THE SUMMA OF ST. THOMAS
ADAPTED TO THE CUSTOMS OF PRESENT-DAY UNIVERSITIES
OR
A COURSE OF THEOLOGY

According to the mind — and, as far as possible, the order and text — of St. Thomas in his *Summa*, with, as occasion arose, digressions inserted into Ecclesiastical History.
For the Use of Thomistic Schools.

FIRST PART
ON THE ONE GOD, THE TRIUNE GOD, AND THE ANGELS
From Question 1 to 114.

A work dedicated to LOUIS, DUKE OF ORLÉANS, Prince of the royal blood, etc.

By the labor and study of *Fr. CHARLES RENÉ BILLUART*, of Reims, of the Order of Friars Preachers, Doctor of Sacred Theology, and also twice Provincial of the Gallic-Belgian Province of the same Order.

VOLUME I
ON GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES
From Question 1 to 18.

The lectures of **HONORÉ TOURNELY** — especially on the knowledge and will of God, as well as on Predestination — are refuted.

PREFACE

We ascend a dangerous sea, frequent with reefs, famous for shipwrecks: we enter the profound abyss of Divinity, the immense ocean of His perfections, the inscrutable mystery of the Trinity; who would not tremble? Who would not exclaim with the Apostle and the Church: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are His judgments and unsearchable His ways!" (quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus & investigabiles viae ejus!)

Alluding to these words, Augustine in his sermon **II** on the words of the Apostle, chapter 12, says: "Do you wish to dispute with me? Rather wonder with me and exclaim with me, O depth of riches! Let us both tremble, let us both agree in fear, lest we perish in error. Let no one seek from me the reason of hidden things. He says they are inscrutable, and you come to scrutinize? He says they are unsearchable, and you come to investigate? If you come to scrutinize the inscrutable, believe me, you have already perished."

Such is the desire to scrutinize the inscrutable, as it is to want to see the invisible and speak the ineffable. Nevertheless, do not believe, Reader, that Augustine by these words prohibits all speculation of such great mysteries, about which he himself discoursed so profoundly; but he prohibits only the too curious investigation of those things which does not stop within the bounds of Scriptures and tradition.

Therefore, about to enter the depths of these disputations, we shall strive according to the admonition of Scripture, not to be wise beyond measure, but to be wise unto sobriety (non altè, sed ad sobrietatem sapere): with our Angelic Doctor as guide, we shall spread our sails, he will detect the dangers, level the rough places, and command us to adore the more profound things, lest we be overwhelmed by glory as scrutinizers of excessive majesty.

Frequent will be our contention in these matters with the Theologians of the illustrious Society of Jesus; but for that veneration with which I regard them, and for preserving the laws of the Christian Religion, everywhere, as much as shall be in us, we shall fight with charity preserved and the stings of words removed; so that if anything contrary should perhaps escape us in the heat of disputations, which nevertheless I shall most carefully avoid, let it not be taken as spoken.

For I do not think they are offended that I say Molinists, or the Molinist School, for such usage has prevailed, nor do I want more injury to be held in these terms than when I call our people Thomists, or the Reverend Fathers Minor, Scotists.

Neither do our complaints touch them against D. Honoratus Tournely, Doctor of the Sorbonne, a man otherwise commendable by many titles: for we do not complain that this most recent Writer

embraced the positions of the schools of the Society, that is free to anyone, but that he, pretending to be as it were a mediator between both Schools, has most unfaithfully and to the gravest injury of our School pursued the province he assumes for himself of weighing the arguments of both parties with equal balance, everywhere either keeping silent about our more solid principles, or dissimulating or holding them in contempt and mockery; but promoting and praising the opposing views where they are pleasing, and where they labor under vice, concealing or covering them with cosmetics, as will be evident from what is to be said.

By this art he has harmed our School more than so many lucubrations of distinguished men from the Society, however learned; for while he is believed, as he himself asserts, to be addicted to no School, but with partisanship removed to sincerely expose the arguments of both, the incautious safely give faith to him as to an impartial judge, and according to his sayings as if truthful, they compose their feelings and affections.

Therefore this Theologian I follow in close pursuit according to my slender ability, not envying or being angry with the man, but blaming and arguing against his sayings, aberrations, dissimulations and evasions by right of defense and without loss of charity: which an equitable Reader will not turn to my vice, since to no one ever, even the vilest of mortals, has the right of defense been denied or is denied.

FACULTY OF THE MOST REVEREND FATHER GENERAL

Fr. THOMAS RIPOLL, humble Master General of Sacred Theology, and servant of the entire Order of Preaching Friars.

By the tenor of these presents, and by the authority of our Office, we give power to the Very Reverend Father **Fr. CHARLES RENÉ BILLUART**, Master of Sacred Theology, and Provincial Prior of our Province of St. Rose, to commit to print a Course of Theology, provided it shall first be approved by the censorial judgment of two Professors of Sacred Theology of our Order, and other things to be observed by law being observed.

In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

In faith of which we have subscribed to these sealed with the Seal of our Office at Rome in our Convent of St. Mary above Minerva on the twenty-fifth day of October 1743.

Place (†) of the Seal.

FR. THOMAS RIPOLL, Master of the Order. Registered page 240.

FR. ANTONINUS BREMOND, Master of Sacred Theology, Provincial of Dacia, Theologian of the Casanatensis College and Pro-socius.

APPROBATION OF THE THEOLOGIANS OF THE ORDER

We, the undersigned Theologians of the Order of Preachers, have read the first part of the Theological Treatises on St. Thomas Aquinas, through the work and study of the Very Reverend and Excellent Father **CHARLES RENÉ BILLUART** of the Order of Preaching Friars, Doctor of Sacred Theology, and also Provincial for a second time: In which the truly Excellent Author teaches nothing contrary to the Catholic Faith, but rather excellently vindicates it from the calumnies of Heretics, in which also he clearly transmits the true doctrine of St. Thomas, and strongly defends it against the Rivals of the Thomistic School: With one hand he builds, with the other he fights.

Therefore we judge these Treatises to be most worthy of light, and to be very useful to all true Disciples of the Angelic Doctor.

Given at Revin on 15 August 1747.

F. DEODATUS LABYE Bachelor and Professor of Sacred Theology and also Master of Studies in the College of St. Thomas Aquinas at Douai.

F. ANTONIUS FONTINELLE Professor of Sacred Theology.

APPROBATION OF THE ORDINARY CENSOR

I have read the Theological Treatises on the First Part of St. Thomas concerning the One and Triune God by **R. P. BILLUART** Doctor of Sacred Theology of the Order of Preaching Friars, elegantly elaborated, in which I found nothing contrary to Faith and Morals, but rather the Learned Author distributes all matters by a singular method, and transmits sound doctrine as well in Speculative as in Moral matters and consonant with the mind and letter of St. Thomas, which

he asserts with strong argument; Therefore I judge this Work worthy of the Press, and I think it will be very useful and pleasing to all Theologians, especially Professors.

Given at Liège 6 December 1746.

A. MEDARD Licentiate of Sacred Theology, Canon of Liège, Prefect and Professor of the Seminary, and specially deputed for the Examination of Books, etc.

PERMISSION OF THE ORDINARY

We permit the printing.

Liège 6 December 1746.

P. A. T. E. Count DE ROUGRAVE, Vicar General of Liège.

SUMMA OF ST. THOMAS ACCOMMODATED TO THE PRESENT CUSTOMS OF ACADEMIES

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON SACRED DOCTRINE OR THEOLOGY

ARTICLE I

What and how manifold is Theology?

The name of Theology is taken from a double Greek word *Theos* and *Logos*, that is in Latin, discourse or consideration about God (sermo seu consideratio de Deo). Whence any discourse or consideration about God, whether it relies on natural light alone, or supernatural, whether it be had by simple assent or by discourse, according to the etymology of the name, can be called Theology.

But according to the signification of the name, Theology imports a discursive consideration, which if it relies on principles known by natural light alone, is called natural Theology, or Metaphysics; if on principles known by supernatural light of faith, it is called supernatural Theology, about which we treat here, and can be described: *The doctrine of divine things deducing conclusions from principles of faith immediately revealed.*

It is customarily divided from the part of the subject, from the part of the object, and from the part of the mode.

From the part of the subject it is divided into Theology of the blessed and Theology of wayfarers. The first relies on supernatural light of glory and is twofold. One which is called by Augustine *morning knowledge* (cognitio matutina), is the beatific vision itself, by which the Blessed clearly see in the Word all divine mysteries, is intuitive, and discursive only eminently or virtually. The other which is called by Augustine *evening knowledge* (cognitio vespertina), is that by which the Blessed from principles known by the light of glory, deduce by force of natural light, conclusions about divine mysteries, and know them either through species infused by God, or acquired by their own labor in the way: it is formally discursive, nor does it differ substantially from ours.

From the part of the object it is divided into speculative and practical or moral; some add polemic. Speculative is that which stops in the sole consideration of divine things, as the Mysteries of the Trinity, Incarnation, divine attributes. Practical or moral is that which treats of things pertaining to the direction of morals, as about human acts, about sins and virtues, about

laws, about sacraments, etc. Polemic is that which deals with controversial matters: it coincides with speculative or practical, according as the controversial matter is speculable or moral.

From the part of the mode it is divided into positive and scholastic. Positive is that which is occupied with Scriptures, Traditions, Councils, Canons, Decrees of Holy Pontiffs, Works of Holy Fathers, historical facts of antiquity and practice; by examining them, penetrating them, discerning true from false, explaining the legitimate sense, drawing out mysteries of faith and revealed truths from them, and from revealed truths deducing others: and all these things in a more diffuse, more elegant and quasi oratorical style, and less accommodated to the Rules of Dialectics. It is called positive, both because it poses and supposes the principles of faith as theses and positions, does not prove them, and because the Scriptures, Traditions, Councils, Canons etc. from which it proceeds, are of positive law.

Scholastic provides the very same things, but by a different method, namely by a more concise, more subtle, and more accurate manner of speaking, according to the Rules of Dialectics, by expounding terms, opening the state of the question, defining, dividing, syllogizing, solving objections, and thus it could equally be called positive, since it also supposes, does not prove, the principles of faith, and proceeds equally from Scriptures, Traditions, Councils etc.; but it has been called scholastic, because its method is used in Schools and Academies.

Therefore positive and scholastic do not differ from each other essentially and in respect of object, for they have the same, but only accidentally in respect of different method, and those are mistaken who place positive Theology in the knowledge of revealed truths contained in Scripture, Traditions etc., scholastic in the discursive deduction of conclusions from revealed truths; for thus positive would not be distinguished from faith, nor would it be Theology, as is evident from the definition of Theology. Therefore positive truly discourses and from revealed things infers and deduces other truths, but not as accurately as scholastic, and in that alone they differ.

But this more accurate method first began to be used in the eighth century by St. John Damascene; it had increase in the twelfth century from Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, who was therefore called the master of sentences, and finally completion in the thirteenth century by St. Thomas.

To these is commonly added mystical or affective, which not so much by discourse of reason as by simple intuition of mind, especially in prayer, tastes and contemplates divine things.

Therefore concerning the various endowments of Theology in this preliminary Dissertation we undertake to treat: briefly indeed, lest we linger too long at the threshold, while graver matters await us.

ARTICLE II

Whether besides Philosophical or natural disciplines Theology is necessary?

St. Thomas proposes the question under the name of sacred doctrine or doctrine which is had through revelation (sacrae doctrinae seu doctrinae quae per revelationem habetur). Hence there is controversy among his interpreters, what he understands by sacred doctrine, whether faith, or Theology, or sacred doctrine in common as it abstracts from faith and Theology?

Cajetan and after him Serra and others embrace this last: because St. Doctor treats of the necessity of faith elsewhere, namely q. 2 a. 4. And the doctrine of which he treats here he proves to be necessary for salvation, which cannot be understood of Theology, since knowledge of divine things through faith suffices for salvation. Nor does it stand in the way that in the following articles St. Doctor treats of Theology; because the order of doctrine demands that one begin from more common things, then descend to particulars. This opinion is probable.

John of St. Thomas, Sylvius and many others on the contrary contend that St. Thomas by sacred doctrine in this first article understands Theology properly taken; because as much in the proem of this question as in the following articles about that same doctrine, which in this first article he teaches to be necessary, he asks whether it is science, whether it is wisdom, whether it is argumentative etc., which cannot be understood of faith, nor of doctrine in the abstract as it is common to faith and Theology. Nor does it stand in the way that St. Doctor in articles 9 and 10 asks whether the same sacred doctrine ought to use metaphors, whether under one letter it has several senses, which does not seem to be able to be understood of Theology, but of Sacred Scripture: for indeed Sacred Scripture is a good part of Theology, and thus it can rightly be asked whether Theology as it contains Sacred Scripture, uses metaphors and under one letter has several senses.

The opposing reason of Cajetan will be answered presently. Therefore according to this interpretation.

I say first: by God's ordinary law, besides Philosophical disciplines, it was necessary for salvation that there be in the Church some doctrine according to divine revelation, that is Theology considered as to substance as it abstracts from positive and scholastic. Nevertheless it is not necessary that every man be a Theologian.

The first part is proved. **First.** Man is ordered to God as to a certain end which exceeds the comprehension of reason, according to that of Isaiah 64: "Eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what you have prepared for those who love you" (Oculus non vidit Deus absque te quae praeparasti diligentibus te): but the end ought to be foreknown by men, indeed who, since they are led by knowledge unlike other animals, ought to order their intentions and actions to the end:

Therefore besides natural disciplines it was necessary for salvation that there be doctrine according to divine revelation or Theology.

You will say this supernatural end is known through faith: Therefore Theology is superfluous. **I respond** and at the same time the conclusion is confirmed: indeed the supernatural end is known through faith when it is had, but according to the common course of divine providence, faith cannot be had, propagated, conserved and defended without Theology, through which St. Augustine says lib. 14 de Trinitate cap. 1: "The most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is born, nourished, defended, strengthened" (Fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur).

For indeed faith, which according to the Apostle to the Romans 10 is from hearing, and hearing through the word of God, is born, nourished, defended, not through simple narration of mysteries, but through discourses, congruences, examples and various other arguments by which the obscurity of Scriptures is elucidated, tradition is proved, the credibility of mysteries is demonstrated, human inconstancy is checked, the cavils, cunning and sophisms of attacking heretics are detected and refuted, which all is proper to Theology: therefore Theology begets, nourishes, defends faith, not directly indeed as if it produced it, but indirectly by removing impediments.

Second. These words of the Apostle to the Ephesians 4 confirm this: "He gave some apostles, others pastors, and teachers for the perfection of the saints in the work of ministry, in the building up of the Body of Christ... that we may no longer be children tossing, and carried about with every wind of doctrine in the wickedness of men, and in cunning to the circumvention of error" (Ipse dedit quosdam Apostolos, alios Pastores, & Doctores ad consummationem Sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem Corporis Christi... ut jam non simus parvuli fluctuantes, & circumferamur omni vento doctrinae in nequitia hominum, & in astutia ad circumventionem erroris). And to Titus: "It behooves a Bishop to be... embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine: that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine, and to convince the gainsayers... For there are also many disobedient, vain talkers, and seducers... who must be reproved: who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not" (Oportet Episcopum esse... amplectentem eum, qui Secundùm doctrinam est, fidelem sermonem: ut potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana, & eos, qui contradicunt, arguere... sunt enim multi etiam inobedientes, vaniloqui, & seductores... quos oportet redargui: qui universas domos subvertunt, docentes quae non oportet).

It is proved **secondly**. Although men were not ordered to a supernatural end nor needed to be instructed about mysteries which surpass natural intelligence, nevertheless there would be necessary for them doctrine proceeding through revelation or Theology, for those things which can be investigated about God by human reason: Therefore. The Antecedent is proved: if truths about God naturally knowable were left to reason alone without revelation to be investigated,

they would be perceived by few and through a long time and with the admixture of many errors: by few; because of the ineptitude or laziness of many, or other necessary occupations of civil life. Through a long time; both because science about God supposes other natural sciences, whence Metaphysics which is about God, is placed in the last place; and because youth entangled in passions is not suitable for so great study, as neither the more advanced age of many detained by other business. With the admixture of many errors, because of the weakness of human genius, the mixture of phantasms and prejudices, the diverse opinions of Doctors and the arguments of sophists; whence the very leaders and Coryphées of the Philosophers of the Gentiles fell into various and most shameful errors about God: Therefore.

Nor does it stand in the way that St. Thomas from this reason concludes only that Theology is necessary so that salvation may come to men more conveniently and certainly (ut salus hominibus convenientius & certius proveniat), which signifies only utility, not simple necessity. It does not stand in the way, I say; because "more conveniently and certainly" (convenientius & certius) are not taken there comparatively but positively, as is evident from the three inconveniences which, according to St. Thomas, would follow without Theology. Or if they are taken comparatively, the comparison does not refer to the mode of obtaining salvation, as if without Theology there is a true though less convenient and less certain mode, but to the knowledge itself, so that the sense is that salvation comes with more convenient knowledge, insofar as it extends to more, is compared more briefly and is immune from error.

I said in the conclusion "by God's ordinary law" (de lege Dei ordinaria); because it is certain that by God's absolute power, faith and knowledge of divine things can be had and saved by another way than with the help of Theology.

The second part is evident, because not every man ought to be a Theologian to be saved, but faith suffices for him by which he simply professes those things which are necessarily to be believed by all: whence St. Augustine in the cited place says: "Many faithful do not excel in this science, though they excel in faith, which alone suffices" (Hac scientia plurimi non pollent fideles, licet fide polleant, quae sola sufficit).

If you say no one can preserve faith unless he judges its mysteries to be credible at least from some general motive, for instance because the Church so commands and holds; but this judgment is an act of Theology, **I respond** that it is indeed some act of Theology, as it is also in rustic parents instructing their children, but of imperfect Theology, from which one cannot be called simply a Theologian, because absolute denomination is taken from a form which perfectly inheres.

ARTICLE III

On the antiquity, utility and necessity of scholastic Theology

I propose this article against the heretics of our time, who attack scholastic Theology with atrocious injuries and calumnies, and against some Catholics who depress it more than is fair.

But that equivocation may be removed, it should be observed that scholastic Theology can be considered in two ways. **First.** According to itself as it abstracts from a more or less accurate method. **Second.** As to state or according to the more perfect method by which it is now transmitted in schools, from which it has been called scholastic. We assigned the origin of this in article 1 to the eighth century, increase to the twelfth, completion to the thirteenth.

Therefore concerning the antiquity only of scholastic Theology according to itself, but concerning the utility and necessity of both, it is to be spoken here.

I say first: Scholastic Theology according to itself has always flourished in the Church, and it is and always was necessary.

Both parts are proved: Scholastic Theology according to itself is nothing other than Theology according to substance about which in the superior article; but Theology as to substance about which in the superior article always flourished in the Church, is and was always necessary as was proved: Therefore. The Major is proved: Scholastic Theology according to itself is nothing other than science methodically deducing conclusions from revealed principles, abstracting from a more or less accurate method: but this is the very Theology as to substance about which in the superior article, as is evident from the definition of Theology as to substance given in article 1.

This is confirmed. Scholastic Theology according to itself is nothing other than argumentative Theology: but Theology as to substance is argumentative: therefore. The Minor is proved: Theology as to substance is science, as will be proved below: but every science is argumentative and discursive: Therefore.

In confirmation of the whole assertion it helps that Christ, the Apostles and Fathers of the former centuries applied scholastic Theology according to itself, or some use of scholastic Theology to the instruction of the faithful, to the conversion of Jews and Gentiles, and to the impugning of heresies.

Thus Christ Matthew 22 proves to the Jews his Divinity from that of David Psalm 109: "The Lord said to my Lord" (Dixit Dominus Domino meo); thus concluding: "if therefore David calls him Lord, how is he his son?" (si ergo David vocat eum Dominum, quomodo filius ejus est?). And Matthew 19 he infers the indissolubility of matrimony from that of Genesis 2: "For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife" (Propter hoc dimittet homo patrem & matrem & adhærebit uxori suae); thus concluding: "what therefore God has joined together, let not man separate" (quod ergo Deus conjunxit, homo non separet).

Paul 1 Corinthians 15 from the resurrection of Christ argues to prove the common resurrection: and to the Romans 11 that grace is not given from works, from this that if it were given from works, it would no longer be grace.

The Fathers of the former centuries SS. Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Jerome, Augustine, and others applied scholastic Theology according to itself, or some use of scholastic Theology to the instruction of the faithful, conversion of Gentiles and impugning of heresies felicitously, their writings everywhere prove.

I say second: Scholastic Theology as to state, or according to the more accurate method as it is now transmitted in schools, is not necessary to the Church, is nevertheless very useful.

The first part is evident: because for many centuries the Church stood and flourished without the help of this more accurate scholastic method as it is now transmitted in schools, since, as was said, it has its origin from St. John Damascene in the eighth century.

The second part is also evident. **First.** Because through this accurate Dialectic excellently faith and Religion is born, nourished, defended, as is evident, both from experience of so many distinguished men who applied it felicitously against the profane novelties of heretics, and from the very nature of accurate Dialectics, for indeed to speak in a concise, simple and open style, with prolixity of words cut off, to remove equivocations of terms, to open and fix the state of the question, to define, divide, syllogize, solve objections, these things, I say, which are proper to scholastic Theology according to accurate Dialectics, help much for persuading and defending truth, no one does not see.

Second. Because the Holy Pontiffs and Councils approve and praise it: Sixtus V in the Bull by which he numbers St. Bonaventure among the exceptional Doctors of the Church, celebrates with many encomiums the scholastic Theology customarily transmitted in schools, and among other things calls it "the invincible bulwark of faith" (invictum fidei propugnaculum): the Lateran Council IV about Peter Lombard and the Council of Vienna equally celebrated it.

You will say **first**. The Apostle to the Colossians 2 and the Holy Fathers everywhere disapprove Philosophy and its mode of proceeding disputatively: Therefore. **I respond**. Philosophy and its method are disapproved by the Apostle and Holy Fathers for a double reason. **First.** Insofar as men abuse it for the deception of others and to the detriment of faith, not however according to itself and insofar as it can be applied for the very aid of faith: whence the same Apostle to Titus, wants the Bishop to be able to exhort in sound doctrine and convince gainsayers, which is done more easily by the ministry of Philosophy and its method. **Second.** Philosophy is disapproved insofar as it wants to dominate faith, measuring its mysteries to human reason according to the elements of this world (secundum elementa hujus mundi), not however insofar as it wants to serve it, for Theology uses it not as superior, but as inferior and handmaid, that is as instrument,

according to that of Proverbs 9: "she has sent her maids to invite to the citadel" (misit ancillas suas vocare ad arcem).

You will say **second**. There are many abuses in scholastic Theology, also many frivolous and useless questions, also a style uncultivated and barbarous: Therefore. **I respond** to the first: that some abuses have crept in not from the very nature and condition of Theology, but from the very vice of men, whence the abuses are to be corrected, not however the science itself to be condemned. To the second likewise, if some useless things are introduced, they are to be cut off as luxuriant branches, but the tree itself is to be preserved. Moreover many questions in Theology are indeed useless to little women and the unlearned, which nevertheless are most useful to the more advanced. Besides, we have been compelled to many which seem merely Philosophical by the very obstinacy of heretics.

To the third: scholastics use a simple style lest they add difficulty of words to the difficulty of perceiving things which is greatest. But if sometimes they use terms less cultivated and smacking of some barbarism to open their mind more clearly and briefly, it should move no one, since this is common to all arts, Cicero says lib. 1 Academica. Whence Augustine lib. 4 de Doctrina christiana cap. 8: "It is the mark of good minds," he says, "to love truth in words, not words. For what does a golden key profit, if it cannot open what we want? Or what harm is a wooden one, if it can do this? When we seek nothing, except that what is closed may be opened" (Bonorum ingeniorum, inquit, insignis est indoles in verbis verum amare, non verba. Quid enim prodest clavis aurea, si aperire quod volumus, non potest? Aut quid obest lignea, si hoc potest? Quando nihil quaerimus, nisi patere quod clausum est). Read St. Gregory in the preface of his Morals.

You will say **third**. The Apostles and Fathers of former centuries did not apply scholastic Theology, who nevertheless excellently propagated and defended faith and religion: therefore it is useless, indeed reprehensible as a pernicious novelty in the Church. **I respond first**. Some use of scholastic Theology always flourished in the Church, as we proved in the first conclusion, and it was sometimes applied more accurately as occasion required, especially when it was necessary to contend with heretics, as is evident from the writings of St. Jerome against Helvidius, Jovinian and Vigilantius, and of St. Augustine against Academics, Manichees, Donatists and Pelagians, so that Cresconius himself reproached Augustine for Dialectics and skill in disputing, to whom St. Augustine lib. 1 against him cap. 13 responds: "If these things are harmful, why do you do this? If they are not, why do you argue?" (Si noxia sunt, quare hoc facis? si non sunt, quare arguis?). Hence St. Doctor lib. de Doctrina christiana cap. 13 says: "The discipline of disputation is very powerful for penetrating and dissolving all kinds of questions which are in the holy letters; only there the lust of quarreling and a certain childish ostentation of deceiving the adversary is to be guarded against" (Disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in litteris sanctis sunt penetranda & dissolvenda plurimùm valet; tantùm ibi cavenda est libido rixandi & puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium). And St. Basil in cap. 2 Isaiah: "Dialectic," he says, "is like a wall to dogmas, because it does not allow them to be easily deceived and to lie open to

anyone's incursions" (Dialectica, inquit, instar muri est dogmatibus, quòd ea non sinit facilè decipi & quorumlibet incursioni patere). And Clement of Alexandria lib. 1 Stromatum: "Dialectic brings help lest we be prostrated by heresies which make incursions" (opem fert Dialectica ne profternamur ab haeresibus quae faciunt incursiones).

I respond second. That the whole which is of faith, and the wonderful conversion of the whole world, might not be attributed to human power or wisdom, but to God; God willed that the primitive preaching of the Apostles and their disciples in the nascent Church should be at least regularly in weakness and simplicity; but as faith was planted and firmed by divine virtue alone and the conversion of the world was made, he willed that secular power should serve for the conservation of this Religion, so he willed that secular wisdom should serve the same end, that he might show through the victory of faith that the world is subject to God both as to power and as to wisdom: whence the consequence of the argument is to be denied: for granted that the scholastic method is new, it is not therefore to be reprobanded as a pernicious novelty; both because this novelty was demanded by the changed state of affairs; and because it is a novelty of method only and not of dogma, which alone is guarded against in the Church.

You will say **fourth**. The study of scholastic Theology evacuates devotion, insofar as through vehement application of mind it exhausts all spirits, so that man after study remains arid and as if insensible to all motives of piety: whence St. Thomas 2-2 q. 83 a. 3 ad 3 notes that in simple persons and women devotion abounds more than in others: Therefore. **I respond first**. This argument militates equally against other sciences as against scholastic Theology; therefore it proves too much. **Second.** I concede the Antecedent about sensible devotion, because it arises naturally from humidity of complexion such as is in women, and which is dried up by study. I deny about solid devotion, rather this is maximally helped by the study of scholastic Theology: in one way directly by illuminating the intellect about mysteries of faith and precepts both divine and ecclesiastical, penetrating them more and more, expounding their credibility, and examining, proving the sanctity, necessity, utility of the latter; whence it happens that the will which is a blind power following the lead of intellect more tenaciously inheres to divine things and more diligently fulfills precepts: in which solid devotion consists.

In another way indirectly, insofar as the study of Theology removes impediments to solid devotion. And **first** it impedes errors into which the devout unlearned often fall: thus it is read in the Conferences of the Fathers, Conference 10 chapter 4, that Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, that is of those who think God has human form. **Second.** It is useful for avoiding the lasciviousness of the flesh, insofar as it turns the mind away from thoughts of lasciviousness and macerates the flesh through the labor of study. Whence Jerome says to Rusticus the monk lib. de vivendi forma about the middle: "love the knowledge of scriptures, and you will not love the vices of the flesh" (ama scientiam scripturarum, & carnis vitia non amabis).

From what has been said you will gather how undeservedly, how foolishly our heretics have affected scholastic Theology and scholastic Doctors with reproaches and injuries of every kind. Wycliffe calls Catholic Academies "camps of Cain" (Castra Cainitica); Luther, "brothels of Antichrist" (Antichrifti lupanaria); Calvin calls scholastic Doctors "horned asses, two-footed beasts" (Asinos cornutos, bestias bipedes), etc. Indeed even Jansenius, with a truly inauspicious outcome, in his prooemial book continually blames them for negligence, drowsiness, temerity, unbridled license etc. These things they say and many others, most wickedly indeed, but providently for their own affairs, since they clearly saw their false dogmas overturned and routed by invincible weapons and arguments of every kind drawn from scholastic Theology: whence that famous saying of Bucer: "Remove Thomas and I shall scatter the Church" (Tolle Thomam & dissipabo Ecclesiam).

ARTICLE IV

Whether Theology is truly science, and is subalternated to the science of God and the Blessed

I say first: Our Theology is truly and properly science as to substance, but imperfect as to state, for lack of actual evidence.

It is proved **first** by overturning the foundation of adversaries: if our Theology were not truly science as to substance, it would be because it lacks actual evidence: but this reason is null: Therefore. The Major belongs to adversaries, and is evident because it has other conditions required for science, namely that the conclusion be deduced from certain and immutable premises. The Minor is proved: for the reason of subalternated science actual evidence is not required, but radical suffices: but our Theology is subalternated to the Theology of God and the Blessed as I shall say presently: Therefore.

The Major is proved: subalternated science in the absence of the subalternating is true science as to substance: but subalternated science in the absence of the subalternating does not have actual evidence but only radical, situated in this, that since it proceeds from principles manifested in the subalternating science, it seeks by its nature to be joined to it, and in that conjunction to have actual evidence of its principles: Therefore. The Major is proved: subalternated science in the absence of the subalternating, since it proceeds from principles manifested in the subalternating, by its nature seeks and inclines to be joined to it that it may have actual evidence of its principles, as has just been said, because everything inclines to its due and natural perfection: but if it were not science in the absence of the subalternating, it would not incline to be joined to it: Therefore. The Minor is proved: if subalternated science in the absence of the subalternating were not science, when it would be joined to the subalternating, it would be science, and thus would be destroyed: but nothing inclines to its own destruction: Therefore.

This reason is confirmed: for true demonstration which is the scientific act, it suffices if the premises are radically known per se, that is which can be resolved into principles actually known per se and immediate, otherwise scarcely any demonstration would be given, since there is scarcely any syllogism whose premises are not to be proved by others more known: Therefore likewise science.

Therefore our Theology like all other subalternated sciences by itself seeks to be resolved into evident principles, and if in fact it does not resolve, and therefore does not have actual evidence, this does not happen per se and from defect of itself, but per accidens and by reason of the state of the way or of the subject in which it is, which lacks the subalternating; and therefore we say it is imperfect as to state, which is the second part of the conclusion, but true as to substance. Thus an infant is a true man as to substance, imperfect as to state. Thus habitual grace in a penitent who relapses, is as much as from itself a quality difficultly movable, and therefore a true habit as to substance, but is by reason of the subject easily movable and therefore imperfect as to state.

It is proved **secondly**. Theology is one of the intellectual habits, since it infallibly perfects the intellect about the true: but it is not art or prudence, since it does not deal with things to be done or made, and one can be an excellent Theologian who is a very bad artificer or a man very imprudent; nor is it the habit of first principles since it deals with conclusions, nor faith, since it deals with mediately revealed things: Therefore it is science and, as we shall say below, wisdom.

You will say **first**. St. Thomas q. 14 de veritate art. 9 says that every science is perfected in vision of the thing present (omnis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficitur). And in 3 Sentences dist. 33 q. 1 a. 2 quaestiuncula 4: "If there were some science which could not be reduced to naturally known principles, it would not be of the same species with others, nor would it be called science univocally" (Quod si esset aliqua scientia quae non posset reduci ad principia naturaliter cognita, non esset ejusdem Speciei cum aliis, neque univoce diceretur scientia).

I respond to the first that St. Thomas speaks of science perfect as to state, as is evident from this term "is perfected" (perficitur). To the second, St. Thomas in the cited place proves that infused virtues differ in species from acquired ones, in proof of which he adduces the example of sciences, and says that if there were some science which did not proceed from principles known by natural light but supernatural, it would differ in species from natural sciences, from which it follows only that our Theology is not of the same species with natural sciences, nor is contained under the same proximate genus, not however that it is not true science, just as from this that infused virtue is distinguished in species from acquired virtue, it does not follow that it is not true virtue: and certainly concerning the mind of St. Thomas there is no doubt whatsoever, if indeed in three places cited in the margin he constantly resolves that Theology is science and solves the principal argument of adversaries taken from evidence.

You will say **second**. According to Aristotle and all Philosophers, it is of the nature of science that it be evident: Therefore. **I respond** by distinguishing the Antecedent: it is of the nature of science that it be evident with radical or actual evidence, I concede; with actual evidence, I subdivide; of the nature of science as to state, I concede; of the nature of science as to substance, I deny. The solution is evident from what has been said.

You will reply according to St. Thomas and Thomists: faith and science cannot be in the same intellect about the same object: but if radical evidence suffices for true science, it will be able to be with faith in the same intellect about the same object: for indeed they are not compatible because one is obscure, the other evident: Therefore.

Many Thomists respond that the Major is to be understood of clear and actually evident science, and thus our Theology which is only radically evident can stand with faith in the same intellect about the same object. Others respond by conceding the Major, denying the Minor; because, they say, faith and science do not exclude each other only because faith is obscure and science evident; but also because faith makes one assent to immediately revealed truths because of the authority of the speaker alone. But Theology makes one assent to mediately revealed truths, because of reason deduced from principles. But it is incompatible that someone assent to truth because of the authority of the speaker alone and at the same time because of reason deduced from principles: since "alone" (solam) excludes every other motive. Whence if there is a proposition immediately revealed, which someone also deduces from other immediately revealed things through discourse, he will have Theology about it, not faith, because he will not assent to it because of the authority of the speaker alone, but also because of the demonstrative medium.

Both solutions are probable.

You will say **third**. There is no science properly speaking of singulars: but Theology deals with singulars, e.g. about Christ, his Incarnation, Passion, the Blessed Virgin, etc. Therefore.

It could be responded **first**. Theology does not deal with singulars formally as they are singular, but with their quiddity which indeed is found in one individual only, just as Philosophy treats of the sun, not as it is singular, but of its quiddity which is in this one individual. But concerning some singulars like the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and similar things, it treats them as they are singular, not as about the principal object, but they are introduced both as example of life, as in moral sciences, and to declare the authority of those through whom divine revelation proceeded to us, upon which sacred doctrine is founded.

I respond secondly by distinguishing the Antecedent. There is no science properly speaking of singulars precisely because they are singular, I deny; because they are contingent and changeable, I concede. For science ought to be certain and infallible. But Theology does not treat of singulars as they are uncertain and changeable, but as they are subject to divine revelation, under which aspect they are certain and immutable.

You will say **fourth**. In any science it is necessary to suppose about the object what it is: but concerning God who is the object of Theology, we cannot know what he is: Therefore. The Minor is proved; because according to St. Thomas 1 contra Gentiles cap. 25 and the truth of the matter, God cannot be defined: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Minor: concerning God we cannot know what he is a priori, I concede the Minor; through effects or through revelation, I deny the Minor. But with the knowledge of God's quiddity posited through effects or through revelation, we demonstrate a priori his properties which flow from his nature as from an a priori reason and virtual cause. Whence when St. Thomas in the cited place contra Gentiles adds that demonstration about God cannot be made except through effects, he understands of demonstration which is reduced to perfect definition and knowledge of quiddity of God, not however of demonstration of his properties: as is evident from both places cited in the margin.

I say second: The Theology of wayfarers is properly subalternated to the science of God and the Blessed which is called morning knowledge (cognitio matutina).

This is common to Thomists with St. Thomas against many others.

Note: subalternation of sciences is the dependence of one upon another. But one science can depend upon another in many ways; but here we attend to the dependence of one upon another in the manifestation of truth, for this is properly called subalternation of sciences.

I said in the conclusion, of the science of the Blessed which is called morning knowledge; because, as I observed in article 1, there is twofold knowledge in the Blessed. One by which they clearly see mysteries in the Word not discoursing formally, but only eminently: and this is called morning knowledge by Augustine. The other by which from principles known by supernatural light they deduce various conclusions by formal discourse; and this is called evening knowledge (cognitio vespertina). The conclusion therefore is to be understood of the first science of the Blessed, not of the second which is substantially the same as our Theology in perfect and connatural state.

It is proved: then there is properly called subordination of sciences, when one depends upon another as to evidence and manifestation of truth or of its principles, as has been said, and is evident in music which is properly subordinated to arithmetic, because it supposes its principles proved and known in arithmetic: similarly perspective with respect to geometry: but our Theology depends upon the science of God and the Blessed as to the manifestation of its principles, just as music upon arithmetic and perspective upon geometry: Therefore. The Minor is proved: just as music proceeds from principles known in arithmetic, and perspective from principles known in geometry, so our Theology proceeds from principles known in the science of God and the Blessed, for the principles of our Theology are the articles of faith which are known and manifested in the fatherland: Therefore.

You will say **first**. For proper subalternation of sciences it is required that the subalternated contract the object of the subalternating through some accidental difference which is the root of new scibility or new conclusions, otherwise they would not be distinct sciences, since they would have the same object: but our Theology does not contract the object of the Theology of the fatherland, namely God, through some accidental difference which is the root of new scibility, or new conclusions, since indeed both regard God as object: Therefore. Thus Tournely.

I respond. The Major is only true of natural sciences which have limited objects, otherwise of sciences of supernatural order which have an infinite and unlimited object. For since this condition is required so that the subalternating and subalternated be distinguished among themselves, an infinite and unlimited object by reason of its infinity, without addition of accidental difference, can have several modes of scibility, by reason of which it can terminate several and distinct sciences.

Add that this condition is not entirely lacking to our Theology with respect to the Theology of the Blessed, for to this it adds virtual revelation or formal discourse from immediately revealed principles to mediately revealed conclusions, as an accidental difference founding a diverse mode of scibility; since on the contrary the Blessed whatever they see in the Word by morning knowledge, see as immediately revealed, nor do they discourse formally, but only eminently insofar as they see one to be cause and reason of another.

You will say **second**. Then one science is properly subalternated to another when it supposes certain conclusions of the subalternating and assumes them in its principles: whence it is commonly said, there the physician begins where the physicist ends: but the conclusions of the science of the Blessed are not principles of our Theology, but the Blessed as well as we deduce conclusions from principles about the same things and truths which we deduce from principles: Therefore. Thus Daelman.

I respond first, as before, that the Major is true only of natural sciences; because if in these the same were the principles and conclusions of the subalternating and subalternated, since there is otherwise in both the same mode of proceeding through natural light, there would be no distinction between them. But although the same were the principles and conclusions of the Theology of the Blessed and of wayfarers, they are sufficiently distinguished by the diverse mode of proceeding, one through supernatural light, the other through natural light: and since the principles of this are manifested in the former, proper subalternation remains.

I respond second. The Minor is true of the Theology of the Blessed which is called evening knowledge (cognitio vespertina), not of that which is called morning knowledge (cognitio matutina) to which our Theology is subalternated; for by this the Blessed see immediately and without formal discourse, primarily those things which pertain to God according to himself, secondarily those which pertain to mysteries which proceed from God, whose reasons and causes

they see in God. These things revealed to us through faith are principles of our Theology. But if the blessed from things immediately seen in the Word deductively deduce the same conclusions as ours (for indeed not all things are immediately revealed to them within the Word) they do not do this through Theology which is called morning knowledge to which ours is subordinated, but through that which is called evening knowledge and which is substantially the same as our Theology.

You will say **third**. There is no proper subalternation between science and the habit of first principles, as Philosophers teach: but blessed science is the habit of first principles with respect to our Theology: Therefore.

I respond. Blessed science has at once the nature of the habit of first principles and of science. It has the nature of the habit of first principles, insofar as by one and simple intuition it is borne upon the divine essence and upon all other things which regard it. It has the nature of science insofar as it so sees the divine essence and its attributes that nevertheless it knows one to be the virtual cause of another, for thus it is eminently discursive.

From these things you will infer that our Theology which we here acquire with great labor, will remain in the fatherland, because since it is subalternated to the Theology of the Blessed, it naturally seeks to be joined to it: whence that common saying of St. Jerome Epistle to Paulinus: "Let us learn on earth those things whose knowledge will persist for us in heaven" (Discamus in terris quorum scientia nobis perseveret in caelis).

From this you will further infer that those who were Theologians on earth, other things being equal, will know more in the fatherland outside the Word through species acquired in this life by their own labor, than those who were not Theologians.

You will say against this Corollary: faith does not remain in the fatherland: Therefore neither does Theology. The consequence is proved: faith does not remain in the fatherland because it is obscure, but in the fatherland there is evidence: but Theology is also obscure: Therefore.

I respond by denying the Consequence. To the proof I distinguish the Minor: our Theology is also obscure essentially and by reason of itself, I deny; accidentally and by reason of state or subject, I concede; whence it is perfected in the fatherland and will be in its natural state, just as when an infant becomes a man.

Therefore when the Apostle 1 Corinthians 13 says: "Charity never fails... whether tongues, they shall cease, whether knowledge, it shall be destroyed" (Charitas nunquam excidit... Sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientia destruetur), it should not be understood of destruction of science as to substance, but either as to the mode of knowing through conversion to phantasms, or as to the mode of obscurity which it has by reason of state and subject, just as when it is said Matthew 24:

"heaven and earth shall pass away" (caelum & terra transibunt), the sense is not that they will be destroyed as to substance, but that they will be renewed as to state.

If you say that according to this solution the distinction posited by the Apostle between charity and science does not subsist, since also charity as to the imperfect mode of operating through faith will fail.

I respond. Nevertheless the distinction posited stands: because this mode of operating through faith is not essential either to the habit or to the act of charity. For since it operates through love and its mode of operating is situated in this, it essentially demands only that the object be known, but it is per accidens whether it be known through faith or through vision; whence in the fatherland only the imperfection of charity is evacuated, not its mode of operating which is in love. But truly since the mode of operating in science is knowledge, and essentially knowledge in the way is made through conversion to phantasms, with conversion to phantasms ceasing, the mode of operating in the science of the way ceases; and thus science as to act is destroyed, not however as to habit, to which it is indifferent whether it be applied through conversion to phantasms, or without it.

ARTICLE V

What is the object of Theology?

Note: object, or as St. Thomas speaks, subject of consideration and not of inherence (subjectum considerationis scilicet & non inhaesionis), is distinguished as twofold in every power or habit, namely material and formal: the material object is that which is indeed attained by the power or habit, not however by reason of itself but by reason of another. The formal object is that which is attained by the power or habit by reason of itself and by reason of which other things are attained.

In the formal object a double aspect should be distinguished: the aspect which (ratio quae), and this is the very thing which is attained, and is called the formal object which (objectum formale quod): and the aspect by which or under which (ratio qua seu sub qua), and this is that by means of which the aspect which is attained: and is called the formal object by which or under which (objectum formale quo seu sub quo); so that from this double aspect which and by which the formal object is integrated, which is specificative of the power or habit.

Let there be an example in the visual power; its material object is body; formal which (formale quod), color; formal by which (formale quo), light; formal specificative, colored lucid thing (coloratum lucidum).

I say first: The formal object which (objectum formale quod) of Theology is God under the aspect of Deity (sub ratione Deitatis).

It is proved **first**. The formal object which of some science is that which is principally and by reason of itself sought and attained by the science, and by reason of which other things are attained: but God as God, is that which is principally and by reason of itself attained by Theology: for it is, as was said, discourse or consideration about God; and by reason of him other things are sought and treated in it; for the things which are treated in Theology either are God himself, or speak an order to God, whether as properties to essence, or as effects to cause, or as means to end, as are human acts, virtues, Incarnation, Sacraments, etc.

It is proved **secondly**. The same is the formal object which of principles and of the whole science since the whole science is virtually contained in principles: but the formal object which of the principles of Theology is God as God, for they are articles of faith which since it is a Theological virtue, has as formal object which God as God, or as true in being (verum in essendo), which is the same; for true in being and being are the same.

I say second: The formal object by which (objectum formale quo) of Theology is virtual and mediate divine revelation (divina revelatio virtualis & mediata).

Before it is proved, note that something is said to be revealed in two ways: **First.** Formally and immediately, as that God is triune, is incarnate etc. **Second.** Virtually and mediately, insofar as it is contained in something formally and immediately revealed, either as effect in cause, or as property in essence or otherwise; from which it is deduced through discourse by force of natural light.

Thus risibility in Christ is virtually and mediately revealed, because through natural discourse it is deduced from this immediately revealed: Christ is man, as property from essence; we say therefore this virtual and mediate revelation, or the force of natural light deducing conclusions from immediately revealed principles to be the formal object under which (objectum formale sub quo) of Theology; because under that aspect and by means of it, it attains whatever it treats about God, just as by means of light sight attains any colored body.

It is proved: Theology is distinguished from faith and Metaphysics, and is as it were midway between them: but it would not be distinguished from them, nor would it mediate between them if it did not have virtual revelation as formal object under which: Therefore. The Minor is proved: if its formal aspect under which were immediate revelation, it would not be distinguished from faith; if only natural light independently of any revelation, it would not be distinguished from Metaphysics: Therefore.

I say third: The adequate material object (objectum materiale adaequatum) of Theology is everything that falls under virtual and mediate divine revelation.

It is proved: the adequate material object of some science is all that which it can attain by reason of the formal object which, and as it is subject to the object, or formal aspect under which: but Theology can attain and contemplate every being by reason of God insofar as it is subject to virtual and mediate revelation: Therefore.

You will say **first**. Against the first conclusion: St. Thomas in the prologue of the Sentences q. 1 a. 4 says divine being knowable through revelation is the object of Theology: Therefore.

Some respond that St. Thomas spoke of the material object and of extension. Others respond that he posited divine being as it is analogous, and suppose for the principal analogate which is God; and this is evident from the example of healthy (sani) which St. Doctor applies there. But whatever the younger St. Thomas held, at least it is certainly established that the elder held our opinion in the present article.

You will say **second** and at the same time insist: everything that is subject to the formal object which of some science or power, pertains to its formal object which: but every divine being is subject or can be subject to the formal object by which of Theology, namely virtual revelation: therefore not only God as God, but divine being is the formal object which of Theology.

The Major is proved from other sciences and powers, thus e.g. because abstraction from all matter is the formal object by which of Metaphysics, not only God, but every being as abstracted from all matter is its formal object which. Thus because light is the formal object by which of visual power, not some particular colored thing, but every colored thing as it is subject to light, is the formal object which of visual power: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Major: everything that is subject to the formal object by which of some science pertains to its formal object which, if it is attained by that science principally and by reason of itself, I concede the Major; if less principally and by reason of another, I deny the Major.

But Theology which as the name imports, is consideration about God, like faith, attains God principally and by reason of itself, but other revealed things by reason of God and in order to him; whence although they are subject to the aspect of its formal under which, they pertain only to its secondary and material object, or, as others say, to the object of extension not of attribution: and hence there is disparity from the opposed examples; for in Metaphysics and in visual power, there is nothing principal which is attained per se and by reason of itself, and by reason of which other things are attained, but every being abstracted from matter is attained per se and independently of another by Metaphysics, just as every colored lucid thing by visual power.

On the contrary, in medicine e.g. because the body under the aspect of health is attained principally and by reason of itself, but other things like pulse, urine, medicines etc. are attained

less principally and by reason of the body to be healed, therefore these although they are subject to the same formal aspect under which of medicine, are nevertheless only its secondary and extensive object, but only the body as healable is the formal object which.

You will reply: if God had revealed nothing about himself, but only about others; faith and Theology would remain; just as if per impossibile God did not exist, Metaphysics would remain: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Antecedent: faith and Theology of the same nature as those which now are, I deny the Antecedent: for then Theology would not be consideration about God, nor would faith be a Theological virtue. Of different nature, I concede the Antecedent. But the same Metaphysics would remain, because Metaphysics, as was said, does not consider God as something principal by reason of itself, and other things by reason of him, but every being as abstracted from all matter.

You will say **third**. According to Philosophers no science proves its object but supposes it: but Theology proves God to exist: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Major: no science proves its object a priori and from intrinsic principles, I concede; a posteriori through effects and from principles borrowed from elsewhere, I deny. But Theology proves God to exist a posteriori through effects and from principles borrowed from Metaphysics. Add that God as supernatural author is the object of Theology, but thus he is not proved, but believed.

You will say **fourth**. The formal specificative object of some science ought to be predicated of all parts of it; thus e.g. because mobile being is the object of Physics, it is true to say of everything about which Physics treats that it is mobile being. Also it ought to be the root of all properties which are demonstrated in it: but God as God is not predicated of all things about which Theology treats, e.g. of Angels, man, sins etc. nor as such is he the root of all properties which are demonstrated in it, e.g. he is not the root of unbegottenness which is in the Father, otherwise it would also belong to other persons: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the first part of the Major: the formal and specificative object of some science ought to be predicated of all parts of it always in the direct way (in recto), I deny; in the direct or oblique way (in recto vel in obliquo), I concede; and thus God is predicated of everything which Theology treats; because all things about which it treats are either God himself, or something of God, namely either his properties or effects, or means leading to him and to be rewarded, or prohibited by him, calling away and to be punished like sins.

To the second part of the Major I also distinguish: the formal object ought to be the root of all properties, either according to itself, or insofar as it is determined in particular species, I concede; according to itself always, I deny; thus mobile being which is the object of Physics, not

according to itself, but as it is determined to celestial or elementary things, is the cause of diverse properties which are demonstrated in Physics. In this sense I distinguish the Minor: God under the aspect of Deity according to himself is not the root of unbegottenness, I concede; as he is determined to the person of the Father, and modified by the relation of paternity, I deny; whence it does not follow that unbegottenness belongs to other persons.

You will say **fifth**. Christ seems to be the formal and adequate object of Theology, according to that of the Apostle 1 Corinthians 2: "I judged not myself to know anything among you, but Jesus Christ, and him crucified" (non judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, & hunc crucifixum): Therefore.

I respond. The Apostle does not treat there of the object of Theology or faith, but of the mode by which he announced the Gospel to the Corinthians; insofar as he first preached to them those things which regard the humanity and passion of Christ, that through these he might lead by the hand to mysteries of divinity: whence he did not say simply, "I judged not myself to know anything except Jesus Christ"; but, "I judged not myself to know anything among you except" etc.

From these things you will infer that the Theology of heretics is not true Theology, or at least is not of the same nature as ours, because it does not have the same formal object by which, namely virtual and mediate revelation, for the heretic does not elicit conclusions from principles believed with divine faith; because a heretic about one article, does not have faith about other articles, but some opinion according to his own will.

Nor does it matter that the Theology of heretics has the same formal object which, namely God; because the formal object which does not specify except as it is subject to the formal object under which.

Neither does it matter that the heretic seems to have certitude just as we do about principles and conclusions: because that certitude does not come from the motive of divine revelation which is necessary for true Theology, but either from obstinacy of his own will, or from their own judgment, by which they judge this or that article of faith to be accepted and not others, for if they proceeded from the motive of divine revelation, they would accept all.

ARTICLE VI

Whether Theology is an entitatively supernatural habit

For preliminaries to the resolution of this question. **First**, something is said to be supernatural which is neither from nature nor proportioned to nature, but above nature. That the habit of Theology is in some sense supernatural, that is, as it is commonly said, radically and objectively,

is freely conceded, because its principles which are articles of faith, and its object which is God, are according to themselves supernatural, although formally and reduplicatively insofar as they are principles and object, they are not supernatural, as I shall say presently.

Note **second**. For a supernatural effect it is required that the cause be supernatural, because a natural cause cannot give supernaturalness which it does not have. Also and maximally it is required that this supernatural cause be proximate, not remote: because concerning the quality of the effect judgment must be made according to the quality of the proximate and immediate cause, not remote, because the influence of the remote cause is modified by the influence of the proximate cause, as is evident in the sun which according to diverse qualities of proximate causes produces diverse effects, here cherries, there apples: whence if the remote cause is natural and the proximate cause is supernatural, the effect will be supernatural, and conversely if the remote cause is supernatural and the proximate is natural, the effect will be natural: thus the act of faith e.g. is supernatural because its proximate cause, namely faith is supernatural, although the remote cause, namely the intellect, is natural: similarly the act of charity is supernatural because its proximate cause namely the habit of charity is supernatural, although the remote cause, namely the will, is natural.

Note **third**. Principles and conclusion in their own way concur to produce the habit of science. Principles concur efficiently as that by which (ut quo), insofar as the assent of principles or premises determines the intellect to assent of the conclusion, as we teach in Logic, which assent of the conclusion, since it is scientific, frequently repeated generates the scientific habit. But the conclusion as inferred from premises is the object of science and consequently its specificative and formal constitutive.

Note **fourth**. The principles of Theology which are articles of faith can be considered in two ways: **First.** Entitatively in themselves, or as they are in themselves absolutely true and speak an order to the first truth revealing: and thus indeed they are supernatural as being immediately revealed; but thus they are not principles of Theology formally, but only materially and specificatively, because thus they do not exercise the nature of principle, since thus they influence nothing in the conclusions of Theology. Whence thus taken they are only mysteries of faith which pertain to faith and not properly to Theology.

In another way they can be considered insofar as they speak an order to conclusions which they virtually contain, and which are deduced from them by means of natural discourse, or as others speak, as they speak active illation (illationem activam); and thus indeed they are formally principles of Theology, but thus they are not formally revealed, but only virtually, or rather revealing, nor thus are they attained by faith but by Theology; and therefore thus they are not formally supernatural, since this active illation or influence is natural, for it is nothing other than discourse of natural light inferring one thing from another: say the same about the object, as will be evident from the second proof and from the solution of the first argument.

These things being noted.

I say: Theology is an entitatively natural habit.

This is common among Thomists against Contenson and some outsiders.

