," as the preceding things have taught.

11. THAT GOD IS THE FIRST CAUSE OF WHATEVER IS NOT. [E]

From this, eleventhly, it seems to be inferred that God is the first cause of whatever is not. For of any non-being it is truly denied that it is; but of this negative truth God is the first cause, as has just been shown. Therefore He is the first cause of so being or not being, as it is signified through that proposition. For according as a thing is or is not, the speech is said to be true or false, as Aristotle's *Categories* taught. Likewise, God is the first cause of all being or every being; and some being or "is" is the cause of some "not being" or non-being; therefore God is the first cause of some non-being or non-entity, and therefore of any whatever by similar reasoning. For "good is not evil" is a certain non-being, and the cause of this is "good is good"; and "man is not a donkey" because he is a rational animal or man. And in purely non-beings the same is plain. For some thing-makable is not made, nor is, because no maker has made it. For a species or thing makable by God alone — such as another star in the heavens, or another angel — therefore was not made nor was, because God did not make it; just as the saving of the ship was not, because the sailor was not present, but was perhaps absent, occupied, as is plain through Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, and through Anselm, *On the Conception of the Virgin* 5.

12. THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF EVERY IMPOSSIBILITY AND REPUGNANCE IS IN GOD.

Twelfthly, it is brought forth from this that the first cause of every impossibility or repugnance is in God. For if impossibility and repugnance be taken negatively, this is plain by what has just been shown. For if in God is the first cause of every true negation and non-being, therefore also of the negation and non-being of every impossible and repugnant; and because every true

negative is reduced to a prior affirmative, and so to the first principle, namely "God is," as is sufficiently plain from above. But if they be taken affirmatively and positively, it is similarly plain, since by the preceding chapters it is established that God is the first cause of all such things. Likewise, of every impossibility and repugnance there is some cause, and God is the first cause of all causes. This can also be proved as the preceding things were proved: for it is true that this is impossible — whatever impossible has been demonstrated; but of this truth, and so of so being, the first cause is the first principle, namely "God is." Likewise, it is true that it is impossible for a chimera to be a goat-stag; but of this truth the cause is not the terms alone, nor a chimera, or a goat-stag, nor any non-being; because what altogether is not can cause nothing at all. Therefore some being is the cause of it, and God is the first cause of all beings. Likewise, everything which is naturally and essentially prior to another is some cause of it; for if not, then it could be without that prior. For every posterior can be without any prior on which it does not causally depend in being. For when all and only those priors have been posited, on which the posterior causally depends in being, that posterior can be posited; for if not, this would be on account of the defect of some essential cause which would necessarily be prerequired for causing it in being. But all such causes are now posited; nor can it be feigned that this is on account of the defect of some accidental cause, since it does not contradict a thing to be without anything accidental to it, as is plain through that most well-known definition of accident mentioned above. Therefore it is plain that, if a prior is not the cause of a posterior, the posterior can be without that prior; and if some posterior can be without the prior signified, that prior is not naturally and essentially prior to that posterior, but only accidentally perhaps — which destroys the hypothesis taken before. Indeed, rather it seems that they are coequal, or connected by no essential order. For if that prior is not the cause of the posterior, each can be without the other, therefore they are not more naturally nor essentially ordered to one another than the units of arithmetic, or any unconnected things — which also subverts the hypothesis previously fixed. This therefore being supposed, it is argued in this way: Everything which is naturally and essentially prior to another is some cause of it; but the necessary is naturally and essentially prior to the impossible, as has been shown above; therefore the necessary is some cause of the impossibility and repugnance of any whatever; and every necessary is either the first necessary, namely God Himself, or caused and dependent upon Him, as the preceding things have taught.

For I imagine that, just as according to what has gone before the first of all is pure necessity, or pure necessary being, standing altogether through itself, not depending upon another in any way — from which, as through likeness and conformity to it, every other necessary or possible is necessary being or possible being — so through dissimilarity and contrariety or opposition to the same, every impossible is impossible to be. I think therefore that every impossible to be is therefore impossible because the necessary being itself necessarily repels it, and so immovably forbids it to be. But lest perhaps it be said to me that things do not follow imagination, and so the image of this imagination be reduced to nothing, I shall fortify it with some reasoning. For every impossible to be is therefore impossible to be because being necessarily and firmly is repugnant to it. But in the impossible to be itself, since it altogether is not, there is nothing; therefore

neither any necessity, firmness, or repugnance. That necessity or repugnance, therefore, is in something existing — so that it is impossible for that to be, because some existing thing through itself, primarily, and necessarily is repugnant to it. But that impossible is repugnant to such an existing thing, not through itself and primarily, but only through the repugnance of the existent — namely, because that existent is repugnant to it — just as it is in the relatives of the third mode, which are said according to measurable and measure, of which sort are the sensible, knowable, and intelligible, or the sensed, known, and understood with their correlatives. For these are called relatives, not because they are related through themselves and essentially, but because it happens to them that other things, namely their correlatives, are referred through themselves and essentially to them, and are measured by them, as is plain in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 20, and similarly in the *Commentary*.

It seems therefore that every impossible to be is therefore impossible to be because some existing thing, through itself and primarily repugnant to it, forbids it to be. But every existent is either the first and pure necessity, or necessary being, or caused and dependent upon it. Likewise, the impossible and the possible are said relatively to one another according to privation, as is plain in *Metaphysics* V, where above. But concerning the impossible, since it is purely non-being, no relation through itself and essentially can arise or be founded; for then two purely non-beings could be related to one another through themselves and essentially, without the co-requirement of any existent at all. This relation, therefore, through itself and primarily is founded in the positive extreme, namely in the possible, and emanates from it, and so is attributed and happens in a certain way to the other, privative extreme — as was just said about the relatives of the third mode. The possible therefore causes this relation and impossibility, and necessary being is prior to the possible to be, and the cause of it, as has been shown above; and God is the first cause of all possibles and necessities, and of all causations of them. Likewise, the impossible is therefore impossible, because it is repugnant to the possible — indeed, because the possible is repugnant to it. The possible therefore is the first cause of this repugnance and impossibility, and God is the first cause of every other causation and cause. This can be confirmed by this: that all opposites are reduced to the first opposites, which are habit and privation, as is plain in *Metaphysics* X, ch. 15, and *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 23, and there it is proved that these are in the genus of substance. But the habitual and the positive is naturally prior to the other, and therefore some cause of it, as the preceding things make manifest. Therefore the first habit in the genus of substance, namely God Himself, is the first cause of every privation, and therefore of any impossibility and repugnance.

Likewise, the proximate cause why anything is possible is that God can do that, as has been shown above. Therefore the proximate cause why anything is not possible is that God cannot do that. And because God cannot do this, it is not on account of the defect of power in Him, since He is omnipotent. Whence Averroes on *Physics* VIII, ch. 4: For an agent not to be able to do something impossible is not a diminution of the agent. Indeed, on account of the abundance of His infinite power — and therefore most powerfully — He cannot do this; for He cannot do this

because it is repugnant to His infinite power; nay, because His infinite power immovably is repugnant to it, and so necessarily forbids it to be. And because, according to what has been shown before, act in God also precedes potency, therefore His potency is repugnant to such an impossible because His most pure act immovably and necessarily is repugnant to it. And this is so because it is pure necessary being, or pure necessity. For this is the first simply of all affirmations and negations, as has been shown above. And this seems to be the consummated resolution of the whole impossibility.

This reasoning, however, is founded in the saying of the Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 12, where he inquires the proximate negative demonstrative middle of a negative conclusion: as, why does the wall not breathe? showing that it cannot be said because it is not an animal, because then to be an animal would be the proximate cause of breathing, and so every animal would breathe. For if a negation is the cause of non-being, an affirmation is the cause of being. Just as being without measure of hot and cold is the cause of not healing, so being with measure of them is the cause of healing; and similarly, if affirmation is the cause of being, negation is the cause of non-being. Likewise, whatever is impossible, [D] God cannot do that. Either, therefore, it is impossible because God cannot do it — and so we have what was proposed; or, on the other hand, God cannot do it because it is impossible. And so, according to what was just alleged: God can do whatever is possible because it is possible; thus also "to be possible" would be naturally prior to "God being able to do it," and the first cause why God could do this — which the preceding things do not permit. And then God would receive His power and perfection from another, nor would He suffice most fully for Himself, nor be the first cause of all. Even if it were so, some creature — indeed, what seems more unworthy, some purely non-existent, neither created nor creatable — would forbid, render impossible, and subject the omnipotent to inevitable necessity, that He should do or not do this or that. And likewise it would coerce the divine intellect to understanding and knowing such things, and His most powerful and most free will to willing.

This view holds Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 3, saying that it is not true to say of any simply impossible thing that God cannot do it because it cannot be done, but rather it cannot be done because God cannot do it. Just as in the affirmative: it is not said that God can do something because it can be done, but the contrary. The same proves likewise John Duns Scotus on *Sentences* I, dist. 43, by the prior reasoning founded on the first *Posterior Analytics*, and by another similar one. And finally holding this, he says there that nothing is simply impossible except what includes contradictories and impossibles, which from their formal natures are impossible, and from Him are principally impossible, from whom in a principiative way they have their formal natures — namely, from the divine intellect — though formally from themselves.

But perhaps someone will object against the things said by the said Doctors. For Henry holds the contrary in *Quodlibet* VI, q. 3, manifestly: namely, that the first cause why anything is possible is from God; but the first cause why anything is impossible is from itself and from the nature of the

thing — speaking most commonly of the thing, namely as it is common to all intelligibles existing or not existing. And to this he alleges Avicenna in *Metaphysics* IV, saying that an agent therefore cannot do it because it is not possible in itself. The same John also proves the contrary where above, and argues in this way: Nothing is simply impossible except that to which simply being is repugnant, and this primarily of itself, because from its first and per se formal natures, prescinding from anything else; indeed, even if (per impossibile) God did not exist, that would still be impossible. And he says in the same place that the possibility and impossibility of possibles and impossibles are reduced principiatively to the divine intellect, not to His omnipotence or potency — which seems to oppose what has gone before.

To these things I say it seems to me, with John aforesaid where above, that Henry by the second saying corrects or retracts the first. Yet it could be that Henry himself, Avicenna, and John might understand that no pure privation or privative impossibility, through itself and primarily, which does not depend on something positive prior, is in God, which would be the cause of the privation and impossibility of impossibles — just as something positive in Him through itself and primarily is the cause of every possibility of possibles. But the impossibility on the part of the impossible thing — that is, the pure and prior necessity of the impossible thing not being — is the cause why God and any active thing cannot. But this positive necessity, according to what has gone before, is in God.

But John's argument does not stand. For to the impossible to be, "to be" is not repugnant through itself and primarily, but because the first being necessarily is repugnant to it, as was said above. Nor is this primarily from the formal natures which he imagines. For if those natures are in some way causes, they are reduced to a prior cause, namely to God, the first cause of all causes. And this is plain through himself there saying that such things are principally impossible from Him, from whom they have their formal natures principiatively — namely, from the divine intellect. But what he says — that even if God were not, such a thing would still be impossible — if "impossible" be taken affirmatively, is false; because if He were not, nothing positive or affirmative would be. But if it be taken purely negatively, namely for "not possible to be," thus it is true: for He Himself is the first and supreme power, by which any possible necessarily is possible, and therefore, He not existing, nothing would be possible. But from this, what he wished does not follow. Or otherwise — and perhaps better — it can be said that "God does not exist" most necessarily includes a contradiction. Therefore even if "God does not exist" be posited, not only one part of a contradiction in many, and perhaps in all things, but also the other will follow necessarily.

It can be argued similarly against him: He says that the divine intellect is the cause of impossibility in things. Now although God might understand nothing concerning the impossible — because, according to him, even if God did not exist, the impossible would still be impossible — therefore by his own consequence the divine intellect is not the cause of that impossibility. And what he says — that possibility and impossibility are reduced principiatively to the intellect of God, not to His omnipotence or potency — seems strange. For according to his most frequent

way of imagining, the divine essence is the principle of potency in God (since act precedes potency in Him), and it is in some way prior to His actual intellection. For from this, it seems, He most powerfully and most perfectly understands the universe of things, because He has a most perfect and most powerful intellective potency. The essence, therefore, or pure being, seems to be the principle of potency or being-able, and this of actual intellection. And whatever is the principle of a principle is the principle of the principiated. Therefore essence and divine potency are prior principles of possibility and impossibility than the divine intellect.

He proves this saying of his thus: Through whatever in God a possible is first constituted in intelligible being, that is the first reason of possibility; but through omnipotence as it is distinguished against the intellect, the creature is not constituted in intelligible being, but through the intellect. But the minor of this reasoning seems to err. For if the divine intellect constitutes anything in intelligible being, since this cannot be done without understanding it, He constitutes it in intelligible being by understanding it. And since to constitute something constituted in some being is naturally prior to the constituted being such, it seems that God naturally first understands any intelligible before it is intelligible — which, however, does not appear; nay, the contrary rather appears. For it seems that the knowable in knowable being precedes knowledge, and the intelligible in intelligible being, intellect.

For it seems that the divine essence, from the infinity of its potency and virtue, most distinctly and as it were nominatim, intelligibly constitutes and contains the universe of intelligibles, and the first, purest, and most proper natures of them all; and these are the ideas of which the philosophers and theologians speak so much. And so, in a manner forerunning the divine intellect, it offers these to it as objects, and so the intellect understands all things consequently. And this Isaiah seems to testify in chapter 40, of God speaking thus: "He calls all by name; on account of the multitude of His might, and strength, and power, not one was left out." Where the interlinear gloss explains "on account of the multitude of His might" thus: because He is omnipotent. Therefore His omnipotence is the cause of His intellection, and prior to it, and in the manner aforesaid. [A]

And from this in particular it could be argued against Scotus. For if God's omnipotence is the cause of His intellection, and His intellection is the cause constituting intelligibles in intelligible being, therefore also His omnipotence constitutes them in this being. For whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused. And this could be confirmed from his own sayings there: for he proves that God's omnipotence is prior to the creature, according to any of its being — whether existence or intelligible — by this, that this omnipotence is from itself formally necessary, but the creature possible according to any of its being, and such a necessary precedes every such possible — as he supposes, and as I have shown above. Therefore it is the cause of it, as the preceding things have persuaded.

Likewise, against another reasoning of his saying: For he says that the divine intellect produces some two intelligibles in intelligible being, and those things so produced from their formal

natures, through themselves and primarily, are repugnant and impossible. It seems that by the same reasoning he should consequently say this also of compossibles, possibles, similars, equals, greateres, lessers — and universally of all positive things, namely that, taking their formal natures, through themselves and primarily, they are such through themselves, or through their formal natures. For the formal nature of "white" makes "white be white" only as much as "not be black" — indeed, prior and more so. For "white," through this that it is white, is not black; and universally every true negative is reduced to some prior true affirmative, as is plain through what has gone before. And so, of no positive thing on this side of God would the first cause or reason be in God, although God is the first cause of all such things — and as he himself says, the first reason of every possibility is in God.

CHAP. XIV. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS THE CAUSE OF ANY FUTURE AND PAST THING — WHEREFORE IT IS SUCH. [C]

That the treatise on the causality of the divine will may be finally completed, I judge it must be shown that the divine will is the cause of any future or past thing — whereby it is such. For according to the Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 3, that which is truly the cause of any thing being is the same as the cause of its becoming, of its having been, and of its being to be. And according to Lincolniensis [Robert Grosseteste], this is conclusion 18 of that second book. But the divine will is truly the cause of any thing's being, as chapter nine proves.

Whence Augustine, *City of God* XXII, ch. 2: According to that will of God, which with His foreknowledge is eternal, surely in heaven and in earth, all things whatsoever He willed — not only past and present, but even future — He has already done. But before the time comes in which He willed it to be done, which He foreknew and disposed before all times, we say, "It will be done when God shall will." But if not only the time at which it is to be, but even whether it is to be, we are ignorant of, we say, "It will be done if God shall will" — not because God will then have a new will which He did not have, but because that which from eternity has been prepared in His immutable will, will then be. The same appears through Anselm, *Monologion* 18, and *De Veritate* 10, and through Augustine, *Soliloquies* I, ch. 21; *Soliloquies* II, ch. 20 and 26; *Contra Faustum* II, as the eleventh chapter of this book touches upon. This appears more, if one attends to Augustine in the same place against Faustus, not only positing the causes of future, present, and past things in God, but also in the divine will. Whence he says thus: "What was done concerning Elijah we do not know, yet we believe of him what true Scripture testifies. This indeed we know was done concerning him, what God's will has; but what God's will does not have, can in no way be done concerning anyone whatever. Accordingly, if it should be said to me that it can be done that the flesh, for example, of this or that man may be changed into a heavenly body, I grant that it can be done, but whether it shall be I do not know — and therefore I do not know, because what God's will has concerning this matter is hidden from me. [E] That, however, is not hidden from me: that without doubt it shall be, if God's will so has it." And below: "Future

things can no more not be done than past things not have been done, since it is not in God's will that anything be false by which it is true. Wherefore all things which are truly future will without doubt be done; but if they shall not have been done, they will not have been future. So all things which are truly past have without doubt passed."

Likewise, future and past things have no being at all; therefore they have no cause, nor any truth; therefore neither do they truly of themselves have being future or past. Therefore they have these on account of some other cause, and that cannot be purely non-being on account of the same. Or at least it is reduced to some existing cause, and of all existing causes the will of omnipotent God is the first, supreme, and efficient. [A]

Likewise, the will of God is the cause why any future to either side is future; therefore for the same reason of any other things: For Antichrist of himself has no being at all; therefore of himself he is not more determined to one part of the contradiction than to another; therefore of himself alone he is not future, but purely indifferent. If therefore he is future, this is through some determining cause; but that cause is necessarily the divine will, or is reduced to it as to the first and supreme cause of that determination. Likewise, "Antichrist will be future" has no more from itself why it is future than "Anti-Christ" — equally possible to be future, but never truly future. But this latter is not future of itself; therefore neither is the former, but through some other cause, which without the divine will cannot cause. Moreover, some thing not future yet possible to be — such as A — God can make to be future and to be future. And if it should come to be, the divine will is the cause why A is future; therefore similarly of all similar things. Wherefore John [Duns Scotus] also on *Sentences* I, dist. 39, says: That nothing such concerning the future is true before the determination of the divine will, but that determination naturally precedes as cause.

Likewise, the same is the cause now why any future is future, which was before the world; but then the divine will was the cause of all futures; therefore still it is, since according to the fifth chapter God is in every way immutable. Likewise, "to be future" is more than "to be possible." But no future of itself has being possible, therefore neither is it future. For every possible, by some power, is possible. But no future has any being, therefore neither any potency. Therefore no future is possible to be, except because some present can make it to be. But no present can make anything without God's will co-acting. Therefore no possibility, or cause of possibility, is in futures, but in present things, and the first and supreme of all causes and possibilities, or of present potencies, is in God. The same, also, is now the cause of the possibility of futures as before the world; but then God alone was, as is plain manifestly through the venerable Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli* 12, which chapter 12 [of this book] alleged.

Likewise, everything which is necessary to be in some manner, by some necessity is necessary to be such. But no past has any being, therefore neither any necessity. And every such thing is necessarily past; therefore this is by some present necessity, which necessarily is God or depends upon Him, and therefore upon His will. Whence also Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II, ch. 17: "All

necessity or impossibility is subject to God's will. But His will is subject to no necessity or impossibility; for nothing is necessary or impossible, except because He so wills it." Likewise, the first true is the cause of any subsequent true, and therefore the cause of really so being, as any subsequent true signifies. But the first true is in God, as ch. 11 with ch. 12 taught; therefore in God is the cause of being true of any future truth, and of so being as is signified through it. And this is not without preceding will, or also concomitant. Likewise, God with His will naturally precedes every past and future; therefore He is the cause of them, as has been shown in the previous chapter.

This Peter Lombard also expressly holds, *Sentences* I, dist. 45.4, saying thus: "This supremely good will, therefore, is the cause of all things which are made naturally, or have been made, or are future." Is not this what the twenty-four Elders concordantly attest, saying to Him sitting on the throne, "Thou hast created all things, and on account of Thy will they were and have been created" (*Apocalypse* 4)? "They were," I say — as the Doctors expound — first in predestination, in art, in the Wisdom of God; and "they have been created" afterwards in work and effect.

COROLLARY.

AND HE HAS A COROLLARY: IF GOD WERE TO CEASE TO BE, NOTHING WOULD BE PAST OR FUTURE, TRUE OR FALSE, POSSIBLE OR IMPOSSIBLE, NECESSARY OR CONTINGENT, NOR EVEN COULD BE — FROM WHICH THE OPPOSITE EVIDENTLY FOLLOWS, NAMELY THAT GOD HIMSELF, AND THUS SOMETHING, HAS PRE-EXISTED, IS, AND WILL BE. O HOW NECESSARY IT IS THAT HE BE, WHOM IT IS SO IMPOSSIBLE EVER TO CEASE TO BE; AND THAT GOD IN ANY WAY NOT BE, MOST NECESSARILY CONTAINS AND IMPORTS A CONTRADICTION; AND "NECESSARY BEING" SEEMS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD.

Hence a marvelous corollary seems to follow: namely, if God were to cease to be, nothing would be past or future, true or false, possible or impossible, necessary or contingent — nor even could be. From which the opposite evidently follows, namely God Himself, and so something, has been before, is, and will be — and likewise other things can be through God's great omnipotence. O how necessary it is that He be, whom it is so impossible ever to cease to be, whom even in any way not to be most necessarily contains and imports a contradiction! Whence perhaps, [A] though enigmatically, can be drawn the most proper name of God, namely "necessary being," or "necesse esse" — which must be understood of being through itself, and of necessity by supreme necessity, namely including the contradictory repugnance of not being.

But that, if God were to cease to be, nothing would be past nor future, is plain from this chapter; and that nothing would be true, nor would truly be or not be, from chapters 11 and 12: since nothing can be true or truly without the first true which is in God; from which it follows that

nothing would be false, since if one of opposites were false, the other would be true. And that nothing would be possible or impossible, necessary or contingent, is plain through the previous chapter: for all these things originate from God. And that nothing of these even could be is plain, because nothing of these could be without God; but if God were not, He Himself could not be — for if He could be, He would be, as the premises in the proof of the first Supposition show.

The remaining parts up to the penultimate are sufficiently plain. As for the penultimate: it is to be known that something can be said in many ways "not to be." First, as future; secondly, [B] as past; thirdly, as something possible to be, which neither will be, is, nor was; fourthly, as that which simply is impossible to be, including a contradiction — such as a chimera, or the commensurability of the diameter and the side of a square. Let it then be posited, with Diagoras or with the fool, as something absolutely possible and including no contradiction, that God does not exist. If therefore God is not, He is not in some one of the said modes. If in the first mode, He will at some time begin to be, and there will be a new and recent God; therefore He will be God, therefore He will be necessary being and eternal, as the demonstration of the first Supposition shows. Here therefore a contradiction is implied. If in the second mode, God is past and not present, and was God; therefore He was necessary being and eternal, as the proof of the first Supposition shows. Here therefore is a manifest contradiction. If in the third mode, God is not and can be; therefore He is, and is necessary being, as the said proof plainly proves. Here therefore a contradiction is implied. If in the fourth mode: that which can be cannot be — for it is absolutely possible that God be, as the premises in the demonstration of the first Supposition perspicuously manifest; [C] indeed, it is also simply absolutely necessary that "God's being" be simply absolutely possible, as the things had in the same demonstration show. Here therefore a contradiction is evidently included.

Again: God's being is necessary, in such a way that His not being includes a contradiction. For this the said proof evidently shows. Let it be said that "absolutely possible" is what does not include simply contradictory things in formally simple consequence. Let "impossible" and "necessary" or "necesse" be taken correspondingly, etc., as there. For it is established that it is absolutely possible that some such necessary being be. For who, this being posited and admitted, would not easily defend himself from every contradiction? Furthermore, however, as much as something is impossible, so much is something necessary. For as much as it is impossible that contradictories be simultaneously true, so much is it necessary that contradictories not be simultaneously true. And universally, as much as it is impossible that something be, so much is it necessary that it not be; and as much as it is impossible that something not be, so much is it necessary that it be — as could easily be demonstrated. But I reckon no one ignorant of this. There is, however, something so impossible, that for it to be true includes a contradiction; therefore there is also something so necessary, that for it to be false similarly includes a contradiction. But what is more necessary than God's being? Who dares say this or that, since this is the first in the genus of necessities, and the cause of all subsequent necessities —

therefore most necessary above all, as the previous chapters have taught. The same evidently show many corollaries premised in chapter 13.

The same likewise can be shown by way of true and false. For as false something is, so true something is; for as false it is that something be or not be, so true on the contrary it is that it not be or be. But something is so false, that for it to be true includes a contradiction; therefore something is so true, that for it to be false includes a contradiction. But what is truer than the first true, as the reasoning just premised, and the previous chapters, manifest? But what is simply and naturally the first true? Is it not "God is," as the twelfth demonstrated? Furthermore, if God is not, truly God is not. Therefore by some truth God is not; therefore there is some truth, and therefore the first truth, which is God. Likewise, if any truth, or anything at all, is, God is — because that or it necessarily is God, or from God, as the second of this book showed. If, moreover, God is not, so it is that God is not, because it is true that God is not, because truly He is not. Therefore through some being it so is that God is not. But every being is the first being, which is God, or from the first being, as the same second [chapter] demonstrates. Therefore God is. This seems the reasoning of Augustine in his *Soliloquies*, and Anselm's *Monologion*, and *De Veritate* 11, written in this book.

From these things it seems clearly to appear that any negative implies and includes some affirmation. For any negative intimates and includes that what it denies truly is not. Does it not also follow: "A is not B; therefore truly A is not B"? For of any whatsoever, "true" and "necessary to be" seems either truly this is that, or truly this is not that. Whether therefore anything be or not be, of necessity God is, because there is some truth. Furthermore, if God is not, nothing truly is or truly is not; nothing truly is this or such, nor truly is not this or such, because by no truth, according to the premises. Therefore anything truly is and truly is not, and anything truly is and truly is not anything [and any such thing] in every way.

Furthermore, it can similarly be argued by way of possibility and necessity. For if God is not, it is possible that He be, or it is possible that He not be. Therefore by some power this is possible; therefore some potency is, and something powerful through that, as is plain from the fourteenth of this book. Therefore something is, therefore also God. If also God is not, it is necessary that He not be — at least for now — and it is necessary that He not be God. Therefore by some necessity of some existing necessary thing, as is shown in the same fourteenth, etc., as before. Likewise, if God is not, there is some positive cause of His not being, and prior to Him, as the 13th of this book shows, etc., as before.

Furthermore, if God is not, neither is the creature, nor anything at all. Yet it is absolutely possible for the creature to be, and for something to be. For in the truth of things now it is true and possible. And what once is or can be absolutely possible is always necessarily absolutely possible — taking these terms as above, and as the proof of the first Supposition more fully expounds. For what once does not formally and simply include a contradiction, never does so. Because a consequence which sometimes is not formal simply through itself and per se, never is

so. And whatever can sometimes be not formal simply, always necessarily is not formal simply — just as whatever can sometimes be formal simply, always necessarily is formal simply, as no logician is ignorant. For who is ignorant that a formally simple consequence is absolutely necessary in consequence? And whose mind would grasp that the absolutely necessary could be made to be, or could be possible according to contradiction to be and not be, or vice versa? Who also doubts that whatever through itself and essentially is something, always — at least while it is — is necessarily such? Otherwise it would not be such through itself and essentially, but through another, which could be present and absent while it itself remains, and accidentally — the cause of which is, that whatever is, while it is, of itself and from its essence cannot lack itself. Wherefore also, whatever through itself and of itself essentially is something, always while it is, is necessarily absolutely such. And from this it is, as I think, that the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, says that "per se" imports "of all" and "always," as the second of this is more fully recited.

Therefore, God not existing, the creature and something can be; therefore also the Creator and God can be; and if He can be, He is, as the premises here and in the first of this show. If also something can be, truly something can be; therefore by some truth, and by some potency of some existing powerful thing now. It is also necessary that the creature can be; therefore by some necessity of some existing necessary thing, etc., as above. If, moreover, something can be, this is through a prior act, and there is some act prior in nature to potency, as the first part of chapter 13 taught. And by the third part of this, the necessary is prior to the possible according to contradiction. But that prior act, and that prior necessary, is necessarily either from God, or God. If also the creature is not, by that not being, and that negation, there is some prior being, and some prior affirmation in nature, and the cause of it, as the 2nd part and the 9th of chapter 13 showed. That is necessarily from God, or God — which the 10th and 11th parts of it evidently confirm. If therefore God is not, God is; and if God is, God is. Thou therefore truly art my God! Indeed, not only art Thou, but most necessarily art, in such measure that nothing else more necessarily or so necessarily could be. Apart from Thee, who alone truly art, scarcely anything else is. For nothing else is necessarily of itself, or is from itself; nay, of itself nothing is, but from Thee, through Thee, and in Thee, nor can anything be otherwise.

Did not Thy secretary Isaiah see this when he said, "Who has measured the waters in his fist, and weighed the heavens with his palm? Who has poised with three fingers the mass of the earth, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance? Behold, the Gentiles are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance; all the nations are before Him as if they were not, and are counted to Him as nothing and vanity." [E] O Lord my God, didst Thou not indicate this to Thy most familiar servant Moses, when, asking Thy name, Thou didst answer him as if for a name proper to Thee: "I am who am; thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel, He who is hath sent me to you"? O Lord my God, how admirable is Thy name! Truly, Lord, admirable is any of Thy names, but how admirable specially is this name! Hence also another wise Moses [Maimonides], following the Sages to whom Thy oracles have been entrusted, says

that all Thy names are transferred from Thy works, except one, exact in four letters, and therefore called in Greek the *Tetragrammaton*, which, as he says, signifies Thy substance purely, not by participation of anything foreign — and which therefore is called Thy separated name. Wherefore, also, it was worthy of so great reverence that it was not pronounced except in the Sanctuary, and by Thy holy priests, and this on a fast day, in the priestly blessing, by the highest priest. Nor did they teach this name except to a disciple suitable for it, and once a week, no more. And this Moses, the *Guide of the Perplexed*, says — though doubtful in this part — that perhaps it signifies the rationale of necessary being. Which I think also Thou, Lord, didst show to the prior Moses (though under a cloud), when Thou saidst, "I am who am; so shalt thou say to the children of Israel, He who is hath sent me to you. This is My name forever — to Me," Thou sayest. The grammarians say, Lord, that a pronoun in speech ought to be placed for the sake of distinction, or for emphasis. When therefore Thou sayest "to Me," Thou seemest to intimate that this name distinctively belongs to Thee, because to Thee alone through Thyself alone, and not through another — for then it would rather be the name of that other — and to none else save through Thee. Otherwise, it would be as much the name of another as Thine. Wherefore likewise Thou intimatest, as I think, that this name belongs to Thee significantly — namely, more excellently than to any other.

Thou saidst likewise, Lord, that this name is to Thee forever; Thou didst not say "is now," "was before," or "will be after," but "is forever." But to be forever, or to have been, or to be future, and so to be of itself — what better seems it to signify than stability, immutability, and the most firm necessity of being? [B] Thou hast also taught me, sweetest Doctor, in the preceding chapter, that "necessary being" precedes in some manner — as I, stammering, can scarcely express — any other being of Thine. Whence it also seems to follow that it is the first and highest of Thy divine names. O Lord, my Father, suffer Thy little child childishly to play before Thee. Behold, I see "necessary being," by Thy providence disposing, agree with Thy great name *Tetragrammaton* not only in signification, but also somehow in number of letters: for it has only four letters, four kinds of letters. O necessary being, on account of Thy name, my most sustainable being! Upon Thee may I always wholly lean; may Thou support me, comfort me; with all my heart may I cleave to Thee, with all my powers may I adhere to Thee; may I wholly be transformed into Thee, and eternally confirmed.

Against these things, however, perhaps someone will object thus: If the divine will be the cause of futurity in things, it causes futurity in them; therefore at some time it causes this. Therefore previously some thing was not future, but then begins to be future. Likewise, if the divine will were the cause of the futurity of all futures, [C] it would be the cause of the truth of all true propositions, even of contingent ones concerning the future. And since the divine will freely wills *ad extra*, it could will nothing concerning future contingents. Which if it should do, all such propositions concerning the future would lack all truth — and both contradictories in such cases would be simultaneously false, and therefore likewise simultaneously true.

But if these arguments proceeded, they would also demonstrate that God by His absolute omnipotence cannot make anything to be, or anything to be future — though many things are possible to be done immediately by Him alone, which never will be done by Him, which, if He should will to be, would necessarily be and be future, by the 10th [chapter], and only through the divine will. Indeed, also, according to this earthly wisdom, God would not be able by any means to impede any future, or make it not to be, except by leading it to being — that is, making it never to be, to be, or to have been. But why could God omnipotent not impede the future act of an impotent man, or of any other creature, and not do some act of His own future — against the first Supposition, the eighth part of corollary 1 of this book, and chapters 32 and 34 of corollary 1 of this book, and against the Prophet who says that God acted freely, and therefore acts and will act with similar freedom?

If anyone wishes to solve these things directly, it must be answered that God by eternal causation — namely, by eternal, immutable, and in every way infrustrable volition — makes futures to be future. Wherefore Aristotle in *De Mundo*, ch. 11, having shown that all things which are in the world are truly God's works, adds: "From which [that is, from God], according to the natural philosopher Empedocles, all things which are, and afterwards will be, have proceeded" — as if to say with the Prophet, or the Prophet with him: He who has made the things that are to come, just as the Father, by eternal causation and generation, causes and generates His eternal Son.

Perhaps you will reply that, although according to the premises a future thing in no instant or measure of time begins to be future, yet in some instant, or measure, or sign of origin, order, or nature, it begins to be future — which seems no more about these than about those. But this scarcely verbally — really nothing — opposes what has been said. For perhaps the signification of the verb "to begin," signifying with time, with flux, and the succession of temporal measure, deceives — and only similar temporal beginning. But if it signifies only thus, the objection does not stand. If, however, the verb "to begin" can in any way, without offense to common speech and the Authors, be transferred to signifying procession, causation, origination, and any order — not of time, but of nature — I do not see why it cannot be conceded that a thing has begun to be future, namely has had a cause of its futurity, naturally, causally, and originally preceding it, as the foregoing has taught. Yet, speaking thus, the thing has not begun to be future otherwise than that it always continually begins to be future, while it remains future — just as eternally there would have been and would be of an eternal foot, dust, and footprint, of the eternal Father and Son, between whom Augustine asserts a priority of origin — if, however, in that ineffable Trinity it is permitted to affirm any beginning whatever; though the generation of the Son seems to be principiated, or initiated, in some manner from the Father, as from the *terminus a quo* He proceeds, and to be terminated in the Son, as in the *terminus ad quem* He tends. For who would deny that the Father is the principle of the Son?

Nor do I think anyone so impudent as to deny altogether that futures have any cause of their futurity, and to say that "Thou wilt run," and any true proposition concerning the future, is the first principle and the first true simply, or coequal with it, or comparable in the order of truth, the

previous chapters being understood. Who also would presume to deny that the divine will is, or can be, the cause of the predestination, election, and salvation of the saints?

But to the other argument, some might perhaps respond that God can suspend every act of His will concerning futures and non-futures whatsoever, and so make it that nothing is future, and therefore make any such affirmation false. But [B] even if God could make nothing to be future, and no simple categorical proposition concerning the future to be true, yet He cannot make it that any disjunctive between such an affirmative and its opposite negative not be true. Therefore the truth of no such disjunctive depends on the divine will, but precedes it naturally and necessarily, as it appears; therefore also the truth of one part, as it appears.

Therefore perhaps it will be said that the future thing — say A — of itself and per se is not future, but is not-future, and this antecedently to the divine will. Yet no thing is future except antecedently from the divine will, nor does this include a contradiction. For just as, according to the Philosopher, a temporal contradiction must be for the same time or instant, so a natural contradiction is for the same order, instant, or sign of nature. Therefore it is not contradictory that A first, antecedently to the divine will, of itself is not future, and second, subsequently to the divine will, and through it, is future — just as neither these: this before generation or creation was non-being, and now after is being.

Or perhaps it is better said that any true proposition concerning the future, both negative and affirmative, contingent, is subject to the divine will, [C] and originates from it, and causally depends upon it. For every such proposition imports a certain liberty. But the first free principle is in the divine will, as the corollary of the tenth of this book shows. Therefore there is the first principle and cause of any other liberty.

Furthermore, if such a negative part by no means were causally subject to the divine will, but were antecedent to it, it would of itself naturally be determined, and necessary in some way — except insofar as it might perhaps be impeded by the divine will. Wherefore in such negatives and affirmatives there would not be on the part of the thing contingency to either side, and equal; nor would such affirmatives and negatives equally convert through opposite qualities, which no one denies, nor the Philosopher in *Prior Analytics* I. Indeed, such propositions would rather be said to be of natural contingency, of contingency in many or in fewer cases, than of contingency to either side, or equally. For there are infinitely more such true negatives than true affirmatives, just as there are infinitely more possibles not future than there are futures — just as also they are of themselves naturally not future. Whatever also of itself is indifferent to both opposites is determined to neither from itself alone. But every possible to be and not to be, or to be future and not to be future, or contingent to either side, or equally to these and those, seems to be of this kind: for it can be and not be, be future and not be future.

Furthermore, such a contingent true negative concerning the future — say "B will not be" — is either true through itself, and that thing is not future, without any other cause whatsoever of its non-futurity, or through another, and through another prior cause. If through itself, therefore

always and necessarily, as it appears, by what was premised in the second of this book. According to this also "B will not be" would be the first complex principle simply, against what was premised in chapters 11 and 12 of this book. If, moreover, that negation had no prior cause, by similar reasoning none would either, as it appears, but any being or non-being, whatever would not be, through itself, not through a prior cause, would not be — which through itself is not, through itself is not substance, quantity, nor quality, against what was just premised. Do not the 2nd part, and the 9th, 10th, and 11th of the previous chapter condemn this? Otherwise, moreover, neither God nor any creature could make anything to be not future, nor in any way [E] not to be. But who has not seen that it is not so?

Wherefore Augustine, *Contra Faustum* II, ch. 26: "God," he says, "what He was about to do, certainly knew, and therefore simultaneously knew that future not to have been, which lest it should be done, He was about to do." Of negations also, concerning which it appears less so, there is some prior cause — namely, of these: "A chimera is not," "A chimera is not a goat-stag," and the like, as the previous chapter teaches. Is it not also that, according to the previous chapter writings, if "God to will anything to be future" is the cause of its futurity, "God to not-will anything to be future" is the cause of its non-futurity?

And if anyone says first that B is not through itself alone not future, but through some other prior cause, that cause is necessarily in God, or is reduced to some cause being in Him. And that cause in God is either the divine essence, potency, or intellect, will set apart, or it is the divine will. If divine essence, potency, or whatever precedes His will — since that cause is merely necessary in being, and similarly in causing, as is plain from the corollary of the tenth of this book — B is necessarily not future, against the hypothesis, just as a chimera of necessity will not be, and of necessity will not be a goat-stag. If, however, that cause is the divine will: just as the divine will is the cause of the futurity of any contingently and freely future things, so also of the non-futurity of all things likewise least future.

Nor does what was first said seem true — namely, that God can suspend every act of His will concerning all futures and non-futures. Indeed, it seems necessary that concerning any future or non-future — indeed, concerning any willable or refusable object — He has some distinct and proper act of will. For how otherwise would He be the highest, or most highly active or even actual act, as the first Supposition, and the third part of the first corollary, teach? Nor does this depend freely from the divine will according to contradiction, just as neither does His being most actual, immutable, and perfect, but it is absolutely necessary. Therefore it is necessary that of any such contradiction He specially wills one part, but not-wills the other. Wherefore also, by so willing, He verifies any disjunctive between opposite contingent parts. Yet neither part of any such contradiction is it necessary simply that God will, nor that God not-will, but any such part He can freely according to contradiction will and not-will. Whence it evidently appears that, although such a disjunctive is necessary by simply absolute necessity, and antecedently naturally to the divine will — namely, in such a way that its necessity or truth is not subject to the divine will, nor to contradictory liberty, or such free power — yet the truth or falsity of either of its

parts is so subject to His will causally, originally, and naturally, itself posterior following it. Just as God necessarily simply wills this or that, A and B contingent contradictories being demonstrated, neither of these does He will necessarily, but most freely, with the greatest contradictory liberty.

Yet perhaps there is still such instance: If the divine will be the cause of the futurity, and of the non-futurity, of things, it is the cause of the truth of this disjunctive — "this will be, or this will not be" (call it A); therefore also naturally prior to it. In that prior instant, then, or sign of cause, origin, or nature — call it B — or in the prior instant or sign B, A is not true, or could not be true, although it is absolutely necessary. But whom would this argument move or disturb? Would it not similarly prove that B has no cause of its truth, neither God nor any other prior naturally true proposition, but is itself the first principle, or coequal or comparable to it in the order of truth — which the preceding things do not permit? Would it not also similarly prove that the intellection or word of God has no cause, or could not be? Some little replies can be feigned here, such as in the second of this, the third, and the fourth, and they can be destroyed as those, with the help of the corollary of the ninth of this book.

CHAP. XV. THAT THE THINGS KNOWN ARE NOT THE CAUSES OF THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE. [D]

Certain clouds of ignorance concerning the divine knowledge having now first been dissipated by its light, it now remains to show — by the same light directing — that the things known are not causes of God's knowledge.

For "to know" is of great perfection in God. If, then, the knowledge of God is caused by things known, He receives perfection from another, therefore He is not from Himself supremely perfect. Likewise, then He would not be most sufficient through Himself; for He would need things known from which He could beg the supports of His knowledge. How, then, will He be incomparably glorious, who glories in begged supports? — which also the 5th part of the corollary of the first of this destroys, and certain things had in chapter 5 of this book. Likewise, if things known were the efficient causes of divine knowledge, they would precede it in time, or in nature; but how, since these are temporal, and that eternal? This little reasoning, however, is famous among many Doctors. If also it were so, God in some way would suffer from them, against the seventh part of the corollary of the first of this book; therefore also He would in some way be changed, against the fifth of this book. Wherefore He would also be in some way inferior, and less noble, than the things known. Likewise, then the divine intellect of itself would be in potency and indifference to knowing this or its opposite, and would be actuated and determined by another, like ours; and so it would not be the highest nor first act — all of which the first Supposition with the third part of the corollary of the first of this book destroys and refutes.

These seem to be the reasonings of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 51, where he appears to prove that God does not understand anything other than Himself; yet he does not intend to prove this, but principally proves three things there. The first is that God does not understand in potency, like a sleeper, because then He would not be venerable and renowned. The second is that He is His intelligence — that is, His act by which He understands; for otherwise He would be in potency, and not the best substance. For through honorable understanding — that is, through the act of understanding diverse from Him — the one understanding has honor. The third is that God does not understand another than Himself in such a way that He suffers and is perfected by it as by a cause, like our intellect, as is plain in the beginning of the chapter.

For after he previously showed the primacy, immateriality, perfection, and unity of God, wishing then to show how God understands, he subjoins, saying: "But the things which are about the intellect have certain doubts. For the intellect seems to be the most divine of apparent things; but how, having such, will it be? — has indeed certain difficulties." Where Averroes [comments]: "How," etc. The question is not in this, that God ought to be most perfect and most noble of all, but the question is, how it will be that He, who is in the term of perfection in Himself, according to which He is of such a disposition, namely intellectual.

Therefore, according to this first matter, he speaks throughout the whole chapter, consequently showing that God does not understand other than Himself in such a way that the divine intellect should suffer from another, and have the perfection of its intellection from it as from a cause, like our intellect, which is perfected by another, suffering — as is sufficiently plain from *De Anima* III. Whence Averroes where above: "If He understands another, then His substance is not His act, but the potency by which this action is done. Wherefore He would necessarily be perfected through this action, as the intellect is perfected in us through that which it understands. Therefore He will not be the most noble substance of all beings, because His nobility would not be His except because He is perfected through another, which other must necessarily be more noble than He, because the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding." And below, in the same place, expounding that text of his — "And if of another, what is that which is one and not another?" — he says thus: "And if He understands another, what is that which is always His being, and one without another? For this is not, namely that He is understanding through the being of another — contrary to that which has been posited concerning the first principle, namely that He always is, without this, that He needs another." And shortly after these things: "It is impossible that His intellect be perfected by anything whatever; for the other which the intellect understands, whatever it be, the intellect follows it, and is under it in order. But the divine intellect is exceedingly noble and perfect."

And Aristotle subjoins consequently: "It is plain therefore that He understands the most divine and most honorable, and He is not changed" — namely, by another from potency to act, as our intellect is — which he proves immediately in two ways. First thus: "For change is into the less worthy"; not every change in any being whatever is into the less worthy, but only in this one of necessity it would be so, since He cannot be changed into one equally worthy or worthier, since

neither is, nor could be, anything such. The same he proves secondly thus: "And motion indeed is already such" — namely, change from potency to act. But it has been shown previously, in chapter 38 and many other places, that He is immobile in every way. Where Averroes: "He whose intellect is going out from potency into act, as is of our intellect, his intellect is motion, and every motion is from a mover. Wherefore the first would suffer, and would be moved by another" — which he reckons manifestly impossible. And below, in the same place, he leads to this impossible consequence: that He would be perfected by something baser than Himself. And he subjoins: "It is manifest that the most noble principle does not acquire nobility except through its action — as the intellect in those who understand does not acquire nobility except through the action of the intellect. If, therefore, the first understands base things — in such a way that He is perfected by them — it would happen that His nobility be in understanding base things, namely in such a way that He acquire nobility from them. Wherefore His action also would be the basest of actions: for it would be base for so noble a Prince to beg His nobility from less noble subjects. And because anything base is in a more noble being baser, in Him it would be most base, since He is the most noble of all, and more honorable than the universe."

Wherefore the Commentator [Averroes] in the end of the comment thus says: "This name, 'knowledge,' is said equivocally of His knowledge and ours; for His knowledge is the cause of being, but being [is the cause] of our knowledge."

It is plain therefore from what has been said that the opinion of Aristotle and Averroes is that God does not understand another than Himself, by which He is perfected, or which is the cause of divine intellection — which the expositions of others similarly attest. Let no one therefore reckon so great a Philosopher in so solemn a matter so basely to have raved as to lightly believe that God knows nothing at all except only Himself. For Averroes says in the beginning of that comment: "This question is the most noble of all that are of God, namely to know what He understands, and is desired by all naturally."

Furthermore, Themistius, as Averroes recites in *De Anima* III, ch. 36, says that "Beings are nothing other than His knowledge — that is, God's — nor is the cause of beings other than His knowledge." Wherefore Ammonius on *Peri Hermeneias* I, last [section], says that "the gods have knowledge of contingents, as producing all things which are in the world, and existing as causes or concauses of all." And below: "To know contingents," he says, "is of their nature; on account of which these things, having an indeterminate nature, can both happen and not happen, but those, by a more noble mode than is their nature, taking the knowledge of them beforehand, also know these things determinately. For it is necessary that they know separable things inseparably, and non-distantly, and the multiplied unitively, and temporals eternally, and the generable ungenerably; the knowledge of these — I say — taking beforehand, from priors, namely from causes and principles, namely from themselves, not from any posterior things whatsoever."

In agreement with which, both in opinion and in mode of speaking, is Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* VII: "The divine mind contains all things, by knowledge separated from all, in itself,

near the cause of all, foreseeing the knowledge of all things, knowing before the angels were made, and leading angels and all other things from within, and from Him, so to speak, the principle, knowing and leading them into being. And this I think the saying conveys, when it says, 'Knowing all things before their generation.' For the divine mind has not learned existing things from existing things, but from itself, and in itself according to the cause, exercises the knowledge, and cognition, and essence of all, and beforehand has co-encompassed" — where another translation: "has beforehand, and has taken beforehand." And it follows: "Not contemplating each according to species, but according to one circumstance of cause knowing and containing all, just as also light, according to cause in itself, has taken before the knowledge of darkness," where another translation, "has taken before." And it follows: "Not seeing the darkness from elsewhere than from light. Therefore divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows also all things — material things immaterially, and unparted things parted, and many things universally" — where another translation, "and divisible things indivisibly, and many things unitively." And it follows: "By the one itself knowing and leading all. For if according to one cause God transmits being to all existing things, according to the same united cause He has known all things, as existing from Him and substituted before in Him; and from non-existing things He shall not take their knowledge, but rather to each one He will be the giver of the knowledge of them; not seeing, God has His own knowledge of Himself, but the other common knowledge comprehending all existing things; for itself knowing itself in every way, the collocation, where above, of those things which are from itself, and of which it is the cause of ignorance. By this, therefore, God knows existing things, not by the knowledge of existents, but by His own; where another translation has it thus: itself the cause of all, knowing itself, is somewhere lacking, if it should ignore the things which are from it, and of which it is the cause."

The same Algazel shows, *Metaphysics* III, sentence 7, and among many things says thus: "In necessary being there is nothing in potency. It remains, therefore, that we say that for Him to foreknow the order of the universe is the cause of the order of the universe flowing from Him." Avicenna also, *Metaphysics* VIII, ch. 6 and 7, proves the same. Likewise, John [Duns Scotus] on *Sentences* I, dist. 39, q. 2, adhering to the said reasoning of Averroes, says that true things do not move the divine intellect to apprehending such truth, because then the divine intellect would become base, because it would suffer from another than His essence.

Furthermore, God makes all things made, by the testimony of the third of this book, and not without His own preceding knowledge, by the fifth of this. But that knowledge of God preceding, and eternally preceding, can in no way be made by posterior and temporal made things. Likewise, past and future things are not at all; therefore they cause nothing at all in God's knowledge. Therefore neither do present things, because they are not otherwise known by God when they are present than when they were future, or will be past — since God is in every way immutable, as chapter 5 teaches. Likewise, then He would not know purely non-beings, since they cause nothing at all. Likewise, then God would suffer from things necessarily, because He necessarily knows all things — which seems to subject His supreme liberty to servitude even of

the basest things. Likewise, then by a stronger and more perfect thing He would suffer more, and know it more; and since a thing, when it has present actual being, has more perfect being than when it has only potential and future being, it follows that God does not know Peter more than He knew him from the beginning. And if anything grows or decreases in any entity, it would similarly grow or decrease in divine cognition — which His immutability does not permit.

Likewise, then God would not be the first in the genus of efficient cause, since nothing acts except through cognition. For Psalm 103 says to Him: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But the effective principle of His cognition is the thing known; therefore it is naturally prior to such cognition, and therefore to every operation proceeding from it. Again to the same effect: In every order of movers, the unmoved mover is prior to the moved mover, as is plain expressly through the Philosopher, *De Anima* III, ch. 54, and through Averroes likewise in his Commentary. But the thing known is the unmoved mover of the divine intellect; the divine intellect is, however, mover and moved. Therefore the thing known is the first efficient and the first mover simply, and not God.

Likewise, then God would not be the first cause of all, for He does not cause extrinsic things except by wisdom disposing, and of this there is a prior cause, namely the thing known itself — which is more plain of futures. For "A is to be future" is the cause of God's foreknowledge, and God is not the cause why A is future, because then He would cause altogether ignorantly. Therefore "A is to be future" is here simply the first cause. Indeed, since God's foreknowledge is here so an effect that in no way is it a cause, it is caused by some prior cause which is not God — all of which by all philosophers and theologians is unanimously condemned.

Likewise, contingents to either side are not of themselves more determined to one part than to the other, because then they would not be to either side. Therefore they cannot of themselves determinately cause in God the cognition of one part, or the other; therefore they are not the causes of divine knowledge in any way. Likewise, if so, God would not be efficient cause or mover in that motion by which He is moved by the knowable, against the third and fourth of this book. Likewise, then a thing would have this — that it is so a mover of God — from itself alone, not from God; for God causes nothing without preceding knowledge. Nor would God be the cause of such truth: "This is a mover" or "moves" — which are repugnant to what was had before, in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, the 11th, and the 13th, manifestly.

Likewise, if the thing known were the cause of divine cognition, it would cause it according to its mode of being. For according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* II: "Each thing, as it is, so is to truth"; therefore also so to cognition caused by it. Therefore the thing known would be the measure of God's knowledge, naturally prior to it. For that is the first measure of another, according to which the other is primarily measured. Which also is plain through the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 5, saying that knowledge and sense are more measured by knowable and sensible things than they measure them; because, according to Averroes there, knowledge and sense follow beings, not contrariwise. And this is true commonly of every knowledge which is

caused by knowns; for not because something is known by such a knowledge, so is it on the part of the thing, but contrariwise.

And this is plain in the exposition of that place according to St. Thomas, where he so adds: "But if any knowledge is the cause of the thing known, it must be the measure of it — as the knowledge of an artificer is the measure of the artifact, because each artifact is measured according to this, that it is perfect to the likeness of the art; and in this way the knowledge of God stands with respect to all things." This also can be sufficiently proved from that procedure of the Philosopher, since just as in every other genus there is one first measure naturally of all things contained in such genus, so it is in the genus of knowables. But such a measure, besides divine knowledge, can be assigned none. For with whom would the measure of knowables better be placed than with Him who, by His wisdom — of which there is no number nor measure — disposed all things in measure, number, and weight (Wisdom 11)?

Whence also Isaiah 40: "Who hath measured the waters in his fist, and weighed the heavens with his palm? Who hath poised with three fingers the mass of the earth, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?" For it would seem too unbecoming and unworthy for the artifact to give measure to the artificer, and the creature to set bounds to the Creator. Whence Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, last prose, says: "It is unworthy if the future things of ours be said to give cause to the knowledge of God. For this force of knowledge, embracing all things by present-time notice, itself constitutes things in all modes." Which he immediately proves through another reasoning: "But it owes nothing," he says, "to posterior things" — as if he argued in this way: Everyone having good from some first owes him something, as gratitude or love; but God owes nothing to posterior things, therefore He has no good from them. Whence the Apostle to the Romans 11: "Who hath first given to Him, that recompense should be made him?"

And from this word "to posterior things" another argument can be drawn: that if things known were the causes of divine knowledge, since the cause is naturally prior to the caused, things known would be naturally prior to the knowledge of God — which seems absurd, since He is the first and the last, the beginning and the end. The same proves [Boethius] above, in the same prose 3, beautifully and at length, and says: "Neither do I prove" — that is, approve — "that reasoning, by which some believe they can dissolve this knot of the question. For they say: not therefore is anything to be in the future, because providence has foreseen it as future; but on the contrary, rather, because something is future, that this cannot be hidden from divine providence" — of which he places the reasoning, saying: "How preposterous it is, that the cause of the event of such things be said to be the cause of eternal foreknowledge, since the cause is naturally prior to the caused?" And he immediately places another reasoning to the same effect, when he says: "But what else is it to think that God therefore foresees future things because they will happen, than to think that the things which once occurred are the cause of that highest providence?"

And Peter Lombard says, *Sentences* I, dist. 45.4, that the will of God is the cause of all things, which is preceded by no cause, because it is eternal — and therefore the cause of it is not to be sought. Likewise, predestination is eternal, therefore there is no cause of its generation, therefore future things are not the cause of it.

Furthermore, to the same effect: If things known were the causes of divine knowledge, they would much help Him in knowing, and would give Him counsel, and would show Him things to be done; and so a foolish man, or an ass, would be a necessary helper, counselor, and teacher of our most wise God — which all Catholic ears refuse even to hear. Isaiah 40 also plainly determines this, saying: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord, or who hath been His counselor, and shown Him with whom He has taken counsel, and instructed Him, and taught Him the path of justice, and instructed Him in knowledge, and shown Him the way of prudence?" Whom following, the Apostle to the Romans 11 thus asks: "Who hath been His counselor? or who hath first given to Him, that recompense should be made him?"

This Anselm also proves, *De Concordia*, ch. 6, by reasoning taken from the priority of causation made before, with which Hugh agrees in *De Sacramentis* I, part 4, ch. 1. Likewise, Augustine, *City of God* XV, ch. 13: "For knowing all things which He knows, that perfection suffices Him alone. But all His creatures, spiritual and corporeal, He knows not because they are, but they are because He knows them. For He has not been ignorant of what He was about to create." And above, ch. 6, last part, he says thus: "When times come and go, nothing comes or goes from God's knowledge. For these things which have been created are not therefore known by God because they have been made, rather they have been made, or are mutable, because they are immutably known by Him." Likewise, *Confessions* XIII, last [section], directing his speech to God, he says: "We see what Thou hast made, because they are; but Thou, because Thou seest them, they are." And above, VII, 4: "What unforeseen by Thee, who knowest all things? And no nature is, except because Thou knowest it." [B]

CHAP. XVI. AGAINST CERTAIN ONES SAYING THAT THE THINGS KNOWN ARE CAUSAE SINE QUA NON OF THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, BUT NOT CAUSE.

There are some, however, hobbling on two sides, saying that things known are *causa sine qua non* (a cause without which not) of God's knowledge, but not a cause — who assign such reasoning: "God does not know without things known, therefore things known are *causae sine qua non* of His knowledge." And this seems to be the opinion of Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, [C] dist. 38; and certain others follow him. But these hobble from the paths of truth.

For when they say that the thing known is a *causa sine qua non* of divine knowledge, either they understand by this name "cause" what the name signifies among philosophers, theologians, and all the lettered, or even idiots who speak of cause — namely, that which in some way causes, at least as a partial cause and concause — or they do not so understand, but in some other way

hitherto unheard of, calling perhaps "*causa sine qua non* of something" everything without which that thing is not, whether it cause that, or be caused by it, or be impertinent to it in every way.

If they understand in the first mode, since every partial cause or concause of any thing is some cause of it (otherwise the father would not be the cause of the son, because man generates man and the sun, nor the wood or stones the cause of the house), it follows that the thing known is some cause of divine knowledge — which they deny. Likewise, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* II and *Metaphysics* V, there are four principal genera of causes, and many more modes of causes; but every mode of any cause whatever is reduced to some principal genus of cause. If, therefore, they speak of cause as he does, it follows that this mode of *causa sine qua non* is reduced to some of these genera. The thing known, therefore, is the efficient, material, formal, or final cause of divine knowledge. Therefore they have simply to concede that it is a cause.

If, however, they concede that the thing known is a partial cause or concause, and so in some way the cause of divine knowledge, all the reasons of the preceding chapter return against them. Likewise, then they have to concede that just as the thing known is the cause of human knowledge, so of divine; for the thing known is only the partial cause or concause of human knowledge, not the principal. For the exterior and interior senses, and our possible intellect, and the agent intellect, are the principal causes of it — which, however, the opinion of philosophers and theologians alleged above does not concede, but denies. Likewise, then things known would be the cause of such knowledge — namely, the knowledge of approbation, or approbative knowledge of God — which beyond simple notice adds the good pleasure of will. And since this is the cause of things, as chapter 9 proves, the same with respect to the same — in the same genus of cause, namely efficient — would be cause and caused, and prior and posterior naturally — the same in species of priority with respect to the same.

Likewise, according to the same Peter in the same place, the knowledge of God which is simple notice is only *causa sine qua non* of things known, and things known similarly cause of it; therefore the same in the same way is cause and caused with respect to the same.

If, however, they understand in the second mode, they have to say consequently that everything willed is the cause of the divine will, and of His approbative knowledge — though, on the contrary, it must be said, as is plain through chapter 9, and through Peter where above, and in the following dist. 45.

Likewise, against their reasoning: either they thus understand that this is not without that in fact, therefore it is *causa sine qua non* of it; or that this of necessity is not without that, but they are necessarily conjoined. If the first be granted, then they have similarly to say that the dog's bark, or the wonder of the ignorant, is such a cause of an eclipse and of God; indeed, also universally, that anything is such a cause of anything, and causes — for all these things coexist. If the second be granted, then the Son of God is the cause of the Father, and the begotten divine essence and wisdom is the cause why the Father is wise, and so the Father is wise by begotten wisdom; and

any attribute, and whatever is necessarily in God, would be the cause of any of these — which no theologian doubts to be false. And if a foot had necessarily always stood in dust, the footprint would have been the eternal cause of the foot; and the same is of splendor caused by fire, and the image caused in a mirror by an object, temporal or eternal; and universally, of every caused thing necessarily accompanying its cause — as passion necessarily follows action, effect [follows] efficient — and of every caused thing universally [accompanying] what causes it; all of which are absurd to all.

[B] CHAP. XVII. HE DISTINGUISHES THE DIVINE THINGS KNOWN: BECAUSE SOME PRECEDE HIS KNOWLEDGE IN A CERTAIN WAY, AND OTHERS FOLLOW IT; AND HE SHOWS THAT THE LATTER ARE IN SOME MANNER THE CAUSE OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, BUT THE FORMER NOT AT ALL.

Lest, however, you understand this too generally, of such things known by God a certain distinction is to be observed: for some of these precede God's knowledge in a certain way, and others follow it. The divine essence, omnipotence, the divine intellect, and the like, precede it [C] (for God is naturally first, and has omnipotence and intellect, before He understands or knows anything). Others, however, follow this. Therefore those things known which naturally precede divine knowledge are the cause of it. For everything which is naturally prior to another is some cause of it, as the 13th has shown.

Likewise, everything necessarily presupposed to anything seems to be some cause of it; for if it were not some cause of it, why could it not exist without that, especially what is presupposed and necessarily preredquired before? Concerning the necessary thing following any whatever, however, it is to be thought otherwise — as the effect follows necessarily the agent, though it is not the cause of it. But God's being, having power and intellect, is necessarily presupposed for His knowledge; therefore they are some cause of it. Likewise, the intellective potency, or intellect, produces — as efficient cause — its every intellection, and any of its act; therefore the divine intellect is the cause of any of His intellection, and of any knowledge. For thus God produces and causes eternally His Word, and the Father His holy Son, and is its eternal cause, as is plain from the second of this book.

But the other intelligibles, which are not God, have, according to the opinion of the Fathers, a double being: namely, intelligible, and of existence, or real — that is, they are intelligibles before they exist in completed act. The first being of these precedes in some way divine intellection. For prior in some way they are intelligible than they are understood by God — not through themselves (for since they are nothing at all, they have no aptitude or potency through themselves, as is established from prior things), but through God — and so in some way they are causes of divine intellection — yet not truly themselves (since they are nothing at all), but the divine essence alone, from itself, primarily great with the proper ideas and natures of all intelligibles, and fruitful, forerunning the divine intellect, offering all these to it most clearly,

most distinctly, and as it were most by name; which intuiting, He understands the universe of things, as the 7th and the 13th have suggested.

For it seems to me that the divine essence is, as it were, a certain intelligible mirror — most clear, infinite, suffering nothing from objects, receiving or reflecting nothing, but actively, from its most infinite clarity, distinctly — not confusedly — bringing forth the faces and ideas of all intelligible objects; into which mirror the eye of the divine intellect, looking, contemplates all these things. I do not, however, opine that such natures or ideas in the divine essence are essentially and really distinguished from it — as the words of the Fathers seem to sound in the ears of some — but that all these are really the same as the divine essence; nay, that this most one and most simple essence from itself alone so represents all intelligibles, as is plain from the first and 7th of this book.

Whence also Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, last [section], speaking of the omnipotent God's Art, full of all natures, says: "All are one in it." And concerning the joys of the just and the punishments of the wicked, or concerning the threefold habitation, he so writes: "All things of God are one in God, except for what pertains to relation. For the wisdom of God, and truth, and eternity, are not diverse among themselves, but they are one, as all the other things. The wisdom of God is no more wisdom than truth, and no more truth than wisdom, no more truth than eternity, than all the other things of God. For they are one in God; and not only are they the same in God among themselves, but they are nothing other than God Himself; and the world was in God before it was in itself — not the world but God."

In agreement with which, Anselm, *Monologion* 33, teaches that "God by one and the same word speaks Himself," etc. And below, ch. 34: "A work which is made according to some art, not only when it is made, but also before it is made and after it is dissolved, is always in that art, not other than what art itself is. Therefore, when the supreme spirit speaks Himself, He speaks all things which have been made: for both before they were made, and when they have been made, and when they are corrupted, or in some way varied, they are always in Him, not what they are in themselves, but what is the same as He Himself. For in themselves they are mutable essence created according to immutable reason; in Him, however, they are themselves the first essence, and the first truth of existing."

But the being of existence and the completed [being] of any creature does not precede divine intellection, nor is the cause of it, but follows it, and is caused by it. For not unwisely, but through His wisdom, He makes all things — itself testifying: "When He prepared the heavens, I was there; when with a certain law and circle He surrounded the abysses; when He established the air above, and balanced the springs of waters; when He surrounded the sea with its bounds; when He set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their bounds; when He poised the foundations of the earth, I was with Him forming all things" (*Proverbs* 18). And Psalm 103: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." This therefore precedes — as principal and instrumental efficient — His made things.

Nor are these repugnant in anything to the two chapters now premised. For those speak of things known posterior to divine knowledge in being existence, and of things known which are only intelligible — namely as, against the natures and ideas of the divine essence aforesaid, they are imaginarily distinguished — which according to that being are not in any way causes of God's knowledge.

COROLLARY.

AND HE HAS A COROLLARY: THAT THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, WHICH IS HIS SIMPLE NOTICE, IS TRULY THE CAUSE [C] OF ANY MADE THING — NOT MERELY *CAUSA SINE QUA NON*.

Whence it can evidently be established that the divine knowledge, which is His simple notice, is truly the cause of any made thing, not merely *causa sine qua non*, as Peter Lombard says in dist. 38 of his *Sentences* where above. The Authorities here and in chapter 15 alleged sufficiently testify these things, and the proximate reasonings similarly prove this. For this knowledge of God naturally precedes any of His making, and is necessarily presupposed for any whatever. Likewise, intellection and actual cognition moves the will, and is the cause of its volition, as could be proved by the same arguments, and through the Philosopher, *De Anima* III, ch. 54, and before and after; but divine actual volition is the cause of any made thing, as chapter 9 proves; and whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused. For thus also the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, just as the Father of the Son, as was touched upon above.

CHAPTER XVIII

HE DISTINGUISHES THE DIVINE NON-COMPLEX SCIENCE (IN A CERTAIN MANNER) AND THE COMPLEX SCIENCE; HE LIKEWISE DISTINGUISHES COMPLEX KNOWABLES INTO THOSE WHICH ARE PRIOR (IN A CERTAIN MANNER) AND POSTERIOR TO THE DIVINE WILL; AND HE SHOWS THAT THE PRIOR ONES ARE IN SOME WAY THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE COMPLEX SCIENCE, BUT THE POSTERIOR ONES BY NO MEANS, BUT RATHER THAT GOD KNOWS THESE THROUGH HIS OWN WILL.

For a fuller acquaintance with the divine science, it must further be observed that, according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* III, there are three operations of the human intellect: namely, the apprehension of simples, composition and division, and discursive reasoning. The third of these does not belong to God, because nothing is unknown to Him, nor can He acquire any new

knowledge, and because such an operation cannot exist without potentiality and imperfection. But the first and second do belong to Him in His own way. For He comprehends all non-complex and simple things, and in some manner composes and divides, affirms and denies, all complex things composed or divided. Let His first knowledge or non-complex notice, then, be called *simply apprehensive* or *intuitive*, or *simple apprehension* or *intuition*; let the second be called *complex*, *compositive* or *divisive*, *affirmative* or *negative*, or *adhesive*; or, in the abstract, *composition and division*, *affirmation or negation*, or *adhesion*. For I, an unlearned little man, can scarcely — and not properly but only by similitude, stammering — re-echo the lofty heights of God's marvelous science: for it is exalted, and I cannot attain unto it.

Having shown, therefore, that God knows all knowable things by a non-complex science, not through posterior known things, but through His own clear essence, which presents all things to Him most distinctly, it now remains consequently to show how God knows all complex knowables. For this it must first be known that complex and true knowables are of two sorts: for some naturally precede the divine will, and some naturally follow it. *That God exists, that God is eternal, that God is omnipotent*, and the like, naturally precede the divine will: for it is not the case that because God wills it to be so, therefore it is so, but rather the contrary. *That the world exists, that any creature exists*, and universally all those true complexes whose truth is caused by and depends upon it, follow it.

Those true complexes, therefore, that precede the divine will, God knows through His essence alone, just as He does the other true non-complexes, as can be perceived from the foregoing chapters of this work. But those that follow His will, God does not know through those complexes, nor through anything else apart from His will, but through His will, or through His substance together with His will — so that, for His complex science, His will is necessarily prerequired naturally as prior.

The first part of this — namely, that God does not know complexly the posterior true complexes through them — can be shown just as it was shown above that He does not know any posterior things non-complexly through them. The second can be shown thus: God foreknows truths concerning the future, and not through any propositions, habits, or acts existing in Him as really distinct from Him, by part 26 of the corollary to chapter 1 of this book. By what, then, except through His own will? Nor can anyone say that God complexly foreknows that Antichrist will exist through Antichrist himself, on account of the chapters already mentioned, since indeed Antichrist in himself is nothing, does nothing per se, and causes nothing; Antichrist also is not of himself determined to come to be, as chapter 14 taught. How then does he per se cause this to be known determinately?

Nor can it be said that God foreknows future things through their futurity. For then, as it appears, future things would be the cause, or causes, of the divine science, contrary to what was set forth above. Moreover, that futurity, if it is nothing, causes absolutely nothing; but if it is something real distinct from God, the same argument applies as before. Furthermore, that futurity is or was

at some time caused by God according to what is prior. How then did God know previously that this was to be future? How also did He know previously that those future things were to be future, or that this future thing was to be future? Again, this futurity either makes the thing to be future contingently and indeterminately, or necessarily and determinately. If contingently and indeterminately, how does God know through it determinately and certainly that the thing will be? Does not also that futurity now exist determinately and certainly, and from it does it not follow determinately and necessarily that the thing will be? How then will it be avoided that all things which will happen, will happen of necessity, and absolutely nothing contingently? But if that futurity be posited as in God, it most clearly seems that it must be posited in the divine will, since this is the cause of the determination and futurity of all future things, by the testimony of chapter 14 of this work; and thus the principal intention is established.

Nor again is it reasonable to suppose that God knows future things through His essence alone, with His will set apart. For of itself alone it is equally indifferent and indeterminate to representing to the divine intellect that Antichrist will be and that Antichrist will not be, just as either of them can equally be the case and equally be known by God. Therefore of itself alone, without some prior determination, it represents neither. Nor likewise must one suppose that God knows future things through His intellect alone, or that this determines the divine essence to display this future thing or that, since it [the intellect] is of itself indifferent to either of contingent opposites, just as God's essence itself is — and since, moreover, the intellect alone is not practical in this way with the will set apart, as appears from chapters 8 and 9 of this work. Furthermore, since the intellect with the will set apart is a necessary principle, as is plain and as is shown by the corollary to chapter 10, every future thing would necessarily be future and foreknown by God, and thus the contingent would equally perish.

Nor can it be determined, as some hold, by the infinity or immensity of His knowledge, because, granted the immensity of His knowledge, He can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be and that Antichrist will not be, just as Antichrist can indifferently be and not be: therefore He will know neither without some other prior determining or terminating determination. Again, the determination by which God is determined to know anything is naturally prior to that knowing, that is, prior to the science arising from such determination. But (on this view) God is determined to know that Antichrist will be by the infinity of His science; therefore the infinite science of God is naturally prior to His knowing that Antichrist will be; and since that [infinite science] includes the knowledge of *Antichrist will be*, it follows that the science of God by which He knows that Antichrist will be precedes itself naturally. This is confirmed: for God is not determined to know that Antichrist will be primarily and adequately through His whole infinite science. For there are no parts of it such as *Burnellus brays*, *the eclipse occurred*, and other such infinite things, which, even if He did not have, He would still no less be able to know that Antichrist will be. Indeed, as it appears, He is not determined to know that Antichrist will be by any other part of His infinite science, except by the proper science of this — that *Antichrist will be* — or by the science of the causes of Antichrist's futurity. But not by the proper science of this,

since then the same science would precede itself. Nor by the science of His secondary causes, since then He would know such things discursively, from causes to caused things, which is contrary to what has been said.

Again, let an argument be made concerning a future effect that is always contingent to either alternative until it occurs, just as some free volition of a creature will be: then concerning the futurity of such a future effect there can be no determination through its causes or through their science, since those causes are altogether indeterminate and free to either alternative — to causing it or not causing it. The same applies to the futurity of Antichrist. For he will be produced by his causes not necessarily but contingently. Otherwise he would not be contingently future to either alternative, as is commonly supposed, but determinately and necessarily about to come. Or let the argument be made concerning a future effect which God will make immediately by Himself without any other cause. How, moreover, did He foreknow that things would be before the production and existence of their causes? Surely not otherwise than now, nor now than then, contrary to the teaching of chapter 5 of this work.

Nor can it even be said, as others perhaps would have it, that God is determined to know things of this sort through the infinity and immensity of His knowability or knowing-power (rather than His actual science). For granted and standing His immense knowability or knowing-power, He can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be or will not be, just as he himself can indifferently be and not be: therefore He will determinately know neither, without some other prior determining limitation. In the same way it can be shown that God is not determined to know things of this sort through His omnipotence, nor through His simply infinite perfection.

Some, indeed, drawing a little nearer, affirm that God foreknows future things through the permission of His will alone — that is, through the fact that He wills to permit, or will permit, posterior active things to do these or those. But these suppose that posterior active things can do something without God and the divine will properly co-acting per se with the same act, contrary to chapters 3, 4, and 9 of this work. Furthermore, granted divine permission alone, if a rational and free agent could freely do anything, it could equally and contingently do either of opposites, or neither. How then does God by this alone know determinately and certainly that this agent will do this, and omit that?

From all these considerations, then, it appears that God foreknows future things and non-future things, what will be and what will not be, through a volition [and nolition] in some manner naturally previous in the will. Furthermore, God knows future things through that by which they are first future; but this is the divine will, as chapter 14 showed; and the reasons brought forward for that conclusion can equally be turned to prove this one. Again, by the testimony of the Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* I.2, *to know is to know through a cause*. But God most truly knows future things; therefore through the truest cause, which virtually contains all other causes and their causations; and this is His will, as has been shown in chapters 9 and 14. And it can be confirmed by Averroes on *De Somno et Vigilia*, where he inquires into the cause of divinatory or

prophetic dreams concerning future things; and he shows that it is from the perfect solicitude of God concerning men. Further, showing how God knows these things, he says that He knows them through the fact that they are determined to be, and have a determinate cause and a universal nature understood, which is the first cause of their being; and thus they are known by the intellective nature, from which sensible nature receives whatever it does and is moved, just as instruments are moved by the form of the artifact; nor does any individual come about essentially from nature except through antecedent science, since, as he alleges from Aristotle, the instrument of the artificer is moved only according to the artificer. According to him, then, God knows future things through a cause determining this thing to be and effective of it; and this is the divine will, as chapters 14 and 9 show. And this seems to be in his mind, especially when, on *Metaphysics* XII, comment 51, he says that *being is not the cause of God's science, but contrariwise*. Since, therefore, according to him God knows future things through a cause determining them to be, and not through any other cause outside Himself, therefore through a cause intrinsic to Himself; which can be no other than His will.

Concordantly with which Ammonius, on the last [section] of *On Interpretation* I, says: It must be said that the gods know all things — past, present, and future — in a manner befitting the gods; and this is by one, determinate, and infallible cognition, on account of which one must indeed say that they comprehend the science of contingent things — as those producing all things which are in the world, being themselves the causes of perpetual substances, but co-causes of generable things, according to their proper operations; and as seeing not only the substances themselves, but their powers and operations — those which are according to nature, and those which are beyond nature; which beyond-nature has entered together with the necessary order subjected, or with the subject coursing through being, in those things which are born to participate in this — not principally, but in the manner called *parypostaseos*, that is, secondary existence. And further on he says: The gods know contingent things in a more noble manner than is their own nature, taking up the cognition of them beforehand determinately, and knowing these things. — But whence are they taking up and pre-taking up the cognition of these things? From what preceding principle, or cause, except from their proper determined will, the indefectible cause of things, and a similar cause of the science had with them?

This same opinion Dionysius, in *De Divinis Nominibus* 7, seems efficaciously to attest, as is more fully recited in chapter 15 of this work.

Again: God rightly knows future contingent things; therefore through something which is really certain. But this is no future contingent thing, since that is not certain; nor is any inferior cause sufficient for the production of it, in the causation of it, certain — but rather contingent, like the effect. Otherwise, that effect would be certainly and determinately future. It remains, then, that God knows these things through His own most certain will, by which He wills that all those things shall be. This could be confirmed by Averroes, on *Metaphysics* IX, comment 21, saying that *to know those things which always are, immutably, in one mode, is to know; but to know a mutable essence is called to estimate*.

Again, this last reasoning and the principal conclusion are made plain by John Scotus, on Sentences II, distinction 37, question 2, refuting those who hold that the created will is the total cause of its own willing without God's co-acting — by the consideration that, if it were so, God would not be by nature foreknowing of future things, since He has knowledge of future contingent things only because He certainly knows the determination of His will with respect to them — which will is immutable and impotential. But if the created will is the total cause of its willing, and itself is contingently disposed to that willing, then however much the divine will be posited as determined to one part of those things which depend on the created will, that [created] will can will otherwise; and so the certainty does not follow from the cognition of the determination of the divine will. He, in *Sentences* I, distinction 41, also reproving the opinion which says that God predestines someone to life because He foresees him as about to use his free will well, writes thus: *But against this it is argued, first, because God does not foresee him as about to use his free will well, except because He wills and pre-ordains him to use it well — for, as was said in distinction 39, the certain foresight of future contingent things is from the determination of His will.* And further, having made two instances concerning Judas or Lucifer about to sin, and arguing that permission alone does not suffice for the certainty of the divine science, he answers thus: *The first of these is solved by this — that God foreknows that He will cooperate to the substance of that act which will be a sin; and this He foreknows because He wills to cooperate with it (if it will be a sin of commission), or He foreknows that He will not cooperate to some act if He does not will it (if it will be a sin of omission). And knowing that He will cooperate to the substance of such an act not with the due circumstances, or that He will not cooperate to a necessary act, and consequently that the man will omit, He knows him to be about to sin — not only because He knows that He will permit this, but because He knows that He will cooperate with him to the substance of an act not circumstantiated, and consequently this man will commit; or that He will not cooperate with him to a necessary act, and consequently this man will omit.*

Again, Saint Thomas, *On the Christian Religion* (or *On Faith, Hope, and Charity*) ch. 138, says that the contingency of the effects of secondary causes cannot disturb the certitude of divine providence, because the efficacy of the divine will furnishes certitude to itself: for the will of God, since it is the universal cause of things, not only that something be done, but that it be done in such a manner, pertains to the efficiency of the divine will not only that what He wills to be done is done, but that it be done in the manner in which He wills it to be done, so that the divine will be efficaciously fulfilled. The same author above, in chapter 133, says that contingent things, insofar as they are virtually in their causes, are not determined to one [outcome], such that certain knowledge could be had of them; nevertheless, insofar as they are actually in their being in God's eternity, they are now determined to one, and certain knowledge can be had of them. He also, on *Sentences* I, distinction 38, last question, asking whether the science of God is of contingent things; and further on distinction 40, fourth question, asking concerning the certitude of predestination, plainly holds the same opinion. But such contingent things can be

determined only through the divine will, as chapter 14 showed; and for this determination one could allege the authority of Averroes on *De Somno et Vigilia*, briefly recounted above.

The same view Anselm seems to hold, *De Casu Diaboli* 21, where he maintains that nothing is truly known except what is understood by certain reason. Therefore God is not properly said to have *foreknowledge* of future things, but rather *knowledge of present things*, because all future things are present to Him. And the same he says in *De Concordia* 7; and Boethius, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, prose 6, says what cannot, it seems, be understood otherwise than that God knows all future things by this — that they are present to Him; that is, by His insuperable and immutable will, presentially determined and decreed certainly that they should come about in the future. Whence also it is prophetically said of Him, *He who has made the things to come*; and Ecclesiastes 6: *He who is about to be, his name is already called*. But this cannot be except by a previous will; and this God seems to intimate, Isaiah 46, saying thus: *I am God, declaring from the beginning the latter end, and from the start things which have not yet been done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done* — as if He would intimate that He thus declares, or can declare, the latter end from the beginning, because all His counsel and will shall stand and be done immutably.

How, moreover, could that of Origen on the *Epistle to the Romans* be better understood — that *not because God knows that something will be, therefore it shall be, but because it is future, therefore it is known by God before it comes to pass* — than this: that because something is future in the divine volition and predestination, therefore it is causally foreknown by God by simple notice, and not the contrary?

Wherefore Augustine, *Against Faustus* XXVI, ch. 2: *It is rather true what God knows than what man opines. Whence future things can no more not come to pass than past things can not have been done, because it is not in God's will that anything should be false by which it is true*. These things, then, are such, and known by God through His will. The same, *De Bono Perseverantiae* 49: *Chastity, charity, piety, etc., which some confess to be of God, and to be foreknown by Him, and through this they cannot deny these to be predestined*. And further, in the same place, ch. 53: *If God's gifts are given to the elect, if there is no predestination, they are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown; therefore there is the predestination which we defend*. But all predestination proceeds from will. Therefore all things which are foreknown by God are willed by Him, and not simultaneously, nor naturally afterwards — therefore prior. Therefore the will of God is the cause of His science, as the foregoing has urged.

This same opinion those illustrious 24 Elders of Apocalypse 4 seem to attest, as chapter 14 of this work touches upon. And just as it has been argued concerning God's science with respect to future contingents, that it is through the divine will, so can it be argued concerning His science with respect to all future, present, and past things which naturally follow His will — chapters 14 and 9 assisting — most especially since He does not otherwise know present or past things than future ones, on account of His complete immutability demonstrated in chapter 5. Here, however,

by *will* I understand every act of will, whether it be volition or nolition, or any other act whatsoever.

These things have been said for that not-foolish question of those fools who said: *How does God know?* — who, perhaps because of its perplexing ambiguity, insoluble for them, will think there is no science in the Most High.

CHAPTER XIX

THE OBJECTS AND RESPONDS.

That the things just said may appear more clearly, they must be tested by a brief scrutiny of disputation.

It is argued that **posterior intellectured things are the cause of the divine intellection**. [1] For everything that moves the intellect to its intellection is the cause of that intellection, and so of its science. But everything intellectured by God moves the divine intellect: for everything intellectured moves the one who understands and his intellect, as appears throughout *De Anima* III; and on *Metaphysics* XII.37 the new translation says: *The intellect is moved by the intelligible*; and the translation which the Commentator expounds: *The intellect is from the intellectured*, which Averroes thus expounds — that is, *the essence of the intellect is in the intellectured*.

[2] Again, that which is naturally prior to another and is necessarily preredquired for another is some cause of it, as appears from the foregoing. But the intelligible and knowable is so disposed to the divine intellect and science, as chapters 13 and 17 demonstrated.

[3] Again, *that a thing is or is not* is the cause of truth, and truth is the cause of science, not the contrary.

[4] Again, the cognition of non-complexes is the cause of complex science; therefore God's complex science is caused by the things known.

[5] Again, it appears that the divine science is not the cause of the things known, since then, since He always equally knows all things, all things would always be equally caused. And then, since He equally knows non-beings as beings, these too would be equally caused as beings.

[6] Again, the posterior is not the cause of the prior. But intellection and science are posterior to the intelligible and knowable: for it follows, *Intellection and science exist, therefore the intelligible and knowable exist*, but not conversely, at least formally. Therefore, by that logical rule in the *Categories*, the intelligible and knowable are prior to intellection and science. Therefore these latter are posterior to those.

[7] Again, just as the intellect is naturally prior to the will, so to know is prior to to will: for none can will except what is foreknown; therefore [it is prior] also to know and to foreknow any complex thing rather than to will it, or to will it to be so.

[8] Furthermore, then God would foreknow future things by such a discursus: *Whatever I will to come about, will come about; this I will to come about, therefore it will come about.* And thus He would in some way be potential, and not most highly actual, contrary to the first supposition and the third part of the corollary to chapter 1 of this work.

[9] Moreover, Origen on the *Epistle to the Romans* says that *not because God knows something to be future, therefore it will be; but because it is future, therefore it is known by God before it comes to pass.*

[10] Again, Augustine, replying to the seventh question of Orosius: *In God*, says he, *the will cannot precede wisdom*; therefore it is rationally [first] to know than rationally to will.

[11] Again, Ecclesiasticus 1: *Who has investigated the wisdom of God which precedes all things? — Wisdom is created prior to all.* Therefore the wisdom of God and His science precede His will.

[12] Furthermore, against the claim that some truths are naturally prior to the divine will: for then by the same reasoning some necessary and impossible things would be prior to it; which seems contrary to Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.17, saying: *All necessity and impossibility is subject to His will, but His will is subject to no necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible except because He so wills; but for Him to will or not to will anything on account of necessity is foreign to the truth.*

For the first of these it must be known that *to move another* can be understood in two ways: properly and metaphorically. Properly, as in real and proper movers and moved, as the Philosopher speaks throughout the *Physics*; metaphorically, as the end is said to move; and every apparent good or evil moves to pursuit or flight, as is said in *De Anima* III, *Ethics* VII.12, *Metaphysics* XII, and elsewhere in many places. Whence in *De Generatione* I.7 he sets down this distinction in these words: *For there is an effective cause, as that whence the principle of motion comes — that is, properly; — but the cause "for the sake of which," that is, the final cause, is not effective; therefore health is not effective except according to metaphor.* Properly speaking, then, it is not true that everything intellected moves the one who understands. For I understand many things which do not exist at all, and so cannot at all properly move. I also understand many existing things which do not properly move me: for I understand the Phoenix of Arabia and the marvels of India — and how would these properly move me, existing at Oxford? — since, according to the Philosopher *Physics* VII, *In every motion the mover and the moved are together, either according to themselves, or at least according to a medium which is immediately moved by the first mover, and immediately moves the last moved by the power of the first mover*, as appears in *De Anima* II.74. But these things neither immediately move me, nor suffice to alter the whole

medium. Speaking metaphorically, however, it is true that everything intellectuated moves the one understanding — not because it itself does so properly, but because its similitude, intention, or image, in the memorative or imaginative power, or in the intellect itself, in some way moves the one understanding to understanding; just as, on the authority of the Philosopher, the end and health, not existing, move man's will — not properly, but very metaphorically, because the cognition of these alone moves someone to willing, and the will so moved moves to further pursuit; whence the end is often called by the Philosopher the *first mover*. Things intellectuated by God, then, move the divine intellect not properly but only metaphorically, because the ideas and similitudes of them in God — that is, the divine essence, which most distinctly represents all intelligible things — move (or moves) in some manner the divine intellect to understanding all intelligibles. And because God has these ideas and similitudes from Himself alone, and in no way from posterior intellectuated things, He is not said to be moved by them to understanding, except perhaps very metaphorically and less properly, as has been said.

The second is solved by this same point. For the intelligible is not always according to itself and properly prior to intellection, since many non-beings are understood — but [is prior] according to its idea and similitude, as has been said.

To the third the same response: for no created truth is the properly so-called cause of the divine science, but the first uncreated truth, by which all other truths are true, as has been shown above; or the divine will, which is the infallible cause of every created truth, as the foregoing has taught. Nor is this truth caused in God by posterior truths, but it is in Him entirely from Himself; therefore neither do posterior truths properly cause the divine science, but perhaps very transumptively, because the idea or image of this truth in the divine mind in some manner causes God's science. Nor is *the thing's being or not being* the cause of such truth in God, as the major premise supposes, but rather contrariwise.

The fourth is solved by what has been said. For although the cognition of non-complexes in God is the cause of His complex science, yet because that cognition is in Him only from Himself, and is not acquired to Him from things known in non-complexes, it does not follow that they properly cause God's complex science.

The fifth is solved by this: that the divine science of cognition alone, of mere simple notice, is not a sufficient cause of things, but with it is also required the science of approbation and the good-pleasure of will, or some such act in the divine will.

The sixth is solved by this same point.

To the seventh, by the response to the first and following arguments. For the intelligible and knowable are not properly and per se prior to intellection and science (for many non-beings are understood and known), but only metaphorically — that is, according to their similitudes and ideas.

For the eighth, it must be known that the divine intellect, in some way naturally prior to its willing, and therefore necessarily simply and absolutely, knows by simple notice — non-complex, as it were — all complex thinkable things, true or false, possible or impossible. Yet not by complex adhesive notice, which is compared to our complex and compositive science above. For it does not in this way know such things before they become true antecedently and causally through His will, as chapter 14 of this work makes plain. So also you equally know in time, by simple non-complex notice, a complexion of this sort: *You are doing this or that, you are willing this or that*, before it is so, as well as when it is so; yet not by adhesive complex science, except when it is so, and after it is so, at least in natural order — as also such propositions become true.

Nor does the ninth proceed. For God does not argumentatively only, and not intuitively, know future things — as a calculating astrologer enclosed in his chamber knows a future eclipse, or a present one above his proper horizon or below it, by certain demonstration, not by clear intuition. But just as one seeing the sun sees it through its species received in the eye — prior in nature to the vision and the cause of it, without any argument. For in order that he may see the sun, it is not necessary that he argue thus: *Whoever has the species of the sun in his eye sees the sun; I have it thus*; but immediately, having the species of the sun in the eye, he sees the sun. So also the divine will, with respect to some future thing, like a proper species of it, represents to the divine intellect that this future thing will be, and He, through it, comprehends this most immediately, without any discursus, just as the corporeal eye, through the species of the sun, [comprehends] the sun.

That [text] of Origen seems to have been resolved in the preceding chapter. Someone perhaps will object that Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* I, distinction 38, expounds it otherwise — but chapter 16 of this work answers. Again, perhaps it is objected that certain other Doctors expound it still otherwise, saying that when it is said *because it is future, therefore it is known by God*, here a cause of consequence, not of being, is denoted. But if Origen speaks of the cause of consequence only, not of being, why does he say *not because God knows it to be future, therefore it will be*? — since it follows excellently, *God knows this to be future, therefore this will be*.

But it can still be objected more sharply thus: if a thing is naturally prior as future before God knows it, and *the thing's being future* is the cause of the divine foreknowledge, by similar reasoning present things are also naturally prior as present before God knows them, and *things being present* is the cause of God's such science, plainly contrary to chapters 15 and 16. But here it must be known that *a thing's being future in the divine will and predestination causally* — not in its proper extrinsic nature — is the cause of the divine science or foreknowledge. For He in no way needs extrinsic things in order to know, as the foregoing has urged; but He has all future things with Himself intrinsically, cognitively, causatively, intuitively, or scientifically from Himself alone, and thus knows them, just as also present things in like manner intrinsically in every way. Otherwise, that is, He would know intrinsically future things first, present things second, past things third in a different way; and so He would be intrinsically changed, the opposite of which chapter 5 teaches. Always, then, in the same way intrinsically, things are first

future in the divine will, second present, third past — and always similarly and equally present and known with Him, and causes of His science, always similar and equal.

Whence Hermes, *De Verbo Aeterno* 15, speaking of the world and worldly things, says thus: *They were not when they were not, but in Him they were even then, whence they had to be born*; with whom many philosophers and theologians agree. Wherefore the Wise Man also says, *To the Lord God all things are known before they were created; so also after they are made He looks upon all things* — so, he says, *not otherwise*. — Intrinsically, in any manner whatsoever.

Perhaps you will reply still further and say: If God's willing is the cause of the existence of things outside in work and effect, it is the immediate cause of such existence of things, as the corollary to chapter 10 teaches; and it is likewise the cause of God's complex science of the existence of such things; therefore the existence of such things outside in work and effect is naturally prior to the divine science just mentioned; and consequently is some cause of it, by chapters 13 and 17 above — plainly contrary to chapters 15, 16, and 17 of this work. — Or perhaps otherwise you will say: God's complex science is the cause of the existence of things outside, and not in the same order with the divine will, since it is causally and naturally posterior to it, as the foregoing chapter establishes; nor is it a cause naturally prior, as appears through the same. Therefore it is a cause of things naturally posterior to the divine will; therefore mediating between it and its effect of this kind — contrary to the corollary to chapter 10 above.

But who does not see the fault of the first of these? Who does not know that nowhere does it follow: *A and B are effects, or things caused, of cause C, and A is immediate, therefore prior to B and the cause of it?* For why could not one cause have two immediate effects, neither of which is the cause of the other? Nor does the divine will alone cause God's science: for it should not be doubted but that the divine intellect causes its act of understanding, and its scientific intellection. Why, then, may not the divine intellect, immediately gazing upon the act of the divine will by which He immediately effects things outside, no less immediately, or at least equally immediately, know through it that it will be, is, or has been, exteriorly — especially since that act of the divine will suffices the divine intellect for knowing — namely, in such a way that posterior things, in their proper natures, do absolutely nothing toward God's science, as the foregoing has urged? Indeed, the divine intellect seems even more immediate to the divine will, and act to act, than God's will or His volition is to things outside. Nor does God's complex science seem the cause of things outside except insofar as it includes the simple non-complex notice and the good-pleasure or will of God.

That [text] of Augustine is solved by this: that he is there speaking of the wisdom of God *ad intra*, by which He is wise of those things which naturally precede the divine will — of which kind is the generation of the Son. For He generates not by preceding will but by nature, as Augustine teaches *De Trinitate* XV.20; and the will of God is not the cause of the science of such things, as the foregoing chapter sets forth. For Orosius asked: *Did the Father beget the Son by will, or by necessity?* Augustine answers: neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is

not in God, and will cannot precede the wisdom which is the Son. The other [text] of Ecclesiasticus could be glossed in the same way. For it seems he is there speaking of the Son who is Wisdom — of the Wisdom of God the Father — and so he says there: *The fount of wisdom is the Word of God on high*. Or it can be said that he seems to understand that the wisdom of God precedes all things outside God, that is, all created things, not all things within Him. For he says there *Wisdom was created prior to all things*. And further, in chapter 24, more expressly, in the person of divine Wisdom, he says: *I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before every creature; I caused in the heavens that an unfailing light should rise, and as a cloud I covered all the earth*.

Anselm appears to understand this concerning necessity and impossibility *posterior* to the divine will, in things creatable or created — by which necessity, according to him in the same place, *it was in some way necessary that Christ should die, and impossible that He should not die*. Whence also immediately after the cited words he subjoins: *Wherefore, since He does what He wills, and only what He wills, just as no necessity or impossibility precedes His willing or not willing, so neither does any precede His doing or not doing — although He wills many things immutably, and does them*.

CHAPTER XX

HE LIKEWISE DISTINGUISHES THINGS WILLED INTO THOSE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR TO THE DIVINE WILL, AND SHOWS THAT THINGS WILLED THAT ARE POSTERIOR ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE VOLITION, NOR A CAUSE *SINE QUA NON*; AND THAT THINGS WILLED THAT ARE PRIOR ARE SOME CAUSE OF IT.

These things being established, it will be settled that things willed posterior to the divine volition are not the cause of the divine volition, nor a cause *sine qua non*, as some imagine; and that things willed that are prior are some cause of it.

Now there are some things willed prior to the divine volition, such as: *that God is, that God is omnipotent, good, knowing*, and the like. Others, however, are posterior, such as *that the whole world exists*, and its individual parts. These three points concerning the divine volition can therefore be shown in the same way as the three preceding chapters — namely chapters 15, 16, and 17 — showed three similar points concerning the divine science; and they can be persuaded otherwise by an argument from similarity: thus is it in the divine science; therefore likewise in the divine volition, especially since the will is as free as the intellect, or freer.

Again, the first part of this can be shown by the consideration that the will of God is the cause of all posterior things, as chapters 9 and 14 taught: if therefore any of these were a cause of the divine volition, it would be the cause of itself.

Again, otherwise God would not know posterior truths, as the substance of chapter 18 manifests. Nor would God be certain concerning them, since for His volition there would necessarily be prerequired an uncertain cause, namely, those posterior things, as future contingents, and these for His science, as is more plainly argued in the same chapter 18.

Again, since God of necessity knows one part of every contradiction, and this is so in all posterior things known through His will, by the same chapter, if His volition were caused by posterior things willed, the divine will would necessarily suffer from them volition or nolition. How, then, does He have a free will?

Again, if God's will were to suffer from such things not necessarily but freely, He could not so suffer, and yet do all things no less. Therefore it is in vain posited that He so suffers.

Again, if God could through His will at one time not so suffer, at another so suffer, He could in some way be changed, contrary to chapter 5. For whatever suffers from a mutable cause, suffers mutably and is mutable.

Again, it is more perfect simply to act, and not to suffer from such things, than to so suffer, as the foregoing teaches; therefore this, not the other, must be attributed to God, as the first supposition dictates.

Again, future contingents are not a cause moving the divine will, since then they would be naturally prior as future than they would move, and than God would will them to be future — contrary to chapters 14 and 18, just as chapter 15 argued concerning the science of such things.

This could also be shown by many authorities cited in chapter 9, and especially by those that say that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all things; whereas if it were moved by another, that other would be prior and superior — for every efficient or moving cause is naturally prior and superior to its moved.

Again, this Peter Lombard plainly holds, *Sentences* I, distinction 45.4, saying thus: *This supremely good will, then, is the cause of all things which naturally come about, or have been done, or are future; which is preceded by no cause, since it is eternal, and therefore the cause of it is not to be sought.* For which he adduces many authorities: first that of Augustine, 83 *Questions* 28, saying: *He who asks why God willed to make the world is asking the cause of God's will. But every efficient cause is greater than what is effected, and nothing is greater than the will of God.* Again, Augustine *On Genesis Against the Manichaeans* I.5: *The Manichaeans seek to know the causes of God's will, when His will is the cause of all things which are. If God's will has a cause, there is something that goes before God's will, which it is impious to believe. He, then, who says, "Why did God make heaven and earth?" must be answered, "Because He willed." But he who says, "Why did He will?" seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found. Let human rashness, then, restrain itself, and not seek what is not, lest it not find what is.* Hugh [of St. Victor] also holds this, *De Sacramentis* I, part four, chapter one, saying: *The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator, which no preceding cause*

moves, nor any subsequent cause confirms, since from itself it is just. And further on: This, then, is the established order of things, that the posterior follow the prior. The first of all is the will of the Creator, since from it are all things; after it follow those which are from it. The first are those which are in it; the second are those which are from it. Those which are in it are eternal, having neither degree nor succession, since they consist in unity, and pass not in eternity; those which are from it are created through it.

The other parts that follow can be shown in the same way as chapters 16 and 17 showed similar points concerning the non-causation and the causation of the divine science.

CHAPTER XXI

HE OBJECTS AND RESPONDS, AND DISTINGUISHES THE *RATIONABLE* AND THE *JUST* INTO WHAT IS PRIOR TO THE DIVINE WILL, WHAT IS POSTERIOR, AND WHAT IS MIXED.

Many things can here be objected against what has been said concerning the divine will, just as the preceding chapter objects against what has been said concerning the divine science; and they can be solved similarly.

Furthermore, it can also be specially objected against what has been said: For if things willed prior are the cause of the divine volition, the divine will has some cause, contrary to the authorities of Augustine just adduced. And then God's will would not be the first and highest cause of all posterior things; for cognition and things willed prior would be the prior and superior cause of that cause, and so of all His caused things.

Again, the willable moves the will, and the appetible the appetite, as appears in *De Anima*, the *Ethics*, and elsewhere in many places; and God wills and desires posterior things willed.

Again, every rational agent acts on account of some end, as appears in *Physics* II and elsewhere quite frequently; but the end moves the agent, as natural philosophy, metaphysics, and morals together often teach.

Again, every one who wisely wills something wills it on account of some reason: therefore reason moves the one willing to so will.

Again, every one who justly wills something wills it because it is just so to will: therefore this moves the one willing to will.

To the first of these it must be said that this conclusion is not contrary to the adduced authorities, since all those speak of posterior things willed, such as the creation of the world and the like, not of prior things willed. For who would deny that God's will produces and causes His volition, as appears from chapter 17 of this work?

For the second it must be said that there is a twofold cause of things in God: namely, sufficient and necessary, by which when posited the thing is necessarily posited; and thus God's will is the cause of all posterior caused things, as the foregoing clearly shows; and speaking of cause in this way, God's will is the first and highest of all such caused things, and thus the objected authorities understand. The other is a partial cause, not necessary, by which when posited the thing does not necessarily follow as posited; and thus cognition is some cause of these posterior caused things, as appears from chapter 17. Cognition, however, does not per se sufficiently and necessarily produce all things known: for God knows equally any non-beings whatsoever, which He does not produce, and beings, which He produces. And concerning such a prior cause the argument seems to conclude.

To the third the answer appears through the response to the similar argument in chapter 19, concerning the motion of the divine intellect by intellected things. For the will of God is not properly moved by posterior things willed, but metaphorically — too metaphorically perhaps — namely, because it is moved by their similitudes or ideas, or by their cognition in the divine intellect; but these are in no way caused by posterior things willed, as chapters 15, 16, 17, and 19 more fully showed; therefore neither is God's volition caused by these.

For the fourth, it must be known that the end is twofold, as appears in *Ethics* I.1 and many other places: namely, the ultimate end and the intermediate end. The ultimate end on account of which God wills and works whatever, is Himself — just as He is also the ultimate end of the action of every thing, as appears in *Metaphysics* XII and frequently elsewhere in philosophy, with which Sacred Scripture concords. Whence Proverbs 16: *The Lord has wrought all things for Himself*. And this is the most powerful final cause of the divine will, and of any operation of His; therefore the saints often prayed to the Lord through this cause. Whence holy David, Psalm 24: *For thy name's sake, O Lord, thou wilt be propitious to my sin*. And the most holy Jeremiah in chapter 14 prays to God, saying: *Do thou for thy name's sake, O Lord, since our turnings away are many*. The holy Daniel also, in chapter 9, thus prays: *For thine own sake, incline, O God, thine ear*. And this is what the Truth itself plainly testifies, Isaiah 43: *I am, I am he that blots out thine iniquities for my own sake*. And further, chapter 48: *For my name's sake I will defer my fury; for my own sake I will do it, that I may not be blasphemed; and my glory I will not give to another*. And Ezekiel 36: *Thus says the Lord: Not for your sake will I do this, O house of Israel, but for my holy name's sake; not for your sake will I do it: be it known to you*. — Although these can also be understood concerning the efficient cause: for the end moves the will in some way, and effects the willing itself; and the argument does not hold concerning this end, since it is not concerning posterior things willed, but rather prior.

There is also of the divine will a final cause intermediate in some manner, although very improperly so — namely, every creature, on account of which another is ordained by God; and thus man is the final cause of every other creature, at least the irrational, and of that divine volition by which He willed and made this. For all this is ordained for the sake of man, as appears sufficiently from the opinions of many Fathers; with whom the Philosopher also

concords, *Physics* II.24, saying thus: *We use all things which exist on account of ourselves; for we are in some manner also the end.* And so Scripture speaks, 2 Maccabees 5: *Not on account of the place, he says, did the Lord choose the nation, but on account of the nation, the place.* And Mark 24: *On account of the elect those days will be shortened.* And Mark 2: *The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.* And John 12: *Not for my sake came this voice, but for yours.* And 1 Corinthians 11: *The man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man.* But such an end does not properly move the divine will, but metaphorically, as has been said in the response to the previous argument.

For the fifth argument, one must inquire **whether reason moves and directs the divine will.** That it does, has been argued; and it can be confirmed by that of Augustine to the seventh question of Orosius, cited in chapter 19: *In God will cannot precede wisdom*; therefore it is rationally [first] to know than rationally to will. The same in *Questions on the Old and New Law*: *God could have made all things at once, but reason forbade it.*

Again, the Apostle to the Ephesians 1 says of God: *Who works all things according to the counsel of His will*; where the Gloss expounds: *that is, according to His will, which is from reason* — as if to say, *Why He chose us rather for the office of preaching or apostolate, we know not; but yet He did so by counsel, not rashly.* And it can be confirmed: counsel is a kind of discursus of reason, as can be had from *Ethics* III.7 and the following process. Otherwise that unworthy ridiculous saying would be verified of God: *Thus I will, thus I command, let will stand for reason!* — and this His wisdom proves, *which reaches mightily from end to end, and orders all things sweetly.*

Again, if God should well will or do anything without prejudgment of reason, by the same reasoning man could do so, contrary to the Apostle, 1 Timothy 5: *Do nothing without prejudice* — that is, without prior judgment. And Proverbs 4: *Let your eyelids precede your steps.* And Ecclesiasticus 15: *God from the beginning constituted man, and left him in the hand of his counsel.* The same is plain from the Philosopher in *Ethics* III on choice and counsel.

This reasoning is confirmed: man is made according to the soul in the image of God, namely according to memory, intelligence, and will. If, therefore, in God will leads reason, so it should be in man correspondingly: otherwise there would be no imitation, nor perfect similitude.

Again, otherwise no one could dispute with God concerning anything He has done: for where there is no reason, there can be no disputation — contrary to that of Job 13: *I desire to dispute with God*; and so he does, saying *Why do I tear my flesh with my teeth? why am I consumed in silence? why do you hide your face?* and elsewhere he frequently proposes many similar questions; whence also he says: *If I am to be judged, I know that I shall be found just*; and further, chapter 19, *Understand that God has not afflicted me with even judgment.* Again, Ephesians 1: *He chose us before the foundation of the world*; and Romans 9: *That according to election the purpose of God might stand* — but election is a deliberate appetite, as appears in *Ethics* III.6 and *Ethics* VI.2: therefore counsel is the cause of election and of the divine will.

Again, Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.10: *Just as in God any small inconvenient consequence carries impossibility, so any small reason, if not vanquished by a greater, carries necessity.* And he so proceeds throughout that book, showing thus that it was rational that God should do or not do this or that, and through this concluding that He has done or has not done this or that. Wherefore in chapter 7 he says: *The will of God ought to suffice as reason for us, when He does anything, although we do not see why He wills. For God's will is never irrational.* Therefore reason moves the divine will and effects His willing. And Peter Lombard says, *Sentences* I, distinction 42.1, that *the will of God is rational and most equitable.*

To the contrary part it is argued thus: If reason moves the divine will, that [reason] is not caused in God by any creature, as appears sufficiently from the foregoing, but is intrinsic and essential to Him; therefore it is necessary; therefore the will of God necessarily consents to it — otherwise in God there could be a repugnance of will and reason, and so sin knowingly against a conscience rationally informed; and thus God would necessarily act *ad extra* whatever He acts.

Again, if reason moves the divine will, a greater reason would move more. Since, then, God could make all things better than He makes them, and this would be better and more rational if it were done, therefore this more moves His will; therefore He so wills and so does.

Again, whatever God does, He could omit, and do something else equally good. Therefore there is no reason why He omits this and does that rather than the contrary. — This is confirmed by a similar [example] in man: for if to a man able to save only one man from death there occur two who will die unless he aids them, supposing parity in all respects, by saving either of them and omitting the other he does well; and this without any reason previous to the will. For there is no stronger reason for this rather than for that. The same applies to one preferring one of two equally suited men to some dignity, and to one liberally giving a gift to one of many equally worthy, or even to one less worthy than to those unequally worthier. Whence Luke 4: *There were many widows, etc., and to none of them was Elias sent except in Sarepta of Sidon to a widow woman; and many lepers, etc., and none of them was cleansed except Naaman the Syrian.* And so did that Evangelical householder of whom Matthew 20 [speaks], giving as liberally to those working in his vineyard for one hour as to others working all day, saying to whoever murmured: *I will give to this last as also to thee. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* — and he alleged, as it was not necessary, no other reason. And this is what that of Job 34 seems to sound: *When He grants peace, who is there that condemns? When He hides His countenance, who is there that beholds Him?* On which Saint Gregory, *Moralia* XXV.14, says thus: *Let no one, then, discuss why, while the Jewish people stood firm in unbelief, the Gentile world for so long lay prostrate; and why, when the Gentile world rose up to the faith, the guilt of unbelief laid the Jewish people low. Let no one discuss why one is drawn by gift, another repelled by merit. For if you wonder at the assumption of Gentilehood — when He grants peace, who is there that condemns? If you are astounded at Judaea perishing — when He has hidden His countenance, who is there that beholds Him? Therefore the counsel of supreme and hidden truth is the satisfaction of open reason. Whence in the Gospel the Lord, when He spoke of the cause of such a thing, says: I*

confess to thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and revealed them to little ones. Even so, Father, — and immediately, as if subjoining a kind of reason for the hiding and revealing, says: For so it was pleasing before thee. And further, in the same chapter 15: Whence also when, paying wages to the laborers in the vineyard, He made certain laborers unequal in work equal in reward, and the man who had sweated more in labor sought more in wages, He says: Did you not agree with me for a denarius? But I will give to this last as also to thee. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? In all things, then, which are exposed exteriorly, the open cause of reason is the hidden justice of will. Wherefore it appears that it is so similarly in all the works of God. Whence Ecclesiastes 8: I understood that of all the works of God, no man can find a reason of those things which are done under the sun. Yet if there were any reason for God's works, it could be in some way found by man, as it can in the case of God, who exceeds all His works in incomparable excellence.

And Anselm, Proslogion 11, says: That, indeed, can be comprehended by no reason, why of like evils, God by supreme goodness saves these rather than those, and damns these rather than those by supreme justice.

Again, Daniel 4: He does according to His will, both with the powers of heaven, and with the inhabitants of the earth, and there is none who resists His hand and says, Why have you done this? And Job 9: Who can say to God, Why do you do thus? Whence even that profane Averroes, on Metaphysics XII, comment 51, says: It is, then, declared that there is some knowing being of whom it is not lawful to say to him: [why?]. With which the Apostle concords, Romans 9: Who resists His will? O man, who are you, that you reply to God? Does the formed thing say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus? And he shows this through the argument from indifference of reason concerning differing acts, as I argued above: Has not the potter, he says, power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? And many such things are in Scripture.

To this, however, someone could briefly respond and say that reason is twofold: namely, uncreated and created. The uncreated reason moves the will of God, not the created; and so the arguments proceed in their own ways on either side. Yet, that these things may appear more clearly, we must dwell a little longer.

For there are some *rational things* naturally prior to the divine will, such as: *that God is, that God is eternal, omnipotent*, and the like; and these rational things and their reason can well move the divine will, as has been shown above in similar cases. And there are other rational things naturally posterior to the divine will, and depending on it as on their cause; and none of these, nor the posterior reason of any of them, moves or determines this will. Indeed, because God wills it to be so, it is rational that it be so, not the contrary — just as in the case of a man preferring one of two equals and omitting the other, in any of the cases mentioned. Because the man prefers this one, it is rational that he be preferred. And this is what the end of the authority of Gregory just adduced says.

And besides these, there appear some rational things mixed in some way from both, such as *this creature being subject to the Creator, and God being Lord of this thing*. For this is not rational necessarily and absolutely, since then it would naturally precede the divine will, and would always be so by absolute necessity; but it is rational conditionally, or by supposition — that is, if this creature or thing exists. And this conditional, *if some creature exists, it should be subject to the Creator, and He should be Lord over it*, is rational simply absolutely, and is naturally rational prior to God's so willing it; nor does its reason or rationality depend on it. For there is some first reason in God necessary absolutely, naturally prior to His will — perhaps such as *God exists* or *God is truthful* or *truth* — from which many other things necessarily follow; and these, as I judge, are all those which are necessary absolutely. For from a necessary antecedent only the necessary necessarily follows; and every absolutely necessary thing is either the first necessary, or is necessarily reduced to it, and necessarily follows from it. For if it follows from it, but not necessarily, this is through some contingent medium, namely through the divine will. But nothing depending on a contingent and free cause is necessary absolutely. All these absolutely necessary things, then, are similarly absolutely rational. For if the antecedent in a necessary consequence is absolutely rational, the consequent likewise will be absolutely rational, nor in any way depending on the divine will, since neither antecedent nor consequence depends on it; therefore neither will the consequent depend on it.

This conditional, then, *If this creature exists, God is its Lord*, is absolutely rational, and naturally prior to God's so willing it; but the existence of the condition — namely *that this creature is* — is caused by and depends upon the divine will. And it is rational that this creature exists because God wills it to exist, not the contrary; for there was no stronger reason why He willed to make this and omit another possible one equal to this in all respects, than the contrary. Hence it appears that this — *God is Lord of this thing* — is mixedly rational in some manner, as has been said. For *that God is Lord of this thing, if this thing is*, is rational simply prior to the divine will; but *that this thing is* is caused by and depends upon it, and therefore is rational posterior to such will.

But still, for the second member of these rational things, it must further be observed that there is a kind of *obligating* reason, a kind of *preponderant* reason, and a kind of *congruent and concomitant* reason. An *obligating reason* is one which dictates that someone ought to and is bound to do or omit this or that, which whoever has and does not follow it, sins; and such reason is not in God with respect to posterior things willed, but is often in us. A *preponderant reason* is one which dictates that it would be better to do this than that, or that it would be better to do this than to omit it; and such reason does not move, nor conclude in the divine will, nor determine it to acting. For God could do better things than He does, and many good things which He does not do. A *congruent and concomitant reason* is one which dictates that it is congruent and good to do or omit this or that; and so speaking of reason, God wills rationally any posterior things willed; and so a man rationally wills to prefer, and prefers, one of two equals, or perhaps one less worthy of two unequals, in any of the previously mentioned cases. For if this be done, it is congruent and good; and such reason does not obligate or determine God or man, but only suffices for willing.

Yet for man it is always safe and holy to conform his will to the preponderant reason wherever he can have such; and so perhaps the Apostle understood when he said *Do nothing without prejudice* — that is, where such preponderant or even obligating prejudice can be found. But where one cannot, as in the preferment of one of two equals, will suffices for reason, or at least the congruent and concomitant reason as defined; and concerning such prejudice the cited authority could similarly be understood. But God cannot follow preponderant reason in all things unless He were to do all possible things, and any of these infinite, which involves a contradiction, as is shown elsewhere. The will, then, suffices for Him as reason in such matters, or at least the congruent and concomitant reason just defined.

These things, then, fully seen, the solution of all arguments pro and contra cannot fail to appear.

But now, for the sixth and last argument, it remains similarly to scrutinize: **Whether justice moves or directs the divine will?** That it does, has been argued before; and it can be argued pro and contra, just as concerning reason and the rational. For all true reason seems to be a kind of justice, and every rational thing a kind of just thing. Furthermore, the affirmative side can be specially argued through Augustine in *Questions on the Old and New Law*, saying: *God can do all things, but does only what befits His truth and justice*. Truth and justice, then, move the will of God to acting.

Again, 2 Timothy 4: *Laid up for me is the crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will render me in that day*. And 2 Thessalonians 1: *Yet it is just with God to render tribulation to those who trouble you*. And elsewhere in the canonical Scripture, and of the Saints and Doctors, it is found very frequently that justice exacts and requires that God should render to each according to his merits, as he has acted. Whence Proverbs 11: *His will is an equal weight*.

Again, *not being just* is the cause why God does not will or do something; therefore by the same reasoning *being just* is the cause why He wills and does something. For by this it appears that Abraham boldly argued against God in Genesis 18: *Will you destroy the just with the wicked? Far be it from you to do this thing, and to slay the just with the wicked, that the just be as the wicked; this is not your way, who judge all the earth: by no means will you do this judgment*.

Again, otherwise the will of God would be the first and supreme justice, and whatever He willed would by that very fact be just. But this is plainly contrary to Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.12, saying thus: *That, however, which is said — that what God wills is just, and what He does not will is not just — is not so to be understood that, if God should will any unfitting thing, it would be just because He wills it. For it does not follow, "If God wills to lie, it is just to lie"; but rather, "He is not God."*

Again, otherwise nothing would be per se just, but only justness positive [posited] from the divine will; therefore neither would anything be per se unjust, but only because forbidden by the same — which seems contrary to the Philosopher, *Ethics* V.12, saying thus: *Of political justice, this part is natural, this legal: Natural is what everywhere has the same force, and not in being*

seen so or not — that is, it does not consist in the judgment of the legislator, in that it so seems to him or not. And he adds: *Legal is what from the beginning differs not, thus or otherwise; but when it is laid down, it differs — for example, that one mina be redeemed, or that a captive be sacrificed, but not two sheep.* And the like is found in the Canon, distinction 1. That something is per se unjust, not only because forbidden, also appears through Augustine, *On Free Will* I.6, saying: *Adultery is not evil because forbidden by law, but it is forbidden by law because evil.* And Augustine teaches in *Questions on Leviticus* 62, and the Gloss on Leviticus 19 recites, that some things are unjust and evil because forbidden, but others contrariwise — like lying.

Again, otherwise the will of God would be the supreme law and the principle of all justice — which seems contrary to Augustine, *On Free Will* I.13, saying thus: *That immutable law to which always one must obey is called supreme reason; therefore it is not will, since reason is in the intellect.* And further, in the same: *The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most ordered.* And this law, as it appears, does not depend on the divine will, but is immutably per se just.

The opposite side of this can also be persuaded by some considerations. In the rules of justice or law, one cannot ascend to infinity, because of the second supposition; but there must be some supreme of all and principle of others. This cannot be in any creature, but is necessarily in God. And there is no necessary reason or law in God prior to His will: for there is no law or reason why, of two equal possibles, He wills and does one and not the other, as has been argued above. Therefore that supreme law and justice is necessarily the will. Whence Anselm, *Proslogion* 11: *That alone is just which you will, and what you do not will is not just;* and Augustine on Psalm 61, *He spoke once: If you ask what is just, what is unjust, look where God spoke once, and there you will find the fount of justice.* This could be confirmed by human laws, ecclesiastical and even secular: for frequently in ecclesiastical laws the Pope says: *It has pleased us thus, or thus,* which by this very fact is established and held for law; imperial laws too often have a similar foundation, whence they say: *What has pleased the Prince has the force of law.* But God is as free in establishing laws for the governance of His whole commonwealth as these are for theirs. Therefore the will of God is sufficient as law, and is the supreme law.

Here, however, it can be answered in all things concerning *justice* or *the just*, just as concerning *reason* and *the rational* it was answered above; and as the rational was there divided, so the just can be divided here.

For there are some just things naturally prior to the divine will, and not depending on it — such as *that God is, that God is eternal, omnipotent,* and the like; and these just things, and their justice, can well move God's will to willing. Others, however, are just things posterior; and others mixed, as was said concerning the rational. Things legal also and laws are similarly divided. Mixed perhaps are such as: *the good are to be rewarded, the bad punished,* and the like. And as in another genus there is some proper and first principle by which the rest are regulated, as the foregoing has taught, so in the genus of the legal and the just there is necessarily some first

law and justice, which is the first rule and the first principle, from which originally all other legal and just things following are derived, and in all things directed.

This proper principle, however, appears to be the infallible truth of the divine essence, on which, as on an immovable foundation, all judgments of justice rest. This David, that exceptional witness of truth, seems to attest, when he says: *The principle of thy words is truth; for ever are all the judgments of thy justice* (Psalm 118). Wherefore from this principle the whole law is named *truth* in the same: *Thy law is truth*. This first justice, however, is just per se, and primarily, necessarily, and absolutely, in no way depending on the divine will, but naturally prior to it. From this first just thing, however, many other just things necessarily follow; and they are, as I judge, all those which are just necessarily absolutely — not because they are commanded by God or any man whatsoever; whose opposites also are unjust necessarily absolutely, which can be shown as above concerning rational things a similar showing was made. And with these just or unjust things neither God nor man can dispense in the least, just as neither can He change what is necessary or impossible absolutely. For these are not subject to the divine will, nor that of any man whatsoever, just as neither is the antecedent, nor the consequence by which from it they most justly follow. Of this kind are: *that a creature, if it exists, is subject to the Creator; that one benefitted is bound to his benefactor*, at least to God his benefactor; *that none ought to sin*; and as perhaps is the case, *that none ought to do anything against his proper conscience, or against the prejudice of his proper reason*. And such perhaps is to *lie*, as Anselm seems to mean, where he was cited. For this seems to contravene some truth, and so the first truth, which is the principle of the whole law and of justice both divine and human; and beyond doubt such would be *for God to lie*, of which Anselm there speaks. These, however, are simply natural laws, immovably founded in the very nature *naturans*.

From this first rule of all legal and just things, however, many other legal and just things follow, not necessarily as the prior, but freely and contingently — because through a free and contingent medium, namely through the divine will. And these are all temporally instituted legal things. Whence Augustine, *On Free Will* I.13, having distinguished a twofold law — namely, temporal or commutable, and eternal or incommutable — says: *In that temporal law there is nothing just and legitimate which men have not derived to themselves from this eternal law*. Wherefore Hugh also in *De Sacramentis* I, part one, chapter 4, speaking of the divine will, thus says: *According to it, that is just which is just, which doubtless would not be just, if according to it it were not just. When, therefore, it is asked, why is what is just, just? it is most fittingly answered, because it is according to the will of God, which is just. But when it is asked, why is it itself just? it is more soundly answered, because to the first cause there is no cause, by which from itself it is what it is. This alone, then, is that whence has arisen whatever is, and itself has not arisen, but is eternal*. Whence also Wisdom 12: *Thy power is the beginning of justice*. And Isaiah 51: *Hearken to me, my people, for the law shall go forth from me, and my judgment shall rest in the light of the peoples*.

Some just things, then, follow necessarily by supposition and inseparably from created nature — as *Man is rational; All men are similar in species; The whole is greater than its part*, and so of similar things; and this is natural law simply for created nature, and is altogether necessary, with which neither God nor natural man can dispense, while such created nature stands. Some, however, follow created nature, not entirely necessarily but for the most part — what almost all and everywhere do by instinct of nature, not by human institution, of which kind are: *To do to another what one wills to be done to oneself*, and similarly negatively; love of offspring, and their education; the requital of benefactors; the violent repulsion of violence; the keeping of faith; and the like. And so frequently and almost always do authors and laws speak of natural law. And with this natural law dispensation can be made for cause; for such natural things, according to the Philosopher, *Physics* II, are always or for the most part disposed in one way, but sometimes and in a small part fail. Whence Gratian in the Canon, distinction 13: *Against natural law no dispensation is admitted, except perhaps where two evils so urge that one of them must necessarily be chosen*. For this seems to be one natural law: *No apparent evil is to be chosen* — with which dispensation is made in the case where it is necessary that someone choose a greater or lesser apparent evil. And this is the *epieikeia* of natural law, just as another similar one is of positive legal right, as appears in *Ethics* V.16. By this second mode or by the first, however, every just thing seems to be natural law, to which there is a stronger reason — since man naturally has reason as his natural rule. Wherefore natural law also seems to be that which follows this; and the opposites of these are forbidden because evil, and not contrariwise.

Yet there is still a kind of just thing derived from the first rule of justice, not necessarily but freely, which is natural in neither of these modes — to which, that is, before it is established, there is no stronger reason for than against it; and such is purely positive and legal right. Whence the Philosopher, *Ethics* V.12: *Legal justice is what from the beginning differs not thus or otherwise; but when it is laid down, it differs*. As if a master should command a subject of two altogether equal things to do this one first, and that one second — then it is first just so to be done, and not otherwise. And such seem all those things which in case of equality and indifference are decided by lot, or even permitted; of which kind perhaps was *not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil*. And similar to these seems that one is to appeal within ten days. For no reason from the beginning compelled to ten days more than to eleven or nine; but some term was necessary, and so the legislator had to define a fitting term. And of this kind appear all those things which are evil because forbidden, and not contrariwise. And in such cases that maxim of the jurists is true: *What has pleased the Prince has the force of law*; and *Thus I will, thus I command, let will stand for reason*. And likewise in certain other cases in which according to truth there is a stronger reason for than against, but it is not clear to all that it is so. Lest, then, anyone according to the fancy of his own head should be able to feign for himself reason, and so make for himself a law — lest perhaps a shadow of reason might creep in under the appearance of true reason — it is expedient that all such things, although according to truth they are per se rational and just, since to many they are doubtful, be made clear by the discreet judgment of the legislator, and by his authority be decreed just and certain.

And thus what has rationally pleased the Prince in establishing has the determinate and certain force of law, and previously had only the doubtful and uncertain. And with such laws dispensation is made, as appears in both rights. In such matters, moreover, *epieikeia* often has a place, as *Ethics* V.16 attests.

Furthermore, there is a kind of *obligating* justice, a kind of *preponderant* justice, and a kind of *congruent and concomitant* justice, just as was said above concerning reason. Through these, and other things already set forth, the response to all the arguments appears.

CHAPTER XXII

THAT GOD HAS AN ACTUAL VOLITION OR NOLITION DISTINCT, OPPOSITE TO ANY OBJECT WHATSOEVER OF THE WILL.

It seems consequent to what has been said to show that the divine will has a proper and distinct actual volition or nolition concerning any object whatsoever of the will — good or evil, true or fictitious, possible or impossible, present, past, and future.

This, indeed, with respect to all such things as are posterior to the divine will, is shown through chapter 18: for God knows complexly all such things to be such, and this He cannot do without a previous will through some act of His own.

Again, if it is not so, there is some object concerning which God has no act of will; and it is certain that He can have one. Therefore He is in potency and as it were sleeping with respect to such an object; therefore He could be more actual, more noble, and more perfect than He now is. Now, then, He is not most actual, most noble, and most perfect — which the first supposition and the third part of the corollary to chapter 1 forbid. For act is prior to potency in definition, perfection, and time, as appears from *Metaphysics* IX.13 and following — where Averroes says, comment 16: *The sign that act is completion and perfection is that act is operation, and operation is the completion and perfection of the operator; and therefore "act" in the Greek tongue signifies what "completion" and "perfection" signifies.* And in comment 17 he says that *the first mover is pure act, in which there is no potency at all.* And on *Metaphysics* XII, comment 38, he says that *what moves the first moved, since it is pure act without any potency, cannot have any disposition other than the one it has.*

Again, if there were potency in God, that potency would be good; and to every such potency its act is better and more honorable, as is proved in *Metaphysics* IX.19.

Again, just as understanding in act is to understanding in potency, so willing or not-willing in act is to willing or not-willing in potency. But understanding in act is more perfect than understanding in potency; therefore willing and not-willing in act is more perfect than these in potency. Therefore by the first supposition and the third part of the corollary to chapter 1, these must be attributed to God.

Surely in *Metaphysics* XII.51 the Philosopher proves through this that God understands in act, not in potency, in these words: *If He does not understand, what venerable thing will He be? but He has it as it were in the manner of one sleeping.* — Where Averroes [says]: *It is necessary, if there is intellect, that always one of these two be the case: either according to a disposition in which the knower does not use his science, or in which he uses it. If the first is granted, he is as one sleeping, and there is not found in him a noble disposition; and this is unfitting.*

Again, felicity consists in use, not in possession; in operation, not in habit, as the Philosopher proves in *Ethics* I.12 by this — that habit can be in one doing no good, as in one sleeping, but operation cannot. And the same is held above, chapter 5, and below in the last [chapter], where also he alleges those who say that *the felicitous differ in nothing through half their lives from the wretched.* But God is most felicitous, therefore also most actual.

This whole appears more expressly in *Ethics* X.12, where the Philosopher proves that felicity is speculative operation, by this — that *the gods are most blessed and felicitous, and this by operating, not by sleeping;* and this operation will necessarily be speculative. — Where Averroes says: *Glorious God, and the Angels, are of more noble state and felicity than the rest of beings; therefore they have act: for it is not fitting that they should be sleeping.*

Surely it is on this account that Algazel in *Metaphysics* III, sentence 7, says that *in necessary being there is nothing in potency.* And Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* 7, deduces this as something impossible — that God should be free [vacat] anywhere — as chapter 15 of this work more fully recited.

Surely also the Prophet, Psalm 120, says of the Lord: *Behold, He shall not slumber, nor shall He sleep that keeps Israel* — taking much or moderate idleness, or being free from the work? In the future blessedness too of Angels and men, there shall be no idleness, cessation, or vacancy of intellect or even will, as both reasons and authorities teach us, but actual and perfect operation of both unceasingly persevering. How then concerning God, then, and now, and always more incomparably blessed, infinitely, must one not similarly judge?

Again, such a disposition in our intellect or will has annexed to it a certain indifference, potentiality, and imperfection; therefore similarly in God. Therefore it must not be posited in Him, by the testimony of the first supposition and the third part of the corollary to chapter 1 of this work. And on account of this reasoning, John, on *Sentences* I, distinction 39, question 2, holds this opinion. For he says that *the liberty of our will, which is indifferent to opposite acts, has necessarily some imperfection annexed, namely passive potentiality and mutability; and therefore such liberty is not to be posited in God.*

Again, God concerning any object whatsoever has memory and intelligence, as appears from chapter 6. If, therefore, concerning some object He does not have an act of will, memory, intelligence, and will would be unequal in God — when yet in us they are equal, as is declared in *De Trinitate* X, penultimate, and XV.23. There would also seem to be a kind of inequality in the

divine persons, to whom these are appropriated by the orthodox Fathers. Surely also if it were so, some of those powers would not be supremely perfect, contrary to the third and fourth parts of the corollary to chapter 1 of this work?

Furthermore, if God concerning a certain object of will were to have no act, and could have one, it appears that He could in some way be changed, contrary to chapter 5 of this work — as if, having no act of intellect or of will concerning any object whatsoever, and being able to have one concerning any whatsoever, and it were posited in being, He would seem changed. So also the contrary case: for if He should cease from every such act, He would appear changed in some respect.

Furthermore, unless God of necessity had some act of will concerning any object whatsoever of His, He could have no act of will concerning Antichrist — neither that he should be, nor that he should not be. Therefore, as it appears according to what has been laid down in chapter 14 of this work, Antichrist would be neither future nor not-future; and so of all other posterior contradictories universally.

Again, if it derogated nothing in any way from the perfection of the divine will to have no act concerning one object, neither would it concerning another, and concerning all others. Again, then by the same reasoning the divine intellect would not in any way be repugnant to having no act of cognition concerning one object, nor concerning another; and so concerning each individually and concerning all together. Therefore it would not in any way derogate His perfection if He were always *as a Lord asleep, as a strong man overcome with wine*.

Perhaps, however, it is by no means to be supposed that God acquires any perfection from the cognition or volition of objects; but because He is supremely perfect, therefore He produces such perfect operations — just as the sun is not therefore more perfectly lucid, nor its light more perfect, because it perfectly illuminates the medium, but because it is perfectly lucid, and its light perfect, therefore it perfectly illuminates. Yet if these perfect operations were withdrawn from God, God would be more imperfect, not on account of the withdrawal of any perfection acquired by Him through them, but on account of the withdrawal of the perfect powers, the supreme actuality, and His omnipotence, from which (or from whom) these operations proceed — just as if the illumination of the disposed medium did not occur from the sun, the sun would be more imperfect, not on account of the withdrawal of any perfection which it acquired from the illumination, but through the withdrawal of that light by which it should illuminate.

Nor from this does any absurd necessity follow in the divine will, just as none in His intellect, but virtue, efficacy, actuality, and infinite goodness, which neither wills nor can be made imperfect, idle, or in the least slumber. Just as also no unworthy necessity follows that same will, if it immutably loves and wills the divine essence, the persons, Christ, and the promised glory of those to be saved, future and past, of those saved — but a most-worthy stability, and most-free communication of goodness.

COROLLARY

1. And it has a corollary: that God wills every truth, and does not positively will (but rejects) every falsehood.
2. That if God wills any antecedent, He wills any consequent of it; and does not positively will every thing repugnant to it.
3. That of any pair of repugnant things, He has a willing of the one and a not-willing of the other.
4. That from God's willing anything whatsoever, it follows that He does not will the opposite of it; and contrariwise.
5. That from God's not willing any affirmative or negative significate, it follows that He wills the opposite of it.
6. That from God's not not-willing any whatsoever, it follows that He not-wills the opposite of it.
7. That from God's positively not-willing any whatsoever, it follows that He not-wills the same also privatively; and likewise contrariwise.
8. That whatever is in any manner whatsoever, God wills it so to be; and whatever is not in any manner whatsoever, God does not will it so to be.

From these, however, certain other hidden things, but most worthy of view, lucidly follow.

[1] First, that God wills every truth, and does not positively will, or rejects, every falsehood.

[2] Second, if God wills any antecedent, He wills any consequent of it, and does not positively will any thing repugnant to it.

[3] Third, that of any pair of repugnant or impossible things, God has a willing of the one and a not-willing of the other.

[4] Fourth, that from God's willing anything whatsoever, it follows that He does not will the opposite of it; and contrariwise.

[5] Fifth, that from God's not willing any affirmative or negative significate — for instance, *A is*, or *A is not* — it follows that He wills the opposite of it.

[6] Sixth, that from God's not not-willing any affirmative or negative thing uttered, it follows that He not-wills the opposite of it.

[7] Seventh, that from God's positively not-willing any whatsoever, it follows that He not-wills the same also privatively; and likewise contrariwise.

[8] Eighth, that whatever is in any manner whatsoever — present, past, or future, true or false, possible or impossible, necessary or contingent — God wills it so to be; and whatever is not in any manner whatsoever, God does not will it so to be.

The first part of this corollary follows manifestly: For if, as the chapter teaches, God has some act of will concerning any truth whatsoever, and concerning no truth has He an act of not-willing — for then, by chapter 10 of this work, that would not be a truth: for it would not be in reality as it signifies — He has, then, an act of willing concerning any truth whatsoever. The other particle of this part appears in like manner: For if, as the chapter teaches, God has an act of will concerning any falsehood whatsoever, and concerning no falsehood — that is, no thing falsely signified — has He an act of willing, for then by chapter 10 it would really and truly be so. Concerning any falsehood, then, God has an act of not-willing — namely, a not-willing that it should be really as it signifies.

The second part of the corollary follows from the first, and the parts of this second correspondingly from the parts of this first, with two most known maxims taken together: *If the antecedent is true, so is the consequent*; and *Everything repugnant to a truth is false*.

The third part evidently follows from the first, with this logical rule: *Of any pair of repugnant and impossible things, one is true, the other false*.

The fourth follows from the third manifestly, this notorious [maxim] supporting it: *God does not at the same time will and not-will anything*.

The fifth and sixth are demonstrated by the third.

The first part of the seventh appears from that notorious [point] presupposed in the showing of the fourth part; the false part of it, however, follows fully from the third part of this.

The eighth appears from the first, since the parts correspondingly from the parts. For whatever is in any manner whatsoever, it is true that it is so. Wherefore by the first of the first, God wills it so to be. And whatever is not in any manner whatsoever, it is false that it is so. Wherefore by the second of the first, God does not will it so to be.

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT BOTH GOD'S SCIENCE AND HIS WILL IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE.

After these things I judge it must be demonstrated that **both God's science and His will is altogether immutable**. For if either of these were changed, God Himself would necessarily be changed, contrary to chapter 5 already cited. This can also be sufficiently shown through the reasons and authorities of that chapter, and confirmed in abundance through others.

For if the science of God were sometimes changed, this would most appear concerning future things, when they become present and so slip into the past. But this is not true, since these are in no way the cause of the divine science, but the contrary, as has been shown above; therefore He always knows them in the same way intrinsically, nor in any other manner. Wherefore Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII.6, and Algazel in *Metaphysics* III, sentence 6, show that God does not so know singulars or particulars — first as future, second as present, third as past — that according to their change He is in any way changed; but always similarly, and never otherwise in any way. Wherefore the same Avicenna in *Metaphysics* IX.1 says: *Through this it is necessary being — necessary being in all its modes — because there can be no future disposition for it which was not.* Wherefore also Ammonius on *On Interpretation* I, last [section]: *The gods, he says, truly exist, and to undergo transmutation, even according to intellect, is impossible.* And further: *To know, he says, contingent things, is the very nature of the gods themselves; on account of which these things, having indeed an indeterminate nature — being able to occur and not to occur — they, however, in some more noble manner than is their nature, take up beforehand the cognition of them and know them determinately. For it is necessary that they cognize partible things impartibly, and without distance, and pluralized things unitedly, and temporal things eternally, and generable things ungenerably. For we shall by no means endure that the cognition of the gods be said to flow along with the flux of things, nor that with them there be anything either past or future, nor that it be said of them, "He was" or "He will be" — as in the *Timaeus* we have assumed — since these are significative of a kind of transmutation; but only, "He is," and this not the "is" which is connumerated with the "He was" and "He will be," and is divided up with them, but that which is understood before all temporal insinuation, and which signifies their inversibility and indecidence — which indeed even the great Parmenides announces of every intellectual being: "For neither was it nor will it be; but only is."*

Concordantly with which Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, last prose, writes thus: *Every judgment, according to its own nature, comprehends those things which are subject to it. But God's state is always eternal and presential; His science also, having surpassed all motion of time, remains in the simplicity of His presence; embracing also the infinite spaces of past and future, considers all things in His simple cognition as if they were now being done. Therefore, if you wish to weigh that presence by which He discerns all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not as it were a presence of the future, but a science of an instance never failing.*

This same thing all philosophers and theologians wish concordantly when speaking of eternity, and of God's intrinsic eternal actions, measured by eternity not by time.

Furthermore, Ecclesiasticus 23: *To the Lord God, he says, all things are known before they were created; so also after they are perfected does He behold all things.* In treating which the blessed Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV.13, says thus: *He knew all creatures, not because they exist, therefore He knows them, but because He knew them, therefore they exist; nor did He know created things otherwise than as creatable; for nothing was added to His wisdom from them; but they being as it was fitting, and when it was fitting, He remained as He was. For so it is written*

in the book of Ecclesiasticus: Before they were created, all things were known to Him; so also after they are consummated — so, he says, not otherwise.

The same opinion is also reinforced by Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* 7, as chapter 15 recited.

Furthermore, Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, last [chapter], writes thus: *Although times depart and succeed, the science of God neither departs nor succeeds. For these things which are created are not therefore known by God because they have been made, but rather they have been made, or are mutable, because they are immutably known by Him.*

The same, *Questions of Orosius* 22: *God from eternity, by His established counsel, made what He willed; nor did He see things made differently, and to be made differently; therefore He sees in the same way things done as He had seen them to be done.*

The same, *Super Genesim ad Litteram* V.18: *How, he says, were things known to God which were not? And again, how would He make those things which were not known to Him? For He made nothing being ignorant of it. Therefore He knew the things He made; He did not learn made things. So before they came to be, they both were and were not: they were in God's science, they were not in their own nature. And further: I dare not, however, say that they became known to God in any other way when He had made them, than the way He had known them in order to make them, with whom there is no change nor shadow of a moment.*

The same, *De Civitate Dei* XI.21: *What else is to be understood when through all things it is said, "God saw that it was good," except the approbation of the work made according to the art, which is the wisdom of God? But God so far from learning that it was good when it was made, that no one of these things would have been made if it had been unknown to Him. While, then, He sees that it is good — what unless He had seen before it was made would by no means have been made — He teaches that it is good; He does not learn it. And Plato indeed dared to say more — namely, that God was elated with joy at the universe of the world being completed; where Plato himself was not so far foolish as to think that God was made more blessed by the novelty of His work, but he wished thus to show that the work already made pleased the Artificer, which had pleased Him in the art as to be made. Not that in any way the science of God is varied, so that other things make other in Him those which are not yet, other those which now are, other those which have been. For it is not in our manner that He looks ahead to what is future, or looks at what is present, or looks back at what is past; but in some manner far and high differently from the custom of our cogitations. He, indeed, not by changing thought from this to that, but altogether incommutably sees, so that those things which are temporally done — and future things which are not yet, and present things which now are, and present things which now no longer are — He Himself comprehends all these by stable and sempiternal presence, nor [does He see] in one way with eyes, in another with mind: for He does not consist of soul and body, nor in one way now, in another before, in another after. Since not, as ours, His knowledge also of three times — of the present, the past, or the future — is changed by variety; with whom there is*

no change, nor shadow of a moment. Nor does His intention pass from cogitation to cogitation, in whose incorporeal contuition all things which He knows are simultaneously present.

The same, on Psalm 138, *Wonderful is thy science from me*, says that God spoke to Moses through some assumed corporeal creature, not in the way that He speaks in His substance: *For how does He speak in His substance? The speech of God is the Word of God; the Word of God is Christ. That word does not sound and pass, but always remains immutably the Word, through which all things were made. To which Word it is said (for it is also the Wisdom of God): Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same. And in another place concerning Wisdom, when Scripture said, "remaining in itself," it says, "it makes all things new." That Wisdom, then, standing — if it is to be called even standing; but it is so called on account of immutability, not on account of immobility, and ever in the same way, in no place, at no time varied, nowhere otherwise than here or there, never otherwise than now or before — it is itself the speech of God.*

The same, *De Trinitate* IV.1: *One is the Word of God, through which all things were made, which is incommutable truth. There are all things principally and immutably together — not only those which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and have been done. There, however, they neither were nor are to be, but only are; and all things are life, and all things are one; and what is more wonderful, all are one life. For all things have so been made through Him, that whatever has been made in these in Him is life, and is not made.*

Further, if the science of God were mutable, it would also in some way be mortal, as appears from the foregoing of chapter 5. How, then, when the Apostle says, *He alone has immortality* (1 Timothy, last); how also when another Apostle and Evangelist teaches, *What was made, in Him was life* (John 1) — what kind of life? mortal? Who of mortals will so say? Surely this also seems contrary to Augustine just recited; who also in *Confessions* I.6 [says]: *Thou, Lord, ever livest, and nothing dies in Thee, since before the beginnings of ages, and before everything that can be called "before," Thou art; and Thou art my God, and the Lord of all things which Thou hast created. And with Thee stand the causes of all unstable things, and of all mutable things the immutable origins remain, and the eternal reasons of all irrational and temporal things live. And further, in book 12, chapter 10: Thou art eternal, having immortality, since Thou art changed by no kind of motion, nor is Thy will varied through times, since not immortal is the will which is one and another. Whence is taken the 183rd proposition of the Sentences of Prosper, which says thus: True is the eternity of God, who alone has immortality, since He is changed by no kind of motion, nor is His will temporal. For not immortal is the will which is one and another. Why then must one not similarly think concerning His science? Indeed, hear him himself on John, Homily 23 of the first part, saying: Pass beyond every mutable spirit; pass beyond a spirit which now knows, now does not know; now remembers and forgets; wills what it did not will, does not will what it willed; whether it suffer these mutabilities now, or be able to suffer them. Pass beyond all these things. For you will not find in God any mutability, anything which is now in*

such-and-such a way, otherwise than it was a little before. For wherever you find "otherwise and otherwise," there is made a kind of death — for death is to not-be-what-was.

This opinion is also confirmed by Gregory, *Moralia* XVIII.31, as appears from chapter 5 of this work.

From these, then, I judge the immutability of the divine science to appear; which being granted, who will deny the immutability of the divine will? Is not the reasoning similar on either side? Do not certain authorities cited above clearly attest it?

Furthermore, if the will of God were mutable and successively alternable, it would be possible for someone to begin to be saved, and something to begin to be future, and likewise to cease, without their being posited in being. For let it be supposed that God yesterday positively did not will Peter to be saved, nor A to be future, but willed the opposite — and that today He wills both. Then, by chapter 10, yesterday Peter was not to be saved, nor A future; and today he is to be saved, and A future — which is a manifest impossibility. The same can be argued concerning the cessation just mentioned, by supposing the opposites of what was set forth.

Again, if God's will were mutable, He would not certainly know future contingents. For He cannot certainly know them except through some certain thing, as has been shown in chapter 18; nor does God know future contingents except through His will; and if that be successively alternable, it is uncertain, like the human will. For just as I do not now know that I shall write tomorrow, by the fact that I now will to write tomorrow, since my will can be changed in the meantime — so it appears that God now does not know that Antichrist will be, by the fact that He now wills him to be future, if His will could similarly be alternated. For granting this, it does not follow: *God now wills Antichrist to be in time A or instant A, therefore Antichrist will then be.* For He can after the present willing, before A, have a not-willing or non-willing concerning that, and continue it up to A and always; which if it be posited in being, the truth of the antecedent and of the opposite of the consequent follows.

This also the sacred authorities attest. Whence Psalm 32: *But the counsel of the Lord stands forever; the thoughts of His heart from generation to generation.* Gloss: *that is, they are not mutable, but eternal; and His predestination is immutable, in which all things are stored up.* And this Gloss is taken from Augustine on the same place of the Psalm, treatise 1, saying: *The thoughts of His wisdom are not mutable, but remain unto the age of the age.* Similar is that of Psalm 116: *The truth of the Lord remains forever.* And that of Psalm 118: *From the beginning I knew of thy testimonies, that thou hadst founded them forever.* And that of the Apostle, 2 Timothy 2: *The firm foundation of God stands, having this seal: the Lord knows those who are His.* And to the Hebrews 6: *God, willing to show to the heirs of the promise the immobility of His counsel, interposes an oath.* And Isaiah 40: *My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done.* And Jeremiah 31: *I have loved thee with a perpetual charity, therefore have I drawn thee, having mercy — with a perpetual charity,* he says, not a new one.

This same thing Augustine expressly says, *De Trinitate* III.2, expounding that of Psalm 121, *Jerusalem, which is built as a city, whose participation is in itself: By "in itself," he says, in this place is understood that supreme and incommutable Good which is God, and the wisdom and will of Him, to which it is sung in another place: Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the same.* And in chapter 3: *Of all visible and invisible things made, the cause is the invisible and incommutable will of God.* And in chapter 4: *God uses all things, whether incorporeal or corporeal, whether rational or irrational, whether good or evil, for the incommutable arbitrium of His sentence.* And *Enchiridion* 75, speaking of the Tyrians and Sidonians whom God did not will to be saved, he says that *in the resurrection, in the most clear light of wisdom, that will be seen which now the faith of the pious has — how certain and immutable and most efficacious is the will of God.* And *83 Questions* 27: *The law of God remains incommutable, and moderates all mutable things by most beautiful governance.* And *On Free Will* I.13: *The law which is called supreme reason, by which the temporal law is borne and changed, is so incommutable that it cannot be varied in any way.*

This is also attested by the Sentences of Prosper, which I gladly cite, since whenever I cite them, I bring forward two witnesses beyond exception — namely, Augustine and Prosper of Aquitaine, who, like a clever bee sucking the marrow from the flowers of the works of Augustine, into the hive of these Sentences, composed them in a honeycomb of honey. Of these Sentences, then, the 342nd proposition says thus: *Since the law of all arts is altogether incommutable, it sufficiently appears that the law which is called truth is above our mind. For this is that incommutable truth which is rightly called the law of all arts and the art of the omnipotent Artificer.* And proposition 42: *The disposition of mutable things contains an incommutable reason.* And proposition 169: *The cogitation and recognition of God is the incommutable reason of things to be changed. For not as a man, so does God repent of any of His works, of whom of all things the sentence is so fixed as the foreknowledge is certain.* And proposition 158: *What in works is said to be prior or posterior, is to be referred not to the maker, but to the things made; for His will is eternal and incommutable, nor is it varied alternately by counsel — in which is together whatever in things to be created or to be ordered either preceded or follows.*

Again, Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, last [chapter]: *God forbid, however, that God should temporally love anyone with a new love which was not in Him before, with whom past things have not departed, and future things are already made. Therefore He loved all His Saints before the foundation of the world, just as He predestined them; but when they are converted to Him, then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that it may be said in the way that human affection can grasp what is said. Just so when He is said to be angry with the bad and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He — just as light is rough to weak eyes, gentle to firm ones, by their own change, namely, not its own.*

The same, *De Trinitate* XV.20, recites the dialectic of the heretic Eunomius to be derided, who posited that the only-begotten Word of God was not Son of nature but of will, namely wishing to assert that will was accidental to God, by which He generated the Son — for this reason, because

we sometimes will something which we did not will before. Whom he refutes immediately, saying: *As though our nature were not for these things understood to be mutable! — which God forbid we believe to be in God. For not for any other reason has it been written, "Many are the cogitations in the heart of a man, but the counsel of the Lord remains forever," than that we should understand or believe that, just as God is eternal, so His counsel is eternal, and through this immutable, just as He is. But what concerning cogitations, this can also most truly be said concerning wills: "Many are the wills in the heart of man, but the will of the Lord remains forever."*

This same is said by the same author much more diffusely in *De Civitate Dei* XXII.2, by distinguishing concerning the will of God: for sometimes it is taken for the effect of the divine will, and so it is mutable; sometimes for that will of His which is sempiternal with His foreknowledge, and so He never has a new will, but always the same, which immutably perseveres. This same thing he shows much diffusely above, in [books] 12.17 and 14.

The same, *Super Genesim ad Litteram* VIII.17, speaking of divine providence, says: *God omnipotent, holding all things, by incommutable eternity, truth, and will, always the same, not moved through time or place, moves creatures through time and place.*

The same appears through the same author in *De Civitate Dei* V.9 and other places, and not a few books; and through Anselm, *De Concordia* 3 and 4, and *Cur Deus Homo* II.17, and elsewhere frequently.

And the blessed Gregory says, *Moralia* XXVI.4: *Although the omnipotent God often changes His sentence, His counsel He never changes.* And the same is held in the Gloss on Isaiah 38, where he treats of the addition of fifteen years to the life of Hezekiah.

But still hear Augustine excellently confirming both opinions together, *Confessions* XII.15, saying thus: *Truth tells me concerning the true eternity of the Creator, that His substance is in no way varied through times, nor is His will outside His substance; whence He does not now will this, now will that, but together, and once, and ever wills all things which He wills — not again and again, nor now these, now those, nor wills what He did not will, or not-wills what He did will, since such will is mutable, and nothing mutable is eternal; but our God is eternal. Likewise that which He says in the inner ear: The expectation of things to come is made a contuition when they have come, and the same contuition is made memory when they have passed. But every intention which is so varied is mutable, and everything mutable is not eternal; but our God is eternal. These things I gather and conjoin, and I find that my God, the eternal God, did not by any new will found the creature, nor did His science suffer anything transitory.*

These two opinions also concerning the science and will of God, the said Anselm of Canterbury, Robert of Lincoln, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and not a few other Doctors unanimously attest. It is also imputed to the Egyptians as an error that they thought the divine will could be changed through sacrifices.

COROLLARY

1. And it has a corollary: that God anew loves and hates none;
2. Nor more or less at one time than at another;
3. Nor do prayers, nor any merits good or bad, bend or change the divine will in the least, here or there.
4. And that every one to be saved or damned, rewarded or punished under any degree whatsoever, He willed from eternity to be saved or damned, rewarded similarly or punished, under the same degree precisely; and this not merely by a conditional or indeterminate will, but as absolutely and determinately as He wills in the present or final judgment, or shall will afterward.

[1] Whence it follows manifestly that God anew loves or hates none. [2] Nor more or less at one time than at another. [3] Nor do prayers, nor any merits good or bad, bend or change the divine will in the least, here or there. [4] And that every one to be saved or damned, rewarded or punished under any degree whatsoever, He willed from eternity to be saved or damned, rewarded similarly or punished under the same degree precisely; and this not merely by a conditional or indeterminate will, but as absolutely and determinately as He wills in the present or final judgment, or shall will afterward.

This whole, however, follows manifestly from the foregoing. But lest in such a sublime matter I seem to dream a little out of the fancy of my own head, I will show this by the testimonies and reasons of my elders.

The first part of this and the second appear from that of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1: *He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in His sight in charity, according to the purpose of His will*; and to the Romans 9: *When they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God might stand according to election, it was said: The greater shall serve the lesser, as it is written: Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated*. This same thing appears through Peter Lombard, *Sentences* III, distinction 32, and through the testimonies which he adduces.

The third part of it follows from the foregoing evidently, and can be proved through the response of the Savior to the sons of Zebedee, when their mother adored and asked that He would say that they should sit, one at His right and one at His left in His kingdom — who answered them thus: *To sit at my right hand or my left, is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it has been prepared by my Father* (Matthew 20). For if prayers and merits could obtain this, He could give it.

This also appears through the response of Samuel which he gave to Saul: when Samuel had said to him, *Because you have rejected the word of the Lord, the Lord has rejected you, that you should not be king*, Saul asked him to bear his sin, and to return with him, that he might adore the Lord. He, refusing, answered: *The Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be turned by repentance: for He is not a man, that He should do penance* (1 Samuel 15). And when Samuel was lamenting Saul, the Lord, rebuking him, said to him: *How long do you mourn for Saul, since I have rejected him, that he should not reign over Israel?* (chapter 16). Similar is that of Jeremiah 7: *I will cast you forth from my face. Therefore do not pray for this people, nor take up praise or prayer for them, nor stand against me, since I will not hear you*. And further, in the same, chapter 11, He commanded the same thing: where the Gloss says: *It is commanded to the prophet not to pray for those against whom sentence has been completed, lest his prayer should appear infirm and not heard, and rightly so. "Do not take up praise for them" — as if to say: lest by replicating the clemency of the old story, by which I am wont to have mercy, and praising it, you should strive to change my sentence*. And further, in chapter 14, after the manifold confession of sins and devout prayer of Jeremiah, the Lord said to him: *Do not pray for this people for good; when they fast, I will not hear their prayers, and if they offer holocausts and victims, I will not receive them, since by the sword and famine and pestilence I will consume them*. Surely this is what the Lord plainly teaches in Ezekiel 14 through Noah, Daniel, and Job, who, even if they were in the midst of a sinful people to which the Lord predicted punishments, would not free their sons or daughters, but only themselves.

Wherefore Gregory, as recited in the Canon 23, q. 4, *Cum superna*, says thus: *When indignation moves itself, so to speak, from the inmost depths, human opinion does not remove it, nor does any man's prayer usefully oppose itself, when God once disposes anything from the inmost by being angered*. With which Augustine concords, *De Civitate Dei* XXI.24, saying thus: *If the Church were as certain about some that, as it knows them, even those who, although still constituted in this life, are predestined to go into eternal fire with the devil, it would no more pray for them than not for him*.

Similar also is that of the Apostle to the Hebrews 12: *Esau, desiring to inherit the blessing, was reproved. For he found no place of repentance, although he had sought it with tears*. — Genesis 27 records that *with a great wail he wept*.

Similar also is that of Numbers 23: *God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as a son of man that He should be changed; has He then said, and shall He not do? has He spoken, and shall He not fulfill?* With which agrees that of 2 Timothy 2: *He remains faithful: He cannot deny Himself*. Gloss: *He, namely Christ, remains faithful in His sayings, and truly faithful, since He cannot deny Himself, who is Truth — which He would do, if He did not fulfill His sayings*. And lest this should appear to derogate the liberty of the divine will in some respect, immediately he subjoins: *This, however — that He cannot deny Himself — is the praise of the divine will*; and this is from Augustine, Homily 53 of the first part on John. Who also in *De Trinitate* XV.14 [says]: *The Word of God, he says, can never have anything false, since immutably it is so disposed as is He from*

whom it is. For the Son cannot do anything from Himself except what He has seen the Father doing. Powerfully He cannot do this; nor is this infirmity but firmness, since truth cannot be false.

This third part also appears through the blessed Gregory, *Dialogues* I.21, and is alleged in the Canon 23, q. 4, *Obtineri*, saying: *Things which are not predestined can by no means be obtained; but those which the holy men obtain by praying, are so predestined that they are obtained by their prayers. For the very predestination of the perennial kingdom is so disposed by God that the elect arrive at it from labor — that by asking they may merit to receive what almighty God before the ages disposed to give to them.* With which Augustine concords, *De Civitate Dei* X.12, saying thus: *Incommutable counsel is with Him, in whose disposition the times have already been made, whatever times will be. For moving temporal things, He is not moved temporally, nor does He know things to be done otherwise than things done, nor does He hear those calling upon Him otherwise than as He sees those who will call upon Him. For when His Angels also hear, He hears in them, as in His true temple not made with hands, just as in His humble Saints, and His commands are temporally done, beheld by His eternal law.* And above in V.9 he writes thus: *Laws, rebukes, exhortations, praises, and reproaches are not in vain, since God foreknew that these would be in the future; and prayers avail to obtain those things which He foreknew He would grant to those praying.* And further, in XXI.24, thus says he: *The Church prays for all men, yet not for all is it heard, but only for those who, although they oppose the Church, are nevertheless so predestined that for them it is heard.* In *De Trinitate* XV.13 he wills the same thing.

Again, if the will of God could be changed by any prayers, it would be lawful and pious to pray for the damned Angels and men, plainly contrary to Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI.24, and contrary to the general faith of the Church.

Again, if so, this would most appear through the most worthy prayers of His most holy Mother, of the holy Angels, and of the holy souls. But they dare to will or ask nothing, nor can they, except what they see God to will. Whence Peter Lombard, *Sentences* III, distinction 31, says: *Those who are in the homeland are so addicted to the justice of God, that nothing pleases them save what pleases God; and through this they will the salvation only of those whom God wills to be saved, and they love only those as themselves.* Who also in *Sentences* IV, distinction 45, writes thus: *God is said to hear the prayers of certain men not only when He brings them to effect, but also when He makes known to the court of Angels and holy souls what shall come of it or not, and what they know to be in the will of God, they themselves also will. For they are so addicted to the supernal will that they cannot will anything beyond His will. The Saints, then, intercede for us before God, both by merit, when their merits suffrage for us, and by affection, when they desire our prayers to be fulfilled — which yet they do not do, except as they have learned in fulfilling the will of God.*

It appears, then, that the will of God is not changed through prayers and good merits; therefore neither through bad ones.

The fourth part appears through the prior parts and their proofs, and because if God willed something other or otherwise at one time than at another, His will, and He Himself similarly, would be changed.

This same thing can also be specially proved thus: When God created the angelic and human nature, He intended something concerning it finally, absolutely and determinately. (For that wisdom which reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly, does not act more foolishly or vainly than created nature and will, which act determinate actions on account of a determinate end, as appears diffusely in *Physics* II.) And He did not intend that the whole [angelic and human nature] should stand and finally enjoy beatitude, since then His purpose would be frustrated, which chapter 10 does not allow. And the same argument applies concerning Lucifer, Adam, Judas, and any person who fell or is damned.

Whence Augustine, *Against Julian* V.6, says: *From the number of the elect none perishes; but the rest of mortals who are not of this number, but are made vessels of wrath, are born for the utility of the former. For God does not rashly or fortuitously create any of them, nor is ignorant of what good He works concerning them — when by this very fact He works good, that in them He creates human nature, and that from them He adorns the order of the present age.*

God, then, did not intend the standing of those falling, nor the beatitude of those to be damned. Wherefore also, as appears through chapter 22, He intended in some way the fall and damnation of any such — which the Psalmist also seems to feel, Psalm 103, when he says thus: *That dragon which thou hast formed to mock him* — if by the dragon Lucifer is designated. And Ecclesiasticus 39: *There are spirits which were created for vengeance, etc.*; and above in the same, chapter 26: *Who turns from justice to sin, God has prepared him for the sword*; with which seems to consonate the saying of the Savior concerning the son of perdition, namely Judas, in John 17, and the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians 2 concerning *the man of sin, the son of perdition*, namely Antichrist — although these things are by the holy Fathers expounded otherwise.

This also appears to be the opinion of the Apostle to the Romans 9, saying: *Has not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor?* — which he immediately expounds concerning vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction, and vessels of mercy prepared unto glory. Which place of the Apostle Augustine, *Against Julian* V, recites more expressly for this opinion, according to another translation, in these words: *But if God, willing to show His wrath and to demonstrate His power, brought in much patience the vessels of wrath which have been completed unto perdition, etc.*

CHAPTER 24. HE OBJECTS AGAINST THE IMMUTABILITY OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND ANSWERS.

It is objected, however, against the immutability of divine knowledge in this manner. God knew Christ to be suffering, and now does not know it; therefore His knowledge is changed. Likewise, God did not know this present instant to exist, and now He knows it. Likewise, God foreknew that Christ was to suffer, or would suffer, and now does not foreknow it. And likewise, in Judith 9: "These things after those Thou didst think upon." For these matters, however, it must be understood that God understands [B] complex things differently than we do; for we always understand such things by comparison to the present instant. For every proposition is composed of a noun and a verb—speaking of the verb in the common manner, as Priscian and the other Latin grammarians speak, so that it embraces present, past, and future—not as the Greeks speak, who, on Aristotle's testimony in the first book of *De Interpretatione*, call only the verb of the present tense a "verb," but the rest "cases of verbs." And as is plain there, every verb co-signifies time. For "he runs" co-signifies present time, namely that the running now is; whereas "he will run" or "he was running," which embraces past or future. And this is manifest, because "he was running" signifies that he completed running prior in time, and "he will run" signifies a future running posterior. And as is clear in *Metaphysics* V.16: prior in time in the past is more remote from the present now, but in the future, that which is closer to the now itself, with the now itself as principle and first being to which the others are compared. Now we, on account of the weakness of our intellect, cannot [C] distinctly cognize all the particles of time which are always flowing and continuously succeeding one another. Therefore we take the present instant, which is of all time the most actual and most known to us, and we set it down as a sign and a certain fixed term, by comparison to which we understand things present, past, and future. Therefore our propositions which signify with time necessarily signify in this way, namely relatively and comparatively to whatever present instant. And so this proposition "Christ is suffering" continually signifies different things, according as different instants successively become present; and "Christ was suffering" and "Christ will suffer" co-signify in the same way—just as the species in a fixed eye, seeing in a certain position the parts of a flowing river continuously running by, continually signifies a different part of the river, and another; and just as such propositions in the soul of one so seeing—"this part is directly presented to me in this position," and "this part is upper, this lower," or "this part is prior and this posterior"—always represent another and another, in comparison to the various parts presented to the eye at various times. Therefore [D] also this proposition "Christ will suffer" or "is suffering," which once was true, is now false; and this proposition "Christ was suffering," which once was false, is now true. And because our knowledge, belief, and opinion are by means of such propositions, they vary in like manner as those propositions do.

But God, by His most infinite clarity, comprehends all particular things and all particles of time, just as they are, most truly through Himself. For He does not need comparison or relation of past or future to the present instant, after the manner of human infirmity, but understands all things at once and presentially, equally clearly. And this is because He does not know through such mutable verbal propositions, but through His essence and proper will, which always uniformly and invariably represent all things. Just as if a punctual sight were posited resting at the center of a heaven revolving around it, and saw by extramission and actively, not passively—as God sees things—it would always uniformly, without any change in itself, see the individual parts of the heaven continuously revolving, and the same part now in the east, now in the south, now in the west. So also [E] God, all in the same way on His part, intrinsically sees something first as future, second as present, and third as past. And this is because He does not see by suffering anything from the things seen, that is, passively, but rather by acting, that is, actively, as has been shown above. Augustine, in *De Trinitate* XV.13, suggesting this cause of the diversity between God's knowledge and ours, says thus: "God did not know created things otherwise than as things to be created; for nothing accrued to His wisdom from them. Far different from this knowledge is our knowledge, because in the marvelous simplicity of that nature, knowing is not one thing and being another, but what it is to know, this is to be. But our knowledge is in many things, and on that account is both losable and receivable, because for us to be is not the same as to know."

Therefore the essence of God, or His will (which is the same), just as it first showed to the divine intellect that Christ was to suffer, in the same way afterward shows Him that Christ is suffering, and now shows that Christ has suffered. And so for God to know these three—or rather this one thing triply named—is to know the same thing and in the same way [A] altogether; just as if we had some one proposition uniformly signifying naturally or by imposition, as God's essence or will signifies to itself, first that Christ was to suffer, then that He is suffering, and finally that He has suffered, and we always had one knowledge conformed to that proposition, then in the same way, without any change in our knowledge, we would know the same thing as future, present, and past.

When, therefore, in the first place it is assumed: "God knew Christ to be suffering, and now He does not know it"—the first must be distinguished according to composition and division, or because it can speak *de dicto* or *de re dicti*. In the composite sense, however, and *de dicto*, it seems further to be distinguished, since the proposition, complex, or *dictum* can be taken either for a proposition, complex, or *dictum* outside the divine mind, or in it itself, insofar as a complex can there be assigned in a likeness-fashion, and a complex knowledge, as Chapter 18 was suggesting. In the sense of composition, therefore, and *de dicto*, outside the divine mind it is true: for God knew such a proposition, "Christ is suffering," namely in the time of the Passion. And if it is argued in this sense, [B] "God knew that proposition, and now does not know it; therefore God, or at least His knowledge, is changed," it must be said that this does not follow. Rather, this is on account of the change of the proposition from a true signification into a false one, and from truth to falsity—just as it does not follow regarding a fixed eye gazing in the same position

continuously at the succeeding parts of the river, that it itself is changed, because previously it saw some part which it does not now see. Rather, it suffices that that part be changed. Just as also it does not follow, "God previously was Lord of the Flood, and now is not, therefore God is changed," but perhaps the Flood itself is changed; and as in pure creatures it does not follow in such relative things.

And if it is still argued, at least it follows that God knows fewer things than He knew, it must be said this does not follow, because just as previously this was known and now is unknown, so its contradictory was previously unknown and now is known. Still perhaps the sophistical caviller will press: Suppose, he will say, that its contradictory does not exist nor any such proposition is true—then the compensation of this for that ceases; therefore He will know fewer things than before. Likewise, of any contradiction one part is better, more worthy, and more noble, as is clear from earlier matters, [C] and knowledge of better, more worthy, and more noble things is better, more worthy, and more noble, as is clear through the Philosopher in *De Anima* I.1, *Metaphysics* I in the prologue, *Metaphysics* VI.3, and through Averroes there, and on *De Caelo* II commentary 60. Therefore the whole of divine knowledge is more perfect at this time than at that.

To the first of these it must be said that it is quite possible for Him to know fewer extrinsic complex things to exist in being than before, but not intrinsic ones in knowable being. Indeed, it is possible that He know no true complex—nor even an extrinsic incomplex—to exist in being, because it is possible that all things be destroyed, just as He did not know before the world existed, when none of those things existed; nor would He, were it so, have less knowledge then than before. For He does not know through such created truths, but only through truths intrinsic to Himself and eternal, as the preceding chapters have taught; and those truths always remain altogether equal in every way, in no way changed.

But still perhaps he will reply and say: let A be such a proposition, or quasi-proposition (speaking by likeness) in the divine mind, "Christ is suffering," and B its contradictory; then A previously was [D] true and now is false, and conversely with B; therefore those truths intrinsic to God are changed, and therefore God Himself is necessarily changed.

It must be said that A does not signify like that created proposition "Christ is suffering," because then it would continually signify or co-signify diversely, or different things according to the diversity of the instant or time in which it would be, as has been shown above; but it always immobily co-signifies altogether the same time or instant. Therefore, just as in the time of the Passion it presentially signified that Christ was then suffering, so now it signifies in altogether the same way that Christ then had been suffering—equivalently to these two propositions of ours: "Christ is now suffering," which was true in the time of the Passion, and "Christ was then suffering," which is true in the present.

But still he will not cease to chatter on, but will say: A is now true, and B likewise; for it is true that Christ is not suffering; therefore contradictories are simultaneously true. But here it must be said that as many instants as there are in the whole of time, so many imaginarily diverse

affirmative and negative propositions corresponding to those instants does God have concerning anything—[E] similar to these: "Christ is suffering in this instant," "Christ is suffering in that instant," and so on for the rest. For God understands all intelligible propositions, true or false. And because, according to the Philosopher in *Sophistical Refutations* I, contradiction is the opposition of one and the same not only in name, but in thing and name, according to the same and toward the same, similarly, and in the same time; if A and B are contradictories, they must refer to the same time. Therefore A in the divine mind affirms for the instant or time of the Passion; so it is necessary that B deny for the same, and then B is false. But if there be taken some other proposition like B, which denies that Christ is suffering for some instant or time, say for the present, that is true—let it be C—but C does not contradict A, because they do not affirm [A] and deny for the same instant or time, just as these do not contradict: "Christ was then suffering" and "Christ is not now suffering"; nor are C and B convertible, because they deny for different instants or times, as these: "Christ is not suffering now" and "Christ was not suffering then."

By these things the response is plain, if the first is taken in the sense of composition, and *de dicto* outside the divine mind. This, however, I take to be the meaning of those who say that God is an infinite ocean, absorbing every contradiction, and that in the divine eternity all truths—future, present, and past—are simultaneously true. Some try to argue against them, because then contradictories would be simultaneously true, and the same proposition simultaneously true and false. But these conclude wrongly, because God does not know anything through created affirmative and negative propositions, which necessarily contradict, since whenever they exist, they exist simultaneously in the same instant, and they affirm and deny for that instant, and each of such propositions alternates successively from truth to falsity, or conversely. But whatever God knows complexly, He knows through propositions uncreated from the beginning, which, although in a certain respect they may seem to contradict, [B] because in the manner of contradictories they affirm and deny the same of the same; nevertheless do not simply contradict, because they do not so affirm or deny for the same time or instant, nor does any of these ever after truth put on falsity, because the conjoining of the extremes in the divine mind is not changeable according to the changeability of time or instant, but always stably conjoins for the same, as has been shown above.

By these same things the response to the second argument set forth above is plain, because every part of an intrinsic contradiction which God has once known, He will always stably know. But if one speaks of a part of an extrinsic contradiction, by such a nature the knowledge of God is neither perfected nor imperfect, just as it is caused by no such thing, just as also not by posterior known things, as the preceding chapters have taught.

By these things the response is plain concerning this: "God knew Christ to be suffering," if it be taken in the composite sense and *de dicto*. But if it be taken in the divided sense, and *de re dicti*, it would seem perhaps that further distinction is required, like this: "the labouring man was being healed"—because *pati* (to suffer) can supposit or appose for "to suffer now" or "to suffer

previously." In the first way it is not true, for God never knew Christ now to suffer. In the second way [C] it is true; for God knew Christ to suffer previously, namely in the time of the Passion. If, then, it be argued in this sense: "God knew Christ to suffer, and now does not know Christ to suffer; therefore God knew something which He now does not know"—there is a manifest equivocation. For in the major, *to suffer* is taken for "to suffer previously"; but in the minor, for "to suffer now"; for in the second proposition, all the verbs are of present tense, not amplifying to past or future. But if the minor is taken concordantly with the major, really and not vocally, it is necessary to say thus: "God does not know Christ to have suffered"—and the discourse will be one which sins in matter, not in form. For this minor will be false, since it is altogether the same in reality, that God previously knew Christ then to suffer, and that God now knows Christ then to have suffered.

By these things also, as I judge, can be had the right solution of that ancient sophism of Oxford: "God knows whatever He has known." The second argument also can be solved by the same. The third capital argument concerning foreknowledge can be solved by similar logic; [D] and this seems to be the logic of Peter Lombard in the first book of his *Sentences*, distinction 44, last chapter, and distinctions 41 and 6, and of Algazel in *Metaphysics* III, sentence 6. The saying of Judith in the third argument can be understood concerning the order of the effects of divine thought, not concerning an order of thoughts in God.

CHAPTER 25. HE OBJECTS AGAINST THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE WILL, AND RESOLVES IT.

By the same reasonings someone can also impugn the immutability of [E] the divine will, and by the same defences it can be defended. It can also be argued by other special reasons against it thus: God created the whole rational nature for beatitude, and willed then that the whole be made blessed, and now does not will it—rather, He wills the contrary, namely, that a great part of it sustain everlasting misery. Likewise, when Judas was in charity and grace, God willed him to be saved; for these alone, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* XV.18, divide between the sons of the eternal kingdom and of eternal perdition, and grace makes one pleasing to God. But now He wills him to be damned. And so universally concerning the just who will fall and the unjust who will rise and finally remain. Likewise, God, offended by sinners and turned away, by prayers and other merits is converted and placated; and conversely concerning the just who sin. Otherwise prayers would seem vain and useless, and sins [A] would be left unpunished. And this seems to be the general faith of the Church, and the content of the Old Testament and the New. Whence Jeremiah 18 says: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, that I may root out and destroy and waste it. If that nation shall do penance from its evil which I have spoken against it; I also will repent of the evil that I thought to do to it. As I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, that I may build up and plant it; if it shall do evil in My sight, that it hear not My voice, I will repent of the good which I have spoken to do unto it." Likewise,

Ezekiel 33: "If I shall say to him, Living he shall live, and trusting in his justice he commit iniquity, all his justices shall be delivered to oblivion, and in his iniquity which he hath wrought, in it shall he die. But if I shall say to the wicked, Thou shalt die the death, and he do penance from his sin, living he shall live, and shall not die." Likewise, Jonah 3: "Who knoweth if God will turn and forgive, and will turn from the fierceness of His wrath, and we shall not perish? And God saw their works, that they were turned from their evil way, and He had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did not [B] do it." Likewise, Zechariah 1: "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you, saith the Lord."

Likewise, Jerome says in his exposition of Amos the Prophet, and is cited in the Canon, *De poenitentia*, distinction 1, "Si agamus": "If we should do penance, God Himself will repent of His sentence." And again: "He promises prosperous things if we do penance; but if we are dissolved by negligence, He also will repent of His pledge, and will change His promises." The same on Daniel 4, and is cited in the Canon as before: "Wherefore, redeem thy sins by alms, and thy iniquities by mercies to the poor, perhaps God will forgive thy offences." But how, if Daniel foretold a sentence which cannot be changed, does he exhort, namely Nabuchodonosor himself, to alms to the poor and mercy, that the sentence of God might be changed? And he answers, saying that it is easily resolved by the example of King Hezekiah, whom Isaiah said was to die, and of the Ninevites, to whom it had been said: "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed"—and yet from the prayers of Hezekiah and Nineveh the sentence of God was changed. Again, to one acting well, He asserts He promises [C] indulgence; otherwise, also (and reverently God speaks of it), He says He threatens evils against a nation, but if it shall do good, He asserts that the mercies of clemency are changed in turn, and promises indulgence; and if it does evil, He says He changes His sentence—not concerning the men, but concerning the works, which are changed. For God is not angry with men, but with vices, which when they have not been in a man, He never punishes that which is changed. Indeed, the whole New Testament—what else does it sound or teach, except mercy of God and friendship in the present and glory in the future for the penitent and converted, and the contraries of these for the impenitent and turned away, which do not happen without a change of the divine will?

Moreover, it is read often of God that He repented of some good and of some evil. How, then, is He not of mutable will? And to what end would the truthful God so often excite us to prayer and supplications, saying: "Ask and ye shall receive, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you," and "Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My name, He will give you," and "We must always pray and not faint," with many similar things—unless prayers of this sort would bend [D] the divine will, and obtain something which He had not previously disposed for us? For if from the beginning He immutably willed all things to befall all, since according to chapter 10 His will is efficacious and unfrustrable in every way, and without prayers no less would whatever was disposed befall whomever it concerned—then all prayers, all litanies also, by which we ask the saints to pray for us, would seem vain and superfluous.

Likewise, God is not of less power than a potter; but a potter can have diverse and contrary wills succeeding one another; therefore God also can do this. And this seems to be the argument of the Lord in Jeremiah 18, saying to Jeremiah: "Arise, and go down into the potter's house, and there thou shalt hear My words. And I went down into the potter's house, and behold, he was doing a work on the wheel. And the vessel was broken which he was making with his hands of clay; and he turned and made it another vessel, as it had pleased his eyes to make it. Then the word of the Lord came to me, saying: Cannot I do with you, O house of Israel, as this potter? Behold as clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel. I will suddenly speak..." etc., as cited above.

Likewise, God can do, and often does, many new effects [E] immediately by Himself, and from an old will a new action cannot proceed immediately, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* VIII, and Averroes likewise in commentary 8.15, and others; therefore this is by a new will. Therefore the divine will is changed.

To the first of these the answer is plain by what was had concerning the corollary of the twenty-third chapter. Nevertheless, for the understanding of the saints, it can be said that God so created rational nature that the whole was capable of beatitude, and the whole would have attained beatitude, had it not freely sinned, and so rendered itself unworthy of beatitude.

For the second argument it must be known that *charitas* (charity) is taken in two ways in Scripture according to the present matter, namely for uncreated and created charity. Uncreated charity is also taken in two ways, namely commonly and essentially, and so it belongs to the whole Trinity, and to any of the Persons; and properly and personally, and so it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit alone; and it is taken also properly for the divine will. [A] As is clear through Augustine in *De Trinitate* XV.19 and XV.20, and many other places. But created charity is the effect of this uncreated charity in the hearts of the faithful, by which we lovingly love God and neighbour. Whence the Apostle, Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit." And so it is one Theological virtue—nay, according to the same Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13, the greatest of the three Theological virtues, which appears sufficiently by the nearly concordant judgment of all the Doctors. Otherwise, however, charity is taken less to the present matter, for natural, moral, or passional charity, by which someone has something dear to him from nature, or from moral virtue, or from passion. Whence 2 Maccabees 14: "But Alcimus, seeing the charity of Nicanor and Judas to one another," etc.; and according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* V, almost throughout, and in many other places. And as is clear also from chapter 2: everything which is said of diverse things is said of some one of them first, by whose participation and varied attribution to it the others are designated in their ways. So charity is first said of essential uncreated charity, from which, as from an original spring, the others, like [B] streams, are derived in some manner.

Grace also can similarly be taken, as it seems. For there is uncreated grace and created grace; or grace gracifying, that is, freely-giving, and grace freely given. Uncreated and gracifying grace is

the divine will, not on account of any preceding merit, nor on account of any retribution or proper utility following, but freely willing eternally good to someone, and giving it to him in time. But created grace, or grace freely given, is the effect of this uncreated grace. The second member of this distinction is sufficiently known to all, but the first is not so known to all; but it can be made known from that of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1: "Blessed be God the Father, who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children, according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath gracified us in His beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through His blood, the remission of sins according to the riches of His grace." Behold that the will of God is gracifying grace, because freely He wills good to someone; and therefore the Gloss says: "Grace predestined us, that is, grace alone fore-elected, that is, by gratuitous will." There is also [C] grace freely giving good, because redemption and remission of sins, where likewise the effect of freely-giving grace is plain. Therefore Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad litteram* IX.26 that in the will of God is grace through which sinners are made saved; and Peter Lombard sets this distinction plainly in *Sentences* II, distinction 27.5.

Each of these graces can be understood generally and specially. For it can be said grace freely-willing and giving generally any good, or specially willing to someone the good of justice and eternal glory, and giving him some special virtue by which he can attain such good; and correspondingly throughout it is called grace freely given. This uncreated grace, gracifying or freely-giving, which is the divine will, can also be taken in two ways, like charity: commonly and essentially, and so it belongs to the whole Trinity and to any of the Persons; and specially and personally, and so it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as is clear through Augustine in *De Trinitate* XV.20. Therefore Scripture most frequently attributes grace to the Holy Spirit, as in some special way and proper [D] author. Otherwise, grace is taken less to the present matter for that which is referred back to God for a gracious benefit, as we say: "Let us give thanks to the Lord our God." All these graces also are taken similarly, in a certain imitation, in creatures: for a created will, willing and giving freely good to some creature, can be called grace gracifying, and grace freely giving; and the good given can be called grace freely given. Also that which the recipient renders to the giver for such a benefit is called grace. But among all these graces, grace is first said of essential uncreated grace, which, most graciously, distils and derives all other graces—just as concerning most dear charity it was said above. The will of God also is taken in many ways, namely properly for His essential will, which is called by the Apostle in Romans 12 "well-pleasing and perfect"; but improperly and figuratively for its effect, or for its sign—as is clear through Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XXII.2, and through Hugh in *De Sacramentis* I, part 4, and through Peter Lombard in *Sentences* I, distinction 45. And it is a certain rhetorical colour which Cicero in his last *New Rhetoric* calls "denomination." [E]

When, therefore, it is taken in the argument: "When Judas was in charity and grace, God willed him to be saved"—speaking of charity and grace uncreated specially, namely insofar as God has someone dear to Himself and gracifies him unto eternal life—it is not true; because Judas never was in such charity or grace, since God never had him pleasing or dear unto eternal life. But if

one speaks of created charity and grace, and of the proper and essential will of God, it is not true, because God never so willed Judas to be saved. And when it is proved that charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition—speaking of created charity, it is not true. For many sinners who will rise and finally remain do not have this; many also of the just who will fall and so finally remain do have it. But uncreated charity alone, which has these dear unto the kingdom, and these not, divides between the sons of the kingdom and of perdition, just as in the beginning it divided light from darkness. And it is of that charity that Augustine speaks there, as is clear in the chapter cited, and in the following chapter at length. And that this charity, [A] namely the dear will of God, immutably and infallibly divides these from those, will easily appear through chapters 20, 21, 22, and 10. For this charity is the Holy Spirit, dividing to each as He wills, 1 Corinthians 12; and the Apostle senses this more expressly in the same chapter, when he asks: "Who distinguisheth thee?"—as if he wished to ask, who distinguishes thee, the elect, from the reprobate?—and to insinuate that God alone so distinguishes thee. And thus Augustine expounds this authority in many places, of which one is *De Correptione et gratia*, cited in the Gloss, when he says: "Who distinguisheth thee from the mass of perdition? None but God; He alone separates thee from the lost. But because man, puffed up, could respond either by voice or by thought, and say: My faith and my justice and my prayer distinguish me—the Apostle meets him, saying: 'What hast thou which thou hast not received?'" Therefore this question follows immediately upon another question. Concerning grace also it must be said similarly throughout, that and how it makes or does not make any one pleasing to God.

But if one speak of the will of sign or of the effect of the divine will, when it is premised: "When Judas was in charity, [B] God willed him to be saved," it is true. And when it is argued further: "Now He does not will him to be saved; therefore the will of God is changed," speaking uniformly, it concludes well, namely, that the effects and signs of the divine will are changed. Nor is this against chapter 23, since that proves the immutability of the essential and intrinsic, well-pleasing and perfect, divine will and volition. Otherwise it can be said, namely, that Judas, when he was in charity and grace, was dear and pleasing to God according to the present justice then by which he was good, and so was written in the Book of Life, and so God willed him to be saved—not, however, altogether absolutely. And this is plain through blessed Ambrose on Romans 9: "That He might show the riches of His glory in the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory," speaking thus: "There are some to whom grace is given for use, as to Saul, Judas, and to those disciples to whom the Lord said, 'Your names are written in heaven,' and afterward they went backward. But this the Lord said of them on account of the justice which they served, as if He should say, 'You are now worthy of eternal life,' because they were good. But according to foreknowledge they were in the number [C] of the wicked." And this authority is cited in the Gloss more diffusely; and on account of this authority Peter Lombard maintains it in *Sentences* III, distinction 21.1. A similar distinction concerning the sons of God Augustine makes in *De Correptione et gratia* 28 and 29, teaching that some are sons of God according to predestination and foreknowledge, some according to grace temporally received; and again under other words: some are sons of God to God, but some to us; that is, some according to divine

judgment, some according to human. And above, chapter 24, he makes a similar distinction concerning the elect; and below, chapter 73, concerning the son of peace. These distinctions of Augustine, Gratian recites diffusely in *De poenitentia*, distinction 4, "Si ex bono."

For the third argument it must be known that the offence of God and His placation, anger or love, sentence of good or evil, and the like, can be taken in two ways: namely, for the will or the divine volition so affected, or for such effects or signs of it—as has just now been said concerning His will. Whence Augustine in II *Ad Simplicianum* 20, teaching how human passions can be attributed to God, namely by separating the unworthy from the [D] worthy, says thus: "From the anger of man I subtract the turbulent motion, that the vigour of vindication may remain, and so in some way I rise to a notion of that which is called the anger of God. Likewise of mercy: if you take away compassion with him whom you pity, of misery shared, and there remain the tranquil goodness of helping and of liberating from misery, some kind of cognition of divine mercy is insinuated. Let us not also repudiate and spurn the zeal of God when we find it written; but let us take away from human zeal the pale wasting of grief and the morbid perturbation of soul, and let there remain only that judgment by which corruption of chastity is not allowed to be unpunished, and we rise to begin in some way to grasp the zeal of God. Therefore when we read also God saying, 'It repenteth Me,' let us consider what is wont to be in men the work of repenting—undoubtedly there is found a will of changing, but in man it is with grief of soul. For he reprehends in himself that he acted rashly. Let us therefore take away those things which come from human infirmity [E] and ignorance, and there remain only the willing that something not be as it was; and so it can in some way be intimated to our mind by what rule it is to be understood when God is said to repent. For when He is said to repent, He wills that something not be as He had made it to be; yet, when it was thus, it ought thus to have been, and when it is no longer permitted to be thus, now it ought no longer to be thus, by a certain perpetual and tranquil judgment of equity, by which God disposes all changeable things by an unchangeable will." The same on that of Psalm 82, "Thou wilt trouble them with Thy anger," he says: "Let us remember, however, that we ought to understand the anger of God without any turbulent affection. For its right reason of vindication is so spoken of, as if a law were said to be 'angered' when its ministers, moved according to it, exact vindication." That also the anger of God, "manifested," and the like, are sometimes taken for the effects, that is, signs, of the divine will so affected, the preceding shows.

Speaking, therefore, in the first way, the offence of God, or anger, is altogether immutable; [A] in the second way it is frequently changed. And so the divine will is said to be changed not by a change of itself but of others—as is clear through Augustine in *De Trinitate* V, last chapter, and *De Civitate Dei* XXII.2, as chapter 23 cited; and in this sense proceed the authorities of the Prophets, and of Jerome, alleged. Many such prophecies also threateningly predict many things, which do not come to pass; for they do not predict these in order that they may come to pass. Whence Jerome in the Gloss on the cited authority of Ezekiel 33: "It does not at once follow that, because the Prophet says it, what he predicts will come to pass; for he does not predict that it

may come, but threatens that it may not come. Nor because God speaks is it necessary that what He threatens be done, but in order that he to whom He threatens may repent, and that not be done which is to come, if the words of God be despised." So in such prophecies always there seems to be understood some condition such as this: "unless ye repent of your sins." Whence also in the prologue of the Gloss on the Psalter, a twofold prophecy is set down, namely according to predestination, which it is necessary always to be fulfilled according to the tenor of the words; and according to [B] threat, as "Forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed," which is not always fulfilled according to the surface of the words, but according to the signification of the tacit understanding. And the like is found in the Gloss on Matthew 1: "Now all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet saying: Behold a virgin," etc. This also Augustine wishes on Psalm 50, "Thou hast manifested to me the uncertain and hidden things of Thy wisdom," saying: "Under this, the Ninevites repented and merited certain mercy. Therefore Nineveh stood and was not overthrown. But I think that what the Prophet said was fulfilled: 'Look at what Nineveh was, and see that it has been overthrown in evil and built up in good.'" And so Gregory understands it in *Moralia* XVI.4 on Job 22, "Who were taken away before their time," when he says that God often changes His sentence, never His counsel, that is, the sense of the words, not His eternal disposition. And so the Gloss expounds it on Isaiah 38: "Thus often it happens that the divine sentence is changed, that it is not always fulfilled to the letter."

The objection concerning the repentance of God is resolved by what has been set forth, which also resolves the seventh of this. To the other thing argued concerning prayers and litanies, it is plain through the end [C] of chapter 23. For it is not to be imagined that God previously wills or does not will anything, and is overcome and changed by prayers, after the manner of unstable man; nor that the Saints in heaven, by multiplied prayers, bend the divine will, as men on earth bend the human—as is sufficiently clear from the preceding. And Peter Lombard says in *Sentences* IV, distinction 45, last chapter: "We pray the Saints to intercede for us, that is, that their merits may suffrage for us." For the Saints do not pray God to do this or that, unless they have seen God so to will, unless perhaps it be something concerning which they do not know the divine will, just as we are ignorant in many things.

But here someone may press thus: If God wills to do something, it seems vain to pray Him to do this; and if He does not will to do something, by no prayers will He do it; therefore all prayers are superfluous. Likewise, then, it would not be necessary to pray generally for all, nor for any neighbour wayfarer; for it is established that wheat does not grow without tares, nor grains without straw; and that the citizens of the city of God and of the city of the devil always run mixed together in the present. Therefore it is established that God does not will all to be saved. If, [D] therefore, His will can by no prayers be changed, whoever prays for all knows himself not to be heard by God; therefore in such a case he prays without hope and vainly, knowingly so.

To the first of these it must be said that it supposes one falsehood, horrendous to any Christian, and which is repugnant to the works and doctrine of Christ; namely, that it is vain to pray to God that He do His will. For Christ, with His most sorrowful Passion imminent, contristate and sad,

prayed thus: "My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt," Matthew 26. And below in the same: "My Father, if this chalice may not pass except I drink it, Thy will be done." Who also in Matthew 6 taught us so to pray: "Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven." For although He wills to give us some good, yet He does not will us to be entirely idle, but wills that we, ever diligent and vigilant, obtain these things by prayers and other merits. Hardly, therefore, in my judgment, can any prayer more useful or efficacious in any prosperity or adversity, concerning anything eligible or to be fled, [E] be found, than that man, with his whole heart, with his whole mind, and with all his powers and marrow, in all things and in each, always say to the Lord: "Thy will be done." For thus it shall come to pass that man retain nothing of himself for himself, but subject totally to the divine will both himself and all things concerning himself in any way—wholly willing only the glory and honour of God, in nothing of himself, in greatest and in least—caring not at all, or fearing, but most gladly embracing, if it be needful, for God's sake, the loss of goods, of honour, and of fame, infamy, mockings, persecutions, and any miseries whatsoever, only excepting the displeasure of God Almighty alone. For this, and thus, no one can say without the deepest humility and the highest charity. And if anyone cannot at once and thus say it, let him repent of this, and let him will this, and let him say so however he can, and pray that he may say so freely and perfectly. And still such a prayer is undoubtedly very fruitful.

For the second, it seems to be said that some are simple persons having zeal of [A] God, but not according to knowledge, who do not know that the sons of the kingdom and of perdition are always mixed in the present, or, if any are in some way sons of perdition, they believe they can change the divine will by pious prayers, and obtain that they be made sons of the kingdom; who, praying generally and piously for all, do not sin, since ignorance and pious intention excuse them; nay rather, they merit much in so praying. Whence blessed Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XXII.2, having distinguished a twofold will of God, one essential and eternal, and another which God wills and effects in the hearts of the elect, says thus: "According therefore to this will, by which we say God wills that He effects some to will, by whom future things are not known, He wills many things and does them not. For His Saints will many things to be done, inspired by Him with a holy will, and they are not done as they pray for some piously and holily, and what they pray, He does not do—although He Himself by His Holy Spirit has made in them this will of asking. And by this, when according to God Saints will and pray that anyone be saved, we can in that mode of speech say, God wills and does not, that we may say He wills who makes these to will." A like instance is had in 3 Kings 8, that the [B] Lord said to David: "Whereas thou hast thought in thy heart to build a house to My name, thou hast done well in pondering this in thy mind; nevertheless thou shalt not build Me the house"—where the Gloss: "An argument that the will of any act pleases, even if not the act itself." This same is plain through Augustine, *Enchiridion* 8, and through Anselm in many places, showing that rectitude of will is to will as God wills him to will, not however to will what God wills—which Peter Lombard in *Sentences* I, distinction last, makes manifest.

But others, knowing or opining the aforesaid, cannot, as it seems, pray absolutely for all that they may be saved. For reason clearly proves this. For who would rationally pray, unless he hoped to be heard? Indeed, when he believed the contrary as constant? For who rationally undertakes any work without hope—nay, with despair of any kind of fruit or end? This is against all reason of agents and nature; for all agents, both natural and voluntary, act for some end, as is clear through the Philosopher in *Physics* II.49, and as concerns voluntary things, in his moral philosophy almost throughout. Whence the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 9: [C] "He that ploughs ought to plough in hope, and he that thresheth in hope of receiving fruit." And 2 Maccabees 12: "Unless he hoped that those who had fallen would rise again, it would seem superfluous and vain to pray for the dead." Those, therefore, who do not hope all to be saved, but know the contrary, ought not pray absolutely for all that they may be saved. Indeed, if at any time they pray generally for all to be saved, it is necessary that tacitly at least they understand of all the predestined unto life, or hope that their prayer may avail for all if and inasmuch as it shall be pleasing and acceptable in the sight of God; not that by their prayer they wish to extort something from God, as if unwilling. In the first of these ways, the Saviour prayed, saying: "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for those whom Thou hast given Me, because they are Thine," John 17. And to this consents the saying of Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XXI.24, alleged in chapter 23 above. For if the Church were certain who, still existing in the way, are predestined with the devil to eternal fire, it would not pray for them more than for the devil; otherwise it would be pious to pray by name for that certain (because revealed) son of perdition, Antichrist. Those who [D] now are certain, at least in general, that in the present way and life there are always such, ought not pray for all absolutely, but in one of the ways said.

But here someone may reply that then no one ought to pray for any wayfarer, for he does not know whether he is predestined or finally reprobate. It must be said: he who believes someone is to be saved, or that by his prayers he can be saved, can well pray for him, even if he is to be damned, as was said above concerning all. If he does not know or doubts, he can pray, at least under the tacit condition aforesaid. This tacit condition of divine right, anyone seems to have if he have charity, by which he prefers the divine will in all things to his own will. But absolutely altogether one ought not pray for any wayfarer.

To the other principal argument concerning the potter, the answer is plain through what has been said. For the succession of contrary wills in him is not without impotence and imperfection, since with potency preceding act—which necessarily implies imperfection, as the foregoing makes manifest. But God is of infinite perfection and actuality. Therefore He is not in potency before act to contrary volitions [E] successively. This therefore is not of impotence or imperfection in Him, as the preceding chapters have taught. But the authority of Jeremiah understands that God can change the effects of His speech or thought, as the potter changes the effects of his art, the art always remaining the same and immobile; and such change is possible in the divine will, as has been shown above. Nor does this set down any intrinsic change in the essential will of God, but extrinsic, in the kingdoms and nations changed. As to what is objected concerning that

proceeding in *Physics* VIII—not advancing, but limping—it is evidently rejected through the 34th part of the first corollary of this work.

CHAPTER 26. THAT THE WHOLE UNIVERSE OF THINGS IS GOOD, AND NO THING IS PER SE EVIL.

Here, however, in the midst of things, on behalf of what precedes and follows, it must be shown that the whole universe of all things is good, and that there is in it nothing which is evil. For the opposite of this Empedocles, Pythagoras, Manes, and the Manichaean heretics seemed to say, as the 18th part of the first Corollary teaches.

Everything *per se* willable and lovable by [B] the good and wise is in some way good, as Philosophers as well as Theologians equally testify. And any part of the world is *per se* willable and lovable by God, just as it is *per se* creatable and conservable by Him, as can appear from chapters 2, 3, 6, 8, and 9. Likewise, every truth is good, because right, just, and holy; and every essence is truth, or has truth, since being and the true are convertible, as is clear from the premises of chapters 2 and 11 of this work. Whence also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II.4: "Everything is, just as it is, so to truth"; and *Metaphysics* V, where being is distinguished: "*Esse* signifies that it is true; not-being, however, that it is not true but false." And the same is recited in the sixth, the fourth, and the same fifth, where the false is distinguished, it is said that "the false is said to be that which is not"; therefore also that which is is said to be true. And Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VIII.6: "The Necessary is truth; truth is the property of the *esse* of any thing, which is established for it." Anselm also in his little book *De veritate* proves that every essence and every action is truth, justice, and rectitude, as is clear [C] in chapters 6, 7, and 8, and almost throughout the little book. And Augustine in *Eighty-three Questions* 1: "Every soul is a soul because it is a true soul; therefore every soul has from truth that it altogether is. Why therefore not so concerning any other thing whatsoever?" Whence also in *Confessions* VII.15 he says thus: "All things are true insofar as they are, nor is anything falsity, except when it is thought to be that which it is not."

Likewise, God, because He is supremely being, is supremely good and perfect, since both Philosophers and Theologians, proving God to exist, prove one first being; and from this they show that this is most being and most perfect and best. Therefore also all other beings, inasmuch as they participate in His being, so proportionally are they naturally good and perfect. And this Aristotle suggests obscurely in *De Caelo* I.100, when he says: "The end of the whole heaven, and all time containing infinity, and the perfection of the eternal, takes its denomination from always being, immortal and divine; whence also it is communicated to others, to these more clearly, but to these more obscurely, to be and to live." Augustine also in *De doctrina Christiana* I, second to last, says the same clearly enough: "Because God is good, we are; [D] and inasmuch as we are, we are good; and inasmuch as we are evil, so much the less we are. He supremely and primarily is, who is altogether unchangeable, and who could most fully say: 'I am who am.' Other things, except from Him, cannot be; and so far are good as they have received that they be."

Likewise, if anything were *per se* evil, that would be contrary *per se* to the good; that, then, or at least the first in the genus of evils, would be equal to the first in the genus of goods, since contraries, as is established, are placed under the same genus and are most distant. Therefore, as Aristotle says in *De Caelo* I.44: "Of contraries, if one be determinate, the other will also be determinate." Where Averroes in the commentary proves this saying: "This is manifest from the description of contraries, which are at the limit of distance, and since each of them is most distant, it is necessary that it be equally in contrariety, namely that neither be stronger than the other; but if we suppose one of them finite and the other infinite, then they will not be contrary to each other equally, because the form of contrariety which is in one of them will not be equal to the form of contrariety [E] of the other." And he adds: "And it is manifest *per se* that they are in the same degree of contrariety; and if not, they will not be at the limit of distance. For it would be possible to add upon the lesser, that it might be more contrary"—which he proves to be false in three ways. First, because then the same would have multiple contraries, namely the highest. Second, because then that which was placed at the maximum distance, would not be so, which is contrary to the position. Third, because then there would not be the same proportion of one of the contraries to the other, and conversely, the opposite of which he asserts to be known. If, therefore, these things be so, evil is infinite and equally strong with God omnipotent, with whom no word will be impossible. He could therefore impede and frustrate the good God from every good work of His, and so He would not be omnipotent, with other infinite absurdities.

This same Augustine proves in *Eighty-three Questions* 6 in this manner: "Everything that is, is either corporeal or incorporeal. Corporeal is contained by sensible species, incorporeal by intelligible. Everything therefore that is, is not without some species; but where any species is, necessarily [A] some mode is; and mode is something of good. Therefore the highest evil has no mode, for it lacks all good. Therefore it is not, because it is contained by no species; and the whole name 'evil' has been found from the privation of species."

Likewise, if there be anything *per se* evil, that is contrary to the highest good, the Lord God good—against Aristotle in *Metaphysics* XII, last chapter, writing thus: "There is nothing contrary to the first." And Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XII.2: "To that nature which supremely is, no nature is contrary, except that which is not. For to that which is, not-being is contrary; and on this account to God and to the supernal essence, and to the Author of all whatsoever essences, no essence is contrary."

Further, that which naturally appetites and loves the good, is in some way good. For if it were *per se* and perfectly evil, it would be *per se* and perfectly contrary to the good. But none of such contraries naturally appetites and loves the other, but rather hates and flees it. But anything naturally appetites the good. For in *Ethics* I.1 it is said that "well have they pronounced the good to be that which all things appetite." And in *De Anima* II.34: "All things appetite the divine and immortal." Which [B] reason also makes manifest. For everything having a natural end naturally appetites it; but God is the ultimate end of all beings, as could be shown from the second Supposition, and is proved expressly in *Metaphysics* XII and elsewhere in many places in the

philosophy of Aristotle, and similarly of Avicenna. Whence Proverbs 16: "The Lord hath made all things for Himself"; and Apocalypse 1: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Avicenna indeed testifies all this concerning the common appetite of the good clearly in *Metaphysics* VIII.6, saying: "The Necessary Being *per se* is pure goodness, and goodness is desired absolutely by whatever is. But that which everything desires is to be, and to be perfect in being inasmuch as it is being; and being is pure goodness and pure perfection. And altogether goodness is that which everything desires according to its measure, since by it its being is perfected."

Likewise, anything is either an operation, or has in some way some natural operation. But every operation, and therefore the operating cause, in some way appetites the good. For according to Aristotle in *Ethics* I.1: "Every art and every doctrine, similarly also action and election, seems to appetite some good. Therefore [C] well have they pronounced the good to be that which all things appetite." And in *Politics* I.1: "For the sake of that which seems good, all do all things." And Augustine on Psalm 32, "Blessed is the nation whose Lord is its God," after great progress concludes: "The causes of repelling misery, and the causes of acquiring beatitude, make all men do whatever good or evil they do." Boethius also in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, prose 2, says thus: "Every care of mortals, which the labour of multiplied studies exercises, proceeds indeed by a different path, but tends nevertheless to attain one end of beatitude." And in *De Caelo* II.34: "Nature always does, of contingent things, that which is best." And in *De Generatione* II, second to last: "In all things, we say, nature ever desires what is better."

This same can be shown otherwise thus: every agent appetites some proper end, as is plain in *Physics* II diffusely; and *Ethics* I.1 and *Metaphysics* IX.16, and elsewhere in many places. But the end always has the ratio of the good, as is clear in *Physics* II.23, where it is said: "Not utterly is the last the end, but the best." And the like is had below, in the same II.31: [D] it is said, "The end is the most powerful cause, and is always, or seems, good"; and *Metaphysics* II.8: "Those who take away the end take away the nature of the good"; and *Metaphysics* III.3, and *Physics* II.74, and elsewhere very often the same sentence is found. Again to the same: every agent naturally desires the ultimate common end of any action, which without doubt is supremely good, and on account of this is the end of any entity and making. For the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* III.3 says: "That which is good *secundum se* and on account of its nature is the end, so that for the sake of it the rest both come to be and are."

Likewise, as the second Supposition wills, and is shown in philosophy in many places, that there is no infinite process in ends, it is necessary that there be one first and last end, and a common one of the whole genus of ends, and the final cause of all other ends, as is in any other genus, as is demonstrated in *Metaphysics* II and X of Aristotle. But no such end this side of God can be assigned. And this is what the Philosopher attests by many authorities. For he says in *Metaphysics* XII.37: "But that which is for-the-sake-of-which—[E] that is, the final cause—the definition shows in immobile things"—that is, the definition of the final cause which he immediately adds, saying: "For there is for something a 'for-the-sake-of-which,' of which this is,

but that is not. But it moves as the beloved; and what is moved"—namely, the first thing moved by it—"moves the others." Where Averroes, declaring the definition of ends, says thus: "Of perfections on account of which the perfectible is moved, some are qualities, as health; some are substances extrinsic to the thing which is moved toward them, that it may be assimilated to them—as are found all the actions of servants, since they are toward the intention of their Lord; therefore they are said to be on account of the Lord. And similarly beings have this with the first principle. But this first mover moves the first moved, as the first beloved [moves] the first lover. For the first heaven is moved by this mover according to desire, that it may be assimilated to him according to its power, just as a lover is moved that he may be assimilated to his beloved. [A] Other heavenly bodies are moved according to desire toward the motion of the first body, and therefore they have fully a double motion. But those which are under these are moved by means of these motions. Generation and corruption are made by two opposed motions; but continuation by one eternal motion."

And on the same passage of the text above: "What is good, and on account of itself eligible, in the same coordination, and ever best and probable as the first—as the text says, which the Commentator expounds: But that which is chosen on account of itself in the universe of things chosen, is greatly noble when it is first acquired." Where Averroes: "That which is loved and desired on account of itself among these abstracted principles, is that which is at the limit of nobility, and of simplicity, and of unity; and toward it everything is moved with a swifter and greater motion than the proper motions of each of them. For it is *per se* eligible, and beloved by all; and such is perfect at the end, and that is acquired on account of itself, and all things which are acquired, are acquired on account of it." [B] Whence the Philosopher in *De Caelo et Mundo* II.63: "What is best-having needs nothing of action, for it is itself the for-the-sake-of-which, namely the end. But action is always in two, when both that for-the-sake-of-which there is and that which is for the sake of this. Of other animals, however, fewer; of plants something small and one perhaps. For either there is some one thing whereby it would be associated, just as also it has, or also many; but all are preludes to the best." As the text which the Commentator expounds: "The actions of man are manifold, and are not on account of themselves but on account of another, since he is not of perfect nobility. But things of perfect nobility do not need an operation by which they may be noble, for it is itself that on account of which the operation comes about; and every action and perfection of operation will be by that which makes the operation on account of something, and on account of that on account of which is the operation of the doer—namely, on account of that noble and perfect end."

And in *De Anima* II.34: "An animal makes an animal, and a plant a plant, insofar as they participate of the always divine and immortal according to what they can. For all things appetite that, and on account of it act all things which they act according to nature." Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, prose 11, shows [C] diffusely that any of beings appetites its proper and common end and good—not the common on account of the proper, but conversely. He says, therefore, that "that to which all things hasten is the highest of all goods, and that is the

end of all things which is desired by all; which because we have collected to be good, it is necessary we confess the end of all things to be good." And below, in prose 12: "Since God is rightly believed to govern all things by the rudder of goodness, and the same all things, as I have taught, hasten by natural intention to the good; whence it cannot be doubted but that they are governed willingly, and turn themselves of their own accord, agreeing and tempered to the disposer's nod, like things suitable to their ruler. So, I say, it is necessary. There is nothing therefore which, preserving its nature, attempts to go contrary to God; nothing, I say, nor is there anything which can or wills to resist this highest good." Who also in *De Hebdomadibus* maintains: "The common opinion of the doctors holds that everything that is tends to the good; everything tends to the like; therefore those things which tend to the good, themselves are good."

Likewise, it could be confirmed through Augustine, who maintains in many places that all men necessarily will [D] beatitude, and on account of it they will and act universally whatever they will or act, as was alleged above. Therefore it cannot be said that all these sayings of the authors are understood of natural, not voluntary actions. For some authorities speak expressly of angels and men, and the same reason is on this side and that. Otherwise also, more noble beings, namely voluntary, and more noble actions, and of more noble potency—say voluntary—would be more negligently disposed, and worse, although nevertheless according to the Philosopher in *De Caelo et Mundo* II.50: "Nature does not care for vile things, despising precious ones."

Whence it seems to follow as something marvellous, namely that every action of any creature is to enjoy or to use, and none to abuse. But to the mind of the Saints this does not follow, because although any action of the creature in some way is referred to God, yet not precisely with the due circumstances, as is required.

Likewise, peace is so great a good that no one doubts but it is good, nor takes counsel concerning it; but all desire it on account of itself as an end. Whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* III.8: "We take counsel not concerning ends, [E] but concerning those things which are toward ends. For the Politician does not take counsel whether he should make peace, nor does any of the others concerning the end, but, having posited some end, they intend in what manner and by what means it shall be."

Likewise, all beings naturally desire a certain peace, namely natural concord and due harmony, both intrinsic and extrinsic everywhere—as is clear in simples and in mixed things, similar and contrary throughout, but in men most of all. For the peaceful want peace, and similarly the warlike. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* X.11: "We make war that we may lead in peace; for no one chooses to make war for the sake of making war, nor to prepare war; for he would seem altogether a violent killer, who would make enemies of friends, that fights and killings might come about." Therefore also, by the testimony of King Artaxerxes the great: "Peace is desired by all mortals." Whence also Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XV.11: "Peace is so great a good, that nothing is wont to be heard with greater pleasure, nothing more desirably to be coveted, nothing better to be found." And peace all good and [A] evil, in every operation, good

or evil, desire and love; nor by any means can they not love peace. This whole, however, Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XIX.12 and 13 plainly says and proves.

Further, natural order is good, and all things have natural order; therefore all things have good. This reason is almost wholly clear in *Metaphysics* XIII.2, where Aristotle, distinguishing concerning the good and refuting Aristippus and other such Sophists who set down that there is no good in mathematical (as is recited in *Metaphysics* III.3), shows that there is good in mathematical, saying thus: "Since the good and the best, the one indeed is always in operation, but the good also in immobile things—those who say that the mathematical sciences say nothing concerning the good or the best, will lie. For they speak and demonstrate most. But of the good, the chief species are order, commensuration, and the determinate—which the mathematical sciences most show. And since these are seen to be cause of many things—I mean order and the determinate." The same is plain in *De Caelo et Mundo* III.24, where it is said: "The disordered is nothing other than [B] beyond nature; for order is the proper nature of sensibles."

Likewise, that is good which gives to each what is its own; but this order does. For Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XIX.13 defines order thus: "Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things assigning to each its place"—which agrees sufficiently with the preceding saying of Aristotle. Therefore in *De Civitate Dei* XV.22 he defines virtue briefly thus: that it is "the order of love."

Likewise, unless order were a great good, it would not be so diligently noted in Sacred Letters. In the rational of Judgment four orders of stones had to be set, and the names of the sons of Israel according to the order of their nativity, and lamps to be placed in order. The Queen of Sheba, also, seeing the order of the ministers of Solomon, said: "Blessed are thy servants." The order of Melchizedek, similarly, is not in the least commended; and almost the whole law and the prophets are sprinkled in various places with such things. The Apostle also admonishes the Corinthians that all things may be done in them according to order and decently. And writing to the Colossians, the Apostle says he rejoices seeing their order.

That all things have some natural order is shown by this, because [C] all things have one natural end, as has just been shown; and because all things essentially and naturally are ordered toward one another, being equally more or less. Aristotle also in *Metaphysics* XII, last chapter, inquires in what consists the natural good and best of the universe, namely whether in some separate good, or in order; and answering, he shows that in both, just as the good of an army consists in order and in the leader; and he sets down there a twofold natural order of all beings, namely toward one another, and toward the first; and Averroes shows this beautifully there in commentary 52. And in *Metaphysics* I, chapter 9, Aristotle recites the reasoning of the Ancients, compelled, as he says, by this truth to set down—although not sufficiently distinctly—one common final cause of all beings. For they saw that in all beings there is being and well-being in natural order; and that this could not be from some element, nor from chance or fortune; therefore they concluded one general principle of the whole goodness to be. Therefore Anaxagoras said that some intellect is in animals, and in nature the cause of the earth and the

world, and [D] of the whole order; and the cause of so saying he received from Hermotimus of Clazomenae, as is recited immediately following in chapter 10; and this opinion the Philosopher approves. Therefore it seems that this is the general opinion of the Philosophers. And Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* IV, prose 6: "Order indeed embraces all, lest in the kingdom of providence anything be permitted to rashness."

Furthermore, Aristotle in *De Secreto Secretorum* I, part 23, says that "the Creator destined all things by His wisdom, with equal weight, and certain number, and order." With which agreeing, the Wise Man in Wisdom 11: "Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight"—therefore also in natural order. These three also import a great good, as is clear through Augustine on Genesis IV.4, and below in *De Libero Arbitrio* II.19 and last, *De Civitate Dei* V.11, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* 4, and elsewhere in many places. Who also in *De Civitate Dei* XI.15 says: "There is no nature which He has not constituted, from whom is every mode, every species, every order, without which nothing of things can be found or thought." And any of these three is good; therefore any [E] thing existing has some good, and is similarly itself good.

Further, every truly being is truly knowable positively. Because according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* II.4: "Each thing, just as it has to be, so to truth"—therefore to cognition. But evil is not knowable positively and *per se*, but privatively and by comparison to good, like a privation through its habit. For the Philosopher says in *De Anima* III.25 that privation, evil, and black are shown and known in some way by their contrary. Where Averroes says that universally all privations are known only through their contraries, namely through the cognition of the habit, and through the cognition of the defect of the habit; and this he intended through blackness, the privation of whiteness. And in *Metaphysics* XII.37 the Philosopher suggests this same: "The intelligible," [A] he says, "another coordination, and the first substance of this." Therefore it is established that he speaks of the coordination of good, when he says that this is intelligible *per se*, suggesting that the contrary coordination, namely of evil, is not intelligible *per se*, but *per accidens*. Which, expounding, Averroes alleges from Alexander, that those things which are understood *per se* are of the *Allastochia* of the good; but those which are of evil are understood *per accidens*, namely through the privation of good; and of all the contrary principles of any transmutation, one is as form, and the other as privation. The *Allastochia* which is as form is understood *per se*, but that which is as privation is understood, but not *per se*. For privation is not understood except in respect of the habit, which is form. With these things Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XII.7 agrees, saying that to wish to find the causes of the sin of the evil will, and of such defections, is as if someone should wish to see darkness, or hear silence; which both are nevertheless known to us through eyes and ears, not in species, but in privation of species. "Let no one therefore [B] seek from me to know that which I know I do not know, unless perhaps that he may learn not to know that which he must know cannot be known."

Further, if anything were *per se* evil, this would seem most of all of an evil moral act; but any such is some motion, therefore an act, and the perfection of the moveable or the moved insofar as such, as is clear from *Physics* III of Aristotle sufficiently diffusely. Likewise to the same: every

act is the end, completion, and perfection of the natural potency of which it is the act. For Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* IX.15: "But the end is the act, and on account of this potency is taken. For animals do not see in order to have sight, but in order to see they have sight." And he there shows this through a long process. Therefore every act is some natural good. And this is the reasoning of Avicenna in *Metaphysics* IX.8, saying: "Nothing in actions is found to be called evil which is not the perfection of the agent cause; and perhaps it is not evil except in respect of the patient suffering sadness through that action, or in respect of a superior cause which ought to prohibit—just as an injury inflicted by the irascible faculty is the proper perfection of that faculty, and as concerns it such action is good, but is the evil of the injured, or [C] of the rational soul which ought to flee that faculty." The same he shows by another sufficiently fitting example concerning combustion produced by fire, which is the proper perfection of the form of fire, and consequently its good, but is perhaps the evil of what is burned, or of him who kindles the fire.

Likewise, homicide and adultery are not *per se* evils, nor any external acts, since they are not in children, fools, sleepers, or even in the furious, since they lack the free judgment of the causal will. This is plain from the second of this work, premised. To the same: if homicide is *per se* evil, homicide insofar as it is homicide is evil, since *per se*, that is, *secundum se*, follows *secundum quod*, as is clear in *Metaphysics* V.23, where these are defined; and if homicide insofar as it is homicide is evil, every homicide is evil, as is plain in *Prior Analytics* I, chapter on reduplicatives; and Averroes on *Metaphysics* V, commentary 3: "Man insofar as he is man is not a maker of idols, since then every man would be a maker of idols."

Likewise, whatever inheres in something *per se* inheres in it essentially, as is plain in *Posterior Analytics* I and *Metaphysics* V, where also [D] previously, and whatever inheres in something essentially, inheres necessarily in all its supposita, as is clear in *De Caelo* II.59, where it is argued that if one star is of spherical figure, therefore every one is. Where Averroes says: "It is necessary that what exists in some individuals of a species from essential things, exist in all individuals of that species; and figure is from essential things." The venerable Anselm of Canterbury also in *De Casu Diaboli* 19, showing that every will, namely act of will, insofar as it is, is good, and no thing is evil, proves it thus: that the will of the first angel, by which he willed to be like God, was not evil—namely essentially and *per se*—because then the Son of God would not will to be like the Father. And he adds: "Or if to will any lowest pleasures were evil, the will of brutes would be called evil."

Likewise, if homicide is *per se* evil, not *per accidens*, since always and everywhere homicide is the same itself and has itself wholly, always and everywhere it is evil. For if now or here it is not evil, and then or there it is evil, this is on account of something which befalls it now and here, by reason of which now and here it is evil. [E] But since elsewhere and at other times this has been separated from it, then and there it will not be evil. Therefore it is not evil only by itself, nor by anything essential to it, as soul is, or risibility to man—for such things cannot be separated. Therefore it is evil only *per accidens*, because by something such which can be present and absent without corruption of the subject.

The venerable Anselm of Canterbury in *De Conceptu Virginali* 4 also argues in this manner: if concupiscential appetites were *per se* unjust, as often as they were consented to, they would make injustice. But when brute animals consent to them, they are not called unjust. Likewise, if the acts of adultery and homicide are *per se* evils, since the act according to essence is similar in conjugates and unconjugates, in innocent persons and those guilty of death, there will also be sin in these. To the same: suppose that, on account of great similitude, or another cause from inculpable ignorance, a man knows another's wife believing her his own; and similarly kills an innocent man placed in prison in the place of the guilty justly damned and duly kept—[A] neither sins, but rather merits in the case. Therefore such acts *per se*, and according to their substance, are not evils, but sometimes are goods, just as carnal acts with one's own wife, while she is believed to be another's, is mortal sin, and the killing of a guilty person believed innocent. This appears in Genesis 29 concerning Rachel and Leah; and in the Canon, 29 Question 1; and in the fourth book of Peter's *Sentences*, distinction 30, manifestly concerning similar things.

Further to the same: justice and injustice are privatively opposed, therefore are apt to be made about the same thing, as is clear in the *Categories* and in *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. But justice is in the rational creature alone; therefore also injustice is, and not in such external acts. Indeed, sin does not seem to be more *per se* in such acts than in similar acts of beasts. This whole, almost, is the reasoning of Anselm in *De Conceptu Virginali*, where similarly he shows that original sin, by virtue of which it is injustice, is not in the seed or body, but only in the rational soul.

Further it seems that no interior act is *per se* evil, because neither blasphemy nor hatred of God; which can be shown, as concerning external acts has been shown, in fools and [B] also the furious; and because any such act is some natural perfection of such natural potency. Moreover, to understand and to will are diverse operations; let it then be supposed that God create some nature which can freely will and not-will, and do the other works of will, and not judge intellectually nor rationally, but simply comprehend like brutes—then such a nature, blaspheming or hating God, would not sin, because it would not act against the judgment or rule of reason. Therefore such acts are not *per se* evil, as appears from what has been shown.

Further, a man can without any preceding fault of his be deceived in many ways through many appearances and sophistical arguments. Let it then be supposed that that most cunning Behemoth of Sophists, whose subtleties are perplexed, should involve some simple person, without prior fault of his own, and ensnare him so perplexingly that it should seem to him altogether that, unless he blaspheme God or hate Him, he will necessarily sin more—then according to the judgment of right reason this man is bound to blaspheme God, or hate Him, lest otherwise he fall into a greater sin, since according to the common conception of the [C] mind, of two evils the lesser evil is to be chosen. The cause of which is that in goods it is the contrary, namely that the greater is more to be chosen. Whence in *Ethics* V.5: "By the reason of the good, the lesser is to the greater evil; the lesser is more eligible than the greater. But what is eligible is the good, and the greater is the more good."

The same is clear through blessed Gregory in *Moralia* XXXII.17, on Job 40: "The sinews of his stones are intertwined," saying: "The sinews of these stones are intertwined, because the arguments of his suggestions are bound by implicit knottings, that they may make many sin in this way, that if perhaps they may seek to flee one sin, they may not escape this without another snare of sin, or commit a fault while avoiding it, and in no way be able to release themselves from one, unless they consent to be bound in another." And he shows this by many examples, the first of which is: if anyone shall have sworn to conceal another's secret, who indicates to him after the oath that he intends to commit a secret homicide, which the man sworn cannot impede except by betraying this secret resolution—then he is bound by the snares of so great a perplexity that, if he betrays the secret, he seems to himself guilty of perjury; [D] if he does not betray, guilty of homicide. He sets down another example concerning some simple person who promises full obedience to a prelate, who first commands him to do what is not fitting; then such a person is perplexed: for if he obey, he commits and does sin; if he obey not, he incurs disobedience, as he believes. Where, against all such perplexities, he sets down a general remedy, namely that the perplexed always choose the lesser evil. For he says thus: "There is, however, what may usefully be done to destroy his cunning: namely that when the mind is constrained between lesser and greatest sins, if there be no way out at all without sin, lesser ones always be chosen. Because also he who is enclosed on all sides by the circuit of walls, lest he flee, hurls himself in flight where the wall is found shorter." And this whole is alleged in the Canon, distinction 13, "Nervi"; and the like is written in 22 Question 4, "Non solum"; and many similar things in many chapters following and preceding.

Likewise to the same is that chapter above, in the same distinction, "Duo mala," and is taken from the Eighth Council of Toledo: "Two evils, although they are most cautiously [E] to be guarded against, yet if the necessity of danger has compelled to perpetrate one of them, we ought to resolve upon that which is known to be obligated by a lesser bond. But what is lighter of these and what graver, let us investigate by the acumen of pure reason." And to this conduces what is premised at the head of that distinction, namely that against natural right no dispensation is admitted, unless perhaps two evils so urge that one of them must be chosen. The same teaches plainly Isidore in *De Summo Bono* III.5.

Suppose then that to some simple person, who has willed and sworn to some prelate full obedience in all things, it be commanded by that prelate, or by the devil who transfigures himself into that prelate, that he hate God and blaspheme; and let him judge that such an act against God is the lesser evil, because there it is one sin only, and against God only, and much excused by the precept of the prelate; and let him believe that not to obey in this case is the greater sin, because against his prelate, and against [A] God, whose office he bears, and that it would be to violate the oath, and to apostatize from the vow. Or suppose that the devil, who transfigures himself into an angel of light, transfigure himself into the angel of great counsel, the Lord Jesus Christ, and command some simple person who believes he is Christ, that he blaspheme and hate God for a moment, because if he does not, he will blaspheme God and hate Him eternally damned, and let

him believe that it is a lesser evil to blaspheme or hate God in this case than not to obey the one commanding, and let this come about without any preceding fault of his.

For we see that many saints are frequently deceived by sophistical arguments. And at least this is possible by the absolute divine power. And if it be said that this is at least on account of preceding original sin: let original sin be deleted by baptism, and let such a person be in charity—then never will he, in punishment of original sin, fall into ignorance which leads him necessarily into mortal sin. Likewise such credulity is one act possible to come about, as is plain through the council [B] and through the text of Job, which cannot be understood as the letter at first sounds, since Behemoth does not have such members, as is plain through Gregory and through Gratian similarly where before, and reason teaches the same. For someone can believe a more manifestly false and less likely thing, like the opposite of the first principle, or that all things are moved or rest, and the like, as is recited in *Metaphysics* IV and elsewhere. But such an act of perplexed belief depends neither in becoming nor in being on prior fault as on any cause of itself, as will be plain inductively. Therefore it is absolutely possible without prior fault for credulity of this sort to come about and remain.

Likewise, suppose that God create a man without original or any other sin, in grace, of such a condition as we are, concerning whom, deceived thus, the argument is made as before. And to obstruct all subterfuges, suppose that such a person be perplexed, let him believe that if he wait, deliberate, take counsel, or pray to God, he will sin more grievously by that very fact—let this credulity be part of that perplexity. And suppose it be commanded him to do at once this or that, and that he believe himself bound to do at once, without any waiting or any such thing; or suppose him in prison, where he cannot have counsel; and moreover, although [C] he pray God, since God is not bound, nor compelled by prayers to act, but whatever He acts externally He always acts freely, suppose by His absolute power that He hear not the one praying. Such a person, then, so perplexed, if he choose and do what he believes to be the lesser evil, does not sin. Therefore no such act is *per se* sin.

But someone perhaps will say that if he so choose, in this case, he nevertheless sins, because he chooses and does the lesser sin, according to the authorities cited above; therefore in some way he sins. But this does not seem so. For no one sins by doing what he ought; but such a person does what he ought. Nor does anyone sin by doing according to the most right judgment of reason, of the Saints, of the Canon, and of a general Council; but this person does so. And likewise if such a one sin, this is mortally in many cases, as it seems; and if he does not so choose, he sins mortally. Therefore such a one in charity, in justice, and in rectitude of will, heir of the heavenly kingdom, would necessarily lose all these of necessity, and unwillingly—which is reproved by many testimonies of the Saints and Doctors. And this seems expressly against blessed [D] Gregory where before, and is alleged in the Canon where before. For he says: "When we are constrained in doubts, we usefully submit to the least, lest in great things we sin without pardon." Augustine also in *De Mendacio* 13 senses the same, where after a long premised disputation he concludes thus: "Thus then it is to be concluded that whatever sins of others—

except those which make unclean him in whom they are committed—any one ought not to avoid by his own sins, neither for himself nor for anyone, but rather to bear them and bravely suffer them. But those which are so committed against a man as to make him unclean, by our own sins also we ought to avoid; and on account of this, those things are not to be called sins, which are done that that uncleanness may be avoided. For whatever is so done that, unless it were done, it would justly be reprehended, is not sin, nor would anything be sin which were done on account of avoiding such things. Therefore on account of avoiding these, whoever shall have lied, does not sin." And below, in the same, 26: "This entire dispute, certainly, although alternates [E] affirmation and denial concerning whether it is to be lied, no one however can say that he finds in any example or word of Scripture that any lie is to be loved or not held in hatred—but that sometimes by lying that is to be done which one hates, that what is more to be detested may be avoided. But in this men err, that they subject precious things to viler ones. For when you have conceded that some evil is to be admitted, lest another more grievous be admitted, not by the rule of truth, but by his own cupidity and custom, each one measures the evil; and thinks that more grievous which he himself more abhors, not what really is more to be fled." And he adds, 27, consequently: "Things which are observed for the cause of sanctity and religion, when injurious persons have wished to violate them, even by lesser sins—not only by injuries to others, if the condition be proposed and faculty given—are to be redeemed; and then they cease to be sins which are undertaken on account of avoiding more grievous things. For just as in useful things, as money or some other commodity, what is lost on account of greater gain is not called loss; so also in holy things what is admitted lest [A] more grievous be admitted is not called sin. Or if also that is called loss which someone loses lest he lose more, let this also be called sin, provided no one doubts that it is to be undertaken, that more be avoided, just as no one doubts that for the sake of avoiding greater loss what is less is to be suffered."

Likewise 22 q. 4, "Si aliquid," is alleged from venerable Bede in homily 44 in this manner: "If anything has happened to us to swear less cautiously, which observed bears toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is freely to be changed by salutary counsel, and that we are rather to perjure ourselves under pressing necessity, than for the sake of avoiding perjury be diverted into another graver crime. Finally, David swore by God to kill Nabal, but at the intercession of Abigail he soon let it go, nor grieved that he had contracted any fault for such perjury." And this same reason makes manifest, for whoever chooses the lesser evil in order so to flee the greater evil, is not deemed to choose the lesser evil, but to flee the greater evil; therefore he incurs no sin. For the Philosopher says in *Ethics* IX.1: "Friendship existing on account of delight and utility, dissolution comes about when those things on account of which they were loving are not done; for they were not loving themselves, [B] but the existing things." With which agreeing Anselm in *De Casu Diaboli* 13: "He who wills something on account of beatitude, wills nothing other than beatitude." And in *De Concordia* 8: "He who keeps rectitude of will only on account of another, does not love it, but that on account of which he keeps it; and therefore he is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be named justice." And Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XI.6: "If anyone refer the will of seeing to another, surely he wills another, and there will not now be

the will of seeing, or if of seeing, not this seeing—as if someone should wish to see a scar, in order thence to teach that there had been a wound; or should wish to see a window in order through the window to see those passing." And below, in the same: "Rightly are all wills bound to one another, if that to which all are referred is good; but if it is depraved, all are depraved." And in *Eighty-three Questions* 36: "If you wish to please men in order that you may profit them unto loving God, now you do not desire this but another."

And these things seem to sound the authorities concerning lying just premised. Which also from canonical Scripture seems to be had. For Isaiah says in the person of God: "Holocausts of rams," etc., "such things I would not"—and certainly [C] He willed them in some way, because He commanded them in the law; but He willed them not on account of themselves, but on account of another end, which He sufficiently expresses below in the same, when He says thus: "Wash yourselves, be clean," etc., "seek judgment, relieve the oppressed," etc. And this is what Micah more clearly makes manifest. "What," he says, "shall I offer worthy unto the Lord? Shall I offer Him holocausts and yearling calves? Can the Lord be appeased with thousands of rams, or with many thousands of fat he-goats? I will show thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requireth of thee: verily, to do judgment and to love mercy, and to walk solicitously with thy God." And Psalm 50: "If Thou hadst desired sacrifice, I would indeed have given it; with burnt offerings Thou wilt not be delighted. A sacrifice to God is a contrite spirit." And Mark 9: "Whosoever shall receive one of these children in My name receives Me, and whosoever shall receive Me, receives not Me, but Him that sent Me." And so the Apostle speaks in 1 Corinthians, saying thus: "If I do this willingly," namely if I shall preach the Gospel, "I have a reward; but if against my will, a dispensation is committed unto me"—suggesting that if he preach the Gospel [D] for temporal gain, he preaches it against his will, namely not willing the Gospel but the gain. Which is plain there more expressly through Augustine in the Gloss, saying: "If, compelled by want of those things which are accessory to temporal life, I preach the Gospel, others through me will have the reward, but I shall not, because I do not love the Gospel itself, but its price set in those temporal things."

Therefore it seems that the perplexed person, choosing in his judgment the lesser evil so as to flee the greater evil, does not, to the mind of these authors, choose any evil, but as much as is in him, rather flees every evil; therefore neither does he seem to sin. The authorities, however, saying that such a one ought to choose the lesser sin, understand that he ought to choose that which seems to him the lesser sin, and which in every other case would be sin. For only in this case is it lawful for a man to choose and do what he believes to be sin; and since this is natural right, that every man flee, and not choose for himself, evil, against this natural right dispensation is admitted only in this case, as is recited above.

Further, this opinion many [E] philosophical and theological authorities suggest and confirm. Aristotle indeed in *Ethics* I.6 says that "good is said equally with being," and shows this inductively through all the predicaments. Where Averroes says thus: "Since the name 'good' is synonymously said to the name 'being,' it is said ambiguously of the ten predicaments, that is, not

according to one intention." Likewise in *Ethics* IV.12: "Evil destroys itself; and if it were entire, it would be unbearable." Where Averroes: "Evil is the corruption of itself; when all its parts shall have been gathered, since this is not tolerable."

Likewise Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII.6: "The Necessary Being *per se* is pure goodness, and goodness is desired absolutely by whatever is. But that which everything desires is to be, and perfection in being insofar as it is being. Privation, however, insofar as it is privation, is not desired, except insofar as being and perfection follow upon it. Therefore that [A] which is truly desired is being. Being is pure goodness and pure perfection; and altogether goodness is that which everything desires according to its measure, since by it its being is perfected. Malice, however, has no essence, but is the privation of substance, and of utility of its disposition." The same in *Metaphysics* IX.7 and 8 distinguishes concerning evil and says that it is said in four ways, namely a horrible work, the principle of it, namely manners, sadness and grief, and the defect of a thing from its perfection. And below, chapter 8, he proves that no action is *per se* evil, because any action is the perfection of the agent, as was alleged above. And below in the same, having made the definition of being through good and evil, he subjoins that a being which is wholly evil, or in which the evil prevails, or is equal to the good, is not yet found. This opinion also Avicenna and Algazel in *Metaphysics* V last, profess.

Boethius also in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* III, prose last, proves it thus: "God omnipotent cannot do nothing, and to do evil He cannot; therefore evil is nothing." The same below in the same IV, prose 6, says: "God, the Founder of all natures, directing all to the good, disposes all things; and while He hastens to retain those things which He has produced into His likeness, He eliminates [B] every evil from the bounds of His commonwealth through the sequence of fatal necessity." The venerable Anselm of Canterbury also in *De Conceptu Virginali* proves the same diffusely, as was touched on above. Whence chapter 4 he says: "Nothing, whether substance or action or anything else, considered *per se*, is just except justice, or unjust or sin, except injustice." And in the fifth: "From these, then, it is easily known that injustice has no essence, although the affects and acts of an unjust will, which considered *per se* are something, usage calls injustice. By this same reasoning we understand that evil is nothing. For just as injustice is nothing other than the absence of due justice, so evil is nothing other than the absence of due good." And in *De Casu Diaboli* 8 the same he demonstrates by intention, and at the end of the chapter concludes thus: "Therefore neither the depraved will, nor the depraved conversion of will, is the evil itself by which an angel or a man becomes evil, which we say is nothing." And in 9 he says that "that evil is injustice, which is the privation of justice; and evil is nothing other than the privation of good." And in 16: "Altogether [C] I reprehend nothing else in the will of the evil angel than the absence of justice, or not having justice." And in 19 he shows the same through two reasons recited above, and concluding says: "Whence it follows that no will is evil, but is good insofar as it is, because it is the work of God." And in 20 he sets down a distinction concerning evil: "There is simple evil, which is nothing other than evil—which is nothing, namely injustice itself; but there is another evil, namely a nature in which is injustice—since it is

something, and other than injustice, which is evil and nothing." And in 26, again distinguishing concerning evil, he says evil is double: namely evil of injustice, which is always nothing, and evil of incommmodity, which he also subdivides; for some such evil is nothing, like blindness; some however is, like sadness and grief.

The same in *De Concordia* 6: "The good which is justice is something truly; the evil, however, which is injustice, lacks all existence; which in the treatise *De Casu Diaboli* and in the little book which I titled *De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato* I have most openly shown. Injustice is not a quality, or action, or any essence, but only the absence of due justice." [D]

This same Hugh in *De Sacramentis* I, part 5, chapter 26 also teaches.

Likewise, if evil were something, this would seem most of all of an evil will; and since it is not eternal, it would have an efficient cause—which Augustine denies in *De Civitate Dei* XII.9, showing that God was the efficient cause of the good will in the angels now blessed, and that of the evil will in the reprobate angels there was no efficient cause, but a deficient one; and that nothing makes such a will but defection, by which God is forsaken, of which defection also the cause certainly fails. And above, in 8, after a long argumentation he concludes: "Let no one therefore seek the efficient cause of the evil will. For it is not efficient but deficient, since neither is it an affection but a defection."

The same also through almost the whole book *De Natura Boni* shows the same conclusion, that evil is nothing, and that all things, insofar as they are, are good and from God. Whence chapter 1 he says: "All goods, whether great or small, through whatsoever degrees of things, cannot be except from God. Every nature insofar as it is nature is good. Every nature, therefore, cannot be except from God." And below in 3 and 13 he says that from God is every [E] mode, whether great or small, and so of species and order. And in 4: "Evil is nothing other than the corruption of natural mode, species, or order; an evil nature, then, is said to be that which has been corrupted." And in 5: "Corruption, however, if it should take away every mode, species, and order in corporeal things, no nature will remain."

The same in *Confessions* VII almost throughout, by no brief disputation shows that evil is not anything, and chapter 12 thus concludes: "Therefore if corruptible things shall be deprived of every good, they will not be at all; therefore, as long as they are, they are good; therefore whatever things are, are good, because individually they are good, and together all are very good." And chapter 13 he subjoins, saying: "To Thee evil is not, nor to Thy whole creature, because outside there is not anything which corrupts and breaks in upon the order which Thou hast imposed on it." Likewise in IV *Super Genesim ad litteram* 14: "If God could not do good things, there would be no power; but if He could and did not, there would be great envy. Because therefore He is omnipotent and good, He made all things very good." The same is plain in *Enchiridion* 6 and 7, in *De Libero Arbitrio* III.19, in *De Civitate Dei* XII.6, and in many other [A] places. Whence also Ecclesiasticus 39: "All the works of the Lord are very good." And

below in the same: "It is not to be said, This is worse than that; for all things shall be approved in their time."

Likewise, Ambrose in the book which he wrote *De Isaak et Anima*, says thus: "What therefore is evil, except the indigence of good?" And again: "From goods, therefore, evils have arisen. For there are no evils except those which are deprived of goods."

Likewise this opinion Lombard favours in *Sentences* II, distinction 25, saying: "Some, however, diligently attending to the words of Augustine, not unlearnedly transmit that the evil will and evil acts insofar as they are, or insofar as they are acts, are good; and they say that every will and act is the good nature of God." And similar to this it seems to feel below in the same, distinction 36; and similarly distinction 45 of the first.

This opinion also blessed Dionysius teaches plainly in *De Divinis Nominibus* in many places, through several reasons premised, especially however in chapter 4.

In order that I may conclude with a certain end the treatise on evil, ambiguous to some, behold a most brief and most certain argument: that ought certainly to be held Catholic whose opposite is held [B] for certain heretical. Such, however, is the principal conclusion of the present chapter. For Jerome in his book XII on Isaiah, expounding that of Isaiah 45: "I am the Lord, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil," says: "Let the heresy be confounded which judges God to be the founder of evils, since here evil is set down not as contrary to good, but for affliction and war, according to that which is written in the Gospel: 'Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.' Let Marcion be confounded, understanding two Gods, one good and just, the other evil and unjust, the founder of one of invisibles and the other of visibles, of which the first makes light, the second darkness; that one peace, this one evil—although both, on account of diversity of merits, one and the same God established."

And Jerome here takes evil not for a man or angel denominatively evil, and as it were subject to malice, but for the *per se* evil, or for the very *per se* and pure malice, according to what he speaks and defines elsewhere. For above, in the same, book I on Isaiah, on that of Isaiah 2: "Cease ye therefore from the man whose breath is in his nostrils, for he is reputed high"—he speaks thus in this [C] place: "*Bama* among the Hebrews is not 'high' said, but 'highness'; that is, the very altitude and sublimity, as if it were said: not divine, but divinity; not stream, but spring; not man, but humanity." It is therefore heretical to judge God to be the founder of evils of fault, as the Prophet and Jerome here speak; since nevertheless according to chapter 3, and according to them, He is the founder of all things, also of evils of affliction and of wars; therefore also it is heretical to judge an evil of fault to be any thing whatsoever.

Isidore also in *Etymologiae* VIII.5 (or 12), reciting the various heresies of various heretics, says thus: "The Colitani or Colicitani say that God does not make evils, against that which is written: 'I, the Lord, creating evils.'" And immediately he subjoins: "The Floriani say on the contrary, that God created evils, against that which is written: 'God made all things good.'" And it is recited in

the Canon, 24 q. last, "Quidam autem," where heretics with their heresies are numbered. And that God is Creator of all and Maker, what has been alleged proves; nor does any Catholic ignore this, for the Nicene Creed in the name of the whole Church generally professes this: [D] "I believe," it says, "in one God the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible," as also chapter three has shown.

COROLLARY.

AND IT MAY HAVE A COROLLARY: THAT GOOD AND *PER SE* EVIL, OR GOODNESS AND PURE MALICE, ARE NOT PROPERLY CONTRARIES, BUT PRIVATIVELY OPPOSED.

Whence it is manifest that good and *per se* evil, or goodness and pure malice, are not properly contraries, but privatively opposed. For if they were properly contraries, they would be placed under the same genus, and constituted by positive contrary differences, distant most. Whereas, however, *per se* evil, or pure malice, sets down nothing positive—since therefore they are opposed, and one of these only positive—it is established that these are opposed privatively. Nor ought anyone be moved [E] by the fact that the Philosopher frequently sets down good and evil as if contraries, because he does this by setting down an example. Of the examples, however, which he sets down, he does not always suppose that it is so, but that he who learns may understand, as is plain through the same, *Prior Analytics* I. Or otherwise it can be said that when the authors at times affirm good and evil to be contraries, they understand by contraries opposites; or by evil, the evil of affliction and sensible pain, according to the distinction of Avicenna and Anselm above recited.

But someone perhaps will object against the things said the saying of the Philosopher in *Ethics* II.7 in these words: "Not every operation, nor every passion, receives a mean. For some, immediately named, are entwined with malice—for example, joy at evil, shamelessness, envy; and in operations, adultery, theft, homicide. For all these, and such as these, are said [A] *secundum se* to be evils, but not their excesses or defects. There is therefore never about these to be right, but always to err; nor is there well or not well in such things—in that as it is fitting, and when, and how, for example to commit adultery—but simply to do any of these is to sin." A similar opinion also the Catholic Doctors say in many places, and Lombard in *Sentences* II, distinction 40, for this opinion recites Augustine.

For these things it must be said, as Anselm suggests in *De Conceptu Virginali* 4, that names can be imposed in two ways on those evil acts: either so that they signify absolutely the substance of such an act, or so that with the act they co-signify some evil circumstance accompanying. Therefore Anselm says there: "Names are given to certain actions, by which it is signified that they come about unjustly, like fornication and lying. But one thing is understood when the action itself or the speech is considered, another when whether justly or unjustly is considered. Finally, every essence is from God, from whom nothing is unjust." And so the objections are resolved.

For Augustine and the Philosopher take those names above said in the second way, not the first; therefore they do not contradict the things shown.

That Augustine speaks thus appears through [B] this which he says: "Those things which are established to be sins are not to be done under any pretext of a good cause, nor for any so-called good end, nor with any so-called good intention." And that the Philosopher speaks thus, it seems. For he does not say that any such act is really *per se* evil, but that "some immediately named are entwined with malice"—suggesting that some names signify evil acts not absolutely according to the essence of the acts, but co-signify and entwine malice together with them. And this is sufficiently clear through this, that he named homicide among them, which is not *per se* evil, as is plain through himself in *Ethics* X.14, alleging from the lawgivers that "it is necessary to provoke to virtue the obedient by the good; but the disobedient and more degenerate by punishments and chastisements; the incurable, however, exterminate"—which is also sanctioned by the laws of all peoples.

CHAPTER 27. THAT ALL THINGS COME ABOUT FROM DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

It seems consequent upon what has been said to inquire concerning providence. For as Lactantius recites in book one of his *Divine Institutes Against the Gentiles*, Democritus is the author of the opinion holding that all things come about by chance, and Epicurus the confirmer. Whence also the Philosopher in *Physics* II.44 says: "There are some who maintain that this heaven and all worldly things have chance as their cause; for from chance, they say, there came about the revolution and the motion which separated all into this order." These, as appears from the first of *De Generatione et Corruptione* and *Metaphysics* I, [D] seem to have been Democritus and his colleague Leucippus, who set down that all things come about from indivisible bodies, but concurring differently, according to *risutos*, *diatigi*, and *tropi*—that is, according to figure, order, and position. They said this concurrence to come about fortuitously, that is, by chance; whom Epicurus, imitating, similarly thought.

Therefore Isidore in *Etymologiae* VIII.19 says that "Epicurus said no divine providence has set up or rules the world, but assigned the origin of things to atoms, that is, indivisible and solid bodies, by whose fortuitous concurrences all things are born. He asserted also that God does nothing." Josephus also in *Antiquities of the Jews* X, last, says: "The Epicureans deny providence in life, and do not consider that God cares for human affairs, nor judge that all things are governed by a blessed and incorruptible substance for the stability of all things; but assert that this world is borne about of itself without ruler and without any care."

Others, however, not so universally, but dividing, said that the heavenly things [E] are governed by providence, but inferior things, whatsoever, are agitated by fortuitous motions. Others, however, with more irrational opining, brought forth the contrary opinion. But against all these,

or rather for all these, it must be shown that all things which come about, come about from divine providence, and are ordained by the laws of His providence.

For what is providence except *procul videntia*, or *praevidentia*, of intellect, with *procul violentia*, or *praevolentia*, of will? But God has knowledge of all things, as chapter six teaches, and that is some cause of any thing made, the seventeenth attesting; God also has volition toward all things, as chapters 8, 9, and 22 show, and neither of these is new through the twenty-third, and the volition of God is efficacious, nor can be frustrated, by the tenth. It is plain therefore that all things which come about come about from divine providence.

Likewise, through the proximate chapter, all things are good; therefore also according to the priors they descend from the first good, and not perversely and improvidently, but providently and discreetly. Likewise, a good father of a family cares for all things concerning him, and provides as much as [A] he knows and can, nor leaves anything unordered in his house, but orders all things in their places and times carefully. Whence also Aristotle in *Oeconomica* I.3 says thus: "Whatever things ought to be done *per se*, the care, namely, ought to be *per se*"; and follows: "It is needful that masters rise before servants, and sleep last, and that the house never be without a guard, just as the city; and whatever ought to be done, neither by night nor by day be omitted." And below in the same: "The house also is to be constructed for guarding things, for nourishment, garments, and other things animate—servants, free, female, male; foreign and citizen—for safety and for health, for summer cold, for winter warm; and it is needful that each thing be put in its place." How much more shall that great Father of the family, of whose magnitude there is no end, and of whose wisdom there is no number, whose goodness also is immense, govern providently His whole great house, with all that it contains, [A] at all times? Whence Matthew 20: "The kingdom of heaven is like to a man who is a householder." Where Chrysostom: "The man householder is Christ, [B] to whom heaven and earth are as one house; the family is of heavenly, terrestrial, and infernal creatures."

Likewise, if God did not provide for all things, this would seem of unskilfulness, impotence, malice, or negligence—all of which are most far from God. Indeed, it becomes God as well as other things, that all things be providently governed by Him. Whence Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* IV, prose 6: "So things are best done, if the simplicity remaining in the divine mind brings forth an undeviating order of causes; but this order coerces mutable things, otherwise about to flow rashly. And so it comes about that, although to us, unable to consider this order, all things may seem confused and perturbed, nevertheless its measure, directing all things to the good, disposes them." With which agrees Augustine in *De Libero Arbitrio* I.13, saying thus: "It is the eternal law by which it is just that all things be most ordered." And in III.7: "Whatever shall occur to you better by true reason, know that God has done it, as the founder of all good things." And *Super Genesim ad litteram* IV.14: "If God could make good things and did not, there would be great envy"; [C] and in *De Quantitate Animae* 18: "By the justice of God this universe is sustained and ruled, by which it has been brought to pass that not only do all things exist, but exist so that they could not better exist." Algazel also in

Metaphysics III, sentence 7, says thus: "Everything that is, namely the number of stars, and their measure, the disposition of earth and animals, and whatever has being, came about in the manner in which it is, because of all manners of being this was more agreeable to it; and whatever else is possible besides this is imperfect in respect of this which now is. Care, therefore, is complete with completeness of goodness."

Likewise, the like seems to be in all beings of one species, and generally in all beings of all species, because according to the Philosopher in *Oeconomica* I.1: "In the smallest things the nature of individual things is found." But it is so concerning men, that unless they had a common ruler directing them to the public good, but each intended his own private good, their commonwealth would be most poorly disposed, or would perish; and although in different provinces they had different princes and rulers, unless they still [D] had one common superior prince and ruler, an error would befall such as the prior. How would inferior providence congruously be aided by abundant, except by the authority of a common Prince embracing both? Of all provinces and men therefore there is naturally one Prince; for this is better for all. For all things naturally desire good, as is clear from the proximate of this work, and the greater good more. Wherefore the Philosopher in *Politics* I.1 says: "In men there is one ruling, and according to nature, on account of safety." And below in the same he proves that the city is a natural community, because it is the end of two natural communities, namely of the household and of the neighbourhood, and the end of any thing is natural to it. Secondly, he proves the same through this: that what is best and most sufficient of any thing is natural to it, because it is its end; but the best and most sufficient he says is in the civil community. Therefore he concludes saying thus: "From these things therefore it is manifest that the city is of those things which are by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal." And by the same reasonings it can be shown that of all men there ought naturally to be one community governed by one [E] Prince; therefore also universally of all beings by similar reasoning.

And this seems to be the determination of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* XII, last chapter, where he argues against the Pythagoreans setting down mathematical number to be the first principle of things, by this: that then the substance of the universe would be unconnected, nor would beings mutually confer with one another, and there would be many principles not ordered under one another nor under any other. But this is against the natural disposition of beings and of the universe; therefore it is not so. And this is what he says in these words: "Beings will not be disposed badly, nor is the plurality of principalities good; therefore one Prince." This Prince, however, according to his whole process there, is God. And this seems to be the reasoning of Damascene in *Sentences* I.3, and of Lombard in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, and of many philosophers and doctors elsewhere in many places.

Likewise, the parts of animals [A] and plants, and of the whole universe, are best and most usefully ordered. The cause of this, however, cannot be any element, nor any particular cause; therefore, according to the Philosopher, the universal nature, which is God. And this was the reasoning of the ancient Philosophers, recited from chapters 9 and 10 of *Metaphysics* I in the

proximate chapter. Whence Avicenna in *Metaphysics* X.1: "When you wish to know that the useful things which you understand lead to commodities in nature, consider the disposition of the usefulness of members in animals and plants, and how each of them is caused; and there is not there a natural cause in any way, but its principle is from divine care, just as also those things hang upon care. Know also that the more the common people approach and hold and say, the truer it is; nor do they refuse this except those who wish to seem philosophers, because they are ignorant of these causes or others."

Aristotle also in *De Animalibus*, assigning the cause of the disposition of the members of animals, says that nature so ordered them on account of the better and the safety of the animal—which his authority cited above in *De Animalibus* XI plainly testifies. And in this all philosophers [B] and physicians agree. Aristotle frequently also supposes that nature always does that which is better. Whence in *De Generatione* II, second to last: "In all things, we say, nature ever desires that which is better." And in *De Caelo* II.34: "Nature always does, of contingents, that which is best." And in 50: "Nature does nothing as may chance; it is irrational that she has cared for animals and despised precious things—namely the heavenly things—but it seems studiously done that which she does." And in 59: "Nature does nothing irrationally, nor in vain." And above in 56: "Neither animate nor violent will any of them—namely the heavenly bodies—be borne in motion, as if nature provided what was about to be, since with motion not so disposed, nothing would come about." About this place, and in many other places, he says many such things.

And that this nature according to Aristotle is God is plain through his words, which cannot agree to an irrational nature, nor to any rational, except the first. Which his saying recited above from his little book *De Morte Aristotelis* plainly teaches. Whence in *Oeconomica* I.1 he says: "Nature fills with the period of the procreation of offspring always being, since by one it cannot, [C] by species nevertheless, just as it was preordained by the divine nature of male and female to community." Averroes also on *De Anima* II commentary 34 says that "the divine solicitude, since it could not make the generable and corruptible to remain according to the individual, took pity by giving it a power which can remain in the species."

Further, what is to be more rightly esteemed the universal nature than the common soul of the world? But this is God, as the premises of the second of this work show, which also many similar things touched upon there seem to prove.

Further, the principal opinion is proved by many testimonies of the philosophers. For Aristotle, besides what was alleged above, in *De Secreto Secretorum* I, part 23, says that "God established all impressions, colds, and heats in winter and summer with the highest providence inevitably." The same in *De Mundo* 13: "With God governing, always immobily and diligently is ruled the whole beauty of heaven and earth, divided according to all natures." This also Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII.9 and 10, and Algazel in *Physics* V and *Metaphysics* V, plainly hold.

Averroes also on *Metaphysics* XII commentary 37 says that [D] God has care and solicitude concerning all beings, both concerning individuals and concerning species. And in commentary

52 he says that the principle of voluntary and natural ought to have an ordered intention of action toward the first cause. And it is to be known that this is the opinion of Aristotle concerning solicitude. And having recited two contrary opinions—one of which set down God to have solicitude concerning anything; the other, that there is no solicitude at all—he says: "And the truth is in this, that there is solicitude; and that if any are without solicitude, they proceed from the necessity of matter, not from a diminution of the agent." But none proceed from the necessity of matter, except perhaps as he himself speaks on *Physics* II commentary 88, when he says: "Those things which are found in natural things from necessity, not on account of something, like the death of an animal, are on account of matter; but those which are found in them on account of something are on account of form." And such privations, although in some way they are intended by God, nevertheless not so principally as habits and form. For these are intended on their account finally, not the contrary. Whence Wisdom 1: "God did not make death." And Ecclesiasticus 39: [E] "Famine and death are created for vengeance."

Further, Calcidius on the second part of the *Timaeus* of Plato says thus: "The race of ancient men reckoned all those things which flow forth, by divine counsel and providence, for the use of human life and the faculty of acting—both with potencies and reasons aiding and operating, these very things which aid—to be gods; on this account, because in their rude minds the true sciscitation of God had not yet sat firmly. For they were shepherds and forest-dwellers, and the rest of such, without the study of humanity." Where also for affirming providence he adduces Plato, Pythagoras, Orpheus, Lippon, and Musaeus; and the whole sect of the Stoics concordantly professes divine providence, on the testimony of Lactantius where before.

To this also conduce many philosophical and theological authorities, alleged in chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, and the proximate of this work, which make mention of solicitude, providence, governance, and the like. Moreover Augustine in VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*, from chapter 11 to the end, shows much and diffusely the work of divine providence to be bipartite, namely of creation and of administration, [A] under which the whole creature lies; and IX.24 the same, and *De Libero Arbitrio* I.11: "There is nothing of things which divine providence does not administer." And the same in II.28, 34, and III.2, and other books, and not a few places, of which now I will touch on one, omitting the others. *De Civitate Dei* V.11 he says thus: "God who made man a rational animal of soul and body, who did not allow him sinning to be unpunished, nor leave him without mercy, who gave to good and evil essence with stones, seminal life with trees, sensual life with cattle, intellectual life with the angels alone; from whom is every mode, every species, every order, measure, number, and weight; and whatever is naturally, of whatever kind it is; from whom are the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, the motions of seeds and forms; who gave to flesh origin, beauty, health, fecundity of propagation, disposition of members, safety, concord; who also gave to the irrational soul memory, sense, and appetite; but to the rational, mind, intelligence, and will; who not only heaven and earth, nor only angel and man, but neither the inwards of an exiguous [B] and contemptible animal, nor the feather of a bird, nor the floweret of an herb, nor the leaf of a tree, did He leave without the agreement of their parts and a

certain peace as it were—is in no way to be believed to have wished kingdoms of men, and their dominations and slaveries, to be alien from the laws of His providence."

Lactantius moreover, where before, shows in many ways and diffusely the general divine providence. Of this Lactantius and his book aforesaid, which contains seven books, blessed Jerome in *De Viris Illustribus* 80 and blessed Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XVIII.24 make laudable mention. To no one therefore should his authority seem contemptible.

Isidore also, where before, recites from Epicurus that the world was set up or ruled by no divine providence, as a heresy or error, as his procedure evidently shows. Josephus also in *Antiquities of the Jews* II, last, recites Moses to have said thus: "To despair of the providence of God is of immense madness."

Likewise, Psalm 118: "By Thine ordinance the day continueth: for all things serve Thee." And 146: "Who giveth to beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call upon Him." And 148: "He hath established [C] them for ever and for ages of ages: He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And Wisdom 12: "There is no other God but Thou, who hast care of all." And the whole Canonical Scripture of the Old and New Testaments most frequently says God to provide for things, to care, ordain, establish, dispose, prepare, make, govern, and many similar things, which both according to the face of the letter and according to the exposition of the saints are referred to divine providence.

For all of which let it suffice to adduce one irrefragable testimony of the Truth saying: "Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow nor reap, nor gather into barns, and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin. But I say to you, that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed as one of these. And if the grass of the field, which is to-day, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, God doth so clothe," Matthew 6. And below 10: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father." Which all Catholic expositors refer to divine providence, of whom one I will now mention for all. [D]

For Augustine says in the *Sentences* of Prosper, proposition 286: "When the Saviour says that one sparrow does not fall to the earth without the will of God, and that the grass of the field which after a little while is to be cast into the oven, He nevertheless forms and clothes—does He not confirm that not only is this whole part of the world, deputed to mortal and corruptible things, but even its vilest and most abject particles, are ruled by divine providence, lest, perturbed by fortuitous motions, we should esteem those things whose causes we cannot comprehend?"

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters 28–32

CHAPTER XXVIII. ON FATE.

Here, however, for a fuller treatment of the present matter, a certain brief inquiry must be made concerning Fate. For many assert that Fate exists; and many also, especially the Catholic Doctors, deny Fate. The Stoics indeed, as Boethius testifies in his commentary on the last part of Book I of the *Peri Hermeneias*, assert that Fate exists, and that all things are managed by Fate; which Augustine likewise attests in the fifth book of the *City of God*, chapters 8 and 9; and many Philosophers and Poets agree with them. Against these stand Augustine in the first part of his commentary on John, Homily 37: "Oh, if your heart were not foolish (*fatuum*), you would not believe in Fate"; which he likewise reproves and condemns above in Homily 31. Likewise in Book 2 of *On Genesis according to the Letter*, chapter 25, he says that Fate is to be rejected by the soundness of Faith. The same author also, in the *Questions on the Old and New Law*, Question 115, with great labor destroys the fate of the stars and the art of Mathesis, because, if it be posited, it destroys free will in men and in God, and subjects Christ and his deeds to necessity. He moreover, in Book 2 *Against Faustus*, treating of the star that led the Magi to Christ, rejects the fate of the stars, both with respect to Christ and with respect to all men. Blessed Gregory also, in Homily 10, which is on Epiphany, speaking of the same star, says thus: "It must be known that the Priscillianist heretics, who think that each individual is born under the constitutions of the stars, take this in support of their error, namely that a new star appeared when the Lord appeared in the flesh, whose Fate they think this same star to have been. But far be it from the hearts of the faithful that they should say there is anything called Fate" — which he then refutes by many arguments. Jerome too, in Book 11 [of his commentary] on that passage of Isaiah 38, "In those days Hezekiah was sick," etc., says: "The question of Fate is solved, and the bonds of necessity and of causes, in that the day of death is by no means appointed for each individual, but by the will of God, and by causes unknown to mortals, one either lives or dies; especially since even in this life the necessity of death is now deferred, and we read that very many were raised up after death." Ambrose, moreover, in his *Hexameron*, treating of the work of the fourth day, refutes and rejects Fate at length. Gregory of Nyssa likewise, as is alleged in the Gloss on Matthew 2, argues against those who posit Fate by this consideration: that then prayers would be foolish, the nature of the contingent would be destroyed, and there would be no free will of the will. Chrysostom holds the same view on that passage of Matthew, as do many Catholic commentators. With these agrees that Ovid Naso of Pelignum, in Book 1 of *De Vetula*, where he treats of the game of dice, and condemns it because it does not rest upon reason but upon the chance hazard of the dice, and upon men's fortune or fate, saying thus: "Nor do you know the fortunes of men," etc. — "If you posit Fate, those who follow Fates are foolish (*fatui*). For with Fate posited, freedom of will would not exist; but freedom is something, therefore Nothing — Fate is foolish (*fatuum*); those who follow Fates are foolish." Of these, however, to use the words of the Philosopher in *Ethics* I, chapter 12: "Some of these things many and ancient men say; but those things, few and glorious men. It is not reasonable that either of these err in

everything, but rather that they direct one thing, or many." Therefore, to that knowledge of dividing — which brings great fruit to the studious — according to the tradition of the Peripatetic discipline, I have recourse.

Fate, then, according to the judgment of the Doctors, is said in two ways: in one way, the common power of the Stars, which generally regulates and constrains all things that happen in the world by inevitable necessity; and specially, a certain sidereal virtue residing in the constitution of the stars at the hour at which someone is conceived or born, which imposes necessity on all future things concerning the one then born. In another way, Fate is said from *fando* — from the speaking, namely, or pronouncement of Jove, according to the Stoics and other heathen Philosophers and Poets, who among them was the supreme God — which among Catholics may be called the Speaking or Pronouncement (*Fatio, Famen*) of God. Stellar or astral Fate, especially if it imports necessity, is not to be posited, as the things set forth above concerning the 32nd part and the 39th of the first corollary teach; and so the Doctors recounted above, indeed all the Catholic Doctors, with one accord condemn this Fate. If, however, the fate of the stars in no way imports necessity, but rather a certain disposition and inclination in men toward certain acts, it does not seem to be utterly denied. Divine Fate, however, is undoubtedly to be conceded. Is it not written at the beginning of creation: "God said, Let there be light, and there was light"? And so of the rest of the creatures? And elsewhere: "He himself spoke, and they were made: for whatever things he willed, he made, because his will is perfect"? This, however, is divine Fate above all — that of the divine will, which is the efficacious cause of things, as the foregoing have taught. This distinction is plain through Augustine, *City of God* V, chapters 1, 8, and 9, where, the first member having been reproved, he says diffusely concerning the second that the Stoics call Fate the entire connection and series of causes by which everything that happens is brought about, which they attribute wholly to the will and power of the most high God, who is most truly believed to foreknow all things and to leave nothing disordered; but they prove themselves to call Fate principally the will of the most high God, whose power is invincibly extended through all things — since they call him Jove, whom they hold to be the supreme God, from whom they say the connection of Fates depends. And below, in chapter 9, he says: "We do not say that all things happen by Fate; rather, we say that nothing happens by Fate, since the name of Fate, where it is wont to be used by speakers — that is, in the constitution of the stars at which each is conceived or born — we show to avail nothing, since the matter itself is vainly asserted; but the order of causes, in which the will of God most prevails, we neither deny, nor do we call by the name of Fate, except perhaps as we may understand 'Fate' as derived from *fando*, that is, from speaking. For we cannot deny that it is written in the holy letters: *Once has God spoken, these two things have I heard, that power belongs to God, and to thee, O Lord, mercy, for thou wilt render to each according to his works.* For what is said, *Once has he spoken*, is understood immovably — that is, he has spoken unchangeably, just as he knows unchangeably all things that are to be, and which he himself shall do." And the same author above, in chapter 1 of the same book: "By divine providence are human kingdoms established, which if anyone for

that reason should attribute to Fate — because he calls the will or the power of God by the name of Fate — let him keep his judgment, but correct his tongue."

With this Isidore agrees, *Etymologies* VIII, 45, saying: "The Gentiles say Fate is whatever the gods speak (*fantur*), whatever Jove pronounces (*fatutur*); from *fando*, then, they call it *Fatum*, that is, from speaking; which, unless this name were already wont to be understood in another matter, by which we wish to incline the hearts of men, we could reasonably call Fate from speaking. For we cannot deny," etc., the words of Augustine quoted above. There is, however, still another twofold distinction concerning Fate. For in one way Fate is taken actively, for the speaking or pronouncement of the divine will, or of God who disposes all things; in another way passively — and the name itself sounds more in this sense — for the effect and passive disposition of this Fate inhering in the things themselves disposed. The first member is plain through Augustine, *City of God* V, chapter 8, where he cites Seneca, Homer, and the Stoics on this side. For from Seneca he cites these verses:

Lead me, O highest Father, lord of the lofty pole, Wherever it has pleased thee; there is no delay in obeying. I am at hand untiring; even should you wish me unwilling, I shall accompany groaning, And, evil, I shall suffer to do what was lawful for the good. Fates lead the willing; the unwilling they drag.

From Homer, however, he cites these verses, which Cicero translated into Latin:

Such are the minds of men, as the Father himself, Jupiter, has illumined the bountiful earth with light.

And Augustine says that through these verses, which the Stoics cite for their opinion concerning Fate, it is most openly declared what they think Fate to be — since they call him Jove, whom they hold to be the supreme God, from whom they say the connection of Fates depends. Whence it seems that Aristotle, *De Anima* II, [text] 148, unjustly reprehends Homer, imputing to him that Homer thought intellect to be corporeal, like sensation, because he said — as Aristotle reports — that such intellect is in earthly men as the Father of men and gods leads in the day. For by the Father of men and gods Homer did not mean the Sun or anything corporeal, as Aristotle tacitly insinuates and his expositors expressly state, but Jove himself, the supreme Father both of men and of the other gods, as is plain through his aforesaid verses, savoring of this same view. Nor ought it to stand in the way that he says "with light" — as if he meant that Jupiter does this through the medium of some material light. For he can fittingly understand by this light the agent intellect, which by your own testimony, *De Anima* III, [text] 18, is compared to light. Whence also the Psalmist, in Psalm 35: "In thy light we shall see light." This first member of the distinction concerning Fate is also plain through the Philosopher in the last [chapter] of *De Mundo*, expounding the three appointments of the Fates — as does also Isidore, *Etymologies* VIII, 45 — Atropos of the past, Lachesis of the future, Clotho of the present, and saying: "The fable, namely concerning the threefold Fate, is fashioned not without order. But all these are

nothing other than God, as the strenuous Plato also says." Whence it appears that this opinion is also Plato's.

The second member of the aforesaid distinction is plain through Lady Philosophy in Book 4 of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, prose 6, where she instructs Boethius thus: "All generation of things, and the entire course of mutable natures, and whatever else is moved in any way, draws its causes, order, and forms from the stability of the divine mind. This, composed in the art of its simplicity, has appointed a manifold mode for the conduct of things; which mode, when it is contemplated in the very purity of the divine intelligence, is called Providence; but when it is referred to the things which it moves and disposes, it has been called by the ancients Fate. That these are different will easily be plain. For Providence is the very divine reason, established in the supreme Prince of all, which disposes all things; whereas Fate is a disposition inhering in mobile things, by which Providence binds each to its own orders. For Providence embraces all things equally, however diverse, however infinite; but Fate distributes individual things, distributed in motion, places, forms, and times — so that this unfolding of temporal order, gathered into the gaze of the divine mind, is Providence; but the same gathering, when distributed and unfolded in time, is called Fate. And although these are different, yet the one depends upon the other. For the order of Fate proceeds from the simplicity of Providence; for just as the artificer, perceiving in his mind the form of the thing to be made, moves the effecting of the work, and that which he had foreseen simply and as present he leads through temporal orders — so God by Providence indeed disposes singularly and stably the things to be done, but by Fate administers in many ways and temporally these very things which he has disposed. Whether, therefore, Fate is exercised by certain spirits ministering to divine Providence, or by the soul, or by the whole subservient nature, or by the celestial motions of the stars, or by Angelic virtue, or by the various craft of demons, or by some of these, or by all, the fatal series is woven; this surely is manifest, that Providence is the immovable and simple form of things to be done, but Fate is the mobile bond of these things which divine simplicity has disposed to be done, and the temporal order. Whence it comes that all things which are subject to Fate are also subject to Providence, to which Fate itself is also subject."

From these things, however, it appears that Boethius posits Fate only according to effect, not, however, according to the efficiency of the divine will, as do the Theologians and the Philosophers cited above. He also seems voluntarily to argue against the Stoics in his exposition of Aristotle's first *Peri Hermeneias*, where he treats of future contingents, in this — that they posited all things to come about from Fate. For they themselves were speaking of Fate according to the efficacy of the divine will, as appears from what has been said. Wherefore, they are perhaps immune from every real error, even if not from every verbal one, as the foregoing has taught. For this word "Fate" is suspect among Catholics, although the thing itself is sound.

Having shown, then, in what way Fate exists or does not exist, and what it is, it remains now to show of what kind it is. First, therefore, it must be shown that Fate, taken from *fando*, or from the speaking of God, is in some manner the cause of all things which are done naturally, voluntarily,

or in any other way whatsoever. The proximate [chapter] proves this. That all voluntary things, however, come from Fate — namely from the speaking or connection of causes — appears through the proximate and the ninth of this [book]. Indeed, all who speak of Fate place it as much, or more, in human voluntary affairs as in any others. Which is also plain in *City of God* V, chapters 6 and 9, where Augustine says: "It does not follow that, if to God the order of all causes is certain, therefore there is nothing in the choice of our will. For our wills themselves are in the order of causes, which is certain to God, and is contained in his foreknowledge — since human wills are also the causes of human works. And so he who foreknew all the causes of things could surely not have been ignorant in those causes also of our wills, which he foreknew to be the causes of our works." And below, having distinguished three species or genera of causes — the fortuitous, the natural, and the voluntary — and again by cause which makes and is not made; which makes and is made; and which is made rather than makes; and having reduced all these species to the divine will, he subjoins: "How then does the order of causes which is certain to God who foreknows it bring it about that there is nothing in our will, since in that very order of causes our wills hold a great place? Let Cicero contend, then, with those who say this order of causes to be fatal, or rather call it by the name of Fate — which we abhor chiefly on account of the word, which is not wont to be understood in the true sense. But that he denies the order of all causes to be most certain and most known to the foreknowledge of God — this we detest more than the Stoics. Wherefore our wills also avail just as much as God willed and foreknew them to avail; and therefore whatever they avail, they most certainly avail; and what they are about to do, they shall altogether do, because he foreknew them as availing and as about to act, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived." This he also more expressly manifests in chapter 10. With which agrees the authority of Boethius cited above, but in the same prose below he says still more expressly: "This series of Fate, or Providence, constrains the acts and fortunes of men by the indissoluble connection of causes."

CHAPTER XXIX. ON CHANCE AND FORTUNE.

It seems pertinent to what has been said to inquire in like manner concerning Chance and Fortune. For many concede these, and many likewise deny them. For Democritus and Epicurus and their followers not only concede them but even attribute excessive dignity to them, saying that all things come about by chance or fortuitously, as is plain from the 27th [chapter] of this [book]. Whence also that ancient Sallust says: "Surely fortune dominates in every matter." These things almost all the Philosophers, Poets, and the common people likewise concede. Aristotle concedes them in *Physics* II at length, and in his book *On Good Fortune*, and in many other places. Avicenna also, Algazel, Averroes, and Boethius concede them. Ovid too, in *The Art of Love*: "Chance prevails everywhere; let your hook always hang ready, in the pool where you least believe it, there will the fish be." The same in *Ex Ponto*: "All human things hang by a slender thread; and by sudden chance, things which were strong, fall." Many other such things from the Poets are sufficient. The common people likewise posit these, as the adverbs of doubting show,

which are very frequently inserted in almost every conversation. The sacred letters too are not silent concerning chance. Whence 2 Samuel 1: "By chance I came to Mount Gilboa"; and 1 Kings (last chapter): "A certain man, drawing a bow at random, by chance struck the King of Israel"; and Ecclesiastes 9: "I saw that neither is the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all things." The ancient Gentiles, especially the Egyptians and Romans, also worshiped Fortune as a Goddess, as many histories tell, whom certain of the Jews, turned away from the Lord, also at times worshiped: of whom Isaiah 65: "You who have forsaken the Lord, who set a table for Fortune," etc., "I will number you in the sword." However many times also, in Sacred Scripture, adverbs of doubting are placed, all of which seem to belong to fortune.

To these, on the contrary, the Stoics utterly deny Chance and Fortune, affirming that all things are conducted by fate and divine providence. With these agree certain Ancients likewise destroying Fortune and Chance, since one ought to refer each of the things that happen to some determinate and certain cause, as the Philosopher briefly mentions in *Physics* II, [text] 42. With these likewise certain Catholic Doctors seem to consent. That these, then, who are as it were in extreme contraries, may be brought back to the middle of concord, it must be known that all who speak of Chance and Fortune say that these exist when something happens beyond the intention of the agent, as is plain through the aforesaid Authors and through the common conception of all who speak of them. Now, that something should occur beyond the intention of the agent can be considered in two ways: either beyond the intention of every agent altogether, so that it is intended absolutely by no one, or beyond the intention of some particular cause, or of any inferior cause whatever. The first may be called simply casual or fortuitous; but the second only in some respect. Therefore, nothing is simply casual or fortuitous, but only in some respect; and thus the contradiction mentioned above is removed.

That nothing is simply casual or fortuitous is shown in this way. Nothing which is done from purpose and from the intention of an agent is simply casual or fortuitous. But everything that is done is done from purpose and from the intention of the agent. This agent, however, the Astrologers think to be the heaven, or celestial virtue, which produces all things — even those which seem to be fortuitous — by certain reason and determinate causation. Wherefore they call certain planets fortunate, and indeed even fortunes — namely the Sun and Moon. The "Part of Fortune" too, in nativities, in the inceptions of works, and in all human matters, is judged to be of the very greatest power, and is reckoned the most excellent of all parts. Hence they assign to it the tenth essential house. This is taken in the day from the Sun to the Moon, but at night the contrary, and is projected from the ascendant. Of this, Albumasar, *Greater Introductory* VIII, difference 3, writes thus: "Its proper signification is to signify the soul and fortune, of that and its powers; and it signifies life and bodies, and substance and progress, and fortune, also enrichment and poverty, gold and silver, and utility and weight, the praise of the marketplace, and good fame, and the eminence of the one born, and of his kingdom, and of his principality. And it signifies the rich, and honor, also eminence, both good and evil, the present and the absent, the

apparent and the hidden. It signifies also the intention and beginning of works and matters; and this Part is preferred to all parts, just as the Sun is preferred by its splendor to all the planets; and it is itself loftier and more precious than all the parts." And hence perhaps it is that goods of this kind, by many — even by Philosophers — are most often called the goods of fortune.

Others, however — namely the ancient Gentiles — thought there was one Goddess distributing or withdrawing all such goods at the pleasure of her will, without any reason; wherefore they had even painted her as blind, and called her Fortune. But both these positions are refuted by the things set forth in the proximate [chapter] and the chapters above, especially if the Astrologers should posit human acts to be subject of necessity to celestial virtue, or that virtue itself to do anything at all without God specifically intending and likewise effecting the same. What, then, is that agent which from a certain intention and a determinate purpose makes all things and effects all things, but God, who is the first agent of all agents and makes all things according to the purpose and intention of his own will, as the 28th and 27th [chapters] of this [book] show? Likewise, Chance and Fortune are causes per accidens, as is plain from *Physics* II, and every cause per accidens is reduced to some cause per se, as the second [chapter] of this [book] shows; and every cause per se to God; therefore God is the first cause of these, and not rashly and necessarily, but according to the purpose of his will.

But lest I seem singular in this judgment, behold, many Philosophers and Theologians hold this view. Aristotle, in *Physics* II, among the recited opinions on Chance and Fortune, shows in what way that opinion has truth which posits nothing to be done by Fortune, saying that Fortune is the cause of nothing simply, but only per accidens, in these words: "And so it will appear as though nothing were done by Fortune. They speak rightly in all this, for it is reasonable that there should be such a thing as Fortune; for it happens per accidens, and Fortune is a cause per accidens; but as cause simply of nothing — as the builder is properly the cause of the house, but the flute-player per accidens." That all Fortune, however, is reduced to God appears through the same author in the last [chapter] of *De Mundo*, where he shows how, although he is one, yet he is many-named — from all the things which he initiates — as he inductively declares, and at the end he says thus: "And in sum to speak, he is to be called both heavenly and earthly, and from any Nature and Fortune, as being himself the cause of all." And below he says that God is called *Heimarmene* because he couples and disjoins, and *Nemesis* from the distribution made to each — which seem fitting to Fortune. Whence also Damascene, *Sentences* 39, expounds *heimarmene* as Fortune. He proves this still more expressly in his book *On Good Fortune*, where he recites five opinions concerning it, namely: that it is from God, from Nature, from the event of things, from reason, and from appetite — concerning which he proceeds disputatively. And in chapter 2 he refutes the last two opinions. First, that of appetite, since of every appetite there is some cause, either nature or fortune. If nature, then nature is more properly called the cause of it than fortune; and such a man would more properly be called well-natured than well-fortuned. If fortune is the cause of it, then fortune will be the cause of all human acts, since it is the cause of that which is to understand and to take counsel. And he adds, arguing: "For he who took counsel did not take

counsel before he took counsel, but it is a certain principle; nor did he who understood understand before he understood — and this to infinity. Therefore the intellect is not the principle of understanding, nor counsel of taking counsel. What other, then, but fortune? And so all things are from fortune." And he answers, saying: "Either there is some principle of which there is not another outside itself, or, since it is such according to its being, it can produce such; but what is sought is this: What is the principle of motion in the soul? Plainly, just as in the universe, God. For in some way the divine moves all things in us. The principle of reason is not reason but something better. What, then, will be better than knowledge and intellect, save God? For virtue is the instrument of intellect. And on this account those of old were called well-fortuned who, if they make a rush, direct it without existing reason, and to take counsel does not benefit them; for they have a principle such as is better than intellect and counsel. But those who have reason do not have this, nor divine instincts." And in the first chapter he says: "There is in the soul, by nature, that whereby we are borne by impulse without reason; in respect of which we shall surely fare well. And if anyone should ask one who is so disposed why this pleases him to do, he says: 'I do not know, but it pleases me' — suffering something like those things which are done by God. For, borne by God, they have impulse without reason to do something." And in *Rhetoric* II, [chapter] 23, treating of the goods of Fortune and the well-fortuned, he says thus: "They are more unpremeditated on account of good fortune. The best disposition of good fortune is asserted to be those who are lovers of God, and have themselves toward the divine in some way, believing on account of the good things done by Fortune" — but why this, unless God were the Author of Fortune?

The same author also, in *Ethics* X, [chapter] 14, recites a threefold opinion as to how men become good, saying thus: "Some hold that men become good by nature, others by custom, others by teaching." And determining the truth of the first opinion, he says thus: "That which is of nature, then, is manifest; that it is not in us, but exists by some divine cause, as it is for the truly well-fortuned." On which Averroes says: "Some men are thought to be good by nature; and what is of this by nature is not from us, but by a certain divine grace to those whose fortune is truly good." Likewise Avicenna, *Metaphysics* X, 1, says: "The principle of all utilities is from divine care; and know that the common people approach more closely and hold to it; and he says: It is true, nor do they shrink from this, except those who wish to seem Philosophers, because they are ignorant of the causes and occasions of these things." And speaking of adversities and prosperities, almsgivings and sins, and similar things, he says thus: "The cause of all these is not here, but thence. The principles of all these proceed to nature, will, or chance. The principle of nature, indeed, is there. But our wills are after they were not; whatever, however, is, after it was not, has a cause. Therefore every will of ours has a cause; and the cause of this will does not extend to infinity, but to certain things which happen extrinsically — earthly, namely, or celestial; but earthly things attain to celestial. The collection, then, of all these comes necessarily from the necessity of the divine will. Chance, however, comes from the concurrence of all these. For when you have resolved all things, they will be reduced to those things, the necessity of which depends solely upon God Almighty. The judgment of God, however, is the first simple

position." This Boethius too suggests in the *Exposition on the First Peri Hermeneias*, where, having distinguished a threefold animal — namely, that subject to nature, to the heaven, and to reason with free choice of will — and having declared the two prior species, of the third he says thus: "Which we are: all subject to divine providence; from the will of the Gods we likewise depend. Therefore neither is the entire necessity of the celestials overthrown, nor does this discussion eliminate chance from things." By which he intimates, as it seems, that there is in things chance with respect to particular and inferior causes, but not with respect to divine providence and will, to which we are subject in all things, and from which we depend in all. This he manifests yet more diffusely and expressly in the fifth book of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, prose 1: "If indeed anyone defines chance as an event produced by rash motion, with no connection of causes, I affirm that there is nothing at all of chance" — behold, that nothing is simply casual, since it is not beyond the intention of God, as the following sentence shows: "For what place can remain for rashness, while God constrains all things into order?" And, having recited Aristotle's definition of Chance, and given the example of one digging the soil for the sake of cultivating the field and finding a hidden treasure, he says: "The digging of the soil and the hiding of the treasure are fortuitous causes of gain — that is, Chance — which comes from causes meeting and flowing together with one another, not from the intention of the doer; nor did either he who buried the gold, or he who tilled the field, intend that the money should be found." It is plain, therefore, according to him, that nothing is called simply casual, but only with respect to some particular cause, or with respect to inferior causes — which his following words more fully show, when he says: "It is plain, therefore, to define Chance as an unforeseen event from concurrent causes in those things which are done for some other purpose. The order proceeding by inevitable connection, however, makes the causes meet and flow together; and this order, descending from the fount of Providence, disposes all things in their times and places," which the following meter exemplifies.

This also clearly seems to be the judgment of Augustine, *Retractations* I, 1, saying: "It does not please me that I so often called upon fortune, although I did not wish any goddess to be understood by this name, but the fortuitous event of things either in our body or in external goods or evils. Whence also are those words which no religion forbids us to say: *perhaps (forte)*, *peradventure (forsan)*, *perchance (forsitan)*, *perhaps (fortassis)*, *perhaps (fortasse)*, *fortuitously (fortuitu)* — which, however, must all be referred to divine providence." This too I did not pass over there in silence, saying: "For perhaps that which is commonly named Fortune is governed by some hidden order; and we call nothing else Chance in things, save that whose reason and cause is secret or hidden." I said this indeed; but it grieves me that I there named Fortune, since I see that men have it as a most evil custom that, where it ought to be said *God so willed*, they say *Fortune so willed*. The same author, in *83 Questions*, Question 24: "Whatever happens by chance, happens at random; what happens at random does not happen by providence. If, therefore, some things happen in the world by chance, the entire world is not administered by providence; therefore nothing happens in the world by chance." The same, *City of God* V, 9: "Those causes which are called fortuitous (whence also Fortune received its name), we say are

not none, but hidden; and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or of any spirits whatever." The same on that of Psalm 9, "I will confess to thee, O Lord, with my whole heart": "He does not confess to God with his whole heart who in any way doubts of his providence. All bodily torments either exercise those converted to God, or admonish that they may be converted, or prepare the obdurate for the just final damnation; and so all things are referred to the regimen of divine providence, which fools think happen by chance, at random, and with no divine administration."

The same, also, on that of Psalm 148: "Fire, hail, snow," etc., "which do his word": "Why does he add, *which do his word*? Many, unwilling to contemplate and discern the creature performing its motions in its own places and order under the nod and command of God, it has seemed to them that God governs all higher things, but does not care for, govern, or rule the lower, but they are abandoned to chance. But do not assent to these; for these things are blasphemous and execrable to God, since the entire providence of God is at work in the earth. In all places, regions, and times, he distributes and orders his own things to each. It would be long to recall the more diligent consideration of all things; who shall explain it? Yet those who have eyes see the visible things which please and are praised — yet not these things themselves, but he who made them. Thus shall all things praise. These things, then, which seem to be moved by chances, do his word, and in their every motion serve the word of God."

This same thing is plain through the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, saying: "We have been called by lot." For what is *sors* (lot) but *fors* (chance), fortune, or accident? But this lot is the divine election and will, as is plain there through the Gloss, and through Augustine on that of Psalm 30, "In thy hands are my lots," in tract 3, saying thus: "*Sors* is called the grace of God by which we have been saved, which is well called *sors* because it is not the choice of man but the will of God; for it found no merits of ours, but by the lot of his own will called us to salvation, because he willed, not because we were worthy, not from works lest perhaps anyone should be exalted. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works. This *sors* is in some manner hidden; the will of God in the human race is *sors*; *sors* coming from the hidden will of God, with whom there is no iniquity. For he is no respecter of persons, but his hidden justice is *sors* to thee." What also is more casual or fortuitous than the lot and the events of lots — which yet are known to be moderated by the divine will, as the series of either Testament evidently shows? Wherefore the Apostles, when about to elect another in the place of Judas the Apostate, casting lots, said: "Thou, O Lord, show whom thou hast chosen." Whence also Proverbs 16: "Lots are cast into the bosom, but they are tempered by the Lord." Wherefore also Augustine on that of Psalm 30, where above, says thus: "Not in the hands of men, but in thy hands. What are these lots? Why lots? On hearing the name of lots we ought not to seek out diviners. For *sors* is not anything evil, but is a thing in human doubt indicating the divine will. For the Apostles also cast lots." This is also recited in the Canon, Cause 26, Question 2, *Sors non est*.

Furthermore, for Chance and Fortune to be more fully investigated, it seems that each is taken actively and passively, according to efficiency and according to effect, according to cause and

according to that which is caused — just as was said above of Fate. Actively, according to efficiency and cause, the Philosopher speaks of them in *Physics* II, defining each as a "Cause per accidens," etc., as is there written; which also is plain especially of Fortune through what has been set forth here. That Chance, however, is taken passively, according to effect and that which is caused, its very name seems to indicate; for *Casus* seems to signify passively. For what is *casus* but that which falls (*cadit*) from another, as the effect from the cause? Wherefore we commonly say: "A wonderful chance befell or happened to such a man." Wherefore also the definition of Chance recited from Boethius says that Chance is "an unforeseen event from concurrent causes in those things which are done for some other purpose"; with which agrees Augustine cited above: "We call nothing else Chance in things," he says, "save that whose reason and cause is secret or hidden." But Chance taken actively, according to efficiency and cause, would more properly, as it seems, be called *casuatio* or *casuantia*. That Fortune also is taken passively, and according to effect and that which is caused, appears similarly from the customary mode of speaking. For we commonly say "wonderful prosperous or adverse fortune befell such a man," wishing to say that some good fortune (*enfortunium*) or misfortune (*infortunium*) has befallen him. Whence also the Philosopher, *Ethics* I, showing that felicity does not consist in the goods of fortune, since itself is permanent and by no means easily mutable, whereas fortune is the contrary, in chapter 15 says that fortune often "recirculates" around the same persons — *recirculates*, he says, passively. And below, chapter 16, speaking of the Happy Man, to whom prosperous or adverse things happen: "We all judge," he says, "the truly good and wise man to bear his fortunes becomingly." Wherefore also Augustine cited above says that by the name "fortune" he did not wish to signify any goddess, but a fortuitous event of things.

Yet, considering the things above diligently, it seems that Fortune, taken actively according to efficiency and cause, may be further subdistinguished. For it can be taken for a cause which acts from purpose toward some certain end, and causes another end not intended; and thus the Philosopher in *Physics* II speaks of it; and thus it pertains only to inferior causes — by no means to God, as the things had above have shown. It can also be taken for a cause secret and hidden from us — beyond our knowledge, intention, and supposition (though not its own) — producing something; and thus it can pertain to inferior causes, and likewise to superior, to Angels and to God. Whence the Philosopher in *Physics* II, [text] 47, says: "There are some to whom there seems to be a certain cause Fortune — unmanifest indeed to human intellect, as a certain divine and more felicitous being." This judgment is also strengthened by Augustine, *City of God* V, 9, cited above; which especially of God and of the divine will many things, both philosophical and theological, set forth above seem to attest.

But here perhaps someone may object to me with that of Averroes who, on *Physics* II, [text] 48, refutes Avicenna because in *Physics* I, [chapter] 13, of his own work he posited something to be and to be called casual, in that it is casual with respect to one cause although with respect to another it is necessary. But this does not stand in the way, since Avicenna speaks of the casual according to a respect, not, however, simply — for thus, according to him, nothing is casual, as is

plain through his authority, *Metaphysics* X, 1, alleged above. Averroes, however, who from custom willingly catches a man at his words, argues against Avicenna's words, not against his meaning, by proving that from this cause nothing ought to be called simply casual; and so he concludes only verbally, but in fact nothing against him. Whence Proverbs 19: "He who follows only words shall have nothing." Wherefore Avicenna can say to Averroes what once Aphratagoras said to Socrates, as the same Averroes recites from Themistius on *De Caelo* III, comment 17: "If your contradiction against me," he says, "were according to the meaning of my intention, surely it would conclude against me. But since you do not understand the meaning of my speech, I do not consider that anything is concluded against me."

Yet, favoring neither of these, but holding the truth in honor above all, it seems to me that nothing is called absolutely casual, according to the common usage of the speech of Philosophers or of the common people, except what is casual with respect to any of its inferior causes known to us, or at least with respect to its principal cause known to us — not, however, what is casual or beyond the intention of an instrumental and accessory cause whatsoever. For if someone deliberately kills a man with a sword, that killing is not called casual, although it is beyond the intention of the sword — which only intends to descend and cut — and beyond the intention of the air, which, principally intending something else, perhaps acts accessorially to this.

CHAPTER XXX. THAT VOLUNTARY THINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

Lest, however, anyone should believe that the things had concerning providence are true only in natural things, it must specially be shown that voluntary things also are by no means exempted from the laws of this providence. For this follows from chapter 27, and can be shown in like manner by the reasons and authorities of that chapter, as also the next two chapters from abundance make plain. Likewise, every wise Father of a family provides for and cares for better and more perfect things more diligently and solicitously. But rational and voluntary things are better and more perfect than other natural things, for they are the end of these, as chapter 21 teaches.

This seems to be the reason of the Savior against the Epicureans, anxious for themselves and not placing their hope in divine providence, salutarily admonishing: "Be not anxious for your soul, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on. Is not the Soul more than Food, and the body more than raiment? Behold the birds of the air, that they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of much more value than they? Which of you by being anxious can add a single cubit to his stature? And about clothing, why are you anxious? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they neither toil nor spin: I tell you, however, that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed like one of these. But if the grass of the field, which today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven, God so clothes, how much more you, O you of little faith?" Matthew 6. From which he thus concludes:

"Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or What shall we drink? or Wherewith shall we be clothed? for after all these things do the Gentiles seek; for your Father knows that you have need of all these." But of what avail to us would be this knowledge of the Father, if according to it he did not provide for his sons?

In this passage, as is plain to one beholding it, and as Chrysostom says, Christ argues by a twofold argument or topic: first descending from the greater to the lesser, when he premises, "Is not the soul more than food, and the body more than raiment?" Second, on the contrary, ascending from the lesser to the greater, when he premises, "Behold the birds of the air," etc. And Chrysostom adds, on that "Are you not of much more value than they?": "All animals God made for the sake of man, but man for his own sake. As much, therefore, as the creation of man is more precious, so much greater is God's solicitude for him." So also many holy Doctors expound this passage, whom the Gloss in part recites there.

Likewise, after the Savior, in Matthew 10, foretold to the Apostles the persecutions which they were about to suffer for his name, in order to strengthen them against the fear of death by means of divine providence, he said thus: "Fear not them that kill the body. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not, therefore: you are of more value than many sparrows." On which Chrysostom says that he again introduces the discourse on God's providence; and Jerome says, as is alleged in the Gloss, and it is the meaning: "If little animals do not fall without God as Author, and there is providence in all things, and the things which in these are to perish do not perish without the will of God, you who are eternal ought not to fear that you live without God's providence." But that he says, "the very hairs of your head are all numbered," shows the immense providence of God toward men, and signifies an ineffable effect — that nothing of ours is hidden from God. According indeed to Hilary and Chrysostom, the numbering of the hairs shows the diligence of divine providence concerning us.

This reason the Apostle also seems to confirm, 1 Corinthians 9, where he wills that providence, or God's care concerning natural and irrational things, is as it were nothing in comparison with his care concerning us, saying thus: "It is written in the law, *Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the grain*. Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes it is written." With which the Philosopher agrees in *De Caelo* II, [text] 50, where, arguing against those positing the stars to be moved by their own motion, he supposes that nature more cares for the precious, saying thus: "Moreover, it would be irrational that nature gave them" — namely, the stars — "no organ for motion; for nature does nothing in vain, nor that, having cared for the animals, has she despised the precious." Otherwise, the entire Scripture concerning the Predestination of the Saints, and the Reprobation of the wicked, would be emptied.

CHAPTER XXXI. THAT VOLUNTARY ACTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

But here someone might still be willful, saying that voluntary things themselves are contained under providence, but not voluntary actions themselves. Wherefore it seems expedient to restrain this willfulness, which can plainly be done through the proximate Chapters and their proofs. Likewise, by the reasons and Authorities of the proximate chapter, voluntary things are subjected to divine providence, and this in particular more than the rest; therefore, according to the mind of the Authors, this is according to that, or with respect to those things which are voluntary, namely according to their voluntary actions. For the very volitive power, and whatever else apart from voluntary actions, is purely natural and necessary. In the providence over such things, then, no such great distinction is to be made by discreet men from the providence over other natural things; nay, more truly it might be said, "The face of man like the fishes of the sea, and like the creeping thing that has no ruler" (Habakkuk 1) — unless God provided also for voluntary actions.

Likewise, by chapter 9, the will of God is the moving cause of every motion, and not at random, but with disposing wisdom; and neither of them is new, but eternal, as the foregoing have taught: therefore the proposition is plain through the definition of providence given above. Likewise, all natural actions, as much of animate things as of inanimate, are from providence, since they are produced by his will and knowledge — as is plain enough from earlier chapters — and since they happen naturally and necessarily; therefore they are reduced to the first necessary being, from which they flow and on which they depend. This, even of the actions of irrational creatures, of which it seems less so, is plain through Augustine, *On Faith, to Blessed Peter*, chapter 31, saying: "Those irrational animals carry out the course and order of the present age according to the incomprehensible will of the Creator; which animals are about to render no account of their deeds, since they are not rational."

Voluntary actions, however, are better and more acceptable to God; for to these he prepared a fitting retribution, not to those — as both Philosophers and Theologians say with one mouth in concert. Wherefore they are also disposed by a more solicitous providence, as the proximate chapter argued; which is plain enough through the Apostle, Ephesians 1 and 2, where he sets forth a twofold preordination or predestination: the first, of justice and just works in the present; the second, of glory and rewards in the future. Whence for the preordination of justice, in chapter 1 he says: "He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted." And for the preordination of just works, in chapter 2 he says thus: "We are his workmanship, created in good works, that we should walk in them." All this is plain there through the Gloss, which more amply pursues this twofold preordination or predestination, citing under these words of Jerome: "He distinguishes two preordinations of God, and their effects: of which the one is of the present, to justice; the other of the future, to the crown."

Augustine also, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 21, expounding the authority alleged from the second chapter, says thus: "What is this that he said, *Not from works, lest anyone should be exalted?* Hear, and understand: not from your own works existing of yourselves, but as in those in which God formed you — that is, fashioned and created you. For this is what he says: *We are his workmanship, created in good works* — not by that creation by which we were made men, but by that of which he was speaking who was indeed a man: 'Create in me a clean heart, O God.'" The same author, *On Faith, to Peter*, chapter 32, says thus: "Those will reign with Christ whom God by his gratuitous goodness has predestined to the kingdom. For he who prepared them as such by predestining them, prepared them to be called according to his purpose, that they should obey, to be justified, that having received grace they should rightly believe and live well." Whence it is most clearly plain that God prepared for those predestined to the kingdom to obey, to believe rightly, and to live well — which are to act voluntarily, or voluntary actions. These therefore are reduced to divine providence.

Likewise, Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter VIII*, 11 and following, at length shows that God presides over the entire creation, rational and irrational, even over wills of every sort, by the bipartite work of providence: namely, of creation and of administration; of creation as regards the production of any creature; of administration as regards its actions and passions and other motions — which in chapter 13 he shows by a likeness thus: "Just as the motion of any member of an animal is from the soul, and even relies on something fixed in moving, so the motion of any creature is from God, and relies on him as on the fixed, while it is moved." The same, *Confessions* I, 6: "I received the consolations of human milk; nor did my mother or my nurses fill their breasts of themselves, but you, O Lord, gave me the nourishment of infancy according to your justification, and your riches disposed even to the foundation of things." And below, in chapter 12: "I was urged to learn letters, and good came to me, nor did those who urged me act well; but good came to me from you, my God. For they did not consider toward what end I should refer that which they compelled me to learn — beyond satisfying the insatiable desires of copious want and of ignominious glory. But you, by whom the very hairs of our head are numbered, made use of the error of all who were urging me to learn for my benefit." And in *Confessions* VII, 6, on consulting the Mathematicians, and on those consulted: "You, most just Moderator of the universe, by hidden instinct so act with consulters and consulted being ignorant, that when each consults, he hears that which he ought to hear by the hidden merits of souls from the abyss of your just judgment."

Likewise, all voluntary actions are from divine fate, and absolutely nothing in voluntary acts is casual or fortuitous, as chapters 28 and 29 teach; therefore all voluntary actions are derived from divine providence. Likewise, all prosperous or adverse things which befall men through voluntary actions are foreseen by God; therefore also all such voluntary actions: for if they were casual with respect to God, whatever proceeded from them would likewise be casual. For Aristotle in *De Bona Fortuna*, chapter 2, proves that fortune is not the cause of intellection and counsel, since then all things would be from fortune. For all our works are caused by intention

and counsel — or at least the argument is understood concerning such things. Wherefore Averroes on *Physics* II, [text] 44, refutes those of opinion that the motion of the Heaven is from chance, since, since it itself bestows order on other beings, all other causes would be found to be from Chance. For what is found from that which is from chance, is found from Chance. Reason itself persuades the same: for if God reasonably intends some end coming about through voluntary actions, either he intends to do it immediately by himself alone, or through some intermediate means, or in neither way. Not in the first way, since he does not so do. If in the second way, either through the same means by which it is produced — and so the proposition is had — or through others; and so his will is frustrated in something, or changed, contrary to what was said before. If in neither way, he does not reasonably intend that end. For whoever reasonably intends any end, likewise intends the means through which such end may come — unless he wills to do it immediately by himself, as is plain from *Ethics* III, 8, where it is said thus: "Setting some end, one intends in what manner and through what means it shall be" — and to this the whole of that chapter conduces.

That all prosperous things are derived from divine providence is sufficiently established from earlier chapters; from abundance, however, it can otherwise be shown thus: Otherwise, one receiving such things would not be bound to render thanks to God for them, which no one will presume to affirm save the enemy of grace, the subverter of either Testament, the mocker of the holy Fathers, and the most untaught reproacher of all Catholic Doctors — who teach to give to the Lord our God always not feigned or foolish thanks, but true and discerning, for all things. For "the thanks of the foolish are poured out," Ecclesiasticus 20; and according to Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 26: "If anyone should give thanks to a man, on the ground that he thought that man either had not foreknown, or knew not, it would more truly be called adulation or mockery than thanksgiving. *But be not deceived*, says the Apostle, *God is not mocked*." And according to the same, *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 2: "It is a mocking thanksgiving, if for this thanks are given to God which he himself did not bestow, nor did." Likewise, otherwise such prosperous things would not be gifts of God; and since this destroys the sequence of either Testament, and faith, as it were the common conception of the soul innate in all — or rather, is destroyed by these — no one of the faithful will concede this, and scarcely any unbeliever.

Likewise this is plain concerning the Powers, Dignities, and all Prelacies. To begin from the loftier and worthier: if anyone could be Pope without the Lord providing, it would not be certain to us that the Lord provides the Pope; wherefore neither ought we to write to the Supreme Pontiff thus, "By such divine providence" — though this style is customary to all, and admitted by the curia, and hitherto approved. Nor ought other Prelates or Kings to write thus: "By such grace of God, Bishop, or King," nor we to them — lest perhaps we be found false witnesses of God, giving testimony against God, that he provided whom he did not provide; which is no small peril, as is plain from 1 Corinthians 15. For according to Augustine (and the Gloss alleges this), "by no less but perhaps a greater crime, falsehood is praised in God than truth blamed."

Likewise this is true of secular Kings; wherefore also of any Ecclesiastical persons; which must first be declared concerning the Kings of England. William of Malmesbury reports, in *On the Deeds of the English Kings and Pontiffs*, Book 2, chapter 106, concerning the most holy Edward the Confessor, in these words: "Brithwold, Bishop of Winchester, had once seen, by the revelation of a dream, the felicity of that age; he had seen, and had announced it. For while in the time of King Cnut he was watching at Glastonbury in heavenly vigils, and there came upon him a thought which often disturbed him, of the royal stock of the English nearly extinguished, while he was meditating on this, sleep crept upon him; and behold, caught up on high, he sees Peter the Prince of the Apostles consecrating Edward himself, who was then in exile in Normandy, as King — designating him for a celibate life, with a fixed number of 24 years of reign computed for him. And to him complaining about posterity, [Peter] answered: 'The kingdom of the English is God's; he has provided himself a King after thee at his own pleasure.'" All Kings of the English, therefore, are exalted by divine providence; wherefore also all others. For "the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof."

This same thing is plain concerning the institution and destitution of Kings, and the division and translation of kingdoms, in the books of Kings and Chronicles, in many places: first, of the institution of Saul, 1 Samuel 9; and of his destitution, 1 Samuel 15; of the institution of David, 1 Samuel 16; of the division of the kingdom predicted in the time of Solomon, but for the merits of David deferred to the time of Rehoboam, and then completed; of the institution of Jeroboam over the 10 tribes, and of Rehoboam and his sons over the residue, that a Lamp might remain to David, 1 Kings 11 and 12. And therefore when Rehoboam, with the tribe of Judah and the house of Benjamin, wished to fight against Jeroboam and the house of Israel, that he might restore the kingdom, the Lord said to them through the Prophet: "You shall not go up, nor fight; for from me has this thing been done," 1 Kings 12, and 2 Chronicles 11: "Let each return to his own house, for this hath been done by my will." Whence Hosea 8 [Proverbs 28]: "By the sins of the land are its many princes." And Ecclesiasticus 10: "In the hand of God is the power of the earth; he shall raise up a useful ruler over it in his time. The kingdom shall be transferred from one nation to another, on account of injustices, and injuries, and contumelies, and various deceits." These things, however, God willed to manifest in his peculiar kingdom — namely, of the Hebrews — that through fewer or one he might teach in many, and universally in all, that it is so. Whence the Apostle to the Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God, and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God." Likewise 1 Peter 2: "Be subject to every human creature for God's sake, whether to a King as supreme, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good. Servants, be subject in all fear to your masters, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward."

Yet further, this is true of those kingdoms concerning which it seems less so — namely, of unbelievers and of evil men; wherefore also universally of any whatsoever. Whence Amos 9: "Are you not as the children of the Ethiopians to me, O children of Israel, says God? Did not I

cause Israel to come up out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Cappadocia, and the Syrians from Cyrene? Behold the eyes of the Lord are upon the kingdom that sins, and I will destroy it from the face of the earth." With which the Apostle agrees, Romans 3: "Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also." And below, chapter 10: "There is no distinction of Jew and Greek; for the same is Lord of all." For which Augustine, in *City of God* V, and elsewhere very diffusely, shows that the Kingdom of the Romans was from God. Whence also in V, 11, he says thus: "The most high God, who disposes the great and small parts of the world, is in no wise to be believed to have willed that the kingdoms of men, and their dominions and servitudes, should be alien from the laws of his providence" — and he speaks there principally concerning the Kingdom and Empire of the Romans, for the time of their unbelief. The same, above, in chapter 1: "The cause of the magnitude and long duration of the Roman Empire is neither fortunate nor fatal — according to the opinion of those who say things are *fortunate* which have no causes, or do not come from any rational order, and *fatal* which happen by some necessity beyond the will of God and men: utterly, by divine providence, are human kingdoms established." And the same is clearly plain in IV, 33.

Likewise Jerome in Book 5 of his commentary on Isaiah — which he composed in the more lovable historical exposition for the 10 visions of Isaiah, namely of Babylon, Philistia, Moab, Damascus, Egypt, the desert of the sea, Idumea, Arabia, the valley of vision, and Tyre, which according to him are there better called the 10 burdens; for the Hebrew word *Massa* is understood as burden or weight, for which the Seventy translated *vision* — handles this matter at length; and on that of Isaiah 22, "The burden of the valley of vision," he says thus: "The Seventy translated more manifestly: *the valley of Sion*. For this city is the seedbed of the Prophets, in which the temple was constructed, and the visions of the Lord were multiplied; which, although it is founded on a mountain, is in no way called a mountain, but a valley, because it has been humbled — which Jeremiah also speaks of, when he takes the cup full of wine and gives it to all the nations, and last gives it to Jerusalem, that she may drink, and vomit, and fall, and be mad — signifying that this is to be devastated by the Babylonians. From which we understand the Creator of all to be equally God, and to dispense all things by the same judgment, according to that which he himself speaks through Amos, *Are you not as the children of the Ethiopians*, etc., recited above — lest the Jews should think they had a privilege of merits because they had been led out of Egypt. He says also that other nations are translated to other lands by his command."

Likewise this is plain especially of the four great kingdoms, unknown to no one: first of the Chaldeans or Babylonians, second of the Medes and Persians, third of the Greeks, fourth of the Romans — concerning which it is found scattered in Scripture frequently and conjointly, in Daniel 2, under the metaphor of the four parts of the statue revealed to Nebuchadnezzar himself through a dream; and below in chapter 7, under the figure of four great beasts seen through a dream by Daniel. Whence Daniel himself says thus: "The Lord himself changes times and ages, transfers kingdoms and establishes them"; on which the Gloss: "We should not therefore wonder if at times we see Kings succeed Kings, and Kingdoms Kingdoms. All things happen by the will

of him who knows the causes of all, who founded all things, and permits even evil Kings to be raised up, that they may punish the evil, and cleanse the good." And below, Daniel said to Nebuchadnezzar, the first Monarch of the Chaldeans, in this special manner: "Thou, O King, art King of Kings, and the God of Heaven hath given thee a kingdom, and strength, and power, and glory, and all things wherein the children of men dwell; and the beasts of the field also, and the birds of the air, hath he given into thy hand, and hath put all things under thy dominion." With which the most holy Jeremiah agrees in chapter 27, in the person of the Lord saying thus: "I made the earth, and man, and the cattle that are upon the face of the whole earth, in my great strength, and in my outstretched arm; and I gave it to whom it pleased in my eyes. And now therefore I have given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, my servant; moreover, the beasts of the field also have I given to him, that they may serve him; and all nations shall serve him, and his son, and his son's son, until the time of his own land come, and of himself." And below, chapter 43: "Behold, I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, my servant, and I will set his throne upon these stones, and he will set his seat upon them, and coming, he shall strike the land of Egypt." This same thing the voice rushing down from heaven testifies, in these words: "To thee it is said, O King Nebuchadnezzar: Thy kingdom hath passed from thee, until thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will" (Daniel 4). And below, in chapter 5, the destruction of this first kingdom and the institution of the second is found explicitly through the writing *Mene, Tekel, Peres*, and its interpretation, saying to Belshazzar the last King: "God hath numbered thy kingdom, and finished it; thy kingdom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians" — which was at once fulfilled, Babylon being captured by Darius and Cyrus, Kings of the Medes and Persians, and Belshazzar slain.

Of Cyrus also, the successor of Darius, Isaiah 45 says: "Thus saith the Lord to my anointed Cyrus, whose right hand I have taken hold of, that I may subdue nations before him, and turn the backs of Kings," etc. Whence also that same Cyrus, 2 Chronicles, last chapter, and 1 Esdras 1, says thus: "All the kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord God of Heaven given to me." Of the third kingdom also, or third Monarchy — namely the Greeks, over which Alexander presided — the same is plain especially through what was set forth in showing the 32nd part of the first Corollary of this [book]. Of the fourth Monarchic kingdom, namely of the Romans, Augustine in *City of God* V, at length, especially teaches the same. Of these great kingdoms and of unbelievers, let these things suffice for this occasion. Through which, although the proposition is sufficiently apparent concerning the kingdoms of the wicked, yet it can be briefly shown from abundance thus. Job 34: "He maketh a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people." On which Gregory, *Morals* XXV, 15: "Let no one who suffers such a ruler accuse him whom he suffers, since surely it was of his own merit to lie under the dominion of a perverse ruler." And below, chapter 16: "According to the merits of the subjects, the persons of those ruling are bestowed." This Augustine also in *City of God* V at length shows. Whence in chapter 20, of Nero, he says thus: "Whose luxury was so great that nothing manly was to be feared from him, and so great his cruelty that nothing soft would be believed of him if it were not known. Yet even to such, the

power of dominating is given only by the providence of the most high God, when he judges the affairs of men to be worthy of such Lords. Open on this matter is the divine voice, the wisdom of God speaking: *Through me Kings reign, and tyrants through me hold the earth.* But lest tyrants should be esteemed not the worst and most wicked Kings, but be reckoned by the ancient name as the strong — whence Virgil says, *Part of peace it shall be for me to have touched the right hand of the tyrant* — most openly in another place is it said of him: *Who maketh a hypocrite to reign for the perversity of the people.*" And below, chapter 22, he says that the true God, when he willed and as much as he willed, gave the kingdom to the Romans, the Assyrians, and the Persians; thus also to Nero and Domitian, the most cruel, and to Julian the Apostate. "These plainly the true God rules and governs as he pleases." Let these things, then, suffice to have introduced concerning Kingdoms and Kings.

Nor can anyone pretend that God provides for these great things, but does not care for lesser. For this folly Wisdom 6 refutes, saying: "The Lord shall not exempt the person of any, nor shall he stand in awe of any man's greatness; for he himself made both the small and the great, and he careth for all alike." And Job 34: "He accepteth not the persons of princes." Reason also persuades this: for if God provides Popes and Emperors or Kings, why not Cardinals and Dukes? And if these, why not Archbishops and Counts? And if these, why not Bishops and Barons; and so step by step, descending from the greatest to the least. Whence Proverbs 29: "From the Lord proceeds the judgment of every one." And Job 34, "Over a nation, and over all men," etc. On which Gregory, *Morals* XXV, 15, says thus: "What we see done in the greatest things, let us cautiously fear even in our individual selves. For divine judgments are extended over one soul as over one city; over one city as over one nation; over one nation as over the universal multitude of the human race; for thus the Lord intends individuals as if he were free from all, and so simultaneously intends all as if he were free from individuals. He who, by administering, fulfills all things, rules by fulfilling, neither is absent from the universe when he disposes one, nor absent from one when he disposes the universe — quietly working all things by the power of his nature."

By the laws of this providence also are the victories of wars disposed. This follows from the foregoing, and can be proved like the foregoing. For through victories, kingdoms and many dominions are acquired, which are given through the providence of God. Likewise this is plain in the battle of Israel against Amalek, in which, when Moses lifted up his hands, Israel conquered; but if he let them down a little, Amalek prevailed (Exodus 17). Likewise it is plain from Joshua 7, of those 3,000 fighters going up against Ai, who, immediately turning their backs, fell, fleeing headlong; and the Lord said to Joshua: "Israel will not be able to stand before their enemies, and will flee from them, because it is polluted with the anathema; I will be no more with you." Behold the cause of their flight and of the victory of the enemies: "I will be no more with you, until you crush him who is guilty of this crime." Does not the following history, especially chapter 11, plainly teach the same? Is it not written in chapter 11: "For it had been the sentence of the Lord, that their hearts should be hardened, and they should fight against the children of

Israel, and fall, and not deserve any mercy, but should perish." Does not that most strenuous David say thus: "Let all this assembly know, that the Lord saveth not by sword and spear; for it is his battle" (1 Samuel 17)? Does not also the man of God say thus to King Amaziah of Judah, who had only 30,000 fighters of his own, and therefore was hiring 100,000 stout men of Israel, that he might fight against Edom: "O King, let not the army of Israel go forth with thee; for God is not with Israel; but if thou thinkest that battles consist in the strength of an army, the Lord shall make thee fall before thy enemies; for it is God's to help and to put to flight" (2 Chronicles 25)? Did not Jonathan with his Armor-bearer alone, about most boldly and most happily to attack the garrison of the Philistines, send word ahead, "It is not difficult for the Lord to save, either with many or with few" (1 Samuel 14)? This too the most strenuous of soldiers, the Maccabee, well understood, who armed his few — fatigued with fasting — against a very great multitude thus: "It is easy for many to be shut up in the hand of a few; and there is no difference in the sight of the God of Heaven, to deliver with a great multitude or with a small company. For not in the multitude of an army is the victory of war, but strength is from heaven; the Lord himself shall crush them before our face" (1 Maccabees 3). And below, in the same: "As the will is in heaven, so let it be done." And in 2 Maccabees, last chapter: "The Lord giveth victory to the worthy, not according to the power of arms, but as it pleaseth himself."

Do not testify to this truth that horse with the terrible rider, those two youths fair in virtue, of best glory, beautiful in apparel (1 Maccabees 3 [2 Maccabees 11])? Those five men also from heaven, adorned with golden bridles, providing leadership to the Jews (2 Maccabees 10)? Saint Jeremiah too, dead to the world, living in heaven, giving Judas a golden sword, a gift from God (2 Maccabees, last chapter)? That Angel of the Lord also, who in one night struck down 185,000 in the camp of the Assyrians (2 Kings 19)? Let that truthful witness also approach, the eminent of the Prophets, and most illustrious of Kings, holy David, bringing forward the whole Psalm 43 [44] in testimony of the truth: "O God, with our ears we have heard," etc.; "the work that thou hast wrought," etc.; "thy hand destroyed the Gentiles," etc.; "they did not get the land in possession by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them, but thy right hand," etc. — all the verses that follow. And above, Psalm 32 [33]: "The King is not saved by a great army; nor shall the giant be saved by his own great strength. Vain is the horse for safety: nor shall he be saved by the abundance of his strength. Behold, the eyes of the Lord are on those that fear him," etc., "to deliver their souls from death." And because he himself was greatly assailed by enemies, and had the greatest victories, he attributes them, as in nearly all the Psalms, not to himself but to the Lord, with most humble thanksgiving.

What else also is, "A man shall not be strengthened by his own strength," and, "Lest thou shouldst say, *My strength and the might of my hand have furnished all these things to me*; but thou shouldst remember the Lord, that he himself gave thee the strength" (Deuteronomy 8). And below, in chapter 32: "On account of the wrath of my enemies I have deferred, lest perhaps their enemies should be proud, and should say, *Our high hand and not the Lord hath done all these things*." And Jeremiah 46: "The swift shall not flee, nor the strong think to save himself." What

else also does it sound, that occurs so often in Scripture, that the Lord will send his fear upon the enemies, that he himself will be the Captain of the war, that he will be with his own in war, will fight for his own, will go before them, will shut up the enemies in the hands of his own, will turn them to flight, will overthrow the enemies, will lay low, humble, slay, crush, break together with his own — with infinite similar expressions? And to conclude many things in few: to this conduces the entire series of either Testament, where mention is made of bodily, or even spiritual, war.

But, as I think, this the Lord deigned to show in his elect people, and in bodily war, by manifest virtue, in order that — since in fewer matters the way is greater, and through bodily things spiritual things are known — he might at least show by his hidden virtue that it is generally so in all things, and especially in spiritual war, that thus he might teach the impotent and the wretched where to hope and seek for fortitude, victory, and salvation. "For all these things befell them in figure, and they were written for our correction" (1 Corinthians 10). But to whomever these things are not pleasing, let him hope in princes, trust in man, place flesh as his arm, and let his heart depart from the Lord; let him hope in his bow; let his sword save him; and if at any time victory befall him, let him not give thanks, nor in hymns and confessions bless the Lord — because, [he will say,] he did not do great things for him, nor give him victory. Nor do I doubt, if such a one is at least a Christian in name, that he will be more ungrateful to the true God than any unbeliever to the false god, or to false gods, to whose grace and virtue he ascribes his victory and honor; and to whom or to which, according to his rite, rendering thanks, he slays victims and offers fat solemn sacrifices. Let such men hope as they wish; for me, however, in any battle of mine, to cleave to God is good, to place my hope in the Lord my God. "For the name of the Lord is a most strong tower; the just runneth to it, and shall be exalted." Let him place me beside himself, and let anyone's hand fight against me; "for I can do all things in him who strengtheneth me," and in myself nothing — for I cannot even think the smallest thing.

This whole thing the lofty Roman Emperor Justinian humbly professes, in the *Code, On the Old Law to be Made Plain*, when he says: "With God governing our empire, which has been handed down to us by the celestial Majesty, we both happily wage wars, and adorn peace, and sustain the state of the Republic, and we so raise our minds to the help of God Almighty, that we trust neither in arms, nor in our soldiers, nor in our captains of war, nor in our wit, but refer all hope to the providence alone of the supreme Trinity." This too the universal Church confesses, which, when she prays the Lord for peace, truly and not falsely puts forth this cause: "For there is no other who fights for us, but thou, O God." The proposition is also proved through Augustine, *City of God* XIX, 15, saying thus: "Every victory, when it comes even to the wicked, by divine judgment humbles the conquered, either correcting their sins or punishing them. The man of God Daniel is a witness, when, placed in captivity, he confesses to the Lord his sins or the sins of the people, and testifies with pious grief that this was the cause of that captivity."

And although it is established from earlier chapters that wisdom, riches, and other prosperous things are bestowed by divine providence, yet it can be confirmed by a few testimonies. For in 1

Kings 3 the Lord says to Solomon: "I have given thee a wise and understanding heart, riches and glory." And Ecclesiasticus 1: "All wisdom is from the Lord God." Which King David, full of the Spirit of God, most fully attests in 1 Chronicles, last chapter, in these words: "Thine, O Lord, is the magnificence and the power and the glory and the victory; for whatsoever is in heaven, and whatsoever is on earth, is thine; thine the riches, and thine the glory; thou rulest over all; in thy hand is virtue and power, greatness, and command. Who am I, and who is my people, that we should be able to promise thee all these things? All things are thine, and what we have received from thy hand, we have given to thee." And since the whole Scripture is filled with such fitting testimonies, let it suffice to have briefly touched on these.

This also is plain through Augustine, *Tractate 2* on that of Psalm 32, "Confess to the Lord on the harp; sing to him on the psaltery of ten strings," saying that "the harp has on the lower part that which sounds, but the psaltery on the upper, so that the harp signifies earthly life, the psaltery the heavenly, which is in the 10 commandments; and in each God is to be praised. In earthly life there is prosperity and adversity. In all prosperous things God is to be praised; and whoever does not praise from these is ungrateful, since they are God's, and are not given by another.

Adversities are in pains, languors, oppressions, temptations, tribulations: everywhere let him praise God who plays the harp; let him not heed that they are lower things, but that they cannot be ruled and governed save by that Wisdom which reaches mightily from end to end and disposes all things sweetly. For he does not rule heavenly things and abandon earthly, or is it not said to him: *Whither shall I go from thy spirit? and whither shall I flee from thy face? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into hell, thou art present.* Where, then, is he absent who is nowhere not present? Therefore in all prosperous or adverse things, confess to the Lord on the harp. If you abound, give thanks to the giver; if you lack, or it is taken away by loss, play the harp securely, and say: *The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so is it done; blessed be the name of the Lord.*"

Likewise this is true of that prosperity concerning which it seems less so — namely of the wicked — which yet many take ill, indeed even some Saints, as it seems. Whence Jeremiah 12: "Thou indeed art just, O Lord, if I dispute with thee; nevertheless I will speak just things to thee. Why doth the way of the wicked prosper? Why is it well with all them that transgress and do iniquitously? Thou hast planted them, and they have taken root." Behold what he attributes these things to God. Which holy Job also vehemently marveling at, that he should dispute not against man but against God, makes the hearers attentive thus: "Hearken to me, and be astonished, and lay your fingers on your mouth; and when I remember, I am afraid, and trembling shall shake my flesh." Then he sets forth the following question: "Why are the wicked exalted, and strengthened with riches? Their seed continueth before them, the multitude of their kindred and grandchildren; their houses are secure, and the rod of God is not over them; their ox hath conceived, and hath not miscarried, the cow hath calved, and is not deprived of her offspring. Their little ones go out like Kings, and their infants exult with sports; they take the timbrel and the harp; who said to God, *Depart from us, we will not have the way of thy sciences. Who is the Almighty, that we*

should serve him?" And he answers: "Yet, since their goods are not in their own hand," — supply, "but in the Lord's," as he said above, "*The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away*" — "let the counsel of the wicked be far from me" (Job 21). This question the Psalmist likewise treats at length in Psalm 72 [73], premising the danger of seeing the prosperity of the wicked — for he was nearly cast down, as very many are cast down: "But my feet were almost moved," he says, "etc.; because I was zealous against the wicked," etc.; "for there is no regard to their death," etc.; "in the labor of men they are not," etc.; "therefore pride hath held them; iniquity hath proceeded as it were out of fatness; they have set their mouth in heaven," etc., "and they have said, *How doth God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High? Behold these are sinners, and abounding in this world they have obtained riches.*" — As if he were arguing: therefore God does not know, nor cares, nor distributes human affairs providently — which argument once concluded the Psalmist, or perhaps someone else, in whose person, from the things now set forth, he concludes when he says: "And I said, *Then have I in vain justified my heart, etc., and have been chastised,*" etc. But immediately he refutes this conclusion by deducing it to a manifest impossibility, subjoining: "If I said, *I will speak thus*" — namely, as that conclusion says — "behold I have reproved the generation of thy sons" — namely, I have shown them to be reprovably, which is a manifest impossibility. On which Augustine: "*If I said, I will speak thus,* namely, that God does not care for human affairs, *behold I have reproved the generation of thy sons,* namely, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the Prophets, who all said God cares for human affairs."

This same thing, although it is plain from the foregoing, can yet be shown specially of all adversities and scourges, evil and good things befalling indistinctly. For all these are the punishments of those who suffer; and every punishment is in some way the punishment of sin, and just, and from God, as is plain through Augustine, *Retractations* I, 9, on the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, saying thus: "Every punishment, however, if it is just, is the punishment of sin; but if it is unjust punishment — which no one doubts to be a punishment — has been imposed on a man under the dominion of some unjust power. But because to doubt of the omnipotence and justice of God is the part of a madman, this is just punishment, and is paid for some sin." Every just thing, however, is just from the first justice, which is God, as is sufficiently established from chapter 2. The same author, in book 5 *Against Julian*, says to Julian: "If this is not the punishment of sin, surely it is unjust punishment, and you make God unjust, by whose command or permission — or weak, by his not turning aside — it is inflicted on the innocent." And in 83 *Questions*, 24: "God justly governing the universe, allows no punishment to be inflicted undeservedly."

Likewise, otherwise a great cause of patience, hope, consolation, and joy would be taken from the afflicted when they fall into various tribulations. For who shall so patiently, hopefully, consolingly, and joyfully sustain such things, if he believes them to befall him only from an enemy, or from chance, and that through them sins are not purged, virtues exercised, or rewards heaped up — as if he should believe these to be sent upon him by God, for some such good?

Whence Seneca, in the little book which he specially wrote on this matter, entitled *Seneca to Lucilius*: "Since the world is governed by providence, why do many evils happen to good men? A good man is the disciple of God, his emulator and true offspring; whom that magnificent parent — no light exactor of virtues — like stern fathers, educates more harshly. Therefore when you see good men, accepted by the Gods, laboring, sweating, climbing through hard places, but the wicked riotous and flowing in pleasures, consider that it is not of sons to be delighted by the license of slaves, that those are kept in stricter discipline, while the audacity of these is fed. Let the same be plain to you concerning God: he does not have the good man in delights; he tries him, he hardens him, he prepares him for himself. Do you wonder if that God, most loving of the good, who wills them to be the very best and most excellent, assigns to them a fortune with which they may exercise themselves? I, indeed, do not wonder if at times the Gods conceive an impulse, while they watch great men struggling with some calamity. To us at times it is a pleasure, if a youth of constant mind has received a charging beast on his hunting-spear, if he has undauntedly endured the rush of the lion, and the spectacle is the more pleasing, the more honorable made it. Such things are not what can turn the countenance of the gods to themselves; these are puerile and human entertainments of levity. Behold a spectacle worthy that God, intent on his work, should look upon; behold a pair worthy of God: a strong man matched with evil fortune, especially if he has even challenged it. I do not see, I say, what Jupiter has on earth more beautiful, if he wishes to turn his mind, than that he should look upon Cato — when, his cause having been more than once broken, standing nonetheless among public ruins, you may understand him as a steady helmsman in the storm, a soldier in the line of battle. Fire proves gold, misery brave men. For nothing seems more unhappy than he to whom no adversity has ever come; for it has not been allowed him to test himself. Even if all things have flowed to him as he wished, even before his wish, the Gods have judged ill of him: he seemed unworthy by whom Fortune should at any time be conquered, which flees from every most cowardly man" — as if he should say, "What then? Shall I take this man for an adversary? At once he will lay down his arms; there is no need of all my power against him; he shall be driven off by a slight threat, he cannot endure my countenance; let another be looked round for, with whom we may be able to come to grips. I am ashamed to engage with a man prepared to be conquered; the gladiator judges it ignominy to be matched with an inferior."

And below: "Let us come to Regulus. What did fortune harm him? Did it not make him a model of fidelity, a model of patience? Nails fix his skin, and wherever the wearied body inclines, it presses upon a wound; his eyes are kept suspended in perpetual vigil; the more torment, the more glory shall there be. Do you judge Socrates ill-treated, that he drank that publicly mixed potion no otherwise than as a medicine of immortality?" — as if he were saying, "It is not so." Where also he generally shows that the evils which seem to befall good men are not evils to them, but goods, useful, both for themselves and for all others, of whom the gods have greater care.

Is not this also what the Lord himself says? "I will not destroy the Nations which Joshua left, that in them I may try Israel, whether they keep the way of the Lord, and walk in it, or not" (Judges

2). And it follows: "These are the Nations which the Lord left, that he might instruct Israel in them, and all who knew not the wars of the Canaanites; and that afterwards their sons might learn to fight with their enemies, and have the custom of fighting" — "the five Satraps of the Philistines," etc. (Judges 3). Wherefore also blessed James admonishes, saying: "Esteem it all joy, my brethren, when you fall into divers temptations, knowing that the proving of your faith worketh patience; but patience hath a perfect work" (James 1). Wherefore also the Apostles went rejoicing from the presence of the Council, since they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus (Acts 5). And to the Romans 5: "We glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope, and hope confoundeth not." And 1 Peter 1: "Wherein you shall greatly rejoice, if now you must be for a little time made sorrowful in divers temptations, that the trial of your faith, much more precious than gold which is tried by the fire," etc.

This same thing, as concerns the good, the various tribulations of Job show — Job himself in the very first chapter saying: "The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so is it done." Whence Augustine, on that of Psalm 32, "For he hath spoken and they were made; he commanded, and they were created": "The Devil could not harm Job unless having received the power from God; when he permitted, he could; therefore he could not, but he who permitted. And therefore Job, well instructed, did not say, *The Lord gave, the Devil hath taken away*; but, *The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so is it done* — not as it pleased the Devil; and all this for the merit and glory of his saint." For which the same author says on that of Psalm 34, "Let them be confounded and ashamed": "The Devil had no power to take away the goods of holy Job, except when he received it from the supreme power. Wherefore he also said, *Put forth thy hand* — that is, give power. But God, who had permitted the Devil to take those things away, did not desert his servant within, but, to overcome the Devil, made the soul of his servant a sword for himself."

The same is proved by the tribulation of holy Tobias, by the testimony of Raphael, who says: "Because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary that temptation should prove thee." For which Augustine in the *Sentences of Prosper*, proposition 221, says: "The progress of the faithful does not come without temptation; nor does anyone become known to himself save by the examination of probation; nor is anyone crowned save he who has conquered, nor does anyone conquer unless he has fought; but who fights save he who has an enemy and resists temptation?" The same author also, on that of Psalm 148, "Fire, hail, snow," etc., "which do his word," concerning the killing of an innocent person by lightning, or any other kind of death whatever, says thus: "Whatever happens here against our will, you must know it does not happen save by the will of God, by his providence, order, nod, and laws. And if we do not understand what or why it is done, let us give this to his providence, since it is not done without a cause; and let us not blaspheme. For all things which to vain men seem in the nature of things to happen rashly, do not happen save at his command." The same on that of Psalm 57, "They shall be carried away as wax that melteth": "Here are punishments, prisons, exiles, torments, deaths, divers kinds of pains

and tribulations; and these are dispensed by the judgment of God; but to many they are for probation, to many for damnation."

The same on that of Psalm 31 [32], "Be glad in the Lord, all you upright of heart": "What is *upright of heart*? Those not resisting God. Whatever a man suffers contrary to his will — afflictions, sorrows, labors, humiliations — let him attribute it solely to the just will of God; he is upright of heart. The perverse of heart, however, are crooked and distorted, who say that they suffer unjustly the evils which they suffer, attributing iniquity to him by whose will they suffer; or, because they do not dare attribute iniquity to him, they take from him governance. And these distorted of heart hold three opinions: either, that there is no God — as the fool said in his heart; or, that God is unjust, who does not distribute worse things to the worse; or, that God does not govern human affairs."

Likewise Jerome, in book 4 on Isaiah, treating that of chapter 28, "Will the plowman plow all day," etc., says thus: "God variously dispenses the human race; now he punishes, now has mercy; now corrects, now defends; now plows, now sows, now reaps the ripe fruits, and threshes them on the threshing-floors when reaped, and governs his world as he wills." With which agrees Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, prose 4: "What you indeed think most just, to omniscient providence appears different — that is, contrary." Whence also "a certain victorious cause in war pleased the Gods as just, but not Cato; the conquered cause pleased Cato, not the Gods" — as Lucan attests. But he immediately rejects Cato's opinion, saying: "Therefore whatever you see done contrary to expectation, in things indeed there is right order, but to your opinion perverse confusion." And below in the same prose he shows: "Why, by divine providence, do adversities not befall some good men, but befall others; and similarly with the wicked? Adversities do not befall some good men, since they are weak, and would not suffice to bear them, but perhaps would cease to cultivate innocence, by which they could not retain fortune. There is another so perfect, that providence judges it impious that he should be touched by any adversities. There are some good men sometimes greatly raised up, that through them the wickedness of the wicked may be repelled. To others good men, [providence] distributes mixed things according to the quality of their souls. Wherefore providence stings certain good men, prone to luxury, with another adversity, lest by long felicity they riot. Others it agitates with hardships, that they may strengthen the virtues of the soul by the use and exercise of patience. Some pusillanimous fear more than is fitting, but yet can endure harsh things. Others, presumptuous beyond what is fitting, despise as easiest for themselves adversities which yet they cannot endure: these the providence of God leads, through the experience of sad things, to knowledge of themselves. Some good men, however, inexpugnable to every torment, have offered an example to others that virtue is unconquered." And he subjoins: "Although that this is rightly and disposedly, and from the good of those to whom they seem to come, there is no doubt; for to those that love God all things work together for good" (Romans 8). And he shows at once that prosperous and adverse things befall the wicked from like causes: adverse things indeed for three causes: first, because they have so deserved; second, that their punishments may deter others from sin; third, that the

wicked themselves may be amended by such things. Prosperous things, however, befall them for many causes: first, that the good seeing this may elicit an argument as to what they ought to judge of such felicity — namely, of riches and the like — which serves even the wicked; second, because some wicked men would become worse if they suffered want of family substance, which disease divine providence remedies by the gathering of money; third, that one having a sordid conscience, while in dread of the punishment due to sin, fears to lose the goods of fortune which he has, may change his ways, and while fearing to lose fortune, may abandon wickedness; fourth, that the more such felicity is heaped upon certain wicked men, the more it may cast them into deeper unhappiness when it is taken from them. For according to the same in *Consolation II*, prose 4: "In every adversity of fortune, the most unhappy kind of misfortune is to have been happy."

Then he consequently shows why the right of punishing is permitted to evil men, and says this is done so that to the good it may be the cause of exercise, and to the wicked of punishment; from which often that supreme providence has produced an extraordinary miracle: that the wicked have made the wicked good. To this conduces likewise what Jacques de Vitry recounts of a certain Hermit who fell into the spirit of blasphemy, to the extent that he had begun to think the judgments of God to be unjust, in that he allows the wicked to prosper and the good to be afflicted. To him an Angel sent from the Lord, in the form of a man, said: "Follow me, and you shall see the hidden judgments of God." Whom when he had followed, to the house of a certain good man, having all night been entertained with the joyful offices of hospitality, the Angel stole the cup of his host, which he most loved, and gave it to a certain wicked man who had received them on the second night. On the third night they were more kindly entertained by a kindly host, whose servant in the morning he cast off a certain bridge, drowning him; and on the fourth night, having likewise been well received by a good man, he killed his little son crying, and not letting them sleep. At which the Hermit, wishing to leave him, [the Angel] said thus: "I am sent to you by the Lord, that I may disclose his hidden judgments to you. Our first host had loved that cup too much; therefore for his good I took the cup from him, and gave it to our wicked host, that he might receive his reward in the present. The servant of the third I drowned, because he had firmed in his heart to kill his master on the morrow; and so I preserved the good master from death, and the wicked servant from homicide of the work, that he might be more mildly punished in hell. The fourth host, before he had a son and heir, used to give large alms; but his son and heir being born, he withdrew his hand. Wherefore I took from him the cause of avarice, and brought into paradise the soul of an innocent." Of which deed, or of similar, the Wise Man assigns another cause, saying: "He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding, or fiction should deceive his soul" (Wisdom 4).

These and similar things concerning holy Job and Tobias God willed manifestly to show — that they were done by him — that he might generally teach us the same in all similar cases, and thus arm us against all adversities by patience. Whence Tobit 2: "God permitted this temptation to befall him, that an example might be given to posterity of his patience, like that of holy Job. For

whatsoever things were written, were written for our learning, that through patience and the consolation of the Scriptures we might have hope" (Romans 15).

That tribulations also brought upon evil and good men by evil men are sent by God, Psalm 77 [78] proves, saying: "He sent upon them the wrath of his indignation; indignation, and wrath, and tribulation, sent through evil Angels."

That, however, I may conclude so long a series in a brief discourse: as is contained scattered in the Canonical Scripture and in various writings of the Fathers, scourges befall for five causes — as is also recited in *Sentences* IV, distinction 15, of the Lombard. First, that the merits of the just may be increased through patience, as in Job. Second, for the keeping of virtues against pride, as Paul, as is plain from 2 Corinthians 12. Third, for the correcting of sins, as the leprosy of Miriam, as is plain in Numbers 12. Fourth, for the manifesting of the works of God, as is plain from the man born blind, John 9. Fifth, for the inception of punishment in the present, that here may be seen what shall follow in hell — as that of Deuteronomy 32: "A fire is kindled in my fury, and shall burn even to the lowest hell." Whence also Jeremiah 17: "With double destruction destroy them" — as it was concerning Herod, as is plain in Acts 12, and many similar in many places.

Likewise this is true, not only of adults, but also of little ones — concerning whom it seems less so. Whence Augustine, *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 35, says thus: "For God is not driven by fate to come to the aid of those infants, but not these, when there is a common cause for both; or shall we suppose that human affairs in little ones are conducted not by divine providence but by fortuitous chances — when rational souls are either to be damned or to be liberated, since indeed not even a sparrow falls on the earth without the will of our Father, who is in heaven? Or is it to be attributed to the negligence of parents, that little ones die without baptism, so that the divine judgments do nothing there? What shall I say, that sometimes a little one breathes his last before baptism, even when his parents hasten and the ministers are ready that the little one may be baptized — yet, God being unwilling, it is not given, who did not preserve him for a little while in this life that it might be given? What is it also that sometimes baptism could come to the help of the little children of unbelievers, lest they should go into perdition, and yet could not for the children of the faithful? Where surely it is shown that there is no respect of persons with God; otherwise he would deliver the children of his worshipers rather than of his enemies." The same, *On Reprehension and Grace*, chapter 27: "It is wonderful and yet true, that he alienates from his kingdom certain sons of his friends — that is, of the regenerated good, because they are faithful — leaving this world as little ones without baptism, for whom surely if he willed it, he could provide the grace of this washing, since all things are in his power; whereas he sends thither the parents of those alienated; and certain sons of his enemies he causes to come into the hands of Christians, and to be brought through the washing into the kingdom from which their parents are alien — when both to those there is evil, and to these good, no merit is in the little ones from their own will. Surely these judgments of God, since they are just and lofty, can neither be reprov'd nor penetrated."

The same, *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 50: "Sometimes this grace is presented to the children of unbelievers, when by the hidden providence of God they come in some way into the hands of the pious. Sometimes the children of the faithful do not obtain it; sometimes an impediment exists which prevents them from being aided in their peril. These things, however, are done by the hidden providence of God, whose judgments are inscrutable and his ways past finding out."

This whole thing also the universal Church professes in her orations, saying: "Direct our acts in thy good pleasure," etc. And again: "May the virtue of the Holy Spirit be present with us, by whose wisdom we have been founded, and by whose providence we are governed." And again: "O God, whose providence is not deceived in the disposition of itself, we suppliants beseech thee, that thou wouldst remove all hurtful things, and grant us all things profitable" — manifestly supposing that all hurtful and likewise profitable things are disposed by divine providence.

CHAPTER XXXII. THAT ALL THINGS COME FROM THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD ACTUALLY DISPOSING, NOT MERELY PERMITTING.

But because among the Authorities of the Saints which speak of the providence of God, some make mention of permission, it might perhaps appear that by providence they understand only permission. It now remains to show that all things come from actual preceptive — or even positive — providence, namely that which posits an actual will in God. This will be shown by reasons similar to those by which the foregoing chapters have been demonstrated, especially because the chapters speaking of the divine knowledge and will, by which universal providence is proved, speak of the actual and positive knowledge and volition of God, not only of the permissive.

Likewise, otherwise he would not most wisely, nor most perfectly, nor most fittingly dispose the universe. Likewise, all inanimate and irrational things, which do not depend on voluntary actions, are actually provided for, and all their operations, as chapters 27 and 31 teach; therefore much more all voluntary things, and all voluntary actions, as is plain from chapters 30 and 31. Those philosophical testimonies adduced before also cannot fittingly be understood of permissive providence, nor can the other testimonies of Scripture and of the Saints be understood in this sense. For how would the Savior, in Matthew 6, reasonably remove anxiety from us, if he cared for us only by permitting and providing nothing actually? How also in Matthew 10 would such a somnolent providence arm us against the fear of death for his name? For who would more confidently contend, [merely] because God only permits this or that? What also of consolation would this be: "One of the sparrows does not fall without your permitting Father, and you are better than they; therefore fear not, since you shall not fall without your Father permitting this greater event, and indifferently neglecting it"? Indeed, this would not be a consolation but a manifest mockery. What also would the numbering of the hairs profit us, if he provided nothing further actually for us, but permitted all things to run uncertainly and to be agitated by fortuitous

motions? How also in the numbering of the hairs would the ineffable affection of God, and the immensity and diligence of providence, be noted, as is alleged above?

The speech of God also imports an act; but all things are from it, since they are from the speaking or pronouncement of the supreme God, as chapter 28 shows. Otherwise also many things would happen by chance simply, and by fortune; for not whatever is permitted is intended, which chapter 29 condemns. Yet further, Job, Tobias, and the narration of Jacques [de Vitry] prove actual providence; every adversity also which is the just punishment of sin. Nor does the manner of speech of Scripture, of the Doctors, or of the common people seem to call bare permission "providence," since thus any neighbor would provide for any other.

And Anselm, *On Truth*, chapter 8, says: "According to that which acts, it more properly seems to be called acting and striking; according to that which suffers, action and striking. For *agentia* and *percutientia* are said from the agent and striker, just as *providentia* from the *providens*, *continentia* from the *continens*; which" — namely, the agent and striker, the provider and continent — "are active." Therefore it is plain that providence, from its signification, imports not only permission, but some act, or a certain agency.

Furthermore, if this exposition were fitting to Scripture, since Scripture similarly speaks of predestination, creation, governance, the conferral of grace and other goods, the remission of sins, and many similar things — all could be expounded by mere permission. But how much this would derogate from the Christian faith, or rather subvert it entirely, no Christian doubts. Likewise, then the holy Fathers laboriously proving that all things are governed by providence would labor in vain; for they would not be teaching anything doubtful or unknown, since no one is ignorant that all things happen by the Lord's permission.

Likewise, all things that here in any way happen have some causes, and all those causes are reduced to some first cause, as the second Supposition and the second chapter show; and this first cause of all is God, as is doubtful to no one. God therefore in some way causes all these things, and not by natural necessity, nor casually, ignorantly, improvidently, or rashly; therefore through the will, with certain knowledge providing.

Likewise, a loving, prudent, and powerful mother actually provides all things for her sons. But God our heavenly Father is incomparably more loving, more prudent, and more powerful than any mother; wherefore by actual — not permissive or merely forgetful — providence he provides all things for us. Whence also Isaiah 49: "Can a woman forget her infant, so as not to have pity on the son of her womb? And if she should forget, yet will I not forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee in my hands" — Gloss: "that I may always see and remember; nor think thyself utterly forsaken." But of what avail would that vision or memory of the intellect alone be, unless the prudent benevolence of the will were likewise present? Therefore he immediately subjoins: "Those that judged thee, I will judge; thy sons I will save; I am the Lord that saveth thee, and thy redeemer."

Likewise Isaiah 10 says of Sennacherib King of Assyria: "Woe to Assyria, the rod of my fury, and the staff itself is mine indignation in their hand. To a deceitful nation I will send him; against the people of my fury I will give him a charge, that he may take the spoils, and divide the prey, and tread it down." The Lord, then, in such things is the principal agent, and any tyrant only the instrumental. Therefore it follows: "And it shall come to pass, when the Lord shall have performed all his works on Mount Zion and Jerusalem, that I will visit upon the fruit of the magnificent heart of the King of Assyria, and upon the glory of the height of his eyes. For he hath said: *In the strength of my hand I have done it, and in my wisdom I have understood,*" etc. And it follows: "Shall the axe glory against him that cutteth with it? or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn? Just as if a rod should lift itself up against him that lifteth it up, or a staff should exalt itself, which is wood; therefore," etc. — there follows his punishment, where the Gloss says: "as if to say, just as these inanimate things are instruments doing nothing of themselves, but through him who moves them, so neither did Sennacherib act of himself, but operated in the virtue of God; whence his glorying is foolish and worthy of vengeance." On which Jerome also, in book 4 on Isaiah, says: "O most foolish of mortals, you think the wrath of God to be your own wisdom, and you refer his command to your own fortitude; just as if the axe should glory against him who holds it, and the saw against him by whom it is drawn, and they should say that all the works which are done through axe and saw are their own, perfected by their art; and if anyone should lift up a rod and exalt a staff with power to strike whomsoever he wills, and that very rod or staff should glory and say that the one struck has been struck by themselves — so you also, when you have been the instrument of God's will, are raised up in pride, and glory that all the things done were of your virtue." This same judgment is plain much more fully in chapter 4.

Likewise Isaiah 13: "The burden of Babylon," etc. — "I have commanded my sanctified ones, and have called my strong ones in my wrath, them that rejoice in my glory. The Lord of hosts hath given charge to the troops of war that come from a country afar off, from the highest heavens — the Lord and the vessels of his fury — to destroy the whole land." On which Jerome, on Isaiah, book 5, says: "We, following the order of history, say these sanctified and strong ones to be the Medes, of whom Scripture testifies more openly in the consequents, saying: *Behold, I shall stir up the Medes against you, who shall not seek silver, nor will they have gold.*" And he adds: "Nor is it wonderful if he calls the Medes sanctified for the subversion of Babylon, since through Jeremiah he calls Nebuchadnezzar himself, who served his command in destroying the prevaricating Jerusalem, his servant and his dove. Moreover, that he says, *Strong in my wrath and rejoicing in my glory*, shows that they overthrew the power of so lofty a kingdom not by their own strength, but by the wrath of God." Whence also Daniel 1: "The Lord delivered into his hand" — that is, of Nebuchadnezzar — "Jehoiakim King of Judah," etc. Gloss: "by whose" — namely, the Lord's — "will it was done, not by the strength of the enemies."

Likewise Jeremiah 31: "He that scattered Israel will gather him." Gloss: "Therefore not the power of the enemies, but the will of the Lord." And above, chapter 10: "I know, O Lord," says

the Prophet, "that the way of a man is not his, neither is it in a man to walk and direct his steps." Where the Gloss: "Let those be ashamed who say that everyone is at his own choice. *For the way of a man is not his,*" etc. Whence David: "By the Lord shall the steps of a man be directed." Nor can anyone expound this authority of the good ways of man and good steps only — on account of the grace of God being necessarily required, which is not totally in the power of man — since Jeremiah is speaking there literally of the way of a Babylonian man, namely Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, as he later many times expresses his name as one to come, as a scourge and the hammer of God's wrath, that he might lay waste Judaea in punishment of sin, as the preceding and following text shows. For the voice of hearing says, Gloss: "of the Babylonian coming, *Behold he comes, and a great commotion from the land of the North, that he may make the Cities of Judah a desolation, and a habitation of dragons.*" For Babylon was on the North side with respect to Judaea, as Jerome says on that of Daniel 11, "His kingdom shall be broken, and shall be divided toward the four winds of Heaven": Egypt is to the South, Macedonia to the West, Syria and Babylonia to the North, and Asia to the East with respect to Judaea. Wherefore in Jeremiah, the Lord said to Jeremiah thus: "From the North an evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land," Gloss: "of Judaea: For behold I will call together all the families of the kingdoms of the North," Gloss: "subject to the King of Babylon," "and they shall come, and they shall set every one his throne in the entrance of the gates of Jerusalem, and upon all the walls thereof round about, and upon all the cities of Judah; and I will pronounce my judgments against them, touching all their wickedness, who have forsaken me, and have offered libations to strange gods." Wherefore also below in chapter 27, the Lord calls Nebuchadnezzar his servant, saying: "Now I have given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon my servant." And it follows in Jeremiah 10, immediately after the text recited above: "I know, O Lord, that the way of a man is not his," Gloss: "of the Babylonian man, but of our merit and thy indignation." And it follows: "neither is it in a man to walk and direct his steps. Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment, and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing." Yet this man of Babylon did not do this from charity, but from cruelty, nor from zeal of justice or obedience to the divine will, but rather from pride and lust of dominating. Therefore he did not merit, but sinned, as also was the case of Sennacherib King of Assyria, as is shown above.

For this is plain expressly in Jeremiah 25, where the Lord says: "Because you have not heard my words, behold I will send and take all the kindreds of the North, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant the King of Babylon, and I will bring them against this land, and against the inhabitants thereof, and I will destroy them," and all the other evils. And it follows consequently: "And they shall serve the King" or Kings "of Babylon 70 years; and when the 70 years shall be expired, I will visit upon the King of Babylon, and upon that nation, their iniquity, and upon the land of the Chaldeans, and I will make it perpetual desolations." Which is more expressly had below, in chapter 50, where his sin and his punishment are more clearly expressed: "Go forth out of the midst of Babylon," he says, "and go out of the land of the Chaldeans, for behold I am stirring up, and I will bring against Babylon an assembly of great nations, and they shall be prepared against her, and on the day she shall be taken; and Chaldea shall be a prey, all that waste her shall be

filled with spoils, says the Lord, because you have rejoiced and spoken great things, plundering my inheritance. Your mother is exceedingly confounded, and she that bore you is made even with the dust. Behold, she shall be the last among the nations, and a desert in the way, and parched, by the wrath of the Lord; she shall not be inhabited, but shall be wholly brought to desolation. Make haste against Babylon, fight against her round about, for she has sinned against the Lord. Her foundations are fallen, and her walls are destroyed, since it is the vengeance of the Lord; take vengeance on her. As she has done, do to her: scatter the sower from Babylon, and him that holds the sickle from the face of the sword of the dove" — Gloss: "He calls Nebuchadnezzar a dove not for simplicity but for the foolishness of his pride." And it follows in the Prophet: "Israel is a scattered flock; the Lions have driven him away. First the King of Assyria devoured him, this last one, Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, has even disjointed his bones. Therefore thus saith the Lord: Behold I will visit the King of Babylon and his land, as I have visited the King of Assyria." And there follows the manner of the visitation: "destroy and slay, the voice of war in the land, and a great commotion. How is the hammer of the whole earth broken and bruised? How is Babylon turned into a desert?" And it follows: "Behold I am against you, O proud one, says the Lord, for the time of your visitation has come, and the proud shall fall," and many other similar things, before and after. This whole thing also the burden of Babylon, by no means light, prophesied in Isaiah 13, plainly attests.

Likewise Jeremiah 47, [the prophet] is said to Nebuchadnezzar himself, under the name of a sword, in the person of the afflicted: "O sword of the Lord, how long wilt thou not be quiet? Go into thy scabbard, rest, and be still." And the Prophet answers for him: "How shall it be quiet, when the Lord hath given it a charge against Ascalon," etc. Where the Gloss: "as if to say, the sword cannot be quiet save by the command of the Lord, whose vengeance it executes." Likewise Lamentations 3: "Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, and the Lord did not command it?" Where the Gloss: "Who is he, how foolish, how audacious, who has commanded that anything be done, and the Lord did not command it — by whose just disposition all things are done?" And he shows this very diffusely, both in evil and in good things.

All these things signify divine providence, not merely permissive but actually preceptive. Nor can anyone say that God provides for those great things, but does not care for some small matters; for if he provides the deeds of Popes and Emperors or Kings, why not Cardinals and Dukes? And if of these, why not Archbishops and Counts? And if of these, why not Bishops and Barons, Rectors and soldiers? And so descending from the greatest to the least, from the proud to the humble, and from the rich to the poor — as the proximate chapter argued — most of all because he hides his mysteries from the wise and prudent, and reveals them to the little ones. Do not even the Angels of the little ones always see the face of the Father in heaven, who also looks on the lowly from near at hand, and knows the lofty from afar? Who himself, being poor, has chosen the poor in this world?

Likewise the Apostle, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, and other holy Doctors, supposing that "all things befell them in figure," and that they "were written for our learning and correction," draw greater things of this kind to lesser, and to all other similar things universally. Jerome also says, in book 4 on Isaiah, where above: "Whatever, however, is said to the Assyrian — that is, to Sennacherib King of the Assyrians — can be referred to the pride of heretics and to the Devil, who in the Scriptures are called the axe, and the saw, and the rod, because through him unfruitful trees are cut down, and the hardness of unbelievers is divided and sawn, and they are struck with a rod, who do not receive discipline." And the same, the burden of Babylon, which in book 5 he expounded historically, as has been said, in book 6, expounding it anagogically, says: "Babylon, which is interpreted *confusion*, signifies this world, which lies in evil, and confounds not only the tongues, but the works and minds of individuals; and Nebuchadnezzar her King signifies the Devil; and his sanctified, strong, and Captains, the Apostles and Apostolic men and Captains of the Church"; and all the Doctors understand and expound the entire sacred Scripture in similar places in a similar manner.

Likewise the greatest and most horrible evils that ever were done — namely the persecution and killing of Christ and the Apostles, and of his other members — emanated from the actual providence of God. For it is not probable that God the Father should ever have negligently exposed his only Son, so beloved, of whom he commanded his Angels that they should keep him in all his ways, and whom he himself never abandoned, since they are one — to chance, or fortune, or the greatest misfortunes; nor did he permit anyone to touch his Christ, or anything to befall him in any way, except from the most wise counsel of his most provident will. For so a wise, good, and powerful parent, if he could, would provide for his most tender, beloved son in all things. For this most befits and is fitting, nor is it otherwise fitting, as chapters 27 and following have taught.

And this Isaiah 53 seems to attest, when he says: "He was offered, because he himself willed it." Nor is there doubt that the Father and the Son are of inseparable will; wherefore many of the faithful unanimously testify this, saying: "Lord, thou who didst make heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, who through the Holy Spirit by the mouth of our father David thy servant didst say: *Why have the heathen raged, and the people meditated vain things? The Kings of the earth stood up, and the princes assembled together, against the Lord, and against his Christ.* For there assembled together truly in this city, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, to do what thy hand and thy counsel decreed to be done" (Acts 4). And similar is what the Apostle says, Romans 11: "According to the gospel, indeed, they are enemies for your sake." And 1 Corinthians 11: "There must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest among you."

Of these three authorities, however, Augustine treats the first two, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 21, with the foregoing meaning, and adds: "So much, indeed, did the hand and counsel of God predestine to be done by the Jewish enemies, as much as the Gospels were

necessary for our sake." And the same, in *On Reprehension and Grace*, chapter 22, says that God chose Judas, for the pouring out of his blood, and that through his damnable work the venerable work of Christ might be completed. Likewise the Lombard, *Sentences* III, distinction 20, says thus: "Of Christ it is read that he was handed over by the Father, and that he handed himself over, and that Judas handed him over, and the Jews. He himself handed himself over, since he willingly went to the passion. The Father handed him over, because by the will of the Father — indeed of the entire Trinity — he suffered. Judas handed him over by betraying, and the Jews by instigating. And the act of Judas and the Jews was evil, but the act of Christ and of the Father was good. The work of Christ and of the Father was good, since the will of the Father and the Son was good. The work of Judas and of the Jews was evil, since their intention was evil. There were diverse things done there or works — that is, diverse acts — and one matter, or thing done — namely, that passion. Therefore the Doctors sometimes unite in that deed the Father, the Son, Judas, and the Jew; sometimes they distinguish — looking at the passion, they call it one work of theirs; attending to the intentions and acts, they discern diverse deeds. Whence Augustine: '*A handing-over was made by the Father, a handing-over was made by the Son, and a handing-over was made by Judas; one matter was done, that is, the passion. What therefore distinguishes among them? That this the Father and the Son did in charity, but Judas in betrayal. You see that not what a man does, but with what intention, must be considered. In the same deed, that is, operation, we find God where Judas is: God we bless, Judas we detest, since God thought of our salvation, Judas thought of the price, by which he sold his Lord; the Son the price which he gave for us. Diverse intention, therefore, makes diverse deeds, although one matter is made from diverse things.*' Behold, he says there was one matter, and diverse deeds, since there was one passion there, but diverse acts; and the acts of Judas and the Jews indeed evil, by which they wrought the passion of Christ — which is good, and is the work of God. The passion of Christ, then, is called both the work of the Jews, since it came from their acts, and the work of God, since by his Authorship — that is, by his willing — it was. Whence Augustine: "No one takes away the soul of Christ from him, since he has the power of laying down and taking up. Behold you have the Author of the work. He shall lay down his soul; behold you have the work of the Author"; and to conclude generally: as often as Christ in the flesh suffers anything, it is the work of the Author; for since he himself suffers by his own will, no other compelling, he himself is the Author of the work.

Likewise Augustine on that of Psalm 103: "From thy rebuke they shall flee, from the voice of thy thunder they shall fear; the mountains ascend, and the plains descend," etc., "thou hast set bounds," etc.: "the Emperor commanded; but who would have commanded, if God had not thundered? Because God willed, they commanded and it was done. Therefore let no one of men arrogate anything to himself; the waters shall fear, but from the voice of thy thunder." And below, in the same: "The mountains ascend" — namely, the powers, by raging — "and descend" — by being appeased. "Why, then, do they not now rage? Why do they not give effort, if they cannot overthrow our land, at least to cover it? Hear: *Thou hast set bounds which they shall not pass, neither shall they return to cover the earth.*"

Furthermore, if not all things came from actual providence, some act could be simply evil, unjust, and disordered — namely, by an order preceding. For there is a twofold ordering, namely preceding and following. Preceding ordering is that which preordains a thing to its being, as God preordained to create the world. Following ordering is that which, the thing being placed in being, orders it by a certain order through something fitting to it — as an evil act through misery and through punishment. Such an evil act, therefore, if it does not proceed from preceptive providence but only from permissive, is simply unjust and disordered — namely, by preceding ordering. For nothing is just in such matters except what is conformed to the first rule of justice, which is the actual will of God, as chapter 21 teaches; nor is anything simply preordained which is not preordained by that which is the principle of this order and the primary orderer. But no act, however evil, is simply unjust or disordered by preceding ordering, since then the entire universe would not be best disposed — the contrary of which the 27th chapter alleged. The universe is better and more wisely disposed, however, if such acts are disposed by preceding and following ordering, than only by following. Therefore any such act is just with respect to God who wills it, and with respect to the sufferer who suffers it on account of his sins, or on account of some other cause approved by the divine will — although with respect to the particular agent, as the devil or man, it is unjust, who does it with malevolent and harmful mind, not with the mind of exercising divine justice. Just as if a torturer should hang someone justly handed over to him by a Judge to be hanged, not from love of executing justice, but from the lust of avenging; and as if a servant ordered to beat the son of his Lord should beat him with the mind of avenging, not with the mind of chastising at the command of the Lord. As is said in Isaiah 10 of Sennacherib King of the Assyrians, who was the rod of God's fury against the delinquent people; but because this man knew it not, nor did it with such mind, he sinned: "Woe," he says, "to Assyria, the rod of my fury, to a deceitful nation I will send him, against the people of my fury I will give him a charge, that he may take," and tread it down. "But he shall not so think, and his heart shall not so esteem; but his heart shall be set to crush, not to correct: for he shall say, *Are not my princes altogether Kings?*" — proudly attributing the whole to his own forces. And therefore there follows the threat of his punishment: "And it shall be," he says, "when the Lord shall have completed all his works" — not Sennacherib — "on Mount Zion, I shall visit upon the fruit of the magnificent heart of the King of Assyria, and upon the glory of the height of his eyes. For he hath said, *In the strength of my hand, I have done it,*" etc. And his punishment follows: "Therefore the Lord shall send leanness among his fat ones," etc. That treading down of the people, then, was just with respect to God who willed it and through that rod of his made it; it was just likewise with respect to the people suffering, but not with respect to Sennacherib cruelly and proudly inflicting it as if by his own forces. The same is plain concerning Nebuchadnezzar, as is shown above, and concerning many other scourgings of the people of God most often in Scripture.

But lest in so great a judgment I should seem to say anything from my own understanding insensately, behold, Doctors of sense who manifestly hold this view. Blessed Augustine, then, in *83 Questions*, Question 27, says thus: "It can come to pass that through an evil man divine providence may both punish and aid. For the impiety of the Jews both supplanted Judas and was

for salvation to the Gentiles. Likewise it can come to pass that divine providence through a good man may both damn and aid, as the Apostle says: *To some we are the odor of life unto life, to others the odor of death unto death.* But since every tribulation is either the punishment of the impious or the exercise of the just — since the same threshing-floor both crushes the chaff and frees the grain from the chaff (whence also it took the name *tribulation*) — and again, since peace and rest from bodily molestations both gain the good and corrupt the evil: all these divine providence moderates according to the merits of souls. Yet the good do not choose for themselves the ministry of tribulation, nor do the evil love peace; therefore they themselves, through whom is wrought that which they know not, receive a reward not of justice, which is referred to God, but of their malevolence. Just as it is not imputed to the good, that to those wishing to profit them harm comes to someone, but the reward of benevolence is given to a good mind. For with the supreme God well administering all things which he has made, nothing in the universe is disordered, nothing unjust — whether we know it or know it not. But when in part the sinning soul offends, then, since by its merits it is there where such ought to be, and suffers those things which such it is fair to suffer, it deforms the universal kingdom of God by no foulness of itself. Wherefore, since we do not know all the things which the divine order rightly does concerning us, we act according to the law in good will alone; in other matters we are acted upon according to the law, since the law itself remains immutable, and moderates by most beautiful governance all mutable things." The same, *On the Nature of Good*, chapter 11: "It is in no wise possible for the nature of God to be harmed, nor for any nature under God to be harmed unjustly, since when by sinning some harm unjustly, the unjust will is imputed to them. The power, however, by which they are permitted to harm is only from God, who, even with them being ignorant, knows what those ought to suffer whom he permits them to harm." And below in the same, chapter 32: "Since the power of those who harm is only from God, as it is written: *Through me Kings reign and Tyrants through me hold the earth.* The Apostle also says: *There is no power but from God.* And Job: *Who maketh the hypocrite to reign for the perversity of the people.* And of the people of Israel he says: *I gave them a King in my anger.* It is not unjust, when the wicked receive the power of harming, that the patience of the good should be proved, and the iniquity of the evil punished. For through the power given to the devil, Job was proved, that he might appear just; and Peter tempted, lest he presume of himself; and Paul buffeted, lest he extol himself; and Judas damned, that he might hang himself. Since, therefore, through the power which he gave to the devil, God himself did all things justly, yet not for these just deeds the reward, but for the wicked will of harming, which was of the devil himself, was the punishment rendered to him."

Likewise blessed Gregory, *Morals* II, 12, on that of Job 1, "Naked came I out of my mother's womb," etc., says thus: "But because consolation must be drawn not only from the consideration of [the human] condition but also from the justice of the Creator, he rightly subjoins: *The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so is it done.* The holy man, the adversary tempting, had lost all things; yet knowing that Satan had no powers of tempting against him save by the Lord's permission, he does not say, *The Lord gave, the devil hath taken away*, but *The*

Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away. For perhaps it would have been to be grieved, if what the Creator had given, the enemy had taken away; but since none took away save he himself who gave, his own he received back, ours he did not take away. Where it is well subjoined, *As it pleased the Lord, so is it done.* For when in this life we suffer those things which we do not wish, we must necessarily incline the studies of our will to him who can will nothing unjust. Great indeed is the consolation in that which displeases — that what is acted toward us, by his ordering, to whom only what is just pleases. If, therefore, we know that just things please the Lord, but we can suffer none save those which have pleased the Lord, then all things which we suffer are just; and it is greatly unjust if we murmur about a just suffering."

This Anselm also testifies, *On Truth*, chapter 7, saying thus: "If all these are what they are in the supreme truth, without doubt these are what they ought to be. Whatever, however, is what it ought to be, is rightly. Therefore everything which is, is rightly." And below, chapter 8, he raises a doubt about sin — how it itself is rightly, since it ought not to be — and concerning the act of an evil will specifically he asks thus: "Do you suppose that the affect of an evil will ought to be?" And he answers that it ought to be and ought not to be. "For it ought to be, since it is permitted well and wisely by him without whose permission it could not come to be; and it ought not to be, with respect to him by whose iniquitous will it is conceived. Just as when one sinning is struck by someone to whom it does not pertain, since this one ought to be struck and that one ought not to strike, the striking ought to be and ought not to be — and therefore right and not right, it cannot be denied. But if you consider the judgment of the supernal wisdom and goodness, whether on one side only or on both — namely of the agent and of the sufferer — that the striking ought not to be, who shall dare to deny that what is permitted by such great wisdom and goodness ought to be? Let him deny who dares; I do not dare."

Likewise Titus, as is alleged in the Gloss, on that of Luke 13, "There were present some, telling of the Galileans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices," says thus: "He manifests here also that whatever befall in the punishment of the guilty from judgments, happen not only by the power of those judging, but also by the nod of God. Whence whether the Judge punishes with a just conscience, or condemns intending something else, the matter must be commended to the divine censure." And Chrysostom, on that below in the same, [verse] 18, "The tower fell here in Siloam and slew them," says thus: "He does not punish all, granting respite to others to repent; nor yet does he reserve all for future punishment, lest more should deny providence. Yet, even did he so act, none would deny permissive providence; therefore all such things come from preceptive providence."

The whole of Scripture, both of the Old Testament and of the New, also attributes to God almost all active verbs — as: to lead in enemies, to send fear and dread, to turn into flight, to humble, to depose, to root up, to destroy, to scatter, to overthrow, to scourge, to strike, to wound, to kill — and their contraries with many similar names, of which kind are: Saviour, Helper, Protector, Defender, salvation, virtue, protection, defense, fortitude — with infinite similar — which would not be unless God in some way did this, and not only permitted, as it seems. Wherefore also all

these are contained under his providence, not merely permissive, but actually positive, and in some manner preceptive.

This, however, seems to be the argument of the Apostle, Romans 11. For when he cites the divine response, "I have left to myself seven thousand men, who have not bowed their knees before Baal," he himself argues that this was according to the operation and election of God, concluding thus: "Therefore in this time also a remnant according to the election of grace are saved." And similarly the Gloss argues on that of Jeremiah 31, "He that scattered Israel will gather him," saying: "Therefore not the power of the enemies, but the will of the Lord." Therefore the Lord truly does all these things. Whence Isaiah 45: "I am the Lord, and there is none other; forming light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil; I am the Lord, doing all these things." Nor let anyone contradict prophetic truth, lest he incur the woe of malediction; for there follows: "Woe to him that gainsays his Maker, a sherd of the earthen pots." Whoever also try with a lying gloss to restrict this universal multitude of works of God's virtue, are reckoned among the enemies of the Lord, the Psalmist saying in Psalm 65: "Sing joyfully to God, all the earth," etc., "Say to God, *How terrible are thy works! In the multitude of thy strength thy enemies shall lie to thee*"; and to the end of the Psalm he pursues the works of the Lord commonly in prosperous and adverse things.

Otherwise, moreover, the beginning and end of the Christian Religion would be detracted from men — namely, fear and love. For "the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord"; and "the end of the precept" — indeed, the fullness of the whole law — is love and charity. Through fear one departs from evil, and through love one perseveres in good. Fear is conceived from adverse things; love is generated from prosperous. He, therefore, who takes from God prosperous and adverse things — except according to that improvident providence, merely permissive, not actually positive — takes from him fear and love together. Therefore Augustine says, 83 *Questions*, Question 36: "Nothing is more true than what was said: *The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord*. For there is no one who does not flee pain more than seek pleasure. Whence it comes that men, whom the beauty of virtue does not yet delight, are deterred from sin by punishments, which are most truly preached through holy men and divine [Scriptures]. That God, then, may be feared, it must be persuaded that all things are ruled by divine providence — not so much by reasons, which he who can find can also feel the beauty of virtue, as by examples, either recent if any occur, or especially from the History of the Old Testament and the New."

Whoever also takes away this providence of God takes from any sufferer the greatest portion of patience, hope, consolation, and joy. For who shall so patiently, especially, consolingly, and joyfully sustain adversities, if he believes them to befall him from an enemy alone, or from chance, and that through them sins are not purged, virtues exercised, or rewards accumulated — as if he should believe these to be sent upon him by God actually providing, on account of some such good? Indeed, so firmly to believe softened harsh things to all the saints of God, blunted sharp things, made gentle anything hard, and sweetly tempered every bitter and contrary thing; and there was in all sad things a singular solace — which is also for me, a sinner, the principal

remedy in any adversities. Oh, how easily contraries does he sustain who fears or loves God, believing God to will him to sustain such things — who can will nothing save most wisely and most justly. This, as I think, makes the yoke of the Lord sweet, and his burden light, and grants rest to laboring souls; which also clearly the Authority of blessed Gregory, *Morals* II, 12, recited above, attests.

Hope in God also is taken from men by him who so posits, and gives them hope in princes, in men, and in flesh; for these truly liberate man from adversities, and truly place him in prosperities, with God as it were sleeping in some way and only permitting — into whose counsel my soul shall not come; rather, let their counsel be far from me, since it is far from the counsel of truth, since it itself is the counsel of vanity. For God commanded all things, both adverse and prosperous, to the ancient Fathers to make known to their sons, that another generation might know — sons that should be born and rise up, and shall declare to their sons especially to this end, that they may put their hope in God, and not forget the works of God (Psalm 77). To me, therefore, "to cleave to God is good, to place my hope in the Lord my God"; for this hope does not confound.

Likewise he who so posits not only takes the foregoing things from men in adverse things, but in prosperous things also he takes from God love, honor, and the manifold rendering of thanks, as the proximate chapter argued. For who shall love and honor his God, and render thanks to him, because he merely permits prosperous things to befall him — as also at times does a robber or tyrant — as much as he would render if he gave them to him from special love, positively, actually, and truly foreseen and given? Likewise, so to posit places men with the ungrateful and the foolish in the denial of God, and renders them more prone to all evils. Whence Job 21, having recited the manifold prosperity of the wicked, as is plain from the proximate chapter, the wicked said to God: "Depart from us" — as if to say, "We are well enough without thee" — and as if with the foolish, denying God, they said, "Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him?" In Psalm 72, the prosperity of the wicked having likewise been recited, as is plain from the proximate chapter, they said: "How doth God know?" etc.; "Behold these sinners obtained riches" — as if they should argue, therefore God does not know, or does not care, nor justly distributes human affairs; and as if further they should say, at least in heart, therefore there is no God; and behold the proneness which arises to sin: "And I said: *Therefore in vain have I justified my heart*," etc.; and above, in the same: "But my feet were almost moved, my steps had nearly slipped, since I was zealous over the wicked, seeing the peace of sinners," etc. And Ecclesiastes 9: "All things equally happen to the just and the unjust, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices; as the good is, so also is the sinner. Whence also the hearts of the children of men are filled with malice and contempt while they live, and after this they shall be brought down to the dead." And above in the same, chapter 8: "Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear." Against these, therefore, and similar dangers, the actual providence of God in all things must be preached.

De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium

Book I, Chapters XXXIII–XXXIV

CHAPTER XXXIII

That with respect to whatsoever there is a permission of God, there is also His actual volition.

To these things I judge it not impertinent to join, that with respect to whatsoever there is a permission of God, there is also His actual volition. For this evidently follows from the immediately preceding chapter. Likewise by the twenty-second [chapter] of this [book]: God has some act of will with respect to whatsoever is permitted, and not an act of nolition, since by the tenth [chapter], in that case it would not come to pass, and therefore neither would it be permitted. The same is also proved by the authorities adduced in the preceding chapter, namely, that nothing is unjust simply because it is permitted by God; if, however, that permission had no act of will, it would not render anything just, as has been argued above. Likewise Augustine says in *Enchiridion* 75: "Nothing is done unless the Omnipotent willeth it to be done, either by allowing it to be done, or by Himself doing it." And he continues in chapter 76: "Nor is it to be doubted that God doeth well, even by allowing those things to be done that are done ill; for He alloweth them only by a just judgment, and certainly all that is just is good. Although therefore those things which are evil, in so far as they are evil, are not good; nevertheless it is good that not only good things, but also evil things, should be. For unless this were good, that evil things should be, in no wise would they be permitted to be by the omnipotent Good, to whom without doubt, just as it is always as easy to do what He willeth, so it is as easy not to allow to be that which He willeth not to be."

From which it appears that God has a positive act of will, of willing actually or not willing, concerning whatsoever. For he proves that it is good that evils exist, by the fact that otherwise they would not be permitted by the omnipotent Good; which he likewise proves by the fact that as easily as He doeth what He willeth, so easily doth He not allow to be what He willeth not, intimating that He willeth anything to be, or willeth it not to be. Either, therefore, he there means "willeth not" positively, as importing a positive act contrary to this verb "willeth," or purely negatively. If positively, the proposition is established—namely, that he supposes this disjunctive in God concerning whatsoever: "God willeth this, or God willeth this not, positively." If purely negatively, then by this he does not prove that unless it were good that evils should be, evils would not be, nor would they be allowed to be—which nevertheless is what he intends, when he says: "It is as easy not to allow to be that which He willeth not"—intimating that if it were not good, but evil, that evils should be, God would not will this, and so would not allow them to be, and therefore neither would they be. If, however, he means "willeth not" purely negatively, thus

there could be a middle ground in God between actually willing and not willing positively, just as there is in a stone, or in a sleeping man; and so it would not follow: "He willeth not this, therefore this is not done"—just as it does not follow concerning a man who can hinder some doable thing, or even promote it: "He willeth not this, speaking purely negatively, therefore this is not done, nor doth he allow this to be"; nay rather, it can be done by another, even though he willeth it not, provided he doth not actually positively will it not, since then he would not hinder another doing it.

Likewise, just as by saying that "as easily as He doeth what He willeth," he means some act, so it appears that by saying "so easily doth He not allow to be that which He willeth not," he means some equally easy and equally efficacious act, namely, willing not, positively. Moreover, it is established that he allows and permits who could prohibit and does not; whence also he does not allow who could prohibit and does. When therefore Augustine says, "How easy it is for God not to allow to be that which He willeth not," by "not allowing" he means prohibiting, which imports some act; but what act, save willing not, positively—which by the tenth [chapter] is as efficacious for impeding or prohibiting as willing is for doing whatsoever?

That also in Augustine's mode of speaking, "willeth not" imports some positive act contrary to volition, is plain by him below, in the same [book], chapter 80, thus saying: "As regards angelic and human creatures who sinned, what God willed not, they did; but as regards the omnipotence of God, in no wise were they able to effect it." If, however, this verb "willed not" imported only a negation, it would seem that the angel and the man could do what God willed not, nor would this in any way derogate from His omnipotence. Likewise the first chapter, 80, below, thus speaks: "In a wonderful and ineffable manner, that is not done apart from the will of God which is even done against His will, since it would not be done if He did not allow it; nor doth He unwillingly allow, but willingly; nor would He allow good things to be done ill, were He not omnipotent, and able to make good out of evil."

The same in 22 *De Civitate Dei* 4: "Many things are done by evil men against the will of God; but He is of such great wisdom and such great virtue, that all things which seem contrary to His will tend toward those issues or ends which He hath foreknown to be good and just." Likewise [in] 26 *Contra Faustum*: "Indeed we know that to have been done which the will of God hath; but that which the will of God hath not, in no wise can be done by anyone." Therefore God not only permits, but actually willeth that every fact be done.

The same on Psalm 61: "God hath spoken once": "God by His own counsel permitted His Son to be slain by the unjust"; and below, in the same place: "God would not have permitted, unless it were just; by judgment He permits; by measure, number, and weight He permits." Therefore the permission of God hath with it counsel, judgment, measure, number, and weight—therefore also some act of will. The same in *De Bono Perseverantiae* 56 cites St. Gregory thus speaking: "I beseech you, confess the Trinity of one Divinity; but if you wish otherwise, say of one essence; and God will be entreated to grant you a voice from the Holy Spirit"—that is, God will be asked

to permit a voice to be given to you, by which you may confess what you believe. Yet that voice permitted to be given would truly and properly be a gift of God: for he there adduces Gregory to testify that to believe in God, and to confess what we believe, is a gift of God.

Likewise the blessed Gregory, in 6 *Moralia* 11, on Job 5: "Who taketh the wise in their craftiness," etc., thus says: "For often some, puffed up with human wisdom, when they perceive divine judgments to be contrary to their desires, attempt to resist by cunning machinations, and that they may twist the force of the supernal dispensation according to their wish, persist in subtle thoughts and seek out subtler counsels; but thence they accomplish the will of God, whence they strive to alter it, and while they strive to resist the counsel of omnipotent God, they obey it; for often even that which trifles against His counsel by human striving aptly serves His disposition. The Lord therefore catches the wise in their craftiness, when human deeds fittingly serve His counsels even when they resist." And below, [chapter] 12: "For the just and merciful Disposer of mortals' acts, some things grants propitiously, others permits in anger; and those things which He permits, so tolerates, that He turneth them to the use of His counsel. Whence in a wonderful manner it comes about, that even what is done apart from the will of God is not contrary to the will of God; because while evil deeds are turned to good use, even those things which oppose His counsel serve His counsel. Hence the Psalmist says: 'Great are the works of the Lord, sought out unto all His wills.' Thus indeed His works are great, that through everything that is done by men, His will is sought out. Hence again Solomon says: 'There is no wisdom, there is no prudence, there is no counsel against the Lord.' It remains therefore that in all things which we do, we should inquire the force of the supernal will, to which our action ought devoutly to do service when known, and to follow as the leader of its journey, lest it serve Him even unwillingly, if proudly it declines from Him. For the force of the supernal counsel can in no wise be avoided, but he tempers it to himself with great strength who restrains himself under His commands, and lightens its weights to himself who bears it willingly with the submitted shoulder of his heart."

From these things it is shown evidently that with respect to whatsoever there is divine permission, there is also divine actual volition—which his authority in 2 *Moralia* 11, cited in the preceding chapter, fully testifies.

But against this seem to militate many sayings of the saints, distinguishing permission against the divine will, and saying that He permits many things which He willeth not, nor loveth. Whence Hosea 8: "They have reigned, and not by Me; they have been princes, and I knew it not." And Jeremiah 14: "The prophets prophesy falsely in My name; I sent them not, and I commanded them not, neither have I spoken to them." And below, 23: "I sent not the prophets, yet they ran; I spake not to them, yet they prophesied."

Likewise then whoever entered into the sheepfold, that is, into the Church, in any manner whatsoever, would enter through the door, since he would enter through God and Christ, nor would anyone climb up another way—which is contrary to that good Shepherd, John 10.

Likewise, then it would not be a thing to be indignantly borne, that the unworthy are preferred to great dignities—which is contrary to the common custom and teaching of the saints. Whence also Ecclesiastes 10: "There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, as if proceeding by error from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity, and the rich sitting beneath. I have seen servants on horses, and princes walking like servants on the ground."

Likewise, then no one ought to be deposed from any dignity or any state whatsoever, since God hath placed him there; nor ought anyone to write: "such-and-such, by divine permission," but "by divine providence, or will, or election." Nor ought one to resist anyone whomsoever doing anything whatsoever, since he doeth it from the will and ordination of God. Whence also Rehoboam, with the houses of Judah and Benjamin willing to fight against Jeroboam and his men, in order to reintegrate the divided kingdom, the Lord said unto them through the prophet Shemaiah: "Ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren; let every man return to his house, for this thing was done by Me of My will," 2 Paralipomenon 11 and 3 Kings 12. With which the Apostle agrees, Romans 13, thus admonishing: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist purchase to themselves damnation."

Likewise, then one would have to obey the precept of anyone whatsoever, and any suggestion, and any appetite whatsoever; for all these proceed not only from the permission, but also from the volition of God.

For more easily resolving these objections, it must be known, according to the Philosopher in 3 *Ethics* 1, that "to will" is said in two ways, namely, simply, and in a certain respect; just as a merchant in danger of shipwreck simply willeth safety, but because perhaps he cannot have it unless he cast forth his merchandise, he willeth to cast forth his merchandise—not, however, this simply, but for the sake of safety. Whence also Proverbs 13: "The slothful willeth and willeth not." Augustine likewise, *De Spiritu et Littera* 26, thus says: "Nor is it usually said that anyone hath done something by will, if he hath done something unwillingly, although if we consider more subtly, even that which anyone is compelled to do unwillingly, if he doth it, he doth by will. But because he would prefer something else, therefore he is said to do it unwillingly—that is, not willing. For someone is compelled by some evil to do that which, willing to avoid, he doth what he is compelled; and through this, if he doth it, not indeed by full and free will, yet he doth it not but by will." The laws also say, that a coerced will is a will. But such operations, according to the Philosopher in the same place, are mixed of voluntary and involuntary, and therefore are sometimes denominated from one of these and called voluntary, sometimes from the other and called involuntary, or not voluntary, so that, according to Augustine just cited, such a one is said to do "unwillingly and not willing."

Wherefore the Philosopher says in 2 *Topics*, that desire with respect to anything desired can be threefold: either as an end, like health; or as of those things which are unto an end, like to sew, or

to compound; or as of those things which are by accident, as in the desire of mixed [wine] for sweetness. For not because it is wine, but because it is sweet [is it desired]; for per se one desires sweetness, but wine by accident. For if it be sour, he no longer desires it; therefore he desires it by accident. And in 7 *Ethics* 9: "If anyone choose or pursue this for the sake of that, per se he chooseth and pursueth this, but by accident the former; but simply we say that which is per se."

And according to him in 6 *Metaphysics* 4: "Accident appears near to non-being; and therefore Plato did not badly place sophistic about non-being, since [it is] about being by accident. Wherefore there is no speculation about it, nor any active, productive, or theological science studious about it." And in 1 *Physics* 74 thus speaks: "Since most properly we say a physician doth something, or suffereth, or comes-to-be from a physician, if as physician he so suffereth or doeth, [it is] manifest that from that which is not, something comes-to-be, and this insofar as it is not." Therefore the authors and doctors, both philosophical and theological, speaking frequently, as is fitting, properly, and in propositions not by accident but simply and per se true, say of him who willeth something only by accident in the said way, that he willeth it not, or willeth not.

Wherefore the Philosopher in 8 *Ethics* 3 says, that friendships for the sake of the useful and the delightful are friendships by accident. And below, 9.1: "On account of these," says he, "namely, the useful and the delightful, friendship existing, dissolution comes about when those things, for the sake of which they loved, are not done. For they did not love each other, but the things existing." And what is "to love," save to will good to the beloved, the Philosopher saying, 8 *Ethics* 3: "Lovers will good things to one another"—with which Anselm agrees, *De Casu Diaboli* 13: "He who willeth something for the sake of beatitude, willeth nothing else than beatitude"—with many other authorities adduced in the 26th [chapter] of this [book] for this same purpose.

Thus also God simply willeth the elect to be saved, and to be rewarded with eternal beatitude; but because it is fitting that their merits should precede, He hath ordained for them rebellious tyrants and many enemies, like Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, and others, as rods of His fury, that thus He might visit their iniquities with the rod, and their sins with stripes, and so might mercifully chastise them, or innocently preserve them from sins, or even usefully exercise their virtues. For what would the patience of the humble and the just merit, unless the injury of the malicious afflicted and pricked it?—all which things are sufficiently plain from what has gone before. Wherefore God willeth not such persecutors of the just simply to exist or to persecute, but only in a certain respect and by accident, on account of the elect; therefore frequently it is said that God willeth not them, nor their works, but only permits them—just as a sick man, who must be cut or burned in order to be cured, says not "I will," but says "if it must be so, I shall permit." He says not "I will," because he willeth it not simply; yet he willeth it in a certain respect and by accident, namely for the sake of health.

Which manner of speaking is also had in Sacred Scripture expressly, Genesis 47, where Joseph says to the Egyptians: "Take ye, and sow the fields, that ye may have grain. Ye shall give the fifth part to the king, and the four remaining parts I permit unto you for seed and for food, for your

children and your families." He said, "I permit": nor is there any doubt that he willed them to have the four remaining parts for themselves and theirs; but principally more he willed to have the fifth part for the use of the king, to whose business he specially attended. And Tobias 2, the Scripture speaking of the blinding of Tobias, thus says: "But this temptation the Lord permitted to befall him, that an example of his patience might be given to posterity, as also of holy Job." Behold, he says that the Lord permitted, and yet He willed that temptation, since it was good, and in no way evil through fault—which is plain by Raphael's testifying below, the same chapter, 12: "Because thou wast acceptable to God, it was necessary that temptation should prove thee"—and this was not but by the divine will. God therefore willed this, not, however, simply and for itself, but in a certain respect and by accident, insofar, namely, as it was an occasion of patience in Tobias and of good example to posterity.

It is plain, therefore, in what manner with respect to the same thing the divine permission and His actual volition are not repugnant. By this is plain [the answer] to the first [objection] from Hosea, that "they reigned, and not by Me," that is, [not by Me] willing simply, although [they reigned by Me willing] in a certain respect and by accident, as has been said. Or otherwise: "They reigned, and not by Me," that is, as far as it lay in them, since perhaps [they reigned] against their own conscience, and against human and legal justice, although not against simple justice which is divine—as the preceding chapter showed by proving that nothing is unjust simply.

To the others concerning Jeremiah and John it is plain by the same [argument] that unworthy prelates are not to be borne unworthily, but worthily as regards divine justice, which so disposes; they may, however, be borne unworthily as regards proper justice, if they have ascended less justly. Yet for us subjects I reckon it safe and salutary not to murmur easily against any prelates whatsoever, but to support them humbly for God's sake, who hath set them over us. For if they be mute or evil, this perchance is in punishment of our sins, who deserve to have such. Whence Job 34: "He maketh a hypocrite to reign because of the sins of the people." Whereon the blessed Gregory says, 25 *Moralia* 15: "Let none who suffereth such a ruler accuse him whom he suffereth, since assuredly it was of his merit to be subject to the jurisdiction of a perverse ruler. Therefore let him rather accuse the fault of his own work, than the injustice of the governor." And below, in the same place, 16: "Thus, then, according to the merits of subjects, are the persons of those who rule bestowed."

Sometimes, however, subjects through their own sins not only receive an evil prelate, but, what is more wonderful, he whom they had received as good is changed into evil. Wherefore Gregory says below, in the same place: "Thus according to the qualities of subjects are the acts of those who rule disposed, so that often, on account of the merit of the flock, the life of the very pastor, who is truly good, is forsaken. That David, praised by God's testimony, the prophet, puffed up with the swelling of sudden elation, sinned by numbering the people; and yet, when David sinned, the people received the punishment. Why this? because, namely, according to the merits of the multitudes are the hearts of rulers disposed. The just Judge corrected the vice of the sinner

from the chastisement of those, on whose account he sinned; but because he himself, by his own will being puffed up, was not free from fault, he himself also received punishment for the fault. For the wrath which raged corporally smote the people, but with intimate sorrow of heart it laid the ruler of the people prostrate."

A good prelate also, admitted and continually remaining good, sometimes on account of the sins of subjects is rendered mute as to the office of preaching and correction. Whence the Lord said to Ezekiel: "I will make thy tongue cleave to the roof of thy mouth, and thou shalt be dumb, and not as a man rebuking, for they are a provoking house." Where the Gloss on the word "provoking" [says], as if to say: "They are of such great bitterness, and contention against God, that they merit not even to hear rebuke." From which it is plain that where there hath been a multitude of sinners, there are unworthy sinners who are corrected by the Lord. Let subjects therefore first correct their own life, and let them not murmur against their prelates; but let them devoutly entreat the Lord for them, in whose hands are the hearts of kings and of all prelates.

Nor doth that which is argued consequently proceed, namely, that just as God placed a prelate in high station, so, if he be deposed, He deposes him. For He is who hath put down the mighty from their seat; nor did He place him there for his perpetual [tenure], but for a time, just as He gave the kingdom to Nebuchadnezzar, and to his seed after him—not for ever, but until the time of his land and of himself should come, as had been alleged earlier from Jeremiah 27—not understanding by "the time of his land and of himself" the time of the duration of the kingdom necessarily predetermined in some great, greater, or greatest conjunction, which renews sects and kingdoms (as the lying astrologers lie, who not only attempt to predetermine the times of great kingdoms, but also the time of the Christian faith, Albumasar *De Coniunctionibus* attesting), but the time prefixed by the Lord. For He changeth times and ages, transferreth kingdoms, and establisheth, Daniel 2: and a kingdom is transferred from nation to nation on account of injustices, Ecclesiastes 10. And as from nation to nation, so from tribe to tribe, from person to person, of which Saul and David are witnesses, as was touched above. And as He transfers kingdoms, so also any lesser dignities whatsoever.

Therefore, since some less worthy ones sometimes occupy dignities, and this as far as concerns them, namely according to human and inferior justice, less justly—although as regards divine and superior justice in some manner justly—well can these judges, judging according to human and inferior justice, since concerning the future they are ignorant of divine and superior justice, namely the most just will of God, will them to be deposed, although perchance not utterly absolutely, but with this expressed or tacit condition: "If it shall be pleasing before God"—and so further to act unto the deposition of such prelates; and if it should happen that this be done and they be deposed, this is wholly done according to divine and superior justice, as has been said. All this, moreover, the authority of Augustine *Ad Simplicianum*, prescribed in the twenty-fifth [chapter] of this [book], seems to confirm.

The fifth argument can likewise be retorted upon the head of the arguer. For if, because some write "such-and-such by divine permission," therefore by pure permission and not by the will of God is so-and-so [in office]: by similar reason, because to certain ones it is always written "by divine providence," or "election," or "by the grace of God," to the supreme Pontiff, bishop, or king, all such are preferred by divine providence and grace, and none of them by pure divine permission—although some of them are, or could be, evil, just as also among those constituted in lesser dignities. Likewise, if because someone writes "by divine permission, such-and-such," therefore by pure permission of God he is such-and-such—since all those constituted in other small dignities always write thus—all are always by pure divine permission such, and none by His volition or election or actual providence: which reason does not permit, since among them are many holy and good men, and God so cares for the little flock as for the great, as the preceding things have taught. Yet because the permission of God seems less than His grace, providence, election, or will, therefore the lesser, for the sake of humility, write thus.

To the sixth, however, concerning not resisting anyone doing anything, it must be answered as was said to the fourth, concerning the deposition of presidents: since just as God willeth one to do anything whatsoever, so He willeth to be resisted, if anyone resists Him, etc., as there. And if you argue: therefore in vain hath He ordained the first action, which He hath similarly ordained to be destroyed by a second; for "one building up, one tearing down: what doth it profit them but the labor?" Ecclesiasticus 34. I respond, that thus could be proved that fire and water and any contraries ought not to be in the world, since one of contraries impedes and destroys the action of the other; nay rather, what is more wonderful, the good angels sometimes mutually resist one another, and contend by turns. Whence Daniel 10: "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days," and below in the same place: "And now I will return to fight against the prince of the Persians"—who both were good angels, as is plain by Gregory, and the Gloss there cites him.

And there is some good and just will, contrary, however, in a certain manner to the divine will: as is plain concerning a good son, who willeth his father to live, whom God willeth to die—as appears by Augustine *Enchiridion* 70, and Lombard cites him in 1 *Sentences* dist. 48.1, and 22 *De Civitate Dei* 2 distinguishes a twofold will of God: one essential and eternal, by which God willeth; another temporal, by which He maketh others to will. Of this second [will] he thus says: "According to this will, by which we say God willeth what He maketh others to will, by whom future things are not known, He willeth many things, nor doth He do them. For many things His saints will to be done, inspired by Him with a holy will, nor are they done; as when they pray for certain ones holily and piously what they pray He doth not do, although He hath made in them this will of praying by His Holy Spirit." Which the Lord also expressly testified when He said to David: "Whereas thou hast thought in thy heart to build a house to My name, thou hast done well, taking this in mind," 3 Kings 8. That will, therefore, or thought pleased God, and yet the work toward which it tended, finally pleased not. For He immediately added: "Nevertheless, thou

shalt not build Me a house." Where also the Gloss says, "an argument that the will of an act pleases, even if not the act."

From all these things it is plain, that although God ordains something, it is not necessary that He will nothing to resist Him, nor [will] to destroy it; nay rather, He hath ordained all agents and resistants, generators and corrupters, and universally all contraries, and to them, both in acting and in resisting, in generating and corrupting, and generally in doing and not doing, hath constituted proper limits which they shall in no wise transgress.

To the last [objection] it is plain by the same: For the precepts of tyrants, the suggestions of the devil, and the appetites of the flesh, God willeth to be done, not that they may be obeyed by all, but for the punishment of sinners, or for humiliation and to forestall sins, or even for the exercise of virtues and the heaping up of merits. Nor is it wonderful: for God Himself sometimes commanded something, and forbade something, nor yet did He will this to be done, nor that not to be done—as is plain Genesis 22 concerning Abraham, to whom He commanded to immolate his son, nor yet willed He him to be immolated; but to prove the faith of Abraham He thus commanded. And Matthew 9, concerning the two blind men illumined, to whom He said: "See that no man know it"; but they, going forth, spread His fame in all that land—nor yet in this, according to the sentence of the Fathers, did they sin. And this is what Lombard manifestly teaches, 1 *Sentences*, distinction 45 and 47.

Yet, these things notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that the rationale of permission and of proper volition—namely, of an actually positive [will] in God and in men—is diverse, although not contrary. For men will some things to be done, which they also permit to be done; yet they will not whatsoever they permit, neither do they permit whatsoever they will. For no one is properly said to permit himself to do anything, but another whom he could hinder if he willed. Wherefore by similar reason it appears that God doth not permit whatsoever He willeth; nay rather, whatsoever He permitteth to be done by anyone, He willeth that thing to be done by the same: for He voluntarily effects it, the same way as the eighth and ninth chapters of this [book] manifestly show.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Whether, and in what way, God willeth, and willeth not, sin.

Here it remains consequently to inquire whether God willeth sin. And it appears that in some way He willeth it. For God permitteth sin; therefore by the preceding chapter it appears that in some way He willeth it. Likewise, by the twenty-second chapter, God hath either willing or not willing with respect to sin—and not not willing, since then it would not come to pass, by chapter 10—therefore willing. Likewise, God voluntarily provides and does all voluntary works, both evil and good, with all their positive circumstances, as is manifest from what has gone before, which necessarily import sin. Likewise, "Sin exists" is true, and is not the first true, as is plain

from the twelfth [chapter] of this [book]; therefore it is true from the first true, as is clearly evident from the same 12 and 13. The first true, however, is in God, as is plain in the same place; therefore God is the cause of this truth, and not but voluntarily. Therefore God willeth this to be true, "Sin exists"; therefore also that it should be so on the part of the thing as is signified by it; therefore He willeth sin to be.

Although Lombard in 1 *Sentences*, distinction 46, reckons this argument sophistical and unworthy of response, yet it appears more unworthy to respond [to him this way], and to confirm the response by a most unworthy instance. For according to the Philosopher in 2 *Topics*, an instance is an argument unto opposition; this instance, however, opposes nothing against the prior position. For he says the argument does not hold, just as in a similar [case] it does not follow: "God prohibits theft to be done, and that theft be done is true; therefore He prohibits the true." It is true that this does not follow, nor is it an instance, as he believes. For "to prohibit" imports a negation, namely, to will or to command something not to be done or not to be; therefore it confounds the following term confusedly and distributively, so that for "to be said of none" it is allowed to descend to any supposit negatively, as is plain from the first [book of the] *Prior* [Analytics]. Now it does not follow: "God prohibits to steal, and every stealing is some operating; therefore God prohibits some operating"—since this term "some operating" in the minor supposits or signifies confusedly only, so that it is not allowed there to descend to any of its supposits; and in the conclusion it is taken confusedly and distributively, as has been said: from which mutation of supposition arises the fallacy of figure of speech.

Nor is there any doubt that that conclusion does not follow, since if God prohibits some operating, He willeth or commands that nothing be operated, and so it is not lawful to operate anything. If, however, it be argued thus: "God prohibits to steal, and to steal is some operating; therefore some operating and some operation is prohibited by God"—it follows well, and that conclusion is true.

And in the same way it appears to be concerning truth and its prohibition. For truth follows the being or non-being of a thing. For if it be argued thus: "God prohibits this true [proposition], or this to be true, 'A thief steals'; and this is true, 'A thief steals'; therefore God prohibits the true"—it does not follow; well does it follow, however, that some true thing, or some proposition to be true, God prohibits. For everyone is bound to beware of such a true [proposition] concerning himself: "This man steals"; and this is by reason of some divine prohibition. For God could rationally prohibit, and so He seems effectually and really to have prohibited each one concerning himself, that this should never be true: "This man steals," "This man commits adultery," and so concerning all similar evils. Wherefore "blessed are those against whom they have spoken every evil thing, lying."

Furthermore, this is true: "Sin exists." Therefore there is some cause of that truth; and God is the first cause of all causes, and every second cause causes by virtue of the first cause, as the preceding has taught. Likewise, there is some cause of that truth, and not the terms alone, nor sin

itself alone, since itself is nothing, as is plain by the 26th [chapter] of this [book]. Therefore there is some positive cause; and God is the first cause of all such. Likewise sin is a certain privation, as is plain in the 26th [chapter], and prior to every negation and privation is the affirmation and habit, and the cause of that, as is plain in the 13th [chapter]; and of every affirmation and habit God is the first cause, as is plain in the same place. Likewise God is the first cause of every being and non-being, as the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th [chapters] have proved. Therefore also of the non-being of due justice, and of the being of sin.

Likewise otherwise God would not best dispose the universe, nor most perfectly ordain it. For better and more perfect it is to order, and to dispose, nay rather to predispose and preordain, as has been said in the preceding chapter, all things, both evil and good, both privative and positive, than only good and positive things. Otherwise the evil and privative would be left disordered—the said preceding ordination notwithstanding—and there would be something unjust and unbecoming simply, which would not in the least defile the most just and most beautiful order of the universe; which is contrary to what is held in the preceding chapter.

Likewise, every thing whose being is good, is good to be from the first good, and God willeth it to be; but for sin to be is good, as is plain by the authority of Augustine adduced in the preceding chapter. Hugh also, in 1 *De Sacramentis* 4 part 14, shows that God willeth evils to be, since this is good. And above, 13, thus says: "If it be said 'God willeth evil,' it is grievous to the hearing, and the pious mind doth not receive this concerning the Good, that He willeth evil. And therefore the pious mind refuses this, not because what is said is not well said, but because what is well said is not well understood: for it hath the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge."

Likewise, every thing which is expedient to men, is from the first good profitable to all, and God willeth it to be expedient and to be. But sins are expedient to men, not only the sins of others, as has been shown above, but even their own. Whence to the Romans 8: "To them that love God all things work together for good, to those who, according to His purpose, are called saints." For to such, as Augustine says in *De Correptione et Gratia* 35: "God so worketh all things together for good, that if any of them deviate and stray, this very thing He maketh to profit them for good, since they are made humbler and more learned, like Peter." And Psalm 82: "Fill their faces with shame, and they shall seek Thy name, O Lord."

Augustine also, 14 *De Civitate Dei* 13: "I dare to say, that to the proud it is useful to fall into some open and manifest sin, by which they may be displeased with themselves who, by being pleased with themselves, had fallen. For more wholesomely Peter was displeased with himself when he wept, than he was pleased with himself when he presumed." This says also the sacred Psalm: "Fill their faces with shame," etc.

Likewise, every thing that contributes to the beauty of the universe, God, the beautiful Author of all beauty, willeth to be. Sin is of this kind. For according to that prophetic and famous saying in 2 *De Caelo* 40, and 3 *Meteorology*, and 1 *Elenchi*: "Contraries, or opposites, placed beside each other, appear more." Whence also in *De Mundo* 10, he thus says: "Some have wondered how the

world, consisting of contrary principles—I mean dry and moist, cold and hot—is not corrupted of old; as if anyone wondered how a city continues, consisting of contrary peoples—I mean, poor and rich, young, old, weak, strong, of the reprobate and the upright" (in another translation, "of the evil and the good"); "but they know not that this was the most wondrous thing of civic concord" (in another translation, "of harmony")—"I mean, that out of many it accepts one, and like nature and fortune of all. But perhaps the nature of contraries thrives, and to make consonance from these, not from likes. As, therefore, He hath joined the male to the female, and not each to its proper sex, and the first compact He joined together by contraries, not by likes, as is seen. Art also, imitating nature, doth this. For painting, mingling the natures of white, black, yellow, and red colors, hath wrought images consonant with their originals; music, mingling acute and grave, long and short sounds in diverse voices, hath perfected one harmony; grammar, making a mixture of vowels and consonants, hath constituted the whole art from these. The same also was that which was said by the obscure Heraclitus: 'It joineth converse and not converse, agreeing and differing, consonant and dissonant; and from all things one, and from one all things.' Thus, therefore, also one harmony hath adorned the constitution of all things—of heaven, I mean, and of earth, the whole everywhere mixed, especially of contrary principles—dry with moist, hot with cold, heavy with light, straight with curved; one virtue, which passeth through all things, hath adorned the whole earth, and sea, ether, and sun, and moon, and the whole heaven; from things unmixed and diverse, from air, earth, fire, and water, creating and disposing the whole world on the surface of one sphere; and forcing especially contrary natures in it to agree with one another, and from these contriving safety for the universe." And below, in the same place, of all things as if contrary, he thus says: "All these things appear to have been made for the cause of good, and to bestow safety through the ages."

Alhazen also in 2 of his *Perspective* shows, that not only light and likeness, but also shadow, obscurity, and diversity, sometimes make beauty—where, by way of example, he says that the beauty of the stars appears not but in the blackness of the night, and that the stars in dark nights are more beautiful than in moonlit nights. With which the wise [author] of Ecclesiasticus 33 agrees, thus saying: "Why doth one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another, and one sun another?" And he answers: "By the knowledge of the Lord they were made distinct; the sun being made and keeping His commandment, by the wisdom of God they are divided. And He changed (or otherwise, will change) the seasons and their feast days, and from these He hath set in number of days, and all men of the earth in the multitude of the discipline of the Lord. He separated them, and changed their ways. From among them He blessed and exalted, sanctified, and applied unto Himself; from among them He cursed, and humbled, and converted them to their own separation. As clay in the hand of the potter, to fashion and dispose it, all his ways are according to his disposition: so man in the hand of Him that made him, and He shall render to him according to His judgment. Against evil, good; and against life, death; so against a just man, a sinner. And so behold all the works of the Most High, two against two, and one against one."

Augustine says in 11 *De Civitate Dei* 18: "God would not have created any of the angels or men whom He foreknew would be evil, unless He had likewise known with what uses for good He would commit them, and thus, like the most beautiful poem, would adorn the order of the ages with certain antitheses, as it were. For 'antitheses,' as they are called in the ornaments of speech, are most becoming, which in Latin are called 'opposites' or 'contraposed.' Just as, therefore, these contraries opposed to contraries render the beauty of speech, so by a certain eloquence, not of words but of things, the opposition of contraries composes the beauty of the world. This is most plainly set forth in the book of Ecclesiasticus, in this manner: 'Against evil, good; and against death, life; so against the pious, a sinner.'"

And below, in the same place, 23: "As painting with black color placed in its proper place, so the universality of things, if anyone could behold it, even with sinners is beautiful, although by themselves considered their deformity is foul." The same in *De Vera Religione* 73 says, that the beauty of the universe is not to be considered in only one part, but in all and in the whole. "Our error also, adhering to a part of the world, is per se foul; but as the black color in a painting with the whole is beautiful, so the unchangeable divine providence becomingly exhibits this whole contest from contraries." The same likewise *Enchiridion* 7: "In the universality, that which is called evil, well ordered and placed in its proper place, more eminently commends the good, that they may please more, and be more praiseworthy, when compared with the evil." The same furthermore in *De Natura Boni* 16 thus says: "Privations are so ordered in the universality of nature, that they have not unbecomingly their turns. For God, by not illumining certain places and times, decently makes darkness; for if we, by holding back our voice, decently interpose silence in speaking, how much more becomingly doth He make privations of certain things, as the perfect Artificer of all things." Whence also in the hymn of the three children, even "light and darkness" praise God—that is, they bring forth His praise in the hearts of those who well consider.

Likewise, every just thing is just from the first just, namely God; and God willeth it to be just and to be. Every punishment of sin is just, as is plain in the 31st [chapter] of this [book], and one sin is the punishment of another. For the prophet says, "Let not the foot of pride come to me, etc. There are they fallen who work iniquity; they were cast out, and could not stand," Psalm 35. Wherefore also Solomon: "A deep pit is the mouth of a strange woman; he with whom the Lord is angry, shall fall into it," Proverbs 22. Which is also plain to the Romans 1, concerning those who, when they had known God, glorified Him not as God, neither gave thanks. "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness."

Whence also Augustine on Psalm 35 cited above says: "Hear the foot of pride: 'who, when they had known God, glorified Him not as God.' Therefore the foot of pride came upon them, whence they came into the deep. God gave them up to the desires of their heart, to do those things which are not convenient." Who also on Psalm 57: "As wax that melteth they shall be taken away," thus says: "These punishments few perceive, therefore the Spirit of God most often commemorates them. Hear the Apostle saying, 'God gave them up,' etc. And he enumerates many things which

are sins, and says they are the punishments of sins. For the first sin is pride, the last punishment is fire or hell. The sins, however, of the damned, intermediate between that first sin and this last punishment, are both sins and punishments. That he be an adulterer is now a punishment, that he be a liar, that he be avaricious, that he be fraudulent, that he be a homicide, are now punishments. Whose punishments? Of the prior apostasy, of that pride, by which they said themselves to be wise, since they said they had of themselves what they had received from God." Which he also similarly teaches in the fifth [book] *Contra Iulianum* 3, and afterwards diffusely, and similarly in the sixth book.

Gregory also says on Ezekiel, homily 11: "A sin which is not quickly blotted out by penitence, is either a sin and the cause of sin, or a sin and the punishment of sin, or a sin both the cause and punishment of sin. Whence Moses: 'The sins of the Amorites are not yet completed.' And David: 'Add iniquity to their iniquity.' And another prophet: 'Blood hath touched blood,' that is, sin hath been rendered for sin. Paul also says: 'Therefore He gave them up,' etc. To John also it is said by the angel: 'He that is in filth, let him be filthy still.'" Whom Isidore follows in the second [book] *De Summo Bono* 19, saying that "the preceding sin is the cause of the following sin, but the following sin is the punishment of the preceding offense; nor are any who are just impelled by God to become evil, but while they are now evil, they are hardened, that they may exist as worse, as the Apostle says: 'Because they have not received the truth of God that they might be saved, God hath sent them the spirit of error.' God therefore makes some to sin, but those in whom such sins have already preceded, that by His just judgment they deserve to go in their desires."

Perhaps it will be answered that one sin is the punishment of another, but according to the pure substance of the act, not according to its deformity. But how is this true of the act of sin, to which great delight, and no sadness at all, is admixed? since also no act is per se essentially evil, by the 26th [chapter] of this [book]. And if anyone shall say that such an act of sin is harmful and penal to the man, insofar as it takes from him the due justice which he had, and induces an opposite privation, he must say consequently that such ablation and privation passively is rather his punishment, and that per se and properly is sin, as the 26th of this [book], and very many doctors testify—otherwise also after sinning sin would not remain. Wherefore Peter [Lombard] in 2 *Sentences* dist. 35 last [says] that the privation and corruption of good is called punishment according to its effect—that is, according to the passion which is the effect of sin, that is, of sinning, itself and the [privation] causing it—and he says that this punishment is from God. Whence also Augustine *De Vera Religione*, 24, says: "This defect, which is called sin, if it occupied [a man] unwilling like a fever, the punishment which follows the sinner, and which is named damnation, would justly seem unjust." Who also in 5 *Contra Iulianum* 14, speaking of the evil man working evil, thus says: "That assuredly is sin to him, since he doth evil, and the punishment of sin, since he suffereth evil himself."

And if anyone shall yet respond to the saying of the Apostle, and similar, by glossing thus: "God gave them up, etc., that is, by deserting them, He permitted them to be given up"—just as also certain doctors seem to gloss—it can be argued by the preceding chapter, that if He permitted

them to be thus given up, He willed them to be thus given up. Likewise Augustine says, and three other holy [authors] agree, that "to be an adulterer, and a liar," etc., are punishments of the prior sin. Therefore they are in some way just, and willed by God. Likewise, the second sin is in some way the punishment of the prior sin, as is plain by the testimonies of Scripture, and the foresaid doctors; and if this be not by the intention or will of God, nor by the intention or volition of the sinner, nor of any other, this would be purely casual, contrary to the 29th [chapter] of this [book]; and likewise then [God] would not punish it orderly nor justly. For nothing punishes another orderly or justly, unless it be ordained by some just judge in punishment of that.

Likewise, then God would not give over the evil into desires or sins differently than the good: for both He gives over only by permitting, which is contrary to the Scripture and the foresaid doctors. For on account of the foot of pride preceding, "they fell who work iniquity; they were expelled, and could not stand." Wherefore Isidore says, "Nor are any who are just impelled by God to become evil," etc.—intimating that some, while they are unjust, are so impelled by God, that they exist as worse; and therefore he says expressly that God makes such to sin, not others. Which the words of the Apostle adduced also savor of: "Because they have not received the truth of God, God sent them the spirit of error"—where Jerome's translation says more expressly: "Therefore God will send them the operation of error, that they may believe a lie," 2 Thessalonians 2. And Scripture everywhere speaking of such says: "Wherefore," "Therefore," "Because," or some similar [word] which signifies a cause, showing thereby that the preceding sin is the cause of the following.

Likewise Lombard, 2 *Sentences*, dist. 30, shows that one sin is the punishment of another, and says that sin, insofar as it is the punishment of a prior sin, is from God, but not insofar as it is sin. Either, therefore, he means that as it is the punishment of sin, it is from God only permitting, and so it is, as it is sin: there is therefore no difference. Or [he means] that it is from God willing and ordaining, and then God willeth sin to be done and to be, at least insofar as it is the punishment of a prior sin.

Likewise, this seems a perilous response, unless by permission he means the will of God in a certain respect, as the preceding chapter expounded—just as also doctors, sometimes thus glossing the saying of the Apostle and similar, can be expounded. For this is the response and exposition of Julian the heretic, in the fifth book against whom by Augustine it is more diffusely refuted. For Julian, as Augustine there in chapter 4 cites, thus expounded the saying of the Apostle: "God gave them up," etc., that is, gave them up by deserting [them], and not by power, but by patience. Against whom Augustine thus inveighs: "Thou inquirest in vain how it is to be understood that God gives up, laboring much to show that He gives up by deserting." And below, in the same place: "The Apostle said what evil they had previously done, and added: 'Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart.' Hence this is the punishment of the preceding sin, and yet itself also is sin. But thou, disputing on the contrary, seemest to thyself to have solved this question in some manner, since the Apostle said the desires were given up to themselves; for now they were already burning with the unjust desires of their disgraces, and thou addest how

they should be thought to have fallen into such deeds by the power of God who gives them up." And Augustine against him: "What more, I beseech, was done? or why did the Apostle say, 'God gave them up to the desires of their heart,' if they were already in any way possessed by the evil desires of their heart? But is it consequent that, if anyone hath evil desires, now also he should consent to them for committing the same evils? And thus, it is one thing to have evil desires, another to be given up to them, that by consenting to them he may be possessed by them—which is done when he is given up to them by divine judgment."

And below, in chapter 5, he cites many things from Scripture, by which he shows that one sin is the punishment of another. "The Lord," says he, "mingled with them the spirit of error, and they have led Egypt astray; again, 'Why hast Thou made us to err from Thy way, O Lord, hardened our hearts, that we should not fear Thee?'; again, 'Behold Thou art angry, and we have sinned, therefore we have erred'; again, 'By the Lord the heart of the nations was strengthened, that they should come against Israel to be exterminated'; again, 'King Rehoboam hearkened not, etc., that the Lord might establish the word of the prophet'; again, 'Amaziah hearkened not, since it was from the Lord that he should be delivered up'; again, 'Because they have not received the love of the truth, etc., God shall send them the operation of error, that they may believe a lie'; again, 'If a prophet shall err, I the Lord have deceived the prophet, etc.'; and again, 'He sent wrath and indignation through evil angels.'" And after the testimony concerning Amaziah, he says he could commemorate many other things, "in which it clearly appears that by a hidden judgment of God, perversity of heart comes about, that what is truly said may not be heard, and thence may be sinned, and the sin itself be the punishment of preceding sin. For to believe a lie, and not to believe the truth, is assuredly sin: yet it comes from that blindness of heart, which by a hidden but yet just judgment of God is also shown to be the punishment of sin."

And below, in the same place, he thus addresses Julian: "What is it that thou sayest? When they are said to be given up to desires, they are to be understood as deserted by divine patience, and not compelled by power into sins—as if the same Apostle had not put both these together, both patience and power, where he says: 'But if God, willing to show His wrath, and to demonstrate His power, hath endured with much patience the vessels of wrath, which are perfected unto destruction.'"

And below, 6: "Who would say that Ahab did not sin by believing the spirit of falsehood? Who would say that this sin was not the punishment of a sin coming from the judgment of God, by whose reading he is sent or permitted a lying spirit? Who says any of these, save he who says what he wishes, and what is true, refuses to hear? But who would so be foolish, that when he hears what is sung in the Psalm, 'Lord, deliver me not from my desire to the sinner,' he should say that the man prayed this, lest God should be patient toward him—if God doth not give up to evils being done, save by exhibiting patient goodness when they are done? But what is it that we say daily, 'Lead us not into temptation,' save that we be not given up to our concupiscences? for everyone is tempted, drawn aside and enticed by his own concupiscence. Or shall we ask this from God, that His patient goodness may not be toward us? Therefore we do not invoke His

mercy, but rather provoke His wrath. Who, sane, would have such wisdom, nay rather, who would say these things, even being mad? God therefore gives up to the passions of ignominy, that things not fitting may be done; but Himself fittingly gives up, and the same things are both sins, and the punishments of past sins, and the merits of future punishments."

If, however, anyone shall say with Lombard that God willeth sin under the rationale by which it is punishment, not under the rationale by which it is sin, it can thus be argued against him: That punishment and that sin per se, namely under the rationale by which it is sin, are necessarily and inseparably joined, and that necessity and inseparability is from God, as is sufficiently plain from the preceding things. For He is the first necessity, and the first necessary being. He willeth, therefore, them to be thus joined and to be joined, and to be: He willeth, therefore, sin to be.

Likewise, whoever knoweth any two things to be necessarily and inseparably copulated, and willeth them to be so copulated, and knowingly and rationally willeth one, willeth the other—especially if concerning each he have some act of will, as the twenty-second chapter shows of God. God, however, knoweth and willeth those two thus to be copulated, and knowingly and rationally willeth one, namely the punishment of sin, therefore also sin. This can immediately appear, since if A and B be so copulated, and God willeth A to be done and is able, A is done, and B necessarily is done with it; and God doth nothing casually, but the whole from a most wise intention disposing all things sweetly, as the twenty-ninth [chapter] teaches. God therefore willeth B and in some manner doth it.

Furthermore, in a necessary consequence, he who willeth the antecedent willeth the consequent, as it appears, at least in the universal, although not in the particular, and under its proper form. For he who willeth some whole, willeth in some way all the necessary parts of it. The Philosopher also teaches in 2 *Prior* [Analytics], that whoever opines any antecedent, similarly opines any consequent of it, at least in the universal, although perchance sometimes in the particular and under proper form he opines the opposite of some consequent. Why, therefore, must it not be similarly judged of volition? But far be it that God will anything in the universal and confusedly, and not will it in the particular and distinctly, or thus will the opposite of it, as the preceding things clearly show. For God knoweth most distinctly whatsoever is contained in any antecedent: for He knoweth every good consequence, and willeth every good consequence to be good. How therefore doth God, willing whatsoever His volition rationally and supremely, will some antecedent, and will not some consequent of it, not only privatively, but even positively, namely by an act positively contrary to volition? For if He willeth not anything, why cannot He rationally not will it thus? But who would even lightly suspect such great contrariety and irrationality in God?

Nay, also, if God willeth anything, to which many things are necessarily annexed, in any way to be done by anyone, that thing shall thus be done by him with all such annexes whatsoever, by the witness of the tenth [chapter] of this [book]; and if some such annexed thing God willeth not, He can rationally not will it, namely by positive nolition. Which if it be put in being, by the same

tenth [chapter] that thing is not done. Therefore that thing simultaneously is done and is not done, and similarly that whole.

Likewise, if God willeth some antecedent, that thing is just—at least with respect to His will and divine justice—therefore any consequent of it is in like manner just. Wherefore also it is willed and loved by God the Author of all justice, as the prior things testify, and the Psalm contests, 10: "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice." Otherwise also God could simultaneously will some antecedent, and not will some consequent of it, nay even will the opposite of the consequent—therefore He would not will some just thing, and would will the opposite of the just.

Furthermore, according to every reason and law—Logic, Philosophy, human, and divine—he who concedes, confesses, grants, or says some antecedent, doth and similarly says all and singular things which necessarily follow, nor ought he to be admitted, neither permitted, in the opposite of any such consequent. For who would rationally admit opposites, repugnants, or contradictories from the same person, since not even truth admits this? How therefore doth God, by His most rational will, ordain, grant, or say something, and not in any way ordain, nor grant, nor say something necessarily following from it; nay rather, He willeth and saith the opposite of this consequent? And although these things may seem sufficiently plain per se, yet behold the testimony of the Philosopher in 2 *Topics*, saying: "Everyone who hath said anything, in some way hath said many things, since many things are by necessity consequent upon any one thing—as if he hath said man to be, he also hath said that he is animal, and that he is animate, and that he is biped, and that he is receptive of mind and discipline; wherefore, by removing any one of the consequents, that which was at the beginning is also removed."

Whence also Thomas, 1 *Contra Gentiles* 81, thus says: "The will of the wise, by reason of which it is concerning the cause, is concerning the effect, which from the cause necessarily follows: for it would be foolish to will the sun to be above the earth, and not to be the brightness of the day." And below, 83: "Whoever willeth anything, necessarily willeth those things which are necessarily required to that, unless there be some defect on his part, either through ignorance, or because by some passion he is led away from the right choice of that which is unto the intended end—which cannot be said of God. If, therefore, God willing Himself willeth something else than Himself, it is necessary that He will all that which to that willed by Him is of necessity required—as it is necessary that God will the rational soul to be, supposing that He will man to be." And below, 84: "If, therefore, God necessarily willeth those things which are required to that which He is supposed to will, it is impossible that He should will those things which are repugnant to them."

This also testifies the Philosopher, 3 *Ethics* 12, in these words: "It is irrational for the doer of unjust things not to will to be unjust, or for the violator [not to will] to be incontinent. If, however, anyone, not ignorant, operates from those things from which he will be unjust, willingly he shall be unjust."

Likewise, otherwise, by similar reason someone could of two things thus joined, namely one spiritual thing and another temporal, buy the one—namely the temporal thing—not buying the other, but receiving it as if gratis, without any simony—the contrary of which appears to have been determined by the Lord Pope Paschal, as is cited in the *Canon, Causa 1, quaestio 3, Si quis obiecerit*, in these words: "If anyone object, [that he buys] not the consecrations, but the things which proceed from consecration, he is proved to dote utterly. For whosoever of them sells the one, without which neither doth the other proceed, leaves neither unsold." And Lombard cites this in 4 *Sentences*, distinction 25.

To this also makes Augustine, 83 *Quaestionum* 15, arguing thus: "The intellect understands itself, therefore it is finite to itself, nor would it will to be infinite, although it could—since it would will to be known to itself."

Furthermore, it can similarly be argued of the acts of homicide, theft, and similar things, [together with which], with all their circumstances posited, sin is necessarily joined. If God thus willeth those, nay rather even doth them, as the preceding things have taught, then also He willeth sin. This sentence also John Scotus, on 1 *Sentences* distinction 41, seems to hold, as inscribed in the 18th [chapter] of this [book].

The opposite of this, however, is urged in many ways. If God willeth sin, God is the Author of sin, witness Augustine 83 *Quaestionum* 3, thus speaking: "When 'with God as Author' is said, 'with Him willing' is said." And then, with God as Author, man would become worse, contrary to Augustine above, in the same place, thus arguing: "With no wise man as Author, doth a man become worse; God, however, is far more excellent than any wise man—much less, therefore, with God as Author, doth a man become worse." And below, *Quaestio* 21, he proves that God is not the Author of evil, since He is not the cause of failing, nor of tending to non-being, which happens by sinning, since He is the highest Good and the cause of being.

Likewise, if God willed sin, since by the tenth [chapter] His will cannot be non-efficacious, He would be some cause of sin; and since in every causation of His with the creature, He is the first cause, as it appears, it would follow that God would be the first cause of sin—contrary to Augustine, 3 *De Libero Arbitrio* 28, by disputation investigating the first cause of sin, and finally thus concluding: "Either, therefore, the will is the first cause of sinning, or no sin is the cause of sinning, nor is there [any] to whom rightly sin is to be imputed but the sinner. Therefore there is none to whom rightly it is to be imputed, save the willing one." And below, 35: "Sins, as we have long disputed, are not to be attributed but to the proper will of the animate, nor any further cause of sins is to be sought."

Likewise, if God willeth sin, and by the tenth [chapter] His will is efficacious, God doeth sin; and "he who doeth sin is the servant of sin," John 8. Therefore God would be the servant of sin and would sin. Likewise, Augustine in *De Confutatione Haereticorum* 16, [responding to those imputing] false chapters to himself, in the 5th response, says: "That sin is altogether not from

God, nor is He the Author of any sin, but the Creator of nature." And in nearly every response, he says expressly that no one falls into sin from the will of God, nor hath He predestined any to sin.

Likewise, then anyone could lawfully rejoice over his own sin, and similarly over any other's: for he would know that God willeth it. Likewise, then every evil-willing one would have rectitude of will: for this is to will as God willeth him to will, as is plain by Anselm *De Libero Arbitrio* 8, and *De Concordia* 5; and any such one willeth as God willeth him to will. Likewise, then anyone knowing this part ought, or at least lawfully could, will to sin: since that is the just will of God, to which, when known, a man ought as far as he can lawfully to conform himself. Wherefore also doing thus he would not sin: therefore he would simultaneously sin and not sin.

Whence also Augustine, 3 *De Libero Arbitrio* 26: "If everyone owes that which he hath received, and man was so made that he must necessarily sin, this he owes, that he sin. Therefore when he sinneth, he doeth what he oweth: which if it is wickedness to say—nature compels no one that he sin, nor doth another's [nature]." And below, 28, speaking of the first cause of evil will, he thus says: "Whatever that cause of will is, it is assuredly either just, or unjust; if just, whoever shall obey it, shall not sin." And Anselm *De Veritate* 12: "Whatsoever ought to be, rightly and justly is; nor is anything rightly and justly, save what ought to be."

Likewise, no one is justly accuser, or avenger, of a fact of which he is the Author; but God is justly the accuser and avenger of sin. Likewise, Psalm 5: "Thou art not a God that willest iniquity"; and 44: "Thou hast loved justice, and hated iniquity"; and Proverbs 6: "Six things there are which God hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," etc. And Habakkuk 1: "Lord, Thy eyes are pure, that Thou shouldst not see evil, and Thou canst not look upon iniquity"; and John 1: "Without Him was made nothing"—that is, sin, according to Augustine, homily 1. Nay rather, this opinion the whole Canonical Scripture, and all the saints and doctors, seem to profess concordantly and unanimously to sustain.

This, therefore, which appears a discord, if by the distinction concerning will premised in the preceding chapter, it be reduced to a middle, perhaps it is reconciled. For God in no wise simply willeth sin, but only in a certain respect, as has been said. For God to will some fact simply, as it sounds in the common manner of speaking, is to love it, to approve it as good, and finally to reward it; and because Scripture and the saints so speak, they deny God to will sin. The vulgar also so understand and not otherwise; therefore that is not to be said before them, since they too greatly abhor it; and well, according to the understanding which they have. For they understand only that God willeth according to the first member of the foresaid distinction.

Whence Hugh says in 1 *De Sacramentis* 4 part 13: "When it is said 'God willeth good,' it sounds well; but if it be said 'God willeth evil,' it is grievous to the hearing, and the pious mind doth not receive this concerning the Good, that He willeth evil. For this alone seems to be said, when it is said 'God willeth evil,' that the Good loveth evil, and approveth what is depraved, and accounteth iniquity friendly to Himself, and rejoiceth in the like, and reckoneth that good which is evil; and

therefore the pious mind refuses this, not because what is said is not well said, but because what is well said is not well understood."

Could it not also be said, that in the whole universe there is no inordination, deformity, or sin simply, but only in a certain respect?—not simply, since not with respect to the first and supreme cause, sweetly disposing all things positive and privative, beings and non-beings, with the highest wisdom, beauty, and justice—as the things premised in the 13th, 14th, and 33rd [chapters] of this [book] have urged. For doth not the 33rd [chapter] of this [book] show that no act is unjust simply, nay that every act is just with respect to the divine will, although some be unjust with respect to the created will, raving (as far as concerns it, although it cannot simply [accomplish anything against] the divine will)? And the 26th [chapter] of this [book] teaches, that every act according to the substance of the act itself, is not evil but good, and is made by God—which the ninth [chapter] of this [book] also confirms. Any act, therefore, with respect to God the Author, is just; therefore also everything necessarily consequent upon any act: for if the antecedent is just, also any thing necessarily consequent upon it shall be just, just as it is also true. And some such act, and some thing necessarily consequent upon it, is sin. It seems therefore that there is no inordination, deformity, or sin simply, in the whole universe, but only in a certain respect, namely with respect to inferior causes, willing—although not able—to disturb the ordination of the superior cause. Therefore, as far as it is in them, they violate and disturb that, as is plain from the 26th and the preceding [chapter] of this [book].

Wherefore also it can not improbably be reckoned, that God at least in a certain respect willeth sin, although not simply, since not according to itself, as the 33rd [chapter] expounded this verb "simply." For He willeth not sin, save perhaps as a physician [willeth] poison in his medicines, namely insofar as it avails for the exercise of the good, for the punishment of the evil, for the beauty of the universe to be contemplated by *antiperistasis* (counter-arrangement), and for similar things recited above.

Wherefore also Ammonius cited above says, "that the gods have cognition of all things, even of contingents, as producing all things which are in the world, not only substances, but also their operations, both those which are according to nature, and those which are besides nature." And he adds: "That which is besides nature came in together with the necessary order subjecting itself to the running course of beings, in those things which are born to participate in this, not principally, but according to the manner which is called *parypostaseōs*, that is, secondary subsistence."

Algazel also in fifth *Metaphysics* last [chapter], treating of the providence of God and of evil, thus says: "Good is provided per se, but evil is provided accidentally. Each, therefore, is ordained." And this is similarly the sentence of Avicenna.

Doth not Scripture and the Church speak thus, often saying that God willeth not the death of the sinner, or of the impious, nor doth He delight in the perdition of men? Doth not the Lord Himself say, "Is it My will that the impious should die?" Ezekiel 18. Doth not Wisdom 1 thus write, "God

made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living"? With which there occur many similar [places] in Scripture. And doth not the Church often sing similar things?

But how are these things to be sanely understood? It is certain that the Lord shall damn the impious, the cursed, and the sons of perdition, to death and eternal perdition; and this by willing, not by a new volition but by an eternal one, nor by a volition sad to Himself, but joyful, nay supremely joyful—as the 39th part of the first Corollary of this [book], the 9th [chapter] of this [book], and the 23rd with the third part of the first Corollary of this [book], the Canonical Scripture, and the faith of the Church clearly teach.

Doth not the Scripture testify, that famine and death are created for vengeance, Ecclesiasticus 39? Doth not Moses say in Deuteronomy 28: "But if thou wilt not hearken to the voice of thy God, etc., all these curses shall come upon thee, etc.; and as the Lord rejoiced before over you in doing good to you, so He shall rejoice destroying and overthrowing you"? Doth not the Wisdom of God say to the rebels: "I will laugh in your destruction"? Proverbs 1. Nor is it wonderful: for the Lord shall rejoice in all His works, Psalm 103.

And how shall this contrariety, as it seems, be reduced to concord, or shown to be no [contrariety], save by the help of the foresaid distinction? Wherefore Augustine, 5 *Contra Iulianum* 15, [says] to Julian: "Thou affirmest these things to be contrary, as if it could not be that one and the same evil be inflicted on sinners both by the iniquity of the devil, and by the equity of God; nor hence are the divine eloquences themselves at variance with themselves, since it is written: 'God made not death,' and likewise it is written: 'Life and death are from the Lord God'—since the deceiver of man is the cause of death, which not as the first author of it, but as the avenger of sin, God brought in." This manner of speaking concerning willing and not willing, several philosophical and theological [authorities] cited in the preceding [chapter] of this [book] also agree with.

Therefore, according to the bifurcation of the foresaid distinction, the objections, as it seems, run, and do not obstruct. For that of Augustine, "With God as Author, man becomes not worse," can, it seems, be understood in the said way, namely, "with God as Author principally," that is, "principally willing this." And if to anyone this please not, let him tell me how, with God as Author, man doth every act of sin, according to the whole substance of the act, as the third [chapter] of this [book], and the 4th, 26th, 27th, and following [chapters] manifest? And how this befits God, and not that? And if with God as Author man doth these, how with God as Author, doth man not become worse? And certainly by this one [argument] one can in some manner respond to almost all the objections.

Yet it is true also otherwise, and can truly be said, that God is not the Author of sin as of the rightly done [act]. For of this latter He is so the Author, that He alone supernaturally creates, and gives to the rightly doer faith, hope, and charity, and perchance other habits inclining to merit, and making every merit—but not so on the part of sin.

Yet, that the intention of Augustine and of the other saints may more appear, the manner of their speaking and understanding is to be heeded, when they deny God to will sin; and the cause of this denial is to be weighed. The cause, however, of this denial seems to be this: when the Apostle, and Augustine, and the other saints had posited predestination, prescience, and the like on the part of God, the Pelagians and other heretics willed to excuse sinners from their sins, and to throw back the cause and the fault upon God, who had thus predestined or foreknown. The saints therefore wish to say, that God by His predestination, prescience, or anything of this kind, doth not coerce them against His will to sin; but that they sin freely and by their own will; and that God by predestining, foreknowing, or willing sins, doth not sin, neither doth He act unjustly, nor is He the first imputable or culpable cause of sins, but that the first imputable and culpable cause is the proper will of the sinner.

Whence Anselm in *De Concordia* 5 says: "Many complain, because they think free will avails nothing for salvation or damnation, but only necessity, on account of God's prescience." And below, 7: "Some clamor, saying: 'It was thus foreknown and predestined by God, and therefore by necessity it was done, nor could it be done otherwise'"—whom he afterwards refutes. And below, last [chapter], he says, that "by the fault of man alone evils come about which he doth, not by the fault of God."

Wherefore also Augustine, 3 *De Libero Arbitrio* 4, and in Prosper's sentences 381: "God, compelling no one to sin, yet foreseeeth those who by their proper will shall sin. Why then should He not, as foreknowing just things, judge them which He compels not to be done? For just as by thy memory thou compellest not the things to have been done which have passed, so God by His prescience compelleth not the things to be done which are future. And as thou rememberest some things which thou hast done, nor yet hast thou done all things which thou rememberest: so God foreknoweth all things of which He is the Author, nor yet of all things which He foreknoweth is He the Author; of those things, however, He is not the evil Author, [but] the just avenger." Behold, he denies that God, foreknowing sins, compelleth to sin; and what he had said simply before, that God is not of all things which He foreknoweth, since He is not of evil [things], the Author, immediately he determines and expounds, saying: "Of which He is not the evil Author"; and adds: "He is the just avenger"—and so he excuses God from sin, and accuses the sinner.

Likewise, the Apostle to the Romans 9, treating of the predestination of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau, "not from works, but according to the election of God who calleth": "What shall we say then? Is there iniquity with God? Far be it." And above, 3: "What if some of them have not believed? Shall their unbelief make void the faith of God? But God is true, but every man a liar, as it is written: 'That Thou mayest be justified in Thy sayings, and mayest overcome when Thou art judged.' But if our iniquity commendeth the justice of God, what shall we say? Is God unjust who inflicteth wrath? Far be it: for if the truth of God in my lie hath abounded unto His glory, why am I also yet judged as a sinner?" Where he removes from God iniquity, infidelity, and injustice. Where the Gloss cites certain ones, who, savoring carnally from that prophetic saying, "I have sinned, that Thou mayest be justified in Thy sayings, and mayest

overcome when Thou art judged," argued that God willed us to sin, that by our comparison He might appear just, and while He pardoned us our sins, [appear] merciful; and that our sins profited Him and were of advantage; and that the more we sin, the more it pleased Him, and the more His justice and sanctity grew. Where Ambrose, as the Gloss cites him, also says: "It is manifest that if the lie of men avails to the glory of God, that He alone may appear true, those are not to be called sinners who sin, since not by will, but by His impulse, they would seem to sin—which far be it." And the sense is: "If God by my lie," that is, sin, "should appear true, why doth He judge me as a sinner?"

Likewise, Augustine, *Enchiridion* 78, says: "When the Apostle had answered, 'Far be it'—that is, 'far be it that there be iniquity with God'—soon, that he might prove this to be done by no iniquity of God, he says: 'For He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I shall have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I shall be merciful.'"

The same in *De Praedestinatione [Sanctorum] contra Pelagianos* 9, thus says: "Those who without the grace of predestination are, that is, foreign from the purpose of God, and persevere in evil works—if also from this life they migrate, as you suppose—we do not say that they were ordained by God the Author of men, that they should perish, as if He had created in them the manners of an evil life, He had headlong driven them into every work of death unwilling. Far be this from the divine purpose: for God is not willing iniquity, nor hath He commanded any to act impiously."

Behold the understanding and gloss of such authorities in Scripture. And below, last [chapter]: "Since here on either side we are able to say nothing clearly, let us only believe that the guilty of death depends upon the will of the Judge, lest anyone should think it comes about by some divine fault, that not all are saved—the Apostle said, 'Who willeth all to be saved.' Wherefore all men who are saved, by God's willing are saved: for our God is the God of saving, and the Lord, the issues of death; and because there is wrath in His fury, and life in His will." And in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* 12: "By predestination assuredly God hath foreknown those things which He Himself was to do. He foreknoweth, however, things which He doth not, like sins whatsoever; for although there be certain things which are sins and the punishments of sins, whence it is said, 'God gave them up to a reprobate mind, that they should do those things which are not fitting,' there is not the sin of God, but the judgment."

And 5 *Contra Iulianum* 5, speaking of Ahab deceived by false prophets, thus says: "The king himself sinned, by believing false prophets; but this very [thing] was also the punishment of sin, God judging and sending an evil angel, that we might more openly understand how in the Psalm He is said to have sent the wrath of His indignation through evil angels. But did He err? did He judge or do anything unjustly or rashly? Far be it. But not in vain was that said: 'Thy judgments, like a great deep'; and 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God,' etc."

The same in 1 *Retractationum* 21 says: "I said, 'God seeketh the death of no one'—which is to be taken thus, that man hath acquired death for himself by deserting God, or not running to God,

according to what is written: 'God hath not made death.'" Behold, in a certain respect—that is, not according to that, or that manner which imports sin—is death from God; in a certain respect, or as it is from man—and he adds—"But also that is not less true: 'Life and death are from the Lord God.'" And below, 26: "Lest it be ill understood that I said God is not the Author of evil, since He is the Author of all things which are; for insofar as they are, so are they good. And lest hence it be thought that the punishment of evils is not from Him, which surely is evil to those who are punished; but I have said this just as it has been said: 'God hath not made death,' since elsewhere it is written: 'Death and life are from the Lord God.' Evil indeed is evil, but it is in the good works of God, since it is just that the evil be punished; and certainly every thing that is just is good."

Likewise Gregory, 25 *Moralia* 15, on Job 34: "He maketh a hypocrite to reign," etc.: "When therefore Antichrist shall reign over the impious, this is not from the injustice of the Judge, but from the fault of the sufferer." And below: "He who endureth an evil ruler, let him rather accuse the fault of his own work than the injustice of the governor." Lombard also understands such authorities in the said way, for which 1 *Sentences*, dist. 38, he adduces Augustine on John saying: "God, foreknowing future things, foretold by the prophet the unbelief of the Jews, but did not cause it: for He doth not therefore compel anyone to sin, because He hath foreknown the future sins of men; for He foreknew their sins, not His own."

The same likewise *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 3, against those excusing sinners and accusing God, thus says: "There are men who endeavor to excuse themselves even from God Himself, to whom James the Apostle says: 'Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils.' Likewise, of those willing to excuse themselves, the book of the Proverbs of Solomon answers: 'A man's foolishness violates his way, but he layeth blame upon God in his heart.' And the book of Ecclesiasticus says: 'Say not, Because of God I have departed; say not, He hath caused me to err.'" And below, 5: "Let no one lay blame upon God in his heart, but let everyone impute to himself when he sinneth; nor when he doeth anything cruel, let him alienate this from his proper will."

And if anyone shall argue that by the same reason it would have to be said that God doth not will, nor doth He effect, our good merits, since He compelleth no one unwillingly to merit—it must be said that merits are attributed to God otherwise than sins, namely on account of habits created by God alone, and infused into us, exciting unto merits and making all merits; and because God in any merit whatsoever is the first imputable and praiseworthy cause: on account of which also He loveth and approveth the merit, and prepareth a reward for it; not so on the part of sin.

Whence Anselm *De Concordia* 6 says: "God doth in all good wills and works, both that they are essentially, and that they are good. In evils, however, [He doth] not that they are evil, but only that through essence they are. How, however, God doth good things by His goodness alone, and evil things by the fault of man or of the devil alone; and how man doth good things through free

will, by grace bestowing, and evil only by his proper will operating; and what God hath in evils without His fault, and man in good with his praise, so that nevertheless the good of man may seem openly to be imputed to God, and the evils to man, when we shall treat of grace and free will, as I think, with God granting, more openly shall appear."

Similarly is to be understood what Sacred Scripture and the Doctors say very often, namely, that punishment is from God, but not the fault. For punishment is from God alone without man co-acting; not so the fault. And punishment likewise is from God punishing, nay rather as the first and principal cause punishing; but the fault or sin is not so from God, as from the first culpable or sinful cause.

And if it still be said that it always sounds ill to many to say that God in any way wills sin: for certain it is true, and this perhaps according to Hugh in the place cited above, "not because what is said is not well said, but because what is well said is not well understood." Would, therefore, that they would receive the salt of wisdom, and would savor and understand the savory truth to a sound taste, and would know that there is no evil in the world which is not on account of some great good, and perchance on account of some greater good. Why, therefore, should there be subtracted from the world and from God the Author of the whole world, this manner of doing good, or beneficial wonderful and great manner? Nay rather, more miraculous it seems, and greater, to make goods from evils, than from goods, or to make goods alone.

And without doubt it ill sounds to many, if it be said that God willeth and doeth the act of incest of a father with a daughter, of a son with a mother, of one professed in continence with one [similarly] professed, of parricide, of sedition, of blasphemy, and of other similar things; and yet both the saints and the philosophers say so, as the preceding things have manifested. For who in such incest prepareth the seed and moveth, createth and infuseth a soul into the foetus, save God? And however it sound, thus speak the saints of God—nay rather, the Spirit of God who speaketh in them, as was cited above. And Isaiah 26: "O Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us"; and below, 45: "I am the Lord, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil"; and Amos 3: "Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done?" The Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 5, that "Christ for us God made sin"—which to the ears of not a few simple ones judging according to the surface of the letter would sound much more horrible. Therefore our most just Judge thus prohibited and otherwise taught to judge, saying: "Judge not according to appearance, but judge just judgment," John 7.

By these things is plain [the answer] to the objections which argue from the authorization of the sinner by God, and how God is not the first cause of sin, since He is not the first imputable cause unto fault—and concerning such [a cause] there speaketh manifestly the authority of Augustine; and that manner of speaking is taken perhaps from that of Psalm 31: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin."

To the other [objection] which argues that God doeth sin, [answer must be made] similarly by retorting concerning the real act of sin. It must, however, be answered by a distinction

concerning the second mode of amphiboly. For "[He doeth sin]" can be taken properly or transumptively, and according to the customary manner of speaking, and as the Philosopher says in 1 *Elenchi*, "when we have been accustomed thus to speak." In the first way it is not true, since sin properly is nothing nor can it be, by the 26th [chapter] of this [book]; therefore neither is it factible by anyone whatsoever. Wherefore also, as the same 26th [chapter] cites from Augustine, "Sin so hath no efficient cause, but only a deficient one." Transumptively can yet be understood in two ways: First, as is the more usual manner of speaking, according to which we say, that "to do sin" is "to sin," and "he who doeth sin sinneth"; and so the Evangelist speaks, and so God doth not sin. Secondly, that God doeth some positive act in the rational creature, from which follows, or with which is conjoined, the sin of that creature, not of God; and so God doeth sin: for He doeth all our works, as has been shown above.

To the other [authority] of Augustine *De Confutatione Haereticorum*, the response is similar by way of an instance through the positive act of sin; another response, however, is plain from the process there and elsewhere, as had already been cited: For when he says that sin is not from God, and the like, he means in the said way, namely, that sin is not [from God] coercing or impelling anyone unwillingly, and so as to render the man excused, and God accused. Whence in response 16 he thus says: "Those who shall not persevere, when they fail from piety, fail not from the work of God, but from their own will." Behold: not from the work of God, in the sense that it excludes their will, or is contrary to it; but adversatively and contrarily—from their own will they fail. And it follows: "Nor are they impelled to fall, nor are they cast out so as to desert." Behold, by this he denies that coercion or violence is brought by God upon such to sinning.

Likewise above, this objection is made against him as the eleventh: that when fathers commit incest with daughters, and sons with mothers, this is therefore done because God has so predestined that it should be done. Augustine answers: "If it were objected to the devil, that he is the author of such crimes, that he himself is the inciter, I think that by some reason he could exonerate himself from this odium, and could prove the perpetrator of crimes from the will of those very persons; for although he is delighted by the fury of those sinning, yet he would prove that he had not brought in the force of crime. By what folly, then, or what madness is it determined to refer to God's counsel that which not even to the devil can be ascribed in totality?" Behold, that according to Augustine's understanding, even the devil is not the author of human sin in such wise that man through him could totally excuse himself, since he doth not bring in the force of crimes; nor can the sin be ascribed to the devil in totality, since man consenteth and cooperateth freely and by his proper will.

The other [objection], that anyone could lawfully rejoice [over sin], proceeds similarly from the essence of an evil act, and yet does not proceed. For let it be supposed that God willeth thee to be saddened and not to rejoice, and thou doest this knowingly: therefore thou oughtest to rejoice in this; how doth it follow? And just as perhaps a good and grateful son ought not to rejoice over the temporal or eternal death of his father, although he know it to be inflicted on him by God—just as neither, perhaps, did the blessed Mary nor the disciples rejoice over the slaying of Christ,

but rather grieved, just as also the other devout Christians, knowing nevertheless that nothing concerning Christ happened by chance or by fortune, but the whole from the divine will and providence disposing.

And if perchance thou yet repliest: "If God willeth sin, thou oughtest, or canst, similarly lawfully will it, wherefore also similarly rejoice over it, the Scripture saying, 'A desire if it be accomplished, delighteth the soul,' Proverbs 13"—it can be answered according to the sentence of Anselm, Augustine, and the other Fathers, that the rectitude of the will is not always for one to will what God willeth, but [for one to will] what God willeth him to will, with the requisite circumstances; wherefore also similarly concerning rejoicing.

Or perhaps it could be said that sin, insofar as it is punishment, is from God; yet [it is] of him in some way, as is plain from the things premised here and in the 32nd [chapter] of this [book]; and so perhaps man can rejoice over it, but not insofar as it is the sin of free will. For which Gregory says, 22 *Moralia* 10, on Job 31: "If I have rejoiced at the ruin of him that hated me": "When omnipotent God smiteth any perverse one, the misery of the perishing is to be condoled with, and the justice of the Judge to be congratulated."

That [saying] of Anselm, however, that the rectitude of will is for one to will as God willeth him to will, proceeds similarly from the very substance of the evil act. It is also established that that definition, according to those words precisely, is not convertible with rectitude of will—that rectitude, I say, which renders those willing right of heart and morally just. For thus a horse, boys, fools, and the like, willing anything, would be morally right of heart and just, just as is plainly evident from the ninth [chapter] of this [book], the 27th, and the following ones. Nor if God willeth anything to be done by John, and he doth this voluntarily, but ignorantly and without intention—being ignorant, namely, that God willeth this to be done by him, nor having a direct intention toward God, but apart from Him or against Him, as frequently happens, just as the things premised in the 32nd [chapter] of this [book] testify—is he to be said to will rightly morally nor justly, as is sufficiently established to moral philosophers and theologians. For who would not know that works are to be judged from the intention of the workers, as the whole sect of the Stoics concordantly attests?

The Philosopher also, 7 *Politics* 15: "Two things there are in which it consists for all things to go well: one, indeed, in this, that the intention and end of actions be rightly placed; one, indeed, [is] to find the actions leading to the end." And 6 *Ethics* 10: "The work is perfected both by prudence and by moral virtue: virtue, indeed, maketh the intention right; prudence, however, [maketh right what is] toward this." And below: "We say that some doing just things are by no means just, [for example] those doing the things ordered by the laws either unwillingly, or through ignorance, or for some other [reason], and not on account of those very things—although they operate, indeed, what is fitting, and whatsoever the studious man ought; but, as it seems, the one who [acts] thus and the one who is so disposed operate single things [differently] as a good man would. I mean, namely, on account of choice, and for the sake of the very things operated."

Who also in 2 *Ethics* 4 placeth the agreement of art and virtue in this: that for someone to be an artificer, namely a grammarian, it is not sufficient that he do the work of the art, namely a grammatical work, but it is required that he do it in an artificial manner, namely grammatically according to grammar existing in him: for he says, "It happens that one doth a grammatical thing, both by chance, and with another supposing it. Then, therefore, [is one] a grammarian, if he do a grammatical thing, and grammatically; this, however, is according to that which is grammar in him"—intimating that it happens similarly in virtue. Where also he immediately puts the difference of art and virtue, thus speaking: "Furthermore, neither is it similar in arts and virtues. For those things which come about from the arts have well existing in them; it suffices, therefore, that they should come about being thus disposed: but those things which come about according to virtues, neither if they thus dispose themselves are they justly or temperately operated, but [only] also if the operator works being thus disposed: first, indeed, if knowing; then, if choosing; and choosing for this very thing."

Who, moreover, would not know that moral operations are by no means to be discerned from the substance of the work alone, but much more amply from the circumstances?—of which one, and not the least, is with what intention, by obtaining of which end, for the sake of which finally a work is done. Wherefore also the Philosopher in third *Ethics* 3 enumerates seven moral circumstances: who, what, about what, and in what, by what, for the sake of what, and how. This sentence also many Catholic authorities cited in the demonstration of the 32nd part of the first Corollary of this [book] manifestly show—nay rather, the supreme Author of the whole Catholic faith, under the metaphor of the simple eye and the wicked eye: for who anywhere doubts this is to be referred to the intention of the inner eye?

Wherefore also Anselm himself, who *De Veritate* 12 teaches that truth, rectitude, and justice are the same really, nay even that they mutually define each other, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 and 8, and in *De Concordia* 5 and 8, defines justice to be "rectitude of will preserved for its own sake"—namely for the sake of that very rectitude or justice—which never can be done save through an intention finally directed to rectitude or justice for its own sake. Wherefore also in *De Concordia* 8 he thus says: "But lest anyone should think that by divine authority the just or right [man] is said [to be] he who preserveth not but for the sake of another the rectitude of will: We say that justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. For he who preserveth it only for the sake of another, doth not love it, but that for whose sake he preserveth it; and therefore is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be named justice."

The same also *De Veritate* 12 premised that "whatsoever ought to be, rightly and justly is, nor is anything rightly and justly save what ought to be"—he asks whether a stone descending should be said to be just, since it doeth what it ought, and answers that it should not, since it doth not will what it doeth. Whether also a horse willing to graze can be said to be just since willingly it doeth what it ought, and answers that it should not, since it doth not recognize justice or rectitude. Whether moreover any man willing what he ought, rightly willeth and hath the rectitude of will?—and answers that he doth not, since he can do this not knowing—as if anyone

willeth to close a door against him who, the former being ignorant, willeth to slay another in the house.

Furthermore, whether he who knoweth that he ought to will what he willeth, always rightly willeth and hath the rectitude of will?—and he answers that he doth not, since it can happen that an intelligent one willeth what he ought, and willeth not that he ought, just as when a thief is compelled to return the money taken away. Yet again, whether everyone who knoweth and willeth that he ought to will what he willeth, hath the rectitude of will, and he answers that he doth not, like he who feeds a starving pauper for the sake of obtaining vain glory. And he adds: "Every will, just as it willeth something, so also it willeth on account of something. For just as it must be considered what it willeth, so it must be seen why it willeth; for not more right it must be in willing what it ought, than in willing on account of what it ought. Wherefore every will hath both why and what. For we will absolutely nothing, unless there be why we will. The just one, however, when he willeth what he ought, preserveth the rectitude of will, not on account of another, insofar as he is to be called just, than on account of that very rectitude."

From all these things, therefore, it is clearly plain, that not every one willing as God willeth him to will, therefore necessarily simply willeth rightly, unless knowingly, with the knowledge at least required in moral matters, and intentionally he willeth this, namely so that he believe God to so will, and therefore finally, according to his intention and purpose, he so willeth, that he may fulfil the divine and not his own will.

He, however, who would, could much more briefly thus expound Anselm, where he says that "the rectitude of will is for one to will as God willeth him to will," by taking there "willeth" for "willeth simply," "loveth," and "approveth," not in a certain respect, as has been said; and not anyone who willeth something, willeth as God willeth, simply loveth, and approveth him to will.

And if thou yet repliest against this by positing that someone knoweth that God willeth him to commit the sin of adultery, who therefore knowingly and intentionally in the foresaid manner committeth it—in which case he sinneth and sinneth not. For he sinneth by committing the sin of adultery; he sinneth not, since with this acting he rightly willeth and acteth, and hath the rectitude of will and operation, as is seen from the premises. If by the sin of adultery thou understandest the act, which is wont to be adultery and sin, it appears that someone, by dispensation or command of God, could commit the same without sinning, just as it appears to have been according to the letter concerning Hosea, who, the Lord commanding, took to himself a wife of fornications, and made sons of fornication of her, just as appears in Hosea 1—just as also some Doctors understand, although certain ones seem to feel the contrary. For it is established from the things premised in the 26th [chapter] of this [book], that such an act is not per se a sin.

And if thou yet attemptest to obstruct, by positing that someone knoweth that God willeth him to commit some sin existing as a sin, an act of sin involved with malice, who therefore knowingly and intentionally in the foresaid manner committeth it—then he sinneth, as the hypothesis clearly proves, and sinneth not according to the foresaid response—thy positing patently includes

repugnancy and contradiction, namely his sinning and likewise his not sinning. For anyone knowing the divine will, and doing something only on account of it, and according to it in all things, seems well to act and not to sin.

But hence perhaps thou wilt argue, that God hath some will concerning man and his free act, to which the man cannot meritoriously conform himself, however much God may reveal it to him to be known, and may attempt to reveal it—a will, namely, by which He willeth the man to sin, or to commit a sin existing as a sin. Wilt thou not also acknowledge that God hath some will concerning the angel and the man confirmed [in glory], to which they cannot knowingly meritoriously conform themselves? For it is established that those confirmed in consummated beatitude cannot further advance in merit; and if thou positest "meritoriously" [as] "rightly or justly," it is established further that God can will someone to conform himself not justly and rightly to the divine will: to which will how knowingly, justly, and rightly will he be able to conform himself? God can also will someone to do something ignorantly: to which will how could anyone knowingly fit himself? God also can will a man to err, by believing this falsehood or that: and how to this will can anyone conform himself knowingly? For how can one knowingly err by believing in particular and under proper form distinctly some falsehood? For who is so knowing something to be false, [also] believes it likewise to be true?

God, moreover, can will someone to will and pray meritoriously, holily, and justly—justly, I say, with respect to the willing one [willing] something to be done, by believing ignorantly and erroneously that to be done would be pleasing to God, or that God willeth this, [when] God is willing the contrary and not that: to which will how could anyone conform himself knowingly?

Furthermore, perhaps thou wilt not cease to object, by positing that anyone knoweth that God willeth him to sin: then such a one ought, or lawfully can, sin. For he ought, or could lawfully, subject himself to the divine will, and conform himself fully to it, especially since he knoweth it. But this proceeds similarly from the essence of a base act, and is nonetheless solved by the premises.

Nor perhaps wilt thou yet cease, but wilt say: "Thou well knowest or believest, that thou wilt sometime sin: thou knowest therefore or believest, according to the premises, that God willeth this. Wherefore thou thyself oughtest, or lawfully canst, will the same." But this proceeds similarly from the substance of an evil act; it is also solved by the premises.

To the other [objection] it is plain by the same, namely by the substance of a base act, and by the other things already premised. The consequence, moreover, halts, and proceeds not. For let it be supposed that thou knowest, that God willeth thee to will nothing, or that He willeth thee to will Himself alone—therefore thou oughtest to will this: how doth it follow? That [authority], however, of Augustine and Anselm concerning "ought," adduced for the confirmation of this, is solved by the premises: For it proceeds similarly from the very essence of an evil act; nor again doth anyone who doeth what he ought, therefore immediately do justly or rightly, unless

knowingly and intentionally in the said manner he doeth it, just as the preceding things show; which Anselm cited above also testifies.

Yet "due to be done" can be regarded in two ways, namely with respect to the divine will, and with respect to the rational created will. With respect to the divine will, all things ought to be done as they are done, and just and right it is that all things should be done as they are done, just as the preceding things clearly show. With respect, however, to the rational created will, that alone in its actions is due to be done, just, and right, which it doth knowingly, and intentionally toward God, and from love of Him finally for His sake—just as is plain from the things premised here, and from the 30th part of the first Corollary of the first [book].

To that of Augustine also: "If the will is just, whoever shall obey it, shall not sin," similarly must be answered. For another [argument], it is established that one can justly and rationally accuse and avenge some fact of which he is in some way the author, namely if the doer doth this not knowingly, intentionally, and with the spirit of executing the authority or will of his author, but in the contrary manner, and with the spirit of malice, just as the preceding things have taught.

To the authorities of Scripture it is plain by the foresaid: yet thus can be objected: "God willeth sin; therefore in some way He loveth sin, and hateth all sin; therefore He simultaneously loveth and hateth the same."

It must be said, that speaking of "to love" and "to hate" in a certain respect, the conclusion is true concerning God, just as also concerning man: for one can love someone as a father, and hate him as a punisher. For God to love someone is to will good to him, and to hate him is to will evil to him, as is plain from the 25th [chapter]; and thus He willeth to His elect eternal good and temporal evil; to the reprobate, however, contrarily; and to the devil himself He willeth great good of nature, and great evil of punishment, and of everlasting misery.

Or it can be said in all these things, as is said by some, that just as sin and every privation is not understood per se, but in comparison to its habit, and not properly positively, but in some manner privatively, as the 26th [chapter] sets forth: so also sin is willed by God privatively; yet any act according to that which it is, since, as such, it is good, is willed by God properly positively. This response, however, if it be fully sufficient, and please my elders, pleaseth me: for I would prefer in the magnitude of so great a question to hear my elders, rather than I myself, the least, to respond.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters 35–38

CHAPTER 35. [D] AGAINST PELAGIUS, THAT GRACE IS GIVEN BY GOD FREELY AND NOT OBTAINED THROUGH PRECEDING MERITS.

Furthermore, since under the magnificent providence of God the divine gifts are contained, it seems necessary that whoever wishes to treat of the providence of God should not be silent concerning the divine gifts. For all things besides God — indeed, even God Himself — are reckoned as divine gifts, as the third [chapter] of this [book], and the 4th, 2nd, 9th, 27th, and following chapters make manifest. Wherefore the Apostle says that He gives to all life and breath and all things [Acts 17:25]. This being known, it must further be shown that God gives all His gifts freely. For He is not greedy, nor is He in need of anything, as the third part and fifth part of the first Corollary teach: and likewise to give thus is more magnificent and more liberal, better and more perfect, [E] than to give in another way, or rather to sell, for some advantage to come to the giver from the gift. This mode of giving must therefore without hesitation be assigned to God, by the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary of this [book], as the twenty-ninth part of the same has likewise refuted the Pelagians. Wherefore any gift of God whatever may not incongruously be called a grace of God, namely a grace freely given. This grace is common to all creatures, both irrational and rational, to the grateful as well as the ungrateful. Nor — without the most thankful giving of thanks — is it further to be observed, that there is a certain grace, a certain species of the aforesaid grace, freely most pleasing to all, which is not only freely given by God but even renders the one to whom it is given pleasing to God, dear to Him, His friend and son in the present life, and a sharer of glory in the future. Concerning this grace, therefore — herself loving me through all things — a little must be said against the ungrateful Pelagians, the enemies of grace. For the pestilent Pelagians say that this highest grace of God is in no way [A] freely given by God, but is obtained through preceding merits. But these Pelagians, by the things here premised, and by the 29th part of the first Corollary of this [book], are driven into the deep [pelagus] and struck down. Moreover, if God gives merits or any helps whatsoever to one predestined to the Kingdom, He does not give them on account of any utility to God according to the prior considerations, but in order that the predestined one may obtain the Kingdom through them, because He reasonably wills [it]; and this can be shown by the 22nd of this [book]. And if He wills him to have merits, in order that he may obtain the Kingdom through them, He naturally first wills him to have the Kingdom; for this is in a certain manner the final cause why He wills him to merit, namely that through this he may acquire for himself the Kingdom. And He freely accepts him for the Kingdom prior to willing or accepting his merits. Because, therefore, first by His magnificent liberality He freely accepts him for reigning, and yet it is not fitting that he should ascend to so great a kingdom unmeriting, He wills him to merit, and gives him aid and grace to merit. Therefore graciousness-conferring grace and freely-given grace, according to the distinction written in [Distinction] 25, naturally precedes all merits of anyone whatsoever. This could be proved by a similar [example]: For [B] if a father wishes his son to do business, in order that he may buy a field, he naturally wishes him to have the field before doing business; for this is the final cause of that, and therefore he freely gives him money, not because he has done business, but in order that he may do business and so acquire the field.

This is also wholly confirmed by that common Philosophical [maxim] from *Physics* II 89, *De Anima* III 49, and *Ethics* III 8: In things to be done, what is first in intention is last in execution. Likewise, the will is borne toward the end of itself and primarily, to such an extent that it does not deliberate concerning it, but it is not borne toward the means except for the sake of the end alone; and therefore concerning these it deliberates carefully. Wherefore it wills the end before the means. Whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* II 8: We deliberate, however, not about ends, but about those things which lead to ends: For the doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor the orator whether he shall persuade, nor the politician whether he shall make peace; nor any of these about the end, but having posited some end, they consider how and by what means it shall come about. Likewise, God well foreknows and wills that whoever has good merits perseveringly shall reign; nor can anyone have good merits perseveringly unless God Himself [C] wills, works, gives, and preserves [them], by the ninth of this [book]. Therefore prior in time and nature God wills that someone reign before He gives him good merits; and therefore before he has good merits. Therefore not on account of merits, as on account of a prior cause, does He grant him grace and accept him to the Kingdom, but altogether freely, and on account of this gives him grace to merit.

But I, foolish in the knowledge of God and vain, when I was attending to philosophical letters, was seduced by the contrary error. For when I sometimes heard theologians treating this matter, the Pelagian side seemed to me more true. For in the schools of the Philosophers, I was rarely accustomed to hear anything about grace, except perhaps spoken equivocally; but every day I heard that we are masters of our free actions, and that it is in our power to act well or ill, to have virtues or vices, with many similar things. And if at any time in church I heard a reading from the Apostle exalting grace and depressing free will — of which sort is that to the Romans 9: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy [Rom. 9:16] — and many similar things, this displeased me as ungrateful to grace. [D] With the Manichaeans I also believed that the Apostle, as a man, could in some matter have deviated from the path of truth. Afterwards, however, before I had become a hearer of theology, having been visited as it were by a certain ray of grace through the aforesaid argument, under a certain thin image of truth, I seemed to see from afar the grace of God preceding all good merits in time and in nature — namely, the gracious will of God, who in both ways first wills the meriter to be saved, and naturally first works his merit in him before he himself does, just as He is in all motions the first Mover; whence I render thanks to Him who freely gave me this grace. Augustine likewise confesses that he was at one time deceived by this error of Pelagius, to such a degree that the texts of the Apostle commending grace seemed to him in no way to agree with the testimonies of the Law and the Prophets, but even to oppose them; from which error a similar reasoning led him to the knowledge of truth. For he says concerning the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 4: When I was erring similarly to Pelagius, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but is from us in us, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God, nor did I think that faith was preceded by the grace of God, struck especially by this testimony of the Apostle, [E] *What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as*

if thou hadst not received? [1 Cor. 4:7], I was convicted. And in *Confessions* VII, last [chapter], after he confessed how through books he had been inflated with secular wisdom and knowledge, and afterwards visited by divine grace, he says thus: Most eagerly I seized the venerable pen of Thy Spirit, and before others the Apostle Paul; and those questions perished in which once he seemed to me to oppose, and the text of his discourse not to agree with the testimonies of the Law and the Prophets; and one face of those chaste eloquences appeared to me; and I learned to read whatever I might find true there, said with the commendation of Thy grace, that he who sees may not glory as though he had not received. Whose footsteps too in this whole matter, as far as [A] I can, I especially follow, because he seems to me as much the Logician as the Philosopher of the Apostles, and another among the Doctors. Many also, as I fear, of the modern Philosophers embrace this false madness more dearly under the appearance of true wisdom. For it seems to many very plausibly colored, agreeing with experience and consonant with reason (for sometimes false things are more probable than true), which nevertheless if they truly wished to philosophize, they could philosophically refute — I do not say through the reasons here set down or to be set down, but perhaps through other stronger ones, which by God's preceding grace they could find. Furthermore, with God's grace as guide, we proceed in this manner: No one can have merits, nor persevere in them, unless God give and preserve, as has just been shown; and if He should wish to give merits to a wicked man and preserve them, as He does to a good man, that one would merit and persevere similarly to the good man, as the tenth [chapter] clearly proves. Therefore not on account of merits, but freely does He choose this one and not that one. Likewise, if God on account of preceding good merits gives grace, why then does He give those merits? Not on account of other prior merits, lest perhaps thus the process should go on infinitely; therefore He gives them freely, and therefore also grace. For grace from the very force of its name, among all things given, seems most freely [B] given. Nor can it be said that He gives this man good merits because He foreknows that he will use them well, because anyone whomsoever would do so, if God willed him to use them well, as is plain by the tenth [chapter]. Nor will he be able [to do so] otherwise, as the ninth chapter proves. How also could anyone use good merits badly, or not well, since a good merit is a good use, or [good] act? Likewise, if God should give grace to someone on account of merits, then because he would merit, He would will him to reign, and because he would merit, He would will him to have merits. Therefore his meriting would be a cause of the divine volition moving the divine will, and the divine will, suffering from "to merit," contrary to the twentieth; and that he would merit would be the cause why God wills him to merit, which is false; for the contrary is true. For because God wills him to merit, he merits, as the 14th [chapter] showed. Furthermore, then God, as far as concerns Himself, would be in potency, and in pure indifference, to willing this man to have grace or to lack it, and would suffer, be actualized, and be determined by the merit of this man, good or bad — which is repugnant to His perfection and supreme actuality, as is plain from the twentieth [C] of this [book]. Likewise, if God did not give grace most freely, but on account of some inferior cause contingent and free, He would certainly not foreknow that He would give it, as the eighteenth of this [book] shows. For by precisely the same cause by which God first foreknows

that He will give grace, at the time of the giving He knows that He gives it. For on account of whatever cause He then gives grace, He always foreknew and willed to give grace on account of that [cause]; otherwise He would have a mutable will, contrary to the twenty-third. Likewise, if God should give grace for merits, He would will and do this because it would be just for it to be so done; whereas it is the contrary and not so, as the twenty-first teaches. Likewise, then the conferral of grace, and the merit preceding it, would not be contained under divine providence, since by chapter ten it becomes efficacious, but they would be left to chance and fortune, contrary to the 27th and others which follow. Likewise, by the first supposition God is so great a good that nothing greater than Him can be conceived, and the good is communicative of itself, and the greater good more so; therefore God is so liberally communicative and capable of giving [D] that nothing more liberally communicable or givable can be conceived: but it is more liberal to give freely altogether with no preceding merit; thus therefore God gives, especially since He has no need of our goods; and what will He give more liberally or more graciously than grace? Therefore God gives grace freely. This even the signification of the name of grace seems to signify, namely that it is freely given, in which the Apostle, founding himself, in Romans 11, proves by a demonstration leading to the impossible — namely to its denial of itself — that grace is not from works: *If, by grace*, he says, *not from works; otherwise* — that is, if the opposite be granted — *grace is no longer grace* [Rom. 11:6]. And above, [chapter] 4: *To him who works, the reward is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt* [Rom. 4:4]. Likewise, some virtuous men, such as the liberal and the magnificent, give purely liberally and altogether freely, according to the requirement of their virtue, without any preceding merit, or even subsequent [merit], as is taught in *Ethics* IV; therefore also God, since He is more virtuous, more liberal, and more magnificent than any man infinitely [E], will do likewise. Indeed, even if these virtuous men do this for friends, or even for those who are merely not enemies, He will do this not only for friends, and not only for those who are not enemies — if any are such middle [persons] — but even for enemies. For according to Augustine, *Enchiridion* 56: It is a less good to be benevolent or even beneficent toward him who has done you no evil; but that is a much greater thing, and of the most magnificent goodness, to love your enemy also and to wish and do good to him. Whence the Apostle to the Romans 5: *God commends* — that is, shows to be commendable — *His charity in us, since while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; and when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son* [Rom. 5:8–10]. Likewise, it seems more fitting that goods should be dispensed according to the will of one wiser and better, than according to the will of one less wise and good; but God is wiser and better than any man infinitely; therefore it seems more fitting that all things should be dispensed according to the divine will, than [A] causally a priori according to the merits of the human will. Whence Ephesians 1: *Who works all things according to the counsel of His will* [Eph. 1:11]. Likewise, no one doubts that God could confer His grace freely, and that this would be more merciful and more fitting; who therefore so far knows the mind of the Lord, or has been His counsellor, that he should dare to deny that God does so, since he ought rather to affirm this — God who even in little ones [parvulis] does so notoriously, as the thirty-first of this [book] alleges? And if anyone

should say, It is not just that it should be so done; therefore He does not do so — let him know from the twenty-first of this [book], that nothing is just in such matters, except because it is willed by God, not the contrary: For not because it is just is it willed by God. Likewise, if anyone has merited his grace, he is more worthy of it than if he had not merited it; *for the workman is worthy of his hire* [Luke 10:7], and Romans 4: *To him who works, the reward is imputed not according to grace but according to debt*. Therefore any man having grace which he has merited is more worthy of it than Christ [is worthy] of the grace of union, or of any other grace freely given to Him in the beginning (For He did not merit this [B] or that). Whoever shall concede this will show himself to be not a member of Christ, but rather of Antichrist, since he raises himself above the Head. Whence Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* [chapter] 19: The most splendid light of predestination and grace is the Saviour Himself, Christ Jesus, who, that He might be such, obtained it by no preceding merits. Let that fountain of grace therefore open itself in our Head, whence to each one according to measure it pours itself through all His members; by that grace any man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his faith, by which grace that man from His beginning was made Christ. And it follows in chapter twenty: Whoever has found preceding merits in our Head of that singular generation, let him in us his members seek the preceding merits of multiplied regeneration. And in *Enchiridion* 27 and *On the Good of Perseverance* [the chapters] next-to-last and last, he says many similar things; where in the last chapter he says: He who made this Man just without any preceding merit, He Himself from the unjust makes the just, without any preceding merit on their part, that He might be the Head, they His members. Likewise, the position contrary to this takes away from God the greatest portion [C] of thanksgivings and praises, of fear and honor; it also uproots the hope of man from God, and founds it in himself: For who will give thanks equally, and praise, fear God, and love Him, if He should render to his merits the due reward, as if He should freely come before him even as an enemy, and confer all goods? Why also will he not hope in himself, since he suffices for himself? Yet how pernicious all these things are, and contrary to Christian doctrine, who is ignorant? This too the most copious series of both Testaments testifies, whence I shall now adduce a few testimonies. Deuteronomy 9: *For not on account of your justices shall you enter, that you may possess the land* [Deut. 9:5]. Job 31: *If my heart has rejoiced in secret, and I have kissed my hand with my mouth, which is the greatest iniquity, and a denial against the most high God* [Job 31:27–28]. On which blessed Gregory, *Moralia* XXII 9, says: By the hand, certainly, action is signified; by the mouth, speech. Therefore he kisses his hand with his mouth who praises what he does, and attributes the power of his work to himself. Holy men, however, know that not by their own power, but by preceding [D] grace, they have been changed for the better in their resolutions or works. And because anyone who attributes to himself what he does is convicted of denying the grace of his Author, immediately is added: *which is the greatest iniquity*, etc., for he denies Him whose grace, despised, he claims for himself the powers of the good work. Psalm 55: *For nothing shalt Thou save them*, and Psalm 105: *They counted as nothing the desirable land* [Ps. 105:24]; and above, [Psalm] 67: *A free [voluntary] rain shalt Thou set apart for Thy inheritance* [Ps. 67:10]. On which Augustine in the exposition cited above adds: Much more

fittingly is grace itself understood as voluntary rain, because by no preceding merits of works, it is freely given. *For if grace, not from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.* For *I am not worthy*, he says, *to be called an Apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God; but by the grace of God I am what I am* [1 Cor. 15:9–10] — this is voluntary rain. *Voluntarily indeed He has begotten us by the word of truth* [James 1:18] — this is voluntary rain. Furthermore, also, Isaiah 52: *Freely* (the Gloss: that is, of your own accord) *you have been sold, and without silver shall you be redeemed* (Gloss: that is, by no merit of yours, but by the gratuitous benefit of God). And Hosea, last [chapter]: *I shall heal [E] their contritions, I shall love them spontaneously* (Gloss: that is, by mercy alone, because He first loved us). Which also in the New Testament, in the time of grace, is more clearly demonstrated. For the Author Himself of all grace, through John, plainly speaks of the grace of God: *No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him* [John 6:44]; and *No one can come to me, unless it has been given him by my Father* [John 6:65]; and below, [chapter] 15: *Without me you can do nothing* [John 15:5]; and above, [chapter] 3: *The Spirit breathes where He wills* [John 3:8]; and below, [chapter] 5: *The Son gives life to whom He wills* [John 5:21]; and Mark 3: *He called to himself those whom He willed, and they came to him* [Mark 3:13]; and James 1: *Voluntarily He has begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be some beginning of His creature* [James 1:18]; and many very similar things. The Apostle Paul himself is also a witness — vessel of free election, in whom the effects of freely-given grace most evidently appeared, whom not while persisting in good [A] works, indeed not even while desisting from evils, but still breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, and as a man of Belial thirsting for the blood of Christians, and persecuting the Lord Himself, suddenly a light from Heaven shone around, with which the grace of Jesus Christ also came before him, as is plain in Acts 9. He, therefore, especially in some manner a son of grace, and not ungrateful, more devotedly honors, exalts, and proclaims grace his mother in nearly all his Epistles, and especially defends her; who in nearly the whole Epistle to the Romans, prolixly disputing and acutely, principally does these things. Whence in chapter 3 he writes thus: *That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may be made subject to God* [Rom. 3:19] (Gloss: attributing all to Him, nothing to one's own merits, *because by the works of the law no flesh is justified, and we are justified freely by His grace*). And to the Ephesians 2: *By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone should glory* [Eph. 2:8–9]. And to Titus 3: *The kindness and humanity of our Saviour God appeared, not from the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us* [Titus 3:4–5]. The same to Romans 9 [B] and 11 he not only says, but proves by the authorities of the Old Testament, and by reason as well. For in the ninth he alleges that of Exodus 33, that the Lord said to Moses, *I shall have mercy on whom I have willed, and I shall be merciful to him whom it has pleased me* [Exod. 33:19]. Whence the Apostle concludes, *Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy* [Rom. 9:16]. Yet if grace and mercy were from works, it would rather be said, *I shall have mercy and be merciful to him who shall have merited it, and It is of him who wills and of him who runs* — that is, in the merit of him who works — that *God show mercy and bestow grace*. And in [chapter] 11 he

proves the same by one authority, 3 Kings 19, saying that God left for Himself seven thousand men, who had not bowed their knees before Baal. Whence he concludes, *So therefore in this time the remnants, according to the election of grace, have been saved* [Rom. 11:5]; and immediately afterwards he proves the same by a demonstration leading to the impossible, namely to its own denial of itself, namely: *If grace be from works, it is no longer grace*, as was alleged above. In this opinion also all the Catholic Doctors are unanimously in agreement, among whom Augustine, because just as the Apostle [C] was first an unbeliever and a blasphemer and an enemy of the grace of Jesus Christ, [and] after he was preceded by that same grace was likewise converted, in some singular way imitating the Apostle, [Augustine] became a praiser of grace, a magnificent and strenuous defender of grace. Likewise, to this side a peremptory argument can be adduced: For the contrary side, which holds that grace is given according to our merits, is the Pelagian heresy, which not only the Catholic Fathers in the Episcopal Palestinian judgement condemned, but even Pelagius himself the heretic, fearing to be condemned in the same place, likewise condemned, as is plain through Augustine *On Heresies* 88, and *On the Predestination of the Saints* 2, and *On Grace and Free Will* 11, and through Isidore *Etymologies* VIII 19, and is recited in the Canon, [Cause] 24, last question, *Quid autem*. This heresy also Augustine fully and carefully destroys, in various books against the Pelagians in general, and against certain of them, such as against Julian and Caelestius in particular, through other special books, as those know well enough who have known the books of Augustine. For this opinion also, and against the Pelagian heresy, Lombard adduces in 2 Sentences, distinction 24, and in many distinctions following, many [D] and efficacious testimonies of truth, which clearly prove operating and cooperating grace likewise. Against these things, however, Pelagius objects thus by asking: If grace be given freely, since all men are equal in themselves, why is it given to this one and not to that one? I also ask the one so asking, why God of infinite souls, and any other things equally possible and equally good in all respects, if they were created, creates these and not those? Let this man also ask, as in the person of such Augustine asks in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 19: I am a man as Christ is a man; why am I not what He is? For the grace of God is such and so great in Him; why is grace diverse, where the nature is common? Certainly there is no acceptance of persons with God. And as if responding, Augustine asks: Who — I do not say a Christian, but [who] insane — would say this? The same in homily 26 on that [text] of John 6, *No one can come to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him*, to one so asking, as if without responding, responds: Great, he says, is the commendation of grace; *no one comes unless drawn*; [E] whom He should draw and whom He should not, why He should draw this one and not that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err. To this asker, however, the 21st of this [book] responds. Furthermore, the Pelagians, ungrateful to grace, do not cease to oppose, but like erring forgers [falsigraphi], not understanding the Scriptures nor the truth of God, as blessed Augustine recounts in *On Grace and Free Will* 11, gather such testimonies from sacred Scripture for the strengthening of their error, and propose them: *Be converted to me, and I shall be converted to you* [Zach. 1:3]; and 2 Paralipomenon: *The Lord is with you if you are with Him; and if you shall seek Him, you shall find Him* [2 Par. 15:2]; from which they strive to argue that grace is given

according to our merits. But in vain, since elsewhere it is so written: *God of hosts, convert us; God, do Thou converting us, give us life; and After Thou converted me, I did penance* [Jer. 31:19]; and Lamentations, last [chapter]: *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted; renew our days as from the beginning* [Lam. 5:21]. Behold, that [A] the Lord renews us fallen unto grace, just as also through it in the beginning He makes us new. Yet in such precepts, *Be converted to me*, etc., according to Augustine in the same place, chapter 11 and 12, He manifests the free will of the will. And below, [chapter] 23: When it is commanded that they work, free will is preceded; but therefore with fear and trembling, lest anyone attribute to himself that he works well; indeed, if Pelagius has even half an eye, he could see, that God by the very fact that He so commands, comes before the will, exciting it itself to act — yet not so that he should do this without Him, but with Him, as the preceding [chapters] taught. Wherefore He says, *Without me you can do nothing* [John 15:5]. And the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 15: *I have laboured more abundantly than all, yet not I, but the grace of God with me* [1 Cor. 15:10]. A similar forgery [falsigraphiam] Augustine also recounts in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 13, in these words: When it is said, they say, *If thou shalt believe, thou shalt be saved* — one of these is required, the other offered; what is required is in man's [power], what is offered is in God's power. And by asking, he objects against them thus: Why is not each in God's power, both what [B] He commands, and what is offered? And immediately he proves that it is so. For He is asked to give what He commands. For believers ask that faith may be increased to them; they ask for unbelievers that faith may be given them; therefore both in its increases and in its beginnings, faith is the gift of God, although it itself, when it is said *If thou believest, thou shalt be saved*, with the reward of salvation set forth, is required from us. For therefore are these things and similar commanded of us, and are shown to be the gifts of God, that it may be understood that we do them, and God does them, that we may do them, as through the prophet Ezekiel He most plainly says: *I shall make you to do* [Ezek. 36:27]. Attend and you will see God promising that He will do that they may do, what He commands to be done. Whence Ezekiel 36: *Not on account of you shall I do, O house of Israel, but on account of My holy name. I shall lead you back into your land; I shall pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed, and from all your idols I shall cleanse you, and I shall give you a new heart, and a new spirit shall I place in your midst; I shall take away the heart of stone, and shall give you a heart of flesh, and shall make you to walk in My precepts, and to keep My judgments and to work [them]* [Ezek. 36:25–27]. And it could not unfittingly [C] be understood, *Be converted to me and I shall be converted to you*, in this manner: Be converted to me through operating grace and the free will of the will, and I shall be converted to you through cooperating grace, by preserving the previous grace, or by giving fuller — according to what is written in the last [chapter] of the Apocalypse: *Let the holy be sanctified still* [Rev. 22:11]. Whence Anselm *On Concord* 10 says: It is said to those converted, *Be converted*, either that they may be more fully converted, or that they may preserve what they have been converted to. Furthermore, certain advocates of Pelagius do not cease to bark, alleging many indeed and manifest words of an Epistle, as they say, of blessed Jerome to Demetrias *On the Instruction of a Virgin*, against the help of grace, and for the sufficiency of free will for any

virtuous works whatsoever. But these, as it seems, neglecting in this part the writings of the elders, more dearly embrace Pelagian Scripture rather than Augustinian, heretical Scripture rather than Catholic. For it is well known to those reading and not neglecting the Letter-collection of blessed Jerome, that there are two letters entitled "of Jerome to Demetrias," of which one, namely [Letter] 94, having such a beginning, [D] *Inter omnes materias*, is without doubt his, in which nothing is contained concerning the excellence of free will; the other however, namely [Letter] 93, beginning in this manner, *Si summo ingenio patique fretus scientia*, which patently extols free will, and concedes grace, but ambiguous, foolish, and fallacious — is in no way to be believed [the work] of Jerome the Catholic Doctor. For it neither smacks of his style, his procedure, nor his sense, but of others much different, as readers may easily see. And it agrees much in opinion and in style with the great Epistle of Pelagius directed to Bishop Paulinus, with his book *On Free Will* — which contains four books — and with many other little works of his. Wherefore it is verisimilarly to be esteemed [the work] of Pelagius himself. Does not Pelagius himself in the little book of his faith, which he sent to Rome to Pope Innocent, write thus? Let them read the Epistle which we wrote in the East to the holy Virgin of Christ Demetrias, and they will find that we so praise the nature of man, that we always add the help of God's grace. And what is that Epistle, except that one mentioned above? Wherefore Augustine in *Book 1 against Pelagius and Caelestius*, *On the Grace of Christ* [E] and *On Original Sin* 23, 28, 29, 30, and 31, asserts plainly that that Epistle is of Pelagius, reciting, discussing, and condemning certain particulars of it; who also with Alypius, in Epistle 1 to Juliana, says: *Who, indeed, wrote the book to holy Demetrias?* and recites by discussing certain particulars of the aforesaid Epistle. Furthermore, also, Guido Prior of Carthusia, in his Epistle sent to Lazarus Prior of Durbon and the brothers, concerning the Epistles of blessed Jerome, plainly says that the aforesaid Epistle is not of Jerome, but rather of Pelagius. The Venerable Bede, however, in [Book] 1 on the *Canticle of Canticles* (which is especially against Julian) on the grace of God, [chapter] 12, reciting and condemning many particulars of this Epistle, affirms that it is [the work] of Julian, the son and nursling of Pelagius. Whence he says thus: *In the book which he wrote to Demetrias the Virgin of Christ, On the Instruction* [A] *of a Virgin, he displays these same things concerning the power of free will, how he thinks. Which book some of our [people] studiously reading rashly judge to be of the holy and Catholic Doctor Jerome, in no way considering, that the sweetness of the soothing eloquence, and the perversity of the seducing heresy, manifestly prove that this little work is not his.* Rather, [Jerome] himself confuted and struck down [Julian's] faith — or rather perfidy — in the Dialogue of Atticus and Critobulus, which, while Pelagius was still living, when as yet Julian was being nourished by him as a small basilisk in the cavern of a serpent, he edited, with divine eloquences. Some, however, looking at a few things, easily declare that nothing such is found in Bede's first book on the Canticles. But these undoubtedly are deceived, thinking the first book of Bede expounding the Canticles to be simply the first book — but it is not so. For in the first book, he does not expound the text of the Canticle, but before he comes to the exposition of the Canticle, throughout that whole first book he discusses and tears apart the errors and heresies of the books of Julian. Wherefore in many

codices that first book is in no way found. Whoever, however, sees the beginning of his last book on the Canticles, will manifestly see him saying [B] that he had first written that book against Julian — which is more frequently found in non-defective codices. This book, however, has in some codices such a beginning: *I thought first to admonish the reader; that the little works of Julian*, etc.; in others, however, such: *Being about to write, with God's helping grace, on the Canticle of Canticles, [the reader] is first to be admonished*, etc., as above. Nor should anyone judge Bede, saying that that Epistle is of Julian, to contradict Augustine saying it is of Pelagius — for these do not conflict. For it frequently happens that many joined together send one Epistle, or perhaps both together dictated [it], and Pelagius, because he was the elder and master, sent it under his name — which afterwards Julian wished to claim for himself. All these witnesses, however, harmoniously testify that that Epistle is not of blessed Jerome, but of Pelagius, or some Pelagian heretic, and profane.

[C] COROLLARY.

AGAINST CASSIAN, MEDIATING BY SAYING THAT GOD GIVES HIS GRACE TO SOME FREELY WITHOUT PRECEDING MERIT, BUT TO OTHERS NOT UNLESS THEY FIRST MERIT TO RECEIVE IT: WHEREFORE ALSO THAT NO SLAVE OF MORTAL SIN CAN BE FREED BY HIS OWN POWERS ALONE.

From these things, therefore, it evidently appears that Cassian, wishing to mediate between the Catholics (who universally affirm in all things that God gives the first grace freely) and Pelagius (who judges that God gives to anyone grace for preceding merit, and to no one simply, purely freely) — by saying that God to some gives grace purely freely, but to others for preceding merit — gravely raves: wherefore also that no slave of mortal sin can be freed by his own [D] powers alone. This whole corollary patently follows from the premises. The aforesaid error of Cassian also Saint Prosper, throughout nearly the whole little book entitled "Of Saint Prosper, In Defense of the Preachers of God's Grace, against the Book of Cassian the Presbyter, which is entitled *On the Protection of God*," discreetly refutes, and diffusely repels. The errors of this Cassian in this matter are written in the *Conferences of the Fathers*. The other part of it [the corollary] is especially persuaded by this — that every slave of mortal sin is ungrateful to God, and cannot be made gracious without grace, nor can he by his own powers alone acquire this through prior [merits]. Unhappy man therefore — who shall free him from the body of this death? *The grace of God through Jesus Christ* [Rom. 7:24–25], to the Romans 7. Which also the authorities of all Catholic Doctors treating this matter unanimously testify.

CHAPTER 36. AGAINST THE PROCURATORS OF PELAGIUS WHO ASSERT THAT, ALTHOUGH MERITS ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF THE PRINCIPAL CONFERRAL OF GRACE, YET THEY ARE THE CAUSE WITHOUT WHICH IT IS NOT CONFERRED.

Although the Holy Fathers cut down [succiderunt] this Pelagian heresy, yet from its venomous root deeply driven into the hearts of many, certain not entirely spurious but pestilent shoots — because they change not the savor but the color — do not cease to sprout. For some [B] of such men say that merits are not the principal cause of the grace given to us, but a cause without which it is not given. But who does not see that these and those similar to them only verbally decline the Pelagian heresy, while really preaching it? They change the voice, on account of avoiding the horror of the heretical name, that thus the same opinion of depravity, sophistically palliated and fallaciously masked, they may more cautiously introduce, and so corrupt the hearts of the simple more easily and seduce them. The voice indeed is the voice of Jacob — namely, of the faithful man, beloved by God; but the hands inserting the iniquitous opinion are the hands of Esau — that is, of the unbelieving man, hateful to God [cf. Gen. 27:22]. Who also is so destitute of mind, that he should not perceive with how glad a heart such men would reconcile Pelagius, Caelestius, Julian, and the other Pelagian heretics, if they dared, and would condemn Paul, Augustine, Gregory, and the other Catholics? Therefore if our merits are the cause without which grace is given to us, by chapter sixteen it can be shown that merits are in some way a cause, as a co-cause [concausa], [C] and a partial cause of the grace given to us. Nor did Pelagius ever rave to such an extent that he wished to say that merits were the total cause of grace given by God, because this would be to posit and at the same time exclude God as the giver of the grace given to us. In what therefore do these dissent from Pelagius? Likewise, then grace would be from merits and works, contrary to the next chapter [Ch. 35]. Likewise, all the arguments there proving that grace is given freely, not for preceding merits, will likewise reprove this forgery, if duly brought forward. Likewise, if they understand by "principal cause" the most principal cause of all and supreme, then neither are evil merits the cause of damnation and punishment, nor is any inferior cause the cause of any effect, as the preceding [chapters] make manifest. Again, according to this, the unjust would similarly merit the first grace, just as the justified [merit] the second — namely, the increase of the first grace; whereas the first is denied by all, as the next chapter [Ch. 35] taught, but the second is catholicly conceded. Whence Proverbs 4: *Acquire prudence, and it shall give increases of graces to your head*. And Augustine to Pope Boniface, [D] as Lombard recounts in 2 Sentences, distinction 26, writes thus: No human merit precedes the grace of God, but grace itself merits to be increased, that increased it may merit to be perfected. And in the *Sentences of Prosper*, proposition 95: The capacity of charity always grows, while by use it is greater, and by liberality is made richer. Likewise, if merits be a prior cause of the giving of grace than is God, then he who so merits comes to God before [God comes to him], and rather draws God to himself than the contrary. How therefore does He say *No one comes to me*, etc., John 6? How does He say *You did not choose me, but I chose you*, John 15? And *Without me you can do nothing*? And how then does the Apostle say *Who has first given to Him, and it shall be repaid to him*? — which he also philosophically immediately proves, since, he says, *From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things*, Romans 11. And how then does he say to the Ephesians 2: *By grace you are saved, and this not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not from works*, when nevertheless it would originally be from yourselves? Likewise, if

merits be a co-cause, or a partial cause, of the giving of grace, then this giving is partly to be attributed to God, partly to us; indeed [E] the prior part is ours, as has just been shown; the posterior however God's, contrary to the gloss on the cited word of the Apostle saying: *By preceding grace*, that is, by the gratuitous will of God; *not from yourselves*, that is, from the power of your nature, because *it is the gift of God* purely, not partly from works. Likewise, Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 3: Pelagius, unwilling to oppose such clear Apostolic testimonies, and yet wishing that what he believes should be from himself, as it were composes [an arrangement] between man and God, that he may claim a part of faith for himself, and leave a part to Him; and what is more lofty, he himself takes the first, gives the following to Him; and in that which he says is of both, he makes himself prior, God posterior. Behold how those so saying embrace the mind and words of Pelagius. Likewise, then it could well be asked why God draws this one and does not draw that one — for He has a true cause, namely some [A] antecedent merit, contrary to the [text of] Augustine cited above. How also do these save operating grace, which in all things precedes sinners? But if these object that [saying] of Augustine: *He who created you without you will not justify you without you*, and similar things — therefore it is necessary that you cooperate to this, that grace be given you — it must be said that this is true perhaps in adults; but it is not necessary for me to do anything antecedently, but consequently, so that with grace infused into me I may will and do well; but the infusion of grace is naturally prior, and my willing well and acting follows it naturally — like the efficient cause its effect, and the cause its caused. Thus, however, Lombard responds in 2 Sentences, distinction 26 (when it is objected that grace does not precede the will of man), through that [text] of Augustine on John, where above: *No one can come to me*, etc.; *Other things a man can [do] unwilling, but [he can] believe only willing*; and through that [text of the] gloss on Genesis 24, *Let us call the maiden, and let us ask her will*, because faith is of will, [B] not of necessity. He says therefore: To which we, responding, say that all these things have been said, because there is no faith except in him who wishes to believe, whose good will faith precedes — not in time, but in cause and nature. Which response he confirms through Augustine *Enchiridion* 23, saying that good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself helps those whom it precedes, while they consent to it — which also above in many chapters is more expressly contained. For he asks thus: Since without doubt, if a man is of such an age that he uses reason, he cannot believe, hope, love, unless he wills, nor reach the palm of God's calling, unless by will he run; how therefore is it not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy? — except because the will, as is written, is prepared by the Lord. Otherwise, if for this reason it is said *Not of him who wills*, etc., *but of Him who shows mercy*, etc., because it is from both — that is, from the will of man and the mercy of God — that we should so understand it as said: *Not of him who wills*, etc., as if it were said, the will of man alone does not suffice, if there be not also the mercy of God; nor does the mercy of God alone suffice, if there be not also the will of man; and therefore, if it is rightly said *Not of him who wills, but of God who shows mercy*, because the will [C] of man alone does not fulfill it; why is it not on the contrary rightly said *Not of God who shows mercy, but of him who wills*, because the mercy of God alone does not fulfill

it? Furthermore, if no Christian will dare to say this, lest he most plainly contradict the Apostle, it remains that for this reason it is rightly understood as said, *Not of him who wills, but of Him who shows mercy*, that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man for being helped, and helps the prepared will. For the good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all; in those which it does not precede, it itself is also among them. Likewise, in the same distinction 26, he alleges Augustine saying: When faith obtains justification, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but this happens with the will accompanying, not leading, following, not preceding. The same above, distinction 25, last [chapter], says that the will or operation of man does not help the grace of God, but grace itself precedes the will by preparing [it], that it may will the good — which also he diffusely shows in distinctions 26 and 27 consequently. Augustine also *On Predestination, Against the Pelagians* 3, writes thus: Foolishly! It is God who justifies the wicked, not preceded by human [D] will, but Himself preceding the will of man by His mercy: For *my God*, He says, *His mercy will come before me*. Hear another Prophet speaking: *Convert me, O Lord, and I shall be converted; heal me, and I shall be healed* [Jer. 17:14]. Whence also the Apostle: *Justified*, he says, *freely by His grace*. Hear *freely*, and be silent about merits. The same in *On Nature and Grace* 32, speaking of our justification, says: Where indeed we also work, but with Him working, we cooperate, because His mercy precedes us. And in *On the Good of Perseverance* 48, he says, that God precedes the will of those to whom grace is given — for that very reason, lest it should appear not freely given, but according to the merits of the preceding will, as against the truth the Pelagian error declaims. The same in *Hypognosticon* 52: In every work done, the will of God is prior, and the will of free choice posterior — that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you should say, as you have been accustomed to say, "Because I first willed, God willed," then you are making it a merit, that grace, [being] from works, is no longer grace, but reward: in this place the Apostle refutes you, saying, *If therefore by grace, then no longer from works, otherwise [E] grace is no longer grace*; grace is given to me, not paid back. The same in *On Heresies* 88 says, that Pelagius did not put grace before free will, but with unfaithful cunning placed it under [it]. Isidore moreover, *Etymologies* VIII 5, sentence 14, treating of various heretics and their heresies, says that the Pelagians put free will before divine grace; and is recited in the Canon, [Cause] 24, last question, *Quidam autem*; where Gratian, following Isidore, enumerates many heretics with their heresies.

[A] CHAPTER 37. AGAINST CERTAIN PELAGIANS WHO SAY THAT MAN CAN BY HIMSELF ALONE DULY PREPARE [HIMSELF]; AND IF HE DOES SO, GOD WILL GIVE HIM HIS GRACE FREELY.

There are still others opining that man cannot by himself properly merit grace; yet he can duly prepare himself, and then God will give him His grace freely — just as in natural things, when matter has been duly prepared, [B] form is immediately introduced. This preparation, however, either helps in something, or it does not help. If it does not help, it does not prepare, nor dispose; if it helps, it is in some way laudable and meritorious, and some cause of justification — contrary

to the two next chapters; and so against this error all the arguments made here and there return. Likewise, according to this, the beginning of faith is from us, but the supplement is from God — which Augustine recounts and reproves in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 2, saying: If it does not pertain to the grace of God that we have begun to believe, but rather that which on account of this is added to us, and through this we ourselves give the beginning of our faith first to God, that there may be repaid to us the supplement of it; but who would say that the one who has now begun to believe merits nothing from Him in whom he has believed? Whence it comes that, [him] now meriting, the rest are said to be added by divine retribution; and through this that the grace of God is given according to our merits — which Pelagius, having objected to himself, [C] lest he himself be condemned, condemned. And concerning preparation it can be argued similarly in every way. In a similar way he argues *On Grace and Free Will*, chapters 12, 17, 18. Likewise, the very preparation is a gratuitous gift of God, as the 9th and 20th chapters make manifest, which the 27th together with the 10th and the same 20th will corroborate; and is sufficiently plain through our highest Author John 15, saying thus: *Without me you can do nothing*; and through His Disciple Paul 2 Corinthians 3, confessing: *Such confidence we have through Christ toward God, that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God* [2 Cor. 3:4–5]. And 1 Corinthians 4: *What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?* And to the Romans 11: *Since from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things*. Whence also Augustine, supported by the strength of these authorities, proceeds throughout the whole book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, showing that the beginning, completion, and end of faith — and the whole entirely — is from God. Whence chapter 7 [D] he says of the elect: *Election was freely obtained, which they obtained, did not precede in them as something which they should first give, that it might be repaid to them* — which he proves by that [text] of the Psalm cited above: *For nothing shalt Thou save them*. And below, [chapter] 14: All this reasoning by which we defend grace truly to be — that is, not to be given according to our merits — though it be most evidently asserted by the testimonies of divine eloquences, yet among those who, unless they assign something to themselves which they should first give and which would be repaid to them, think themselves repressed from all zeal of piety, labors somewhat in the age of greater [persons] using free choice of will; but when one comes to the little ones, and to the very Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, all assertion of preceding grace by human merits fails. The same in *On the Good of Perseverance* 67: Let them attend, how those are deceived who think it to be from us, that we ask, seek, and knock; and this they say is, that grace is preceded by merit, that it may follow, when we receive asking and find seeking, and it is opened to those knocking; nor do they wish to understand that this also is of divine gift, that we ask, seek, and [E] knock. For we have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in whom we cry *Abba, Father*: to which he also alleges blessed Ambrose, saying thus: To pray to God is also of spiritual grace, as it is written: *No one says "Lord Jesus" except in the Holy Spirit*. Likewise, then to receive grace would be of him who wills and runs, contrary to the Apostle to the Romans 9 — since it is of him to prepare himself duly. And it is confirmed by Augustine, *Enchiridion* 23,

disputing on this authority of the Apostle, and attributing the very preparation of our will totally to God, as was against the error just alleged. The same is plain through him *On the Two Souls* 15, and is recited in 2 Sentences of Peter, distinction 26, saying that the will, that it may not admit evil and may attain good, is preceded and prepared by the grace of God — which he also confirms by that of the Apostle, [A] *Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs*, etc. The same is plain through him in *Retractations* I 23, and *On the Predestination of the Saints* 4, saying that God prepares the will; and below, [chapter] 6: Although to believe or not to believe is in the choice of the human will, yet in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord. And below, [chapter] 7: When many hear the word of truth, some believe, some contradict, since in others the will is prepared by the Lord, in others not prepared. And in *On Grace and Free Will* 21: We are formed and created in good works, which we did not prepare, but God Almighty prepared, that we may walk in them. Does not also the royal Prophet say to God: *Preparing the mountains in Thy strength*, Psalm 64? — namely, mountains, that is, those exalted in the state of life, but Thou preparing the mountains, not the mountains themselves, and this in Thy strength, not in their own. Wherefore also below: *The river*, he says, *of God is filled with waters* — that is, according to Augustine, the people of God is filled with the Holy Spirit, that is, with His spiritual gifts. *Thou hast prepared their food*, namely spiritual, *for so is its preparation*. Where the Roman Psalter, which Augustine expounds, has thus: *For so is Thy preparation* [B]; on which Augustine: Not because they merited Thee, those whose sins Thou hast forgiven (for their merits were evil), but Thou on account of Thy mercy, *for so is Thy preparation*; thus hast Thou prepared their food. How also did Paul prepare himself, raging most cruelly against Christ, to obtain the grace of Christ? How Matthew? And how others similar? Do we not read certain sick to have been cured by the Lord, by whom or for whom He had not been entreated, nor who in any way prepared themselves, out of His mercy alone? Would not also a man merciful, pious, and good, knowing and able, do thus? Why therefore not God in all things infinitely better? And if He so heals bodily infirmities, why not similarly — indeed rather — spiritual ones? Is not the soul more than the body? More similar to the Creator and dearer to the Redeemer? But these will perhaps object that [text] of Psalm 9: *Thy ear has heard the preparation of their heart*; and Proverbs 16: *It is of man to prepare the soul, and of the Lord to govern the tongue*; and 1 Kings 2: *Thoughts are prepared for them*. Likewise, the prayers and alms of Cornelius, not yet baptized nor a believer, [C] ascended into memory in the sight of God; whence He commanded him through an Angel, that he should call for Simon, who being called and coming, baptized Cornelius himself, as is plain in Acts 10. Therefore on account of that preparation through prayers and alms he merited to be baptized. Likewise, in such an adult about to be baptized before baptism there are many thoughts, and deliberations about being baptized, and finally consent — and with this whole preparation completed, baptismal grace is given. The first of these, however, concludes nothing, since God so hears our prayers, which yet are not from us alone nor first from us, but from God in us. *For we have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, in whom we cry, Abba, Father*, Romans 8 — which the Apostle expounding, in Galatians 4, says: *God sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father* — that is, making us cry, as is plain through the expositions

of the saints, and through Augustine *On the Good of Perseverance* 66, through whom together with blessed Ambrose, chapter 67, the whole response is plain, as was alleged above. [D] To the other, when they allege, *It is of man to prepare the soul, and of the Lord to govern the tongue*: it is true certainly, but it is not of man alone to prepare the soul, but also of the Lord, as has been shown above; therefore each of these is of the Lord. For who is ignorant that it is greater and better to prepare the soul to speak wisely, than to utter [things already] prepared? Since according to Cato: Speech is given to all, the wisdom of the soul to few. And who — I do not say a Christian, but even a Pelagian — would dare to attribute to himself what is greater and better, but to the Lord God what is worse and lesser? Whence James 1: *Every excellent gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, descending from the Father of lights*. And Augustine, *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 15: You will be the work of God, not only because you are a man, but also because you are just: for it is better to be a just man, than [merely] to be a man. If God made you a man, and you make yourself just, you are doing something better than what God did. The same on that [text] of Psalm 144, *They shall exult in Thy justice*: Let no one attribute to God that he is, and to himself that he is just; for you would be attributing better to yourself than to God; for it is better [E] to be just, than [merely] to be a man. And Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will* 10: Far be it that we should attribute the perfection itself of the will-nature to it, but to God only the creation, since by far indeed it is better to be perfect than [merely] to be made; and since to attribute to God what is less, [and] to ourselves what is loftier, would seem an impious wickedness. Augustine likewise *On the City of God* XII 9 argues in this way: If the good Angels were prior to the same will, and made it in themselves with God not cooperating, then they were made better by themselves than by Him. But far be it — since they could not make themselves better than He had made them, than whom no one makes anything better — that without His operating help they should be able to have a good will, by which they would be better. He also in *Against Pelagius and Caelestius*, *On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin* I 22, refuting Pelagius (who judged that thought is sent by God, but love is from us), says thus: Let him distinguish thought and love, as they are to be distinguished, and since each [A] is the gift of God — but one less, the other greater — let him not here exalt our justice through the praise of our Justifier, that of these two, what is less he should attribute to divine help, but what is greater he should usurp for the human will. And if he should consent that we receive love by the grace of God, let him not so think it, as if any meritorious goods of ours had preceded. For whence could we then have good merits, when we did not love God? For that we might receive the love by which we should love, we were loved, when we did not yet have it. This John the Apostle most plainly says: *Not that we have loved God, but that He has loved us* — most well altogether and most truly. For we should not have whence to love Him, unless we received this from Him, when He first loved us. What good would we do, unless we loved? Or how do we not do good, if we love? For though God's command sometimes seems to be performed by those not loving but fearing, yet where there is no love, no work is imputed as good — nor is it rightly called a good work, because *all that is not from faith is sin*, and *faith works through love*. Yet because Solomon [B] seems to put some difference between preparing the soul and governing the tongue: it must

be known that "to govern" is of some superior ruler, with respect to some inferior directed by him; "to act," however, is of any active cause whatsoever — whether superior or inferior — and therefore it can be said that fire heats iron; but it is of the smith to govern, and to moderate, the heat and the heating: thus also it is of man to prepare the soul, but not of him alone, but as an inferior active cause with the superior active cause, and in the strength of Him who is the Lord; but it is of the Lord alone, as the supreme ruler, to govern the tongue, with man, however, sub-acting [under-acting] — as it is of the smith to govern the hammer striking various sounds. *For in the hand of God are both we and our discourses* [Wis. 7:16]. Very fittingly also it might be said: It is of the Lord to govern the soul, and of man to prepare the tongue. That [text] however of 1 Kings 2, *Thoughts are prepared for them*, the Gloss understands thus, that is, *for His thought*, as if it were said, No thoughts are hidden from Him; and the whole verse seems to support this: *Let old things, he says, depart from your mouth, because the Lord is the God of knowledge, and thoughts are prepared for Him*. Of [C] Cornelius, however, I say, that whatever good preparation he had, he had received already freely from God, as the preceding [chapters] taught. Nor was he entirely without faith. For how would he have prayed to God and given alms for the love of Him, unless in some way he had believed in Him? Yet he did not have full faith, or [faith] not revealed in all things, but veiled. And in these manners Augustine responded to those objecting the same instance, in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 8: It is wont, he says, to be said, *He merited therefore to believe, because he was a good man before he believed* — which can be said of Cornelius, whose alms were accepted and prayers heard before he believed in Christ; nor yet without some faith was he giving and praying. For how was he calling on Him in whom he had not believed? But if without the faith of Christ he could be saved, the architect Apostle Peter would not have been sent to build him up — although unless the Lord build the house, in vain do they labour who build it. Whatever therefore both before he believed in Christ, and when he had believed, Cornelius did well — all is to be given to God, lest perchance any be exalted. To the last point, it is plain by the same — for all such [D] thoughts are made freely by God, without whom we can do nothing, since *we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves*. For which Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 2: Who does not see that to think is prior to believing? For no one believes, unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. For though by a swift, by a most rapid [movement] certain holy thoughts fly before the will to believe, and presently it follows, so that it accompanies as if most closely joined; nevertheless it is necessary that all that is believed, be believed with thought preceding. What therefore pertains to religion and piety, we are not fit to think anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. Yet although these things are so, it is not my intention to deny every preparation and prior disposition to charity, and to grace in adults: For I know that servile fear, fear of punishment, fear of inconvenience, love of advantage, and the moral virtues, much withdraw from sin, incline to good works, and so prepare and dispose to charity and grace, and to truly gracious works — as the very many authorities written in 3 [E] *Sentences* of Peter, distinction 34, sufficiently show. No one however can [do] any of these, nor in any way dispose himself, without God specially acting in this — as the preceding [chapters] make manifest. Yet

truly, the conferral of grace does not always follow such preparation, just as neither does perseverance follow grace itself when conferred, predestinatively to life — as the things previously had clearly teach.

[A] CHAPTER 38. AGAINST CERTAIN PELAGIANS WHO SAY THAT GOD COMES BEFORE MAN IN THE CONFERRAL OF GRACE BY KNOCKING, AND MAN [PERFORMS] THE VERY RECEPTION OF GRACE BY OPENING AND CONSENTING — YET FROM HIMSELF, [HE OPENING] TO HIM WHO KNOCKS, AND THUS IN A CERTAIN WAY MERITING IT.

Furthermore, there are still others not daring to resist such valid testimonies; therefore they give to God the extrinsic first-fruits of grace and faith and similar goods, [B] but to men grace itself and faith with the other such goods. For they say that God always precedes by knocking and exciting to grace, faith, and similar goods, and man follows by opening and consenting — and this from his own powers through himself — according to that of Apocalypse 3: *Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone shall hear my voice, and open to me the door, I shall enter in to him, and sup with him, and he with me* [Rev. 3:20]. These men, however, make God a public seller of His grace, and men the buyers. For they say that He, like a poor little merchant, cries out, and knocks at the doors and gates of each one; but to him who opens, on account of his opening, He gives His grace — which yet would more truly be called *exchanging*, or *selling*. They also make God a poor little hired scribe publishing his work, and for a small price — for opening and supping — writing the names of those opening in the book of life. And so grace will be from our preceding works, contrary to [C] the 35th of this [book], whose arguments all return. For which Augustine also says in *On the Words of the Apostle*, as Lombard alleges in the Gloss on that [text] to the Ephesians 2: *By grace you are saved, etc., not from works*: Do not think that you have received by meriting, you who would have merited nothing unless you had received; grace preceded your merit; not grace from merit, but merit from grace: For if grace [be] from merit, you bought it, you did not freely receive it. Likewise, man cannot open or consent in such things from himself, but from the divine will, as chapter nine teaches; which the Authorities cited above also prove: *No one can come to me, unless my Father shall draw him*. According to these, however, although man knocked by God, not yet having the Father, by opening to Him who knocks, would more truly draw the Father to himself; and *Without me you can do nothing* — therefore neither open; nor *are we sufficient to think anything from ourselves as if from ourselves* — therefore neither to open by believing: for to think is less than to believe. And although this sufficiently appears, behold a fitting witness, Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* 2, saying thus: To believe is nothing else than to think with assent; for not [D] he who thinks, believes — since for that very reason many think, that they may not believe; but everyone who believes, thinks. What therefore pertains to religion and piety, if we are not fit to think anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God; surely we are not fit to believe anything as if from ourselves — which we cannot [do] without thought — but our sufficiency by which we

begin to believe is from God. Wherefore, just as no one suffices for himself for beginning or perfecting any good work whatsoever, whence in every good work, both in beginning and perfecting, our sufficiency is from God: thus no one suffices for beginning and perfecting faith, since faith, if it is not thought, is nothing; and we are not fit to think anything as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. How also is it true: *Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy*; and *By grace you are saved through faith, and this not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not from works*; and *What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?* — which humbly knowing, and truthfully professing, that egregious [E] Doctor and most glorious Martyr Cyprian in his eleventh Epistle (entitled *On the Discipline of the Christian Religion*, to Quirinus), chapter 4, says: We must glory in nothing, because nothing is ours; which he proves because in the Gospel according to John it is written: *No one can receive anything unless it shall have been given him from heaven* [John 3:27]. Likewise in the Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: *What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?* Which also blessed Augustine frequently cites from him: *On Correction and Grace* 19; *On the Good of Perseverance* 43; *On the Predestination of the Saints* 3. Likewise, although God thus knocks, not by this does He elect us — since He likewise knocks at non-elect — but we, opening, choose Him, contrary to His own [word] saying: *You did not choose me, but I chose you*. Whence Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* 23: If they were elect for this reason, that they had believed, they themselves indeed had first chosen, by believing in Him, that they might merit to be elected: [A] But this He takes away altogether who says, *You did not choose me, but I chose you*; the elect indeed without doubt chose Him, when they believed in Him; whence not for any other reason does He say, *You did not choose me, but I chose you*, except that they did not choose Him that He might choose them, but that they might choose Him, He chose them, because His mercy preceded them according to grace, not according to debt. And although He thus knocks, He gives nothing to us — but we, opening, give to Him our consent — contrary to that of the Apostle: *Who has first given to Him, and it shall be repaid to him? Since from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things*. Likewise, according to what was argued above, this position attributes to us what is better and greater, but to God what is worse and less: For who would doubt that opening is better and more useful to us than knocking, since to knock without opening profits not, but harms? Likewise, if man can from his own powers open to Him who knocks, and consent to Him who excites — since the unbelieving adult, who has sufficiently heard the speech of the faith of Christ, and has retained in habit or memory what he has heard — can by the same reason according to the opinion of the Philosopher in *De Anima* II go from first act [B] to second act, and understand and actually think such things when he wishes, and can from himself consent: therefore from himself without God he can acquire grace and faith for himself, and all things requisite — contrary to what has just been premised. Likewise, when God thus knocks, what does He intend? Either He intends that the one knocked-at open, or that he not open, or in a middle way: He intends neither. If He intends that he open, by chapter ten everyone knocked-at opens, which is not true; for many frequently resist the Holy Spirit of God. If He

intends that he not open, by the same tenth he cannot open. If He intends neither, by chapter nine he could not open; and even if he should open, that opening would be casual with respect to God, because beyond His intent, nor contained under divine providence, but would be done by God only permissively — contrary to chapters 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 manifestly. This is also contrary to the 22nd of this [book]. Likewise, thus to open to Him who knocks is meritorious; therefore prior naturally it proceeds from grace, than from the human will, as has been alleged before. Therefore the first grace does not follow that opening as a reward [or] merit to which [C] it is owed. Likewise, this was the error of Pelagius, as is plain through Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* 25, saying: The Pelagians themselves think that, with the precepts received, by ourselves, by free choice of will, we are made holy and immaculate; but rightly is the Pelagian error refuted by this testimony, where the Apostle says, *Therefore us elect in Christ, and predestined before the constitution of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate*. When therefore He predestined us, He predestined His work, by which He makes us holy and immaculate. By this error Augustine also at one time erred, as he himself testifies above, in the same [book] 4: When, he says, I was erring similarly to Pelagius, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but is from us in us, and through it we obtain the gifts of God, struck by that special testimony of the Apostle, *What hast thou that thou hast not received?*, etc., I myself was convicted. For I did not think that faith was preceded by grace, except because we could not believe, if the proclamation of truth did not precede; but that we should consent to the Gospel preached to us, I judged to be of our own determination and from us — which error not [D] a few of my little works sufficiently indicate. This error, however, his book *On the Spirit and the Letter* seems to indicate; in chapter 26 of which he asks: *Whether faith is in our power?* And with great disputation premised, in chapter 31 by a certain distinction he responds — namely, that *partly is it to be attributed to divine gift, partly to us*: It is to be attributed to divine gift on two accounts: First, because faith exists from free choice, which we received from God when we were created; Second, because by the persuasions of things seen, God brings it about that we may will, and believe — whether extrinsically through Angelic exhortations, or through the commandments of the law, or intrinsically, where no one has in his power what may come into his mind. And he adds: *But to consent or to dissent is of one's own will. In these manners therefore, when God acts upon the rational soul that it may believe Him* (for one cannot believe by anything by free choice, if there be no persuasion or calling to be believed), *certainly the will to believe itself God works in man, and in all things His mercy precedes us. To consent, however, to the calling of God or to dissent from it, as I have said, is of one's own will — which thing not only [E] does not weaken what was said, 'What hast thou that thou hast not received?' but even confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and have the gifts of which it hears this, except by consenting; and through this, what it has and what it receives is of God; but to receive and to have, certainly, is of him who receives and has*. The retraction of this error from his first [book] of *Retractations* 23 Augustine recites in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 4. For he had said, expounding certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, *That we believe is ours, that we work good is His, who gives the Holy Spirit to those believing*. And retracting, he says: *Which*

surely I would not say, if I had then known faith itself to be found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit. Both therefore are ours on account of the choice of will, and yet both is given [A] on account of the spirit of faith and charity. And what I said a little before, "It is ours to believe and to will, but His to give to those believing the faculty of working well" — is true indeed, but by the same rule, both is His, because He prepares the will, and both is ours, because it is not done unless with us willing. To this also makes for it that from chapter 13 of *On the Predestination of the Saints*, the thirty-fifth of this [book] alleges. Yet it seems that Augustine in *On the Spirit and the Letter* did not say the aforesaid response by way of finally determining, but rather by doubting, and by inquiring disputatively. For in that thirty-first chapter he says: *This disputation, if it suffices for solving that question, let it suffice; And below: To whom this response is displeasing, let him seek more learned [men]*. Likewise, then according to these, there would be only one calling — namely, that knocking and exciting, not opening, leading in, and making consent — which is plainly contrary to Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* 22, distinguishing a twofold calling: one by which it is said, *Many are called*; and another, with which he deals, by which the elect are called and made [elect], of which the Apostle says: [B] *Without repentance are the gifts and calling of God* — that is, without change, stably fixed. To this calling those who pertain are all teachable by God; nor can any of them say, *I believed that I should so be called* — for the mercy of God preceded him, by which he was so called, that he might believe. This calling also in chapter 23 he calls *the calling according to the purpose of God*, according to that of the Apostle, Romans 8: *To those loving God, all things cooperate to good, to those who according to purpose are called holy* — namely, according to the purpose of the divine will, not their own. Whence also in chapter 26, with great disputation against the Pelagians premised, he so concludes: *Therefore God works in the hearts of men by that calling according to His purpose (of which we have spoken much), not that they should hear the Gospel idly, but that, having heard it, they should be converted and believe*. Likewise, this is contrary to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3, writing thus: *Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase* — because, according to the Gloss, these do not give anything from themselves, but only God, [C] who gives the intrinsic increase. Likewise, Augustine *On Faith to Peter* 64: Hold most firmly, and by no means doubt, that a man whom no adversity prohibits can read and hear the words of the holy Law and the Gospel; but that no one can obey the divine commandments, except him whom God has preceded with His grace, that what he hears with the body, he may also perceive with the heart, and with a good will divinely received, may will and be able to do the commands of God. *For neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase, who also works in us both to will and to perform according to His good will* — namely His, not ours, according to the gloss on Philippians 2. Likewise, 1 Thessalonians 2: *We give thanks to God without intermission, because when you received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but as it is, the word of God, who works in us who believe in this very thing*. If however God did not work otherwise in knocking and calling those who open and believe, than in others, the Apostle would not say *Who works in you who believe*. Indeed it seems sufficiently to express what God [D]

works in them specially, when he says *in this very thing*, namely the very thing which you believe. Whence Augustine, treating this word in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 26, says: What is it that he gives thanks for this to God? Truly it is vain and empty, if He to whom he gives thanks, did not Himself do this; but because this is not vain and empty, surely God, to whom he gives thanks for this work, Himself did it, when they received from the Apostle the word of the hearing of God, when they accepted it not as the word of men, but as it is, the word of God. Therefore God works in the hearts of men, not that they should hear the Gospel idly, but that having heard it, they should be converted and believe. Is not this also what Truth itself says: *No one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draw him? It is written in the Prophets, And they shall all be teachable by God: Everyone who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes to me*, John 6? On which Augustine, in the first part on John, homily 26, says: All the men of that kingdom shall be teachable by God; not from men shall they hear, and even if from men they hear, yet what they understand is given within, flashes within, [E] is revealed within. What do men do announcing outwardly? What do I do now when I speak? I bring the noise of words to your ears. Unless therefore He who is within reveals, what do I say, or what do I speak? The exterior cultivator of the tree, the interior is the Creator; he who plants and he who waters works extrinsically — this we do; but neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. This is *They shall all be teachable by God*. Which all? *Everyone who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes to me*. See how the Father draws. The same in *On the City of God* XV 6, speaking of the manifold correction of men done through men: In this way, he says, are the citizens of the city of God cured, while sojourning in this earth, and sighing for the peace of the supernal fatherland; but the Holy Spirit works inwardly, that the medicine which is applied outwardly may avail something. Otherwise, even if God Himself, using a creature subject to Him, in some human shape should address human senses, whether those of the body, or those most similar to these which we have [A] in dreams, and not by interior grace should rule and act upon the mind, no preaching of truth profits a man. God does this, however, distinguishing the vessels of mercy from the vessels of wrath, by a dispensation which He Himself knows much hidden, but yet just. The Venerable Bede also, on Luke II 4, treating that of Luke 5: *Master, working through the whole night we have caught nothing, but at Thy word I shall let down the net*, says thus: *Unless the Lord shall have built the house, in vain have they laboured who build it; unless the Lord shall have illumined the heart of the hearers, the Doctor labours in the night; unless in the word of supernal grace the instruments of disputation shall have been let down, in vain does the preacher cast the dart of his voice, because the faith of peoples comes not from the wisdom of composed speech, but from the gift of divine calling*. Gregory also *Moralia* XI 5 on that of Job 12: *If He shall destroy, there is no one who builds*, writes thus: *God Almighty destroys the human heart when He abandons, builds when He fills. Whence very often it happens, that when the heart of the hearer, the [his] faults requiring it, is not filled with the grace of Almighty God, in vain is it moved exteriorly by the preacher, because mute is every mouth which [B] speaks, if He cry not within in the heart, who breathes the words which are heard. Hence the Prophet says, "Unless the Lord build", etc. Hence Solomon says,*

"Consider the works of God, that no one is able to correct him whom He has despised". Nor wonder if by a reprobate heart the preacher is hardly heard, since sometimes the Lord Himself, in those things which He speaks, is opposed by the manners of the resistant. Hence it is that Cain even by the divine voice was able to be admonished, and could not be changed, because, the guilt of malice requiring it, God within had already abandoned the heart, to which He outwardly made words for testimony. He also in homily 30 on the Gospel, expounding that of John 14: He shall teach you all things, writes thus: Because unless the same Spirit be present to the heart of the hearer, the discourse of the Doctor is idle. Let no one therefore attribute to the man teaching that he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because unless there be virtue within by which he teaches, the tongue of the Doctor labours outwardly in vain. Behold, you all alike hear one voice of him speaking, yet you do not alike receive the sense of the heard voice. Since therefore the voice is not unequal, why in your hearts is the understanding of the voice unequal — except because by what the [C] voice of the speaker generally admonishes, there is an interior master who teaches certain ones especially concerning the understanding of the voice? Of this anointing of the spirit, again through John it is said, "As His anointing teaches us concerning all things". By the voice therefore one is not instructed, when the mind is not anointed by the spirit. But why do we speak these things about the doctrine of men, when even the Creator Himself does not speak for the instruction of man, if He does not speak to the same man through the anointing of the spirit. Certainly Cain before he perpetrated fratricide in deed, heard, "Thou hast sinned, be still"; but because, his guilts requiring it, by voice he was admonished, not by the anointing of the spirit, he was able to hear the words, but condemned to keep them. The Gloss also on that of Jeremiah 36: From his mouth he was speaking, etc., and I was writing, says thus: To hearers also is the grace of the Holy Spirit necessary: For unless the spirit be present, the discourse of the Doctor is idle; one voice of the speaker we all alike hear in the Church, but not all alike do we understand, except as the anointing of God teaches us concerning all things. The Creator Himself does not speak for the instruction of man, if He does not speak through the anointing of the spirit. For it was said to Cain, "Thou hast sinned, be still"; [D] but because, his guilts prohibiting, he was not anointed, the words of God he was able to hear, but not to keep. Thus Joachim and his servants were able to hear the words of God with the ear of the body, but not of the heart. With which also concords Augustine On Correction and Grace 10 saying thus: Then is correction salutary, when the supernal physician looks upon [the patient]: For it does not profit anything, except when He brings it about, that he should as much as possible repent of his sin; and who does this, except He who looked upon the Apostle Peter denying, and made him weep? And he shows this opinion through the whole book. Furthermore, if a man from himself alone should open to God thus knocking, calling, and offering grace, it seems that certain obstinate men, or others from various causes, would in no way open — which is false, since whoever, according to the opinion of the Apostle, according to the purpose of God are called holy, necessarily come without delay; for otherwise the purpose of the divine will would be frustrated, which chapter 10 does not permit; and therefore Mark 3 it is said: He called to himself those whom He willed, and they came to him. Nor can it be said that God, in calling the elect, does not

propose, nor will, that they come, but leaves this to their choice; for by chapter 22, He either wills [E] that, or its opposite; and not its opposite, because then by chapter 10 they would not come, nor would the Apostle and Augustine then specially name them *called according to purpose* — namely, of God calling, as is plain in Romans 8 and through Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* alleged above. And if that chapter 22 were not, it would not be fitting that God should knock undetermined as to what He should do, and be determined by another, as has been argued above. And because then He would have new volitions, and would somehow be changed, contrary to chapters 23 and 5; nor would it be fitting in any way that some, casually or fortuitously with respect to God, should become holy sons of God and heirs of the kingdom — on account of chapter 27 and other things which follow. Therefore it does not seem that anyone whatsoever, however obstinate, called according to the purpose of God, resists. Whence Augustine *On the Predestination [A] of the Saints* 9, speaking of the grace of this calling, says thus: This grace, therefore, which is occultly bestowed by divine liberality on human hearts, is rejected by no hard heart: for it is bestowed for this reason, that the hardness of the heart may first be removed. When therefore the Father is heard within and teaches, He takes away the heart of stone, and creates a heart of flesh, as the Prophet, foretelling, promised. Likewise John 6: *All that the Father gives me shall come to me* — that is, every predestined and elect [person]. If however this depended originally on their free will, not on God's, perhaps some of them would not come. Therefore Bede there says: These are those whom the Father gives to the Son, whom by hidden inspiration He makes believe in the Son. To which consents Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* 9 saying thus: *All that the Father gives me*, etc. What is *shall come to me*, except *shall believe in me*? But that this may happen, the Father gives. It also seems that if they themselves should believe through themselves, they themselves rather would give themselves to the Son, than the Father merely knocking: for through knocking alone, they are in no way made of the lot of the Son, but through believing the faith of Him. To the same makes that which is said below, in the same [chapter], [B] *Everyone who hears from the Father and has learned, comes to me*; therefore the Father teaches them, and makes them believe in the Son. Whence when immediately He premised: *No one can come to me, unless the Father shall draw him*, as if expounding that mode of drawing, He adds, *It is written in the Prophets, And they shall all be teachable by God; everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned, comes to me*, as if He were saying: The Father draws to me by so teaching. This also Augustine sufficiently expresses in *On the Predestination of the Saints* where above, saying: What is, *Everyone who has heard from the Father*, etc., except that there is no one who hears from the Father, and learns, and does not come to me? For if everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned, comes; certainly everyone who does not come, has not heard from the Father, nor has learned. Far removed from the senses of the flesh is this school, in which the Father is heard, and teaches that one should come to the Son; there is also the Son Himself, because He is His Word through which He so teaches; nor does He do this with the ear of the flesh, but of the heart. Together is also the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; for neither does He not teach, or teach separately; [C] for inseparable are the works of the Trinity. Likewise, if a sinner could through himself believe

one preaching, and have his sins forgiven, he could through himself discern and separate himself from other sinners, hearing and not doing in the said manner — contrary to the Apostle 1 Corinthians 4: *Who indeed discerns thee?* — namely from the lost or those about to be lost, as if to say, God alone; which the following text shows, when he says, *For what hast thou that thou hast not received?*, etc. Which understanding Augustine testifies in *On Correction and Grace*, and is alleged there in the Gloss of Lombard, saying thus: *Who indeed discerns thee from the mass of the lost? No one but God: He alone separates thee from the lost. But because man, inflated, could respond by voice or thought and say, "My faith discerns me, my justice, my prayer", the Apostle meets him saying, "What hast thou that thou hast not received?"* The same in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 6 says thus: The nature in which the possibility of having faith was given to us does not discern man from man; but faith itself discerns the faithful from the unfaithful; and through this, where it is said, *Who indeed discerns thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received?*, anyone who would dare to say, "I have faith from myself, therefore I have not received" — surely contradicts truth most plainly; not because [D] to believe or not to believe is not in the choice of the human will, but in the elect the will is prepared by the Lord; therefore also to faith itself, which is in the will, it pertains: *Who indeed discerns thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received?* And it follows in chapter 7: Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict; therefore these wish to believe, those do not — who is ignorant of this? But since in some the will is prepared by the Lord, and in others not prepared, one must discern what comes from His mercy, what from His judgment. The same in *On Grace and Free Will* 16: The Pelagians say that eternal life is rendered to our merits; and if they so understood our merits as also to acknowledge them as the gifts of God, that opinion would not be reprobated; but because they so preach human merits as to say that man has them from himself, the Apostle most rightly responds: *Who indeed discerns thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received? But if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?* Surely such things you have thought. Most truly is it said: God crowns His gifts, not your merits — if your merits be from yourself, not from [E] Him. For these, if they be such, are evil, which God does not crown; but if they be good, they are gifts of God — because, as James says, *Every excellent gift*, etc.; and John the precursor of the Lord says, *Man cannot receive anything, unless it shall have been given him from above*; certainly from heaven into the earth came the Holy Spirit, when Jesus *ascending on high led captivity captive, gave gifts to men*. And it follows in chapter 17: If therefore your good merits be the gifts of God, God crowns not your merits as your merits, but as His gifts. This opinion he also diffusely pursues consequently. Who also on that of Psalm 118: *Render to thy servant*, etc., says: Let nowhere human pride exalt itself: to His own gifts God renders good rewards, but he who now prays, and says, *Render to thy servant, that I may live*, if he were yet entirely dead, would not pray, but received the beginning of good concupiscence from Him, [A] from whom he asks the life of obedience. The same to Sixtus the Presbyter, as Peter recounts in 3 *Sentences*, distinction 27: When, he says, God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing other than His own gifts. Whence the eternal life which is rendered by God at the end to preceding merits — because the same merits to which it is rendered are not

from us, but were made in us through grace — is itself rightly called grace; because it is freely given; not freely because it is not given to merits, but because the very merits to which it is given are given through grace. Furthermore, just as can appear from chapter 2, in the genus of openers there is some primary principal opener, in whose strength the other openers open — as the other instruments — so that these are as it were possible keys, but He Himself is the power using the key: For He is that *holy and true [One], who has the key of David, who opens and no one shuts, who shuts and no one opens*, Apocalypse 3, as had been foretold in Isaiah 22: *I shall give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and there shall be no one who shuts, and he shall shut, and there shall be no one who opens*. Therefore the whole Church devoutly prays with the Psalmist: *Lord, my lips [B] open Thou*; and with the Maccabees: *May the Lord open your heart in His law and in His precepts*. Therefore the Lord Himself opens our hearts, and universally any of our powers — which He deigned to show in the opening of the ears of the deaf, and the loosening of the bond of the tongue of the same mute, by a doubled miracle, when He put the fingers of His power into his ears, and touched his tongue with the spittle of His clemency, and looking up to heaven groaning thus said: *Effatha*, which is, *Be opened* — Mark 7 — who, deaf and mute, according to Bede in a certain homily, signifies the human race, which, after disregarding the divine command, obeyed the persuasion of the serpent, and tasted the forbidden tree, was made deaf and mute spiritually. And according to him the Gloss there recounts: He looked up into heaven, that thence He might teach speech for the mute, thence hearing for the deaf, thence the medicine for all infirmities to be sought. Likewise Acts 14: *God opened to the Gentiles the door of faith*. Of this divine opening also is witness that purple-seller Lydia, *whose heart the Lord opened to attend to those things which were said by Paul*, Acts 16. Which also the Apostle attests, to the Colossians 4, saying: *[C] Be earnest in prayer, that God may open to you a door of speech*; and many similar things very often occur in Scripture. On this word of the Apostle, however, Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 27 in this manner: How is the door of the word opened, except when the sense of the hearer is opened, that he may believe, and the beginning of faith having been made, may admit those things which are preached and disputed for building up wholesome doctrine, lest with heart closed by unbelief he reprove and reject the things which are said? Whence also to the Corinthians he says: *A great and evident door has been opened to me, and the adversaries are many*. What else can be understood here, except that the Gospel having been first preached there by him, many believed, and many were adversaries of the same faith — according to that of the Lord: *No one comes to me, unless it shall have been given him by my Father*; and *To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom, but to those it is not given*. Therefore the door is opened in those to whom it is given, but the adversaries are many of those to whom it is not given. The same Apostle also says: *When I came to Troas for the Gospel of Christ, and a door was opened to me in the Lord*, etc., *bidding farewell to them, I went out into Macedonia*. [D] To whom did he bid farewell except to those who had believed, in whose hearts namely the door was opened to him preaching the Gospel? And after a small digression he adds: But let us return to the opening of the door, which the Apostle signifies as the beginning of the faith of the hearers. What is, *praying together that God*

may open to you the door of the word, except a most clear demonstration that the very beginning of faith is the gift of God? For it would not be asked from Him by prayer, unless it were believed to be done by Him. This gift of heavenly grace had descended into that purple-seller, to whom, as Scripture says in the Acts of the Apostles, *God had opened the sense, and she attended to those things which were said by Paul*: For so was she called that she might believe. God works what He wills in the hearts of men, either by helping or by judging, that through them may now be fulfilled what *His hand and counsel had predestined to be done*. It seems therefore better and safer to me, to commit the whole rule of our doors to such a doorkeeper, who is never overwhelmed by sleep, deceived by no illusion, allured by no corruption, nor [E] overcome by any power; who, in opening or closing, can never err in the least: than wholly to ourselves, or part to Him and part to ourselves, [we who are] impotent, foolish, and corrupt, who scarcely ever open or close not erring. Yet not that we should give ourselves to drowsiness and idleness, but that under His happy rule, neither above nor beside, we should always most vigilantly persist in the works of grace. Whence Augustine *On the Good of Perseverance* 9: We live more safely, if we give the whole to God, [and] do not commit ourselves part to Him, and part to ourselves. Therefore I commit myself wholly with whole devotion to Him, and I wholly submit myself to His most gracious grace. And if they should object that of Apocalypse 3: *If anyone shall open*, etc.; and that of the Beloved knocking, *Open to me, my sister*, Canticles 5: it must be said, just as was said to similar [objections] in chapter 35, that by such [calls] free will is excited, but it does not follow from this that he can with his own powers alone open — just as he cannot fulfill all the other divine commandments which are likewise commanded.

BOOK I, CHAPTER XXXIX

Against certain persons who think that man by himself alone can merit the first grace of congruity, though not of condignity

Besides these, there are others not content with grace given freely, but who would have it sold by God and bought by them at some price — though a low one, yet (as they assert) a *congruous* one, not a *condign* one. For they say that men, by their own powers alone, can merit the grace of God *of congruity*, though not *of condignity*. And because this error is more notorious than the others in our day, and because all too many through it slide into the Pelagian abyss, it seems necessary to scrutinize it with more diligent examination. Now this error does not differ much in reality from the others recited above; it can be refuted with them in like manner. For nearly all the reasons and authorities adduced against those proceed against this one likewise with a straight front. For from this view it follows that grace is from works and merits — together with Pelagius's root error; it follows also that grace is from merits at least as a partial cause and concause — together with the first ensuing error; and that those merits of congruity are at least the cause and preparatory disposition of grace — together with the second; and that someone can

merit by congruity through himself alone — as the third error posits, namely that a man can open by his own powers alone.

Moreover, if anyone merits the first grace of congruity, this is before he has grace, at least by priority of nature; but before he has grace (of which I am speaking, namely, that which makes one accepted unto the kingdom), he does not even have charity. For charity alone divides the sons of perdition from the sons of the kingdom, as Augustine says, *On the Trinity*, Book 15, ch. 18, and as is plain through the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13. Therefore neither does he love God at all — or at least not with a gratuitous love, freely and chiefly for God's own sake. Wherefore neither does he merit anything from Him — and especially no gratuitous good, that sure pledge of the highest and everlasting good. For with what brow does anyone claim a reward from God, to whom he has bestowed no gift? Or by what title does he demand recompense from Him, to whom he has never tendered anything? And how does anyone merit anything from God, who does nothing for Him? Whence Matthew 6: *Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of them; otherwise ye have no reward with your Father which is in heaven.* On which Chrysostom: "What will you receive from God, when you have given nothing to God? For what is done for God's sake is given to God; but what is done for the sake of men is poured out into the winds." To this Augustine likewise contributes effectively, *Against Pelagius and Caelestius on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin*, Book 1, ch. 22, as Chapter 37 cited.

Moreover, even if someone loves God and acts for Him, not for His own sake but that He may grant him prosperity or ward off adversity, the same conclusion returns. For how does such a one merit more from God than a vendor from a buyer? And besides, he loves the granting of those things and the warding off of these, more than God; and since he loves these for his own sake, he loves himself more than God. For always *that for which a thing is, that thing more is*; as that for which we love, that is more dear (Posterior Analytics 1.2). Indeed, as was declared in Chapter 26: he who loves something for some certain end does not love this, but the end. Therefore not only does such a one in so loving not merit, but he sins; for he acts contrary to the right and due order of loving (per Part 30 of the First Corollary of this work), and contrary to the precept of loving God *with all the heart, and all the soul, and all the strength, and all the mind*, Deuteronomy 6 and Matthew 22. Such a one also enjoys himself and uses God Himself; therefore it is established that he sins, as appears at length through Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 1 and following, and as Lombard recites in *Sentences* I, dist. 1.

It is also plain that such a one does not merit. For no one in working merits unless he has a right intention — namely, of the right end. For just as in natural things motion is named from its end, so also in moral things, as appears from Chapter 34 of this work. But such a one outside charity does not have a right intention. For no intention is right except that which finally tends immediately into God, or perhaps mediately — that which is borne immediately into a creature, and through it finally into God, and this above all things gratuitously for His sake — as Part 30 of the First Corollary teaches. For if it be desired finally for the sake of something else, already that other is more the end intended, as the foregoing make plain. And since other natural things,

insofar as they have received from nature, by that natural inclination so act; man — who has received for this purpose intellectual and freely volitive power — ought to do this knowingly and freely according to the powers given him for this final end. Therefore any man who in acting does not actually or habitually direct his intention finally upon God, and this gratuitously for His sake, acts contrary to the natural order of the universe; wherefore also he sins unnaturally against nature, and against God the principle and end and supreme author of all nature and natural order — or at least does not merit.

This also appears through Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, Book 1, where he says: For if that intention is right, the one intending either enjoys God or through it uses a creature; and if he enjoys God, the proposition is plain; but if he uses a creature, since according to Augustine in the same place, "to use is to refer that which has come into use to the obtaining of that which is to be enjoyed; otherwise to abuse, not to use; for unlawful use ought to be called abuse." Hence it is plain: for the use of a creature, if it is not referred to God, is unlawful use; therefore sin, or at least it is not rightly done; therefore that intention is not right. Nor is anyone's intention without charity and grace borne gratuitously above all things into God. For just as no one's intellect without faith is borne faithfully into God, so no one's affection without grace is gracefully borne into God in such a way that he holds God dear above all things gratuitously. For the proportion is the same here as there.

Again, if a man without the grace of charity could love God gratuitously above all other things, he could likewise know all other commandments and keep them; for he who can do the greater can do the less. But the commandment of the love of God is the first and greatest, Matthew 22. Indeed, whoever loved God in this way would in no way knowingly offend Him, nor would he despise any of His commandments (for this would be expressly repugnant to so great a love), but he would keep them all to the utmost. For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 9.4: They posit a friend as one willing and working good things, or things appearing such, for the friend's sake, namely the beloved's; and *Rhetoric* 2.5: To love is to will to anyone the things he thinks good, for that one's sake, not one's own; and according to active power to be the doer of these. Whence also Wisdom 6: *The lover of her, the keeping or guardianship of her laws*. Wherefore Truth itself says: *If anyone loves me, he will keep my word*, John 14. On which Gregory, Homily 30: "The proof of love is the showing of the work." Hence in his epistle the same John says: *He that says, I love God, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar; for we truly love if we keep His commandments; we truly love if we restrain ourselves from our own pleasures. For he who still flows down through unlawful desires, certainly does not love God, because he contradicts Him in his will*. The Apostle, Romans 13, arguing similarly, concludes: *Love therefore is the fulness of the law*. Wherefore neither could anyone be in a state of salvation without the grace of charity. For Luke 10, the Saviour says: *Do this — that is, keep the commandments — and thou shalt live*. In vain therefore are these three habits posited, namely faith, hope, and charity, supernaturally infused into us, since (as Pelagius asserted) without these our natural endowments would suffice for doing and keeping all the divine commandments — as Augustine recites in *On Heresies* 88,

and Peter (Lombard) *Sentences* II, dist. 28, and Isidore *Etymologies* 8.14, and *Canon* 24, q. ult., *Quidam autem*.

But our Catholic doctors say we need these three habits or others proportionate, because, since the gaze and affection of our soul is depressed by the mass of the body or of sin, or by natural impotence, in such a way that they cannot duly see God or love Him — or even because of the disproportion of so excellent an object — we necessarily need faith or the light of glory, and charity or grace, which elevate them to seeing God duly and loving Him. Whence also Pope Clement V condemns the Beghards' heresy which says that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to seeing God and blessedly enjoying Him: *Extra. de haereticis, Ad nostrum*. And this not only do we in the state of present misery [require], but the angels and our first parents in the state of primal innocence likewise required, when they had placed no mortal obstacle, nor even the smallest venial — as Lombard says and proves through authorities of Augustine, *Sentences* II, dist. 5, 24, and 29, plainly. And if anyone says that the moral virtues sufficiently elevate the affection to gracefully loving God, he will easily be contradicted by the foregoing. For he falls into the above-mentioned error of Pelagius, namely, that man by the powers of free choice alone, without grace, could effectually fulfill all God's commandments, as the foregoing have shown.

Moreover: what similar [virtue] elevates the angels to loving? Furthermore, the moral virtues are generated from works, as appears in *Ethics* 2.1 and 2; nor do they exceed their species or their boundaries, but only incline to similar operations from which they were generated. Whence the Philosopher says in the same place, ch. 2: "The operations and the virtues will be in the same things; for as by withdrawing from pleasures we are made temperate, so when made such we can especially withdraw from them; and as by being accustomed to despise terrors and to bear them we are made brave, so when made such we shall especially be able to bear terrors." Since therefore no one out of pure naturals loves God gratuitously above all things for His own sake, but for some other end, the habit generated from such multiplied lovings will only incline to loving God in like manner — and not otherwise.

Wherefore the same Philosopher in *Ethics* 8 and 9 shows that any one — even the virtuous — first and most loves himself, and that from this love every other love and friendship is derived. Thus *Ethics* 8.2: "It seems, however, that each one also loves the good for himself"; and below, ch. 7: "Each one most of all wills good things for himself"; and *Ethics* 9.4: "The acts of friendship which extend to friends and by which friendships are defined seem to have come from those which extend to oneself"; and below, ch. 8, he asks "whether one ought to love oneself most," argues for and against, and determines that one ought; where below, ch. 9: "Every intellect chooses what is best for itself; and the *epieikēs* (the equitable) obeys the intellect: for it is true of the man of moral worth, that he does and suffers many things for the sake of his friends, and even dies if it be needful: for he will throw away both money and honors, and altogether the goods that are objects of contention, procuring for himself the good. For he will choose to be greatly delighted for a short time rather than mildly for a long time; and to live well

for a year rather than many years anyhow; and one good and great action rather than many small ones. And to those dying this perhaps happens: they choose a great thing for themselves, and throw away their money in proportion as their friends will receive more. For money goes to the friend, but the good to himself: he assigns the greater good to himself."

Behold, according to the Philosopher's teaching, that the virtuous man in his most virtuous operation intends and loves finally — not God gratuitously for God's sake, but his own good, his own advantage, and himself, and God perhaps for his own human sake. Whence Sextus the Pythagorean says in his *Sentences*: "Without God you cannot live for God"; and below: "Wisdom does not make fate; for the grace of God is not subject to fate." Wherefore Anselm in *On Concord*, last chapter, says: "The will which is the instrument, and the natural liberty of choice, without justice is idle and is made the handmaid of its own affection which is for advantage; because, justice being removed, it can will nothing except what that affection (namely, of advantage) wills. But this justice is undoubtedly the grace of God itself, or depends on grace. For justice gives to each what is its own; therefore to God a gratuitous love above all things for His own sake," according to Part 30 of the First Corollary of this work — which can never come to be without grace, as the foregoing have urged.

This same thing Anselm and other Catholic doctors most often attest. For the Apostle says: *Justified freely by His grace*, Romans 3; and again: *Justified by His grace, we are made heirs*, Titus 3; and again: *Grace reigns through righteousness*, Romans 5; and below ch. 10 of certain holding contrary opinion writes thus: *Being ignorant of God's justice, and seeking to set up their own, they have not been subject to the justice of God*. Treating which, Augustine *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 15, says: "Let there be justice, but let it be of grace; let it be from God for thee, not from thyself." And expounding the verse of Psalm 118, *I have done judgment and justice*, he writes thus: "By the name of justice in this place is signified not the virtue itself, but its work. For who works justice in man, but He who justifies the impious? — that is, by His grace makes the unjust just out of the impious. Whence the Apostle, *Justified freely by His grace*: He therefore works justice — that is, the work of justice — who has justice in him." With which many authors say many similar things. Wherefore it also evidently appears that no philosophical or moral virtue is true virtue, simply right or just, without charity and grace perfecting it, raising it to God, and finally directing it to Him gratuitously for His own sake. For not little is wanting to a virtue which lacks the true final cause, the right intention, the just end — and especially such an end as God is known to be.

Whence no less clearly is it weighed: that no work of any virtue not formed by charity and grace; and universally no work of anyone not having the true virtue of charity and grace, is simply virtuous, right, or just; rather, any such work is in some way sin. For how could a work be simply virtuous, right, and just, which does not proceed from such a virtue as has the simply right final cause, the right intention, and the just end? — nay, how could a work not be in some way obliquity or sin, which is twisted from the right, due, and just end simply to another, and there finally and ultimately rests? Wherefore Plato also and the excellent Platonic philosophers said

true virtues are not save such as are in some way impressed on the mind from the form of that eternal and immutable substance which is God. Or is this the virtue of which Aristotle, *Ethics* 7.1, says: "There is a certain virtue above us, heroic and divine"?

Wherefore also Augustine, *Against Julian*, Book 4, ch. 4, recites the contrary opinion as a Pelagian error, addressing Julian thus: "You are wont, denying that the virtues by which one rightly lives are God's gifts, and ascribing them to nature and the human will rather than to God's grace, to use this argument: that infidels sometimes have them." And below, Book 5: "Most bitter, you say, enemies of grace, you set forth examples to us of the impious, whom you call alien to faith yet abounding in virtues, in whom there is, without the help of grace, only the good of nature — though enslaved to superstitions — who are often found, by the powers of inborn liberty alone, both compassionate, and modest, and chaste, and sober." But their error he refutes consequently with an erroneous argument, showing diffusely that there is no true virtue in infidels, nor any right work; nay, that every work of infidels is sin; that even the virtues of infidels are truly God's gifts. Wherefore in Book 6 he says: "Far be it that there be in anyone true virtue, unless he be truly just; nor is anyone just unless he live by faith. *For the just man lives by faith*. Who, moreover, of those who wish to be considered Christians — except the Pelagians alone, or perhaps you alone among them — would call the infidel just, would call the impious just, would call one enslaved to the devil just? But if the impious have not true justice, surely neither do they have true any other virtues, the companions and associates of justice, if they have any; and through this neither continence nor chastity is true virtue in the impious; because, when God's gifts are not referred to their author, by this very evil those using them are made unjust." And below, ch. 8: "Know that virtues are to be discerned from vices not by their offices but by their ends. For the office is what is to be done; thus when a man does something where he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for the sake of that for which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning; which not attending to, you have separated ends from offices, and you have said that true virtues should be called offices without ends; from which so great absurdity follows you, that you are forced to call true even that justice whose mistress you would find to be avarice. For if to refrain the hand from another's goods — if you regard the office — can seem to be of justice; yet if it is asked why this is done, and the answer is, *Lest more money be lost in lawsuits*, how can this deed truly be of justice, when it serves avarice? — like the virtues which Epicurus introduced as the handmaids of pleasure, which whatever they did, they did for the sake of obtaining or holding it. But far be it that true virtues should serve any one save Him, or for the sake of Him, to whom we say: *O God of virtues, turn us*. Wherefore the virtues which serve carnal delights, or any temporal advantages and emoluments, cannot at all be true; nor are those true, which wish to serve nothing. For true virtues serve God in men, by whom they are given to men; they serve God in angels, by whom they are also given to angels. And whatever good is done by man, and not done for the sake of that for which true wisdom commands it should be done — even though by office it seems good, by the not-right end it is sin." And below, ch. 12, he recites the rejoinder of Julian the heretic, and answers thus: "Behold, I recall the same things which you posited. If a Gentile, who does not live by faith, has clothed the naked, has freed one

in danger, has soothed the wounds of the sick, has spent his wealth on honest friendship, cannot be driven by torments to false witness — I ask of you, whether he does these good works well or ill. For if, although they are good, yet he does them ill, you cannot deny that he sins who does anything ill; but because you do not wish him to sin when he does these things, certainly you will say he both does good things and does them well. Therefore the bad tree bears good fruit — which Truth says cannot be. Or do you say the unfaithful man is a good tree? Then he pleases God; and where will be that which is written: *Without faith it is impossible to please God*? See therefore whether you dare say the unfaithful will is a good will. But perhaps you will say: a merciful will is a good will. This would be rightly said, if, just as the faith of Christ — that is, the faith which works through love — is always good, so mercy were always good. But if mercy is also found bad — by which the person of the poor man is accepted in judgment, on account of which finally King Saul deserved to be condemned by the Lord, even out of mercy, because contrary to His precept he spared the captive king through human affection — consider attentively, lest perhaps no mercy be good save that which is of this good faith. Indeed, answer — that you may see this without doubt — whether you reckon the unfaithful man's mercy to be good. For if it is a vice to have mercy ill, undoubtedly it is a vice to have mercy unfaithfully; and if of itself by natural compassion the work is good, even by this good he uses ill who uses it unfaithfully; and this good he does ill, who does it unfaithfully; but he who does anything ill, certainly sins. Whence it is gathered that even those good works which infidels do, are not theirs, but His who uses ill men well; whereas the sins are theirs, by which they do good things ill, because they do this not by faithful but by unfaithful — that is, foolish and noxious — will." And below, ch. 13: "Understand what the Lord said: *If thy eye is evil, thy whole body shall be dark; but if thy eye is single, thy whole body shall be lightsome*; and recognize this eye as the intention by which any one does what he does; and through this learn that he who does not do good works with the intention of good faith — that is, the faith which works through love — has, as it were, his whole body, which consists of those works as members, dark — that is, full of the blackness of sins. For the love of the world, by which any one is a friend of this world, is not from God; the love of enjoying any creatures without the love of the Creator is not from God; but the love of God, by which one comes to God, is not save from God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. Through this love of the Creator each one uses creatures well; without this love of the Creator no one uses creatures well." Imitating whom, Bede also, *Against Julian*, Book 13, says: "Whereas Julian says many of the philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of nature, it is plain that whoever among the philosophers were ignorant of Christ, the virtue of God and the wisdom of God, these by no reason could have any true virtue, just as no true wisdom." Whence also in Prosper's *Sentences*, proposition 106: "All the life of infidels is sin. For there is no good without the highest Good. Where there lacks the knowledge of eternal and unchangeable truth, virtue is false even in the best morals." Wherefore the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, demonstrates that all virtues are rooted in charity. From these, therefore, it plainly stands that no philosophical or moral virtue, without the grace of charity, is simply true virtue, right, or just; nor does it avail to raise the created will to gratuitously loving God above all

things for God's sake — but rather it bends it back, or holds the bent-back will, to its own particular advantage and to itself.

Of necessity therefore some higher, supernatural, heroic, and divine virtue is required — namely, grace freely given by God — to raise the created will, insufficient by itself, to loving God above all gratuitously for God's sake, and finally for His sake. This is also fittingly figured in Ezekiel 1, where the Prophet says: *I saw, and fell on my face, and heard the voice of one speaking; and He said to me, Son of man, stand upon thy feet.* Thus also is it commanded to every man fallen from sin or from the condition of nature, or lying far below; but because by himself he does not suffice to rise or to stand, it is rightly subjoined: *And the spirit entered into me after He had spoken to me, and set me upon my feet.* Who is this spirit, but the Spirit of grace, the Holy Spirit of God? Wherefore Gregory on Ezekiel, Homily 9, says: "Behold, the divine voice commanded the lying Prophet to rise; but he could not at all rise unless the Spirit of the omnipotent God had entered into him." With which Daniel concordantly says: *I lay confounded on my face, and my countenance clung to the earth; and behold, a hand touched me, and raised me upon my knees and upon the joints of my hands,* Daniel 10. What is this hand, but the hand of divine helping grace? Wherefore Augustine *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 11, says: "We endeavour to demonstrate that we are not divinely aided to work justice in this — that God has given a Law full of good and holy precepts; but because our very will, without which we cannot work good, is aided and raised by the imparted Spirit of grace; without which help that doctrine is the killing letter."

Peter (Lombard) also, *Sentences* II, dist. 24, says: "There is in the rational soul a will, by which it naturally wills the good, though feebly and faintly, unless grace help it, which on coming aids and raises it, that it may effectually will good." And below, dist. 25, last: "The will of man, which he naturally has, cannot be raised effectually to willing the good or fulfilling it in act, save by being freed and aided through grace; freed indeed that it may will, and aided that it may perform; because as the Apostle says: *It is not of him that wills to will, nor of him that runs to run* — that is, to operate — *but of God that has mercy*, who works in us *to will and to do for the good will*; whose grace the will or operation of man does not invoke, but grace itself prevenes the will, preparing it to will the good, and aids the prepared one, that it may not will in vain — that is, that it may complete it."

Furthermore, according to all philosophers, natural and moral, every form and every habit, moral or intellectual, is known by its operation, and through distinct and varied operations distinct and varied forms are demonstrated. Why then is the form or habit of charity and grace not proven by the operation of charity and grace, which is to love God above all things dearly and gratuitously? Again, all the doctors writing on baptism and its effect concordantly hold that to anyone rightly baptized in his baptism the three theological virtues — namely, faith, hope, and charity — are infused, together with informing grace. And lest henceforth any one should dare to doubt of this, holy Church has most certainly defined it. For Pope John, *Extravagantes*, in the Constitutions of Clement, *De summa Trinitate, et fide Catholica*, having recited one opinion saying that by the

virtue of baptism guilt is indeed remitted to little ones but grace is not conferred; and another asserting that to them in baptism guilt is remitted, and the virtues and informing grace are infused as to the habit, though not for that time as to use, subjoins: "We, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied alike to all the baptized, have decided to elect, with the approval of the sacred council, the second opinion — which says that to little ones as well as to adults informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism — as the more probable, and as more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the Saints and modern Doctors of theology."

Again, no one can exercise the proper operation of any form unless he first has that form, just as no one can strike strongly unless he first has strength, nor see acutely unless he first has acute vision; and similarly in things intellectual and moral. For no one can act wisely or prudently unless he first has wisdom or prudence; nor in moral things can anyone in general do well unless he first has some virtue in genus, from which (as from a good form, namely goodness) the good action proceeds. Whence in *Ethics* 2.6 the Philosopher shows that virtue perfects him who has it, and renders his work good; with which a similar saying from *Ethics* 6.10 Chapter 34 of this work cited; and the same seems true of every virtue in particular, and of its operation. No one therefore can will justly unless he first has justice, nor love God dearly unless he first has charity. Whoever therefore lacks justice, charity, and grace, cannot of himself justly, dearly, or graciously will or act, nor can he have this of himself — as the foregoing have taught; and it can be proved: for if he could, this would be either by gratefully meriting, willing, or by acting otherwise than gratefully. But not by gratefully meriting or willing — for this he cannot do unless he first has grace, by the immediately preceding reason; nor by doing something not gratefully — for it is not consonant with reason that grace should be given as reward and recompense to one who has worked nothing gratefully. (For according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 3: *Each shall receive his own reward according to his own labour.*) Nor can one lacking it receive it from another creature alone. For no one can beget or make sons of God, nor establish heirs of the heavenly kingdom, save God the Father, the Lord of this kingdom. It remains therefore that grace, according to its name, without any preceding merits, is given freely to the ungracious, by God the most liberal Giver of graces.

For this reason Anselm in *On Concord* professes the same opinion. Where, after he has shown in Chapter 8 that to will rightly is the end of the rational creature, and that justice is the rectitude of will preserved for its own sake (since he who preserves it solely for the sake of something else does not love it but that for the sake of which he preserves it, and therefore is not to be called just, nor is such rectitude to be named justice), in Chapter 9 he subjoins: "There is no doubt that the will does not will rightly except because it is right. For just as sight is not acute because it sees acutely, but sees acutely because it is acute, so the will is not right because it wills rightly, but wills rightly because it is right. But when it wills this rectitude, undoubtedly it wills rightly. Therefore it does not will rectitude except because it is right; for it is the same to the will to be right and to have rectitude. It is therefore plain that it does not will rectitude except because it

has rectitude." The same in *On Truth*, ch. 12: "The reception of rectitude is prior in nature to having or willing it, since to have or to will it is not the cause of reception, but reception causes the having and willing of it." And as is plain through the same in *On the Cause of the Devil*, ch. 17: "The deserter angel, having lost justice, cannot of himself have the will of justice"; nay, as appears above, ch. 12: "The angel disposed for willing could not of himself have his first will, neither of beatitude nor of justice, but the natural will of advantage." With which agrees his statement, *On Concord*, last chapter, recited above. Who also, above, ch. 9, after the things recited above, shows that no one can receive that rectitude save from God: "Let us now consider," he says, "whether anyone not having this rectitude can in any way have it from himself. He cannot have it from himself except either by willing or by not willing. By willing indeed no one can attain it through himself, because he cannot will it (namely rightly) unless he have it; and that he could attain it by not willing, no mind accepts. In no way therefore can he have it from himself; nor from any other creature. For just as a creature cannot save a creature, so it cannot give to it that by which it is saved. It follows therefore that no creature has rectitude save through the grace of God. Therefore, with God so granting, we find His grace to save man to be in concord with free choice, in such a way that grace alone can save a man, free choice doing nothing — as happens in infants and in those without understanding — that it always aids natural free choice, which without it avails nothing for salvation, by giving rectitude to the will, which it preserves through free choice. And although it is not given to all (since *He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens*), yet it is given to no one for any preceding merit (since, *Who has first given to God, and recompense shall be made him?*). But if the will, by free choice, by preserving what it has received, merits either an increase of received justice, or power for a good will, or some reward — all these are fruits of the first grace; and grace for grace, and all is to be imputed to grace, because *neither is it of him that wills, what he wills, nor of him that runs, what he runs, but of God that has mercy.*"

Is not this also what the Prophet says: *I know, O Lord, that the way is not of man, neither is it in a man to walk and direct his steps* (Jeremiah 10)? Whose then is it, but His of whom another Prophet says: *By the Lord shall the steps of a man be directed, and He will choose his way* (Psalm 36)? Indeed, as another reading more clearly puts it: *By the Lord shall the steps of a man be directed* — first; and after the directing already done, *he shall will His way* — namely the Lord's — secondly. Augustine, expounding this, says: "The man himself, that he may will the way of the Lord, his steps are directed by the Lord himself; for if the Lord had not directed the steps of the man, they were so depraved that they would always go through perverse ways and could not, following crooked paths, return. He therefore is the One who directed our steps, that we should will His way." Who also, *Ad Simplicianum* 1.24, says: "For breaking and casting down the pride of men ungrateful to God's grace, who hear and glory in their own merits, these things are recalled: For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, *not from works, but from Him that called, was it said: The greater shall serve the lesser.* Therefore the grace is the Caller's; the works of the receiver of grace are consequent — not such as beget grace, but are begotten by grace. For fire does not heat in order that it may glow, but because it glows; nor does

the wheel run well in order to be round, but because it is round. So no one works well in order to receive grace, but because he has received it. For one cannot live justly who has not been justified, nor live at all who has not been quickened. But grace justifies, that the justified may be able to live justly. Therefore grace is first; good works second."

The same in *On Faith to Peter*, ch. 18, says that God gave to intellectual nature — namely angels and men — the faculty and the will of knowing and loving Him, that each one might both have it and lose it; yet if anyone should lose it of his own accord, he would not be able to resume it by his own choice, but it would belong to Him whose function it was to bestow miraculously the beginnings of holy thinking by the gift of free goodness, renewing whom He would, since it was His function from the very beginning of creation, with no preceding merits, wonderfully to order spirits and bodies in their places and dispositions according as Himself, the wise One, willed as fitting. And below, ch. 21: "That the beginning of good will and thought is not born to a man from himself, but is divinely both prepared and bestowed, in this God evidently shows: that neither the devil, nor any of his angels, from the time when by the merit of his ruin they were thrust into this lower darkness, has been or shall be able to resume a good will. For if it were possible that human nature, after it had turned from God and lost the good of will, could of itself again have it, much more possible would the angelic nature have this — which, the less it is weighed down by the burden of an earthly body, the more it would be endowed with this faculty. But God shows whence good will is given to men, which the angels so lost when they had it that they cannot have it after losing it." The same in *City of God* 12.9 proves that if the good angels were first without good will, they could not have it of themselves; for if they themselves, with God not working, made it, they were made better by themselves than by Him — which God forbid; and if they could not make themselves better than He had made them — than whom none makes anything better — surely they could not have a good will, by which they would be better, save by the operating help of the Creator.

But it will perhaps be objected, by what is in *Ethics* 2.1 and 2: that moral virtue is generated from preceding similar works — as justice, temperance, and fortitude from operating justly, temperately, and bravely; therefore one can virtuously operate without having the virtue. Again, otherwise it would seem foolish and vain to seek and desire the virtues; for no one can do this save by having them; but it seems superfluous and foolish for someone to desire and seek what he has. Again, this seems plain in the arts: for no one has the art of harping or building unless first by harping or building, as appears through the Philosopher, *Ethics* 2.1 and *Metaphysics* 9.14.

To these it can be answered as the Philosopher answers a similar question in *Ethics* 2.4. For since it had been said that virtue is generated from works, "someone might ask," he says, "how we say that those operating just things must become just, and those operating temperate things temperate? For if they operate just and temperate things, they are already just and temperate." And he answers that such persons do not operate justly and temperately, but just and temperate things; and he says that "works are called just and temperate when they are such as the just and the temperate man would operate."

Yet it can otherwise — and not improbably — be said: that whoever operates such things, and not altogether by chance (as a cow happens upon a hare or partridge), does this from some form of virtue, and from some virtue which he has, broadly speaking. For according to the same Philosopher, *Ethics* 6, last, virtue is twofold: one principal, the other natural; or, one acquired, the other innate; and this he proves by common experience, saying thus: "It seems to all that the qualities of character exist for individuals by nature; for in some way we have justice, temperance, courage, and other things from birth. For in children and beasts there exist natural habits, but without intellect they seem to be harmful — just as it happens to a strong body moved without sight that it falls heavily because of not having sight, so it is here. But if such a habit takes on intellect, then it will properly be virtue." And reason convinces of this. For if, because a man, after many sad works, feels himself strongly inclined to doing such things easily and delightfully, he concludes that he has the moral virtue inclining him thus, why if anyone is naturally inclined similarly or more vehemently, more easily and more delightfully, does he not conclude that he has such a natural virtue? And this virtue perhaps, against the acquired virtue (which here he calls principal), Aristotle distinguishing in the *Categories* placed under the name of disposition in the first species of quality. These virtues — not only natural or moral, but also intellectual and artistic — the mathematicians (astrologers) consider that they see in the births of children. And so the prudent ancients, having diligently investigated and known the natural aptitude of any boy, applied each one fittingly to a vocation according to that. Wherefore among them at that time all the arts flourished most excellently. Whence also *Ethics* 3.13 it is written thus: "It must be inborn, like one having sight, by which he judges well, and by which according to truth he will desire the good; and he is well-born, in whom this is innately well: that which is greatest and best, and which it is not possible to receive from another, nor to learn; but as it is innate, such will he have it; and that this is innately well and best — this is true and perfect good birth." Wherefore Aristotle, *Politics* 5.9, recites Socrates affirming that nature produces both depraved and better men by training; and adds: "saying this perhaps not badly: for it happens that some are such that it is impossible to train them or make them studious."

Wherefore in *Secret of Secrets*, Part 3, ch. 10, he writes thus: "There is to be considered the genesis (horoscope) in some, because the begotten is often disposed according to the power of the planets which are in the region of his genesis; and if it should happen that his parents teach him some of the arts, the higher nature will draw him many times to the art proper to his star. For something like this happened to certain men who came together in a certain village, and were lodged with a certain weaver, to whom in that night a son was born. The guests took his nativity and arranged his planets. His genesis was in Venus and Mars, his degree being in Gemini with Libra; the contrary and worst stars had not yet risen. The genesis therefore showed them that the boy would be wise, courtly, swift of hand, of good counsel, beloved by kings. They concealed this, hiding it from the father. The boy grew in prosperity, and the parents tried to instruct him in some of their arts; but he could learn nothing of them. Beating him and scourging him most heavily, they exposed him to his own will. The youth therefore inclined himself to men possessing learning, and acquired sciences, and knew the courses and times of the heavens, and

the manners and governments of kings — and behold, he was made the king's chamberlain." Where also immediately he subjoins: "The contrary of this came about from the wonderful works and dispositions of the planets and their natures: that which befell two sons born to the king of India. Their genesis was compared, but it was hidden from the king. When therefore one of the boys grew up, the king believed it best to instruct him in the sciences. He therefore sent him through India and through other provinces honourably, as became the son of so great a king; but the father's diligence was of no avail, because he could not incline his soul and nature except to the smith's craft. On account of which the king was greatly disturbed, and called all the wise men of his kingdom — who, being asked, all agreed in this: that he should be left to that to which his nature led him. So it was done; and many times this and the like has happened." Wherefore Ovid, *On the Old Woman*, Book 1, recounts thus:

Time was, when once the State sought out the Philosophers at great expense, watching for the common good, and treated them honorably, that they might counsel her in the highest matters. Then it seemed to the senators, in every city, that they should choose teachable boys from the more gifted, sending them to the gymnasia for the cause of learning, to whom each city furnished pleasing stipends for sustenance. And there they made them be discerned by the judgment of the physiognomists — what art was to be learnt by whom; thus his art was assigned to each; thus, devoted to one art, each always cleaved to it, and to be perfected in one sufficed for any one, nor was it permitted to change. Then the arts flourished, each thing was perfectly known, and could be perfectly handed down to posterity, with leisure for writing books on great matters. Then the *mathēseis* alone were worthy of the name of doctrine, and had their followers; then what utility each thing brought was clear among the studious.

Therefore a man can, from such virtues innate to himself, work such things; but not gratefully and graciously in the manner aforesaid. For charity and grace are not innate to us; for *we were by nature children of wrath* (Ephesians 2). And by these things the answer is plain to the objections, and most of all to the first and the last. The second, however, does not proceed: for although someone has a virtue, he can desire that virtue in two ways — namely, that it be more fully increased in him (as the Apostles asked of the Lord, *Increase our faith*, Luke 17), or that it be stably preserved, according to that of Psalm 15, *Preserve me, O Lord*, and Psalm 67, *Confirm, O God, that which Thou hast wrought in us*; and so Anselm answers in *On Concord*, where above.

But if anyone presses still more urgently, supposing that not everyone has every natural virtue — or, if he has, the Almighty takes one away from him (e.g., the art of harping) — and yet he can learn to harp, and not save by working artistically; for if inartistically, and he multiplies such works, they will generate a similar habit in him (as appears in *Ethics* 2 above) — therefore he will not acquire art, but rather inertness and error. Therefore one not having art can work artistically; and consequently one lacking virtues can work virtuously.

To this it must be said that for such a one to harp at all, however slightly, he has in his soul, by his own invention or imagination or by hearing and some teaching, some idol and some likeness

of harping, which somehow directs him in harping; otherwise he would not by purpose touch one chord more than another, nor harp by purpose more than dance, but perhaps purely by chance, like the cow shaking the harp with its horns; and from such striking of chords, however multiplied, he would never become a harpist. I say therefore that such a one has, from his own imagination or hearing of another, some species and form of harping from which his harping proceeds, and through use grows continuously to the perfect. And this seems to be the answer of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9.14, who says: "It seems impossible that one be a harpist who has not harped: for one learning to harp, learns by harping. Whence the sophistic refutation comes about, that not having knowledge, one will do that of which there is knowledge; for the learner does not have knowledge." And he answers: "But because of that which comes to be, something has come to be, and of that which is moved totally, something has been moved; and it is plain in those things which concern motion that the learner must have something of the knowledge perhaps." Where Averroes' text speaks more expressly and without "perhaps," and adds: "Nothing therefore is moved to anything, save from that to which it is moved, in itself." Where Averroes says: "Everything which is generated and made into something, it is impossible for this to come to be unless it has something of that which it will have at the last; for example, because it is impossible for one to harp, save he who has something of the art of harping. And therefore an ass does not learn to harp, nor a man who is not innate to harp."

But of charity and grace we cannot have the smallest spark from ourselves, nor from any creature, as is shown above; wherefore neither can we do anything gratefully for God's sake; wherefore neither can we merit anything from Him, unless He first give it to us freely.

Yet someone perhaps will say: that grace much facilitates a man for fulfilling God's commandments, and is said to be necessary to man for this cause; but then a man could without grace, though more difficultly, fulfill these — contrary to the foregoing. Why also could the angels, in no way weighed down by the mass of an oppressing body, not most easily fulfill these without grace — contrary to what was premised? Furthermore, this man too is a son of Pelagius in this part. For he said that grace was given to men for this purpose: that what they are commanded to do through free choice they might more easily fulfill through grace — as Augustine recites of him in *On Heresies*, where above; *Against Pelagius and Caelestius on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin*, Book 1, ch. 7 and 23; *On the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 13; and in many other places. Again, this heresy was solemnly condemned in the Council of Mileve, at which Augustine was present, against the Pelagians, as is recited in *Canon. de Consecrat.*, dist. 4, last chapter, in these words: "It is decreed: Whoever shall say that the grace of justification is given to us for this purpose, that what we are commanded to do through free choice we may more easily fulfill through grace — as if, even though grace were not given, we could (not indeed easily, but yet) fulfill the divine commandments without it — let him be anathema."

This same thing the holy Prosper recites in his book *On the Predicators of God's Grace, against Cassian*, ch. 21, together with the reason of the Pontiffs because of which they condemned that

saying of Pelagius as heretical. He says: "Let him fall into the pit of that condemned saying, by which it is said that the grace of justification is given to us by God for this purpose, that what we are commanded to do through free choice we may more easily fulfill through grace — as if, though grace were not given, we could (not indeed easily, but yet) without it fulfill the divine commandments. Which the Catholic Pontiffs judged worthy of anathema. We must use the testimony which they used, saying: 'For of the fruits of the commandments the Lord was speaking, where He did not say: *Without Me you can do them with more difficulty*, but said, *Without Me you can do nothing*.'"

Still, the deputy of Pelagius perhaps will respond and say: that grace is for this reason necessary for fulfilling the divine commandments — because through it the divine commandments are revealed to men, and the discrimination of good and evil is shown; and with this revelation and discrimination obtained through grace, man can fulfill them by the powers of his proper will. But this is rebutted by the foregoing. Again, according to this opinion: before law was given to men or angels, grace would not have been necessary to them for loving God above all things gratuitously; or if now the power of law were taken away, and man were committed to the natural law of natural reason's judgment, he would in no way need God's grace — the opposites of which appeared above. Furthermore, even if this be granted, Pelagius's error returns. For Augustine, *Against Pelagius and Caelestius on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin*, Book 1, ch. 2, speaking of Pelagius writes thus: "He places the grace of God and the help by which we are aided by the Lord not to sin either in nature and free choice, or in law or doctrine; so that, namely, when God aids man to decline from evil and do good, He is believed to aid by revealing and showing what ought to be done — not also by cooperating and inspiring love, that he may do what he has known he ought to do." And below, ch. 7, he recites Pelagius's words in this form: "He aids us by His doctrine and revelation, while He opens the eyes of our heart, while, lest we be occupied with present things, He shows us future things, while He lays bare the snares of the devil, while He illumines us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace. Whoever says this, do you think he denies grace? Or does he not confess both man's free choice and God's grace?" And below, ch. 8: "This is to place the grace of God in law or doctrine. Here it appears that he confesses that grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do — not that by which He grants and aids that we may do; whereas the knowledge of the law would rather be effective for this — if grace's help be lacking — that the transgression of the commandment may come about. *For where there is not law, neither is there transgression*, says the Apostle; and: *I had not known concupiscence, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet*. And through this, law is so much one thing, grace another, that the law not only profits nothing, but rather harms most, unless grace help. And the utility of the law is shown in this: that those whom it makes guilty of transgression, it compels to flee for refuge to grace to be liberated and to be aided in overcoming evil concupiscences. For it commands rather than aids; teaches that there is a disease, does not heal; nay, the disease is rather increased by it because it is not healed — that the medicine of grace may more attentively and solicitously be sought, because *the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life*." The same, *On Grace and Free Choice*, ch. 25: "What is it that those

most vain and most perverse men, the Pelagians, say — that the law is the grace of God by which we are aided not to sin? What is it that those wretches say, who without any doubt contradict so great an Apostle? He says that sin received powers against man through the law, and slays him through a commandment, though it is holy, and just, and good — and works death to him through the good — from which he could not be freed unless the Spirit (whom the letter had killed) gave him life, as he says in another place, *The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life*. And these untaught ones, blind against God's light and deaf against God's voice, say that the killing letter gives life, and contradict the life-giving Spirit." And below ch. 28: "Who is so deaf to the apostolic voices? Who would so dote, nay, be so insane, not knowing what he says, as to dare say the law is grace, when he cries — who knew what he said — *You who are justified by the law have fallen from grace?*"

The same again, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 2, says thus: "We must most fiercely and most vehemently resist those who think that without God's help, by the force of the human will alone, justice can be either perfected or, by tending toward it, advanced toward. And when they begin to be pressed how they presume to assert that this is done without divine help, they restrain themselves and dare not utter this voice, since they see how impious and unbearable it is; but they say that these things are not done without divine help, because both God created man with free choice of will, and by giving precepts He himself teaches how man ought to live; and indeed He aids in this — that by teaching He removes ignorance, that man may know in his works what he ought to avoid and what to seek; whereby, entering through naturally inserted free choice the way shown, persisting and living piously and justly, he may merit to come to that blessed and eternal life. But we say that the human will is so divinely aided to do justice, that besides the fact that man is created with free choice of will, and besides the doctrine by which he is commanded how he should live, he receives the Holy Spirit, by whom there comes to be in his soul delight in and love of that highest, unchangeable Good which is God; even now while he yet walks by faith, not yet by sight; that with this given to him as a kind of pledge of the gratuitous gift, he may be inflamed to cleave to the Creator, and may be enkindled to come to participation of that true Light — that from Him it may be well with him, from whom he has it that he is. For neither does free choice avail anything, save for sinning, if the way of truth lie hidden; and when what ought to be done and toward what we ought to tend begin not to lie hidden, unless it also delight and be loved, it is not done, not undertaken, not lived well; but that it be loved, *the love of God is poured forth in our hearts* — not by free choice which arises from us, but *by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us*."

Furthermore, the Council cited above, as recited in the canon, last chapter but one, says thus: "Whoever shall say that the same grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord aids us not to sin only because through Him the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us — that we may know what we ought to seek, what avoid — but not also that through it there be granted to us, that what we have known is to be done, we may also do or be able to do — let him be anathema." If anyone bursts forth into so great an insanity as to say that the grace of God

necessary to man for fulfilling the divine commandments is the free choice freely given by God to man, he is swallowed up in the gulf of the Pelagian sea. For it stands clear from the cited authorities of Augustine, that this is the vanity of Pelagian madness, who in *Against Pelagius and Caelestius on the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin*, Book 1, ch. 2, says: "Since Pelagius establishes and distinguishes three things by which he says the divine commandments are fulfilled — possibility, will, action — possibility namely by which a man can be just; will by which he wills to be just; action by which he is just — of these three the first, that is, possibility, he confesses given by the Creator of nature, nor is in our power, but we have it whether we will or not; but the two others, that is, will and action, he asserts to be ours, and so attributes them to us, that he contends that they are not save from us." Behold, plainly what Pelagius calls the grace of God: namely, the natural possibility, gratuitously given to us by the Creator of nature, by the gracious benefit of creation. This heresy Augustine also recites in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 53, and in *On Grace and Free Choice*, ch. 28, and refutes it here and there. This man too, so erring, falls into the above-mentioned heresy of Pelagius, which posits that man through his free choice can fulfill the divine commandments — and he can easily be corrected through what was premised.

Furthermore, the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 15: *I have laboured more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God which is with me*. And how is it not he, but grace — if he or his free choice be called grace?

Yet some modern Pelagians respond, saying: that man out of his pure naturals can love God above all things gratuitously for His own sake, according to the substance of the act itself, but not meritoriously — or at least not meritoriously *of condignity*, although perhaps *of congruity* — without grace accompanying. But this does not consort with reason, and is refuted by the foregoing. Furthermore, according to these: he who has grace, by loving God and keeping His counsels and commandments, can merit even *of condignity*; why then, if one lacking grace does similar or greater things for God with equally right or righter intention, with equally sincere or sincerer affection, with equally grateful love or even more grateful, does he not similarly or more merit? For as far as the works or the workers are concerned, his work is equally good with that of this one or better; wherefore equally acceptable for the payment of an old debt for sin, and for the redemption of his own soul, and for the purchase of the heavenly kingdom. If therefore God should accept the price of the one and reject the equally just or juster price of the other, He is an acceptor of persons, and does not judge equity.

Again, according to all Catholics — nay, even according to the enemies of grace, the Pelagian heretics themselves — grace much lightens the gravity of every work. *For it makes the yoke of the Lord sweet and His burden light*. Therefore one lacking grace, doing similar things, works more difficultly than one having it; therefore he merits more. For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 2.3: "Around the difficult, however, art and virtue are; for the well, the better, is in this — that is, what is well without difficulty, in this is better." And *Ethics* 3.18 he proves that fortitude consists more in fears than in audacities, and that this is more praiseworthy than that, and according to

some more than temperance — by this, that it is more difficult to bear sad things than to abstain from delightful things; and *Ethics* 5, Book 2: "Worst is he who uses malice toward himself and toward friends; best, however, not he who uses virtue toward himself, but he who uses it toward another; for this work is difficult." Venerable Bede also, *On Times*, Book 2.1, alleges to this same point Jerome on the Gospels, who places marriages in the thirtieth fruit and widows in the sixtieth, for this cause: "By how much," he says, "the difficulty is greater of abstaining from the once-experienced enticements of pleasure, by so much is the reward greater."

Furthermore, then one lacking grace could love God *with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the strength, and with all the mind* finally for His own sake, and his neighbour as himself, similarly for God's sake, and observe all the other precepts and counsels in all things; and so be in the state of salvation, and finally be saved — both according to the foregoing and contrary to the foregoing. For God's grace alone makes sons and friends of God, as the foregoing testify; and the Prophet says: *Who crowns thee with mercy and compassions* (Psalm 102). And the Apostle more plainly: *But the grace of God is eternal life* (Romans 6) — which also the general faith of the Church holds.

Others still feign: that man without grace from himself can perform the divine commandments according to the substance of the work, but not according to the intention of Him who commands — which is, that they be done in grace. But the fiction of these men shall be broken, like the others preceding. This too seems wonderful, because looking through the Old Testament and the New, and all doctors and expositors of them, no other intention of the Commander appears, save that these be done gratuitously for God's sake; and by this very fact it seems to them that such a one is in grace — namely arguing from the posterior to the prior, and from the effect to its efficient. And in the same way all Doctors and preachers, ancient and modern, in preaching and teaching the people of God the way of salvation, preach nothing else save that gratuitously, for God's sake, they should do His commandments and counsels; nor do they say, *Do these things in grace*; rather they say, as it seems, that by this very fact, that they so do these things, they have the grace of God — that grace, namely, of which I am speaking, which makes us pleasing unto life, as the root from which these branches sprout. And the contrary of this seems to me not to be preached without danger: namely, that although someone may love God gratuitously with his whole heart, etc., and exercise all the works of piety toward his neighbour for God's sake, and bear for His sake all penal and adverse things perseveringly to the end, and then with the most ardent and purest love of God, for the defense of God's law, be consummated by the harshest death — yet still he be handed over to the second death and to the torments of hell without end. Let those preach this who will; I would not dare preach such things, lest perhaps while I preached to others, I myself should become reprobate, undermining the hope of the pious and making the charity of many to grow cold.

Behold, how express are the testimonies of truth to this point. Behold the testimony of Joel 2: *Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved* — which the Apostle also attests, Romans 10. And Luke 10: A certain one asked of the Lord, *Master, what shall I do, that I may*

have eternal life? But He said: *In the law what is written?* He answered: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc., and thy neighbour as thyself.* And He said to him: *Thou hast answered rightly; do this and thou shalt live.* If, however, he could have done these things without sanctifying grace unto life, that doctrine of Truth was not true; for it does not follow: *Do these things, even perseveringly to the end, therefore thou shalt live;* for he could do this without grace, without which surely no one shall live. And if you say that the Saviour understood that he should do these in grace — then since that mode of doing is more necessary than the deed itself, nor is it known to a man by himself, nor did He, by teaching and commanding, express that mode — it seems that such teaching is too defective, and that it casts a snare upon men, and leads them into the danger of eternal damnation. For it conceals grace, without which no one is made gracious, nor enters into life, and expresses one dead deed, intimating openly that to do this is sufficient for life — as if a physician should answer absolutely to a simple sick man, who consulted him what he should do to have temporal life, *Eat the flesh of the viper*, but did not tell him the way in which it is wholesomely prepared in the theriac: he would easily prepare for such a simple man a dish of death — which any zealous physician will avoid. But far be it that the physician of bodies be more zealous than our physician of souls. For *the Lord, jealous His name* (Exodus 34).

To this same end is that whole long sermon of the Lord in John 15: *I am the true vine*, etc., where He teaches the disciples how they should bear fruit — namely, by remaining in Him; where also consequently He expounds how they should remain in Him: *Remain*, He says, *in My love*; and still, like the good Master, He teaches how they should remain in His love: *If*, says He, *you keep My commandments, you shall remain in My love*; and afterward expounds singularly how they should keep His commandments — of which He had spoken to them in plural — when He says, *This is My commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you*. Which similitude He still would not pass over without exposition, but said: *Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends*. Whoever therefore has this love, remains in God, and bears in grace much fruit.

Again, Cyprian, Augustine, and unanimously all Doctors and the whole holy Church of God indubitably affirm that whoever, although not reborn of water, has been killed for the confession of Christ, baptized by the baptism of his own blood, immediately in heaven with the holy Martyrs is crowned with a crown of glory; and this is what Christ Himself testifies, Matthew 10, saying thus: *Every one therefore that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father who is in heaven*. To this they hold a similar opinion concerning an adult wishing to be baptized and prevented by death — as Lombard alleges, *Sentences* IV, dist. 4, and elsewhere it is often plain. Which yet they would presume too rashly to affirm, if these things could be done without the grace of charity, without which it is established that no one can be saved.

Again, this grace is a certain habit, and to love God above all things gratuitously for His own sake is its proper act; but the act is the end and perfection of the habit (as Chapter 21 showed). Wherefore the habit is for the act, not contrariwise. To this therefore God wills that men should

have grace — that through it they may do gratuitously the works specified. If therefore they could without that grace so do these things, it would suffice for God and for them; nay, no reason, no cause, no utility either to God or to man would appear, why these things ought to be done in grace, since they could equally be done without it; rather, it would seem altogether superfluous and empty as to every action, like a cipher last in figure as to every signification. And if anyone says that to this God wills that our works be done in grace, because so they can be done more easily, he falls into the above-mentioned error of Pelagius; and even then, he who did them without grace, on account of the greater difficulty, would merit more — as was argued above.

Again, every moral or other habit is known by its effect — namely by this, that someone promptly and delightfully operates the works of such a virtue. Whence *Ethics* 2.3: "It is fit to make the sign of the habits the supervening pleasure or sadness in the workers. For he who withdraws from bodily pleasures, and rejoices in this very thing, is temperate; and he who endures dangers and rejoices, or is not saddened, is brave." And *Posterior Analytics* 2, last, Aristotle argues against Plato (who posits cognitive habits of principles to be in us by nature, but to lie hidden), saying: "If we had them, it is unfitting; for it happens that one having most certain cognitions of demonstrating principles is hidden from himself." Since therefore charity and grace are most perfect habits, they can be known by their operations; and this Truth itself seems to have taught when He said: *By their fruits you shall know them*, Matthew 7. And below ch. 12: *By the fruit the tree is known*. And John 13 He gives a rule generally special and specially general for having this knowledge: *In this*, He says, *shall all men know that you are My disciples, if you have love one for another* — which also below ch. 15 He pursues much more plainly and fully, as was alleged above. And in this opinion the Doctors and treatisers of canonical Scripture seem unanimously to agree. Whoever therefore so works such things, has the grace of charity.

Again, if one operating in grace merits anything, then also one lacking grace, if he similarly operates similar things; for his act in all respects is equally good as the act of another gracious one — especially since his grace in no way informs nor effects nor directs his act. If it be said that grace, by the very fact that it stands there, renders the act meritorious — this does not seem so, since in an act done out of pure naturals it does altogether nothing, just as in a cucumber-field a scarecrow guards nothing, but stands there blind, deaf, dumb, and dead; nor does that grace in the soul contribute more to such an act than it would in a cup, in a purse, or in a chest. Again, if a gracious act is on this account rendered meritorious — because it is done by a gracious one, although not from grace — it follows that his indifferent acts, nay, also venial sins, and universally all his acts are meritorious of the kingdom of God, and this *of condignity* — since one can love a wife from carnal affection, lie jokingly, give alms because of vainglory in venial matters, and many similar things, out of pure naturals, not out of grace given to him. Such grace could also be really posited in one not gracious, nay sinning mortally — yet his works would not on that account be made meritorious. Whence it is manifest that *to be done in grace* and *to be done from grace* are not the same; rather, every thing done from grace is done in grace, but not

contrariwise. It is also manifest that a work is meritorious not because it is done in grace, but because it is done from grace; and every work done from grace is meritorious, but not every work done in grace. All these things will easily appear from the foregoing.

Again, to this is that whole process of Anselm recited above; for he says most plainly that whoever wills rectitude wills rightly, and therefore prior in nature has it, as effective cause of this effect; and he there speaks of the rectitude of grace, as is plain in *On Concord*, ch. 9, and of the grace without which no one is saved (as is plain above in ch. 8) — as was touched upon above; and to the same purpose goes the process of Augustine touched on before.

There is yet another similar quibble, which says: that man can of himself love God *with all his heart*, etc., and do all other things according to the substance of the works — yet shall merit absolutely nothing, or at least nothing *of condignity*, because he does not do them according to the intention of the Commander, which is (they say) that he do them in some way meritoriously, or meritoriously *of condignity*. But this ineptness can be refuted similarly with the prior. Again, what does he understand by "to do meritoriously"? If to do in charity and grace for God's sake, then it does not differ from the prior position; if to do so that some reward is owed to him, this is altogether irrational and contrary to reason. For if a work is meritorious because reward is owed to it, then prior is the owing of reward to it than the work being meritorious — whereas it is contrariwise: for it is on this account, that the work is meritorious, that reward is owed to it; otherwise there would be no cause or reason why reward should be owed to this work and not to that. Therefore prior in nature is a work being meritorious and worthy of reward, than reward being owed to it.

Again, the owing of reward either depends on the work or on something else not pertaining. If on the work — then whoever does congruously such a work, merits; and this man, according to this position, does so without grace. If on something not pertaining — this seems against all reason and law. Again, in the whole Old Testament and New, God promises to those doing the commandments a reward. Yet if He so understood: *Do My commandments meritoriously, and you will be worthy of reward and will have reward* — that promise or doctrine would be ridiculous. For He does not teach anything doubtful or unknown, save perhaps to one doubting whether God is, or whether He is just. For it is established for any one, that any potent person is held to render reward to one operating meritoriously for him, and will render unless he be unjust. It seems therefore that God understands according to the common mode of understanding of men whom He was teaching: namely, *Do this and you shall have reward* — that is, *Do this for My sake, and for My love, and you shall have reward*; and so one not having grace can do, according to these aforesaid.

Again, to one in grace reward is owed for a work; and this man outside grace, according to these, can do a similar work, or greater, for God, with similar or greater love. Why then does this one not merit as much as that, or more? Again, it is in no way probable that God most liberal and rich, merciful and just, who *will render to each one according to his works*, should cast away and

despise — without any reward — one loving Him gratuitously for His sake with all the powers of mind and body, and his neighbour as himself similarly for God's sake; one who abhors all evils, embraces all good things, sustains all sad things, and at last the most bitter death for God's sake. Especially when He Himself most plainly testifies this, even with an oath interposed, Matthew 10, in these words: *Whoever shall give to one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, Amen I say to you, he shall not lose his reward.*

But these will perhaps object: that if no one could love God *with his whole heart*, etc., and do all things to be done, and dismiss all things to be dismissed, gratuitously for God's sake, unless he were in the grace of charity, then a man could know when he was in the grace of charity — contrary to that of Ecclesiastes 9, *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.* Again, such great works can be done without the grace of charity. For one can without charity (as appears 1 Corinthians 13) have all faith and do the greatest miracles, so as to remove mountains; distribute all his goods to feed the poor; and deliver his body to be burned.

To the first objection it is plain through what was said in Chapter 25 of this work — that someone predestined to life, existing in the gravest mortal sin (as was David, when on account of adultery he was committing crafty homicide), is not then less loved by God than he will be loved in the future; and similarly, one foreknown to death, existing in the greatest charity, is no less hated then by God than ever he will be hated after his deepest fall into sin and punishment — as was the case of Judas the traitor of the Lord — except perhaps according to the present justice, and very much by way of transmutation. Therefore no man can know whether he is worthy of hatred or love, since whatever sort he is now, he does not know what end he will have, nor whether he is finally predestined a son of life or of death. And this is what the same Scripture testifies: for when it had said, *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred*, it adds: *but all things in the future are kept uncertain.* Yet to no one is it doubtful but that man can know himself to be worthy of hatred according to the present justice. For he can know himself to be in the gravest sins, and in the gravest actual will of committing, and in despair of salvation — as was the case with Judas and Cain. Similarly it seems probable to me that man can probably know — at least according to the present justice — that he is in grace and worthy of God's love, by this, namely, that he loves God *with his whole heart*, etc., so that he would not in the least wish to offend Him, neither for any avoidable thing to be avoided, nor for any desirable thing to be obtained; and would wish to fulfill the divine will in all things, even though there were never punishment or reward, but only gratuitously for His sake; and through many other signs.

But to be brief, although less truly, the said authority can be expounded thus: *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred* — that is, finally — as the same place expounds itself continuously, as has been said.

As to the other point: it is true that without the grace of charity many great works are done, but not the work of loving God *with the whole heart*, etc., in the said mode; nor are those works done with gratuitous love for God's sake. And therefore the Apostle well says: *If I shall do these and*

those things, but have not charity, it profits me nothing. And straightway through her effects he in some way defines and notifies charity: *Charity is patient, is kind*, etc., as if he wished plainly to intimate that he who truly does not have these things, has not charity, and he who truly has these things, similarly has charity. For according to the same, Romans 11: *If the firstfruit be holy, so is the lump.* But this whole argument from its beginning down to here, so far protracted, is so briefly restricted into a syllogism: Whoever merits *of congruity* grace from God, does, before the receiving of grace in time or in nature, something gratefully for Him; no one does anything gratefully for Him beforehand.

Again, if one lacking grace can merit the first grace *of congruity*, and one having grace can merit the increase of his grace only *of congruity*, not however *of condignity* — then one lacking grace could similarly earn the first grace as one having grace earns the increase of his grace; whereas the first of these is the heresy of Pelagius reprov'd by the Fathers, and the second is conceded by all Catholics. Therefore the first cannot similarly merit the first, and the second the second. That grace had merits being increased, the authority of Augustine cited above proves: "Grace merits to be increased, that having been increased, it may merit also to be perfected." Whence Proverbs 4: *Possess wisdom, and she shall give to thy head increases of graces.* And that this is not *of condignity*, can be shown by the reasons of Chapter 35, showing that grace is not from prior merits or works — since then it would not be grace, but debt — for every increase of grace is grace, and every grace is univocally said with another freely given.

Again, if one can merit increase of grace *of condignity*, he can merit a higher seat in heaven and more intense beatitude, and great breadth and an eternal portion of it, similarly *of condignity* — which is false. For in commutative justice *of condignity* there is required at least equal for equal, as appears in *Ethics* 5.6 and afterwards diffusely. But the momentary operation of a gracious one is not equally good with so great a portion of everlasting beatitude. Whence the Apostle, Romans 8: *I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not condign to the future glory which shall be revealed in us.* Gloss: *I reckon* — that is, I know, that the sufferings of this time — that is, temporal and momentary — are not *condign* — that is, sufficient, if it were strictly dealt with us, for earning future glory. For tribulation itself is with an end, the reward will be without end; and far greater shall be the glory there than the labour here. This same opinion Augustine more expressly teaches, on Psalm 36, *By the Lord shall the steps of a man be directed, and He will choose his way:* "Do not regard so much by what way you are going, but whither you shall come; you shall bear hard temporal things, but to glad eternal you shall arrive. If you wish to bear labour, attend to the reward; you will marvel that so much is given for so much labour. For surely, brethren, for eternal rest eternal labour ought to be undertaken, and to receive eternal felicity you ought to bear eternal sufferings; but if you should bear eternal labour, when would you arrive at eternal felicity? Whence it comes about that necessarily your tribulation is temporal, that, ended, you may come to infinite felicity. But yet, brethren, there could be long tribulation for eternal felicity — for example, since our felicity will not have an end, our misery and our labour and our tribulations might be diuturnal: for even if they were thousands of years,

weigh a thousand years against eternity. What do you weigh, however much finite, with the infinite? Ten thousands of years, ten times a hundred thousand if it must be said, and thousands of thousands which have an end, cannot be compared with eternity."

It is said, perhaps: that because God promised to those operating the eternal kingdom, they merit it *of condignity*; and otherwise they would not merit it *of condignity*. But this does not seem so. For that promise no one could have earned *of condignity*, nor without this could anyone have merited the eternal kingdom *of condignity*. Therefore no one simply *of condignity* could or can merit the eternal kingdom. Nor is the operation of any one after the promise better than a similar one before the promise was; but no operation before the promise merited the kingdom *of condignity*. Nor does that promise make the work better, as appears through the substance of the work and through all its circumstances inductively; rather, perhaps less good. For it makes the intention less sincere; for he who first was operating purely for God alone, now perhaps operates for the promised retribution. Again, then God does not so liberally confer eternal life as He did before the promise; for then He conferred it altogether liberally, but now of the necessity of the promise, and of the necessity of preserving justice — which seems greatly to derogate from His highest liberty and from His perfect immutability. Then also one operating meritoriously would compel God either to resuscitating him and rewarding him eternally, or to incurring offense to justice. Where then is His highest liberty and unsurpassable power?

Again, His promise — eternal, mental, internal, in His Word, or eternal Holy Spirit — does not less oblige God than a temporal verbal external one, perhaps by the ministry of some angel; but whatever He temporally vocally externally promised, He eternally mentally internally in His Word or eternal Holy Spirit promised — which His omnimodal immutability through Chapters 5 and 23 will demonstrate. Again, God so promised: that whatever we should ask in His name, He would give us. And Samuel prayed for Saul, and Jeremiah for the people, and many for many reprobates. They merited therefore *of condignity* to be heard; and God did not hear them — as Chapter 25 of this work alleges. He therefore inflicted upon them manifest injury — which no one save one manifestly unjust will dare even tacitly to think.

Again, principally: if anyone merits the increase of grace *of condignity* — either he merits a continuous increase of it, or a discrete one. If discrete only, and by turns: then through one great merit he merits one certain increase; therefore through half the merit, half the reward and increase; and so proportionally according to its single parts. Therefore he merits *of condignity* his grace to be increased continuously. And every reason which proves anyone to merit *of condignity* his grace being increased by turns and discretely, will likewise prove it continuously. If which be granted, it will be granted consequently that any work of grace merits *of condignity* the remission of any temporal punishment here and in purgatory, nay even of all such punishments of any persons being punished, if it be duly offered and given to that effect. Which does not seem so; because then it would seem superfluous to do many and great works of grace for punishments, or even for venial sins to be redeemed — since *of condignity* a brief salutation of the glorious Virgin would suffice, nay even the smallest thought. And the same follows of mortal sins

however many. For (as it seems to some) the smallest contrition out of grace takes away guilt and commutes the eternal punishment into temporal. Since therefore any contrition is perhaps more intense than is necessarily required, the intensive half of it not necessarily required takes away the whole temporal punishment left; or at least, if contrition were continued further for ever so brief a time, it would take away the whole punishment. For any work of grace merits *of condignity* incomparably more than every such temporal remission — namely, the increase of grace and proportionally the increase of glory everlasting; therefore any such merit *of condignity* will suffice *of condignity* for any lesser thing — as the *Ethics* Book 5 teach in the sanctions of commutative justice. And Anselm says, *Cur Deus homo* II.20: "What can be understood juster than that he to whom is given a price greater than every debt — if it be given with due affection — should remit every debt?"

If, however, it be said: that to commute such a merit (by which one merits the increase of grace and glory everlasting) for the remission of temporal punishment, or temporal punishments, would be his eternal prejudice; and therefore God, judging more equitably, does not do this — still the prior reason stands, especially since to one willing no injury is done, according to the jurists, and according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 5.17: *No one suffers injustice willingly*. Indeed it seems that any one can dispense to the needy with pious affection what is duly acquired by him, inflicting prejudice on no other; or let it be supposed that he offers that merit to God for some dead and damned person to so much misery or less, and the said reason will stand. Even according to the said response, no one could through any work of grace merit plenary remission, nor even mitigation of the lightest temporal punishment, the same prejudice always preventing it — which it is established is most false, in the judgment of the whole Church granting indulgences, and changing penances into other works of piety.

Again, without any commutation: whoever merits continuously and *condignly* incomparably more — namely, increase of grace and glory everlasting — sooner or at least equally soon merits *condignly* incomparably less, namely, the remission of however great temporal punishment; whoever therefore begins to operate meritoriously out of grace, immediately in the first instant, or immediately afterwards, every temporal punishment is remitted to him from debt and *of condignity*.

Again, that no one merits a continuous increase of grace *of condignity* seems so; because then to any work of grace a certain increase of grace would be owed: greater to the greater, lesser to the lesser, and equal to the equal. Let there be therefore two sons of grace equal in grace and in all other things, this excepted: that one, on account of mortal sin or only venial, is debtor of temporal punishment; and let them perform equal works of grace, so that the debtor of punishment is wholly absolved through that merit. Either then beyond that absolution from punishment he merits some reward in the future life, or nothing at all. Not nothing at all, because then it could happen that an adult baptized, actually loving God supremely and actually exercising himself in holy works for a great time of his life — even sustaining martyrdom for Christ and His law — would be equally rewarded in the future life with one little baptized boy

who never did anything good. For this evidently follows, if all these things be conjoined into a fitting penance for the sinner, or if all these equally suffice for satisfaction of his sin or sins. Where then is what each Testament most often promises: that God will render to each one according to his works?

According to this opinion also it would seem that it would more profit sinners to defer satisfaction enjoined upon them, or at least owed for venial things, until purgatory after the term of the present life, and to sweat at other good works not satisfactory, nor done with the mind of satisfying for sin, but simply directed to God and simply meritorious. For so doing, and so finally departing, he would acquire for himself a great everlasting reward, and would sustain after death a small temporal purgatorial punishment. But who would presume to affirm this?

Furthermore, if it be so, such a one would be eternally punished, at least with the punishment of loss — namely by subtraction of the portion of everlasting glory which he would otherwise have had. But who would presume to make heaven a prison or a place of punishment? How also will it be true, what James protests of God, *who*, he says, *gives to all affluently and reproaches not* — if yet He so did, He would give to a man penitent for sin committed and dismissed, an eternal reproach: namely, a diminution of everlasting glory. Indeed, if it were so, no one ever would satisfy or could satisfy in the present life for any sin, however small and least; for if he be saved, he will be punished for that sin with the eternal punishment of loss in heaven, by some subtraction of the everlasting glory which for that good work, by which he satisfies, he would otherwise have had. Which who would presume to say, or even to think?

Furthermore, it would seem wonderful and exceedingly admirable, that he who, out of dearest charity and dearest grace, dearly and gratefully should love God above all things for His own sake, and so should do his works (although satisfactory for sin) for God's sake — would merit nothing of perpetual reward, nor anything of good at all, save a small dismissal of a small temporal punishment. For how would it consort with equity or agree with justice, that He should accept the most worthy price of the greatest everlasting reward only for the smallest debt, for the smallest temporal punishment, since it is worth infinitely more? For so He would exact too heavy usuries.

Wherefore, perhaps, it will be said that such a one merits some everlasting reward; either then less than the other free from such debt of punishment, or equally with him. If less, either eternally less, or temporally only less. Not eternally less, on account of the reasons premised. For let it be supposed that Peter, a little baptized boy made adult, by sinning mortally falls from baptismal grace, which is A; and Paul, an adult constituted in grace, by some pious work earns B grace, which is equal to A or less, beyond his prior grace, or only an increase of it. But Peter — lacking grace, who according to the hypothesis can merit it *of congruity* — performs a similar pious work, meriting *of congruity* the first grace after sin, which is C. Either then C is equal to A, or less, or greater. If equal, the previously specified inconvenience returns: namely, that an adult laudably operating is beatified equally with a little one only baptized. If C is less than A, the

inconvenience will be greater. If however greater — why does Peter, less disposed to meriting than Paul, by a similar pious work merit more than he? For Paul merits B grace equal to A only, or less. Indeed, let it be supposed that Paul through some good work merits B grace, less by however much than A grace, and the consequent will be that Peter, through a similar good work, merits an equal grace or less; rather it seems reasonably that less, since he is less disposed to meriting. Furthermore, if C is greater than A, this is according to some finite proportion. Let it be supposed therefore that Peter's merit (through which he merits C grace) is proportionally diminished, or below; and the previously mentioned inconveniences return. Especially if according to the Pelagian hypothesis, God gives no grace freely to Peter, but only on account and according to the antecedent merit.

Furthermore, let it be supposed that Peter and Paul are constituted in equal grace, and Peter is debtor of small punishment for sin, but Paul not at all, and both perform equal meritorious works, etc., as above against the prior response. For it follows plainly that it would more profit Peter to defer that satisfaction to purgatory after this life; that even Peter saved in heaven would be eternally punished; that God gives to him sparingly and reproaches him always; that he never will satisfy nor ever can satisfy for any sin whatever; that moreover God deals unmercifully, cruelly, and unjustly with him — namely, by compensating a portion of his merit (to which is worthily owed a portion of glory everlasting) for satisfaction of small punishment, since this is worth infinitely more *of condignity*, and so iniquitously diminishing his reward.

Furthermore, if some good work exceeds for satisfaction of this, and some less suffices according to the foregoing — and as the Pelagians confess — some equally suffices, etc., as above. Furthermore, by how much eternally Peter merits less than Paul, according to what should the quantity of that lessness be attended? Unless perhaps according to the quantity of the eternal punishment owed to him before for mortal sin. But that perhaps was more intense than the glory which Paul merits. Wherefore Peter through that satisfactory work merits nothing of everlasting glory — contrary to the hypothesis; nay, neither is he fully cleared from the whole debt of the ancient punishment.

Nor is it necessary that Peter's preceding sin was mortal, or to be punished with perpetual punishment. Is it not so, if Peter is now constituted in glory, that he is free from the debt of eternal punishment, and debtor perhaps only of temporal punishment? How then does the just God now exact debt and satisfaction from him for eternal punishment?

Therefore perhaps it will be said, in the first place: that in the prior case, Peter merits some everlasting reward, only temporally less than Paul — namely, by so much less and shorter extensively for some certain finite time, by as much as the temporal punishment was that was dismissed through his merit; and from then on equal extensively and intensively similarly to eternity. But by no means is such deformity (rather, full conformity is reckoned by the Fathers as to be posited in the saints) in the future felicity and consummated beatitude; nor is the time of merit, or of progress, reckoned in heaven after the final judgment by the Orthodox Fathers; nor is

even the place of prison or punishment in heaven esteemed by the holy Fathers. Who also would say that no one satisfies nor can satisfy through any pious works whatsoever, for however small a sin in the present life — but that after this life, if he passes to the future, he will be punished there with some punishment of loss? By a similar reason it would seem that of two equally meritorious not departing at the same time — but the one in the beginning as it were of the world, and the other at the end — the prior would await the posterior, nor would receive any taste of beatitude before him.

Wherefore perhaps it will be said: that in the said case, Peter and Paul merit altogether equally; therefore equal increase of grace in the present, and of glory in the future; wherefore Peter simply merits more — namely, the dismissal of his punishment — contrary to the hypothesis already premised.

If however it be said, with the Apostle to the Romans 5: that *where sin abounded, grace did more abound* — therefore because Jesus Christ, through whom grace and truth, more applies the virtue of His most blessed and most immaculate Passion to the merit of him who is debtor of temporal punishment on account of his sin; and so beyond his merit common with the other, even temporal punishment is remitted. This however does not solve it; for as the Apostle says, *Where sin abounded, grace did more abound* — therefore that remission of punishment is from grace, not from merit *of condignity*. Nor does that response help the ungrateful Pelagians, who profess no gratuitous grace as the debt of merits in such cases. Nor does any reason compel Christ suffering more to assist him, since he is more unworthy, or at least no more worthy than another; nay, since He assists voluntarily, He can assist less or equally as it pleases Him. Let Him therefore assist equally — and the argument stands intact, as before. Then also according to this, however great the temporal punishment which he should owe, the Passion of Christ joined to however small a merit would take away the whole. For no reason appears why so much should be taken away rather than greater; nay, if on this account, that in someone sin so much abounded, so much grace abounded — by the same reason in another, where sin more abounded, more grace would abound proportionally taking it away, nor would he merit any less of increase of grace and glory everlasting.

Others say: that the debtor of punishment will necessarily have one circumstance of merit which the other will not have, namely, that his work is penance and an Ecclesiastical Sacrament; and that circumstance takes away temporal punishment, while the principal merit acquires increase of grace and glory everlasting. But this does not solve it either. For let it be supposed that one guilty of venial sin and of temporal punishment, without confession and sacramental penance for taking these away, performs some pious work, and another wholly free merits equally; or let it be supposed that the free one believes himself guilty of similar sin, and debtor of so much punishment, and for taking these away similarly performs an altogether similar work; or let it be supposed still that, so believing, he is contrite, confesses, and from grace performs all things equally as the guilty one — and the argument returns. Or still let it be supposed that such a one guilty of mortal sin in the time of the ancient law (which perhaps in no way obliged to oral

confession), through God's grace, contrition, and other holy works, has satisfied for sin; or that someone in the time of the new law, not having an opportunity of a confessor, similarly satisfies for his mortal sin without the sacrament of penance — and the little response just premised is taken away.

Furthermore, if anyone merits increase of grace *of condignity*, then equally grateful works merit equal increase. Let John therefore perform some work of grace only for himself, saying with holy David, *Have mercy on me, O God*; but Peter performs a work of grace equally meritorious for others, and intends their grace, saying with the Apostle to the Philippians 1, *This I pray, that your charity may abound more and more*. Then John's grace is increased according to some certain amount, and Peter's grace by as much (for he merits equally); and the grace of those for whom Peter prays is increased in some amount; for *whatever we shall ask of the Father in the Son's name, He will give to us*. Therefore Peter simply merits more — which manifestly contradicts the hypothesis.

It seems also that Peter's prayer in grace would be of infinite merit. For let there be many infidels disposed to the grace of Christian faith, for whom Peter prays only generally that they may be converted to the faith and there may be one fold and one Shepherd. Since therefore *whatever we shall ask of the Father in the Son's name, He will give to us*, He will convert someone or some of them; and since there is no greater cause for one than for another (granted that they are equally disposed), it follows that all single ones will be converted. And by the same reason it would so happen if there were a hundred or a thousand, or however great a number. Peter's prayer therefore, as far as it is in itself, is not of limited but rather of infinite merit. This reason is confirmed: for if Peter's prayer were of value to one only, it would be of certain merit; if it should be of value to two, of greater; and so on; and the more it is of greater merit, the more worthy it is to be accepted for more. The more therefore it prays for many and is heard, the more for more will it more worthily be heard.

Again, since it seems in no way reasonable that the merit of Peter's prayer should be of more value from debt to another or others than to Peter himself (since Psalm 34 says: *My prayer shall return into my own bosom*), it seems that that prayer is also for Peter himself of infinite merit.

If however it be said: that the more for many he merits grace, the lesser to each of them he merits — wherefore that reason does not proceed — this cannot stand, because then he would merit for some a grace less than baptismal grace, and a glory less everlasting than the least glory of little ones, or that could be sensed by itself.

Furthermore, that equally grateful works do not merit *condignly* equal grace being increased is urged: because then by the same reason they would merit equally all other goods, since of two equals the prior departing always equally intensively (and with this longer than the other) is glorified. Again, then one existing in grace through his prayers could merit *of condignity* the first grace for another not having grace; therefore it would not be grace, by the foregoing; nay, also he could merit *of condignity* that first grace be given to himself. For let him pray in grace; and if it

should happen to him to fall from it by sinning mortally, let God infuse on him the grace of rising again, and let his prayer be so efficacious that he obtains this *of condignity* — then if he sin mortally, God is held by his prior *condign* merit to give him the first grace by which he may rise.

Again, then an adult in the first instant in which grace is infused in him, can use it meritoriously, as Anselm plainly teaches, *On Truth*, ch. 12 — which by many reasons and authorities elsewhere was urged, and (as I esteem) urged through. Wherefore he can merit *condignly*, and receive in the same instant, an increase of it. And since in an intense quality there is not a heap of remitted parts, but always there is only a single quality purely simple (as I here suppose, because as I judge this is shown elsewhere) — therefore he can merit *condignly* his first grace, which is against the position of these and against Catholic truth, as Chapter 35 declared.

Again, if in an instant he merits *condignly* a certain increase of grace given to him, it follows that if he likewise merits continuously throughout some whole time, he will merit *condignly* an infinite increase of grace; or throughout some whole continuous time, meriting likewise as in an instant, he will only merit *condignly* as much as in an instant — and through some whole continuous time still less.

Furthermore, then someone gracious could merit *condignly* for any wayfarer, even reprobate, the grace of conversion and the everlasting glory which can be with some predestined ones worse than they; the opposite of which appeared as to Samuel praying for Saul, and Jeremiah praying for the people of the Jews, and through Augustine, *City of God* 21.25, universally about all the reprobate, as Chapter 25 alleged.

Again, someone finally reprobate sometimes has charity, who afterwards looks back and similarly goes back — or at least this is possible; otherwise everyone having charity and grace would necessarily be saved. Which was true of Saul and Judas, as the Doctors affirm. But such a one, existing in however great grace, cannot merit *condignly* that God love him unto life. For let such a reprobate exercise himself in works of grace however much (even ten thousand times more than one predestinate does); and yet God does not love him unto life, but only hates him unto death — as ever He will do in the future. For since such a one, after all his merits, is dead and buried in hell, and finally damned, it is certain that God does not love him unto life, but hates him unto death. Wherefore neither did He ever love him, nor did He even not hate him — as Chapters 23 and 25 teach.

Furthermore, if such a one could merit *condignly* that God love him, he could move the divine will from reprobation to predestination, from hatred to love, or at least could move it as a prior and efficient cause — contrary to Chapter 20. And if one existing in grace cannot merit *condignly* that he be loved unto life eternal, therefore no one can. Similarly also it can be shown that no one existing in grace can merit *of congruity* causally and antecedently to the divine will, that he be loved by God unto life eternal, or that he be more loved by Him.

Furthermore, it seems that no one can merit *of condignity*, and according to the rigor of right, anything good from God — unless perhaps it be such a good that follows the merit inseparably (as is perhaps to be one meriting good and just simply or in part). Otherwise he who merits would compel God and the divine will necessarily to giving — or to willing to give — the reward, or to losing justice. For if the just Lord remains in all His ways, and someone merits *condignly* anything from Him, it is just that he have it; and every such *just thing* is just from God's will, as Chapter 21 teaches. Wherefore it is necessary that He will to render this to him — especially since (per Chapter 22) He has the act of will concerning the rendering of reward; therefore, since power is not lacking to Him, it is necessary that He render — as Chapter 10 showed; and so the creature would compel God to will, and even to operate externally — which the first Supposition and its infinite perfection in no way allow, nor can Chapter 20 consent.

Again, let it be supposed (according to the adversaries) that John yesterday merited *of condignity* the good A to be rendered to him by God tomorrow. Yesterday therefore it was just, and willed by God, that A be rendered to John tomorrow. Let it also be supposed that he today demerits A. Therefore God today does not will to render A to John; wherefore (per Chapter 23) neither did He yesterday will it; nay, today He wills that he never have A; wherefore through the same Chapter 23 He willed yesterday similarly.

Furthermore, if one can merit anything *condignly* from God, he can (as it seems) merit *condignly* for himself or another existing in grace, that he persevere finally and be saved; which if he should do, such a wayfarer cannot sin mortally nor be damned.

Again, by Chapter 20 of this work, no merit is the motive of the divine will; wherefore neither the cause why God wills to give to anyone this or that. And by the same arguments it can be shown that no one causally and antecedently merits *of congruity* anything good from God — supposing that no congruous thing is unjust (just as no unjust thing seems congruous), and that every congruous thing is just and willed by God.

Again, no one merits *condignly* anything from another, who does not first do anything for him, or give to him. For the proper work of a labourer ought to precede the wage in time or in nature. For if he should receive every operation from God as prior, and continue in His virtue, he does not seem through this to merit *condignly* anything from Him, but rather to be more bound to Him after his operation than before; because then he has received more of good benignly from Him than before — and especially he who gives nothing of his own as a giver, but only of the good of Him to whom it is given. But no man does first for God; for He, in any making and motion, is the first maker and mover, as is plainly clear from the foregoing. What then does man merit *condignly* through such making? This seems to be the reasoning of the Apostle, Romans 11: *Who, he says, has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For from Him and through Him and in Him are all things.* Whence it stands, that out of grace alone He gives goods, not from preceding merit. Wherefore Augustine on Psalm 32, *All His works are in faith*, intimating the distinction of debtor and debt, says thus: "Let us hold God a most faithful debtor,

because we hold Him a most merciful Promiser. For we did not lend Him anything as a loan, that we might hold Him a debtor, since from Him we have whatever we offer Him. *For who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? Since from Him and through Him and in Him are all things.* Therefore we have given Him nothing, and we hold Him a debtor. Whence then a debtor? Because a most faithful Promiser." With which Anselm agrees, *On Concord*, ch. 9, saying: "God gives to no one for preceding merit. *When did anyone first give to Him, and recompense shall be made him?*" The same in *Cur Deus homo* I.20: "God owes nothing to anyone, but every creature owes to Him; and therefore it is not fitting for man to act with God as peer with peer."

Lombard also, *Sentences* I, dist. 43, following Augustine, says God is not our debtor save perhaps from promise, not from contract. This same thing Cyprian holds, cited above, when he says: "In nothing must we glory, since nothing is ours." And the Gloss on Romans 4, *To him, however, who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt*: "What we work well having received grace, must be ascribed not to us but to Him, who through grace has justified us. For if He were to render the due reward before grace, He would render to sinners the due punishment. Do not therefore flatter yourself about merits, when you hear that the wage is rendered to you according to the debt of the work, as if there were not in the work the grace of the Rewarder, just as in faith there is the grace of the Justifier. For scarcely do I persuade myself that any work be said from debt to claim the remuneration of God, since even this very thing — that we can do something, or think, or speak — we do by His gift and bounty." Blessed Bernard also, *On Grace and Free Choice*, last chapter, treating of the crown of justice to be rendered to the Apostle, holds the same.

Again, by the first Supposition and the third part of the First Corollary of this work, nothing which in any way diminishes liberty is to be ascribed to God; but to owe *of condignity* and by the pure rigor of right diminishes liberty, and in some way subjects to slavery. For freer would be a lord who had servants working, and was held to them by no debt or rigor, but only by spontaneous liberty, than one held to his servants working by necessary debt and rigor, who could be compelled unwillingly to render — who would also otherwise lie under the injury of slavery.

Again, by the same: nothing which diminishes the liberty of the giver is to be ascribed to God; but debt diminishes; for it is more liberal to give freely than dutifully.

Again, no one merits anything from another *of condignity*, who does not do something which is in some way good to the latter, but only to the doer. But by the fifth part of the First Corollary of this work, no man does any good to God. Wherefore Job 22: *What does it profit God if you are just, or what do you bring Him if your life is immaculate?* But whatever good a man does, profits himself. Whence Augustine, *On Free Choice* 3.25: "God owes nothing to any one, because He bestows all things gratuitously; and if any one says something is owed to him by Him through his merits, certainly that he should be was not owed to him. For there was no one to whom it

would be owed; and yet what is the merit of being converted to Him from whom you are, that from Him you may even be better, from whom you have it that you are? What therefore do you preserve to Him, that as a debt you may demand it — when, if you would not be converted to Him, nothing would be lacking to Him, but you would be wretched? All things, therefore, owe to Him: first, that they are, insofar as they are natures; then, whatever better they can be if they will, whatever they have received that they may will, and whatever it is fit they should be."

Again, no one lacking grace can of himself satisfy God *condignly* for original sin, or for the smallest actual sin — as appears from the foregoing concerning Part 32, 38th, and 39th of the First Corollary of this work. Wherefore neither merit anything from Him from debt and *of condignity*. For whatever good such a one will be able to do, is less than the debt for sin. For otherwise such a one of himself could merit *condignly* grace in the present and glory in the future, contrary to the foregoing. This Anselm also proves in *Cur Deus homo* I.21 and 22; which also blessed Job seems to feel when he says: *I have sinned, what shall I do unto Thee, O Watcher of men?* (Job 7) — as if he were saying: I have sinned, what shall I do for Thee for *condign* satisfaction? — intimating that *nothing*. On which blessed Gregory, *Moralia* 8.21, says: "Behold, he confesses the evil which he has done, but the good which he ought to offer to God in recompense, he does not find; because for cleansing guilt the virtue of every human action is feeble, unless the mercy of the Forgiver should foster it, and the justice of the rightly Judging not press it down."

Again, no one can fully render the debt which he has received from God; wherefore neither can he merit from Him by pure debt and *of condignity*. For a son cannot render to a carnal father as much as he owes; how much less can anyone render to the heavenly Father as much as he owes? For if a son could render to a father as much as he owes, let him render — and he is absolved from every natural obligation and debt towards the father, so that in no emerging case is he held more to the father than to any extraneous person whatever — which the law of nature and gratitude does not permit. Whence the Philosopher, *Ethics* 8, last: "It must be rendered, contributing what one can; for friendship requires according to power, not according to dignity. For neither is it in all things as in those which pertain to the gods, men, and parents. For no one according to dignity ever shall recompense; but to him who serves according to power he seems to be *epieikēs* (equitable); for he must render what he owes; but doing nothing worthy of those things which have been bestowed, he has worked; wherefore he always owes." Again, whoever has received anything from another is held to render the equal if he is able, as the law of gratitude clearly proves. Whence the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 8.13: "It must be rendered to one who is able, according to the dignity of the things he has suffered, and willingly." With which agrees the authority just alleged. And *Ethics* 5.8 a certain species of commutative justice is posited: to recompense proportionally for an antecedent benefit. For it is said there: "By the doing in turn what is proportional, the city remains; if not, it seems to be slavery; for if not, recompense does not happen; and by recompense they remain. Wherefore also they readily build the temple of the Graces (Charites), that recompense may happen; for this is proper to grace: for

one must serve in turn him who has done a grace, and again himself begin doing a grace." Which the seven books of Seneca *On Benefits* most often attest. Wherefore also if one has received more than he can recompense, he is held to recompense as much as he can, which the first authority of the Philosopher plainly says.

But God has done more for us than we can render *to the condign*, as the said first authority of the Philosopher wishes, and is plain — because God has given to man all of Himself, and all His powers and habits and acts, as the foregoing make plain. All these things therefore he owes to God. Furthermore, beyond these, God has given to man — and for man wretched and captive, bound to perpetual flames — Himself, incarnate, suffering, dead, and buried, in temporally redeeming the price; furthermore, He promises and gives Himself wholly as a reward in happily consummating, which exceeds any pure man infinitely. Therefore any man owes to God infinitely more than he is and can, or at least as much as he can. This reason is confirmed by Anselm in his Meditation on the Redemption of the Human Soul, where he says, the Christian soul raised from grievous death speaking: "Certainly, Lord, because You have made me, I owe to Your love my whole self; because You have redeemed me, I owe my whole self; nay, I owe so much more to Your love than myself, by as much as You are greater than I, for whom You gave Yourself, and to whom You promise Yourself."

Response is made perhaps according to the same Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II.18, saying: "When you say a creature owes to God what it best knows and can — if you understand from debt, and do not subaudibly add, *if God commands*, it is not always true. Indeed man does not owe virginity from debt, but if he wills, he is bound to use marriage." But this does not solve it. For God by not commanding does not destroy the law of gratitude which He has sanctioned; and by this law any benefited person is held to the benefactor for the equal or greater, or at least for what he can — as the prior authorities will. Again, if God should exact, man would be held to do as much as he could; if however He does not exact, but leaves it to one's own will, He does more for him, since He grants greater liberty; wherefore by this very fact, man more, or at least as much, is obliged to God, as much as he would otherwise be obliged.

Here someone perhaps will respond: that God can remit that whole obligation. For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 8, last, immediately after the cited authority concerning recompense to be made to gods and parents, "But to those to whom it is owed, there is the power to release, even the father." But again the argument returns against this man: for to remit so much debt and so much obligation is one benefit not small. For that benefit, then, with the others he is more obliged, as if a creditor were freely to forgive a debtor all the money lent, and were to remit (as much as he could) every obligation — by so much more straitly would he oblige him to himself, as the second benefit would exceed the first.

But, lest I seem to contravene Anselm and Aristotle, I say (as may be elicited from the meaning of both): To owe is twofold: namely, potentially or habitually, and actually. To owe actually — I understand actually being obliged to do something under the penalty of sin, as is the case of a

labourer hired for a certain work. And so we are not held to do whatever we shall be able to do for God's sake. And this is perhaps the mind of Anselm; and so according to Aristotle a father can release the son, and God the man, that he may not be obliged as far as he can. Potentially or habitually to owe — I understand this: that anyone benefited from the antecedent benefit has an obligation in potency and habit to do something, which when it shall please the benefactor, can be reduced to act — namely, if he should exact this from him: as if John should hand over to Peter ten with the condition interposed, *Have these ten freely, unless I should chance to ask them back; if I ask, you are held to repay them to me*. And so any rational creature is held to God in all things as much as it can — namely if He should will to exact this from it. Wherefore he can merit nothing of good from strict, debt, and violent rigor from Him, just as Peter cannot for those ten buy anything from John. For he has somehow free, and his own, this or that for meriting, buying, or doing — not from himself, but from God; and this not from any precontracted debt, but altogether from grace and free permission of His gratuitous will.