It is proved **first**. A habit acquired by human study, or through natural acts is not entitatively supernatural: but Theology is a habit acquired by human study or through natural acts: Therefore. The Major is established, because a supernaturally entitative effect seeks a supernatural cause exceeding natural powers, for no one gives what he does not have. The Minor **first** is from St. Thomas here a. 6 ad 3, in the prologue of the Sentences q. unica a. 3 quaestiuncula 3, and 2-2 q. 54 a. 1 ad 2. **Second.** It is established by experience, since we see only those become Theologians who studiously apply themselves to readings, speculations, discourses and other exercises of letters, not those who indulge in leisure. **Third.** Because through labor and exercise of theological study, namely by speculating on the principles of faith and from them deducing various conclusions by natural light and discourse, there is acquired in our intellect something by which we perceive and know those things which we did not know before: but this very thing is theological science: Therefore.

Some respond that Theology is not acquired, but infused, nevertheless our acts are required not by mode of efficient cause, but only dispositive. Just as, they say, although charity is infused, nevertheless many acts of the will are required as dispositions.

But against this **first**, this response openly contradicts St. Thomas. **Second.** It is false because disposition to some form ought to be of the same order with it, otherwise there would be no commensuration and proportion of disposition to form: whence Theologians teach that none of our acts can be a disposition to grace, because they are of diverse order. As to charity: **I respond** that the acts which dispose to it are supernatural, as proceeding from supernatural aid.

It is proved **second**. That habit is not supernatural whose principles and specificative object formally as such are not supernatural: but the principles and specificative object of Theology formally as such are not supernatural: therefore. The Minor as to principles is evident from the last note: it is proved as to the specificative object; the formal object which (objectum formale quod) does not specify except as it stands under the object or formal aspect under which (ratione formali sub qua): but the formal object under which of Theology is natural namely the force of created intellect, deducing through natural discourse conclusions from immediately revealed principles: Therefore.

You will say **first**. That habit is entitatively supernatural whose principles and object are supernatural: but the principles and object of Theology are supernatural; for the principles are articles of faith, the object is God: Therefore. Thus Contenson.

I respond. The solution of this principal argument flows from what has been said. And **first** the principles which are articles of faith do not influence the conclusion except remotely and by means of natural discourse; but the effect as was said savors more of the nature of the proximate cause than the remote. Moreover we showed that insofar as they are formally and reduplicatively principles they are not supernatural except materially. Similarly God is not the specificative object of Theology, as we said, except as he stands under virtual revelation, and thus as he is formally specificative he is something natural; for it is a conclusion about God deduced by natural light from principles of faith.

You will insist: natural light deducing conclusions from principles, or natural discourse, is not the cause of the conclusion, but a mere condition applying revealed principles to theological conclusions: therefore from it the naturalness of the theological habit cannot be taken as from a cause. The Antecedent is proved: thus natural discourse is related to Theology, as a natural premise in a theological syllogism: but a natural premise is only a condition applying principles to the conclusion: Therefore.

I respond by denying the Antecedent: to the proof, I deny the Antecedent and the parity; the disparity is that a natural premise is required in theological discourse per accidens and because of the defect of our intellect, which needs to be instructed about the containment of the conclusion in the revealed premise; whence it is not necessary in Angels and the Blessed, but discourse is essential to any science since through it it is constituted in the nature of science and is distinguished from the habit of first principles, and specially Theology from faith. Moreover that is essential to some thing, without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived: but without formal or virtual discourse Theology can neither be nor be conceived, but it can be and be conceived without a natural premise.

You will reply: granted that discourse is essential to science, nevertheless science is not specified by it, but by the medium which is assumed in such discourse: this is evident in the habits of opinion and science, which although they are produced through discourse, are nevertheless of diverse species because of the diverse medium assumed, one namely probable, the other demonstrative: but the medium in the discourse of Theology is supernatural.

I respond. That the medium is nothing other than principles or premises taken conjunctly, and thus the same must be said about it which in the first solution we said about principles, namely that insofar as it is formally influencing, it is not supernatural, but natural.

You will say **second** with the same Contenson: Theology is marked with those endowments which can belong only to supernatural wisdom. **First.** It is subalternated to the supernatural science of God and the Blessed, but the subalternated ought to be of the same order with the subalternating. **Second.** Its certitude is greater than any natural certitude. **Third.** It unites the

divisive differences of natural sciences, namely the nature of speculation and practice: whence also St. Thomas here art. 1 says it is revealed and divinely inspired: Therefore.

I respond to the first, I deny the Minor: for since subalternated science is inferior to the subalternating and depends upon it, it is not required that it be of the same order with it.

If you insist: what is of natural order cannot speak a positive habitude to that which is supernatural, otherwise there would be no reason why we could not through natural acts dispose ourselves positively to first grace or merit it, which is the Pelagian heresy: but subalternated science speaks a positive habitude to the supernatural subalternating and seeks to be joined to it: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Major: what is of natural order cannot speak a positive habitude to that which is supernatural, if it does not otherwise depend upon that supernatural thing, I concede; if it does depend, I deny. Thus e.g., in one who has long exercised acts of charity, with charity lost through sin, there remains some natural disposition to eliciting similar acts of charity from which it resulted. Moreover our Theology depends upon the science of the Blessed in the evidence of its principles, whence it speaks a habitude to it; but natural acts do not depend upon grace, nor do they have any connection with it from elsewhere, and therefore they cannot speak a positive habitude to it.

To the second I confess that the certitude of Theology is greater than any natural certitude, not because it is formally supernatural, but only radically, insofar as by means of natural discourse it resolves its conclusions into principles of faith from which it had deduced them by means of similar discourse, about which more fully presently.

To the third **I respond** with the same solution; for Theology to be at once speculative and practical, it is not required that it be formally supernatural, but it suffices that it be radically and objectively supernatural. Insofar namely as it is rooted in faith which is at once speculative and practical and has God as object, who since he is first truth and ultimate end, is the first rule of speculation and practice, about which also below.

To St. Thomas **I respond** that Theology is called revealed and inspired by him, because it is radically such.

ARTICLE VII. Whether Theology is More Worthy Than Other Sciences? Where is its Certainty?

I. Suppose that Theology is more worthy than other practical sciences, because among practical sciences, that one is more worthy which is not ordered to a further end, for the dignity of a practical science is taken from the end to which it tends: but the end of Theology insofar as it is

practical, is eternal beatitude, to which as to the ultimate end all other ends of practical sciences are ordered.

II. Suppose that Theology from the part of its matter is more worthy than other speculative sciences, because it is principally about those things which by their height transcend reason, namely about God and divine things. Nor does it stand in the way that Metaphysics also treats of God, because it treats of God as natural author and knowable by natural light: but Theology treats of God as supernatural author and knowable by supernatural light.

But because certainty maximally contributes to the dignity of science, the question here principally turns on whether Theology is more certain than other sciences, even than the habit of first principles. For which:

Note: Theologians commonly distinguish a twofold certainty, one objective, the other subjective. Objective certainty is the firm and invariable determination of an object in its being: for that object is certain and firm in itself, which has firm and invariable causes of its entity and truth, and according to causes of greater or lesser invariability there is greater or lesser objective certainty: concerning this we do not treat.

Subjective certainty is the firmness of adhesion of a cognitive power to its knowable object. But this firmness can arise either from the motion of the will alone determining the intellect to adhere to or assent to some object independently of any other legitimate motive, as happens in heretics, who sometimes more firmly adhere to their errors than Catholics to the truths of faith: and this is improper certainty, which ought rather to be called pertinacity than certainty. Or this firmness arises from the efficacy of the means or motive determining the intellect to assent to truth. And this is proper certainty about which we inquire.

It should be noted furthermore that something can be more certain than another in two ways: in one way with respect to itself (quoad se), when namely from itself and from its nature it has firmer causes of its certainty. In another way with respect to us (quoad nos), when its certainty is more connatural and proportioned to our intellect, and satisfies and quiets it, which happens when certainty arises from evidence, because evidence is the ultimate thing in which our intellect rests.

Finally, it is worthwhile for this and other questions to have an accurate notion of a theological conclusion, and of its distinction from a proposition of faith. A proposition of faith is one which is formally and immediately revealed in the written or handed down word of God, and is proposed by the Catholic Church as revealed; for if this second condition is lacking, although the first is present, it will indeed be of faith with respect to itself (quoad se), but not with respect to us (quoad nos); because the Church alone is the infallible rule in discerning revealed from non-revealed things, as is explained more fully elsewhere.

A theological conclusion is one which is deduced by natural discourse either from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another naturally certain, in which it is virtually contained, whence it is only mediately revealed. I say also from a naturally certain premise; because if the natural premise were only probable, so also would be the conclusion, since its extremes would be united only probably to one middle term in the premises, as if you say: Every disciple loves his master, Judas was a disciple of Christ: Therefore he loved Christ: this conclusion is only probable, indeed false, consequently it is not a theological conclusion which must be certainly true.

Furthermore, a conclusion can be virtually contained in premises in two ways. **I.** By reason of natural connection, that is either as a property in essence, or as an effect in cause, as if you say: every man is risible, Christ is a man, therefore Christ is risible; this conclusion is contained in the premises as a property in essence or by reason of the natural connection which risibility has with man. **II.** A conclusion can be virtually contained in premises by reason of signification, that is either as a part in the whole, or as singular in universal, or as implicit in explicit expressed by equivalent terms, if you say: Christ died for all; therefore he died for me. The conclusion is contained in the antecedent, not by reason of natural connection, but by reason of signification, or as part in whole, or singular in universal; for whoever says explicitly the whole or universal, says implicitly the part or any singular. Similarly if you say: Christ is one substance with the Father; therefore he is consubstantial with the Father: because being one substance and being consubstantial signify the same thing with different terms.

But such a conclusion is not properly and strictly a conclusion which ought to proceed from the more known to the less known, but is rather an explanation of the signification of the premises, and is immediately revealed, and therefore certain with the certainty of faith and pertains to faith: therefore our question is only about conclusion strictly speaking or contained virtually in premises by reason of connection. With these things noted and supposed.

I say I. Theology whether with respect to habit or with respect to act or conclusion is more certain with respect to itself (quoad se) than all other natural sciences, even than the habit of first principles, but not with respect to us (quoad nos).

The first part is proved. Theology has certainty from the light of divine science or from divine revelation into which it is ultimately resolved and which cannot be deceived: but other natural sciences have certainty from the natural light of human reason, which (although the object about which it is concerned is sometimes most certain) is nevertheless wrapped in darkness through sin and subject to error: Therefore.

The second part is proved. That is more certain with respect to us (quoad nos), which the intellect more fully attains, which is more connatural and proportioned to it, and which more satisfies and quiets it: but the conclusions of natural sciences are more connatural and

proportioned to the human intellect, are more penetrated by it, more satisfy and quiet it, because of their evidence, in which, as I said, the human intellect ultimately rests, than a theological conclusion which is obscure and non-evident, as being based on faith. Indeed faith itself which from the part of its motive is most certain, sometimes suffers indeliberate motions of doubt because of the weakness of a mind not yet seeing the truth: Therefore.

I say II. Although a conclusion properly theological is more certain than other natural sciences, it is not however formally as conclusion, certain with supernatural certainty of faith, nor does it pertain to faith. It follows from what has been said: for it implies a contradiction for a natural essence to have a supernatural property. But Theology is a habit entitatively natural as has been said, whose property is certainty: therefore. But furthermore, it is proved: A theological conclusion reduplicatively as such, is not immediately revealed, nor does it rest on the motive of faith alone, but is only virtually and mediately revealed in its premises, from which it is deduced by human discourse; whence we assent to it, not precisely because of revelation, but because by natural light we perceive it to be connected with revealed truth: but faith or supernatural certainty of faith rests on revelation alone and immediate: Therefore.

I said: Theological conclusion formally and reduplicatively as such, that is reduplicatively as inferred from premises by discourse: because taken specifically and materially it can be of faith, if namely from elsewhere it is immediately revealed and defined by the Church, as is evident in this syllogism; of double nature there is double will: but in Christ there is double nature: therefore double will. This conclusion although formally as conclusion is not of faith, nevertheless taken materially is of faith, because it is defined by the Church against the Monothelites.

You will object **I.** against the first part of the first conclusion. Granted that a theological conclusion inferred from two premises of faith is more certain than any natural science, at least that which is deduced from one premise of faith, and from another natural does not seem more certain: Therefore. The antecedent is proved: the natural premise is the cause of the certainty of the conclusion, but what is the cause of the certainty of any conclusion is more certain than it, from this common axiom, on account of which each thing is such and that more so: Therefore.

I deny the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish the major: the natural premise is the adequate cause of the certainty of the conclusion, I deny the major; inadequate cause, I concede the major: and in this sense with the minor distinguished I deny the consequence. But the axiom alleged is understood especially of formal cause, and granted it is understood of efficient cause, it ought to be understood of adequate cause, not inadequate, as is evident in the generation of a mule.

You will sub-assume: but the effect in the present matter ought to conform to the inadequate cause: therefore. The antecedent is proved from this other common principle: the conclusion follows the weaker part: Therefore.

I answer I. I deny the antecedent. To the proof I answer that there is not one understanding of this axiom. Some restrict it to the quantity and quality of premises, so that if of premises one is universal, the other particular, one affirmative, the other negative, the conclusion is particular or negative. Others and rightly understand it of the premise weaker according to itself and taken solitarily, but not as conjoined and subordinated to a proposition of faith, from whose fellowship namely it is elevated and becomes more certain if not intrinsically, at least extrinsically, insofar as it serves formally to a proposition of faith as its instrument for inferring the conclusion: for we more certainly assent to a demonstrated truth if we know it to be approved by a grave and especially by an infallible authority. Yet it does not follow from this that a premise only opinative or probable can also be thus elevated, because an opinative proposition is not capable of certainty, for if it became certain, it would be destroyed as opinative.

However, whatever may be about these solutions **I answer II.** that even in the present case the axiom is verified and the conclusion to that extent follows the weaker part, as it is less certain than the premise of faith, and than if it were inferred from two premises of faith, although nevertheless it is more certain than the natural premise itself or than if it were inferred from two natural premises.

You will object **II.** A theological conclusion is not more certain at least than the habit of first principles such as are; whatever is or is not. The whole is greater than its part and similar: therefore. The antecedent is proved. **I.** First principles are most certain, but nothing is more certain than the most certain. **II.** In assent to first principles the intellect operates by way of nature, but in assent to conclusion it operates freely; but the intellect acting necessarily and by way of nature operates more immovably than when it acts freely: Therefore. **III.** Knowledge of first principles is had without discourse from apprehension of terms alone, whence it is certain from itself. But knowledge of conclusion had through discourse is certain from another and by participation of principles: but what is certain from itself, is more certain than what is certain through another: therefore. **IV.** Concerning first principles no doubt ever arises: but concerning theological conclusions, many doubts arise, many controversies, as experience shows: Therefore.

I deny the antecedent: to the first proof I distinguish the major: first principles are most certain with objective certainty about which we do not treat, I concede; with subjective certainty and from the part of motive, about which we treat, I deny. To the second I distinguish the minor: the intellect acting naturally operates more immovably than when it acts freely in the same order, I concede; in a diverse and superior order, I deny. Thus the intellect assenting freely to supernatural things of faith from the motion of grace, operates more firmly than when it necessarily assents to first principles; because grace as much as from itself more firmly and more indefectibly, although freely, moves to supernatural acts, than nature impelling necessarily to natural acts. But a theological conclusion although it is entitatively natural, is nevertheless originatively supernatural, as being based on faith and reducible to supernatural principles, under which falsehood cannot lie. Nor does it matter that the light of reason by which we perceive the

truth of first principles, is also from God just as the light of faith: for there is disparity in this that the light of reason is from God as exemplar and efficient cause, indeed pure and lucid in its origin, but obscured through sin and subject to various errors. But the light of faith is from God as from first truth in speaking, which therefore can neither deceive nor be deceived.

To the third, either of the preceding solutions can be applied to the minor: **I.** Thus distinguishing: what is certain from itself, is more certain objectively than what is certain through another, I concede; is more certain subjectively, I deny; or thus: what is certain from itself is more certain than what is certain through another in the same order, I concede; in a diverse and superior order, I deny.

To the fourth I distinguish the antecedent: concerning theological conclusions many doubts arise, many controversies from defect of motive, I deny; from defect of intellect which does not rest except in the evident, I concede; from which it follows that although Theology is more certain with respect to itself (quoad se), nevertheless not with respect to us (quoad nos) as was said in the conclusion. Furthermore it should be noted that many controversies are moved in Theology about conclusions which are not truly theological, because they are not deduced from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another naturally certain. And as to those which are moved about merely theological conclusions, they often happen not from a doubting mind, but for the sake of truth being more elucidated and the mind exercised.

You ask whether a proposition deduced from two propositions only mediately revealed, ought still to be censured as theological? I answer affirmatively, even if perhaps not so strictly. Because they are still deduced under virtual revelation, although not immediately, and can be reduced at least mediately to formally revealed things. Just as in natural sciences there is true demonstration, although it proceeds from principles only mediately per se known, otherwise there would be very few true demonstrations.

You will object **III.** against the second conclusion. In this syllogism: every man is risible: but Christ is man; therefore Christ is risible. The conclusion pertains to faith: therefore. The antecedent is proved: this conclusion pertains to faith which whoever denies is a heretic: but whoever would deny this conclusion, Christ is risible, would be a heretic: Therefore.

I deny the antecedent: to the proof I distinguish the minor: whoever would deny this conclusion would be a heretic formally, I deny; for it is not of faith. Presumptively or by inference, I concede; because whoever denies some conclusion, therefore denies either because he does not perceive the connection between it and the premises, or because he denies the premises, and since in this syllogism the connection between premises and conclusion is necessary and evident, whoever would deny the conclusion would be presumed to deny not the connection but this premise, Christ is man: and therefore I say that he would be presumptively or by inference a heretic.

You will insist: whoever in this discourse: Christ died for all: therefore he died for me, would deny the conclusion, would be formally a heretic precisely because he would deny this conclusion: But this conclusion is theological: therefore. It is proved: it is deduced from immediately revealed things: Therefore.

I deny the minor. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: it is deduced from immediately revealed things by reason of connection and through true inference from the more known, I deny; by reason of signification and through mere explanation of the premise, I concede; for whoever says Christ died for all, says, if not as to words, at least as to sense, that he died for this one and that one and individuals. Whence this proposition: Christ died for me, is immediately revealed as to sense, as was said in the preliminary notes.

ARTICLE VIII. The Lighter Difficulties Which Remain from the Question of Saint Thomas are Briefly Resolved.

It is asked I. Whether Theology is one in species? I answer affirmatively. It is proved: sciences take their specific unity from their object not material, but formal: but Theology has one unique formal object which and by which: therefore. The minor is proved: the formal object which (quod) of Theology is God under the aspect of deity in order to which it attains other things. The formal object by which (quo), or under which is divine revelation, namely mediate and virtual, so that it attains nothing except under this formal aspect, as is evident from the preceding: just as therefore the visual power is unique; because although it regards many materially diverse things, namely man, stone, horse etc.; nevertheless it regards all under one aspect of the colored and luminous. So Theology is one in species, because although it regards many materially diverse things, nevertheless it regards all under one formal aspect of virtual and mediate revelation.

You will say: in a theological syllogism, of which one premise is natural and the other supernatural, there are two lights, one supernatural namely faith, the other natural: but in a syllogism of which two premises are supernatural there is one unique light namely supernatural of faith: but the lights of premises influence the conclusion: therefore the conclusion inferred from two premises of which one is natural, the other supernatural is diverse from that which is inferred from two supernatural premises.

I answer that these two lights are subordinated to each other, namely natural to supernatural, as to the habit of first principles, and therefore they do not influence the conclusion except under the same aspect of formal and mediate revelation, no differently than if two premises were supernatural.

It is asked II. Whether Theology is at the same time speculative and practical? I answer that it is at the same time speculative and practical; because it attains speculable and practical things

under one and the same aspect of divine revelation. It is nevertheless more speculative than practical, because it treats principally of divine things rather than of human acts.

Here the Holy Doctor stops: but some of his disciples inquire further, whether it possesses both gifts simply formally, or only one simply and the other according to a certain respect? And they respond for the most part that it has both simply, but formally eminently. And when it is objected that practical and speculative are essentially opposed differences which cannot belong to one science, some deny the antecedent, and say they are only accidental. Others respond that they are differences dividing only natural sciences; but not of a science whose object is infinite, and that things which are dispersed in lower things are united in higher things.

Indeed if Theology is considered as it regards diverse particular objects, and contains diverse treatises of speculation and practice, it is undoubted that it is simply speculative and practical. But if it is considered as it is one and simple habit, it seems to us more probable and more conformable to Saint Thomas that it is simply speculative and according to a certain respect practical. The reason is: because that science is simply speculative and according to a certain respect practical, whose intrinsic ultimate and primary end is speculation, and if it treats anything about practice it orders it to speculation: but such is Theology: therefore. The minor is proved: the intrinsic end of Theology ultimate and primary is eternal beatitude, or possession of God which according to Saint Thomas and Thomists consists in vision and contemplation of God, and all practicable things about which it treats it refers to this end. The principal thing, says the Holy Doctor here, treats of divine things rather than of human acts, about which it treats according as through them man is ordered to perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists: Therefore.

It is asked III. Whether our Theology is wisdom? I answer affirmatively. Because wisdom is science considering the highest causes, for this one thing only does wisdom add to science commonly taken: whence that one is called wise in each genus who considers the highest cause of that genus, as in the genus of building the architect who disposes the form of the house, is called wise, and Architect with respect to inferior artisans who hew wood or prepare stones: but Theology considers the highest cause in every genus, namely God and under the highest aspect, namely divine revelation: Therefore.

It is asked IV. Whether Theology is argumentative? I answer affirmatively. It follows from the preceding. For indeed every science is argumentative, because every science deduces conclusions from principles which is to argue: but Theology is science as has been proved: therefore. Compare article 3 of this Dissertation.

It is asked V. Whether Theology argues to prove its principles? I answer that just as other sciences do not argue to prove their principles, but argue from principles to show other things; so Theology does not argue to prove its principles, which are articles of faith, but proceeds from

them to show something. And although natural sciences can prove their principles a posteriori or through effects, Theology nevertheless cannot do this. The reason for the disparity is that the proportion between effects and natural causes is known by natural light, but not between supernatural ones. Theology can nevertheless explain its principles by similarities and examples. Thus the Apostle 1 Cor. 15 explains future resurrection by the example of grain which is sown and revives in another form. Thus the Holy Fathers explained the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity by the example of the sun emitting light. The integrity of the Blessed Virgin by the example of a ray passing through crystal. It also proves evidently the credibility of its principles through various motives of credibility, about which elsewhere.

Furthermore it should be noted that although in natural sciences inferior sciences neither prove their principles, nor dispute against one denying principles, but leave this to a superior science; nevertheless the supreme among them, namely Metaphysics, disputes against one denying its principles if the adversary concedes something; but if he concedes nothing, it cannot dispute against him by proving, it can nevertheless solve his reasons. Similarly Theology, since it has no superior, disputes with one denying its principles, indeed arguing and proving one denied thing through another conceded if the adversary concedes something, as heretics and Jews do. But if the adversary concedes nothing, as are infidels, there remains no further way to prove positively its principles or articles of faith through reasons, but negatively namely to solve reasons, if any are adduced against them: since indeed faith rests on infallible truth, but it is impossible that the contrary be manifested about the true; it is manifest that proofs which are induced against faith are not demonstrations, but solvable arguments.

But understand this thus, not that the Theologian can evidently show the falsity of an argument which is proposed against faith, with evidence, as they say, intrinsic; otherwise he ought to show evidently the opposite truth, which cannot be done, since such truth pertains to faith, but that through good reasons and manifest motives of credibility he can prudently persuade himself and others, that the argument which is proposed against faith is not to be admitted as true, which is to solve arguments against faith evidently, with evidence, as they call it, extrinsic.

It is asked VI. From what places Theology draws its arguments, or how many and what are the theological places? I answer that ten are commonly assigned. The first is Sacred Scripture. The second, Apostolic Tradition. The third, the custom and authority of the Catholic Church. The fourth, Definition of ecumenical council. The fifth, Authority of the Apostolic See or Roman Pontiff. The sixth, Authority of some Father or Doctor of the Church. The seventh, Opinion of graver Doctors. The eighth, Natural reason. The ninth, Authority of Philosophers. The tenth, Human history. Nor does it matter that Saint Thomas here in article 2 enumerates only four theological places, namely Sacred Scripture, Doctors, Philosophers and natural reason: for it was not the Holy Doctor's purpose there to recense all places of Theology, but only to show that Theology is argumentative.

Only two things are to be noted here: first that from the first five places only are infallible arguments deduced: from the last five only probable unless perhaps from the sixth and seventh when namely either all Fathers, or all Doctors unanimously agree in asserting some truth; for then regularly speaking there is a certain and infallible argument deduced from this, since the unanimous sense of Fathers or Doctors, seems to be the sense of the Church itself.

The other thing to be noted is that not all assigned places are properly theological, but only the first seven. The last three Theology uses as extraneous and probable arguments. For indeed generally speaking in any science there are two places of arguing, namely authority and reason, because the human mind gives assent to some thing only if it is induced either by authority of the speaker, or by evidence of object; since therefore in theological things which rest on faith, evidence of object is lacking, authority alone of God revealing is the proper place in it of arguing. It nevertheless uses human reason as handmaid so that it may serve faith, not that it may dominate or proceed on equal footing; since indeed grace does not take away nature, but subjects and perfects it, so it is fitting that natural reason should be subservient to faith and obey, just as natural inclination of will obeys charity: whence the Apostle 2 Cor. 10 says: Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ (in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi). But the last three places pertain to human reason: the first seven to divine authority.

Some institute here a treatise on theological places; but we refer to the treatise on faith: about these Cano our own has written extensively, whose work, as much for elegance of style, as for excellence of doctrine, is approved by the applause of all learned men, and is rightly commended to all Theologians for assiduous study.

Saint Thomas asks in article 9 whether Sacred Scripture ought to use metaphors. And article 10 whether under one letter it has several senses: we refer both also to the cited place about faith.

TREATISE ON GOD AND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

Since the principal intention of this sacred doctrine is to transmit knowledge of God, not only according to what He is in Himself, but also according to how He is the principle and end of things, and especially of rational creatures, intending to expound this doctrine, **1.** we will treat of God. **2.** Of the movement of rational creatures toward God. **3.** Of Christ who, according to His humanity, is the way for us to tend toward God. And this is the division of the entire work or Summa into three parts. But since the second would grow too large, it is divided into two parts, the first of which is called the Prima Secundae (First Part of the Second Part), that is, the first part of the second part; the second is called the Secunda Secundae (Second Part of the Second Part), that is, the second part of the second part.

DISSERTATION I. On the Existence of God

ARTICLE I. Whether the existence of God is self-evident or demonstrable?

Note 1. A proposition is said to be known per se (self-evident) whose truth becomes known per se and without a medium distinct from itself, just as the sun is said to be visible per se, because it is seen by itself and not through a medium more luminous. A distinction is drawn between what is known per se quoad se (in itself) and what is known per se quoad nos (in relation to us). A proposition that is known per se quoad se only and not quoad nos is one that lacks a probative medium a priori and is called immediate, as when the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, as its definition or part of the definition, but the quiddity of the subject does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but needs to be demonstrated by reasoning through something better known to us. A proposition known per se quoad nos is one whose truth becomes known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms without any reasoning, whether a priori or a posteriori, such as those expressed in very well-known and most common terms; like "everything either is or is not," "the whole is greater than its part": for no one is so stupid that from the first apprehension he does not have a notion of being and non-being, of whole and part, and therefore does not conceive that everything either is or is not; that the whole is greater than its part. The question therefore is whether this proposition "God exists" is known per se and in what way? Whether only quoad se, or also quoad nos?

Note 2. Some here raise a further question with great apparatus, whether there is an inborn or innate notion of God in us. But since by this innate notion of God they understand nothing other than that without reasoning, though easy, from the mere apprehension of the terms, a sound and attentive mind understands that God exists, just as from the mere apprehension of terms without reasoning the first principles are understood, "everything either is or is not," "the whole is greater than its part," as Honoratus Tournely himself, an asserter of this innate notion, explains here in article 1. This question, so hotly debated, coincides with ours: whether this proposition "God exists" is known per se quoad nos? For whose resolution.

I say **1.** This proposition "God exists" is known per se quoad se, not quoad nos; consequently, the notion of God is not innate to us. The first part is proved: that proposition is known per se quoad se whose predicate is included in the notion of the subject, as its definition or part of definition, like "man is animal"; for by this very fact it is immediate and lacks a probative medium a priori: but the existence of God is thus included in the notion of God; for God is essentially His own being, or is necessarily and essentially existing being, as we shall prove below: Therefore. If you say that from this reasoning it follows that these propositions, "God is good," "God is just," and similar ones are also known per se, because Goodness, Justice, and other attributes are also included in the notion of God. I respond: These and other attributes are included in the notion of God in this sense, that they are distinguished from the Deity neither really nor formally, yet they

are not of the primary concept of God, as being itself is; for God, as He differs from creatures, is defined as being existing per se: whence being per se constitutes the essence of uncreated being as its ultimate actuality; not Goodness, Wisdom, or other attributes.

The second part is proved: that proposition is not known per se quoad nos in which the quiddity of the subject does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but needs reasoning in order to become known to us: because then it cannot immediately become known to us whether the predicate belongs to the subject: But the quiddity of God does not become known to us from the first and common apprehension of the terms, but through reasoning: therefore. The Minor is evident; because we do not understand what God is as soon as we hear this word "God," just as from the utterance of these terms, "whole" and "part," "being" and "non-being," we immediately understand what whole is, what part is, what being is, what non-being is; but what God is, even the wise understand through reasoning and very imperfectly: Therefore.

This is confirmed: That is known per se quoad nos whose opposite no one of sound mind can think, or at least about which no one can seriously doubt, as is evident in first principles, "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be," "twice three are six," "the whole is greater than its part," whose opposite no one of sound mind ever thought or about which he seriously doubted: but the opposite of "God exists" can be thought, according to that Psalm 52: "The fool has said in his heart: there is no God"; indeed even the wise and good sometimes suffer undeliberate motions of doubt about it: Therefore.

I say **2.** That God exists is demonstrable, not a priori or through causes, but a posteriori or through effects. The first demonstration is called demonstration propter quid (of the reason why). The second, demonstration quia (of the fact that). The first part is evident; because God has no causes. The second part is proved **1.** From the Scriptures: Psalm 18: "The heavens declare the glory of God." Wisdom 13: "From the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator can be seen by analogy." And Romans 1: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that are made, being understood by the mind: His eternal power also and divinity: so that they are without excuse," etc. **2.** By reason; because the existence of a cause can be excellently demonstrated through an effect necessarily depending on it, just as the existence of fire is demonstrated through smoke: but all creatures are effects of God, necessarily depending on Him in being and being preserved: Therefore. If you say that finite effects, such as creatures are, do not require an infinite cause: I concede this of a secondary cause, not of a primary cause, which is the cause of all things caused by none, for this must necessarily be infinite. That we must arrive at this will be evident from the following article, in which other objections pertaining to this will also be solved.

Objections against the second part of the first conclusion are solved

Objection. Reversing the fundamental reasoning of St. Thomas, this proposition "God either is or is not" is known per se: but nevertheless the quiddity of the subject in this proposition does not become known to us except through reasoning, just as in this one, "God exists": therefore St. Thomas's foundation is ruined. I respond: I deny the Minor: but the quiddity of the subject in this proposition does not become known to us except through reasoning as regards the particular and determinate notion, I concede the Minor; as regards the common notion proportioned to its predicate, I deny the Minor and the Consequence. We intend therefore with the Holy Doctor that for some proposition to be known per se, the quiddity of the subject must be known without reasoning, at least according to that notion by which it is proportioned to its predicate, so that the proportion of such a subject to the predicate and of the predicate to the subject becomes immediately evident from the terms alone, but if this is had through reasoning, then that proposition will not be known per se absolutely but only to the wise and those reasoning. Furthermore, in this proposition, "God either is or is not," the quiddity of the subject as proportioned to the predicate immediately becomes evident, because it suffices to know it under the most common notion of being or nothing, for of both it is equally verified, "is or is not." But in this proposition "God exists," the quiddity of the subject as proportioned to the predicate does not immediately become evident to us, because it is proportioned to it under the notion of a particular and determinate being.

Objection 2. Those things are said to be known per se quoad nos whose knowledge is naturally in us, but according to Damascene lib. 1. Orthodox Faith c. 2 & 3 and other Fathers whom Doctors Vitasse and Tournely gather in great number, knowledge of God is naturally inserted in us: Therefore. Multiple solutions can be applied to this argument from St. Thomas. First: The Holy Fathers can be understood concerning knowledge of God in something common, and under some confused notion of good as such or of beatitude: for man naturally desires beatitude, and what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him: but this is not simply to know that God exists, but only secundum quid (in a qualified sense), just as to know someone coming is not simply to know Peter, although Peter is the one coming. Whence also many think the perfect good of man, which is beatitude, is riches, some pleasures, some something else. Second: The Holy Fathers assert that the notion of God is innate to us, insofar as through principles innate to us we can know by easy reasoning obvious to all that God exists. This is the more common solution which Tournely himself, patron of the opposite opinion, admits is not to be disapproved. Third: The Holy Fathers can be understood concerning knowledge of God by participation or likeness, inasmuch as by any truth known, God (of whom any truth is a participation and some likeness) is known in some way. From these you will infer that Doctor Vitasse has strayed far from the truth when he said that all theologians both ancient and modern, both Catholic and heterodox, except the Socinians, admitted the notion of God to be inborn in us; when St. Thomas himself, the Prince of Theologians, and others more commonly with him, reject it.

You will insist in many ways from reason with Doctor Vitasse for the innate notion of God. **1.** The notion of God is common to all peoples and men, just like the soul and nature itself: therefore it should be considered inborn to the soul by nature itself. **2.** If the notion of God is not congenital to the soul, the soul formed it from sensible things, but an idea from sensible things, since it is finite, cannot represent infinite God. **3.** God is the supremely good and perfect being, but there is in us by nature an idea of the supreme good: therefore. **4.** There is innate in the souls of all men a propensity to Religion: therefore also a notion of the divinity to be worshipped: Therefore.

I respond to the first: the Antecedent could be denied in the principles of the praised theologian who here in the solution of the first argument admits that there can be true atheists, and many of this kind formerly existed. But granted the Antecedent, I deny the Consequence. For the notion of God is common to all, not because it is inborn, but because it can be had very easily, so that there cannot be invincible ignorance about the existence of God, as we shall prove below. To the second I concede that a finite idea cannot represent the infinite as to what it is, but well as to whether it is; and how can the praised author deny that knowledge of the existence of God can be had from sensible things, when both the Scriptures and the Fathers everywhere proclaim this? To the third I distinguish the Minor: there is in us by nature an idea of the supreme good as existing in our mind, granted; as existing on the part of reality, denied. To the fourth, I deny that there is innate in the souls of all men a propensity to religion, but this arises from supposed knowledge of God.

Objection 3. That proposition is known per se quoad nos whose truth becomes evident from the first apprehension of the terms without reasoning: but such is this proposition, "God exists": therefore. The Minor is proved. By the name of God is immediately understood from the first apprehension of it and without reasoning that than which nothing greater and better can be thought: but that than which nothing greater and better can be thought is immediately understood from the first apprehension of the terms to exist on the part of reality: therefore. The Minor is proved: it is greater and better to exist on the part of reality and in the intellect than in the intellect only: therefore. St. Anselm uses this argument in chapter 2 of the Proslogion.

I respond: I deny the Minor: to the proof, first the Major could be denied; for perhaps one who hears this name "God" does not immediately understand that something is signified than which nothing greater and better can be thought; for this is not known per se quoad nos, but needs to be demonstrated through reasoning: whence there were those who believed God to be a body, namely the Anthropomorphites, than which however something greater and better can be thought. But granted the Major, namely that anyone, hearing this name "God," immediately understands that that than which nothing greater can be thought is signified, I deny the Minor: For from this it does not follow that he understands that what is signified by this name exists in the nature of things, or, as they say, exists in actu exercito (in exercised act), but exists only in the apprehension of the intellect, or, as they say, in actu signato (in signified act); nor can it be

argued that it is in reality, unless it is supposed that that than which nothing greater can be thought is a real being or possible in the nature of things, which is not known per se nor admitted by those positing that God does not exist; for it can be thought that there is nothing of this sort than which nothing greater can be thought, but that it is something chimerical and a being of reason gratuitously feigning it to itself. For imagine to yourself a chimera necessarily existing, what will you infer from this? That existence is of the objective concept of this chimera, or that it exists in your apprehension and in actu signato, not that it exists on the part of reality and in actu exercito: So in our case. Whence some thus distinguish the Minor: That than which nothing greater can be thought is immediately understood from the first apprehension of the terms to exist on the part of reality, if it is supposed as known per se that such a being is real or possible in the nature of things, I concede the Minor: If it is not supposed as known per se that such a being is real, but needs to be proved from elsewhere, I deny the Minor. That this needs to be proved is established, since St. Thomas and all theologians sweat in proving it.

Concerning St. Anselm, St. Thomas in Q. 12 of Truth art. 12 frankly admits that he was of the opposite opinion, from which, with due reverence to him, he departs: So also we, unless perhaps it is said with some that St. Anselm proved by this argument that the existence of God is known per se not absolutely but supposing His reality.

You will infer: Therefore than the most perfect being and than which nothing better can be thought, something more perfect and better can be thought, namely a really existing being; for it is more perfect to exist really and in the intellect than in the intellect only, as already said: But this implies a contradiction; for it would be to think a most perfect being and not most perfect: Therefore. I respond: I distinguish the Inference: Therefore than the most perfect being something more perfect can be thought in actu signato, or according to essential concept, denied. Because in the objective concept of the most perfect being existence is involved. Something more perfect can be thought in actu exercito or according to reality, granted. Nor does this imply a contradiction, just as it does not imply a contradiction that I conceive a chimera necessarily existing from itself in actu signato, or in apprehension, and that I conceive and affirm that it does not exist in actu exercito or on the part of reality. Therefore the consequence from ideal state to real state is not valid, nor does it follow absolutely: Existence is of the essential concept of such a being: Therefore such a being necessarily really exists, but only conditionally; thus: Existence is of the essential concept of such a being: Therefore if it exists or if it is a real being, it necessarily and essentially exists: just as from the fact that I conceive sensitive to be of the essential concept of horse, saying "horse is sensitive," it does not follow absolutely that horse exists sensitive, but conditionally: if it exists, it necessarily and essentially exists sensitive.

This entire argument in which adversaries especially trust, having been proposed more fully and in the usual form, so that it may be more efficaciously and clearly solved, I propose summarily thus. It is known per se that God is the most perfect being, than which nothing more perfect can be thought: but it is known per se that the most perfect being exists in reality: Therefore. The

Minor is proved: To exist is a perfection: Therefore. I respond **1.** The Major can be denied. This is evident from what has been said. I respond **2.** I deny the Minor: Both because it needs proof as is evident from the very argument in which it is proved: And because this is not apprehended by most perspicacious Doctors, St. Thomas and the major part of theologians: And finally because it is not known per se that the most perfect being is a real being, but it can be doubted whether it is not a being feigned by reason. And when it is said in the proof that existence in reality is a perfection, we also concede that the most perfect being is conceived as existing in reality; but from the fact that it is conceived as existing in reality, it does not follow that it really exists in reality, because perhaps it is not a real being, but fictitious; just as from the fact that I conceive a chimera existing in reality, it does not follow that it really exists; and this is what we were saying above, that the concept of the most perfect being imports existence in actu signato, not in actu exercito.

Objection 4. This proposition, "God is to be worshipped," is known per se quoad nos: Therefore a fortiori this one, "God exists," which is supposed for the first: for being is prior to being worshipped. I respond **1.** I distinguish the Antecedent: This proposition, "God is to be worshipped," is known per se quoad nos absolutely, denied. Conditionally, namely if God exists, I concede the Antecedent: just as this, "Parents are to be honored," is known per se quoad nos, not absolutely, but conditionally, if Parents exist: Whence the Consequence is denied. **2.** Granted the Antecedent, I deny the Consequence: Because for some practical principle to be known per se quoad nos, it is not necessary that the speculative principle on which it is founded be also known per se quoad nos, but it suffices that it be known to us whether per se or through reasoning: thus although this practical principle, "Parents are to be worshipped," is known per se quoad nos, it is not however known per se to us who are and whether our Parents are; but we know this through reasoning or otherwise.

Objection 5. That truth exists is known per se: But God is truth: Therefore. I respond: I distinguish the Antecedent: That truth exists in common is known per se, I concede the Antecedent. The first truth, denied. But God is the first truth.

Objection 6. In the principles of St. Thomas, a boy coming to the use of reason is bound in that first instant to turn himself to God: but in that first instant he cannot attain knowledge of God through reasoning, both because then he is incapable of reasoning and because reasoning requires a lapse of time: Therefore this knowledge of God is immediately present to him by nature. I respond **1.** to the Major, that a boy coming to the use of reason is bound only to turn himself to God in the way in which he knows Him, so that if he knows Him only confusedly under the notion of good as such, or of honest good, so and not otherwise is he bound to turn to Him. **2.** Granted the Major, the Minor can be denied: Because a boy is then only considered to come to the use of reason when he is capable of reasoning: nor does it matter that reasoning requires some small amount of time; because the first instant of reason in a boy is not understood as a physical instant but a moral one. Moreover, there are not lacking other means by which God

becomes known to all, even boys, for instance through inspiration, through Parents or Teachers, or otherwise as I shall say below.

Objection 7. Natural law as to first principles, such as: Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided, is known per se quoad nos: Therefore also its Author. I respond: I distinguish the Consequence: Therefore also its Author in common, granted. In particular, denied. So it is known per se that natural law is from someone in common. But from whom? whether from nature itself, or from reason, or from some distinct being? and what that is, is not known per se to us, but is proved by some reasoning, though easy.

ARTICLE II. Whether God exists, and by what arguments is it demonstrated?

I say. God's existence is proved against atheists by five principal arguments. Before these arguments are proposed, for easier understanding of them.

Note 1. By the name of God is understood even among atheists themselves, a being than which nothing greater and better can be thought; that is, a substance intelligent, superior to all created things, maker and director of all, independent, immutable, eternal, infinite, immense, most purely actual, in one word, supremely and infinitely perfect in every kind. But atheists say this is impossible in reality and purely chimerical, especially because of that collection in it of many perfections which seem to be opposed to each other. Whether there are true atheists we shall consider below.

Note 2. Movers and agents are subordinated among themselves in two ways, per accidens (accidentally) and per se (essentially). There is subordination per accidens when one receives being or active power from another, but does not receive actual influx, nor does it need it while actually operating; thus a son is subordinated to a father, for he received the power of acting and moving from the father, but acts and moves independently of the actual influx of the father: And it is called subordination per accidens, because it is entirely per accidens with respect to the action by which the father, for example, produces the son, that this son begets another son, or does something else. Subordination per se is when one mover or agent needs the actual influx of a superior in order to actually act, so that the superior actually influences the inferior while it acts; thus secondary causes are subordinated to God. Furthermore, although in movers and agents subordinated per accidens a process to infinity can be admitted, it is otherwise in those subordinated per se; because since in movers and agents subordinated per se the last does not act or move unless moved and applied by the prior, and this by another, and so always, so that the last does not move or act unless it is moved at least mediately by the first of all, if a process to infinity is posited, there would be no motion or action, because the infinite is impassable nor can one arrive at the first in it, just as if there were infinite wheels in a clock, of which the last

depended in its motion on the motion of the first, it would never move, since one could never arrive at the first of the wheels which are supposed to be infinite. These things noted.

The first argument is proposed thus, but first supposing that certain things are moved in this world, which is evident to the senses themselves. There is a first mover entirely immobile: but that is God: Therefore God exists. Both the Major and Minor are to be proved.

The Minor is proved **1.** The first mover entirely immobile is purest act lacking all potentiality; for insofar as something is mobile, it is in potency to that toward which it is moved: whence what is entirely immobile lacks all potentiality and is purest act: but purest act is God: Therefore etc. This Minor is proved: Purest act contains every imaginable perfection, for if it lacked any, it would be in potency to it, and thus would not be purest act, and so it is that than which nothing greater or better can be thought: it is, I say, spiritual substance, intelligent, maker and director of all, independent, immutable, eternal, immense, infinite, unique, etc. Therefore God. The Consequence is evident from the **1.** notation.

The first Minor is proved **2.** The first mover entirely immobile must be a being from itself and independent, otherwise it would be mobile by another, a substantial being, spiritual, intelligent, maker and director of all; for it moves all things both substantial and spiritual, nor could it move unless it knew; an uncreated, necessary and immutable being, otherwise it would not be immobile, nor the first mover; an eternal being because immutability is the root of eternity, in one word, a being containing all perfections, otherwise it would be mobile and in potency to them, as we were already saying in the first Proof.

The first Major is proved: Everything that is moved is moved by another: but in movers subordinated per se there cannot be a process to infinity: Therefore there is a first mover which is not moved, but is entirely immobile. The Minor is evident from the **2.** notation. The Major is proved: The same thing cannot be mover and moved according to the same respect; therefore everything that is moved is moved by another. The Antecedent is proved: The same thing cannot be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing; for to be in potency with respect to something is to tend toward it, and thus to lack it: but to be in act with respect to something is to already have it; but something cannot be had and not had simultaneously by the same thing: but if the same thing according to the same respect moved itself, it would be in act and in potency with respect to the same thing: Therefore. The Minor is proved: Insofar as something is moved, it is in potency, for to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act, and insofar as something moves, it is in act, for to move is to make act: Therefore if the same thing, etc.

Some Moderns respond, to whom this commonly received axiom does not please, because they see it greatly favors physical premotions: The same thing can be in potency simultaneously and in virtual act, by which it can move itself to formal act, and they gather various examples in proof of this matter; thus they say: living things from virtual act move themselves to formal act,

heavy things move themselves to the center, hot water restores itself to its original coldness, crushed grapes heat themselves, similarly lime diluted with water, etc. But against this **1.** Virtual act, or what is the same, the active potency of creatures, is not simple activity, devoid of all potentiality, because it is created and imperfect potency, but is partly active, insofar as it can elicit act, partly passive, insofar as it needs to be moved by another for this also. Whence however much it is supposed to be in virtual act, yet for it to be and be placed in formal act, it always needs to be moved by another. Virtual act or active potency is therefore said insofar as it can elicit act as moved by another, by which it is sufficiently distinguished from purely passive potency. Against this **2.** That something is in virtual act, hence it is said to be able to move itself, not actually moving itself, for this it must be in formal act, but that virtual act or active potency cannot by itself alone reduce itself to formal act, otherwise our principle recurs that it would be simultaneously in act and potency with respect to the same thing. Against this **3.** What is moved is less perfect by itself alone than jointly with that toward which it is moved, otherwise it would be moved to it in vain; and so what is in virtual act is less perfect by itself alone than with the formal act toward which it is moved: but what is less perfect cannot by itself alone give to itself or to another what is more perfect; for no one gives by himself alone what he does not have: Therefore. And if you say that it has more perfection virtually. I insist on what has been said, To have virtually is something less perfect than to have formally: Therefore the same as before.

As for the examples to the contrary, I respond to the first: Living things move themselves according to different parts of which some are moved, others moving: The first moving part is the heart, but the motion of the heart, although it is elicitively from the heart, is however efficiently from the generator as a proper passion of a vital being, insofar as the generator, giving participated life to the offspring, ultimately determines the heart to motion, by means of which it moves other parts. To the second: Similarly the impetus by which heavy things are moved downward is from the generator as a property following nature, just as heat follows fire. To the third: The same must be said, that coldness is a property of water which flows from it when the obstacle is removed, and thus it is from the generator: nor does it matter that often in these and similar cases the generator no longer exists, for if it does not exist in supposition, it always exists virtually in the very nature of the thing which it gave, determined to such properties. To the fourth: I respond that by the motion of crushing the grapes, the more spirituous parts erupt from the mass with impetus, and by this motion become heated, and being hot they heat others. The same is said of lime diluted with water. But about these things more fully in physics book 7, on the conditions of motion; see if you please.

The second argument is proposed thus, but first supposing that certain things come to be or have been made in this world, which is evident to the senses themselves and the experience of the world itself. There is a first cause of all things, efficient and entirely uneffected: but this is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is evident by the same considerations as the first Minor of the preceding argument. The Major is proved: Everything that comes to be is made and caused by another, for nothing can effect itself, otherwise it would be before it was: but in efficient causes

subordinated per se there cannot be a process to infinity; nor even in causes subordinated per accidens, if there is no God: Therefore. The Major is evident: The Minor as to the first part is also evident from what has been said; and concerning this subordination per se the argument of St. Thomas seems to proceed, as Sylvius notes here: in this sense namely that the first cause is the cause of the middle and the middle the cause of the last, not only because it gave it active power, for this makes only subordination per accidens, but also insofar as it actually influences it so that it actually operates and effects: and in this sense this argument is most closely related to the preceding one.

The second part of the Minor is proved: Although a process to infinity in causes subordinated per accidens does not contradict, when there is a first agent outside the whole collection of infinite causes, and in fact would have been given if generations had been from eternity, it nevertheless contradicts if a first agent outside the whole collection is not posited: but if there is no God, there is no first agent outside the whole collection of infinite causes: Therefore, etc. The Major is proved: Just as any cause is not from itself but from another, so also the whole collection is not from itself but from another: but as is supposed, there is no other causing outside the whole collection: Therefore, etc. The Major is evident, because in all predicates, except quantitative ones, or those that savor of quantity, the argument from individuals to the whole is valid, as will be evident to one reasoning and we shall now say: Therefore, etc.

The third argument is proposed thus: There is a necessary being, that is, to which it necessarily and from its nature belongs to exist: but such a being is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is evident, **1.** because a necessary being is a being from itself, an unproduced being, independent, immutable, eternal, a being from which contingent things participate in being, for what is per se such is the cause of others which are such per accidens, and so a substantial, spiritual, intelligent being, maker of all: Therefore God. **2.** A necessary being cannot be circumscribed by any limits in perfection: Therefore it is infinitely perfect: Therefore God. The Antecedent is proved: For by what could it be limited in perfection? Not by itself, for it is not the cause of itself, and if it were, it would confer every possible perfection on itself. Moreover, what is necessary is as much as it can be. Not by another, for it acknowledges no superior: Therefore.

The Major is proved: If there were no necessary being, but all things in the nature of reality would be contingent and possible, no being would in fact exist on the part of reality: but the consequent is false: Therefore. The sequel of the Major is proved: those things which only speak of possibility and contingency to act cannot be reduced to it except through a cause which necessarily contains that act itself; thus because water is in potency to heat or is accidentally hot, it could never be heated unless there were some being hot from its nature, from which heat would flow into water mediately at least or immediately: Therefore if there is no necessary being to which it belongs necessarily and from its nature to exist, no being would in fact exist on the part of reality. This is confirmed: Suppose in fact no beings exist, as can happen if all are contingent, for the contingent can be and not be; or at least imagine none to exist; from what will

they have being, if nothing is necessarily existing? Not from themselves, for what is not cannot give itself that it be; not from another, for nothing else exists as is supposed; therefore they could not be, therefore they would be and would not be possible, they would be as is supposed, and they would not be because there would be nothing from which they could have being: Therefore a necessary being must be admitted from which all other things have being.

Atheists respond that although individuals are contingent, nevertheless the whole collection of beings which they say is infinite is not contingent, but necessary, because the consequence from individuals to the whole, from distributive to collective sense, is not valid. Thus from the fact that any citizen is not the people, it does not follow that all citizens are not the people; from the fact that individual parts of an infinite line, if it were given, are finite, it does not follow that the line is finite; from the fact that extension can be without this or that figure, it does not follow that it cannot be without every figure.

But against this. **1.** This Response admits an actually infinite multitude which Philosophers reject as impossible. **2.** According to this Response there is a necessary being, namely this whole collection of beings; therefore a being perfect in every kind, as we were arguing above. But how can a collection of created and imperfect beings be imagined to be infinitely perfect, since the whole collection of parts is nothing other than the parts taken together: Therefore this infinite perfection of beings will be and will not be God. **3.** Although the consequence from individuals to the whole is not valid in quantitative predicates or other accidental ones, which belong either to individuals alone separately, or to the collection alone, as collection; it is nevertheless valid in essential predicates which belong to the thing according to itself. Furthermore, the predicates in the examples given belong either to individuals alone separately, or to the collection alone, as collection: thus to be the people does not belong to one or to individuals separately, but to all collectively. Similarly, the infinite, if it were possible, does not belong to parts separately, because it is of the nature of a part that it be finite, but to all collectively. Moreover, from the impossible or absurd, another impossible follows; but it is impossible to give an infinite line especially for that reason that it consists of finite parts. Likewise, it is of any figure separately that it can be absent from extension, not of every figure collectively, because what is extended cannot be without every figure. And this especially applies to predicates that regard quantity, because the whole collection imports in the genus of quantity something above any individual, namely greater quantity: But truly in essential predicates which belong to the thing according to itself, the consequence is legitimate, from distributive to collective sense: thus it is valid, any man is rational; therefore all men are rational, even if they were infinite. Furthermore, contingency or possibility to be or not be is something essential to any individual being, as the atheists themselves admit: Therefore also to all or to the whole collection of beings.

If you say, to be producible is an essential predicate of every possible creature: but nevertheless this Consequence is not valid: Any possible creature is producible: Therefore the whole collection of possible creatures is producible: Therefore. I respond: I deny the Minor: For in

whatever way individual possible creatures are producible, so the whole collection of them is producible: but individual possible creatures are producible, not collectively, but distributively only; that is, not so many at once, so the whole collection of them is producible distributively and not collectively.

But why do we delay in solving the arguments of atheists against the existence of a necessary being when they freely admit it; for they admit not only the very collection of beings of which we just spoke, but matter itself which they say is necessary, eternal, uncreated, infinite, from whose particles or atoms moving most swiftly in a double motion, straight and oblique, this visible world arises by chance. That alone therefore falls to us to prove against them, that if they wish to speak consistently, they must admit God, and that they err immensely and most stupidly, while they attribute the perfections of divinity to a most vile thing, namely matter or its corpuscles.

The first follows from what has been said: For whoever acknowledges a necessary, eternal, uncreated, infinite being, from itself, consequently infinitely perfect in every kind, as is evident from the argument, acknowledges God, since we understand nothing else and atheists understand nothing else by the name of God, than an infinitely perfect being; and therefore they deny that God exists, because they do not conceive that an infinitely perfect being can exist; when nevertheless they acknowledge matter itself to be such: Therefore whether they will or not, they acknowledge that God exists, and in this they plainly contradict themselves, since they assert that an infinitely perfect being cannot be conceived, and yet admit infinitely perfect matter; as if infinitely perfect matter could be conceived more easily than an infinitely perfect spiritual being, and thus they incur the same inconveniences which they wish to avoid.