Furthermore, that no one merits the first grace *of congruity*: because either this would be by congruity antecedent to the divine will and moving it to making grace, or by congruity consequent to it and depending on it. If by congruity antecedent — since every such congruity is a certain reason and justice — it is reasonable and just, by reason and justice antecedent to the divine will, that God give His grace to such a one; wherefore (by Chapter 21) this is necessarily reasonable and just. It is necessary therefore that God do this, or do contrary to necessary reason and justice, and sin. Even then such an inferior congruity would move the divine will (contrary to Chapter 20), and would determine it (of itself indifferent), and would be totally alien from divine providence (contrary to Chapter 27 and the others which follow). If by congruity consequent to the divine will — then that is posterior to the divine will; wherefore (by Chapter 20) it in no way moves it to willing to confer grace, as a merit exciting and inducing.

Again, if so it is, it is congruous that God give grace to one so meriting, because this is willed by God; therefore this is not only congruous (as these say) but also condign — because whatever God wills to be done is worthy and just to be done, as Chapter 21 demonstrated. Nor does anyone doubt who is sure of divine justice, and knows that every just is worthy. They will perhaps say that it is well worthy, but not condign. But what is *condign*, save what is, *with reason and justice, worthy*? Wherefore Esther 6 is written thus: *To this honour is condign whomsoever the King wills to honour*. Likewise to the same purpose: every sufficient is condign — for so the Gloss expounds that of Romans 8, *the sufferings are not condign* etc. — *condign* — that is, sufficient. But such a work is sufficient for impetrating grace, for nothing is lacking to it; for it impetrates it. That also is sufficient which God wills and discerns to suffice on the part of the worker; and such is this work according to the position of these. If, however, it be said that it is not condign — that is, equally good — neither is the work in grace equally good with the increase of temporal grace and everlasting glory, as is argued above.

Again, if this is congruous by congruity consequent to the divine will, namely because God wills so to be done — then also one who does no good but sins mortally and most gravely (as Paul did

when, still breathing of threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, he was striving to delete the Christian name) merits *of congruity* grace to be given to him; because God wills so to be done. For He through His operating grace gratuitously prevenes sinners, as is shown above. And if it be said that God gives to such grace, but not for such evil deeds, and therefore through such they do not merit *of congruity* grace to be given to them — therefore according to these, to those who merit the first grace *of congruity*, God gives it on account of their prior merits; therefore grace already is not grace (as is argued above); and even then those merits antecedently and causally a priori move the divine will and cause volition in it — the contrary of which was being said: namely, that it is congruous that God so do by congruity only consequent to the divine will. The contrary of this also Chapter 20 was showing.

Again, Augustine on Psalm 118, *Render to Thy servant*, distinguishing a fourfold rendering, shows that God renders good for evil. For he says: "There are four renderings: either evils for evils are rendered, as God will render eternal fire to the impious; or goods for goods, as He will render the eternal kingdom to the just; or goods for evils, as Christ through grace justifies the impious; or evils for goods, as Judas through malice persecuted Christ. Of these four renderings the first two pertain to justice, the third to mercy; the fourth God knows not. Now the third is first necessary; for unless He should render goods for evils, in no way would there be those to whom He should render goods for goods."

This reason can also be made under another form: Since one merits God's grace *of congruity* — either because God so wills it to be, therefore it is congruous; or because this is congruous, therefore God so wills it to be. If the first be granted, similarly so it is condign, and so it is of the worst worker; and even then it is just posterior to the divine will, wherefore it is not the cause of it. For prior in nature God wills so to be, and in so willing makes it congruous — therefore it is not because it is congruous that God wills so to be. If the second be granted, then by Chapter 20 this is not a positive and contingent just (capable of being otherwise) — for every such just depends on the divine will — but rather a necessarily absolute just, or at least a mixed just. And so, supposing that such a deed is of necessity, it is just; and so God of necessity of preserving justice would give grace to one so meriting.

Again, God can freely not give grace to one so working. Let it be supposed therefore that He does not. Then it is not congruous; or if to one so working He gives grace, and to another similarly working does not give it — therefore this is not *per se* congruous, and so willed by God, but contrariwise.

Again, it is easier for any one existing in grace to merit *of congruity* that God love him — or that He love him more unto life — than for one lacking grace to merit the first grace and that he be loved by God unto life eternal. But one foreknown to death, existing in grace, cannot do this, as is argued above.

Again, since one merits anything from God *of congruity* — since every congruous is just (because every unjust is incongruous) — that is just, and the opposite of it unjust; wherefore

impossible concerning God, as the first Supposition and the third part of the First Corollary prove. And Anselm says, *Cur Deus homo* I.10: "In God any unfitting thing, however small, follows impossibility"; and if the opposite of it be impossible, this is necessary; and every necessary just is condign. Whoever therefore merits anything from God *of congruity*, merits also *of condignity*.

It is said perhaps, that someone merits anything from God *of congruity* because, if God should render this, it is congruous. And certainly so it is, if God should render him punishment; therefore he merits no more *of congruity* grace than punishment. And similarly, if God should render grace to one most gravely sinning, it is congruous; therefore he merits it *of congruity*. And if two work altogether similarly, and God gives to the one grace and to the other gives nothing, the one merits it *of congruity*, and the other not — although yet he works similarly in all things. And even if God so render, so to happen is condign; for nothing in such things is *worthy* or *condign*, save because it is willed by God — since neither is it reasonable or just, as Chapter 21 showed; and Esther 6: *To such honour he is condign, whomever the King wills to honour*.

Again, according to these: man lacking grace can merit something *of condignity*, but grace only *of congruity*. Either then there is some maximum which he can merit *of condignity*, or some minimum which he cannot. If the maximum which he can be granted, let it be A; either then A is a finite good or infinite. If finite — he can yet merit something more; A therefore is not the maximum which he can merit. If infinite — this does not seem so; because every act of his was finite, and all together finite in merit and value; and because still he could merit more, nor could God reward him *condignly*, since He cannot make an infinite (as appears from the showing of Part 40 of the First Corollary). Nor can the first division be denied: that if some good can be merited *of condignity*, and some not. For let a small good be taken which can be merited *condignly*, which imaginatively grows continuously until it is as much as cannot be *condignly* merited. Then A in some instant — which is B — will begin to be as much as such a one cannot *condignly* merit. Either then A in B begins to be intrinsically as much (namely, that then primally it will be so much), and then there is some thing surely which he cannot *condignly* merit. For he cannot *condignly* merit as much as A will then be, but anything less he can. Or A begins extrinsically to be as much as such a one cannot *condignly* merit (namely, that then it will not be so much, but immediately afterwards it will be); and then A will be the maximum which such a one can *condignly* merit. Since he can *condignly* merit so much as A will be in B, as is given, and nothing further greater than it.

Again, let John and Peter, infidels equally and equally long, merit *of congruity* the first graces to be given to them; and let John, after some time in instant A, receive grace according to what he merited; but Peter dies in A. Since therefore he merited equally with John, nor through him does it happen that he dies (as I posit), God will reward him *of congruity* with equal grace, and will finally save him — although he has been baptized with no baptism of water, of spirit, or of blood. Which seems contrary to the Gospel, and to all Doctors, and to the general faith of the Church. Whence John 3: *Unless one be born again of water and the spirit, he cannot enter into*

the kingdom of God. And this literally and really, or at least spiritually and virtually (as the Doctors expound), which happens in adults by believing and willing to be baptized, or by shedding their own blood for the love of God.

Again, Augustine says, *On Grace and Free Choice*, ch. 50: "Let men suspect whatever good merits they think to precede, that they may be justified by God's grace — not understanding, when they say this, anything other than denying themselves grace." Therefore they who place merits of *congruity* before God's grace, deny God's grace.

Perhaps someone will object against what has been said. **First, by proving that someone can merit eternal glory condignly.** For *Wisdom* 3 says of the Just: "*In few things they were vexed, in many they shall be well disposed, because God hath tried them and found them worthy of himself*"; and *Ecclesiasticus* 26: "*All the weighing is not worth a continent soul*" — therefore the continent soul condignly merits an infinite reward. And *Luke* 10: "*The labourer is worthy of his hire*" — but the hire of the labourers in the vineyard of Christ is the penny of infinite glory. And below in the same Gospel, chapter 20: "*They that shall be accounted worthy of that world, and of the resurrection from the dead,*" etc. And *Apocalypse* 3: "*They shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy,*" with many other similar passages.

Reason makes the same point clear. For every virtuous act is incomparably better than any useful or pleasurable good distinguished against the honest, virtuous, and just good; otherwise the useful or pleasurable good could be increased to such a degree that it would be equally good with the felicity which consists in virtuous acts, as is shown in *Ethics* 1.9 and following. Indeed, it would even be better; and so, since felicity is the greatest human good, as is shown there and elsewhere, by all the common philosophers and theologians, it would have to be placed in money or pleasures — against all who are sound and wise, and against the entire process of the said Philosopher. Then also a great good given, or a pleasurable thing forgone, would be received by God as much as the greatest virtuous act; and also a man, even according to right reason, could equally or more elect riches and eternal pleasures without justice and virtue (even when he is bound to the act of virtue), although by so electing he sins and does the contrary of reason.

Moreover, it seems that that is better for a man which, when had, necessarily makes him good, than that which when had does not so make him, but allows him to be evil and miserable. But the virtuous act, when had by anyone, necessarily makes him good; whereas all money and pleasure can be present in any evil and miserable person whatsoever. Thus the Philosopher proves in *Ethics* 1.12 that felicity is to be placed not in possession or habit, but in operation. For he says: "It makes no small difference whether one judges the best to lie in possession or in use, in habit or in operation. For a habit may exist while accomplishing no good, as in one who is sleeping or otherwise idle; but operation cannot — for he will operate of necessity, and will operate well."

Again, he who loves God above all things with his whole heart, and does all things on his account, cannot be condignly recompensed with anything less than God. For no love seems to be condignly recompensable with a good less than that which the lover prefers his beloved to, and which he would relinquish sooner than the beloved. For if love is to be recompensed with love, then the greater with the greater, and the equal with the equal; otherwise the due proportion would limp. But love in one who is able cannot be idle: for to love is to will good to the beloved and to do it, as the foregoing in chapter 39 of this work teaches. Therefore God, omnipotent, loved by man above all things with the whole heart, condignly loving him equally in return, wills good to him — a good above all goods; and this he can do; therefore he renders it to him, or shall render it at the opportune time. But such a good, above all other goods, is only God himself. Therefore God will condignly render himself to one who so loves; as is also evident from what is shown in the 32nd and 34th parts of the first corollary of this work. Whence Anselm, *Monologion* 70: "Nothing can be the reward of this love except that which surpasses all natures: For what shall the highest goodness render to one loving and desiring it, except itself? For whatever else it should render, it does not render, since it is neither matched with love, nor consoles the lover, nor satisfies the one desiring." For which the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9.1 says: "But they contend, since other things become theirs, and not what they crave. For it is similar to becoming nothing, when one does not obtain what he craves."

This is again confirmed: For friendship and love, as it seems, condignly require such proportionality, that as much as the lover would do for the beloved proportionally according to his own powers (or above them, if he could), so much should the beloved do for the lover proportionally according to his powers. But man so loving God would do for him, and would give him if he could, a good above all goods, and a better one. Therefore God, since he is omnipotent, will condignly do as much for him.

Again, that man can condignly merit some good, seems clear. For every good work is essentially and inseparably followed by a certain goodness, a certain rectitude, a certain justice, beauty, decency or honesty, or even actual being-good, right, and just; and this seems to be some reward of his, which he condignly merits.

Furthermore, it ill befits the highest justice and most clement goodness to be more prompt to punish sinners than to reward those who do well, as also seems clear from the 31st part of the first corollary of this work. But every sinner is immediately and inseparably followed by his own punishment, namely injustice, sin, and the servitude of sin, the privation of the justice and liberty he had before — at least with respect to those injustices and servitudes which he then newly incurs — as is also evident through the same 31st part. Therefore the contrary holds in every good deed.

Although it should be sufficiently clear that anyone who sins, by that very fact necessarily and inseparably incurs sin, injustice, and servitude to sin, becoming a sinner, an unjust man, and a slave to sin, with the privations mentioned above and many similar evils, which remain in him

even after the act of sinning (just as they inhered in him when he actually sinned), all of which are a worthy punishment of the prior sin or of sinning — yet this can be confirmed from abundance by certain authentic testimonies. For the Author of authors says, *John* 8: "Everyone that committeth sin is the servant of sin." Whence also *Job* 7: "I have sinned: what shall I do to thee, O keeper of men? Why hast thou set me opposite thee?" — namely, through sin — "and I am become burdensome to myself," namely, through punishment. Upon which Gregory says in *Moralia* 8.22: "This contrariety of guilt has been made for man the weight of punishment, that he should serve as a slave to his evil corruption — he who, when well a servant, used to rejoice in the liberty of incorruption."

The same is the view of Augustine in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.20 and 2.1, but more manifestly in 3.19 and following, where he shows that every vice and sin is a corruption of nature and of some natural good. The same is evident through him in *De Civitate Dei* 12.6 and *Enchiridion* 7. Most manifestly does he show this in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.24, saying: "Since no one overcomes the laws of the omnipotent Creator, the soul is not allowed not to render its debt: For either it renders by using well what it has received, or by losing what it would not use well. Therefore, if it does not render by doing justice, it will render by suffering misery. And these are not divided by any interval of time — as if at one time it should not do what it ought, and at another suffer what it ought — lest even for a moment of time the universal beauty be marred, so that there should be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of vindication."

This also appears jointly in good deeds and evil ones. For Hermes says of God: "Who justifies the work of no evildoer, and deprives no benefactor of rewards." With which Aristotle agrees concordantly in the last book of *De Mundo*: "Always," he says, "is he accompanied by vengeance, or by punishing or tormenting justice, of those who abandon the divine law; but the blessed and happy man is from the beginning forthwith a partaker of justice." *Genesis* 4 also says: "Is it not so, that if thou doest well, thou shalt receive" — namely, immediately — "but if ill, sin shall forthwith be present at the door?" And Augustine says in *De Genesi ad Litteram* 8.31: "Divine providence, ruling the universal creature, administers natures, that they may be willing — that the good may not be unfruitful, nor the evil unpunished. For those who will evil have within themselves their own interior punishment, namely that very iniquity of theirs. So therefore the good have within themselves their own interior reward, namely the equity and rectitude of their deed itself." The same in *De Quantitate Animae*, last chapter: "The supreme and true God by an incorrupt law rules everything that he has founded; he forsakes the soul in no act without punishment or reward." The same on Psalm 118: "I have sworn and am determined to keep the judgments of thy justice"; "By faith are kept the judgments of God's justice, since under God the just judge, no right deed is believed to be unfruitful, nor any sin unpunished."

Again, to be loved or hated by God seems no small reward or punishment; but God loves those who do well and hates those who sin. For Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 2.28: "If you should speak just things, men will hate you; if unjust, the gods. But if you should speak just things, the gods will love you; if unjust, men." The same in *De Bona Fortuna* 1: "We deem God worthy, who is

Lord of such things, that he distributes both goods and evils to the worthy." The same in *Ethics* 10.13: "He who operates according to intellect, and cherishes it, and is best disposed, seems to be most beloved of God: For if there is any care of human things on the part of the gods, as it seems, it would also be reasonable that they should rejoice over what is best and most akin — and this will be intellect — and that they should beneficence in return those most loving and honoring it, as friends caring for them." Where Averroes: "If God has care of men, as is believed, and as ought to be, he rejoices over the better, and it is more worthy that he should benefit those who love him more, and that he should honor and visit them, as is the disposition of friend with friend."

Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4, prose 1, says: "By that very Author, of whose kingdom we now speak, you shall know that the good are always powerful, but the evil abject and always feeble; and that vices are never without punishment, nor virtues without reward." The same speaking specifically of virtue and virtuous works, *De Consolatione* 3, prose 4: "There is in virtue a dignity proper to it, which it forthwith transfuses into those to whom it has been joined." And he understands, as it seems, both here and earlier, by "virtue" not only the habit but also the act. With which Ovid concordantly speaks in *De Ponto*:

"Hardly will you find one in many thousands
Who thinks virtue is its own reward;
The very beauty of a right deed, if rewards are absent,
Moves no one, and one repents to be honest for nothing."

Whence also Averroes on *Ethics* 1.12: "An act which is done according to the requirement of virtue is virtue." And Augustine on Psalm 36 ("The just is merciful, and lendeth"): "If he has wherewithal outwardly, charity itself gives; but if he does not have, he gives benevolence; he always has wherewith to give, whose breast is full of charity." This itself is charity, which is also called good will, and there he takes "will" for the act of will, as the whole process shows. The same in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3.10, as Peter [Lombard] also recites in *Sentences* 1, distinction 17: "I call charity," he says, "the motion of the soul to the enjoyment of God on his own account, and of oneself and one's neighbor on God's account." The same in *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, treating that word of the Apostle, "Neither death nor life shall be able to separate us from the charity of God": "The charity of God," he says, "is here said to be a virtue, which is the most right affection of our soul, which conjoins us to God, by which we love." In a similar manner does the Prophet seem to speak when he says: "*I have done judgment and justice*" — that is, the act of justice, or work — which Augustine, expounding, says: "By the name of justice in this place is signified not the virtue itself, but the work thereof."

It is also commonly said, and the thirty-first part of the first corollary teaches, that God rewards good merits beyond what is condign; therefore good merit demands something condignly. Furthermore, what God wills to be done, and promises to those rightly working, is worthy to be

done, and condignly so; but he himself wills and promises that those who perseveringly do well shall have for their hire eternal glory; therefore they condignly merit it.

Again, Christ merited for himself and for us many goods, as Lombard cites in *Sentences* 3, distinctions 18, 19, and following; and who would dare to assert that he did not merit these condignly — especially since, as Christ exceeds any pure man infinitely, so the merit of Christ seems to exceed the merit of any pure man? Therefore Christ could merit however much condignly. For which Anselm says in *Cur Deus Homo* 2.14: "Do you think such a gift, so lovable, can suffice to satisfy what is owed for the sins of the whole world?" — and he answers: "Indeed, it can do infinitely more"; therefore he condignly merited eternal glory for all to be saved. Whence *Apocalypse* 5: "*Worthy art thou, O Lord, to take the book and to open the seals thereof, because thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God in thy blood, and hast made us a kingdom to our God.*" Behold what he merited for us condignly! And it follows: "*Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power and divinity and wisdom and strength and honour and glory and benediction*": behold what he condignly merited for himself!

Furthermore, just as it was argued earlier that no one merits any good condignly, so likewise it could altogether be argued that no one merits any evil condignly — which, if anyone should concede, he would be forced consequently to concede that God is unjust, who punishes sinners so grievously when they have merited no punishment condignly. He would also confess that the Scripture of truth lies. Whence *Job* 11: "*Would that God spake with thee, and that thou mightest understand that thou art required less by him than thy iniquity deserveth*"; upon which Gregory says in *Moralia* 10.6: "He who understands the multiplicity of God's law weighs how much less are all the things he suffers." And *Job* 33: "*I have sinned and indeed offended, and as I was deserving I have not received.*" And Psalm 84: "*Thou hast mitigated all thy wrath.*" And *Habakkuk* 3: "*When thou art angry, thou shalt remember mercy.*" With which there are many other similar things in Scripture.

Indeed the Apostle says, *Romans* 6: "*The wages of sin is death; but the grace of God, life everlasting.*" Gloss: "Eternal death is the wage of sin — that is, the worthy retribution for sin; but eternal life is given by the grace of God alone" — which exposition he confirms by many authorities of many [Fathers].

Furthermore, one of the foregoing arguments — that wishing to show that whatever a man merits *de congruo*, he also merits *de condigno* — is against the common school, or at least against a great part of it, which distinguishes these from one another.

RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTIONS

But that the objections may be more easily resolved, it must be known that God and man are not related in the same way to rendering reward for any merit, good or evil. For man, as a king or another, by public edict promulgates that whoever shall do such-and-such a good or evil shall

receive this or that for a fitting wage; and he himself remains indifferent and undetermined in his will toward those subject to him as to who shall have what. And if one does such a good thing, another however does an evil thing, then by this his indifference of will is determined; and by this also, antecedently, causally, and efficiently is his will moved to willing and to rewarding and punishing this man and that according to their preceding merits.

But not so does God act, who from himself alone, begging nothing from anything posterior, always equally determinately wills, and does not will, whatever things he does or does not will — as the 20th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, and following chapters have taught. Which the Apostle most plainly testifies, *Romans* 9, on Jacob and Esau, saying: "*When the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger; as it is written: Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.*"

And if anyone should object that the whole of sacred Scripture, and all the Doctors, indeed the universal Church, indubitably affirm that God will reward the good *because of* their good merits, and will punish the evil *because of* their evil merits — since *because, for, therefore*, and similar [particles] frequently signify some cause — it must first be shown that merit is no cause of the eternal reward that follows.

For it is not a material cause, since the material cause is necessarily simultaneous with what it materializes, but the meritorious act, by which one merited that reward, does not then remain. Nor is it a formal cause: for the formal cause is necessarily simultaneous with what it informs. Nor a final cause, because the contrary seems more the case, as appears from chapter 35 of this work. Nor an efficient cause — which yet seems most plausible — for it can be neither in act nor in potency. Not in act: For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.3, "singular agents are simultaneous in being and not-being with the very things of which they are causes, as this physician with this convalescent, and this builder with this building." But the meritorious act precedes the reward in time, and is not simultaneous with it. Nor is it the efficient cause of the reward in potency, for then it would sometime issue into act, and would actually effect the eternal reward, and then, as has been said, would be simultaneous with it. Nor can anyone say that merit is the efficient cause of the reward because it then first moves the will of God (which is naturally indeterminate beforehand) and determines it, effecting in it the actual and certain volition of conferring the reward — for the 20th, 23rd, 25th, and 35th chapters of this work forbid that it be so said.

Furthermore, it must be noted that this particle *propter* (*because, for the sake of*) is multiple by mode of equivocation. For first and principally it signifies a cause of being; secondarily and somewhat transumptively it signifies a cause of knowing or making known; and sometimes it signifies an order. That it signifies a cause of being, no one is ignorant. That it also signifies a cause of knowing is clear from the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.12, who says that if, in things equally predicable (that is, convertible — as that the planets are near, which is a cause,

and that they do not twinkle, which is its effect, not a cause), the effect should be more known, then demonstration will be through it: as that the planets are near *because* they do not twinkle. Behold, according to him, this *propter* there does not signify a cause of being, but the effect, which is only a cause of knowing. Whence, with the demonstrative syllogism ordered through the terms A, B, C, he subjoins: "Therefore it is demonstrated that the wandering bodies are near." This syllogism therefore is not *propter quid* (a *why*-syllogism) but *propter quia* (a *because*-syllogism). For it is not from this — that they do not twinkle — that they are near; but from this — that they are near — that they do not twinkle. See how he first concedes, and second denies, that the planets are near *because* they do not twinkle: this is because *propter* signifies for him first only a cause of knowing, secondarily however a cause of being.

This also accords with the whole process of that chapter and of those following, where demonstration from effect is called demonstration *quia*; even though this particle *quia* signifies a cause, just as *propter* does — therefore it there signifies only a cause of knowing. Although Donatus irrationally subordinates *quia*, *quapropter*, *propterea*, and many similar particles, which are manifestly causal, to the non-causal but rational power of the conjunction; just as he subordinates to the causal power *si* (*if*), *nisi* (*unless*), and such — which would more properly have been subordinated to the conditional power, which he wholly omitted.

This is also sufficiently proved by that frequent and common example of the Philosopher: namely, *why* (*propter quid*) are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? *Because* (*propter id quod*) the exterior angle is equal to the two interior opposite to it. Yet the quantity of the exterior angle is in no way the cause — indeed not even the effect — of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right angles. For neither of these is the material, efficient, formal, nor final cause of the other, since both can always exist without the other. That the exterior angle is equal to the two interior opposite to it, however, is only a cause of our cognition why the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles: for through this it is demonstratively taught to be so, as the second part of Euclid's *Elements* I.32 shows. And so Averroes on *Physics* 8, comm. 58, says that there are three demonstrations: namely, of the cause; of the being only; and of the cause and the being together.

But lest in the Catholic cause I seem to bring forth only pagan witnesses, behold what the most faithful Paul says: "*Christ became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Because of which* (*propter quod*) *God hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above every name*" — namely, that he be called God. Yet this name he had before his Passion; indeed he had this name naturally even before all his merit. For that man was prior naturally [a man] and prior naturally God, before he did anything or merited in any way. For every agent precedes naturally any of its actions. Therefore Christ did not merit being God, but this was given him most graciously, without any preceding merit, as is clear from chapter 35 of this work. Lombard also in *Sentences* 3, distinction 6, adduces many authorities for this same point; and below, in distinction 18, treating the aforesaid authority of the Apostle, he says that that man did not merit so great a good, namely the name of God; therefore it does not seem that he merited that name in

any way through the obedience of his passion — except as regards the cognition and manifestation of it, not to God, but to men, who at first did not know this, and through his Passion, Resurrection, Ascension, and the like learned and truly came to know that he is not only man but also God. And this is what Lombard says there: "How then is this said," he says, "*Through obedience this name was given him?*" And he answers, according to that very common figure of speech in Scripture: "It is to be taken as that whereby a thing is said to come to be when it becomes known. After the Resurrection, what before was in obscurity is set in the open, that men and demons might know it." Whence the Saviour himself says, *John 13: "By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another."*

It might therefore be said that, when it is said "*This man, on account of (propter) such-and-such merit, shall receive such-and-such reward,*" the particle *propter* does not signify a cause of being, but a cause of knowing. For through merit it is made known to men, demons, and perhaps angels what reward each shall have.

This word *propter* also sometimes signifies an order, and not incongruously. For according to the foregoing in chapter 35, God first wills reward and glory for man as an end, and therefore wills for him and works in him fitting merits, as certain previous means to this end. Therefore, that they may finally rightly be ordered, he bestows on them the end *for which* and *to which* he himself finally ordained them. Therefore *propter* can sometimes designate order, so that the saying of the Apostle may be understood thus: "*He became obedient,*" etc., "*on account of which God exalted him*" — that is, *after which* preceding (ordained by God to the subsequent), which he had decreed should not be done except after that. For which Anselm, treating the same authority of the Apostle in *Cur Deus Homo* 1.9, says: "But that, when the Apostle had said '*He humbled himself,*' etc., '*because of which God,*' etc. — this was not so spoken as if he could in no way have come to this exaltation except through this obedience of death, and as if this exaltation were conferred only as a reward for this obedience. (For before he suffered, he himself said that *all things had been delivered to him by the Father, and that all things of the Father were his.*) But because he, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, had disposed himself to show the height of his omnipotence to the world in no other way than by death — and because what is disposed to come about only through this comes about through it — it is not incongruously said to come about *because* of it. For if we intend to do something, but propose first to do another thing through which that may be done, when what we wish to precede is now done, if what we intend is done, it is rightly said to be done *because of* the former, since that is done because of which there had been a delaying, since it had been disposed not to be done except through it. For if I have to cross a river that I can cross by horse and by ship, but propose not to cross except by ship, and on this account delay to cross because the ship is absent — when the ship is at hand, and I cross, it is rightly said of me: '*The ship was ready, and on that account he crossed.*' And we speak this way not only when what follows is done through that which we want to precede, but also when it is not done through it, but we have only resolved to do something else after it. For if anyone defers taking food because he has not yet been at the celebration of Mass that day, when

what he wished to do first is finished, it is not incongruously said to him: 'Take food now, because you have done that on account of which you delayed taking it.' Therefore much less unusual is the locution when Christ is said to have been exalted *because* he sustained death, through which and after which he had decreed to do this exaltation."

And he sets down another exposition of the same Apostolic saying in these words: "This can also be understood in that mode by which the same Lord is read to have *advanced in wisdom and grace before God* — not because it was so, but because he so bore himself as if it were so. For thus by death he was exalted, as if it came about because of it."

If therefore anyone should wish to speak consequently of the merit and reward of our head Christ and of his members the Christians, as regards the proposed causality, behold these three modes of speaking of our authentic Fathers. But because this opinion seems ambiguous and doubtful, and could probably be contradicted — especially if it be transferred from the Head to the members — I would gladly, without prejudice or reproach to my venerable Fathers and Authors, for the sake of the less wise (among whom I, who am insufficient to search the deep things of God, am chief), greatly desire if it were possible a clearer opinion, or that same opinion more clearly expressed and more removed from contradiction. Whence Alexander, as Averroes recites in *De Caelo* 2, comment 1, says of Aristotle's view: "We are not supported on the opinion of this man among all the others except because we see it to be of less ambiguity and more remote from contradiction."

It seems therefore to me that, *with every law of retribution established by the will of God set aside*, it is not true that on account of such a good or evil deed such a reward is owed; for then it would be necessary absolutely, and God could not [decide] the contrary without offence to justice, but of absolute necessity would so will and so do externally — as has been argued above. But that such a deed should merit such a reward — this is *because* God so willed, and so established such in the law, which will and law continually persevere unchanged, as chapter 23 has shown.

When therefore it is said "*This man, on account of such-and-such merit, will obtain such-and-such reward*," a distinction must be made: For this particle *propter* can signify a cause which is the virtue and efficacy of such merit alone — and so it is not true, as has just been shown. But if in that merit, indeed above and before the merit, it imports a cause which is the divine will and his law concerning retribution to be made similarly to every good or evil work, then it is true and to be conceded catholically. For *because of this*, that this man so merited and the law is now established, he shall obtain such a reward — that is, *because* God wills each one to be rewarded according to his works, and *this man* so works, *therefore* he shall obtain such a reward.

And when it is said "*God wills to reward this man on account of his merits*": if *propter* signifies a posterior cause in the merit moving the divine will, determining it and educing it from potency to the act of willing — it is not true, as has been shown above. But if it signifies the divine will, truly the cause preceding all merit and reward, which will reward him as he has merited — it is

true and certain. For it is true that God has a will, which is the first cause of all merits and likewise of all rewards.

It can also be said congruently in another way that merit is the efficient cause of the reward — not properly, but only transumptively — namely, because it effects in the meritorious one a form by which, according to present justice, he is made suited to the reward or to the punishment; or more briefly: because it makes the meriting one *such* as that to which alone the reward is ordained. For according to the ordination of present justice, no adult shall obtain the foretold glory or punishment unless first, through his good merits, he has acquired a certain comely form by which he is fittingly formed for obtaining glory; or through his evil merits, a certain deformed form, by which he is fittingly deformed in some manner for punishment. Thus, therefore, on account of merit reward is owed, and merit is an effective cause of reward, because it induces a form by which a man is made suited to receive the reward — just as a priest and a soldier, on account of having received their orders, the one celebrates and the other fights, and they are honored with their proper honors.

And when it is said "*God wills to reward this man on account of his merits*": if *propter* signifies a posterior cause effective of the divine volition, it is to be denied. But if it signifies a cause in the merit somehow effective of a certain form, or even that very form by which this man is made suited to a reward willed for him by God, according to present justice, it is to be conceded. Therefore: "God wills to reward this man on account of his merits" — that is, "this man, on account of his merits in the said manner, is such as God wills and has established to reward."

For which Blessed Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, last chapter, says: "In this God established Paul as a meriter of the crown — when he deigned to have him as a coadjutor of those works to which that crown was promised. Moreover, he made him coadjutor as a willing one — that is, consenting to his will. And so the will is reckoned as an aid into merit. If therefore from God comes the will and the merit, it is no doubt that from God comes both willing and accomplishing for good will. Therefore God is the author of merit, who both applies the will to the work, and unfolds the work through the will. Otherwise, if those things we have called *our merits* are properly so called, they are certain seedplots of hope, incentives of charity, indications of hidden predestination, presages of future felicity, the *way* of the kingdom, not the *cause* of reigning."

Furthermore, in a third way, not incongruously, it can be said: "This man is to be rewarded on account of his merits" — that is, *on account of merits to be ordered*, so that *propter* there signifies the final cause of the order of the universe, most fittingly predestined by God. For it does not befit that the universal order should be perturbed in the smallest matter, as the treatise on Providence makes manifest. And Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.13: "The eternal law of God is that by which it is just that all things be most ordered." And Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* 1.12: "It does not befit God to leave anything inordinate in his kingdom." And according to the same, in the same place: "To order rightly a sin without satisfaction is nothing other than to

punish it"; through which he shows that every sin without satisfaction is necessarily to be punished. And Augustine, supported by similar reasoning, *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.24, shows the same; indeed, that "sin and punishment are not divided by any interval of time, lest even by a moment of time the universal beauty be marred." Therefore likewise it must stand in things rightly done, as the present chapter has shown above. And this mode of speaking accords with the second mode recited above from Anselm.

When therefore it is said "*This man is to be rewarded on account of his merits,*" this is: "*This man is to be rewarded on account of merits to be finally ordered*" — that is, on account of the final order of merits foretold by God. And when it is said "*God wills to reward this man on account of his merits*": this is, "*God wills to reward this man on account of merits to be finally ordered,*" that is, "*He wills that such be the end of such merits, according to the order foreordained by him for such things,*" — so that the merits in no way antecedently, causally, *a priori* move, determine, or actuate the divine will to render rewards. Whence Avicenna *Metaphysics* 8.7: "God," he says, "loves the order of the goodness of the universe, but does not suffer from it nor concupisce it."

And if anyone should still ask: "If not on account of merits, why then does he choose or reprobate this man or that?" — chapter 21 and other [chapters] respond. For when the *why* is sought after, the formal cause of that volition is, in a manner, God himself; the prior efficient cause, in a manner, is his will; the posterior, however, among created things, is none whatsoever. And this is what the Apostle says, *Romans* 9, when he had foretold that God *loved Jacob and hated Esau*, and this not from works, but from his will, *that the purpose of God according to election might stand* — he introduces a questioner asking the aforesaid question, to whom he thus responds: "*Who resisteth his will? O man, who art thou that repliest against God?*" — as if he should say: There is no such cause prohibiting or effecting the divine will, by which it could be answered why he loved this man and hated that. And forthwith by *locus a simili* or *a minori*, he proves it thus: "*Doth the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus?*" — that is: on account of what preponderating reason, motive, and effective of thy volition? Certainly not. Indeed, without any prior preponderating reason, he can freely from the same lump make one such vessel, and another otherwise; and this is what he subjoins: "*Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?*"

And below, chapter 11, he says the same more plainly: "*O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!*" — namely, by any prior effective reason, since none such exists at all. And this is what he immediately subjoins: "*For who hath known the mind of the Lord?*" — namely, any preceding reason why he so did, as if he should say: No one, since this is not knowable, since it is not true. And he adds more expressly: "*Or who hath been his counsellor?*" — namely, what posterior caused thing was the prior cause, and as it were offering a reason on which the divine counsel relied in working? Therefore most plainly he immediately subjoins: "*Or who hath first*

given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" — as if he should say: No one, nor any thing posterior to God himself; which he forthwith ostensibly demonstrates, when he says: "*For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things,*" — in the manner that chapter 20 and others teach the same conclusion.

Whence also Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* 12, says: "Why are these called thus, those otherwise, and yet others by innumerable and diverse modes? Far be it from us to say that the judgment is the clay's, not the potter's." Augustine in this part follows not only the Apostle, but also the Sage, *Wisdom* 15, saying thus: "*The potter, of the same clay maketh vessels that are clean, and likewise such as serve to the contrary uses; but what is the use of these vessels, the potter is the judge.*" And again, *De Correptione et Gratia* 25: "If it be asked of me, *Why did God not give them perseverance to whom he gave that love by which they would live as Christians*, I answer that I do not know"; and there [Augustine cites] the Apostle: "*O man, who art thou that repliest against God?*" — and: "*O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God,*" etc.

The same in *De Bono Perseverantiae* 16: "*Why, you ask, in the same case, will he punish me rather than him? Or will he free him rather than me?* If you ask why, this I do not say — because I confess that I find nothing to say, since in this matter, as his justice is just, so are his judgments, as his mercy is great, so are they unsearchable."

But if a *why* be sought as final cause — and this regarding the reprobation of the wicked, since this disturbs many more — it must be said, according to chapter 21, that the ultimate final cause is God himself: "*The Lord hath made all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day,*" *Proverbs* 16. Behold: the wicked one for the evil day, finally and ultimately, the Lord hath made for himself.

The intermediate final cause, however, is as manifold as are the many goods which proceed from the reprobate, of which the 31st part of this work and chapter 34 unfold some. One of these is the manifestation of the Lord's dominion and his power, as he himself testifies, *Exodus* 9: "*Therefore have I raised thee up,*" namely Pharaoh, "*to set me against thee, that I may show in thee my might, and that my name may be declared in all the earth.*" For if Pharaoh had in no way resisted the Lord, how would God have shown so many miracles? And *Psalms* 105: "*He saved them for his name's sake, that he might make his power known.*" By this same authority, in like manner, the Apostle responds, *Romans* 9, when he says: "*For the Scripture saith: For this purpose I have raised thee up, that I may show my power in thee, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth.*" And it follows: "*What if God, willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,*" etc.

But because, according to chapter 21 of this work, man is the end of all other things, and the elect men are in some manner the end of the reprobate, therefore the reprobate are finally ordered to the utility of the elect. Whence the Apostle, *Romans* 9: "*The elder shall serve the younger,*" namely the reprobate the elect; and below, chapter 11: "*Enemies for your sake,*" namely the elect;

and 2 Corinthians 4: "*All things for your sake*"; and 2 Timothy 2 more expressly: "*I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they also may obtain the salvation.*" For this same point there is the testimony of God, which is greater, Exodus 10, where Moses says of Pharaoh: "*I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I may work these my signs in him, and thou mayst tell in the ears of thy son and of thy grandsons, how often I have crushed the Egyptians and wrought my signs among them, and that you may know that I am the Lord.*" Behold the final cause: "*That you may know,*" namely, you, the elect, "*that I am the Lord.*" For how would the wicked fear God, and the good love him so much, unless they had seen, or heard, that hand of God so mighty — so powerful an avenger of the wicked, but so vigorous a helper of the good — as all those miracles concerning the Egyptians and the Hebrews terribly and lovably make manifest.

There is in addition another final cause not small, but a great utility of the elect: namely, that the punishment of one might be the fear of many — indeed, more truly, that the punishment of many might be the fear of a few (*for many are called, but few are chosen*); namely, that the elect, knowing the guilt and perpetual punishments of the reprobate, may be roused to offices of fear and humility, and turned to the urgency of constant prayer.

Wherefore Augustine, *De Bono Perseverantiae* 17: "It seems to men that all who appear to be good faithful ones ought to receive perseverance unto the end. But God has judged it better to mix certain ones who will not persevere with the certain number of his saints, that those for whom security in the temptation of this life is not expedient may not be secure. For many are kept back from a pernicious haughtiness by what the Apostle says: *Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.*" And below, chapter 37: "For this reason, indeed, are the not-persevering mingled with the persevering by the most provident will of God: that we may learn not to be high-minded but to consent to the humble, and to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. *For it is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish for his good pleasure.*"

The same, *De Sancta Virginitate* 16: "Is it to be believed that God permits, on no other account, that there should be mixed with the number of your profession many men and women who shall fall, except that, as these fall, your fear may be increased, by which pride is repressed — which God so hates that against this alone the Most High humbled himself?"

There is yet a third cause, not small: namely, that the sons of grace and the elect, seeing that they are separated from the reprobate not by their own merits but freely by the grace of God, the grace of God may appear more pleasing, and the elect, sons of grace, may be rendered more thankful to the most Gracious Author of grace.

Whence Augustine on the title of Psalm 87: "*Shall thy wonders be known in the dark?*" etc. — "There occurred," he says, "the question what is the use of these dead [reprobates], what God may do with them for the utility of his body, which is the Church"; that there might be demonstrated in them what the grace of God is in the predestined, who according to purpose are

called. Whence the body itself in another psalm says: *"My God, his mercy shall prevent me."* These reprobates, indeed, are useful to the elect not only on the way, but even in the fatherland: namely, that, their misery being seen, the glory of these may be more pleasingly held. For things opposed, placed next to one another, appear more, as the 34th part discloses; and so much more dearly is loved the most gratuitous Liberator and most gracious Rewarder, who could equally have damned these as those eternally. Whence Psalm 57 says: *"The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge."* And the last chapter of *Isaiah*: *"And they shall go out and see the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me: their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be a sight to satiety to all flesh."* Where the Gloss on the words *"to a sight of satiety"*: "Because they shall see them separated from themselves by just judgment, with the loss of the power by which they raged against the good, and a vengeance upon them so great that they shall not seek a greater — they who now say: *How long, Lord, dost thou not avenge our blood?* They shall also be satisfied with their own beatitude, giving thanks, having seen the unspeakable punishment of the impious."

Wherefore Gregory, *Homily 40*, treating that gospel story of the rich man buried in hell and the beggar Lazarus carried into the bosom of Abraham, writes thus: "The just always behold the unjust in torments, that hence their joy may grow, since they look upon the evil which they have mercifully escaped, and refer the more thanks to their Redeemer, the more they see what they themselves could have suffered in others, had they been left. Nor does the sight of the punishment of the reprobate cloud that brightness of so great a beatitude in the mind of the just, since, where there shall now be no compassion of misery, doubtless the joy of the good shall not be lessened. But what wonder is it, if while the just behold the torments of the unjust, this comes to them as a service of joys; since even in painting black color is laid underneath, that white or red may appear more bright? Thus, therefore, as has been said, the joys of the good grow as much as the evils of the damned lie beneath their eyes, which they have escaped; and although their joys suffice them fully to enjoy, yet without doubt they always behold the evils of the reprobate; for those who see the brightness of their Creator, nothing is done in the creature which they cannot see."

The same in *Dialogues 4.46*, to Peter asking: "But no just man is fed by the cruelty of the offender; the slave is commanded to be beaten by the just Lord that he may be corrected from wickedness; therefore he is beaten in order that he may amend. But if the wicked, handed over to the fires of hell, do not come to correction, to what end shall they always burn?" Thus he responds: "But the omnipotent God, who is merciful, is not fed by the torment of the miserable; but because he is just, he is not appeased forever from the avenging of the iniquitous. But all the iniquitous, deputed to eternal punishment, are punished indeed for their own iniquity, and yet shall burn for some end — namely, that all the just may both see in God the joys which they receive, and may behold their tortures which they have escaped; that they may know themselves so much more to be eternal debtors to divine grace, the more they observe in eternity the evils to be punished which by his help they have overcome."

Wherefore Augustine, *On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Evil*, says thus: "Then the common defendant and enemy, the devil, will be condemned in the sight of all the elect of God, whose damnation and intolerable punishment will offer a delightful spectacle to the elect; then with most ardent love they will love their Liberator and the Giver of all goods, and without end and without weariness they will praise him with the cry of their heart." Peter [Lombard] also professes this opinion in *Sentences* 4, last distinction.

Therefore, supposing that the misery of the damned somehow is of value to the glory of those to be saved, it can be argued that God ordained the former finally to the latter. Otherwise, this would happen by chance or fortune, and would not proceed from divine providence; therefore those to be saved would not be bound to give thanks to God for that portion of their glory — against chapter 27 and others that follow. Therefore this also plainly seems to be the opinion of the Apostle, *Romans* 9, in the solution of this same question, when he says: "*God endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory.*"

Whence Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* 10: "*Why does God not teach all*, the Apostle has uncovered: because *willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, he brought forth in much patience vessels of wrath, which were perfected unto perdition, that he might make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory.*" The same more expressly, *Contra Iulianum* 5.6: "Of the number of the elect no one perishes; but the rest of mortals, who are not of this number, but indeed of that same lump from which these come — having been made vessels of wrath — are born for the utility of these. For God neither rashly nor by chance creates any of them, nor is ignorant of what good he might work concerning them; since by this very fact he works good — that he creates the human nature in them, and from them adorns the order of the present age." Behold a threefold good from the reprobate: the utility of the elect; the good of nature; and the adornment of the age.

Suppose also, according to the pious zeal of many — though not according to knowledge — that the whole of hell, with all its reprobate inhabitants, were taken from the midst, and there were only heaven with its holy citizens. Then the age would be much perfect, and if God had so made it, he would have done very well. But now, God acts so much more perfectly and so much better, by how much of perfection and goodness those noble damned creatures contain in themselves; and by how much of resplendence and clearer manifestation that comparison, as of an extreme contrariety, confers upon the just — as upon shining sparks, and like stars. For who, or whose reason, would have prohibited the Lord from the beginning, had it pleased him, from creating heaven full of elect in glory and hell full of reprobate in punishment, that this comparatively might have appeared the more glorious — and would have been so? There will not be lacking, however, those who, by human affection, would pity these, and by pious compassion would contend that it ought not so to be done. But why do they not pity little children — not only not sinning, but altogether incapable of sinning — who, dying without the Sacrament of Baptism, are to be punished by the supplication of eternal fire, as Augustine says in *De Fide ad Petrum* 59 and

24, plainly? Why also do they not contend with God, that he might retract his judgment, by which not by Fate or by chance, but by the counsel of his will, he assumes one such little child to baptism, to the kingdom, to glory, and abandons another, indeed even repels another, in a manner, from baptism to the prison and the punishment, as the authority of Augustine, *De Bono Perseverantiae* 35, plainly testifies, with others similar to it set forth in chapter 31 of this work? Why do they not also pity the innocent beasts, that they should be subject to so many miseries and so many deaths? Why do they not blame God for these things? Why do they not also accuse the potter, who from the same lump of clay makes one vessel for honor, but another for dishonor and contempt? Is not God as free a Lord of his own as the potter is of his? And this seems to be the reason of the Apostle, *Romans* 9, in the solution of this question, which is now in our hands.

Indeed, hearken — and diligently hearken; consider — and vigilantly reconsider Augustine in his little book *De Praedestinatione et Gratia Dei*, which is prefixed in the book of his Sermons as the fifth Sermon, [chapter] 18, writing thus: "With what impudence, finally, will man judge concerning God — clay concerning the potter — not only saying, *Why hast thou made me thus*, but even concerning others, with damnable curiosity searching out and saying, *Why from the same lump didst thou make one in this manner, and another in that?* If the human race, which it is plain was first created from nothing, were not born with the debt of death and the original of sin, and yet from them the omnipotent Creator wished to damn some unto eternal destruction — who would say to the omnipotent Creator, *Why hast thou done thus?* For he who, when they were not, gave them to be, had power to determine the end for which they should be; nor would the rest say, *Why with the equal merits of all does the divine arbitration differ?* — *Because the potter has power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto contempt.*" The same, on the title of Psalm 70, says thus: "In all the holy Scriptures, the grace of God which liberates us commends itself to us, that it may have us as commended ones. For who would say to him, *What hast thou done*, if he should damn the just? How great therefore is his mercy, if he justifies the unjust!"

And if you should still object that God could have ordered the world and the glory of the elect sufficiently well and congruently by some other more benign mode, and without the perdition of any so noble a creature — therefore it did not befit such a pious and just God to prepare any angel or man for eternal misery freely: I confess undoubtedly that he could so [act], and could have repaired the human race in another way than through the Passion and death of Christ. Why then, out of the whole of compassion, do you not complain that the only-begotten Son of so lofty a King, so innocent, so delicate, so tender — indeed your Lord God — was, on behalf of an offending and miserable slave of his, so contemptibly seized, so cruelly scourged, wounded, lacerated, and finally consummated by a most foul death? Why do you not there recall, annul, and nullify God's judgment? And though, following your will, God should have ordered things more benignly and better — since he could always do better, and better without end — there would always remain the same complaint: *Why has he so ordained, and not better, when he could so easily have ordained better?*

Let therefore that querulous temerity check itself against God, nor irrationally seek a reason superior to the divine will — since that very [will] in such posterior willed things is the summit of reason, not reason's footwoman or handmaid, but the contrary; for reason follows it as Mistress and Magistress, as chapter 21 demonstrated. Whence *Ecclesiastes* 8: "*I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God that are done under the sun.*" Behold, regarding posterior willed things: the more anyone shall labor to seek, the less shall he find; even though the wise man should say he has knowledge, he shall not be able to discover it. Therefore let every human complaint check itself against God, and let it suffice for a reason in all things — that God and the Lord so willed it. Whence *Ecclesiastes* 7: "*Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom he hath despised. In the good day enjoy good things, and beware beforehand of the evil day: for as he hath made this, so also he hath made that, that man may not find against him just complaints.*"

Furthermore, perhaps you may turn yourself to canonical authorities, and object that of the Apostle, *1 Timothy* 2: "*Who will have all men to be saved*"; and that of *Ezekiel* 18: "*Is it my will that a sinner should die, saith the Lord, and not that he should be converted, and live?*"; and that of *Acts* 10: "*God is not a respecter of persons*"; and that of *Mark*, last chapter: "*Preach the gospel to every creature,*" etc. And Gregory, *Moralia* 4.24, on that of *Job* 3 (*Now I should sleep silent*): "If no putrefaction of sin had corrupted our first parent, he would never have generated from himself sons of hell; but those alone who now through redemption are to be saved would have been born from him as elect."

To these things it must be said: the authorities of sacred Scripture objected cannot be understood according to the literal surface, as chapters 10 and 23 of this work prove. Of these therefore the first — not I, but the Catholic Fathers — expound in many ways. For Ambrose there, expounding the Apostle, first asks: "If God, who is called omnipotent, wills all men to be saved, why is his will not fulfilled?" Secondly he answers: "But in every locution sense and condition lie hidden. Whence Peter the Apostle says: *All Scripture needs interpretation*. For God wills all men to be saved, *but if* they come to him. For he does not so will, that the unwilling be saved; but he wills *them* to be saved, *if they themselves will*. For he who gave the law to all excepted no one from salvation." And on that of *Romans* 9, "*I will have mercy on whom I have mercy*": "He does not judge unjustly who wills all to be saved, with justice remaining."

Augustine also, *Enchiridion* 77, raises the same question, and after a long discussion concerning the insurmountability of the divine will, in chapter 83 thus responds: "We ought so to understand what is written, *Who wills all men to be saved* — as if it should be said: *no man becomes saved except him whom God himself willed to be saved* — not that there is no man whom he wills to be saved." Which, in chapter 84, he confirms by a similar [example], saying thus: "For so we understand what is written in the Gospel: *Who enlightens every man* — not because there is no man who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by him." Then he adds another resolution of the same: "Or certainly," he says, "this is so said: *Who wills all men to be saved* — not that there is no man whom he does not will to be made saved (he who would not

work the powers of miracles among those whom he says would have done penance, if he had so worked); but so that we understand by *all men* every kind of men, distributed by whatever differences: kings, nobles, ignobles, private persons, exalted ones, the humble, the learned and unlearned, those of whole body, the weak, the ingenious, the slower, the foolish, rich, poor, mediocre, males, females, infants, boys, adolescents, young men, old men, in all tongues, in all customs, in all arts, in all professions, in the innumerable variety of pleasures and concupiscences constituted, and whatever other differences are in men." Which exposition, in chapter 85, he shows to accord with the Apostle's process: "The Apostle had ordered," he says, "that prayers be made for all men, and had specifically added, *for kings and for those who are in high station* — who could be thought, by their more potent pride and worldly haughtiness, to abhor the humility of the Christian faith. Wherefore saying: *For this is good before our Saviour Lord* — that is, that prayer be also made for such — immediately, that he might remove despair, he added: *Who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth*"; which he confirms by a similar [comparison] saying: "By this mode of locution the Lord also used in the Gospel, where he says to the Pharisees: *You tithe mint, and rue, and cumin, and every herb*. For neither did the Pharisees nor any aliens through all the lands of foreigners tithe all the herbs. As therefore *every herb*, every kind of herbs, so there *all men*, every kind of men, we can understand." (And this is what is logically often said: that in such expressions distribution can be made for the singulars of genera, or for the genera of singulars, as here: *Every animal was in the ark of Noah*. Whence *Genesis 7: They went in, both they and every beast according to its kind*.) And that same exposition of the same saying he sets down in *De Correptione et Gratia* 61, which he also confirms by the gospel saying just adduced: *Who tithe every herb*; and through that which Paul says: *I please all in all things*. And below, [chapter] 74, otherwise he expounds this: "*God wills*," he says, "*all men to be saved* — that is, *he makes all men will to be saved*, since he himself works the willing." And he uses a similar mode of speaking in *De Civitate Dei* 22.2, as was alleged above. The same also in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* 10 thus expounds a similar saying: "As we speak entirely, when of some master of letters who is alone in the city we say, *He teaches everyone here letters* — not because all learn, but because no one learns there unless from him whoever learns letters there: so we rightly say, *God teaches all to come to Christ*, not because all come, but because no one comes otherwise." The same also in *De Natura et Gratia* says the same — namely, that all are vivified through Christ, since none except through him — as we say that the master of letters in the city teaches all, since none learns except whom he himself has taught.

That objection of Ezekiel, however, is resolved by that distinction concerning *willing* which chapter 34 made; and if anyone shall wish to weigh his last word — namely, *and not that he should be converted, and live* — as if this were of the divine will, that every sinner be converted and live: it must be answered according to what has already been said.

And that of *Acts* mentioned above — *God is not a respecter of persons* — if it ought to be expounded according to the speaker's mind, it should be understood in the said mode: namely,

that God is not a respecter of persons according to genus, not according to species or number. He is not, I say, a respecter of persons according to genus — but rather from every nation and people he calls and receives unto salvation; and this seems to be the mind of Peter the Apostle, who said this. For he, as it seems, first believed that only the Jews were accepted by God to the faith of Christ and the kingdom, according to that of *Matthew 15*: "*I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel*," and earlier in chapter 10: "*Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles, and into the city of the Samaritans enter ye not; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel*." But after he heard how much grace the Lord had visited even on Cornelius the Gentile, opening his mouth, he said: "*In truth I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh justice is acceptable to him*." Therefore Saint Peter wishes only to say that God is no respecter of those persons who are only of the circumcision, with all others excluded; but that in every other people, nation, or tongue, he that feareth God and worketh justice is acceptable to him. And of the same opinion as Peter were the rest of the faithful from the Jews; and even the other Apostles, as it seems. Whence in the same place: "*The faithful of the circumcision who came with Peter were astonished, because the grace of the Holy Spirit was poured out also upon the Gentiles*"; and below, chapter 11: "*And the apostles and brethren who were in Judea heard that the Gentiles also had received the word of God*," and they glorified God.

Whence Augustine, *De Bono Perseverantiae* 35, says: "What is it that sometimes the children of unbelievers are baptized, but those of believers are not? Surely, that it might be shown that with God there is no respect of persons; otherwise he would liberate the children of believers rather than those of unbelievers." With which his authority in *De Correptione et Gratia* 27 and *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* 50 agrees, which chapter 31 has.

And that God is a respecter of persons according to number is plain from him in the same book, saying: "*This Jesus God hath raised up, and hath made him manifest not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God*." And below, chapter 13: "*And believed, as many as were preordained to eternal life*." Whence the Apostle, *Romans 4*: "*According to the purpose of the grace of God, as also David affirmeth the blessedness of the man, to whom God reputeth justice without works*." And below, chapter 9: "*For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger*." And in the same place: "*I will have mercy on whom I have mercy*," etc.; "*So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy*" — together with the whole process of the chapter to this same effect.

Treating which Augustine, *Enchiridion* 78, says thus: "Both twins were born by nature children of wrath — by no proper works of their own, but originally bound by the chain of damnation from Adam. But he who said, *I will have mercy on whom I have mercy*, loved Jacob by gratuitous mercy, but hated Esau by debited judgment, which since it was owed to both, in the one the other recognized that he was not to be glorified about his distinct merits — that in the same case he did

not incur the same punishment — but about the largesse of divine grace, since *it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.*"

And in *De Bono Perseverantiae* 26: "Of two twins, of whom one is taken up, the other left, the outcome is dissimilar, but the merits common." And earlier, chapter 19: "Of two infants equally bound by original sin — *why* this one is taken, that one left; and of two impious men, already grown in years — *why* this one is so called that he should follow the Caller, but that one is either not called, or not so called: *the judgments of God are unsearchable.* Of two pious men, *why* perseverance to the end is given to this, but is not given to that: *the judgments of God are unsearchable.*"

The same, *Enchiridion* 75: "Then will not be hidden what now is hidden, why of two one was to be assumed by mercy, the other left by judgment; in which the one who was assumed would recognize what was owed to him by judgment, did not mercy come to his aid; *why* this one rather than that was assumed, since the cause of both was one." And Blessed Gregory in *Moralia* 25.14, on that of *Job* 34, "*He himself granting peace, who is he that condemneth?*": "Let no one discuss why one is drawn by gift, another repelled by merit." With which Anselm in *Proslogion* 11 also concords, saying thus to God: "If in any way it can be grasped *why* you can will to save the wicked, that certainly by no reason can be comprehended: *why* of similar wicked ones, you should save these more than those by your highest goodness, and damn those more than these by your highest justice."

This Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Blessed Virgin Mary plainly prove, who without any preceding merit were sanctified in the womb, while others altogether like them were forsaken. If anyone, however, should fashion for himself any merits whatever for such a sanctification, suppose that another virgin like the glorious Virgin had lived altogether similarly: and if God is in no way a respecter of singular persons, it would follow that God would have similarly been incarnate from her, and so the only Son of God would have had many mothers. But I most firmly believe that even if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as my Lady did, none of them would have been such in divine acceptance; and that he gave to her alone, before all, the honor of being virgin and mother — being uniquely incarnate from her. Yet in no way does it seem that so great a wisdom, which disposes all things sweetly, did not by studious providence singularly and eternally pre-elect a unique mother for himself, but as if negligently left her to be the mother of him to the merits and varying wills of men, and as it were to chance and fortune, and as to the cast of dice.

But because, by revelation of the Lord, I had learned that to reveal and confess the works of God is honorable and grateful — behold a brief story to the same point. I knew a certain young cleric, a devout servant of the glorious Virgin, who, that he might more acceptably serve the most pure Virgin (who has no spot or wrinkle of mind or body), vowed to her perpetual chastity not only of flesh but also of thought, and cleanness of will; and the same vow he renewed daily in his devotions. Envyng him, that crafty serpent who, through a thousand windings and flowing

frauds, never ceases to disturb quiet hearts, infused so much venom of temptation that he began solicitously to think and, doubting in some manner, to dispute concerning the value, merit, and reward of chastity — and at length was deceived deceitfully, to such a degree that he held cheap even the chastity of the Blessed Virgin, and consequently her whole most holy life, esteeming that if another woman had led a similar or holier life, she would in other respects have been similar to her, or more blessed. On which account, both in loving and in showing the accustomed observances, he became remiss and tepid. Who, when on a certain night he had given his eyes to sleep, visited by the ray of healing grace, seemed led by someone into a certain pleasant place, like paradise, where there was shown to him a tree incomparably beautiful, and likewise precious, which, rooted in the earth, raised itself into heaven; on whose summit, as in a little nest, a small boy was resting; and the tree was distinguished along its length by spaced and most beautiful knots. To him wishing to know what and what kind of tree this was, the answer was given thus: "This is the virginity of holy Mary." And immediately one of the knots of the tree being opened, like a mouth, a voice was made saying: *"And if all the daughters of the house of Jacob had lived as she did, none would have been such."*

This whole matter concerning the acceptation and prepositioning of one of equal — and even less worthy — persons is more clear from chapter 21.

To that last [objection] concerning preaching, it must be said as chapters 23 and 25 say concerning prayer. For Christ, who himself preached to men with his own blessed mouth, or through his Apostles, or through any other preachers whatsoever, did not will that all hearers should be compunctioned and acquiesce to the truth — indeed, he did not will that anything else, or otherwise in the smallest degree, should ever be done by any of his sermons than what was fully done, as chapter 10 makes manifest. Whence *Isaiah 55: "As the rain and the snow descend from heaven, and return no more thither, but soak the earth, and water it, and make it to spring, and give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater: so shall my word be, which shall go forth from my mouth: it shall not return to me void, but it shall do whatsoever I please, and shall prosper in the things for which I sent it."*

And if you should ask: Why then did he will to preach to all indistinctly? — the response is clear from the foregoing. Yet it must be said that he willed this on account of the erudition of the elect and the punishment of the reprobate. Whence *Matthew 13* and elsewhere frequently: *"Who hath ears to hear, let him hear"*; and *Matthew 19: "All men take not this word, but they to whom it is given; he that can take, let him take."* And *John 9: "For judgment I am come into this world, that they who see not may see, and they who see may become blind."* And *Matthew 13*, when asked by the disciples why he preached to the multitudes in parables, he answered: *"Because to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. Therefore I speak in parables to them, because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand: that the prophecy of Isaias may be fulfilled in them, who saith: With the ear you shall hear, and shall not understand: and seeing you shall see, and shall not see. For the heart of this people is grown gross, and with their ears they have heard heavily, and have shut their eyes,*

lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them." And this is in *Isaiah* 6 with words slightly different from the foregoing. And in *Mark* 4 the same is more expressly clear: where, after the Lord had preached to the crowd in parables, he said thus to the twelve Apostles: *"To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God; but to them that are without, all things are done in parables: that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them."*

But pure men, who do not know how to distinguish between the elect and the reprobate, ought to preach to all, wishing them salvation — just as also to pray for all, as chapters 23 and 25 have shown. Whence *Ecclesiastes* 11: *"In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening let not thy hand cease: for thou knowest not which may rather spring up, this or that; and if both together, it shall be the better."* Therefore preaching ought to be made to all indistinctly, that the elect may be edified unto life, but the reprobate, that they may be less harmful, and become less evil, and be less damned; or that by such preaching, as by some sword of the Spirit or some spiritual rod of the Lord's mouth, they may be struck; and that to us merit may be increased. For the Apostle says, *Ephesians* 6: *"Take the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God."* And *Isaiah* 11: *"He shall strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall slay the wicked."* And *2 Corinthians* 2: *"We are the good odour of Christ unto God, in them that are saved and in them that perish: to the one indeed the odour of death unto death; but to the others the odour of life unto life."* And *Luke* 10: *"Into whatever house you enter, first say, Peace be to this house; and if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon him; if not, it shall return to you."*

Whence Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* 68: *"Let men suffer themselves to be corrected when they sin, nor let them argue from the very correction against grace, nor from grace against correction; because both for sins is just punishment owed — to which pertains just correction, which is exhibited medicinally, even if the health of the sick is uncertain, so that, if he who is corrected pertains to the number of the predestined, the correction may be a salutary medicament; if however he does not pertain, the correction is for him a penal torment. Therefore under this uncertainty correction is to be applied out of charity."* The same, below, chapter 75: *"As far as it pertains to us, who cannot discern the predestined from the not-predestined, severe correction is to be applied medicinally to all, lest they perish, or destroy others; but it is for God to make it useful to those whom he himself foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son."* And it follows, chapter 76: *"If sometimes we correct out of fear, lest someone perish from it, why do we not also correct out of fear, lest someone perish more from it?"* And earlier, chapter 73, treating the said authority of Luke: *"Since we know not who is the son of peace according to God's predestination, or not, it pertains to us thus to make no exception, to discern none, but to wish all to be saved, to whom we preach this peace. Nor must it be feared that we should lose it, if he to whom we preach is not, we being ignorant, the son of peace; for it shall return to us — that is, profit us."*

Gregory's saying does not contradict the foregoing: for if the first parent had perseveringly stood, God would have ordained otherwise.

These things being preliminarily set forth, it now remains to pursue what follows.

RESUMING THE MAIN ARGUMENT: ON THE DISTINCTION OF MERIT *DE CONDIGNO*

When therefore at the beginning it is argued that someone can merit something *de condigno* from God, for the matter of solution it must be known: that to *merit* is to do something rewardable — that is, worthy or due to be rewarded; but everything due, worthy, or condign is reasonable and just. Therefore, just as chapter 21 distinguished concerning the reasonable and the just, so it must be distinguished similarly concerning the due, the worthy, and the condign. What concerns *condignum* — since concerning this it is argued — let it suffice to demonstrate; once it is known, the rest will not be hidden.

Therefore the *condign* is either prior naturally and antecedently to the divine will, or posterior and subsequently, or even somehow mixed of both. Or, in other words, the same: there is the condign *per se* absolutely, and of the inflexible rigor of justice; there is the condign *per accidens* and with respect to the divine will, and of justice depending on it; there is the condign somehow mixed of both.

Furthermore, according to the common manner of speaking of all, and the proper manner of the Doctors, it must be known: that *to merit de condigno* is taken differently in good and in evil. For it is said that one sinning condignly merits eternal punishment, because that sin is so evil that, from its malice alone, eternal punishment without any injury of right could be inflicted on the sinner. But it is said that no one condignly merits eternal life, because no one's work is so good or so meritorious before God that, from its goodness or merit alone, eternal life is owed without all grace — indeed, not anything good distinct at all, as has been argued above.

Yet these two modes of *meriting condignly* can be reduced to some one common, univocal, or at least analogous to both — which is perhaps: *to do something to which a pure wage can justly be rendered* — so that the word *pure* excludes from the wage every freely conferred good or evil. And this is potential condign, because a wage can justly be rendered to it.

I can therefore, beginning higher from the principle, distinguish another way concerning meriting and demeriting condignly: namely, *actually* and *potentially*. To *merit actually* is to do something rewardable — namely, something to which a reward is actually owed; and so no one sinning merits any other punishment than what he shall have. For it is not worthy or due that he be otherwise punished than as God has determined him to be punished. And this *meriting* can be subdivided into the three modes already mentioned. To *merit potentially*, however, is to do something rewardable — namely, something to which a reward could be rendered. And so every

sinner sinning mortally, whether to be damned or to be saved, merits a greater punishment than he shall have, and perhaps eternal punishment of any intensity. For God could justly punish anyone so sinning with a greater punishment than he shall punish — and perhaps with as much as he wished.

This *meriting* (or *meriting condignly*) potentially is somehow mixed of meriting condignly antecedently and subsequently to the divine will — as chapter 21 of this work more plainly explained in its similar [case]. For that he should do this or that depends on the divine will, according to chapter 9; but that, this or that being done, a pure wage could or could not be worthily rendered to it, is altogether necessary.

Speaking therefore of *meriting condignly actually* in the first mode, namely antecedently to the divine will *per se* and absolutely: it appears that no one can merit any good or evil from God, as the other arguments have shown. According to the second mode, however, one can: for everything that God wills and establishes is worthy and condign, as has been shown above. According to the third mode similarly, one can merit good and evil condignly actually from God — namely, such good or evil which has been proved above to follow inseparably from one's work. For *that he do such a work* depends on the divine will, as chapter 9 showed; but *that, such a work being done with all its universal circumstances, such a good or evil follow* does not depend on the divine will, but follows of necessity — like *this man's running upon this man's being moved*.

Therefore one of the prior arguments does not hold — namely, that which argued that *that reward necessarily following* necessitates the divine will to willing it, and to rendering it, to him who merits it. For just as it freely wills and works such a merit in anyone whomsoever, so also does it [freely will and work] all things which necessarily follow.

By this premised distinction, many things which were argued above are resolved.

To that which argued that *the virtuous act condignly merits every useful and pleasurable good distinguished against the honest good, because it is better than this and that*, it must be said that this does not follow. Just as if John saves the life of Peter, Peter is not on that account bound to render to him all his goods — even though, however many and great they may be, they are much less than the benefice received before. Likewise also, if John teaches Peter the sciences and the virtues — although they may be incomparably better than all Peter's goods — Peter is not on that account bound to render to John all his goods. Indeed, it suffices to render in such matters insofar as he can, and as accustomed to be returned competently.

Whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9.1: "But in those [services] which are not done because of agreement — that is, the promise of reckoning, that is, of certain retribution — these [are done] for their own sake — that is, [for the sake of those] receiving or giving — it is said that they are inaccusable. For such, according to the friendship of virtue, is the retribution to be made according to election; for this is of friendship and of virtue. So also it seems concerning

communicating in philosophy: For dignity is not measured by money; nor will an equally weighing price be — but perhaps what is sufficient, as in things conceded to gods and parents." And this perhaps is because Peter without his great detriment is unable to render an equally weighing recompense to John; and although God is sufficient, yet he is not bound; for no one in meriting does anything good for God, but for himself. Why then is God bound to render this *de condigno*? And if you say that I argued thus above — I confess [it]; but this was against those positing that the gracious one merits *de condigno* from God an increase of grace. And so the argument seems to proceed: that he merits condignly the remission of any temporal punishment, which is less.

The other argument, which argued that *he who loves God above all things ought to be similarly loved by him in return*, does not well advert to the analogy to be observed in other friendships. For it is not the case that, in proportion as a worthier one is loved by another, he is bound to so love in return; for it suffices that he love in return less, according to the excellence of his state. For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 8.7: "But the analogous in all friendships existing according to surpassing — that is, with one extreme of friendship abounding over another in goodness — must come about in love also: namely, that the better one be loved more than he loves, and the more useful one similarly, and each of the others in like manner. For when love is made according to dignity, then there comes to be, in some manner, equality, which seems to be of friendship." And since God is better and worthier infinitely than any whatsoever, it seems, following the proportionality, that he is bound under no degree of love to love any one loving in return. And especially because that one freely gives to him all that love, and is bound to love God as much as he can, as was proved above. And this a brief reason can persuade: for let John and Peter, with many others, equally love God above all things; then if God were bound to love them in return above all things, anyone whatsoever among them — he would be bound to love John more than Peter, and the contrary, and any one over any other, and over all the others, and over Blessed Mary, and as his own only Word.

Yet it greatly befits and behooves God purely gratuitously to love such lovers of his ineffably in return — indeed, more truly, *to love them beforehand*. And this is what that faithful friend John, much loved and loving, testifies in his First Epistle 4, saying: "*In this is charity, not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us.*"

To Anselm and Aristotle it must be answered that such a one merits only according to his proper foreordination, not according to the absolute rigor of justice. And the confirmation of that argument shall be infirmed by what has been said.

To the other arguments which follow, up to the argument made concerning the merit of Christ, the foregoing shall respond. And that one [the argument concerning Christ's merit] can be resolved through the premised distinction concerning *meriting condignly*. For in the first mode — namely, antecedently to the divine will, and of absolutely necessary and inflexible rigor of justice — it seems that Christ did not merit for himself, nor for us, resurrection from death and

eternal life, nor anything of the sort. For if he had done so, it would be necessary absolutely that God should render these to him and to us, since he cannot be unjust. And so God would raise up and beatify the elect of simply absolute necessity, and not from the good pleasure of his free will — which chapter 9 does not permit.

It also seems possible that, even if no man had sinned, the Son of God might have assumed a passible man, and have done all things, or similar things, or greater, or more often, and have suffered, as he now did — not on account of any reward to be applied to himself or others, but from sincerest charity for God's sake alone — and after all these things have laid down and annihilated the man so assumed, never afterwards to be resumed; and all other men, and any creature whatsoever, never having to create anything thereafter. And the same seems possible, even supposing the lapse of man into sin — since it implies no contradiction formally. And if it had been so, Christ would have merited nothing condignly for himself or for others in the first mode aforesaid; therefore neither now, since as much of merit or good work as he had now, then he would have had as much or more.

Christ, moreover, did not merit through his divine nature, but through his human; and this not from his natural [powers] alone, but from grace freely given, as chapter 35 alleged — which Lombard also attests in *Sentences* 3, distinctions 13 and 18. The Apostle also seems to be of this mind, *Romans* 1, saying of Christ:

"Who was predestinated the Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification, by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead."

Where the Gloss: "He, in respect to his being man, was predestined — that is, without merits, by grace alone preelected — not only that he should be our Head, but that he should not draw his origin, nor by will perpetrate, sin; and that from a mortal nature he should be clarified immortally." If therefore he did not merit immortality for himself condignly, neither did he merit anything else, as it seems; therefore neither for us.

The Lord Jesus Christ himself also seems to testify this really and in fact, by giving thanks to God the Father because he heard him, *John* 11. If however he had merited condignly, and from pure debt, to be heard by the Father, no thanks would have been due to be rendered him, as the thirty-first chapter argued: For who, true and wise, will give thanks or render to him who has never done anything gracious or bestowed anything freely on him — since it is proper to thanksgiving that it be a retribution of a benefit freely given. For which the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5.8: "In doing the proportional in return, the city remains; for they remain together by retribution; on account of which men readily perform the sacrament of thanksgiving, that retribution may be made; this indeed is proper of thanks: for one ought to serve in turn him who has done a favor" — namely, by acting back to him in thanks, who first did something freely.

With which Tully [Cicero] agrees, in his *Old Rhetoric* 2, defining *thanks* in this way: "Thanks is that in which the memory of friendships and offices — that is, benefits — of another, and the

will of remunerating that other, is contained." Whence the Poet: *"Thanks for things deservedly is owed unbought."* But if thanks were reasonably to be referred to him who does no favor, but only pure debt, then buyer and seller, lessor and lessee, hireling or servant and master, would owe thanks to one another mutually — which reason forbids, since without thanksgiving each side has been fully satisfied and recompensed in all things. Why then would thanksgiving further be expected, which is a certain retribution as has been said? Nor does custom hold this; and far be it that all such be mutually ungrateful, since no one can be ungrateful save of grace freely given. But according to the Apostle, *Romans 4: "To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt"* — therefore it does not seem that any thanks be referable from such a worker to his master. Whence *Luke 6: "If you love them that love you, what thanks are due to you?"* And below, chapter 17: *"Which of you having a servant ploughing or feeding cattle, will say to him when he is come in from the field, Pass forthwith, sit down to meat, and will not rather say to him: Make ready my supper, and gird thyself, and serve me whilst I eat and drink, and afterwards thou shalt eat and drink? Doth he thank that servant for doing the things which he commanded him? I think not."*

From which therefore Christ gave thanks to the Father because he heard him, it seems that he did not merit *de condigno*, as is permitted, to be heard; therefore neither anything at all, by similar reasoning.

And when it is argued that *the merit of Christ exceeds the merit of any pure man infinitely, since Christ thus exceeds any man*: perhaps this is not necessary, since one could thus argue concerning his understanding, his volition, his speaking, his walking, and any other operation of his.

The merit of Christ, however, can be considered in two ways. In one mode, with respect to the act itself of meriting, which is properly called merit; and so it seems to have been only finite, like the soul, the potency, the act, and the habit whence it proceeded. For according to the foregoing in the 40th part of the first corollary of this work, no creature is, nor can be, infinite. Nor does that causal hold: *Christ exceeds any man infinitely; therefore the merit of Christ likewise [exceeds]*. For likewise God exceeds any creature; and yet not any motion made — or possible to be made — immediately by God, similarly exceeds the motion made by any creature. And specifically this causal does not hold concerning the merit of Christ, because Christ has two natures: the divine, namely, infinite — and according to that he did not merit; and the human, finite — and according to that only he merited.

Otherwise can the merit of Christ be considered: namely, with respect to the price which through it he offered to God the Father; and thus it can congruously be called *infinite*. For through the meritorious act of his proper human will, he offered himself entire — the perfect Son of God, perfect God and man — to God the Father, as a price for redeeming men. Wherefore, although he had assumed however imperfect a human nature, and so through a meritorious act of will more remiss in any whatsoever proportion he had similarly offered himself, or although perhaps in the

natural [endowments] now assumed, through a meritorious act of will as remiss as you will, he had similarly offered himself for redeeming men, he would have most sufficiently redeemed them — not by reason of the infinity of the act, of the will, or of the merit properly, but by reason of this infinite price, infinitely infinite, offered through that merit. Just as if of two willing to buy the same vendible thing, one with most fervent will offers a price less than just, the other with the most remiss will offers a just price, or a greater one — this man will have the thing, that one will lack it. And this not by reason of the diversity of the acts of will, but only of the offered prices.

Whence also *1 Timothy 2*: "*There is one God,*" says the Apostle, "*and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.*" And according to this opinion can be understood the saying of Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* 2.14, alleged above; and this appears through him below in the same, chapter 20, saying thus: "What can be understood more merciful than that to a sinner, condemned to eternal torments and not having whereby to redeem himself, God the Father should say: *Take my only-begotten and give him for thyself*, and the Son himself: *Take me, and redeem thyself*? For as it were they say this when they call us and draw us to the Christian faith. What also can be more just than that he to whom is given a price greater than every debt, if it be given with a due affection, should remit every debt?"

But granting that the merit of Christ had been infinite in the species of merit properly, still it does not follow that he merited anything *de condigno* in the first mode — namely, antecedently to the divine will. Because still the divine will would have first made in the human will of Christ any merit of his by nature, and would have first willed eternally and in time and by nature that Christ and any Christian have whatever through that he merited for himself or for his own — as can appear from what has been said in this chapter and in others. And if you do not believe me, at least believe the truth saying: "*I have not spoken of myself, but he who sent me, the Father himself hath given me commandment what I should say and what I should speak,*" *John 12*. And earlier, chapter 5: "*I cannot of myself do anything; but as I hear, so I judge, and my judgment is just, because I seek not my own will, but the will of him that sent me, the Father.*" Treating which Augustine on *John*, part 2, homily 45 (or 99 of the whole), says thus: "On account of the person of the Son, one made of two substances, divine and human, sometimes he speaks according to what he is as God — as is that which he says: *I and the Father are one*; sometimes according to what he is as man — as is that: *Because the Father is greater than I*, according to which we have received what is said by him, and concerning which I now dispute: *I cannot do anything of myself, but as I hear I judge.*"

Yet, these things notwithstanding, certain ones strive to assert that Christ condignly merited both for himself and for us. *For one merits condignly that which, if he should demand it, it is necessary to be rendered to him; but if Christ should demand glory for himself and for us, it is necessary that it be rendered. Christ also, by meriting, willed that glory be rendered to himself and to his own; and whatsoever he willed, was necessary to be fulfilled — otherwise the divine will could be frustrated, which chapter 10 manifestly forbids.*

To which it must be briefly answered: that the first assumption is not true universally understood. For if Christ — according to what was possible for him, as the divine omnipotence shows, and is plain through Lombard *Sentences* 3, distinction 18 — had assumed an impassible body, perfectly glorious, such as he now has, and without all merit had demanded glory for himself or for us, it would have been necessary that it be rendered, not because he had condignly merited it, but because he had so willed; and his human will would necessarily have been conformed to the divine will, as appears from the premises, and because he cannot sin; and the divine will is necessarily always just, and effectively fulfilled. Or if his human will could have been contrary to or differently willing from the divine will, it would not have been necessary that such a willed thing be rendered to him, since neither just, as chapter 21 has shown.

Whatever also the Father or the Holy Spirit demands, it is necessary that it be rendered to him, as chapter 10 of this work proves; and yet they merit nothing.

If, however, that first assumption be understood in this way: that one condignly merits everything which, if he should demand it by reason of merit *de condigno* in the first mode — namely, antecedently to the divine will, and of the rigor of absolute justice — it is similarly necessary to be rendered to him: it must be said as before, that neither Christ, nor any other, can so actually merit anything from God. Therefore neither can Christ, by reason of this merit, demand anything from God — unless Christ could err and will contrarily or differently from the divine will. And if, in demanding anything, he so did, it would not be necessary that it be rendered to him, since neither just, as chapter 21 demonstrated.

The other argument premised can also be resolved through what has already been had. The remaining objections raised above have been rejected by the foregoing — up to the last of them, which was concerning the distinction of merit *de congruo* and *de condigno*. For which it seems that this distinction must be made: that *merit de condigno* is taken triply, as has been said; but *merit de congruo* is potential merit, of which it was said above — namely, such a good or evil work which by congruity or congruence of the work is rewardable, that is, possible and able to be rewarded; not that by congruity or some congruence prior to the divine will it is actually to be rewarded, as has been shown above.

COROLLARY

A COROLLARY AGAINST CERTAIN OTHER MOST RECENT DEFENDERS OF PELAGIUS, FEIGNING THAT, ALTHOUGH MAN CAN IN NO WAY MERIT THE FIRST GRACE, HE CAN HOWEVER OBTAIN IT BY HIS OWN POWERS ALONE.

From these things, however, is clearly convicted a certain most recent error of the Pelagians feigning that, although man in no way — neither *de condigno* nor *de congruo* — is able to merit grace, he can however obtain it by his own powers alone. Whence also no less clearly can be refuted a certain Pelagian error perhaps to be feigned and said: that God does not give grace to

man on account of any antecedent merit, but on account of his future merits foreseen by him — just as a sower sows good seed in the earth which he foresees will bring forth abundant fruits. These errors, however, can easily be corrected by what has been touched upon here and in the foregoing chapters.

For many, like baptized infants who continually die, effectively receive great grace, who never bear good fruit from it, never bring forth sweet fruits, but bitter ones; never make grapes, but wild grapes; or if at some time they do certain pleasing works, returning to their vomit and choking grace, they do many evil things, and progress and persevere in them — finally hardened.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters 40–42

CHAPTER XL.

THAT GRACE, WHICH IS A HABIT FREELY GIVEN BY GOD, TOGETHER WITH THE HUMAN WILL IS PROPERLY THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF EVERY GOOD AND MERITORIOUS ACT OF ITSELF.

After these things, the grace of God, with me, will demonstrate (as I hope) that grace itself is properly the efficient cause of every good act—namely the grace freely given, which is a habit of the soul freely infused by God, according to the distinction concerning grace made in chapter 25, of which the immediately preceding chapters were also speaking. For if grace were not properly the efficient cause of a good act, a man could from his own natural powers, without grace, fulfill God's commandments and accomplish any good act—contrary to what was demonstrated just above. For if one having grace performs his every act with grace doing absolutely nothing along with him, then he could likewise act with grace removed; for neither the total efficient cause nor even a partial efficient cause would be removed. Likewise, if grace or charity does not produce the act of human love by which one fulfills the commandment concerning love, by the same reasoning neither do faith and hope, infused habits (as is clear from what was alleged in the preceding chapter), produce the acts of believing and hoping. Therefore a man could, from himself and from his natural powers and naturally acquired powers, believe, hope, love, and do whatever he ought—which is a manifest error of Pelagius, and contrary to what was previously shown.

Likewise, the theological and supernatural virtues are not less efficacious for similar acts than the natural, moral, and intellectual virtues; but all these latter properly produce their acts. For who doubts that natural forms and virtues produce their acts? And who is unaware that moral virtues produce moral acts, and intellectual virtues likewise produce intellectual acts? Why otherwise would those lacking these virtues not act in the same way as those possessing them, since no

efficient principle would be lacking to them? Hence the Philosopher in *Ethics* II.1, 2, and 3 shows that moral virtues are generated from works, and once generated they generate similar works; and there in chapter 3, after a multifold demonstration of this, he says: "Therefore virtue is supposed to be such as is operative concerning pleasures and griefs in the best things, but vice the contrary." And further, finally concluding: "Since therefore virtue concerns delights and griefs; and since by those things from which it comes to be, by these same things it is increased and corrupted when not similarly performed; and since from those things from which it comes to be, concerning these things it operates—let this be said." And above in I.7 he defines the happy man as one operating according to perfect virtue, which he very often suggests in many other places.

Likewise grace or charity makes the intention right, lifts and erects the will, as was shown in the preceding chapter—just as in moral matters moral virtue does, by testimony of the Philosopher there, and as more fully alleged in chapter 34. Likewise virtue, and especially the highest virtue—namely grace or charity—is no less efficacious than vice; but vice produces evil acts; therefore grace or charity also produces good acts. To say nothing of morally acquired vices, who is unaware, who does not feel, what acts that one root vice produces—the law of the members, the tyrant of nature, the tinder of sin, concupiscence or the concupiscibility of our flesh, which is also frequently called original sin by the Doctors? Witness is too-frequent experience, exceedingly violent. Witness is the Apostle, saying: "I am carnal, sold under sin; for what I work I do not understand: for what I will, this I do not, but what I hate, that I do; now then it is no longer I that work it, but sin that dwells in me. For I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man; but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin," Romans 7. Witnesses are the Glosses and the expositions of the saints expounding this letter. Witness is almost the entire 40th distinction of the second book of the Sentences of Lombard, where he plainly holds this view and confirms it through Augustine. For he says: "Original sin is called the tinder of sin—namely concupiscence or concupiscibility, which is called the law of the members, or the languor of nature, or the tyrant which is in our members, or the law of the flesh." Hence Augustine in the book *On the Baptism of Little Ones*: "There is in us concupiscence, which is not to be permitted to reign; and there are its desires, which are actual concupiscences, which are the weapons of the Devil, which come from the languor of nature; for that languor is the tyrant which moves evil desires." And further: "By the name of concupiscence he signified not the act of desiring, but the depraved vice, when he called it the law of the flesh." Hence the same Augustine in the *Tractate on the Words of the Apostle* says: "There is always a battle in the body of this death, because the very concupiscence with which we are born cannot be ended as long as we live; daily it can be diminished, but not ended. What, then, is the concupiscence with which we are born? It is surely a vice, which makes the little child capable of desire, and renders the adult also desiring."

Since therefore cupidity is so combative, so efficacious, and so manifoldly active, how does charity restrain, diminish, and overcome it, if it does absolutely nothing, if it absolutely moves

nothing, if it is utterly idle? Not so, not so does the Apostle hold in 1 Corinthians 13, saying: "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envies not, deals not perversely, is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeks not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinks no evil, rejoices not in iniquity"—as if he were plainly saying: "It does not do these things, but the contraries of these." Hence he immediately adds: "But rejoices with the truth, bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things." Which Augustine, in *On the Four Virtues of Charity*—where he beautifully shows that "charity tolerates all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things"—demonstrates beautifully. Hence among other things, in the person of Abraham (to whom he attributes the second of these virtues), he says: "The virtue of charity remaining in me believes, does, and says all things. For I hear it speaking within me to my heart without sound of voice." And further: "O charity, who can do so much in this battle of mortality, still anxious—how much will you be able to do in that perfect peace, secure?" The same Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, near the end, says: "Cupidity is diminished as charity grows, until charity comes here to such a magnitude that there cannot be a greater; but there—who can explain how great charity will be, where there will be no cupidity at all to overcome by restraint? When health will be at its height, when there will be no struggle of mortality?" The same to Anastasius, as Peter [Lombard] alleges in *Sentences* II, dist. 26: "Without the Spirit, the will of man is not free. For when it is conquered by cupidities, it is not free for good unless it be liberated; nor is it liberated unless through the Spirit charity be poured into the hearts. The will is not free unless grace liberates it through the law of faith—that is, it is not free without faith working through love—and that suffices and is truly good. For there is no good fruit which does not arise from the root of charity. But if faith working through love is present, there comes about a delight in the good." The same in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 13 says: "There is no good fruit which does not arise from the root of charity"; and as Peter cites in *Sentences* III, dist. 31: "The root of all evils is cupidity, and the root of all goods is charity. But what kind of root is charity—living or dead? Not dead—it is plainly established. And how is it living, if it produces or yields nothing of living work or fruit?"

The same Augustine on Psalm 31, sermon 1, treating that text of the Apostle in Romans 13, "The fullness of the law is love" (or charity, according to another translation), says: "Does charity ever permit you to do anything evil to him whom you love? But perhaps you do nothing evil and also nothing good. Therefore neither does charity permit you to fail to do whatever you can for him whom you love. Is not that the charity which prays even for enemies? Therefore it does not desert a friend, when it wishes well to an enemy. Therefore if faith is without love, it will be without work. But that you may not think much about the work of faith, add to it hope and love, and do not consider what you may do; for love itself cannot be idle." With which also in concord, Gregory in homily 27 on the Gospels, expounding John 15, "This is my commandment, that you love one another," says: "Every commandment concerns love alone, and all are one precept, because whatever is commanded is grounded solely in charity. For just as many branches of a tree come forth from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity, nor does the branch of a good work have any greenness, if it does not remain in the root of charity. Therefore

the Lord's precepts are both many and one—many through diversity of work, one in the root of love." The same in homily 30: "The love of God is never idle; for it works great things, if it exists; but if it refuses to work, it is not love." And Peter in *Sentences* II, dist. 26 says: "That grace itself is not idle, but merits to be increased, that increased it may merit also to be perfected." Again the Apostle to the Galatians 5 says: "Faith works through love"; and again 1 Corinthians 15: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been void, but I have labored more abundantly than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God with me." Who therefore would say that charity or grace works absolutely nothing? If anyone should think so, let him read the books and expositions of Augustine and the other Doctors on these and very many similar authoritative passages, and he will cease to think so. The same is testified by very many authorities cited in the preceding chapters—among which is that of Augustine in the *Hypognosticon* 60, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 48, *On Grace and Free Choice* 36, and to Simplicianus 24; and that of Anselm in *On Concord and Truth*, cited in the preceding chapter, are explicit.

Who, even one who has barely entered the outer court of theology, would not know that most common division of grace into operating and cooperating, since almost all the Doctors and disciples most frequently affirm it? Hence Peter, in the *Sentences* II, distinctions 5, 26, 27, and 29, diligently expounds it. He also at the end of distinction 25, speaking of the freedom of nature and of grace, says: "The Apostle marks both freedoms when, in the person of unredeemed man, he says: 'To will is present with me, but to perform that which is good I find not'—as if he were saying: 'I have the freedom of nature, but I do not have the freedom of grace; therefore the perfection of good is not with me.' For the will which man has naturally is not able to be raised up to willing the good efficaciously, or fulfilling it in work, unless it be liberated and assisted by grace, that it may perform—because, as the Apostle says, 'It is not of him that wills to will, nor of him that runs to run' (that is, to work), 'but of God that shows mercy,' who works in us to will and to work the good, whose grace neither the will nor operation of man calls forth, but grace itself prevents the will, preparing it that it may will the good, and helps it once prepared, that it may not will in vain—that is, that it may perfect." And in distinction 26 he immediately adds: "This is operating and cooperating grace; for operating grace prepares the will of man so that it wills the good, while cooperating grace helps that he may not will in vain. Hence Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*: 'God by cooperating perfects in us what he begins by operating, because he himself operates as beginning so that we may will, and cooperates as perfecting with those who will. So he operates that we may will; therefore when we will, and we will so as to perfect, he cooperates with us; yet without him operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we are worth nothing for the good works of piety.'" And Peter adds: "From these words it is sufficiently clear what is operating grace and what is cooperating: for operating grace is that which prevents the will (for by it the will of man is liberated and prepared so that it may be good, and may efficaciously will the good); cooperating grace, however, follows the now-good will, helping it." And there further on he cites Augustine in *On the Predestination of the Saints* saying that grace is not given according to other merits, but it produces all good merits. Likewise in

distinction 27 he writes: "Some not unlearnedly hand down that virtue is a good quality of mind, or a form which informs the soul, and itself is not a movement or an affection of the mind, but by it free choice is helped, that it may be moved and lifted up to the good; and so from virtue and free choice arises a good motion or affection of the mind." And there he immediately says that it is so concerning grace and the human will. And further on: "In meriting good things the principality of cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is excited, and the will of man is healed and helped that it may be good—which is also itself a gift of God, and the merit of man, indeed of grace, because principally it is from grace, and is grace. Hence Augustine to Sixtus the Presbyter: 'What is the merit of man before grace, when none of our good merit is in us except by grace?' For from grace, as has been said, which prevents and heals the choice of man, and from this very choice itself, there is procured in the soul a good affection, or a good motion of mind—and this is the first good merit of man. Just as, for example, from faith, virtue, and the choice of man there is generated in the mind a certain good motion that is rewardable—namely the very act of believing—so from charity and free choice there comes forth another motion that is exceedingly good, namely loving. So is to be understood concerning the other virtues." The same in *Sentences* III, dist. 36 says that "charity is the mother of all virtues; but what kind of mother? barren or fruitful? And how is she barren when she is a mother? But if she is fruitful, how does she bring forth nothing?"

Here, however, many friends of the Pelagians try in many ways to respond, who nevertheless all agree in this one point—that grace, the created virtue, or charity, does not truly and properly produce good acts according to the substance of the acts, but either does not produce them at all, or produces them only in some improper and transferred way. For some say that grace or charity, the created virtue, in no way produces good acts, but rather uncreated grace and charity, which is God and the Holy Spirit of God; and so they understand all the authorities saying grace or charity produces any act. But although these men can in some manner evade certain authorities cited above, they cannot evade the reasons. Whoever is Catholic looks with sound eyes at such authorities—some on the surface of the letter, some a little within—and can immediately perceive another sense, namely concerning created grace and charity. Hence Peter in *Sentences* II, dist. 27, among the other things alleged above, says: "When good merits are said to be from grace and to begin, either grace freely-giving (that is, God) is understood, or rather grace freely-given, which prevents the will of man (for it would not be a great matter if these were said to be from God, from whom are all things); but rather his grace freely-given is understood, from which good merits begin—which when they are said to be from grace alone, free choice is not excluded, because there is no merit in the adult man which is not through free choice. But in the meriting of good things the principality of cause is attributed to grace, because the principal cause of good merits is the grace itself by which free choice is excited, and the will of man is healed and helped, that it may be good."

Others, however, say that grace is said to produce a good act because it excites the will so that the will itself produces a good act. But these men also are reasonably refuted by the reasons given above. Likewise, if grace excites the will, it moves the will in some way, and produces some act; and if it does this by preventing the will not yet acting, why can it not by similar reasoning co-act the meritorious act with the will itself acting? Who, unless ungrateful to grace, would assign to the grace of God the worse or less good act, and to one's own natural powers the more good act? For who is unaware that the meritorious act is incomparably better than the bare excitation toward it, with which it is consistent that one merit nothing—indeed, sin? But the things alleged in the preceding chapters do not allow this. A man or angel could also will and act without such excitation, since it does nothing along with [the act] here or there; and therefore could fulfill all God's commandments without grace, which is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter recited. Moreover, the human will could similarly be excited by something other than grace—namely by reason, by moral virtue, by a teacher, by natural instinct or inclination, or by various other things; therefore these other things suffice without grace for fulfilling the commandments. According to this view also, the created will would be a more principal cause of merit than grace: for it principally—indeed singularly—produces the merit, while grace only excites toward acting. But this is plainly contrary to the Apostle alleged above: "I have labored more abundantly than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God with me." For how should this be understood, except that not I principally and grace instrumentally, but the contrary—as is also plainly testified by the saying of Lombard cited against the foregoing response?

Others suppose that grace produces good acts not effectively but only formally, just as whiteness makes the subject white, and the soul makes a thing animate, and any form makes its formed thing. But these things can be refuted by the reasons and authorities alleged above. Likewise grace, which is an infused habit, is not the natural and essential form of the act of willing of the gracious one, just as no habit is the form of its act; for the act is more actual than the habit, nor is the subject of the habit natural [to it], nor composite from habit and act as from form and matter, but is simple. Nor is grace the material cause of the good act—for instance, of due love of God and neighbor—nor the final cause, as no one is unaware; nor (as these say) the efficient cause; therefore a man could perform that act and fulfill the commandments without grace, from his natural powers alone, just as Pelagius raved; for no required cause would be wanting. But if anyone should say that grace is improperly a form, and somehow the actual [form] of the good act, namely because it informs the will performing it, he falls into the deep of Pelagius mentioned above. He must consequently say that every act proceeding from such a will is good and gracious, because similarly informed by grace—which is not true of the acts of children, nor of all the acts of adults, since it is not true of indifferent acts and venial sins. By the same reasoning every act of a wise man would be wise, or done wisely; every act of the temperate, temperate, or done temperately; and so concerning all the virtues and vices universally—which no one doubts to be false. These men also, contrary to the Apostle, place grace empty, that is idle, as the Gloss expounds; therefore they themselves seem empty and inane of grace.

Others still suppose that grace is said to produce good acts because it binds and represses repugnant concupiscence, and once concupiscence is bound, the gracious will produces gracious acts. But the reasons and authorities given above refute these men. How also does grace bind and repress repugnant concupiscence, if it does absolutely nothing, as was touched on above? Or if grace does anything for the repression of concupiscence, why not, by similar reasoning, for the production of a good act—as was argued above against the second response? Likewise, men constituted in grace sometimes have concupiscence as strong, and sometimes stronger, than men destitute of grace, as the lives of many saints, and especially Saint Paul in 1 Corinthians 12, evidently show concerning himself. Therefore such men destitute of grace can produce good acts and fulfill God's commandments, just as such men constituted in grace can. Therefore these men also, like the previous, are absorbed in the gulf of the Pelagian deep. The same can also be shown otherwise thus: because however much concupiscence is bound and quieted by grace, just so much could it be quieted by moral virtues, by medicine, by natural alteration, and in some men by their own natural complexion. Therefore such men by the power of nature, without such grace, could observe all God's commandments; therefore these men also slip back into the deep of Pelagius. To the same point: if a gracious man, with concupiscence somewhat repressed by grace, can produce a great act and great merit, then a non-gracious man, slightly more impeded by concupiscence somewhat greater, can produce a similar act—though perhaps proportionally less, and perhaps so much the better as it is more difficult—as the preceding chapter argued: for similarly unequal causes produce similarly unequal effects. Hence the Philosopher in *On the Heavens* III, c. 72, refuting those who hold that fire burns on account of angles—namely the sharpness of angles—says: "If fire heats and burns on account of angles, all the elements will be heat-producing; some perhaps more than others. For all have angles—both the eight-based and the twelve-based, and the pyramid; according to Democritus also the sphere has an angle—and so it burns; whereby they differ in more and less."

Likewise, then the angel and man in the state of innocence before the Fall would in no way have needed grace to merit; for he had no reluctant concupiscence—the opposite of which was shown in the preceding chapter. Hence Augustine in *Enchiridion* 87 says: "Human nature lost through free choice that immortality in which it could not die; this immortality, in which it cannot die, it is going to receive through grace, which it would have received through merit if it had not sinned, although there could not have been then nor any merit then without grace. For although sin was constituted in free choice alone, yet free choice was not sufficient for retaining justice, unless divine help were offered through participation in the immutable Good." This same thing Peter in *Sentences* II, distinctions 5, 24, and 29 proves and holds.

Others opine that grace is said to produce good acts because, by characterizing the soul to the Lord and clothing it with the garment of the Lord, it renders it terrifying to the adverse power, so that it dare not attack it as another which lacks these things; and so the gracious soul can freely perform gracious works. But these men, like the foregoing, will be propelled into the pit of perdition, into the deep of Pelagius.

Others judge that grace is said to produce good acts because it liberates and justifies a man from sin, which had impeded him from doing good acts. But these men are refuted, by the principal reasons and authorities, and also by what was given above against the fourth response, together with their father Pelagius. The Pelagians are also condemned especially on account of this opinion. For they hold (as Augustine recites in *On Grace and Free Choice* 16): "That grace alone, which is not given according to our merits, is that by which our sins are forgiven; but that which we expect at the end—namely eternal life—is given according to our merits"—understanding our merits to come to us from ourselves, not from the grace of God or from God. Hence Augustine, after reciting this Pelagian error, adds: "It must be answered them: If they so understood our merits as to recognize them themselves to be gifts of God, this opinion would not be reprehensible. But since they so preach human merits as to say that man has them from himself, the Apostle most rightly answers: 'For who distinguishes you? And what have you that you have not received? But if you have received, why do you glory as though you had not received?' Surely to one thinking such things it is most truly said: God crowns his gifts, not your merits. If your merits are from yourself, not from him, they are evil—which God crowns? But if they are good, they are gifts of God, namely through his grace freely given." In the Council of Mileve also, celebrated against the Pelagians—at which Augustine was present, as is clear from Epistle 134 among his Epistles, and as is contained in the Canon *De Consecratione* dist. 4—it was concordantly decreed: "That whoever shall say that the grace of God by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord avails only for the remission of sins already committed, and is not a help that they may not be committed, let him be anathema."

There are many other tortuous little responses, which through what has been given here and in the preceding chapters can easily be straightened out, by the help of God's grace—indeed, by it principally operating.

After these things, however, objection is made against these things. For if grace properly produces a gracious act, the gracious man will operate more easily and more strongly than the non-gracious. For the former has the great help of grace, the latter none—the opposite of which, as it seems, the most ungrateful sinners show by experience. Likewise, let A be one whole meritorious act done by grace and the human will; and let B be a part of A done by grace; and let C be a part of A done by the human will alone. Therefore C is meritorious, or A is meritorious only with respect to C, because C alone comes from the free will of man—for in this alone all merit consists. Likewise let a man set for himself a certain degree of love which he would have without grace co-acting; then if he should love with grace co-acting, he will love beyond that degree; therefore he will love at least as intensely, violently, and unwillingly; therefore not meritoriously. Therefore if grace be posited as active, it takes away merit and the freedom of choice. Likewise grace and the human will are either equally powerful or unequally; if equally, each can impede the other so that it does nothing—and so grace could violently prohibit a man from sinning, and from willing this or that; and thus everyone having such grace would be finally confirmed [in good]. If unequally, then either grace is more powerful, or the will. If grace, the

foregoing absurdity returns; grace can also make the will will unwillingly, and detain it unwilling in the act of willing. If the will is more powerful than grace, the will can be weakened, or grace strengthened, until they are equally powerful or grace more powerful—and if this be posited, the difficulty returns. Likewise, since grace is an irrational agent, and not [acting] from choice, if it be an agent, it always necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, as much as it can; therefore whatever action of whatever species or degree grace once produces, the gracious man also always produces it. Nor does it seem consonant with reason that an irrational agent should produce a free act, and freely, but [rather] by necessity of nature. Likewise, then it would not be in a man's power to keep the commandments, nor to be saved, since it is not in his power to have such grace as is necessarily required. Many similar objections could also be raised, but with these solved the solution of others similar will be clear, by the grace of God revealing it.

To these ungracious objections, by the help of grace, response must be made. For the first, what theologian doubts that charity and grace make the yoke of the Lord sweet, and his burden light, when so many Doctors teach this in so many places? Which also that secretary of God Isaiah, seeing, said: "He gives strength to the weary, and to those who are not, he multiplies might and strength. Boys shall fail, and labor, and youths shall fall in infirmity. But they that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall take wings as eagles; they shall run and not labor, they shall walk and not faint," Isaiah 40. Wherefore concerning the wicked, in the person of the wicked, the Wise Man says thus: "We have wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity and destruction, and have walked through hard ways; but the way of the Lord we have not known"—and Scripture brings forth many similar things.

But for a more sufficient and subtle solution of this objection, it must be noted that—according to what was shown in the preceding chapter—the proper operation of charity and grace is to love God dearly and freely above all things, finally for his own sake, and so to do other things for the sake of God. But no one lacking charity and grace can have such love and operation; rather, as long as he lacks them, he necessarily loves chiefly his own advantage and himself, and on account of his own advantage and himself finally performs all other things. Therefore the love and operation of charity or grace—or of the dear and gracious one—proceeding from charity and grace, differs specifically from the love and operation of one not dear and not gracious. For just as the objects of loves, and the things finally loved, differ in species, so also do their proper loves: as is the case in cognition and proper and distinct vision; otherwise also all volitions and loves would be of the same most special species, and all cognitions and visions likewise; and so concerning the other powers and their proper operations whatsoever. Hence the Philosopher *Ethics* VIII.3: from the fact that there are three species of lovable things—namely the useful, the delightful, and the honest or virtuous—it follows that there must be three species of lovings and friendships. For he says: "These differ from one another in species; and lovings therefore and friendships are equal in number to lovable things." And further on at VIII.7: "But there is another species of friendship, which is according to superabundance—as of father to son, and in general of an elder to a younger, of a husband to a wife, of every ruler to one ruled. But these differ from

one another: for it is not the same in parents toward children, and in rulers toward those ruled; nor in father toward son, and son toward father; nor in husband toward wife, and wife toward husband. For each of these has another virtue and work, another reason for which they love—therefore other lovings and friendships." Anselm also in *On Free Choice* 7, having made the distinction concerning will into the natural instrument by which we will, and into its use or work, adds: "That which is the work is as manifold as how many and how often we will—just as sight, which is the work, and is named vision, is as numerous as how numerously we see."

The same can also be shown briefly and theologically thus: If a non-gracious man could love and act with any love and action of the same species as the gracious man, he could without grace fulfill all the commandments just as the gracious man does—which is the error of Pelagius, as the preceding chapter manifests. Therefore the love of the gracious one from grace and that of the non-gracious one differ in species. Yet the gracious man can sometimes love and operate not from grace but from natural friendship, from affection of advantage, from appetite for what is delightful and useful to himself—performing an indifferent act, or even a venial sin. Either, then, the objection compares an act of the gracious man proceeding from grace with any act of the non-gracious man, and then they differ in species, and no experience shows that the non-gracious man can act so strongly an act of the same species as an act of the gracious man proceeding from grace; therefore the objection does not stand. Or it compares an act of the gracious man not proceeding from grace with an act of the non-gracious man similar in species—and so they can well act equally strongly, because grace does not co-act, nor help the gracious man there; therefore neither does this objection stand.

For the second, it must be known that it in no way proceeds, because by similar [reasoning] it could be shown that God does not produce a meritorious act of the will—the opposite of which is clear from chapter 3 of this work, and 4, and many other chapters previously discussed. It also imagines a falsehood: for if A has, just as it has, diverse parts, both grace and the will produce the whole and any part of it—not separately but conjointly, not successively but simultaneously, just as God and the will [do]; just as also two men draw a ship. Hence Bernard in *On Grace and Free Choice* 23: "To this end grace prevents free choice, that thereafter it may cooperate with itself; yet so that what was begun by grace alone is perfected equally by both—that they may operate mixedly not separately, simultaneously not by turns, through each effect; not partly grace, partly free choice, but each performs the whole through an indivisible work—the whole indeed this, and the whole that, but as the whole [is] in that, so the whole [is] from that."

The third is removed as the second: for similarly it could be shown that God does not produce a free and meritorious act of the will. And it is nonetheless solved abundantly as the first: for a man cannot without grace love under any degree with a love of that species which is from grace proceeding. Yet to dig out its root, I say that although the non-gracious man could love similarly in species as the gracious man does from grace, the objection would not stand. For grace would not make him will violently and unwillingly, or so intensely; but from one willing and reluctant it would make him willing freely and loving voluntarily—for this is proper to grace, as what was

set forth here concerning grace manifests. This is also specially manifested by the conversion of Saint Paul, and by him whom by the prayers of Saint Stephen, the founder of the Grandimontensian order, divine grace converted. For William of Auvergne, in part three of his *Tripartitum* 22, recounts in this manner concerning a certain such man—who indeed forbade that prayer be made for him, and who said that he in no way wanted to obtain the grace of repentance or conversion. With him unwilling and resisting, Saint Stephen, founder of the Grandimontensian order, made prayer for him with his community, and was heard. For when they had prayed for him, that man came to them, announcing to them how he had been visited; and making confession of his sins with much devotion and tears, he did penance.

He also sins gravely who is ignorant of the *elenchus*. For how does it stand contrary, that someone now wills one thing, and previously did not will it, or willed its opposite? What contradiction? Or why does such a man will unwillingly? For example, suppose this man set for himself yesterday that today he would feed one poor man; and that today, visited with more abundant grace, he wishes to feed two, and feeds them. What violence? What contradiction is between these things? It seems also very probable that a man can with grace and from grace will however remissly. Therefore a man can from grace love under as great a degree as he had set for himself, and as he would have been going to have without grace, and even under a lesser degree.

The fourth sins as the third and the second; for so it could be proved that God does not produce our free acts, and also that the grace of confirmation would do violence to the will of the confirmed [one] toward not sinning, and toward his beatific act—which nevertheless can be solved as the third.

The fifth, if it should prove anything, would similarly prove that neither the end, nor its species in the soul, nor its cognition, would move the willing one, nor in any way produce a free act of the will—contrary to chapters 19 and 21 above. Who also, having barely entered into philosophy, has not read that chapter of *On the Soul* III, *On the Mover*, where it is sufficiently shown that imagination is one cause moving animals, and intellect [moves] men in their forward motion? How is this to be understood, except that imagination is one efficient cause of appetite in animals; the intellect indeed (namely the species of the object in the intellect, or the act of understanding—the very intellection itself) [is the cause] of will in men—by which and from which animals and men are moved progressively, as is evidently gathered from the discussion? Who does not see that discussion in *Metaphysics* XII where the Philosopher shows that the first mover, which is God, moves—as the new translation says—just as the desirable and the intelligible move while not being moved, and as the loved [moves]; and as the translation Averroes expounds says, moves as the desired and the understood, and as the loved? On which Averroes, comment 36, says: "This mover is a mover because it produces motion, and because it is the end of motion; but these differ in us—namely that which moves us in place insofar as it is an agent, and that which moves us insofar as it is an end. And it has a double existence: in the soul and outside the soul. For what is in the soul is the agent of motion; what is outside the soul is the mover according to end. For example, since a bath has a double form—in the soul and

outside the soul—we desire that other form which is outside the soul beyond that form which is in the soul; and on account of that form which is in the soul we desire the other form which is outside the soul. Therefore the form of the bath, insofar as it is in the soul, is the agent of desire and motion; insofar as it is outside the soul, it is the end of motion, not the agent."

This same thing reason also manifests; for cognition is necessarily presupposed to volition; therefore there is some cause of it (volition), as has been shown in the foregoing; and not the material, formal, or final cause; therefore it is the efficient cause of it. And this seems to be the reasoning of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III, where he was alleged. Cognition is also naturally and essentially prior to volition, therefore it is also some cause of it, as is plain from chapter 13 of this work, and so on, as before. From these things it is recognized that it is not contrary to reason—as the sixth supposes—that an irrational agent should produce a free act; rather, necessary reasoning requires this. That, however, only an irrational agent should produce this would be [contrary to reason]; but that it should produce it together with a rational [agent] is in no way contrary to reason. The last objection, however, is purely Pelagian. For it would prove that grace is not necessarily required for the observance of the commandments, nor for attaining perpetual salvation; nor does it stand more against one saying grace is active than against one saying it is not active—provided he says it is necessarily required for salvation, as anyone is necessarily compelled to say who does not wish to profess the Pelagian heresy, as the preceding chapters manifest.

CHAPTER XLI.

THAT GRACE NATURALLY PRIOR TO THE HUMAN WILL PRODUCES GOOD ACTS.

Having shown that grace, together with the will, produces good acts, it must further be inquired whether both [are] equally first according to nature, or one [is] naturally prior to the other—and if so, which of them. I think, however, that grace freely infused naturally prior to the will produces good acts. For the human will, by the heaviness of sin or of nature, is so depressed that it cannot but love itself and its own advantage finally on account of its very self—namely, the will—unless by the power of grace it be raised to God above all things, to be loved gratuitously on account of him alone, as chapter 39 proves.

But such a thing raising it necessarily prevents the thing so raised in its ascent—as appears clearly with a stone elevated above. And especially because the soul thus depressed cannot of itself ascend in any way of that species, as the immediately preceding chapter makes plain. For just as a heavy and weak man lying on the ground, unable much or little to raise himself up by himself, can yet—with another preventing him and continuously fore-raising him, and continuously holding him up that he may not fall back—in some way co-raise himself, and in order to raise himself he necessarily needs at the beginning, and continuously, such a fore-raising

and continuously sustaining one—so it is with the created will destitute of grace, or aided by grace.

This, however, is true not only on account of the depression of free choice through sin, but also on account of the natural heaviness of free choice, by which it is naturally bound to loving principally itself and its own advantage, etc., on account of these things, nor is it able to ascend to anything above itself—for instance, to God above itself, etc., to be loved gratuitously—unless it be prevented and raised continuously by grace, and continuously sustained that it may not fall back, as is plain from chapters 39 and 40 of this work.

This whole matter Daniel seems to have figured congruously when he said: "There remained no strength in me, but my appearance was changed in me, and I withered away, having no vigor at all, and I heard the voice of his words, and hearing I lay consternated upon my face, and my countenance clung to the earth. And behold, a hand touched me, and raised me upon my knees, and upon the joints of my hands. And he said to me: Daniel, man of desires, understand the words which I speak to you, and stand in your degree; for now I am sent to you. And when he had spoken these words to me, I stood trembling. And he said to me: Fear not, Daniel," Daniel 10. Hence Gregory *Moralia* 22, ch. 18, on Job 31, "Through every step of mine I will pronounce him," says: "No one, deserting the lowest things, suddenly becomes the highest, because to obtain the merit of perfection, while the mind is daily led on high, this is undoubtedly arrived at by certain steps, as it were of an ascension. Hence aptly is added: 'Through every step of mine I will pronounce him.' Hence the Prophet says: 'I was awakened, and my spirit failed for a little while.' What is it then that he says, 'My spirit,' but the spirit of man—that is, the spirit of elation? And because by hidden grace we proceed to the love of God by a measure tempered from above, the more in us daily virtue grows from the Spirit of God, the more our spirit fails. For this spirit of error, because it is not suddenly cut off from us by the roots, is well said to have failed 'for a little while.' But then we are perfected fully in God when we have failed by the roots from ourselves. These measures of growing virtues, then, are called by the voices of holy men 'steps.'"

And further on, in the following chapter, confirming this through the deed of Daniel mentioned above, he says: "Well does the Prophet Daniel, when the Lord was speaking to him—while he was eager to insinuate to us the position of his body—signify these increments of merits. For he says: 'I heard the voice of his words, and hearing I lay consternated upon my face, and my countenance clung to the earth. And behold, a hand touched me, and lifted me upon my knees, and upon the joints of my hands. And he said to me: Daniel, man of desires, understand the words which I speak to you, and stand in your degree; for now am I sent to you. And when he had spoken these words to me, I stood trembling. And he said to me: Fear not.' This position of his body, while he was hearing the words of one speaking within, he would by no means express to us with such care, if he had known that it lacked mysteries. For in Sacred Scripture, of just men not only what they say, but very often also what they do, is prophecy. The holy man, therefore, full of mysteries within, expresses by the position of his body the power of the voice; and through the fact that he first lay prostrate on the earth, through the fact that he afterward

raised himself upon the joints of his hands and upon his knees, through the fact that at the last erected indeed but trembling he stood in himself, the whole order of our advancement is made known to us." Where, having expounded the prophetic words in order, on the last—namely "Fear not"—he says: "Aptly by the divine voice is it added, 'Fear not,' because when we recognize more in ourselves what we should fear, more is poured into us by internal grace concerning God which we should love—so that our contempt may pass over little by little into fear, and fear may pass over into charity; that whereas we resist God seeking us through contempt, we flee through fear, and with contempt and fear at length set aside, we are joined to him by love alone. For little by little we unlearn to fear him, and we cleave to him by the force of love alone. With certain steps, as it were, of our advancement having been set in place, we first place the foot of our mind in the lowest by fear, and afterward we lift it up to the heights of love through charity." With this is also consonant the saying of the same Gregory *Moralia* 22, ch. 9, set forth in chapter 35 of this work.

To this likewise sufficiently agrees Ezekiel saying: "I fell upon my face, and I heard the voice of one speaking. And he said to me: Son of man, stand upon your feet, and I will speak with you. And the Spirit entered into me after he had spoken to me, and set me upon my feet," Ezekiel 1. With these the Apostle also agrees, saying: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been void, but I have labored more abundantly than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God with me," 1 Corinthians 15. These passages clearly insinuate the priority of grace. For it is certain that the Apostle labored, by his own testimony. Why then does he say "not I, but grace," except to suggest that grace first and principally—as the principal efficient cause—produces good acts; but the man not so, but secondarily, instrumentally, and subserviently to grace thus acting? Wherefore Gregory in *Homily 9 on Ezekiel*, treating the words of Ezekiel and the Apostle just set forth, says thus: "Behold, the divine voice commanded the prostrate Prophet that he should rise, but he could in no way rise unless the Spirit of Almighty God had entered into him; because by the grace of Almighty God we can indeed strive after good works, but we cannot fulfill these unless he himself, who commands, helps. So Paul, when he was admonishing the disciples, saying: 'With fear and trembling work out your own salvation,' immediately—lest anyone in them should work these very good things—added, saying: 'For God it is who works in us both to will and to perfect according to good will.' Hence it is that Truth itself says to the disciples: 'Without me you can do nothing.'" And further on: "But it must be known that our evils only are ours; but our good things are both Almighty God's and ours: for he by inspiring prevents us, that we may will, and helping he follows after, that we may not will in vain, but may be able to fulfill what we will. With prevenient grace, however, and good will following, that which is the gift of Almighty God becomes our merit—which Paul well explains in a brief sentence, saying: 'I have labored more than all of them'; who, lest he should seem to have attributed to his own power what he had done, added: 'Yet not I, but the grace of God with me.' For because he was prevented by a heavenly gift, he as it were acknowledged himself to be alien from his own good work, saying, 'Yet not I.' But because the prevenient grace had made free choice in him into the good, by which free choice he had followed the same grace in the work, he added: 'But the

grace of God with me'—as if he were saying: 'In the good work I labored not I, but yet I.' For in that I was prevented by the gift of the Lord alone, not I; but in that I followed God by my will, also I." With these things, therefore, briefly said against Pelagius and Celestius, let us return to the order of expounding. "Son of man, stand upon your feet, and I will speak with you." The order of speech and of work is to be noted by us: because first the likeness of the glory of the Lord appears, that it may cast down; afterward he speaks, that he may reveal; then he sends the Spirit of superabundant grace, and lifts him up, and stands him upon his feet. For unless we saw something of eternity in the mind, never would we fall upon our face by repenting. But once we are lying down, the voice of the Lord consoles us—which nevertheless we cannot do by our own power; therefore the Spirit himself fills us, and lifts us, and stands us on our feet, that we who lay prostrate in penitence for our fault, may afterward stand upright in good work.

From these words of Gregory diligently inspected, it evidently appears that it is the heresy of Pelagius to say that grace does not precede free choice, but the contrary—which Augustine, Isidore, and the Canon also plainly testify, as was recited in chapter 36 of this work. Hence Lombard in *Sentences* II, dist. 26, citing Augustine for this same point, says: "A good will accompanies grace, not grace the will." Hence Augustine, writing to Pope Boniface against the Pelagians, says: "When faith obtains justification, just as God has dealt to each one a measure of faith, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but by it [grace] itself merit is earned to be increased—that increased it may merit also to be perfected—the will accompanying, not leading; following at the heels, not preceding." And Lombard adds: "Behold, expressly here you have it that grace prevents the merit of a good will, and the good will itself is the handmaid of grace, not its forerunner." Fulgentius also, Bishop of the Church of Ruspe—as Isidore reports in the *Catalogue of Illustrious Men* ch. 14—wrote and sent to the bishops two books *On the Truth of Predestination*, in which he demonstrates that the grace of God prevents the human will in good things. This same opinion the Apostle plainly teaches, saying: "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who shows mercy," Romans 9. For why does he say it is not of him willing to will, nor of him running to run (namely to work), but of God showing mercy—except to show that this is of God, and of divine mercy and grace primarily and principally, and as of the prior agent; but [it is] of him willing and running not so, but secondarily and instrumentally, and as of the posterior agent—as has also been shown above concerning a similar saying of his? This same understanding of this Apostolic saying is sufficiently shown by the expositions of Augustine in *Enchiridion* 23, and *On the Two Souls* 15, written in chapters 36 and 37 of this work.

Hence Peter in *Sentences* II, dist. 25, near the end, says: "The will of man, which he has naturally, is not able to be raised to willing the good efficaciously or to fulfilling it in work, unless through grace it be liberated and helped: liberated indeed that it may will, and helped that it may perfect; because, as the Apostle says, 'It is not of him willing to will, nor of him running to run' (that is, to work), 'but of God showing mercy,' who works in us to will and to work the good. The will or operation of man does not call forth grace, but grace itself prevents the will,

preparing it that it may will the good, and helps the prepared one, that it may not will in vain—that is, that it may perfect." And further on, in dist. 26, treating certain authorities which seem to assert that faith and the act of faith belong to free will, he says: "These things have been said in this way, because faith is not present except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith prevents, not in time but in cause and nature. Hence Augustine above congruently said that 'a good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and grace itself helps it, because it [grace] helps those by whom it is prevented—when it consents to them in the effect of the good—and is in them, because in time it is not preceded by them.'"

Likewise, who is unaware that a prior cause is more principal than a posterior one? But grace is the principal cause of every good act, as appears in the immediately preceding chapter against the second response. This same opinion is plainly taught by very many authorities cited in chapter 36 of this work and in those following—which the whole Catholic Church catholically professes, praying in this manner: "May your grace, O Lord, ever prevent and follow us, and continually grant us to be intent upon good works." If we naturally operate prior to grace, why do we ask that it itself prevent us by operating? Rather, we cause it to be intent upon good works, than it causes us. But if it be said that grace prevents us by liberating from sin, but does not properly produce meritorious acts, the preceding chapter contradicts it, by showing that grace properly produces good acts; against which it can also be specially contradicted, as was done against the sixth response of the same.

It is said otherwise: that grace naturally prior to [the will] produces the first good human act, but the other following acts the will operates naturally prior. But why so variously? What reason for the diversity, since the whole agent and the act are at first and afterward of similar account? Against this response also there proceed the reasons and authorities just given; especially that of the Apostle, "Not I, but the grace of God with me." For the Apostle is speaking of himself—not for the instant of his conversion, but for the time following, in which he was always in grace, and labored with grace—which is also plainly testified by Gregory expounding it, as is alleged above. The same is similarly testified by Augustine alleged above, saying that "grace merits to be increased, that increased it may merit also to be perfected, the will accompanying, not leading; following at the heels, not preceding." For he speaks expressly concerning the merit by which grace merits to be increased, which succeeds the first good act.

COROLLARY.

COROLLARY: THAT BOTH GOD, AND HIS CREATED GRACE, PROPERLY AND NATURALLY PRIOR PRODUCE ANY GOOD ACT OF A RATIONAL CREATURE THAN [DOES] THAT [CREATURE] ITSELF; AND THAT THE AUTHORS WHO SAY GOD PRODUCES OUR GOOD WORKS DO NOT EXCLUDE BUT INCLUDE THE GRACE OF GOD ALSO SIMILARLY PRODUCING THEM; AND THOSE SAYING

GOD'S GRACE PRODUCES OUR GOOD WORKS DO NOT EXCLUDE BUT INCLUDE GOD ALSO SIMILARLY OPERATING THE SAME.

From these things it is evidently inferred that both God and the created grace of God properly and naturally prior produce any good act of a rational creature than [does] the creature itself; and that the authors who say God produces our good works do not exclude but include God's grace producing the same likewise; and those saying that God's grace produces our good works do not exclude but include God producing the same likewise.

That God properly produces any good act is clear from chapters 3 and 4 of this work. It is similarly clear from chapter 27 and the following, together with chapter 10 of this work, plainly. And that grace likewise produces, and even prior in nature to the rational creature, is clear from chapters 40 and 41 of this work. That, however, God naturally prior produces—rather than the rational creature, in the good production common to both—who would not concede this, granted that God's grace there naturally prior produces, rather than such a creature? For who, even lightly considering, would think that God's created grace acts naturally prior in the action common to both, than its author? than its and all things' first mover? This same thing the reasons and authorities of chapter 35 of this work, and of those following, and especially [the passage from] Gregory on Ezekiel alleged above sufficiently prove. The other parts follow lucidly from what has been set forth. They appear also very frequently in Sacred Scripture and in its sacred treatise-writers, who mixedly and indifferently affirm now God's grace to produce our good works, now God—holding these for the same. Those expounding Sacred Scripture (which says that God's grace produces in a man a good act) say very often that God produces that act, and similarly the contrary; those wishing also to show that God produces good human acts show that God's grace produces them, and the contrary; as many authorities in the chapters set forth above, and elsewhere in Sacred Scripture and in the writings of the saints, most plainly testify—which it was not necessary to touch on here, because they offer themselves abundantly not only to the diligent but even to the negligent reader.

CHAPTER XLII.

THAT GOD NATURALLY PRIOR TO GRACE PRODUCES ANY GOOD ACT OF THE CREATED WILL.

Since now—God and God's grace leading the way—it has been shown in the preceding chapter that God and God's created grace properly produce any good act of the created will, and both [do so] prior in nature to the created will, it must further be shown that God and the Holy Spirit of God naturally prior to grace itself produce any such act. Who does not admit this as a notorious principle? Who does not nod assent? Who dissents? Yet for the sake of some slower minds, behold a brief demonstration of this:

Since indeed God and grace produce a good act of the created will, either both [do so] equally first according to nature, or God [is] naturally prior to grace, or the contrary. They are not both equally first, because then those two agents and movers would be reduced to some third [agent] prior to both of them, by whose power both would act and move—as Philosophy fully testifies, and as can be shown from the second Supposition, from chapters 12 and 13 of this work. Nor is God naturally posterior to grace, as was briefly shown in the demonstration of the preceding Corollary. Who also is unaware that it is more dignified and more perfect to be a prior and principal cause naturally, than to be a posterior, instrumental, and subservient one? But God is such, as the first Supposition shows. Who furthermore is unaware that God is universally the first cause of all things, and the first mover?

Likewise, it is true that grace acts, but it is not the first true thing simply, as is plain from chapters 11, 12, and 13 of this work, but caused by it [the first truth]; therefore God is the cause of this truth, and produces it as true; therefore God naturally prior produces what grace produces, than [does] grace itself.

It seems, therefore, that imagination is to be thus engaged in the production of a good human act: that—as chapter 39 touched on—God most graciously and most liberally, in no way prevented nor excited by another, primarily wills eternal life for a man; and because he does not will it for the adult without his own merits, most graciously and most liberally he wills these merits, and also the grace through which he merits, which also most graciously and most liberally he infuses into him, creating it and moving it, and through it the man toward acting well—so that God in this motion is simply the first mover and not moved; grace [is] the second mover and moved; the created will, or the rational creature, the third mover and moved; and the good act produced [is] moved and not moving. Just as also sin separates us from God, so charity and grace conjoin us with him, and is in some way a union of God with man, and of man with God, by which he both heals the infirm, raises the fallen, excites the idle, and directs the operating one. It has been shown, however, in the preceding chapter that grace prevents the man, and naturally prior produces good acts. But it would seem unreasonable that an inanimate and irrational thing—namely grace or charity—should regulate an animate and rational thing, especially in its free and rational acts, unless it itself were principally regulated by some rational thing, and ruled from above. But grace or charity is regulated in acting by the Holy Spirit, as by a more principal and superior agent.

Hence the Apostle says: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit," Romans 5. And again: "May the Lord direct your hearts in the charity of God," 2 Thessalonians 3. And again: "No one can say 'The Lord Jesus,' but in the Holy Spirit. There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but the same God who works all things in all," 1 Corinthians 12. And further: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God," Romans 8. And further on: "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba, Father." And further on: "The Spirit aids our infirmity, and asks for us with unspeakable groans"—that is,

makes us ask, according to the Gloss and the expositions of the saints. Hence Augustine in *On the Perfection of Justice* 21 says: "It is not heavy, what is done by loving, not by fearing. The Jews labor with the precepts, who try to fulfill them by fearing; but perfect charity casts out fear, and makes the burden of the precept light, not only not pressing with the weight of burdens, but even raising as on wings; which charity, that it may be had even as great as can be had in the body of this death, the choice of our will is little, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps—for it is poured out in our hearts (which must often be said) not through ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us." And further on, ch. 22: "To the charity of God the commandment of God is not heavy, which charity is not poured forth in our hearts except through the Holy Spirit, not through the choice of the human will—to which giving more than is fitting, they are ignorant of the justice of God." And further on, ch. 33, he says that God produces, and helps, that we may be perfect, and without the infirmity of sin; and adds: "And these things the grace of God works with us through Jesus Christ our Lord, not only by precepts, by deeds, by examples, but also by the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is latently poured forth in our hearts, which intercedes with unspeakable groans, until in us soundness be perfected, and God, as he is to be seen, be shown in eternal truth." The same in *On the Freedom of Choice* to Hilary 2 says: "That which they say—that free choice suffices for a man for the fulfilling of the Lord's commandments, although it not be helped by the grace of God and by the gift of the Holy Spirit toward good works—is in every way to be anathematized, and detested with all execrations. For those who assert this are utterly alien from the grace of God, because being ignorant of the justice of God (as the Apostle says concerning the Jews) and willing to establish their own, they are not subject also to the justice of God. For the fullness of the law is nothing other than charity, and indeed the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, not through ourselves or through the powers of our own will, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us." The same in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 13: "What are the laws of God, written by God himself in our hearts, but the very presence of the Holy Spirit, who is the finger of God, by whose presence charity is poured forth in our hearts, which is the fullness of the law and the end of the precept?" The same in *Against Julian* VI, ch. 26, speaks thus to Julian: "You do not recede from your dogma, by which you think the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord to be concerned only with the remission of sins, in such a way that it does not help us avoid sins, and to conquer carnal desires, by pouring charity into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us by him." The same in *On Grace and Free Choice* 36: "Charity, although small and imperfect, was not lacking to Peter when he said to the Lord: 'I will lay down my life for you'—for he thought he could do what he felt he willed; and who began to give him this charity—even though small—but he who prepares the will, and by cooperating perfects what he begins by operating, since he himself works as beginning so that we may will, who cooperates as perfecting with those willing? On account of which the Apostle says: 'I am certain that he who works in us a good work will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ.'" The same Augustine shows this diffusely in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 13, treating the authoritative passages of the Apostle just touched on, and in many other places.

COROLLARY.

COROLLARY: THAT GOD AND THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE IN SOME WAY CALLED CHARITY AND GRACE, BY WHICH DEARLY AND FREELY GOD NOT ONLY LOVES HIMSELF AND MAN, BUT ALSO BY WHICH MAN LIKEWISE LOVES GOD AND NEIGHBOR.

From these things it can be gathered in some way that God and the Holy Spirit are called the charity and grace by which dearly and freely God not only loves himself and man, but also by which man likewise loves God and neighbor. For according to the distinction concerning charity and grace set forth in chapter 25, charity and grace are purely and supremely called the dear and gracious will of God, or the love by which he dearly and freely loves himself. Secondly it is taken for the same will or love, insofar as through it he dearly and freely—namely not on account of any preceding merits, nor on account of his own advantage—loves the creature. Thirdly, according to that most frequent trope in poetry, in philosophy, and in theology, by which the effect is named by the name of its maker—which is also one rhetorical color which Tully at the end of his *New Rhetoric* calls "denomination"—charity and grace are called the habit [infused] from the second charity, namely from the divine will dearly and freely infused into the creature; which, from another cause—namely from likeness to charity taken in the first or second mode—can similarly transumptively in some way be called charity and grace. For according to the Philosopher *Topics* VI: "Translation makes known in some way what is signified, through likeness; for all who translate, translate according to some likeness." But in this they are alike: because just as God dearly and freely loves himself and the creature through charity and grace taken in the first or second mode, so also the creature [loves] through such a habit freely infused into it.

Fourthly, on account of the same causes, charity and grace can be called the act by which God and neighbor are dearly and freely loved—deriving from the third charity, namely from the habit of charity and grace. Fifthly, according to similar transumption, that is called grace which is freely repaid for grace freely done—as the poets, the philosophers, and the theologians teach, and according to most frequent manner of speaking among all. These things, however, appear in some way from chapter 25 of this work. They appear similarly through Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, who in a certain treatise *On Grace and the Justification of the Sinner* says thus: "Grace is the good will of God, by which he wills to give us what we have not merited, that from the gift it may be well with us, and not that something may come from it to the giver. So also is wont to be called grace, such a will of one man toward another. Consequently, from grace so called, the very gift which is given by such a will is also called grace. Thirdly, the affection and praise due, repaid by the very recipient, is called grace. It is plain, therefore, that every good which is in us, whether gratuitous or natural, is from the grace of God, because there is no good which he does not will to be, and his willing is doing. Therefore there is no good which he does not make good,

and perseverance in good he himself makes. Nevertheless these same things our free will also does—just as a grain germinates, both by a certain intrinsic generative force and by the heat of the sun together with the moisture of the earth." And further on: "A good will, by which a man is conformed to the divine will, is grace given by grace, which is the divine will. And then grace is said to be infused, when the divine will begins to operate in our will. But every good which the good will of God works in us, as has been said, is called grace given; but only the conformity of our will to the divine will is grace given, which renders us pleasing to God; and the good will of God producing and conserving this conformity in us, among the other wills of God, alone is called gratifying grace [*gratia gratificans*]. And this will of God which is gratifying grace is naturally prior to the conversion of our will to the good. There is another gratifying grace, namely the divine will of conserving in good the will converted to the good." Charity, however, or grace, which is God, is taken in two ways: namely essentially and commonly with respect to the whole Trinity, and to any of the persons; but otherwise personally and properly, and so it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit alone, as Augustine in *On the Trinity* XV, chs. 17, 19, and 20 manifestly teaches. Hence in chapter 20 he says: "The will of God, if any person in the Trinity is properly to be so called, this name better befits the Holy Spirit, as does charity. For what else is charity than will?"

The Holy Spirit, therefore, is the first and supreme charity by which God dearly loves himself and man, and by which also man dearly loves God and neighbor. Through him, the supreme charity, the habit of charity is given to man, and is poured out into the act by which we dearly love God and neighbor. This, however, I think to be the understanding of Augustine in books 8 and 15 of *On the Trinity*, and elsewhere, where he most intently strives to show that "charity is God, and the Holy Spirit of God"—as Lombard recites copiously in *Sentences* I, dist. 17. He himself similarly perhaps could be understood and expounded, although he most pertinaciously labors to prove that there is no charity in man other than the Holy Spirit alone—as his discussion and his words, beyond glossing, build up, as it seems.

It will perhaps be objected that in similar manner God and the Holy Spirit could be called our faith and hope, because from him are faith, hope, the habit, and the act by which we believe and hope. Peter also, in *Sentences* I, dist. 17, says: "It is not said by expression of cause, 'God is charity'—namely because charity is from God, and is not God himself, just as 'patience' and 'our hope' are said, not because he is, but because these things are to us from him"—to prove which he adduces the authority of Augustine in book 15 of *On the Trinity*, in chapter 17 thereof.

To the first of these it must be said that, if the manner of speaking permitted, God could according to the aforesaid trope be called our faith, just as he is called our hope, and our patience also. But it must be further noted that God and the Holy Spirit can much more conveniently and more closely to proper truth, and less transumptively, less metaphorically, be called our charity than [our] faith or hope. For as I touched on above, one cause of this tropical speech, and of the denomination of one thing by the name of another, is that one of them is the efficient cause of the other; another cause, according to the Philosopher, is the likeness of one thing to another. But by

both of these modes God and the Holy Spirit can be called the charity of man. For the charity of man, both habit and act, is made by him; God too, or the Holy Spirit, and the charity of man are very greatly alike in reality and in name, in such a way that each is in a certain way called charity univocally—because concordantly in reality and in name. For who is unaware that God and the Holy Spirit are charity, and that the created charity of man is charity? And who does not know that God and the Holy Spirit by their charity dearly love first God, secondly man on account of God; that man also by his charity dearly loves first God, secondly man on account of God? But God cannot thus univocally be called our faith or hope: for he believes nothing in a riddle, but sees all things clearly; nor does he hope anything, but always has fullest certainty concerning all things. He nevertheless makes us believe and hope; therefore in the first manner mentioned above he could in some way be called our faith and hope.

To the second it could be said that Peter understands God to be called charity not only by expression of cause—as he is called our patience and our hope—but also on account of the univocal likeness mentioned above. Yet it must be noted that the authority of Augustine does nothing there for Peter, nor does he take it according to its due understanding. For he intends through it to show that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God and neighbor—and this not by expression of cause, but properly according to himself. Hence, having recited Augustine's words, he subjoins: "From the foregoing it is clear that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God and neighbor." But without doubt, to one diligently looking at that chapter 17 of book 15 of *On the Trinity* which he alleges, it evidently appears that Augustine principally treats that text of 1 John 4, and shows that "it is not said by signification of cause, as has been said to God, 'You are my patience,' and 'Lord, my hope'; and therefore it is not said, 'Lord, my charity,' or 'You are my charity'; but truly and properly according to substance, just as it is said, 'God is Spirit.'" And he shows that charity is taken commonly, in such a way that any person in the Trinity may be called charity; and properly, in such a way as it pertains to the Holy Spirit alone. He understands also there, and speaks, of the charity by which God loves himself and man—not the contrary—as his words set forth above testify. He says: "It has not been said, 'Lord, my charity,' or 'You are my charity'; but it has been said thus: 'God is charity.'" And further on, in the same place, he says that "John the Apostle commemorated the love of God—not that by which we love him, but that by which he himself loved us; and that this love is the Holy Spirit."

CHAPTER XLIII

ON SAVING PENITENCE ACCORDING TO DIVERSE OPINIONS, AND ON THE POWER OF THE KEYS

After these matters, it seems we must treat of the justification of the unjust and of saving penitence, concerning which a manifold opinion is in circulation, but principally a twofold one. The first is that of the Pelagians, which holds that the sinner first naturally repents, and through

this secondly merits, receives, and possesses grace and justification. The other is that of certain others, which says that God first naturally and gratuitously infuses grace into the sinner, and that the sinner secondly repents in a saving manner.

The first of these is varied in two ways. For some Pelagians affirm that grace naturally precedes justification; certain others, on the contrary. The first group holds that the sinner first naturally repents; secondly, through this, receives grace; and thirdly, through this is justified. Others, on the contrary, say that the sinner first naturally repents; secondly, through this is justified; and so thirdly, receives grace. And these are still further divided in two ways. For some think that the sinner alone, through contrition, expurgates his sin and so justifies himself. Others judge that God does this, but on account of the merit of contrition temporally and naturally preceding. Therefore the opinion of the Pelagians, generally taken, is only one, but specially threefold.

These opinions of theirs—the common one and the special ones—they strive to establish by many testimonies of Sacred Scripture and by other arguments. For the Pelagians, as Augustine reports in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 11, gather such things from the Scriptures, of which sort is: "Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you" [Zech. 1:3], so that according to the merit of our turning to God, His grace might be given to us, by which He Himself also turns to us. And: "The Lord is with you when you are with Him"; and: "If you seek Him, you shall find Him" [2 Chron. 15:2]; and similar passages. He also writes thus in *On the Predestination of the Saints* 13: "The Pelagians say: When it is said, 'If thou shalt believe, thou shalt be saved,' one of these is required, the other is offered; what is required is in man's power, what is offered is in God's power."

Who also, as they say, is ignorant that penitence is remissive of sins, and the cause of the justification of the unjust, of reconciliation, and of divine acceptance? And therefore [it is] also prior in time or nature to the remission of sin, the justification of the unjust, and divine acceptance: for this is shown commonly by the Old Testament and the New, by all the Catholic Doctors treating of penitence, and by divine, canonical, and human laws. Whence Jeremiah 18: "Suddenly," says the Lord, "I will speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, that I may root it out, and destroy, and disperse it: if that nation shall repent of their evil which I have spoken against them, I also will repent of the evil that I thought to do to them" [Jer. 18:7-8]. Likewise Jonah 3: "God saw their works, that they were turned from their evil way: and God had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not" [Jonah 3:10]. The Gloss: "Daily God threatens the peoples, that they may do penance; if they are converted, He Himself also turns aside the sentence, and is changed by the people's conversion." Whence Augustine also on Psalm 50: "*The uncertain and hidden things of Thy wisdom Thou hast made manifest to me*" [Ps. 50:8]: "On this uncertainty the Ninevites did penance, and merited certain mercy."

The same, *On True and False Penitence* 1, says thus: "How great is the grace of penitence to be sought, every Authority cries out, every life of the blessed strives to show. For it heals languors,

cures lepers, raises the dead, increases health which it preserves, restores walking to the lame, abundance to the withered, sight to the blind, puts vices to flight, adorns virtues, fortifies and strengthens the mind, heals all things, restores all things, gladdens all things, tempers successes, restrains impulses, moderates excesses; one ignorant of himself recognizes himself through this; he who always seeks it finds it. This is what leads men to the angels, and gives back the creature to the Creator. This showed the lost sheep to him who sought, and offered the tenth drachma to her who was anxious; this brought back the prodigal son to the father, and reserved him wounded by robbers to the keeper for healing. In this every good is found, through this every good is preserved; it puts to flight the darkness, brings in the light, refines all things, it is itself a consuming fire."

Likewise, medicine precedes the medicated; penitence is medicine, as is plain from the proximate authority of Augustine; who also further on at chapter 13 says: "Let the penitent believe that this very penitence is medicine." Who also in *On Penitence* 1 says: "How profitable and necessary is the medicine of penitence," etc. Who also further on at chapter 8 says: "Sins are dried up by the medicament of penitence." Wherefore the whole Church prays: "Heal me, O Lord, by the medicament of penitence, O God." Likewise Ambrose, as alleged in the Gloss on Luke 5: "I came not to call the just, but sinners to penitence" [Luke 5:32]: "Usurpers of justice," he says, "are not called to grace; for if grace [comes] from penitence, surely he who disdains penitence renounces grace."

Likewise Chrysostom, as alleged in the Gloss on Luke 3: "Preaching the baptism of penitence" [Luke 3:3]: "John came," he says, "exhorting them to do penance, that through penitence, made better and contrite, they might exert themselves to receive pardon. Aptly therefore, when he had said that he came preaching the baptism of penitence, he added, *for the remission of sins*, as if he were saying: For this reason he persuaded them to repent, that they might more easily obtain the pardon following, believing in Christ. For unless they were led by penitence, they would by no means demand grace."

Likewise the Psalmist: "I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin" [Ps. 31:5]. Therefore he said first in his heart, and proposed to confess; and afterwards in time or nature, and on account of this, the wickedness of his sin was remitted. Whence Augustine, expounding this, says: "A great matter: 'I said, I will pronounce'—he did not say, 'I have pronounced,'—'and Thou hast forgiven.' 'I said, I will pronounce, and Thou hast forgiven.' For by the very fact that he said, 'I will pronounce,' he showed that he had not yet pronounced with his mouth; but with his heart he had pronounced this very thing, 'to say, I will pronounce, is to pronounce'; therefore Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my heart." With whom Cassiodorus also agrees, expounding the same passage. And John Chrysostom, as alleged in the Canon, *On Penitence*, distinction 1, *Nunc autem*, says: "If thou rememberest thy sins, and frequently pronouncest them in the sight of God, and entreatest His clemency for them, thou shalt more swiftly destroy them."

Likewise as alleged above and in 4 Sentences, distinction 17: "No one," he says, "can receive the grace of God unless he be purged from every defilement of sin, or from every sin through the confession of penitence, through the gift of saving baptism, or even through baptism." Likewise Ezekiel 18: "If the wicked man," says the Lord, "do penance for all his sins which he hath committed, etc., he shall surely live"; and below: "When the wicked turneth himself from his wickedness, etc., he shall save his soul alive: For he hath considered, and turned himself from all his iniquities which he hath wrought, he shall surely live" [Ezek. 18:21, 27-28]. Likewise the Prophet: "I will wash my bed every night with my tears" [Ps. 6:7]. On which Augustine: "He will wash his bed every night, that with such great tears he may obtain the most efficacious medicine from God's mercy."

Likewise Psalm 84 says most plainly: "Justice shall walk before Him, and shall set His steps in the way" [Ps. 84:14]. Augustine, expounding this, says: "That justice consists in the confession of sins; for it is truth itself. For thou oughtest to be just against thyself, that thou mayest punish thyself. This is the first justice of man—that thou shouldst punish thyself as evil, and that God may make thee good. Because therefore this is the first justice of man, this becomes a way for God, that God may come to thee. There make a way for Him in the confession of sins." Whence John, when he was baptizing in the water of penitence and wished those who came to him to repent of their previous deeds, said this: "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight His paths" [Matt. 3:3]. "Thou wast pleasing to thyself in thy sins, O man—displease thyself for what thou wast, that thou mayest be what thou wast not. *Prepare ye the way of the Lord*: let this justice go before, that thou mayest confess thy sins; He will come and visit thee, because *He shall set His steps in the way*: for there is a place for Him to set His steps, there is a place for Him to come to thee. But before thou didst confess thy sins, thou hadst blocked the way of God against thyself; there was no way by which He might come to thee. Confess thy life, and thou openest the way; and Christ will come, and set His steps in the way, that He may form thee with His footprints."

Likewise Psalm 103: "Thou hast put on confession and beauty" [Ps. 103:1]—confession first, and through it beauty second; which Augustine's exposition also testifies. Who also is ignorant of that most famous Gospel narrative concerning Magdalen, the most fortunate of sinners, which proclaims that she, by fervent love and many tears, merited remission of sins and pardon, and divine friendship? Whence Luke 7: "Many sins are forgiven her," says the Lord, "because she hath loved much" [Luke 7:47]. And below: "He said to the woman: Thy faith hath made thee safe; go in peace" [Luke 7:50]. "*In peace*," says Theophilus, "that is, in justice; for justice is the peace of man with God." Whence also the Apostle to Romans 2: "The doers of the law shall be justified" [Rom. 2:13]. And James 2: "You see how by works a man is justified, and not by faith only" [James 2:24].

Likewise Peter Lombard, 4 Sentences, distinction 14: "Penitence," he says, "is necessary for those placed far from God, that he may approach"; where he also alleges from Jerome that penitence is "the second plank after shipwreck," because if anyone corrupts by sinning the

garment of innocence received in baptism, he can repair it by the remedy of penitence. The first plank is baptism, where the old man is put off and the new is put on; the second is penitence, by which we rise after a fall, while the returning oldness is repelled and the lost newness is resumed. Those who fall after baptism can be renewed by penitence, but not by baptism. Peter adds: "Of penitence, both a sacrament and a virtue of mind are spoken of: for there is interior and exterior penitence; the exterior is sacrament, the interior is virtue of mind, and each is a cause of salvation and justification."

Reason also seems to confirm this same thing. For if justifying grace is given gratuitously before contrition and penitence in time or nature, the sinner need not further be contrite, nor further repent, since he is already justified and just. Likewise, if God justifies one sinner not for any preceding merit, but purely gratuitously, why not another, and another, and so all? Likewise, if God now purely gratuitously justifies anyone, why now rather than at other times after, or before? Likewise, specially for the second opinion, it follows manifestly: This man has grace, therefore he is without mortal sin; and he is not converted, since someone could be without grace and without sin, just as perhaps the Angels and the first men were at their creation. Therefore this is naturally prior to that. Again, if having grace is naturally prior to the deletion of sin, it can be without it; therefore the sinner can simultaneously be in grace and in mortal sin.

But this general error of the Pelagians, the 35th [chapter] and those following generally direct and reduce. For they show that no one can in any way merit the first grace. Likewise, he who is contrite and repents of sins either does this justly, well, meritoriously, and praiseworthy, as he ought, or otherwise. If otherwise, he does not merit justification nor the friendship of the just God. If justly and well, then he already previously has justice, charity, and justifying grace, from which—as from an efficient cause naturally preceding, and as from an original root—a just act of this kind proceeds and sprouts forth, as is established from chapters 39, 40, and 41. Specially from the sayings of Anselm, *On Concord* 9, *On Truth* 12, and Augustine, *To Simplicianus* 24; and again from Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 17 and 12, and *On Concord* 9 and last; and from Augustine, *On Faith to Peter* 18 and 21, set forth in chapter 39 of this work.

Who [Augustine] also on Psalm 110: "*Confession and magnificence are His work*" [Ps. 110:3], says thus: "What is more magnificent than to justify the wicked? But perhaps man's work precedes this magnificence of God, that when he has confessed his sins, he may merit to be justified." "Not from works," he says, "lest perhaps anyone be exalted; for we are His handiwork, created in Christ in good works. For man does not work justice unless he is justified. But believing in Him who justifies the wicked, he begins from faith, that good works may show—not as preceding what he merited, but as consequent upon what he received."

It was also shown plainly in chapter 40 of this work that there is no good fruit which does not arise from the root of charity. Whence also Hosea, last chapter: "From me," says the Lord, "is thy fruit found" [Hos. 14:9]. The Gloss: "Every operation, and the observance of both the Old and the New Testament, has proceeded from My gift." And Augustine on Psalm 50: "*And take not*

Thy Holy Spirit from me" [Ps. 50:13]: "But the Holy Spirit is in him who confesses; it now pertains to the gift of the Holy Spirit that what thou hast done displeases thee. To the unclean spirit sins are pleasing; to the holy, displeasing. Although therefore thou still beseechest pardon, yet from the part by which the evil thou hast committed displeases thee, thou art joined to God: for this displeases thee, what also displeases Him: now you are two to fight off thy fever, both thou and the Physician. Because therefore there cannot be confession of sin and punishment of sin from himself in man, when each is angry with himself and displeases himself, without the gift of the Holy Spirit, he does not say, *Holy Spirit, give me Thine*, but, *Take it not away from me*."

Likewise, he who repents either repents from love of justice, or from fear of punishment, or from another cause. If from love of justice—namely, from gratuitous love of God above all things on account of God—he already has charity and grace by nature first, whence he may thus love God, as was just argued. If from fear of punishment or from some other cause—say, on account of his own advantage, and not from the aforesaid love of justice—how does he merit through this justification and the friendship of God, as in chapter 39 was more fully taught philosophically and theologically? For right intention makes a work right, and according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 6.10, virtue makes intention itself right; but no virtue is right without charity and grace, which makes one pleasing to God, as the same chapter 39 shows. Who indeed doubts that on the gratuitous love of God above all things on account of Himself, and of one's neighbor on account of God, the whole law and the prophets depend, since Matthew 22 testifies this as Truth? [Matt. 22:40] Wherefore the Apostle also says: "Now the end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith" [1 Tim. 1:5]. Whence Augustine, *Enchiridion*, penultimate chapter: "The end of every precept is charity—that is, every precept is referred to charity. But what is done thus from fear of punishment, or from some carnal intention, so that it is not referred to that charity which the Holy Spirit pours forth in our hearts, is not yet done as it ought to be done, although it seems to be done. For this charity is of God and of neighbor, and surely on these two precepts the whole law depends and the prophets. Add the Gospel, add the Apostles; for from no other source is this voice: *the end of the commandment is charity*. Whatsoever therefore God commands, and whatsoever things are not commanded but counseled by special advice, are then rightly done when they are referred to loving God and one's neighbor on account of God." This his authority plainly testifies in *Against Pelagius and Caelestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin* 22, which chapter 37 of this work contains.

He also in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 13: "A commandment," he says, "if it is done from fear of punishment, not from love of justice, is done servilely, not liberally, and therefore is not done. For the fruit is not good which does not rise from the root of charity. But further, if the faith which works through love is present, it begins to take pleasure in the law of God according to the inner man, which delight is not the gift of the letter but of the Spirit, even if another law in the members still resists the law of the mind, until in the newness which from day to day is increased in the inner man, all the oldness, changed, passes through, the grace of God liberating us from

the body of this death." From this place seems to be drawn that rule of Law at the end of the fifth book of the Decretals, ascribed to Augustine, saying thus: "He who from fear performs a precept, performs it otherwise than he ought, and therefore he does not perform it."

Likewise, whoever savingly repents does this from gratuitous love of God naturally preceding. For he does this for some end. If on account of God, he loves God gratuitously for His own sake—which he cannot do unless he previously possesses charity, as is plain from chapter 39. If on account of another end, he does not repent savingly, nor does he merit life, as is plain from the same chapter 39 and other premises. Likewise, by the corollary of chapter 41 of this work, God works and pre-works in man any good work whatsoever; and by the same corollary, He does this through grace gratuitously infused, and naturally first operating with the human will. Wherefore also, every saving contrition and penitence.

Likewise, if anyone, as they say, merits remission of mortal sin through contrition, he likewise merits remission of the eternal punishment due for the sin, either as to the whole, or as to a part of it infinite in duration—because at least he merits the conversion of that eternal punishment into some temporal punishment. And if he merits this in one instant or short moment—namely, by repenting once—if at another instant or time, namely by repenting another time in similar fashion, he will merit the full remission of any temporal punishment, since any temporal punishment is incomparably less than the eternal. And thus the penitence which in the Church is wont to be imposed on penitents in the present life would be superfluous, and even purgatorial fire after this life. It also follows that any contrition whatsoever, however slack or brief, takes away every venial fault and every punishment due for a venial sin, or even for any venial sins whatsoever—since it suffices to take away every mortal fault and the eternal punishment due for mortal [sin], or some infinite portion of it, which are incomparably greater than these—which no one is unaware is contrary to reason and Catholic truth.

Indeed, it also follows evidently that any contrition, however lukewarm and slack, provided it is supported by the requisite circumstances, merits full remission of any mortal sin whatsoever, both as to fault and as to any punishment whatsoever, both eternal and even temporal. But that even the slightest contrition accompanied by the requisite circumstances destroys or excludes every mortal sin as to fault—both the Pelagians themselves and others commonly confess; which could be shown manifoldly both by reasons and by authorities. But because scarcely anyone hesitates over this, let it suffice to prove this by a single argument and by a single—indeed threefold—testimony. For every such contrition proceeds from charity and grace, which destroys and excludes every mortal sin.

John Chrysostom also, *On the Restoration of the Fallen*, alleged in the Canon *On Penitence*, distinction 3, *Talis*; and in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 14: "Such, believe me," he says, "is God's piety toward men: He never spurns penitence, if it is offered to Him sincerely and simply. Even if anyone has come to the summit of evils, and yet from there wishes to return to the way of virtue, He receives him willingly, embraces him, does all things to recall him to his former

state. And what is yet more excellent and eminent: even if one cannot fulfill the whole order of satisfaction, yet however small a penitence and one performed in however brief a time, He does not reject; He accepts it also, nor does He suffer the reward of even the slightest conversion to perish."

Further it also follows against these, that any contrition whatsoever destroys every mortal sin fully as to punishment. For let it be supposed that Peter has sin A, for which is owed the eternal punishment B; and that through contrition C he merits the remission of A as to fault, and as to punishment D—an infinite part of B—but not as to the whole of B. And let it be supposed that Paul has two similar sins or more, and is similarly contrite for his many [sins], as Peter is for his one. Then Paul through his contrition merits to have remitted to himself one infinite part of one eternal punishment equal to B, owed for one of his sins, and another infinite part of another eternal punishment equal to B, owed for another of his sins. These two parts joined together exceed—indeed in some manner infinitely exceed—the whole of B. If therefore Paul through his contrition merits for himself such a great remission, and Peter through his equal [contrition merits the same], much more reasonably and worthily does he merit for himself the remission of the whole of B, which is far less—especially since Peter is more innocent and more disposed to merit.

But that this same thing may be shown more briefly and clearly, let this known truth be supposed: Of any two penalties uniform and similar in species, having a beginning and no end, unequal in intensity and duration, the more intense, however much shorter or briefer in duration, is nevertheless simply greater. But lest anyone say this supposition is not sufficiently notorious, behold its brief demonstration. Let K be one uniform intense punishment of fire, beginning at instant L in the future, to endure interminably; and M another similar uniform but more remiss punishment, beginning at the present instant N, to remain eternally. Therefore K is not equal to M, nor less, therefore greater. For if the adversary shall say that K is equal to M, let O be a part of M beginning at L and from then enduring eternally, and P the remaining part of it; let Q be the intensive imaginary part of K (or true, as some opine), equal to O, and R the residual part of K. Since therefore K and M are equal, if equals be subtracted from them—namely, O and Q—the residual parts are equal, as is plain to anyone, and Euclid in Book 1 of his *Elements* supposes this as manifest. Therefore P and R are equal, which no one is unaware is most false, since P is in every way finite, but R is infinite according to duration and uniform throughout, as clearly follows from the premises.

Which can also easily be shown to be false. For either P and R are of equal intensity or not. If so, P is altogether equal to a finite part of R as great in duration as P is; for it is similar in species, and equal to it intensively, and similarly extensively. Therefore that part of R is equal to its whole, since they are equal to a third—namely, P. But if P and R are not of equal intensity, one of them is more intense. If R be remitted to equality with P, or P intensified to equality with R—then they will not be equal, but R greater than P, as was just taught. Much more therefore now is R greater. But if P is more intense, this is not infinitely but only finitely. Let it be supposed

therefore for the sake of example that [it is greater] in some multiple proportion—say tenfold, or hundredfold, or another, as you please—and let P be divided into intensive parts equal in number according to the denominator of the given proportion, namely into ten, or a hundred. Then any of those parts will be of intensity equal to R; let them be joined in length according to duration, and let T be the whole uniform punishment gathered from them. Then T is simply finite in duration, as is established, and of intensity equal to R; therefore less than R, as was shown above—which can also most easily be demonstrated in continuous permanent quantities.

Yet perhaps more sensibly thus, to the same effect: To P, an intense punishment, can some punishment similar in species, more remiss but more prolonged—yet finite in duration both before and after—be made equal in all things weighed. For some such punishment can be greater simply in penalty, more punishing, and more to be fled from than P, all things being weighed. Wherefore also some punishment equal to it—namely, such that as much as it is lighter from remission, so much is it heavier from duration. To this second more remiss or more prolonged punishment, by similar reasoning, some third punishment more remiss than this second but more prolonged—yet finite in duration before and after—can similarly be made equal. Which, if posited, is necessarily equal to P itself, since both are posited equal to the second punishment. To this third punishment also a fourth, more remiss but more prolonged, similarly equal can be taken; and to this fourth a fifth, and so onwards, until one comes to one as intense as R—indeed less intense than R—and finite in time on both sides, which according to the premises will necessarily be equal to P, and less than R. Wherefore P is also similarly proved necessarily less than R.

But if the false-writer does not cease his obstinacy, saying that P does not exceed R in any multiple proportion, but in some other whatever, let P be intensified or R remitted until a multiple proportion arise between them, etc., as above. But if it be said in the first place that K is less than M, and M greater than K, let K be intensified or M uniformly remitted until the punishments are equal, the prior quantity of duration being preserved, etc., as before. For no one doubts that K can by mere intensification be made a punishment greater simply than M, and M by mere remission less than K. For some uniform intensification throughout K augments K more than one extension altogether finite for one time finite on both sides, as is clearly plain from what precedes. But some extension of K, finite—say from L to N or beyond—augments K beyond M, as is most certainly established to all. Wherefore some intensification likewise augments it. If therefore K is now a less punishment than M, and can by mere intensification be made a greater punishment, it can likewise be made equal; and the same happens of M through remission and shortening to L or beyond.

Likewise differently, to the same effect: If K be a less punishment than M, let its first intensity and uniformity be preserved, and let it be extended toward N continuously until it is a punishment simply equal, all things made equal, with M—for this can be done. For thus by mere extension toward N, it can be made a greater punishment. For if it be thus extended to N, who does not see that K is a greater punishment than M, since it is equal extensively and greater

intensively? Let K therefore with its prior intensity and uniformity be extended to some certain instant, so that it thus becomes a punishment equal, all things being weighed, to M. Then that instant cannot be posited as N nor before N, because then K would be notoriously greater than M, as was just taught; nor can it be posited between N and L, as was demonstrated above. Therefore the previously accepted supposition is plain.

Which moreover can also be ostensively demonstrated thus briefly: K is composed precisely of Q and R; M of O and P; and Q is equal to O, and R greater than P, as no one is ignorant, and as was shown above. Therefore the whole K is greater than the whole M; for there is a part of K equal to M—namely, that which is composed of Q and one part of R equal to P—as is clear to all eyes; and it is plain by that common principle, self-evident: "If thou addest equals to equals, the wholes become equal," which Euclid in Book 1 of his *Elements* enumerates among common conceptions of mind. If therefore a part of K is equal to M, since K is greater than that part—as that common principle, "Every whole is greater than its part," clearly manifests—it is similarly greater than M, as is clearly plain to all, as also Proposition 7 of Book 5 of Euclid's *Elements* clearly demonstrates, saying: "If two equal quantities be compared to any third, their proportion to it will be one; likewise the proportion of that to both is one."

Therefore the foretasted truth is plain. Retaining therefore the premised case concerning Peter, and his sin A, and his eternal punishment B, and his contrition C, and the part of B—namely, D—remitted through C: let it be supposed that Paul has E, a sin greater than A, for which is owed F, an eternal punishment similar in species to B but more intense, and so greater; and through G, a contrition equal to C, he merits the remission of H, an infinite part of F. Therefore by the premised truth, H is a greater punishment than B. If therefore Paul through contrition G merits what is greater—namely, the remission of H—much more does Peter through contrition C, equal [to G], merit what is less—namely, the remission of the whole of B, the greatest punishment—since he is better, more innocent, and more apt to merit. For who is the just creditor, Lord, or Judge who refuses what is offered by his debtor for the payment of a smaller debt, which—not from grace but by right—suffices for the payment of a greater debt, and which from other debtors not from grace but by right he accepts for the full payment of the greater—greater, I say, not by a little, but by however much you wish to think, as can easily be shown?

Likewise, let it be supposed that there is owed to Peter, for some sin, a punishment equal to that part of the punishment remitted to Paul through his contrition, and that Peter is contrite equally [with Paul]. Therefore Peter through his contrition merits the full remission of his punishment. Therefore any contrition whatsoever suffices for the full remission of any fault and punishment whatsoever.

Likewise, the intensive half of contrition C in Peter, and any small part of it, or another however more remiss contrition supported by the requisite circumstances, would merit the deletion of A as to fault, and as to an infinite part of B—though less than D. Wherefore the other half of C in Peter, or the whole contrition C, which is double or however much more intense and better than

that more remiss contrition aforesaid, merits much more the remission of the small remaining part of B—indeed even something great beyond. For otherwise that whole contrition is not fully remunerated by God, nor even any part of it. For the half of any signed part would merit the remission of A as to fault, and as to an infinite part of B—and why does not one half merit as much as another? Why therefore does it not merit the remission of the small remaining part of the punishment, and something beyond, as much as the remission of A as to fault and as to the infinite remitted part of the punishment exceeds the residual part of the punishment?

But who would presume to say that God does not fully remunerate any good act whatsoever, against the 31st part of the first corollary of this work? Whence the Lord Himself says: "Everyone that hath left house, etc., for My name's sake, shall receive a hundredfold" [Matt. 19:29]. And Mark 10: "There is no man who hath left house, etc., for Me, who shall not receive a hundred times as much, now in this time" [Mark 10:29-30]. And Luke 6: "Give, and it shall be given unto you: good measure, and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall they give into your bosom" [Luke 6:38]. And the Wise Man says: "Afflicted in few things, in many they shall be well rewarded" [Wisd. 3:5]—which the series of either Testament evidently shows.

Not only does it follow against these that God does not fully remunerate any good act whatsoever, but also that He cannot. For if He could, let God fully remunerate Peter's contrition C: either, then, He does this by remitting to him the whole fault A, and the whole punishment B or D, and giving him glory infinite extensively and intensively likewise, or something less than this, or something less. Not the whole, as no one is ignorant, both because Peter through a more remiss act would have merited only equally—since he could not [have merited] more—and so act C would not be remunerated to the full; and also all who merit eternal life would equally merit infinite glory extensively and intensively, and so the difference of heavenly mansions would perish—nor less. For let it be said that he merits remission of fault A, and of punishment B or D, and O—glory infinite extensively, but intensively finite. Then either O glory is more good and eligible than A and B (or D) are evil and to be fled from, or equally so, or less. If more, and not infinitely but only finitely, let it be said for example's sake that [it is more] hundredfold, and let C be divided into many imaginary intensive parts—say into a thousand. According to what was shown before, one of those parts by itself alone would merit the full remission of fault A and of some infinite punishment. Wherefore another equal [part] would merit at least the remission of the residual temporal punishment, and any of the others by similar reasoning glory infinite extensively, as good and eligible as the fault and punishment remitted was evil and to be fled from. All these parts therefore concurring virtually merit glory infinite extensively, more intense than O. And so by further division of C into more parts and more, one can proceed beyond every assignable intensity of glory. From this, however, it also evidently appears that O cannot be posited as equal to A and B (or D), nor less.

Likewise, according to these, any contrition however small merits the full remission of any venial sins whatsoever and of any temporal punishments owed. For if not, let A be a contrition

which by no means merits these, and let B be another, lesser contrition. Then according to what was shown before, B in a mortal sinner merits the remission of mortal sin as to fault and as to an infinite part of the punishment owed; and these incomparably exceed any venial sins whatever and any temporal punishments. But what justice, what equity, what law dictates accepting some price for the just, legal, and full payment of the greatest debt, and refusing a greater price for the full payment of the smallest debt?

Likewise, again according to these, any contrition merits the full remission of all fault and punishment. For any mortal—and perhaps even venial—fault is worse and more to be fled than every punishment of sense or loss not including fault, as the 30th part of the first corollary teaches. And any contrition merits the full remission of every mortal sin, and of any mortal sins, as to fault. Therefore likewise as to punishment. For let Peter be guilty of two—or any mortal—sins, and Paul only of one, lesser than any sin of Peter, and of one punishment owed for that. Then if Peter repents, he merits the dismissal of two—or however many more—greater evils (since [they are] of so many mortal sins) than those two evils of Paul. Why then will not Paul, similarly repenting, merit the full dismissal of all his fault and punishment?

Likewise, according to these, any contrition is of infinite efficacy and infinite merit. For however many mortal sins and however grievous, however many and however worthy of infernal punishments anyone has, at any contrition he merits the remission of all mortal sins as to fault, and as to the cutting off of an infinite part of any of the infernal punishments owed.

Likewise, against these similarly it follows that any good act in grace and proceeding from grace is similarly of infinite merit. Since any good act in grace and proceeding from grace is better, or at least as good and meritorious, as a similar act not in grace, or not done from grace—and some such act, namely, a contrition prior to grace, is of infinite merit, as was just argued.

Likewise, if anyone through contrition merits the first grace after sin, it seems he merits as much grace as he previously had and lost by sinning, if he had grace before sinning. For otherwise penitence, diminutively and not perfectly, would heal and vivify the penitent, nor fully reconcile him to God; but God would reproach him with his preceding sin, by subtracting the portion of the preceding grace—against that of James 1: "Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not" [James 1:5]. Such a one also, if he so departed [this life], would be punished in heaven eternally with the punishment of loss—namely, by the subtraction of the portion of grace and glory previously owed to him—indeed, however long he might live and merit, he would still be punished eternally in heaven by such punishment of loss. For he would always have less than one similarly working would have had otherwise, and this on account of his preceding sin.

It also seems that if he rises in lesser grace than he lost by falling, his sin is not fully remitted. For he sinned by losing such great grace and in some manner subtracting it from his God and Lord—which he ought always to have kept, and even returned with usury—nor is he absolved from this obligation on account of his sin, because if he had not sinned he would not have been absolved. Nor is it fitting that from his sin he carry away gain and greater liberty. But it is certain

that sin is not fully dismissed until what was taken away is fully restored, especially if the obligation is not paid. Whence Matthew 5: "Be at agreement with thy adversary betimes, whilst thou art in the way with him: lest perhaps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Amen, I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence till thou repay the last farthing" [Matt. 5:25-26]. And Luke 12: "Thou shalt not go out, until thou pay the very last mite" [Luke 12:59]. And Augustine writes to Macedonius, as alleged in Canon 14, last question, *Si res*, that "sin is not remitted unless what was taken is restored." And below: "I would say this most confidently: that he who intervenes for a man so that he should not restore what he has taken away, and who does not compel one fleeing to him to repay—as far as he can honestly—is a partner of fraud and crime." Where also in the following chapter Gregory is alleged, strictly precepting that if the thing taken away cannot be restored, its price be given.

Wherefore Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* 1.20: "Hold," he says, "most certainly, that without satisfaction—that is, without the spontaneous payment of the debt—God can neither dismiss sin unpunished, nor can the sinner come to beatitude, or such [beatitude] as he had before he sinned"; and chapter 21: "Satisfaction must be according to the measure of sin"; and chapter 24, dialoguing thus he writes: "*A*. Attend to strict justice, and judge accordingly, whether man satisfies God for the equality of sin, unless that very thing which by allowing himself to be conquered by the Devil, he took from God, by conquering the Devil he restores. So that, as by the fact that he was conquered, the Devil seized what was God's, and God lost; so by the fact that he conquers, the Devil should lose, and God recover *B*. Nothing stricter or more just can be thought. *A*. Dost thou suppose the highest justice can violate this justice? *B*. I dare not think so. *A*. In no way then ought, nor can, man receive from God what God proposed to give him, if he does not return to God all that he took from Him, that as through him God lost, so through him He may recover."

Indeed it seems that he must return more than the simple thing taken—namely, something satisfactory for the contempt or injury inflicted. Whence in the divine law—Exodus 22—it is precepted that whoever has stolen anything shall in [different] cases restore fivefold, fourfold, or double; with which the civil law also agrees. In Leviticus 5 also it is commanded that if anyone has done damage in things consecrated to the Lord, or in the things of his neighbor, he shall integrally restore all things, and shall offer over and above a fifth part to the Priest, according to the measure and estimation of the sin. Wherefore Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* 1.11: "As long," he says, "as the sinner does not pay what he plundered, he remains in fault; nor does it suffice merely to return what was taken, but for the contumely inflicted he ought to return more than what he took away."

Nor can anyone say that the impotence of returning the whole grace lost excuses, because he does not pay the obligation of having grace and returning it, as was shown above; and because thus any damned man and the Devil would be excused from debt and sin. Anselm proves this same thing in *Cur Deus Homo* 1.25 lucidly and diffusely. Even considering more subtly, perhaps

the new impotence of paying the old debt excuses from new and continuous sin, taking sin properly—so that by not paying, he does not properly, anew, and continuously sin with another and another sin (as Augustine speaks in *On Free Will* 3.30, and as is the case with damned men and demons)—but it does not thus excuse nor exonerate the impotent from his old debt. For who is unaware, according to all laws divine equally and human, that impotence descending from fault by no means excuses, but perhaps rather aggravates, especially with the fault not remitted, but itself remaining? And how is fault justly and fully remitted except through full preceding satisfaction, as also all laws dictate? And if anyone shall say that fault is sometimes dismissed from the grace and mercy of the Lord, this does not help the Pelagians, who say that men merit dismissal and pardon of sins, and so consequently the grace and mercy of the Lord—and that the remission of sins is not made through grace.

And if anyone perhaps wished to investigate more profoundly, it would seem that God cannot fully dismiss sin as to fault unless full satisfaction has first been made for it as to fault. For as can be had from chapter 26 of this work, and all the Doctors agree, sin properly is not anything positive, but only privative; but a privation cannot be removed except through the positing of a habit, at least naturally preceding. Nor can such or such great a privation fully be removed without the positing of such or such great a habit preceding. For if a lesser habit be posited, and not so great, that whole privation is by no means fully removed, but some portion of it remains, as is plain in natural, artificial, and moral things evidently. God therefore cannot, as it seems, dismiss and fully remove sin as to fault, except by first naturally positing fully the habit which He privated, or privates.

Nor is it always true that one rising in lesser grace than he lost is impotent to render so much grace. For he can, by living long and working well, merit so much grace, as the Pelagians acknowledge. Therefore to a sinner now mortally contrite, and so meriting and rendering less grace than he lost, his mortal sin is not fully dismissed as to fault; nor even is it dismissed until he has fully merited so much grace, and merited and rendered fully so much. And so mortal fault and grace would again stand together; and so someone would be at the same time pleasing to God and dear, and not pleasing nor dear, but the enemy of God, hated by God, living and dead, son of the eternal kingdom and of eternal perdition. If therefore, according to the premises, one rising to grace rises to as much as that from which he fell through sin, however small a contrition merits grace and consequently however much glory. And so every contrition however small and remiss would be in some manner of infinite efficacy and infinite merit, since however much grace and glory man could merit immediately through it; for he can lose by sinning however much.

Let it also be supposed that Peter, having little grace, by sinning slightly mortally lost that grace; and immediately after a brief delay in sin (in which he disposed himself to repenting), he repents very intensely and fervently, and so merits grace. Either, then, he merits thus infinite grace intensively, or only finite. If infinite, then by the same reasoning so does any penitent, since Peter's penitence does not infinitely exceed another's. If only finite, let that be A; and let it be

supposed further that Paul, having grace B, however much greater than A you wish, by sinning however more grievously mortally lost grace B, and remained very long in sin, and disposing himself to the contrary by all his powers always heaped crimes upon crimes, and at last very remissly and tepidly repents—yet with the requisite circumstances. Therefore Paul, according to the premises, who in the beginning sinned most grievously, persisted very long in sin, continually disposed himself away from penitence and grace by always heaping crimes with all his heart as he could, by the slightest contrition merits the greatest grace B to be returned to himself. Why then does Peter—who in the beginning sinned less, remained less in sin, did not add sin upon sin, but disposed himself toward penitence and grace very greatly, repenting most fervently and most perfectly—merit lesser grace and not so much? What reason, what equity, what justice would dictate this? Indeed rather the contrary would seem: since all the bad circumstances derogating from penitence and grace are much less with Peter, and the good circumstances promoting penitence and grace much greater.

Perhaps it will be said that this circumstance is better with Paul: that he first had greater grace. But undoubtedly that circumstance rather aggravates than alleviates his sin. For who—except perhaps the ungrateful—will deny that the natural law of gratitude insolubly obliges the benefactee and beloved to his benefactor and lover, to render similar things, and that the more benefactee and beloved is more strictly obliged to this? Wherefore [he sins] all the more if he does not return the good of gratitude, and much more amply if he returns the evil of ingratitude, and incurs a graver offense. Whence the Philosopher, *Politics* 7.7: "The mind is raised more against the accustomed and against friends than against the unknown, thinking itself to be little esteemed; on which account also Archilochus, fittingly complaining to friends, disputes to his soul: 'For not from foes, but from spears come piercings.'" And below, Aristotle himself says: "The magnanimous by nature are not savage, except when acting toward the unjust; but they suffer this more from the accustomed, if they think they suffer unjustly. And this happens according to reason: for from those they think benefits owed, with hurt, they think themselves deprived of these. Whence it is said: 'Savage are the enemies of brothers; and these indeed beyond loving, those beyond hating.'" And the Prophet says: "If my enemy had cursed me, I would verily have borne with it. And if he that hated me had spoken great things against me: I would perhaps have hidden myself from him. But thou a man of one mind, my guide, and my familiar," etc. [Ps. 54:13-14].

Augustine likewise, in *On True and False Penitence* 14, alleged in the Canon *On Penitence*, distinction 5, *Consideret*; and in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 16: "He becomes ungrateful," he says, "who, full of virtues, did not fear God at all. For in this each sinner becomes more culpable, the more acceptable he is to God. For Adam therefore sinned more, because he abounded with greater—indeed, with every—good." And if anyone still says that in the more friendly and more pleasing one sinning the fault is greater—nevertheless, if he repents, he is no less received into the former friendship, and into a fuller one—either this is from the gratuitous grace of him receiving such a penitent, or from preceding debt and merit. If from grace, this does

not help the Pelagians in any way, since they refuse gratuitous grace and sell it according to the debt of merit. If from debt and the value of merit, it seems much more that he who has sinned less and repents more fervently merits such great grace and friendship.

It seems also most unworthy of perfect reconciliation that he who was the most friendly, and parted in the most hostile manner by sinning, through the least and most frigid contrition seek perfect reconciliation and the greatest preceding friendship. For if he sought this duly, he ought reasonably to repent according to the magnitude of the offense and of the preceding friendship, or beyond, if he were able. Therefore this most frigid penitent seems to set far too little value on the offense, and on the privation of the friendship which he requires. Whence the Philosopher, *Rhetoric* 2.4, showing by what things the angry are softened and grow tame, says thus: "Therefore softening is the destitution and quieting of anger. If therefore they are angered with those who set little value [on them], and to set little value is voluntary—it is manifest that they are gentle to those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, and to those who confess and repent. For having satisfaction—that is, what is to attest concerning deeds—they cease from anger." But satisfaction must be according to the quality and quantity of sin, as was touched on above.

In agreement with this, John the Baptist: "Ye offspring of vipers, who hath shewed you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore worthy fruits of penitence" [Luke 3:7-8]; as if he were saying: there is no other way of fleeing. On which Gregory, as alleged in the Gloss: "He admonishes that not only the fruits of penitence are to be done; for the fruit of good work is not said to be equal of him who has fallen less and him who has fallen more, or of him who has fallen in nothing and him who has fallen in some crimes. By this therefore each one's conscience is convened, that he should seek so much greater gains of good works through penitence, as he has inflicted graver damages on himself through fault." In the Sentences of Peter 4, distinction 16, it is also written in this way: "Satisfaction is precepted by John, where he says: *Bring forth worthy fruits of penitence*—namely, that according to the quality and quantity of fault may be the quality and quantity of punishment. For the fruit of good work ought not to be equal in him who has sinned in nothing or less, and in him who has fallen more grievously."

If also that circumstance—which is to have had greater grace—makes Paul's penitence somewhat better than Peter's, [yet] is made worse or lessened just as much or more through the remission of the penitential act in Paul beneath the intension of the penitential act in Peter, the argument returns.

Further, if a sinner falling from the greatest grace immediately when he repents merits the whole of it suddenly: much more, if he had remained without sin in his grace, [would he merit it]; and any just man persevering in such great grace, by loving God above all things, and on account of Him avoiding sin, and doing similar things, would in any single instant or moment merit so much grace—especially since he has other circumstances more apt for meriting—and so in the briefest time anyone will merit infinite grace intensively. The same can similarly be argued of a penitent

continuing the act of penitence which he began, or continually intensifying it, that in any briefest time he will merit infinite grace. For since in the beginning he suddenly merited so much, and in any instant or particle of subsequent time he again newly merited so much—since the act is penitential, equally or more meritorious always—it was so.

Further, how much grace then does a sinner who was never in grace, now contrite, immediately merit? It is certain that some, by the fact that he is now made pleasing to God through contrition. If you say great or small according as his contrition was great or small: therefore through some contrition—say A—he can immediately merit grace under degree B; which either is less than baptismal grace—which is C—or equal, or greater. Not less, because then an adult who through himself has actually merited would in such a case depart with less grace, and pass to less glory, than a small child only baptized. How then will God render to each according to his works, as either Testament often testifies?

According to this also it would seem possible that someone could merit so remissly as to have in the future life lesser glory intensively than is one small delight in the present—say to see some smallest delightful thing, or to taste, which no Christian or even profane man rejects—since according to Philosophers and Theologians felicity and beatitude is a sufficient and perfect good. For according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1.9, "Felicity is a perfect good, and through itself sufficient, which makes life lacking nothing." And Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* 3, prose 2, says that "beatitude is the good, having obtained which one can desire nothing further; which indeed is the highest of all goods, containing all goods within itself, to which if anything were lacking it could not be highest, since something would be left outside which could be wished for. It is plain therefore that beatitude is a state perfect by the gathering together of all goods." And the Prophet says: "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance: at Thy right hand are delights even to the end" [Ps. 15:11]. And below 16: "I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear" [Ps. 16:15]. Whence also Apocalypse 7: "They shall no more hunger nor thirst" [Rev. 7:16]; and 1 Corinthians 2: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him" [1 Cor. 2:9].

But if it be said that B is equal to C, the consequent is that in the case [supposed] an adult who has actually merited through himself is rewarded equally with a small child only baptized, who never merited anything. How then will God reward each according to his works and merits?

Again, let it be supposed that someone who never had grace is contrite with a contrition lesser than A; and then, by hypothesis, he merits lesser grace than B or C—which was just rejected. But if it be said that B is greater than C, this is in some certain finite proportion. Let it be supposed therefore that someone is contrite with a contrition lesser than A proportionally, or below; and then according to the hypothesis he will merit grace equal to C or less—both of which were already destroyed. But if it be said in the first place that any such contrite person merits at least as much grace as is baptismal grace: either, then, he always merits as much equally, or always more, or sometimes as much, sometimes more, never as much equally, as was shown above. And

because then those penitent equally would merit equal grace—which is repugnant to all justice, especially where no gratuitous liberality is mixed in, as is the case in the justification of the unjust according to the aforesaid hypothesis of the Pelagians—therefore always more. But if through a certain contrition—say through A—he were to merit B, a grace greater than C, baptismal grace, why not through D, a contrition lesser than A proportionally as C is less than B, or below, will he merit E, a grace equal to C or less? Therefore proportionally to merits rewards must always be rendered, as all justice human and divine alike dictates, especially where pure rewards are repaid, and nothing is given of grace gratuitously.

Likewise, he who by sinning most grievously lost the greatest grace, and continually after, having sinned most grievously, through the least contrition merits the greatest grace—why then does not he who never had grace, nor has exercised himself in such great ingratitude, through a greater contrition merit so much grace, or more, and so any grace whatever, even infinite?

Likewise, if every such penitent, immediately when he merits, merits a grace greater than baptismal, why, if he continues that act, or continually intensifies it, in however small a time he will merit infinite grace? Why also does not any just man constituted in grace, through any act of his equally good as the act of this penitent—or however much better—merit so much grace or more, and so in however small a particle of time, infinite grace? as was argued above. And the same can similarly be argued concerning the excess of grace which he merits beyond baptismal grace.

But if anyone will obstinately persist against the premises, saying that one falling from great grace through sin by no means rises through any small contrition always to as much, but always or sometimes to less—besides the premised reasons showing the opposite, [his view] can also through the just-premised matters be specially castigated. For such a one either rises to grace less than baptismal, or equal, or greater, etc., as before.

Further, how can a dead man obtain life for the dead, and in some way raise the dead—another or himself? For either he would do this through a living work, or a dead one. Not through a dead one—no one is unaware. If through a living one, he naturally previously has life. For every operation naturally presupposes the form from which it proceeds, as chapter 39 makes plain. Therefore he does not through such living work bestow on the dead the spiritual life of grace. For just as a tree does not first by nature bring forth living fruit, and afterwards by nature is therefore alive—but the contrary—so also man, who is called by the Philosophers an inverted tree.

Whence the Saviour, John 15: "As the branch," He says, "cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in Me. I am the vine, you the branches: he that abideth in Me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit; for without Me you can do nothing"—nothing, namely, of good, without My making grace. On which Augustine, part 2, sermon 27 (or 81 of the whole): "From a living root," he says, "another shoot can sprout from a cut branch; but he who is cut off, without root cannot live. Then He adds: *As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless you abide in Me.* A great

commendation of grace, my Brothers; it instructs the hearts of the humble, it stops the mouths of the proud. Behold to whom—if they dare—let them respond, who, ignorant of God's justice and willing to establish their own, are not subject to the justice of God: behold to whom let them respond who please themselves and think God not necessary to themselves for doing good works. Do not such men resist this truth—men corrupt in mind, reprobate concerning the faith—who reply and speak iniquity, saying: 'From God we have that we are men, but from ourselves that we are just'? What say ye who deceive yourselves, not assertors but precipitators of free will, from the height of elation, through the emptiness of presumption, into the depths of submersion? For your voice is that man of himself does justice; this is the height of your elation. But see what follows you, and—if there is in you any sense—shudder. For he who thinks to bear fruit from himself, is not in the vine; he who is not in the vine, is not in Christ; he who is not in Christ, is not a Christian; these are the depths of your submersion."

"Again and again consider what truth still adds, and says: *I am*, He says, *the vine*, *you the branches*: *he that abideth in Me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit*; for without Me you can do nothing. Lest anyone should think that the branch could bear at least some little fruit from itself, when He had said *the same beareth much fruit*, He did not say, 'because without Me you can do little,' but, *you can do nothing*. Whether little, then, or much, without Him it cannot be done, without whom nothing can be done; because even if the branch bears a little, the Husbandman cleanses it that it may bring forth more. Yet unless it abides in the vine, and lives from the root, it cannot bear however much fruit from itself. But although Christ would not be the vine unless He were man, yet He would not give this grace to the branches unless He were also God."

On which also Alcuin, as alleged in the Gloss: "Every fruit of a good work proceeds from that root, who has freed us by His grace, and advances us by His help, that we may be able to bear more fruit." With this also agrees that of Matthew 7: "A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruits" [Matt. 7:18]. On which Augustine, *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount* 2.36: "The tree," he says, "is the soul itself—that is, man himself; and the fruits, the works of man. The bad man therefore cannot work good things, nor the good evil. Therefore the bad, if he wishes to work good, let him first be made good." Similar to these is also the example of earth, seed, rain, and warmth. For the earth is not good because the seed is vivified and grows; nor for that reason does it receive rain and heavenly warmth. But it is first naturally good earth, having moisture and warmth from heaven, and therefore and afterwards naturally germinates good fruit, and therefore the seed sown in it is vivified and grows. So also of the dry earth of our heart, and the seed of the word of God sown in the soul of the sinner—according to the parable and Lord's exposition recited more fully in Matthew 13 and Luke 8—of the rain of grace, and the heat of charity, descending from heaven heavenly. Nor however do I separate grace and charity essentially, but join them, so that both grace and charity is warm and moist, having virtually warmth and moisture, which are the principles of life, in which life consists, as both natural Philosophers and Physicians attest.

But that charity is a certain heavenly heat and a certain divine fire, who doubts? Who does not feel it? Whence also the dearest Author of charity says: "I am come to send fire on the earth, and what will I but that it be kindled?" [Luke 12:49]. Wherefore also the Holy Spirit was sent down upon the disciples in the species of fire, as the history of Acts 2 testifies. Treating the first of these, Gregory, on Ezekiel, homily 5 of book 1, says: "When a carnal mind receives the Holy Spirit, kindled with spiritual love, it bewails the evil it has done, and the earth burns when, conscience accusing him, the heart of the sinner is set aflame and is consumed in the sorrow of penitence. Hence again it is written: *Thy God is a consuming fire* [Deut. 4:24]. For because the mind which He has filled, our Creator renders clean from the rust of sins, He is called both fire and consuming." Who also on the Gospels, homily 30, says: "The Holy Spirit came upon the disciples with sudden sound, and changed the minds of the carnal into love of Himself; and outwardly with fiery tongues appearing, inwardly hearts were made flaming, since while they receive God in the vision of fire, they burned sweetly through love." And below: "God is fire, Paul attesting: *Our God is a consuming fire* [Heb. 12:29]. God indeed is called fire, because through Him the rust of sins is consumed. Of this fire Truth says: *I came to send fire on the earth, and what will I but that it should burn?* For *earth* are called earthly hearts, which while they always heap lowest thoughts within themselves, are trampled by malign spirits; but the Lord sends fire upon the earth, when by the breath of the Holy Spirit He kindles the heart of the carnal."

Not only is charity called fire, but also water, with Truth attesting in John 4, saying: "If thou didst know the gift of God, etc., He would have given thee living water" [John 4:10]; and below: "The water that I shall give him shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting" [John 4:14]. Where Chrysostom, as alleged in the Gloss: "Sometimes Scripture calls the grace of the Holy Spirit fire, sometimes water, showing that these names are not representative of substances, but of action. Through the appellation 'fire,' it enigmatically suggests the elevating and warming and consumptive of sins quality of grace; through the appellation 'water,' however, the cleansing which is from the Spirit, and the much refreshment which it shows to the minds receiving Him." Where also Theophilus in the Gloss similarly alleged called the grace of the Holy Spirit "living water"—that is, vivifying, refreshing, and motive: "For the grace of the Holy Spirit always moves him who works good, disposing assents in his heart."

But what better expositor than the holy Evangelist, who reclined upon the Lord's breast at the Supper, who later in chapter 7 expounding the recited saying of Christ, "*He that believeth in Me, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water*" [John 7:38], adds: "Now this He said of the Spirit, which they should receive who believed in Him." That charity is called water or waters, Augustine on Psalm 103: "*Who covereth the higher rooms thereof with waters*" [Ps. 103:3], in sermon 1 and 2 sufficiently diffusely shows. That grace also is designated by the name of rain, moisture, dew, and the like, sacred Scripture and the sacred Doctors very often manifest. For the Prophet says: "A free rain, O God, Thou shalt set apart for Thy inheritance: and it was weakened,

but Thou hast made it perfect" [Ps. 67:10]. "Thou," he says—"not it itself, but Thou hast made it perfect"—that is, healed it through the medicine of this rain. On which Augustine, putting forth one exposition and adding another, says: "Much more congruously is grace itself understood as the free rain, since it is given gratuitously without any preceding merits of works. For if of grace, not of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace [Rom. 11:6]. *I am not worthy*, he says, *to be called an Apostle, because I have persecuted the Church of God; but by the grace of God I am what I am* [1 Cor. 15:9-10]: this is the free rain. He has freely begotten us by the word of truth: this is the free rain. This free rain therefore, with no preceding merits of good works, did God set apart for His inheritance; *and it was weakened*: for it knew that it was nothing through itself, attributing not to its own powers but to the grace of God what it is."

Whence also the Apostle, who had said the law was weakened through the flesh—because the flesh does not fulfill what is fulfilled through the Spirit, that is, through spiritual grace—he himself again says: "*That the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit* [Rom. 8:4]." This therefore is *Thou hast made it perfect*, because the fullness of the law is charity, and "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts" [Rom. 5:5]—not through ourselves, but through the Holy Spirit who is given to us. Who below in Psalm 146 says of God: "He prepares for the earth rain"—that is, grace for earthly hearts; the effect of which rain he adds: "*Who*"—he says, or according to Augustine's letter—"*makes to spring forth on the mountains hay, and herb for the service of men*" [Ps. 146:8]. "Who," I say, "principally makes to spring forth on mountains"—that is, in men first earthly through sin but afterwards, after this rain, made heavenly and exalted; or "in mountains," that is, in elated men—"hay and herb for the service of men," that is, good fruits to be of value to men. On which Augustine: "Behold," he says, "the fruit of the rain, which makes to spring forth," etc. Similar to this is that of Psalm 84: "*The Lord shall give goodness, or sweetness*, according to Augustine's letter, *and our earth shall give her fruit*" [Ps. 84:13]. "The Lord," I say, "shall give the goodness of His grace first, and our earth shall give her fruit second." On which Augustine: "Think," he says, "of the word you have heard, lest the birds snatch the seed, that what was sown there may germinate; but unless God shall rain, what does it profit that there is sowing? This is, *the Lord shall give sweetness, and our earth shall give her fruit*. Let the rain of God come, and let what was sown there bear fruit."

In agreement with this is that of Isaiah 55: "The rain and the snow comes down from heaven, and shall return there no more, but soaks the earth, and waters it, and makes it to spring forth, and gives seed to the sower, and bread to him that eats" [Isa. 55:10]. This rain of grace, therefore, makes the seed of the word of God germinate in those hearing. Robert Lincoln also says, as is alleged in the next chapter: "God and the grace of God, and also our will, makes good in us, just as the grain germinates both by some intrinsic generative force, and by the heat of the sun, with the moisture of the earth." Whence also Peter, *Sentences* 2, distinction 27: "Just as the earth is watered by rain that it may germinate, and bring forth fruit—so on the earth of our mind, that is, on the will, the rain of divine benediction is poured—that is, grace is breathed in, which God

alone does, not man with Him—by which the will of man is watered, that it may germinate and bear fruit; that is, it is healed and prepared to will the good (according to which He is called *operating*), and is helped to do the good (according to which He is called *cooperating*); and that grace is not incongruously named *virtue*, because it heals and helps the infirm will of man." And below: "From the grace which prevenes and heals the will of man, and from the will itself, is procreated in the soul a good affect, or good motion of mind; and this is the first good merit of man."

This whole [matter] is congruously figured in that rod of Jesse, the Blessed Virgin, who before she brought forth the fruit of salvation, is shown to be full of grace, as the history teaches in Luke 1. Foreseeing this order, Isaiah said: "Drop down dew, ye heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just: let the earth be opened, and bud forth a Saviour" [Isa. 45:8]. This whole [matter] also that most salutary fruit, true salvation, and truth, which sprang from this earth, truly attests. For He Himself in Matthew 13, as was touched upon above, parabolizing about seed, says: "Others fell upon good ground, and gave fruit" [Matt. 13:8]. Because therefore the seed fell on good ground, therefore it gave fruit, not the contrary; therefore the earth was first naturally good. Which cannot be without charity and grace. For any earth which has not this virtue is sterile and bad, as no Theologian is unaware, as the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13 also plainly teaches. For charity divides between the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal perdition, with Augustine attesting in *On the Trinity* 15.18. Charity is also a fountain proper to the good and saints, of which it is said: "Let no stranger be partaker with thee" [Prov. 5:17], with Augustine likewise attesting on Psalm 103: "*Who covereth the higher rooms thereof with waters*," sermon 1.

Therefore this earth had charity by nature first, before it produced good fruit. Wherefore he also says that "others fell on good ground"—not "they made the ground good." The ground therefore was good before the seed fell on it. Whence also Luke 8: "But that on the good ground are they, who in a good and very good heart, hearing the word, retain it, and bring forth fruit" [Luke 8:15]. On which account Matthew 12: "*Make*," He says, "*the tree good, and his fruit good*" [Matt. 12:33]"—the tree good first, and the fruit good second. Wherefore he adds: "*for by the fruit the tree is known. O generation of vipers, how can you, being evil, speak good things*"—that is, speak well—"since you are evil? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh; A good man out of his good treasure bringeth forth good things" [Matt. 12:34-35]." But what is this good treasure of the good man, except charity, which alone makes a man good? Whence Augustine, *On the Words of the Lord*, sermon 12: "The Lord admonishes us," he says, "that we should be good trees, that we may have good fruits. For He says: *Either make the tree good*, etc.—where He says, *make the tree good*, this is a salutary precept to which obedience is necessary; but what He says, *Either make the tree bad*, etc., is not a precept that thou shouldst do it, but an admonition that thou shouldst beware. For He spoke against those who think that, while they are bad, they can speak good things, or have good works. The Lord Jesus says this cannot be: for first the man must be changed, that the works may be changed. Therefore let each one be

a good tree, let him not judge himself to have good fruits if he remains a bad tree; there will not be good fruit except of a good tree; change the heart, and the work will be changed; uproot cupidity, plant charity. For just as cupidity is the root of all evils, so is charity the root of all goods."

Wherefore also Anselm, *On Concord* 10: "Just as the earth," he says, "brings forth innumerable herbs and trees—without which human nature is not nourished, or even by which it is destroyed—without all care of man; but those which are most necessary for nourishing our life, [it brings forth] not without great labor and a cultivator, nor without seeds. So human hearts, without doctrine, without study, of themselves germinate as it were thoughts and wills nothing useful for salvation, or even noxious; but those without which we do not advance to the salvation of the soul, by no means do they conceive or germinate without the seed of their germination, and laborious cultivation. Whence those men to whom such cultivation is given are called by the Apostle the agriculture of God. The seed of this agriculture is the word of God—indeed not the word, but the sense which is perceived through the word. For the voice without sense establishes nothing in the heart, nor only the sense of the word, but every sense or understanding of rectitude—since the human mind, whether through hearing, or through reading, or through reason, or by any other manner conceives, is the seed of willing rightly. For no one can rightly will what he does not first conceive in heart; but to will to believe what is to be believed, is to will rightly. But that the Apostle says faith is from hearing [Rom. 10:17] is to be understood that faith is from this, that the mind conceives through hearing—not that the conception of the mind alone makes faith in man; but because faith cannot be without conception. For when rectitude of willing is added to the conception, through grace there is made faith, since he believes what he hears." And below: "Truly mission, preaching, hearing, understanding are nothing, unless the will wills what the mind understands; which the will cannot do unless it has received rectitude. For he wills rightly when he wills what he ought. Thus what the mind conceives from hearing the word is the seed of the preacher, and the rectitude is the increase which God gives, without which neither he that plants nor he that waters is anything, but God who gives the increase [1 Cor. 3:7]."

And below: "Let us see in examples how the word becomes seed. When those to whom it is said hear: 'If you will and hear Me' [Isa. 1:19], they understand and think what is said, to will to hear—this is to obey. For he who hears and does not obey is said not to hear; but they cannot obey unless they will; and to will to obey is to will rightly. But no one can will rightly except he have rectitude of will, which no man has except through grace. So what was said, 'If you will,' etc., is seed, by no means germinating any fruit through itself without the addition of rectitude." From which it can also appear that there is a twofold rectitude of will, habitual and actual—namely, the habit of grace, and the act proceeding thence; which can also appear by a congruous example. By nature it is prior to have a sound ear than to hear soundly, and this is the cause of that, not contrariwise. But the spiritual ear of the human heart cannot be sound without the medicine of charity and grace. Wherefore also our salutary Physician, about to heal a deaf man,

first put His fingers into his ears, which signifies the conferring of grace; and second, He said to him "*Ephphatha*"—which is, "Be opened"—and so immediately his ears were opened, as Mark 7 recites. Which He congruously hinted, after His parabolic discourse on the sower, the seed, etc. (Matthew 13), He immediately added: "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear" [Matt. 13:9]; similarly Luke 8.

Wherefore also John 8: He said to the wicked Jews: "He that is of God, heareth the words of God; therefore you hear them not, because you are not of God" [John 8:47]. He, I say, who is first of God, hears the words of God afterwards. And above, the same: "Why do you not know my speech? Because you cannot hear my word" [John 8:43]. On which Chrysostom, as alleged in the Gloss: "First therefore must virtue be sought which would hearken to the divine word; for as long as anyone is not cured in his proper hearing, by the word which says to the deaf 'Be opened,' he cannot perceive by hearing." And below 18: "Every one that is of the truth, heareth my voice" [John 18:37]. He, I say, who is first of the truth, from this hears my voice afterwards, not the contrary. On which, Augustine on John, part 2, sermon 61, Sentence 115 of the whole: "What He says, 'Every one that is of the truth, heareth my voice,' commends grace, by which according to His purpose He calls. Of which purpose the Apostle says: 'We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called' [Rom. 8:28]"—the purpose, namely, of the One calling, not of those called; which elsewhere is more openly so put: "Labour with the gospel, according to the power of God; who hath delivered us and called us by His holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace" [2 Tim. 1:8-9]. For if we think of the nature in which we were created, since truth created all, who is not of the truth? But not all are those to whom it is granted that, for hearing the truth and believing, [it is granted] from the truth itself, with no preceding merits whatsoever, lest grace not be grace.

For if He had said, "Every one who hears my voice is of the truth," he would for that reason be thought to be called "of the truth" because he obeys the truth. But this He did not say, but He says, "Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice"; and through this, he is not "of the truth" because he hears His voice, but for this reason he hears, because he is of the truth—that is, because this gift has been conferred on him by the truth. Whence also the 376th proposition of the *Sentences* of Prosper is excerpted. This same the Authorities of Augustine plainly attest: *On Faith to Peter* 64; *On the City of God* 15.6; Gregory, *Moralia* 11.5; Bede 2 on Luke 4—as chapter 38 more fully recited.

This also seems to hint that of Luke 10: "Into whatsoever house you enter, first say, Peace be to this house. And if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon him" [Luke 10:5-6]. Therefore not because their peace rests on him, is he therefore made son of peace, but the contrary. Whence Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 73: "He did not say, 'Upon whomsoever your peace shall rest, he shall be made son of peace,' but, 'If the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon him,' or upon that house. Already, then, even before this peace was announced to him, he was son of peace, or there [the son of peace] was."

From these, however, it is evidently known that in that sacred Scripture, which the Father sanctified and sent into the world, of which not one iota or one tittle shall pass away [Matt. 5:18], the order of words is not idle, nor of deeds, but full of profound causes and many mysteries. This same can also be shown otherwise thus: It is by nature prior for a man to receive medicine than to be healed of infirmity. For not because he is healed does he receive the medicine, but the contrary; and it is by nature prior for a man to be sound, than to do works of soundness, by similar reasoning. But grace alone is the medicine of the languid soul, as is plain from the premises; and Augustine in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 13, says: "Grace is medicine." Therefore it is by nature prior to receive grace than to be healed; and so to be healed than to be sound, and to exercise works of soundness. Whence Augustine on Psalm 31: "Blessed are they whose," etc.: "Let everything," he says, "be imputed to His grace, not to our merits. *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered* [Ps. 31:1]. God therefore covers the wounds, do not thou. For if thou wishest to cover, the physician, blushing, will not cure. Let the physician cover, and let him cure; for with a plaster he covers; under the covering of the physician the wound is healed, under the covering of the wounded one the wound is hidden."

This priority of heavenly grace gratuitously given to the ungrateful, infirm, and sinners, for the dismissal of sin and the operation of good, the Lord Jesus Christ also mystically intimates to us, while curing the deaf and dumb man, He put His fingers into his ears, and spitting He touched his tongue, and looking up to heaven, He groaned and said *Ephphatha*—which is, "Be opened"—and immediately his ears were opened, and the bond of his tongue was loosed, and he spoke rightly, as Mark 7 recites. Behold that to the infirm, first by the imposition of hands, the grace of the Holy Spirit is infused; second, through it he is healed; and third, having been healed, he does sound works. This mystical understanding can be confirmed by the very deed and the manner and order of doing—attending to other very many similar things in Scripture—which the expositions of the Saints also ratify.

In agreement with this is also that of Matthew 12: "There was offered to Him one having a devil, blind and dumb: and He healed him, so that he spoke and saw" [Matt. 12:22]. First He healed the infirm; second, having been healed, he did sound works. Whence also Luke: "When," he says, "He had cast out the devil, the dumb spoke" [Luke 11:14]. On which Bede, as alleged in the Gloss: "This demoniac, in Matthew, is narrated to have been not only dumb, but also blind. Three signs, therefore, simultaneously were performed in one man: the blind sees, the dumb speaks, the possessed of the devil is freed—which daily is fulfilled in the conversion of believers, that, the devil first being expelled, they look upon the light of faith; thereafter, mouths previously silent are loosed unto the praise of God."

Which is most beautifully shown in that woman who had a spirit of infirmity for 18 years, and was bowed down, nor could she at all look upward, whom when Jesus saw, He called her to Him, and said to her, "Woman, thou art delivered from thy infirmity": and He laid His hands upon her, and immediately she was made straight, and glorified God [Luke 13:11-13]. What is this woman so infirm, except a sinful soul, or human nature for a long time—namely thrice 6 years, that is,

before the law, under the law, and in the time of grace, for all years (since 6 is perfect, as is plain from Boethius's *Arithmetic* 1.22)—pressed down by the heavy burden of sin, nor able through itself to look up to God by affection? Her—not weeping, not asking, not bringing forth any merit—Jesus the Saviour saw, who not having been sought came to seek and to save what had perished [Luke 19:10]; saw her, I say, with the gaze of internal mercy, and called her to Himself, breathing in gratuitous grace gratuitously, and so healed her, where operating grace is lucidly indicated.

But because not even thus can this woman raise herself up to any good work, without her physician further specially helping her, cooperating, indeed even pre-operating, and previously by nature raising her up—He laid His hands upon her thus first, and immediately she was made straight to working well, and she glorified God second. Wherefore also He well says, "she was made straight," rather than "she made herself straight." For she is first and rather raised up by the hand of God, than she raises herself up—where also cooperating grace is perspicuously demonstrated. To this mystical understanding agree the expositions of the Saints. Whence also Augustine, *On the Words of the Lord*, sermon 31, says thus: "What of that woman who was 18 years in infirmity? In six days God perfected His works; thrice six makes 18, in the fig-tree this is in the woman 18 years—namely, the human race before the law, under the law, and under grace was bent over, could not look upward, because *Lift up your hearts* it heard without cause, but the Lord raised her up. Therefore there is hope, but for the sons, until the day of judgment shall come. A man gives much to himself; and what is man? Just man—man is something great, but when he is just, by the grace of God he is just man; for what is man, but that Thou art mindful of him?" [Ps. 8:5]

Which is also patently shown in the cure of the paralytic, to whom the Saviour first said, "Man, thy sins are forgiven thee," and second, "Arise, take up thy bed and go," as the Gospel history of Luke 5 sets forth. Which can also similarly be demonstrated by many other Gospel curative miracles similar to these. This same is lucidly manifested also by very many other Catholic Authorities. For the Lord says through Isaiah 43: "Thou hast not called upon me, O Jacob, neither hast thou laboured for me, O Israel. Thou hast not offered me the ram of thy holocaust, neither hast thou glorified me with thy victims: I have not caused thee to serve in offering, neither have I wearied thee with incense. Thou hast not bought me silver with money, neither hast thou inebriated me with the fat of thy victims. But thou hast made me to serve in thy sins, thou hast wearied me with thy iniquities. I am, I am He that blot out thy iniquities for my own sake, and I will not remember thy sins. Put me in remembrance, and let us judge together: tell, if thou hast any thing to justify thyself" [Isa. 43:22-26]. "*I am*," he says, "*who blot out thy iniquities for My sake*"—that is, on account of My mercy gratuitously, not on account of thy prior merits. Wherefore He adds: "*Put in remembrance, and let us judge together; tell if thou hast anything to justify thyself*"—as if He were saying: "Thou hast nothing whereby thou mightest merit justification"; or according to the Septuagint translation: "Tell thou first thy iniquities that thou mayest be justified"—and then He speaks ironically, and is as much as if he were saying

manifestly: "Thou canst say nothing." But what justifications didst thou have, except iniquities, by which thou by no means meritest justification?

Wherefore also the Apostle says: "Justified freely by His grace" [Rom. 3:24]. On which the Gloss—and it is principally Augustine's *On the Spirit and the Letter* 8: "*Justified freely*—that is, without preceding merits—and this through *His grace*, that is, through gratuitous gifts. For the grace of God is the gift of God; but the greatest gift is the Holy Spirit Himself. Therefore they were not justified through the law, not through their own will, but through the grace of Christ; not that it happens without our will, but our will is shown to be infirm through the law, that grace may heal the will, and the sound will may fulfill the law not constituted under the law, nor needing the law. This therefore is the grace by which the wicked is justified—that is, becomes just who before was wicked—and therefore no merits precede the receiving of this grace, since to the merits of the wicked not grace but punishment is owed. Nor would this be grace, if it were not given gratuitously; but it is given gratuitously, because we had done no good before this whereby we might merit it; for nothing had preceded in our merits except that whereby we deserved damnation. Therefore He found not merits of goods, but merits of punishments. Therefore *they are justified freely*, because they had wrought nothing by His grace."

Who also in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 20: "When the Apostle says," he says, "*man is justified freely by faith without the works of the law* [Rom. 3:28], he wishes nothing else to be understood in what he says *freely*, except that justification is not preceded by works. Plainly elsewhere he says: *If by grace, it is not now of works; otherwise grace is no more grace* [Rom. 11:6]." The same to Titus 3: "But when the goodness and humanity of God our Saviour appeared: not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his mercy, he saved us, by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost: whom he hath poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour: that, being justified by his grace, we may be heirs, according to hope of life everlasting" [Titus 3:4-7]. The same to Romans 3: "By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before Him. Where then is thy boasting? It is excluded: by what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith. For we account a man to be justified by faith, without the works of the law" [Rom. 3:20, 27-28].

But perhaps someone will say this must be understood of the legal, sacramental, and ceremonial works, which had been customary in the Old Law—not however of the moral works of the Decalogue, which both laws admit. Yet the further course of that Epistle, together with others, manifests another understanding evidently, showing that the Apostle wishes to speak also of the works of the Decalogue aforesaid. For the Apostle intends—as the course of the Epistle and Catholic expositions attest—to refute Jews and Greeks, and all Gentiles converted to the justice of Christian faith, mutually quarreling and exalting themselves over each other; the Jews indeed saying that they had merited this justice through observance, and the works of their law, with the Gentiles meriting nothing but offending grievously by adoring idols; the Greeks and Gentiles, on the contrary, asserting that they had worshiped idols from simple ignorance, and had immediately with joy received the faith of Christ preached by the Apostles, while the Jews

having the Law and Prophets had so much more grievously sinned, by killing Christ testified by the Law and Prophets, and despising His Apostles. But how would he truly contradict the Jews by saying, "By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before Him," unless he understood universally that no flesh will be justified by any works, nor by any work of the law—sacramental, ceremonial, or moral whatsoever—but through the law of Christian faith; faith, I say, not dead, or formless or naked, but living, formed, and clothed through grace and charity?

Which the words of the Apostle also evidently indicate. For when he had premised, "By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before Him," he immediately adds: "For by the law is the knowledge of sin" [Rom. 3:20]; which below in chapter 7 he more clearly expounding, says: "I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known concupiscence, if the law did not say: Thou shalt not covet" [Rom. 7:7]. But what and what kind of law is it that prohibits coveting? Is it not the moral [law] of the Decalogue? Wherefore also above, the same: "Let us serve," he says, "in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter" [Rom. 7:6], because—as he himself says—"the letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth" [2 Cor. 3:6]. Which is to be understood literally, not concerning the understanding of the Old Testament in sacramentals and ceremonies according to the surface of the letter and the spiritual or mystical understanding, but concerning the ten Commandments of the Decalogue, moral, delivered to Moses on stone tablets and through Moses promulgated to the people. Wherefore also he immediately adds: "Now if the ministration of death, engraved with letters upon stones, was glorious; so that the children of Israel could not steadfastly behold the face of Moses, for the glory of his countenance, which is made void: how shall not the ministration of the spirit be rather in glory?" [2 Cor. 3:7-8]

What therefore is in the Apostle, "By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified, but through the law of faith," this is, "the letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth"—namely, the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is not from works done according to the letter of the law. For according to the same in 1 Corinthians 12, the Holy Spirit "divides to every one according as He will" [1 Cor. 12:11]; "according as He will," I say, liberally and gratuitously, not according as is owed from anyone's merits.

Augustine in *On the Spirit and the Letter*—through almost the whole work—most diligently teaches this understanding of the Apostle from the recited Authorities and other similar ones, and he proves it through the words of the Apostle as above, as is clearly plain there in many chapters. Where also in chapter 12, after a great scrutiny he concludes thus: "These things therefore being considered, we gather that man is not justified by the precepts of a good life, except through the faith of Jesus Christ—that is, not by the law of works but of faith, not by the letter but the spirit, not by the merits of deeds, but by gratuitous grace." And below 24: "The law of faith is charity inscribed in the heart, and diffused, perfected in those hoping in Him, that the soul healed not by fear of punishment, but by love of justice may work the good." Who also on Psalm 31, treatise 1, teaches the same understanding and the same sentence clearly. Whence he begins his sermon thus: "The Psalm of the grace of God and of our justification, with no preceding merits of ours, but the mercy of the Lord our God preventing us, commended chiefly by the Apostolic mouth, [is

to be] taken up by our slenderness for treating"; the Psalm, I say, commended by the Apostolic mouth in Romans 4, where the Apostle treats this matter. For there he says thus: "*David speaketh the blessedness of the man, to whom God reputeth justice without works: Blessed are they whose,*" etc. [Rom. 4:6-7]. The Gloss: "*reputeth*"—that is, acceptably, that is, gratuitously bestows, as it were, on one impotent to approach—"justice"—that is, the remission of sins, and good works; and this without preceding works.

Augustine also on the aforesaid Psalm, where above, says: "We must put no works before faith—that is, that anyone before faith should be said to work them well. For those very works which are said to be before faith, although they seem laudable to men, are vain. So they seem to me, like great strength and a most swift course off the road. Therefore let no one count his good works before faith. Where there was no faith, there was no good work; for intention makes a good work, and faith directs intention. Do not greatly attend to what a man may do, but to what he looks at when he does it, whither he directs the muscles of the best governance." And he speaks there not of dead or formless faith, but of [faith] formed by charity, according to that of the Apostle to Galatians 5: "Faith that worketh by charity" [Gal. 5:6]; as also his more diffuse course shows. Wherefore he says: "Faith, taking up hope and love, begins to work well." Where also Augustine asks thus: "How is a man justified by faith, without works? The Apostle himself would respond: 'For this reason I have told thee this, O man, lest thou shouldst seem to presume as it were of thy own works, and to have received the grace of faith by the merit of thy works. Do not therefore presume of works before faith—since thou hast known that faith found thee a sinner; and if faith given made thee just, it found thee wicked, whom it would make just.' He says: 'Believing in Him who justifies the wicked, his faith is reputed unto justice' [Rom. 4:5]. If the wicked is justified, from a wicked he is made just; if from a wicked he is made just, what are the works of the wicked? Let the wicked also boast of his works, and say: I give to the poor, I take away nothing from anyone, I do not covet another's wife, and the like; let him say all these things—I ask whether he is pious or impious. Thou art impious, and thy works are nothing—but believe in Him who justifies the wicked, that thy works also may be good works. For nor would I call them good as long as they do not proceed from a good root."

And below: "Thou hast done nothing of good, and remission of sins is given to thee. Thy works are attended to, and works are found evil. If God repaid those works what is owed them, He would surely condemn. For the wages of sin is death [Rom. 6:23]. To bad works what is owed except damnation? To good works indeed what is owed? Reward—the kingdom of heaven. But thou wast found in evil works; if there be repaid to thee what is owed, thou must be punished. What then? God repays thee not the punishment owed, but gives the unowed grace; He owed vengeance, He gives indulgence. Thou beginnest, then, to be in faith through indulgence. Now that faith, taking up hope and love, begins to work well." Wherefore the Gloss on that of Romans 3 above alleged—"We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law"—says thus: "We Apostles think that any man, even a Gentile, is justified through faith without the carnal works of the law—that is, without circumcision and new moons or the veneration of the

Sabbath; or without works of the law of any kind even moral; but this is to be understood of the works preceding faith, not following, without which faith is empty, as James says: 'Faith without works is dead' [James 2:20]; and Paul himself says: 'If I should have all faith, but have not charity, I am nothing' [1 Cor. 13:2]. Well therefore the Apostle, preaching faith to the Gentiles, in order to show that one comes to faith not by the merit of good works, but that good works follow faith, says: 'A man is justified by faith without the works of the law'—not but that one believing must afterwards work through love (as Abraham wished to immolate his son [James 2:21]); for works follow the justified, do not precede the one to be justified, but by faith alone without preceding works the man is made just."

This same the Prophet seems to hint, when he says thus: "Repay Thy servant, give me life, and I shall keep Thy words" [Ps. 118:17]. On which Augustine: "If he had asked good things to be repaid for good things, he had already kept the words of God. But he did not say, 'Repay Thy servant, because I have kept Thy words,' as if to demand a good reward for the good of obedience; but he said, 'Repay Thy servant, I shall live and shall keep Thy words.' What is this but to say that the dead cannot keep them—the unfaithful, surely, of whom it is said, 'Let the dead bury their dead' [Matt. 8:22]? Wherefore if we understand the dead as the unfaithful, the living as the faithful—since 'the just shall live by faith' [Hab. 2:4], nor can the words of God be kept except through faith which works through love—he asks this for himself who says: 'Repay Thy servant, I shall live and shall keep Thy words.' And since before faith nothing is owed to a man except evils for evils, but God repays through unowed grace good for evil—he asks this repayment who says, 'Repay Thy servant, I shall live and shall keep Thy words.' For there are four repayments. Either evils are repaid for evils—as God will repay eternal fire to the wicked; or good for good, as He will repay the eternal kingdom to the just; or good for evil, as Christ through grace justifies the wicked; or evil for good, as Judas through malice persecuted Christ. Of these four repayments the two first pertain to justice, that evils may be repaid for evils, goods for goods; the third pertains to mercy, that goods may be repaid for evils; the fourth God knows not: for to no one does He repay evil for good. But this third repayment is first necessary. For unless God repaid goods for evils, there would in no way be those to whom He could repay goods for goods. See that Saul, afterwards Paul: 'Not by the works of justice which we have done,' he says, 'but according to His mercy He hath saved us' [Titus 3:5]. And again: 'I give counsel, as having obtained mercy from the Lord, to be faithful' [1 Cor. 7:25]—that is, that I might live, since *the just shall live by faith*: dead therefore he was through his injustice, before he lived through God's grace. God therefore repaid him good for evil, that is, life for death—such repayment as is here asked: 'Repay Thy servant, I shall live'; but this man who already prays and says, 'Repay Thy servant, I shall live'—if he were utterly already dead, he would not pray, but he received from Him the beginning of good concupiscence, from whom he asks the life of obedience. For they had some faith who said: 'Lord, increase our faith' [Luke 17:5]; but [the other] both confessed his unbelief and did not deny faith, who when he was asked if he believed, said: 'I do believe, Lord; help my unbelief' [Mark 9:23]. Already, surely, beginning to live, he asks life, who, believing, prays for obedience—not for the keeping [the reward of] kept

obedience, but help that it may be kept. For with growing life he comes to life day by day, who is renewed from day to day."

Likewise Job 33: "He shall look upon men, and shall say, I have sinned" [Job 33:27]. He shall look, I say, first with the gaze of gratuitous mercy, gratuitously inspiring grace; and the sinner second, having been compunct through grace, shall say, I have sinned—that is, he will repent of sins. Wherefore Gregory, *Moralia* 24.5, expounding that word, says: "He could not know himself to be a sinner, did he not have justice. For no one apprehends his own perversity except when he has begun to be upright. For he who is altogether perverse cannot even see this which is. But he who understands himself to be a sinner has already in some part begun to be just, and that which when not just he had done, from this, that he is just, he accuses—by which his own accusation he begins to cleave to God, while bringing forth a right judgment against himself, he condemns in himself this which he feels to displease Him. Therefore having received his justice, this man shall say, *I have sinned*; and it is to be noted that what is premised, *He shall look upon men*, and then is added, *and shall say, I have sinned*."

Wherefore also below 40 the Lord said to Job: "I will ask thee, and do thou tell me. Hast thou an arm like God, and canst thou thunder with a voice like Him? Look on the proud and humble them, look at all the proud and confound them," etc. "And I will confess that thy right hand is able to save thee" [Job 40:2-9]—as if to say, this man cannot, but God [can]. On which Gregory, *Moralia* 32.7: "*Look on*, etc.—as if He should say: As I [do]. But in two ways every sinner is looked on by the Lord—when he is converted from sin, or punished for sin. Of the gaze of conversion it is said: 'The Lord turned and looked on Peter, and Peter remembered, and went out and wept bitterly' [Luke 22:61]; of the gaze of vengeance again: 'The countenance of the Lord [is] upon them that do evil things, to cut off the remembrance of them from the earth' [Ps. 33:17]. In both ways the proud is overthrown in humility, because either by repenting he knows fault, or perishing he receives punishment." And below on that, "*And I will confess*"—as if openly He said, "If thou canst do these things which I have set forth, I shall reckon to thee and not to Me all the goods which thou hast done; but if thou canst not, it is plain that from the guilt of thy wickedness thou canst not by thy virtue free thyself. Behold, by the divine voice it is said to blessed Job that he is not saved by his own virtue; and yet some men, who are far from this man's powers, despising God's help, trust they can be saved by their own fortitude. For these what else ought we to pray, except that, if they have already received the gifts of good works, they may also receive this gift, that they may learn from whom they have received them?"

In agreement with this also is that of Habakkuk 3: "He looked, and dispersed the nations: and the everlasting mountains were crushed to pieces" [Hab. 3:6]. A similar sentence the Prophet seems to teach when he says: "Who looketh upon the earth, and maketh it tremble: who toucheth the mountains, and they smoke" [Ps. 103:32]. For then surely the earth trembled, and the mountains smoke, when the sinner—frigid and dry, lifted up and hard—being compunct by the gaze of God, sends forth a fervent shower of smoking tears.

According to these and other places of Scripture, God seems to be compared to the sun, and God's gaze to the sun's ray. For just as the sun and the solar ray is luminous and warm effectively, so also God and the divine gaze. For He Himself is the Sun of intelligence illuminating the intellect; He is the Sun of justice inflaming the affect, and directing the effect. The ray of this Sun, or its gaze, falling on the mind of a sinner, drives away the darkness of ignorance, and manifests an infinite multitude of sins, and infinite horrid circumstances—just as the ray of the other sun [manifests] an infinite multitude of atoms. Which ray or gaze, reflecting from the sinner unto God, raises the eyes of the sinner, attracts him, and converts him, that he may look upon this most clear Sun, from whom—much turned away, yet in His eyes—he had perpetrated so many and so sordid things. And so this gaze or ray, of punishment, hurls and produces beyond the horrid and dense cloud of sin, the splendor of the sun and the warmth privating it: lightnings and thunders terrible of the divine offense and threat. And so by the spirit of compunction and fear conceived within the sinful earth, an earth-tremor is made, which—through the mouth of the sinner, as through some passage of the earth, hastening to go out—bursts forth into confession. And so at last this cloud of sin is dissolved into a rain of tears, purgative of all squalors, and whitening above snow [Ps. 50:9] the sinner soul.

This rain, received by heavenly virtue, sanctifies, irrigates, and makes fruitful the cursed, parched, and sterile earth of the sinner, by raining upon it. Even when so rained upon, the ray of the divine gaze does not desert it, but cherishes and refreshes it, in marvelous ways causes it to bear fruit, brings it to maturity, and at last marvelously altered, attracts and brings it to heaven. After such tempest and rain of tears, [the gaze] cherishes [the earth] by infusing serenity of conscience, and manifold consolation. Which a certain devout soul experiencing said: "After tempest Thou makest a calm, and after weeping and tears Thou pourest in exultation" [cf. Tobit 3:22]. He refreshes by exhaling the sweet vapor of meditation, return-of-love, and heavenly and sincere prayer. Whence sometimes the abundant rain of tears is remitted, that thus there be made a circular generation of such rain. Sometimes [there comes] a heavenly dew of celestial savor, of celestial sweetness, sweetly feeding and inebriating those who taste—this is Manna, this is the water of refreshment, this is the inebriation of the house of God [Ps. 35:9]. Through this ray or gaze frozen things are dissolved, slimy and slippery things are constrained, withered things grow green again, and dead things live again. This ray makes the earth fruitful by inspiring grace, mother of good works and nurse; which also brings to maturity by giving perseverance; which then this earth, marvelously altered by celestial virtue, emptied of earthly heaviness and grossness, changed into a celestial nature—as it were a shell filled with celestial dew—attracts to heaven, elevates, and brings.

Since therefore the gaze of God is of such efficacy and virtue, no wonder if the Church of God so often desires it and so often implores it. But let it suffice to have moralized these things briefly. With the premises also agrees that Gospel narrative of Luke 22 concerning Peter's sin, the Lord's gaze, and Peter's bitter weeping: "*The Lord, turning, looked on Peter; and Peter remembered the word, etc. And going forth, he wept bitterly*" [Luke 22:61-62]. The order of the words is to be

noted: "The Lord, turning, looked on Peter." Behold that the Lord, in mercy, first turned Himself to the sinner, before the sinner [turned] to Him. Behold that He first looked on the sinner by inspiring gratuitous grace, before the sinner repented of sins. On which Bede, as alleged in the Gloss: "His looking is to have mercy, since not only when penitence is being done, but also that it may be done, the mercy of God is necessary." On which also Augustine, *On the Consensus of the Evangelists*, as similarly alleged there: "It seems to me," he says, "that that gaze was made divinely; and as it is said, 'Look upon me and hear me,' and 'Turn, O Lord, deliver my soul' [Ps. 6:5], so I judge it was said, *The Lord, turning, looked on Peter*." The same in *Hypognostica* 50: "If a sinner presumes to be cleansed by his will alone, he cannot, indeed he is not even compunct from the heart; for unless the Lord had looked on Peter, he would never, moved by penitence, have wept bitterly. Therefore penitence is the best and most perfect thing, which calls back all defects to the perfect; but every best gift, says James the Apostle, and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights" [James 1:17].

Also blessed Ambrose, in book 9 on Luke—Augustine *Against Pelagius and Caelestius*, *On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin* reciting—says thus: "Good are the tears which wash fault. Indeed, those whom Jesus looks at weep. Peter denied first, and did not weep, because the Lord had not looked at him; he denied a second time, did not weep, because the Lord had not yet looked at him; he denied also a third time; Jesus looked, and he wept most bitterly. Let these read the Gospel and see that the Lord Jesus was at that time within while He was being heard by the chief of the priests; but the Apostle Peter was outside and below in the courtyard with the servants by the fire, now sitting, now standing, as is shown by the most truthful and most concordant narration of the Evangelists. Whence it cannot be said that the Lord looked on him with corporeal eyes, visibly admonishing him; and therefore what is written there, 'The Lord looked on him,' was done within in the mind, was done in the will. The mercy of the Lord came secretly to his aid, touched his heart, recalled the memory, by His interior grace visited Peter, moved and brought forth the affect of the inner man even to outward tears."

And Isidore, *On the Highest Good* 2.12, says: "Whoever is compunct by the memory of his sins to lamenting, then let him know that he is being visited by God's presence: for then Peter wept, when Christ looked on him; whence in the Psalms: 'He looked, and the earth was shaken, and trembled' [Ps. 103:32]; the steps of God are in the heart of the inner man, when good desires arise that the bad may be trampled."

It is plain therefore that God's mercy and grace precede penitence, as the efficient cause its effect. Wherefore Jeremiah 31, in the person of the converted sinner, says: "After Thou didst convert me, I did penance" [Jer. 31:19]. The Gloss on "after"—not before, not through me—and "after Thou shewedst me, I struck my thigh: I am confounded and ashamed." The Gloss: "After, not before, not through me." Likewise Lamentations, last [chapter]: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted" [Lam. 5:21]. The Gloss: "Convert us through grace, and we shall be converted as much as is in us by free choice." Whence "by the grace of God I am what I am, and His grace in me hath not been void [1 Cor. 15:10]. For the grace of the One calling

precedes and excites the freedom of the will. Ours is that we fall; God's that we rise. For men are flesh, a spirit going and not returning [Ps. 77:39]. It is not therefore of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God who showeth mercy [Rom. 9:16]. It is to be noted nevertheless that we are not converted by God's grace unless we are also converted by our will."

Did not the Lord show this same thing to Moses, in Exodus 33, when He said: "I will have mercy on whom I will, and I will be merciful to him whom it shall please me" [Exod. 33:19]? He does not say, "I will have mercy and be merciful on him who shall have merited it by repenting," but, "On whom I shall gratuitously will, and on him whom it shall please Me gratuitously." This exposition the Apostle authorizes in Romans 9, disputing on grace and the gratuitous will of God: "*To Moses,*" he says, "*He says, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will shew mercy to whom I shew mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.*" And below: "*Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will; and whom He will, He hardeneth*" [Rom. 9:15-18]. Does not the Lord also testify this in Hosea, last [chapter], when He says thus: "I will heal their breaches, I will love them freely" [Hos. 14:5]? The Gloss: "By mercy alone, since He first loved us [1 John 4:10]." Does not the Lord also say to the sinful people in Isaiah 52: "You were sold gratis, and you shall be redeemed without money" [Isa. 52:3]? The Gloss: "Without money, by no merit of yours, but by the gratuitous benefit of God."

And what else has the Prophet sensed when saying to God: "For nothing shalt thou save them" [Ps. 55:8]—"for nothing," that is, for no preceding merit, but by Thy grace alone? Whence Augustine, expounding this: "By no preceding merits of theirs Thou shalt save them: 'I, who was first a blasphemer,' he says, 'and a persecutor, and contumelious; but I obtained mercy' [1 Tim. 1:13]. He received letters from the priests, that wherever he found Christians, he might bind and bring them. No good merits of his therefore had preceded—indeed, such things had preceded for which he should be condemned; he brought no good, and he was made saved. *For nothing shalt thou save them*; they did not bring goats, rams, bulls; they did not bring gifts and ornaments to Thy temple; they pour over not anything from a good conscience of libation; in them all is foul, all rough, all detestable. And since they bring nothing to Thee whereby they might be saved, *for nothing Thou shalt save them*—that is, by gratuitously given grace."

Who also in *On Grace and Free Will* 49: "Through the Holy Spirit," he says, "He works in the hearts of the elect goods, who has worked that those very hearts should be from evil into good." And it follows in 50: "Let men suspect whatever good merits they think to precede, that they may be justified through the grace of God; not understanding, when they say this, that they do nothing else but deny grace. What else is it that Truth itself says: *No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him*" [John 6:44]? According to these, however, the sinner first by meritorious repenting would rather draw the Father and the Son to himself than the contrary. What else did the Apostle understand, when he said: "Knowest thou not, that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" [Rom. 2:4] Therefore the benignity of God precedes, effects, and produces penitence. And in 2 Timothy 2: "Lest at any time God may give them repentance" [2 Tim. 2:25]. Therefore God gives penitence through preceding grace.

Augustine, treating this in 5 *Against Julian* 5: "He chooses no one worthy," he says, "but by choosing makes [him] worthy; yet He punishes no one unworthy. The Apostle says, you say, '*The goodness of God leadeth thee to penance*'; this is true; but whom He hath predestined, He leadeth—although the man himself, according to his own hardness and impenitent heart, as far as it pertains to him, treasures up wrath for himself in the day of wrath, and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works [Rom. 2:5-6]. For however much patience He shows, unless He Himself give it, who shall do penance? Hast thou forgotten that this same Doctor says: 'Lest at any time God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil' [2 Tim. 2:25-26]? But His judgments are like a great deep [Ps. 35:7]." Who also in *On True and False Penitence* 16: "Since fruitful penitence is the work not of man but of God, He can inspire it whenever His mercy [wills], and reward [those] from mercy whom He could damn from justice." Which the Gloss on the aforesaid passage of Timothy most plainly attests.

Wherefore at the end of the book of holy Prosper, *For the Preachers of the Grace of God against the Book of Cassian*—where 13 chapters are recited excerpted from the proceedings against the heretic Pelagius and other little books of his condemned in the Synod of Palestine—the last asserted that "penitence is not given according to the grace and mercy of God, but according to the merit and labor of those who through penitence have been worthy of mercy." Where also consequently, among the 13 sanctions destroying those 13 heresies, the 13th says thus: "That [it must be confessed] that pardon is given to penitents according to the mercy and grace of God, not according to their merit—since penitence itself the Apostle calls the gift of God, where he says concerning some: 'Lest at any time God may give them penance.'"

From these things, however, is plain the correction of the whole opinion of Pelagius generally and specially of the first part. Now, however, against the two remaining parts, [we must proceed] first generally.

For both assert that the remission of sin and the justification of the unjust precede grace in time or nature. But according to what can be had from chapter 26 of this work, and according to all Philosophic and Theological treaters, evil itself, or evil-itself and sin, and the malice of sin is not anything positive, but only privative. But no privation is driven from the subject except through the positing of a habit in the subject, and this naturally preceding. For the induction and positing of a habit is the cause of the expulsion and removal of the opposite privation. For privation cannot in any way be taken away except through the positing of a repugnant habit, with the subject capable of either remaining. For how is death taken away except through life, blindness except through vision, darkness except through light, nakedness except through clothing? Or how is ignorance taken away except through knowledge? How then will privative malice be taken away, except through the positing of a habit of goodness causally and therefore naturally preceding? But charity alone or grace is such a habit of goodness, the same restoring [it] after mortal sin, and conserving, as appears from the premises.

Sin is also uncleanness, and the privation of due cleanness; wherefore it cannot be taken away except through the positing of a habit of cleanness, charity, and grace preceding. For it cannot be taken away through the act of penitence without such a habit, since the act of penitence by no means by itself repugns it, and because then on the cessation of the act, the uncleanness of sins would return. Wherefore the Lord, in Ezekiel 36, intimating this order of cleansing, says: "I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed; and I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh" [Ezek. 36:25-26].

The Gloss: "Note that He gives a new heart and a new spirit after the pouring of water."

Expressing the same order of cleansing of sin through fired stone or fire, by which charity is figured, Isaiah says: "There flew unto me one of the seraphim, and in his hand a calculus" (where the Septuagint has *Carbunculus*) "which he had taken from the altar with the tongs. And he touched my mouth, and said: Behold, I have touched this with thy lips, and thy iniquity shall be taken away, and thy sin shall be cleansed" [Isa. 6:6-7]. On which the Gloss says that "this one so flying is Christ sent from the Father, who alone dismisses sins, which the whole Trinity dismisses; and that this calculus or carbuncle is charity," and says, "that that altar is the altar which John saw in the Apocalypse, which is full of fired calculi by which sins can be purged." And note the order evidently expressed: "I have touched," he says, "this"—namely, with charity—"thy lips," namely first according to nature, "and thy iniquity shall be taken away, and thy sin shall be cleansed" later, namely according to nature. Wherefore he congruously says, "shall be taken away."

Sin is also turpitude, and the privation of due beauty; wherefore it is not taken away except through the positing of a repugnant habit of beauty. But charity and grace is the beauty of the soul, or the restorer of it. Wherefore Augustine on Psalm 103, treatise 1, treating that of the Canticle of Canticles according to the old translation, "*Who is this who descends made white?*" [Cant. 8:5 LXX]: "Made white," he says, "because not through herself white"; and he adds: "I was first a blasphemer," and likewise: "We also were sometime by nature children of wrath, even as the rest" [Eph. 2:3]. Grace approaches, illuminating and whitening: "First thou wast black, but thou hast been made white from His grace; for you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord" [Eph. 5:8]. The same could similarly be argued: that sin is the injustice, infirmity, and death of the sinful soul; but grace is the justice, soundness, and life of the spiritual soul, or the restorer of it.

Now further specially against the first of these, which says that man cleanses himself from sin by himself: either this is by a clean act or unclean. If by a clean one, he is first himself clean, as appears from the premises. Whence Matthew 23: "Woe to you, etc., who clean the outside of the cup and dish, but within you are full of rapine and uncleanness. Thou blind Pharisee, first clean the inside of the cup and dish, that the outside also may be clean" [Matt. 23:25-26]. And the Apostle says to Titus 1: "All things are clean to the clean: but to them that are defiled, and to unbelievers, nothing is clean: but both their mind and their conscience are defiled" [Titus 1:15]. Nor by an unclean act. For how could the unclean by his uncleanness purge the unclean? Whence

Ecclesiasticus 34: "Of the unclean what shall be cleansed? And of a liar what truth shall be told?" [Sir. 34:4]. But such a one, who corrects himself from his sins by himself, and so merits grace, has not to pray with the other sons of the Church: "Have mercy on me, O God, according to Thy great mercy" [Ps. 50:3], but, "Lord, render to me justice according to the demand of my merits"; nor has he further to say, "And according to the multitude of Thy tender mercies"—but, "of Thy justices"—"blot out my iniquity." Indeed, he ought not reasonably to ask this, since not God but he himself blots out his iniquities, as he says. Wherefore he has not consequently to pray, "Wash me yet more, etc., Thou shalt sprinkle me, O Lord, with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed," etc. [Ps. 50:9]. Nor must such a one claim any participation in the blessed blood of Jesus Christ, "*which was shed for many for the remission of sins*" [Matt. 26:28], as the Gospels and the whole Church of God attest. For he can cleanse himself by himself.

But not so—not so does the Lord Himself feel, when through Isaiah 43 He thus says: "I am, I am He that blot out thy iniquities" [Isa. 43:25]. "*I am*," he says, "*I am He*"—namely, discretively, as Grammarians attest, that is, "I, and no other, who blot out thy iniquities." For He is "the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world" [John 1:29], "and the sins of the world," as the whole Church chants. Wherefore Theophilus, as alleged in the Gloss, says: "Why did he not say 'sins of the world,' but 'sin'?—namely, that by what he says 'sin,' he might seem to hint at sin universally; just as we are accustomed to say that man was cast out of paradise, that is, the whole human race." And Augustine, on that passage in sermon 4, teaches that both these—"Behold the Lamb of God, behold who taketh away the sin of the world"—must be taken discretively in the aforesaid manner. Who also, as alleged in the Canon *On Consecration*, distinction 4, *Nemo*; and in 4 Sentences of Lombard, distinction 18: "No one taketh away the sins of the world but Christ, who is the Lamb taking away the sins of the world." Similar to this is also that below, the same: "*This is He who baptizeth in the Holy Spirit*" [John 1:33]. Which Augustine in sermon 5 there similarly understands; the Scholastic History [Comestor] and other Doctors: "*This*," namely, "and no other—but this alone." With which also agrees that of Acts 15: "God, who knoweth the hearts, gave testimony, giving unto them the Holy Ghost, etc., purifying their hearts by faith" [Acts 15:8-9], and many other places.

Wherefore Augustine in the sermon *On the Remission of Sins*, as alleged in Canon 1, question 1, *Vt euidenter*: "That it might evidently be shown," he says, "the Lord, that sins are dismissed by the Holy Spirit, whom He gave to His faithful, not by men's merits—in a certain place He thus says: '*Receive ye the Holy Ghost*,' and immediately He added, '*Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven*'" [John 20:22-23]; that is, the Holy Spirit dismisses, not you." The same on that of John 20: "Receive the Holy Ghost: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven; and whose you shall retain, they are retained" [John 20:22-23], part 2, homily 67 (or 121 of the whole), thus says: "The Church's charity, which is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, dismisses the sins of its participants; but of those who are not its participants, it retains [them]; therefore after He had said, '*Receive the Holy Ghost*,' He immediately subjoined this concerning the remission and detention of sins."

Wherefore the Prophet says: "Send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created: and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth" [Ps. 103:30]. On which Augustine: "The poor in spirit," he says, "did not wish to have their own spirit, they will have the Spirit of God; for He said this: 'For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you' [Matt. 10:20]. *Thou wilt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created.* For we are His handiwork—says the Apostle—'created in good works' [Eph. 2:10]. From His Spirit we have received grace, that we may live unto justice, since He it is who justifies the wicked [Rom. 4:5]. *Thou wilt take away their spirit, and they shall fail; Thou wilt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be created, and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth*—that is, of new men, confessing themselves to have been justified, not just from themselves, that the grace of God may be in them. See of what kind they are, whose face has been renewed. Paul says: 'Yea, I have laboured more than all they.' What is it, Paul? Attend, if thou art thyself thy spirit. 'Not I,' he says, 'but the grace of God with me' [1 Cor. 15:10]. What is it, then, that when He has taken away our spirit, we are turned into our dust, looking with profit on our infirmity, that, His Spirit being received, we may be re-created."

The Prophet also says: "Thou hast blessed, O Lord, Thy land: Thou hast turned away the captivity of Jacob: Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people: Thou hast covered all their sins" [Ps. 84:2-3]. With which in agreement Augustine on that of Psalm 31, "*Blessed are they whose,*" etc.: "The title of the Psalm is called *Of understanding*. The first understanding, then, [is] that thou shouldst know thyself a sinner; the consequent understanding is that, when from faith through love thou hast begun to work well, thou shouldst not impute this to thy powers, but to the grace of God; since the whole is to be imputed to His grace, not to our merits. *Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.* If God has covered the sins, He did not wish to advert [to them]." Where also Jerome: "Those whose sins God dismisses, He covers."

Reciting which authorities, Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, says: "From these it is openly shown that God Himself looses the penitent from the debt of punishment, and looses [him] then, when He inwardly illuminates by inspiring true contrition of heart. To which sentence reason gives suffrage, and authorities attest. For no one is truly compunct concerning sin, having a contrite and humbled heart, except in charity; but he who has charity is worthy of life. But no one is at the same time worthy of life and of death; therefore he is not then bound by the debt of eternal death. For he ceases to be a son of wrath from the time he begins to love and repent. Therefore God alone interiorly cleanses man from the spot of sin, and looses [him] from the debt of eternal punishment, who through the Prophet says: 'I alone blot out the iniquities and sins of the people.'" And below, after various sentences of the Doctors are recited: "Behold," he says, "how various are the things handed down by the Doctors; and in this such variety, what is to be held? This indeed we can say and feel: that God alone dismisses sins and retains them, and yet on the Church He has conferred the power of loosing and binding; but otherwise He Himself looses or binds, otherwise the Church. For He Himself through Himself only thus dismisses sin, since He cleanses the soul from every interior spot, and looses [it] from the debt of eternal death." And

he adds below: "It has been shown how the Priests dismiss or retain sins, and yet God has retained for Himself a certain singular power of dismissing or retaining, since He alone through Himself looses the debt of eternal death, and inwardly purges the soul."

Such a one, also, has no need of another Saviour or Physician—namely, Jesus Christ. For he can save and heal himself; indeed, neither does this Physician save anyone from sin or heal, but each [saves and heals] himself. Therefore He came in vain to seek and to save what had perished [Luke 19:10]; in vain was His name called Jesus, that is, Salutory or Saviour, since He is to no one the cause of salvation, but each [is the cause] to himself. This man therefore endeavors to extinguish or pervert the name of Christ. But not so—not so. Rather, let him convert his name, and who was a Pelagian, become a Christian; who was a disciple of Pelagius, shipwrecked in the Pelagus [sea] of perfidy, become a disciple of Jesus Christ, freeing [men] from the Pelagus of sin.

Wherefore the Angel of the Lord said to Joseph: "Thou shalt call His name JESUS: for He shall save His people from their sins" [Matt. 1:21]. With which in agreement Peter, filled with the Holy Spirit, said of the Lord Jesus Christ that "there is no salvation in any other; for there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved" [Acts 4:12]. Which the Prophet, well seeing, says: "Thou Thyself art my King and my God, who commandest the saving of Jacob" [Ps. 43:5]; and above 26: "The Lord is my light and my salvation" [Ps. 26:1]; and below 40: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee" [Ps. 40:5]; and below 102: "Who healeth all thy diseases" [Ps. 102:3]. Wherefore Jeremiah 17: "Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed: save me, and I shall be saved" [Jer. 17:14]. With which many similar things very often occur in Scripture.

Likewise, as was touched on above: How can a dead man give life to a dead man? Can a dead man raise a dead man? For no one can do the work of life, unless he previously has life. But every mortal sinner is spiritually dead. Who even of men presumes of himself so much that he could corporeally raise one corporeally dead? Who therefore will presume that he can spiritually raise one spiritually dead—when this is just as much, or more, as the spirit and spiritual life is greater than the body, and corporeal life? Whence Anselm, *On Free Will* 10: "When free will," he says, "deserts rectitude, it serves sin through the impossibility of recovering it by itself. Thus is made a spirit going and not returning [Ps. 77:39], because 'whoever commits sin, is the servant of sin' [John 8:34]. For just as no will, before it had rectitude, could receive it, with God not giving—so when it has deserted what it received, it cannot receive it except with God restoring it. And I esteem it a greater miracle, when God restores deserted rectitude to a will, than when He restores lost life to a dead man. For the body, by dying from necessity, does not sin, that it should never receive life again; but the will, by deserting rectitude through itself, merits to lack it always."

The same in *Cur Deus Homo* 2.16: "More marvelously," he says, "did God restore human nature than [He] instituted [it]. (For each is equally easy for God.) But man before he existed did not

sin, that he should not have to be made; but after he had been made, by sinning he merited to lose what and that to which he had been made. Therefore God so much more marvelously restored him than He instituted [him], by how much He did this of the sinner against merit, that not of the sinner nor against merit." Chrysostom too, as alleged in the Gloss on Luke 5: "Whether is it easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven thee, or to say, Arise and walk?" [Luke 5:23]: "It is plain," he says, "that to consolidate the body is easier; for as much as the soul is more noble than the body, by so much is the absolution of crimes more excellent. But because you do not believe this, since it lies hidden, I will add what is less but more open, so that what is more hidden may be demonstrated through this." With which in agreement Augustine on Psalm 9: "*I will tell of all Thy wonders*" [Ps. 9:2]: "He tells all the wonders of God who sees them done not only manifestly in bodies, but also invisibly in souls—but far more sublimely and excellently. For earthly men and men devoted to their eyes more wonder that the dead Lazarus rose in body, than that the persecutor Paul rose in soul."

The Prophet says, speaking to God: "Wilt Thou show wonders to the dead, or shall physicians raise to life, and confess to Thee? Shall any one in the sepulchre declare Thy mercy: and Thy truth in destruction? Shall Thy wonders be known in the dark; and Thy justice in the land of forgetfulness?" [Ps. 87:11-13]. But what else do these seem to signify, except that God alone does wonders spiritually, raising up the dead and buried, the lost and forgotten by His preventing grace? Whence Augustine, expounding the first of these verses: "The Ecclesiastical physicians, although they cure not from their own (since neither do bodily physicians cure from their own), yet however much by faithful ministry they help unto salvation, they can cure those living, not arouse those dead—of whom it was said, *Wilt Thou show wonders to the dead?* For God's grace is too hidden, by which men's minds in some way come back to life, that they can hear from any of His ministers the precepts of soundness; which grace He commends in the Gospel saying: *No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him* [John 6:44]; and a little after, *Therefore did I say to you, that no man can come to me, unless it be given him by my Father* [John 6:66]. Above He had said, *But there are some of you that believe not* [John 6:65], and as expounding the cause of this thing: *Therefore did I say to you, that no man can come to me, unless it be given him by my Father*—to show that even faith itself, by which one believes, and by which the soul revives from the death of its heart, is given us by God. However much therefore from her—excellent preachers of the word, and persuaders of truth even through miracles—as great physicians may treat with men, if they are dead and have not revived by Thy grace: *Wilt Thou show wonders to the dead, or shall physicians raise to life, and shall those whom they have raised confess to Thee?* For this confession indicates the living. For as elsewhere it is written, *From the dead, as if he were not, confession perisheth* [Sir. 17:26]." Who also to the same sentence expounds the following verses; on the third thus saying: "Nor shall the physicians raise the wicked that they may confess to Thee, in whom Thy hidden grace does not work, by which they may be drawn to believe; since none come to me, except whom Thou hast drawn."

Peter besides in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, says that the cleansing of the soul from the spot of sin God alone does, who alone raises and illuminates the soul; which the Priests cannot do, who nevertheless are the Physicians of souls. Whence the Prophet: "Shall physicians raise to life, and confess to Thee?" Likewise Ecclesiasticus 17: "From the dead, as if nothing, confession perisheth," or according to another translation, "From the dead, as if he were not, confession perisheth" [Sir. 17:26]. He, therefore, who confesses sin, not because he confesses, is alive. For a dead man cannot do the work of life; but he is first at least by nature alive, and therefore effects the work of life. This sentence also Saint Augustine's exposition above alleged corroborates. Who also in *On the Words of the Lord*, sermon 8: "*They confess*," he says, "*either praising God or accusing themselves*. Each confession is pious—whether when thou reprovest thyself who art not without sin, or when thou praisest Him who cannot have sin. But if we think well, thy reprehension is His praise. For why dost thou now confess in the accusation of thy sin, in the accusation of thyself—why dost thou confess except because from a dead man thou hast become alive? For Scripture says: *From the dead, as if he were not, perishes confession*. If from the dead confession perishes, he who confesses lives. And if he confesses sin, surely from death he has revived. If a confessor of sin has revived from death, who has raised him? No dead man is the raiser of himself; who has raised him, except He who, the stone removed, cried out saying, *Lazarus, come forth* [John 11:43]? But what is *to come forth*, except to come forth into the open from what was hidden? He who confesses comes forth; he could not come forth unless he lived; he could not live unless God's calling were."

And Bernard says, in *On Grace and Free Will* 23: "The Apostle says: 'What hast thou that thou hast not received?' [1 Cor. 4:7] Thou art created, healed, saved—what of these is from thyself, O man? What of these is not impossible to free will? You could neither create [yourself] when you were not, nor justify [yourself] a sinner, nor as a dead man could you raise yourself—to omit the rest of the goods which are necessary to be healed, or laid up to be saved. What we say of the first, is plain also of the last; but of the middle no one doubts, except 'he who, ignorant of God's justice, and willing to establish his own, is not subject to the justice of God' [Rom. 10:3]. For why dost thou recognize the power of the Creator, the glory of the Saviour, but ignore the justice of the Healer? 'Heal me,' he says, 'and I shall be healed; save me, and I shall be saved, for Thou art my praise' [Jer. 17:14]. He recognized the justice of the Just God, by whom he hoped equally to be saved from sin and freed from misery; therefore he set Him as his praise, and not himself by merit. Who is he who is, who knows not God's justice? Who is he who justifies himself? Who is he who justifies himself, who presumes merits for himself from elsewhere than from grace? But He who has made [it] that He may save, also gives whence He may save. He, I say, gives merits, who has made [those] to whom He may give. And it follows in 24: Therefore those who rightly understand confess a triple operation, not indeed of free will, but of divine grace in it, or concerning it: the first, creation; the second, reformation; the third is consummation. For what was not had to be created in him; what was, [had to be] reformed through a deiform form; the members are not perfected except with the head."

From these it appears that God alone vivifies and resuscitates through grace those dead through sin. Which the Prophet, well noting, says: "Thou shalt vivify us; and we will call upon Thy name" [Ps. 79:19]. "Thou wilt vivify us"—Thou alone, by inspiring the life of grace, and this first; and "we, vivified, shall call upon Thy name" with living invocation, second. And below 84: "O God, Thou turning, wilt vivify us"—or according to another reading, "*Thou converting, wilt vivify us*" [Ps. 84:7]; "Thou," I say, "singularly, discretively turned to us through the benefit of grace, or converting, wilt vivify us." And below 118: "In Thy equity vivify me" [Ps. 118:40]; "in Thy equity," I say, "not mine"; where Augustine's reading has: "In Thy justice vivify me." On which he says: "Not in mine, but in Thy justice vivify me—that is, in charity; for in me I had whence I might die; but whence I might live I find not, except in Thee." And below: "Quicken Thou me according to Thy mercy: and I shall keep the testimonies of Thy mouth" [Ps. 118:88]. "Quicken me according to Thy mercy, not according to the justice of [my] merits"—and this first—"and I shall keep the testimonies of Thy mouth" second.

Wherefore also our Physician, salvation, and life: "As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life: so the Son also giveth life to whom He will" [John 5:21]. These therefore raise up the spiritually dead—not the dead themselves; etc. This is by gratuitous will, not for the merit of those raised preceding. "The Son," He says, "*giveth life to whom He will*"—not to those who merit to be vivified. For God alone can raise up sons of Abraham from stones, from stony men—frigid, dry, and hard—as can be known from Matthew and Luke 3.

The third of the aforementioned errors, the things foretasted sufficiently rectify.

The second principal opinion, however—affirming that grace naturally precedes the remission of sin and the justification of the unjust—is divided in two ways. For some say that grace, according to that which it is absolutely, precedes the remission of sin and the justification of the unjust—not however inasmuch as it is grace, but in this respect follows this and that. Others, however, posit that grace, inasmuch as it is grace, naturally precedes these. The first of these dissents little vocally from the principal opinion of Pelagius recited, and agrees really; which therefore can be corrected like that, by taking grace and the other terms required with reduplication, according to the mind of Canonical Scripture and the Doctors. Which could also be reduced to the truth by very many other ways. But because it seems too puerile, it must not be manfully resisted; an older age and a more mature intellect will put this to flight.

But those having an intellect and senses more digested, and positing grace inasmuch as it is grace to precede the remission of sin and the justification of the unjust, are varied in two ways: for some say that grace precedes justification mediately, others, however, immediately. The first of these affirm that God first naturally and gratuitously infuses grace into the sinner; and that the sinner secondly in order of nature elicits some purgative act of sin; and so by such a mediating act merits and obtains the remission of sin. And these, sensing diversely about that mediating act, are further divided into five special sects. The first thinks that this mediating purgative act is contrition of heart; the second, that it is confession of mouth; the third, that it is absolution; the

fourth, that it is satisfaction of work; the fifth, that it is sacramental penitence, such as is celebrated in the Church—integral and perfect; for they do not think any single part suffices.

The first of these, which seems subtler than the others, opines that God first naturally gives grace gratuitously to the sinner; and the sinner secondly in order of nature loves God gratuitously; and thirdly naturally repents; and through these merits the remission of sin, of divine offense, of eternal punishment, divine friendship, and eternal life. And so fourthly in natural order, he perceives the dismissal of sin; fifthly, the remission of divine offense; sixthly, the relaxation of eternal punishment; seventhly, divine reconciliation and friendship; eighthly, eternal life—although all these in time, or rather in the instant of time, happen simultaneously.

This opinion very many Doctors seem to profess; with whom also the Glossator on the Decretals at the beginning of the first distinction *On Penitence*, treating this matter, seems to consent. For he says that grace precedes contrition as a cause, and contrition the remission similarly as a cause. And below: "Note," he says, "that all these are simultaneous in time: justification, contrition, love, remission—but some of these naturally precede, and are prior in nature. For I must understand that one first has grace before he is contrite. Therefore grace precedes; love follows—since he who has grace, loves; whom contrition follows, for he who loves is contrite; remission follows, for he who is contrite, to him is it remitted." But the very many authorities, which the first distinction *On Penitence* recites of Gratian, and Peter [Lombard] in 4 Sentences distinction 17—of which some were recited above for the Pelagians—seem plainly to attest that sins are dismissed by contrition alone. With which reason also gives suffrage. For otherwise it would seem superfluous to be contrite of sins; and since to repent is also free to man, he could, having received grace, not repent, and so be justified and just without any penitence after or before.

But this opinion the reasons made by way of merit against the first opinion of the Pelagians seem to correct. The reasons by way of life and death, soundness and infirmity, goodness and malice of tree or earth, and other similar ones brought against the Pelagians also correct it. For love and contrition, by which the sinner merits the remission of sin, are living, sound, and good works; wherefore he himself is first by nature living, sound, and good, as was more fully deduced above—as Anselm in *On Concord* 9, Augustine in *Ad Simplicianum* 1.24 (as was touched on above), and chapter 39 more fully alleged, evidently attest.

Likewise, as is plain through chapter 26 of this work, and by all the Doctors in agreement: sin or the malice of sin is not anything positive, but only privative—and not [a privation] of contrition or any act whatsoever, because then on the cessation of the actual contrition or that other act whatever, sin would immediately return. It is therefore the privation of some habit which is opposed to it positively, and this immediately, in a disposed subject—just as light and darkness. But this habit immediately opposed to sin is grace, or supplied through grace, or grace necessarily restores it immediately to the sinner. Otherwise, someone could simultaneously be in grace and in mortal sin, which is repugnant to what was previously shown.

Therefore by infused grace sin is immediately deleted, just as by light darkness is immediately taken away; or grace immediately restores the habit immediately opposed to sin, which immediately by itself takes away sin; and so grace, only with that habit mediating, takes away sin, just as the sun [takes away] the darkness of the air only with its ray mediating—not therefore by an act of love or contrition causally and naturally mediating.

Likewise, grace is naturally prior to contrition, and contrition is not its necessary effect, nor inseparably consequent on it, because then everyone receiving and having grace would always necessarily repent. Which is established to be false of the holy Angels, of men before the fall, of small children baptized after the fall, of the holy adults in this life always having the grace of God, but not always sorrowing, and of the Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore grace infused in a sinner can for the time be without an act of contrition in him, just as also after—just as also other infused habits, and habits possible to be infused, namely intellectual and moral, can exist without their proper acts—especially since contrition is a spontaneous act of free will. Since also grace and contrition are two effects of God in the contrite heart, with grace prior in nature, and contrition posterior, nor inseparably following it, [if it be supposed] that this be put into being—since according to hypothesis sin is not taken away except through the act of contrition—the sinner will be at the same time in grace and in mortal sin. Or if in this case sin is taken away without the act of contrition, this is through some habit immediately opposed to sin, which is grace, or immediately introduced through grace, as was touched on above. Wherefore also previously it was similarly taken away. For a habit once immediately opposed by itself and essentially to some privation is always similarly opposed to it, as can be had from chapter 2 of this work.

But if anyone responds that grace is not the habit immediately opposed to sin, nor immediately restores it, but with some medium mediating: that other thing either is a habit, or an act. Not an act, on account of the premises; and because this response defends one saying in the case premised that sin is destroyed without contrition and an act of the sinner prior. Nor can it reasonably be said that it is a habit. For who is that? That habit also either necessarily and inseparably follows grace, or contingently and separably. If contingently and separably, it is possible that infused grace exists without it; and that the sinner be at the same time in grace and in mortal sin, as was argued above. If necessarily and inseparably, by the same reasoning from the beginning it should have been said that the habit immediately opposed to sin immediately follows grace. For through this the difficulty is in no way diminished, but rather increased, as is easy to see.

Likewise, every form, and every habit—natural, moral, and intellectual—immediately denominates its formed and habituated [subject], just as it is immediately opposed to the privation of this form or habit, around its disposed subject—e.g., light [denominates] the lit, justice the just, wisdom the wise, and so of all others. Why then does grace and charity not immediately denominate someone pleasing and dear, especially since to be pleasing and not to be pleasing—or to be not pleasing or ungrateful—just like dear and not-dear, around a disposed

subject (say, around a rational creature) are immediately privatively opposed? Why also does grace or charity, which is the spiritual life, soundness, and beauty of the one having it, not immediately denominate him living spiritually, sound, and beautiful—just as life, soundness, and beauty of any natural [thing] denominates it naturally such? Why also does grace not immediately effect and denominate adults pleasing, just as it does small children baptized—as also it did the first men, if they were created in grace, or had grace before sin—and likewise the Angels? Since according to that common saying of the Philosopher, "One inasmuch as one is naturally fit to make always one." Likewise, on the induction of mortal sin, the expulsion of grace immediately follows; wherefore also in the same way conversely by similar reasoning.

This opinion also rectify the Authorities premised, saying that the sinner is justified through the grace of God gratuitously, not from works or merits of the sinner preceding—which both Authorities and reasons very many made above against the Pelagian opinions in agreement attest. This same opinion, on account of many other things it says, could also be castigated manifoldly otherwise.

The second of the said sects relies on this reasoning: If sins are dismissed before oral confession, it is not necessary to confess. For by what reasoning is a man bound to confess sins which he does not doubt have been dismissed? Why also would not a baptized adult similarly be bound to confess anew sins dismissed in baptism—which no one doubts is false? Wherefore the Lord precepts: "Tell thou first thy iniquities that thou mayest be justified" [Isa. 43:26]—according to the translation of the Septuagint, as the Gloss there recites. Augustine also on that of Psalm 74: "*We will give praise to Thee, O God: we will praise, and we will call upon Thy name*" [Ps. 74:2]: "*Confess and call upon Him,*" he says. "For by confessing thou cleansest thyself, that He may come, called upon. Before invocation, confession precedes; thy confession cleanses thee." Who also on that of Psalm 95: "*Confession and beauty in His sight*" [Ps. 95:6]: "Beauty," he says, "thou lovest; wilt thou be beautiful? Confess. He did not say, 'beauty and confession,' but 'confession and beauty.' Wast thou foul? Confess that thou mayest be beautiful. Wast thou a sinner? Confess that thou mayest be just. Confession and beauty in His sight. Let them confess their sins, vomit out the evils which they had eagerly devoured, let them not return to their vomit like an unclean dog—and there will be confession and beauty. We love beauty: let us first choose confession, that beauty may follow." This sentence also Augustine's exposition on that of Psalm 103, "*Thou hast put on confession and beauty*"; and on that of Psalm 84, "*Justice shall walk before Him,*" etc., recited above, plainly attests.

Ambrose says in his book *On Paradise*, as alleged in *On Penitence*, distinction 1, *Alij e contra*; and in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 17: "No one can be justified from sin unless he has previously confessed." Who also in his sermon on Lent, as similarly alleged in the same places: "Confession," he says, "frees the soul from death; confession opens paradise; confession bestows hope of salvation." Likewise Augustine, *On True and False Penitence* 13, alleged in the said places: "In this," he says, "that the penitent through himself says to the Priest, and conquers shame by fear of the offended, the pardon of crime is brought about. For it is made venial

through confession what was criminal in operation." In each of the said places many similar Authorities also are recited.

But the correction of this sect follows evidently from the correction of the prior sect. For if contrition of heart proceeding from grace does not precede the deletion of sin, much more does not oral confession—since this is later. Through the same things by which the first sect was reduced [to truth], the second can also be reduced. For sin is a privation only, and not of confession or any act whatsoever, because then on the cessation of the confession or that act sin would return. It is therefore the privation of some habit, which either is grace, or restored by grace, as was shown above; and this before confession not only in nature but in time, when grace is gratuitously infused into the ungrateful, and he is contrite of sins, as also the things previously had manifest.

Likewise, if mortal sin were not destroyed before oral confession in a sinner receiving gratuitous grace and contrite, willing to confess, and seeking a Confessor diligently and long, grace and mortal sin would stand together long—which was rejected above. What Catholic also doubts that in a sinner duly repenting from grace already infused, and willing to confess, and diligently seeking confession, sins are dismissed before confession; and that he, if he die on the way to a Priest, is saved? And if to him so dying before confession sins are dismissed, why not similarly if he had lived until he came to the Priest? Why not similarly to another similar [person] not dying on the way, but living until after confession? What reason for diversity? What cause for variation, all things being equal among these?

This those ten leprous men also lucidly manifest, who at the Lord's command, while they went to seek the Priests to show themselves to them, were cleansed—of whom Luke 17. Which also evidently shows that leper, whom the Lord first touched with His hand and cleansed, and afterwards commanded to show himself to the Priests, and offer what Moses commanded to be offered for a testimony to them, as Matthew 8 and Mark 1 more fully recite. "Show himself," I say, through oral Confession; and "offer what Moses commanded" through satisfaction of work, which the law commands.

Who also doubts that an adult unbeliever, converted in heart by the preaching of a believer, and believing in Christ, willing to be baptized, and diligently seeking a Baptist—even before the baptism of water, by the baptism of breath, is baptized from all mortal sins; and if he so departs, is saved—as is sufficiently shown in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 4, and *Extra, On Baptism and its Effect: Debitum*. Why then not similarly in the Baptism of saving penitence?

This same is proved manifoldly in *On Penitence*, distinction 1, by the said lepers, and very many efficacious Authorities and reasons. It is true however that Gratian argues for and against, and affirms neither part, but leaves it to the judgment of the Reader, as is clearly plain in the penultimate chapter. The Authorities and reasons there adduced for the first sentence efficaciously prove it. Those, however, adduced to the opposite, some prove the proposition more if subtly inspected; some proceed against the negligent or contemners of oral Confession, and the

proposition of confessing—as the whole is plain there through the Gloss, and through Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 17, where also he proves and holds this sentence.

The third sect founds itself on the power of the keys. For it is not falsely or in vain that the Lord said to Peter: "I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven" [Matt. 16:19]. Who also more generally—His disciples being gathered—says: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose you shall retain, they are retained" [John 20:23]. What Christian also is unaware that the vicar of Christ on earth, and other inferior prelates and minor priests, by the virtue of these keys absolve penitents from sins, bind some by the chain of excommunication, and loose some? Otherwise, as he argues, it would be superfluous to be absolved.

But this sect cannot stand at the understanding of [its] sectaries. For if neither contrition of heart nor oral confession precedes the deletion of sin, as was shown above, much more does not the Priest's absolution—since this, if it be done legitimately, is after those. This sect can also be corrected like the proximate one. Wherefore Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, proves and holds that sins are deleted before the absolution given by the Priest. Likewise, if in the absolution of the Priest sins are dismissed, either the Priest by his absolution dismisses them, or God at his absolution. The Priest, however, does not properly delete sins, but God alone, as was shown above. Whence Ambrose, as alleged in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 18, and in *On Penitence*, distinction 1, *Alij e contra*: "The Word of God dismisses sins; the Priest is judge; the Priest exhibits his office, but exercises the rights of no [his own] power."

And Jerome says, as alleged in the Gloss on Matthew 16: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind," etc., and in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 18: "Bishops and Priests, not understanding this passage, take to themselves something of the supercilium of the Pharisees, that they either condemn the innocent, or think they loose the guilty—since with God it is not the sentence of the Priests, but the life of the accused, that is sought. We read in Leviticus concerning lepers, where they are commanded to show themselves to the Priests, and if they have leprosy, then they are made unclean by the Priest—not because the Priests make them lepers and unclean; but because they have knowledge of the leper and the non-leper, and can discern who is clean and who unclean. As therefore there the Priest makes the leper unclean, so here also the Bishop or Priest binds or looses." Who also will even lightly esteem that the Priest by absolving externally creates internally grace in the soul of the sinner purgatory of sins, as was shown above? Wherefore the Lord precepted through Moses—Aaron and his sons saying: "Thus shall you bless the children of Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless thee, and keep thee. The Lord shew His face to thee, and have mercy on thee. The Lord turn His countenance to thee, and give thee peace. And they shall invoke my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them" [Num. 6:23-27]. "I," He says—namely, "alone—will bless them"—that is, the effect of blessing, namely grace, or increase of grace intrinsically I will give them.

Nor does God always at the absolution of the Priest bestow grace, or dismiss sins. For these holders of the heavenly keys can sometimes go astray, by binding—putatively and according to their judgment—some who according to truth and the judgment of God are loosed from the chain of sin, and similarly by loosing some who are truly bound. Wherefore Origen, as Peter recites him in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, says thus: "Someone goes out from charity, from faith, from truth; through this he goes out from the camps of the Church, even if he is not cast out by the voice of the Bishop—just as conversely: someone is cast out by an unright judgment, but if he has not done that he should merit to go out, he is not in the least harmed. For sometimes he who is cast out is within, and he who is outside seems to be retained within"—which Jerome, as alleged above, also plainly attests. Wherefore Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 16, having recited Jerome's saying, immediately subjoins: "Openly here it is shown that God does not follow the judgment of the Church, which sometimes through surreption and through ignorance judges. But God always judges according to truth, both in remitting and in retaining faults." With which in agreement Innocent III, *Extra, Sentence of Excommunication, A nobis saepe quaesitum*: "The judgment of God," he says, "always rests on the truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows opinion, which often it happens to deceive and to be deceived; on which account, it sometimes happens that he who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and he who is free before God is bound by an Ecclesiastical sentence." Which can also be drawn from below, the same, *Inquisitioni tuae*; and above, *On the Restitution of the Despoiled, Literas*. Where it is plainly handed down: that if one of the spouses, after marriage celebrated, surely apprehends a legitimate impediment which he cannot however prove, by reason of which they cannot without mortal sin be carnally joined—however much at the instance of the other spouse he be by Ecclesiastical censures judicially compelled to render the carnal debt—he ought in no way [to do] this, but rather, throughout the whole time of his life, humbly to sustain the sentence of excommunication.

The fourth sect seems to be founded on that common saying alleged above: "Sin is not dismissed unless what was taken is restored," and many similar things there similarly placed give it suffrage. Wherefore Pope Leo, as alleged in *On Penitence*, distinction 1, and in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 17: "Christ," he says, "delivered to the prelates of the Church this power, that to those confessing they should give satisfaction of penitence, and admit the same purged by saving satisfaction to the communion of the Sacraments through the door of reconciliation." Wherefore also Raphael in Tobit 12: "Almsgiving," he says, "delivers from death, and the same is what purgeth away sins, and maketh to find mercy and life everlasting" [Tob. 12:9]. Whence also Proverbs 15: "By mercy and faith sins are purged" [Prov. 15:27]; and the Saviour, Luke 11: "Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you" [Luke 11:41]. With which many similar things, of fasting, and prayer, and the like occur often in the Scriptures.

This [sect] can also be similarly corrected, as the others have been corrected. From the preceding [matters] it is plain that the alms or any works of someone are not dear, pleasing, and acceptable to God so long as he is in mortal sin outside of charity and grace—not dear, not pleasing, nor

accepted by Him. Whence Proverbs 15: "The victims of the wicked are abominable to the Lord: the vows of the just are acceptable" [Prov. 15:8]; and Ecclesiasticus 34: "The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked, neither hath He respect to the offerings of the unjust, nor will He be pacified for sins by the multitude of their sacrifices" [Sir. 34:23]. And Isaiah 1: "Offer sacrifice no more in vain," says the Lord; "incense is an abomination to me. The new moon and the sabbaths and other festivals I will not abide. Your assemblies are wicked. My soul hateth your new moons, and your solemnities: they are become troublesome to me, I am weary of bearing them. And when you stretch forth your hands, I will turn away my eyes from you: and when you multiply prayer, I will not hear: for your hands are full of blood" [Isa. 1:13-15]. Wherefore Genesis 4: "The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings" [Gen. 4:4]: "to Abel," he says—namely, to the offerer or giver first; "and to his offerings," second; and on account of the giver, to the offerings—not the contrary.

Whence blessed Gregory, *Moralia* 22.11, on that of Job 31: "My door was open to the traveller" [Job 31:32]: "By the omnipotent God," he says, "a gift is not received from a hand, which from a heart bound in malice is brought forth. For first the soul who gives alms ought to be cleansed, since whatever is given to God is weighed by the mind of the giver. Therefore every spot of malice from our interior man must be wiped off by change of thought, since the offering does not know how to placate the wrath of the Judge, unless it pleases by the cleanness of the offerer. Whence it is written: God had respect to Abel, and to his offerings; but to Cain and his offerings He had no respect [Gen. 4:4-5]. For sacred speech does not say 'He had respect to the offerings of Abel and to the offerings of Cain He had no respect,' but first says that He had respect to Abel, and then adds 'and to his offerings'; and again says, 'He had no respect to Cain,' and then adds, 'nor to his offerings.' For from the giver's heart what is given is received. Therefore not Abel from his offerings, but the offerings offered from Abel were pleasing. For first the Lord is read to have had respect to Him who gave, before to those things which he gave."

Who also, as Gratian recites in question 14, 5, *Scriptum*, says thus: "It is written, 'The victims of the wicked are abominable to God, and the vows of the just are acceptable.' For neither in the judgment of God is it inspected what is given, but by whom. Hence it is that it is written: 'God had respect to Abel, and to his offerings; but to Cain and his offerings He had no respect.' For about to say that the Lord had respect to the offerings, he carefully premised that He had respect to Abel; from which thing it is patently shown that not the offerer was pleasing from the offerings, but the offerings from the offerer. For 'the gifts of the wicked the Most High doth not approve, nor doth He have respect to their offerings, nor will He be pacified for sins by the multitude of their sacrifices.'"

Likewise Augustine, *On True and False Penitence* 14: "Let the penitent," he says, "offer to God his mind and contrition of heart, then also what he can of his possession; then let what he offers, he offer secure. The Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings—but he says first 'to Abel' than 'to his offerings.' For taking up the mind, which He knew humble and pure, He rewarded the gifts of his liberality." The same in *Enchiridion* 59: "He who," he says, "wishes to give alms in

order, ought to begin with himself, and give them first to himself, and cleanse his interiors—as elsewhere it is read: 'Cleanse those things which are within, and those which are without will be clean' [Matt. 23:26]. Of these alms admonishing, the Lord says: 'But yet that which remaineth, give alms; and behold, all things are clean unto you' [Luke 11:41]." Whom also Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 15, sententially reciting: "By these alms which a man owes first to himself, the interiors are cleansed, to which Christ exhorts saying: 'Cleanse those things which are within'; for to the unclean nothing is clean, but their mind and conscience are polluted." Of fasting, of prayer, and similar things, by similar reasoning is similarly to be judged.

The fifth sect protects itself by this: that some penitence is remissive of sin (as had been alleged at the beginning), and what [could be] more worthily exercised in the Church than that pleasing penitence which proceeds from grace, and is the most saving sacrament? Wherefore Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 1, defining a sacrament, says: "A sacrament is properly so called which is so a sign of God's grace and a form of invisible grace that it bears its image and exists as the cause." Augustine says, as alleged in 4 Sentences of Peter, distinction 17, and in *On Penitence*, distinction 1: "Do penance such as is done in the Church. Let no one say to himself: 'I do it secretly, before God I do it; God knows who pardons me, since I do it in heart.' Therefore *Whatsoever you shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven* [Matt. 18:18] was said in vain? Therefore the keys of the Church were given in vain? We frustrate also the word of Christ." Wherefore also Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 14, says that "exterior penitence is a Sacrament and the cause of salvation and justification," as was more fully alleged above. If also penitence is a sacrament, it is a sign of a sacred thing—for thus a sacrament is commonly defined; and it can be had from Augustine, *On the City of God* 10.11, and Peter recites in 4 Sentences, distinction 1. But what could it more holily designate than the sanctification of a profane sinner and the emendation of sin? Otherwise also it seems that the whole sacramental penitence would be superfluous, or at least some part of it.

The fifth sect's vices, however, can also restrain the others. Who doubts that a penitent, before the whole penitence is performed, is cleansed from sin as to fault—that is, from the spot of sin—although not absolved from the debt of punishment? What otherwise would be done concerning one duly repenting, confessing, undertaking penitence, and beginning and continuing it duly, but dying before the penitence has been performed in full? Who would not know that such a one passes to the purgatorial fire? If however he were to die in mortal sin, he would descend to hell, where there is only the punishing, not the purging, of sins. What also is to be felt of those who repent late, in the article of death, in the last breath and gasp of life, and do not perfect the due penitence in the present? Do they pass with their mortal sins? Far be it, far be it. He sins mortally who says this, as no Christian doubts. Who also is unaware that a Priest performing a long penitence for a mortal sin can lawfully celebrate Mass before the penitence is consummated? And who doubts that no one in mortal sin can lawfully celebrate?

On account of these and similar foretasted things, therefore, the last opinion seems to me to be true, and that grace immediately precedes justification—with no act of the one being justified,

namely, mediating temporally or naturally; that justification of the unjust likewise precedes naturally his just acts and works; that, moreover, in every adult [whose] justification [is being effected], certain just acts—namely, dilection and contrition—always in fact naturally consequent and inseparably accompany the justification.

Furthermore, according to the premises of chapters 23 and 25 of this work, I believe that God interiorly—as far, namely, as to the act or intrinsic affection of the will—altogether equally, equally gratuitously, equally dearly, has loved, loves, and will love anyone to be justified, or one justified, e.g. Paul, before his conversion, in it, and after it. I believe also, according to the premises of many chapters, that this eternal dilection of God is purely gratuitous, since prevented by no merits of the creature. Wherefore consequently, that I may be in nothing ungrateful to the most welcome and most ample grace of my most liberal and magnificent Lord God; but that I may render full grace to Him for all things which He has bestowed on me gratuitously, at least by acknowledging in general His benefits according to the things shown above, against the premised opinions:

I confess to my God: just as eternally and gratuitously He has loved me, and eternally has disposed to confer on me gratuitously the justifying grace, in time pleasing before Him; so, when the time pleasing comes, [He has disposed] to infuse gratuitously the justifying grace into me unjust, to justify me gratuitously, to wash my injustices gratuitously, to raise up and to heal me gratuitously, to dismiss to me gratuitously the debt of eternal punishment, and to turn it into temporal punishment gratuitously, to make me a son of the kingdom gratuitously—and this Himself, not me; through Himself and through His grace, not through me, but in me and concerning me, [to do this] purely gratuitously.

Further, however, according to the Corollary of chapter 41 of this work: through Himself and through His grace gratuitously infused into me, and through me at the same time and in me, consequently in nature and inseparably from those gratuitous benefits memorialized, [He has disposed] gratuitously to make me myself gratuitously to love God and to repent of all offenses. Eia, then: "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me His holy Name. Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all His benefits" [Ps. 102:1-2].

This also the holy Church of God seems to testify, thus chanting: "From above the Lamb is sent to release gratuitously the debt; let us all give voice with tears for indulgence." "To release," she says, "gratuitously, not for any preceding merit—the debt of mortal fault and of due eternal punishment." Wherefore she well subjoins: "Let us all give voice with tears for the indulgence"—namely, of fault and of the aforesaid punishment, and naturally previously made—the voice, namely, the interior of dilection, with tears, that is, with the bitterness of contrition, and the act of penitence consequently. This also the Lord, foretelling through Isaiah 45, says concerning Cyrus under the type of Christ: "He shall send away My captivity, not for price nor for gifts" [Isa. 45:13].

Wherefore Peter in 4 Sentences, distinction 18, says: "Just as God retained for Himself the power of baptism, so also of penitence; and therefore, just as He interiorly illuminates the soul by His grace, so also at the same time He relaxes the debt of eternal death. For He through Himself covers the sins of penitents, and then covers them when He does not reserve them for punishment. Then therefore He covers when He looses the debt of eternal punishment. That He covers, however, Augustine openly says, expounding that place of the Psalm: 'Blessed are they whose sins are covered'—that is, covered up and forgotten. For if God has covered the sins, He did not wish to advert [to them]; and if He did not wish to advert, He did not wish to animadvert—that is, to punish, but to ignore. So therefore he says them covered by God, that God may not see, that is, that He may not eternally punish. For God's seeing sins is to impute to punishment; but to turn the face from sins, this is not to reserve them to punishment.

"Likewise Jerome: Those whose sins God dismisses, He covers, that they may not be revealed in judgment. Likewise Cassiodorus: Those who have grave sins, to some God imputes [them], to some through mercy He does not impute [them].

"From these things openly is shown that God Himself looses the penitent from the debt of punishment, and looses [him] then, when He inwardly illuminates by inspiring true contrition of the heart"—namely, habitual, that is, the habit of charity or of grace effective of contrition, and at the same time then effecting it. Wherefore he immediately subjoins: "To which sentence reason gives suffrage, and authorities attest. For no one is truly compunct concerning sin, having a contrite and humbled heart, except in charity; he who has charity, however, is worthy of life; but no one is at the same time worthy of life and of death; therefore he is not then bound by the debt of eternal death. For he ceases to be a son of wrath from the time he begins to love and to repent"—from which, I say, he begins to love and repent habitually, that is, from which he received charity, which is the habit of dilection and penitence effective—and then at the same time effecting this and that. And he hints here at the reason against the proximate prior opinion. Wherefore immediately after he adds: "From then, therefore, he is loosed from wrath, which does not abide upon him who believes in Christ, but upon him who does not believe."

This, however, cannot be understood except concerning believing habitually, namely, of having faith—as small children baptized believe, and adults sleeping who do not have the act of faith; where also he immediately infers: "Not therefore afterwards through the Priest to whom he confesses is he freed from eternal wrath, from which he is already freed through the Lord, from when he said 'I will confess'—namely, from which instant of time, he proposed to confess, or from which instant of nature he said habitually 'I will confess,' that is, he received charity or grace, which is the habit of so saying.

Similarly also it can be shown that, the habit of charity received, he is not first naturally through the act of penitence freed from wrath and from the debt of eternal punishment, from which he was first naturally freed through that habit, as was more fully deduced above against the proximate opinion. Wherefore he subjoins, finally concluding: "God alone therefore interiorly

cleanses man from the spot of sin, and looses [him] from the debt of eternal punishment, who through the Prophet says: 'I alone blot out the iniquities and sins of the people.'"

In the justification, however, of an adult sinner, although he is justified through the habit of charity or grace antecedent naturally to the act of dilection or saving penitence, nevertheless an act of this kind, according to the law established in the one being justified, is required concomitantly—as a certain gratuitous consequent from such welcome antecedent, and as it were a certain holy fruit proceeding from a tree before dead, sterile, and accursed, but now vivified, made fruitful, and sanctified; as also a certain spontaneous conversion of the sinner to God, who by sinning had spontaneously turned himself away from Him; as also a certain spontaneous sadness of the sinner in his reconciliation to God, whom previously by spontaneous delectation he had offended.

Wherefore Jeremiah 31, in the person of the converted sinner, thus says: "Convert me, and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord my God. For after Thou didst convert me, I did penance" [Jer. 31:18-19]. And Lamentations [last]: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted" [Lam. 5:21]—which the Gloss above alleged lucidly attests. Wherefore Augustine in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 15: "Without thee," he says, "God made thee. For thou didst not bring forth any consent that God should make thee. How didst thou consent, who wast not? He, therefore, who made thee without thee, does not justify thee without thee. Therefore He made thee unwilling, [and] He justifies thee willing—however Himself He justifies, lest there be a justice of thine."

With which in agreement Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will* 24: "Those who rightly understand," he says, "confess a triple operation, not indeed of free will, but of divine grace in it, or concerning it: the first, creation; the second, reformation; the third is consummation. Since therefore consummation has to be made of us or also in us, but not by us; creation, however, was made even without us; only reformation, which is with us in some way on account of our voluntary consent, will be reputed unto merit for us. Reformation itself: our fasts, vigils, continence, works of mercy, and other exercises of virtues, through which surely it is brought about that our interior man is renewed from day to day; while intention, bowed down by earthly cares, gradually rises again from the depths to the supernal; and affection, languishing around the desires of the flesh, gradually convalesces in love of the spirit; and memory, sordid with the turpitude of the old men, made bright by new and good acts, daily grows resplendent. In these three, therefore, interior renovation consists: namely, in rectitude of intention, purity of affection, and recollection of good operation, by which a memory well conscious of itself is enlightened. But these things, since it is certain that they are stirred up in us by the divine Spirit, are God's gifts; while however with the assent of our will, they are our merits. 'For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father, that speaketh in you' [Matt. 10:20]."

Augustine also, *On Penitence* 2: "Everyone," he says, "who is now constituted arbiter of his own will, when he comes to the Sacrament of the faithful, unless penitence for the old life [has been

done] cannot begin a new one, [except] from this penitence when he is baptized. Only the small children are immune. For they cannot yet use free will: for whom for the consecration and remission of original sin the faith of those by whom they are offered avails, that whatever spots of delicts they have contracted through others—from whom they were born—even by the interrogation and response of others may be purged. Of other men, none crosses over to Christ that he may begin to be what he was not, unless it repents him to have been what he was. This first penitence is enjoined upon the Jews when Peter the Apostle says, 'Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized'" [Acts 2:38].

Who also in *On True and False Penitence* 10: "He who has sinned through himself," he says, "obtained indulgence by his own sorrow, [and] through the faith of the Church—just as through baptism—it makes man clean and new, so that nothing remains which displeases God; without penitence baptism profits no one who has sinned spontaneously." And above 2: "He who is converted necessarily sorrows that he has what he rejoices to lose."

The faith of the universal Church holds also constantly that voluntary sins in adults are by no means remitted without penitence—and they are not remitted through an act of penitence causally and naturally preceding justifying grace, or the remission of mortal sins as to fault, as has been shown above. Therefore they are remitted with the act of penitence consequent on grace and remission of this kind, just as also the precedents make manifest.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I — Corollary to Chapter 43, through Chapter 45 and its Corollary

COROLLARY [to Chapter 43]

Corollary: that that is prior according to nature, or naturally prior to another, which is the cause of it; that something from which a consequence of subsisting holds to another, and not the converse, is prior to it according to nature. Hence also that not everything from which a consequence of subsisting is not converted is prior according to nature, but [is so] according to superiority or universality, according to consequence, or according to any other such mode; that not whatever is prior to another according to nature can exist without it, nor again whatever can exist without another, and not the converse, is prior to that according to nature, but according to some other mode so called — unless perhaps "prior according to nature" be said equivocally in three modes.

From these things certain sparks of truth, of no small utility to logicians, philosophers, theologians, and all lovers of truth, shine forth: namely, that that is prior according to nature, or naturally prior to another, which is its cause — which seems to need to be understood of efficient, material, and formal cause, although in different special modes. Of the final cause,

however, it does not so seem; rather the opposite seems more so, namely that it is naturally posterior to the action or thing of which it is the final cause. Item, that something from which a consequence of subsisting holds to another, and not the converse, is prior to it according to nature; hence also, that not everything from which the consequence of subsisting is not converted is prior according to nature, but according to superiority, or universality, according to non-consequence, or according to any other such mode. Item, that not whatever is prior to another according to nature can exist without it, nor again whatever can exist without another, and not the converse, is prior to it according to nature, but according to some other mode now mentioned — unless perhaps "prior according to nature" be said equivocally in many modes.

The first part of this is clear from what has been said before, and because it is useful in doctrine and is hardly doubted by anyone, it was fitting to mention it rather than to prove it. For Logic, natural science, and divine [science] alike attest to it, which Theology and theologians also attest, of whose abundance, for the sake of testimony, I shall take a few. The Philosopher, indeed, in the *Categories*, having posited four modes of "prior," subjoins: "It seems, however, that besides those that have been mentioned there is another mode of 'prior'. For of those things which are converted according to the consequence of existence, that which is in any way the cause of the other is rightly called prior in nature. That there are some such things is plain. For 'a man exists' is converted according to the consequence of existence with the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement is true by which it is said that a man exists; and if the statement is true by which it is said that a man exists, then it follows that a man exists. But the true statement is in no way the cause that the thing exists, yet the thing in some way seems to be the cause that the statement is true. For while the thing exists or does not exist, the statement must be called either true or false; and so according to five modes one is said to be prior to another."

Who, also, in natural science or in metaphysical wisdom, doubts that causes are prior to and superior in nature to their effects — for example, the simple to the composite, the generator to the generated, the agent to that which is acted upon, and universally that which moves to that which is moved? For how otherwise would they demonstrate God to be the first and supreme of all things according to nature? Which theologian, too, does not know that God truly and really preceded the world and time — yet not temporally, nor according to any successive and long, true, and real duration, but only according to cause and nature, as is shown in the prior matters in the 34th part of the first corollary of this [Book]? The same Boethius attests, in the fifth book of *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, the last prose; Augustine, *Confessions* 12, [chapter] 28, as the same part alleges; and Anselm, *On Truth*, [chapter] 12, as is plain in the 39th [chapter]. How many testimonies also, in the 35th and on this side, copiously set forth above, show that grace precedes our good works — which must be understood not temporally but causally and naturally? Hence also Peter [Lombard], in the second book of *Sentences*, distinction 26, says: "Faith precedes the good will, not in time but in cause and nature." Who, moreover, will deny that God is the first of causes, and that He acts prior in causality, and therefore prior in nature, in the common action — as the artificer with respect to his instrument — as is also clear from the

proximate [chapter] of this [Book]? The remaining particles of this first part will easily appear through these and the like.

The first particle of the second part follows evidently from this first one. For it follows: "God raises this man up spiritually or bodily; therefore he lives correspondingly," and not the converse. "This man lives spiritually or bodily; therefore God raises him up so or so" — for since he has been continuously alive for a long time, the antecedent will be true, and the consequent plainly false, since God by no means continually raises one already alive, but raised him up in a single instant. Some also live naturally whom God does not naturally raise up, nor has He naturally raised them up — such as those who were never naturally dead. Some also live spiritually whom God neither so raises up nor has raised up — such as the holy Angels, Christ, and perhaps the Mother of Christ. God too lives, who was never raised up. Hence to "this living" it does not at all follow that God raises this man up, but rather the converse. Let it then be supposed that God now raises spiritually this man, who was previously spiritually dead, by inspiring the life of grace; then it follows excellently: "God raises him up; therefore he is alive," and not the converse, as has been shown above. And yet that God raises him up is prior according to nature to his being alive: for it is the cause of it; for, because God raises him up, therefore he is alive, and not the converse. Similarly, it follows excellently: "God wills now to raise this man up; therefore he is alive," by the tenth [chapter] of this [Book], and not the converse, as the preceding things make manifest. And yet that God wills now to raise this man up is prior in nature to this man's being alive: for it is the [cause] of it, the efficient cause. Similarly, it follows excellently: "God creates this, or wills to create this now; therefore this is," and not the converse — for He does not continually create things created, but conserves [them]; and yet this is prior to that in nature, because it is the cause of it. Similarly, it follows excellently: "This man has grace; therefore he is clean from mortal sin," and not the converse. For someone could be clean from mortal sin and not have grace — as perhaps, according to some, was the case with the first parents before the fall, for some little while, that they had neither grace nor fault, or at least could so have been; and yet to have grace is prior in nature, because it is the cause of it: for grace purges mortal sins, as has been shown above. The second particle of this second [part] follows most clearly from this first one; and these things being plain, the third is sufficiently plain.

It is perhaps objected that the Philosopher, in the *Categories*, when laying down the modes of "prior," in assigning the second mode, says that that is prior according to nature from which the consequence of subsisting is not converted. It is not so. For the Philosopher says that that is prior which is not converted according to the consequence of subsisting, and from which there is no conversion in that which is consequence; he does not, however, say that that is prior according to nature, but rather says the contrary. For he says that there are five modes of "prior," as was recited above — namely, according to time, non-conversion of consequence, order, honor, and according to nature; whereas, if the second were the same as the fifth, there would be only four modes.

The first particle of the third part of the foresaid corollary follows evidently from the first particle of the second part of it. For according to that, something is prior to another according to nature, from which to that other a consequence of subsisting holds; therefore it cannot subsist without it. Which can also be otherwise demonstrated. For God's willing to grace the ungraced, to justify the unjust, to give him grace and justice, to make him gracious and just, is naturally prior — because causally — to his being gracious and just, as the prior matters have taught. God's also willing created grace to be, or any creature whatever, and creating it, is prior in nature to its being, because the cause of it, as the ninth [chapter] of this [Book] shows; and yet these cannot be without those, as the tenth [chapter] of this [Book] proves, and the mutual relation makes manifest. To give is also prior in nature to receiving, to act than to be acted upon, to move than to be moved, and yet they cannot be separated. Similarly, to receive grace and to have it is naturally — because causally — prior to sins being effaced, as was shown above; just as it is naturally — because causally — prior for the air to receive light and to have it, than to put darkness to flight; and just as it is prior that the Sun be, than that it shine within or without, the requisite disposition in every way being supposed. Which also seems to be universally true of all those things which some proper passion or proper [property], some action or some effect, necessarily and inseparably follows.

But if anyone object that this is one most common rule and general maxim, "Whatever is prior to another according to nature can exist without it" — it seems to me that [this is] not [so]; nor does any reason or authority occur to me on which it could be securely founded so generally understood. Yet it could be verified with some exceptions, like the rules of the jurists, by excepting, namely, the cases just touched upon, and others as is fitting. The second particle of this third [part] follows evidently from the second particle of the second [part]. The opposite, however, Plato, Aristotle, and Averroes — those famous philosophers — seem to think. For Aristotle in the fifth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, [chapter] 16, having posited many modes by which some things are called prior and posterior, subjoins: "Other things [are prior] according to nature and substance — those which can exist without others, and those [others] not without them" — by which definition Plato made use, with which Averroes also concurs in the commentary. It can be said that this is to be understood according to popular reputation rather than according to truth, and according to Plato's opinion; or otherwise, that it can be understood as another similar rule already premised. The third particle of this third part will easily be shown through the third particle of the second.

But also it can be otherwise said, that many speak equivocally concerning the priority of nature. For some, speaking more properly and profoundly, call that "prior according to nature" which is so according to causality, as in the first particle of the first part of the foresaid corollary; others, however, more famously and customarily than truly, [call it so] according to non-conversion of consequence, or according to consequence; others again according to the possibility of being without another, [the converse] not [holding], as appears from the things premised. Others further call that "prior according to nature" which is prior intended by nature, and so the whole is

said to be prior to the part, and the end to that which is for the end. Whence the Philosopher, in *Politics* 1, [chapter] 1, says that the city is prior in nature to the household and to each individual. Further, "prior according to nature" can not improbably be called "more perfect according to nature." These [distinctions] disentangle, free, and preserve [people] from many traps of sophists, from many snares of Pelagians, from many many people's nooses, in this matter and many others.

But that all the pestiferous arrows prepared in the Pelagians' quiver may more easily be blunted, it must further be observed that "penitence" is taken in two ways, as also "to repent," as also "to believe," and many similar things. For such words sometimes signify an action or act, sometimes a habit or aptitude for acting. They properly and most usually signify the action or act; but transumptively, according to that metaphor and species of trope by which the name of an effect is sometimes transferred to its cause, they signify the habit productive of such an action, or the aptitude for acting. And this is a sufficiently frequent manner of speaking, both among ordinary people and among those skilled in the various sciences. For we commonly say — and authors say similarly — "the eagle sees sharply," "the horse runs swiftly," "man laughs," "the dog barks," and so of others — even though they are altogether asleep or at rest — meaning not the act but the habit or aptitude. This is found very often in the books *On the History of Animals*. Hence also the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, [chapter] 6, defining virtue and showing the definition of it, says: "It must be said that every virtue, of whatever it is the virtue, both perfects that which has it well, and renders its work well — for example, the virtue of the eye both makes the eye excellent and renders its work [well]: for by the virtue of the eye we see well; similarly the virtue of the horse both makes the horse excellent and good for running and bearing the rider, and for awaiting warriors. If indeed it is so in all things, then the virtue of man too will be a habit from which a good man is made, and from which he renders his work well." With which the Apostle concords: "Charity is patient, is kind, suffers all things, etc." (1 Corinthians 13). Hence also Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*, [chapter] 37 and after, in many chapters, teaches diffusely that continence, patience, and the like — which properly sound forth as acts — are sometimes and among some people in operation or in use, sometimes, however, and among some, in habit, not in act.

So also Truth itself speaks, saying, "He who has believed and has been baptized shall be saved; but he who has not believed shall be condemned" (Mark 16) — which seems to be understood of believing habitually, that is, of having faith, that is, of having the habit of faith — on account of baptized infants, who do not believe actually but only habitually, that is, do not have the act of faith but only the habit, nor are they damned. Hence also Innocent III, writing to the Bishop of Arles, as is recited in the *Extra, On Baptism and Its Effect, Maiores*, recites approvingly that some concede that infants believe, not by use but by the habit of faith which we receive in baptism, just as also many other words, according to the common usage of speaking, are referred not to act but to aptitude. With which Augustine concordantly, as is alleged in *On Consecration*, distinction 4, *Quis autem*: "Who," he says, "is ignorant that to believe is in infants to be

baptized? But not to believe, is not to be baptized?" The same, in Epistle 14 to Boniface inquiring, when it is asked of a baptized infant whether he believes in God, and it is answered that he believes — whether this is to be taken as for then or for the future, namely that he will believe at a greater age — replying, says thus: "To believe is nothing else than to have faith. Therefore, when it is replied that the infant believes, who as yet has no affection of faith, it is replied that he has faith on account of the sacrament of faith, and turns himself to God on account of the sacrament of conversion." And concerning other responses given on behalf of the infant, and concerning his other works, he is of the same mind. Nor is it strange if the name of an act be transferred to a habit, since sometimes a similar transfer is made conversely, as is plain from the 39th [chapter].

It is plain therefore from the things premised, by the place from the like, that "to repent" and "penitence," "to be contrite" and "contrition," and the like, sometimes signify the act or use, sometimes signify the habit effective of such an act or use, and the [habit] actually causing it — namely the habit of charity and grace given gratuitously to the sinner, whence well, justly, and meritoriously he loves God gratuitously, and on account of Him repents of sins. Hence also Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 14, says: "To strip and emend souls steeped in vices is the work of perfect virtue and heavenly grace; and therefore penitence can be soundly defined thus: Penitence is the virtue or grace by which, with the purpose of emendation, we lament and hate the evils we have committed, and are unwilling to commit further things to be lamented." Therefore the very many authorities asserting that penitence effaces sins, heals infirmities, raises the dead, and the like — and that these things are done through penitence — can, according to the things premised, be conveniently understood of the foresaid habitual penitence, which is the cause of actual penitence. Hence also the *Gloss* on the beginning of the distinction *On Penitence*, [responding] to the contrary opinion alleged above, says: "The remission of sins precedes contrition of heart. For no one can truly be contrite unless he first has faith working through love. Therefore sins are said to be remitted through contrition — that is, through that which causes contrition of heart, that is, through charity."

Furthermore, actual penitence is partly formed, partly unformed; partly meritorious, partly preparatory. Of unformed penitence it is said in Wisdom 5: "Then those repenting will say within themselves, etc."; and Matthew 27: "Then Judas, led by penitence, returned the thirty pieces of silver, etc." — to which many similar [passages] occur in Scripture. But formed and meritorious actual penitence is that which proceeds from charity and grace, and is formed [thereby]. Unformed and preparatory penitence is a certain sorrow for sin, from fear of punishment, from fear of inconvenience, from servile fear, temporally preceding grace, and preparing the sinner for the remission of sin, for the working of good, and for the reception of grace and saving penitence — as was taught in the 37th [chapter]. Such penitence, always or for the most part — as I believe — precedes grace, justification, and true penitence in adults. Of this kind also is every displeasure, horror, abomination, detestation, and disapproval of sins which precedes justifying grace and true penitence.

Such penitence is commonly born from fear of the punishment of hell, from fear of inconvenience, from servile fear. Hence also the Lord impresses this fear, as useful to sinners, even by reduplication, saying: "Fear Him who can destroy both body and soul in Gehenna" (Matthew 10 and Luke 12); "Fear Him who, after He has killed, has the power to send into Gehenna; yes, I say to you, fear Him." Hence Proverbs 15: "By the fear of the Lord everyone turns aside from evil." And above, [chapter] 1: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Which Bede, expounding, as Peter [Lombard] alleges in *Sentences* 3, distinction 34, says: "There are two fears of the Lord, the servile, which is the beginning of wisdom, and the friendly, which accompanies the perfection of wisdom. The servile is the beginning of wisdom because he who, after his errors, begins to grow wise is first seized by divine fear lest he be punished; but perfect charity casts this out. There succeeds to it the holy fear of the Lord, which abides forever." Blessed Augustine, too, expounding that of Psalm 127, "Blessed are all who fear the Lord," speaking of this twofold fear — of which one is chaste and abides forever, and the other is excluded by charity — says thus: "Some, on this account only, fear lest they suffer some evil on earth, lest sickness befall them, lest loss, lest bereavement, lest the loss of someone dear, lest exile, lest the condemnation of prison, lest some tribulation — on this account they fear and tremble; this fear is not yet chaste. Hear further: another does not fear to suffer on this earth, but fears Gehenna. Hence the Lord too has terrified [them]. You have heard, when the Gospel was read, where 'their worm does not die, and the fire is not extinguished.' Men hear these things, and because they are truly going to come upon the impious, they fear and contain themselves from sin — they fear, indeed, but do not love righteousness. But when, through fear, they contain themselves from sin, the custom of righteousness is formed; and that begins to be loved which was hard, and God grows sweet, and now man begins to live righteously on this account — not because he fears penalties, but because he loves eternity. Therefore fear is excluded by charity, but a chaste fear has succeeded. For what is the chaste fear? According to which, my brethren, we ought to understand what is said: 'Blessed are all who fear the Lord, who walk in His ways.'"

The same, expounding the First Epistle of John, in Homily 9, says: "Let fear begin, since the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Fear, as it were, prepares a place for charity. But when charity has begun to dwell, the fear which prepared the place is driven out — for, as we see, when something is illumined, light is introduced through a bristle: the bristle enters first, which, unless it first goes out, the light does not succeed. So first fear occupies the mind, but the fear does not remain there which entered for this purpose, that it might introduce charity."

Therefore the authorities which seem to assert that penitence precedes and produces justification and the purgation of sins can be understood of unformed and preparatory penitence — which does these things because it moves and excites, disposes and prepares, that they may be done. All these things, and things like these — for example, "whence the principle of change," conciliator, physician, and universally everything that changes — are reduced to the third species of cause, which is commonly called efficient, as the Philosopher in *Physics* 2, [chapters] 29 and 31, and *Metaphysics* 5, [chapter] 2, makes manifest.

Such, it seems, was the baptism of penitence which John preached for the remission of sins, as is recited in Luke 3. Concerning which word Chrysostom — as is recited in the *Gloss*, and was partly objected by the Pelagians above — says thus: "Since the sacrifice was not yet offered, nor the Spirit descended, how was remission to be wrought? What then is it that Luke says, 'for the remission of sins'? Indeed, the Jews were ignorant, nor did they ponder their own faults. Since therefore this was the cause of evils, [John came] that they might recognize their sins so as to seek a Redeemer; John came exhorting them to do penance, that, made better and contrite by penance, they might strive to receive pardon. Aptly, then, when he had said that he came preaching the baptism of penitence, he added, 'for the remission of sins,' as if to say, 'For this reason he was urging them to repent, that they might more easily obtain the subsequent pardon, by believing in Christ. For unless they were led by penitence, they would by no means seek grace.' Hence that baptism had no other cause than that it was preparatory to faith in Christ." The same blessed Gregory holds, and other Catholic teachers. Hence Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 2, says: "John foreshadowed Christ's baptism by his own baptism — he who is read to have baptized first, but in water, not in the Spirit, as he himself says: 'I baptize you in water unto penitence.' He washed only their bodies, but did not cleanse them from sins. The baptism of John was unto penitence, not unto remission; the baptism of Christ unto remission. For John, baptizing, called men to penitence, and taught those whom he baptized to repent, according to that: 'They came to John in the Jordan, confessing their sins.' But in John's baptism the remission of sins was not given, which was given in Christ's baptism. To what end then, since it did not confer grace, was John's baptism useful? Because by the use of baptizing it prepared men for Christ's baptism."

Hence also similarly Augustine, on Psalm 110, "Confession and magnificence are His work," showing that such authorities are to be so understood, says: "What is more magnificent than to justify the impious? But perhaps the work of man precedes this magnificence of God, that, when he has confessed his sins, he may merit to be justified. For the publican came down from the temple justified rather than the Pharisee, because he did not dare to lift his eyes to heaven, but struck his breast saying, 'Lord, be merciful to me a sinner.' This is the magnificence of the Lord, the justification of the sinner — since 'he who humbles himself shall be exalted, and he who exalts himself shall be humbled.' This is the magnificence of the Lord, that to whom much is forgiven, he loves much. This is the magnificence of the Lord, that 'where sin abounded, grace also abounded the more.' But perhaps from works? 'Not,' he says, 'from works, lest perhaps anyone be exalted; for we are His workmanship, created in Christ in good works.' For man does not work righteousness unless justified. But believing in Him who justifies the impious, he begins from faith, that good works may show — not preceding what he has merited, but following what he has received. Whence then that confession? It is not yet a work of righteousness, but the disapproval of the offense." Behold therefore, according to Augustine, that the confession of sin preceding the justification of the sinner is not a work of righteousness, but only the disapproval of the offense, the abomination and detestation of sins — which never existed without similar displeasure, sorrow, and penitence. But lest any of the Pelagians should

dare to claim even this preparatory and unformed confession as his own, he immediately subjoins: "But neither in this, O man, glory in yourself, that he who glories may glory in the Lord. For what have you that you have not received? Therefore not magnificence alone, by which the impious is justified, but 'confession and magnificence is His work.' What then shall we say? 'Of whom He wills, He has mercy, and whom He wills, He hardens.' Is there iniquity with God? God forbid."

Actual formed and meritorious penitence's justifying the unjust and effacing sins can also be understood in two ways: namely, antecedently in nature, and concomitantly and subsequently according to the law established. Antecedently, namely so that it precede in nature justification and the effacement of sin — and this is false, as has been shown above. Concomitantly and subsequently, namely so that in every justification of an adult sinner, and effacement of his sin, according to the present law, such actual penitence inseparably accompanies and naturally follows — this is true, as has been shown above.

In this way blessed James the Apostle speaks in his epistle, chapter 2, where the Pelagians have alleged him above, saying that man is justified not by faith alone but also by extrinsic works — which are more properly called "works" because he is not justified without them, that is, he does not remain just by faith alone without works, when there is opportunity or necessity of working: because faith then without works dies, by the departure of charity, which is the life and form of Christian faith, which always — when there is need — works, as the things preceding both make manifest. Hence also, according to him, faith is consummated by works and preserved alive, and the just man is preserved. For he intends there principally to refute the heresy of certain ones — perhaps on occasion of that word of the Lord, "He who has believed and has been baptized shall be saved," or that saying of the Apostle alleged above, namely, "No one is justified by works" — those, that is, who say that every baptized person and every one who believes in Christ is just and to be saved even without any good works whatsoever.

Hence he says thus: "What will it profit, my brethren, if anyone say he has faith but does not have works? Can faith save him? But if a brother or sister be naked and need daily food, and one of you say to them, 'Go in peace, be warmed and filled,' but does not give them what is needful for the body, what will it profit? So also faith, if it has not works, is dead in itself. You believe that there is one God; you do well: the demons also believe and tremble. But would you know, O vain man, that faith without works is otiose, or, according to another reading, dead? Was not Abraham our father justified by works, offering Isaac his son upon the altar? You see that faith was cooperating with his works, and by works faith was consummated; and the Scripture was fulfilled, saying: 'Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness, and he was called the friend of God.' You see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith alone."

But who, reading the history of Genesis, does not know that Abraham was just and the familiar friend of God before he offered his son, or rather wished to have offered him? Therefore he was not justified by that work antecedently, but only concomitantly and subsequently — namely, by

that work following his faith and righteousness, which (when necessity required this) preserved him faithful and just in his faith and righteousness, which otherwise he would have lost by despising the Lord's command. Hence also Augustine, on Psalm 31, treatise 1, wishing to harmonize the saying of Paul to the Romans 4, "If Abraham was justified by works, he has glory, but not before God; for what does the Scripture say? 'Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness'" — and the cited saying of James — by way of objection and response says thus: "'You see,' says the heretic, 'that Abraham was justified not by works but by faith. Therefore I shall do whatever I will, because even if I have no good works, but only believe in God, it shall be reckoned to me for righteousness.' I reply, then, as if against the Apostle, and I say of that same Abraham what we find also in the Epistle of another Apostle who was wishing to correct men who had ill understood this Apostle. For James in his Epistle, against those who refused to work well, presuming on faith alone, commended the work of Abraham, while Paul commended the faith. The Apostles are not at variance with each other. He speaks of a work known to all: Abraham offered his son to be sacrificed to God — a great work, but from faith. I praise the superedification of the work, but I see the foundation of faith; I praise the fruit of the good work, but I recognize in faith the root. But if Abraham did this without right faith, no work of any sort would profit him. Again, if Abraham so held faith that, when God commanded him to offer his son to be sacrificed, he should say within himself, 'I do not do it; yet I believe, because God liberates me even though I despise His commands' — faith without works would be dead, and like a sterile and dry root would remain without fruit. What then? Are we to set no works before faith, that is, that anyone be said to work well before faith? Therefore, brothers, Abraham was justified from faith; but if works did not precede faith, yet they followed. Will your faith be barren if you yourself are not barren? It itself is not barren — hold faith [intending] to work; for the same Apostle says: 'faith which works through love.'"

The same [Augustine], in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, [chapter] 20, harmonizing the saying of the Apostle alleged above by the Pelagians, "The doers of the law shall be justified" (Romans 2), with another of his sayings, "We reckon that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law" (Romans 3), says: "He would not say, contrary to himself, 'The doers of the law shall be justified,' as if they were justified by works, not by grace, since he says that man is justified freely by faith without the works of the law — wishing nothing else to be understood by 'freely' than that works do not precede justification. Plainly indeed elsewhere he says, 'If by grace, then no longer of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.' But thus is it to be understood: 'The doers of the law shall be justified,' that we may know they are not otherwise doers of the law unless they be justified — not so that justification accedes to the doers, but so that justification precedes the doers. For what else is 'justified' than 'made just' — by Him, namely, who justifies the impious, that from impious he may be made just? For if we should so speak as to say, 'Men shall be liberated,' it would surely be understood that liberation accedes to those who already are men. But if we should say, 'Men shall be created,' it would surely not be understood that those are created who already were, but that by the very creation they become men. Likewise, if it had been said, 'The doers of the law shall be honored,' we should not rightly understand it except that

the honor accedes to those who are already doers of the law. But when it is said, 'The doers of the law shall be justified,' what else is said than 'the just shall be justified'? For the doers of the law are surely just; and so this is just as much as if it were said, 'The doers of the law shall be created' — not who already were, but that they may be — so that the Jewish hearers of the law may also so understand that they need the grace of the Justifier, that they may be able to be doers."

Similarly also sins are said to be remitted by the confession of the mouth, as the second sect of the mediators showed — which yet cannot be understood antecedently in time or in nature: namely, so that the confession of the mouth precede in time or in nature the remission of mortal sins as to fault — as has also been shown against the same — but concomitantly and subsequently according to the law established, namely because, for the justification of the unjust and the conservation of righteousness, it is fitting according to the law of the Church, if there is opportunity, that confession of the mouth should follow; otherwise, on account of contempt, the sins return, which previously had been effaced in contrition and in the purpose of confessing — they return, I say, truly, or imputably, or with equal weight as to guilt, or even with overweight, on account of the aggravation of the new contempt added.

In this way also, similarly, sins are said to be remitted in adults by baptism. For what Catholic doubts that all sinners, great and small, are commonly baptized for the remission of sins, since baptism for the remission of sins was commonly instituted? For who does not profess the Council of Nicaea, which on behalf of the whole Church of Christ and each of His sons says, "I confess one baptism for the remission of sins"? Yet many adults, before the baptism of water or river, in the baptism of the Spirit by believing in Christ, and in the baptism of penitence, are cleansed from all sins, as was shown above against the second sect of the mediators. Therefore these are baptized for the remission of sins not antecedently, but subsequently in the modes foresaid.

Furthermore, that actual penitence justifies the unjust and effaces sins can also have a twofold understanding: namely effectively, or ostensibly, manifestatively, or even significantly. For actual penitence — and especially of the kind which is celebrated in the Church — shows, manifests, and is the sign that the penitent is justified, and that his sins are effaced. For thus we commonly and Catholicly say that sins are remitted by oral confession and by the power of the keys — namely, by the priest's absolution — as the second sect, and the third of the mediators, were demonstrating; which yet cannot be understood properly, effectively, as has been shown above against them, but manifestatively and significantly. For they manifest, and are signs in the forum of the Church, that sins are remitted to those who have confessed and been absolved according to the laws of the Church established. Hence also in *On Penitence*, distinction 1, after it has been validly proved that sins are remitted by grace before confession, it is subjoined: "Therefore confession is made for the showing of penitence, not for the obtaining of pardon; and just as circumcision was given to Abraham as a sign of righteousness, not as a cause of justification, so confession is offered to the priest as a sign of pardon already received, not as a cause of remission to be received." Hence also the *Gloss* on the beginning of that first

distinction, after reciting the opinion saying that contrition of heart alone does not efface sins where the abundance of a priest is at hand, subjoins: "But whatever it [says], say that neither by contrition of heart nor by oral confession are sins remitted, but only by the grace of God; but contrition of heart itself is the sign that sins have been remitted, just as exterior satisfaction is the sign of contrition of heart."

With which Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 17, concords: "Confession is the witness of a conscience fearing God." With which also accords what was alleged above, that Christ commanded the cleansed leper to show himself to the priests and to offer for his cleansing — not as something to be obtained but as already had — what Moses commanded as a witness to them; he did not say "for efficacy," but "as a witness," and as a sign of the cleansing already attained. Hence also fittingly, in Leviticus 14, where the rite for cleansing the leper is given, it is commanded that the leper to be cleansed be brought to the priest, who, when he has found that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him to offer this and that, that he who is clean may be lawfully purged. But how is one cleansed anew, or purged, whose leprosy has already first been cleansed and found cleansed — except because, having been cleansed, or being clean and purged, or pure, he is shown to be so by the judgment of the priest? For it is certain that the legal priests by no means miraculously and effectively cleansed the lepers, but only declared the previously cleansed, or the clean. This the words of the Law plainly express: "When," the foregoing law says, "the priest has found the leprosy cleansed, he shall do this and that." This manner of speaking is found above in the same [book], chapter 13, more expressly and more often, where the laws are given concerning him who appears, but is doubted, to be a leper — that he ought to be brought to the priest, and according to his judgment to be reckoned clean or unclean. There also, in the case where he will be judged clean, sometimes it says that "the priest will cleanse him," that is, will judge him clean; sometimes that "such a one will be cleansed," that is, will be judged clean — as is plain, and the *Gloss* attests. Hence also the text, expounding itself plainly enough in the foresaid case, sometimes says that "the priest will consider him, and will decree him to be clean," sometimes that "he shall pronounce him clean." Where also, in the case where one ought to be judged unclean, sometimes it says that "the priest will contaminate him" — that is, according to the *Gloss*, will judge him contaminated; and sometimes more expressly says that he will judge such a one to be held by leprosy; sometimes that he will be polluted by the priest's judgment, and reckoned among the unclean. Which the authority of blessed Jerome alleged against the third sect plainly attests.

Hence also Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 18, says: "God looses or binds in one way, the Church in another. For He alone of Himself so remits sin that He cleanses the soul from every interior stain and looses it from the debt of eternal death. He has not granted this to priests, to whom, however, He has given the power of binding and loosing — that is, of showing men to be bound and loosed. Hence the Lord first restored the leper to health Himself; then He sent him to the priests, by whose judgment he might be shown to be cleansed. So also Lazarus, already raised to life, He offered to the disciples to be loosed; for even if anyone is loosed before God,

yet he is not held loosed in the face of the Church except by the priest's judgment. Therefore in loosing or retaining sins, the Evangelical priest so works and judges as the legal one once did in those who were contaminated by leprosy — which figures sin; and the Evangelical priests have the same right and office which the legal ones once had under the Law in curing lepers. They therefore remit or retain sins when they judge or show those remitted or retained by God."

Similarly Augustine speaks, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, [chapter] 20, where, having posited one exposition of the Apostle's saying to the Romans, "The doers of the law shall be justified," recited above, subjoining a second, says thus: "Or rather it has been said thus, 'shall be justified,' as if it were said, 'They shall be held just; they shall be reputed just' — as it was said of someone, 'But he, wishing to justify himself,' that is, that he might be held and reputed just. Whence we say in one way, 'God sanctifies His saints,' and in another, 'Hallowed be Thy name.' The former, because He Himself makes those holy who were not holy. The latter, that what is always holy in itself may be held holy by men also — that is, holily feared." In a similar manner of speaking, then, it can not incongruously be said that contrition or actual penitence justifies the impious and effaces sins — namely ostensibly, manifestatively, or even significantly, although not properly effectively.

Furthermore, that actual penitence effaces sin can be understood either as to fault, or as to penalty, or the satisfaction owed or established. For who is ignorant that a sinner duly repenting and absolved from sin by the authority of the keys is bound by the same authority to penalty and satisfaction? Although therefore the sinner, by the infusion of grace, is immediately justified and purged from sin as to fault or stain, he yet remains obligated to temporal penalty, and to perform fitting satisfaction. But contrition and penitence interior and exterior — namely, confession, blushing, fasting, prayer, and almsgiving — is part of this penalty and satisfaction foresaid. Yet contrition and interior penitence could be so great, so vehement, so intense that it would suffice fully without any other extrinsic penitence or satisfaction to be made.

It can therefore be reasonably said that contrition and actual penitence justifies the unjust and effaces sins as to the discharge of the penalty and the satisfaction owed for sin. For the sinner is said to be justified and purged from sin by satisfaction and satisfactory works — for example, by fasting, by prayers, by alms, and the like — as the fourth sect of the mediators recites. Although yet it is certain that sin as to fault and stain has previously been remitted, as has been shown against the same; which therefore must be understood in the manner stated. Thus speaks the law — rather, the Lord in the law, in Leviticus 4 and 5, frequently saying: "If anyone has sinned in this way or that, let him offer this or that, and the priest shall pray for him, and it shall be remitted to him." Where also, in the first chapter, it is commanded that the soul which has sinned in such a way perform penance for the sin and offer this or that, and the priest shall pray for him and for his sin, and it shall be remitted to him. And below, more expressly, it is commanded that the soul causing damage in things sanctified to the Lord, or in the goods of his neighbor, restore in full all that was taken, and over and above a fifth part, and offer to the priest a ram without

blemish from the flocks, according to the measure and estimation of the sin; who shall pray for him, and it shall be remitted to him for each [sin] which by doing he committed.

With this also accords [the fact] that those contrite, confessed, and absolved — and therefore perfectly cleansed from the faults and stains of sins — yet for the satisfaction enjoined upon them by the priests, by frequently saying the Lord's Prayer, pray to the Heavenly Father, saying, "Forgive us our debts," or as Luke 11 records, "Forgive us our sins." Forgive us, we say, our debts or sins — namely as to Thy offense and wrath, as to punishment and satisfaction, which Thou hast previously remitted as to stain or fault. Hence also Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* 1, [chapter] 20, in dialogue manner says thus: "What is this that we say to God: 'Forgive us our debts,' and every nation prays the God in whom it believes to forgive their sins? For if we pay what we owe, why do we pray that He forgive? Is God unjust, that He should again exact what has been paid? But if we do not pay, why do we vainly pray Him to do what — because it is not fitting to do — He cannot do? Or he who does not pay vainly says, 'Forgive'; but he who pays supplicates, since this very thing pertains to payment, that he supplicate."

With this also accords what blessed Gregory relates, on the Gospels, Homily 34, of a certain man named Victorinus, who was of opulent substance and a sinner; but, compunct by the consideration of his guilt, he raised himself against himself, abandoned all things of this world, sought a monastery; in which monastery he was of such great humility and such severity towards himself that all the brothers who there had exercised themselves in the love of divinity were forced to despise their own life when they saw his penitence. For he strove with the whole effort of his mind to torment his flesh, to break his own wills, to seek out stealthy prayers, to wash himself with daily tears, to seek to be despised, to fear the veneration offered by the brothers. He was therefore accustomed to anticipate the brothers' nightly vigils; and because the mountain on which the monastery is situated juts out on one side in a more secret part, there he had made a custom of going out before vigils, that he might daily slay himself in the weeping of penitence the more freely the more secretly. For he contemplated the strictness of his coming judgment, and, already in agreement with that same Judge, in tears was punishing the guilt of his crime. But on a certain night, while the Abbot was watching and seeing Victorinus prostrate in prayer for a long time on the secret side of the mountain, a light from heaven was suddenly poured out upon him, and so great a brightness scattered itself there that the whole part of that region grew bright from it; and a voice came at the same time saying: "Thy sin is remitted to thee."

Furthermore, alongside the foresaid distinction another can consequently be drawn out. For that actual penitence justifies the unjust can be understood either as to the effacement of the stain of sin or fault, or as to full reconciliation with offended God, and the plenary reformation of one's status. For when sin has been remitted to anyone as to fault, God still remains angry with him: for He still wills for him a punishment or satisfactory penalty for the sin. For God's wrath, as was said in the 25th [chapter] of the first [Book], and the throng of doctors attests, is not any commotion or disturbance of His own, but only the will to punish, and its effect, namely the punishment or penalty itself. Which the Prophet, well noticing and lamenting, says: "O God, turn

us, etc. O Lord God of hosts, how long wilt Thou be angry against the prayers of Thy servant" — namely the now converted — "wilt Thou feed us with the bread of tears, and give us tears to drink in measure?" (Psalm 79) "In measure," namely, of penalty, against the measure of fault, as is said in Isaiah 27, and the preceding things make manifest. Hence also Augustine, expounding the verse of the Psalm concerning God's wrath premised, says thus: "'Thou wast angry against the prayer of Thine enemy, and still Thou art angry against the prayer of Thy servant. Thou hast turned us, we have known it, and still Thou art angry against the prayer of Thy servant.' So plainly Thou art angry as a Father, correcting; not as a Judge, condemning. Do not think that the wrath of God has now passed because thou art turned: the wrath of God has passed from thee, but lest it damn thee eternally; yet He scourges and does not spare, since 'He scourges every son whom He receives.' But yet how long wilt Thou be angry against the prayer of Thy servant — not now Thine enemy? How long wilt Thou so feed us, and the rest aforesaid?"

Nor again does the sinner, when sin is remitted, immediately have the plenary reformation of his status, as evidently follows from what has been said. He still remains a debtor of penalty and of the satisfaction owed for the sin. He has also, for the most part, a certain infirmity contracted from sin — namely, facility for evil and difficulty for good. For obtaining plenary reformation, then, contrition and penitence — interior and exterior — avails the penitent, as follows from the things premised, as Bernard also testifies in *On Grace and Free Will*, [chapter] 24, recited above. Hence Augustine, *On True and False Penitence*, [chapter] 17: "Let each one strive," he says, "to correct his offenses, that after death it may not be necessary to bear punishment. For there are certain sins which are mortal, and in penitence are venial, but not at once healed. For sometimes a sick man would die if he were not treated medically, and he is not at once healed; he languishes in vigor who was about to die." And above, [chapter] 13: "Sin becomes venial through confession, which was criminal in the act; and even if it is not at once purged, yet it becomes venial which had been committed mortally."

And Anselm says, *Cur Deus Homo* 1, [chapter] 25, that beatitude is to be given to no one except to him from whom sins have been entirely remitted, and that this remission is not made except by the debt being paid which is owed for sin according to the magnitude of the sin. He plainly intimates, then, that sin is remitted in some measure but not entirely, partially not totally, diminishingly not fully, before the plenary discharge of the whole debt for sin.

Through these things and the like, the divine grace inspiring, the foresaid authorities and others similar — which seem to oppose this view — will be reduced to concord, and all the subtleties of the Pelagians will be dissolved, and all other objections lulled to sleep.

Furthermore, although sin, by the infusion of grace, is effaced as to fault and stain naturally before contrition, confession, absolution, and plenary satisfaction, as has been shown above, yet the sinner remains obligated to plenary satisfaction owed for sin, as has been shown above. Contrition, however, confession, absolution — or the due seeking and reception of absolution — and any work of satisfaction is satisfactory in some way, because partially or totally for sin; and

it avails for merit, for humility, for guarding against sin, and for subduing the warring flesh. None of these things therefore is superfluous, useless, or otiose, as was objected above. Hence Augustine, *On True and False Penitence*, [chapter] 13: "Blushing itself," he says, "has its part in remission. For out of mercy the Lord has commanded this: that no one should repent in secret. For in this — that of himself one says it to the priest, and conquers shame by the fear of the Offended One — there is the pardon of the crime. For sin becomes venial through confession, which was criminal in the act; and even if it is not at once purged, yet it becomes venial which had been committed mortally. For he has offered much of satisfaction who, mastering his shame, has not denied to God's messenger any of those things which he committed. And since shame is a great penalty, he who blushes for Christ becomes worthy of mercy. Hence it is plain that the more openly anyone confesses, in the hope of pardon, the foulness of his crime, the more easily he will obtain the grace of remission. For the priests themselves can profit those who confess the more, the more they can spare them, to whom the Lord remits the crime."

Wherefore Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 17, last [chapter], says: "If it is asked to what end confession avails, since in contrition the sin has already been effaced — we say that there is a certain punishment as the satisfaction of work. Through confession also the priest understands how he ought to judge concerning the crime; through it, also, the sinner becomes more humble and more cautious." With which the *Gloss*, on the beginning of the distinction *On Penitence*, agrees, asking to what purpose exterior penitence and confession is necessary, since the sin has been previously remitted by contrition. And it answers: "This is done for humility and for the exercise of righteousness, and that one may make satisfaction to the Church, which one has injured, and that he himself and others may be rendered more cautious." And he adds: "But if it be subtly considered, the remission of sins is to be attributed to the grace of God, not to contrition." Hence it evidently appears that the Glossator does not say what was alleged above for the contrary part out of this *Gloss*, according to his own subtle view — and also because then he would plainly contradict himself, as the things preceding make manifest — but according to the common opinion of others, and famous among all who speak commonly.

Nor let any theologian, I beg, blame me for treating this little gloss, which is not a theological one, in this way. For the Pelagians object it to me; what then evil is to strike them with their own sword? For "to Greeks and barbarians, to wise and unwise, I am made a debtor"; nor am I ignorant that "what is foolish of God is wiser than men, and what is weak of God is stronger than men" — than some men, sometimes. But he who has thought otherwise, let him himself speak wisdom among the perfect, give solid food to the advanced. It goes very well with me if I minister milk to Christ's little ones, if the declaration of my words gives light, and gives understanding to little ones. Would that I might so become all things to all, that I might gain all to truth.

What was argued above — that since to repent is in man's free power, having received grace, one might not at all repent, and so be justified and just without any penitence after or before — perhaps concludes well as concerns absolute power: for omnipotent God could perhaps so justify

an adult by the habit without the act, as He justifies baptized infants and those sanctified in the womb. But according to the law now established it does not conclude. Of which the cause, I deem, is this: that the act of contrition is not produced by man alone, nor antecedently by man with God, but by God antecedently with man — as the corollary of [chapter] 41 teaches. For God, magnificent in holiness, whenever He inspires in an adult sinner the habit of charity and grace, also breathes in the act, which He works also through His infrustrable will, as the tenth [chapter] of this [Book] teaches, in man and with man — but prior naturally to man, irresistibly and indefectibly.

This view by no means evacuates the power of the keys. For the power and use of the keys extends to many and great things in the private and public forum: first, to the indication and notification of the true absolution from sin granted by God, as was said above — provided this be done conformably to the divine absolution and to the judgment of the Church triumphant, and concordantly to the condition or merit of the one absolved, as the preceding things make manifest. Hence Augustine, *On True and False Penitence*, [chapter] 13: "The Lord said," he says, "'Whatever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven': that is, I God, and all the orders of the heavenly court, and all the saints in My glory, praise with you and confirm those whom you bind and loose. He did not say, 'whom you think to bind and loose,' but, 'in whom you exercise the work of righteousness and mercy'; other works of yours upon sinners I do not recognize."

And Gregory, in Homily 26 on the Gospels, expounding that of John foresaid, "Whose sins ye remit, etc." says: "It often happens that he who holds the place of judgment either condemns the undeserving, or himself, bound, looses others; often he follows in loosing and binding his subjects the motions of his own will, not the merits of the causes; whence it comes about that he deprives himself of this very power of binding and loosing, who exercises it according to his own wills, and not according to the morals of his subjects. Often it happens that the pastor is moved towards a neighbor by hatred or favor; nor can those judge worthily of subjects who in the cases of subjects follow their own hatreds or favors. Hence it is rightly said by the Prophet, 'They were putting to death souls that do not die, and giving life to souls that do not live.' For he puts to death one not dying who condemns a just man, and he strives to give life to one who is not going to live, who attempts to loose a guilty one from his punishment. Therefore the causes are to be weighed, and then the power of binding and loosing exercised: it must be seen what fault, or what penitence, has followed after the fault, that almighty God may absolve, by the pastor's sentence, those whom He visits by the grace of compunction. For then is the absolution of the presider true, when meanwhile the judgment follows the Judge — which the resurrection of the four-day-dead well signifies; which, indeed, demonstrates that first the Lord called the dead man and gave him life, saying, 'Lazarus, come forth'; and afterwards he who had come forth alive was loosed by the disciples, as it is written, 'And when he who had been bound with bands had come out, then He said to the disciples, "Loose him, and let him go." Behold, the disciples loose him, now living, whom the Master had already raised when dead. For if the disciples had

loosed Lazarus when dead, they would have shown stench rather than virtue. From which consideration it is to be observed that we ought to loose by pastoral authority those whom we recognize our Author to vivify by raising grace; which vivification, before the work of righteousness, is now recognized in the very confession of sin."

Hence also Peter [Lombard], in *Sentences* 4, distinction 18: "How is it true," he says, "'Whatever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven, and whatever thou shalt bind, etc.' — for sometimes priests show some loosed or bound who are not such before God?" And he answers: "But this is to be understood in those whose merits demand to be loosed or bound. For then the priest's sentence is approved and confirmed by the judgment of God and of the whole heavenly court, when it proceeds from discretion, so that the merits of the accused do not contradict. Whomsoever therefore they loose or bind, employing the key of discretion, by the merits of the accused they are loosed or bound in heaven, that is, before God, since in the divine judgment the priest's sentence so proceeded is approved and confirmed."

Secondly, ecclesiastical priests truly bind and loose certain ones — namely, the notoriously criminal — by debarring them from the communion of the Church's sacraments and admitting the same, when reconciled, to them. For although such a one, prevented by God's grace, may repent and truly be absolved before God from all sins, yet he will not be received to the ecclesiastical sacraments unless cleansed and absolved by the priest's judgment. This well appears concerning those who sin publicly and therefore do public penance, who are openly cast out of the Church on the head of the fast and resumed on the Lord's Supper after their penance has been performed. This was well figured in Lazarus, notoriously dead and buried, whom the Lord first raised by Himself, and then commanded the disciples to loose him still bound, and let him go (John 11) — evidently showing that one notoriously dead through sin, although by Christ's calling through grace he revives, must yet come forth through the door of the mouth, by confessing, and be loosed — that is, absolved — from the bond by which he was held before the Church, and be permitted freely to go away by the liberty of the Church Militant.

Hence Augustine, in the first part on John, sermon 49, expounding this place, says: "What does this signify? Where you condemn, you lie dead; you lie buried; when you confess, you proceed. What is to proceed but, as if going forth from hidden things, to be made manifest? But that you may confess, God brings it about, by calling with a great voice — that is, with a great grace by calling. Therefore when the dead man came forth still bound, confessing and still guilty, that his sins might be loosed by the ministers, the Lord said: 'Loose him, and let him go.' What is, 'Loose him, and let him go'? 'Whatever ye loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'" The same, in *Sermons on the Words of the Lord*, sermon 8, after by the example of Lazarus he has shown that one confessing his sin has previously been raised by the Lord (as is more fully recited above), by way of objection and response subjoins: "Then someone will say: 'What does the Church profit, if the confessor, raised by the Lord's voice, comes forth? What does the Church profit the confessor, to whom the Lord says, 'What ye loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven'?' Note Lazarus himself: he came forth with his bonds; he was already living, by confessing, but he was

not yet walking free, entangled with bonds. What therefore does the Church do, to which it has been said, 'What ye loose shall be loosed,' but what the Lord said immediately to the disciples: 'Loose him, and let him go'?"

And Alcuin, as is recited in the *Gloss* on John 11, says: "Christ therefore raises [the dead], because He gives life interiorly through Himself; the disciples loose, because by the ministry of priests those given life are absolved."

Thirdly, ecclesiastical priests can truly bind by the bond of excommunication, and loose, in the Church Militant, by separating from the communion of the sacraments and the faithful, and reconciling [them] — to such an extent that, although it may be evident to the Church that some excommunicated person truly repented, and that it did not stand by him that he was not reconciled to ecclesiastical unity, and so departed [this life], and therefore that he is truly absolved before God and in the Church Triumphant — yet he ought not to be held as a son of the Church Militant until he has been absolved by her, as Pope Innocent expressly teaches in *Extra, On the Sentence of Excommunication, A nobis est saepe quaesitum*. Where, concerning such an excommunicated and dead person, he writes thus: "It happens sometimes that he who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and he who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence. The bond, then, by which a sinner is bound before God is dissolved in the remission of his fault. But that by which he is bound before the Church, is relaxed when the sentence is remitted; which the Gospel discourse manifests in the raising of Lazarus, whom the Lord first raised, and then commanded the Apostles to loose the one raised. Hence, however much one has been concerned to humble himself by an oath given that he would obey the command of the Church, and however many signs of penitence have preceded — yet if, prevented by death, he cannot obtain the benefit of absolution, although he is believed to have been absolved before God, yet he is not yet to be held as absolved before the Church. Yet succor can and ought to be afforded him by the Church's benefit, if his penitence in life is established by evident signs; and to the dead man let the benefit of absolution be granted."

Fourthly, ecclesiastical priests can truly bind and loose, by enjoining various penances — graver or lighter — on penitents, by mitigating, changing, and perhaps by indulgences from the immense treasury of the Church, mercifully relaxing every exterior penance that has been enjoined; and they can perhaps, out of the most ample mercy of the Lord, absolve the penitent from every penance and extrinsic penalty owed for sin in the present or in the future. Hence Augustine, *On True and False Penitence*, [chapter] 13: "The priests themselves," he says, "can spare the confessing, to whom the Lord remits the crime. For He raised Lazarus from the tomb; He offered him to the disciples to be loosed — by this showing the power of loosing granted to the priest. For He said: 'Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven': that is, I God, and all the orders of the heavenly court, and all the saints in My glory praise with you and confirm those whom you bind and loose; He did not say 'whom you think to bind and loose,' but 'in whom you exercise the work of righteousness and mercy'; other works of yours upon sinners I do not recognize."

Fifthly, ecclesiastical priests truly absolve from the obligation by which a sinner, when opportunity is granted, is held according to the law established in the Church to confess his sins to the priest and be absolved by him. For this once being done, he is no longer held to do so concerning the same [sins].

Sixthly, ecclesiastical priests absolve truly and finally in some way from sins, since, according to what was premised, although sins by the infusion of grace are effaced before confession and the absolution obtained, yet, unless the sinner — having opportunity — afterwards confesses and is absolved, they return in some way and are newly imputed; indeed, on account of contempt of the keys, they are aggravated.

Seventhly, the power of the keys, the priest's absolution, and the sacrament of penitence avail for obtaining the increase of grace — which ought, not in a small degree, to excite each one to confess most often. For this, according to Augustine, as Peter [Lombard] recites in *Sentences* 4, distinction 1, is the difference between the old and new sacraments, that the former only promised and signified, while these give salvation. And it seems to be in the same way concerning the baptism of penitence as concerning the baptism of water; but the baptism of water confers on an adult previously baptized in the Holy Spirit and approaching in grace an increase of grace and of the virtues, as Jerome says, as Peter alleges in *Sentences* 4, distinction 4: "The faith which makes the faithful is given or nourished in the waters of baptism, since to one not having it is given there, and to one already having it that he may have it more fully" — which Peter expressly holds there.

Hence also, eighthly, this power avails for the diminution and repression of concupiscence and the tinder of sin. For Augustine teaching, *Enchiridion*, penultimate [chapter], and elsewhere in many places, "When charity grows, cupidity is diminished and decreases." In one baptized first by the baptism of the Spirit, when he afterwards receives baptism in water, the tinder of sin is weakened, as is taught in Peter [Lombard]'s *Sentences* 4, distinction 4. Why, then, should it not be felt similarly in the baptism of penitence? This effect too ought to excite, not in a small degree, to most frequent confession.

To what was argued above — "If penitence is a sacrament, it is a sign of a sacred reality following it" — some respond, as Peter [Lombard] recites in *Sentences* 4, distinction 23, that this is not true of the sacrament of penitence, just as not always in other sacraments which effect what they figure. With whom Peter [Lombard] himself concords, on the same matter, in distinction 4, by way of question and reply: "If it is asked of what reality that baptism is the sacrament which is given to one already just, we say that it is the sacrament of the reality that has preceded — that is, of the remission given before through faith; nor wonder that the reality sometimes precedes the sacrament, since sometimes also it follows long after, as in those who approach feignedly, in whom — when they have afterwards repented — the baptism will begin to profit; in whom the baptism was the sacrament of this sanctification which they have through repenting." But it can be said otherwise, and perhaps more truly, according to what precedes —

that the sacrament of penitence is the sign of the sacred reality always conferred through it, namely the increase of preceding grace.

Certain authorities also and arguments objected by the Pelagians the 35th and 21st [chapters] of this [Book] expound and resolve.

CHAPTER 44. ON PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO THE NAME (*quid nominis*).

After these things, on Predestination some brief things are briefly to be said. Concerning which, it is to be known what the name [signifies]. For according to the Philosopher in *Elenchi* 1, "Those who are ignorant of the force of names paralogize themselves and others, both when disputing and when listening to others"; with which the Apostle concordantly says in 1 Corinthians 14: "If I do not know the force of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him to whom I speak, and he who speaks shall be a barbarian to me."

Now *destinare* (to destine), according to the grammarians, [means] to send, to depute, to mark, to inscribe, to ordain — and in these last modes Sacred Scripture speaks. Hence 2 Corinthians 9: "Let each one, as he has destined in his heart, etc." — *Gloss*: "has destined, that is, has preordained." And Wisdom 5: "Like an arrow shot to the destined place, etc." Hence also *praedestinare* and *praedestinatio* are said in the same modes. Hence blessed Augustine, proceeding by a similar way, in *On Predestination against the Pelagians* II, defines predestination thus: "Predestination is by way of premitting and foreseeing, or preordaining, something future."

CHAPTER 45. THAT PREDESTINATION IS REALLY TO BE POSITED; WHAT IT IS, IN HOW MANY MODES IT IS SAID; THAT IT IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF WORKS, BUT ACCORDING TO THE GRATUITOUS WILL OF GOD.

Now, having grasped what predestination is said to be nominally, it remains to inquire whether it is really to be posited; and that it is to be really posited, [chapter] 27 and the things following sufficiently prove. Which both series of the Testament also attest. Hence Exodus 32: "Either forgive them this fault, or, if Thou dost not, blot me out of Thy book, which Thou hast written." But this book written by God — what else can it be understood to be than His predestination of things to come, as all Catholic expositors attest? And Psalm 68: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living"; and Psalm 138: "In Thy book all shall be written"; and Isaiah 4: "Holy shall be called everyone who has been written in life, in Jerusalem"; and Daniel 12: "In that time Thy people shall be saved — everyone who shall be found written in the book."

In the New Testament likewise the Apostle attests predestination, not with the name suppressed but expressed, where he treats of the Son of God predestined, in Romans 1; and below, [chapter] 8, of those whom He predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son; and in Ephesians 1,

of those whom He chose before the foundation of the world, and predestined to the adoption of sons. Truth itself likewise truly taught this, in Matthew 20, speaking of the seat at the right hand or the left, prepared by the Father for those who would sit there; and below, [chapter] 25, of the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world for those who would reign. For which also, in Acts 10, it is written of witnesses preordained by God; and below, [chapter] 13: "As many as had been preordained to eternal life, believed." Which authorities concerning the divine election, with their many likenesses in both Testaments, evidently insinuate. This too all the doctors — indeed, all the learned, and equally the unlearned Catholics — Catholicly confess.

Now the question "Whether predestination is" being terminated, it remains consequently to inquire what predestination, now found, really is. And, as can be had from [chapters] 9, 27, and the following, with the help of [chapter] 23 — it is the eternal pre-volition, or pre-ordination, of God's will concerning a future thing. And this can be taken in two ways. In one mode, generally, namely for the divine pre-ordination with respect to any future thing whatever, and so it is convertible with providence, as will appear from [chapter] 27 and the following. So speaks the Philosopher in the *Secret of Secrets*, part 1, chapter 16: "God," he says, "destined all things by His wisdom in equal weight, and in certain number and order." And below, in the same book and part, in chapter 22, he says that "the most high Destiner has not so predestined future things that He should derogate in any way from His own power."

In another mode, specially, namely for the pre-ordination of the divine will concerning a rational creature, angelic or human; and this is the common way of speaking in Sacred Scripture and the doctors. And further, just as God's volition is taken in two ways — namely simply and according to a certain respect, of goods and of evils — as [chapter] 34 and the preceding have taught, so a twofold predestination of this kind corresponds to it, simply and according to a certain respect, of goods and of evils. Now that predestination is of goods, no theologian is ignorant. But because by some perhaps it is doubted whether it is similarly of evils, this I shall show.

For this, as has been touched on, follows from [chapter] 34 with the preceding, and from [chapter] 27 and the following, and from the corollary of [chapter] 23 and the arguments and authorities which it adduces; and from that [chapter] 23 with this [point] most well known to every Christian, that God wills, both in the final judgment and afterwards will will, that many evil angels and men be tortured by eternal fires.

Item, Augustine says in *City of God* 21, [chapter] 25, that some in this life are predestined to go into the eternal fire with the devil, as [chapter] 23 has more fully alleged. The same, on John, part 2, homily 53 (or 107 of the whole work), expounding John 17, "None of them is lost, except the son of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled," says thus: "The son of perdition was called the betrayer of Christ, predestined to perdition, according to the Scripture which especially prophesies of him in Psalm 108." The same, *Enchiridion* 80, says that God has predestined some justly to penalty, and some kindly to grace. The same can be had in *On the Good of Perseverance*, [chapters] 45 and 49, and elsewhere in many places.

But some not holding this view always expound predestination in such cases by simple foreknowledge. Which exposition, if it is fitting, seems likely to be able to fit the whole of Sacred Scripture, our Doctors, and the Saints, wherever they make mention of predestination even of the good — which is sufficiently established as contrary to Catholic truth.

Item, if God has foreknowledge of such [evils], therefore also a willing of them, as chapter 18 has shown; and therefore some predestination of the will. Item, the contrary of this is rather found, namely that the name of foreknowledge is put for predestination. Hence the Apostle in Romans 11: "God has not rejected His people whom He foreknew" — and he is speaking there of the remnant of the Jews predestined to the kingdom, who by grace are saved. For which Augustine says in *On the Good of Perseverance*, [chapter] 54: "Sometimes predestination is signified also by the name of foreknowledge, as the Apostle says: 'God has not rejected His people whom He foreknew' — which is not rightly understood except as 'whom He has predestined.' This the circumstance of the very reading shows" — which, just as I have briefly touched, he there manifests more diffusely.

Item, this twofold predestination Isidore manifestly posits in the second [book] of *On the Highest Good*, [chapter] 6, in these words: "Predestination is twofold: either of the elect to repose, or of the reprobate to death. Marvelous is the disposition of the supernal distribution, by which here the just is more justified, and the impious is more soiled; the bad is sometimes converted to good, the good is sometimes turned back to evil." With whom Anselm concords, *On Concord* [chapter] 7, saying thus: "Not only of the good, but also of the evil, predestination can be spoken. It is therefore not unfitting if in this way we say that God predestines the evil and their evil works, when He does not correct them and their evil works; but He is said more specifically to foreknow and predestine the good, since in these He causes both that they are and that they are good, but in the evil, not [that they are evil] but only that they are essentially, not that they are evil."

Yet very often the Saints say that predestination is only of the good — which is for this reason, that the predestination of the evil is not predestination simply and *per se*, but only *per accidens*; and being *per accidens* is close to non-being, as was said of volition in chapter 33. The predestination of the evil is commonly called reprobation. And because, according to Augustine in *On Genesis to the Letter IV*, [chapter] 6, "When the matter is conceded, one is not to labor about words"; and according to the Philosopher in *Topics 2*, "in nominations, that which most often [obtains] is the [proper] thing to be named; but those which are of the things — whether of this or not of this — are not to be attended to in many cases" — let predestination of the good be called predestination absolutely, and predestination of the evil be named reprobation.

Now predestination can be described thus: Predestination is the eternal preparation by the divine will of final grace in the way (*in via*) and of everlasting beatitude in the fatherland (*in patria*) for a rational creature. Which Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, [chapter] 12, more briefly thus defines: "It is the preparation of grace." But it must be understood in the manner

stated. For grace is prepared or given to many who fall from it and are finally damned; but of the predestined, none has ever perished or will perish. The effects of this predestination are: the conferring of grace in the present, justification from sin, good merits, final perseverance, and perpetual beatitude in the future.

It is also to be known that this predestination in the good is twofold: namely, of grace and of merits in the present, and of glory and of rewards in the future, as can be elicited from its description premised, and from chapter 31; and is had expressly from the saying of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1 and 2, with the *Gloss* alleged in chapter 31. But reprobation and its effects are known by the opposites of these.

But because the Saints and Doctors say frequently that God has predestined and prepared for the reprobate fire and penalty, but not sins, nor [predestined them] to sin — someone might argue against this through the proximate chapter, with [chapter] 23 helping; or through this saying of the Saints might argue against chapter 34, with the same [chapter] 23 succoring. And it can here be answered concerning predestination similarly as concerning volition has been answered in chapter 34, and as has been touched on at the beginning of this chapter.

Now it remains to inquire whether on the side of the predestined there is any cause of divine predestination. And that there is not, chapter 20 makes manifest. Item, if there were any cause, it would maximally seem to be the good works of the predestined; but those, before they exist, cause nothing; therefore no one is predestined before he works; therefore God's predestination is temporal and new — against the proximate chapter, and [chapter] 23, and against canonical Scripture alleged in the proximate chapter, and against all Catholic doctors treating this matter.

Nor can it be said that the foreknowledge of the works of the predestined is the cause of divine predestination, since these things are prior in nature predestined by God to the predestined one, before they are foreknown by God. For God prior in nature wills him to have such merits, and through them the kingdom of heaven, before He knows this; and through this, that He so wills, He knows that it is or will be so, as chapter 18 has shown. The knowledge or foreknowledge of merits, therefore, does not cause predestination in God.

Furthermore, God predestined for Peter, first, the kingdom; and merits, as a means to the kingdom — not the converse — as appears from [chapter] 35.

Item, for whatever cause God eternally prepared grace to be conferred upon someone, for the same cause He confers it upon him temporally, by chapter 23 — and because otherwise the will of God would be frustrated, against chapter 10. For from eternity He willed to confer grace now on account of works, and He does not do so. But, by the hypothesis, on account of the works of the predestined God eternally prepared grace to be conferred on him; therefore He confers it on him temporally on account of works — against chapter 35 and the things which follow. Or otherwise, ostensibly: for whatever [reason] God does not confer grace temporally, [for that

reason] He did not eternally prepare grace to be conferred. Every work is that on account of which God does not confer grace temporally [if not done].

Item, as freely as God confers grace temporally on anyone, so freely He prepared from eternity to confer grace upon him. But God most freely confers grace temporally, not on account of preceding merits, according to what chapter 35 and the following have taught.

Item, predestination is the grace of God making the predestined gracious for life, according to the distinction of grace premised in chapters 35 and 42. Therefore it is not from works or merits whatever, according to what chapter 35 and the following have demonstrated. But that predestination is the grace of God is plain, because every volition of God concerning a good extrinsically to be conferred on someone emanates freely, not from any inferior cause causing it from before, as is plain from chapter 20. For which also the Apostle says in Ephesians 1: "He predestined us into the adoption of sons according to the purpose of His will, in praise of the glory of His grace" — which chapter 25 has more fully treated. Furthermore, almost all the reasons proving that grace is given freely will similarly prove that predestination is made freely.

Furthermore, this is plainly against the Apostle, in Romans 9, saying of Jacob and Esau: "When they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand — not from works but from Him calling — it was said: 'The greater shall serve the lesser,' as it is written: 'Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.'" In which, under the name of "sons of promise" he shows the sons of predestination, as is plain there from the series of the reading, and from the exposition of all Catholic doctors expounding that place. And below, the Apostle shows by Sacred Scripture that predestination is from the mercy of the divine will, not from works, saying thus: "To Moses the Lord says: 'I shall have mercy on whom I have mercy, and shall show mercy to whom I have shown mercy.'" And he concludes: "Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, that is, not of one doing anything whatsoever, but of God who shows mercy." And, having alleged another place of Scripture about Pharaoh, he again concludes thus: "Therefore on whom He wills He has mercy, and whom He wills He hardens." But if that volition were caused by the works of such ones, and followed them, he would not say it congruously; rather he ought to say it thus: "He on whom one will work well wills to have mercy; and on him who [will work] evilly, He wills to harden." And this would be originally and principally of him who wills and runs, not of God who shows mercy. And therefore he said above this conclusion: "Not from works but from Him calling, that the purpose of God according to election might stand" — not according to any merits in any way.

Nor do I believe anyone so dull, so impudent, and so frivolously cavilling as to say that the Apostle did not understand this of works then future, but only of present ones — of which there were none then. For how should so great a doctor, the chosen vessel having the firstfruits of the Spirit, who did not learn or receive it from man, but through revelation of the Lord Jesus Christ, who also was speaking wisdom among the perfect — have so unlearnedly taught the Romans, so perfect and learned, that "when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil," not

from works then present, was it said: "The greater shall serve the lesser," and "Jacob I have loved, etc."? For who, being most unlearned, would not know that "when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil," nothing could be said to be due to them on account of present works at that time? Or to whom would it not seem ridiculous if he had said: "He predestined them before they existed, and before the foundation of the world, on account of the works which they then had presently" — when this no one even of the simple has ever doubted? And every Christian doctrine ought to be of something useful and unknown — but this is not useful to any Christian, nor can be unknown to any. And how would he have so studiously, if so fruitlessly, adduced testimonies and examples of the Old Testament with such vigilant disputation, to prove that conclusion which could never have been doubtful or unknown?

How also from this conclusion so understood — namely, of the works of those who do not work presently, nor have ever worked — would he, proceeding further, draw the other conclusions which follow? Of which the first is, "Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy." The second: "Therefore on whom He wills, He has mercy, and whom He wills, He hardens." For unless he understood his statement commonly, of works past, present, or future, there would be no connection of reason; nor would he have said, "that the purpose of God according to election might stand." For if the purpose of God should follow future works, it is not according to His election, but according to the meritorious election of those who will merit. Nor ought he to have said, "Not from works, but from Him calling," but rather the contrary: "Not from Him calling, but from the future works of those, by which God is first and originally as it were excited and called to predestining." And so God would rather be called the called, and they themselves the callers. Nor ought he to have concluded: "Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy" — but rather "not of God who shows mercy, but of him who is going to run and to will." For this is the principle and origin why God shows mercy, not [something] in God. Nor again ought he to have concluded: "Therefore on whom He wills He has mercy, and whom He wills He hardens"; but thus: "Therefore on whomever is going to will well, God has mercy, and whomever is going to will badly, He hardens."

Item, if the Apostle were there denying that God's predestination and calling is from past or present works only, but were permitting it to be from future ones — as some of the Jews converted, dwelling in Rome, then wished to assert (namely those who said that, on account of their merits and the merits of their fathers in observance of the Mosaic law, they had received the grace of Christ and the faith of the Gospel, as is plain from the process of the Epistle to the Romans, and Lombard in the prologue of the *Gloss* on that Epistle recites this from Haymo and Augustine) — and as the Pelagians now assert, namely that the elect are predestined on account of their future merits — how would he refute them and commend grace, which yet he principally willed [to commend], as is plain through the whole epistle, and through Lombard in the prologue [referenced] above, and through the many authorities of Haymo and Augustine adduced there by him?

And that he intended this specially through that process alleged from chapter 9, is plain from Augustine, *Enchiridion* 78, saying: "The Apostle was commending grace, for whose commendation he had already spoken concerning those twins of Rebecca's womb: 'When they were not yet born, nor doing anything good or evil, that the purpose of God might remain according to election, not from works but from Him calling, it was said that the greater shall serve the lesser.'"

Item, according to the same Apostle, God does not confer grace presently on account of works, as chapter 35 and the following have more fully alleged; therefore neither did He prepare it on account of future works. For He has the immutability of His counsel, with the same Apostle still attesting, in chapter 6 to the Hebrews. Indeed, just as He calls those existing to grace not on account of their present works, so He does not predestine those to come on account of future ones, but these and those alike, purely freely. Hence in Romans 4 He calls the things which are not, as those which are. And how He calls them, the same called Apostle himself testifies of himself: "He called me by His grace," he says (Galatians 1); and 2 Timothy 1: "He has called us by His holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace, which has been given to us in Christ Jesus before the secular times, but is now manifested through the illumination of our Saviour Jesus Christ."

This therefore is the view of the Apostle in his words to the Romans treated above: that God calls and predestines purely freely, not from past, present, or future works. And this Augustine attests expressly in his sermon *On the Predestination and Grace of God*, where he treats the foresaid authority of the Apostle in these words: "If according to their future morals it is said that the divine judgment has decreed, certainly that will be evacuated which the Apostle premised, saying: 'Not from works, but from Him calling, it was said that the greater shall serve the lesser.' For he does not say 'from past works,' but, when he generally said 'not from works,' he willed both past and future to be there understood: past, namely, which were none, and future, which were not yet. Jacob was predestined a vessel unto honor, but not from works, since 'not from works, but from Him calling, it was said: "The greater shall serve the lesser.'" And lest perhaps vessels predestined unto honor, attributing something to their own powers, should deny glory to the Creator, the Apostle in another place named them 'vessels of mercy,' so that they should recognize themselves to be all that they were according to mercy. For the same Apostle so says elsewhere: 'And this not from yourselves, but it is the gift of God.'"

The same is plain through the *Gloss* of Lombard on the literal text alleged. For there, according to the exposition of that one, the Apostle shows that Jacob was not predestined and Esau reprobated either on account of preceding merits or on account of future ones. Hence he says thus: "'The greater,' that is, Esau, 'shall serve the lesser,' that is, Jacob. And lest anyone should think this is done from preceding merit of theirs (because this was said to her, that is, the mother, 'when they were not yet born,' for it might seem that they could have somehow merited in the womb by struggling), he subjoins: 'Or when they had not yet done anything good or evil; therefore it was said,' that the purpose of God might remain — that is, be fulfilled — according

to election, that is, according to the grace by which He has chosen — not according to the debt of merits — by which He Himself makes those to be chosen, He does not find them — 'not from works.' Just as he showed that this had not been said for their preceding merits, so likewise this he shows to have been said not for the future merits of either. Whence I say: not on account of their preceding merits was this said. Again I say: not from works good or evil future, which would not be future good or evil unless grace had been added or subtracted, but 'from Him calling' — that is, from the grace of God."

The same in *Sentences* 1, distinction 41, says: "He chose Jacob and reprobated Esau, which was not on account of their merits which they then would have, since they had none, since they did not even exist; nor on account of future merits which He foresaw, did He either elect that one or reprobate that one. Yet some have opined that God therefore chose Jacob because He foreknew that he would be such — one who would believe in Him and serve Him — which Augustine sometimes says he held, in the book of *Retractations*, where he openly shows that if he had been chosen on account of future merits, then the election would not be of grace. Therefore he was not chosen by God because he was going to be such, but from election was made such."

This same view the same Apostle teaches to the Ephesians 1, saying: "He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and unspotted." He does not say "because we were, or were going to be, holy and unspotted," but "that we might be holy and unspotted." And there follows: "who has predestined us into the adoption of sons according to the purpose of His will" — not according to the merits of our will. And there follows: "We have been called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will" — not ours, nor according to our future works.

In this — that he says "we have been called by lot (*sorte*)" — he seems to have imitated the Psalmist, in Psalm 23, speaking thus to the Lord: "In Thy hands are my lots." On which Augustine, treatise 3, says: "Why lots? For the lot is not anything evil, but a thing in human dubiety indicating the divine will. Therefore by 'the lot' he meant — as I judge — the grace by which we have been saved. Why do they call the grace of God 'lot'? Because in the lot there is no election, namely of merits, but the will of God. For where it is said, 'This man does it, this man does it not,' merits are considered; and if merits are considered, it is election, not lot. But when God finds no merits of ours, by the lot of His will He saves us — because He willed [to do so], not because we were worthy. By merit, this lot is the tunic of the Lord, woven from above [seamless], which signifies the eternity of charity. Since it could not be divided, the lot was cast over it. To whom it has come, signifies those who seem to come to the lot of the Saints. This lot is the hidden will of God: the will of God in the human race is a lot — a lot coming from the hidden will of God, with whom there is no iniquity."

The same, in [book] 6 *Against Julian*, [chapter] 21, says: "They are born condemnable [from] Him creating, who is the Creator of all; and through the Mediator they are liberated from condemnation owed; but by gratuitous compassion, not owed, [they] whom He has chosen

before the foundation of the world by election of grace, not from works either past, present, or future — otherwise grace is now no longer grace. Which appears especially in infants, of whom neither past works can be spoken (for they were not), nor present (for they work nothing), nor future (since at that age they die)." The same, above, in book 5, chapter 6, says: "These are the elect, and that 'before the foundation of the world,' by Him who 'calls the things that are not as though they were' — but elected by the election of grace. Hence the same doctor says of Israel: 'The remnant has been saved by the election of grace.' And lest perhaps before the foundation of the world they should be thought elect from works foreknown, [the Apostle], following, added: 'But if of grace, then no longer of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.'"

Item, this was one of the errors of the heretic Pelagius — namely, to say that God predestines on account of foreknown future merits — as Augustine touches in *On the Predestination of the Saints* in many places. Hence in chapter 24, treating the saying of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1 alleged above, he says thus: "'God,' as Pelagius said, 'foreknew who would be holy and unspotted by the choice of free will; and therefore He chose them before the foundation of the world in that very foreknowledge by which He foreknew that they would be such. Therefore,' he says, 'He chose them before they existed, predestining as His sons those whom He foreknew would be holy and unspotted.'" Which Augustine refutes thus: "Let us look at the words of the Apostle, and let us see whether He has chosen us before the foundation of the world because we were going to be holy and unspotted, or that we might be. 'Blessed,' he says, 'be God, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, as He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and unspotted.' Therefore not because we were going to be, but that we might be — this is sure and manifest. For we were going to be such, because He Himself, predestining, chose, that through His grace we might be such."

By this error too Augustine was sometimes deceived, as he himself testifies above in the same [book], [chapter] 4 — which his error several of his works sufficiently indicate, as he says. Of which one was the *Exposition of certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans*, which he recites in his *Retractations* he had retracted, in these words, disputing: "What did God choose in the not yet born, to whom He said the greater would serve, and what in the same greater not yet born did He likewise reprobate?" [And] "concerning whom these things were said," and "though much later that prophetic testimony was put forth — 'Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated' — to this end I led my reasoning, that I might say: 'Therefore God did not choose anyone's works in the foreknowledge by which He Himself was going to give them, but He chose faith in foreknowledge, that whom He foreknew was going to believe in Him, that one He might choose.' I had not yet sought more diligently nor found, what is the election of grace, of which the Apostle says: 'The remnant has been saved by the election of grace' — which surely is not grace if any merits precede it." And this is the retractation in *Retractations* 1, [chapter] 23.

The first opinion of Augustine, therefore, was that God did not predestine on account of future works distinguished from faith (and this he does not retract but approves), but on account of future faith — namely, on account of the act of faith, or on account of believing itself, as his own

words show. For he says: "He chose faith in foreknowledge, that whom He foreknew was going to believe in Him, that one He might choose." And below: "Hence what I said immediately afterwards, for the same Apostle says, 'But the same God who works all in all,' nowhere is it said, 'God who believes all in all'; and then I subjoined: 'For that we believe is ours, but that we work good is His who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe' — surely I would not say this, if I already knew that faith too is found among the gifts of God." And this view, as senseless, he reprobates and retracts.

This therefore is Augustine's last view: that God predestines no one on account of the future act of believing — that is, because he will believe in Him — nor on account of any future works of his.

A similar error to the prior one, concerning the matter of predestination, Augustine posited in *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 68, which in *Retractations* 1, [chapter] 26, in part he expressly retracts, in part in its like. For from the fact that he retracts one view as erroneous, it is certain that he wills any like view to be held as retracted, since concerning likes one is to judge similarly. This too Lombard holds, *Sentences* 1, distinction 41. And it can be said that he retracted this error more expressly, after he had perfected the book of *Retractations* — namely, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, [chapter] 4 — where he says, as was recited above, that "several of his works sufficiently indicate this error." There then he reprobates and retracts this error of his, wherever it has occurred in his works.

The same also, below, in the same [work], chapters 11 and 12, makes a similar retraction of a similar view from his work *Against Porphyry on the Time of the Christian Religion*.

Item, Augustine, *On Correction and Grace*, [chapter] 56, treating God's promise made to Abraham in Genesis 15 about multiplying his seed, says thus: "For He did not promise them," namely the predestined, "to Abraham because He foreknew that they would of themselves be good. For if it is so, then what He promised is not His but theirs."

Item, if God predestines anyone on account of his future works, why does He predestine those works for him — as chapter 31 has demonstrated — not on account of other prior works, and these on account of others, lest perhaps this proceed without end? It remains, then, that He predestines as much the merits as the rewards purely freely.

Item, in some way God predestines a reward to someone before a merit. For He predestines the reward as the end, and the merit as the means to this end, as chapter 35 was arguing; therefore He predestines a future merit on account of the future reward, and not the converse.

Item, reprobation — about which there is more apparent doubt — is not on account of future works; therefore neither is predestination. For the Apostle to the Romans 9 puts them on equal footing. "For when," he says, "they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God might remain according to election, not from works but from Him calling, it

was said to her: 'The greater shall serve the lesser, as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.'"

On which Augustine in *Enchiridion* 70 says: "The Apostle, sensing how much it could move those who cannot penetrate by understanding this profundity of grace — what was said, 'Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated' — says: 'Is there iniquity with God? God forbid.' For it seems unjust that without any merits of good or evil works God should love one and hate the other." The same is plain through the same Apostle below, in the same [chapter], saying: "On whom He wills, He has mercy, and whom He wills, He hardens." And again: "Has not the potter of clay the power, from the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto contumely?"

Here, however, it is to be known, according to Lombard in *Sentences* 1, distinction 41, that both predestination and reprobation can be taken in two ways. For predestination is taken for the eternal preparation by God of grace to be conferred on someone, and for its temporal effect — namely, the conferring of that grace itself. Reprobation, again, is taken for the eternal non-volition of God of grace [to be given] to someone, and for its temporal effect — namely, privation or desertion of grace; and this is called obduration. Where also Lombard says that of God's eternal reprobation itself there is no merit. And below, in the same distinction: "God reprobated those whom He willed, not on account of future merits which He foresaw — yet by a most right truth, removed from our senses."

But if anyone hateful to God should wish to cavil sophistically, saying that the works are not the principal cause of predestination — and so all the things premised must be understood — but that they are the cause without which not (*causa sine qua non*), since God similarly confers grace temporally just as He predestined it eternally, as was argued above — it follows that God confers grace temporally on account of the merits of works, as the cause without which not, although not as the cause that is utterly principal — which chapter 36 has refuted. And this perversity can similarly be confuted, as chapter 16 confuted a like one.

Item, who would so dote as to say that blessed Augustine, when he expounded certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, and wrote the book of *Eighty-Three Questions*, or the 68th question of those, and said that future merits were the cause of divine predestination, as was recited above — that he was so foolishly and tastelessly wise as to believe that future merits were the principal cause of divine predestination, so that God should not be the more principal cause of it — indeed not [a cause] at all? No sane wise man can doubt that Augustine then understood as such a saying is commonly wont to be understood, and as such words sound among ordinary men. Because, according to the same Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine*, every doctor ought so to speak. And according to the Philosopher in *Topics* 2, "in nominations, that which is most often is to be named." For those things which are in voice ought to signify the affections of the soul, as the same Philosopher teaches in *Peri Hermeneias* 1, and Augustine in *On the Trinity* 15, [chapter] 10. Which the Apostle teaches diffusely in 1 Corinthians 14. For he says: "Brothers, if I come to you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, unless I speak to

you either in revelation, or in knowledge, or in prophecy, or in doctrine? Yet things without soul giving voice — whether flute or harp — unless they give a distinction of sounds, how shall it be known what is sung or what is harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who will prepare himself for war? So also you, by the tongue, unless you give a clear discourse, how shall what is being said be known? For you will be speaking into the air. There are, suppose, so many kinds of languages in this world. If therefore I do not know the force of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him to whom I speak, and he who speaks shall be a barbarian to me. But in the Church I would rather speak five words with my understanding, that I may instruct others, than ten thousand words in a tongue."

Hence Nehemiah 8: "He read in the book of the law of God distinctly and openly to be understood." And what was said of speech, the same is to be understood of writing. Since, according to the Philosopher in *Peri Hermeneias* 1, and Augustine in *On the Trinity* 15, [chapter] 10, "Those things which are written are notes of those things which are in the voice." According to the Apostle in Romans 15, "Whatever things have been written, have been written for our doctrine."

Augustine, therefore, when he first taught that predestination is made on account of future merits foreknown by God, understood it as commonly such words present themselves to all; and when he afterwards recited it, similarly. According to the later view, then, of Augustine, it is not true to the common understanding of men that anyone is predestined on account of his future works. And the common understanding of men of such a proposition — "Jacob is predestined on account of his future works" — is this: that the future works of Jacob foreknown by God were some at least partial cause moving God to predestine him to the kingdom; not that they were the total and principal cause, such that God should there do nothing, or not do predestination more principally than they.

From these things also it appears that all the Catholic doctors and councils — indeed the whole Church of God — when condemning the heretical errors of Pelagius (who held that grace is given according to our merits, and that anyone is predestined on account of his future merits), understand it in the way stated. Hence it is established that that assertion is heretical which asserts merits to be the cause without which not — i.e., the partial cause moving or exciting God to predestine anyone, or to confer grace upon anyone. And if this is not the common understanding of the Church, and of the Ecclesiastical doctors, concerning the causation of merits with respect to grace and predestination, let this falsigraph without understanding assign, if he can, another more competent common understanding, or even a competent one — at least according to the fiction of his fantastic head; and that understanding of his, and his error according to that understanding, by the things premised — and better perhaps by others, which escape me — as not understanding nor intelligible Catholicly, will, by those who understand Catholicly (as I hope), be sufficiently intelligibly convinced.

But let such men consider — I beg — and fear, since "the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee the feigned, and remove Himself from thoughts which are without understanding"; and therefore in the sight of the Lord let them humbly entreat that He give them, according to His own utterance, an understanding, and not at all according to their understanding, that the utterance of the Lord be given to him. And this is a good understanding to all who do it always.

COROLLARY [to Chapter 45]

Corollary, that no one is predestined or reprobated on account of works which he would do if he lived longer; nor is anyone saved on account of works, or damned.

From these things this porism is collected: No one is predestined or reprobated on account of works which he would do if he lived longer; nor is anyone saved on account of works, or damned. For according to the things premised, no one is predestined or reprobated on account of his truly future works; and it seems even less so that anyone should be predestined or reprobated on account of works which he would do if he lived longer. And if no one is predestined or reprobated on account of such works, then neither is anyone saved or damned [on their account], since no one is saved or damned on account of anything other than that on account of which he was predestined to be saved or reprobated to be damned, since the salvation and damnation of anyone proceeds from the divine will, which is altogether invariable, as chapter 23 has demonstrated. Yet from some causes here that distinction concerning *propter* (on account of), premised in [chapter] 39 of this [Book], can be of value.

And lest I, the lowest, in such a sublime matter should seem alone to define anything, behold for this the manifest Catholic faith which is faithfully professed in the Athanasian Creed: "At whose advent all men have to rise with their bodies, and shall give an account of their own deeds" — "of deeds done," he says, not "of those that would have been done if they had lived longer" — "and those who have done good things shall go into eternal life, but those who have done evil into eternal fire" — namely, according to the good or evil things which they have done; not which they would have done if they had lived longer.

Behold for this same point the principal doctor, holy Paul, in 2 Corinthians 5, saying: "We must all be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each may bear the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil" — "according as he has done," he says, not "according as he would have done if he had lived longer." With which view sufficiently accords the form of the future judgment written in Matthew 25. For in the final judgment the goods or evils which the judged have done will be recited, and for those they will be adjudged to glory or to penalties. But of the good or evil things they would have done, if they had lived longer, no mention will be made.

This same conclusion Augustine proves diffusely in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, [chapter] 14, and through the great process following; and in *On the Good of Perseverance*,

[chapter] 21, and many chapters consequently; and below in the same [work], [chapters] 34 and 35, plainly.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book I, Chapters 46–47 (Conclusion of Book I)

**CHAPTER XLVI. [D] AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS WHO CONCEDE
PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION TO GLORY AND TO PUNISHMENT, BUT
DENY THAT THESE ARE TO ANY DETERMINATE DEGREES.**

There is yet, concerning the matter of predestination and reprobation, a certain loquacity so foolish that perhaps it appears more foolish to refute it earnestly than to recount it as a fable. For the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* III.15, concerning those who play the sophist with fables: "It is not worthy to attend to them with earnestness." Nevertheless, since the wise man counsels us to answer a fool, lest he seem wise to himself, I shall answer this person not earnestly but in a perfunctory manner, by way of a passing rebuttal. Certain persons, then, seeing predestination and reprobation [E] so firmly grounded that they cannot wholly destroy them, at least endeavor to mutilate them in some respect. For they concede that some persons are predestined to glory, and some reprobated to punishment; yet they say that no one is predestined or reprobated to any determinate degree of glory or of punishment. Now this position cites and adduces no reason or authority to prove its contention, but, as if in mere historical narration, simply asserts that this is so; and therefore it is to be despised with the same facility with which it is asserted.

Nevertheless, out of abundance of caution, I shall bring forward some arguments against it.

When the final judgment has been completed, God will will and prepare for each person his own degree of glory or of punishment; therefore, by Chapter 23 above, He so prepared and willed from eternity; wherefore, by the immediately preceding chapters, He predestined that this should so come to pass from eternity. Likewise, He eternally foreknew this; therefore, by Chapter 18, He eternally pre-willed it. The same is proved by Chapters 22 and 27 and others which follow — indeed, by all of them; for whatever proves predestination [A] in general will likewise prove it in species and in degree; and whatever ought to refute the latter will likewise refute the former.

Likewise, God predestined to each person a degree of merit, therefore also of reward. What I have assumed is plain by Chapter 31, and can yet be made further plain, because no creature, without God acting, moving, and conserving, can do anything or move anything, nor indeed can it further conserve an actually existing action or motion, as Chapters 3, 4, and 14 show. No creature, therefore, can of itself intend its motion or merit without God; for this is something greater. If, then, God temporally intends the merit of anyone, this is not by purely natural means, nor by cognition alone, but by His volition, as Chapters 8 and 9 demonstrate; and by Chapter 23,

this volition is not new but eternal; therefore, by the immediately preceding chapters, He so predestined it from of old.

Likewise, grace produces every degree of merit, and only as it is acted upon and moved by God, as Chapter 40 was showing, etc., as was just argued. Likewise, to merit much and intensely is better than [B] to merit simply and remissly; therefore by what was set forth in Chapter 38 of this book, the former is from God. Whence in Philippians 1: "He who began a good work in us will perfect it"; where the Gloss, which is Augustine's, says: "By cooperating in us, God perfects what by working He begins, because He Himself, by beginning, works that we may will, who, by perfecting, cooperates with those who will." And in *Against Julian* VI.18: "Ignorance and concupiscence are remitted in those being reborn, and diminished in those advancing; ignorance is diminished by truth shining more and more, concupiscence is diminished by charity becoming more and more fervent. None of these two goods is from us. For we have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we may know the things which have been given to us by God."

Likewise, the venerable Bede on Canticles, treating the passage in Cantic VII, "I will go up into the palm tree, and I will take hold of its fruits," speaks thus: "The Lord descends into His garden when He bestows heavenly gifts upon the faithful; He ascends into the palm tree when He grants increases of virtues to advancing elect, when He brings them forward to perfection, when He worthily expends Himself." And below, in the same place, on the verse, "Who is this that ascends, leaning upon her beloved? [C]" — "Deservedly leaning upon Him without whose help she was not only unable to ascend to the summit, but not even to rise again. For we cannot have the advances of the virtues, nor the very beginnings of faith, save by the Lord's bestowal."

Likewise, if God predestined and provided merit to His people absolutely, and not any determinate degree, then as to the degree, God would leave merit unprovided for, and would commit it to chance or to fortune, nor would it be governed by any providence or care; which Chapter 27 with those following does not permit. The Wise Man likewise contradicts this in Wisdom 11, saying to God, "Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight." The Philosopher too, in *Secretum Secretorum*, Part I, Chapter 16, in concord with him says: "God has by His wisdom destined and appointed all things in equal weight, and certain number, and order, and has set them for His servants, that they may serve Him." And in *Metaphysics* XIII, Chapter 2, he says thus: "But the species and order of the good especially, the commensuration and the determinate." Whence then are these goods, except from the First in the genus of goods, who pours into the rest every good?

Whence Hermes, *Concerning the World and Heaven* I, says — there [D] the text — "the fated series of ages is the disposition of all temporal things, the goal traced out by the finger of the highest disposer," as was more fully recited in Book II of this work.

Wherefore Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* IV, prose 6, introduces Philosophy saying: "Every generation of things, every progression of mutable natures, and whatever else is moved in

any manner, derives its causes, order, and forms from the stability of the divine mind. This, set in order in the citadel of its simplicity, has established a manifold mode for things to be done, which mode, when it is contemplated in the very purity of the divine intelligence, is named providence; but when it is referred to those things which it moves and disposes, it has been called by the ancients fate, which, that they are different things, will easily be made clear. For providence is the divine reason itself, which disposes all things; but fate is the disposition inherent in mobile things, by which providence binds each thing in its proper orders" — that which directs each individual thing in motion, distributed by places, forms, and times, as Chapter 28 has more fully alleged.

Whence Augustine, *On Free Will* II.28: "Whatsoever goods, however small, however great, cannot be except from God; [E] which, however much they fail and tend to non-being, yet some form remains to them, that in some manner they may be; and whatever remains to anything failing is from that form which knows not how to fail, nor permits the very motions of failing or advancing things to exceed the laws of their numbers." This proposition the blessed Prosper excerpted from this place and inserted as Chapter 380 of his *Sentences*, with this title prefixed: "The Creator leaves nothing in any creatures unordered."

The same Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV.5, treating the aforesaid authority of the Wise Man and showing in what way these three are God and in what way they are not, says thus: "According to that which we know — measure in the things which we measure, number in the things which we number, and weight in the things which we weigh — God is not these things; but according to that by which measure prefixes the mode of every thing, [A] and number presents the species of every thing, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability — primarily and truly and uniquely, He is these things, who terminates all things, and forms all things, and orders all things, and nothing else is to be understood by this. How could it have been said, by means of a heart and human tongue, 'Thou hast disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight,' unless 'Thou hast disposed all things in Thyself'? For neither measure, nor number, nor weight is to be observed and considered only in stones and woods, and such mobile things, however much they be corporeal, whether terrestrial or celestial. There is also a measure of acting, lest there be irrevocable and immoderate progression; and there is a number of the affections of the soul and of the virtues, by which it is gathered from the deformity of folly to the form and beauty of wisdom; and there is a weight of will and love, by which appears how much each thing is weighed in seeking, in fleeing, in preferring, and in postponing. But this measure of souls and minds is contained by another measure, and number is formed by another number, and weight is drawn by another weight. But the measure without measure is that to which is equated what is from it, nor is it from elsewhere itself; the number without number is that by which all things are formed, [B] but it itself is not formed; the weight without weight is that by which all things are referred that they may rest."

And below, in the same place, VII: "Let us know, therefore, that 'all things are disposed in measure, number, and weight' is so said as if it were said: 'These were so disposed that they

should have their proper measures, and their proper numbers, and their proper weight, which would be changed in them according to the mutability of each kind by increases and diminutions, by multitude and paucity, by lightness and gravity, according to the disposition of God."

And in *On Predestination against the Pelagians* IV: "Who suffices to comprehend this measure, this number, this weight of God, that he might be able to set forth all His ordinances in these three definitions? In measure, I think, consists quality; in number, quantity; in weight, balanced reason." Whence in Numbers 22: "If Balak should give me his house full of gold and silver, I shall not be able to alter the word of the Lord my God, to speak more or less."

To this last sentence Gregory plainly accords in *Moralia* XXVII.22, on Job 37: "The clouds scatter their light, which traverse all things round about: wherever the will of the Governor shall lead them, to all that He has commanded them." [C]

Likewise, what Christian is so undevout and arid as never to pray to God that He purify his thoughts, increase his devotion, and inflame his love, and make him abound in good works, since the whole Church humbly prays: "Almighty everlasting God, direct our actions according to Thy good pleasure, that in the name of Thy beloved Son we may merit to abound in good works"? And the Apostle prays this for his neighbor; who therefore will not pray it for himself? "This I pray," says the Apostle, "that your charity may abound more and more," in Philippians 1; and in 1 Thessalonians 3: "May God multiply you, and make you to abound in charity, both toward one another and toward all"; and to whom did he pray for this, except to God? And why do we ask God for this, unless He brings about what we ask? For otherwise to ask Him would seem vain and ridiculous.

Wherefore blessed Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 2, proving that perseverance is not from us but from God, argues in this way: "Why is perseverance asked from God, if it is not given by God? Or is this also a derisive request, when it is asked from Him [D] which is known not to be His to give, but to be in the power of man? But 'do not err,' says the Apostle, 'God is not mocked.' If you truly and faithfully ask anything from so great a wealthy One, from Him from whom you ask, believe that you receive what you ask. Do not honor Him with your lips and lift yourself up against Him in your heart, believing that what you pretend to ask of Him is from yourself."

The same is found below in the same work, 36 and 12, where Augustine always wills that nothing is to be asked from God except what is believed to be done by Him; and *On Grace and Free Will* 29: "We say, 'Lead us not into temptation,' that sins might be avoided, which we should by no means ask from the Father who is in heaven if we could effect this by the power of human will." And below, in the same place, he says that blessed Cyprian in his book *On the Lord's Prayer* shows that those things which are commanded to be fulfilled in the Law are also to be sought in prayer; which surely, as Augustine says, "would be done most vainly, if for the doing of these things, without divine aid, the human will sufficed."

And *On Holy Virginity* 17: "Witnesses are the voices of pious supplications, that those very things which are commanded by God are not done unless He gives and aids who commands; for they are mendaciously asked for, [E] if without His aiding grace we could do them."

Blessed Cyprian also, in Homily 5, which is entitled *On the Lord's Prayer*, expounding that little verse, "And suffer us not to be led into temptation," says thus: "When we ask not to come into temptation, we are admonished of our weakness and infirmity, lest anyone insolently lift himself up; since the Lord Jesus, teaching humility, said: 'Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation; the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak'; that, when humble and submissive confession precedes, and the whole is given to God, whatever is suppliantly asked with the fear of God may be granted by His piety."

This authority Augustine also adduces to the same conclusion concerning the gift of perseverance, in 9. And the Lord plainly intimates the same thing in Matthew 7, when He says thus: "Ask, and it shall be given you, or ye shall receive; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you" — by Him, namely, of whom ye ask, whom ye seek, on whom ye knock. And the Apostle in Romans 10: "The same Lord of all is rich unto all [A] who call upon Him" — namely, His riches, as Lord, generously distributing to all who from within faithfully call upon Him. Whence the Psalmist: "Delight thou in the Lord, and He shall give thee the petitions of thy heart," in Psalm 36; and James 1: "If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him; but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering; for he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind. Let not that man therefore think that he shall receive anything of the Lord."

He, then, who asks faithfully, by no means wavering, ought to hope that he will receive from the Lord the things asked; which the entire series of both Testaments most frequently testifies. Since therefore we faithfully ask from the Lord increases of good works, no Catholic is to waver but that the Lord will bestow these on us abundantly.

Whence the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 9: "God is able to make all grace abound in you, that ye, having always all sufficiency in all things, may abound to every good work. And He that ministereth seed to the sower will both provide bread for eating, and will multiply your seed, [B] and will increase the increases of the fruits of your righteousness."

Whence the holy Prosper, in his book *On Behalf of the Preachers of God's Grace* II, recites a certain definition of Cassian — most Catholic, as he calls it: "From which," he says, "it is plainly gathered, that not only of acts but also of good thoughts the beginning is from God, who both inspires in us the beginnings of holy will, and bestows the strength and opportunity of accomplishing those things which we rightly desire. For 'every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights,' who both begins the things which are good, and pursues, and consummates them in us, the Apostle saying: 'He who gives seed to the sower will both provide bread for eating, and will make to grow the fruits of your righteousness.'"

Furthermore, who is so foolish a flatterer as to give thanks to God for anything which he does not believe himself to have received from Him, as Chapter 31 was arguing? And who is so ungrateful as never to render thanks to God for the increase of good acts and works? Indeed, since the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 1: "We are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, as it is meet, [C] because your faith groweth, and the charity of every one of you all toward each other aboundeth." Upon which Augustine, in *On Grace and Free Will* 40, says: "These things the Apostle said, lest perhaps concerning so great a good, which they had from God, they should be lifted up as if having it from themselves. 'For what reason, therefore, your faith super-grows,' he says, 'and the charity of every one of you all toward each other abounds, we ought to give thanks to God for you.'"

Likewise, God predestined to Samson so great a merit, that he should many times abstain, and be a Nazarite of the Lord, and should begin to deliver the people of Israel out of the hand of the Philistines, in Judges 7. Likewise, He similarly predestined so great a merit to Solomon, that he should build a temple to Him, in 2 Kings 7. And to Isaiah so much, that he should make his mouth as a sharp sword, that he should be the salvation of the Lord even to the ends of the earth, with many other eminencies of merits, in Isaiah 49. And to Jeremiah so much, that he should be a prophet to the gentiles, that he should go to all to whom He should send him, that he should speak all things which He should command him, and that he should be set [D] over the nations and the kingdoms, to root up, and pull down, and waste, and to destroy, and to build, and to plant, in Jeremiah 1.

And to John the Baptist so much, that he should be great before the Lord, that he should drink no wine nor strong drink, and should turn many of the children of Israel to the Lord their God, and should go before the Lord in the spirit and power of Elias, in Luke 1; indeed, that he should be called an angel, who should also prepare the way before the face of Jesus Christ, as is sufficiently plain from Malachi 3 and Matthew 11. And to Paul so much, that the Lord Jesus Christ predicted concerning him: "He is a vessel of election to me, to bear my name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and the children of Israel: for I will show him how great things he must suffer for my name's sake," as is plain from Acts 9. Many similar instances also occur most frequently in Scripture.

And who, finally, would dare say that no determinate degree of merit was predestined to the Lord Jesus Christ, but that this was neglected through carelessness, and dismissed to chance and to fortune — when nearly all the prophets, in the spirit of the Lord, most studiously prophesied concerning His greatest merits, and Christ Himself said to His Father: "Lord, Thou hast proved me and known me; Thou hast known my sitting down, and my rising up; [E] Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar; Thou hast searched out my path and my line, and Thou hast foreseen all my ways," in Psalm 138?

Nor can anyone feign that He predestines to some a determinate degree of merit, and to some not; or to one some degree of future merit, and to another not — on account of Chapter 27 and

others which follow, and because "the Lord, who is the ruler of all, will not subtract the person of any man, nor will He stand in awe of any man's greatness, since He hath made the little and the great, and equally is the care of all to Him," in Wisdom 6.

But to these things the obstinate one will perhaps reply that God did not predestine these great recorded merits, but only foretold them. But this cannot stand, because if God truly foretold these things, He foreknew them; therefore He eternally pre-willed them and predestined them, as Chapters 18, 23, and the immediately preceding chapters [A] clearly show.

It can also be had from Chapter 31 of this book, that God predestined all merits to all persons; therefore these merits to these persons. It is plain, moreover, from the series of Scripture alleged above, that God not only foretold, but also promised those great merits; wherefore He Himself was going to do them, and this by His will — not new, but eternal, etc., as above. Indeed, in Joshua 23 it is written: "As therefore God has fulfilled in deed what He promised, and all things have prospered, so He will bring upon you whatever evils He has threatened, because ye have transgressed the covenant of the Lord your God."

And the Apostle in Romans 4, speaking concerning the promise which the Lord made to Abraham in Genesis 15, that his seed should be as the stars of heaven, says thus: "In the promise of God he hesitated not by distrust, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God, most fully knowing that whatsoever God has promised, He is able also to do."

Treating which authority, Augustine in *On Rebuke and Grace* 56 says: "He Himself, then, makes them good, that they may do good things; for He did not for that reason promise them to Abraham, because He foreknew that they would be good of themselves: for if that, indeed, is not His own but theirs [B] which He promised — but Abraham did not so believe, but because what He promised, He is able also to do — He did not say: what He foreknew He is able to promise, or what He foretold He is able to show, or what He promised He is able to foreknow; but, what He promised, He is able also to do. He, therefore, makes them persevere in good, who makes them good."

The same in *On the Predestination of the Saints* III: "It must be guarded against, brothers, beloved by God, lest a man should lift himself up against God, when he says he himself does what God promised. Was not faith promised to Abraham? He, giving glory to God, most fully believed, because what God promised, He is able also to do. He Himself, therefore, makes the faith of the gentiles, who is able to do what He promised."

And below in the same work, 12: "God promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men were to do; for although men do good things which pertain to the worship of God, He Himself causes that they may do what He has commanded; not they that He may do what He promised. Otherwise, that the promises of God should be fulfilled, would not be in God's, but in men's power; and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by Abraham himself."

The same, in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 18: "God promises what He Himself does; for He does not [C] promise and another does — that would no longer be to promise, but to predict." Whence also the 45th proposition of Prosper's *Sentences* is excerpted.

And if anyone is yet not ashamed to cavil further, by saying that in the foregoing authorities of Scripture there is concerning merits not promise but prediction, let him hear the Apostle in Romans 9, saying: "Not all who are of Israel, are they Israelites; nor are they all the children of Abraham who are the seed of Abraham, but in Isaac shall thy seed be called," from Genesis 21 — that is, "Not those who are the children of the flesh, are the children of God; but those who are the children of the promise are accounted as the seed. For the word of promise is this: At this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son," from Genesis 18.

And Augustine says in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 18: "It is itself the promise to Abraham by which it was said to him, 'In Isaac shall thy seed be called.'" If, therefore, these words, "In Isaac shall thy seed be called, and Sarah shall have a son," are words of promise, why not other similar words similarly delivered?

Furthermore, of evil works such as tribulations and persecutions there is a determinate term established beforehand; therefore also of good works: for God's care is no less concerning good works than concerning evil ones. Whence Psalm 79: "Thou shalt feed us with the bread [D] of tears, and shalt give us drink with tears in measure"; and Psalm 103: "The mountains ascend, and the plains descend into the place which Thou hast founded for them; Thou hast set a bound which they shall not pass, neither shall they return to cover the earth."

Where Augustine, in tract 2, by mountains and plains in no way understands different things, but the same — namely, secular powers behaving in different manners. Whence he says thus: "As long as the mountains ascend and the plains descend, they raged and were appeased; when they raged, they were mountains; when they were appeased, they became plains: for He has founded a place for them. Why do they not rage now? why do they not go mad? why do they not labor — if they cannot subvert our land, surely to cover it? why not? Hear: 'Thou hast set a bound which they shall not pass, neither shall they return to cover the earth.' They have received the appointed bound, because they cannot transgress the imposed end."

Likewise, Psalm 94: "In His hand are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His." Upon which Augustine says: "The earthly powers have been opposed to the Church; they have promulgated laws against the Church, [E] they have endeavored to blot out the Christian name from the earth. You perhaps are troubled by so many temptations on account of the scandals of the world; but not even those scandals do anything to you, because they have received their measure from the Lord, because the sea is His. For this world is the sea, nor can the waves rage save up to the shore where He Himself has set the bound. No temptation, therefore, unless it shall have received measure from the Lord, takes anything from you, corrects something, smoothes something, cleanses something."

And in *City of God* V.22: "These earthly kingdoms the one true God rules and governs as it pleases Him; thus also the very times of wars, as it is in His judgment and just judgment and mercy, either to wear down or to console the human race, that some end more quickly, others more slowly."

Blessed Job clearly manifests the same. Whence in 28 he says thus: "He" — namely, God — "beholdeth the ends of the world, and looketh on all things that are under heaven, who made a weight for the winds, and weighed the waters by measure, when He gave a law for the rains, and a way for the sounding storms." And below, in 38: "I encompassed [A] it" — namely, the sea — "with my bounds, and made it bars and doors, and said: Hitherto thou shalt come, and shalt go no further."

Likewise, every predestined person will have a degree of reward according to the degree of his virtues, and especially of charity or grace, because by however much anyone shall be better, by so much will it be better for him. And according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* II.6: "Every virtue, of whatever it shall be virtue, also makes that thing well-disposed and perfect."

And according to Augustine, *Enchiridion* 95: "Charity, by however much greater it is in anyone, by so much better is the one in whom it is."

But every increase of true virtue, of charity or of grace, is from God acting and willing it, and this not by a new volition but by an ancient one. God, therefore, predestined to each one a determinate degree of these virtues in this life, and of rewards in the homeland. That God brings about the increase of virtues in this life is proved from this: that God brings about the increases of good works, as has been proved above; from which the habits are always increased, as is plain from the Philosopher, *Ethics* II.2; or, if there be any habits which are not increased from works, those are increased by God alone.

Likewise, by Chapter 2, no creature alone can preserve [B] any virtue in being, therefore not in any determinate degree, since this is the same or greater. Likewise, nearly all the reasons and authorities proving the increases of works to be from God will similarly prove the increases of virtues to be from Him; especially the arguments from petition and giving of thanks. For the faithful faithfully ask from God increase of virtues; wherefore the whole Church thus prays: "Grant us, we beseech Thee, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and charity." Whence the Apostles, who were already faithful, said: "Lord, increase our faith," in Luke 17. And the father of the sick boy: "I believe, Lord, help my unbelief," in Mark 9. The Apostle also, in 1 Thessalonians 3: "May the Lord," he says, "multiply you, and make you to abound in charity also one toward another, and toward all"; and many similar passages occur frequently in Scripture.

Likewise, who is so ungrateful and ingrate as not to render thanks to God for the increase of charity and grace, when he would do this with prompt heart for the increase of temporal goods? Moreover, the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians 1 says thus: "We are bound to give thanks to God always for you, as it is meet, because your faith super-groweth, [C] and the charity of every one

of you all toward each other aboundeth." Since therefore the increase of virtue is asked of God, and for it received thanks worthy of God are returned, it is certain that it is given by Him, as has been argued above.

This gradual progress of virtues and merits, and the determinate terms of prosperities and adversities, and of human life itself, divinely constituted, blessed Job shows by saying: "Thou hast appointed his bounds which cannot be passed," in Job 14. And below, in 31: "I will declare him through every one of my degrees."

On the first of which, blessed Gregory, *Moralia* XII.1, says: "None of those things which happen to men in this world come without the secret counsel of Almighty God; for foreknowing all things that are to follow, He decrees them before the ages, in what manner they may be disposed through the ages. It is even now appointed for man, both how much the prosperity of this world will follow him, and how much adversity will strike him, lest either immoderate prosperity should lift up His elect, or excessive adversity should weigh them down. It is also appointed how long he is to live temporally in this very mortal life. Well, therefore, is it said: 'Thou hast appointed his bounds which cannot [D] be passed.' Which, however, can also be understood according to the spirit, because sometimes we strive to advance in the virtues, and we apprehend certain gifts, but, repulsed from certain others, we lie in the depths. For there is no one who apprehends as much of virtue as he desires, because Almighty God, discerning the inner things, sets a measure to spiritual advances themselves; that, from this good which he strives to apprehend and is unable, he may not lift himself up in those things which he is able to do."

Upon the second, in *Moralia* XXII.18 and 19, he beautifully teaches the same sentence, as is more fully recited in Chapter 41 of this book. Who also, below in 20, shows the same by that passage in Mark 9, "I believe, Lord, help my unbelief"; and by that passage in Luke 17, "Increase our faith"; and by the authority of Ezekiel 47, which, expounding morally, he speaks thus: "Wisdom itself, which is wont to be the mistress of good works, is granted to the panting mind by increases, that to it, doubtless, the ascent is made by the steps of great moderation; which the prophet Ezekiel well announces in figurative narration, who, concerning that man whom he had seen on the lofty mountain, narrates, saying: 'He measured a thousand cubits, and he led me through the water [E] up to the ankles; again he measured a thousand, and he led me through the water up to the knees, and he measured a thousand, and he led me through the water up to the loins, and he measured a thousand, and he led me to a torrent which I could not pass, because the deep waters of the torrent had swelled, which cannot be forded.' For what is signified by the millenary number, except the fullness of the gift conferred?" This passage of Gregory is also recited in the Canon, *De Poenitentia*, distinction 2, "Haec quae de charitate."

Furthermore, charity or grace is a habit not naturally acquired, nor naturally acquirable by any creature, but supernaturally infused gratuitously by God, as Chapter 35 and those following have taught. Wherefore neither can it be naturally increased: for it is of the same nature under any of its degrees. As therefore by the Lord alone it is created, so also by Him alone is it increased.

Whence [A] the Psalmist, in Psalm 137, says to God: "Thou shalt multiply strength in my soul." And the Apostle says, in 2 Corinthians 3: "We are transformed from glory to glory by the Spirit of the Lord"; and in Romans 12: "Each one as God hath divided the measure of faith." On which the Gloss, which is ascribed to Augustine, says: "Which faith, namely, God has measuredly divided. For He divides faith measuredly to each one."

Who also, on Psalm 118, "Set me a law, O Lord," etc., in Sermon 11, says: "Why does this man yet ask that a law be set for him, which surely, if it had not been set for him, he would not have run the way of God's commandments in the breadth of heart, that is, in charity, the fullness of the law? But because he speaks as one advancing, and knows that what he advances is God's gift, what else does he ask, when he asks that the law be set for him, except that in it he may more and more advance? Finally, he added: 'And I will seek it always.' For what does he seek which he has, except because he both has it by acting, and seeks it by advancing? But what is 'always'? Or is 'always' said while he lives here, because so long he is advancing?"

And below, in the same place, on the same Psalm: "Give me understanding, that I may learn Thy commandments," Sermon 18, he says thus: "Our understanding advances unto the understanding of those things which it believes, and faith advances [B] unto believing those things which it understands; and that those very things may be more and more understood, the mind advances in understanding itself: but this is not done by its own forces as natural, but by God aiding and giving, just as a remedy is made — not by nature — that the diseased eye may receive the power of seeing. He, therefore, who says to God, 'Give me understanding that I may learn Thy commandments,' is not in every way without it like cattle, nor so, although a man, that he is to be reckoned in the number of those who walk in the vanity of their mind, darkened in understanding, alienated from the life of God: for if he were such, he would not even say this. But it is no small thing of understanding to know from whom understanding is to be sought; and it is to be considered how much more deeply divine commandments are to be understood, when, that he may yet learn them, he asks that understanding be given to him, who already so understands, and who has already said before that he has kept God's words."

Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 12: "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit; and there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all. And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man for [C] profit; to one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge; to another, faith; to another, the grace of healing; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another, divers kinds of tongues; to another, interpretation of speeches: but all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."

Here the Apostle manifestly shows that as well the habits of virtues as the acts are divided to each one according to the will of the Holy Spirit, and from one God who works all in all. Whence it is clear that as well their beginnings as their increases are similarly distributed.

This Augustine plainly testifies, *On the Predestination of the Saints* 13, thus saying: "When it is said," they say (namely, the Pelagians), "'If thou shalt believe, thou shalt be saved' — one of these is exacted, the other is offered; what is exacted is in man's power, what is offered is in God's. Why not both in God's — both what He commands, and what is offered? For He is asked to give what He commands. Believers ask that faith be increased to them; they ask for unbelievers that faith be granted them; both in its increases, and [D] in its beginnings, therefore, faith is the gift of God. But it is so said, 'If thou shalt believe, thou shalt be saved,' as it is said, 'If by the Spirit ye shall mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live': for here also of the two one is exacted, the other is offered; 'If by the Spirit,' he says, 'ye shall mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live.' That, therefore, we should mortify the deeds of the flesh by the Spirit, is exacted; that we should live, is offered. Whence, then, does it please that we should say that to mortify the deeds of the flesh is not the gift of God, nor confess this to be the gift of God, since we hear it exacted from us, with the reward of life offered if we shall do this? Far be it that this should please those who are sharers, defenders of grace; this is the damnable error of the Pelagians, whose mouths the Apostle soon after stopped, adjoining: 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God,' lest we should believe that we mortify the deeds of the flesh not through God's Spirit, but through our own; concerning which Spirit of God He was also speaking there, where he says: 'But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing his own to every one as He will' — among which He named also faith."

The error of the Pelagians is, therefore, damnable to share faith or grace — namely, its beginning and increase — [E] giving one to God and the other to ourselves; for the whole is wholly to be given to God, as is plain by the same Augustine, above, in the third [chapter] of the same work, thus saying: "If God works our faith, acting in our hearts in a wonderful manner that we may believe, is it to be feared that He cannot do the whole, and therefore that man claims for himself the first parts of it, that he may merit to receive the last from Him? See if anything else is done in this manner, except that the grace of God should be given according to our merits in any way whatsoever, and so grace would no longer be grace. For thus, by this pact, what is owed is rendered, not given freely; for it is owed to the believer that his faith be increased by the Lord, and the increased faith would be the reward of the faith received."

And below, in the same work: "Man composes with God, that he may claim part of faith for himself, and leave the part to Him; and what is more lofty, he himself takes the first, and gives the latter to Him; and in that which he says is of both, he makes himself the prior, God the posterior." From which it is plain that faith is increased by God, and that it is of pride that man should attribute part of faith to himself, part to God. The whole, therefore, of [A] our good let us wholly give to God, Augustine saying in *On the Gift of Perseverance* 9: "We live more safely if we give the whole to God, and do not commit ourselves to Him in part, and to ourselves in part."

Likewise, this was the error of Cassian the Pelagian. For he himself, as the holy Prosper recites in his book *On Behalf of the Preachers of God's Grace, against Cassian* 25, in his second definition spoke thus: "Divine protection, therefore, is inseparably present to us, and so great is

the Creator's piety toward His creature, that providence not only accompanies it, but also continually precedes it, which the Prophet, having experienced, confesses, saying: 'My God, His mercy shall prevent me'; who, however, when He has perceived in us a certain rising of good will, illumines it and confirms it, and incites it to salvation, granting increases to that which He Himself planted, or perceived to have emerged by our exertion." Against whom Prosper immediately subjoins: "Now in this point there is a departure from the foregoing definition, and what had been wholly given to grace is now in part assigned to free will."

Likewise, the Pelagian error gave to us the beginning of our faith, and to God the whole increase, as is plain from *On the Predestination [B] of the Saints* 2 and 3. This error gives to God the beginning, and to us the whole increase. Therefore this differs from that as much as a thing converted from its converse; indeed, this seems worse than that. For the former attributes to man the prior part of faith, but the worse — that is, the less good — and gives the latter, but better, to God; this, on the contrary, attributes the better part to man, and gives the worse to God.

Likewise, if the increase of grace were to be attributed to man, this would be on account of human merit, namely, because the merit of human will would precede, and the increase of grace would follow; which is against Augustine writing to Pope Boniface, against the Pelagians, as Lombard recites in *Sentences* II, distinction 26, in these words: "Grace itself merits to be increased, that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected, with will accompanying, not leading; following, not preceding." With which Chapter 41 also accords, proving that grace in acting precedes the human will. Chapter 39 also proves that no one merits the increase of grace by condignity; rather, that the very increase of grace is given freely; therefore also it was freely predestined [C] by Him, as has been frequently argued.

This, moreover, the Apostle testifies in Colossians 2, thus saying: "Let no man seduce you, willing in humility and religion of angels, walking in things which he hath not seen, in vain puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, supplied with nourishment and built up, increases unto the increase of God." Upon which the Gloss: "The Head, that is, Christ, from which, that is, of whose fullness receiving, the whole body, that is, the Church, by the joints of charity and the bands of faith and hope and works, in which the faithful are joined and made similar, supplied with nourishment and built up, increases unto the increase of God, that is, as much as God provided." Therefore the increase of virtues and works is provided for and predestined by God under any of its degrees; wherefore also to each predestined person there is predestined a determinate degree of beatitude. For these things mutually correspond to one another, which can also be shown by nearly all the same things by which the foregoing about the degree of works and virtues was shown.

Furthermore, specially to this same purpose: the diversity of mansions in the house of the heavenly Father is no less for the perfection and adornment of the city [D] of the glorious God, than is the number of citizens; but the latter is predestined by God; therefore so also is the former. This number, indeed, the venerable Anselm not only asserts but also proves, in *Cur Deus*

Homo I.16, in this manner: "It is not to be doubted that the rational nature, which is or shall be blessed in the contemplation of God, is foreknown by God in some rational and perfect number, so that it is fitting that it be neither greater nor less. For either God does not know in what number it is more fitting that it be constituted — which is false — or, if He knows, in that number He will constitute it." And this same reason proceeds similarly concerning the degrees of rewards.

And Augustine says, *On Free Will* III.18: "If all the angels had sinned, they would have made no scarcity for ruling His empire to the Creator of the angels: for neither would His goodness, as if from some weariness, nor His omnipotence, by difficulty, fall short for creating others whom He would place in those seats which the others by sinning would have deserted; nor could spiritual creation of any number whatsoever, condemned for its own merits, narrow the order, which conveniently and decently receives whatsoever condemned ones." [E]

If, therefore, in the seats of those sinning others are to be placed, the number seems determinate beforehand; and if there is a determinate order which conveniently and decently receives whatever condemned ones, much more does it seem to be similarly so concerning the saved.

The same in *Enchiridion* 21: "The supernal Jerusalem, our mother, the city of God, will be defrauded of no number of her citizens, or perhaps will reign with even fuller abundance. For we know neither the number of holy men, nor of unclean demons, in whose place succeeding, the children of holy mother Church, who appeared barren on earth, will remain in that peace from which those fell, without any term of time. But the number of those citizens, whether what is, or what shall be, is in the contemplation of that Artificer who calls the things that are not as those that are, and disposes all things in measure, and number, and weight."

The same, in [A] *On Rebuke and Grace* 61: "So determinate is the number of the predestined, that none can be added to them, nor can any be diminished from them"; which he proves by two authorities of Scripture. The first is from Matthew 3: "Bring forth," says John the Baptist, "fruit worthy of penance, and say not within yourselves, We have Abraham for our father; for God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham" — to show that they are so to be cut off, if they bring not forth fruit, that the number which is promised to Abraham may not be lacking.

"Yet more openly is it said in the Apocalypse: 'Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown'" — and it is Apocalypse 3. "For if no other is to receive unless this one shall lose, the number of the elect is determinate" — that is, it cannot be increased or diminished, as Lombard expounds it, *Sentences* I, distinction 40, as also seems a reasonable understanding.

To which Job 34 sufficiently consonants: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their place." Upon which Gregory, *Moralia* XXV.9, says: "It is to be noted, that while, others falling, others are described as confirmed in standing, the number of the elect is shown to be determinate and definite. Whence also to the Church of Philadelphia [B] is said by the angel: 'Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.'"

Yet further, according to the foregoing: the diversity of the degrees of mansions in heaven is recognized to pertain no less to divine providence and predestination, than the proper names of the future heavenly citizens. But the proper names of all the elect are most certainly contained under divine providence and predestination. For the Prophet says concerning God: "He numbereth the multitude of the stars, and calleth them all by their names," in Psalm 146. And by the stars, Augustine and all the Doctors understand the elect and the predestined. Is not this also fittingly figured in that command of the Lord: "Take the sum of the whole congregation of the children of Israel, by their congregations and houses, and the names of each one," in Numbers 1?

Does not Truth itself say: "Rejoice, because your names are written in heaven," Luke 10? And in John 10 He calls His own sheep by name. Upon which Augustine, in Sermon 45: "For He has their names written in the book of life. Whence the Apostle says: 'The Lord knoweth them that are His.'"

Furthermore, the diversity of degrees of the heavenly mansions in the heavenly [C] Church works the beauty and adornment, just as the diversity of sounds perfects sweeter melody, and the variety of colors makes a picture more beautiful, as none is ignorant. Whence, just as also the philosophical and theological matters concerning contraries and diverse things set forth above, in Chapter 34 of Book I, testify.

Wherefore Alhazen, *Optics* II, in the chapter on beauty, says: "Diversity makes beauty: since the figures of an animal's members are of diverse parts, and they are not beautiful except on account of the diversity of the parts. For if the entire nose were of equal thickness, it would be at the height of ugliness; and its beauty is on account of the diversity of its two extremities, and its pyramidity. And similarly, the beauty of the eyebrows is only when their extremities are thinner than the remaining anterior parts. And similarly all members of an animal, when they are looked at, it is found that their beauty is only from the diversity of the figures of their parts. And similarly with respect to writing: since if all parts of writing were of equal thickness, they would not appear beautiful, since the extremities of letters do not appear beautiful, [D] except when they are thinner than the rest. For if the extremities of letters, and their middles, and their continuations were of one mode of thickness, the writing would be at the height of ugliness. Therefore, diversity makes beauty."

Why else would God command the curtains of the tabernacle to be made varied, and the veil to be woven with beautiful variety? Why else would the Prophet, from the variety of clothing, praise the heavenly Queen, the triumphant Church, the Spouse of Christ not having spot nor wrinkle, by saying: "The queen stood on Thy right hand in golden clothing, surrounded with variety"? And who is the Author of this beauty, except the most beautiful Author of all beauty, God — and not by a mutable and novel will, but by an immutable and eternal one, as the foregoing have perspicuously taught?

COROLLARY.

COROLLARY: THAT ALL DEGREES OF GRACES, MERITS, PROSPERITIES, ADVERSITIES, [E] OF GLORY OR OF PUNISHMENT, IN THE PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE, ARE ALIKE PREDESTINED BY GOD ETERNALLY AND DISTINCTLY.

From these things, then, it is evidently perceived that all degrees, both each and every one, of graces, of merits, of prosperities, of adversities, of glory, or of punishment, in the present and in the future, are alike predestined by God eternally and distinctly. This entire Corollary follows so plainly from the foregoing, that it nowhere needs the help of proof.

[A]

CHAPTER XLVII. HE OBJECTS, AND HE RESPONDS.

The Pelagians object against the foregoing concerning Predestination and Reprobation, attempting either utterly to destroy them, or at least to show that they are according to the merits of persons. "God," they say, "does nothing irrationally; and there is no reason why He should predestine or reprobate one rather than another. Therefore He predestines or reprobates everyone, or no one. And not everyone, as all alike say; therefore no one. Or if there is any reason why He predestines or reprobates this one and not that one, [B] that reason cannot be founded except in merits, and in the difference of merits."

Wherefore Joachim, Abbot of Fiore, *Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Predestination of the Elect*, dialoguing between Benedict who asks and himself who responds, assigns a twofold reason and cause of God's Election, Predestination, and mercy: of which the first is aptitude for mercy, salvation, and good; the second, the good action itself; and of contraries he posits contrary causes and contrary reasons.

Likewise: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God," John 1. Therefore that men, according to Predestination and grace, may be made sons of God, is in their free power, and only by merits acceptable to God. With which the Prophet also accords, Psalm 68, where, having recited the sins of certain persons, he subjoins: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and with the just let them not be written." And the passage of Apocalypse 3: "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown" — which, namely, God promised to those who choose Him.

Likewise, if Adam had not sinned, no one would have been reprobated, but each would have been predestined; therefore each of these is on account of corresponding merit. Likewise, it would be unjust and cruel [C] for a man or angel to harm another without any preceding fault, nor could he do this without fault; how much more, then, does this not befit the most just and

most pious God? Therefore neither does it befit Him to reprobate anyone, and to predestine him to eternal fire, except on account of some preceding fault.

But the irrational reason of the first of these can be lucidly resolved by the foregoing, and by Chapters 21 and 35, and by following chapters. As for what is brought in for confirmation from Joachim — although he was a great Doctor, he does not have great authority. As in the matter of the Trinity he was an Arian, as is plain in the little book which he published against Peter Lombard, *On the Trinity, or On the Essence of the Trinity*, and through Innocent III, and the General Council, as is recited *Extra de summa Trinitate et fide catholica*, "Damnamus": so in this matter he was a Pelagian, by positing the original cause of Predestination and Reprobation not on the part of God who Predestines and Reprobates, but on the part of those Predestined and Reprobated — namely, aptitude and act, as is recited above.

He labors, however, to decline as a perilous sea the Pelagian sea, [D] by saying that the cause of Election and divine Reprobation is aptitude for mercy or for wrath, but not for works or acts. And to Benedict asking what that aptitude for good or for evil is, if it is not good or evil works — as the Apostle says concerning Jacob and Esau — he responds that it is not work, but a receptacle of grace or of wrath, from the first of which good works arise, from the second evil ones. And below: "When God elected these or those, He did not seek in them the righteousness which He Himself was about to give, but only the matter of humility and of pitiableness — that is, that they should be apt for mercy."

But because he came too near the shore of the Pelagian sea, suffering precipice, he was absorbed by its whirlpool, so that he also said that the cause of Predestination and Reprobation was the merits of persons. And, that I may briefly recollect his diffuse process: he wills that the cause of Predestination be humility, of Reprobation, pride. For he says: "Abjection and misery are properly the cause of divine election. Whence the Apostle: 'See, brethren, your vocation, that not many are wise according to the flesh, but the foolish things of the world [E] hath God chosen.'"

And below: "It is clearer than light that no one is taken up by God on account of righteousness, but on account of misery; not on account of works, but on account of paltriness; not on account of strength, but on account of weakness; not on account of wisdom, but on account of foolishness; not on account of nobility, but on account of ignobility — just as that Pharisee was repelled on account of his righteousness, but the publican was taken up on account of his sins; not because God loves iniquity and hates the purity of innocence, but because He repels the one who is proud of his righteousness, but spares the humble penitents from sins."

And below: "The cause of election is abjection and affliction, not because these simply please God, but because they bring forth humility — which alone God requires as a virtue in angels and in men." And below: "Because the Lord foreknew that the Jewish people would be proud, He hated and repelled them."

From which it also evidently appears that he is contrary [A] to himself. How also can it stand that aptitude is the cause of predestination or reprobation, since of two equally apt persons one is sometimes taken up, and the other is left; indeed, sometimes the less apt is taken up, and the more apt is left? How also is abjection and misery the cause of divine predestination, when many — as I fear — abject, miserable, and beggarly here, are finally reprobated; many also here always noble, fortunate, and rich, are predestined to life? In the holy angels also, predestined and finally confirmed, there was never abjection nor misery of any kind, since neither of fault nor of penalty. What, moreover, was the abjection or misery the cause whereby Christ was predestined Son of God in power, in Romans 1? Which could also be refuted by many other reasons. But because not many adhere to it, let these few suffice.

But as to their alleging John saying, "He gave them power to be made the sons of God," they seem to wish to construct from this that some are made or can be made newly the sons of God according to predestination — namely, that out of those not predestined, and therefore out of the reprobate, they are made newly and temporally predestined, and similarly cease to be reprobated, against what was shown before in Chapters 23 and 45 of this work, which also evidently includes a contradiction, [B] as can perspicuously be demonstrated from the same places.

Moreover, John's statement seems rather to prove the contrary. For he does not say: "He gave them power to make themselves sons of God," but "to be made sons of God." But by whom? Surely not from themselves, surely not from their own will? Who ever begets himself? Who is ever born from himself? What son of the Devil can beget himself, and bring forth a son of God? Hear what follows: "Neither," he says, "from the will of the flesh, nor from the will of man, but from God they were born." Therefore not they make themselves, but God makes them sons of God.

Wherefore the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* V.17 and IX.2, shows that power and potency is twofold: namely, active and passive. Such, then, is what is here said: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God," as is what is said in Romans 8: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." God, then, gave to men the power to be made sons of God — namely, the rational soul and free will, freely and voluntarily receptive of grace in the present, and of glory in the future, that thus, both here and there, they may be made sons of God: yet so that, in the present, when they shall have been made sons of God through faith and prevenient grace adopting them as sons of God, [C] they may freely do the acceptable works of sons; that thus, as acceptable sons, they may freely persevere, insofar as nothing can snatch this filiation from them, unless they themselves will it.

Wherefore Chrysostom there says, as is alleged in the Gloss: "He said, 'He gave them power to be made sons of God,' showing that there is need of much zeal, that the image, formed in the baptism of adoption, we may always preserve uncontaminated; together also showing that this power no one will be able to take away from us, unless we ourselves take it away; together also

wishing to show that this grace comes to those who are willing and zealous. For it is in the power of free will, and of grace, by their cooperation, to be made sons of God."

And Augustine, Homily 3 on John: "Why," he says, "are all born in sin? Because no one is born except from Adam; but to be born from Adam was of necessity from condemnation, to be born through Christ is of will and of grace; men are not compelled to be born through Christ; not because they have willed it, are they born from Adam — yet all who are from Adam are sinners with sin; all [D] who are through Christ are justified and just, not in themselves, but in Him."

Nor, indeed, by saying "He gave them power to be made sons of God," does He exclude God from that making, and include man alone; nor, if that making be common to both, does He set man before, and place God after, in natural order. Wherefore He says: "He gave them power to be made sons of God," not "to make themselves." And again: "Neither from the will of the flesh, nor from the will of man, but from God they were born" — who is the principle and Author of this divine generation.

Wherefore Bede, as is alleged in the Gloss: "The carnal generation," he says, "of each one took its origin from the embrace of marriage; but the spiritual is administered by the grace of the Holy Spirit." And Chrysostom: "These things the Evangelist narrates, that, learning the vileness and humility of the prior birth, which is by blood and by the will of the flesh, and recognizing the loftiness of the second, which is by grace and is of nobility, we may here receive a certain great understanding, and worthy of the gift of Him who begot, and after these things show much zeal."

And Augustine says, Homily 3 on John: "'As many as received Him, He gave [E] to them power to be made the sons of God.' If they are made sons, they are born; if they are born, how are they born? Not from the flesh, not from blood, not from the will of the flesh, not from the will of man, but from God they are born. Let them rejoice, then, that they are born from God; let them presume themselves to belong to God; let them receive the document that they are born from God. 'And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.' If the Word was not ashamed to be born of man, will men be ashamed to be born of God?"

Nor by saying "He gave them power to be made sons of God" does he say that He gave them power to be made sons of God through preceding works of merits, as Pelagius dreams. Far be it that the Evangelist should contradict his own Lord, since by the same one's recital, in 6 below, He says thus: "No man can come to me, except the Father, who has sent me, draw him"; and "No man can come to me, except it be given him by my Father." Far be it also that he should contradict himself in so brief a series; for soon after these words of his recited above, he says that the Word was full of grace and truth, and adds, "And of His fullness we all received, and grace [A] for grace."

We received, I say, first, grace freely given and truth, because grace was previously promised; and thus grace for grace — namely, grace freely given for the gracious promise of gratuitous

grace prophetically previously made. Or we received, in certain hope, secondly, grace of beatitude in the future, for grace in reality, and gracious works, in the present.

Wherefore Augustine, Homily 3 on John, writes thus: "He does not say: 'And of His fullness we all received, grace for grace,' but says thus: 'And of His fullness we all received, and grace for grace.' Where I do not know what He has wished us to understand: that we received from His fullness, and besides, grace for grace. For we received from His fullness first grace, and again we received grace for grace. What grace did we first receive? Faith. Walking in faith, we walk in grace. Whence have we merited this? By what preceding merits of ours? Grace was given to thee, not a wage rendered. Whence is it called grace? Because it is given gratis. For not by preceding merits hast thou bought what thou hast received. The sinner, then, received this first grace, [B] that his sins might be forgiven him. What did he merit? Let him interrogate justice; he will find punishment. Let him interrogate mercy; he will find grace. But this also God had promised through the Prophets. So when He came to give what He had promised, He gave not only grace, but also truth. How was truth manifested? Because what was promised was done. What is, then, 'grace for grace'? By faith we earn God; thou receivest as reward immortality and eternal life, and that is grace. For for what merit dost thou receive eternal life? For grace. God crowns His own gifts, not thy merits."

It can also very fittingly be understood and expounded according to the letter, concerning those who have actually been made sons of God through faith and grace in the present, that He gave them power — namely, grace assisting free will — to be made sons of God in the future, in the kingdom of heaven. Wherefore He puts before: "But as many as received Him" — namely, through formed faith, by believing in Him — "He gave them," etc. Wherefore Theophilus, as is alleged in the Gloss, says: "Because, in the resurrection, we shall obtain the most perfect filiation, according to what the Apostle says, 'expecting the adoption [C] of the sons of God, the redemption of our body,' He gave power to be made sons of God — that is, of obtaining this grace in future grace."

But when they object that text of the Psalm, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living," if they understand it according to the literal surface, this man concedes that predestination and reprobation are temporal — namely, that someone was previously predestined and not reprobated, and now is not predestined but reprobated. For if anyone is temporally blotted out from the book of the living, then it is so against what was shown before. Wherefore it is necessary that he should have another understanding.

It can therefore be understood concerning blotting out according to present righteousness, according to the distinction set forth in 25 above; or "let them be blotted out" — that is, let them be held as blotted out, that is, as not written, or shown, according to what is added: "And with the just let them not be written." Or also "let them be blotted out" according to their own hope, just as God is also said to repent, as Chapter 7 has recited.

Wherefore Augustine on that Psalm, in the second tract: "Brothers," he says, "we ought not so to take it, that God writes anyone in the book of life and blots him out. If a man said, 'What I have written, I have written,' concerning the inscription [D] above where it was written 'King of the Jews' — does God write someone and blot him out? He is foreknowing, He has predestined all to reign with His Son in eternal life before the foundation of the world; these He has inscribed; the book of life contains them. How, then, are they blotted out from there where they were never written? This is said according to their own hope, because they themselves thought they were written. What is 'let them be blotted out from the book of life'? May it also be made evident to themselves that they are not there. So, then, those who hoped that they were written in God's book as if by the merit of their righteousness, when their condemnation shall have been brought even to their own knowledge, will be blotted out from the book of the living — that is, they will know themselves not to be there. For the verse which follows expounds what was said: 'And with the just let them not be written.' I have said, then, 'let them be blotted out' according to their hope, but according to Thy equity what do I say? 'Let them not be written.'"

Those who understand that text of the Apocalypse according to the letter, "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no other," or "that no one take thy crown," have likewise to say that someone can temporally and newly lose the crown of predestination, and another receive it, and so consequently this one cease temporally and newly [E] to be predestined, and begin to be reprobated, and the other contrariwise; which the foregoing do not permit.

Nor does John — indeed, nor the Spirit in John — say or intimate that anyone of himself and by his own forces, without God's aid, holds or can hold his crown — namely, perseveres in good life and good works to the end; or that anyone can of himself and by his own forces only, without God specially operating, receive the crown of predestination, or of grace in the present, or of glory in the future, as Chapters 2, 9, 35, and following, with 45, prove.

This same the most faithful words of the same place most faithfully testify: "These things saith the Holy and the True, who hath the key of David, who openeth and no man shutteth, who shutteth and no man openeth: Behold, I have given before [A] thee a door opened, which no one can shut, because thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word, and I will keep thee from the hour of temptation. Behold, I come quickly; hold fast that which thou hast," etc. Where it is plainly taught that perseverance in good is firstly from divine preservation, secondly from human cooperation; how much more is the inception and attainment of good life not from man by himself.

Therefore when it is said, "Hold fast that which thou hast," etc., the good man is prevented and aroused, that he may finally persevere in good. For perhaps he was so predestined, that through such exhortation of God or of man he might finally persevere, and acquire and hold the crown, according to what was set forth in Chapter 23 of this work.

Whence also Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 64: "For those who are not yet called, let us pray that they may be called: for perhaps they are so predestined, that they may be granted to our

prayers, and may receive grace, by which they would will and be made elect; for God, who has predestined all things, will fulfill them."

This passage of the Apocalypse can also be expounded as the foregoing of the Psalm. For one can [B] lose, or receive, the crown of life according to present righteousness, or according to manifestation, or according to firm hope. Wherefore Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 7, proving that final perseverance cannot be lost, and intimating the distinction concerning being lost, says thus: "Final perseverance, since no one has it except him who shall have persevered to the end, many can have it, but no one can lose it. But lest perhaps it be said that perseverance to the end is indeed not lost when it has been given — that is, when it has been persevered to the end — but is then lost in some manner when a man acts through obstinacy, that he is unable to attain to it: just as we say that a man who has not persevered to the end has lost eternal life or the kingdom of God — not that he had already received and had it, but that he would have received it if he had persevered — let us put aside controversies about words, and let us say also that some things which are not had, but are hoped to be had, can be lost."

But what is argued, "If Adam had not sinned, no one would have been reprobated, but each would have been predestined," does not prove that these things depend on merits. For as to the form of the inference, the opposite manifestly stands. For if, as appears from Chapter 45, God [C] does not predestine to a man a determinate end, or a man to a determinate end — say, life on account of his future works — but conversely, in no way does it follow, "Because if a man had acted otherwise, God would have predestined otherwise" — *a posteriori* to the prior. For that a man should have acted otherwise would not have been the cause, neither prior causally or naturally, why God should have predestined otherwise; but the converse.

An example of this is: "If Christ had not done good works, He would not have been predestined Son of God; therefore on account of His good works He is predestined Son of God" — it fails. "If Paul had not preached, he would not have been predestined, or elected to preach; therefore because he preached, he had been predestined a preacher?" No, but the contrary. "If the Sun never shone, nor fire ever heated, it would not have been predestined to do so; therefore because it does so, it is predestined to do so?" No; but because it is predestined, or pre-ordained to do so, it does so.

Nor is it altogether the clearest of all that, if Adam had not sinned, no one would have been reprobated. For it seems to some not to have been necessary, even though Adam had stood, that all his posterity would have been immediately made impeccable, and finally [D] confirmed; but it was possible that his posterity should have had liberty of contradiction toward good and evil. Holding, however, with Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.19, that if Adam had finally stood, all his posterity would have been confirmed impeccable, then according to the sentence of Gregory, *Moralia* IV, set forth in Chapter 39 of this work, none of the reprobate would have been generated, but only those who are now predestined to life; nor for that reason is the sin of Adam

the first cause of reprobation, but if he had not sinned, God would have ordered otherwise, as was said above.

And if you object against this, that some predestined person is sometimes generated by some reprobated person, as a Christian by a non-Christian, and a good Christian by an evil one, and would not have been begotten by any if Adam had not sinned, therefore not those alone now predestined would have been then born — you contradict not me, but rather blessed Gregory.

Nevertheless, in defense of blessed Gregory, it can be replied in many ways. In one way, that if Adam had not sinned, those alone would have been then born who are now elect — that is, only as many would have been then born as are now elect. Or otherwise, "those alone," etc., is true according to souls. For God would then have created only those souls which are now the souls of the elect, although He would perhaps have coupled some to other bodies. Or perhaps yet another way, it can be said, that those alone according to souls and according to bodies would have been then born, who are now elect; but some elect now begotten by one father — say, by a reprobate — would have been then begotten by another, namely by an elect.

But you perhaps object to me: "If it were so, Isaac could have begotten Abraham his father, which seems absurd; by equal reason — indeed, by greater — he could have begotten any other man whatsoever, and infinite men, against the foregoing in the demonstration of the 40th part of the first Corollary of this work. If, moreover, it was so, why did he beget Jacob rather than any other man, since he himself was indifferent, and the mother by similar reason? Yet further, if it is so, let two men be supposed equally able to generate the future John, and let them apply [A] the requisite operation, and each will generate the same John in different places. For why this one rather than that one? And if this one or that one alone had acted, he would doubtless have begotten John; therefore also now, since he acts in similar manner.

"It would also be possible, according to this sentence, for a young man to newly generate his old grandfather, and render him a young boy of one day; and at the same time decrepit and an infant — with many other absurdities indeed; nay, he could even raise the dead. For he could generate someone who once was dead and buried. The Philosophers also say that if the agent is the same and the patient the same, the act will be the same; therefore, conversely, if the agent or patient be different — say, the father or mother — the act will be diversified, namely the offspring."

For the solution of these things, it must be said that there is a twofold sentence concerning the numerical identity of a man. One: that for the numerical identity of a man, the numerical identity of the body of the man is by no means required, neither according to the whole, nor according to any part of it, but only the numerical identity of the soul; so that if Peter's soul were placed in Paul's body, or [B] in any other's, it would nonetheless be the same Peter. The other: that for the numerical identity of a man, the numerical identity of the soul is required, and also of the body, either according to the whole or according to some principal part, or some principal parts.

According to the first sentence, all the objections can easily be solved, by saying that it is not in the power of the man generating to generate this A or this B, this man or that one, but in the power of God, who infuses the soul which He shall have willed.

Supposing also the second sentence, it is to be replied not improbably, that the same son can be generated from different fathers — yet not from different seeds, which give to the son the principal matter of the body. That, moreover, the same seed which is shed by one could be shed by another, appears: because that seed is the surplus of nourishment, left from the third digestion; and if another, entirely similar, took the same nourishment, other things being equal, by digesting the same part of it, he would convert it into his own substance, which the other would, and would leave the same surplus. Just as one fire applied to a certain combustible generates one fire; [C] and if another, entirely similar, had been similarly applied, and not the first, it would have generated the same fire numerically as the first; because any combustible whatsoever, or its matter, is in proximate or near potency to one fire only, or to a single form of fire — otherwise it would be in proximate potency to infinite, or to infinite simply.

From these things the response to the objections can easily be elicited. But that philosophical principle, "If the agent is the same and the patient the same, the act will be the same," does not seem to be straightway simply conceded. For the same father and mother at different times generate different offspring; and the same Sun in the same air or glass, and in the same Moon, at different times generates different light. Wherefore Averroes, on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII.11, writes thus: "If the matter were one, and the agent one, and the potency one, then that which comes to be will be one. For when the subject is one, and the potency existing in it is one, and the agent is one, then there will be no cause of multitude."

For the argument from injustice and cruelty, it is to be known that not every penalty rationally inflicted on a man by a man is on account of his preceding [D] fault, but sometimes for caution, and for a manifold cause, as appears in many places in the Scriptures, both divine and human. Wherefore a certain rule of Law says: "Without fault, unless there be cause beneath, no one is to be punished," *Extra de Regulis Iuris in sexto* — with which many civil and canon laws also accord.

Peter, *Sentences* IV, distinction 15, also shows that for five causes scourges befall men in this life: sometimes for the correction of sin; sometimes for the inception of the punishment of sin; sometimes for the increase of merit, as concerning Job and Tobias; sometimes for the avoidance of sin, as is plain from Paul, 2 Corinthians 12, concerning the angel of Satan; sometimes, indeed, for the glory of God, as is plain from the man born blind, John 9. Sometimes also one is punished by public penance or punishment, that others may fear, and thus be deterred from evil, and confirmed in good — as the divine, canon, and civil law concordantly attest.

If, therefore, anyone is temporally punished for the temporal benefit of others, why not temporally and eternally for the temporal and eternal benefit of the elect — that they may flee evil more in the present, and [E] choose good, and in the future may rejoice more, more closely

love, and more amply praise God? For manifold utility, both in the present and in the future, comes from the reprobate to the elect; nay, the reprobate themselves are specially created on account of the elect, as is plain from Chapter 39.

What injustice, therefore, or cruelty is there with God, if He predestines and makes one creature of His for the service of another creature, and both for His own service, praise, glory, and honor? — especially since He eternally punishes none save one worthy of eternal punishment, namely his sin worthily and justly demanding this eternally; which He always punishes most mercifully and most piously, since much, indeed, and infinitely in some manner short of what is condign, as can be had from Chapter 39 of this work.

If also, as it appears from the sentence of Augustine, *On Free Will* III.11, and *City of God* XI.27, to be miserable is more eligible [A] than not to be, what injustice or cruelty is there with God, if He gives to some creature many great goods, even though He punishes it with another good of His creation — say, with sensible pain — provided that its whole state is more eligible than to be fled; nay, on its account, as for a benefit, it is bound to render thanks to God?

Why, then, do they not argue against God, that He punishes innocent beasts, and baptized infants, with no small sensible pain — He who also handed over His most innocent Son and our Lord Christ to the most bitter punishments and most cruel torments?

If also God omnipotent, the most free Lord of all subject creation, whose mere will is the most just law of all subject creation, as is plain from Chapter 12, were to eternally punish an innocent — especially if for the perfection of the universe, the utility of others, and His own honor — who would presume to litigate with Him, to convict Him, and to say: "Why doest Thou thus?" None, I believe, as is plain from Chapters 12 and 39. "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" Romans 9.

It is true, however, that [B] God has eternally punished none without his fault temporally preceding and eternally remaining; yet not on account of fault, as on account of a cause antecedently moving the divine will, did God reprobate anyone eternally, but on account of certain final causes, as Chapters 20 and 39 have more fully shown.

Not so, however, but far otherwise, must we judge concerning a man with respect to a man. For man does not have pure dominion over his neighbor, nor is his will the highest law, but it is subject to the higher divine law, by which he is bound to love his neighbor as himself.

Some, however — like Scotus on *Sentences* I, distinction 41 — wishing to avoid that reprobation should be causally from the works of the reprobate, and also cruelty in God, say that Lucifer or Judas is first offered to the divine will in his pure naturals without fault, and so He does not will to damn him; secondly, God wills, and from this knows that He will cooperate with him to the substance of an evil act, and so that he will sin mortally by committing, or that He will not cooperate with him to the substance of a good act, and so that he will sin mortally by omitting; and inasmuch as [C] He foresees him to be such, He wills damnation and punishment for him.

The reason of Scotus, however, by no means evidently proves this, as the foregoing manifest. For it is similar to the argument from injustice and cruelty set forth above. Yet if this position stand with the foregoing here and Chapter 45 of this work, and plainly excuses God from all injustice and cruelty, and pleases the chiefs, it pleases me. May the Spirit of truth teach us truth. AMEN.

Here ends the First Book.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, BOOK II

CHAPTER 1: THAT FREE WILL EXISTS, AND WHAT IT IS.

Since the treatment of the foregoing matters has continued up to this point in an unbroken sequence and has proceeded further than I expected, I fear that if the connected series is prolonged still further, it may bring weariness to the fatigued and distaste to the fastidious. Wherefore, as propriety demands a certain break, I make one here, intending to treat what follows more briefly. Beginning again, therefore, with a fresh starting point, we must now discuss free will. For some things previously established seem to destroy free will entirely; some seem to take away its power; and some seem to annihilate its freedom. All these things, however — relying on the rules of my elders and following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers, with the Lord helping me according to the judgment of His own free will — I hope faithfully to harmonize.

First, therefore, it seems to me that free will itself must be established. And that free will must be posited, all theologians, all logicians, all moral philosophers, and nearly all natural philosophers unanimously attest. Nevertheless, on account of some who might perhaps tremble with fear where there is nothing to fear, it seems to me that this should be briefly shown.

For it is clear from the second, third, and fourth chapters of Book I that God preserves, makes, and moves all things outside Himself, and this not from necessity of nature, as purely natural powers lacking cognition do; nor from sense cognition alone and irrational natural appetite, as other irrational natural powers do; but from the rational judgment, or arbitration, of the intellect, as the sixth chapter of Book I teaches; nor from that alone, but with free will, as the eighth and ninth chapters of Book I prove. Therefore it is clear that God has free will — "will," I say, on account of the judgment of reason or intellect, and "free," on account of the spontaneous power of the will. For on account of these two operations of these two powers in one mind, free will took these two names for itself as one name, as the very meaning of the name makes clear. And because the arbitration of reason ought to precede the will, it would more properly be called "free judgment" (*arbitrium liberum*) rather than "free will" (*liberum arbitrium*).

Hence Augustine, *Hypomnesticon* 31, says that why it is called free will must be briefly discussed: "Arbitrium," he says, "I think received its name from 'arbitrating' — that is, considering or discerning by rational deliberation what to choose and what to refuse." Likewise, it is called "free" because it is placed in its own power, having the capacity to do what it wills. And Bernard agrees plainly in *On Grace and Free Will* 4.

Free will, moreover, belongs not only to God but also to rational creatures. For necessity and contingency, or freedom, are naturally opposed as contraries with respect to creatures; and one of them is natural, namely necessity, and therefore the other is too. For contraries correspond to one another to such an extent that not only if one is natural the other is natural, but also if one is determinate the other is determinate, and this to the same degree.

For the Philosopher says, *De Caelo* I.44: "If one of two contraries is determinate, the other will also be determinate." On which Averroes says in his commentary: "This is manifest from the description of contraries, which are at the extreme of separation. For in *Metaphysics* X.14 contraries are described as those which, placed in the same genus, differ the most." And Averroes adds in the same place: "And since each of them is at the greatest distance, it is necessary that they be equally in contrariety — that is, that neither be stronger than the other. And it is self-evident that they are in the same degree of contrariety," which he immediately proves by saying: "For if not, they would not be at the extreme of distance. For it would be possible to add to the lesser so that it would be more contrary, and then the same thing would have several contraries; and that which was posited at the greatest distance would not be what is the contrary of its position."

From this it is clear that not only is there contingency and freedom in creatures, but also as much as there is necessity in them. The Apostle's rule teaches the same — namely, that if one of two contraries exists, the other ought to exist as well: "If there is an animal body," he says, "there is also a spiritual body" (1 Corinthians 15). If therefore there is necessity, there is also freedom; and if in any creature there is contingency and freedom, among all creatures the rational creature seems worthy of being honored with this distinctive privilege.

Likewise, no one doubts that it is absolutely possible for some creature to have free will, since this includes no contradiction; therefore it is possible for an omnipotent God to create such a creature — for otherwise He would not be omnipotent. And such a creature would not seem to be of a different nature from the present rational creature; therefore the rational creature now present was created with free will.

Likewise, every argument that endeavors to show that no creature actually now has free will proceeds similarly against a possible creature that would have free will if it were actually posited, and would by no means conclude against it; therefore neither does it conclude against an actually existing rational creature.

From these things it evidently appears that free will — or rather, "free judgment" — can be defined or described in this way: that it is a rational power of judging rationally and executing voluntarily. And with these things agree Hugo, *Sentences* III.20, and I *On the Sacraments*, part 5, chapters 20 and 21; and Peter, *Sentences* II, distinctions 24 and 25; and many others in many other places.

CHAPTER 2: ON THE ACT OF FREE WILL AND ITS OBJECT.

Free will having been established, it remains consequently to inquire about its act and its object. Experience and nature teach that its act is willing and not-willing, loving and hating; and its object is the apparent good and the apparent evil.

[Question 1] But one who wished to dig deeper could reasonably ask whether both the aforementioned acts — namely willing and not-willing — are equally primary and proper to the will. This does not seem so. For every single power, just as it has one essence and one form, so also has one end, one perfection, and one operation — at least one that is primary, most proper, and essential. If, however, those two acts are not equally primary and proper to the will, either one of them is reduced to the other, or both to a third, which is the primary and most proper act of the will, by virtue of which the others belong to it, according to what was established in I.2.

But no act of the will seems naturally prior to willing and not-willing, loving and hating, or more proper to the will. In a similar way one can inquire about the primary and most proper object of the will — whether that is the good, or the evil, or some third thing which is neither.

It seems, therefore, that it can be briefly said that the primary and most proper act of the will is to will its primary and most proper object, which is the good. And because it wills the good, therefore it does not will evil; therefore it hates evil; therefore it flees evil. For the good is naturally prior to evil, as is clear from I.2 and I.26.

[Question 2] But since it is agreed that the will wills the good and does not will evil, we must inquire further: whether it can knowingly will evil, and something neutral — that is, what appears to it neither good nor evil. I think it can — if not per se, yet with a great good conjoined. For example, if someone could not have A, a great good, except with or after first having B, a small evil, he could will B, the evil — not per se or for its own sake, but so that through it he might obtain A, the good. And thus, in accordance with the foregoing, he would primarily and principally will the good; indeed, in a manner of speaking common to many, he would will nothing other than the good, as is clear from I.26. And the same applies to the neutral.

Furthermore, from these considerations another question can arise: **[Question 3]** whether the will can knowingly will per se a pure evil — one that appears to it in every way evil, having no good in any way conjoined, whether subsequent or preceding — and not even the volition itself appears good to it, but in every way evil. Some think so, because otherwise the will would not

have full freedom. Yet the opposite seems to follow from the foregoing. For if the good is the primary and proper object of the will, and willing the good its primary and proper act, it cannot will anything except by virtue of these, and finally for the sake of the good.

Likewise, human nature, when evil is set before it, shrinks back and flees — although it may perhaps desire what is pleasurable and useful, as anyone's mind experiences in itself, unless someone happens to be a Manichaean, having an essentially evil and essentially dark soul from an essentially evil God and Prince of Darkness, contrary to I.1 and I.26.

Likewise, by I.26, every thing is good; and as universal experience shows, we see that all natural things — inanimate and animate, insensible and sensible, and irrational — seek what is good for them and flee what is evil for them. By what irrational reason, then, would the sole rational thing, which surpasses all irrational things, seek and love what is evil for itself, and hate and flee what is good for itself?

If also by I.26 every natural thing is good, and every act of it, and whatever is positive in it — how can any natural thing love per se something that appears in every way evil, and in no way whatsoever good, nor conjoined with good, since all friendship or love is always by reason of some likeness and agreement, and never by reason of dissimilarity or perfect contrariety, as universal experience makes clear? What man ever loved a man entirely contrary and adverse to him, hostile, plotting against him, and harming him in all things, and never willing or able to do him good, precisely for this reason? And did he not rather hold him in hatred? Or if he did not at all hate him but loved him, he did this perhaps for the sake of acquiring or strengthening the virtue of patience, as is read in many sources about the philosopher Socrates — that he therefore married the most contentious Xanthippe. Or perhaps he did this for the sake of increasing merit and reward, or for the sake of God who commanded the love of enemies — and so per se and finally he loved the good, and such evil finally for the sake of the good.

Wherefore Boethius, *Music* I, prologue, says: "Likeness is friendly, dissimilarity hateful and contrary; for a people rejoices in modes that resemble its own manners. For it cannot be that soft things are joined to hard, or hard to softer things, because it is likeness that fosters love and delight." Many ancient philosophers also attest to this, as is clear from *Ethics* VIII.1, who say: "Like to like," as "jackdaw to jackdaw," and that "like seeks like." Wherefore it is commonly said:

It is and always will be: like seeks its like.

Hence Ecclesiasticus 13: "Every animal loves its like; so also every man loves his neighbor. All flesh is joined to its like, and every man associates with his like."

Likewise, if anyone can will and love evil per se, he can also love someone out of pure malice, and the other can love him in a similar way in return — and so there would be friendship between them solely on account of evil, without any regard for good. This is contrary to Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII.2, contrary to Cicero, *On Friendship*, contrary to Seneca, *On Benefits* —

indeed universally contrary to all who treat of friendship, whether philosophical or theological, who all say concordantly that the cause of friendship is the good.

Wherefore Aristotle, in the same place, wishing to consider friendship and its species, says: "Concerning these things, it will become clear once the lovable is known; for it seems that not everything is loved, but what is lovable, and this is the good — namely the honorable, the pleasurable, or the useful. The useful seems to be that through which some good or pleasure comes about; therefore the lovable things are the good, the pleasurable, and the ends." And immediately asking, he says: "Do they love the good, or what is good for themselves? For these sometimes differ." And answering, he adds: "It seems that each person loves what is good for himself; and what is simply good is lovable, but for each individual, what is good for that individual. Each person loves not what is really good for him, but what appears so." And below, chapter 3: "These differ from one another in species" — namely the three lovable goods mentioned above — "and therefore the friendships are equal in number to the lovable things."

Likewise, if something is desired and loved per se because it is such, the more it is such, the more desirable and lovable it will be — as is clearly the case with the honorable, pleasurable, and useful good. This is also clear from the Philosopher's consideration in *Topics* II, on more and less: "If pleasure is a good, greater pleasure is a greater good." And Averroes on *Metaphysics* XII, comment 36, says that what is primarily desired is the good, and the more something is esteemed as a greater good, the greater the desire will be. If therefore pure evil is desired per se, a greater evil will be more desired, and the greatest most desired — namely supreme misery, which nevertheless every wretched person and every non-wretched person alike would most flee.

Hence Augustine, *Enchiridion* 86: "Nor is the will to be blamed, or said not to be a will, or said not to be free, by which we so will to be happy that we not only do not will to be miserable, but are utterly unable to will it."

Likewise, evil by reason of its being evil is hateful and hostile to anyone; and it does not seem that the same thing under entirely the same aspect, to the same person not otherwise but similarly disposed in every way, can be both hateful, hostile, hated, and an enemy, and also lovable, friendly, loved, and a friend — and especially supremely one and also supremely the other.

Likewise, everything lovable or loved, especially that which is loved for its own sake alone, is an end or has the character of an end, as anyone's mind senses in itself — which the authority of the Philosopher, *Ethics* VIII.2, cited above, and many other authorities also attest. But the end, especially the ultimate end desired for its own sake alone, is the good, or an apparent good, and has the character of the good — as all philosophers treating of causes concordantly attest.

Likewise, by a similar reasoning to that by which one can love pure evil, one can also hate pure good in the same way — namely because it is purely good, a good that would be in every way good for him: useful, pleasurable, and honorable, and in no way whatsoever evil, nor having any evil annexed to it; and also such that through that hatred he would acquire no other good, nor

exclude any evil that would otherwise be more pressing. Therefore one could hate any good because it is good, and a greater good more, and the greatest good most — namely happiness and God. The contrary of this everyone's mind experiences, and manifold reason makes clear.

Manifold philosophical and theological authority also attests that no one can will or desire pure evil per se, but in all his works always desires the good, or at least something that appears in some way good — useful, pleasurable, or honorable.

Hence the Philosopher, *Ethics* I.1: "Every art and every doctrine, and similarly every act and every choice, seems to seek some good; therefore they have rightly declared the good to be that which all things seek." And below, chapter 17: "It is manifest that happiness is among things honorable and perfect; and it seems to be so, also because it is a principle; for it is for its sake that all people do all other things."

In agreement with this, Augustine, *City of God* VIII.8: "There is a part of philosophy called moral, which the Greeks call Ethics, in which the supreme good is sought — by reference to which we do all that we do, and which we seek not for the sake of anything else but for its own sake, and in obtaining which we require nothing further for our happiness. It is therefore called the end, because it is for its sake that we will other things, but it itself only for its own sake."

And *On the Trinity* XIII.5: "It is true that all men wish to be happy, and desire this one thing with the most ardent love, and for its sake desire all other things." And above, chapter 3 of the same: "If anyone were to say, 'You all wish to be happy and do not wish to be miserable,' he would say something that no one would fail to recognize in his own will. For whatever else anyone secretly wills, he does not depart from this will, which is sufficiently known to all and in all."

And on Psalm 32, "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord," tractate 3: "All love happiness, and therefore men are perverse, because they wish to be evil but do not wish to be miserable; and since misery is the inseparable companion of wickedness, what is it? They wish to be evil so as not to be miserable? Consider this a little in all men who do evil deeds: they always wish to be happy. Someone commits theft; you ask why? Because of hunger, because of necessity — therefore so as not to be miserable, he is evil; and therefore he is more miserable because he is evil. Therefore for the sake of driving away misery and acquiring happiness, all men do whatever they do, whether good or evil."

Wherefore Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 2: "Every care of mortals, which the labor of manifold pursuits exercises, proceeds indeed by diverse paths, but strives to arrive at the one end of happiness."

Anselm also, in *On the Fall of the Devil* 22 and after, supposes as manifest that the evil angel could not will that by which he would become miserable, since he received inseparably the will to be happy.

Furthermore, the Philosopher, *Politics* I.1: "All do all things for the sake of what seems good; it is clear that all aim at some good." And *Ethics* III.10, he supposes that the will is directed toward some end; and having recounted two opinions — one that it is directed toward the per se good, and the other that it is directed toward the apparent good — he adds his own opinion, saying that simply and according to truth, what is willable is the per se good, but for each individual, what seems so. And *Physics* II.31, he says that the final cause is the good of the others: "For that for the sake of which is the most powerful, and the end wishes to be the end of the others; it makes no difference to call the same thing good or apparently good." And *Metaphysics* V.3, in words not far different, he says the same. And *De Anima* III.51, he says that the appetible is the good or the apparent good.

Avicenna also, *Metaphysics* VIII.6, says: "Goodness is desired absolutely by whatever exists; that which every thing desires is being, and perfection in being; inasmuch as it is being, and being is pure goodness and pure perfection, and goodness in every way is what every thing desires according to its own measure, since through it its being is perfected."

Wherefore Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 10: "The sum and cause of all things sought is the good. For what retains in itself no good, either in reality or in likeness, can in no way be sought. Conversely, even things that are not good by nature, if they seem to be so, are sought as though they were truly good. Hence it happens that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum, hinge, and cause of all things sought. That for the sake of which something is sought seems to be most desired — as for the sake of health someone might wish to ride on horseback, desiring not so much the motion of riding as the effect of health. Since therefore all things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not those things but the good itself that is desired by all; but we have agreed that what is desired for the sake of other things is happiness; therefore happiness alone is thus sought."

Dionysius also, *On the Divine Names* 4, says: "Existing things desire the beautiful and the good, and whatever they do, they do for the sake of what appears good; and every intention of existing things has the good as its beginning and end. For nothing does anything with an eye to the nature of evil." And below: "All things exist for the sake of the good, both those that are good and those that are contrary; for we do even these things with a view to the good. No one does what he does with an eye to evil."

In agreement with this, Augustine, in *Questions on Numbers*, question 23, expounding the phrase "the sin of the unwilling," says: "For all men who knowingly do what is not permitted would wish it to be permitted — to such an extent that no one desires to sin for the sake of sinning itself, but for the sake of what follows from it."

And Peter, *Sentences* II, distinction 39, says that the higher spark of reason, which, as Jerome says, could not be extinguished even in Cain, always wills the good and hates evil. This is also attested by many authorities cited in I.26, and by many other philosophical and theological authorities besides.

[Question 4] Consequently one could ask whether the will can knowingly not-will positively, or hate, the good. And I believe it can, at least per accidens — if, namely, by not-willing and rejecting some small good, it could obtain some greater good or avoid some greater evil, just as it can also will evil, as was said above.

[Question 5] Here one could further ask whether the will can knowingly not-will and hate per se a pure good — one that appears, and because it appears, in every way good. And some argue that it can, because otherwise the will would not be free in every respect. But this cannot stand. For just as the primary reason for willing and loving is the good or the apparent good, as the foregoing attests, so the primary reason for not-willing and hating is evil or the apparent evil — for contraries have contrary reasons. Therefore no one can not-will per se what does not appear in some way evil — dishonorable, useless, or distressing. It also seems equally possible to love per se evil and to hate per se good — namely because it is purely good — but the former is not possible, as was shown above; therefore neither is the latter.

[Question 6] After this, it is reasonable to inquire whether the will can not-will a pure good presented to it. For if it cannot, since it is not in its power what and when something appears to it as a pure good, it is not in its power what or when it wills, and therefore not what it does — for the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* IX.10: "What is possible according to reason necessarily does, when it desires that for which it has the power and in the way it has it." And *Politics* V.7 and *Rhetoric* II.24 say the same. But this would destroy the freedom of the will, which the previous chapter was establishing.

If, however, it can not-will a pure good presented to it, and by the foregoing it is necessary that it neither not-will it nor hate it, then it can have no act whatsoever regarding that object — and therefore, by similar reasoning, regarding any other object and any other, and regarding any whatsoever — and so be entirely idle for a time, and for any time whatsoever, the opposite of which we seem to experience.

Likewise, then a cause sufficiently disposed for acting could on one occasion act and on another not act, the same disposition remaining precisely — which seems contrary to reason, since there is no better reason why it should act or rest on one occasion rather than another.

For resolving these questions, it should be known that willing and not-willing are sometimes taken for a rational act of the will, and sometimes for a natural act — namely for concupiscence or anger, which are motions of the irrational concupiscible and irascible powers. Speaking in the first way, willing and not-willing are free and in man's free power, as is clear from the preceding chapter; and thus the will, regarding some pure good presented to it, can elicit neither willing nor not-willing, but be entirely idle; and the same will, disposed in precisely the same way at other times, can will it. For this evidently appears from the difference between a rational and an irrational power assigned in *Metaphysics* IX.10, as the 34th part of the corollary of I.1 more fully manifests.

Speaking in the second way, however, willing and not-willing are not free, nor in man's free power — just as they are not in a beast's — but necessary by natural necessity, and frequently involuntary, as we experience with all too much certainty and frequency, groaning with the most holy Apostle. Yet these motions are in a manner in man's power, insofar as he has a superior rational power by which he can resist them, repress them, and greatly restrain them — which because beasts do not have, they cannot do so.

The Philosopher, well noting this, *Ethics* I, last chapter, distinguishing in multiple ways the species and powers of the irrational soul, says: "One part resembles the common and vegetative — I mean the cause of nourishing and growing. But there seems to be also another nature of the irrational soul, which participates in reason in some way. For we praise the reason of the incontinent and the continent person; for it rightly urges toward the best things. But there seems to be in them something else besides reason, innate, which opposes and resists reason. For just as the loosened parts of the body, when we choose to move them to the right, move perversely to the left, so also in the soul: for the motions of the incontinent tend toward contraries. But in the case of the body we see what moves perversely; in the soul, however, we do not see it. But perhaps we should estimate no less that there is something in the soul besides reason, opposing and resisting it — though in what way it differs makes no difference."

"But this too seems to participate in reason, as we said. For the irrational part of the continent person obeys reason. And further, that of the temperate and the brave is perhaps still more subject; for all things harmonize with reason. The irrational part therefore seems to be twofold: the vegetative, which in no way shares in reason; and the concupiscible and universally appetitive, which participates in some way, insofar as it is responsive and obedient to it — just as we say we have the 'reason' of father and friends, not in the mathematical sense. That the irrational is in some way persuaded by reason is indicated by admonition, all rebuke, and all entreaty. But if this too must be said to have reason, then what has reason will be twofold: one part principally and in itself, the other as something obedient to a father."

[Question 7] In a similar way one could inquire whether the will can not-will a pure evil presented to it — to which one can similarly argue and similarly respond.

[Question 8] Furthermore, one could ask consequently whether the will can will and not-will any of its objects under any degree whatsoever, since there is no resistance of any kind there. But since it is of determinate entity, it seems similarly of determinate activity. Otherwise, whoever loved something according to the utmost of his power would love it under a degree simply infinite in intensity — contrary to what was previously shown in the 40th part of the corollary of I.1.

[Question 9] Still further, perhaps it would be asked whether it is of the essence of free will to have naturally the freedom, or possibility, of contradiction — and this with respect to any act of its own. For this seems to be implied by the meaning of the name. Yet the opposite is certain

concerning God's free will by which He loves Himself, and by which each divine person loves every other and itself, as can be shown by the first supposition.

[Question 10] Furthermore, and in connection with this, it can be further asked whether free will, which of itself is naturally of contradiction, can always freely according to contradiction do the opposite of any of its acts — for this seems to be contained in the meaning of the name. Yet one must distinguish times and qualities of free will. For the time and quality of confirmed beatitude, it cannot, as the very nature of confirmed beatitude demonstrates, and all Catholic Doctors unanimously attest. But for the time and quality of the wayfaring state, it can do the opposite privatively — that is, not perform such an act — yet it cannot always do the positive opposite — that is, the contrary positive act with respect to any object — as the foregoing makes clear.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT FREE WILL IS NOT SO CALLED BECAUSE IT CAN FREELY WILL AND NOT-WILL ANYTHING WHATSOEVER, BUT BECAUSE IT CAN FREELY WILL WHATEVER IS ITS WILLABLE OBJECT, AND NOT-WILL WHATEVER IS ITS NOT-WILLABLE OBJECT.

From these things I consider it manifest that free will is not so called because it can freely will and not-will anything whatsoever, but because it can freely will whatever is its willable object and not-will whatever is its not-willable object — just as if sight were a free power, it could not therefore see a sound or other invisible things, but only its own visible objects. Nor is it called free because it can freely will or not-will any of its objects in any manner whatsoever, as the foregoing has taught, but in a manner suitable to its power. Nor is it called free will because it can freely do the opposite of any of its acts, as the foregoing demonstrates, but because from rational judgment or arbitration it spontaneously performs that act, as the first chapter of this book shows. Nor is it called free will because it can freely do good and sin, as evidently follows from the foregoing, but for the reason just assigned.

CHAPTER 3: THAT NO LOWER CAUSE CAN NECESSITATE THE CREATED WILL TO ITS RATIONAL AND FREE ACT, TO MERIT PROPERLY, OR TO SIN.

Consequently it remains to show that no lower or secondary cause can necessitate the created will to its rational and free act, to merit properly or to sin. For according to what was shown in the first chapter of this book, a rational creature has free will and is naturally free — indeed, as free as an irrational creature is naturally necessary, or necessitable, or servile. But the latter is so naturally necessitable and servile that it can be necessitated by a secondary cause; therefore the former is so free that it cannot be necessitated by any secondary cause. For if a beast is

necessitated by some secondary cause, it will be necessitated by any stronger one; therefore the created will be necessitated neither by that cause nor by any stronger secondary cause — much less by any weaker one.

Likewise, if the human will could be necessitated to its free act by some secondary cause, this would seem most likely to be by the stars and celestial powers, which seem to have the greatest efficacy on subjects, including on humans, to such an extent that those skilled in astrology and other sciences of judgment founded on celestial influence seem frequently to predict their characters and acts. But this does not accord with reason. For the stars and celestial powers are material and irrational things; but the human soul is rational and immaterial, as philosophers and theologians attest, and therefore more perfect and naturally superior to those things.

It is clear that it is contrary to the natural order for the immaterial to be necessarily subjected to the material, the rational to the irrational, the more perfect to the less perfect, and the superior to the inferior, and to be ordered and governed in all things by its irrational motion — especially in its own proper rational and free act. For who, unless perhaps an ass, would say that an ass ought naturally to govern a man, and not the other way around? Or who, more irrational than an ass, would say that an inanimate thing less perfect than an ass ought naturally to govern a man? Not so, not so; but we naturally experience the contrary natural order, which all philosophers attest, and which is expressed evidently in Genesis 1.

Nor do we only see that man ought naturally to govern insensible and irrational things, but also among men themselves, the wise ought to govern the unwise, and the more wise the less wise, in a fitting order. Wherefore the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* I: "The more principal is more a wisdom than the one that serves; for the wise man ought not to be ordered, but to order; nor should he be persuaded by another, but the less wise by him." And *Ethics* VI.6, he says that wisdom is as it were the head, having the most honorable knowledge. And *Politics* I.1: "The ruler and the subject exist by nature for the sake of preservation. For that which can foresee by the mind is by nature the ruler and by nature the master" — which he further manifests in chapters 2, 3, and 6; and below, III.9: "He who commands that intellect should rule seems to command that God and the laws should rule; but he who commands that a man should rule adds a beast as well." And *Ethics* V.11: "Not if a man is less, should he rule, but reason."

Also in the *Secret of Secrets*, Part III.5, it is said that it was found written on a stone in the Chaldean language: "The King and Intellect are brothers." Wherefore the wisest of the kings of the earth says: "The understanding man shall possess the helm" (Proverbs 1). And Augustine, *On Free Will* I.16: "When reason dominates the irrational motions of the soul, a man is to be called well-ordered. For neither is the right order, nor is it to be called order at all, where better things are subjected to worse ones. This reason, or mind, or spirit, when it rules the irrational motions of the soul — that dominates in man to which dominion is owed by the eternal law."

And below, chapter 19, having shown that no vicious soul can overcome a virtuous soul, he adds: "I think you would not deny that any soul, of whatever quality, is better and more powerful than

any body. For no one denies this who sees what is easy — that a living substance is to be preferred to a non-living one, and one that gives life to one that receives it. Much less, therefore, does a body, whatever it be, overcome a soul endowed with virtue."

Someone might perhaps pretend in reply that the celestial bodies are animate and more perfect than animate humans, and therefore it sufficiently accords with the natural order that they should rule over humans. But if they are animate, it is either by a material and extended soul, or by an immaterial and indivisible one. If material, that soul is necessarily irrational and less perfect than the immaterial and rational human soul, as abundant philosophy attests; therefore they are less perfect than humans. Moreover, such a soul in a celestial sphere or star is philosophically rejected. If, however, they are said to be animated by a rational soul, such as an intelligence, this still does not avoid the difficulty. For they do not act on lower things and on humans through that soul immediately, since it is only in the heavens; but only through some material and irrational power flowing from them into the medium and into humans and human souls — such as through light or motion.

That very intelligence, even if it were immediately applied to the human soul, could not necessitate it to will — neither through its substance alone, nor through any act of its own. Not through its substance alone, since it is of itself indifferent to causing willing and not-willing, and one willing and another. Nor through any act of its own, since every act of it is an accident, and therefore less perfect, inferior, and naturally less powerful than the human soul. One intelligence also cannot necessitate another to will; therefore neither can it a human being.

If also the heavens through such a soul could necessitate a man to good, then also to evil. For many are as strongly inclined to evil by certain stars as others are inclined to good by other stars — and so the holy angels, since there are no others in the heavens, would impel humans to sin.

Wherefore Augustine, *On Free Will* III.19, proves and holds that neither desire, nor a vicious mind, nor a body, nor a mind or intellect having virtue, can cast another virtuous mind from the citadel of virtue and subjugate it to desire. And he adds: "Therefore it remains for you to answer, if you can, whether anything seems to you more excellent than a rational and wise mind. 'Nothing, I think, except God'; and that is also my opinion."

Likewise, then angels would be souls; the heavens too could, or could have, merited and sinned, been saved and damned, made happy and made miserable; and therefore would be our neighbor, and to be loved by humans as a neighbor. But who among philosophers, theologians, or even common people does not know these things to be deliria and empty phantasms?

Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article affirming that the celestial bodies are moved by an intrinsic principle which is the soul, and that they are moved by a soul and an appetitive power, like an animal; and another asserting that the soul of the heavens is an intelligence, and the celestial orbs are not instruments of intelligences but organs, like the ear and eye are instruments of the sensitive power; and another asserting that the nature which is the

principle of motion in celestial bodies is an intelligence — an "error," he says, "if it is understood as an intrinsic nature that is an act or form."

Likewise, experience teaches the contrary. For given the conception or nativity of someone, however excellent or bad as to morals, he can be educated contrarily by parents, friends, and himself, and confirmed in contrary habits — as anyone who wished could easily find out, and many astrologers have found out in many ways.

Hence the Father of Philosophers, Hermes, *On the Heavens and the World* 9, treating of the power of the planets over man from the time of conception to the time of birth and from then to the time of death, says: "This natural power, suited from the beginning, forms and works, and governs human nature not by a law of compulsion but of friendship. For human nature is not made such or such by that higher power, but acquires only a natural aptitude, from which afterward nature or life more powerfully takes on such or such qualities or acts."

Wherefore Ptolemy says in the *Centiloquium*, saying 1: "The judgments that I deliver to you are between the necessary and the possible" — that is, for one who considers the natures of things and the work of the stars. And saying 5: "The best astrologer will be able to prevent much of the evil that is to come according to the stars, when he has foreknown its nature." And saying 95: "It almost always happens that what ascends in every face of these figures resembles its work."

[The text then provides Haly's commentary with an anecdote about a man whose nativity had the first face of Aries ascending with several significators in the terms of Saturn, yet who dressed splendidly and lived sumptuously — but who confessed privately that his desires were entirely contrary to his outward behavior, proving that astrological indications represent natural inclinations that can be overcome by will.]

Likewise, all Catholic Doctors reject stellar fate — especially if it implies necessity — as I.28 somewhat recounted. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article affirming that our will is subject to the power of the supracelestial bodies; and another asserting that the will and intellect are not moved in act by themselves but by an everlasting cause, namely by celestial bodies; and another asserting that the celestial orb is the cause of the physician's will to heal; and many others similar to these.

Furthermore, if the human will could be necessitated to its free act by some secondary cause, it would seem that this could be done by vehement temptation. But however great the temptation, so great could be the incitement by stars and celestial powers — since it is most certain that they greatly incite and incline humans — and no incitement by the stars can necessitate the human will, as was shown above.

Likewise, as much as any temptation arouses, so much can some disposition in the body, resulting from stars and complexion. But this is proved false by the experience recounted above from Haly; it can also be proved by the experience about Hippocrates in the *Secret of Secrets*, Part IV.1, recounted by Aristotle, where he writes: "The disciples of Hippocrates the wise painted

his portrait on parchment and brought it to Philemon, saying: 'Consider this figure and tell us the quality of his complexion.' He, looking at the composition and disposition of the figure, compared its parts and said: 'This man is lustful, deceitful, and fond of sexual intercourse.' For which reason they wanted to kill him, saying: 'O fool, this is the figure of the worthiest and best man in the world.' But Philemon pacified them and corrected himself, saying: 'This is indeed the figure of a wise man, but what you asked about from my science, I showed you, and what I think according to it.' When therefore they came to Hippocrates and told him what they had done and what Philemon had answered as his judgment, Hippocrates said to them: 'Philemon certainly spoke the truth; he did not miss a single letter. Nevertheless, since I looked upon these things and considered them to be shameful and reprehensible, I resolved to govern my soul over them, and I drew it back from them, and I triumphed over the retention of my desire.' This, therefore, is the praise and wisdom of Hippocrates: for philosophy is nothing other than abstinence and the conquest of desires."

Wherefore the Philosopher, in the *Ethics* almost throughout, Plato, Socrates, Seneca, and all moral philosophers in their moral philosophy frequently show and even more frequently suppose that acting well and badly, virtues and vices, are in man's free power. The Author of human nature also clearly expressed this in the institution of humanity itself. For when Cain was exceedingly angry against his brother Abel, the Lord said to him: "Why are you angry, and why has your countenance fallen? If you do well, will you not be accepted? But if badly, sin will immediately be at the door. Its desire will be subject to you, and you will rule over it" (Genesis 4).

Wherefore Augustine, *On Free Will* I.18: "It has already been found that the rule of the human mind is human wisdom, and that it can also fail to rule." And chapter 19: "Do you think that desire is more powerful than that mind to which we know the eternal law has granted dominion over desires? For I in no way think so; for it would not be most orderly that weaker things should command stronger ones. Wherefore I think it necessary that the mind be more powerful than desire, by the very fact that it rightly and justly dominates desire."

Augustine also, *On Free Will* [i.e., Anselm, *On Freedom of Will*] 5, proves at length that no temptation can conquer the will. Hence he says: "Who can say that the will is not free to preserve rectitude, and free from temptation and from sin? If no temptation can turn it from rectitude to sin except when it is willing — that is, to willing what it ought not? When therefore it lies, it lies not by another's power but by its own."

"Is it not clear from what has been said that no temptation can conquer a right will? For if it can, it has the power to conquer, and conquers by its own power. But this cannot be, since the will is conquered only by its own power; therefore temptation can in no way conquer a right will. And when it is said to do so, it is said improperly; for nothing else is meant than that the will can subject itself to temptation."

And below, chapter 7: "Understand that the will has an insuperable strength, not conquerable by any other force." "You see, therefore, that when a man, with some temptation pressing upon him, abandons the rectitude of will that he possessed, he is not dragged away by any alien force, but turns himself."

If anyone should think it is the same with beasts, behold a very great dissimilarity. For beasts by natural necessity follow their appetite, pursuing what is pleasant and fleeing what is painful; but man is subject to no natural necessity. Wherefore Anselm, *On Freedom of Will* 5, in dialogue form, writes: "How is the will not free, which no alien power can subject without its own consent? Cannot we say by a similar reasoning that the will of a horse is free, which serves the appetite of the flesh only when willing? — No. For in a horse, the will does not subject itself, but being naturally subject, it always necessarily serves the appetite of the flesh. In man, however, as long as the will itself is right, it neither serves nor is subject to what it ought not to be, nor is it turned from its rectitude by any alien force, unless it willingly consents to what it ought not — which consent it evidently has not naturally or from necessity, like a horse, but from itself."

Furthermore, temptation is twofold: through painful things and through pleasurable things; through adversity and through prosperity; and universally through fear of evil and through love of good. Of these, the first is stronger and greater. For everyone naturally dreads and flees from a painful evil more than they desire a pleasant good, as we experience both in ourselves and in beasts. For we naturally seem to love more the good that we have and fear to lose through a painful evil, than to desire a good not yet possessed and not yet our own. For everyone naturally loves himself and his own things more than he desires or loves what is not his own, since he does not naturally desire or love other things except for his own sake, as is clear from I.39.

Wherefore the Philosopher, *Ethics* III.18: "It is more difficult to endure painful things than to abstain from pleasurable ones." In agreement with this, Augustine, *83 Questions* 36: "There is no one who does not flee pain more than pursue pleasure. For we see that even the most savage beasts are therefore most deterred from pleasures by the fear of pains."

Therefore temptation through painful things is stronger than the other, and this one cannot subdue the human will; therefore neither can the other. That this cannot conquer the human will evidently appears because the strongest temptation of this kind cannot subject the human will; therefore none can. For the strongest temptation through painful things is through death, especially through the most painful death — for the Philosopher says, *Ethics* III.14, that the brave person is concerned with the greatest terrors: "For no one endures dangers more; and the most terrible thing is death."

But this does not overcome the human will. For how many of the faithful, heretics, and unbelievers have chosen and voluntarily endured the harshest death rather than change their profession, will, or work, as many histories attest? How many Gentile philosophers also, living morally and according to the rule of honor, overcame the strongest temptations and subjugated

warlike appetites to the command of reason, as histories written about their lives clearly manifest?

Furthermore, if any secondary cause could subdue the human will, this would seem most likely of the devil, whose power is very great, concerning which Job 41: "There is no power on earth that can be compared to him." But he cannot overcome the will of man, as the foregoing makes clear, and as Augustine attests in *On Free Will* I.19, cited above. Nor can he overcome the will of man through his essence alone, as was shown above concerning good angels; nor through any act of his — because that act would be some temptation, and no temptation can conquer the human will, as was just shown. How many evils also would that malicious spirit do in the world if he had dominion over human wills! How many men and women have also most vigorously resisted his temptations, both among the faithful and among the unfaithful!

[Objection 1] It can, however, be reasonably objected against what has been said. For a pleasurable or painful object has some power to move the human will to willing or not-willing, and the will itself is of only finite power in resisting, as in existing. Therefore it is either of lesser, equal, or greater power. If lesser, it is necessarily overcome. If equal or greater, let the object be increased until it is of greater power in moving than the human will in resisting, or let another object be taken that is as much more powerful than the human will as the will is more powerful than the first object, and the will will be necessitated by it to willing or not-willing.

The will also experiences difficulty in resisting enticement, as we experience all too certainly and frequently, as philosophers and theologians also attest. For the Philosopher says, *Ethics* II.3, that it is more difficult to fight against pleasure than against anger, and that art and virtue are always concerned with what is more difficult. And *Ethics* III.2: "It is difficult sometimes to judge what should be chosen for what, and what should be endured for what; and still more difficult to abide by what is recognized."

And Anselm, *On Freedom of Will* 5, says that it is difficult not to lie in order to avoid death. And chapter 6, he says that it is difficult for us to preserve rectitude of will when we consent to temptations. Wherefore moral philosophers, theologians, and canonists hold concordantly that the greater or lesser quantity of temptation diminishes or increases, lightens or aggravates the guilt of the one consenting, and the punishment.

Since therefore the human will experiences some difficulty in resisting enticement, and is yet of finite power as well as essence, the enticement can be so strong and cause such great difficulty that the human will cannot overcome it, but will necessarily yield to it.

[Objection 2] Likewise, a pleasurable and painful object irresistibly overcomes the wills of small children, fools, the mad, and perhaps the perfectly drunk. But the will of well-disposed adults is not infinitely more powerful essentially or accidentally than the aforementioned wills; therefore it can be overcome by some object.

[Objection 3] Likewise, beasts are necessitated by objects, and man is not infinitely stronger than a beast; therefore he too can be similarly necessitated by some object to will.

[Objection 4] Likewise, final beatitude is some creature, and it necessitates the will of the blessed to its beatific act and to not sinning. For the very nature of beatitude perfectly proves this; and all Doctors hold concordantly that one perfectly and finally confirmed in blessedness cannot become miserable or sin.

[Objection 5] Likewise, some strong temptation can overcome the tempted, and sometimes does, as many say they have experienced. Hence the Philosopher, *Ethics* VII.7: "If someone is overcome by strong and surpassing pleasures or pains, it is not to be wondered at but pardoned — if he struggles against them, just as those who try to restrain laughter suddenly burst out." This the Apostle seems to have well expressed, 1 Corinthians 10: "God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you can bear, but will make with the temptation also a way of escape, so that you may be able to endure it."

Wherefore Anselm, *On Freedom of Will* 6, in the person of the disciple: "I cannot pretend that there is not a certain powerlessness in the will, which nearly all of us experience when we are overcome by the violence of temptation."

[Objection 6] Likewise, someone, through fear of one great evil — such as imminent death unless he perhaps lies, throws treasure or merchandise into the sea, or does something of the sort — is necessarily compelled to act thus in this case. Hence Daniel 14, after recounting how the Babylonians gathered against the king and said "Deliver Daniel to us, or we will kill you and your household," it is added: "The king therefore saw that they were pressing upon him vehemently, and compelled by necessity, he delivered Daniel to them."

[Objection 7] If the will were so free, it would be possible for it knowingly to not-will the good and to will, choose, and knowingly do evil — which seems contrary to the Philosopher, *Ethics* III.3: "Every evil person is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to flee, and on account of such error they become unjust and universally bad." And *Ethics* VII.2, he cites Socrates as holding that no one acts contrary to what is best, but only through ignorance.

Resolution of Objection 1: According to natural philosophers and physicians, the pleasure of any perceptive power is caused by the agreement and certain natural proportion or relationship of the pleasurable created object with the power delighted. For any pleasurable created thing in relation to any power naturally apt to be delighted in it, there is some maximal agreement and some most suitable natural proportion — say, of pleasurable thing A to free power B, with C being the most suitable relationship.

When pleasurable thing A is under degree C, B can resist it and be of greater power in resisting than A in moving, as the foregoing makes clear. Therefore no matter how much A is increased, B can resist more easily than before. For although A is more pleasurable absolutely and stronger and more motive than before, it is not so relative to B; rather, it then moves B less

pleasurably, or perhaps unpleasantly or painfully, because of the dissolution of that most suitable preceding proportion.

A fitting example of this is in the visible and in sight. For it is certain that the eye sees light, and this optimally and most pleasurably in a certain proportion and agreement, beyond or short of which, if the light is intensified or diminished, it will not be seen as well, nor will it cause as much pleasure, but perhaps pain — which is similarly clear in the other senses and their objects.

Therefore it evidently appears that such arguments are fallacious: "This pleasurable thing moves this man so much; therefore double moves him twice as much or more strongly, and quadruple four times as much," and so on — because of the cause stated above.

It is also clear by a similar case that the form of the argument does not hold — just as this one does not: "A luminous sphere larger than a dark one illuminates incidentally half of it and some part beyond; therefore a luminous sphere twice as large illuminates twice as much of the dark sphere," and so on. For then some finite luminous sphere would illuminate another dark one according to its entire surface incidentally — which anyone who has even slightly entered the outer court of Optics sees most clearly to be false and manifestly impossible.

Similarly with an eye seeing a sphere larger than the eye according to some part of it at a given distance: at a greater distance it sees more — a larger part of the sphere — and at a still greater distance always more, but not always proportionally more. For then at some certain distance it would see the entire hemisphere, and at a further distance even beyond, and so at some distance the entire surface of the sphere — which anyone who has perceived even a little about optics perceives to be great impossibilities.

Indeed it is most clear that such an argument is fallacious: "This pleasurable thing attracts and moves this man so much; therefore a more pleasurable thing attracts and moves him more." For if the given pleasurable thing is posited in the most suitable proportion for moving this man, and through the intensification of the pleasurable thing the proportion is dissolved, it moves him less pleasurably — or perhaps then it moves him unpleasantly, indeed painfully.

From these things it is also similarly clear that in this most suitable proportion there is the greatest difficulty of resisting; therefore if through the increase of the pleasurable thing the proportion is dissolved, the difficulty diminishes. Concerning the painful, the same should be judged as concerning the pleasurable.

It is therefore clear that no created pleasurable or painful thing can necessitate a man to willing or not-willing — especially so long as free will remains healthy.

[The text continues with further responses to the objections and extensive theological arguments about the finite capacity of the rational soul for grace, glory, pleasure, and punishment, including discussions of Christ's soul, the heresy of the Beguards, and whether there is a maximum possible degree of sin and punishment. These arguments conclude that while the soul has finite

capacity for created beatitude and pain, a person can potentially sin without limit, though their capacity for the sensation of punishment is finite.]

Resolution regarding beasts, children, and the mad: It can be said, in accordance with the foregoing, that beasts, children, fools, and similar beings are not entirely necessitated by their objects, but that they of themselves by a certain natural necessity necessarily pursue or flee their recognized objects — as a stone descends and as a plant grows. Yet someone might perhaps answer differently, saying that children, fools, the drunk, and the insane have a free will and its free use, although they lack the use and judgment of reason — just as if God omnipotent were to make a creature lacking intellect but having some other cognitive power together with a free will. For this seems possible to God's omnipotence, especially since intellect and will are diverse powers, at least in operation. Nor therefore can it be inferred that they can merit; for freedom alone does not suffice for meriting, but rational cognition of the object and end is required, preceding with a fitting judgment of reason. Nor can it be inferred that they have free will, for the aforementioned reason: for free will — or rather, free judgment — according to what was shown in the first chapter of this book, implies two things: the rational judgment of deliberating, and the free power of executing.

Resolution regarding necessitation by temptation: It can perhaps be conceded that some pleasurable or painful object can necessitate a man to doing something, but not to his rational and free act. For it can take away from a man the use of reason and free will, and render him demented — and then, like a ship deprived of its helmsman's guidance, he will be tossed by impelling forces; like an untamed horse with broken reins, he will be drawn by pleasures; and like a child, fool, or madman, he will pursue desire in all things.

Resolution regarding the strength of the devil: The devil's power does not give him dominion over human wills, since no temptation can properly conquer the human will. Even the devil cannot overcome man's will through his essence alone, as was shown concerning good angels; nor through any act of his, since that act would be a temptation, and no temptation can properly conquer the human will.

Resolution regarding coerced acts: No one is properly necessitated to willing or doing something by the fear of imminent horrible evil, as was shown above, but only improperly — on account of the great difficulty imposed. For such action is voluntary in some way, though not simply so: for the motion and operation of the members proceeds from the will. Wherefore the Philosopher, *Ethics* III.1, speaking of such actions that are in a way coerced, says: "Such actions are therefore mixed, but they more resemble voluntary actions; for they are voluntary at the time when they are performed. The end of the action is according to the time, and both the voluntary and the involuntary are to be spoken of at the time when one acts — and one acts willingly. For the principle of moving the organic parts in such actions is in the person himself; and where the principle is in oneself, it is also in one's power to act. Such actions are therefore voluntary — though perhaps simply involuntary, for no one would choose any such thing in itself."

This accords with Anselm, *On Freedom of Will* 5, as cited above. What is cited from the Philosopher, *Ethics* III.2 — that in those coerced situations there is pardon for things that exceed human nature and no one would endure — can be explained through the magnitude of difficulty that a person refuses to endure, according to what was touched on above. There is not properly necessity there, as the foregoing also taught.

Resolution regarding the practical syllogism: For the practical syllogism, one should respond that whoever has such a syllogism — "Every sweet thing is to be tasted; this is sweet; therefore this is to be tasted" — if he has a will in conformity and is not prevented, necessarily acts in conformity. Otherwise it is not true. For otherwise the Philosopher would fall into that insane proposition condemned at Paris — that man necessarily obeys reason in all things — just as Socrates seems to have damnably fallen into the same error.

Regarding astrological judgments: The stars and celestial powers greatly dispose and vehemently incline the human body to pursuing certain agreeable things and fleeing contrary ones. This disposition is a natural virtue or vice, of which many natural and moral philosophers and astrologers often treat. This natural virtue or vice inclines as vehemently toward its proper pleasures and operations as moral virtue does toward its own — indeed, sometimes much more vehemently. For we manifestly see some persons from early childhood so affected toward pursuing certain things that they are scarcely and with the greatest difficulty restrained.

Hence astrologers say that if someone has a strong nativity toward some vice, however much he is exercised in the opposite virtue, he will never be perfectly established in it without most easily relapsing into such vice. This proneness, disposition, or natural concupiscence — so firmly inhering, so vehemently impelling, and so pleasurably attracting — is not uprooted, conquered, or subjected except by strong fighting, painful struggle, and manifold labor and pain. But most people flee from sorrows and labors and embrace delights and luxuries; therefore they pursue for the most part their natural desires.

And this is why astrologers, physiognomists, and the like often speak the truth. Concerning natural habits, dispositions, and aptitudes they have certain judgments; but concerning human acts they do not have such certain judgments, because they are not confirmed by any necessity, as the foregoing has taught — as also anyone who wishes can often find out by examining the nativities of many people and other customary judgments.

For let such a judge tell me: "You will then marry a wife, then beget a son, then receive riches and honors, tomorrow you will go to such a place and do this or that" — and for then and perhaps forever I will abstain from such things. Let him also tell me about my newborn child: "He will be so dishonorable, so wicked, addicted to such and so many vices" — and I will procure that all occasions of vice be removed from him to such an extent, and that he be so artificially altered to the contrary, so studiously educated in all virtues, and guarded with such diligence, and I myself will so forewarn and instruct him, that he will not be so evil — indeed not evil at all, but good — though perhaps not so morally good as if he had been born more apt

for virtues. For just as according to Ptolemy in the *Centiloquium*, saying 8, "a wise soul aids the work of the stars, as a sower aids natural forces," so according to the same, saying 5, "the best astrologer will be able to prevent much of the evil that is to come according to the stars, when he has foreknown its nature."

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT THE WILL OF A RATIONAL CREATURE IS NOT MERELY PASSIVE BUT ACTIVE; AND THAT THE WILL, THOUGH MOST SUFFICIENTLY DISPOSED BY SECONDARY CAUSES TO ACT, CAN ON ONE OCCASION NOT ACT AND ON ANOTHER OCCASION PERFORM ITS FREE ACT; AND THEREFORE THAT WHEN UNEQUAL GOODS ARE SET BEFORE THE WILL, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL THE GREATER; INDEED, WHEN AN HONORABLE GOOD AND A DISHONORABLE BUT VERY PLEASURABLE OR USEFUL EVIL ARE SET BEFORE IT, IT CAN KNOWINGLY NEGLECT THAT GOOD AND CHOOSE THAT EVIL; AND THEREFORE THAT WITH RIGHT REASON IN THE INTELLECT THERE CAN BE ERROR IN THE AFFECTIONS; AND THAT THE IRRATIONAL APPETITE DOES NOT NECESSITATE MAN TO ACT; THAT CELESTIAL BODIES DO NOT NECESSITATE THE WILL; THAT THE DEVIL DOES NOT NECESSITATE THE WILL; AND THAT NO TEMPTATION NECESSITATES THE WILL; THAT PURE EVIL SHOWN TO THE WILL NECESSITATES IT TO NOT-WILLING, AND PURE GOOD TO NOT HATING POSITIVELY; AND THE WILL ITSELF BY NATURAL NECESSITY NECESSARILY CANNOT DO THESE THINGS. WHERE ALSO IT IS SHOWN CONSEQUENTLY THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD GREATLY BEFIT AND MOST GREATLY BENEFIT THEOLOGIANs AND PERFECT CATHOLICS NOT TO BE IGNORANT OF ASTROLOGY AND OTHER SUCH SCIENCES.

[The corollary text restates all the above conclusions and adds an extended argument for why theologians should learn astrology and similar sciences — both for their practical benefits and for effectively refuting their abusers. This section includes discussions of Ptolemy, Abraham, Moses, Solomon, Daniel, and other biblical figures who were learned in these sciences, along with arguments about how such knowledge assists in correcting the calendar, determining Easter, and understanding celestial signs.]

CHAPTER 4: THAT FREE WILL WHEN TEMPTED CANNOT BY ITS OWN POWERS WITHOUT GOD'S HELP AND HIS GRACE OVERCOME ANY TEMPTATION.

Having shown in the previous chapter that no secondary cause and no temptation can necessitate free will to its rational and free act, it remains not irrelevantly to show that free will, when tempted, cannot by its own powers without God's help and His grace overcome any temptation.

For the proud Pelagius asserted the opposite: he said that man by the powers of free will alone can fulfill God's commands, as is more fully recounted in I.3.

Also at the end of the book of Blessed Prosper *For the Preachers of the Grace of God against Cassian*, where the 13 errors of Pelagius are recounted, two of these are set forth: "That free will is not free if it needs God's help, since each person has it in his own will to do something or not do it"; and "That our victory is not from God's help but from free will."

The same is attested by the Council of Milevis, at which Augustine was present along with Anselm, legate of the Roman Church, against the Pelagians, in which it is written: "It has pleased all the bishops who were at this holy synod to establish what has been defined in the present council." And there follows: "It has been decided that whoever says that the grace of God by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord avails only for the remission of sins that have already been committed, but not also for help so that they may not be committed — let him be anathema."

Hence Augustine, *Against Pelagius and Celestius, On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin* I.23, writes: "In his book to the sacred virgin Demetrias, when he says that we may deserve divine grace so as to resist the evil spirit more easily with the help of the Holy Spirit, he clearly indicates what he thinks. For why did he interpose this word 'more easily'? Was not the sense complete without it — 'that we may resist the evil spirit with the help of the Holy Spirit'? But what damage this addition has done, who does not understand? For he wishes it to be believed that the powers of nature — which he extols so as to cast them headlong — are so great that even without the help of the Holy Spirit, though less easily, the evil spirit can still somehow be resisted."

This error of Pelagius, then, although it seems to have been destroyed by what has already been said, can nevertheless be further and not uselessly destroyed and refuted from an abundance of other arguments.

For every temptation either excites to doing what is forbidden or restrains from doing what is commanded. Therefore every temptation is properly overcome either by resting from what is forbidden or by doing what is commanded. But no one can act without God acting, as the third and fourth chapters of Book I show; nor can anyone rest from acting without God causing his rest — for if resting is acting, this is clear from the foregoing; and if it is purely not acting, it is clear from I.10 and the corollaries of I.13.

Likewise, by I.22, God necessarily either wills the tempted person to overcome the temptation — and then by I.10 He gives insuperable help to the tempted — or He does not will him to overcome it, indeed wills him not to overcome it — and then by the same I.10 he will in no way overcome it.

Or let the argument be put this way: Let the falsifier suppose that the tempted person overcomes the temptation without God's help. Then by I.22, God has an act of will regarding this

overcoming — either volition or nolition. If volition, then by I.10 He gives insuperable help to the tempted. If nolition, then by the same I.10 he in no way overcomes the temptation.

More briefly: the tempted person overcomes; therefore it is true that the tempted person overcomes; therefore by the corollary of I.22, God wills him to overcome — and so on as before.

Nor can anyone pretend that the tempted person naturally first overcomes and that God naturally afterward wills him to overcome — so that the divine volition does not provide help to the tempted — because by I.22 and I.24, that volition is eternal, and by I.20 and I.21, it is not caused by this overcoming.

Likewise, such a victory pleases God; therefore He approves and wills it — not by a novel volition, nor one caused subsequently by such victory, as was just argued — but by one that is prior, eternal in time and in nature, as I.18 with the three following chapters makes clear. Therefore by I.10 it is an insuperable helper to the one who overcomes.

Likewise, otherwise not every victory of the tempted would be preordained by divine providence, but some would be left to chance and fortune — against I.27 and what follows.

Likewise, by I.31, bodily victory is contained under divine providence; but spiritual victory is better than bodily victory; therefore by I.30, the former cannot exist without divine providence.

Likewise, all the reasons and authorities proving that bodily victory is given by the Lord will prove the same concerning spiritual victory. For all things written about bodily victories in the Old Testament prefigure spiritual victories — for according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10, "all things happened to them in figure," as I.31 more fully treated.

Hence Gregory, cited in the *Decretum* 23, question 1: "Unless these carnal wars bore the figure of spiritual wars, the books of Jewish histories would never, I think, have been handed down by the Apostles to the disciples of Christ — who came to teach peace — to be read in the churches."

Likewise, to resist a greater temptation requires greater virtue, and a lesser temptation lesser virtue; therefore to resist however small a temptation requires some virtue. But no virtue can do anything without the Lord of virtues, who is the first virtue of all virtues, as chapters 2, 3, and 4 of Book I teach.

[The chapter continues with extensive citations from Scripture — Psalms, Isaiah, Gregory, Augustine — all proving that victory over temptation comes from God's grace, not from human effort alone. It refutes various Pelagian subterfuges: that grace is needed only for meritorious victory; that grace merely means God moderates the tempter's power; that grace is simply free will itself given freely; and that grace is needed only for knowledge of sin. Each is shown to be a form of the Pelagian heresy condemned by councils and Church fathers.]

CHAPTER 5: THAT FREE WILL, HOWEVER GREAT THE CREATED GRACE SUPPORTING IT, CANNOT WITHOUT OTHER SPECIAL HELP FROM GOD OVERCOME ANY TEMPTATION.

After the foregoing, what is more fitting than to demonstrate that free will, supported by however great a created grace, cannot without some other special help from God overcome any temptation? This is evidently demonstrated by the arguments just set forth in the previous chapter. It is also clearly evident from the corollary of I.41.

Moreover, otherwise a wayfarer who is finally reprobate — but presently existing in however great a grace — could by himself, without other help from God, overcome any temptation regarding mortal sin, or some certain given temptation. And if he were to do so, he would die in grace and would be predestined to life; and so someone reprobated to death could from his works be predestined to life — indeed, a reprobate could make himself predestined to life, against I.43.

Here I once heard someone respond by saying that no one can make himself predestined, but someone can bring it about that he is predestined — that is, according to him, he can do something such that, once done, he will be predestined to life.

This response, however, errs in two ways. First, in that it strives to separate things that cannot be separated — namely that someone makes himself predestined, and that he brings it about that he is predestined. For if he brings it about that he is predestined, this is through some merit that is a total or at least partial efficient cause of his being predestined — because through that merit he moves and incites God to predestine him. Therefore that merit is a similar efficient cause, moving and inciting toward his being predestined; therefore it similarly effects his being predestined; therefore it similarly makes him predestined.

Second, it errs in saying that someone can bring it about that he is predestined — that is, according to the same person, he can do something such that, once done, he will be predestined. For that ablative "once done" either signifies the cause of predestination, or the order of prior to posterior, or neither cause nor order but something unrelated. If a cause, then his deed is the cause of divine predestination — against I.43. If order, then after that deed he is predestined and before he was not; therefore predestination is temporal and daily, not eternal — against I.42. If something unrelated, then by the same reasoning a dog can bring it about that someone is predestined: for a dog can do something — such as bark — and once it has barked, some person will be predestined, just as he was eternally before.

Here the respondent further replied, saying the prior division was insufficient, and added a fourth member — namely that the ablative signifies an effect of predestination, and in this way he explained his statement: "Someone can bring it about that he is predestined, because he can do something such that, once done, he will be predestined" — that is, once done, it follows as from effect to cause, and from posterior to prior, that he is predestined.

Wherefore, consistently speaking, he must concede that someone can bring it about that God exists, or that the world exists: for he can do something such that, once done, it follows as from effect to cause and from posterior to prior that God or the world exists.

Likewise, by the same reasoning he would have to concede that someone can make himself predestined, because he can produce its effect. [The text continues with several more logical refutations of this position.]

Likewise, if someone could overcome a strong temptation by his own powers, he could similarly increase his own merit — which is of far greater difficulty — against I.44. Likewise, since overcoming temptation is meritorious, the tempted person could through multiplied victories by his own powers, without God's help, similarly multiply his merit and virtues, and acquire for himself a reward beyond the limit divinely appointed for him — against I.44.

Likewise, if a person in grace who is reprobate and tempted could of himself overcome a temptation regarding mortal sin, he could of himself die in grace and be saved; therefore he could of himself increase the number of the elect, or permute the units of that number — which is against what was established in I.46.

Here perhaps Lombard would respond, as he responds in *Sentences* I, distinction 40, in these words: "We respond that it is said for the following reason, and it is true, that the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished — because both cannot simultaneously be the case: namely that someone be saved and not be predestined, or that someone be predestined and be damned."

But this exposition or gloss is too far removed from the text. For Sacred Scripture and the sacred Doctors, when they say the number of such or such persons cannot be increased or diminished, mean what philosophers, logicians, and other practitioners of other arts, and the common understanding of people always mean — namely that no further such unit can be added to or taken from the number of such persons; not that some unit of it is simultaneously such and not such.

[The text provides extensive argumentation against Lombard's interpretation, showing that Augustine's statement that "the number of the predestined is so certain that no one is added to them or diminished from them" must be understood in the straightforward sense — that the actual count cannot change — not merely in the trivial sense that no one can simultaneously be predestined and not predestined. Multiple biblical parallels are offered, along with logical arguments about the absurd consequences of the weaker interpretation.]

Therefore perhaps someone will respond more subtly, saying that the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished, but can be greater or less than it previously was or currently is — though one of these seems to entail the opposite of the other. And it also seems that if such a number could be greater, it could be made greater by the addition of some unit — and so on as before.

[The chapter concludes with additional arguments showing that if man could persevere by his own powers, the number of the elect would depend on human wills — which are simply contingent in either direction and, with respect to God, entirely fortuitous — making the number of the elect contingent and uncertain, contrary to Scripture and the Fathers. It would also render prayer for overcoming temptation vain, and thanksgiving for victory empty — which is condemned as not merely vain but profanely heretical.]

CHAPTER 6: THAT THE SPECIAL HELP OF GOD IS HIS UNCONQUERABLE WILL.

After it has been shown in the foregoing that no tempted person can overcome any temptation whatsoever by the powers of free will alone, whether without grace or with however great a grace, without other special help from God — it remains consequently to inquire what that help is by which the tempted overcome all temptations, and without which they are overcome in all.

That help, since it is neither free will nor created grace or charity — which are the greatest created gifts of God and of the greatest help — what can it be but the divine will? For whomever God helps, He helps voluntarily, just as whatever He does externally He does not by nature, nor from cognition alone, but by will, as chapters 8 and 9 of Book I teach. Far be it also that He should help anyone fortuitously or by chance, because then I.22, I.27, I.28, and I.29 would shamefully rebuke Him.

The divine will, therefore, is that help without which every tempted person is overcome — as can be known from I.22 and the other things previously established — and through which every tempted person who overcomes efficaciously overcomes the tempter, as I.10 with the foregoing shows.

Hence holy David, well experienced in spiritual battle — having been frequently overcome and overcoming — says: "In His indignation there is wrath, and in His will there is life" (Psalm 29) — wrath, namely, prostrating into guilt the one whom the Lord is indignant at; and life, sustaining in innocence the one whom the Lord deigns to voluntarily help. Though it is also expounded otherwise, the entire course of that Psalm 29 supports this exposition.

"I will exalt You, O Lord, because You have lifted me up and have not let my enemies rejoice over me. O Lord my God, I cried to You and You healed me. Lord, You brought my soul up from hell; You saved me from those descending into the pit." And then, stirring up thanksgiving for such great benefits to the Lord, he immediately adds: "Sing to the Lord, O you His saints, and give thanks to the memory of His holiness; for there is wrath in His indignation, and life in His will."

The same, Psalm 5: "Lord, as with a shield of Your good will You have crowned us" — where the Gloss says: "The good will by which You have crowned us is for us as a shield against the enemy by which we are protected, and it is as a crown — that is, arms — by which the enemy is

defeated. This is a shield against him who by temptations and tribulations suggests despair; and the sense is: Your good will protects us and makes us conquer. Or thus: a shield, which is named from its roundness, does two things — it guards the body and crowns the head. So the gratuitous will of God by which He calls us is a defense here against all things, and in the future a crown."

The same, Psalm 43: "For not by their own sword did they possess the land, and their own arm did not save them, but Your right hand and Your arm and the light of Your countenance, because You were pleased with them." And Psalm 88: "You are the glory of their strength, and in Your good pleasure our horn shall be exalted" — the Gloss: "You are the glory — that is, the exaltation — of their strength, whom You not only illumine but also give the ability; and in Your good pleasure — that is, because it has pleased You, not because we are worthy — our horn shall be exalted."

And 2 Maccabees, last chapter: "The Lord gives victory not according to the power of arms, but as it pleases Him." And lest any deceit of Pelagian malice steal upon you, hear from whom anyone is made worthy — "for he is worthy of this honor whom the king wishes to honor" (Esther 6).

And Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* 12: "Also what I said — that the salvation of that religion has never been lacking to anyone who was worthy, and that he was not worthy to whom it was lacking — if it is discussed and asked from where anyone is worthy, there are some who say by human will; but we say by grace or divine predestination."

Whoever therefore is worthy of victory is not worthy from himself, but from God's gratuitous will, which both makes him worthy of victory and makes him victorious.

CHAPTER 7: THAT NO ONE, EVEN WHEN NOT TEMPTED, CAN BY THE POWERS OF FREE WILL ALONE, WITHOUT GRACE OR WITH HOWEVER GREAT CREATED GRACE, WITHOUT OTHER HELP FROM GOD, AVOID ANY SIN.

To complete the treatment of the avoidance of sin, it only remains to show, in consequence of the foregoing, that no one — even when not tempted — can by the powers of free will alone, without grace or in however great a grace, without other help from God, avoid any sin.

For it is easier for a tempted person to avoid sin than for a non-tempted person to avoid temptation. For all day long we are tempted unwillingly, but we never properly sin unwillingly. But no tempted person can avoid the sin about which he is tempted by the powers of free will alone, without grace or with however great a grace, without other help from God, as the three preceding chapters have taught. Therefore no non-tempted person can avoid being tempted about sin by the powers of free will alone, without grace or in however great a grace, without other help from God. And if he is tempted about sin and God's help is not present, he is necessarily overcome, according to the aforementioned chapters.

Likewise, whoever is not tempted — it is necessarily from God that he is not tempted, as the eleventh part of I.13 proves. And by I.22, God necessarily has some act of will regarding such a person not being tempted — and not a nolition, because then by I.10 he would be tempted — therefore a volition, which by the same I.10 does not allow him to be tempted.

Hence Augustine, in his sermon on the nativity of Saint Mary Magdalene, last chapter: "This your God says to you: I governed you for Myself, I preserved you for Myself so that you would not commit adultery. A tempter was absent, and that the tempter might be absent, I brought it about. Place and time were absent, and that these might be absent, I brought it about."

Likewise, if anyone who is not tempted could by his own powers avoid sin, let this be supposed to occur. Then by I.22, God has some act of will regarding this avoidance — and not a nolition, because then by I.10 it would not occur — therefore a volition; therefore by the same I.10, it provides insuperable help.

Likewise, that avoidance is accomplished either by acting or by not acting. If by acting, God is there the first cause acting, as chapters 3 and 4 of Book I prove. If by not acting, God is still the first cause of that non-action, as the eleventh part of I.13 teaches.

Likewise, according to what was cited in Chapter 3 of this Book II, grace is necessary for avoiding sins — and this, it seems, even for those not tempted. For some of the authorities cited there speak generally of all persons indiscriminately, making no mention of the tempted. And that grace is either the Holy Spirit or some created gift of His which does nothing except under the direction of the Holy Spirit Himself, as is clear from chapters 3 and 4 following.

Likewise, according to what was shown in Chapter 4, every man would commit any sin if he were not specially preserved by God.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT THE DIVINE WILL, JUST AS IT PRESERVES THE TEMPTED FROM RUIN, SO ALSO IT PRESERVES THE NON-TEMPTED BOTH FROM TEMPTATION AND FROM SIN.

Hence it is manifest that the divine will, just as it preserves the tempted from ruin, so also it preserves the non-tempted both from temptation and from sin. This corollary can be similarly demonstrated through the foregoing, just as the fifth chapter demonstrated a similar conclusion.

O therefore the wondrous condescension of divine mercy toward us wretched and ungrateful ones — which preserves those not tempted untouched from so many and such great whirlwinds of temptation; which preserves those tempted unconquered in so many and such great assaults of temptation; and which heaps up so many and such great rewards for those who conquer through it, not through themselves! So that therefore, with it leading, we may return from ingratitude, let

us humbly ask that, with it also granting, we may deserve to receive not the spirit of this world but the Spirit who is from God, so that we may at least know the things that have been given to us by God, in whom, crying "Abba, Father," we may render the most humble thanks in all things.

CHAPTER 8: ON PERSEVERANCE — WHAT IT IS, AND THAT NO WAYFARER, SUPPORTED BY HOWEVER GREAT A CREATED GRACE, CAN BY THE POWERS OF FREE WILL ALONE, OR EVEN WITH THE HELP OF GRACE, PERSEVERE FINALLY WITHOUT OTHER SPECIAL HELP FROM GOD.

After these things, perseverance must be treated. For the proud Pelagius presumed to assert that man by the powers of free will alone can fulfill all God's commands and avoid all sins, as is evident from II.4 of this work; and therefore can persevere finally from himself — which the various books of blessed Augustine published against the Pelagians also attest.

First, therefore, we must see what perseverance is. Cicero, *Rhetoric* II, defines it thus: "Perseverance is a stable and perpetual remaining in a well-considered plan." And Aristotle, *Ethics* VII.7, defines perseverance in this way: "To persevere is to hold fast in what one has resolved." And for the difference between perseverance and continence, he adds: "Continence is to overcome, just as not being conquered is different from conquering; on account of which, continence is also more choice-worthy than perseverance."

Having understood what perseverance is, it remains consequently to show that no wayfarer, weighed down by a corrupt body, established in however great a created grace, can by the powers of free will alone, or even with the help of grace, persevere finally without other special help from God.

For by the preceding chapter, no wayfarer however full of grace can so avoid mortal sin. Likewise, no wayfarer however full of grace can so avoid temptation regarding mortal sin, as the preceding corollary inferred — and it is sufficiently clear from the preceding chapter and from what is very evidently apparent in itself. And if he is tempted regarding any mortal sin, he cannot avoid it, as chapters 4 and 5 of this book show.

Likewise, nearly all the arguments that proved similar conclusions about overcoming temptations and avoiding sins in the four preceding chapters will prove this conclusion. And for this conclusion, the entire second chapter of Book I similarly serves.

For this same purpose there are quite many authorities of canonical Scripture and of the Doctors, some of which were cited above, with quite many more remaining to be cited for anyone who wishes. Of these I will cite a few, and briefly.

Psalm 118 says to the Lord God: "By Your ordinance the day perseveres" — that is, the angel or human being, luminous with the light of justice. And Joshua 14 records Caleb as having said: "The Lord has granted me life, as He promised, up to the present day. I am now eighty-five years

old, as strong as I was at the time when I was sent; the strength of that time perseveres in me to this day, both for fighting and for marching." But through whom did such great strength persevere for him, if not through Him who promised in Numbers 14: "My servant Caleb I will bring into this land"?

And Deuteronomy 29: "He brought you," says Moses, "for forty years through the desert. Your garments have not been worn out, nor have the sandals of your feet been consumed by age. You have not eaten bread, nor drunk wine or strong drink, so that you might know that He is the Lord your God." But since, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10, "all things happened to them in figure," what could be better figured by these things than that, with the Lord leading us through all the years of this pilgrimage through the trackless desert of this world, with Him granting perseverance, our spiritual garments — namely our virtues — have not been worn out, nor the sandals of our feet — namely the gifts of genuine charity, of the twofold love of God and neighbor — consumed by age through misuse? We have not eaten bread of doctrine that without Him would strengthen our heart; we have not drunk wine and strong drink of devotion that would perseveringly gladden our heart without Him. Yet we have not failed, so that we may know that He is the Lord our God, from whom all things, through whom all things, in whom all things exist and subsist — who also sustains and supports all things by the word of His power, as the same Apostle attests, Romans 11 and Hebrews 1. Similar is Genesis 27: "With grain and wine and oil I have established him."

What else than perseverance do these words proclaim: "Preserve me, O Lord"; "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established" — that is, according to Augustine, the just or the Apostles; "He set my feet upon a rock"; "Command, O God, Your strength"; "Confirm, O God, what You have wrought in us"; "Who founded the earth upon its stability"; "Guard us, O Lord, as the pupil of the eye"; "Unless the Lord guard the city, he watches in vain who guards it" — and many similar things in many Psalms?

And the most eloquent Isaiah, chapter 26: "The city of our strength is Zion; the Savior — a wall and rampart shall be set up in it" — namely to guard the city. And holy David, 1 Chronicles, last chapter, thus praying to the Lord for the people devoted to him: "Lord God, preserve forever this will of their heart, and let this mind remain always in veneration of You" — what else did he seek than consummated perseverance? And why did he seek it from God, if it were not given by Him, but each person could have it by his own powers, as I.46 more fully argued?

Hence blessed Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 2, shows the same conclusion by the same argument: "Why," he says, "is this perseverance sought from God, if it is not given by God? Or is this prayer also mocking, when something is asked of Him that is known not to be given by Him but to be in man's power even without His giving? Just as also that thanksgiving is mocking, if thanks are given to God for what He Himself has neither bestowed nor done. But 'do not be deceived,' says the Apostle, 'God is not mocked.'" And he relies heavily on this argument almost throughout that whole book, as is evident in chapters 3, 6, and 9, where he also cites this from

the blessed martyr Cyprian, *On the Lord's Prayer* (which is his fifth epistle), and in many other places.

And just as that David prayed to God for the perseverance of his people, so also our David, the Lord Christ, prayed to God the Father for His people: "Holy Father, keep them in Your name, those whom You have given Me, that they may be one, just as We are. While I was with them, I kept them in Your name; those whom You have given Me I guarded, and none of them perished except the son of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled." And below: "I do not ask that You take them out of the world, but that You keep them from evil" (John 17).

Following His teaching, His priests pray thus: "Guard, we beseech You, O Lord, Your Church with perpetual mercy; and since without You human mortality slips, may it always be drawn from harmful things and directed to salutary ones by Your helps."

Likewise, 1 Kings 19 [= 3 Kings 19:18]: the Lord said to Elijah: "I have left for Myself seven thousand men whose knees have not been bent before Baal, and every mouth that has not adored him with a kiss." Whoever therefore does not bend his knees before Baal — so as to be deflected from justice in deed — nor adores him with the mouth of heart or body, nor kisses his hand in thought or speech, is kept not by his own powers or merits but by perseverance freely given by the Lord. For the Lord would not have said "I have left for Myself seven thousand men" if He Himself had not done this, but they had rather left themselves to the Lord when they abandoned idols on their own, not through Him.

So the Apostle argues, Romans 11, showing that the remnants of Israel are saved by grace: "Has God cast away His people? God forbid. Do you not know what the Scripture says in Elijah? What does the divine response say to him? 'I have left for Myself seven thousand men who have not bent their knees before Baal.' So therefore also in the present time, remnants according to the election of God's grace have been saved. But if by grace, then it is no longer from works." From the fact, then, that God says "I have left for Myself," the Apostle implies that God did this, not they themselves; and that God did this freely — namely according to the election of grace, not for merits. For if He had done this for their merits, they by their merits would primarily and in a certain way more principally have done this. "So therefore," he says, "also in the present time, remnants according to the election of God's grace have been saved" — just as in that time those remnants, or those left over, were saved, not by themselves, but by God, and this freely, not from works.

[The chapter continues with extensive citations from Augustine's *On the Gift of Perseverance* and *On Rebuke and Grace*, showing through each petition of the Lord's Prayer (according to Cyprian's exposition) that perseverance is God's gift and not from man himself. It includes Augustine's key distinction between the help given to the first man Adam — without which he could not persevere if he willed — and the help given to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God — by which perseverance itself is given to them, so that they not only cannot persevere without this gift but also through this gift are made to be none other than persevering.]

Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 59: "In this place of miseries, where temptation is human life upon earth, strength is perfected in weakness. What strength? None other than this: that he who glories should glory in the Lord. And therefore concerning perseverance in good itself, God did not wish His saints to glory in their own powers, but in Him — who not only gives them help such as He gave to the first man, without which they cannot persevere if they will, but also works in them the willing itself. For since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, perseverance is given to them by the generosity of divine grace both in the possibility and in the will. For their will is so kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they so will, and they so will because God works in them to will."

"For if in so great a weakness of this life their own will were left to them, so that they might remain in God's help — without which they could not persevere — if they willed, and God did not work in them to will, among so many and such great temptations their will would succumb through its own weakness, and therefore they could not persevere, because failing through weakness of will they would not will, or would not will so strongly as to be able."

"Help was therefore given to the weakness of the human will, so that it might be driven by divine grace unswervingly and insuperably — and therefore, although weak, it might not fail, nor be conquered by any adversity."

And chapter 53: "To the first man, who in that good in which he was made had received the ability not to sin, not to die, and not to abandon that good itself, was given the help of perseverance — not by which it would be brought about that he would persevere, but without which through free will he could not persevere. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God through grace, not such a help of perseverance is given, but such that perseverance itself is given to them — not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are nothing other than persevering."

"For He did not only say, 'Without Me you can do nothing,' but also said, 'You did not choose Me, but I chose you, and appointed you, that you should go and bear fruit, and your fruit should remain.' By which words He showed that He gave them not only righteousness but also perseverance in it."

Likewise, to posit that a man in grace can persevere in grace by himself was the error of Pelagius — which is evident from Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 3, where, wishing to show through the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, according to the exposition of the blessed martyr Cyprian, that perseverance in good is a gratuitous gift of God and not from man himself, he says: "Read somewhat more attentively his exposition, the book of the blessed martyr Cyprian that he composed on this subject, whose title is *On the Lord's Prayer*, and see how many years before he prepared an antidote against the poisons of the Pelagians that were to come. For in it are things which the Catholic Church especially defends against them — one of which is that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, since all the merits of the righteous are gifts of God, and God's grace confers all of them."

[The chapter concludes with Anselm's testimony from *On the Harmony* 9 and from his meditations, confirming that no one preserves the rectitude received except by grace both preceding and following.]

Anselm, *On the Harmony* 9: "In how many ways, after receiving that rectitude, grace helps free will to preserve what it received — although I cannot enumerate them all, for it does this in manifold ways — nevertheless it will not be useless to say something about it. Certainly no one preserves this received rectitude except by willing. But no one can will it without possessing it; and no one can in any way possess it except through grace. Just as, therefore, no one received it except by grace going before, so no one preserves it except by the same grace following. For grace so follows its gift that it never, whether the gift be great or small, ceases to give it — unless free will, by willing something else, abandons the rectitude it received."

The same, in his meditations, in a certain prayer entitled *For Enemies*: "Almighty and merciful Lord Jesus Christ, just as I could not begin anything good without You, so neither can I complete or keep it without You."

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT NO WAYFARER, BY THE POWERS OF FREE WILL OR GRACE ALONE, OR BOTH CONJOINED, WITHOUT OTHER SPECIAL HELP FROM GOD, CAN PERSEVERE FOR ANY TIME AT ALL.

Hence it is manifest that no man in this state, by the powers of free will alone, or of however great a created grace, without other help from God, can not only not persevere finally, but not even for any time at all — which is sufficiently clear from the foregoing.

Likewise, if anyone could so persevere for one hour — since at the end of that hour he would be as spiritually strong as before, or perhaps even stronger — he could still equally easily or more easily persevere similarly for another following hour, and so for all hours, and thus finally — against the chapter just set forth.

Likewise, if anyone could so persevere for one hour, he could also finally: for the end of that hour will perhaps be for him the end of life. For if of two equals, one who will live many years can so persevere for an hour, so can another who will live only for an hour; therefore he can so persevere finally — which the preceding chapter does not permit.

Likewise, as the second chapter of Book I teaches, everything that is natural and is not per se such but is mutable into not-such, if it is to remain unchanged, must continually lean upon something per se fixed; therefore every just person must continually lean upon God.

Hence Isaiah 50: "Let him trust in the name of the Lord and lean upon his God" — where the Gloss says: "So that human fragility may be sustained by the divine majesty." And Song of

Songs, last chapter: "Who is she who ascends from the desert, abounding in delights, leaning upon her beloved?"

Hence Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will* 15, says: "It is so necessary for man that not only should the ungodly be justified by the grace of God, but also that when he has been justified, grace should walk with him and he should lean upon it lest he fall. On account of this it is written in the Song of Songs concerning the Church itself: 'Who is she who ascends made white, leaning upon her kinsman?' For she was made white — she who could not be white by herself. And now, made white, she walks well, but only if she perseveringly leans upon Him by whom she was made white."

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, BOOK II (continued)

CHAPTER 9: THAT NEITHER MAN NOR ANGEL WITH HOWEVER GREAT A GRACE BEFORE THE FALL COULD PERSEVERE FINALLY, OR FOR A TIME, WITHOUT OTHER SPECIAL HELP FROM GOD.

Having shown that man after the fall, restored through grace, cannot by the powers of free will alone, or even of however great a created grace, without other help from God, persevere finally or for a time, it remains to show consequently that neither man nor angel before the fall, supported by however great a created grace, could so persevere finally or for an hour. This indeed will be shown similarly by the reasons demonstrating the principal conclusion of the preceding chapter.

Likewise, if free will in grace before the fall could so persevere, it could similarly overcome any temptation and guard against any sin. And since it is not now infinitely weaker after the fall — for then it would have entirely lost all its strength — it could also now, with as much grace as it then had, overcome some temptation, namely one weaker in proportion to how much weaker free will now is than before, as due proportionality clearly proves. This is contrary to chapter 4 of this Book II. Or again, to the same conclusion: let free will have as much additional grace as it has been weakened by the fall, so that the same proportion is always preserved — and so on as before.

And if anyone wishes to respond by saying that before the fall there was no difficulty whatsoever in resisting the tempter, but after the fall there is always some difficulty, and therefore the argument does not proceed — indeed that response will retreat. For if free will by its own powers, or with grace without other help from God, could then resist all temptation without difficulty, it could also do so now, though with some difficulty. For difficulty by no means excludes all possibility of free will and includes impossibility — because if it did, it would not be

called difficult but impossible. The powers of free will, though weakened and resisting with some difficulty, still exceed the powers of some temptation or tempter.

Many saints in this state also overcame very many temptations, as is believed, without any difficulty or annoyance — indeed with great ease and joy — and also guarded against many sins about which they were not at all tempted, without any difficulty, indeed with the greatest ease. Nor is it entirely clear that for angel or man before the fall there was absolutely no difficulty. For it seems remarkable if man could then move every weight without any difficulty whatsoever, indeed with equal ease however it might be moved; nor does it seem less remarkable if he could then have discerned every letter or color in any light, however intense or dim, and at any distance, great or small, without any difficulty, uncertainty, or error — indeed with equal ease, certainty, and verification. These things, however, I leave to more careful study, pursuing what I have begun.

Holy Augustine, therefore, speaking of man before the fall, *Enchiridion* 88, says: "Man was so made upright that he could both remain in that uprightness — not without divine help — and become perverse by his own will."

The same, concerning the same subject, *On Rebuke and Grace* 48: "God had then given man a good will — for He had made him in it, He who had made him upright. He had given him help without which he could not remain in it if he willed." And chapter 49, concerning man and angel before the fall: "If this help had been lacking to either angel or man when they were first made — since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine help if it willed — they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault; for help would have been lacking without which they could not remain." And below in the same chapter: "The first man did not need grace to receive the good, because he had not yet lost it; but to remain in it, he needed the help of grace, without which he could not do so at all."

The same, *On Nature and Grace* 50, after recounting the arguments of someone trying to show by analogy that not sinning is placed in our power, says: "Just as those analogies are false, so too is what he wished to show by means of them." He continues: "He follows up and says, 'In a similar way we should understand about the possibility of not sinning — that not sinning is ours, namely in our power.'" And Augustine adds: "If he were speaking of the integral and healthy nature of man, which we do not now have, not even then would he rightly say that not sinning is only ours — although sinning would be ours. For there too there would be the help of God, like light for healthy eyes, by relying on which they see."

The same, to the same effect, *City of God* XIV, penultimate chapter: "Why did God not permit the first man, who was created upright — that is, of good will — to be tempted by an evil angel? Because he was so constituted that if he trusted in God's help, the good man would conquer the evil angel; but if he proudly abandoned God his Creator and Helper, pleased with himself, he would be conquered — having good merit in a will that was right because divinely aided, but evil merit in a will that was perverse because it abandoned God. For even trusting in God's help

was not possible without God's help; yet withdrawing from these benefits of divine grace by pleasing himself was in his power."

"For just as in this flesh, living without God's help and without the aids of food is not possible — yet not living in it is in one's power, as those who kill themselves do — so living well in it, even in Paradise, was not in man's power without God's help, but living badly was in his power."

From these things, therefore, the first part of the principal conclusion to be shown is clear; from which, together with the preceding corollary and the reasons proving it, the second part will similarly be clear.

CHAPTER 10: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES.

Here perhaps someone will object against what has been said. For Lombard, *Sentences* II, distinction 24, after citing certain authorities asserting that God's help was necessary for man or angel before the fall to remain in the good they had then received, says: "Here we must consider what that help was, given to man in creation, by which he could remain if he willed." And he answers: "That was certainly the freedom of will, immune from all stain and corruption, and rectitude of will, and the soundness and vitality of all the natural powers of the soul."

[Bradwardine then mounts an extensive critique of Lombard's position, arguing that identifying the divine help needed before the fall with free will itself is essentially the Pelagian error — that man can fulfill God's commands by free will alone. The argument proceeds through several steps:]

If free will alone sufficed for man to stand in the good, then it sufficed for him not to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil — since it was by eating from it that he fell. Therefore free will sufficed for man to fulfill the divine command about not eating from the forbidden tree, which was the only command imposed on him (Genesis 2). And so the Pelagian error returns — that man can keep God's commands by free will alone.

Augustine, *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* VIII.21, inquiring into the cause of the divine command, posits a threefold prohibition: Sometimes something per se evil is prohibited, like tasting a deadly herb. Sometimes something is prohibited that would be harmful to the one prohibiting. But sometimes something is prohibited that is harmful neither to the one prohibiting nor to the one prohibited, except because it is prohibited — and it is prohibited not so that either avoids evil, but only so that the one prohibited may gain the good — namely the good of merit, by obeying the one prohibiting. The prohibition regarding the tree falls under this third category.

Hence Augustine says: "He was prohibited from that tree, which was not evil, so that the very keeping of the command would be his good, and its transgression his evil." And below: "But when that is touched which would not harm the one touching it if it were not prohibited, nor anyone else however much it might be touched — why was it prohibited, if not so that obedience

per se good and disobedience per se evil might be shown?" And further below: "The Lord indeed may know why He commanded; what is commanded must be done by the servant, and then perhaps it may be seen by the one who merits why He commanded." He says "by the one who merits," and adds: "But lest we seek the reason for this command any longer — if this itself is a great benefit to man, that he serves God, then by commanding, God makes useful whatever He wills to command."

Likewise, if man had stood fast in the good, he would have merited through this confirmation and eternal beatitude — and this he could have done by free will without grace. Therefore he could merit those things too. But that through standing he would have merited confirmation and beatitude is sufficiently apparent, since the holy angels merited similarly.

Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 39: "The good angels by their own free will stood in the truth and merited to know most certainly about their future fall that it would never happen." And chapter 40: "The devil and his angels, even if they were blessed before they fell, there was still something to be added to their beatitude if they had stood in the truth by free will, until they received that fullness of supreme beatitude as a reward for their perseverance." And chapter 41: "He made man with free will, and although ignorant of his future fall, nevertheless good, because he perceived that not dying and not becoming miserable was in his power. In which upright state, without vice, if he had willed to remain by his own free will, he would certainly, without any experience of death or unhappiness, have received — by the merit of his perseverance — that fullness of beatitude by which the holy angels are blessed: namely, that he could never fall further, and would know this most certainly."

[The chapter continues with detailed analysis showing that Lombard's exposition of Augustine's authorities is unfaithful to Augustine's actual meaning. Bradwardine systematically shows that throughout *On Rebuke and Grace*, Augustine always distinguishes between free will and the divine help needed for perseverance — they are really distinct, not identical. He acknowledges that his critique of Lombard, "the Lord's Anointed, Bishop of Paris," may seem harsh, but excuses himself by his zeal for Catholic truth against Pelagian inventions.]

The chapter concludes: It is therefore clear that although the first man before sin could have persevered if he had willed, yet without God's help he could not will it; therefore he could not persevere finally or for a time, as the preceding chapter asserted.

CHAPTER 11: THAT PERSEVERANCE IS NOT SOME CREATED GIFT OF GOD REALLY DIFFERING AND DISTINCT FROM CHARITY AND GRACE.

So that the divine help necessary for free will to persevere in good, mentioned above generally and confusedly, may be known more distinctly, it now remains to show that perseverance is not some created gift of God really differing from or distinct from charity and grace.

For if it were, it would not be incompatible for them to be separated from one another — and for someone to have charity and grace who does not have perseverance. And if this could be for one moment, it could be for another, and so on until the end — and thus someone without final perseverance would persevere finally, which includes a contradiction.

Likewise, if so, someone having charity without perseverance for a moment could at the end of that moment pass away by natural or other death, without final perseverance divinely given to him — and so without final perseverance he could be saved, contrary to Matthew 10: "He who perseveres to the end will be saved" — "he," that is, discretively, because he and not another.

Likewise, no one doubts that whoever has had the gift of charity and grace and does not finally persevere in it falls from it through mortal sin, in which he remains until death, and is a child of eternal death. Such a person therefore, dying in charity and grace yet without final perseverance, would simultaneously eternally inherit both life and death: life because he dies in charity — which according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV.18, "alone divides between the children of the eternal kingdom and the children of eternal perdition"; death because he departs without final perseverance.

Likewise, proceeding from the contrary: if these were really distinct, someone could without charity and grace have final perseverance and be saved — because "he who perseveres to the end will be saved" (Matthew 10). This is contrary to the aforementioned authority of Augustine.

Likewise, if perseverance were such a gift of God, it would have some proper act distinct from the proper acts of other virtues — for habits are discerned by proper acts, just as forms by proper operations, as natural and moral philosophers and theologians alike attest. But such a proper act of perseverance cannot be assigned: for it cannot be posited as an act of memory, understanding, or even will, as induction through each one manifests, nor can it be called anything else whatsoever.

Likewise, if perseverance differed really from charity, since it is necessary for salvation, the Lord would have given some special commandment concerning it — which is nowhere found in the Old or New Testament. Or else the observance of the Lord's commandments would not be sufficient for salvation — yet when someone asked what he should do to receive eternal life, the Lord answered: "You know the commandments: do not commit adultery, do not kill," etc. (Mark 10).

Wherefore it seems to me that habitual perseverance is habitual charity, or enduring charity; and actual perseverance is "per-loving" (*peramatio*), and to persevere finally is to "per-love" (*peramare*) finally.

Hence Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 3: "To persevere in doing something, to say it in one word, is to accomplish (*perficere*). For we say that to persevere in writing something is to write it through (*perscribere*), in leading, to lead through (*perducere*). Let us say therefore — even if it is not in use — that to persevere in willing is to 'per-will' (*pervelle*)." Therefore to persevere in the

love of charity, of which it is said in Matthew 10, "He who perseveres to the end will be saved," is finally to "per-love."

Or alternatively, it can be said more consonantly with the word itself, and perhaps more closely to the thing: that to persevere is to "per-serve" (*perservare*) the commandments, and perseverance is the "per-servance" (*perservantia*) of the commandments. Or still more generally: habitual perseverance is justice habitually preserved; actual perseverance is the actual preservation of justice; and to persevere itself is to preserve justice.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT THE NAME "PERSEVERANCE" SIGNIFIES NO ABSOLUTE THING ESSENTIALLY, BUT ONLY ACCIDENTALLY AND RELATIVELY — NAMELY CHARITY OR JUSTICE WITH A REGARD TO FUTURE CONTINUOUS REMAINING UNTIL THE END; AND THAT IT COULD NOT IMPROBABLY BE SAID THAT PERSEVERANCE IS THIS VERY RELATION.

Hence it is manifest that the name "perseverance" signifies no thing essentially or even absolutely, but only accidentally and relatively — namely charity or justice itself, with a regard to the end, that is, with a regard to future continuous remaining until the end. Wherefore it could not improbably be said that perseverance is this very relation — which the definition of Aristotle, and especially of Cicero, recounted in chapter 7, seems to suggest.

This corollary is sufficiently clear from what was shown in this chapter. It can nevertheless be shown additionally thus: If perseverance signified essentially and absolutely some thing in the wayfarer — since it is not of the essence of the wayfarer nor essentially consequent upon him, as is clear in many who lack it — a wayfarer having final perseverance could lose it, so that it would be true that he had lost final perseverance, just as with other habits and other absolute accidents. Yet this includes a contradiction: for if he lost final perseverance, he once had it; therefore he was then going to persevere finally, and therefore was not going to fall. Yet at the same time he was going to fall, as the subsequent event demonstrated.

Hence Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 7: "We call chaste the one we know to be chaste, whether or not he will remain in that chastity; and if he has any other divine gift that can be held and lost, we say he has it as long as he has it, and if he has lost it, we say he had it. But perseverance to the end — no one has it unless he has persevered to the end. Many can have it; no one can lose it."

CHAPTER 12: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES.

Through the corollary just set forth, the response to certain possible objections against what has been said is clear.

[The chapter addresses several objections:]

Objection: If perseverance does not really differ from charity, then since perseverance is really identical to charity, everyone having charity has perseverance — which is false, since many who have it will sin mortally and fall.

Response: This is resolved by the corollary. Perseverance adds to charity the regard of continuation through the whole time until the end; it is not a separate thing that can be possessed independently.

[Multiple further objections are addressed regarding: whether perseverance can be greater or lesser as charity is; whether those who have charity can reasonably ask God for perseverance; the case of someone in charity who will sin mortally but later return and finally persevere; and whether perseverance once had can be lost. Each is resolved through the distinction established in chapter 11 — that perseverance is not an absolute thing but a relational aspect of charity's continuation to the end.]

Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 7: "Let men not say that perseverance has been given to anyone until the end, unless the end itself has come and he who was given it is found to have persevered to the end." Augustine means that of no one as long as he lives in this life is it determined and certain that he has received final perseverance — not that no one has received it. Indeed, he most frequently shows the opposite, as the preceding chapters recounted.

CHAPTER 13: THAT THE HELP WITHOUT WHICH NO ONE PERSEVERES, AND THROUGH WHICH EVERYONE WHO PERSEVERES DOES PERSEVERE, IS THE HOLY SPIRIT, THE DIVINE GOODNESS AND WILL.

Having shown that free will before the fall or after, supported by however great a created grace, could not persevere finally or for a time without other special help from God, it now remains to show what that help is, supported by which everyone who perseveres does persevere, and without which no one can persevere at all.

This help is the Holy Spirit, the divine goodness and will, as chapters 8 and 9 of Book I easily demonstrated. This can also be shown as the fifth chapter of this Book II showed its similar principal conclusion. The authorities cited in those chapters also attest to this, to which I will add a few others.

Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 47 and 49, as the end of II.9 more fully cited, shows that the divine help necessarily required by free will for persevering in good is not only that without which we cannot persevere even if we will, but also that which causes us to will. But what is that

without which we cannot will, and which makes us will and produces our volitions, if not God — who according to the Apostle, Philippians 2, "works in us both to will and to do," and this through the Holy Spirit and His most omnipotent will, as chapters 8 and 9 of Book I prove?

For the divine goodness and will are frequently in canonical Scripture and in the Doctors appropriately assigned in a certain way to the Holy Spirit. Wherefore Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 47: "The first grace given to the first Adam is that by which man has justice if he wills; the second can do more — by which it is also brought about that he wills, and wills so much and loves with such ardor that by the will of the spirit he conquers the will of the flesh that desires contrary things" — by the will of the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle means in Romans 8 when he says, "If by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the flesh, you will live."

The same, *On Rebuke and Grace* 59: "Concerning perseverance in good itself, God did not wish His saints to glory in their own powers but in Him — who not only gives them help such as He gave the first man, without which they cannot persevere if they will, but also works in them the willing. For since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, the possibility and the will to persevere are given to them by the generosity of divine grace. For their will is so kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they so will, and they so will because God works in them to will."

The same, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 18: "By His own will he falls who falls, and by the will of God he stands who stands." And chapter 36: "It is shown clearly enough that the grace of God — both for beginning and for persevering to the end — is not given according to our merits, but is bestowed according to His most secret and at the same time most just, most wise, and most beneficent will."

CHAPTER 14: THAT PERSEVERANCE IS GIVEN FREELY BY GOD, NOT OBTAINED BY MERITS.

After these things, it remains to inquire whether anyone can merit perseverance for himself.

That he can might appear not improbably. For someone can merit perseverance for another through his devout prayers — otherwise it would seem useless to pour out prayers to God that He might confirm someone in the good, contrary to what was shown in chapter 8. Why then cannot one merit perseverance for oneself?

Likewise, a wayfarer existing in grace and about to fall from it could and can through the insistence of devout prayer obtain perseverance for himself from God. Why else would the Son tell us that whatever we asked the Father in the Son's name, He would give us?

Likewise, man can merit eternal life, as the entire Christian faith attests, and this is greater and better than perseverance; therefore much more can he merit perseverance too.

Nevertheless, the opposite part seems more probable and more consonant with reason and the authorities of the Saints.

For if anyone could merit perseverance, let two wayfarers be supposed — John and Peter, equal in all natural and gratuitous gifts — and let God give perseverance to neither of them except according to the requirement of merits. Let them equally merit perseverance up to time or instant A, at which both are equally tempted regarding mortal sin. And since it is not necessary that when one consents the other consents, nor when one resists the other resists, let John be supposed to resist and so die, and Peter to sin. Then John merited perseverance and received it at A or before; and Peter equally merited it before A. Therefore he too received perseverance at A or before — which is false, since he did not persevere but fell.

Or thus: Peter and John equally merited that perseverance be given to them, and Peter did not merit that perseverance be given to him; therefore neither did John — contrary to the foregoing.

Or let any inequality of merits whatsoever be supposed: still, the one who merited perseverance more, when equally or less tempted, can fall into mortal sin; and the one who merited less, when equally or more tempted, can resist and so die — and therefore persevere finally.

Also, to baptized infants departing thus, a certain perseverance is given; but to many adults who have merited in many ways, it is by no means given.

Indeed, suppose that one person established in the greatest grace most excellently merits that perseverance be given to him, yet finally falls into mortal sin; and that another in a small grace — namely baptismal grace — never merits well, but throughout his whole time exercises himself in indifferent acts or venial sins, but abstains from mortal sin, and so departs. This person therefore had final perseverance, the other by no means. Therefore it seems obvious that final perseverance is not given according to the merits of those to whom it is given, but according to the gratuitous grace of the one who gives it.

[The chapter then provides extensive citations from Augustine's *On the Gift of Perseverance* and *On Rebuke and Grace*, and from Gregory's *Moralia*, showing that the reason why some persevere and others fall is inscrutable to human understanding — it belongs to God's most secret, most just, most wise, and most beneficent will. Augustine's treatment of Romans 11 (the remnant saved by grace), the parable of the workers in the vineyard, and Christ's prayer "I confess to You, Father... because it was pleasing before You" are all adduced to show that perseverance is a free gift of predestination, not a reward of merit.]

Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 36: "It is shown clearly enough that the grace of God — both for beginning and for persevering to the end — is not given according to our merits, but is bestowed according to His most secret and at the same time most just, most wise, and most beneficent will; since those whom He predestined, them He also called with that calling of which it is said, 'The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance'" (Romans 11:29).

The same, chapter 19: "Of two pious persons, why perseverance to the end is given to one and not the other — inscrutable are the judgments of God. Yet this should be most certain to the faithful: that the one is among the predestined, and the other is not. For 'if they had been of us,' says one of the predestined who had drunk this secret from the Lord's breast, 'they would certainly have remained with us'" (1 John 2:19).

[The chapter concludes with responses to objections, distinguishing between "impetratory" merit (which obtains something new) and "conservatory" merit (which preserves what one already has). Perseverance cannot be imperatorily merited for oneself, though one's good works serve to conserve it. The reason God wills us to pray for perseverance — even though we cannot merit it — is so that we may clearly recognize that we do not have such goods from ourselves but from God.]

CHAPTER 15: ON ETERNAL PERSEVERANCE — THAT IS, THE CONFIRMATION OF THE BLESSED — AND ITS CAUSE, WHICH IS THE ETERNAL CHARITY OF GOD'S WILL.

Having dealt with temporal perseverance on the way, it remains to inquire about eternal perseverance in the fatherland — that is, the beatific confirmation of the blessed, and its cause.

This perseverance, or confirmation of the blessed, makes them certain; the perseverance of the wretched does not. This makes its own unable to sin; the other does not. This makes the blessed comprehensors unable to fall back from the beatific act and the enjoyment of God; the other does not make the wretched wayfarers likewise unable — as the nature of perfect beatitude requires, as many philosophers and all theologians alike attest, and as Peter, *Sentences* II, distinctions 5 and 7, somewhat recounts and declares. I therefore do not think I need to linger longer over demonstrating this, as I hasten to other matters.

Concerning the cause of this confirmation, however, multiple opinions are found.

[Opinion 1: Grace] Some think the cause is grace, citing Augustine, *Against Maximinus* III.13: "To whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature but of God's grace." And Isidore, *On the Supreme Good* I.10: "The nature of angels is mutable, because mutability is innate in their nature; but eternal charity makes them incorruptible. It is by grace, not by nature, that the angels are immutable." Peter, *Sentences* II, distinction 7, plainly holds this.

Yet this, in the form stated, seems open to challenge. For if grace indiscriminately and sufficiently confirms, then the grace of a wayfarer confirms him — especially since it is of the same nature as the grace of the blessed. Also, in demons and obstinate humans one need not posit any such habit as the cause of their obstinacy; therefore neither in confirmed angels or humans, by similar reasoning.

[Opinion 2: Great abundance of grace] Wherefore some think that not just any or any amount of grace, but a great abundance of grace, confirms the blessed. They cite Augustine, *On Rebuke*

and Grace 40: "The devil and his angels, even if they were blessed before they fell and did not know that they would fall into misery, there was still something to be added to their beatitude if they had stood in the truth by free will — until they received that fullness of supreme beatitude as a reward for their perseverance: namely, that by a great abundance of the charity of God given through the Holy Spirit, they could never fall further, and would know this most certainly about themselves."

But neither does this seem entirely certain. For it was shown in chapter 3 of this book that no secondary cause can necessitate free will; therefore neither can any charity or grace of whatever quantity. Also, some perfect wayfarer has, it seems, as much charity or grace, or more, on the way as one least among the blessed — say an infant purified from original sin through baptism, circumcision, or otherwise — has in the fatherland; and this does not suffice to confirm.

[Opinion 3: Contemplation of God] Some think that contemplation of God is the cause of the confirmation of the blessed in good. Isidore, *On the Supreme Good* I.10: "The mutability of nature is aided in the good angels by the contemplation of the Creator, from which the apostate angel was deprived; and while they are mutable by nature, the divine contemplation does not allow them to be changed."

But this opinion, like the previous one, can be challenged. Moreover, the angels before their confirmation contemplated and saw God; man also, according to Peter, *Sentences* IV, distinction 1, saw God without mediation before sin; and after sin many holy prophets contemplated and saw God. Also, if the vision of God confirms the good in good, what vision confirms the wicked in evil?

[Opinion 4: Fullness of goods attained] Some judge that because the saints in heaven see no good they lack which they might wrongly desire, they therefore cannot sin but are immovably confirmed in the good they have. Hence Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 6: the good angels "have been advanced by God so that they have attained whatever they could will, and no longer see what more they could will; and on account of this they cannot sin."

But this cannot stand. For confirmation is a positive effect; therefore it has some positive cause, and a merely privative cause does not suffice. According to this, a wayfarer having some small good and seeing nothing greater would be immovably confirmed.

[Opinion 5: Knowledge of future misery] Others, following Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 22 and after, think that the cause of the confirmation of the blessed is that they know they would be eternally miserable if they sinned, and no one can will that by which he knows he will be eternally miserable.

But far be it! For according to this, the blessed would avoid sins more by fear of punishment than by love of justice, which is unbecoming. Also, even if infernal misery had never been ordained for sinners, God could confirm the good in good eternally.

[Opinion 6: Intensity of beatific delight] Others dream that the blessed, from the great vehemence of beatitude and its annexed delight, become as it were drunk, and thus free will is bound in them so that they can in no way fall back from the beatific act or proceed to any other act.

But no sober person judges this, nor does anyone so dream unless perhaps he is drunk or insane. For who would be so foolish — indeed, insane — as to affirm that in beatitude, which according to both philosophers and theologians is the ultimate perfection of man, the human soul with its powers would not be supremely perfect? Or that when it is supremely perfect, it could not have the use of free will and its perfect act?

[Opinion 7: Total beatitude as collection of all goods] Others, seeing that no single good by itself alone can be a sufficient cause of confirmation, think that total beatitude — which is the collection and sum of all goods together — is the cause of confirmation sought. For it fully satiates, since every desirable thing is present and every thing to be fled is far absent; and it is the natural end of free will, and every movable thing rests once it has attained its natural end.

But this opinion, like the others, seems to err — especially if it speaks of total created beatitude. For no created thing, simple or composite, can necessitate a rational and free will, as chapter 3 of this book makes clear.

Bradwardine's own view: It seems to me that grace, abundance of grace, contemplation of God, and the other things mentioned above are in a certain way the cause of confirmation in good; but none of them suffices by itself. The sufficient cause of confirmation is not and cannot be any lower or secondary cause, but only the supreme and first — namely God Himself, the Holy Spirit, the uncreated, eternal, insuperable, and immutable grace and charity of God's will, as can be clearly drawn from chapters 13, 6, and 3 of this book, and from I.2, I.9, I.10, and I.23.

This seems to be specially testified by that saying of Plato in *Timaeus* II, introducing God speaking to the angels thus: "O gods, whose maker and father I am: you are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble by my will — because my will is a greater bond, and more vigorous for the custody of eternity, than those vital bonds from which your eternity is assembled and composed" — as is more fully cited in the first and second chapters of Book I.

In agreement with this, the Prophet: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath of His mouth all their power" (Psalm 32). And who are these heavens more fittingly than the rational heavenly creatures dwelling in the heavens?

Augustine, commenting on this verse together with the preceding one ("The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord"), tractate 3, writes: "The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord. What of the heavens? Hear what of the heavens. For where there is no misery, there is no need of mercy. On earth, human misery abounds; the Lord's mercy superabounds. But the heavens where there is no misery — do they not need the Lord because they do not need mercy? All things need the Lord, both the wretched and the happy. Without Him, the wretched person is not lifted up; without

Him, the happy person is in need. Therefore, lest you should ask about the heavens when you hear 'The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord' — hear that the heavens too need the Lord: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were established.' They did not provide their own stability, nor did the heavens themselves furnish their own firmness. 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath of His mouth all their power.' They had nothing from themselves; but as a supplement they received from the Lord. For by the breath of His mouth, not part but ALL their power."

CHAPTER 16: ON THE ETERNAL PERSEVERANCE, OR OBSTINACY, OF THE WICKED IN EVIL, AND ITS CAUSE.

Now that the eternal perseverance, or confirmation, of the good in good has been treated, what is more fitting than to treat of the eternal perseverance, or obstinacy, of the wicked in evil?

Just as confirmation makes the confirmed unable to sin, so obstinacy makes the obstinate unable to will or do good. And just as the former makes them unable to cease from the beatific act, so the latter makes the obstinate unable to rest from the miserable act — which is well expressed figuratively in Job 41: "His heart shall be hardened like a stone and pressed together like a smith's anvil."

Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter* 21: "Neither the devil nor any of his angels, from the time when by the merit of his ruin they were thrust down into this lower darkness, could or will be able to resume a good will." And below, chapter 26: "The will of those condemned is such that it has in itself always the punishment of its own malice, yet can never receive the disposition of goodness. For just as those who will reign with Christ will have no remnants of evil will in themselves, so those who are assigned to the punishment of eternal fire with the devil and his angels, just as they will never have rest, so they will never be able to have a good will."

Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 6: "So the angels are separated that those adhering to justice can will no good which they do not enjoy, and those abandoning it can will nothing which they do not lack."

Concerning the cause of obstinacy, various opinions are offered:

[Opinion 1: Privative — lack of charity or grace] Some posit only a privative cause — the defect or desertion of charity or grace. But if so, since according to Peter, *Sentences* II, distinctions 5 and 24, the angels and first parents were created without grace, then they were finally obstinate at that point; and every wayfarer lacking grace would be immutably obstinate.

[Opinion 2: Privative — lack of divine mercy] Others say the cause is the lack of divine benevolence or mercy — God not willing to show mercy to the wretch. But this is destroyed by the same reasoning. Also, by I.23, God's will is immutable; therefore if God at some time does

not will to show mercy to this wretch, He never willed it. Therefore every obstinate person, whenever he existed, was immutably obstinate.

[Opinion 3: Privative — lack of confirmation in good] Others say the cause is the lack of confirmation in good. But then every wayfarer who is not confirmed would be eternally obstinate.

[Opinion 4: Loss of the use of free will] Some think that the vehemence of the punishment the obstinate endure makes them foolish and, according to what was shown in chapter 3, takes away all use of free will and casts them into outer darkness — and so makes them obstinate.

But before the day of judgment this does not seem to be the case. For now the demons, though obstinate, have great knowledge, predict many truths ingeniously, craftily deceive humans, and subtly accomplish many artificial and wonderful things — as both experience and multiple historical and other books, both profane and Catholic, attest. It also seems that God omnipotent could have struck the apostate angels with the punishment of obstinacy without such great vehemence of sensory punishment.

[Opinion 5: Natural immutability of angelic will] Others think the cause of obstinacy in demons is the natural immutability of the will — since angels, not weighed down by the mass of a body, know and apprehend immutably without discursion, and therefore will and desire immutably.

But this position seems to err both in matter and in form. In matter, by supposing what is false: for just as the angel is mutable in itself and in its nature — from non-being to being and vice versa — so also in its action, especially since it has free will naturally suited for merit and sin. Of similar angels, some sinned and some resisted sin and laudably merited. Also, the evil angels before they sinned had a good will, as did the other angels and the first man. Also, Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter* 21: "If it were possible that human nature, after turning away from God and losing the goodness of will, could again have it from itself, much more possibly would the angelic nature have it — which, being less burdened by the weight of an earthly body, would be all the more endowed with this faculty." Therefore, according to Augustine's judgment, the angelic will turned away from God is by its own nature more returnable, convertible — and therefore more mutable — than the human will.

This position also errs in form: for the human soul separated from the body, and the whole human being in body and soul together after the final judgment — who by nature is of mutable apprehension and similarly of mutable will — are rendered obstinate just like the demons.

[Opinion 6: Obstinate will itself] Some say the cause is voluntary obstinacy, or an obstinate will in evil. Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will* 18: "The devil cannot breathe toward the good — this is not caused by any alien violent oppression, but by his own will obstinate in evil, and voluntary obstinacy."

But this cannot stand: nothing can be the cause of itself. And when it is said that the devil's own obstinate will is the cause, one must ask what the cause of that obstinacy is.

[Opinion 7: Free will of the obstinate] Some say the cause is the free will of the obstinate itself, freely refusing all good and freely continuing the evil act. But if free will alone made someone obstinate in evil, this would be either mutably or immutably. Not mutably freely, as the nature of obstinacy implies. Not immutably, since free will by itself and by its own nature is mutable according to contradiction, as the first chapter of this book and what follows taught.

[Opinion 8: Malice and vice] Others say the cause is the malice and vice of the obstinate. But malice and vice are either pure privation or something positive. If pure privation, they are refuted by the foregoing. If something positive — whether act or habit — they are similarly refuted.

[Opinion 9: Vehemence of volition] Others believe that the more perfect the will, the more perfectly it immerses itself in its object — and the angelic will, being separated from a body, is maximally perfect and perfectly free, so it immerses itself in its object so vehemently that it cannot retract itself. But this position, like the fifth, errs in both matter and form.

[Opinion 10: No cause at all] Those who say no cause of obstinacy should be posited say that obstinacy is nothing — merely an impotence or privation of the power to will well and to cease from willing evil. But they err doubly: in matter, because they falsely suppose that no privation has a cause; and in form, because they do not avoid the difficulty.

Bradwardine's own view: Saving the judgment of my elders, it seems that some cause of obstinacy should be posited — both privative and positive. The privative cause, regarding what is privative there — namely the inability to will well — is the privation or lack of grace, according to I.39 and I.43. Nor can they merit this, by I.35 and following. Nor does God will to give them grace freely. Indeed, so that this privative cause may be reduced to a prior positive cause (as I.13 teaches), they lack grace and will lack it because, as the most just punishment for their prior sin, God wills them to lack grace eternally — which they would have had eternally if they had not sinned.

There is also a positive cause of obstinacy, regarding what is posited positively there — namely the eternal continuation of the act — and this is the free will of the obstinate, as Bernard seems to hold. But since this alone does not suffice, as was shown above, it seems, according to what was shown in chapter 15, that God's being indignant and not willing this act ever to cease, and willing it to be eternally continued as the most just eternal punishment for the preceding sin, is the sufficient and supreme cause of this.

Hence the Prophet: "Wrath is in His indignation, and life in His will" (Psalm 29).

CHAPTER 17: THAT NO RATIONAL CREATURE CAN BE CONFIRMED OR OBSTINATED IMMUTABLY BY NATURE.

Having shown that some rational creatures are immovably confirmed in good and some immutably obstinated in evil, and this not solely by free will and their own nature, we must inquire further whether this can be done by nature.

Some argue that it can: in the confirmation of the blessed, no infinite help is applied to nature, but only a finite one; and as much could be applied to it by the addition of a greater and stronger natural endowment. Similarly with the obstinate.

But this does not seem correct — unless one speaks equivocally and too sophistically of "rational creature," supposing for example that God could create a rational creature having only the judgment of reason without freedom of acting, or vice versa. Speaking univocally, however, of a rational creature of the same nature as exists now, it does not seem that anyone can be confirmed in moral or supernatural good by nature alone.

For if the natural strength and power of a rational creature is naturally increased, as the power of the intellect is increased, then — proportionally — so is the free power of the will. However much it can naturally use the power of the intellect, so much also the free power of the will; therefore it can will as mutably as a lower, less powerful will.

Also, whatever created power is posited, however great, it is a created rational power, and as far as concerns its own nature, just as it is mutable in nature and in being — from non-being to being and vice versa — so it is mutable in action and mutable in will, and avails for opposites successively, as was shown concerning the angels in the preceding chapter.

Also, whatever rational creature is posited, it is of itself mutable in intellect: for it can know something after not knowing it, and vice versa; and it can be deceived when what it believes to be true, the relevant thing having been secretly changed, is false. Therefore it is similarly mutable, deceivable, and capable of sinning in will.

Also, under whatever degree of perfection of nature, there can be a rational creature immutably confirmed in good or evil; there can also be a similar creature mutable in the state of wayfaring. For this includes no contradiction — indeed, under whatever degree of finite perfection of nature, there can be a rational creature that is mutable and capable of meriting. Otherwise the omnipotent hand of God would be most shamefully mutilated and rendered excessively impotent. Otherwise there would be a certain limit of natural perfection naturally fixed, beyond which a rational creature could not pass and beyond which God omnipotent could not create such a creature — which accords with no reason. For why to this limit and not beyond?

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT NO RATIONAL CREATURE IS OR CAN BE IMMUTABLE, UNABLE TO MERIT, OR IMPECCABLE BY NATURE.

From these things I consider it manifest that no rational creature is or can be immutable, unable to merit, or impeccable by nature. This follows so evidently that it needs no proof.

Augustine, *Against Maximinus* III.13: "The nature of celestial creatures could die because it could sin; for angels too sinned and became demons, of whom the devil is prince. And those who did not sin could have sinned. To whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature but of God's grace. Therefore God alone is He who not by anyone's grace but by His own nature neither could, nor can, nor will be able to sin."

Jerome also, Epistle 13 to Pope Damasus, on the Prodigal Son, says: "From many testimonies of Scripture we are taught that perfect justice belongs to God alone." And below: "In the Psalms it is said, 'No living thing shall be justified in Your sight' — he does not say 'no man,' but 'every living thing' — that is, not the Evangelist, not the Apostle, not the Prophet; I ascend to greater things — not the Angel, not the Thrones, not the Dominions, not the Powers, nor the other virtues. God alone is He in whom sin does not fall. All others, since they are of free will — just as man too was made in the image and likeness of God — can bend their will in either direction." This must be understood as referring to their bare nature.

Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II.10, after showing that Christ, God and man, cannot sin and yet is to be praised for His justice, asks: "I think we should ask: since God could make such a man, why did He not make the angels and the two first humans such that they similarly could not sin, and yet would be praiseworthy for their justice?" And answering he adds: "Because it ought not and could not be that each of them should be the very same as God, as we say of this man."

CHAPTER 18: AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS WHO SAY THAT THE ACT OF FREE WILL IS NOTHING.

With these matters, by God's help, dispatched, it now remains to investigate the proper act of free will, with the same help. But because there are some — of whom Isaiah did not keep silent — "groping like the blind along a wall, and fumbling as though without eyes, stumbling at midday as in darkness, and in gloomy places like the dead sleeping" — so insensible and lifeless that they do not at all perceive their own proper acts, asserting that the act of free will is nothing: therefore I will pause for a while, so that He who illumines the eyes of the blind may deign to pour true light into them and into me.

For it is clearer than light to all that if the act of free will is nothing, neither is the act of any other power or form anything. For free will is the most perfect created power or form; therefore its proper act will not be less perfect than the proper act of any other power. Wherefore it is no less clear that this blind position must consequently hold that every action and passion, every acting and being acted upon, every motion and change, every moving and being moved, changing and being changed — universally — is nothing.

How greatly this opposes nearly all sciences, those who know will easily detect. It endeavors to extinguish all sciences that do not abstract from action and motion — and these are all sciences, with scarcely arithmetic and geometry excepted (though even Euclid's *Elements* Book XI and Jordanus's *On Triangles* use motion in their definitions and theorems, and Boethius in the last chapter of his second book of Arithmetic treats all musical consonances, which can never occur without motion).

[Arguments from the trivial arts:] Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Music all deal with sound and voice. If sound and voice are something, as these sciences teach, then sounding and voicing are something, and the striking or percussion from which sound is generated is likewise something — for nothing is generated from nothing.

[Arguments from natural philosophy:] Motion is the efficient cause of heat, as natural science frequently attests and everyone experiences without it. Therefore motion is something, since every efficient cause of a real effect is something truly real.

[Bradwardine then refutes a response that claims motion causes heat only by congregating hot parts — showing this would apply equally to cold, wet, dry, etc., and that cold objects like stones, metals, and wood actually grow hotter when moved vigorously, not colder.]

[Arguments from sensation:] Whatever is truly sensed is something; and sensing is truly sensed, as everyone experiences. The Philosopher, *De Anima* II, shows that by the same external sense we sense an external object and sense ourselves sensing it. Therefore sensing is something and not nothing.

Likewise, imagination, cogitation, desire, anger, joy, sadness, and many similar things are sensed by the material sense; therefore they are something and not nothing. These also multiply and truly really alter bodies and cause many real effects — and nothing alters or causes nothing.

[The chapter then provides extensive evidence from Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, and Augustine about the real physical effects of mental acts — how fear causes pallor, anger causes redness, desire causes bodily changes, intense study alters the body, and even maternal imagination affects offspring (citing Jacob's striped rods from Genesis 30).]

[Arguments from intellection:] If understanding, thinking, composing, dividing, and reasoning are not something and do not produce anything — and since they produce knowledge and other intellectual habits — it patently follows that none of those habits is anything either.

[Arguments from beatitude:] If no act is anything, then since beatitude is an act, it is nothing. But that beatitude is an act is clear from the Philosopher, *Ethics* I, III, and X, where he demonstrates through many chapters that happiness is an operation and act. And *Metaphysics* IX.16: "Happiness is an operation in the soul, because it is a certain kind of life." Truth itself concordantly attests: "This is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent" (John 17).

All philosophers — Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, and others except the Epicureans (who should not be called philosophers but rather "pleasure-lovers") — and all theologians without exception agree that final happiness and beatitude is the actual vision or enjoyment of God, or both together. No one, I hope, is so foolish or insane as to deny that eternal life, happiness, and beatitude are something.

Therefore the act of the will is something, and not nothing.

CHAPTER 19: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES.

But perhaps someone will object against these things.

Objection 1: Augustine, *On the Perfection of Human Justice* 5, says that sin is an act, not a thing (*res*). The same, *Hypomnesticon* 19: "Evil is not a nature, but truly an act arising from the defect of good." And in the *Propositions of Prosper*, proposition 176: "There is no substance of evil, because what does not have God as its Author does not exist."

Response: According to Augustine's manner of speaking, "thing" (*res*) is taken in two ways — generally and specially. Generally, it is convertible with "being" or "something" in its most general community, as common to every true or fictitious, imagined, or however understood being. Specially, however, it is said from "rateness" (*raritas*) or "the established" (*ratum*), and thus comprehends only what exists in an established way — whether per se, like substance, or through another, like accidents through substance — and thus is common only to the ten categories.

Still more specially, "thing" is said from "the permanently established," whose being is not in flux or becoming. And most specially, "thing" is said from "that which exists per se in an established way," like substance alone.

Speaking in the first or second way, an act is a thing. Speaking in the third or fourth way, it is not. And Augustine's words attest to this sense. He says: "We respond that sin is said to be an act, not a thing — just as in the body, lameness by the same reasoning is an act, not a thing, since the thing is the foot itself, or the body, or the man. That very defect by which a man limps is neither a foot, nor a body, nor a man."

This is confirmed by Augustine himself, *On the Perfection of Human Justice* 25, who — having rejected the mode of speaking of his opponent Celestius — says according to his own opinion that an act is a thing (*rem*). Many other authorities of his cited in the preceding chapter say the same.

The authorities of Sacred Scripture also attest to this most copiously: Genesis 34 calls Shechem's act a "foul thing" (*rem foedam*); Genesis 38 calls Onan's act a "detestable thing" (*rem detestabilem*); Genesis 44: "You have done a most wicked thing" (*pessimam rem*); Psalm 100: "I

did not set before my eyes an unjust thing" (*rem iniustam*); and Hebrews 6, where the Apostle calls God's promise and oath "two things" (*duas res*). Thus it is clear that acts are things.

Objection 2: Authorities say evil is not a nature or substance but an act or action.

Response: Evil is taken in two ways, as I.26 teaches — for malice itself, which is pure privation, and for the subject of that privation. Similarly, an evil act can be taken in two ways: for the substance or essence of the act itself, and figuratively and tropically for its malice or deformity. Hence Augustine, *City of God* XII.8: "Evil will is not an affection but a defection." And *On Free Will* II, last chapter: "The motion of aversion of the will, which is sin, is defective and a defect, and therefore is not from God." And Bernard, *On Free Will* 10: "To will evil is a defect of the will."

Evil in the first sense is an act in the second sense; and evil in the second sense is an act in the first sense. Augustine's statement in *On True Religion* that "acting and being acted upon is not substance" is true literally and in intention: he means that it is not substance properly so called — because it does not subsist per se — or more commonly, that it is not a permanent essence but one always consisting in becoming or in flux. From this, therefore, it cannot be proved that acting, an act, or action has no essence whatsoever and is nothing.

CHAPTER XX. THAT GOD IS THE NECESSARY CO-EFFECTOR OF EVERY ACT OF THE CREATED WILL.

With these things having been shown beforehand, the proper order now requires us to show consequently that God is the necessary co-effector of every act of the created will—the opposite of which the Nimrodian and Pelagian heresy barked against. For Josephus, in Book 1 of his *Jewish Antiquities*, chapter 2, says thus: "Because they were swelling with a multitude of young men, God again caused them to depart from themselves, since they did not think they possessed good things through His favor, but believed their own strength to be the cause of their riches. Whence they resolved to be disobedient to the will of God." And further on, chapter 3: "The one who made them become arrogant toward injury and contempt of God was Nimrod, son of Ham, son of Noah, who, being bolder and strongest of hand, persuaded them not to ascribe it to God that happiness came to men through Him, but that this was furnished to them by their own power. And he drew the kinsmen of his race to the cause of tyranny, he alone presuming to call men back from the fear of God and to place their hope in their own power. The multitude, however, was inclined to obey Nimrod's commands, thinking it a grievous servitude to submit to God."

Pelagius likewise, in the third book *On Free Will*, distinguishing three things in man—namely, the ability, the willing, and the doing (that is, possibility, will, and action)—said that man has the first from God and from the grace of God, but the remaining two from himself alone, without God. Whence also the blessed Augustine, in Book 1 *Against Pelagius and Celestine*, *On the*

Grace of Christ and *On Original Sin*, chapter 2, says: "Although he establishes and distinguishes three things—possibility, will, and action—he confesses the first of these three to be given by the Creator of nature, but asserts the remaining two to be ours, and so attributes them to us that he contends they belong to us from no source but ourselves." And further on, chapter 3: "For we ought to know that he believes neither our will nor our action to be aided by divine help, but only the possibility of willing and working, which alone of these three he affirms we have from God—as though what God Himself placed in nature were infirm, but the other two, which he wished to be ours, were so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they need no help from Him; and therefore He does not help us to will, does not help us to act, but only helps us to be able to will and act"—as other works of this same holy Father indicate in many places.

Therefore, with God who works in us the willing and the accomplishing of our acts directing us according to His good pleasure, we must fearlessly attack this error. Now, according to the two immediately preceding chapters, every act of the will is something, and not from eternity; therefore it is made—and this by the created will, as the corollary of the third chapter of this second book teaches—and not by it alone, because by the third chapter of the first book, God's efficient causality is necessarily required there. Therefore God is a necessary co-effector there—that is, a co-effector with the created will who is necessarily required.

All the arguments proving the principal conclusion of that third chapter likewise prove this one too, from all of which, however, let this one suffice for now: It seems to be less to preserve a thing in being than to produce it from non-being into being; but by the second chapter of the first book, no creature can preserve any thing in being without God also preserving it; therefore neither can it produce any thing into being. And according to the two immediately preceding chapters, an act of the will is some thing, not nothing.

Likewise, it is less to persevere finally or for a time in a good act of the will, or in any good, than to effect that good; but according to the eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters of this second book, no one without God's help can persevere in good, finally or for a time.

Likewise, every act of the will is a certain motion; therefore, by the fourth chapter of the first book, God necessarily co-moves there—which the arguments and authorities of that chapter sufficiently show, from which let these two suffice for the present: It is less to exist than to move, and by the second chapter of the first book, no creature suffices to exist by itself; therefore neither to move. Likewise, if a man could will and move from his own form sufficiently without God co-moving, then any other natural thing could likewise move from its own form; and so there would be no way taken from motion to prove one first mover, which is against both philosophy and theology alike, as the aforementioned chapter cited.

And this is true not only in natural things but also in voluntary ones. Whence the Philosopher, in *On Good Fortune*, chapter 2, as the twenty-ninth chapter of the first book more fully recounted, proves that appetite is not the cause by which someone is fortunate, because that appetite has some cause, and that cause is either nature or fortune. And having refuted the first, he adds in

refutation of the second: "If it is fortune, then fortune will be the cause of all things—namely, of human acts; for even of understanding and deliberating. For the one deliberating did not deliberate before he deliberated, but there is a certain principle; nor did the one understanding understand before he understood, and this to infinity. Therefore intellect is not the principle of understanding, nor is deliberation the principle of deliberating. What then is it other than fortune? Therefore all things are from fortune."

And he responds: "Or there is some principle of which there is no other outside it, and this thing, because it is such by its being, can produce such a thing. But what is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? It is clear: just as in the whole, so God. For He moves in a certain way all things that are divine in us. The principle of reason is not reason, but something better. What then will be better than both knowledge and intellect, if not God? For the power of the intellect is His instrument."

Behold: God is the motive power, as it were the craftsman; and the art itself and the intellect are instruments moved by Him—which many philosophical and theological authorities cited in chapter 4 of the first book also attest. Indeed, God Himself through Isaiah, chapter 10, teaches the same, where He calls Sennacherib the rod of His fury, a staff, an axe, and a saw; where the gloss says that just as these inanimate instruments do nothing by themselves, but through the one who moves them, so neither did Sennacherib act by himself, but in the power of God—which Jerome also beautifully and extensively pursues in Book 4 on Isaiah, as the thirty-second chapter of the first book more fully recounted.

And Avicenna, in Book 10 of his *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, as the twenty-ninth chapter of the first book more fully cited, says: "Our acts of willing exist after not having existed; but whatever exists after not having existed has a cause; therefore every act of our will has a cause. The cause of this willing does not proceed to infinity, but to certain things that happen from outside—namely, earthly or heavenly things; but earthly things lead back to heavenly ones. Therefore the collection of all these proceeds necessarily from the necessity of the divine will."

This error was also refuted and overturned by Abraham, the most illustrious patriarch, philosopher, and prophet, by a similar argument, as is evident from the thirty-fifth part of the corollary of chapter 1 of Book 1.

Wherefore also Saint Thomas, in *On the Christian Religion, or On Faith, Hope, and Charity*, addressed to Raynaldus, chapter 129, says thus: "Since everything mutable and multiform is reduced to some immobile principle as to its cause, and since the intellect and will of man appear mutable and multiform, it is necessary that they be reduced to some higher, immobile, and uniform cause. And since they are not reduced, as to a cause, to the heavenly bodies, it is necessary to reduce them to higher causes." And in the next chapter: "Because secondary causes do not act except through the power of the first cause, just as instruments act through the direction of art, it is necessary that all other agents, through whom God fulfills the order of His governance, act by the power of God Himself. The acting of each of them is therefore caused by

God, just as the motion of the mobile is caused by the motion of the mover. But the mover and the moved must be together; therefore it is necessary that God be present to every agent interiorly, acting, as it were, within it, while He moves it to act."

This he also proves and holds equally for natural and voluntary things in his booklet of questions *On the Power of God*, question 20, as is more fully recounted in the demonstration of the second corollary of chapter 1 of the first book; and similarly in Book 3 *Against the Gentiles* and in many other places.

Likewise, John Scotus, commenting on Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 2, showing that the first efficient cause is intelligent and willing, argues in this manner: "Something is caused contingently; therefore the first cause causes contingently; therefore it causes willingly." Proof of the first consequence: "Every secondary cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first; therefore if the first necessarily moves, then every other is necessarily moved, and everything is necessarily caused. Therefore if some cause moves contingently, the first will also move contingently, because the secondary cause does not cause except in the power of the first cause, insofar as it is moved by it." Proof of the second consequence: "There is no principle of operating contingently except the will or something accompanying the will, because everything else acts from the necessity of nature, and thus not contingently."

And he immediately objects against the first consequence in this way: "Our willing can contingently cause something; therefore it is not required that the first cause cause it contingently." And against the second consequence—namely, "it causes contingently, therefore willingly"—he objects thus: "Other things naturally moved can be impeded, and so the opposite will happen contingently and violently."

To the first objection he responds thus: "It must be said that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows concerning it as concerning other things, because whether He immediately necessarily moves it, or immediately moves something else which necessarily moves it because it is moved, it follows in the end that whatever is proximate to the will necessarily moves the will—even if the proximate thing is the will itself—and so it will necessarily will; and it further follows, impossibly, that it necessarily causes everything it creates."

To the second objection he responds thus: "I say that if another cause can impede this one, it cannot do so except in the power of a higher cause, and so on up to the first cause; and if this immediately and necessarily moves the cause nearest to it, there will be necessity all the way down to that point; therefore it will necessarily impede, and consequently the other cause cannot naturally cause."

And further on, commenting on distinction 39, he recounts these things more briefly in these words: "In distinction 2 it was proved that God is intelligent and willing through the contingency of things, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its

effect unless the first cause stands contingently toward the cause nearest to it or toward its effect. This was proved briefly from the fact that a cause that moves insofar as it is moved, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily moves. Therefore every secondary cause that produces insofar as it is moved by the first necessarily moves what is nearest to it, or produces its effect. Therefore the entire ordering of causes down to the last effect will necessarily produce, if the relation of the first cause to the cause nearest to it is necessary."

And this is sufficiently attested by that well-known first proposition from the *Book of Causes*: "Every primary cause has more influence upon its effect than the universal secondary cause"—with its commentary, as the second chapter of the first book more fully cited.

Wherefore also Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned and excommunicated two articles contrary to the aforementioned truth. The first says that in efficient causes, the secondary cause has an action that it does not receive from the first cause. The second holds that in efficient causes, when the first cause ceases, the secondary cause does not cease from operation, provided the secondary cause operates according to its own nature. A third article, however, he does not condemn absolutely, but expounds—namely, that all voluntary motions are reduced to the First Mover. "It is an error," he says, "unless it is understood as referring to the First Mover absolutely, who is uncaused, and understanding it of motion according to its substance, not according to its deformity."

Likewise, by the twenty-second chapter of the first book, God necessarily has an act of will regarding every act of the created will—and not a nolition, because then it would not come about, as the tenth chapter of the first book teaches—therefore a volition; and by that same tenth chapter, that volition is necessarily efficacious. Therefore it is necessary that it effect every such act. Indeed, if the opposite of this were granted, the will of God would not be efficacious, nor would God be omnipotent. For suppose that God wills the created will to produce its act; then if God does nothing there, but the created will acts alone, it can freely of itself alone not produce its act, and consequently frustrate the divine will and likewise mutilate His omnipotence; because if God wills something to be done, and it is not done, God cannot bring it about that it be done. For from the opposite of the conclusion together with the major premise, the opposite of the minor follows, as that same tenth chapter of the first book more fully deduced.

And on account of these arguments, John Scotus holds this conclusion in his commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, distinction 37, question 2, which asks: "Whether the created will is the total and immediate cause with respect to its own willing, so that God has no immediate efficient causality with respect to it, but only mediate." And having recounted the opinion that affirms this, he says: "Against this opinion there are two arguments. First, because from it it follows that God is not naturally foreknowing of future things. Second, that He is not the best."

Proof of the first consequence: "Because God has no knowledge of future contingents except because He knows with certainty the determination of His own will regarding them, which will is immutable and beyond all potentiality. But if the will is the total cause with respect to its own

willing, then however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, the created will could will otherwise, and so certainty does not follow from knowledge of the determination of the divine will."

Proof of the second consequence: "Because whatever the best wills, comes about. But if He wills my volition to occur, and that volition is in the power of my will as a total cause standing contingently toward it, it can of itself be determined to one part or to the other indifferently; and so what the divine will determines it to can fail to come about."

Likewise, if the created will alone effected its act, not all actions nor human affairs would be governed by divine providence—contrary to the twenty-seventh, thirtieth, thirty-first, and thirty-second chapters of the first book. For if God provides for such actions, He does so voluntarily, and His will is efficacious, by the tenth chapter of the first book; wherefore the divine will effects all such actions.

Likewise, otherwise many things could be purely causal and fortuitous—that is, with respect to secondary causes, and even the first cause—contrary to the twenty-ninth chapter of the first book.

Wherefore also the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned two erroneous articles. The first said that human acts are not governed by divine providence. The second held that some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would happen of necessity.

Likewise, if the created will alone could produce its act, it could also alone sometimes produce a more intense act and sometimes a less intense one; and so it could alone intensify its act and its good merit—contrary to the forty-sixth chapter of the first book.

Likewise, if the created will alone could produce its act, the created intellect could similarly do so; and so it could understand, compose and divide, reason discursively, and know many truths without the aid of the agent intellect, which is God—and this is against the philosophers, as the sixth chapter of the first book more fully cited. For how would a man ignorant of the sciences, both in habit and in act, artfully seek them through his own study, and likewise find them, unless he were directed by someone knowing in act and teaching him? For this cannot happen by fortune or chance.

Whence also Averroes, commenting on *On Sleep and Waking*, assigning the cause of knowledge acquired in sleep, says thus: "It is manifest that this knowledge acquired in sleep is not preceded by an active mode. Whether a preparatory mode precedes it is doubtful. And since this knowledge is acquired after ignorance, and after it was in potency, and without any preceding knowledge, it is manifest that it is acquired in the same way as first propositions are acquired. And since this is so, it is necessary that the agent producing them be the same and of the same kind; because everything that goes from potency to act has an agent that is of the kind of that thing which goes from potency to act. Therefore it is necessary that the one producing this

knowledge be an intellect in act, and this is the one that gives universal principles in speculative matters, whose existence was demonstrated in the book *On the Soul*."

Likewise, God produces true dreams in the intellect of a sleeping man and true prophecy in the intellect of a waking man, as the sixth chapter of the first book taught. Therefore God is the agent intellect producing human knowledge—and not through a heavenly body as an intermediary, as some imagine, but through Himself, as could be shown in many ways. But for the sake of brevity, I adduce only Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning and excommunicating a certain article in these words: "That God, or an intelligence, does not infuse knowledge into the human soul in sleep except through a heavenly body as intermediary."

Likewise, the human intellect is of itself potential and in potency to understanding. Therefore, in order for it to come into the act of understanding, it necessarily requires something actual that moves it from this potency to this act. This cannot be a body, nor anything corporeal, nor anything that is not an intellect, nor an intellect not in act, as is easy to show in each case. Therefore this is an intellect in act; therefore this is the intellect that produces all our understanding.

And by this reasoning Aristotle demonstrates this conclusion in Book 3 of *On the Soul*, chapters 17 and following, and Averroes on that passage similarly, and on Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 18, and on *On Sleep and Waking*. And Avicenna, Book 5 of *On the Soul*, chapters 5 and 6; Algazel, Book 5 of his *Physics*, chapters 1 and 6. And there is likewise an article condemned and excommunicated by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: "That the agent intellect is not joined to our possible intellect."

These thinkers, however, seem to disagree somewhat. For Aristotle and Averroes hold this agent intellect to be God, as is evident from chapter 6 of the first book. Avicenna and Algazel, however, hold it to be the lowest intelligence, as is evident from the passages just cited, and also from Book 9 of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, chapter 3, and Book 5 of Algazel's *Metaphysics*. But this is erroneous if it is understood to mean that that intelligence alone, without God, is the principal agent of human understanding, because since it is of limited and finite being, it necessarily has similarly limited activity; and so there could be so many men that it would not suffice to produce understanding in all of them at once, even though all could understand at the same time.

Likewise, since the mover and the moved must be together, as the Philosopher teaches in Book 7 of the *Physics*, and men can actually understand simultaneously in however many places however far apart, and no such intelligence can of itself be simultaneously in however many places however far apart, since it is of itself of determinate being—therefore no such intelligence is the agent intellect.

The same could be argued by arguments taken from motion, and by many other philosophical and theological arguments; but let these few suffice. It is therefore necessary that the agent

intellect be of infinite activity, immense, non-local, present everywhere, and immobile in every way; and no finite intelligence can be such, but only God, who is infinite in every respect.

Nor can anyone say that the agent intellect is necessary for the possible intellect only in order to abstract material intentions from matter and strip them bare, and in a way infuse them into it, but that once these are had, it does not need its help and can do everything by itself; because the foregoing arguments conclude that when the possible intellect is understanding or knowing in potency, in order for it to come into act it necessarily requires some mover in act.

Wherefore also the Philosopher, in Book 3 of *On the Soul*, chapter 18, says thus: "There is intellect that is such as to become all things, and intellect that is such as to make all things, like a kind of state, like light. For in a certain way light also makes colors that exist potentially into colors in act." Where the translation that Averroes expounds reads thus: "It is necessary that in it—namely, in the soul—there be an intellect that is intellect insofar as it becomes everything, and an intellect that is intellect insofar as it makes it understand everything; and the intellect insofar as it understands everything is like a kind of state, which is like light," etc. Where Averroes, commenting on the words "and intellect insofar as it understands," etc., says thus: "By this he means the agent intelligence; and by his saying 'understands everything, like a kind of state,' he means that it makes every thing understood in potency to be understood in act, after it was in potency, like a state in form."

Avicenna also, in Book 5 of *On the Soul*, chapter 5, says: "The cause of giving intelligible form is nothing other than an intelligence in act, in which are the principles of abstracted intelligible forms, whose relation to our souls is like the relation of the sun to our sight; for just as the sun is seen by itself in act, and by its light there is seen in act what was not seen in act, so is the disposition of this intelligence with respect to our souls." And after many things said on this subject in chapters 5 and 6, he concludes thus: "It is therefore possible that the soul of some man, because it is clear and adheres to intelligible principles, is so inspired that it is kindled with ingenuity to receive all questions from the agent intelligence, either suddenly or nearly suddenly, and firmly impressed, not probably but with an order that comprehends the middle terms. And this is one mode of prophecy, which is higher than all other powers; whence it is fittingly called a holy power, and it is the highest degree among human powers."

Algazel also, in Book 5 of his *Physics*, says that the agent intelligence is always acting on our souls unceasingly; and in chapter 6 he says: "The soul is clarified to such a degree that it is joined with the agent intelligence, so that knowledge is infused into it. For there is no thinker who does not discover many things by himself. For first a conclusion passes through his mind, and then he exercises himself to know the middle term, as though it came into his soul and he does not know from where; or first he perceives the middle term, and then the conclusion is presented to him. And every contingent thing needs a cause from which it occurs; wherefore the soul needs an intelligence. These things and similar ones are not impossible to perceive. When this has been understood, then it is not impossible to arrive at the last of the things that are

understood, whether in a long or a short time. But the one to whom all these understood things are revealed in a short time without instruction is called the Wisest or a Prophet; and this is magnificence or miracle."

A similar view, drawn from the Platonists, from Aristotle, and from Averroes, was recounted in chapter 6 of the first book.

Likewise, according to all these philosophers and according to truth itself, just as corporeal light effects corporeal vision, so some spiritual light effects spiritual vision; and this light is the agent intellect or some power of its. This view of the pagans agrees with the philosophy of Catholics.

For in Wisdom 7, it is written of uncreated Wisdom herself in this manner: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things; she reaches everywhere because of her purity. For she is a breath of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the clarity of God almighty. She is the brightness of the eternal light, and the spotless mirror of the majesty of God; and being one, she can do all things; and remaining in herself, she renews all things; and through the nations she transfers herself into holy souls. She constitutes friends of God and prophets, for God loves no one except the one who dwells with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and compared to the arrangement of the stars and their light, she is found to be prior."

And 1 John 1: "God is light." And John 1: "He enlightens every man coming into this world." And Proverbs 2: "The Lord gives wisdom, and from His mouth come knowledge and prudence"—and many similar passages occur very frequently in Scripture.

Likewise, if a man, once he had the stripped-bare intentions, could from himself do the rest, he could from himself through his own study, or through another teacher without God, discover very many truths. Yet that Averroes, commenting on Book 1 of *On the Heavens*, commentary 32, where it is shown that circular motion has no contrary, says thus: "I for my part spent a long time during which I did not understand the final explanation of this passage, but God led me to the truth."

Robert also, Bishop of Lincoln, commenting on Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 1, says thus: "I call 'teaching' not only what we hear from the mouth of a teacher, but I accept scripture in place of a teacher. And if we speak more truly, neither the one who sounds externally teaches, nor the letter of scripture seen externally teaches; these two only move and excite. The true teacher is the one who illuminates the mind inwardly and shows the truth." With which many illustrious testimonies from the thirty-eighth chapter of the first book clearly agree.

Saint Thomas also, in *On the Christian Religion, or On Faith, Hope, and Charity*, chapter 129, having shown how man is moved to understand by a man—namely, because an intelligible object is proposed—and how by an angel (in two ways: namely, because through the angel an object is proposed to man, and because the natural light of man is strengthened by the light of the angel), adds: "But God helps man to understand not only on the part of the object that is proposed to man by God, or by the addition of light, but also by the fact that the very natural

light of man, by which he is intellectual, is from God; and also by the fact that since He Himself is the first truth, from which all other truth has its certainty—just as secondary propositions derive theirs from first principles in demonstrated sciences—nothing can be made certain to the intellect except by the power of God, just as conclusions are not certain in the sciences except by the power of first principles."

The blessed Augustine also, in his entire book *On the Teacher*, principally and intentionally demonstrates this one conclusion: that in all teaching, God as the supreme Teacher teaches all knowledge. Whence also in Book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 12, he says thus: "I wrote a book whose title is *On the Teacher*, in which it is discussed, inquired into, and found that there is no teacher who teaches man knowledge except God—according to what is written in the Gospel: 'One is your Teacher.'" And in chapter 4 of the same work he says: "For this reason even those unskilled in certain disciplines give true answers about those disciplines when they are properly questioned, because the light of eternal reason is present to them when they are able to grasp it, in which they behold these immutable truths."

Also, in the *Sentences of Prosper*, chapter 382, headed "On knowing creatures that are not seen": "The human soul, naturally connected to those divine reasons on which it depends, when it says that this is better done than that, if it speaks truly, sees what it says in those higher reasons. For it would not discern by thought that something ought to have been done, except in those reasons by which all things were made."

And in Book 2 of *On Free Will*, chapter 14, and in many subsequent chapters, he shows that there is one common truth by which all true things are true and by which all known truths are known. Whence in chapter 21 he says thus: "This truth, then, about which we have been speaking for a long time, and in which, being one, we behold so many things—do you think it is more excellent than our mind?" And in chapter 22: "For this truth shows all good things that are true, which men who understand, each according to his capacity, choose singly or in multiples for their enjoyment. But just as those who choose in the sunlight what they gladly behold, and are gladdened by that sight—among whom, if some happen to be endowed with more vigorous, healthy, and strong eyes, they behold nothing more gladly than the sun itself, which also illuminates the other things in which weaker eyes delight—so the strong and vigorous sight of the mind, when it has beheld many true and immutable things by certain reason, directs itself to that very truth by which all things are shown, and clinging to it, as if forgetting the rest, in that one truth enjoys all things at once."

The same author, in Book 8 of *The City of God*, chapter 8, says that the philosophers "whom we see not undeservedly placed above the rest in fame and glory said that the light of minds for learning all things is God Himself, by whom all things were made." And in chapter 9: "Whatever philosophers, therefore, have held these views about the supreme and true God—that He is both the maker of created things, and the light of things to be known, and the good of things to be done; and that from Him comes to us the principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the

happiness of life—whether they are more fittingly called Platonists, or whatever other name they give to their school, whether Ionians, or Italians on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, or Atlantean Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or any others who have seen and taught this: we place them all before the rest and confess them to be nearer to us." And in chapter 10: "This, then, is the reason why we prefer these to the rest: while other philosophers wore out their talents and studies in seeking the causes of things, and what the proper mode of learning and living might be, these, by knowing God, found where the cause of the established universe was, and the light of perceiving truth, and the fountain of drinking happiness. Whether therefore these Platonists or any other philosophers of any nations hold these views about God, they agree with us."

And the same author, in Book 5 of the *Confessions*, chapter 6, says thus: "You had already taught me, my God, by wondrous and hidden ways; and therefore I believe that You taught me, because it is true, and there is no other teacher of truth besides You, wherever and from whatever source it has shone forth."

Likewise, the blessed Gregory, in Book 7 of the *Morals*, chapter 25, commenting on Job 37—"Are not your garments warm when the earth has been fanned by the south wind?"—understanding by garments the hearers, by earth the heart or mind, and by the south wind the Holy Spirit, says thus: "Let teachers in no way attribute to themselves what they see their hearers profiting in through their exhortation toward the highest things; because unless the Holy Spirit fills their hearts, the voice of the teachers sounds in vain at the ears of the body. For teachers can form the voice outwardly, but they cannot impress it inwardly. 'For neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase.'"

The blessed Ambrose also, commenting on 1 Corinthians 12—"No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit"—says thus: "For whatever is false is from man, and whatever is true, by whomever it is said, is said by the Holy Spirit." Whence also in John 11, after recounting the saying of Caiaphas—"It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation not perish"—it adds: "This he did not say of himself, but being high priest that year, he prophesied."

And Origen, as cited in the Gloss, on Exodus 4—"I beseech you, Lord, I am not eloquent," and further, "I will be in your mouth"—says: "God opens the mouth of those who speak the words of God; but the Devil opens the mouth of those who speak falsehood, false testimony, scurrilities, base things, of whisperers and detractors, and of those who speak idle words."

Also, in 3 Kings 3, when the Lord offered Solomon to give him whatever he wished to ask, and he asked for wisdom, and the Lord gave it—by this magnificent example it is sufficiently shown that all wisdom is from the Lord God. Ecclesiasticus 1—which the legal, sapiential, and prophetic books also very frequently and most clearly attest.

Not only is speculative or political wisdom given by the Lord, but also manual wisdom, which is called mechanical art. Whence Exodus 31: "The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Behold, I have called by name Bezalel, and I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding and knowledge in every work, to devise skillfully whatever can be made of gold, silver, and bronze, marble and gems and various kinds of wood; and I have given him as a companion Oholiab, and in the heart of every skilled man I have put wisdom, so that they may make all that I have commanded you—the tabernacle of the covenant and the ark of the testimony," etc.

Nor is the wisdom only of the faithful given by the Lord God, but also that of the unfaithful. Whence the Apostle, in Romans 1, speaking literally of the philosophers of the nations, says thus: "What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them; for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made—even His eternal power and divinity—so that they are without excuse; because although they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools."

Behold: God revealed His knowledge to them, for which they also ought to have given Him thanks—which, however, they would not have been obliged to do unless they had received it from Him, as the thirty-first chapter of the first book teaches. "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools." But why, since they spoke the truth? Because they said they were wise, and this from themselves, not from that fountain of wisdom from which all wisdom, like a certain luminous river, is derived—who "makes His sun rise upon the good and the evil, and sends rain upon the just and the unjust" (Matthew 5).

Whence Augustine, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 7, says: "'Professing themselves to be wise'—which is to be understood in no other way than as attributing this to themselves—'they became fools.'" And to the same point belongs the authority of the Venerable Bede against Julian, cited above in the thirteenth chapter of this second book.

And in Isaiah 10, the Lord says: "I will visit upon the fruit of the proud heart of the king of Assyria and upon the glory of the haughtiness of his eyes. For he said: 'By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood.'" Wherefore also, against this pestilential poison of pride, the Lord prepared a salutary antidote: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this: to know and understand me, that I am the Lord who exercises mercy, judgment, and justice on the earth" (Jeremiah 9)—as if He were saying plainly that man makes none of these things for himself from himself, but God does all of these things for all according to mercy and judgment.

And with this the authority of the Venerable Bede against Julian, mentioned above, sufficiently agrees; and the same author, in the same chapter 7 above, says that Julian uttered blasphemy in

saying that the mind of man can become wise by itself. And this whole matter the authorities of both testaments concordantly attest.

Whence Exodus 4: "The Lord said to Moses: 'Who made the mouth of man?'" The Gloss adds: "outwardly or inwardly." "Or who made the mute?" The Gloss: "in reality or in spirit." "And the deaf, the seeing, and the blind? Is it not I? Go therefore, and I will be with you in your mouth, and I will teach you what you are to say."

And Matthew 10: "Do not be anxious about how or what you are to say; for it will be given to you in that hour what you are to say. For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." And John 16: "When the Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth." And 1 John 2: "The anointing teaches you about all things." And Psalm 17: "Your discipline itself will teach me." And Psalm 70: "God, You have taught me from my youth." And Psalm 93: "He who teaches man knowledge; blessed is the man whom You instruct, O Lord, and teach out of Your law." And Isaiah 48: "Thus says the Lord: 'I am the Lord your God, who teaches you useful things and guides you in the way you walk'"—which the glosses on these authorities, and other Catholic expositions, clearly teach; I pass over them in silence for the sake of brevity.

Nevertheless, behold for these matters the testimony of the Apostle, taught by the Lord, teacher of the nations, clear enough: "Such confidence we have through Christ toward God—not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as though from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Corinthians 3).

Without doubt, therefore, we are not sufficient to understand, to compose, to syllogize, or to acquire any knowledge from ourselves as though from ourselves; but in all and each of these things our sufficiency is from God, who opens the ears of the deaf and enlightens the eyes of the blind, who is the Lord of the sciences, who teaches man knowledge, distributing to each as He wills.

If, therefore, according to the foregoing, God is necessarily required as the co-effector of every act of the created intellect, then also of every act of the created will, and of every operation thereof, by a similar argument. And by this reasoning Augustine, Gregory, Prosper, and Bernard demonstrate the same conclusion.

The blessed Augustine therefore, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 2, says thus: "Who does not see that thinking comes first? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it ought to be believed. If therefore we are not sufficient to think anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, surely we are not sufficient to believe anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is from God. Wherefore no one is sufficient for himself either to begin or to complete any good work, but in every good work, both in beginning and in completing it, our sufficiency is from God."

And Augustine makes the same argument in *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 18, and in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 17, and in many other places.

The blessed Gregory also, in Book 33 of the *Morals*, chapter 22, commenting on Job 41—"Who has first given to me, that I should repay him?"—says thus: "If we at least anticipate the gifts of good works by thinking well through our own power, where is that which again through Paul is so subtly said—where all confidence of the human mind in itself is cut off from the very root of the heart—when he says: 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God?'"

The holy Prosper also, in *Against Cassian*, chapter 6, recounts the fourth definition of Cassian, who says: "That it may more clearly appear that even through the good of nature, which has been granted by the beneficence of the Creator, the beginnings of good wills sometimes come forth—which, however, unless directed by God, cannot arrive at the consummation of virtues—the Apostle is a witness, saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find.'" To which Prosper replies: "Falsely therefore, according to this definition, did you say before that not only the beginnings of actions but also of good thoughts are from God, who begins, carries out, and consummates in us the things that are good. But this can in no way be partly false, nor should contraries have been inferred against it—so that what you rightly professed to begin from grace, you afterward confirmed we possess through the good of nature and through free will."

He says: "The blessed Apostle did indeed say, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find.' But the same Apostle said, 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.' And the same said, 'It is God who works in us both to will and to act according to His good pleasure.' The Apostle is therefore not contrary to himself; but when the willing has been given to us, we do not immediately find the doing as well, unless—as we ask, seek, and knock—He who gave the desire grants the effect. That voice of the one saying, 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find,' is the voice of one who has been called and is already established under grace, who delights in the law of God according to the inner man, but sees another law in his members warring against the law of his mind and taking him captive to the law of sin; and although he has received the knowledge of willing rightly, he does not find in himself the power of doing what he desires, until for the good will he has received he merits to find the faculty of the virtues he seeks."

And further, in chapter 25, he holds the same. The blessed Bernard also, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 22, says thus: "Hence we presume to be God's co-workers, cooperators of the Holy Spirit, and meritorious of the kingdom, because by voluntary consent we are joined to the divine will. What then? Is this the entire work and the entire merit of free will—that it consents? It is indeed, yet not as though even this consent, in which all merit consists, were from itself, since we are not sufficient even to think, which is less than to consent, from ourselves as from ourselves. These are not my words but the Apostle's, who attributes everything that can be good—thinking, willing, and accomplishing according to good will—to God, not to his own free

will. Therefore God works three things in us—good thinking, willing, and accomplishing: the first without us, the second with us, the third through us."

Whence also Isaiah 40: "Behold," he says, "the nations are counted as a moment of the balance before Him." Upon which the Gloss says: "In comparison with Him"—namely, God—"a moment that from nothing is inclined to either side." And Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He will incline it wherever He wills." But every rational creature is called a king, because it rules itself by reason. For this cannot be understood only of the heart of a great earthly king and not of the heart of a small subject, "since He made both the small and the great, and He has equal care for all" (Wisdom 6).

Wherefore we each humbly beseech the Lord, saying with the Psalmist: "Incline my heart, O Lord, to Your testimonies and not to avarice" (Psalm 118). On which Augustine says: "What is it to have a heart inclined to something, if not to will it?" Wherefore also, immediately before, on the preceding verse—"Lead me in the path of Your commandments"—he says thus: "He asks for divine help by which he may be led, because 'it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.' Finally, because God works the willing itself in all, 'for the will is prepared by the Lord.'"

To this also pertains Wisdom 11: "You have disposed all things in measure and number and weight"—with the exposition of Augustine in Book 4 *On Genesis Literally*, chapter 5, and more fully recounted in chapters 9 and 46 of the first book. "There is," he says, "a weight of will and love; but this weight is seized by another weight. The weight without weight is that by which all things are referred so that they may rest."

Likewise, if a man could will from himself alone, he could likewise from himself alone resist temptation—contrary to chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this second book. Likewise, if a man could will from himself alone, he could thus will badly, and since a rational power can bear on its objects, he could likewise from himself alone will well; and so without God's help, by the powers of free will alone, he could merit—which is the error of Pelagius, as is sufficiently clear from the foregoing—and he could from himself alone prepare himself for grace and open to God or to a man who knocks, contrary to chapters 37 and 38 of the first book.

And even if someone is already established in grace, still by the fifth chapter of this second book, without God's help he cannot resist temptation, and therefore cannot merit. No one, however full of grace, merits unless grace cooperates, as chapter 40 of the first book teaches; nor does grace operate unless it is directed by the Holy Spirit, by chapter 42 of the same. All the merits of the faithful are also given by God, as has been shown above. Therefore no one from himself alone without God can will well; therefore neither can he will at all.

Nor can anyone pretend that man, as far as concerns himself and the power of free will, could by himself go in either direction—namely, to evil and to good—but that God does not wish to allow him to do good without Himself; because this would bring back the error of Pelagius. And in

Wisdom 7 it is said that He is "a lover of good action, or of the good, who forbids no one from doing good."

Likewise, neither an angel nor Adam before the fall could will by himself, as the tenth chapter of this second book teaches; and therefore neither can man now. Likewise, if a man could will by himself, he could also act by himself; and since, according to the Philosopher in Book 2 of the *Ethics*, virtue is generated from works, he could by himself acquire virtues for himself—contrary to the third chapter of the first book, and contrary to Augustine and Bede in their books against Julian, as the sixth chapter of this second book more fully cited, where they hold that every virtue, even of the unfaithful, is from God.

Likewise, no creature has free will more powerful than Jesus Christ had, but He Himself could not will by Himself, as He Himself testifies: "I cannot do anything of Myself; but as I hear, I judge, and My judgment is true, because I seek not My own will, but the will of the Father who sent Me" (John 5). Whence Augustine, on John, Book 2, Homily 45, says thus: "On account of the one person of the Son, consisting of two substances—divine and human—sometimes He speaks according to that by which He is God, as in 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to that by which He is man, as in 'The Father is greater than I'; according to which we have received from Him the saying, and this which I now discuss: 'I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge.'" Otherwise Christ could knowingly have willed the contrary of the divine will and could have sinned mortally.

Likewise, the Father does all the works of the Son; therefore the Son Himself according to His divinity likewise does those same works. For in John 14, Christ says: "The Father dwelling in Me, He does the works." And Augustine, in Book 1 on John, Homily 20, says: "The Son of God walked upon the sea; the flesh was walking and the divinity was governing. When therefore the flesh was walking and the divinity was governing, was the Father absent? If He was absent, how does the Son Himself say: 'The Father dwelling in Me does His works'? If therefore the Father dwelling in the Son does His works, that walking of the flesh upon the sea was done by the Father, and was done through the Son. Therefore that walking is an inseparable work of the Father and the Son; I see both working there."

Likewise, it was shown in chapter 46 of the first book that what is asked from the Lord is from Him. But man rightly asks of God that he himself may will, choose, and always do good, and always not will and flee every evil, saying with the Psalmist: "Incline my heart to Your testimonies, and not to avarice" (Psalm 118); and again: "Lord, lead me in Your justice; because of my enemies, direct my way in Your sight" (Psalm 5); and Esther 14: "Give me confidence, O King of gods and Lord of all power; put a well-ordered speech in my mouth in the sight of the lion, and turn his heart to hatred of our enemy, so that he may perish, and the rest who consent to him"—with many similar passages occurring very frequently in Scripture.

And the holy Church of God prays accordingly: "Almighty and everlasting God, direct our acts according to Your good pleasure," etc. And again: "Make us love what You command." She also

prays for enemies, that God may convert their evil wills to good. And the priest in the Mass, about to receive the Lord's Body, says: "Make me always obey Your commandments," etc.—with many similar prayers.

Likewise, whatever God promises, He does, as was taught in chapter 46 of the first book. But God promised men their future wills and many of their future works, as that same chapter cited—and this is evident from Ishmael, Isaac, Samson, Solomon, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and many others. Whence also Ezekiel 36: "I will take away the heart of stone from your flesh," says the Lord, "and I will give you a heart of flesh, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in My precepts and to keep My judgments and do them."

These two motives Augustine adduces for this one conclusion, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 31.

Likewise, that for which thanks are given to God is done by Him, as was shown in the thirty-first chapter of the first book. But who is so ungrateful as to give thanks to the Lord his God for no act of his own will or of another's? It is also said in 1 Ezra 7: "Blessed be the Lord God, who put this in the heart of the king, to glorify the house of the Lord." Therefore God effects all the wills of all.

To this same conclusion, and specifically concerning the evil acts of the will, many arguments and authorities adduced in chapters 26, 31, 33, and 34 of the first book contribute.

This same question is clearly proved by the series of both testaments and the manifold authority of the saints—and this universally, of every volition, good or bad. Whence Isaiah 26: "Lord, You will give us peace; for You have worked all our works in us." And further on, 45: "I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; I the Lord do all these things"—which the text and the Gloss on Isaiah 10 cited above also most plainly attest.

Likewise, Jeremiah 10: "I know, O Lord, that man's way is not his own, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps." Where the Gloss says: "Let those be ashamed who say that each person is governed by his own will. For man's way is not his own," etc. Whence David: "By the Lord the steps of a man are directed." And Proverbs 20: "By the Lord the steps of a man are directed." The Gloss: "Not by the freedom of will."

Hence Isaiah says: "For You have worked all our works in us." And there follows consequently: "But what man can understand his own way?" On which the Gloss says: "Truly, what he has done, he has from God, because what kind of person he will be, or how long he will live, he does not know of himself, but it is in God." And above, chapter 16: "When the ways of a man please the Lord, He will convert even his enemies to peace." And further on, 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He will incline it wherever He wills." And Psalm 104: "He turned their heart to hate His people, and to deal craftily with His servants."

Likewise, Exodus 3: "I will give this people favor in the sight of the Egyptians," says the Lord. And further, chapter 4: "I will harden his heart"—namely, Pharaoh's. And further on, chapter 9: "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he did not hear them, as the Lord had spoken to Moses." And again: "But for this purpose I have raised you up, to show My power in you, and that My name may be told in all the earth." And chapter 14: "I will harden the heart of the Egyptians, so that they may pursue you, and I will be glorified in Pharaoh and in all his army."

This same conclusion the Apostle proves through this same Scripture, in Romans 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: 'For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show My power in you,'" etc.

Likewise, Joshua 11: "There was no city that surrendered to the children of Israel, except the Hivites who dwelt in Gibeon; he—namely, Joshua—took all of them by war. For it was the Lord's sentence that their hearts should be hardened and they should fight against Israel and fall, and should not deserve any mercy, and should perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses."

And 1 Ezra 6: "The Lord had turned the heart of the king of Assyria toward them, so that his hands might help them in the work of the house of God." And chapter 7: "Blessed be the Lord who put this in the heart of the king, to glorify the house of the Lord." And Nehemiah 7: "God put it in my heart, and I gathered the nobles."

Likewise, 1 Kings 10: "Saul went to his house, and a part of the army went with him, whose hearts God had touched." But how had He touched their hearts, unless because He inspired in them the will?

And 2 Chronicles 21: "Behold," says Isaiah to Joram, "the Lord will strike you with a great plague, with your people and your sons and your wives and all your substance." And there follows: "Therefore the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and the Arabs, and they went up into the land of Judah and laid it waste, and carried off all the substance that was found in the king's house," etc.

Likewise, Esther 14: Esther prayed to the Lord in this manner: "Turn his heart"—namely, Ahasuerus—"to hatred of our enemy, so that he may perish." And further, chapter 15: "And when he had raised his face and indicated the fury of his breast with burning eyes, the queen fell down," etc. "And God turned the spirit of the king to gentleness, and anxious and fearing, he leaped from his throne," etc.

Likewise, John 1: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made." And further, chapter 3: "A man cannot receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven, and the Father who sent me has drawn him." And chapter 6: "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him." And further on: "No one can come to Me unless it has been given him by My Father." And further, chapter 15: "Without Me you can do nothing." And Philippians 2: "It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to His good pleasure." And Romans 1: "God delivered them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things

that are not fitting." And 1 Corinthians 3: "Neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase. You are God's field, God's building." And further, chapter 4: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?" And further, chapter 12: "There are diversities of operations, but the same God who works all things in all"—with many similar passages, both in the Old Testament and in the New.

The blessed Augustine also, through the foregoing authorities and others in his various books, but especially in those he wrote against the Pelagians, demonstrated this same conclusion with ardent spirit and the most elaborate care. Whence in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 35, he says thus: "It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may will as much as suffices so that by willing we do. It is certain that we will when we will, but He makes us will the good—He of whom it was said, as I just quoted, that 'the will is prepared by the Lord'; of whom it was said, 'By the Lord the steps of a man are directed, and he will want his way'; of whom it was said, 'It is God who works in us to will.' It is certain that we act when we act, but He makes us act, by providing the most efficacious powers to the will—He who said, 'I will cause you to walk in My justifications, and to observe My judgments and do them.'"

The same author, further in the same work, chapter 43: "Divine Scripture, if diligently examined, shows that not only those good wills of men that He makes out of evil ones, and once made good directs to good acts and to eternal life, but also those that preserve the creature of the world are so in God's power that He makes them incline wherever He wills, whenever He wills—whether to bestow benefits on some or to inflict punishments on others—as He Himself judges, by a most hidden judgment indeed, but without doubt a most just one. For we find that some sins are also punishments of other sins, such as the vessels of wrath that the Apostle says are fitted for destruction; such as the hardening of Pharaoh, whose cause is said to be the showing of God's power in him; such as the flight of the Israelites from the face of the enemy from the city of Ai. For terror was produced in their hearts, so that they fled, and this was done so that sin might be punished in the manner in which it deserved to be punished. Whence the Lord says to Joshua: 'The children of Israel will not be able to stand before the face of their enemies.' What is 'they could not stand'? Why did they not stand by free will, but, troubled by fear, fled by their will—unless because the Lord has dominion even over the wills of men, and turns to fear those with whom He is angry?"

And he demonstrates the same through Joshua 11, which I cited above.

The same author, chapter 44: "Did not the wicked man, the son of Benjamin—namely, Shimei, about whom 2 Kings 16 speaks—curse King David of his own will? And yet what does David say, full of true, profound, and pious knowledge? What does he say to the one who wanted to strike the one cursing? 'What have I to do with you, sons of Zeruiah? Let him alone, let him curse, because the Lord told him to curse David. Leave him alone, let him curse, because God

told him to, so that the Lord may see my humility and repay me good for his cursing this day.' How did the Lord tell this man to curse David? Who is wise and will understand these things? For He did not tell him by commanding, where obedience would be praised, but because God, by His just and hidden judgment, inclined that man's own will—evil by its own vice—to this sin; and therefore it is said, 'The Lord told him.' For if he had obeyed God commanding, he would have been to be praised rather than punished—whereas we know he was later punished for this sin. Nor is the reason hidden why the Lord told him in this way to curse David—that is, why He sent or let loose his evil heart: 'So that the Lord may see my humility,' he says, 'and repay me good for his cursing this day.'"

And there follows, chapter 45: "Behold how it is proved that God uses even the hearts of the evil for the praise and help of the good. So He used Judas in betraying Christ; so He used the Jews in crucifying Christ. And how much good He has bestowed on the peoples who would believe through this! He who also uses the Devil himself, the worst of all, but most excellently, for exercising and proving the faith and piety of the good—not for Himself, who knows all things before they happen, but for us, for whom it was necessary that we be dealt with in this way."

"Did not Absalom choose of his own will the counsel that was harmful to him? And yet he did so because the Lord had heard his father praying that this would happen; on account of which Scripture says: 'And the Lord commanded that the good counsel of Ahithophel be overthrown, so that He might bring all evils upon Absalom.' It had called it good counsel, because it was for the time useful to his cause—since it was for him and against his father, against whom he had rebelled—so that he could have overwhelmed him, had not the Lord overthrown the counsel that Ahithophel had given, by working in Absalom's heart so that he would reject such counsel and choose another that was not in his interest."

And there follows, chapter 46: "Who does not tremble at these divine judgments, by which God works in the hearts even of evil men whatever He wills, yet renders to them according to their merits? Rehoboam the son of Solomon rejected the salutary counsel of the elders and rather assented to the words of his contemporaries. Why was this, if not by his own will? But hence the ten tribes of Israel departed from him and established another king for themselves, Jeroboam, so that the will of the angry God might be fulfilled, which He had also predicted would come about. For what does Scripture say? 'And the king did not hear the people, because it was a turning from the Lord, that He might establish His word which He spoke by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite concerning Jeroboam the son of Nebat.' Assuredly it happened thus, and that through a man's will, yet so that the turning was from the Lord."

"Read the books of Chronicles, and you will find written in the second book: 'And the Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and the Arabs who were neighbors of the Ethiopians, and they went up into the land of Judah, and devastated it, and seized all the substance that was found in the king's house,' etc. Here it is shown that God stirs up enemies to devastate those lands that He judges worthy of such punishment. But did the Philistines and

Arabs come to devastate the land of Judah without their own will, or did they come by their own will so that it was falsely written that the Lord stirred up their spirit to do this? Indeed, both are true: they came by their own will, and yet the Lord stirred up their spirit. This can also be said thus: the Lord stirred up their spirit, and yet they came by their own will. For the Almighty works in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, so that through them He may do what He Himself has willed to do."

And chapter 47: "What does it mean that the man of God said to Amaziah the king: 'Let not the army of Israel come with you, for the Lord is not with Israel'—because if you thought to prevail through them, 'God will turn you to flight before your enemies'? How is there power in God either to help or to turn to flight? How does the power of God help some in battle by giving them confidence, and turn others to flight by sending fear, unless He who 'in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever He willed' does so even in the hearts of men?"

"We read what Joash, king of Israel, said, sending a messenger to King Amaziah, who wanted to fight with him. For after some words he said: 'Now sit at home; why do you provoke your own ruin? You will fall, and Judah with you.' Then Scripture adds: 'And Amaziah did not listen, because it was from God, so that he might be delivered into ruin, because they had sought the gods of Edom.' Behold: God, wishing to punish the sin of idolatry, worked this in the heart of the one at whom He was justly angry—that he did not heed the salutary warning, but despising it went to war, where he fell with his army."

He demonstrates the same through the deception of the prophet by the Lord, concerning which Ezekiel 14 speaks, and through Ahasuerus, concerning which Esther 15 speaks, as cited above. And further, in chapter 48, he says: "It is written also in the Proverbs of Solomon: 'As the rush of water, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He will incline it wherever He wills.' And in Psalm 104 it is read, concerning the Egyptians, what God did to them: 'He turned their heart, so that they hated His people, and dealt craftily with His servants.'"

"In the apostolic writings, too, see what is written. In the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans: 'Therefore God delivered them over to the desires of their hearts and to uncleanness.' And a little later: 'As they did not think it worthwhile to have knowledge of the Lord, God delivered them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not fitting.' And in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians, he says of certain people: 'Because they did not receive the love of truth so that they might be saved, therefore God will send them an operation of error so that they may believe a lie, and all may be judged who did not believe the truth but consented to falsehood.'"

And drawing the principal conclusion of the entire discussion, he says thus: "By these and similar testimonies of the divine words, it is sufficiently shown, as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills wherever He wishes—whether to good things according to His mercy, or to evil things according to their merits, sometimes by an open, sometimes by a hidden judgment, but always a just one."

The same author, in *On Correction and Grace*, shows this same conclusion in many chapters, as the tenth chapter of this second book cited in part. Whence also in chapter 49 he says concerning the perseverance of the good itself: "God did not will that the saints glory in their own powers, but in Himself—He who gives them not only the kind of help He gave the first man, without which they could not persevere if they willed, but who works in them the willing itself, so that since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, the possibility and the will to persevere are granted to them by the liberality of divine grace. For their will is so kindled by the Holy Spirit that they can because they will, and they so will because God works in them to will."

And further in the same work, chapter 70, he says thus: "It is not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God—who 'in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever He willed'—so as to prevent Him from doing what He wills; since indeed He does what He wills with the very wills of men. Unless perhaps—to mention one example among many—when God willed to give the kingdom to Saul, it was so in the power of the Israelites to submit or not submit to that man (which was indeed placed in their will) that they could even resist God. Yet He did not do this except through the wills of the men themselves—without doubt possessing the most omnipotent power to incline human hearts wherever it pleases."

"For so it is written: 'And Samuel dismissed the people, and each one went to his own place; and Saul went to his house in Gibeah, and the mighty men whose hearts God had touched went with Saul. But the sons of Belial said: "Can this man save us?" And they dishonored him and did not bring him gifts.' Is anyone going to say that none of those whose hearts God touched to go with him went with Saul, or that any of the pestilent men went, whose hearts He did not touch to do so?"

"Likewise, concerning David, whom the Lord established in the kingdom with more prosperous success, we read thus: 'And David went on prospering and growing great, and the Lord was with him.' And after this had been stated, a little later it is said: 'But the Spirit of the Lord came upon Amasai, chief among the thirty, and he said: "We are yours, David, and we will be with you, son of Jesse; peace to you, and peace to your helpers, because your God has helped you."' Could he himself oppose the will of God, and not rather do the will of Him who worked in his heart through His Spirit, with which he was clothed, so that he would will, say, and do this?"

"Likewise, a little later the same Scripture says: 'All these men of war, leading the battle line, came with a peaceful heart to Hebron, to make David king over all Israel.' By their own will they made David king—who does not see it? Who would deny it? For they did not do it without heartfelt sincerity or without good will—they did it with a peaceful heart. And yet He worked in them who works in the hearts of men whatever He wills. For which reason Scripture prefaced: 'And David went on prospering and growing great, and the Lord Almighty was with him.' And so the Lord Almighty who was with him brought these men to make him king. And how did He bring them? Did He bind them with bodily chains? He worked within; He held their hearts, He moved their hearts, and drew them by their wills, which He Himself worked in them."

And there follows in the next chapter: "If therefore, when He wills to establish kings on earth, He has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own, who else makes correction salutary and brings about correction in the heart of the one corrected, so that he may be established in the heavenly kingdom? What could be said more clearly or more openly?"

Behold: here Augustine expressly holds that no one could of his own will have gone with Saul unless God had touched his heart to do so. Therefore, by the same reasoning, no one can turn himself this way or that—indeed, cannot will anything at all—unless God touches his heart for this very thing and effects the willing itself.

Whence also in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 16, he says: "What—do they already use the exercise of the will? Unless He wills and helps, from whom the will is prepared, they cannot will." The same author, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 28: "God does what He wills in the hearts of men, either by helping or by judging, so that through them also what His hand and His counsel predestined to be done may be fulfilled. Vainly, therefore, did they say that even what we have proved from the testimony of the Scripture of Kings and Chronicles—that when God wills to be done what can only be done by willing men, their hearts are inclined to will it, by Him inclining them who works in us to will in a wondrous and ineffable way—does not pertain to the matter we are discussing."

The same author, in *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 37: "'It is God who works in us both to will and to act according to His good pleasure.' We therefore will, but God works in us to will. We act, but God works in us to act according to His good pleasure. This is beneficial for us both to believe and to say; this is pious, this is true, so that the confession may be humble and submissive, and everything may be given to God."

This same thing the blessed Prosper shows in *Against Cassian* in many chapters, as is partly evident from the citations above. Whence also in chapter 8 he recounts from the African bishops writing back to Pope Zosimus in this manner: "The will is prepared by the Lord, and so that they may do something good, He Himself touches the hearts of His children with fatherly inspirations. 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God'—so that we may feel that our own free will is not absent, and yet in each individual motion of the good human will, we may not doubt that His help avails more."

The same author, in his *Sentences*, chapter 312, headed "That man can do nothing without God," recounts Augustine saying: "God does many good things in man that man does not do; but man does no good thing that God does not cause man to do."

Likewise, Bernard, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 23, says: "What do our words sound like other than that saying: 'It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'? The Apostle certainly does not say this as though one could not will or run in vain, but that he who wills and runs ought to glory not in himself but in Him from whom he received both

the willing and the running. Finally he says: "What do you have that you did not receive?" And he shows the same in chapters 18, 22, and others.

Likewise, the most glorious doctor and martyr Cyprian, in Epistle 13, addressed to Quirinus, entitled *On the Discipline of the Christian Religion*, chapter 4, demonstrates this one conclusion alone: "In nothing should we glory, since nothing is ours." And this through John 3: "A man cannot receive anything unless it has been given him from heaven." And through the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?"—and through many other passages of Scripture.

Likewise, the venerable Anselm, in *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1, and in what follows, shows that the Apostle's saying is addressed to angels as well as to men and to every creature; and that no creature can from itself alone have anything, or will, or pre-will. Whence also in chapter 7, when the disciple objects in this manner—"In our nature this can be asked, since we believe no man can have a good will except with God giving it, but can always have an evil will with only God's permission: Why did God make it such?"—he responds first materially in chapter 8 thus: "I do not think it can be denied that either the will or the turning of the will is something. For even if they are not substances, it cannot be proved that they are not essences, since there are many essences besides that which is properly called substance. A good will is no more something than an evil will is. For the will that wishes to give mercifully is no more something than the will that wishes to seize violently." And consequently he shows this conclusion, which he states in summary at the end thus: "Neither the evil will, nor the perverse turning of the will, is that very evil by which an angel or a man becomes evil—which we call nothing. Nor is the good will, or the good turning of the will, that very good by which they become good."

And through many subsequent chapters he shows that evil, or pure wickedness, is not some positive thing but a pure privation. And in chapter 20, to respond more formally, he shows that every act of the will is from God in a threefold way. In one way, because God, although He could, does not prohibit, but permits. In another way, because the power of willing—namely, the will itself, which is the voluntary power—is from God. In a third way, because God Himself truly through Himself co-effects every act, even an evil one, according to its essence, because in that respect it is good; but not according to its wickedness—in that respect it is made only by the unjust will.

Whence he says thus: "What wonder if, just as God is said to lead into temptation when He does not deliver from it, so we should acknowledge that He gives an evil will by not prohibiting it when He can—especially since the power of willing anything at all is from Him alone?"

Behold, for the first and second points. And he adds for the third: "When the Devil turned his will to what he ought not, both the willing itself and the turning itself were something; and yet they had something only from God and of God. Nor could he will anything or move his will unless He permitted it who makes all natures, substantial and accidental, universal and

individual. Insofar as the will and the turning, or the motion of the will, is something, it is good and is of God. But insofar as it lacks the justice without which it ought not to be, it is not simply evil but something evil; and what is evil is not of God, but of the will, or of the one moving the will. For simple evil is injustice, since it is nothing other than evil, which is nothing. But the other evil is the nature in which injustice resides, since it is something, and something other than injustice, which is evil and is nothing. Therefore what is something is made by God and is of God; but what is nothing—that is, evil—is made by the unjust one and is his."

Against which the disciple immediately objects in these words: "That God indeed makes the natures of all things must be admitted; but that He makes the individual actions of perverse wills—such as the very perverse motion of the will by which the evil will moves itself—what is fitting in this?" And he responds: "It is no wonder if we say that God makes the individual actions that are done by an evil will, since we say He makes the individual substances that are made by an unjust will and a dishonorable operation."

And there follows under the disciple's name consequently: "I have nothing to object. For I cannot deny that any action whatsoever is truly something, nor do I wish to acknowledge that what truly has some essence is not made by God. Nor does this reasoning of yours in any way accuse God or excuse the Devil, but entirely excuses God and accuses the Devil."

The same author, in *On Concord*, chapter 6, having asked whether foreknowledge or the knowledge of God is from things, or conversely, and having destroyed the first part and consequently established the second, and with an objection raised against this view in this manner—"If indeed whatever things exist take their essence from the knowledge of God, then God is the maker and author of evil works; therefore He does not justly punish the wicked"—responds in these words: "This can be easily resolved if it is first recognized that the good, which is justice, is truly something; but the evil, which is injustice, lacks all existence. For injustice is not a quality, or an action, or any other essence, but only the absence of due justice. Every quality, every action, and whatever has any essence is from God, from whom comes all justice and no injustice. God therefore makes all things that are done by a just or unjust will—that is, good works and evil. In good works, indeed, He makes both that they exist and that they are good; in evil works, He makes that they exist, but not that they are evil. For a thing's being just and good is to be something; but no thing's being unjust or evil is to be something."

And further in the same chapter, he shows that God effects every volition, action, and motion in a twofold way: first, because God makes every active and passive thing and all their powers; second, because He truly and efficiently moves and acts. Whence he says thus: "Just as God does not make injustice, so He does not make anything to be unjust; yet He makes all actions and all motions, because He makes the things from which, out of which, through which, and in which they are done, and no thing has the power of willing or doing except by His giving." Behold, for the first point. And there follows for the second: "The very willing also, which is sometimes just and sometimes unjust, and is nothing other than using the will and the power of willing, which

God gives—insofar as it is good, it is from God; which indeed, when it is right, is good and just; but when it is not right, by this alone that it is not right, it is evil and unjust. But for something to be rightly is something, and this is from God; but not to be rightly is not something, and is not from God."

"So therefore God, in all good wills and works, makes both what they are essentially and that they are good; in evil ones, not that they are evil, but only that they exist in their essence." And in chapter 8 he says the same, where he posits another mode of making by which God is said to make evil things—namely, because He permits, just as He is said to harden a man when He does not soften him, and to lead into temptation when He does not deliver.

The same author, in *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter 4: "Certain names are given to certain actions by which it is signified that they are done unjustly, such as 'fornication' and 'lying'; but one thing is understood when the action or the utterance itself is considered, and another when both are considered as done justly or unjustly. For every essence is from God, from whom nothing is unjust." And in many other places he repeatedly holds the same.

Likewise, William, Bishop of Auxerre, commenting on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, asks whether an evil action is from God working and cooperating, and holds that it is, which he proves both by authority and by reason. First, by the authority of Isaiah cited above: "Shall the axe boast against him who cuts with it?" etc. Whence he concludes that God was the principal agent, and Sennacherib the instrumental one—like an axe or a rod—in the destruction of the Jews carried out through Sennacherib. Second, he proves the same by a twofold argument. The first is that the passion of Christ was good; therefore it proceeded from a good cause; therefore from the good will of God, and not only from the evil will of the Jews. The second is: Someone by fornicating generates a holy prophet; then this action is the cause of a good thing; therefore it is good. And it is evil; therefore an evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and is from God. And he adds that "we concede this, saying that God is the efficient, formal, and final cause of an evil action, but not the material cause: He is its efficient cause because He is its principal agent."

Saint Thomas also, in his questions *On Evil*, question 19, asks whether the action of sin is from God, and in responding says thus: "It must be said that among the ancients there were two opinions on this matter. Some of old said that the action of sin is not from God, attending to the very deformity of sin, which is not from God. Others said that the action of sin is from God, attending to the very essence of the act, which must be held to be from God for a twofold reason."

"First, indeed, by a common argument: since God Himself is being through His own essence (because His essence is His being), it is necessary that everything that in any way exists be derived from Him. For nothing else is its own being, but all things are said to be beings by a certain participation. Everything that is said to be such by participation is derived from that which is such through its essence, just as all things on fire are derived from that which is fire

through its essence. It is manifest, however, that the action of sin is a certain being, and is placed in the category of being; whence it is necessary to say that it is from God."

"Second, the same is evident by a special argument: it is necessary that all motions of secondary causes be caused by the first mover. God, however, is the first mover with respect to all motions, both spiritual and corporeal. Hence, since the act of sin is a certain motion of free will, it is necessary to say that the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God."

This same thing John Scotus also plainly attests, commenting on Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 41, as is more fully recounted in chapter 18 of the first book.

From the foregoing, as I judge, it is sufficiently clear that, for the created will to effect any act of its own, whether good or evil, the divine co-efficiency is necessarily required.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT WHATEVER THE CREATED WILL HAS EFFECTED, THE UNCREATED WILL NECESSARILY CO-EFFECTS; AND WHATEVER THE ANGELIC OR HUMAN WILL HAS DONE, THE DIVINE WILL NECESSARILY COOPERATES IN; AND THAT EVERY ACT OF THE CREATED WILL IS WHOLLY EFFECTED BY THE CREATED WILL, AND WHOLLY LIKEWISE BY THE UNCREATED.

Whence this conclusion is also easily derived: whatever the created will has effected, the uncreated will necessarily co-effects; and whatever the angelic or human will has done, the divine will necessarily cooperates in; and every act of the created will is wholly effected by the created will, and wholly likewise by the uncreated.

This corollary is most clearly proved by the ninth chapter of the first book. It can also be most easily demonstrated from the foregoing, just as that ninth chapter was demonstrated. For if God is necessarily required for co-effecting and cooperating in every act of the created will, and God effects or operates nothing *ad extra*—indeed, cannot do so—purely naturally or from knowledge alone, His uncreated and efficacious will is necessarily required.

Wherefore also the prophet says: "Incline my heart, O God, to Your testimonies" (Psalm 118). And further in the same Psalm: "I have inclined my heart to do Your justifications." Whence also Augustine, in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 21, says: "Man prays that he may do the commandments of God—which would not be commanded if our will did nothing there, nor would God be prayed to if our will alone sufficed."

The same author, in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 7: "Let not those deceive themselves who say, 'Why are we preached to and commanded to turn from evil and do good, if it is not we who do this, but God who works in us to will and to act?' Rather, let them understand—if they are sons of God—that they are led by the Spirit of God, so that they may do what is to be done; and

when it is fitting, let them give thanks to Him by whom they are led. For they are led so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing."

And he is recounted in the *Sentences of Prosper*, chapter 310, in this manner: "It is without doubt more to be led than to be governed. For he who is governed does something, and is therefore governed so that he may act rightly; but he who is led is scarcely understood to be doing anything himself. And the grace of the Savior so prevails over our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: 'As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God.' Nor can our free will do anything better than to commend itself to Him who cannot act badly."

Wherefore also Bernard, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 23, speaking of grace, writes thus: "Grace itself arouses free will when it sows the thought; it heals it when it changes the affection; it strengthens it so that it may be brought to the act; it preserves it from feeling failure. Grace so works with free will that it only precedes it in the first stage; in the rest it accompanies it—precisely so that what was begun by grace alone is completed equally by both, so that they work mixedly, not separately, simultaneously, not in turns, through each individual effect: not partly grace and partly free will, but each accomplishes the whole in an undivided work. The whole is indeed done by this, and the whole by that; but as the whole is in grace, so the whole is from grace."

CHAPTER XXI. HE RECOUNTS SIX FALSE RESPONSES: THE FIRST SAYS THAT GOD IS SAID TO MAKE EVERY ACT OF THE CREATED WILL ONLY BECAUSE HE MAKES EVERY CREATED WILL, WHICH ALONE TRULY AND PROPERLY EFFECTS ITS ACT. THE SECOND, THAT GOD IS SAID TO MAKE THE GOOD ACT OF THE CREATED WILL BECAUSE HE MAKES THE CHARITY OR GRACE THAT EFFECTS IT. THE THIRD, THAT GOD PRESERVES THE WILL. THE FOURTH, THAT GOD MAKES THE OBJECT AND ALL THINGS MOVING THE WILL. THE FIFTH, THAT HE PERMITS. THE SIXTH, THAT GOD PROPERLY EFFECTS EVERY GOOD ACT OF THE WILL BUT ABSOLUTELY NO EVIL ACT. AND HE CORRECTS THEM GENERALLY AND TOGETHER.

Many, however, not daring or being able to resist entirely so firm a truth and so powerful testimonies for it, attempt at least to obscure it in many ways with certain smoky responses, saying that God does not truly and properly effect the act of the created will, but only metaphorically. For the first group says that God is said to effect every act of the created will because He made every created will, which alone truly and properly effects its act. The second group holds, consequently with the first, that God is therefore said to make every good act of the created will because He makes the charity or grace from which, together with the created will alone, the good act is effected. The third group asserts that God makes every act of the created will only because He preserves every created will, which alone properly effects its act. The fourth, because He makes every object moving the created will and all the other things required.

The fifth, because He permits, when He could freely impede. The sixth, however, imagine that God properly effects every good act of the created will, but absolutely no evil act.

For the first opinion, the Philosopher can be adduced in Book 8 of the *Physics*, chapters 32 and 33, and Book 4 of *On the Heavens*, chapter 25, where he shows that the generator or maker of a heavy or light thing moves it locally because it bestows upon it the forms by which it is so moved. To the same end seem to work the authorities of Anselm from *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, and *On Concord*, chapter 6, cited above. Moreover, since God is omnipotent, He can create a nature that suffices by itself for moving, and similarly for acting. Suppose, then, that He does so, and all the arguments made for the contrary part cease; therefore they do not formally conclude. And on this argument, although it is quite irrational, many obstinately rely.

For the second opinion, the same arguments apply by way of similarity.

For the third, because the preserver is in some way a cause of the preserved, and whatever is the cause of a cause is a cause of the effect.