But, as I said, they err immensely and most stupidly, while they ascribe the attributes of divinity to matter. For it is obvious to all that matter is inert from itself, has no substantial form from itself, but is mere capacity for all forms, has no motion from itself nor is moved, unless it is moved by another, either body or spirit, is incapable of all sense, thought, intelligence, counsel; for imagine whatever disposition of matter or atoms you wish, you will never elicit from it the power of thinking: Therefore atheists err immensely and most stupidly, while they attribute the perfections of divinity to this most vile of all things. But to assert that this visible world was formed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms or corpuscles of this matter is of no less stupidity and madness, as I shall show below.

The fourth argument is proposed thus: There is some supremely perfect, supremely noble, supremely being which is the cause of every perfection of others: but that is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is evident from what has been said, especially from the first notation. The Major is proved: We see among beings that some are more or less beings, more or less perfect: but more and less are said of different things according as they approach more or less to something which is more such and participate in it in different ways: just as the more hot is what

approaches more to the maximally hot and participates more in it: Therefore there exists in the nature of things some supremely perfect, supremely noble, supremely being, and indeed one which is the cause of other perfect things either efficient, or at least exemplary, namely from whose approach or recession, greater or lesser participation, imitation or defection the perfection of others descends or is measured. For according to the common axiom, the first in any genus is the cause of the rest which are of that genus, efficient namely or exemplary.

I say "or exemplary," because if the first in any genus is not always the efficient cause of the rest of that genus, like for example fire is the efficient cause of all hot things; it is at least the exemplary cause: for the more perfect of some genus are at least examples for the less perfect of that genus.

The fifth argument is proposed thus: There is a supreme provider and governor: but such is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is evident; because we understand God to be nothing other than the supreme divinity ruling and governing all things. The Major is proved: We see that some things which lack knowledge operate not rashly and fortuitously, but for an end; which appears from this, that they always or more frequently operate in the same way; the heavens for example always move in the same way, heavy things are always carried downward, light things upward, etc. But things which do not have knowledge do not tend toward an end, unless directed by someone knowing and intelligent, just as an arrow would not reach the target unless directed by the archer: Therefore there is a most wise governor and some supreme intelligence, directing all things to their ends, which is God.

Atheists say that those acts of natural causes do not proceed from the direction of some intelligence, but from necessity and inclination of the nature of the agent. But against this, this being granted; the directing intelligence should not therefore be excluded, but on the contrary should be admitted, which made the parts, fabric, disposition, inclination of these natural causes to these motions and ends: Thus although a house is proportioned for human habitation, it nevertheless has this dependently on the direction of some intelligence.

A sixth argument is added, related to the preceding, from contemplation of this world, which is briefly proposed thus: All the marvels which shine forth in this world, whether in heaven, or on earth, or in the sea, or in man himself alone, according to fabric, order, position, motion, disposition, beauty, variety, harmony in order to their ends, cannot without madness be referred to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, but must necessarily be ascribed to some supreme intelligence, maker and director of all these things: But this is God, since all understand by God the supreme founder and ruler of the world: Therefore God exists. The Antecedent is proved: An exquisitely elaborate work, for example a royal house, a clock, an elegant statue, or painting, could not without madness be ascribed to chance or fortune and not to a most skilled artificer: Therefore a fortiori the ordered and marvelous disposition of the entire world, indeed of the human body alone, in which far more art and industry shines forth than in the most exquisite

works made by human art, cannot without madness be ascribed to a fortuitous concourse of atoms and not to supreme intelligence.

And indeed if this world, marvelous with such variety of parts and such apt disposition of all to their ends, was made by a fortuitous concourse of atoms; tell me please, why by this same fortuitous concourse of atoms was not sometime made a clock or royal palace, a statue or painting and other things which we see made by human art? or, as Cicero says in book 2 On the Nature of the Gods, why are not the poems of Homer similarly made from a fortuitous concourse of letters, or a royal house, from a fortuitous heap of wood and stones, or painted tablets from a fortuitous falling of colors onto them? You may see this argument more fully expounded in the Authors.

Objections Are Resolved

1. You object: No science proves its own object. But God is the object of Theology. Therefore.

I respond 1. I distinguish the Major: no science proves its own object from its own principles, let the Major pass; from principles borrowed from elsewhere, I deny. Our reasons, however, are borrowed from the natural sciences, as we have already said before. I said, let the Major pass; because nothing prevents Theology from proving the existence of God from its own principles, namely from faith, as St. Thomas did here in the argument sed contra, from that passage in Exodus: "I am who I am" (*Ego sum, qui sum*).

Hence **I respond 2.** I distinguish the same Major: no natural science proves its own object, I concede the Major in the sense of the prior solution. No supernatural science, I deny the Major. The reason for the disparity is that natural sciences consist in this: that from principles known by natural light they prove properties about their object, and thus they presuppose it. But Theology is concerned with proving all those things which can be deduced from what is immediately revealed, for it reaches all things which fall under divine revelation virtually. And since of this kind can be and in fact is the existence of God, it can also prove it from its own principles.

You object 2. The existence of God is an article of faith. But those things which are of faith are not demonstrated. Therefore.

I respond 1. That the existence of God and other such things which can be known through natural reason are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles of faith. For faith presupposes natural knowledge, just as grace presupposes nature, and as perfection presupposes the perfectible. Nevertheless, nothing prohibits that which is in itself demonstrable and knowable from being accepted by someone as credible, who does not grasp the demonstration.

Hence flows the second Response by distinguishing the Major: The existence of God is of faith with respect to those who do not know it through natural demonstration, I concede; with respect to those who know it, I deny the Major.

You will insist: The existence of God is simply an article of faith, and for all. Therefore. The Antecedent is proved from the Apostle to the Hebrews 11, saying: "He who approaches God must believe that he exists" (*Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est*). But no one, however learned, is exempt from having to approach God. Therefore.

I respond that the Apostle speaks of God as a supernatural Author who as such is known only through faith. This meaning is indicated by the following words, for the Apostle says: "He who approaches God must believe that he exists, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him" (*inquirentibus se remunerator sit*): that is, because he is the author of grace and rewarder of glory. It can also be understood that the Apostle speaks not of those who have demonstration of God's existence, but of those who lack it.

You will infer: Therefore the Theologian or Christian Philosopher is in a worse condition than the Peasant. The Inference is proved: **1.** Because this Theologian does not have the merit of faith which the Peasant has. **2.** Because the certainty of faith which the Peasant has about God's existence is greater than the certainty of demonstration which the Theologian or Christian Philosopher has. Therefore.

I respond by denying the Inference. To the first proof, I deny the Antecedent: For although the Theologian or Christian Philosopher does not have formal actual faith about God's existence, he nevertheless has it in preparation of mind (*in praeparatione animi*), so that he would believe it if he did not know it, whence he does not lose the merit of faith.

To the second proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: The certainty of faith is greater than the certainty of demonstration taken in isolation, I concede the Antecedent; than demonstration confirmed by divine testimony, I deny the Antecedent. For the Christian Philosopher who knows how to demonstrate that God exists also knows through reflexive judgment that this truth is confirmed by divine testimony and can be an object of infallible faith, indeed that it is included in these propositions: God is a supernatural author, God is triune; which he believes by divine faith. Hence he is maximally strengthened concerning that truth, understanding it to be infallible, which is also proposed and revealed as true by God himself, and which is included in those things which he believes by divine faith, and thus the certainty of faith remains in him at least virtually. Just as one who would make some demonstration which he saw approved as true by his teacher or another most learned man would undoubtedly be maximally strengthened in his demonstration, understanding it to be immune from deception which the most learned man approves as true.

Some respond that it does not imply contradiction that a Christian Philosopher assent to this proposition "God exists" both because of evidence and because of revelation, as if because of a motive more certain than evidence itself. Such assent, however, since it is not about something obscure, will not be properly and strictly of faith, which is according to the Apostle "evidence of things not appearing" (*argumentum non apparentium*), but only broadly and improperly.

You object 3. God cannot be demonstrated to exist except through effects. But effects are not proportioned to him, being finite to infinite. Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Minor: effects are not proportioned so that through them we may know what God is, let the Minor pass. So that through them we may know that he is, I deny the Minor. For given any effect whatsoever, it is necessary to posit also a cause, since it has a necessary connection with it. I said, let it pass; because from the nature of even a disproportioned effect, some at least imperfect notion of the nature of the cause can be had through analogy.

You will insist: God cannot be known as to whether he is (*quoad an est*) unless he is known as to what he is (*quoad quid est*). But through effects, from what has been granted to pass, he cannot be known as to what he is. Therefore neither as to whether he is. The Major is proved: existence is part of the quiddity of God (*de quidditate Dei*). Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Minor: through effects a notion of God as to what he is cannot be had directly and per se, let it pass as above. Indirectly and per accidens, I deny the Minor. Therefore, from the fact that there is an effect, it is directly proved that there is a cause; but because from elsewhere existence is an essential predicate of the cause, it is indirectly proved what he is, though very imperfectly, since God involves far more other perfections.

You object 4. If God were supremely wise, the ruler of the world, he would not permit so many monsters and evils, both in moral and natural things. **2.** He would not allow the good to be oppressed and afflicted while the evil prosper. Therefore.

I respond to the first from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, that since God is supremely good, he would in no way allow any evil to be in his works, unless he were so omnipotent and good that he would make good even from evil: this therefore pertains to God's infinite goodness, that he permits evils to exist and elicits goods from them.

To the second **I respond** that from this the existence of God and of another life is rather proved: for if it is natural and just that virtue be rewarded and sin punished, and in this life the contrary often happens, therefore there is another life in which by the supreme judge both reward is given to virtue and punishment to vice.

Moreover, there are many reasons, about which perhaps when we treat of providence, for which God allows the wicked to prosper temporally and the good to be afflicted contrarily, and

especially so that from this we may learn to despise these perishing and fleeting worldly goods which are common to both bad and good.

You will insist against the first solution: a perfect contrary necessarily and by its nature has the property of destroying totally its contrary. Therefore if there is given a supreme and infinite good, namely God, no evil can be given, even under the pretext of eliciting good from it.

I respond by distinguishing the Major: a perfect contrary by its nature has the property of destroying totally its contrary formally and in its proper subject, I concede. Effectively and in other subjects, I subdistinguish: if it is a univocal cause and acts necessarily, I concede; if it is an equivocal cause or acts freely, I deny. Therefore the reason of infinite goodness which is in God as in his proper subject excludes entirely from him every reason of evil, so that he is in himself supremely good and in no way evil. But while he effectively communicates his goodness to creatures, he does not expel from them every reason of evil, both because since he is a cause of a higher order and therefore equivocal, he cannot communicate to them his entire goodness, and because since he acts freely in them, he communicates to them such and so much degree of goodness as has pleased him.

You object 5. None of the adduced reasons, nor all of them together, efficaciously prove that God exists. Therefore. The Antecedent is proved: the first proves there is a first mover. The second a first cause. The third a necessary being. The fourth a most perfect being. The fifth a supreme governor. The sixth a creator of the world. But this does not suffice to prove that God exists. Therefore. The Minor is proved: beyond all these things, God is one, eternal, immutable, immense, omnipotent, infinite, etc. But that such a being exists is not proved by the assigned reasons. Therefore.

I respond by denying the Antecedent. To the proof I deny the Minor. To the proof I distinguish the Minor: but that such a being exists the assigned reasons do not prove immediately, I concede the Minor. They do not prove at least mediately, I deny the Minor, as is evident from the reasons themselves explained above: thus, posited and proved that there is a first mover, it immediately follows that he is purest act and perfect in every way, and therefore that he is eternal, immense, immaterial, omnipotent, infinite, also one; because there cannot be two supremely perfect beings, as we shall say when treating of God's unity. The same must be said of the other proofs, as can be seen.

I respond 2. That although our reasons would not evince all these attributes distinctly, it would follow only that they do not sufficiently demonstrate God as to what he is (*quoad quid est*), not however as to whether he is (*quoad an est*); for all these distinct attributes pertain to the question what he is (*quid est*). But to satisfy the question whether God exists (*an sit Deus*), it suffices that there be demonstrated to exist such a being as corresponds to the imperfect and confused concept which we are accustomed to form when we hear the name of God: otherwise the question as to

what he is (*quoad quid est*) would be confused with the question as to whether he is (*quoad an est*).

You will insist: Atheists admit a necessary, independent, unproduced, most perfect being, namely matter itself or the world, and yet they deny that God exists. Therefore our reasons are insufficient.

I respond by distinguishing the Antecedent: Atheists, etc., and speak consistently with their principles, I deny the Antecedent. And they do not speak consistently with their principles, I concede the Antecedent. For given that matter or the world is necessary, eternal, independent, infinitely perfect, it follows that it is God, as is evident from what has been said.

From these you will gather how undeservedly a recent Scotist treats these reasons of St. Thomas, which venerable antiquity has always and successfully employed, and which Theologians everywhere use, as worthless and proving nothing, but supposing what is to be proved.

ARTICLE III

Whether the Demonstrations of Descartes Concerning God's Existence Should Be Admitted?

Descartes has devised two demonstrations which not a few recent Philosophers and Theologians employ.

The first demonstration of Descartes (3rd Meditation, Metaphysical) is this: There exists in us an idea of infinite and supremely perfect being. But this can be had only from a being that is also infinite and supremely perfect. Therefore there exists an infinite and supremely perfect being. Therefore God.

The Major is evident. For we do not prefer better things to worse for any other reason than because we see them approach closer to the idea of supremely perfect being innate in us.

The Minor is proved: this idea could not have its origin from ourselves, nor from parents, or teachers, nor from sensible things. Therefore from God alone.

The Antecedent is proved: the supreme perfection which this idea exhibits is not present in us, or in parents, or in teachers, or in other sensible things. But if this idea of supreme perfection proceeded from the aforesaid, the supreme perfection represented by it ought to be in them. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: because whatever perfection is in an effect must be contained in the cause either formally or at least eminently.

The second demonstration of Descartes (5th Meditation, Metaphysical) is this: Whatever is comprehended in the clear and distinct idea of anything, that can be truly affirmed of that thing, or truly affirmed. But in the clear and distinct idea of God, actual existence is comprehended. Therefore it can be affirmed of him.

The Major is certain from what has been said above.

The Minor is proved: God is a supremely perfect being. But in the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being, actual existence is comprehended. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: In the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being, every perfection is comprehended. But actual existence is a certain perfection. Therefore.

The question is therefore whether these two reasons should be admitted as true demonstrations of God's existence? **And I respond** negatively for both.

§. I. Concerning the First Demonstration of Descartes

I say 1. His first Minor, namely that the idea of infinite and supremely perfect being cannot exist except from a supremely perfect and infinite being, is false.

It is proved 1. A finite and imperfect thing does not require an infinite and supremely perfect cause. But the idea of God which is in us is finite and imperfect. Therefore it does not necessarily proceed from God, but can have its origin from other created things.

The Minor is proved: Two things must be distinguished in an idea according to Descartes himself, one of which is had from the intellect, the other from the object: for an idea is **1.** An accident inhering in the mind or at least a mode of it, or certainly an actual perception, and this is from the intellect. **2.** It is a representation of this rather than that object, and this, he says, is had from the object. The first can be called the entitative reality or perfection of the idea. The second is called by Descartes the objective reality or perfection of the idea. But both are something finite and imperfect. Therefore.

The Minor for the first part is evident and admitted by Descartes.

The second part is proved: this idea of God which is in us represents only something finite. Therefore its objective reality or perfection is finite and imperfect. The consequence is evident from Descartes who derives all the perfection of an idea from the perfection of the infinite thing represented.

The Antecedent is proved: this idea according to Descartes himself and the truth of the matter represents infinity itself only negatively, and the infinite thing itself positively indeed but

inadequately. (For two things must be distinguished in infinite being, namely the thing itself which is infinite, and the very infinity by which it is infinite, from Descartes himself.) But to represent infinity negatively and to represent positively but inadequately an infinite thing is to represent something finite. Therefore.

The first part of the Minor is proved: to represent something negatively is to represent, as Theologians say after St. Dionysius, by excess or by removal (*per excessum seu per remotionem*), that is, it is to represent not what a thing is, but what it is not. And therefore to represent infinity negatively is not to represent what infinity is, but what it is not. But that which is not infinity is finite. Therefore to represent infinity negatively is to represent something finite.

The second part of the Minor is proved: to represent an infinite thing positively but inadequately is to positively exhibit a thing which is infinite, but not everything that lies hidden in it, and therefore it is to represent a thing to which, as it is represented, something can be added, namely that which lies hidden in it and is not represented through the idea. But that to which, as it is represented, something can be added, is finite under this aspect, that is, insofar as it is represented. Therefore to represent an infinite thing positively but inadequately is to represent something finite, or, to speak more properly, it is to represent an infinite being under the aspect of the finite, or at least, not infinite.

It is confirmed 1. An idea representing inadequately only an infinite being lacks the perfection by which it would adequately represent, and would be more perfect if it represented it adequately. But an idea which lacks some perfection and than which another more perfect can be given is not infinite and supremely perfect. Therefore.

It is confirmed 2. The perfection of an idea is not derived from the perfection of the thing represented, but from the mode of representing; for the perfections of the thing represented are not perfections of the idea, but the perfection of the idea is the very representation of the thing. But this idea represents infinite God in a most imperfect manner, namely inadequately. Therefore it is an imperfect and finite idea, and therefore does not require an infinite and supremely perfect cause of itself.

It is confirmed 3. If the objective reality of the idea of God were infinite and supremely perfect, it would be either God himself, or something other than God. But neither can be said. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: not the first, as Descartes seems to admit, though some of his disciples resist, because otherwise there would be given in this life, by natural powers, an intuitive vision of God, which according to sounder Theology is proper to the Blessed, and which also seems condemned in the Council of Vienne against the Beghards and Beguines under Clement V, as is related in the Clementine *ad nostrum*, concerning heretics. For God "inhabits light inaccessible" (1 Timothy 6). And "we see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face" (1 Corinthians 13). Nor also the second, as Descartes intends, because the idea itself would be

another God; for nothing else is understood by the name of God than infinite and supremely perfect being. Therefore.

It must therefore be said that every idea, every knowledge which we have of God, has its origin from sensible things in three ways. **1.** By addition, insofar as we collect the perfections which we see dispersed in created things into one superior nature and amplify them with all mental effort, and beyond what we imagine, we think much more still remains. **2.** By removal, insofar as we remove from that superior and supremely perfect being the imperfections which we detect in visible things. **3.** By analogy or transference (*per analogiam seu translationem*), insofar as from knowledge of created being we are led to knowledge of uncreated being, which is the cause and principle of all creatures. Hence the Apostle: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made" (*Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*), etc.

It is proved 2. All reality, whether entitative or, as Descartes wishes, objective of our ideas is produced totally by our mind and not by the object. Therefore.

The Antecedent is proved: if I form in my mind an idea of a non-existing being, but only possible, say of Antichrist, of another world than this, etc., this idea will have reality even objective, since it is an idea of a possible being. But nevertheless this reality, even objective, will not be had from Antichrist or another world, if indeed they do not actually exist so that they can cause something; but from the mind alone, composing this species at will.

I say 2. The Major of Descartes' syllogism is not so certain and evident that an Atheist cannot deny it. For he will say that he does not have an idea of infinite and supremely perfect being, but only of sensible and created things: and that he prefers better things to worse happens because he experiences the former to be more consonant with his appetite and reason. What will Descartes say to these things?

§. II. Concerning the Second Demonstration of Descartes

As for the second demonstration: I now omit that Descartes commits a vicious circle in his syllogism. For he proves the existence of God through this principle: whatever is in a clear idea, etc., and he proves the truth of this principle through the existence of God: for he teaches that all certainty of our cognitions must be sought from this principle, God is truthful and good. This, I say, I now omit.

I say 1. The whole syllogism of Descartes in his second demonstration rests on a supposition which is denied by atheists, and is not evident, and which ought to have been proved first by Descartes, namely that the clear and distinct idea of infinite and supremely perfect being which I

bear in mind is an idea of a real or possible being, and not of some chimerical being which can exist only in the intellect.

For beings are of two kinds, as is obvious to all: some are which exist or can exist on the part of reality (*a parte rei*) and are called real. Others which exist only in the intellect, can nowhere exist on the part of reality and are called beings of reason (*entia rationis*).

From this therefore, that in the clear and distinct idea of some being which I conceive in mind I see existence included, it follows that it exists, but only in that mode in which it is a being, so that if it is a real being, it exists on the part of reality; but if it is a being of reason, only in the intellect.

So that that being in whose idea existence is comprehended may be proved to exist on the part of reality, it must first be proved or supposed as evident that such a being is real, or possible on the part of reality.

Now since Descartes does not prove that the idea of infinite and supremely perfect being is an idea of a real and possible being, nor is this evident from elsewhere (for this very thing is what is asked, this is what atheists utterly deny; indeed what even to an intellect not yet convinced by other demonstrations seems chimerical and utterly impossible, as containing incomprehensible perfections, such as infinity, aseity (*aseitatem*), independence, omnipotence, etc., and also certain others which seem to destroy each other, e.g., freedom and immutability, immensity and indivisibility, properties of bodies and spirits, etc.), since, I say, Descartes neither proves this idea of infinite being to be of a real and possible being, nor is this evident from elsewhere, against him I argue formally thus:

Either Descartes supposes the idea of infinite and supremely perfect being to be an idea of a real and possible being, or not, but only to be an idea of a chimerical being fabricated by his intellect. But if the first is said, he supposes that about which there is question and which he ought to prove; for this very thing is what is asked, this which is denied by atheists and considered by them as utterly impossible and chimerical, because of the contradictions appearing in it, as we have just said. If the second, he proves nothing other than that that being exists in the intellect, not indeed on the part of reality.

With this posited, I again distinguish formally his paralogism: Whatever is comprehended in the clear and distinct idea of any being, that is true of that thing or can be truly affirmed, let the Major pass. But in the clear and distinct idea of infinite and supremely perfect being existence is included, I distinguish the Minor with the atheists; and this idea of infinite and supremely perfect being is an idea of a being of reason only, impossible on the part of reality, I concede the Minor: it is an idea of a real and possible being on the part of reality, I deny the Minor.

In this sense I distinguish the Consequent: therefore an infinite and supremely perfect being truly exists, it truly exists in the intellect, I concede the Consequence. It truly exists on the part of reality, I deny the Consequence.

I confess therefore that I cannot conceive a supremely perfect being unless I conceive it as existing, so that the idea of existence necessarily accompanies the idea of infinite being, but it is not necessary that that infinite being and its existence about which I think exist outside the intellect on the part of reality, from the fact that they exist in my intellect thinking about them. For the Consequence from the ideal state to the real state is not valid, since many beings of reason exist in the mind which neither are nor can exist on the part of reality: before all things therefore it was incumbent upon Descartes to prove against atheists that infinite and supremely perfect being is not chimerical nor impossible on the part of reality, so that from its clear and distinct idea he might demonstrate its actual existence on the part of reality.

This fundamental reason is suggested by St. Thomas, *Prima pars*, q. 2, a. 1, ad Arg. 2, which does not differ much from Descartes' demonstration. Compare Article 1 of this Dissertation, objection 3.

I say 2. It is false to suppose the Minor, namely that there is given in this state a clear and distinct idea of God or of infinite and supremely perfect being.

It is proved 1. The idea of some thing most unlike it is not clear, but the idea which we have of God in this life is most unlike him. Therefore.

The Minor is evident: for it is finite and inadequate as has been said; but there is no similarity between finite and infinite, nor even between supremely perfect and its imperfect or inadequate idea.

The Major is proved: an idea is an image of a thing. But an image dissimilar to the thing which it ought to represent, although it can be clear in itself, with respect to the thing to be represented cannot be said to be clear, but rather obscure and confused. For example, an image of Caesar elegantly painted, but little similar to him, will indeed be clear in itself, but obscure with respect to Caesar. Therefore.

Also, to use Descartes' example, **it is confirmed 1.** If someone looks out over some tract of sea, the example is Descartes', the idea of the sea which he will have will indeed be clear with respect to that little portion of sea which he sees, but obscure and confused with respect to the whole sea. Therefore similarly the finite and inadequate idea which we now have of God will indeed be clear with respect to that which it explicitly and expressly represents, namely the finite, but obscure and confused with respect to the infinite.

It is confirmed 2. To know that the idea of the infinite which I have is clear and distinct, I ought to know the infinite itself clearly and distinctly; but I do not know this in this life nor can I know it. Therefore at least I do not certainly know whether the idea of it is clear or distinct.

The Major is proved: an idea is an image of a thing, as I have already said. But to know that the image of some thing, e.g., of Caesar, is clear and distinct with respect to him, I ought to know Caesar beforehand. Therefore.

It is proved 2. A clear idea according to Descartes in the first part of the Principles and his followers is one which becomes known by attention of the mind alone. But the idea of God as it is now had does not become known by attention of the mind alone, but is acquired through discourse from sensible things, as has been said, analogically and by removal of imperfections, always under obscure and misty conditions. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: for who is of such keen intelligence that by intuition of mind alone, without the help of any discourse or superior aid, he might know infinite, eternal, immense, omnipotent being, free and simultaneously immutable, immense and not divisible, and other such things which seem incompossible; especially since according to the Scriptures, God is truly hidden (Isaiah 45:15), "who has made darkness his hiding place" (Psalm 17), and "around him are clouds and darkness" (Psalm 96).

ARTICLE IV

Whether There Can Be Invincible Ignorance About the Existence of God

Note: Invincible ignorance is said to be that which cannot be overcome by moral diligence, and therefore is involuntary and blameless. Vincible ignorance is that which can be overcome by moral diligence; and thus is voluntary in its cause, namely in the negligence of learning, and is blameworthy.

Also, ignorance is either negative, which is nothing other than mere nescience (*nescientiam*) or non-thinking (*incogitantiam*). Or positive, which is an erroneous judgment by which someone judges positively to be what is not, or not to be what is, e.g., that God does not exist.

I say: There cannot be invincible ignorance, whether positive or negative, about the existence of God as natural author. This is the more common opinion.

I say as natural author, for indeed that the existence of God as supernatural author can be invincibly ignored is beyond controversy, for there is negative infidelity.

Concerning positive ignorance it is sufficiently established: because it does not seem possible that a man judge that God does not exist, or apply his mind to judging this, without reasons for

doubting the opposite occurring to him: since all creatures cry out God, which reasons if he would weigh, he would undoubtedly know that God exists; therefore if he does not weigh them nor inquire further, his error will be vincible.

As for negative ignorance, however, some admit it, at least for a brief time and especially in the dawn of reason (*in diluculo rationis*). Thus Molina and some of the same society.

Nevertheless **the conclusion is proved for both parts:**

1. From Scripture. In Wisdom 13 it is said: "From the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator could be known" (*A magnitudine speciei & creaturae poterat cognoscibiliter Creator horum videri*). And there below: "If they had such power that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?" (*Si tantum potuerunt scire ut possent aestimare saeculum, quomodo huius Dominum non facilius invenerunt*). In Romans 1 those who were ignorant of God are called indiscriminately inexcusable: therefore they were ignorant vincibly and culpably.

In Psalm 78 it is said: "Pour out your wrath on the nations that do not know you and on the kingdoms that do not call upon your name" (*Effunde iram in Gentes quae te non cognoverunt & in Regna quae nomen tuum non invocaverunt*). But the Prophet would not say this by divine inspiration unless their ignorance were vincible and culpable. Therefore.

It is proved 2. From the Fathers: Augustine on Psalm 74 says: "God everywhere secret, everywhere public, whom none may know as he is, and whom no one is permitted to ignore" (*Deus ubique secretus, ubique publicus, quem nulli licet ut est cognoscere, & quem nemo permittitur ignorare*).

Chrysostom, homily 9 to the people of Antioch on these words: "The heavens declare the glory of God" (*Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei*), says: "Let the Scythian and Barbarian and Jew and Egyptian and every man walking upon the earth hear this voice... into this book equally the unlearned and the wise will be able to look."

Gregory the Great, book 27 of Morals, chapter 3: "Every man by the very fact that he is created rational ought to gather from reason that he who made him is God" (*Omnis homo eo ipso quòd rationalis est conditus, debet ex ratione colligere eum qui se condidit, Deum esse*).

It is proved 3. By a threefold reason. The first also satisfies the foundation of the adverse opinion.

Although the existence of God is not known per se to us (*per se nota quoad nos*), as we said above, but is demonstrable from creatures, nevertheless this demonstration is so easy, so obvious, that no one is sound of mind, however rustic or barbarous, who is not capable of it, or at

least to whom from inspection of the world or of himself some suspicion or conjectural opinion of some supreme Divinity or Ruler does not occur, as is evident from the Scriptures and Fathers cited; which being posited, he is bound to inquire who he is, and if he neglects this, he vincibly ignores. Therefore.

Second reason. The first precepts of the natural law cannot be invincibly ignored: therefore neither their Author who is God. The Antecedent is commonly admitted and will be evident from what will be said elsewhere. The Consequence is also evident, for he who knows that certain things are commanded or prohibited immediately and without difficulty infers that they are commanded or prohibited by someone superior. Therefore.

Third reason: If man could invincibly ignore God, however wicked he might be, he would commit no mortal sin: an absurd Consequent: therefore also the Antecedent. The sequela is proved: mortal sin is an offense and injury to God. But he cannot be offended or affected by injury who is invincibly unknown; just as one who would kill the King while invincibly ignorant that he is King would not be guilty of the crime of lese majesty. Therefore.

Here should be noted this proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act inconsonant with rational nature and right reason. Theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."

You will say: at least for a brief time, in the prior instants of reason, negative invincible ignorance about God's existence seems to be admissible. It is proved: knowledge of God, from what has been said, is not had except through discourse. But a child in the first instants of reason does not seem capable of this discourse. Therefore.

I respond by denying the Assumption: because the Scriptures and Fathers make no exception of persons or times, and our reasons hold for any time whatsoever and any person whatsoever. Hence to the proof I deny the Minor: because a child is not considered to have arrived at the use of reason unless insofar as he is capable of discourse at least easy, such as this is, for this is to use reason.

Moreover, a child does not arrive at the use of reason in one physical instant, but in a moral one which includes some duration of time; so that before he obtains complete use of reason, first through reason beginning to dawn (*per rationem illucescere incipientem*), he knows the world, creatures, parents, himself; then with the same reason developing itself more, he knows that these are not from themselves, but from someone, and thus he already has some imperfect knowledge of their author, and from this he easily perceives that he is bound to inquire further who that author is.

But if these things perhaps do not suffice, we do not refuse to admit with some recent authors that besides the inspection of creatures, God does not lack other means by which to all, in the first instant of reason, he not only can reveal himself, but also in fact does reveal himself, say through inspiration, through parents and teachers, or through some other mode, according to the condition and capacity of persons: because since God must be necessarily worshipped by man as Author and Lord of all, and possessed as ultimate end, it seems to pertain to his gentle providence that he should imprint knowledge of himself on anyone with the use of reason, however he may finally do this.

You will infer: Therefore no one ever could, can, or will be able to ignore God even vincibly, and consequently no one ever was, is, or will be an atheist. But the Consequent seems false, since many ancient and approved authors report not a few atheists, indeed histories narrate that entire nations of America acknowledged no God. Therefore.

I respond that atheists are distinguished as of multiple kinds. Atheist is said as if "without God" (*quasi sine Deo*). Some therefore are called atheists speculatively and properly, such as are, if they exist, those who mentally or by internal judgment deny that God exists. Others are called atheists practically, who, although they acknowledge God mentally, nevertheless live as if God did not exist, whom they would wish not to be the avenger of their crimes, of whom the Apostle says in Titus 1: "They profess to know God, but deny him by their deeds" (*Confitentur se nosse Deum, factis autem negant*).

Also those are called atheists indirectly, who namely attribute to creatures and idols what is proper to God alone, or who deny to God himself what belongs to him, such as providence, or attribute what does not belong, such as a human body. For these, although they do not deny God entirely, nevertheless do not acknowledge the true one.

Finally, those have been called atheists who did not venerate the common gods of their country and their images. Thus Socrates for this cause was condemned to death by his citizens as an atheist. Thus Jews by Greeks and Romans, indeed Christians themselves were commonly called atheists by Gentiles.

That there are also practical and indirect atheists is more than known in so many wicked men who live as if God did not exist, and in innumerable idolaters who worship false gods. But that there exist atheists properly so called, that is speculatively and properly, is not one opinion among Theologians. Some deny it and understand the proofs to the contrary as concerning atheists indirectly or practically. Others affirm it, and this does not seem improbable to us, since that such were Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodore of Cyrenaica, Evemeros, Hippon of Melos and others, many ancient Authors testify whom Vitasse cites here in a long series, q. 2, art. 1.

Of the same stamp seems to have been Vanini, burned alive at Toulouse for this impiety in the year 1619, who when close to punishment and urged to ask pardon from God, from the King,

from Justice, is reported to have responded: "I acknowledge no God, I never offended the King, I devote Justice to the devil."

As for entire nations, however, we do not think they were entirely ignorant of God, but only did not know distinctly as we do, yet they knew under some common notion of some supreme Ruler; for even the Barbarian nations of the American Islands venerate the devil under the name Maboya as author of all evils, and invoke the supreme divinity to restrain the devil's malice, as Historians relate.

Supposing therefore that there were or are atheists properly so called: **I respond** to the argument by distinguishing the Inference: Therefore no one will be able even vincibly to ignore God, if he proceeds prudently and wisely and assents to and seconds the first illuminations, whether acquired or sent, I concede the Inference. If he proceeds imprudently and unwisely and resists the first illuminations and extinguishes or obscures the light of reason, I deny the Inference. For then he will be able vincibly to ignore God, indeed even to deny him, and thus "the fool said in his heart: there is no God" (Psalm 52).

You will ask whether all those who admit that there can be invincible ignorance about God's existence for a brief time necessarily run into the superior condemned proposition about philosophical sin? **I respond** negatively: For there are among those who, although they admit invincible ignorance of God in speculation, nevertheless deny it in practice, at the instant of sin; because, they say, if one speculatively ignorant of God in the first instant would do all that is in him (*faceret totum quod in se est*), God would either illuminate him or remove the occasion of sinning. Hence the ignorance of him which would be invincible speculatively would be vincible practically, nor would he sin with merely philosophical sin.

But those who admit also practically invincible ignorance for that first instant and consequently philosophical sin, some also excuse from condemnation, because the proposition seems condemned because of its generality, namely that it admits philosophical sin not for some brief instant, but indistinctly for the whole course of life. Also because it admits it in anyone ignorant even vincibly; for it does not distinguish. Also because it admits it in one who, although he knows God exists, does not actually think of him while sinning. Hence it would follow that almost all crimes are merely philosophical sins and God is not offended by them.

But those who admit invincible ignorance of God and philosophical sin in the dawn of reason (*in diluculo rationis*) or for a brief time do not say these things. Nevertheless, granted that these can decline the reproach of condemnation, they do not decline at least this absurdity, that someone could fully, voluntarily and freely commit an immense crime and not offend God.

DISSERTATION II

Concerning the Nature or Quiddity of God and His Attributes in General

ARTICLE I

What Is the Constitutive of the Divine Nature?

§. I. The State of the Question Is Explained with Various Opinions of Theologians

Having known about God that he exists (*quòd sit*), it remains to inquire what he is (*quid sit*). But we cannot perfectly know what God is (*quid sit*): because he is infinite being. Hence the Holy Fathers convicted Aetius and his disciple Eunomius of error and madness, who boasted that they knew God as perfectly as God himself knows himself.

Nevertheless, by a threefold way, as we noted before, or more briefly and clearly by a double way, we can acquire some knowledge of him. **1.** By the way of negation (*Per viam negationis*), removing imperfections from him: And this is rather to know what he is not than what he is. "God is ineffable," says Augustine on Psalm 85. "We say more easily what he is not than what he is. Do you think of earth? This is not God. Do you think of the sea? This is not God."

2. By the way of affirmation (*Per viam affirmationis*), attributing to him the perfections of creatures, with imperfections removed and in a far more excellent manner. Thus with the same Augustine, book 5 *On the Trinity*, chapter 1: "We understand God to be good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, present without place, making mutable things without any change of himself and suffering nothing." And sermon 1 *On the words of the Apostle*: "He exceeds every creature of his... If you ask about magnitude, he is greater; if about beauty, more beautiful," etc.

But before we treat of all these perfections individually with the Holy Doctor, we institute here according to the custom of the school a Question: what in this immense sea of perfections can more probably and with foundation in reality be conceived as the constitutive of the divine nature, or its essential difference, from which other perfections flow.

The question is not therefore about the physical constitution of the divine nature according as it really is in itself: For thus it is certain that all perfections, whether absolute or relative, really

constitute God, since they are all identified in the very nature of God which is most simple in itself.

Nor is the question about the divine nature taken broadly and in some ample signification for uncreated being by which it is distinguished from creatures, and which is related in the manner of a transcendent, and is found in all attributes, in that proportional mode in which the notion of created being is imbibed in all differences and modes of creatures.

But the question is about nature or essence strictly taken for that which is first conceived in God, as the source and origin of other properties, from which therefore it is virtually distinguished, and in which under this aspect it is not conceived as transcendentally included: This is about the metaphysical constitutive, or essential difference of the divine nature, as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state in the manner of created nature, in which there is always found some perfection which is first conceived in it as its essential difference and origin of other perfections, as in man rationality.

In the resolution of this question, no less difficult than celebrated, Theologians are divided into various opinions. We reduce the more common ones to the following headings.

First. Some distinguish between essence and nature, in that essence is the principle of being (*principium essendi*), and nature the principle of operating (*principium operandi*); and they want essence to be constituted by aseity (*aseitatem*), and nature by intellection (*per intellectionem*).

Others deny that essence and nature in God are distinguished virtually or by reasoned reason (*ratione ratiocinata*); because only those perfections in God are distinguished virtually and with foundation in reality which in creatures are distinguished formally, or virtually, not from mere potentiality as intellect and intellection, but from their formal object, and therefore pertain to diverse lines as intellect and will. Because virtual distinction in God requires equivalence of many as many (*aequivalentia plurium ut plurium*), which is not had unless when there is had equivalence of many formally distinct from their nature and pertaining to diverse lines, for equivalence of many distinct from potentiality alone and having the same formal nature is not equivalence of many as many, but of many in the manner of one, as is evident in the equivalence by which the divine intellect is equivalent to human intellect and intellection, which does not suffice to constitute virtual and founded distinction between the divine intellect and its intellection.

Now essence and nature in created things are not distinguished from formal object, but from the potentiality of created essence, which is not pure act and its operation, whence although it is actuated through being (*per esse*), it is nevertheless still in potency to operate; if therefore created essence were of such actuality that it would always be operating, and could not, while it exists, be or be conceived in potency to operating, essence in it would not be distinguished from nature.

Nor should you say that the line of being (*linea essendi*) and the line of operating (*linea operandi*) are diverse lines; for they are diverse, not from their nature or formal object, as are e.g. intellect and will, but from potentiality and imperfection of nature or essence alone, which is not at the summit of actuality, and consequently does not identify its ultimate act which is operation; for being is for the sake of operating (*esse enim est propter operari*).

Since therefore God is at the summit of actuality in every order, he cannot be conceived with foundation in reality in potency either to being or to operating, but identifies both to himself, consequently essence in him is not distinguished virtually, neither from nature, nor from the power of operating, nor from actual operation, namely that which is first conceived in him and is most noble, namely to understand (*intelligere*) as we shall say presently.

But whatever may be the case about this difficulty, omitting it, we here take essence and nature as the same, both because essence, as just said, is not only the principle of being, but also of operating, since from it flow operative properties: Thus rationality in man not only gives specific being, but is also the root of operative powers, and therefore the radical principle of operating. And because it is unusual both in Theology and in Philosophy to assign two substantial differences of things, one for essence, another for nature. Hence Councils, Fathers, Theologians and Philosophers everywhere use essence and nature for the same thing: Thus in the 6th Synod, act 3, the divine Persons are said to be of one nature or essence (*unius naturae vel essentiae*). In the Lateran Council under Innocent III, a little after the chapter *damnamus*, it is said substance, essence or nature (*substantia, essentia sive natura*): in which places essence is confused with nature.

Second opinion constitutes the divine nature in the collection of all perfections: Hence according to it God will be able to be defined, "supremely perfect Being" (*Ens summè perfectum*). But it does not reach the point of difficulty. It is indeed true of the physical constitution of the divine nature, but this is not what is treated, as has been noted: The question is about metaphysical constitution, in which is not attended all that which the thing contains on the part of reality (*a parte rei*), but something first which is the source and origin of others. But this first thing is not the collection of all.

Third opinion places the divine nature in infinity (*in infinitate*), and according to it God is defined: "Being infinite in every way" (*Ens omnimodè infinitum*). Thus Scotus with his followers. This opinion is akin to the preceding, for indeed being infinite in every way is the same as supremely perfect being; hence it is impugned by the same reason.

Moreover, infinity is only a mode of nature, namely the mode of having perfections without end, just as finitude in creatures is a mode of nature: but a mode of nature is not nature, nor does it constitute it, but supposes it constituted. Add that infinity is a transcendent predicate of all attributes, nor virtually distinct from them, as I shall say presently about aseity.

These opinions therefore being omitted, the difficulty turns around two more celebrated opinions, of which the first places the divine essence in aseity (*in aseitate*), or in existence from itself and through itself (*in existentia à se & per se*): And this opinion pleases many especially outside the School of St. Thomas: Among Thomists, however, Capreolus, Banez, Ledesma are cited for it, to whom Contensonus most recently subscribes.

The other, which is more common among Thomists, judges the divine essence to be constituted by the intellective grade (*per gradum intellectivum*), whose patrons are again divided among themselves, some opining for radical understanding (*pro intelligere radicali*), some for remote, some for proximate, namely for the very intellective power: Others opining for actual understanding (*pro intelligere actuali*), not under the aspect of operation, but under the aspect of ultimate actuality subsisting per se.

For actual understanding (*actuale intelligere*) can be taken in two ways: **1.** as it is formally proceeding from a principle and under the concept of action; **2.** as it is the ultimate actuality of this principle. This distinction, although St. Tournely calls it obscure and involved, nevertheless seems to us perspicuous and evident. For who would deny that operation is the ultimate act of an operative power? And it has foundation in St. Thomas below q. 18, a. 2, ad 1, where he says: "to sense and to understand and such things are sometimes taken for certain operations, sometimes for the very being of those so operating" (*sentire & intelligere & huiusmodi quandoque accipiuntur pro quibusdam operationibus, quandoque pro ipso esse sic operantium*).

With these things noted and presupposed.

§. II. The Difficulty Is Resolved

I say 1. The nature or essence of God is not constituted metaphysically by aseity (*per aseitatem*).

It is proved 1. From St. Thomas who below q. 13, a. 11 says: that this name "He who is" (*Qui est*) determines no mode of being, but relates itself indeterminately to all; and therefore it names an infinite sea of substance. Therefore according to St. Thomas the concept of being from itself (*ipsius esse à se*) does not determinately import the divine nature, but something indeterminate and transcendent in the uncreated order.

Also there at ad 1 he says that this name "God" which is said from understanding (*ab intelligendo*) is, as to the thing signified (*quoad rem significatam*), more proper to God than the name "He who is." But this would be false if existence from itself, or aseity, were the formal constitutive of the divine nature. Therefore. Compare the response to the first objection below.

It is proved 2. By the fundamental reason: that is the formal constitutive of the divine nature which distinguishes it, not only from creatures, but also from attributes, persons, and other divine formalities. But the notion of being from itself (*entis à se*) does not provide this. Therefore, etc.

The Major is evident; because here, as has been said, the question is not about divine nature broadly taken for uncreated entity, under which aspect it is distinguished from created things, but about it strictly taken as it is the root of divine attributes, and therefore virtually distinct from them.

The Minor is proved: The notion of being from itself from its formal nature (*ex sua ratione formali*) is a transcendent predicate of all divine formalities or perfections and formally imbibed in them. But such a predicate does not distinguish nature from attributes. Therefore.

The Major is evident: for everything that is in God is being from itself (*ens à se*). The Minor is also evident, because through that nature and property are not distinguished through which they agree and which is found formally in all of them.

This reason also militates against Scotus's opinion, because infinity is also a transcendent predicate.

To this fundamental reason adversaries respond **1.** and commonly, that being from itself (*esse à se*) can be taken in three ways. **1.** For negation of being from another as from a real cause with dependence; and thus, they say, whatever is in God is being from itself. **2.** For negation of being from another as from a formal principle without dependence; and thus the eternal Father is being from itself, but not the Son and Holy Spirit. **3.** For negation of being from another as from a virtual cause, or root; and this belongs to the divine essence alone.

They confess therefore that aseity in the first mode does not constitute the divine nature, because thus it is transcendent to all attributes: nor also taken in the second mode; because otherwise the Son and Holy Spirit as such would not have the divine nature since they have being from the Father as from a principle. Therefore aseity taken only in the third mode is the constitutive of the divine nature, since it as such is not transcendent to attributes, but their root.

But on the contrary: this response manifestly begs the question (*petit principium*) and supposes, or does not reach what is in question. Therefore it is worthless.

The Antecedent is proved: aseity taken in the third mode, that is, not to be from another as from a root, but to be rather the root of others, constitutes the divine nature, they say; but this is not what is asked, for everyone admits this, but what is asked is to which formality or nature (*cui formalitati seu rationi*) in God it belongs that it not be from another as from a root, but rather be the root of others, which this response of the adversaries in no way proves or shows, since they confess it is not aseity in the first or second mode. Therefore.

This reason is confirmed and more explained: to say that not being from another as from a root but being the root of others constitutes nature, and conversely that being from another as from a root constitutes properties, is to prove what nature is and what properties are in general; but not

what they are in this particular thing, namely in God, or to which of his formalities they belong, which nevertheless is here asked. Therefore the same as before.

The Major is proved: not being from another as from a root, but being the root of others, also being from another as from a root, are definitions of nature and properties in general which do not belong more to God than to man or other creatures. For I say equally of human nature that it is what is not from another as from a root, but what is rather the root of others, and of its property that it is from another as from a root. But if it is asked what is in man that is not from another as from a root, but that is the root of others: I will respond that it is rationality. And this is what is now asked in God and what adversaries ought to assign in him. It is not, as we have already said and they confess, aseity in the first and second mode, nor as is evident, aseity in the third mode. Therefore none of those assigned by adversaries: and this reason, of which I have not yet heard or seen a solution, has inclined me fluctuating into this opinion.

To our foundation Contensonus responds again differently, saying that aseity, or the notion of being from itself (*entis à se*) is found in every attribute implicitly only, not indeed explicitly, and he thinks that by this distinction we are sufficiently satisfied, since we ourselves confess, he says, that the essence or divine nature is found implicitly in every attribute, by which nevertheless nature remains.

But on the contrary: Contensonus plays with words. Aseity, he says, is found in every attribute implicitly only. I ask what aseity? Whether aseity as it says negation of existing from another as from a cause? But this aseity, the praised Theologian confessing there, is not proper to the divine nature, but is common to all attributes by the very fact that they are divine, consequently it does not constitute nor distinguish nature.

Whether aseity as it says negation of virtual root? But this aseity is a notion of nature in general only, as is evident from the preceding response: hence it remains to be explained what is in God to which this common notion of nature belongs.

But what he adds that we confess the essence or divine nature to be found implicitly in every attribute, by which nevertheless nature remains: again is equivocal and needs explanation. Indeed the divine nature, or the grade constituting the divine nature, if it is regarded as it is in reality (*ut est in re*), is found implicitly in every attribute, because God is a most simple being identifying all perfections to himself without any real distinction. And this is not asked.

But if it is regarded as it is in our intellect conceiving nature as the root of attributes (which is asked), we say that under that formal aspect (*sub ista ratione formali*) it is not found even implicitly in attributes, because under it it is virtually distinguished from them. I say even implicitly, because through such concepts of root and rooted there is formally exercised distinction of reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*).

Or what is the same, we say that such a concept of nature is not a concept transcendentally common to all attributes, but distinguished from them by reasoned reason (*ratione ratiocinata*); conversely indeed the notion of being from itself or uncreated is a concept transcendentally common to all attributes, through which consequently they cannot be distinguished from nature: hence it is true to say "relation in the divine is being from itself, will is being from itself," just as in created things it is true to say "relation is being from another, will is being from another"; but it would be false to say in a formal sense, or according to concept (*secundùm conceptum*), "relation in the divine is divine nature," just as in created things it would be false to say "will or risibility in a formal sense is the nature or essence of man."

It is proved 3. The constitutive grade of the divine essence ought to be something real and positive; for a real and positive being, such as God is, cannot be constituted by something negative, as is evident per se. But aseity is something negative, for God is not said to be from himself because he is cause of himself, but because he is not from another. Therefore.

St. Tournely responds that aseity is indeed something negative by reason of the name (*ratione nominis*), but by reason of the thing signified (*ratione autem rei significatae*) it is something positive. For the thing signified by aseity is the necessity, plenitude, totality, universality of being, in one word, most perfect being (*ens perfectissimum*).

And if you infer: therefore aseity is no longer considered by us as some special and first perfection in God, but as every perfection, which falls back into the second opinion previously rejected. He responds that aseity does not say explicitly the plenitude of being, or every perfection, but only implicitly and in root.

But on the contrary: either aseity constitutes the divine nature according to what it explains, or according to what it implies. If the first; therefore nature is constituted by something negative. If the second, therefore it is constituted by every perfection, which the praised Tournely impugns no less than we do.

It is proved 4. God ought to be constituted by the grade of understanding (*per gradum intelligendi*): therefore not by the notion of being or of being from itself (*per rationem essendi seu entis à se*).

The Antecedent is proved **1.** God since he is most perfect being ought to be constituted by the most perfect grade. But of four grades constitutive of nature, namely of being, living, sensing and understanding, the most perfect is the grade of understanding. Therefore. The Major and Minor are evident per se.

The same Antecedent is proved **2.** from the doctrine of St. Thomas below q. 93, a. 3. Among creatures, only Angels and men are made to the image of God (*ad imaginem Dei*), that is, they participate and imitate something of the nature of God, because they are intellectual. Therefore

the nature of God is constituted by the grade of understanding and not by the grade of being. The Antecedent is from St. Thomas.

The consequence is proved: if the nature of God were constituted by the grade of being, not only intellectual creatures, but all whatsoever would be made to the image of God. But this is false and against the Holy Doctor in the place cited. Therefore. The sequela is evident; because all would participate in the nature of God, namely in the grade of being.

You will say: all creatures are not made to the image of God, because although they agree with him in the notion of having being (*in ratione habendi esse*), nevertheless not in the mode of having being from itself (*in modo habendi esse à se*). But on the contrary; but neither men nor Angels agree with him in the mode of having being from itself. Therefore either they too are not made to the image of God, or all creatures are also adorned with this gift.

I say 2. Divine understanding (*Intelligere divinum*) not radical but actual under the aspect of ultimate actuality subsisting per se constitutes metaphysically the divine nature: hence the description of God will be this: "being supremely and most actually understanding" (*ens summè & actualissimè intelligens*).

It is proved 1. According to what we have just said in the 4th proof of the preceding conclusion, the divine nature is metaphysically constituted by the intellective grade; and since it is purest act devoid of all potentiality, it ought to be constituted by that which in that grade is most actual, and has no shadow of potentiality. But such is actual and not radical understanding. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: either the discourse is about remote radical understanding, which is the very immaterial substance, or about proximate which is intellective power. But both, in our mode of conceiving, are related to actual understanding in the manner of potency to act, or of first act to second. Therefore.

You will say: nothing prevents the divine nature from being conceived by one concept in the manner of intellective power, and by another concept in the manner of actual intellection, because in these conceptions nothing imperfect is attributed to God, but only imperfectly understood, which imperfection is not reflected back onto the thing understood, but holds itself on the part of the one understanding. Thus the most learned Sylvius q. 14, a. 4, towards the end.

But on the contrary: by the very fact that you conceive nature in the manner of potency, you do not conceive it as pure act, consequently neither as something divine. Also you conceive it as perfectible by act, consequently imperfect from itself (*ex se imperfectam*), both of which are repugnant.

But granted that something could be conceived in God in the manner of potency, it could not be conceived as constitutive of nature or essence; because the constitutive of nature ought to be

conceived as something more actual and perfect, from whose perfection other attributal properties emanate. Hence.

The Conclusion is proved 2. That is constitutive of the nature of anything, not what is first conceived in it in any way whatsoever, otherwise the notion of substance in man would be constitutive of human nature; but what is first conceived in it as something more actual and perfect, whence it happens that it is the root and origin of other perfections. But among all God's perfections, the first which is conceived as more actual and perfect is not radical understanding or the power of understanding, but understanding itself most actual and most perfect. Therefore.

§. III. Objections Against the First Conclusion Are Solved

You object 1. from the authority of Scripture and the Holy Fathers: Exodus 3. To Moses asking what was the name of God, God responded: "I am who I am" (*Ego sum qui sum*). And, "thus you shall say to the children of Israel, He who is (*qui est*) sent me to you."

Similarly the Holy Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen oration 36, Hilary at the beginning of book 1 *On the Trinity*, Augustine book 5 *On the Trinity* chapter 2, Jerome Epistle 1 to Damasus, St. Thomas here q. 3, a. 4, q. 7, a. 1, q. 13, a. 11, write that God's being (*esse Dei*) is his essence, and that the name "He who is" (*qui est*) is most proper to God. Therefore.

I respond. Scripture and the Fathers speak of the nature or essence of God broadly taken, as it says uncreated and divine being, distinct from all creatures, not indeed of the nature of God metaphysically taken as it is considered by Theologians, and as it says something first in God which is the root of others: for being from itself (*esse à se*), as St. Thomas teaches in the cited q. 13, a. 11, and we saw in the proof of the conclusion, does not signify something determinate in God, consequently not essence metaphysically considered, but relates itself indeterminately to all things which are in God, and therefore it names an infinite sea of substance (*Pelagus substantiae infinitum*).