For the fourth, because the object moving the will in some way effects its act, as seems evident from Book 3 of *On the Soul*, the chapter on the mover. Likewise, Augustine, on Psalm 104—"He turned their heart to hate His people and to deal craftily with His servants"—inquires thus: "Are we to understand or believe that God turns the hearts of men to commit sins? Or is it not a sin, or a small sin, to hate the people of God and to deal craftily with His servants? Who would say this? Is God then the author of such grave sins, when He must not be believed to be the author of even the slightest sin? Who is wise and will understand these things?"

And for a response he adds: "For this is that wonderful goodness of God, by which He makes good use even of evil ones, whether angels or men. For they were not good before they hated His people, but malicious and impious—the sort who would easily envy their prosperous neighbors. Therefore, in that He multiplied His people, by this beneficence He turned the evil to envy; for envy is hatred of another's prosperity. So therefore He turned their heart so that through envy they hated His people and dealt craftily with His servants. Not therefore by making their heart evil, but by doing good to His people, He turned their heart—spontaneously evil—to hatred. For He did not pervert a right heart, but turned a heart spontaneously perverted to hatred of the people, so that He might make good use of that evil—not by making them evil, but by lavishing on His people good things at which the evil could very easily feel envy. How He used their hatred both for the exercise of His people and for the glory of His name—which is useful to us—the following verses teach, which are recounted in His praise."

For the fifth opinion, there seems to support it the Philosopher's statement in Book 8 of the *Physics* and Book 4 of *On the Heavens*, cited earlier, that the one who removes an impediment or prohibition moves the elements locally. And Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 75: "Nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by permitting it to happen or by Himself doing it."

Wherefore also Hugh, in *On the Sacraments*, Book 1, Part 4, chapter 2—and the Lombard recounts it in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 45—shows that the will of God is taken in five or six senses in Scripture: namely, for His good pleasure or disposition, for His command, prohibition, counsel, permission, and operation.

For the sixth opinion, there seems to support it Genesis 1: "God saw all that He had made, and it was very good." And the authority of Augustine cited above for the third opinion seems to prove the same. The same author, in the *Hypomnesticon*, chapter 29: "Man could make the fall by himself, because he willed it, but he could not similarly rise by himself—that is, by his own will." And quite many other authorities of his and of many others attest that man can sin and fall by himself, but cannot merit or rise without God. Whence Hosea 13: "Your destruction is from you, O Israel; your help is only from Me."

But all and each of these responses are evidently refuted by all the arguments and the very many authorities already set forth in the preceding chapter, which can in no way admit such a gloss. Likewise, the authorities of Scripture and the Doctors are to be taken according to their common meaning, as the forty-fifth chapter of the first book teaches; but many authorities of Scripture and the Doctors cited in the preceding chapter clearly convey that God properly effects the act of the created will. The corollaries of the third and fourth chapters of the first book also correct or destroy all of these petty responses.

Likewise, if God effected the act of the created will not properly but only metaphorically in some of the aforesaid modes, why would holy David, Solomon, Jeremiah, Isaiah, Paul, and Christ—and the other authors of the Old and New Testaments—and also the blessed Cyprian, Augustine, Gregory, Prosper, Anselm, Bernard, Thomas, and John, and the other ancient and modern writers, have labored so greatly and vainly in so studiously proving that God effects and works in us both to will and to work, when this would have been doubtful or unknown to no philosopher or Catholic? For it would have sufficed to say that God created or made all things, and that whenever anything acts, He does not impede it from acting but permits it.

Likewise, no philosopher or Catholic Doctor, but only Pelagius or a Pelagian, expounds, glosses, or understands the aforementioned philosophical or theological texts in any of the aforesaid modes; and therefore every such response is suspect.

Whence Pelagius, after he said that man can will and work by the powers of free will through himself—as the preceding chapter of this book discloses—raised against himself the apostolic authority and responded, as Augustine recounts in Book 1 *Against Pelagius and Celestine, On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin*, chapter 9, in this manner: "And how," he says, "will that saying of the Apostle stand: 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish'?" Then, to resolve this objection, as it were, which he saw was vehemently contrary to his doctrine, he continued and added: "He works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, when He kindles us—who are devoted to earthly desires and, after the manner of dumb animals, love only present things—by the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; when by the

revelation of wisdom He rouses the stunned will to the desire of God; when He persuades us to all that is good." Many other similar petty responses of Pelagius are also recounted in the thirty-ninth chapter of the first book.

CHAPTER XXII. HE SPECIFICALLY CORRECTS THE FIRST OF THESE.

Likewise, specifically against the first group: no thing made by God can exist by itself, nor can it preserve another thing in being without Him, as the second chapter of the first book showed. Therefore neither can it act or produce another thing into being, as the preceding chapter argued.

Likewise, the corollaries of the third and fourth chapters of the first book, with the arguments and authorities proving them, specifically refute these people.

Likewise, then God would not have knowledge of present things nor even of future things, nor would all things be governed by His providence; many things would happen by chance and by fortune; nor would there be any way taken from motion effective for proving a common first mover. For a secondary cause could move while the first cause was totally at rest—with many other impossibilities and absurdities, as the preceding chapter more fully makes clear.

Likewise, then a man could from himself alone open the door of his heart to the one who knocks—contrary to chapter 38 of the first book.

Likewise, this is against the authorities of Anselm in *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, and *On Concord*, chapters 6 and 7, where he shows that God effects every act of the created will in a threefold way, as the preceding chapter cited.

Moreover, by a similar reasoning, God would be said to be—and would be—the maker and author of sin, contrary to the Doctors. Whence also Augustine, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 29, says thus: "Surely we believe by the will; the question is whence it is in us. If by nature, why not in all, since God is the same Creator of all? If by the gift of God, then again why not in all, since He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth? Let us therefore say the first and see whether it satisfies this question: that free will, naturally attributed by the Creator to the rational soul, is that middle power which can either be directed toward faith or inclined toward unbelief. And therefore neither can the will by which one believes God be said to be one that was not received, since it arises, when God calls, from free will, which he naturally received when he was created."

And in chapter 31: "If, however, it is answered that one must beware lest anyone think sin is to be attributed to God, which is committed through free will—if, in what is said, 'What do you have that you did not receive?', the will by which we believe is therefore attributed to a gift of God because it arises from free will, which we received when we were created—let him attend and see that this will is not to be attributed to the divine gift only because it comes from free will, which is naturally born with us, but also because God acts by the persuasions of things seen, so

that we may will and believe, whether externally through angelic exhortations, or internally, where no one has in his power what comes into his mind, but to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will. In these ways, therefore, when God acts with the rational soul so that it believes—for it cannot believe anything by free will if there is no persuasion or calling to which it may believe—surely God works even the willing to believe in man, and in all things His mercy goes before us."

And lest perhaps it trouble anyone that he says consenting or dissenting belongs to one's own will, as if it were only of one's own will and not of God—let everyone beware, I beseech, let him beware; because this was the error of Pelagius, as is evident from chapters 37 and 38 of the first book; which Augustine strives to uproot throughout the entire book *On the Predestination of the Saints*.

Whence also in chapter 4, speaking of the authority of the Apostle from *On the Spirit and the Letter* mentioned above—namely, "What do you have that you did not receive?"—he says thus: "By which preeminent testimony I too was struck and convicted, when I was erring similarly, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves, and that through it we obtain the gifts of God." And he takes "faith" there not for the habit but for the act. He adds: "For I did not think that faith was preceded by the grace of God, except in that we could not believe unless the proclamation of truth preceded us. But that once the Gospel was preached to us, our consenting was our own affair, I used to think. Which error of mine certain of my works sufficiently indicate, among which is the one you mentioned in your books, where there is an exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans."

"Finally, when I was reviewing all my works—of which work I had already completed two books—when in the first volume I came to reviewing this book, I spoke about it thus." And this is in Book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 23.

"Likewise, what I said in my disputation—'What did God choose in the one not yet born, namely Jacob?'—I led the reasoning to this point, to say: 'Therefore God did not choose anyone's works in foreknowledge, works that He Himself would give, but faith'—namely, the act. Whence he adds: 'So that the one whom He foreknew would believe in Him, He chose, to whom He would give the Holy Spirit, so that by working good, he might also attain eternal life.' Accordingly, what I said immediately afterward—'For the same Apostle says, "The same God who works all things in all"; nowhere is it said, "God who believes all things in all"'—and then I added: 'For what we believe is ours; but what we work well is His, who gives the Holy Spirit to believers.' Certainly I would not have said this if I had already known that faith itself is found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit. Both, therefore, are ours on account of the free exercise of the will, and yet both are given through the spirit of faith and charity. For not charity alone, but as it is written, 'charity with faith is from God.'"

"And what I said a little later—'It is ours to believe and to will'—behold, he speaks of the act of faith—'It is ours,' he says, 'to believe and to will; but it is His to give believers the ability to work

well through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured into our hearts.' This is indeed true, but by the same rule, both are His, because He prepares the will; and both are ours, because nothing happens unless we will it."

Behold: Augustine in these two passages retracts what he said on the Epistle to the Romans—that believing and willing are ours. And it is certain that he was by no means of so unsound a mind at that time—namely, after his conversion, when he expounded those propositions of the aforementioned epistle—as to believe that believing and willing are ours in the way that the rational soul, the intellect, and the will are ours, that is, from ourselves and not from God. Rather, as both the series of that exposition and of the retraction attest, he then believed that the intellect and will are in us from God creating, but that the acts of those powers are in us from ourselves alone performing them, without God further co-acting; and this is what he later retracted.

His later view, therefore, is that God properly co-effects with man the acts of those powers, and not only improperly—namely, because He made those powers.

Whence also further in the same work, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 6, treating that saying of the Apostle—"Who then distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?"—he says thus: "To suspect natural gifts of God in this intention of the Apostle, or the whole perfect nature, such as was given in the first condition, or whatever remains of a vitiated nature—this is, I think, exceedingly absurd. For are men distinguished from men by these gifts, which are common to all men? For here he first said, 'Who then distinguishes you?' and then added, 'What do you have that you did not receive?' For someone inflated against another could say: 'My faith distinguishes me, my justice, or something else of the kind.' Meeting such thoughts, the good Doctor says: 'What do you have that you did not receive?' From whom, unless from Him who distinguishes you from another, to whom He did not give what He gave to you?"

"And so does anyone dare to say: 'I have faith from myself; I did not therefore receive it'? Surely he contradicts the most manifest truth. Not because believing or not believing is not in the exercise of the human will, but because in the elect the will is prepared by God. Therefore to faith itself, which is in the will, pertains: 'Who then distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive?'"

And there follows chapter 7: "Many hear the word of truth; but some believe and others contradict. The former therefore wish to believe, the latter do not wish to. But since in some the will is prepared and in others it is not prepared by the Lord, we must discern what comes from His mercy and what from His judgment."

Likewise, Augustine, on Psalm 118—"Your hands have made me," etc.—distinguishing a twofold mode of man's being made by God, says thus: "Was this said according to Adam, from whom, since all men have been propagated, what man—when Adam was made—cannot say that

he too was made, by reason of origin and seed? Or could it also rightly be said, 'Your hands have made me and formed me,' because each person is not without the work of God even from parents—He Himself creating, they generating—since if the operative power of God were withdrawn from things, they would perish, and nothing at all would be born, whether from the elements of the world, from parents, or from seeds, if God did not work them?"

Likewise, then someone with intact natural endowments could from himself alone, or through another teacher without God properly co-acting, acquire for himself moral and intellectual virtues—the opposite of which Augustine teaches in Book 4 *Against Julian* in many chapters, and Bede against the same Julian in chapter 13, as was cited above.

Whence also Bede says quite expressly against this response: "What Julian therefore says—that many of the philosophers had patience, chastity, modesty, and other virtues from the good of nature—it is established that whatever philosophers did not know Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God, could have had no true virtue and no true wisdom at all. But insofar as they had even some taste of any wisdom or image of virtue, they received all of this from above—not only by the gift of the first condition, but also by His daily grace, who, not abandoning even the one who abandons His creature, bestows His gifts on men as He Himself judges: great gifts on the great, and small on the small."

To that which is adduced for this opinion, it can easily be responded that that is one good and true mode of speaking, among those with whom it has been customary; but through this it is not proved that the elemental forms do not move the elements. For it is certain that when the generator has been destroyed and the impediment removed, the elements are moved; therefore by some mover, and not by the generator or the one removing the impediment, because neither of those exists and consequently does nothing, causes nothing, and moves nothing; therefore it is the form that moves.

In every motion, moreover, the mover and the moved are together, as is taught in Book 7 of the *Physics*, chapters 8 and following, and Book 2 of *On the Soul*, chapter 74; but neither of the aforesaid is together with the element moved, because it does not exist at all.

Also, the elements are then moved naturally; therefore by a nature. For nature, as is taught in Book 2 of the *Physics*, chapter 3, is a principle and cause of moving and resting in that in which it primarily is; and this is twofold—namely, matter and form—as is shown there consequently. But prime matter is not a principle of local motion, as is unknown to no philosopher; therefore the form of the element naturally moves it.

By the same reasoning also, the element rests in its natural place by the same thing by which it is moved to that place; but it rests there by its own form. Moreover, a greater quantity of earth or fire descends or ascends more swiftly; therefore not only from something extrinsic, but from its own intrinsic form. Mixed bodies also are moved according to the motion of the dominant element; therefore that dominant element has motion naturally from itself.

The same Philosopher also, in Book 4 of the *Physics*, treating of the void, chapters 71 and following, most plainly assumes that the elements are moved naturally from themselves; and similarly in Book 1 of *On the Heavens*, where he refutes the infinite. Averroes also, on the aforementioned passages, holds the same; and on Book 3 of *On the Heavens*, chapter 28, and on Book 4, chapter 22, he shows at length that in simple bodies, the mover and the moved are not actually distinguished from one another, and that their forms are their movers.

And he glosses there the argument of the Philosopher in Book 7 of the *Physics* proving that nothing moves itself, but that everything that is moved is moved by another, in this way: "Aristotle," he says, "did not intend by this argument that he wrote in Book 7 of the *Physics* except to declare that nothing moves itself in such a way that the mover is the same as the moved and in the same respect. And therefore he posited that whatever rests through the rest of another, it is necessary that its motion be only from another—that is, it is necessary that the mover in it differ in essence and definition from the moved, although it does not differ in subject." And a similar argument of the Philosopher in Book 8 of the *Physics* and Book 4 of *On the Heavens*, mentioned above, can be glossed similarly.

Likewise, if the elements did not have from themselves, but only from the generator or the one removing the impediment, local motion, then by the same reasoning they would have no other action either. Therefore fire would not from itself burn or shine when both the generator and the impediment-remover had been destroyed or removed far away.

It also seems a strange mode of speaking, and too far from the truth, to say that the lamp or candle of my companion, which lit my lamp or candle illuminating my study, illuminates my study along with its room—when perhaps they are too far apart and enclosed by stone walls, or perhaps his lamp has been extinguished.

By a similar reasoning also, whatever I now write at Oxford, my father would be writing at Chichester, because he begot me who am writing—indeed, my grandfather and great-grandfather and the rest of my ancestors, and our first parents themselves, would now be doing all the deeds that are ours.

That saying of Anselm, however, does not disturb the matter, because he does not say that God effects our acts only in that manner, but in that manner metaphorically and in another manner properly, as the preceding chapter recounted.

To the argument, it must be said that although God is omnipotent, He can nevertheless do nothing that includes a contradiction. But just as it includes a contradiction for any nature to exist without God preserving it in being by Himself, properly, actually, and specifically, as the second chapter of the first book taught, so equally or even more does it include a contradiction for any nature to act or move without God by Himself, properly, actually, and specifically co-acting and similarly co-moving, as the third and fourth chapters of the first book more fully showed.

And thus Saint Thomas responds in *On the Power of God*, question 20, where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, to a similar argument for the negative part, brought in the fifth place: "Whenever," says the one arguing, "God institutes some nature, by that very fact He gives it all those things that belong to the nature of that nature. Similarly, by the very fact that He makes a man, He gives him a rational soul. But it belongs to the nature of a power that it be a principle of acting, since power is the ultimate of a potency that is a principle of acting on another insofar as it is other, as is said in Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*. Therefore, by the very fact that He implanted natural powers in things, He gave them the ability to complete their operations; therefore it is not necessary that He further operate in natural things."

And in the seventh place he adduces another argument similar to this fifth one, to the first of which he responds thus: "To the fifth, it must be said that it belongs to the nature of an inferior power to be in some way a principle of operation in its own order—that is, to act as an instrument of a superior power. Whence, if the superior power is excluded, the inferior power has no operation."

And consequently to the other he responds thus: "To the seventh, it must be said that the natural power, which was bestowed on natural things in their institution, inheres in them as a kind of form, having a fixed and firm being in nature. But what is done by God in a natural thing by which it actually acts is like an intention alone, having a certain incomplete being, in the manner in which colors exist in the air and the power of the art in the instrument of the craftsman. Just as therefore sharpness could be given to an axe by art, as a form permanently remaining in it, but the force of the art could not be given to it as a form permanently remaining in it unless it had an intellect—so a proper power could be conferred upon a natural thing as a form permanently remaining in it, but not the force by which it acts toward being, as an instrument of the first cause, unless it were given to it to be a universal principle of being. Nor again could it be conferred upon a natural power to move itself, or to preserve itself in being. Whence, just as it is clear that it could not be conferred upon the instrument of the craftsman that it should operate without the motion of the art, so it could not be conferred upon a natural thing that it should operate without the divine operation."

CHAPTER XXIII. HE CORRECTS THE SECOND.

The second opinion can be refuted by the same arguments as the first. Likewise, by way of similarity: the bare will cannot perform a bare act without God properly co-acting, as was taught in the preceding chapter; therefore neither can the virtuous will perform a virtuous act without God properly co-acting.

Likewise, by chapter 40 of the first book, grace or charity properly effects the good act; and by chapter 42 of the same, not without God properly co-acting.

Likewise, by chapter 46 of the first book, God properly effects every increase of every meritorious act; therefore also totally every such act.

Likewise, by the fifth and eighth chapters of this second book, no one having charity or grace, however great, can by himself resist any temptation, nor persevere finally or for a time without a special help from God—that is, without the divine will efficaciously doing this, as the sixth and thirteenth chapters of this second book prove. Therefore neither can he elicit a virtuous act.

Likewise, if God makes the habit of charity, and you alone make the act, since the act is better than the habit—as the twenty-second chapter of the first book and the eighteenth of this second book more fully cited—you make something better in yourself, and likewise make yourself better, than God Himself does, which is against what was cited in chapter 37 of the first book.

And by this same argument Augustine proves the same conclusion about the angels in Book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 9, where, having proved that there was no efficient cause of the evil will of the evil angels, he adds thus: "If we say there is no efficient cause even of the good will, we must beware lest the good will of the good angels be believed to be not made, but coeternal with God. Since, therefore, they themselves were made, how can their good will be said not to have been made? Moreover, since it was made, was it made together with them, or did they first exist without it? But if together with them, there is no doubt it was made by Him by whom they too were made. But if the good angels first existed without a good will and made it in themselves without God cooperating—then they were made better by themselves than by Him, than whom no one makes anything better. Perish the thought! Or if they could not make themselves better than He had made them—since no one makes anything better than He—then surely they could not have a good will, by which they would be better, except with the working help of the Creator."

"And when their good will accomplished this—that they were turned not toward themselves, who were less, but toward Him who supremely is, and adhering to Him existed more, and by participating in Him lived wisely and blessedly—what else is shown but that any good will would have been needy and would have remained in mere desire, had not He who had made a good nature out of nothing, capable of receiving Him, made it better by filling it from Himself—first by making it, then by arousing it to greater eagerness?"

"We must therefore confess, with due praise to the Creator, that it pertains not only to holy men but can also be said of the holy angels that the charity poured into them is through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them."

Likewise, since final beatitude is an act, as the eighteenth chapter of this second book more fully cited, and if every blessed person alone without God totally effects his act, then every blessed person by himself bestows beatitude on himself and alone beatifies himself. Who does not see with what absurdity this is said? For then the rational creature would have the best and greatest good from itself alone; yet James says: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above,

descending from the Father of lights." And so by reason of the benefit received, one would have to love oneself more than God, for one receives a greater benefit from oneself alone.

It would also seem exceedingly unreasonable that I should do all my works finally for God's sake, and yet He would not be my ultimate end, nor would He bestow upon me my ultimate end; nor would it befit His clement justice that I should do and suffer so many and such great things finally for His sake, and yet He would not render to me the final reward, which is blessedness and everlasting happiness, but I myself would render it to myself—when in Revelation, the last chapter, He Himself says: "Behold, I come quickly, and My reward is with Me, to render to each one according to his works." And many similar passages occur very frequently in Scripture.

If also the rational creature alone made its beatific act, this would be freely, by the freedom of contradiction. For it would not be necessitated by God—because this would be through His will, which by the tenth chapter of the first book cannot be inefficacious, and so God would effect that act, the opposite of which is supposed—nor would it be necessitated by any created thing, as by the third chapter of this second book. If, therefore, it thus freely makes its beatific act, by the same reasoning it thus freely continues it; and therefore it could likewise freely abandon it altogether, or for a time. Therefore it would not be finally confirmed; and therefore not blessed—for the most illustrious portion of final beatitude is the security of eternally being so.

Whence the blessed Augustine, in Book 13 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7, speaking of final beatitude, says thus: "Whatever will be loved will be present, and what is not present will not be desired. Everything that will be there will be good, and the highest good, God Himself, will be present to those who love Him; and what is altogether most blessed, it will be certain that it will always be so."

And the same author shows the same in Book 11 of *The City of God*, chapter 13. And otherwise, the one finally blessed could thus freely become and be miserable—contrary to chapter 15 of this second book and contrary to all Catholic Doctors.

Indeed, according to this view, it seems that God could not confer beatitude immediately, nor thus beatify anyone. For the essence of beatitude is for the beatific act to be made immediately by the blessed person alone; therefore, if it were made immediately by God, it would no longer be beatific. This was condemned and excommunicated by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in these words: "That happiness cannot be immediately bestowed by God."

Likewise, if someone who has received charity or grace could by himself produce a good act, he could also always distinguish himself from another who received similar grace but does not produce a similar act; and such a person could, by perseverantly willing well, distinguish himself from another having similar grace but about to fall—just as the predestined are distinguished from the reprobate. This is against the Apostle's saying in 1 Corinthians 4: "Who then distinguishes you?"—as if to say: not you, but God—as is evident from the expositions of Augustine cited above in the preceding chapter and chapter 25 of the first book.

Likewise, if by grace freely given by God, man alone effects a good act without God properly co-acting, since by chapter 43 of the first book justifying grace naturally precedes contrition, an adult sinner under the current law, once such grace has been infused in him, could freely be contrite; therefore also not be contrite; and therefore be justified without any contrition and without any act of the will—which is against the many Catholic testimonies cited in that same chapter.

Likewise, the Apostle says in Ephesians 2: "By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God—not of works, so that no one may boast. For we are His handiwork, created in good works, which God prepared so that we might walk in them." Therefore God properly effects our good works. For by the tenth chapter of the first book, the preparation of the divine will cannot be inefficacious.

And if anyone pretends, as before, that the Apostle says we are God's handiwork created in good works because God made us and created in us good habits, from which we alone do good works—how then would the Apostle by this teaching of his, and similar teaching in many of his epistles, cut off from men the occasion of being proud, the material for presuming on their own powers, and for glorying in their own merits as though their own, and recall them to humility and confidence in God alone, and to glorying in Him alone, from the recognition of their own impotence and of divine assistance? For he would do this most ineffectively if this were the case—which, however, the Apostle principally intended, as his words sufficiently suggest: "so that no one may boast," he says.

And 1 Corinthians 1: "Let no flesh glory in His sight. For from Him you are in Christ Jesus, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord." And further, in chapter 4 of the same: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?" And 2 Corinthians 3: "Such confidence we have through Christ toward God—not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." And Romans 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy." And Philippians 2: "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish—or alternatively, to work—according to His good pleasure." Where the Gloss says: "With fear"—that is, with humility, not proudly. "And therefore He is to be feared, because it is not you, but God who works," etc. "According to His good pleasure"—namely, His, not for your merits.

And there follows—and this is from Augustine's *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 37: "We therefore will, but God works in us to will; and we work, but God works in us to work. This is beneficial for us both to believe and to say, because it is pious and true, so that the confession may be humble and everything given to God."

The same author, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 6: "The Apostle said this testimony to repress man's inflation: 'What do you have that you did not receive?' He did not

allow any of the faithful to say: 'I have what I did not receive.' The entire haughtiness of this response is utterly repressed by these apostolic words."

And he sets forth two false responses or expositions of this saying. The first is that this is said because man does not have perfect faith from himself, but does have its beginning by which he first believes in Christ. But he evacuates this response through the same saying: "And here it is answered, 'What do you have that you did not receive?'" etc. Therefore by the same reasoning, the response given above can be evacuated through the same saying.

The second is that this can be said about faith because man received his natural endowments from God, from which he believes. But against those who respond thus he adds: "That argument is understood to avail nothing for what they intend, if we consider why the Apostle said this. For he was acting so that no one might glory in man, since dissensions had arisen among the Corinthian Christians, so that one said, 'I am of Paul,' another, 'I am of Apollos,' another, 'I am of Cephas.' And from there it came to his saying: 'God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak to confound the strong, and the ignoble and contemptible, and the things that are not, as though they were, to bring to nothing the things that are, so that no flesh should glory before Him.' Here certainly, against human pride, the intention of the Apostle is clear enough: that no one should glory in man, and therefore not in himself either."

"Finally, when he had said, 'Let no flesh glory before Him,' to show in what man ought to glory, he immediately added: 'But from Him you are in Christ Jesus,' etc., 'so that, as it is written, he who glories may glory in the Lord.'"

And there follows: "Do you not see that the Apostle does nothing other than humble man and exalt God alone, since among those who are planted and watered he says that neither the planter nor the waterer is anything, but God who gives the increase—although even the planting and watering themselves he attributes not to them but to the Lord, saying, 'To each as the Lord has given. I planted, Apollos watered.' Hence, then, persisting in the same intention, he came to say, 'Therefore let no one glory in man.'"

The same author, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 21: "When the Apostle had said, 'By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not of yourselves; it is the gift of God; not of works, lest anyone be exalted,' he saw that men might think this was said as though works were not necessary for believers, but faith alone sufficed for them; and again, that men might be exalted about good works, as though they sufficed by themselves to do them. He therefore immediately added: 'For we are His handiwork, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared so that we might walk in them.' What is this? Having commended the grace of God, he had said, 'By grace you have been saved through faith.' And giving the reason why he said this, he says, 'For we are His handiwork, created in Christ Jesus in good works.' How then 'not of works'? 'Lest anyone be exalted.' But hear and understand: 'not of works' is said not as though they were your own works, arising from yourself, but as works in which God has fashioned you—that is, formed and created you—not by that creation by which we were made men, but by that of which the one

who was already a man was speaking: 'Create in me a clean heart, O God.' Or: we are fashioned by God—that is, formed and created—in good works, which not we but God prepared, so that we might walk in them."

The same author, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 78, giving the reason why the Apostle says in Romans 9, "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy," says thus: "For looking most closely and most salutarily at the whole face of the holy Scriptures, one finds the admonition that 'he who glories should glory in the Lord.'" And he shows the same at length in *On the Good of Perseverance* in many chapters toward the end. Whence also in chapter 69 he says that this ought to be preached, so that the one who obediently hears it "may glory not in man, and therefore not in himself, but in the Lord."

The same author, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 32: "But because it can be said that those works—namely, miraculous ones—are divine, but that living justly pertains to our own works, I undertook to show that this too is a divine work; and this I have done in this book, perhaps more verbosely than is enough. But against the enemies of the grace of God, I seem to myself to have said too little; and nothing is so great a pleasure to say as that in which the Scripture of God most abundantly supports me, and where the aim is that 'he who glories may glory in the Lord,' and that in all things we may give thanks to the Lord our God with hearts lifted up—from whom, the Father of lights, comes every best gift and every perfect gift."

"For if this is the work of God because it is not done by us, or because with Him giving we do it, then neither is that work of God—that a mountain be moved into the sea—since the Lord said it could be done through the faith of men, and He attributed it to their own work, saying: 'If you have faith like a grain of mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, Be taken up and cast into the sea, and it will be done; and nothing will be impossible for you.' Certainly He said 'for you,' not 'for Me or the Father.' And yet no man does this except with God giving and working."

And further at the end: "There is therefore something in the hidden and profound judgments of God, such that even of the just, 'every mouth may be stopped' in His praise and not opened except for the praise of God, according to the Apostle's word in Romans 3: 'Let every mouth be stopped, and let the whole world be subject to God.' And further: 'Where is your boasting? It is excluded.'"

This same view is held by the most glorious Doctor and Martyr Cyprian, in his Epistle 13, entitled "To Quirinus, On the Discipline of the Christian Religion," chapter 4, whose title is: "In nothing should we glory, since nothing is ours." He proves this throughout that entire chapter, and through that frequently quoted saying of the Apostle, "What do you have that you did not receive?" etc., and through many other passages of Scripture. And further in the same, chapter 10, he proves clearly that we must trust in the Lord alone, and glory in Him.

From these things it manifestly appears that the intention of the Apostle in his aforementioned teaching was this: that not only natural goods or good habits of whatever kind are properly made

and given by God, but also all good acts whatsoever—so that all material for being exalted about any of the foregoing might be utterly uprooted from the hearts of men, and they might be recalled to true humility in all things. He would, however, do this less effectively if the habits alone were from God and the acts from oneself alone, since by the twenty-second chapter of the first book, acts are better than habits.

Likewise, if a son who is a knight, having received from his father his natural endowments, his rank, and his arms, fought valiantly, and so perhaps was puffed up in pride—how would his pride be uprooted and humility planted in him if someone said to him: "Let no knight glory in the sight of his father; for from him he is in knighthood, so that he who glories may glory in his father." And: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?"—and the rest of what was mentioned above?

For he could reasonably respond by saying: "Why should I not glory in my knighthood? I received indeed from my father my natural endowments, because no one begets himself; I received my rank, because no one is permitted to confer such rank upon himself; I received my arms, because I was not born armed, nor am I a maker of arms. But the proper use of these things, which surpasses all, I did not receive from another but have from myself. The valiant military deeds I did not receive from another but have from myself. The frequent victories spread abroad by celebrated fame I did not receive from another but have from myself. For such things, therefore, I shall rightly glory in myself, and in no other." And so for any soldier of Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER XXIV. HE CORRECTS THE THIRD.

The third foolishness among the foregoing can be refuted similarly to the preceding ones.

Likewise, if the created will cannot subsist by itself, but necessarily needs God to preserve it in being, much less can its act subsist by itself or by the created will alone, but it necessarily needs divine preservation—and therefore much more so divine co-production or co-action. For if the created will cannot without God preserve in being its act already produced into being—which is less—then neither can it without Him produce any act into being—which is more—as has been argued many times.

The argument adduced above for this opinion only proves that God is therefore said in a certain way to metaphorically effect the act of the created will because He preserves the created will; but it does not prove that He does not also properly effect every such act.

CHAPTER XXV. HE CORRECTS THE FOURTH.

Furthermore, the fourth false writing set forth above can be destroyed like the preceding ones. This was also specifically the gloss of Pelagius, as is evident from the twenty-first chapter of this second book.

Likewise, then God would equally make or give to the one working well regarding any object and to the one not working, or working badly, regarding a similar object similarly presented to him; and therefore they would be equally bound to give thanks to the Lord their God, as can be gathered from the thirty-first chapter of the first book. And so Lucifer and Michael, Cain and Abel, Linus and Peter, any imperfect person and any perfect one, would be equally bound to the love of God and to the giving of thanks—which no grateful Catholic, or scarcely even an ungrateful heretic, would presume to affirm.

The first argument intending to show this is resolved like the preceding one for the immediately preceding opinion.

The authority of Augustine also sufficiently attests that presenting an object to the will is one mode of causing or making the act of the will; but he does not say that God effects the act of the created will in no other way. Nor does he speak there universally about every act of the created will, but only about the evil act; and he denies that the Lord is the author of that, which can be understood with respect to the deformity of the act, not with respect to its substance—as Augustine himself holds in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 48, where among many testimonies of sacred Scripture, he also shows through this same passage of the Psalm that God works in the hearts of men every act of the will, both good and evil, by His hidden but just judgment, as the twentieth chapter of this second book more fully cited.

Isaiah, Anselm, and the Parisian article, along with the passages cited in chapters 20, 19, and 18 of this second book, and chapters 26 and 34 of the first book, hold the same.

Otherwise, however, this can be fittingly understood as meaning that God did not turn the heart of the Egyptians to hate His people in the sense that He compelled them so that they would be excusable, or so that He would be accusable of sin—along with the other interpretations of similar authorities more fully set forth in chapter 34 of the first book.

Whence also Augustine, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 48, having shown through this passage of the Psalm, together with other passages of Scripture, that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills wherever He wishes, whether to good things or to evil things—because this seems less evident regarding evil things, and from this it might perhaps seem to someone that God would be unjust—shows that God does this according to the merits of men, by His judgment that is sometimes open, sometimes hidden, but always just: "For it must be fixed and immovable in your heart," he says, "that there is no injustice with God. And so, when you read in the books of truth that men are seduced by God, or that their hearts are blunted or hardened, do not doubt that evil merits preceded, so that they justly suffered these things, lest you fall into that

Proverb of Solomon: 'The foolishness of a man perverts his ways, but he blames God in his heart.'"

CHAPTER XXVI. HE CORRECTS THE FIFTH.

The fifth subterfuge will easily have every avenue blocked by the same things that blocked the other evasions.

Likewise, this is fully obstructed by the thirty-third chapter of the first book.

Likewise, every evil act of the will according to the substance of the act and not according to its deformity is made by God, as is sufficiently taught in chapter 26 of the first book and chapters 18, 19, and 20 of this second book. This cannot be understood of merely permissive making, because in that sense He would effect the deformity of anything whatsoever. It is therefore understood of making that is properly and really effective.

Likewise, to say that God delivers men over to sins—which are also punishments of preceding sins—only permissively was the error of Julian, the heretical Pelagian, which Augustine extensively refutes in Book 5 *Against Julian*, as chapter 34 of the first book more fully cited.

To those authorities that seem to prove this opinion, it can be briefly responded that they do well prove that permission is one metaphorical and improper mode of making; but they do not prove that God only thus improperly, and in no way properly, effects the free acts of the will. Why God is said to make certain voluntary acts and to permit others—even though He properly makes them all—chapters 33 and 34 of the first book sufficiently indicate.

Regarding that manifold divine will that Hugh and the Lombard posit, it must be known that one simple thing sometimes admits a multiplicity of names, as is evident regarding God, as the third chapter of the first book cited from Aristotle in *On the World*.

The multiplicity of names is twofold: either many names signify the same thing, or the same name signifies many things. The first of these is again twofold: either many names signifying the same thing signify it in every same way and for the same reason—and then they are synonyms, about which Averroes says on Book 1 of the *Physics*, chapter 1, that "synonymous names are not used in demonstrative teaching"; and the same author holds this on Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 39. Or they signify it in a different way and for a different reason; and then according to Averroes in that same chapter 39, they can be called "dispositional names," because they stand to each other as disposition and disposed, or "attributive names," as the theologians prefer—of which sort are power, clemency, wisdom, and similar things said of God.

If, however, the same name signifies many things, this can be in two ways. Either it does so equally primarily through diverse modes and reasons not related to any one thing in common—and such are equivocals, as is expressly evident through the Philosopher at the beginning of the

Categories, and Book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2, suggests the same—and no science considers such things, as is evident there through Averroes. Or it does so not equally primarily, nor by modes or reasons entirely diverse, but primarily and principally signifies some one thing in one way and by one principal and primary reason; and consequently, denominatively and metaphorically, it signifies other things by other modes and reasons—not entirely other, however, but related to the first. And such are called "denominatives," as is evident through the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Categories*, or "principal and derived," as is evident through the same author in the *Topics* and Averroes on Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 39; and they are midway between equivocal and univocal, as Averroes says on Book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2. Of this sort are the names "being," "one," and similar names that are used in the sciences, as is evident from Book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2, and Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, almost throughout.

Whence also Averroes, on Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, says thus: "He intends in this treatise to distinguish the significations of names to be considered in this science; and all these names are said according to a relation to one thing, but with diverse modes. And therefore the exposition of these names is a part of this science in itself. Wherefore also the entire content of this fifth book is this: to know in how many ways each name is said, and why, and what is the primary thing to which the rest are referred, and what is the order of those others to one another and to the first"—as its entire series makes clear.

The Philosopher also, in Book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2, says thus: "Being is said in many ways, but in relation to one thing and to some one nature, and not equivocally; but as everything healthy relates to health—this in preservation, that in action, another as a sign of health, this because it is susceptible of it." Where Averroes says that "all these are attributed to the same thing as to the same end." And further, distinguishing three modes by which things are attributed to the same thing, he says thus: "He intended by this to declare that things that are attributed to the same end—as healthy or salubrious things to health—or to the same agent—as medicinal or medical things to medicine—or to the same subject—as the nine categories to substance." "He omits, however, a fourth mode, by which things are attributed to the same form. For according to each genus of cause, such metaphorical attribution is made. He likewise omitted the converses of these four modes mentioned; because not only are effects attributed to their causes, but causes to effects. Nor is such metaphorical transference made only according to some genus of cause properly so called, but also according to any connection, proximity, comparison, or similarity whatsoever—not, however, according to contrariety or irrelevance in any way. For every metaphorical transference makes one thing known through another, or indicates some pertinence or similarity between them."

Whence the Philosopher, in Book 6 of the *Topics*, says thus: "A metaphor makes what is signified known in a certain way through similarity. For all who make metaphorical transfers do so according to some similarity."

Wherefore also that florid Cicero, at the end of his *New Rhetoric*, treating of rhetorical colors, expresses certain other modes of such attributions and suggests many more. For such attribution or metaphorical transference is a certain rhetorical color, which he places as the thirty-third there, and which he also calls "denomination," which he defines thus: "Denomination is that which draws speech from things near and neighboring, by which a thing may be understood that is not called by its own name."

He says this is sometimes constructed from the inventor to the thing invented, sometimes the reverse—as if someone called the Tarpeian Rock "the Capitol" or the Capitol "Tarpeian," or wine "Liber," or grain "Ceres," or the reverse. Sometimes, however, a master using some instrument is denominated from it—indeed, even named by the name of the instrument—as the Macedonians were called "sarissas," just as the English might be called "bows and arrows." Sometimes, however, the deed is named from the doer, as if one called war "Mars"; sometimes the reverse, as if one called a lazy art "lazy" because it makes people lazy, and cold "sluggish" because it makes people sluggish. Sometimes such denomination is made of the contained from the container, sometimes the reverse.

This color is one grammatical figure contained under trope, which is called *metonymia* or *methomia* by Bede, Donatus, Isidore, Hugh, and the other grammarians—meaning "denomination" or "trans-nomination"—and they express these aforementioned and certain other modes of it. Cicero, however, leaves the remaining divisions of such denominations to the custom of poets, orators, and everyday speech—and rightly so, because every science, language, and country delights in its own proper modes, tropes, figures, colors, and schemes in such expressions.

I pursued these things a little more broadly than the subject required, because sacred Scripture is most copiously sprinkled with such figures, and without knowing them it cannot be understood. For these clarify its obscure meaning, unfold what is implicit, make certain what is doubtful, and open up what is closed—as no one who knows the figures of grammar and the colors of rhetoric, and considers them, is permitted to be ignorant, just as Augustine in his book on *Locutions* and in Book 4 of *On Christian Doctrine*, Bede, Cassiodorus, and the other fathers in their various works have more fully taught.

Whence also almost all the distinctions of names of sacred Scripture that Maurice, Nicholas, and others make are not distinctions of pure equivocal into their equivocated senses, but rather of denominatives into their denominated senses, or of metaphorical transfers into the things to which they are transferred. Wherefore all these distinctions are reduced to the second mode of equivocation, about which the Philosopher says in Book 1 of the *Sophistical Refutations*: "Another mode is metaphorically or from metaphorical transference, when we are accustomed to speak thus."

The perfect knowledge of these distinctions is to know in how many ways each name is said, what its primary signification is, what is the reason for the metaphorical transference to other

things, and what is the order of the other things in that order to one another and to the first—just as was said above about the distinctions of names in Book 5 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Applying these things, therefore, to the matter at hand, I say that the divine will—like the angelic and the human—is taken primarily and principally for the instrument of willing, or for the volitional power. Second, it is taken for the habit of this will, of which sort is charity, because it likewise is in a certain way an instrument of willing and a certain volitional power, in that together with the will it co-effects its act, as chapter 40 of the first book teaches. Third, for the proper and intrinsic act of the will taken in the first sense—namely, for the volition itself—because it is effected by it. These three wills are really distinguished in creatures; but in God they are one and the same in reality—His most simple essence, God Himself.

In the fourth place, the divine will is taken for His extrinsic operation, because it is made by the three prior senses, or by the first through the two following. Whence the prophet, Psalm 110: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." For although there is only one will in the Lord, he says "according to all His wills"—that is, according to all the effects of that will. Just as God Himself, according to the Philosopher in *On the World*, chapter 12, though He is one, has many names, being named from all the effects that He Himself brings about—and this both in the abstract and in the concrete. For He is called not only "thunderbolt-hurling," "rain-giving," "thunder-making," and the like, but also "the motion of the unwearying fire," "the root of the sea," "sun," and "moon," as the third chapter of the first book more fully recounted. So also "tongue," both in sacred Scripture and in common speech, is taken for the speech formed by the tongue; so also "hand" is taken for writing. And Augustine gives these examples for the same conclusion in Book 3 of *On Free Will*, chapter 30, and Book 14 *Against Faustus*, chapter 2; and he holds the same in the *Questions of Orosius*, chapter 18, expounding 1 Corinthians 15—"Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God"—that is, the works of flesh and blood. And on Psalm 50—"Behold, in iniquities I was conceived"—and further, "Deliver me from blood-guilt"—he holds the same. For all these are attributed to the same agent, as Averroes said above.

Fifth, the divine will is taken for its sign. For a sign and the thing signified often correspond. Thus, according to the Philosopher cited above, urine is called "healthy" or "salubrious" because it is a sign. And thus "name" and "word" in sacred Scripture are frequently taken for the thing signified by the name and the word. Whence Psalm 39: "Blessed is the man whose hope is the name of the Lord." And Proverbs 18: "The name of the Lord is a very strong tower." And Jeremiah 29: "I will raise up over you My good word, to bring you back to this place." And Amos 3: "The Lord will not do a word unless He has revealed His secret to His servants the prophets"—"a word," he says, that is, the thing signified by the word. And Matthew 7: "He who hears My words and does them will be likened to a wise man." And further, chapter 24: "But My words shall not pass away."

And thus Christ is called a serpent and a ram, because He was signified by the serpent of Moses (Numbers 21) and by the ram of Abraham (Genesis 22). And thus Daniel 7 says: "These four great beasts are four kingdoms that shall arise from the earth." And further in the same, chapter 8: "The ram that you saw having horns is the king of the Medes and Persians; and the he-goat is the king of the Greeks; and the great horn that was between his eyes is the first king," etc. These things, however, were said to be those things because they were signs of them.

Of signs, however, as the Philosopher says in Book 2 of the *Prior Analytics*, second to last chapter, one kind is an *eikos* and another a *tekmērion*. A *tekmērion*, as he says, is a demonstrative and necessary sign, which therefore produces knowledge; for it is called a *tekmērion* as if "held before the finger." Such a demonstrative sign of the divine will is twofold: namely, His exterior operation—that is, His will in the fourth sense mentioned above. For it necessarily follows that if God works something externally, He wills this, as chapters 8 and 9 of the first book teach. God's permission also is such a demonstrative sign of His will, as chapter 33 of the first book proves. This sign, however, is not as evident as the first. For the first is evident to all and in all free works, not only of God but of every creature freely operating. The second, however, is not evident to all, for the rational creature also permits many things to be done that it does not properly will or make. But God does not act thus, on account of the actuality of His will, which is infinitely infinite, as chapter 22 of the first book taught, and because no creature can do anything without Him co-acting—and therefore willing—as chapters 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9 of the first book sufficiently show.

Permission, therefore, taken generally, is superior to willing and properly acting. For whoever voluntarily does anything permits it, but not conversely universally—because not in creatures, although in God, for the aforementioned reasons.

An *eikos*, however, as he says, is a probable sign: "For what they know to have happened or not happened, or to be or not be, in most cases, this is an *eikos*." Such a probable sign of the will, both uncreated and created, is threefold: namely, a command, a prohibition, and a counsel. Each of these is a sign of volition in whoever does it; not, however, demonstrative, but probable, and therefore it can deceive, and sometimes does.

Whence God Himself commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son; yet He did not will this, as is evident from Genesis 22 and from the tenth chapter of the first book. Nor can anyone pretend that He first willed this and later did not will it, because of the immutability of the divine will proved in chapter 23 of the first book.

He also forbade the two blind men who had been given sight that anyone should know (Matthew 9), and the cleansed leper that he should tell anyone (Mark 1); yet He did not will this, because they, doing the contrary, were not sinning, as is evident there through all Catholic expositors, who say that the aforesaid healed persons, in spreading abroad the miracles, did not sin because they understood that God had not forbidden them because He did not want His works proclaimed, but in order to give men an example of declining human praise.

He also counseled the young man to sell what he had and follow Him (Matthew 19); yet He did not will this, since the young man did not do it, as is evident through Matthew together with the tenth chapter of the first book.

That these three signs are probable yet fallible with respect to the created will, no one is unaware.

There is also a fourth species of this sign—namely, of the *eikos*—with respect to the created will: namely, permission. For it is a probable sign that a rational creature, knowing someone to be doing something and permitting it when it could freely impede, wills this; yet it often deceives.

From these things, therefore, it is sufficiently clear that permission and the other signs of the divine will, although they are improperly called God's will in the aforementioned way, are nevertheless not His uncreated and intrinsic will, but are created signs of it. And this is the view of Hugh and the Lombard in the places mentioned above.

These created signs do not properly and sufficiently co-effect the act of the created will, just as they do not of any other creature's act; but besides them, God Himself is necessarily required, who through Himself properly co-effects that act, as chapters 3 and 4 of the first book and chapter 20 of this second book taught—and this through His own volition, intrinsic and uncreated, as is evident from chapters 8 and 9 of the first book and from the corollary of chapter 20 of this second book.

Wherefore everywhere, when I say simply "the will of God," I understand His actual volition—namely, the proper and intrinsic act of the will itself taken in the first sense.

CHAPTER XXVII. HE CORRECTS THE SIXTH.

The last quibble among the foregoing will be easily destroyed by the same things by which the other preceding ones were destroyed.

Likewise, every evil act according to the substance of the act is essentially something, just as a good act is. For the act of fornication is no less something than the licit conjugal act, as the arguments that speak for themselves and walk upon the ground evidently show.

Whence also Anselm, in *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 8, showing the same conclusion, says thus: "Finally, is a good will any more something than an evil will? For a will that wishes to give mercifully is no more something than one that wishes to seize violently."

Every evil act, therefore, according to the substance of the act, is equally effected as a good one; and therefore it equally has an efficient cause, which necessarily requires the co-efficiency of God. God therefore truly and properly effects every evil act according to the substance or pure essence of the act, as chapters 20 and 25 of this second book more fully urged.

Likewise, William of Auxerre, commenting on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, asks whether an evil action is made by God working and cooperating, and recounts three opinions. The first says that every evil action is only from man or from the Devil. The second holds that every evil action is from God in the sense that God alone gives the power to perform it. The third holds that every evil action, insofar as it is an action, is good and from God—which, having refuted the others, he himself holds, as the twentieth chapter of this second book more fully cited.

The authority of Genesis cited to the contrary does not mean that all things that God had made were very good morally. For how would inanimate or irrational things be morally good, since they are not capable of moral goodness? Yet all things that God had made were naturally very good. So too are evil acts good with respect to their substance or essence, which God makes—not with respect to their wickedness, which by chapter 26 of the first book is nothing, and therefore is not properly made either by man or by God, but only improperly by man.

To the first authority of Augustine, chapter 25 of this second book responds. To the second and similar ones, the response can be given through the same and through chapter 34 of the first book.

CHAPTER XXVIII. HE OBJECTS AGAINST THE TWENTIETH CHAPTER AND RESPONDS.

It is also objected against the twentieth chapter in this manner. If God is necessarily required for properly performing every act of the created will, since God's acting is not in the power of the created will, no act would be in its power; therefore none would be free, nor would the will be the mistress of its own free acts—even though the Philosopher says in Book 3 of the *Ethics*, chapter 13, that we are masters of our actions from beginning to end, and holds a similar view in many other places.

And the same thing seems to be attested by the Lord Himself in the first institution of human beings. For in Genesis 4 we read that the Lord said to Cain: "If you do well, will you not be accepted? But if you do badly, will not your sin be at the door? But its desire shall be subject to you, and you shall have dominion over it."

Likewise, if man could not by his own proper powers alone accomplish his acts, it would seem unreasonable to command or even to forbid him anything, because it would not be in his free power to do or to avoid such things.

Whence in Ecclesiasticus 15 it is written: "God from the beginning made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added commandments and precepts: if you wish to keep the commandments, they will preserve you, and make faith that is pleasing forever. He has set before you water and fire; stretch out your hand to whichever you wish. Before man are life and death, good and evil; whichever pleases him shall be given to him."

Likewise, if God made man's evil act, He would unjustly punish for it, because if God makes it, He makes it by the divine will, which man cannot resist, as the tenth chapter of the first book teaches.

Likewise, if God by His will makes the evil act, He wills and loves that act; indeed, He wills it by a will of good pleasure. For that is His essential and intrinsic will, through which He makes whatever He makes externally, as is evident from the foregoing. Therefore evil pleases God; therefore He does not justly punish for it.

And in 3 Kings 11 it is written: "Solomon did what was not pleasing before the Lord"—namely, by loving foreign women and worshipping idols. And Romans 8: "Those who are in the flesh cannot please God." And Hebrews 11: "Without faith it is impossible to please God."

Likewise, there are many volitions, both good and evil, that are never fulfilled. If, therefore, God by willing caused these, He would make and will a volition to come about regarding some object of volition that He would not will to be fulfilled—indeed, that He would will not to be fulfilled—as can easily be seen through chapters 10 and 23 together with chapter 22 of the first book. And so He would will and make it in vain.

Likewise, Augustine, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 27: "The Apostle says, 'There is no power except from God.' Nowhere, however, do we read in the holy Scriptures, 'There is no will except from God'; and rightly it was not written, because it is not true."

The same author, in Book 5 of *The City of God*, chapter 8: "From God are all powers, although from Him are not the wills of all."

The same, in the *Sentences of Prosper*, proposition 288: "The desire to harm can come from each person's own depraved mind; but there is no power except from God."

The same, in Book 12 of the *Confessions*, chapter 11: "You said to me, Lord, with a strong voice in my inner ear, that You made all natures and substances that are not what You are, and yet exist; and this alone is not from You: that which does not exist; and the motion of the will from You who are, toward what is less—because such a motion is an offense and a sin."

And he proves the same extensively in Book 2 of *On Free Will*, the last chapter.

The same, in Book 5 *Against Julian*, chapter 6: "God does not make evil wills, but uses them as He wishes, since He cannot will anything unjust."

The same, in the *Hypomnesticon*, chapter 33: "We confess that free will belongs to all men, having indeed the judgment of reason—not through which it becomes fit to begin or certainly to complete without God what pertains to God, but only in the works of the present life, both good and evil. Good, I say, those that arise from the good of nature—that is, to will to labor in a field, to will to eat, to will to drink, to will to have a friend, to will to have clothing, to will to build a house, to take a wife, to raise cattle, to learn the art of various good things, or whatever good

pertains to the present life—all of which do not subsist without the governance of God, but indeed are from Him and through Him, and have begun to be. Evil, however—that is, to will to worship an idol, to blaspheme, and similar things."

Likewise, John Damascene, in his *Sentences*, chapter 39, headed "On what is in our power, that is, on free will," having enumerated six kinds of efficient causes, says thus: "To which of these, then, do we subject those things that are done by men, if indeed man is not the cause and principle of his acts? For it is not right to ascribe to God sometimes base and unjust acts; nor to necessity, for they do not belong to things that are always the same. Nor to fortune, for fortune rules not contingent but necessary things. Nor to nature, for the works of nature are animals and plants. Nor to chance occurrence, for the acts of men are not rare and unexpected. Nor to accident, for accidents are said to be symptoms of inanimate or irrational things. It remains, therefore, that the man himself who acts and does is the principle of his own operations and free in will."

And to the same conclusion he immediately adds another argument: "Furthermore," he says, "if man is the principle of no act, he possesses a counselor superfluously. For to what purpose would he use counsel, being master of no act? For all counsel is for the sake of action. But to declare superfluous what is the best and most precious of the things in man would be utterly absurd."

And in the following chapter, headed "On those things that are not in our power": "Of those things that are not in our power," he says, "some have their principles—namely, causes—from those things that are in our power; that is, the rewards of our acts, both in the present and in the future age. But all the rest depend on the divine will." Therefore, according to him, our acts do not depend on the divine will; therefore neither on God.

Likewise, Ammonius, on the last chapter of Book 1 of *On Interpretation*: "The gods use us as self-moving beings—that is, as movable from ourselves. And in this way they govern the things that concern us, and distribute all things to us according to our own worthiness."

To the first of these, let this brief response suffice for the present. In the administration of temporal and spiritual things, we see that with respect to the same thing there are many powers and many dominions ordered according to higher and lower. Whence also in certain regions, the mayors or prefects of cities are called "powers," who nevertheless are subject in all things to a superior power—namely, the imperial power. Just as also a certain middle order of angels, who are similarly called "Powers," is subject to the divine power; and another middle order called "Dominations" is subject to the divine dominion.

Wherefore also that centurion rightly said: "I am a man set under authority, having soldiers under me" (Matthew 8). Therefore no one should doubt that although the created will has power and dominion over its act, yet through this the superior power and lord—namely, God Himself—is not excluded from a superior power, dominion, and efficiency with respect to the same act.

Whence also Saint Thomas, in his book *On the Power of God*, question 20, where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, argues in this manner: "The will is the mistress of its act. But this would not be the case if it could not act unless God worked in it, since our will is not mistress of the divine operation. Therefore God does not work in our will when it operates."

And he responds in this manner: "It must be said that the will is said to have dominion over its act not by exclusion of the first cause; but the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one option, as it determines nature; and therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and the will."

With which the Gloss concordantly expounds Genesis 4—"Its desire shall be subject to you, and you shall have dominion over it"—saying thus: "Not over you, because you are of free will; in your power, because you are of free will."

The second argument should move no one who does not wish to adhere to the heretic Pelagius. For as Augustine recounts in *On Heresies*, chapter 88, and Peter in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, distinction 28, and Isidore in Book 8 of the *Etymologies*, chapter 14, and the *Decretum*, question 24, last chapter, "Certain people"—his heresy was that man could fulfill the commandments of God by the powers of free will alone; which he also strove to establish by this same argument.

Whence also Augustine, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 35, says: "The Pelagians think they know something great when they say, 'God would not command what He knew could not be done by man.' Who does not know this? But He commands certain things that we cannot do, so that we may know what we ought to ask of Him. For it is faith itself that obtains by praying what the law commands."

"Finally, He who said, 'If you wish, you will keep the commandments,' in the same book of Ecclesiasticus says a little later: 'Who will set a guard over my mouth, and a seal of wisdom upon my lips, lest I fall because of them, and my tongue destroy me?' He had certainly already received the commandment, 'Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking guile.' Since therefore it is true that he said, 'If you wish, you will keep the commandments,' why does he seek for a guard to be placed over his mouth, like the one who says in the Psalm, 'Set a guard, O Lord, over my mouth'? Is not God's commandment and his own will enough for him, since if he wills he will keep the commandments?"

"How many of God's commandments are there against pride? He knows them; if he wills, he will keep them. Why then does he say a little later, 'Lord, Father and God of my life, do not give me the haughtiness of eyes'? The law had already said to him, 'You shall not covet.' Let him therefore will and do what is commanded, since if he wills he will keep the commandments. Why does he then say, 'Turn away concupiscence from me'? Against lust, how many things has God commanded? Let him do them, because if he wills he will keep the commandments. What is this cry to Him about the appetite of the belly and sexual desire not seizing him?"

"If we said these things to him now, he would most rightly respond to us and say: 'From this prayer of mine, by which I ask these things from God, understand how I said, "If you wish, you will keep the commandments." It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may will as much as suffices so that by willing we may do. It is certain that we will when we will, but He makes us will the good—He of whom it was said, as I just quoted, that the will is prepared by the Lord; of whom it was said, "By the Lord the steps of a man are directed, and he will want his way"; "God is the one who works in us to will." It is certain that we act when we act, but He makes us act, by providing the most efficacious powers to the will—He who said, "I will cause you to walk in My justifications, and to keep My judgments and do them.'""

The same author teaches the same in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 7. Peter also, in Book 2 of the *Sentences*, distinction 28, recounts and refutes this Pelagian argument.

Julian also, the disciple and follower of Pelagius, in his epistle to Demetrias—of which mention is made in chapter 35 of the first book—suggests a similar argument: "We ascribe iniquity to the Just One," he says, "when we complain that He commanded something impossible."

This argument, as heretical, along with six other heresies, the Venerable Bede recounts from the aforementioned epistle in *Against Julian*, chapter 12. And further, in chapter 18, he responds thus: "What he says—that the Lord, who is just, did not command anything impossible—is indeed true, if he looks to the help of Him to whom the Catholic voice supplicates, saying, 'Lead me in the path of Your commandments.' But if he trusts in the powers of his own mind, he refutes the truthful sentence of the same Just One, who says, 'Without Me you can do nothing.'"

Likewise, in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 7, Augustine recounts such an argument of Celestius the Pelagian: "It must be asked whether man has been commanded to be without sin. For either he cannot, and it was not commanded; or because it was commanded, he can. For why would something be commanded that could in no way be done?"

And there follows Augustine's response: "It is replied that it is most wisely commanded to man that he walk with straight steps, so that when he sees he cannot, he may seek medicine—which, for the healing of the inner man's limping from sin, is the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

The same author, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 13: "'When it is said,' say the Pelagians, "'If you believe, you will be saved,'" one of these is required, the other is offered. What is required is in the power of men; what is offered is in the power of God.'" He rebukes them by adding: "Why is not both in the power of God—both what is commanded and what is offered? For God is asked to give what He commands. Believers pray that their faith be increased; they pray for unbelievers that faith be given to them. Both in its increases and in its beginnings, therefore, faith is a gift of God."

"For it is said, 'If you believe, you will be saved,' in the same way as it is said, 'If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you will live.' For here too one of two things is required and the other is offered. 'If by the Spirit,' he says, 'you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you will live.' To mortify the deeds of the flesh by the Spirit is what is required; to live is what is offered. Does it then please us to say that mortifying the deeds of the flesh is not a gift of God, since it is required of us, with the reward of life offered if we do it? Perish the thought that this should please those who are sharers in and defenders of grace! This is the damnable error of the Pelagians, whose mouths the Apostle immediately shuts by adding: 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God'—lest we believe that we mortify the deeds of the flesh not through God's Spirit but through our own."

"Just as therefore, although it is a gift of God to mortify the deeds of the flesh, it is nevertheless required of us with a reward proposed—so too faith is a gift of God, even though it too, when it is said, 'If you believe, you will be saved,' with the reward of salvation proposed, is required of us."

The same author, in *On Holy Virginity*, chapter 17: "The voices of pious prayers in the holy Scriptures are witnesses, by which it is shown that those very things that are commanded by God are not done except with Him who commands giving and helping. For they are falsely asked for if we could do them without His grace helping."

The same, in Book 10 of the *Confessions*, chapter 30, says to the Lord: "Give what You command, and command what You will." "You command continence; and since I knew," he says, "that no one can be continent unless God grants it, and this itself was a matter of wisdom—to know whose gift this was—O my God, attend to me: You command continence; give what You command, and command what You will."

From these authorities of Augustine, it is sufficiently shown that he holds that the commanded act is not from man alone without God, nor from God alone without man, nor partly from man alone and partly from God alone, but wholly and totally from both—as the corollary of chapter 20 of this second book demonstrates.

Whence also the prophet, Psalm 118: "Give me understanding, and I will search out Your law and will keep it with my whole heart." Behold: first he asks for the divine action—"Give me," he says, "understanding"—then he promises his own: "and I will search out," he says, etc. And again, asking for the divine action, he adds: "Lead me in the path of Your commandments; incline my heart to Your testimonies." And further, expressing his own action, he says: "I have inclined my heart to do Your justifications." But to incline the heart is to make it will, as is evident from the process of the Psalmist and from the exposition of Augustine more fully cited in chapter 20 of this second book.

Likewise, Ezekiel 36: "I will cause you," says the Lord, "to walk in My precepts and to keep My judgments and do them." On which Augustine says in *On the Predestination of the Saints*,

chapter 13: "For these things are commanded of us and are shown to be gifts of God, so that it may be understood that we do them and God causes us to do them—as He says most openly through the prophet Ezekiel. For what is more open than when He says, 'I will cause you to do them'? Attend to the passage of Scripture itself, and you will see that God promises He will cause them to do what He commands to be done. He does not pass over their merits, but their evil ones; by which He shows that He renders good for evil, precisely by making them thenceforth have good works, since He Himself causes them to do the divine commandments."

And if you ask why God commands man things that he cannot fulfill by his own powers without God, chapter 35 of the first book responds: that this is to show that man has free will, by which he can freely fulfill God's precepts. For why should man not be commanded what he can freely do whenever he wills? But because he can do nothing by his own powers alone without God, he is therefore taught not to think or presume anything proudly about his own power, but always to implore divine help humbly, to place his hope in God, and to trust in Him in all things.

Why, I ask, does the master of a ship not quite reasonably command his sailor to haul the ship here or there, raise the mast, lift the sail, and similar things—none of which the sailor can do without the master? This whole matter is expressly proved by the authorities more fully cited in chapter 35 of the first book.

Likewise, Augustine, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 39: "All these commandments of love—that is, of charity—which are so great and such that whatever a man thinks he has done well, if done without charity, is in no way done well—would be given to men in vain if they did not have free will. But because they are given through both the old and the new law, and the law without grace is a letter that kills, but in grace the spirit gives life—whence comes charity in men if not from God Himself? For if not from God but from men, the Pelagians have won; but if from God, we have defeated the Pelagians."

"Let then the judge John sit between us and say to us, 'Beloved, let us love one another.' With these words of John, when those people begin to exalt themselves and say, 'Why is this commanded of us, unless because we have it from ourselves that we love one another?'—immediately there follows that saying of John, confounding them: 'Because love is from God.'"

"Why then was it said, 'Let us love one another, because love is from God,' unless because by the commandment free will was admonished to seek the gift of God? Which indeed it would be admonished to without fruit if it did not first receive something of love, so that it might seek to have added to it the means to fulfill what was commanded. When it is said, 'Let us love one another,' it is the law. When it is said, 'Because love is from God,' it is grace. For wisdom carries on its tongue both law and mercy. Whence it is written in the Psalm, 'For He who gave the law will also give blessing.'"

The same author, in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 21: "The commandments would not be ordered to be done if our will did nothing there; nor would God be prayed to if our will alone

sufficed." And above, chapter 12: "For the law commanded this so that, when man failed in fulfilling these things, he would not exalt himself swollen with pride, but would flee exhausted to grace; as if the law, terrifying him, would lead him to love Christ by the service of a pedagogue."

To that authority of Ecclesiasticus saying that God left man in the hand of his own counsel, it must be said that by this it shows man to be established in the possibility of free will, by which, if he had willed, he would have kept God's commandments.

Whence Augustine, in the *Hypomnesticon*, chapter 28, having recounted the entire aforementioned authority, adds: "What does 'and He left him in the hand of his own counsel' mean, except that He left him in the possibility of his free will? For by 'hand' power is understood. This is the first grace by which the first man could have stood, if he had willed to keep God's commandments." But not even then could he have willed this without another special help from God, as the same Augustine shows, touching on the same authority, in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 47, and in many other places, as chapters 9 and 10 of this second book more fully cited.

The same author, in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 32, recounts Celestius citing this authority with many similar ones: "The Apostle," he says, "says of a certain person, 'Let him do what he wills.' Likewise, he says to Philemon about Onesimus, 'Whom I wished to keep with me, so that he might minister to me in your stead; but without your counsel I wished to do nothing, so that your good might not be as of necessity but voluntary.' Likewise, in Deuteronomy, 'He has set life and death before your face, good and evil; choose life, that you may live.' Likewise, in Solomon, 'God from the beginning made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel,' etc. Likewise, in Isaiah, 'If you are willing and hear Me, you shall eat the good things of the earth; but if you are not willing and do not hear Me, the sword shall devour you; for the mouth of the Lord has spoken this.'"

These are the words of the wicked Celestius—not the celestial one. And the heavenly Augustine adds: "Here, however much they cover themselves, they are exposed. For they declare that they are arguing against the grace of God and His mercy, which we wish to obtain when we say, 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,' and, 'Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.' Why do we ask these things with such great groaning in prayer, if it is of man who wills and runs, and not of God who shows mercy?"

"Not because this is done without our will, but because the will does not accomplish what it does unless it is divinely helped. This is the health of faith, which makes us seek so that we may find, ask so that we may receive, knock so that it may be opened to us. He who argues against this closes against himself the door of God's mercy."

"I do not wish to say more about so great a matter, because I entrust it better to the groaning of the faithful than to my own words. But see, I beseech you, what this amounts to: the mercy of God is therefore not necessary for the one who wills and runs—mercy that even goes before him

so that he may run—because the Apostle says of a certain person, 'Let him do what he wills.' There, I think, where it follows, 'He does not sin if she marries'—as though it were a great thing to will to marry, where the help of divine mercy is being more carefully discussed!"

"Or does it even profit anything there to will, unless God by the providence by which He governs all things joins male and female? Or because the Apostle wrote to Philemon that his good should not be as of necessity but voluntary—as though good is voluntary in some other way than when God works in us both to will and to work according to His good pleasure?"

"Or because it is written in Deuteronomy, 'He has set life and death before the face of man, good and evil,' and He admonished him to choose life—as though even the admonition itself did not come from mercy, or it would be of any profit to choose life unless God inspired the charity of choosing and granted the thing chosen? Of whom it was said, 'For His anger is but for a moment, and in His will is life.'"

"Or because it was said, 'If you will, the commandments will preserve you'—as though he should not give thanks to God because he willed to keep the commandments, who, abandoned by all the light of truth, could not have willed this?"

"With fire and water set before man, he indeed stretches out his hand to whichever he wills. But He who calls is higher: 'No one can come to Me,' says the Prince of faith, 'unless the Father who sent Me draws him.'"

"And he thought he had found something great for his cause in the prophet Isaiah, because God said, 'If you are willing and hear Me,' etc.—as though the entire law were not full of such conditions, or these commandments were given to the proud for any other reason than that 'the law was given for the sake of transgression'—that is, so that man, proudly trusting in his own powers, might receive the commandments and, failing in them and being made a transgressor, might seek a liberator and savior; and so the law, humbling him through fear, would, like a pedagogue, lead him to faith and grace. Thus 'when infirmities were multiplied, afterward they hastened.'"

And the same point is directly addressed by his entire book called *On the Spirit and the Letter*.

Likewise, Saint Thomas, in *On the Power of God*, the aforementioned question 20, argues in this manner: "Ecclesiasticus 15 says that God made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel; but He would not have left him if He were always working in the will. Therefore He does not work in the will when it operates."

And he responds: "It must be said that God is not said to have left man in the hand of his own counsel so as not to work in the will, but because He gave to the will of man dominion over its act, so that it would not be bound to one side of a contradiction—which dominion He did not give to nature, since through its form nature is determined to one thing."

The blessed Prosper also, in *Against Cassian*, after showing in chapter 16 that the act of the will is made by both God and man, in chapter 17 recounts a similar argument of the Pelagian Cassian through a similar authority for the aforementioned conclusion: "Cassian says that the freedom of the will lies at hand for man. Also the book called the *Shepherd* most openly teaches this, in which two angels are said to adhere to each of us—namely, a good and an evil one; and it is placed in man's choice to choose which one he will follow. And therefore free will always remains in man, which can either neglect or love the grace of God."

And in chapter 19, responding, he first says that the book of the *Shepherd* has no authority; and consequently he proves at length through many passages of Scripture that the will is not so free that it can do anything without God, but everything with Him. Whence he adds: "Nor is this freedom so free that it has from itself so much distaste that it neglects the grace of God, or so much delight from itself that it loves it."

And he proves this because of Lydia the seller of purple, of whom it is written that God opened her heart so that she might attend to the things said by Paul; and because according to the Apostle, the charity of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit; and because according to John, love is from God. From which, in conclusion, he adds: "Let human poverty therefore acknowledge this: what is rightly said about any good things is much more rightly said about that without which all good things are of no profit: 'What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?'"

For the third argument, chapter 34 of the first book responds sufficiently. For the fourth, the next chapter responds, together with the same chapter 34 of the first book.

Yet for this one in particular, it can be said thus: when it is argued that the evil act pleases God, this word "well" can determine "pleases God" by reason of the divine pleasure itself—and in this sense, no one doubts that just as the evil act pleases Him, so it supremely well pleases Him, as the first supposition of the first book and the third part of its corollary prove. Or it can be taken by reason of the act that is the object of good pleasure, and this either by reason of the substance of the act or by reason of its wickedness. If by reason of the act, this is again twofold: either "well" naturally, and so it is true; or "well" morally, and so it is false. If by reason of its wickedness, then it is not properly effected by man or by God, because by chapter 26 of the first book, it is in that respect not an effect or anything, but a pure privation only.

The fifth argument was that of the Pelagian Cassian for proving the same conclusion, as the holy Prosper recounts in the book he wrote against him, chapter 15, in these words: "Wishing to prove that religious thoughts and holy plans, conceived by no inspiration of God, can come forth from natural wisdom, Cassian sets forth the words of Solomon: 'And David my father wished to build a house to the name of the Lord God of Israel. And the Lord said to David my father: Because you have thought in your heart to build a house to My name, you have done well in pondering this very thing in your mind; nevertheless, you shall not build the house to My name.'"

"Was this thought and this purpose of King David good and from God, or evil and to be called from man? For if that thought was good and from God, why is the fulfillment denied to the one in whom it was inspired? If, however, it was evil and from man, why is it praised by the Lord? It remains, therefore, that it should be believed to have been both good and from man. In the same way we can judge our own daily thoughts; for neither was it granted to David alone to think something good from himself, nor is it naturally denied to us that we can ever know or think anything good."

To which Prosper responds by adding: "In no way can it be proved by this testimony and argument that pious thoughts are born from free will alone and not from the inspiration of God. For the will of David, which was certainly good, is not to be believed as not being from God just because the Lord did not want the temple to be built by him, but by his son."

"To make this clearer from examples, let us look for cases where God did not will what men, willing by God's will, wished to do. The Lord commanded the Apostles, saying: 'Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things that I have commanded you.' When the Apostles heard this, without doubt they did not receive mere empty words through bodily sounds only in their outward ears, but by the power of the living word the inextinguishable flame of charity was kindled in their hearts, by which they most ardently wished to preach the Gospel among all nations."

"But when they were forbidden to speak the word in Asia and were prohibited by the Spirit of Jesus from going to Bithynia—did they not have this will from God, that they desired to convert to the faith the hearts of these peoples as well, whom God by His hidden judgment did not then wish to hear the Gospel? Or because the Church daily prays for her enemies—that is, for those who do not yet believe in God—does she not do this by the Spirit of God? Who would say this, unless one who does not do it, or who thinks that faith is not a gift of God?"

"And yet what is asked for all is not obtained for all; nor is there injustice with God, who often does not grant what He gave the grace to ask for."

Augustine teaches the same in Book 22 of *The City of God*, chapter 2, as chapter 33 of the first book more fully cited.

Nor should this seem marvelous, because the saints, thus willing in a holy manner, even if they lack one object of volition, nevertheless attain another—namely, God Himself, for whose sake they finally and in a holy manner will other things; and because they are likewise not defrauded of their merit and reward; and because perhaps they do not will any such things absolutely at all, but only under this express or tacit condition: "If this be pleasing before God"—as was urged in chapter 25 of the first book. And so it cannot be proved that such volitions are made in vain.

To the sixth argument, chapter 25 of this second book and chapter 34 of the first book respond.

To the authority of the *Hypomnesticon*, chapter 33, saying that the free will of men cannot accomplish anything pertaining to God without God, but only good and evil works of the present life—it must be said that Augustine only means that free will cannot accomplish any work of its own pertaining to God without God—that is, without the grace of God and His charity poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit—as chapter 39 of the first book sufficiently shows. It can, however, do works of the present life, though not without His general influence and providence and special efficiency.

Wherefore, having enumerated various works of the present life and having comprehended the rest universally, he adds: "All of which do not subsist without the governance of God; indeed, they are from Him and through Him, and have begun to be."

And that Augustine means in this way in such expressions, let himself be the witness, in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 32, where, having recounted the argument of Celestius—by which he wished to show that man from himself alone can will, because the Apostle says of a certain person, "Let him do what he wills"—he adds thus: "But see, I beseech you, what this amounts to: the mercy of God is therefore not necessary for the one who wills and runs—mercy that even goes before him so that he may run—because the Apostle says of a certain person, 'Let him do what he wills.' There, I think, where it follows, 'He does not sin if she marries'—as though it were a great thing to will to marry, where the help of divine mercy is being more carefully discussed. Or does it even profit anything there to will, unless God by the providence by which He governs all things joins male and female?"

Whence also Proverbs 19: "House and riches are given by parents, but from the Lord properly comes a prudent wife." The Gloss: "From the Lord properly"—that is, immediately and through Himself—"is given a good wife." Wherefore also sacred Scripture and other authors, where they speak similarly, are to be similarly expounded, as chapter 34 of the first book also expounded certain similar passages.

For the seventh argument, it must be said that if that Damascene so understood inwardly as his words sound outwardly, he is to be denied unhesitatingly and simply by all philosophers and theologians. And in truth, according to the rule of truth of our Master (Matthew 12), "By your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned"—conjecturing his understanding from his words, I believe that as he outwardly expressed, so he mentally understood. Especially because he expresses that understanding so many times, and according to it weaves the entire course chapter by chapter, nor does he put forth any incidental words from which another understanding might reasonably be drawn.

Therefore, when he says that God is not the efficient cause of human acts, I flatly reject this. And to his first argument, saying "For it is not right to ascribe to God sometimes base and unjust acts," chapter 25 of this second book and chapters 34 and 26 of the first book respond.

To his second argument, it must be said that it does not prove that man is master of his free act of will in any other way than he is of his counsel of the intellect. But he is not master of his counsel in such a way that he is not the servant and instrument of a superior Lord—namely, the agent intellect, the Lord our God—as chapters 6 of the first book and 20 of this second book taught.

Whence also the Philosopher, in *On Good Fortune*, chapter 2, as chapter 6 of the first book more fully cited: "For the one deliberating did not deliberate before he deliberated, but there is a certain principle; nor did the one understanding understand before he understood, and this to infinity. Therefore intellect is not the principle of understanding, nor is deliberation the principle of deliberating. What then?"

And he responds: "Or there is some principle of which there is no other outside it, and this thing, because it is such by its being, can produce such a thing. But what is sought is this: what is the principle of motion in the soul? It is clear: just as in the whole, God. For He moves in a certain way all things that are divine in us. The principle of reason is not reason, but something better. What then will be better than both knowledge and intellect, if not God? For the power of the intellect is His instrument."

He Himself also, according to the prophet, is "terrible in His counsels over the sons of men" (Psalm 65). And Job 12: "In whose hand is the soul of every living thing and the spirit of all the flesh of man. He Himself has counsel and understanding. If He destroys, there is no one who builds; if He shuts up a man, there is no one who opens; if He holds back the waters, all things will dry up; if He sends them forth, they will overturn the earth."

Wherefore also Joseph in Egypt said to his brothers: "It was not by your counsel, but by the will of God that I was sent here." Nor is this surprising; for He Himself is "the spirit of wisdom and understanding, and the spirit of counsel" (Isaiah 11). "All these things one and the same Spirit works, distributing to each as He wills" (1 Corinthians 12). "He Himself therefore will direct counsel" (Ecclesiasticus 39).

This argument therefore does not conclude that man is master of his free act of will in such a way that he is not also the servant and instrument of a superior Lord—as was shown regarding the act of counsel.

And because, according to the Philosopher in Book 1 of the *Physics*, chapter 22, "when one absurdity is granted, others follow"; and according to the same author in Book 1 of *On the Heavens*, chapter 31, "He who has transgressed slightly from the truth at the beginning, as he proceeds, departs more than ten thousand times"—transgressing at the beginning from the truth in this one inconvenient principle (namely, that man alone without God effects his acts), and proceeding further, he has been led into many other absurdities, and indeed ones ten thousand times more absurd.

[1] For from this first absurdity follows this second: that all things for which praise and blame follow are done through us alone.

[2] And from that this third: that all things in which persuasion or law is established can thus be done by us—as is evident from his chapter 40. If this is understood without the divine grace helping us, it is the heresy of Pelagius, as is evident above in this same chapter and in chapter 39 of the first book. If, however, it is understood with such grace, that grace effects our praiseworthy acts and the observance of the divine law, as chapter 40 of the first book teaches—and not without God specifically co-acting, as chapter 42 of the same teaches. And it seems that he means without grace, because he makes no mention of it in the entire discussion.

[3] There also follows from this a fourth: that it is in ourselves alone without God to acquire every art—which he concedes in his chapter 40, contrary to what was shown above about the agent intellect in chapter 20 of this second book.

[4] A fifth absurdity, following nonetheless, is this: that our rewards in the present and in the future, and consequently all predestination of the elect, depend on the human will and not on the divine. Whence in his chapter 42 he says: "Of those things that are not in our power, some have their principles and causes from those things that are in our power—that is, the rewards of our acts, in the present and in the future age. But all the rest depend on the divine will." Therefore, according to him, these do not depend on the divine will, but only on the human. And so predestination itself would not be the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future; and therefore predestination would be from the works of the predestined, not from God predestining—which is the Pelagian heresy, as is evident throughout chapters 44 and 45 of the first book.

[5] The sixth is that human acts are in no way contained under divine providence; because if God does not make them, then He does not will them, as is evident from the tenth chapter of the first book; and therefore He never willed them, as is evident from the twenty-third chapter of the first book; and therefore He never provided for them, as is evident from the twenty-seventh and following chapters of the first book.

Whence also, relying on this deduction, or on the principle of this deduction, he says in his chapter 42, headed "On Providence": "It is necessary that the maker of those things that are and their provider be the same; for it is neither fitting nor proper that one should be the maker of all things and another their provider. For both would thus be in utter weakness: this one in making, that one in providing."

And further, he shows consequently that all those things that are not in our power, just as they are under divine efficiency, so are they under divine providence; but those that are in our power are not at all. Whence he says: "Our thoughts and actions, and what is to come, are known to Him alone. But I say 'all things' meaning those that are not in our power; for those that are in our power belong not to providence, but to our free will"—which is against chapters 30 and following of the first book.

[6] The seventh follows evidently from this sixth: namely, that God predestined no one's good works, nor anyone to be good in the future. For He predestined nothing that He did not provide for—which is against chapters 44 and 45 of the first book.

Wherefore also in his chapter 44, entitled "On Foreknowledge and Predestination," he says thus: "It must be known that God foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things. He foreknows even those things that are in our power, but does not predetermine them"—that is, predestine them.

And in his chapter 91: "It must be known that it is the custom of divine Scripture to call God's permission His action—as when the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans, 'Does not the potter have power from the same lump of clay to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?' For since He Himself made both one and the other—for He alone is the maker of all things—yet He Himself does not construct honorable or dishonorable vessels, but each person's own will does. And this is manifest from what the same Apostle says in the second Epistle to Timothy: 'In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay; and some indeed for honor, but others for dishonor. If anyone therefore purges himself from these, he will be a vessel for honor, sanctified and useful to the master, prepared for every good work.' It is clear, however, that the purging is done voluntarily. 'If anyone,' he says, 'purges himself.'"

And he shows the same from the other side regarding evil, and adds: "All these things are to be received not as God acting, but as God permitting."

[7] From this seventh follows this eighth: that any adult sinner whatsoever can rise from sins by himself, without the grace of God and without any help from Him. For if God did not predestine for the sinner the act of repentance by which he rises, then He never willed it, nor does He will it now, since He is immutable, by the twenty-third chapter of the first book. Therefore He does not make it, because He does nothing *ad extra* purely naturally, but only voluntarily, as the ninth chapter of the first book taught.

And this is plainly attested by his saying just cited. For he says that the Apostle's statement in Romans, asserting that God makes a vessel for honor, is understood only of permission, and that God Himself does not constitute honorable vessels, but each person's own will does. Nor does his reasoning hold. "God Himself," he says, "does not constitute honorable vessels, but each person's own will; because the Apostle says, 'If anyone purges himself, he will be a vessel for honor.' It is clear, however, that the purging is done voluntarily. 'If anyone,' he says, 'purges himself.'"

But it does not follow that because man purges himself, God does not purge him; because man also washes his hands, and water likewise does, and furthermore the one who pours the water. And because, by the corollary of chapter 20 of this second book, both God and man make the entire act of the human will.

Whence, just as the Apostle says here, "If anyone purges himself"—or according to Jerome's translation, "cleanses himself"—so also elsewhere the same Apostle says: "Making purification of sins"—namely, the Son of God, Jesus Christ (Hebrews 1). And further in the same, chapter 9: "The blood of Christ will cleanse our conscience from dead works." And the Lord concerning Christ: "He will sit refining and cleansing silver, and He will purge the sons of Levi" (Malachi 3). And the Son concerning the Father: "Every branch that bears fruit, He will prune it" (John 15). And Acts 15: "Purifying their hearts by faith." And Ezekiel 36: "I will pour clean water upon you, and you will be cleansed from all your defilements, and from all your idols I will cleanse you; and I will give you a new heart, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will take away the heart of stone from your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh." And Isaiah 43: "I am, I am He," says the Lord, "who blots out your iniquities for My own sake." And further: "Tell if you have anything, that you may be justified"—as if He were saying: from yourself, nothing.

Which the prophet of the Lord clearly seeing, humbly prayed: "According to the multitude of Your mercies, blot out my iniquity. Wash me yet more from my injustice, and from my sin cleanse me. You will sprinkle me, O Lord, with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed; You will wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow" (Psalm 50).

But because, as was said above, God does not wash an adult sinner unless the sinner also washes himself—that is, cooperates with the one washing—therefore the same prophet says: "I will wash my bed every night; with my tears I will drench my couch" (Psalm 6). And Isaiah 1: "Wash yourselves, be clean, and remove the evil of your thoughts." And Jeremiah 4: "Wash your heart from wickedness, O Jerusalem, so that you may be saved." And James 4: "Cleanse your hands, you sinners; purify your hearts, you double-minded."

And Augustine, in *On the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 15: "He who created you without you does not justify you without you." But this eighth point—how impiously it sounds to pious ears—what Catholic does not know? For it is worse than the Pelagian heresy, which said that grace is not necessary for meriting and that all grace is given according to our merits—with this sole exception: grace by which sins are forgiven to man, as Augustine says in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 16. It is also against chapter 43 of the first book.

[8] And from this eighth follows this ninth: that man can merit the first grace of God, with the entire Pelagian heretical depravity. For if a man who is a sinner, an enemy of God, and ungrateful to God, can purge himself from himself alone, he can from himself alone transfer himself from the anger and enmity of God to His love and friendship, and consequently to the first charity and grace.

Wherefore also in his chapter 43 he says thus: "It must be known that the choice of actions is in our power, but the end of good actions belongs to God's operation, justly cooperating—according to His foreknowledge—with those who choose the good with a just conscience." But this is against chapter 35 of the first book and the others that follow.

[9] From this ninth follows a tenth: that man from himself alone can follow God when He calls. Whence in his chapter 44 he says thus: "It must be known that the power has been given by God to nature, and He Himself is the principle and cause of every good. But it is in our power to follow God calling us to this, or to depart."

And above, chapter 43: "There is a final abandonment when man—while God does all things that pertain to salvation—remains insensible and incurable, and indeed incorrigible, from his own purpose." Where he clearly implies that the exterior calling or knocking of God suffices for man without an interior calling and the opening of the human heart by the right finger of God. But this is against chapter 38 of the first book.

[10] From these things also follows an eleventh, manifestly: namely, that man from himself alone can persevere finally in virtue. Wherefore also in chapter 44 he says: "It must be known that the power has been given by God to nature, and He Himself is the principle and cause of every good. But it is in our power either to remain in virtue or to depart from virtue, which is to become wicked." But this is against chapter 8 of this second book and the others that follow.

[11] The twelfth absurdity following from the foregoing—or rather from which the foregoing follow—is this: that if God performed the voluntary acts of men, He would violate and compel the will. For he did not know how to see how God's action in the volitions of men and the freedom of the will could stand together. And this, as I believe, was the original cause of his entire error.

Whence in his chapter 91—first treating how God makes one vessel for honor and another for dishonor—he shows that this is only permissively, not properly effectively, as was recounted above in the seventh absurdity. And having enumerated other similar passages from Scripture, he adds: "All these things are to be received not as God acting, but as God permitting." And immediately expressing the cause, he says: "Because free will is not subject to violence with respect to the good." Or according to another reading: "Because it belongs to free will to be free from violence with respect to the good."

And in chapter 44 he says: "It must be known that God foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things. He foreknows even those things that are in our power, but does not predetermine them. For He does not will wickedness to happen, nor does He compel virtue." As if he were saying plainly: "God does not predetermine the virtuous works that are in our power, because then He would compel us to them."

This error, however, was condemned and excommunicated by the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in this form: "That some things can happen by chance with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause, because then they would happen of necessity."

This is likewise the error of Pelagius condemned in the Synod of Palestine, as the book of Prosper *Against Cassian* sufficiently attests. Whence also at the end, thirteen errors of Pelagius

are recounted. This is placed as the eleventh in these words: "And that free will does not exist if it needs the help of God, since each person has it in his own will to do or not to do something."

Not only in this, however, but in many other things, he falls into articles condemned at Paris. One of which is that human acts are not governed by divine providence. Another is that in efficient causes the secondary cause has an action that it does not receive from the first. A third is that in efficient causes, when the first ceases, the secondary does not cease from its operation, provided the secondary operates according to its own nature. A fourth is that all voluntary motions are reduced to the first mover—this is an error unless it is understood as referring to the first mover absolutely, who is uncaused, and understanding it of motion according to its substance, not according to its deformity.

[12] Moreover, beyond all these things there is another absurdity of contradiction and self-repugnance. For in his chapter 39 he says that God does not effect our acts. And in chapter 44 he says: "It must be known that the power has been given by God to nature, and He Himself is the principle and cause of every good, and without His cooperation and help it is impossible for us to will or to do the good."

And in chapter 42 he says that our permanence is to be attributed to God, for it belongs to His containing power. If therefore a substance cannot by itself permanently exist but necessarily needs the divine power to contain and continuously hold it in being, much more so can no accident, and therefore no act of the created will.

Wherefore, just as an act of the will already made cannot permanently exist unless He specifically preserves it, so neither can it come into being unless He also specifically makes it.

Likewise, in his chapter 43 he first proves that all things are governed by divine providence; but then he says that those things that are in our power do not belong to providence but to our free will.

And if you say on his behalf that he does not understand that first universal statement—"All things are governed by divine providence"—universally and absolutely, but only of all natural things, still all the arguments he made to prove that universal statement under that understanding prove it equally well or better of voluntary things, as will easily appear to anyone willing to consider.

In the same chapter also, he first says that providence is the will of God, on account of which all things that are receive their fitting guidance. Second, however, he says that those things that are in our power do not belong to providence but to our free will. If, therefore, our acts do not belong to providence, neither do they belong to the divine will, nor does God will them—because He wills nothing newly, by the twenty-third chapter of the first book.

Third, however, he says: "Of those things that are in our power, the good things He antecedently wills and accepts."

Notwithstanding all these things, if anyone wishes to gloss him, he can say with some color that he does not intend to prove that God in no way effects human acts, but that God does not so effect them that man does not also similarly perform his own acts; nor does God so make human acts that He compels or violates man to act, taking away from him the free use of the will and excluding the praise and blame of man.

Whence also in that chapter 39 he says thus: "To which of these, then, do we subject those things that are done by men, if indeed man is not the cause and principle of his acts?"—etc., as recounted at the beginning.

And in chapter 41: "Every person deliberating, with the choice of things to be done residing in himself, deliberates so that he may choose what has been prejudged by deliberation, and choosing may act. But if this arises of necessity from the rational faculty, free will will not be rational, or, being rational, the master of actions and free in will."

"Whence also irrational things are not free in will; for they are driven more by nature than they drive, and therefore they do not contradict the natural appetite, but they simultaneously desire something and make an impulse toward action. But man, being rational, drives nature more than he is driven; and therefore, desiring, if indeed he wills, he has the power to restrain the appetite, or to follow it. Whence irrational things are neither praised nor blamed, but man is both praised and blamed."

And to this same point can be adduced his other sayings about compulsion and violence in the demonstration of the eleventh absurdity recounted above.

The last authority, however—namely, that of Ammonius—does not present an obstacle but proves the intended conclusion. For he says: "The gods use us as self-moving beings—that is, as movable from ourselves." He therefore holds that God in our motions uses us as His instruments—not, however, as inanimate instruments, or as animate but irrational ones that are moved of necessity, but as rational ones that are moved from themselves—that is, by their own free will.

Wherefore he adds: "And in this way they govern the things that concern us." But they would not do this unless they also governed our free acts; nor could they govern them except through providence; nor can providence exist without the divine will, and that will is necessarily efficacious, as the tenth chapter of the first book teaches. Therefore, according to him, God through His provident will effects every free act of the human will.

CHAPTER XXIX. THAT THE UNCREATED AND CREATED WILLS, IN CO-EFFECTING THE ACT OF THE CREATED WILL, ARE NOT CO-EQUAL NOR COEVAL IN THE NATURAL ORDER.

Now therefore, having established that God and likewise the creature, the uncreated will and also the created will, properly produce every act of the created will, it remains consequently to inquire whether these two agent causes in this common action of theirs are equal in the natural order and coeval, or whether one of them naturally precedes the other—and if so, which one it is.

If, however, they are posited as equal in the order of action and naturally coeval, both are reduced to some other third cause naturally prior to them, by whose agency they act; since this is the case with all things so ordered, as all philosophers unanimously attest—some of whose testimonies the first, second, third, and fourth chapters of the first book, and especially the proof of the third corollary of the second chapter of the first book, more fully recounted. Therefore God as agent has a prior agent cause, by whose power and agency He acts. That cause is necessarily not God, but a creature; therefore in the common action of creature and God, the creature is prior in the order of acting to God. And if this is true of any creature in any action, it seems most of all true of the rational creature in its free action—but the hypothesis posited them as equals.

Many philosophers also teach in many places that every mover is either absolutely first, or is reduced to that first mover in its moving, as is evident from the fourth and third chapters of the first book, and from the twentieth of this second book. If, therefore, God and the rational creature in their common motion are equals in order, neither of them is absolutely the first mover, as is evident from the preceding argument; and because that first mover is unique, nor is it possible for there to be more than one, as the Philosopher teaches in Book 8 of the *Physics* and Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, and other philosophers elsewhere in many places—which is also attested by that well-known saying in Book 5 of the *Topics*: "What is said by way of superabundance belongs to one alone, as fire's being the lightest." Whence also the prophet: "You alone are the Most High over all the earth" (Psalm 72). Therefore God in such motion has a prior mover, etc., as before.

CHAPTER XXX. THAT IN EVERY COMMON ACTION OF THE UNCREATED AND CREATED WILLS, THE UNCREATED NATURALLY PRECEDES THE CREATED.

Since the first part of the foregoing division has been destroyed, and therefore the second established, we must inquire about the third. For the most proud Pelagius—more proud than Lucifer, who wished to be made equal to God—compelled to confess that God is the co-effector of human acts, claims for himself the priority and superiority over God, and in the common action sets man as naturally prior and superior, God as naturally posterior and subject, and places the human will above the divine will, as was touched upon in the treatise of the first book on grace.

Whence also the humble Augustine, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, addressed to Prosper and Hilary, chapter 3, having destroyed by the testimonies of sacred Scripture the error of

Pelagius affirming that faith—namely, the act of faith—is in us from ourselves alone without God, adds: "Not wishing therefore to oppose such clear testimonies, and yet wishing to have from himself what he believes, the man, as it were, makes a deal with God, claiming a part of faith for himself and leaving a part for God; and what is more arrogant, he takes the first part for himself and gives the subsequent part to God, and in what he says belongs to both, he makes himself prior and God posterior."

The same author, in *On Heresies*, chapter 88, says thus: "Finally, when Pelagius was rebuked by the brethren because he attributed nothing to the help of God's grace for fulfilling His commandments, he yielded to their correction to this extent: that he did not place grace before free will, but with faithless cunning subordinated it."

But what philosopher, in the common action or motion of agents or movers that are naturally first and second, would place the naturally second before the naturally first in an inverted natural order? And what philosopher doubts that God is naturally the first of all things acting or moving together with Him, especially since He is commonly called by the philosophers the first cause, the first agent or efficient cause, the first mover or even the prime mover, as the twentieth chapter of this second book recounted from both philosophers and theologians?

For what theologian, or Catholic—indeed, what heretic, schismatic, or pagan—would dare to place himself before his God, to call himself lord in acting and his God a servant, himself superior and God inferior, himself the architect and principal craftsman and God the subordinate servant and, as it were, his instrument, himself the leader and God the one led, his own will the first and the divine will its attendant, his own will the mistress and the divine will the handmaid, his own will commanding and the divine will obeying, his own will drawing and the divine will drawn, his own will in charge and the divine will subject—when this is against the first supposition of the first chapter of the first book, which is admitted by all who worship God in any way, since no one is ignorant that something else is more perfect than this, as the second supposition and the third part of the corollary of the first chapter also teach?

Although no one can reasonably doubt that God precedes the creature, and the divine will precedes the human, naturally in acting in every action common to them, nevertheless, on account of some who might perhaps tremble with fear where there is no fear, I will endeavor to certify this with a few brief arguments.

Now the divine volition by which God wills the created will to produce its act, and the created will's producing its act, are convertible according to the consequence of being: for whenever one of these exists, the other exists too, and conversely, as is evident from the twentieth of this second book and from the tenth of the first book. And that divine volition is the cause of the other, because it is the efficient cause, as is evident from the ninth chapter of the first book and the twentieth of this second book. Therefore it is prior by nature, as the Philosopher says in the *Categories*, where, having distinguished four modes of priority, he adds this fifth: "Of things that

are convertible according to the consequence of being, that which is in any way the cause of the other is rightly said to be prior by nature."

Likewise, otherwise the human will would be freer than the divine: for the human will, like a mistress, would always precede, and the divine, like an attendant, would follow; the human will would freely pre-choose from among all things possible to it to do this or that, and the divine would necessarily consent; the human will would rule in all things, and the divine would be ruled in all things.

Likewise, otherwise the human will would necessitate the divine will to act, which seems to derogate excessively from the freedom of the divine will and to subject it to excessive servitude. For when the human will effects its act, the effecting of that act then exists, and for that time it is necessary that it exist. For according to the Philosopher, in the last chapter of Book 1 of *On Interpretation*: "What is, when it is, necessarily is." Therefore, by the twentieth of this second book, for that time it is necessary that God, by willing, co-effect that act; and that necessity befalls the divine will from the action of the human will, as from a prior cause.

And similarly it follows that the human will necessitates the divine will to not performing a certain action, and to not willing that action; indeed, it renders it impossible for God and necessarily prohibits Him from performing or willing such an action. For if a man, at the instant when he could perform volition A with respect to object B, performs a volition with respect to the same object, or does absolutely nothing, then for that time A does not exist, and it is necessary that A does not exist for that time—because according to the Philosopher in the same passage: "What is not, when it is not, necessarily is not." Therefore it is necessary that God for that time does not perform A, nor will that A be performed or exist, as is evident from the tenth chapter of the first book; and it is impossible for God for that time to perform A, or to will that A be performed or exist. And all this necessity and impossibility befalls God and the divine will from man and from the human will, as from a prior cause—which His supreme freedom and omnipotent power in no way permit.

Furthermore, to the same point: if the human will thus precedes the divine, the human will could antecedently necessitate the divine will to act, to continue, to cease, to rest, and to resume again as often and whenever it wished. For every man, as often and whenever he wishes, can perform a free act of his own will, continue it, cease, rest, and resume it again. And if man does so, it follows necessarily, by the twentieth of this second book, that God similarly does so; and the antecedent, as a naturally prior cause, is in man's power, from which another necessarily follows as a posterior effect—and so is naturally in man's free power.

If, however, it is said that this does not follow, because God could freely resist and impede any man from any of the aforesaid, the reply is easy: for at the instant when God performs these things with man, He cannot resist or impede, as the preceding arguments have taught. Likewise, this response does not apply except in action and continuation, not in cessation and rest; because God cannot resist or impede a man who is acting from ceasing, or a man who is not acting from

resting, because this would be making him continue or newly act. But God cannot do this, because if He did, He would naturally precede the man in so acting. For if man naturally preceded God there, it would rather be said that man makes God continue or newly do something, than the reverse; for the naturally principal and first cause rather makes the instrumental and secondary cause do something, than the reverse.

If, therefore, in such a free action or continuation God naturally precedes man, and the divine will precedes the human, since this can happen in every species of free acts, in every free act according to species the divine will can naturally precede the human; therefore it does so now in fact. For absolutely no reason can be given why, of two free acts of the same species with respect to the same object, performed by the same two causes—and, to say many things briefly, having all causes and circumstances similar in species—in the action of one the divine will naturally precedes, and of the other the human.

Likewise, whatever is natural to any individual of a species is essential to it—namely, its entire essence, or a part of it, or something following essentially and inseparably from its essence, if it is in its most natural disposition. And whatever is thus essential to any individual is thus essential to the species and to every individual of it; otherwise it would not be essential to the species or to any individual, but accidental and extraneous, since it could, while the species and any individual of it remains in its most natural disposition, be now present and now absent.

Whence a threefold conclusion can follow. First, that whatever is natural to any individual of a species is natural to that species. Second, that whatever is natural to any species is natural to each individual of it. Third, that whatever is natural to any individual of a species is natural to each individual of it. Likewise, the species and each individual of it have the same nature; therefore whatever is natural to one of them is natural to each of them.

Wherefore the Philosopher, in Book 2 of *On the Heavens*, chapters 48 and 49, argues that if one star moves with a motion of rotation or revolution, every star moves thus; and if one does not so move, neither does another. And in chapter 59, from the fact that one star is of spherical shape, he argues the same universally of every star. On which Averroes in that commentary 59 says: "He gave a natural demonstration and said: If therefore one of the stars is found to be spherical, it is necessary that all be spherical. And this is not obvious, but the demonstration is founded on this: that all celestial bodies are of the same nature in species, and that celestial bodies are many individuals in species, and it is necessary that what exists in some individual of the species among essential properties exists in all individuals of the same species; and that shape is among the essential properties in celestial bodies, because they are animate." According to these propositions, therefore, his statement is verified; and it is not, as we said, merely by example.

Therefore, if in any free act it is natural that God precedes man and the divine will precedes the human, this will be natural in every such act.

Furthermore, the aforesaid response does not apply even in acting. For if the human will performing its free act does not necessitate God to co-act with it, because He could freely impede it—then God freely does not impede it from acting; therefore God voluntarily does not impede it; therefore He wills not to impede it. Because by the twenty-second chapter of the first book, God has some act of will regarding the non-impeding; and not a nolition, because by the tenth chapter of the first book, then the non-impeding would not exist—and therefore the impeding would then exist. Therefore He has a volition. Therefore, with the human will acting, God co-acts by willing to co-act, and by willing not to impede.

Either, then, the human will by acting, just as it naturally precedes the divine volition by which God wills to act, likewise precedes that divine volition by which God wills not to impede; or the reverse. If the former, then both of those divine volitions necessarily follow the human will acting. And by the tenth chapter of the first book, if God wills not to impede but to co-act, He necessarily does not impede but co-acts, etc., as was argued at the beginning.

If the reverse, and from that divine volition by which God wills not to impede, the entire action of the human will depends as from a naturally preceding cause, then the divine volition co-causing the free act with the human will precedes it naturally in causing. And if this volition of God, by which He wills not to impede the human will from acting, naturally precedes it in acting, why not also His volition by which He wills to co-act with the same?

Likewise, if the human will naturally precedes the divine in their common action, and the created or human will of Christ necessarily follows His divine will in all things, then the will of any mere man would be freer than the human will of the Lord Jesus Christ—which no reason permits. For how would it be fitting that the servant be freer than the Lord, or the disciple than the Master? For this would be the most corrupt polity, or rather the very corruption of polity, as almost the entire book of Aristotle's *Politics* makes manifest. Whence also Luke 6: "The disciple is not above his Master." And John 13: "The servant is not greater than his Lord." And earlier in the same: "You call Me Master and Lord, and rightly so; for so I am."

That in Christ there is a twofold will—namely, divine and human—no Catholic doubts; because if Christ had two perfect natures, divine and human, as the Evangelical creeds and all Catholic doctors attest, He had also the perfect operations and consequently the volitions belonging to them. And conversely, if Christ had only one operation and a single will, He consequently had only one nature—which is the Eutychian heresy, as Isidore says in Book 8, *Etymologies*, chapter 5 or 14. And this is recounted in the *Decretum*, question 24, last chapter, "Certain people." Wherefore that heresy must consequently posit this heresy as well: that in Christ there is only one will. And therefore Jerome, commenting on Mark 14—"The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak"—says that this is against the Eutychians, who posit only one will in Christ; which also because Macarius the Archbishop conceded this, he was condemned in the metropolitan synod. The Lombard also, in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 17, proves at length by very

many authorities that in Christ there was a twofold will, divine and human. Moreover, Damascene, in his *Sentences*, chapter 36, proves the same.

That the human will of Christ necessarily followed His divine will can easily be demonstrated to Catholics. For who would doubt that this is more fitting and natural than the reverse?

Likewise, otherwise Christ could by His human will will the contrary of His divine will; and so Christ could by His divine will will that Christ by His human will go to the East, and by His human will could will that by the same will He go to the West. With these wills in place, He could not go to the West, because then the human will would overcome the divine—contrary to the tenth chapter of the first book. Nor could He go to the East, because then this supposit would go voluntarily, yet unwilling and against its will; and so the same entire supposit would do the same deed voluntarily and involuntarily with respect to the same entire supposit, and freely willing and freely not-willing—and this even according to the same nature. Nor could He stand in the middle, because then the human will would impede the divine, even though the divine is infinitely more powerful; and the divine will itself would be frustrated from its purpose—contrary to the tenth chapter of the first book.

Otherwise also, Christ the Son of God, who is God, could have willed what was undue and consequently could have sinned, which is exceedingly erroneous and absurd. For according to the Philosopher, in Books 1 and 7 of the *Metaphysics*, acts and operations concern individuals, and belong to individuals or supposits. Christ, however, was supposed only by the divine supposition—namely, of the Word of God—as the Lombard shows by sufficiently authoritative testimonies in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 5. If, therefore, Christ had sinned by willing something unjust according to His human will, that entire supposit—namely, the Word of God, and God—would have sinned by so willing unjustly; and so the highest justice would be unjust, the highest rectitude distorted, the highest goodness evil, and the highest blessedness or happiness would be subject to the highest misery—with infinite other absurdities.

Likewise, if God could sin, He could lie; and so the highest truth would be false. Whence the Apostle, in Hebrews 6, speaking of God, says thus: "Wishing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of His counsel, He interposed an oath, so that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest consolation." The Gloss says: "By two immutable things"—that is, by the promise and the oath.

Likewise, 2 Timothy 2: "He"—namely, Christ—"remains faithful; He cannot deny Himself." The Gloss: "He who is the truth—which He would do if He did not fulfill His words." But that He cannot deny Himself is praise of the divine will.

And Numbers 23: "God is not like a man, that He should lie." Whence to you who think God can lie, one can rightly say that word of Psalm 49: "You thought wickedly that I would be like you"—because every man is a liar—"therefore I will rebuke you and set the matter before your face."

Whence also the Truth Himself, Jesus Christ, rebuking such liars, leads them to this as to a manifest impossibility: that He would be like them, a liar (John 8).

Likewise, Anselm, in Book 2 of *Why God Became Man*, chapter 10, treating the passage of John just mentioned and asking whether Christ could have lied, says that He had the power but did not have, nor could He have, the will. Whence he says thus: "Every power follows the will. For when I say 'I can speak' or 'I can walk,' it is understood: 'if I will.' For if the will is not understood, it is not power but necessity. We can therefore say of Christ that He could have lied—if it is understood: if He had willed to. And since He could not lie unwillingly, nor could He will to lie, it can no less be said that He was unable to lie. So He both could and could not lie."

Likewise, if Christ could have lied, He could have preached falsely and likewise taught falsely by word and deed—and whoever concedes this will drench the entire Catholic faith with excessive hesitation and ferment it with excessive suspicion.

Likewise, Augustine, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 19, speaking of Christ, says thus: "Was it to be feared that with advancing age that man would sin by free will, or that for this reason the will in Him was not free—and was it not rather all the more free, the more it could not serve sin?"

The same author, in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 36: "Nor was it to be feared that by this inestimable mode, in which human nature was assumed by God the Word into a unity of person, it would sin through the free exercise of the will, since the assumption itself was such that the human nature assumed by God would admit in itself no motion of an evil will."

The same, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 45: "This mode by which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit—not as a son—suggests to us the grace of God, by which that man, with no preceding merits, at the very beginning of his nature when he began to exist, was united to the Word in so great a unity of person that the same one was the Son of God who was the Son of Man, and the Son of Man who was the Son of God; and so in the assumption of human nature, grace in a way became natural to that man, by which He could admit no sin."

Likewise, the Lombard, Book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 12, writes thus: "It is not unreasonably asked whether that man could have sinned or could have not been God. For if He could have sinned, He could have been damned; if He could have been damned, He could have not been God. Therefore, if He could have sinned, He could have not been God—because being God and being able to will iniquity cannot coexist. Here a distinction is needed: whether we are speaking of the person or of the nature. If of the person, it is manifest that He could not sin nor could He not be God. If of the nature, we must discuss whether we are speaking of it as united to the Word, or of it as if not united to the Word but nonetheless existing—that is, either of it according as it was united to the Word, or of it according as it could have existed and not been united to the Word. For there is no doubt that that soul, being and being united to the Word, could

not sin; and it is without doubt true that the same soul, if it existed and were not united to the Word, could sin."

Likewise, if Christ could have sinned according to His human will, He could also have been deceived and erred according to His human intellect—for it is less to be so deceived than to sin—and so the highest truth would be false, and the highest wisdom would be deceived, with many other exceedingly great incongruities.

Through these foregoing arguments, Damascene proves the same conclusions in his *Sentences*, chapter 36, saying thus: "It must be known that we speak of will in God, but we do not principally speak of choice. For God does not deliberate—for deliberation belongs to ignorance; about what one knows, no one deliberates. If deliberation belongs to ignorance, then certainly so does choice. God, knowing all things simply, does not deliberate. Nor do we seek deliberation or choice in the divine soul of Christ; for He had no ignorance. And if His nature was one of which future things were unknown, yet according to the hypostasis being united to God the Word, He had knowledge of all things—not by grace, but as was said, on account of the hypostatic union. For He was both God and man; and therefore He had a sentential will. For He had a natural will that is simple, the one that is considered similarly in all human hypostases. But His holy soul did not have a sentential will—that is, a *theleton*, or object of will—contrary to His divine will, nor anything beyond His divine will."

"For sentential will is divided along with hypostases—except in the holy and simple and uncomposed and indivisible Trinity and Godhead. For there, since the hypostases are not entirely divided and distant, neither is the object of will divided; and there, since the nature is one, the natural will is also one; and since the hypostases are also inseparable, the object of will is also one, and the motion of the three hypostases is one."

"In human beings, however, since the nature is one, the natural will is also one; but since the hypostases are separated and distant from one another—in place, time, disposition toward things, and many other respects—the wills and sentential preferences are different."

"In our Lord Jesus Christ, however, since the natures are different, the natural wills of His divinity and of His humanity—that is, the volitional powers—are also different. But since the hypostasis is one and the one willing is one, the object of will—namely, the *gnomicon*, that is, the sentential will—is also one, with His human will following—namely, His divine will—and willing what His divine will willed it to will."

Behold: the human will of Christ follows His divine will.

And if you do not wish to believe Damascene and me, believe Christ Himself, who in John 12 says: "I have not spoken of Myself, but the Father who sent Me, He gave Me a commandment what to say and what to speak." And John 5: "I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge, and My judgment is true, because I seek not My own will, but the will of the Father who

sent Me." Therefore His human will follows the will of the Father, and consequently necessarily followed the divine will of Christ in all things.

Whence Augustine, on John, Book 2, Homily 45 (or 49 of the whole), says thus: "On account of the one person of the Son, consisting of two substances, divine and human, sometimes He speaks according to that by which He is God, as in 'I and the Father are one'; sometimes according to that by which He is man, as in 'The Father is greater than I'—according to which we have received from Him the saying, and this which I now discuss: 'I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge.'"

Likewise, Augustine, Book 1 on John, Homily 20: "The Son walked upon the sea; the feet of flesh were set upon the waves; the flesh was walking, and the divinity was governing."

Is it not also written of Christ in Isaiah 11: "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him"? "Upon," it says—not beneath, nor beside. And further, chapter 41: "Who," says the Lord, "stirred up the righteous one from the East?" The Gloss: "That is, Christ." "He called him to follow Him." The Gloss: "Who, if not I?" And further, chapter 49: "Those from the West shall fear the name of the Lord, and those from the rising of the sun His glory, when He comes like a violent river, whom the Spirit of the Lord drives"—which is plainly understood of Christ.

And further, chapter 61: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me," etc.—which was without doubt said in the person of Christ, as Christ Himself most clearly attests in Luke 4.

Whence also, earlier in the same Gospel: "He was led into the desert by the Spirit." And Matthew 4: "Jesus was led into the desert by the Spirit." And Mark 1: "The Spirit drove Him into the desert"—all of which the Doctors understand as referring to the Holy Spirit, God.

Whence also Chrysostom, on that passage in Mark 1, says that the Evangelist does not show Him simply going into the desert but being driven, so that you may understand this to happen according to the word of the divine disposition.

Likewise, Anselm, in Book 1 of *Why God Became Man*, chapter 9, says thus: "What He Himself says—'I have not come to do My own will, but the will of Him who sent Me'—is of the same kind as 'My teaching is not My own.' For what anyone has not from himself but from God, he ought to call not so much his own as God's. No man, however, has from himself the truth he teaches or the just will he has, but from God. Therefore Christ did not come to do His own will but the Father's, because the just will He had was not from His humanity but from His divinity."

And further, chapter 10: "It can rightly be understood that through that pious will by which the Son willed to die for the salvation of the world, the Father gave Him—yet not by compelling—the commandment and the cup of suffering, and did not spare Him but delivered Him up for us, and willed His death; and that the Son Himself was obedient even unto death, and learned obedience from what He suffered. For just as according to His humanity He did not have from Himself the will to live justly, but from the Father, so also that will by which He willed to die in

order to accomplish so great a good, He could not have except from the Father of lights, from whom comes every good gift and every perfect gift. And just as the Father is said to draw by giving the will, so it is not incongruously asserted that He impels. For just as the Son says of the Father, 'No one comes to Me unless the Father draws him,' so He could have said, 'unless He impels him.' Likewise He could have said: 'No one runs to death for My name's sake unless the Father impels or draws him.' For since everyone is drawn or impelled by will toward what he unswervingly wills, it is not unfittingly affirmed that God, who gives such a will, draws or impels. In this drawing or impelling no violence or necessity is understood, but the spontaneous and beloved tenacity of a good will that has been received."

Likewise, the prophet says: "You have held my right hand, and in Your will You have led me" (Psalm 72)—which is said in the person of Christ as man to God, as the expositions of the saints teach, and as the Church attests, which at the time of the Lord's Passion—namely, on Palm Sunday—sings this verse in the Mass. The divine will of Christ therefore holds and leads His human will; and so it naturally precedes it.

Likewise, the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 15, speaking of the Father and His Son Christ according to the form of a servant, says: "He has subjected all things under His feet. But when He says 'All things are subjected to Him,' without doubt it is except Him who subjected all things to Him. But when all things have been subjected to Him, then the Son Himself will be subject to Him who subjected all things to Him." The Gloss: "Except Him"—that is, His divinity—"who, just as He is from no one, so for no reason can He be subject to anyone; for He is the principle of all things. Therefore God is not subject to Him, but rather He is subject to God according to His humanity." And what it says—"He Himself will be subject"—it does not say this as though He were not already subject, but uses a kind of expression by which Scripture often speaks, so that what always is, is said to come about at some time when it begins to be known.

Furthermore, those who place themselves before God wish to be not only freer than Christ according to His human will, but even according to His divine will and the Holy Spirit likewise—because neither the Son of God nor the Holy Spirit can have any willing unless the Father has first in some way caused and given it to them, and to the Holy Spirit, the Father together with the Son. Indeed, they cannot even understand, or exist, or have anything at all, unless it flows to them from their principle and is causally derived. For they have being from their causative principles, and therefore also the power to understand, to will, and all else.

And who in this most blessed Trinity will presume to assert the Trinity of persons to be entirely confused, with absolutely no order among them? Is not the Father said among theologians to be the principle of the Son? Is not the Father said to be the principle of the entire divinity? Is not the Father said to be the first person? Does not the producing cause, the begetter, and the one who gives being in some way precede the caused, the produced, the begotten, and the one to whom being is given? What philosopher or theologian would deny this?

Whence also Hermes, in *On the World and the Heavens*, chapter 1, teaching that there are three principles of things—namely, cause, reason, and nature—says that from its cause, the caused is preceded; and he understands there by "cause" the absolutely first cause that is completely uncaused—namely, God the Father, who first causes the reason proceeding from Him, namely the Son, and through Him the entire universe of nature. Wherefore also he says: "Reason from cause, and from both, nature." And further: "Reason is a certain power proceeding from the cause, ordering all things from the beginning"—where he takes these three terms—reason, *nous*, and divine mind—indifferently and interchangeably for the same thing, as was briefly touched upon in the second chapter of the first book. With this view many other philosophical and poetical testimonies are also known to agree, some of which were recounted in the second chapter of the first book.

Is this not also what Paul seems to have meant when he said that God—namely, the Father—"in these last days has spoken to us in His Son, through whom He also made the ages, and who is the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance," etc. (Hebrews 1)? Wherefore also Chrysostom, in the second homily on that epistle, says thus: "He is said to work through the Son, because it is established that He begot the craftsman. For if the Father is His cause according as He is Father, much more is He the cause of those things that are declared to have been made through the Son."

And he says—as Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, recounts in *On Free Will*, chapter 9—commenting on "In the beginning was the Word": "The Father precedes the Word, not by nature but by cause; the Father precedes the Word causally; the Son precedes all things that were made through Him naturally." With which Augustine concordantly writes in *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 16: "God is the cause of all things that are. And because He is the cause of all things, He is also the cause of His own wisdom, and God was never without wisdom; therefore He is the eternal cause of His eternal wisdom, and is not prior in time to His wisdom." And then: "If it is inherent in God to be an eternal Father, and He was not ever not a Father, He was never without the Son." And the same author, in *On the Threefold Habitation, or On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Wicked*, says that the Father does not precede the Son in time, but in origin.

Whence also Richard, in Book 5 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, having distinguished a threefold procession—namely, one that is only immediate, one that is only mediate, and one that is both mediate and immediate—and further, in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of the same, shows that the first and third processions are in the divine persons, but the second in no way. And he says that the procession of the Son from the Father is only immediate; the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is both mediate and immediate; and that this procession is naturally prior to the other, and one person is causally—and therefore naturally—prior to another. Whence in chapter 7 he writes thus: "Duality is naturally prior to trinity; for the former can exist without the latter, but the latter never without the former. Naturally, therefore, that procession is also prior which can subsist in a duality of persons, compared to that which cannot exist without a Trinity of persons."

"But in that plurality of persons and true eternity, nothing there precedes, nothing there succeeds, and by that very fact nothing there is prior in time, nothing posterior in time. But what cannot be prior temporally can be prior causally, and by that very fact naturally. For as we said far above, the perfection of one person requires the fellowship of another, and so it happens that one is the cause of the other."

Is it not the case also that Augustine, in Book 15 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 17, says that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father? But the sublimity of this matter is inaccessible, and the words of the Doctors quoted above—both on account of their depth and on account of their superficially apparent contrariety—require a pious and religious hearer or reader, humble and prudent.

Does not the Son Himself also say: "What My Father has given Me is greater than all" (John 10)? Which must be understood of the Son according to His divinity, as Augustine attests in Part 1 on John, Sermon 48, and Hilary in Book 7 of *On the Trinity*, and Pope Innocent III in the General Council, in the *Decretals*, "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," chapter "We Condemn": namely, that the Father by begetting the Son gave Him His substance, His essence, and the full being of divinity; He gave Him to be God, to be coeternal with the Father, to be equal to the Father—and this is greater than all creatures and all things that can be created. And is not some kind of priority of origin or cause signified by the past tense "gave"?

Does not the Son, then, in a similar manner receive and have from the Father, and the Holy Spirit equally from both, all His knowing and willing? Is it not written in John 5, from the mouth of the Son: "The Son can do nothing of Himself, unless He sees the Father doing it; for whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does likewise. For the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things that He Himself does"? And further, chapter 8: "Of Myself I do nothing, but as the Father has taught Me, I speak these things." And chapter 16: "The Spirit of truth will teach you all truth; for He will not speak of Himself, but whatever He hears, He will speak."

Wherefore also Augustine, on John, Homily 20, expounding the first of these authorities, says: "This is what 'the Son cannot do anything of Himself unless He sees the Father doing it' means—because the Son's seeing is His being born of the Father. His vision is not one thing and His substance another; nor is His power one thing and His substance another. All that He is, is from the Father; all that He can do, is from the Father—since what He can do and what He is, this is one and the same, and the whole is from the Father."

And in Homily 40, expounding the second: "Incorporeally the Father spoke to the Son, because incorporeally the Father begot the Son. Nor did He thus teach Him as though He had begotten one unlearned; but for Him to have taught is the same as to have begotten one who knows; and 'the Father taught Me' is the same as 'the Father begot Me knowing.' For if—as few understand—the nature of truth is simple, then for the Son, to be is the same as to know. Therefore from Him He has His knowing, from whom He has His being. Not that He first existed from Him and afterward knew from Him; but just as in begetting He gave Him to be, so in begetting He gave

Him to know—because, as was said, in a simple nature of truth, to be and to know are not one thing and another, but the very same."

Whence also Proposition 351 of the *Sentences of Prosper* seems to be sententially extracted, which says: "The Father did not teach the Son as though He had begotten one unlearned and conferred knowledge on one who did not know; but the eternal doctrine is an eternal essence. To be taught by the Father is the same as to be begotten by the Father, because in a simple nature, to be and to know are not one thing and another, but the very same." Wherefore also Proposition 374 says thus: "Whatever God the Father gave to God the Son, He gave by begetting. For the Father so gave the Son, without which the Son could not exist, just as He gave Him to exist; how then would He give Him certain words, in whom He ineffably spoke all things?"

Augustine also, on Psalm 118—"I have understood more than all my teachers"—treating the same authority, says thus: "The Son Himself says, 'As the Father has taught Me, I speak these things'—which is most difficult to understand as spoken by the person of the Word, unless one can somehow grasp that for the Son to have been taught by the Father is the same as to have been begotten. For He for whom to be is not one thing and to have been taught another, but for whom to be is the same as to have been taught—from whomever He has His being, from the same He simultaneously has His having been taught. But as spoken by the person of the man in whom He took the form of a servant, it is more easily understood that He learned from the Father what He said."

And in Part 2 on John, Homily 45 (or 49 of the whole), expounding the third authority quoted above: "'He will not speak of Himself,' he says, 'because He is not of Himself; but whatever He hears, He will speak.' For Him, to hear is to know, and to know is to be—as was discussed above. Because, therefore, He is not of Himself but of Him from whom He proceeds, from whom He has His essence, from Him He has His knowledge, from Him therefore His hearing, which is nothing other than His knowledge."

From this passage also Proposition 368 of the *Sentences of Prosper* seems to be extracted.

Furthermore, if the Son or the Holy Spirit could have any willing from Himself—that is, a willing of His own that the Father did not give Him—there could be in that most blessed and most harmonious Trinity a discord and contrariety of wills; and therefore some person, or any person, could be not most blessed, and indeed could be miserable, as is evident from the eighth part of the corollary of chapter 1, Book 1. And the blessed Augustine says in Book 13 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 5: "No one is blessed except the one who has all that he wills and wills nothing badly." Also, some person could be not omnipotent and not have a universally efficacious will; for of contrary wills, one is necessarily impeded, or both. And so a person could not be God—contrary to the first supposition, the third part, the sixth, seventh, and eighth parts of the corollary of chapter 1, Book 1.

Moreover, if this were so, one person could create while the other did not create—which all theologians know to be absolutely false. I will therefore briefly confirm this. The Son of God Himself says: "My Father works until now, and I work" (John 5). And further: "Amen, amen, I say to you: the Son cannot do anything of Himself unless He sees the Father doing it; for whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does likewise." On which Augustine, Book 1 on John, Homily 20, says: "The Catholic faith, confirmed by the Spirit of God in His saints against every heretical depravity, holds this: that the works of the Father and the Son are inseparable." And further: "Not only of the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit—just as there is equality and inseparability of the persons, so also their works are inseparable." And he shows this principally and, as it were, singularly, but at length throughout that entire twentieth homily.

This is also entirely against the authority of Damascene cited above. It is also manifestly destroyed by the authority of Christ just cited: "The Son can do nothing of Himself, unless He sees the Father doing it; for the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things that He Himself does." This was said, as is evident at length through Augustine in that twentieth homily mentioned, because just as the Son is not, and cannot be, of Himself, but of the Father, so He neither does nor can do anything of Himself alone, but of the Father.

Likewise, John 5: "I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge, and My judgment is true, because I seek not My own will, but the will of the Father who sent Me." Which Augustine, Book 1 on John, Homily 22, expounds of the Son not according to His human nature, but according to His divine nature in the aforementioned manner—although it could perhaps more fittingly be expounded of Him even according to His human nature, especially because there the diversity of wills in the Son and in the Father is expressed, which with respect to His divine nature cannot be understood in any way, as is evident from the foregoing, and because otherwise that most blessed Trinity would not be supremely one.

And Augustine says in that Homily 22: "The will of this Trinity is one; the power is one; the majesty is one." Wherefore also in Book 2 on John, Homily 45, he expounds that authority of Christ according to His human nature, as was cited above. Whence it can be evidently gathered that such authorities spoken of Christ can be understood and expounded in both ways—which the same author also attests on Psalm 118—"I have understood more than all my teachers"—cited above.

Likewise, John 12: "I have not spoken of Myself, but the Father who sent Me, He Himself gave Me a commandment what to say and what to speak; and I know that His commandment is eternal life. Therefore what I speak, as the Father has said to Me, so I speak." And further, chapter 14: "The words that I speak to you, I do not speak of Myself; but the Father dwelling in Me, He does the works." These also Augustine, Book 1 on John, Homily 54 (that is, the last) and Homily 17, expounds of the Son in the aforementioned manner—namely, according to His divine nature.

Whence in that Homily 17 he says: "The Son does not speak of Himself because He is not of Himself; and therefore the Father dwelling in Him does the works; because the one through whom and with whom He acts is from none other than Himself." And in *On the Words of the Lord*, Sermon 56, he expounds the same authority in the same way, and says: "He attributes to Him whatever He does, from whom He is who does it."

Furthermore, if the human will naturally precedes the divine in common action, the human will is the naturally prior cause why God acts, and therefore why He wills—as is evident from the corollary of the tenth chapter of the first book—which is against the twentieth chapter of the first book.

Likewise, if the divine volition by which God wills to act presently depends on the present human will as on a prior cause, by the same reasoning His eternal volition by which He eternally willed to act now eternally depended on the human will eternally now being future, as on a prior cause. And since God does not know these posterior complex truths except through His own will, as the eighteenth chapter of the first book proved, it patently follows that these posterior things are the causes of the divine essence—contrary to the fifteenth chapter of the first book and others that follow. Indeed, it manifestly follows that God does not know these future things with certainty, nor present things, and therefore nor past things, as is easily seen through the eighteenth chapter of the first book.

For God does not know determinately and certainly future things except through something determined and certain to Him; but a free will, according to the contradiction with respect to its future act, being equally contingent, is not determined and certain with respect to that act—otherwise that act would be determinately and certainly future, and not contingent in either direction. Nor is God certain about that future act through His own will, because His divine will wills and does nothing in such matters unless it is preceded by the human will; but such a preceding is entirely indeterminate and uncertain.

Furthermore, if for the human will to act now is naturally prior to the divine will's acting now, its acting now is the naturally prior cause why the divine will now acts. Therefore, its always having been going to act now was always the naturally prior cause why the divine will always willed to act now. For according to the Philosopher, Book 2 of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 3, what is truly the cause of something's being is the same as the cause of its coming to be, or its being and its future being. Therefore this future being was the naturally prior cause why God willed this to be future—not the reverse—contrary to the fourteenth chapter of the first book, which the arguments of that chapter also refute and condemn.

Likewise, if—some future thing being pointed out—this thing's being future is the cause why God wills this to be future, and by the same fourteenth chapter, God's willing this to be future is the cause why this is future, then this thing's being future is the cause why this is future. And similarly it can be deduced that a thing's being present is the cause why it is present, with the help of the ninth chapter of the first book and the authority of the Philosopher cited above.

Likewise, if the human will's being about to act were the cause of the eternally prior divine volition, its being about to act would be the naturally prior cause of divine predestination and reprobation; and therefore its presently acting would be the naturally prior cause of the effect of predestination—namely, the conferral of grace in the present. Both of these are the heresy of Pelagius condemned by the Fathers, as is evident from chapters 45 and 35 of the first book, with the others that follow, which those same chapters also condemned.

Furthermore, if the human will naturally preceded the divine in acting, human affairs would not be subject to divine providence—contrary to the twenty-seventh chapter of the first book and others that follow. Indeed, what is much more unworthy, if this were so, the divine volitions would be governed by human providence and would be subject to it—which is entirely contrary to reason. For according to the true judgment of reason, it belongs to the wise and good to rule the foolish and wicked, and to the wiser and better to rule the less wise, and to provide for them in all things.

Whence the Philosopher, Book 1 of the *Metaphysics*, in the Prologue: "We consider the more principal wisdom to be more wise than the subordinate. For it is fitting not for the wise man to be ordered, but to order; and not for this man to be persuaded by another, but the less wise by him." And Book 5 of the *Ethics*, chapter 11: "We do not allow a man to rule, but reason." And Book 1 of the *Politics*, chapter 1: "That which can foresee by mind is by nature the ruler and master." And further, in Book 3, chapter 9: "He who orders the intellect to rule seems to order God and the laws to rule; but he who orders a man also adds the beast."

And Cicero, Book 3 of *On the Republic*: "Do we not see that dominion has been given by nature itself to every best person, with the greatest advantage to inferiors?"

Whence also Wisdom 7 and 8, according to the quotation of some: "Wisdom is not overcome by malice; she reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly." But who does not know that these things are found infinitely more abundantly and perfectly in God than in man? He is therefore, according to the view of the Philosopher in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics* at the end, the one supreme prince of all things.

Likewise, then, man performing anything would be the principal craftsman, and God in a certain way his instrument—whereas by nature the reverse is true, as very many philosophical and theological authorities cited in the twentieth of this second book most plainly attest. Whence also Jeremiah 18: "Behold," says the Lord, "as clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel."

Furthermore, then God would not be omnipotent. For He could not make man will, however much God Himself willed this; because if He could, let Him do it: therefore God makes a man will at some hour in which the man himself had determined he would by no means will, and in which he would by no means have willed unless God had done this. Either, then, in that volition the human will naturally precedes, or the divine. If the human, then God does not make this man

will, but rather the reverse, as was argued above. If the divine, then it is so in all cases, as was shown above.

Indeed, according to the hypothesis, however much God wills this prior naturally or antecedently to the human will, it will produce no action, because then the human will would naturally precede, as that hypothesis posits. Nor is someone rightly judged omnipotent who in performing anything necessarily needs the help of a prior agent that naturally precedes him in acting.

Nor can anyone pretend that this is by no means contained under omnipotence; for this is one truly makeable thing. Indeed, then man would be more powerful than God in this respect. For although God might will a man to will something, and might do everything He could to the utmost for this purpose, the man could freely resist Him and not will. For all human affairs are preordained and provided for by the providence of the eternal divine will, as the twenty-seventh chapter of the first book with the following chapters makes clear. Therefore all inferior causes carrying out this preordination and provision in their every motion or rest are necessarily subject to this divine will and of necessity obey its command. For it would seem too futile for Him to provide or preordain anything unless He could bring it about in effect.

Wherefore also the Philosopher says in Book 3 of the *Ethics*, chapter 8, that deliberation is about possible things that will come about through us. Whence also the supreme Philosopher says in Isaiah 46: "My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done; I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass; I have created, and I will do it." And Isaiah 51: "The Lord has thought, and He has done whatever He has spoken."

Otherwise also, the human will could frustrate the divine will, and thereby render our most happy God miserable—contrary to the tenth chapter of the first book, and contrary to all the happy and even the miserable, however many.

Whence also Proverbs 21: "There is no wisdom, there is no prudence, there is no counsel against the Lord; the horse is prepared for the day of battle, but the Lord grants salvation." Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 42: "He has adorned the great works of His wisdom, which exists from before the ages and unto the ages; neither has anything been added, nor shall it be diminished, and He has no need of anyone's counsel. How desirable are all His works, and like a spark which one may consider! All these things live and remain forever, and in every necessity they all obey Him." And Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He will incline it wherever He wills." Many other things similar to these are more fully cited in the twentieth of this second book.

And Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 77: "Who is so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men to good—whichever He wills, and whenever He wills, and wherever He wills?" And in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 69: "For the willing or not willing is so in the power of the one willing or not willing that it does not impede the divine will

nor overcome its power." And chapter 71: "God has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own."

Likewise, human volition is a gift of God, as is evident from the twentieth of this second book; therefore, by the seventh of this second book, it is not antecedently from man but from God. Likewise, the faithful reasonably ask God to make men will this or that, as is evident from the twentieth of this second book; therefore God antecedently does this, as is evident from the forty-sixth chapter of the first book.

Likewise, then the human will in meriting, in repenting, in rising from sin, and in doing any good whatsoever would naturally precede God and the divine will; and therefore would all the more precede the action of grace. All of which are false and allied to the Pelagian heresy, as is evident from chapters 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 41 of the first book, and from the authorities of Scripture and the Doctors more copiously cited there.

Whence also the Apostle, in Romans 11: "Who has first given to Him, that it should be repaid to him? For from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things." And Job 41: "Who has first given to Me, that I should repay him? All things that are under heaven are Mine." On which Gregory, Book 33 of the *Morals*, chapter 22, writes thus: "Certainly no one, so that divine grace might follow him, has first given anything to God. For if we anticipate God by working well, where is what the prophet says: 'His mercy shall go before me'? If we gave something of good work so as to merit His grace, where is what the Apostle Paul says: 'By grace you have been saved through faith, and this not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God, not of your works'? If our love anticipates God, where is what the Apostle John says: 'Not as though we have loved God, but because He first loved us'? Where is what the Lord says through Hosea: 'I will love them freely'? If without His gift, by our own virtue, we follow God, where is what the Truth protests through the Gospel, saying: 'Without Me you can do nothing'? Where is what He says: 'No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him'? Where is what He says again: 'You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you'? If we at least anticipate the gifts of good works by thinking well through our own virtue, where is what again through Paul is so subtly said—so that all confidence of the human mind in itself may be cut off from the very root of the heart—when he says: 'Not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God'?"

"No one, therefore, anticipates God by merits, so that he might hold Him, as it were, as a debtor. But in a wondrous way, the Creator, who is equitable to all, both pre-elected some and justly abandoned others in their reprobate ways; yet He does not show piety to the elect without justice, because here He presses them with harsh afflictions; nor again does He exercise justice toward the reprobate without mercy, because He bears patiently with those whom He will someday condemn in perpetuity. If, therefore, the elect follow grace that goes before them, and the reprobate receive according to what they deserve, and the elect find in mercy something to praise, and the reprobate have nothing in justice to accuse—then it is rightly said: 'Who has first

given to Me, that I should repay him?' As if it were openly said: 'I am not compelled by any reason to spare the reprobate, because I am not held as their debtor by any action of theirs.' For this reason they never receive the eternal rewards of the heavenly homeland: because now, while they could have merited them, they despised them by free will. And this free will is indeed formed toward the good in the elect, when their mind is lifted from earthly desires by the breath of grace. For the good that we do is both God's and ours: God's through prevenient grace, ours through obedient free will. For if it is not God's, why do we give Him thanks eternally? Again, if it is not ours, why do we hope for rewards to be repaid to us? Because, therefore, we give thanks not without merit, we know that we are preceded by His gift; and again, because we seek recompense not without merit, we know that by subsequent free will we chose the good things we would do."

And further: "It is clear to all that not only the things that are under heaven, but even those things created above the heavens that are called celestial, serve His will."

With which Augustine concordantly says in Book 4 *Against Julian*, the son and follower of Pelagius, chapter 5: "When a man is divinely helped, he is not only helped to attain perfection—as you yourself said, wishing it to be understood that he begins by himself without grace, which grace then perfects—but rather, as the Apostle says, 'that He who began a good work in us may perfect it even to the end.' For in what you wish man, as you speak, to be stirred to something praiseworthy by the impulses of a generous heart, in this you do not wish him to glory in the Lord, but in free will, and so to give first that it may be repaid to him. O ungrateful ones toward the grace of God! O enemies of the grace of God, and Christians in name only! Does not the Church pray for her enemies? What does she pray? That the evil will be converted to good—'because the will is prepared by the Lord,' and 'God,' as the Apostle says, 'is the one who works in us both to will and to act.'"

And further in the same, chapter 11: "But with what arrogance and what presumption of your own virtue you have said—'Therefore very easily, by the pursuit of holiness, which God helps, a man can be without sins'—he does not recognize who does not know your dogmas. For you want even the pursuit of holiness to precede, without God's help, in the will of man, which God should then deserve to help—not freely."

Furthermore, those who place their will before the divine will act more proudly than the first proud angel, who, coveting equality with God, said: "I will be like the Most High" (Isaiah 14). For these are by no means content with equality with God or His likeness, but claim majority and superiority over God. But let them beware lest they descend to him, or rather beneath him, as is added in Isaiah: "Nevertheless you shall be brought down to hell, into the depths of the pit; those who see you shall stare at you, and look closely at you."

These also say more proudly of the Lord their God than those uncivil citizens said of that noble man, their lord: "We do not want this man to reign over us" (Luke 19). For they not only say "We do not want this man to reign over us," but "We want to reign over Him." For they wish to

naturally precede God, and consequently to lead Him and govern Him in all their deeds. But let them fear and beware of what is said there consequently: "But as for those enemies of mine who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and slay them before me." Nor is this surprising: for they had conspired against the royal majesty, and so were most justly to be punished with the penalty for the crime of *lèse-majesté*.

Whence Anselm, in *On Similitudes*, chapter 8: "Pride is so called because it steps above where it ought to walk; for pride is called a 'stepping above.' Accordingly, one's own will, because it is not subjected to God's will but is exalted above it, is rightly called pride; and it is also the beginning of all sin, because from it every sin is born. And because man has it from himself, and does not wish to have the will of God above himself to follow, he takes from God Himself what properly and uniquely belongs to Him."

And there follows chapter 9: "For God alone ought to will whatever He wills by His own will, so as to have no other will above Himself to follow. When, therefore, man wills something by his own will, he takes from God, as it were, His crown. For just as the crown belongs to the king alone, so one's own will belongs to God alone. And just as someone would dishonor a king if he took his crown from him while he wore it, so man dishonors God when he takes from Him His own will, by having the privilege that He alone should have."

Wherefore also Aristotle, in his *Riddles*, riddle 3, thus exhorts: "Do not take the king's crown." Those twenty-four elders prudently observing this by no means proudly placed their crowns or wills above the crown or will of God, but humbly submitted them.

Whence Revelation 4: "The twenty-four elders fell down before Him who sat on the throne and worshipped the one living forever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying: 'You are worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power, because You created all things, and on account of Your will they existed and were created.'"

So also that most illustrious of kings and extraordinary prophet: "Shall not my soul be subject to God?" (Psalm 61). And further: "Nevertheless, be subject to God, O my soul." So also that Antiochus, at first the most proud of princes, at last humbly acknowledged "that it is just to be subject to God, and that a mortal should not think himself equal to God" (2 Maccabees 9). If, then, not equal, how much less higher? "For the Lord is high above all nations" (Psalm 112). Whence also Romans 3: "Let every mouth be stopped, and let the whole world be subject to God."

Likewise, Psalm 22: "The Lord rules me." And Psalm 79: "You who rule Israel, attend; who lead Joseph like a sheep." And Isaiah 49: "He who has mercy on them shall rule them." And Revelation 7: "The Lamb, who is in the midst of the throne, shall rule them and lead them." And Esther 15: "And when she had invoked the God who is the ruler of all and the Savior God," etc. And Psalm 46: "For God is the king of all the earth, and the Lord shall reign over the nations." And Psalm 102: "His kingdom shall rule over all"—with infinitely many similar passages.

These likewise say more impiously than those impious ones who said: "Who is the Almighty, that we should serve Him?" (Job 21). For those merely refused to serve the Almighty; but these not only refuse, but—what is more arrogant—wish the Almighty to serve them, while the human will commands and precedes as mistress, and the divine obeys and follows as handmaid.

Not so the prophet, not so. But: "By Your ordinance the day continues, for all things serve You" (Psalm 118). Not so did Jacob think of his Lord, but: "Let my Lord go before his servant," he said, "and I will follow slowly in his footsteps."

Likewise, then the divine will would rather bow in obedience to the human than the reverse—which no reason allows, and He Himself teaches the contrary: "By Myself I have sworn; the word of justice shall go forth from My mouth and shall not return, because every knee shall bow to Me" (Isaiah 45). Which Scripture the Apostle in Romans 14 cites thus: "For it is written: 'As I live, says the Lord, every knee shall bow to Me.'"

Furthermore, then the human will would lead the divine wherever it wished, whereas it is more reasonable for the reverse to be the case, since God sees, hears, and is able better. Whence Job 37: "The clouds spread His light, which illuminates all things round about, wherever the will of the governor leads them, to whatever He commands them upon the face of the earth, whether in one tribe, or in His land, or in whatever place of His mercy He commands them to be found."

On which Gregory, Book 27 of the *Morals*, chapter 22, says thus: "For the clouds to spread light is for the holy preachers to extend the examples of their life by speaking and acting. But the holy preachers wish to exhort certain people but cannot; often they desire to turn away from some, yet are compelled by the impulse of internal instigation to exhort them most insistently. Let us see the cloud of God, how it is led by the hand of the governor even to things it does not desire, and is again held back by the hand of the governor from its own impulse."

And he gives the example of Paul, who when he wished to depart from the Corinthians was held with them by the Lord; and who also, when he wished to go to the Thessalonians, neither could nor was able—as he says—to leave those with whom he then was, being impeded—as he says—by the Lord.

Whence he thus concludes: "The clouds of God therefore illuminate all things round about, because they illumine the ends of the world with the light of preaching. But because, being subject to divine commands, they cannot accomplish what they wish, they therefore cannot go except where the will of the governor leads them." Whence it is further added: "To whatever He commands them upon the face of the earth." "For often, when they are led by the will of the governor, they desire to act one way, but are disposed otherwise. For very often they endeavor to correct some of their hearers gently, and yet their speech is drawn into harshness; often they desire to cut off some sharply, yet their vigor or severity is restrained by a spirit of gentleness. Just as therefore they cannot go where they wish, so neither can they act as they wish. For the internal judge who holds them when He sends them also receives them with moderation when

He leads them, so that sometimes they arrange one thing in thought but perform another in action; sometimes they begin one way but finish another. Because, therefore, they serve according to what is commanded them, let it rightly be said: 'Wherever the will of the governor leads them, to whatever He commands them upon the face of the earth.'"

Likewise, Deuteronomy 31: "The Lord your God, He is your leader." And Isaiah 63: "The Spirit of the Lord was his leader." And 2 Chronicles 13: "In our army, God is the leader." And Psalm 54: "My leader and my intimate friend." And Wisdom 10: "The Lord led the just man by right paths." And Psalm 72: "You have held my right hand, and in Your will You have led me"—with very many similar passages throughout Scripture. The divine will, therefore, leads the human, naturally preceding it.

Whence also that Annius Seneca—as Augustine cites in Book 5 of *The City of God*, chapter 8—speaks somewhat metrically thus: "Lead me, O supreme Father and ruler of the high heavens, wherever it has pleased You; there is no delay in obeying. I am here, eager. Make me to will, and I shall follow; groaning and unwilling, I shall suffer what the good man might have done. The fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling."

Where Augustine also adds: "Plainly, in this last verse, he called 'fates' what he had said above was 'the will of the supreme Father.'"

With which the blessed Gregory concordantly says in Book 6 of the *Morals*, chapter 12, on Job 5—"Who catches the wise in their craftiness," etc.: "For so great are the works of God that through everything that is done by men, His will is sought out—to which, once known, our action ought to serve devotedly, and, as it were, follow as the leader of its journey, lest it even unwillingly serve Him, if in pride it turns away from Him. For the force of the supreme counsel can in no way be avoided."

Likewise, otherwise the human will would draw the divine after itself, whereas it is more reasonable for the reverse to be the case, as is evident from the authority of Seneca cited above.

Likewise, if this were so, the human will would rather govern the divine by acting than the divine the human—which is contrary to reason and against the authority of Job quoted above: "The clouds spread His light, which illuminates all things round about, wherever the will of the governor leads them." And Wisdom 14: "But You, Father, govern by providence"—and He is speaking of navigation and similar human affairs. And Isaiah 48: "I am the Lord your God, who teaches you useful things, who governs you in the way you walk."

Whence also Song of Songs 1: "Draw me after You." And John 6: "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him." And further, chapter 12: "I will draw all things to Myself." And Isaiah 10: "Shall the axe boast against him who cuts with it, or shall the saw be exalted against him by whom it is drawn?"—which is understood of Sennacherib and of God, as the twentieth of the first book more fully cited.

Likewise, otherwise the human will would rather stir up the divine to do something than the reverse—which is against sacred Scripture very frequently, both in evil acts and in good. Whence 1 Chronicles 5: "The Lord God of Israel stirred up the spirit of Pul, king of the Assyrians, and the spirit of Tilgath-pilneser, king of Assyria, and He carried away Reuben and Gad and half the tribe of Manasseh," etc. And 2 Chronicles 21: "The Lord stirred up against Joram the spirit of the Philistines and the Arabs who bordered on the Ethiopians, and they went up into the land of Judah and devastated it," etc. And Ezekiel 23: "Thus says the Lord God: Behold, I will stir up all your lovers against you, from whom your soul has been sated, and I will gather them against you on every side—the sons of Babylon, and all the Chaldeans, the nobles and tyrants and all the princes, all the sons of the Assyrians, young men of splendid form, leaders and magistrates, all the princes of princes and renowned horsemen; and they shall come upon you," etc. And Amos 6: "Behold, I will stir up against you, O house of Israel, says the Lord God of hosts, a nation, and it shall crush you."

These and many others about evil acts of the will. About good acts, however, it is written in 2 Chronicles, the last chapter, and 1 Ezra 1: "The Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus the king," etc. And Isaiah 41: "Who"—the Gloss says, "if not I"—"stirred up the righteous one from the East? He called him to follow Him. He gave the nations before him," etc. And there follows: "Who has wrought and done this, calling the generations from the beginning? I the Lord, the first and the last; I am." And further, chapter 45: "I," says the Lord, "have raised him up for justice, and I will direct all his ways." And Haggai 1: "The Lord stirred up the spirit of Zerubbabel, and the spirit of Jeshua, and the spirit of all the rest of the people, and they entered and worked in the house of the Lord."

Likewise, if the human will naturally precedes the divine in an action common to both, the human will rather inclines and determines the divine to act, than the divine the human—which is against what has been shown and cited above in the twentieth of this second book. Whence also Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He will incline it wherever He wills."

With these arguments here set forth, the authorities of Augustine in *On Grace and Free Will* and in *On Correction and Grace*, more fully cited in the twentieth of this second book, also sufficiently agree.

Likewise, then it would rather be said that man makes God will, and do, or perform something, than the reverse—for man is the prior and superior cause in these things—which is against many authorities more fully cited in the twentieth of this second book. Whence also the Apostle, in Philippians 2: "It is God," he says, "who works in us both to will and to accomplish (or, alternatively, to work) according to His good pleasure." And Romans 15: "I dare not speak of anything that Christ has not accomplished through me." And Isaiah 45: "I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil: I the Lord do all these things." The Lord is therefore prior and superior in such action.

And Ezekiel 36: "I will cause you to walk in My precepts and to keep My judgments and do them." And Romans 8: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God." On which Proposition 310 of the *Sentences of Prosper*, which is from Augustine and is cited in the Gloss, says thus: "It is without doubt more to be led than to be governed. For he who is governed does something, and is therefore governed so that he may act rightly; but he who is led is scarcely understood to be doing anything himself. And the grace of the Savior so prevails over our wills that the Apostle does not hesitate to say: 'Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God.' Nor can our free will do anything better than commend itself to Him who cannot act badly."

Likewise, Augustine, in *On the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 13, treating the same authority, says thus: "Someone says to me: 'Therefore we are led, not leading.' I respond: Indeed, you both lead and are led; and then you lead well if you are led by the good. For the Spirit who leads you is a helper to those who act, because as the Lord says: 'Without Me you can do nothing.' Now then, you who have heard 'Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God,' do not let yourselves go. For God does not build His temple out of you as from stones that have no motion of their own, are lifted up and placed by the builder. Living stones are not like that; and you, like living stones, are being built together into a temple of God. You are led, but run also; you are led, but follow—because even when you have followed, it will be true that without Him you can do nothing. 'For it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.'"

This is especially so because the argument of the Apostle and of the prophets most plainly tends to this: that God in such acts is not only an agent, but also the first agent. For by this teaching of his, the Apostle principally intends to insert and nourish humility in human hearts, as the twenty-third of this second book teaches. Yet he would not only not accomplish this, but would indeed raise men up to greater pride, if he taught that God works in us to will and to accomplish—not antecedently as Lord, but subsequently as servant. For how would he cut off for men, rather than further supply, the material for being proud, by teaching them that they have God always most readily as a mere servant at every nod of their will, obeying their wishes in all things?

Wherefore also the Apostle fittingly prefaced: "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish according to His good pleasure." On which Augustine, in *On the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 1, says thus: "Lest they give themselves any credit because he said 'work out,' he immediately added: 'For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish.' God is the one who works in you; therefore with fear and trembling." Where also the Gloss says: "With fear"—that is, with humility, not proudly. "And therefore He is to be feared, because it is not you but God who works," etc. "According to His good pleasure"—that is, His will.

For how can it truly be understood that "it is not you, but God who works in you to will and to accomplish," given that from the foregoing it is sufficiently established that these are human acts,

unless it means: not you antecedently, or principally, or naturally prior, but God in this way; you, however, subsequently, instrumentally, and in subordination? As if it were said: "It is not the staff, but the man who strikes; it is not the axe, but the man who builds."

Thus also the same Apostle speaks in Romans 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy"—which cannot be expounded otherwise.

Whence Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 23: "Again, lest anyone, even if not about works, should glory about the very free exercise of the will—as though the merit might begin from it, to which a reward of working well would be repaid as something due—let that same freedom hear the same herald of grace saying: 'For it is God who works in us both to will and to work according to His good pleasure.' And elsewhere: 'Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.' Since without doubt, if a man is of such an age as to use reason, he cannot believe, hope, or love unless he wills, nor reach the prize of the heavenly calling of God unless he runs willingly."

"How then is it 'not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'? Unless it is because the will itself, as it is written, 'is prepared by the Lord.' Otherwise, if the reason it was said—'Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'—is that it comes from both—that is, from the will of man and from the mercy of God—so that we should take 'Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy' as if it were said: 'The will of man alone does not suffice unless there is also the mercy of God.' Then the mercy of God alone does not suffice unless there is also the will of man. And so, just as it was rightly said, 'Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'—because the will of man alone does not accomplish it—why is it not conversely rightly said: 'Not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills'—because the mercy of God alone does not accomplish it?"

"But if no Christian would dare to say 'Not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,' lest he openly contradict the Apostle, it remains that the reason it was rightly said—'Not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'—is that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be helped, and helps it once prepared. For the good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all. Among those it does not precede is itself. For both are read in the holy Scriptures: 'His mercy shall go before me,' and 'His mercy shall follow me.' It goes before the unwilling, that he may will; it follows the willing, that he may not will in vain. For why are we admonished to pray for our enemies—who are assuredly unwilling to live piously—unless so that the Lord may work in them to will? Again, why are we admonished to ask that we may receive, unless so that what we will may be done by Him from whom it was done that we will? We pray, therefore, for our enemies, that the mercy of God may go before them, as it went before us; and we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may follow us."

The same author, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 17, treats the same authority in the same sense.

Anselm also, in *On Concord*, chapter 9: "It is not of him who wills that he wills, nor of him who runs that he runs, but of God who shows mercy.' For to all, except God alone, it is said: 'What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?'"

Thus speaks John 11: "But one of them, named Caiaphas, said to them: 'It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and not the whole nation perish.' This he did not say of himself, but being high priest that year, he prophesied."

And thus speaks the Master Himself and the Truth, saying to His disciples: "For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you" (Matthew 10). And John 15: "You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you." And 1 John 4: "In this is the love of God: not that we have loved God, but that He first loved us." And Tobit 3: "Your counsel is not in the power of man." And Jeremiah 10: "I know, O Lord, that man's way is not his own, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps." Where the Gloss says: "Let those be ashamed who say that each person is governed by his own will. For man's way is not his own," etc. Whence David: "By the Lord the steps of a man are directed." But the second Gloss is evidently convicted of being falsely attributed by the thirty-second chapter of the first book.

Let those Pelagians, then, be ashamed, and let me not be ashamed—I, a Christian, a follower of Paul, Augustine, and Gregory. Let them tremble, and let me not tremble, who in acting with You, O Lord my God, so shamelessly and fearlessly make themselves higher by governing You. Fill their faces with shame, I beseech You, and let them seek Your name, O Lord. Let them be ashamed and troubled forever, and let them be confounded and perish—so that they may know that Your name is Lord; You alone are the Most High over all the earth (Psalm 82).

Moreover, that in the common action of God and man, God naturally precedes man, and the divine will precedes the human, very many authorities of the philosophers, of sacred Scripture, and of the Catholic Doctors concordantly attest. For all philosophers agree on this one thing: that in essentially ordered causes one must not proceed to infinity, but must arrive at one supreme cause, naturally first of all, regulating and moving all others—as the craftsman does his instruments—as was sufficiently cited in the fourth chapter of the first book and the twentieth of this second book.

Whence also Avicenna, in Book 10 of his *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, speaking of the disposition of beings, says: "All this flows from above, nor does all this follow from the imagination of celestial things only, but because the first true one willed all this; therefore from Him begins the being of every thing that was, but through another as intermediary. Therefore, for these reasons, prayers and sacrifices are useful to men, and especially litanies for rain and other things of the kind."

Likewise, Aristotle, in *On the World*, chapter 11, says thus: "Just as in a chorus, when the chorus leader begins, the entire chorus of men and women sings in harmony, with various voices, high

and low, maintaining one continuous harmony—so it is with God, who disposes all things." And further in the same chapter, comparing God and the world to a commander and an army, he says: "All things move under one signal, at the nod of the commander who exercises power. So also must we think about the universe. For at one impulse, when all things are set in motion, each does its proper work; and this by an invisible and hidden being, which is in no way an impediment—neither to Him for acting, nor to us for believing," etc.—cited more fully in the third chapter of the first book.

The Commentator also, on the first proposition of the *Book of Causes*, which says: "Every primary cause has more influence upon its effect than the universal secondary cause," says thus: "What does it mean that the universal primary cause acts upon the effect of the secondary cause before the universal secondary cause that follows it acts upon it?" etc.—which is clear enough. Wherefore also certain articles asserting the contrary of this were condemned at Paris, as the twentieth of this second book more fully recounted.

Nor do the philosophers understand this only in the action of nature, but also of the intellect, and likewise of the will, as is evident from the Philosopher in *On Good Fortune* and from all those who speak of the agent intellect, as the same twentieth chapter similarly recounted.

Whence Avicenna, in Book 10 of his *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, shortly after the authority cited above, speaking of the disposition of the parts of animals and plants, says thus: "There is no natural cause there in any way, but the principle of it is without doubt from divine care. Similarly, believe that these intentions depend on divine care. Know also that the common people approve and hold and say to be true—and none refuse this except those who wish to appear philosophers, because they are ignorant of the causes and occasions of these things." "We have therefore already composed a book on this subject about sin and its opposite. Therefore attend to the disposition of all things, and believe what is said about the divine scourges that descend upon the cities of the wicked, and upon injurious men, and similar things—how the truth is defended."

"Know also that the cause of prayer here, and of almsgiving and similar things, and likewise the occurrence of injury and sin, are from none other than there. For the principles of all these things extend to nature, or will, or chance. The principle of nature is from there. But wills, which are in us, exist after not having existed. Whatever exists after not having existed has a cause; therefore every will that is in us has a cause. The cause of this will does not extend to infinity, but to certain things that occur from outside—namely, earthly and heavenly things; but earthly things lead back to heavenly ones. Therefore the collection of all these proceeds necessarily from the necessity of the divine will. Chance, however, arises from the convergence of all these things. When, moreover, you resolve all things, they will indeed be reduced to principles whose necessity descends from God. The judgment of God is the first simple positing."

Behold: he says that the common people approve this, and those wishing to appear philosophers alone refuse it—as the prophet says: "Since I did not know literature, I shall enter into the powers of the Lord" (Psalm 70).

And this argument of Avicenna is the argument of Saint Thomas for this same conclusion, in *On the Christian Religion*, chapter 120, as the twentieth of this second book more fully cited. For this same view, nearly or rather truly all those philosophical and theological authorities can be adduced that were more fully brought forward concerning fate, chance, and fortune in chapters 28 and 29 of the first book.

Wherefore also a certain article condemned by the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, says thus: "That all voluntary motions are reduced to the first mover. This is an error, unless it is understood as referring to the first mover absolutely, who is uncaused, and understanding it of motion according to its substance, not according to its deformity."

This same thing the canonical Scripture attests in many places, some of which were cited above; a few more I will briefly cite now.

That most eloquent Isaiah says, chapter 26: "Before Your face, O Lord, we have conceived, and as it were we have been in labor, and we have brought forth the spirit of our salvation." And the Lord, through the same prophet, chapter 45: "I will go before you." And Ecclesiasticus 33: "As the potter's clay is in his hand, to shape and to dispose it, all his ways are according to his disposition; so man is in the hand of Him who made him."

When those questioning the Lord asked, "Who are You?" He answered: "The Beginning" (John 8). And Revelation 1: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, says the Lord God."

Moreover, if according to the view of the wise man in Ecclesiasticus 25, "If a woman has the primacy, she is contrary to her husband"—which he considers unfitting—how much more unfitting would it be if the soul or human will had primacy over God? Certainly as much more as the disparity between God and man is greater than between husband and wife. Whence also above, in chapter 24, uncreated Wisdom herself says: "In every people and in every nation I have held the primacy, and I have trodden down with power the hearts of all the exalted and the lowly."

Wherefore also the Apostle, in Colossians, speaking of the Son who is this supreme wisdom of God: "All things were created through Him and in Him, and He is before all, and all things consist in Him; and He is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, so that in all things He may hold the primacy." And Colossians 2: "Let no one seduce you, wishing to walk in humility and religion of angels, which he has not seen, vainly puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the head, from which the whole body, through joints and connections, supplied and constructed, grows into the increase of God." The Gloss: "The head"—that is, Christ—"from which the whole body"—that is, the Church, etc.

Therefore the Church growing in merit is supplied by Christ the head as the first and head agent, not the reverse.

Likewise, Exodus 14: "The Lord will fight for you, and you will be silent." And further, chapter 17, it is written that after the defeat of Amalek, Moses built an altar and called its name "The Lord is my exaltation," saying: "Because the hand of the Lord alone, and the war was God's." The Gloss: "Who works all our works in us"—just as the holy Church sings to God: "There is no other who fights for us, except You, our God."

And Wisdom 6, it is read of Wisdom in this way: "She anticipates those who desire her, so that she first shows herself to them." And further: "The beginning of her is the truest desire of learning"—and she herself anticipates and goes before that beginning, and therefore whatever is begun.

For this purpose there are also very many other authorities of sacred Scripture, which I do not recite this time, lest perhaps they should produce too much weariness or provoke nausea in those who are daily satisfied with such things as daily bread.

I will, however, append a few authorities of authentic Doctors. The blessed Augustine, in the *Hypomnesticon*, chapter 42, says thus: "In every holy work, the will of God is prior, the will of free choice posterior; that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say—as you, O Pelagian, are accustomed to say—I willed first, then God willed, you are already making merit, so that grace is no longer from works—for then it is no longer grace, but wages." At this point the Apostle rebukes, saying: "If therefore it is by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. Grace, therefore, is given, not repaid."

The same author, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 3, having cited the authorities of sacred Scripture against Pelagius, who said that man believes from himself, sets forth the substance of Pelagius's response in these words: "Not wishing, therefore, to oppose such clear testimonies, and yet wishing to have from himself what he believes, the man, as it were, makes a deal with God, claiming a part of faith for himself and leaving a part for God; and what is more arrogant, he takes the first part for himself and gives the subsequent one to God, and in what he says belongs to both, he makes himself prior and God posterior."

Whom he immediately refutes by adding: "The pious and humble Doctor did not think so. I will speak of the most blessed Cyprian, who said: 'In nothing should we glory, since nothing is ours.' To show which he brought forth the Apostle as witness, saying: 'What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?'"

And in chapter 4 he adds: "By which preeminent testimony I too was struck and convicted, when I was erring similarly, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God is not a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves. For I did not think that faith was preceded by the grace of God, except in that we could not believe unless the proclamation of truth preceded us. But that once the Gospel

was preached to us, our consenting was our own affair and came from ourselves—this I used to think." From all of which it evidently appears that this Pelagian position contains heresy.

And there follows: "Which error of mine certain of my works sufficiently indicate, among which is the exposition of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans." "Finally, when I was reviewing my works and came to reviewing this book on free will, I spoke about it thus: 'What I said—that it is ours to believe and to will, but His to give believers the ability to work well through the Holy Spirit—is indeed true, but by the same rule both are His, because He prepares the will; and both are ours, because nothing happens unless we will it.'" And this retraction is placed in Book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 23.

The same author, on Psalm 126—"It is vain for you to rise before the light"—says thus: "Those who wished to be disciples above the Master, and servants above their Lord, wished to rise before the light; they were going in vain, because they were not going after the light. To them, therefore, this Psalm says: 'It is vain for you to rise before the light.' Such were the sons of Zebedee, who before they were humbled according to the passion of the Lord were already choosing places where they would sit, one at the right hand and the other at the left. And Peter had risen before the light, when he wished to give counsel to the Lord not to suffer for us, when he said: 'Far be it from You, Lord; be gracious to Yourself; this shall not happen.' He wished to rise before the light, and to give counsel to the Light."

"But what did the Lord do? He made him rise after the light: 'Get behind Me, Satan.' 'For this reason you are called Satan: because you wish to rise before the light. Get behind Me, so that I may go first and you follow where I am going—and you may go there, not where you wish to go, and thereby wish to lead Me.'"

And on Psalm 55—"My enemies shall be turned backward"—treating the words of Peter and Christ just mentioned, he says: "Peter was called Satan. Why? Because he wished to go before the Lord and give earthly counsel to the heavenly leader. 'Far be it from You, Lord; this shall not happen.' You say 'Far be it' and you say 'Lord.' If He is Lord, He acts by power. If He is Master, He knows what He is doing. But you wish to lead the leader, teach the teacher, command the Lord, choose for God—you go very far ahead, but you shall be turned backward."

The same author, Book 1 on John, Homily 49, expounding John 11—"Are there not twelve hours in the day?"—and treating incidentally the aforementioned counsel of Peter and the Lord's response, says the same. Whence, among other things, he says in the person of the Lord to Peter: "'And as for what I said, 'Get behind Me, Satan'—hear also the reason for this: 'For you do not savor the things that are of God, but the things that are of men.'" Let no one therefore flatter himself. Of his own he is a Satan; of God he is blessed. For what is 'of his own,' if not of his own sin? Take away sin; what is yours? 'Justice,' you say, 'is of my own.' What do you have that you did not receive?"

And understanding by "the day" the Lord, and by "the twelve hours" His twelve Apostles who were giving counsel to the Lord not to go into Judea, he continues expounding: "When therefore men wished to give counsel to God, disciples to the Master, servants to the Lord, the sick to the physician, He corrected them and said: 'Are there not twelve hours in the day? If anyone walks in the day, he does not stumble.' Follow Me, if you do not wish to stumble; do not give Me counsel—you from whom it is fitting to receive counsel. What then does 'Are there not twelve hours in the day?' mean? In order to show that He is the day, He chose twelve disciples. If I am the day, He says, and you are the hours, do the hours give counsel to the day? The hours follow the day; the day does not follow the hours."

"If, however, God always works all our works with us and naturally posterior to us, He follows our counsel in all our counseled works—not we His."

From the foregoing, then, it is clear that to any such heretic who places himself before God and his will before the divine will, it can be said in the person of God, in a Catholic manner: "Get behind Me, Satan!"—or according to Jerome's translation: "Go behind Me, Satan, for you do not savor the things that are of God, but the things that are of men" (Mark 8 and Matthew 16). "Go behind Me, Satan; you are a scandal to Me," etc.

Likewise, the Lombard, Book 2 of the *Sentences*, distinction 18, says thus: "It must be known that the causes of all things have been in God from eternity, and these are called primordial causes, because no other causes precede them, but these precede others—they are the causes of causes. And although the divine power, disposition, or will is one thing, and therefore one principal cause of all things, yet on account of diverse effects, Augustine says in the plural that the primordial causes of all things are in God—introducing the likeness of a craftsman, in whose design is the figure of the ark. So also in God, the cause of each future thing preceded."

"In creatures, however, the causes of some things, but not all, exist, as Augustine says, because God also sowed seminal reasons in things, according to which some things come from others—as such a grain from this seed, such a fruit from this tree, and the like. And these are called primordial causes—though not from God properly, because they have before them an eternal cause, which is properly and universally the first. But relative to the remaining things that proceed from them, they are called first. They are also called primordial causes of things because they were implanted in things by God in the first condition of things. And just as creatures are mutable, so these causes too can change; but what is a cause in the immutable God cannot change."

Likewise, Hugh, in *On the Sacraments*, Book 1, Part 2, chapter 2, says thus: "The entire order and arrangement from the highest to the lowest in the structure of this universe follows upon itself by certain causes and origins of reasons, so that of all things that exist, nothing is found unconnected or separable by nature, or foreign. Of things, some are causes only and not effects—such as the first of all; others are effects only and not causes—such as the last of all; still others are both causes with respect to posterior things that they generate, and effects with respect to

prior things by which they are generated. And just as to those that are last and effects only, nothing posterior is seen, so to those that are first and causes only of subsequent things, nothing prior is found."

"Of first causes, some are generated—which are first in their genus—others uncreated—which are universally first. For in this universe of all things, with all things cohering causally, something first is found such that nothing can be prior to it out of all things, since it is itself the first of all. To those causes that are universally first, nothing is prior, since they are themselves the first of all, nor do they have other causes prior to themselves, since they themselves are the causes of all."

And in chapter 6 he shows that these first causes are God's will, wisdom, and power—which the earlier chapters there also hold. Whence chapter 5 says: "In the predestination of things to be created, goodness worked; in the creation of things predestined, power worked; in the beatification of things created, both power and goodness."

And in the last chapter he says thus: "Since, therefore, there are three things in God—wisdom, power, and will—as primordial causes: from the will they proceed, through wisdom they are directed, through power they are brought about. For the will moves, wisdom disposes, power unfolds. These are the eternal foundations of all causes and the first principle."

The same author, Part 4, chapter 1, says: "The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator, which no preceding cause moved, because it is eternal; nor does any subsequent cause confirm it, since it is just of itself. For He did not therefore will justly because what He willed was going to be just; but what He willed was rightly just because He willed it." And in the last chapter: "So therefore the order of things stands, such that later things follow the first. The first of all is the will of the Creator, since from it are all things."

Likewise, Anselm, in the *Monologion*, chapter 10, writes thus: "In this the intimate utterances of the creative wisdom and of the craftsman with respect to their works to be made differ from each other: that the former, neither assumed nor aided from elsewhere, but as the first and sole cause, was sufficient for its craftsman to complete its work; but the latter is neither the first nor the sole nor sufficient cause even to begin its work. Wherefore the things created through that wisdom are entirely nothing that they are not through it; whereas the things made through this would not exist at all unless they were something that they are not through it."

Likewise, the most eloquent Doctor and most glorious Martyr Cyprian, in his Epistle 13, entitled *On the Discipline of the Christian Religion*, addressed to Quirinus, in chapter 4 shows at length that in nothing should we glory, since nothing is ours. And in chapter 10: "We must trust in the Lord alone, and glory in Him"—which he confirms through many passages of Scripture, through Jeremiah saying: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, nor the strong man in his strength, nor the rich man in his riches; but let him who glories glory in this: to understand and know that I

am the Lord who exercises mercy and judgment and justice on the earth; for in these things is My will, says the Lord." And after: "My soul is subject to God alone."

Likewise, Jerome, in Book 12 on Isaiah, treating Isaiah 45—"I girded you, and you did not know Me"—says thus: "The ecclesiastical man—to you God gave speech and wisdom—must beware lest he think what he speaks is his own, but must refer all to the glory of the giver, lest he too deserve to hear: 'I girded you, and you did not know Me.'"

Likewise, the blessed Prosper, in *Against Cassian*, chapter 1, recounts his first definition, saying: "Not only of actions, but also of good thoughts, the beginning is from God, who inspires in us the beginnings of a holy will, and grants the strength and opportunity to carry out what we rightly desire. For every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights, who both begins in us the things that are good, and carries them out, and consummates them, as the Apostle says: 'He who gives seed to the sower and bread for eating shall provide, and shall make the fruits of your justice to grow.'" And this definition Prosper very frequently approves and confirms as most true.

The same author, chapter 8, recounts the blessed Pope Zosimus writing thus to the whole world: "We, by the instigation of God—for all things must be referred to their author, from whom they are born—have referred all things to the knowledge of our brothers and fellow bishops." Therefore, according to him, all our good works are born from God as author; therefore from God willing. For according to Augustine, *Eighty-Three Questions*, question 3, when we say "by his authorship," we mean "by his willing." Therefore such works of men are born and proceed from the divine will before the human. For if they were born primarily from the human will, they would be more principally and rather referred to it; and man himself would more truly than God, and more properly, be the author of such works—which no one will say unless he contradicts the Author of all things and all orthodox authorities, as was also briefly shown in the ninth chapter of the first book.

Wherefore also the same Prosper, immediately in consequence in the same chapter, recounts from the synodal letter of the African bishops writing back to that Pope, the words that follow: "That, moreover, which you placed in your letter, which you arranged to be sent to all provinces, saying: 'We, by the instigation of God—for all good things must be referred to their author, from whom they are born—have referred all things to the knowledge of our brothers and fellow bishops,' we have received as having been said so that you might, with the drawn sword of truth, as if in passing, cut off those who exalt the freedom of human will against the help of God. For what did you do by such free will as when you referred all things to the knowledge of our humility—and yet you faithfully and wisely saw, and truly and confidently said, that this was done by the instigation of God? And this because 'the will is prepared by the Lord,' and so that they may do something good, He Himself touches the hearts of His children with fatherly inspirations. 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God'—so that we

may feel that our own free will is not absent, and yet in each individual motion of the good human will, we may not doubt that His help avails more."

This is also plainly attested by Saint Thomas and John Scotus, more fully recounted in the twentieth of this second book.

Likewise, the Lombard, Book 4 of the *Sentences*, distinction 5, at the end: "In our good works, God Himself works good things, and we; neither we alone, nor He alone, but also He with us and in us; and yet in doing these things we are His ministers, not the authors."

The same author, in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 45, asserts and shows by very many authorities that the will of God is the first and supreme cause of all things—namely, of all species and all motions—which the twentieth chapter of the first book also sufficiently showed.

Likewise, if man acted before God, and the human will in meriting acted prior in nature to grace and the Holy Spirit, and likewise in repenting—contrary to chapters 41, 42, and 43 of the first book.

This is also the faith and general profession of the Church, which thus prays: "We beseech You, O Lord, go before our actions by Your inspiration, and follow them with Your help, so that every work of ours may always begin from You, and through You what has been begun may be finished." And again: "The vows which You inspire by going before, also follow with Your help." And again: "O God, from whom come holy desires, right counsels, and just works, give to Your servants that peace which the world cannot give," etc. She also similarly implores the Holy Spirit, when she says: "Drive far away the enemy, and grant us peace forthwith; with You thus going before as leader, may we avoid all harm."

From all the foregoing, it is sufficiently manifest, I judge, to anyone who thinks soberly: in every action or motion common to God and the rational creature, God acts or moves naturally prior, and the will of God, co-doing anything with the created will, naturally precedes it in doing.

COROLLARY

THE COROLLARY HAS A THREEFOLD CONCLUSION: ONE NATURAL—THAT IN EVERY CAUSATION COMMON TO GOD AND A SECONDARY CAUSE, GOD CAUSES NATURALLY PRIOR TO THE SECONDARY CAUSE; ANOTHER THEOLOGICAL—THAT GOD WILL NOTHING CONDITIONALLY; A THIRD LOGICAL—THAT NO PROPOSITION ATTRIBUTING ANY CAUSATION TO ANY INFERIOR CAUSE POSTERIOR TO THE DIVINE WILL, OR ANYTHING ELSE POSITIVE INFERIOR TO ANYTHING UNDER GOD, IS ABSOLUTELY FIRST, UNLESS PERHAPS A PROPOSITION IS SAID TO BE ABSOLUTELY FIRST BY REASON OF THE PRIORITY OF THE SUBJECT, NOT OF THE CAUSE; HOWEVER,

VERY MANY SUCH PROPOSITIONS ARE FIRST IN A QUALIFIED SENSE AND IN A CERTAIN GENUS.

From these things a threefold conclusion manifestly follows. One natural: that in every causation common to God and a secondary cause, God causes naturally prior to the secondary cause. Another theological: that God wills nothing conditionally. A third logical: that no proposition attributing any causation to any inferior cause posterior to the divine will, or anything else positive inferior to anything under God, is absolutely first—unless perhaps a proposition is said to be absolutely first by reason of the priority of its subject, not of its cause; however, very many such propositions are first in a qualified sense and in a certain genus.

The first part is evidently clear. For if, as the chapter demonstrated, in every causation of a rational creature—which is the first, most worthy, and supreme among all secondary causes—God always causes naturally prior and the creature posterior, then much more so in every causation of any secondary cause—which can also be shown for those other causes just as it was shown for these.

The second part is patently inferred. For if God wills something under a condition, that thing is either past, present, or future. Not past, nor present, because He wills every past thing determinately, absolutely, and certainly to be past, and every present thing similarly to be present. If, however, it is said—as seems more plausible—that He wills under a condition something future to come about, how can this reasonably be so, since by the thirtieth chapter of this book and the part of the preceding corollary, and the sixth chapter of the first book, God absolutely knows that no thing, nor any condition of a thing, can exist unless He Himself, antecedently to any secondary cause, independently and unimpededly by a secondary cause, wills and makes it? Since He wills nothing in vain or foolishly.

Likewise, if He willed anything conditionally to come about, the existence or positing of the condition, when it came to exist, would be antecedently determining, moving, and actualizing the divine will to then determinately, absolutely, and simply willing—contrary to the chapter and the part of the corollary just discussed.

Likewise, that condition is either past, present, or future: that is, is the fulfillment or existence of that condition past, present, or future? Not past, nor present, because then that condition is determined, absolute, and certain to God; and so He likewise wills the thing to come about—therefore not under any condition. If, however—as seems more plausible—He wills something future under a future condition: either He wills that condition to come about, or not. If not, then He does not otherwise will the thing to come about; and so He wills vainly and foolishly that it come about conditionally—as if He were to will conditionally all impossibilities and absurdities, such as His not existing if a chimera existed. And if He does not will that condition to come about, by the twenty-second chapter of the first book and its corollary, He wills it not to come about. Similarly He could will all impossible things to come about, and Himself to be a chimera tomorrow.

By a similar irrational reasoning He could will, and would similarly will, nothing to come about. If, however, He wills that condition to come about—either absolutely or under another condition. If absolutely, then by the tenth chapter of the first book, it will absolutely be fulfilled and exist, and God well knows and wills this; and since He wills nothing in vain or foolishly, He wills not conditionally but absolutely, determinately, and simply that the thing come about—especially since His volition or action does not antecedently depend on anything else, nor can be impeded by anything else.

If, however, it is said that God wills that condition to come about under another condition, one must inquire further about that other condition—whether He wills it to come about or not, etc., as before—since no one would dare to imagine an infinite chaos—namely, an infinite regress of such conditions—in the divine will with respect to a single particular object of volition.

Likewise, if God wills a future thing only conditionally, this seems most of all to be the case for a future thing that depends on the freedom of the human will. But why not similarly for what depends on the freedom of His own will? And so God would will no future thing absolutely, determinately, or simply, but only conditionally.

And if anyone responds: "Indeed, because He is certain determinately of His own will"—certainly so also of the human will, since nothing can exist without Him specifically and naturally prior willing and similarly operating the same thing, as the twentieth and thirtieth chapters of this book teach.

Likewise, since an absolute and simple will is more determinate, more certain, and more actual than a conditional one, God would will one future thing more determinately, more certainly, and more actually—and therefore more perfectly intrinsically—than another; and therefore He would similarly know it, as can be shown through the eighteenth chapter of the first book. This can be refuted by the first supposition, and by the third part of the corollary of chapter 1, Book 1.

Likewise, when that thing is present or past, God will determinately, absolutely, and simply will it—just as He always wills all present and past things. And so, according to the passages of time, He would intrinsically will and will will temporal things mutably, differently, and differently—contrary to the twenty-third chapter of the first book and its corollary.

Likewise, some such object of God's volition about the future can not come about: suppose it does not. Then God wills it absolutely not to come about, just as He will later will and know; why then does He vainly will conditionally that it come about?

The third part follows evidently, since no proposition is absolutely first that has an extrinsic cause prior absolutely to the attribution of this inherence of its terms and its truth; but every proposition attributing any causation to any cause has a cause of this that is prior absolutely—namely, God, or the divine will—as the first part of the corollary makes clear. Moreover, every proposition that truly affirms any positive inferior thing of anything under God has a superior

and absolutely prior cause—namely, God and the divine will—as can be perspicuously demonstrated from these premises and the ninth chapter of the first book.

If, however, someone wishes to say that a proposition is absolutely first because it attributes a proper attribute, or any accident, to its first subject, even though it has a prior cause, he says enough. For "absolutely first" excludes not only a prior subject but also a prior cause—indeed, universally everything that is prior. But let people speak as they wish; one should not quarrel about words, provided the substance is agreed upon.

It is certain, however, that a proposition attributing any accident to its first subject under God is first by the priority of its subject, since God is the subject of no accident, but the cause, as is evident from the corollary of chapter 1, Book 1.

However, very many propositions are first in a qualified sense and in a certain genus—namely, with respect to inferior and natural causes or things; such as those that attribute a proper effect to a proper cause that is first in the genus of all natural causes, or in a certain limited genus, and in some determinate science—namely, natural science or some other subalternate science—or that attribute a proper attribute to its first subject, or to the definition of its first subject, in the aforementioned modes. According to these principles, I think the Philosopher, in Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he treats this subject, should not be unreasonably expounded.

CHAPTER XXXI. HE OBJECTS AND RESPONDS.

Now with this tower of the city of David erected up to heaven—indeed, above the heavens—fortified with battlements, set with a thousand shields, furnished with every armor of the strong, and on whose summit God alone, more exalted than all, most worthily sits as the supreme ruler, the Pelagians are troubled, rage in mind, are furious in body, grow pale in face, burn with their eyes, gnash and tremble, grind and screech, make tumult, cry out, shout, bark, and rage with all the fury of malice. For nothing is more destructive of the pestilential dogma of the Pelagians, nothing more defensive of the salvific dogma; nothing more humbles their pride, nothing more tramples all their insolence than this tower. Wherefore here with open assaults, there with hidden ambushes; here with art, there with fraud; here with boldness, there with deceit, they endeavor to destroy it. Nor do they consider themselves to have accomplished anything unless they have constructed an opposing tower, in which they themselves sit supreme and trample God underfoot; in which they themselves rule as lords and God is subjected as servant; in which their will precedes as mistress and God's will follows like an attendant; in which their will orders and commands as queen, and God's will obeys and serves as handmaid.

These therefore attack first in this manner: If God acts the free act of the created will prior by nature to the will itself, the will itself suffers prior by nature to acting; therefore it does not freely

suffer. And if it suffers unfreely, since for it to so suffer is for it to act—or at least from its so suffering there necessarily follows its performing its free act—it unfreely performs its free act, which includes a contradiction and destroys the freedom of the will.

Likewise, a cause naturally precedes its effect. But our good or evil merits are the cause why God loves us or hates us, why He wills glory or punishment for us, as the entire Catholic faith holds and the entire canonical Scripture attests. And in testimony of their heretical falsehood, they strive to violently pervert the truthful Scripture and the tongues of Catholic Doctors. "It is written," they say: "Let us anticipate His face in confession" (Psalm 94). "In the morning my prayer shall come before You" (Psalm 87). "I anticipated the dawn and cried out; my eyes anticipated You before daybreak" (Psalm 118). "Return to Me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will return to you" (Zechariah 1). "The Lord is with you because you were with Him" (2 Chronicles 15). To which many similar passages present themselves in many places.

Likewise, in the last chapter of Mark it is written: "They went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord cooperating." Therefore, with the disciples operating first, the Lord cooperates afterward.

Whence Damascene, in his *Sentences*, chapter 43: "It must be known," he says, "that God antecedently wills all to be saved and to be fortunate in His kingdom. For He did not create us for punishing, but for receiving His goodness, since He is good; but He wills to punish sinners, since He is just. The first, then, is called the antecedent will and acceptance, existing from Himself; the second, the consequent will and concession, arising from our cause—and this latter is twofold: one dispensational and instructive, leading to salvation; the other desperate, leading to final punishment. This applies to things not in our power. But of those things that are in our power, the good things He antecedently wills and accepts; the pernicious and truly evil things He wills neither antecedently nor consequently."

Robert also, Bishop of Lincoln, in a certain question on the knowledge of God, asking how God knows things that happen by chance or by free will, responding by distinguishing between an antecedent and a conjoined cause, says that in the first way God is not the cause of contingent things, but in the second, because when they occur He makes them be; for nothing happens that does not happen by His agency. And in a certain question on the will of God, asking about the will of sign, he says that the good pleasure of God is the antecedent cause of the good of the universe and of the good of individuals; but of the evil of individuals, the good pleasure of God is not antecedent but conjoined, because when evil exists it is well ordered in the universe.

With which Damascene concordantly says in the passage just cited: "It must be known that the choice of actions is in our power. But the end of good actions belongs to God's operation, justly cooperating with those who pre-choose the good with a just conscience according to His foreknowledge; of evil actions, however, to God's abandonment, again according to the justice of His foreknowledge, which abandons."

Augustine also, in Book 13 of *The City of God*, chapter 15, says that for man's evil, his own will is prior; but for his good, the will of his Creator is prior—whether to make it, which had not existed, or to remake it, which had fallen and perished.

To which also certain similar things can be cited from Chrysostom in his various writings. Whence on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Homily 12, he writes thus: "It is necessary to show caution on every side, lest perhaps we fall asleep. For behold, he says, He who keeps Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep; 'and do not give your feet cause to stumble.' He did not say 'do not stumble,' but 'you, do not give cause.' It is in our power to give cause, and in no other's. For if we wish to stand firm and immovable, we shall not be moved."

"What then—is nothing of God? All things indeed are of God, but not so as to injure free will. 'If then all things are of God,' he says, 'why does He blame us?' For this reason I said: so that our free will may not be injured. It is therefore of our free will; for it is necessary that we first choose what is good, and then He introduces what is from Himself. He does not precede our wills, lest our free will be injured. But when we have chosen, then He introduces much help."

"And how then does Paul say, 'It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy'? First, because he did not introduce this according to his own view, but as if gathering it from what had been set forth before; for he had said, 'It is written: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy'; and therefore, 'It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.' You say to me then, 'Why does He still find fault?'"

"Second, this must be said: that to the one to whom more belongs, he said the whole belongs to that one. For it is ours to choose and to will; but God's to bring about and lead to perfection. Because therefore the greater part is His, he said the whole was His, according to the custom of men. For so we do—for example, we see a house well built and we say the whole thing is the craftsman's work; and yet not the entire work is his, but also the workmen's, and those who supply the material for the house, and many others. But because he contributed more, we call the entire work his. So also here."

"Again, in a multitude where many are, we say 'all are there'; but where few are, 'none.' So also Paul said, 'It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.' He establishes here two great things: one, that we may not be raised to pride—if you hasten,' he says, 'the effect cannot be yours unless help comes from above; for without it all will be in vain.' Yet whatever you have attained of those things toward which you hasten, it is clear that you attain it by running and willing."

"He did not therefore say this because we run in vain, but what? Because we run in vain if we think the whole is ours, if we do not attribute the greater part to God. For God did not wish the whole to be His, lest He seem to crown us without cause; nor again ours, lest we fall into pride. For if having the smallest part we think highly of ourselves, what if we were lords of our entire work?"

And further: "The prophet said, 'Wash your heart from wickedness, O Jerusalem.' You see that the good is also ours."

The height of this fortification, arrogantly exalting itself against the knowledge of God, the soldier of Christ, girded with spiritual arms powerful in God, will easily destroy, bring into captivity, and avenge upon the obedience of Jesus Christ, and every disobedience of the impudent neck; he will take away, shatter, and break all their carnal weapons.

For the first arrow of theirs, repelled by the breath of God, wounds the archer; for their first subtlety is refuted by itself. If, as you strive to argue, the created will acts its free act prior by nature to God, the created will acts prior by nature before God wills this, by the corollary of the tenth chapter of the first book—since, as you say, because the will acts, therefore God wills it to act, and not the reverse. Its acting, therefore, is the cause why God wills it to act, and a cause prior according to nature. Therefore the created will and the divine will co-cause that act of the divine will, and the created will does so prior by nature. Therefore, according to your own deduction set forth above, God unfreely causes His own free act. Similarly also you could argue about the Son of God the Father; for according to all Catholic Doctors, the Son has whatever He has from the Father, and this according to a certain causality and priority, as the foregoing in chapter 30 of this book teach.

Similarly also you could argue about the Sun and its action—that the Sun suffers prior by nature before it acts. And if you concede this, I ask what passion. If you say creation or preservation—so also the created will, and this does not help you. If you say preparation for acting—so also the created will. Suppose also the Sun is created most fully prepared to act, and the created will to will—this does not help you either, because a will most fully prepared to act can not act, as is evidently apparent from the first and second chapters of this second book.

If you say motion toward acting—under what species of motion is that motion contained? If it is an alteration, what kind of alteration, and in what kind of quality? That motion and the external illumination of the Sun are also really diverse, and the former can through omnipotence exist without the latter. Therefore from that motion another does not necessarily follow, as you suppose; and so regarding the created will the same must be held.

Such a motion made in the created will is also a certain disposition or preparation for willing; but by the foregoing, when the will is most sufficiently prepared, it does not necessarily follow that it wills. And as the second chapter of this book showed, no created thing, and no secondary cause, can necessitate the created will to its free act.

If you say that the Sun first suffers its acting before it acts—therefore prior by nature it receives its acting before it acts; and so the Sun's acting is prior by nature to the Sun acting it. But how is this, since every efficient cause precedes at least by nature all its effects?

If you say that the Sun's first passion is not its illuminating but some other acting prior to that—this seems to have been refuted above. Moreover, concerning that other acting, the preceding

argument returns: for that acting is an acting of the Sun, as you concede; therefore prior by nature the Sun receives that acting before it acts it, etc., as before. And if you still do not blush to pretend that the Sun receives that acting through yet another acting, which it suffers by receiving prior to the first, you will be rebuked as before. Moreover, you will either make an infinite regress in this way—which nature abhors and the second supposition prohibits—or only a finite one, and then you will give some first acting of the Sun, against which the argument returns.

If, however, you say that the Sun's first passion is a certain conjunction or adjunction of it with its acting—that adjunction is either some motion or a relation alone. If a motion, it will be removed by the foregoing. If a relation alone, it must be a real relation, since it really helps toward acting; it must be founded in the conjoined extremes, just as equality is founded in equal quantities and similarity in similar qualities. But the foundation is prior by nature to what is founded, just as a cause to an effect; therefore both the Sun and its acting naturally precede this relation—the opposite of which was posited.

When therefore you argue, "God acts the act of the created will prior by nature to the will itself; therefore the will itself suffers prior by nature to acting," you err and do not conclude. For the will does not suffer there except by receiving its act or acting, and it is prior by nature for the act or acting to exist than to be received; and still prior by nature for the will to produce its act or acting than for it to exist, because through producing it begins to exist. Therefore it is prior by nature for the will to perform its act than for it to receive it and so to suffer.

And if you still reply that the will's acting is acted upon—because it does not eternally but newly has being, and if it is acted upon, it is acted upon through some being-acted-upon preceding it, and so the will still suffers prior by nature to acting—you err as before. For thus you could argue that every agent or active thing, even God Himself, is passive, and this prior by nature to being active, and always suffers before acting.

For let A be God's acting *ad extra*, in which God does not suffer, or does not suffer prior to acting. Then, as before: God's acting A is acted upon, because it does not eternally but newly has being; therefore it is acted upon through some being-acted-upon preceding it; and so God suffers there prior by nature to acting. Similarly also you could argue that there is no first acting of God *ad extra*: let A be the first; then, as before, A is acted upon, because it does not eternally but newly has being; therefore it is acted upon through some being-acted-upon preceding it, and every being-acted-upon happens through some acting prior to it. Therefore that being-acted-upon and A, the first acting, are causally and naturally preceded by another acting.

From these things, therefore, it evidently appears that it is not necessary that for every new acting, it be acted upon through some being-acted-upon naturally prior to it—indeed, not even through some acting prior to it—but through some agent causally and therefore naturally prior to it. When therefore you argue that the will's acting is acted upon, and therefore through some being-acted-upon naturally prior—this does not follow. For its first acting is acted upon through

God and through itself, not through any being-acted-upon or acting temporally or naturally preceding it.

If, however, anyone wishes to say that every created agent suffers prior by nature to acting, because in acting it is subjected to and made posterior to God acting, he can do so with much probability, and this would agree with the sayings of many. And speaking of suffering in this way, the argument does not proceed.

As for the argument about the causality of merit with respect to love and hatred in God, it is refuted by chapter 39 of the first book.

That passage from the Psalm, "Let us anticipate His face in confession," does not disturb the matter. For the prophet does not say "Let us anticipate the divine cooperation with us," but "His face in confession"—in confession, I say, of praise, praising God; whence it is added, "and in psalms let us sing joyfully to Him"; and in confession of sin, accusing yourself; therefore it follows, "Come, let us adore and fall down before God, let us weep before the Lord"—which, so that we may do it, He goes before us by working; for "confession and magnificence are His work."

Nor should the passage from Psalm 87, "In the morning my prayer shall come before You," disturb us; because it does not say "my prayer shall come before Your cooperation," but "before You"—as if to say, "In the morning I shall pray before You, before the face of my God"; which, so that I may do it, the Holy Spirit effects; for by Him the sons of God are led.

Those passages from Psalm 118 can similarly be understood and expounded. The remaining ones from Zechariah and Chronicles were expounded in chapter 35 of the first book. That passage from Mark, "the Lord cooperating," etc., does not even have an appearance of support.

The saying of Damascene does not present an obstacle either. For he does not affirm that the choice of actions is ours and God's, and ours prior to God's; but that we first choose well by working before we attain our final reward.

The saying of the Bishop of Lincoln, if rightly understood, does not present an obstacle. For "antecedent cause," as he speaks there, includes natural necessity. Whence he says: "The antecedence of which we speak here is the preordination of a future event that is necessary according to the course of nature."

As for what the same Bishop of Lincoln, Damascene, and Augustine seem to assert—that in good things the divine will is prior to the human, and in evil things posterior—how does this help your case? For the good act of the will and the evil act, according to the substance of the acts, are naturally good, as is evident from the twenty-fifth chapter of this second book and the twenty-sixth of the first book. They are also, with respect to the natural substance of the acts, of a similar nature. If, therefore, one is made antecedently by God according to the substance of the act, so is the other.

If also—as you suppose—it does not befit God to will or make evil antecedently, how does it befit Him to be dragged by the Devil, by any sinner, and by any harlot to consent to their wicked deeds, and to will and do all of them consequently? How does it befit the divine will to be subjected, like an adulteress, to any vile person, and oppressed by anyone violently? How also does God have a novel will following an evil created will? Or how is the divine will caused and followed from the human—contrary to the twentieth and twenty-third chapters of the first book?

Nevertheless, for the understanding of the Fathers, it must be known that, as the foregoing in chapters 34 and 39 of the first book attest, God wills Himself first; second, in a certain way He wills other goods outside Himself; third, evils—namely, insofar as from evils certain goods come, by His providence sweetly disposing all things. And so God wills good in a certain way prior and antecedently, but evil posteriorly and consequently, because finally for the sake of good.

It must further be known that God wills and makes the good merits of the will through grace naturally preceding, as chapters 40 and 41 of the first book taught; but evil things not so. Wherefore it can be said that God wills good things antecedently, but evil things in no way.

Augustine, however, when he says that for man's evil, his own will is prior to God's, means, as I think, that for man's penal evil, his own sinning will is prior to God's punishing will. For he says: "If in what was said, 'You shall die the death,' since it is not said 'by deaths,' we understand only that death which happens when the soul is abandoned by its life, which is God—for it was not abandoned so that it might abandon, but so that it might be abandoned, it abandoned—for man's evil, his own will is prior; for his good, the will of his Creator is prior, whether to make it, which had not existed, or to remake it, which had fallen and perished. Even if, therefore, we understand God to have announced this death in saying 'On the day you eat of it, you shall die the death'—as if He were saying, 'On the day you abandon Me through disobedience, I will abandon you through justice'—surely in that death the other two deaths are also announced, which without doubt were to follow."

What Damascene says—that God wills evil things neither antecedently nor consequently—according to the surface of the letter can be refuted by chapter 34 of the first book, and can also be understood and expounded through what was shown there. And what wonder if Damascene denied the pre-efficiency of God in the act of free will, since he denies even His co-efficiency, as the twenty-eighth chapter of this second book makes clear?

The saying of Chrysostom also, if understood literally, seems to need correction in many things, as the eighth chapter of this book, the twentieth and its corollary, and the thirtieth of this book prove.

COROLLARY

A NOTABLE COROLLARY: THAT SACRED THEOLOGY REQUIRES A PIOUS AND PRUDENT READER.

From these and other foregoing things, it is evidently recognized that sacred theology requires a reader who is equally pious and prudent, lest perhaps with the Manicheans he suspect something false in sacred Scripture, or while truthfully confessing all things to be true, he consent to the falsehood of the Pelagians; lest in defending Catholic Doctors he favor heretics, or in pursuing heretical authors he accuse Catholics; lest because he embraces something rightly said by someone, he also follow that person's error; or because he rejects someone's error, he also despise what was rightly said by that person.

For who, having read the chapters set forth in this second and first book—indeed, having read the books of canonical Scripture and the Doctors—does not easily see how many and how great passages of both superficially seem to consent to the Pelagian heresy? Such passages of sacred Scripture frequently present themselves copiously, some of which are recounted in the foregoing chapters, with which Pelagius also fortified himself; and Augustine himself sometimes partly consented, as is evident from chapters 35 and 45 of the first book; and sometimes appeared to consent to such an extent that Pelagius and the Pelagians sometimes fought against Augustine himself with Augustine's own sayings, as is evident from Book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 9, and chapter 15 of *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 67, and Book 2 of the Lombard's *Sentences*, distinction 28. And we experience all too frequently that many bring forth the sayings of Augustine and other Doctors to strengthen Pelagian wickedness, as is also evident from the chapters mentioned.

Chrysostom also seems to agree with this Pelagius. For in Homily 47 on John, expounding John 6—"No one can come to Me unless it has been given him by My Father"—he says: "When you hear 'that He gave,' do not think it a simple determination, but believe that the one who rendered himself worthy to receive, that one received."

And on Matthew 7—"Ask and it shall be given to you," etc.—in Homily 18 of the incomplete work, he says: "Ask, etc. Seek, etc. Knock, and it shall be opened to you, with grace following you. Nor do we acquire grace unless we have been diligent and have labored, so that the gift of God may not be given to the negligent. For grace is the help of human infirmity; but help is not given to those who sleep, but to those who hasten and strive."

And further, in Homily 23 on Matthew 19—"Not all receive this word, but those to whom it is given"—he says: "He did not say 'Not all can,' but 'not all receive'—that is, all can indeed receive, but not all wish to receive—'but those to whom it is given.' This does not signify that it is given to some and not given to others, but shows that unless we receive the help of grace, we can do nothing from ourselves. But that grace is not denied to those who will, the Lord says in the Gospel: 'Ask, and it shall be given to you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks

it shall be opened.' But the will must precede, and so grace follows; for neither does grace without the will accomplish anything, nor can the will without grace."

And on Matthew 13—"To you it is given to know, etc.; but to them it is not given"—as recounted in the Gloss of Thomas, he says: "He said this not introducing necessity or fate, but demonstrating that those to whom it is not given are themselves the cause of all their evils, wishing to show that to know the divine mysteries is a gift of God and a grace given from above; yet not for this reason is free will destroyed. And this is clear from what follows. For so that neither those despair, nor these become lazy hearing that it is given to them, He shows that the beginning of these things is from us, when He adds: 'For to him who has, it shall be given, and he shall abound; but from him who has not, even what he has shall be taken away.' As if to say: when someone has desire and zeal, all the things that are from God shall also be given to him; but when he is empty of these and does not contribute what pertains to himself, neither are the things from God given to him."

And in his complete exposition on Matthew and on the Epistle to the Hebrews in various places, and in many other short works, he seems to profess the same view.

Damascene also, in chapter 39 of his *Sentences*, seems to agree with Pelagius, striving to show that free will can produce its act without God, as the twenty-eighth chapter of this second book makes clear. And further in chapter 44: "It must be known," he says, "that the choice of actions is in our power. But the end of good actions belongs to God's operation, justly cooperating with those who pre-choose the good with a just conscience according to His foreknowledge; but of evil actions, to God's abandonment, again according to the justice of His foreknowledge, which abandons."

And further in the same: "It must be known that God antecedently wills all to be saved. For He did not create us for punishing, but for receiving His goodness, since He is good; but He wills to punish sinners, since He is just."

Robert also, Bishop of Lincoln, in *On Free Will*, in his questions on the will of God, and in his other works, seems similarly to favor the Pelagians, saying that God does not make, or does not antecedently make, the free act of the will, and that the will from itself can consent or dissent to God offering grace or exciting it to any good.

The great Cassian likewise, in his book *On the Protection of God*—being the thirteenth of the Conferences of the Fathers, or the third of the seven conferences of three Fathers written for Honoratus and Eucherius, attributed to a certain Chaeremon—as is evidently apparent to those reading it, raved with Pelagius, as the holy Prosper also clearly shows in his book entitled *For the Preachers of the Grace of God, Against the Book of Cassian the Priest On the Protection of God*, as is also partially recounted in chapter 37 of the first book and afterward.

Concerning the authority of this holy Prosper, it is sufficiently established for scholarly men. About him also in the *Decretum*, distinction 15, last chapter, where the authentic writings of the

Doctors are recounted, it is written in this manner: "Likewise, the short works of the blessed Prosper, a religious man." About him also Martin in his *Chronicles*, treating of Leo I the Emperor, says that Prosper, of Aquitanian nationality, flourished in these times, who, having been made a bishop in the kingdom of Italy, was illustrious for his learning and miracles. About him also Cassiodorus, in a certain work to the brothers of his monastery, writes thus: "Read diligently and listen gladly to Cassian the Priest, who wrote about the formation of faithful monks, who at the very beginnings of a sound purpose says that eight principal vices must be fled." And a little later: "Who, however, was rightly censured by the blessed Prosper on the subject of free will. Whence we advise that you should read him with caution in such matters when he goes too far. Whose sayings Victor, Bishop of Maritan, with the Lord's help, so purged, and added what was lacking, that the palm in these matters is rightly awarded to him."

With which Gennadius of Marseilles disagrees, and, consenting as it seems to the Pelagians, in *On Illustrious Men*, chapter 84, treating of Prosper, says: "Read the book published under his name against the short works of Cassian, which the Church of God approves as salutary, but he defames as harmful." For in truth, the views of Cassian and Prosper on the grace of God and free will are found in some things to be contrary to each other.

The Abbot Joachim also, although a man distinguished in the divine Scriptures, was infected by this plague of Pelagius, as is evident from the last chapter of the first book. Many others also, and great Doctors, seem frequently in many things to agree with Pelagius. Indeed, almost the entire world, as I fear and grieve, goes after him and favors his errors, while nearly all commonly believe that by the powers of free will alone they can decline from evil, do good, keep the commandments, merit grace, persevere finally, make themselves predestined and of the number of those to be saved; or if a few acknowledge that they need the help of God and His special co-efficiency, they most proudly place themselves and their free will before God and the divine free will.

Who therefore between Scylla and Charybdis, between the whirlpool and the storm, between the right and the left, walks directly and safely, unless the pious and prudent reader, not leaning on his own prudence, but upon Him who is at once the guide, the way, and the terminus? Because He is the unbending truth; who, as Wisdom attests, is the guide of wisdom and the corrector of the wise.

And what Catholic does not know that sacred Scripture, which the Father sanctified and sent into the world, can in no part of itself be—nor ought to be—corrected by man? And what theologian does not know that other writings of whatever writers are not always fortified with such firmness, but can sometimes be corrected by men? Which is evidently demonstrated by the real contradiction among them. For who after the canonical writers is greater than Origen, Jerome, Cyprian, and the most illustrious Augustine? The later of whom rightly reprehend the first. For he erred most gravely, as no theologian is unaware, and the blessed Jerome corrected some of his works.

The same Jerome also sometimes reprehends himself on the fault of translation. Whence on Isaiah, Book 5, expounding chapter 19—"There shall not be for Egypt a work that makes head and tail, bending and restraining itself"—he says: "In what we translated as 'bending and restraining,' we can say 'bent and wanton,' so as to understand the old man and the boy. But we, translating the Hebrew word *Acmon* hastily, were deceived by its ambiguity and said 'restraining.'"

And further in the same book and chapter, on the passage "And the land of Judah shall be a celebration to Egypt," he says: "I think it better to reprehend my own error than, while I blush to confess my ignorance, to persist. For instead of what I translated as 'And the land of Judah shall be a celebration to Egypt,' in the Hebrew is read *Agga*, which is usually interpreted as 'celebration'—whence also Haggai is turned into 'festive'—and 'fear'; which Aquila translated more significantly into a Greek word meaning when someone, frightened and timid, rolls his eyes around and dreads the approaching enemy. Wherefore I think that it should be translated as 'into fear' instead of 'celebration,' which also better agrees with the course of the prophecy."

And on the matter of bigamy—because writing to Oceanus and on Paul's Epistle to Timothy, as is recounted in the *Decretum*, distinction 26, "Of one," and further distinction 28, last question, "It is necessary"—he asserted that someone who before baptism had one wife and after baptism another does not become a bigamist, since all old things are dismissed in the entirely renewed person through baptism. On this error Ambrose, Augustine, and Innocent rebuke him, as is contained in the same places in the *Decretum*, which the Church also follows.

What theologian also is unaware of the great contradiction and contention between Jerome and Augustine, which their letters clearly show? In one of which—namely, the twentieth of Jerome's letters—Jerome says that he judges certain things in a certain letter of Augustine directed to him as heretical. And they contradict each other on translations of the Bible, on the titles of the Psalms, on their authors, on Melchizedek, and on many other things.

The blessed Cyprian also, a Catholic Doctor and distinguished Martyr, teaching that baptism conferred by heretics is invalid, is rebuked by the blessed Augustine in *On a Single Baptism*, as is also recounted in Book 4 of the *Sentences* of Peter, distinction 6. The same Augustine, the preeminent Doctor, also frequently reprehends himself, and for this reason composed a book of *Retractions* of his writings. And after that, in his book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, he retracts certain sayings of his, as is evident from chapters 35 and 45 of the first book. So also the Venerable Bede wrote a book of *Retractions*; so also the blessed Hilary is said to have written a book of *Retractions*, in which he is reported to have rightly retracted what Peter recounts in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 15, from his book *On the Trinity*—namely, that Christ did not feel any pain of the Passion, and indeed did not even have the sensitive nature capable of pain. The blessed Jerome also corrects and retracts certain of his own deeds, as the foregoing makes clear.

If, therefore, so many and such great Doctors and Scribes sometimes erred in writing, why is it not permitted sometimes to suspect the same of others, especially when they sometimes contradict these great Doctors, and sometimes each other? Why, therefore, is it not permitted to examine their sayings in doubtful and suspect places—and especially where they contradict each other—and with all humility, reverence, and sobriety, if necessary, to correct them, or rather humbly to declare what has been corrected by better Fathers?

Wherefore also the most holy and learned Augustine, in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 61, having recounted that the adversary against whom he writes brought forth in his support many testimonies not from the canonical Scriptures but from certain short works of Catholic authors, adds: "The first testimonies he put forth—because the name of the one who said them is not read there, either because that person did not write them, or because the manuscript you sent, if it happened to lack them through some corruption—what need is there to examine? Especially since I know that in the writings of any men whatsoever I am free, because I owe unhesitating assent only to the canonical books."

And to Paulina, *On Seeing God*, chapter 4: "If anything is established by the clear authority of the divine Scriptures—namely, those that are called canonical in the Church—it must be believed without any doubt. But as for other witnesses or testimonies by which something is persuaded to be believed, you may believe or not believe, weighing how much weight they have or do not have for producing faith."

And further, chapter 29: "With these things carefully and confidently examined—those things which you see—attend to those things which you believe; and in these very things which you believe though unseen, weigh the credibility of the witnesses in discerning. For you do not believe me as you believe Ambrose, from whose books I placed so many testimonies. Or if you think we should be believed with equal balance, will you in any way compare us to the Gospel? Or will you equate our writings with the canonical Scriptures? Surely, if you judge rightly in discerning, you see us far below that authority; and me much further. But however much you believe either of us, you in no way compare either to that excellence."

And in Epistle 7, to Marcellinus: "Your letter contains a question not from the divine books but from mine. In such questions I do not labor much; because even if my view cannot be defended by clear reason, it is mine, not that of the author whose meaning it is not permitted to reject, and when, not being understood, what is gathered from him is judged to be blameworthy."

"I therefore confess that I am of the number of those who strive to progress by writing, and progress by writing. Whence if anything has been put forth by me too incautiously or unlearnedly, which is rightly reprehended not only by others who can see it, but also by me myself—because I too should at least afterward see it, if I progress—this is neither to be wondered at nor grieved over, but rather pardoned and rejoiced in; not because an error was made, but because it was disapproved. For he who wants others to err so that his own error may be hidden loves himself too perversely. For how much better and more useful it is if, where he

erred, others do not err, and by their admonition he may be freed from error! But if he wishes, let him at least not have companions in error."

"If God grants me what I wish—that I may gather and demonstrate in a work intended for this purpose whatever in all my books most rightly displeases me—then men will see that I am no respecter of my own person. But you who love me greatly, if you assert against those whose malice, ignorance, or intelligence reprehends me, that I have nowhere erred in my writings, you labor in vain; you have not taken up a good cause. You are easily defeated with me myself as judge, since it does not please me when my dearest friends consider me to be such as I am not."

And further, speaking to certain friends urging him to hastily complete his books on Genesis and on the Trinity, so that he himself while still alive could defend them once written against all, he says: "Which you say for this reason: because you do not think there is anything in them that can be rightly censured. Otherwise you would urge me not to their publication but to more diligent correction. But I look more to true judges, severe with truth, among whom I wish first of all to place myself, so that only those things may come to them for reprehension that could not be seen by me, however diligently searching."

And further: "If a reason is given against the authority of the divine Scriptures, however acute it may be, it deceives by its semblance of truth; for it cannot be true. Conversely, if the authority of the holy Scriptures is objected against a most manifest and certain reason, the one who does this does not understand, and opposes to the truth not the meaning of those Scriptures, which he was unable to penetrate, but his own; and sets against it not what is in them, but what he finds in himself, as though in their name."

Whose authority I follow all the more safely, venerate more devoutly, and embrace more firmly for this very reason. For I know that God resists the proud, gives grace to the humble, and understanding to the little ones.

The same author, to Jerome, Epistle 9 in the collection of Augustine's letters: "I confess to your charity," he says, "that I have learned to defer this fear and honor only to those books of Scripture that are now called canonical: that I most firmly believe no author of them to have erred in anything. But if I find in them anything that seems contrary to truth in their writings, I have no doubt that either the manuscript is faulty, or the translator did not follow what was said, or I have failed to understand."

"Other writings, however, I read in such a way that however much they excel in holiness and learning, I do not for that reason think something true because they thought so, but because they could persuade me—either through those canonical authors or by probable reason—that it does not depart from the truth. Nor do I think you, my brother, feel otherwise. I say plainly: I do not think you want your books to be read as those of the Prophets or Apostles, about whose writings it is wrong to doubt that they are free from all error. Perish such a thought from pious humility and truthful consideration."

I have said these things lest I seem to think highly of myself, to act wrongly, or to reprehend the Fathers unjustly. For whoever has been a Father or brother—even an angel from heaven—who has said, written, held, or taught the Pelagian heresy, I will fearlessly reprehend him. For I am most certain, and do not hesitate in the least, that the Old and New Testaments, Christ, Paul, Augustine, Gregory, and the other Doctors, the holy Church of God in so many synods and councils, so many popes and saints, and so many and such powerful arguments in the destruction of this heresy, have not erred, have not been blind, nor have led the blind into a pit.

Furthermore, about sacred Scripture I boldly pronounce that no part of it really contradicts another part, or consents to the Pelagian heresy; and if any passage seems superficially to do so, this assuredly happens from a defect of an eye that is not healthy. Therefore the eye must be purged so that it can sincerely see the true meaning of Scripture according to the expositions of the saints, or another meaning to be divinely inspired.

That Augustine sometimes agreed with the Pelagians in part cannot be denied; and therefore, reproving himself, he repented. If there are any other places in his books beyond those he expressly retracted, in which he truly—and not merely apparently—agreed with Pelagius, those he retracted in general and in their likeness, as can be gathered from chapter 45 of the first book.

If, therefore, Augustine—the most learned of Doctors, the most subtle penetrator, the sharpest disputant, and the most valiant vanquisher of the Pelagians—was sometimes deceived by their error, what wonder if Chrysostom and other lesser ones?

And in truth it seems to me that Chrysostom almost contradicts Augustine, departs from him slightly, draws too close to the Pelagians, and does not in all things walk rightly in his expositions toward the truth of the Gospel. For the Savior, commending the gratuitous grace of God, says: "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him," and "unless it has been given him by My Father." But if, as Chrysostom says, the one who renders himself worthy to receive, that one receives—then rather the one who makes himself worthy, through this, draws the Father and Christ to himself, rather than the reverse. Rather also such a person, through his own worthiness as through a worthy merit and a condign price, buys from the Father the right to come to Christ, rather than the Father giving it to him. And so it would better be said: "No one can come to Me unless by his preceding merit he draws God the Father, and unless he first merits that this be sold or repaid to him by the Father."

And in this exposition he seems to contradict Augustine, Part 1 on John, Homily 26, who expounding that most true word of the Word, says thus: "A great commendation of grace! No one comes unless drawn. Whom He draws and whom He does not draw, why He draws this one and does not draw that one—do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." Yet according to Chrysostom, there would be some cause—namely, the difference of merits.

What Chrysostom also says—that someone renders himself worthy of coming to Christ—could perhaps be corrected by the foregoing in chapter 39 of the first book. For there is no worthiness antecedent to the divine will.

Augustine also, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 12, treating what he said in his little book against Porphyry—namely, that the salvation of the Christian religion never failed anyone who was worthy—says: "If one inquires whence anyone is worthy, there are some who say: by the human will. But we say: by grace, or by divine predestination."

What Chrysostom also says—that the will ought to precede grace—seems very suspect and close to the Pelagian error; indeed, not close but identical, as the chapters of the first book on grace make clear.

Does he not also, on the Epistle to the Hebrews recounted above, seem to establish that not giving one's feet cause to stumble, overcoming any temptations, standing firm, and persevering finally, is in the free will of man alone and in nothing else—contrary to chapters 4, 8, and other chapters of this second book, and contrary to authors quite greater than himself recounted in those chapters?

What he also says—that God in no way precedes our wills, but the reverse, even in their good acts—the thirtieth chapter of this book condemns, fortified by greater authorities and valid arguments.

The argument he adduces for himself is, moreover, clearly irrational. "So that our free will may not be injured," he says. For what kind of injury to the created free will is it to serve, to be subject, and to follow the Creator, King of kings and Lord of lords? Perish the thought that anyone with the Nimrodites should think it a grievous servitude to submit to the supreme God! For to serve Him is without doubt to reign, the best freedom, and perfect salvation; and to wish to depart from His subjection is proved to be the worst servitude.

O Catholic Father: either you hold that the human will alone suffices to produce its acts, or that the divine co-efficiency is necessarily required. If the first, you separate and stray from the truth of Catholic doctrine with Nimrod and the Pelagians, as the twentieth chapter of this book attests. If the second, why do you teach soberly? If in the common act of the human and divine wills, the free will of one of them must in your judgment necessarily be injured, why, I ask, would the divine free will not be injured more than the human, while you place the human first and the divine second? While you make the human will the preceding mistress and the divine will the following attendant? While you establish the human will as free, exempting it even from God's service, and make the divine will a handmaid and servant, subjecting it even to man's service?

Here also, Father, you seem to consent to Pelagius, as the thirtieth chapter of this book attests. How also do you say that the Apostle did not introduce "it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs," etc., as his own view, when he truly—not falsely—concludes this from canonical

Scripture? Which both his entire argument and many of his other epistles evidently indicate, as well as many great Catholic Doctors expounding and frequently citing that apostolic word.

Your second response and exposition of that apostolic word also seems plainly to contradict the same Apostle, Christ, and many other disciples of Christ—our doctors—and to consent to Pelagius, as the twentieth chapter of this book and its corollary, with the following chapters, clearly teach.

In that reasoning which you then suggest—"The prophet said, 'Wash your heart from wickedness'; therefore the good is ours"—if you mean ours only, namely that the sinner alone could wash himself from sin without God specifically washing him, as you seem to think, you err disgracefully—just as Damascene in a similar subtlety disgracefully erred, as the twenty-eighth chapter of this book showed. Does not the prophet elsewhere say to God, "Wash me yet more, O God, from my injustice"?

This view seems to consent to the senseless view of Pelagius, as chapter 43 of the first book discloses. I know, however, that I could fashion glosses for him; but in truth I have neither the knowledge nor the conscience to gloss him in these matters. Therefore, as I said above, theological studies require a pious and prudent reader. But whoever more pious and prudent knows how to truly gloss him in such matters, not reconciling Pelagius, it pleases me; I rejoice together and acquiesce.

Perish the thought that I should not more gladly always learn from anyone the true mind of any irreprehensible doctor, rather than reprehend him from ignorance by not understanding him. But let the glossers of his sayings beware, I beseech, lest they open a way for the Pelagians—exiled from the Church of Christ—to return, and provide a Catholic gloss for their heretical sayings.

If indeed such a glosser is found to be more pious and prudent than Augustine, Gregory, Bede, Prosper, very many holy popes and lesser bishops, synods and councils, and the entire holy Church of God—who do not gloss such sayings of Pelagius and the Pelagians, but absolutely condemn them, as many chapters of the first and second books teach, and very many authentic books and histories attest—it would be wonderfully amazing for anyone to dare to profess himself similar and so great.

For if these holy Fathers knew how to gloss such sayings in a Catholic manner and did not wish to, but condemned them as heretical—this would be the worst impiety. If they wished to and did not know how—this would be the greatest ignorance, since you alone and easily know it.

The same seems to be said of Damascene and the other Fathers mentioned above, although some of them in certain of their sayings could be glossed more colorably.

Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, however, wrote much on divine knowledge and will, and on free will. On free will indeed he wrote twice. First, a little book that begins thus: "Since there can be doubt about the being of a thing"—in which he proceeds more disputatively and inquiringly than

determinatively or definitively. Whence also at the end: "Whether the motion of free will is from itself or not," he says, "I do not determine, but leave for those who see clearly to investigate." And further, "Having inquired and discussed whether the motion of free will by which it is moved to evil is from God," he adds, "This again I do not determine." And further, "Having inquired and discussed whether free will can will the gratuitous good and consent to the offering of the first grace from itself, or not, but from God first willing and acting this, and how then there would not be necessity there," he does not determine, as he says; and he says he leaves these questions, with many others touched upon there, for posterity to determine.

Second, he wrote another little book on free will, which begins in this manner: "Since by the freedom of the will man is worthier than the other animals"—in which he proceeds more determinatively. Wherefore I never cite the first of these, but sometimes cite the second.

And if anyone objects that it seems unworthy for so small a person to reprehend such great Fathers, the reply must be given firmly: it is more unworthy, assuredly, to consent to heretical errors by favoring such great men, and to allow to be reprehended the irreprehensible Father of our faith, the irreprehensible spotless bride of Christ, our irreprehensible mother, and our greater Doctors.

For what Christian does not know that the Catholic doctrine of Christ is to be preferred to every contrary doctrine? And who does not know that if Doctors disagree, the more authoritative in such a matter is to be preferred? And who in this matter, after the authors of sacred Scripture, is more authoritative than Augustine?

Even if I, a small person, ought not to reprehend such great Fathers, the Truth is great, who does not shrink from reprehending every reprehensible person without regard to persons. Nor do I simply reprehend them, but if they follow the error of Pelagius, I make manifest that they have been reprehended by greater Fathers.

But I do not even simply reprehend them nor show them to have been reprehended. Rather, I say that I do not yet have the knowledge or the conscience to sustain their sayings in all things. For if I accept the surface of the letter, I seem to consent to the Pelagians. If I attempt to gloss the letter, I fear that, if according to the mind of the speakers, I may still favor Pelagius; but if contrary to or beyond the mind of the speakers, I will be a liar against my own mind.

I do not know truly before God how to gloss such sayings unless, in my judgment, I consent to reconcile the Pelagians through a similar gloss and condemn the Fathers who had condemned them, or at least to invalidate their sentence. Which I therefore leave to the prudence of my superiors; and if they teach that such sayings are to be sustained in a Catholic manner, I will most devoutly acquiesce.

Nevertheless, it could probably be said that Chrysostom does not wish to assert that anyone can begin, continue, consummate, or universally do anything good without the help of grace. Wherefore he also seems to wish consequently to assert that no one can merit the first grace.

Whence on Matthew 7—"Ask, and it shall be given to you," etc.—in the incomplete work, Homily 18, where he was cited above, he says: "The Lord, knowing that whatever He had commanded was impossible for men and above nature as regards human nature, and that the commandments were greater than human power, sends them to God, whose grace knows nothing impossible, saying: 'Ask, and it shall be given to you'—so that what cannot be accomplished by men may be fulfilled through the grace of God."

"God created every sensible creature armed and fortified. Some He fortified with swift running of feet; others He armed with claws; others with swift wings; others with teeth; others with horns. But man alone He so disposed that his strength would be God Himself; and in that He made him weaker than all in himself, He willed him to be stronger than all in Himself."

"For knowing, O God, that to know and worship God is eternal life, but to be ignorant of and despise Him is everlasting perdition, He did not create him so weak that he could do absolutely nothing good—lest He whom He had made above all things and for whom He had made all things should be found inferior to all. Nor did He create him so powerful that he could do whatever he wished from himself even without God's help—so that, compelled by the necessity of his weakness, he would always necessarily have his Lord. And truly it is a most just thing that the creature necessarily have its maker."

"For if all man's power is in God, and yet he despises the author of all his goods, how much more would he neglect God if his power were in himself?"

And further, treating Matthew 21 on the tied donkey and its loosing: "Because of certain likenesses, men not knowing the Son of God were compared to donkeys. For this animal is unclean, and compared to almost all other beasts, more irrational, foolish, weak, ignoble, and burden-bearing. So were men before the coming of Christ."

"The donkey, however, was tied—that is, impeded by the bond of diabolical error, so that it did not have the freedom to go where it wished. For before we sin, we have free will to follow the will of the Devil or not. But if once sinning we have bound ourselves to his works, we can no longer escape by our own power; but like a ship with a broken rudder, it is carried wherever the storm wills. So also a man who has lost the help of divine grace through sin does not do what he wills, but what the Devil wills; and unless God by the strong hand of His mercy frees him, he will remain in the bonds of his sins until death."

What he therefore seems to say—that man sometimes merits grace, and the human will precedes grace—can perhaps be expounded of the increase of grace, or of the second grace, not the first; or also of any gift of God that man merits through grace. For further in the same homily he says: "It is written: 'Desire wisdom, keep justice, and God will provide it for you.' But what do you say? This very thing I ask—to know and to do. And how can I do before I receive? Do what you can, so that you may be able to do more; and keep what you know, so that you may know more. For justice itself works itself, and manifests itself."

"How? While you work justice in yourself, justice works you in itself. For every art works itself. For example: you work a vineyard, you gather its fruits, and delighted in them you work better. You see that the vineyard itself cultivates itself by bearing fruit for you while it is cultivated. So conversely, he who carries out the work of sin—since sin is an unclean spirit—works in him the delight of sinning, so that while delighted in sin he sins more. So also he who works justice—since justice itself is the Holy Spirit—works in him the delight of doing justice, so that delighted in justice he does more."

"Such is what Wisdom says: 'Have thought for the precepts of God, and meditate always on His commandments, and He Himself will strengthen your heart and give you the desire for wisdom.' You see that justice itself works itself, with you only beginning and laboring; but it opens itself when cultivated. For just as he who sins, while sinning, becomes more and more darkened in mind, and recedes from the light of truth, so that no salutary knowledge remains in him—only malice alone, of which Solomon says, 'The wisdom of the impious is wickedness'—so also he who works justice, while working, becomes more and more brightened in mind, and ascends to the knowledge of greater wisdom, and justice itself offers itself like a mirror before the eyes of his heart."

By "grace" he also sometimes understands some gift of God that is grateful and accepted, which we merit by laboring—such as knowledge, wisdom. Whence also immediately before that saying from the same homily objected above, expounding the word "Ask, and it shall be given to you," he says: "God so disposed us to be that neither, by being diligent and laboring over the Scriptures, do we acquire the saving knowledge without the grace of God—lest we attribute to ourselves what we know—nor, however, do we acquire grace unless we have been diligent and labored over the Scriptures—lest the gift of God be given to the negligent."

Through that which he implies—that man's labor and will precede grace—he perhaps understands a preparation that sometimes precedes the infusion of grace, as chapters 37 and 43 of the first book make mention. Yet he does not say that man alone makes this preparation without God, nor antecedently to God, nor that it is in any way meritorious of grace freely given.

And although on the Epistle to the Hebrews he seems to wish to deny that God properly performs the act of the human will, he appears elsewhere to hold this view. Whence on Matthew 27—"If anyone says anything to you, say that the Lord has need of them, and immediately he will let them go"—he says: "Do not consider what happened to be a small thing. For who persuaded the owners of the animals not to wish to contradict, or, being unwilling, to be silent and agree? And in this He instructs the disciples that He could also have prevented the Jews, but did not wish to."

Or perhaps he understands that God does not so act or pre-act the act of the human will as to compel it unwillingly, or violently necessitate it to act. Whence on Matthew 16—"If anyone wishes to come after Me," etc.—he writes thus: "See that He does not make the speech coercive. For He did not say, 'Whether you wish or do not wish, you must suffer this.' 'If anyone wishes,'

etc. And by saying this, He attracted more; for the one who releases the hearer to freedom attracts more, while the one who uses violence very often impedes."

And on the same word of Christ, Luke 9, he says: "Since the Savior is pious and kind, He wishes to have no unwilling or coerced servant, but willing ones, giving thanks to Him for the service. And therefore, compelling no one and imposing no necessity, but persuading and doing good, He attracts all who are willing, saying: 'If anyone wishes.'"

From this, however, it appears that he does posit God pre-acting the act of the human will. For why else would he say that the Savior wishes to have willing servants, giving thanks to Him for the service? Why indeed would they give thanks to the Savior, unless for the benefit of the service first given and first received from Him? Otherwise it would seem that the Savior ought rather to give thanks to the servants, because they freely anticipated Him with the service of their obedience.

Would not anyone who thought otherwise pervert the words of Christ, and could not be Christ's disciple but rather His master, as the series of the Gospels makes clear? For Christ says: "If anyone wishes to come *after* Me"—He does not say, "If anyone wishes to go *before* Me, or to precede Me." And He says, "and *follow* Me"—He does not say, "and *precede* Me." And again: "He who does not bear his cross and come *after* Me cannot be My disciple."

Although, therefore, Chrysostom perhaps erred at times, he seems to have later corrected himself and retracted what he had erroneously said. Whence the blessed Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, in a certain letter to John, Bishop of Antioch—and it is recounted in the *Decretum*, distinction 50, "John"—writes thus: "John Chrysostom was judged by two synods of orthodox bishops, but was afterward restored." It is not, however, expressly stated there that he was judged on the charge of heresy or error in his doctrine, in his writings or sayings. Nevertheless, immediately before, the following is prefixed: "Peter denied Christ, and yet afterward was made the prince of the Apostles. Paul stoned Stephen, and yet was chosen by the Lord as an Apostle. And many, returning from heresy to the unity of the Catholic faith, have been received in their orders; some indeed have been promoted to the episcopal rank—such as Augustine and many others."

Isidore, however, Bishop of Seville, in *On Illustrious Men*, chapter 6, after a great commendation of this John, adds: "He, however, in the thirteenth year of his episcopate, was oppressed by the hostility of Theophilus, Bishop of Alexandria. For the bishops favoring the Emperor Arcadius condemned him though innocent, and deposed him from the episcopate, and thrust him into exile in Pontus."

I do not know, however, whether this condemnation was one of the aforesaid judgments, or another separate one. Yet much should be presumed in favor of the double synodal judgment of many orthodox bishops. Theophilus also, Bishop of the city of Alexandria—as Gennadius, Priest of Marseilles, attests in *On Illustrious Men*, chapter 33—was a Catholic Doctor, a valiant vanquisher of heretics, and was praiseworthy and distinguished for the holiness of his life.

John Damascene also seems to have erred not a little in his life. Why then could he not have erred similarly in his doctrine? For in the little book *On Lovers of the World and Lovers of God*, it is reported of him that in Damascus among the Agarenes—who are commonly called Saracens—he learned their letters opportunely, and that because of his gentle and sweet conversation with all, he became known to the king, and was honored by him with the greatest honor, and used to go with him, as a beloved, to the tomb or shrine of Muhammad himself. He was compelled there by the king to worship and venerate his body, and to bow to the stone, and to proclaim Muhammad. And proclaiming Muhammad, he said obscurely, "These people say," and in a loud voice, "that Muhammad is the Apostle of God." On their return to Damascus he was honored by the king and his magnates magnificently, as one who fully proclaimed the defiled one.

If, however, in doing these things he contracted any profane pollution, it seems to have been abolished and purged in the false accusation against him that followed—regarding a most grievous crime toward the king—and in the cutting off of the thumb of his right hand. Carrying it with him, kneeling before an image of the most merciful Virgin, which he had with him, and praying devoutly with tears and the deepest groaning for three days, he obtained its perfect restoration. After the death of the aforementioned king, having become a monk, in his book called *Panax* or *On the Hundred Heresies*, as the hundredth heresy, he refutes and vanquishes the heresy of the Agarenes—the same as the Ishmaelites.

Nevertheless, by similar methods perhaps to those by which Chrysostom, and also by what was set forth in chapter 28 of this book, Damascene too can perhaps be expounded, and similar Catholic Doctors who said similar things. For we ought reasonably to interpret the sayings of Catholics in the more benign sense we can; but those of heretics, in their perfect hatred, we should judge according to their heresy. For the understanding of a saying is weighed from the intention and cause of the speaking.

Nor should I reasonably be accused of charging Chrysostom, Damascene, and other saints with the worst crime—namely, heretical depravity—since even if they said a heresy, they would not immediately be held as heretics. For the one who from simplicity and ignorance says a heresy, not intending to defend it obstinately, but prepared to stand by the judgment of the Church and of his superiors, is not immediately to be held as a heretic. Perish the thought! For then too many and too great Catholic Doctors would be heretics. Perish, perish the thought! But rather, about any such person who has zeal for God but not according to knowledge, it can be said: "If in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal this to you also." He is therefore to be admonished and gently instructed.

For Papias says: "They are called heretics who hold wrong opinions about the Lord or creature, or about Christ or the Church, and who thereafter defend with obstinate depravity the perfidy of the newly conceived error." Augustine also, in Book 18 of *The City of God*, chapter 52: "Those who in the Church of Christ have some morbid and depraved view, if corrected so that they may

hold what is sound and right, resist obstinately and refuse to correct their pestilential and death-dealing dogmas, but persist in defending them—these become heretics, and going outside are reckoned among the enemies who exercise the Church."

This same thing is evidently proved by Innocent III, who, as is evident in the *Decretals*, "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," chapter "We Condemn," condemned and rejected a certain little book of the Abbot Joachim on the Trinity as heretical; yet Joachim himself, because he submitted all his writings to the judgment of the Roman Church, he in no way condemned as a heretic. Whence he says thus: "If anyone presumes to defend or approve the view or doctrine of the aforesaid Joachim in this matter, let him be rejected by all as a heretic. In no way, however, do we wish to derogate from the flourishing monastery of which Joachim himself was the founder; since there the institution is regular and the observance salutary; especially since Joachim himself ordered all his writings to be submitted to us for the judgment of the Apostolic See, either to be approved or to be corrected—also dictating a letter, to which he subscribed with his own hand, in which it is firmly stated that he holds that faith which the Roman Church holds, which, by the Lord's disposition, is the mother and mistress of all the faithful."

And if anyone still objects that according to my view, at least the writings of Chrysostom, Damascene, Cassian, Joachim, and the other Doctors who sometimes write heretical things should not be read, nor even cited, because of the suspicion and fear of enclosed venom—indeed they are to be read, but not as the holy Gospel; rather with prudence and caution, as Cassiodorus advises reading Cassian, as was recounted above. Just as also other Doctors advise reading Origen, who, as the same Doctors affirm, erred most grievously in many things.

Whence Cassiodorus, in *On the Institution of Divine Letters*, chapter 1: "Origen," he says, "is designated as a heretic by the opinion of many Fathers. Although the authority of so many Fathers attacks him, he has even now been again condemned by the most blessed Pope Vigilius in the present time. But how he should be read, the holy Jerome indicated probably in a letter he wrote to Tranquillinus, so as neither to remove the studious from the reading of him that is necessary, nor again to cast the incautious headlong into ruin. Him indeed they have not undeservedly said should be treated like dill, which while it seasons the foods of the sacred writings, is itself thrown away after being cooked and dried up. About him it was said in conclusion: 'Where good, no one better; where bad, no one worse.' And therefore he is to be read cautiously and wisely, so that we may take from him the most salutary juices, and at the same time avoid drinking the poisons of his perfidy, which are contrary to our life."

To which also that saying of Virgil can be fittingly applied: when asked by someone what he was doing as he read Ennius, he replied: "I seek gold in dung."

"Wherefore in the works of the same Origen, as far as I was able to find in passing, the places that are said contrary to the rules of the Fathers I have marked with the sign of heresy's rejection, so that he may not be able to deceive—he who is shown by such a sign to be guarded against in his depraved meanings. The later writers, however, say he should be entirely avoided, for the

reason that he subtly deceives the innocent. But if with the Lord's help caution is applied, his venomous things cannot harm."

In the Fourth Council of Carthage also, as Gratian recounts in distinction 37, we read thus: "A bishop should not read the books of the Gentiles; but let him read through those of the heretics, either out of necessity or for the occasion."

This view is also clearly proved by the authority of Book 7 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 7, and certain other passages written in the third book of this work.

How, moreover, writers or writings of this sort ought to be cited is known from the foregoing. For they cannot and should not be cited as the holy Gospel, but as probable and reputable witnesses in places where they are not proved to have erred. Nevertheless, the authority of such persons, insofar as it concerns the speaker, does not produce full faith. For how, on the basis of the speaker alone, shall I believe him in other things, when it is established that he once erred and said what is false?

I know that the civil and canonical laws hold the same about witnesses. Wherefore also Augustine, to Jerome, Epistle 19 in the collection of Jerome's letters, shows that there is no falsehood at all in the entire sacred Scripture; because once an officious falsehood is admitted in sacred Scripture, no particle of those books will remain that cannot, as each sees fit, be referred by the same rule to the office of the lying author; and so nowhere in the sacred writings will there be the certain authority of chaste truth.

Indeed, not only the authority of those who have erred, but even of those who have not erred but could have erred—if there are any such—does not, insofar as concerns the authority of the speaker alone, furnish the fullest faith. Only the authority of Him who neither errs, nor could, can, or ever will be able to err furnishes that. The most authentic citation, therefore, is that of the prophets, when they say, "Thus says the Lord"—not "thus says Priscian, Aristotle, Cicero, Justinian, Pythagoras, Boethius, Euclid, Ptolemy," or any of the other fallible ones.

Wherefore it is established that sacred Scripture—which the Father sanctified and sent into the world—by reason of its unerring Author, is to be incomparably preferred in firmness and certainty to all other authentic writings, and that to it alone, by reason of its Author alone, the fullest faith is to be given. For although men seem to have written canonical Scripture, and "every man is a liar," yet they did not write it themselves, but through them as through His pen, the Spirit of Truth, the right finger of God, wrote it, as the same Scripture attests in many places, and the Catholic Doctors attest, and the Catholic faith holds. About other fallible writers, however, through whom it is not established that the Holy Spirit spoke, a different view must be held, as the most learned Augustine proves and teaches in the places mentioned above.

CHAPTER XXXII. THAT IN EVERY NON-ACTION COMMON TO GOD AND CREATURE, IT IS NATURALLY PRIOR THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT THERE THAN THAT THE CREATURE DOES NOT; AND IT IS BECAUSE GOD DOES NOT PERFORM A CERTAIN ACTION THROUGH THE CREATURE THAT THE CREATURE DOES NOT PERFORM IT, AND NOT THE REVERSE.

Having shown that in every action common to God and creature, God acts naturally prior to the creature, it remains consequently to show that in every non-action common to God and creature, it is naturally prior that God does not act there than that the creature does not—namely, because God does not perform a certain action through the creature, therefore the creature does not perform it, and not the reverse.

For this follows plainly from the thirtieth chapter of this book. Just as of two movers ordered according to prior and posterior, such that the first can from itself alone unimpededly move the second, and the second cannot move except as an instrument moved antecedently through the first, it is prior by nature that the first moves than the second—and because the first moves, therefore the second moves, and not the reverse—so also in non-moving similarly, as is evidently apparent in the arm, the staff, and the ball, and in the celestial mover, the heaven, and the air. Which reason also makes manifest.

For privation is not properly an effect but a defect; and therefore it does not properly have an efficient cause, but a deficient one. This, however, can only be a superior cause failing to act, which if it acted, would cause the state by which the privation would be removed. Just therefore as the positing of the prior cause is the cause of the positing of its posterior effect, so also the removal of the cause is the cause of the removal of the effect. Just as the presence of the sun is the cause of day, so its absence is the cause of night; just as the presence of the helmsman is the cause of safety on a ship, and his absence the cause of destruction, as the Philosopher attests in Book 2 of the *Physics*, chapter 30, and Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 2, and Anselm in *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter 5.

Wherefore the Philosopher, in Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 16, distinguishing things prior and posterior, says: "Others according to power: that which exceeds in power is prior, and that which is more powerful. Such a thing is one whose pre-will another must necessarily follow; the other is posterior. So that when it does not move, the other is not moved, and when it moves, the other is moved; and the pre-will is the principle."

Where the text that Averroes has reads: "And it is said 'prior' according to power or virtue, as we say 'prior' to dominion. For the lord is said to be prior because he is superior in power. That also is said to be prior which is stronger; and prior is such a thing as compels another to follow its will, so that if what is prior does not move, what is posterior will not be moved; and if it moves, it will be moved; and the will is the principle here."

On which Averroes says: "More worthy is that which compels what is posterior, so that its will follows its own will; so that if what is prior does not move, what is posterior will not be moved. And the beginning, according to which 'prior' and 'posterior' are said here, is the will—namely, because the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger. And this is what he intended when he said, 'And the will is the beginning.'" In which same view Albert, Thomas, Durandus, and all expositors agree.

Whence also Augustine, on Psalm 148—"His confession is above heaven and earth"—says: "Attend: He Himself made heaven and earth, He Himself governs them, they are governed at His nod. He Himself moves times and moments; He Himself renews; through Him are all things. Therefore these things praise Him whether in rest or in motion, whether from earth below or from heaven above, whether in oldness or in renewal. When you see these things and rejoice, and are lifted up to the Craftsman, and behold His invisible things, understood through the things that have been made—His confession is in heaven and on earth."

This same thing is similarly confirmed through the Philosopher in Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 12, where he inquires about the negative middle term, the proximate demonstrative term of a negative conclusion. For example, why does a wall not breathe? He shows it cannot be said "because it is not an animal," because then being an animal would be the proximate cause of breathing, and so every animal would breathe. "For if a negation is the cause of the thing's not being, an affirmation is the cause of the thing's being. Just as being without measure of hot and cold is the cause of not being healed, so being with measure of the same is the cause of being healed. And similarly, if an affirmation is the cause of being, a negation is the cause of not being."

Which Robert of Lincoln, expounding that passage, similarly plainly holds; Thomas also and others expounding it.

Likewise, if the creature's not acting were the cause why God does not act, and the creature's acting were the cause why God acts, then it would be prior by nature for the creature to act than for the first agent, and prior by nature for the secondary cause to move than the first—contrary to the thirtieth chapter of this book plainly.

Likewise, proportional things are judged alike: the prior active not acting on the posterior passive, and the posterior passive not suffering from the prior active; and the prior active not acting through the posterior active, and the posterior active not acting through the prior active. But of the first two, the first is the cause of the second and naturally prior to it; therefore of the remaining two, similarly.

For who would even slightly doubt that because the active does not act on the passive, therefore the passive does not suffer—and not the reverse? Just as because the active acts, therefore the passive suffers—and not the reverse? Just as acting is the cause of suffering and naturally precedes it?

For who does not know that because God did not make a certain possible angel that He did not make, therefore that angel was not made—and not the reverse? And because He did not make another star in heaven, therefore it was not made—and not the reverse? And because He did not make an angel more perfect in natural endowments, therefore it is not more perfect—and not the reverse? And because He did not make heaven greater, therefore it is not greater—and not the reverse?

Likewise, the first cause of every true negation is in God, as the tenth and eleventh parts of chapter 13 of the first book show. The cause of a negation that is not necessary but contingent seems to be in God: His not willing it to be so, or His not making it to be so—just as the cause of similar affirmations in God is God's willing and making it to be so, as the ninth chapter of the first book demonstrates.

Thus, whatever is not done by a secondary cause, God wills not to be done, and positively does not will it—that is, He has a not-willing of its being done by it—as the twenty-second chapter of the first book and its corollaries teach. And this not causally or antecedently from the secondary cause, as the twentieth chapter of the first book shows. Therefore it is prior naturally and causally that God positively does not will—and consequently does not will and does not make—the secondary cause to act, than that the cause itself does not act.

Likewise, by the same twentieth chapter, no positive thing posterior to the divine will is the cause of that will. And it would seem much more unworthy for some privation to be the cause of the divine will. Therefore, the secondary cause's not acting is not the cause why God wills it not to act, and positively wills it not to act, nor why He does not act—but the reverse.

Likewise, by the second chapter of the first book, if God withdrew His hand by which He sustains all things, they would be turned to nothing; and this causally, on account of the withdrawal of divine preservation. For because God would not preserve beings, therefore they would not be—but not because they would not be, therefore God would not preserve them. Just as before the production of things, because God did not produce things, therefore they did not exist—and not the reverse. Just as it would still be the case if He had still produced nothing. And just as it now is for many non-beings not produced, which He could have produced.

Whence also Avicenna, Book 1 of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 9: "The intention of being comes from a cause that is a cause of being, and the intention of non-being comes from a cause that is the privation of the intention of the cause of being."

With which Augustine concordantly says in Book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 17: "God, by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will, brought it about regarding the things He created that they previously were not, for as long as they were not, and that they subsequently were, when they began to be."

And the Apostle says: "who calls those things that are not, as those things that are" (Romans 4)—although this is also expounded otherwise.

The prophet also says: "He called a famine upon the land" (Psalm 104). On which Augustine, having prefaced one exposition, adds: "Or—which is more credible—'He called a famine' is to be understood as meaning that He said that famine should be. So that 'to call' is the same as 'to name,' 'to name' as 'to say,' 'to say' as 'to command.' For He called the famine—He who calls those things that are not, as those things that are."

Whence also Anselm, in *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1: "God is said to make the non-being of what is not, because when He could, He does not make it be. And if you consider the things that are—when they pass to non-being, does He not Himself make them not be? Since not only is there no other essence except by His making, but neither can what has been made in any way remain except by Him preserving it. When He ceases to preserve what He made, what was returns to non-being—which it has not from Him, namely the non-being, but because He ceases to make being."

Behold how plainly he attests that non-being does not properly have an efficient cause, but rather a deficient one—namely, a making and preserving cause that fails to make and preserve, that is, one not making a possible thing or not preserving what has been made, as was touched upon above.

COROLLARY

THE COROLLARY OF THIS CHAPTER IS NOT FOUND IN THE CATALOGUE.

From these things it seems not improbably to be inferred that God's not giving knowledge, grace, or perseverance, or any gift of His to a capable creature, is the cause why it does not receive and does not have it; and because God does not give, therefore the creature does not receive—and not the reverse.

This corollary does not deny that God sometimes does not give grace or other gifts because of the fault of those not receiving, but it affirms that the proper and *per se* cause of non-reception is non-giving, and not the reverse.

This corollary seems to follow manifestly from the foregoing. It also seems that it can be shown, just as the principal conclusion was. Who also does not know that all knowledge is given by God, as is evident from chapter 6 of the first book, the third and twentieth of this second book—and especially prophetic knowledge and the manifold revelations of secrets, to which no one can attain by the way of natural ingenuity, but only by divine revelation?

Why then do not all have all these kinds of knowledge, unless because the One through whom is given the word of wisdom and knowledge does not give it—distributing to each as He wills? Wherefore also Elisha said: "The Lord has hidden it from me and has not told me" (4 Kings 4)—thereby giving the cause of his ignorance.

Who also, reading and not neglecting the prophetic books, does not easily see that the prophets did not always have divine revelations, nor the spirit of prophecy; and therefore did not always have prophetic visions, but when it pleased the one revealing? What then is the cause of this non-reception, unless non-giving—as Gregory also seems to attest on Ezekiel, Homily 1?

And if you say that the laziness or sin of someone is the cause why God does not give him such prophetic knowledge—certainly, sin and laziness notwithstanding, God could, if He wished, give him such knowledge. God also sometimes shows prophetic revelations to the wicked and does not show them to the most holy men. To the same most holy prophets also He sometimes shows such visions and sometimes hides them. To evil angels and to our first parents before sin, and to the holy confirmed angels who never sinned and never will sin, God did not give every kind of prophecy, as is evident from chapter 16 of this book. What then is the cause of this non-reception, unless non-giving?

Moreover, if the angels and first parents, according to the opinion of some, were created outside grace and remained thus without fault for some little while, the cause why they then did not receive and did not have grace was because God did not give it—and not the reverse—as no one is unaware. And so now similarly.

Likewise, proportional things are judged alike: not giving grace and not receiving grace, and not giving so much grace and not receiving so much. But it is certain that God's not giving an angel in the beginning, or a baptized infant, so much grace—namely, one greatest grace of which it was capable, which He did not give—was the cause why it did not receive it, and not the reverse.

Likewise, this seems clear regarding infants. For by what image of reason can it be said that the infant does not receive grace, and therefore God does not give it—and not rather the reverse?

Likewise, regarding adults: suppose, according to what was said above about grace and penance in the first chapter of this book, that of two sinners entirely equal before this instant, who as much as was in them would have been equals at this instant, God freely confers His grace on one and by no means on the other. Then the cause why this one does not receive is because God does not give. For if He gave or wished to give to this one, this one would receive just as the other did.

And if you say that one first merited, or at least disposed himself, or now does so, and the other did not, and therefore this one receives grace and the other does not—you do not maintain the supposition set forth, which posited parity in all things. Also, according to what was shown above about grace in the first book, no one merits the first grace by a prior disposition, nor by any other action whatsoever.

Since also these are equal in all things, except for that disposition or merit, and by the thirtieth chapter of this book, no one can elicit a merit, disposition, or any action unless God pre-wills and pre-acts, and by the tenth chapter of the first book, if God pre-wills anyone to do anything, he necessarily does it—the cause, therefore, why this one so merits and so disposed himself for grace is because God antecedently wills this and does it. And if God so willed regarding the

other, that one would similarly do it, and otherwise he cannot. The cause, therefore, why this one does not so merit and dispose himself is because God does not will this nor effect it in him. And so likewise this will be the cause why this one does not receive grace—especially since according to you, God does not confer grace without such preceding merit or disposition.

And if you again say that God offers grace to everyone, and wills that he receive it—not absolutely, however, but under this condition: if he freely consents—by the corollary of the thirtieth chapter of this book you are again corrected.

Moreover, you seem to suppose that man can from himself alone, or at least from himself antecedently with God, consent to the offer of grace—contrary to chapter 38 of the first book, and the twentieth and thirtieth of this second book.

Likewise, according to the foregoing, against the former response: suppose two sinners equal in all things, to whom God equally offers grace. And since according to you it is not necessary for everyone to receive grace offered to them, suppose one receives it and the other does not. The one who receives grace consents, and the cause of this is because God by willing and pre-willing works and pre-works consent in him, nor can he otherwise consent, as the thirtieth chapter of this book shows. And the one who does not receive grace does not consent, nor can he do so unless God by pre-willing pre-works this in him; nor can he make God pre-will and pre-work this in him, nor resist God pre-willing and wishing to pre-work, by the tenth chapter of the first book. The cause, therefore, why he does not consent is because God does not will to go before him, and does not go before him by working. For if God willed this, this one would consent just as the other did.

Otherwise perhaps you will say that God freely offers grace to everyone, provided he opens his hand, opens his bosom, opens the chest of his heart that receives grace. And so the one who accepts does so because God gives; but the one who does not accept does so not because God does not give, but because he does not open. And so God does not give because this one does not accept the grace that is offered. Just as if I extend a gift to you and you accept it, I do not give because you accept, but the reverse. And if I extend something to another and he does not accept, he does not fail to accept because I do not give, but I do not give because he does not accept.

This response, however, will be chastised like the preceding one, and by chapter 38 of the first book.

Moreover, when God offers grace to someone, what does He intend regarding the reception of grace with respect to that person? Either He intends and wills that he receive it, or not. If He intends and wills that he receive it, by the tenth chapter of the first book it always happens thus; nor can one say that God intends this conditionally, as the foregoing against the preceding response make clear. If God does not intend or will this—knowing well that unless He intends and wills this, and this antecedently and independently of human action or passion, He offers it vainly and deceptively—for who reasonably offers anything to someone in need without granting

the other things necessary, without which the offerer well knows the needy person cannot receive it, nor can have those other things from himself alone or antecedently from himself, nor from anyone else except from the offerer himself, who gives all things freely and gratuitously begins?

A wonderful mercy that would be, which in no way relieves the misery of the wretched, but rather aggravates it by deceptively extending such things and not giving! Indeed, by the twenty-second chapter of the first book and its corollary, if God does not intend or will this, He intends and wills its opposite—where a greater deception and duplicity would seem to appear.

Or let it be argued in this way: when God offers grace to someone, either He wills to give it to him, or He does not will to give it to him, etc., as above.

Likewise, in the example proposed: if you offered me something, and knew well that I could not by myself alone, nor by the help of anyone else, open my contracted hand to receive it, nor begin to open it, nor do anything unless you began everything and continuously followed through; and you knew that it was not in my power what you willed concerning me, and that whatever you willed would immediately happen; and you did not will—indeed, you were unwilling—to act or help toward opening my hand—would you not be the cause why I did not open my hand and receive your gift? And so your not giving would be the cause why I did not receive.

This is also confirmed. To give, as the jurists say, is "to make someone accept." To give, therefore, imports not only offering but also accepting. How then do you say that acceptance is not the cause of giving? Indeed, it is not the cause of offering; but it is a cause of giving, just as offering is. For just as offering, so also acceptance naturally and causally precedes giving, and effects and consummates it. For unless I accept, it does not become mine.

Moreover, if giving imports these two things—offering and accepting—the failure of giving, or not-giving, can occur either from a defect of offering or from a defect of reception. The one, therefore, who when he can does not do both things necessarily required for giving, without which giving cannot happen, is the cause why it is not given.

If, therefore, you offer me something, and you can make me receive it, and I cannot otherwise receive it, the cause why I do not accept is because you do not make me accept.

To make this still clearer, suppose you are a wise teacher and I an ignorant student, and by the command of the Father, our common Lord, you are bound to provide me with teaching, and I am under your authority—such that if you effectively offer me teaching, I will accept it, but otherwise not at all. If, therefore, you do not offer or give me teaching, and I do not accept it, will not the Lord reckon you as the cause why I do not accept the teaching? I believe that by just judgment He will reckon so.

Perhaps you still will not cease responding, saying that God offers grace to everyone, and some do not place an obstacle to grace but rather remove it, and therefore they receive the grace offered to them; but others place an obstacle to grace and do not remove it, and therefore they by

no means accept it—just as in the case of illumination and non-illumination of a house by the sun through a window that is open or closed.

For this response, it seems one should reasonably ask what the obstacle is. And it seems to be some object or thing resisting grace—namely, mortal sin repugnant to salvific grace, or a non-consent, or dissent, a non-opening or closing of the human heart when the grace of God is offered. And whatever the obstacle is said to be, this response can be rebuked like the previous ones, since no one can remove this obstacle except God, or through God Himself removing it first; and if He Himself wills to remove it, it is removed irresistibly, as the tenth chapter of the first book teaches.

The same thing is shown by the foregoing on grace and penance together with that same tenth chapter of the first book. Whence also the Lord Himself says: "I will have mercy on whom I will, and I will be clement to whom it pleases Me" (Exodus 33). And again: "I will take away the heart of stone," etc. (Ezekiel 36). The Gloss: "that is, all hardness, and the unbelieving heart." And the Apostle: "He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills" (Romans 9).

And Augustine, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 9, treating John 6—"Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned, comes to Me"—says: "Very far removed from the senses of the flesh is this school in which God is heard and teaches. We see many coming to the Son, because we see many believing in Christ; but where and how they heard and learned from the Father, we do not see. This grace is exceedingly secret; but who doubts that it is grace? This grace, therefore, which is secretly bestowed on human hearts by worthy liberality, is rejected by no hard heart. For it is given for this very reason: that the hardness of heart may first be removed."

"Since, therefore, the Father is heard and teaches inwardly so that one may come to the Son, He takes away the heart of stone and gives a heart of flesh, as the prophet predicted in his promise. For thus He makes sons of the promise, and vessels of mercy that He prepared for glory."

And there follows, chapter 10: "Why, however, does He not teach all to come to Christ, unless because all whom He teaches, He teaches out of mercy; but those whom He does not teach, He therefore does not teach because 'He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills'?"

And if you say the obstacle is some positive act repugnant to grace—such as an actual contradiction, rebellion, or contempt—and that it cannot be removed except by non-action or the privation of such an act, which is not from God, or not antecedently from God, but from man—you can still be rebuked as before.

Moreover, then everyone not having such a contrary act would receive grace—which is false of infants, of those mentally impaired, of adults whether healthy, sleeping, or waking, having good moral acts, or indifferent ones, or only venially evil ones—which acts one established in grace can have.

Likewise, how do you say that such an act cannot be removed except by non-action or the mere privation of acting? For it can be removed by a contrary positive act—as contempt by obedience, hatred by love, and so on. How easily, therefore, could God, if He wished, remove such an obstacle or act!

Such an obstacle, moreover, by the thirtieth chapter of this book, is made and placed antecedently by God. How, then, does God wish to confer grace on this one, in whom He prepares an obstacle repelling grace? Or if God does not give grace because of the resisting obstacle, and God Himself knowingly and precedently causes this obstacle, how is God not the cause of the non-reception of salvific grace?

This corollary also seems to be attested by the series of both Testaments and the copious authority of the Doctors. For who, having even looked at the bark of sacred Scripture or the Doctors, does not know that God originally established all things with their measures, numbers, and weights, as is also briefly touched upon in chapter 46 of the first book?

Why, therefore, just as He antecedently and originally established and provided the number of the elect—as chapters 46 of the first book and 5 of this book attest—did He not similarly establish the number of those who would believe and those who would finally persevere, so that it is just so many and not more, nor fewer?

Who, then, is the primary cause of this negation? Is it not He who numbers the multitude of stars—namely, the multitude of those to be saved—just as He is the cause why there are not more material stars in heaven, just as He is also the cause why heaven is not greater? What also is the cause why these are the units in the number of the elect, and not other ones of equal number in their place, unless He who calls them all by name—just as He is the cause why these material stars are not other ones created, and this world is not another with other creatures?

Who also doubts that just as God provided and established a certain number of stars, so also of the sand of the sea, by which the reprobate are figured, as chapter 27 of the first book and what follows make clear? Since also after the final judgment He will will the number of the damned to be precisely so much and no more—and not by a novel volition, nor one caused by posterior things, as chapters 23 and 20 of the first book teach.

What theologian also, unless a companion of Pelagius, does not know that the first cause of reprobation and of the divine volition by which He eternally reprobates some is on the part of God who reprobates, not on the part of the angel or man who is reprobated, as is evident from chapter 45 of the first book? If, however, not receiving grace and perseverance were the cause of not giving, the reverse would be the case.

Wherefore also Augustine, Gregory, and other Doctors frequently imply and say that no cause of non-drawing by God, of non-hearing, non-obedience, non-perseverance, and the like, is to be sought or assigned on the part of the one not drawn and the like—as many things set forth above about grace, penance, and perseverance make clear.

Augustine indeed, Part 1 on John, Homily 26, says: "Whom He draws and whom He does not draw, why He draws this one and does not draw that one—do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." If, however, the Father did not draw someone because that person was not drawn, the reason could reasonably be asked why, and truly given why.

Likewise, in Exodus 4 we read the Lord saying to Moses: "Who made the mouth of man, or who made the mute and the deaf, the seeing and the blind? Is it not I?" The Gloss on the word "mute" says: "In mouth or in spirit." Wherefore the rest are to be similarly expounded.

Where also another Gloss, namely Augustine's, says: "There are those who calumniate God, or rather the Scripture of the Old Testament, because God said He made the mute. What then do they say about Christ, who openly says, 'I came that those who do not see may see, and those who see may become blind'? Who but an ignorant person would believe that anything could happen to a man in bodily defects that God does not will? But that He wills all justly, no one doubts."

With which Moses concordantly says, Deuteronomy 29: "You have seen all that the Lord did before you in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and to all his servants and to all his land—the great trials that your eyes saw, those great signs and wonders. And the Lord has not given you a heart to understand, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, until this present day." The Gloss: "A heart to understand"—that is, a will to do what you understand. "And eyes"—namely, of the heart—"to see." "To hear"—that is, to obey.

With which Isaiah also concordantly says: "Blind the heart of this people, and make heavy their ears, and close their eyes, lest perhaps they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them" (Isaiah 6). A similar view Christ also teaches, as Matthew 13, Mark 4, and Luke 8 evidently show.

Whence also John 12: "Although He had done so many signs before them, they did not believe in Him, so that the word of Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he said: 'Lord, who has believed our report, and to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?' For this reason they could not believe, because Isaiah again said: 'He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, so that they may not see with their eyes and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them.'"

Which Augustine, treating in Part 1 on John, Homily 53, writes thus: "What He added—'and be converted, and I heal them'—whether 'not' should be understood, that is, 'not be converted'—the sentence being connected from above, where it was said 'so that they may not see with their eyes and understand with their heart,' because here too it was said 'so that they may not understand'—for conversion itself also comes from His grace, to whom it is said, 'O God of powers, convert us.' Or perhaps this too should be understood as done out of the mercy of divine medicine: since they were of a perverse and proud will, and wished to establish their own justice, for this reason they were abandoned so as to be blinded; they were blinded so as to stumble against the stone of

stumbling, and their faces were filled with shame—and thus humbled, they would seek the name of the Lord, and not their own justice, by which the proud man is puffed up, but the justice of God, by which the ungodly man is justified. For this indeed profited many of them for good, who, stricken by their crime, afterward believed in Christ—for whom Christ Himself also prayed, saying: 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.'"

And in his *Questions on the Gospels*, as recounted by the Gloss of Thomas on Matthew 13, where the same authority of Isaiah is cited, he says: "They closed their eyes, lest at some time they see with their eyes—that is, they themselves were the cause that God closed their eyes for them. For another Evangelist says, 'He has blinded their eyes.' But whether they should never see, or rather so that at some time, seeing and being displeased with their blindness and grieving, and being humbled and moved from this to confess their sins and piously seek God."

"For thus Mark says this: 'Lest at some time they be converted and their sins be forgiven them'—where it is understood that through their sins they merited not to understand; and yet this same thing was done to them mercifully, so that they might recognize their sins and, being converted, might merit forgiveness."

"But what John says about this passage—'For this reason they could not believe, because Isaiah again said, He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, so that they may not see with their eyes and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them'—seems to oppose this view, and entirely compels us to take what is said here—'lest at some time they see with their eyes'—not as meaning 'lest at some time they may see,' but simply 'so that they may not see.' Since he says openly, 'so that they may not see with their eyes.'"

"And what he says—'For this reason they could not believe'—sufficiently shows that the blinding was not done so that, moved and grieving that they could not understand, they might eventually be converted through repentance. For they could not do this unless they first believed, so that by believing they would be converted, by conversion healed, and by healing they would understand. But rather, they were blinded so that they would not believe. For he says most openly, 'For this reason they could not believe.'"

"If this is so, who will not rise to the defense of the Jews, proclaiming them to be without fault for not believing? For 'for this reason they could not believe, because He blinded their eyes.' But since God must rather be understood to be without fault, we are forced to acknowledge that by certain other sins they merited to be so blinded, by which blinding they could not believe. For John's words are: 'They could not believe, because Isaiah again said, He has blinded their eyes.' In vain, therefore, do we try to understand that they were blinded so that they might be converted, since they could not be converted because they did not believe, and they could not believe because they were blinded."

"Or perhaps we may not absurdly say that some of the Jews were healable, but were so endangered by the swelling of pride that it was beneficial for them first not to believe, and they

were blinded for this purpose: so that they would not understand the Lord speaking in parables, and not understanding, would not believe in Him, and not believing would join with the rest of the desperate in crucifying Him. And so, after His resurrection, they would be converted—since they would then be humbled by the guilt of the Lord's death, would love more the One by whom they rejoiced that so great a crime had been forgiven them—because their great pride was to be cast down by such humiliation."

"Let anyone who thinks this has been spoken inappropriately consider whether he does not find that it so happened, as is manifestly read in the Acts of the Apostles. It is therefore not inconsistent with what John says—'For this reason they could not believe, because He has blinded their eyes so that they may not see'—that we understand they were blinded so that they might be converted; that is, the Lord's words were hidden from them through the obscurity of parables, so that after His resurrection they might recover by a more salutary repentance. Because through the obscurity of speech they were blinded, they did not understand the Lord's words; not understanding, they did not believe in Him; not believing, they crucified Him. And so after the resurrection, terrified by the miracles done in His name, they were struck with the guilt of a greater crime, and prostrate to repentance—then, having received pardon, converted with the most burning love. Yet for some, that blindness did not profit unto conversion."

And in *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 41, he says: "In the mass of perdition the Tyrians and Sidonians were left, who could have believed if they had seen the miraculous signs of Christ. But since it was not given them to believe, that by which they would believe was also denied them. From this it appears that some have in their very nature a divine natural gift of understanding, by which they would be moved to faith if they heard words or saw signs suited to their minds. And yet if by a higher judgment of God they are not distinguished from the mass of perdition by the predestination of grace, neither are those divine words or deeds applied to them, by which they could believe if they heard or saw such things."

"In the same mass of perdition the Jews also were left, who could not believe when such great and clear miracles were done in their sight. For why could they not believe? The Gospel did not keep silent, saying: 'Although He had done so many signs before them, they did not believe in Him, so that the word of Isaiah the prophet might be fulfilled, which he said, Lord, who has believed our report? And to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed? And for this reason they could not believe, because Isaiah again said, He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, so that they may not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I heal them.'"

"The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their heart so hardened, since they would have believed if they had seen such signs as these others saw. But it did not profit them that they could have believed, because they were not predestined by Him whose judgments are unsearchable and whose ways are untraceable. Nor would it have harmed these others that

they could not believe, if they had been so predestined that God would illuminate the blind and wish to take away the heart of stone from the hardened."

I know that many understand the aforementioned words of the Lord, Moses, and Isaiah, and similar ones, very differently and expound them otherwise. Nor does this present an obstacle. For sacred Scripture, from its manifold fecundity, gives birth to manifold understanding. Yet no Catholic, I think, will so accept other or alien expositions that he would repudiate the exposition of the preeminent Evangelist, instructed by the very preacher of truth—indeed, of the most holy Gospel itself—and of the most learned Augustine.

Therefore the Lord Himself said: "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and he will not let the people go" (Exodus 4). And further, chapter 9: "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he did not hear them, as the Lord had spoken."

What does it mean that the Lord is said to harden the heart of a man, unless that the authority, superiority, and causality of the hardening of the human heart belongs to Him, not to man—although it happens because of man's preceding sin? And what is it for the Lord to harden a man's heart, unless not to soften when He could, not to give the oil of piety, not to have mercy on the miserable sinner—or not to will or not to wish to do these things—as the expositions of very many Doctors attest?

Whence Gregory, Book 11 of the *Morals*, chapter 5, on Job 12—"If He shuts up a man, there is no one who opens": "God is said to harden through justice, when the heart of the reprobate is not softened through grace."

With which Augustine concordantly says in *On Predestination and the Grace of God* (which is the fifth among his Sermons), chapter 7: "What does 'I will harden' mean, except 'I will not soften'?"

And Peter says in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 41, chapter 1, that the reprobation of God is "not to wish to have mercy," and the hardening of God is "not to have mercy"—so that nothing is inflicted by Him whereby man becomes worse, but only that by which he would become better is not bestowed.

Because, therefore, God does not soften the heart of a man, the heart itself is not softened—and not the reverse. Wherefore also the Apostle, in Romans 9, treating this passage of Scripture and showing that predestination or election and reprobation are not from the works of men but from the divine will, after a preceding disputation concludes: "Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills." And consequently, by a powerful disputation, he restrains men from presuming to ask or dispute about such matters.

If, however, God hardened someone because that person was hardened—that is, did not soften a man because the man was not softened—a cause could be reasonably sought and given. Why also would the Apostle say, "whom He wills, He hardens"? Otherwise he would rather say: "He

who wills to be hardened, or who does not wish to be softened, or who is not softened, is hardened."

Wherefore the blessed Augustine, in *On Predestination and the Grace of God*, chapter 17, says: "Did not Nebuchadnezzar, after innumerable impieties, repent when scourged, and receive again the kingdom he had lost? But Pharaoh was made harder by the very scourges and perished. Here let the one who judges the divine counsel with a heart that thinks itself too wise in lofty wisdom give me a reason why the medicine compounded by one and the same physician was effective for the destruction of one and for the salvation of another—unless because 'the good odor of Christ is to some an odor of life unto life, and to others an odor of death unto death.'"

"As to nature, both were men; as to dignity, both were kings; as to cause, both held captive the people of God; as to punishment, both were gently admonished by scourges. What then made their ends different, except that one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the remembrance of his own iniquity, while the other fought by his free will against the most merciful truth of God?"

"Here whoever responds that for the one to be changed, the divine help was present, but for the other to be hardened, it was absent—and contends that this is unjust; on account of which the Apostle, placing the ends of things in the will of God, said, 'He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills,' and the Lord saying, 'Without Me you can do nothing'—let him understand that all things are either brought to completion with the Lord's help, or permitted when He abandons, yet let him know that without His will absolutely nothing is admitted."

And there follows, chapter 18: "But we return to infants, we return to twins. It is little, what I said; we return to those not yet born, who were sown in the same act of intercourse and were to be brought into the light at the same moment. The discrepant and diverse judgment of the divine will appearing toward them confounds, by the magnitude of the question, the minds of men who dispute too proudly about the will of God."

"Raise now your voice with all your strength, O unjust accuser of the Just, and tell me what good did the one merit, and what evil did the other commit? And I respond to you—not I, but the Apostle Paul—'Neither indeed merited anything, and the potter has power over the clay from the same mass to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor.'"

"You will say, 'Why?' What is the reason for this confused diversity of judgment? Let him again rebuke this presumption and say, 'O man, who are you to reply to God?' Especially because, returning to the comparison of human acts, he responds that the creditor cannot be accused of injustice who wished to have such a judgment regarding two debtors: to forgive one and to exact from the other what is owed by both."

"If this is so, by what impudence will a man judge God—clay judge the potter—not only saying, 'Why did You make me thus?' but also scrutinizing about others with damnable curiosity, and saying, 'Why did You make another from the same mass thus, and another otherwise?'"

"If the human race, which was created originally from nothing, were not born with the debt of death and sin from its origin, and yet from them the almighty Creator wished to condemn some to eternal destruction—who would say to the almighty Creator, 'Why did You do thus?' For He who gave being when they were not, had the power over what end they should have. Nor would the rest say, 'Why does the divine judgment differ when all have equal merits?' Because 'the potter has power over the clay from the same mass to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor.'"

"Now, however, since just punishment is rendered to the condemned, but undeserved grace is given to the saved—who will go so far as to forget the human condition and scrutinize the secrets of the divine mind, asking when he himself has justly incurred punishment, why another received a grace that was not owed him?"

On account of these things, however, it must be known that hardening can be taken in two ways. In one way, for reprobation—that is, for active hardening, namely, the divine will not willing or not wishing to soften, or willing not to soften. And in this sense, it does not have a superior and prior cause to be assigned on the part of men, as is evident from chapters 20 and 45 of the first book. And in this sense I think the Apostle speaks in Romans, where he was cited, as his argument evidently indicates.

In another way, hardening is taken for reprobation passively—that is, for the effect of reprobation, the effect namely of the aforementioned divine will; that is, for the defect of conferral, or for the non-conferral itself of softening grace. And in this sense it is said—though improperly—to have a cause on the part of the hardened man: namely, a preceding fault. Yet that fault is not the non-reception of grace itself, but another one prior to it, as is evident regarding Pharaoh and others when they are actually hardened; for one is first a sinner before God is an avenger.

And in this sense the Doctors usually speak, saying that God out of mercy liberates, but according to judgment hardens. Judgment, however, seems to be according to the works of the one judged. Whence also Peter, Book 1 of the *Sentences*, distinction 42: "Just as the effect of predestination is the conferral of grace, so the effect of reprobation is hardening." And above, distinction 41, chapter 1, he says that there is some merit of hardening, but none of mercy. And he adds: "He has mercy, therefore, according to grace, which is given freely; but He hardens according to judgment, which is rendered for merits." Whence it is given to understand that just as the reprobation of God is not to wish to have mercy, so the hardening of God is not to have mercy—so that nothing is inflicted by Him whereby man becomes worse, but only that by which he would become better is not bestowed.

Further, it should be noted that sometimes it is read that the Lord hardens a man's heart—which must be understood in the aforesaid manner or manners. Sometimes, however, the man himself is read to harden his own heart, his neck, and the like—which can be understood in two ways: either because this happens on account of his prior fault, as the foregoing attest; or because he is

hard voluntarily, not unwillingly or by compulsion. Sometimes, however, it is read simply that his heart is hardened—which can be expounded in either way.

Furthermore, concerning Rehoboam we read: "The king did not listen to the people, because the Lord had turned away from him, to raise up His word which He had spoken by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite to Jeroboam" (3 Kings 12). And concerning Amaziah: "He did not wish to listen to Amaziah, because it was the Lord's will that he should be delivered into the hands of enemies, because of the gods of Edom."

Wherefore also Augustine, in *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 46: "Who does not tremble at the divine judgments, by which God works in the hearts even of evil men whatever He wills, yet renders to them according to their merits? Rehoboam the son of Solomon rejected the salutary counsel of the elders and rather assented to the words of his contemporaries, responding threateningly to those whom he should have treated gently. Why was this, unless by his own will? But hence the ten tribes of Israel departed from him, and established another king for themselves, Jeroboam, so that the will of the angry God might be fulfilled—which He had also predicted would come about."

"What does Scripture say? 'And the king did not hear the people, because it was a turning from the Lord, that He might establish His word which He spoke by the hand of Ahijah the Shilonite concerning Jeroboam the son of Nebat.' Assuredly this happened, and that through a man's will, yet so that the turning was from the Lord."

And further, chapter 47: "What does it mean that the man of God said to King Amaziah, 'Do not let the army of Israel come with you, for the Lord is not with Israel, with all the sons of Ephraim; if you think you will prevail through them, God will put you to flight before your enemies'? Then Scripture adds: 'And Amaziah did not listen, because it was from God, that he should be delivered into ruin, because they had sought the gods of Edom.' Behold: God, wishing to punish the sin of idolatry, worked this in the heart of the one at whom He was justly angry, so that he did not heed the salutary warning, but despising it went to war, where he fell with his army."

Likewise, what else does this signify: "Not all receive this word, but those to whom it is given. He who can receive it, let him receive it" (Matthew 19)? And: "Their eyes were held, so that they did not recognize Him" (Luke, last chapter)? And: "You do not believe, because you are not of My sheep" (John 10)?

Indeed, the philosophical rule set forth above—"If the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation"—the Truth Himself seems to canonize when He says: "He who is of God hears the words of God; for this reason you do not hear, because you are not of God" (John 8).

Wherefore also Chrysostom, as cited in the Gloss of Thomas on John 10, says: "He shows why they do not believe, adding: 'But you do not believe, because you are not of My sheep.'" On which word Augustine, Part 1 on John, Homily 48, says: "Sheep are those who by believing

follow the shepherd, entering through the door. How then did He say to these, 'You are not of My sheep'? Because He saw them predestined to everlasting destruction, not purchased for eternal life at the price of His blood."

And above, Homily 42, expounding John 8: "Since He foreknew who would believe, He called them 'of God,' since they would be born again of God by the adoption of regeneration. To these belongs: 'He who is of God hears the words of God.' But what follows—'For this reason you do not hear, because you are not of God'—was said to those who were not only vitiated by sin (for this evil was common to all), but who were also foreknown not to believe with that faith by which alone they could be freed from the obligation of sins. Wherefore He foreknew those to whom He said such things would remain in what they were 'of the devil'—that is, they would die in their sins and impiety, in which they were similar to him—and would not come to the generation in which they would be sons of God, that is, born of God, by whom they had been created as men."

"According to this predestination the Lord spoke." This, however, can also be understood and expounded otherwise: of anyone existing in grace, and thus being "of God," as long as he is such; and of anyone lacking grace, and thus not being "of God," as long as he is such—according to what was set forth in chapters 38 and following of the first book.

Whence the Savior says: "Why do you not recognize My speech? Because you cannot hear My word" (John 8)—as long, namely, as you are evil.

Wherefore also Chrysostom, as recounted in the Gloss of Thomas there, says: "First, therefore, virtue must be sought, which hears the divine word, so that henceforth we may stand strong to receive the entire speech of Jesus; since as long as someone has not been healed in his own hearing by the Word—which says to the deaf, 'Be opened'—he cannot perceive by hearing."

Nevertheless, there is one word of God that all the predestined, each and every one, hear or will hear at some time, and no reprobate will ever hear that word. This word, as Augustine shows in Homily 45 on John through a long disputation, is: "He who perseveres to the end, he shall be saved."

It is therefore evident, according to the view of the Truth—with Augustine attesting—that just as being of the sheep of Christ and of God according to predestination, that is, being predestined, is the cause of believing and salvifically hearing the voice of Christ, so also not being so is the cause of not so doing. But not being predestined is originally from God, because not from the works of the reprobate, as chapter 45 of the first book attests.

The same view is also attested by the authorities of the same Augustine from *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 10, and *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 41, cited above. And in *On Correction and Grace*, almost throughout, he shows that all men should be charitably corrected and admonished, but that correction profits only the predestined, not the non-predestined.

Where also in chapter 68, after a long disputation, he concludes thus: "Let men therefore endure being corrected when they sin, and let them not argue from the correction itself against grace, nor from grace against correction. Because both just punishment is owed to sins, and just correction pertains thereto—which is administered medicinally, even if the health of the sick person is uncertain. So that if the one who is corrected belongs to the number of the predestined, the correction may be a salutary medicine; if, however, he does not belong, the correction may be a penal torment. Under this uncertainty, therefore, it must be administered out of charity, since the outcome is unknown."

This view also the Savior seems to have taught to those capable, when, with the Jews murmuring against His discourse on the bread of life, He responded: "Do not murmur among yourselves. No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him. It is written in the prophets, 'And they shall all be taught by God.' Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned, comes to Me" (John 6)—where He seems to suggest that because they were not drawn or taught, because they did not hear or learn, therefore they did not come to Him by believing.

Wherefore also further: "There are some of you who do not believe. For Jesus knew from the beginning who would believe and who would betray Him. And He said: 'For this reason I said to you that no one can come to Me unless it has been given him by My Father.'"

If you do not believe me expounding, believe Augustine, saying in Homily 26 on John: "To the murmurers Jesus responded, 'Do not murmur among yourselves,' as if saying: I know why you do not hunger, and do not understand this bread, nor seek it. 'Do not murmur among yourselves. No one comes to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him.'" Note the "why" and the cause.

And there follows: "A great commendation of grace! No one comes unless drawn. Whom He draws and whom He does not draw, why He draws this one and does not draw that one—do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err." Do not, I say, wish to judge by a cause taken from the one drawn or not drawn, antecedently moving the drawing divine will—according to the foregoing in chapters 20 and 35 and following of the first book. If, however, someone's not being drawn by God were the cause why God did not draw him, it could be reasonably asked why God draws him, and could be reasonably—because causally—answered: because he is not drawn. And similarly, about similar things the same could be asked and similarly answered.

And further: "'For it is written in the prophets, and they shall all be taught by God.' Why did I say this, O Jews? The Father has not taught you; how can you recognize Me?"

And further, Homily 27, expounding "For Jesus knew from the beginning," etc., he says: "After He had distinguished believers from non-believers, He expressed the cause why they do not believe: 'For this reason I said to you that no one can come to Me unless it has been given him by My Father.'"

And in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapters 9 and 10, he confirms this exposition, as was recounted above. Where also in chapter 10, speaking of the Father's teaching, he asks and

resolves: "Why, however, does He not teach all to come to Christ, unless because all whom He teaches, He teaches out of mercy; but those whom He does not teach, He does not teach because 'He has mercy on whom He wills, and He hardens whom He wills'?"

And further: "'Why,' they say, 'does He not teach all?' If we say 'because those whom He does not teach do not wish to learn,' we shall be answered: 'And where is what is said to Him, O God, You will convert and give us life? Or if God does not make the willing out of the unwilling, why does the Church, according to the Lord's command, pray for her persecutors?'"

Behold: Augustine rejects the position that says the Father does not teach someone because that person does not wish to learn. And could he not similarly—indeed even more evidently—reject the opinion that says the Father does not teach someone because that person is not taught?

And there follows: "When therefore the Gospel is preached, some believe and some do not believe. But those who believe, when the preacher sounds outwardly, hear and learn inwardly from the Father. But those who do not believe, hear outwardly but do not hear or learn inwardly. That is, to those it is given to believe, to those it is not given. Because 'No one,' He says, 'comes to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him'—which is more openly said afterward."

"For after a while, when He was speaking of eating His flesh and drinking His blood, and certain even of His disciples said, 'This is a hard saying; who can hear it?'—Jesus, knowing in Himself that His disciples were murmuring about this, said to them, 'Does this scandalize you?' And a little later: 'The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life. But there are some of you who do not believe.' And immediately the Evangelist says: 'For Jesus knew from the beginning who would believe and who would betray Him. And He said: For this reason I said to you that no one can come to Me unless it has been given him by My Father.'"

"Therefore, to be drawn to Christ by the Father, and to hear and learn from the Father so as to come to Christ, is nothing other than to receive a gift from the Father by which to believe in Christ. For it was not those hearing the Gospel from those not hearing that He was distinguishing—He who said, 'No one comes to Me unless it has been given him by My Father'—but those believing from those not believing."

"Faith, therefore, both begun and perfected, is a gift of God. And that this gift is given to some and not given to others, no one at all doubts who does not wish to resist the most manifest sacred writings. But why it is not given to all should not disturb the faithful person, who believes that from one all have gone into a condemnation without doubt most just—so that there would be no just reproach of God even if no one were freed from it. Whence it is established that it is a great grace that very many are freed, and they may acknowledge in those who are not freed what would be owed to themselves—so that he who glories may glory not in his own merits, which are equal to those of the condemned, but in the Lord."

"Why, however, He frees this one rather than that one? 'Unsearchable are His judgments and untraceable His ways.' For it is better that here too we hear and say, 'O man, who are you to reply

to God?' rather than dare to say, as though we knew, what He willed to be hidden—He who nevertheless cannot will anything unjust."

Not therefore because someone is not drawn, not taught, not freed, does not receive this gift, does God therefore not draw, not teach, not free, and not give—but rather the reverse.

Whence also Augustine, in *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 64, says: "Those who remain in the delight of damnable sins, if they are predestined, have not yet risen because the help of the merciful One has not yet raised them"—although before the infirm he does not wish this view to be preached in this manner, but in another, so that nothing may be subtracted from the meaning.

This same thing the blessed Ambrose also seems plainly to attest, in Book 9 on Luke, saying: "Those whom Jesus looks upon weep. Peter denied the first time, and did not weep—because the Lord had not looked upon him. He denied the second time, and did not weep—because the Lord had not yet looked upon him. He denied the third time; Jesus looked upon him, and he wept most bitterly."

Nor can it be said that the Lord looked upon him with bodily eyes, visibly admonishing him. And therefore what is written—"The Lord looked upon him"—was done inwardly, in the mind, in the will, as chapter 43 of the first book more fully recounts.

Moreover, Augustine also, in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 16, thus addresses Julian: "You say that the door is opened by Him to those who knock—He who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth—so that we may understand, with you teaching, that the reason not all are saved and do not come to the knowledge of the truth is that they themselves do not wish to ask, while God wishes to give; do not wish to seek, while God wishes to show; do not wish to knock, while God wishes to open."

This, therefore, according to the view of Augustine, was the error of Julian the Pelagian, which he also consequently refutes there. And further, treating that saying of John—"No one can come to Me unless the Father," etc.—he says: "Who already use the exercise of the will—unless He wills and helps, from whom the will is prepared, they cannot will."

And there follows, chapter 17: "If you say to me, 'Why then does He not convert the wills of all the unwilling?' I will respond: 'Why does He not adopt by the washing of regeneration all infants who are going to die, whose wills He finds to be as yet nonexistent, and therefore not contrary?' If you see that this is more profound than can be found by you, let both be equally profound for each of us—why, in both the greater and the lesser, God wills to help one and does not will to help another."

Behold, according to the view of Augustine: just as God's willing to help is the cause of help, so also His not willing or not wishing to help is the cause of non-help. Not because someone is not helped by God does God therefore not wish to help him or not help him—but the reverse. Otherwise it would be perfectly plain, not profound.

And further in the same, speaking of two similar persons, one of whom is condemned according to judgment and the other freed according to mercy: "Why," he says, "does He condemn this one rather than that one, or free this one rather than that one? We—who are we to reply to God? Does the clay say to the one who shaped it, 'Why did you make me thus?' Does not the potter have power over the clay from the same mass of vitiated and condemned origin to make one vessel for honor according to mercy, and another for dishonor according to judgment?"

The same author, in Book 11 on Genesis, chapter 14, objecting and responding, says: "'He could,' they say, 'also convert their will to good, since He is omnipotent.' He could, indeed. Why then did He not do so? Because He did not will it. Why He did not will it is within His own counsel. We ought not to be wiser than is fitting."

And in very many places in his many books he professes the same view.

The same seems similarly to be thought about perseverance: namely, that the reason anyone does not receive or does not have perseverance is because God does not give it to him—although perhaps in punishment of his prior sin—and not the reverse. For this follows from the foregoing and can be shown similarly through the foregoing.

This view also the prophet seems clearly to attest: "Let not the foot of pride come to me," he says. "There those who work iniquity have fallen; they were driven out and could not stand" (Psalm 35).

Which Augustine, expounding, says: "First that one who did not stand in the truth fell, then those parents whom God dismissed from paradise. Whence that humble one who says he is not worthy to loose the strap of the sandal was not expelled but stands and hears Him, and rejoices with joy on account of the voice of the Bridegroom—not on account of his own—lest the foot of pride come to him and he be expelled, and not be able to stand."

Hence also a certain predestined and persevering disciple and Doctor says: "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us. But that they may be manifest, because they are not all of us" (1 John 2)—wishing to show that just as being of the number of the elect according to divine predestination is the cause of remaining and persevering finally, and not being so is the cause of not so remaining. That is, just as the volition and election of God eternally preparing and temporally conferring grace and perseverance on anyone is the cause of persevering finally, so also the non-volition and non-election, or reprobation of God, is the cause of not persevering finally. Otherwise, non-election or reprobation of God would not be originally and causally from the one calling, but from the works and merits of the reprobate—which was rejected in chapter 45 of the first book.

Whence also Augustine, in *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 19, disputating, says: "Why did He not give perseverance to the end to certain people who with good faith served God? Why do you think, unless because he who says 'They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us' does not lie?"

"To men, however, it seems that all who appear to be good and faithful should have received perseverance to the end. But God judged it better to mix some who would not persevere into the certain number of His saints, so that those for whom security in this life's temptation is not expedient might not be secure. For that saying of the Apostle represses many from pernicious elation: 'Therefore let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall.'"

And further, chapter 19: "Of two pious persons, why perseverance to the end is given to one and not to the other—the judgments of God are unsearchable.' Yet this must be most certain to the faithful: that one is of the predestined, the other is not. 'For if they had been of us,' says one of the predestined, who drank this secret from the Lord's breast, 'they would certainly have remained with us.'"

"What is, I ask, 'they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us'? Were they not both created by God? Both born of Adam? Both made of earth? And from Him who said, 'Every breath I have made,' had they not received souls of one and the same nature? Were they not, finally, both called and, following the one calling, both justified from the ungodly and both renewed through the washing of regeneration?"

"But if he who knew what he said heard this, he could without doubt respond and say: 'These things are true; according to all these things they were of us. But according to a certain other distinction they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us.' What then is this distinction? The books of God are open; let us not avert our gaze. The divine Scripture cries out; let us apply our hearing. 'They were not of us' because they were not called according to His purpose; they were not chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world; they did not fall into His lot; they were not predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things."

And further, chapter 45, he recounts certain people objecting in this manner: "But they say—as you write—that no one can be stirred by the goads of correction if it is said in the assembly of the Church, with many hearing: 'The determined sentence of the will of God in predestination is such that some of you, having received the will to obey, have come from unbelief to faith, or having received perseverance, remain in the faith; but the rest of you who remain in the delight of sins have not yet risen because the help of merciful grace has not yet raised you. But if any of you are not yet called, whom His grace has predestined to be chosen, you will receive grace by which you will wish to be chosen. And if any of you obey, if you are predestined to be rejected, the powers of obeying will be withdrawn, so that you will cease to obey'"—or according to another reading: "If any of you obey, if you are not predestined to be received," etc., as above. This must be understood in punishment of a prior fault.

In the following chapters, responding, he destroys nothing of these things about predestination, but asserts all to be true. Whence in chapter 46 he says: "These things, when they are said, should not so deter us from confessing true grace of God—that is, which is not given according to our merits—and from confessing predestination of the saints according to it, as we are not

deterred from confessing God's foreknowledge. If anyone were to speak to the people about that foreknowledge and say: 'Whether you now live rightly or not, you will be afterward such as God foreknew you would be—either good if good, or evil if evil.' Would it then, if upon hearing this some turned to sluggishness and apathy, and abandoning exertion inclined more readily to lust and went after their desires—would what was said about God's foreknowledge for that reason be thought to be false?"

And chapter 47: "Let the truth therefore be said, especially where some other question impels that it be said."

And chapter 64: He teaches the foregoing about predestination, and specifically that saying—"If any of you obey, if you are not predestined to be received, or if you are predestined to be rejected, the powers of obeying will be withdrawn so that you will cease to obey"—that although it is true, no one should preach it to a multitude of the infirm in this form of words, speaking in the second person and directing the discourse to them; but in another form, in the third person, so that nothing of the meaning is subtracted.

The same author, in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 24: "Those who are not going to persevere, and will thus lapse from Christian faith and conduct, and the end of this life will find them thus—without doubt they are not to be counted among the number of these, not even at the time when they are living well and piously. For they are not distinguished from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God, and therefore are not called according to His purpose, and consequently not elected."

Where also in chapter 25 he adds: "Here if I am asked why God did not give them perseverance—those to whom He gave the love by which they might live as Christians—I respond that I do not know. For not arrogantly but acknowledging my measure, I hear the Apostle saying: 'O man, who are you to reply to God?' etc. And 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and how untraceable His ways!'"

And in *On the Refutation of the Sixteen Chapters Falsely Attributed to Him*, Response 14: "Why He retains this one lest he depart, and does not retain that one—it is neither possible to comprehend nor lawful to investigate."

This last view is also clearly attested by very many authorities of Augustine and Gregory set forth in chapter 14 of this book, all of which can be understood according to the foregoing expositions: namely, that on the part of the one not persevering, no sufficient cause of his non-perseverance is to be assigned—namely, his fault.

For of two persons dear to God, pious, equal, and equally tempted, God preserves the one standing by the fifth chapter of this book; He does not preserve the one falling from a fall. But why this one rather than that one? What did the one who first sinned here sin before the other, so that in this first sin he merited to fall?

Also, of two beloved, equal, equally tempted, and equally sinning persons, God raises up one and accepts him and makes him persevere finally, and leaves the other behind. Indeed, without injustice to anyone, He can raise up the one who sinned more and make him persevere finally, and leave the one who sinned less uncorrected. How then is fault a sufficient cause of non-perseverance?

It is also evident from chapter 39 of the first book that good or evil merit is not properly the cause of reward or of actual punishment, although these are rendered for merits, as was shown there.

Not receiving perseverance, therefore, is not the cause, or the sufficient and preceding cause, of God's not giving it. For if it were a cause, it would be a sufficient and preceding one. It seems, therefore, that the reverse is the case.

Further, for a fuller understanding of the Doctors saying that there is no cause why, of two pious equals, God gives perseverance to one and not to the other, it should be noted that this has a twofold sense: one, that there is no sufficient cause on the part of the men themselves—which is true, just as no cause of predestination and reprobation on the part of men is to be posited, as the preceding teachings showed. Another, that there is no sufficient cause on the part of God—which also can be understood in two ways: in one way, entirely generally—and so it is false; for the divine will is the sufficient cause of both. In another way, specifically—namely, that in God there is no cause or reason preceding His will that determines it more weightily to giving perseverance to this one and not giving to that one. And this sense I believe to be true, as the twentieth and twenty-first chapters of the first book clearly make manifest.

CHAPTER XXXIII. HE OBJECTS AND RESPONDS.

Here, however, certain people object: God does everything reasonably and from some just cause; otherwise He would seem to act rashly. And Job 5 says: "Nothing happens on earth without a cause." There is therefore some reason and some just cause why God gives grace or perseverance to this one and not to that one; and not on the part of God—therefore on the part of those people.

Likewise, then no one would sin simply by omitting; for it is not he who omits who is the cause, but God.

Likewise, God abandons no one unless He is first abandoned by him. For He who seeks the estranged, how does He abandon the already converted? Or He who attracts an enemy, how does He repel a friend? Whence John 6: "Him who comes to Me I will not cast out." And Judith 13: "He has not abandoned those who hope in Him." And He who, as the Apostle attests, said: "I will not leave you nor forsake you" (Hebrews 13). And who through the prophet says thus: "Because you have rejected knowledge, I will also reject you" (Hosea 4).

And Augustine, in Book 13 of *The City of God*, chapter 15, says that the sinful soul was not abandoned by its life, which is God, so that it might abandon, but so that it might be abandoned, it abandoned. And in *On the Refutation of the Sixteen Chapters Falsely Attributed to Him*, Response 7, he says that God abandons no one before He is abandoned, and often converts many who have abandoned Him. And further, Response 14: "God does not abandon the one who is about to depart before he is abandoned, and often makes it so that he does not depart, and even if he has departed, that he returns."

Which very many canonical and other authorities also attest.

Likewise, the Wise Man admonishes every wise person, saying: "Do not say, 'Through God it is absent'"—namely, the wisdom of God.

Likewise, Anselm, in *On the Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1, says that God alone has from Himself whatever He has, and all other things have only from Him; and just as from themselves they have only nothing, so from Him they have only something. Where he also consequently shows that nothing and non-being are not from God but inhere in everything else from itself.

And further, chapter 2, he raises the question: just as the good angel therefore received perseverance because God gave it, did the evil angel likewise not receive perseverance because God did not give it?

And further, chapter 3, responding, he says that in the good angel, giving was the cause of receiving; in the evil angel, however, not giving was not the cause of not receiving perseverance—but the reverse.

The first of these objections is resolved by the foregoing here and in chapter 21 of the first book. Nor does the objection about omission of good proceed. For similarly you could argue that no one merits by omitting evil, or by declining from evil. Similarly also you could argue about commission: that no one sins or merits by doing anything, since God there pre-acts by working.

Wherefore also Augustine, in the Gloss on Deuteronomy 29—"The Lord has not given you a heart to understand," etc.—cited just above, says: "How does He say above, 'You have seen the trials,' etc., if the Lord did not give eyes to see? But they saw with the body, not with the heart. Whence He prefaced, 'The Lord did not give you to know.' To this pertain the two things that follow: 'eyes to see' and 'ears to hear'—that is, to understand and to obey. But what He says—'The Lord did not give you'—He says by way of reproach and accusation, and He would not say it unless it pertained to their fault, lest anyone think himself excusable on this account. For He shows at once that without help they cannot understand and obey with the eyes and ears of the heart; and yet if the help of God is absent, man's fault is not thereby excusable, since the judgments of God, though hidden, are just."

As for the argument that God abandons no one before He is abandoned—what is truer? For God does not inflict punishment unless He is first offended by fault. He therefore abandons no one by

taking away grace unless that person first abandons Him by sinning. But what does this obstruct? For it is not because God does not give someone grace and perseverance that he is thereby abandoned by God; nor because someone does not receive grace or perseverance from God is he thereby abandoned by Him—as is evident regarding the angels and first parents, who according to the view of some lacked grace for a certain while, and after they received grace the apostate angels and first parents lacked perseverance for another while, as the following fall showed; yet in neither interval were they abandoned by God, because they had absolutely no fault.

But if it was not so in fact, it could have been so. And what, I ask, was then the cause of not receiving grace? Was it not non-giving? And why should not receiving perseverance be judged similarly?

As for what the Wise Man says—that the wisdom of God is not absent through God—by whom, then, is prophetic wisdom absent from many holy men without any preceding demerit on their part? And present to many evil men, their manifold demerit notwithstanding—as also to evil angels and to the first parents before sin? And from the holy confirmed angels was absent manifold wisdom, as is evident from chapter 16 of this book—and through whom, unless through God not giving?

It is nevertheless true that the wisdom of God necessary for salvation, once given, is not absent from anyone through God wholly voluntarily withdrawing it without any preceding fault, because He abandons no one unless He is first abandoned by him, as was shown above.

That saying of Anselm, however—that non-beings do not have their non-being from God—needs deeper scrutiny. For the opposite seems to follow from the second, fifth, ninth, and following parts of chapter 13, and from chapter 14 of the first book.

Likewise, for the Antichrist not to exist is true, just, and reasonable, and not naturally prior to the divine will—because then it would be necessary, as is evident from chapters 18 and 21 of the first book. Therefore it is posterior, caused, and dependent on that will, as is evident from the same passages and from the demonstration of the twelfth part of chapter 13 of the first book.

Likewise, the Antichrist's not existing is not naturally prior to the divine will—because then it would be necessary by the foregoing, and because then it would not be subject to the divine will. It is therefore posterior and dependent on that will.

Likewise, by the corollary of chapter 22 of the first book, God wills the Antichrist not to exist. And by the twentieth chapter of the first book, it is not because the Antichrist does not exist that God wills him not to exist, since his non-existence is posterior to and subject to the divine will; since also by the same twentieth chapter, contingent beings are not the cause of the divine will—much less, therefore, contingent non-beings. It is therefore the reverse: because God wills the Antichrist not to exist, therefore he does not exist.

Likewise, God knows the Antichrist does not exist—and not because the Antichrist does not exist, as is evident from chapter 15 of the first book—but by chapter 18 of the first book, because He wills him not to exist. This knowledge and volition, therefore, is the cause of his non-being.

Likewise, the Antichrist has non-being and is a non-being—either through himself or through another. If through himself, as Anselm seems to assert there, and Augustine in *On the Immortality of the Soul*, chapter 13, as the second chapter of the first book cites—then always and necessarily, as is evident from the second and twenty-sixth chapters of the first book.

How also does he have non-being through himself, since he has neither himself nor anything of himself—because neither matter nor form? If also the Antichrist has non-being from himself or through himself—either a necessary non-being, so that it is impossible for him to be, or a possible and contingent non-being. The first clearly does not hold, nor the second, as is also evident from chapter 14 of the first book, even through Anselm.

If through another—either through another being or a non-being. If through another non-being, the same inquiry must be made about that, and since there is no infinite regress in such things, let a stop be given at some point, etc., as above. If through another being, that is either God or something dependent on Him; and so the entire procession will eventually be reduced to Him.

Many things also are non-beings whose being or non-being depends only on God—namely, those that are made immediately and solely by Him.

Likewise, the Antichrist does not through himself have being, nor non-being—because then, by the foregoing, he would always necessarily have one of the two. But of himself he is indifferent—that is, he has from himself no difference toward being or toward non-being. If, therefore, he now has one of these, now the other, this must be through something else determining him now to this, now to that.

Likewise, according to this position, it seems that the non-being of beings, or of non-beings, would be their being—indeed, their necessary being—and that they would have it from themselves, not from God. Also, that God could not destroy that being, and that the being they receive from God would be accidental to them, and, with them essentially remaining, would come and go, like a garment on a man who remains.

For Anselm says there that all things other than God have from themselves only nothing. And further: "When God, as if angry, destroys something by taking away its being, the non-being is not from Him; but when He removes, as it were, His own being that He had bestowed—what had been made and was preserved by Him to be—it returns to non-being, which it has not from Him, but from itself, before it was made." Just as if you reclaim a tunic that you had willingly lent for a time to someone naked, he does not have his nakedness from you, but with you removing what was yours, he returns to what he was before he was clothed by you.

But no one doubts that this is not the mind of Anselm—because his other subtle works show otherwise. For God truly creates from nothing, newly bestowing the entire being of a thing upon it—indeed, perhaps not properly "bestowing upon it," since what is bestowed upon seems to exist before it is bestowed. Rather, He newly makes and produces the entire thing.

Nor should it disturb us that according to the Doctors all things eternally were in God. For they were not there really and truly as things diverse from Him, as can be shown from the first supposition and by manifold arguments and very many authorities. But because I consider this to be virtually known to both philosophers and theologians, I confirm it very briefly.

Augustine indeed says in *On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Wicked* that the world was in God before it was in itself—not the world, but God. William also, Bishop of Paris, condemned an article asserting that many truths existed from eternity that are not God Himself.

Anselm, however, can be expounded to mean that non-being is not from God efficiently, properly, but deficiently; not as an effect, but as a defect—as the preceding chapter of this book said. Which his words there set forth, and others, seem to attest. For he says: "When God, angry, destroying something, takes away being, the non-being is not from Him; but when He removes, as it were, His own being that He had bestowed—what had been made and preserved by Him to be—it returns to non-being."

And further: "For just as from the highest good nothing comes except good, so from the highest essence nothing comes except essence. Whence since the highest good is the highest essence, it follows that every good is an essence, and every essence a good. Nothing, therefore, and non-being—just as it is not an essence—so it is not a good. For nothing and non-being are not from Him, from whom nothing comes except good and essence."

But what both Anselm and Augustine seem to assert—that things through themselves or from themselves are not, or have non-being—can be expounded by placing the negation first: namely, that things are not through themselves, nor have being from themselves—but through God.

And if anyone objects that even if God did not exist, still non-beings—such as the chimera and the Antichrist—would not exist, the last part of chapter 13 and the corollary of chapter 14 of the first book, with their demonstrations, will respond.

Anselm's second saying also—namely, that not receiving perseverance was the cause of not giving—similarly needs greater scrutiny. For this seems to conflict with his earlier saying. For if no being—since not even God—is the cause of non-being or of a non-being, but every non-being or non-being is such through itself, how will one non-being or non-being be the cause of another? How, therefore, can not receiving be the cause of not giving?

If also not receiving is the cause of not giving—either a positive cause or a privative one. Not a positive cause, clearly. Nor a privative one—for this would be because it would deprive the

cause of giving; and since it would only deprive by removing receiving, receiving would be the cause of giving—contrary to Anselm's position.

If also not receiving is the cause of not giving, in what genus of cause? Not material, nor formal, clearly; nor final—for then not giving would be the efficient cause of non-reception, and the one not giving would finally intend and cause the non-reception—contrary to Anselm in the same passage. Nor can it be said that not receiving is the efficient cause of not giving—because not a positive efficient cause, clearly. Nor a privatively efficient cause—for this would be because it would deprive the positive efficient cause. Wherefore receiving would be the positive efficient cause of giving—contrary to Anselm's position.

The venerable Father Anselm intends, as I think, that all the angels received a good will from God, in which, if they had stood until a certain term appointed by God, they would have been beatifically confirmed by the merit of that standing—just as those who persisted were, as is evident below in chapter 6 of *On the Fall of the Devil*. And in this good will even the apostate angel stood for a time, but did not persist, did not continue to will, did not finally persevere in so willing. And he did not have this persevering will—not because God entirely voluntarily and by mere motion, without preceding demerit, took it away or did not give it, as if He now by His absolute omnipotence were to take away from Gabriel his beatific will purely voluntarily without any preceding fault—but because the evil angel first culpably willed something else, and by that culpable will lost the prior just will.

He therefore understands, briefly, that God did not without the preceding fault of the evil angel take away from him the just will, or cease to give or preserve it; but He did this because of his preceding sin, as is plainly evident from that third chapter.

Where, after a long disputation, he says at the end: "I say that the reason he did not will when he ought and what he ought is not that the will failed to give what was failing, but because he himself, by willing what he ought not, expelled the good will—the bad always coming in. Wherefore the reason he did not have a persevering good will, or did not receive it, is not that God did not give it, but the reason God did not give it is that he, by willing what he ought not, both abandoned it and by abandoning did not hold it."

Which he also shows consequently in chapters 4 and 6. And this accords with many things written in the preceding chapter of this book.

Wherefore also Augustine, in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 48: "Then"—namely, in the state of innocence before sin—"God had given man a good will; for in that state He had made him who made him upright. He had given him help, without which he could not remain in it if he willed; but that he should will, He left in his free will. He could therefore remain if he willed, because the help was not lacking through which he could perseveringly hold the good that he willed. But because he did not wish to remain, surely it is his fault—whose merit it would have been if he had wished to remain. Just as the holy angels did: who, while others fell through free

will, through the same free will stood, and merited to receive the due reward of this standing—namely, such a fullness of blessedness that they would be most certain of always remaining in it."

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT NOT ONLY DO BEINGS NEED GOD NECESSARILY FOR THEIR TRUE BEING, BUT ALSO NON-BEINGS FOR THEIR NON-BEING; AND THAT GOD MOST WORTHILY HOLDS SOVEREIGNTY NOT ONLY OVER BEINGS BUT ALSO OVER NON-BEINGS.

From these things I consider it manifest that not only do beings need God for their being, but also non-beings for their non-being; and that God most worthily holds sovereignty not only over beings but also over non-beings.

This corollary follows evidently from the foregoing here and from the corollary of chapter 14 of the first book.

Wherefore also the three youths of Daniel, as if with one mouth, invite nights and days, light and darkness, to bless the Lord, praise Him, and superexalt Him forever (Daniel 3).

The blessed Dionysius also, in chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names*, says: "Every power, every operation, every state, every sense, every word, every deed, every touch, every knowledge, every union—and simply every existing thing—is both from the beautiful and good, and in the beautiful and good, and is turned toward the beautiful and good. And all things whatsoever that are and come to be, all look to it, and are moved by it and are held together. And in its grace and for its sake and in its exemplary form is every principle—namely, material, efficient, formal, elemental—and simply every principle, every containing, every end. Or, to speak comprehensively: all existing things are from the beautiful and good, and all non-existing things are supersubstantially in the beautiful and good. And it is the principle and end of all—super-principial and super-final—because from it, and in it, and through it, and unto it are all things, as the sacred word says."

And further, chapter 5: "All things whatsoever that are and come to be, through the good and the best are and come to be. And to this all things look, and by it are moved and held together. And for its sake and through it and in it is every exemplary, consummative, intellectual, special, formal principle—and simply every principle, every containing, every summit. Or, to speak comprehensively: all things that are, are from the good and the best; and all things that are not are super-essentially in the good and the best. And it is the principle and end of all—super-principial and super-final—because from it, and through it, and in it, and unto it are all things, as the sacred word says."

CHAPTER XXXIV. THROUGH THE FOREGOING HE DRAWS MEN TOWARD FEAR AND LOVE, TOWARD TRUST, PATIENCE AND HUMILITY, TOWARD PRAYER, AND TOWARD THE GIVING OF THANKS.

O great and wonderful God of ours, sole light of our eyes, open, I beseech You, the eyes of my heart and the eyes of others, so that we may truly contemplate the great and wonderful things of Yours set forth above, and having contemplated them, venerate them more devoutly.

For with the foregoing weighed by discreet consideration, who is not shaken with fear? Who is not kindled with love? Who is not strengthened in trust? Who is not armed with patience? Who is not provoked to the lowest humiliation, to assiduous prayer, and to continuous thanksgiving?

Who, I say, considering discreetly the foregoing, is not shaken with fear, seeing Your most omnipotent will efficacious in all things, according to which You govern all things celestial, terrestrial, and infernal? By which You exalt whom You will and when You will; You humble whom You will and when You will; You heal, You make sick, You give life, You put to death; whom You will You predestine and save, and whom You will You reprobate and damn. Even if He were to damn an innocent person, who would accuse Him—since His will in such matters is the mistress of reason, the author of justice, and the rule of equity, as is evident from chapters 20, 21, and 39 of the first book?

Which that great Nebuchadnezzar also experienced and attests, of whom Daniel 4 is written thus: "The word was fulfilled upon Nebuchadnezzar, and he was driven from among men, and ate grass like an ox, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, until his hair grew like eagles' feathers and his nails like birds' claws."

"Therefore at the end of the days, I Nebuchadnezzar lifted up my eyes to heaven, and my understanding was restored to me, and I blessed the Most High, and praised and glorified Him who lives forever, because His power is an everlasting power, and His kingdom from generation to generation. And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing before Him. For He does according to His will, both in the powers of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, and there is none who can resist His hand or say to Him, 'What have You done?'"

Wherefore also Job, though most holy, says: "My foot has followed His steps; I have kept His way and have not turned aside from it. I have not departed from the commandments of His lips, and I have hidden the words of His mouth in my bosom. But He Himself is alone, and no one can turn aside His thought; and whatever His soul has wished, this He has done. And when He shall have fulfilled His will in me, many other similar things are at hand for Him. And therefore I am troubled before His face, and when I consider Him, I am anxious with fear" (Job 23).

On which the blessed Gregory, Book 16 of the *Morals*, chapter 15, writes thus: "As if he were saying from one side: I now ponder what I suffer, but I still dread what I may be able to suffer. For He fulfills His will in me, because He afflicts me with many blows; but many similar things are at hand for Him, because if He plans to strike, there is still found a place where the wound

may grow. Hence it must be considered how fearful before the scourge was one who even when struck still fears being struck further."

"Considering the incomprehensible force of His power and examination, the just man did not wish to be secure even about the scourge. Whence, still fearing, he adds: 'And therefore I am troubled before His face, and when I consider Him, I am anxious with fear.' Rightly is he troubled before the face of the Lord, who sets before the eyes of his heart the terror of that majesty, and is shaken with fear of His rectitude, while he sees himself unable to render a worthy account if he is strictly judged."

"Rightly, moreover, is it said, 'And when I consider Him, I am anxious with fear'—because when anyone least considers the force of the hidden strictness, he least dreads it; and he is all the more secure in this life as he is more distant from the consideration of the internal strictness. For just men always return to the secret chamber of the heart, behold the force of the hidden strictness, stand before the judgment of the innermost majesty—so that they may at some time be all the more secure, the more they did not wish to be secure here as long as they lived."

"But behold: about the blessed Job we know that he was devoted to all the works of holiness, and yet he endures so many scourges, and is not even secure amid the scourges, but still fears, still trembles as he considers the force of divine strictness. What then shall we wretches, we sinners, say, if he who so acted so fears?"

Whence also Augustine, on Psalm 70, Treatise 1: "The love and fear of God greatly move us: fear, because He is just; love, because He is merciful. For who would say to Him, 'What have You done?' if He condemned the just? How great, therefore, is His mercy, that He justifies the unjust!"

Who will not fear such and so great a Lord? And who, struck with such fear, will not take care to avoid offending Him and to appease Him, and thus, fleeing all evils and pursuing all goods, will not finally love Him above all things with all his strength?

For love extends to good, and the greater the good, the more it is to be loved. But You, Lord my God, are the good of every good, good above all goods, a good infinitely infinite, as the first supposition shows. How much, therefore, ought I reasonably to love You? Proportionally infinitely? Would that I could! But how can I, so small and finite, love You infinitely?

And how will due proportion of lovable things and loves otherwise be preserved? For You, my superlovable God, exceed other lovable things infinitely. How also, if I loved You—the infinite good—finitely, could I not love some finite good equally, and some indeed more?

Or perhaps, Lord, I ought to love You infinitely as to the manner, even if perhaps not as to the act. As far as pertains to the manner of loving, I ought to love You finally for Your own sake, and no other good finally for its own sake, but all for Your sake, Lord, the supreme good, who are the beginning and end of all goods.

Or perhaps I do in a way love You infinitely as to the act, both intensively and extensively. Intensively in a way, because more intensely, firmly, and strongly than any finite good, if I love You and it fittingly—since I love that good only for Your sake; for always, "that for the sake of which each thing is, that is more." Extensively in a way, by comparing You, Lord, the supreme good, to other goods however many and however great, and loving You, Lord, above all things and before all things—while I would prefer all of them, and even myself, not to exist rather than You alone; or while I would prefer all of them and even myself not to exist rather than to offend You once.

But still, most loving Lord, considering a certain other proportionality of loves and friendships, I am greatly anxious and troubled. For if it is true that a certain person says, "In all friendships and loves that exist by way of superabundance, the analogy is fitting—that the better should be loved more than he loves, and the more useful, and each of the others similarly. For when love is according to worthiness, then a certain equality is produced, which indeed seems to belong to friendship"—by how much You are better than I and more useful to me than I am to You, by that much more ought I to love You than You love me.

But can I do this? How much, I ask, do You love me, Lord? Do You love me sparingly and feebly, as sparingly and feebly as I am good? Perish this thought from You, Lord, supremely good! For You would not be supremely good unless in every goodness You possess You were supremely and perfectly good, as You have taught me above. Your love, therefore, by which You love Your lover and friend—though unworthy—is not sparse or thin, cold or feeble, but most perfect and supreme. Otherwise also, with the goodness of Your beloved and friend growing, You could intensify Your love, progress in love, and change—the opposite of which You have shown in the foregoing, in chapters 5 and 23 of the first book.

How then shall I love You as much as You love me? Indeed, how shall I love You as much more than You love me as You are better than I?

Or perhaps, because I ought to love You in a way infinitely as to the manner of loving, and as to the act of love both intensively and extensively in the aforesaid ways, but You do not love me so—because I am not to be so loved? For I ought to love You finally for Yourself, and all other things for You; but You do not love me for my sake, nor other things for my sake, but me and other things for Your sake—as indeed they ought not to be loved otherwise. I ought also to love You infinitely in a way intensively—namely, above every finite good—but You do not love me so. I ought also to love You, Lord, the supreme good, infinitely in a way extensively—namely, wishing rather that however many and however great other goods, and even myself, not exist, rather than You, or rather than offend You once. But You do not love me so, because I ought not to be so loved.

I know, however, that in a certain ineffable way, incomparably greater than mute I can express, You love Your friends incomparably more than You are loved by them—just as You are

incomparably better and greater. For Your love transcends the love of every creature, just as any goodness of Yours transcends any goodness of any creature, incomparably infinitely.

O great Lord, great good, who fill heaven and earth—indeed, whom the heavens and the heaven of heavens cannot contain—as You deigned to show to me, Your little one, in chapters 2 and 5 of the first book! Why do You not fill my little soul? O soul, how small, so miserable, that is not most fully filled with the love of so great a good! Why do you not open all your little doors? Why do you not spread wide all your folds? Why do you not extend all your capacity, so that by the sweetness of so great a love you, so small, may be totally occupied, totally sated, and totally inebriated? Especially since you, however small, cannot be sated by the love of a lesser good—which seems wonderful. But my God is still more wonderful.

Say therefore, I beseech, humbly, that it may be so, most lovable my God, and without doubt it will be so.

What also is more effective for love than to go before in loving? But You, most loving—would that You were most loved—Lord, went before me, wretched and not loving but hostile, by loving, reconciling, magnificently bestowing the jewels of surpassing charity, as You show from many of the foregoing.

What moreover is more lovable to one who is multiply miserable than manifold mercy, or a more multiplied mercy, without end, number, weight, or measure? But You, Lord, as You show from chapter 1 of the first book—because infinitely and supremely good—are consequently infinitely and supremely merciful, so that nothing more merciful could be or even be thought.

You, most merciful Lord, did not exclude me, Your most ungrateful servant—not only withdrawing the service due to You, but rebelling in many ways—from Your most pious protection; but from the roaring lions, from the gnashing demons, lest they drag me devoured down to the underworld, You mercifully defended me—as You piously teach from chapters 22 of the first book and 32 of this second book and others. And what I count as no less: from so many greater and lesser sins You mercifully preserved me—as many as I could otherwise have incurred—as You show from chapter 4 of this book.

Indeed—and this seems of incomparably greater mercy—not only did You, by Your gratuitous grace, mercifully go before me, who merited nothing good but was heaping sins upon sins and so greatly and continuously offending You, so great a Lord; You healed all my infirmities, and once healed, advancing me from virtue to virtue, You exalted me to all healthy and holy things that I did; and healthy and saved from all enemies and infirmities of the soul, until I should proudly abandon You, You guarded me—as You revealed from chapter 35 of the first book with what follows, and from chapter 5 of this book with its thirtieth chapter and the one following.

Indeed, even if after the gift of such great grace, after the covenant of such great friendship, contumaciously abandoning You—however ungrateful and unworthy I become, however much I mock and despise You, Lord—You defend me from enemies, preserve me from sins, as You have

taught above. And when it pleases Your mercy, You go before me by Your gratuitous grace and bring me back—not only undeserving but given over to evil merits—and You do not reproach me for past disgraces; nor do You restore me to a lower degree of Your friendship, but to an equal or more excellent one, most merciful my God. And thus You diligently guard me, cherish and nourish me, protect me and continuously advance me to greater things—until perhaps, becoming proud again, I abandon You, as You teach through the foregoing with chapter 43 of the first book, most pious my God.

And so as many times as I depart from You, however far into a distant region, even to the end of the desert or the depth of the sea—indeed, even if I go to the gates of the lower hell—Your mercy is at hand, ready to bring back the wretch. Otherwise You would be of numerable and finite mercy—the contrary of which You have demonstrated above.

And upon all these remembered goods, You give me the consummative and crowning good of all, without which the rest will not profit—not because of the demand of merits, but from Your gratuitous grace: namely, final perseverance, as You show through chapter 14 of this book. And thus finally, eternal life, glory, and Yourself.

For You crown with mercy and compassions, and Your grace is eternal life. You are the worker of our merits that please You, the rewarder, and the reward. Yet if You wished to reckon strictly with us, we would merit absolutely nothing good, as I have learned from You in chapter 39 of the first book. It is therefore not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of You, Lord, superabundantly showing mercy.

And to consider not only the greater goods but also the lesser ones—such as the goods of nature and fortune, as they are commonly called; goods interior and exterior; interior, of mind and body; of mind: ingenuity, moral and intellectual virtues; of body: health, strength, beauty, and other bodily powers; exterior: nobility, riches, victories, fame, glory, and honor, and whatever else there is—I infallibly see that all these goods are Your gratuitous gifts, as by Your gratuitous grace You taught me through the twenty-seventh chapter of the first book and what follows.

There are also many other great goods that few consider or notice—namely, the privations of all the evils that one does not have: that you are not senseless or foolish, not leprous or blind, not infamous among the people, not the reproach of men and the rejection and derision of the people, not confused by failing in your deeds as cleric or layperson, not ignominiously defeated, not addicted to vile servitude, not wasted by hunger, not robbed or slaughtered by bandits, not devoured by a wild beast, not drowned in the sea, not hanged on a gallows, nor consumed by any more shameful and bitter death.

And from whom, I ask, Lord, are these very many goods—because infinite in multitude and greatest because infinite in magnitude, or nearly so—to Your useless servant, unless from You, most manifoldly supremely and infinitely good God, as You wished to kindly show from chapters 13 and 22 of the first book and chapter 32 of this book?

Whence also You strike my mind with a certain little question: namely, whether I am more bound to You, good Lord, for the love of positive created goods that I received from You giving, or for the aforesaid privative goods—namely, the exclusions of evils—which also, unless You giving, I was unable to receive or have, since those, as it seems, are finite both in multitude and in magnitude, but these are infinite both in multitude and magnitude, or at least more numerous and greater.

But who will rebuke me if, leaping over this good little question, I seek You, Lord, the supreme good, find You, and hold You, and do not let go? For I know—and this time let it suffice for me to know—that both for these goods of Yours and for those, I am bound very greatly to Your love; but for Yourself, the supreme good, incomparably more beyond measure.

You also move me with another question: namely, whether one mercifully preserved from sin is more bound to Your love than one who has fallen and been mercifully raised from sin. But leaving this question also for myself at present, grant that I may seek Your face, find it, and see it perpetually and enjoy it.

With these and similar questions now left aside, who, considering so good a Lord and such great benefits of His, is not entirely kindled with love, entirely suspended in devotion, entirely converted into love?

But I see, Lord, that it is easy to say these things and paint them on parchment—perhaps difficult to do and accomplish in effect. You therefore, best and therefore most powerful Lord, to whom nothing is difficult, grant, I beseech, that I may do these things more easily in my heart than utter them with my mouth. Open, I beg, Your most munificent hand, and grant that nothing may be easier for me, nothing sweeter, nothing more delightful than to fulfill these things most effectively and most affectionately.

But You, most loving Lord, who love those who love You and go before them in loving, and incomparably love us more than You are loved by us—whom will You not raise up to hope in You by the gift of so great love, by the covenant of so great friendship? To trust in You? Indeed, to super-hope and confidently presume?

For You, Lord, are so infinitely good and merciful that nothing better or more merciful could be, or even be thought, as You have mercifully shown above. And as good and merciful as You are, so pious and clement, rich and powerful, magnificent, liberal, and gracious with every virtue—as You most truly make manifest from that first most precious and truest supposition of Yours. What then will You be able to deny to Your needy friend, humbly begging Your help?

Allow me, I beseech, now to presume a little upon the hope conceived, and to dispute with Your magnificent goodness, so that I may hope still more highly and trust more abundantly.

It is not, I say, the part of human friendship to repel a needy, begging, and blushing friend and make his face blush all the more—especially if abundant resources are at hand. How much more is so horrible a vice far from Your friendship?

You have also shown me above that I cannot think or ask for anything good unless You work—and antecedently work—this in me. You, therefore, who plant the beginning, give the middle, grant the end. You who make me ask, make me obtain and hold. You who give many goods to those who do not ask, how will You give nothing to those who ask? You who hear Your enemies, even demons, asking impiously, how do You repel Your friends and children asking piously? Nor can You allege any kind of want, as the aforesaid supposition clearly teaches.

Perhaps You object to me that I do not deserve to be helped. O most liberal Lord, if You help no one unless he has deserved to be helped, You do not give Your help freely but sell it. What then is Your praise? Where is Your great liberality?

Perhaps You still reply that I not only do not deserve but abundantly deserve punishment. O merciful Lord, Your mercy is more abundantly great. For my entire sin, and even the sin of all men, is finite—for it could be increased. But Your mercy is infinite, which cannot be increased.

Is it not also more merciful and liberal to do good to a needy enemy who is continually hostile, than to a well-deserving friend? What is more merciful or liberal than, in no way anticipated, to convert a continually hostile enemy to friendship freely, to freely remit all enmity and injury, and freely confer abundant benefits?

But Your mercy and liberality are so great that they could not be greater, nor even be thought greater. And what is more proportionate and fitting to such great mercy and liberality than to freely make such great misery happy, and freely enrich such great poverty? Or if anything more merciful and liberal is found, who else will be thought its author but You, most merciful and most liberal my God?

You, therefore, who give the greater, how will You deny the lesser? But if You still object to me however great a misery of mine—I confess it, and therefore I confidently approach Your mercy, which is incomparably greater. For where is Your mercy shown, except in misery revealed? And where Your great mercy, except in great misery revealed?

Did You not also show me above, Lord, where You slightly stirred me to Your love, that by Your gratuitous grace You freely go before sinners, freely make the ungrateful gracious, and freely preserve the graced? Who, then, among sinners will not hope in You, Lord?

I know, however, Lord—I know, and not without grief I know or report—that notwithstanding all these things, there are certain people, namely the proud Pelagians, who would prefer to hope in men, that is, in themselves. For they say: "If God freely predestines us and our works, and administers as He wills, so that we can do nothing without Him working and preparing, He can also similarly reprobate us, not give us good works, or take them away once given, precipitate us

into evil works, and bind us once precipitated. Who then can be secure? Who will certainly hope, and not rather despair? But if predestination and reprobation depended on our own free will, and we alone were the free lords of our acts without God, we could be secure; it would be well for us; then we could safely trust and hope."

O vain sons of men, lying sons of men, weighing deceitfully in the scales! Why do you not wish to hope in Him who is supremely good, supremely merciful, supremely propitious, and inestimably abundant in all the gifts of grace—but in yourselves, who are multiply wretched and evil, and deficient in all goods? Why do you not wish to hope in His blessed governance, who cannot err—but in yourselves, who, like a sheep that is lost, very often go astray? Why do you not wish to hope in His powerful help, whose power has no end, whom nothing can conquer, whom nothing can resist—but in yourselves, who are fragile and infirm and almost nothing and emptiness?

Beware, I beseech, of the prophetic curse—indeed, the Lord's curse through the prophet: "Thus says the Lord: Cursed is the man who trusts in man and makes flesh his arm, and whose heart departs from the Lord" (Jeremiah 17).

Note also, I beg, what one who hoped in the Lord—and was not defrauded—says in this very matter: "I do not wish to exaggerate with my words, but rather leave it for their reflection to see what sort of thing they have persuaded themselves of: namely, that by preaching predestination, more despair is brought to the hearers than exhortation. This is to say that a man then despairs of his salvation when he has learned to place his hope not in himself but in God—while the prophet cries out: 'Cursed is the man who has his hope in man'" (Augustine, *On the Good of Perseverance*, chapter 52).

And further, chapter 64, addressing those who say that preaching about predestination makes men despair: "Perish the thought," he says, "that you should despair of yourselves because you are commanded to have your hope in God, not in yourselves. For 'cursed is everyone who has his hope in man,' because 'blessed are all who trust in Him.'"

And chapter 65: "Why do we fear to preach the predestination of the saints and the true grace of God—that is, that which is not given according to our merits—as also the holy Scripture? Or is it to be feared that a man will then despair of himself, when his hope is shown to be placed in God? Would he not rather despair if he, most proudly and unfaithfully, placed it in himself?"

And chapter 69: "Just as other things must be preached so that the one who preaches them may be obediently heard, so predestination must be preached so that the one who obediently hears it may glory not in man, and therefore not in himself, but in the Lord—because this too is a commandment of God. And to obediently hear this commandment—that he who glories may glory in the Lord—is similarly, like the rest, a gift of God. Which gift whoever does not have, I do not hesitate to say, has whatever else he has in vain. We wish the Pelagians to have this."

The same author, in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 13: "Since the Apostle says, 'Therefore it is of faith, so that according to grace the promise may be firm,' I marvel that men prefer to entrust themselves to their own infirmity rather than to the firmness of God's promise." "'The will of God concerning me is uncertain to me,' you say. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you? Do you not fear: 'Let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall'? Since therefore both are uncertain, why does a man not rather entrust his faith, hope, and charity to the firmer rather than the weaker?"

And in Book 2 *Against Julian*, chapter 17, addressing the Pelagians who say that men are provoked to virtue when it is preached to them that they can do their deeds by their own virtue, but that when it is preached that they can do nothing without the mercy of God, His help and grace, they are cast down and broken by desperation, he says: "As much as the saints presume on the mercy of God, which is great, so much do you presume on your own virtue, which is nothing. And as much as they wage war against ingrained vices, aided by the grace of God, so much do you wage war against the grace of God itself. But dare you say in your heart that when men hear you, they are kindled to virtue, but when they hear such great men as Cyprian, Hilary, Gregory, Ambrose, and the other priests of the Lord, they are broken by desperation and renounce the pursuit of perfection? Do such monstrous thoughts ascend into your heart and not strike your forehead?"

You also, Pelagians, who seem to yourselves subtle—how do you not see that if by your cleverness predestination and the cooperation of God are removed, His foreknowledge can similarly be removed? Or if foreknowledge is not removed, neither is predestination?

Hope as you will; but would that you hoped in the Lord! "But for me it is good to cling to God, to place my hope in the Lord God" (Psalm 72). "For blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord, and the Lord shall be his confidence" (Jeremiah 17).

Wherefore also Augustine, on Psalm 70, Treatise 1: "Let our entire hope be in God, and let us presume nothing of goods as from our own powers, lest making our own what is from Him, we lose even what we have received."

With which the entire sacred Scripture agrees, together with all its holy expositors, as also chapter 32 of the first book, concerning fear, love, and hope—although briefly—urged.

And who, perfectly trusting in such and so great a Lord—without whose will, always best, wisest, most just, and most merciful, and never erring, nothing adverse can happen—will not be strengthened to perfect patience in all adversities, as was briefly touched upon in chapter 32 of the first book?

Who also, fully loving God and neighbor, and noticing that for those who love God all things work together for good, and that God orders all things for the elect and for Himself—as is evident from chapters 39, 32, and others of the first book—will not bear with equanimity

whatever adversities, and indeed sustain them gladly and cheerfully, and vehemently thirst for adversarial suffering, as is read of the Apostles and many other saints?

Who moreover—any sinner or other, if anyone presumes himself to be otherwise—trusting in the most just and most pious God, that every adversity is sent by Him either for the punishment of sin (so that if it suffices, one may fly immediately after the present life to the eternal), or if it is less sufficient, at least be punished proportionally less—or perhaps incomparably, as it were, less—in Purgatory (especially if he considers that, according to what was set forth in chapter 39 of the first book, whatever adversity or punishment sent to him by God is in a certain way infinitely less than his sin would require, if dealt with without mercy), or for the matter and accumulation of merit while he suffers patiently?

For who will be crowned with glory unless he has fought gloriously? And who will fight gloriously where a combatant is lacking? God therefore brings to man an adversary combatant, so that he may have someone with whom to fight legitimately, and thus by the merit of a victorious contest be crowned—as is evident from chapters 31 and 32 of the first book. Especially if, according to what was set forth in chapter 39 of the first book, he notices that the sufferings of this time and the merits of patience, however great, are not condign—indeed, are almost nothing and emptiness—compared to the future reward and glory to be liberally compensated for these; or both for the punishment of sin and for the increase of his merit no less—as is evident from chapters 39 and 43 of the first book.

Who, I say, thus trusting in God, will not most patiently, most gladly, and most joyfully sustain all adversities?

Furthermore, who, duly weighing these things, will not only not hate enemies and those exercising hostilities, but will love them? Will not only not curse them, but on the contrary bless them? Will not only not reject them, but embracingly receive them as ministers of God and his own beneficent helpers? For through them and they themselves provide the material—which was lacking—for the exercise of most glorious virtue, merit, and reward to be obtained.

Wherefore Sennacherib, the devastator of the Israelite people, is called a rod, a staff, an axe, and a saw in the hand of God; and Nebuchadnezzar, the most savage depopulator of the same, the servant of God—as is evident from chapter 32 of the first book.

Wherefore also Abishai, wishing to kill Shimei who was cursing David and throwing stones at him, holy David answered: "Let him alone, let him curse according to the command of the Lord. For the Lord commanded him to curse David; and who is the one who dares to say, 'Why has he done so?' Let him alone, let him curse according to the command of the Lord; perhaps the Lord will look upon my affliction and will repay me good for this cursing today" (2 Kings 16).

The blessed Gregory also, in Homily 35 on the Gospels, treating Luke 21—"In your patience you shall possess your souls"—reports that a certain Stephen, father of a certain monastery, very holy and singular in the virtue of patience, in whom the virtue of patience had grown so vigorously

that he believed him to be a friend who inflicted any trouble upon him, gave thanks for injuries, and if any loss was inflicted on him in his own poverty, he considered it the greatest gain.

And who, endowed with such patience, will lack humility? Who also, discreetly considering that he can do absolutely nothing good by himself without God specifically working it, nor yet with God antecedently but only subordinately—like an instrument in the hand of a craftsman—and this both in the free consent to operate under and with such a craftsman, and in all his other motions and rests—as chapters 20, 30, and 32 of this book show—will not be easily inclined to the lowest humility, as is evident from chapters 23 and 30 of this book?

Wherefore, of two equal or unequal vessels—as noble as you like in the nobility of their material and form—if a most precious liquid is poured into one while the other remains empty, should the first be proud and vainly exalt itself above the other? By the same and not unreasonable reasoning, even a less noble vessel receiving such liquid could similarly be proud. But the nobler vessel, if such liquid is specifically poured into it, could perhaps be proud believing that it was pre-selected for such a service because of its nobility. But could not this liquid be poured into a baser vessel? Why also do you, noble vessel, vainly glory in your nobility? Whence comes your nobility? Not from yourself, clearly. Could not your Maker have made you for the basest use?

Also, of two trumpets, equal or unequal in the aforesaid way, if a noble trumpeter plays one solemnly while the other remains mute—why should the first be proud and exalt itself above the other, considering the causes set forth above?

Moreover, of two pens, equal or unequal however much in the aforesaid ways, if a subtle scribe writes subtly with one while the other rests—what material for being proud and vainly glorying, with all things duly weighed as set forth above?

Truly, this is how it still seems to me, a wretched sinner: if God deigns to pour some habit or act into me, His ignoble vessel, before certain others equal or inferior to me—if there are any such—or superior ones (for it often happens that more liquid is poured into inferior and simpler vessels)—similarly also I feel, if my heart utters some good word—indeed, not my heart, but if the Spirit of our Father through me, His instrument, speaks some good word; or if the supreme Scribe with the finger of His right hand through me, His pen, writes some truth.

Who also will not think most humbly and abjectly of himself, if he prudently considers how poor and miserable he would have been from himself, and that the chief goods he has he does not have from his preceding merits but from the gratuitous gift of God; and that he cannot even preserve his goods already possessed—indeed, not even his smallest good—but God continuously preserves them; and that he cannot by himself avoid any evil of soul or body, interior or exterior, except by God's special help?

How miserable, foul, and abject, then, would he have been—full of all miseries and stench of mind and body, inwardly and outwardly—had not God mercifully preserved him, as the foregoing attest, which draw us to love!

Wherefore also a certain very humble person humbly writes: "Happy is the one to whom God shows His mercy. He himself is the one who cannot be proud—to whom God shows His mercy. For by showing him His mercy, He persuades him that whatever good he has, he has not except from Him who is our every good. And when he sees that whatever good he has, he does not have from himself but from his God, he sees that everything for which he is praised is from the mercy of God, not from his own merits. And seeing these things, he is not proud; not being proud, he is not exalted; not exalting himself, he does not fall; not falling, he stands; standing, he clings; clinging, he remains; remaining, he enjoys and rejoices in the Lord his God. His own delights will be He who made him, and those delights no one corrupts, no one interrupts, no one takes away."

Who also, rooted in this lowest humility, truly perceiving that he has nothing good from himself, and cannot by himself seek anything, or preserve what has been acquired, or avoid any evil—will he not always turn himself with devout and continuous insistence of prayer to Him who is beyond measure rich and powerful, and liberal and clement, as the foregoing attest—that which was brought forth to induce love and trust—most insistently beseeching that He may remove all harmful things and grant all things profitable?

Who will not by all ways and means merit His will? But although the Father, infinitely magnificent and super-overflowingly liberal, does not wish to sell but to give most liberally the good things given to His children, He does not wish them to languish in idleness or waste away in sloth, but rather to reach strenuously for the crown through prayers and other merits of probity—as is evident from chapters 23 and 39 of the first book.

For the Lord's giving a crown to His soldiers, dignified through prayers and other merits of probity, is much more liberal than crowning the unworthy without merits. Is it not more liberal to give manifold gifts than simple ones? But to certain of His children He gives, as it were, a single simple gift—namely, to baptized infants, everlasting glory. But to others, whom He wished to give a more distinguished honor and a more glorious crown, He liberally destined other prior gifts: He liberally girded them with the military belt, liberally gave them valiant contests, glorious victories, and how many manifold works of probity—by which He no less liberally further granted that they should have Him Himself as their patron in war (from whom they had all other things), and should continually invoke His name, which is "Almighty," at least in heart and at opportune times confidently resound it with their mouth. "For the name of the Lord is a most strong tower; the just man runs to it" by invoking it more devoutly, "and shall be exalted" by triumphing.

And who does not know that all prayers and all merits are special gifts of God, as very many passages in the first and second books clearly make manifest? Wherefore also the Lord Himself says: "I will pour out upon the house of David and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem the spirit of grace and of prayers" (Zechariah 12). And all these things God gives to His own, not for any utility of His own, but theirs.

Is there not, then, greater liberality here than there—especially since the Lord does not give the crown of life to His soldiers because of their prior merits, as though for some utility brought to Himself, or for some cause antecedently moving His will; but rather the merits for the crown, and both the merits and the crown according to His most liberal and gratuitous will—as is evident from chapters 35 and 39 of the first book?

And who, gratefully considering so many and so great and so gracious benefits, both positive and privative, is not easily provoked—indeed, drawn and urged by a certain grateful and spontaneous violence—to render thanks of every kind, and the most grateful of grateful actions of thanks, and to sing "Thanks be to God" always? For whatever good we have or can do, whatever evil we do not have and do not do—it is entirely Your gratuitous gift, most gracious grace, and the Author of grace, my God.

Indeed, because these small things seem small to You, who are great, You moreover give us Yourself. For You gave Yourself to us when we did not yet exist—as provider, predestiner, elector, and finally maker. You also give Yourself to us who now exist through You—as most continuous preserver, most magnificent promoter, most ready helper, and most pious protector in all things.

What then shall I render to the Lord for all that He has rendered to me freely? What thanks shall I give to the gratuitous bestower of so many and so great graces? For grateful repayment requires something proportional, as You, Lord, freely teach both through natural reason and through the moral philosophers. What then of Your goods from my goods shall I render to You, since I have nothing good nor can have except from Your gratuitous gift? Nor do You give me Your other gifts in such a way that they are so mine that they cease to be Yours. For I myself entirely am more Yours than mine—indeed, I am Yours, not mine. And all things of mine are more Yours than mine—indeed, they are Yours, not mine. What then shall I render to You, my God? Indeed, Lord, for Your goods I shall render Your goods to You, and the same good in a certain way for itself.

Wherefore also a certain grateful son of Yours, sublimated by the gifts of Your grace, gratefully giving thanks, says: "Blessed are You, Lord God of Israel, our Father, from eternity to eternity. Yours, O Lord, is magnificence and power, and glory and victory, and to You is praise. For all things that are in heaven and on earth are Yours. Yours, O Lord, is the kingdom, and You are above all princes. Yours are riches, and Yours is glory. You rule over all; in Your hand is power and might; in Your hand is greatness and dominion over all. Now therefore, our God, we confess to You and praise Your illustrious name. Who am I, and who are my people, that we should be able to promise all these things to You? All things are Yours, and what we received from Your hand we have given to You."

For You, Lord my God, who do not need our goods, do not so require repayment that You may be made richer thereby; but so that through the same repayment You may make us richer, and give us Your thing and Yourself all the more.

But still, Lord, considering the aforementioned proportionality of benefit and repayment, I am multiply distracted and troubled. For if I wish to repay You at equality or beyond—as perhaps I should if I could—what equal or greater thing shall I repay You for myself, for all my positive and similarly privative goods? What moreover for Yourself, gratuitously given to me?

If, however, I do not wish to repay, or not according to due proportionality, how shall I not be ungrateful to You? How shall I be excused from ingratitude?

Or perhaps You will remit to me the obligation by which I bound myself to repay You. For why, supremely liberal—to such an extent that You could not be more liberal—would You not remit and grant even this obligation? Since You remit and grant much greater things—namely, the gravest sins against You. Since also the strongest obligation, contracted from Your own express command, from a personal oath and solemn vow—whether of virginity of mind or body, or of continence from mortal sin—You remit to the fallen one who rises.

And how are You omnipotent if You cannot do this? And how are You of worse, less liberal, and less generous condition than a miserable man, who can similarly remit—namely, even the strongest obligation, as it seems, by which anyone has been obligated to him?

Wherefore also one of the lovers of Your wisdom—whether wise, I do not know; You know—speaking of the obligation of a son to a father and of repayment, says: "the debtor"—namely, the son—"is to be repaid to the father. But doing nothing worthy of the things that were done for him, he worked. Wherefore he always owes. But those to whom it is owed have the power to remit, and the father certainly."

But otherwise, Lord, You taught me, ungrateful and unwise, more graciously in chapter 39 of the first book. For if You were to absolve me, not repaying, from the obligation by which I am bound to You, You would make me freer, confer a greater freedom, and give me a new benefit. How, then, unless I become ungrateful for so great a new benefit together with the prior ones not withdrawn, am I not more tightly bound and more lovingly obligated?

Is it not the case that if anyone lends me money under an obligatory bond, and when I do not pay freely remits the money and freely returns the obligation, he binds and ties me with a bond of more manifold obligation—not an obligation that produces a violent action in the contentious court, but one that in the court of gratitude and love requires a grateful spirit and a concordant repayment, especially if opportunity permits or necessity requires? Whose spirit, unless perhaps an ungrateful one, does not inwardly feel thus?

Wherefore also another lover of moral wisdom—a studious liberator of benefits, a most just and most grateful rewarder, at least in teaching and word (would that, Lord, it were so before You in deed and action!)—says: "A creditor of a benefit must be sought more diligently than a creditor of money. For the latter must be repaid as much as I received, and if I have repaid I am free and discharged. But to the former, more must be paid, and nevertheless, even when thanks have been returned, we still owe. For I must, when I have repaid, begin again."

But, Lord, so that I may dispute a little with the former wise man—or lover of wisdom—about Your promise, for You and the law of gratitude that You have sanctioned: If, I say, a father can remit to a son the natural obligation by which the son is bound to him—let him remit. And then, by your ungrateful hypothesis, into whatever calamity the father falls, however rich and powerful the son may be, the son is in no way bound to him, or at least no more than to a stranger. Indeed, he would be more bound to liberate from death any stranger from whom he had received even the smallest benefit not yet repaid, rather than his own father who is about to die. Which who, unless a most ungrateful son, would even hear, or even think?

But to descend to lesser obligations, and finally from them to ascend to greater ones: it seems that no obligation, however small, contracted between a benefactor and a beneficiary—even from the smallest benefit—can be fully discharged while both remain, so that the beneficiary is in no way bound to the benefactor by reason of the benefit previously received.

For it cannot be fully discharged by the benefactor remitting every debt and every obligation; for thus benefiting further, he further obligates the recipient. Nor by the beneficiary repaying the equal or the greater, even a hundred thousand times or more.

For suppose, according to the ungrateful hypothesis, that the beneficiary has fully repaid the benefactor and has entirely divested himself of every obligation contracted by reason of the benefit previously received. Then suppose the benefactor and a stranger, both in need, meet the beneficiary—who is able to help only one—with all else being equal, and they humbly beg his help. Who, unless ungrateful—indeed, according to a certain grateful person, the most ungrateful of all, namely one forgetful of the benefit previously received—would hesitate to prefer the benefactor over the stranger by reason of the beneficence previously received?

Who, therefore, will sufficiently repay a father? Or who will sufficiently repay You, supreme Father?

COROLLARY

THE COROLLARY IS MANIFOLD, AND GRATEFUL TO ALL WHO ARE GRATEFUL.

From these most grateful rules of gratitude, a most grateful conclusion is gratuitously derived for all: namely, that the natural obligation of gratitude by which the beneficiary is bound to the benefactor, by reason of any benefit previously received—even the smallest—cannot be fully dissolved; nor can the beneficiary repay the benefactor condignly—that is, sufficiently or fully—so that the entire obligation is totally extinguished. Indeed, perhaps the more abundantly the beneficiary repays the benefactor, the more he is obligated and the more he owes.

Much more so, neither can the natural obligation of gratitude by which a son is bound to a father be fully dissolved, nor can a son repay a father condignly; but perhaps the more he repays him, the more he is obligated.

Wherefore, beyond all measure, more and more, neither can the obligation of the rational creature benefited by God, by which it is bound to Him by the law of gratitude, be dissolved—even by the infinite omnipotence of God. Nor can anyone repay God condignly for any benefit, even the smallest—that is, so that the entire obligation is totally annulled. Indeed—and this seems most wonderful, yet most true and most grateful—the more anyone has repaid the Lord and the more he has paid the debt of gratitude, the more he owes and the more he is obligated.

O admirable bond of gratitude, and grateful ligament of obligation, which neither creature nor Creator can fully loosen! Indeed, the more the giver of the benefit or the receiver strives to loosen it in many ways—by remitting every debt and every obligation, by heaping repayments upon repayments—the more he tightens it, makes it firmer, and ties it more indissolubly.

O, therefore, the vice of ingratitude, most greatly to be detested, which strives to loosen—indeed, to break—and utterly to destroy so indissoluble a bond of gratitude, which neither any creature, nor even God, can dissolve! Who can dispense from such a vice? Certainly neither man, nor angel, nor God—although with other things they can.

Let no one, therefore, who has been benefited by man or by God, intend to repay in such a way that he hastens to free himself from all obligation and further repayment. For this belongs to an ungrateful spirit. Rather, let him always heap repayments upon repayments, gifts upon gifts, and thanks upon thanks, so that he may always be more and more tied by the most grateful bonds of gratitude, and may become ever more grateful, and so at last be entirely transformed into gratitude.

The first part of this conclusion evidently follows from the foregoing. The second follows from this first and similarly from the foregoing.

But what reason or what cause is it that from so small a root, from so slender and finite a benefit, there proceeds and arises so strong an obligation, so great and in a way infinite—since neither by finite power nor perhaps by infinite power, nor by any finite repayment or finite repayments, can it be extinguished?

I think it is because, with benefactor and beneficiary remaining, for the beneficiary to be in a certain way affected and bound to the benefactor is reasonable and just—with a mixed reasonableness and justice, partly antecedent and partly consequent to the divine will, as can be gathered from chapter 21 of the first book. For just as it is reasonable and just in this mixed way for man to be affected and inclined toward the good, so also toward the giver of good; for the giver is good to him.

And just as this is reasonable and just, so also necessary, as is evident from the same chapter 21 of the first book. Just as, therefore, with creature and Creator existing, it is reasonable and just and necessary for the creature to be bound and subject to the Creator, so also for the rational creature to be good, and naturally to be affected and inclined toward the good and toward the giver of good, and similarly to be obligated to him.

Not, therefore, from a small or great benefit alone does so great an obligation arise, nor from any created nature, nor from any human or divine statute, but from the immutable truth of the divine essence, as can to some extent appear from chapter 21 of the first book.

The third part appears from this: everyone, it seems, reasonably loves more and is more bound to love the one through whom he has a good, rather than another. And therefore also the one through whom and toward whom he exercises a praiseworthy operation and meritorious action. Wherefore also the beneficiary making repayment operates laudably and meritoriously toward the benefactor—and the more he does so, the more so.

Following this reasoning, the Philosopher, in Book 9 of the *Ethics*, chapter 7, asserts that benefactors love their beneficiaries more than the reverse—which he also makes manifest by certain other reasons. But who doubts that a repayment gratefully made is grateful to the beneficiary? The benefactor also, having received repayment, loves the repaying beneficiary more than before, and is more ready to do him good; and therefore the beneficiary can then trust more in the benefactor than before—and the more he has repaid, the more so. Is not, therefore, the beneficiary making repayment more bound to the benefactor who receives than before—and the more he has repaid, the more so?

The three following parts about father and son follow in order from these three, and can be proved like these and by argument from the lesser. The other three following parts follow in similar order from the first three parts and from these, and are similarly proved.

The last of these—which seemed most wonderful—with the foregoing understood, is established to be most true. And it is also better demonstrated otherwise: for according to the foregoing, whatever we repay to God, we first receive from Him; and therefore for every repayment we are further bound to Him. For when the gifts are increased, the reasons for the gifts are also increased. The remaining parts are evident.

O most liberal Lord, who freely gave me to myself, and all my other goods! Moreover, to Yourself—with how great an obligation to repay do You bind me? With how indissoluble a bond do You constrain me—which, as You taught above, can be dissolved neither by me nor by You, omnipotent Lord?

And what worthy thing shall I repay You? What proportional thing shall I find? What equal or greater thing shall I discover?

Or perhaps I may in a way repay You condignly by humbly confessing and truly professing that I can never repay You condignly? Or perhaps I shall sufficiently repay You if I always repay You with all the powers of mind and body as much as I can? For neither Your justice nor Your piety allows me to be obligated beyond my power, to the impossible. Is it not true what a certain person says in this matter: "Friendship requires what is possible, not what is according to worthiness. Nor is this possible in all cases—such as in honors toward the gods and parents. For no one could ever repay according to worthiness; but one who serves to the best of his ability seems to be virtuous."

Is it not enough that another exhorts us: "Glorify the Lord as much as you can, and He will still surpass you; and admirable is His magnificence. Bless the Lord and exalt Him as much as you can; for He is greater than all praise"?

Or perhaps I can repay You something in a way equal to myself, to the goods conferred on me, or something greater than these, or something equal to Yourself conferred on me? Since I cannot give something greater, if I repay You myself entirely and all that I have and all that I can—and more and greater things if I could—and even You Yourself in a certain way: namely, by referring myself entirely, with every power of mind and body, and whatever I in any way have or am able to do in any way, to Your praise, glory, and honor—indeed, to You, Lord, and for You alone—preferring to lose all these things, and more and greater things beyond all number and measure, and even myself, irrecoverably, rather than offend Your majesty even once or in the slightest; and also by loving You for Your own sake alone above all other things, with all my heart.

For thus You teach me to love You, good God. Otherwise indeed, given the choice: either that I lose however great other goods, and even myself, with all things reduced to nothing without recovery, yet without my sin; or that I offend You once and most slightly and sin—I would have to, according to the most right reason, with You, Lord, as judge, sin; and so if I so did, I would not sin. For every sin is a certain deviation from the rectitude of reason.

O powerful and good Lord God, I beseech that as I utter vocally, so I may do effectively, and doing so may persevere finally. Which gift of Yours, conferred on me and through You and through me referred back to You, deign, I humbly beseech, to accept mercifully as some kind of repayment. For I have not, nor will I ever be able to have, anything greater—unless perhaps it would be to effectively will, know, and do, and that in me, concerning me, and about me, in whatever prosperity or adversity, joyful or sorrowful, and in all other things, there should always be done only what would be most grateful to You and most pleasing to Your will.

Which gift also grant, I humbly pray, to me, a wretched beggar; and through Yourself and through me, repay it to Yourself who give it, and accept it as some kind of repayment. And if there is still perhaps something greater—which, however, looking everywhere, I do not see—that also I humbly beg and devoutly request: that You show it to me, earnestly begging, and grant it, so that through You I may repay it to You. So that for Your greatest benefits, most graciously conferred on me, I may most gratefully repay to You the greatest and most grateful repayment

possible for me, render the most grateful of grateful actions of thanks, and give the most grateful thanks unceasingly.

But still my trembling mind, like an industrious bee, wavers and inquires: How can I render Him grace—to whom, for His gracious works, for His gratuitous benefits, whatever I can is a debt, and even I myself? Is it not the case that if it is of grace, it is not of works? Otherwise grace is no longer grace. Does a debtor, by repaying a debt, do a favor to the creditor? Do not grace and debt seem to be mutually opposed?

Whence it seems that a wonderful thing is produced: namely, that no one can be in any way obligated to do a favor, or to repay a favor.

Or perhaps I may extricate myself from this ungrateful entanglement by doing freely and voluntarily what I am bound to by debt and necessity—just as the works of Your professed ones, Lord, or of those otherwise obligated to do certain things voluntarily, are no less grateful before Your eyes, provided they are not done unwillingly but with free and spontaneous will?

Is it not true, as one of Your grateful children and our Fathers says: "There is a necessity that takes away or diminishes the favor of one who does good, and there is a necessity by which greater favor is owed for a benefit. For when someone, by a necessity to which he is subject, unwillingly does good, either no favor or a lesser one is owed to him. But when he voluntarily subjects himself to the necessity of doing good, and does not unwillingly bear it, then indeed he merits greater favor for the benefit. For this is not to be called necessity, but grace, because no one compelled him to undertake or keep it, but he did so freely."

"Such is the case when someone freely vows a purpose of holy life. For although he ought to keep it of necessity after the vow, lest he incur the condemnation of an apostate, and although he can be compelled to keep it if he refuses, yet if he keeps what he vowed not unwillingly, he is not less but more grateful to God than if he had not vowed, and he is not to be said to live holy by necessity, but by the same freedom with which he vowed."

Or perhaps a certain distinction about grace, which You taught me above, will defend me from this ungrateful subtlety? For it is called grace because it is freely rendered for a grace freely given. What then is more due? And what is more grateful to You, Lord our God? And what is more fitting for us than that in all things, everywhere and always, with all our heart, mouth, and works, we freely give thanks to the Lord our God?

Did You not teach one of Your grateful disciples—and our Doctors—to say and write: "What is better for us to carry in our mind, press with our mouth, and express with our pen than 'Thanks be to God'? This can neither be said more briefly, nor heard more joyfully, nor understood more gratefully, nor done more fruitfully."

And You also taught him to know and tastefully say that "wisdom is the worship of God, which is chiefly established in this: that the soul be not ungrateful to Him." Whence also in the most true and singular sacrifice we are admonished to give thanks to the Lord our God.

"But the soul will be ungrateful if it attributes to itself what belongs to it from God—as the pestilential and ungrateful Pelagians do."

Not so, however—not so, we, the grateful children of God. But acknowledging humbly, and no less truly, that all and each of our goods—positive and similarly privative—habits, acts, and works, and the lacks of evil habits, acts, and works, are not in us from ourselves, but descend from above from our heavenly Father, from the Father of lights, and are the gratuitous gifts of the Lord our God—always and everywhere, in all and each, for all and each, with all our heart, mouth, and work, let us freely give thanks to the Lord our God.

For thus You, the Author, instruct us through our mother, the most prudent virgin and most beautiful bride of Yours, having neither spot nor wrinkle—Your holy Church. Again, therefore, and again—indeed, continuously, always and everywhere, with the unceasing voice of heart, and mouth, and work—let us give thanks to the Lord our God.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, BOOK III

CHAPTER 1: THAT GOD CAN IN A CERTAIN MANNER NECESSITATE EVERY CREATED WILL TO ITS FREE ACT, AND TO FREE CESSATION AND REST FROM ACT.

The Pelagians, however — pestilent and ungrateful for the manifold grace of God — strive to take away from God His due thanks and the due expressions of gratitude. For they deny predestination and divine providence in good and in evil, as well as the co-efficiency of God, and especially His pre-efficiency with free will in its free act and in all merits, relying chiefly on this argument: that then there would be necessity, not freedom or merit. But other heretics attempt likewise to take away from God His due expressions of gratitude, saying that He does whatever He does from necessity, and nothing freely, nor by free will. Wherefore also certain heretics endeavor to destroy free will universally, both in God and in creatures, along with all grace, and every gratuitous and free action, saying that all things that happen, happen of necessity. Concerning these matters and similar ones, therefore, we must now inquire. For which purpose it seems that this must be diligently investigated: whether necessity and freedom, and merit, are incompatible.

First, therefore, it must be shown that God can in a certain manner necessitate every created will to its free — indeed, to its most free — act, and to a similar cessation and rest from act. For God can will a created will to produce its free act, and this antecedently and naturally prior to the

created will; wherefore also, by I.10, that will would of necessity obey, and this for as long as God so willed it to will. Concerning cessation and rest, the reasoning is entirely the same.

Hence Anselm, *On the Harmony* 2, says: "Just as it is necessary that whatever God wills should be, so it is necessary that what man wills should be, in those things which God so subjects to the human will that if he wills, they come about, and if he does not will, they do not come about. For since what God wills cannot fail to be, when He wills that man's will should be compelled or prevented by no necessity from willing or not willing, and wills that the effect should follow the will, then it is necessary that the will be free, and that what it wills should be."

Likewise, otherwise a man could make God false and perjured. For suppose that God predicts, and by swearing through Himself affirms, that this person will freely do this or that, and does whatever He can to bring this about; then if this person is not necessitated by God to freely doing this or that, he can freely omit this and that.

Likewise, otherwise a man could frustrate divine providence, predestination, and will — indeed, could make our most blessed God miserable. For no one doubts that God could bring about, provide for, predestine, and pre-will the free acts of humans, and what depends on them — indeed, He has done so from eternity, as I.27 and what follows, together with I.45, prove. The Apostle also plainly testifies to this, Ephesians 2: "We are His workmanship," he says, "created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them." And the Gloss says the same thing even more expressly, as I.31 more fully cited.

Likewise, every power that is stronger in due proportion can necessitate a weaker power naturally subject to it in any of its actions, and in this manner the divine, angelic, and human wills relate to one another, as the first supposition and I.10, together with II.20 and II.30, attest.

Hence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* V.16, distinguishing things that are prior, says: "Other things are called prior according to power; for what exceeds in power is prior, that is, what is more powerful. Such a thing is one whose pre-volition the other must necessarily follow — that is, the posterior — so that when the former does not move, the latter is not moved, and when the former moves, the latter is moved; and pre-volition is the principle." The translation which Averroes expounds reads thus: "Also that which is stronger is called prior, and such is that which compels the other to follow its will; so that if what is prior does not move, the other which is posterior will not be moved; and if it moves, it will be moved; and will is the principle here." On which Averroes comments: "Universally, that which is stronger and more worthy is called 'prior,' and it is that which compels what is posterior so that its will follows its own will, because the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger."

Furthermore, arguing also from physics: suppose there were only one man and one woman. Then since the human species cannot fail or be preserved without generation, it is necessary that they voluntarily generate. Nor can anyone pretend that although they will necessarily generate voluntarily, yet not on this occasion nor that — and therefore any intercourse of theirs will be

free and subject to no necessity — because suppose that the man or woman has advanced so far in the days fit for generation (which according to the Philosopher, *On Animals* IX, in women are 50 years and in men 70, or according to Pliny and Solinus, 80 in men) that there remains for them time only for one such act: then immediately they will necessarily perform that one act voluntarily. For without the will, generation will never occur. Moreover, what constrains them thus is posited by the Philosophers to be universal nature, which by II.3 cannot be called any force of the stars or of any secondary causes whatsoever; therefore it is necessarily the first cause, as I.27 showed through philosophical authorities.

And similarly one can also argue theologically: If there were only one man and one woman before the number of the elect and predestined by God from the natural propagation of humans continuously derived from the first parents had been completed — unless they necessarily and voluntarily begot offspring, the generation of humans would cease and God's purpose would be frustrated, against I.10. Concerning Adam and Eve, before they naturally came together, a similar argument can be made.

Likewise, otherwise God could not necessitate a rational creature so that it would be impeccable and perpetually blessed, against II.17.15.

Likewise, Isaiah 40: "Behold," he says, "the nations are regarded by Him as a moment of the balance" — the Gloss adds: "in comparison with Him," namely God — "which moment is inclined in either direction from nothing." And Proverbs 21: "As divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; wherever He wills, He will incline it," as II.20 more fully cited.

Blessed Augustine also, in *On Grace and Free Will*, after reciting this authority of Solomon with many others, in chapter 48 concludes thus: "By these and similar testimonies of the divine Scriptures, it is sufficiently manifest, as I judge, that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills wherever He wills — whether toward good things, out of His mercy, or toward evil things, according to their merits." The same author, *Enchiridion* 77: "Who would so impiously rave as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men into good — whichever ones He wills, whenever He wills, wherever He wills?" The same, *On the Gift of Perseverance* 20: "How possible it is for God to convert the wills of men, however averse and adverse, to faith, and to work in their hearts so that they yield to no adversities, nor depart from Him overcome by any temptation." The same also, in *On Rebuke and Grace* 69, says: "When God wills to save a man, no will resists. For whether to will or not to will is so in the power of the one willing or not willing, that it does not overcome the divine will or surpass its power." And below, throughout the whole of chapter 70 and at the beginning of 71, he teaches the same most plainly and notably, as II.20 more fully cited.

Likewise, otherwise God would not be omnipotent. For although God were to do everything He could so that you would simply or at a certain time will or love something, you could — this notwithstanding — entirely not will the same thing, and for some part of the given time will it

and for another part not will it, indeed even will the contrary, and thus you could render God and the man Jesus Christ false, a liar, perjured, and miserable, as was argued at the beginning. Nor can anyone say that the free acts of the will are by no means contained under God's omnipotence — on account of I.10, II.20, and II.30, and on account of the authorities of Augustine just cited. For then they would in no way be enclosed under divine providence, governance, and predestination, against I.27 with what follows, and I.45. What indeed more worthily pertains to His omnipotence than to preserve His truth inviolable in all things, even in free acts? How also does it not pertain to His omnipotence to be able to dispose freely of all possible things, both natural and free, whatsoever?

Wherefore Augustine says, *On Rebuke and Grace* 70, that God has the most omnipotent power to incline human hearts wherever it pleases Him. And chapter 71: that God has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves do. There is also no doubt that the free acts of the will are the noblest of all, and some acts are contained under God's omnipotence — and not merely the less noble ones, for this is forbidden by His infinite nobility, the first supposition of Book I, and the blessedness of the blessed.

If, however, anyone should wish to say that God can necessitate a man to an act of the will, but that once this is done, such an act will not be free, he can easily be contradicted. For if God does this — since for everything that He does externally His will alone suffices, as the corollary of I.10 teaches, and is demonstrated by His omnipotence — God can do this by His will alone, namely without any habit or any created thing whatsoever that does not now concur with the free volition of man; and only by willing, or by naturally pre-willing, that the man should will. And by II.30, He in fact now does so concerning every free act of the will.

Likewise, let John elicit a free act of will A, together with B and C as sufficient and necessarily required secondary causes. Then God can necessitate John to act A, and this without any other secondary cause, as is clear from the foregoing — namely by merely willing, or naturally pre-willing. And by II.30, He previously did so when A was free; therefore God then necessitated John to A, a free act of the will. And also if A was then free, by the same reasoning it is now free as well: for all things are in entirely the same condition now as then, in all first and secondary causes.

Or also, suppose that God necessitates John to act D, similar to A as much as possible, together with B and C as precisely or entirely similar secondary causes — which He can do, as the foregoing proved. Otherwise, some secondary cause — namely, that other one necessarily required — would necessitate the will of man like that of a brute, against II.3. And A and D will be acts entirely similar in nature, for in their first and secondary causes no difference can be assigned; therefore if one is free or necessary in any way, both will be likewise.

If, however, it is said that D is necessary and A is free because God wills to make them such, this is contradicted in the following way. If God by so willing necessitates to act D, this is not by making act D necessary per se — because of itself it can fail to be, and because only one thing is

necessary per se, namely God Himself, as is clear from I.1, corollary, part 17 — nor through any secondary causes that per se necessitate the created will, as nature and object per se necessitate beasts, as was shown above. This is therefore only through the divine will — namely by willing to necessitate to D, or to make D necessary, as the hypothesis admits.

Either, then, God by so willing absolutely necessitates to act D and renders it absolutely necessary, or only relative to His volition — that is, such that given that volition, it is impossible for things to turn out otherwise, or because it cannot in any way be impeded. The first cannot be said, as no one is unaware, and the foregoing has taught. The second remains, then, and speaking thus, free act A, which God wills to make free, is just as necessary relative to that divine volition as D is relative to the other: because, given that volition, it is equally impossible for things to turn out otherwise, and equally impossible for it to be impeded in any respect, as I.10 teaches. Therefore A and every most free act of a creature is just as necessary as D is.

Likewise, suppose imaginatively — or, according to some, as is truly possible — that God performs some act of the created will by simply willing to perform that act, neither willing it to be necessary nor free. Then by hypothesis it will be neither. Likewise, if God were only to simply will and thereby produce the acts of irrational animate or inanimate things, those acts would not be necessary with respect to God, nor with respect to other causes: for no other cause necessitates except through the power, cooperation, and co-necessitation of the first cause, which is the first necessary being, as Book I, chapter 1 and what follows teach.

Likewise, if God performs some act of the created will, not willing to necessitate to it, but simply willing to produce it, that act is still necessary with respect to the divine will, because that will cannot be impeded. The first and per se reason, then, why something is called necessary with respect to God or the divine will is not because He wills to necessitate to it, but because He is the first cause, universally efficacious, omnipotent, and unable to be impeded.

Wherefore also Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned a certain error which said that for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it is not sufficient that the first cause itself be unimpedable, but it is required that the intermediate causes also be unimpedable. "Error," says the Bishop, "because then God could not produce any necessary effect without posterior causes." Therefore all effects, even free ones, can be necessary with respect to the first cause, because they proceed from His will, which cannot in any way be impeded.

Furthermore, just as it is necessary that whatever God wills to happen should happen, so also it is necessary that whatever happens should happen in the way God wills it to happen, as the foregoing clearly shows. Just as, therefore, natural necessary effects must necessarily occur with respect to their natural secondary causes on account of the efficacy of the divine will, so also free effects must freely occur with respect to their lower free causes on account of the universal efficacy of the divine will. Therefore all free effects and acts of all lower free agents are necessary with respect to the divine will — necessarily free, and necessarily freely produced.

Moreover, no created will is freer than the human will of Christ, and His divine will was able to necessitate that will — indeed, it did in fact necessitate it to each and every one of its free acts, and to each and every free cessation and rest from any and all acts. For if His human will had not necessarily consented to His divine will, which naturally preceded it (as II.30 taught), it could have dissented from it, and willed something else — indeed even the contrary — and sinned, which in each part contradicts what was shown concerning Christ in II.30.

Hence also John 5: "I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge" — which Christ says according to what He is as man, as Augustine attests, as is more fully cited there. The same concerning Christ — namely that His human will necessarily followed the divine — Anselm teaches, *Cur Deus Homo* I.10, and II.10 shows that Christ could have lied if He had willed, but could not have willed to lie, as II.30 more fully cited. And *Cur Deus Homo* II.17 shows that God had the power to preserve His life so that He would never die, although He could not will that.

Therefore by the same reasoning, He could not will anything that His divine will had not predisposed Him to will, or whose opposite it had disposed concerning Him. Hence below in the same chapter he says: "If you wish to know the true necessity of all that He did and suffered, know that all things were of necessity, because He Himself willed it. No necessity preceded His will" — His divine will, I say — no necessity preceded it, but His human will [was preceded by necessity], as had been cited from the same Anselm in connection with I.10.

This is therefore the judgment of Christ, Augustine, Anselm, Damascene, and Lombard, as the foregoing in this chapter and II.30 declare, nor have I seen any Doctor holding the contrary view. This opinion therefore seems sufficiently certain.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT A CERTAIN KIND OF NECESSITY AND FREEDOM, AND MERIT, AND ALSO CHANCE AND FORTUNE, ARE NOT MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE; AND CONCERNING THE GENERAL HARMONY OF FATE, FOREKNOWLEDGE, PREDESTINATION, AND GRACE WITH FREE WILL AND MERIT.

Hence it is made manifest that necessity and freedom, and also necessity and any merit whatsoever, and furthermore necessity and chance and fortune, are not mutually incompatible. Hence also the harmony of fate, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace with free will and merit is clearly recognized in general.

For the first part of this is shown most clearly by the principal conclusion. The second is shown from this first, and can also be proved by the same means by which the principal conclusion is proved.

Likewise, according to the Philosopher, *De Interpretatione*, last chapter: "What is, when it is, is necessarily." And some free and meritorious act now is; therefore that it now exists is necessary.

Likewise, in God and in the confirmed angels there is necessity for many acts of will, and the greatest freedom.

Likewise, Augustine, *Enchiridion* 86, says: "First it was necessary that man be made such that he could will both well and badly; but afterwards he will be such that he cannot will badly, nor will he therefore lack free will. For the will shall be far more free which can in no way be a slave to sin. Neither is the will to be blamed, or said not to be a will, or said not to be free, by which we so will to be happy that we not only do not will to be miserable, but are utterly unable to will it."

The same, *City of God* V.10: after having first argued against the Stoics who said that our wills are not subject to necessity — on the ground that they would then not be free — he responds to their argument by distinguishing necessity in two ways, showing that there is one necessity that is involuntary, which takes away or removes freedom, and another that is voluntary, which is compatible with freedom.

Hence chapter 9 says: "However the most tortuous contentions and disputations of the philosophers may stand, we, just as we confess the supreme and true God, so we confess His will, supreme power, and foreknowledge, nor do we fear that we do not do by will what we do by will, because He foreknew that we would do it — He whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived. This Cicero feared, so that he attacked foreknowledge; and the Stoics, so that they would not say all things happen by necessity, although they contended that all things happen by fate — whom he refutes consequently."

And chapter 10 adds: "Nor is that necessity to be feared which the Stoics labored to avoid by distinguishing causes of things, so as to remove some from necessity and subject others to it, and among those they wished not to be under necessity, they placed our wills as well — lest they should not be free if subjected to necessity." And distinguishing, he adds: "For if our necessity is to be called that which is not in our power but achieves what it can even if we are unwilling — such as the necessity of death — it is manifest that our wills, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity. For we do many things which we would not do if we were unwilling; to which primarily belongs willing itself: for if we will, it exists; if we do not will, it does not exist; for we would not will if we were unwilling."

And he adds for the second member: "But if that is defined as necessity according to which we say it is necessary that something be so or happen so, I do not know why we should fear it, lest it take away freedom of will. For we do not place the life of God and the foreknowledge of God under necessity" — in the first sense — "if we say it is necessary that God always live and foreknow all things, just as His power is not diminished when it is said that He cannot die or be deceived."

Hence also Josephus, *Antiquities* XVIII.2, treating of the four sects of philosophers among the Jews, of which one was the Pharisees, says that they were the first because they were esteemed better than the rest, and these, as he says, believe all things to be governed by fate. "But they do not take away the free will of man." Fate, however, imports necessity, as I.28 showed. And the same Josephus, *Jewish War* VII.8: "Men cannot avoid fate, even if they foresee it."

It is therefore clear that necessity and freedom are by no means incompatible; wherefore neither will necessity and merit be incompatible — which can also be shown in another way. For suppose that God confirmed some wayfarer to freely do all the good things that he will do here on the way, with the wayfarer being utterly ignorant of this, just as good angels are confirmed to do their good deeds knowingly. Then such a person would do good things and do them well, because just as voluntarily and just as freely, as far as lies in him, as any other unconfirmed wayfarer. Therefore also just as meritoriously — which is confirmed by an evident example.

For suppose that someone going devoutly to Mass were followed by some hidden force, unbeknownst to him, such that he could not stop, delay, or turn aside. Then such a person necessarily goes thus, and merits no less than he would if that aforementioned force were entirely removed.

But lest I seem to beg for such an example outside Sacred Scripture, suppose that someone holding a rod or staff, willing and intending to rashly strike his neighbor, but not able to do so by his own powers — and suppose that such a blow is delivered by some hidden force, yet strongly directing him so that he cannot resist at all, while he himself does not think so, but thinks the opposite. Then he sins just as if he were striking by his own strength; and so it is with any free acts whatsoever.

That in all free acts it not only could be so, but that it is in fact so, the Lord Himself sufficiently shows, Isaiah 10: "Woe to Assyria," He says, "the rod of My fury, and the staff — in their hand is My indignation. Against a deceitful nation I will send him, and against the people of My wrath I will command him, to take spoils and seize plunder, and to trample them like the mud of the streets. But he will not so consider, and his heart will not so reckon; rather, his heart will be set on destruction and on the annihilation of not a few nations. For he will say, 'Are not my princes likewise kings?' etc." And below: "As my hand has found the kingdoms of the idol, so also its images from Jerusalem and Samaria. Shall I not, as I have done to Samaria and its idols, so do to Jerusalem and its images?"

And there follows the threat of punishment with the expression of guilt: "And it shall be, when the Lord has completed all His works on Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the proud heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of the haughtiness of his eyes. For he said, 'By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom I have understood, and I have removed the boundaries of peoples, and have plundered their princes. Shall the axe boast against him who chops with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him who draws it? As if the rod should rise against him who lifts it, and the staff exalt itself — which indeed is wood!' Therefore

the Lord, the God of hosts, will send leanness upon his fat ones, and beneath his glory — or, as another reading has it, his glory — a burning shall be kindled, like the burning of fire."

On which the Gloss says: "Just as these are merely inanimate instruments, doing nothing by themselves but through him who moves them, so also Sennacherib acted not by himself but by the power of God; hence his boasting was foolish and deserving of vengeance."

From this, therefore, it is clearly seen that even though someone does something good or evil necessarily — yet ignorantly and freely, as far as lies in him — he merits or sins.

Hence Theophylact, as cited in the Gloss on Luke 22, "The Son of Man goes as it has been determined," says: "Not as if unable to defend Himself, but as one determining death for Himself for the sake of human salvation. But because Judas did the things that were written with evil intent, lest anyone think him innocent as a minister of the dispensation, he adds: 'But woe to that man by whom He shall be betrayed.'"

In concordance with this, Isidore, as cited in the Gloss on Luke 24, "Was it not necessary for Christ to suffer these things?" etc.: "But if it was necessary for Christ to suffer, nevertheless those who crucified Him are guilty of punishment; for they were not striving to accomplish what God had disposed; hence their execution was impious."

With these the authority of Augustine, *83 Questions* q.27, plainly agrees, with many similar passages more fully cited in I.32.1. That also a good or evil act by someone freely, as far as lies in him — even if not entirely freely — should be counted to him as free merit, reason plainly teaches, because so it is in all other human deeds, whether evil or good, just or unjust. For one who speaks the truth, yet willing and believing himself to be lying, is guilty of falsehood — and vice versa.

Hence Augustine, *Enchiridion* 12: "No one is rightly judged a liar who says what is false thinking it true, since as far as lies in him, he does not deceive but rather is deceived. On the other hand, as far as lies in him, that person lies who says what is true thinking it false; for as far as his mind is concerned, since he does not say what he thinks, he does not speak truly, even though what he says turns out to be true. Nor is he in any way free from falsehood who unknowingly speaks truth with his mouth but knowingly lies in his will. Not considering, therefore, the things about which something is said, but only the intention of the speaker, better is he who unknowingly says what is false because he thinks it true, than he who knowingly bears a lying intent, not knowing that what he says is true."

Likewise, one who wills to kill someone and does as much as lies in him to kill, is truly called a murderer. Hence 1 John 3: "Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer." In this manner the Apostle speaks, Hebrews 6, saying that those once enlightened and then fallen away "crucify again for themselves the Son of God."

So speaks blessed Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, distinguished Doctor and Martyr, in Epistle 3, entitled *On the Lapsed*. And so Augustine speaks, Epistle 14, to Boniface, citing and recounting the words of Cyprian in sequence and explaining them: "Rightly," he says, "are parents, or any elders, attempting to bind baptized children or little ones to the sacrileges of demons, called spiritual murderers. For in those cases where they do not accomplish the killing, but as far as lies in them they were killers, they are rightly told when prohibited from this crime: 'Do not kill your little ones.' For the Apostle also says, 'Do not quench the Spirit' — not because it can be quenched, but as far as lies in them, they are rightly called its quenchers who act so as to wish it quenched."

"In this sense can rightly be understood what the most blessed Cyprian wrote in his epistle *On the Lapsed*, when rebuking those who during the persecution had sacrificed to idols: 'And lest anything be lacking to complete the crime,' he says, 'infants too, placed in or dragged by the hands of their parents, lost as little ones what they had obtained at the very beginning of their birth.' He said 'lost' — as far as pertains to the crime of those by whom they were forced to lose it — 'lost' in the mind and will of those who committed so great a crime against them. For if they had lost it in themselves, they would certainly remain to be condemned by divine judgment without any defense."

"But if holy Cyprian had thought so, he would not have immediately subjoined their defense, saying: 'Will they not, when the day of judgment comes, say: We did nothing; we did not willingly hasten to profane contagions, abandoning the food and cup of the Lord? The treachery of others destroyed us; we found our parents to be our murderers. They denied us the Church as mother, they denied us God as father; so that while we, small and unknowing and ignorant of so great a crime, were joined through others to the fellowship of guilt, we were caught by the fraud of others.' He would not have subjoined this defense unless he believed it most just and likely to benefit the little ones in God's judgment."

"For if it is said, 'We did nothing' — 'the soul that sins, it shall die' — then those will not perish under God's just judgment whom their parents by their own crime, as far as pertains to themselves, destroyed."

Likewise, one who wills and does as much as lies in him to know another man's wife, yet actually knows his own wife whom he believed to be another's, is condemned as guilty of adultery. Hence Matthew 5: "Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." Just as one who wills to know his own wife and unknowingly knows another — or his wife's sister whom he believed to be his own — is excused from the crime, as canon law attests, not only regarding this case but regarding many similar ones, as does Lombard, as I.1 more fully recounted.

Likewise, by I.10, no one can act simply against the divine will; and by the same I.10 together with I.22, it is necessary that everyone always act conformably to the divine will. Therefore no

one merits or sins except by freely doing, as far as lies in him, what is in conformity or disconformity with the divine will.

Hence Augustine, *Enchiridion* 80: "These are the great works of the Lord, sought out according to all His purposes, and so wisely sought out that when the angelic and human creature had sinned — that is, had done not what He willed but what it itself willed — even through that same will of the creature, by which was done what the Creator did not will, He Himself fulfilled what He willed, making good use even of evils, as being supremely good, for the damnation of those whom He justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom He graciously predestined to grace. For as far as pertains to them, they did what God did not will; but as far as pertains to God's omnipotence, they were in no way able to accomplish it."

The same, *Against Faustus* XXII: "A man becomes unjust when he loves for their own sake things that should be used for another purpose, and desires for another purpose things that should be loved for their own sake; for thus, as far as lies in him, he disturbs in himself the natural order which the eternal law commands to be preserved."

In agreement with this, Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I.15, says: "Nothing can be added to or diminished from God's honor, as far as pertains to Him; for He Himself is to Himself His incorruptible honor, in no way changeable. But when each creature keeps its own order, as if prescribed to it, whether naturally or rationally, it is said to obey God and honor Him — and this especially the rational nature, to which it is given to understand what it ought to do. When it wills what it ought, it honors God — not because it confers anything on Him, but because it voluntarily subjects itself to His will and disposition, and in the universe of things maintains its own order and the beauty of that same universe, as far as lies in it. But when it does not will what it ought, it dishonors God, as far as pertains to it, because it does not voluntarily subject itself to His disposition, and disturbs the order and beauty of the universe, as far as lies in it" — which, however, it absolutely cannot do, as he shows in the same chapter consequently, by reducing to two impossibilities.

The first is that if it were so, there would arise in the very universe which God ought to order a certain deformity of beauty from the violation of order. The second is that God would seem to fail in His disposition — "both of which," he says, "as they are unfitting, so they are impossible."

But this same point can be shown still more briefly and perhaps more easily thus. For no philosopher or theologian doubts that a man merits or sins because, in the state of meriting and sinning, he knowingly, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously consents, wills, and does good or evil. But he can do this and thus, even if he necessarily does this or that, as the foregoing attests.

Hence William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris, in his *Tripartite* — whose first principal part concerns faith and laws, the second virtues, the third vices and sins — in the last part, chapter 10, having recounted the error of those who say man cannot sin because he has the necessity or impossibility of doing or not doing anything whatsoever — and therefore, as they argue, he does

not have free will, nor guilt, nor praise — and having refuted them, responding to their argument, says: "On account of this, we used to distinguish that there is one necessity of violence and imposition; and whatever is done from it is to be imputed not to the agent but to the one imposing the violence. Indeed, that to which violence is done should not be called an agent, but rather that which imposes the violence — as the wheel of a mill."

"And a second is the necessity of stability and immutability, such as we say is the necessity of God, by which He is immutably good, and whatever exists by this necessity must always act well, and the contrary is impossible. And this necessity does not take away freedom but perfects it."

"A third necessity is extraneous or extrinsic, which some call necessity per accidens; and we make the same distinctions concerning impossibilities. And in this way certain things about the past are called necessary or impossible — such as your having eaten and done whatever you did."

"And there is a fourth necessity, which Aristotle calls determined — as that Socrates is sitting while he sits — and perhaps it can be referred to the necessity we called extraneous. For just as it is necessary that you have done what you did, because time does not admit of the change of return or revocation, so also Socrates sits while he sits; therefore the flow of time is the cause of both necessity and impossibility."

"The necessity of violence, since violence is against the will, renders one free from blame. But we call it against the will — the necessity, impossibility, or even violence — when it is neither sought after, nor procured, nor tolerated, nor neglected."

And below, chapter 11 of the same work: "According to the error of those who say all things happen from necessity, it is not necessary that on account of this no one can sin or act well. And this appears from what we have said about necessity and impossibility — namely, which and when they excuse from guilt and obligation, and to what extent."

"We have shown that the necessity by which God necessarily always acts well, and the impossibility by which it is impossible for Him to act badly, in no way prevent or hinder Him from acting well and laudably in both respects. And this is because they neither violently impel Him to act well, nor violently hinder or turn Him from acting badly, nor does that impossibility in any way resist or contradict His will."

"So the necessity of celestial power or fate — which according to them is impossible to avert or impede, and which also moves human souls, as they think — moves them, I say, to the thoughts and affections that are in them, and through those to actions and the avoidance of deeds. Since they do not move them violently, but voluntarily, this does not excuse human souls from sins and faults."

"And this is because from whatever principle a voluntary deed is done — provided it is voluntary, that is, willed in any of the three ways we mentioned: either sought after, or tolerated, or neglected — it is always to be imputed to the one willing and acting by will. Nor does it follow that if he cannot do otherwise, or even will otherwise, he is for that reason excused — because he neither wills to be able otherwise nor to do otherwise nor to will otherwise."

"On account of this, Seneca says that every sin is so voluntary that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin. Wherefore necessity or impossibility that does not take away from a deed its being voluntary — that is, from the necessity which it is impossible not to be free — takes away neither guilt nor merit from that deed."

"In truth, however, if everything that moves our souls were outside us, and we did not have a motive principle of our works within us or in ourselves, everything would seem to be attributable to the extrinsic mover or movers, if there were several. Wherefore it would not be imputable to us, either for praise or blame, likewise neither for merit nor guilt. For according to this, neither would be in our power. For since from the mover alone who is outside us would come our wills, and the aversions or repressions of our wills, and such a mover would in no way be in our power, those wills would not be in our power. Nor would they be in us as our actions and works, but only as passions from an extrinsic agent, and we would be merely receivers of such impressions and in no way agents. Wherefore we would act neither well nor badly, but the celestial power or fate would do all these things that seem to be our actions, and we would be merely instruments of celestial power and fate."

"Now it is manifest that to an instrument the operation performed through it is not to be imputed, for praise or blame, guilt or merit — just as the various motions of the mill-wheel, neither in their essence nor in their slowness or speed, can be blameworthy imputed to the wheel itself, but to the water alone that impels and revolves it."

"Wherefore it is manifest that if celestial power or fate, or any other extrinsic mover, were to move human souls to willing or not willing, it does not take away from them the mastery, command, and authority over their own wills and actions, since it can impose force, violence, or compulsion upon them for these things. And this is on account of the freedom and sovereignty of the will, on account of which it endures no compulsion and is susceptible of it in no way whatsoever."

From these things, therefore, it evidently appears that even if someone has been necessitated to do something good or evil, if nevertheless he is ignorant of that necessitation and does it voluntarily and freely, as far as lies in him, he merits. But because ignorance is not the per se cause of meriting, nor does merit necessarily follow from it, one can also merit when necessitated to do something not ignorantly but with true knowledge.

For if ignorance were necessarily prerequisite to merit, it would be its essential cause, as I.4 and I.13 teach. For every effect is produced, or can be produced, when all and only its essential

causes are posited. But ignorance is not any essential cause of merit, as induction makes manifest; ignorance itself is a pure privation and nothing, wherefore it causes no true thing. And by II.18 of this work, merit is a true existing thing.

Therefore, with the aforementioned ignorance removed and all essential causes of merit remaining, there will be merit just as before — especially because the habit opposed to ignorance, that is, knowledge, does not formally conflict with merit, nor with any other positive thing necessarily concurring with such merit.

Wherefore it also seems that the essential and per se reason for meriting is this: the meritorious agent — if I may speak thus, namely one capable of meriting — does something moral freely, as far as lies in him, or simply freely — that is, voluntarily or spontaneously. I added "meritorious agent" to distinguish from God and the perfectly confirmed saints, as they will be after the final judgment, who can do such things and in such a way without meriting, because they are not or will not be capable of meriting.

This seems very consonant with reason. For if someone, although knowingly necessitated to do something for a friend, does this for him not unwillingly as if compelled by necessity, but as far as lies in him freely and entirely spontaneously and devoutly and with most grateful love — it seems that reason requires and gratitude compels that the one benefited should return some favor to his benefactor, or at least repay some grateful effect. For the inmost force of gratitude does not permit that he should be to him like the rest of men, like a heathen and a tax collector, who never loved him freely, never wished him well, and never benefited him in the least.

All this is demonstrated most clearly in the Lord Jesus Christ, who was in a certain manner necessitated to all His meritorious works, as the present chapter showed — and not ignorantly but with distinct knowledge, as no Christian doubts. He Himself also expressly attests this, saying: "I cannot do anything of Myself, but as I hear, I judge" (John 5) — which He said of Himself according to His human nature, as II.30 cites.

Hence Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II.5, dividing necessity in two according to Augustine's aforementioned distinction, shows that one kind implies prohibition or compulsion, and renders the necessitated person unwilling; and the other implies none of these things, but only the immutability of a spontaneous will. The first, as he says, takes away the grace and merit of the one acting; but the second does not take them away, but is compatible with and increases them.

Wherefore, to the point, he first asks: "How shall we impute our salvation to His grace, if He saves us by necessity?" And immediately responds: "There is a necessity that takes away or diminishes the grace owed to the benefactor; and there is a necessity on account of which greater gratitude is owed for the benefit. For when someone under necessity to which he is subject does good unwillingly, little or no gratitude is owed him. But when he voluntarily subjects himself to the necessity of doing good and does not bear it unwillingly, then indeed he deserves greater

gratitude for the benefit. For this is not to be called necessity but grace, because he undertook and keeps it not under compulsion but freely."

"For if what you spontaneously promise today to give tomorrow, you give tomorrow with the same will — although it is necessary for you tomorrow to fulfill the promise if you can, or else lie — nevertheless the one to whom you give owes you no less for the benefit bestowed than if you had not promised, since you were not necessitated to make yourself a debtor before the time of giving."

"Such it is when someone spontaneously vows the resolution of a holy way of life. For although after the vow he must keep it of necessity, lest he incur the damnation of an apostate — and although he could be compelled to keep it if he were unwilling — nevertheless, if he keeps what he vowed not unwillingly, he is no less but rather more pleasing to God than if he had not vowed, because he denied himself not only the common life but even its license for God's sake. Nor should he be said to live holily by necessity, but by the same freedom with which he vowed."

And Anselm recites the same distinction in chapters 10 and 17, where he shows at length that Christ did and suffered all things by this second necessity. Hence he also says that the God-man was unable to will to preserve His life so that He would never die, and since He had this from Himself — namely that He could not will it — not by necessity but by free power, He laid down His life. This he also demonstrates consequently by impossible and ostensive proof.

First by *reductio ad impossibile* in this way: Christ could have not died; therefore the faith of the blessed Virgin and of the ancient saints, by which they believed Christ would suffer — in which faith they were cleansed from sin — could then always previously have been false. And if it had been false, it would have cleansed no one. Therefore the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints could then never previously have been cleansed, even though it was then a past truth that they had been cleansed.

Second, he demonstrates this ostensively, by arguing from the contrary in this way: At the time of Christ incarnate but not yet having suffered, it was a past and necessary truth that the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints had been cleansed in the genuine — not feigned — faith of Christ's future passion. Therefore it was then necessary that Christ suffer; for if the antecedent is necessary, the consequent will be likewise, as he supposes — which the Philosopher shows in *Prior Analytics* I. Otherwise the false would sometimes follow from the true.

For if the consequent were not necessary, it would either be false or could become false; therefore, according to Anselm, as much as it was necessary at the time of the incarnate but not yet suffering Christ that the blessed Virgin and the ancient saints had been cleansed, so much was it necessary that Christ would suffer — by the second mode of necessity, not the first.

Hence among other things he says: "He was truly going to die, because if He were not truly going to die, the faith in His future death — through which both that Virgin from whom He was born and many others were cleansed from sin — would not have been true. For if it were not

true, it could have availed nothing. Therefore if He could have not died, He could have made not true what was true."

Then, asking why it was true before He died that He was going to die, and the disciple answering that it was because He Himself willed this spontaneously and with immutable will, Anselm adds: "If therefore, as you say, He could not have not died because He was truly going to die, and He was truly going to die because He Himself spontaneously and immutably willed it, it follows that He could not have not died for no other reason than that He willed to die with immutable will."

And shortly after he says: "When we say that that man who, according to the unity of person, as was said above, is Himself the same who is the Son of God, God — could not have not died or willed not to die after He was born of the Virgin — no inability to preserve or will to preserve His immortal life is signified in Him, but rather the immutability of His will by which He spontaneously made Himself man for this purpose: that persevering in the same will He might die, and because no thing could change that will."

"For it would be more of an inability than an ability if He could will to lie or to deceive or to change the will which He previously willed to be immutable. And if, as I said above, when someone spontaneously resolves to do some good thing and afterward fulfills with the same will what he resolved — although he could be compelled to pay the promise if he were unwilling — he is not to be said to act from necessity, but from the same free will with which he resolved."

"For neither necessity nor inability should be said to cause something to be done or not done where neither necessity nor inability effects anything, but will alone. If, I say, it is so in a man, much more are necessity and inability by no means to be named in God, who does nothing except what He wills, and whose will no force can compel or prevent."

"Finally, the Virgin, who was made clean through faith so that He could be taken from her, by no means believed He would die except because He would will it — just as she had learned through the Prophet who said of Him, 'He was offered because He Himself willed it.' Wherefore, since her faith was true, it was necessary that it would be so, just as she believed."

Reading and rereading diligently this book of Anselm, the Christian philosopher, I venture to assert as certain that it was his considered judgment that Christ suffered and did all things by the second aforementioned necessity, not the first. Nor is there any doubt that Christ merited most abundantly in both ways. Wherefore, according to the same Anselm, there is no doubt that known necessity and merit are not incompatible.

The same seems to be attested by Lombard, who in *Sentences* II, dist. 5 and 11, says that the holy confirmed angels continually progress in meriting; and in *Sentences* IV, dist. 45, says that the angels know what is in God's will and will it themselves: "For they are so devoted to the supernal will that they can will nothing apart from His will." And it is not likely that the angels themselves are ignorant of that necessity, since we ignorant humans know it.

Likewise: you know that you are now meriting — let this be supposed. And you know, according to the Philosopher, *De Interpretatione*, last chapter, that what is, when it is, is necessarily. You therefore know that you are necessarily now meriting; wherefore you also know that known necessity and merit are not incompatible.

The first of these demonstrations, therefore — which showed the non-incompatibility of necessity and merit through ignorance — is a demonstration of cognition only. It is neither *propter quid* nor *quia*, since it proceeds neither from cause to effect nor conversely. Yet it makes us know the truth more openly and easily. The second is *propter quid*, because it proceeds from cause. The third — namely in the last argument — is a demonstration only *quia*, because it is taken from the effect. These three demonstrations Averroes briefly touches upon in his commentary on *Physics* VIII.58, though in other words.

The third part of the corollary is clear from the first, together with I.29. The fourth part of the corollary — striving to harmonize fate, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace with free will and merit — follows evidently from the first and second. For the reason they seem to be discordant is only that the former are believed to imply necessity, and the latter freedom; but these are not mutually incompatible, but stand together harmoniously, as the aforementioned parts attest.

CHAPTER 2: THAT GOD IN A CERTAIN MANNER NECESSITATES EVERY CREATED WILL TO EVERY FREE ACT OF ITS OWN, AND TO EVERY FREE CESSATION AND REST FROM ACT, AND THIS BY A NATURALLY PRECEDING NECESSITY.

Here, consequently, I think it should be shown that God in a certain manner necessitates every created will to every free act of its own, and to every free cessation and rest from act, and this by a naturally preceding necessity.

For, as Anselm teaches in *Cur Deus Homo* I.17 and *On the Harmony* 2, there is a twofold necessity — namely preceding and following, or accompanying. The preceding makes a thing to be, and this is found in all irrational agents; for when the active principle approaches the passive with the due circumstances, the effect necessarily follows, as the Philosopher teaches, *Metaphysics* IX.10. And the same applies to the necessity of non-being, concerning things prevented from being by irrational agents.

The following or accompanying necessity, however, is one that in a certain way is produced by the existing thing, and arises and descends from any being whatsoever, and inseparably follows and individually accompanies it — and similarly non-being. And this, according to the Philosopher, *De Interpretatione*, last chapter, is found universally in all beings and non-beings whatsoever. Hence he says: "What is, when it is, and what is not, when it is not, is necessarily." And Anselm holds the same in the aforementioned places.

Not only is this preceding necessity found in irrational agents and their acts, but also in rational agents acting from the freedom of will and their free acts. For once there is posited in a rational and free agent both the power and the will to do any free extrinsic thing, it necessarily follows that it is done — for nothing required is lacking.

And the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* IX [10]: "What is possible according to reason necessarily does, when it desires that for which it has the power, and in the way it has it." And he teaches the same opinion elsewhere frequently, as is recounted in the foregoing.

From this a certain general rule seems perspicuously to follow: that universally every effect produced by any rational or irrational and free agent is produced in this way — that once its agent is posited with all its sufficient naturally prior dispositions by which it produces the effect, the production necessarily and infallibly follows, and it is produced from a naturally preceding necessity. This is also sufficiently apparent from the meanings of the terms.

Hence there can be drawn the following definition of naturally preceding necessity: it is an active cause which, once posited with all its sufficient naturally prior dispositions by which it causes its effect, necessarily and infallibly results in that effect being caused.

And from this can clearly be known the definition of an effect that is necessary by naturally preceding necessity: namely, it is an effect caused by a cause which, once fully posited, necessarily results in that effect being caused.

But someone will perhaps object here by denying the rule and the foregoing definitions, saying that they are true of lower and secondary causes only, but not of the supreme and first cause — on the ground that every secondary cause, whenever and however it is disposed or affected, with respect to whatever it can cause or has caused, is necessarily then so disposed or affected. But the first cause is not so, as the respondent claims, because although God now wills something to be future — say the Antichrist — it is not necessary for now that He so wills, but He can for now not so will.

But according to this responsive objection, there would be absolutely no antecedent necessity with respect to any effect, nor any effect necessary with respect to its cause by naturally preceding necessity. For no secondary cause can do anything without the co-efficiency and pre-efficiency of the first cause — namely the divine will — as II.20 and II.30 showed. If therefore in that cause there is no antecedent necessity, neither can there be in any other.

Furthermore, this effect now made or created immediately by God must necessarily now exist; therefore also its efficient or creating cause — namely the divine will — must exist. Or if that will could for now not exist, then this effect too could not exist, contrary to the foregoing.

Similarly it can be argued concerning any past effect: since according to I.14, the will of God is the cause of every past thing, therefore it is past. And if someone says that the divine will is an antecedent necessity with respect to present and past things but by no means with respect to

future things, he makes the divine will mutable — against I.5 and I.23. For he makes the divine will free with respect to future things according to contradiction, to such an extent that at the same instant in which it exists with respect to some future thing, it could not exist; and when that future thing becomes present or passes into the past, he makes it necessary with the opposite necessity.

Furthermore, why cannot the omnipotent will of God be as necessary and as great a necessity with respect to a future effect as with respect to a present or past one? For if of itself alone it is necessary and an antecedent necessity with respect to the present and past, it can be likewise with respect to the future, since it intrinsically always relates in entirely the same way to the same thing — first as future, second as present, and third as past.

But if the antecedent necessity with respect to the present and past is posited as not sufficiently or totally from itself alone, but from the aid of something else — namely the present or past thing — then it does not seem fully self-sufficient, nor fully omnipotent, against the first supposition, parts 3, 5, and 7 of the corollary of I.1.

If also the present thing in some way helped to produce the necessity in the divine will with respect to that present thing, it seems that it would be some cause of it and would in some way cause it; therefore it would be naturally prior that the present thing exists and necessarily now exists, than that the divine will has that intrinsic necessity — which can be refuted by I.20 and II.30. Moreover, if that necessity in the divine will were so constituted, it would be a subsequent necessity, and the necessity of the present thing would be an antecedent necessity — contrary to the hypothesis.

If also some extrinsic aid can furnish the divine will with intrinsic necessity with respect to all present and past things, why not similarly with respect to all future things, or some future thing?

Furthermore, even if the divine will that now exists with respect to some future thing could for now not exist with respect to it, as the response claims, this is not in the power of that future thing, nor of any lower cause, nor of any causes, but only in the free power of the divine will — and that will is universally efficacious and infallible in causing. Therefore it is an antecedent necessity with respect to that future thing.

Behold how this manner of speaking about naturally antecedent necessity accords with reason. It also accords with the manner of speaking — indeed, it is the manner of speaking — of the older philosophers and theologians, and of our Fathers, as the foregoing here and in the previous chapter of this work teaches.

Hence Augustine, *On Free Will* III.3: "The will of Him" — namely God — "is my necessity." And although this is said under the name of the disciple, Augustine does not reject but approves it, showing that will and necessity are not incompatible. With this also the words and opinion of Augustine accord, *City of God* V.9 and 10, as set forth above in this work. He also, *On the Literal*

Interpretation of Genesis VI.22, shows that the necessity of future things is in God, in the divine will, where he says: "This is necessarily future because He wills it."

This also accords with the words and mind of Anselm cited in the previous chapter. Hence *Cur Deus Homo* II.17: "All necessity and impossibility are subject to His will; but His will is subject to no necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible except because He so wills." And below, speaking of Christ, he says: "If you wish to know the true necessity of all that He did and suffered, know that all things were of necessity because He Himself willed it."

And in a certain meditation of his on human redemption, he says: "All necessity and impossibility are subject to His will, for what He wills must necessarily be, and what He does not will is impossible to be."

The same, *On the Harmony* 2, after the aforementioned distinction about necessity and its extensive demonstration, says: "The work of a will, to which it is given that what it wills should be and what it does not will should not be, is voluntary or spontaneous, since it is done by a spontaneous will. And it is necessary in two ways: because it is compelled to be done by the will, and because what is done cannot simultaneously not be done." "The work," he says, "of a will" — that is, the operation or extrinsic product proceeding from a willing will — "is compelled," that is, necessitated, as his procedure and words clearly manifest.

Hence *Metaphysics* V.16, where one translation says: "What is prior and more powerful is that whose pre-volition the other must necessarily follow"; another translation says: "What is stronger and prior is that which compels the other to follow its will." Which translation Averroes, expounding, says: "Universally, that which is stronger and more worthy is called 'prior,' and it is that which compels what is posterior so that its will follows its own will, because the will of the weaker follows the will of the stronger" — as the first chapter of this book more fully recounted.

The most divine Isaiah also seems to have had the same manner of speaking by divine inspiration, predicting concerning Christ that He would come "as a violent river, which the Spirit of the Lord compels" — "violent," that is, not unwilling but full of force, the force of the Spirit of the Lord, who rested upon Him fully and drove Him in all things and led Him, and whom He necessarily followed in all things, as II.30 and III.1 more fully declared.

Hence Matthew says that Jesus was "led by the Spirit into the desert"; and Luke, that "He was driven by the Spirit into the desert"; and Mark, that the Spirit "cast out" or, according to another reading, "compelled" Him into the desert — all of which are most certainly said of the Holy Spirit, as II.30 briefly recalled.

Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned a certain error which said that for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it is not sufficient that the first cause itself be unimpedable, but it is required that the intermediate causes also be unimpedable. "Error," says the Bishop, "because then God could not produce any necessary effect without posterior causes."

Therefore all effects, even free ones, are necessary with respect to the first cause, because they proceed from His will, which cannot in any way be impeded.

And if anyone thinks to object by saying that the Parisian article does not say universally "all effects" but only particularly or indefinitely "effects" — I confess I do not know how it was written in the original article. I do know, however, that among the heavily corrected articles I found it written universally. Nor does it matter; for from that particular or indefinite proposition, together with other true ones, the universal follows evidently.

For if it suffices for some effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause that it is unimpedable with respect to them — since universally all effects are produced by it, and it is universally unimpedable with respect to some effects, or even to any single one, as the foregoing demonstrated — all effects are necessary with respect to it.

With these things supposed, the principal conclusion is easily shown. For according to the previous chapter, God can so necessitate every created will, and this by naturally preceding necessity — because the entire chapter proceeds according to such necessity. And He could not do this by doing anything other than merely willing, since He acts externally in no other way, as I.9 and I.10 teach. Nor by willing otherwise than as naturally prior; and by II.20 joined with II.30, He always so wills — as was also argued more fully in the previous chapter.

Likewise, by the same II.20, God through His will is the efficient cause properly of every act of the created will; and by the same II.30, He is naturally prior to the created will; and by I.10, the divine will cannot be frustrated. Therefore, by the general rule and definitions set forth above, every act of the created will is produced from a naturally preceding necessity — indeed, by the same reasoning, every created will that does anything does it from a naturally preceding necessity.

To the same conclusion it is argued not implausibly in this way: In the created will that now wills, there is a certain necessity to will — at least a subsequent necessity — and in the divine will likewise, which wills and causes the created will to now will, since according to the Philosopher and Anselm cited above, "What is, when it is, is necessarily."

These two necessities in these two wills — the divine and the human — are either co-equal and disparate in causality, unrelated to each other, or they are not. If they are such, then according to what was established in II.25, both are reduced to a third, as to a common cause prior to both. Therefore the divine will is necessitated by some prior cause to will something outside God — which no one doubts to be false.

For that cause is either rational and free, or irrational and necessary in acting. If the first is granted, then the divine will is not the first of all free causes, nor God the first of free agents — the opposite of which is shown by the first supposition of Book I and chapter 9, together with II.20 and following, and II.30. If the second is granted, then God wills and does something outside Himself by absolutely absolute necessity — which is destroyed by the foregoing.

Moreover, every necessity in any creature, like anything else, is produced by the divine will as by a prior efficient cause, as I.9 taught. Therefore every necessity of willing in the created will is effected by the divine will. Therefore those two aforementioned necessities cannot be called disparate and co-equal with one another. Nor does anyone so rave or go mad as to say that the necessity in the human will is a naturally preceding and efficient cause with respect to the necessity in the divine will; for this would derogate too much from His supreme freedom — which is also proved false by the foregoing.

Therefore that necessity in the divine will is naturally prior to the necessity in the human will, and is its efficient cause.

Likewise, no created will in its acts is freer than the human will of Christ, and His divine will necessitated it to each of His acts, as was shown here above and in the previous chapter. Therefore it also in a certain manner necessitates every other will.

The divine will also antecedently necessitates the blessed confirmed in heaven to their beatific act, and to not sinning, and in the contrary manner the damned, as II.15, 16, and 17 suggested. Why then not all other agents by a similar reasoning?

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT A CERTAIN KIND OF ANTECEDENT NECESSITY AND FREEDOM AND MERIT ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE; AND THAT NO LOWER CAUSE, BUT ONLY THE HIGHER — NAMELY THE WILL OF GOD — IS AN ANTECEDENT NECESSITY WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECT; AND THAT ALL THINGS THAT ARE, HAPPEN, AND COME ABOUT, ARE, HAPPEN, AND COME ABOUT FROM SOME NECESSITY NATURALLY PRECEDING THEM.

Hence it evidently follows that a certain kind of antecedent necessity and freedom and merit are not incompatible, and that no lower cause, but only the higher — namely the will of God — is an antecedent necessity, and that all things that are, happen, and come about, are, happen, and come about from some necessity naturally preceding them.

For the first part of this is shown most clearly by the principal conclusion, which can also be shown straightforwardly in the same way. And the second follows from this first. This corollary can also be demonstrated as to these parts in the same way as the previous one was demonstrated.

The second part of this follows manifestly, since no lower cause, however disposed, can do anything if the divine will resists, or even if it does not act — as I.10, I.9, and II.20 clearly show. Therefore the divine will alone remains as the antecedent necessity.

Hence together with I.9 follows the last part of this corollary.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, BOOK III (continued)

CHAPTER 3: ON THE CONTINGENT IN EITHER DIRECTION ACCORDING TO DIVERSE OPINIONS, AND THAT IT EXISTS.

Now, according to the general rule about naturally preceding necessity touched on in the preceding chapter, it seems that the contingent in either direction must be discussed. Concerning this contingent there are diverse opinions.

[Opinion 1] Some say that nothing is so contingent, but will be; and they say that such a contingent does not exist in present things, but in future things.

[Opinion 2] Others say the contingent exists in things; and these are divided in many ways. Some say it exists in certain propositions about the future, and in no other things. Others posit it in other things: some only in passive potencies, others only in active ones — and these only in efficient causes actually acting. Others posit it in their effects, only while they are actually being produced.

[Opinion 7] Still others say that something is contingent in either direction only because, and for the reason that, God wills it to be able to be and not to be.

The **motive of the first opinion** is this: no being essentially relates to both parts of a contradiction — to being and not being — because every being is determined to being. But every contingent in either direction, or equally contingent thing, relates equally to these. Otherwise it would not be contingent in either direction and equally. Hence the Philosopher, *Prior Analytics* I, in the chapter on the contingent, calling this the "indefinite contingent," says: "Indefinite because it is no more this way than that." This also seems to be the opinion of the same Philosopher, *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter, where in things that are and things that have been made, he posits necessity because of determinate truth; but in things that will be, contingency in either direction, because of indeterminate truth in singular future propositions that are subject to our power and are no more naturally apt to happen one way than the other.

Hence before that last chapter he says: "In those things therefore that are, and that have been made, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false." And below in the last chapter he adds: "Wherefore in other future things, whatever are said to be of such a kind according to potency, it is manifest that not all things happen of necessity, but some are in either direction — the affirmation is no more true than the negation; in others, one is true more often and for the most part, but it is possible for the other to occur and the former not at all. Therefore what is, when it is, and what is not, when it is not, is necessarily."

And below: "I say that it is necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow or there will not be; but it is not necessary that there will be a naval battle tomorrow, nor is it necessary that there will not be. But that there will be or will not be is necessary. Wherefore, since propositions are

true just as things are, it is manifest that whatever things are such that either alternative obtains and their contraries can occur, it is necessary that the contradiction be similarly disposed."

Where Boethius also says: "Contingent things are whatever relate equally to being and to not being." And below: "These things that we call 'in either direction' are such that while they have not yet been done, they can both be done and not be done."

This motive, however, should not move us. For if such a contingent, because it is equally contingent, is therefore not existing, by the same reasoning it will not be non-existing, nor more future than present, nor even more future than not future. Otherwise it would not relate equally to both parts but would be under only one. Therefore it would have to neither be nor not be, neither be future nor not be future — and so for each pair of contradictories — but it would mediate equally between all contradictories, which evidently implies a contradiction. This motive, therefore, is further removed from the truth.

And the opinion itself is not true: for the contingent necessary, the contingent in the majority of cases, and the contingent in fewer cases are opposed to the equally contingent. And if one of the opposites is possible or natural, so is the other, as was shown in II.1. But those are possible and natural things that actually exist; therefore the equally contingent is possible to be in act — indeed, naturally is in act.

The second position concedes that such a contingent exists, on account of the many authorities attesting to this, but not in things distinct from propositions, on account of the motive set forth above. Therefore it exists only in certain propositions, as was said. But its motive has already been removed, and the position itself is close to error. For if contingency is in such propositions, this is either on account of the propositions themselves insofar as they essentially exist as such things — and then it is in things already actually existing, and by the same reasoning by which contingency is posited in these things, it could be posited in other present things, which these deny — or contingency is posited in such propositions on account of the things signified by them, and then it should rather be posited in those things than in the propositions, for the Philosopher says, *Posterior Analytics* I.2: "That on account of which each thing is such, is itself more such." And in the *Categories*, chapter on substance: "In the fact that a thing is or is not, the proposition is said to be true or false." And *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter: "Propositions are true just as things are" — and reason teaches the same. Therefore this opinion really posits the same as the preceding one.

The third opinion is that of Averroes himself, on *Physics* II, comment 48, and his reasoning is this: equal contingency is in certain potencies, and not in active ones; therefore only in passive ones. But his strongest reason, which can be drawn from his words there and on *Physics* VIII, comment 8, is this: if equal contingency is posited in some active potency, that potency relates equally to acting and not acting, and to doing one of the opposites and the other; therefore it will do neither or both — for why would it do this rather than that?

But this reasoning of theirs is entirely irrational, for it destroys all freedom — or rather, is destroyed by freedom — as the 34th part of the corollary of I.1 most clearly demonstrated, showing that once a rational and free agent is posited with all the naturally prior dispositions by which it produces its free action, it does not necessarily follow that it produces it, nor does it necessarily follow that if it produces some action it will produce this one — but the opposite of each can stand. Thus both the opinion and the reason of the one holding it perish together.

The fourth opinion cannot stand. For in a stone at rest there is equal contingency — that it be moved to the east or west, to the north or south. With the third and fourth destroyed, the fifth and sixth are similarly destroyed.

The seventh opinion opines with wondrous wonder. For to begin with the easier matters: every existing thing determinately and necessarily now exists, and every non-being determinately and necessarily now does not exist. Neither of these, therefore, indifferently and equally in either direction, relates to being or not being — which nevertheless, according to the foregoing, seems to belong to the nature of this contingent.

Also, if something is contingent because God wills it to be able to be and not to be, by similar reasoning something is necessary because God wills it to be so and not to be able not to be — for contraries ought to have contrary reasons. This is contrary to what was previously shown in I.21. For it is not because God wills Himself to be that it is necessary for Him to be, but rather the reverse.

Furthermore, that divine volition or will which is posited as the cause of such contingency in things is either simply and absolutely necessary, or contingent. Not absolutely necessary, since by I.10 it is a simply efficacious and infrustrable cause in every way, and all its effects would come about absolutely necessarily. For who does not know that from an absolutely necessary antecedent in an absolutely necessary consequence, nothing follows except what is absolutely necessary — just as from the true nothing follows except the true? And so every effect posited as contingent in either direction, whether present or future, would be and would have been absolutely necessary.

If, however, that will is contingent — what is the cause of its contingency? If another such will, that one is either necessary or contingent: not necessary, for the reasons given; if contingent, the question returns — what is the cause of its contingency? And so either there will be an infinite regress in such wills, or it will stop at some divine will or volition that is contingent in either direction, not for the sole reason that God wills it to be so contingent, but for some other proper reason.

CHAPTER 4: WHAT THE CONTINGENT IN EITHER DIRECTION IS.

Having established through the foregoing that the contingent in either direction exists, and what and of what kind it is not, it remains consequently to inquire what it is and of what kind.

According to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* IX.10: just as when an irrational agent is posited with all the sufficient and naturally prior dispositions for acting, it follows of necessity that it acts — so according to the same author in the same place, when a rational agent is posited with all the sufficient and naturally prior dispositions for its free action, it does not follow of necessity that it acts, nor does it follow that it does not act, but the opposite of each can stand, as the first chapter of Book I more fully manifests.

One brief demonstration of this is worth recalling. Supposing that A is some rational and free agent, I take its first free act, which is B, and let C be the collection of all sufficient and naturally prior dispositions. Either, then, given C, B is necessarily produced, or not. If so, and it is not in A's free power for C to be posited, or for any part of it — since the whole of C naturally precedes B, and B is the first free act of A — then neither is B in A's free power, the opposite of which was stated. But if given C, B is not necessarily produced, we have what was sought. For now A with C produces B, and this does not follow necessarily; therefore the opposite can stand; therefore it is possible that A stands with C without producing B, and also while producing it.

Wherefore, just as according to the foregoing in this chapter, together with the general rule about naturally preceding necessity set forth in III.2, the proper effect of an irrational agent is said to be produced from a naturally preceding necessity — naturally predetermined to one part only — so the proper act of a rational and free agent is rightly said to be produced from a naturally preceding freedom — naturally undetermined to either part, but relating equally to either alternative.

And just as the former is called a contingent necessary with respect to its total cause, so the latter is called a contingent that is free, in either direction, and equal with respect to its total cause.

This is also clear from Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning a certain erroneous article that said: "When the will is in such a disposition in which it is naturally apt to be moved, and the mover is so disposed that it is naturally apt to so move, it is impossible for the will not to will." And again another article positing: "Knowledge of contraries is the sole reason why the rational soul can do opposites, and a power that is simply one cannot do opposites except per accidens and by reason of something else."

Wherefore it seems to me that the equally contingent, taken per se and primarily, can be fittingly defined thus: **it is the per se and primary act of a free agent, which — once posited with all the naturally prior dispositions with which it produces it — does not necessarily follow as produced, but either part can stand equally.**

Furthermore, the equally contingent is taken in many ways; but according to what was established in II.26, it is taken per se and primarily in one way only, and to that primary way all others are reduced as attributive and accessory. And that way is the one described above.

For the equally contingent, since it exists, is per se and primarily either a cause or an effect — but not a cause. For every such contingent happens to be from something else; for if it were per se and from itself alone, it would not be said to "contingently happen" in this way. For who would say that God is so contingent, and that it so contingently happens that God exists?

Nor is a cause per se and primarily so contingent. For a cause that is from another is not from another insofar as it is a cause, but insofar as it is an effect.

The equally contingent, therefore, per se and primarily, is an effect, or act — as the definition just given states — **of a free agent**, because not of an irrational agent, as the foregoing has taught. And it is its per se effect — that is, according to what it is as a free agent (for it also produces many effects not freely but necessarily, each of which is a contingent necessary with respect to its total cause). And it is its first effect or act — namely an immanent action, such as willing or not-willing — not its extrinsic and secondary effect, namely a transient or exterior operation. For such a secondary effect, once the primary act from which it proceeds (namely willing or not-willing) is posited, will be produced from a naturally preceding necessity, as III.2 taught. Therefore it is a contingent necessary with respect to its total cause, not simply an equally contingent thing. Nevertheless, this secondary effect can in a certain way be called denominatively and tropically an equally contingent thing, because it is an action derived from an agent or action that per se and primarily acts or contingently occurs equally.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: WHAT THE FREEDOM OF CONTRADICTION IS, AND WHAT IS AN ACT FREE BY THE FREEDOM OF CONTRADICTION.

Hence it is clearly known what the freedom of contradiction is, and what is an act free by the freedom of contradiction.

The freedom of contradiction is a free active power which, once posited with all the dispositions necessary for acting, can freely act and not act; nor does it follow of necessity that it acts, but both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand.

An **act free by the freedom of contradiction** is the proper act of the freedom of contradiction — that is, of a free active power — which, once posited with all the naturally prior dispositions for the act, can freely be produced or not produced; that is, it does not necessarily follow that the act is produced, but both this and the other part of the contradiction can equally stand.

CHAPTER 5: DRAWS QUASI-COROLLARILY 13 PARTS FROM THE FOREGOING.

[1] First: propositions about the equally contingent are converted through opposite qualities.

[2] Second: some good consequence is neither simply necessary nor "as of now" necessary, but equally contingent.

[3] Third: some indeterminate cause — that is, one not predetermined to acting — does act.

[4] Fourth: every and only an act free by the freedom of contradiction is equally contingent.

[5] Fifth: every and only an equally contingent thing is an act free by the freedom of contradiction.

[6] Sixth: contingency in either direction and necessity are not incompatible.

[7] Seventh: contingency is properly said with respect to the present.

[8] Eighth: freedom is properly said with respect to the present.

[9] Ninth: no act of a creature is simply equally contingent, but only in a determinate genus — namely with respect to lower causes.

[10] Tenth: no act of a creature is free simply by the freedom of contradiction, but only in a qualified sense — namely with respect to all secondary causes.

[11] Eleventh: only an act of the divine will directed outward is simply equally contingent.

[12] Twelfth: only an act of the divine will directed outward is free simply by the freedom of contradiction.

[13] Thirteenth: the first and supreme freedom of contradiction, and the similar contingency in either direction, is in the divine will; and these are the causes of similar freedom and contingency in all other things.

[Bradwardine then demonstrates each of the thirteen parts in order:]

Part 1 follows manifestly from the preceding chapter. For according to what was shown there, whatever contingently and equally can happen or be from any cause — given that total cause with all its naturally prior dispositions — can also contingently and equally not happen and not be, and vice versa.

Part 2 similarly follows. For according to the authorities cited above, "in the fact that a thing is or is not, the proposition is said to be true or false," and "propositions are true just as things are." And in reality, now in fact, from this free cause with these naturally antecedent dispositions, this free act is really produced and follows — but not necessarily by antecedent necessity, either simply or "as of now," as is clear from the definition of the equally contingent given in the preceding chapter, together with the general rule about naturally preceding necessity shown in III.2 — but only contingently and equally.

Such equally contingent consequences are sufficiently shown by everyday words and deeds. For among all people, nations, and languages it is commonly said: "If you do this or that, I will do

this or that"; and "If this king or people does this to that one, the other will repay this to this one" — and so they say and so they do consequently. Many such consequences are also found in Sacred Scripture: Genesis 13, Abraham said to Lot: "If you go to the left, I will take the right; if you choose the right, I will go to the left." And Matthew 11: "Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida; for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes." Other such conditionals, not a few, are placed most frequently in Scripture, none of which is necessary in any way, but only contingent equally, just as the thing itself.

Part 3 also follows manifestly. For every determination of an active cause to acting naturally precedes the action to which it determines. But by the foregoing in the preceding chapter, it is possible that some freely active cause is entirely equal regarding all the naturally prior dispositions of its free act at the time of rest and at the time of action; and at the time of rest it is undetermined; therefore also at the time of action. Nor does the posterior effect determine its efficient cause to acting, for the reason stated.

Part 6 is immediately inferred. For by what was shown in this chapter and the preceding one and the third, the contingent in either direction is some existing thing; and by the Philosopher, *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter: "What is, when it is, is necessarily."

But so that this may be more clearly declared, we must begin a little higher. It should be known, according to what was shown in the preceding chapter, that **the contingent can be taken in two ways**: in one way, per se, properly, and in the first degree of contingency — such is the first and immanent act of a rational and free agent with the freedom of contradiction, such as willing. And such contingency and the following necessity are not incompatible, as has already been shown.

In another way, the contingent can be taken per accidens in a certain way, or through another thing, secondarily and denominatively, and in the second degree — such is the transient and extrinsic act of the aforesaid agent descending from the first act, such as moving the hand, the staff, and striking. Such an effect is necessary with respect to its total cause, as the preceding chapter teaches, and contingent similarly in the way described.

From this it is further clearly gathered that **one and the same exterior effect in the second degree of contingency can be called, with respect to one and the same cause (namely willing), both necessary by preceding necessity and also denominatively or by transumption necessary in a certain way by following necessity** — because its cause, namely that willing, is necessary in that way.

Part 7: The equally contingent, as III.3 showed, is some existing thing; and as the preceding chapter showed, the equally contingent per se, primarily, and properly taken is the act of a cause actually and presently acting.

John Scotus also says, on *Sentences* I, distinction 39: "A cause is not contingent merely because it pre-existed before this instant in which it causes, and then as pre-existing could have caused or

not caused; for just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so a cause, when it causes, then causes necessarily or contingently. From the fact therefore that in this instant the will causes this willing, and not necessarily, it does so contingently."

Part 8 is demonstrated from Part 7 joined with Part 4; it can also be demonstrated from the definitions of the freedom of contradiction and of its free act, which the corollary of the preceding chapter showed.

Part 9, as to the first part, follows evidently. For if any act of a creature were simply equally contingent, this would seem most of all to apply to the free act of a rational and free creature, as the foregoing in the preceding chapter teaches. But every free act of such a creature comes from a naturally preceding necessity, and is necessary in that way, as III.2 shows. Therefore by the definition of the equally contingent declared in the preceding chapter, no free act of a free creature is simply equally contingent — because it is necessary with respect to the divine will naturally pre-willing it.

And that every such act is equally contingent in a determinate genus — namely in the genus of lower causes — is clear from the same together with II.3. For once all the lower causes naturally prior to and producing such an act are posited, it does not necessarily follow that it is produced — but the opposite can equally stand.

Wherefore the Philosophers, who for the most part consider natural causes, say simply: "it contingently happens in either direction or equally to do this or that," and they mean this to contingently happen with respect to these causes. Therefore, according to the common manner of speaking, "contingent in either direction or equally" — though stated simply — is taken and signifies in this way.

Hence some say that contingency, freedom, possibility, impossibility, and necessity are said only with respect to lower causes, and not with respect to higher causes at all. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemning the article affirming that what is simply impossible — that is, in all ways — cannot be done by God or by another agent, adds: "Error, if it is understood of the impossible according to nature." The impossible according to nature — that is, according to lower causes — is more customarily called the simply impossible; and so similarly with the possible, the necessary, and the contingent.

Part 11 also follows manifestly. For according to what was shown in this chapter and the preceding one, some act of the will is simply equally contingent; and by Part 9, no act of the created will is such; therefore it is an act of the uncreated, divine will. And not directed inward, because God cannot not love Himself, nor can He not will any essential thing within Him — because then He could not be God. Therefore only directed outward.

This is also clear from the definition of the contingent similarly from the preceding chapter. For once there is posited in God the simple cognition of the Antichrist, together with the volitional power and all the naturally prior dispositions for the volition by which He wills the Antichrist to

exist, it does not necessarily follow that God so wills — but its opposite can equally stand, as was shown concerning a rational agent in the preceding chapter. For if this necessarily followed — since all things naturally preceding that volition in God are simply and absolutely necessary — it would be simply and absolutely necessary that God so wills. And thus by I.10, the Antichrist's future existence would be absolutely necessary, and this by a natural or violent naturally preceding necessity. Therefore nothing would be free or contingent — the opposite of which the foregoing has taught.

Part 13, as to the first part, patently follows from the foregoing. And once the first part is conceded, who will deny or doubt the second? For who does not know that the first in any genus is the cause of all others, insofar as they are contained in that genus? Who furthermore, having considered the foregoing, does not know that if the divine will were not free or contingent, but absolutely necessary, all other things would similarly be absolutely necessary? And this is perhaps what the seventh opinion recounted above was dreaming.

CHAPTER 6: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES.

Perhaps someone will object against what has been said.

Against Part 1: Let John be supposed contingently and equally not to will A. Therefore, converting through opposite qualities, it follows that John contingently and equally wills A. Therefore "John wills A" is equally contingent. Therefore by Parts 3 and 4, "John wills A" exists; therefore John wills A. Therefore John simultaneously wills A and does not will A.

Also, a pure negation posits nothing; therefore a negative proposition about the contingent in either direction does not posit the affirmative; therefore neither is it truly converted into it in any way.

Response: The proposition "It is contingent that John..." and every such proposition can be taken in two ways — de inesse and modally. Taken de inesse, it signifies that a contingent thing, or some contingent, is John's willing — and so the argument proceeds, but it does not conflict with the aforementioned conversion, because that conversion is made only in propositions taken modally. Taken modally, it does not signify that some contingent is John's willing, but that John can will in either direction.

Against Part 2: In such a contingent consequence, the opposite of the consequent stands "as of now" with the antecedent; therefore the consequence does not hold "as of now."

Response: I immediately deny the assumption. For the opposite of the consequent does not stand "as of now" with the antecedent, but "as of now" can stand. And therefore the consequence is not "as of now" necessary, but can for now fail to hold.

Against Part 3: If some active cause is undetermined to acting, there is no cause or reason why it should act rather than not act; therefore it simultaneously acts and does not act, or neither acts nor fails to act.

Response: III.3 and the 34th part of the corollary of I.1 respond to this.

Against Part 6: The Philosopher, *Prior Analytics* I and *De Interpretatione* II, seems to be expressly contrary. For according to his teaching, it evidently follows: "It is contingent to be; therefore it is contingent not to be; therefore it is not necessary to be" — and conversely: "It is necessary to be; therefore it is not contingent not to be; therefore it is not contingent in either direction to be." Therefore each of these evidently entails the contradiction of the other.

Response: It should be known that every contingency in either direction excludes some necessity and is incompatible with it, and vice versa. Wherefore, just as there is a twofold necessity — preceding and following — as III.2 taught, so also there is a **twofold contingency in either direction**: one properly and strictly taken, which excludes only the naturally preceding necessity and is incompatible with it alone (as is clear from the definitions of the equally contingent and of naturally preceding necessity given in III.4 and III.2) — yet this contingency does not exclude following necessity, nor is it incompatible with it. The other is contingency in either direction improperly, commonly, and broadly so called, which excludes both the aforementioned necessities from the contingent and is incompatible with both.

And so according to the Philosopher, nothing actually being or not being is said to contingently occur with respect to the present in the broad sense — because according to him, *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter: "What is, when it is, and what is not, when it is not, is necessarily" — namely by following necessity, as III.2 shows. But according to the same author in the same place, only the future is said to so contingently occur with respect to the future. For the future contingent, although for now it is necessary for it not to be (by this following necessity, because it now is not), for the future according to him it is by neither necessity necessary for it not to be or not to exist, or to be or to exist — but by the opposite of each, it can equally contingently happen this way or that.

Against Part 7: The authority of the Philosopher with the exposition of Boethius, *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter, adduced in III.3 for the first opinion, evidently suggests that contingency is found only in propositions about the future.

Response: Here one could respond, as Anselm seems to have responded in *Cur Deus Homo* II.17, by saying that Aristotle erred here — because by positing that everything that is, when it is, is of necessity, he seems to have destroyed the contingent in either direction, since necessity and contingency in either direction seem mutually incompatible. Hence Anselm, having distinguished necessity there into preceding and following (as III.2 set forth), adds concerning following necessity: "This is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions, seems to destroy either alternative and to assert that all things are of necessity."

Nevertheless, lest I so simply contradict so great a Philosopher and very many philosophical men, I say that **contingency in either direction is taken in two ways for the present purpose — properly and strictly, and commonly or broadly**, as the preceding response distinguished. The first is properly said with respect to the present; the second with respect to the future, as was shown just above. And I believe this to be the mind of the Philosopher's cited authority.

Against Part 8: Everything adduced against Part 7 applies here too, since every freedom is a contingency, as Part 4 of the preceding chapter demonstrated.

Also, everyone who freely operates is said to freely operate either because he can now freely operate and not operate, or because he previously could freely do both for now. The first cannot be said, on account of the frequently cited authority of the Philosopher ["What is, when it is, is necessarily"]; therefore the second remains — which proves that freedom is said only with respect to the future.

Response: These are easily resolved by a similar distinction about freedom to the distinction about contingency already given. For **freedom, as customarily understood, excludes necessity and is incompatible with it; and it can be taken in two ways — properly and strictly, and commonly or broadly**.

Properly, it excludes only naturally preceding necessity and is incompatible with it, as is clear from its definition which the corollary of III.4 set forth. But it does not exclude following necessity, nor is it incompatible with it — rather, it is compatible with it, embraces it, and includes it, as is clear from the said corollary joined with the corollary of III.1.

Freedom so taken is per se, primarily, and properly said with respect to the present. But commonly, broadly, and by vulgar transumption, it excludes all necessity — both preceding and following — and so, supposing that famous dictum of the Philosopher ("What is, when it is, is necessarily"), it is not said with respect to the past or present but only with respect to the future.

When it is asked why a person who freely operates is said to freely operate, I say: properly, because he operates from a power naturally preceding his operation, which — once posited with all the naturally prior dispositions for the work — does not necessarily result in operating, but both operating and not operating can equally stand, as the corollary of III.4 shows — by contrast with irrational agents, which when they can, act necessarily by a natural naturally preceding necessity, as the same III.4 taught.

This natural priority is what many contend about, saying: "Whoever freely operates previously could freely operate and not operate" — which has something false and something true in it. For if the verb "could" signifies a temporally preceding potency, it is false, as the proofs of Part 8 in the preceding chapter showed. But if it signifies a naturally preceding potency — namely that whoever freely operates has a potency naturally preceding his operation, from which he does not operate by a naturally preceding necessity, but with which both operating and not operating can stand — it is true, as the foregoing has taught.

Hence John Scotus, on *Sentences* I, distinction 39, immediately after his statement recounted above, adds: "There is therefore a potency of a cause for the opposite of what it causes, without succession; and that potency is a real potency of what is naturally prior, as a first act, for the opposites that are naturally posterior, as second acts. For the first act, considered in that instant in which it exists, is naturally prior to the second act; thus it posits the second act in being as its effect contingently — and as naturally prior, it could have not posited it, but its opposite, in being."

Against Part 9: Some creature acts such that, once its acting potency is posited with all the necessary concurrents — natural and supernatural — naturally prior to the action, the action does not necessarily follow, but both action and non-action can equally stand. Therefore by the definition of the equally contingent given in III.4, that action is simply equally contingent. Otherwise every acting creature, if not determined naturally from itself, would be determined by something else — namely by the divine willing, which is necessary with respect to this action. This seems condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in this form: "What is not of its own nature determined to being or not being is not determined except by something that is necessary with respect to it." And again: "No agent is in either direction; rather, it is determined."

Response: This argument assumes what is false, as the proof of Part 9 shows. Nor does the condemnation of the article conflict: for the article universally posited that everything that is not of its own nature determined, etc. — wherefore the condemnation denies it universally, not affirming the opposite of every singular, but the particular proposition opposed to it for some singular. And this is verified through the willing of God directed outward — not essentially according to what it is (for thus it is the very essence of God), but only relatively, insofar as it is a willing directed outward. For such willing of God is not of its own nature determined to being such willing or not being, nor is it determined by anything that is necessary with respect to it, as Part 11 of the preceding chapter demonstrated.

Against Parts 11, 12, and 13: Every will or volition of God is acted or produced, and is acted or produced; therefore through some acting or producing naturally anteceding it. And once such acting or producing of that will or volition is posited, its being acted or produced necessarily follows. Therefore every act of the divine will is produced from a naturally preceding necessity, and is necessary in that way — and none is simply equally contingent or free by the freedom of contradiction.

Response: [Bradwardine provides an extensive response involving the nature of action and passion — whether they are relations, absolute things, or the same reality under different descriptions. He argues that the first divine production (the generation of the Word) is not preceded by another production, and that positing an infinite regress of divine volitions is neither necessary nor coherent. He ultimately responds that the divine volition directed outward is produced through God's understanding in a certain way causally preceding it, but that understanding does not necessarily cause that willing — as the foregoing has made clear.]

[The chapter continues with a lengthy treatment of whether God's infinite volitions regarding infinite objects constitute an infinite series ordered essentially by prior and posterior, and concludes that such volitions are either collateral and co-equal (like God's volitions regarding infinite points on a line), or — if ordered — ordered downward, not upward, thus not threatening the existence of a first contingent and free act.]

CHAPTER 7: RAISES THE QUESTION WHETHER ANYTHING IS IN THE POWER OF THE CREATED WILL; AND POSITS ONE RESPONSE, AND CORRECTS IT.

The foregoing gives birth to a weighty question: whether anything is in the power of the created will. For how shall anything be judged to be in the power of the created will, when every action and non-action of it depends on the naturally preceding divine will, as II.20, II.30, and II.32 taught? How is it in the power of the secondary cause — namely the created will — that the first cause — namely the divine will — should anticipate it by willing, which divine will the created will must necessarily imitate, as I.10 teaches? How, finally, is any act, cessation, or rest in our power, when all these things occur in us from a naturally preceding necessity, as III.2 set forth? And if nothing is in the power of the created will, how is created free will preserved?

Some respond here that, given the general influence, something is in the power of the created will, but otherwise nothing.

But concerning that general influence, one must ask whether it is something or nothing. If nothing, nothing comes from nothing. If something, it is either a creature or the Creator. Not a creature, because the Creator — namely God Himself — is necessarily required as a truly efficient cause of any action of the created will, as the foregoing has taught. If the Creator — namely God Himself — is posited: either absolutely insofar as He is God only, or insofar as He is actually influencing toward the act of the created will. Not in the first way, because by I.8 and I.9, He does nothing externally in that way, and therefore does not influence in that way. If in the second way, then by I.8 and I.9 He does nothing externally and therefore does not influence except by willing — and this not universally and confusedly, but singularly and distinctly, just as He also knows, as can easily be shown by I.22, I.27, and what follows. And so His general influence is His willing, or volition, special to willing specially to do this or that.

To say, therefore, "given the general influence, some act is in the power of the created will" is nothing other than to say: "given God's special volition or willing toward some certain act of the created will, that act is in the power of the created will." And so this response does not resolve the question but rather entangles it further.

CHAPTER 8: RECOUNTS SIX OTHER LITTLE RESPONSES, AND CORRECTS THEM.

There are also six other similar little responses to the same question, all of which concordantly confess that the uncreated will anticipates the created will in all things, but they are further differentiated.

[Response 1] The first says that something is in the power of the created will because it is in its power that God should will and pre-will its free act.

[Response 2] The second posits that a free future act is in the power of the created will because it is in its power to do something from which it follows that God wills or does not will this.

[Response 3] The third thinks that something is in the power of the created will because, equally as soon as the uncreated will precedes the created to some free act, the created will can do the opposite — namely rest from that act and exercise the opposite act.

[Response 4] The fourth affirms that something is in the power of the created will because, although the uncreated will pre-wills the created will to have a certain act for a certain future measure of time, it is nevertheless in the created will's power to so dispose itself beforehand that God does not then will this, and that it does not then have that act.

[Response 5] The fifth opines that God does not properly produce the act of the created will, but only improperly — namely because He ordained and wills that the created will alone should properly and freely perform its act.

[Response 6] The sixth, weaker than the rest, weakly judges that God co-acts and pre-acts properly every act of the created will, but so weakly influencing that He by no means necessitates it to act.

[Bradwardine then refutes each response at length. Against Response 1, the core argument is:]

Against the first: According to the common manner of speaking of ordinary people and the Doctors, nothing is said to be in anyone's power except what is subject to his will and follows his will as its effect or privation of effect — as motion and rest. Hence Augustine, *Retractations* I.22: "Nothing is in our power except what follows our will." But for the divine willing to anticipate the human willing is by no means subject to the human will, nor does it follow it as an effect — but the contrary, as II.30 demonstrates.

Also, nothing is in anyone's power except what he can do when he wills, as Augustine says, *On Free Will* III.3: "I cannot think anything else to be in our power except what we do when we will." But no one can make God anticipate him by willing — because whoever does anything naturally anticipates what he has done; therefore the human will, by willing, would anticipate the divine will, contrary to the hypothesis and II.30. And by I.23, every willing of God is eternal, not temporally made by anyone.

Also, if it is in man's power what God wills, then it is in his power what God willed from eternity (by I.23); and since by I.10, God's willing necessarily results in His doing when He has willed —

"For He spoke and they were made" — it is similarly in man's power what God has already done in the past. Therefore it is in man's power to make what was done in the past not to have been done — contrary to many authorities cited against Part 8 of III.5.

[The refutations of all six responses proceed similarly, each showing that they either collapse into the first (already refuted) or contradict established principles about divine priority, efficacy, and immutability. Key arguments include:]

- If the divine willing were in man's power, the divine will would be more in man's power than his own will — since Augustine says "nothing is so much in our power as the will itself" (*On Free Will* III.3).
- No Christian will presume to say he has greater power than Christ Himself — yet Christ said: "I cannot do anything of Myself" (John 5).
- If anything were simply in man's power, avoiding sin would seem most of all to be so — yet the whole Church prays "Lead us not into temptation."

[Against Response 5, Bradwardine invokes II.20 and following to show that God properly co-acts every act of the created will. Against Response 6, he invokes I.10 to show that however God acts — even "weakly" — His will cannot be frustrated.]

CHAPTER 9: RESPONDS.

Therefore, so that the perplexity of this question may be more absolutely and briefly untangled, it should be known that **power** for the present purpose can be taken in two ways — for active power and passive power, as the preceding chapter distinguished. That which we can in no way do but only suffer is not said to be in our power, as the preceding chapter showed. Rather, according to the common manner of speaking of ordinary people and authors, only that is said to be in our power which is in our active power — and this not just any active power, but only the power of contradiction, as the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* IX.18, as more fully recounted in the corollary of III.4.

Wherefore everything and only that is said to be in our power which is in our free power — free, I say, with a similar freedom, namely of contradiction, as the same corollary defined.

Therefore, by Part 10 of III.5, no act of ours is simply in our free active power — as the preceding chapter also sufficiently proves — **but only in a qualified sense, namely with respect to all secondary causes.**

Wherefore both ordinary people and the learned, who for the most part consider natural and secondary causes, say simply that this or that is constituted in our power, and they mean with respect to these causes. Therefore, according to the common manner of speaking, "to be

constituted in our power," though stated simply, is taken and signifies in the said way — just as was said about the equally contingent in III.5.

Yet according to the more customary manner of speaking, it can be more intelligibly defined by saying that **that is in our power which, when we will, we do, and when we do not will, we by no means do.**

Hence Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* 26, after a great disputation, expressing its definition or meaning of the name, says: "We call this power: where to the will is adjoined the faculty of doing. Hence each person is said to have this in his power: what, if he wills, he does; if he does not will, he does not do." And *On Free Will* III.3: "I cannot think anything else to be in our power except what we do when we will." And *City of God* V.10, showing that many things are in our power: "For we do many things which we would not do if we were unwilling — to which primarily belongs willing itself: for if we will, it exists; if we do not will, it does not exist; for we would not will if we were unwilling."

Nothing, therefore, is in our power except in a qualified sense only — namely sub-actively, sub-executively, and sub-serviently necessarily (namely by a naturally preceding necessity with respect to the divine will). And it is therefore said to be in our power because when we will, we do it voluntarily, not unwillingly.

But simply and entirely absolutely, antecedently and sufficiently — without needing anything that is not subject to our power or will — nothing at all is truly said to be in our power. And thus the reasons and authorities that seem contrary are harmonized with one another.

Let no one, therefore, be indignant even if he has nothing absolutely and simply in his own power, but is subject in all things to a higher power — for the Apostle says, Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers."

Let it suffice for any man to have what he ought in his power in a certain way: namely to be subject to the higher divine power in all things, and to be set over the lower. Let him have a middle power between the extreme powers — just as those angelic spirits who, constituted in a certain middle order, are called "Powers," yet are subject to the divine power. Just as even the greatest kings and princes, who have power over subjects, are themselves subject to the King of Kings — to Him, namely, who on His garment and on His thigh has written: "King of Kings and Lord of Lords" (Revelation 19).

And just as other middle men — dukes, counts, barons, satraps, and other prefects who in certain cities are commonly called "Powers" — exercise power over subjects while they themselves are subject to higher powers. This the centurion rightly perceived when he said: "I am a man set under authority, having soldiers under me" (Matthew 8) — as II.28 also recalls.

Hence Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* 69: "Whether to will or not to will is in the power of the one willing or not willing, so as to fulfill the divine will — yet not to surpass its power."

And *Retractations* I.22: "Unless someone changes his will, he cannot do good — which is placed in our power, where He says, 'Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad.' This is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is in man's power to change his will for the better; **but that power is nothing unless it is given by God**, of whom it is said, 'He gave them the power to become children of God.' For since this is in our power — what we do when we will — nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. **But the will is prepared by the Lord**; in that way, therefore, He gives the power."

According to this exposition, the authorities of Augustine and others that say absolutely that something is constituted in our power should be understood. And the other authorities of others that say similarly absolutely that nothing is constituted in our power should be expounded according to the distinction set forth above.

CHAPTER 10: DISTINGUISHES CONCERNING NECESSITY AND FREEDOM.

So that the foregoing may be made more clearly manifest, it should be known that necessity and freedom are said in many ways.

Necessity per se and primarily is taken for the vehemence of being of that which per se and primarily is a necessary being — which is God. And thus it cannot properly be defined, as I.13 teaches; it is however described and made known in some fashion — and this better by affirmation than by negation: namely through the vehemence and firmness of being, rather than through the impossibility or non-possibility of not being, as the seventh part of that same I.13 manifests.

Otherwise, necessity is taken for **natural necessity**, for **fatal necessity**, for the **necessity of violent coercion**, and for the **necessity of spontaneous stability, permanence, or even firmness** — which, though less properly, is also called the necessity of immutability.

There is also **preceding** and **following** necessity, as III.2 showed.

And since in however many ways one of two opposites is said, in that many ways the other will also be said, and necessity and freedom are in a certain way opposed: **freedom** is said contrarily in the same ways — namely freedom from necessity in the first sense, freedom from natural necessity, from fatal necessity, from violent necessity, from preceding necessity, and from following necessity.

Of all these, the three mentioned — namely natural, fatal, and violent necessity — **are incompatible with the freedom and merit of a rational creature**. Wherefore these three can be reduced to one general category: the necessity that is adversarial or contrary to freedom, which therefore takes away freedom and excuses sin.

The other can be called **spontaneous necessity**, consonant with and compatible with freedom and merit — according to the distinctions of Augustine and Anselm about necessity set forth in the proof of the corollary of III.1.

All authorities, therefore, that deny necessity from the rational creature deny only the first kind — namely that which is adversarial and contrary to freedom, and takes away freedom — **but not the second**: the spontaneous kind, consonant with freedom, which is compatible with freedom.

Hence for the most part, when they deny necessity as if opposing it, they use the conjunction "but" (*sed*) or another similar one — which according to grammarians, truth, and common usage is called adversative, because by opposing the prior statement it posits its opposite — and they affirm will or freedom, saying that someone did or does this or that not from necessity but from freedom, or will, or free power, indicating that they are only rejecting the necessity adversarial to will or freedom.

Hence the Apostle to Philemon: "Without your counsel I wished to do nothing, so that your good might not be as if from necessity, but voluntary." And 1 Corinthians 7: "He who has settled in his heart firmly, having no necessity but having power over his own will, and has judged in his heart to keep his virgin, does well."

[Bradwardine then reviews the three principal errors that subjected human acts to necessity — the Manichaean error (necessity of a naturally evil soul), the error that will is merely passive, and the Pelagian error (that divine foreknowledge imposes violent necessity) — and shows that in each case, the authorities opposing these errors deny only the adversarial necessity in question, never the spontaneous necessity. He provides extensive citations from Augustine's *On Free Will* III, Anselm's *On the Harmony* 1 and 7, and Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* V.]

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT NECESSITY AND FREEDOM AND MERIT ARE NOT MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE — OR ARE INCOMPATIBLE.

From these things I consider it manifest which necessity and freedom and merit are not mutually incompatible, and which are. For **spontaneous necessity by no means is incompatible with freedom**, as what has been shown here and in III.1 and III.2 demonstrates; therefore neither will it be incompatible with merit.

This spontaneous necessity is further twofold — preceding and following — as can be gathered from III.2; just as freedom is also twofold — one entirely simple and completely absolute, the other said only in a qualified sense — as III.5 and III.9 show.

Of these necessities, neither is incompatible with the freedom of contradiction said in a qualified sense; nor is following necessity incompatible with the freedom of contradiction simply; as can be gathered from III.2, III.5, and III.9. But **preceding necessity is incompatible with the freedom of contradiction simply.** And natural, fatal, and violent necessity are **incompatible in every way with the freedom of contradiction,** as appears from what has been shown here and in II.3; therefore they cannot stand together with merit.

CHAPTER 11: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES.

But perhaps it will be objected against what has been said. For it was said in III.9 that although all human acts come from a naturally preceding necessity, man is nevertheless called free and of free will because he does not act unwillingly or under compulsion, but spontaneously — and when he wills, he does, and when he does not will, he does not do some of his acts.

Objection: In the same way, beasts — although they do their deeds from a naturally preceding necessity — nevertheless do not act unwillingly or under compulsion but purely spontaneously, and when they will or desire, they do, and when they do not will or desire, they do not do some of their deeds from naturally preceding necessity. Therefore they act just as freely and just as meritoriously as man.

Also, no possible reason seems assignable why in human acts the necessity with respect to God — that is, the divine will naturally preceding such acts — should be compatible with merit (as the corollaries of III.1 and III.2 say), more than any other necessity, or at least more than the necessity with respect to nature or fate (which the corollary of the preceding chapter denied to it), or more than absolute necessity.

Response: These are easily resolved if what was previously shown is kept in memory. For as the preceding chapter taught, a rational creature is free with a threefold freedom — from natural, fatal, and violent necessity — indeed from necessity with respect to all secondary causes, by II.3. But irrational beings are not so: they are subject in all things to natural necessity, and (as some hold) to the fatal necessity of the stars.

As for Augustine's meaning when he says that man freely does something because when he wills he does it and when he does not will he does not — it can be said that he speaks there against the Pelagians and against the violent and involuntary necessity that they said follows from divine foreknowledge or predestination (as the preceding chapter recounted), removing that from man — but he does not affirm that only that freedom exists in man.

Better, it can be said that man is called free with the freedom of contradiction because, once all the secondary causes naturally prior to his free volition are posited with all the necessarily required dispositions, it does not necessarily follow that he wills — but he can equally will and not will, as is clear from III.4 and following. And therefore, with all these things standing in this

way, when he wills, he wills and produces his willing, and when he does not will, he neither wills nor produces his willing.

Therefore, supposing according to the opinion of the fool that God does not exist and man does exist and can act, or according to the opinion of certain people (namely the Pelagians, who say they are wise) that man can act without God in any way co-acting — man in his free acts would be free simply by the freedom of contradiction. But beasts are not so. Indeed, even if they are supposed to be able to act with God in no way co-acting, still — once the appetible object and the other secondary causes with the required dispositions naturally prior to the appetite (namely the act of desiring) are posited — it necessarily follows that they desire, namely by natural necessity.

Hence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* IX.10: "Irrational potencies necessarily, when the passive and active approach one another as they can, the one acts and the other is acted upon." And the authority of Damascene attests: "Irrational beings are not of free will; they are driven by nature rather than driving, and therefore they do not contradict the natural appetite, but as soon as they desire something, they rush to the act."

This objection Anselm also resolves in a similar way in *On Freedom of Will* 5, where first the disciple asks: "How is the will not free, which no alien power can subject without its own consent?" And when the disciple requires: "Cannot we say by similar reasoning that the will of a horse is free, which serves the appetite of the flesh only when willing?" — he responds: "This is not similar. For in the horse, the will does not subject itself, but — naturally subject — it always necessarily serves the appetite of the flesh. In man, however, as long as the will itself is right, it neither serves nor is subject to what it ought not to be, nor is it turned from its rectitude by any alien force, unless it willingly consents to what it ought not — which consent it evidently has not naturally or from necessity, like a horse, but from itself."

Augustine also, *On Free Will* III.1, responds similarly to a similar objection about the natural motion of a stone.

When the objector further argues — beasts act freely, therefore meritoriously — the inference does not hold. For as is taught most frequently in moral philosophy and sacred theology, for merit it does not suffice merely to do naturally some one good thing, but it is required to do it well — which only a right intention of the end achieves, as is clear from I.34. This is directed by reason rightly pre-judging. Therefore beasts, lacking reason, will of necessity also lack merit.

Indeed, just as it is perhaps absolutely possible that God might make some immaterial nature entirely free to will without the judgment of reason — for since He now makes one nature having both those powers, He could, it seems, make another having only one of them — if therefore He made such a creature, it would be as free as a man or angel, yet could not merit or sin at all, because it would lack the judgment of reason to which it might freely conform or also fail to conform.

There is also an **irrefutable reason** assignable why necessity in the will with respect to the divine will is compatible with merit, and no other whatsoever. For it is compatible with merit on account of the reason that the proof of the corollary of III.1 assigns. And to briefly assign the reason for this: I say that **the nature of the created will is such that in its free acts it is subject of necessity to no secondary cause** (as II.3 shows), **but only to God** (as II.30 and III.2 taught). This was also well shown in the first institution of man, when he was instituted to be subject to God alone and to be set over all other things, as the history of Genesis 1 teaches. Therefore in merit it will be similarly.

Nor should any rational mind doubt that the omnipotent Creator should reasonably be preferred to all other created or creatable active things and agents in some special prerogative over the rational creature, as over all creation universally.

Nor is any other necessity compatible with merit. Concerning violent and entirely involuntary necessity, no one doubts or is ignorant. Every natural necessity belongs to a material and irrational form, as can be gathered from II.3; therefore according to what was shown in this chapter, it cannot have merit. Every form subject to the fatal necessity of the stars is necessarily material and consequently irrational; therefore by the foregoing, it is not susceptible of merit. Nor is absolute necessity compatible with merit — because if there were such necessity in human acts, there would be no possibility of acting otherwise in either man or God; and so God would necessarily produce human acts, and by the same reasoning whatever He does externally; therefore He would not be a rational and free agent (as is clear from III.4 and III.5), but an irrational agent acting from natural necessity.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM EXISTS IN IRRATIONAL CREATURES, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM AND AGREES WITH THE FREEDOM OF RATIONAL CREATURES.

From these things it is clearly known what kind of freedom exists or does not exist in irrational creatures, and how rational freedom differs from and agrees with the freedom of irrational creatures.

For in irrational creatures there is, with respect to their natural actions, **freedom from violence and involuntary coercion**. For when they desire, they act, and when they do not desire, they do not act — which is first and chiefly verified of their appetite, just as it is in humans concerning their will, as III.9 more fully showed. Wherefore the Philosopher, *Ethics* III.5, attributes to children and animals both will and the voluntary: "Children and animals share in the voluntary," he says. Anselm also, *On Freedom of Will* 5, implies that a horse has a will, as the present chapter recounted above.

Furthermore, in beasts there is perhaps **freedom from the fatal necessity of the stars**. For it seems that if beasts had been created perfect on the first day of the world before the creation of the stars, they could then have performed their proper natural actions.

But there is not in them **freedom simply** — because not with respect to higher causes, namely the first cause, that is, the divine will — just as there is not in rational creatures either, as III.5 and III.9 show. Nor is there in them **freedom from natural necessity**, as the present chapter demonstrated above. Therefore there cannot be in them the freedom of contradiction simply, nor with respect to all lower — that is, all secondary — causes, as the corollary of III.4 shows.

The difference and agreement between these freedoms I consider manifest from the foregoing.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book III, Chapters XII–XXVIII

CHAPTER XII

Begins to dispute that most famous question: whether all things which shall come to pass will come to pass of necessity; and recites the opinion of the Mathematicians or Stoics, who say that all things which shall come to pass will come to pass of an absolutely simple necessity.

Here, however, from what has been laid down, that most famous question manifestly arises — that sharpest axiom and most difficult problem — namely, whether all things which come to pass shall come to pass of necessity. It now remains, accordingly, to discuss this very thing. Now there are various and many opinions concerning it, of which the first steadfastly affirms that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by an utterly absolute necessity. And this is the opinion of certain Mathematicians and of those who posit fate; which Boethius, on the first book *Peri Hermeneias*, asserts to be the opinion of the Stoics.

The most common motive for this opinion is this: Whatsoever God foreknows with certainty as about to come to pass shall come to pass by utterly absolute necessity; for otherwise He would by no means certainly foreknow it, and His foreknowledge could be deceived. But all things which shall come to pass, God foreknows with certainty as about to come to pass. This may be more forcefully confirmed if it be added that the science of God in no way depends on things, and that it includes the divine will, which is necessary and immutable with respect to all future things, as can probably appear from what has gone before.

For this opinion also, as John of Salisbury (afterwards Bishop of Chartres) reports in *Policraticus* II.23 — which he wrote for the Blessed Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, while he was discharging the office of the Chancellorship of England, where he treats this matter at length — a

certain Stoic adduced another motive. For he would ask whether you could do any of those things which you are not at all about to do. When you had admitted this, he would offer you a thousand gold pieces upon your doing it; and if perchance you refused them, he would order them to be multiplied for you by however great a sum, so that you might effect what can easily be done.

But this opinion takes away every liberty of free will — namely, the liberty of contradiction — and removes at the same time every contingency to either alternative; which the first chapter of Book II and the fourth of this present book, with what follows, do not permit. Wherefore Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, also condemned at Oxford the article asserting that every true proposition concerning the future is necessary.

CHAPTER XIII

Treats the opinion of Cicero, who says that God does not know future things.

Another opinion is that of Cicero, namely, that many things come to pass freely, but God does not foreknow them, on account of the motive recited in the preceding chapter. For he was unable to see how there could be a certain foreknowledge of all future things unless there were also an absolute necessity in every respect, and so all manner of liberty would be taken away. For he believed that the foreknowledge of future things and their liberty necessarily repel one another; wherefore (as he believed) it was necessary either to deny the one and affirm the other; and it seemed to him more useful for civil intercourse to deny foreknowledge than the liberty of free will. Wherefore in his book *On Divination*, he denies all divination and all foreknowledge. But this opinion, no less execrable to the ears of unbelievers than to those of the faithful, the sixth chapter of Book I sufficiently refutes.

CHAPTER XIV

Treats the third opinion, which says that many things are future in their own nature, but not with God.

The third opinion asserts that many things are future in their own nature, but not to God. For all things are present to Him in eternity, and therefore He is not properly said to foreknow future things, but rather to behold them as present; and by this it intends to avoid the difficulty of the foregoing motive. And this is the view of Boethius in *Consolation of Philosophy* V, in the last prose; and of Anselm in *On the Fall of the Devil* 21 and *On Concord* 7; whom many Doctors also follow.

But, although this saying is not in itself most clear (for it might be argued against in many ways), nevertheless, taken as admitted, it does not avoid the difficulty. For it is certain that future things

are not in God materially, nor do they actually exist, created in their own natures, as they will be when they shall be present; for by the same reason they would always be so; therefore [they would be] when they shall be past; nay, even all past things would now exist materially and in being, in the manner in which they were in God and in their own natures outside God, as ever they were. By some mode of being, therefore — namely, by existing in being and materially actually created in their own natures — future things shall be when they shall be present, which they are not now in God; as Bede says, on that text of John 1, "*That which was made, in him was life*": that is to say, whatsoever was made in time, whether living or wanting life, all this in the spiritual *ratio* of its Maker had as it were always lived and lives — not because what He created is co-eternal with the Creator, but because the *ratio* of His will is co-eternal with Him, in which from eternity He had and has what and when He would create, how He would govern the creature that it might endure, to what end He would conduct each of the things which He created.

And Augustine says in *On Genesis to the Letter V*, that things, before they were made, both were and were not: they were in the science of God, they were not in their own nature; and this God foreknows with certainty. Let, therefore, an argument be made from such foreknowledge, and the difficulty returns.

For the Authors and Doctors, however, it is to be known that all things are eternally in God, and present with God — that is, in His eternal and utterly immutable knowledge: that is to say, He knows them eternally and immutably, as is plain through Bede and Augustine just recited; and so the Lombard expounds such Authorities in *Sentences I*, dist. 35, which exposition he confirms by authorities. Nor is it to be wondered at if the Theologians use such a transferred manner of speaking, since the Philosophers use a similar and greater. For Avicenna says in *On the Soul IV.2*, that all things which in the world are past, present, and future, have being in the Wisdom of the Creator. Aristotle also says, *On the Soul III.37*, that all those things which are, the soul in some manner is: for they are either things sensible, or things intelligible; and science is indeed the knowables, but sense the sensibles. On which Averroes says, "*It comes about of necessity that the soul is all beings in one of the modes according to which it is possible to say, the soul is all beings.*"

And so perhaps it might be said by the same transference of speech, that things made, before they were made, were God — as seems to appear from Book I, chapter 17. Whence also John 1, "*That which was made in Him was life*" — which life surely is not in God except as one life which is one God and three persons; which the blessed Augustine on John, in the first homily, shows by the example of the Carpenter. "*The carpenter,*" he says, "*makes a chest in his work, and therefore has the chest in his art; but the chest in the work is not life, the chest in the art is life, because the soul of the artificer lives, where these things all are before they are brought forth. So therefore, dearest brethren, because the wisdom of God, through which all things were made, contains all things according to its art, before it fashions all things; here those things which are made through the art itself are not forthwith life, but whatsoever was made, life is in Him. You see the earth; the earth is in the art. You see the heaven; the heaven is in the art. You*

see the sun and moon; these too are in the art, but outside they are bodies, in the art or the artificer they are life. But that life which is in Him is the light of men. For this follows: 'And the life was the light of men.'"

Yet otherwise, perhaps more clearly and briefly, it may be said that all things are in God not really, but causally, just as, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* IV.23, a thing is said to be in its cause; and this, according to Averroes, in four ways, according to the four causes of things. Now God is the threefold cause of all things — efficient, formal, and final: He is the cause of every present, past, and future thing; wherefore He Himself is such, and this through His will, ever the same, immutable, and eternal, as the first book shows. Thus therefore, as I think, the sayings of this kind of the Fathers may not unsuitably be understood and expounded.

And if you object that these things do not solve the foregoing difficulty: it is true that they do not solve it perfectly and simply with all men, because not with the subtle and acute. Yet they better quiet the souls of most than would the right solution itself. Therefore it is greatly expedient in disputing — as also in preaching — to use sometimes evident and gross examples, so that he whom the subtlety of reason does not move may at least be moved by the gross and palpable congruity of the example. For not without cause did the Authors place the example among the species of argument; wherefore Aristotle in *On the World* 9, and Boethius where above, by examples taken from men and their cognition, show that God knows all things future, present, and past.

CHAPTER XV

Recites the fourth opinion of the Sophists, who say that nothing is future.

The fourth opinion contends that nothing is future. And this is the opinion of the Sophists, around which they sophistically wrangle, saying: The future is not a being, therefore it is a non-being, and nothing; therefore nothing is future. Again thus: Let Antichrist be posited as future; then Antichrist is future; therefore by conversion the future is Antichrist — therefore either the future, which is Antichrist, or which is not Antichrist. If Antichrist, then Antichrist is Antichrist; therefore Antichrist is man, and animal, and being, and existing. If not Antichrist, then contradictories are verified of one another, and of the same — which the first principle does not permit.

This same is again refuted thus: If anything be predicated of Antichrist, most of all the same will be predicated of itself, because according to the ancient rule of Boethius, no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself. Again, then "*Antichrist will be*" is true in the divided sense; that "*true*" either is Antichrist or something else: not Antichrist, because he is not; therefore there is no "*true*," nor is that "*true*" something else. For whatever may be granted besides God, when that is destroyed "*Antichrist will be*" would still be true, or could be — as it was before any creature whatsoever; and then by the same reasoning "*God will be*" and "*God is*"

would be something else than God; therefore God exists and shall exist through something other than Himself; therefore, that being destroyed, He would not be. But if it be said that that "*true*" is God, then God is "*Antichrist will be a sinner, and will do all evils.*" Again, that which is "*Antichrist will be*" will be "*Antichrist exists*"; therefore God will be "*Antichrist exists*"; therefore now He is "*any being whatever exists.*" Again, God is "*Antichrist will be*"; and "*an eclipse will be*" is God by the same reasoning; therefore "*an eclipse will be*" is "*Antichrist will be.*"

Moreover, they themselves say, if anything were future, something could desire and work for the sake of it; which does not appear, since every operation is for some end, and for the sake of the good, as is plain from *Ethics* I.1 and *Metaphysics* II.8 and 9; but no such future is; therefore there is no end nor good. This reason is confirmed, since every appetible or willable appears as good, as the second chapter of Book II shows; but the future does not appear as a being, nor as good.

Further they urge thus: Then there could be hope and confidence concerning such a future good; therefore such a one would knowingly trust in nothing, and would incur the prophetic rebuke of Isaiah 59, by which they are rebuked who trust in nothing and speak vanities. But this ineptitude attempts to destroy all knowledge and to subvert all faith. For Grammar and Rhetoric posit three times — present, past, and future — and Dialectic likewise, as appears from book I of *Peri Hermeneias*; natural and moral science also posit natural and voluntary actions to be done for the sake of an end not yet had but to be had; Medicine, moreover, and Astrology judge concerning future things; every faith also posits hope, foreknowledge, and prophecy, very often concerning future things.

These men also have to say consequently that they themselves cannot imagine or understand any future, nor any non-existent thing, since then it would be imagined or understood, and by conversion conversely; wherefore it would be itself and would exist; they are therefore quite uncouth. Wherefore they have further to concede consequently that they themselves do not act for the sake of felicity, or any other future end whatsoever; wherefore they will always remain unhappy and miserable — which is also repugnant to their profession, which appearance they finally desire. They have also by the same reason to concede that nothing is past, and that they can understand no past thing, nor remember anything. Who then would argue against such men, since they are able to recollect no argument, and therefore can recite none? Who also would do anything for such ungrateful men, who never remember any benefit? But the irrational reasonings of theirs aforesaid have not even the appearance [of reason].

CHAPTER XVI

Refutes the fifth opinion of the Megarics, who deny all power with respect to future things.

There is also a fifth opinion, which not only denies that anything is future, but denies all power with respect to anything future. For it says that no active thing can do anything except while it is actually doing it. And this is the opinion of certain men who, as is recited in *Metaphysics* IX.5,

are called Megarics, and (as Averroes says there) this saying — that is, this opinion — is held by certain *loquentes*. Albert there gives three of their reasons.

The first is: A cause is called active with respect to its effect, and cause and caused are simultaneous; therefore the cause is not active before it actually acts. The second is: If any mover can move, and is in potency to moving before it moves, and nothing comes from potency to act except through a motion and a mover different from itself, that thing needs another prior mover in order that it may move, and by the same reasoning that other still needs one other prior mover, and so on to infinity, which is impossible. The third is: No nature is destitute of its proper operation; wherefore form or active power always has actual operation; therefore it never precedes it, nor can precede it.

But these reasons Albert solves, as also they are sufficiently soluble by anyone. This opinion Aristotle and Averroes also there sufficiently rebuke and refute.

CHAPTER XVII

Corrects the sixth opinion of certain men who think that something is future to either alternative, or not future, in the composite sense, not in the divided.

The sixth opinion feigns that something is future to either alternative, or not future, in the composite sense, but not in the divided sense; which they endeavor to establish thus. No simple proposition concerning the future in contingent matter is equally true or false, the Philosopher attesting in the last chapter of book I of *Peri Hermeneias*; wherefore neither is anything future to either alternative, or not future, dividedly.

This opinion, however, I heard in the Roman Curia from a certain famous Toulousan philosopher in a certain solemn disputation concerning the contingency of future things, who responded according to it totally and publicly; which I likewise heard at Oxford. But this is easily refuted: For according to it nothing is contingently future to either alternative, but all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by an utterly absolute necessity, which the twelfth chapter of this book condemns.

Again, he who so opines is ensnared in the noose of his own opinion: for he says that nothing is contingently future or not future in the divided sense; therefore nothing is contingently future; therefore Antichrist is not contingently future, which is repugnant to the opinion. It also follows that "*Antichrist is not future*" is true and its opposite is false — which manifests the unreasonableness of the position.

Again, to you who so opine I propose: "*Antichrist will be.*" If you concede or deny [it], you have to concede consequently the opposite of your position and reasoning likewise; nor can you doubt it, because you well know that it is neither true nor false; nor can you distinguish it on account of the simplicity and most great univocation of the terms and of the whole complex. But if you say

that you do not understand it, nor can understand it, you are refuted as the fourth opinion was refuted — unless perhaps it seem to you vain and foolish to argue at all with one who cannot understand the arguer, nor even yourself the respondent; wherefore it does not seem worthier to argue with you than with a foolish, dead man, a beast, or a log.

But if at the start you have denied to me this — "*Antichrist will be*" — and likewise this — "*Antichrist will not be*," or "*non-Antichrist will be*" — still the opposite of the position returns; nay, it follows: "*Non-Antichrist will be, therefore Antichrist will be*," as no one is ignorant who has crossed the threshold of Logic. Wherefore again the opposite of the position follows. Furthermore, if you have denied both of these, you will concede that a middle is found between contradictories, which all Sophists, Logicians, Philosophers, and Theologians detest; which the Philosopher also in *Metaphysics* IV.27 reprove and condemns in many ways; who also in chapter 29, the last, says: "*It is necessary that one or the other part of a contradiction be true*"; where also immediately he subjoins: "*Furthermore, if it is necessary either to assert or deny everything, it is impossible that both be false*."

Again: "*Antichrist will be or will not be*"; therefore "*Antichrist will be, or Antichrist will not be*"; therefore that disjunction is true, therefore so is one of the parts. Again, then neither God, nor angel, nor prophet would know dividedly that Antichrist, nor any of the possibles, is contingently future or not future, but only conjunctively that it is future or not future — as also any layman knows; wherefore all foreknowledge would be utterly taken away, and so this opinion coincides with the second, destroyed in chapter 13 of this book.

This opinion Boethius also expressly refutes in *Consolation of Philosophy* V, prose 3, where he also compares it to the ridiculous oracle of Tiresias, saying, "*Whatsoever I shall have said, will either be or will not be*"; concerning which Tiresias Ovid in book III of his *Mythologies* tells more fully.

Again, this free and contingently produced act now is, and was not always; therefore at some time it was future; therefore then it was true that it was future. Again, if anyone yesterday had said that I should speak today, he would have said true, as the issue of the matter proves; for today I am speaking. For he would have said that it was wholly going to be so, as it really now happens; therefore he would have said true; and if he had said the opposite, he would have said false, since it would not so really come to pass — according to that proposition common in *Categories*: "*Through the thing's being or not being, the discourse is called true or false*"; and *Peri Hermeneias* I, last chapter: "*Likewise true discourses are, just as the things are*." And Jeremiah 28: "*The prophet who has prophesied peace, when his word shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known whom the Lord has sent in truth*." And Ezekiel 33: "*When that shall have come which has been foretold, then shall they know that a prophet has been among them*." And Deuteronomy 18: "*This shall be a sign to you: that which the prophet has foretold and has not come to pass, this the Lord has not spoken, but the prophet has feigned through the swelling of his own mind*."

Again, then no one ought to believe or hope for any such future thing: for it seems foolish and frivolous for anyone to believe or hope for anything future which he well knows, or firmly opines, is not true that it is future; wherefore no one ought to believe or hope that he or any of men shall die, shall rise again, or shall obtain everlasting life.

Again, this opinion takes away all motion and free, meritorious successive action. For according to it in such contingent matters nothing is future; therefore there is no terminus to which the motion [tends], nor any "*having been changed*" [*mutatum esse*]; wherefore no such motion is, nor even can be — which subverts all moral science, nay, all natural science, and all science needing motion or time, just as the opinion of the Sophists [does], or [it subverts] divine omnipotence or liberty, or these will be subverted by it. For all motion is subject to the free will of omnipotent God, as chapter 9 of book I and chapter 30 of book II show; therefore in motion and time there is something freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, which is repugnant to the opinion. Or if no such thing be freely and contingently future with respect to the divine will, then either it [the divine will] in no way disposes freely, by liberty of contradiction, concerning future things, or, if it so disposes, it can dispose otherwise, but has not the power of executing.

Furthermore, according to this view, no proposition concerning the future would be true, or could be, except a necessary proposition, which Logic, Philosophy, Theology, and every true science reckon false. Wherefore Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford the article asserting that every true proposition concerning the future is necessary.

But what is alleged from the Philosopher — namely, that no proposition concerning a contingent future is true or false — is true, according to those commonly expounding, determinately and of necessity, just as it is in propositions of other times.

CHAPTER XVIII

Rectifies the seventh opinion, which says that something can begin to be future.

The seventh opinion confesses that something can begin to be future, intending by this to avoid the difficulty already touched upon. This opinion, however, I heard from a certain famous Doctor, who also said that it had been common in a certain most solemn University at which he had studied. But this opinion is mistaken in two respects: first, because it is grounded in falsehood; secondly, because it is not helped by it.

For if anything can begin to be future, let A begin in the future instant B to be future; therefore A will begin in B to be future; therefore A in B, or immediately after B, will be future; therefore A will be after B; therefore A will be; therefore A is future — the opposite of which was posited.

But if it be said that this proposition concerning the future, "*A will begin in B to be future*," is not true, nor ever will be, because neither before B, nor after B, nor in B; but this proposition

concerning the present, "*A begins to be future*," will be true in B — it shall be contradicted in this manner: If this proposition, "*A begins to be future*," will be true in B, then it is future-true in B; therefore the future is in B really as it signifies, or shall signify in B; therefore the future is in B "*A begins to be future*"; therefore in B A will begin to be future.

Again, let B be present; then this is true concerning the present: "*A begins to be future*"; and this likewise: "*this beginning is*" — either then this beginning was future or not. If it was future, then before B it was true that this beginning was future, and that this beginning will be; therefore then it was also true that A will begin in B to be future. If it was not future, then something is present which was never future, which is contrary to reason, and reproved in the preceding chapter. For if this present beginning was never future, it was never foreknown by God; and if anyone yesterday had said that this beginning will be, he would have said false; but if anyone had said that this beginning will never be, he would have said true — although nevertheless not as the second, but as the first foretold, it really now happens. Nay, it follows that both contradictories were simultaneously true. For by the hypothesis, this was always true: "*this beginning will not be*," because it was never future; and this was true: "*this beginning will be*," because if anyone had said it, he would have said true, as the issue of the matter proves and the foreknowledge of God shows: for otherwise He had no foreknowledge of this, or a false one. And if some one thing be present without prior futuration, why not anything whatsoever? And so the opinion of the Sophists, condemned in chapter 15 of this book, would be reconciled forever.

Moreover, this response destroys its own hypothesis, or shall be destroyed by it. For if this is not true — "*A will begin in B to be future*" — by the same reasoning no such proposition is true, nor even can be. For if it could, let it be posited as so; the argument returns. If, therefore, no such proposition can be true, nothing can begin to be future in any future instant; wherefore neither ever. Or if anything which is not now future can begin to be future in some future instant, let it be posited in being, and the difficulty returns. For if something not now future shall begin to be future in some future instant, then after some future instant it will be; therefore it will be; therefore it is future; therefore something not future is future.

Again, no possible cause can be assigned why something should begin to be future rather in one instant than in any other; therefore in any whatsoever, or in none. But if some certain disposition of the cause of that future thing be assigned as cause of the aforesaid diversity, that will at once be removed, supposing that the future effect is always contingently future equally until it is brought about — as is the case with the free act of the will, which for a long time can remain in equal disposition, in equal indifference, in equal indetermination through all things between two contrary acts wholly equal, around two objects wholly equal — such as whether to eat or to drink, or, of two equal impossible foods, whether to take this or that — and at last to choose freely either, namely this or that, as the fourth chapter of this book with what follows manifests.

But if it be said that nothing shall begin to be future before it be determined through a certain disposition in its cause which is necessary with respect to it, it will follow that every future thing shall come to pass of necessity, which the twelfth chapter of this book condemns.

Again, if something shall begin to be future for some time — say, for a year — before it is brought about, by the same reasoning something can begin to be future for a less time before it is brought about — say, for a month — and by the same reasoning for a week, and for a day; and so finally by the same reasoning every time can be removed: for the reasoning is the same of the whole and of the part; wherefore it will be possible for something to be present which was never future, which has been reproved above.

Again, if one future thing should begin to be future, then by the same reasoning so would another, and any whatsoever; therefore time is not eternal: for some most distant future instant exists — namely, that which does not yet begin to be future; therefore after it there is no future instant, since it does not begin, nor began, to be future; therefore after it there is no future time; therefore after that instant there will be no instant, nor time.

Again, of whatever future thing, whenever anyone had said that it is or was future, he would have said true, and one saying its opposite would have said false; therefore every future thing was always truly future, as the preceding chapter argued.

Again, if future things were not always future, they were not always foreknown by God, nor eternally predestined by Him — against chapter 6 and 45 of book I; nay, of necessity it will follow that at some time He begins to foreknow and predestine future things; therefore He is mutable, which chapter 5 of book I does not allow; nor in the beginning of the world did He know what He would do at the end or in the middle time, which is unbecoming. Whence Isaiah 46: *"Return, O ye transgressors, to the heart, and remember the former age, for I am the Lord, announcing from the beginning the latest, and from the start the things which are not yet done, saying, 'My counsel shall stand, and my whole will shall be done.'"* And Psalm 118 [119], at the beginning: *"I have known concerning thy testimonies that thou hast founded them in eternity."* And Psalm 138 [139]: *"Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar."* How far? *"Behold, O Lord, thou hast known all things, the latest and the most ancient."* Wherefore Augustine in *On Free Will* III.3 says thus: *"Today God foreknows what He will do after a year"*; and there follows: *"He has always foreknown this."* And the Philosopher says in *Peri Hermeneias* I, last chapter, that it makes no difference whether one has affirmed or denied something for the thousandth year rather than for any time whatsoever.

Again, if anything can begin to be future, by the same reasoning some future thing can cease to be future without its being placed in being. For if A now begins to be future, this is on account of some cause or disposition in the cause now placed which was not placed before, or not so placed; therefore if that cause or disposition be removed, A not being placed in being, A ceases to be future without its being placed in being. Let, then, A now be future, and in the future instant B let it cease to be future without its being placed in being; then in B, as also always, this consequence

will be good: "*A was future, and never was, nor is; therefore A is future*"; and the antecedent will be true in B, therefore also the consequent; therefore in B A will be future after B. Again thus to the same point: A is future; therefore A will be, and not before B, nor in B; therefore after B; therefore in B A will be future.

Further to this same point: Let A now be future, and without being placed in being let it cease in the future instant B to be future, and remain not future for some certain time, which let be C. Still after that time God can make A to be present, therefore also future: for He can restore all the causes of A with all their dispositions, on account of which A was future before B; let it be posited, therefore, that He does so; and it will follow that A will begin to be future in some instant after the time C; from which it will further follow that A will be or was future in two intermediate instants or times, and in any intermediate instant or time not future nor present — which is utterly irrational and absurd.

Nor does that [opinion] avoid the difficulty. For after anything has begun to be future and to be foreknown with certainty by God, either it is possible for it not to come to pass, and then God by no means foreknows it with certainty — nay, it seems consequently possible that the foreknowledge of God be deceived, as was argued in chapter 12 of this book; or that thing would come to pass of necessity, and then it will necessarily follow that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by an utterly absolute necessity — which the same chapter 12 condemned.

CHAPTER XIX

Castigates the eighth and ninth opinions, which believe that nothing of the inferior world is contained under divine providence, and that nothing voluntary or free is disposed by the providence of God.

There are also many other minor opinions besides these, which — because each and all are fully refuted by what has been shown before — I purposed to pass over in silence; but lest they appear wholly untouched, and that it may appear what kinds of phantasms of errors the fantasies of many bring forth, I will briefly touch upon them; that thus at last among the skilled, who in many of the things shown before could condemn me as superfluous because they are as it were notorious, I may deserve to be excused for cause known.

The first, then, of these opinions and the eighth, with the rest recited, affirms that none of the things of the inferior world are contained under divine providence. The ninth opinion, however, says that no voluntary or free things are disposed by divine providence. And this is the common reasoning of both: that divine providence imposes necessity upon things provided, and, that being removed, all necessity is removed, because (as they say) there is no cause of necessity if not that.

But both of these conjointly are refuted by chapters 27, 28, and 29 of book I; the second dividedly by chapters 30, 31, and 32 of the same. Again, specially against this [second]: Then at least it has to concede that all natural things shall come to pass by an utterly absolute necessity, since it speaks of this alone, as it seems. For it concedes that all natural things are contained under divine providence; therefore whatever God provides or does in this inferior world, He does this by an utterly absolute necessity; therefore any man — even a male and female slave — is more free in all his providings and doings than is the Lord his God in His own — which the first supposition of book I forbids.

Again, then God necessarily and not freely provides and does whatsoever is provided and immediately done by Him; He is therefore less free and more servile than every slave — by which the prior opinion is also confuted. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned a certain article asserting that God necessarily does whatever is immediately done by Him: "*An error*," he says, "*whether it be understood concerning the necessity of coercion, because it takes away liberty, or concerning the necessity of immutability, because it posits an impossibility of doing otherwise.*" And the same condemned another article in this form: "*That some things can casually come to pass with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are foreordained by the first cause, because then they would come to pass of necessity*"; and again another in these words: "*That human acts are not ruled by divine providence.*"

This same insensate view also long before had been judged as it were heretical, in Job 22: "*Dost thou think*," he says, "*that God is higher than heaven, and is lifted up above the height of the stars, and dost thou say, 'God knoweth not, and as it were through a mist He judgeth. The clouds are His hiding-place, He doth not consider our things, and He walketh through the hinges of heaven'?*" And Ezekiel 9: "*They have said, the Lord hath forsaken the earth.*"

CHAPTER XX

Corrects the tenth opinion, that God has no volition with respect to any effect of the inferior world; and the eleventh, that He wills no voluntary or free effect.

The tenth says that none of the inferior world is willed by God; and the eleventh asserts that no voluntary or free things are willed by Him. And this is the common reasoning of both: that the divine will is necessary, and the cause of necessity in the things willed, nor is there any other necessary cause, nor [any other] imposing necessity on things caused; wherefore, that being taken away, there will be no necessity, but liberty.

But these two are easily refuted. For if these things are not willed by God, they are not provided by Him, as is plain through chapter 27 of book I; but this was just now refuted. The second of these is also specially reproved by chapters 8, 9, 22, and 45 of book I, and chapter 20 of book II, and may be refuted by the same reasonings by which the ninth opinion is refuted.

CHAPTER XXI

Refutes the twelfth opinion, which thinks that no inferior things are made by God; and the thirteenth, which esteems that no voluntary or free things are made immediately and properly by Him.

There still remain two others similar to these aforesaid. For the twelfth says that no inferior things are made by God; the thirteenth, however, feigns that no voluntary or free things are made properly at least and immediately by Him; and this through similar reasoning, because thus and not otherwise all things would necessarily come to pass.

But these can be refuted conjointly by those things by which the prior similar opinions are refuted, with chapter 10 of book I joined in; which conjointly chapter 3 of book I condemns. The second of these, however, is specially condemned through chapter 22 of book II; all its cavilling subterfuges also are obstructed through chapter 21 of the same and what follows.

CHAPTER XXII

Castigates the fourteenth opinion, that God does not will anything freely future absolutely, but only conditionally; and the fifteenth, that no evils, but only goods, are absolutely provided, willed, or done by God.

The fourteenth posits that God does not will future free things absolutely, but only conditionally — namely, if the active free [agents] themselves should will them. The fifteenth asserts that no evils, but only goods, are absolutely, immediately, and properly provided by God, willed, and done.

But these two both err in two respects: first, because they suppose what is false; secondly, because they do not escape the difficulty of the problem. The first supposes what is false, as the corollary of chapter 30 in book II shows. Nor does it escape the difficulty, because, after God by absolutely willing has made any free thing present or past, it is necessary that God in the present and always in the future will this, as is plain through chapter 23 of book I — and not more necessary then than before, as can be shown through the same chapter 23, and because otherwise the thing willed, present or past, would necessitate the divine will, and would deprive it of its pristine liberty; therefore concerning whatever future thing God now wills, and always willed necessarily that it shall be; therefore also through chapter 10 [of book I] all future things shall come to pass of necessity.

The second likewise supposes what is false, as those things adduced against the six opinions recited in the recent chapters prove. This [opinion] also chapter 26 of book I represses, showing that nothing is *per se* evil, but that every evil act, according to that which it is, is good and from

God; which chapter 20 of book II also demonstrates. This same is also refuted by chapters 33 and 34 of book I. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article affirming that all voluntary motions are reduced into the first mover: *"An error,"* he says, *"unless it be understood [as referring] to the first mover simply not caused, and understanding concerning motion according to substance, not according to deformity."*

This opinion also speaks thus only that it may avoid this universal: *"All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity"* — by means of [saying] that not all, because evils are not provided, willed, nor done by God; yet it concedes that all goods are provided by God, willed, and done. Wherefore consequently it has to concede that all goods which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity — which also seems a sufficiently great absurdity, and not much less impugnable, than that more universal one above.

CHAPTER XXIII

Argues against the sixteenth opinion, which posits that God does not will the free act of the creature with an antecedent will, but only with a consequent [will], and that God with the creature co-effects every free act of the creature, but posteriorly in natural order; and the seventeenth, which judges that, although God always in fact does and carries through any act of the creature, it is nevertheless absolutely possible for some creature to act through itself alone.

The sixteenth believes that God does not will the free act of the creature with an antecedent will, but only with a consequent — that is, not prior, but posterior, naturally to the creature — and that thus He does every free act of the creature. The seventeenth, however, feigns that God always in fact acts immediately and properly, and naturally prior, [in] every act of any creature whatsoever, but that it is absolutely possible for some creature to act through itself alone, without God so co-acting.

But the sixteenth errs in two respects: first, because it supposes what is false, as chapter 30 of book II demonstrates; secondly, because, this being granted, the difficulty is not removed. For after God has cooperated in anything with man, it is necessary that He has so cooperated, as also that that thing has been; and since He works nothing externally except by willing, as the corollary of chapter 10 of book I teaches, it is necessary that He has willed this; and since by chapter 23 of book I His will is in every respect immutable, it is necessary that He always in the future will so, and always in the past has willed [so]; and since the divine will is not less free, nor more necessary, in the production of a thing, or after, than before — as chapters 5 and 23 of book I show — and because otherwise the thing willed would deprive the divine will of liberty and would impose necessity upon it as to willing, which yet does not do this in the human will, and so the divine will would be less free and more servile than the human: since, I say, these things

are so, God necessarily wills concerning any future thing that it shall be; wherefore by chapter 10 of book I, concerning whatever future thing it is necessary that it shall be.

The seventeenth, however, errs in three respects: first, because it affirms what is false; secondly, because it is repugnant to itself; thirdly, because it does not avoid the difficulty. That it affirms what is false is perspicuously demonstrated from chapters 3 and 4 of book I, and from chapters 20 and 22 of book II. Again, that I may briefly touch some short reasonings against this little opinion: If this were possible, it would be consequently possible for a creature to produce something without God properly co-acting, wherefore also to conserve the produced thing without God properly conserving it — against chapter 2 of book I. And it would moreover be possible that something should now be done, or in the future, which God did not will — against chapter 22 of book I and its corollary; and if this were possible, by the testimony of chapter 18 of book I, it would further be possible that something be present or future which God did not know — against chapter 6 of book I; wherefore also it would be possible that something casually come to pass with respect to God and the divine will — against chapter 29 of book I. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article asserting that some things can casually come to pass with respect to the first cause.

This [opinion] is also repugnant to itself. For let A, according to it, be a creature able to move and act through itself alone without God; either then A creature is, by that very fact, necessarily virtually infinite, or with this it can be finite. If it be said that it is necessarily infinite, this cannot be, as had been demonstrated in chapter 1 of book I; since also every creature, present or future, is or will be only finite, no such thing can or will be able to do anything through itself; this position therefore in no way helps the opining ones, but is repugnant to them, since they speak only of present or future creatures, just as also the problem is only concerning such. But if it be said that A creature can be finite, let it then be posited that A exceeds any other active creature only in finite proportion, wherefore also action [exceeds] action, as natural science demonstrates: if therefore the power A through itself alone can [produce] B motion or act, and any other active power can now in fact [produce] a proportional motion or act — whence then does the opining one know that it is not so in fact? Why then does he affirm the opposite of this?

Thirdly it errs, because it does not avoid the difficulty of the question. For if it is so, and always shall be in fact, that the divine will in every motion and action precedes, and is efficacious and necessarily causing through chapter 10 of book I, nor in the power of any other through chapter 8 of this book, and altogether immutable in itself through chapter 23 of book I, it seems that in fact all things which come to pass come to pass of necessity in the present, and all things which shall come to pass likewise shall come to pass in the future. How therefore can the difficulty of the problem be avoided through this?

CHAPTER XXIV

Treats the eighteenth opinion, which says that God's willing and pre-willing is in man's power; and the nineteenth, that it is in man's power to do something, whence it follows that God does not will, nor ever willed, that A shall be — which nevertheless He now wills and always willed shall be; and the twentieth, that as soon as the divine will precedes the free act of the human will, just as soon the human will can [tend] toward the opposite of such an act; and the twenty-first, that with God willing to lead a man to act A future in the measure B, the man can dispose himself beforehand so that God then does not will this, wherefore also that he then does not have that act; and the twenty-second, that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but defectible and frustratable somehow; and the twenty-third, that the divine will is not the efficient cause of any things, but only consenting to the divine intellect dictating, and some other executive power, posterior in God or in second causes, effects the things effected; and the twenty-fourth, that although the divine will co-acts and carries through every act of the created will, it nevertheless does this by influencing so weakly that it by no means necessitates it to action.

There are also four others much similar to one another, of which the first and eighteenth affirms that God's willing and pre-willing is in man's power; the nineteenth esteems that it is in man's power to do something, whence it follows that God does not will, nor ever willed, that A shall be — which He nevertheless now wills and always willed shall be. The twentieth opines that as soon as the divine will precedes the free act of the human will, just as soon the human can [tend] toward the opposite of such an act. The twenty-first thinks that, with God willing to produce in a man act A future in a certain measure of time or instant, a man can so dispose himself beforehand that God then does not will this, and that he then does not have that act.

But all these err in two respects: First, because they affirm what is false; secondly, because they do not avoid the difficulty of the problem. That all affirm what is false, the eighth chapter of this book manifestly shows; and that they do not avoid the difficulty can be shown, just as has been shown against the fourteenth opinion and the sixteenth. For the will of God is necessary with respect to all present and past things; therefore also with respect to all future things; wherefore also all future things are in some manner necessarily future, and by some kind of necessity all things shall come to pass.

There are also three other phantastical vanities. Of these the first and twenty-second judges that the divine will is not always necessary in acting, but defectible and frustratable sometimes. The twenty-third dreams that the divine will is not the efficient cause of any things, but only consenting to the divine intellect dictating, and some other executive power posterior, in God or in second causes, effects the things effected. The twenty-fourth thinks that, although the divine will co-acts and pre-acts every act of the created will, it nevertheless does this by influencing so weakly that it by no means necessitates it to action.

But the first of these, and the third, is plainly refuted through chapter 10 of book I; the second of these, however, errs in matter and in form. In matter, because it supposes what is false, as chapter

10 of book I, chapter 10 of book II, and what follows have taught; it errs in form, because it does not escape the proposed difficulty. For if the divine will consents to and wills any executive power whatsoever to execute anything by doing [it], that [power] will necessarily execute [it] through chapter 10 of book I, and the difficulty returns.

CHAPTER XXV

Touches the twenty-fifth opinion, which feigns that God does not provide, predestine, will, nor make degrees of free acts, of merits, or even of rewards; and the twenty-sixth, that no act is anything; and the twenty-seventh, that no not-acting, ceasing, or resting is from God; and the twenty-eighth, that future foreknown things are the cause of God's foreknowledge; and the twenty-ninth, that future foreknown things are the *sine qua non* cause of divine foreknowledge; and the thirtieth, that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode; and the thirty-first, of the Academics, that no one can search out or know this hidden miracle of nature, this concealed secret of God; and the thirty-second, that in all future, present, and past things, with respect to the science and will of God, there is always contingency to either alternative, and liberty, and absolutely no necessity.

There still remain three other minor opinions briefly to be retracted. Of these the first and twenty-fifth, with the foregoing, affirms that God does not provide, predestine, will, nor make degrees of free acts, nor of any merits whatsoever, or even of rewards. The twenty-sixth thinks every free act, and universally any act whatever, to be nothing. The twenty-seventh esteems that no not-acting, ceasing, or resting is from God.

But these three err commonly in two things: first, because they affirm what is false; secondly, because they do not avoid the difficulty. That all affirm what is false is sufficiently shown by chapter 46 of book I, chapter 18 of book II with chapter 32 of the same. Nor does the first avoid the difficulty. For it says that God in no way disposes concerning degrees, that thus it may avoid the necessity in them, otherwise (as it believes) necessarily to be conceded. Yet it does not deny that all acts and all things, according to their essence, are contained under the divine disposition; wherefore neither can it escape that all acts and things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity.

Again, a degree is either something or nothing. If something, it is contained under divine disposition; therefore all degrees which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity, and all other things by the same reasoning, as was just argued; therefore universally all things [shall come to pass of necessity]. If nothing, it is not contained, nor is it distributed under the name of being; wherefore it does not falsify this universal: "*All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity*"; and this universal the opining one has to concede for all beings which are not, or shall be, degrees — wherefore also simply for all beings.

Again, either beings are varied numerically and essentially with the variation of degrees, or not. If so, then so they are contained under divine disposition, and shall necessarily come to pass, as was argued above. If not, and all things according to their essence are contained under divine disposition, and degree innovates nothing essentially or numerically, then still all things which shall come to pass, as to their essences and number, shall come to pass of necessity; wherefore also simply all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity.

Nor does the twenty-sixth extricate itself from the difficulty of the problem. For it denies that act is something, that it may not be forced to concede it to be provided by God, willed, or done — that thus in free acts it may flee the necessity which otherwise (as it judges) it cannot flee. All present and future beings, therefore, which are not and shall not be acts (as the opinion suggests, and the opining one expressly concedes), are and shall be provided by God, willed, and done; wherefore according to him, they shall come to pass of necessity, and no act is anything; wherefore it is not contained, nor is it distributed under such names as "*being*" or "*something*," nor does it falsify this universal: "*All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity.*" This universal therefore is simply true, because it is for any of its singulars.

Again, God wills every agent or one about to act to do whatsoever he does or shall do, as chapter 22 of book I and its corollary, with chapter 30 of the same and the others following, manifest, and most of all meritorious works, as is plain through chapters 42 and 45 of book I. For these, when they are done, are pleasing and accepted to God — and not newly, but eternally — as chapter 23 of book I shows; wherefore by the reasoning of the position just touched on, it is necessary that everyone about to act do whatever he shall do, and most of all virtuous works.

Again, no second cause can move or act without God properly co-moving and likewise co-acting, as chapters 4 and 22 of book I show, and this by willing, as chapter 9 of book I shows; therefore the difficulty returns.

That the twenty-seventh likewise by no means frees itself from the proposed difficulty can perspicuously be demonstrated, just as against the immediately preceding [opinion].

There remain still two other minor opinions similar [to these]: of which the first and twenty-eighth, with the prior ones, esteems that future foreknown things are the cause of God's foreknowledge; the second, however, and twenty-ninth, thinks that future foreknown things are the *sine qua non* cause of divine foreknowledge.

But both of these suppose what is false, nor through this do they evade the difficulty. They suppose what is false, by the testimony of chapters 15 and 16 of book I. Nor do they exclude the difficulty: for the divine will and His knowledge, with respect to present and past things, is necessary, just as it is also necessary that these be and have been — and not by a new necessity arising from the presence or pastness of things, or any other cause arising temporally, on account of part 6 and corollary 7 of chapter 1, and chapter 23 of book I. The will of God therefore was, and His knowledge likewise, necessary from eternity with respect to all future things; wherefore

through chapter 10 of book I, all future things were eternally in some manner necessarily about to come to pass.

There is also a thirtieth opinion, which affirms that God knows and foreknows things according to their mode — necessary things necessarily, and contingent things contingently. Nor does this opinion avoid the difficulty. For if God knows things according to their mode, either God takes the mode of knowing from the posterior things known, or rather they take the mode of being from God knowing and from His knowledge and from its mode. The first cannot be said, on account of the first supposition, part 3 and corollary 5 of chapter 1, and chapters 15 and 16 of book I. Rather, therefore, it seems on the contrary that every future thing known by God takes the mode of knowing and knowability from God, from the divine will, and from His knowledge, as chapter 14 of book I and what follows persuade. Since also every species, mode, and order is from God, according to what is set down in chapter 26 of book I — and since God does not impose mode upon things except by willing, and His will is universally efficacious and in no way frustratable through chapter 10 of book I — it seems that all things are of necessity in that mode in which God shall have willed them to be present, past, or future, especially since the divine will is not in the power of any inferior cause, nor even of any [causes whatsoever], as chapter 8 of this book shows.

Furthermore, if God knows future contingents contingently, how shall He know them necessarily when they shall be present, or shall pass into the past, since also they shall necessarily then be such? Or if then He shall know them necessarily, how does He not necessarily foreknow them while they are future, since He and His knowledge are altogether immutable through chapters 5 and 23 of book I? Furthermore, concerning the divine will, it is altogether similar, as was touched against the preceding opinions.

There is also a thirty-first opinion which judges that no one can search out or know this hidden miracle of nature, and this concealed secret of God: and this seems to have been the most ancient general view of the Academics, which John of Salisbury in *Policraticus* II.22 seems to profess in this matter; to which Cicero also (as he says at the close of his life) turned aside. But it is most certain that it is fitting, expedient, and necessary that Philosophers, Theologians, and the professors of any faith whatsoever respond — albeit maturely and soberly — to those inquiring, insulting, and opposing, with something more sufficient, more reasonable, or more probable. Wherefore Logicians, Philosophers, Physiologists, Ethicists, and Divines, Catholic and pagan Theologians, will sweat anxiously around the elucidation of this so anxious axiom. Whence also Ammonius the Armenian, in his *Recordations on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias*, on the last [chapter] of book I, treating this matter, writes thus:

This theorem is necessary to all parts of Philosophy. According to moral Philosophy it is altogether necessary to presuppose that "*Not all things are and come to pass of necessity, but there are some which are in our power.*" For since, as masters of certain operations, the existing in us [is] to choose or not to choose certain things, and to do them or not. Some of these acts of

choice and operations we call blameworthy, and some praiseworthy. Nay, the theorem also seems opportune for Physiology: for the Physiologist will inquire whether all things which come to pass come to pass of necessity, or some from fortune and from chance; and to the Logical method in the same way. For this is what is now sought: whether every contradiction divides true and false determinately. The theorem laid forth, you will find, is also [opportune] to first Philosophy. For the Theologian also will inquire in what manner those things which are in the world are governed, and whether all things come to pass determinately and of necessity (as in the perpetual things), or there are some contingently coming to pass. And not even men of an idiotic disposition will you find neglecting meditation upon this theorem.

Furthermore, there is also a thirty-second opinion — not yet, so far as I know, opined by anyone, but perhaps to be opined, which (to confess the truth) once tempted me, perhaps probably to arise from the things to be said — which will presume to establish that in all future, present, and past things, with respect to the science and will of God, there is always contingency to either alternative, and liberty, and absolutely no necessity.

But this opinion in no way fully satisfies the difficulty of the problem, and also supposes what is false. It does not fully satisfy: for the difficulty of the problem seems most of all to press many men because in their free acts they would not wish to be subject to any superior and prior necessity, but [to be] simply Lords, and entirely free absolutely with respect to their free acts, and to have them also simply in their free power. But this responding opinion does not bestow this upon them. For although a future free human act could contingently and freely not be future, and conversely, through the power of the divine will, this nevertheless is not simply, sufficiently, and antecedently in human power; since the human will in all its actions and non-actions necessarily follows the preceding divine [will], nor does the divine will consist in the power of the human will, as the foregoing things manifest. Furthermore, all things which are, are done, and come to pass — even in the acts and non-acts of men — are, are done, and come to pass by some necessity itself naturally preceding, as the corollary of chapter 2 of this book shows.

Furthermore, it also supposes what is false. For when it says that in future, present, and past things, with respect to the science and will of God, there is absolutely no necessity, either it understands that, with the science and will of God standing with respect to some future, present, or past thing, that thing can not be such — that is, that these stand together without repugnance: *"God knows and wills this to be future, to be, or to have been,"* and *"this will not be, is not, or was not"*; or it understands that the science and will of God, which are causes of future, present, and past things, is always in itself free and contingent to being for then and to non-being, never in any way necessary to being for then, for any measure whatever — and so consequently these things caused, by reason of these causes.

The first cannot be said: for it stands that it is simply impossible and includes a contradiction — *"God knows the false,"* and *"the will of God is frustrated"* — through chapter 10 of book I.

Nor can the second be said truly, since according to all Philosophers and Theologians, a thing now presentially existing must by some kind of necessity now exist, and a past thing must have pre-existed, as was somehow touched in chapter 2 of this book. For what theologian would presume to affirm that it is in no way necessary that the world has been created, that Christ has been incarnate of the virgin, born and suffered, has redeemed man, has risen, has ascended, has sat and sits at the right hand of the Father — especially since even concerning future things, by His own testimony, it has been and is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, the prophets, and the psalms concerning Him? And since through chapters 2 and 14 of book I no posterior thing has being or has had being except through the divine volition: this [volition] is in some manner necessary with respect to present and past things. For necessarily it follows: *"this now is or was, therefore God now wills it to be or to have been"*; and the antecedent is in some manner necessary, wherefore also the consequent. For in every formally simple consequence, and absolutely necessary, if the antecedent is necessary simply or by some certain mode, the consequent will also be confirmed by similar necessity; otherwise from a true the false might sometimes follow. Just as therefore present and past things are in some manner necessarily such, so also is the will, by the divine volition, with respect to them — nay, more necessary than they are: for it is the cause of necessity in them.

Furthermore, this assertion seems contrary to the view of the Philosopher in the last chapter of book I of *Peri Hermeneias*, who shows that contingency to either alternative is found only in future things, but not in present nor past, but contrary necessity. It will perhaps be said that this is true with respect to inferior causes, but not with respect to a superior or supreme cause. But without doubt, looking more subtly, the opposite manifestly appears: namely, that just as there is contingency to either alternative in future things with respect to inferior causes, so also is there in present and past. For no inferior cause happens to do or not to do anything in the future except with God first willing or not willing it, as chapters 30 and 32 of book II show; and in similar fashion any inferior active cause happens to do or not to do anything in the present, and to have done or not to have done in the past, whatsoever it is possible for it to do or not to do. For if God should will any active cause to do or not to do anything in the present, to have done or not to have done in the past, of necessity it is so through chapter 10 of book I, and God can contingently so will and not will, with a possibility and contingency excluding all necessity, as the opinion asseverates. As therefore it is contingent to either alternative for you to read or not to read tomorrow, so also to have read or not to have read yesterday: for it is contingent to either alternative for God so to will or not to will. And just as it is contingent to either alternative for someone to build or not, to generate or not, for the future, so to have built or not, to have generated or not, for the past: for it is contingent to either alternative for God so to will or not to will. It is contingent therefore to either alternative for Solomon to be a virgin in the present and never to have begotten a son, nor to have made the temple; for John the Evangelist also not to be a virgin in the present, but to have begotten sons, and to have made Solomon's temple — with infinite other similar things.

Wherefore it has consequently to say that determinate truth is not more found in propositions concerning the present or past than in propositions concerning the future in matter equally contingent, but similarly here and there — against the Philosopher where above, and against many philosophical treatises.

Furthermore, this opinion takes from the blessed the most blessed portion of all blessedness — namely, the certitude of being thus eternally — Augustine saying in *On the Trinity* XIII.7, where he treats of the things of blessedness: "*And what is altogether most blessed, it shall be certain that it shall always be so.*" Nay, according to this view neither are the blessed certain of their past blessedness, nor of the present; nor would any of men have certitude, certain knowledge — wherefore not knowledge of anything; because not of anything future, present, or past — and the opinion of the Academics, once condemned by Philosophers and Theologians, would return; nor would anyone be, or be able to be, certain that he is or has been, that he does anything or has done — against Aristotle, Augustine, nay also against all Philosophers, Theologians, and the common people not infected by the heresy of the Academics. Wherefore neither could anyone safely testify concerning anything past, nor swear, against all the laws of the world, divine and human alike.

For God could most contingently make concerning any future, past, or present thing this side of Himself, that it never shall be, has been, or is. According to this view, also, it would be expedient to pray to God for evils of guilt and of past punishment, that He may make those never to have been; nay, it would seem to be only as expedient to pray for past evils that they may not have been, as for possible or future evils, lest unless God succor, they may not be done. But who so prays? What Church? What person? Why our heavenly Father? Why our mother the Church? Why the Spirit of truth, who taught all truth — [who] has nowhere taught the children so to pray?

Furthermore, the rational creature, angelic and human, which is wholly mutable according to nature in essence and in acts, when it has any act, even most mutable, and most free according to contradiction, it is necessary for it that it then has that act, and that act of his has then a certain necessity of being — namely, consequent necessity; wherefore also much more, as it seems, any act of God [has such necessity], since He Himself is supremely necessary being, immutable, stable, and firm, as the first supposition manifests.

CHAPTER XXVI

Treats the thirty-third opinion, more famous than the rest, which affirms that something always was future, and is still future; nevertheless it is in no way necessary that it ever was, or now is, future. And [it affirms] that something never was future, nor now is future, and that it is possible — with a possibility opposed to all necessity — that it always was, and now is, future; and likewise correspondingly with respect to the foreknowledge of God. Yet

concerning every past or present thing, it says that it is necessary that it has been or is, and that it is necessary that God always foreknew that it was about to be, or knows that it is now present, and likewise that it is necessary that God knows that it is past and has been; and [Bradwardine] reprove it for the insufficiency of its response, in that it does not sufficiently empty out the difficulty.

Besides these, however, there is a thirty-third opinion, which affirms that something always was future, and is still future — yet it is in no way necessary that it ever was, or now is, future; and that something never was future, nor now is future, and it is possible (with a possibility opposed to all necessity) that it always was, and now is, future; and concerning the foreknowledge of God correspondingly in every respect. Yet of every past or present thing, it says that it is necessary that it has been or is, and that it is necessary that God always foreknew that it was about to be, or knows that it is now present — and that it is also necessary that God knows it to be past and to have been.

And this is the more common and famous opinion among the more recent Philosophers and Theologians, and especially among our Englishmen, and is, as it were, alone unanimously approved by them. Of these, before all things, with the knees of my heart bent, I humbly implore the kindly patience of charity (which seeks not its own to the prejudice of truth, nor is irritated if anyone has zealously labored to elucidate truth, but rejoices together at truth elucidated by anyone, believing all true things and bearing all things) — that, if not I, but in me and through me the Spirit of truth deigns to bring forth some truth perhaps repugnant to this opinion, they may by no means be jealous, by no means irritated, by no means indignant, lest perhaps they be convicted of resisting not me, but rather the Holy Spirit. For whatever true thing is said by anyone, is said by the Holy Spirit, as chapter 22 of book II recited from the blessed Ambrose; but [I implore them], as true sons of charity, to rejoice together at, believe, and bear truth.

For there is no slight peril in the knowledge of truth to be unwilling to abandon a former — though recognized — falsity, with pride alone forbidding. Whence the Apostle, 2 Thessalonians 2: *"They have not received the love of truth that they might be saved; and therefore God shall send them a working of error, that they should believe a lie, that all may be judged who have not believed the truth, but have consented to iniquity."* But let us not so [act], but rather, according to the wholesome counsel of the same Apostle, putting off, according to our former conversation, the old man, who is corrupted according to the desires of error, let us be renewed in the spirit of our mind, and let us put on the new man, who, according to God, is created in the justice and holiness of truth — wherefore, putting away lying, let us speak truth in all things, singing with the Prophet: *"Open the gates, and let the just nation enter, that keepeth the truth: the old error has departed and receded."*

Yet I believe that I shall in truth assert nothing wholly new, which the reasoning and authority of the ancients shall not confirm. May it therefore please the reasonable charity of this opinion not to refuse to hear, but to hear kindly some reasons.

First, then, it appears that the response of this opinion by no means suffices; secondly, that its hypothesis does not stand. For granting the hypothesis of the opinion, the difficulty is not sufficiently solved. The difficulty of the question most of all bites and goads all because in their free acts they would not wish to be subject to any superior and prior necessity, but [to be] simply lords, and entirely free absolutely with respect to their free acts, and to have them simply in their free power. But this response does not avoid all manner of necessity, nor does it save all manner of liberty.

For although that which is future could not be future, and conversely, and that which is foreknown by God could be not foreknown, and conversely; this nevertheless is not antecedently and sufficiently in our power, nor in [the power] of all inferior causes, as chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this book show. For the superior cause — namely, God — does not in the manner of the question follow, by knowing or willing, any or all the inferior causes, as chapters 15 and 21 of book I, with what follows, and chapter 30 of book II show; but on the contrary, all and each of these in all their motions and cessations universally necessarily follow His will, as chapters 30 and 32 of book II, and chapter 2 of book III, with chapter 10 of book I teach.

Therefore, since by the corollary of chapter 9 of book I all future things shall come to pass from the divine will (which is the first and supreme cause through chapter 30 of book II), and is in no way frustratable, but efficacious in every respect through chapter 10 of book I, nor antecedently or sufficiently in our power, nor in [the power] of any or all inferior causes, through chapters 8 and 9 of this book — no future thing is simply, namely sufficiently and antecedently, placed in our power, nor do we have, with respect to any future thing, all manner of liberty simply; but in all things we are necessarily subjected, and we serve a naturally preceding necessity — namely, the divine will — as chapters 5 and 6 of this book with what follows teach.

CHAPTER XXVII

Responds, according to the view of the Philosophers and Theologians, that all future things shall come to pass by a certain necessity with respect to superior causes, not contrary to, but consonant with liberty.

That, however, before I withdraw, I may set forth my own view on this — nay, not my own, but the common view of our Fathers — supposing the distinction concerning antecedent and consequent necessity laid down in chapter 2 of this book, I say that antecedent necessity is twofold: one utterly absolute, and the other in some manner respective; and this latter is twofold, namely with respect to some or all inferior or second causes, or only with respect to superior and first causes — namely, the supreme and first cause of all, who is God.

This manner of speaking concerning superior and inferior causes can be had from Augustine in *On Genesis to the Letter VI.22*, where he says that Hezekiah, according to inferior causes, had ended his life at the term predicted by Isaiah, but according to other causes — namely, superior,

which (as he says) are in the will and foreknowledge of God — was then to end his life when he ended it. The Lombard, however, in *Sentences* II, dist. 17, speaking of superior and inferior causes, says that the superior causes are the will and power of God. The *Glossa* on Isaiah 38, where the prediction of Hezekiah's death and the addition of years to his life is treated, suggests the same distinction, though under different words, saying that God considers some things in two ways: namely, according to the merits and nature of the thing, which are called inferior causes, and according to His own counsel. Therefore the counsel of God, according to it, is the superior cause, or [the term] embracing the superior causes; the inferior causes are merit and nature.

The same manner of speaking, also, as to the other part of it — namely, concerning first and second causes, or the first cause — is sufficiently known from Philosophy, where God is most frequently called the first cause; therefore in comparison to the posterior and second [causes], which is also sufficiently expressed in the first proposition of the *Liber de Causis*.

According to this distinction, therefore, it seems to me to be said that not all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by an utterly absolute necessity, as chapter 12 of this book proves, nor even by a respective [necessity] — namely, with respect to any or all inferior or second causes, as chapters 5, 8, and 9 of this book show; but all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by a respective necessity — namely, with respect to superior or first causes, which are the will and power of the supreme God.

It is not to be understood, however, that all or any of the inferior causes — say, rational ones — could, of themselves, act freely [in respect of] this or that, and that the superior cause, God Himself, acts purely necessarily *ad extra*, and so necessitates them to acting; for it would include a contradiction that any inferior cause should do anything without the first specially and properly co-acting, nay, also naturally pre-acting, as chapters 20, 28, and 30 of book II prove. Likewise, the act of the divine will *ad extra* is subject to no preceding necessity, but is alone simply contingent to either alternative, and free simply by liberty of contradiction, as chapter 5 of this book teaches.

But it is to be understood in this way: that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of the necessity of superior causes — that is, all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass causally from the power and will of God, [these being] superior and prior naturally in causing to any others whatsoever, nor is it simply and antecedently in the power of any one or any several inferior causes that all those things should not come to pass. Or more briefly, in this way: All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of the necessity of the first cause — namely, the necessity of agency or activity or efficacy in acting; that is, all those things shall come to pass from the divine will, which with respect to all things willed is not impedible, nor avertible by anyone, because in no other's power, and therefore necessary and inevitable in causing — nay, the very antecedent necessity itself.

For all this the next chapter manifests, nor does it irk to recite its manifestation briefly: For the will of God is the cause superior and prior naturally; wherefore whatever future thing shall come

to pass, [it shall come to pass] through chapter 14 and the corollary of chapter 9 of book I, with chapter 30 of book II, and [the will of God is] not frustratable, but necessary in causing, through chapter 10 of book I; nor simply in the power of an inferior or several inferior causes, through chapter 8 of this book. For how is God's pre-willing of any future thing whatsoever placed antecedently, sufficiently, and simply in the power of any other? Nay, through chapter 9 of this book, nothing at all is in our simply free power. Further, if it were placed in our power that some future thing should not come to pass, this would be by resisting the divine will, or by impeding or changing it, or by causing it not so to pre-will — which is contrary to the chapters just cited; for the cause naturally and prior superior does not follow in causing the inferior and posterior cause, just as neither does the artificer [follow] the instrument.

Every inferior thing also in its action and passion whatsoever is necessitated in some manner antecedently, naturally, by the divine will: for it is the necessity naturally antecedent to all things, as chapter 2 of this book with its corollary manifests. Just, therefore, as all things which are, are done, and come to pass in the present, are, are done, and come to pass of a certain necessity naturally preceding all these in the divine will, so also those things which shall be, shall be done, and shall come to pass in the future.

All these things can be briefly reduced into one syllogistic argument thus: All things which shall come to pass by a naturally preceding necessity, shall come to pass by some necessity. All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by a naturally preceding necessity, because [they shall come to pass] from the divine will, which is to all the things willed by it a naturally antecedent necessity; therefore all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by some necessity. Or more briefly, in this way: All things which shall come to pass by this necessity, shall come to pass by some necessity (the divine will having been pointed out); All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by this necessity; therefore all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass by some necessity.

But because excessive brevity is the mother of obscurity and doubt, behold a syllogism a little more diffuse and clear to the same point: All things which shall come to pass from a cause such that, with it being posited, it necessarily follows that they shall come to pass, and the positing of which is not nor will be antecedently in another's power according to contradiction, shall come to pass of necessity with respect to that cause, in such wise that it neither is nor will be antecedently in another's power according to contradiction that they shall not come to pass; All things which shall come to pass, shall come to pass from a cause of this kind. And still more expressly thus: All things which shall come to pass from the divine will in this manner, that — it being posited — it necessarily follows that they shall come to pass, and that it should be posited is neither nor shall be antecedently in another's free power according to contradiction, shall come to pass of necessity with respect to the divine will, in such wise that it neither is nor will be antecedently in another's free power according to contradiction that they shall not come to pass; All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from the divine will in this aforesaid way.

The major can be shown through the definition of the necessity naturally preceding, and of its effect, premised in chapter 2 of this book — assuming this also as notorious: that the future effect of a cause which is necessary in causing, and the antecedent necessity to the meaning of the foregoing definition, cannot otherwise be antecedently in another's free power according to contradiction except as to the positing or not-positing of the cause — just as the future illumination of this transparent thing by this lamp is in my free power, because I can freely remove or not remove, extinguish or not extinguish, this lamp. For otherwise — namely, that, with such a cause standing, it should be in another's power according to contradiction whether the effect should come to pass or not — manifestly implies contradictories. For it implies that some cause is a necessity naturally antecedent to the meaning of the definition laid down in chapter 2 of this book, and that the same, to the same meaning, is not a necessity naturally antecedent. For if, with such a cause standing, it is in another's contradictory power that its effect by no means come to pass, then from it fully posited it does not necessarily, nor indefectibly, follow that its caused thing be caused; therefore by the foregoing definition that cause is not a necessity naturally antecedent — which nevertheless by the hypothesis is posited as a necessity naturally antecedent. The minor is demonstrated by the corollary of chapter 9 of book I, with chapter 10, and chapter 8 of this book.

Furthermore, according to what is laid down in chapters 15 and 23 of book II, the divine will necessitates in some manner — by a certain spontaneous necessity — angels, blessed men, and those finally confirmed, to the eternal preservation of their beatific act, to never sinning, and to all other things which pertain to beatitude; which [necessity] is also so efficacious and firm with respect to all other things, as the foregoing has taught, because it is of infinite power simply in every respect.

But lest in so great a matter so small a one as I should seem to know any less soberly, to act perversely, or to affirm rashly, behold the great and fitting testimonies of my elders to this very point.

The Wise One indeed says, Ecclesiasticus 42: *"The Lord has known all knowledge, and has looked upon the sign of the age, announcing the things that have passed and those that shall come, revealing the traces of hidden things: no thought escapes Him, and no word hides itself from Him; He has adorned the great works of His wisdom, which is before the world and even unto the world, neither is anything added, nor shall it be diminished, and He has need of no man's counsel. How desirable are all His works, and as it were a spark which is to be considered! All these things live, and remain forever, and in every necessity all things obey Him."*

Whence Augustine in *On Genesis to the Letter VI.21*, speaking of the making of the first man from clay in the age of manhood, thus says: *"It is manifest that man was not so made, contrary to which there was in that first condition — namely, of inferior causes — because there was also the possibility of being made thus, although there was not the necessity of being made thus. For this was not in the condition of the creature, but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the*

necessity of things." And in chapter 22: "It is in the nature of this youth that he should grow old, but whether this be also in the will of God we do not know; nor would it be in his nature unless it had first been in the will of God: and certainly the cause of senescence in the youthful body is hidden. For it is not perceived by the eyes, but is gathered by some other knowledge; this cause, therefore, by which it comes about that this can be, is hidden — to the eyes, but not to the mind. Whether, however, this is also necessary in every way we do not know, and that by which it comes about that it can be, we know in the nature of the body itself; that, however, by which it comes about that it must be, manifestly is not there; but perhaps it is in the world that he must grow old: but if it is not in the world, it is in God; for what He Himself wills is necessarily future, and those things are truly future which He has foreknown. For many things are future according to inferior causes, but if they are thus in the foreknowledge of God, they are truly future; if, however, they are otherwise there, they are rather thus future, as they are there where He who foreknows cannot be deceived. For youth is said to be future in old age; but yet it is not future, if he is to die before: but this shall be thus as the other causes hold themselves, whether woven into the world, or reserved in the foreknowledge of God. For according to certain causes of future things, Hezekiah was about to die, to whom God added fifteen years of life — doing in fact that which before the constitution of the world He foreknew Himself to be about to do, and was preserving in His will. Nor would those [years] be rightly said to have been added, unless they were added to something which had held itself otherwise in other causes. According, then, to certain inferior causes he had now ended his life; according, however, to those which are in the will and foreknowledge of God, who from eternity knew what He was to do at that time, and this was truly future — then was he to end his life when he ended it: for even though, on his praying, it was granted to him that he should also so pray that by such a prayer it should be granted to him, He certainly foreknew, whose foreknowledge could not be deceived; and therefore what He foreknew was necessarily future."

The Lombard also in *Sentences* II, dist. 18, alleges Augustine saying that, that woman should be made from the rib of the man was necessary — not founded in things, but hidden in God; and it can be elicited by sense from *On Genesis to the Letter* IX.28. Likewise Ambrose, on that text of Romans 9, *"that the purpose of God according to election might stand,"* etc. *"In him,"* he says, *"whom He has elected, the purpose of God remains, because nothing else can come to pass than what He has known and proposed concerning him, that he be worthy of salvation; and in him whom He spurns, in like manner the purpose remains which He proposed concerning him, that he shall be unworthy."* The same on that text of 1 Cor. 7, *"For what knowest thou, woman, whether thou shalt save thy husband?"* etc. *"This,"* he says, *"He says because perhaps they may believe, just as the Lord has divided to each one — the Lord has divided to each one when he is to be saved; that is, He knows when he can believe, and bears with him."*

Likewise the blessed Cyprian, in his epistle 3, entitled *On the Lapsed*, thus says: *"Since the crown of martyrdom comes down from God's appointment, nor can it be received unless the hour*

of receiving has been [reached], whoever, abiding in Christ, withdraws meanwhile, does not deny faith, but waits for the time."

Likewise 1 Esdras 5: *"The eye of God was made over the elders of the Jews, and they could not restrain them."* This necessity according to superior causes aforesaid — both as to non-doing and as to doing — the blessed Job evidently shows in various places. For in the fifth chapter, speaking of God, he thus says: *"Who frustrateth the cogitations of the malignant, that their hands may not bring to pass what they had begun."* And below, chapter 14: *"The days of man are short, the number of his months is with thee"* — and that He may show how it is with Him, namely by way of the necessity aforesaid, he subjoins: *"Thou hast appointed his bounds, which cannot be passed."* And below, chapter 23: *"No one can turn away His thoughts; and His soul, whatsoever it has willed, this it has done."*

Concerning the first of these, the blessed Gregory, *Moralia* VI.12, thus says: *"Our action ought devoutly to serve the supernal will once known, and to follow it as the leader of its journey — lest, even unwillingly, it serve it, if proudly declining it: for the force of the supreme counsel can in no way be evaded."* With which sufficiently agrees that of Tobit 30: *"Thy counsel is not in the power of man"*; and that of Isaiah 14: *"The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who shall be able to weaken it?"*; and that of Jeremiah 47, concerning the sword of the Lord, which cannot rest when the Lord has commanded it the motion of vengeance, as is more fully alleged in chapter 32 of book I. And that, above, of the same prophet, chapter 10: *"I know, O Lord, that the way of man is not his, neither is it of man to walk and to direct his steps."* Glossa: *"Let those blush who say that each one is governed by his own free judgment: for the way of man is not his."* Whence David: *"By the Lord shall the steps of man be directed."* And Proverbs 20: *"By the Lord are the steps of a man directed."* Glossa: *"Not by liberty of free will."* Nor can anyone expound these of good ways or steps only, as chapter 32 of book I shows.

On the second authority of Job aforesaid, the blessed Gregory in *Moralia* XII.1 says that in the advance of the virtues a man strives to apprehend the good, and is not able, because almighty God has appointed terms for man which cannot be passed, as chapter 46 of book I more fully alleged. Who also below, *Moralia* XVI [on that text of Job 15, *"Before his days be full he shall perish"*], thus says: *"The days are fixed for each one by the inner foreknowledge of God, nor can they be increased or diminished, unless it should happen that they be foreknown either as longer with the best works, or shorter with the worst — as Hezekiah merited the increase of days by the pouring forth of tears."*

But lest anyone believe that Gregory affirms the pre-ordination or foreknowledge of God to depend on future works, let him hear him above, in the same book, chapter 1, saying concerning the same Hezekiah: *"The Lord through the Prophet said at what time he himself merited to die; through the largesse of His mercy, however, He deferred him to death at that time which He Himself foreknew before the ages. Nor therefore is the Prophet a deceiver, because the time of death was made known at which that man merited to die; nor are the Lord's decrees broken,*

because — that the years of life should grow from God's largesse — this also was fixed before the ages, and the span of life which was unexpectedly added on the outside, was inwardly settled without increase to foreknowledge." The same also in Moralia XVI.4, on that text of Job 22, "Who were taken away before their time," thus says: "Almighty God foreknows that time of each one for death at which his life is terminated, nor at any other time can any have died except at that very time at which he dies. For if to Hezekiah fifteen years are recorded as added to life, the time indeed of his life grew from that term at which he merited to die. For divine disposition foreknew his time when it later took him from the present life. Since therefore it is so, what is it that is said — that the wicked were taken away before their time? — except that all who love the present life promise themselves longer spans of the same life. But when supervening death takes them from the present life, it cuts off the spans of their life which they had been wont to extend longer for themselves as it were in thought."

The same again below, in the same book, chapter 15, on that text of Job 23 cited above, *"No one can turn away His thoughts,"* thus says: *"Concerning whose immutability it is fittingly subjoined: 'And no one can turn away His thoughts.' For just as He is immutable in nature, so is He immutable in thought. His thought no one will turn away, because no one prevails to resist His hidden judgments. For even if there have been some who by their entreaties seemed to have turned away His thought, His inward thought was such that they were able by entreating to turn away His sentence, and from Him they received what they should do with Him. Let it therefore be said, 'And no one can turn away His thoughts'; because once-fixed judgments cannot in any way be changed: whence it is written, 'He has set a precept, and it shall not pass away'; and again, 'Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away'; and again, 'For my thoughts are not as your thoughts, neither are my ways as your ways.' When therefore externally the sentence seems changed, internally the counsel is not changed, because concerning each thing it is immutably constituted within whatever is mutably done without."*

Nor ought it to move anyone what he says — that the divine sentence can be turned aside by entreaties: for this is sufficiently expounded in chapter 25 of book I; and because here he says that God's thought, judgments, and counsel cannot be changed, as also above, in the same book, chapter 4, on the authority of Job 22 just laid down, he says, *"God often changes His sentence, but His counsel never."* This same view most plainly the authority of the same in *Moralia XXVII.22* attests, which chapter 30 of book II more fully alleged.

This necessity of future things according to superior, not according to inferior, causes Anselm shows in *On Concord*, though under other words. For he shows that future things in one way come to pass from necessity, and in another way from liberty — namely, because with respect to the divine will they shall necessarily come to pass, but with respect to the created will by no means; and because with God and in eternity they are immutably constituted, but with the creature and in time mutably. Whence chapter 2: *"Just,"* he says, *"as it is necessary that be whatever God wills, so it is necessary that be what man wills in those things which God so subjects to the human will that, if he wills, they happen; if he does not will, they do not happen."*

For since what God wills cannot not be — when He wills the will of man to be coerced or prohibited by no necessity to willing or not willing, and wills the effect to follow the will — then it is necessary that the will be free, and that what it wills be." And below: "The work of the will, to which it is given that what it wills should be, and what it does not will should not be, is voluntary or spontaneous, since it comes about by spontaneous will, and is in two ways necessary: because it is by the will compelled to come to pass, and because what comes to pass cannot at the same time not come to pass."

Who also below, chapter 3, thus says: *"Nothing prevents something to be known or foreknown by God to come to pass or to be future in our wills and actions through free will, so that, although it be necessary that what He knows or foreknows be, yet many things are by no necessity (supply: unwilling), but by free will. For what wonder if in this manner something is — namely, from liberty with respect to ourselves, and from necessity, namely with respect to the divine foreknowledge or knowledge — since there are things which receive opposites in different respects, just as the same going is to-go and to-go-away with respect to different places?"* And there follows: *"But if, by what Job says of man to God — 'Thou hast appointed his bounds which cannot be passed' — anyone wishes to show that no one could hasten or defer the day on which he dies, although sometimes it seems to us that someone does of his free will something whence he dies — that is not what is objected against what we said above. For since God is not deceived, nor sees anything but truth, whether [a thing] come to pass from liberty or from necessity, He is said to have appointed with Himself immutably what with man, before it comes to pass, can be changed."*

"Such also is what Paul the Apostle says of those who are 'called according to purpose, holy': 'Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren: and whom He predestined, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also magnified.' This 'purpose,' according to which the holy are called, is in eternity (in which there is no past or future, but only present) immutable; but in the men themselves, from liberty of free will, it is sometimes mutable. For just as, although in eternity nothing has been or shall be, but only is, and yet in time something has been and shall be without repugnance, so what in eternity cannot be changed is, in time, before it is, proved to be mutable through free will, without inconvenience."

"And, that the same Apostle might show that he had not put those words for temporal signification, those things even which are future he pronounced by a verb of past time. For not yet did he so temporally call, justify, magnify those whom He foreknew as still to be born. Whence it can be recognized that, from the lack of a verb signifying eternal presence, he used a verb of past signification; since the things which are past in time, in likeness of the eternal present, are altogether immutable: for in this respect, things temporally past are more like the eternal present than things present, since those things which are there — namely, in eternity —

can never not be present, just as past things in time can never not be past; but the present things in time, all that pass, become not-present."

And in chapter 4 he subjoins: *"In this way, then, whatever Sacred Scripture pronounces of those things which are done by free will as it were necessary, it speaks according to eternity, in which every truth — and only truth — is immutably present; not according to time, in which our actions and wills are not always. But since the thing is so otherwise known to be in time than in eternity that sometimes it is true that something is not in time which is in eternity, and that something has been in time which has not been there, and shall be temporally what shall not be there: it seems to be deniable by no reasoning that something be similarly mutable in time, which is there immutable. For mutable in time and immutable in eternity are no more opposed than not to be in some time and to be always in eternity, and to have been or to be future according to time and not to have been or not to be future in eternity. So therefore, without any repugnance, something is said to be mutable in time before it be, which in eternity remains immutably — not before it be or after it be, but unceasingly, because there is nothing there according to time."*

Do not many illustrious Prophets confirm this view, as the series of the Old Testament most clearly teaches? Does not also the Sibyl, prophesying concerning Christ and many things concerning Him, say thus: *"O Jews, it is necessary that these things be"* — as the thirty-second part of the corollary of chapter 1 of book I more fully recited?

Indeed, ten Sibyls are read of, all illustrious Gentile prophetesses; this Sibyl was in Greek surnamed Tiburtina, in Latin Ebulnea — whom Augustine in *City of God* XVIII.23 and 24 surnames Erythraea, or, according to some, Cumaea: of whom, under that surname, Virgil seems to be mindful in the *Bucolics*, eclogue 4, saying thus: *"The last age of the Cumaean song now comes"* — that is, of the song of the Sibyl of Cumae according to Servius in the commentary; and there follows consequently: *"Now is born from anew a great order of ages; now the Virgin returns, the Saturnian reigns return; now is sent down a new offspring from the high heaven,"* etc. — all of which can be aptly applied to Christ, as Jerome also does in the prefatory epistle of the Bible. This [Sibyl] Augustine in *City of God* XVIII.23 and 24 says was in the time of Ahaz or Hezekiah, kings of Judah, and Romulus and the founding of Rome — or, as some have written, in the time of the Trojan war.

Some of her prophecies concerning Christ, as they are written in her book, Lactantius alleges in his book of *Divine Institutions Against the Gentiles*; which Augustine also in *City of God* XVIII worthily commemorates. Of this Sibyl's verses (the thirty-third part of the corollary of chapter 1 of book I in the writings) the holy Church is mindful in a certain sequence on the Nativity, singing thus: *"If she will not believe her own seers, [let her believe] the gentiles by the Sibylline verses, [which] foretold these things."* These things I have brought forth more abundantly, lest perchance the authority of this wise Sibyl should be thought contemptible.

This Sibyl, then, prophesying many things of Christ, says: *"It is necessary that these things be."* Does not the very Lord of the Prophets and faithful Author of faith Himself faithfully authorize

this view, when He says: *"It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me"*? (Luke 24.) Wherefore by similar reasoning, it is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the book of life, in the mind, and in the will of God; and there all future things are eternally and immutably, most distinctly and most certainly inscribed, as the foregoing things have taught.

Furthermore, unless such necessity be supposed, it is possible for the whole holy Church of God to fall, collapse, fail, and perish — for the whole little ship of Peter to suffer shipwreck and be submerged — for the whole faith of Christ before the consummation of the age, even tomorrow or today, to fail and cease — nay, even, as to all its articles concerning the future, to be and always to have been erroneous, false, foolish, and fallacious — for Christ to have been a Pseudo-Prophet, deceiver, liar, and false; the holy Apostles, Martyrs, [Confessors] of Christ also who once passed faithfully in this faith, not to be, nor ever to have been saved, but always damned; or that fictitious faith should suffice for salvation. Which what disciple of Christ — nay rather of Antichrist — what son of holy mother Church — nay rather of the synagogue of Satan — what Catholic — nay rather what heretic — would presume to affirm, since it is so dissonant, so absurd, so horrible, so execrable to Christian ears?

What Christian, moreover, knows not Christ to be the cornerstone, and foundation of the militant Church? And of what kind of foundation: weak, slipping, infirm? — far be this from the soul of a Christian even lightly to dream. Does not Christ on this account compare the faithful Christian to one building his house upon a rock, which no tempest undermines or overthrows? The cause of which He assigns: because it was built upon a rock, as Matthew 7 recites. On which Chrysostom: *"The Church,"* he says, *"built by Christ cannot be torn down."*

Whence Augustine in *On the Words of the Lord*, sermon 13: *"This name, that he might be called Peter, was imposed upon him by the Lord, and this in such a figure that it might signify the Church: for since Christ is the rock, Peter is the Christian people. For the rock is the principal name; therefore Peter [is named] from the rock, not the rock from Peter — just as not from the Christian is Christ, but from Christ the Christian is named. 'Thou art therefore Peter,'"* he says, *"and upon this rock which thou hast confessed, I will build my Church: I will build thee upon me, not me upon thee. Let us discern what is of God, what is of ours; for then we shall not be disturbed, then we shall be founded upon the rock, fixed and stable against winds, rains, and floods — namely, the temptations of the present age. Yet behold that Peter, who was then our figure: now believing, now wavering; now confessing the immortal, now fearing lest he should die. Hence, since the Church of Christ has the firm, it has also the infirm; nor can it be without the firm, nor without the infirm."* Wherefore the Apostle: *"Other foundation,"* he says, *"no man can lay, besides that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus,"* 1 Cor. 3; and again: *"The firm foundation of God standeth, having this seal: the Lord knoweth who are his."* He knoweth, I say, the Lord who are His, by knowing and willing, building and guarding, and this infallibly, insuperably, and immutably; and therefore the firm foundation of God stands. And how firm? Without doubt firmer than any other foundation weak, slipping, corruptible, temporal, earthly, or

heavenly, as the foregoing testify. Wherefore the *Glossa*: *"The firm foundation of God stands — that is, those whom God has chosen and immovably founded in the faith."*

Is not this also what the Prophet figuratively foretold: *"Who hast founded the earth upon its stability, it shall not be moved for ever and ever"* (Ps. 103); and again: *"He has built His sanctuary as an unicorn's horn in the land which He has founded for ever"* (Ps. 77); and again: *"He has established the orb of the earth, which shall not be moved"* (Ps. 92)? Assigning the cause of all this in Psalm 118, He thus says: *"For ever, O Lord, thy word remaineth in heaven; thy truth from generation to generation: thou hast founded the earth, and it remaineth; the day continueth by thy ordinance, since all things serve thee."*

The blessed Augustine, indeed, on these places understands by *"earth"* the Church, which still pilgrimages on earth. Who also on that recited text of Psalm 103, sermon 1: *"By 'earth,'"* he says, *"I understand the Church: which is its firmness, upon which it is founded, except its foundation? Or do we incongruously understand by the firmness upon which the earth is founded, the foundation upon which the Church is constituted? What is that foundation? 'Foundation,' he says, 'no man can lay besides that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus.' There then are we deservedly made firm, because there made firm we are not moved for ever and ever. For nothing is firmer than this foundation. You were infirm, but a firm foundation bears you: in yourself you could not be firm; you shall be firm always, if you do not withdraw from that firm foundation; it shall not be moved for ever and ever: this is the predestined column and firmament of truth."* And below, sermon 2: *"He has founded the earth upon its firmness" — that is, He has made the Church firm upon the foundation Christ. The Church will totter if its foundation totter. And whence shall Christ be changed? Who, before He came to us and took on flesh, [is the one through whom] all things were made, and without Him was nothing made — who contains all things by majesty, and us by goodness. Christ not tottering, [the earth] shall not be moved for ever and ever. Where are they who say that the Church has perished from the world, when it cannot even be moved?"* Whereon Cassiodorus: *"Mystically,"* he says, *"it can be received that the Church founded on Him cannot be inclined."*

Is not this what Christ Himself insinuates, saying thus: *"My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall not perish for ever, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father who hath given them to me is greater than all, and no one can snatch from my Father's hand: I and the Father are one"* (John 10)? Is this not what the Apostle teaches in Romans 8 when he says: *"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation? or anguish? or persecution?"* etc.? *"But in all these things we overcome because of him who hath loved us."* *"Because of him,"* he says, not because of ourselves. And there follows: *"For I am sure that neither death nor life,"* etc., *"shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."* And 2 Tim. 2: *"A faithful saying: for if we be dead with him, we shall live also with him; if we suffer, we shall also reign with him; he that remains faithful cannot deny himself."*

Can also the promise of Christ be false, fallacious, and lying, by which He said: *"I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age"* (Matthew, last chapter)? Can also that great prayer of Christ to the Father, by which He asked Him for His own that He might preserve them; and that by which He asked for Peter that his faith should not fail; and that posing by which He posed His chosen disciples that they should go and bear fruit, and their fruit should remain (recited in John 17, Luke 22, and John 15) — can [these] be void, empty, and inane?

Far be it even lightly to think this, because then Christ could be and have been not Christ — namely, not the true Christ, but a pseudo-Christ and false, or none. Did not the true Christ truly say thus: *"Pseudo-Christ and pseudo-Prophets shall arise, and shall give great signs and wonders, so that even the elect, if it can be done, shall be led into error"* (as Matthew 24 makes clear)? Behold the true consequence of the true Christ: *"If it can be done, the elect shall be led into error."* Wherefore by the true discipline of Logic, from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is truly inferred: It truly follows, therefore: *"None of the elect shall be led into error"* (as Christ there suggests); therefore this can in no way be done — Christ being their elector, preserving them insuperably. Wherefore the blessed Gregory, on Ezekiel I, homily 9, treating Christ's recited consequence: *"One of two things,"* he says: *"for if they are elect, it cannot be done; if it can be done, they are not elect."* Who also in *Moralia* XIV.8, on that text of Job 18, *"In his days the latest shall be astounded, and horror shall invade the first,"* treating Christ's said consequence, thus says: *"And if they are elect that they cannot be conquered by torments, yet by this — that they are men — they also fear the very torments which they see."* And in *Moralia* XXXIII.31, on that text of Job 41, *"From his nostrils proceedeth smoke,"* treating that consequence, thus says: *"It is added: 'if it can be done,' because without doubt it cannot be done that the elect should be fully captured into error."*

With which Augustine agrees, *On Faith to Peter* 67: *"Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that all whom God, by His gratuitous goodness, made vessels of His mercy, predestined by God before the constitution of the world to the adoption of the sons of God — that none of those whom God predestined to the kingdom can perish, nor can anyone whom God did not predestine to life by any reason be saved."* The same in *On Rebuke and Grace* 21: *"Those,"* he says, *"elect, who are called according to purpose, who are also predestined and foreknown — if any of these perish, God is deceived: but none of them perishes, because God is not deceived. If any of them perishes generally, God is overcome by human vice; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by no thing."* The same in chapter 26: *"What will you contrive against the words of Him saying, 'I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not'? Or will you dare to say that — even with Christ praying that Peter's faith should not fail — it would have been about to fail, if Peter had willed it to fail (that is, if he had not willed it to persevere unto the end), as if Peter would in any way have willed otherwise than that for which Christ had prayed that he might will it? For who is ignorant that Peter's faith would have then perished, if that very will by which he was faithful had failed, and would have remained, if the same will should remain? But because the will is prepared by the Lord, therefore Christ's prayer for him could not be in vain. When*

therefore He prayed that his faith should not fail, what else did He pray, except that he should have in faith a most free, most strong, most invincible, and most persevering will? Behold how the liberty of will is defended according to the grace of God, not against it: for the human will does not by liberty obtain grace, but rather grace obtains liberty, and that it may persevere — delightful perpetuity and insuperable fortitude."

The same, chapter 34: *"Whoever in God's most provident disposition are foreknown, predestined, called, justified, and glorified — I say not even those not yet reborn, but even those not yet born — already are sons of God, and therefore can in no way perish."* The same, chapter 35: *"Peter was called according to purpose, that no one could snatch him from the hand of Christ, to whom he had been given."* The same, chapter 53: With Christ thus posing the disciples that they should go and bear fruit, and that their fruit should remain — *"Who shall dare to say, Perhaps it shall not remain? For without repentance are the gifts and calling of God; but [we speak of] the calling of those who are called according to purpose."*

Furthermore the same, in *On the Words of the Lord*, sermon 14, treating that text of Matthew 14 about how, with Christ praying on the mountain, the boat in the sea was tossed by the waves, thus says: *"While He prays in the heights, the boat is disturbed by the waves in the deep. Because the waves rise, this boat can be disturbed; but because Christ prays, it cannot be sunk. This boat, brethren, think of as the Church; this troubled sea, the world."*

Furthermore through chapter 28 of book I, all things shall come about by fate, named from divine speech [*famen*]: but fate imports necessity, as is plain through all who speak of it, and through the authorities there adduced. And Boethius says, on the last chapter of book I of *Peri Hermeneias*: *"All things which fatal reason does, undoubtedly happen of necessity"*; which Ammonius also intends on the same place, as was alleged in chapter 10 of this book. Josephus also, in *On the Jewish War* VII.8: *"Men,"* he says, *"cannot avoid fate, even if they have foreseen it."* Whence the Poet:

"Cease to hope that the fates of the gods can be bent by prayer."

This same plainly the authorities of Augustine, *City of God* V.9, and Isidore, *Etymologies* VIII.45, attest, expounding that text of Psalm 61 [62]: *"God hath spoken once"* — that is, immovably, that is, immutably He has spoken, just as He immutably knows all things which are future, and which He is to do, as chapter 28 of book I more fully recited.

The same, in *On the Spirit and the Letter* 29: *"It is written,"* he says, *"God hath spoken once" — that is, immutably; though it can also be understood of the only-begotten Word."*

Boethius also, *Consolation of Philosophy* IV, prose 6, thus says: *"This series of fate, or providence, binds the acts and fortunes of men by an indissoluble connection of causes; which causes, since they proceed from the beginnings of immovable providence, the causes themselves must also be immutable. For thus things are best conducted, if the simplicity remaining in the divine mind brings forth an undeclining order of causes; this, in turn, restrains mutable things by*

its proper immutability." And below: "God by the series of fatal necessity eliminates every evil from the bounds of His commonwealth."

Furthermore Hermes, the father of Philosophers, *On the Eternal Word* 43, to Asclepius asking concerning *heimarmene*, thus responds: *"O Asclepius, this is the necessity of all things which are done, ever joined to itself with chained connections: this therefore is either the maker of things, or the supreme God, or, under that God, the second produced God, or the discipline confirmed by divine laws of all heavenly and earthly things. In this way, then, heimarmene and necessity, both joined to one another by divine cement, the prior of which, heimarmene, gives birth to the beginnings of all things, but necessity drives to effect those things which depend on those primordials. Order follows these — that is, the woven texture and disposition of time and of things to be perfected. For nothing is without the composition of order, or rather in all things the world is borne by order, or wholly consists of order. These three, then — heimarmene, necessity, order — most especially are effected by the nod of God, which govern the world by their law and divine reason: from these, then, all willing or unwilling divinely is wholly turned away. These are not moved by anger, nor bent by favor, but serve the necessity of eternal reason; which eternity is non-reversible, immovable, and indissoluble. Heimarmene therefore is first, which, as if a seed of all future things being cast, suffices for offspring; necessity follows, by which all things are driven to effect; the third, order, preserving the texture of all things which heimarmene and necessity dispose."*

Who also, *On the World and Heaven* I, treating of the first cause, reason, and divine mind, thus says: *"He governs and composes all things: there are joined in species, written in individual singularity, whatsoever hyle, whatsoever the world, whatsoever the machine of the world, whatsoever time, whatsoever in temporal things the elements bring forth: there is the woven texture of the work, the series of fate, the disposition of ages, the goal of all temporal things engraved by the finger of the supreme disposer; there is the knot of perpetuity."*

Whom his son Aristotle also imitated in *On the World*, last chapter, showing why God, since He is one, is many-named, and after declaring His many names with their causes (as chapter 3 of book I alleges), assigns the cause of these four divine names: *Necessity, Heimarmene, Nemesis, Adrastia*.

It is to be known, namely (according to Damascene in his *Sentences* 39), that among the Greeks six famous principles were posited: namely, God, necessity, *heimarmene* (which according to him is interpreted as fortune), nature, event, and chance. The Philosopher therefore, where above, says: *"I think also that necessity is called nothing other than this, namely, as it were, an insuperable substance; heimarmene in turn — because it couples and disjoins; Nemesis — from the distribution made to each one; Adrastia — being an unavoidable cause."* Where also, consequently expounding the three fatal Establishments — namely, Atropos of the past, Lachesis of the future, and Clotho of the present — he thus says: *"But the fable is perfected not disorderly; these all are nothing other than God, just as also the strenuous Plato says."*

Fate therefore, or divine speech, by which He disposes all things by speaking, according to Augustine, Isidore, Hermes, Aristotle, and Plato, and other Authors, imports immutability, incommutability, indissolubility, indeclinability, necessity, and inevitability. Which the faithful saying of the Author of the faith also testifies: *"Heaven,"* He says, *"and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away,"* or *"shall pass"* (Matt. 24, Mark 13, Luke 21); which Luke 16 thus expounds: *"It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than for one tittle to fall from the law."* And Matthew 5: *"Amen I say to you: till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."* Whence John 10: *"The Scripture cannot be loosed."*

With which agrees that of Jeremiah 31: *"Thus saith the Lord, who giveth the sun for light by day, the order of the moon and stars for light by night, who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar; if these laws shall fail before me, then also shall the seed of Israel fail, that they should not be a nation before me for ever."* Glossa: *"As the order chiefly of the celestial stars cannot be changed, and the wave of the sea is rolled to the shores, and the terrible crash of whirlpools is heard, nor goes beyond the precept whence Thou hast set the bound which they shall not transgress; so by the will of the Lord shall the seed of Israel be perpetual, nor shall it ever cease."* And there follows in the Prophet: *"Thus saith the Lord, If the heavens above can be measured, and the foundations of the earth searched out beneath, and I will cast away all the seed of Israel for all the things which they have done."* Glossa: *"As this is impossible, so also that."*

Below also, chapter 33: *"Thus,"* says the Prophet, *"saith the Lord, If my covenant with the day and my covenant with the night can be made void, that there should not be day and night in their season, then also can my covenant be made void with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne, and the Levites and priests my ministers."* On which the Glossa above said, concerning the creation of the sun, and moon, and stars, and their course, that their laws cannot be changed; now likewise it says that the covenant of day and night cannot be made void, nor the Lord's covenant with David. For the legal priesthood being finished, the kingdom and priesthood of Christ shall remain forever.

With these also agrees that of Isaiah 54: *"The mountains shall be moved, and the hills shall tremble; but my mercy shall not depart from thee, and the covenant of my peace shall not be moved, said the Lord thy commiserator."* On which Jerome, book 15 on Isaiah, thus says: *"More easily shall the mountains be moved and the hills, than my sentence shall be changed — according to what He says in the Gospel: 'Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass.'" And on Matt. 24, on the recited text of the Gospel, he is thus alleged in the Glossa of Thomas: "That He may the more lead them to the faith of what was premised, He subjoins, 'Heaven and earth shall pass away,' etc., as if He should say, It is easier that things fixed and immovable be destroyed, than that anything of my words fall."* Where also Hilary: *"Heaven,"* he says, *"and earth, from the condition of creation, have nothing of necessity in themselves not to be; but the words of Christ, drawn from eternity, contain in themselves virtue that they may remain."* Who also on that text of John 10 cited above, says, in *On the Trinity VII* (as the Glossa

there recites), that the discourse of God is indissoluble. Theophylact also on that recited text of Mark 13, according to the *Glossa*, thus says: "*Sooner shall the immobile elements fail, than the words of Christ*" — which Gregory in *Moralia* XVI.15, cited above, also plainly attests.

The blessed Ambrose also on that mentioned text of Luke 16, "*It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than for one tittle to fall from the law,*" says that Christ in this said of the law that one tittle could not fall. Chrysostom also on that premised text of Matt. 5, in homily 10 in *Opus Imperfectum*, thus says: "*Since all things which were future from the beginning of the world unto the end were mystically prophesied in the law — lest any of those things which come to pass should seem not to have been beforehand known by God — therefore He says: 'It cannot be that heaven and earth pass, until all things which were prophesied in the law have been fulfilled in the things themselves.'* An ingenuous man, if he be found in even a vile lie, blushes — and how shall God not do what He promised in the law, or do otherwise? A wise man does not leave his word in vacuum — and how shall divine words be able to remain empty, without issue? God punishes a man if he himself does not do what he teaches another to do — how shall Christ not have fulfilled in deed what He spoke in the Prophets? This is therefore what He says: 'Amen, indeed, I say unto you, until heaven and earth pass,' etc." — which according to Remigius, there in the *Glossa*, "*shall remain essentially, but shall pass through renewal.*"

With which the Philosopher in *On the World* 13 concordantly says, that God, immobile, moves all things and conducts them where He wills, just as the law of a city, being immobile, disposes in the souls of those using it all things which are according to civility; and this shown as it were through each of the works of the city, by way of conclusion he subjoins: "*So is it surely to be reckoned of the greater city — I say, of the world. For the law for us equally undeclining, God receiving no corruption,*" or, according to another translation, "*transposition, greater and more certain*" (in another translation, "*more firm*") "*than the writings which are on tablets,*" according to another translation, "*on stones.*"

This same Balaam testifies, Numbers 22, saying: "*I cannot change the word of the Lord my God, to speak more or less*"; and 23: "*I cannot prevent the blessing*" — where the *Glossa*: "*For a human tongue cannot, even if it should will, turn away the word of God,*" as chapter 8 of this book more fully alleged. And behold one greater than Balaam to this point — namely, holy Isaiah, who says: "*The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who shall be able to weaken it?*" (Isaiah 14). *Glossa*: "*This cannot be changed.*"

Fate, therefore, or divine speech, by which He utters, orders, and disposes all things — both according to theological and to philosophical letters — introduces and imports necessity at least according to superior and first causes.

Which the holy Thomas in *On the Christian Religion* 137 [i.e., *Summa Contra Gentiles*, where this matter is treated] really attests, although verbally (as it seems) he contradicts. Whence he thus says: "*Although the order of divine providence applied to things is certain (by reason of which Boethius says that fate is an immovable disposition inherent in mobile things), yet it does*

not follow on this account that all things happen of necessity: for effects are called necessary or contingent according to the condition of their proximate causes. For it is manifest that if the first cause be necessary, and the second cause be contingent, the effect will follow as contingent" — as he shows by the example concerning the heavenly motion, and generation and corruption below; and he subjoins: *"But it has been shown that God carries out the order of His providence through inferior causes; therefore some effects of divine providence will be contingent according to the condition of inferior causes."*

He also, on *Sentences* I, dist. 38, question 5, when it is asked whether God's knowledge is of contingent things, and it is argued that not, because of a necessary and immutable cause the effect seems to be necessary — whence, since God's knowledge is the cause of things and is immutable, it does not seem that it can be of contingents — thus responds: *"Since there are many ordered causes, the ultimate effect does not follow the first cause in necessity and contingency, but the proximate cause, as is plain in the flowering of a tree, of which the remote cause is the motion of the sun, but the proximate is the generative power of the plant. Now the flowering can be impeded through some impediment of the generative power, although the motion of the sun be invariable. Likewise also, God's knowledge is the immutable cause of all things; but the effects are produced by it through the operations of second causes; and therefore through the mediation of necessary second causes He produces necessary effects, such as the motion of the sun and the like; but through the mediation of contingent second causes He produces contingent effects."*

Who also consequently, on dists. 39 and 40, when inquiring concerning providence and predestination, makes similar arguments and likewise responds. The same, also, in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.67 and 85, by the same example shows the same.

The view of this Doctor, therefore, stands in this: that necessity and contingency are not predicated with respect to superior causes, but to inferior causes. Wherefore, although the superior causes be necessary with respect to all causes, yet it does not follow that all things come to pass necessarily, because the inferior and proximate co-causes — from which the effect is named necessary or contingent — are not all necessary, but some are contingent.

But this cannot soundly be understood except according to the common manner of speaking of the Philosophers and the common people, who consider natural things only according to natural and inferior causes, and as they consider, so they speak — as chapter 5 of this book shows. And such *"necessary"* or *"contingent"* is not called such utterly absolutely, but only in a certain respect and in a certain genus of causes — namely, of inferior. Since, then, names are by convention, they can be extended that they may be predicated most absolutely — namely, both with respect to superior and to inferior causes; nay also, the necessity of speaking in Theology most especially requires this, as is shown in chapter 5 of this book. For who shall presume to deny: It is necessary that God be omnipotent and good, and impossible that God be not such, and that it be possible for God to enlighten the blind, and to raise the dead, to make the sun stand or to go back, with similar things? Whence Luke 18: *"What is impossible with men, is possible with God,"* and above, chapter 1: *"No word shall be impossible with God."* Wherefore the blessed

Ambrose, on that text of 1 Cor. 3, *"The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God,"* thus says: *"When God does what the world denies can be done, He proves its wisdom to be foolishness."* And what Catholic or pagan denies that God is omnipotent — namely, able to do all things, and that all things can be done by Him? What man, even mad, denies that all things which are done by God can be done by Him, and are possible with respect to Him? But all things which are done are done by Him of necessity, as chapter 3 of book I teaches.

Following also philosophical reasoning: from what or with respect to what shall any thing in any genus better be denominated, than from the principle and with respect to the first in that genus? But the first capable [thing] and the first power is the supreme and first cause. Wherefore the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IX.2 says that *"in all the terms"* — that is, definitions — *"of powers, the ratio (that is, the definition) of the first power is included."* Where also the text which Averroes expounds more expressly thus says: *"All these definitions have the definition of the first power";* on which he thus says: *"These powers are not predicated equivocally, because all have the definition of the first power";* and he means that, when these powers are considered, they seem to be attributed to the first power. For in the definition of every active power is taken the definition of the action of the first form, which is absolute from matter. Whence at Paris an article is condemned which asserts that *"the simply (that is, in every way) possible or impossible is the possible or impossible according to philosophy"* — namely, according to the natural and inferior causes which philosophy considers.

Furthermore, the Doctor's example does not help. For he says that, although the heavenly motion be necessary, yet its effects in inferior things are contingent because of the contingency of inferior causes; and so it is to be understood (as he says) of God's knowledge or will and its caused things. For if the motion of heaven were necessary, and embraced perfectly all inferior causes — for example, if there were only irrational agent causes, and in their every action were totally subjected to heaven — all things which should come to pass would come to pass of necessity. But because it is not so, it happens because some inferior causes — for example, rational ones — are not subjected to heaven in their free acts, as chapter 3 of book II showed; which by means of such acts can help or impede the heavenly operation in others, as is plain concerning cultivators of trees and fields, the generation and nutrition of animals, and the like.

But the divine will perfectly embraces all inferior causes, both rational and irrational, in their actions whatsoever, as chapters 9 and 22 of book I, with chapter 20 and 30 of book II, joined with chapter 10 of book I, teach. Wherefore if the first cause act necessarily, all second causes likewise co-act: for all second causes in their every causation are more immediately, more essentially, and more inseparably joined with the first cause than any of them with another, and similarly all their caused things, as the corollaries of chapters 2, 3, and 4 of book I teach.

Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article asserting that *"Beings decline from the order of the first cause considered in itself, but not in order to the other causes acting in the universe":* *"An error,"* he says, *"because the order of beings to the first cause is more essential*

and more inseparable than to the inferior causes." And again another, affirming that *"for all effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it does not suffice that the first cause itself be not impedible, but it is required that the intermediate causes be not impedible"*: *"An error,"* he says, *"because then God could not produce any necessary effect without the posterior causes."*

Wherefore the same Doctor, more distinctly treating these things in [his question] *On the Power of God*, q. 4, when it is asked, *"Whether something is to be judged possible or impossible according to inferior or superior causes,"* says in answer that the judgment of the possible and impossible can be considered on the part of those judging: for if there are two sciences, one of which considers higher causes, and another less high, the judgment in each would not be taken in the same way, but according to the causes which each considers. Now wisdom is twofold: namely, mundane, which is called Philosophy, which considers inferior causes and judges according to them, as medicine [does] of health; and divine, which is called Theology, which considers superior causes — that is, divine ones — according to which it judges what are the divine attributes, such as wisdom, goodness, the divine will, and so forth. Wherefore according to the consideration of the Theologian, all those things which are not in themselves impossible are called possible.

Since therefore, according to the view of this Doctor, nothing stands in the way that all things which shall come to pass should not come to pass of necessity, except this — that necessity is not predicated according to superior causes — and this is not in the way, but rather helps, since it is true most especially speaking theologically, as has been taught — it follows manifestly that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass of necessity with respect to superior causes.

Furthermore, many future things shall be done immediately by God, without the cooperation of inferior causes; therefore those cannot be called contingently future on account of the contingency of inferior causes; wherefore in those his response has no place; therefore according to him at least all such things shall come to pass of necessity, wherefore also simply all things [shall]. For the divine will holds itself more freely and more contingently to its every extrinsic effect than any second cause to its own, as the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth parts of corollary 5 of this book show.

From all these things, then, I judge it not unmanifestly demonstrated, that fate or divine speech introduces and imposes such necessity on all things. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, also condemned an article which said that *"fate, which is the disposition of the universe, proceeds from divine providence not immediately, but by means of the motion of the superior bodies, and that this fate does not impose necessity upon inferior things, because they have their contrary, but upon superior things"*: all things therefore which shall come to pass shall come to pass of the necessity of superior causes — as the other two articles just recited also plainly attest.

This same view the authorities of Augustine in *City of God* V.9 and 10, alleged in the proof of corollary 1 of this book, expressly profess; and the authorities of the same, *On Rebuke and Grace* 69 and 70, which chapter 20 of book II recites, will the same. For chapter 69 says that *"no [free]*

judgment resists God willing to make a man saved"; the cause of which he immediately subjoins: "For thus to will or not to will is so in the power of him willing or not willing, that it fulfills the divine will, and does not overcome [its] power." And chapter 70: "When God willed to give the kingdom to Saul, it was not in the power of the Israelites to subject themselves to him or not to subject themselves — which was indeed placed in their will, that they could even resist God; who nevertheless did not do this except through their wills, without doubt having the most omnipotent power of inclining the hearts of men to whom He pleased." And below, concerning a certain Shemei, who however in 1 Paralipomenon 12 is called Abishai, "whom the Spirit of the Lord clothed that he should promise and bring help to King David, thus says: Could that man have been opposed to the will of God, and not rather have done His will, who worked in his heart through His Spirit, with which he was clothed, that he should will, say, and do these things?"

This same most clearly the authority of Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* X.1, written in chapter 29 of book I, attests. Boethius also, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, last prose, after very much ventilation of this problem, finally thus responds: *"I will confess a thing indeed of most solid truth, but to which scarcely anyone, except the speculator of divine wit, would have access. For I shall reply that the same future thing, when it is referred to the divine notion, is necessary; but when it is weighed in its own nature, seems wholly free and absolute."* And below: *"If providence sees anything as present, that thing must be — although it have no necessity of nature; and indeed God beholds those future things which proceed from the liberty of free will as present. These therefore, referred to the divine intuition, are made necessary through the condition or disposition of the divine notion; but considered through themselves, they do not desert the absolute liberty of their own nature."*

On this response Gratian leans, in *Decretum*, q. 23, q. 4, where, after the disputation premised on the same matter, definitively responding, he thus says: *"Although it be conveniently said: 'If these things be predestined or foreknown, they shall necessarily come to pass,' yet it is not therefore absolutely true that they shall necessarily come to pass which are predestined or foreknown, because here the necessity is referred to the issue of the things, there to the intuition of divine foreknowledge";* which response he confirms by the alleged authority of Boethius — though he alleges it not from Boethius, but from Augustine. Nor wonder if among so many and so often alleged he should once err in one's name. However, if Augustine wrote down the same authority, I do not know — I do not recall — nor do I believe that it can be found in the books of Augustine. If, however, it is found in them, it is so much the more authentic and accepted.

Whom the holy Thomas follows, on *Sentences* I, dist. 38, last question, where, when it is asked, *"Whether God's knowledge is of contingent things,"* in answering a certain argument, he thus says: *"It must be said that the act of divine cognition passes over the contingent, even if it be future to us, just as our sight passes over it while it is; and because what is is necessary when it is, which yet absolutely is not necessary; therefore it is said that what is considered in itself is contingent, but related to God's cognition is necessary, because it is referred to it according as it is in actual being."* And on this response he leans consequently in this whole matter.

Again, no man is freer than Jesus Christ; but all things which came about concerning Him came about of the necessity of superior causes, or of the divine will, as had been demonstrated in chapter 1 of this book.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Recites a certain erroneous gloss of the authorities.

To these things, however — and most of all to the authorities which make mention of necessity according to superior causes — the common response is that they speak of the *necessity of the consequence*, not of the *consequent*; or of *conditional* necessity, not absolute; or of the necessity *of the saying* [*dictum*], not of the thing; conjointly, not dividedly. And this Boethius seems to suggest where he was alleged; and so the gloss of the *Decretum* notes on the alleged authority of Boethius.

Likewise Anselm, *On Concord* 2: "*When I say,*" he says, "*If God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future,' it is the same as if I should say, 'If it shall be, of necessity it shall be': and when I say, 'If it shall be, of necessity it shall be,' it is of the same value if it is so pronounced: 'That which shall be, of necessity shall be.' For this necessity signifies nothing other than this: that what shall be cannot at the same time not be.*" This is conditional necessity, of the consequence, or of the saying [*dictum*], and conjunctive — not, however, of the consequent, of the thing, or divided; and this alone he concedes, denying every other — which also below he more expressly manifests, when he says: "*It is not the same that a thing be past, and that a past thing be past; or that a thing be present, and that a present thing be present; or that a thing be future, and that a future thing be future — just as it is not the same that a thing be white, and that a white thing be white. For wood is not always of necessity white; but sometimes, before it became white, it could be made not white, and after it is white, it can be made not white: but a white wood it is always necessary to be white, because neither before it is, nor after it is white, can it be made that the white not at the same time be white. Likewise a thing is not of necessity present, since before it was present, it could be made that it should not be present, and after it is present, it can be made not-present: but a present thing it is necessary always to be present, because neither before it is, nor after it is present, can it at the same time be not present. In the same manner, some thing — like some action — is not of necessity future, because before it is, it can be made that it not be future; but a future thing it is necessary to be future, because the future cannot at the same time be not future. Concerning the past, likewise it is true: that some thing is not of necessity past, since before it was, it could be made that it not be — and that a past thing is always necessary to be past, since it cannot at the same time not be past. But in a past thing there is something which is not in a present or future thing. For it can never be made that a thing which is past should be made not-past, just as a thing which is present can be made not-present, and a thing which is not of necessity future can be made not future. Therefore when 'future' is said of the future, it is necessary that be what is said, because the future is never not-*

future, just as as often as we say the same of the same. For when we say that every man is a man, or if he be a man, he is a man, or every white is white, and if it be white, it is white, it is necessary to be what is said, because a thing cannot at the same time be and not be. For if it be not necessary that every future be future, some future is not future, which is impossible. By necessity, therefore, every future is future, and if it is future, it is future — when 'future' is said of a future thing — but by a consequent necessity which forces nothing to be. When, however, 'future' is said of a thing, the thing is not always of necessity, although it is future. For if I say: 'Tomorrow there will be a sedition in the people,' nevertheless not by necessity will there be a sedition. For it can be made that, before it be, it not happen — even if it be future."

The same in book II, *Cur Deus Homo* 27, teaches the same. Whence he thus says: *"If it be said that it was necessary that He should die by His own will, because the faith or prophecy concerning this had truly preceded, this is no other than if you should say: 'It was necessary that it should be future thus, because thus it was about to be future': but such necessity does not force a thing to be, but the being of the thing makes the necessity to be. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be; and there is a consequent necessity, which the thing makes. Preceding and effecting necessity is, when it is said: 'Heaven is rolled, because it is necessary that it be rolled.' Consequent, on the contrary, is what effects nothing, but is — as when I say: 'You speak of necessity, because you speak.' For when I say this, I signify that nothing can make it that, while you speak, you do not speak — not that something compels you to speak. For the violence of natural condition compels the heavens to be rolled, but no necessity makes you to speak."* And below: *"By this consequent and effecting-nothing necessity (since the faith and prophecy concerning Christ were true, because of His will, not of necessity, He was about to die), it was necessary that it be so. By this He was made man; by this He did and suffered whatsoever He did and suffered; by this He willed whatsoever He willed. For therefore they were of necessity, because they were future, and they were future because they were, and they were because they were."*

The holy Thomas also, where just now alleged, immediately after his foregoing authority, subjoins: *"Whence the distinction is good, that something is necessary by necessity of consequence and not of consequent, or by conditioned necessity, not absolute"*; and below he distinguishes this: *"Everything known by God is necessary that it be"* — because it can be of the saying [*de dicto*], and so true; or of the thing [*de re*], and so false. Who also in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.67, 83, and 85, recites and expounds this distinction much more clearly and diffusely, and according to it always responds in this matter concerning future things. The Lombard also, in *Sentences* I, dist. 38 and 40, responds according to this distinction in this matter — whom almost all later Doctors commonly imitate.

But this response in many ways fails. First, because it is false; second, because it is incautious; third, because it is diminished. First, I say, it fails because it is false. For it falsely expounds the authorities which posit the necessity of all future things with respect to superior causes, or to the first cause, but not with respect to inferior or even second [causes], by saying that they speak

only of the necessity of consequence or conditional. For this is not the understanding of the Authors, but another which it does not touch — which the preceding chapter expounded.

For if the Authors in such authorities spoke only of the necessity of consequence or conditional, they would have to concede that future things would necessarily come to pass with respect to the inferior and second causes, just as with respect to the superior and first. For the consequence or conditional in such matters with respect to second causes is just as necessary as with respect to the first. For just as this consequence or conditional is necessary — *"God foreknows this to be future, or shall make this future"* (or *"If God foreknows or shall make this future, this shall be"*) — so is this: *"A second cause foreknows this to be future, or shall make this future, therefore this shall be"*; and likewise of the conditional.

Again, every doctrine ought to be of something doubtful or unknown; but this consequence or conditional was never doubtful or unknown to anyone — *"God, or if God foreknows this to be future, therefore this is future or shall be"*; what wise man, then, would write this to teach, since it is not teachable, but *per se* knowable to anyone, supposing the knowledge of the terms?

Again, if the Authors meant only this, they would in no way solve the proposed question. For supposing and conceding the necessity of consequence and the conditional of this kind, how is the perplexity of the question solved by this? For who, with only this necessity shown to him, will not as much as before doubt concerning free will, merit, demerit, the certitude, fallibility, or mutability of divine knowledge, and the other things touching this problem — since no one ever of sound head doubted concerning that necessity of consequence?

Why also did so many Authors write so many, so ambiguous and so difficult things on this matter and this necessity, if they wished to mean nothing else, when in one most short and easy word they could have dispatched it, by saying that in all such cases there is only the necessity of consequence or conditional?

To the same understanding of necessity they would have to concede that the Chimera, and all things not future, shall come to pass of necessity. For the consequence and conditional premised concerning them is just as necessary as concerning others. For necessarily it follows: *"God foreknows, or if God foreknows, that the Chimera and all things not future shall come to pass, then those things shall come to pass."* Nor can anyone respond that in past and future things the antecedent is posited as being [*in esse*], but in these not — and therefore there is not similar necessity here and there — because the consequence or conditional itself *per se* in things truly foreknown and future does not posit the antecedent in being, just as not in another matter, or other terms whatsoever, but only the necessity of consecution; and so does the other consequence or conditional foreseen.

Speaking, then, precisely of the said necessity alone, similar [necessity] must be conceded concerning the Chimera and all things not future or foreknown, just as concerning future things and things truly foreknown. For the consequence and conditional of this kind is firm by similar

necessity, just as another of any sort. Furthermore, in this consequence: *"God foreknows the Chimera to be future, therefore the Chimera shall necessarily be,"* the antecedent is supposed and posited just as in this: *"God foreknows Antichrist to be future, therefore Antichrist shall necessarily be";* and the necessity of consequence is equal; therefore simply equal and similar is the necessity in both. Nor does it suffice to say that the antecedent in the second is true, and in the first false, and therefore there is not similar necessity here and there. For the falsity of the antecedent in no way diminishes the necessity of consequence, nor does its truth augment it, as no Dialectician is ignorant. Since therefore the necessity of consequence in no way includes the truth of the antecedent — looking at the necessity of consequence alone — the necessity is similar in both; and this alone in such cases this response posits; wherefore it has consequently to posit that as it is necessary that Antichrist be future, so also that the Chimera [be].

The text also and procedure of the Authors speaking concerning this necessity convict and refute this gloss as viperous — destructive, namely, of its own text, not expository. For the cause which Boethius assigns where above — why future contingents are necessary with respect to the divine cognition or will, and not with respect to inferior causes — is this: that with the divine cognition they are present, and what is, when it is, is necessary; but with inferior causes they are not present, but future, and therefore with them, before they are, they can not be.

For Boethius says, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, last prose: *"Since every judgment comprehends those things which are subject to it according to its own nature, and to God there is always an eternal and present-making state, His knowledge also, having transcended all motion of time, remains in the simplicity of its presence, and embracing the infinite spaces of past and future, considers all things as if they were now being done in its simple cognition. Therefore, if you wish to weigh the presence by which He discerns all things, you will more rightly esteem it not foreknowledge as it were of the future, but knowledge of an instant never deficient; whence it is called not pre-vidence, but rather pro-vidence."* And below: *"No necessity compels the one walking by his will to walk, although it is necessary that, when he is walking, he walk. In the same way, then, if providence sees anything as present, it must be, although it have no necessity of nature; and indeed God beholds those future things which proceed from the liberty of free will as present. These therefore, referred to the divine intuition, are made necessary through the condition or disposition of the divine notion."* And below, to a certain objector asking him: *"What therefore does it matter that they are not necessary, since on account of the condition of the divine knowledge they happen in every way as it were necessarily?"* — as if to say, if it be so, between being not necessary or necessary it makes no difference — Boethius thus responds: *"This much it matters: that those things which I proposed a little before — the rising sun, and the walking man, which while they are happening cannot not be happening — yet of these one, before it was happening, was necessary to exist, the other not at all. So also those things which God has as present, without doubt shall exist; but of these one indeed descends from the necessity of the things, the other from the power of those doing. Not without justice, therefore,*

did we say: these things, if they be referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if they be considered through themselves, are absolved from the bonds of necessity."

Whom in this assigning of cause the holy Thomas follows, on *Sentences* I, dist. 38, q. 5, saying: *"God from eternity not only saw the order of His own to a thing, from whose power the thing was future, but beheld the very being of the thing — which, in what manner it may be, Boethius evidently teaches in his book of Consolation. For all cognition is according to the mode of him who knows; therefore, since God is from eternity, it is necessary that His cognition have the mode of eternity, which is to be wholly at once without succession. Whence as, although time is successive, eternity is present to all times, one and the same indivisible — as a now standing — so His cognition beholds all temporal things, although they be successive, as present to itself, nor is any of them future with respect to itself, but one [is future] with respect to another. Whence according to Boethius it is better called providence than fore-vidence, because not as future, but all things as present, He provides by one intuition, as from a watchtower of eternity. But it can be called fore-vidence inasmuch as He knows that which is future to us, not to Him."* And below: *"The act of divine cognition passes over the contingent — even if it be future to us — just as our sight [passes] over it while it is; and because what is is necessary when it is, which yet absolutely is not necessary, therefore it is said that what is considered in itself is contingent, [but] related to God's cognition is necessary, because it is referred to it according as it is in actual being. And therefore it is altogether similar, as if I should see Socrates running presentially, which indeed in itself is contingent, but referred to my sight is necessary."* And below: *"What is known by God can be taken according to the condition by which it underlies the divine knowledge, and this is, according as it has determinate being, and so it has necessity; or it can be taken without that condition, namely as it is in its causes, before it is in act, and so it does not have necessity."*

The venerable Anselm also in *On Concord* 3 and 4 gives a similar cause of a similar saying. For he says that all future things are necessary and immutable in eternity, but not necessary, but mutable, in time before they happen — because in eternity (as he says) there is no past or future, but only an immutable present.

This therefore is the cause of the Authors why all future things with respect to superior causes — namely, divine cognition and will — are necessary: because what is, when it is, is necessary; and all future things are there in presence and in act. And why with respect to inferior causes they are not necessary: because there they are not actually present, but future. How, then, do they speak of necessity, when they say *"what is, when it is, is necessary"* — whether of the necessity of consequence, or of saying, or of thing? — or do they understand the whole proposition in the conjoined or in the divided sense?

If they understand it in the second way, then since from that cause they consequently infer that all future things shall come to pass with respect to superior causes of necessity, they will mean a similar necessity; not therefore the necessity of consequence or of condition only, as this

response feigns. If, however, they understand it in the first way according to the same understanding, they would have to concede that to-be or to-be-future what shall be, when it shall be, shall be necessary. For this consequence is just as necessary, *"If something shall be, it shall be,"* as this: *"If something is, it is";* and this, according to them, is just as necessary *de dicto*, or in the composite sense, as that. For it is just as impossible that anything be at once future and not future, as that anything at once presentially be and not be — which yet they do not concede, but deny, imitating the doctrine of the Philosopher, *Peri Hermeneias* I, last chapter, by saying that *"what is, when it is, is necessary,"* but future things, before they come to pass — and this is, when and while they are future — are not necessarily about to happen, but it is possible that they not happen at all.

Furthermore, when Boethius, in assigning the difference between the necessary and the non-necessary in the foregoing authority, says that the rising sun and the walking man, while they are happening, cannot not be happening — yet one of them, namely the first, before it was happening, was necessary to exist, the other [i.e., that the man should be walking] not at all (insinuating that, before the man was walking, it was possible that he not walk) — how does he understand of the necessary and possible? Either simply altogether — namely, with respect to any superior or inferior causes — or in a certain respect, namely with respect to inferior natural causes?

He does not understand in the first way, because according to his view, both before and after that distinction laid down, just as one of them, before it was happening, was necessary with respect to the first cause, so the other; and because God works equally freely *ad extra* any effect whatsoever (as chapters 9 and 20 of book I, chapter 30 of book II, and the first supposition teach). It is not therefore more necessary, with respect to the divine will willing and doing both, that the sun rise than that the man walk, as also chapter 10 of book I proves. And because he says likewise that the other of them, before it was happening, was minimally necessary to exist (which cannot be understood with respect to the first cause — namely, divine providence and cognition — because, according to his view recited above, all things are there present), it is necessary therefore that he understand the necessity and possibility of these in the second-stated mode — namely, only with respect to natural and inferior causes, with respect to which alone such things are called future. Which his subsequent words also manifest: for he immediately subjoins, *"Those things also which God has as present, without doubt shall exist; but of these one indeed descends from the necessity of the things."* Of what things, except natural and inferior? And he adds, *"the other; however, from the power of those doing";* from the power, namely, opposed to the said necessity — that is, free from the necessity of inferior causes: for the differences of opposites must be opposite.

This therefore, according to him, is the difference between necessities — for example, the rising of the sun — and non-necessaries but free — for example, the walking of a man: that those are necessary with respect to inferior causes, but these by no means, but free; so that according to him acts of free will are not called wholly and simply free, because not with respect to any

causes (since with respect to superior they are called necessary), but they are called free in a certain respect only — namely, with respect to inferior causes — as chapters 5 and 9 of this book show. Wherefore also after his foregoing words he immediately subjoins: *"Not without justice, therefore, did we say: these things, if they be referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if they be considered through themselves, are absolved from the bonds of necessity."*

Boethius therefore in the alleged authorities understands that all future things shall come to pass of the necessity of superior causes, as the preceding chapter expounded — not of the necessity of consequence or conditional only, as this response dreamed; which still another word of his shows. For about to concede this necessity according to superior causes, and to deny another, he premised: *"I will confess,"* he says, *"a thing of most solid truth, but to which scarcely anyone, except the speculator of divine wit, would have access. For I shall reply that the same future thing, when it is referred to the divine notion, is necessary; but when it is weighed in its own nature, seems wholly free and absolute."* If, however, he were speaking only of the necessity of consequence or conditional, who, even of asinine wit, would not most easily have access to its speculation? Who in known terms ever did not know this consequence or conditional: *"God foreknows this to be future, or if God foreknows this to be future, this shall be"*? And who, in philosophical or theological letters at least advanced to the threshold — or even an idiot believing in an omnipotent God — was ignorant of this consequence: *"God provides and wills this to be, therefore this shall be"*? Or who would not most easily have access to the speculation of this consequence?

He does not therefore speak of the necessity of consequence or conditional only, but of another declared in the preceding chapter. And if anyone has not at all gained access to the speculation of this necessity, let him impute it not, I pray, to me, but to the slowness of his own human wit — humbly and attentively asking that he may merit to receive some participation of divine wit, by which he may be able to speculate it. Nor let anyone esteem the authority of Boethius to be despised, since holy Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas, and many other Catholic Doctors imitate him in this matter. For he was a great Philosopher and Catholic Doctor, as his philosophical and theological books manifest, and at last crowned by happy martyrdom and inscribed in the catalogue of saints under the name *Severinus*: for he had many names according to the custom of the noble Romans, which are commonly prefixed at the beginnings of his books.

Secondly, this response fails as incautious: for it has not guarded against the necessity which it willed and believed to have guarded against, nor has it bestowed on us the free power which it willed and believed [to have bestowed]. For if this consequence is necessary — *"God foreknows or pre-wills anything whatsoever, therefore that shall be"* — and the antecedent is not in our power (as chapter 15 of book I and chapter 8 of this book show), then neither is the consequent in our simply free power that excludes any preceding necessity.

Thirdly, this response fails because it is greatly diminished. For although to some few authorities it apparently in some way responds, yet to the reasons made and to most numerous other

authorities it does not respond and will not be able to respond. For how shall it be able to respond to the reasons there made, and especially to the syllogistic reason? How also shall it respond to Ecclesiasticus, Augustine, the Sibyl, our Lord Christ, Chrysostom, Paul, Job, Gregory, Tobit, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the *Glossa*? Or how shall it be able to respond to the necessity of divine fate, and to all the authorities and Parisian articles proving that? For no one positing fatal necessity posits it as necessity of consequence, but only as conditional.

By what color shall it be able to respond to the authorities of Augustine in *City of God* V.9 and 10? For never was any of the Stoics so foolish — nor any of laymen so unlettered — as to believe that every necessity of consequence or conditional is repugnant to the liberty of free will. For who is so rude or foolish as to be ignorant that the necessity of this consequence and conditional, "*If you will freely, you will freely,*" is compatible with the liberty of free will? Why then would Augustine refute the Stoics positing this, if he himself there posit this same and no other? Why also does he in vain teach that this necessity does not take away liberty, when no man ever did not know this? Wherefore not doubtfully he willed there to mean not this necessity, but another patefact in the preceding chapter — which the words of the procedure show.

For speaking there of the necessity of divine fate — namely, said from speaking [*fando*] — he expounds that text of the Psalm: "*God hath spoken once*" — that is, immovably, that is, immutably He has spoken, just as He immutably knows all things which are future, and which He shall do. Then he reproves the Stoics, because they did not wish to subject our wills to such necessity, lest then they should not be free; and distinguishing concerning necessity, he removes their motive, showing that one necessity — namely, *unwilling*, which befalls us being unwilling, e.g., the necessity of dying — is repugnant to the liberty of free will; and that another necessity is defined, according to which we say "*it is necessary that something be so, or be done so,*" which is not repugnant to the liberty of free will. Behold how plainly he expresses this necessity, and defines it by respect to the active cause, as the preceding chapter expounded; and this is twofold — namely, *conservative* and *factive*, as is taught in chapter 2 of book I. For the conservative he says, "*necessity according to which we say, 'it is necessary that something be so'*"; and for the factive he subjoins, "*or be done so*" — but of the necessity of consequence or conditional he makes no mention at all. Wherefore it does not seem that he wished to speak of the necessity of consequence or conditional only — which the exemplary reasoning, by which he shows his proposition, also clearly teaches.

For he shows the said necessity (according to which, namely, we say "*it is necessary that something be so or be done so*") not to be feared, lest it should take from us liberty of will — because we do not put the life and foreknowledge of God under necessity (namely, in the first manner, which takes away or diminishes liberty), if we say that it is necessary that God always live and foreknow all things — just as His power is not diminished when it is said that He cannot die or be deceived. In this reason he says nothing at all, nor does he understand, of the necessity of consequence or any conditional.

How also through this necessity can the other authorities of his, *On Rebuke and Grace*, mentioned in the preceding chapter, be expounded? That authority too of his, *On Faith to Peter*, how shall it be expounded by this subtle and logical gloss, known only to such [as understand] — nay rather perverted? — especially since he wills all his sayings in that little book to be understood according to the vulgar and customary mode of speaking of simple faithful or unfaithful, rude, untaught, that no sense of heretical falsity might creep upon them. Whence also at the head of the book he says: "*Son Peter, I have received the epistle of your charity, in which you have signified that you wish to go to Jerusalem, and have requested to be instructed by our letters [as to] what rule of true faith you ought to hold in those parts, that no sense of heretical falsity might creep upon you.*" Who also at the heel of the book says: "*These forty chapters meanwhile, most firmly pertaining to the rule of true faith, faithfully believe, strongly hold, truly and patiently defend; and if you have known anyone to dogmatize contrary to these, flee him as a pest, and cast him off as a heretic. For so do these things which we have laid down agree with the Catholic faith, that if anyone shall wish to oppose not only all but even single ones of them — in that he contumaciously contradicts each of these, and does not doubt to teach the contrary — he shall appear a heretic and enemy of the Christian faith, and on this account to be anathematized by all Catholics.*" Wherefore, most plainly affirming and most certainly asserting, "*Most firmly,*" he says, "*hold, and in no way doubt that it is so.*"

Likewise, how through this response shall Anselm be expounded — and especially in *On Concord 3*, where he says: "*Those things which are temporally past, in likeness of the eternal present, are altogether immutable*"? For this cannot be expounded of the immutability of consequence, conditional, or saying, but of the thing — since it is one pure categorical [proposition]. Since also immediately after he says that those things which are present in eternity can never not be present there, but present things in time can not be present there — either he means in the composite sense and *de dicto*, or in the divided sense and *de re*. Not in the first way: because thus the second part is false; for as this is not possible, "*Things present in eternity are not present in eternity,*" so also this, "*Things present in time are not present in time*": he means therefore in the second way, just as the preceding chapter [shows], as both his words and procedure evidently indicate.

For the motives of this response, however, it is to be known that that distinction concerning the necessity of consequence or of consequent, conditional or absolute, *de dicto* or *de re*, is in its cases good — as in this and the like: "*If I am to read tomorrow, it is necessary that I read tomorrow.*" However, the reasons and authorities premised in the preceding chapter cannot reasonably be expounded — nor to that meaning only — through it, as has been shown above.

First, however, for the saying of Boethius, it is to be observed that he could very fittingly have said this exemplarily. For seeing that it would be very difficult to understand in what way something could be necessary with respect to the will and cognition of God, and free in its own nature, he wished somehow to show this through a manifest example, that thus, through easier and more known things, he might lead the slower to more difficult and more unknown — as in

every philosophical and theological discipline this is a frequent and useful manner of teaching, by examples; wherefore not unreasonably is the example reckoned among the species of argument by Logicians.

Wishing therefore to show that some future things are necessary with respect to the first cause, and free in their own nature, he advisedly said: "*There are two necessities, one simple — like that 'it is necessary that all men be mortal'; another conditional, like 'if you know someone walking, it is necessary that he walk'*" — that thus by the first he might deny pure necessity from contingent future things, and by the second (in which the consequent is necessary with respect to the antecedent, and free in its own nature) he might somehow show — though much disparately and remotely — that it can be so concerning freely future things with respect to the first cause. For this is the cause naturally antecedent, from which all free things necessarily follow: necessarily, I say, with respect to it, not in their own nature — as the preceding chapter expounded.

Wherefore in the whole subsequent procedure he always denies the necessity of nature and of coercion from free acts; another, however — namely, according to superior causes — never. Which yet, as it seems, he would sometime have done if he had in no way posited it. Nay, both here and in IV, prose 6, he always proves it, expressly sustains and defends it — as the whole of his procedure testifies, and especially the authorities recited in the preceding chapter.

Secondly, I say, for the understanding of Boethius and all others, who say expressly that in such cases there is conditional necessity, of consequence, of saying, or conjointly, but not of consequent, of thing, or dividedly: that this is true to a twofold understanding. First, because according to them in every such conditional, consequence, saying, and composite enunciation there is absolute necessity, but in the consequent, or thing, or divided enunciation by no means. Secondly, in the common and customary mode of speaking: for thus the consequence is necessary with all, but the consequent is not so. For the necessity and liberty of such consequents, according to the more common and customary mode of speaking, are reckoned only according to inferior causes — concerning which both the common people and the professors of almost all the sciences consider very much and speak, as chapters 5 and the preceding chapter teach.

Thirdly, for the understanding of Boethius — because the Philosophers are wont to weigh few words with many meanings (Ovid in book III *De Vetula* saying, "*Speaking few, they wished much weight to underlie their words*") — I believe that by the necessity of *condition*, besides the said conditional necessity, he wished to mean with Anselm a *concomitant* or *consequent* necessity, which arises in some manner from the placing of the present thing in being, and necessarily accompanies it and follows it while it is present; according to which, by the Philosophers and Theologians, and according to all generally, it is said that *everything which is, when it is, must be*, as chapter 2 of this book more fully taught. Who, therefore, could thus reasonably understand, since just as in a conditional from a necessary antecedent the consequent necessarily follows, so also in things, from any thing presentially placed in being — as from a cause

antecedent according to nature, or at least including a cause antecedent according to nature — necessarily really follows, as if inseparable, a consequent according to nature, because [it is] a posterior naturally a certain such necessity. Of this, however, as of all others, the Sophists are able sophistically to wrangle, asking what is that consequent necessity which necessarily follows every thing — and what seems more wonderful, every non-thing. For as *"that which is, when it is, is necessary,"* so also *"that which is not, when it is not."* This necessity, however, cannot be caused or descend from non-being. To these, however, and the like, chapters 13 and 14 of book I [will] respond.

If, however, he wished to understand the first necessity — namely, conditional — well indeed; but the second — namely, consequent or following — I firmly believe he wished to mean, as both his view and his words indicate evidently. For the cause of this necessity, according to him, is this: that future things are present with the divine cognition or providence; and everything that is present, while it is present, is necessary to be — as is shown above. Wherefore, evidently showing that by *condition* he by no means means *conditional*, but the disposition or state, present or in the manner of presence, of the divine cognition, he thus says: *"No necessity compels the one walking by his will to walk, although it is necessary that, when he is walking, he walk. In the same way, then, if providence sees anything as present, that thing must be, although it have no necessity of nature; and indeed God beholds those future things which proceed from the liberty of free will as present. These therefore, referred to the divine intuition, are made necessary through the condition of the divine notion."*

Whence Robert of Lincoln [Grosseteste], *On Free Will* 3, surpassing the elders in understanding, and most profoundly investigating this matter even unto its foundation, says: *"Twofold,"* he says, *"is necessity, as Anselm distinguishes in book II of Cur Deus Homo, chapter 17: one which he calls preceding necessity, which is the cause that a thing be, and forces a thing to be; the other which he calls consequent necessity, which is not the cause of a thing, nor forces a thing to be: and this, as he himself says, is that necessity where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions. It seems to destroy to-either-alternative, and to establish all things to be of necessity. And by this consequent and effecting-nothing necessity, it is necessary that God know my future sitting tomorrow, and similar things. From things necessary by this consequent necessity, no inconvenience follows, but rather a contingent seems to follow necessarily: for while I sit, it is necessary that I sit, and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But what comparison these sayings have, that I sit and that I have sat, to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat — the same comparison the knowledge of God has to my future sitting before I sit; for He knows future things as present."*

And below: *"These two necessities — from one of which only the necessary follows, but from the other (as has been said) a contingent seems to follow — I think Boethius called the simple necessity and the necessity of condition; although some understand the necessity of condition not as that which has been said above to be the consequent necessity, but the necessity of consecution of the consequent to the antecedent: as when it is said, 'If a man runs, he moves his*

feet'; here is the necessity of consecution of consequent to antecedent, although both — namely, both the consequent and the antecedent — are contingent." And he adds: "From the words, however, of Boethius himself, more deeply considered, it can better be weighed that he called the necessity of condition that which we above called the consequent necessity. For he says: 'The same future, when it is referred to the divine notion, is necessary; but when it is weighed in its own nature, it seems wholly free and absolute.' And after a few [words]: 'And indeed God beholds those future things which proceed from the liberty of free will as present. These therefore, referred to the divine intuition, are made necessary through the condition of the divine notion; but considered through themselves, do not desert the absolute liberty of their own nature.' And again: 'These things, if referred to the divine notice, are necessary; if considered through themselves, are absolved from the bonds of necessity.' What other do these words savor than this: that those things which in their own nature are contingent to-either-alternative, flexible, and mutable, in God's notice are invariable — not on account of the invariability of the things, but on account of the immutability of the knowledge of God?"

Furthermore, for the understanding of Boethius, it is to be known that by the *necessity of condition* or *conditional*, he could reasonably mean a *consecutive* necessity between an unimpedible cause and its caused; because, just as in a verbal conditional from the verbal antecedent the verbal consequent necessarily verbally follows, so also in the condition or real connection of the unimpedible cause and the caused, from the cause which naturally precedes — as from a real antecedent — there really necessarily follows (because it is naturally posterior) its caused, which is its real consequent. And this is *respective* necessity, namely with respect to superior and inferior causes — of which the first he concedes in free acts, but the second he denies, as has been shown above.

This I judge probably to be the meaning of the Authors who say that whatsoever — or, if anything — God wills, foreknows, or provides, shall come to pass of necessity. Because according to them God's will, foreknowledge or knowledge, and providence are causes of things; and unimpedible causes; but efficacious altogether, and necessary in causing — as chapters 9, 15, 27, and what follows, with chapter 10 of book I, teach.

The *Glossa* of the *Decretum*, however, could be understood according to the second understanding of Boethius said above; but the gloss could also have expounded its text more closely through *consequent* necessity, or through the consecutive necessity of superior causes, as the surface of the letter offers, as the foregoing also expound. But perhaps because that exposition would have been too difficult and much more diffuse, passing over it in silence, it chose the easier and shorter, not prejudicing the better.

However, if anyone leans pertinaciously on this gloss, let him beware, I pray, lest perchance he lean on a reed which shall enter and pierce his hand. Behold what it says in the end: "*This*," he says, "*is twofold. It is necessary that this come to pass which God foresaw: de dicto it is true; de re it is false. For that thing which God foresaw, it is not necessary that it come to pass. And note*

that this argumentation is not valid: 'If God foresaw something, that thing shall necessarily come to pass; therefore if God foresaw something, it is necessary that it come to pass' — because this expression necessary cannot determine that consequence, but only the consequent."

This gloss therefore wishes to deny all such [statements]: *"That which God foreknows or foreknew, provides or provided, wills or willed any thing — it is necessary that it come to pass"*; because necessity, according to it, in all such [cases] is referred not to the consequence, but to the consequent — not to the saying, but to the thing only.

But behold how diligently it has regarded the text of Boethius and of the *Decretum* which it expounds by glossing! *"If anything,"* says the text of both, *"providence as present sees, it must be,"* or *"it is necessary that it be."* Behold likewise how diligently it has regarded the words of canonical Scripture and of the Doctors. For Luke 24, Truth itself says, *"It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me."* And Matthew 18: *"It is necessary that scandals come."* Which Luke 17, expounding equipollently: *"It is impossible,"* he says, *"that scandals should not come."*

Augustine also, *On Free Will* III.11: *"So far,"* he says, *"is it from being true that the sins of the creature are esteemed to be deputed to the Creator, although the things which He foreknew were future come about of necessity, that, when you have said you find no way how whatever is necessary to be done in His creature should not be deputed to Him, I, on the contrary, shall not find a way, nor confirm one to be findable, or to be at all, by which to Him should be deputed whatsoever in His creature is so done of necessity that it is done by the will of those sinning."*

Like view, with similar manner of speaking, are uttered by his many authorities alleged in the preceding chapter. Anselm also says, *On Concord* 2: *"What God foreknows as future, it is necessary that it be future"*; and below, *"If God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future."* Who also in book II of *Cur Deus Homo* 17: *"Nothing,"* he says, *"is necessary or impossible, except because He Himself wills [it]."* In his *Meditation on Human Redemption* he also thus says: *"Christian soul, soul resuscitated from a heavy death — every necessity and impossibility of His underlies the will, since what He wills, it is necessary that it be, and what He does not will, it is impossible that it be."* A similar view, similarly, many learned men also utter.

For the understanding of Anselm, however, it is to be known that according to his view there is a twofold necessity, namely *preceding* and *consequent*, and each of these is threefold. Now preceding necessity, according to him, is an active cause indefectible in acting, which, namely, being placed, its effect necessarily follows. And this is twofold: because some [is] *compatible with liberty*, but some *destroying liberty*; and this latter is twofold: for some such necessity is *natural*, but some such necessity is *violent*. These three modes are sufficiently known from chapters 2 and 10 of this book; which also can be elicited manifestly from book II of *On Concord*, where also in matters of free will he concedes the first of these (as the preceding chapter recited), and denies the other two.

Consequent necessity also is twofold: one *dictional* or *consequential* and *complex*; the other, however, *real* and *incomplex*. Now consequent dictional or consequential and complex necessity is the necessity of some saying or composite enunciation — i.e., conjunctly in the composite sense — or conditional necessity or necessity of consequence. And this, according to the Logic of Anselm in *On Concord 2*, is so great a necessity that its opposite formally implies and involves contradiction, as his alleged authority evidently indicates. Wherefore he has consequently to concede that such [necessity] is utterly absolute. In the thing, however, and in the consequent there is no absolute necessity, as was said in the second exposition of Boethius.

However, according to the probable Logic of the Moderns of Oxford, not all those propositions in which the same is said of the same are reckoned necessary, as Anselm and the older Doctors suppose. For this would not be necessary, nor true, but false, if no man existed, "*Man is man*"; for it follows: "*Man is man, therefore man is a rational animal*" — for this is from the *per se* understanding of that — "*therefore man is animal; therefore animal is man*"; though yet, no man existing but other animals (as before the creation of Adam was the case), every animal would be irrational and not man; and no animal would be rational nor man.

To that which they are wont to object — "*Therefore indeed man is not man*" — there is twofold response. For some simply concede this; and if it be argued further, "*therefore something is man, and that is not man*," they deny that consequence, because the antecedent is simply negative, nor does it posit or imply anything (as they say) — just as neither does this, "*The Chimera is not animal*," or "*is not man*." Others, however, denying this — "*Man is man*" — concede its contradictory thus: "*Not-man, or no man, is man*"; and so always by prepending the negation, they say the contradictory must be given. Equipollences, however, the Philosopher says always hold, unless something special impedes and is repugnant. But because these things pertain more to Logicians than to Theologians, let it suffice in this place to have briefly touched these things.

Now consequent real and incomplex necessity is twofold: one is *presential*, the other is *causal* or *effectual* — to apply names as closely as possible, though somewhat by transference. Now consequent real and presential necessity can be called from the present thing, or from presence. For this necessarily follows every present thing in this manner: that everything which is, when it is, by this necessity is necessary to be, as was said in the third exposition of Boethius. For this view Anselm says, *On Concord 2*, in this way: "*Because the thing is posited to be, it is said to be of necessity; or because it is posited not to be, it is affirmed not to be of necessity*." And below: "*What free will wills, it both can [will], and cannot not will, and it is necessary that it will. For it can not will before it wills, because it is free; and when it now wills, it cannot not will, but it is necessary that it will, since it is impossible to it that it both will and not will the same simultaneously*." And there follows: "*But the work of the will, to which it is given that what it wills, be — is in two ways necessary: because by the will it is forced to come to pass, and because what is, cannot at the same time not come to pass*." Who also below in chapter 3 says that future things are necessary in eternity and with God, the cause of which he assigns, because there they are present, not future — as has been shown above.

The same also in book II *Cur Deus Homo* 17: "*The being of the thing,*" he says, "*makes the necessity of being. For there is a preceding necessity, which is the cause that the thing be; and there is a consequent necessity which the thing makes. Preceding and effecting necessity is, when it is said, 'Heaven is rolled, because it is necessary that it be rolled.' But consequent — and which effects nothing, but is — is when I say, 'You speak of necessity, because you speak.'*"

Now this consequent necessity cannot only be expounded through dictional or consequential necessity, since whether the thing be or not be, whether you speak or not speak, according to his view in *On Concord* 2 recited above, this saying is always necessary of any thing whatsoever: "*Such a thing is such a thing,*" and "*You speaking, speak*"; and the consequence likewise: "*If such a thing is, such a thing is*"; and "*If you speak, you speak*." This therefore is not that consequent necessity which he says is *made by things*, but that real necessity said above, which necessarily follows from every thing.

His subsequent words also seem to attest this: "*This,*" he says, "*is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions, seems to destroy to-either-alternative and to establish all things to be of necessity.*" But in *Peri Hermeneias* I, last chapter, where Aristotle treats of these things, no such necessity appears to be posited which could seem to destroy *to-either-alternative* and to establish all things to be of necessity, except the said real and presential necessity, which affirms that *everything which is, when it is, must be*; and similarly concerning what is not. Whence he thus says: "*To be, what is, when it is, and not to be, what is not, when it is not, is necessary; but not everything which is, is necessary to be, nor everything which is not, is necessary not to be*" (supply: simply).

This understanding of Anselm concerning consequent necessity is also testified by the alleged authority of Robert of Lincoln recited above, in which he first alleges from him a twofold necessity — namely, preceding and consequent; and below shows that the necessity of *condition*, which Boethius asserts, is not the necessity of consecution, but the consequent necessity which he predicted — namely, presential, as has been shown in the third exposition of Boethius.

Now consequent real, causal, or effectual necessity can be called from the cause or from the effect; and seems to be that consecutive necessity between an unimpedible cause and its effect, in the fourth exposition of Boethius said above, on account of the reason and cause similarly assigned there. And this understanding the authorities of Anselm alleged in the preceding chapter sufficiently seem to attest.

And if anyone objects that then antecedent and consequent necessity would be the same — it must be said that this is sufficiently possible — nay, even necessary, by diverse respects and diverse reasons. Yet *preceding* necessity properly and strictly taken is only a cause, or in a cause indefectible in causing — concerning which chapter 2 of this book has spoken; and this corresponds to the logical antecedent in a logical consequence. *Consequent* necessity, however — real, causal, or effectual — can be taken in two ways. In one way, that it be only an effect, or in the effect of such a cause unimpedible in causing — and corresponds to the said preceding

necessity, as effect to efficient and patient to agent; and this is likened to the logical consequent in a logical consequence. In another way, that it embrace as it were both — namely, that it be the consecutive necessity, or consecution, or real consequence itself between such a cause and its caused, just as logical consecution or consequence is not in the antecedent or consequent alone, but embraces both, and is a certain habitude in the middle between them; and this consequent real necessity corresponds to the whole necessary logical consequence.

However, it is to be known that antecedent or preceding necessity has a twofold understanding. For in one way it is taken as has here been said, and as chapter 2 of this book defines it; in another way for necessity simply and utterly absolute. For this naturally precedes every other necessity; or for the natural necessity preceding naturally necessary effects — which Robert of Lincoln also seems to suggest in *On Free Will* 3, where he says: "*From the necessary, according to the view of Boethius, a contingent seems to follow — yet not from the absolute or antecedent necessary, which forces the thing to be, but from the necessary of condition and consequent, which permits the thing to be free.*" Who also below, chapter 10, reckons antecedent and simple necessity as the same. Who also in a certain question of his concerning the knowledge of God, when it is asked, "*In what manner does God know those things which happen by chance, or from free will,*" distinguishing twofold cause — namely, antecedent and conjoined — defining the antecedent cause: "*It is,*" he says, "*the antecedent cause — namely, pre-ordaining — that according to the course of nature some thing should come to pass of necessity, like an eclipse of the sun and moon*"; and below, after the response that God is not the antecedent cause of effects of this kind, but conjoined, removing one possible objection, he subjoins: "*God's doing and His knowing are the same; nor does it follow: 'God's knowledge, which is the cause of the thing, is eternal, therefore it is antecedent'; for the antecedence of which we now speak is the necessary preordination of a future event according to the course of nature.*"

This also seems to consonate with the words and mind of Anselm, *On Concord*, and book II *Cur Deus Homo*, where he was alleged. For *On Concord* 2, denying antecedent necessity in free acts, he concedes it in the rising of the sun. And *Cur Deus Homo* II.17, likewise denying antecedent necessity from things of free will, he concedes it in the rolling motion of heaven. For "*the violence,*" as he says, "*of natural condition compels the heavens to be rolled.*"

The understanding of holy Thomas can also be elicited manifestly from what has gone before. For he concedes the necessity *of saying*, not *of thing*; the necessity *of consequence*, *of condition*, and *of supposition* — but denies another. For the necessity *of condition* and *from supposition*, in his manner of speaking and in the common manner of speaking of the Parisian Doctors, can be expounded in two ways. For some is dictional and complex; some, however, is real and incomplex; and this latter is twofold: some presential, but some consecutive, causal, or effectual, as has been distinguished concerning Anselm's consequent necessity above. For consequence and consecution is twofold: dictional or logical, and real; and this latter is twofold: presential and causal or effectual, on account of the reason and cause assigned in the exposition of Boethius and Anselm above.

Saint Thomas therefore concedes the necessity *of saying* and *of consequence*, for necessity simply absolute, according to the Logic of Anselm and of the older Doctors recited above. The necessity *of thing* and *of consequent*, however, he denies in similar understanding. Which his words also indicate manifestly: "*Good*," he says, "*is the distinction, that something is necessary by necessity of consequence and not by necessity of consequent; or by conditioned necessity, not absolute*" — as was alleged above. Who also in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.67, speaking of such necessary, says: "*This is not necessary absolutely, but under condition, and by the necessity of consequence.*" And below, chapter 83: "*Although God concerning things caused does not necessarily will anything absolutely, He does will something necessarily from condition, or from supposition.*" And below, chapter 85: "*Necessity from supposition in the cause cannot conclude absolute necessity in the effect; God, however, wills something in the creature not by absolute necessity, but only by the necessity which is from supposition: from the divine will, therefore, absolute necessity cannot be concluded in created things; but this alone excludes contingency.*"

Saint Thomas therefore wishes only to deny absolute necessity excluding contingency. Necessity, however, of consequence, of condition, and of supposition — real, presential — he concedes, as in the assignment of the cause of necessity which he posits, recited above, clearly appears. Necessity also *of consequence, of condition, and of supposition* — real, causal, or effectual — he suggests and affirms, if his view and words be intimately scrutinized; which the cause assigned above in the fourth exposition of Boethius evidently shows.

Otherwise, however, and more briefly, it can be said that necessity, according to him, is not predicated according to superior causes, but inferior only — as the preceding chapter recited. When therefore he denies necessity from free acts, he means concerning necessity with respect to inferior causes, as the preceding chapter alleged. According to these expositions premised — or any of them — the Lombard and other Doctors making distinctions of this kind can be understood.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book III, Chapters XXIX–XXX

CHAPTER XXIX. [B] HE OBJECTS AND RESPONDS.

The deceptive response which sought to undermine the fortifications of necessity according to the higher causes (which had been laid out earlier) having now been excluded, the clamorous assault of the Pelagians comes rushing in from every side. Of their attacks, the first and sharpest is this: *If a man is necessitated to do anything whatsoever, he does not sin.* For according to Augustine, *On Free Will*, Book III, ch. 28: "No one sins in that which can in no way be avoided."

And in *On the Two Souls*, ch. 18, he says: "To hold anyone guilty of sin because he has not done what he could not do is the height of iniquity and madness." Hence Jerome also, in his *Explanation of the Faith to Pope Damasus*, Epistle 32, says: "We execrate the blasphemy of those who say that anything impossible has been commanded by God to man, and that God's commandments cannot be observed by individuals but only by all in common." And it follows: "We so confess free will that we say that we always need God's help, and that those err equally who say with the Manichee that man cannot avoid sin, and those who assert with Jovinian that man cannot sin." Whence also the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 10: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that you may be able to bear it." In agreement with these, the Philosopher [Aristotle], *Ethics* III, ch. 12, says that all and only vices that are reproached are in our power, that is, in our power; and *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6: "It seems that necessity is rightly held to be something not reproachable."

Likewise, precepts are reasonably given to men; therefore they are simply within men's power, as the authority of Jerome cited above attests. Hence Deuteronomy 30: "This commandment which I give thee this day," says Moses, "is not above thee, nor far off, nor placed in heaven, that thou mightest say: Which of us can ascend to heaven to bring it to us, that we may hear and fulfill it in work? Nor is it placed beyond the sea, that thou mightest plead and say: Which of us can cross the sea, and bring it unto us, that we may hear and do that which is commanded? But the word is very near thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." Hence the Philosopher, *Ethics* III, ch. 11: "Whatever things are neither in our power nor voluntary, no one urges anyone to perform; for as no purpose is served by persuading someone—say, not to grow warm, or feel pain, or be hungry—since we shall suffer these none the less."

Likewise, then all good and evil merit would perish, and all freedom of choice, since nothing would be freely in man's power. Likewise, then all reproaches or praises, exhortations or dissuasions, prayers, and universally all good and evil operations would seem superfluous; and this in part is the reasoning of Augustine, *On Free Will* III, ch. 1, and of the Philosopher, *Ethics* III, ch. 11. Hence the same Philosopher in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter, proves that not all things either are or come about by necessity, because then there would be no need to deliberate or to engage in business; "For," he says, "if we do this, this will be; but if not, it will be not." Therefore this opinion subverts all polity, corrupts all morals, and overturns all probity. Likewise, this opinion renders men negligent toward the good, prone to evil, indeed even presumptuous in the end, or finally despairing, and therefore eternally to perish; since according to it, whatever men do or do not do, all things will not happen any more or less, nor not happen.

Besides these, very many other clever arguments are raised by others. "Many things," some say, "are done which we are free to impede." For as they argue by example: This little child who has been baptized and is finally to be damned because of a future sin which he will commit when grown up, can be killed at once in a state of grace and saved. Likewise, they say, we all experience in ourselves complete liberty; therefore we all have in ourselves complete liberty.

Hence Augustine, *On Free Will* III, ch. 1, says: "I see, and in some way touch and hold what you say to be true, namely concerning the freedom of the soul. For nothing do I sense so firmly and so intimately as that I have a will, and that I am moved by it to do something." Likewise, if our will were thus [necessitated], it would not be in our free power, and therefore nothing whatsoever would be, as Augustine says in *On Free Will* III, ch. 1: "I find absolutely nothing that I can call mine if the will, by which I will or do not will, is not mine."

Likewise, then God would be the author of sin, therefore not a just accuser nor avenger. Likewise, they say: "I am unwilling to have him as my God, who impels me to evil." Likewise, then difficulty and ignorance would excuse no one from sin, because neither would the impossibility of avoiding it. Likewise, then before man's fall into sin there would not have been a greater possibility or freedom of avoiding sin than there is now after the fall—against Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* II, dist. 25, and against Bernard and similarly Hugh: For then he could not have avoided sin, except by absolute power, and now he cannot either. Likewise, natural and fatal necessity is incompatible with merit; therefore so is any other necessity. Likewise, then there would not be greater liberty in man than in a brute beast: For man cannot not do whatever he is going to do, except by absolute power, and so and not otherwise can a brute. Likewise, then man could not sin, because it is necessary for him always in all things to will as God wills him to will, and this is to will justly and rightly, as is clear through Anselm, *On Free Will* ch. 8, and *On Concord* ch. 5.

Likewise, then there would not be greater liberty in the wayfarer than in one finally confirmed in glory. For the wayfarer cannot will the opposite of anything he is going to do, except by absolute power, and the comprehensor [the blessed in heaven] can do likewise; therefore he cannot merit more than the latter; rather, he is also finally confirmed like the latter. Likewise, if future things will come about by some kind of necessity, this is on account of the divine will, namely because God wills them to be; therefore the divine will or volition is the cause of that necessity, and is naturally prior to it; therefore it can exist without that necessity: hence from the divine will with respect to future things, the necessity of future things does not necessarily follow. Likewise, the will is of itself free according to contradiction; therefore God can assist it in such a way that it freely uses this kind of liberty. Likewise, it is more perfect that God so assist the will that it operate freely, than that it operate necessarily; therefore this, and not the other, must be attributed to God.

Likewise, then no one sins by omitting what he ought to do, since Augustine says in *On the Two Souls*, ch. 18: "To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is the height of iniquity and madness." Likewise, then God would permit nothing except what He properly causes, nor would the permission and action of God differ, nor the will of permission from the will of good pleasure—the opposite of which all the Doctors concordantly attest. Likewise, then God would will and love sin, against Psalm 5: "For thou art not a God that willest iniquity"; and against Psalm 44: "Thou hast loved justice and hated iniquity." Likewise, very many canonical authorities condemn this. Hence Genesis 4: "Under thee shall be his desire, and

thou shalt have dominion over him"; and Ecclesiasticus 15: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel," etc., as follows; and 1 Corinthians 7: "He who hath determined, being steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but having power of his own will, and hath judged this in his heart to keep his virgin, doth well." Many other passages similar in letter and meaning could be added.

Likewise, if all things came about necessarily with respect to higher causes, this would be by preceding necessity, against Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II, ch. 17, who shows that the free acts of men and of Christ neither were nor are necessary by preceding necessity, but only by following necessity. Hence he says thus: "Preceding and efficient necessity is when it is said the heavens revolve, because it is necessary that they revolve. But following necessity, which produces nothing, but is itself produced, is when I say that you of necessity speak, because you are speaking. When I say this, I signify that nothing can bring it about that, while you speak, you do not speak; not that anything compels you to speak. For the violence of natural condition compels the heavens to revolve, but no necessity makes you speak." And below: "By this following and effecting-nothing necessity, since the faith and prophecy concerning Christ was true—because He was going to die from will, not from necessity—it was necessary that it should be so; by this He was made man; by this He did and suffered whatever He did and suffered; by this He willed whatever He willed. For these things were necessary because they were going to be, and were going to be because they were, and were because they were. And if you wish to know the true necessity of all that He did and suffered, know that all things were of necessity because He Himself willed; but no necessity preceded His will. Therefore, if these things were not, except because He Himself willed, if He had not willed, they would not have been. So therefore no one took His soul from Him, but He laid it down Himself, and took it again, because He had power to lay down His soul and to take it again, as He Himself says."

The same author in *On Concord*, qq. 3, 4, and 2, says that things of free will, before they come to pass in man, can both be changed and not come about through free will and in time, as chapters 27 and 28 of this book argued more fully. Boethius also, in *On the Consolation of Philosophy* V, last prose: "Those things which proceed from free will, before they come to pass, could have failed to occur." Anselm too, in *On Concord* ch. 2, says: "If it is asked concerning the sin of the will itself when it sins by willing, whether it is by necessity, the answer is that just as it does not will from necessity, so the sin of the will is not from necessity, nor does the same will operate by necessity." Robert of Lincoln [Grosseteste] also, in *On Free Will* ch. 10, says that for Peter the predestined to be saved—not necessarily but contingently—it is necessary that he be thus saved; and he adds: "But I call it necessary by following necessity, not by antecedent necessity." Likewise, Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will* chs. 4 and 5, distinguishing a threefold liberty—from sin, from misery, and from necessity—says that the last belongs to free will. Hence in ch. 5 he says thus: "Liberty from necessity belongs equally and indifferently to God and to the entire rational creature, both good and evil."

And to say much in few words: Authors are adduced in great number—almost all logical and philosophical writers, and truly all theological writers—who seem to deny necessity in free acts. Whence Robert, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned at Oxford a certain error which said that *Every true proposition about the future is necessary*; and Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned at Paris another error which laid down that *Nothing is by chance, but all things come about by necessity, and that all future things which will be will be by necessity, and those that will not be it is impossible to be, and that nothing happens contingently, considering all the causes*—an error, he says, because the concurrence of causes is part of the definition of the chance event in the *Book of Consolation*. Likewise another in this form: that *God necessarily does whatever is done immediately by Him*—an error, whether it be understood of the necessity of coercion (because it removes liberty), or of the necessity of immutability (because it imposes the impossibility of doing otherwise). Bernard also, in his Epistle 10 to Pope Innocent, reckons as heretical the saying of Peter Abelard that *God can do or omit only those things, or only in that manner, or only at that time at which He does them, and no other*—which the same Pope, as appears from his rescript among Bernard's letters cited as the fourteenth, condemned as heretical.

But certain reasonings strive to destroy the aforesaid necessity, or to use that necessity through them; for, as they say, if the reasonings of this opinion show that all things which will come about will come about by necessity of the higher causes, it can similarly be shown that all things which will come about will come about by necessity of the lower causes, because the divine will will be necessarily fulfilled through these as well as through those. Again, they say that through the reasoning of this opinion its opposite can be shown, or at least the possibility of its opposite. For God can will some creature to be able to act freely without any necessity whatsoever; which is argued by some thus: For God to will the creature to act freely is different from God's willing the creature to act necessarily; therefore this willing can be separated from the other, and since the will of God is efficacious, it is possible for the creature to act freely without any necessity whatsoever. Furthermore, they say: If according to the reasoning of this opinion, because God wills all future things to come about, therefore they will come about by necessity; then by similar reasoning, because God wills certain future things to be able to come about in no way, it is necessary that certain future things be able to come about in no way; therefore it is possible that certain future things in no way come about, and it is necessary that all future things come about—which most plainly contradict.

But whoever is surrounded by the shield of truth from these and similar arrows and assaults of the Pelagians, even should they have suborned the noonday demon, will not fear. The first argument indeed is the proper argument of Pelagius and his followers. For Augustine cites this argument as Pelagius' own in *Retractations* I, ch. 9, and *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 67, and responds. For that book [*On Nature and Grace*], as is clear from *Retractations* I, ch. 9, and *Retractations* II, ch. 42, was written against a certain book of Pelagius. This argument, almost in its own form, is also reported by Augustine from Caelestius the Pelagian in *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 2; and in another form, but with the same perverse meaning, in many subsequent

passages, where he responds. The venerable Bede also, *Against Julian* XII, cites the same clever argument from Julian's letter to Demetrias, of which the thirty-fifth [chapter] of Book I made mention, and responds. Peter [Lombard] following them, in *Sentences* II, dist. 28, cites this same argument from the Pelagians and resolves it. But because this is their strongest argument, I shall treat it for a little while more thoroughly:

This argument can equally be made about meriting well as about sinning. For if no one sins in that which he cannot avoid, by the same reasoning no one merits in that which he cannot avoid or omit—which is false concerning Christ and the confirmed angels according to some opinion, as is evident in Book I of this work and in the proof of its corollary, and as Book II of this work shows. Also, everyone who now merits, necessarily now merits, because according to that common saying of the Philosopher: *What is, when it is, necessarily is*—which appears more clearly if someone merits in the first instant of attaining adulthood or awakening, or if an angel or man, created with the things necessary for meriting, were to merit in the same instant in which he was created (as was the case with Christ according to His human nature). Otherwise He would not have advanced in merit, against all Catholic Doctors who interpret in a Catholic sense Luke 2: "Jesus advanced in wisdom, age, and grace before God and men"; many of whom Thomas's *Gloss* recites there. Only Ambrose seems to think the contrary, but Peter [Lombard] in *Sentences* III, dist. 13, brings him into agreement with the others. The same is held by Gregory on Ezekiel I, homily 6, whom the same Peter cites in *Sentences* III, dist. 18, who in both of those distinctions shows and holds the same. This same point can be drawn entirely from the demonstration of the eighth corollary of the fifth chapter of this book.

Likewise, whoever wishes to avoid this necessity in merits will, with the heretic Pelagius, against Catholic truth, hold that our merits proceed in no way from God but only from our free will—as is clear from blessed Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, chs. 16 and 17, as the thirty-eighth chapter of Book I argued more fully. This can also be established from the forty-fifth and forty-sixth chapters of Book I and from many other places.

Likewise, no one sins except in that which he cannot avoid, at least for the present, because no one sins except by a present sin, which when it is, cannot not be. And if anyone says that he could have avoided it earlier, he does not press the point nor answer it; for even if he could have earlier, now he cannot; therefore he does not avoid it, since everyone who sins, sins in that which he cannot avoid. The same can be argued more evidently of one sinning in the first instant of attaining adulthood, or of recovery from madness, or of awakening from sleep, or even in the first instant of his being. For this seems possible regarding sinning, since it is possible regarding meriting, as has been shown above.

Likewise, whoever argues thus evidently implies and supposes that any man, not divinely aided by his own powers, can overcome any temptation, avoid any sin, persevere finally by himself alone, and also merit and act, or at least pre-act, anything from himself. But how many heresies and errors this contains, the fourth chapter of Book II together with the fifth and following, the

thirty-eighth chapter of Book I together with the forty-fifth and forty-sixth of the same, the twenty-second of Book II together with the thirtieth of the same, and several others, lucidly manifest.

Now these arguers and their argument having been refuted by way of objection, it remains to resolve the argument itself directly. The right resolution is the demonstration of its sin: for it sins mortally and incurably in form, as the corollaries of the first and second [chapters] of this Book III show. Nevertheless the tenth chapter of this book with its corollary much more artfully, lucidly, distinctly, and formally responds.

To the authority of blessed Augustine and to others similar, response can be made in many ways:

First, it can fittingly be understood in this manner: that no one sins in that which he does not do freely, by liberty of contradiction and contingently to either alternative, as the fourth and fifth [chapters] of this book show, so that as far as concerns the power of the will considered nakedly and absolutely in itself, he could not do that thing. The same is to be said of any free act, good, evil, or indifferent, if it be understood in the substance of the act itself.

Second, in agreement with the prior exposition, and with the prior procedure, and with the procedure and letter [of Augustine], it can be said that Augustine intends there to remove from man the natural necessity of sinning, so that no one sins in that which he cannot avoid by the possibility of nature, but does it by necessity of nature. Hence above, in the same Book III, ch. 26: "If anyone owes that which he has received, and man was so made that he necessarily sins, then he owes it to sin: but if it is wicked to say so, then nature does not compel anyone to sin." And below in ch. 28: "An evil will," he says, "is the cause of all evils. But if it were according to nature, it would surely preserve nature, and so would not be evil; whence it is gathered that the root of all evils is not nature." This understanding the tenth chapter of this book also confirms, teaching that Augustine's *On Free Will* was written against the Manichees, who held that there are two natural souls in man—a good one and a bad one—and that the bad soul does all bad deeds by necessity of nature; whence after the authority cited last, which says that the root of all evils is not according to nature, he immediately adds that *this suffices against all who wish to accuse natures*. Therefore that book must be understood and expounded correspondingly and refutationally, as was just touched upon, and as was more fully taught above in the tenth chapter of this book.

Third, no less in agreement with the procedure: the foregoing authority can also be expounded thus: that no one sins in that which can in no way be avoided even if he wills, but happens to him unwilling and against his will—so as to remove violent and compelling necessity, against the will, from the sinner. For this is a frequent way of speaking among ordinary people and among the Doctors: *I can if I will, you can if you will, he can if he wills, do this or that*. For what is easier, what is more free, than to do something if I will, and not do it if I do not will? That this is Augustine's understanding seems clear from his words and procedure in *On Free Will* III, ch. 28, where he was cited. For having shown that the will is the cause of sin, he inquires further

whether there is any prior cause of the will itself to which sin may rightly be imputed; and having proved that there is not (because if the will did not obey it, it would not sin), he objects in the person of an inquirer: "Is it perhaps violent and compels the unwilling?" And he replies, teaching that this is not so, until the end of that chapter. According to this necessity, then, and the liberty opposed to it, his words must reasonably be received and understood; otherwise they would not bear on the proposed question. Above also, in ch. 26, he says: "Nature does not compel anyone to sin, nor does another's [sin]: For one does not sin in suffering what he does not will: for he does not sin in that which he suffers unwillingly." And below, ch. 29, he says: "Nor is it to be wondered at that man, either through ignorance, has not the free choice of will to choose what to do rightly, or through the resistance of carnal habit which has by violence of mortal succession in some way grown naturally upon him, sees what should rightly be done and wills it, but cannot fulfill it. For this is the most just punishment of sin: that one should lose what he was unwilling rightly to use, when he could without any difficulty if he willed." Which he also recites with approval in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 68.

He writes still further below in the same Book III, ch. 31: "The Creator of things showed with what facility man could, if he had willed, retain what he was made, since his offspring could even surpass what was born." And subsequently in ch. 36: "The Author of the soul granted it such great dignity that He even put it in its power, if it willed, to tend to beatitude." He also above, in ch. 3, showing almost definitively what it is to be in our power, says: "I cannot understand anything else to be in our power except what we do when we will." The same in *On the Spirit and the Letter* ch. 26, wishing to inquire whether faith is constituted in our power, first inquires intently and very diligently what power is, and finally determining and as it were definitively making known what is sought, says thus: "We call this power, where the faculty of doing is joined to the will: hence anyone is said to have something in his power who, if he wills, does it; if he does not will, does not do it." This same is concordantly attested by his authority in *City of God* V, ch. 10, set forth in the ninth chapter of this book.

In agreement with this, Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* II, ch. 10: "Every power follows the will; for when I say I can speak or walk, it is understood: 'if I will'; for if the will is not understood, it is not power, but necessity." Likewise Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 75: "Nor did God unjustly will some not to be saved, since they could be saved if they willed." The same in *On the Faith to Peter*, ch. 57, and cited in *Sentences* II, of Lombard, dist. 39 (though incorrectly, since it is actually in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas*): "Hold most firmly that the first men were created good and upright with free will, by which they could, if they willed, sin by their own will, and that they sinned not by necessity but by their own will."

The same in *Hypognosticon*, ch. 28, treating that of Ecclesiasticus 15: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel": "By 'the hand'," he says, "is understood possibility; this is the first grace by which the first man could have stood, if he had willed to keep the Lord's commandments." The same in *On the Joys of the Just and the Punishments of the Evil*, or *On the Threefold Habitation*: "If God's foreknowledge cannot be evaded, man could not have

sinned otherwise than by will, no other force compelling him, because thus God foreknew him to be about to sin: If therefore by will, not compelled, he was led to sinning, undoubtedly he could have not sinned if he willed; therefore he merited punishment, because he did not sin unwillingly." The same in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 148: "Man could have remained in the good if he had willed." And below in chs. 49 and 59, he repeats and confirms the same opinion. The same in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 44: "God made man such that he was sufficient to lack the evil of sin if he had willed."

Likewise Jerome, on Ezekiel 33: "If when I say to the wicked: O wicked man, thou shalt surely die: thou hast not spoken to him that he may keep himself," etc.: "From these things," he says, "we say that man, even though impious and wicked, can be saved if he hears the master's words and repents from his impiety, nor any less can the master be damned if he does not teach; and in both cases free will is preserved, since it is in the master's will either to speak or to be silent, and in the hearer's either to hear and do and be saved, or to despise and perish through contempt." The Truth Itself also says: "The poor you have always with you, and when you will you can do them good," Mark 14.

Nor do the Authors so speak only of men, but indeed also of God. Hence Algazel, *Metaphysics* III, opinion 8: "The First is powerful, which is so understood that He does when He wills, and does not when He does not will, and is said to be able to destroy the universe of being, because He will do this if He wills; therefore He is powerful over everything that is possible, in this sense, namely, that if He willed, He would do it." Whom also Anselm followed in *Cur Deus Homo* II, ch. 10, inquiring whether Christ could sin and lie; and answering negatively, he shows what power and being-able is: "Every power," he says, "follows will. For when I say I can speak or walk, it is understood: 'if I will'," etc., as is recited above. And it follows: "We can therefore say of Christ that He could lie, if it be understood: 'if He willed.' And since He could not lie willingly, nor could He will to lie, no less can it be said that He was unable to lie; thus then He could and could not lie." And below in ch. 17, inquiring whether Christ could have preserved His life, he answers in similar fashion; and above in Book I, ch. 1, he hints at the same. Likewise Augustine, *Hypognosticon*, ch. 61: "The most high God has the power, if He will, to save the evil by undeserved grace, as well as to reserve them by just future judgment to the punishment of Gehenna." Wherefore the Wise Man wisely in Wisdom 12 says to God: "It is in thy power, when thou wilt, to be able." This same the truth of the holy Gospel attests, saying: "Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean," Matthew 8.

From all these things, as I hope, it evidently appears that the Authors and authorities saying that men can avoid any sins whatsoever can fittingly be expounded in the manner aforesaid, namely, that they can *if they will*. But undoubtedly, they cannot will this from themselves alone, or antecedently to God; but only with God, and from God antecedently—as the twentieth and thirtieth [chapters] of Book II declare.

Hence a fourth exposition of such Authors and authorities can be drawn out, no less consonant with truth. For when the Authors say that man can avoid sin, it is true *if God wills, if God wills to assist*, and with the help of God joined to him; otherwise no one can avoid sin, as has been shown above. Hence Augustine, *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 33, says: "If anyone—namely, Caelestius—says: 'It can come about that man does not sin even in word'—the answer is: If God wills, he can; God does will, therefore he can." Likewise he says (still Caelestius): "If anyone says: 'It can come about that man does not fail in thought'—the answer is: If God wills, he can; God does will, therefore he can." This manner of speaking, although it seems to be Caelestius', Augustine does not reject, but rather approves. This opinion also, although it seems to be Caelestius', Augustine does not totally deny, but rather affirms. For who would deny that man, like the Blessed Virgin, can by the help of omnipotent God avoid any sin, so that for a certain time, or never, he should deviate in any matter? Therefore he immediately adds: "See how he was willing to say: If God assists, he can—to whom it is said: Be thou my helper, forsake me not—not indeed for grasping bodily goods and avoiding bodily evils, but for performing and perfecting righteousness; on account of which we say: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

Considering therefore Augustine's procedure before and after, it evidently appears that he wishes to deny that any man, in the state of present misery, is in fact without sin, or even can be by his own powers alone; he does, however, concede that man through God's help can avoid sin. Hence above, in ch. 2, he cites Caelestius' first argument in this form: "He who denies that man can be without sin must be questioned: What is the sin which can be avoided, or which cannot? If what cannot, it is not sin; if what can be avoided, man can be without sin; for no rational justice allows that to be called sin which can in no way be avoided." And Augustine answers that sin can be avoided, *if vitiated nature be healed by the grace of God through Jesus Christ*. "Healed," he says, and supply: *and preserved healthy*, as is clear from him in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 26, and in the *Sentences* of Prosper, ch. 131, as the fifth and eighth [chapters] of Book II argued more fully.