Similarly in *Prima pars*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, responding to this authority of Damascene book 1 *Orthodox Faith* chapter 12, "He who is (*Qui est*) does not signify what God is (*quid est Deus*), but a certain infinite sea of substance" (*quoddam Pelagus substantiae infinitum*): he says that this name "He who is" (*qui est*) says absolute and indeterminate being not determined by anything added, and therefore Damascene says that it does not signify what God is (*quid est Deus*), but signifies a certain infinite sea of substance, as if not determined (*quasi non determinatum*).

And in the body of the article he had said: "That 'He who is' (*qui est*) signifies being indeterminately and not what it is (*quid est*), and because in the state of the way we know only this about him, that he is (*qu'a est*), and not what he is (*quid est*), except through negation, and

we cannot name except according to how we know; therefore he is most properly named by us, 'He who is' (*qui est*)."

You object 2. That is constitutive of the divine nature which is first conceived in it: Hence St. Dionysius *On Divine Names* says, being itself per se (*ipsum esse per se*) is more ancient than life itself per se (*ipsa per se vita*). Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Major: That is constitutive of the divine nature which is first conceived in it in the manner of an actual determinate predicate virtually distinct from attributes and their root, I concede the Major. What is first conceived in it in the manner of a common predicate transcending all attributes or properties, I deny the Major: Otherwise the notion of being, or of substance, or of body in man would be its formal constitutive, since those are conceived in him prior to rationality. Moreover, the notion of being from itself (*entis à se*) is related in the manner of a common and transcendent predicate, as has been proved.

You will insist: The notion of being from itself (*entis à se*) in God is related in the manner of an actual determinate predicate, pouring forth all divine properties from itself. Therefore.

The Antecedent is proved: That in God is related in the manner of an actual determinate predicate pouring forth all divine properties from itself, which distinguishes the divine nature, for the same thing is constitutive and distinctive. But the notion of being from itself (*entis à se*) is distinctive of the divine nature from what has been conceded above. Therefore.

I respond by denying the Antecedent. To the proof I distinguish the Major: That in God, etc., which distinguishes the divine nature from some things only, I deny the Major: otherwise body could be said to be constitutive of man, since even through it he is distinguished from Angels. What distinguishes the divine nature from all things, namely both from creatures and from divine properties, I concede the Major: For this is required for the notion of nature strictly taken, since it is the root of properties, and therefore at least virtually distinct from them. Now the notion of being from itself (*entis à se*), although it distinguishes the divine nature from created things, nevertheless does not distinguish it from divine properties, since it is no less proper to them than to nature.

You object 3. If the divine essence were constituted by actual understanding (*intelligere actuale*), it would follow that God would be formally intelligent by his essence, not by his intellect, since the essence would be actual understanding itself. But this is against St. Thomas, *Prima pars*, q. 14, a. 4, where he says that God is intelligent by his intellect (*Deus est intelligens per suum intellectum*). Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the Antecedent: If the divine essence were constituted by actual understanding taken in the manner of operation formally proceeding from a principle, I concede the Antecedent and deny the Consequent; because then the essence would not be actual

understanding itself, but the principle from which understanding proceeds. If by actual understanding taken in the manner of ultimate actuality, I deny the Antecedent and concede the Consequent.

For this second mode is what we hold: that the divine essence is constituted by actual understanding, not as by operation, but as by ultimate actuality of the intellective principle, which ultimate actuality is the very essence, and from this essence or nature so constituted proceeds divine intellection as operation, which latter is what St. Thomas means when he says God is intelligent by his intellect.

You object 4. The constitutive of the divine nature ought to distinguish that nature from the divine persons: but actual understanding (*intelligere actuale*) does not distinguish the divine nature from the persons, since the persons also understand actually. Therefore.

I respond that the constitutive of the divine nature ought indeed to distinguish that nature from everything that is not that nature, but not from the persons as they are subjects having that nature. For the persons are not other natures, but the same nature in different manners of existing. Hence the divine nature, however constituted, is common to the three persons.

But if the objection is about distinguishing the nature from the personal properties, **I respond** by distinguishing: actual understanding does not distinguish the divine nature from the personal properties taken formally as they are in the persons, I concede; taken materially as they would be considered in themselves if they could exist separately, I deny. But this latter distinction is not required, since personal properties do not exist separately from the nature.

You object 5. Operation follows being (*operatio sequitur esse*): therefore being is prior to operation, and consequently the grade of being should constitute the divine nature rather than the grade of understanding.

I respond by distinguishing: operation follows being in the order of natural priority (*in ordine prioritatis naturalis*), I concede; in the order of perfection and actuality (*in ordine perfectionis et actualitatis*), I deny. And we speak here of constitution according to the order of perfection, by which that is constitutive which is most perfect and actual.

Moreover, in God there is no real distinction between being and operating, but only a virtual distinction according to our manner of conceiving. Hence the priority of being over operation is only according to our imperfect manner of understanding, not according to the reality of the thing (*secundum rem*).

From these things it is evident how the divine nature is to be conceived by us wayfarers: namely as supremely and most actually understanding being (*ens summè & actualissimè intelligens*), from which as from a fountain all other divine perfections flow forth, not indeed really and

temporally, but according to our manner of conceiving virtually and with foundation in the thing (*virtualiter & cum fundamento in re*).

And although this conception is imperfect and analogical, nevertheless it is the most perfect that we can have in this state of life, and it gives us the best access to understanding the other divine attributes and the distinction of the divine persons, as will become evident in what follows.

This concludes our treatment of the constitutive of the divine nature. In subsequent articles we shall treat of the individual attributes of God and how they flow from this supreme understanding which we have posited as the metaphysical constitutive of the divine essence.

Section IV. Objections Against the Second Conclusion Are Resolved

1. You object from the authority of St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor, in question 6, article 2 below, says that in God being or essence and understanding are the same according to reality, but not according to the reason of understanding. Therefore, according to our mode of conceiving, understanding in God is not formally His essence.

In the same place, at the first response, he teaches that beatitude does not belong to God according to the reason of essence, but rather according to the reason of intellect. Therefore, the reason of essence is one thing, the reason of intellect another. And in 1 to Annibald, distinction 35, question 1, article 2, at the third response, he says that just as understanding is the same in reality with essence but different in reason, so also is willing. But willing is distinguished virtually from essence and does not constitute it. Therefore, so also understanding.

Finally, here in the prologue to question 14, where he treats of God's knowledge, he says that up to this point he has treated of the substance of God, but now he begins to treat of operation. And among operations he places understanding. Therefore, he first presupposes the divine essence as constituted before we conceive understanding in it.

Response: To these and similar texts of St. Thomas, a twofold general solution can be applied from the principles laid down. First, that the Holy Doctor speaks of God's essence taken broadly for uncreated being, or of actual understanding under the aspect of operation or attribute. Second, that he posits between essence and understanding only a distinction of reasoning reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*), which is founded in our mode of conceiving divine things by analogy to created things, in which being and understanding are really distinguished; but not a distinction of reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*) which would have foundation in God.

Furthermore, regarding the passage from 1 to Annibald, I respond specifically that this work is falsely attributed to St. Thomas. For this see Echard. Otherwise, in the cited words a comparison is made between understanding and willing respectively to essence only as to the genus of

distinction, insofar as neither is really distinguished from essence but only by reason, not however as to the mode of distinction of reason.

And regarding the passage from the prologue of Question 14, it should be further noted with John of St. Thomas that the Holy Doctor did not say that up to this point he had treated of God's nature, but of those things which pertain to God's substance; nor did he say that now he considers divine operations, but those things which pertain to God's operation. Moreover, nature pertains to operation, being indeed the root and principle of operating. Therefore, when treating of God's understanding, he treats of His very nature.

You will insist from the same St. Thomas who in the cited Question 14, article 1, teaches that immateriality is the root of intellectual power or divine intellection, from which it follows that divine intellection cannot be constitutive of divine nature. **1○.** Because intellection is not what is first conceived in God, but immateriality itself. **2○.** Because it implies that the constitutive of nature is demonstrated *a priori* through something else, since it should rather be the *a priori* reason for proving other things. Therefore, etc.

Response: St. Thomas did not say that immateriality is the root or *a priori* reason of intellectual power and divine intellection, but only that it is the reason; whence nothing forces us to understand root in the strict sense. For it is evident that immateriality is not properly the root of the intellectual grade, as nature is the root of properties, since in intelligent creatures themselves nature is constituted through the very intellectual grade, and not through immateriality itself from which the intellectual grade follows as a property.

It is therefore root broadly and improperly, namely it is a quasi-concomitant reason or condition necessarily required and essentially absorbed in every cognitive grade, as will be clearer from what will be said concerning the cited Question 14. Just as if I were to say that humanity is the reason of rationality, or the power of self-movement is the reason of life.

Hence it does not follow that immateriality is what is first conceived in God, and granted that it is so, at least it would not be conceived as something more actual and perfect, but as something potential and common to all attributes. Likewise it does not follow that the intellectual grade is proved through immateriality as through an *a priori* reason.

Others respond that immateriality is the *a priori* reason of the intellectual grade for us, not in itself, because since immateriality, intellectuality and intellection are not distinguished in created things from their genus or formal reason, but from potentiality (because indeed a creature is not pure act identifying its ultimate actuality), hence it happens, as we observed above, that these are not distinguished in God by virtual distinction founded in reality, but by distinction founded in diverse modes of conceiving and of reasoning reason only, taken namely from analogy to creatures, in which since we see immateriality to be the root of intellection and to be

distinguished among themselves, we gather that it would also be so in God, if He were not most pure act. This response is also probable.

2. You object secondly: Actual understanding is essentially operation. But operation does not constitute the operating nature, but presupposes it as constituted. Therefore, etc.

This principal argument of the adverse opinion St. Thomas proposes to himself below in Question 14, article 4, in the first argument, and thus solves it: "To the first therefore it must be said that understanding is not an operation going out, but remaining in the same."

And explaining this more fully below in question 41, article 4, at the third response, he says thus: "Understanding and willing are not such acts which designate the procession of some thing from God distinct either essentially or personally. Hence with respect to these acts the notion of potency cannot be saved in God except according to the mode of understanding and signifying only, insofar as intellect and understanding are signified diversely in God (which imports mere distinction of reasoning reason), although God's very understanding is His essence having no principle."

These words both confirm our conclusion and indicate the solution of the argument. Whence, conformably to the mind of the Holy Doctor, I distinguish the Minor formally: Finite operation which is an accident does not constitute the operating nature but presupposes it as constituted - I concede the Minor. Infinite operation subsisting through itself - I deny the Minor.

The disparity is that it is of the nature of operation which is finite and an accident superadded to the operator, that it proceed from the very operator, and therefore it presupposes him as constituted. But truly, it is not of the nature of infinite and *per se* subsisting operation that it proceed from the operator, but only that it be his ultimate act identified with him without virtual distinction. Because in infinite being nothing can be conceived unless it remains pure act in our concept. But the operating nature would not remain pure act if it were conceived as distinct from its ultimate act proceeding from it and under the aspect of first act toward that.

Operation therefore as emanating from a principle and under the concept "from" (*ab*) is not formally in God (note this well), but only eminently and virtually, insofar as the same entity in God eminently does all that in created things the proceeding operation and the principle from which it proceeds do. And therefore we said that divine nature is constituted through intellection, not under the aspect of operation as emanating, or under the concept "from," but under the aspect of ultimate actuality subsisting through itself.

3. You object thirdly and simultaneously insist: Divine understanding must presuppose some object at least virtually distinct from itself, by which it is specified. But that cannot be anything other than the divine nature itself, for it is not specified by anything outside itself, as will be evident from what will be said elsewhere. Therefore, etc.

The Major is proved: if divine understanding did not presuppose some object at least virtually distinct from itself, it would have itself as object, and thus would not be a direct act but reflexive, for it would be understanding of itself. Therefore, etc.

Response: I deny the Major, because an object in every intellection seeks to be united to the intellect, and the more perfect the intellection, the more perfect the union. Whence divine intellection by reason of its infinity and supreme actuality reaches such a grade of perfection, eminence and simplicity that it is identified with its object without virtual distinction founded in reality.

Thus expressly the Holy Doctor below in question 14, article 2, where he says that since God has no potentiality but is pure act, it is necessary that in Him intellect and the thing understood be the same in all modes. Therefore not even virtually distinct.

And to the proof of the Antecedent, Gonet responds that divine understanding is an act in a most eminent way both direct and reflexive simultaneously: reflexive because it is understanding of itself; direct because it has no other object to which it tends *per se* first and connaturally. John of St. Thomas affirms it is simply direct, because it is first and unique; but a reflexive act presupposes a prior direct one. Either can be said.

1. You will insist first: Nothing is actually understood unless there is first presupposed something intelligible. Therefore divine intellection first presupposes in God an intelligible nature.

Response: I distinguish the Antecedent: Nothing is actually understood unless there is first presupposed something intelligible in created things mixed with potentiality - I concede the Antecedent. In God who is most pure act, I sub-distinguish: Unless there is first presupposed something intelligible with priority founded in our mode of conceiving by analogy to creatures - I concede. With priority founded in reality as conceived - I deny.

For it is of the nature of pure act not only that it be actually understanding, but also that it be actually intellect. Whence the Thomists commonly teach that God in the beatific vision supplies not only the role of impressed species, but also of expressed species or actually understood.

2○. You will insist secondly: Divine volition is not the first voluble thing. Therefore neither is divine intellection the first intelligible thing, and consequently it presupposes a prior intelligible object.

Response: I deny the Consequence. The disparity is that since divine volition is an inclination consequent upon nature, it does not constitute it but presupposes it and tends primarily toward its good. But truly actual intellection, since it is the first and most perfect act of divine nature, constitutes it and does not presuppose it.

4○. You object fourthly: Divine nature ought to be constituted proportionally as other intellectual natures. But other intellectual natures, namely Angel and Man, are not constituted through actual intellection, but through the power of understanding. Whence it is commonly said that words in definitions speak not of act but of power. Therefore, etc.

Response: I deny the Major. The disparity is that divine nature, since it is most pure act, cannot be constituted through that which imports even a shadow of potentiality, as is the power of understanding. For by this very fact that you conceive something potential, you do not conceive something divine, since everything that is in God is most pure and most perfect act. It is otherwise with created natures by reason of imperfection and potentiality.

You will insist: Either divine nature is constituted through the power of understanding, or the concept of nature is not saved in God. The second is not admitted, therefore the first.

The Major is proved: Nature is commonly defined as the principle of motion and rest of that in which it is. Therefore the concept of nature is not saved in God if it is not constituted through the power of understanding.

Response: I deny the Major. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: Nature is commonly defined as principle of motion, etc., so that "principle" says only and always power toward act - I deny the Antecedent. So that it says also the source and root from which operative powers flow - I concede the Antecedent and deny the Consequence.

Therefore "principle" in the definition of nature can be understood in two ways: **1○.** for that which is the source and root of properties and operative powers; for thus it is rightly called principle of motion. **2○.** For power toward act. Both senses are saved in creatures, because potentiality perfectible through its act does not repugn them. But in God it is not saved in the second sense, because He is most pure act in whom it implies conceiving something imperfect and in potency toward its act. But it is well saved in the first sense, because being the root and virtual cause of divine properties involves no imperfection, but rather perfection. Hence you will infer that the concept of nature, as such, belongs to God and creatures only analogically.

5○. You object fifthly and simultaneously insist: That is constitutive of divine nature which is participated by sanctifying grace, for sanctifying grace, as theologians commonly teach, is a participation of divine nature. But sanctifying grace does not participate divine understanding, but only divine intellectuality. Therefore, etc.

The Minor is proved: Both because divine understanding is participated by the beatific vision by which the Blessed are constituted actually seeing and understanding God, and because sanctifying grace does not give actual acting but only the ability to act. Therefore, etc.

Response: I distinguish the Minor: Sanctifying grace does not participate divine understanding insofar as it is eminently operation - I concede the Minor, for thus it is participated by the beatific vision. Insofar as it is ultimate actuality subsisting through itself of a nobler grade in God and for that reason the root of divine attributes - I deny the Minor.

Therefore divine understanding by reason of its eminence and infinity performs diverse roles, by reason of which it can be participated diversely by creatures inadequately: insofar as it eminently performs the role of intellectual virtue, it is participated by the light of glory; insofar as it eminently performs the role of operation, it is participated by the beatific vision; and insofar as it is the root of divine attributes, it is participated by sanctifying grace. For indeed sanctifying grace is the root of infused virtues which are principles of operations, and in this sense it is said to give the ability to operate.

6○. You object sixthly and add: But divine understanding is not the root of all divine perfections. For what is this consequence, asks D. Tournely: God actually understands with most perfect intellection; therefore He is good, just, eternal, immense, etc. Therefore divine understanding is not constitutive of divine nature.

Response: I distinguish the Assumption: Divine understanding is not the root of all divine perfections immediately - I concede the Assumption. Mediately or immediately - I deny the Assumption and the Consequence.

Therefore divine understanding is the root of all divine attributes, but in diverse ways. Of those which pertain to operations deduced from understanding, such as wisdom, knowledge, will, love, justice, omnipotence, etc., it is the root immediately *per se*. But of others which pertain to being and are as it were modes of divine essence and its transcendental properties, such as eternity, infinity, truth, goodness, etc., it is the root not immediately *per se* and under the concept of intellection, but by means of the notion of uncreated being and pure act absorbed in it.

Thus in man his specific difference, namely rationality, is *per se* immediately the root of properties which belong to him as man, such as being risible, capable of wonder, etc. But of properties which are generic or more common, such as being capable of sleep, being *per se* subsistent, or which are transcendental, such as being one, true, etc., it is the root by means of the generic grade of animal or substance, or by reason of transcendental being included in it.

Whence such is this consequence: Man is rational, therefore he is capable of sleep, *per se* subsistent, one, true. Such is this: God is actually understanding, therefore He is eternal, infinite, immutable, immense, etc. So that in both cases the antecedent is the cause of the consequent not immediately by reason of itself, but mediately and by reason of another included in it.

You object finally: Personal intellection generative of the Word does not constitute the person of the Father. Therefore neither does natural intellection constitute divine nature.

Response: I deny the inference. The disparity is **1○.** that person speaks of incommunicability which relation confers, not intellection as such. **2○.** Because since person imports the concrete from nature and subsistence, it is conceived to be completed and constituted through subsistence. But truly nature is what is first and more perfectly conceived in reality, and therefore ought to be constituted through that which is first and more perfectly conceived in it.

These things belong to the Tract on the Trinity. Furthermore, confer many things about divine intellect to Question 14.

Article II. On Divine Attributes in General

What is a twofold attribute?

1○. I say first: An attribute properly taken is commonly defined as an absolute perfection simply simple, necessarily and formally existing in God, and following upon the constituted essence according to our mode of conceiving.

I said "attribute properly taken" because since according to the etymology of the name it is called attribute from the fact that it is attributed to God, sometimes it is taken improperly for everything that is predicated of God, whether essentially or accidentally, whether absolutely or relatively.

It is explained: it is called absolute perfection, not to exclude perfections which speak a transcendental respect to creatures, such as providence, mercy, justice, but to exclude divine relations, which since they are not common to the three persons, do not have the nature of attribute; for an attribute is a property of nature, following it in whomever it may be.

It is called perfection simply simple to exclude simple or qualified perfection. Simply simple perfection is that which involves no imperfection in its concept, or as others say, which is better than its absence, that is, which it is better for any being qua being to have than not to have, such as goodness, justice, etc. Simple or qualified perfection is that which involves some imperfection, or which is not better than its absence, and that not by reason of the subject but by reason of itself formally, such as being extended, figured, vegetative.

It is said to exist necessarily in God to exclude free acts such as creation. It is said to exist formally in God to again exclude qualified perfections, which exist in God only eminently, that is, with imperfections removed; but attributes which are simply simple perfections exist in God formally: So that God's essence, if taken physically and as it is on the part of reality, contains all attributes formally explicitly; but if taken metaphysically for the essential constitutive, it contains them also formally, but only implicitly and confusedly, as will be evident from the following article.

It is said to follow upon the constituted essence to exclude essential predicates and to signify that attributes do not constitute divine nature but presuppose it as constituted and follow upon it by way of property.

But although we speak of attributes in the plural, it should nevertheless be observed that they are not really plural because of God's supreme simplicity and unity, but are only virtually plural, insofar as God's most simple entity is equivalent to many created perfections really distinct.

2○. Hence I say secondly: Attributes as virtually plural are divided in many ways. Some pertain to divine being, such as simplicity, immensity, aseity, etc. And these are also called absolute, concerning which St. Thomas treats in the immediately following Questions. Some pertain to operations, such as knowledge, providence, omnipotence, and these are called respective, concerning which he treats in Questions 14 and following.

Likewise some are negative, which remove imperfections from God, such as being infinite, immense, immutable; by which way, as we have already indicated, God is better and more easily known; for it is easier to say what God is not than what He is. And among those some are which, although they are enunciated with positive terms, nevertheless involve negation, such as simplicity which involves the negation of composition. Others are affirmative, which are affirmed of God affirmatively, such as justice, goodness.

Article III. How Are Divine Attributes Distinguished From Each Other and From Essence?

Section I. What and How Many-fold Is Distinction?

Although these words - distinction, plurality, division, diversity - are sometimes used promiscuously for the same thing, nevertheless they do not signify under the same formality. Distinction is opposed to identity, plurality to unity, division to union. Diversity imports distinction without agreement in some univocal genus; difference on the contrary imports distinction with agreement in some univocal genus; thus predicaments are diverse among themselves, but those which are of the same predicament are distinguished.

Distinction therefore is nothing other than the lack of identity, for those things are said to be distinguished which are not the same.

It is divided **1○.** into real distinction and distinction of reason. Real distinction is the lack of identity which is given on the part of reality independently of the intellect. It is twofold: one real simply which is called major; another real modal which is called minor. Real major is between perfect beings which are separated or can be separated from each other, as between Peter and Paul, between body and soul. Real minor is between a thing and its mode, as between Peter and

his sitting, or between two modes, as between sitting and standing. They are called modes because they are minute entities which, although they cannot exist without a subject, the subject nevertheless can exist without them, whence they are said to be modally distinguished from it. That such entities are given is evident from sense itself and is proved in metaphysics.

Distinction of reason is the lack of identity under concept only between those things which are not distinct on the part of reality, but are one and the same. It is also twofold: one of reasoning reason (*rationis ratiocinantis*), another of reasoned reason (*rationis ratiocinatae*). The first is that which is made without foundation in reality, as if you distinguish between Tully and Cicero, or if you conceive the same predicated of itself, saying for example "Cicero is Cicero"; then indeed I conceive the same subject enunciated through the mode of subject and predicate as if duplicated, whence results in the mind a certain distinction. The second is that which is made with foundation in reality, as if you distinguish for example between justice and mercy in God; for although justice and mercy are really identified in the same divine essence and are one and the same thing really with it, because nevertheless this simple essence is equivalent to justice and mercy really distinct in creatures, and thus is virtually multiple, it provides our intellect with foundation for distinguishing them in God.

Of this distinction therefore a twofold foundation can be assigned. The first is the said eminence of the thing identifying to itself many perfections really distinct in lower things. The second is the imperfection of our intellect, which since it cannot attain all these perfections at once simultaneously, conceives them with distinct acts as if they were distinct. Whence results distinction in the intellect. This distinction which, when regarded in the intellect, is called of reasoned reason with foundation in reality; when regarded in the thing is called virtual; because it provides what real distinction would provide and is equivalent to it for the verification of contradictories concerning the same thing.

Scotus with his followers rejects this distinction of reasoned reason or virtual, and establishes another which he calls actual formal from the nature of the thing. Actual, because it is on the part of reality before every concept of mind; Formal, because it is not between things which enjoy their own existence, but between formalities or modes of the same thing; From the nature of the thing, because it results from the fact that one is not of the formal concept of another. He says this distinction is not real, because it is not between things, although he admits it is real in this sense that it is on the part of reality independently of the intellect. Nor is it of reason, because, as said, it precedes every act of intellect. Whence according to him it is intermediate between real distinction and distinction of reason.

The question therefore is by what distinction divine attributes are distinguished from each other and from essence. The same difficulty concerns divine relations with respect to essence, which, although it pertains to the Tract on the Trinity, will equally be resolved here.

Section II. Various Opinions Both of Heretics and Catholics Concerning the Proposed Difficulty Are Expounded

I. Aetius and Eunomius in the 4th century acknowledged no distinction of attributes from each other and from essence: for since they boasted that they had as perfect a knowledge of God as He has of Himself, they devised to defend this error that attributes are in no way distinguished from each other and from essence, which they placed in the Unbegotten (*ingenito*). Whence when they professed to know God as unbegotten, consequently they boasted to know God fully. And again, since the Son is begotten, and as I said, they placed God's essence in the Unbegotten, they denied the Son to be God.

Not much different from the Eunomians are the Nominalists, who admit only distinction of reasoning reason and variety of names between absolute attributes among themselves and between essence; for which reason, as Vitasse reports from Baluze tome 4 Miscell., they were ejected from the Academy of Paris and others.

II. From the opposite, a certain Walter, as theologians commonly report from Augustine Nifo 12 Metaph. disp. 13 art. 3, posited distinction absolutely and simply real of attributes from each other and from essence, nor nevertheless did he deny simplicity in God; because he thought that true composition required parts of a whole through the mode of act and potency; the same said Scotus, to save God's simplicity with his formal distinction.

Close to this comes the error of certain Greeks of the 14th century who were called Palamites from their principal defender Gregory Palamas, first a Monk, afterwards Bishop of Thessalonica. For these distinguished even according to reality between divine essence and its operations. But by the name of operations they understood not only those which we call transient, such as creation, government, etc., but also the very attributes, such as goodness, wisdom, justice; which they asserted to be really distinguished from divine essence and to be lesser, though coeternal; just as they said the splendor of the sun is not the substance of the sun, though coeval with it.

To these should be numbered the Socinians, who to show that the Holy Spirit, who in Scripture is called the power of God, is not God, say that God's power and attributes are distinguished from Him.

Abbot Joachim at the end of the twelfth century seems likewise to have admitted real distinction between divine essence and persons, if indeed he condemned as heretical Peter Lombard because he said that some supreme thing is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding. Therefore according to the aforesaid Abbot, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not that supreme thing, that is, divine essence. Lest however he deviate from the Nicene faith, he admitted Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be one essence; but he understood the unity not as real and simple, but as moral and collective, just as many men are one People.

These things are established from the Lateran Council IV under Innocent III in the year 1215, in which the booklet of this Abbot was condemned. He however is not to be considered a heretic, because he subjected all his writings to the judgment of the Church in a protestation prefixed to his works.

III. Gilbert Porreta, Bishop of Poitiers in the 11th century, said that divinity is not God, but the form by which God is, just as humanity is not man, but the form by which man is. And when in the Council of Paris in the year 1147 convened against him, he first denied that he had ever said divinity is not God, but afterwards pressed by various interrogations he added: "I boldly confess that the Father is Father by one thing, God by another, yet He is not this and this"; he brought forth many other obscure and subtle things. Wherefore Eugene III, the Supreme Pontiff then staying in Gaul, remitted his cause to be more accurately discussed to the Council of Rheims which was convened the following year 1148 from Bishops of ten Provinces, and to which there were present many Theologians and many Abbots, among whom St. Bernard was eminent.

Therefore in that Council when Gilbert again denied that divinity is God, the Fathers of the Council issued against him a Symbol in which they define that divinity and all relations and properties which are from eternity are God. It is indeed true that the Holy Pontiff did not want this Symbol to be a rule of faith, not because it contained anything contrary to truth, but because the Bishops had issued it without the Cardinals who were gravely moved about this matter.

Nevertheless the Pontiff himself afterwards with the whole Council, namely Cardinals and Bishops, defined: "That no reason in Theology should divide between nature and person; nor should God be said to be of divine essence in the sense of the ablative only, but also of the nominative." That is, not only should it be said "God is God by divinity," but also "God is divinity itself" (Deus est ipsa Deitas); which is the very doctrine of the Symbol and by which Gilbert's principal error is condemned.

Nor should it move you that the Holy Pontiff prohibits that any reason in Theology distinguish between nature and person, as if he also reproved the distinction of reasoned reason: for these things were defined according to Gilbert's sense. But he admitted a twofold reason, one Mathematical which distinguishes those things which are not distinct in reality; another Theological which distinguishes those things which are distinct in reality: and he said that relations in God are distinguished from essence by reason not only Mathematical but also Theological; because he contended that they are extrinsically affixed to God or at least really distinct from Him.

The Council therefore, proscribing Gilbert's error in his very terms, says that in Theology reason, namely Theological, does not distinguish between essence and person, that is, that reason does not admit essence and person to be distinct in reality, as Gilbert erroneously opined.

These things have been said about Gilbert from St. Bernard, his principal adversary, Sermon 80 on the Canticles and book 5 on Consideration to Eugene chapter 7, from Geoffrey the Monk of Clairvaux in his Letter to the Cardinal of Albano who was also present at the Council of Rheims, and from Otto of Freising, a contemporary, book 1 on the deeds of Frederick I chapter 50 and following. He favored Gilbert a little more than was right and detracted somewhat from St. Bernard, but approaching death he revoked this and subjected himself to the Censure of the Church, as witnessed by Radevicus book 2 chapter 11 in Labbe for the year 1147. Gilbert also subscribed to the definition of the Council of Rheims and revoked his error, as witnessed by the same Otto; whence he is not to be called a heretic.

From what has been said it is clear that Gilbert distinguished between abstract and concrete, so that divinity was not God, but the form by which God is. But it is uncertain whether he likewise distinguished abstracts among themselves, so that it could not be said that justice is divinity, wisdom is goodness. It is likewise uncertain whether just as he distinguished relations from essence, so he distinguished absolute attributes from the same essence and from each other.

Finally, theologians dispute what kind of real distinction Gilbert sustained between divinity and God, between relations and divine essence: whether absolutely and simply real? Or only actual formal? The latter opinion is defended by Petavius tome 1 Dogmatic Theology book 1 chapter 8 number 8, Vasquez dispute 120 in 1 part chapter 2, and certain others, and they prove it **1○.** from the fact that Gilbert said in the Council of Paris that the Father is Father by one thing, God by another, yet is not this and this, and thus relations and divine essence are one entity, not many. **2○.** Because he repeatedly declared that the three persons are one God. **3○.** Because if he had sustained simply real distinction, his error would have been obvious to anyone, and the Fathers of both Councils of Paris and Rheims would not have needed so many interrogations and explanations to reach him.

Nor does it obstruct that St. Thomas below in question 28, article 2 says that Gilbert taught that Relations in divine matters are assisting or extrinsically affixed. For the Holy Doctor did not say this from his own opinion, but from the relation of others: "Concerning this," he says, "Gilbert Porreta is said to have erred, for he said (namely as it is said) that Relations in divine matters are assisting or extrinsically affixed"; or he attributes this to him argumentatively as a consequence from his principles.

Hence the praised Theologians infer that the opinion of Scotus scarcely or not at all differs from the opinion of Gilbert.

On the other hand, Scotists and certain others with them object and contend that Gilbert established distinction absolutely and simply real: Because according to Matthew of Paris for the year 1199 and a manuscript Code of Gilbert in Vasquez dispute 120 chapter 2, Gilbert himself thus taught that relations are distinguished from persons so that they would be diverse in number,

and would be three eternal things, and differing in number from each other and from divine substance.

On which side the truth stands we do not judge; let others judge.

Scotus therefore with his followers posits between attributes compared among themselves and between divine essence, likewise between divine relations and essence, his actual formal distinction, concerning which see above.

St. Thomas with his followers and with almost all other Theologians acknowledges between the aforesaid a virtual distinction or of reasoned reason. Which opinion is true is inquired.

Section III. The Question Is Resolved

I suppose **1○.** against Palamites and Walter, and Abbot Joachim, that neither attributes from each other and from essence, nor relations from essence in God are distinguished really entitatively: Because the opposite opinion is defined in the Lateran and Rheims councils, and will be evident from the confutation of the Scotistic distinction. For if these are not distinguished actually formally, *a fortiori* they are not distinguished actually really.

I suppose **2○.** against Aetians and Nominalists that these aforesaid are distinguished more than by distinction of reasoning reason, as will be evident from the assertion of virtual distinction.

Therefore, I say **1○.** divine attributes are not distinguished from each other and from essence, nor relations from essence by actual formal distinction, commonly called Scotistic.

It is proved **1○.** by an argument deduced from Scriptures: Those things which are actually, formally distinguished in reality from something cannot be predicated of it in the abstract, but rather must be denied, because since the abstract includes nothing from itself other than what it explains, if it were predicated of that from which it is formally actually distinguished in reality, there would not be identity of predicate and subject, as is evident in these predications: Peter is humanity, is justice, is goodness. But according to the Scriptures attributes are predicated of God in the abstract: thus John 14, Christ said of himself, "I am the way, the truth and the life." Whence St. Bernard in the Council of Rheims, when asked to put in writing what he thought against Gilbert, said: "Let it be written with an iron stylus, in an adamantine nail, and let it be carved in flint, that divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, magnitude, is truly God." Therefore, etc.

It is proved **2○.** from Councils. **1○.** From the Council of Rheims in which it was defined that theological reason ought not distinguish between nature and person, that is, as we explained, that nature and person are not distinguished in reality, and that God is divinity, which could not be said if divinity were formally distinguished in reality from God, as is evident from the preceding

proof. **2○.** From the Lateran Council under Innocent III, where in the chapters of faith title 2 it is read thus: "We however, with the approval of the sacred and universal Council, believe and confess with Peter, that there is one certain supreme thing, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which truly is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three persons together and singly each of them: And therefore in God there is Trinity only, not quaternity... Although therefore the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another, nevertheless they are not another thing, but what the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Spirit, the same entirely."

Moreover, if entirely the same in reality, therefore in no way are they distinguished in reality. Likewise if they are formally really distinguished, therefore there will be formally really quaternity in God, indeed centenary, so to speak. **3○.** From the Council of Florence under Eugene IV in the year 1439. In that Council John the Theologian of the Order of Friars Preachers, Provincial of Lombardy, disputing for the Latins against the Greeks, speaks thus in session 18: "You ask whether in divine persons substance and person, or *hypostasis*, are the same; we indeed say that substance and person, or *hypostasis*, are the same in reality, but differ in our mode of understanding." Mark the Ephesian Bishop responds on behalf of the Greeks: "Perhaps in this part there is no discrepancy between us." And in the following session 19, Andrew the Rhodian Archbishop, conceding this without any hesitation, said: "In the common Theology of Doctors, both Greek and Latin, it differs to say divine substance and substance (that is subsistence as he immediately explains) of the Father and Son: lest however you think this differs in reality, but only in apprehension and understanding."

Scotists respond **1○.** that these words do not contain a definition of the Council but conversations of the Fathers. **2○.** That it was not the intention of the Council to proscribe Scotus's opinion, about which there was no controversy, but the error of real distinction.

To the first I admit that these words do not contain a definition, otherwise the Scotist opinion would be heresy, and the truth of the Thomistic school would be a truth of faith: nevertheless these words have very great authority, and our opinion is most validly confirmed by them, since it is received by the common sense of both the Greek and Latin Church as true, and is applied to refuting the said error of real distinction.

To the second I likewise admit that it was not the mind of the Council to condemn Scotus's opinion, but the heresy of real distinction between essence and relations. But truly the Fathers could not refute heresy except through doctrine which they considered true, for indeed error is not refuted by error; since therefore they used our opinion for this end, without doubt they held it as true, and the contrary Scotistic opinion as false, especially because they said that relations are distinguished from essence only through the intellect.

And indeed it will perhaps seem strange that Scotists, especially among them Father Francis Henno, do not want their distinction to be disapproved by these most open words of the Council:

because, they say, there was no controversy about it; when nevertheless the praised Theologian pretends to derive it from other passages of the same Council that are minimally pertinent.

The Conclusion is confirmed by an argument deduced from these Councils. The aforesaid Councils reproved and condemned distinction truly and properly real. This is confessed by all, even Scotists. But actual formal distinction before every concept of mind is truly and properly real. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved: That is truly and properly real which, whatever it may be, whether substance, or accident, or mode, or identity, or distinction, or action, which is or can be on the part of reality independently of the intellect, for this is the definition of being truly and strictly real. But Scotus's actual formal distinction is on the part of reality independently of the intellect. Therefore, etc.

I know Scotists respond that only that distinction is properly and strictly real which is concerned either with separable extremes, or with producer and produced, or with those things which are immediately subjected in separate or separable subjects. But on the contrary **1○.** these things are feigned merely gratuitously and completely invert the common definition of real being or reality. **2○.** Gilbert according to Scotists posited distinction strictly real in divine matters, yet nevertheless he did not think divinity and God to be separable, nor to be producer and produced, nor to be subjected in separate or separable subjects. Therefore, etc.

Nor should you say that Gilbert distinguished divinity from God as things, but Scotus as realities only and formalities. For what, I ask, are those realities, what formalities, if they are not things and beings? Will there perhaps be a medium between being and nothing? Is not being or thing said of what is or can be on the part of reality independently of the intellect? These therefore seem to be mere words and subtleties of unfounded reasoning reason.

You will perhaps say: things are said which enjoy their own existence; realities or formalities which exist by the existence of essence. But again **1○.** these things are said gratuitously. **2○.** It is to explain the unknown through the more unknown, for it is indeed unknown to which things many existences belong. **3○.** Matter probably will not be a thing, because in the more probable opinion it exists by the existence of form. **4○.** Finally Gilbert according to Scotists distinguished between divinity and God, between relations and essence as between things, and yet he himself did not consider whether one or many existences belonged to God.

Moreover, these things are not said to invite envy, but arguing for the inquiry of truth. At least it cannot be denied that this distinction of Scotus greatly favors the condemned errors of Gilbert Porreta, the Palamites and Socinians; if you say conversely that through it the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is better and more easily explained, namely how the nature of the Father is communicated to the Son and not the person; likewise the mystery of the Incarnation, namely how the Son is incarnate and not the Father. I respond that this was also Gilbert's reason for his

error. Likewise these things are optimally explained through virtual distinction, as will be evident from what will be said elsewhere.

The Conclusion is proved **3○.** from the Fathers. St. Augustine book 7 on the Trinity chapter 6 says: "It is not one thing for God to be, another to be a person, but entirely the same." Therefore without any real distinction even formal, otherwise it would not be entirely the same. In the same sense are cited St. Damascus book 1 Orthodox Faith chapter 11, St. Fulgentius in Response to Ferrand interrogation 2, St. Anselm in Monologion chapter 17, St. Bernard sermon 80 on the Canticles and book 5 on Consideration chapter 6 and following; and others.

D. Tournely relates here that among the articles condemned by Stephen Bishop of Paris with the counsel of Parisian Theologians in the year 1286, this is read: "That something is God really, which is not God according to its formal being." And that among the articles revoked by Louis in the year 1362, this is reprehended: "That something is God according to its real being, and yet is not God according to its formal being." As witness to this matter he adduces Gerson tome 1 of works new Edition page 101 and 118. But according to Scotists, something is God really which is not God formally, namely justice; for it is distinguished according to them from divinity formally and not really.

The Conclusion is proved **4○.** by reasons. The first, which is of St. Bernard book 5 on Consideration chapter 7 and which Augustine had preceded book 5 on the Trinity chapter 5, is taken from God's supreme perfection. God is from Himself the most perfect being than which nothing more perfect can be thought. But a being which from itself so identifies all perfections to itself that they are in no way distinguished from it except through concepts more or less explicit, is more perfect than if they were really formally distinguished from it and not included in its essential concept, as is evident per se. Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed: these perfections really formally distinct from essence could not be conceived except as perfections received in divine essence as in a subject. Therefore divine essence would be conceived in potency toward them as perfectible toward perfective, which repugns God as most perfect and pure act. Therefore, etc.

The second reason is taken from God's supreme simplicity and is thus proposed. God is supremely simple. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with real formal distinction. Therefore, etc. The Major is certain from faith. I prove the Minor: Real formal distinction in God imports real formal composition in God, in that mode namely in which there is distinction. But supreme simplicity cannot stand with formal real composition. Therefore, etc. The Minor is evident and admitted. I prove the Major **1○.** Composition is the union of distinct things. But things formally really distinct in God, if they exist, are united to divinity and among themselves. Therefore real formal distinction in God imports real composition in God. I prove **2○.** the same Major: from real entitative distinction in God if it were given, real entitative composition in God is inferred

and was inferred by the Fathers against Walter and Gilbert. Therefore from real formal distinction in God, real formal composition in God is legitimately inferred.

Notwithstanding these things which seem demonstrative, Scotists deny that attributes, although formally really distinct from each other and from essence, make composition in God. **1○.** Because they are not united in essence, but are identified with it. **2○.** Because for composition it is required that one be related through the mode of act and another through the mode of potency. **3○.** Because there is plurality of attributes, relations and essence, but where there is plurality, it is not necessary that there be composition, since plurality and composition are distinguished; plurality indeed is opposed to unity, and composition to simplicity. **4○.** Because real distinction of persons among themselves does not harm divine simplicity. Therefore neither does formal real distinction of attributes from each other and from essence, and of relations from essence. Thus R. P. Henno here dispute 2 question 2 in folio objection 4.

But on the contrary: to the first, either attributes are identified with essence and among themselves really formally or not. If the first, therefore they are not distinguished formally really. If the second, therefore they are united and compose formally really.

To the second I respond **1○.** that this response is merely gratuitous, both because composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things, in whatever way they may be distinct, and because truly there are compositions in which this condition of act and potency is not found, such as integral composition, composition of mixture as in elements, composition of order as in an army, composition by aggregation as in a heap of stones. **2○.** Although Walter and Gilbert did not distinguish in God through the mode of act and potency, nevertheless the Fathers and Theologians infer from their distinction composition in God. **3○.** Granted that for composition it is required that one be related through the mode of act and another through the mode of potency, this is also found in God according to Scotus's opinion. For granted that essence is formally really distinguished from attributes or divine perfections, by this very fact essence is posited as a receptive subject of them, consequently in potency toward them as perfectible and actualizable by them.

To the third I respond **1○.** that that plurality openly destroys God's supreme unity, as I will say now, and thus P. Henno falls into Scylla wishing to avoid Charybdis. Moreover it contradicts the Lateran Council chapter "firmly," in which Trinity is admitted in God, not Quaternity, or any number. **2○.** Either those many things are separated from each other, or united, or really formally identified. The first cannot be said. If the second, therefore they compose formally really. If the third, therefore they are not many, but one and the same formally really.

To the fourth, I deny the parity. The disparity is that in our opinion relations do not compose either with essence, because they are really formally identified with it, nor among themselves, both because with respect to themselves they are not related as co-parts, but as wholes, just as

individuals in men and angels, and because they are compared to each other as distinct and opposed, not as united. But according to Scotus's opinion, since both the relations themselves and the very attributes are not formally really identified with essence, but are formally really distinguished from it, and otherwise are not separate, it follows that they are united to it and compose with it.

The third reason is taken from God's supreme unity and is thus formed. Just as God is supremely simple, so He is supremely one, indeed most one, if that could be said, says St. Bernard. But formal real distinction is opposed to this supreme unity: both because, as Father Henno himself admits, it imports real formal plurality, but plurality is diametrically opposed to unity; and because distinction is related to unity as composition to simplicity. But real formal composition destroys supreme simplicity, as adversaries admit. Therefore formal real distinction destroys supreme unity.

I say **2○.** Divine attributes from each other and from essence, likewise relations from essence, are distinguished by virtual distinction, or of reasoned reason, not indeed major which is through the mode of excluding and excluded, but minor, which is through the mode of implicit and explicit.

The first part is proved. Those things are said to be distinguished virtually which, although they are in themselves a most simple thing, nevertheless are equivalent to many really distinct things and produce diverse effects, whence they provide our intellect with foundation for forming distinct inadequate concepts as if of things really distinct in reality, from which results in the mind a certain distinction, which is called of reasoned reason or with foundation in reality. But in God attributes, relations and essence are one most simple thing, as is established from what has been said, nevertheless equivalent to many really distinct things in creatures producing diverse effects, and thence providing our intellect with foundation for forming diverse inadequate concepts about it, from which results in the intellect distinction of reason with foundation in reality. Therefore, etc.

This distinction therefore, as I have already observed, insofar as it is regarded in the thing, is called virtual, because it is virtually real and equivalent to it. Insofar as it is regarded in the mind it is called of reasoned reason or with foundation in reality.

And that foundation, as we have also observed, is twofold. The first on the part of the thing conceived, namely its eminence or equivalence to many things distinct in creatures, which is called virtual multiplicity. The other on the part of our intellect, namely its weakness by which it happens that since it cannot attain this eminence of God with one act adequately, it must achieve this with many repeated inadequate concepts, whence arises in the mind distinction which is called with foundation in reality.

Let St. Thomas be heard in the cited place: "That God exceeds our intellect is on the part of God himself because of the plenitude of his perfection, and on the part of our intellect which is

deficiently related to comprehending it. Whence it is evident that this plurality of reasons is not only on the part of our intellect, but also on the part of God himself; insofar as his perfection surpasses any conception of our intellect; and therefore to this plurality of reasons something corresponds in the thing, which is God; not indeed plurality of thing, but full perfection, from which it happens that all these conceptions are suited to him."

By these words not only is our conclusion explained and proved, but also those things are dissipated which P. Henno brings forth from the same Holy Doctor partly truncated, partly diminished in the end of his present disputation on the distinction of attributes. It is indeed a paradox, perhaps hitherto unheard of in the schools, that St. Thomas stands for Scotistic formal distinction, with virtual distinction rejected, which is commonly called Thomistic from him as its principal defender.

The second part is proved: Major distinction of reasoned reason, or which is related through the mode of excluding and excluded, is that by which one thing with foundation in reality is so prescinded from another that it in no way, even implicitly, includes that in its concept, but remains in potency toward it as something contractible and perfectible through it as through something extraneous. But such distinction cannot be conceived in God. Therefore, etc.

The Minor is proved: whatever is divine or whatever is conceived in God ought to be conceived as most pure act and infinite being in the genus of being. But it repugns to conceive with foundation in reality most pure act and infinite being in potency as contractible and perfectible through another as through something extraneous; for this would be to destroy the concept of most pure act, of whose nature it is to exclude all potentiality and imperfection, and the concept of infinite being, of whose nature it is to include at least implicitly every reason of being. Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed: God is the most perfect being than which nothing more perfect can be thought. But it is more perfect if all things which are in God mutually include each other formally at least implicitly, than if one were excluded from the formal concept of another. Therefore, etc.

From this last conclusion you will gather that attributes, relations and essence in God do not differ entirely in the same way as metaphysical grades differ, namely animality and rationality. For these are distinguished by major distinction or exclusive precision, but those by minor distinction or inclusive precision. From which you will further infer that God is not composed of genus and difference, because this composition is founded in major distinction, and finally that He is not placed in any predicament.

Section IV. Objections Are Solved

Note the principal objections of Scotists, if they prove anything, prove not only formal real distinction, but real entitative distinction, as will be evident from the following, which since it cannot be admitted with faith safe, consequently their reasons cannot be admitted, as proving too much and against faith.

1○. You object: Augustine book 3 against Maximus chapter 10 proves that Trinity of persons does not obstruct divine simplicity, because plurality of perfections does not obstruct it. But the argument would not conclude if plurality of perfections were only through the intellect and not formally from the nature of the thing, for from the fact that plurality through intellect can stand with a simple thing, it does not follow that plurality on the part of reality can stand.

I respond **1○.** By this argument, if it concludes anything, not only formal distinction between attributes is concluded, but real entitative, since indeed persons are distinguished among themselves really entitatively; therefore it proves too much, consequently it proves nothing.

I respond **2○.** The mind of St. Augustine is not to prove that real relations which in God differ really stand with divine simplicity, from the fact that perfections differ in God really or by reason and nevertheless stand with divine simplicity; but to prove that relations which really differ stand with divine simplicity, from the fact that perfections, namely wisdom and magnitude, differ in creatures really, and yet as they are in God, do not destroy divine simplicity. This proof is legitimate; for if those things which in created things differ even sometimes according to diverse genera, such as wisdom and magnitude, insofar as they are in God, do not destroy His divine simplicity, *a fortiori* those things which in created things differ only within the same genus, such as relations, do not destroy this divine simplicity.

You will insist according to Augustine book 7 on the Trinity chapter 7: The distinction between relation and essence is greater than between wisdom and knowledge, for he says, "not by the same word by which wisdom, wisdom indeed by which essence." But according to Thomists wisdom is distinguished from essence virtually. Therefore at least relation is distinguished from it actually formally.

I respond: I distinguish the Major: The distinction is greater fundamental, etc. - I concede the Major. Actual formal - I deny the Major, or rather, I deny the supposition because no actual formal distinction is given in God.

But there is greater fundamental distinction, because the word explains relative being and toward another, wisdom explains absolute being and toward itself, similarly essence. The relative and absolute in created things differ by a whole genus, not so wisdom and essence, which since they are toward themselves are of the same genus. And thus there is greater foundation for distinguishing in God between relative and absolute than between two absolutes.

You will reply again from Augustine and simultaneously from many Fathers, especially those who wrote in the fourth and fifth centuries against Aetius and Eunomius, who removed all distinction from God. Augustine in the cited book 7 on the Trinity says that it is one thing for God to be, another to be Father... for what He is, is said toward Himself; Father toward the Son. Basil book 1 against Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa oration 12 against the same, Gregory Nazianzen oration 35, and others throughout say that prescience, goodness, justice and other attributes are not God's substance. Likewise, that through any attribute, not all of God's perfections are designated, but only some, otherwise all would be synonymous. And Damascus book 1 on faith chapter 4 says: "If you say good, if just, if anything such, you will not speak God's nature, but those things which are around it." Therefore, etc.

I respond: These sayings of the Fathers are verified by virtual distinction alone without the help of actual formal distinction. Thus **1○.** according to Augustine, it is one thing for God to be, another to be Father, virtually namely not really formally. "What He is, is said toward Himself, Father toward the Son," because Paternity is a relative term, and being absolute; whence there is diversity in the mode of signifying the same thing virtually multiple.

2○. Prescience, goodness, justice and other attributes are not God's substance in virtual and explicit sense, or according to the signification of terms; otherwise in real formal sense. For it is entirely the same thing signified by diverse names and apprehended by diverse inadequate concepts, of which one does not explain another although it implies it; and hence it is evident how through any attribute, not all of God's perfections are designated, but only some, nor are all synonymous, because one attribute expressed by voice explains itself alone.

3○. Finally, he who says good, just and anything such, does not speak God's nature but those things which are around nature. This is true explicitly and in virtual sense, otherwise implicitly and in formal real sense. And if anything more is attempted to be derived from the Fathers' sayings understood according to the surface, Scotists will prove not only formal but strictly real distinction.

2○. You object: Such is distinction as is contradiction. But before every operation of mind a certain contradiction is affirmed concerning divine essence, attributes and relations, or rather contradictories are verified. Therefore, etc. The Major is certain. I prove the Minor: thus before every operation of mind it is truly said, God is formally God by deity not by justice. Intellect generates, will does not generate. Essence is communicated to the Son, paternity is not communicated. Therefore, etc. Thus Francis Henno.

I respond **1○.** By retorting the argument: Such is distinction as is contradiction. But between divine essence and relations there is not only formal contradiction or as to formalities, but real entitative or as to entities, for truly essence is communicated to the Son not only formally but

really entitatively, not paternity, otherwise the Father would be distinguished from the Son formally only and not really entitatively, which cannot be admitted. Therefore, etc.

I respond **2○.** Directly to the argument which totters on all sides, and **1○.** the Major can be denied, although P. Henno calls it certain. For indeed concerning a thing simply and formally one, but virtually distinct and multiple, the same thing can be affirmed and denied, and thus those things which seem contradictory can be verified; because truly and properly those things are not contradictory unless they are affirmed and denied of the same under the same aspect; but where a thing is virtually distinct and multiple, those things which seem contradictory are not enunciated of the same under the same aspect, but under diverse aspects. Thus divine essence insofar as it is equivalent to created intellect generates, insofar as it is equivalent to will it does not generate. Divine essence insofar as it is absolute is communicated, insofar as it is equivalent to the relative it is not communicated.

Note well indeed that those things which in created things are really distinguished are identified in God with their natures preserved. Consequently to these things, the Minor must also be denied, namely that contradictories properly so called are verified concerning divine essence, attributes and relations.

But for greater clarity, I distinguish the Major: Such is distinction formally or virtually as is contradiction - I concede the Major. Such is distinction always formally as is contradiction - I deny the Major. For it suffices, as has been said, virtual distinction which is equivalent to actual real, such as is eminence or virtual multiplicity of divine entity. For by that title it is called virtual distinction, because by reason of infinite entity it provides eminently what formal real distinction would provide formally.

Hence you will infer that the very formal distinction which Scotists so greatly boast is not sufficient to verify strictly real contradiction in divine matters; since for this strictly real distinction is required, or one equivalent to strictly real, for such, they say, ought to be distinction as is contradiction, nor is their formal distinction strictly real, nor equivalent to it, it follows that it is not sufficient for this effect, unlike our virtual distinction, which is equivalent to strictly real.

1○. You will insist with the same P. Henno: Either this virtual distinction or that equivalence to many leaves on the part of reality complete identity between essence, attributes and relations in God concerning which contradictories are verified, or it does not leave it. If not, therefore there is given some distinction among them, and we have our intent. If it does leave it, therefore it follows that on the part of reality paternity is no less communicable than essence, since they are entirely the same. **2○.** That on the part of reality essence generates no less than the Father. **3○.** That the Son proceeds on the part of reality no less through will than through intellect, all of which and similar things cannot be admitted without heresy, or at least without error. Therefore, etc.

I respond **1○.** as above by retorting the argument: this objection, if it proves anything, proves not only formal but entitative distinction, since not only formally but also entitatively divine essence is communicated to the Son, and paternity is not communicated entitatively.

I respond **2○.** directly: Having conceded the Antecedent for the first part, namely that virtual distinction leaves on the part of reality complete entity between essence, relations and attributes, I deny the consequences. Because, as has been said not infrequently, by this very fact that one and the same thing on the part of reality differs by reason, or is virtually distinct and multiple, it can in reality be communicated under one aspect and not under another, generate under one aspect and not under another, no differently than if it were really distinct and multiple; because reasons really distinct in lower things are identified in the higher, with their natures and properties preserved. Whence this virtual multiplicity provides what real would provide, and therefore is called virtual, just as the virtual heat of the sun provides what formal heat of fire would provide.