And below he cites Pelagius' fifteenth argument: "If there is any sin which cannot be avoided, how is God called just, if He is believed to impute to anyone what he could not avoid?" And he answers that sin can be avoided when the humble will is helped. The same in *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 71, says that the condemnation of someone by Episcopal judgment can, if God will, work to salutary correction. Likewise the venerable Bede, *Against Julian* XII, recites from him this heretical argument: "We ascribe iniquity to the just, cruelty to the merciful, when we lament that He commanded something impossible; and then we think man should be damned by Him for things he could not avoid." And he answers: That is true, if it look to God's help, to whom the Catholic voice supplicates saying: *Lead me into the path of thy commandments*. But if he trusts in the strength of his own soul, he refutes God's truthful saying, by which He says: *Without me, ye can do nothing*.

Further, that you may receive the true gloss of this authoritative authority of Augustine without doubt, hear Augustine himself in *Retractations* I, ch. 9, expounding the same authority objected

to him by Pelagius: "Who, I ask, sins in that which can in no way be avoided? But sin is committed; therefore it can be avoided. Pelagius made use of this testimony of mine in a certain book of his in these and similar words of mine; because the grace of God is not mentioned, the Pelagians think we have held their opinion. But this is in vain. For will indeed is that by which one sins and lives rightly; but the will itself, unless it is freed by God's grace from the slavery of sin, and is helped to overcome vices, cannot live rightly and piously by mortals." Whom Peter in *Sentences* II, dist. 28, follows not far off, both in the objection and in the response.

Hear also Augustine in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 67, expounding most clearly and glossing the same authority cited by Pelagius for his heresy: "Pelagius says: 'Likewise, in his books *On Free Will*, Augustine the Bishop says: Whatever is the cause of the will, if it cannot be resisted, it is yielded to without sin; if it can, let it not be yielded to, and there will be no sin. Or perhaps it deceives the unaware? Then let him beware lest he be deceived. But is the deception so great that it cannot be guarded against? Then there are no sins; for who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against.' I acknowledge—the words are mine; but let him also deign to acknowledge all that is said above. The matter at hand is the grace of God, which gives us medicine through the Mediator, not the possibility of justice. That cause therefore, whatever it may be, can be resisted; certainly it can. For we ask help in this, saying: *Lead us not into temptation*; which help we would not ask if we believed it could in no way be resisted. Any sin therefore can be guarded against, but with the help of Him who cannot fail; for therefore we say: *Lead us not into temptation*."

To the other authority of Augustine, *On the Two Souls*, just cited above, both the tenth chapter of this book and especially the second exposition reply, because that book is against the Manichees, as the tenth chapter of this book said. I therefore reply, as the second exposition and the tenth chapter teach. And in this way I confidently reply, because Augustine in *Retractations* I, ch. 15, retracting this book *On the Two Souls*, replies to the same authority of his objected by the Pelagians, and to similar ones in the same book in similar fashion. Hence Peter in *Sentences* II, dist. 28, having recited the aforesaid authority of Augustine, says: "On hearing these things, Pelagius leapt forth saying: 'Why then are little ones, and those who do not have the grace without which they cannot fulfill the divine commandments, held guilty?'" And he adds Augustine's responding opinion: "On what occasion he said this, Augustine reveals in the *Retractations*, replying to Pelagius. For he said this against the Manichees, who contend that there are two natures in man, one good from God, the other evil from a tribe of darkness, which never was good, nor can will the good; for if there were such, it would seem not imputable to it if it did not do good." To Jerome's authority a similar answer must be made: for it speaks expressly against the Manichees.

To the Apostle's authority a response can be made through the three foregoing expositions. For the first exposition can fittingly be drawn from the words: "He will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able." For by this he hints that the temptation is not, nor will be stronger than the power of the will, as the third [chapter] of Book II taught. The third exposition

above can be sufficiently drawn from the words *power* and *be able*, namely *if you will*. The fourth exposition is evidently hinted when he says that *God will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able*; as if to say: It is from God and from divine help that you are not tempted above what you are able. This the next words make still more expressly clear: "but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that you may be able to bear it"—as if he said manifestly: From His helping action and the issue of His help you have it that you can bear the temptation, as the fourth and fifth [chapters] of Book II declare.

To the first authority of the Philosopher [Aristotle], the ninth chapter of this book responds; to his second authority, the distinction concerning necessity written in the tenth chapter of this book responds. For he speaks there of the violently necessary; assigning the third mode of the necessary, he says: "Further, that which forces and force, namely that which against impulse and predilection impedes and prohibits; for the violent is called necessary—wherefore also painful, as Evenus says: 'Every necessary thing is painful'; and as a violence, a certain necessity, as Sophocles says: 'If you compel me to do this, force does'; and necessity seems to be something not reproachable; and rightly: for it is contrary to motion according to predilection and according to deliberation."

The argument from precepts no more opposes this opinion than it would oppose one who said that God acts through our free acts, and that God's grace is necessarily required for the observance of the commandments. This argument is therefore Pelagian, heretical, execrable, as the twenty-eighth chapter of Book II shows—which also fully resolves it. Hence Augustine on that of Psalm 118: "The declaration of thy words enlightens, and giveth understanding," etc., sermon 27, says thus: "What is the little one, except the humble and weak? Therefore do not be proud, do not presume from your own virtue—which is none—and understand why a good law has been given by the good God, which yet cannot give life. For this it has been given: that from a great one it might make a little one, that it might show you that you do not have the strength of yourself to do the law; and so, in want and need of help, you might flee to grace and cry: *Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Yes, Lord, yes, do, O merciful Lord! Command what cannot be fulfilled, indeed command what cannot be fulfilled except through Thy grace*, so that, when men cannot fulfill it through their own strength, every mouth may be stopped, and no one may seem great to himself. For who fulfills Thy commandments as they ought to be fulfilled—that is, from faith which works through love—unless the love itself is poured into his heart through the Holy Spirit? For not those who act in spirit, but as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God; not because they themselves do nothing, but lest they should do nothing good, they are led by the Good to act."

To the authorities of Jerome and Deuteronomy, the response is the same as to Augustine's first authority above; Jerome's authority too was previously expounded. Concerning the authority of Deuteronomy, it is to be known that Caelestius the Pelagian objects the same passage of Scripture along with many similar ones against Augustine in *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 32;

and Augustine responds, as has been answered before in the fourth exposition of Augustine's first authority, as the twenty-eighth [chapter] of Book II more fully recited.

The Philosopher's authority can be expounded through the ninth chapter of this book; yet it expounds itself: "Whatever things are neither in our power, nor voluntary," etc.; and it is true that no one is reasonably urged to non-voluntary things; nor through this does any merit perish, as the corollaries of the first and second [chapters] of this book show; nor even freedom of choice, as the same corollaries manifest. For how does it follow: because God's will, not impendible, but most omnipotently efficacious, wills man to operate freely, therefore he does not operate freely? On the contrary, this does not follow, but the opposite manifestly follows—namely that he operates freely, indeed even necessarily operates freely; necessarily, I say, by the necessity stated in the twenty-seventh chapter of this book; and this is finally the response of Augustine and Anselm, as their authorities evidently testify in *On Free Will* III, ch. 2; *On the Joys of the Just and Punishments of the Evil*; *On Concord* I, and many others, more fully cited in the tenth chapter of this book.

This opinion therefore by no means abolishes free will, but founds and confirms, protects and defends it with inviolable stability. Yet the highest and greatest liberty is in God alone, the highest and most greatly free, as the fifth and tenth [chapters] of this book manifest; in lower causes, however, there is a lower liberty, as the same chapters have taught.

That it is argued that reproaches, praises, exhortations, dissuasions, prayers, etc., must be reckoned superfluous: this no more impugns the twenty-seventh chapter of Book III than the twentieth of Book II, or the twenty-third of Book I; nor does the argument conclude, as is plainly taught in chs. 23 and 25 of Book I, and ch. 28 of Book II. And Augustine in *On Free Will* III, ch. 1, and the Philosopher in *Ethics* III, ch. 11, ought to be reasonably content with what has gone before here and in the tenth chapter of this book.

Concerning the saying of the same Philosopher in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter, weighing it more equitably according to the counsel of the wise man on the four cardinal virtues: "Let not the authority of the speaker move you, nor who, but what he says, attend to; let famous or rather smoky authority be set aside for now, that thus the more freely, the more truly you may judge what reason itself proves; and you will see plainly that he does not conclude what is proposed, but the opposite manifestly." For how does it follow: *all future things will come about by necessity; therefore there is no need to deliberate or engage in business*? On the contrary, the opposite evidently follows: *all future things will come about by necessity, therefore there is need*—because of necessity it is necessary to deliberate and engage in business, for many fitting deliberations and businesses are future. But to come closer, even to the very foundation of his reasoning: who, positing necessity in all future things, would posit it only in the ends and not in the means to those ends? For just as God, most wise, has from eternity preordained certain ends, so also has He ordained certain means, as the twenty-seventh chapter of Book I and what follows manifest. For "the things that are, are ordained of God," Romans 13, as the twenty-sixth of Book

I teaches. The wisdom of God, infinitely infinite, as the sixth of Book I taught, "reaches everywhere," Wisdom 7. "It reaches therefore from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly," Wisdom 8. It reaches, I say, from the first end, from the term *from which*, and from any beginning, through all the means even to the last end, and to every term *to which*, and orders all things, ends and means, by sweetly arranging them. If therefore divine preordination and previolition, not impendible but efficacious, imposes some kind of necessity upon all things, it imposes some such necessity on ends and on means.

If therefore from God's providence it is in some way necessary that men obtain certain ends, it is necessary that they similarly deliberate, engage in business, and proceed through due means—as by way to the term, by care to health, by discipline to a doctorate, by merits to the crown—as the twenty-fifth of Book I touches, and the authority of blessed Gregory, *Dialogues* I, ch. 21, cited in the canon, plainly attests, and the authorities of Augustine written in the twenty-third of Book I.

Yet, in reverence to the Philosopher, it can be said that his argument is good in logic, because very probable and apparent. Or otherwise, and better: If all things came about by necessity contrary to liberty and simply absolute, there would be no need to deliberate or engage in business, because nothing would then be deliberable, nor could any deliberation exist. For deliberation, according to the same in *Ethics* III, chs. 7, 8, and 9, is not concerning such necessary things, but only concerning those that are in us, namely in our free power. That he speaks here of necessity contrary to liberty and simply absolute, his procedure and words clearly indicate. For he speaks there of the necessary which excludes everything to either alternative; but such is not the necessary according to the higher causes (as conceded in the twenty-seventh of this book), which is compatible with contingency to either alternative and with liberty, and which is similarly in our free power, as the fifth and tenth of this book teach—but only the necessary contrary to and destructive of liberty and free power, as the same chapters manifest.

Hence the Philosopher says thus: "These are the consequences and similar—if of all affirmations and negations it is necessary that one be true and the other false, that there be nothing to either alternative, but that all things are or come about by necessity. Therefore there will be no need to deliberate or to engage in business," whose cause he subjoins, "since if this"—namely whatever—"we do, this will be"—namely one designated future thing—"but if not"—supply: *we do*—"it will be"—supply: *the same future thing*; as if to say, whatever we do or do not do, this future thing will not happen any more or less, and so no future thing would be in men's power, nor would depend on human free acts. Hence below he says thus: "These things are not possible: for we seem to be the principle of future things, by virtue of the fact that we deliberate and do something." Considering therefore the Philosopher's procedure, it evidently appears that he wishes to refute the necessary which is contrary to and destructive of contingency to either alternative, of liberty, and of free power. Hence Ammonius, expounding that chapter, says: "Many are led into the opinion which destroys the contingent itself, and the Philosopher argues against those who do all things by necessity and take away contingency."

He also speaks there of necessity simply. For he says: "It is necessary that what is, when it is, is, and that what is not, when it is not, is not; but not everything that is, is necessary to be, nor is everything that is not necessary not to be"—supply: *simply*; whence he immediately adds: "For it is not the same to be necessarily when it is, and to be simply by necessity. Likewise also concerning what is not. And in the contradiction the same reasoning holds." This very thing his words immediately following clearly show. For he concedes such things in the composite sense: *It is necessary that this will be or will not be*; and denies them in the divided sense. In the composite sense, however, there is necessity simply absolute, and this in that sense he concedes; correspondingly therefore and refutationally he denies the same in the divided sense, as in the second exposition of Boethius in the twenty-eighth of this book it was more fully taught. Hence he says thus: "It is necessary indeed that everything either be or not be, and that it shall be or shall not be; yet not, dividing, to say one or the other is necessary. I say, for example: it is necessary that there be a sea-battle tomorrow, or not to be a future one; but not 'there shall be a sea-battle tomorrow' it is necessary, or not to be a future one; that it shall be or not be is necessary." Hence Ammonius, expounding this word of the text *Futuris*, says thus: "He signifies by saying *Futuris* that it is taken in contingent matter. For *to mellon*, that is, *what is to come*, is one thing, in that which he determines concerning generation and corruption, distinct from *to esomenon*, that is, the participle of the future tense from *sum, es*; and *esomenon* indeed signifies what will entirely come about, as when we say there will be winter or summer, or an eclipse: *mellon*, that is *futurum*, what can come about and not come about—say, *I am going to walk*, *I am going to sail*. He insinuates therefore that according to other matters indeed [we say] necessary and impossible; but winter and summer and eclipse, according to him as also according to the other Philosophers, will come about by necessity simply and by necessity of nature." This necessity then he denies here, and the corresponding possibility or contingency he affirms.

To one therefore turning over the Philosopher's writings diligently, and turning them more diligently over again, it will plainly appear that he removes from free acts a threefold necessity: namely, simple absolute necessity, necessity of nature, and violently compelling necessity. Here in chs. 1, 2, and 3, as is clear from what has been shown here and in the tenth chapter of this book; the second [type] in *Metaphysics* IX, as the same tenth manifests; the third in *Metaphysics* V, as is recited above; the same also in *Ethics* II and III, chs. 2 and 3. Who also in *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 3, writes thus: "Necessity is twofold; one indeed according to nature and motion, as a stone by necessity [moves] up and down, but not by the same necessity; but in those things which are from intellect, some are by no means from that which is per se in vain, as a house or an effigy, nor are they by necessity"—namely, of this or that kind aforesaid.

Further, for all things objected concerning possibility and necessity, and that may be objected, another and perhaps better response can be made—because briefer, and more conformable to the customary mode of speaking, and more cautious—nor on that account less truly. It is established that *possible* and *to be able* are derived from *possibility* or *power*, as also they are vocally so named; but *possibility* and *power* are manifold, as the foregoing have taught. Since therefore

John can do or not do this or that, or John can do this or that, or not do it, is twofold, it must be considered all around whether it be by some power that he can—say, by his own natural power, or another's; whether by power, indeed by the great and absolute omnipotence of God; and it can simply be conceded that it is possible thus to be, because by some possibility or power it is thus to be—as a particular or indefinite proposition having some singular even one true, is true and simply to be conceded. But of necessity it must be thought otherwise. For if of some signed necessity it is necessary for this to be or not to be, it is not therefore simply to be confessed that it is necessary for this to be or not to be, as was said of possibility and the possible—especially according to the customary mode of speaking of common logicians, philosophers, and theologians instructed in logical matters. For according to their understanding it evidently follows: *It is necessary that this be; therefore it is impossible that this not be*, and *It is not possible that this not be*, whence it is necessarily inferred further: *that by no possibility or power is it possible that this not be*. It is therefore established clearly that, speaking thus, it does not follow from some necessity: *It is necessary that this be, therefore it is necessary that this be*; for then by no possibility or power could this not be, since yet by some necessity it is necessary that something be, and by some possibility or power it can not be, and it is possible for it not to be.

If however perhaps it were lawful to speak more sharply, although a bit more strictly, it might be said that if by some necessity it is necessary that this be, it is necessary that this be on account of the reasoning concerning possibility and power above; but it does not follow further: *it is necessary that this be, therefore it is impossible that this not be, and it is not possible to not be*, taking it so generally—but only restricting it specially: *therefore by some possibility or power, namely opposed to some necessity, it is impossible that this not be, and not possible that this not be*. Speaking therefore commonly, as most do, I never simply or absolutely concede, nor intend to concede, unless greater authority compels me, that it is necessary for anyone to do or not do this or that, nor that it is not possible, or that he cannot do or not do this or that; rather, that it is possible, and that he can do or not do this or that, those things being demonstrated in which contingency is found. And although this manner of responding may perhaps appear simpler and more cautious, yet the other manner of responding through the foregoing definitions or other better ones, is approved as more doctrinal.

Nor does this opinion, sensibly understood, corrupt morals or virtues. For it is not opposed to liberty of choice or to merit, as the corollaries of the first and second [chapters] of this book show; on the contrary, this opinion most strongly fortifies, defends, and saves morals and virtues, by the inexpugnable wall of divine power and the aforesaid necessity, as the thirty-fourth of Book II showed.

That it is argued that this opinion renders men negligent: this proceeds against the twentieth and thirtieth of Book II, against foreknowledge, predestination, and grace, and so against the sixth, forty-fourth, thirty-fifth and following [chapters] of Book I, just as against the twenty-seventh of Book III. Hence Augustine, *Against Julian the Pelagian* IV, ch. 16, recites a similar argument

objected by him: "You slander me," he says, "for saying that no zeal is to be expected from human will, against that of the Gospel: *Ask and you shall receive.*"

The same in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 46, responding similarly to similar objections against grace and divine predestination, says thus: "When these things are said, they ought not to deter us from confessing the true grace of God—that is, which is not given according to our merits—and according to it, from confessing the predestination of the saints; just as we are not deterred from confessing the foreknowledge of God if anyone speaks thus to the people about it, saying: 'Whether you now live rightly or not rightly, such you shall be afterwards as God has foreknown you to be: either good if good, or evil if evil.' For if some on hearing this turn to torpor and sluggishness, and prone to labor and to lust go after their concupiscences—is therefore that which has been said about the foreknowledge of God to be thought false? Indeed, if God has foreknown them to be good, will they not be good, however much wickedness they are now engaged in? But if evil, will they not be evil, in whatever goodness they are now preserved? There was a certain man in our monastery who, when corrected by the brothers as to why he did certain things which ought not to be done, and did not do certain things which ought to be done, used to reply: 'Whatever I am now, such I shall be as God has foreknown me to be.' Which assuredly he said truly, and yet by this truth he did not advance unto good, but advanced into evil to such a degree that, the society of the monastery being deserted, he became a dog returning to his own vomit; and yet still it is uncertain what he is to be."

Whether this opinion, taken as occasion, may render someone negligent and evil and finally to perish, I do not know, I fear, and I grieve if it shall be so; yet I know that no one [shall do so] except perhaps a son of perdition, that the eternal Scripture of the eternal book of God may be fulfilled, as the Savior Himself said in John 17. And what can I do? For I cannot predestinate, nor even reprobate. Yet undoubtedly I am not a better preacher or doctor than my master Christ, or the doctor of the Gentiles, holy Paul, and even than His other holy Apostles. And the preaching and doctrine of these did not always profit all unto salvation, indeed it harmed some, at least by occasion taken, not given. Hence when Christ was preaching and teaching about the sacrament of His blessed body and blood and on this matter, saying: "No man can come to me except the Father who sent me draw him"; and "No man can come to me unless it were given him by my Father," some of His disciples hearing said: "This saying is hard, who can hear it?" And from this they went back, John 6—went back, namely, from the faith, according to Chrysostom, and from life, according to Augustine, as Thomas's *Gloss* recites.

The Pharisees also hearing His preaching were scandalized, Matthew 15; and Mark 6 has it that "many hearing him were scandalized"; and Luke 4: "they were filled with wrath in the synagogue"—namely hearing these words of Christ preaching. And below in ch. 6: they—namely hearing Christ preaching the wisdom of God—"were filled with madness, and they talked one with another, what they might do to Jesus." And John 8: they said to Christ teaching: "Thou hast a devil." And to the Apostle disputing with the Athenians, some said: "What is it that this word-sower would say?" Others, however, said: "He seems to be a setter forth of new gods";

and some indeed mocked, Acts 17. Likewise to him speaking words of truth and soberness a certain madman said: "Paul, thou art mad, much learning doth make thee mad," Acts 26. Some also against Christ and His disciples, on account of their preaching and doctrine, raged so cruelly that they consumed them by the harshest death.

But on account of such causes or occasions, ought the organs of truth to be silenced? Truly, although before some people, in time and place, yet not before all everywhere and always—as Christ, Paul, and the other Apostles by their lucid examples have lucidly taught us, as was touched upon above. Hence Chrysostom on that word of John 6 recited above—"From this many of his disciples went back": "This perhaps came about for our consolation, when sometimes it happens that a man speaks the truth, and what he says is not grasped, and those who hear are scandalized and depart. The man repents that he has said what is true. For man says within himself: 'I should not have spoken thus.' Behold it happened to the Lord; He spoke and lost many, and He Himself is not troubled, because from the beginning He knew who would not be believing. We, if it happens to us, are troubled; but let us find consolation in the Lord, and yet let us speak our words cautiously."

In agreement with this, Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, where above, namely ch. 46, having recited the perils mentioned, adds: "On account of such souls, are those things which are truly said about God's foreknowledge to be denied or kept silent? And those who do not pray, or pray coldly, because—the Lord saying [it]—they have learned to know that God knows what is necessary for us before we ask Him: should the truth of this opinion be deserted on their account, or thought to be erased from the Gospel?"

These perils therefore by no means standing in the way, the truth must be taught: and this for two reasons; first, that errors concerning other necessary matters may be salutarily avoided; second, that the capable and apt may be usefully instructed. For the first, Augustine says in *On the Gift of Perseverance* ch. 46: "Are those things which are truly said of God's foreknowledge, on account of such souls, to be denied or kept silent? Then, namely, when, if they are not said, one falls into other errors." Into what and how great errors one would fall, the necessity having been denied which was shown in the twenty-seventh of this book, is easy to see. For since that necessity evidently follows from many antecedents previously set forth, whoever shall deny it must, by Logic compelling, similarly deny each antecedent. He must therefore deny God's pre-action, co-action, help, grace, predestination, foreknowledge, efficiency, conservation, and other such; indeed at length even that God exists, and with the foolish most foolishly say: "There is no God."

For this same first cause, and also for the second jointly, Augustine in *On the Gift of Perseverance* ch. 47: "Let the truth," he says, "be spoken, especially where another question impels that it be spoken, and let those receive it who can; lest perhaps when it is kept silent on account of those who cannot grasp it, not only those who can grasp the truth (whereby falsity is avoided) be defrauded of the truth, but they be even captured by falsity. For it is easy, indeed even useful, that the truth be sometimes kept silent on account of the incapable. But there is one

reason for keeping silent the truth, another reason for the necessity of telling the truth. The reasons for keeping silent it would be long to seek out or insert all of them; among them however is also this one: lest we make those worse who do not understand, while we wish to make more learned those who understand—who, when we are silent on something such, become indeed not more learned, but neither do they become worse. But when the matter stands so that he who cannot grasp it is made worse by our speaking it, but he who can [becomes worse] by our keeping it silent, what should we think ought to be done? Should not the truth rather be spoken, that he who can grasp may grasp, rather than be silent, so that not only do both not grasp, but the more intelligent of them is even made worse, who, if he had heard, would have grasped? Through him also more would learn: for the more capable he is of learning, the more apt he is to teach others. Do we fear that, when we speak, he may be offended who cannot grasp the truth, and not fear that, when we are silent, he who can grasp the truth may be captured by falsity?"

And if anyone still presses and objects: that on account of the doctrine of the few, the many ought not to be disturbed; and that few, if any, receive this doctrine, while many more, perturbed, reject it; and also that the Church has stood very well in past times without this novel doctrine which disturbs so many men. Let him attend, I beg, to the Philosopher, *Politics* III, ch. 5, saying: "It happens that one or a few differ in virtue; but it is difficult that the many should attain the summit of all virtue." Let him further consider, I supplicate, what similar [objection] could be brought against our master and Lord Christ, against Paul, and against His other disciples, our holy Doctors. For when Christ was teaching about the sacrament of the blessed Eucharist, and about the necessity and impossibility which we have in our hands—namely in the acts of men with respect to higher causes—saying: "I am the true bread that comes down from heaven," etc., and "All that the Father gives me shall come to me; and no man can come to me, except the Father who sent me draw him," etc., many foolish in heart were troubled, so much so that they murmured and quarreled among themselves, and said: "This saying is hard, who can hear it?" And at length they went back: but a few, namely His twelve disciples, remained, John 6. Hence by His own testimony: "Many are called, but few are chosen," Matthew 22. Hence He admonishes: "Enter ye in at the narrow gate, for wide is the gate and broad the way that leadeth to perdition, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate and strait the way that leadeth to life, and few there are that find it!" Matthew 7.

Likewise also when Paul preached to the Athenians, many were troubled, deriding his new doctrine; but a few, namely Dionysius the Areopagite and Damaris with a few others, believed, Acts 17. In the city of Ephesus also, as is in Acts 18, on account of his sound doctrine there was a great disturbance, so much so that the city was filled with confusion, and they made an assault with one mind into the theater; and when silence was demanded so that an account might be rendered, there was one voice of all, as of those crying out for two hours: "Great is Diana of the Ephesians." A similar disturbance, commotion, concurrence of people, acclamation, and outcry occurred in the city of Jerusalem on account of his doctrine, as appears in Acts 21 and the chapters that follow consequently—so much so that he was nearly imperiled; he was accused

before the judges, and was compelled to appeal to Caesar. Of the other Apostles too, and the rest of the saints of God, you will find too frequently that at their preaching and doctrine many were scandalized and gravely disturbed, but a few salutarily informed: yet this in no way drew them back from evangelizing to all in common, on account of the reason assigned in the thirty-ninth of Book I. Nor did it diminish their merit; whence that most excellent Preacher and Doctor, in the person of all preachers and doctors, says: "We are the good odor of Christ to God, in those who are saved and in those who perish: to some indeed the odor of death unto death, but to others the odor of life unto life," 2 Corinthians 2.

How also will the Church and Catholic truth stand well without the distinction of this problem, since faithful and unfaithful, grammarians, logicians, mathematicians, naturalists, moralists, divines, theologians, old and young, men and women, the lettered and the unlettered, and universally all and each, the learned and the unlearned alike, daily mangle, chew, ruminate on, and gnaw at it? Especially since from the lack of knowledge of the solution of this problem one falls into very many and very great errors, as was shown above, and as the erroneous opinions concerning this problem recited above in this Book III in many chapters evidently demonstrate. Hence Ammonius on the last [chapter] of *On Interpretation* I says: "This theorem is necessary to all the parts of philosophy: to moral philosophy entirely; nay rather, to physiology, and to logical method; and you will find this theorem extended to first philosophy. For the theologian also will inquire in what manner those things are governed which in the world come about before all things by necessity and determinately, just as in eternal things, [and whether] there are some things contingently happening; nor will you find men of even uncultivated disposition negligent of the meditation on this theorem." And below: "This theorem has great strength for the whole of our life."

Blessed Augustine also in *On the Gift of Perseverance* ch. 59 cites a similar [objection] from a similar cause objected to him: "They say," he says, "that there was no need of this uncertainty of disputation, by which the hearts of so many less intelligent people are disturbed, since for so many years the Catholic faith has been defended no less usefully without this definition of predestination."

I also opine probably that many receive, and few reject this doctrine; and to use the words of Avicenna, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, recited in the twenty-ninth of Book I: "The crowd more approaches and holds, and says: 'It is true,' nor flee they from this, except those who wish to seem philosophers." This doctrine also is not novel as to substance, but ancient, as the twenty-seventh of this book showed through ancient authors; and if it had any novelty as to a more lucid and fuller manner of speaking, it should not reasonably be reproached. For Christ is not reasonably reproached, but praised, because after the old testament He brought in the new—although men lived very well under the old testament; nor is the learned Scribe reproached, but praised by the Lord, who brings forth from his treasure new and old, Matthew 13. Hence Jerome, in the epistle to Sophronius, which is prefixed in place of a prologue to Jerome's psalter, writes thus concerning the detractors of his new translation after the old: "Most perverse men: for

although they always demand new pleasures and the neighboring seas do not suffice their gullets, why in the study of Scripture alone are they content with the old taste?"

Hence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* I, last chapter, after he has corrected the opinions of the ancients on causes, says thus: "Tenuously and in a certain way all these have been said before—namely the causes—but in a certain way not at all. For the first philosophy seemed to stutter about all things, as it were a new thing existing about its beginning"; who in *Ethics* I, ch. 11, also says: "It will seem of every [art] to bring forth and arrange in detail those things which have admirable consideration, and time is the inventor or good cooperator of such things; whence even additions have been made to the arts. For it belongs to anyone to add what is lacking." Averroes also on *On the Heavens* IV, comment 11, says: "The discourse of the later one ought to be sharper and more correct." Hence Boethius in Book I of *On Scholarly Discipline*, treating of the excellence of the master, says: "It is of a most miserable mind always to use [only] what has been found out, and never things to be found out; even more foolish to confide entirely in the speeches of masters." Hence the Philosopher, *Politics* I, ch. 9, shows that it is more expedient for a city to be ruled by the best man than by the best laws; where he says: "In whatever art, to rule according to letters [alone] is wretched: it is therefore manifest that the best polity is not according to letters and laws." With which Varro concordantly in his *Sentences* says: "Choose that instructor who has learned more in his own [matters] than in others'. He will teach nothing magnificent, who has learned nothing from himself; and they are falsely called masters who are merely narrators of what they have heard, as if those should be heard who would relate rumors."

Hence Vitruvius, *On Architecture*, Book VII, notably reports that King Ptolemy gathered an outstanding library at Alexandria, dedicating games to the Muses and Apollo; and like athletes, so for victors among writers and poets, he set certain prizes, assigning six judges, to whom he added a seventh, namely Aristophanes, who would read all the books in order. And on a certain day, an assembly being made for the public contest of poets, the people indicated whom they most approved; and the judgment of the judges being implored, those six judges decreed victory to him who had pleased the people. Aristophanes alone, however, judged that man to have won who had pleased the people least; and the King and the whole people were stirred up. And silence at length being obtained, Aristophanes declared that man alone to be a poet, because what he said he discovered by his own labor; the others having stolen others' poems. And the royal cabinets being scrutinized, the books inspected, and a comparison made, he convicted them as thieves, and the King ordered an action of theft to be brought against them.

Wherefore also Jesus the son of Sirach is praised because, after the law and the prophets and the greatest wisdom of Solomon, he renewed wisdom from his own heart, Ecclesiasticus 50. Hence above, in ch. 24, Wisdom Itself says: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger: and they that drink me, shall yet thirst. They that explain me shall have life everlasting." Wherefore also to Daniel, the man of desires, who put his heart to understanding so much that he afflicted himself, the Angel said these things: "But they that are learned shall shine as the brightness of the firmament: and they that instruct many to justice as stars for all eternity. But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words

and seal the book even to the time appointed: many shall pass over, and knowledge shall be manifold." And below: "And I heard," says Daniel, "and understood not. And I said: My lord, what shall be after these things? And he said"—namely, the Angel: "Go, Daniel, because the words are shut up and sealed until the appointed time. Many shall be chosen and made white, and shall be tried as fire: and the wicked shall deal wickedly, and none of the wicked shall understand, but the learned shall understand."

Hence Gregory in *On Ezekiel* II, homily 4: "It is to be known," he says, "that through increments of times the knowledge of spiritual Fathers grew. For Moses was more instructed in the knowledge of omnipotent God than Abraham, the prophets more than Moses, the Apostles more than the prophets. I am mistaken if Scripture itself does not say it: 'Many,' he says, 'shall pass over, and knowledge shall be manifold.'" And he proves this clearly afterward, finally concluding thus: "Therefore the measure of the reed, which is six cubits and a palm, is led to ten cubits, and the measure of ten cubits at the end rises into thirteen, because as much as the world is led to its extremity, so much the more largely is the entrance of eternal knowledge opened to us."

Furthermore, just as for the same man at a more tender age food and doctrine more easy and weak rather than more solid is fittingly administered, so also for the whole Church. For at the origin of her birth she was to be imbued with the milk of easy, lucid, and pleasant doctrine; but now after she has, through the progress of time, grown up and been firmly strengthened, she is to be nourished with solid foods—especially those who have a sound taste, strong teeth, and a strong stomach of heart. Hence the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3: "I, brethren, could not speak to you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal: as unto little ones in Christ. I gave you milk to drink, not meat: for you were not able as yet, but neither indeed are you now able." And to the Hebrews 5: "You are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat. For everyone that is a partaker of milk is unskillful in the word of justice; for he is a little child. But strong meat is for the perfect: for them who, by use, have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil." And 1 Corinthians 2: "We speak wisdom among the perfect."

Yet on account of this opinion, men ought not be negligent in the good. For just as God foreknew man's end, namely eternal life, so also He foreknew the way and the means to this end, as was shown above in responding to the Philosopher's reasoning in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter. Wherefore Daniel, full of the Spirit of God, certainly understanding the term of the seventy years of desolation to be approaching and the beginning of the consolation of the Israelite people aforesaid—captive and promised through Jeremiah 29 by God who cannot lie—did not on that account any less diligently set his face to the Lord his God, to ask and entreat in fasting and sackcloth and ashes, that He should do what He had promised, as Daniel 9 manifests in its history. On which Jerome [says]: "Jeremiah had foretold seventy years of desolation of the temple, after which the people would again come into Judea, and the temple would be built there, and Jerusalem; which thing does not make Daniel negligent, but rather provokes him to ask, that what God promised through His clemency, He might fulfill through his prayers."

In agreement with him, Gregory, *Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 32, writes thus: "There was a certain matron, very religious, who frequently came to the church of these martyrs, namely Processus and Martinian; and on a certain day, when she had come as usual to pray, going out, she found two monks standing in pilgrim's habit. She believed them pilgrims, and ordered something to be given them as alms; but before her bringing of alms reached them for distribution, they stood nearer and said: 'You now visit us; we shall seek you on the day of judgment, and whatever we can, we shall bestow upon you.' This said, they were taken from her eyes; she terrified returned to pray, and poured herself out at length in tears, and after this became more instant in prayer the more certain about the promise."

Nor is it true that whatever men do or do not do, all things will not happen any more or less. First, as regards the doings or works themselves; second, as regards the ends of works. For not only ends or terms, such as the mansions in heaven, are predestined by God, but also the way and the ordained means—as was demonstrated above in responding to the similar argument of the Philosopher in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter, as also the forty-fifth of Book I clearly teaches. Yet it is true that no one will ever do or omit anything, by reason of which some future thing would not come about, or in another and not in every way in which it will come about; nor [such that] some non-future thing would come about: for this includes a contradiction, as the eighteenth of this book shows. Wherefore all things which will come about, and in whatever ways they will come about, will so seriously come about as if they were entirely going to come about by necessity.

That certain people argue consequently that they can freely impede many future things: either they understand that they can do this from themselves alone, without God acting jointly or beforehand—and then they are Pelagian heretics, as the twentieth and thirtieth of Book II demonstrate; or they understand that they can with God acting jointly and beforehand with them—and then it is not only possible, but indeed necessary by the necessity of higher causes, as the twenty-seventh of this book shows. Wherefore concerning any free impediment, future and not future, the necessity is similar, just as concerning any free effect, future or not future. For every such future impediment is some such future effect.

Again, either they understand that with God acting jointly or beforehand they can impede some future thing, which is A, the divine will to A's coming about still standing, as the fourteenth of Book I teaches—which is heretical and blasphemous, as the tenth of Book I shows—or they understand that they can change or avert the divine will from A, or make Him not will A to come about, which is similarly erroneous and against the twentieth of Book I, the thirtieth of Book II, and the eighth of this book; or that, with God acting and pre-acting, and from itself alone, not from any human act not willing but unwilling A to come about, they can impede A from coming about. And so they do not press the point: for thus it is not only possible, but necessary in the manner aforesaid. So also that which they say they can do, is rather to say that God can [do] through them, like an omnipotent artificer through His instruments necessarily subservient to

Him. Although how a second cause, like man, can impede the effect of the divine will, could be more fully disputed.

And what they argue concerning the little child, they truly seem to speak as little children, and to think as little children. For how do they understand that they can kill the little child, either by themselves, or with the Lord, etc., as before? For a similar necessity or impossibility in the killing of the little child must be posited, as in any other free effects whatsoever. The argument concerning the little child can also similarly be made about the adult. They also seem to suppose the salvation or damnation of man—the most worthy creature—to fortuitous motions of men, demons, or beasts, and as it were to a chance throw of dice; whence also predestination and reprobation, persons and the number of the heavenly citizens consequently—which the twenty-seventh of Book I together with the following 45 and 46 do not allow, and which the authorities of Augustine in *On the Gift of Perseverance* ch. 35, *On Rebuke and Grace* ch. 27 cited in the thirty-first of Book I, *On Grace and Free Will* ch. 50 with many others cited in the thirty-ninth of Book I, condemn.

That it is argued from the experience of liberty, this does not certify in every way, since as Hippocrates says in the first of the first [book] of the *Aphorisms*: "Experience is fallacious, judgment difficult." For beasts, the mad, fools, and children seem to experience similar liberty—who yet do not have full liberty, because not the liberty of contradiction, nor [liberty] from necessity with respect to higher causes, nor even with respect to lower causes, as is clear from the eleventh of this book. Nor does Augustine, nor anyone else, experience having liberty exempt from subjection to God, but [only] a will free from unwilling coercion.

Furthermore, what they object consequently is the argument of the Manichees against that [word] of our master Christ: "No man can come to me unless the Father, who sent me, draw him," John 6—Chrysostom there saying: "Here the Manichees leap forth saying, 'Therefore nothing is set in us'; which can also similarly be objected against the twentieth and thirtieth of Book II; yet the ninth of this book fully responds.

That they also object that God would be the author of evil, can similarly be objected against the twentieth and thirtieth of Book II; yet here the thirty-fourth of Book I responds. As to what they also say—"I am unwilling to have him as my God who impels me to evil"—similarly can be said against the twenty-sixth and thirtieth of Book II; against which I, on the contrary, say: I am unwilling to have Him as our God who is not omnipotent in acting, who does not have most omnipotent dominion over my weak will, who could not most omnipotently make me will and do whatever He willed, who does not have a will universally efficacious, infrustrable, indefectible, and necessary in causing—indeed whose will is not a necessity to me, according to the sensible opinion written in the twenty-seventh of this book.

Indeed, constantly and with free voice, I say: I am unwilling to have Him as my God whose most blessed will I, a wretched sinner, can most easily depose from the highest fortress of His most worthy liberty, and submit to the necessary yoke of opposite servitude, and hold submitted

indissolubly; whose most holy will I, a sinner, can most easily oppress like a weak little woman, and necessitate to the horrible act of sin; nay even more than any little woman whatsoever I can necessitate to consent to the most foul, vilest act of sin. And to Him still acting confidently, I say: I am unwilling to have Him as my God, whom I, a sinner, impel to necessarily willing or even permitting evil; whom I, a wretched sinner, necessitate by turns, as wickedness pleases, to willing or permitting evil—who is so miserably subjected to the servitude of so wretched a sinner.

For the adversary confesses that, as long as my evil act is future, so long is God most free, with the fullest liberty of contradiction, either to will and permit it, or not. But when it is done by me temporally and presently, then it is necessary, by a necessity opposed to the prior eternal liberty, that the Lord will and permit that act. To which similarly I still say: I am unwilling to have Him as my God who in the whole universe of the creature does or conserves or voluntarily permits any evil thing simply, and not good. Wherefore the twenty-sixth of Book I shows that no thing is evil simply, but every [thing] is good. Wherefore I still say: I am unwilling to have Him as my God—namely, the highest good—from whom (according to the opinion of James) every other good does not descend.

Why again, I say, do you wish to have Him as your God, who does not impel you to every good (at least one necessarily owed), and does not repel you from every evil, since He could most easily, and as easily as He permits the opposite, and without any inconvenience or labor of His own, and to your greatest advantage and worth? Why, I add further, do you wish to have Him as your God, who permits so many evils (according to you) in the universe subject to His regiment, who does not make so many small and lesser goods better, indeed who does not make the whole universe better, since He could so just as easily? Whom I still ask: Do you wish to have Him as your God who impels you to good? If not, you profess the Pelagian heresy, as 21, 23, and 30 of Book II show: if so, then according to you all goods which will come about will come about by necessity, etc., as against the fifteenth opinion repressed in the twenty-second of this book.

Yet undoubtedly God violently impels no one unwilling, but He spontaneously impels and draws all the willing to whatever free acts of theirs.

Further, for this and all similar [objections] concerning sin and necessitation to sinning, or to sinning, perhaps another, more subtle and probable response can be made: that God necessitates in some way to the act of sin according to the substance of the act itself; but it does not therefore seem consequent that He necessitates to sin, or to the deformity of sin, insofar as it is sin or the deformity of sin. For omnipotent God could, as it appears, separate the substance of the act itself, and any positive thing, from the deformity of sin, and could produce and preserve such an effect of His as really positive and good, without such a privative defect and malice—especially since sin, deformity, malice, or defect is not essentially the act itself, nor a necessary consequence of the substance of the act itself, as appears from the twenty-sixth of Book I. Therefore, with God good, rightly acting, pre-acting, and necessitating in some way to such an act good according to

substance and nature, malice or sin in no way necessarily follows. Whence then does it follow, except from the free will of the creature deficient, willingly and voluntarily sinning? But if anything sounds otherwise, may God deign to reveal it to me, and render me soberly wise; and if perhaps I sin in falling, may He bring me back to the rule of justice.

That it is argued that difficulty and ignorance excuse no sin, because neither does the impossibility of avoiding it: this can similarly be argued of any merit; yet these excuse sin in some [degree], because they take away or in some way diminish free choice; for either they becloud cognition or weaken execution; whereas this impossibility of avoiding, or necessity of doing, neither diminishes nor offends [free choice], as the corollaries 1 and 2 and the tenth of this book teach.

That it is argued that there was not greater possibility of avoiding sin before the fall than after: this can similarly be argued of avoiding merit, or of doing a possible merit, but not a future one. Nor does the causal reasoning proceed. For how does it follow: man cannot do A except by absolute power, nor can he do B except by absolute power, therefore he cannot do A more than B, nor vice versa? It does not follow similarly arguing: No creature can do anything except by God's power (as the second of Book I and following have proved), therefore no creature can do one thing more than another, more easily than more difficultly, nor can one creature do more than another, the stronger and more potent more than the weaker and more impotent, however much. Nor does it even follow concerning ordained power: No creature can do any future thing except by God's ordained power (as the corollary of the ninth of Book I showed), therefore no creature can do one future thing more than another, more easily than more difficultly, nor can one creature, namely the more potent, [do] more than another more impotent, however much. Thirdly, it does not follow concerning natural power. For just because no natural thing can naturally operate anything except through natural power, [it does not follow that] no natural thing can naturally operate one more than another. Therefore [man] before the fall, when he was wholly sound in nature and very strong in gracious gifts, was more able than after he fell among thieves, and into the latrine of sin—where he is wounded in nature, and despoiled of grace; whence he is rendered impotent and weak. He has now also a most strong enemy whom he did not have then, namely the corrupted body which weighs down the soul, and the concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to the spirit; to which two pestilential companions are added: too great ignorance for discerning, and very great difficulty in executing. And this is the reasoning and cause of the Doctors who had been cited on the opposing side: Peter, *Sentences* II, dist. 25; Hugh, *On the Sacraments*, Book I, part 6, ch. 16; Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 12, as their writings clearly attest.

How and why natural and fatal necessity is repugnant to merit, and not this [necessity], the eleventh of this book teaches. That it is argued that there is no greater liberty in man than in the brute, the eleventh of this book resolves. For in man there is necessity with respect to God alone; in brutes, with respect to Him, and with respect to lower causes, or natural causes. Nor does its causal reasoning proceed. For [it does not follow that] if man cannot in the opposite of doing

except by absolute power, nor can the brute, therefore man no more than the brute—as has been shown above. Nor does this opinion render man impeccable, as the thirty-fourth of Book I shows.

That it is inferred that there is no greater liberty in the wayfarer than in the comprehensor [the blessed]: who would presume to deny this, since there is greater liberty in God, in the holy confirmed Angels, and in any comprehensor whatsoever, than in any wayfarer—as Catholics are not unaware, as the authority of Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 86, set forth in the first [chapter] of this book, attests, and as Hugh and Peter, where they were cited near here, show? Nor is the causal reasoning effective, as has been shown above. For the wayfarer has manifold infirmity—ignorance, difficulty, the flesh, the world, and the devil as tempters—and not the abundance of confirming grace; the angel, however, has none of these evils, but the opposite goods fully, with most abundant beatifically confirming grace. And this is the reason of the confirmation in good, as the fifteenth of Book II shows. Yet in one way the wayfarer has freedom of choice which God and the comprehensor do not have, namely to obey the divine commands or not, to sin or not.

That it is consequently inferred that the wayfarer cannot merit more than the confirmed Angel: this seems, according to the opinion of Peter, *Sentences* II, dist. 5 and 11, recited in the first of this book, to be conceded. But because the same can be argued of the Angels to be beatified plenarily and perfectly after the final judgment, the response must be otherwise: that no one can merit anything good from God of strict deserving, namely by necessity of right and inflexible rigor, but whatever good we merit from Him, all proceeds and depends on His most gratuitous grace and gratuitous will, as the thirty-ninth of Book I more clearly demonstrated. God can therefore, without injury of right, and without prejudice to any one, prefix to angel and to man a certain term for meriting, and accept his works as meritorious up to that point, but beyond that as compensatory and consummating of preceding merits. Yet necessity alone, in fully consummated angels, does not seem to be repugnant to merit, as the corollaries of the first, second, and tenth of this book teach, but only consummated perfection. For those meriting are on the way and in motion to the term, but the comprehensors and consummated [are] plenarily in the ultimate term. Nor does it follow that the wayfaring man is finally confirmed: For not therefore is anyone said to be finally confirmed because he necessarily follows the divine will, but for another reason assigned above.

The clever argument which consequently growls in Logic, Philosophy, and Theology is heretical and condemned, as is established from the forty-third of Book I. Again, according to this insensible opinion, God could will something to be or to come about, and it would not be or come about; could will something to be or come about of such-or-such a kind—namely, predestined and good—and it would not be such, nor come about; could also will something not to be or come about simply or such, and against His will it would be or come about simply or such; and so God most blessed and omnipotent would be rendered miserable and impotent, as the tenth of Book I teaches. Further, according to this vain and false madness, God could know

Himself without loving Himself: for in some way He seems to know prior to loving; and the heavenly Father could be without His Son, since He is in a way prior to Him, as the thirty-second of Book II showed.

The two arguments that follow seem to put forward a certain blasphemous exemption from subjection and servitude to the Lord our God, to which through the fifth and ninth of this book a fuller response is made. The same arguments also seem to suppose with the Pelagians that the created will can act without God properly co-acting, or at least without Him naturally preceding—which the twentieth of Book II together with the thirtieth has refuted. Nor is there any doubt but that it is far—nay, infinitely—more perfect that, when God wills to do something through some creature, every knee should necessarily be bent to Him, than that anyone should be able to resist Him in this way; for thus, and not otherwise, is He omnipotent and infinitely perfect, as appears more completely in the first [chapter] of this book.

That which is argued concerning omission no more opposes the twenty-seventh of this book than the twentieth or thirtieth, or the thirty-second of Book II; nor does it proceed concerning omission more than concerning commission. The authority of Augustine has been glossed above; nor does this authority of Augustine intend to destroy his other authority on Deuteronomy 20 and the sacred text there, which were cited in the thirty-third of Book II. The arguments concerning permission, volition, and love of sin proceed against the twentieth of Book II, just as against the twenty-seventh of Book III, which are also fully resolved through the thirty-third and thirty-fourth of Book I. The authorities of Genesis and Ecclesiasticus go against the twentieth and thirtieth of Book II, just as against the twenty-seventh of Book III, which are more clearly expounded in the twenty-eighth of Book II. The authority of the Apostle, however, denies a necessity adverse to free power, as his words show, which the tenth of this book also makes clear; he also seems to speak there of the necessity of law or right, which has its origin from a vow or other contract, and of the opposite power.

To that which is argued concerning antecedent necessity, response must be made through the distinction concerning antecedent necessity set forth in the twenty-eighth of this book; or otherwise: Anselm, denying preceding necessity from effects freely and contingently future, intends to deny it from the first cause of those, namely from the divine will, according to the eleventh and twelfth truths of the fifth of this book; and his words evidently indicate this. For he says: "Know that all things were of necessity because He Himself willed; but no necessity preceded His will." And in such effects he affirms following necessity, because according to him they are made by a cause—namely the divine will necessary by following necessity—as appears in the proximate chapter. The reason of this transumptive denomination from cause to effect can be drawn from what was set forth in the twenty-sixth of Book II; nor does it include any repugnance for the same effect to be necessary with respect to the same cause both by following necessity and even by preceding [necessity], as is per se clear, as the demonstration of the sixth part of the fifth of this book has evidently taught.

The authorities of Anselm and Boethius, saying that things of free will, before they come about in man and through free will and in time, can be changed and in no way come about—they understand manifestly with respect to lower causes, because according to them with respect to higher causes they are necessarily going to come about. For their opinion and words evidently indicate this, as the twenty-eighth of this book shows. They wish therefore to say that as far as concerns the reasoning and causality of lower causes—namely free will, or the whole man, or any other temporal causes—there is no necessity with respect to contingent future things, but contingency and possibility to either alternative; but in eternal God, who has above all times and all temporal things a determined, present, immutable, and infrustrable will with respect to all future things, there is necessity of all future things, as the proximate chapter has more fully shown. The authority of Anselm in *On Concord*, ch. 2, however, speaks of necessity contrary to and unwilling to liberty, as the following word evidently indicates: for he immediately adds that "if she did not will of her own accord, she would not operate." Robert of Lincoln denies that Peter the predestined is saved necessarily by a necessity repugnant to contingency; another necessity, namely friendly to contingency, he in no way denies but plainly concedes. For he concedes that it is necessary that Peter be saved, not necessarily but contingently; therefore he must consequently concede that it is necessary that Peter be contingently saved. How he denies preceding necessity, appears in the preceding chapter.

Bernard denies of free will an unwilling necessity, contrary to it, not concordant. Hence in ch. 3: "Consent," he says, "is voluntary, having free disposition of itself; for it is not compelled, not extorted; it is of will, not of necessity; nor does it deny itself nor offer itself to anyone except from will; otherwise, if it can be compelled, it is unwilling, violent, not voluntary. For where will is not, neither is consent: for there is no consent except voluntary. Where therefore consent, there will; and where will, there liberty; and this is what I think is called free will." And below, ch. 4: "All things which are man's, except the will alone of himself, are not free; life, sense, appetite, memory, ingenuity, and any such things, by this very fact subject to necessity, that they are not subject to will entirely; the will itself, however, because it is impossible for it to disobey itself (for no one either does not will what he wills, or wills what he does not will)—even is it impossible for it to be deprived of its liberty: indeed the will can be changed, but only into another will, so that it never loses liberty; therefore neither can it be deprived of that, nor of itself. If man could ever either will nothing at all, or will something and not by the will, the will could also lack liberty: only the will therefore, since by its inborn liberty either to dissent from itself, or beside itself in something to consent, is compelled by no force, by no necessity—does it constitute the creature meritorious, just or unjust, worthy and capable of beatitude or misery, according as it has consented to justice or injustice."

Who in ch. 5, giving the reason for what was cited above, says thus: "For just as, converted to good through grace, the consent of the human will makes man freely good and free in good thereby, that he becomes [it] of will, is not unwillingly drawn—so spontaneously rolled down into evil, in evil it constitutes him no less free as spontaneous, led indeed by his own will, not

coerced from elsewhere to be evil. And just as a heavenly Angel, or even God Himself, remains freely good, namely by will, not by any extrinsic necessity, so indeed the devil equally freely both falls and persists in evil by his own voluntary nod, not by another's impulse; the will of liberty therefore remains, even where there is captivity of mind, full indeed in the evil as in the good." Hence in ch. 6 he concludes one definition of free will thus: "From this liberty alone, by which it is free for the will to indicate itself either good if it consents to good, or evil if to evil—since indeed it senses itself to consent to neither except certainly by willing—we believe free will is named." Who in ch. 18 also denies necessity of not sinning of God, and denying similar necessity—namely unwilling—of Angels and men, attributes to them the opposite liberty; another necessity, however, according to higher causes (the aforesaid in the twenty-seventh of this book) he in no way denies, but rather affirms. Hence he says thus: "Otherwise, neither does God lack free will, nor the devil; since that He cannot be evil [is] not weak necessity, but firm will in good and voluntary firmness; and that this one is not able to breathe again into good [is] not made by alien violent oppression, but by his own obstinate will in evil and voluntary obstinacy. Therefore even from this rather is free will spoken of, that whether in good or in evil it equally makes the will free, since neither anyone good nor evil ought to be said, or be able to be, except willing. By such reasoning then it will not improperly be said that to good and evil it [the will] is equally disposed, since on either side, namely, there is to it not facility in election, but liberty in will. By this, indeed, prerogative of divine dignity, as has been said, the Creator singularly distinguished the rational creature; that just as He Himself was of His own right, and of His own will, not of necessity, that He was good, so also it [the rational creature] would in some way be of its own right in this part, in that not except by its own will it would either be made evil and justly damned, or remain good and meritoriously saved; not because its proper will could suffice for salvation, but because it would by no means obtain it without its own will. For no one is saved unwilling: for what is read in the Gospel, 'No man comes to me unless my Father draws him,' likewise in another place, 'Compel them to come in,' in no way impedes; because indeed however many the kindly Father, who wills all to be saved, may seem to draw or compel to salvation, He yet judges no one worthy of salvation whom He has not proved willing. For He intends, when He terrifies or smites, to make them willing, not to save them unwilling—although when He changes the will from evil into good, He transfers, not removes liberty."

Yet, on the surface of the letter, what he says seems calumniable: that liberty from necessity belongs equally to God and to creature—since every virtue and perfection belonging to both seems infinitely more to belong to God, since every creature is finite in every way, but He is most infinite in every way, as the first supposition proves.

That it is objected that all Authors deny necessity of free acts: through the twenty-ninth and twenty-eighth and tenth of this book set forth above, this can sufficiently be resolved, I think.

The Oxford article condemned by Robert of Canterbury does not oppose the aforesaid necessity. For from this it does not follow that every true proposition about the future is necessary, but its opposite manifestly. For if this be true and necessary by such necessity—"Antichrist will be

born"—it necessarily follows that he will at some time be born, and that afterward in perpetuity it will be false. For the fuller understanding of this article, it should be known that some at Oxford were of the opinion that no proposition about the future in contingent matter is true or false, as can be drawn from the seventeenth of this book; from which it necessarily follows that every true proposition about the future is necessary—namely, that it necessarily be fulfilled, such as: "The sun will rise," "There will be an eclipse," and the like; whereby it justly deserved to be condemned.

Furthermore, it can be said that the article speaks of absolute necessity, contrary, not consonant, with liberty, as the tenth of this book distinguishes. The Parisian article, however, speaks of necessity not with respect to higher causes, but only of lower ones—namely, of celestial bodies and natural causes—that is, of necessity of nature or stellar fate. For some at Paris were of the opinion that the human will is subject to the necessity of the stars, and that it is only passive, and that it necessarily wills, when all the lower required causes are posited, as is clear from the thirtieth of Book II, the sixth and tenth of this book. This is evidently shown by the words of the article, duly weighed. For in the article it is condemned that nothing happens by chance, wherefore its opposite is affirmed: but with respect to God and higher causes nothing at all happens by chance, but only with respect to lower ones, through the twenty-ninth of Book I. Hence the same Stephen of Paris condemned an article asserting that some things can casually happen with respect to the first cause, and that it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause; but the article denies necessity with respect to those causes with respect to which it affirms chance, but this is only with respect to lower causes. The passage of Scripture which the article cites for itself indicates this evidently, because, "the concurrence of causes is part of the definition of the chance event," in the *Book of Consolation*, that is in Prose 1 of Book V. Where Boethius says: "It is clear to define chance as an unforeseen outcome from confluent causes, in those things which are done for another reason"; which he understood of lower causes, not higher, as his preceding and following words manifest, as is shown more fully in the twenty-ninth of Book I—which fortify and confirm the aforesaid necessity. For after the definition of chance set forth, he immediately adds: "And it is the order proceeding by inevitable connection that makes the causes to concur and flow together, which descending from the fountain of providence, arranges all things in their times and places."

That the article also speaks of necessity with respect to lower causes, namely of necessity of nature or stellar fate, appears through other articles joined with it in condemnation. For with that one is condemned another article asserting that from the diversity of places, necessities of events are acquired; and again, another laying down that from diverse signs of the heaven are signified diverse conditions in men, both of spiritual goods and of temporal things; and again, another which said that in the hour of generation of man, in his body, and consequently in his soul (because it follows the body), from the order of higher causes, namely celestial bodies and lower, there is in man a disposition inclining to such actions and events—an error, unless understood of natural events and by way of disposition. Furthermore, another which laid down that fate, which

is the disposition of the universe, proceeds from divine providence, not immediately, but by means of the motion of higher bodies; and that this fate does not impose necessity on lower things, because they have contrariety, but on higher ones; where also many other similar [propositions] are condemned. Now the condemnation of this last article saves the aforesaid necessity. For here it is condemned that fate proceeding from divine providence does not impose necessity on lower things; therefore its opposite is affirmed, namely that it imposes necessity on lower things governed under divine providence. Of this kind, however, are all our free acts, as the thirty-first of Book I shows. Hence the same Stephen of Paris condemned an article asserting that human acts are not ruled by divine providence. Nor is it likely that this Stephen, condemning the aforesaid article, reconciled another which he himself previously condemned, laying down that for effects to be necessary with respect to the first cause, it does not suffice that the first cause itself be unimpedible—as the twenty-seventh of this book has more fully recited.

The condemnation of another Parisian article, and of Peter Abelard, does not oppose the necessity stated in the twenty-seventh of this book; for the twenty-seventh of this book affirms only necessity in future things with respect to the divine will; whether however God can or cannot will and do otherwise, it does not affirm.

That which is argued, according to the reasoning of the aforesaid necessity, that all things which will come about will come about by necessity with respect to lower causes, limps incurably in matter and in form. In matter, because it supposes that all things which will come about will come about through lower causes, since yet God alone will do many things through Himself; for He alone will create future things to be created. Of those things also which will come about through lower causes—say, of things of free will—it sins in form: because, even though, with respect to the divine will, infrustrable and immutable, and determinately and distinctly willing those things to come about through lower causes, it is necessary for them to come about through those, as the twenty-seventh of this book teaches; with respect, however, to lower causes—say, man and free will—it is not necessary for those things which will come about through them, to come about through them, because, as far as concerns their own reasoning and causality, there is no necessity with respect to their free future effects, but indetermination, indifference, contingency, and possibility to either alternative.

That it is argued consequently that the opposite of this position is possible, this neither opposes nor impugns it. For many things are true that are not necessary, and whose opposites are recognized as possible. Yet the argument does not prove that the opposite is possible, nor is it true. It is not true, because through the third and fourth of Book I, it is not possible for a creature to act without God properly co-acting, and this through His own will, not frustrable, prior in nature to any second cause acting, nor existing in the power of any second cause, or any of the second causes, or all of them, as the ninth and tenth of Book I, the thirtieth of Book II, the seventh and eighth of Book III manifest. The reasoning, however, does not proceed. For when it is argued that for God to will the creature to act freely is different from God's willing the creature to act necessarily, therefore this willing can be separated from the other—how does he speak of

liberty? If of the liberty opposed to the necessity shown in the twenty-seventh of this book, he assumes a falsehood. For God neither wills, nor can will the creature so freely to act, as has been shown above and there; just as He neither wills nor can will the creature to be so free as not to be of necessity subject to God, or that it could act without Him; for this includes a contradiction, as the twenty-second of Book II, and the twenty-third of Book III against the seventeenth opinion has shown. Just as also He cannot will Himself not to be, or God not to be, not to beget or breathe forth, nor a creature to be simply omnipotent and equal to Himself, and three of the creature to be equal to or fewer than two, a point or a soul to be a body, and similar infinite things. If however he speaks of another liberty, namely that opposed to necessity of nature, of fate, or of violence, and consonant with the aforesaid necessity, he does not refutationally oppose, nor impugn, as is clear in the tenth of this book. Furthermore, when he says "different," if he speaks of essential and real diversity, he assumes a falsehood; because there is not, nor can there be in God such diversity of wills: for all His wills are His one essence. If, however, he speaks of diversity according to reason and the human mode of understanding, he does not conclude. For similarly it could be inferred that God can understand, and not love Himself; that He can beget, and not breathe forth; that He can make three not to be more than two. For to will three to be is different from willing three to be more than two; therefore this willing can be separated from the other, etc., as the adversary above argued. Likewise it could be shown that it is possible for God not to be, and for past things not to have been, and present things not to be—which he denies; because for God to will Himself freely to be, is different from for God to will Himself necessarily to be; therefore etc., as the false-writer argued. Of past and present things also the same is clear. And similarly I will prove that it is possible for a point or soul to be a body, and a simple unit to be any number whatever—since for God to will a point, soul, or simple unit to be a body or number, is different from for God to will these or those not to be; therefore etc., as the contradictor argues.

The last clever argument, finally, raves, deviates, and errs as if blind from ignorance of the refutation. For it does not argue from the same point, nor to the same; or if it so argues, it assumes falsehood, as is clear from what has been said above.

CHAPTER XXX. HE ARGUES THIS [HYPOTHESIS] CONCERNING THE FALSITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS BY A WAY TAKEN FROM THE NECESSITY AND LIBERTY OF THE DIVINE WILL, WHICH ALWAYS NECESSARILY REMAINS UNIFORM AND EQUAL.

The first error, namely concerning the insufficiency of the response set forth in the twenty-sixth of this book, having been rectified, it now remains to do likewise with the second, which arises from the non-subsistence of the hypothesis it supposes. For this hypothesis supposes seven things:

First, that what is now future, can—by a possibility excluding any necessity whatsoever—now and for the present not be future.

Second, that what was always future can in similar manner never have been future.

Third, that what is not now future can similarly now and for the present be future.

Fourth, that what was never future can similarly always have been future.

Fifth, that, these things by no means standing in the way, every existing thing is necessarily now to exist.

Sixth, that everything which has been must necessarily have been.

Seventh, that everything which is or has been must necessarily always before have been future.

And concerning things foreknown and known by God, and His foreknowledge and knowledge correspondingly, it lays down seven similar things in every way.

This error must be opposed in two ways. First, by a way taken from the intrinsic action of God; second, by a way taken from His extrinsic action. The first way has a double method: one from the divine will or volition, and the other from His intellect or cognition; and each of these has yet two paths of truth: one leading through necessity or contingency and liberty; the other proceeding through immutability or mutability.

By this path of truth, then, which leads through the necessity or liberty of the divine will, we proceed in this manner: If the seven aforesaid things concerning present, past, and future things, things foreknown and known, the foreknowledge and knowledge of God be true, also seven similar things concerning what God has previously willed and willed, and concerning the will or volition of Him, will necessarily be true, as the locus from similitude proves sufficiently; which the eighteenth of Book I evidently shows, since God knows or foreknows none of these things except by a previous will. This can also be demonstrated through each individually:

First, namely that God now wills something—say, A to come about—and can, by a free power (that is, of contradiction, excluding all-around necessity), now and for the present not will A to come about: this can be demonstrated in two ways—through the impossible, and simply by ostension. Let the opposite be granted, namely that God for the present cannot not will A to come about; therefore it is necessary for the present that God will A to come about, and through the tenth of Book II it necessarily follows: God wills A to come about, therefore A will be; and the antecedent is necessary for the present, therefore also the consequent, as the common rule of Logicians teaches. This can similarly be demonstrated through the impossible: for otherwise it would be possible that the false should follow from the true. The necessity of the consequent inferred, this hypothesis denies. To the same, by ostension, in this manner: it follows, A will not be, therefore through the tenth of Book I God does not will A to come about; and the antecedent is for the present possible, as the hypothesis says, therefore also the consequent, as no logician

fails to know. Which can also easily be demonstrated through the impossible: for otherwise it would be possible from the true to follow the false.

Second, namely that God always willed something future—say, A to come about—and can, by the power aforesaid, never have willed A to come about: it can be demonstrated as the first; it can also be demonstrated through the first. For if through the first it be posited that God now does not will A to come about, it follows through the tenth of Book I that He never willed A to come about, since A was never future, because never has been, is, or will be.

Third, namely that God now does not will A to come about, and can, by the aforesaid possibility, for the present will A to come about: it is proved as the first. To the same, if God can for the present not will what He now wills, by similar reasoning He can for the present will what He now does not will.

Fourth, namely that God never willed A to come about, and can, by the power already aforesaid, always have willed A to come about: it is proved as the proximate; it is also proved through it, as the second through the first.

Fifth, namely that, together with these, of any existing thing which God wills now to be, it is necessary for Him to will it now to be; and that of everything which now is, it is necessary that God for the present will it now to be: as to the first part, it is demonstrated in two ways. First, by ostension thus: Let A be something now existing; then through the ninth of Book I it necessarily follows: A is, therefore A is conserved in being by the divine will, and God wills this to be; and the antecedent is necessary for the present, as the hypothesis posits, therefore also the consequent, as the proof of the first teaches. Through the impossible in this manner: let the opposite be granted, namely that something—say, A—which God now wills to be, can not will to be for the present; therefore through the ninth of Book I A can for the present not be, which this hypothesis denied. The second part of this follows from the prior with this added: that everything which now is, God wills now to be, as the ninth of Book I taught.

Sixth is, that of every past thing which God willed to have been, it is necessary that He willed it to have been; and that of every past thing it is necessary that God willed it to have been: this is proved as the fifth.

Seventh is, that of everything which is or has been, it is necessary that God always before willed it to have been future. For through the eighteenth of this book it necessarily follows, this is or was, therefore it always was future, therefore everything which is or has been, was always before future; therefore through the fourteenth of Book I God always was willing this; and through the hypothesis the antecedent is necessary, namely about every existing and past thing—that this is, this was—therefore also the consequent, as the proof of the first teaches.

From these last three, that is, the fifth, sixth, and seventh, concerning necessity around the divine will, an eighth concerning impossibility around the same can be drawn out: namely, that no existing thing can God now actively nill (that is, by an act of nilling positively contrary to

volition) to be now; nor can He will any existing thing now for the present not to be; and that of no past thing can He actively nill it to have been, nor will it not to have been; and that of no present or past thing can He actively nill it to have been future, nor will it not to have been future. This most clearly follows from what has been said and from the confession of the hypothesis, the tenth of Book I being added.

These four concerning necessity and impossibility of the divine will around present and past things being demonstrated lastly, four similar things concerning impossibility and necessity of the divine will around non-present and non-past things can similarly be demonstrated.

The first is, that whatever non-existing thing God does not will now to be, it is impossible for Him to will it now to be; and that of every thing which now is not, it is impossible for God to will it to be now.

The second is, that whatever non-past thing God did not will to have been, it is impossible for Him to have willed it to have been; and that of every non-past thing, it is impossible for Him to have willed it to have been.

The third is, of everything which is not nor has been, it is impossible that God ever willed it to have been future.

The fourth is, of every thing which now is not, nor has been, it is necessary that God actively nill it to be and to have been, and to have been future, that it should be now or earlier.

All these will be shown through the locus from similitude. They can also, like the foregoing, be demonstrated by supposing with the Philosopher in *On Interpretation* I, last chapter, that *what is not, when it is not, must necessarily not be*—which this response cannot deny. The fourth of these is also proved through the same twenty-second of Book I, and its corollary coming to its aid.

These foregoing things, as it were in long-distant fashion, having been touched, we must approach more closely. Now, with respect to any extrinsic object whatsoever, the divine will is equally free or necessary, and with respect to any future object it is entirely free, as the hypothesis says; therefore, with respect to any past or present object, against the hypothesis. Or thus, with the same major: also with respect to any past or present object, the divine will is necessary according to the hypothesis; therefore also with respect to any future object, against the hypothesis often spoken of.

Likewise: of whatever sort intrinsically with respect to any object the will of God is at any time, of such sort it always was before, and always after will be; but with respect to A future, the will of God is now entirely free according to contradiction, according to the hypothesis; therefore it always will be so; therefore when A shall be present or past, against the hypothesis. Or thus, with the same major: and with respect to A present or past, the will of God is necessary according to

the hypothesis; therefore always before so it was; therefore when A was future, which this hypothesis denies.

Likewise, not under another opinion but under another form: in whatever way intrinsically God wills or actively does not will, loves or hates at some time some object, in such way—if it be lawful to say so—and entirely intrinsically he always before did so, and always after will do; but according to the hypothesis God now entirely freely and contradictorily wills and loves A future; therefore He will entirely similarly freely and contradictorily will and love it when it shall be present or past, against the hypothesis, because then He will do this necessarily, as the hypothesis confessed. Or, with the same major: and according to the hypothesis, God necessarily intrinsically wills or loves A present or past now; therefore always before so He did; therefore when A was future, against the hypothesis often mentioned.

All this, however, consists virtually in this one thing: that the divine will, with respect to any extrinsic object, is always equally free or necessary intrinsically to willing; and with respect to any object, when it is present or past, is necessary; therefore always before, while it was future, so it was; therefore by the same reasoning, with respect to any future thing it is now necessary; therefore concerning any future thing, it is necessary that it come about. For through the tenth of Book I it necessarily follows: God wills this to come about, therefore this will be; and the antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent, as has been shown above. Or if with respect to a future object, when it is future, it be contradictorily free, it will also similarly equally be free with respect to it when it shall be present and past.

Here, however, all the men of this way concordantly respond, denying the major. For they say that when the thing is future, the divine will is not necessary, but free according to contradiction, to willing it; but when it shall be present or past, then conversely. But these do not heed that then God otherwise intrinsically wills present and past things than He willed them future; wherefore God and His will are necessarily intrinsically changed against the fifth and twenty-third of Book I: for He is intrinsically changed from one of opposites into the remaining—from free choice to non-free, from non-necessary to necessary, from free according to contradiction, to necessary according only to one part.

Likewise then God is less free intrinsically now than before, therefore not of infinite liberty, but defined by certain limits; and a new servitude is imposed on Him as well. Likewise then God is less powerful than He was, wherefore neither omnipotent. For that which yesterday He was able to will and not will, today He cannot; and the intrinsic act of will which yesterday He could produce or have, today He cannot; and what yesterday He could do, now He cannot. For yesterday He could will that A be not now or earlier, today, however, [it is] never [the case that it is] made or would be made, nor would it ever have been future, and today He so cannot. Yesterday He could positively nill A to be ever, to have been, or to have been future; today He so cannot. Yesterday He could produce or have such an act: *I will that A was never future, present, or past*; today He so cannot, nor so much does He have dominion over His own will. And the

same is concerning the act of nilling A ever to have been future, present, or past. Yesterday He could will and do concerning A which was not yesterday, and which was never future, or would be yesterday, that it should be or have been yesterday, and that it should have been always before future to being yesterday; today He can do neither, nor have done—which is no doubt to derogate from God's omnipotence.

Wherefore Lombard, *Sentences* I, dist. 44, refutes the opinion saying that God cannot always do what He could at some time, and says: "Let us therefore confess that God can always whatever He once was able—that is, have all that power which He once had, and the power of all that thing which He once had—but not always be able to do all that which He at some time was able to do; He can indeed do or have done what at some time He was able [to do]." And let no one be moved that he says, "God cannot always do all that which at some time He could do." For he says this, as his procedure teaches, not on account of any intrinsic diversification of divine power, but only on account of the diverse signification of this infinitive verb *facere* with this verb of present time *posse*, and again with this verb of past time *potuit*. For according to his logic, in the first case [*posse facere*], it signifies present action with present time; and in the second [*potuit facere*], with past tense, [it signifies] past [action]; and therefore he denies that God now can rise again, and concedes that He once could rise again, because this is not the same *posse* with that, but diverse, as the twenty-fourth of Book I, in its similar [example], more fully showed.

And if you object: God once could rise again, and now cannot rise again, therefore He once could something which He cannot now; one must say according to the logic of Lombard previously stated, that in the first case with the verb of past time, this infinitive *resurgere* supposes or is appended for past resurrection, and in the second with the verb of present time, for present resurrection, and so it is taken for diverse [things]; therefore neither is it rightly concluded for the same, namely that something the same that once He could, now He cannot. But, just as in the premises he takes *resurgere* for diverse [things], so he can well conclude for diverse [things] thus: therefore God once could something, and other [thing] now He cannot; nevertheless, that same past *resurgere*, which He once could, He still can: for He can now have once risen, which *posse* is altogether the same with *posse* once to rise.

Or otherwise, perhaps it can be distinguished: in the first, *resurgere* can be taken for *to rise now or earlier*; but in the second, it cannot be taken except for *to rise in the present*; therefore taking *resurgere* uniformly in the premises as to form, [he] concludes; but in matter [he] is deficient, because the first is false. Taking it differently, however, [he] does not conclude. This distinction, however, can be more fully known from the twenty-fourth of Book I.

Lombard, then, on account of the cause of the diverse signification of the verbs aforesaid, denies that God can always do whatever at some time He could do; he affirms, however, that God can always [do] what at some time He could; and that He can now have done whatever at some time He could do or have done.

Likewise, yesterday God could lay down or not have that eternal volition by which He eternally willed A to be now, and could have had a contrary eternal volition; and today He cannot so do. For now it is necessary that He have eternally had that eternal volition, wherefore also that He will have it eternally, since He is intrinsically immutable in every way, as the fifth and twenty-third of Book I teach. God therefore does not have so much liberty, so much dominion of His own will, nor so much power within or without today as yesterday; but as He grows old, so in these things He is diminished and decreased—which horribly mutilates and curtails the omnipotent hand of God and His infinite power; or rather, He vainly strives to do these things and is not able, the Lord saying through the Prophet: "Is my hand shortened and become little?" Isaiah 50; and below in 49: "Behold, the hand of the Lord is not shortened." But let those who say so beware, because still His hand is stretched out, above 5.

Likewise, then God is not always supremely perfect, against the first supposition and the third part of the first corollary of Book I. For it seems more perfect to have a will free toward without, as He once had, than newly necessary, as He now has with respect to present and past things. Or, if this be more perfect, then before He was not supremely perfect; if, however, He was equally perfect, in vain is He intrinsically changed from one to the other—since according to the common opinion of the Philosophers, in vain is anything done through more, if fewer suffice, especially if just as well; since yet, according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* I, ch. 1: "Every act and election seems to seek [a good]"; and as the Philosophers, both natural and metaphysical, show: every action is for the sake of an end, and every such end is a good, as the twenty-sixth of Book I cites. But according to the Philosopher, *On the Heaven and World* I, ch. 32: "God and nature do nothing in vain." Hence Ezekiel 6: "I the Lord have not spoken in vain."

And if anyone should say that God is so changed not for His own good, but for the good of the creature, how would the good of the creature remain if God were to destroy the entire creation, never again to create any? Since yet then there would come about and remain in Him a necessity of having willed creatures to have preceded, and of their having been annihilated. Nor is such new necessity in God any better for the creature than His old liberty.

Likewise, in the divine will there is contingency to either alternative simply with respect to all present and past things. For all things naturally previous to that act of divine volition being posited, it does not necessarily follow that it is produced, but this and that stand equally. For so it was while things were future; nor is that act of divine volition now intrinsically caused otherwise than before, on account of the fifth and twenty-third of Book I, nor extrinsically by anything—namely an extrinsic concauser, on account of the same things, and on account of the twentieth of Book I being joined. The divine volition therefore with respect to present and past is simply contingent to either alternative, as is clear from the fourth of this book; and is confirmed through the eleventh truth of the fifth of this book; therefore also simply free according to contradiction, as appears from the fifth truth of the fifth of this book.

Likewise, the divine will freely according to contradiction produces the act of willing present and past things, just as it did when they were future, as is clear through the fourth corollary of this book with the deduction set forth; therefore also similarly contingently, as the fourth truth of the fifth of this book says. Likewise, contingency and liberty are properly said with respect to the present, as the seventh and eighth truths of the fifth of this book show; therefore God contingently and freely wills and does present things.

Likewise, if God can not will and positively nill to come about what He willed to come about, and will otherwise and otherwise intrinsically (because freely and necessarily) through the successions and differences of times, it would be possible that yesterday He positively willed Peter to be saved, and willed him not to be saved, but to be damned; and today He wills him to be saved, not damned. And the same is concerning God's nilling yesterday A to come about, and today willing it to come about. Therefore through the tenth of Book I, yesterday Peter was not to be saved, and A not to come about; and today Peter is to be saved, and A future—against the eighteenth of this book, and against the reason of any man.

Likewise, then God would will otherwise and otherwise according to temporal successions and differences, and would will temporally and successively, and not in eternity, or in the instant of eternity, immutably, indivisibly, and instantaneously always at once; or in eternity itself there would be some succession, and divisibility; wherefore He would necessarily be mutable, nor sufficient to Himself supremely; for He would need time for willing—and this similarly is against all authors speaking of eternity, and of the actions of God in it, as the first of Book I has somewhat cited.

Likewise, then a new action could not come about from an ancient will alone without an intrinsic change of itself preceding. For it is necessary that He intrinsically will otherwise when He produces a thing than before, just as a man wills otherwise this to come about, and otherwise wills this to be. For when He produces the thing, He necessarily wills, and before He freely willed; if however He intrinsically willed altogether similarly, then both then and before He would equally freely and equally necessarily will then and before, since the extrinsic thing does not necessitate God intrinsically to willing. This, however, seems to be the error of Aristotle and Averroes, *Physics* VIII, as the thirty-fourth part of the first corollary of Book I more fully showed. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, justly condemned the article unjustly saying that from an ancient will nothing new can proceed without some preceding transmutation.

Nor can anyone say that that change and that necessity in the divine will follows naturally the production of the thing in being, and does not precede; because this is more inconvenient. For if that necessity follows necessarily and naturally the existence of the thing in being, the existence of the thing in being is naturally prior to it and the cause of it, as the thirteenth of Book I has shown; therefore an extrinsic object necessitates the divine will to willing—which is horrible and absurd. Nor is the extrinsic object the cause moving the divine will, as the twentieth of Book I teaches; wherefore neither the necessity. Of these two necessities, of which one is in the

produced thing and the other in the divine will, that one in the divine will is the cause of the other; for this one is newly produced and caused by it, therefore it is prior to it in all things; even in those in which God and the creature agree, more worthy and prior in nature is God, as the first supposition proves, which the Philosopher also teaches in *Metaphysics* II, chs. 4 and 7, of the same; ch. 3, and Averroes in those same comments, as the second of Book I more fully cited. This necessity also in the divine will is either the first necessity simply, or nearer to it, as no one doubts; therefore prior, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 16: "Prior and posterior are spoken of, some indeed as some first existing thing and a principle in each genus, that which is nearer to the principle." Where also the text which Averroes expounds has thus: "Some indeed before and after are spoken of as the first being and principle in each genus, and what is nearer to some terminated principle"; on which Averroes says: "Universally before is said of every terminated principle, and of everything which is nearer to some terminated principle."

Also prior in nature is God's willing presentially and in the manner of the present that the thing be, than the thing's being. For this is the cause of that, therefore prior in nature, as the Philosopher says in the *Categories*, in the chapter "On the prior": "Of those things which are converted according to the consequence of essence, that which is in any way the cause of the other is rightly said prior in nature." And this willing presentially and in the manner of the present in God, after He willed in the manner of the future, is a certain change in Him, as follows from the hypothesis; therefore a change in God necessarily precedes the produced thing.

Likewise, if God were to will a future thing freely, and the same when present or fallen into the past necessarily, there would be some cause why then necessarily and not before; and none except the presence or pastness of the made thing; therefore the made thing would necessitate God's will to willing—which seems indecent and unworthy of God.

To this last reasoning, however, response is made in many ways. For some assign a cause from the part of the thing; others, from the part of God; others, in mixed fashion; and certain others say that nature is the cause of this. Of those assigning the cause from the part of the thing, some assign it from the part of the absolute thing; some from the part of the relative thing, or of relation. The first say that the absolute thing itself, being present or past, is the cause sought.

But this is not true, because through the twentieth of Book I a posterior thing is not the cause of the divine will, nor does it cause anything there, therefore it does not necessitate it. Likewise, the past thing is nothing, therefore it causes nothing, therefore it does not necessitate the divine. Likewise, a future thing has as much being as a past thing, or more, because potential and past being do not have it so, therefore it necessitates as much or more. Likewise, if it were so, this would be because the present or past thing must necessarily be or have been; therefore it is necessary for God to will it to be or to have been; therefore of these two necessities, of which one is in the thing—by which it is necessary for it to be or to have been—and the other in God—by which it is necessary for Him to so will—prior naturally would be the necessity in the made thing, because the cause of the other—which was refuted above. Likewise, God can necessarily

will both future things, because those can always not come about, but [also] present and past, because those cannot not be nor have been; therefore God can will in some intrinsic way—say, necessarily—and only with the supposed help of an external thing—say, time or some temporal thing—wherefore He seems miserably needy, and not supremely sufficient to Himself, against what was shown in the fifteenth of Book I. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis ad Literam* VI, ch. 19: "Did the founder of time need the help of time?" As if to say: in no way. And he holds the same expressly in *City of God* XI, ch. 30, which seems most true of the intrinsic operations of His own will.

Likewise, it seems more orderly and decorous that the posterior and effect should contract necessity from its prior and cause than vice versa: and through the thirtieth of Book II, the divine will is the first cause of all posterior effects.

Likewise, supposing according to this response that the willed object moves the divine will, still this it does not do immediately of itself according to its real extrinsic being, but according to its intrinsic knowable being, namely through its eternal likeness or idea; just as it moves the created will only through its likeness, or species in the cognition of the causes. But that likeness or idea in the divine mind is always equally clear, equally actual, and in all things equal throughout; therefore it always equally moves the divine will; therefore if once it necessitates it, so always; and if once it does not necessitate it, neither ever.

Likewise, then a spider with its very weak thread could insolubly bind God, and so as it were detain Him in prison and in fetters through the ages. For if it spins and binds anything, it is necessary that God then so will, and after through perpetual ages. Likewise, then any creature would seem stronger than the Creator. Likewise, through the third of Book II the willable object cannot necessitate the created will, which is infinitely weaker than the divine, therefore neither this; or, if the object can necessitate the divine will, the created cannot; this latter is weaker than the created.

Likewise, let A be one not now existing in B—an instant—nor before, which yet God could have made now and before; now therefore, according to what was shown above, it is necessary that God actively nill A to be in B and to have been before B, and to have been future for being in B or before, and so eternally before and after to have nilled, and to be about to nill. Or, that it may proceed more easily for the slower: let it be supposed that God actively nills A to be in B—a present instant—which yet He could have made in B; then it is necessary that He so nill. The cause of this necessity cannot be assigned from the part of the nilled thing, since it is not, wherefore neither does it cause. Likewise, the same case being retained, it is impossible for God to will A to be in B, or to have been before B, or to have been future, that it should be in B or before, and always before He could have willed these things. What therefore is the cause so newly making the divine will impotent? Not that thing, [which is] not a being, since it does not at all cause, nor can it make impotent the created will.

Likewise, it seems absurd, and to be detested by the ears of all, that some weak thing—and (what seems more unworthy) some pure privation of a thing—should necessitate the omnipotent to such impotence, that He cannot now nor ever in the future produce or have an intrinsic act of will which He always could before, nor now or ever will what before He always could will. For now and in the future He cannot produce nor have such an intrinsic act: *I will that this day were never future, present, nor past*; now also nor in any future times can He produce nor have such an intrinsic act of will: *I will that A was future for being in B or before; I will that A be in B; I will that A was before B*—and always before He could produce or have such acts not temporally but eternally, and so eternally not temporally will. What therefore from the omnipotent has irreparably taken away so great a power? What has indissolubly bound the so insurmountable? What has incurably mutilated His so great intrinsic dominion over His own will? What has inalienably subjugated His supreme liberty to the lowest servitude of such necessity and impossibility? Far be it that anyone should even lightly think that any creature does this, or any privation of a creature.

Of those, however, assigning the cause of the aforesaid necessity from the part of relation, some posit it as positive, and some as privative. The first say that from the presence or pastness of the thing arises one real or rational relation, which is the cause of this necessity in the divine will. But against this response can be brought the arguments which were against the prior. That relation either is something or nothing. If nothing, it causes nothing, it necessitates nothing. If something, it arises from the absolute present or past thing; therefore that originally so necessitates God. For whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused; thus therefore the first response returns. Likewise, that relation, if it be something, God can destroy: for otherwise God and the creature equally would be more potent for doing something than God Himself for destroying the same—which does not seem [right], since He is omnipotent over whatever; once it is destroyed, this response also will be destroyed.

Likewise, of the past there is no real relation to the divine will, because there is no real extreme in which it could be founded, since the past has already passed into non-being; nor can it be founded in the divine will, because then it would rather be called a relation of the divine will to the past than vice versa; and because then a new real relation would be present, and accidental, and inhering in God; wherefore He would also be mutable, against the fifth and twenty-third of Book I. Wherefore also Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, chs. 4 and 5, shows that not everything which is said of God is said of Him according to substance, since some things are said of Him according to relation, as is clear in the divine persons; yet nothing is said of Him according to accident, because not mutably. Hence in ch. 4 he says thus: "Therefore nothing accidental in God, because nothing mutable or losable: nothing in Him is said according to accident, because nothing happens to Him; yet not everything which is said is said according to substance: in created and mutable things, however, what is not said according to substance, it remains, is said according to accident. For all things happen to those which can either be lost or diminished."

And it follows in ch. 5: "In God, however, nothing is said according to accident, because in Him nothing is mutable or losable; nor yet is everything which God is said to be, said according to substance. For He is said toward something, as Father to Son, and Son to Father, which is not accidental; because both He is always Father, and He is always Son, and so always—because the Son was always begotten, nor did He ever begin to be Son. But if at some time He had begun to be, or at some time should cease to be Son, He would be said according to accident; and because the Father is not called Father except from the fact that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except from the fact that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance, but [are said] toward each other; nor yet only according to accident, because both He who is called Father, and He who is called Son, is to them eternal and incommutable."

And below in the same final chapter, he raises a question about temporal relations to God and the creature, by which they are temporally related to each other—how those are not accidents, since nothing happens to God temporally because He is not mutable. And he answers that this is not because anything happens to God's substance temporally, but to that creature with respect to which He is said relatively; wherefore he finally concludes thus: "What therefore God is said temporally to begin, which before was not said—it is manifest that it is said relatively, not according to accident of God, that something has happened to Him, but plainly according to accident of that which God is said to begin to be something, He Himself is changed; God however, far be it that He should temporally love anyone, as if by a new love which was not in Him before, with whom past things have not passed, and future things have already been done."

And through all this he hints at the third mode of those things which are said toward something, as the measurable to the measure, the knowable or known to knowledge, and the sensible or sensed to sense, as the Philosopher teaches in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 20—which therefore are said relatively, to use the words of Averroes, "not because the relation is in the substance of either relative, but in the substance of one only, and in the other on account of the other"—that is, the other; say, the known or sensed is referred to knowledge or sensation only on account of the relation of the other relative to it. For when whatever is newly known or sensed, nothing new is caused in it, but in the senser or knower only, and through it alone is referred to them.

There is therefore no new real relation between God and the past, which would necessitate Him to willing, nor even any new relation of reason: not in God, since He always intrinsically holds Himself altogether similarly, because otherwise He would be mutable, as the foregoing have taught; nor in present things—for let it be posited that God should annihilate the whole universe; nor in past things, since they are nothing at all, nor is anything at all in them or any of them.

Likewise, the relation of the future to the divine will is as great as that of the past, therefore it necessitates as much. Likewise, relation, as Averroes says on *Metaphysics* XII, comment 20, "is of weaker being than the other predicaments"; but other absolute predicaments do not necessitate the divine will, as is clear against the prior response. Likewise, then God is necessitated to willing that relation: either through itself, or through another. If through itself, by the same

reasoning He could thus be necessitated through an absolute to willing it—especially since the absolute is better, more willable, and more motive of the will. If through another, the process will necessarily be without end.

Those, however, who posit a privative cause from the part of relation, say that God cannot will of any present that it not be, nor of any past that it not have been, because this is not willable. But these do not rightly touch the cause sought; for what was first sought was the cause why it is necessary that God will this to be, or this to have been—not why He cannot will the contrary. For although God could not will the contrary, yet, as it seems according to this response, He could not have this willing, just as a man can not will this to be, although he wills this not to be.

Likewise, no created or extrinsic relation necessitates God to willing, as has been shown against the proximate response; therefore neither the privation of any such relation necessitates Him to not willing, since such privation is not more potent over the divine will than the habit. Likewise, the cause why this not-being is not for the present willable, is because this now is; wherefore for the present it is necessary that this be: for this affirmative is prior to this negative and the cause of it; for some [being] necessarily must be, as the thirteenth of Book I teaches. The existence therefore of this thing is the original cause of the impossibility of God willing this now not to be, and of the necessity of not so willing. Wherefore the external thing is the cause of the impossibility and of the necessity in the divine will, as the first response said.

Likewise, by the same reasoning it is necessary that God now will this to be, because *this not to be* cannot for the present be not willable, and this is because it is now necessary that this be willable, and this because it is necessary that this be, and this because this is. For *this to be* is the original and primary antecedent, from which a priori and causally all these consequences follow, as in the proximate similar [example] is deduced; wherefore etc., as there.

Likewise, that it may be more clearly argued, this response must necessarily say consequently that therefore God necessarily wills this to be, because *this to be* is necessarily willable; and the original cause of this is *this to be now*; wherefore *this to be now* necessitates God to willing, because whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused; and so the first response returns.

Likewise, then any existing thing necessitates God to willing, and any active thing which can produce another, can necessitate, and make impossible the divine will, as the first response said. Likewise, pure and sole privation is never the cause of anything positive; wherefore of no necessary act in the divine will. Likewise, *this now not to be* is willable by man, and at some time was willable by God, because it is not simply and per se not-willable, or unwillable by Him; and now it is not willable by God, but not-willable or unwillable; therefore some cause of this change is, and of this negation and privation [there is] some affirmation and prior power and cause, as the thirteenth of Book I teaches; and that cannot be posited except this absolute thing now existing, or something relative in it; and so the first response returns, or the second.

Of those, however, assigning the cause of the foresaid necessity from the part of God alone, and intrinsic to God Himself, [there is] a fourfold variation. For the first say that this is from the divine nature: God, they say, is of such a nature that with the present or past thing, He necessarily wills it to be or to have been. But if this be purely naturally and intrinsically only to God: since an agent purely naturally disposed always similarly, the patient also disposed always similarly, the action will always be similar (since no cause of dissimilarity can be given, as the Philosopher teaches in *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 10); but all things purely natural intrinsic to God always are similarly disposed, since through the fifth of Book I He is immutable in nature, [therefore] He is always equally necessitated to willing.

This reasoning is confirmed because, according to the Philosopher in *On Generation and Corruption* II, last chapter: "The same having itself similarly is innate to do the same always"; and *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, shows that the same is the cause of contraries, but through diverse dispositions; the divine nature, however, is always similarly disposed. Nor can anyone say that the nature of God is otherwise intrinsically disposed when the thing is present or past than when it is future, because then He would be mutable; and because then this would be from the presence or pastness of the thing; therefore that would be the cause of the necessity in the divine will—which was destroyed before.

The second posit that this is from the part of divine truth, which, as the present and past thing necessarily holds itself, so necessarily demands that God should always conformably will. This response, however, can be refuted as the prior, because divine truth, taken purely naturally, always holds itself altogether similarly intrinsically. Likewise, according to this response, the cause of this is the necessary truth from the part of the present or past thing, and the original cause of this is the existence of such a thing; therefore it is the original cause of the necessity in the divine will—which was reproved above. Likewise, God's intrinsic truth with respect to the future is as great, and is intrinsically similarly altogether holding itself, as with respect to the past or present; wherefore as necessary and as firm. For it could not intrinsically hold itself otherwise except on account of the existence or pastness of the extrinsic thing—which it cannot, since it in no way depends on or is caused by it, since this is the inferior truth, and that the superior; this caused, that uncaused; this posterior, that prior, as the eleventh and twelfth of Book I teach.

The third, however, believe that this is from the part of the divine will, namely because He wills Himself to be necessitated to willing the present to be, and the past to have been. But if, when the thing comes and passes away, He wills Himself to be necessitated to so willing, He either wills this necessarily, or freely according to contradiction. If necessarily, whence is that necessity to Him? And the original difficulty returns, because a process to infinity in such wills is not to be granted. If freely according to contradiction, He can not so will; which, if it be posited, He is not necessitated, as this hypothesis says.

Likewise, let A be the will by which God now wills this to be freely according to contradiction, and B the will by which He wills Himself to be necessitated to A. Either then B is now a new or

an ancient and eternal will. It is not now new, as the twenty-third of Book I shows. If it is eternal, either then that eternal [will] eternally before was free according to contradiction, or necessary. If free, whence then is it now necessary? And the difficulty returns. If it was eternally necessary, and from it always necessarily followed that A is now to come about, and from A this is to come about; wherefore as before was shown, eternally it was necessary that A be now to come about, and that this thing be now to come about, and so concerning every future thing—the opposite of which the hypothesis supposed.

Likewise, supposing that of these two divine volitions—of which one wills the thing to be or to have been, and the other wills Himself to be necessitated to so willing—if He had only the first, still He would necessarily will the thing to be or to have been, just as the thing necessarily would be or have been. For supposing that He had this volition only: *I will this to be or to have been*, He would necessarily so will. Likewise, the will of God alone, by which He wills the thing to come about in A—a future instant—suffices for producing it in being in A, as the tenth of Book I and its corollary teach, and because otherwise He would not be omnipotent—which, if it be posited, the response will be destroyed.

Likewise, by the same reasoning He could similarly necessitate Himself to willing all future things, and to producing all things. Who therefore has known the sense of the Lord, or who has been His counselor, so much as to dare to say He has not so done? Likewise, by the same reasoning He could similarly necessitate Himself not to do, and make Himself impossible to do whatever He is not going to do; and so He could render the omnipotent so impotent that He could not lift a straw—namely by willing Himself to be necessitated to willing never to lift a straw, or to be made impossible to willing to lift a straw.

Likewise, since God cannot be necessitated to willing future things, and can [be] to present things, and no cause from the part of God intrinsic can be given on account of His complete immutability, some extrinsic cause will be given, and none except the thing without, as the first response said.

Likewise, the present or past thing is necessarily presupposed to that necessity in the divine will; therefore there is some cause of it, as had been shown in the fourth of Book I; and so the first response returns.

The fourth, however, affirm that this is from the part of the mode of willing in God. For they say that He wills the future as it were *futurely*—namely, by such an act: *I will this to come about*; the present, however, and the past, as it were presentially and pastly—that is, by such acts: *I will this to be*, *I will this to have been*. Of which modes, the first, as they say, makes liberty according to contradiction; the others, however, necessity according to one part only.

But this is not true, because altogether similarly, and not otherwise intrinsically, He wills first this to come about, second this to be, and third this to have been—otherwise He would be intrinsically changed, against the fifth, twenty-third, and twenty-fifth of Book I.

Likewise, if God willed past, present, and future things otherwise intrinsically, He would otherwise know them intrinsically, against what has been shown before in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of Book I.

Likewise, even if those modes of willing were diverse, no intrinsic cause could be assigned why one should be free and not another, since cognition, voluntary potency, and all required intrinsic things are equally potent, equally efficacious, and through all equally firm with respect to one as with respect to another; nor can an extrinsic cause be assigned, because then the first response or the second would return.

Likewise, God wills presentially that this wayfarer is predestined, and pastly that this one was predestined; therefore He necessarily wills in these modes; therefore this wayfarer is necessarily predestined; wherefore necessarily he is to be saved, since these two follow necessarily from the antecedent. And similarly it can be argued of any future thing, that it will necessarily come, since of any such God both wills presentially and pastly willed such propositions to be true and to have been true: *this will be, is true; this will be, was true*; wherefore He necessarily wills and willed in these modes, whence it necessarily follows that this will be. And the same is if A be posited as the volition by which God wills this to come about, and B the volition by which He wills A to be or to have been—that B is necessary, etc., as before.

Wherefore others, perceiving that the cause of the foresaid necessity cannot sufficiently be assigned from the part of the thing alone, nor of God alone, assign it in mixed fashion from both. But with the foregoing standing, this cannot stand, since every effect caused by two causes is either caused partly by one and partly by the other, or by both as to its whole, as the act of the created will is wholly produced by the created will and wholly by the increated similarly, as the corollary of the twentieth of Book II showed. But the necessity above-said is not caused partly by these causes, because no partibility can be assigned there.

Nor can anyone fancy that a certain similitudinary and imaginary partibility according to intension and remission is to be posited there; because let A be that necessity, and B its primary part caused by God, and C its remaining part caused by the second cause: either then A is of infinite intension, or only finite. If infinite, then both B and C [are infinite]: because if either be not infinite, but only finite—let that be C, as it rather seems—then B is simply infinite; for otherwise from it and C there would not be composed something simply infinite, because finite added to finite makes only finite, as can be mathematically demonstrated. It has also been shown in the first of Book I that no form can be simply infinite intensively. Nor can it be conceded that B, the part of A, the foresaid necessity, is simply infinite, because it is necessarily finite in conjunction with C: for there of necessity is some grade which is the common end and term of both, just as some point would be in the continuation of two such lines. And because B is part of A, wherefore also less than it; but no simply infinite is less or greater than another simply infinite, as the Philosopher attests in many places.

If however it be said in the first place that A is not simply infinite, but only in some respect, it can be refuted by the same: since if both B and C are everywhere finite, then also A constituted from them, as has been argued above. Wherefore perhaps it will be granted that A is simply and entirely finite; but then A could be increased, and be greater and better, since A is good in God, because through the third part of the corollary of the first of Book I, nothing else is in Him. Therefore not every good in God is in Him the optimum possible, nor the highest, against the fourth part of the corollary above-said; wherefore neither would God always remain necessarily optimum, against the sixth part of the corollary mentioned.

Anselm also in *Monologion*, ch. 16: "It is clear," he says, "that whatever good the supreme nature is, He supremely is it; therefore He is the supreme essence, supreme life, supreme reason, supreme salvation, supreme justice, supreme wisdom, supreme truth, supreme goodness, supreme magnitude, supreme beauty, supreme eternity, supreme immutability"; wherefore also the supreme necessity above-said.

Likewise, if God should newly cause in His will, although only partly, such a necessity, He would be mutable, as has been shown above. Likewise, posterior willed things are not the total cause, nor even partial cause of the divine will, as the twentieth of Book I teaches, nor do they do anything in it, wherefore neither do they necessitate it in any way. It has also been shown against the prior responses that the things outside are not the cause of this necessity, wherefore not even partially effective cause. Nor can anyone say that both God and the things outside cause this necessity according to their whole, because both are reproved above against the foregoing responses.

Likewise, God is altogether similarly disposed, and entirely not otherwise, as far as is from His intrinsic part, with this thing now existing, than before, as has been shown above; therefore that new necessity in the divine will is caused totally by the thing outside.

Likewise, every new causation from the part of God being removed, and only the present thing being posited, that necessity will be posited, as the foregoing manifest; therefore the position of the thing alone is the sufficient cause of this necessity.

Likewise, that God in mixed fashion with the thing outside present should cause this necessity is either freely according to contradiction, or necessarily. If freely, He can not so cause with the thing standing present; and then either there will not be such new necessity, which is against the first hypothesis; or, if there will be, it will be caused by the thing alone, which this response denies. If necessarily, whence is that necessity to Him? Etc., as against the sixth response set forth above.

Likewise, that God in mixed fashion with the present thing should cause necessity of this kind: either this is purely naturally or voluntarily. If naturally, this will be reproved as the fourth response before. If voluntarily, let it then be through A, a volition or intrinsic act of will: either then A is a new volition or eternal, etc., as against the sixth response in the similar argument.

Likewise, if it were so, this would maximally seem to occur because God causes the present thing, and that further causes this necessity in the divine will; therefore the present thing, as instrumental, intermediate, and second cause, would cause this whole necessity, which has been destroyed above.

Likewise, the past thing is nothing, wherefore it causes nothing, neither does it necessitate separately or in mixed fashion. The thing also which now is not, nor ever has been, although it could have been now and earlier, is nothing nor was anything; therefore it causes nothing separately or in mixed fashion, wherefore it does not so necessitate or make impossible the divine will, etc., which against the first response have been similarly argued.

Others, however, seeing that no cause of this kind of necessity can reasonably be given, say that there is no cause of it, wherefore neither is any cause of it to be sought, nor any to be assigned—which they confirm through examples: "God," they say, "at some time created the world, but why then? God also is newly creator and Lord of this thing—but why? What makes Him such?" As if to say: no cause.

But this can be said neither philosophically, nor logically, nor theologically: for every change has a cause, as the whole of philosophy attests. For otherwise, with similar levity, it could be said that no motion, no action, or passion, and universally that no change has any cause: but this is a change; for the transit from one of the contradictories to the remaining cannot be without change. But God before was freely and not necessarily willing this; now however He is not freely, but necessarily willing this. That the transit from one of the contradictories to the remaining necessarily requires a change, Logic clearly teaches. For let A be this: *God is not necessarily willing this*, and B this: *God is necessarily willing this*, and C this present instant; and according to that most common Logical [maxim]: "Because the thing is, or is not, the speech is true or false"; therefore if it be totally and in every way similarly from the part of the thing signified by A and B in C as it was, and contrariwise; and A was true before C, and B false; therefore also in C—or if A is false in C, and B true, therefore similarly before. Therefore this response makes contradictories simultaneously true, and also simultaneously false, and the same proposition simultaneously true and false.

Likewise, B before was false, and now is true, therefore there is some cause of this; and this necessarily is, because before it was not so really, and now it is so; therefore otherwise it is from the part of the thing now than before; therefore through some change, therefore through something changing, therefore through a cause.

To the same end it can similarly be argued according to the procedure of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IV against those denying first principles, by disputing on the supposition that names have determined and certain significations. As long therefore as the signification or thing signified of any name remains entire, the name similarly remains, and contrariwise; they therefore approach simultaneously, and recede simultaneously; wherefore there is never an

acquisition or loss of any name without acquisition or loss of some signification or signified of it, wherefore not without some change of any kind whatsoever.

Likewise, their examples savor neither philosophical nor theological truth. For philosophically speaking: a rational agent acts at a certain time toward without, because then He wills; whence the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 10, says that factive potencies with reason are of contraries; and he objects: why then will they do contraries simultaneously? But this is impossible. And he answers, hinting that the consequence is not valid because something else is required which determines the potency to one part, namely the will; and when through it it is determined, then it does the one [thing], not both. That will determining is therefore the cause why then He does this; whence in answering he says thus: "Therefore there must be something else which is proper; I say, however, this either appetite or pre-election: for that which it shall have desired principally, this it shall do, when as it is able it shall have stood forth; therefore that which is potent according to reason necessarily, when it desires, of which it has potency, and as it has, this it does"; God, however, with reason and rationally made the world when He eternally willed Himself to be about to make it; therefore because then He willed, then also He did—which appears more completely in the ninth of Book I.

Hence Apocalypse 4: "Thou hast created all things, and on account of Thy will they were and have been created." And Augustine in Book I of *On Genesis Against the Manichees*: "The will of God is the cause of all things which are. Whoever therefore says: 'Why did God make heaven and earth?'—it must be answered: 'Because He willed.' For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth."

Likewise, by the same reasoning they must say consequently of whatever, whenever created or made by God, that there is no cause why then it is or is created; and this seems to destroy the efficient and final cause in God, or to posit Him to act casually and fortuitously at every time and instant. But the foregoing show the efficient cause in God, and that of John 1: "All things were made by Him," with the third, fourth, and ninth of Book I. And the final cause in God many philosophical and theological authorities prove, written in the twenty-fifth of Book I. Hence Proverbs 16: "The Lord hath made all things for himself." And Apocalypse 1: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." That God does not act casually or fortuitously at any time or instant, the eighth and ninth of Book I, with the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth, teach. Hence Ecclesiastes 3: "All things have their season"—but from whom, except from Him who arranges all things in measure and number and weight? Wherefore Augustine, *City of God* XXII, ch. 2, says thus: "Before the time comes in which He has willed that to come about which before all times He has foreknown and disposed, we say it shall come about, when God shall have willed."

And if they still object that of that volition there is no cause, wherefore neither of the foresaid necessity, this ought to move no one, because that volition of God is eternal, but that necessity is novel, wherefore also it has some cause. That God also is newly Creator has a cause—a cause, I

say, formal and efficient similarly. For God is newly said relatively Lord of this thing, and not by a new relation accidentally newly to God Himself, but only to the creature, as has been shown above against the second response. The relation itself therefore arising from the creature, which is necessarily subjected to the divine dominion, is the extrinsic and improper formal cause by which God is formally said Lord of this thing. This relation also has an efficient cause, namely the producer of this thing, from which this relation necessarily sprouts and emanates. Therefore when they ask: who made God Lord of this thing? I say: He who made this thing. For He made in some way that relation by which God is said Lord of this thing; just as he who gives John this thing makes him Lord of this thing; he who sees John or understands [him] makes John seen and newly understood; God therefore makes Himself Lord of this thing by making this thing, from which necessarily arises the relation aforesaid—just as John himself makes himself Lord of this thing by making this thing his own.

Of which canonical scripture often offers examples sufficiently authentic. Hence Psalm 9: "The Lord is become a refuge for the poor." 17: "The Lord is become my protector." 29: "The Lord became my helper." 89: "Lord, Thou hast been our refuge." And 117: "He is become to me salvation," with many similar in many places. That therefore God is newly said relatively to the creature, is on account of a new cause and a new change from the part of the creature, just as in whatever is newly said relatively. For this is either on account of a new change in that which is so newly said, or in that to which it is newly so said, as appears of relatives of the third mode, as can be drawn from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* V, ch. 20, and from Averroes there, as was cited above; and *Physics* V, ch. 10, he wills that where there is a new relation, there is change and motion, at least in one of the relata, as Averroes there exemplifies of a column which first is on Socrates' right, and afterward is turned to the left, by Socrates' being moved in place. The same opinion Boethius also in *On the Trinity*, last chapter, plainly teaches.

Wherefore Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, last chapter, shows that when God begins temporally to be said relatively to the creature, this is by a change in the creature, not in God: hence he says thus: "Of that immutable substance of God we ought to take it, that something is said relatively to the creature, that although it begin to be said temporally, yet it is not understood that something has happened to that very substance of God, but to that creature to which it is said: 'Lord,' he says, 'Thou hast been our refuge.' God is therefore said relatively as our refuge. For He is referred to us, and then He becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; is anything then made in His nature which was not before we fled to Him? Therefore some change is made in us. So also He begins to be our Father when by His grace we are regenerated: our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and at the same time He begins to be our Father, but by no change of His substance. What therefore God is said temporally to begin, which before was not said, it is manifest that it is said relatively, yet not according to accident, that something has happened to Him, but plainly according to the accident of that of which God is said to begin to be something, He Himself is changed."

Their examples therefore do not contain truth, nor even agree with the things exemplified. For these examples are concerning relations born from the creature, and extrinsic to God Himself. The aforesaid necessity in the divine will, however, is caused by no creature, as has been shown above—which this response also confesses—and is intrinsic to God Himself.

These things therefore, by way of liberty and necessity of the divine will, against the principal hypothesis.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book III, Chapters XXXI–XL

CHAPTER XXXI. HE RECALLS THE SAME [HYPOTHESIS] BY WAY OF THE NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY OF THE DIVINE INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE.

Against this same hypothesis one can likewise argue by way of the necessity and contingency of the divine intellect and knowledge. For before the presence or pastness of a thing, God knew it contingently always to have been future and to be about to be; but in its presence or pastness he knows necessarily that it has always been future, and is or has been; therefore he then knows otherwise intrinsically than before, which is contrary to the reasons set forth above and contrary to the authorities cited above. Nor can any rational cause of this novel necessity in the divine knowledge be assigned, since the reasons concerning novel necessity in the divine volition or will, set forth in chapter fifteen of Book I and supplemented by chapter sixteen, prohibit it if they are properly transferred to the divine knowledge. Nor can such a necessity be posited without a rational cause, as has been shown against the last response.

Likewise, if the divine knowledge with respect to future things is contingent toward either side, and with respect to present and past things is necessary, God intrinsically knows present and past things more certainly than future things: for these objects of knowledge are more certain than those. For the things which are necessarily of some sort are more certainly of that sort than those which are only contingently of that sort toward either side: for the latter cannot be otherwise than they are, while the former can be. Therefore God knows present and past things more perfectly than future things. For to know what is certainly is more perfect than to know it uncertainly; therefore God is intrinsically changed and improved anew; nor does he even know future things in the highest degree certainly, nor in the highest degree perfectly. Nor can any rational cause for this greater certitude be given, since it is not intrinsic to God himself, given that he himself is not

intrinsically changed, nor is it extrinsic, since no extrinsic thing causes anything in him, as chapters 15, 16, and 20 of Book I teach. Wherefore also the Wise Man in Ecclesiasticus 23 says, "To the Lord God, before they were created, all things were known, and so also after they were perfected he beholds all"; thus he says, and not otherwise. Whence also Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15.13, says: "Nor did he know created things otherwise than as to be created: for nothing accrued to his wisdom from them, just as it is written in the book of Ecclesiastes, 'Before they were created, all things were known to him, so also after they were consummated'"; thus he says, not otherwise. The same Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* 5.18, says: "Of God himself I dare not say that things became known in any other way when he made them than that in which he knew them in order to make them, with whom there is no change nor shadow of variation." Wherefore also Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* I, dist. 35: "God knew from eternity what is eternal, and everything which was to be, and he knew immutably; he knows past or future things no less than present things, and by his eternal and immutable wisdom he himself knows all things which are known."

CHAPTER XXXII. HE LEADS BACK THE SAME [HYPOTHESIS] BY WAY OF THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE DIVINE WILL.

The same hypothesis can also be impugned by way of the immutability of the divine will. For if God could nill privatively, or even positively for now, that these present things which he now wills to be should be, and that those past things should have been which he wills to have been, and from now on always nill that those present and past things should have been future, which he always before willed to have been future, he would be mutable, as all the authors of this hypothesis confess. But the divine will stands altogether intrinsically the same way toward future things as toward present or past things, as can be had from what was shown earlier in chapter thirty of this [book]; otherwise indeed it would be intrinsically changed when the future was made present or past, contrary to chapter twenty-three of Book I; therefore if future things, which he wills, and which he always before willed to be, he can for now and always afterward nill to be — they not being placed in being — he is mutable. Or conversely, if God can without his being changed [now nill] future things, which he now wills, and always before willed to be and to have been future — that is, can for now and always afterward nill them to be (they not being placed [in being]) and nill that they have been future — he can likewise without his being changed nill for now that these present things should be and past things should have been, and always afterward nill that these should have been future. For no cause or reason of dissimilarity can be given.

And if perhaps someone says that this is the cause of dissimilarity between these — that now it is necessary that God will and have always willed this present or past thing to have been future, and therefore, if afterward he should nill this, he would necessarily be changed; but not so before concerning future things — therefore God intrinsically wills present and past things otherwise than future things, and intrinsically wills the same thing first as future and then as present

otherwise; therefore he is mutable. The divine will too is no more necessary with respect to past or present things than with respect to future things, as chapter thirty of this [book] teaches.

And if someone should still say differently — that if God could after this will, concerning this present or past thing, that it had been future, which he always willed to have been future, and were to do this, the thing itself would be mutable, and would necessarily be changed from "having been future" into "not having been future," but not so concerning a future thing; wherefore the divine will would here necessarily be changed in the same way, and not there [in the case of the future thing] — but why in this case would the present or past thing be changed more than the future thing? For no cause or reason can be rendered, except that a present or past thing must always have been future, and that God always conformably willed it, and not so concerning a future thing; and so this response is similar to the prior one.

Again, to the same point: change in the effect is not the cause of change in the agent, but rather the contrary, where there is change in the agent, and most of all in the effect of the divine will: for otherwise it would be continuously changed at the change of its effects; it is also impassible, unalterable, and altogether immutable from all its effects, as chapter twenty of Book I teaches.

Likewise, this seems to be a kind of common conception of the mind among all: everything which is of one disposition, and can be of the opposite, can be so through some change — speaking of actualizable potency, and not absolute potency. This appears in every other matter, both absolute and also relative. For if this is not a being, or a man, or hot, and can be, it can be this through some change. And the same appears in every relative species: for if this is not the double of that, or a father, or known, and can be, it can be this through some change, as chapter thirty of this [book] shows. The same is not improbably confirmed because, as it seems, if this is not such, and can be, it can be made such, speaking generally of becoming, as "the Lord has been made our refuge," as the same chapter thirty makes manifest. But every such making seems to be some kind of change, since it is a transition or motion from one of the opposites to the other. And the cause of this whole, as if a maxim naturally implanted in all, seems to be this: that it is necessary that what is, when it is, is, and what is not, when it is not, is not; and likewise that what was, was, and what was not, was not. For in this Logicians, Philosophers, Theologians, and the whole common multitude consent. And if it is necessary that this is or has been of one disposition, and it can be of the opposite, it can be changed, since this cannot be except through receding from the prior disposition as from a *terminus a quo*, and accession to the latter as to a *terminus ad quem* of motion.

And if anyone should say that this maxim is true only of present and past things which do not depend on the future, let him notice, I beg, that this gloss is sustained by no common conception of the mind, nor by any authority of the elders, but only by certain sophistries of sophists. The will of God too in no way depends on future things, as chapter twenty of Book I and chapter thirty of this [book] teach, but future things [depend] on it, as chapter fourteen of Book I shows;

nor is the divine will in any way intrinsically otherwise toward future things than toward present or past things, nor conversely, as chapter thirty of this [book] makes clear.

The aforesaid being supposed, therefore, it seems that if God now is, and always was, willing this to be or this to have been future, and he can be of the opposite disposition, the thing not being placed in being, this can [happen] through some change, and not on the part of the willed before its being placed in being. For it includes a contradiction that something be changed from future to non-future, except through its being placed in being, as chapter eighteen of this [book] showed; therefore through change of the divine will. It can likewise be argued by supposing A to be one [thing] not future, yet possible to be: God always was willing A to be, and can be willing A to be; therefore [this can happen] through some change, and not through change on the part of the thing, since that would be from non-future to future, contrary to chapter eighteen of this [book]; therefore through change of the divine will.

Furthermore, passing over these little logical reasonings, I show the same thing through one theological argument. Namely, if according to the hypothesis God always willed something to be, and can never have willed this, but always have willed the opposite, without any change whatever, by similar reasoning, after God has said, promised, and sworn that he will do A, or that A will be, he can not do A, and it is possible that A not be, without his being changed, lying, or perjuring himself in any way. For he can never have so said, promised, or sworn, without any change whatever; and if this be posited, he can not do A, without change, lie, or perjury of any kind — which seems to be a lie, and contrary to theological truth. For in Numbers 23, when Balak wished to placate the Lord, so that Balaam with God's consent or permission should curse the people of Israel, to whom shortly before the Lord had promised good things and a blessing, Balaam — nay rather the Lord through Balaam — answered, "God is not as a man, that he should lie, nor as a son of man, that he should be changed. Has he then said, and will he not do? Has he spoken, and will he not fulfill? I have been led to bless; I am not able to prohibit a blessing." Therefore if God promises anything — say A future — unless he should fulfill it, he would be mutable and a liar. Yet according to the aforesaid hypothesis Balak could have truly answered: even if God said and spoke that A would be, it is possible that he never said this, nor spoke it, and this without any change whatever; and if this be placed in being, although he should not do A but its opposite, it does not follow that he is changed or even lies.

Nor let anyone esteem this saying of Balaam lightly because he was wicked, as though it were not authentic: for it is a saying of the Lord the supreme author, just as the saying of Caiaphas was. For Scripture there premises: "To whom" — namely Balaam — "when the Lord had occurred and had placed his word in his mouth, he said, 'Return to Balak, and these things you shall speak to him.'" And all Catholic interpreters embrace the sayings of Balaam there as prophetic and divine and authentic — which the holy Church also does, which on the day of Epiphany sings thus: "Balaam, prophesying about whom, says, 'There shall come forth a glittering star out of Jacob.'"

Likewise Psalm 88: "Neither will I profane my testament, and that which proceeds from my lips I will not make void; once I have sworn in my holy place, if I lie to David; his seed shall remain forever." Where the Lord intimates through the Prophet that, if the seed of David should not remain forever, as he himself promised and swore, then he himself would profane his testament, and would make void what proceeded from his lips, and would even lie. But profanation, voiding, and lying import change. Yet if, after he had promised and sworn this to David, he could never have promised or sworn this, he could not do this without profanation of the testament, voiding, or lying of any kind.

Likewise Malachi 3: "Behold," says the Lord to the people of Israel, "I will send my angel and he shall prepare the way before your face"; and he promises many other goods, and as confirmation of the promise he adjoins: "For I am the Lord, and I am not changed" — as if he were saying, "I am not mutable, therefore I will do these things for you; therefore conversely, [if] I shall not do these things for you, therefore I am mutable" — which yet according to the hypothesis would in no way follow. For although the Lord promised these things, it can be without any change whatever that he never promised these things; if this be posited, even if God should not do these things, he is not changed.

Likewise, Hebrews 6: "God, wishing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immobility of his counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immobile things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation." Where the Apostle supposes that the promise and oath of God, by which he promised to the heirs certain goods which are A, are immobile things, which if he should not fulfill by exhibiting to them the goods A, he would lie; wherefore also he would similarly be changed. Which yet according to the hypothesis would in no way follow. For let us be in the middle time between the promise and the exhibition of the goods A; then according to the hypothesis it can be that God never promised nor swore to the heirs the goods A as future; if this be posited, God can never exhibit these things to the heirs without change or lie of any kind.

To all these things someone perhaps will briefly respond by saying that all these things are to be understood always conjointly in the sense of composition, not divisively or in the sense of division — because if God should not fulfill what he promised, in such a way that these two concur — that God promised this and that God does not fulfill this — he is changed and lies; yet divisively this — namely A which God promised — he can not fulfill or not do without change and without lie, since it can be that he never promised A.

But the authorities aforesaid, if they are looked at internally, do not speak conjointly but only divisively. For the Apostle, through the things premised, wished to lift up the heirs to the strongest consolation and the firmest hope in Christ; "that by two immobile things," he says, "in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation, who flee for refuge to lay hold of the proposed hope, which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm, and reaching to the inner part of the veil, where Jesus our forerunner has entered for us, made a

Pontiff forever according to the order of Melchizedek." But how would we have the strongest consolation, or sure and firm hope, only in one composite proposition, in one conditional, in one heap of expressions — say, "God cannot without change and lie [not] fulfill his promise, the promise existing"? — i.e., such a proposition is not possible: "God without change and lie will not fulfill his promise"; or, "If God promised anything and shall not fulfill, he will lie and be changed." Especially when that on which such a proposition or consolatory and hope-bearing conditional rests as on a foundation of the whole consolation and hope — namely, God's promising — would be more infirm and unstable than any thing whatever. For every present or past thing necessarily is or was; but according to the hypothesis God's promising, which now is, and which always was, can for now not be and never have been.

Indeed it seems that in this regard we would reasonably have less consolation from divine promises than from human ones. For if a man should promise anything, at least with solemn stipulation, or oath, or other such security, if he should not satisfy [it], he can be refuted and convicted as false, a liar, and a perjurer; but God not so, since he can never have promised anything. For what Catholic will presume to take it that the hope to which the Apostle leads us is only in propositions or consequences of this sort, and not in things? Nor does the Apostle so feel, but [he holds] that we securely and firmly hope for the very thing promised by God, just as the whole Church hopes, and that thus we may have the strongest consolation. Wherefore also the Apostle, showing that he is not speaking about the immutability of a conditional consequence or proposition of this composite kind, but about the immutability of the will, counsel, promise, or oath of God, says: "God, wishing to show to the heirs of the promise the immobility of [his] counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immobile things" — namely promise and oath — "in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation."

It seems, therefore, that the Apostle understands and speaks divisively rather than conjointly — namely according to the common understanding of men, which is this: that whatever has been promised by God must necessarily be fulfilled, or God lies and is changed. For example, God yesterday promised that he would do A good for men tomorrow; then today they will say and so understand: "God will do A good for us tomorrow, or he will lie and be changed." Malachi too, and David, and Balaam — nay rather the Holy Spirit, who spoke through these Prophets — seems to understand and speak likewise in the recited authorities. These same things can also be brought to bear against the same hypothesis by way of the immutability of divine knowledge, with the names competently transferred.

CHAPTER XXXIII. HE MOVES THE SAME [HYPOTHESIS] BY WAY OF REVELATION IN THE WORD, AND SETS DOWN SIX RESPONSES OF THOSE CONCEDED REVELATION IN THE WORD, AND ARGUES SERIOUSLY AGAINST [THEM].

These things, then, having been objected against this hypothesis by way of the intrinsic action of God, it remains consequently to object against the same by way of his extrinsic action — namely, by way of divine revelation and its effect. This, however, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, is twofold. For one kind is in the Word of God — namely in the supreme light itself, the supreme uncreated truth, in the very essence of God; another kind, however, is in the proper genus of the creature — namely in an inferior created light.

First, then, by way of revelation in the Word: Suppose that God reveals or has revealed in the Word to Paul that A will be tomorrow. Then Paul either sees or has seen, knows or has known, that A will be tomorrow; therefore it is necessary that he so see or have seen, know or have known. Since every human act, when it is, must necessarily for then be, and every past human act must necessarily have been: for otherwise what a man now wills and does, he could now not will or do, and what he willed and did, he could never have willed or done; wherefore also that which now is or has been can for now not be now, nor ever have been — contrary to all Logicians, Philosophers, Theologians, and laymen, which this hypothesis also denies.

And if it is necessary that Paul know or have known A will be tomorrow, it is necessary that A will be tomorrow: for it follows necessarily, "Paul knows or has known A will be tomorrow; therefore it is true or has been [true that] A will be tomorrow; therefore A is or has been future tomorrow; therefore A will be tomorrow," as is clear from what was shown in chapter eighteen of this [book]. The whole of this consequence therefore is necessary, and the first antecedent likewise; wherefore so is the last consequent, as chapter thirty of this [book] makes clear. Therefore it is necessary that A will be tomorrow; wherefore by similar reasoning concerning anything future, it is now necessary, and was always necessary, that it will be; and concerning anything not future, that it will not be — the opposite of which the hypothesis supposed.

To this, however, the response is twofold. For some concede such revelation, but others deny it. Now those conceding revelation of this kind respond consequently in accord with the aforesaid hypothesis, by saying that, just as God by his essence now knows, and always knew, whatever future will be, and now can for now not know it nor ever have known it, but now and for now know and always have known its opposite, so also a man or angel, who through the same essence knows and has known whatever future will be, can conformably now and for now not know it, nor ever have known it, but now and for now know its opposite and previously have known it.

But this response seems absurd. For if it were so, it would be possible that Christ, Moses, Paul, and any prophet whatever who saw the secrets of God in the Word, never saw anything there, nor was a prophet, but a pseudo-prophet, and Antichrist if he were past, the worst — Mohammed and any cursed person whatever, who never saw anything there — saw all the secrets of God there, and was the most distinguished of prophets.

This response also does not avoid [the difficulty]. For if Paul knows and has known in the Word that A will be, and can not know nor have known A will be, then either he can will and have willed [conformably], or not will or not have willed conformably, or he cannot. If he can,

suppose that it was revealed in the Word to Paul that A is still to be future, and he was likewise commanded that he should will, preach, and act conformably to the revelation shown — just as God commanded Jeremiah, saying, "You shall preach the words which I shall speak to you," Jeremiah 19; and to Ezekiel, "Go and you shall speak my words," Ezekiel 3; and to Jonah, "Preach," he said, "the preaching which I speak to you," Jonah 2. And it is verisimilarly believed that the Archangel Gabriel received through revelation and command in the Word the business of announcing the Lord's incarnation to the most blessed Virgin. The Lord Jesus Christ also testifies of himself, saying: "I have not spoken from myself, but the Father who sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say and what I should speak," John 12. And further, John 14: "As the Father has given me commandment, so I do." And if any man or angel had revelation and commandment in the Word, who ever more worthily than the Lord Jesus Christ, the only Word of God, the most uniquely-only Word of God?

Whence Augustine on John, part 1, last homily — namely 54 — expounding the first authority, says: "Therefore he says he did not speak from himself, because he is not from himself. The Son is the Word of the Father, and the Wisdom of the Father; in him are all the commandments of the Father; for the Son never did not know the commandment of the Father, such that it would be necessary for him in time to have what he previously did not have. For he received from the Father what he has, in such a way that, by being born, he received, and the Father by begetting gave to him. For he is also life, and he received life — namely by being born, not previously existing without life, since the Father also has life, and what he has he is, nor did he receive, since he is not from anything; but the Son received life, the Father giving, from whom he is, and he himself is what he has. For he has life, and he is life: hear him speaking himself: 'Thus,' he says, 'the Father has life in himself; thus he gave to the Son also to have life in himself.' Did he give to one existing and not having? But he gave by begetting him, who begot life; and because that birth is eternal, never was the Son not, who is life — never was the Son without life. And just as the birth is eternal, so is he who is born — eternal life. So also commandment, not [as if] the Father gave what the Son did not have, but as I said, in the Wisdom of the Father, who is the Word of the Father, are all the commandments of the Father. But it is said that the commandment is given, since he to whom it is said to be given is not from himself; and this is to give to the Son, without which the Son never was, which is to beget the Son who never was not."

The aforesaid revelation and commandment having been made to Paul, then, suppose that he willed, preached, and did, by external operation, conformably to the revelation shown. And according to this response, A still being future, it is possible that it not be, and the Word never have known nor revealed it, and Paul never have seen in the Word that A would be. Wherefore also, as the response says, it is correspondingly possible that Paul never willed conformably to the aforesaid revelation. It is therefore now possible that Paul did not preach, did not externally do what he has now done. For he could not have done such things except by the prior willing; wherefore even that past [willing], it is possible never to have been.

And that this may be more manifestly drawn into the light, let it be supposed, in accord with the authorities about prayer and the manner of prayer set forth in chapters 23 and 25 of Book I, that Paul be given a commandment, under penalty of eternal damnation, that he should absolutely will every and only person shown to him in the Word as to be saved to be saved, and that in his prayers and other beneficences he should aid only such a person; and let it be shown to him in the Word that Peter the wayfarer is to be saved, whom he absolutely wills to be saved, prays for him, builds a house for him, and administers other beneficences; and let him die, and migrate to heaven while Peter is still surviving as a wayfarer. Then, as the hypothesis says, it is possible that Peter not be saved; wherefore also, as this response says, it is consequently possible that this never was shown in the Word, that Paul never saw this, never willed this, never prayed for him, never built him a house, nor administered other beneficences, nor migrated to heaven but to hell.

Or, retaining the aforesaid commandment and revelation, suppose that Paul obeyed the commandment in nothing, and thus dying descended to the lower regions; then it is possible that Peter — still a wayfarer — not be one to be saved, nor that this was ever revealed; wherefore also that Paul did not act, or omit, contrary to the commandment, nor sinned, nor descended to hell, but ascended above.

Or perhaps, as will seem more opportune to many, suppose that Paul received a commandment that he should not will to be saved any one shown to him in the Word as one to be damned, nor pray for the salvation of any such person, and that whomsoever shown to him in the Word as to be saved he should will to be saved, and pray for him; and let it be shown to him in the Word that Antichrist is to be damned, whom he should neither will to be saved nor pray for; and so let him, dying, be saved, or, doing the contrary, dying be damned — Antichrist still surviving as a wayfarer, etc., as before.

Gabriel too, in the middle time after he came to the glorious Virgin announcing that she would conceive the blessed Son, before she conceived, could not have come to her nor have brought that announcement, as is clear by the prior deduction. The Lord Jesus Christ too, in the middle time after he was incarnated for the redemption of the human race, before he redeemed, could not have been incarnated. And after he predicted to the disciples that, "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be delivered to the chief priests and scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to be mocked and scourged and crucified, and on the third day he shall rise again," Matthew 20, and ascended to Jerusalem to that end — before he suffered, he could not have said these things, nor have ascended to Jerusalem. Likewise, after [he was] now nearer to the passion, "he was sad even to death," and "he sweated a bloody sweat" — before he suffered, it was possible that he had not been so saddened nor sweated. All of which are clear by the prior deduction.

Now, that I may collect these many things virtually in one word, I suppose that we are in the middle time between such past effects and revealed future things. And, as the response says, it is possible that those revealed future things will not be, and were never revealed, seen, or willed;

therefore it is possible that those past effects were not. For it follows necessarily negatively: "The cause was not, therefore the effect was not"; and the antecedent is possible, therefore also the consequent — as is clear from chapter thirty of this [book]. Or conversely, affirmatively: "It is necessary that those effects were, therefore [it is necessary that] those volitions, visions, and revelations [were]"; for it follows necessarily affirmatively, "The effect was, therefore its cause was"; and the antecedent is necessary, therefore also the consequent, as the same chapter thirty demonstrated. And if it is necessary that those visions and revelations were, therefore also that those revealed [futures] will be, as has been shown above.

Nor can anyone reasonably decline to the other side of the fork by saying that Paul cannot not will what he wills, nor can not have willed what he willed, just as he can not know what he knows, and not have known what he knew, the revelation in the Word having been made — since by the topic of similitude and proportion it seems that, just as Paul knows something in the Word, that is, in the essence of God, so he can will or love something in the Holy Spirit, that is, in the essence of God. For just as the Son and the divine essence stand toward our knowing, so the Holy Spirit in the same essence [stands] toward our loving: otherwise our charity or love would in no way truly be said [to be such], which yet was shown in chapter forty-two of Book I.

Wherefore if, on account of this — that the Word, knowing and showing something future, can now for now not know nor show it — Paul, seeing this, can now and for now not see it, since it is similarly the case with the Holy Spirit willing something future, it will likewise be the case with Paul willing in him.

This response also does not help, but rather harms those responding, since if, the revelation of this kind having been made and Paul willing conformably, it is necessary that Paul so will, or in the past have so willed, it is necessary that he so see, and in the past have so seen: for this volition of his is caused from that vision of his; wherefore it is necessary that it be so revealed in the Word or have been [so revealed]; wherefore also it is necessary that it will be so, as is deduced above.

Likewise, there are some effects caused by sole vision, or by volition or nolition conjoined. For sole certain vision concerning some near prosperous or adverse thing causes in the heart and body of the one so seeing love or sadness, dilation or constriction, hope or fear, and many other corporeal passions, as can be had from chapter eighteen of Book II — as in Christ a bloody sweat, and in some, death, as is seen in Nabal, 1 Kings 25; just as it is reported of a certain great man of England, after his deportation, having been reconciled, who, dissolved incurably from too much joy, ended his life with joy. Wherefore let argument be made about such cases as before. Therefore against all admitting revelation in the Word this one brief argument proceeds: "It is necessary that this effect be or have been; therefore [it is necessary that] that revelation in the Word [have been]; wherefore that revealed thing must be future."

But here many respond in many ways. Yet all converge in this one [point], that this consequence does not hold. And if it be argued against all in common: "It follows necessarily, 'This effect was,

therefore its cause was'; the antecedent is necessary, therefore also the consequent" — they concede [this]. But if it be argued further, "Its cause was, therefore that revelation in the Word [was]" — they concordantly say that this does not follow, but is a fallacy of the consequent, since this effect could not have had this cause, but many other causes. In assigning these causes, however, they vary in many ways.

For some say that it is possible that that revelation in the Word was not a revelation, since it was not even true, but one false appearance, and that, it is possible, was the cause of this effect.

Others say that opinion, estimation, or appearance created in its proper genus could have been the cause of this effect.

A third group [says it was] the vision of the opposite of what was revealed in the Word.

A fourth group [says it was] the complex vision and the simple vision of a simple object in the Word.

A fifth group [says it was] the liberty of the created will.

A sixth group [says it was] God by himself alone.

But against all these responses one must argue first generally at once, then against the individual ones individually. For all converge in this one [point] — that an effect produced from one cause can not have been produced from that one, but from another. From this, however, it seems to follow by the topic of similitude — at least concerning the omnipotence of God — that whatever cause produced some effect, can not have produced it at all, and whatever effect produced from any cause can have been produced not from that one but from another. Therefore Paul, who built a house and begot a son, can not have so done, and Peter could have built that house and begotten that son — together with many other very great absurdities.

CHAPTER XXXIV. HE ARGUES SPECIALLY AGAINST THE FIRST.

Now, however, specially against the first: Further, if it were as it says, the essence of God would falsely show and erroneously present, and thus the mirror without spot of the divine majesty would be made foully spotted; the highest truth would be false, the highest light darkened, the highest justice fallacious, and the highest fidelity a liar. Then also Christ and the Blessed could most easily be deceived all day, wherefore even be made wretched all day — nay even never have been blessed: for all fallacy, like every evil, is repugnant to beatitude and felicity. For felicity, according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 1.9, is "a good per se sufficient and perfect"; wherefore Boethius too, *Consolation* 3, prose 2: "It is clear that beatitude is a state perfected by the congregation of all goods." And blessed Augustine on Psalm 2, "Blessed are all they that trust in him": "He said 'blessed,' where there is the sum and heap of all goods." The same Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.5: "They are continuously wretched who either do not have what they will, or

have that which they do not rightly will. Therefore he is not blessed except he both has all things which he wills and wills nothing wickedly." And further, 13.7: "No one will will to live wickedly in that felicity, or will something which will be lacking, or will what he willed be lacking; whatever will be loved will be present, nor will that be desired which will not be present; everything which will be there will be good."

But who is there who does not naturally and *per se* hate and flee falsity, love and seek truth? Whence the Philosopher, *Ethics* 4.14: "According to itself a lie is depraved and to be fled, but the true is good and praiseworthy." And in *Secret of Secrets*, part one, ch. 4: "Truth is the root of all praiseworthy things and the matter of all goods, since it is contrary to lying." Tully too, in *Old Rhetoric* 2, says that truth is among those things which totally and partly are to be sought for their own sake, and its contrary among such things to be avoided. Wherefore blessed Augustine, *City of God* 11.11, showing that the evil angels were not blessed before their fall: "Their life," he says, "was not blessed, since at some time it would cease, whether they knew this or, not knowing, thought otherwise: since fear, for those knowing, and error, for those not knowing, did not allow them to be blessed."

And further, 11.[13], after a great examination of this matter he so concludes: "Wherefore it now occurs to anyone without difficulty that beatitude — which intellectual nature with right purpose desires — is brought about by both joined together: that is, that with no molestation it should fully enjoy the immutable good, which is God, and should waver with no doubt, nor be deceived by any error, that it will remain in him forever." The same, *Enchiridion* 9: "We must tend to that felicity, where we are shaken by no calamity, deceived by no error: error must be avoided with all the care we can, not only in greater things but also in lesser things." And further, 10: "If, the truth being more diligently considered, since to err is nothing other than to think true what is false and false what is true, or to hold for certain what is uncertain or for uncertain what is certain — whether it be false or true — and this is so deformed and unbecoming in the mind, just as we feel it to be beautiful and becoming in speaking or assenting, 'Yes, yes; no, no'; truly it is on account of this also that this miserable life which we live is such, that to it sometimes, lest it be lost, error is necessary. Far be it that such be that life where the very Truth is the life of our soul, the life where no one deceives, no one is deceived; here, however, men deceive and are deceived, and they are more wretched when they deceive by lying than when they are deceived by believing those who lie. To such a degree, however, does rational nature flee falsity, and as much as it can avoid error, that even those who love to deceive do not will to be deceived."

Likewise, error and deception concerning future things, and especially [things] pertinent to the deceived, seems more to be repugnant to beatitude than simple ignorance of future things. But this [latter] is repugnant. Wherefore Augustine, *On Genesis* 11.23, 25, 27, shows that the apostate angels were not blessed before their fall, because they were neither prescient nor certain of their future event; which also in chapter 26 he proves in similar fashion concerning the first man. Lombard too, *Sentences* II, dist. 4, speaking of the angels: "They were never blessed who fell,

since they were ignorant of their event" — which causal he confirms through blessed Augustine on Genesis where above.

And if anyone should say that Augustine there is speaking of foreknowledge of future things only pertinent — not impertinent — to the angel or man foreknowing, let argument be made only concerning these things [pertinent ones]. For it pertained to Christ and to the blessed Virgin, beatified in heaven, that their kindred according to the flesh and grace, then journeying away from the Lord, whom they so much loved and desired to be saved, and for which they instantly prayed — for whom Christ specially poured out his blessed blood — whose salvation was granted and divinely revealed to them that they should be saved. What lying spirit, then, would presume to deceive Christ and the now-blessed Virgin in these matters, or even in any pertinent matters whatever? To which of the Blessed too is it not pertinent? Indeed [does not] he stand defiled with errors of dark falsity, or adorned with the splendors of luminous truth? What also more pertains to the blessed than his perpetual beatitude? And concerning that it is possible that he be deceived. For notwithstanding that God has shown to him in the Word that his beatitude will perpetually endure, and he has seen this, he can not beatify him for the future — namely by withdrawing the beatitude, or by annihilating him, or by remitting him to the state of the way, in which he sins finally and is damned.

Likewise, every [thing] which harms beatitude is repugnant; but all ignorance harms, as Anselm says, *Why God [Became] Man* 2.13: "Ignorance, even if at some time it does not harm regarding something else, on this alone it harms — that it takes away the good of knowledge." Likewise, every penalty is a kind of misery; but all error, or at least involuntary [error], and in matters pertaining to the one erring, is a penalty, as Augustine says, *On Free Will* 3.29: "To approve false things for true so that one errs involuntarily is not the nature of established man, but the penalty of the damned." Wherefore Christ, Mary, and the blessed, throughout the whole time during which they were blessed, could have been deceived, punished, and wretched, and not blessed.

Indeed this also seems to make God unjust, since punishing a holy angel without fault. Wherefore Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* 11.30: "It occurs to anyone, and is true and manifest, that it is contrary to justice itself that, with no preceding merit, God should damn this very thing in anyone which he himself has created in him." And above, 24: "Is God prior as avenger before the devil [is] sinner? Far be it." And *On Free Will* 3.29: "Every penalty, if it is just, is the penalty of sin." And *Against Julian* 2.20: "If God the just inflicted such great evils on little ones drawing nothing of sin, he would the more appear unjust" — which thereafter in 3, 4, and many subsequent chapters, the last of book 4, the first of book 5, and afterward in various chapters, and the first of book 6 and thereafter in not a few chapters, he most constantly teaches the same.

Anselm 2, *Why God [Became] Man* 2: "That, however, the first man was made such," he says, "that he should not die by necessity, is easily proved from this — that, as we said, it is repugnant to the Wisdom and Justice of God that he should compel to suffer death without fault one whom he made just for eternal beatitude. It follows therefore that, if he had never sinned, he would

never have died." Who in *Monologion* 69 most sweetly proves the same — which all the Catholic Doctors treating this matter concordantly hold.

Likewise, if this response were true, it would not be possible that God beatify anyone perfectly: for to perfect beatitude there is required certitude that it will perpetually remain. For beatitude, as was shown before, is a good lacking in nothing, but perfect; and as Boethius says, "having obtained which one can desire nothing further." And Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil* 6, says that "the angels who stood are so advanced that they have obtained whatever they could will, nor do they now see what more they could will." Whence the Prophet: "I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear," Psalm 16. And Apocalypse 7: "They shall hunger no more, neither shall they thirst any more." But who would doubt that certitude concerning a good for always is a great good — which all desire and without which they cannot be satisfied, even if they should abound in all other goods however much? For the more and greater goods they had, the more ardently they would desire certitude of always having them; otherwise they could and would reasonably have to have some fear lest perchance they lose those goods; but fear cannot be associated with perfect beatitude.

Whence Augustine, *On Genesis* 11.23 and afterward, shows that the devil and the first man were not fully blessed before their fall, since they did not have certitude of it. He there in 23 says thus: "Neither are the holy angels uncertain of their eternal life and beatitude. For how blessed, if uncertain?" And further, 24: "If God did not reveal to the devil, while he was still a good angel, what he would do or suffer, he was not yet fully blessed, since the fully blessed are certain of their beatitude, so that no fear may disturb it." And 25: "I do not see how those can be blessed for whom their very beatitude is uncertain." Who also in *City of God* 11.11 holds a similar process: "And so the blessed life," he says, "is doubtless not [blessed] except eternal, and certain and secure of its eternity." The authorities of his cited above from the same 11 and 12 also attest to this. The same in *On the Trinity* 13, speaking of final beatitude, says: "Whatever will be loved will be present; nor will that be desired which will not be present. All that will be there will be good, and the highest good will be God himself, and he will be present there to those loving him; and what is altogether most blessed, that he will so be forever will be certain."

To perfect beatitude, then, the certitude of this is required. But God cannot give it: not through any revelation, since not through that in the Word — which is the most luminous of all and the highest. For that, as the response says, can be deception and error; wherefore through it no one can be perfectly certified concerning it or its revealed [content]. Nor through another, since that other would either be certain or uncertain. If uncertain, it would not certify; if certain, [it would be so] either through itself or through another. If through itself, by the same reasoning one would have to stand in the first one, and then likewise the difficulty returns. If through another, thus either there will be an infinite process, or some [revelation] will be certain through itself; wherefore by similar reasoning so [will] the first; and even, with one certain one being posited — however many in number it may be — the argument returns. Indeed, what seems more absurd, God can certify no one concerning his past or present beatitude, as the foregoing makes

manifest, since any such revelation can be illusory and false. Every blessed person also believes and hopes for future things, and continuously did so before; and every such credulity and hope can now be, and always before have been, erroneous and false. No one, then, of such a kind now is, nor ever was, certainly blessed; wherefore neither can this be revealed certitudinally.

But if anyone should respond that the good are certain of their beatitude eternally enduring with the certitude of firmest credulity, excluding every actual hesitation and fear of its opposite, by the same reasoning he would have to concede that God cannot certify anyone concerning his omnipotence regarding future things perfectly — nor otherwise than has been said. Which does not seem [right], since concerning present and past things he well can; therefore also concerning future things, since present and past things cause absolutely nothing there, as can be had from chapters thirty and thirty-one of this [book], and especially past things, since they are nothing, wherefore they do not cause [anything]. If even present or past things were the cause of this certitude, they would also be the cause of the beatitude of the blessed; wherefore they would beatify the blessed. Therefore the devil, and his sin and penalty, and his eternal misery, would beatify Christ and the other blessed — which is sufficiently absurd in itself, and even false; since since they are of finite power in acting, they would have a maximum and most remote terminus of action beyond which they cannot [act], as seems quasi *per se* known, which the Philosopher also shows, *On the Heavens* I.116, and Averroes in his Commentary.

But God can beatify and certify the blessed concerning such present and past things beyond every assigned terminus; indeed it does not seem that the action of these lowest things ascends to the highest heaven. Or if these present or past things were anything in the certitude of the blessed, God can supply their causation, and cause the whole through himself; for otherwise he would not be omnipotent. Wherefore Stephen, Bishop of Paris, condemned the article asserting that God cannot [bring about] the effect of a secondary cause without it. On account of which Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* III, dist. 26, says that Christ, in whom were the goods of the homeland, believed and hoped the resurrection on the third day to be future, but did not know it more perfectly as past than he understood it as future.

Likewise, then, by such certitude the good angels could have been certain of their future beatitude before their confirmation, and the saints now in the way [could be]. Indeed it seems that some wayfarers had some such certitude concerning various things. Whence Romans 8: "I am certain," says the Apostle, "that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor virtues, nor things present, nor things to come, nor strength, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the charity of God." And Acts 16: "A vision was shown by night to Paul. There stood a man of Macedonia beseeching him and saying, 'Pass over into Macedonia, help us.' And as soon as he had seen the vision, immediately we sought to set forth into Macedonia, being assured that God had called us to evangelize to them." Wherefore also in Wisdom 7 it is said that "the spirit of wisdom is unique, manifold, subtle, modest, distinct, mobile, undefiled, certain." What Catholic, too, is not so certain of the articles of faith concerning the future — namely, that there will be a final judgment, and a general resurrection of

the dead, and that God will render to each according to his works? The saints in the way, then, now have a similar certitude such as the perfectly blessed have and will have.

Likewise, this certitude is the certitude only of hope; for this is found in wayfarers, as has just been shown. Wherefore Lombard, *Sentences* III, dist. 26: "Hope," he says, "is the certain expectation of future beatitude." Therefore in Christ and in the other blessed there is only the hope and certitude of hope — which is false, since that is imperfect, but beatitude is perfect, as has been shown above. Whence the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13: "We know in part and we prophesy in part, but when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known. Now there remain faith, hope, charity."

Wherefore also Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* III, dist. 26, having proposed the question whether faith and hope were in Christ, responds thus: "It seems to certain learned men that faith — the virtue — and hope were not in him, just as they are not in the saints already beatified, or in the angels. And although the saints believe and hope the future resurrection, and the angels also believe the same, nevertheless faith or hope is not a virtue in them, since they enjoy contemplating God by species, and in the Word of God they look upon the future resurrection or judgment, not through a glass in a dark manner, but most clearly. For if, because they believe the future resurrection, therefore it is true that they have faith — therefore, when it has been consummated, after the judgment they will likewise be said to have faith, since they will believe it past. But just as they will then believe, yet will not have faith — which makes [them] faithful — since they will not believe without knowledge, which will not be enigmatic but by species, so also now they believe and hope the resurrection, yet they do not have faith, since they know in believing. For there has come to them what is perfect, and what is in part has been done away. For knowledge has come, and faith has been done away; the species has come, and hope has ceased. So also Christ, in whom were the goods of the homeland, indeed believed and hoped the resurrection to be future on the third day, for which he also prayed to the Father; nor yet did he have faith — the virtue — or hope, since he did not have an enigmatic or speculative [knowledge], but had the clearest knowledge of it: since he did not know it more perfectly as past than he understood it as future. Yet Christ hoped, as he says in the Psalm: 'In you, Lord, I have hoped.' Yet he did not have faith or hope as a virtue, since he saw by species those things which he believed." Hugh too, *On the Sacraments* 2, part 13, holds the same; and all Catholic interpreters concordantly hold the same.

Likewise, if God can perfectly certify no one, he can perfectly beatify no one — since certitude is the most blessed part of the whole beatitude, as was cited above from Augustine. Whose mind also, having only the aforesaid certitude, would not crave a firmer one? Wherefore he would not be fully quieted, satisfied, or beatified by it, nor by the whole beatitude which he would have; wherefore he would not be perfectly blessed — such as is the beatitude expected in the homeland by all the faithful. For if any beatitude or felicity is perfect, as was taught above, [then] which, if

not that one? Wherefore the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13: "When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away."

This response, then, eclipses the light of the blessed, deceives their sight, despoils them of certitude — that is, of the most blessed portion of the whole beatitude — drags them miserably down to misery; and what seems more wonderful and more miserable of all, [it] makes Christ, Mary, and the other saints, who long ago were blessed, never to have been blessed, but always before to have been wretched, and transfers the place of beatitude — the highest heaven — into hell, the place of misery.

Furthermore, what seems most heretical of all, this response has consequently to assert that God himself can be deceived and err. For if a man or angel can be deceived and err in the essence of God, so can God, since he understands nothing except what — and as — is shown and shines forth in it. This response also makes God uncertain similarly concerning future things. For if through his cognition of future things he can be deceived concerning them, through it he cannot be certain of them; nor could the Father, by his omnipotence, certify the Son concerning any future thing: for he himself is not certain — how then will he be able to certify another? Indeed, even if he were certain — as no one doubts that he is certain — still he could not certify the Son: for he could not certify him except through revelation in the Word, in the clear essence of God; but that does not certify, since with it stands error; wherefore neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit can certainly know any future. For they can know nothing, nor in any way, except what — and as — they receive from the Father to be known. For just as they have all their being from the Father, so also all their knowing, and all other things, as was more fully shown in chapter thirty-two of this [book].

CHAPTER XXXV. HE ARGUES AGAINST THE SECOND.

Nor can the second response stand, which says that the cause of such a past effect could have been not a revelation in the Word, but an appearance, estimation, or opinion created in its proper genus — since that [appearance] is or was false if the revealed [thing] will not be. Wherefore it is possible that Christ, Mary, and the saintly blessed are deceived and wretched, and not certain of their beatitude — together with the other absurdities induced against the prior response.

Likewise, Paul in his proper genus and in act believed that A was revealed as future, and it was not future. Suppose this, since it is possible and compossible with this. Wherefore the Word did not show him that A would be, but that A would not be; therefore he simultaneously, particularly, and actually believed contradictories under their own proper form — one in its proper genus, the other in the Word — which is a manifest impossibility, and contrary to the Philosopher, *Prior Analytics* 2.

Likewise, that credulity in its proper genus was one effect, therefore it had a cause; thus none other than that revelation and vision in the Word; for that being removed, no cause for so

believing would have been in Paul rather than in Peter. And it is necessary that that effect was, because the effect of it — namely the previously-done extrinsic work — is necessary to have been; therefore it is necessary that its cause was, namely that vision in the Word. Or conversely, if it is possible that that cause was not, therefore also [that] the effect [was not], as chapter thirty-three of this [book] argued more fully.

Nor can anyone say that Paul opined A to be future merely freely and gratuitously without cause, since then there is no reason why Paul would so opine rather than Peter, nor why Paul would opine A to be future rather than A not to be future, since no evidence, no cause whatever is more in favor of this than against — indeed perhaps it is more apparent and opinable and favorable in the case that A not be future than that it be. Nor can Paul gratuitously and freely opine anything whatsoever, as no one is unaware, since no one can opine something unless it appear to him as true, and this is not in anyone's free power. Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.151, shows that imagination is not opinion, since imagination is in us when we will — that is, voluntary according to Averroes — but opinion not, since it is necessary that what is opined be true or false, [or] appear true or false. "To opine," says the Philosopher, "is not in us: for it is necessary either to say true or false." Where the text, which Averroes expounds, has thus: "To estimate, however, is not in us: for it is necessary either to falsify or to verify."

Suppose also that Paul be a grave and stable man, and will not or believe anything from sole voluntary levity, but from a preceding rational cause; and the argument returns. Or even suppose that he received this from God in commandment, and wills and believes in his proper genus, and externally operates only conformably to the divine revelation and commandment; and the difficulty returns.

Suppose also that one only so doing has long since died, and is in heaven; and according to this response it is now possible that he did otherwise — indeed contrarily to the aforesaid revelation and commandment — and that he was always after death in hell, as chapter thirty-three of this [book] argued more fully.

This argument also goes immediately against this response, the case set forth in chapter thirty-three of this [book] being retained. For it follows that Paul, after he received this revelation and commandment and obeyed by meriting well, and living and dying in charity, was beatifically crowned — afterward to have omitted, or done the contrary, and always after to have been without charity in mortal sin, wretched and damned — as the prior deduction of chapter thirty-three of this [book] proves.

And if anyone says that it does not follow that it is now possible that Paul was without charity and not saved, since God by his absolute power can preserve charity in one mortally sinning, and save such a person — at least it follows necessarily that it is now possible that Paul, who through the act A merited eternal life, through the same sinned mortally, and merited eternal death — namely by doing that act against the revelation and commandment of God in the Word — and that Paul, who throughout the whole time after A was good and dear to God, throughout that

whole time was wickedly mortal and odious to God; and that Paul, who throughout the whole time after his death was blessed, throughout that whole time was wretched. For there is no greater misery than sin: whence Proverbs 14: "Sin makes peoples wretched."

It also follows by the foregoing reasoning that it will be in the power of Antichrist, and of any wayfarer, to pervert the laws of God and change the faith of the Church. For, the revelation and command in the Word having been made to Paul concerning Antichrist, or any other wayfarer, as chapter 33 of this [book] touches, and he having well obeyed in charity, and so having died and been beatified in heaven, it is possible that Antichrist or another wayfarer should so act, that Paul having charity was not good nor dear through it, nor merited, but sinned, and that he, blessed in heaven, was wretched in heaven — together with other abuses similar to these, turning, indeed perverting, the law of God and the general faith of the Church, as is clear to no Catholic knowing the law and faith. Which yet no one will presume to concede, except a disciple of Antichrist, who "shall speak words against the Most High, and shall crush the saints of the Most High, and shall think that he can change times and laws against God," Daniel 7.

This principal *falsigraphia*, however, does not avoid the argument. For it is possible that God reveal in the Word to Paul that A will be, without Paul having such volition or created credulity in its proper genus, as no one is unaware. If this be posited, the argument is restored. For all two things altogether really distinct, such that neither has any part of the other, nor is any cause of it, can be separated from each other. For every thing is sufficiently constituted with all and only its causes and essential things possessed: for if it were not, this would be on account of some defect of something necessarily required for its being. God, however, cannot be separated from existing things, since he is the necessary form, and somehow the being, of all, and the necessary conserver of them in being, as chapter 2 of Book I shows. All created things, however, that are altogether — that is, according to all parts — really distinct, even if one is the cause of the other, can be separated from one another, on account of the reason aforesaid, and since God of the plenitude of [his] power can supply the causality of the second cause.

This is proved by a most faithful argument: for in the sacrament of the altar there exist accidents without subject; much more therefore can any accident exist without any other [accident] existing, and any substance without any accident, and any substance also without any other altogether distinct created substance. The Philosophers, although obscurely, seem to attest the same. For Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.55, reproving those wishing to define singulars — say, the Sun — says: "They sin by the addition of such things, which being taken away, the Sun will still be — say, 'circling the earth' or 'hidden by night': for if it should stand still or appear, will the Sun still not be? But it is absurd if not. For 'Sun' signifies a certain substance." Plato too in the *Timaeus* posits two virtues of fire — namely heat and light — and that "the divine powers conjoined the domestic and familiar body of the eyes [with] a perlucid, serene, and unsullied fire, without destructive and devouring heat." Fire, then, according to him, can be without heat, and by the same reasoning every substance without its proper accident, and much more without an accident not its own; and any substance without any other in the manner stated.

With which Augustine concordantly, *City of God* 11.10: "On account of this, the divine nature is said to be simple, for which to have something is not [the same as] either being able to lose [it], or [being] another thing having that which it has — as some vessel [has] liquor, or a body color, or air light or heat, or the soul wisdom: for none of these is what it has. For neither is the vessel liquor, nor body color, nor air light or heat, nor soul wisdom. Hence it is that they can also be deprived of the things they have, and turned and changed into other habits or qualities, so that the vessel is emptied of the moisture with which it is full, and the body is discolored, and the air becomes dark or cold, and the soul becomes foolish." And *On the Trinity* 15.13: "Far different from this knowledge is our knowledge: but what knowledge is to God is the very wisdom, and what wisdom is the very essence or substance, since in the simplicity of that nature it is not one thing to know wisely and another to be, but what it is to know is to be. Our knowledge, however, is in many things mixable, both [other things] received and admitted; since for us to be is not what to know or be wise, since we can be even if we neither know nor are wise." And on John part 2 homily 45 [or 99 of the whole]: "Mutable is our mind, which receives by learning what it did not know, and loses by unlearning what it knew; and therefore that substance is not most truly simple, for which to be is not what to know: for it can be and not know; but that divine [nature] cannot, since what it has, is, and through this it does not so have knowledge that one thing is for it the knowledge by which it knows, another the essence by which it is — but both [are] one." Whence also it is translated as the 368th proposition of the *Sentences* of Prosper. Blessed Gregory too, *Moralia* 18, on Job 28, "But where is wisdom found?" etc., holds the same.

Likewise, the Word was made flesh prior naturally to all revelation made to him in his proper genus, for us captives and wretches to be redeemed, on account of solely the eternal revelation eternally shown to him by the Father in the sole essence of God, according to what was shown in the immediately preceding chapter. Therefore in the middle time, in which we are between the incarnation and the redemption, it is possible that he was not incarnated, since he did not have that revelation, since the human race was not shown as one to be redeemed by him — since now it is possible that it not be redeemed by him, as the principal hypothesis says.

And if anyone should say that it does not follow that the Word now can not have been incarnated, but [only] that he can not have been incarnated for that cause, namely for man to be redeemed, but for another — therefore even after the redemption of man consummated by him, and after the final judgment, similarly he could [be]; or if then he cannot, neither before: for the divine will is always equally free or necessary with respect to it, as is clear from chapter thirty of this [book].

Then also by similar reasoning God could now never have willed the sacraments of the Church to have been instituted for that end for which they were instituted, nor to have had that effect which they always had; wherefore now also it is possible that those sacraments were always illusory, false, empty, and figments, and men justified and saved through them were always sinners and damned. Likewise, by the same reasoning it is now possible that God conferred on other operations, things, or signs, which evil men used, every sacramental virtue; wherefore it is

consequently possible that the evil were always until now and damned in hell, and that those always until now in hell are now good and rewarded in the heavenly places.

It also follows, as is clear by the foregoing deduction, that it would be in the power of Antichrist and of any wayfarer to make the Word to have been incarnated and to have suffered for another final cause than it was — namely, for redeeming him whom he did not intend to redeem, and not for redeeming him whom he intended to redeem — which does not seem to befit sound faith. It also follows that it has been and is in the power of men to evacuate the whole effect and virtue of the Lord's passion, as has been more fully argued in chapter eight of this [book].

CHAPTER XXXVI. HE ARGUES AGAINST THE THIRD.

The third response, however, positing that the cause of the past effect of the past vision in the Word could have been not the vision of the future A shown, but [the vision] of its opposite, fails and errs in many ways.

First, since since God reveals voluntarily only, although it can be that he did not reveal A, which he previously revealed; and if that be placed in being, it is not necessary that he revealed its opposite — indeed it stands well with this that he revealed nothing whatsoever. Suppose, then, this with the other; and the response does not respond.

Second, since it has consequently to say that just as, something having been seen in the Word, it is possible that it never was seen, but its opposite, so something having been willed in the Word, it is possible that it never was willed, but its opposite. Wherefore also, by such volition, something having been done within the seer and willer or outside, it is possible that it never was done, but its opposite — as chapter 33 of this [book] proves. If, however, [someone] should obstinately deny that it is similar concerning vision and volition — since what was previously seen can never have been seen, and its opposite, that which never was seen, can have been seen; but concerning what was willed, not so, since what once was willed must necessarily always have been willed, and what was not willed in like manner not willed — by chapter 33 of this Book III he will be convinced.

Granting also what it says: let such a revelation be made to Paul with the command of willing and acting conformably, and let him obey in all things; then it is necessary that Paul now so will, or in the past have so willed; therefore it is necessary that he now so see, or in the past have so seen. For this volition of his is now caused, or was in the past caused, by this vision of his.

Furthermore, either Paul through the same act by which he saw distinctly that A would be can have seen distinctly the opposite, or through another. If through the same, therefore by similar reasoning through the same act through which he willed distinctly that A would be — or anything else — he can have willed distinctly the opposite; wherefore he did not do what he did.

If through another, therefore one other act, which never was, it is possible to have been; and one which was, not to have been — contrary to the principal hypothesis.

Likewise, the vision of the opposite would have caused the opposite effect, and not that one. For if Gabriel had seen in the Word that the Son of God was not to be incarnated of the Virgin, that vision never would have caused in him the will of going to the blessed Virgin and announcing what he did, but rather no will, or the opposite will. Christ also, if he had not seen in the Word his future passion, but its opposite, would not have had the cause of so much sadness and bloody sweat. Paul likewise, if he had seen in the Word himself to be saved, would have had great delight created in his proper genus; if, however, he had seen the opposite, he would have had great sadness.

Likewise, this response does not avoid the difficulty. For let such a revelation be made to Paul with the command of willing concordantly and acting; and let him fully obey, and so dying be saved. And according to this response it is now possible that he never saw that vision or commandment in the Word, but the opposite of both; and now it is necessary that he was so externally operating; wherefore it is now possible that he acted contrary to the revelation and vision in the Word, sinned mortally, and was wretched and damned.

Concerning Gabriel similarly, in the middle time between the annunciation and the incarnation, it was possible that he was lying. For when he said to the gracious Virgin, "Behold, you shall conceive," it was possible that for then he had not seen this in the Word, but plainly its opposite; wherefore it was likewise possible that that most blessed Archangel of the Lord was a most wretched angel of Satan, since lying against so great and so luminous a truth, and sinning mortally. Let him affirm this who dares; but I, on account of reverence for the truth showing all these things, on account of reverence for the sender and her to whom he was sent, and on account of reverence for the one sent and him on account of whom he was sent, do not dare to affirm such things.

From this, however, it follows that the finally-confirmed blessed can sin; wherefore neither are they finally confirmed, contrary to chapter fifteen of Book II. And from this it is further inferred that the blessed are not, nor can they be, certain of their beatitude. For how will a sinnable creature in a sinnable state — since not finally confirmed — be certain of never sinning, and of perpetual beatitude? Nor can God confer another firmer or more certain state on the blessed.

Even if God could certify the blessed concerning his future beatitude, this would be most of all through some revelation in the Word; but no such [revelation] certifies, since whatever such, even if now it is of one of the opposites, can now and for now not be of that one, but of its opposite. Indeed, what seems more erroneous, neither can God certify the blessed concerning his past or present beatitude. For in this present instant, suppose [it to be the one] in which blessed Gabriel announces to the gracious Virgin that she will conceive a Son: it is possible that he is now sinning by lying, and in the past has sinned, from the time at which he willed this knowingly. For it is possible that he now sees, and continuously before saw, the opposite of this

in the Word. No blessed person, then, is certain, nor can be, concerning his future, past, or present beatitude — contrary to what was previously shown in chapter thirty-four of this [book].

CHAPTER XXXVII. HE ARGUES AGAINST THE FOURTH.

The fourth response, saying that the incomplex and simple vision of a simple object in the Word can have been the cause of such a past effect, simply says much. For sole incomplex cognition of an object does not sufficiently move anyone to act — say, to speak, to run, to build, and to do similar things — but beyond it, will is required by necessity, as chapter eight of Book I taught.

Likewise, certain non-voluntary effects — say, delight, sadness, confidence, fear, dilation, constriction, and the other corporeal passions of this kind — are not caused, or are not caused in so great a degree and so vehemently, by the sole incomplex cognition of an object, or by an estimation or opinion that it will happen to the cognizer, and this nearby. For we all know that we shall die, but we do not greatly grieve or fear, since we do not opine that [it will happen] immediately: for these things each of us can experience. Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.152, proves that imagination or fancy is not opinion through this — that when we opine something terrible to befall us, we immediately suffer with it; but when we only imagine, by no means — as if we should consider terrible things in a picture. Concerning such effects, then, this response does not respond.

Likewise, suppose the object seen in the Word [be] one effect contingently future — say, the salvation or damnation of the one so seeing, or of another dear to him. Then that object can not be and never have been seen, since not [have been] shown in the Word; therefore any present or past effect of it can for now not be present nor have been past consequently. Or even suppose that object seen in the Word [be] one revelation in the Word concerning something contingently future. Suppose indeed that it be revealed to Daniel in the Word, that Jeremiah sees or saw in the Word that A will be tomorrow, etc., as before.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. HE ARGUES AGAINST THE FIFTH.

The fifth response, however, which posits the liberty of the created will to be able to have been, or to be, the cause of such a past or present effect, seems to say very freely without any action of reason; nor does it evacuate the difficulty, nor is it true. It does not evacuate the aforesaid difficulty: for suppose that he who sees in the Word be commanded to will and operate only conformably to the vision, etc., as chapters thirty-three and thirty-five of this [book] argued more fully; and the difficulty returns. Nor is this response true: since there are some effects caused by the sole vision of certain objects in the Word, without any free operation of the will, as is clear from chapter thirty-three of this [book].

CHAPTER XXXIX. HE ARGUES AGAINST THE SIXTH.

The sixth response also, asserting that God by himself alone can be or have been the total cause of the effect often mentioned, present or past, is not true. For according to it, it would be possible that a man, who from a vision and command in the Word prayed, ran, preached, built houses, and procreated sons, did none of these things, but God did each through himself alone. Wherefore it will also be consequently possible for the deflowered to be re-virginated through his action or quietation, freely and contingently future. And there will be, according to this, as much contingency with respect to present and past things as with respect to future things. For when a revelation in the Word has been made to a man wayfarer concerning some effect — which is A through him — freely and contingently future, and he, from that revelation, doing another effect before A — say B — in the middle time after B and before A, or while B is being done, just as it can happen that he do or not do A as future, so it can happen that he did or did not do B as past, or do or not do B as now present, as is clear from chapter thirty-three of this [book].

Likewise, according to this it is possible that a man who, from such revelation, merited or sinned against it, and was just or unjust, saved or damned, rewarded or punished, blessed or wretched, in heaven above or in hell below — never so did, nor received such things.

Likewise, by the same reasoning by which it is possible that God alone did what he did with a rational secondary cause, it will likewise be possible for him alone to have done whatever he did with an irrational secondary cause; therefore whatever God did with any secondary cause whatever, it is possible that he alone did, and that no secondary cause ever did or moved anything.

Likewise, if those things which God did not do alone, he can have done alone, by similar reasoning those things which he did not do with another nor alone, he can have done — since he does not need the help of another — wherefore also those things which he did, he can likewise not have done. All of which most plainly conflict with the principal hypothesis.

CHAPTER XL. HE REPROVES THOSE DENYING REVELATION IN THE WORD.

These things, then, having so far been disputed against those conceding revelation in the Word, it remains to affirm the same in some words, just as the very Word shall give, against those who, to the Word's injury and our misery, deny it. For there are certain defenders of this hypothesis who, not being able to solve the aforesaid arguments concerning revelation in the Word, and not being willing to relinquish the hypothesis, tend to the other — namely the sinister — side of this fork, by saying that no complex [proposition] concerning a future contingent can be revealed in the Word.

For how does it not redound to the Word's injury to despoil him of his omnipotence — that he cannot show himself to his most beloved lovers through himself? How also does it not redound

to our misery, depriving us of final beatitude? For this consists in such a vision, as not only Theologians but also Philosophers in very many places attest.

But these will perhaps respond that our final felicity and beatitude consists in the incomplex vision of God, but not in the complex — that is, the blessed will see incomplexly in the essence of God, and in the Word, the very essence of God, and any of the persons, and the incomplex things which shine forth in it; complexion, however, or composition, or imaginative proposition, or affirmation or negation concerning future contingents — namely, that God affirms intrinsically, just as the Father affirms to the Son, that something will be or not be — cannot be revealed in the Word or essence; in the proper genus, however, [it] well can. Wherefore they also say that all such things are revealed through created propositions, habits, and acts — namely in the proper genus — and cannot be revealed otherwise.

But if a future contingent cannot be revealed to a creature in the essence of God or in the Word, this is either on account of impotence in God, or on account of impotence in the future, or on account of impotence in the creature.

Not on account of impotence in God, since he is omnipotent — and since the Father reveals such things to the Son in his clear essence, as is clear from chapter 34 of this [book]. God can also so reveal incomplex things; wherefore complex things by similar reasoning: for he is not of measured or restricted power.

Nor on account of impotence in that future: for that can be revealed in the essence of God; for in it, it is revealed to the Son. That truth concerning the future is also most truly, most certainly, and most clearly written in the book of divine prescience; why then can it not be likewise revealed there? Since also that truth is more certain and more true there than in any created proposition, it can be more certainly and more truly revealed there.

Nor on account of impotence in the creature: since if it be so, let omnipotent God increase, as much as is needed, the power of the creature. The creature can also see in the Word a thing incomparably higher, subtler, and more difficult — somehow infinitely so — namely, the trinity of persons in the unity of essence. For what we now believe, then we shall see in clear light, as the Catholic Fathers concordantly attest. The creature can see in the Word any incomplex things; why then not by similar reasoning complex things?

If, however, it be said that the creature cannot see future things in the Word on account of its excessive disproportion, distance, and remoteness from the Word, it can be contradicted as before. For omnipotent God can elevate the creature in natural or supernatural [endowments] as much as is needed; wherefore also many learned Doctors not unlearnedly posit a certain created supernatural light, which they call the light of glory, elevating the created intellect to the beatific vision of the beatific uncreated light. Which the Prophet too seems patently to teach, when he says, "With you is the fountain of life; in your light we shall see light," Psalm 35.

Notwithstanding this disproportion and distance, also, the creature can see any incomplex things in the Word; why then not these complex things?

Likewise, the creature can see in the Word a thing contingently future to be when it is, and to have been when it has passed; why then not [see it] to be when it is future — especially since such a truth always intrinsically in every same way is true and written and shining in the Word, whether the thing is future, or present, or sent into the past? Otherwise indeed God would be intrinsically changed, contrary to chapter five and twenty-three of Book I, which is also evidently shown from chapters 30, 31, and 32 of this [book].

Likewise, necessary complex [propositions] concerning the future, and any other necessary complex [propositions], can be revealed in the Word; why then no future contingent — since all true [propositions] are likewise inscribed there?

Perhaps it will be said that all true necessary [propositions], and all true [propositions] concerning the present and past, have a determinate and certain cause and are true in like manner; wherefore they can also be revealed determinately and certainly in the Word; future contingents, however, do not so have, nor are so true; wherefore neither can they be so revealed in the Word.

This, however, is not true: for the immutable divine will is the determinate and certain cause of all future contingents, through which they are also so determinately and certainly known by God, and so determinately and certainly are in him when they are future, as when they are present or past having flowed away — as appears through chapters 14, 18, and 23 of Book I, and through chapters 30 and 32 of this [book]. And God can show to a creature in the Word that he wills such a future to be, wherefore [also] make him foreknow in the Word that it will be — indeed even know most truly and demonstratively in a certain way, since through the truest and infrustrable cause, namely the divine will.

Likewise, the divine essence is more similar, nearer, and more proportional to our mind than created qualities, propositions, or habits; for both are substances, and immaterial substances, and very much akin. Wherefore the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.13, says: "If there is some care of human things from the gods, as it seems, it would also be reasonable that they rejoice in the best and most akin; and this is the intellect." Man too, as Genesis attests, was made to the image and likeness of God, and this most of all in the rational soul, as very many Catholic Fathers attest. Wherefore [the divine essence] is also the most natural and most desired end of our mind. If, then, these things be so, in the divine essence too more clearly, more truly, and more certainly all true complex [propositions] are inscribed and shine forth, just as also incomplex ones, [more so] than in any created proposition, than in any habit, than in any creature; why then will our mind in no way more clearly, more truly, and more certainly see there, and be able to see, any true complex [propositions], just as incomplex ones, than in any creature — especially since our mind has been most fully purged from every mass of the burdening body, from all obscuring

phantasms, from all rust and gloom, from every dross and misery, and deifically transformed above the splendor of the Sun?

This too can perhaps be argued more strongly concerning all the angels, or any of them, of whom in Ezekiel 28: "You [are] the seal, of likeness," etc. — since [the angel] seems to have been made nearer to the likeness of God, as Gregory says, *Moralia* 32.23, on Job 40, "He is the beginning of the ways of God": "Although man is created to the likeness of God, yet [the prophet], attributing as it were something greater to the Angel, says that he is not made to the likeness of God, but is himself the seal of the likeness of God — so that, the more subtle his nature, the more fully the likeness of God is believed to have been expressed in him." And Isidore says, *On the Highest Good* 1.10: "The condition of the Angel differs from the condition of man: for man is created to the likeness of God, but the Archangel, who fell, is called the seal of the likeness of God, God testifying through Ezekiel, 'You [are] the seal of the likeness, full of wisdom, perfect in beauty, you were in the delights of paradise.' For as much as his nature is subtler, so much the more fully has it been expressed to the likeness of divine truth."

Since also God is the most natural end of our mind, and it cannot be perfected except in perfect conjunction with him, how, according to one of its powers — which is apprehensive of simple things — will it be perfected, perfectly conjoined with God (perfectly, since by contemplating incomplex and simple things through the essence of God) — but according to its other power, also nobler, which composes and divides simple things into complex ones, will it remain eternally imperfect? Indeed, neither can it be perfected for eternity, or at least it will not be perfected to such an extent, nor can it be like the other power, its sister, also lower than itself — since it can see no true complex [proposition] in God? Indeed these two powers of the created intellect seem proportional to the power of the divine intellect apprehending simple things, and to the power composing apprehended simple things — speaking very improperly of a "composing power" in God, since stammeringly we can scarcely thinly resound the great things of God, as chapter 18 of Book I more fully touched. Wherefore, just as that power [is perfected] by contemplating in [the divine essence] simple things in some incomplex way, so this other [power will be perfected] by contemplating in it complex things in some complex way. For thus is one part of the image perfectible finally just as the other, and so will it attain its natural and proper end.

Likewise, otherwise omnipotent God cannot certify any blessed person concerning his beatitude as eternally enduring, nor concerning any future contingent. For if he can, suppose [it]; either that revealed certainly will necessarily come to pass, or by no means. It will not come to pass necessarily, as this position posits; therefore it can in no way come to pass. Wherefore this blessed person can be deceived and err, and now not be blessed, nor ever before have been, but now be wretched and always before have been wretched — together with many other and great absurdities, as can appear from chapter 34 of this [book].

Whose mind, also, does not desire infallible certitude concerning his beatitude eternally enduring? Therefore to say that no one can have such certitude is to deprive every rational creature of his beatitude, as is clear from the same chapter 34. According to this also, the blessed now in heaven are not certain concerning the final judgment, the resurrection of the dead, and their future beatitude, except by the certitude of faith or hope — contrary to what was previously shown in chapter 34 of this [book].

These also strive to deceive the truth — namely the Lord Jesus Christ — at least according to his human nature. For if he sees only in his proper genus things contingently future, since those can not be, Christ too can be deceived and err. What Christian, except perchance one deceived and erring, will presume to affirm [this]? Nor can anyone avoid the deception by saying that such vision in Christ and the other blessed could have been [vision] of one of the opposites and not of the other, as is clear from chapter 36 of this [book].

These likewise deprive the blessed not only of certitude of knowledge, but also of multitude [of things known]: for to perfect beatitude perfect knowledge is required, not only as to the clarity of knowledge, but also as to the multitude of things known. The blessed therefore truly knows all things. For how otherwise could he not be deceived, and how otherwise would he not have the evil and darkness of ignorance, and how otherwise could he not always study, progress, and labor further? This [latter], however, is not of the nature of the end, but of the way. Wherefore Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15.16: "Since now in this enigma there is so great a dissimilarity from God, in which yet some likeness has been found, this also must be confessed, that even when we shall be like him, when we shall see him as he is — which he assuredly said who attended to this present dissimilitude — neither shall we then by nature be equal to him (for nature is always less than the maker by which it has been made); and then indeed our word will not be false, since we shall neither lie nor be deceived; perhaps also our thoughts will not be voluble, going from some things to others and returning, but we shall see all our knowledge at one and the same view." And how otherwise would the appetite of the blessed be satisfied — by which he would will to know whatever proposed thing, [since] he would at least prefer to know than not know the truth? And how otherwise will beatitude be a good in every way perfect, as all these things are clearer from chapter 34 of this [book]?

For how can the blessed actually or habitually know all things in the proper genus? For he could not [do so] except through propositions, acts, and habits infinite [in number]; but thus he cannot. He cannot, therefore, clearly know all things, except through the divine essence demonstrating all things most clearly, except through the book of divine knowledge containing all things most clearly, except through the mirror of divine majesty, in which all things shine clearly, except through the eye of divine power, to which all things lie open clearly. Wherefore the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 1.65: "If a senior should receive a young eye, he would see indeed as a young man." Where also the text, which Averroes expounds: "An old man," he says, "if he should receive the eye of a young man, would see as a young man." Wherefore also if a man or angel should receive the eye of God, he will see somehow as God. May not that prophetic [saying], "Eye to

eye they shall see," Isaiah 52, be so understood — and that, "The eye has not seen, O God, beside you, what things you have prepared for those waiting for you," Isaiah 64? "The Lord is my illumination," Psalm 26 — and many similar things in many places?

Wherefore the Philosophers also assert that man must finally know all things through the substance of the agent intellect, through the very substance of God; and that this is his ultimate and perfect felicity. For Averroes, on *On the Soul* 3, comm. 36, speaking of the copulation and continuation of the agent intellect with us, says that we are sometimes said to be moved to the continuation of this; and adds: "And it is manifest that, when this motion will be completed, that intellect immediately will be copulated with us in all ways; and then it is manifest that its proportion to us in that disposition is as the disposition of the intellect which is in habit to us; and since it is so, it is necessary that man understand by his proper intellect all beings, and that he do his proper action in all beings, just as he understands by the intellect which is in habit, when it has been continued with the imaginable forms, all beings by proper intellection. Man therefore in this manner, as Themistius says, is assimilated to God — namely, in this, that he is all beings somehow, and knowing them somehow. For beings are nothing other than his knowledge, nor is the cause of beings other than his knowledge; and how wonderful is this order, and how strange this manner of being!" With whom Augustine concordantly *On the Joys of the Just and the Pains of the Wicked, or Of the Threefold Habitation*, says that "in the future life, in the royal city, the just shall shine as the Sun," as the Lord said, "where there will be the highest peace, the highest rest, no labor, no grief, no poverty, no old age, nor any night, nor any death, nor any desire of food, no burning of thirst — but the food and drink of all will be the vision of Christ and the holy Trinity, and the contemplation, by the eye of pure heart, of the very divinity, and assiduous reading, so to speak, of the book of life, that is, of eternal truth and the highest wisdom, and of the Word of God, which is the vision of Jesus Christ; where whatever now is hidden from us will then be manifest; where the reason will be manifest why this one is elected and that one reprobated, why this one is taken up into the kingdom, why that one reduced to slavery, why one dies in the womb, another in infancy, another in youth, another in old age, why one is poor, another rich, why the son of an adulteress is baptized, and sometimes the son of a legitimate spouse dies before baptism, why one who begins to live well sometimes ends badly, and one who begins badly often ends well — all these things and many such will be plain and open in the book of life." And further: "In the vision of God a triple knowledge is known — namely, the man who beholds, God who is beheld, and all others; all things will be seen and understood. For just as through a glass mirror a triple vision is administered to us, since we see ourselves, and the mirror itself, and whatever is present nearby, so through the mirror of divine clarity we shall see God himself, as he is, as much as is possible to a creature, and we shall know ourselves and others by true and certain knowledge." Who also in *City of God*, last [book] 28: "If the prophet Elisha, absent in body, saw his servant Gehazi accepting gifts, how much more in that spiritual body will the saints see all things?" Is this what God promised to Moses, desiring to see the face and glory of the Lord: "I will show you all good," Exodus 33? Gloss: "Eternal rest, in which is

every good, in the vision of God, as the Psalmist says, 'I shall be satisfied when your glory shall appear.'"

Blessed Gregory too, *Dialogues* 4.22, speaking of the saints in heaven: "What is there," he says, "that they do not know there, where they know him who knows all things?" It will perhaps be answered, as it seems Peter [Lombard] answers, *Sentences* II, dist. 11, last [chapter], that Gregory there speaks of the angels, and when he intimates that they know all things, he understands only of all those things whose knowledge makes the knower blessed — namely, those whose knowledge is of the substance of beatitude, of which kind is the mystery of the Trinity. But to those looking at Gregory's process, it is plainly clear that he there speaks of men, and of the mutual knowledge of men — strangers and unknowns to one another in this life. For Peter [the interlocutor] asks whether either the good recognize the good in the kingdom, or the wicked recognize the wicked in punishment, and speaks manifestly of men. Where Gregory, in responding, also shows that yes — both concerning the good and the wicked — and this only concerning men, and adjoins: "It happens, however, in the elect something more wonderful, since they know not only those whom they knew in this world, but recognize as their neighbors and acquaintances good men whom they had never seen. For when they shall see the ancient fathers in that eternal inheritance, they will not be unknown to them by sight, whom they have always known by [their] work. For since there all see God by common clarity, what is there that they do not know there, where they know him who knows all things?"

Anselm furthermore, *On the Similitudes* 57, says that the eighth part of beatitude is wisdom, and adds: "For the good will be filled with that perfect wisdom which is God, and will gaze upon it face to face. When he has so beheld it, he will see the nature of the whole creature, which subsists better in God than in itself. For then the just will know all things which God made to be known — both those which are past, and those which afterward are to be future. There each will be known by all, and all by each; nor will it altogether escape anyone in what country, of what stock, [each] was born, or what he did in his life."

Likewise, what Theologian will presume to deny that Christ truly knows all things according to the assumed nature, since both reason and the manifold authority of the Fathers attest this? For to him "the Spirit was given not by measure," John 3, and this according to all his gifts; in him too, by the testimony of the Apostle, "it pleased that all the fullness of divinity should dwell corporeally," Colossians 1; in whom also, according to the same, "are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden," *ibid.*, 2.

The same Hugh of Saint Victor, in a certain little responsive book to Master Walter of Mauritania, in many ways strives to approve and pertinaciously to affirm. For Walter asked whether the soul of Christ has so great knowledge and wisdom altogether as the divinity has. He opined and argued that it does not, since beatitude consists in knowledge — the Lord saying, "This is eternal life, that they may know," etc. If, then, the soul of Christ should have equal knowledge with the divinity, it would have equal beatitude, equal charity, and the other goods in

which beatitude consists. Likewise, otherwise it would be false that God has greater sufficiency in every good than his creature.

Notwithstanding which, [Hugh] holds plainly that yes, since the soul of Christ thus knows all things not through habits, acts, or any one act, but through God himself, through the very essence of God — which he also holds concerning our beatitude. Whence he says: "This," he says, "is life, that they may know you only true God and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. Knowledge of God therefore is eternal life. And what is the knowledge of God? Is it an accident? Then the love of God is an accident, and beatitude is an accident, and our beatitude is in accidents. Wherefore [is it] not rather God who is our beatitude, he the wisdom by which we know, he the love by which we love, he the joy by which we exult? Therefore there is one wisdom by which all are wise: nor yet do they know in one way, since they know by participating; but if all who are wise are wise by this wisdom, much more by this wisdom was wise that soul which was united to wisdom itself." And further: "The Apostle attests that there is fullness there, and we say that the whole wisdom is not in its house: therefore half dwells within and half outside. And where it is asked, 'If she is not found at home, in whom does the fullness of divinity dwell corporeally?' Where there is fullness, nothing is lacking; where nothing is lacking, all is present. If perhaps the fullness of divinity is there, and the fullness of wisdom is not there? He says again, 'In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden.' But you say well: 'All the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are there, but they are hidden.' He carries, and does not see. But far be it from our understanding that we should so feel; but they are hidden — not so that they are hidden from him, but that they may not be seen by the impious in him. They are hidden and stored away; they are stored away that they may be brought forth at the opportune time."

And further: "Christ saw in the divinity, he saw also in the humanity, yet from the divinity: for the fullness of divinity was in the soul of Christ, and from the fullness of wisdom the soul of Christ was fully wise. Therefore, they say, the soul of Christ has as much wisdom as God has. What does the comparison do? There is one alone; one is the wisdom of God by which the soul of Christ is wise, nor is it [wise] by participating, so that this or that should be wise in it and through it, but by having the fullness, so that it possesses the whole. Let us not say, then, 'so much,' or 'as much,' but let us say: 'the whole wisdom of God is in the soul of Christ, and from the whole wisdom of God the soul of Christ is wise'; nor yet is the soul of Christ equal to God, since the wisdom of God is not [equal to itself in this regard]; there [in God] grace, here [in the soul] nature; and the same there [is] grace as here nature."

And further, responding to the first argument of Walter, he says: "Even if the soul of Christ should have equal knowledge with the divinity, it would not on that account need to have equal beatitude — since to be blessed is to have a good by nature and from oneself, and to be that, [rather] than to have it by grace and from another, and not to be it." And further, responding to the second, he says thus: "Afterward you added: 'If the soul of Christ has equal knowledge with God, it will be false that God has greater sufficiency in every good than his creature' — and so on. Just as the creature cannot be equaled to the Creator, so neither the good of one to the good

of the other; but this is well and truly said where the good of the creature is found other and diverse from the good of the Creator. But where it is one and the same itself, who can be greater or lesser? For what is the true good of the creature, especially of the rational [creature], other than God? Or what is the good of God other than himself? If, then, the true and unique good of the creature is God, and the good of God cannot be other than himself, is God on that account less or greater than himself, since he is at the same time himself the good both of his creature and his own? Let then at last cease this so frequent repetition of comparison, where there is the singularity of unity."

And further, at the end: "What need to pursue each thing? Briefly I shall show you what seems to me must be felt in this matter. We believe that full and perfect and whole wisdom of God was in the soul of Christ, and from that wisdom the same soul was fully and perfectly wise — not by participating in it, but by possessing it whole, since 'according to fullness she received.' John, however, who was 'a burning and shining lamp,' had comprehended in part: the soul of John, then, received from the fullness; the soul of Christ comprehended the fullness. Whoever, however, persist in contending to assert that the wisdom by which the soul of Christ was wise was one, and that which was united to the soul of Christ was another — I do not wish to prejudice anyone; let them see for themselves with what sense they assert this, lest perhaps the pronouncement be more carnal — and theirs — than true. This one [thing] I indubitably affirm: that either there was no other wisdom in the soul of Christ besides the divine, or, if there was another, it was not equal to that one. He who does not believe this, the believer does not believe well; to other things I do not compel, but I persuade."

The same Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* III, distinctions 13 and 14, shows through reasons and authorities of Doctors. Where also in dist. 14, to certain objectors he responds thus: "Responding, we say that the soul of Christ, through the wisdom freely given in the Word of God to which it is united, which also it perfectly understands, knows all things which God knows."

The blessed angels also — all, or at least some — know all things in the Word, or at least will know [them] when final beatitude is consummated; for otherwise the angels and beatified men could always progress by learning, both through their own study and through divine revelation; wherefore they would never be perfectly blessed. Nor does anyone concede this. And Robert [Grosseteste] of Lincoln, on *Posterior [Analytics]* 1.14, says that "the intelligences receiving irradiation from the first light see in it all knowable things, universal and particular." And Gregory says, on Luke 15, "What woman having ten drachmas?" etc., homily 34: "Cherubim is called the fullness of knowledge, and those higher ranks have been deservedly called Cherubim, since they are filled with so much more perfect knowledge as they more nearly contemplate the brightness of God; so that, according to the manner of the creature, they know all things the more fully as they approach the vision of their Maker by the merit of [their] dignity." And further, showing that the gifts of the orders are so special to each that they are common to all: "Cherubim," he says, "we have called the fullness of knowledge, and yet who is there that does not know something, where they all together see God himself, the fountain of knowledge?"

Isidore too, *On the Highest Good* 1.10: "The angels of God know all things before they happen in themselves, and the things which among men are still future, the angels already, with God revealing, know."

Blessed Augustine likewise, *On Genesis Literally* 8.48, says that "God himself speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds with immutable truth, where there is the intellect knowing simultaneously whatever things even through times do not happen simultaneously."

These, then, deprive the blessed angels and all men — indeed even the beatific Lord of the blessed himself, the Lord Jesus Christ — of the certitude and multitude of knowledge required for beatitude, as the foregoing makes manifest. And not only this, but also they deprive them of all knowledge or foreknowledge — the knowledge or foreknowledge, I say, of all contingent futures, and of any other knowable things, except perhaps things known *per se*, or of which they have a demonstration or sense. Wherefore much more [they deprive] Christ and all the prophets in the way. For where there is not perspicuous certitude, there can be properly no knowledge, but rather faith, opinion, or estimation, as is clear from chapter 18 of Book I. Wherefore the Apostle [says]: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing," Hebrews 11. Whence Augustine, first part on John homily 40: "We believe that we may know," he says. "For what is faith except to believe what you do not see? Faith therefore is to believe what you do not see; truth, to see what you have believed."

Who also *To Paulinus*, *On Seeing God* 3, and afterward diffusely shows that to see and to believe differ in this — that to see is to know or know certainly and evidently something, namely by some sense of body or mind, certainly to feel something, or to recall having felt it; but to believe is to assent to other things not so known. Where in 4 he says thus: "Hold this distinction, that if I admonish you in any disputation about something which you so see by the eyes of the flesh, or feel by any other sense of it, or recall to have so felt, as sounds, colors, fragrances, odors, savors, heats are felt, and whatever else through the body, by seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching we feel, are felt; or you do not so see, but with the gaze of the mind you see — life, will, thought, memory, intelligence, knowledge, your faith — and whatever else you behold with the mind, and that it is so not only by believing but plainly by seeing, do not doubt: this judge me to have shown. But what I shall not have shown so that it be held by sense, sight, or perception of body or mind — and when I shall have said something which is seen by neither of those two genera — it remains that it only be believed."

And further, 5: "Some think that this very thing which we say is to believe — when a true thing is believed — to be only this, to behold with the mind. If it is so, this our prolocution would be deceived, in which we distinguished that it is one thing to perceive something by the sense of the body — as in heaven the Sun, and on earth a mountain, a tree, or any body — and another by the gaze of the mind, [which is] nonetheless evident, as our will is beheld by ourselves within when we will something, or thought when we think something, or memory when we recall, or any such thing in the soul or body — or another to believe before what is neither present nor recalled to

have been present in the gaze of the body or mind, as that Adam was created without parents, and Christ born of the Virgin and having suffered rose again."

And further, 6: "Is it enough that between seeing and believing we believe this to differ — that present things are seen and absent things believed? Plainly, perhaps, it is enough — if we understand things present in this place to be those which are present to the senses, whether of the mind or the body, whence also they are called things present, the term being drawn from 'at hand.' For just as I plainly see this light by the sense of the body, so I see my will, since it is present to the senses of my mind and is inwardly present to me. But if anyone indicates to me his will — whose mouth and voice are present to me — yet because the will itself, which he indicates to me, lies hidden from the sense of my body and mind, I believe, I do not see, even if perchance it is as he says. Therefore those things are believed which are absent from our senses, if it seems suitable that testimony be borne to them; but those things are seen which are at hand, whence they are also called present — by the senses of the mind or of the body. For though there are five senses of the body — of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching — sight indeed is principally attributed to the eyes; but we also use this word in the others. For we do not only say, 'See what shines,' but also, 'See what sounds, see what smells, see what tastes, see what is hot.' Nor, because I said that those things are believed which are absent from our senses, should it be so taken that they are reckoned among those things which we sometimes saw, and we retain that we saw, and we are certain — although they then are not at hand when they are recalled by us. For these are not reckoned among believed things, but among seen things, and therefore are they known: not because we had faith in other witnesses, but since we without doubt remember and know that we saw."

Someone perchance will respond, saying that these things do not follow, since God can so illuminate the mind of someone, and the propositions or habits in his mind, and so reveal to him such truths, that he will know and behold them certainly. But if that illumination be made through some created light, however most clear, or through some creature, such revelation about the future can be erroneous, illusory, and false: for the opposite can come to pass. In the same way also any revelation about the present or past not *per se* known or demonstrated, or sensed, notwithstanding such illumination, can be illusory and false. For why not concerning such present and past things just as concerning future things? Indeed, if to someone existing in London such a revelation were made, that tomorrow at the first hour A as a future contingent will be at Rome, and he should believe continuously, would he not, just as from this revelation he can be deceived and err before the first hour of tomorrow's day, by believing that A then will be — since notwithstanding such revelation it is possible that A not be — so also from the same revelation in substance can he be deceived concerning the present, by believing that tomorrow at the first hour A is, and the first hour having passed, similarly be deceived concerning the past, by believing conformably that A was?

The cause of this is that, however and by however great a created light any proposition is illumined whose truth is not *per se* known, nor by the light of habit evidently demonstrated

through some [things] *per se* known and in a *per se* known consequence, nor indubitably sensed — that [proposition] is not certain, since notwithstanding such illumination the thing could be otherwise. For just as such a true proposition is illumined, so could a false one [be]. For so clearly does the Sun and Moon and other luminaries shine on a false writing as on a true, on the lying as on the true-saying. Where, then, can these be discerned? Certainly in no fallible created light, [but only in] the infallible uncreated light. No truth of this kind, then, can be certainly and infallibly seen, except in the intrinsic light of infallible truth, in the brightness of the eternal light, and the mirror without spot of the divine majesty, in the book of life, in the Word of God, who and which cannot lie — in the clear essence of God, where all things, just as they are, are eternally, immutably, and infallibly inscribed; where there is no error, nor even can there be, just as not in God; which also there will see, read, and most certainly know whoever shall have perfectly inwardly seen, read, and known that book — as appears from chapter 34 of this [book].

Did not all that throng of Philosophers wish to say this — some uttering obscurely, some clearly — concerning the agent intellect? And how God is the light for knowing all things, as chapter 6 of Book I and chapter 22 [of Book I] more fully recited. Did not most clear Isaiah feel thus, when he promised to the congregation of the faithful: "There shall be no more for you a Sun for shining by day, nor shall the splendor of the Moon illumine you, but the Lord shall be for you an everlasting light," Isaiah 60? Did not the prince of the Apostles, Peter, feel this, when he wrote thus to the faithful: "We have a more firm prophetic word, to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts," 2 Peter 1? Did not the vessel of election, Paul, feel thus, writing thus to the Corinthians: "We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away. We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known"? Did not he who was more loved among the disciples feel this, who also drew from the Lord's breast all that he poured forth to thirsting servants, when he said, "God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all," 1 John 1? And further, 3: "Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, since we shall see him as he is." And how? Hear: "No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has narrated [him]," John 1 — which by the testimony of Bede in the Gloss can be referred to the past and likewise to the future. Did not Truth itself feel this, when he said, "I am the root and the offspring of David, the bright and morning star," Apocalypse last? And again, "He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him," John 14? Are not these and very many other similar places of both the Old Testament and the New to be so understood? If anyone doubts, let him look at the Catholic expositions and glosses, and beyond doubt he will be made certain.

I know, however, that there is a certain knowledge and even certitude said in another way — namely probable and firm credulity, vehement and indubitable adhesion, and firm hope. For thus we know who were and are our parents, brothers, and sisters; thus we know what we have

learned by the testimony of trustworthy men or books — books, I say, historical and sacred and even others — say, that Troy was a noble city and destroyed by the Greeks; that Alexander, Charlemagne, Edward, and other princes accomplished many great deeds; that Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and other philosophers taught very many things. Wherefore Geber in the prologue [of book] 1 says that "the better knowledge after the knowledge of faith is that whose principles are certain and firm." And the Philosopher in *On Memory and Reminiscence*: "It does not happen," he says, "that future things are remembered; but [they are] opinable and able-to-be-hoped; and there will indeed be a certain knowledge of hope-character, just as some say [there is] a divinatory [knowledge]." And *Ethics* 7.3: "Some of those opining," he says, "do not doubt, but estimate that they certainly know. If, then, on account of [their] quiet, those believing while opining act more than those knowing without [merely] opining, knowledge does not differ in any way from opinion. For some believe no less in those things which they opine than others in those things which they know; Heraclitus makes this manifest." Who also *Topics* 4 says that "faith is vehement opinion." Where he also recites from certain ones that "faith is the vehemence of opinion."

Wherefore Augustine, *To Paulina On Seeing God* 4: "If those things which we have not seen — that is, in the present we have not perceived either by mind or body, nor have we learned about them from sacred Scriptures, by reading or hearing — we had not believed at all, whence would we know that there are cities where we never were, or that Rome was founded by Romulus, or — that I may speak of nearer things — that Constantinople [was founded] by Constantine? Whence finally would we know what parents brought us forth, by what fathers, ancestors, forebears we were begotten? Of such things indeed, when we know very many, yet we did not learn them either by any sense, present like the Sun, like the will of our mind, like the authority of canonical eloquences, like that Adam was the first man, or that Christ was incarnate, suffered, and rose again — but [we learned them] by others reporting, of whose testimony in this kind of things alone we have least doubted."

And further, 6, intimating the aforementioned distinction concerning knowledge: "Our knowledge," he says, "consists of seen things, things, and believed things. But in those things which we have seen or see, we ourselves are witnesses; in those, however, which we believe, we are moved by other witnesses. Yet for the faith of those things which we recall neither having seen nor see, signs are given either in voices or in letters, or in any documents whatever, by which, when seen, things not seen are believed. Not without reason, however, do we say that we know not only those things which we have seen or see, but also those things which we believe by suitable testimonies or witnesses moved to each thing. Further, if we say not incongruously that we know that which we believe most certainly, hence it has come about that even those rightly believed things, although they are not present to our senses, we are said to see by the mind: for knowledge is attributed to the mind, whether through the senses of the body, or through the soul itself it retains something perceived and known; and faith itself is seen by the mind, although that

be believed by faith which is not seen. Whence the Apostle Peter says, 'In whom now not seeing you believe'; and the Lord himself, 'Blessed are they who have not seen and have believed.'"

But far be it that the perfectly blessed should have only such an improper, fallible, imperfect knowledge, cognition, or certitude — as is clear from what is here premised, and from chapter 34 of this [book]. Not so, then, not so; but they will have the most certain vision in the most clear Word of God, just as Christ also had here in the way; and Peter [Lombard] evidently testifies, *Sentences* III, dist. 26, as chapter 34 of this [book] more fully recites. Wherefore the Prophet [says]: "I believe to see the goods of the Lord in the land of the living," Psalm 26. He did not say "to opine," "to estimate," or "to believe," but "to see." It was shown above how much there is between believing and seeing. Those, therefore, who take from the blessed such vision, take away at the same time the reward of faith from the faithful: for it is established that this is the reward of our faith. Wherefore Jesus also said to the Jews who believed in him: "If you remain in me, you shall be truly my disciples, and you shall know the truth," John 8 — as if he said manifestly, "You who now believe enigmatically, if you shall remain in believing, you will at last know most certainly the truth." Which Augustine, expounding, homily 40 of the first part, says thus: "What did you say is not the truth? It is the truth — but it is still believed, not yet seen. If one remains in that which is believed, one comes to that which is seen. Hence John himself the holy Evangelist in his epistle: 'Most beloved,' he says, 'we are the sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We are now, and we shall yet be: what more shall we be than we are? Hear: it has not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him.' Whence? 'Since we shall see him as he is.' A great promise — but it is the reward of faith." Who also in *City of God*, last [book] 28: "It must be considered," he says, "what a great man said: 'In part we know and in part we prophesy, until that which is perfect shall come; and we see now through a glass in an enigma, but then face to face.' So now the holy angels see, and as they see there, so we shall see. The vision is reserved as our reward, and faith is preserved for us in this vision."

The blessed too, who here humbly believed God to be one and triune, if they shall not see this clearly and certainly in heaven, how will this faith be worthily and fully remunerated? Or if they shall see this clearly and certainly, as they thirstingly desire, in what? Certainly not sufficiently in any creature: for no creature can show this clearly and certainly as it is, on account of its infinite dissimilarity. If, however, they shall see this clearly and certainly, and read and know in the Word of God, in the book of life, in the clear essence of God; why not also other true complex [propositions] similarly, since this true complex is seen as the highest, most excellent, and most difficult of all things written there? How also can the blessed not see in that most clear and most certain book of God, and read most clearly and most certainly any true complex [proposition] most clearly and most certainly written there? Why, I ask, can he not — especially since the eyes of his heart have been fully cleansed and made perfect in every way; since also now with his weak and infirm eyes he can see and read such things in other obscure books, less visible and very much less legible? If you say [it is] on account of the excessive excellence of that book over

the eye of the angelic and human mind, this is reprov'd above. How also can the blessed there see and read most well that God is one and triune, which seems most excellent of those things written there, and the other inferior things he cannot? How also, just as you yourself concede, notwithstanding this maximum excellence, can the blessed there see and read any incomplex things, and yet not complex ones?

In this you seem indeed to make the blessed similar to a boy knowing simple letters but not knowing how to make from them syllables or a syllable; or knowing syllables, but not knowing how to join them into words or a word; or knowing how to read words, but not knowing how to understand orations or an oration. Indeed — what seems much harder — never able to learn any of these things. How, however, can anyone endowed with the highest ingenuity, seeing, reading, and understanding in some book the individual words and individual incomplex [items], not be able to see, read, and understand in the same book any proposition and any oration whatever — indeed not even any most easy in understanding? How then will the blessed not so see, read, and understand in the book of divine knowledge any complex [things], just as incomplex ones? Not so, then, not so. For so does not blessed Augustine, cited above, feel, who says that there will be for the Blessed an assiduous reading of the book of life. Who also in *Sermon 20 on the Words of the Apostle*, speaking of the time of the way and of the homeland: "Now," he says, "we walk by faith; then by species. What is 'by species'? 'Beautiful in form before the sons of men,' since 'in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.' 'He who loves me,' he says, 'keeps my commandments; and he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him.' And what will you give him? 'And I will show myself to him.' This will be the species, when he does what he said: 'And I will show myself to him.' There you will see the equity of God; there without a codex you will read in the Word. Therefore when we shall see him as he is, our pilgrimage will then pass over. 'Without a codex,' he says, 'you will read'; 'without a codex,' I say, the creator in the uncreated codex, in the eternal book of the eternal knowledge of God. And it follows: 'The way is to believe; let us hold this way, and we shall come to the species; when we shall come to the species, we shall see the equity of God; and there it will not be there to say, "Why did he help this one, and not this one? Why has this one been led by the governance of God to be baptized, but that one, although he lived well as a catechumen, has died by sudden ruin and not come to baptism; but that one, although he lived wickedly — luxurious, an adulterer, a stage-actor, a hunter — fell sick, was baptized, departed: in him sin was joined, in him sin was deleted? Why will you find no merits, except punishment? Why grace?' 'O the depth of the riches!' Peter denies, the thief believes. 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!'"

In a similar way, just as it has been argued concerning the book, it can be argued concerning the Word: for how can the blessed not hear and know true complex [propositions] in the Word, and through the Word of God — in whom and through whom all true things are most truly, most distinctly, and most certainly expressed, and the truest and most certain reasons of all true things? And who will presume to say so most eloquent a Word [to be] mute? Who would

presume this, except a deaf man? And who would dare to say that the Word of the Lord in no way expresses, nor can express, any true complex [propositions], but only incomplex ones? Or if he expresses true complex [propositions], yet [say] that the creature cannot hear or understand in that Word true complex [propositions], but only incomplex ones — nor [say] that the omnipotent Word can through himself express to the creature true complex [propositions], just as incomplex, orations just as words? Who, I ask, would presume to affirm this, except perhaps one spiritually deaf, who has ears and will not hear the Word of God? Not so the Prophet, not so; but he says: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me," Psalm 84. Upon which Augustine: "God was speaking within him," he says, "and the world was making a clamor for him outside. Holding back, then, somewhat from the noise of the world, and turning himself to himself, and from himself to him whose voice he heard within, stopping his ear against the tumultuous unquietness of this life, and against a soul weighed down by a corruptible body, and a sense thinking many things, depressed by an earthly habitation, he said, 'I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me'; and he heard. What? 'For he will speak peace to his people'; and having shown that that peace will not be perfect in the present, but in the future, concluding he says thus: "There will then be peace, purged in the sons of God, all loving themselves, seeing themselves full of God, when God will be all in all. We shall have a common spectacle — God; a common possession, a common peace we shall have — God. For whatever it is that he himself now gives us, he himself will be for us instead of all things, who gives — that itself will be the perfect and full peace; this he speaks to his people, this he wished to hear who said, 'I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me, since he will speak peace to his people.'"

Who also *City of God*, last [book] 29: "How great will be that felicity, where there will be no evil, no good will lie hidden? There will be leisure for the praises of God, who will be all in all. I am also admonished by the holy Canticle, where I read or hear, 'Blessed are they who dwell in your house, O Lord; into ages of ages they shall praise you, all those.' Now the strings of the corporeal harmony lie hidden; they will not lie hidden, internally and externally disposed throughout all the parts of the body; and with the other things, which there will seem great and wondrous, rational minds will be kindled in the praise of so great an artificer, by the delight of rational beauty. There true glory, true honor, true peace, where no one will suffer anything adverse either from himself or from anyone. The reward of virtue will be he himself, who gave virtue, and to it has promised himself — than which nothing better or greater can be. For what else is it that he said through the Prophet, 'I [will be] their God, and they shall be the people for me,' except 'I will be the source whence they shall be satisfied; I will be whatever things are honorably desired by all — both life, and salvation, and food, and abundance, and glory, and honor, and peace, and all goods'? For thus also that is rightly understood which the Apostle says, 'that God may be all in all.' He himself will be the end of our desires, who will be seen without end, loved without satiety, praised without fatigue. This gift, this affection, this act will assuredly be for all, just as eternal life itself [is] common."

Nor must it be thought that to hear, to see with the mind, and to read in consummated beatitude are really diverse, as it seems from the authority cited above; indeed perhaps perfect beatitude does not have parts really differing. For either some of those parts would be perfect and sufficient for beatifying — and then that one alone would suffice — or any of them would be imperfect; and how then would perfect beatitude result from such imperfect parts, especially when all those parts are finite in number and in power? What also could be the perfect beatitude of an angel or man on this side of God, since he is the end of both? Wherefore Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* 3, prose 10, by way of dialogue between Philosophy and himself, proves diffusely and expressly holds that human beatitude is the highest good, wherefore also God — indeed even divinity itself.

With whom Anselm concordantly, *Monologion* 70: "If the rational creature, which is useless to itself without the persevering love of God, so eminently surpasses all creatures, certainly nothing can be the reward of this love except that which super-eminently surpasses all natures. For the same good which demands so to be loved is no less compelled to be desired by the lover. For who so loves justice, truth, beatitude, incorruptibility, that he does not seek to enjoy them? What then will the highest goodness recompense to one loving and desiring it, except itself? For whatever else it should recompense, it does not recompense, since it neither is compensated to the love, nor consoles the lover, nor satisfies the one desiring. Or if it wishes to be loved and desired in order to recompense something else, it does not wish to be loved and desired for its own sake, but for the sake of another; and so it does not wish itself to be loved, but another — which is unspeakable to think. Nothing therefore is more true than that every rational soul, if as it ought, it should study by loving to desire the highest beatitude, at some time will perceive that to be enjoyed, so that what it now sees as through a glass and in an enigma, then it will see face to face. To doubt whether it shall enjoy that without end is most foolish, since enjoying it neither will it be able to be tortured by fear, nor deceived by fallacious security."

With whom also concordantly Augustine in the *Sentences* of Prosper 20: "With this affection," he says, "is God to be worshiped, that the worship itself be its own reward. For he who worships God in order to obtain another rather than himself, does not worship God, but that which he covets to obtain." Boethius too where above [says]: "Since by obtaining beatitude men are made blessed, and beatitude truly is divinity itself, it is manifest that they are made blessed by obtaining divinity. But just as men are made just by obtaining justice, wise by obtaining wisdom, so by obtaining divinity it is necessary by similar reasoning that they be made gods. Every blessed therefore is a god, but indeed by nature one — by participation, however, nothing prohibits that there be very many." And further he shows that those things which seem diverse to be contained in beatitude — say, sufficiency, power, reverence, clarity, pleasure, and other such things — are one and the same, and that all these goods are situated in the substance of the highest good, in the very substance of God.

With whom also concordantly Augustine on Psalm 84, "Your salvation give to us," understanding by 'salvation' Christ: "Already," he says, "you have given us your Christ. Yet still let us say to

him, 'Give us your Christ' — since we say to him, 'Our daily bread give us today.' And what is our bread except he who said, 'I am the living bread who came down from heaven'? Let us say to him, 'Give us your Christ.' For he gave us Christ, but a man, whom we know; whom he gave us as a man, that very one he is to give us as God. For to men he gave a man, since he gave such a one to men as could be received by men: for no one of men could receive God as Christ. He was made a man for men: he saved himself for the gods. Or perhaps did I speak arrogantly? Truly arrogantly, unless he himself had said, 'I have said, you are gods, and all sons of the Most High.'" Who also on Psalm 35, "They shall be inebriated with the abundance of your house": "When that ineffable joy has been received," he says, "the human mind somehow perishes, and is made divine, and is inebriated with the abundance of the house of God." And further, on "Since with you is the fountain of life," etc.: "Here," he says, "the fountain is one thing, the light another; there not so: for what is the fountain, this is also the light, and whatever else you call it, since it is not what you call, since you cannot find a congruent name. It does not remain in one name. If you should say that it is only light, it would be said to you: 'In vain therefore was it said to me that I should hunger and thirst. For who is there who eats that light?' Plainly rightly was it said to me: 'Blessed [are] the pure in heart, since they shall see God.' If it is light, let me prepare my eyes; let me prepare my mouth, since that which is light is also a fountain — a fountain which satisfies the thirsty, a light which illumines the blind."

Who also on John, part 2, homily 45 [or 99 of the whole], treating that of John 16 which the Lord said about the Holy Spirit, "For he will not speak from himself, but whatever he will hear he will speak," says: "In that incorporeal and immutable nature, to hear and to see is the same. For when it is said 'to know,' there are all of them — and to see, and to hear, and to smell, and to taste, and to touch. Nor wonder that the ineffable knowledge of God, by which he knows all things, through various modes of human speech is called by the names of all of these corporeal senses; since even our mind itself — that is, the inner man — to which knowing uniformly through these five corporeal messengers diverse things are reported, when it understands the immutable truth, chooses, loves, sees the light of which is said, 'It was the true light,' and hears the word of which is said, 'In the beginning was the Word,' and takes the odor of which is said, 'After the odor of your ointments we run,' and drinks the fountain of which is said, 'With you is the fountain of life,' and enjoys by touch of which is said, 'But for me to adhere to God is good' — nor [are these] another and another, but one intelligence is called by so many names of senses." Which also the words of Hugh recited above attest.

Those, therefore, who strive to assert the contrary of this, strive to deprive the blessed not only of the perfection of sight and hearing, but also of all senses, and of all spiritual powers of their mind, and the greatest sweetness, and highest delights of that great supper, of that heavenly banquet prepared for all the blessed. They attempt furthermore, like tenacious dispensers, to contract the liberal hand of the Lord, and to curtail his infinite power, and to put the infinite abundance of his magnificence under a measure, and constrict it under a small measure.

Who also, having even slightly entered the threshold of theological discipline, would be ignorant of the common distinction between morning and evening cognition, or daily and nocturnal? And [the fact] that morning cognition is the cognition of things in the Word, and evening cognition the cognition of things in the proper genus? For this distinction is held among Doctors and disciples so commonly that it scarcely needs founding. Yet, by way of abundance, behold blessed Augustine, who in *On Genesis Literally* 4.27, and afterward, diffusely and perspicuously hands it down, and says that the angels knew the things to be done in the Word, and [things] done in the proper genus, and calls the first cognition "morning" and "day"; the second, "evening" and "night," on account of the excellence of clarity of this over that. Where also in 29 he says thus: "Much indeed is between the cognition of some thing in the Word of God, and the cognition of it in its nature, so that the former deservedly pertains to day, the latter to evening. For in comparison with that light which is beheld in the Word of God, all cognition by which we know any creature in itself can deservedly be called night — which again differs so much from the error or ignorance of those who do not even know the creature itself, that in comparison with it, it can not incongruously be called day; which yet day, except again in comparison with that day, two coequal to angels — we shall see God as he is, he himself also would be night — would not need here the lamp of prophecy. Whence the Apostle Peter says: 'We have a more certain prophetic word, to which you do well to attend as to a lamp [shining] in a dark place, until day shines forth and the day-star arises in your hearts.' Wherefore, since the holy angels — to whom we shall be made coequal after the resurrection if we hold the way which Christ has been made for us until the end — always see the face of God, and enjoy his only-begotten Son, the Word, equal to the Father, in whom first of all wisdom was created — they doubtless first knew the entire creation, in which they themselves are principally established, in the very Word of God, in whom are the eternal reasons of all even things temporally made, as in him through whom all things have been made; and then in the very creature which they thus knew, as it were looking down on it as something below, and referring it to the praise of him in whose immutable truth the reasons according to which it was made are principally seen."

And further, 32, he writes thus: "Nor let anyone judge that what I have said about spiritual light, and about the day created in the spiritual and angelic creature, and about the contemplation which it has in the Word of God, and about the cognition by which the creature is known in itself, and its referral to the praise of immutable truth, where the reason of the thing to be made was first seen — which when known was made — does not now properly, but as it were figuratively and allegorically agree to understanding day and evening and morning, but otherwise indeed than in this custom of daily light of this corporeal kind, yet not as if here properly, there figuratively. For where the better and more certain [day is], there is also a truer day. Why then not also a truer evening, and a truer morning?" And further, 35: "The angelic mind, by pure charity adhering to the Word of God, after by that order it has been created so that it precedes other things, first saw them as to be made in the Word of God before they were made, and so first they were coming into being in its cognition, when God said that they should come to be, [rather] than in their own proper nature; which likewise, having been made, it knew also in

themselves, with a lesser knowledge — which has been called evening." The aforesaid sentence very many authorities also attest.

Does not Averroes seem to feel this on *Metaphysics* 12, comm. 18, when he says thus: "We have already searched out concerning these two opinions in the book *On the Soul*, and we have said that the agent intelligence is as it were a form in the material intellect, and that it makes the things-understood, and receives them according to the material intellect; and that the material intellect is not generable and corruptible, and we declared there that this is the opinion of Aristotle; and that the intellect-in-habit has a generable part and a corruptible part. That, however, which is corrupted is its action; in itself, however, it is not corrupted, and it enters us from within. And if the action of that intellect, insofar as it is copulated with the material intellect, were not generable, then its action would be its substance, and it would not have necessity, in this action, to be copulated with the material intellect. But when it has been copulated with the material intellect through action, its action insofar as it is copulated with it will be an action other than its substance. And it was that which acts, a substance — and is for another, not for itself. And therefore it is possible that something eternal understand something generable and corruptible. If, then, the intellect should be denuded, at human perfection, from potency, it is necessary that this action, which is other than it, be destroyed by it; and then either we shall not understand at all by this intellect, or we shall understand according as the action is its substance — and it is impossible that in some hour we not understand by it. It will remain, then, when this intellect has been denuded from potency, that we understand by it according as the action is its substance — and this is the ultimate prosperity."

The Philosopher too, *Metaphysics* 12.38, having somewhat described the first principle of things, so concludes: "On such a principle, then, depends heaven and nature. For such a deduction the best is for us for a small time; for thus indeed always is that." Upon which Averroes: "From this," he says, "it appears well that Aristotle opines that the fortune of men, in that they are men, is none except through the continuation of them with the intellect, which has been declared in the book *On the Soul* to be the active and moving principle in us. The abstract intelligences ought to be principles of those things of which they are principles in two ways: namely, as movers, and as ends. For the agent intelligence, insofar as it is abstract and a principle to us, must necessarily move us according as the loved [moves] the lover. And if every motion must necessarily be continued with that from which it is, according to its end, it is necessary that finally we be continued with this abstract intellect, so that we shall be dependent on such a principle on which heaven depends — although this be in us for a small time, as Aristotle said." Aristotle, that is, and Averroes posit that felicity is possible for man in the present life, and this for a small time near the end.

Does not the Lord himself teach this when he says: "If there shall be a prophet of the Lord among you, in vision I shall appear to him, or through sleep I shall speak to him. But not such my servant Moses, who in all my house is faithful: for mouth to mouth I shall speak to him, and openly, not through enigmas and figures he sees God," Numbers 12 — and elsewhere: "Their

angels always see the face of my Father," Matthew 18? Does not his Evangelist Mark teach this when he says: "Which immediately known, Jesus in the Holy Spirit, that they were so thinking within themselves, says to them," and the rest, Mark 2? If, then, Jesus knew that in the Holy Spirit, why not also other things? Does not his Apostle Paul teach this when he says: "I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I know a man in Christ fourteen years ago — whether in the body, or out of the body, I do not know, God knows — caught up of this kind to the third heaven," and further: "that he was caught up into paradise, and heard secret words," 2 Corinthians 12? Do not these and many similar [things] insinuate the aforesaid sentence?

Hear blessed Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* 12, disputing about the rapture of Paul, and about the third heaven, and understanding by three heavens three kinds of visions — namely, corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual — and positing the difference between these, that in corporeal and spiritual vision there can be fallacy, in intellectual not at all. Where after he has shown in 49 the manner of fallacy both in corporeal and in spiritual vision, in 50 he consequently subjoins: "But truly in those intellectual seen things the soul is not deceived: for either it understands, and it is true, or if it is not true, it does not understand."

And further, 52, intimating a double mode of rapture — one from the senses of the body to the likenesses of bodies and to spiritual vision, the other from such likenesses and from spiritual vision to intellectual vision — says thus: "Further, if as someone is rapt from the senses of the body that he may be in those likenesses of bodies which [are seen without] spirit, so also he be rapt from these, that he may be conveyed to that as it were region of intellectual or intelligible things, where without any likeness of body the perspicuous truth is discerned, obscured by no clouds of false opinions — where the virtues of the soul are not laborious and toilsome; there is one and total virtue, to love what you see, and the highest felicity, to have what you love. For there the blessed life is drunk in its fountain. To obtain this, where there will be secure rest and ineffable vision of truth, is the labor undertaken from the temptations of the world to be contained — there is the clarity of the Lord seen, not through a vision signifying — whether corporeal, as it was seen on Mount Sinai, or spiritual, as Isaiah saw, or John in the Apocalypse — but through species, not through enigmas, as much as the human mind can grasp it, according to the grace of the assuming God, that mouth to mouth God may speak to him whom he has made worthy of such colloquy — not the mouth of the body, but of the mind." Where also in 53 he so adjoins: "Thus I judge must be understood what is written about Moses. He had desired, as we read in Exodus, to see God — not indeed as he had seen on the mountain, nor as he saw in the tabernacle, but in that substance by which God is, with no corporeal creature assumed, which is presented to the senses of mortal flesh, nor in spirit by likenesses of bodies figured, but through his own species, as much as the rational and intellectual creature can grasp it, called back from every sense of the body, from every significative enigma of the spirit. For thus it is written: 'If, then, I have found grace in your sight, show me yourself manifestly that I may see you,' since a little above one reads, 'And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a friend speaks to his friend.' He felt, therefore, what he saw, and what he did not see he desired. For also a little after,

when God said to him, 'For you have found grace in my sight, and I know you above all,' he answered him, 'Show me your clarity'; and then indeed he received an answer figured from the Lord, about which it would be long to dispute, when he said to him, 'You shall not be able to see my face and live: for man shall not see my face and live.' Yet unless Moses had merited to see the desired and longed-for clarity of God, God would not in the book of Numbers say to Aaron and Miriam his brothers and sisters: 'Hear my words. If there shall be a prophet among you, in vision the Lord will be known to him, and in sleep I shall speak to him; not so in any way my servant Moses — in all my house he is faithful: mouth to mouth I shall speak to him, in species, and not through enigmas, and he sees the clarity of the Lord.' Nor is this to be understood according to the substance of the body, which is presented to the senses of the flesh." And it follows, 54: "In that mode, then, in that species by which God is, far ineffably more secretly and presently he speaks with an ineffable speech, where no one seeing him will live this life: since you live mortally in these senses of the body. But unless someone in some way die from this life — whether wholly going out of the body, or so turned away and alienated from the carnal senses that he deservedly does not know, as the Apostle says, whether in the body or outside the body he is — when he is rapt and conveyed to that vision."

And it follows, 55: "Wherefore, if this third kind of vision, which is superior in every corporeal and spiritual vision, the Apostle has called the third heaven — in this is seen the clarity of God, for the seeing of which hearts are cleansed: whence it is said, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, since they shall see God,' not through any corporeally or spiritually figured signification, as through a glass in an enigma, but face to face — which is said about Moses, 'mouth to mouth' — namely through the species by which God is whatever he is, however much the mind, which is not what he is, even cleansed from every earthly stain, alienated and arrested from every body and likeness of body, can grasp him: from whom — that is, God — we are pilgrims, weighed down by a mortal and corruptible burden, as long as we walk by faith, not by species. Why, however, should we not believe, that to so great an Apostle, Doctor of the Gentiles, rapt up to this most exalted vision, God wished to demonstrate that life in which after this life it is to be seen for eternity? And why is this not said to be Paradise, except that one in which Adam corporeally lived?"

Who also, *On Genesis Literally* 8.34: "Most certainly we ought to hold," he says, "that God either speaks through his substance, or through a creature subject to him; but through his substance he does not speak, except for creating all natures; to spiritual and intellectual ones, however, not only for creating, but also for illuminating, when they can already grasp his speech, such as is in his Word — which 'in the beginning was with God, and God was the Word, through whom all things were made'; to those, however, who cannot grasp it, when God speaks, he speaks only through a creature, either only spiritual — whether in dreams or in ecstasy, in the likeness of corporeal things — or even through bodily [creatures], when to the senses of the body either some species appears or voices sound." And in *City of God* 10.14 he says thus: "It pleased divine providence to ordain the course of the times, that the law might be given in the edicts of

angels concerning the worship of the one true God; in which the person also of God himself indeed not through his substance — which always remains invisible to corruptible eyes — but through certain signs, by a creature subject to the Creator, was visibly to appear, and by transitory little intervals of times to speak in the voices of human language syllable by syllable — which in its own nature speaks neither corporeally but spiritually, nor sensibly but intelligibly, nor temporally but, so to speak, eternally; nor does it begin or cease to speak — which with him more sincerely they hear not the ears of the body, but of the mind — his ministers and messengers, who in his immutable truth enjoy [him], immortally blessed."

Gregory too, *Moralia* 28.2: "It must be known," he says, "that divine speech is distinguished in two ways. For either the Lord speaks through himself, or through an angelic creature his words are formed for us." And further, 3: "Since hearing does not at one time grasp all things which are said to it — being one which perceives both the matters through words, and the words particularly through syllables; but our sight, in that it directs itself, grasps the whole suddenly and at once — the speech of God made to us inwardly is rather seen than heard, since while it insinuates itself without delay of speech, with a sudden light it illumines the darkness of our ignorance: whence also Baruch the son of Neriah, when asked, expounded how he had heard the words of the prophesying Jeremiah, said: 'From his mouth he was speaking as one reading, and I was writing.' For he who speaks while reading intends one thing and produces the word in another, since what he sees he says. The prophets of God, therefore, since they see his words rather in the heart than hear them, as it were speak as readers; but when through an angel the Lord indicates his will, sometimes he demonstrates it by words, sometimes by things, sometimes simultaneously by words and things, sometimes by images shown to the eyes of the heart, sometimes by images even before bodily eyes for a time taken from the air, sometimes by heavenly substances, sometimes by earthly, sometimes simultaneously by earthly and heavenly; sometimes, indeed, even through an angel, God so speaks to human hearts that the angel himself also is presented to the gaze of the mind."

Who also, *Moralia* 18.33, on Job 28, "Whence then comes wisdom, and what is the place of understanding? It is hidden from the eyes of all the living": "As long," he says, "as one lives mortally here, God can be seen through certain images, but through the very species of his nature he cannot — so that the soul, breathed upon by the grace of the Spirit, sees God through certain figures, but does not reach to the very force of his essence. Hence it is that Jacob, who testifies that he saw God, did not see anything but an angel; hence it is that Moses, who 'speaks face to face with God, as a man is wont to speak with his friend,' says to him in the very words of his speech, 'If I have found grace in your sight, show me yourself manifestly that I may see you.' For certainly, if it was not God with whom he was speaking, he would say 'Show me God,' and not 'show me yourself'; if, however, it was God with whom he spoke face to face, why was he asking to see whom he was seeing? But from this his petition it is gathered that, since he was thirsting to discern through the clarity of his uncircumscribed nature him whom he had begun to see through

certain images, that thus the supernal essence might be present to the eyes of his mind, no created image might temporally interpose for him to the vision of eternity."

And further, 34: "It must be known," he says, "that there were some who said that God even in that region of beatitude is beheld indeed in his clarity, but is not seen in his nature — whom indeed a lesser subtlety of inquiry deceived. For to that simple and immutable essence clarity is not one thing, nature another; but the very nature is its clarity, and the very clarity is nature. For that the wisdom of God will at some time show itself to its lovers, he himself promises, saying: 'He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him' — as if he plainly said, 'You who behold me in your [nature], it remains that you see me in my nature.' Hence again he says, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, since they shall see God.' Whence Paul says, 'Now we see through a glass in an enigma, then face to face. Now I know in part, then I shall know as I am known.'" And above the same: "The fathers of the Old Testament saw the Lord, and yet, according to the voice of John, 'No one has ever seen God,' and according to the sentence of blessed Job, 'Wisdom, which is God, is hidden from the eyes of all the living' — that is, of those existing in this mortal flesh: and he could be seen through certain circumscribed images, and could not be seen through the uncircumscribed light of eternity. But if by some still living in this corruptible flesh, yet growing in inestimable virtue, the eternal clarity of God can be seen by some keenness of contemplation — this also does not abhor from the sentence of blessed Job, who says, 'It is hidden from the eyes of all the living.' For whoever sees the wisdom which is God, dies utterly to this life, lest now he be held by its love. For no one sees it who still lives carnally, since no one can embrace God and the world at the same time. For he who sees God, by that very thing dies, by which either by intention of heart or by effect of work he is wholly separated by mind from the delights of this life. Whence also to the same Moses it is said: 'For man shall not see me and live.'"

The same sentence all the Catholic Doctors seem concordantly to attest, and the general faith of the Church.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, *DE CAUSA DEI CONTRA PELAGIUM*

Book III, Chapters XLI–XLIX

Translated from the 1618 Savile edition

CHAPTER XLI

HE RECITES THE DIVERSE MODES ACCORDING TO DIVERSE WRITERS OF SEEING IN THE WORD; HE RAISES AN OBJECTION AND ANSWERS IT.

Since indeed it has been shown that true complex propositions can be revealed to a rational creature in the Word and in the very essence of God, it remains consequently to inquire concerning the mode of that revelation — namely, in what way such things are able to be revealed there. For the easier knowledge of which it seems first that we must inquire how incomplex things are revealed in the Word and in the divine essence to a creature, and so to proceed thence in order to complex things. For in these matters, as in those, diverse modes are assigned diversely by diverse writers. For some think that in all such things revealed and seen, the Word of God supplies the place both of habit and of created act, and is both the habit and the act of the seeing creature. Others judge that the Word in all such things supplies the place of species or habit, but not of act — indeed that the creature, by a created act of seeing, sees what the Word, as species, habit, or idea, presents to it; and these are further divided in three ways. For these maintain that the creature distinctly sees individual things, whether incomplex or complex, which it sees in the Word, by a single created beatific supernatural act, presenting individual things distinctly and immediately and supernaturally. Those, however, hold that by one created act it sees all incomplex things in the Word, and by another created act all the complex things which it sees. These others maintain that it sees the individual incomplex and complex things which it sees in the Word by created acts, individual and distinct, corresponding to the individual things seen. Now any pathway of this tripartite sect splits into two trails as regards the number of visible things or things seen: for these hold that the creature can simultaneously see in the Word an infinite number distinctly; those, however, only a finite number.

Now further pursuing the foregoing division, others are of the opinion that the Word does not supply the place of species, habit, or act, but that whatever incomplex or complex thing the creature sees in the Word, it sees through a created species, habit, and act — through a species, I say, or habit mediating between the Word and the act of seeing — and yet that these are said to be seen in the Word, just as material things seen are said to be seen in the Sun or in material light, because the Word, as it were a kind of spiritual Sun and light, illuminates these things and disposes them so that they are able thus to be seen. And these have a triple sect on the side of such habit, just as the former had on the side of act. For some affirm that by a single habit all incomplex and complex things seen there are seen; others, that the incomplex are seen through one habit and the complex through another; others again, that individual incomplex and complex things seen are seen through individual habits, proper and distinct. And further still, all these are divided in two ways through infinite and finite as regards the multitude of visible things or things seen, just as the former, all of whom hold opinions concerning acts corresponding to habits.

Furthermore, there are still others who mediate, who say that all incomplex things which are seen in the Word are seen through the very Word itself, with no creature, no species, habit, or act mediating, as the first opinion says, but whatever complex things [are seen] are seen through some mediating creature; and these, like the former, are separated in many ways. And still further, beyond these mediators, there are others who strive to mediate among the latter sects, saying that all incomplex things which are seen in the Word are seen through a created act

mediating between the seeing creature and the Word, but not through any mediating habit or species, but the Word itself supplies the place of every such species and habit; the complex things, however, which are there seen, they say are seen by the mediation both of habit and of created act: by a created habit, I say, mediating between the Word and the act of seeing, and by a created act mediating between such habit and the seer, and both mediating between the seer and the Word. All of whom moreover, like the former, can be divided in two ways as regards the number of things seen in the Word, namely through infinite and finite.

But which of these modes is the truer, and the more fitting to philosophical and theological discipline, I leave to the diligence of scholars to investigate; for this perhaps in this place would seem irrelevant, or to some seem more laborious than the proposed task, and because I hasten to other matters along the path I have begun. First, however, I shall briefly touch here upon the reasons of the opponents. Among all their reasons there are two upon which they chiefly rely: one proceeding through distinction, the other through necessity. The first is this: If the creature distinctly saw in the Word that the Antichrist would be, or that the Antichrist will be contrary to Christ, or any such true complex proposition whatever, it would distinctly see the extremes of such a proposition or true complex proposition; and not by the same act, because by the same act precisely it would in no way distinguish or discern between them; and that act also would be purely equivocal, and the same proposition would be true and false, with other inconveniences which are easily seen as following from these. Their second reason is this: If anything future contingent were revealed to a creature in the Word, it would necessarily come to pass — which they argue by reasonings of the kind which the prior chapters above brought forward against earlier responses.

But the first reason does not proceed. For thus they could argue that the Father could not see such true complex propositions in the Word or in His essence, nor reveal them to the Son or to the Holy Spirit — against the sixth and seventh, the eighteenth and nineteenth chapters of Book I, and the thirty-fourth of this book. God also, by His most unitary and most simple but most infinite power, sees all things most distinctly, as is plain from the seventh of the first; why therefore, according to the prior premises of this book, if He should mercifully and omnipotently — though ineffably — accommodate the eye of His power to a disposed creature, can it not also itself see in like manner in some way, not by its own power but by the divine? Does not also a creature, knowing or believing in its proper kind any true complex proposition whatever, any proposition whatever having extremes however diverse, do this through a single simple act of knowing or believing? Why therefore can it not similarly through one simple act see in the Word any true complex proposition, especially since the Word incomparably more simply expresses any true complex proposition than any proposition, than any habit, than any creature?

The second reason similarly does not conclude. For if, because a future contingent is revealed to a creature in the Word, therefore of necessity it will come to pass, why not similarly because it is revealed to the Son and to the Holy Spirit in the Word and in the essence of God, as is plain from the thirty-fourth of this book? They will perhaps say, because the revelation made to the Son can

be not, and not have been, made to Him; but to a creature, in no way. But if the revelation about a future contingent made to the Son, with the thing existing as future, can be not, and never have been, made to Him; it can similarly with the thing existing as present, or transferred into the past — or if then it cannot or could not, neither could it ever, nor can it now, as can be made plain from the thirtieth and thirty-first of this book. Also, if from the revelation to a creature in the Word the necessity of the revealed thing follows, why does it not similarly follow from the revelation in its proper kind?

Now although I have run through the modes of seeing in the Word with such lightness, it does no harm at least to have briefly touched upon them. And although anyone may not at once be able to see fully the mode of seeing in the Word, let him not on that account at once recoil as if disbelieving in the vision. For we see and know most certainly many marvelous things, and many things also we hold by most certain faith, the mode of which in our present blindness we are not able perfectly to comprehend. But we shall comprehend perfectly both the thing and the mode when "that which is in part has been done away, when that which is perfect has come, when we shall know even as we are known, when we shall see face to face" — even as the Word itself most truly is, the brightness of eternal light, the spotless mirror of the divine majesty, and the image of His goodness, in which all things and all modes are most perfectly displayed.

CHAPTER XLII

HE STILL FURTHER REDUCES THE THIRTY-THIRD OPINION AND ITS HYPOTHESIS BY WAY OF REVELATION IN THE PROPER KIND; AND FIRST OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST, AND HE RECITES ONE RESPONSE WHICH SAYS THAT CHRIST COULD BE DECEIVED, AND HE REFUTES IT.

The infirmity of the principal hypothesis having been uncovered by way of revelation in the Word, it remains consequently to uncover it by way of revelation in the proper kind; and first in the Lord Jesus Christ, then in pure creatures, namely the Angels and human beings who are His servants. Let it therefore be supposed that A. — the future, namely the salvation of Paul still surviving as a wayfarer — was distinctly revealed to Christ in the proper kind, and that He likewise believed it; and according to the hypothesis it is possible that Paul not be saved; therefore it is also possible that this was not revealed to Christ, nor that He believed it. For necessarily it follows: Paul will not be saved, therefore this was never revealed to Christ nor believed by Christ; and the antecedent is possible according to the hypothesis, therefore so also is the consequent — which the hypothesis nevertheless denies. Or let it be argued from the contrary side: It is necessary that this was revealed to Christ and believed by Him; therefore it is necessary that Paul be saved. For necessarily it follows: this was revealed to Christ and believed by Him, therefore it will be; if it will not be, neither was it; and the antecedent is necessary, therefore also the consequent.

Here the answer is given in many ways. For some say that it is necessary that Christ in the proper kind received such a proposition, *Paul was to be saved*; but it is not necessary that it was a revelation, or revealed, because it is not necessary that it was true — indeed, it is possible that it was false. And if it be argued further, *and it is necessary that Christ believed this, therefore it is possible that Christ believed something false and was deceived* — certainly even this they do not fear consequently to concede in answering. It is wonderful, however, with what brow any Christian would presume to concede this concerning his God and Lord Christ, since no Jew, Saracen, or Gentile of any sort would dare so great an irreverence or rather blasphemy against his god. For who would wish to have such a god, whom any fool and wretch could most easily deceive all day long? If also Christ could be deceived and err, it would be possible that the highest truth were false, and the highest wisdom were beguiled.

And if anyone should still presume to answer that in Christ there are two natures, namely divine and human, and that according to the divine He cannot be deceived or err, but according to the human; let it then be supposed that He is so deceived, falsely believing A. to be B. Then Christ believes in particular and in act that A. is B., and firmly believes and knows it to be true that A. is B., because Christ is God, since He truly knows in particular and in act all true things, as the sixth and seventh of the first teach. Therefore Christ in particular and in act, under His most proper form, believes both contradictories simultaneously — which is a manifest impossibility. For how can anyone most certainly believe in particular and in act, under its most proper form, something to be true, which by the same modes he most certainly knows to be false? Hence the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* II (in that chapter, *It happens however sometimes*), determining concerning the false of opinion, of the possible and the impossible, shows that someone can simultaneously hold opposite opinions — namely, one in the universal, the other in the particular; one in act, the other not in act; one in proper form, the other indeed outside; in particular, however, and in act, and in proper form, in no way.

Item, if anyone could thus, as Christ, know some consequence to be good, and believe the antecedent in particular and in act under its proper form, and yet not believe the consequent — indeed, most certainly know in the said modes the consequent to be false — this makes the whole of logic foolish and weakens it; and it is against the Philosopher in the same place. For let it be supposed that Christ according to His human intellect falsely believes A. to be true; and by the sixth of the first He believes and most certainly knows that A. is not true, and knows that this consequence is good: A. is true, and A. is not true; therefore the not-true is true; or therefore the same is true and not true. And He believes the whole antecedent because He believes both its parts, and He does not believe the consequent in any way; nay, according to both natures of His He most certainly knows that consequent to be false. Indeed, it necessarily follows that Christ according to the same nature, namely the human, can simultaneously believe contradictories, and a consequence, and the antecedent with the opposite of the consequent. For if according to the soul He believes a falsehood in the proper kind, simultaneously according to the same He believes or knows the opposite truth in the Word — especially concerning a thing specially

concerning Himself; or at least concerning the omnipotence of God this is possible, as the things had before in chapter forty of this book teach. This also follows as true not only in Christ God and man, but also in a mere man — namely, by believing in the proper kind one falsehood, and seeing in the Word the opposite truth, as Christ does. According to this, similarly, a man could through a mathematical demonstration know one thing, and through sense-appearance, or through some probable argument, simultaneously believe the opposite — for instance, that the sun or a star is greater and lesser than the earth.

Item, if Christ could be deceived and err, He could have falsely and erroneously preached, and similarly taught — having been a pseudo-Prophet and pseudo-Christ, even Antichrist; which whoever shall concede will leaven the entire Catholic faith with hesitation and excessive suspicion, and will deservedly be convicted as a pseudo-Christian, and as a disciple of Antichrist. Item, if this were possible, it would be consequently possible that Christ deceptively instituted all the Ecclesiastical Sacraments, and that they were always delusive and had no efficacy; therefore men were never saved through them, but always damned, as the thirty-fifth of this book argued more fully. Item, those who presume to concede this veil with the Jews the face of Christ — at least the interior, namely His intellect — with the veil of ignorance, and they strike His head, namely the same intellect, or even the Word of God, His divine nature, with the tongue of blasphemy, saying that He can be deceived and err — and consequently they approve that mocking experiment of the Jews, striking Christ already veiled, and saying, *Prophesy unto us, Christ, who is he that struck thee?* For if He could believe some falsehood to be true, why could He not have believed that the very one who struck Him had not struck Him at all, and conversely, with His eyes already perfectly veiled? And if falsely, divining erroneously, He had said, *This man struck me, and that one did not strike me*, with what ridicule of the Jews would He deservedly have lain open? What certain experience they would have had that He was not the Messiah!

Item, let it be supposed that Christ, already veiled and struck, erroneously believed that A. struck Him; either Christ could have said this assertively, or not. If He could have, let it be supposed; either then He was lying properly — namely, going against His mind in so saying — or not. If He was lying properly, this is against what was shown earlier in the thirty-second of the second, and also He spoke only in conformity to His mind. If not, on the contrary He asserted a falsehood knowingly, as is plain through the sixth of the first. If He could not have said this in asserting, then He could not assert what He believed to be true, even if according to that belief He had wished to assert it. Also, if He could not assert that, He could assert its opposite; which if He had done, He would have asserted against His mind, and would have lied.

Item, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* I and VII, acts and operations are of singulars and supposita; but Christ was suppositated only by a divine supposition, namely of the Word of God, as Peter Lombard, *Sentences* III, dist. 5, shows by sufficiently firm testimonies. If therefore Christ according to His human nature had erred, the whole suppositum, the Son of God, God, would have erred — and so the highest light would have been darkened, the highest wisdom

would have been made foolish, and the highest truth would have been falsified. And this is virtually the reason of Damascene by which he shows that in the soul of Christ there was no deliberation, election, nor ignorance of anything, as the thirty-second of the second alleged more fully.

Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo*, Book II, chapter 13, shows that Christ according to His human nature has no ignorance of anything, by manifold reason: both because ignorance is useful for nothing; and because He could not have done such great works without immense wisdom; and because men would not have believed Him if they had known Him to be ignorant; and because He loves every good, wherefore also He knows it; and because no one knows the good perfectly except him who knows how to discern it from evil, and no one knows how to make this discrimination who is ignorant of evil — as He will know every good perfectly, so He will be ignorant of no evil. If therefore, according to these, ignorance was not possible in Christ according to His human nature, much more neither deception, nor fallacy, nor error.

Peter [Lombard] also, *Sentences* III, dist. 13 and 14, shows that Christ according to His soul knows all things; for the showing of which he likewise says that Fulgentius in a certain sermon brought forward many things. Therefore those who, as something contrary to the Christian faith, avoid every ignorance concerning the soul of Christ — would they not much more have shunned every fallacy and error as deadly poison concerning His soul? Let the reason which they adduce be inspected: *No one knows anything which his soul is ignorant of; but Christ according to every opinion knows all things; therefore His soul knows all things*. If therefore Christ, because God, of necessity knows all things, how shall His soul not only be ignorant of something known, but also estimate the opposite of it? Of Christ also the Apostle says, *In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden*, Col. 2; but a foolish treasurer would he be, who would exchange the treasure of wisdom and knowledge for foolishness and fallacy.

Item, Augustine on Psalm 21, in the second tractate, treating that word of Christ in Matt. 26, *Wheresoever this Gospel shall be preached in the whole world, &c.*, says, *Why then accommodate it to calumniators, namely the Donatists? Either the Lord lied, or he deceived him; let them choose what to say; either let them say that the truth lied, or say that the truth was deceived*. Item, if Christ could now be deceived, and could always have been deceived, He can now be wretched and have always been wretched; therefore neither now nor ever before was He blessed — as was shown in chapter 34 of this book — which no one will presume to concede except a wretch. Item, if Christ could be deceived, He would not be certain of His own beatitude, therefore neither fully blessed, as the same chapter 34 teaches.

Item, if Christ could have been deceived in the proper kind, believing Paul to be saved who was not to be saved, He could similarly according to His soul in the proper kind have willed that and prayed the Father for his salvation; therefore He could according to His human will have willed inwardly, and operated outwardly, contrarily to His divine will; and this knowingly, because this man Christ our God knew the divine will to be unwilling of this and willing the opposite of it.

Therefore Christ could have sinned, because He could have done knowingly against the mandate of the Father. *For the Father, says Christ, who sent me, He gave me commandment, what I should say and what I should speak,* John 12 — which the things shown in the thirty-second of the second by no means allow.

CHAPTER XLIII

HE TREATS ANOTHER RESPONSE.

Now there are others, wishing only to avoid that horror, who say that it is now possible that Christ never believed in the proper kind that Paul was to be saved. But this response falls into Scylla while wishing to avoid Charybdis. For if what Christ believed in the proper kind He could in no way have believed, He could in no way have willed what He likewise willed; therefore also what He did outwardly He could not have done. He could therefore not have prayed, not have spoken, not have walked, not have suffered, nor have redeemed mankind. He could also never have instituted the Ecclesiastical Sacraments, nor have justified or saved anyone — as the series of reasonings in chapters 33 and 35 of this book more fully manifests; all of which plainly destroy the principal hypothesis. Again, then the act of believing or willing of Christ created in the proper kind, present or past, can now not be, nor ever have been — manifestly against the hypothesis.

Furthermore, if Christ according to the man can do this, another mere man like Paul can also, especially since they are of the same nature — at least through the omnipotence of the great God and His co-operation, or special assistance. Therefore Paul the wayfarer, who believed something and willed and did, merited or sinned, can have done none of these things, nor have had operations of this kind — against the principal hypothesis. Further, if it be so, it is possible for Christ to lie, to perjure Himself, and to sin. For let Christ now assert with the firmest oath, without any condition expressed or tacit, as far as He absolutely simply can, that Paul the wayfarer will bear His name before men, or freely will do this or that, or that this or that future thing will contingently come to pass: still according to the hypothesis it is possible that this in no way come to pass; therefore also it is consequently possible that Christ neither knows nor believes it, since by what was shown above in the previous chapter He cannot be deceived or err — indeed, since He always knows all true things, it is possible that He now distinctly knows the opposite of what He now jurally asserts. It is therefore possible that Christ the man now jurally assert against His mind; and so it would be in the free power of the wayfarer to render his Lord God a liar, perjurer, wretched, and infamous — which though in itself is sufficiently absurd and incongruous, was also through what was shown earlier in chapter 30 of the second truly reproved.

CHAPTER XLIV

HE RECITES A THIRD RESPONSE.

To these, however, as to other things, not a few, but more than the hairs of my head, defenders of the old, clamorous, and tumid error — because they refuse to bend their stiff neck under the most sweet yoke of truth — dream up and fabricate countless responses and objections to themselves and contrary to truth: some falsigraphic, some quarrelsome, some sinning in matter, some in form, some in both; many indeed not unwrapping the wrapping of the difficulty, but rather entangling themselves in a more multiplied net; very many of which any friend of truth, advanced even moderately, will easily repress and refute. For *the perverse*, as Ecclesiastes says, *are corrected with difficulty, and the number of fools is infinite*. Nor is it strange: for of error there is always a tortuous plurality as companion; but of truth, simple unity. Whence the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* XIV, 3, says, *All things irrational are repugnant both to themselves and to rational things, and the long discourse of Simonides seems to be in them; for the discourse becomes long, just like that of slaves, when they say nothing sound*. Hence Proverbs 14: *Where words are many, there is frequently want*.

These responses, however, not all but the more probable ones, seem rationally to be treated; the emptier ones to be passed over in silence, lest time and study, with useful things omitted, be consumed in vain over empty matters. For the Philosopher says in *Physics* I, 11, *Neither is it fitting to resolve all things, but those by which someone, demonstrating from principles, lies; but those which not, by no means*. And in *Topics* I, *To be solicitous about anyone whatsoever offering things contrary to opinion is foolish, or about those of which we have a contrary opinion. Wherefore one ought not to consider every problem, nor every position, but such a one as he who is in want of reason, and not who is in want of punishment or sense, will doubt about*. Who also in *Metaphysics* III, 15: *Concerning those who sophistically argue from fables, it is not worthy to attend with study*; whence also the Wise Man wisely prohibits answering the fool according to his folly.

One therefore of these responses, which seems to itself probable, asserts that as long as the object believed by Christ, or willed, is future, Christ can not believe nor will it, nor have believed, nor have willed; but when it shall have been present or past, He cannot so. But this will easily be refuted by the reasonings of the thirtieth of this book, since it could assign no cause for this novel necessity, nor posit it without cause. Again, let it be supposed that Christ specially prayed for Paul still surviving as a wayfarer and likewise unbelieving, that he be converted to the faith and convert others by preaching, and be beatified in heaven; and let it be supposed that Christ did other works to the same effect, namely came to him, surrounded him with light, prostrated him, blinded him, and the like, as the history in Acts 9 teaches. Now therefore in the intervening time, in which we are, it is possible that Christ did none of these things — because it is possible that Christ never believed or willed such future things concerning Paul, since it is possible these things not be — or it is possible that Christ irrationally, erroneously, and culpably did these things, because not conformably, indeed dissimilarly and contrarily to the vision in the proper kind and in the Word and the paternal mandate. For let it be supposed that He received a mandate

from the Father that He should pray or do nothing except according to what was divinely revealed to Him in the proper kind. Nor can anyone feign that, although it is not possible that the past effects of Christ were not, it is nevertheless possible that they were not done to the aforesaid end concerning Paul, but to another end altogether — on account of the reasonings premised in chapters 8 and 35 of this book. Furthermore, in the intervening time in which we are, between the bloody sweat of Christ and His terrible passion, according to these it is possible that Christ in no way so sweated — as chapter 33 of this book more fully argued.

Others assert that the same act of believing in Christ, which is or was most distinctly of one object, can be and have been most distinctly of the opposite object, not of that one. But then this could be without any change whatever; therefore it would be purely indifferent for showing to the mind of Christ this object or that; on which account, without some determination, of itself it would distinctly show neither, or both, as chapter 7 of the first more fully argued. Again, every such created act in the proper kind is an inanimate thing, purely natural, not free; therefore according to what was shown against the fourth response in chapter 30 of this book, it always so acts and according to the utmost of its power, and signifies; therefore if the same act, disposed in the same way, can represent and show both opposites, it always does so, since no reason at all can be rendered why this act, disposed altogether in the same way, yesterday showed to the soul of Christ one of the opposites, and today the other.

Item, if it be so, since the act represents, signifies, and shows the object most properly, most distinctly, most immediately of itself and primarily, the same likeness or species could similarly be proper to opposites, and by the same reason by which it is proper to one, it would be proper to another; and so any part of the definition and the whole; and so one of the opposites would truly be the other; the same proposition in number would also be true and false, and contradictories simultaneously true. For a proposition affirming through such an act and species common to both opposites one of the opposites of itself would be true; but a proposition affirming through the same act and species in number one of the opposites of the other would be false; and this proposition would be that one, because in nothing at all would this differ from that; and any part of this would similarly be a part of that, and conversely. According to this, also, the likenesses of things in the soul would not naturally always signify one thing, but at pleasure this or that — the opposite of which the wise soul most easily experiences. Hence the Philosopher in *Peri Hermeneias* I, 1: *As letters are not the same to all, so neither are voices the same; but those of which these are the primary signs, the affections of the soul are the same to all, and those of which these are the likenesses, the things also are the same*; which all logicians and philosophers concordantly hold; blessed Augustine also in *De Trinitate* XV, 10, agrees with these.

Item, then such species or act in the soul would be purely equivocal; for it would signify many things, namely both contraries equally primarily, of which the ratio of substance is diverse — and by the same reason by which one species or act, also all; therefore no one could understand, compose or divide, love, nor hate anything certainly, distinctly, and properly. Such equivocation, also, has not yet been discovered by any logician or philosopher; indeed, according to their

judgment, neither is it possible to be found. For all hold concordantly that every species in the soul naturally and univocally chiefly always signifies one thing. Such species in the soul, moreover, or act, is most univocal, as the premises witness; which the definition of univocals in the *Categories* also shows. What term also would be univocal, if not that one? It is therefore univocal and equivocal purely simultaneously.

Furthermore, if it be so concerning species and act in the soul, by the same reason it will be so in memory, and in every interior and exterior sense similarly — indeed, also in the sensitive medium, and even in the object: for here stands and is founded the whole of such natural resolution. Wherefore the contrary happens. For just as one object is only one, so it naturally causes only one species like itself only in the sensitive medium; so also that further in the exterior sense, and so further through the interior senses, until likewise it finally reaches the soul. Furthermore, the vision or cognition of one of the opposites causes one effect in the soul or in the body of the knower, namely delight, dilation, and the like; the cognition and belief of the other, however, causes the opposite effect; therefore some past effect can not have been, and the opposite have been — as was shown in chapter 36 of this book; the reasons also adduced in chapter 36 against this little response go fully against it.

Furthermore, whoever shall say this has similarly to say of the acts of the will, wherefore he has consequently to say that what Christ or any other mere man through such a volition did outwardly, he could never have done, but the opposite of it, which he did not do. Item, then the act in Christ, or in another, which is or earlier was love and merit, can now be, and earlier have been, hatred and sin; the friend of someone could also become or be the enemy of the same without any change whatever in the other or in himself — against what was shown earlier in chapter 30 and 22 of this book, and against Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, last [chapter], where he says, *Friend is said relatively; for he does not begin to be unless when he begins to love; therefore some change of will occurs that he be called friend*. And Anselm says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 7 that *that will which is the work — namely the act of will, which is the natural instrument of willing — is as multiple as how many and how often we will*. Hence the Philosopher in *Ethics* VIII, 7, distinguishes the species of love and friendship according to the species of those loved; whence he says, *The reasons for which they love are different; therefore the lovings and friendships also are different*.

Others, however, hold that it is possible that the past effects done by Christ by means of human cognition or volition were done by Him by means only of His divine cognition and volition. But these are refuted by the thirty-ninth of this book. Again, according to this, it is now possible that Christ according to the human nature never willed anything, never merited anything, never redeemed mankind: for these things He did not do, except according to His human nature; therefore it is now consequently possible that no man was saved. Furthermore, then the past created act of Christ's willing in the proper kind can not have been, or Christ unwillingly have done anything, and have willed dissimilarly and contrarily to the divine will and to the paternal mandate, and to have sinned and been wretched.

Others still, subtle in their own eyes — as it seems to them — answering subtly, affirm that Christ did not understand or believe in the proper kind through natural acts similar to the cognitive acts of other men, but through one supernatural act supernaturally given to Him, which, like the Word itself and the divine essence, can have represented and shown equally any future thing whatever as either future or not future — so also, as they assert, can that act. But this response strives cruelly to mutilate Christ both according to His human and His divine nature similarly. For according to it, Christ could not, nor can, have a proper and perfect natural operation of a man — namely, distinct cognition of an object through an act singularly proper and distinct — as other mere men have; nor can God of His whole power confer such cognition on Christ. For if Christ could or can in any way have such cognition and knowledge or belief concerning futures, let it be supposed; and the response is emptied, and the difficulty returns. Or if Christ is not mutilated in any human power, He can, like other men, in that natural operation of man; and also if God is not curtailed in His omnipotence, He can at least of the plenitude of power give Christ such a cognitive act. For if He cannot, either this is on account of active impotence in God, which no one will concede, or on account of receptive impotence in Christ, which cannot be said, since any other man of the same nature is receptive of such an act. Again, Christ and other men are of the same nature, and these are naturally capable of such actions, therefore also He, as is plain in itself; which the Philosopher also testifies in *De Caelo* II, 48, arguing that if one star is moved by the motion of revolution, all are so moved; and 49, he hints at a similar argument concerning the motion of rolling of the stars; and 59, he likewise argues concerning the sphericity of the stars. Upon which Averroes says: *The demonstration is founded upon this, that all heavenly bodies are of the same nature in species, and that heavenly bodies are many individuals in species; and since it is so, it is also necessary that what exists in any of the individuals of a species among essential things, exists in all individuals of that species; and figure is among the essential things in heavenly bodies, because they are animate; according to these propositions, therefore, this discourse is verified, and is not by way of example.*

Item, forms of the same nature are naturally suited to have proper operations of the same nature, and the soul of Christ and the soul of any other man are of the same nature. Item, the human nature in Christ, if it were dismissed by the Word, could in itself produce such an act; nor does the Word weaken it, but rather strengthens it now united. Item, by similar reason they have necessarily to say consequently that Christ had and has a similar act of willing; which though it now were, or earlier was, most distinctly with respect to one object, could now not be and earlier not have been of that, but of another; therefore also the work which in the present would proceed from such volition, or in the past would have proceeded, could now not be, and in the past not have been; the work also which is not now nor was earlier, could be now and have been earlier. Item, Christ can have acts of knowing and willing similar to the acts of other men concerning present and past things; therefore also concerning necessary things, and concerning all future things; therefore also concerning all contingents.

Furthermore, it does not seem that the same created cognitive or volitive act could immediately and through itself alone, always disposing itself altogether in the same way, be most distinctly of all diverse things — as was argued above against a similar response. Other arguments also fighting against that one militate against this one. Item, since Christ according to the man, and another mere man, are of the same nature, and Christ according to the man is capable of such a cognitive act, and likewise of a volitive one, so also is another mere man; since therefore a mere man is capable, and God omnipotent can give him such acts of knowing and willing — by receiving which, even if he now believes and wills, or earlier believed and willed, some future contingent in meriting, sinning, or doing some extrinsic work — he can now and earlier do and have done not those things, but their opposites. Against this response similarly the procedure of chapter 33 of this book plainly goes. Other little responses, however, possible to be fabricated here, will easily be broken through these and similar means, by the help of the grace of Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER XLV

HE VENTILATES A FOURTH RESPONSE.

Some, however, wishing to defend Christ from lying, perjury, and sin, say that those things which Christ asserted and swore to one understanding, He could have asserted and sworn not to that one but to another understanding. But this seems an assertion from a marvelous understanding! For let the words of Christ be so plain and so simple that they cannot rationally be taken in a double sense, nor in another than the literal surface primarily intends; and let Christ say and swear that He understands them only in that way: and if anyone shall yet say that Christ can understand that saying in another way, he has consequently to say that Christ can certify no one concerning any saying of His, in what understanding He said this — and this is to leaven the sacred Gospels with hesitation and excessive suspicion. For who, on account of the uncertain words of Christ, would certainly believe or do something great and uncertain? Nor could a civil or secure contract be made with Christ, however plainly He said, promised, or swore something: for always the snake could lie hidden in the grass, and fallacy under a hidden meaning, and Christ would be more changeable and various in speech than the chameleon in color. For the color which the chameleon now has or had in the past, it is necessary that it now has and had in the past; but concerning the understanding of Christ's discourse, it is in the opposite way. The assertion of Christ would also be more dubitable and uncertain than the assertion of any other man whatever, so that of Him truly could be said that ridiculous reproach of Horace, *Epistles* I, 1:

By what knot shall I hold Proteus changing his countenance?

Although nevertheless according to Isidore, *De Summo Bono* II, 31: *By whatever art of words anyone swears, God, who is witness of conscience, takes it as he to whom the oath is sworn*

understands it; and it is alleged in *Sentences* III of Peter [Lombard], dist. 39, and in the *Canon* 22, *Causa* question 5, *Whatsoever*. Hence concerning our Lord Jesus Christ Himself it is written, Mark 4: *He spoke the word to them as they were able to hear*; and the Apostle says, 1 Cor. 14: *If I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be to him to whom I speak a barbarian, and he that speaks to me a barbarian*. Furthermore, a marvelous — indeed a miserable and useless — master and lord would He seem who could teach no disciple to what understanding He spoke: for what would be the communication between them? But this does not befit our Master and Lord Christ; whence in Luke 24 it is written thus of Him, *He opened to them the sense, that they might understand the Scriptures*; who also said to His disciples, *To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven*, Matt. 13. And Luke 8: *He that hath ears to hear let him hear. And his disciples asked him, what this parable might be? To whom he said, To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God, but to the rest in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand*. Whence it appears that, although the parables of the Gospel and the amphibological [sayings] of Jesus Christ can be taken to a manifold and dubious understanding, yet He can certify concerning them — how much more concerning His other sayings; indeed it appears that His other sayings cannot rationally be taken to so dubious an understanding, but to the certain one which the words intend, according to the common understanding of men. Whence John 16: *These things I have spoken to you in proverbs; the hour cometh when I shall no more speak to you in proverbs, but plainly of my Father will I declare to you* — which ought to be understood for the state of present life, as the following word indicates: for immediately he subjoins, *In that day you shall ask in my name*. Which also for the same reason Augustine holds, in part 2 on John, homily 48, or 102 of the whole.

Furthermore, let Christ assert something concerning the future in a human soul, or in an Angel, through natural acts or species, naturally signifying only one thing, as the previous chapter showed; and the response will not avoid [the difficulty]. For the Prophet said, *I will hear what the Lord God shall speak in me*, Psalm 84. Upon which Augustine: *The Prophet said, "God spoke in him within," and the world made to him the noise of mouths; restraining therefore somewhat from the noise of the world, and turning himself to himself, and from himself to Him whose voice he heard inwardly — as if stopping his ear against the tumultuous unrest of this life, and against the soul aggrieved by the body which corrupts, and by sense weighing down the earthly habitation thinking many evil things — he said, "I will hear what the Lord God shall speak in me."* Likewise on Psalm 88: *The Prophet spoke to God*, he says, *in vision to Thy Saints* — where the text of Augustine has, *in aspect*; which he thus expounds: *He spoke to them in aspect, that is, in revelation; whence Prophets were called Seers. They saw something within, which they would speak forth; in secret they heard what they preached openly*. According to these also, neither could the Holy Spirit certainly teach the understanding of Sacred Scripture — against that of John 14: *The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance whatsoever I shall have said unto you*; and against that of the same chapter 16: *When that Spirit of truth shall come, He shall teach you all truth*.

Furthermore, if what Christ said to one understanding, He can have said not to that understanding but to another, since such understanding in Christ is some proper and distinct cognitive act — as can be had from the previous chapter — He can not have had the act which He had, and have had the one which He did not have, which contradicts the hypothesis. Item, Christ can certify a man concerning His understanding in propositions about the present and the past; therefore also in propositions about the future; and those things which in those He uttered to one understanding, He cannot have uttered to another, therefore neither in others about the future. Item, by the same reason they have to say consequently that what Christ willed and did with one intention and to one end, He could not have willed or done with that intention but with another, and to another end; and since the final intention is some proper and distinct act of will, directed to some proper and distinct end, as is plain from the previous chapter, Christ could not have had the act of will which He had, and have had the one which He did not have. He could also not have suffered, nor have instituted the Ecclesiastical Sacraments for the justification of men or salvation; therefore also those justified and saved through them can now not be such, and in the past not have been. Christ also could similarly not have done what He did, and have done what He did not do. Item, if these are possible concerning Christ according to the human nature, similar things will also be possible concerning a mere man, as can be shown from the things had before in the previous chapter. Therefore what a mere man asserted, willed, and did to one understanding and to one proper and distinct end, he could have done not to that one, but to another; therefore the mere man, who in so doing merits or sins, merited or sinned, and receives or received a just reward, can not so, but the opposite singly. These also can be reprov'd concerning a mere man through the same things by which similar things were reprov'd concerning Christ God and man.

Others more specifying this little response judge that He could have asserted under a condition, at least tacit, what He asserted absolutely. But these can be refuted just as the first ones: for every condition tacitly understood is some act of intellect; therefore it is possible that the past not have been. By the same reason what Christ willed absolutely, He can not so have willed, but only under a condition still future; and since from a conditional will an effect does not follow, except perhaps when the condition obtains, the Ecclesiastical Sacraments can not have been, or not have been useful, and His past deeds not have been. Let it also be supposed that Christ yesterday asserted and willed something to come tomorrow under a condition fulfilled today, and the difficulty returns. These things also are all to be conceded by similar reason concerning a mere man, therefore also the inconveniences to which it has been deduced above. Furthermore, if Christ knows future contingents, He can so assert them; but He knows them simply absolutely, for so they are true; and as they are true, so He knows them. Again, if Christ did not know futures except under a condition, either He knows that the condition will obtain, or not. If He knows, then either under another condition, or simply absolutely: if under another condition, there will be such an infinite process in conditions, nor any such determined knowledge: if simply and absolutely, and in similar manner He knows futures, let Him also assert absolutely the fulfilment of that condition, and the response is voided; if He does not know that the

condition will obtain, He does not know certainly: nor does He then know otherwise than another mere man. Furthermore, let Christ assert A. to be future under condition B., and let Him assert simply that B. will be, and the difficulty returns. And if anyone still shall say that that assertion can be under another condition, namely C., then there can be an infinite process in such conditions, and no certitude at all except concerning sole uncertainty — as was argued above. Item, let Christ assert anything future, and let Him assert that He asserts it simply absolutely without any condition tacit or expressed.

Others, however, say that not everyone who says a falsehood lies, but [only he] who says a falsehood with the mind of asserting; and that Christ, although He said something with the mind of asserting, can have said it not with such a mind. But this will be refuted by what was had before, since the proper and distinct mind of asserting is the final intention or purpose, and some proper and distinct act of will or intellect.

Others are of the opinion that to lie is to go against the mind with the intention of deceiving; but Christ did not have the intention of deceiving; therefore even if He said anything against His mind, He is not nevertheless to be charged with lying. But these worthless slaves wickedly blaspheme our Lord Christ: for they concede that He can assert a falsehood against His mind knowingly and perjure Himself; therefore they have consequently to concede that He can sin — against what was shown earlier in chapter 32 of the second. For every deed against conscience is sin, the Apostle saying, *Whatsoever is not of faith is sin*, Rom. 14. Gloss: *Whatsoever, even if it be good in itself, which is not of faith, that is, which is done against faith, that is, against conscience, is sin* — which the general council also similarly understands, as is plain in the Decretals, *De praescriptionibus*, last chapter; and Pope Innocent III, in *De restitutione spoliatorum*, chapter *Literas*; where also he adds that vulgar saying: *Whatsoever is done against conscience builds up to hell*. How also will anyone be excused from the intention of deceiving, if he asserted a falsehood knowingly intending that it should be believed by the hearers as a sincere truth?

Others still hold that it is not necessary that Christ lied, even if He asserted one falsehood, because it is not necessary that this was against His mind. But these have a marvelous mind: for they do not advert that Christ is God and man, and therefore at least according to His divine nature knows all things most truly. Item, according to His human nature He knows all things at least pertaining to Him from near, as was shown in chapter 42 of this book; or at least according to that nature He believed to be true what through it He asserted. For He had not forgotten the rule which He taught: *Let your speech be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay*, Matt. 5; in the heart it is, in the mouth it is — and similarly negatively. But chiefly, whatever He swore, He believed to be true; otherwise He would have sworn too perversely. And it is possible that He asserted and swore a falsehood; therefore also that He believed the falsehood to be true; therefore also that He was deceived — which in chapter 42 of this book had been reproved; whence it also follows that it is possible He sinned, the opposite of which had been demonstrated in the thirty-second of the

second. Item, let Him assert with an oath that He so knows or believes in the proper kind that it will be in the future as He asserts and swears, and the response does not respond.

CHAPTER XLVI

AGAINST THE SAME OPINION AND HYPOTHESIS BY WAY OF REVELATION IN THE PROPER KIND CONCERNING PURE CREATURES, NAMELY THE ANGELS.

Christ being our leader along the first path of this twofold revelation in the proper kind — namely concerning the Lord Jesus Christ — having opposed against the principal hypothesis, it seems consequent through its other method, namely concerning pure creatures, the Angels and human beings who are His servants, to proceed against it. Let therefore a revelation be made in the proper kind to Michael concerning future good merits and concerning the salvation of Paul, still a pilgrim in the world; notwithstanding which it is possible that Paul neither merit nor be saved; therefore also that Michael be deceived, and have been deceived earlier; on which account also that he is not now, nor was earlier, blessed — as the things had before in chapter 34 of this book teach.

Again, because, as the Philosopher says, *one inconvenience being given, others happen*, from this it further follows evidently that Michael is not now certain concerning his future beatitude — nay, what seems more absurd, neither concerning past nor present beatitude. For this depends upon one uncertainty, because contingently future; therefore neither now is he, nor ever was, blessed, as is plain from what was shown earlier in chapter 34 of this book. There follows also from the same that it is in the power of Paul, a wretched pilgrim on earth, to draw down Michael, the most happy citizen in heaven, from his highest beatitude to the lowest misery — that is, by deluding him to deceive him basely all day long. Indeed, what is graver and worse, it follows that it is now possible, and depends on the will of Paul, that Michael now sin, and have sinned earlier.

For let it be supposed, according to the authorities concerning praying and the mode of praying premised in chapters 23 and 25 of the first, that Michael received a mandate in the proper kind, that he should will every and only the one shown to him and seen [as] to be saved in the proper kind and in the Word, and should aid only such a one with services and benefits; and let it be shown to him in the proper kind and in the Word that Paul, still a pilgrim, will be saved; and let him will by a willing in the proper kind that he be saved, and let him also bestow services and benefits on him: with all this so done, it is still possible that Paul not be saved; therefore also that Michael have sinned in willing him to be saved and bestowing benefits on him against the divine mandate — since it is possible that he did not see Paul as one to be saved in the proper kind and in the Word, indeed [that he] saw the opposite of this in the Word, and did not see this in the proper kind, since a falsehood is in no way seen, just as neither is it known. Let it also be supposed consequently to this, that Michael, comforting Paul, appears to him and says, *Joy be ever to you, because you are of the number of those to be saved*; still it is possible that Paul for

now is not to be saved, but to be damned; and that Michael now sees this in the Word, therefore also that he asserts this against his mind, and lies; that he is also an Angel of Satan, an Apostate from truth, and was so in the past.

Furthermore, it follows that Michael can plainly believe two contradictories simultaneously — against what was shown earlier in chapter 42 of this book. For now he believes in the proper kind that Paul is to be saved, and it is necessary that he believe so for now; and it is possible that he sees for now the opposite of it in the Word, because it is possible that for now the opposite is true and shown to him in the Word. Furthermore, if it is possible that Paul not be saved, it is possible that Michael did not certainly know in the proper kind that he was to be saved; therefore neither willed in the proper kind that he be saved, nor bestowed benefits on him — because this certain vision was the cause why he willed and did these things, just as concerning the vision in the Word the thirty-third of this book and the following chapters more fully argue. According to this similarly any wretch can most easily inflict damage and punishment all day long upon the most holy and most blessed Angels without any preceding fault — which seems to redound to their misery and to God's injury, as the thirty-third of this book more diffusely showed.

CHAPTER XLVII

AGAINST THE SAME OPINION AND HYPOTHESIS BY THE SAME WAY CONCERNING PURE HUMAN BEINGS.

Now after the Angels we must come to human beings. Concerning human beings, indeed, in the state of innocence, and in the state of glory, it can similarly be argued, just as concerning the Angels in the previous chapter it was argued. Again, all the saints, even the blessed Virgin, before the salvific passion of Jesus Christ, were cleansed and saved in the faith and virtue of that future passion, in some way revealed to them in the proper kind. For He, the corner-stone made [such], by manifold pounding of the passion, joined both walls into one with the most tenacious cement of His blessed blood. He is also the one to whom the crowds, both those who went before and those who followed after, cried saying, *Hosanna to the Son of David*. Hence also the Apostle says, *One faith, not many*. Whence blessed Gregory, on Ezekiel II, homily 5 or 17 of the whole, says, *The Jewish people went before, the Gentile followed; and because all the elect, both who could be in Judea, and who now exist in the Church, believed and believe in the Mediator of God and men, those who go before and those who follow cry "Hosanna." Hosanna in the Latin tongue means "Save us." From Him both the former sought salvation and the present seek it, and confess "Blessed is He that comes in the name of the Lord," since one is the hope, one is the faith of the preceding and following peoples. For just as those, by the expected passion and resurrection of the Lord, were saved; so we, by His past passion and His resurrection abiding for the ages, are saved*. Blessed Augustine likewise in *Hypognosticon* 63 says: *All the saints of God who were before the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ were saved by no other faith than that which is now; who also in De libero arbitrio 7, De perfectione iustitiae 32, De natura et gratia 44, in Epistle 93*

to Optatus, in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, teaches the same. Anselm also in *Cur Deus Homo* II, 17 wills this same thing, which all Catholic treatise-writers concordantly will.

This therefore being supposed as a constant, let it be argued for the intervening time in which we are between those past effects and that future passion: it is necessary that those effects were; therefore it is necessary that this passion will be — or if it is not necessary that this passion will be, neither is it necessary that those effects were. For they could not have been cleansed and saved by an erroneous, fallacious, and false faith. For if they could then, they could now and always — which seems to stain, or rather to defame, the Catholic faith with excessive suspicion, and render men tepid and too dubious to believe. How also could falsehood be of as great avail as truth itself avails? Who would concede this except a false person? Furthermore, if false faith would suffice, true faith would be superfluous — especially since the same effect would result, and much more briefly and easily from false faith than from true. For for true faith were required incarnation, nativity, preaching, passion, and death of Christ, with many other deeds of His; for false faith, however, that itself alone would suffice. It would have sufficed, therefore, most fully for salvation to persist in a false faith concerning a future Christ until the completion of the number of the elect, and so to have closed the ages; therefore, just as the Apostle argues by deducing to the impossible, as he reckons it, *Christ died in vain* — *if, he says, justice is by the law, then Christ died in vain*, Galatians 2 — Gloss: *in vain, that is, frustra, without cause*. For according to the judgment of the philosophers, which they always presuppose as a kind of self-evident maxim, *In vain are more things posited where fewer suffice*. A pseudo-Christ also would have availed as much as the truthful and the truth itself, Christ — which no one, as I hope, will presume to concede, except perhaps a pseudo-Christian and disciple of pseudo-Christ, namely the true Antichrist. Hence Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* II, 17, treating this matter, says: *Truly He was about to die, since if He had not truly been about to die, the faith of His future death would not have been true, by which both that virgin from whom He was born, and many others were cleansed from sin; and if it were not true, it could have profited nothing*. Hence also the faithful Church of Christ wholly faithfully sings: *True faith of Him born has purged the crimes of the world*.

Furthermore, Christ asserted and swore that some future things would come to pass, namely His passion, resurrection, ascension, the general resurrection, the betrayal of Judas, the denial of Peter, and many similar things. In the intervening time therefore in which we are, if these can in no way come to pass, Christ can have been a liar, perjurer, and sinner — against what was shown earlier in chapter 32 of the second. Or if Christ cannot have been these things, it is necessary that what He swore in asserting, will come to pass. Item, God foretold many future things to men in the proper kind, asserted, promised, and swore them; therefore it is necessary that all those things come to pass, or that God lie; but it is impossible for God to lie. This whole thing also evidently appears from the authorities concerning divine speech or word in chapter 27 of this book, and from the reasonings and authorities premised in chapter 32 of this book.

Hence the Lord through the Prophet: *Neither will I profane my testament, and what proceeds from my lips I will not make void, or I will not reprove*, as the Roman Psalter has — which Augustine expounds, *I have sworn once in my holy one, if I lie to David*, Psalm 88. *Testament*, however, according to Papias, and according to Isidore *Etymologies* V, 8, *in the holy Scriptures is not said only of that which has no force except when the testators are dead, but every pact and agreement is called a testament*; hence the translation of Jerome has thus: *Neither will I violate my pact, and what has gone forth from my lips I will not change*. Whereon Augustine: *Not because the sons sin, therefore shall I be found a liar; I have promised, I do. Suppose those have willed even to sin in despair, and so to go altogether into sins, that they offend the eyes of the Father, and deserve to be disinherited; is He not the God of whom it was said, "Of these stones God shall raise up sons of Abraham"? "The Lord knoweth them that are His." For He securely promised, who predestined us before we were. Let the despairing sin as much as they will, let the members of Christ answer, "If God be for us, who is against us?" Therefore God shall not be harmed in His truth, He shall not be deceitful, He shall not profane His testament. His testament remains immovable, because He, foreknowing, predestined the heirs, and what proceeds from His lips He will not reprove. Hear now thy confirmation, hear now thy security; if thou knowest thyself to be among the members of Christ, "I have sworn once in my holy one, if I lie to David"; do you wait for God to swear again? How often is He to swear, if once swearing He lies?* Cassiodorus: *Once, that is, immutably*; in which manner Augustine and Isidore expound that of Psalm 61, *Once has God spoken*, as chapter 27 of this book more fully recited.

And below upon that, *But Thou hast rejected, &c. Thou hast turned aside the testament, &c.:* *What is this*, says Augustine, *Thou hast promised all those things, but Thou hast done these contraries? Where are the promises in which a little before we rejoiced, of which we so eagerly applauded, of which we securely congratulated ourselves? As if another had promised, another fulfilled — which is to be wondered at. Not another, but Thou indeed; Thou who didst promise, Thou who didst confirm, Thou who, on account of human doubt, didst even swear; "Those things Thou hast promised, and these things Thou hast done." Where shall I hold Thy oath? Where shall I find Thy promise? What is this? Would God then promise something false, or swear something false? Why then did He promise those things, and do these? I say that He did these things to confirm the promised. For David was placed, to whom these things were promised — to be fulfilled in his seed, which is Christ. Therefore, on account of the things promised which were said to David, men expected them to be fulfilled in David. Therefore, lest any Christian, when he should say, "He spoke of Christ," another should say, "No, but he spoke of David himself," and should err when he saw all things fulfilled in Christ, He destroyed those things in David, that when you should see those things not fulfilled in him which it was necessary to be fulfilled, you should seek another in whom they should be shown to be fulfilled. So also concerning Esau and Jacob we find the elder adored by the younger, since it was written, "The elder shall serve the younger," that when you saw it not fulfilled in those two preceding, you should expect two peoples in whom it should be fulfilled — which the not-lying God deigns to promise. "Behold of thy seed," He said to David, "I will set upon thy throne." He promised something from his seed in*

eternity, and Solomon was born; he was made of such great wisdom and prudence, that the promise of God concerning the seed of David was thought to be fulfilled in him. But Solomon fell, and gave place for hoping for Christ — that since God could neither be deceived nor deceive, He would not place His promise in him whom He knew to be about to fall, but after his fall thou shouldst look back to God and demand thy promise. "Therefore, O Lord, hast Thou lied? Dost Thou not fulfil what Thou hast promised? Nor dost Thou show what Thou hast sworn?" Perhaps here God was about to say to thee, "I swore indeed, and promised, but this one would not persevere." What then? Didst Thou, O Lord God, not foreknow that this man would not persevere? Surely Thou didst know. Why then didst Thou promise to me, in one not about to persevere, what was to be in eternity? Didst Thou not say: "If they shall forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments, and keep not my commandments, and profane my testimony, my promise shall nevertheless remain, my oath shall be fulfilled — I have sworn once in my holy one, if I lie to David"? Render therefore what Thou hast sworn, return what Thou hast promised. It was taken away from this David, lest it be expected in this David; expect therefore what I have promised. David himself also knew it; see therefore what he says: "But Thou hast rejected, and brought to nothing — therefore where is what Thou hast promised? Thou hast deferred Thy Christ." Although he enumerates certain sad things, in this word he refreshes us: God altogether remains what He has promised; for Thou hast not taken away Thy Christ, but deferred Him. Whereon Cassiodorus: Above, when concerning Christ the Father promised, He spoke of David, concerning whom now He places contraries — that the things which were necessary to be done, since God had sworn, should be sought to be fulfilled not rather in him, but in another.

The Apostle says, 2 Tim. 2: If we believe not, He remains faithful, He cannot deny Himself. Gloss: If we believe not that He punishes the wicked, foolishly are we confident in His mercy; He, however, namely Christ, remains faithful in His sayings, and even in that He has said, "He that does not believe shall be condemned," and is truly faithful, because He cannot deny Himself, who is the truth — which He would do if He did not fulfil His sayings. This, however, that He cannot deny Himself, is a praise of the divine will; just as the fact that some cannot believe is a fault of human will. This last part of this gloss is from Augustine on John, homily 53; who also in De Trinitate XV, 14, says: That Word can never have anything false, because it is immutably so as that of which it is. For the Son cannot do anything of Himself, except what He shall have seen the Father doing; He cannot powerfully — nor is this infirmity, but firmness, because the truth cannot be false. And below in chapter 15: Great is the power of that Word, not to be able to lie.

Item, if God did not render what He promised, He would not be faithful, nor just; whence Heb. 6: God is not unjust to forget your work, and the love which you have shown in His name. And 2 Tim. 4: I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; for the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. Treating which, Augustine on that of Psalm 100, Mercy and judgment will I sing to Thee, O Lord, says: How does he say, see, "I have fought the good fight, &c."? In this time of mercy, hear concerning judgment: "For the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the

just judge, will render to me in that day." He did not say "will give," but "will render"; when He gave, He was merciful; when He shall render, He shall be judge — because "Mercy and judgment will I sing to Thee, O Lord." But by giving He made Himself a debtor of the crown of merits. There I obtained mercy; therefore the Lord first was merciful here, but He shall render to me a crown of justice. Whence shall He render? Because He is a just judge. Why a just judge? Because "I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith." Therefore, just, He cannot but crown these things.

The Prophet says, *Right is the word of the Lord, and all His works are in faith*, Psalm 32 — upon which Augustine in tractate 2: *We find God faithful. Hear the Apostle: "If we believe not, He remains faithful, He cannot deny Himself." We have therefore also a faithful God; let us rather distinguish a faithful God from a faithful man: a faithful man is he who believes God promising; a faithful God is He who exhibits to man what He promised. Let us therefore hold a most faithful debtor, since we hold a most merciful promiser. Whence a debtor? Because a promiser. We do not say to God, "Lord, render what Thou hast received," but "render what Thou hast promised," since right is the word of the Lord. What is right is the word of the Lord? It does not deceive thee; do not thou deceive Him; or rather, do not deceive thyself.*

Item, God swore many things to come to pass, and every oath of God is necessarily to be fulfilled — otherwise God could perjure Himself, and be perjured. The same thing is plain from the things alleged above from Psalm 88, and from Augustine in the same place; which also that of Psalm 109 seems to attest: *The Lord has sworn, and He will not repent*; and that of Psalm 131: *The Lord has sworn truth to David, and He will not frustrate him* — where the text of Augustine has: *And He will not repent of it*; upon which he says thus: *What is "He has sworn"? He firmed the promise through Himself. What is "He will not repent"? He will not change. When He changes His works through His unchangeable counsel, He is said to repent on account of the change, not of His counsel, but of the work. This, however, He so promised, that He should not change. How is that also said: "The Lord has sworn, and He will not repent: Thou art a Priest in eternity according to the order of Melchizedek"? So also this, because it was thus promised that it should not be changed, since necessarily it was about to be in the future and to remain. He said, "The Lord has sworn truth to David, and He will not repent: of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne."*

Item, Isaiah 14: *The Lord of hosts has sworn, saying: If not as I have thought, so shall it be.* Gloss: *He has sworn, that is, immovably has decreed; "if not, &c." as if He should say, otherwise it cannot be done.* Item, Genesis 22, the Lord speaking to Abraham: *By myself I have sworn, that because thou hast done this thing, &c., I will bless thee, and multiply thy seed, &c..* Gloss upon *I have sworn*: *because immutably has it been constituted by God* — which word in sacred Scripture is found in this same way expounded most often. Hence Basil concordantly upon that of Luke 1, *The oath which He swore to Abraham our Father: Let no one*, he says, *hearing that the Lord swore to Abraham, be prompt to swearing. For just as fury said of God does not signify passion but punishment, so neither does God swear as a man, but His word in place of an oath is*

expressed to us for truth, approving by an immutable judgment what was promised. Which exposition the Apostle seems sufficiently to canonize, Heb. 6, when he says: To Abraham promising, God, since He had no greater by whom He should swear, swore by Himself, saying, "Unless blessing I will bless thee, and multiplying I will multiply thee," and so patiently bearing, he obtained the promise. For men swear by one greater than themselves, and the end of all their controversy for confirmation is the oath. In which God, willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immobility of His counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immovable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the firmest solace, who flee for refuge to hold fast the proposed hope which we have, as an anchor of the soul safe and firm. Gloss: by two immovable things, that is, by promise and oath.

Hence Jerome on Isaiah 33, treating that of Isaiah 45, *By myself I have sworn, the word of justice shall go forth out of my mouth, and shall not return, because to me every knee shall bow: He swears*, he says, *according to the Apostle, that "by two immovable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have most firm consolation."* Yet let no one on account of these and similar suspect that God otherwise inwardly swears than He simply says, or that the inward oath of God is firmer or more certain than His simple word. For it is no easier for God to say a falsehood simply than to swear it; whatever also is there is good, and whatever also of good is there, is there infinitely and supremely, as the preceding things have taught. To this also attests the Gloss upon that of Amos 6, *The Lord God has sworn in His soul: Every word of God ought to be taken for an oath; and He speaks in our manner; not because He has a soul as we, but by the name "soul" the affection of the divine will is shown. Therefore He swore in His will.* Why therefore does God swear to men? That mercifully condescending to their slowness and incredulity, He may certify and quiet them in human manner.

Item, future things revealed by God to ancient Prophets, and prophesied by them, will of necessity come to pass — otherwise it would now be possible that they saw only false and vain things, and prophesied only such, therefore also that they were never Prophets. For according to all men of every sect, only those are called Prophets who proclaim true things from afar, or foretell. It would also now be possible that ancient seers were never seers but blind: for *he who is now called Prophet, of old was called Seer*, 1 Kings 9. The ancient truthful Doctors were never such, but seducing deceivers; who had a glorious dignity and an exceptional grade of goodness — never had these things, but always the opposite. For who is ignorant that the truthful is more worthy and better than the deceiver, and one believing what is true than one believing what is false? Who would not choose this rather than that? For truth itself is more worthy and better than falsehood, as is also shown in chapter 34 of this book. Indeed, what seems more absurd, it would now be possible that ancient Prophets and Apostles, friends of God (Wisdom 7 and John 15), organs of the Holy Spirit — for He, as the Nicene Symbol says, *spoke through the Prophets*, nor were the Apostles speaking, but *the Spirit of their Father was speaking in them* — who had His glorious gifts, namely Prophecy and the discernment of spirits (1 Cor. 12), never were such, never received such things, but were organs of that lying spirit in the mouth of all the lying

Prophets (3 Kings 22). The Holy Spirit, also, did not speak what He did speak, and did not do what He did do.

Item, according to this, it would now be possible that Isaiah, in that which he saw most truly without any deception, was deceived; and consequently, in that he well merited, mortally sinned; and in that he truly asserted, lied — as the previous chapter concerning Angels argued more fully. Furthermore, if it is now possible that the elders who were Prophets, seers, and such-and-such, and had such-and-such gifts, and performed such-and-such works, were not such, nor had such things, nor did such things; correspondingly it is possible that the elders who were not such, nor had such things, nor did, were such, had such things, and did them. Indeed, those who were, had, and did in the opposite manner, were not so, had not, or did not so, and were and had and did just as the true Prophets — which without doubt by exchange converts, indeed perverts, the true Prophets, and their true gifts and works, into pseudo-prophets, and their false gifts and works, and conversely — as chapter 33 of this book more fully argued.

Furthermore, then the Prophets and Apostles can have been deceived in believing a falsehood concerning the future, and this through Christ and the Holy Spirit of God. For the Apostle says in Galatians 1 that he received and learned the Gospel preached by him *through the revelation of Jesus Christ*; who also in 1 Cor. 12 enumerates prophecy among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Whence 2 Peter 1: *We have a more sure prophetic word, to which you do well to attend; this first understanding, that no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation. For prophecy was not brought at any time by human will, but holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.* Which the whole Catholic Church also catholically professes in the Nicene Symbol, saying, *who, namely the Holy Spirit, spoke through the Prophets.* How then does Christ call Himself only truth, John 14, and not also falsity? How also is God and Christ, knowingly asserting a falsehood concerning the future in the soul of Isaiah or Paul, and deceiving him, remaining truth, and excused from fallacy and lying — John, the disciple of truth, saying, *Every lie is not of truth*, 1 John 2? Hence Augustine in *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 14: *If, he says, the body of Christ was a phantasm, Christ deceived; and if He deceived, He is not truth; but Christ is truth; therefore His body was not a phantasm.* Who also in *De agone christiano* says: *Nor let us hear those who deny that such a body of the Lord rose, as was placed in the tomb. For if it had not been such, He Himself would not have said after the resurrection to the disciples, "Handle and see, for a spirit hath not bones and sinews, as you see me have." For it is sacrilege to believe that our Lord God, since He Himself is truth, lied in any matter.*

If also He can assert a falsehood concerning the future, why not concerning the past and present, and any false notorious things, so as to lie notoriously and sin — against the things had earlier in chapter 30 of the second of this book? How also, if it be so, is the Holy Spirit called only the spirit of truth (John 14), and not also the spirit of falsity, the lying spirit in the mouth of all the prophets (3 Kings 22), and the spirit of giddiness and error (Isaiah 19)? How also does it befit a just and true God to deceive men, especially the most devoted and most familiar servants, His most beloved and most loving friends, and this without fault or cause? Augustine does not so

think on Psalms 32, 88, and *Eighty-three Questions* q. 14, alleged above; who also in *De Civitate Dei* XI, 12, says: *Who of men knows himself to persevere in the action and progress of justice unto the end, unless he is made certain by some revelation by Him who, by a just and hidden judgment, instructs not all in this matter, but deceives no one?* Hence also Pope Innocent III says: *The judgment of God always rests on truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived.*

The most wise Sibyl also says thus: *There shall arise from the stock of the Hebrews a woman by the name of Mary, having a husband by the name of Joseph, and there shall be procreated of her, without intercourse with man, of the Holy Spirit, the Son of God, by the name of Jesus; and she shall be virgin before birth and after birth; He, however, who shall be born of her shall be true God and true man, as all the Prophets predicted, and shall fulfil the law of the Hebrews, and shall add His own things together, and His kingdom shall remain for ages of ages.* And to the indignant and objecting priests of the Hebrews, she answered: *O Jews, it is necessary that these things be done, but you shall not believe in Him.*

Item, Cassiodorus in his prologue on the Psalter defines prophecy in this way: *Prophecy is a divine inspiration which announces the events of things with immovable truth.* With which the gloss of Peter [Lombard] on the Psalter also concords in the prologue, as chapter 25 of the first more fully alleges. The same is plain through the authority of Augustine on John, part 2, homily 62 or 116 of the whole, alleged in chapter 27 of this third [book].

And behold, greater than Augustine: that most beloved disciple of truth, who from the very fount, namely from the breast of truth, drew his Gospel, who says, *though He had done so great signs before them, they did not believe in Him; that the saying of Isaiah the Prophet might be fulfilled, who said: "Lord, who has believed our report, and to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" Therefore they could not believe, because Isaiah again said, "He has blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they may not see with their eyes, and not understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them"* (John 12). Treating which, Augustine in *De bono perseverantiae* 41 understands according to the literal surface; whence he says: *In the mass of damnation the Jews were left, who could not believe with such great and clear powers done in their sight. For why could they not believe? The Gospel did not keep silent, saying, "Although however such great, &c.," recited above.* Who also on John part 1, homily 53, expounding the same, says: *It is so said "they could not," in the same way as it is said of our Lord God, "If we believe not, He remains faithful, He cannot deny Himself"; concerning the Omnipotent it is said, "He cannot." Therefore just as that the Lord cannot deny Himself is a praise of the divine will, so that they could not believe is a fault of the human will.*

And if anyone object that Augustine in the same homily, in the same place, thus expounds *they could not, that is, they did not will*; and on the same: *Why could they not? Because they did not will*; this does not run counter to the preceding understanding. For Sacred Scripture from its marvelous fecundity has a manifold understanding, as all its Catholic treatise-writers sufficiently show. Yet it seems an exposition very strange, and very remote from the way of speaking of

Scripture, of the Doctors, and of the common people, to expound *not being able by not willing*; nor does Augustine expressly thus expound, but says, *It is said, "they could not,"* where it is to be understood that *they did not will*; and it is true that they did not will. Yet it does not evidently follow that this is the exposition of that, but he says it is to be understood that they did not will, that he may show that they did not believe voluntarily, not unwillingly, and therefore that they were culpable in not believing, and sinned, according to what was premised in chapters 1 and 10 of this book. Hence also he immediately subjoins: *Just as it is said of our Lord God, "If we believe not, He remains faithful, He cannot deny Himself," because of the Omnipotent it is said, "He cannot"; therefore just as that the Lord cannot deny Himself is a praise of the divine will, so that they could not believe is a fault of human will.* Where also he evidently hints that this cannot be taken properly and to the common understanding. For he says it is said *they could not* in the same way as concerning the Lord, *He cannot deny Himself*, which is taken properly and to the common understanding; for thus He cannot deny Himself, as neither lie. When, however, he says *they could not, because they did not will*, he understands that from their voluntary merits they had been blinded; whence opposing and answering he subjoins, *But the Prophet says another cause, not of their will. What cause does the Prophet say? "Because God gave them the spirit of compunction, eyes that they may not see, and ears that they may not hear, and He blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart"; even this, I answer, their will deserved; for thus God blinds, thus hardens.* Yet this exposition does not seem to fit the mind of the Evangelist: for he in no way explicitly or implicitly assigns that cause, but this — *because Isaiah said, "He has blinded their eyes, &c."* — manifestly supposing that the prophecies cannot fail to be fulfilled.

For which reason it must be adverted that Augustine there in no way definitively, but inquisitively proceeds. Whence he says: *When questions of this kind have come up — why one is so, the other so; why one, with God deserting, is blinded, the other, with God aiding, is illuminated — let us not usurp judgment of the judgment of so great a Judge, but trembling let us cry out with the Apostle, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How inscrutable are His judgments, and unsearchable His ways!"* Whence it has been said in the Psalm, *"Thy judgments are like a great deep."* Therefore let not the expectation of your charity, brethren, push me to penetrate this height, to discuss this abyss, to scrutinize unscrutable things; I acknowledge my measure, and I seem to myself to feel even your measure: this is higher than my growths, and stronger than my strengths, I think than yours also. Together therefore let us hear the Scripture admonishing and saying, *"Seek not higher things, and search not into things stronger than thee"* — not because these things are denied us, since the divine Master says, *"Nothing is hidden which shall not be revealed,"* but if we have come to anything, in that let us walk, as the Apostle says, *"Not only what we know not and ought to know, but also if we are wise of anything otherwise, this also God will reveal to us."* We have come, however, into the way of faith; let us most perseveringly hold this; this will lead us to the chamber of the King in which all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden. We must walk, we must progress, we must grow, that our hearts may be capable of those things which we cannot now grasp; if the last day shall find us advancing, we shall there learn what we could not here. If anyone, however, knows

that he can expound this question more clearly and better, and has confidence, far be it from me not to be readier to learn than to teach. Whence the very great difficulty of this matter appears.

To this Apostle, however, his co-Apostle Peter agrees, saying: *You killed Jesus of Nazareth, whom God raised up, the sorrows of hell being loosed, according as it was impossible that He should be held by it. For David says concerning Him, "I foresaw the Lord before me always, because He is on my right hand that I be not moved; therefore my heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced; moreover, my flesh also shall rest in hope, since Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor wilt Thou give Thy holy one to see corruption. Thou hast made known to me the ways of life; Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy face,"* Acts 2. And behold, greater than both, who says: *Scripture cannot be loosed,* John 10 — from whom many similar things are alleged in chapter 27 of this book; who also Luke 24 says: *It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning me.*

That also prophecies will necessarily be fulfilled, the places of Scripture saying, *This and that was done that the Scripture, prophecy, or word of the Prophet might be fulfilled* seem to attest: *if it behoves or behoved that Scripture be fulfilled, it is necessary that Scripture be fulfilled* and similar things. Whence Matthew 1: *Now this whole was done* — namely the incarnation of Jesus Christ — *that there might be fulfilled what was said by the Lord through the Prophet saying: Behold a virgin shall conceive in her womb, &c.* Gloss: *Prophecy is one thing from the predestination of God, which it is necessary should come to pass in all manners, that it should be fulfilled without our choice, as this one of which here we are treating; another is from the foreknowledge of God, with which our choice is mixed; another is what is called threat, which is made for the sake of a sign of divine animadversion, that the elect may flee from the face of the bow, and the incautious justly perish; and this is not from foreknowledge, because it is foreknown far otherwise than the future is threatened.* Which the gloss of Thomas also recites almost under the same words.

And below 21: *Now this whole was done, that there might be fulfilled what was said through the Prophet saying: "Tell ye the daughter of Sion: Behold, thy King cometh to thee meek, sitting upon an ass and a colt, the foal of one used to the yoke."* And still further below at 26, Peter wishing to defend the Lord about to be taken, He says: *"Turn back thy sword, &c. Or thinkest thou that I cannot pray to my Father, and He will exhibit to me presently more than twelve legions of Angels? How then shall the Scriptures of the Prophets be fulfilled, that so it must be done?"* Mark 14 also writes: *"As to a robber are you come out with swords, &c. Daily I was with you in the Temple teaching, and you laid not hands on me, but that the Scriptures might be fulfilled."* Item John 19: *They said one to another: Let us not cut it, but let us cast lots for it whose it shall be, that the Scripture might be fulfilled saying: They have parted my garments among them, and on my vesture they have cast lots.* And below: *That the Scripture might be consummated, He says, "I thirst."* Furthermore, Luke 24: *O foolish, and slow of heart to believe in all things which the Prophets have spoken! Was it not necessary that Christ should suffer these things, and so to enter into His glory?* And John 20: *For they did not yet know the Scripture, that*

He must rise from the dead. Blessed Peter also in Acts 1 says: *Brethren, the Scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit foretold by the mouth of David concerning Judas.*

This word *must*, however, imports necessity. Whence Isidore on that of Luke 24, *Was it not necessary that Christ should suffer these things*, as is alleged in the gloss of Thomas, says: *But if it behoved Christ to suffer, yet they who crucified Him are guilty: for they were not striving to perfect what God had disposed; whence also their execution was impious.* And behold, greater than Isidore, Jesus Christ, expounding *behooves* through *it is necessary*: *These*, He says, *are the words which I spoke unto you while I was yet with you* — namely in mortal flesh, according to Bede — *because it is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me*, Luke 24. And when He was with them in mortal flesh, He said to them that *it behoved the Son of Man to suffer many things, and to rise again*, as is plain Matt. 16, Mark 8, and Luke 9. And it is verisimilar that He not only simply foretold this to them, but also showed it through the Scriptures, as Luke manifestly indicates. Hence Matthew at the same place: *Jesus began to show His disciples that He must go to Jerusalem and suffer many things*; and Mark 8: *He began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things, &c.*; and below 9: *He said to them, "How is it written of the Son of Man that He shall suffer many things"*; and Luke 18: *Jesus took the twelve, and said to them, "Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and all things shall be accomplished which were written by the Prophets concerning the Son of Man, for He shall be delivered to the Gentiles, &c."*

Hence according to the most true exposition of truth, *behoove* and *be necessary* are the same, which is also plain from His words in Luke 24: *O foolish, and slow, &c. Was it not necessary that Christ should suffer these things, &c.*; and *beginning from Moses and all the Prophets, &c.* And below the same: *It is necessary that all things be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses and the Prophets, &c.* And still further below: *Then He opened their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures; and He said to them, "Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, &c."* It therefore appears evidently that He uses these words alternately and indifferently for the same sense, and that the true sense and the true understanding of the Scriptures is that all the prophetic Scriptures concerning Christ behoved necessarily to be fulfilled.

The same evidently appears through the common manner of speaking of almost all the Prophets: for they frequently predict future things in the manner of the past, and under words of past time, as very many prophecies show — which they do, according to the exposition of the Doctors, because such things are at least as certain with God and with the Prophet as if they were past and already done. Whence the Prophet in Psalm 3, in the person of Christ, says: *I have slept and taken my rest, and I have arisen.* Upon which Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XVII, 18: *Or perhaps anyone is so foolish as to believe that the Prophet wished to indicate to us as something great, that he had slept and arisen, unless that sleep were death, and the awakening were resurrection — which thus could be prophesied of Christ? For also in the fortieth [Psalm] much more manifestly is this shown, where, in the person of the same Mediator, in the customary manner,*

things future were predicted as things past — since what was to come, was already done in the predestination and foreknowledge of God: "My enemies", he says, "spoke evils of me, &c."

The same on that of Psalm 43, *For Thou hast saved us from those that afflict us, &c.: This, he says, is said in the figure of past for future; but it is therefore said as past, because it is so certain as if it had been done. Note why most Prophets speak as if past things, when future things, not yet done, are foretold. For also concerning the Lord Himself the future Passion was foretold, and yet, "They have dug", He said, "my hands and my feet, they have numbered all my bones": He did not say "they shall dig" and "they shall number"; "But they themselves have considered and looked upon me": He did not say "they shall consider" and "they shall look"; "They have divided my garments": He did not say "they shall divide". All these things are said as past, when they are future, because to God even future things are as certain as if they were past — for to us things which are past are certain, and things which are future are uncertain: for we know that something has happened, and it cannot be that what happened did not happen. Give a Prophet to whom the future is not as certain as the past is to thee, and as that which thou rememberest happened cannot be that it did not happen, so to him what he knows is future cannot be that it does not happen. Whereon Cassiodorus: "Thou alone wilt save us, and Thou wilt confound those who hate us" — so it would seem ought to be said; but since the future is so certain as the past, which cannot not have been, he says, "Thou hast saved", "Thou hast confounded".*

Item, Augustine expounding the title of Psalm 84: *The Prophet sings, he says, into the future, and uses words as of already past time; he speaks as if done what was about to be done, because with God even what is future is already done; there therefore the Prophet was seeing things future to us, but already done in His most certain providence and predestination. The same in De Agone Christiano: Thus the Scriptures speak, that they insinuate past time for future, just as that which the Apostle said, "He has made us sit together in the heavenlies" — has not yet been done, but because it is most certainly future, it is so said as if it were already done. The same in De correptione et gratia 33, treating that authority of the Apostle, Romans 8, Whom He predestined, them He also called, &c.: Not in all, he says, have these things been done: for still even unto the end of the age many are to be called and to be justified; and yet he placed words of past time even of future things, as if God had done them — which He so disposed from eternity to be done. Therefore concerning Him says also the Prophet Isaiah, "Who has done the things which are to come"; therefore future things prophetic are with God in eternity as past, therefore also firmed by similar necessity.*

For which reason also immediately in chapter 34 from these things he concludes: *Whoever therefore are foreknown, predestined, called, justified, and glorified in the most provident disposition of God — I do not say even those not yet reborn, but even those not yet born — already are sons of God, and therefore can in no way perish. With whom also concordantly Anselm in De Concordia III, treating the same authority, says thus: In order that the same Apostle should show that he did not place those words for temporal signification, even those things which are future, he uttered with the word of past time. For not yet did He temporally call,*

justify, magnify those whom He foreknew as still about to be born; whence it can be known that He, on account of the indigence of a word signifying eternal presence, used words of past signification, since the things which in time are past are altogether immutable to the likeness of the eternal present. In this indeed they are more like the eternal present, things temporally past, than things present: since those which are there, namely in eternity, can never not be present — just as things past in time can never not be past; but things present in time, all things which pass, become non-present. Therefore future things prophesied of this kind with God in eternity, and past in time, are firmed by similar necessity.

Furthermore, if prophecies could be falsified, and now not be true, nor ever have been true, no one ought to assert them most firmly, nor with a simple oath; for they are not most firmly true, and he would expose himself to the danger of perjury and sin. But what Catholic, for the conversion of one unbeliever unwilling to be converted to the Catholic faith, except by most firm assertion and with absolute and simple oath concerning the resurrection and final beatification, would doubt to do these things? — just as the Lord did frequently, saying, *Amen, amen, I say to you, that thus and thus it shall be*; just as the Prophets also frequently say, *The Lord has sworn this and that*. With what great security also the Apostle says, *Although we, or an Angel from Heaven, should preach to you besides what we have preached to you, let him be anathema*; the cause of which after a few he subjoins: *I make known to you, brethren, the Gospel that has been preached by me, that it is not according to man; for neither did I receive it from man, nor did I learn it, but through the revelation of Jesus Christ*, Galatians 1. Gloss: *Note that he therefore says "we, or an Angel" who can be understood as good, not because this should ever happen, but he is certain from God concerning the truth of his Gospel; which even if an Angel should announce otherwise, he would not believe, but would anathematize.*

Furthermore, if the Prophets can be falsified, so also can sacred Scripture; therefore sacred Theology is more uncertain, weaker, lower, and less worthy than other faculties which cannot. Again, if sacred Scripture can be falsified, what security do we have in this life? For this is the teacher and leader, mirror and register of all human life. What security is possible to a man in the divine promises, if God can — without lie, fault, or cause — cut off, violate, scrape away, cancel, infringe, and falsify any book, any pact, any chirograph, any instrument however solemnized with witnesses, signs, even an oath, any testament even firmed by the death of the testator? How then could a contract with Him be safe? Indeed, incomparably less safe would a contract be for a man with God, who cannot lie and sin, than with another man, who can do these things. For God, if according to the hypothesis He can [do] the opposite of any pact of promise whatever, can do this without duplicity or change, without lying, perjury, or sin, and can never have so contracted; but no man so can; therefore any man can have remedy and recourse against any man so contracting and not fulfilling the contract, by suing him for perjury, for violation of faith and contract.

This therefore seems to vary the most beautiful uniform color of sacred Scripture with foul stains, to change its most pleasing odor with putrid fumes, to leaven its sweetest taste with

venomous draughts. Concerning men of this way, therefore, the Apostle did not keep silent: *They have changed*, he says, *the truth of God into a lie*, Romans 1; and 2 Corinthians 2: *We are not as very many adulterating the word of God*: for these things they do who change truthful Scripture into mendacious, and Scripture, an incorrupt virgin, into an adulterous harlot. Not so its Author and witnesses. *Scripture cannot be loosed*, says Christ, *which the Father has sanctified and sent into the world*, John 10. Nor is it doubtful to any Christian, *but that the testimony of the Lord is faithful*. For He Himself is the *faithful witness in heaven*; therefore *His testimonies are made very credible*. This also is plainly proved by what was alleged above from Psalm 88. Hence also Augustine on that of Psalm 144, *The Lord is faithful in His words*, says: *What did He promise, and not give? Some things He still has promised, and not given; but let Him be believed from those things which He has given. We could believe Him simply saying; He did not wish to be believed simply saying, but wished His Scripture to be held; just as if you should say to some man, when you promised something, "Do you not believe me? Behold, I write to thee." For since "generation goes, and generation comes," and so these ages run by, mortal men yielding and succeeding, the Scripture of God ought to remain, and a kind of chirograph of God which all passing should read, and hold the way of His promise; and how many are the things which He has rendered from this chirograph! Men doubt to believe Him concerning the resurrection of the dead, and the future age, which alone now remains to be rendered; through all generations He has rendered the things which were written, and what remains is not believed Him, with all these things rendered? Behold, you have made the calculation: He has rendered so great things; surely on account of a few remnants He has not become unfaithful? Far be it! Why? Because the Lord is faithful in His words, and holy in all His works. Behold what Augustine expressly supposes — that if God should not render the things promised in the chirograph of sacred Scripture, He becomes unfaithful; but this is a manifest impossibility; therefore it is necessary that He faithfully render whatever through His canonical Scripture He has repromised.*

CHAPTER XLVIII

HE RECITES FOUR RESPONSES, AND CORRECTS THEM.

Here, however, occur many petty stubborn responses. For some, wishing to excuse God from all lying, say that although God has predicted, promised, and sworn anything to men in the proper kind, it is yet possible that He never did such a thing. This, however, even if according to some fancy it seems possible to be said of God, cannot yet be said of Christ according to the human nature, as was shown in chapters 44 and 45 of this book. For although it would seem this could be said of God revealing in the Word, yet it cannot be said of Him revealing in the proper kind: for such revelation is some created thing, signifying naturally in one mode, as chapter 44 of this book teaches; therefore it is necessary that every such past revelation already was, and signified naturally in that mode. Let therefore such a revelation be made, *that A. will be*; then if it be possible that A. not be, it is consequently possible that when God asserted and swore it, He did

this against His mind, since He always knows all things; therefore also He had lied, and was perjured, and had also deceived His most beloved without fault — against what was shown earlier. It can also similarly, and perhaps more probably, be argued concerning the present.

Item, then no faith, or the least, would be to be applied to the divine promises, even those by oath, and less than to human ones, as in chapters 45 and previous it was argued. Item, this is expressly against the authorities from Psalm 88 and its expositions, and other similar ones recited in the previous chapter; it is also against what was shown earlier in chapter 32 of the second of this book. Item, then what God revealed to one understanding in the proper kind, He could have revealed not to that one but to another — against what was had before in chapter 45 of this book. Item, by the same reason what God never revealed in the proper kind to Isaiah, He can have revealed to him, and not only to him, but also to any other person whatever; therefore he who never was a Prophet can now have been a Prophet. God can also by similar reason never have instituted those things which truly were and are the Ecclesiastical Sacraments to the effect of salvation, but have instituted others; therefore past faithful ones can not have been on the way of salvation, nor saved, and past unfaithful ones can have been so. By like reason God can now not have commanded what once He commanded; therefore he who only by acting against that sinned, and received damnation, can never have sinned nor have been damned. Otherwise an impotent man, by sinning, would necessitate omnipotent God to have once commanded something. Furthermore, if God can not have predicted or promised the future, He can also [not have predicted or promised] the past, namely the incarnation, passion, and the like — which does not seem [right]; He can also by similar reason not have foreseen or foreknown past things; therefore also consequently past things can not have been, as the whole appears from chapters 30 and 31 of this book.

Others, however, say that what God revealed in the proper kind to one understanding, He can have revealed not to that one but to another. This response will be reproved just as the previous one, which can also be refuted by what was had before in chapter 45 of this book; which also similarly the authorities from Psalm 88 and its expositions, and other similar ones alleged in the previous chapter, destroy. Others, however, hold that God never reveals a future contingent in the proper kind, except under some condition tacit or expressed. But these do not avoid the difficulty. For although God in fact had not revealed something absolutely without a condition — namely, of any kind whatever — He could yet so reveal something. For so He knows many futures, and so the Father has revealed to the Son, and to the Spirit of both, and to the man Christ Jesus, as can be had from chapters 34 and 42 of this book; who also can be reduced to truth through what was had before in the correction of a similar response in chapter 45 of this book. And if anyone shall not yet blush to be stubborn, saying that God can have revealed and asserted in the proper kind to a man under a condition at least tacitly understood that which He revealed and asserted absolutely, he will be corrected — as I hope — through the same things by which a similar response in chapter 45 of this book was corrected; he can also be reduced through the

same things by which the first response of this chapter was reduced from going astray and from error.