Thus therefore in God the same entity entirely, by reason of its eminence virtually multiple, is communicated in reality under the aspect of the absolute, is not communicated under the aspect of the relative; generates as relative, does not generate as absolute; generates as intellective, does not generate as volitive.

But let the Angelic Doctor himself speak below in question 39, article 1, at the second response, but especially question 7 on Power, article 1, at the fifth response, where he thus discourses: "It must be said that concerning that which is the same in reality and different in reason, nothing prohibits contradictories being predicated, as the Philosopher says in 3 Physics, just as it is evident that the same point in reality, different in reason, is principle and end, and according as it is principle it is not end and conversely. Whence since essence and property are the same in reality, they differ in reason, nothing prohibits that one be communicable and another incommunicable." Thus St. Thomas.

Do you want another example? The rational soul in man is unique, nevertheless eminently vegetative and sensitive, and by reason of this eminence or virtual multiplicity, it is communicated and not communicated under diverse aspects; it is communicated to certain parts as vegetative, it is not communicated as sensitive; it is communicated to other parts as sensitive, it is not communicated as rational.

2○. You will insist secondly: An actual effect seeks an actual cause. But contradiction is actual. Therefore distinction ought to be actual.

I respond: I distinguish the Major: An actual effect seeks an actual formal or virtual cause - I concede. An actual formal cause always - I deny. For indeed for an actual effect there is not required a cause which is actually formal or univocal, that is, formally actually containing the effect, such as fire for example with respect to heat to be produced, but it suffices that it be

actually a virtual and equivocal cause, just as actual virtual heat of the sun is sufficient cause of actual formal heat.

But our virtual distinction is actually in God, namely divine eminence identifying perfections in lower things really distinct, from which as from an equivocal cause proceeds actual real contradiction.

3○. You object: Those things which have distinct definitions are formally distinguished. But essence and attributes in God have distinct definitions. Therefore, etc.

I respond: I distinguish the Major: Those things which have distinct definitions given concerning the thing as it is in itself on the part of reality are formally distinguished - I concede the Major. Those things which have distinct definitions given concerning the thing as it is inadequately conceived, I sub-distinguish: they are formally distinct in reality - I deny. Under the concept inadequately defining - I concede.

In this sense, I distinguish the Minor: we explain essence and attributes with distinct definitions, not as they are identified in reality, but as we attain them with distinct inadequate concepts.

You will infer: Therefore the definitions which we give of them are vicious. The inference is proved: a good definition ought to explain what the thing is on the part of reality, and not under our concept only. Therefore, etc.

I respond: I deny the inference. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: a good definition ought to explain what the thing is on the part of reality adequately or inadequately - I concede the Antecedent. Adequately, I sub-distinguish: an adequate definition - I concede. An inadequate one - I deny.

But a definition is not vicious from the fact that it is inadequate, but only when it attributes to a thing what does not belong to it, or denies what belongs to it, which does not happen here, but only explains the thing according to some part of itself, not according to all: in which there is no vice; for as is commonly said, "of those abstracting there is no lie" (*abstrahentium non est mendacium*).

4○. You object: The intellect forming this proposition, "divine wisdom is not formally divine goodness," does not cause its truth, but finds it in reality; for from the fact that a thing is or is not in reality, the proposition is said to be true or false. Therefore in reality divine wisdom is formally distinguished from divine goodness.

I respond: This proposition has a double sense by reason of the particle "formally," which can be taken in two ways. First absolutely for the quiddity of the thing as it is in itself, so that the sense of the proposition is, "divine wisdom is not formally in itself and on the part of reality divine

goodness." And in this sense it is false, since all attributes absolutely as they are in themselves on the part of reality are formally identified.

Second, "formally" is taken relatively for the quiddity of the thing as it underlies our concepts and is denominated extrinsically distinct by them: in this sense the aforesaid proposition is true, but from it is concluded only that wisdom and goodness are formally distinguished under concept.

Whence formally, I distinguish the Antecedent: The intellect forming this proposition, "divine wisdom is not formally divine goodness," does not cause its truth but finds it in reality, if "formally" is taken absolutely - I deny the supposition of the Antecedent: for the proposition is not then true, but false. If "formally" is taken relatively - I deny the Antecedent.

But to what is added that a proposition is said to be true or false from the fact that a thing is or is not in reality, this is true when in the proposition there is no reduplication under concept, as happens in the present proposition through "formally" taken relatively.

You will insist: if this proposition is false, "divine wisdom formally absolutely in reality is not divine goodness," this contradictory one will be true, "divine wisdom formally absolutely in reality is divine wisdom." But the Consequent is false, therefore also the Antecedent.

The Minor is proved: this proposition is false, "the attribute of wisdom is formally absolutely in reality the attribute of goodness." Therefore also the preceding "divine wisdom," etc.

I respond: I deny the Minor. To the proof, I deny the Consequence. The reason is that they are not taken in the same mode, nor do they signify entirely the same thing: attribute of divine wisdom and divine wisdom, attribute of divine goodness and divine goodness. For when I say "attribute of wisdom," the state of reason is imported, since there are not various attributes in God except through reason, and the explicit concept by which it is virtually distinguished in reality from goodness is reduplicated, so that the very virtual distinction is exercised there: nothing of this happens when divine wisdom, divine goodness is said.

Whence the supposition of this proposition is false: "the attribute of divine wisdom is formally absolutely in reality the attribute of divine goodness." No differently than if I were to say: "a goat-stag is formally absolutely in reality a chimera." For just as a goat-stag is not given absolutely in reality, which this proposition supposes, so neither are attributes given in God absolutely in reality, that is, properties consequent upon essence, which the prior proposition nevertheless supposes. For attributes are made and spoken of only through reason conceiving certain perfections in God by analogy from creatures, as properties consequent upon essence, which nevertheless is not in reality, since nothing in God is prior or posterior, but one most simple entity.

You will reply: if wisdom in reality is formally goodness, mercy is justice, will is intellect, etc., therefore at least it will be true to say that absolutely formally in reality, mercy punishes, justice pardons, that intellect wills, will understands. But these things are false and absurd. Therefore, etc.

I respond **1○.** I deny the Major. Because when the proper operation of some attribute is predicated, then is imported explicitly by way of consignification the reason on account of which one attribute is virtually distinguished from another, so that the virtual distinction is exercised there, and therefore the operation of one attribute cannot be formally predicated of another.

I respond **2○.** I deny the Minor if "formally" in the minor is taken absolutely for essence or quiddity as it is on the part of reality, because in this sense it is true that the same most simple entity which essentially in reality is mercy, punishes, that the same entity which essentially in reality is will understands, although nevertheless it does not punish reduplicatively under the aspect of mercy, that is, insofar as it is equivalent to the power of having mercy in created things, nor does it understand insofar as it is equivalent to the power of willing in a creature.

From which it follows both that there is no intercession of Scotus's formal distinction, since it is a most simple entity which provides all these things, and that our virtual distinction must be admitted, since it provides all these things insofar as it is equivalent to many really distinct things in creatures.

Against the second conclusion it could be objected that it was defined in the Council of Rheims that reason in Theology should not distinguish between essence and person. But we anticipated this above in Section 2, number 3. Look there.

You object furthermore against the same: Distinct formal concepts cannot be formed about God unless on God's part distinct objective concepts correspond. But from the second conclusion there are not distinct objective concepts in God. Therefore, etc.

I respond: I deny the Major. For to form distinct inadequate formal concepts about God, God's infinite perfection suffices, which since it is equivalent to many really distinct things, provides foundation to my intellect for conceiving it inadequately under one aspect and not under another.

You object again against the same: Composition of reason repugns God, therefore also distinction of reason. The Consequence is evident, because God is not less one than simple, and distinction is opposed to unity just as composition to simplicity.

I respond: I deny the Consequence, because for composition even of reason there is required a double part mutually excluding, of which one is related in potency to another, or both to the whole: for composition strictly taken is the union of parts; but it is of the nature of a part that it exclude a part.

Whence the foundation of composition of reason would have to be major virtual distinction or through the mode of excluding and excluded, which, as we proved, repugns God. But truly the foundation of distinction of reason does not repugn God, for it is, as we said, the eminence of that entity on one part, and on the other the imperfection and limitation of our intellect.

APPENDIX

First Question: Are all attributes in God equal?

Response 1°. If we speak of attributes as they are in reality, they are equal, not with positive equality which would require real distinction, but with negative equality which consists in the negation of excess, for they are in reality one and the same.

Response 2°. If we speak of them as they are conceived by us, under distinction: either they are considered under the aspect of uncreated and infinite being which they transcendentally include, and thus they are equal, because this aspect, being indivisible and unique, is equally imbibed by all. Or they are considered under their explicit aspect and by analogy to similar perfections in created things, and thus they are unequal in a certain sense, because intellect, for example, expresses greater perfections than will, and so forth with the rest.

Second Question: Do God and the blessed also make a distinction of reason between essence and attributes?

Response: More probably negative: Because the foundations of reasoned distinction are partly the eminence of the thing, partly the imperfection of the intellect reaching the thing through diverse inadequate concepts; but God attains his essence, however most eminent, with a single intuition, and likewise the blessed, at least in beatific vision, because they know God through a single and most simple species, namely the divine essence performing the functions of both impressed and expressed species, as we shall say below. I said, at least in beatific vision: Because it does not seem to conflict that the blessed, through another knowledge they have outside the Word, might form diverse concepts about the essence of God, and thus form a distinction of reason.

DISSERTATION III

On Attributes in particular which pertain to Divine Being

From St. Thomas, Questions 3 to 11

Of the attributes which we conceive in God, some, as I have already noted, pertain to his being or substance, others to his operation; and since according to us being is prior to operation, hence with St. Thomas we first treat of those which pertain to divine being; then of those which pertain to his operation, such as knowledge, providence, etc.

And since we know God more perfectly through negation, namely by removing from him the imperfections of creatures which we can penetrate, than through affirmation, affirming about him divine perfections which we cannot sufficiently grasp; hence again with the holy Doctor we begin from negatives, and **1°.** we treat of the simplicity of God or non-composition. Whence follows:

ARTICLE I

On the Simplicity of God

St. Thomas, Question 3

Note that there is a twofold simplicity: **One** arises from potentiality and defect: **The other** proceeds from form and act. **The first** brings with it poverty and imperfection, and belongs to prime matter, which is almost nothing. **The second** denotes the highest perfection and actuality, and about this is the question.

First Question: Whether God is a body?

It is certain that idolaters attributed a body to God, since they held as gods either their idols, or the sun, or the moon, or heaven, or plants, or brutes, or men, Jupiter, Saturn, etc. This error flowed from this, says Augustine in his book *On the Usefulness of Believing*, that "they progressed too far and fell into these corporeal things and think nothing else exists (as God) than what they perceive with these five messengers of the body." The same error is attributed to the Sadducees among the Jews.

Among Christians, indeed, certain Egyptian Monks from the sect of the Audians are reported by Socrates (book 6, history, chapter 7) and Sozomenus (book 8, chapter 11) to have maintained that God is a body. Whether Audeus himself, the author of the sect, fell into this error? Some affirm, others deny, chiefly for this reason that St. Epiphanius, who was contemporary with him, in heresy 70 where he treats of the Audians, praises Audeus as a man conspicuous for sanctity, and reproves in him only two things. First, that he celebrated Easter with the Jews on the 14th moon. Second, that from ignorance and with excessive pertinacity he contended that man according to the body was made in the image of God. Refuting this error in the same place, St. Epiphanius shows that it follows from this that God is corporeal; yet he does not accuse Audeus of this error. Indeed, St. Epiphanius's very argument sufficiently suggests that Audeus did not

expressly teach that God is a body, otherwise he would have fruitlessly deduced this grave inconvenience from his doctrine argumentatively. But it is probable that this was the cause of error for later disciples of Audeus, who explicitly affirmed that God is a body; whence they were called anthropomorphites.

Whether Tertullian himself held that God is corporeal is a more serious controversy among the learned; about which in a special digression at the end of this article.

Response therefore to the question negatively. It is of faith.

Proved 1°. from Scriptures: John 4 it is said: "God is spirit." 2 Corinthians 3: "The Lord is spirit." 1 Timothy 1: God is called invisible. 3 Kings 8: immense. Malachi 3: immutable. All of which can in no way belong to a body, but to spirit alone. Whence in the Lateran Council IV, chapter *Firmiter*, it is said: "There is one essence, substance or nature of God, altogether simple." I omit the Fathers whose doctrine is open for this Catholic dogma.

Proved by a threefold reason. **1°.** God is the first unmoved mover, as is evident from what was said above: but every body can be moved, either by local motion passing from one place to another, or by motion of alteration receiving some new accident: Therefore.

2°. God is the first being, as is evident from what was said before: but a body cannot be the first being: Therefore. The minor is proved: The first being is act. For although in one and the same thing which exits from potency to act, potency is prior in time to act, nevertheless act is simply prior to potency, because what is in potency is not reduced to act except through a being in act: but every body is in potency, because the continuous as such is divisible into parts to infinity; therefore.

3°. God is that which is most noble among beings, as has often been said: but it is impossible for any body to be most noble among beings; therefore. The minor is proved: A body is either living or not living; if not living, it is manifest that what is living is nobler than it, at least substantially; if living, it does not live insofar as it is a body, otherwise every body would live, but it lives through something else, just as our body lives through the soul: but that through which a body lives is nobler than the body: Therefore.

You will say: In the Scriptures things are attributed to God which belong only to a body. **1°.** A threefold extension is attributed to God: for it is said in Job 11: "It is higher than heaven, what will you do? Deeper than hell, and how will you know? Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." **2°.** Members are attributed to God. Job 41: Arm. Psalm 33: eyes. **3°.** Position is attributed: Isaiah 6: "I saw the Lord sitting." And there verse 3: "The Lord stands to judge." **4°.** Affections of the soul joined to the body are attributed, such as repenting and being angry. Genesis 6: "It repents me that I have made man." Also, "touched with sorrow of heart

within, I will destroy, he says, man whom I have created." Psalm 6: "O Lord, rebuke me not in your fury, neither chastise me in your wrath": Therefore.

Response: These and similar things are to be understood, not in the proper and literal sense, but in the improper and metaphorical sense; for Scripture is accustomed to deliver to us spiritual and divine things under the likeness of corporeal things so that it adapts itself to our way of thinking and speaking.

Therefore **1°.** when it attributes threefold dimension to God, under the likeness of corporeal quantity, it designates his virtual quantity, namely through depth, the power to know hidden things: through height, the excellence of power over all things: through length, the duration of his being: through breadth, the affection of love toward all things.

2°. By arm is understood his operative power externally, by eye his knowledge and providence.

3°. By sitting, his immobility and authority; by standing, his strength to conquer all that opposes.

4°. By repentance and anger is understood not an affection of the soul but the effect which among men repentance and anger are accustomed to produce, namely retraction of a work done and vindication of offense.

Second Question: Whether in God there is composition of matter and form?

Note: Although according to the truth of the matter every body and only a body is composed of matter and form, yet because this is not conceded by all, therefore the holy Doctor asks here whether God, although he is not a body, is nonetheless composed of matter and form.

Response: Negative.

Proved by a threefold reason. **1°.** Because God is pure act: but in pure act there is no matter which essentially involves potentiality; therefore.

2°. God is good and perfect through his essence, not through participation: but what is composed of matter and form is good through form, and thus through participation: Therefore.

3°. God is the first agent simply: but what is first agent simply must be primarily and per se form: Therefore God is primarily per se form, not composed of matter and form. The minor is proved: Each thing acts through its form: Therefore what is first agent simply must, etc.

Third Question: Whether God is the same as his essence or nature: that is, whether God lacks substantial composition from nature and suppositum?

Before the response, note **1°.** that the holy Doctor by this name "God" which imports suppositum, understands that which has true deity, whether it be the individual of deity as undivided and pre-understood to the three persons, or whether it be an incommunicable person, the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit.

Note **2°.** that suppositum adds two things to nature or essence: For it does not only embrace what is imported by definition, namely the principles of species. But it adds to nature **1°.** individuating principles, as they are in humanity, for example, this flesh, these bones, this quantity, these accidents signifying matter; for although these are not included in humanity, they are nonetheless included in this suppositum which is man. **2°.** It adds subsistence or existence per se which is the term and complement of nature resulting from it.

According to this acceptance it is properly suppositum; according to the first less properly. The question of St. Thomas seems to proceed about suppositum taken improperly and in the first way, not in the second way and properly taken, as his proof indicates. These things being noted.

Response to the question affirmatively.

Proved 1°. From that of John 14: "I am the way, the truth and the life": but life in God is his very deity, or nature: therefore the same is God as his nature. And thus it seems to be defined in the Council of Reims against Gilbert Porretanus who was unwilling that abstracts could be predicated of God in the concrete, as we saw in the preceding dissertation. And whom St. Bernard pressed with this most valid argument: if deity is not God, either it is nothing, or something which is not God. It cannot be said to be nothing since it is the divine nature by which God is God. Neither is it something which is not God, because it would be either less or greater than God, or equal to him; not less, both because it is that by which God is, and that by which God is God is infinite, nor can it be less than what it constitutes. Not greater because that and not God would be the highest good. Not equal because then there would be two highest goods, which is impossible. Therefore.

Proved further: In incorporeal things nature is not distinguished from suppositum: But God is incorporeal as has been proved: Therefore. The major is proved: Therefore in corporeal things nature is distinguished from suppositum, because nature speaks only of those things which enter the definition of species, or that by which such a thing is such, for example, the nature of man, that by which man is man; but suppositum beyond this includes individuated nature and various accidents by which they are individuated. For corporeal natures are individuated through matter designated by certain accidents, therefore in those things which are individuated by themselves and not through matter, as are incorporeal things, suppositum includes nothing else which nature does not include, and thus they are one and the same.

You see, as I said before, this reason proceeds about suppositum taken improperly for individual: For the holy Doctor himself elsewhere often teaches that subsistence is distinguished in Angels

from essence; yet it does not follow from this that St. Thomas spoke diminutively, since below in article 7 he removes every composition whatever from God.

Moreover, that there is no composition in God from nature and subsistence is proved by this general reason that he is most pure act, a supremely perfect being, essentially identifying every perfection and thus also subsistence, from which therefore he is not composed with nature.

Fourth Question: Whether in God essence and being are the same? That is, whether God is so simple that he lacks substantial composition from essence and existence? For here St. Thomas takes being for existence.

Response: Affirmatively.

Proved by a threefold reason: **1°.** If existence were not of the essence of God, it would be caused by it as a property, or by some extrinsic principle. Not the first, because what does not exist cannot give itself existence: In this case indeed it is supposed that God does not exist. Not even the second, otherwise God would not be the first efficient cause.

2°. Because otherwise essence would be in potency to existence, as to its act: but this conflicts with most pure act which God is: therefore.

3°. That which has being, and is not being, is being by participation, just as what has fire and is not fire is ignited by participation; but God is not being by participation but from himself and through essence: therefore.

Fifth Question: Whether God is in some genus or category?

Response: Negative.

Proved: What is placed in some genus or category is placed directly or properly as species, or reductively as principles and privations; thus for example a point is reduced to the category of quantity: but God can be placed in neither way in a category, not directly as species, because every species consists of genus and difference: but in God genus and difference cannot be conceived, since genus imports potentiality. Not even reductively, because what is placed reductively in some category does not extend itself beyond that category, thus a point is not a principle except of continuous quantity: but God is the principle of total being pervading all genera: Therefore. About this question more fully in Logic.

Sixth Question: Whether in God there are any accidents, or whether there is accidental composition in him?

Response: Negative: Because subject is compared to accident as potency to act, for the subject through accident is in some way in act: but being in potency is altogether removed from God, as from most pure act: Therefore.

Seventh Question: Whether God is so simple that he admits no composition whatever in himself?

Response: Affirmatively. It is of faith decided in the Lateran Council cited above.

Proved by a fivefold reason. **1°.** From enumeration of compositions which we have hitherto rejected from God: And indeed in God there is no composition, neither of quantitative parts, because he is not a body; nor composition of form and matter, nor composition from nature and suppositum, nor from essence and existence, nor composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident: Therefore he is in no way composite, but altogether simple.

2°. Every composite is posterior to its components and dependent on them: but God is the first being simply depending on none, therefore.

3°. Every composite is caused by something uniting diverse parts: but God is caused by none, since he is the first efficient cause: Therefore.

4°. In every composite potency and act are found, for either one part is in potency to another, or all parts to the whole: but God is most pure act devoid of all potentiality: Therefore.

5°. In every composite there is something, namely a part, which is not the whole itself: but everything which is in God, is God: Therefore.

You will say: The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity does not seem to cohere with highest simplicity: Therefore. The antecedent is proved: Highest and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality; but in God there is Trinity of persons: Therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major: highest and undivided simplicity does not admit plurality in that in which there is simplicity, granted; in another in which there is not simplicity, denied. But in God there is simplicity in nature, plurality indeed in persons.

You will respond: Those persons are in nature: Therefore there is plurality in that in which we say there is simplicity.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Those persons are in nature as identified in it, granted. They are in nature as distinct from it, denied. Whence they do not compose with it, but are the same; because composition is the union of distinct things, nor do they compose when compared to each other, because as such they are not united but opposed.

If you ask whether at least in God composition of reason can be admitted? we respond negatively at the end of the article, about the distinction of attributes in the preceding dissertation.

Eighth Question: Whether God enters into the composition of other things as a part, either formal or material, or in any other way?

Response: Negative. It is **1°.** against Marcus Varro, who according to Augustine (book 7, *On the City*, chapter 6) held that God was the soul of the world. **2°.** Against the Almarians who held that God is the formal principle of all things. **3°.** Against David of Dinant, who most foolishly held that God is prime matter.

Proved 1°. God is the first efficient cause of all things: but an efficient cause does not coincide in number with the form of the thing made, but only according to species, thus man generates man, not himself: but with the matter of the thing made, it does not coincide even according to species, for matter is in potency and the efficient cause in act: Therefore God is not the form or matter of things made by himself.

2°. Since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to him primarily and per se to act: but what enters into the composition of something is not primarily and per se acting, but rather the composite, for the hand does not act, but man through the hand; and fire heats through heat: Therefore.

Confirmed: What composes as a part is less perfect than the whole which arises from it and another part: but it conflicts with God being less perfect than any thing: Therefore.

You will say 1°. In the mystery of the Incarnation the divine Word composes Christ with human nature: Therefore God can enter into the composition of another.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: The divine Word composes Christ with human nature by the mode of material or formal part inhering, I deny the antecedent. By the mode of completing term, actuating and perfecting human nature, I grant the antecedent. The first composition, as mixed with imperfection, the holy Doctor rejects here, not the second, which imports the greatest perfection and which he admits in the third part. Indeed it can be said that the two natures in Christ in no way have the nature of part and co-part: for it is of the nature of co-part that with another part it constitute a whole which is more perfect than any part separately, which does not happen here. About this more fully in the treatise on the Incarnation.

You will say 2°. Whatever things exist and differ in no way are the same. But God and prime matter exist and differ in no way; therefore they are completely the same: And since prime matter enters the composition of things, so also God. The minor is proved: Whatever things differ, differ by some differences, and thus it is necessary that they be composite: but God and prime matter are altogether simple: Therefore they differ in no way. Thus David of Dinant.

Response: I distinguish the major: Whatever things exist and differ in no way by difference properly or improperly taken are the same, I grant the major. Whatever things exist and differ in no way by difference properly taken, yet differ by difference improperly taken for diversity, are the same, I deny the major. And to this sense I distinguish the minor and deny the consequence.

It must be said therefore that simple things do not differ by some other differences, for this belongs to composite things: thus man and horse differ by rational and irrational differences, but these differences do not differ further from each other by other differences, but by themselves. Whence if force is applied to the word, they are not properly said to differ, but to be diverse: For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10, diverse is said absolutely from this that it is not the same, but everything differing differs by something.

Difference therefore is to be sought in those things which agree in some univocal genus, for it is necessary that something be assigned in them according to which they differ; but in those things which agree in no univocal thing, it is not to be asked by what they differ, but they are diverse by themselves. Whence if force is applied to the word, prime matter and God do not differ, but are diverse by themselves, insofar as one is pure act, the other pure potency, having no agreement in any univocal thing. See St. Thomas in the cited place *Against the Gentiles*, with the commentaries of Ferrariensis.

APPENDIX

On the System of Benedict Spinoza

Allied to the error of David of Dinant is the impious and insane system of Benedict Spinoza, who from a Jew of Amsterdam became an Atheist in the last century in his *Ethics*, a posthumous work, and restored the former's figment with a certain method.

David held that prime matter is God. Spinoza holds that there is one substance of the world and that it is God, relying on this foundation that in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of one nature or attribute: which he proves by this argument not much dissimilar from the sophism of David of Dinant: "If several distinct substances were given, they would have to be distinguished among themselves, either from diversity of attributes or nature, or from distinction of affections. If only from diversity of attributes, it is therefore conceded that there is only one of the same attribute or nature. But if from distinction of affections, since substance is prior by nature to its affections and considered in itself, that is, truly considered, it cannot be conceived as distinct from another, that is, several cannot be given, but only one."

But this sophism is dissolved with one breath, thus distinguishing the final particles: Therefore several cannot be given, but only one in species, let it pass. But only one in number, denied.

Thus Peter and Paul are of the same nature in species, but they are distinguished in number through various affections or accidents.

Furthermore, as to the first part of the argument: From this that several substances of the same nature cannot be given, it does not follow that several of diverse nature or attribute cannot be given; consequently it cannot be inferred from this that there is one substance of the whole world which is God. Furthermore, how false this assertion is I shall soon show in many ways.

But the insane Author adds figments to figments. For he feigns **1°.** that one substance cannot be produced by another. **2°.** That no substance except God can be conceived. **3°.** That this one substance has two modes undistinct from it, namely extension and intelligence, and thus all mundane bodies are modes of it insofar as it is extended, all intelligences modes of it insofar as it is intelligent. **4°.** That this is eternal, infinite, immense, immutable, most perfect, because it is necessary. **5°.** That this or God formally contains all things. **6°.** That all things which are in the world, or can fall under the intellect, follow from the blind necessity of divine nature, as a ray from the sun, fruit from a tree, so that nothing in the world is contingent. **7°.** Consequently that God has operated nothing for any end, yet operates freely, but he understands freedom from coercion, not from necessity.

These and many other ravings Spinoza has babbled, which to have related is to have refuted. But that we may return for a while to the head of the error, namely that there is one substance of the whole world which is God.

1°. It is evident to the very senses that there are several substances in the world, since its parts not only can be separated from each other, but are in fact separated.

2°. In the world there is extended substance, there is also thinking substance, a stone is extended, man thinks: but these are distinct substances; therefore. The minor is proved from Spinoza himself in *Ethics* number 3, where he says that substance is what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that which does not need the concept of another thing from which it ought to be formed: but a thinking thing can be conceived without an extended thing, and vice versa an extended thing without a thinking thing: therefore.

3°. The thought of man is not God nor a mode of God: Therefore something distinct from God. The antecedent is proved: God according to Spinoza is a being infinite in every kind of perfection: but human thought is finite and imperfect. Also a mode cannot be conceived without the thing of which it is a mode, thus Peter's sitting cannot be conceived without Peter. But human thought can be conceived without God being conceived.

4°. This one substance of the world, which has two modes, namely extension and intelligence, considered precisely according to itself, what is it? matter, or spirit? If matter, I infer **1°.** Therefore vile potency, not a being most perfect in act such as God is. **2°.** I infer; therefore it is

blind and not intelligent, for with whatever motion, modification, extension or figure you endow matter, you will never elicit thought or intellection from it. **3°.** I infer: Therefore it is inert without motion and without form. Whence therefore so many modes, so many forms, so many affections? From the very necessity of nature, says Spinoza; but what is this necessity and whence? These are words and nothing else.

Furthermore, it is impossible for something to follow necessarily from another unless it is contained in it; for no one, however necessarily acting, gives what he does not have. Also if all beings which are in the world follow from the necessity of nature, from what will they have that they are finite and limited? For what is from itself and acts necessarily can be limited by none, since nothing else prior from which it exists or depends is supposed.

Also it is no less impossible that such wonderful and ordered disposition of the world to proper ends should follow from blind necessity of nature, than from the fortuitous concourse of Epicurus's atoms.

But if this one substance of the world considered according to itself is spirit, it follows **1°.** That it does not identify to itself extension and intelligence as two modes undistinct from itself; both because these two modes are no less opposed to each other than standing and sitting at the same time, and therefore cannot belong to one and the same thing; and also because just as intelligence conflicts with matter, so extension conflicts with spirit.

It follows **2°.** That all things which are in the world do not follow from blind necessity of the nature of this substance, as Spinoza wants, but on the contrary proceed from the intelligence of this spirit producing and directing.

5°. Finally if God is the one and universal substance of the world, it follows that whatever exists in the world is either formally God, or formally in God, as his mode undistinct from him, according to Spinoza. I infer: Therefore God is formally stone, plant, horse, dog, ape, worm, etc. with all their imperfections. Also I infer: Therefore he is at the same time hot and cold, round and square; for such are many beings in the world. Also he is at the same time holy and wicked, for such are many men. Also therefore when man hates man, execrates, wounds, kills, curses, etc. God himself hates himself, execrates, wounds, kills, curses himself, etc. Than which nothing more insane can be feigned.

Other and far more objections can be and are opposed by certain Theologians against this system, but we refrain from them, because it disgusts us to linger longer in seriously refuting so many and such absurd figments.

HISTORICAL DIGRESSION

On the first question of the preceding article

Whether Tertullian held that God is corporeal?

It is probable that Tertullian did not hold that God is corporeal or at least that he revoked this error.

The first part is proved: The error about God's corporeality cannot be reconciled with the principles of Tertullian's doctrine: Therefore. The antecedent is proved: **1°.** A principle of Tertullian's doctrine is that everything corporeal is passible, book *On the Soul* chapter 7. But he teaches in the book *Against Praxeas* chapter 29 that God is impassible.

2°. In book *On Baptism* chapter 11 he asserts that God is simple: "Wretched incredulity," he says, "which denies to God his properties, simplicity and power." But if God were corporeal, he would not be simple.

3°. In *Apology* chapter 17 he teaches that God is immense, nor can he be circumscribed by any place, which does not belong to a body.

4°. In the book *Against Hermogenes* he teaches that God is not divisible into parts, yet such he would be if he were corporeal.

5°. In *Apology* chapter 21 he teaches that the three persons of the Trinity are one spirit, one God, of one substance, which does not cohere with the opinion about God's corporeality.

6°. He explicitly teaches that God is spirit; these are his words in *Apology* 20: "For God is also spirit."

Against this last proof some object that Tertullian likewise says the soul is spirit, although he expressly teaches that it is corporeal. But he attributes spirit to God and to the soul in different senses: For he says God is spirit in substance and nature, or as spirit is opposed to corporeal and extended mass, as is evident from the places cited in numbers 1 and 5. But he says the soul is spirit not by nature and substance, or as spirit is opposed to extended mass, but as it signifies life and respiration; as is evident from book *On the Soul* chapter 11: "We must call the soul spirit," he says, "by a certain condition, not by name of state, but of act; not by title of substance but of work; because it breathes, not because it is properly spirit."

The second part is proved from Augustine book 10 *On Genesis according to the Letter* chapter 25, where he thus discourses: "Tertullian because he believed the soul to be a body, not for any

other reason except that he could not think it incorporeal; and therefore he feared lest it be nothing, if it were not a body, nor could he think otherwise about God; who indeed because he is acute, sometimes is overcome by the force of truth against his own opinion. For what could he say more truly than that which he says in a certain place that every corporeal thing is passible? He ought therefore to have changed his opinion, by which a little above he had said that even God is a body. For I do not think he was so foolish as to believe even the nature of God to be passible."

You will say 1°. Tertullian explicitly asserts that God is a body. Thus in book *On the Flesh of Christ* chapter 11 he says: "Everything that exists is a body of its own kind, nothing is incorporeal except what does not exist." And in book *Against Praxeas* chapter 7: "For who will deny that God is a body, even if God is spirit: For spirit is a body of its own kind in its own form: but even those invisible things, whatever they are, have with God both their own body and their own form, through which they are visible to God alone": Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Tertullian explicitly asserts that God is a body in a broad and improper sense, granted. In a strict and proper sense, denied.

Explanation: Body is used by certain ancients, especially by Tertullian, in a twofold sense. **1°.** Improperly for everything which is real and subsists and is opposed to nothing, empty and void. **2°.** Properly for material mass extended and as it is opposed to immaterial substance.

When therefore Tertullian says God is a body, he understands about body improperly as it is something subsisting and opposed to nothing. Which is evident from the first cited place, where he says: "everything that exists is a body of its own kind." **2°.** From these particles "of its own kind" used in both places, by which he signifies that he does not understand body simply and properly, but in a certain way. **3°.** From the scope which he intended acting against Praxeas. For he contended that the Son of God is not something real subsisting, emanating from the Father, but an empty and void sound of voice and air struck; whom to refute Tertullian did not need to maintain that the Word is properly a body, but it sufficed for him to maintain that the Word is something real subsisting and not a mere and empty sound of voice.

Whence he immediately adds: "how much more what is sent from his very substance will not be without substance": And before he had said: "but I say nothing empty and void could have proceeded from God... nor lack substance what proceeded from such great substance and made such great substances." **4°.** Because in that place against Praxeas when he says God is a body, he at the same time adds that he is spirit. But these cannot be reconciled, if he understood about body properly taken. **5°.** St. Phoebadius, Bishop of Agen, in his book *Against the Arians* (tome 4, *Library of the Fathers*, Lyon) speaks of the Word of God in exactly the same way as Tertullian, yet no one therefore accused him of error against the immateriality of God. **6°.** Finally because St. Augustine, although in the place cited above from *Genesis*, also *Epistle* 157 and book 2 *On*

the Soul chapter 5, seems to think that Tertullian sometimes attributed a proper body to God; nevertheless in the book *On Heresies* which is later than the preceding ones, heresy 86, he confesses that Tertullian can be understood and excused in that sense which we attribute to him. "Tertullian," he says, "says the soul is indeed immortal, but contends that it is a body. Nor this only, but even God himself. Nevertheless he is not said to have become a heretic. For he could in some way be thought to call the very nature and substance of the divine a body; not such a body whose parts some greater, some lesser could or ought to be thought, such as are all things which we properly call bodies; although he thinks something such about the soul; but he could, as I said, be thought to call God a body for this reason, because he is not nothing, he is not emptiness, he is not a quality of body or soul, but everywhere whole, etc."

You will say 2°. and at the same time insist: Tertullian in book 2 *Against Marcion* chapter 16 attributes human members and human affections and passions to God; therefore he attributed to him a body truly and properly so called.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Tertullian attributes human members and human affections and passions to God in a proper and natural sense, denied. In an improper and metaphorical sense, granted; namely in that sense in which Scripture itself attributes those things to God, as we saw above.

You will respond: Tertullian seems to have admitted some passions properly so called in God: Therefore. The antecedent is proved from the cited place against Marcion: he says God has anger because of the wicked, and bile because of the ungrateful, and jealousy because of the proud, and whatever is not expedient for the evil. So also mercy for those who err, and patience for those who repent, and excellence for those who merit, and whatever is needful for the good. And in book 1 against the same, chapter 26, speaking of God: "Most stupid therefore," he says, "who is not offended by a deed which he does not love to be done, when offense is the companion of frustrated will. Or if he is offended he ought to be angry, if he is angry he ought to avenge; for vengeance also is the fruit of anger, and anger the debt of offense, and offense, as I said, the companion of frustrated will": Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Tertullian seems to have admitted some passions properly so called in God which are corporeal, altering and corruptive such as he attributes to the soul, denied. Incorruptive, perfect, happy and coherent with the highest immutability and impassibility of God, granted. Thus he explains himself in book 2 cited against Marcion: "Most foolish," he says, "who prejudge divine things from human ones, so that because in man such passions are held to be of corruptive condition, therefore they think them to exist in God of the same state. Distinguish substances and attribute to them their own senses as diverse as the substances require, although they seem to communicate in words... as much as the corruptibility of human substance makes them corruptive in man, so much does the incorruptibility of divine substance make them incorruptive in God."

But from this that Tertullian admitted such passions in God, we cannot gather that he attributed a body to him.

You will say 3°. St. Thomas 1 *Against the Gentiles* chapter 20 numbers Tertullian among those who attributed a body to God: Therefore.

Natalis Alexander responds that St. Thomas only looked at the words of Tertullian and the first idea which they suggest; but the more recondite sense of those words, made by comparison with the principles of his doctrine, he did not thoroughly investigate, because his design did not require this, nor did it pertain to the conversion of the gentiles to examine that controversy.

Moreover, nothing prevents acknowledging that St. Thomas, relying on various authorities of St. Augustine as we saw before, held the opposite opinion as probable; nor do we absolutely deny it, since we do not assert certainly that Tertullian never attributed a body to God, but only probably and under disjunction, namely that it is probable that he did not fall into this error, or if he fell into it, that he revoked it.

Nor should you say that St. Augustine in the later work *On Heresies* certainly revoked his prior opinion and excused Tertullian. For there St. Augustine does not speak entirely assertively, but as if doubting and inquiring: "he could," he says, "in some way be thought," etc. Which words are not of one certainly asserting, but of one favorably opining from indulgence and seeking causes of excuse. Therefore Augustine did not absolutely revoke his prior opinion, nor did he assertively excuse Tertullian.

ARTICLE II

On the Perfection of God

St. Thomas, Question 4

First Question: Whether God is perfect?

Perfect according to that from which the name is imposed is the same as totally made, or what has been totally reduced from potency to act; but according to that for the signification of which the name has been transferred, perfect is that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection. About the perfect taken in this second sense we treat here. Whence:

Response to the question affirmatively.

Proved: God is the first principle of all things, not material but efficient; but this must be most perfect: Therefore. The minor is proved: Just as matter insofar as it is such is in potency, so the agent insofar as it is such is in act: Therefore what is the principle of all things, not material but

efficient, is in no way in potency, but in act: but what is in no way in potency but in act is supremely perfect, because just as potency imports imperfection, so act imports perfection: Therefore.

This will be established even more from the following resolution and from what will be said about the infinity of God.

Second Question: Whether the perfections of all things are in God?

Response: Affirmatively.

Proved 1°. from Scripture, Psalm 93 it is said: "He who planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he who formed the eye, shall he not consider?" Ecclesiasticus 24: "In me is all grace of way and truth. In me is all hope of life and virtue." Romans 11: "Of him, and by him, and in him are all things." And elsewhere.

Proved 2°. By reason: Whatever perfection is in the effect must be in its efficient cause, either according to the same nature if it be a univocal cause, as man generates man, or in a more eminent way if it be an equivocal cause and of a superior order; thus formal heat produced by the sun is eminently and virtually in the sun, for no one gives what he does not have either formally or eminently: but God is the first efficient cause of all things: Therefore.

Proved 3°. God has all fullness of being; Therefore he has the perfections of all things. The consequence is evident; because every perfection is a perfection of being, or every perfection is attended according to some being, thus justice gives just being, goodness good being, and thus he who has fullness of being has all perfections. The antecedent is proved: God is being itself per se subsisting essentially and from himself: but what is being itself per se subsisting essentially and from himself has all fullness of being, since there is nothing by which it can be limited: Therefore.

Third Question: How are the perfections of all things in God?

Before the response it should be noted what we have already touched upon in Article 1 of the preceding Dissertation, that there are perfections of two kinds. Some are called simply simple, others simple only or in a qualified sense.

A simply simple perfection is commonly defined by Theologians after St. Anselm chapter 14 of the *Monologion*, as that which is better itself than not itself: That is, which to have is better for any being qua being than to lack it. Such are life, goodness, wisdom, justice, etc. I said qua being, and not insofar as it is this or that being: for although, for example, it is not better for a stone qua stone to live, because through this its essence would be destroyed, yet for it qua being it is better. Therefore a twofold condition is required for a simply simple perfection. **1°.** That it

involve no imperfection in its formal concept. **2°.** That it not exclude from the same subject another greater or equal perfection, otherwise it would not be better to have it than to lack it.

A simple perfection only or in a qualified sense is one which is not better itself than not itself, and therefore lacks one or the other assigned condition, namely, either it involves some imperfection in its formal concept, such as to be moved, to reason, to be a body, to be sensitive, to be quantified, to be colored, etc. Or it does not suffer in the same subject another greater or equal perfection, whereby it happens that it is not better to have it than to lack it. For this last reason relation in divine things is not called a simply simple perfection, not because it involves any imperfection, but because it does not suffer in the same person another relation of equal perfection, for example, Paternity does not suffer Filiation, whereby it happens that it is not better to have Paternity than to lack it, since the Son who lacks it is of equal dignity and perfection with the Father.

It should further be noted that something can be contained in another in multiple ways: **1°.** formally or as to its formal nature, thus heat is contained in fire, soul in man: **2°.** virtually when one has by power whatever perfection is in the thing contained. But then it is judged to have it virtually, either when it can produce the thing which is said to be contained, thus a plant is contained in seed, effect in cause, or when by itself alone it can provide all that the contained thing can provide, thus formal heat of fire is contained virtually in the sun: **3°.** eminently, when one is contained in another in a more perfect way than it is in itself; and this either eminently formally, as the sensitive in the rational soul, or eminently virtually, as heat in the sun. These things being noted:

Response to the question: **1°.** All simply simple perfections of creatures are in God formally eminently.

The first part is proved: God is supremely and infinitely perfect: therefore he must contain all perfections which according to themselves involve no imperfection, such as are simply simple perfections, for if one were lacking, he would not be supremely and infinitely perfect.

Confirmed: Simply simple perfections are predicated formally of God, for it is said in a formal sense, God is wise, God is good, just as it is said man is sensitive: Therefore he contains them formally.

The second part is explained: A simply simple perfection in creatures, for instance wisdom, can be considered in two ways: **1°.** as it is created in this individual. **2°.** According to itself and in common as it abstracts from created and uncreated. Considered in the first way it is limited to a certain genus and species, for it is an accident and quality of such or such species, and thus it is not a simply simple perfection, nor is it formally in God, but only virtually according to the sense of the following response. But considered in the second way, it abstracts from the limitation of

genus and species, and imports only cognition through the highest cause, and thus it is a simply simple perfection, and is formally in God.

When therefore we say that simply simple perfections of creatures are formally contained in God, the sense is not that they have in God that very created and individual being which they have in creatures, as if God were wise, for example, with the created wisdom of man; but that they are in him according to their formal nature apprehended in common, excluding the limitation of genus and species, and in a nobler and higher way: Therefore formally eminently. And hence we said above from Augustine book 5 *On the Trinity* and chapter 1, that God is good without quality, present without position, etc.

Response 2°. Perfections in a qualified sense, which are such by reason of imperfection, are not in God formally, but only eminently virtually.

Proved: It is impossible for any imperfection to be formally in God, as in a most perfect being: but perfections in a qualified sense, of which we treat, involve in their formal concept imperfection that cannot be separated, thus for example if you separate from the rational or discursive the imperfection which it involves, what remains is not rational, nor does man remain man. Therefore such perfections are not formally in God.

Add that if they were formally in God, they could be predicated of God, and thus it could be truly said: God is rational, is sensitive, a lion, a stone, etc.

But they are in God eminently virtually: **1°.** Because God by himself alone can provide and in a more perfect way all that he can through those. **2°.** Because he is the cause of them, as to all their differences not only generic, as the sun is the cause of sublunary things into which it influences, but also numerical and atomic, because he is the most universal cause of total being, which notion of being is transcendentally imbibed in all differences. But whatever is in the effect necessarily pre-exists virtually in the cause, as was said, and indeed in a more perfect way, if it be an equivocal cause and of superior order such as God is: Therefore perfections in a qualified sense of creatures are contained virtually eminently in God.

Hence Augustine sermon 1 *On the Words of the Apostle*: "He exceeds," he says, "every creature of his... for if you ask magnitude he is greater, if beauty more beautiful, if sweetness sweeter... for no reason suffers that either the thing made be equaled to its maker, or the work be compared to the artificer. As is read in the Prophet (Wisdom 13): 'he who makes strong things is stronger, and he who made beautiful things is more beautiful than they.'"

You will say against the first part: St. Thomas below question 14, article 6 says that God is related to all creatures contained in himself, as man to animal, and as the number six to imperfect numbers contained under it: but man formally contains animal and the number six other inferior numbers: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major: the word "as" expressing some parity, granted; expressing complete parity, denied. Therefore the holy Doctor does not make parity in this, that just as man formally contains animal and the number six other inferior numbers, so God formally contains all creatures, otherwise every creature could be predicated of God, saying, God is animal, just as we say, man is animal, which holy Thomas never dreamed, indeed which he explicitly asserts to be impossible, below question 13 article 5, where he says and proves that it is impossible for anything to be predicated of God and creatures univocally.

But he makes parity in this, that just as man contains animal and something more, just as the number six contains inferior numbers and something more, so God contains all creatures and infinitely more, abstracting from the mode of containing; and this sufficed for his intent. For he proves there that God knows all numerical perfections of creatures. But for this it is not required that he formally contain them, but it suffices that he contain them virtually eminently.

I said in the response, perfections in a qualified sense, which are such by reason of imperfection, because those which are such from this that they do not suffer another equal or greater, such as relations, are formally in God.

Fourth Question: Whether God and all creatures together are something more perfect and better than God alone?

Response: Negative. It follows from what was said. For if God contains all perfections of creatures whatever and that in a more excellent way: Therefore he is equally or less perfect by himself as with them.

Confirmed: The infinite is not made greater by addition of the finite; but the perfection of God is infinite, the perfections of creatures are finite. Whence Augustine *Tract* 11 *On John*: "if you are without God you will be less, if you are with God, God will not be greater: Not greater from you; but you less without him."

Nevertheless God and creatures are several things and having several perfections. For which reason some think it can be said that God and creatures are something more perfect extensively than God alone, but improperly. For "more perfect" properly signifies intension and not extension.

Fifth Question: Whether any creature can be similar to God?

Response: Every creature is in some way, that is imperfectly similar to God.

Proved: similarity is attended according to agreement, or communication in form, and therefore such is the similarity as is the communication or agreement of form: But all creatures insofar as they are beings communicate with God in something, not indeed according to the univocal nature

of species or genus, according to which there would be more perfect similarity, but according to the analogical nature of being: for just as God is being in his way, namely through essence, so also proportionally creatures are beings in their way, namely through participation and imitation of God.

Hence it happens that those things which are more perfect in their being, or in more grades, such as are intellectual creatures, are more similar to God.

About this imperfect similarity therefore Scripture is to be understood, when it says man was made to the likeness of God Genesis 1 and 5, and James 3. But about perfect similarity it is to be understood, when it denies that any creature is similar to God, as Psalm 34, 39, and 70.

But whether conversely God can be said to be similar to a creature? **Response:** negatively, because then only is there mutual relation and equipollence in similarity, when two have a form of the same nature and are themselves of the same order: But when this does not obtain, but one only is said to be similar to another, because it imitates it in some way, as effect an equivocal cause, or image a prototype; then there is no correlation of similarity; thus for example, although this image is said to be similar to Caesar, yet it would be wrong to say that Caesar is similar to this image; or as Augustine says in book 2 *Soliloquies* chapter 6: "Who looks into a mirror and rightly says he is similar to that image, and not rather that it is similar to him." But thus the matter stands in God. Therefore.

ARTICLE III

On the Good in General

St. Thomas, Question 5

First Question: In what precisely does the formal nature of the good consist?

Some place it in perfection, others in appetibility; St. Thomas says both. Here and elsewhere he places it in appetibility. "The nature of the good," he says, "consists in this that something be appetible." On the contrary, there and below he says: "The nature of the good," he says, "consists in perfection."

There are also reasons for and against. On one side **1°.** If something lacks what is required for its integrity or perfection, it is said to be bad: Therefore goodness consists in perfection or integrity, for good is said by opposition to bad. **2°.** This causal statement is true: therefore something is appetible because it is good; therefore the nature of good is prior to the nature of appetible. **3°.** Appetibility is an extrinsic denomination sought from appetite, just as visibility from sight:

Therefore before the denomination there must be presupposed the nature of good which can be nothing other than the perfection of the thing in its being.

On the other side: if goodness were formally perfection, St. Thomas after he treated of the perfection of God would have fruitlessly added this and the following question about the goodness of God. **2°.** The perfection of being in its being is its constitutive. But the good which is a property of being, like the true and the one, does not constitute being, but supposes it constituted.

Hence difficulty is increased from both sides: Because goodness, as I said, is a property of being, a property ought to add something to the essence of which it is a property. But it does not seem what goodness can add to being: For it cannot add something real, because everything real is contained under being, nor something of reason, otherwise being would be good fictitiously and not really.

If you say for the first opinion that it adds a relation of appetibility. Against: that relation is either real or of reason: Whichever you say, the other inconvenience recurs. Furthermore if it be real, either it is categorical or transcendental. Not categorical, otherwise it would be inferior to being, since it is one of the categories and thus could not be a property of being universally taken. Add that it itself is some good thing: Therefore not the formal goodness by which all things are good.

Neither can it be a real transcendental relation; **1°.** Because a real transcendental relation is not distinguished from the thing, but is the thing itself ordered. **2°.** Because nothing is referred transcendentally to another unless it depends on it, for the relation itself is a certain dependence, thus God is not referred really to creatures, but only by reason, because he does not depend on them, but creatures well to him because they depend on him. Similarly the knowable with respect to knowledge, the sensible with respect to sense; and in all things which are related as measure and measured, perfective and perfectible.

But the good as an appetible end is the measure and perfective of appetite, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, and the sensible of sense, not conversely; whence it does not depend on appetite, but appetite on it, consequently it is not referred really to appetite, but by reason only, which, because appetite is really referred to the appetible, conceives the appetible as if it were likewise referred to appetite; whence results a relation of reason only.

For the conciliation of both opinions and the solution of these difficulties, it should be observed that perfection can be considered in two ways. **1°.** In the genus of formal cause: For it is evident that perfection formally constitutes a thing perfect in its being, because each thing is constituted through some actuality, and actuality is perfection. **2°.** In the genus of final cause, moving and alluring. For it is evident likewise that perfection moves and allures appetite as something suitable to it and perfective of it, for all things seek their perfection.

This being pre-noted: To the question: **Response:** The formal nature of good consists in perfection, not as constitutive of being, but as suitable to appetite and perfective of it (both things St. Thomas says) by the mode of the appetible and finalizing. And thus the nature of good formally consists both in perfection and in appetibility.

But this appetibility, although it is explained through a relation of reason to appetite, nor can it be conceived by us without that, because it is related as its perfection, and that is referred to it, nevertheless it does not formally consist in that relation, but in that which is the foundation of this and is called radical appetibility, which is not distinguished in reality from perfection itself, but only through diverse concepts and respects, just as although the omnipotence of God, for example, is not conceived by us without respect of reason to creatures, nevertheless it does not consist in that respect, but in that which is its foundation.

The reason of the response is: because in good there must be saved that it be a property of being, and that it belong to it insofar as it is perfect: But both are saved, the former by formally constituting in perfection, not as constitutive of being, but as perfective of appetite by the mode of appetible finalizing. For through this the nature of the perfect is saved, as is evident: Also the nature of property; because the nature of the perfect, as perfect and terminative of appetite is conceived to follow the nature of the perfect as constituent.

If you say that a property ought to be distinguished really from the essence of which it is a property, but perfection as perfective is not distinguished really from perfection as constituent, but only by reason.

Response: That greater distinction is not required nor is it possible in metaphysical and transcendental passions of being; for they cannot be distinguished really from being universally taken, since, as I already said, they themselves are beings; and therefore they are not properly properties with that rigor and with that distinction with which physical properties of particular being are distinguished from it, such as risibility from man; and thus they add to being neither something real nor something of reason, but are being itself diversely conceived, and founding diverse concepts of reason, as St. Thomas resolves in the first article of this Question, and through these things satisfaction is given to the instances proposed from both sides.

From what has been said you will gather **1°.** that being is prior according to reason to good, because we conceive being before the property following from it; but good is related to being as a property virtually distinct from it and following from it.

You will gather **2°.** against the Manicheans, that every being insofar as being is good, because every being insofar as being is in act and consequently in some way perfect, because every act is a certain perfection: But the perfect has the nature of good, as was said: Therefore. Whence Genesis 1: "God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good." And 1 Timothy 4: "Every creature of God is good."

From which it further follows that things which are only beings in potency, such as possible things and prime matter, are also only good in potency; and that Mathematics as abstracted from being, motion and sensible matter are not good. About which see more broadly Cajetan here § *To the first doubt*, and John of St. Thomas here disputation 6, article 2.

It should be noted however that although every being is good, and they are the same according to reality, yet because they differ according to reason, being simply and good simply are not said in the same way. Being simply is said according to first being which is substantial, good simply is said according to ultimate being.

The reason is: because since being properly says something to be in act, and act properly expresses order to potency; according to this something is said to be being simply, according to which **1°.** it is discerned from what is in potency, which is substantial being; but through superadded acts, something is said to be being in a qualified sense; thus to be white signifies being in a qualified sense; for being white does not remove being in potency simply, since it comes to a thing already pre-existing in act.

But good expresses the nature of the perfect by the mode of the appetible, and consequently expresses the nature of the ultimate; whence what is ultimately perfect is said to be good simply, but what does not have the ultimate perfection which it ought to have, although it has some, insofar as it is in act, is not said to be perfect simply, nor good simply, but in a qualified sense.

Thus therefore according to first being which is substantial something is said to be being simply and good in a qualified sense, that is insofar as it is being. But according to ultimate act something is said to be being in a qualified sense and good simply.

You will gather **3°.** that good has the nature of final cause, because it has the nature of appetible; for good is, as already said, what all things seek, but the end is that which is sought.

Note that when we say good is that which all things seek, it should not be understood as if any one good is sought by all, but that whatever is sought has the nature of good, and is sought under the aspect of good.

Note again that when it is commonly said that good is diffusive and communicative of itself, this should not be understood according to the propriety of the word to diffuse or communicate, which imports the operation of efficient cause, but as it imports the nature of final cause, so that good is said to be diffusive or communicative of itself because it is apt to diffuse or communicate desire of itself and to move appetite by the mode of final cause to its attainment.

You will gather **4°.** that the nature of good insofar as it consists in perfection also consists in mode, species and order, according to that of Wisdom 11: "God disposed all things in measure and number and weight."

The reason is: because, as we said, each thing is said to be good insofar as it is perfect, and perfect is said of that to which nothing is lacking according to the mode of its perfection; but each thing is what it is through its form: But form presupposes certain things, and certain things necessarily follow it: Therefore for something to be perfect and good, it is necessary that it both have form, and those things which pre-exist, and those which follow it.

I subsume: But for form there is required determination or commensuration of principles, whether material or efficient causing it, and this is signified by mode, whence it is said that measure prefigures mode. But the form itself is signified by species, because through form each thing is constituted in species, and therefore it is said that number provides species; because definitions signifying species are like numbers, just as unity added or subtracted varies the species of number, so in definitions a difference applied or subtracted.

Finally, to form follows inclination to the end, or to action, or to something of this kind, because each thing insofar as it is in act acts and tends to that which is suitable to it according to its form, and this pertains to weight and order: Therefore the nature of good insofar as it consists in perfection also consists in mode, species and order.

You will gather **5°.** that good is conveniently divided into honest, useful and delectable: Because, as was said, good is something insofar as it is appetible and the term of motion of appetite; just as local motion is terminated simply to something ultimate which is either the thing toward which it tends, such as place, or rest in that thing, and in a qualified sense to a medium through which one goes to the ultimate (for this is also said to be a term of motion, insofar as it terminates some part of motion) so likewise in the motion of appetite.

Therefore that which is appetible terminating motion in a qualified sense as a medium through which one goes to another is called Useful. But that which is sought as ultimate totally terminating the motion of appetite, if it be the thing toward which appetite per se tends, is called Honest, because honest is said to be what is desired per se; if it be rest in the desired thing, it is Delectable: Therefore.

You see this division is of good, reduplicatively qua good, not qua being, for thus it is divided into ten categories. Also it is a division of an analogous term into its analogates, for honest good is principally good, but the others are good by reason of that.

ARTICLE IV

On the Goodness of God

St. Thomas, Question 6

First Question: Whether being good belongs to God?

Response: Being good belongs to God especially. It is evident from Scripture, Psalm 117: "Give praise to the Lord, for he is good": And elsewhere.

The reason is: That is good which is perfectly appetible: But God is most perfectly appetible: Therefore. The minor is proved: God is the cause of all perfections which are in creatures: But all things seek their perfection: Therefore.

If you ask whether in reality all creatures seek God? **Response:** They seek at least implicitly; because whatever they seek from creatures is a participation of God. Whence those who seem on one side, and as to something, to flee from God or pursue him with hatred, on the other side, and as to something else, implicitly seek him, because they seek something which is a participation of God, such as being, or better being, to be freed from miseries, or something else.

Second Question: Whether God is the highest good?

Response: Affirmatively.

Proved: All perfections and goodnesses of all things flow from God, as from an equivocal cause: But the effect is more excellently in an equivocal cause than in itself: For equivocal causes produce effects inferior to themselves: Therefore good is in God in the most excellent way, and therefore he is called the highest good.

Third Question: Whether being good through essence is proper to God?

Response: Affirmatively.

Proved: Each thing is said to be good according as it is perfect, as is evident from what was said: But to no created being, but to God alone does it belong to be perfect through essence: Therefore. The minor is proved: The perfection of any thing is threefold. **1°.** According as it is constituted in act in its being. **2°.** As certain accidents are superadded to it necessary for its perfect operation. **3°.** Through this that it attains its end; thus for example the first perfection of fire consists in the being which it has through its substantial form actually existing. The second consists in heat, lightness, dryness and such things. The third is according as it rests in its natural place.

But this threefold perfection, namely actual existence, superadded qualities and attainment of the end, belongs to no creature according to its essence, but to God alone, whose essence alone is his being or existing, and to whom no accidents come, but what are said of others accidentally, belong to him essentially, such as being powerful, wise and such things, and who is ordered to nothing else as to an end, but he himself is the ultimate end of all things: Therefore. Whence Luke 18 it is said: "No one is good," namely through essence, "but God alone."

Confirmed: each thing is good according as it is perfect; but insofar as it is perfect it is in act: but being in act belongs essentially to no creature, but to God alone; Therefore.

You will say: the essence of a created thing considered according to itself is good with its own goodness, distinct from the goodness of existence: Therefore it is good according to essence. The antecedent is proved: **1°.** Because essence thus considered is being, for it is not nothing: Therefore it is good. **2°.** Because thus considered it is appetible, for we do not seek the naked existence of health, for example, but also health itself. **3°.** Because otherwise human nature in Christ would not have its own and created goodness, just as it does not have its own and created existence. **4°.** Among created essences, one is according to itself better and more perfect than another; thus we say man is essentially more perfect than horse: Therefore it is according to itself and essentially good.

Response: Granting the antecedent, I distinguish the consequence: Therefore it is good according to essence, the word "according" expressing the sufficient reason of goodness independently of anything else, denied. The word "according" expressing indeed the reason of goodness but insufficient independently of anything else, granted.

I do not therefore deny that created essence has its own goodness, but it does not have it except dependently on existence: which is thus evidently proved. A thing is good in the way it is being; for good is a passion of being: But a thing as long as it does not have being in the nature of things, neither is, nor is it called being simply, but only in a qualified sense, namely in potency; for simply it is nothing, and when it is created, it is said to be produced simply from nothing: Therefore neither is, nor is it called good simply, but only in a qualified sense and in potency: Therefore for it to be called good in act and simply, existence is required at least as a condition. But existence is essential to no creature, but to God alone.

Hence the solution of the instances is evident. For to the first I respond that a creature is being and good as actuated through existence simply; but excluding existence, just as it is being in potency, so it is good in potency. Similarly to the second, we do not seek naked existence, but the thing actuated however through existence. To the third, human nature in Christ has its own goodness, insofar as it is actuated if not through human existence, at least through divine. To the fourth, one essence is better than another essentially in act and simply, insofar as it is actuated through existence, otherwise it is better in a qualified sense only and in potency.

You will insist: Every essence before it exists is understood as integral, and God loves it as such with love of complacency: Therefore independently of existence it is good.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent: Essence before it exists is understood as integral objectively and possibly, granted. It is understood as integral entitatively and simply, denied. To this sense, I distinguish the consequence: Therefore independently of existence it is good objectively and possibly, I grant the consequence: It is good entitatively and simply, I deny the

consequence. But whether it is loved by God with love of complacency in the state of possibility, we shall say below.

Fourth Question: Whether all things are good with divine goodness?

Response: Each thing is good with divine goodness extrinsically and causally, insofar as divine goodness is the efficient, exemplar and final cause of all goodness. Nevertheless formally and intrinsically, each thing is good with a likeness of divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally its goodness denominating it. And thus there is one goodness of all, and also many goodnesses.

ARTICLE V

On the Infinity of God

St. Thomas, Question 7

Question: Whether God is infinite according to the nature of being?

Note **1°.** Infinite is said of what lacks an end, or term. Whence if it lacks essential terms, it will be infinite in essence; if it lacks terms in a certain genus it will be infinite in that attribute, such as the genus of quantity or quality. Here St. Thomas treats of the infinity of God as to essence, or the nature of being.

Note **2°.** Limitative terms of essence are either extrinsic or intrinsic. An extrinsic limitative term is an efficient cause, which, given that it could produce an infinite effect, if it is infinite, can also produce it limited. Intrinsic limitative terms are either metaphysical, namely genus and difference by which a thing is constituted in a certain and finite species, or physical namely form and matter, or a receptive subject behaving by the mode of matter.

This last point, since some impugn it, is proved: **1°.** Every act inhering in another receives termination from that in which it is, because what is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient, just as liquid in a vessel is adapted to its measure, and one accident is more perfect in one subject than in another. Therefore act received in some subject is contracted according to the potentiality of the subject in explaining more or less its perfection and power; similarly form terminates the potentiality of matter or subject to a determinate perfection or species.

2°. Matter or receptive subject and form depend on each other in the mode of causing and being; and they communicate and mix their conditions to each other: Therefore they limit each other, since they do not leave each other in their purity; but mixed and limited with another.

3°. Everything receptive is in potency to the act of which it is receptive, consequently not infinite in the nature of perfect and pure being, about which infinity here is the question. Similarly act received in the potency of the recipient is not pure, because it is joined to potentiality, and thus less than pure act, therefore limited.

These things being noted and proved: To the question:

Response: God is infinite according to essence and the nature of being.

Proved: God as to essence and the nature of being lacks every limitative: therefore. The antecedent is proved: He cannot be limited extrinsically through an efficient cause, because he is from himself, nor intrinsically through genus and difference, or matter and form, because as we proved above, he is a most simple being devoid of all composition, whether from genus and difference, or from matter and form, or from essence and existence; because, as we said, he is essentially his being, so that being or existing in God since it is his very essence, is not received in it, nor receptive of further act; since existence is the ultimate of all actualities: Therefore.

Hence you will infer **1°.** that nothing else besides God is infinite through essence, because either it is composed of matter and form, or of genus and difference by which it is limited to a certain category: but if it be some form transcending all categories such as existence; since nothing else besides God is essentially its being or existing, such existence in created things is receivable in essence and composes with it, and thus is limited through it, just as likewise essence, as receptive of existence is limited through it, or at least through order to it.

You will infer **2°.** that no created thing is actually infinite according to quantity or other accident; because an infinite accident would require an infinite essence and subject. About the actually infinite in creatures, see more in Physics.

ARTICLE VI. On the Immensity of God. St. Thomas Q. 8.

§ I. Preliminary Notes

Note 1°. Immense is said as if without measure: Hence if it is considered as to the divine being, it is infinity; if as to duration, it is eternity; if as to place, it is incircumscriptibility; and concerning immensity taken in this last sense we treat here.

Note 2°. Immensity and ubiquity, although sometimes taken for the same thing, are not nevertheless entirely the same. Immensity denotes first act: Ubiquity denotes second act. Therefore immensity is the aptitude, or capacity of existing in all things and places even infinite ones if they were given. Ubiquity however is the actual existence in all things and places which exist. Wherefore immensity is an attribute of God, because it belongs to him naturally and

necessarily: Ubiquity however is not an attribute of God, because it belongs to him freely and in time.

Note 3°. In a threefold general way God is said to be in all things, namely through power, through presence, and through essence in the manner that something is said to be in human affairs. Thus a King is said to be in the whole kingdom through power and command, because although he is not present everywhere, he can nevertheless command everywhere and direct all things through his ministers. Through presence someone is said to be in all things which are in his sight; just as all things which are in some house are said to be present to someone existing in the house, who nevertheless is not according to his substance in any part of the house. According to substance or essence someone is said to be in a place, in which his substance is held. In this, I say, threefold general way God is said to be in all things: **1°.** through power, because all things are subjected to his power and command, and he governs and directs all things. **2°.** Through presence, because "All things are naked and open to his eyes" (Hebrews 4). Through essence or substance, insofar as he is present to all as the cause of being, as we shall prove more fully now.

Note 4°. Besides these common and general modes by which God exists in all things, there are other special modes, by which he is said to exist in certain things; thus in a special way he is said to exist through grace in the just and Saints, who love him actually or habitually, for he is in them as the beloved in the lover, and consequently in the manner of a friend dwelling and living with them, and as an end inchoately possessed and enjoyable; concerning which see extensively John of St. Thomas here a. 6. Likewise in a special way God is in Heaven through the manifestation of glory, and in Christ through hypostatic union, and in various others in which he specially operates, as in the Sacraments, etc.

Note 5°. The Manicheans among Epiphanius heresy 66 denied the general existence of God in all things through power, insofar as they said spiritual and incorporeal things only were subject to divine power; visible and corporeal things however were subject to the power of a contrary principle. There were others who denied the general existence of God in all things through presence, insofar as they said divine providence, or his sight did not extend to these inferior bodies, from whose person it is said Job 22: "He walks around the hinges of Heaven, and does not consider our affairs." The general existence of God in all things through essence or substance was denied, as St. Jerome testifies on chapter 66 of Isaiah, by those among the Jews who confined God to the Temple of Jerusalem. Likewise among the Gentiles, as many as fashioned God as corporeal. This they also deny, the Socinians and certain Calvinists, among whom from the Catholics must be numbered Augustine Eugubinus on Psalm 138. For these teach that God is indeed everywhere through power and operation, but according to substance is only in Heaven, in that way in which the sun substantially existing in its orb, influences sublunary things. Concerning this single general mode by which God is in all things according to substance, now there is difficulty. Hence follows.

§ II. Whether God is according to substance in all things?

I SAY God according to substance is intimately in all things.

It is proved **1°.** from Scripture. Deuteronomy 4 it is said: "God in heaven above, and in earth beneath." Psalm 138: "Where shall I go from your spirit, and where shall I flee from your face? If I ascend to heaven, you are there; if I descend to hell, you are present." Jeremiah 23: "Do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." Job 11: "It is higher than heaven... deeper than hell, longer than the earth is its measure, and broader than the sea." These texts moreover and many others similar, if taken in their natural and obvious sense, as is apparent to one considering, do not import mere presence of knowledge or power, as the Socinians wish, but true presence of substance. Add that in them God is said to be in hell and in earth in the same way as he is said to be in heaven; but in heaven the Socinians concede he is substantially.

Confirming the Catholic dogma the Holy Fathers everywhere agree, whose texts it would be too long to relate.

It is proved **2°.** by reason. **1°.** Immensity is a perfection simply simple: Therefore it is not to be denied to God. **2°.** Thus an incorporeal thing is related to being in a place through quantity of power, as a corporeal thing is related to being in a place through dimensional quantity: but if there were some body having infinite dimensional quantity, it would be necessary for it to be everywhere; Therefore if there is some incorporeal thing having infinite power, it is necessary that it be everywhere; but it has been shown that God is of infinite power, therefore he is everywhere. **3°.** and especially, God operates in all things through the power of his substance identified with himself. But every agent is present to what it acts upon at least by power: Therefore. Truly this fundamental reason which the Scotists attack, will be explained more in the following section.

You will object **1°.** from Scripture Isaiah 66: "Thus says the Lord: Heaven is my throne, earth however is the footstool of my feet." And Psalm 10: "The Lord in his temple, the Lord in heaven is his throne": Therefore God is only in heaven as in his proper seat.

I respond: I deny the Consequence. Therefore God is only in heaven through open revelation of his glory, I grant the Consequence. Through essence, I deny. These therefore and similar words of Scripture do not signify that God is not through essence elsewhere than in heaven, but that he is in heaven in a special way, as I have already said, namely through majesty and manifestation of his glory in the Blessed, just as in a special way he is in hell through vindicative justice and in the just through grace.

You will insist. Psalm 113 it is said: "The heaven of heavens is the Lord's, but the earth he has given to the sons of men." Therefore thus he seems to be in heaven, so that he is not on earth, but has left it to men.

I respond according to the common interpretation of the Doctors, that the sense of these words is the same as the preceding ones, namely this: the highest of the heavens is destined to the Lord as a throne and royal court, in which he glorifies the Saints; but the earth he has given for the use of men, which does not exclude the general presence of God in it through essence. Some understand these words with respect to the division of the Promised Land; so that the sense is: God reserved to himself the distribution of heavenly goods, but the distribution of the earth he conceded to the sons of men, namely to Moses and Joshua.

You will reply: God in Scripture is said to ascend, descend, walk; but he who is everywhere, is incapable of local motion: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the Major. God is said to ascend, descend, etc. in the proper sense, I deny the Major. In the metaphorical sense, I grant. For thus Scripture often speaks to adapt itself to our understanding, and to signify that God unmoved in himself produces such effects, as we produce when we move, when we ascend, descend, etc. Thus God is said to approach us, when he bestows benefits, to recede from us when he withdraws graces, to descend, to walk when he watches over our necessities. He is also said sometimes to walk in human form, as he appeared to Adam in the earthly Paradise.

You will object **2°.** from the Fathers. Clement of Alexandria book 1 of Stromata thus says: "Those indeed say God pervades the universal substance, we however say only the effecter." St. Augustine book 83 of questions says God is nowhere. The same Augustine book 2 on diverse questions to Simplicius q. 1. And John Damascene book 1 Orthodox Faith chapter 16 say he is only in place through operation, and is not said to be in place except abusively. Lactantius book on the Work of God chapter 16 says God is only in heaven, in that way in which the soul is only in the brain.

I respond to the first. Clement of Alexandria denies God pervades the universal substance in the sense of the Stoics against whom he there argues; these however said God pervades all substance and is mixed with all things, as a part and soul of the world: but he does not deny God is according to entity in all things in the Catholic sense.

To the second and third: The Holy Fathers say God is nowhere, is not in place except abusively, not to exclude the spiritual and substantial presence of God in all things which they assert in various places; but to remove every sense of material and corporeal presence, because God is not in place in the manner of a body through various parts of himself corresponding to various parts of place, and circumscriptively as if enclosed and contained in it, but rather containing it; and therefore he is abusively said to be in place, when rather place ought to be said to be in him.

To the fourth: God is in heaven in a special way, just as the soul is in the brain in a special way; but this does not prevent him from being in a general way in all things, just as the soul is generally in the whole body. If Lactantius claims anything else, he is to be abandoned; for in many things, as Authors note, he spoke untheologically, indeed erroneously, and therefore his works were consigned among the apocrypha by Pope Gelasius.

You will object **3°.** If God were everywhere, he would be extended: But extension is repugnant to God, since he is spirit: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the Major. If God were everywhere in a corporeal way through contact of dimensional quantity, he would be extended, I grant the Major. If he were everywhere in a spiritual way through contact of power, I deny the Major. But God is everywhere through contact of power, as we shall say more fully now: Hence his presence in things is not to be estimated like the presence of some body; but imagination must be corrected and the mind must be called away from the senses.

You will object **4°.** from inconveniences. If God were in all things, he would be in the most sordid things, indeed even in demons: But this seems indecent and absurd: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the Minor. For since God is spirit, he is not stained by the filth of corporeal things, just as the soul is not stained by the filth of a leprous body to which it is united, nor the light of the sun by the mud in which it is diffused. As to demons; since in them is imported both nature which is from God, and the deformity of guilt which is not from him, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in demons; but with this addition: insofar as they are certain things. The same must be said of sinners. But in things which denote nature not deformity, it must be absolutely said that God is.

§ III. Whether the substantial existence of God in things is efficaciously demonstrated from his operation virtually transient; and by what kind of demonstration.

THIS is whether the operation of God virtually transient is not only the reason through which we know him to be according to substance in things; but also is the formal reason, through which he exists in things, just as material quantity is the formal reason through which a body is in place, consequently whether the demonstration of the existence of God in things from his operation is a priori and through an intrinsic place? Both the Thomists with St. Thomas affirm: both the Scotists with Scotus deny. Outside both schools many adhere to the Thomists as to the first, not so many as to the second.

I say **1°.** The existence of God according to substance in all things is efficaciously proved from his operation in them.

It is proved **1°.** From that of the Apostle Acts 17: "He is not far from any one of us, for in him (that is through him as others translate) we live, and move, and are": Where the Apostle from the operation of God in us proves him to exist in us: For that the Apostle speaks of the entitative presence of God, and not only of his objective presence or knowledge (as the learned Father Henno interprets after certain others, as if the Apostle inferred only that God is known to us because he operates in us) is clear **1°.** from other versions in which it is read thus: "Although not far from any one of us subsisting." **2°.** From St. Augustine book 4 on Genesis ad litteram chapter 12 n. 23. from St. Hilary on Psalm 118 and others who understand this place of the Apostle concerning the substantial presence of God. **3°.** Because it is established that God is absent from many of us as to knowledge, since many do not know God.

It is proved **2°.** from the Fathers. St. Augustine in the place cited says: "Since we are something other than God himself, we are in him for no other reason, except that he works it." St. Anselm in Monologion chapter 22: "Since nothing can be or be conserved without God, we are compelled to say God is everywhere and always." Hugh of St. Victor book 7 erudit. Theolog. chapter 19 in Gonet: "Since we perceive the effects of divine power to be absent nowhere, why do we doubt that the same power of God is in all things? But if the power of God is everywhere, since the power of God is nothing other than God, it is established that God is absent nowhere."

The praised Father Henno responds, that in these and similar statements of the Fathers there are not formal consequences, as if from the operation of God they necessarily inferred his substantial presence, but they are only material consequences, as if they said, there is no better reason why God operates everywhere than that he is everywhere, but he operates everywhere, therefore he is everywhere. But against this response is not only fictitious without any foundation, but openly contrary to the cited texts as is apparent to the reader. Moreover it much derogates from the authority of the Fathers if we say they discourse about matters of Religion through only material consequences.

Before the proof from reason I premise from John of St. Thomas that two things can be considered in existence. First, the reason of ultimate actuality according to which being or existence corresponds to being as being is and according to which it is something common to every created and creatable being. Second, the very specification and limitation of existence according to which it pertains to such or such a nature, for instance that it be the existence of a horse or stone, by reason of which one existence is distinguished from another. Being according to the reason of ultimate actuality and universality by which it corresponds to being as being is, is the proper effect of God, both because the most universal effect must be reduced to the most universal cause, and because just as to kindle is the proper effect of fire, because fire is fire through essence, so because God is being through essence, his proper effect is to give being simply. But according to what existence has of restriction and specification from the part of such or such nature whose being it is, thus it also corresponds to a created agent, insofar as by producing the form, or created nature, it also produces being as restricted to such a form. Nor is

it inconvenient that some effect according to diverse considerations correspond to diverse causes. And thus existence according to the reason of universal and common actuality to every being, corresponds to the first being, but according to its specification and restriction which it has from the fact that it is the existence of such a being corresponds to the secondary cause productive of such a being.

These things being premised. It is proved **3°.** The conclusion by the fundamental reason of St. Thomas. An agent which operates intimately in all things not through power diffused from itself, but through power undistinguished from itself and identified with itself is intimately in all things according to substance: But God operates intimately in all things not through power diffused from himself, but through power undistinguished from himself: Therefore.

The Major is supposed from Physics, but because it is denied by some, it is proved briefly. Every agent must be joined to what it acts upon and to the effect at least by conjunction of power. **1°.** Because agent and patient are related as act and potency, as perfecting and perfectible; but act and potency, perfecting and perfectible must be simultaneous. **2°.** Because an effect immediately proceeding from some cause, seeks to be immediately joined to it or its power in its egression, the matter is not otherwise conceivable. **3°.** Because if the agent is not at least present by power to what it acts upon and to the effect, no reason can be assigned why it rather subjects that subject to itself and acts upon it than upon another, nor why it produces that effect rather than another. If therefore the power by which the agent is joined to what it acts upon and to the effect is not distinct from its substance, but is the very agent itself, as happens in God, by this very fact that he operates intimately in all things, it follows that he is according to substance intimately in all things.

Therefore the Minor of the first syllogism is proved: God operates in all things and conserves being not in any way whatever, not only such or such being, or as restricted to such or such species, but in the most universal way and absolutely, as it corresponds to being as being is, and is common to every created and creatable being; for thus it is the proper effect of God as we have explained: But being absolutely is most intimate to each thing, not indeed by constituting, for that is proper to form, but by actuating, because whatever is of a thing, if it is not actuated through existence, is nothing: And God produces and conserves this in all things not through created power emitted from himself, but through infinite power undistinguished from himself: Therefore.

This second part of the Minor is proved: The power productive of being absolutely as it corresponds to being as such, is the power productive of the whole creatable being, for it is of the same nature in all things, consequently creative power. To produce being absolutely, says St. Thomas, not insofar as it is this or such pertains to the nature of creation; and this is more evidenced from the fact that through suspension of the influx of divine power, the whole being is annihilated: Therefore it is a sign that it depended on God, as to the whole being, no less than

things which are simply created: But if it is creative power, therefore infinite, therefore identified with the divine substance, therefore God.

This Minor is confirmed. This is the difference between God and a created cause as to the mode of acting, that God is a purely efficient cause, independent of a subject to be transmuted, but a created cause is not purely efficient, but effects by transmuting: But being absolutely speaking per se, is not producible through transmutation, but through efficiency alone; therefore it is not producible through created power.

The Minor is proved. That form is producible through transmutation which has a contrary form, or privation in matter, through whose mutation matter passes from potency to act: But speaking per se being absolutely does not have a contrary form or privation in matter; because to existence, as such, nothing is opposed except nothing: Therefore being absolutely is not producible through transmutation, but through the influx of God, through whose suspension the thing is reduced to nothing. But that very being which follows upon the production of a form, can be attained through transmutation just like the form which it follows, always however dependently upon the influx of God.

From these are anticipated the principal objections which the Scotists and certain others make against this reason of St. Thomas. For they object **1°.** Therefore a created agent cannot act at a distance, because it is of finite power, which reason does not run in God. They object **2°.** Nothing prevents God from operating in things through power diffused from himself and using creatures as instruments. They object **3°.** created causes also produce the being of their effects, consequently to produce being infinite power is not required. These, I say, are anticipated.

To the first indeed, I deny the Antecedent. For a created agent cannot act at a distance, not precisely because it is finite, but for the reasons which we have deduced in the proof of the conclusion.

To the second I respond: Power diffused from God is created power, but through created power, God can operate determinate effects or being specified and restricted to such or such species and by transmuting, but not being absolutely as it corresponds to being as such, or by simply effecting: it is clear from what has been said.

To the third similarly, I distinguish the Antecedent: created causes produce being simply and absolutely as it corresponds to being as being is, I deny the Antecedent. Such or such being, or being specified and restricted to such a form, I grant the Antecedent. And to this sense, I distinguish the Consequent. It is also clear from what has been said.

Father Henno insists: If by the impossible God were only present in Heaven through essence, he could operate in other parts of the universe: Therefore from his operation everywhere, it does not follow by formal consequence that he is substantially and essentially everywhere.

The Antecedent is proved. To will and to do are the same in God, for "Whatever he willed he did" Psalm 113. but if God by the impossible were only in Heaven through essence, he could will that something be done on earth, since no repugnance of this can be assigned: Therefore also do.

I respond: I deny the Antecedent, supposing namely that operating on earth, he would remain only in Heaven.

To the proof, I distinguish the Minor. But if God by the impossible were only in Heaven through essence, he could will that something be done on earth, in the way it is doable, I grant the Minor. In the way it is not doable, I deny the Minor. But absolute being, as it corresponds to being as being is, is not doable except through infinite power which is God himself, as we have proved, but the power through which he would act on earth remaining in Heaven, would be created and finite: And this is the repugnance which the Franciscan Theologian seeks.

I say **2°.** The operation of God virtually transient is the formal reason through which he exists intimately in things.

It is proved **1°.** From the words of the Apostle cited in the prior conclusion: For the Apostle seems to prove God is in us through this that through him we live and are, as through a reason a priori; because if it were a proof a posteriori, it would be through an effect more known to us, which however is not the case; for although it is known to us that we are and live, it is not however more known to us that through God we are and live, than that he himself is in us. By the same reason it can be said that the Fathers praised in the first Conclusion prove the existence of God in things from his operation as a reason a priori.

The Conclusion is proved by the reasons of St. Thomas **1°.** a corporeal thing is in place not immediately through its substance, but through contact of dimensional quantity: Therefore an incorporeal thing is in another not immediately through its substance, but through some contact; for everything that is in place or in any thing whatever, touches it, and if it does not touch it is not in it, but at most near to it: but no other contact can be conceived in an incorporeal substance than of power, for it does not touch immediately through itself, as I have already said from the parity of corporeal substance, and it is clear; because according to itself it is absolute from other things, as I shall say now; nor through immensity, because immensity is only the aptitude to exist in all things, not the formal reason of existing; whence God from eternity is immense, but does not from eternity exist in things, but only in time. I subsume, but the contact of power is through operation, because active power is not united, or touches another except by acting upon it or applying itself to it: Therefore.

Just as therefore corporeal substance through quantity of mass is apt to exist in place, and through the contact of this quantity to the surface of what contains it formally exists in place, and thence in it results where, or the relation of coexistence and presence. So incorporeal substance through quantity of power is apt to exist in things, and this is called in God immensity, because

his power can extend itself to all things, and through contact of this power to things, producing them formally exists in them, and thence results the relation of coexistence or presence, which in God is of reason only and extrinsic denomination, because it does not depend on things, but makes them depend on itself, nor properly applies itself to them, but applies them to itself.

There is however a difference between God and other incorporeal substances, such as Angels and the rational soul, as to such contact of power, that since the operation of an Angel is not creative, but eductive, it does not make the subject in which it operates, but supposes it, and renders itself present to it through the productive operation of a superadded effect, similarly the soul supposes the entity of matter: Hence although the Angel is in that subject intimately as to the terms of place and quantity, it is not however within the terms of essence or substance, because it does not produce the being of the subject, but supposes it. Similarly the soul although it penetrates matter more intimately than the Angel penetrates quantity, because it informs it in substantial being; because however it supposes the potential entity of matter to which it superadds substantial being, it does not totally flow into the entity of matter. But truly God, since his operation is creative of the whole being, and supposes nothing at all previously produced, but effects the whole, therefore intimately flows within the terms of essence: Hence that of St. Thomas "Nothing enters into essence except he who gives being, namely God the creator."

2°. The divine essence according to itself is entirely absolute from all creatures: Therefore it does not connote them, or is compared to them in any way, consequently does not exist in them, except insofar as it makes them depend on itself: But this it accomplishes through operation in them: Therefore.

It is confirmed: God is denominated in time as existing in creatures; but this new denomination does not come to him through his own change: Therefore through change of the creature. I subsume, but God changes creatures through his operation virtually transient: Therefore.

Objections are solved.

You will object **1°.** with D. Tournely: The operation of God according to our mode of understanding follows and supposes the presence of God in things: Therefore the operation of God is not the formal reason through which God exists in things, or the existence of God in things is not proved through operation as through a reason a priori. The Consequence is clear; for just as to operate follows to be, so to operate in place, follows to be in place.

I respond: I distinguish the Antecedent. The operation of God follows and supposes the presence of God in things in the order of being, I grant the Antecedent. In the order of placing, I deny the Antecedent. Therefore to be and to operate in place, are simultaneous in God by simultaneity of time: But in the order of placing, to operate since it is the formal reason of being in place, is conceived prior to essence. Just as in corporeal substances, although substance in the order of

being is conceived prior to quantity, quantity however, or the contact of quantity in the order of placing, is conceived prior to substance, because it is the formal reason through which substance is in place.

You will object **2°.** with the same Theologian. What is in God necessary and intrinsic, does not depend nor is proved a priori from what is free and external; but the presence of God in things (their existence being supposed) is necessary and internal; since it cannot happen, that he be absent from those things; but the transient operation of God is free and external: Therefore the presence of God in things is not proved a priori from transient operation.

I respond: I distinguish the Major. What is in God necessary and intrinsic does not depend, nor is proved a priori from what is free and extrinsic, if it is necessary independently from what is free, I grant the Major. if it is necessary only ex hypothesi and dependently upon what is free, I deny the Major. To this sense, I distinguish the Minor. but the presence of God in things (their existence being supposed) is necessary, and the existence of things is not independent from the operation of God, I grant the Minor. And the existence of things is independent from the operation of God, I deny the Minor and the Consequent. To that however which is said that the presence of God is intrinsic and transient operation is extrinsic, the response will be apparent from the solution of the 6th objection.

You will object **3°.** with the same. If by the impossible something were in which God did not act through power, it would still be present to it through his nature, which since it is infinite and immense, can be conceived as distant from no thing, otherwise it would be conceived as circumscribed and finite by something, which implies contradiction.

I respond **1°.** Retorting the argument: If God by the impossible were not immense and produced some creature, he would be in it, therefore not by reason of immensity, but by reason of operation he would be in things.

I respond **2°.** I deny the Antecedent. for given this impossible, that something were in which God did not act, he would not be present positively to this thing, but only negatively; just as corporeal substance, quantity being removed, would not be present to place positively, but only negatively: thus e.g. water in a vessel, quantity being removed, would no longer be positively in the vessel as in place, because it would no longer touch the surface of the surrounding vessel, by which reason it is said to be positively in the vessel or in place, but would be said only to be present to the vessel, by presence, or negative indistance, insofar as in its substance it would be from that neither distant nor present. Similarly God in the hypothesis made, would not be in that thing positively, since he cannot be so in it except through operation, but would be negatively, because existing in himself, he would be from it, neither distant nor present. But from one impossible, another impossible following is not wonderful, nor does it imply contradiction, and thus the response to the proofs of the Antecedent is clear.

You will object **4°.** with the same: Just as God through eternity immediately coexists with all time, so through immensity immediately and formally he is intimately present to all things.

I respond: I deny the Antecedent. The disparity is that eternity is the actual and wholly simultaneous duration of an immutable thing; But immensity is not actual existence in things, but only aptitude to exist in them, but it actually exists through operation.

You will object **5°.** with the same: the reason of omnipotence and divine immensity is diverse: but if God were formally and immediately constituted present in place through operation, the same would be the notion of immensity as of omnipotence: Therefore.

I respond: Some among whom recently our Rabaudi, think omnipotence and immensity are not in God attributes virtually distinct, because the second act of both is the same without virtual difference, namely operation; for by the same operation God acts, and formally touches creatures, nor does he touch except because he effects. This opinion does not seem improbable, and according to it the major proposition of the argument would have to be denied. The more common opinion however within and outside the school of St. Thomas is that those attributes are virtually distinguished, because although operation is the second act of both, not however under the same aspect: For it is the second act of omnipotence, insofar as it acts, or effects; it is the second act of immensity, insofar as it touches and extends God in order to space: but these two aspects must be virtually distinguished in God, because those things are virtually distinguished in God which are so distinguished in creatures, that they pertain to diverse lines, as we have said in the preceding; but immensity pertains to the entitative order, and imports the breadth of extension; and omnipotence pertains to the operative order and imports the breadth of power of acting: Hence St. Thomas lists immensity among the attributes which pertain to the entitative order: And below q. 25 omnipotence among the attributes which pertain to the operative order.

In this therefore opinion the Minor must be distinguished: if God were formally and immediately constituted present in place through efficient operation, the same would be the notion of immensity and omnipotence, I grant, through operation as touching and extending God in order to space, I deny. The solution is clear from what has been said.

You will insist. According to what we have said in the first § from article 3 of St. Thomas, God is everywhere in three distinct ways, namely through presence, through power and through essence: But he is everywhere through power by means of operation: Therefore he is not everywhere through essence by means of operation, otherwise these two modes would not be distinguished.

I respond: I deny the Minor. For the reason through which God is in things through power, is not operation, but power itself, not as executing or acting, but as governing and ruling: Hence although God did not operate being in creatures, he would nevertheless be in all things through power, insofar as he could govern and rule them through Angels and men; just as a King sitting

on his throne is present to his whole kingdom through power, insofar as he rules and governs the whole kingdom through ministers. Hence St. Thomas said: "And yet if God were not everywhere, he would nevertheless govern all things by his providence."

You will reply: God by means of knowledge exists in all things through presence: But knowledge in God is operation: Therefore he does not exist in things through essence by means of operation; otherwise, as before, these two modes would not be distinguished.

I respond: I distinguish the Major. God by means of knowledge as formally immanent is in things through presence, I grant the Major. By means of knowledge as virtually transient, I deny the Major. To this sense, I distinguish the Minor. Knowledge in God is operation formally immanent and virtually transient, I grant the Minor. Formally immanent only, I deny the Minor. Therefore knowledge in God insofar as it is operation formally immanent makes all things present to God objectively, and thus by its means God is in all things through presence. But insofar as it is virtually transient giving being to creatures, it makes God be in them through essence.

You will object **6°.** Either operation according as it is held on the part of God and is his substance is in him the formal reason of existing in things, or according as it is held on the part of the creature which it changes. If the first, therefore antecedently to the created and changed thing, God is present through his substance, because operation as it is the substance of God precedes the created thing; if the second, therefore God is in things through something created, which cannot be said.

I respond: That neither operation precisely, as it is held on the part of God, nor precisely, as it is held on the part of the creature, is the formal reason for God existing in things; but operation according as it is held on the part of God and simultaneously connotes the passive change of the creature which it makes and touching applies to itself; and thus it imports in the direct something divine, but in the oblique and by connotation something created. Hence, as I have already noted, there results in God an extrinsic denomination of being present and a relation of reason of presence or coexistence.

You will object **7°.** The Word exists in the humanity of Christ through subsistence: Therefore there is given in God another formal reason of existing than through operation.

I respond: This mode of existing is special; but we speak of the general mode, by which God is in all things. Moreover the Word does not exist in the humanity of Christ, except insofar as it produces and conserves it, and unites itself to it hypostatically, consequently by operating.

You will ask **1°.** Whether God is not only in all things; but also in all places, as they are places formally?

Note 2°. Before the response note: It is one thing to be in place materially as a thing is, another to be in place as place is formally. Thus e.g. if there were a vessel painted filled with liquid, the liquid would be in the vessel formally as place is, but the painting would be in the vessel as thing is. That God is in all places, insofar as places are certain things we have proved thus far from his operation in things. Whether however he is also in all places formally as places are?

I respond: God is in a qualified sense in all places, insofar as they are places formally. Because things located are said to be in place formally insofar as they fill place; but God fills every place, not indeed like a body, which is said to fill place insofar as it does not suffer another body with itself; but because he gives being to all located things, and makes each one fill its own place.

You will ask **2°.** Whether to be everywhere is proper to God?

I respond: To be everywhere first per se is proper to God. It is explained and proved. That is said to be everywhere First, which according to itself as a whole and not according to diverse parts is everywhere; for what belongs to something by reason of a part, does not belong to it First; thus if a man is white only in tooth, like an Ethiopian, whiteness does not belong First to the man, but to the tooth. That is said to be everywhere per se to which it belongs to be everywhere not by accident and from some supposition made, because thus a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed; but to which it belongs to be everywhere by any supposition made of things and places even infinite. But in these ways to be everywhere is clear to belong to God alone; because he alone according to himself as a whole and not according to part, is in all things and places, however much they are supposed multiplied even to infinity.

§ IV. Whether God is actually in imaginary spaces?

Note 1°. We call imaginary spaces the vacant and empty intervals which we conceive outside the world, or in the space which the world now occupies before it was created.

Note 2°. For something to be actually in space can be understood in two ways. In one way comparatively to the term to which it coexists and is present. In another way absolutely in order to itself, insofar as it is existing in itself and designable in every part of space, although it coexists with or is present to no term. In the first way that God does not exist actually in imaginary spaces is manifest, for since the imaginary spaces themselves are nothing, but figments of our mind, God cannot so exist in them as to coexist and be present to some term of his presence, as he exists in positive and real places. Concerning the second way therefore there is difficulty.

That God exists actually in imaginary spaces by absolute and designable presence in any part of space, many from the Society hold, although they differ in the mode of explaining this presence. From this opinion, which they attack from elsewhere, those do not seem to recede who say God

exists actually in imaginary spaces, not as in things or places, but in himself. Thus Bancel who attributes the same opinion to Bannes and Serra; concerning the latter however it is not so clearly established.

However with the more common opinion. I say: God is not actually positively in imaginary spaces, but only by power and potency. Thus commonly the Thomists with St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, the Scotists and many others.

It is proved **1°.** by the Authority of the Fathers. St. Augustine on Psalm 122 says: "Before God made Heaven and earth, where did he dwell? In himself he dwelt, with himself he dwelt, and with himself God is." St. Bernard book 5 on consideration chapter 6: "Where was God before the world was made?... You should not seek where he was beyond himself, for nothing was besides him; therefore he was in himself." St. Thomas on chapter 2 of John lecture 1 to those words: "And the Word was with God," responding to the objection of certain heretics, who said that if before all things nothing was, nothing was in which the Word was, says: "This objection proceeds according to the imagination of those who posit that everything that is, is somewhere and in place, which indeed is excluded by John when it is said with God." But the same reason applies to imaginary spaces now outside the world, as to imaginary spaces before the world. Likewise Augustine book on the nature of good chapter 3 says God is above the world "Not by spaces of places, but by ineffable and singular power."

It is proved by reason. **1°.** From the principles of St. Thomas placed above. God is somewhere, insofar as he operates there, as we have proved: but God does not operate in imaginary spaces since they are nothing: Therefore.

2°. God is not in nothing, for in nothing, says St. Thomas, "Nothing at all is," indeed it is foolish, says St. Bonaventure in 1 D. 37 with Henno to say God is in what is nothing; just as it would be foolish to say God is in a chimera which we imagine, or in possible things: But imaginary spaces are entirely nothing and mere figments of our reason, no differently than a chimera: Therefore.

The adversaries respond that imaginary space is not nothing like a chimera or possible thing, but is nothing, which it does not contradict to be filled, consequently God can exist in it, not by relative existence through relation to something which is touched, but by absolute existence and designable in any part of space. Thus the first sphere, they say, exists in imaginary spaces, thus also Christ, who according to Scripture ascended above all the Heavens.

But against this, this response directly attacks the opinion of the adversaries: Something cannot be understood to be present to empty space, except because either it fills it formally through its quantitative extension, as happens in the first sphere and perhaps in the body of Christ, or effectively by effecting something which is in that space, and by means of which the efficient cause is present to that space; because to be in space cannot be understood without correspondence to it, and without some proportion filling the void, otherwise there does not

remain absolute presence in space, but only the existence of the thing in itself. But something cannot be understood to have correspondence and proportion to empty space, except in this twofold way, either because it formally fills it, or because it effects something in it by means of which it is present to it: For, which you should note well, effective power does not regard empty space immediately, because since it is nothing, power does not make it, nor can it be received in it, but mediately, insofar as it can make something in it, by means of which it is present to it: But God does not fill the empty void formally through quantitative extension which he lacks, nor effectively, because he effects nothing in it by means of which he is present to that void: Therefore.

I said: And perhaps in the body of Christ: Because that Christ is said to have ascended above all heavens, can be understood either that he ascended above the convex of heaven, or that he obtained a more sublime and worthy place of heaven: just as when we say that someone ascended above a tower or above a tree, the sense can be that he ascended above the ultimate summit of the tower or tree, or that he reached the superior part of the tower or the superior branches of the tree. St. Thomas admits both explanations. The first 3 p. q. 57 a. 4. The second in 3 d. 22 q. 3 a. 3.

It remains therefore, and it is the second part of the conclusion, that God is in imaginary spaces by power only and potency; because he can create in them another world or anything else whatever, by means of which he will be present to them. Nor does his immensity require more; because, as I have now more than once observed, immensity consists in this that he can exist in all things and places which are, but not that he exists actually in things and places which are not, but that he can exist in them, because he can produce them. Therefore God is not constrained in our opinion, within the ambit of this universe, since he can exist outside it by creating and operating whatever pleases him; and through these the principal objections are anticipated.

Objections are solved.

You will object **1°.** according to Scripture and the Fathers: God is not contained in this world, but is outside it. 3 Kings 8 it is said: "The heavens of heavens cannot contain you." Job 11 God is said to be "higher than heaven, deeper than hell." In the Council of Ephesus chapter 6 with Serra it is said that the divine nature is superior to every term and place even imaginary. St. Thomas himself Quodlibet 12 a. 1 says God is not only in those things which are, but also in imagined things and in past and future things. And 1 to Hannibal d. 37 q. 2 a. 2: "This adverb everywhere," he says, "refers to every imaginable place": Therefore.

I respond: Generally these and similar testimonies are to be understood either according to what Augustine says that God is outside and above the world, not by spaces of places, but by ineffable and singular power, as we say in the second part of the conclusion, insofar as he can operate outside the world, and exist there by operation; or according to what St. Thomas says that God is

above all things through excellence of his nature, not through local distinction. But the former words of St. Thomas are to be understood in the first sense is clear from the fact that he says God is in imagined things, just as in past and future things, but by power only, insofar as he can produce these and reproduce those. As to the latter words, I have already noted elsewhere that this work to Hannibal is not by St. Thomas. However the sense of these words is, that no true place can be thought to be given in which God is not; it is clear, because the Author adds: "Nor is it possible to imagine any place, where he would not be if that place were posited"; through which last particle, he signifies that he speaks of true and posited place.

You will insist. Augustine book 11 of the City chapter 5 disputing against certain ones who said the world was from eternity, because otherwise God would have been idle for infinite times, says: "Will they say that the substance of God is absent from so many spaces of places outside the world, and occupied in only one, and in comparison of that infinity, so small a place, in which the world is?" Therefore.

I respond: St. Augustine there speaks not asserting, but arguing in the opinion of those who posited the world to be from eternity, because otherwise God in the infinite times which they thought had preceded the world should have languished in idleness. Augustine therefore says: Similarly therefore let them think infinite spaces of places outside the world, and the same inconvenience follows thence; for either those spaces are real just as they feign real times before the world, and just as they deem it inconvenient that God ceased from operation in those times, so it is inconvenient that God cease from operation in those spaces, and this is what he intends in the words of the argument: but if those times and spaces are fictitious and imaginary, just as it is not inconvenient not to operate in imaginary spaces, so neither in imaginary times. Hence he concludes: "That if they say the thoughts of men are vain by which infinite places are imagined, when no place is besides the world; it is responded to them in this way, that men vainly think past times of God's vacation, when no time is before the world."

You will object **2°.** from reason. God from eternity and necessarily is immense and infinite in the notion of immensity: Therefore he is in all and infinite imaginable spaces, nor does he depend for this on his free operation.

I respond: I deny the Consequent, because immensity does not import actual existence in all places, but only the power of existing in them, as is clear from what has been said in the second part of the conclusion and elsewhere.

You will insist. Eternity by reason of its infinity embraces all times, past, present and future: Therefore equally immensity by reason of its infinity embraces all places past, present and future, consequently imaginary.

I respond **1°.** This argument proves too much, for from it follows that God actually exists in all things which were and are no more, as in Noah's Ark, in the Temple of Jerusalem, and in all things which will be and are not yet, as in Antichrist, which is not to be admitted.

I respond **2°.** I deny the Consequent. The disparity is **1°.** that eternity, as we shall say now, is the actual duration of a thing immutable from eternity and to eternity, independent of contact and operation, consequently it must embrace all durations not only present, but past and future. But immensity is not actual existence in infinite places, but the power of existing in things dependently upon operation and contact which cannot be made in imaginary space, except by producing something in it. Another disparity is that eternity is infinite in the notion of duration, and thus must embrace all times and all differences of durations, such as are not only present time, but also past and future. But immensity is infinite in the notion of placing, and thus must embrace all differences of places: but place whether past, or future consequently imaginary is neither place, nor any difference of place but pertains rather to the line of duration. A third disparity is that through eternity things are said to be in God, and through immensity God is said to be in things; but whatever is in another is in the manner of that other; since therefore God is from eternity and to eternity, he contains all durations, but since place is only in time, God is not in it except in time and when it exists.

You will object **3°.** God can no less by reason of his immensity and quantity of power, than an infinite body could, if it were given, by reason of its extended quantity: But if an infinite body were actually given, it would fill all imaginary spaces: Therefore.

I respond: I distinguish the Major. God can no less in the genus of efficient cause than an infinite body, if it were given, I grant the Major. In the genus of formal cause, I deny the Major. But if an infinite body were given, it would fill imaginary spaces formally through its material extension, by reason of which it would have proportion and correspondence of the full to the empty, as we have said; which God cannot, because he is not extended materially and this involves imperfection: But he can effect whatever bodies he wishes in imaginary spaces, and by means of these bodies be in those spaces.

You will object **4°.** from inconveniences. If God did not actually exist in imaginary spaces, it would follow **1°.** that he could be changed, in the case namely where he created some body in imaginary spaces; for then he would begin to be anew, where before according to us he was not. **2°.** It would follow that he could be moved per accidens, that is to the motion of another in that way in which a sailor is moved to the motion of a ship, because he could move that body in the spaces, and thus would begin to be where the body would be, and would cease to be where the body would cease to be. **3°.** It would follow that he could be divided from himself, if namely he created two bodies distant from each other in these spaces; for he would be in both and would not be in the middle according to us, because it is imaginary space: Therefore divided.

I respond to the first, I deny the Sequence: For in order that something be changed, it must be related passively and receive something in itself which it did not have before; but God is not anew present in that body through some presence received in himself, but through action upon that body which he creates or moves outside the world: Hence the whole change is held on the part of the body produced or moved. Just as when God created this world, he existed in it in which he did not exist before, nor nevertheless was he therefore changed, because he did not anew exist in it through something received in himself, but through the very production of the world; but the production of the world is in God from eternity, but virtually transient in time, as I shall say below.

And hence the response to the second is clear, because to be moved is to be changed; for motion is the act of a being in potency to receiving something: for while a body is moved, God in it is not moved, although he ceases to be where the body ceases to be, and begins to be where the body begins to be; because he does not begin to be anew through some presence received in himself, but through this that he produces or conserves that body, where before he did not conserve.

If you say: God according to substance and not only according to connotation or denomination was not before present in this place, and now the body being produced is there present according to substance.

I respond as before, I distinguish the Antecedent. And now he is there present according to substance as producing and changing the creature I grant the Antecedent. According to substance receiving presence in himself, I deny the Antecedent. For God does not exist in things through passive application of his substance to them, but by making them present to himself through active change of them, for which it suffices that he be in himself with the power of effecting and changing them, and through this of existing in them.

To the third I respond with John of St. Thomas, that the inconvenience objected is founded on false imagination apprehending spiritual things in the manner of corporeal things, as if spiritual substance is divided if it is not continuously placed in space; so that it operates in extremes and not in the middle. This indeed would suffice for the division of a quantified thing which is measured by space, but does not suffice for the division of a spiritual thing which is not measured by space or place, but is independent of it, and rather contains it than is contained by it: hence from the fact that it operates in extremes and not in the middle, it does not follow that it is divided in itself, but that the effect is divided and that it assists those things thus divided without division of itself. In which, says the praised Theologian, it is necessary to transcend imagination and correct it from the eminence of the spiritual thing and its independence from all measurement of intervening space or place.

ARTICLE VII. On the Immutability of God. St. Thomas q. 9.

It is asked **1.** Whether God is entirely immutable? Response: Affirmatively.

It is proved **1.** From Scripture. Malachi 3 it is said: "I am God and I do not change." James 1: "with whom there is no change nor shadow of turning."

It is proved **2.** By reason which is virtually threefold. For the nature of change there is required **1.** Potentiality with privation, as the term from which. **2°.** Form to be newly acquired, as the term to which. **3°.** Subject susceptive of successively many forms: but the first is excluded in God by reason of pure act. The second by reason of infinite perfection. The third by reason of supreme simplicity: Therefore.

It is confirmed: if God could be changed, he would be changed either for the better or for the worse, or for the equal, or he would lose what he has, or acquire what he does not have; but all these things manifestly import imperfection.

You will say **1°.** God was made and is made daily from not operating to operating, as is clear in the creation of the world which was made in time and in the daily production of new effects: Therefore he is changed.

I respond: I deny the Antecedent. For God from eternity operates what happens in time, because his operation formally immanent and virtually transient is not distinguished from himself; for it is nothing other than his very will by which he wills from eternity that something be done in time; hence the whole change is held on the part of the creature. He is not however denominated from eternity as creating or operating, because the extrinsic denomination of creator or operator depends on the effect produced in time.

You will insist: if God operated from eternity the effect would be eternal, for what would prevent it? the consequent is false. Therefore.

I respond: I distinguish the Major. if God operated from eternity for eternity, the effect would be eternal, I grant, thus his Son is generated from eternity. If he operated from eternity for time, the effect would be eternal I deny; for the effect follows from action according to the consideration of the form which is the principle of action; but the form which is the principle of divine action is his will, whose condition is that the effect be posited when he wills it to be posited. Therefore the cause preventing that the effect which God operates from eternity be eternal, is the divine will itself.

You will say **2°.** and simultaneously insist: of God it is said Psalm 17: "with the holy you will be holy, and with the perverse you will be perverted." Likewise God now hates, now loves the same

man. Likewise he is said to be angry and to repent: but all these things cannot be understood without change: Therefore.

I respond from what has already been said elsewhere, that all these things are said of God not properly but metaphorically, or not by reason of diverse affections, but by reason of diverse effects which correspond to similar affections in creatures. Thus while he exercises works of benignity and mercy toward the just, especially conferring graces, he is said to be good with them, and to love them: while he exercises works of severity toward sinners, especially removing graces he is said to be perverted with them and to hate them; when he punishes, he is said to be angry; when he destroys a work done, he is said to repent: because those who do such things among men are affected by love, hatred, anger, repentance and suchlike passions. But as to internal affection, in that way in which it can be in God namely eminently, it is eternal since it is God himself: hence those whom he loves with internal affection, he loves from eternity; those whom he hates, he hates from eternity according to the diverse condition of persons, so that the whole change is held on their part: thus unmoved in himself remaining he loved and hated Peter from eternity for the diverse state of sin and repentance, just as the same sun for the diversity of subject softens wax and hardens clay, recreates healthy eyes, torments sore ones: which example Augustine uses in Psalm 72.

If you oppose Lactantius who book 2 Divine Institutions chapter 17 and book on the anger of God chapter 22 says truly that God is affected by the passion of anger. I have already warned that Lactantius, otherwise an excellent defender of our religion, erred in many things and is to be read cautiously, although here he could be explained and understood concerning anger as to effect; because he argues against those who denied that God punishes sins.

We do not touch here the grave difficulty sought from the freedom of God. Concerning this below.

You will say **3°.** What is generated, is changed: but it is of faith that the Word is begotten by the Father: Therefore.

I respond: I distinguish the Major: what is generated, beginning to be is changed, I grant the Major. what is generated not beginning to be, but existing from eternity is changed. I deny the Major. For change requires that something begin to be which was not before, or that something cease to be which was before: the Word from eternity is what it now is, nor can it lose what it now has.

You subsume: but the Word begins to be what it was not before: Therefore. The Antecedent is proved. It began to be man through the Incarnation: but before it was not man: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the Antecedent. to the proof I distinguish the Major. it began to be man through the Incarnation passively and in the manner of a subject receiving humanity in itself, I deny the

Major. terminating it and giving its personality to it I grant and omitting the Minor I deny the Consequent. therefore in order that something be truly changed through the advent of something new, it is required that it advene to it by the mode of informing form, or at least that it receive it through passive potency: but humanity does not advene to the word by the mode of informing form, nor does it receive it through passive potency, but rather by acting upon it, namely terminating it and communicating to it its subsistence. For it is without it the purest, most integral and most perfect act, to which it so repugnates to receive something passively and by the mode of informing.

Concerning this argument more fully when concerning the Incarnation. I omitted the Minor, because although the Word before the Incarnation was not formally man, it nevertheless contained humanity eminently.