All the responses also premised are insufficient and in many ways diminished. For although they perhaps seem to answer some one reason or authority, or to a few, yet to many other ones they have no appearance of answering, as is clear to anyone considering these and those distinctly.

CHAPTER XLIX

HE RECITES A DOUBLE OPINION SAYING THAT IN REVEALED FUTURE THINGS THERE IS ORDAINED OR ABSOLUTE NECESSITY; IN OTHERS, HOWEVER, NONE.

Some, however, weighing more diligently the reasons and authorities premised, and seeing that they cannot avoid all-encompassing necessity in future things — somehow drawn and attracted by truth itself to necessity — approach more nearly, and confess that in some future things there is some kind of necessity: namely, in things divinely revealed, divinely prophesied, and divinely promised. And these are further divided into a double sect. For these hold that in such future things there is only ordained necessity, and that they cannot fail to come to pass *de potentia ordinata*, but that they can fail *de potentia absoluta*; those, however, [hold that there is] indefectible absolute necessity, which by no power can fail of coming to pass.

And because such sayings as, *It is necessary that the Antichrist will be, by ordained necessity*, and, *It is impossible that the Antichrist will not be, de potentia ordinata*, have an ambiguous and obscure meaning, some of the first sect thus clarify and expound them: *It is ordained that the Antichrist will be*. But these deviate and rave triply. First, because they expound badly: for how is one [proposition] of necessity sufficiently expounded by one such simple [proposition] of *inesse*, since *necesse esse* simply includes *esse*, and adds [something] beyond it as antecedent over its non-convertible consequent — or, if it is necessary, it adds nothing there beyond simple being, [and thus] loses its hitherto-customary signification, and is there placed in vain; nor is such a proposition modal, which seems neither of the old logic nor of the new, but rather of a bastard or of none?

Secondly, because they do not avoid the difficulty: for let *necessary* and *possible* and their opposites be taken as among logicians and theologians they are commonly wont to be taken — as I have taken in the premises — and the difficulty returns. Thirdly, because they are inconsistent with themselves. For if it is necessary that the Antichrist will be because it is ordained that he will be, since concerning all future things it has been ordained by the divine will that they will be — as the corollary of the ninth, the fourteenth, and twenty-third of the first teach — concerning all future things it is necessary that they will be, in the same understanding; though concerning some they concede this, concerning others they deny it.

Others, however, of the same sect, expound these things differently, saying: *It is necessary that the Antichrist will be by ordained necessity*, that is, *if the law and Scripture divinely ordained ought to stand fixed, it is necessary that the Antichrist will be* — and thus of others predicted in the law. But these sin similarly in many ways. For according to these it is necessary that God do what He promised in the law to do, by such ordained necessity; therefore the law, or the promise of God written in the law, and thus something extrinsic, necessitates God and the divine will to doing something. But how could a small thing of small power bind and necessitate the Omnipotent of infinite power? And how would He not thus be of less power and of more servile condition than a man, who cannot thus be necessitated? How also, if it were thus, would He not be mutable? For He would be changed from free into not-free, and from not-necessary into necessary. To this also resist plainly what was shown earlier in chapter 21 of the first and 33 of the third. By the same reason, also, by which the law would necessitate God to will and do anything, [it would also] make Him impotent to similar things. By similar reason, moreover, God could will and do something *de potentia ordinata*, and could not [will and do] something so. But how does the omnipotent Creator receive power or impotence from a weak creature?

Furthermore, when they say, *It is necessary that this be in the future, if the law ought to stand fixed*, either they understand and suppose that it is necessary that the law stand fixed, or not — but [rather] that it is possible for it to be loosed. If it is necessary that it stand, the law itself is necessary, and from the necessary law it follows that the Antichrist will be; therefore by what was had before in chapter 30 of this book, it is now necessary, and not contingent in either direction, that he will be. If, however, it be said that it is necessary that the law stand by ordained necessity, not absolute, then either it is necessary that that ordained necessity stand, or not. If so, and from that follows the law of Scripture, and from this, that the Antichrist will be; therefore still it is necessary that the Antichrist will be, as above was argued. If it be said that it is necessary that that ordained necessity stand by ordained necessity, not absolute, as before, either there will be an infinite process in such ordained necessities — which nature abhors, reason flees, and the second supposition plainly forbids — or only finite, and there will be some first such ordained necessity; and if it is necessary that that one stand, and from it follows the whole series and that the Antichrist will be, therefore it is necessary that the Antichrist will be. If, however, that ordained necessity, or any other by which it is necessary that the law stand, is not necessary to stand, neither is the law necessary to stand, since it has no necessity from elsewhere. If, moreover, it is not necessary that the law stand fixed and true, but it is possible for it to be loosed and falsified, it is similarly possible that revelations be falsified, and so the inconveniences deduced from chapter 42 of this book up to here return. Item, if the law is loosable, it stands contingently in either direction; how then can one [proposition] of necessity be inferred from one contingent [proposition] of inesse? What therefore is it that they say, *if the law will stand, it is necessary that the Antichrist will be*?

If, however, they shall say that there is only the necessity of consequence, or conditional [necessity], what difficulty therefore do they empty or evade? Indeed, they are also found

contrary to themselves. For thus they have to say consequently of any future things whatsoever, that they are necessarily about to be in the future: for that all those things will be necessarily follows from one contingent [proposition] of inesse, namely such a one: *These things will be*. Furthermore, arguing from the start, these are inconsistent with themselves. For if all things predicted in the law of sacred Scripture will come to pass *de necessitate ordinata*, much more all things predicted, prescribed, and preordained in the eternal law, in the eternal book, in the divine will and mind, will come to pass by such ordained necessity, since the omnipotent will of God in no way can fail or be frustrated, as chapter 10 of the first teaches. But all future things are eternally preordained, and prescribed, and predicted in the divine will and mind, as the corollary of the ninth, the fourteenth, and twenty-third of the first, with the thirty-fourth of this book, lucidly manifest. Therefore all future things will come to pass by such ordained necessity — though concerning some they concede this, namely the things predicted in sacred Scripture, but concerning others they deny it.

Those, moreover, who profess the other sect, positing in all and only divinely revealed, prophesied, and promised things indefectible necessity, and after such things shall have been, absolute [necessity], so that by no power can they fail to come to pass, go astray in two things. First, because they affirm a falsehood; secondly, because — granted this — they do not avoid the difficulty. First, I say, they affirm a falsehood, namely that God is newly necessitated and bound, as can be had from the things adduced against the response just recited. Who also would dare to say that the Omnipotent, and on every side infinitely perfect, is less powerful, less perfect, less free now than before, in one occurrence than in another, namely after He has revealed or predicted something than before — since, James testifying, *with Him there is no transmutation, nor shadow of vicissitude*, James 1? Which also chapter 5 of the first shows. Who also would dare to say that the Omnipotent could come to such impotence, that He could not once raise one straw, if yet He will never raise any straw, and this He reveal or say to anyone — He cannot do this? Who also of Christians would dare to say that Christ, indeed and the whole Trinity with the whole army of Angels, could not have preserved Him from death, and that Christ could not still have prayed the Father, and the Father not have heard the Son? Who would deny the Gospel, and the most truthful voice of truth saying, *Or thinkest thou that I cannot pray to my Father; and He will exhibit to me presently more than twelve legions of Angels?* Matt. 26. Who finally would dare to set his mouth against heaven, and so impiously blaspheme as to say that God is not omnipotent — against all symbols, and against all sacred Scripture, and against the first supposition of the first? Whoever also shall presume to say this, has further to say with the foolish, *There is no God*: for if He is not omnipotent, He is not God, as the first supposition of the first teaches.

Furthermore, if the revelation in the proper kind, if a word in the air, if one breath of weakest being in the ether, imposes necessity on God and on future things, much more incomparably the intrinsic eternal Word of God, by which He has eternally said and says all future things, and His intrinsic and eternal revelation, by which the Father has eternally revealed and reveals all future

things to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, as chapter 34 of this book has shown more fully. Furthermore, let such revelation or prediction concerning the future be corrupted, and every such necessity is corrupted, and the whole difficulty returns. Item, then the cause of that necessity would be the prophetic revelation or prediction. But how does one prophesying in London concerning the free future acts of a man who is in Rome — for instance, of the Pope or Emperor — necessitate him to his free acts, since he does nothing at all concerning him? How also, if the Prophet dies before the one of whom he prophesied is born, does he necessitate him? And if anyone resort to God, and to the divine action and necessitation, I suppose that God after the prophecy does nothing else concerning him about whom it was prophesied than otherwise He would have done: for He knows what otherwise He would have done.

That also prophecy or any prediction whatsoever imposes necessity is against the Philosopher in *Peri Hermeneias* I, last [chapter], saying thus: *Nor does this differ, if anyone says the negation, or does not say it; for it is manifest that thus the matter stands; or if this one shall affirm, but that one deny; for not on account of affirming or denying will it be or will it not be.* With which concordantly the Gloss on Matthew 1, *Now this whole was done, that there might be fulfilled what was said by the Lord through the Prophet saying, "Behold a virgin shall conceive in her womb, &c."*, the Gloss of Thomas reciting, says thus: *It can be said that "that" is not placed causally; for it was not therefore fulfilled because it was predicted, but rather it was therefore predicted because it was about to be fulfilled. Let it be placed consecutively, just as in Genesis: "He hung the other on the gallows, that the truth of the diviner might be proved" — because, with one hung, the truth of the diviner was proved; so also in this place it must be understood that, this being done which was predicted, the prophecy has been fulfilled.* Which yet according to this series in the old gloss I have not found, but I have found thus in it: *Prophecy is a sign of God's foreknowledge. Because what He says is certainly foreknown by God, and therefore ought to be held by man; but no sign of what it designates effects, but only signifies what it shows; just as prophecy does not make the necessity of the things which it predicts, but is a sign of the foreknowledge of God.* And below: *There is not a necessity of things from the speech of the Prophets, but only the exhibition of truth; prophecy does not make the necessity of the things which it says, but is a sign of the foreknowledge of God.*

Furthermore, even if it were true what they say, in no way would it unwrap the perplexity of this wrapping, but would rather wrap it up, and entangle it more manifoldly. For let God reveal to Christ or to Michael concerning all future things that these will be; then according to the hypothesis of necessity all those things will be. Again, let God reveal to anyone, or predict, that this Paul the wayfarer will freely and contingently in either direction do this A. act, and this without any condition tacit or expressed; for God can do this, since He so knows whatever future things, which can also be shown by what was premised in chapters 48 and 45 of this book; therefore Paul will do A. freely and contingently equally, because so it was predicted, and even necessarily, because according to the hypothesis all things divinely revealed and predicted will of necessity come to pass. God also predicts to someone the merits and sins, the salvation and

damnation, of this and that one; then those things will of necessity come to pass; therefore also the positors of this hypothesis have to concede that necessity does not repugn liberty of contradiction and contingency in either direction, with merit and sin and the like, but [that they] are amicably associated together — which yet they wholly strive to avoid.

Still further, heaping errors on errors, they answer further, affirming that God cannot reveal singulars, especially in contingent matter. But by so saying, they too narrowly straiten, mutilate, and curtail the most ample omnipotence of God; or if they should wish this and not be able [to do otherwise], what prohibits omnipotent God to say and assert some singular contingent — and this singularly — which He, as He most certainly knows, [knows] to be true? What prohibits God from revealing in the proper kind to Christ, Mary, or Michael some singular contingent, just as He reveals it in the Word? Who would dare to say that Christ did not know, nor could God have revealed to Him in the proper kind, those whom or whom He came to redeem, and redeemed; for whom or for whom He prayed, and many other things did? Who would dare to say that Christ never knew, nor even one of the wayfarers to be saved or damned — since He Himself says, *I know whom I have chosen*, John 13? Who also specially prayed for Peter, that his faith should not fail, Luke 22. Who also would presume to affirm that Christ did not know that Judas would betray Him, and finally be damned? Who would so contradict the Gospels?

Or who would presume to affirm that Christ could not have said, *This man shall do this, and that man shall do that*, since concerning Judas He predicted that he would betray Him, and incur the woe of damnation; and concerning Peter, that he would deny Him, as the Evangelists testify; and concerning Paul, that he would bear His name before the Gentiles, and the kings, sons of Israel, Acts 9? Why also could not such a singular be revealed and predicted, since this is not from a defect of active power in God, who would reveal — as no one is ignorant — nor from a defect of passive and receptive power in an Angel or man who would receive the revelation, nor from a defect of singular such revelation power, since God could supply these defects from the plenitude of power. And a man can himself or through another man adhere to such a singular proposition; a man can also, just as it is possible for a man to reveal to another such a proposition: there is therefore here and there the requisite power. Even if a man through himself or through another can [do] these things, much more through God, and God through him.

What also is the reason of the diversity, or the diversity of reason, why God can reveal and say singulars about past and present, and not about the future, since He knows all things intrinsically, equally certainly, as the thirty-first of this book shows? These also seem to have neglected both Testaments. To recount, however, a few of many: Behold, in Genesis it is manifestly written what and what kind of things God predicted and promised to Abraham as to be fulfilled in him and in his seed: Genesis 12, 15, and 17; where He singularly specifies that in a son named Isaac, whom Sarah was to bear to him at this time, in another year — namely, the next then following — and not any Sarah whatever, but Sarah his only wife — to whom also He promised that from Isaac nations and Kings and peoples would arise. Where also concerning Ishmael it is foretold and promised in this way: *I will multiply him exceedingly; he shall beget twelve Dukes*; concerning

whom likewise above 16: *He shall be wild, &c.* This promise of Isaac as a holocaust, with a most firm oath now performed and confirmed by the Lord through Himself, [is] below 22.

What also could be revealed or predicted more singularly than what the Lord through Joseph revealed concerning the Cup-bearer and the Baker of King Pharaoh, Genesis 40? What more singular than that prophetic blessing by which Jacob blessed Ephraim and Manasseh with hands exchanged, Genesis 48? What more singular than the Lord's so many predictions concerning Moses and Aaron, and Pharaoh and their works, which the beginning of Exodus plainly writes? What more singular than the prediction of the rejection of Moses from the leadership of the people into the promised land, and his death, and the substitution of Joshua, and the introduction through him, as the History of Numbers and Deuteronomy manifests? What more singular than the revelation concerning Saul, 1 Kings 9 and 10, and the revelation concerning David, 1 Kings 16, and afterwards frequently? What more singular than the revelation made to Jeroboam through Ahijah, that he would reign over the ten tribes of Israel, 3 Kings 11? And below 13: concerning Josiah and the altar at Bethel? And further on, 22, and 2 Chronicles 18: concerning Zedekiah and Ahab not returning from battle, through Micaiah?

What more singular than this prophetic prediction of Elisha: *At this time, tomorrow, a measure of fine flour shall be at one stater, and two measures of barley at one stater, in the gate of Samaria;* and to a certain leader not believing: *Thou shalt see with thine eyes, and shalt not eat thereof,* 4 Kings 7? Or what more special than the prophesying of Elisha concerning Hazael, who would reign and do evils, in the same chapter 8? What also more singular than the prophecies concerning Babylon, Jerusalem, Zedekiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, Cyrus, and many others through Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and the other Prophets? These are a few from the Old Testament. Now, however, from the New, some brief things are to be briefly proffered.

Who is ignorant of the most singular promises, predictions, and prophecies concerning John the precursor, and concerning the Lord the Saviour, and concerning the glorious Virgin? Who has not heard or read that of Gabriel in Luke 1: *Thy wife Elizabeth shall bear to thee a son, and thou shalt call his name John, &c. He shall be great before the Lord, and wine and strong drink he shall not drink, &c.;* and that of Zachariah: *Thou, child, shalt be called the Prophet of the Most High, &c.?* And that of Gabriel again: *Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bear a son, and shalt call his name Jesus; He shall be great, &c.,* and the rest of the glorious things? And that of Elizabeth: *Blessed art thou that hast believed, because those things shall be perfected which were said to thee?* And that of the glorious Virgin: *All generations shall call me blessed?* And that of Simeon: *Behold, this child is set for the ruin and for a sign which shall be contradicted, and a sword shall pierce thy own soul also,* Luke 2?

Or who is ignorant of what and what kind of things Christ predicted that He would do and suffer? Or how He predicted that Judas would betray Him, that Peter would deny Him and similarly follow [Him] through martyrdom, and that John, whom He loved, would so remain until He should come, as the Evangelists testify? That also Paul would bear His name before the

Gentiles and Kings and sons of Israel, and how much it behoved him to suffer for the name of Christ, as the history of Acts 9 teaches? Concerning whom also below 21, Agabus prophesied sufficiently singularly.

Furthermore, [it is] not doubtfully but most certainly to be affirmed [that] every true prophecy, even though uttered generally, was understood, and predicted, salutarily by the same Holy Spirit who *spoke through the Prophets* specially and distinctly — indeed singularly and discreetly — concerning that one or those of whom or which it has been, is, or will be fulfilled. For otherwise He would speak ignorantly, uncertainly, in vain, and foolishly. Which by one brief example I reckon sufficient to confirm. Blessed Peter says: *Brethren, the Scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit foretold by the mouth of David concerning Judas, &c. For it is written in the book of Psalms: Let his commemoration — or according to the truer text, Let his habitation — be made desolate, and let no one dwell in it; and let another receive his bishopric*, Acts 1. These things, however, in the book of Psalms, namely Psalm 108, were prophesied generally; therefore prophecies prophesied generally necessitate as much as those prophesied singularly; and whatever the Holy Spirit prophesied generally, He could also have prophesied singularly.

These things therefore [are advanced] against the thirty-third opinion, and against its premised hypothesis. For which reason it seems much to be wondered at, and how admirably to be admired, how grave men dare in so great a matter posit so plainly so great a supposition — so dubious, so uncertain — indeed, [one] which so probably appears false, and its opposite true — as if it were a self-evident first principle. For it seems worthy that it should be a conclusion demonstrated by violent reasonings, not a supposition assumed gratuitously. And if anyone shall wish to prove it, let him weigh, I beseech, faithfully both the proper reasons and the contrary reasons.

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book III, Chapter L

He responds, in accordance with the judgment of the Philosophers and Theologians, that God necessarily wills and knows whatever He wills and knows by a *consequent* necessity—of immutability, immobility, stability, and ordained necessity—not by an *antecedent* and absolutely simple necessity, not a natural, violent, or unwilling necessity, not contrary, but consonant with the highest and greatest liberty.

Good Master, sole Master, Master and Lord, who from my youth—when, with thy inspiration, I undertook this work—hast taught me thus far all the truths I have learned and which I have written with thy pen: even now, most loving Lord, send forth thy light, that thou who hast led me into this most profound abyss mayest thyself bring me up onto the mountain of this inaccessible

truth; thou who hast led me into this widest sea, lead me to harbor; and thou who hast led me into this longest and pathless desert, do thou, who art guide, way, and end alike, lead me to the end. O Lord of knowledges, who hast the key of the pit of the abyss, who hast the key of knowledge, who hast the key of David, who openest and no man shutteth, who shuttest and no man openeth, who alone art worthy to take the book and to loose its seals: show, I pray, most learned of teachers, the solution of a word so intricately bound, to thy little child who knows no way out. Now, however, I give thanks to thee, most serene Lord, who hast granted to him that asked, hast shown to him that sought, hast opened to him that knocked the door of mercy, the door of clarity, the door of truth. For now, with thee illuminating thy face upon thy servant, as in a certain brightness of eternal light and a spotless mirror of the divine majesty, I seem to see that this is the most correct solution of this word, which long ago thou wast pleased to show to thy beloved sons and disciples—our most worthy Fathers and Masters: for in them was a more abundant spirit of thine, prudence and intelligence, the interpretation of dreams, the disclosure of secrets, and the loosing of things bound. Now these set down a twofold necessity, namely *antecedent* and *consequent*, and said it is necessary that God will and know whatever He wills and knows—by *consequent* necessity, but in no way by *antecedent* necessity, as is more fully recounted in chapter twenty-eight of this book.

Furthermore, that I may the more briefly and clearly set forth what God has taught me, let it be known that in the divine will *ad extra*—that is, with respect to its posterior objects of willing—there is no antecedent necessity, but the highest contingency to either alternative, and the supreme freedom of contradiction, than which none greater can be conceived, as appears from the fourth chapter of this book, and from the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth parts of the fifth. Yet a certain concomitant or consequent necessity is in it. For just as the present act of the will of most mutable man, with respect to any object whatever—present, past, or future—although it be contingent and free (and even if, according to the opinion of certain ones, it were as contingent and free as the act of the divine will, and were not produced by God but by man's own most free will alone), nevertheless when it exists, it is necessary that it exist by this consequent necessity—so also is the act of the divine will, which is altogether immutable, as the twenty-third chapter of Book One teaches, necessary, I say, by a consequent and present necessity, as has been more fully shown from the second supposition of the consequent necessity of Anselm in chapter twenty-eight of this book. The points laid out in chapter thirty of this third book show the same: for the act of the divine will with respect to a present or past thing is necessary; therefore also with respect to a future thing. For it is not made newly necessary by the presence or pastness of the thing, nor by anything extrinsic or intrinsic, as was shown there. Therefore it is eternally and always necessary by its own proper and intrinsic firmness—that firmness whereby, generally, everything that is, when it is, must be; and specifically, just as the present act of an angelic or human will with respect to an object of any temporal difference, when it is, must be—so also the present act of the divine will, with respect to any temporal difference, while it is, must be.

All these things can be reduced more briefly to syllogistic form thus:

Every will altogether intrinsically immutable, once free or necessary with respect to any object whatever, is always free or necessary with respect to it; the divine will is of this kind.

Or thus:

Every will not newly necessitable from without nor from within, once necessary with respect to anything willed, is always necessary with respect to it; the divine will is of this kind.

Furthermore, lest in matter so hidden and dangerous, so transcendent and unsearchable, so closed and sealed, I—so very small a person—should seem to dream up something singularly out of the shadowy fantasy of my own head, behold most sound minds, most lucid geniuses, most famous Authors, Catholic Doctors—some explicitly, some implicitly, all in concord—setting forth this judgment.

Hermes Trismegistus indeed (thrice greatest, Father of the Philosophers), in *De verbo aeterno* 9, says: "Necessity follows the decree of God; the effect accompanies His will." And the reason for what was earlier said follows: "For neither is it credible that what has pleased God will displease Him, since He long beforehand foreknew that this same thing would come to pass and would please." With this judgment also accord his other sayings, written in chapter twenty-seven of this book.

May not those obscure words of **Plato** in *Timaeus* 17 also be expounded concerning this consequent necessity, where he says: "Now since we have set forth all things, with very few exceptions, which the understanding of the Mind has established, we must speak also of those things which Necessity introduces; for the generation of the sensible world has been constituted as mixed, from the assembly of necessity and intelligence, intellect and salutary persuasion holding sway and continually drawing the rigor of necessity to the best acts. And so, with necessity overcome and yielding to the providential authorities, the first beginnings of things and of the world were established." Yet it is true that both of these sayings could be understood concerning the efficacious necessity in the divine will set forth in chapters 27 and 28 of this book; just as many things said there can also be conveniently understood of this consequent necessity. For necessity, according to what was set down in chapter 27 of this book—and as the foregoing words of Plato seem to attest—was posited among the Greek Philosophers as a famous principle of beings, and in God; which some expounded in this way, others in that, and certain others in both, and all not badly. For it can fittingly be understood and expounded in either way.

Anselm, the great Philosopher of Christ, Archbishop of Canterbury, imitating these in *Cur Deus Homo* II.17, and in *De Concordia* 2 and 3, explicitly and in plain terms denies antecedent necessity in God, but affirms and demonstrates this consequent necessity, as has been briefly shown in the second member of the distinction concerning consequent necessity in chapter twenty-eight of this book. But that the great testimony of so great a man may be more fully published, behold thus does he speak finally: "The Virgin who was made clean through faith—that He might be assumed from her—by no means believed He would die except because He

willed it; just as she had learned through the Prophet who said of Him: *He was offered because He Himself willed it*. Wherefore, since her faith was true, it was necessary that things should be as she believed. But if it troubles you again that I say *it was necessary*, remember that the truth of the Virgin's faith was not the cause that He should die, but rather, because this was to come to pass, true faith existed. Hence if it is said that *it was necessary that He should die by His own will, because the true faith or prophecy which had preceded concerning this was true*, this is no different than to say *it was necessary that thus it should come to pass, because thus it would come to pass*. But this kind of necessity does not compel the thing to be; rather, the being of the thing causes the necessity to be. For there is an *antecedent* necessity, which is the cause that a thing is, and there is a *consequent* necessity, which the thing causes. Antecedent and efficient necessity is, when it is said *the heaven turns because it is necessary that it be turned*; but consequent necessity, which effects nothing but is brought about, is when I say *that you speak of necessity because you speak*. For when I say this, I signify that nothing can bring it about that, while you speak, you do not speak—not that something compels you to speak. For the violence of natural condition compels the heaven to be turned, but no necessity makes you to speak. But wherever there is antecedent necessity, there is also consequent; not however wherever there is consequent, there immediately is also antecedent. For we can say *it is necessary that the heaven be turned because it is turned*; but it is not similarly true that *therefore you speak because it is necessary that you speak*. This consequent necessity runs through all times in this manner: whatever has been, it is necessary to have been; whatever is, it is necessary to be, and necessary to have been about to be; and whatever is to come, it is necessary that it shall come to pass. This is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions, seems to destroy 'either alternative' and to assert that all things are by necessity—by this consequent and inefficient necessity. Since, then, faith and prophecy concerning Christ were true, because by will, not by necessity, He was about to die, it was necessary that thus it should be. By this He was made man; by this He did and suffered whatever He did and suffered; by this He willed whatever He willed. For therefore by necessity they were, because they were going to be; and they were going to be because they had been; and they had been because they had been. And if you wish to know the true necessity of all the things He did and suffered, know that all were by necessity because He Himself willed them; but no necessity preceded His will. Wherefore if they were not save because He Himself willed them, if He had not willed them, they would not have been. Thus, then, no man took His soul from Him, but He Himself laid it down and again took it up, because He had power to lay down His soul and again to take it up, as He Himself says."

Behold how, according to the foregoing, he posits a similar consequent necessity in the intrinsic acts of God with respect to future things, just as also in human acts intrinsic and extrinsic—namely, in the faith and cleansing of the Virgin, in the prophecy and speech of a man while he is presently speaking—such as Aristotle posits in *Peri Hermenias* I, last chapter, as inseparably following all things: that whatever is, when it is, must be, as was more fully said in chapter twenty-eight of this book. This same necessity, with the same cause and likeness applied to

human acts, the authoritative passages of the same *De Concordia* 2 and 3 most plainly demonstrate, as was more fully shown in chapters twenty-seven and twenty-eight.

This Archbishop is humbly followed by his devoted Suffragan, the most subtle Philosopher and most profound Theologian, **Robert, Bishop of Lincoln**, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, who explicitly denies antecedent necessity in God but concedes this consequent necessity, as was briefly touched upon in the third exposition of Boethius set forth in chapter twenty-eight. But because so great a testimony is not to be cramped within brief space, behold his words more diffusely. Wishing indeed to preserve contingency together with necessity—nay rather, to show that the contingent follows from necessities—thus he says: "Necessity is twofold, as Anselm distinguishes in Book Two of *Cur Deus Homo*, chapter 17. One he calls *antecedent* necessity, which is the cause that a thing is and compels the thing to be; the other he calls *consequent* necessity, which is not a cause of the thing nor compels the thing to be. And this, as he himself says, is that necessity which, where Aristotle treats of singular and future propositions, seems to destroy 'either alternative' and to assert all things by necessity. By this consequent and inefficient necessity, it is necessary that God knows my sitting tomorrow, and the like. For there is no necessity in God, since all things in Him are voluntary; nor is anything else necessity in Him than the voluntarily-persevering inflexibility of His own will. From necessities by this consequent necessity nothing inconvenient seems to follow—nay rather, more truly, the contingent seems to follow.

For while I sit, it is necessary that I sit; and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But the same comparison that these sayings *I sit* and *I have sat* have to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat—the same comparison has the knowledge of God to my future sitting before I sit. For He Himself knows future things as present, nor does He know them otherwise when they are future and when they are present or past. Therefore, by every similar mode by which it is necessary that God know things when they are or are past, it is necessary that He know the same things before they are. But when things are or are past, His knowledge has consequent necessity; therefore He has the same necessity before things come to pass. And just as, supposing per impossibile that this saying *I have sat* had, before my sitting, the same necessity which it has after I have sat, that necessity would not compel my sitting to be, but yet from that necessity the contingent fact of my sitting would follow—so from the necessity of God's knowledge follows the contingent future. By this very same thing, the objections which from the truth of the saying about the future seem to destroy 'either alternative' and free will may seem solvable. For if I am to sit tomorrow, it was true *without beginning* that I was to be or had been about to sit; nor can it not have been true, because the truth which was without beginning in this saying cannot not have been in it. Therefore it is necessary that it has been and is true; and from this necessarily follows my still-contingent sitting.

These two necessities—from one of which nothing follows but the necessary, and from the other of which (as has been said) the contingent seems to follow—Boethius perhaps called *simple* necessity and *necessity of condition*; though some understand by *necessity of condition* not that

which has been called above *consequent* necessity, but the *necessity of consequence* (of consequent following antecedent), as for example when it is said: *If a man runs, he moves his feet*. Here is the necessity of the consequence (of consequent to antecedent), although both—both consequent and antecedent—are contingent. But from the words of Boethius himself, considered more inwardly, it can be more clearly weighed that he himself called *necessity of condition* what we have been calling above *consequent* necessity. For he says that the same future thing, when referred to the divine notion, is necessary; but when weighed in its own nature, it appears altogether free and absolute. And a little after: *But God beholds as present those future things which proceed from the freedom of choice. These therefore, related to the divine intuition, become necessary by the condition of the divine notion; but considered in themselves they do not desert the absolute freedom of their nature*. And again: *These, if they be referred to divine knowledge, are necessary; if considered in themselves, they are absolved from the bonds of necessity*. But what else do these words savor of, save that those things which in their own nature are contingent to either alternative, flexible, and changeable, are in the knowledge of God invariable—not on account of the invariability of the things, but on account of the immutability of the knowledge? And that *God knows this to be* is inflexible and immutable from the truth which it has. And so, since from this invariable *God knows this* there follows this contingent *this is*: the contingent follows, according to Boethius's judgment, from the necessary—not however from a necessary that is *absolute* or *antecedent* which compels the thing to be, but from a necessary *of condition* and *consequent*, which permits the thing to be free."

Behold how he attests the sixth truth set forth in the fifth chapter of this book; behold also how he professes what is shown in chapters thirty and thirty-one of this book—namely, that God does not intrinsically know any future thing otherwise when it is future than when it is present or past, but in every way similarly: namely always necessarily, by this consequent necessity. Wherefore he doubtless wills, consequently, to say the same concerning God's willing anything first as future, then as present, and finally as past.

The same again, lower in the same fifth chapter, says: "God knows all things by one indivisible and simple gaze, eternally, always, similarly, immutably. Wherefore what He knows He cannot afterward not-know, which can also be proved in many ways. For it is plain from what has already been said, that the same comparison which these sayings *I sit* and *I have sat* have to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat, the same comparison has God's knowledge to my future sitting tomorrow before I sit. For He knows future things as present, nor does He know them otherwise when they are future and when they are present or past. Therefore by every same mode by which it is necessary that God know things when they are or are past, it is necessary that He know the same things before they are. But when things are or are past, His knowledge has consequent necessity; therefore He has the same necessity before things come to pass.

Likewise, supposing per impossibile that the future running of Socrates tomorrow were now presently in my bodily sight, in every same mode in which his running will tomorrow be present in my sight, then just as tomorrow it will be necessary that I see or have seen Socrates running,

so now it would be necessary, before Socrates ran. But all future things are much more presently in God's gaze than any present thing can be presently in my gaze; therefore much more strongly does God necessarily see and know all future things."

Behold also how, here and above, in accordance with the foregoing, he supposes—with Anselm—that the act of divine cognition with respect to any future thing is as necessary, nay more necessary, by this consequent necessity, as is the act of human cognition with respect to a present thing, as also as is its extrinsic act, such as a present sitting. Mark also, I beg, the cause given by the Doctor here and above: for he says, *He knows future things as present*. What else does this cause set forth, save the cause of Aristotle and Anselm: namely that *being which is, when it is, must be* by this consequent necessity, and therefore God thus necessarily knows future things?

The same consequent necessity, though not so explicitly, and the same cause of necessity itself with the same likening of the divine act to the human—namely, to a present walking—is so explicitly shown by **Boethius**, the human Philosopher and divine, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, in the last prose, as chapter 28 of this book and the first authoritative passage from Lincoln set forth above more fully manifest. His worthy footsteps, both in this necessity and in the cause of it and in the comparison set forth, are clearly followed by **Saint Thomas** on the *First Sentences*, distinction 38, question 5, where it is asked: Whether God's knowledge is of contingent things. There, in the fourth place on the negative side, he makes this kind of argument: *God knows or foreknows that Socrates will run; therefore Socrates will run; and the antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent*. To which he also recounts two responses, each of which agrees with the principal hypothesis treated above: of which the first says that this proposition is not necessary—*God foreknows or has foreknown that Socrates will run, or this is foreknown by God*—although it be true concerning the past, because it depends on the future; and the other posits that God can, for the present, not know what He now knows, and this, as he says, seems to be the Master's view in the text. He rejects both, and so speaks: "To the fourth it must be said, that to this argument many responses are made. For some say that this antecedent—*This is foreknown by God*—is not necessary; and if it be objected that it has been said of the past, therefore it is necessary, they respond that it has an instance in past things which speak of a respect to the future. Hence when it is said *this was about to be*, although it be said of the past, yet because it depends on the future, it is not necessary; for what was once future can not-be future, since *the one about to walk will not walk*, as is said in *De Generatione* II. But this instance is null; for although what was future can not-be future, with the causes hindered which were determined to the effect, as in the greater part—nevertheless it cannot not-have-been future. For it will always be true to say *this was once future*. Likewise it is not to the purpose, because when one says *foreknown*, not only is the order to the future imported, but also a certain act which is signified as past. And therefore others say (as the Master in the text seems to say) that this antecedent is not necessary, because *foreknown*, although by the word it signifies past time, yet signifies a divine act to which pastness does not befall; and therefore, just as God can not-

know, so He can not-foreknow. But neither does this solve the matter; because although the divine act has not the necessity of compulsion, yet it has the necessity of immobility, speaking of intrinsic acts such as *to will*, *to understand*, and the like; whence it is not contingent that it not-be, if it be posited to be. And because the consequent cannot be posited not to be, unless the antecedent also be posited not to be, the consequent also cannot be posited not to be. But this is certain: that the antecedent can be posited to be; for it is determinately true that God now knows something future, and so it follows that the consequent cannot be posited not to be even taken absolutely, and much less that it can happen not to be."

See, I beg, how expressly he posits this consequent necessity in God's intrinsic acts, calling it *necessity of immobility*, by which it is not contingent that the act not-be. See more expressly still, when he subjoins his own response: "And therefore it must otherwise be said, that the antecedent is necessary absolutely, both from the immobility of the act and also from the order to the thing known; because that thing is not posited to be subject to divine knowledge except while it is in act according as it has determination and certainty. For *itself it is necessary to be while it is*; and therefore similar necessity is to be inferred in the consequent—namely, that *Socrates running* be taken according as it is in act; and thus it has determination and necessity. Whence it is plain that if *Socrates running* be taken according to what follows from the antecedent, it has necessity. For it does not follow from the antecedent except according as it is subject to the divine knowledge to which it is subjected, as it is considered presentially in its actual being. Hence the consequent must also be so taken; in which way it is plain that the consequent is necessary. For it is necessary that Socrates run while he runs."

Behold most clearly the aforesaid necessity with the cause assigned above. And he holds this judgment expressly through many distinctions and questions following concerning the knowledge, providence, and predestination of God. He also, in *Summa* I, q. 14, art. 13, where it is asked *Whether God's knowledge is of future contingents*, and the second argument is made that it is not, because every conditional whose antecedent is absolutely necessary has its consequent absolutely necessary; but of this conditional—*If God knew this to be future, this will be*—the antecedent is absolutely necessary, both because it is eternal and because it is signified as past—he sets down the first of the two prior responses, and rejects it in these words: "To the second it must be said that some say this antecedent *God knew* is not necessary but contingent, because, although it be past, yet because it is contingent, it imports a respect to a contingent future. But this does not take necessity from it; for that which had a respect to the future, it is necessary to have had, although the future thing does not always follow." Where also below, according to his own judgment, he so responds: "Hence it must be said that this antecedent is necessary absolutely." And touching on the ambiguity *whether also the consequent is necessary absolutely*, he subjoins: "It must be said that, when in the antecedent something is posited that pertains to an act of soul, the consequent must be taken not only according as it is in itself, but according as it is in soul. For one thing is the being of a thing in itself, and another the being of a thing in the soul; for example, if I say *if the soul understands something, that is immaterial*: it is so according

as it is in the intellect, not according as it is in itself. And similarly, if I say *if God knew something, it will be*: the consequent is to be understood as it is in its presentness, and so it is necessary, just as is the antecedent—because *being which is, when it is, must be*, as is said in the first of *Peri Hermenias*."

Nor should anyone be moved that he says *God's having foreknown this future is necessary absolutely*: for *absolute necessity* can reasonably be taken in the present sense, as it is opposed to *conditional necessity*, which had been rejected in chapter 48 of this book—namely, for the aforesaid consequent necessity, by which without any condition whatsoever, *everything that now is, for now must be*. But *absolute necessity* is taken otherwise for *necessity simply*, whose opposite formally includes contradiction; and thus he speaks below, in particle 19, question 3, where it is asked *Whether God wills of necessity whatever He wills*—where, in responding, he confirms consequent necessity, saying thus: "It must be said that something is called necessary in two ways, namely *absolutely* and *by supposition*. Something is judged necessary absolutely from the relation of the terms, as because the predicate is in the definition of the subject—as it is necessary that man be an animal—or because the subject is of the notion of the predicate—as it is necessary that a number be even or odd. But it is not so necessary that Socrates sit; whence it is not necessary absolutely, but can be called necessary by supposition: for supposing that he sit, it is necessary that he sit while he sits. Thus God wills Himself and His goodness by absolute necessity; but other things besides Himself, He does not will by absolute necessity, yet He wills them by necessity by supposition. For supposing that He will, He cannot not-will, because His will cannot be changed."

The same in the *Quaestiones de Veritate*, part 13, question 4, where it is asked *Whether God of necessity wills whatever He wills*, responds that He wills Himself as the end necessarily, but other things by no means. Where also, responding to the first argument, he so says: "To the first it must be said that something is called necessary in two ways: in one way absolutely, in another way by supposition. Something is called necessary *absolutely* on account of the necessary relation among themselves of the terms which are placed in some proposition, as *that man be an animal*, or *that every whole be greater than its part*, or any such thing. But that is *necessary by supposition* which is not necessary of itself, but only when something else is posited—as *that Socrates has run*; for Socrates, as far as he is of himself, is not more inclined to this than to its opposite, but the supposition having been made that he has run, it is impossible that he has not run. Thus then I say that *God's willing something in creatures*—for example, *that Peter be saved*—is not necessary absolutely, since the divine will has no necessary order toward this, as is plain from what has been said. But the supposition having been made that God wills it, or has willed it, it is impossible that He has not willed it or does not will it, since His will is immutable. Hence this kind of necessity is called among Theologians the *necessity of immutability*." Where also below, responding to the fourth, he says: "It must be said that *God's willing or having willed something, after He wills it or has willed it*, is necessary by supposition, but not absolutely—just

as also *Socrates's having run, after he has run*; and similarly concerning creation and any act whatever of the divine will which terminates at something exterior."

From these things it sufficiently appears that, in the manner of speaking of the Parisian Doctors, what is called *necessity by supposition* is the same as what, in the manner of speaking of Boethius and Anselm, is called *necessity of condition* and *consequent necessity* in the sense set forth above, as was briefly touched at chapter 28. But that this matter may be made somewhat more diffusely and clearly plain, let it be known that this manner of speaking—*necessary by supposition* or *by hypothesis*; *good, better, best, eligible, more eligible, most eligible by supposition* or *by hypothesis*; and so of others—is originally Greek. According to which mode Aristotle, the Greek Philosopher, speaks in *Ethics* IV, last chapter; *Politics* VII.12 and IV.3; and Theophilus in his exposition of the parable of the dissipating or prodigal son in Luke 15. Nor is it to be thought that the Greek Philosophers, who loved wisdom and sought wisdom and found so much wisdom, were so insipidly wise or so spoke when they said *this is necessary, good, better, or best, eligible, more eligible, or most eligible, by supposition or hypothesis*, as to mean only this:

This conditional is necessary, good, better, or best, eligible, more eligible, or most eligible: *If A is, B will be; If anyone do shameful things, it is good that he be confounded with shame; If citizens of such-and-such a condition exist, such-and-such a polity will be better and more eligible for them; if of another, another will be.*

For what is so great in this for ethical or political discipline? Indeed, by considering more subtly according to logical method, it will clearly be seen that these differ. For a conditional posits nothing, and therefore supposes nothing. For what is *to suppose* but to *posit under another*? It is plain that this conditional, *If a man runs, the man is moved*, neither posits nor supposes that the man runs; but whether he runs or does not run, the conditional is always good and true. Nor be it to anyone moving that, among childish rudiments, a *conditional* is called a *hypothetical*, that is, a *suppositive* or *suppositional* proposition. Sufficiently childish and crudely is it so called—unless perhaps *hypothesis* has another signification in Greek. But among Greek authors I do not remember that a conditional proposition is called *hypothetical*, nor a *hypothesis*. But every supposition supposes something, and therefore posits something; and so does *hypothesis*. For what does *hypothesis* sound in Greek but *suppositio* in Latin?

Wherefore the Philosopher, in *Politics* VII.12, showing that the best polity is that according to which the city will best be governed and most attain to felicity, and that felicity is the operation and use of perfect virtue—and this not *by supposition* but *simply*—and defining *by supposition*, says thus: "I call *by supposition* what is necessary; *simply*, what is good. For example, sentences regarding just actions, punishments, and chastisements are from virtue indeed; yet they are necessary, and what is good they have necessarily. For it would be more eligible that no man and no city need any such things; but those that pertain to honors and abundances are simply the best choices. For the one is the choice of a certain evil; but such choices are the contrary, since they

are preparations and generations of goods. The serious man indeed will use poverty and sickness and other ill-fortunes well, but the blessed lies in the contraries. For this also is determined according to the moral discourses, that such is the serious man, for whom things good through virtue are simply good." In a similar mode he speaks also in *Politics* IV.3, of a polity not *simply*, but *better by hypothesis*.

Whence Theophilus in the place earlier cited says: "The Lord corrects the Pharisees' intent through the present parable—those whom *by hypothesis* He calls just, as if to say: *Granted you to be truly just, and not transgressors of any of the commandments. Are not those returning from disgrace then to be admitted on this account?*"

Looking, therefore, to the words and mind of the Greeks and of the Parisian Doctors—who in this part judge the Greek glosses to be best, and on that account perhaps imitate them—when they say *God's willing or knowing anything ad extra is necessary by supposition*, I do not think they understand only the necessity of this kind of conditional or of such a consequence: *If God wills or knows that this is or shall be, this is or shall be*, as appears from things set forth here and in chapter 28 of this book; but the necessity *from condition* and the *consequent* necessity aforesaid. For when any *willing* or *knowing* is posited as inhering, and supposed as a foundation or root in God, immediately as it were from itself there sprouts up and arises this consequent necessity, just as also to any other aforesaid thing whatever, posited or supposed in being, is added and as it were supposed this consequent necessity, by which *whatever is, while it is, must be*.

And to this judgment accord the preceding words of Thomas, who also in *Contra Gentiles* I.83 thus says: "From these things it can be had, that although God absolutely wills nothing of necessity in regard to caused things, He yet wills something of necessity *by condition* or *by supposition*. Now it has been shown that the divine will is immutable; but in any immutable thing, if anything is once, it cannot afterward not-be. For we say that to be moved is to have oneself otherwise now and before. Therefore if the divine will is immutable, supposing that He wills something, it is necessary by supposition that He will it. Likewise everything eternal is necessary; but God's willing any caused thing to be is eternal—for as His being, so His willing is measured by eternity. Therefore it is necessary, but not absolutely considered, because the will of God has no necessary relation to this thing willed. Therefore it is necessary by supposition. Furthermore, whatever God could, He can; for His power is not lessened, nor is His essence. But He cannot now not-will what He is posited to have willed, because His will cannot be changed; therefore He could never before not-will whatever He has willed. Therefore by supposition He has willed of necessity whatever He has willed, just as also He wills it. But neither is necessary absolutely, but possible in the manner aforesaid."

Behold how, by the reasonings of chapter 30 of this book—though briefly much-touched—he shows this consequent necessity in the divine will: namely, because whatever God could ever before will or not-will, He can now; and whatever He cannot now, He never could before. He

also, on the *First Sentences* in the distinction and question aforesaid, leaning likewise on the reasonings of chapter 31 of this book, shows this necessity in the knowledge of God; whence he so says: "I say therefore that the divine intellect intuitively from eternity each contingent thing, not only as it is in its causes, but as it is in its determinate being. For unless this were so, since when the thing exists He sees the thing itself as it is in its determinate being, He would otherwise know the thing when it is than before it comes to be; and so by the events of things something would be added to His cognition." Whence also he subsequently infers consequent necessity in God's knowledge, as is recounted above.

He also in *Contra Gentiles* I.67, positing similar necessity in the knowledge of God, so says: "From these things it can now somehow be made plain, that God from eternity has had ineffable knowledge of singular contingent things, and yet they do not cease to be contingent. For the contingent does not repugn against the certitude of cognition except in so far as it is *future*, but not in so far as it is *present*. For the contingent, when it is future, can not-be, and so the cognition of one estimating it to be future can be deceived—for he will be deceived if that be not which he estimated to be future. But from this, that it is present, *for that time* it cannot not-be, although it can not-be in the future. But this no longer pertains to the contingent in so far as it is present, but in so far as it is future. Hence nothing perishes from the certitude of sense, when it sees a man running, although this is contingent. Therefore every cognition borne upon the contingent in so far as it is present can be certain. But the gaze of the divine intellect from eternity is borne upon each of those things which are accomplished in the course of time, in so far as it is present, as has been shown above. It remains therefore that nothing prohibits God from having infallible knowledge of contingent things from eternity."

Behold that what is future to us is always so present to God as, when it shall come presentially, will be to us—as also other contingent things now are to us; and so that with Him it cannot not-be, just as contingent things present with us now cannot. Where also he immediately subjoins: "Likewise the contingent differs from the necessary according as each is in its cause. For the contingent is so in its cause, that being and not-being can come from it; but the necessary cannot come from its cause except being. But according to that which each of these is in itself, they do not differ as to the being upon which they are founded; because in a contingent thing, according as it is in itself, there is not being and not-being, but only being—although as a future contingent it can not-be. The divine intellect from eternity knows things, not only according to the being which they have in their causes, but also according to the being which they have in themselves. Nothing therefore prohibits Him from having an eternal and infallible cognition of contingent things."

Behold that, just as the contingent and the necessary that are now beings with us do not differ in being and in the consequent necessity of being, so also eternally with God. And below: "It does not happen that the effect exceeds its cause; sometimes, however, it falls short of it. Hence since with us cognition is caused from things, it sometimes happens that those things which are necessary, we cognize not by the mode of necessity but of probability. But just as with us things

are the cause of cognition, so divine cognition is the cause of things known. Therefore it does not prohibit those things to be contingent in themselves, of which God has necessary knowledge."

He also below, supposing that the effect is called necessary or contingent from its proximate cause, not from a remote one, subjoins: "But God's knowledge, although it be the cause of the things known through it, is yet a remote cause; therefore the contingency of the things known does not repugn against its necessity, since it can be that the intermediate causes be contingent." And below, again: "If each thing be cognized by God as presentially seen, it will be necessary that what God cognizes be, just as it is necessary that Socrates sit from this, that he is seen sitting; but this is not necessary absolutely." The Doctor therefore concedes in such things the aforesaid consequent necessity, and denies only absolute necessity, as also was more fully shown in chapter 28 of this book.

This consequent necessity also seems to be conceded by **William of Auvergne** in his *Tripartitum*, part the last, chapter 10, asserting—like Thomas—in God a *necessity of stability and immutability*, by which it is necessary that He be whatever He is and that He always act well, as is more fully recounted in the demonstration of the first corollary of this book.

This same *necessity of stability, immutability, and immobility* of these Doctors—and therefore the aforesaid *consequent* necessity—greater Doctors and Authors insinuate and affirm. For Isaiah—nay rather, the Lord through his mouth—says: "*My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done*" (Isaiah 46). But how shall it stand? Firmly? or infirmly? Without doubt whoever shall say *infirmly* is himself infirm. For whose counsel shall stand firm, if that of the Foundation most firm of all does not stand firm? Not so judges the Apostle when he says: "*The firm foundation of God stands, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are His*" (2 Tim. 2). Why, I ask, did the Apostle say *the firm foundation of God stands*, if it stood most infirmly—nay rather incomparably more infirmly than the most infirm and most mutable created thing? For any created thing now standing must now stand by this consequent necessity. Therefore if the divine fundamental counsel and foreknowledge and predestination, which now stands, could for now not-stand, it would stand more infirmly than the most unstable creature.

This word *to stand*, said of God, designates firmness and immutability. Whence Augustine in *Confessions* I.6: "With Thee, O God, the causes of all unstable things stand, and the unchangeable origins of all changeable things abide; and the eternal reasons of all irrational and temporal things live." And in V on Genesis literally, chapter 18: "To God Himself created things were not made known otherwise when He had made them than in that mode in which He knew them in order that He might make them—with whom there is no commutation nor shadow of turning, but in a simple and wonderful mode He knows all things stably and unchangeably."

Why also did the Apostle compare the foreknowledge and predestination of God, or the predestined themselves, to a foundation—nay, a *firm foundation*—if there be there no firmness of necessity, but the greatest infirmness, and greater than in any thing continually slipping and flowing—since in any such thing there is so firm a consequent necessity? For it would be a

foundation infirm and weak, so easily about to fail, that now and for now it could fail and not-be; and it would be incomparably more infirm and weak than the weakest natural foundation, which cannot so fail. Rather it seems that, by this transferred locution by which he names God's foreknowledge or the predestined a *foundation*—which is the firmest and most immobile of all things—he intended a similar firmness and immobility. For as the Philosopher says in *Topics VI: Translation makes known in some mode what is signified through likeness; for all who transfer, transfer according to some likeness*. Wherefore the Gloss says: "*The firm foundation of God stands*, that is, those whom God elected and immovably founded in the faith"—as also chapter twenty-seven of this book more fully showed.

Whence Augustine, on that of Psalm 2 *He hath established the orb of the earth, which shall not be moved*: "There is the orb of lands immobile, which is the good who are stable in faith. For *the firm foundation of God stands, having this seal, The Lord knoweth who are His*. This is the orb of lands which shall not be moved. There is also a mobile orb of lands, which is the evil." This firmness also the Psalmist frequently insinuates under the metaphor of foundation. Whence Psalm 8: "*I shall see Thy heavens, the works of Thy fingers, the lights and stars which Thou hast founded*." Upon which Damascene in his *Sentences* 21, treating of the Planets, so says: "They run their unceasing course, which the Founder appointed for them, and as He founded them, as Lord David says: *the moon and stars which Thou hast founded*. For because he said *Thou hast founded*, he signified the stability and immutability of the order and structure given them by God." And below at Psalm 23: "*He Himself hath founded it upon the seas*—that is, the orb of lands"—that is, the Church, according to Augustine, who in expounding how He founded it upon the seas, subjoins: "He Himself most firmly stabilized it upon all the waves of this world, that they might be overcome by it." And lower at Psalm 118: "*In generation and generation is Thy truth; Thou hast founded the earth and it abides*." Upon which Augustine, understanding by *generation and generation* all generations, so subjoins: "But why never even in these generations is truth lacking, opening as it were the cause: *Thou hast founded the earth and it abides*—calling those who are in the earth, *the earth*. But another foundation no man can lay, besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus."

This most firm firmness, under the same metaphor, Isaiah also insinuates in chapter 28—nay, the Lord through Isaiah—saying thus: "Behold I will lay in the foundations of Sion an angular stone, tried, precious, in the foundation founded." This stone, sent to us long ago, confirming the same, says: "*Every one that heareth these my words and doeth them shall be likened to a wise man who built his house upon the rock; and the rain came down, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, and it fell not, for it was founded upon the rock*" (Matt. 7). Upon which Chrysostom: "Just as the Church built by Christ cannot be torn down, so a Christian who has built himself upon Christ no adversity can cast down. Nor is it contrary that some fall from the Church; for not all who are called Christians are Christ's, but the Lord knoweth who are His."

This necessity, then, of *stability, immobility, and immutability*, and therefore the consequent necessity, I judge the Apostle to have understood when he said: *The firm foundation of God*

stands; the Lord knoweth them that are His; and the Lord through Isaiah saying: My counsel shall stand. Such immobile stability of the divine counsel David also insinuates, saying: "The counsel of the Lord stands forever, the thoughts of His heart in generation and generation" (Psalm 32). The Gloss: "that is, not changeable but eternal, just as His predestination is immutable, in which all things are stored." Where also Augustine in tractate one: "The thoughts of His wisdom are not changeable, but abiding into the age of the age." Which the Apostle most plainly teaches, in Hebrews 6: "God, willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of His counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have a most firm consolation, who have fled to hold fast to the hope set before us; which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm." The Gloss: "By two immutable things—that is, by the promise and the oath."

The Apostle therefore wills that the counsel, promise, and oath of God be confirmed by such immobility that God cannot do the opposite, just as He cannot lie. With which also accords that of Numbers 23: *"God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed. Hath He said then, and shall He not do? hath He spoken, and shall He not fulfill?"* And that of Psalm 88: *"Once have I sworn in my holy one, if I lie unto David."* Cassiodorus: *"Once, that is, immutably."* As also Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* V.9, and *De Spiritu et Litera* 29, and Isidore in *Ethymologies* VIII.45 expounds that of Psalm 61: *"God hath spoken once, that is, immutably—this is, unchangeably He has spoken; just as He unchangeably knows all things which are to come and which He is to do,"* as chapter twenty-seven of this book more fully alleged. The same is testified by many authoritative passages of canonical Scripture and the Doctors concerning God's oath, written in chapter forty-seven of this book; and many similar from chapter twenty-three of Book One say in like manner that God knows and wills all things immutably and unchangeably.

To these things perhaps some defender of the contrary opinion will respond, saying: it is true that God wills and knows all things immutably, because He cannot be changed in His volition or cognition; yet He can—without any change at all—now have never willed or foreknown the future thing which He always willed and foreknew, wills and foreknows now, and now not-will or not-foreknow it, but rather its opposite both now and before; therefore it does not follow that God necessarily wills and not-wills future things by the aforesaid consequent necessity.

But this response will be corrected by what was previously shown in chapters 30 and 31, and especially in chapter 32 of this third book. For certain authoritative passages touched here and there imply that God is a liar if what He has predicted does not come to pass; yet if He could without any change whatever not-have-predicted what He has predicted, it would in no way follow, as in chapter 32 was more fully shown. Nor is the necessity in things predicted by God greater than in things simply willed and foreknown, as chapter 49 of this book shows. Therefore God cannot not-know and not-will future things which He knows and wills, unless He be changed, as the same chapter 32 shows. Therefore for now He cannot not-know or not-will what He now knows and wills.

Upon the reasonings of chapter 32, by way of mutability and immutability set forth above, **Robert of Lincoln** leans, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 4, where, having recounted the opinion saying that this is not necessary—*God knows that A will be*, where A is some future contingent—because He can not-know A before A is, and so as A is or is not, He becomes knowing and not-knowing A (and this is the contrary opinion and principal hypothesis), he subjoins: "But to say by this reason that the said proposition is not necessary, is openly impious; because to say this is to say that God is changeable as to knowledge. First therefore must the authoritative passages oppose this impiety, by which it will be plain that He immutably and always and eternally knows all things." And he adduces many authoritative passages saying that God knows and wills all things immutably, as was touched above. He, in chapter 5 below, having rejected the aforesaid opinion through authoritative passages and through some reasonings, subjoins: "Likewise, God knows A. Either then He can not-know A, or cannot. If He cannot not-know A, then necessarily He knows A. But if He can not-know A, then He can come from knowing A to not-knowing A. Therefore He can be changed and altered, which is impossible." The same below in chapter 9, where finally in determining he responds, says that God *considered as causally preceding His acts of willing and knowing* can not-do those acts; but *considered as actually doing those acts* He cannot, since He is immutable. Whence so he says: "This predication can be: *God can not-will or not-know A*—referred back to Him considered in the notion of an agent of one of the opposites, and so it is impossible that He not-will what He wills, or not-know what He knows. For there is in God's nature a power to either, because He causally precedes either; but with respect to Him as an agent of one of them, since He is immutable, there is no power to the opposite of that which is in act." On similar arguments concerning mutability **Saint Thomas** leans, in *Summa* I, q. 19, art. 3, and in *Contra Gentiles* I.83, as was recounted above.

And how, even if it were as the response says, would the firmness and fundamental stability shown above in God's knowledge be saved? How also, if it were so, by the promise and oath of God concerning anything future, according to the Apostle, should we have most strong consolation, as chapter 32 of this book more fully shows? For how should we have most strong consolation in a thing so weak, which for the time or moment in which it is or has been, can not-be and not-have-been—nay, in a thing incomparably more weak in being than the weakest creature? For any creature is stronger and more constant in being: it indeed, while it is, must be, and *to have been* if it has been. How also, if it were so, would the Apostle have said our hope concerning such promises is *as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm*? For what security or firmness is in such an anchor, which—although it now most firmly clung where it could, and in the past had clung at a fitting foundation—could now and *for now* be loosed and altogether deceive, and in the past *always have been loosed* and *totally have deceived*? Such an anchor, then, if it be supposed, is more insecure, weaker, and more unstable than any wind or sea, or any flowing thing whatever. Who therefore, trusting in such an anchor, would commit himself to a tempestuous sea? Who, then, in this great and most perilous sea of the world will be safe by such an anchor?

Wherefore it seems to me that the Apostle, by this transferred locution from the *anchor*, which is the firmest of the things of a ship—stabilizing and firming the whole ship, while indeed it cleaves to something firmer—has figuratively insinuated the most stable security and firmness of our hope, which is *as the anchor* of Peter's ship tossed by waves and contrary winds of this world; and that this anchor of our hope is not safe and firm of itself, but from cleaving and binding to something more firm—namely, to the immobility of the divine counsel and to the *two immutable things* aforesaid, which it is impossible should fail or not-be, as it is impossible for God to lie. The reason of this transumption can likewise be shown, as was shown of the response of the transumption from the *foundation* above.

Furthermore, the words of sacred Scripture and of the Doctors are to be taken according to the customary and common mode of understanding and speaking, as was shown in chapter forty-five of Book One. But it is not the customary and common mode of understanding or speaking, but a very unusual and most strange one—and one scarcely admitted save among deceitful Sophists—to say that God determines or has determined, has willed or wills *immutably* that anything be, when without any change whatever He can never have determined or willed this, nor now determine or will it. Indeed, the customary and common mode of understanding and speaking seems in such cases to hold for the same: *immutably* and *not able to be otherwise* and *necessarily*; and to reckon them convertible. Wherefore the Parisian Doctors call the aforesaid consequent necessity *necessity of immutability and immobility*. Whence Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* II.17, almost throughout, holds for the same and promiscuously takes *immutably to be or to be future*, and *not-able-not-to-be or not-be-future*, and *necessarily to be or to be future*. Where also, asserting this consequent necessity to be spontaneous, by way of dialogue between Anselm and Boso concerning Christ, thus he writes: "*Boso*: Since they lie under the same reason, namely *to die* and *to will to die*, both seem to have been in Him by necessity. *Anselm*: Who willed Himself spontaneously to become man, that by the same immutable will He might die, and through the faith of this certitude that the Virgin be made clean from whom that man was to be assumed? *Boso*: God, the Son of God. *Anselm*: Was it not shown above, that God's will is compelled by no necessity, but it itself by its own spontaneous immutability preserves itself, when something is said to be done by necessity? *Boso*: Truly it was shown; but we see the contrary: that what God immutably wills cannot not-be, but it is necessary that it be. Wherefore if God willed that man to die, He could not not-die. *Anselm*: From this, that the Son of God assumed a man with that will, that he should die, you prove that the same man could not not-die. *Boso*: So I understand. *Anselm*: Has it not similarly appeared from what has been said, that the Son of God and the man assumed are one Person, so that the same is God and man, the Son of God and the Son of the Virgin? *Boso*: Thus it is. *Anselm*: The same man therefore by his own will could not not-die, and he died. *Boso*: I cannot deny."

He also below in the same place plainly maintains that, if God proposes to do something immutably, He will necessarily do it—not however by violent or contrary necessity, but by

necessity consonant with liberty; which also still further below in the same place, by the distinction of necessity recounted above, he illuminates and clears.

He also in *De Concordia* 3: "Things which in time are past, after the likeness of the eternal present, are altogether immutable. In this indeed those things in time past are more like the eternal present than things present, since the things in eternity can never not-be present, just as past things in time can never not-be past. But all present things in time, which pass, become not-present." And below, chapter 4, immediately he subjoins: "In this mode therefore, whatever Sacred Scripture pronounces of those things which are done by free choice as if necessary, it speaks according to the eternity in which every truth is present, and not save as truth, immutably."

Behold how indifferently he takes and holds for the same *to be immutable* (or *immutably not-able-not-to-be*) and *to be necessary* (or *necessarily that anything be*)—necessity, namely, which in the same passages he calls *consequent*, as was touched above.

Wherefore **Robert of Lincoln**, *De Libero Arbitrio* 4, having recounted the authoritative passages of Augustine in *De Genesi ad Litteram* V.19, and other passages here above, and those previously set forth in chapter twenty-three of Book One, who say that God immutably knows all things, in chapter 5 thus concludes: "From these authoritative passages it evidently appears that God knows all things by one indivisible and simple gaze, eternally, always, [similarly,] immutably. Wherefore what He knows He cannot afterward not-know." And there follows: "Therefore by every same mode by which it is necessary that God know things when they are or are past, it is necessary that He know the same before they are. But when things are or are past, His knowledge has consequent necessity; therefore He has the same necessity before things come to pass." He also below in chapter 6 alleges Augustine saying that the *Ideas* in God, which he names *exemplars*, are immortal, immutable, invariable, eternal, and indefatigable. Whence also he concludes: "From these things it is plainly held that the exemplars are necessary."

Sacred Scripture, therefore, the Glosses, and the Doctors saying that God *immutably*, *unchangeably*, and *immobilely* knows, wills, determines, and the like, understand that *it is not possible to be otherwise*, and that He *necessarily* so does—*necessarily*, I say, by the aforesaid consequent necessity. Nor is it to be reckoned for least, that **Robert of Lincoln**, **Saint Thomas**, and other Parisian Doctors, recount in proper form, in concord, and reject and condemn, the opinion contrary to this necessity, and the principal hypothesis, as the foregoing have somewhat recounted. Wherefore without doubt they approve and affirm this response according to this consequent necessity, since it is not possible to assign a reasonable middle between these, as the preceding chapters manifest.

The Oxford Doctors likewise deny absolute necessity in such things, but concede a certain other, which they similarly call *ordained necessity*, or *necessity by ordained or established law*; which, according to what is shown in chapter forty-nine of this book, cannot rightly be understood otherwise than this consequent necessity. For the divine will, as to its extrinsic objects of willing,

is rightly called *ordained*, and similarly the law *ordained or established*; because just as a Lawgiver or any other orderer first—at least by nature—thinks of these and those, then freely orders or establishes one certain thing: so God also, the King and Lawgiver of the universe, having thought that these and those could be done, most freely establishing has ordained these to be done and not those; and this is the universal law, established, posited, ordained, ordering, regulating, and moderating the universe, as is plain from chapter twenty-one of Book One. It is also called *necessity*, because just as a merely positive law, most freely and without any compelling necessity established by man, is from then on necessary by consequent necessity and by such ordained necessity—inasmuch as, according to the Jurists, that is called *possible* or *impossible* which is possible or impossible *de jure*—so also the divine will, although ordained, posited, and established without any antecedent necessity, most contingently and most freely, is firmed by similar necessity.

This judgment seems to be supported by what has been set forth concerning *fate* in chapter twenty-eight of Book One, and twenty-seven of this book. For all the Authors who posit fate as said by the speech of God, and such *fatal* necessity, in concord insinuate that God, like man, freely speaks *ad extra* by way of contradiction; yet that He Himself speaks while He speaks, just as also man speaks while he speaks, is necessary—necessarily, namely, by the aforesaid ordained or consequent necessity, which by accompanying necessarily follows the being of anything, by which *whatever is, when it is, must be*. For *fate*, as Isidore recounts in *Ethymologies* VIII.45 and 46, the ancients said is "*whatever the gods speak*, and what is appointed and established for individuals." Wherefore the Philosopher in *De Mundo*, last chapter, says that "there are three established orderings of fates according to as many times," which in another translation are called *the three Parcae*. These, according to Papias in his *Elementarium* and Isidore in *Ethymologies* VIII.45 and other Grammarians, because they spare none, or *spare not even the least*, are so called from *parcendo* (Greek terms in original); namely *Atropos* in the past, *Lachesis* or *Lichesis* in the future, and *Clotho* in the present, "perfecting" (as the Philosopher says in the place earlier cited) "and *spinning out* to each its own." And he adds: "The fable also is perfected not without order. But all these are nothing other than God, as the strenuous Plato also says." He also above in chapter 13 says that "in the greater city, namely in the world, God is *equally inclining* law"—in another translation *equal*—"receiving no corruption, or transposition" (in another translation *direction or transposition*); "but greater and more certain than those Scriptures which are in the *cirbeses*" (according to another translation, *better and firmer than stones written upon*). For Scriptures upon stones are first freely and contingently written, but after they are written, they remain necessarily written, or at least are then necessarily written by the aforesaid consequent necessity. So also—nay, incomparably more firmly—is the firmer Scripture of the book of God. Where also it is consequently subjoined: *under whose rule, ever immobily and diligently is governed all the beauty of heaven and earth, and all things are generated, grow, and corrupted, obeying the divine decrees*.

This judgment also Hermes confirms, in *De Verbo Aeterno* 43 and *De Mundo et Coelo* 1, showing that the necessity of things is from divine law. For he says that these three—*Heimarmene* (fate), necessity, and order—are most greatly effected by the nod of God, governing the world by their own law and divine reason. And he says that the text of the work, the fatal series, the disposition of the ages, the limit of all temporal things, and universally all things, are written there—namely, in God—*by the finger of the supreme Disposer*, as chapter twenty-seven of this book more fully recounted. Whence also the Prophet: "*Forever, O Lord, Thy word abides in heaven; in generation Thy truth; Thou hast founded the earth and it abides. By Thy ordering the day perseveres, for all things serve Thee, were it not that Thy law is my meditation*" (Psalm 118), etc. Behold the legitimate ordering of the Lord, embracing things heavenly, earthly, and universally all things. Behold the law of the Lord most completely ordained, by firm necessity and necessary firmness eternally enduring. For these words of the Prophet import immutability and necessity. For Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XV.20: "Neither is it for any other cause written, *Many are the thoughts in the heart of a man, but the counsel of the Lord abides forever*, save that we may understand or believe that, just as God is eternal, so His counsel is eternal, and on this account immutable, just as He Himself is. What is said of *thoughts*, can also be most truly said of *wills*: *Many wills are in the heart of a man, but the will of the Lord abides forever*." And the thirty-second Psalm says: "*The counsel of the Lord abides forever; the thoughts of His heart in generation and generation*." Upon which Augustine in tractate one: "The thoughts of His wisdom are not changeable, but abiding into the age of the age." And the Gloss: "that is, not changeable but eternal, and His predestination is immutable, in which all things are stored."

Cassiodorus, on that of Psalm 118 alleged above, *O Lord, Thy word abides in heaven*, says: "Because, literally, the solemn order of the heavenly statutes abides. For the year flows by through days and months, and by the same vicissitudes the conversion of sun and moon returns, and the law of all things once established remains immutable." And below: "*In generation and generation Thy truth*, that is, in every generation; *Thou hast founded the earth*, that is, the Church by faith, *and it abides*. For literally this cannot be said of the earth, which shall be moved. But Christ is the foundation, besides which no other can be laid—that on which those who are not the sons of the bondwoman remain. For there follows, *By Thy ordering the day perseveres*. For these aforesaid—that the Word in heaven, that the truth in generation, that the earth has been founded—are the day which the Lord has made, on which Christ the Sun of justice, however much He may press, never sets, and which in the future He shall complete, to be closed by no end. And rightly do I say *the Word in heaven the truth*, and *in generation the earth founded*, since *all things which pertain to this day serve Thee*. Literally, all things temporal and eternal He disposes by His nod." *Thou hast founded the earth and it abides*, he says; but founding and foundation import immutable stability and necessity, as was shown above. Whence also below in the same place: "*From the beginning I have known concerning Thy testimonies, that Thou hast founded them forever*."

A similar judgment is also insinuated by such words as: "*Confirmed is His mercy upon us, and the truth of the Lord abides forever*" (Psalm 116); "*He hath established the orb of the earth, which shall not be moved*" (Psalm 92), where Augustine says it is *immobile*, as was alleged above; "*They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Zion; he shall not be moved forever*," etc. (Psalm 124), where Cassiodorus shows that those trusting in the Lord cannot be moved; "*It shall not be inclined into the age of the age*"—namely, the earth (Psalm 103), where Cassiodorus: "It cannot be said of the earth which is read to be about to pass; but mystically it can rightly be received as the Church founded upon Christ, which cannot be inclined." "*The mountains shall be moved, and the hills shall tremble; but my mercy shall not depart from thee, and the covenant of my peace shall not be moved, said the Lord, thy Comforter*" (Isaiah 54). "*Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away or transeunt*" (Matt. 24); and many similar with their expositions and glosses written in chapter 27 of this book. With these likewise accords that of Jeremiah 5: "*I have set the sand a bound for the sea, an everlasting precept which it shall not pass; and they shall be moved, and shall not prevail; and the waves thereof shall swell, and they shall not pass over it*"—insinuating the limit of tribulations and labors, as is plain from the expositions set forth in chapter 46 of Book One. And again, that of Psalm 148: "*He hath established them forever, and forever and ever; He hath made a precept, and it shall not pass away*."

Whence blessed Gregory in *Moralia* XVI.15, on that of Job 23, *No one can turn away His thoughts*—namely God's—says: "Concerning whose immutability it is aptly subjoined: *No one can turn away His thoughts*. For just as He is immutable in nature, so also is He immutable in thought. Let it therefore be said, *and no one can turn away His thoughts*, since judgments once fixed cannot in any way be changed; whence is it written: *He hath made a precept, and it shall not pass away*; and again, *Heaven and earth shall pass, but my words shall not pass*; and again, *For my thoughts are not as your thoughts, neither are my ways as your ways*. Therefore when externally His sentence seems changed, internally His counsel is not changed, since concerning each thing within, immutably is constituted whatever externally is mutably done."

With which also accords Augustine in the *Sentences* of Prosper, proposition 169: "The thought and re-thought of God concerning things to be changed is the unchangeable reason. Neither indeed, as it does man, does it repent God of any of His deeds, whose sentence concerning all things whatsoever is as fixed as His foreknowledge is certain." With which not discordantly Isaiah: "*The Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who can disannul?*" (Isaiah 14). The Gloss: "that is, it cannot be changed."

This same necessity, ordained as has been said, is evidently insinuated by the Authoritative passages concerning *necessity of stability, immobility, and immutability* set forth above; nor less evidently do the Authoritative passages concerning the divine oath, set forth in chapter forty-seven of this book, show it, on account of the immutability and necessity contained in it—especially since, according to what is there shown, every intrinsic word of God with respect to exterior things is firmed by equal necessity, and is equipollent to an oath. The same likewise the

Authoritative passages alleged in chapter forty-seven imply, saying that divine predictions and promises are necessarily to be fulfilled—especially since the necessity in such things is no greater than in any whatever known by God *ad extra*, as the next chapter of this book teaches; but the whole necessity which is there is from the firm presentness, and the *present* firmness, of the act of divine cognition and volition: by which it, like all other present things and acts of any kind, while it is, must be, by the aforesaid consequent and ordained necessity.

Further still, this same ordained and consequent necessity all the Authors who posit *fate* as said by the speech of God, and such *fatal* necessity, in concord insinuate, as was shown above. But how many and how great are the philosophical and theological Authors and Doctors who explicitly and implicitly posit this *fatal* necessity, as chapter twenty-eight of Book One and twenty-seven of this book teach? What else does the *intransibility*, *immutability*, *stability*, *firmness* of Christ's words, of laws, of pact, also of God's covenant, signify, from the Gospels and Prophecies, with the glosses and expositions of the Doctors, which chapter twenty-seven of this book more fully recounted? How also can the Philosopher in *De Mundo* 13 more conveniently be expounded, where he says that God *immobile* moves all things and turns them whither He wills, as the *law of the world receiving no alteration, more certain and firmer than the Scriptures which are in stones*, as the same chapter 27 and here above more fully alleges? For Scriptures upon stones are first freely and contingently written, but after they are written, they remain necessarily written, or at least are *then* necessarily written by the aforesaid consequent necessity. Thus, nay incomparably more firmly, is the firmer Scripture of the book of God. Why also did he compare the divine law governing all things rather to a *Scripture in stones*, than to a Scripture in wax, parchment, painting, dust, or earth, or in any metal, save that in some mode—exemplaritably and figuratively—he might designate its greatest firmness, as such a Scripture is more firm than others? As Job also says: "*Who shall grant me that my words be written? Who shall grant me that they be exarated in a book with an iron stylus or a leaden plate, or be carved with a chisel in flint?*" (Job 19). Wherefore also the sons of Seth wrote the discoveries of the sciences upon two columns—one indeed of bricks, the other of stones—as was previously recounted. How firm therefore the necessity, and how necessary the firmness, of the divine Scripture written in the most firm science of God, in His most firm mind, in the book of His most firm life!

Authorizing this Philosopher in this part, the supreme Philosopher says: "*Scripture cannot be loosed which the Father sanctified and sent into the world*" (John 10). With which similarly accord not a few similar passages prepared in chapter forty-seven of this book, which testify that the Prophetic Scriptures—promissory and juratory—of the Prophets and of God are necessarily to be fulfilled. For *that natural Scripture written with fragile pen, fluid ink, and corruptible skin or papyrus cannot be loosed*—this can be from no firmness or stability of this infirm and fleeting Scripture, but only from the insoluble and necessary firmness of the Scripture of the book of immortal life, indelible, unerasable, uncancellable, and indefectible; from which all true material Scripture originally and figuratively flows down and emanates.

To this cause of necessity in the Scriptures the Gloss on the first chapter of Matthew testifies, which first says that prophecies are necessarily to be fulfilled, as chapter forty-seven of this book alleges. Afterward, however, it says that the Prophet brings no necessity to the things prophesied, but is *a sign of God's foreknowledge*, as chapter forty-nine of this book more fully recounted. This necessity, then, is founded upon God's foreknowledge: it cannot be founded upon the prophesied things, which are as it were *the effects and outcomes* of prophecy—which also impose no necessity upon themselves, since they have none of themselves; nor upon the prophecy, which does not produce the prophesied things, but is only a sign of divine foreknowledge. Therefore the necessity of the Scripture of the book of immortal life—the firm foreknowledge of God—is the necessity of the aforesaid prophetic Scripture.

Whence also Augustine *De Correptione et Gratia* 29 says that the sons of God according to foreknowledge, *before they were made, were already sons of God, written in the memorial of their Father with unshaken stability*. He also below in chapter 34, more fully expressing this unshaken stability, thus writes: "Whoever therefore in God's most provident disposition are foreknown, predestined, called, justified, and glorified—I say not *not yet reborn*, but *not yet born*—are already sons of God, and therefore can in no wise perish." Note, I beg, the causal: *they are already sons of God, and therefore they can in no wise perish*. What else does this causal insinuate, nay rather express, save that those things, whatever they may be, which are in the providence, disposition, foreknowledge, and predestination of God, cannot there not-be—at least for now—according to that saying of the Philosopher so often remembered, *being which is, when it is, must be*?

How great then a number, how great a crowd, how great an army of authoritative passages of canonical Scripture and of the Doctors expressly or implicitly profess this judgment of necessity, doubtless not easy to count. But that I may bring forth in brief the greatest abundance, behold this judgment of consequent necessity is insinuated and confirmed by the reasonings and authoritative passages from chapter thirty of this book up to this place, manifoldly prepared—which it does not seem possible to solve plainly, solidly, and truly for one not holding this judgment, but scarcely by some insipid sophistries, by oblique cavils, by profane forgeries and violent obstinacies, by distorted ambiguities, by schismatic expositions, and by viperous glosses destroying their own text. To this judgment, however, all the reasonings and Authoritative passages seem—both according to the surface of the letter and according to the deep and solid meaning—plainly and fully, solidly and sincerely and spontaneously, to consent, and in concord to attest. Let any indifferent Judge, simply, and a friend of truth alone, compare the proofs, responses, and authoritative passages of any other judgment with this one. Let him for the time set aside, I beseech, hate and love, since the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* I.1 says that *to a prefect and a Judge, love and hatred and his own commodity are often joined, so that he cannot sufficiently see the truth, but attends in judgment to his own delightful or sad*. And in *Rhetoric* II.1: "Things do not appear the same to lovers and to haters, nor to the angry and to those mildly disposed, but either altogether different, or different by magnitude." With which also accords Ptolemy in word

12 of his *Centiloquy*: "Love and hatred remove men from rectitude"—or according to another translation, *Love and hatred pervert the truth of judgment*. Or if he will not set those aside, then let him exchange, giving freely to this judgment that hatred and to the other that love and favor, and contrariwise; and so weigh them by an equal balance, which is more firmly founded, more copiously attested, and more reasonably defended; and that one, until God reveal another to him, let him soberly choose, hold, and defend. For, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* I.11: "All existing things are consonant with the true; but the true is quickly dissonant from the false." This is plainly the doctrine of the same Philosopher in *De Caelo* II.1, and of his Commentator Averroes, who there recounts that famous saying of Alexander: "We are not sustained upon the judgment of this man among all others, save because we see it of less ambiguity and more remote from contradiction."

Furthermore, the authoritative passages concerning the necessity of *fate* or of *the divine speech*, and similar ones, positing necessity in God and in things, and rendering the cause of it because *being which is, when it is, must be*—or because all things are always present with God on account of the necessity of things according to higher causes, adduced in chapters twenty-seven and twenty-eight of this book—much more immediately and evidently make for this consequent necessity of this chapter than for that. But because from this necessity follows the other, they make also for that one. And because that necessity was contradicted, it had to be confirmed by the valid testimonies of many truthful witnesses, the greatest above all exception—so that, with that conceded, this might be more easily admitted. The process and order could also have been contrarily permuted, that first this consequent, then that according to higher causes, had been shown. For this is prior by nature to that. Yet not so commodiously for doctrine. For not always are things prior and more known by nature prior and more known in human cognition. Indeed, for the most part, the contrary, as the Philosopher attests in *Physics* I.2 and after, and in *Metaphysics* II.1; which also the Apostle attests, saying: "*The invisible things of Him*"—namely God—"from the creation of the world, that is, by man, are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, His eternal power also and divinity" (Romans 1). Hence therefore it seemed more commodious to observe the order set forth, as in the beginning was observed. For prior by nature seems God's making something to His preserving what is made, and yet it was first shown that God is the necessary preserver of beings, before that He is their maker; because this was more useful for doctrine: for from this, before human cognition, the other is more easily shown than contrariwise.

COROLLARY

That every present act of divine volition and cognition is necessary, by the aforesaid consequent necessity, always to have been and similarly always to be; wherefore also that all things which presentially are, are done, or come to pass, by similar necessity are, are done, and come to pass in the present; and that all things which shall come to pass shall by

similar necessity come to pass in the future. Nay further, that all things which now are done, are now done from some antecedent necessity; and that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from some antecedent necessity in the future.

From these things, as it were *porismatically*, it clearly shines that:

Every present act of divine volition and cognition must, by the aforesaid consequent necessity, now be, always have been, and similarly always be to be;

wherefore also that all things which presentially are, are done, or come to pass, by similar necessity are, are done, and come to pass in the present;

and that all things which shall come to pass, by similar necessity shall come to pass in the future;

nay further, that all things which now are done are now done from some antecedent necessity;

and that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from some antecedent necessity in the future.

The first part, second, and third of this *porism* lucidly follow. For according to what was previously shown, every such act now present must now be, and therefore have always been and similarly always be to be, since God is immutable in every way, as chapters 5 and twenty-three of Book One teach. Whence is also evidently known the agreement and difference of the divine and the angelic or human will. For in two things they agree and in two things they differ. For just as the created will must, for now, will what it wills and have willed what it has willed, so the divine. But this—namely, the human—is possible in the future not so to will, and in the past not to have willed; the divine, in no wise after or before. The cause of this is not hidden: for the one is mutable, but the other is altogether immutable.

The three following parts will be easily concluded from these three with certain things shown previously. For syllogistic reasoning manifestly teaches that:

All things which presentially are, are done, and come to pass from a cause which is, by consequent necessity, *necessary in being and infrustrable in causing*, by similar necessity are, are done, and come to pass in the present;

All things which presentially are, are done, or come to pass, presentially are, are done, and come to pass from such a cause.

Why then does it not follow concerning future things? In a similar mode in which the syllogism was applied to present things, it will also be applied to future things:

All things which shall come to pass from a cause which is, by consequent necessity, always *necessary in being and infrustrable in causing*, by similar necessity shall come to pass;

All things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from such a cause.

For there does not seem possible to be assigned a cause why not all things which shall come to pass from any cause whatsoever shall come to pass from some necessity, save either because the cause can fail in being, or because, even if it remain, it can be impeded, frustrated, and fail in causing—as a man willing to do something future can dismiss that will, and even if he hold it continually, can be impeded and frustrated in many ways. It is also certain that all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from such a cause; for they shall come to pass from the divine will, by the corollary of chapter 9 of Book One, and that is *necessary in being* by consequent necessity, by the parts of the preceding corollary; it is also *infrustrable in causing*, by chapter 10 of Book One.

Here perhaps some will respond that all future things are necessary inasmuch as they are present with God and in Him, but not inasmuch as they shall come to pass *outside*, in *material or real being* in their own natures. But this response, if it understands that future contingents, *as far as they are of themselves, and as their inferior causes are absolutely considered*, shall not necessarily come to pass, understands truly, but does not avoid the issue. If, however, it understands that future contingents, *related to the divine prevolition and precognition* (which is necessary in being and infrustrable in causing), shall not necessarily come to pass *outside* in material, real, or natural being at the times preordained by God, it does not understand truly, as the preceding things clearly showed. Which can also be more briefly shown thus:

It necessarily follows: *Whatever God wills and foreknows shall be in real extrinsic natural being, thus shall be*; God wills and foreknows this thus to be; therefore this thus shall be.

Or enthymematically, if anyone wills:

God wills this to be really; therefore this thus shall be.

And the antecedent is necessary, as is shown above, as also these responders confess; therefore the consequent likewise, as chapter thirty of this book makes plain.

All this is clearly testified by **Robert of Lincoln** in *De Libero Arbitrio* 10, where, treating of the concord of predestination and free choice, he first really makes the foregoing argument, and recounts virtually the response of the contrary opinion and of the principal hypothesis—distinguishing such propositions (*Whatever God predestines or wills to be, must be*) according to *composition* and *division*, and conceding the *composite* sense and denying the *divided*; and then, that opinion having been formally approved and materially rejected, according to his own judgment in responding, says that prevolition—namely, divine predestination—is a cause necessary in being by consequent necessity, and infrustrable in causing; therefore also any total effect of it future by similar necessity. Whence so he says: "God's predestination especially seems to annihilate free choice. For it itself is a cause of the goods predestined, and such a cause as cannot not-be, nor can it be frustrated by its effect. But of every cause which cannot not-be, nor be frustrated by its effect, every effect cannot not-be. Therefore the effect of predestination cannot not-be; therefore it is necessary that every effect of predestination be. Necessarily

therefore every one to be saved shall be saved; therefore not from free choice is salvation or any good work meritorious of eternal life.

Perhaps some responder, to evade, will so distinguish, saying: *the predestined* is necessary; yet *that which is predestined* is not necessary, but contingent. But this distinction, although it be true, yet seems nothing to the truth of the solution. For let A be called any effect of predestination, considered in itself bare of this accident, *predestined*; and let it be syllogized in this mode: *Every effect of a necessary cause not able to be frustrated by its effect is necessary and not able not-to-be; A is the effect of such a cause; therefore A cannot not-be, but is necessary*. And so as to its being, free choice is nothing, since to have being from the free choice of a rational creature is contingent, not necessary. And behold the proper response: Or perhaps will the effect of predestination simply be rather *A's contingently being* than *A's being*? For example, let some present wayfarer be named Peter: not this—namely, *that Peter is to be saved*—but *that Peter's being saved is contingent*, that is, *that Peter is to be saved not from necessity, but with possibility of the existing of its opposite*, namely *that Peter not be saved*—is simply the effect of predestination. For God knows not only that Peter is to be saved, but that Peter is to be saved *not from necessity, but contingently*, and so from eternity He preordains—namely, *that Peter is to be saved, and not from necessity but with possibility of the contrary*. And this whole, *infallibly foreknown and preordained by God*—namely, *that Peter is to be saved not from necessity, but with possibility of existing of its opposite, namely that Peter not be saved*—is necessary simply. And so the effect of predestination, which is an invariable cause that cannot be frustrated by its effect, is not *that Peter be saved*, but *that Peter be saved not necessarily but contingently*; and this whole—namely, *that Peter be saved not necessarily but contingently*—is necessary, just as the syllogism placed above argued must be the effect of predestination. But *necessary* I say by *consequent* necessity, not antecedent—*necessity of condition* according to Boethius, not simple. And on this account, *that Peter be saved* is not necessary, but contingent.

This major proposition of the syllogism placed above, namely, *Of every cause which cannot not-be nor be frustrated by its effect, the effect cannot not-be, but is necessary*, must thus be understood: that we understand the effect *simply and totally*, and not according to part—that is, the *whole effect proportionate to the cause, with no conditions omitted*. For instance, with respect to this cause which is predestination, the effect will not be *Peter's being saved* simply and totally, but this whole: *Peter's being saved not from necessity but contingently*. Therefore, according as the major proposition is truly understood, if under *the effect of predestination* be assumed *Peter's being saved* or some such thing, without this condition added—*not from necessity but contingently*—the assumption does not correspond to the major proposition, nor does the conclusion follow. But if there be taken simply and totally the effect falling under predestination—as for example *Peter's being saved not from necessity but contingently*—it correspondingly is assumed to the major, and the conclusion follows."

He also below in chapter 11, showing the concord of grace with free choice, clearly puts forth a similar judgment. Nor be anyone moved that he says it is not necessary *that Peter be saved*, but

that Peter be saved not necessarily but contingently—although it follows necessarily: *Peter shall be saved not necessarily but contingently; therefore Peter shall be saved*; and the antecedent, according to him, is necessary, therefore also the consequent. Because when he says it is necessary that *Peter be saved not necessarily but contingently*, he understands it of the aforesaid consequent necessity, consonant with contingency and the liberty of choice, as he also evidently expresses. But when he denies that *Peter be saved* is necessary, he understands of necessity contrary to contingency and the liberty of choice, which—according to what was set forth in chapter 10 of this book concerning this adversative conjunction *Sed (but)*—he evidently insinuates, saying thus: *Peter to be saved is not necessary, but contingent*. For which also below in chapter 11 he says: "Since grace is nothing else than God's will, by which He gratuitously saves, but He wills (for example) not only *that Peter be saved*, but *that he be saved from the liberty of his choice, and not necessarily but contingently*—just as He foreknows and predestinates not only *that he be saved*, but *that he be saved with the aforesaid addition*: grace or the divine will does not compel *that Peter be saved* or any such similar thing to be necessary, but, as has been said, *that he be saved from free choice and contingently* to be necessary."

Nor again let it move anyone that he says *perhaps*, and as it were doubting—he does not seem to respond by way of definition. For this is his final response; and because he can reasonably do this, even if he himself does not doubt, in order to repress the presumptuous audacity of others, and that they may soberly take instruction. Adverbs of doubt and similar words also do not always import doubt of the speaker, but sometimes by the figure of *Irony* certitude and certain affirmation; sometimes, however, doubt in the minds of hearers, and reproof of them. Wherefore the Prophets, the Apostles, and God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, knowing most certainly, sometimes uttered such adverbs and words. Whence Psalm 80: "*For nothing perhaps I had humbled their enemies*." Cassiodorus: "*Perhaps*—that is, *truly*, if it be said ironically." And below at Psalm 118: "*Unless that Thy law is my meditation, I had perhaps perished in my humility*." And the Apostle to Romans 8: "*I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory*." Gloss: "*I reckon, that is, I know*." And in 1 Corinthians 7: "*I think that I also have the spirit of God*." Gloss: "Note that in saying *I think*, the Apostle does not doubt, but reproves contemners." And Job 14: "*Dost thou think that a dead man shall live again?*" Upon which Gregory in *Moralia* XII.5: "Just men are wont, in that which they themselves feel certain and solid, as it were to bring forth something out of doubt, that they may transfer the words of the weaker to themselves; but again by a strong sentence in every way contradict that infirm doubt, so that by the fact that they seem to bring forth doubtfully, they somewhat condescend to the weak, and by the fact that they bring forth a certain sentence, they draw the doubtful minds of the weaker to solidity."

He Himself also, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge—Jesus Christ—similarly speaks, saying: "*Doth He give thanks to that servant because he hath done what He commanded him? I think not*" (Luke 17). And Matthew 11: "*If in Sodom etc., they had perchance remained unto this day**. And John 4: "*Thou perchance wouldst have asked of Him,*"

etc. And below in chapter 5: "*If you believed Moses, perhaps you would believe me also.*" And still below in 8: "*If you knew me, perhaps you would know my Father also.*" Upon which Augustine, part 1, homily 37: "He who knows all things, when He says *perhaps*, does not doubt but reproves. Note then how *perhaps*—which seems to be a word of doubt—is said reprovingly. But it is a word of doubt, when it is said by a man doubting because not knowing; but when a word of doubt is said by God, since nothing whatever lies hidden from God, by that doubt unfaithfulness is reproved, divinity does not opine. For men, concerning those things which they hold certain, sometimes reprovingly doubt—that is, place a word of doubt—when in heart they do not doubt: as if you were indignant with your servant and should say, *Dost thou despise me? Consider, perhaps I am thy Lord.* Hence also the Apostle, speaking to certain contemners of his, says: *I reckon that I also have the spirit of God.* He who says *I reckon* seems to doubt, but he reproves, he does not doubt." In Matthew 24 also the very Wisdom of God says: "*They shall give great signs and wonders, so that even the elect, if it be possible, may be led into error.*" Upon which Gregory on *Ezekiel* I.9: "Why is this said with doubt, since what is to be is foreknown by the Lord?" And he responds: "This doubting of dominical speech was, from the hearts of the elect, a designation of the temptation. Through this then is expressed that the elect shall be tempted in heart; for they nod, if they do not fall. It is therefore said *if it be possible*, because they shall tremble, and yet they are called *elect*, because they shall not fall."

For the two remaining parts, however, it must be observed that in the divine will, with respect to its extrinsic effects present or future, there is fullest contingency to either alternative, and supreme freedom of contradiction, as has been more often said. Yet with respect to them there is in it antecedent necessity—as with respect to present things, as the last part of the second corollary of this book shows. Wherefore also by similar reasoning with respect to future things likewise. For all things which shall come to pass from a cause necessary in being and infrustrable in causing shall come to pass from naturally antecedent necessity, as the definitions of naturally antecedent necessity and its effect in chapter 2 of this book show; and all things which shall come to pass shall come to pass from such a cause—namely, from the divine will, as has been shown above. Nor does this imply any repugnance, as is more fully declared in chapters 29 and 5 of this book.

THOMAS BRADWARDINE — *DE CAUSA DEI CONTRA PELAGIUM*

Book III, Chapter LI — On Eternity

(with Corollary)

CHAPTER LI. ON ETERNITY.

But further, with the spirit of understanding raising us up a little higher, this same truth can be shown by another way, namely, by the way of eternity, touched upon in the thirtieth chapter of this book. For when this is known, God and His knowledge and willing can in some manner be known; but when this is unknown, those things also are necessarily unknown. Therefore, we must first discourse a little concerning eternity itself.

It is established, then, according to the opinion of the Philosophers, that the measure ought to be of the same nature as, and similar to, the thing measured. Now man is mutable, and his actions are mutable; therefore they are also measured by a mutable measure, namely a temporal one — by time itself, that is, or by an instant. But God, and any intrinsic action of His whatsoever — to wit, His knowing and willing — is altogether immutable, as the fifth and twenty-third chapters of the first book teach. Therefore, neither God, nor any intrinsic action of His, is *per se*, immediately, and properly measured by a mutable measure (namely, by time or an instant), but by an immutable, invariable, stable, and eternal measure — or rather, by eternity itself, immutably, wholly without succession, uniformly, and stably enduring.

For in eternity itself there is no divisibility, no greater, no less, no priority, no posteriority, no mutability, no approach, no recession, no succession, nothing past, nothing future, nor any successive difference whatsoever, but an indivisible, simple, single, identical, unsuccessive, and instantaneous presentness and simultaneity, as is shown in the first chapter of the first book — nay rather, a super-indivisible, super-simple, super-single, super-identical, super-unsuccessive, and super-instantaneous presentness and simultaneity beyond the temporal instant. For the temporal instant is the end of the past and the beginning of the future; but in eternity there is nothing past nor future — that is, nothing mutable and successive in any way — for the past comes and recedes, begins and ceases. Not so in eternity: the temporal instant stands now only, but eternity always. The temporal instant, as also time itself, is posterior to eternity and to the eternal instant, and imitates each as best it can.

Therefore God knows and wills indivisibly, simply, singly, presently, and simultaneously — nay rather, super-simply, super-singly, super-instantaneously, super-presently, super-simultaneously beyond the temporal instant. For who would presume to say that God knows or wills intrinsically in different and different ways according to different and different successive differences of time? Who would presume to say that the omnipotent and altogether self-sufficient Creator of time stands in need of time and of the successions of flowing time, like miserable man, in order to know or will anything — or to know anything intrinsically, contingently, freely, necessarily, or in any other manner whatsoever? For the first supposition, the fifth and twenty-third of the first book, and the thirtieth of this book, set forth above, forbid that it be so said.

The same opinion, although obscurely, the ancient Philosophers also testify. Among them, Father Hermes, in the first book *On the World and the Heaven*, wrote thus: "Whatever is extended through spaces consists either as yearly, or temporal [secular], or perpetual, or eternal. The yearly

is dissolved by old age, the temporal by an age, the perpetual by durability, the eternal is unbounded. Time, beginning from eternity, is resolved into the bosom of eternity, wearied by its longer circuit — namely, departing from unity to number, from stability to motion. The moment of time is what is moved, the moment of eternity is that from which time is born and into which it must be resolved, that which is extended throughout the universe."

The same author, on the eternal Word, in the forty-third chapter, says: "Eternity is unopposable, immobile, and indissoluble. This, then, is eternity, which neither begins to be nor ceases, which, fixed by an immutable law of running, is turned by sempiternal commotion, and rises and sets often through the members of another, so that with the changing of the times it rises again through those members through which it had set."

For the fuller exposition and better understanding of this saying, however, one should attend to what he writes upon the thirty-fourth chapter of the same work, saying that God alone is immobile — unless someone should dare to say that His commotion is in eternity. But rather eternity itself is immobile, in which the agitation of all times remains, and from which the agitation of all times takes its beginning. Therefore God was stable, and similarly eternity was always with Him. And so, although eternity is stable, immobile, and fixed, nevertheless because the agitation of time, which is mobile, is always called into eternity — and so mobility is turned by reason of time — it comes about that eternity itself, alone immobile, seems to be agitated through the time in which it is, and in which is all agitation. Thus it comes to pass that the stability of eternity is moved, and the mobility of time becomes a stability fixed by the law of running. Thus also it is credible that God is agitated within Himself by the same immobility; for His stability in greatness is an immobile agitation, since the law of His own immobile greatness is so. Hence this — being such as is not subject to the senses — is undefined, incomprehensible, inestimable; nor can it be sustained, nor be brought to pass, nor be tracked out. For where, and how, and whence, or when, or of what kind it is, is uncertain. For it is borne in the highest stability, and in itself is its own stability, whether it be God, or eternity, or both, or one in the other, or both in both. Wherefore eternity is without the definition of time. For stability, since it is fixed in such wise that, by the benefit of firmness, it is able to sustain those things which are agitable, deservedly holds the principate. Therefore the beginning of all things that are is God and eternity. But the world, since it is mobile, does not have the principate; for its mobility forestalls its own stability by holding an immobile firmness in the law of sempiternal agitation.

After him Plato, and certain Platonists, discoursed concerning eternity, age, and time. Whence Plato, in the ninth chapter of the first book of the *Timaeus*, using "age" for "eternity," speaks thus: "Days and nights and months and years, which were not before the celestial adornment, He commanded then to exist when the world was being born — all of which are parts of time. And we, when we ascribe these things together with age to the same solitary nature, do not rightly fashion them as parts of an indivisible thing. For we say it *was, is, will be*; but to that solitary nature only *to be* belongs, according to its true and certain reckoning. *To have been*, however, and *to be about to be*, do not belong to it; these indeed are proper to the begetting of time. For

these are motions: the one of that which goes before, the other of that which is impending — not of age, but of time. For the abode of age is perpetual and immutable; therefore neither younger nor older, nor *was*, nor *will be*, nor will it suffer any of those things which sensible nature suffers, but all these things are alternations of time, which images age." In the same author, moreover, this same eternity is sometimes called *saeculum* (an age). Whence Averroes, on the second book *On the Heaven and the World*, chapter 100, where the translation he expounds has *saeculum*, says thus: "Plato called that which was before time existed *saeculum*, because time is new according to him; and he intends by *saeculum* a being terminating all beings, which existed before time."

Aristotle, following these, in the first book *On the Heaven*, chapter 100, divides and distinguishes eternity in two ways: positing one as the natural period of any life whatsoever, but the other as that which derives its name from "always being" — namely, uniformly and immutably — being called the immortal divine, that is, of God, who according to His substance and every intrinsic disposition is intransmutable and altogether immortal. For whatever is transmuted, at least intrinsically according to some disposition, necessarily dies in respect of that disposition which it loses. Whence he says thus: "This name has been divinely uttered by the ancients. For the end which contains the time of the life of each thing, of which there is nothing outside according to nature, has been called the eternal of each thing. According to the same reckoning, the end of the whole heaven, and all time, and that which contains infinitude in its perfection, is eternal, taking its name from 'always being,' immortal and divine. Whence to other things also it is communicated — to some more clearly, to some more obscurely — to be and to live. For just as has been many times declared in the encyclic discussions concerning divine matters by reasonings, that the divine is intransmutable, necessary, first, and supreme, that which is so disposed bears witness to the things said. For neither is there anything else that will move it (for that would surely be more divine), nor does it have anything depraved, nor is it in need of any of its goods, since none is wanting." These three causes of the Philosopher are to be noted.

Likewise it is to be noted that, where the new translation says that the eternal takes its denomination from "always being," the translation which Averroes expounds says thus: "this name is derived from its act, since it always is." Whence it can be elicited that *to be* is a certain *acting*, or a certain action of being, just as *to live* is the action and the life of the living, as had been declared in the eighteenth chapter of the second book. Whence further it is to be observed that, just as according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the *Physics*, fluxible time follows fluxible action — namely, the motion of the heaven — so stable eternity follows stable action — namely, the being of God — and from it in some manner is derived, flows down, and emanates. For just as a flowing point causes a line, and an instant time, so also God, the most stable instant, through His act, as it were by a certain flux, is seen to cause eternity. And this most of all in human cognition, which according to the Philosopher in the book *On Memory and Reminiscence* does not occur without the continuous, nor without the reckoning of time and motion — although in God there is no flux mutably or temporally successive.

From these things, eternity is seen to be definable thus, briefly: **Eternity is the measure, impartibly and immutably abiding, of an act likewise abiding.** The reckoning of the genus and differentiae is not hidden. Whence it is also clear that eternity precedes time according to nature; for time is a passion of that which is prior according to nature. For the being of God and His act is naturally prior to the motion of the heaven, just as God is naturally prior to the heaven, since both this and that are caused by God, as the second and fourth chapters of the first book show. Whence the Philosopher, in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 16: "Things prior," he says, "are called the passions of the prior, as straightness is of lightness; for the former is *per se* a passion of a line, but the latter of a surface."

By the same considerations also, that saying of Exodus 15 can be expounded: *The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond.* For if "eternal" be taken in the first manner, it is plainly true; if in the second, then still the Lord is in some manner higher than eternity, and transcends it, as the cause originating and exercising principate over its caused, originated, and produced effect. For from Him in some manner causally, originally, and by way of principle it is derived. Wherefore the second proposition of the *Book of Causes* says thus: "Every higher being is either being higher than eternity and prior to it, or with eternity, or after eternity and above time."

Nor do I reckon it should be neglected — for the understanding of Scripture frequently — that where the new translation has "eternal," the translation which the Commentator expounds has sometimes "age of ages" (*saeculum saeculorum*), sometimes "age" (*saeculum*), sometimes "age of an age" (*saeculum saeculi*), sometimes "ages" (*saecula*); and Plato sometimes calls eternity *aevum*. Whence it appears that these are really the same. With these things in concord, Augustine, on Psalm 105 (or Psalm 135), *Confess to the Lord because He is good, because His mercy endures unto an age*, says that this Greek word, *eis tòn aiōna*, can be interpreted "unto an age" and likewise "unto eternity." The same author, on Psalm 101, *In generation and unto generation*, or as he himself has it, *In the generation of generations are Thy years*, says that by this phrase, "in ages of ages," eternity is wont to be designated in the sacred Scriptures. The same author also, on Psalm 130, *Let Israel hope in the Lord, from this now and unto an age*, sententially approving both the translation and the distinction of the Philosopher, speaks thus: "What is written in Greek, *eis tòn aiōna*, has been expounded as 'from this now and unto an age.' But the name of *saeculum* does not always signify this present age, but sometimes eternity. For 'eternal' is understood in two manners: 'unto eternity,' that is, always without end; or 'until we arrive at eternity.' This, therefore, is how it should be understood: until we arrive at eternity, let us hope in the Lord God, because when we have come to eternity, hope will be no more, but the very thing itself will be."

Further, of the *Twenty-four Philosophers*, the ninth of the twenty-four definitions concerning God says thus: "God is He to whom alone is present whatever pertains to His time" — calling God's time His eternity.

Among all the Philosophers whom I remember to have seen, however, Boethius, the familiar disciple of Philosophy, in the fifth book of the *Consolation*, last prose, expressing more clearly the usefulness of the cognition of eternity and its aforesaid property, speaks thus: "That God is eternal is the common judgment of all who live by reason. What therefore eternity is, let us consider; for this lays open to us in like measure both the divine nature and the divine knowledge. Eternity, then, is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life — which becomes more clear from a comparison of temporal things. For whatever lives in time, this, being present, proceeds from things past into things future; and there is nothing constituted in time which can equally embrace the whole space of its own life: but the morrow, indeed, it has not yet apprehended; the yesterday it has already lost; even in this present life of yours, you live no more than in that mobile and transitory moment. What therefore suffers the condition of time, although — as Aristotle judged concerning the world — it never began to be nor ever ceases, and its life be extended with the infinity of time, yet not such is it that it should be rightly believed eternal. For it does not at once comprehend and embrace the whole space of an infinite life, but the future it does not yet have, the past it has now no longer. Whatever, therefore, comprehends and possesses, equally and at the same time, the whole plenitude of interminable life, to which neither anything of the future is wanting nor anything of the past has flowed away — this is rightly held to be eternal. And this must of necessity, both being in possession of itself, always be present to itself, and have the infinity of mobile time present to itself. For that infinite motion of temporal things imitates this present-stationed state of immutable life; and since it cannot represent and equal it, it falls from immobility into motion, decreases from the simplicity of presence into the infinite quantity of future and past. And since it cannot possess equally the whole plenitude of its life, by the very fact that it never in any manner ceases to be, it seems to some extent to emulate that which it cannot fulfill and express, binding itself to whatever presence there be of this scant and fleeting moment — which, since it bears a certain image of that abiding presence, bestows upon whomsoever it falls upon that they should seem to be. But because it could not abide, it has snatched at the infinite journey of time, and in that manner it has come to pass that, by going, it should continue that life whose plenitude it could not embrace by abiding. And so, if we wish to impose upon things their fitting names, following Plato, let us say that God indeed is eternal, but the world perpetual."

In concord with whom, Anselm, in the *Monologion*, chapter 24, says: "It is established that the supreme substance is without beginning and without end, and that it has neither past nor future, nor the temporal — that is, fleeting — present which we now use, since its age, or eternity, which is nothing other than itself, is immutable and without parts. Therefore, does not 'always,' which seems to designate all time, when it is said of that supreme substance, much more truly be understood to signify eternity, which is never dissimilar to itself, than the variety of times, which is always in some respect not similar to itself? Wherefore, if it be said 'always to be,' since for it *to be* and *to live* are the same, nothing better is understood than 'eternally to be' or 'to live' — that is, perfectly at once to obtain interminable life as a whole. For its eternity is seen to be interminable life, perfectly existing as a whole at once."

Likewise the Prophet shows this same present and uniformly always-instant of eternity, in Psalm 83, saying: *Better is one day in Thy courts above thousands* — as if to say, in Thy courts there is only one day, not many, and in one only manner, and therefore indivisibly always-instant. This same one day can likewise be called many days, and even many years. Whence Job 10: *Are Thy days as the days of man, and Thy years as the times of men?* And below in 36: *The number of His years is inestimable.* And Psalm 76: *I considered the days of old, and the eternal years I had in mind.* And Psalm 101: *But Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.* And by like reasoning, eternity can be called both singularly and plurally "all time" and "all times": singularly all time, because it singularly and indivisibly coexists with all time and is equivalent to it in existing; and plurally all times, because it stably coexists with all times and is equivalent to them in existing. It can also be called greater than any time even infinite, if according to Aristotle it be supposed that it is superior to and prior to any time, as has been shown above. Nor does anything there, as in fluxible time, flow away or is taken away, but the whole abides stably together at once.

Now although eternity can metaphorically be called all time and all times, it can also figuratively be named "instant," according to that of Ecclesiasticus 42: *The Lord knew all knowledge, and looked upon the sign of the age*; nay more truly "instant" than "time" or "times," because unsuccessively, impartibly, immutably the same in number it always-instant.

But that I may confirm the aforesaid understanding of Sacred Scripture by sacred witnesses: Behold, Augustine on the same passage cited from Psalm 83 says: "Let men despise thousands of days; let them desire one day — one which has neither rising nor setting; one day, the sempiternal day, to which yesterday yields not, and which the morrow does not press upon." The same author, in the third book *On Free Will*, last chapter, expounding the same authority, says: "By 'thousands of days' let the mutability of time be understood, but by the name of 'one day' let the incommutability of eternity be called." The same also in the first book of the *Confessions*, chapter 6: "Thou art not changed, nor is the day of today carried through in Thee, since Thy years shall not fail. Thy years are the day of today. How many of our days, and of those of our fathers, have already passed through Thy today, and have received from it their measures in such manner as they could exist, and yet others shall pass and shall receive and shall in some manner exist; but Thou art the same, and all things of tomorrow and of the last, and all things of yesterday and behind, today Thou wilt make, today Thou hast made. What is it to me, if some man does not understand? Let him also rejoice, saying, 'What is this?' Let him rejoice; and so let him love rather to find Thee by not finding, than by finding not to find Thee."

The same author, on Psalm 101, *In generation and unto generation are Thy years*: "Which," he says, "are Thy years? Which, but those that come not nor pass away? Which, but those that do not come for this end, that they may not be? For all days in this time come to this end, that they may not be — every hour, every month, every year. Nothing of these stands. Before it comes, it shall be; when it has come, it shall not be. Therefore those Thy years, eternal — Thy years which are not changed — shall be in the generation of generations. For not other are God's years, and

other God Himself; but God's years are God's eternity. God's eternity is His very substance, which has nothing mutable, where nothing is past, as if now it were not; nothing is future, as if not yet it were. There is not there save *is*. There is not *was* and *will be*, since both what was now is not, and what shall be is not yet, but whatever is there, is nothing but *is*." And below, on the verse *Thy years shall not fail*: "Let us hope," he says, "to come to those abiding years, in which days are not carried through by the circuit of the sun, but that abides which is, just as it is, because this alone truly *is*."

The blessed Gregory also, in the sixteenth book of the *Morals*, chapter 16, on that of Job 24, *But those who have known Him are ignorant of His days*, says: "What are 'the days of the Lord' but His very eternity? Which is sometimes expressed by the change of one day, as it is written: *Better is one day in Thy courts above thousands*. Sometimes, however, on account of its multitude, it is signified by the appellation of many days, of which it is written: *Unto the age of the age are Thy years*. We, then, are rolled within times by the fact that we are creatures; but God, because He is the Creator, comprehends all our times by His eternity." The same author also, above in book 9 of the *Morals*, chapter 26, on that of Job 10, *Are Thy days as the days of man*, etc.: "The days," he says, "and years of man differ from the days and years of eternity, because our life, which begins in time, while eternity forms it within the breadth of its own bosom, eternity devours; whose immensity, indeed, since it stretches above and below, beyond and on this side of us, without inception and without end its eternal *being* is dilated, and to it neither things passed pass away nor things yet to come are wanting — as if they did not appear — because He who has always to be sees all things present to Himself, and when in beholding He is not stretched after and before, by no change of intuition is He varied."

The same property of eternity Anselm also insinuates, in the third and fourth chapters of *De Concordia*, as the twenty-seventh chapter of this book alleges. Concerning which Robert of Lincoln, in the eighth book *On Free Will*, says that eternity is at the limit of simplicity, simpler than every instant. These things concerning eternity, set forth above, all the Doctors, ancient and modern, profess unanimously.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY: THAT THERE IS ONE AND THE SAME INSTANT, ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE, IN THE WHOLE OF ETERNITY; AND THAT THE WHOLE OF ETERNITY IS NEITHER MORE MULTIPLE NOR GREATER THAN ITS INSTANT, NOR IS THE INSTANT OF ETERNITY SIMPLER THAN OR LESS THAN IT; WHEREFORE ALSO ETERNITY AND ITS INSTANT ARE REALLY THE SAME. FURTHERMORE, THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THESE THINGS, ETERNITY IS CALLED WHOLE, GREAT, LONG, EVEN INFINITE; AND IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN, TO BE, AND TO BE GOING TO BE; AND THAT SOMETHING IS SAID, MOREOVER, TO HAVE BEEN, TO BE, AND TO BE GOING TO BE IN ETERNITY. WHEREFORE

ALSO IT IS SAID OF GOD AND HIS INTRINSIC ACT, BY TRANSMPTION, *HE WAS, IS, AND WILL BE*; CONCERNING HIS EXTRINSIC ACTIONS, HOWEVER, IT IS PROPERLY AND TEMPORALLY SAID, *HE DID, DOES, AND WILL DO*.

From these things, however, it is evidently inferred that there is one and the same instant, altogether immutable, in the whole of eternity, and that the whole of eternity is neither more multiple nor greater than its instant, nor is the instant of eternity simpler or less than it; wherefore also eternity and its instant are really the same. Moreover, notwithstanding these things, eternity is called whole, great, long, even infinite; and is said to have been, to be, and to be going to be; and something, moreover, is said in eternity to have been, to be, and to be going to be: wherefore also it is said of God and His intrinsic act, by transumption, *He was, is, and will be*; concerning His extrinsic actions, however, it is properly and temporally said, *He did, does, and will do*.

The first part of this corollary follows evidently, since according to what was shown before, in eternity, always-instant stably, there is no mutability, nor any diversity whatever. The second follows from the same things, and from the first. The third follows from the second. The fourth is inferred from the second and third. For if eternity and its instant were not really the same, they would differ as time and its instant; wherefore the one would be more multiple and greater, but the other simpler and less. The fifth likewise follows from the premises; for eternity coexists with all time — great, long, even (according to Aristotle) infinite. Wherefore also it admits from time such transumptive denominations. The sixth, too, follows from this fifth, and is proved likewise as the fifth. The seventh also is inferred from the sixth, and by the demonstration of that. The eighth part of it can be inferred from the sixth.

The cause of this transumption, however, is that we have no word properly signifying the stable abiding of eternity; wherefore we are necessarily compelled to transfer, according to whatever sort of similitude, our temporal words — according to whichever temporal differences — to eternity and to the eternal God, and to His coeternal intrinsic acts, since they coexist with all time, and have not been wanting to any time, nor are wanting now, nor will be wanting in future.

To this Anselm bears witness, in *De Concordia*, chapter 3, saying: "The proposition (*propositum*), according to which the saints have been called in eternity, in which there is no past nor future, but only present, is immutable in eternity. For it has not been, nor will it be, but only is. Although there is nothing there save the present, nevertheless that present is not temporal, like ours, but eternal, in which all times are contained. For just as the present time contains every place, and the things which are in any place; so to the eternal present is enclosed at once all time, and the things which are in any time. Therefore when the Apostle says that God foreknew His saints, predestined, called, justified, magnified — none of these is prior or posterior with God, but all are to be understood at once in the eternal present. For eternity has its own *at once*, in which are all things which are at once in place and in time, and which are in diverse places or times. But that the same Apostle might show that he had not put those words in a temporal signification, those things which are future he pronounced by the verb of the past tense. For not

yet had he so temporally called, justified, magnified those whom he foreknew as still to be born. Whence it can be known that he used verbs of past signification on account of the lack of a verb signifying the eternal presence, since those things which are past in time are altogether immutable in likeness of the eternal present."

Is it not also said truly of the Holy Spirit by the voice of truth, *Whatsoever He shall hear, He shall speak* (John 16)? Upon which Augustine, in the second part *On John*, homily 45 (or the ninety-ninth of the whole), says thus: "Nor let it move you that the verb of future time is set down. For it has not been said *whatsoever He has heard*, but *whatsoever He shall hear, He shall speak*. That hearing indeed is sempiternal, since the knowledge is sempiternal; in that which is sempiternal, however — without beginning and without end — whatever verb of time be put down, whether of past, of present, or of future, it is not put down mendaciously. For although that immutable and ineffable nature does not receive *was* and *will be*, but only *is* (for it is truly, since it cannot be changed, and therefore to it alone it befits to say, *I am who am, and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is hath sent me to you*), nevertheless on account of the mutability of the times in which our mortality and our mutability are involved, we say not mendaciously *both was, and will be, and is*. *Was* in the ages past; *is* in the present; *will be* in those to come. *Was*, since He has never been wanting; *will be*, since He shall never be wanting; and since He always is — for neither, as one who is no more, has He set with things past; nor, as one who does not abide, does He glide on with the present; nor, as one who has not been, does He arise with things to come. Therefore, since human speech is varied according to the rolling of times, of Him who through no times could be wanting, nor can be, nor shall be able to be wanting, true things are said by verbs of any time. Therefore the Holy Spirit always *hears*, since He always *knows*; and so He has both heard, and hears, and shall hear; and through this, has heard, and hears, and shall hear."

In concord with which, Gregory in the twenty-third book of the *Morals*, on that of Job 33, *Once shall God speak*, says thus: "But that He says not 'has spoken' but 'shall speak,' setting down not the past time but the future, is plain to all, since to God neither past nor future time is fitting. Therefore any time whatever is so freely placed in Him, inasmuch as none truly is; nor would any time be able to be said freely, if even one were said properly. Hence it is permitted to say boldly any time in God, since in Him no time may properly be said."

The last part of this, however, follows manifestly. For just as the eternal intrinsic act of God is measured by eternity or by its instant, so His extrinsic, temporal action upon temporal things is measured by time, or by an instant of time, just as is the action of a creature.

Book III, Chapter LII

CHAPTER LII. BY WAY OF ETERNITY HE DEMONSTRATES THE AFOREMENTIONED OPINION OF THE 50TH CHAPTER.

I have set forth these matters concerning eternity at somewhat greater length for this reason: because I judge it very difficult — indeed almost most difficult — for a temporal man, ever accustomed to act and to understand temporally, with all the differences and respects of fluxing time conceived in the manner of present, past, and future (which are never standing still, but always running), to lift his understanding above those temporal phantasms, and out of that cloudy prison in which he has been so long fettered, up beyond time, beyond the instant, and beyond all temporal differences, in order to contemplate serenely and freely an eternity that ever remains in the same way without mutability — having no flux or succession, nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or lesser — and to contemplate God, who is in that eternity alone (above time and instant) correspondingly eternal, and eternally simply, uniquely, instantaneously, and simultaneously — nay, supersimply, superuniquely, superinstantaneously, and supersimultaneously beyond the temporal instant — ever knowing, willing, and doing all things from within. Although this is most difficult, nevertheless it is necessary for anyone who wishes to know the truth in this matter without grave error.

But I, when I was younger, being ignorant of the Scriptures and of the power of God, blinded by the ignorance of these things — or rather born blind — and deceived by false imagination, supposed that the divine knowledge and willing, like the human, were altered through the vicissitudes of times, and disposed otherwise and otherwise, just as the whole of Sacred Scripture seems to those reading superficially to attest. For it seems very often to say that God is affected otherwise and otherwise toward men according as they themselves are altered otherwise and otherwise in good or evil merits. But how these and similar things ought to be understood, the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of Book I expound. I reckon this same ignorance also to be the cause why perhaps some men similar to me believe that God wills and knows things future, present, and past — and the same thing as future, as present, and as transmitted into the past — otherwise and otherwise from within: that is, non-necessarily and necessarily, freely and not freely; whence they also deny every kind of necessity from future things.

But to this ignorance there appears to apply a remedy, by the power of eternity: scientific reason, the authors of the sciences, the knowing Doctors, the wise Prophets, the wiser Apostles, the most wise Jesus Christ, and the series of both Testaments. For every essence existing eternally — that is, most simply, most unitively, and most immutably — wills and knows its volitions and the things known by it altogether in like manner, and universally so. For if His volition or cognition were changed, He Himself would necessarily be changed, as no one is ignorant, and as the twenty-third chapter of Book I shows. But God is such an essence, as the twenty-third and twenty-fifth chapters of Book I taught.

Likewise, every action properly measured by an immutable measure is immutable; this is at once evident from the mutual proportion and correspondence of the measure to the measurable thing and conversely, and it can be confirmed from the tenth book of the *Metaphysics*. But every intrinsic action of God is measured by an immutable measure, namely by eternity, as the chapters immediately preceding make manifest. Therefore every volition and cognition of God is immutable — immutable, I say, with respect to prior and posterior; for in eternity there is nothing prior or posterior, as appears from what was just shown above. Therefore no intrinsic action of God has — or has had — itself otherwise from within first (for instance, freely according to contradiction before the presence or pastness of the thing) and otherwise afterward (for instance, necessarily); for then it would not be properly measured by eternity, but rather by time, at least as regards being free or necessary, namely by that time in which the foreknowledge was free or necessary; whence the whole of that action would be measured by the whole of that time, as parts by parts — just as the parts of celestial motion, past and future, are measured by similar parts of time, and so the whole by the whole.

[The action is also] immutable in this further sense: that, after it is or has been, it cannot not be, on account of the aforesaid causes. It is immutable thirdly in this sense: that whenever it is, it cannot not be at that time, but it is necessary that it be at that time, just as also is its measure. For just as it is necessary that any most mutable thing measured by most fluxible time or by an instant be when it is, and when it is measured be at that time necessarily measured by a consequent necessity, so also is it necessary that any most immutable action of the most immutable God, measured by most immutable eternity, when it is, be; and when it is measured, be necessarily measured. For how could it be reasonably affirmed that a most fluxible measure now in some way full of a most fluxible measured thing must of necessity be filled by it for that present moment, while a most firm measure now in some way full of a most firm measured thing could for that present moment be wholly emptied of it? Therefore eternity imports a presential necessity, by which — just as eternity itself, so also everything that is in it (because it is always [presentially] in it) — is necessarily.

Now, in order that I may further confirm by the testimonies of the greater authorities the things said above concerning eternal God, His coeternal intrinsic actions, and those future actions ever present in eternity (and therefore necessary insofar as they are there): behold Hermes, *On the Eternal Word*, ch. 43, who speaks thus: "These three — Heimarmene, necessity, order — are effected especially by the nod of God, which govern the world by their law and by divine reason; from these therefore every divine willing or unwilling is wholly turned away. These are not moved by anger, nor bent by favor, but serve the necessity of eternal reason — which eternity is unturnable, immobile, and indissoluble."

Behold also Ecclesiasticus 42, which says: "The Lord knew all knowledge, and looked into the sign of the age" — that is, the sign or instant of eternity; and there follows: "Announcing what has passed, and revealing the things that are to come; the traces of the ages. No thought passes Him by, and no word hides itself from Him. He has adorned the magnificent works of His

wisdom, who is before the age and unto the age; nothing is added, nor shall be diminished, and He needs no one's counsel; for all His works are desirable, and as a spark to behold. All these things live and remain forever, and obey Him in every necessity."

Behold also, more expressly, Boethius, who in Book V of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, in the last prose, after his words on eternity recited in the preceding chapter, immediately subjoins: "Since therefore every judgment grasps according to its own nature the things that are subject to it; and since to God there is always an eternal and presentary state, His knowledge also, having transcended all motion of time, remains in the simplicity of His presence, and embracing the infinite spaces of past and future, considers all things in His simple cognition as if they were now being done. Therefore, if you wish to weigh the presence by which He discerns all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not foreknowledge as of the future, but a knowledge of an instantaneity that never fails. Whence it is called not *previdence* but rather *providence*, because, set far from the lowest things, it surveys all things as from the lofty summit of things. Thus, then, the divine gaze, looking down upon all — that is, looking downward, that is, seeing all things — does not at all disturb the quality of things which, with Him indeed, are present, but with respect to the condition of time are future."

And below, from this presence of future things in eternity in the divine cognition, he concludes a similar necessity, saying: "No necessity compels him who is walking by his will to advance, although when he advances it is necessary that he advance. In the same manner, therefore, if providence sees anything as present, that thing must necessarily be, even though it has no necessity of nature. But God beholds as present those future things which proceed from the freedom of choice; therefore these things, referred to the divine intuition, become necessary." This whole matter, however, was more fully declared in the twenty-eighth chapter of this Book.

This doctrine St. Thomas follows in his commentary on the *First Sentences*, distinction 38, question 5, as the twenty-eighth chapter of this Book has more fully recited; and not only there, but almost everywhere where he treats this matter. The same doctrine also Anselm most plainly imitates in *On Concord*, [chapters] 3 and 4, as his words written in the twenty-seventh chapter of this Book clearly indicate.

Of these — namely Boethius and Anselm — Robert Lincolnensis [Grosseteste], in *On Free Will*, reverently embraces this doctrine. Whence in chapter seven he says: "Although we have spoken of God's knowledge by way of temporal extension, it is most well known that nothing in eternity is according to such a manner of temporal extension; but it is not easy to speak otherwise concerning the simple state of eternity to a weak intellect, still occupied with phantasms of temporal things." Whence also above, in chapter 5, he says that God knows all things by a single, indivisible, and simple gaze, eternally, always, in like manner, immutably; "Wherefore what He knows, He cannot afterward not know; for what relation these statements have — 'I am sitting' and 'I have sat' — to my sitting while I sit and after I have sat, the same relation does the knowledge of God have to my sitting that will be tomorrow, before I sit. For He knows future

things as present, nor does He know them otherwise when they are future and when they are present or past; therefore by every same manner by which it is necessary that God know things when they are or when they are past, it is necessary that He know the same things before they are. But when things are or are past, His knowledge has a consequent necessity; therefore it has the same necessity also before things come to pass."

Nor must the reasoning of the Doctors be forgotten: they say that all things are necessary in eternity because they are present there — which is equivalent to the cause given by the Philosopher, namely, "What is, when it is, must necessarily be" — which St. Thomas also most clearly expresses where he was alleged. This necessity of eternity, therefore, is equipollent to the consequent necessity shown in the fiftieth chapter of this Book. Yet certain authorities placing this necessity in eternity were adduced to prove the necessity according to superior causes set forth in the twenty-seventh chapter of this Book — although they support this much more immediately and evidently than that one, on account of the cause stated in the like manner in the fiftieth chapter of this Book.

This aforesaid necessity of eternity is also sufficiently insinuated by such words of Scripture: "The counsel of the Lord remains forever," "The truth of the Lord remains forever," "Unto the age His mercy," "He has established them forever, and unto the age of ages" — as appears in the fiftieth chapter of this Book. And how great a multitude of authorities of the Old and New Testament, and of authentic writers, brings forth such words and insinuates such or some such necessity, who is ignorant? The twenty-seventh chapter of this Book also commemorates a few of these, all or nearly all of which can soundly be understood according to eternity and the necessity in it. Whence Anselm, *On Concord* 4, says: "Whatever Sacred Scripture pronounces of those things which come about by free choice as necessary, it speaks according to eternity, in which all that is true is present — and nothing but the true — immutably."

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

Book III, Chapter 2 — Corollary

**COROLLARY OF THIRTY PARTS TO BE NOTED, WITH OBJECTIONS RAISED
AND RESOLVED**

From these things, with the good Spirit of God kindly revealing them, there can be, as I hope, more easily dug up and unearthed certain divine treasures, most precious pearls in the field of Scripture long hidden and unknown to me — namely certain most illustrious and profound truths that quiet tumultuous whirlwinds, pacify the assaults of adversaries, and answer numerous objections. After such long digging I seem to perceive and see their resplendent images by certain subtle rays, although these emerge through a dark and earthy medium. From the premises, therefore, the following seems to follow manifestly:

[Truth 1] That God could not, prior in time or in eternity, have not willed (whether privatively or positively) what he now wills, but only by a certain priority of nature or cause — namely the priority of the volitional power to its act.

[Truth 2] Indeed, even God, and likewise the created will, could similarly *prior* in this present instant have not willed what he now wills.

[Truth 3] Both could (by possibility, namely either by preceding power, or insofar as it pertains to the nature of his power nakedly and absolutely considered, or by absolute power or non-repugnance) not will *now and for now* what he now wills — most especially if, according to the opinion of certain ones, the creature were posited as willing and not-willing solely from itself; it could likewise not-will that. But by subsequent and determined, actuated or ordained possibility, it cannot.

[Truth 4] Concerning God's complex knowledge of posterior knowables, the same judgment must be made.

[Truth 5] From these things it furthermore appears clearly how *potuit* (he could have), *potuisset* (he might have been able), *posset* (he could) and *potest* (he can), *posse* (to be able), *possibilitas*, *potentia* and *potestas* signify, differ, and agree in this matter.

[Truth 6] Furthermore, how power in God and in man toward some act for now, which it does not have now, can be drawn out or pass into that act, and how it cannot.

[Truth 7] Also that God and the creature is or is not in some way (for instance, willing this or not willing it, knowing or not knowing), and could and can, by preceding absolute possibility or non-repugnance, not be such or be such without any change whatever; but by ordained or actuable possibility, it cannot be so.

[Truth 8] Further, that the divine volition is always equally free and contingent intrinsically, and therefore equally free and contingent intrinsically with respect to present and past things as with respect to future things; and always equally necessary, and therefore equally necessary with respect to future things as with respect to present and past things.

[Truth 9] Likewise, that God, by preceding possibility, or insofar as it pertains to the nature of the divine power nakedly and absolutely considered, or by absolute power or non-repugnance, could and can now and always in the future not will, and never in the past have willed, any later

future, present, or past *volitum* whatsoever; but by subsequent and determined, actuated or ordained power, he cannot. And the same holds concerning God's being able to will, and to have willed, what he never will, does not, or has not willed — and not being able; concerning his being able not to do, and not to have done, what he will do, does, or has done — and likewise not being able; and being able to do or to have done what he will not do, does not do, nor has done — and likewise not being able.

[**Truth 10**] Wherefore correspondingly: any thing now future could and can for now not be; any created thing now present could or can now and for now not be; and any past thing similarly could not have been; correspondingly also they cannot.

[**Truth 11**] Also that a thing which is not future can be future, and what is not now can now and for now be, and what is not now past can now be past — and that correspondingly they cannot.

[**Truth 12**] Moreover, concerning future contingents, with God there is determinate truth, but with the creature by no means, except perhaps when God reveals it.

[**Truth 13**] Indeed, that with God truth concerning future things is intrinsically equally determinate as concerning present and past things; and therefore with God there is intrinsically equal contingency and freedom with respect to present and past things as with respect to future, and equal necessity with respect to future as with respect to present and past; but with inferior causes there is not such equal contingency or freedom, nor such equal necessity.

OBJECTIONS

That these illustrious truths may shine forth more brightly when their opposites are placed alongside them according to the philosophers' practice, behold what is commonly objected.

Some object against subsequent necessity (whether according to eternity in the divine will as previously stated, at least with respect to future effects), saying: God could before have not willed what he wills, and have willed what he does not will; also not have foreknown what he foreknows, and have foreknown what he does not foreknow. For he is not less powerful than man is. Whence Peter [Lombard], *Sentences* I, dist. 40, says that God from eternity could have not predestined this man; and above, dist. 38, says that God could have not foreknown what comes to pass; and on this opinion he is sustained by many distinctions and chapters there, which very many imitate.

Again, as they say, God could not do what he does or has done, also do what he does not do or has not done; and besides do other things otherwise and have done them. God can also not do things he will do, and do things he will not do. Otherwise indeed he would not be omnipotent, but bound. Many widely-known authorities of canonical Scripture and of the canonical Doctors testify to this most plainly. Wherefore the opinion of Peter Abelard affirming, as Bernard recites in Epistle 10, that God can do or omit only those things, or only in that way, or only at that time

at which he does, and not otherwise — was condemned by Pope Innocent as heretical, as is testified by his bulled rescript transcribed in the fourteenth place among Bernard's epistles.

Stephen, Bishop of Paris, also condemned the article asserting that God necessarily does whatever is immediately done by him; "an error," he says, "whether it be understood of the necessity of coercion, because it removes liberty, or of the necessity of immutability, because it posits the impossibility of doing otherwise."

Likewise it is not absolutely necessary that future contingents come to pass; therefore the revelations, promises, oaths, and predictions of God, of Christ, and of the Prophets can by similar possibility be falsified. Therefore against this opinion, just as against its opposite, return all the absurdities of the many preceding chapters.

Likewise, according to what is premised here and in chapter 50 of this [book], it is not necessary by preceding necessity that God will what he wills; therefore he can by the opposite [possibility] not will it, and by similar reasoning will what he does not will. Since therefore that power is not idle in God, it can pass into act; therefore he can simply will what he does not will. For which reason the arguments adduced through the way of immutability in chapter 32 of this [book] do not at all proceed; or if they do proceed, since from this opinion it follows that God can not-will what he wills, and will what he does not will, it will likewise follow that God is mutable.

Likewise, even if God's volition and cognition were necessary in some manner, they would not be so necessary with respect to future things as with respect to present and past. Therefore it would become more necessary upon the thing's becoming present without any change whatever, which the thirtieth [chapter] of this invalidates; or by a change in him, which the thirty-second of this enervates. For unless the divine volition and cognition were more necessary with respect to present and past than to future, God could equally not will and not know present and past as future things; therefore those [present and past] could not only [possibly fail], but equally fail to be and to have been, just as future things [can fail] to come to be. There would also be in them not only contingency to either side and freedom, but as much as in future things, and as much necessity in future as in those. Moreover determinate truth — indeed truth equally determinate here and there — which all things, both reason and manifold authority, manifestly forbid.

For if a present thing could for now not be, and a past not have been, by some change — namely from such to non-such — this could be, which evidently implies a contradiction. It would also be expedient for men to deliberate about past things just as about future; indeed it would not be expedient to deliberate about these, just as not about those. According to this opinion, also, the deflowered could be revirginated, just as the contrary.

The Philosopher also, in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I, says: "What is, when it is, must be; and what is not, when it is not, must not be." This is also testified by the authorities of Averroes, Hugh, and Peter cited in chapter 6 of this [book], and not a few others. The same Philosopher in the same place evidently establishes that in past things there is necessity and

determinate truth, but in future things by no means — rather contingency to either side, and freedom, and indetermination of truth; and that if all future things came to be necessarily, there would be no need at all to deliberate or to engage in business.

He also in *Ethics* III.7 shows that deliberation is not about anything necessary whatever, but only about things which are in us, that is, in our power. He also further on, in [*Ethics*] VI.2, says: "Nothing done is eligible — for instance, no one chooses Troy to have been captured. For one does not deliberate about what has been done, but about what is future and contingent. What has been done cannot not have happened. On account of which Agatho rightly says: 'Of this alone is even God deprived: to make undone things which have been done.'" He also in *De Mundo*, last [chapter], says: "Thus it is established in [the realm of] the done that one of the Fates is called Atropos, that is, *unchangeable*, because all things which have been done are immutable."

Concordantly with these, Pliny in *Natural History* II says that God cannot make it that he who lived did not live, that he who held honors did not hold them, and that he has no right over past things except that of forgetfulness. Many Catholic Doctors hold these same views in many places. But specifically against the revirgination of the corrupted, Amos 5 seems to contradict, saying: "The virgin Israel is cast down upon her own land; there is none that may raise her up." On which the Gloss: "Thus it happens that the virgin Israel who has gone astray has none to raise her, because he who has once departed from union, and has lost the virginity which he had with one man, will not be able to recover his former state and virginity and the blessedness of union."

Whence Jerome to the virgin Eustochium, Epistle 82, writes thus: "Beware, I beg you, lest God should ever say of you, 'The virgin Israel is fallen, and there is none to raise her up.' I will speak boldly: although God can do all things, he cannot raise up a virgin after her ruin. He is able indeed to free from punishment, but he is not willing to crown one who has been corrupted." This is alleged in the canon, *Causa* 32, *quaestio* 5, *Si Paulus*.

DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE TRUTHS

That these assaults may be more safely met, the truths premised must be proved, so that thus, surrounded by the shield of solid truth, no fear may be feared.

[Demonstration of Truth 1]

For the first truth, it must be known that *to not-will privatively* is said to be not-willing on account of the privation of the act of willing — that is, *not to will*. *To not-will positively*, however, is said to be not-willing through a positive act of will contrary to the act of willing — as it were, to reject or to hate. This manifestly follows from the premises. For according to what was previously shown, God in no way is otherwise and otherwise intrinsically — neither temporally nor variably according to successive volumes of times — but eternally, immutably, and stably is whatever he is intrinsically in any way whatsoever.

[Demonstration of Truth 2]

The second truth similarly follows evidently. For according to the premises, in eternity there is no priority or posteriority of duration, nor any succession from this to that.

[Demonstration of Truth 3]

The third [truth] appears to be patent in virtue of the two prior ones. For if there is some priority there, as all confess, and none according to time, nor according to eternity, it remains that [there is priority] only according to nature, since other modes of priority have no place there. For this truth to be more fully shown, however, it must be known that the volitional power in God, just as in the creature, naturally in some way precedes its act, as cause precedes the caused, the begetter the begotten, and the producer the produced — which mode of priority in divine matters is more fully shown in chapter 30 of Book II of this [work].

This volitional power, according to what was previously shown in chapters 4 and 5 of this [book], even most completely prepared or disposed, insofar as it naturally precedes its free act *ad extra* (which it now elicits presentially and eternally), could not elicit it, because there is no antecedent necessity there — indeed it stands equally, contingently, indifferently, and freely according to contradiction toward producing it and not producing it.

This natural or causal priority in the eternal God is similar in some way to the temporal priority in temporal man, by which prior in time he could have not willed what he now wills. Wherefore, according to the similitude of the protension of temporal priority, it is said that *prior* God could have not willed what he now wills — where, however, temporal priority is not properly signified, but only the natural or causal priority of free power according to contradiction to its free act.

Nevertheless, in temporal man, beyond this temporal priority, there is also that natural and causal priority — namely of the volitional and active power to the act. For the human volitional power, as far as concerns itself, even most sufficiently prepared, insofar as it naturally precedes its free act which it presentially produces now, could not produce it, because there is no antecedent necessity there, but it stands equally, contingently, indifferently, and freely according to contradiction toward producing it and not, as is clear from chapters 4 and 5 of this [book].

But that this may shine forth more clearly, let it be supposed (according to what was held in the demonstration of the eighth truth of chapter 5 of this [book]) that a rational creature — angel or man — was created in a past instant A with a most sufficient disposition for willing, and willed in that [instant] well or badly (the angel well, the man badly), and existed no further than A. Each therefore, according to the corollary of chapter 4 of this [book], freely according to contradiction willed in A — the one well, the other badly. Therefore each could, and consequently *prior could have* not so willed. For the past-tense verb implies a *prior*, which cannot rightly be understood of temporal priority, nor any other successive priority, but only of the aforesaid natural and causal priority.

The greatest reason, also, why it seems necessary to say that God and man *prior could have not willed* what he wills, is that contingency and freedom may be saved in them — which seem necessarily to import possibility to the opposite according to temporal priority. But they do not necessarily import this, but only that aforesaid causal priority, as is clear from the seventh and eighth truths of chapter 5 of this [book], and from their defenses in chapter 6, and especially from the words of John Scotus posited there.

Therefore God could similarly *prior causally* have not-willed privatively what he now wills, and likewise positively. This, I judge, is the understanding of certain Doctors saying that active powers in a certain prior [moment] to their acts can not produce those acts, but sometimes contrary ones. Of this causal priority in the eternal God, I think, ignorance is the cause why some perhaps suppose the eternal God, like temporal man, can be and act, be affected and disposed, otherwise and otherwise successively-intrinsically according to prior and posterior in time. For on account of the similarity of these two similitudes, and on account of the very great custom of temporal men of measuring temporal powers and actions according to prior and posterior in time, they by no means distinguish between them, but estimate that causal [priority] as temporal. But not so, not so according to the Fathers' opinion — but far otherwise must be thought.

Therefore one must imagine — imitating the image of truth — that the eternal God, not temporally nor instantaneously by a temporal instant, but supertemporally and superinstantaneously above the instance of a temporal instant, in the unique and most simple instant of eternity, freely willed something posterior; and how *prior he could have not-willed* that *volitum*, because not by priority in time nor in eternity, but only by the aforesaid causal priority. That temporal men, thinking temporally through an instant of time as most known, may rise up somehow to the more unknown instant of eternity, the imagining must be done according to the image of creatures premised: that God in the instant of the world's creation (which is A) freely willed something inferior, and never afterward temporally had the freely volitional power, just as he did not properly have it temporally.

For let it be imagined — perhaps by an impossibility, or by a possibility (as it seems) — that no time succeeded A; or by an impossibility, that immediately after A the freely volitional power had been taken away from God himself. And [imagine] how *prior he could have not-willed* that *volitum*, because not by priority of time nor of eternity, but only of nature or cause. Nor can anyone posit any successive and long duration before A, as had been shown in I.1 of this [work]; or perhaps, against the obstinate, let it at least be imagined that God did not precede A by any partibly successive duration.

This same thing seems to be able to be shown, with no such imagination supporting it, but by solid Catholic truth alone. For God created the world in A, and then willed freely the world to be. Therefore, according to what was objected at the beginning, *prior he could have not willed* the world then to be. But by what priority? Not of time, not of eternity, not of successive duration, but only of nature and cause, as was shown above.

Concerning natural and irrational powers, however, although they naturally and causally precede their acts, otherwise must one think. For there is no freedom of contradiction toward acting and not acting, but antecedent necessity, as is clear from what was shown in chapters 2 and 4 of this [book].

Although also the volitional power in God *ad intra* in some way causally precedes its act — by which, namely, he wills himself to be, wills and loves all his essentials — nevertheless he cannot, nor *prior causally could have*, not so willed; because by the mode of nature and antecedent necessity, not contradictory freedom, he so does, just as he also generates and spirates. The objections that contrary things are possible to occur — chapter 43 of Book I [of this work] resolves these.

[Demonstration of Truth 4]

The fourth truth is sufficiently clear from the third and its demonstration. According indeed to the opinion of the fourth, perhaps that of Psalm 2 must be expounded: "You are my Son, today have I begotten you." For there must not properly be taken the *day* for a day of fluxible time, but for a day or instant of eternity, where there is nothing prior or posterior successively, as the premises of this chapter and the previous one make manifest.

Wherefore Augustine, expounding it, says: "*Today*, because it signifies presence — and in eternity nothing is past as if it had ceased to be, nor future as if it were not yet, but only present, because whatever is eternal always is — is taken divinely according to that saying, '*Today have I begotten you*,' by which the most sincere and Catholic faith preaches the everlasting generation of the power and wisdom of God who is the only-begotten Son." Therefore *today* designates the instantaneous presence of eternity. And yet he does not say "today I beget you," which nevertheless would be most truly said, but "Today have I begotten you," to signify that there is no temporal or durational priority of the Father to the Son, as certain heretics fabricated, but only a certain priority of origin or cause, of which more fully treated in II.32. According to which mode also an angel just now first created, knowing and willing, could say to his act: "I now in this present instant have begotten you, or produced you."

[Demonstration of Truth 5]

For the fifth truth it must be known that necessity is twofold, namely *preceding* and *subsequent*, as was said in chapter 2 of this [book] and often afterward. Therefore correspondingly the *power*, *possibility*, or *potestas* is twofold — namely preceding and subsequent. *Preceding* [possibility] is as it were contrary to preceding necessity: that is, with the active power or cause most sufficiently prepared posited, insofar as it naturally and causally precedes its act, it is possible according to contradiction for the act to be produced and not to be produced, because there is no antecedent necessity there, but contingency to either side, and freedom of contradiction, as was said in the demonstration of the third [truth]. *Subsequent* possibility, in similar manner, is opposed to subsequent necessity.

Power *nakedly and absolutely considered* is active power, insofar as it precedes the act, and is not limited or determined by anything. *Absolute power*, or *of non-repugnance*, can be called that by which is said to be possible whatever does not formally include contradiction and repugnance in good and formal consequence simply — concerning which it was more fully said in I.1, in the demonstration of the first supposition. And it corresponds necessarily to what is *simply and entirely absolutely* [possible], namely whose not-being formally implies and involves the repugnance of contradiction. Whence the Philosopher in *Prior Analytics* I defines the contingent opposed to the necessary in this way: "I call to be contingent, or contingent, that which is not necessary (namely absolutely), but with which posited as existing, nothing impossible will follow on this account." With this posited, he says, as existing — namely through that species of obligation called *positio* — nothing will be, that is, will result in formal consequence as simply impossible, that is, simply and entirely absolutely [impossible], that which formally implies and includes contradiction. From this absolute power and of non-repugnance, I think, God is truly said to be and is omnipotent.

These expositions of names having been tasted, this fifth truth, understood concerning the posterior *volita* of God, is shown manifestly through the fourth and the demonstration of it. For who indeed doubts that toward God's volition *ad extra* there is no preceding necessity, but most pure freedom of contradiction, and therefore by preceding power (according to the previously stated exposition of preceding power) he can not-will what he so wills? Who also will say that omnipotent God, insofar as concerns the nature of his power nakedly and absolutely considered, or even concerning absolute power or of non-repugnance (according to the previous expositions), cannot not-will what he so wills?

Whence John Scotus, on *Sentences* I, dist. 40, posing the question whether the predestined can be damned, responding first says that *predestination* properly taken denotes an act of the divine will, namely the election of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory. Second, he distinguishes the proposed question according to composition and division; and denying the composite sense, he says that in the divided sense these two — namely *to be predestined* and *to be able to be damned* — are said dividedly in two categoricals of the same [subject], nor are the opposites simultaneously true, nor can one succeed the other, because in eternity there can be no succession. But these are simultaneously true insofar as the divine volition is considered as prior, naturally to the transit of itself over that object which is "glory to this one"; in that priority naturally, it is not repugnant to it to be of an opposite object — indeed it could essentially be of the opposite, but not simultaneously of both.

Who, moreover, will concede that the rational creature — most especially if it should will and not-will solely from itself — produces its free volition from preceding necessity and not from contradictory freedom? Or even, as is the fact now (with God acting prior), and from preceding necessity with respect to inferior causes, and not from contradictory freedom with respect to those, produces its free volition? And consequently is able by preceding power to not produce that at all? Nor will anyone judge that the rational creature, insofar as concerns the nature of its

power nakedly and absolutely considered, and concerning absolute power and of non-repugnance, cannot not-will what it now wills.

For how does this simple categorical, "He does not will now to read tomorrow," when he now wills to read tomorrow, simply and formally absolutely imply repugnance, or include contradiction? Who is so ignorant in obligational *positio* that, with this admitted as possible, he does not easily defend himself from contradiction and from every absolute impossible — by formally conceding every consequent, denying repugnant ones, rejecting impertinent ones, like the jurists?

Otherwise, with any one [proposition] posited, one could dispute about anything — or respond according to its quality, if he wishes — just as about this. With A this present instant existing in London, if it be posited as absolutely possible, and similarly admitted, "He is not in London but in Rome in A," no contradiction follows formally in A, nor any absolute impossible — although as-of-now and *per accidens* contradiction and absolute impossible would seem to follow, namely that he who is in London in A is not in London but in Rome in A. Yet this *per se* simply and absolutely does not follow. For that he is in London in A is not absolutely necessary, nor does to-be-in-London in A inhere in this man *per se* and essentially in A. Indeed, insofar as it pertains to the nature of the thing, and to the absolute power of things, it would not be repugnant for this not to inhere in him in A. For he could have set out on a journey long ago, and in A or earlier finally arrived at Rome.

Similarly, this man who in A is white and sitting can in A not be white in A nor sitting, but black and standing or lying. And if anyone object that in similar manner God could or can not be — that is most false, as the corollary to I.14 teaches.

This opinion is plainly testified by John Scotus in *Sentences* I, dist. 2, saying: "I call *contingently caused* that whose opposite could come to be when it does"; and further on, on dist. 39: "Not in this way is the cause contingent — namely because it pre-existed before that instant in which it causes, and then as pre-existent could cause or not cause; because just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so the cause when it causes, then causes either necessarily or contingently. Since therefore in this instant the will causes this volition, and not necessarily, therefore contingently — there is therefore a power of the cause to the opposite of what it causes, without succession; and that real power is the power of the prior naturally, as of the first act, [to] all things which are posterior naturally, as second act. The first act considered in that instant in which it is prior naturally to the second act, so posits it in being as its effect contingently; which as prior naturally could not posit it but the opposite in being."

He also in the same place, distinguishing freedom in many ways, says thus: "There is also another freedom not so manifest, without any succession; for positing a created will to have being only in one instant, and that it in that instant has volition — it does not necessarily then have it"; which he consequently shows through the art of obligations, positing as possible that volition not to be in that instant, as I did above.

This same opinion Henry of Ghent professes, *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, saying that this proposition in the divided sense, "What God wills, he cannot not-will," has a twofold cause of truth, of the second of which he says: "But another cause of truth is, God does not have in himself the power by which there could be in him the not-willing of what he wills" — which is false, because the power in God's will concerning the actual being of creatures, as has been said, has no determinate necessity; indeed insofar as it concerns itself, is to either side concerning willing or not-willing it, with no connotation concerning the possibility or non-possibility of succeeding (concerning the will of God) the act of not-willing after the act of willing — but states a precise possibility to either, insofar as it pertains to the nature of the divine will. And in this sense similarly that proposition is false in the divided sense: "It is not possible for one not sitting not to sit" — therefore according to him, it is now and for now possible for him who now does not sit, to sit.

This same is confirmed by the saying of St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 3, written in chapter 50 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 6]

The sixth truth is shown by this fifth, and through the demonstration of it.

[Demonstration of Truth 7]

For the seventh truth it must be known that *subsequent* possibility, defined above, and *determinate, actuated, or ordained* possibility are the same. For just as the necessity by which "everything that is, when it is, is necessarily" is called *subsequent, determinate, actuated, and ordained*; so also the opposite possibility, by which according to certain ones something which is, while it is, can oppositely not be, is named by the same names, on account of the lack of proper names or denominations — namely the lack of proper *differentiae*. This seventh truth, so understood, manifestly follows from what was previously shown here and in chapter 50 of this [book] above. For it was shown here and there that an act of the divine will, just as of the human, when it is, is necessary by subsequent necessity. Therefore by the opposite possibility, it is not possible for it not to be.

[Demonstration of Truth 8]

For the eighth, it must be known that God's knowledge is twofold, namely *incomplex* and *complex*, in the way it is granted to ignorant and stammering man to know and express it, as I.18 more fully showed. God's complex knowledge of things known posteriorly through the divine will is, by this same chapter 18, [posited] through the divine will, and therefore follows it both negatively and affirmatively according to the truths premised concerning it. But God's incomplex and simple-apprehension knowledge by no means follows the divine will. For God thus knows necessarily and simply all knowable things, and although the cognitive power in God in some way naturally or causally precedes that act, it is in no way possible that he should not always produce and have that act, as was said in the demonstration of the third truth concerning similar

matters. Concerning God's complex knowledge of things known prior to the divine will, the same must be thought as concerning his incomplex knowledge.

[Demonstration of Truth 9]

For the ninth, I judge it must be thought that *potuit* (he could have), said of God, by no means properly signifies temporal priority, nor any successive [priority], as appears from the premises, but the natural or causal priority of free power according to contradiction to its free act — according to which priority, namely insofar as the cause preceded, it could in no way have produced that act, as was said above in the demonstration of the third truth. Yet if it be said of the creature, both priorities can be congruously designated, since in it both priorities are found, as the demonstration of the third made plain.

More conveniently and more customarily, however, the verb *potuit* of past tense is said for the past than for the present — as that God could have not-willed to create the world in past instant A in which he created it; and similarly of creatures, namely of an angel and a man created and willing in past instant A, as was said in the demonstration of the third [truth] — although it can also be said of the present, although less consonantly, as the fourth truth expressed.

Potuisset (he might have been able), as anyone's mind acquiesces, signifies the same priority, and this more proximately than *potuit* to this causal priority according to human understanding, and more remotely from temporal priority; and it is said more conveniently of the past than of the present, more conveniently however than *potuit* of the present. It can also congruously designate power nakedly and absolutely considered, or absolute power or of non-repugnance, as the fifth truth spoke — so that thus it is said that this man "could have" done this or that, that is, insofar as it pertained to the nature of absolute power, so that no repugnance would have followed formally.

Posset (he could), as anyone's mind conceives, signifies the same natural and causal priority — more proximately, however, according to human conception, to this causal priority, and more remotely from temporal priority, than *potuit* or even *potuisset*. It also significantly enough signifies absolute power and of non-repugnance, as has been said of *potuisset*. It is said more conveniently of the present than *potuit* or *potuisset*, for it is of present time; of the past it is not said as those are; but of the future, as those are not said. For according to the logicians, it is an *amplifying* (*ampliativum*) verb. Therefore under the voice of present time it can be extended further to the future, so that it is said: "God could (*posset*) tomorrow not-will what tomorrow he will will, and do what he will not do" — where, however, by no means properly is temporal priority designated, but natural or causal priority, or even absolute power or of non-repugnance.

Potest (he can), similarly, is said for two times, namely of present and future, because it is an *extensive* or amplifying verb, as was said above. If however it be said of the future — as "God can (*potest*) tomorrow not-will what tomorrow he will will, and not do what he will do" — it does not properly signify temporal priority, but causal or absolute and of non-repugnance, as was said of *posset*.

If however it should be said of a creature — for instance, of a man — both priorities could be designated, as was said of *potuit*, which is also true of *potuisset* when it is said of the past, and of *posset* when it is said of the future. But if it be said of the present and for the present — as "God now *can*, and for now, not-will what he now wills" — it does not so plainly signify the aforesaid natural or causal priority. Therefore neither does the mind of the listener so admit this saying, as if it were said *potuit*, *potuisset*, or *posset* — but in some way refuses and resists, as if it were said of man, "A man now willing anything, can now and for now not-will it"; or "A man now white or sitting, can now and for now not be white or sitting." For the mind takes the subject thing with the quality or disposition which it now has, which on first appearance it judges necessarily to be for now — just as every mind takes, as a kind of principle naturally implanted in itself and well-known, that "everything that is, when it is, is necessary to be"; and therefore refuses, and does not admit, the contrary possibility.

Likewise, when it is said, "God or man can now and for now not-will what he now wills," if it be understood of power nakedly and absolutely considered, insofar as it pertains to the nature of power, or of absolute power or of non-repugnance, it is true and to be truly conceded, as can be had from the demonstration of the fifth truth premised. Yet much more readily the mind receives such a sentence with *posset* than with *potest*, because the signification of this is more easily known in *posset* than in *potest*. According to a similar manner the difference between *volui*, *voluissem*, *volo*, *vellem* (I willed, I might have willed, I will, I would will); *feci*, *fecissem*, *facio*, *facerem* (I did, I might have done, I do, I would do); and similar [conjugations] can perhaps be assigned.

Posse, *possibilitas*, *potentia*, and *potestas* seem to signify power preceding naturally or causally its act, free according to contradiction to do it and not. According to which opinion the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* IX.10 that "the rational powers, or those *with* reason, are of contraries"; and below in [chapter] 18 that "the powers according to reason are of contradiction, because what can move thus, can also not thus" — as chapter 4 of this [book] and chapter 25 of Book I more fully showed. They can also signify the *naked and absolute power*, or of *non-repugnance* aforesaid, according to the opinion of the same Philosopher in *Prior Analytics* I, recited above in the demonstration of the fifth.

For thus it is said that in God there was, is, or will be the *posse*, *possibilitas*, *potentia*, and *potestas* of not-willing what he willed, wills, or will will — which can also be said similarly of the creature.

These things I have judged must be treated somewhat more diffusely, because the cognition of these greatly distinguishes, illuminates, and renders serene the understanding of Sacred Scripture, of the Doctors, and of all who commonly speak; and ignorance of them greatly confounds, beclouds, and obscures it.

This profundity, and the others preceding, that most subtle searcher Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, digging most profoundly even to the foundation in them, also finding and showing most clearly

how God *prior could* and *could not have not known* or *not willed* what he knows or knew, wills or willed, and how he *could* and *could not*, *can* and *cannot not know and not will* what he knows and wills — after he had said in *De Libero Arbitrio* 7 that "in God there is the *posse* that he should not have known what he knows," and in chapter 8 he argues against that thus: "Whatever, while it is, is necessary to be, and it is not possible that it not be then when it is — as that Socrates is white, if it is true in instant A, has no *posse* to be false in A. If therefore what is true in instant A cannot be false in the same A — but eternity, since it is in the limit of simplicity, simpler than every instant — what is true in eternity cannot be false in the same eternity. But that God knows A is true in eternity; therefore there is no *posse* for him not to know A."

In chapter 9, finally determining, he responds thus: "Just as light is not prior to splendor by time, but by nature and cause; and if there were eternal light without beginning, nonetheless light begetting splendor would be prior to begotten splendor naturally and causally. And as according to Chrysostom: 'The Father is also not prior to the Son by eternity, not by nature, but by cause' — for he says thus on *In principio erat verbum*: 'The Father precedes the Word not by nature, but by cause; the Father precedes the Word causally, the Son precedes all things which were made through him naturally' — so there *posse* in some way precedes the act, not by eternity, nor perhaps by nature (since they are one in nature, and one nature), but perhaps there *posse* precedes the act by cause, and also by a priority from which consequence does not convert; just as animal precedes man, although however *posse* and *act* in [God's] substance are not different and different things — so the Father is prior to the Son in cause, although however the Father and the Son are one in substance.

"This causal priority is insinuated from the consignification of past tense through this verb *potuit*. When I say, 'God *potuit* (could have) not have known A,' and when it is said, 'God *posset* (could) not have known A,' is insinuated the freedom of judgment, and one rational power for this thing naturally, which is in act toward its opposite. Therefore this predication, when I say 'God can,' can return upon the powerful nature itself; and thus it is true that he can both of the opposites. Thus it is true what Anselm says: 'God can not-will what he wills'; and it is established that he can will what he wills, and so can opposites — and so according to the force of the expression, on account of the priority insinuated through this verb *potuit*, returns the predication of the same verb; similarly of this verb *posset*.

"Or this predication can return upon the same considered in the nature of agent of one of the opposites; and thus it is impossible for him not to will what he wills, or not to know what he knows. For there is in God's nature a *posse* to either, which causally precedes either; but upon the same agent of one [opposite], since he is immutable, there is no *posse* to the opposite of that which is in act.

"For just as according to Anselm's distinction the free will of man — where *posse* precedes the act temporally — can not-will, and cannot not-will, but it is necessary for it to will (for it can not-will before it wills, because it is free, and when now it wills, it cannot not-will, but it is

necessary for it to will, since it is impossible for it both to will and not-will the same thing simultaneously) — so perhaps in God, where there is no temporal precession but a causal one, if God's nature is considered itself not in the *ratio* of acting, and is compared to the free will of man naked of act before he wills, it will be true to say: 'God can not-will what he wills.' But if the divine nature itself is considered in the *ratio* of acting, and compared to the free will of man when now he wills in act, it will be true to say: 'It is necessary for God to will what he wills, and not to will what he does not will.' For it is impossible for him both to not-will what he wills, and to will what he does not will. Which distinction in our *posse* and act is made by temporal priority — there in [God] is made by causal priority, and by the subject upon which different predication returns by different consideration; but the distinction is more manifest where temporal priority accompanies it.

"Through such a distinction also of the consideration of the subject, when *posse* is predicated of God, we say God can create more worlds, or infinite worlds — and yet that he cannot do this. For if the divine nature itself is considered, infinitely powerful, it can indeed do this concerning [its] power; but if the same is considered as most ordered in things to be done, it is impossible for it to create more worlds, and impossible for it not to create one world — yet of his power this is possible. Similarly God could, as concerns power, have liberated man otherwise than through the death of his Son; but if [he is considered as] doing all things most fittingly, he could not have liberated man otherwise. Whence Augustine says that he could have liberated otherwise; but Anselm, that he could not have liberated otherwise; and similarly many other authors.

"And for the evidence of what has just been said, let us suppose a created free will not to be prior to actually willing something rightly or not rightly — as perhaps was the free will of an angel and of the first man. Was it not the case according to this that the angel, when he was simultaneous with the first act of existing, willed by the act of willing something well or badly — for instance, Gabriel something well, Lucifer something badly — and was in the free *potestas* of each what he willed, and each *could have not-willed* the opposite of what he willed? Otherwise neither would this be praiseworthy nor that blameworthy, nor would they have had freedom of judgment.

"Let it also be understood that their state was simple, namely instantaneous or eternal. Was not each, simultaneously with the act of one of the opposites, having in the same indivisible the *posse* to the opposite act — and would not such a predication be true of each: 'This one can will the opposite of what he wills, or not-will what he wills,' if the predication returns upon the nature of the free will nakedly considered without its act?

"And because by the force of the expression the predication so returns with this verb *potuit* or *posset*, every mind immediately conceives this to be true: 'The first angel, immediately when he first was, and willed this — could (*potuit* or *posset*) have not-willed this same thing.' And because the present-tense verb more by the use of speech returns upon the subject according to

the disposition which it actually has, the mind immediately rather conceives this to be false: 'He can not-will what he wills,' if in the indivisible he wills, as has been posited."

He also further on, resolving the argument recited above, writes thus: "It is patent therefore that what is, is necessary to be while it is, and yet not inconveniently, but for some [thing] it is necessary in the same indivisible to have *posse* to the opposite of what is — as in the example given of the angel — and that the predication of necessity and of possibility of the opposite does not return upon the simply same and considered in the same way."

According to this understanding, then, I think it can rationally be possible to expound Lombard's words alleged on the contrary; and Robert of Lincoln so understands him in similar matters, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 7, saying: "There is in God an eternal *posse* that he should not have known without beginning what he knows. Whence the Master in the *Sentences*: 'God could have created nothing, and so foreknown nothing of the created.' Therefore he has the power that he had never created, and never known many things which he created and knew. From this *posse*, indeed, which is to either of the opposites — namely to have known and not to have known without beginning — follows the contingency of things."

This understanding also Lombard's words express evidently. For in the first book of the *Sentences*, dist. 39, he says: "Just as the divine essence cannot be increased or diminished, so neither the divine knowledge — and yet it is conceded that he can know what he does not know, and can not-know what he knows; because there could be subject to his knowledge something which is not, and there could not be subject something which is, without any change in that knowledge." *Posse* (to be able), he says, and *posset* (could) — which according to the previous expositions signify power contradictorily free, insofar as it naturally or causally precedes its free act, or power nakedly and absolutely considered, namely insofar as concerns the nature of power.

Wherefore also further on in the same distinction: "If, he says, you say that God cannot know or foreknow what from eternity he did not know or foreknow — that is, [cannot] have the power of knowing and foreknowing from eternity, and now something, yet that has not been foreknown nor is future — it is true." And in dist. 40: "When the question is concerning the foreknowledge or predestination of God, possibility and impossibility may be referred to God's power, which always was and is the same, because predestination, foreknowledge, [and] power are one in God."

In a similar manner the Philosopher seems to speak in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I, denying necessity in future contingents, and affirming that in them there is the possible to be and not to be, and that in them it happens to be and not to be. These words signify power insofar as it precedes its act naturally, as appears from the premises — indeed, as it more seems, insofar as it precedes its act temporally, by which precession can also rationally be intimated the natural precession, as was said above. That he speaks of temporal priority, however, the example shows well: "Many things, he says, are manifest to us thus disposed: that this garment is possible to be

cut and is not cut, but is worn out first; similarly also it is possible not to be cut. For it would not be possible to be worn out first, unless it were possible not to be cut."

It seems also not inconsonant to the text that, when he says "it is possible for this to be and not to be," he understands of *absolute power*, as appeared in chapter 29 of this [book], or insofar as concerns the nature of power nakedly and absolutely considered. Whence also, after his last words just recited, he immediately concludes by adding: "Wherefore in other future things, namely [other than] the cutting or not-cutting of the garment, whatever are said according to power are of this kind, it is manifest that not all come to be from necessity" — namely from necessity repugnant to this power.

This same opinion is intimated by the words of Scotus on *Sentences* I, dist. 2, 39, and especially dist. 40, recited above in the demonstration of the fifth of this [chapter].

Otherwise it can be said that Lombard does not speak there definitively and according to his own opinion, but rather inquisitively and according to the opinion of others. For in dist. 40, where he had been alleged, having raised the question concerning predestination, "Whether the predestined can be damned," he says: "In the resolution of this question I would prefer to hear others rather than to teach"; and below: "It is conceded by some that even now God can not have predestined from eternity. Thus also concerning the foreknown and concerning foreknowledge they say, which they by no means concede in the actions or operations of God and of men; for from when something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not be or not have been."

A third response could be — which does not please me — namely to deny it [Lombard's opinion] plainly in this matter, as St. Thomas seems to do on *Sentences* I, dist. 38, q. 5, where he manifestly disapproves the response which seems to be his [Lombard's], as is more fully recited in chapter 50 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 10]

The tenth truth, as concerns both its parts, plainly follows from the premises. For as concerns the affirmative part, [it follows] from the fifth and sixth; and as concerns the negative, from the seventh, [it follows] evidently.

And if anyone object that if there were a power which in no way could pass into act, that would be entirely idle; therefore if there is some power which in some way cannot pass into act, that at least in that way is idle; therefore there is some power in some way idle in God — to this argument one could perhaps insist more sophistically than demonstratively, similarly arguing: "In God there is power for the infinite division of the continuum into equal parts, for the infinite creation of finite foot-quantities, for inscribing or circumscribing in an assigned circle a figure of infinite right-line angles, equilateral and equiangular; for any finite continuum or discrete quantity it can create as creatable" — which yet cannot be drawn out into act, for it would include contradiction so to be.

But it can more truly be said that the power by which God can for now not-will positively what he now wills — because it is a *rational power* — is the same of contraries, and therefore is now in act, not however of not-willing but of willing.

Whence also Robert of Lincoln in *De Libero Arbitrio* 8 argues against this possibility in this way: "If this possibility is without act and empty, it is not deducible into act." He, further on in [chapter] 9, responding, says: "It is true that a possibility impossible to be drawn into act is no possibility, or is empty; and yet the possibility by which God can not-know, or could have not-known, what he knows, is some [possibility] and is not empty, because it is a *rational possibility* and the same of opposites; and whichever of the opposites is, it is drawn into its act, since to either there is one and the same [possibility]."

Nevertheless, as it seems, this does not plainly settle the mind of the opponent. For the opponent intends that every active power not only can pass into some act, but into any act with respect to which it is said to be a power — and when, or *for when*, it is said to be a power. And therefore, that the volitional power of God or of man, which is said to be a power *now and for now* to an act which it does not have now, can *for now* [pass] into that. Therefore approaching more proximately, it seems must be said that a power with respect to some act, when and how it is with respect to that, can pass into it; but in the way in which it is not [a power] of that, by no means.

The volitional power, however, in God and in man is not for now a power to the act opposite to that which it now has, except by *preceding possibility*, and insofar as concerns the nature of power nakedly and absolutely considered, or by absolute power or of non-repugnance — and so it can, or (to be more acceptably said to the mind) it could, *for now* [pass] into that, as appears from the sixth truth and the fifth and their demonstration. By *subsequent and determined, actuated, or ordained possibility* through the act which it now has, by no means; indeed thus it is necessary for that power for now to have this act, and to lack the contrary.

Still perhaps it is asked by way of objection: Is such volitional power *before* the act, or *with* the act? For this division is by opposites, as the philosophers and all commonly attest. Not before the act, because in this instant there is not, nor can there be, a *before* and *after*; nor *with* the act, because the act is not.

But here, as above, it can be responded that that power is *with* the act — namely with the act which it now has. But if it be spoken of the act with respect to which it is called a power, which it does not have, it can be said that it is not before that temporally nor with that, because that act is not — just as the volitional power of man with respect to act A, which he can have tomorrow but will not have. Therefore that aforementioned division must seem to be understood by no means concerning merely *possible* acts, but only concerning acts really *present* or *future*. Or it can be said that there is a certain priority there not actual but habitual, not temporal but natural or causal, by which that power could precedently produce that act; and such priority and posteriority, without repugnance, is simultaneous with the simultaneity of a temporal instant.

[Demonstration of Truth 11]

The eleventh truth follows from the fifth, sixth, and eighth. For if God or the creature wills or knows something now, and now and for now can not will or not know it — and this cannot be by a change between opposite terms (namely from such to non-such): because not by a change in the willer or knower, nor in the willed or known, nor in any third [thing].

Not by a change in the willer or knower — as concerning God all concede, which I.5 and I.23 also teach. Furthermore, neither is this possible to occur in the Creator nor in the creature, by a change in him or in her past or future — as no one is ignorant — nor in the present instant. For that necessarily would be between opposite terms, namely from such to non-such, or from non-such to such — as is necessarily every successive or sudden change. But no such change can occur in this present instant. For it evidently includes contradiction that, from one willing A in present instant B, in B should come to be one not-willing A in B. For it includes that the same in the same present instant B should both will the same A and not will it.

Nor is it possible that this occur by a change in the *volitum* or known — because not in the *volitum* or known *future*, which for now can not be future, where it would seem most [possible]. For it formally implies contradiction that something be changed from non-future to future, or from future to non-future, except by its position in being, as I.18 of this [book] shows.

Nor can this occur by a change in the *volitum* or known *present* — for this includes contradiction, as has been shown above in a similar case. Nor in the *volitum* or known *past*, as no one is ignorant; which can also be shown as was shown above concerning the future.

Nor likewise is it possible for this to occur by a change in any third thing, as anyone's mind conceives, since this would seem impertinent.

Likewise this man, who in present instant A is in London white and sitting, can by this possibility in A not be in London, white, nor sitting — indeed in A be in Rome, black and standing — as the demonstration of the fifth shows; and not by any change, as no one is ignorant.

This opinion is plainly testified by John Scotus, as appears in the demonstration of the fifth truth. Henry of Ghent concordantly holds it in *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, opposing and responding in this way:

"That God wills, he cannot not-will, otherwise his will would be mutable. It must be said that this proposition, namely 'What God wills, he cannot not-will,' can be *de re* and *de dicto*, *divided* or *composite*. If *de dicto* and composite, thus it is true; if *de re* and divided, thus the sense is, 'What God wills' etc. — that is, 'God does not have the power of not-willing what he wills' — which by the force of the expression can have a twofold cause of truth.

"Of which one is: God does not have the power by which he might at another time not-will what now he wills — which is true, because such power would posit in God a possibility in *succeeding* concerning God's will, the act of not-willing after the act of willing; for thus he would be mutable, as the objection proceeds. But according to this sense, this proposition is false

in the divided sense: 'For one sitting not to sit is not possible' — because a man sitting now, afterwards can in act not sit.

"Another cause of truth, however, is: God does not have in himself the power by which there could be in him the not-willing of what he wills — which is false, because the power in God's will concerning the actual being of creatures, as has been said, is by no necessity determined; indeed insofar as it concerns itself, it is to either side concerning willing it and not willing it, connoting nothing concerning the possibility or non-possibility of succeeding (concerning the will of God) the act of not-willing after the act of willing — but says a precise possibility to either, insofar as it pertains to the nature of the divine will. And in this sense similarly that proposition is false in the divided sense: 'For one not sitting, it is not possible not to sit'; nor does such power posit any mutability.

"For just as for actual change two things are required, namely simply a power to the contrary of what now is in, and an actual succession of one of them after the other — so for *mutability* two things are required, namely the said power, and a power to actual succession; that is, that that power by which something is to either side, be a power to succession of one after the other — which concerning God's will can in no way occur. Therefore [there is] no mutability, although in some sense he can not-will what he wills, and therefore wills it in no way of necessity.

"Whence concerning what he always willed from eternity, and wills, and will will: simultaneously from eternity he had, and has, and will have the *potestas* of not-willing; and could from eternity not have willed, or have not-willed from eternity; and can now not-will, and will be able for eternity not-to-will, or not-to-will-for-eternity; and this without any mutability of himself."

[Demonstration of Truth 12]

For the twelfth truth it must be known that *actuabile* power is to be called not that entirely absolute and of non-repugnance aforementioned, but that which to common manner of understanding and speaking is said to be able to pass into act — by which it is said of one sitting that he can stand, of one in London that he can be in Rome, and similar [cases]. This twelfth, so understood, is known evidently from chapter 32 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 13]

The thirteenth truth manifestly follows from what was previously shown in this chapter. For it was shown above that every intrinsic action of God is measured by eternity, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, nor any mutability whatever; and that every intrinsic action of his is intrinsically immutable in every way; and that no action of his is intrinsically otherwise and otherwise — for instance, freely and not freely — according to prior and posterior. Therefore neither is any volition of his, *prior* (namely before the presence or pastness of a thing), more free than *afterwards* (with the thing made present or lapsed into the past); nor less free afterwards

than before, nor less before and more afterwards on account of the same reason — as no one is ignorant. Therefore [it] always equally free, immutably, intrinsically perseveres.

Likewise, although in the divine volition there is *subsequent* necessity, yet in it there is contingency and freedom of contradiction *from preceding necessity*, as was shown in chapters 4 and 5 of this [book] — which always remains equal, with the *volitum* first future, then present, and finally past. For the incomplex or simple cognition of the thing in God, and his volitional power, and all things causally previous to the act of will, eternally remain equally potent, equally causing, equally producing that act.

The arguments of chapter 30 of this [book] also show this. Otherwise indeed the eternal God would be intrinsically changed — indeed, he would be incurably wounded, irreparably mutilated, and irrecoverably slain, as the arguments and authorities of the same chapter 30 manifest. Wherefore the Philosopher rightly says that the divine will, or God willing, is "an immobile law moving all things and equally inclining toward us"; therefore it equally always remains free; whence he adds, "receiving no corruption, direction, or transposition," as the same chapter 30 more fully alleged. Avicenna concords with him, similarly alleged there.

Furthermore, who would steal or rob from divine freedom even the smallest portion? Who, moreover, will presume to make his God newly not most freely, but remissly free; not most, but remissly perfect; not most, but remissly powerful — and therefore not omnipotent? Who, I say, will so presume to befool every reason, falsify every faith, and invalidate all symbols?

Otherwise also a posterior thing willed would diminish divine freedom, and would subject it to a new servitude; therefore that freedom could be wholly removed and taken away — all of which there is no doubt are false, as can more fully be known from the same chapter 30. Likewise divine freedom is no more handmaid or slave than human freedom; rather it is equal with respect to future, present, and past.

[Demonstration of Truth 14]

The fourteenth truth, sister most similar of the thirteenth, can be known manifestly through it and through the demonstration of it. For just as in the human will or volition there is equal necessity with respect to a future, present, or past *volitum*, so also in the divine — since [the divine will] is in no way increased extrinsically from outside (namely from the presence or pastness of a thing), nor from within, since the eternal God is intrinsically immutable in every way. Finally, there is no necessity there except *subsequent*, [arising] from the firmness and stability of the act of the divine will, as is clear from chapter 50 of this [book]. But that act always intrinsically remains equally stable, equally firm — like the volitional power and the other intrinsics to God himself.

This is also shown manifestly through chapter 30 of this [book]. Furthermore, the cause of the contrary error I think to be ignorance of eternity, and the imagination by which perhaps some temporal men imagine and judge that God's intrinsic volition and cognition vary intrinsically according to the volumes of times, and of temporal things, just as actions and other temporal

things [vary]. For they suppose things to be sometimes future, sometimes past intrinsically with God, and therefore that they are otherwise and otherwise, sometimes thus, sometimes thus, with him — which yet is repugnant to the most indivisible, most immutable, and most stable instant of eternity, as is clear from this and chapter 51 of this [book].

Therefore, alongside the premises concerning eternity in these chapters, that we may ascend from the more known instant of time to the more unknown instant of eternity, it seems verisimilar to imagine in this way: as if God in the instant of the world's creation (in which let us suppose us to be), which no succession preceded, nor any would follow — existing in the center of a circular line, reflecting from East through South and West back to East by his most efficacious will going forth (as it were) through individual semi-diameters to the individual points of the circumference — would now create simultaneously, according to truth, all things present, past, and future according to prior and posterior in time, [yet] according to prior and posterior in the line corresponding to the prior and posterior in time, with the beginning of the line placed in the East.

Therefore just as, if it were so, those created things according to prior and posterior in the line would have a similar order *among themselves*, but by no means with God; rather all to him, and he to all, would equally relate — so also now these temporal things according to prior and posterior in time obtain a similar order compared to one another, but with God in the most simple and most unique instant of eternity by no means; rather there all things temporally past, present, and future, not only present, but *equally* present always remain. Nothing there arises, nothing dies, nothing there future, nothing past, but instantaneously only present, as this chapter and the next one make manifest.

Whence Hermes in *De Mundo et Coelo* II says: "Just as a circle to its center, so the temporary world stands to eternity." Therefore even if it were really as this imagination supposes — just as the divine will would be contingent and free, indeed equally contingent and equally free with the freedom of contradiction and from preceding necessity, and necessary and equally necessary by subsequent necessity with respect to any *volitum* prior or posterior in *position* among themselves, but with God by no means — so it is even now with respect to any *volitum* prior or posterior in *time* among themselves, but with God in the instant of eternity present and equally present.

But how all things are said to be present eternally with God, and to be in him, and to live in him, although chapter 14 of this [book] expounds, still on account of the somewhat slow [understanding] perhaps must more plainly be expounded. This indeed I judge is said *causally*, according to that figure of trope expounded in II.26, by which an effect is denominated sometimes by the name of its cause. According to which the Philosopher in *Physics* IV.23 says that something is said to be in something as the caused in the cause — for instance, the things of subjects in the king, and entirely motion in the first mover. According to him in the same place this is also true of things caused by formal cause similarly, and final.

And because according to him in *Metaphysics* XII, and Averroes there, comment 6, God relates in this triple genus of cause to all things, all things can be said to be in God as in efficient cause, because he makes and creates all things; as in formal cause, because he forms all things and conserves them in being; and as in final cause, because he disposes, perfects, and consummates all things. Wherefore Hermes in *De Verbo Aeterno* 38 says: "All things are from him, and in him, and through him." Which, as I think, the Apostle felt in Romans 11 when he said: "Of him, and through him, and in him are all things." Whence Esther 13: "Lord, in your dominion all things are placed."

Therefore all things are said to be present eternally with God because the *causes* of things — namely God's cognition and volition — are present eternally with him. According to this figure also the Apostle says in Hebrews 7 that Levi was in the loins of his father — namely Abraham — when Melchizedek met him; though [Levi] followed him by three generations.

This opinion Moses seems to feel — indeed the Lord through Moses — when he says in Deuteronomy 32: "Are not these things laid up in store with me, and sealed up in my treasures?" And the Prophet says — indeed the Lord through the Prophet — "The beauty of the field is with me," in Psalm 49. On which Augustine: "*The beauty of the field*, the fertility of all things bringing forth on the earth, is with me. How [is it] with him? With him were all future things, and with him are all future things; nor are all past things subtracted from him; with him are all things by a certain cognition of God's ineffable wisdom constituted in the Word."

Better, however, according to this figure, things are said *not to have been, nor to be future, but to be present causally* according to the divine volition and cognition eternally with God — because to those causes nothing whatever happens or recedes as future or past, with the things caused acceding or receding. Rather God knows and wills entirely similarly and in no way otherwise intrinsically a thing first future, then present, and finally past. Therefore all things — not only present, but equally present — can be said to be eternally with God.

Whence the Apostle to the Romans 4: "He calls the things which are not as those which are" — that is, entirely similarly, and in no way dissimilarly intrinsically in any manner. Gloss: "Thus those things which are future, are already with God; with God indeed it is already done what by his disposition or predestination is future." Whence elsewhere: "Who made the things which are future." Wherefore Ecclesiasticus 23: "To God, before they were created, all things were known; so also after they are perfected he beholds all things."

Which, understanding according to the previous exposition, Augustine in *De Trinitate* XV.13 says that "God did not know created things otherwise than [as] to-be-created. For nothing was added to his wisdom from them, but with them existing he remained as he was. For thus it is written in Ecclesiasticus: 'Before they were created, all things are known to him; thus also after they are consummated' — *thus*, he says, *not otherwise*."

He also in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* V.18, speaking of things made by God, says thus: "Before they were made, they both were and were not. They were in God's knowledge; they were not in their own nature. To God himself, however, I do not dare to say [they] became known otherwise when he had made them, than in that mode in which he knew them so as to make them — with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration."

For a similar reason I judge it rightly said that past, present, and future things *were* or *are* a *life* in God, because insofar as they are there, in no way at all do they die. For no intrinsic mode of God's cognition or volition dies, nor can it die. Wherefore according to the Apostle, "God alone has immortality" — that is, immutability intrinsically in every way, as chapter 30 of this [book] more fully expounded.

Whence John 1: "What was made, in him was [or, is]" *life* — according to the translation which Augustine expounds. On which, in homily 1, he says: "What is this? The earth was made, but it itself is not life. There is, however, in that wisdom spiritually a certain *ratio* by which the earth was made: this is life." Which, shown by the example of the smith and the chest, concluding he adds: "So therefore, because the wisdom of God, through which all things were made, contains all things in art before it fabricates [them], all things which are made through that art are not therefore life, because not in their own nature; but whatever was made, is life in him."

He also in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* V.15: "All these things, after they were made, were in the knowledge of the Maker — and surely better there where truer, where eternal and incommutable. Furthermore, if he knew them before he made them, surely before they were, with him they were known in that mode in which they sempiternally and incommutably live and are life; but they were *made* in that mode in which each creature in its kind is."

And in *Confessions* I.6: "You, Lord, ever live, and nothing dies in you. With you stand the causes of all unstable things, and with you remain immutable the origins of all mutable things, and the sempiternal *rationes* of all irrational and temporal things live."

This opinion Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and Ammonius testify. For Ammonius in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I writes thus: "As Timaeus taught us, and as Aristotle theologizing pronounces, and before these Parmenides — both with Plato and in his own poems — *with the Gods there is nothing past nor future*, since both of these are non-being: this no longer, that not yet; and this changed, that born to be changed. But the Gods truly exist, and to undergo change is not even according to intellect possible. Indeed, what is unchangeable must entirely precede what in any way is changed, and remain when that is changed. Wherefore in the Gods having the *ratio* of principle to beings, it is impossible to consider past and future. But all things with them are in one fixed eternal *now*, with temporal measures emerging together with the subsistence of [time] itself as a whole, and measuring those things alone which according to time have either subsistence or operation."

And further on: "We will not therefore endure that it be said that the cognition of the Gods runs along together with the flux of things, nor that there is anything with them either past or future, nor it be said of them, *was* or *will be*, as we assumed in the *Timaeus* — since they are signifying of some change. But [the proper word] is only *is*; and this *is* not co-numbered with *was* and *will be*, and codivided with these; but is understood before all temporal insinuation, and signifies their unchangeableness and undecidedness — which indeed great Parmenides also pronounces along with the intellectual being: 'For he was not, nor will be, but only *is*.'"

This imagination premised — as if God simultaneously created all things in an instant, and as if all future and past things were instantaneously present with him, and that his volition and cognition have similar and equal necessity now as they would have then — what was just shown seems to confirm; which also, although obscurely, Ecclesiasticus seems to have proffered, who in chapter 42 says thus: "The Lord knew all knowledge, and looked upon the sign of the age, announcing things which have passed and things which shall come, revealing the traces of the ages. No thought escapes him, and no word hides itself from him. He decorated the *magnalia* of his wisdom, who is before age and unto age; nothing has been added, nor will be diminished, and he has need of no one's counsel. How desirable are all his works, and as a spark which it is to consider; all these live and remain in age, and in every necessity all things obey him."

Augustine in *De Trinitate* IV.1, expounding more clearly, says thus: "There is one Word of God, through which all things were made, which is incommutable truth. There principally and incommutably are all things simultaneously — not only those which are now in this entire creation, but also those which were and which are future. There, however, they neither were nor will be, but only *are*; and all things are *life*, and all things are *one*, and (what is more wondrous) life is *one*. For thus all things were made through him, that whatever was made in these things, is life in him, and was not made."

He also in *Ad Simplicianum* II.17, treating of the penance and foreknowledge of God, says: "When someone treating these things with more limpid consideration shall have asked how foreknowledge agrees with God, and shall have found that the notion of this word is far and wide surpassed by his ineffable divinity — he will not wonder that both could be said of him on account of men, of whom both would be incongruously said on account of himself. For what is *foreknowledge* but knowledge of future things? But what is future to God, who transcends all times? For if God's knowledge has the things themselves, they are not future to him, but present; and through this no longer foreknowledge, but only knowledge can be said. If, however, just as in the order of temporal creatures, so with him too, things which are future are not yet, but he prevents them by making — therefore he senses them, in one way according to foreknowledge of futures, in another according to knowledge of presents. Therefore something temporally happens to God's knowledge — which is most absurd and most false. It is returned to this, then, that knowledge would now of present things be made, which of these same things future was foreknowledge — and since what was foreknowledge before would afterwards become

knowledge in God, [it would] admit mutability and be temporal — since in God, who truly and supremely is, there is no part of him mutable, nor any temporal motion of notion."

And in chapter 18: "If it is so in God that it can properly be said, *He understands and understood, He senses and sensed*, he admits time, and [there] creeps in nonetheless that mutability which is far to be removed from God's substance. And yet God both knows and foreknows in an ineffable mode; for thus also he repents in an ineffable mode."

And in chapter 19: "When I shall have removed from human knowledge mutability, and whatever is imperfect, and shall have left only the vivacity of certain and unshaken truth surveying all things by one and eternal contemplation — indeed, [I shall] not [have] left it (for human knowledge does not have it), but shall have thought it according to my powers — God's knowledge is somehow insinuated to me."

Anselm confirms this in *De Concordia* 7, saying: "It must be known that just as foreknowledge is not properly said in God, so neither predestination, because to him neither *before* nor *after* is anything, but all things are simultaneously present to him."

He also in *De Casu Diaboli* 21 says that the deserter angel could not have foreknown by knowledge of certain reason that he was about to fall, because he could have not been about to fall. And to the objection by the disciple concerning God's foreknowledge and matters of free judgment, he says: "Briefly I respond. God's foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge. For to him to whom all things are always present, he does not have foreknowledge of futures, but knowledge of presents. Therefore since the *ratio* concerning the presence of a future thing is different from the knowledge of a present thing, it is not necessary that the divine foreknowledge and that [foreknowledge] about which we ask have the same consequence."

Boethius also in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, last prose, expressing this most clearly, says: "His knowledge, having transcended all motion of time, remains in the simplicity of his presence, and embracing the infinite spaces of past and future, considers in his simple cognition all things as if they were now being done. Therefore if you wish to weigh that presence by which he distinguishes all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not foreknowledge as of future, but knowledge of a never-failing instance." From this he infers consequently in God *subsequent necessity*, as the present chapter and chapter 50 of this [book] more fully recited.

Following him, John Scotus on *Sentences* I, dist. 40, asks, argues, and responds thus: "I ask whether the predestined can be damned. That [he cannot]: every past is simply necessary; but the predestination of this predestined has passed into the past, because God predestined him from eternity."

And further on: "To the first argument I say that the argument proceeds from a false imagination, the understanding of which imagination helps to understand the truth of the proposed question. For if by an impossible we should understand God not yet to have determined his will to either

part, but to be deliberating whether he wished to predestine this man or not — our intellect could well grasp that he contingently predestined or did not predestine him, as appears in the act of our will. But because we always recur to the act of the divine will as if past, therefore we as it were compare the freedom in that will to the act, as if now placed by the will. But that imagination is false. For that *now* of eternity, in which is that act, is always present; and so it must be understood concerning the divine will or volition as it is of its object, as if by an impossible God should now begin to have a willing in this *now* — and so freely God can in the *now* of eternity will what he wills, as if his will were determined to nothing.

"Then I say, to the form of the argument, that the predestination of this man has not passed into the past. For although it itself co-existed with past things which have passed, yet it itself has not passed; but other things have passed which co-existed with it. Whence as was said in dist. 9: verbs of different times said of God, as they most truly suit him, do not signify parts of the time measuring that act, but consign the *now* of eternity, as if measuring that act, insofar as it co-exists with those many parts of time. And therefore it is the same that *God predestines*, *has predestined*, and *will predestine* — and so contingent one as the other, because nothing is there except the *now* of eternity measuring that act, which is neither present, nor past, nor future, but co-existing with all those."

St. Thomas also on *Sentences* I, dist. 38, q. 5, most plainly follows him and alleges him, saying: "God from eternity beholds the very being of the thing; how this is, Boethius evidently teaches in *De Consolatione*. For all cognition is according to the mode of the cognizer, as has been said. Since therefore God is from eternity, it must be that his cognition has the mode of eternity, which is total being-simultaneous without succession. Whence just as although time is successive, yet eternity is present to all times, one and the same indivisible as a *now standing* — so his cognition beholds all temporal things, although they are succeeding, as present to him; nor is any of them future with respect to him, but one with respect to another."

And further on, on dist. 40: "What is measured by eternity is simultaneous with all time, yet so that it is measured by none of them. And therefore the act of divine foreknowledge cannot be posited in being now, as if measured by present time, so as to have an order of present time to future to its known. But to all time and every known [thing] it has the order of present to present. Therefore when it is said *God foreknows this*, it is not understood that this is future with respect to divine knowledge, but with respect to this time in which it is referred. And therefore it is necessary to absolve verbs and participles of this kind, said of God, from the determination of time, so that they consignify the *now* of eternity and not of time. Otherwise the error inevitably would follow."

Which in the first [book] *Contra Gentiles* 66, he declares by an example concurring with the imagination premised, saying: "To any time or instant of time eternity is present-presentially; the example of which is somehow visible in a circle. For a point signed in the circumference, even if indivisible, is not however co-existing simultaneously according to position with each other

point in the circumference; for the order of position makes the continuity of the circumference. The center, however, which is outside the circumference, has direct opposition to any point signed in the circumference. Therefore whatever in any part of time is, co-exists with the eternal as present to the same — even if with respect to another part of time it is past or future. But to the eternal nothing can co-exist present-presentially except as a whole, because it does not have the duration of succession. Therefore whatever through the whole discourse of time is done, the divine intellect in his whole eternity beholds as if present."

He also further on in [chapter] 67 writes thus: "When we say *God knows*, or *knew this future*, a certain medium is actuated between the divine knowledge and the thing known — namely the time in which the speech is — with respect to which what is said to be known by God is *future*; not with respect to the divine knowledge is it future, which existing in the moment of eternity has [itself] present-presentially toward all things. With respect to which, if the time of speech be subtracted from the middle, it is not to say that this is cognized as if not existing — so that there be place for the question by which is asked, *Whether it can not be*. But thus it would be said to be cognized by God as already seen in his essence; with which posited, no place remains for the said question, because what already is, cannot, with respect to that instant, not be. Deception therefore happens from this, that the time in which we speak co-exists with eternity — or also past time, which is designated when it is said *God knew*. Whence the relation of past or present time to future is attributed to eternity, which in no way pertains to it; and from this it happens, *secundum accidens*, to be deceived."

Robert of Lincoln, following him, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 writes thus: "While I sit, it is necessary that I sit; and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But what relation these statements have — *that I sit* and *that I have sat* — to my session while I sit and after I have sat: the same relation has the knowledge of God to my future session, before I sit. For he knows future things as present, nor knows them otherwise when they are future and when they are present or past. Therefore in every similar mode by which it is necessary that God know things while they are or have passed, it is necessary that he know the same before they are. But while things are or have passed, his knowledge has subsequent necessity; therefore it has the same [necessity] before things happen."

And further on in [chapter] 5: "God knows all things by one indivisible and simple gaze eternally, always, similarly, immutably. For it is patent from what has been said, that what relation these statements have — *that I sit* and *that I have sat* — to my session while I sit and after I have sat: the same relation has God's knowledge to my session about to be tomorrow, before I sit. For he knows future things as present, nor knows them otherwise when they are future, and when they are present or past. Therefore in every same mode by which it is necessary for God to know things when they are or when they have passed, it is necessary for him to know the same before they are. But when things are, or have passed, his knowledge has subsequent necessity; therefore it has the same necessity before things happen."

This always-presential instance of eternity aforementioned in God, and the every-mannered stability and immutability in him according to any of his intrinsic modes, God himself intimates and testifies, saying: "I am who I am; thus shall you say to the children of Israel: *He who is* sent me to you," Exodus 3. And in John 8: "Before Abraham was made, I am." And concordantly the Prophet: "Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world were formed, from age to age you are God," Psalm 89; and below 92: "From age you are." And below 101: "As a vesture you will change them and they will be changed; but you yourself are the same, and your years will not fail." And the Apostle, 1 Timothy 6: "He alone has immortality."

Such authorities of this kind, the understanding of this kind, are evidently testified by authentic expositions premised in I.1 and I.5 of this [work], to which I will here add a few others. Blessed Augustine, on Psalm 89 premised, says: "Optimally he did not say *from age you have been*, or *unto age you will be*, but he placed a verb of present signification, insinuating God's substance to be in every way incommutable — where there is no *was*, nor *will be*, but only *is*. Whence it has been said: 'I am who I am,' and 'He who is, sent me to you'; and 'You will change them, and they will be changed; but you yourself are the same, and your years will not fail.' Behold what eternity has been made our refuge, that abiding in it, we may flee to it from this mutability of time."

He also on Psalm 101 cited: "Let us hope to come to those *standing* years in which days are not transacted by the circuit of the Sun, but what is, remains as it is — because this alone truly *is*." And on the same place above, on "in generation and unto generation" (or as Augustine has it, "in generation of generations are your years"), he says: "Not different are God's years and he himself; but God's years are God's eternity; God's eternity is his very substance, which has nothing mutable — where nothing is past as if it now is not, nothing is future as if it not yet is. There is nothing there except *is*; there is no *was* and *will be*; for what was, now is not, and what will be, is not yet — but whatever is there, is nothing if not *is*. Meritoriously thus God sent his servant Moses, who knew the name of him sending him; and he, indicating himself immortal to a mortal, eternal to a temporal, says: 'I am who I am.'"

He also in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* V.16: "That eternal and incommutable nature which is God has in itself to-be — as was said to Moses, 'I am who I am' — far otherwise than these things which were made are. Where that *truly* and *primarily* is, which in the same mode always is, and not only is not changed, but cannot be changed at all."

Concordantly with him, Gregory in *Moralia* 18.31, on that of Job 28, "Nor will they be commemorated in comparison with him," says: "The Prophet, contemplating his incommutability of essence, says: 'All things will grow old as a vesture, and as a covering you will change them, and they will be changed; but you yourself are the same, and your years will not fail.' Hence to Moses is said: 'I am who I am, and you will say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you.' Only he truly *is*, who alone incommutably remains. For all that which now is thus, now otherwise is, is next to non-being. For it cannot remain in its state, and somehow goes toward

non-being, while from what it had been it is led to something else through the moments of times."

[Demonstration of Truth 15]

The fifteenth is patently known through the fifth and sixth and the demonstrations of them; which is also concluded manifestly through the thirteenth.

For if according to the thirteenth the divine will is intrinsically equally free and contingent with respect to present and past as with respect to future, and could and can (by the possibility of which the fifteenth speaks) now and always in the future not-will, and never in the past have-willed future things — otherwise indeed by I.10 all future things would necessarily simply come to be, which chapter 12 of this [book] condemns — it could and can similarly with all present and past things.

This is also demonstrated through the fourteenth. For if, as the fourteenth asserts, the divine will is equally necessary with respect to future as with respect to present and past, and could and can (by the possibility of this fifteenth) now and always in the future not-will, and never in the past have-willed future things, it could and can similarly with all present and past things. The saying of [Henry of] Ghent in the demonstration of the eleventh truth, recited above, also testifies to this.

[Demonstration of Truth 16]

The sixteenth is inferred from the seventh manifestly. The thirteenth and fourteenth and the demonstrations of them also show this, with this added: that God cannot by such power not-will present things, nor not have-willed past things; because it is necessary by opposite necessity (that is, subsequent) for God to will present things and to have willed past things, as is clear from this chapter and chapter 50 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 17]

The seventeenth, as concerns both affirmative and negative parts, is correspondingly known through the fifteenth and sixteenth, with help from likeness.

[Demonstration of Truth 18]

The eighteenth, as concerns the first two parts, [is inferred] from [truths] 15 and 16; as concerns the two remaining, from the two parts of the seventeenth, correspondingly — since [God] does or does not do nothing except what he wills or does not will, with [the demonstrations of] I.9 and I.10 of this book remaining.

Through this [truth], as I hope, can be resolved the objections concerning God's possibility of not doing what he will do, does, or has done, and otherwise and other things. Through this also can the error of Abelard be avoided, and the Parisian article condemned — for the fuller understanding of which the matter must be ordered from a little higher.

Now, looking diligently into the writings of the Fathers, it evidently appears that there was a triple necessity erroneously posited concerning God and his actions *ad extra* — all of which equally are reduced to *necessity of nature*.

Some indeed said that whatever God does *ad extra*, he does from necessity of his essence, just as irrational agents — for instance, light [produces] splendor and fire heat. Others posited that whatever God does *ad extra*, he does from necessity of his knowledge, because through his knowledge he comprehends the better order possible in things, to which he necessarily conforms himself in operating according to his knowledge. The third believed that whatever God does *ad extra*, he does from necessity of his will, because through his knowledge he comprehends the better order possible in all beings, and the most perfect and best will necessarily conforms itself to similar knowledge by operating exteriorly according to its interior *dictamen*.

These three errors concerning this necessity Henry of Ghent recites in *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, which he also imputes to Avicenna. Similar errors St. Thomas imputes to certain philosophers and even theologians — namely Peter Abelard — in the *Quaestiones de Potentia Dei*, q. 5, asking: "Whether God can do what he does not do, and omit what he does." Where, responding, he says: "It must be said that this error — namely, to posit that God cannot do anything except what he does — was twofold. First, of certain philosophers saying that God acts from necessity of nature; which, if it were so, since nature is determined to one [thing], divine power could not extend to acting upon other things than those it does. Second, it was of certain theologians considering the order of divine justice and wisdom according to which things are made by God, which order they said God could not pass over; and therefore they fell into this — to say that God cannot do anything except what he does. And this error is imputed to Master Peter Abelard."

It is therefore patent that this Peter understands that God is able to do or omit only those things which he does, insofar as concerns the nature of his natural power, and concerning his power nakedly and absolutely taken — so that it could not extend itself to doing other things or omitting other things, because his volitional power could not exert itself toward another in any way — and therefore that he does and omits whatever [he does and omits] by necessity of nature and simply absolute. As his other words also indicate manifestly.

For Bernard recites his similar words in this passage where he had been alleged: "By this reasoning by which it is convinced that God the Father begot the Son as good as he could (for otherwise he would be guilty of envy), it is clear that all things which he does, he makes egregious as he can, and would not wish to subtract any commodity which he could confer." And after a few [lines]: "He so attends to what is good in all things which God does, that he is said to be inclined to the doing of individual things rather by the price of the good itself than by the wish of his will." Item: "From these things therefore — collated as much from reason as from description — I think it is clear to all that God can do or omit only that which he sometimes does."

And after a few [lines]: "He, if he could disturb the evils which occur, nor would he do this except opportunely (he who can do nothing inopportunely) — surely I do not see how he would not be consenting to sins. For who is to be said to consent to evil, except he through whom that could opportunely be disturbed?" Item: "By the aforesaid arguments and resolutions of objections, I think it is clear to all that God can do or omit only those things, or only in that mode, or only at the time at which he does, not otherwise."

And below in chapter 7 he recites the errors of the same [Abelard], saying: "First, it must be seen what it is to consent to evil, and what not. He indeed is said to consent to evil who, when he ought to prohibit it and can, does not prohibit it. If, however, he ought and cannot, and on the contrary, if he can but ought not — he is not guilty. If, however, he neither ought nor can, much less is he to be considered guilty. And therefore God is alien from consent to evils, who neither ought nor can impede evils. Therefore he ought not, because since things happen by his benignity in the way they best can, he ought in no way to will against this. Therefore also he cannot, because his goodness can in no way provide impediment to what is greater, when the lesser good has been chosen."

He wished therefore to say that God in no way had power of doing other things otherwise, nor of omitting what he does — as both his arguments and words, especially according to the ninth truth as expounded, manifest.

Abelard wished to say, however, that just as God necessarily and absolutely wills the ultimate end (namely his own goodness), so also necessarily and absolutely he wills those things which are toward the end — namely all creatures. Thus that all those same in number, in all their modes, emanate from him by a necessary order of goodness; therefore that none of these could in any way be omitted, nor anything else be made in any way, because then the necessary order of goodness would be disturbed, nor could the divine goodness manifest itself.

Who therefore will accuse me of this error? For I say that God, insofar as concerns the nature of his volitional power, most contingently and most freely according to contradiction can not-will what he wills, and will what he does not will, and correspondingly not-do and do — as the fifteenth truth and the following testify. Who yet, without repugnance, by a certain *subsequent necessity* — to the act of divine will already posited in being and entirely immutable — necessarily wills and does what he wills and what he does. Just as an angel or man, even if most contingently and most freely (even from himself only, as God [from himself]), should will whatever he wills, by this subsequent necessity necessarily he would will it.

Wherefore St. Thomas, where he was previously [cited], having recited the error of the philosophers and Abelard and refuted the first, adds: "Now it remains to investigate concerning the second position. Concerning which it must be known that 'someone is unable to do something' is said in two ways. In one way *absolutely* — namely when some of the principles which are necessary for action do not extend to that action, as if the foot is contracted, the man

cannot walk. In another way *from supposition* — for, with the opposite of some action posited, that action cannot occur. For I cannot walk while I sit.

"Since, however, God is an agent through will and intellect, as has been proved, it is necessary in him to consider three principles of action: namely first, *intellect*; secondly, *will*; thirdly, the *power of nature*. The intellect therefore directs the will; the will commands the power, which executes; but the intellect does not move except insofar as it proposes to the will its appetible — whence the whole 'moving' of the intellect is in the will.

"Therefore in two ways God is said absolutely unable to do something. In one way, when God's power does not extend to that — as we say that God cannot make affirmation and negation simultaneously true, as is clear from what was said above. Thus, however, it cannot be said that God cannot do anything except what he does. For it is established that God's power can extend to many other things.

"In another way, when God's will cannot extend to that. For it is necessary that any will have some end which it naturally wills, and the contrary of which it cannot will — as man naturally and of necessity wills beatitude, and cannot will misery. With this — that the will wills its natural end of necessity — it also wills those things without which it cannot have the end (if it knows these); and these are those things which are *commensurated* to the end. As if I will life, I will food. For those things without which the end can be had, which are not commensurated to the end, it does not will of necessity.

"The end, therefore, which is natural to the divine will, is its goodness, which it cannot not-will. But to this end creatures are not commensurated, in such wise that without them the divine goodness could not be manifested — as God indeed intends from creatures. For just as the divine goodness is manifested through these things which now are, and through this order of things, so it can be manifested through other creatures otherwise ordered. And therefore the divine will, without prejudice to will, justice, [and] wisdom, can extend itself to other [things] than those it does. And in this the aforesaid erring ones were deceived. For they esteemed the order of creatures as if commensurated to divine goodness, as if without that it could not be. It is therefore patent that *absolutely* God can do other things than those he does; but because he himself cannot make contradictories simultaneously true, *from supposition* it can be said that God cannot do other things than those he does."

Thomas also touches this error in *Summa* I, q. 25, a. 5, and *Contra Gentiles* I.81, and refutes it.

Hugh also in *De Sacramentis* I, part 2, c. 22, similarly understands and refutes this — as detractive and diminutive of the infinite divine power. Whence he says thus: "Let them now go, and glory in their sense, because they think to discuss divine works by reason and constrain his power under measure. For when they say, 'thus far he can, and no further,' what is this but to enclose and restrict his power, which is infinite, to a measure? For they say, 'God cannot do otherwise than he does, nor better than he does.'"

And below: "By such causes and reasons certain ones are induced to say that God is so bound and tied to the measure and law of his works that besides what he does he can do nothing — neither otherwise nor better. And through this they are convinced plainly to bind under term and measure that infinite and immense power of divinity, who extend it to something which truly has an end itself, and deny it to proceed further. For it is certain that everything which has been made in number and weight and measure has its legitimate term and end; and therefore, if to the measure and mode of the work the Creator's power is composed, doubtless it itself is declared to be terminated by end and measure.

"Here those scrutinizers of ours, who failed scrutinizing the scrutinies, say they bring forth something new (and truly new), nor as much true as new. They say that single creatures considered in themselves have less than the perfect, but the universality of all things is expressed in such consummation of good, that it cannot be better than it is."

The same error this same Hugh recites in his book of *Sentences*, c. 12, and refutes — where he also says: "When Augustine says 'God can do many things which he does not will,' he looked to the effect which he does not will: that is, what he does not operate, he can operate; for he does not omit from impotence. And according to this can be said: 'God can will what he does not will.'"

Whose opinion and almost his words, Peter [Lombard] in *Sentences* I, dist. 43, follows, reciting and rebutting the same error: "Some, glorying in their sense, have attempted to constrict God's power under measure. For when they say 'thus far God can, and no further,' what is this but to include and restrict his power, which is infinite, to a measure? For they say: 'God cannot do other than he does, nor better do what he does, nor pretermitt any of these things which he does.'"

He also further on, reciting and resolving a certain [argument] of Abelard's, says: "What was proposed: 'God cannot do except what his justice exacts, and he cannot do that which his justice exacts not to be done' — we say that in those expressions the sense is twofold. For if you understand 'he cannot do except what his justice exacts' — that is, except what his just will wills — you say what is false. For God's justice is taken as his most equitable will, in the manner Augustine takes those words of the Lord in Genesis speaking to Lot: 'I cannot do anything until you enter there,' expounding: 'He said he could not, which doubtless he could by power, but he could not by justice.'"

Behold how evidently the aforesaid opinion is here clear: namely that God, insofar as concerns the part of *power*, can will what he does not will, and do what he does not do; but insofar as concerns the part of his *will* now actually and immutably willing or not willing something, he cannot.

Wherefore at the end of the distinction, showing that God can will what he does not will nor ever willed, he says thus: "He has the power of willing both now and from eternity what nevertheless

he neither now wills, nor willed from eternity." From which and others similar, more expressed [statements], they were alleged in the demonstration of the ninth truth.

Almost all the Doctors of Paris refute this Peter Abelard, the Parisian Master, in this part. Whom, along with his undisciplined disciples following the shadow of certain philosophers and saying that God does whatever he does by necessity of nature, I think to have given cause for the edict of condemnation of the Parisian article objected. Wherefore according to his [Abelard's] opinion already premised against him, [the article] should be understood and expounded thus: that the article condemns that "God necessarily does whatever is immediately done by him" — by *necessity of coercion* or *necessity of immutability* (namely natural necessity and of the divine will, which is naturally determined to do these and not other things) — namely *absolute necessity*, which (as the article posits) places in God the impossibility of doing otherwise: namely, *natural impossibility from defect of natural power* — namely *absolute impossibility*.

This understanding of this article is testified by many other [articles] simultaneously condemned with it by the same Bishop. Of which one affirms: "That God is eternal in acting and in moving, just as in being; otherwise he would be determined by another, which would be prior to him." And another: "That what is determined of itself, like God, either always acts or never; and that there are several eternals." And another: "That the first principle cannot immediately produce ungenerable things which are new effects; but a new effect requires an immediate cause that can be otherwise." And another: "That God is the necessary cause of the first intelligence, with which posited, the effect is posited, and they are simultaneous in duration." And another: "That God is the necessary cause of the motion of celestial bodies and of the contingent conjunction in the stars" — to which and to which many others similar are condemned in the same series, before and after the said article.

Henry of Ghent also, on the occasion of this article, in *Quodlibet* V, q. 4, asks: "Whether God necessarily produces whatever exteriorly he immediately produces?" And first he argues that yes, because it follows necessarily, "God wills to do this, therefore he does this," and the antecedent is necessary, because otherwise God's will would be mutable. Then [he argues] no, by the article recited.

And responding he says that according to the philosophers' opinion in every divine making was posited the triple necessity recited above; and the first two — namely necessity of essence and of knowledge — being reprov'd, in reprov'ing the third necessity (namely of will), he says thus: "Similarly God in no way acts from necessity of his will, whether concomitant matter or absolutely considered, according to which some could say that although he does not act by necessity of his nature, nor of his knowledge, yet he acts by necessity of his will, because his knowledge comprehends the better order in things, and the perfect will necessarily adheres to it. As is patent, since the will is not *per se* except of its end, and what is *per se* of something, although it have a necessary order to that, and to those things which have an essential disposition to that, yet not to those things which have an *accidental* disposition to that."

Which shown by example, he adds: "Wherefore, since God's will is *per se* of the good end which he himself is — although he necessarily wills it, and those things which have a necessary disposition to it (as are whatever things are in the divine essence) — yet he does not necessarily will those things which have an accidental disposition to it; but such are all things other than himself, because nothing accrues to his goodness from them. By no necessity therefore does he will any of those, but he does nothing except what he wills; therefore none of the others apart from himself which he does, does he do of necessity."

And further on: "God does not of necessity will those things which are outside himself, on account of which when he makes them in the being of existence (concerning which is the question), he does not make them of necessity of his will — so that according to this mode the goodness of his essence is not the *ratio* for him of willing all things, because he could will other things which he does not will, nor will will, just as the truth of his essence is not the *ratio* for him of knowing all things which he could know — namely those things which could be or could come to be, and yet will not be. So that just as he does not of necessity know himself to do those things which he does, so he does not of necessity will to do those things which he does, as will be said now. Similarly neither does he of necessity know or will to be those things which are of absolute necessity.

"It must be said therefore simply and absolutely that whatever God does outside himself, none of these does he do of necessity — neither of those things which he does immediately (which according to the Philosopher was only one — that he posited him to do of necessity, as has been said) — nor of those which he does mediating other things, in which the philosophers concord with us. Nor also of these does he do anything by *necessity of coercion*, which impels the will against its own inclination (whether natural or voluntary) into action — because he is impassible and omnipotent. Nor by *necessity of immutability*, which simply and absolutely binds and holds virtue in act — as the condemned article well says, as has been said in opposing."

He also further on, responding to the first argument, says thus: "To the opposite argument, that of necessity occurs that which God wills to do — it must be said that this is true by necessity of consequence, not of consequent; because the antecedent is not simply necessary, namely 'that God wills to do that which he does' — except by considering the act of will as it is in God the divine essence itself, in which way it is not considered in the proposed question, but only insofar as it actually transits into the *volitum* exteriorly. And as it is argued that the antecedent is simply necessary, because what God wills, he cannot not-will — because otherwise his will would be mutable — it must be said," etc., as alleged in the demonstration of the eleventh truth.

In the recited article, therefore, is condemned *natural, simple, absolute, and preceding* necessity with respect to divine volition and making *ad extra* — but not the aforesaid *subsequent* necessity. For who will deny it to be necessary by this subsequent necessity that God does whatever is immediately done by him — just as also by this necessity, "Everything which is, when it is, is

necessary to be," and that what occurs and has been made occurs and has been made, and that God wills it so to be?

From these things can be elicited and held that the necessity of immutability, in the understanding of the Doctors, is twofold or threefold:

One, by which (if it were in use) whatever is somehow such, and cannot not be such by a change, could be said: "It is necessary by necessity of immutability for it to be such, because from this it cannot be changed." And so whatever is past, it is necessary to be past, and whatever was future, it is necessary to have been future, and whatever is non-future, it is necessary to be non-future, and the like. Of this the said article does not speak.

Another, which is *necessity of stability* and *subsequent*, as is clear from chapter 50 of this [book] — concerning which the said article does not understand.

Third, which is the *necessity of natural immutability*, by which (namely) some thing is naturally and by necessity of nature determined to do some one thing, nor has it natural power to the opposite — as irrational active powers, as is clear in *Metaphysics* IX.10. And such necessity of immutability Peter Abelard posited in God *ad extra*, such as is condemned in the article.

Whence Thomas, *De Potentia Dei*, where he was previously [cited], says: "Those who said that God acts from necessity of nature posited the power of which we treat, not only by reason of immutability of nature, but by reason of *determination* of nature *to one*."

Wherefore also Henry of Ghent says that God does *ad extra* by necessity of immutability "which simply and absolutely binds and holds virtue in act — wherefore the condemned article well says [it]."

The irrational reasonings of Peter Abelard, however, and of any others — whether philosophers or *friend-of-philosophy-foolers* (*friuolophilorum*) — eager to construct natural necessity in God with respect to his done [things], ought to move no rational animal.

For if he acted *ad extra* by necessity of nature, since any of his effects is finite, he himself would be finite, against the first supposition; or if according to that he were infinite, any of his effects would also be similarly infinite, as in I.9 it was more fully argued.

Nor does God by his knowledge comprehend — indeed cannot comprehend — *the best being possible to be made*, than which better nothing could be made. For let it be supposed that he comprehend and make [it], and let A be that. Either, then, A is simply infinite in every way, and then it is God, and therefore not made, as the first supposition proves; or finite, and then it would be possible to make something greater than it. Therefore for any good possible to be made, can be made always greater and greater, and therefore similarly to be comprehended; therefore neither can a perfect and best will make the maximum good and best [thing] possible to be made. It suffices for it, therefore, that it make a good as much as it spontaneously wished without evil

— especially since there is no reason prior to itself, or regulating it in things to be done, but it itself is the principle and rule of reason, as I.21 of [this book] more fully showed.

Also it was objected above that if this *subsequent necessity* were posited in God, the omnipotent would be bound. But I wonder by what mind, by what face they dare object this to me, affirming the contrary — when they themselves must necessarily concede that God, eternally before free and at liberty, is now temporally newly bound by an exceedingly weak extrinsic chain (as it were a spider's thread) — also insolubly bound, and unliberatably captivated — as chapter 30 of this [book] more fully argued.

But I do not say that he is newly necessitated by the aforesaid subsequent necessity, nor through anything outside himself, but eternally, uniformly only through his own eternal most-free act of his own and most-free will. If anyone, however, wishes to call this necessary act of the divine will, or this subsequent necessity (according to the metaphors of the poets, grammarians, and rhetoricians), as also *love*, *bond*, *knot*, or *chain* — I think there is not much to be contended over the name, while the matter is rightly understood. Then it can be metaphorically said that God is bound — namely by this bond of love and chain of charity. I know, however, that some catholic listeners abhor this — not because what is said metaphorically is not catholically said, but because what is catholically said is not catholically understood.

Some indeed, because the customary bond and chain seems to import some violence, similarly understand if anything such is said of God. But these err, since in the customary bond and chain are two things, namely *violence* and *firminess*. And because according to the Philosopher in *Topics* VI, "all who transfer transfer according to some likeness, not however according to all" — as he shows in his *Poetria* — it suffices that this transference is done for the second property, although not for the first.

Nor is it true that every chain implies violence. For many subject themselves freely to the chains of many obligations toward God and men, and bear them gratis. Whence Ecclesiasticus 6: "Send your foot into her fetters" — namely of wisdom — "and your neck into her chains. Place your shoulder under her, and bear her, and be not weary in her bonds, and her fetters will be to you a protection of fortitude and a base of virtue, and her chains a stole of glory, and her bonds a connection of salvation."

Wherefore the Apostle to the Colossians 3 calls *charity* "the bond of perfection." Whence also Hosea 11: "I will draw them in the cords of Adam, in the bonds of charity."

Wherefore Hugh of St. Victor, *De Laude Caritatis ad Petrum*, addressing charity, says thus: "O charity, how much you can — you who overcame God! You compelled him obedient to you to descend from the seat of paternal majesty even to enduring the depths of our mortality; you led him bound by your chains. Whence let man be more ashamed to resist you, when he sees you triumphing over God: you wounded the impassible, bound the insuperable, drew the incommutable."

He also further on praises this charity, because it itself is God. What is this charity, except the dear will of God, and the dear volition of God, according to the premises in I.25?

But because Henry of Ghent imputes to Avicenna the threefold erroneous necessity recited above, and I have alleged him several times, I must briefly discuss whether he accuses him justly. For it seems that he can probably and rationally be defended.

He objects to him that for the first necessity he says thus: "Of the first truth there is no first action of his except through essence." And who would deny this? For his first action is not *ad extra*, but *ad intra*, by which he knows and loves himself, and this not freely according to contradiction but purely necessarily by necessity of his essence.

Again he opposes that for the second necessity [Avicenna] says thus: "His knowledge is knowing that his perfection and his excellence are that goodness be made by him, and this is of those communicating his glory. And from his understanding himself follows the ordination of goodness in being, and he understands how it is possible and more elegantly to come to be the existence of the whole. Whence, as he says, from his understanding the ordination and goodness which can be better, according to which he understands it, that flows by such flux by which more perfectly is reached to order according to possibility."

But if for this saying he merits to be condemned, why not similarly Augustine, who in *De Libero Arbitrio* III.7 thus says: "Whatever shall occur to you by true reason as better, know that God has made it as the maker of all good things. Therefore there can be something in the nature of things which by your reason you do not think; but that there is not what by true reason you think, cannot be. For neither can you in the creature think anything better, that the artificer of the creature has fled. Indeed the human soul, naturally connected to the divine *rationes* upon which it depends, when it says 'this would be better made than that,' if it speaks truly, and sees what it says — sees it in those *rationes* with which it is connected. Let him therefore believe that God made what by true reason he knew was to be made by him, even if he does not see this in things made; because even if he could not see the heaven by his eyes, and yet by true reason he gathered some such thing was to be made — he ought to believe it has been made, although he does not see it by his eyes. For he would not see by thought that it was to be made except in those *rationes* by which all things were made."

And in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* IV.18: "If God could not make goods, there would be no power; but if he could, and would not make them, there would be great envy. Because therefore he is omnipotent and good, he made all things very good." He also in *De Quantitate Animae* 18: "By God's justice this universe is sustained and ruled, by which it has also been made that not only all things are, but they are so that they entirely could not be better." And further on in [chapter] 20: "God judged this most beautiful, that there should be whatever is, in the way it is."

And further on: "Who is he who justly grows angry that the soul has been given to act and administer the body, when so great and so divine an order of things could not be better connected?"

Behold Augustine, a Catholic Doctor, professing a similar opinion. As, then, he wishes to expound Augustine, so let him expound Avicenna also. In many ways, however, both can be well understood and expounded.

In one way *from the part of God*, and from the part of the mode of doing related to God, namely insofar as concerns the part of the maker. For he does all things through wisdom, goodness, and infinite power. And so Peter [Lombard] responds in *Sentences* I, dist. 44, and Thomas in *Summa* I, q. 25, last article, asking, "Whether God could do better the things he does."

In another way *from the part of things made*, and this in many ways: in one way, that God could not make these same things made *essentially* better in number — because then they would be other and not the same; *accidentally* however he could. And so Thomas responds where he had been alleged.

Thirdly, it can be said that God could do nothing better — that is, *more purely good*, namely more unmixed with evil or natural malice. For the Philosopher says in *Topics* III that "those things which are more unmixed with contraries are more such — as that is whiter which is more unmixed with black"; therefore also a lesser evil is sometimes called *good*, and *better* sometimes. Whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* V.5: "In the *ratio* of good a lesser evil is to a greater evil; for a lesser evil is more eligible than a greater; the eligible, however, is good, and *more*, [is] *greater*."

And Lamentations 4: "It was better for those slain by the sword than for those killed by hunger." And it is the most frequent mode of speaking among all. According to which mode of speaking also sometimes something is said *better* than another, because that is good and the other evil, or not good. Whence the Philosopher in *De Generatione* II, second-to-last [chapter]: "It is better to be than not to be." And the Prophet: "Better is a little to the just man than the great riches of sinners," Psalm 36. And Solomon in *Proverbs* 16: "Better is a little with justice than many fruits with iniquity; and better to be humbled with the meek than to divide spoils with the proud."

The authors say therefore that God cannot do anything better than he does — perhaps against those who posited in beings something *per se* evil, of which is touched in I.1 and I.26. With which Avicenna along with many other philosophers contradicts, as the same I.26 reveals. With which also almost all the Catholic Doctors contradict, but specifically Augustine in his books *De Libero Arbitrio*, as there and in *Retractations* I.9 evidently appears. Of which the first is therefore called *Unde Malum*, and many other books.

Wherefore in *De Libero Arbitrio* III.6, [Augustine] warns lest anyone say of sinful souls "It would have been better if they had not existed" — implying that then the universe would have been more pure and more unmixed with evil, and therefore that those [souls] are not of the perfection of the universe, nor have they any goodness, but only pure malice, according to the

Philosopher's consideration in *Topics* III touched on. Wherefore in the same chapter 6 he says that sinful souls are not vituperated except in their own comparison, when it is thought what they would be if they had not wished to sin.

And further on in [chapter] 7 he shows that no thing is reprehensible except in comparison with the better. Nor must anyone say that the whole universe, or anything of it, can be better than it is — so that it could be good, and now is evil, or is not good. Wherefore in the same chapter 6 of the third [book], as he also touches in *Retractations* I.9, he shows that God for the making of creatures is to be praised in all, not blamed. Who also above in [chapter] 5 intimates that God could have created men in some inferior grade of creature; therefore not according to him does God necessarily always make the better which he could.

Still further perhaps fourthly, as concerns the *natural order* of things — that the parts of animals and plants and of the whole world (for instance, the elements and heaven) are now better naturally ordered than they would be if placed according to the contrary order — so that nothing is there useless or shameful. And this the Philosopher intimates in *De Animalibus* XIII, and through three following books, where he treats of the parts of animals, and of their formation, fittingness, and utility — and elsewhere in the same book frequently. Whom Avicenna follows in this part — as both, [as cited] in I.27 of this [work], allege. Whom also Algazel follows, as the same I.27 alleged.

That [it pertains] to the disposition of the elements and of heaven, Augustine intimates in *De Libero Arbitrio* III.7, where he had been alleged. Who also in *De Quantitate Animae* 20 says thus: "God in no act deserts the soul without punishment, without reward. For he judged this most beautiful, that there should be whatever is, in the way it is, and so the grades of nature were ordered, that those considering the universe might not be offended by any deformity from any part — and that all punishment of the soul, and every reward, might always confer something of just beauty on the part and the disposition of all things. For free will has been given to the soul; nor however has free will been given to the soul so that, attempting whatever by it, it should disturb that part of the divine order and law. For it has been given by the most wise and most invincible Lord God of every creature. But to see these things as they must be seen is for few, nor is anyone made fit for this except by true religion. Since these things are so, who is he who justly grows angry that the soul has been given to act and administer the body, when so great and so divine an order of things could not be better connected?"

This opinion he also teaches in *De Libero Arbitrio* III.24. If, however, in some manner said, or in another not said, Avicenna can be sanely understood (as Augustine [can be]) — well; if not, also well — since Avicenna is not entirely a necessary witness to me in this case, especially where he errs. But even if in one or few [things] he should err, like other philosophers, indeed even Catholic Doctors, he can in many other [things] tell the truth.

If, however, he can be sanely understood, it can further be said that the Ghent doctor refutes the surface of the letter, or rather those badly understanding the letter of Avicenna — just as also, by

the testimony of Eustathius, Aristotle sometimes refuting (as it seems) Plato did not wish to argue against him, but against those who badly understand his sayings, as II.2 more fully alleged.

Thirdly, the Ghent doctor objects against Avicenna that for the third necessity he says thus: "Every knowledge by which one knows what proceeds from it, nor is mixed with it any impediment, pleases him what proceeds from it. Therefore *first it pleased* that from his essence flow everything which is." This saying, however, by itself alone does not seem to contain explicitly or implicitly the said necessity of the divine will, but rather to intimate freedom.

[Demonstrations of Truths 19, 20, and 21]

The nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first follow lucidly from the corresponding parts of the fifteenth (correspondingly speaking of *posse*), and similarly from the first three parts of the proximate truth — with this added, that the divine will is a *necessary cause* (that is, necessarily required) for something to be future, present, or past — to be done or done, or even conserved — as I.14 and I.9 taught.

The nineteenth specifically is doubtful to almost no one. Otherwise indeed all things which would happen would happen by simple absolute necessity, which chapter 12 of this [book] condemns.

The twentieth specifically is also clear from the fifth truth of this [chapter] and the demonstration of it; which the testimonies of Henry of Ghent there, and in the demonstration of the eleventh and eighteenth, plainly confirm — also of St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 3, in chapter 5 of this; of Scotus on *Sentences* I, dist. 29, in the demonstration of the fifth and eighteenth; and of Robert of Lincoln in the demonstration of the ninth truth, more fully recited in those [places].

For if (as they assert) the *potestas* in God's will concerning the actual being of creatures is determined by no necessity, but insofar as it concerns itself, is to either side concerning willing it and not willing — then creatures now actually existing can now and for now not exist. If also, according to them, "for one not now sitting it is possible now and for now to sit," and contrariwise, why not similarly concerning any creature now being? If moreover (as Scotus and the Lincoln doctor affirm) a creature's volition now existing can now and for now not exist, why not similarly think concerning similar [cases]?

[Demonstration of Truth 21]

Around the twenty-first the contest is keener on account of the many opposing it. Yet I judge this sufficiently shown from the last part of the fifteenth truth — which the demonstration of the fifth of this [chapter] also sufficiently shows.

Let A be the singularly proper name of some past thing — for instance, of the universal flood — yet not connoting the pastness, nor any accidental condition of it, but insofar as is possible the thing itself essentially, simply, and entirely absolutely. Why therefore could not, or cannot, A not

have been? What repugnance does it formally imply? What contradiction does it evidently include? None, doubtless, as was shown there.

For sometime — namely when A was, or before — from this enunciation, "A never was," nothing per se impossible, no contradiction formally and simply followed; therefore neither now, as appears from the demonstration of the first supposition.

Also from a proposition which sometime was true, never simply formally does any falsehood follow — because then from the true a falsehood would formally follow.

Likewise, of the same *ratio* is "the thing being able not to have been when it was" and "the thing being able to have been when it was not" — namely before it was. But a thing which was not always (for instance the world or an angel) can by such absolute possibility have always been — nor does it formally imply any repugnance, nor necessarily import [it]. It can also by such *potentia* have been for one day before it was, and for one year — and for two by similar reasoning — why therefore not for three and four, and so infinitely thereafter? This same the opinion of many Doctors seems also to confirm.

Likewise by the twentieth truth, and through what was just premised, a thing now present can without repugnance now and for now not be. And it is as necessary for that to be for now, as for A to have been; therefore A also can not have been. Indeed, it seems that for a thing which is now present, it is in some way *more* necessary — at least *multipliciously* (in more ways) necessary — for it to be for now, than for A to have been. For a present thing, beyond the necessity from the divine will alone (common and equal to both intrinsically), is necessary to be through *proper natural causes*: through matter and form, and also through *common natural causes* conserving it naturally in being. But A is necessary to have been from the divine will alone — or at least not from so many causes, because not from proper [causes], since they no longer are nor cause — or let it be posited that God destroys every natural cause proper and common to A, conserving the existing stone; and then it will more appear that for the stone for now to be is more necessary than A to have been. If therefore the stone now being can now and for now not be, it seems that A as much, or more, can not have been.

It will perhaps be replied that from the pastness of the past thing arises a certain *relation*, by which it is necessary simply for it to have been, and therefore impossible simply for it not to have been. But this was reprov'd before, when it was shown that "A not to have been" implies no contradiction formally. Also, that relation: it is not necessary simply to be or have been; for sometime it was not; therefore neither would it formally repugn for it now not to be; therefore it makes nothing simply necessary.

That relation also is either to God (or to the divine will), or to some natural thing or things. The first was destroyed by chapter 30 of this [book]. The second cannot stand: for let it be supposed that God destroyed all other natural causes. So great, moreover, and so powerful a relation — indeed rationally a stronger one, whether to God or to natural causes — arises from the *presence*

of the present thing, just as from the *pastness* of the past. And that not impeding, it is possible for the thing which now is, now and for now not to be — therefore also for the past not to have been.

For no absolute thing — for instance, the most powerful or most efficient natural form — makes its formed [thing] or effect to be necessary simply; therefore neither does a relation (since it is of weaker being, as chapter 20 of this [book] touches) make anything necessarily simply to have been.

So great and so powerful a relation similarly seems to arise from the futurity of the future, just as from the pastness of the past, and therefore would render that as necessarily future, while it is future, just as that [renders the past] necessary. Then also that relation would simply necessitate God's will to willing it to be, and according to it the thing to have been — as can be shown from I.18 and I.19 — which does not befit his most worthy freedom, as chapter 30 of this [book], and the thirteenth and fourteenth truths, manifest.

Still perhaps others will respond otherwise, saying that A cannot not have been on account of the *defect of a necessarily required relation* — namely on account of the defect of *willability* or *factibility* of it by God. But this response does not avoid the arguments made for this twenty-first, nor render the cause of its saying. For although God could not will the contrary — namely "A not to have been" — yet he could (as it seems, and as the fifteenth truth asserts) *not-will* "A to have been," just as he could before A was. With which posited, A would not have been past, by I.14 — as also against a similar response chapter 30 of this [book] proceeds.

By the same reasoning, the thing which is now present, on account of the defect of a similar relation, could not now and for now not be — against the twentieth truth. Such privation of relation would also necessitate simply the divine will to will it and according to it, and impossibilite it to will oppositely, as it could once will — which was reprov'd before, against a similar response written in chapter 30 of this [book], and is against the thirteenth and fourteenth truths.

Such defect of relation is also not simply necessary to be or to have been, because neither is that relation if it were or had been, as neither are absolute things, as has been shown above — which can also be shown in similar manner.

Indeed, the opposite volition of God — namely "A not to have been" — it is simply possible now to be, just as it was before the pastness of A, as can be shown from the premises, and from the thirteenth and fourteenth truths.

Thirdly it is said by some that the past cannot not have been, nor can God do this, because each implies contradiction. For proving which they adduce testimonies of the Doctors. For Augustine in *Contra Faustum* XXVI.2 says: "Whoever therefore says, 'If God is omnipotent, let him make things which have been done not to have been done,' does not see that he is saying this: 'If he is omnipotent, let him make those things which are true, by the very fact that they are true, to be false.'"

The same Jerome to Eustochium, Aristotle, and Agatho seem to feel, alleged above. Whom St. Thomas following, *Summa* I, q. 25, a. 4, asking, "Whether God can make those things which are past not to have been," responding says thus: "It must be said that under God's omnipotence does not fall something which implies contradiction. But the past not to have been implies contradiction. For just as it implies contradiction to say that Socrates sits and does not sit, so also that he sat and did not sit. To say that he sat is to say that it is past; to say, however, that he did not sit, is to say that it would have been the opposite of him." For proving which he alleges the sayings of Augustine and the Philosopher noted.

But these either understand in the *composite* sense, or in the *divided* sense, that the past cannot not have been. If in the composite sense, they have to say consequently that the present cannot not be present, and that the future cannot not be future — on account of similar contradiction included. If in the divided sense — namely taking some past thing (for instance, the flood), not convolving the pastness or any accidental condition, but only the thing itself nakedly, essentially, simply, and entirely absolutely — which thus taken let it be named A: thus it is absolutely and per se and simply, without repugnance, possible for "A not to have been," as has been shown above.

For the cause of these moreover, it must further be inquired whether they understand that "the past not to have been" in the divided sense (in the manner aforementioned) includes contradiction *per se and entirely formally*, or *per accidens* and *as-of-now* only.

Not in the first way, as is now established. If in the second way, the cause does not help, speaking of power *absolutely*, as the truth to be shown speaks. For thus also "you will run" includes contradiction, if you are not about-to-run; for it includes per accidens and as-of-now that one not about-to-run be about-to-run. For you actually and as-of-now are not about-to-run. Indeed, thus also every false proposition concerning the future, and universally every false proposition, includes contradiction. Yet who would deny this to be possible absolutely, and that God can thus verify "you will run," and many other false enunciations?

Thus therefore I judge that the thing which is past — for instance, A — can not have been, and that God can make A not to have been. Through which I understand that God, insofar as concerns his power *absolutely*, and concerning the nature of his volitional power free according to contradiction (insofar as it causally precedes its act, by which he now wills A to have been) could not elicit nor have it, but its opposite — as he could when A was future — just as also a man might be able to with respect to his past volitum: because with God nothing intrinsically is past or future, but eternally and instantaneously only present, as the demonstration of the fourteenth declared. Yet by *subsequent necessity* — not from the pastness of the thing (because that itself causes nothing whatever in the divine will), but only from the stability and firmness and presentaneity of the intrinsic act of the divine will — it is necessary for God to will A to have been, and similarly A to have been.

But although these things from the premises seem evident, behold still some testimonies of my elders for fuller evidence.

Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo* II.17 says: "God improperly is said to be unable to do something, or to do by necessity. For all necessity and impossibility is subject to his will; but his will is subject to no necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible except because he so wills [it]. But that he himself either should will or not-will something on account of necessity, is alien from the truth. Wherefore since he does all things which he wills, and only what he wills, just as no necessity or impossibility precedes his willing or not-willing, so neither his doing or not-doing — although he wills many things immutably and does [them]. And just as when God does something, after it has been done, it can no longer not have been done, but it is always true to have been done — yet rightly it is not said impossible for God that he should make what is past not to be past — for nothing operates there of necessity of not-doing or impossibility of doing, but God's will alone, who always wills the truth (since he himself is truth) immutable, as it is. So if he proposes himself immutably about-to-do something, yet there is no necessity of doing in him, or impossibility of not-doing, since in him will alone operates."

The same in *De Concordia* 2: "Some thing — like a certain action — is not future of necessity, because after it occurs, it can come to pass that it not be; and concerning the past it is similarly true, because some thing is not past by necessity, since before it was, it could come to pass that it not be" — which not ineptly can be understood of the priority of free power according to contradiction toward its act, as in similar cases above has been shown.

Whence John Scotus on *Sentences* II, dist. 2, q. 7, says that "the angel's creation, and the angel, can not be in the instant in which it is, in the sense of composition; in the sense of division, however, well [it can]" — as has been touched in the matter on God's predestination and foreknowledge. Where he also says that "the conserved can not be when it is conserved, and when it is produced, in the sense of division."

And further on, responding: "When it is said in the argument 'God cannot make an angel not to have been,' it is denied as of the thing signified by *to have been*; and if it be said, 'the past cannot not have been,' it is denied — because this is not past *in se*, that is, per se and essentially, since pastness or to-be-past is not of its essence, nor essential to it, but accidental — therefore also it is absolutely possible to be separated."

This question 7 on the second distinction, in some books is the first on the same distinction. For he wrote twice on the *Sentences*, and this is the cause of discord in this place, as in many other places.

This same is testified by Gilbert on Boethius's book *De Trinitate*, affirming that God can make Peter never to have been, and that this corrupted woman never was corrupted.

William, Bishop of Auxerre, follows him also, who on *Sentences* I, q. 49, asks: "Whether God can damn Peter and save Judas." Having argued that yes, because he can do this *of power*; and

that no, because he cannot do this *of justice* — he responds thus: "We say that God of power purely considered can damn Peter, having regard to God's power and the natural power of Peter by which he could sin and not sin. But it does not follow, 'therefore he can damn Peter,' because this verb *can* in the conclusion regards merits.

"Or if it is true what Master Gilbert says on Boethius's book *De Trinitate* — for he says that God can make that Peter never had been — it can be said according to this, that God can damn Peter, because he can make that Peter begin now to be, and could sin and sin, and so be damned."

He also further on, q. 50, asks, "Whether God can make a virgin from a corrupted [woman]": and having argued that no, by Jerome's authority alleged above; and that yes, because he can repair the blind and the dead, therefore also the corrupted; and recited one response saying that God cannot make a virgin from a corrupted [woman] as concerns every dignity of virginity, because he cannot make her not to have been corrupted, which is a certain dignity in the virgin according to which she merits the aureole — he objects against it: "Let God give to this corrupted [woman] every-mannered dignity of virginity, if he can; therefore he can make a virgin from a corrupted [woman]. If he cannot give now, and gave before, therefore something impedes — and only the pastness, namely because what has been done cannot not have been done. Therefore something impedes God's power; therefore God is not omnipotent."

Wherefore also otherwise responding to the question, he adds: "On account of this it is fitting to say, as Master Gilbert says, that God can make that this woman never have been corrupted, because *as concerns himself*, he does not relate to things otherwise than he related from eternity. Whence past, present, and future are from the part of things, not from the part of God. But we are accustomed in such matters to speak with the supposition of the past — when it is said 'God cannot from a corrupted [woman] make a virgin'; for this he cannot do *with the supposition of the past*, but he can according to himself, since he is omnipotent. And in his omnipotence four things are understood: namely *amplitude of power*, which is not determined to some effect (as the *potestas* of heating to heating); and *that from himself and per se he is able* — that is, without indigence of extrinsic help, without coercion, and without impediment."

From this also appears one resolution of the objections. For according to this Doctor, the authorities saying "the past cannot not have been past, nor God make from a past not past, or a virgin from a corrupted [woman]" are understood in the *composite* sense — namely composing and consignifying with the thing the pastness — not in the *divided* sense, namely dividing the pastness from the thing, and taking it nakedly, essentially, and simply absolutely, as was said above. Or also according to the common manner of assigning composite and divided sense, which does not differ really from the prior. For he says: "We are accustomed in such matters to speak with the supposition of the past — when it is said, 'God cannot from a corrupted [woman] make a virgin'; that is, 'he cannot do this with the supposition of the past, but he can according to himself.'"

This same logic seems to be Anselm's in *De Concordia* 2, where, making this distinction in enunciations of *necessity*, of future, present, and past, he concedes the composite sense and denies the divided. Whence he says thus: "Indeed it is not the same thing — *for a thing to be past* and *for a past thing to be past*; or *for a thing to be present* and *for a present thing to be present*; or *for a thing to be future* and *for a future thing to be future* — just as it is not the same that *a thing is white* and *a white thing is white*. For wood is not always necessarily white, but sometimes — before it was made white, it could come to pass that it not be made white; and after it is white, it could come to pass that it be made not white. But the *white wood* always must be white, because neither before it is, nor after it is white, can it come to pass that the white simultaneously not be white.

"Similarly, a thing is not by necessity present, since before it was present it could come to pass that it not be present, and after it is present, it could come to pass [that it be] not present. But the *present thing*, it is necessary always to be present, because neither before it is, nor after it is present, can it simultaneously be not present.

"In the same mode some thing — like a certain action — is not by necessity future, because before it is, it can come to pass that it not be future. But the *future thing* is necessarily future, because the future cannot simultaneously be not future. Concerning the past also it is similarly true, because some thing is not by necessity past, since before it was, it could come to pass that it not be; and because *the past* is always necessarily past, since it cannot simultaneously not be past."

According to the same logic also John Scotus, proceeding on *Sentences* I, dist. 39, similarly distinguishes, concedes, and denies that vulgar saying of the Philosopher in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I: "What is, when it is, is necessary [to be]." For he says that some thing — for instance, A — which now is, now and for now can not be, as in the demonstration of the fifth truth was alleged.

The same logic St. Thomas also intimates, *Summa* I, where he had been alleged, responding thus: "It must be said that although the past not to have been is *per accidens* impossible, if there be considered that which is past — namely Socrates's running — yet if the past be considered *under the ratio of past*, that itself not to have been is *per se* impossible, and absolutely implying contradiction."

It seems therefore that when he says "the past cannot not have been, nor can God make this," he understands in the composite sense, not the divided. To this also testifies another saying of his in *De Aeternitate Mundi*, and his distinction concerning the necessary, and the similar distinction in *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 3, premised in chapter 50 of this [book].

This same can also be otherwise confirmed. For he himself does not dare to concede a diminution of God's power intrinsically of any kind whatever; therefore neither will he dare to concede that God once could will or not-will anything which now he cannot.

For he argues, where he was previously [cited], that the past can not have been, in this way: "Whatever God could do, he can [do], since his power is not diminished. But God could, before Socrates ran, [make] that he not run; therefore," etc. And he responds in this way: "It must be said that just as God, as concerns the perfection of divine power, can do all things, but certain things do not lie under his power, because they fail from the *ratio* of the possible — so, if attended to is the immutability of divine power, whatever God could, he can. And he could once will the flood never to have been future, present, or past; therefore he can also now."

But against this response of these Doctors it can not improbably be replied: For if the philosophers and theologians asserting "the past cannot not have been, nor can God make this" understand in the composite sense, they have to assert consequently to a similar understanding that "the future cannot not be future, the present cannot not be present, nor can God make this or that, nor anything which he does not do" — yet though they assert these, they deny those.

Wherefore for the understanding of the philosophers and Doctors, perhaps to be more lucidly known, it must be known that the philosophers, considering of natural causes and the natural course of beings, when they say something can or cannot come to be, understand often of the power of *natural and inferior causes*, and according to the natural course and order naturally established for natural things. And so it is true that the past cannot become not-past — just as the future can become not-future, and the present not-present, when those arrive [and] these recede.

Still further, as I think, there is another more profound and more sincere understanding. For by carefully turning the books of the philosophers, and more carefully reflecting, it appears that they posit a general two-membered division: namely, into *terms* and into *ways*. The *terms* are two, namely *being* and *non-being*; the *ways*, correspondingly, are two: *generation* and *corruption*, leading to these terms.

The philosophers, therefore, seeing any thing existing in either term, [and observing] that for it to be in the other [term] it transits through the way to that — or that the term in any way accedes to it — say that this must occur through *generation* or *corruption*, mutation, or motion in itself or in another. Therefore when they say that a thing existing in some term (that is, in or under any kind of being or non-being) can be in or under the opposite term, they understand of the power *mutable, actuable, and terminable by opposite terms succeeding one another* — which cannot pass into act except through some change in that thing or in another, namely through accession to one of the opposites and recession from the other.

That, however, I may expound this as briefly as I can: I say that power is twofold. One, *entirely absolute* or of *non-repugnance*; and so something which is somehow can be not-such without any change, as the eleventh truth showed.

The other is *natural* power, and *according to contradiction and natural order, mutable, actuable, and terminable by opposite terms successively*. And according to this, whatever, of whatever sort,

is, cannot be not-such except through some change between opposite terms in itself or in something else, as the twelfth truth suggested.

And concerning this latter power the philosophers commonly speak, when they say something or some thing can or cannot be such or such, on account of the cause premised. Thus, then, speaking of power, it is most true that the past cannot not be past. For this cannot be by a change or making between opposite terms — namely between past and not-past. For it evidently includes contradiction that A first was past, and now is not past. But concerning future and present things, it is not so. For the future can be changed, and will be changed, from future to non-future, when it becomes present; and the present from present to non-present, when it slips into the past.

This therefore, according to the philosophers and theologians, is the *difference* of things divided according to the threefold difference of time: that the *future* can be changed and become from future not-future, and the *present* from present not-present; but for the *past* to be changed from past into non-past is *absolutely impossible*.

Still further, beyond the premises, it must be noted that *making* is twofold:

One, *mutable* or itself a mutation, *initiable and terminable by opposite terms* — which corresponds to similar power, namely *natural, mutable, actuable, and terminable* aforesaid. Concerning which power almost always understand and speak the philosophers, theologians, and universally all learned and unlearned, when they say anything can or cannot be made — the cause of which is that whatever they see come to be naturally, artificially, voluntarily, violently, casually, or fortuitously, they see come to be through this kind of making.

Of this cause there seems to be another prior cause: for the making naturally and causally precedes (at least) its made; therefore neither can it be temporally preceded by it. The maker also similarly the making — neither can be temporally preceded by it. Wherefore also the maker [is preceded by] its made — neither can it be temporally preceded by it. Therefore just as every temporal maker has a temporal beginning, so any of its making, and any of its made.

By this *first making*, then — namely *mutable and terminable by opposite terms* — God cannot make from a past a not-past, in such wise that something first should be past, and afterward should recede from it as from a *terminus a quo* of making and motion, and accede to *not-past* as to a *terminus ad quem* of the same making and motion. For thus something would first be past, and afterward not-past — which evidently implies contradictories.

The philosophers, therefore, and theologians, dividing universally all things according to triple temporal difference (according to future, present, and past), intend further to assign this difference between the members: that God by this making *initiable and terminable by opposite terms* can make from future a not-future, by producing it into being; and from present a non-present, by withdrawing it from being. But from past a not-past, in no way.

This understanding evidently appears from the words of the Doctors and Philosophers proximately adduced to the opposite. Whence blessed Augustine in *Contra Faustum* XXVI, denying that God can make that things which have been done not have been (as was more fully alleged above), showing himself to speak of this kind of making *terminable and mutable from some terminus into its opposite*, immediately adds: "He can make that something which was, not be; for he then makes that it not be, when he finds something to be, of which it should be made — for instance, when he makes him who began to be by being born, not to be by dying. For this made he found, of which it should be made. But who would say that 'of that which now is not, he should make not to be'? For whatever is past, now is not. If of itself something can be made, there is still that of which it would be made. And if it is, how is it past?"

The authorities saying that *creature* cannot have always been, understand insofar as *creature* imports a making out of preceding nothing — namely *initiable and mutable* making — supposing the Catholic truth. Other [authorities], however, which say that nothing else than God can be co-eternal with him, understand perhaps, supposing the Catholic truth, namely that everything else than God is made *after non-being* by him.

Or perhaps more subtly: that nothing else than God can be eternal *properly*, namely so that it has its whole being simultaneously, without any mutable succession and without possibility for change — as Boethius, Anselm, and the proximate chapter spoke. Whence although the world had no beginning of duration or time, nor end, by no means would it properly be called *eternal* on account of the defect of the aforesaid cause.

Wherefore Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, last prose, writes thus: "What suffers the condition of time — although it (as Aristotle judged of the world) neither ever began to be, nor would cease, and its life be protended with the infinity of time — is not yet such that it should rightly be believed *eternal*. For it does not embrace and clasp the whole space of life simultaneously, although infinite, but does not yet have future things, the past things it does not have. What therefore embraces and possesses the whole plenitude of interminable life equally simultaneously, to which neither anything of the future is absent nor of the past has flowed by — *that* is rightly proclaimed eternal; and it is necessary that it both, master of itself, always be present-presentially with itself, and have the infinity of mobile time present.

"Whence not rightly do certain ones, who when they hear it seemed to Plato that this world had no beginning of time, nor would have an ending, in this manner think the made world made co-eternal with its founder. For it is one thing to be led through interminable life (which Plato attributed to the world), and another to have embraced equally simultaneously the whole presence of interminable life — which is manifestly proper of the divine mind. Nor ought God to seem more ancient than the things made *by quantity of time*, but rather *by the property of his simple nature*."

For these and others, however, a certain not-useless distinction concerning eternity or eternal must be noted. For in one mode the authors take *eternal*, as has now been said. In another,

however, as it imports only the lack of beginning and end. Whence the grammarians, following Everard of Bithynia (or as some say, of Bath) in his *Graecismus* — where he assigns the differences of names — say thus: "*Aeternum*, [is] *truly without beginning, without end; perpetuum*, [is] *that to which there will be a beginning, but lack of end.*" And because this second mode is easier of understanding than the first, almost all, neglecting the first, adhere to the second.

Other authorities again, which assert that the creature cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, can be understood and expounded as the others touched before.

The same understanding Jerome also intimates manifestly when he says God cannot raise up a virgin after ruin: for *raising up* evidently imports some transit from one of opposites into the other — for instance, from death to life, from malice to goodness, and universally from any kind of non-being to the opposite being.

In a similar mode also can be understood the gloss on Amos which says that "a virgin who has lost her virginity will not be able to receive virginity": for *to receive* [signifies] to capture again, and to capture another time, and so designates a change and an *initiating* terminus.

Or perhaps it understands according to a settled law. For immediately it adds: "Scarcely is it conceded to her, that from one thousand she should return to one hundred, and from one hundred to ten" — which perhaps must be understood according to dignity and order in the Church militant, not according to grace and merit.

For according to the laws of the Church in the *Decrees* and *Decretals* sufficiently widespread, those constituted in orders and dignities can sin in such wise that they ought to be deposed or suspended, nor in perpetuity restored, but to remain perpetually in an inferior state. Every sin, however, is a certain *deflowering* of the sinner, *defloration*, and *corruption*.

And this understanding similarly is consonant with the words of the Gloss. For it says: "Thus it happens that the virgin Israel, who has erred, has none to raise her up, because he who has once departed from union and lost the virginity which he had with one man, will not be able to recover his former state, virginity, and beatitude of union. And scarcely is it conceded to her, that from one thousand she should return to one hundred, and from one hundred to ten."

It also concords with the text, which in the same place has "the house of Israel has fallen, and the virgin Israel has been cast upon her land" — which also does not deny the power of rising again to an equal state, but the act, assigning her an inferior grade. Whence it says thus: "The house of Israel has fallen, she will not add that she rise; the virgin Israel has been cast upon her land, there is none to raise her up. Because thus says the Lord God: 'The city out of which a thousand went forth, there shall be left in it a hundred; and out of which a hundred went forth, there shall be left in it ten.'"

On which the Gloss: "He does not deny that she can rise, but the virgin Israel will not rise — because once erring, even if she is brought back on the shoulders of the Pastor, she does not have the same glory with him who never erred from God. Whence through the Prophet: 'I prefer the penance of the sinner rather than [his] death.' He does not compare penance to the sanctity of the Church, but [says] that compared to death and hell, it is better."

To the letter also, no woman vitiated even before baptism can be consecrated among God's virgins, by the testimony of Augustine on the epistle to Titus, and is alleged in the canon, dist. 26, *Acutius* — with which other laws also concord.

By the aforesaid [things] similarly is patent the understanding of the Philosopher in *Ethics* VI, saying that "what has been done cannot not have happened." For he speaks there of what is *deliberable* and *eligible* through inferior causes — for instance, through men. And he says that no one elects what has been done, namely past, for instance Troy to have been captured, nor deliberates about what has been done, but about future and contingent — because the made does not happen not to be made. All of which uniformly and conformably to the procedure is understood manifestly *of the power of secondary causes*, namely of men. And it is true that *through human power, deliberation, or election*, what has been done cannot not be done, but a future contingent can be made, or not made, through these causes.

He understands consequently also that the past cannot be, or be made, not past *by mutable power and making, initiable and terminable by opposite terms* — as are made all true and proper effects of true and proper making cause. Whence he himself, in *Physics* II.31: "The doctor, and the deliberator, and entirely the maker — all are principles of mutation or rest."

The saying of Agatho, however, seems to suffer just calumny. For God is *not* deprived of this alone — to make ungenerated those things which have been made. For he is also deprived of this: from a present, mutably to make now and for now non-present; from a future, to make the exhibition of the thing mutably non-future; from a number of four contingent contradictories, to make all simultaneously true which can be simultaneously true and which he can make simultaneously true; to make a maximum circular line, or a finite straight line possible to be made, or [a line] greater than he can make; to inscribe or circumscribe in a circle a maximum or minimum rectilinear figure; to make another God, and infinite gods; and universally [God cannot do] anything which necessarily implies contradiction.

Someone perhaps will say for Agatho that none of these is something; and I [reply] against either: therefore neither [is it true that he cannot] make ungenerated things which have been made.

Yet, lest Agatho seem not to have spoken rightly (whom Aristotle testifies to have spoken rightly), let me seem to speak less rightly. I say to the letter he spoke rightly. For he says God is deprived of such *making*, but not of *the power of making* — and it is true, and it is necessary that

God by no means makes ungenerated things which have been made. Yet that he *cannot* [do] this, he does not say.

It can also be understood and expounded that God cannot do this through the power and action of natural and inferior causes, as he can make future effects — nor also by mutable making and terminable by opposite terms, as the saying of the Philosopher was expounded before.

Perhaps also it can otherwise be expounded more proximately to his mind: that he supposes generally all things to be divided into three — *future, present, and past* (or done) — and through what he says exclusively, "of this alone is God deprived, to make ungenerated," etc., he intends to include the last of the three members of the aforesaid division, and to exclude the first two. Let him also understand of *mutable making and terminable by opposite terms*, and so it is true that of the number of these three, of this alone is God deprived to make — that is, [deprived of the *power*] of making, by such making, from past as from a *terminus a quo* of making and mutation, a not-past. For this evidently includes contradiction — namely that something first be or was past, and afterwards not-past. From a future, however, as from a *terminus a quo*, he can make by this kind of making a not-future; and from a present a not-present — which also he continually does, since when that arrives, this recedes.

The saying of Aristotle in *De Mundo* can be similarly understood and expounded according to the premises, and similarly the saying of Pliny recited. Yet Pliny seems most badly to rave, saying that God has no right over past things except that of forgetfulness, as I.14, I.6, and I.23 teach.

Those denying, therefore, that God can make from a past a not-past, understand of *power and making according to the natural course and order naturally instituted for natural things*, of the *power and making mutable, actuable, and terminable by opposite terms* aforesaid.

But (as was briefly touched above) there is a certain other making opposed to this, namely *stable, not mutable, not newly actuable, not initiable nor terminable by opposite terms* — and this corresponds to *absolute power and of non-repugnance* aforesaid. According to which also that which is somehow in this present instant can be made by God in this present instant non-such — indeed of opposite condition — without any change, by the eleventh truth.

For God so to do is for him so to will. Thus perhaps God could make the world (which is initiated and temporal) not to be of this kind, but eternal. For it includes no contradiction formally simply, as it seems, that the world should not have a beginning of duration or time, but always to have been — as it seems to some — or at least could thus make the world more ancient, and to have been earlier temporally by however much. For this implies or imports no repugnance formally.

This kind of making is similar to generation, cognition, and divine volition — indeed more truly to the knowledge and volition of God *ad extra* — by which according to the fifth, sixth, and eighth truths, "what he wills now and knows, he could and can now and for now not know nor

will without any change." It is also similar to the doctrine by which the Father eternally teaches the Son and the Holy Spirit, concerning which [is treated in] chapter 34 of this [book].

This kind of mode of speaking concerning making is had in John 11, where it is asked thus concerning Christ: "Could not he, who opened the eyes of one born blind, have made that this man also should not die?"

Thus also speaks Augustine in *Contra Faustum* XXVI.2: "If I should hear that something was about-to-be, [and] if God made [it] not to come to be, I will most faithfully respond: that rather was about-to-be which God made, not that which, if it had been about-to-be, this he would have made. For God knew indeed what he was about to make; and therefore simultaneously he knew that not-future to have been, which he would-have-made not to come to be."

Thus moreover speaks Peter [Lombard] in *Sentences* I, dist. 38, saying that "God could make that what comes to be, would not come to be, and so would not be foreknown."

By absolute power, therefore, and of non-repugnance aforesaid, and by this kind of making, God can make a thing which is past — for instance A nakedly and absolutely considered — not to be past. For God so to do would be nothing else than to not-will it itself to be past, or to will the opposite by *no-volition* or *volition* not mutable, not initiabile or terminable, but stable and eternal — which is absolutely and irrepugnantly possible, both as concerns the nature of his absolute power, and as concerns the nature of his volitional power free according to contradiction (insofar as it causally precedes its act, by which in every same mode intrinsically he wills now A to have been, just as he willed before A to be future, as the preceding [parts] taught) — the cause of which is that with God *intrinsically* nothing is past or future, but immutably, stably, eternally, and instantaneously only present, as was shown above.

Furthermore, because perhaps to some it seems difficult of understanding, how the past can be made not-past *by making not mutable, not initiabile, nor terminable by opposite terms* aforesaid — behold for this an open example easy of understanding.

A future indeed can be made not-future before it occurs — or, to say more truly, with that itself never occurring, with itself never posited in being, with itself never *presentified* (made present). Let A be John's running tomorrow contingently future. Who of men doubts that God of his power — indeed *omnipotence absolute* — can make that John will not run, and therefore that A will not be? And consequently can make some future not-future, with itself never made present?

And without doubt this cannot [be done] by the *making mutable, initiabile, and terminable* aforesaid. For it evidently includes contradiction that something *from future, as from a terminus a quo of making and mutation, becomes not-future*, except through positing it in being.

Behold still a perhaps more evident example for the same: something — namely a not-future — can be made future. Let A be a possible effect to be made, which will not be made. And (as anyone confesses) God of his absolute power can make that A will be — and therefore that what

is not future, be future — but not by the *making mutable, initiabile, or terminable* often spoken of. For it evidently implies contradiction that something *sometime* be future, and *always* or *sometime before* was not-future, as chapter 18 of this [book] shows.

Just as, then, a not-future can be made future, and a future not-future, without positing it in being, by *making not mutable but stable*, so also a past [can be made] not-past in similar manner.

Therefore it does not follow (as was objected above) that, if past things can not have been by this power, then they have this through change. Nor does it also follow, if past things can be or be made not-past, that it would be expedient for men to deliberate about them. For not everything which can be or be made, can [be] this through human deliberation or human power.

[Demonstration of Truth 22]

The twenty-second truth says that a future thing cannot not come to be, nor a present now and for now not be, nor past things not have been — taking power correspondingly to the sixteenth truth. Which thus understood follows evidently from the same sixteenth, with this one [thing] added: that the divine will is a *necessary* cause — namely *infrustrable* and *indefectible* in causing — as I.10 teaches. This can also be shown from the first negative part of the eighteenth truth.

[Demonstration of Truth 23]

The twenty-third truth is clearly patent from the first three parts of the seventeenth, with this added — that the divine will is *infrustrable and indefectible in causing*. It also follows from the corresponding parts of the eighteenth truth.

[Demonstration of Truth 24]

The twenty-fourth manifestly follows from the last part of the seventeenth, with this one [thing] co-assumed — that the divine will is a necessary cause (that is, necessarily required for something to be future, present, or past) as I.14 and I.9 demonstrate. This is also manifestly shown from the last negative part of the eighteenth truth.

According to these things, the vulgar [saying] of the Philosopher, "What is, when it is, must be; and what is not, when it is not, must not be," and similar [sayings] can be conveniently understood and expounded.

The sayings of Averroes, Hugh, and Peter here objected were, however, expounded in chapter 6 of this [book]. That [saying] also of the Philosopher: "If all things were or came to be from necessity, [there would be] no need to deliberate or engage in business," was expounded in chapter 29 of this [book]. It can also be conveniently expounded that he understands there of necessity *contrary and repugnant to preceding possibility and contingency*, as appears in the demonstration of the ninth truth.

By similar modes can be expounded the saying of the same Philosopher from *Ethics* III, objected. Many other similar things, I judge, must be similarly expounded.

By the premises similarly, God, Christ, and the Prophets, who predicted some things still future, can be defended from fallacy, lying, and from every inconvenience. Because just as those future things can in no way come to be, so also those past revelations, promises, oaths, and predictions [can] not have been.

[Demonstration of Truth 25]

The twenty-fifth follows evidently from the premises concerning eternity. Concerning future contingents, when they will become present and past, there will be determinate truth with God — and not then first and newly — because with God intrinsically and in eternity nothing is prior or posterior successively, nothing mutable, nothing new, as the premises in this chapter and the next taught.

Likewise, God's will is the cause of all future things, by I.14, and infrustrable and immutable, by I.10 and I.23. And this is determinate with God, as no one is ignorant. And because of present and past things [it is] determinate, therefore also of future similarly — as can be shown by the thirteenth and fourteenth truths.

Likewise, with God there is determinate knowledge of all future things, because [it comes] through a determinate cause — namely through his will, by which he knows them, as in I.18 was shown — and because otherwise God would more certainly know present and past things than future, and thus something would accede to his knowledge from the things known, against I.23 and chapter 31 of this [book].

Likewise, all things are always present in eternity and intrinsically with God, namely *causally*, as the demonstration of the fourteenth truth shows. Therefore concerning all things, just as concerning *temporally present* things, there is determinate knowledge, certitude, and truth with him.

Whence Ammonius in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I says: "Nor is it possible for the Gods to have indeterminate cognition of futures, as if conjecturing about them. First indeed, as Timaeus has taught us, and as Aristotle theologizing pronounces, and before these Parmenides — both with Plato and in his own poems — *nothing is with the Gods either past or future*, since both of these are non-being: this no longer, that not yet; and this changed, that born to be changed. Therefore conjectural cognition must necessarily be cast off from the Gods, and from rational life in its limit. Second, how, unless we shall participate but slightly in sobriety, shall we not attribute more to the cognition of the Gods than to yours? But [shall we attribute it,] hearing it confessed dubious and indeterminate? For [the cognition] will be of the same *ratio*."

He also further on, having shown this in many ways, concludes openly: "Therefore even contingents must be said to be ordained by the Gods, and their event determinately known by them" — which, that he may more evidently teach, he alleges Iamblichus, that "cognition is a medium between the cognizer and the cognized; for it is the operation of the cognizer concerning

the cognized — which cognized also is sometimes cognized in a higher mode than is its nature, sometimes in a lower, sometimes equally."

"For when our intellect disposes political actions, it cognizes singular matters by referring them to universals. This cognition, however, is *higher* than the cognized: the singular is partible and changeable, but the *ratio* by which the practical intellect cognizes is indivisible and unchangeable.

"When, however, the intellect, turned to itself and operating according to *purgative* virtues, considers according to substance, the cognition is *of the same order* as that which is cognized.

"When, however, ascending to the summit of its perfection, and meditating according to *contemplative* virtues, it considers those things which [are] of the divine orders, and how from one principle of all these are produced, and what is the property of each — the cognition is *worse* than that which is cognized.

"These things being so, it must be said that the Gods cognize all things — done, being, and future — in a mode befitting the Gods. This, however, is by *one and determinate and infallible* cognition. Wherefore it must be said that they comprehend the knowledge of contingents as producing all things which are in the world, and as causes of perpetual substances, and concauses of generables, according to their proper operations — and as seeing not only the substances themselves, but their virtues and operations, both those which are according to nature and those which are besides nature.

"What is *besides nature* entered simultaneously with the necessary order subjected to the discourse of beings, in those which are born to participate this — not principally, but according to the mode which is called *parypostaseos*, namely *side-existence*. To cognize, however, contingents is the nature of those [Gods]. Wherefore these have an indeterminate nature — to be able to come to be and not come to be — but those [Gods], cognizing them in a more noble mode than is their nature, *take in advance and determinately* know these.

"For it is necessary that they cognize partible things impartibly and indistantly, and pluralized things unitively, and temporal things eternally, and generables ingenerably. For we will not endure that it be said that the cognition of the Gods runs along together with the flux of things, nor that there is anything with them either past or future, nor it be said of them, *was* or *will be*, as we assumed in the *Timaeus* — since they are signifying of some change. But [the proper word] is only *is*."

This opinion is also plainly testified by the authorities of Augustine and Cassiodorus on Psalm 43, written in chapter 47 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 26]

For the twenty-sixth it must be known that things are *of determinate being* and *of determinate stability* with the creature in three ways: *in themselves; in their causes; in both ways*.

In themselves — as a present contingent thing (for instance, John's running or sitting), which from its presence has a certain *subsequent necessity* of being for now, and so it is *determinate and certain*, and similarly *knowable* by man; and a past thing similarly.

In their causes — as natural things future by natural necessity (for instance, future eclipse of the luminaries, transmutation of elements, and death of mortals).

In both ways — as such natural effects present or transmitted into the past.

But future *contingents* are determinate by none of these modes. *Not in themselves*, [this] is established. *Not in their causes*, because then they would not be contingent to either side, but contingent to the natural [outcome] or necessary. Therefore neither in either of these modes.

This is the opinion of the Philosopher in the last [chapter] of *Peri Hermeneias* I, as he is commonly alleged, and was touched in the objections — although the word *determinate* nowhere is placed there in the whole series of his text.

Whence also Ammonius, expounding that place, says thus: "By its own nature it is the same — contingent — but to the cognition of the Gods, *not yet indeterminate but determinate*. It is patent, however, that to our cognition it is impossible determinately to be cognized — sometimes contingent — but it will follow from necessity, with the preceding causes of its generation."

Nor do any resist this except perhaps the *mathematici* and *diviners*, saying that all human acts are subjected to the necessity of the stars. But these II.3 refutes.

But by *divine revelation* the rational creature can have determinate and certain cognition of future contingents — indeed, as it were, demonstration *propter quid* and *from cause*.

For God can certitudinally reveal to the rational creature his will concerning some such future, in its own genus or in the Word, as chapter 40 of this [book] and the following taught. The divine will, however, is the cause of future things — *necessary* in being (by *subsequent necessity*), and *infrustrable in causing* — as I.14, chapter 52 of this [book], chapter 50 of this [book], and I.10 teach. All of which he can similarly reveal.

The creature, therefore, can cognize the contingent that-it-will-be *through cause*, and that "of that there is a cause," and that "it is impossible otherwise to be." It can also cognize that-it-will-be *from true and first and immediate and more known and prior* [things], and *causes* of the conclusion — or rather and more eminently perhaps than through created propositions, namely *through the mirror of eternal truth*. Therefore also *demonstratively*, as is patent in *Posterior Analytics* I.2 — or more perfectly and excellently than through *discursive syllogistic demonstration*.

This same is confirmed by Augustine's authority on Psalm 43, written in chapter 47 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 27]

The twenty-seventh can be shown by the twenty-fifth and the demonstration of it. It can also be shown by the fourteenth and demonstration of it, since the divine will is the cause of all future things, through which also God foreknows all those, as I.14 and I.18 teach. This is clearly testified by the sayings of Augustine and Cassiodorus on Psalm 43, written in chapter 47 of this [book].

[Demonstration of Truth 28]

The twenty-eighth can be shown by the proximate, and by the thirteenth and the demonstrations of them.

[Demonstration of Truth 29]

The twenty-ninth can be shown by the proximate, and by the fourteenth, and the demonstrations of those. The authorities of Augustine and Cassiodorus on Psalm 43, premised in chapter 47 of this [book], also seem plainly to testify this.

Augustine also in *Contra Faustum* XXVI.2 says thus: "Future things can no more not come to be, than past things have not been done." Nor can anyone say Augustine understood in the *composite* sense, or *de dicto*, and not in the *divided* sense, or *de re* — because then he would render nothing obscure or doubtful clear, nor would teach anything. The procedure also, end, and cause, which he says, show him to speak in the divided sense, and *de re*. His cause moreover seems to be the *efficacious will of God*, neither frustrable nor mutable, and the *irrefragable and immutable truth in every way*.

Whence also immediately before, concerning a certain *possible to be made*, he says thus: "I concede that it can be made; but whether it is future, I do not know — and therefore I do not know, because what God's will has of this matter is hidden from me. Yet this is not hidden from me, that without doubt it will be future, if God's will has this. Furthermore, if I shall hear that something was about-to-be, but God made [it] not to come to be, I will most faithfully respond: that rather was about-to-be which God made, not that which, if it had been about-to-be, this he would have made. For God knew indeed what he was about to make; and therefore simultaneously he knew that not-future to have been, which he would-have-made not to come to be. And without doubt rather true is what God knows, than what man opines."

From which immediately he concludes: "Whence future things can no more not come to be, than past things have not been done." But how would this follow from the prior, if he were speaking only in the composite sense?

Behold similarly the cause which he immediately adds: "Since it is not in God's will that by it something be false, by which it is true. Wherefore all things which are truly future without doubt will come to be; if, however, they had not been done, they would not have been future. So all things which are truly past, without doubt have passed."

It also manifestly appears, through those two universal affirmatives, one of the future and the other of the past, that he speaks of the future and past *things themselves*, not only of propositions themselves.

He also further on: "The sentence by which we say that something *was*, is therefore true, because that of which we speak now *is not*. This sentence God cannot make false, because he is not contrary to truth. If you ask where this true sentence is, it is first found in our mind, when we know and say it true. But if it be removed from our mind, when we shall have forgotten what we know, it will remain in truth itself. For always it will be true, that what was, and is not, has been. And there it will be true that already has been what was — where it was true, before it came to be, that what was not, was about to be. To this truth God cannot oppose himself, in whom is the highest and incommutable truth itself, by which it is illuminated that whatever is true in the minds of any, [is] true."

This equality of necessity with God with respect to future things, just as with respect to past — insofar as all these are present with him in eternity, indeed because past, since they are confirmed by similar certitude, stability, and necessity, and because they thus co-existed with all past time, indeed and preceded all secular times — all the prophets commonly intimate; indeed more truly the Holy Spirit, who has spoken through the prophets, prophesying future things as if already past, as the [things] previously had in chapter 47 of this [book] manifest.

With which the philosophers seem to consonate. For Aristotle in *De Mundo* 11 says that "all things are truly God's works," from which (according to natural Empedocles) "all things, whatsoever are, and afterwards will be, proceeded."

Whence Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* 33, treating that of the Apostle to Romans 8, "Whom he foreknew and predestined," etc., writes thus: "All those things have already been done — *foreknew, predestined, called, justified* — since both they have already all been foreknown and predestined; but still even unto the end of the age many are to be called and justified. And yet he placed verbs of past time, even of future things, as if God had done [them], which from eternity he disposed that they should come to be. Therefore concerning that, the Prophet Isaiah also says: 'Who made things which are about to come.'"

This in Isaiah, however, according to this series I do not remember having read; perhaps he alleges another translation, which I have not seen. Yet this opinion in Isaiah occurs. For in chapter 41, according to the translation of Jerome, Isaiah — indeed the Lord through Isaiah — says thus: "Who has raised up from the East the just one" — namely Jesus Christ — "and called him to follow him? He shall give nations in his sight," etc., and adds *mixedly* of the future: "Who has worked and made these things, calling generations from the beginning? I the Lord, the first and the last, I am." And below, [chapter] 48: "Earlier things from then I announced, and from my mouth they went forth, and I made them heard; suddenly I worked, and they came."

For this *subsequent necessity*, however, from the presence or pastness with God in eternity, Augustine further on in [chapter] 34 concludes by adding: "Whoever therefore in God's most provident disposition are foreknown, predestined, called, justified, and glorified — I do not say also not yet reborn, but also not yet born — they are already sons of God, and therefore can in no way perish."

This Anselm in *De Concordia* 3 also treats, expounding the same authority of the Apostle much more clearly, as chapter 47 and chapter 27 of this [book] reveal.

Furthermore, the same Augustine in part 2 of his commentary on John, homily 14 (or the 68th of the whole), treating that of John 14, "In my Father's house there are many mansions," and below, "If I shall go and prepare a place for you," etc., says: "How are the mansions in the Father's house — not other [mansions] but the same — and without doubt already are, as not to be prepared; and not yet are, as to be prepared? How shall we think — except how also the Prophet preaches God, that 'he made things which are future'? For he does not say 'he is about to make things which are future'; therefore he both made them, and is about to make them. For neither have they been made, if he himself has not made them; nor are they future, if he himself shall not have made them. He therefore made them by predestining, [and] he is about to make them by operating."

Where also that of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, "He chose us before the constitution of the world"; and that of Romans previously touched, "Whom he predestined, those he also called" — he understands and expounds in similar mode. This authority of Augustine, although not according to its series, is alleged in the canon, *De Poenitentia*, dist. 4, *In domo*.

Moreover, the same Augustine in *De Trinitate* V, last [chapter], says: "With God neither past things have passed, and future things have already been done."

Further on, in *De Civitate Dei* X.12: "Where and when God should make immutable counsel, lies with him in whose disposition already are made all the times whatsoever are future. For moving temporal things temporally, he is not moved; nor knows things to be done otherwise than things done; nor hears those invoking otherwise than he sees [those] about to invoke; and his eternal commands, written by his eternal law, are temporally done."

He also in *Confessions* I.6: "*Your years*, [he says] to God, *do not fail*. Your years are this present day; and how many, oh how many of our days and our fathers' days have passed through your *today*, and from it have received their measures, and somehow existed; and yet other days will pass and will receive [measures], and somehow exist; but you yourself are the same, and all tomorrow and to-the-end, and all yesterday and back, *today* you will make, *today* you have made. What is it to me, if anyone does not understand? Let him also rejoice, Lord, saying 'What is this?' Let him also so rejoice, and love by-not-finding-to-find rather than by-finding-not-to-find you."

[Demonstration of Truth 30]

The thirtieth seems so certain, that it scarcely needs proof. For inferior causes are *temporal*, active and passive *with motion and time, with beginning and with end*. For what is past has already passed beyond the *potestas* of these causes, nor is subjected further to them. For it cannot be initiated by them through operation and motion, as appears in the demonstration of the twenty-first.

What, however, is *present*, for now must be by *subsequent necessity*. What, however, is *future*, is *initiable* through action and motion *from a secondary cause free according to contradiction toward acting and not acting*, nor has it from itself any necessity of being. No secondary cause also has efficacious will in all things as God [does]; indeed, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* III.5, "the will is of impossible things"; therefore even if it could will past things not to have been, and present not to be — still the thing does not follow its will, as it follows God's will.

Against the first of these, however, can be probably objected in this way: A secondary cause can make from past a present. For the Sun, in the same mode set against the same illuminable thing (corruptible or eternal), now and earlier, generates the same light now that [it generated] earlier. For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VIII.11, "diversity of effects is on account of diversity of efficient, or on account of diversity of matter"; and according to him in *Metaphysics* XII.11, "if the agent is one and the matter one, what is made is one." Which Averroes also plainly says in either commentary. The Philosopher also in *De Generatione* II, second-to-last [chapter], says that "the same thing, similarly disposed, is innate to make the same" — supposing, namely, identity of matter.

But just as it has been argued that light corrupted, the same in number, can again be generated, so it can also be argued concerning other forms generable and corruptible, accidental and substantial; therefore also concerning composites themselves the same in number returning. Also water by discontinuation corrupted, by recontinuation is generated the same in number. Some indeed (like the Platonists) concede this. But part 39 of the corollary of I.1, and the philosophers and theologians, refute these and deride them.

Others wishing to avoid such an error, say that not only the Sun, but also all other planets and fixed stars co-act in every effect produced by anything; and because their position and aspect to one another and to the Sun continually varies, also the produced effects continually vary. But these do not escape the alleged authorities of the Philosopher; for not any small *accidental* diversity in the agent makes a *numerical* diversity in the effect — and especially in simple substances or composite ones.

The stars of heaven can also be applied to some place of the earth according to an equally strong aspect now as earlier (although perhaps not according to a similar [aspect] in every way), and therefore can regenerate a corrupted effect.

Sometime also (as it seems) all the planets and stars will return to a similar aspect entirely as they now have, and which in any instant earlier they had — for instance, according to the Platonists, at the end of the Great Year of the world, which according to them is the return of all celestial things to their primary state, of which I.1 of [this work] more fully discoursed. Then therefore the corrupted things will return the same in number.

Some, however, wishing to resolve this argument, affirm that the celestial motions are not proportionable among themselves by any rational proportion, but only *irrational* — such as is the proportion of the diagonal of a square to the side, and of the cone to its half — concerning which elsewhere has been more fully treated. Therefore neither will the celestial motions ever fully return to their primary state, nor to any other subsequent.

But this responsive hypothesis is most voluntarily and easily posited without evidence of reason, and therefore is equally easily refuted. Even, granting the hypothesis, do they show their proposition? It is not entirely evident; what to discuss with mathematical theorems much foreign to the sacred letters would seem to theologians more *curious* perhaps than fruitful, especially since the proposed axiom can otherwise be fully resolved.

Others say that the diversity of *numerical time* is the cause of the numerical diversity of effects. But how, since time is not the *efficient, material, or formal cause* of produced effects? What also is the cause of the numerical diversity of time? If they say "the diversity of celestial motions" — what is the cause of the numerical diversity of these? And so one must continually ascend until reaching the first such diversified [thing].

Others still say that the cause of such diversity of effects is the *diversity of natural order in the subject toward diverse effects*. But that diversity in *relation* be the cause of diversity in *absolute accidents or in substances* does not seem; indeed, rationally it is the contrary. The universality of order also necessarily arises from diverse ordered things as from a foundation and prior cause; therefore those diverse ordered things would rather be the cause of such diversity of effects than diversity of order. What also, of what kind, and how many these diverse ordered things are, [the proponent] does not express, and scarcely if he could express clearly.

The Philosopher also in *Metaphysics* XII, where he had been alleged, touches one [point] through which he seems to resolve the premised objection, and to expound his own sayings, saying: "That has been made in act, whose matter was in potency, or in potency" — intimating that even if the agent is the same and the matter the same, yet from diversity of potencies in the matter toward diverse effects, can come diverse effects. Therefore for the effect to be the same in number, identity of numerical potency is required. Wherefore Averroes in that commentary 11 says: "If the matter were one, and the generator one, and the potency one, then what comes to be will be one. For the subject, when it is one, and the potency existing in it is one, and the agent is one — then there will be no cause of multitude."

But against these philosophers the principal objection can thus be reduced: If A active acts tomorrow on B passive, having C potency to D effect, tomorrow it will produce D. Let it be supposed that God of his omnipotence today creates D, changing nothing about A, B, or C. Or if a change necessarily follows: D today corrupted, omnipotent God reduces A, B, and C to the prior state in every way; then A tomorrow from B and C will make D *past and corrupted*.

In a similar mode it can also be shown that a man naturally to be generated in the premised mode, once made by God, *deflowered, dead, and buried*, can a man newly generate, and a woman bring forth, and bring forth him a virgin — for every birth necessarily comes forth a virgin. A secondary cause can therefore make a *past and corrupted* present-presentially exist, and therefore not be past.

Among all the recited opinions, however, the opinion of the Philosopher seems to me more consonant to reason: namely that *the numerical diversity of effects succeeding one another in the same matter or subject, with the same agent and matter or subject existing, is from the diversity of potency or of potencies in it* — although a much greater discussion would be required around the full exposition of this kind of potency.

But whatever the heathen philosophers may feel, let Catholic theologians indubitably acknowledge that the *first, highest, and most true cause of these diverse effects is the divine will* — not mutable or diverse, but stable and the same — by which without succession of acts of will and any change of itself, he wills and makes diverse effects to succeed one another when he wills, and where, as I.9, I.23, and I.47 teach.

Whence also Judith 9: "This was made which you yourself willed."

Blessed Augustine also in *De Trinitate* III.2, speaking of all things which come to be usually or unusually, often or rarely, says: "Of these none comes to be except by God's will; but to most it does not appear. And so it pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute these things to other causes — either *true*, but proximate, although they could not see at all the cause superior to all other causes, that is, the will of God — or *false*, and not even from the very investigation of bodily things and changes, but produced from their own suspicion and error."

Thomas Bradwardine, *De Causa Dei Contra Pelagium*

(Conclusion of preceding chapter, Chapter LIII, and Closing Epistle to the Mertonians)

[Conclusion of the preceding chapter — continuation of corollaries on free will, divine necessity, and the immutability of past contingents]

Wherefore in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 6, [Augustine] also says: "When it is asked what is to be believed in regard to religion, the nature of things must not be searched into in the manner of those whom the Greeks call Physicists, nor must it be feared, as if by these same men, lest a

Christian be ignorant about the force and number of the elements, about the motion and order and eclipses of the stars, about the figure of the heaven, about the kinds and natures of animals, of waves, of stones, of springs, of rivers, of mountains, about the spaces of places and times, about the signs of impending storms and other things following, concerning those things which they have discovered or think they have discovered. For not even they themselves, men of such excellent talent, blazing with zeal, abounding in leisure, investigating some things by human conjecture and others by historical experience, have discovered everything; and in those things which they boast of having discovered, they are more often opining than knowing. It is enough for the Christian to believe that the cause of created things, whether celestial or terrestrial, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, namely his good will."

Furthermore, whether a secondary cause can produce the same effect numerically that preceded — as it seems likely it can, supposing a preceding miracle, as was just objected, and perhaps in the recontinuation of a liquid through the discontinuation of one corrupted — or whether it cannot, as outside these cases it appears it cannot, the objection does not proceed. For if it cannot, there is no obstacle. But even if it could freely make from the past and corrupted thing one presently existing, still on this account it cannot make of the past a non-past, or of one corrupted (whether masculine or feminine corrupted) a virgin, as God can. For although God by his omnipotence might restore Abraham and Sarah to the same state in all respects which they had when Isaac was begotten, and might cause Abraham to beget and Sarah to bring forth Isaac, he would still bring forth Isaac as one [now] corrupted [i.e., one who has died] and as the past father of Jacob. Yet it is true according to the course of nature, and without miracle, that every parturient woman necessarily emerges no longer a virgin.

Yet still perhaps the sophist will sophistically press the objection thus: Let that be called past which was and is not; if therefore the secondary cause can make of the past that it [now] is, it can also make that it not be past. But this does not prove that the secondary cause can make of the past a non-past with respect to this condition, namely "having been," that is, that it lack having been; therefore it is no obstacle.

But still perhaps he will rejoin: A free secondary cause — say, Peter — could earlier have made some past free effect of his (let it be called A) not past, namely simply by omitting it (just as the law speaks of "Doing" in the *Digest, On the Rules of Law*: "He who does not do what he ought to do," it says, "is seen to do against these things, because he has not done"; and this is a sufficiently common manner of speaking); or by producing a contrary effect impossible with A, which let it be named B; and God omnipotent can restore to Peter every power which he previously had, and even greater; with which done, Peter can make A non-past. Or thus: Peter previously could have made it that A had not been; therefore even now, if through God's omnipotence he is made equally powerful as he was then, or more powerful still, he can.

Or perhaps still more strongly in this manner: Whatever in any way God once could do, he can still in the same way do; otherwise he would become less powerful, and would cease to be omnipotent. But God once could, through a secondary cause — say through Peter — make A not be past, that is, make it that A had not been.

But these things, although they may seem acute, are easily blunted. For although Peter might now have all the power, or greater, than before, on this account he could not now [produce] every effect numerically the same as before, but perhaps the same and equal in species, or greater. The cause of this is that for the numerical identity of the effect, the numerical identity of the agent or of the agent's power alone does not suffice; rather there is required also the numerical identity of the matter or object and of that power [in question], as the foregoing testify. And if it be supposed that God omnipotent fully restore all these same numerical things, granted that Peter can now produce the same effect numerically or the same defect numerically as before — yet on this account he cannot now make A not to be past, because he could never previously have done this, since [he could not have done it] before A existed. For then it was not feasible for Peter that A be not past, since from eternity beforehand it [already] was [past] — just as now it is not feasible by any secondary cause that the Antichrist who is to be should not be past now or before. For how could he produce that which from eternity beforehand was, and which cannot have a beginning and end of production, since nevertheless every doing of a secondary cause necessarily requires this, as is plain in the demonstration of the twenty-first part of this corollary?

Nor when A existed could Peter make A not to be past, for similar reasons. For then, just as always before, A was non-past, nor did this then or before depend in any way on Peter's doing or omitting. Therefore neither after A existed could Peter make A not to be past. For if he had done this, A both then and always before would have been non-past — for nothing can begin to be non-past — and because he could not do this, or have done it after A existed except through an inceptible and changeable production from past into non-past, which involves a contradiction.

The second instance is resolved like the first. For from equal power now and before, or greater, in Peter, it does not follow that he can now [produce] every effect numerically the same as before, as has just been made plain. And if anyone objecting should suppose that God omnipotent restores in Peter as agent, in the subject as patient, and in all the requisites everything numerically the same as before — although Peter may now produce the same effect numerically or defect as before, yet on this account he cannot now make it that A had not previously been, but [only] that A not be now by ceasing, that is, only privatively from the production of A, or by producing a contrary, impossible, and excluding effect of A itself; so that otherwise A would now be, and it would be the same to have made it earlier (or to make it that A had not previously been) and to make it now that A be not now — but not to make it now that A had not previously been, according to the Logic of the 24th [chapter] of the first [book] previously laid down. Just as it was really the same at the time of Christ's passion to say "Christ now suffers" and now [to say] "Christ then was suffering," and so likewise concerning all other past things.

The last instance is resolved like the earlier ones. God cannot through a secondary cause make A non-past, just as he never previously could. For he can do nothing through a secondary cause unless that cause can in some way do it; but no secondary cause can do this in any way, as has been shown above. For every doing of a secondary cause is temporal with change and beginning; but [the state of] A's being non-past cannot be initiated, therefore it cannot come about through a secondary cause through any temporal production, but only by God alone, by an eternal production — namely, by his volition or non-volition, eternal and not having a beginning, by which he does not will A to be past, or wills A to be non-past — as the demonstration of the 21st part more fully manifests.

Yet perhaps still you will not cease to object thus: This man, say John, who did this or that — it is contingent that he did neither this nor that; and John, who did neither this nor that — it is contingent that he did this and that. For it is contingent that God will or not-will this. But this is no obstacle. For although this is possible and contingent in respect to the divine will, yet not in respect to the human will, say John's. For nothing is in John's power except what, when he wills it, he does, as the previous things testify. But although John may will this, it does not therefore follow that it is so. And although John could moreover not have done what he did, yet he cannot make himself not to have done what he did. For whatever he does in the present or even in the future, it does not therefore follow that he did not do what he did.

Against the second particle of this thirtieth [point] it is objected thus: Contingency and liberty are properly said in respect of the present, but in respect of the future improperly or less properly, commonly or extensively, as the 5th and 6th [parts] of this [corollary] affirm. Therefore among inferior causes there is greater contingency and liberty in respect to the present than in respect to the future. But who would not know that it does not follow from being more properly such, that it is more simply such? For who does not know that "perfect" is more properly said of a creature fully made than of God who can in no way be made nor was made? And who would concede that the creature is more perfect than God? Who, again, does not know that "great" is more properly said of body than of God, and of powers extended according to corporeal dimensions than of an indivisible non-extended power? Yet who would concede that a finite body is greater than God, of whose magnitude there is no end? Or that the finite power of any element, of any clod of earth, or of any drop of water is greater than the infinite power of God? Wherefore that consequence does not hold.

Furthermore, against the third particle of this thirtieth, someone perhaps will object that the divine will is an infrustrable and indefectible cause; therefore whatever inferior cause will produce any future effect of its own, just as it produces and has produced every present and past effect of its own — and through the fourteenth and twenty-ninth parts of the aforesaid corollary there is in it equal necessity in respect of futures as in respect of presents and pasts — wherefore it is also equally necessary that inferior causes produce their future effects, just as that they produce present ones and have produced past ones.

But this neither concludes nor obstructs. It does not conclude, because although in the divine will there is equal necessity in respect of futures as in respect of presents, yet there is another necessity in inferior causes in respect of their present effects; but in respect of effects contingently capable of either alternative in the future, there is by no means [such necessity]. Wherefore necessity is many times greater in respect of present effects of inferior causes than in respect of their future effects.

This even if it did conclude would not obstruct. For although it would be necessary, and equally necessary, that inferior causes produce their future effects, just as they produce their present effects, or have produced their past ones, as far as concerns the divine will — yet not so as far as concerns the inferior causes themselves. For an inferior cause, considered nakedly and absolutely as something about to act in either way, of itself, is bound by no necessity to acting that way, but is disposed indifferently, indeterminately, and contingently in either way to acting it and not acting it, as in the 29th [part] of this [corollary] a similar response was given to a similar argument.

Further, beyond the foregoing objections, one can also object otherwise against what has been said. For from the foregoing it seems to follow that contradictories are simultaneously true, at least in eternity, since all things succeeding one another in time are without succession there simultaneously, as the foregoing testify.

Again, if there were such a necessity of consequence and of immutability in God, he would not be of free judgment, since [he would be] in no way pliable hither and thither.

Furthermore, if such a necessity be in God, prayers are vainly offered to him, since by them he can in no way be inclined, in no way bent.

But the first of these was resolved at the 24th [chapter] of the first [book]. The second is resolved through the first and fifth of this [book]; for these show that liberty, contingency, and necessity are not repugnant. Who indeed would doubt that liberty of judgment is compatible with necessity of consequence? For most-mutable man, although according to the opinion of certain ones he could will of himself alone without God co-acting anything, if he now willed anything, would necessarily for now will it with necessity of consequence. Does God then not have liberty of judgment about presents and pasts as about futures, or less in respect of these than in respect of futures, and thus in respect of the same object less now than before — or rather has he irrecoverably lost all liberty about certain willed things, incurring a new servitude, new fetters of new necessity, contrary to what was earlier shown in the 30th, 50th, and 52nd [parts] of this [corollary], and especially against the 13th and 14th parts of this corollary?

Nor because God is of free judgment is it consequent that he is mutably pliable, like mutable man hither and thither. But God is said to be free with the freedom of contradiction because there is no necessity in him antecedent to the act of will toward the outside; rather, insofar as it

precedes that act causally, he could in either way produce it and not, as the demonstration of the third truth of this corollary and the ninth more fully manifests.

Whence also Saint Thomas, on Book I of the *Sentences*, distinction 39, question 1, which asks "Whether God can not know that which he knows" — and where it is argued thirdly that he cannot, because everything that is, must be while it is, but God's knowing is being-in-act; and fourthly because everything eternal is necessary, but any knowing of God is eternal — responds in this way: "To the third it must be said that what is, must be while it is; speaking absolutely, however, it does not have to be; and so it is necessary that God knows while he knows, yet it is not necessary that he know except by necessity of immutability, which does not exclude the freedom of will. And this freedom is signified when it is said that God can not know and not will." "To the fourth it must be said that everything eternal is necessary by necessity of immutability, which does not exclude the freedom of will, as has been said." But how knowing pertains to the freedom of will, he immediately brings out, saying: "Although in God being and knowing are the same in reality, yet knowing follows the will as commanded by it or not; and therefore his being is subject to the freedom of the will, as knowing to the operation of the creature." He also holds the same opinion in [the *Summa*] *Against the Gentiles*, Book I, [chapter] 85, as the twenty-eighth [chapter] of this [book] briefly recited.

The third objection supposes with the Egyptians that God is mutable and of alterable will through merits and through prayers, contrary to the fifth and twenty-third [chapters] of the first book. It is resolved through the foregoing, around the saying of the Philosopher in [book] 1 of *Peri Hermeneias*, last [chapter], and the instance concerning negligence in the 29th [chapter] of this. For God, just as he predestined for some, say the elect, the end, so also the way to it; just as the extreme, so also the means; just as the crown, so also the warfare, the merits, and the labors — as the authority of blessed Gregory in *Dialogues* I.21, and others written in the 23rd [chapter] of the first [book], lucidly manifest.

CHAPTER LIII

Against ready accusers, easy judges, and headlong condemners; and he sets forth 36 chapters which seem to him erroneous, humbly imploring the authority of the Church to determine the truth.

These things being completed by the grace of God, I look back and reflect upon the dreadful magnitude of this most perilous sea — Pelagius the pestilent with his pestiferous Pelagians being now swallowed up from its abysses, while we, with the Lord as captain, have been brought across into the safest little ship of Peter — rendering manifold thanks for manifold grace. I return to my mind, I roll over the foregoing things, I ruminate and chew them over, considering with myself also the very greatest difficulty of the matter — indeed of the matters — the very great variety of opinions, and the not slight vanity of those holding them. I firmly believe and

unhesitatingly judge that many ready detractors will accuse me in many ways, judge me lightly, and perhaps headlong condemn me. But did not our Fathers, both ancient and recent, before the law, under the law, and under grace — indeed our Master and Lord Jesus Christ himself — suffer like things from like men, as not a few histories testify, and as the beginning of this [work] touches upon? And who am I, so very small, rotten and a worm, that I am reckoned comparable to so great and such men? Why therefore should I fear to suffer with them, or shrink from being troubled, that thus at least, however unequally and distantly, I may merit to be compared to them?

Nevertheless, let him who has thought me to err — Timaeus exhorting and the Apostle persuading, I beg — consider, and again and again in considering let him consider and notice that he is himself a man like me, surrounded by infirmity, subject to vanity, in many ways prone to error, and let him beware lest perhaps he himself err. One thing I know: that if I err, I probably err greatly, since [I do so] not alone, but with many great and approved Authors, and likewise with many great probable arguments, and ones not easily refuted.

One thing also I humbly request and require: that whoever shall contend that I err should weigh our reasons and the contrary authorities supporting our contrary opinions on an indifferent and just balance, not a favorable or deceitful one, and embrace the more proven opinion. For I confidently think — indeed I seem to know — that if for the opinion of the contrary part there were as many and as valid reasons, and as many authorities so meaty, so consonant, as for the opinion of this part, and reasons as withered, and authorities as thin, as discordant, for that part as for this, that one would long since have been solemnly canonized, and this one solemnly stoned. The contrary qualities of these opinions also seems perspicuously to demonstrate that the more vehemently both opinions were recently tested in the long and frequent scholastic council-chamber, and the more diligently they were probed, the more this one always appeared brighter, like gold; that one more obscure, like brass or slag.

Nevertheless, because I by no means reckon myself of so great authority, nor am I drunkenly wise enough to esteem even lightly that so great a cause should be finally decided through me so very small, and the mouth of those speaking iniquity be stopped, with bent knees of my heart I implore the Church — and especially the Roman [Church], which is recognized to flourish with supreme authority and to be governed by the spirit of wisdom — to deign to determine what is to be held catholically concerning the foregoing. For it is not without peril to err in such matters. Simon, you sleep — rise up, I beseech you, draw forth the sword, cut off whatever sinister things of heretical depravity, defend and protect the catholic truth. Furthermore, even if the Lord himself sleeps in Peter's little ship, compelled by the excess of the storm, I will also confidently rouse him, that with the storm of the spirit of his mouth calmed, he may make it tranquil and serene. Far be it, however, that he who toiled vigilant in the prow of this little ship should now sleep or doze on a cushion in the stern — unless perhaps for this reason: that thus, weighed down beyond their strength, recognizing their own weakness, [men] may cry to him more fervently,

knock more attentively, seek help more diligently, and the help once found may more lovingly hold and more dearly embrace.

But although with great desire I would wish that all the foregoing things, both as a whole and severally, might merit the examination of the Church, yet I beg suppliantly and with all my heart especially in the 36 articles written below, which seem to me erroneous, that thus, whoever shall have erred — whether I, which I fear, or another, which I think — may be led perspicuously back to the path of truth, and confirmed in it unwaveringly.

The 36 Articles Submitted as Erroneous

[1] That God is not so perfect and good but that something more perfect and better could be.

[2] That some thing exists, with God in no way conserving it.

[3] That some thing exists, with God in no way immediately and *per se* and properly conserving it, but only by means of the heaven or some other thing and through it; or because he prohibits corruptive [agencies], or because he permits the thing to be, or does not destroy the thing when he could.

[4] That some created or creatable thing could exist altogether without divine conservation, or at least without immediate, *per se*, and proper divine conservation.

[5] That some thing comes to be according to its essence or substance, with God by no means making it.

[6] That some thing comes to be according to its essence or substance without God immediately, *per se*, and properly making it, but only by means of the heaven or some other [agency], and through it; or [only] with God prohibiting contrary impeditive [agencies]; or only for this reason, that its efficient cause is made, conserved, permitted, or not impeded by God.

[7] That some thing according to its essence or substance could come to be with God by no means making it, or at least with God in no way immediately, *per se*, and properly making it.

[8] That God is in some way mutable.

[9] That God's knowledge or his will is in some way mutable.

[10] That God in knowing, willing, or doing anything intrinsically is not always intrinsically equally, supremely, and most fully actual.

[11] That God's knowledge is caused by posterior known things.

[12] That God's will, or his volition, is caused by his posterior willed things.

[13] That an act of the divine, angelic, or human will is nothing.

[14] That an act of the created will, according to its essence or substance, comes to be from itself with God by no means co-acting it.

[15] That an act of the created will, according to its essence or substance, comes to be from itself, without God immediately, *per se*, and properly making it, but only by means of the heaven, the general influence, the object, or some other similar [thing], and through it; or only by such an improper reason, namely because God made or conserves the created will which produces that act, does not destroy it or impede it, but permits it to be and to operate, or because he prohibits it from being impeded by others.

[16] That when God and the rational creature co-effect their free act, the creature naturally acts it before God; and that the created will naturally precedes in acting as mistress, and the divine will naturally follows it as handmaid.

[17] That God's pre-willing — that is, his naturally prior willing, or his eternally prior having willed — this or that present or future thing, is or was in the free contradictory power of man.

[18] That the first cause, or the divine will, is in the free power of a posterior cause or the created will.

[19] That the grace by which we are saved is not given by God simply gratuitously, but is procured by some prior merit, great or small, condign or congruous.

[20] That the divine will is impendible, and not universally efficacious in causing.

[21] That for the divine will to be infrustrable and necessary in causing in respect of any of its effects whatsoever, and of any posterior causes whatsoever — and for all its effects to be necessary in respect of it — it is not sufficient that it be the first cause naturally, and unimpedible by the power of any other or any others, and universally efficacious in causing.

[22] That it is not necessary that God created the world, became incarnate, or redeemed man; nor [necessary] that God wills this, or even has willed it.

[23] That the divine will, in respect of future contingents, as long as they are future, is free with the freedom of contradiction, and not necessary; but when they become present or slip into the past, [his will] ceases to be free with this kind of freedom and begins to be necessary with the opposite necessity in respect of them.

[24] That the divine will is not always equally free or equally necessary in respect of any of its objects whatever, and of any of its intrinsic acts whatever.

[25] That it is not necessary that God knows or has known of any present or past thing whatever that it is or was.

[26] That God's knowledge in respect of future contingents, as long as they are future contingents, is contingent, not necessary; but when they become present or pass into the past,

[his knowledge] ceases to be contingent and begins to be necessary with the opposite necessity in respect of them.

[27] That God's knowledge is not always equally free or equally necessary in respect of any of its objects whatever; and that the divine intellect, or God, in no way eternally remains intrinsically most fully uniform, namely always equally free or equally necessary in respect of any of his intrinsic acts whatever.

[28] That although Christ according to his human intellect, will, and tongue, in their proper genus, by natural human acts distinctly knew or believed, and likewise willed, with living voice asserted and swore that the Sacraments of the Church would endure to the end of the age, that there would be a general resurrection of the dead, and that they [the dead] would have eternal punishment or glory — yet it is not necessary that he knew, believed, willed, asserted, or swore this. Or, as some more sophistically say: that although Christ according to his human intellect, will, and tongue thus knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore any of these things, and this with the general, plain, simple, absolute meaning, yet it is not necessary that he knew, believed, willed, asserted, or swore this with that meaning, but it is contingently possible that he did this, not with that [meaning], but with some parabolic, mystical, conditional, or other such meaning.

[29] That even if Christ according to his human nature, by natural human acts, distinctly knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore concerning some future contingent that this will be — yet as long as that remains future contingent, it is contingent and free according to contradiction, not necessary, that Christ thus knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore it; but when it becomes present or slips into the past, it is not contingent or free that Christ thus did, but necessary with the opposite necessity.

[30] That it was and is in man's power to deceive Christ according to his assumed human nature with the union remaining, to make him believe what is false, to lie, to will vainly and repugnantly to the divine will. Or, as certain ones more subtle in their own eyes do not fear to assert: that it was and is in man's power to do something whence — together with certain other true [premises] — it follows that Christ according to his united human nature was or is deceived by believing what is false, has lied, or in present moment lies, has willed or wills vainly or repugnantly to the divine will.

[31] That it was impossible for Christ according to his united human nature, in his proper genus, to have natural, proper, and distinct acts of knowing or willing in respect of any things placed in man's power, or any things contingently — and not absolutely necessarily — future. Or that it was possible for Christ according to his united human nature, in his proper genus, to be deceived in believing, and to err in willing — namely, to will what would never come to be to come to be, and repugnantly or differently to the divine will (I say will with the rational will, not with the sensual or carnal appetite).

[32] That the prophecies concerning Christ before their fulfillment were not necessarily to be fulfilled; and that in the time between the cleansing or sanctification of the Blessed Mary and the holy Fathers of the Old Testament in the faith of Christ the future Redeemer, and the passage and salvation of those same Fathers, and the passion of Christ — it was not necessary that they were cleansed, sanctified, or saved through faith in Christ the future Redeemer; or that it was possible that they were cleansed, sanctified, and saved through a feigned, false, erroneous, and lying faith.

[33] That the prophecies and promises of Christ before their fulfillment were not, nor are, necessarily to be fulfilled.

[34] That all the prophecies foretold concerning Christ, and all the prophecies and promises of Christ concerning future things, although they appeared verbally absolute, were nevertheless mentally, tacitly conditional, and none simply absolute.

[35] That it is not necessary that the Church of Christ persevere faithful unto the end of the world.

[36] That it is possible that the Church of Christ, by the doctrine of Christ, has always been deceived directly in the substantial articles of the Christian faith, and erroneously believed in the future resurrection of the dead, the day of judgment, and life eternal; and that it is not necessary that there will be a general resurrection of the dead, nor that the reprobate or elect will have eternal punishment or joy.

The 36 Opposed Truths

These articles being condemned as erroneous, what is more consequent than that these same number of opposed truths be sanctioned?

[1] That God is so perfect and good that nothing more perfect or better could be.

[2] That nothing exists unless God conserves it in being.

[3] That nothing exists unless God immediately, *per se*, and properly conserves it in being — not only by means of the heaven or some other thing, and through it; or because he prohibits corruptive [agencies], or because he permits the thing to be, or does not destroy the thing when he could.

[4] That no created or creatable thing could be altogether without divine conservation, nor without immediate, *per se*, and proper divine conservation.

[5] That every thing made, according to its essence or substance, comes to be from God.

[6] That every thing made, according to its essence or substance, comes to be from God himself immediately, *per se*, and properly making it — not only by means of the heaven, or some other

[agency], and through it; nor only because God prohibits contrary impeditive [agencies], or made or conserves the efficient cause of the thing, permits, or does not impede [its] operating.

[7] That no thing according to its essence or substance could come to be except from God, nor except from God himself immediately, *per se*, and properly making it.

[8] That God is in no way mutable.

[9] That neither God's knowledge nor his will is in any way mutable.

[10] That God in knowing, willing, and doing whatsoever intrinsically is always intrinsically equally, supremely, and most fully actual.

[11] That no knowledge of God is caused by posterior known things.

[12] That no will of God, or volition, is caused by his posterior willed things.

[13] That every act of the divine, angelic, and human will is something.

[14] That every action of the created will, according to its essence or substance as an act, comes to be from itself, and from God equally co-acting it.

[15] That every act of the created will, according to its essence or substance as an act, comes to be from itself and from God, equally immediately, *per se*, and properly co-acting it — not only by means of the heaven, the general influence, the object, or some other similar [thing], and through it; nor only by such an improper reason, namely because God made or conserves the created will which produces that act, does not destroy it, or does not impede it, but permits it to be and to operate, or because he prohibits it from being impeded by others.

[16] That whenever God and the rational creature co-effect their free act, God naturally acts it before [the creature does], and that the divine will naturally precedes in acting as mistress, and the created will follows it in natural order as handmaid.

[17] That God's pre-willing — that is, his naturally prior willing, or his eternally prior having willed — this or that present or future thing, neither is nor was in the free contradictory power of man.

[18] That the first cause, or the divine will, is not in the free power of a posterior cause or the created will.

[19] That the grace by which we are saved is given by God simply gratuitously, nor is it procured by some prior merit, great or small, condign or congruous.

[20] That the divine will is not impedible, but is universally efficacious in causing.

[21] That for the divine will to be infrustrable and necessary in causing in respect of any of its effects whatsoever, and of any posterior causes whatsoever — and for all its effects to be

necessary in respect of it — it suffices that it be the first cause naturally, and unimpedible by the power of any other or any others, and universally efficacious in causing.

[22] That it is necessary that God created the world, became incarnate, redeemed man, and that God wills this, and also has willed it.

[23] That when future contingents become present, or slip into the past, the divine will in respect of them does not cease to be free with any freedom, or any mode of freedom intrinsically, by which it was previously free; nor does it begin to be necessary with any opposite necessity in respect of them.

[24] That the divine will is always equally free, or equally necessary, in respect of any of its objects whatever, and of any of its intrinsic acts.

[25] That it is necessary that God knows of any present thing that it is, knows also and has known of any past thing that it was.

[26] That when future contingents become present or pass into the past, God's knowledge in respect of them does not cease to be contingent with any contingency, or any mode of contingency intrinsically, by which it was previously contingent; nor does it begin to be necessary with any opposite necessity in respect of them.

[27] That God's knowledge is always equally free, or equally necessary, intrinsically in respect of any of its objects whatever; and that the divine intellect or God eternally remains intrinsically most fully uniform — namely, always equally free, or equally necessary, in respect of any of his intrinsic acts whatever.

[28] That whatever Christ, according to his human intellect, will, and tongue, in their proper genus, by natural human acts, distinctly knew, believed, willed, with living voice asserted and swore — it is necessary that he so did; and whatever he knew, believed, willed, asserted, or swore with any meaning, it is necessary that he with that same meaning so did.

[29] That if Christ according to his human nature by natural human acts distinctly knew, believed, willed, asserted, and swore concerning some future contingent that this will be — that thing still remaining future contingent — it is necessary that Christ so did, and as necessary then as it will be when that thing will be present or transmitted to the past.

[30] That it never was nor is in man's power to deceive Christ according to his assumed human nature, with the union remaining, to make him believe what is false, to lie, to will vainly, or repugnantly to the divine will; nor was it ever or is it in man's power to do something whence — with certain other true [premises] — it follows that Christ according to his united human nature was or is deceived by believing what is false, has lied, or in present moment lies, has willed or wills vainly, or repugnantly to the divine will.

[31] That it was possible for Christ according to his united human nature, in his proper genus, to have natural, proper, and distinct acts of knowing and willing in respect of certain things placed in man's power, and of certain things contingently — and not absolutely necessarily — future; and that it was impossible for Christ according to his united human nature, in his proper and own genus, to be deceived in believing, or to err in willing — namely, to will what would never come to be to come to be, or repugnantly or differently to the divine will (I say with the rational will, not with the sensual or carnal appetite).

[32] That the prophecies concerning Christ before their fulfillment were necessarily to be fulfilled, and that in the time between the cleansing or sanctification of the Blessed Mary and the holy Fathers of the Old Testament in the faith of Christ the future Redeemer, and the passage and salvation of those same Fathers, and the passion of Christ — it was necessary that they were cleansed, sanctified, and saved through faith in Christ the future Redeemer; and that it was not possible that they were cleansed, sanctified, and saved through a feigned, erroneous, and lying faith.

[33] That the prophecies and promises of Christ before their fulfillment were and are necessarily to be fulfilled.

[34] That not all the prophecies foretold concerning Christ, nor all the prophecies or promises of Christ concerning future things, were mentally, tacitly conditional, but many [were] mentally simply absolute.

[35] That it is necessary that the holy Church of Christ persevere faithful unto the end of the world.

[36] That it is not possible that the holy Church of Christ, by the doctrine of Christ, has always — or ever — been deceived directly in the substantial articles of the Christian faith, or erroneously believed in the resurrection of the dead, the day of judgment, or life eternal; and that it is necessary that these things will be, that the reprobate also will have punishment, and the elect joy eternal.

Here ends this work, On the Cause of God against Pelagius, and on the power of [secondary] causes, and the power of God the cause of causes; written through at London, in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ one thousand three hundred forty-four.

A LATER LETTER TO HIS MERTONIANS

To his beloved brothers and friends, the Warden and Fellows of the Hall of Merton in Oxford, Thomas of Bradwardine [sends] greeting and grace, that they may prosper happily in all things.

I wanted to comply with your petition straightway, but with intervening impediments I have not until now been able to. What I willed, God knows. For detained by long and lasting occupations, scarcely at length, sometime stealing a little leisure, I seized the pen, and what in the meantime for the time being could occur to me on that question — which you proposed, *On the Cause of God against the pestilent Pelagius*, to be treated — I have transmitted in these writings.

At first indeed I judged what I was attempting to be either perilous or rash. At last, however, looking to your charity and attending to your humility, I judged that I ought by no means to oppose so religious a desire of yours. Receive therefore, and benignly accept, this little gift — small indeed, but offered with no small devotion: in doctrine, of a disciple; in charity, of a friend; in Christ, of a fellow servant.

I beseech [you], do not treat as familiars the inept and importunate questioners into the word of God — those who, by a depraved and perverse custom and curiosity, run about not so much from love of truth as from desire of novelty, and want more to hear new things than to speak true ones. These, indeed, neither measuring their own capacity nor showing reverence to the divine mysteries, presume about all things, ever ready to give faith to depraved doctrines rather than envy to good ones.

To you, therefore, the Collegians daily laboring in the scholastic field, it pertains to chastise the temerity of such men, and to lead [them] back to the form of study and the way of discipline; that any of you may be not only a "scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven, who brings forth from his treasure new things and old," but also "the faithful servant whom the Lord shall set over his household, that he may give them their measure of wheat in due time."

Farewell in the Lord.

THE END.