You will say **4°.** Wisdom 7 wisdom is said to be more mobile than all mobile things; but God is wisdom: Therefore.

I respond: Wisdom is said to be mobile similitudinarily, insofar as it most swiftly diffuses its likeness from the highest beings to the lowest; for all things are from divine wisdom as from an effective and formal principle, just as artifacts are from the wisdom of the artificer.

It is asked **2°.** Whether to be immutable is proper to God?

Response: Affirmatively. It is proved. Every creature is mutable either according to substantial being, like sublunary bodies; or according to local being only, like celestial bodies; or according to order to the end and application of power to diverse things, as in Angels; or according to various accidental perfections, as are all created beings finite and imperfect, or finally according to being and non-being, as again universally all creatures which are in the potency of the creator and conserver as to being and non-being: but God is mutable in none of these ways, as will be apparent to one discoursing through the individual cases, and is clear from what was said in the first question: Therefore.

ARTICLE VIII. On the Eternity of God. D. Th. Q. 1.

Question 1. What is eternity?

Response. Eternity is defined by Boethius: "The complete and perfect possession of interminable life all at once." This definition is commonly received.

Explanation. It is called possession, and not duration - not that eternity is not duration, as I will say below, but because duration by its very name implies a certain distinction of parts which should not be understood in the divine being. Therefore Boethius said "possession," speaking

metaphorically to designate the immutability and indeficiency of eternity; for that which is possessed is held firmly and quietly.

It is called possession of life rather than of being. **1.** Because that which is truly eternal is not only a being, but a living one. **2.** Because life itself extends in some way to operation, not being; but eternity is the permanence of an invariable thing in being and operating.

It is called interminable life, to designate that eternity neither has nor can have beginning and end.

It is called complete possession all at once, to signify that eternity lacks division and succession according to before and after, such as is found in time, whose nature is to be successive, since it is the measure of motion. But eternity consists in one single now that is never past nor future, but always now.

It is called perfect, to exclude the now of time, which although it is complete all at once and has no parts, is nevertheless not something perfect in the nature of duration, since it immediately vanishes; nor is anything perfectly possessed in it.

Therefore the sense of Boethius's definition is that eternity is the complete, simultaneous and indeficient duration of a living thing, lacking succession, beginning and end.

You say: Eternity seems to admit succession: therefore. **Proof 1.** It admits more and less; for now eternity has lasted longer than a thousand years ago. **2.** Eternity contains all created things, many of which are successive, indeed succession itself and time: Therefore.

Response. I deny the antecedent. To the first proof I deny the antecedent. To the proof I say that eternity has indeed lasted for a longer time now than a thousand years ago, but neither it nor God is therefore more enduring, older or greater; because it is indivisible and complete all at once. We indeed through imagination apprehend eternity to be greater which coexists with greater time, but we are deceived: similar to those navigating who think the earth moves, when they alone move while the earth remains motionless.

To the second proof, successive things and succession itself or time are contained in eternity, not formally but eminently; so that it coexists with all successive successions and times while remaining motionless and invariable; in much the same way as the center of a circle, which is indivisible, corresponds to all and each part of the circumference, and remains motionless, although the circle is rotated around it.

Take another similitude. Imagine a tree extended over a river from its source to the mouth of the river - it would contain all parts of the water flowing beneath it and would coexist with them,

itself not flowing but remaining motionless. Thus eternity, containing all past, present and future times, coexists with them as they flow, not flowing itself but remaining motionless.

From what has been said you will gather **1.** that eternity implies two things. First, something pertaining to the extension of it, namely that it lacks a term of duration, beginning and end, which is to have infinity in duration itself. Second, concerning the mode of duration, that it lacks all succession and mutability.

You will gather **2.** that eternity differs from aeviternity and time, not precisely because eternity lacks beginning and end, and aeviternity has a beginning, time a beginning and end; for this difference is only accidental. If aeviternity had no beginning, and time neither beginning nor end, it would nonetheless still be distinguished from eternity. The true difference of these is situated in this: that aeviternity is the duration of a thing immutable according to substantial being, but mutable accidentally, for instance regarding place or operation, as in Angels: hence from this part it is not complete all at once. And time is the duration of a thing variable according to being and operating, for it is the measure of motion according to before and after; hence from no part is it complete all at once, but through flowing parts. But eternity is the complete simultaneous duration of a thing invariable in being and operating.

Question 2. Whether God and he alone is eternal?

Response. Affirmatively.

Proof 1. By Authority. Psalm 9 says: "The Lord remains in eternity." Psalm 110: "You are the same, and your years shall not fail." Deuteronomy 23: "I live eternally." 2 Maccabees 1: "God the Creator alone excelling, alone just, alone omnipotent and eternal." Hence the Church in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter "firmly," on the supreme Trinity: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one true God alone, eternal, immense, etc."

The reason is: Because eternity follows immutability, just as time follows motion: but God and he alone is essentially immutable: Therefore God and he alone is essentially eternal.

He is not only eternal, but is really his eternity, just as he is his goodness and his wisdom; because he is his being which belongs to no creature; but eternity is nothing other than the duration of divine being, or divine being itself enduring; it is however virtually distinct from divine being, like other attributes, because duration and being in created things pertain to diverse genera; and although duration in created things is not distinguished entitatively from the enduring thing, for it is the enduring thing itself, it is nevertheless distinguished modally; for it is a mode of the thing, so that although there cannot be duration without existence of the thing, there can nevertheless be existence without duration properly speaking, as if a thing should cease to be immediately upon beginning to be.

When therefore certain words of past, present or future time are said of God, as Apocalypse 1: "Who is, who was, and who is to come," they should not be taken as if God successively varies through present, past and future, but because his eternity includes all differences of times. Similarly when the operations of God are designated as successive, succession should not be taken from the part of the principle, but from the part of the effects.

When however certain things besides God are called eternal, they should be understood either of eternity improperly taken for the longest duration, as Psalm 77: "Illuminating you wonderfully from the eternal mountains." And Genesis 49: "Until the desire of the eternal hills should come." Or participatively or only on account of interminability, which they have not from themselves, but from God's good pleasure, as is said of the fire of hell, Matthew 25: "These shall go into eternal punishment."

Question 3. Whether eternity has the nature of true duration with respect to God?

Response. Affirmatively. **1.** Because eternity behaves with respect to God, just as aeviternity and time with respect to creatures, for they are three species under the same genus: But aeviternity and time are true durations with respect to creatures: Therefore eternity also with respect to God.

2. If eternity did not have true duration with respect to God, it would be because duration implies succession: But the consequent is false: Therefore. The major belongs to the adversaries. The minor is proved. Although, as I have already said, duration according to the etymology of the name implies a certain successive extension of parts, nevertheless as to the thing signified and by virtue of its proper concept, it does not imply succession; indeed succession diminishes the perfection of duration, because duration as to the thing signified is nothing other than the permanence of a thing in being. Hence something endures more perfectly the less it loses of being. In succession however some loss of being is included, insofar as the successive does not remain in the same way, but passes from potency to act: Therefore succession is not of the concept of duration, but rather makes it imperfect.

Question 4. Whether eternity has the nature of measure with respect to God and creatures? Many affirm, many deny: both seem favored by St. Thomas.

Before the response, note that measure is twofold, extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic is that which measures something outside itself, and therefore by application to the measured: thus the duration of the motion of the first mobile, which is time, collected and repeated by numbers, say by hours and applied by the intellect to inferior motions, measures those as a more uniform and regular duration, because the most perfect in any genus is the measure of the rest. Thus also the ell measures cloth, the pound weight. This measure, as is evident, is distinguished from the measured, and terminates its relation.

Intrinsic measure is that which is in the measured thing; and therefore does not measure by application, but by information or identity, hence it is not really distinguished from the measured, nor does it terminate its relation. Thus time which is extrinsic measure with respect to us, is intrinsic with respect to the motion of the first mobile; for it does not have another superior time by which it is measured, and what is most perfect in any genus is the measure of itself and others, intrinsic of itself, extrinsic of others. Hence the duration of the motion of the first mobile is according to diverse respects measured and measure: insofar as it implies successive extension, it is measured; insofar as it implies more perfect uniformity and regularity, it is measure.

Furthermore, measure should make known the quantity of the measured, for measure is therefore assumed, that it may be known how great some thing is. It should not however make known a posteriori and through effects better known to us, but a priori insofar as it is most perfect of its genus, and for that reason the measure of others; for by this very fact, as much as it is of itself, it is indicative of the quantity of the measured.

Having noted these things.

Response. It is more probable that eternity has the nature of measure with respect to God and his duration: So that the duration of God, insofar as it explicates his virtual extension infinitely durative, is measured, but insofar as it explicates supreme uniformity and immutability in enduring, it is measure. This seems to be St. Thomas's view, who here in article 5 repeatedly says that eternity is the measure of permanent things, and in 1 d.19 q.2 a.2 ad 1 says that God is in the now of eternity as in his proper measure, but other things as in an exceeding measure.

Proof: The nature of measure according to itself, removing imperfections which it accidentally involves, belongs to God: But eternity contains the conditions of measure with imperfections removed: Therefore. The major and minor must be proved.

The major is proved. The nature of measure according to itself involves no imperfection, and thus is a perfection simply simple, for nothing is assumed as measure which is not most perfect in its genus, and for that reason a measure manifesting the quantity of others: But that it is really distinguished from the measured, and that hence the measured depends on the measure and is imperfect as perfectible by it, this is not included in measure according to itself, but insofar as it is extrinsic; but according to itself it seeks to be joined to the measured, otherwise it does not measure: Hence the more perfect the measure is, the more perfectly it is joined to the measured; so that if it is a most perfect and infinite measure, it is identified with it, and thus renders it perfectly joined to itself, and consequently perfectly measured: Therefore measure does not say of itself real distinction from the measured. But in God we posit intrinsic measure identified with the measured.

The minor is proved. Eternity implies supreme uniformity of simplest duration, by reason of which it is known how great this duration is: Therefore it has the nature of measure; for time, which is the duration of the motion of the first mobile, is the measure of itself and others because among created things it is most uniform and regular, and for that reason shows how much the duration of itself and others is extended: Furthermore eternity is intrinsic and identified with God, and with God's duration, and hence indistinct really, nor terminating a relation of dependence of the measured.

You say 1. Measure cannot be conceived except as perfection; therefore neither the measured except as imperfect, perfectible by it; consequently really distinct and dependent on it, all of which are repugnant to God. On the other hand, nothing is the measure of itself.

Response. Granting the antecedent, I deny the consequent where it is a question of intrinsic measure identified with the measured. Indeed intrinsic measure cannot be conceived except as perfection, but therefore the measured should not be conceived as imperfect potential and perfectible by it as by something extraneous, if indeed it has that perfection identified to itself, but it follows only that it does not explicate it as the measure explicates it, but implies it as its own. Thus the intelligible object is conceived in God as perfective of the intellect, because specificative, not that it perfects the intellect as something imperfect and potential, but because through its concept it explicates a perfection which the intellect does not explicate, which nevertheless it identifies and implies as its own.

To what is added: It is true that nothing is the measure of itself under the same aspect, but well under a diverse aspect, as I explained in the conclusion. We have an example in time: For insofar as it implies extension of the motion of the first mobile it is measured, insofar as it implies uniformity and regularity of such motion, it is measure, and thus it is the measure of itself under a diverse aspect.

You say 2. St. Thomas here in article 3 says: eternity is nothing other than God himself. Hence God is not said to be eternal as if measured in some way; but the notion of measure is taken there according to our apprehension only. And in 1 d.19 q.1 a.1 ad 4: divine magnitude is in no way measurable or measured, neither by another nor by itself. First, because numeration posits termination, and divine magnitude has no term within and without... Second, because commensuration is not of one quantity to itself but of two.

Some, to extricate themselves from these texts, understand eternity to be the measure of God not formal but virtual, and say St. Thomas in the objection denies to eternity the nature of formal measure, not virtual; thus Gonet. Although this opinion is not improbable, it does not seem necessary to flee there. Hence.

Response. St. Thomas in the objected places should be understood concerning extrinsic measure really distinct by application measuring and exceeding. And as to the first it is evident; for

therefore the holy Doctor denies that God is measured by eternity; because, he says, he is his eternity; he understands therefore that he is not measured by eternity as by a measure distinct from himself. He adds: but there the notion of measure is taken, namely actually distinct such as is usually employed in human affairs, according to our apprehension only; because being and eternity in God are not distinguished actually, except according to the apprehension of our mind.

As to the second it is still more evidently clear. **1.** Because there he speaks of measure which posits termination, consequently exceeding. **2.** Because he says commensuration is not of one quantity to itself, but of two; therefore he speaks of commensuration which is made by something extrinsic and distinct; hence in the same place he concludes the solution, saying that to the divine magnitude nothing diverse from it is commensurated. Therefore when he denies measure to God, he speaks of measure which is diverse and extrinsic.

Question 5. Whether eternity has the nature of measure with respect to creatures?

Response. Eternity is the measure of creatures, but inadequate and exceeding. Thus St. Thomas in the place cited in the superior response.

The reason is: because eternity is the measure of the divine action by which God produces and conserves creatures in their being: therefore it is also the measure of the terms of this action. But it is inadequate and exceeding measure as to two things. **1.** As to extension, because it comprehends all durations without beginning and end: **2.** As to the mode of measuring, because it measures in an immutable mode, not by numeration, but by supreme unity and indivisibility.

More things could be said about these difficulties, but because they are less necessary, we omit them: John of St. Thomas on this question can be seen; but the more celebrated difficulty about the real presence of even future things in eternity we remit to the question on God's knowledge.

ARTICLE IX. Whether God is One? D. Th. q. 11.

Note 1. For the intelligence of God's unity the holy Doctor examines the unity of being in general, and teaches that transcendental one does not add anything above being, but only the negation of division; so that if one is taken as it is distinguished from being, it says formally negation only; but if it is taken in its total signification, it says formally perfection, namely undivided entityness: for one formally is nothing other than undivided being: hence this indivision or negation of division it adds to being not as a constitutive form of one, but as an intrinsically connoted mode: one therefore is not entityness precisely, nor indivision precisely, but entityness connoting indivision, or as it underlies the negation of division. And because entityness as such, and entityness as underlying indivision are really the same, thus one and

being are really the same, and are distinguished only by reason. Because however we conceive the notion of being before the notion of the undivided, therefore we conceive one as a passion of being.

But this transcendental one is opposed privatively to multitude, because it signifies the privation of division. But quantitative one which is the principle of number is opposed to multitude relatively, because quantitative unity is related to multitude as measure to measured; for multitude is measured by unity repeated.

Note 2. When we ask whether God is one, it is not a question of positive and specific unity, by which something is an undivided being in itself and divided from any other of the same species, in which sense any man is one; but of numerical and exclusive unity, by which something is so one that it excludes whatever else of the same nature and is unique in it, in which sense we say the sun is one. We ask therefore whether God is the sole and unique God, so that besides him, there is no other God.

Note 3. Polytheism or the plurality of gods blind and insane gentility, completely addicted to idolatry, extended so far that, as Eusebius testifies in book 5 of Evangelical Preparation chapter 15, Hesiod numbered thirty thousand gods. We examined the causes and origin of idolatry with the Author in the Treatise on Religion, Dissertation 7 article 2 §3, and we exposed its various species in the same place §1. Look there.

Among Christians however not a few heretics impugned the unity of God, especially those who admitted two principles: one good, author of invisible things, the other evil, cause of visible things. Such were the Gnostics led by Carpocrates in the 2nd century. The Marcionites so called from Marcion in the same century. The Valentinians from Valentinian in the same century: he so asserted two principles that he called one the profound, the other silence, male and female from whose combination proceeded thirty Aeons, that is, thirty ages. The Manicheans in the third century so called from Manes their leader, who was the servant of a certain Persian widow, first called Curbicus, then Manes, finally Manichean. These in later centuries had as followers the Albigenses and others.

The Tritheists, other enemies of God's unity, at the end of the sixth century said the three divine Persons were three Gods. Against all these.

I say: God is one.

Against those who admit the old testament, such as many Jews were according to Annatus in the Apparatus book 7 article 1, it is proved from that text in Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one." And chapter 31: "See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me." And elsewhere.

Against heretics who admit the new testament: It is proved from that text in Mark 12: "Well, master, you have said in truth that there is one God, and there is no other besides him." John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God." 1 Corinthians 8: "We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one." To these and other similar texts are added the Professions of faith in the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, Athanasian Symbols and the consensus of all the Fathers in their writings.

Against Gentiles and any others, it is proved by triple reason.

The first is taken from God's supreme simplicity. Singularity is of the essence or nature of God: but to an essentially singular being it is repugnant to be multiple: Therefore. The minor is evident, because singularity is unmultiplicable; otherwise if it were multiplicable, it would be common to many, and then not singular: Thus if singularity or thisness by which Socrates is this man were of the essence of human nature, like rationality, there would be a unique man in the world.

The major is proved: That by which God is singular or this God is the same as that by which he is God: but he is essentially God: Therefore he is essentially this God, or singularity is of his essence. The major is proved; because if he were God by one thing and this God by another, the divine nature would have to be contracted by thisness or individual difference, and thus there would be some composition in God, and not supreme simplicity: Therefore.

If you say: Angelic nature is essentially singular according to Thomists, and yet there are many Angels at least in species: Therefore this reason of St. Thomas is ineffective.

Response. I deny the consequent. For this is the disparity between God and Angels, that angelic nature, although specifically taken is essentially singular, because it lacks the principle of numerical multiplication, namely matter, and therefore there cannot be many Angels numerically in the same species; nevertheless generically taken it is not essentially determined to one species, hence there can be many species of Angels: but in God there is neither genus nor species; but he is in every part most simple and supremely singular; hence neither as to species nor as to number can he be multiplied.

The second reason is taken from God's infinite perfection. God is an infinitely perfect being: but there cannot be two or more infinitely perfect beings: Therefore. The minor is proved: If there were two infinitely perfect beings, they would have to differ among themselves; but that by which they differed would be either an imperfection, and this cannot be said, because an infinitely perfect being admits no imperfection; or it would be a perfection, nor can this be said, otherwise one would lack a perfection which the other had, and thus that first one would not be infinitely perfect: Therefore.

Related to this is this other reason. God is the supreme being, the supreme good: but that which is supreme has neither greater nor equal, otherwise it would not be supreme: Therefore one.

The third reason is taken from the unity and order of the universe. By the name of God we understand the supreme ruler and governor of the world: but the governor of the world is unique: Therefore God is unique. The minor is proved: The diverse and unequal beings of the world, some superior, some inferior, are so ordered that some serve and are coordinated to others by firm law: but they cannot come together into one order except by being ordered by one, because properly one is the cause of one, and many are not the cause of one except accidentally, insofar as they are in some way one.

This reason is strengthened further. If there were two or more gods, either one would suffice for the government of the whole universe, so that he would do entirely and in every way the same as the other, or he would not suffice, but would need the help of another, so that one would do something or in some way, and another something else or in another way. If the first: Therefore that other is superfluous, but nothing is more absurd than to posit a superfluous God. If the second: Therefore neither is God, because neither is omnipotent, neither the maker of all things; and the ordering of things which is something most perfect in the whole universe would be an accidental effect, namely from several causes fortuitously concurring into one.

Also either one would necessarily agree with the other in the government of the universe, so that he could not dissent from that one, or he would be free and could dissent from that one. If the first: Therefore he is not God as being dependent on another and subject to him. If the second: in the case where he dissented and wanted to dispose of the things of the universe in another way, either one would prevail in this war and subject all creatures to himself, and thus the other, powerless and conquered, would not be God: or neither would prevail, but each would subject a certain portion of creatures to himself, and thus neither would be God, because neither would be omnipotent, neither would subject all creatures to himself, and the order of the universe would be dissolved: Therefore it is manifestly necessary to posit a unique governor of the world.

What could be objected about the three divine persons does not stand in the way because they govern through one and the same nature, one will, one and the same omnipotence.

You say 1. In the Scriptures many are called gods. Psalm 81: "I said: You are gods and all sons of the most high." Ibid: "God stood in the synagogue of gods." Exodus 7: "The Lord said to Moses: Behold I have constituted you the god of Pharaoh." 1 Corinthians 8: "There are those who are called gods whether in heaven or on earth. (For indeed there are many gods and many lords) but to us there is one God": Therefore.

Response with the Roman Catechism part 1 number [missing]: "That the sacred Letters called Prophets and Judges gods was not done in the manner of the Gentiles, who foolishly and impiously invented many gods for themselves, but by a certain custom of speaking they wanted

to signify some excellent virtue or function which was granted to them by God's gift." Thus gods are called Prophets on account of the revelation of future things made to them. Judges on account of the authority of life and death granted to them. The just on account of the indwelling Holy Spirit: And so of the rest.

As to the Apostle, when he says "for indeed there are many gods," he does not speak from his own opinion, but according to the opinion and error of those who posited many gods, as is evident from the words subjoined; as if he said, there are indeed according to the erring Gentiles many gods, but to us illuminated through Christ there is one God.

You say 2. St. Basil Epistle 141 denies that God is numerically one: Therefore.

Response with Sylvius, that Basil does not deny this as if he wants there to be many gods, for he repels this calumny from himself. Epistle 80: "They cause us to be accused of preaching three gods, and with this figment they fill the ears of many, nor do they cease until they make this calumny credible." But he takes one for that which is not simple, but consists of parts which can be numbered: for he says in the same place, "whatever is said to be numerically one is not really one or of simple nature." But all confess that God is simple and incomposite; therefore God is not numerically one. He therefore denies that God is numerically one, as if he consisted of parts which could be numbered, or is divisible into many singulars; although he is one exclusively, that is, so one that not many.

You say 3. Many miracles performed by the gods of the Gentiles are read in histories, many future things announced, many diseases which seemed incurable healed, etc.: therefore.

Response. These are for the most part fictitious, and if some are partly true, they should be ascribed to the industry and perspicacity of demons; for these, endowed with most acute genius, can much better than we conjecturally know from present circumstances what future things will be, and since they excellently know the power of natural things, by applying it in various ways they seem to work miracles, while they produce only merely natural effects.

DISSERTATION IV. On the Knowability and Vision of God by us, and also on his Names. D. Th. Q. 12. & 13.

In the preceding we have considered how God is according to himself, now we must consider how he is in our knowledge, that is, how he is known by us. God can be known by us in multiple ways. **1.** Abstractively through effects, thus through creatures we naturally know God as Author

of nature: according to that text of the Apostle in Romans 1: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that are made, being understood by the intellect."

2. Supernaturally but obscurely through faith. **3.** Supernaturally clearly and intuitively, as he is in himself, in the way the Blessed in Heaven see him. This knowledge of God is called vision; because just as we are said to see a corporeal thing when we clearly and intuitively attain it present to the corporeal eye, so we are said to see a spiritual thing when the intellect, which is the eye of the mind, clearly and intuitively bears upon it as really present to itself in itself.

The holy Doctor treats of the knowledge of God through faith in the second part of the second; of natural and abstractive knowledge through effects, he treats in the two final Articles of this question: In the remaining eleven, of the knowledge of God through intuitive vision. He treats of this same vision of God under diverse respects in various places. In the first part of the second he treats of it as it is beatific and the ultimate end. In the supplement he treats of it as it pertains to the state of glory to which we are led through Christ: Here he treats of it precisely as it pertains to the knowability of God.

ARTICLE I. Whether the divine essence can be seen by the corporeal eye?

That he could be seen by corporeal eyes was thought by all who among Gentiles and Heretics imagined him to be corporeal. Among Catholics indeed who acknowledge God to be pure spirit, there are nevertheless some who contend that he can be seen and in fact should be seen by the corporeal eye, not gross and material as it now is, but glorified, not through corporeal vision, but through spiritual vision united to it. Thus many of the School of Discalced Carmelites with their Master Bona Spes. Valencia however considers it probable that a corporeal eye could be created which either by its nature or by some superadded gift could see God: against all these with the Author and common opinion.

I say 1. The divine essence cannot absolutely be seen, as it is in itself, by the corporeal eye even if glorified.

Proof 1. From Scripture. 1 Timothy 1 it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal and invisible": And chapter 6: "Whom no man has seen, nor can see": But these authorities should be understood of vision through the corporeal eye: **1.** Because they are commonly so interpreted by the holy Fathers and Theologians: It is not permitted to interpret Scripture against the common sense of the holy Fathers and Theologians. **2.** Because it cannot be understood of vision through the mind, since in many other places of Scripture it is declared that God is visible to the eyes of the mind, as 1 John 3: "We know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is." And elsewhere similarly, as we shall see in the following article.

Proof 2. From the Fathers. Origen against Celsus says: "Therefore Celsus falsely imposes on us, saying that we hope to see God with corporeal eyes": And he adds that the mind alone sees God. St. Cyril of Jerusalem Catechesis 9: "God cannot be seen by the eyes of flesh; for the incorporeal cannot fall under corporeal eyes." St. Athanasius according to St. Augustine Epistle 111 says that God, "according to the property of his divinity, is altogether invisible... except insofar as he can be known by mind and spirit." St. Ambrose according to the same in the same place as will be cited below. St. Jerome according to the same in the same place asserts the same and proves it, because "an incorporeal thing is not seen by corporeal eyes."

As to St. Augustine, about whom there is especially difficulty, that he constantly held our opinion is shown by many proofs. **1.** Epistle 6 to Italica he says: "This (namely God) the eye of the body can neither now see nor then will be able to see"; which he proves by many arguments, and calls the opposite opinion foolishness and madness. Epistle 112 or the book "On Seeing God," after he confirmed the same opinion in the former, and in this Epistle from Scriptures, from Saints Ambrose, Jerome, Athanasius cited, he concludes thus with the words of Ambrose: "Nor is God seen in place, nor is he sought with corporeal eyes"; and he adds: "But I confess this to be my opinion also." In Psalm 41 after the beginning: "God indeed cannot be seen except by the soul": And elsewhere frequently.

Finally St. Fulgentius his disciple, to whom the holy Doctor's mind was better known than to some of the Moderns, to Question 3 of Ferrandus, testifies this to be the opinion of his master, and subscribes to it with these words: "God the spirit is not seen by corporeal eyes." And, "not to the eyes of the body, but to the eyes of the soul does God promise his vision."

If you say the praised Fathers should be understood concerning the gross and material corporeal eye, as it is in this state, not as glorified and in some way converted into the power of the mind.

On the contrary: 1. The praised Fathers speak of the vision of God which will be in the other life after the resurrection; then however the eye will be glorified. **2.** They so exclude the corporeal eye from the vision of God that they ascribe it to the mind alone. **3.** Most of the cited Fathers therefore deny that the corporeal eye can see God because body cannot see spirit; but this reason applies even to the glorified eye, unless perhaps you say that through glorification it becomes spirit: but by this hypothesis the question ceases and the whole difficulty.

Proof 3. By reason: God is spirit; but it is absolutely impossible for spirit to be seen by the corporeal eye: Therefore. The major is of faith. The minor is proved. It is impossible for any power to bear beyond the latitude of its adequate or extensive object: For in this the adequate or extensive object differs from the proportionate object, that under the proportionate are comprehended only those things which the power can naturally and without elevation attain. But the adequate and extensive comprehends all things to which the power can bear, even supernaturally and as elevated: And thus it is impossible for any power to bear beyond the

latitude of its adequate and extensive object, otherwise it would be adequate and extensive, as supposed, and would not be, because beyond that the power would supernaturally extend itself: But spirit is not contained within the latitude of the extensive and adequate object of the corporeal eye: Therefore.

The minor is proved. The adequate object of the corporeal eye, like all material power, is something corporeal and material, namely of the eye, color; of the ear, sound; of smell, odor, etc.: therefore. The antecedent is proved. **1.** From the common sense of men and the commonly received definition of these powers: For sight is commonly defined as the power perceptive of lucid color; hearing, the power perceptive of sound, and so of the rest. **2.** From that word of Christ to the disciples Luke 24: "Handle and see, because a spirit has not flesh and bones, as you see me to have." Now if spirit were contained within the adequate object of the corporeal eye or other material sense, so that the eye could supernaturally see it, Christ would ineffectively prove the truth of his flesh from the fact that he could be touched and seen, since in this opinion even spirit could by divine power be touched and seen. **3.** The adequate object of the corporeal eye or other material sense extends less widely than the object of the intellect: Experience testifies to this first point, and it is also established by reason: Because a power extends itself the less, the more it is material: For through matter active powers are limited; hence we see that the object of external sense is more restricted than the object of internal sense, and of this than of intellect; because external sense is more material than internal, and this than intellect; indeed intellect, although for this state it depends on phantasms and therefore is limited to the quiddity of material things; nevertheless, because according to the common notion of intellect it does not have limiting matter, it is unlimited and bears upon whatever being and upon common notions of being abstracted from matter: Therefore the adequate object of material sense should be material, for we cannot prescribe any other limit to it, and if it could supernaturally extend to spiritual things and to God, it would be unlimited like intellect, indeed it would be supernaturally intellect, because it would be supernaturally a power perceptive of truth and being as such.

Confirmation: God is more distant in the notion of object from sensible objects than one sensible from another sensible, e.g. than color from sound: But it absolutely cannot happen that the eye hear sound and the ear see color; otherwise they would not be two distinct senses; but the eye would be ear and ear eye: Therefore a fortiori it cannot happen that God be seen by the corporeal eye.

If you say, material water in Baptism, as elevated, acts on the soul, similarly material fire in hell: Why not equally could the corporeal eye, as elevated, attain spirit?

Response. The disparity is that both water in Baptism and fire in hell act merely efficiently, as instrumental causes of God: but it is of the nature of an instrumental cause that it attain an effect superior to its own power, because it acts by the power of the principal agent: but the visual power is a vital and principal cause of vision; as vital, vision should proceed from it as

proportioned to it; as principal, since it acts by proper power, it cannot act outside the latitude of its adequate object.

Proof 4. The vision of God is immaterial, as proportioned to God himself who is immaterial: But it implies that an immaterial act be elicited vitally and principally by a material power however elevated.

Proof 5. From inconvenience. If God could supernaturally be seen by the corporeal eye of man, he could equally be seen supernaturally by the eye of a brute, say of an ox or dog; for the sensitive powers of brutes are of the same, indeed sometimes of greater perfection than the sensitive powers of man: but the consequent seems absurd, as will be declared more below: Therefore.

The disciples of Bona Spes respond with their Master that all these things prove that the corporeal eye cannot see God by corporeal vision, but not by spiritual vision united to it. But on the contrary.

I say 2. It cannot happen even by God's absolute power that the corporeal eye see the divine essence by spiritual vision united to it.

Proof 1. Because the Fathers praised in the first conclusion say that God cannot be seen except by the mind alone. **2.** Because in this opinion, the argument by which Christ proves the truth of his flesh would also be ineffective. **3.** Because vision is vital action: But as action it must necessarily be from an agent, for the concept of action is formally the concept of egression. As vital it must necessarily be from an intrinsic self-mover; for by this we distinguish living things from non-living, that living things move themselves from within, otherwise dead things: thus we say an animal first lives when it begins to have motion from itself; and an animal is judged to live as long as such motion appears in it: when however it no longer has any motion from itself, but is only moved by another, then the animal is said to be dead due to the defect of life. Hence those things which seem to move themselves and whose movers the crowd ignores, we say similarly to live, like quicksilver, bubbling water, etc. Therefore it is impossible that the corporeal eye see God by spiritual vision united to it. **4.** Spiritual vision is intellection: But it absolutely cannot happen that the corporeal eye understand, because what is not intellective in first act cannot much less understand in second act than stone or wood.

You say against the notion of vital act: The motion of heavy things downward, emanations of properties in inanimate bodies are from within, and yet are not vital acts, nor through them are heavy things or other inanimate things said to live: Therefore the notion of vital act is badly assigned through this, that it is from an intrinsic self-mover.

Response. Both the motion of heavy things and other emanations or resultances required for the completion of generation are properly from the generator and not from the generated, except as

moved and not as self-moving; according to that principle, "Who gives being, gives what follows upon being." Nor however is the generator said to live through those motions; because through them it does not move itself, but moves another; but to live is to move oneself from within, so that the motion is from the living thing and in the living thing: Because vital action as such is immanent action.

Proof finally from inconvenience as above. Because thence it would also follow that the eye of a brute could see God by spiritual vision united to it, and thus be blessed. To this inconvenience Master Bona Spes according to Henry of St. Ignatius his disciple distinction 7 article 6 §7 number 224 responds in two ways. **1.** He denies that this absurdity follows from his opinion: because, he says, the eye of man lives in first act by the spiritual life of the rational soul; hence it is capable of spiritual life in second act, not so the eye of a brute. **2.** He says it is not more absurd or impossible that an ox see God by spiritual vision united to it than that there be God through union with the person of the Word.

But on the contrary. **To the first Response 1.** The eye of the body indeed lives by the spiritual life of the soul, not only in first act but also in second; nevertheless it is not therefore spiritual or intellective in first act, because it is not informed by the soul as it is spiritual, but as it is sensitive only: just as although bones live actually by life which is spiritual and sensitive, they are nevertheless not sensitive and intellective in first act, because they are not informed by the soul as it is spiritual and sensitive, but as it is vegetative only; but what is not spiritual or intellective in first act cannot absolutely understand in second act; and therefore the adversary grants that stone cannot see God or live in second act, because it is not seeing or living in first act. **2.** If corporeal sense were intellective in first act because it is naturally animated by spiritual life, it could naturally understand in second act: because to be intellective in first act is nothing other than to be able to produce and receive intellection in itself.

Also if the eye were intellective in first act because it is informed by an intellective soul, it would follow that it would also be auditive, olfactive, gustative, etc. in first act, because it is informed by an auditive, olfactive soul, etc. which are all absurd.

To the second, I deny the assumption and parity. The disparity is that if the person of the Word were united to a brute, the brute would not be called God except through communication of idioms, insofar as the predicate God would be predicated of the supposition having the nature of a brute, but the nature of the brute itself would not be God or Divinity. But if a brute saw God through spiritual vision, not only would the brute be said to see God and be blessed through communication of idioms, but the very nature of the brute would be seeing God and blessed, than which nothing more absurd can be thought.

Furthermore a brute united to the person of the Word is not capable of the denomination of person: Therefore a fortiori, neither of intellectual vision which seeks a proportioned intrinsic principle, namely intellective in first act.

From what has been said you will gather against Valencia and Ariaga that a corporeal eye is not creatable which could be supernaturally elevated to the vision of God; because by this very fact that it is corporeal, all the reasons which we have brought forward thus far militate against it.

Objections Are Solved

You object 1. from Scripture: Job 19: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior." Therefore.

Response. When it is said "in my flesh I shall see God my Savior," it is not understood that he will see God with the eye of flesh; but that existing in flesh after the resurrection he will see God. That is, I shall see God in flesh, but not through flesh.

You insist 1. It should be understood that Job will see and has seen God in flesh through flesh: Therefore. The antecedent is proved. A little later it is subjoined: "Whom I myself shall see and my eyes shall behold." And chapter 42: "By the hearing of the ear I heard you, but now my eye sees you."

Response. I deny the antecedent. To the proof **Response** to the first place that the sense is: I existing in flesh will see God with the eyes of the mind, and with corporeal eyes God made man. St. Augustine applies the same interpretation to this place in book 2 of the City of God chapter 29 with these words: "For that which the above-mentioned Job says... and in my flesh I shall see God, undoubtedly prophesied the resurrection of the flesh, he did not however say through my flesh" (this, according to our first explanation) "which indeed if he had said, God Christ could be understood, who will be seen through flesh in flesh."

To the second, **Response 1.** that he understands concerning the eye of the mind according to that text of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1: "May he give you the spirit of wisdom in the knowledge of him, having the eyes of your heart illuminated." **Response 2.** According to the more common interpretation that in this place there is no question of the vision of God according to essence but according to providence; hence the sense of that is, formerly I had heard many things about your providence, now however I see manifest signs of it in myself. Or as Gregory the Great expounds: Now I know you much better than before, because I have profited through scourges.

You insist 2. in many other places of Scripture; Genesis 32 of Jacob it is said: "I saw God face to face." The same of Moses, Exodus 3. The same of Isaiah chapter 6 and elsewhere frequently: Therefore.

Response. These and similar Scripture authorities according to the common interpretation of the Fathers should be understood of God appearing under corporeal species; or certainly of the vision of God through the eye of the mind: nor is there any Father who ever understood these concerning the vision of God as he is in himself through the corporeal eye even clarified: So that Augustine himself, about whose mind the adversaries dispute, in book 22 of the City chapter 29 expressly says: "It is difficult or impossible to show by any examples or testimonies of divine Scriptures," namely that through the corporeal eye even glorified, the incorporeal nature of God could be seen. But it would be the greatest temerity to interpret Scripture against the common sense of the Fathers.

You object 2. St. Augustine in book 22 of the City of God chapter 29 says: "Therefore the power of those eyes will be far greater," namely of the glorified, "not that they may see more acutely... but that they may see even incorporeal things": Therefore.

Response. that Augustine speaks there only inquiringly and under condition, which is evident from the fact that it is prefaced: namely glorified eyes, "Therefore they will be of far different power" (note the condition) "if that incorporeal nature is to be seen through them."

You insist 1. Augustine speaks assertively not only inquiringly and under condition: Therefore. The antecedent is proved. In the same place above the holy Doctor derides the opinion of Philosophers who certainly teach that neither can body be seen through spirit, nor spirit through body: Therefore.

Response. I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: he derides this opinion as to the first member only, I grant the antecedent. As to both, I deny the antecedent. This is evident to one reading the text, and also from other places where he approves this reason as to the second member and especially Epistle 112 chapter 23 with these words: "For as Jerome elsewhere briefly and truly defined, an incorporeal thing is not seen by corporeal eyes." Otherwise he would deride the opinion not only of Philosophers, but also of other Fathers who used it, as we have seen; which is not to be said of St. Augustine.

You insist 2. St. Augustine condemns this opinion even as to the second member: Therefore. The antecedent is proved. A little below he says: "It can happen and is very credible that we shall so see the bodies of the new heaven and new earth that we shall see God everywhere present... through the bodies which we shall bear with clearest perspicacity... Not as now the invisible things of God are seen through the things that are made, being understood by the intellect... But as men among whom we live and exercise vital motions, as soon as we look upon them, we do not believe them to live, but we see them..." Therefore.

Response. that St. Augustine by these words understands that glorified eyes will see God accidentally in some effect of his, just as our eyes now are said to see someone's life when they see sensible and corporeal motions proceeding from him. But life is not seen by the corporeal

eye as a per se visible, but as sensible per accidens, which indeed is not known by sense, but immediately with sense by some other cognitive power. That immediately upon seeing those bodies the divine presence is known from them by intellect happens from two things, namely from the perspicacity of intellect and from the refulgence of divine clarity in renewed bodies.

You insist 3. According to that explanation of St. Thomas, it follows that God would not be seen formally by the corporeal eye, but per accidens only or through another; but formally only by intellect: but this cannot be said according to Augustine's mind: Therefore. The minor is proved. St. Augustine there asserts that God is seen in that mode concerning which he says there not assertively but doubtingly, "it can happen, it is credible," etc.: but Augustine never doubted that God is seen formally by intellect and per accidens by the corporeal eye: Therefore.

Response. I deny the minor. To the proof, I distinguish the minor: but Augustine never doubted that he is seen formally by intellect, nor concerning the special mode in which he would be seen by the intellect of the Blessed, I deny the minor. He never doubted that God is seen formally by intellect, but well concerning the special mode in which he would be seen by the intellect of the Blessed, I grant the minor. He did not doubt: therefore Augustine that God is seen formally by intellect and accidentally by sense, just as now the invisible things of God are seen through the things that are made, being understood by the intellect: but he doubted concerning the peculiar mode, namely whether glorified eyes would see God per accidens in that more excellent way in which we are said to see the life of our neighbor when he moves in our sight. And concerning this mode of seeing God he said doubtingly, "it can happen, it is very credible": because this is not entirely certain.

You insist 4. at least it cannot be denied that St. Augustine continually doubted whether God after the resurrection would not be seen by the corporeal eye, and was now inclined to one, now to the other opinion: but the doubt of so great a Doctor, especially a continual one, should be considered reasonable and probable: Therefore at least it is probable that God after the resurrection is to be seen by the corporeal eye.

Response. I deny the antecedent. For it is certain to us that Augustine constantly held that God is not to be seen after the resurrection, nor can be seen by the corporeal eye, from Epistles 6, 111, 112 and from many other places. Also from St. Fulgentius his Disciple who makes the holy Doctor an assertor of this our opinion. But there were two other doubts to Augustine in this matter. First, whether God in the fatherland is to be seen in that special way in which we see someone's life through the motions of his body, concerning which in the response to the second instance. Second, whether and how the body after the Resurrection is to be converted into spirit, as some according to him in Epistle 112 had asserted from that text 1 Corinthians 15: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body," which is outside the state of our question, as we have already noted.

Now this opinion of some concerning the transmutation of body into spirit, although he does not expressly condemn it in the aforesaid Epistle 112, both because of the authority of a certain Bishop asserting it, whom he had offended by his previous letters and wanted to reconcile to himself: and because the matter perhaps was not yet sufficiently explored by him; nevertheless he so examines it that he in no way deflects from our opinion: Hence chapter 21 of the said Epistle he speaks thus: "Finally because what I said in that Epistle of mine concerning these eyes of our flesh, that they neither now can nor then will be able to see God, is also true in this way. For it was not said except concerning corporeal eyes, which then will not exist if the body itself will be spirit, and through this corporeal eyes will never see God, because when he is seen, spirit will see him, not body. Therefore the whole question now remains concerning the spiritual body... insofar as it is changed from animal to spiritual, which must be treated more diligently and carefully, especially because of the body of Christ."

But he discusses this difficulty more diligently in book 22 of the City chapter 29, nor does he entirely evacuate it, for he says there: "We do not know what approaches the spiritual body will have, for we speak of an unexperienced thing." But he finally resolves it in book 1 of Retractations chapter 17 and defines that body is not to be converted into spirit: "Whoever," he says, "takes these things so as to think that the terrestrial body, such as we now have, is so changed by resurrection into a celestial body that there will be neither these members nor substance of flesh, is undoubtedly to be corrected, being admonished concerning the body of the Lord who after resurrection appeared in the same members not only to be beheld by eyes but also to be touched by hands, and even by speech confirmed that he had flesh saying: Handle and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see me to have."

You object 3. by reason. In anything there is obediential potency to anything from whose production no contradiction follows: Therefore the corporeal eye can be elevated to see God by spiritual vision, since in this no contradiction appears.

Response 1. I deny the consequent and its proof. For multiple contradiction would follow from this. **1.** Such vision would be vital as supposed, and would not be, because it would not be from within. **2.** The corporeal eye would understand as supposed, and would not understand because it is not intellective in first act. **3.** It would bear outside its adequate object, which therefore would and would not be adequate. Add the absurdity that a dog could see God and be blessed.

Response 2. I distinguish the antecedent. In anything there is obediential potency to anything instrumentally and merely efficiently, I grant the antecedent. Principally and vitally, I deny the antecedent. Because a principal cause acts by proper power; if therefore it is elevated beyond proper power, by this very fact it ceases to act as principal cause. Similarly vital action as such seeks to be from an intrinsic principle proportioned to itself: just as vital action in general should be from a vital principle in general, and therefore vital action as such cannot be from stone, so vital action in such species must necessarily be from a vital principle in such species. Hence just

as vision as vital cannot be from ear, nor hearing from eye, so neither can spiritual vision as vital be from a corporeal vital principle. But the corporeal eye is the principal and vital cause of its vision, by which it is said formally and vitally to see, as is per se evident. If therefore it should instrumentally and merely efficiently produce or receive spiritual vision, it would not be through it formally and vitally seeing, but would be related to it in some dead way just as water in Baptism is related to the production of grace, or as stone would be related if it were elevated to produce instrumentally the vision of God, through which it would neither live nor see God.

You insist 1. The spiritual soul can attain corporeal things by material sensation even principally and vitally: Therefore the corporeal eye can attain spirit by spiritual vision principally and vitally.

Response 1. By this argument it is proved that God is seen by the corporeal eye naturally just as the soul naturally attains corporeal things, consequently it proves too much, and therefore nothing. **2.** I deny the antecedent. For sensing is not proper to the soul alone, nor to the body alone, but to the composite, that is to the whole compound; because the formally sensitive power is not identified with the soul alone, nor with the body alone but with both; otherwise the intellective power. **3.** Granting the antecedent I deny the consequent. The disparity is that the spiritual soul is eminently sensitive, but the corporeal eye is not eminently spiritual.

You insist 2. An Angel is more distant from God than a corporeal eye from an Angel: but an Angel can see God; therefore a corporeal eye an Angel: if an Angel, why not God?

Response. I distinguish the major. An Angel is more distant from God than a corporeal eye from an Angel entitatively, I grant; objectively, I deny. Because since God is true being and intelligible, he falls under the object of Angelic and human intellect. But an Angel, since he is not material, cannot fall under the object of material sense. Confer the subsequent article especially in the final objection.

You object finally. According to St. Thomas 3rd part question 76 article 7 ad 1, Christ's eye sees himself subsisting under the Sacrament: but between the Body of Christ in the Sacrament and the corporeal eye there is no greater proportion than between the corporeal eye and spirit; since the Body of Christ in the Eucharist exists indivisibly in the manner of spirit: Therefore.

Response. I deny the minor. For abstracting now from the mode in which Christ sees himself in the Eucharist, concerning which in the 3rd part in the place cited, it suffices that his body is true and material having all its absolute accidents, quantity, quality and therefore color, although not in a quantitative mode in order to place: Hence between it and the corporeal eye there is some proportion, which is none between the corporeal eye and spirit.

ARTICLE II. Whether Created Intellect Can See God As He Is In Himself By The Powers Of Nature Alone?

Eunomius and Aetius, and from these called Anomeans in the fourth century, attributed not only intuitive but also comprehensive vision of God to the powers of nature alone, as will be more evident from what is said below, against whom Saints Chrysostom, Basil, both Gregories, Ambrose, Epiphanius and others fought most fiercely. This error was partly revived, namely as to vision, in the 14th century by the Beguards and Beguines, whom the Council of Vienne condemned. Against these and those.

I say. No created intellect can see God intuitively or as he is in himself by the powers of nature alone. This is of faith.

Proof 1. From the praised Council of Vienne under Clement V in the year 1311, in which the Beguards and Beguines were condemned, among whose errors the fifth article was this: "Any intellectual nature in itself is naturally blessed, and the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God and to enjoy him blessedly." Thus it is referred to in the Clementine "ad nostrum," on Heretics book 5 title 3.

Proof 2. from Scripture Matthew 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal." 1 Corinthians 2: "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man what God has prepared for those who love him." Romans 6: "The grace of God is eternal life": But eternal life is the very vision of God, according to that text of John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God." Therefore.

Proof 3. By argument founded on principles of faith. It is read in the Scriptures, and defined in various Councils against the Pelagians, that man by the powers of nature alone cannot merit glory, which is the very vision of God: Therefore neither can he by the powers of nature alone elicit that operation. **Confirmation:** Therefore it was defined that we cannot by the powers of nature alone elicit acts of faith, hope and charity, by which we merit glory, because they are supernatural, or exceeding our natural powers: But the vision of God as he is in himself is still more supernatural, since this is the end, those are means. Therefore.

As to the a priori reason, namely why this vision is supernatural or exceeds the powers of nature, Tournely notes that it should not be inquired more laboriously; since none, he says, can be brought forward which is not open to most grave difficulties. Nevertheless St. Thomas brings forward many here and elsewhere. And therefore.

Proof 4. By a priori reason: An object whose mode of being exceeds the mode of being of the knowing nature cannot be known by it naturally or by its powers alone quidditatively or as it is in

itself: But the mode of being in God infinitely exceeds the mode of being of any created intellect whether human or Angelic: Therefore. The minor is evident both from itself and by induction; for there are modes of being of three kinds: Some are those whose nature has being in matter, as corporeal things are. Some are without matter, yet they are not their being, but are in potency to it, and thus have something which is in them by way of matter, such as incorporeal substances, which we call Angels. But God's proper mode of being alone is that he is his subsisting being, and therefore purest act from all matter and from anything else having itself by way of matter.

The major is proved. Knowledge happens according as the known is in the knower: But the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower; for what is in something is in it according to the mode of that thing, so that if the knowing nature has being in matter, such as the rational soul is, it naturally knows all things according to the mode of material quiddity through species abstracted from sensibles; if it does not have being in matter, but has potential being to existence like an Angel, it knows other things according to its mode, that is according to the mode of nature potential to being: But God known according to the mode of material or potential quiddity is not known quidditatively as he is in himself; since he himself is his being and purest act. Therefore an object whose mode of being exceeds the mode of being of the knowing nature cannot be known by it naturally quidditatively and as it is in itself.

The wise Master Tournely objects: "This reason seems to require in the knower the same nature or the same immateriality which is in the known object: But that does not seem true: For a lower Angel naturally knows a superior, nor nevertheless does he have the same grade of essence with him: Created intellect also, aided by the light of glory, intuitively knows God, nor nevertheless through the light of glory is it constituted in the same grade of essence and immateriality with God." Thus he.

But on the contrary, I deny the major. Since God, infinitely distant in nature and immateriality from creatures, knows them quidditatively and most perfectly: Therefore this reason does not require equality between knower and known; but it requires that the object quidditatively and as it is in itself knowable not exceed in the genus of being the nature of the knower. I say in genus and not in species or perfection of being within the same genus; because here is speech concerning the mode of being generically considered, according as a thing is material or immaterial, because there is speech concerning the mode of being from whose diversity follows diversity of knowledge; but knowledge happens by the mode of immateriality and immateriality follows the generic mode of being as is evident from what has been said. We say therefore that by this very fact that an object is of a superior genus in mode of being, the knowing nature cannot by natural powers know it as it is in itself; because whatever it naturally understands, it understands according to the mode of its genus: thus e.g. because the rational soul is in the lowest genus of immateriality or mode of being (for although according to itself it is spiritual, it is nevertheless the form of body and concrete with matter) therefore whatever it knows naturally and from proper powers, it knows according to its mode through species abstracted from

sensibles, by which pact pure being, as God is, cannot be known as he is in himself; and hence is evident the response to both parts of the Minor.

To the first, although a superior Angel differs from an inferior in species and perfection of being, they nevertheless agree in genus, insofar as all are per se subsisting and independent of matter, and thus they know in the same way through infused and not abstracted species from phantasms; hence nothing prevents the inferior from being able naturally to know the superior quidditatively.

To the second, created intellect strengthened by the light of glory indeed knows God intuitively, not however naturally and from proper powers, concerning which the question proceeds, but supernaturally, insofar as through supernatural light it is elevated above its order, so as no longer to know according to the mode of its genus through species abstracted from phantasms.

It should therefore be noted carefully that here the question is **1.** Not concerning any knowledge, but concerning knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. **2.** Not concerning supernatural knowledge or through powers of superadded aid, but concerning natural knowledge according to the exigency and powers of the knowing nature. **3.** Not concerning the specific mode of being or concerning greater or lesser nobility and perfection in the same genus of being, but concerning the very genus of being, from which follows diversity of immateriality and consequently of knowledge.

Proof 5. What is connatural to some superior nature cannot naturally belong to an inferior nature, but only through the action and elevation of the superior: But to see God as he is in himself is connatural to God: Therefore. The minor is proved. To act through proper form is connatural to any agent: But to see God as he is in himself is to act through God's proper form, namely through his essence: Therefore. The minor is evident because for the vision of God any species is impossible or at least useless, but the divine essence supplies its function, as we shall say below; therefore.

From what has been said, especially in the fourth proof, what can chiefly be objected is easily solved, and partly will recur in the following article.

Whether indeed by God's absolute power some intellect is creatable which could see God intuitively through its own powers, or as others say, whether a supernatural substance can be created to which the light of glory is connatural and consequently the vision of God connatural, we shall resolve negatively below when treating of the light of glory.

ARTICLE III. Whether Intellect Supernaturally Aided Can See God As He Is In Himself?

Some heretics formerly denied the possibility of beatific vision according to St. Gregory book 18 Morals chapter 28. In the same error, as Turrecremata testifies book 4 on the Church chapter 35, Almaricus fell, against whom St. Dominic fought in the great Lateran Council under Innocent III. But this error was especially that of the Palamites in the 14th century, from whom the Armenians drew it.

The Palamites therefore, of whom I have already made mention in the preceding, contended that the divine nature, as it is in itself, cannot even supernaturally be seen by created intellect; but they admitted a certain uncreated light emanating from God visible to corporeal eyes, such as, they said, the Apostles had seen on Mount Tabor, and by this the Saints in Heaven enjoy and are blessed: Indeed they boasted that they, with head inclined to the navel and compressed, and with eyes contorted, see this light and are thence affected with wonderful pleasure. This delirium of the Palamites the Greeks accepted and confirmed in 4 pseudo-synods: against whom.

I say: Created intellect supernaturally aided can see God as he is in himself. This is of faith decided by the Council of Florence in the Decree of union given to the Armenians, where it is defined that purified souls are immediately received into Heaven, and clearly behold God himself triune and one just as he is. The same had been defined by Benedict XII in the Extravagant "Benedictus Deus."

Proof from Scripture 1 John 3 it is said: "When he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him just as he is." Therefore not in effects, not in something extrinsic, but God's very substance in itself. Psalm 16: "I shall be satisfied when your glory appears": But in nothing outside God can we be satisfied, because in all things we find limitation. 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a mirror in an enigma, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I am known." If not through enigma and through mirror; therefore not through effects, therefore intuitively in himself, which "face to face" signifies. Also if I shall know as I am known: Therefore intuitively, for I am intuitively known.

Proof from the Fathers. From many, one or two will suffice. Augustine Epistle 112: "If you ask whether he can ever be seen just as he is? (namely God) I respond that this is promised to the faithful." Chrysostom, about whom there is difficulty, homily 69 to the People says the blessed behold the King himself not through entrance, not through faith, but face to face. The same in the Epistle to Theodore the Lapsed chapter 7, expounding those words of St. Peter Matthew 17: "It is good for us to be here," says: "What will be said when the very truth of things will be present? when with royal houses opened, it will be permitted to behold the King himself, no longer in enigma, nor through mirror but face to face?" Also elsewhere.

Proof 5 by reason **1.** Man can supernaturally attain his beatitude to which he is elevated by God's grace: But intuitive vision of God constitutes the essence of beatitude according to Thomists, or at least is necessarily required for it according to all; according to that text of John 17: "This is eternal life that they may know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." Therefore.

2. There is in man a natural desire of knowing the cause when he beholds the effect, and from this wonder arises in men: But God is the cause of all natural and supernatural things, not any cause whatever, but first and most universal pouring out and conserving the whole being in them: Therefore there is in man a natural desire of seeing God, by seeing his effects. I assume: But it is not likely that so universal a desire should always and in all be frustrated: Therefore.

3. Although God clearly seen is not contained within the connatural and proportioned object of created intellect, he is nevertheless contained within its adequate and extensive object, insofar as he is true being and intelligible: For created intellect is capable of every intelligible: But intellect supernaturally aided can attain what is within the latitude of its adequate object: Therefore. Consult the response to the final objection. **Confirmation:** Our intellect in this life knows God imperfectly: Therefore it can be completed by God so that it knows perfectly, since in this there is no repugnance.

What force these reasons have we shall say in the appendix at the end of the Article.

Objections Are Solved

You object 1. from Scripture. In many places of Scripture, God is said to be inaccessible and invisible. Thus 1 Timothy 5: "To the King of ages, immortal and invisible." In the same place chapter 9: "Whom no man has seen, nor can see." John 1: "No one has ever seen God." And elsewhere similarly. Therefore.

Response. These and similar Scripture authorities should be understood either of corporeal vision of God, or intellectual through natural powers, or of comprehensive, not indeed of quidditative vision through supernatural aid. Hence the Gloss on these words 1 Timothy 6: "Who dwells in inaccessible light": says; "inaccessible to our powers, accessible to his gifts."

You reply: From the fact that it is said in Scripture that God is incomprehensible, it is rightly gathered that he is absolutely and simply incomprehensible: Therefore by parity, when he is said to be invisible, it is rightly gathered that he is absolutely and simply such.

Response. I deny the consequent. The disparity is that nowhere in Scripture is it read that God is comprehensible; but often that he is visible. Hence so that all things may be reconciled, it should be admitted that he is invisible to our powers and comprehensively; but visible by his gifts and quidditatively.

You insist: If from some places of Scripture it could be gathered that God can be seen intuitively, it would be especially from those where it is said that God was seen or is to be seen face to face: but from these nothing can be proved for intuitive vision: Therefore. The minor is proved. From the fact that Genesis 32 says Jacob: "I saw the Lord face to face": And of Moses it is said similarly Exodus 33 that he saw God face to face, it does not follow that they saw God as he is in himself: Therefore by parity.

Response. I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny the consequent. The disparity is that in the objected places it is discerned from the adjoined circumstances that Scripture does not speak of intuitive vision of God, but of some eminent knowledge of God through certain figures whether sensible or imaginary representing something divine. For of Jacob it is said there: "Behold a man wrestled with him," which indicates that there is no question there of vision of God in himself, but in an Angel. And of Moses also in the same place it is said that he asked God: "Show me your face": Which is a sign that he had not then seen. But nothing such is found in the places cited for the conclusion and others, but on the contrary from the adjoined circumstances it is proved that they should be understood of intuitive vision, as is evident from the first proof.

You urge: When something is affirmed and denied of God in Scripture, the affirmation is taken in metaphorical sense, and the negation in proper sense: e.g. when penance or change is affirmed of God, as Genesis 6, it is taken in metaphorical sense; but when penance or change is denied of God, as Romans 11 and Malachi 1, it is taken in proper sense: Therefore when Scripture affirms that he is seen or to be seen as he is in himself, or face to face, it should be taken in metaphorical and improper sense, and when it denies this, it should be understood in proper sense.

Response. I distinguish the antecedent. If what is absolutely affirmed is absolutely and in the same mode denied, let the antecedent pass. If what is absolutely affirmed is not absolutely nor in the same mode denied, I deny the antecedent. Now intuitive vision of God is absolutely affirmed, as is evident from the citations; but it is not absolutely and in the same mode denied in the objected places. Thus when it is said 1 Timothy 6 and John 1 that no one saw God nor can see; it is not said that by God's grace he has not seen or cannot see. Also when it is said Exodus 33: "Man shall not see me and live," it is not said that if he does not live he will not see.

You object 2. from the Fathers: Chrysostom Homily 14 on these words John 1: "No one has ever seen God." Thus he says: "That which is God not only Prophets, but neither Angels saw, nor Archangels; for how could that which is of creatable nature see what is increatable." Similarly elsewhere: So that Vasquez in 1st part of St. Thomas disputation 36 chapters 2, 3 and 4 thinks the holy Doctor can scarcely be understood in a good sense. He accuses Theodoret, Basil, both Cyrils, Gregory of Nyssa, Jerome and others of the same error.

Response. Chrysostom here and elsewhere speaks of comprehensive vision, which is evident **1.** because he was acting against the Anomeans who asserted that God could be comprehended by

created intellect. **2.** Because the five homilies which he published against them he inscribed "on the incomprehensible nature of God." **3.** Because in them he continually and six hundred times uses words of comprehension and incomprehensibility. **4.** Because in the very homilies he often expressly signifies that by vision he understands comprehension: Thus a little after the related words he subjoins: "Vision here is called the most certain consideration and comprehension of the Father, as great as the Father has of the Son." **5.** Finally because in many places he admits quidditative vision of God, as we saw in the proof of the Conclusion.

You say with Vasquez that the Anomeans were not so stupid as to arrogate comprehensive vision of God to themselves: Therefore when Chrysostom impugns their opinion, he rejects not comprehensive but quidditative vision of God.

Here Theologians justly wonder that a Catholic Writer prefers to absolve most wicked Heretics from stupidity rather than vindicate a most illustrious Doctor of the Church from error. Moreover **Response.** It is entirely false, the assumption of Vasquez: For it is more certain than certain that the Anomeans with Eunomius were so stupid as to arrogate comprehensive vision of God to themselves. This is established **1.** from Epiphanius heresy 76, where he calls them not only insane, but also furious and delirious. **2.** From Theodoret book 4 Heretical Fables, where he relates that Eunomius said he knew God's very substance exactly, and had the same knowledge of God as God himself has of himself. **3.** From Jerome on chapter 11 of Matthew. Finally from Chrysostom himself who everywhere calls them stupid, mad and insane: "This kind of men," he says Homily 5, "we should despise and spurn no otherwise than delirious and insane." "They assert," he says Homily 2, "that they know God just as God himself knows himself... This opinion of theirs arose from stupidity and most vehement inflation of mind."

You insist: Chrysostom in the cited place subjoins: "If you question them (Angels), you will hear nothing from them about God's substance, but only repeating: Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will": But if they saw God's substance as it is in itself, they could narrate about it: Therefore.

Response 1. The minor can be denied; for although Angels see God's essence, it does not follow that they can narrate it to us, because we are incapable of this narration; for according to the Apostle there are ineffable words which it is not permitted for man to speak. **Response 2.** Chrysostom's sense is that Angels cannot narrate about God's substance perfectly and according to its dignity, just as the only-begotten who is in the bosom of the Father.

You reply: Chrysostom homily 3 "on the incomprehensible nature of God," speaking of the Seraphim veiling their face, says: "although they do not see the very pure light, nor the very sincere substance (of God) but what they saw were condescensions and indulgences." What he understands by condescension and indulgence he immediately explains: "When God," he says, "does not show himself as he is, but insofar as he who merited such a sight can see, to that extent

he measures and tempers his representation according to the strength of the seer; we say that he condescends so far, and we call such a thing condescension and indulgence": therefore according to Chrysostom, Angels do not see God's substance, nor God as he is in himself, but only condescension, which since it is not God, is only something created.

Response. I deny the consequent and say as before that Chrysostom by these words wants only that Angels do not see God's essence and God as he is in that mode in which God sees himself, namely comprehensively, as the Anomeans wanted, against whom he expressly acts in the cited homily, but that they see in an inferior mode, which he calls condescension; insofar namely as the divine essence in the notion of species is united to the divine intellect in the supreme grade of union and identification, and therefore totally and totally, and in order to comprehension; but to created intellect it is united in an inferior grade and descending from that supreme one, so that although it is united totally, not however totally. Thus Chrysostom explains himself in the following homily 4 with these words: "John says that no one has seen God, so that you may understand that that exquisite comprehension and express knowledge has befallen no one." And a little later: "When therefore he says that God, although condescending, could not be borne by those powers (Angels), he teaches nothing else except that they could not receive his express, ample, integral knowledge... nor is God comprehensible even to the superior powers themselves." Hence I deny that in Chrysostom's mind condescension is something created.

You replicate. In the same homily 3 he says that this very condescension was seen by the Prophets, but it is established that Isaiah, of whom he speaks, did not see the divine essence: Therefore.

Response. Chrysostom says that Isaiah saw condescension more obscurely than the Angels see: for his words in the cited place are; "the superior powers (namely Angels) although they do not see God comprehensively, nevertheless see through condescension intuitively: but Isaiah only abstractively through prophetic light, or in the person of an Angel: For Chrysostom calls condescension every knowledge of God which God communicates to creatures, whether in this life or in the blessed, because it is inferior to the comprehensive knowledge by which he sees himself, and thus in that condescension there are degrees.

You urge with Suarez. Chrysostom homily 14 on John says Angels indeed saw God in assumed nature, for before they did not see: Therefore.

Response. The holy Doctor manifestly speaks there of the vision of God, not as he is in himself, but as he is in assumed nature, which Angels did not see before in this way, and afterwards not only saw but also comprehended.

Other Fathers who can be objected should be understood in the same sense as Chrysostom. Some however except Theodoret, Chrysostom's disciple; for he in dialogue 1 which he inscribed "immutable," acting against the Eutychians who wanted nature in Christ to be absorbed by

divinity, proves that Christ had a true Body, because he was seen by all on earth. But when the Eutychian objected that God was seen by Prophets in the old Testament and is still seen by Angels, and yet God is not Body; Theodoret responds that Prophets in the old testament did not see the divine nature, but certain visions accommodated to their comprehension: "Thus therefore," he says, "let us understand concerning Angels, hearing that they always see the face of our Father; for they do not see the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended nor perceived by mind, and which comprehends all things, but some species accommodated to their nature... after the Incarnation however he was seen even by Angels according to the divine Apostle, not in the similitude of glory, but using true and living flesh as a covering."

Nor can it be responded that he speaks of the comprehensive vision of the Anomeans, because there he does not act against them, but against the Eutychians. Because of these and similar things, Doctor Petavius who in book 7 of Catholic Dogmatic Theology interprets St. Chrysostom and other Fathers catholicly, abandons Theodoret with the Greeks and Armenians.

Not a few however explain him in a good sense. Some say he should be understood according to the sense of his Master Chrysostom concerning comprehensive vision, which they prove from these words of his: "They do not see the divine essence which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended," or as another version has it, "enclosed by thought." Therefore, they say, he excludes only comprehensive vision. But they deny what is assumed, that Theodoret acts only against Eutychians, and say that he also acts against Anomeans who were then raging through Syria on occasion given.

Others think Theodoret excludes only the vision of God through corporeal eyes. For he proves against Eutychians that Christ has a true body by this argument: He who has a true body is seen by corporeal eyes: but Christ was seen by corporeal eyes: therefore he has a true Body. And when he had objected to himself in the person of the Eutychian that Prophets saw God, and Angels see him, when nevertheless God does not have body; he responds that neither did Prophets see God's essence, nor do Angels see it; certainly by corporeal eyes, concerning which the argument proceeds, but that Angels only see him thus in flesh after the incarnation.

On the other hand it is established that Theodoret elsewhere expressly asserts intuitive vision of God. Thus in the commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians he says: "The faithful now walk by faith, not by sight; but then they will see face to face." Also in the life of St. James the anchorite.

Moreover, granted that Theodoret with a few dissented from the common sense of the other Fathers concerning the present dogma, the series of tradition is not therefore dissolved.

You object 3. by reason: God is more distant from created intellect than Angel from corporeal eye: but the corporeal eye even supernaturally cannot see an Angel: Therefore neither can created intellect see God.

Response. I distinguish the major: God is more distant from created intellect than Angel from corporeal eye in the notion of being, I grant. In the notion of object and relation, I deny. Because God as intelligible is contained within the adequate object of created intellect, but not Angel, as pure Spirit, within the object of corporeal sense, as I shall now explain more broadly.

You reply. Finite power cannot attain the infinite: but created intellect is finite and God is infinite: Therefore.

Response. I distinguish the major: Finite power cannot attain the infinite infinitely, I grant the major. Finitely, I deny the major.

You insist: Supernatural object cannot be attained except in supernatural mode: Therefore neither can the infinite except in infinite mode.

Response. I deny the consequent. The disparity is that supernatural object is attained as supernatural, consequently in supernatural mode; but the infinite is not attained as infinite, and thus can be attained in finite mode.

You object 4. No power can even supernaturally be elevated beyond the latitude of its specificative object: but God clearly seen is not contained within the latitude of the specificative object of created intellect, whether Angelic or human. The major is evident; because if power were elevated beyond its specificative, it would pass the limits of its essence, and consequently would not remain the same, since its specific and essential constitution is taken totally from the specificative object. Hence visual power e.g. remaining the same cannot be elevated even supernaturally to sound, nor auditive to the colored; because sound is the specificative of hearing, just as lucid color of sight, as I said above. Therefore.

The minor is proved **1.** Created and natural power cannot be specified by increated and supernatural object such as God is seen in himself. **2.** There are two created intellects specifically different just as the natures of which they are powers, namely Angelic and human: but there cannot be one and the same specificative of double power specifically distinct. Hence it is commonly said that the specificative object of human intellect for the state of conjunction is the quiddity of sensible things, and whatever through connotation to that and to its mode is knowable; for the state of separation the spiritual quiddity of the soul according to whose mode it understands other spiritual substances. But in each Angel the proper specificative is the proper spiritual substance itself, according to whose mode it knows the rest.

It is commonly responded that although God clearly seen in himself is not contained within the proportioned and connatural object of created intellect, he is nevertheless contained within its terminative and extensive or adequate object, which is being in its whole latitude; and hence that supernaturally aided it can attain that, just as the light of the sun although it is improportioned to the eyes of an owl; because nevertheless it is not outside the latitude of its visual power, for it is

of the same species as ours, if the visual power of the owl is strengthened, it will be able to see the sun.

But this solution which is St. Thomas's 3 contra gentiles chapter 5, however true, nevertheless does not evacuate the difficulty unless it is explained more. For indeed **1.** it follows that God clearly seen in himself only exceeds the faculty of our intellect just as an excellent sensible exceeds weak sense, and consequently that he is attained by it under the formal notion of its specificative, just as the light of the sun with respect to the owl; for under the same formal specificative notion it is regarded by the owl as the light of the moon. But that is false since God is in no way seen clearly in himself under the notion of sensible quiddity or through connotation to that (which is the formal notion of the specificative object of our intellect). **2.** Even if being in its whole latitude is the adequate and terminative object of created intellect, it is nevertheless regarded by diverse intellects angelic and human under diverse formal specificative notion, as has been said; hence the whole difficulty remains why intellect can be elevated beyond its specificative object, by which it is distinguished from another intellect, and visual power cannot be elevated beyond its specificative to attaining sound, when sound is contained within the latitude of the sensible object, just as God within the latitude of the intelligible object.

For the solution of this difficulty.

Note 1. in any created intellect the generic notion of spiritual power and the specific notion of such intellect or power should be distinguished: From the part of generic notion is attended only passive capacity actuable by the intelligible; from the part of specific notion is attended active power of understanding, according to which therefore, and not according to capacity from generic notion, is sought the specific distinction of intellects according as they approach more or less to the notion of pure act. Hence.

Note 2. That the passive capacity of created intellect is greater than its active power, because in the notion of spiritual power, as such, it has absolute and complete immateriality segregated from all matter, and hence receptive or actuable by every intelligible, even if most perfect (but in finite mode) because the mode of informing and changing intellective power from the part of intelligible object however much it may be most perfect, is no other than spiritual mode excluding all corporeal matter: Therefore by this very fact that some power is immaterial, it is capable of whatever intelligible, because it is capable of being actuated in spiritual mode, which in all is one: Hence it happens that its active power by reason of such passive capacity can be elevated beyond its specificative and connatural object.

But in sensitive power, since the very generic notion of sensibility implies materiality and corporeity, and is immaterial only insofar as it is active above the conditions of matter, in one word, because immateriality itself in sensitive power does not come from the generic notion of sensitive power, but from its specific notion; hence it happens that its passive capacity is not

greater than the active (for all cognitive power is founded in immateriality) and consequently that its active power cannot be elevated above its specificative object, otherwise it would extend beyond its adequate object which implies contradiction.

And this is the reason why sight cannot be elevated to hearing, because not only its active power, but also its passive capacity is limited to the visible alone, in that it does not have immateriality from the very generic notion of sensibility, but only from active power which is limited to the visible alone; when nevertheless intellect for the opposite reason can extend beyond its specificative, because it is not its adequate object by reason of passive capacity, which on account of absolute immateriality which it has from the generic notion of intellective power, is actuable by every intelligible, in one and the same mode namely spiritual excluding all matter; hence.

Response to the argument, I distinguish the major: no power can even supernaturally be elevated beyond the latitude of its specificative object, if simultaneously and at once it is adequate, I grant; otherwise, I deny. And in this sense with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequent. Nor does it follow thence that created intellect passes the limits of its essence and does not remain the same, because there always remains the same its connatural and proportioned specificative from which it draws species, nor does it attain another as specificative, because not under the same formal motive notion, but as elevated supernaturally by reason of passive capacity.

APPENDIX

Whether the possibility of the beatific vision can be demonstrated or known by natural light alone?

Response: We answer in the negative entirely. The reason is that supernatural vision is not only beyond reason in the nature of being, but also in the nature of truth and the knowable, since it can neither be known or demonstrated a priori through natural cause, nor a posteriori through natural effect: for it has no connection with natural cause or effect, from whose knowledge the mind might ascend to investigating or demonstrating it; so much so that if this vision did not exist, or were not possible, all natural things would be in exactly the same manner as they are now.

As for the reasons by which we have proved it, the first is not merely natural, but theological, one premise of which is of faith. The others only probably and morally persuade the possibility of this mystery, faith being supposed, without which we would have no knowledge of it.

For as to the second, when we say there is in man a natural desire to see God having seen His effects, we do not understand this of desire or innate appetite which follows nature without knowledge; for such appetite is carried toward good naturally due to it, as is evident in the innate appetite of heavy things toward the center; but the beatific vision is not thus due to man, as is evident from what has been said. We understand therefore of appetite elicited from previous knowledge, not indeed absolute and efficacious, for this is carried toward good attainable by natural powers, which the beatific vision is not, but conditional and inefficacious, if it can be done, insofar as it is possible: From such desire of the beatific vision, since speaking absolutely it can be frustrated, its possibility cannot be demonstratively proved, but only probably and morally persuaded, insofar as, since this appetite is so universal that it is found in all, even the wise and prudent, it is not likely that it would be so frustrated that all would always be deceived.

In the third reason we indeed prove that in our intellect there is capacity, or non-repugnance to the intuitive vision of God, because it is contained within the adequate object of our intellect, but since this vision is something entirely supernatural, we cannot know by natural light alone that it involves no repugnance from any other source. Indeed we naturally know that God is omnipotent, and in general can do all that does not imply contradiction: But whether in particular this or that effect, especially if it be supernatural, implies contradiction or not, we do not know naturally.

Therefore, supposing the truth of this mystery known through faith, we solve the objections and repugnances which are opposed against it, which is to show that it is not proved impossible or false; (for what is true cannot be proved false) but whether other repugnances do not lie hidden in supernatural being, is naturally impervious to us, and thus naturally we cannot demonstrate positively that it is possible. We shall discuss these things somewhat more fully in the Treatise on the Trinity and on the Incarnation, where we shall ask whether the possibility of those mysteries can be naturally known.

ARTICLE IV

Whether anyone in this life has seen, or can see God as He is in Himself?

First Conclusion: A pure man by ordinary law cannot in this mortal life see God as He is in Himself.

I said **first**, by ordinary law or power of God, because that it can happen absolutely, indeed that it has happened, we shall demonstrate below. I said **second**, pure man, because no one denies that this was granted to the God-man, that is, Christ, who was simultaneously wayfarer and comprehensor.

It is proved first from Scripture. Exodus 33 it is said: "No man shall see me and live." Therefore.

Second by reason. The natural knowledge of man the wayfarer is only of sensible or material things, or at least through species drawn from sensible things: But God cannot be seen as He is in Himself by such knowledge, since He is neither material nor sensible, nor is He seen through species, as we shall say: Therefore.

The Major is proved, **first** by experience, by which we are conscious that we understand nothing except in the manner of corporeal and material things. **Second** because the mode of natural knowledge must be consonant with the mode of the nature of the knower, otherwise it would not be natural: But our soul as long as it lives this life, has being in corporeal matter: Therefore it knows nothing except what has form in matter, that is, material and sensible things, or what can be known through such things.

It is confirmed: The more someone is disposed to perceive divine things, the more he is freed from the body: Therefore as long as man leads mortal life in the body, he cannot see the most divine nature of God. The antecedent is evident a posteriori; thus in moderate sleep and alienations from the senses, divine revelations and previsions of future things are more perceived.

Second Conclusion: Man the wayfarer living in this flesh, but not using the senses of the flesh, by extraordinary power of God and beyond the common order of things can be elevated to clear vision of His essence; and it is probable that this was granted to Moses and Paul.

The first part is common, not so the second. I said, "but not using the senses of the flesh": Because when the intellect of man is elevated to the highest vision of God's essence, it is necessary that the whole intention of the mind be called thither, so that it understands nothing else from phantasms, but is totally carried toward God.

It is proved: God can miraculously and supernaturally operate something in corporeal things, producing namely some effects above the common mode of being and operating: Therefore similarly He can supernaturally, and by His extraordinary power beyond the common order, elevate the minds of some living in this flesh, even to the vision of His essence.

It is confirmed first. Although the intellect for this state depends on the senses in its knowledge, this dependence is not so necessary to it that it cannot be absolved from it by the extraordinary power of God, since it is of the same intrinsic power in the body as separated from the body, in which state it does not depend on the senses: Therefore.

It is confirmed second. The soul of Christ living in this mortal life had this privilege: Therefore it is not absolutely repugnant.

The second part of the Conclusion is most controverted among the Holy Fathers. Standing against it are St. Dionysius Celestial Hierarchy chapter 4, Irenaeus book 4 chapter 37, Nazianzus oration 34, St. Leo sermon on the Transfiguration, St. Chrysostom homily 14 on John, St. Gregory book 18 morals chapter 37, Cyril of Alexandria, Hilary, Bede, Prudentius, etc. Saving the reverence of such great men, we adhere to our standard-bearers Saints Augustine and Thomas, to whom are numbered Ambrose, Basil and others.

It is proved from Scripture first concerning Moses. Numbers 12, when Mary and Aaron spoke against the Lord saying: "Has the Lord spoken only through Moses? Has He not also spoken similarly to us?" But God, wanting to show that Moses above others was endowed with the singular privilege of His vision, says to them: "Hear my words: If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in vision, or I will speak to him through dreams. But not so my servant Moses... for I speak to him mouth to mouth and plainly, and not through enigmas and figures does he see the Lord."

To this place therefore with Saints Augustine and Thomas we especially adhere and not to others, for example Exodus 33 where it is said that Moses saw God face to face, because we know these and similar passages about Moses just as about other Prophets, of whom the same is narrated, are understood by the Fathers of some eminent knowledge of God and familiarity with Him. But this praised passage can nowhere be understood in this way, or in any other sense alien to ours, for unless you understand it of clear vision, Moses would have seen God through enigmas and figures, and so you would not preserve the sense of Scripture, which says that Moses saw God, not through enigmas and figures.

Second concerning St. Paul. The Apostle himself 2 Corinthians 12 says thus of himself: "I know a man in Christ, fourteen years ago (whether in the body I know not, whether outside the body I know not: God knows) such a one was caught up to the third heaven. And I know such a man, that he was caught up into paradise, and heard secret words which it is not lawful for man to speak."

These ineffable things, says St. Thomas, are those which pertain to the vision of the Blessed, which exceeds the state of the way, according to that of Isaiah 64: "Eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you." And certainly if St. Paul had not seen the divine essence and in it the divine Mysteries, of the Trinity and Incarnation, but had only known them through faith, could he have spoken of them?

From these therefore I argue thus. Those things which depend on the free will of God cannot be made known to us from elsewhere than from Sacred Scripture, through which the divine will is manifested to us: but Sacred Scripture, as is evident, accepted in its natural and literal sense, clearly teaches that Moses and Paul saw God, and this involves no repugnance or incongruity, since all concede that this is possible: Therefore.

It is confirmed by the congruent reason of Saints Augustine and Thomas: just as Moses was the first Doctor of the Jews, so Paul was the first Doctor of the Gentiles: Therefore it was fitting that they should see the divine essence, and be eyewitnesses of the mysteries so that they might better and more solidly teach them to Jews and Gentiles.

It is proved from the Holy Fathers. Augustine Epistle 12 to Paulina on seeing God, chapter 13, says thus: "Then it can be asked how the very substance of God could be seen by some placed in this life, because of what was said to Moses; no one can see my face and live, unless because the human mind can be divinely caught up from this life to the angelic life, before it is freed from the flesh through that common death; for thus was caught up he who heard there ineffable words which it is not lawful for man to speak."

And below at the end of the same chapter: "But what I had begun to say, that to his (Moses') desire even that which he had sought was granted, is afterward demonstrated in the book of Numbers... What therefore is it that made him thus excepted, unless perhaps because by that contemplation he was deemed worthy even then, such a ruler of his people and minister faithful in all his house, that as he had desired, he might see God as He is, which contemplation is promised to all the children at the end."

And book 12 on Genesis to the letter chapter 27 he says: "For he (Moses) had desired, as we read in Exodus, to see God, not certainly as he had seen on the mount... but in that substance by which God is... Unless however Moses had merited to see the desired and longed-for clarity of God, God would not have said in the book of Numbers to Aaron and Mary: hear my words, if there be a prophet among you of the Lord, I will be known to him in vision, and in sleep I will speak to him, not thus as my servant Moses is faithful in all my house, I will speak to him mouth to mouth in form and not through enigmas, and he saw the clarity of the Lord." Nor is this to be understood according to the substance of the body which is presented to the senses of the flesh.

Sylvius responds to the first place, and after him Tournelius, that St. Augustine asserts nothing, but proposes the matter under doubt; "perhaps," he says, "Moses was worthy of that contemplation," which manner of speaking expresses not a fixed but a doubtful mind of the holy Doctor. But on the contrary: The praised Doctors should have noticed that "perhaps" in Augustine's phrase does not affect the fact, but the reason of the fact. Augustine clearly asserts that Moses' desire to see God was satisfied, and afterward seeking the reason of this singular prerogative, he says "perhaps," because Moses was Ruler of the people.

They respond similarly to the second that Augustine indeed speaks more assertively there, but they say, it is known what Augustine said about those books on Genesis in book 2 Retractions chapter 24, namely that in that work more things were sought than found, and of those which were found, fewer were established; but the rest were so placed as if they still ought to be sought:

Therefore, they infer, he does not thoroughly examine the matter here, which in other places he studiously discussed and defined.

But on the contrary, among those fewer established things should deservedly be placed what is being treated. For that should be considered established which is proved from the Scriptures, and is fortified against attacks. But this Augustine does there concerning the intuitive vision of God granted to Moses. **First** he proves it from the desire of Moses Exodus 33. **Then** from the words of God to Aaron and Mary which we have related in the proof of the Conclusion: And because it could be objected that no one can see God and live; he distinguishes there a double death, one common and true which is placed in the separation of the soul from the body, another special and improperly said which consists in alienation from the senses, which, he says, the Apostle suffered in rapture, and either one he says suffices for the intuitive vision of God.

Moreover, granted freely that this was not established in that place, but to be numbered among things still to be sought; he afterward sought this and studiously discussed it, and according to our opinion decreed it definitively, namely Epistle 112 which he wrote after the books on Genesis.

That our Doctor subscribes to St. Augustine in the places cited in the second conclusion is confessed by all even adversaries.

Objections are Solved against the second part of the second Conclusion

You object: To Moses asking the Lord to show His face and glory, the Lord responds: "You cannot see my face, for no man shall see me and live." And below: "You shall see my back parts, but my face you cannot see": Therefore.

Response: that since immediately after Moses' petition God adds, "I will show you all good," that is myself, as Augustine interprets in the cited book on Genesis (for what is all good except God), to reconcile Scripture it must be said that through the words of the argument, God denied His vision to Moses for then, and that He promised it to him for the following time, of which promise He gave proof Numbers 12.

You will insist first. God says: "No man shall see me and live"; that is, he will not be able to see me and live.

Response first with Augustine in both places cited, that through those words is not signified that man must absolutely die by common death in order to be able to see God, but only that he must not live this sensual life, that is, use the senses, but rather be entirely abstracted from them as if dead, as happens in rapture or excess of mind: And thus it happens (concludes the holy Doctor to Paulina) that both that is true which is said, "no one can see my face and live." See the holy Doctor in both places excellently discoursing about this matter.

It can be responded second that this was said according to ordinary law in the sense of the first conclusion.

You will insist second. John 1 it is said, "The law was given through Moses, grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God: the only-begotten son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him." In which place all the Prophets and especially Moses seem to be excluded from this privilege of vision, which was granted to the only-begotten alone, that he might declare the truths which he manifestly saw: Therefore.

Response: Through this place Moses is by no means excluded from the quidditative vision of God, otherwise also the Angels and Blessed who were then in heaven when St. John wrote this would be excluded from it. For "no one," or as it is in Greek "nullus," excludes all both men and Angels. Therefore that place is understood only of comprehensive vision, or of vision as great as the only-begotten possessed, who far more clearly and perfectly than any saint, or Angel, or Moses sees the divine Mysteries and heavenly secrets, which he declared to us in the law of grace: when therefore it is said; "No one has ever seen God," the sense is that no one, not even Moses, saw the essence of God comprehensively or as perfectly as the Word of the Lord who is in the bosom of the Father saw it: understand in the same way what is opposed from chapter 6: "not because anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God."

You will insist third. The Apostle himself 1 Timothy 6 says that God dwells in inaccessible light "whom no man has seen, nor can see": Therefore.

Response: This authority and others similar if they be adduced, should be understood of comprehensive vision, or of ordinary law, excluding special privilege granted to few: otherwise if that place is taken generally and absolutely of quidditative vision, it will also prove that the blessed in the fatherland do not see God.

You object second with Sylvius and Tournelius many things from Augustine, by which the holy Doctor seems to assert that the vision of God which he desired was denied to Moses, and that no one can see God and live: thus the holy Doctor book 2 on the Trinity chapter 16, Tract 3 on John number 17, Epistle 112 to Paulina chapter 5, question 150 on Exodus number 5, and elsewhere.

Response: That since the mind of Augustine for our opinion in those things which we have brought forward in the proofs of the conclusion, is so open that it suffers no escape, as is evident from what has been said, nor did he revoke it in any way in the books of retractions, it must necessarily be said that those things which are opposed, were not said by Augustine in that sense which the adversaries attribute to them, unless they want him to have taught openly contradictory things even in the same work, namely Epistle 112.

I say therefore that Augustine, when he says the intuitive vision of God was denied to Moses, sometimes speaks of vision through corporeal eyes, sometimes understands that it was denied for

the time when Moses was asking Exodus 33, although it was afterward granted to him Numbers 12; but when he says no one can see God and live, he understands of sensual life, as he explains himself.

You object third. The vision of God makes man blessed, but neither Paul, nor Moses through those visions which they had, were blessed: Therefore. The Minor is proved; if they had then been blessed, they would never have returned to the misery of this life, but their bodies would have been glorified through redundance from the soul, as they will be in the saints after the resurrection: but the consequent is false: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: the permanent vision of God makes man blessed, I concede the Major; transient vision, I subdistinguish; makes man blessed permanently and absolutely, I deny; in a qualified sense, I concede; and with the Minor distinguished according to the sense of the Major I deny the Consequence.

Therefore the divine essence cannot be seen except through the light of glory which can be participated in two ways; in one way through the mode of an immanent form; and thus it makes the saints blessed in the fatherland: in another way through the mode of a certain transient passion, as is said of the light of Prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was caught up (say the same of Moses) and therefore from such vision he was not simply blessed, so that there would be redundance to the body, but only in a qualified sense.

You will reply: Faith and hope cannot be simultaneous with vision of the divine essence: but Paul and Moses in that state had faith and hope: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: faith and hope as to act cannot be simultaneous with vision of the divine essence, I concede the Major; as to habit, I deny; for habit and act are not opposed and habitual inclination to one can stand with actual tendency to the opposite, as is evident in a stone propelled upward; and this especially when the act does not generate habit, as happened in Moses and Paul: whence with the Major distinguished according to this sense, with the Minor distinguished I deny the Consequence.

You will reply again: One act of science produces a habit opposite to habitual faith: likewise also one act of vision, as is evident in one who when he once saw Rome, cannot anymore have faith even habitual about its existence: therefore similarly the act of vision of the divine essence in Paul and Moses expelled even habitual faith.

Response: I deny the Consequence. The disparity is that the evidence had through an act of demonstration, or through actual vision, e.g., of Rome, remains habitually in him who saw Rome; because he saw through a remaining species: But truly the evidence which Paul and Moses had from vision of the divine essence did not remain in them habitually, but only under obscure and dim recollective knowledge, both because they did not see through species; and

because the light of glory was in them transiently and communicated through the mode of passion; and from divine dispensation that that habitual state of evidence of divine Mysteries was not proper to wayfarers.

You will urge with Estius and Sylvius. If Paul had seen God's essence, he would not have used a metaphor from the lower sense, saying he heard, for hearing is less than seeing, nor would he say plurally about God "words," because in God there is only one word: Therefore.

Response: That the Apostle says "heard" for "saw," because that consideration was according to the interior act of the soul in which hearing and sight are the same, according to what is said Numbers 12: "I speak to him mouth to mouth and plainly." Again because he perceived by intimate knowledge secrets about God's essence as if through words; for secrets are ordinarily communicated through words: And therefore the Apostle said well that he heard words. It can be added that he said "words" plurally, because although there is one word in God, yet he knew many mysteries in it.

You ask whether this privilege of seeing God in this mortal life was granted to anyone other than Moses and Paul.

Response: It is pious to think that this prerogative was not denied to the Most Blessed Virgin: For it is reasonably believed that she who bore the Only-begotten from the Father full of grace and truth, received above all others greater privileges of grace. But at what moment this happened to her? He knows who adorned her with this grace.

As for other Prophets or Saints, nothing is established from Scripture, and commonly by the Fathers and Theologians that singular privilege is denied to them.

ARTICLE V

On the Light of Glory

Two things are distinguished: one holding the principle on the part of the beatific vision elevating and perfecting the power to this vision, and is called the light of glory. Another holding on the part of the object representing it to the intellect, and is called species. We treat of the first in this article. We shall treat of the second in the following.

§ I. Whether the created intellect needs the light of glory to see God's essence?

Above we resolved that the created intellect cannot naturally see God, but can supernaturally with aid: Now we ask about that supernatural aid which is called the light of glory. And **first**

whether the intellect needs it to see God intuitively. What this light is, I shall say in the following §.

I say: The created intellect needs the light of glory to see God intuitively. It is of faith decided in the Council of Vienne against the Beghards and Beguines, who contended that the Soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God and to enjoy Him blessedly: "We," says Clement V, "with the sacred Council approving, condemn and reprove entirely this sect (of Beghards and Beguines) with the aforesaid errors."

It is proved first by reason: A power which of itself and intrinsically is impotent to some act, in order to elicit this act needs to be intrinsically elevated, strengthened and perfected through some virtue received in itself: But the created intellect from what was said in article 2 is of itself intrinsically impotent to see God: Therefore to elicit this vision it needs to be elevated, strengthened and perfected through some virtue received in itself. This virtue is called by Theologians the light of glory, because it relates in some way to the intellect with respect to beatific vision, as corporeal light to the eye with respect to its object.

It is proved second. Everything that is elevated to some form exceeding its nature, must be disposed to it through something that exceeds its nature, and is of the same order with that form; thus if air must receive the form of fire, it is necessary that it be disposed by some disposition befitting fire: But the divine essence is of a higher order than the created intellect, and when it is seen by it, it is united to it as an intelligible form: Therefore the created intellect must be disposed to it through some supernatural virtue, which is called the light of glory.

This reason is akin to the preceding. If you say that the light of glory itself is also some supernatural form, and yet another form in the intellect is not required as a previous disposition to it: Therefore St. Thomas's reason does not stand.

Response: I deny the Consequence. Because St. Thomas's reason proceeds about forms which are perfect, complete and principal, as is evident in the example he adduces about the form of fire in air; not truly about forms that are for the way and ordered to others, for these do not require another disposition of the same order, otherwise there would be an infinite process, but passive obediential potency suffices. Moreover the light of glory is indeed a supernatural form, but for the way and ordered to the divine essence as intelligible form, ultimate and principal; and therefore to this a supernatural disposition is required, not to that.

Objections are Solved

You object first. That which is lucid per se does not need another light to be seen, as is evident in sensible things: but God is lucid per se; for He is intelligible light itself: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major. That which is lucid per se does not need another light to be seen on its own part, or insofar as it is of itself, I concede; on the part of the seeing power which since it is weak must be strengthened, I deny.

You will insist: If God is seen through created light of glory, He will not be seen immediately: but the consequent is false: Therefore. The Sequence is proved: The light of glory will be a medium through which God is seen: but what is seen through a medium, is not seen immediately: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Sequence. To the proof, I distinguish the Major: The light of glory will be a medium through which God is seen as through a likeness, I deny; as through a virtue strengthening the intellect to immediate vision of God, I concede. And therefore it can be said that it is not a medium in which God is seen, but under which He is seen; and this does not remove immediate vision of God.

You object second. The divine essence supplies the place of intelligible species: Therefore also of the light of glory.

Response: I deny the Consequence. The disparity is that species relates on the part of the object, and since God is the object of vision, it is no wonder if by Himself alone He provides all that can be desired on the part of the object: But truly the light of glory relates on the part of the power elevating and strengthening it as a virtue intrinsically received in it, which does not befit God.

You will insist first. The light of glory is required to determine the intellect to see God: But it is sufficiently determined to this by the divine essence, which, as was already said and will be said, performs the function of intelligible species: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major. The light of glory is required to determine the intellect to see God: to determine on the part of the object, I deny the Major. For to this we confess the divine essence suffices in intelligible form: to determine on the part of the power namely by elevating and proportioning it to the object to be seen, I concede; but this the divine essence does not do, as was already said.

You will insist second and assume: But neither can created light of glory proportion the intellect to see God: Therefore. It is proved: However perfect this light may be, since it is of finite power as being created, it always leaves infinite distance between the intellect and God: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Assumption: but the light of glory cannot make the intellect proportioned to see God in the nature of being, I concede; in the nature of power, I subdistinguish: It cannot make the intellect proportioned to see God infinitely and comprehensively, I concede; to see God finitely and quidditatively, I deny. Because between the intellect and God to be seen in a finite manner, as the blessed see Him, there is not infinite

distance, but finite which created light of glory can remove because of the power which it receives from God for such an effect, although according to its being it is infinitely distant from God.

You will insist third. The light of glory cannot make the intellect apt and proportioned to see God even in a finite manner: Therefore. It is proved: the virtue perfecting a vital power to vital act must be vital: but the light of glory is not vital since it comes from outside: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the Major. The virtue perfecting a vital power to vital act must be vital, as that which, or as that by which, I concede. As that which always, I deny; thus semen is a principle of life, although it is not vital as that which, but as that by which; similarly habits, e.g., of charity, justice, science perfect powers to vital acts, because although they are not vital as that which, they are nevertheless as that by which. Whence to the minor according to this sense I say, that although the light of glory is not vital as that which, it is nevertheless as that by which, because it is a certain power ordered to elevate the intellect to higher life namely blessed: And when it is said in the minor that this comes from outside. I respond that this extrinsic thing is God, who is the first Author of life.

You object third. This light of glory would strengthen the intellect either by intensifying its natural powers, or by concurring partially with it to beatific vision: but neither can be said: not the first, because such vision would be natural; but the vision of God through essence is of another nature than natural vision. Not the second, because the intellect as long as it is not intrinsically strengthened, can neither partially nor totally concur to the vision of God: Therefore.

Response: The intellect is strengthened to the vision of God neither through intensification of natural powers, nor through partial concurrence, but through the acquisition of a new and supernatural disposition by which it is elevated to a superior order.

You will insist: The intellective power strengthened by the light of glory would be proportioned to beatific vision: Therefore it would be natural, just as the vision of one miraculously and supernaturally illuminated is nonetheless natural.

Response: I deny the Consequence. For this vision proceeds from a supernatural principle, namely from the light of glory, or rather from the intellect as supernaturally elevated through the light of glory and tends to a supernatural object, consequently it cannot be called natural. To the comparison; the disparity is, that the visual power miraculously restored is supernatural only as to mode, but natural as to entity and naturally proportioned to its vision.

Other objections will be dissolved in the following §§.

§ II. What is the light of glory?

I say first: The light of glory is not God Himself, not external assistance, not actual previous concurrence, not the beatific vision itself, not impressed species, not the habit of charity, not finally a quality through the mode of complete power totally eliciting vision.

These are various opinions of Theologians.

The first part is proved first. Because the light of glory must be intrinsically received in the intellect informing it and inhering in it, in that it must intrinsically make it potent and proportioned; for nothing from impotent and disproportioned is made intrinsically potent and proportioned, unless through something intrinsically received: but God cannot be received in the intellect in this way: therefore.

Second. Because the Council of Vienne decreeing against the Beghards that the light of glory is required for beatific vision, which they denied, did not understand this of God whom they themselves admitted in that vision.

The second part is proved: either from that simultaneous concurrence of God, or His external assistance some intrinsic virtue is derived in the intellect or none: if the first be said, it is not purely simultaneous concurrence which does not reach the cause but only the effect, nor, as is evident, pure external assistance, and so we have our intent; for that intrinsically superadded will be the light of glory in the way we shall define below. If the second, therefore the intellect will not be made intrinsically potent and proportioned to see God. This illation is proved: it is impossible that what is of itself and from its nature impotent and disproportioned to something, be made intrinsically potent and proportioned unless it be intrinsically changed, and so unless it receive something in itself: Therefore.

The third part is proved. Actual previous concurrence does not make a power potent and proportioned; but supposes it: but the light of glory is given to elevate, perfect and make the intellect proportioned to beatific vision: Therefore.

The fourth part is proved; because light is what is required for vision, not the vision itself, and since the Council of Vienne defines that light is necessary for the vision of God, it is manifest that it distinguishes it from the vision: Therefore.

The fifth part is proved first because no species is given nor can be given, as we shall say. **Second** because that relates on the part of the object, not on the part of the power, and so cannot perfect it, but supposes it perfect and proportioned to itself just as the species of a lucid object, e.g., do not perfect or elevate the eye otherwise weak and impotent to vision of the object, but suppose it otherwise strengthened.

The sixth part is proved: the habit of charity is in the will, and is given for loving God; but the light of glory is in the intellect and is given for seeing.

The seventh part is proved: Because the intellect itself elicits beatific vision, as we shall say below, since it is a vital act: therefore the light of glory is not a quality through the mode of complete power eliciting vision.

You will say against the second part: One impotent to draw a ship becomes potent through the concurrence of another: therefore similarly the intellect, etc.

Response: I deny the Consequence: the disparity is that impotence to draw a ship arises from intensive excess of the effect in the same order: whence provided power is multiplied whether from intrinsic or extrinsic in the same order, sufficient potency is placed for such an effect. But truly impotence to the vision of God in the created intellect arises from the fact that such vision is of a higher order: whence the intellect will always be impotent unless it be raised to this order through a supernatural form. Add that two drawing a ship are partial causes, not so the intellect and light of glory with respect to beatific vision, as I shall say below.

I say second: The light of glory in the blessed is a permanent quality, or supernatural habit infused inhering in the intellect elevating and perfecting it to see God.

This is gathered from the Author who here says: "The light of glory is necessary for this that the intellect be made potent to understand, through the mode by which a power is made more potent to operate through the mode of habit."

It is proved by reason first from the refutation of other opinions as in the preceding conclusion. **Second** the vision itself is permanent, therefore it naturally requires permanent light by which it is elicited. **Third** a power acts more naturally and easily through permanent form than through transient aid; for this more approaches the natural mode of acting. Whence just as habitual charity is given in the fatherland for loving God, so habitual light is given for seeing Him.

However, concerning the given definition two things are to be observed. **First,** that although we said in the preceding article that it is of faith from the Council of Vienne, that the light of glory is required for the vision of God, it is not however of faith that this light is a habit as we have now defined it; because although the Council said that the light of glory is required, it did not however expressly determine that this light is a habit.

The second thing to be observed is that according to Theologians in the Treatise on grace, supernatural habits are distinguished from natural ones in this, that supernatural ones do not suppose proximate power, namely to act, as natural habits do, nor do they give only to act well or badly or more easily, but to be able to act simply, and therefore they have a certain mode of

power; and therefore the light of glory in the Blessed, although it is a habit, nevertheless has the mode of power.

From what has been said in this and the preceding §, you will gather that the first and principal function of the light of glory is to strengthen and elevate the intellect to eliciting beatific vision: the second to dispose the intellect to the reception of the divine essence in the nature of intelligible form, as is evident from the second proof of the second conclusion of the preceding §. The third to dispose the same intellect to the reception of the beatific vision itself, because since beatific vision is immanent action, which is received in the subject from which it is elicited, by this very fact that the light of glory disposes the intellect to elicit this vision, it also disposes it to receive it.

§ III. Whether by God's absolute power, the created intellect can see God without the Light of glory

Before the resolution, note that the light of glory can be communicated in two ways; in one way through the mode of permanent form or habit, and thus it makes the Saints blessed in the Fatherland; in another way through the mode of disposition or transient passion, as is said of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was caught up.

Moreover some supernatural aid can be given which is not the light of glory, neither according to habit nor according to disposition, and yet supplies its function; just as supernatural aid is given supplying the function of the habits of faith, hope and penance for eliciting acts of faith, hope and penance in catechumens and penitents not yet justified.

This being noted.

I say: The created intellect cannot by God's absolute power see God without the light of glory, either communicated permanently through the mode of habit, or transiently through the mode of disposition, or at least without some supernatural aid supplying the function of the light of glory.

It is proved by the reason already proposed in the first §: the intellect of itself and intrinsically impotent to see God, as is the created intellect, from what has been said cannot absolutely be made intrinsically potent, unless it be intrinsically changed and perfected through something intrinsically received: But that intrinsically received, through which it is perfected and changed, and becomes from non-potent potent, is what we call the light of glory, or at least some supernatural aid supplying its function: Therefore.

If you say with Molina that the intellect is made potent through God specially assisting and simultaneous concurrence. **On the contrary:** since that power relates on the part of the power

intrinsically and formally perfecting it in the physical genus, it must inhere in it and formally affect it, which is repugnant to God. Confer the first and second proof of the first Conclusion of the preceding §.

If you say with Suarez, that in every created agent there is congenital obediential power immediately active of whatever supernatural effects, by means of supernatural concurrence alone. **On the contrary first.** This active obediential power implies contradiction, for it would be natural and supernatural at once: natural, because it would be congenital to all natural agents, and following their nature as a property; supernatural, because it would be immediately ordered to supernatural effects. Likewise it would be finite because created, and simultaneously infinite because it would be productive of more and more perfect effect infinitely. **Second.** This power would destroy the whole order of grace; for this being posited, grace would be superfluous, since all supernatural effects which are attributed to grace and other supernatural habits, could be done through this active obediential power. Deservedly therefore such power is rejected as chimerical by the more prudent Theologians, who with St. Thomas acknowledge only passive obediential power in creatures with respect to those things which exceed the faculty of nature, insofar as they have from nature aptitude to receive forms by which they are elevated and perfected to those supernatural effects.

I said in the Conclusion: "Or at least without some supernatural aid supplying the function of the light of glory." Thus with Sylvius and Serra: Because this aid being posited, no implication seems to exist that the intellect should see God, since through it it is intrinsically changed and perfected, and becomes from non-potent potent to supernatural vision; just as for supernatural acts of faith, hope and penance, as happens in catechumens and penitents not yet justified.

Nor does it follow from this, says Sylvius, that the light of glory is not necessary; because what is required for something by God's ordinary power, is rightly said to be necessary, although it does not imply that the thing cannot be done without it. Thus the habits of faith and hope are necessary for salvation, although it does not imply that God cannot confer salvation on one who did not have these habits, but only actually believed and hoped. Thus the praised Theologian.

Add that this is rightly said to be necessary without which or another supplying its function the thing is not done.

Moreover, with this modification applied, many places are more easily explained in which St. Thomas seems to teach that the intellect can absolutely see God without the light of glory: thus Question 10 on truth article 11 he says that God can lead the mind of man to this, that it be united to the divine essence in the state of the way in the manner in which it is united to it in the fatherland, without this that it be suffused by the light of glory; just as He made Peter walk on the waters, without this that He gave him the gift of agility.

And in 4 distinction 49 question 2 article 7 he says: "It can be done miraculously that by divine power some created intellect, having only the disposition of the way, be elevated to seeing God through essence."

And although it does not escape me that St. Thomas is understood by many Thomists, of the light of glory not through the mode of habit, but through the mode of disposition transiently communicated, in which sense, they say, it can be called disposition of the way, not indeed positively as if it arose from the state of the way, but permissively insofar as it is not incompossible with the state of wayfarer, nor does it place man outside the state of the way; although, I say, this is the solution of many Thomists, nor do I disapprove it; perhaps however it will be simpler and plainer, and more expedited from various instances, if we say according to the letter of the holy Doctor, that God can miraculously elevate man to the vision of Himself without the light of glory, but not without some supernatural aid which supplies its function.

§ IV. Whether by God's absolute power an intellect can be created to which the light of glory is connatural, consequently the natural vision of God?

I say: By God's absolute power an intellect cannot be created to which the light of glory is connatural.

It is proved first. The ultimate disposition to some form cannot be connatural except to one having the form itself; just as the ultimate disposition to the form of fire, e.g., cannot be natural except to one having the form of fire; because the ultimate disposition to form, necessarily and connaturally draws it with itself, which is verified not only in forms physically informing, but also in forms united to the mind intentionally: But the light of glory is the ultimate disposition to the divine nature to be united to the intellect in the nature of intelligible form: For through this light, the rational creature becomes deiform: Therefore the light of glory cannot be natural except to one having the divine nature.

It is confirmed: No disposition to some form can be natural, unless the form itself be natural, because disposition and form must be of the same order; otherwise how would disposition dispose to form? but the form to which the light of glory disposes, cannot be natural; for it is the divine essence itself to be united per se and without species, as we shall say, to the intellect in the nature of intelligible form: Therefore.

It is proved second. An intellect, to which the light of glory would be connatural, would be supernatural; a supernatural intellect would suppose a supernatural substance of which it would be a power: but it implies contradiction to give a created supernatural substance: Therefore.

The Major is readily conceded by adversaries: Indeed therefore they posit that the light of glory can be connatural, because they say there can be given a created supernatural substance, from

which would naturally emanate accidents, which now indeed are supernatural, but to such substance would be connatural.

Therefore the Minor is proved: supernaturality consists in transcendental order to God as He is in Himself and elevated above all nature, as to specifying object and connatural end, as is proved in the treatise on grace; for which see Gonet there disputation 2 article 3. Consequently supernatural being is constituted essentially through order to something extrinsic, namely to God as He transcends every creature: but it implies contradiction to give a created substance, especially if it be complete, such as that of which we treat should be, which is constituted essentially through order to extrinsic, because substance especially complete, is being in itself and to itself, and so has its constitutive within its proper line, so that it cannot borrow its species from something extrinsic: Therefore.

Nor should you say that substance excludes indeed order to subject of inherence, but not order to something extrinsic as to specifying object: For substance is not only in itself, but also to itself, as was said; and therefore because it is being in itself, it excludes order to subject of inherence, so because it is being to itself it excludes order to something extrinsic specifying.

Hence you have the difference between substance and accident as to supernaturality, and why while it is repugnant to give supernatural substance, it is not repugnant to give supernatural accident; because accident since it is not being in itself and to itself, but being of being and affection of substance, can be essentially constituted through order to something else extrinsic; thus relation is constituted through order to term, power through order to act, act through order to power; but substance since it is being in itself and to itself, must be constituted within its proper line independently from anything extrinsic as constitutive and specifying.

It is confirmed: Supernatural simply and absolutely such, is said, that which is above every created and creatable nature, because if it is only above some nature, as understanding, which is above sensitive nature, flying, which is above human nature, it is said only supernatural respectively and in a qualified sense, not simply and absolutely: But it implies contradiction to give a created substance above every created nature: Therefore.

The Minor is proved. By nature is understood the radical principle of motion and rest, consequently substantial nature, for this alone is the principle of motion and rest: But it implies contradiction to give a created substance above every substantial nature, for it would be above itself: Therefore.

And hence again you have why it does not imply contradiction to give supernatural accident; because that accident be above every created substantial nature, it does not follow that it be above itself, as if there were given a created substance above every created substance, it would have to be above itself.

It is proved third from inconvenience. If the light of glory were connatural to some creature, this creature would be of itself and naturally impeccable and blessed, which is proper to God alone, since every creature, by this very fact that it is from nothing, is peccable and defectible; the sequence is evident, because since the light of glory is the ultimate disposition to the vision of God, this would be naturally due to that creature; but the vision of God is incompatible with any sin, any misery: Therefore.

Nor should you say that God by His absolute power can deprive this creature of this light, or deny His concurrence to eliciting this vision; for this does not prevent this vision from always being due to it connaturally or from its nature, nor that from its nature it would require to be impeccable and blessed.

Other many inconveniences see if you wish in Gonet here disputation 1 article 1 § 4.

You object first. An intellect suffused with the light of glory is not of infinite power; therefore nothing prevents such from being created by God; but if it were created, the vision of God would be connatural to it.

Response: I distinguish the Antecedent. An intellect suffused with the light of glory is not of infinite power and yet is elevated to a superior order namely supernatural, I concede the Antecedent. And remains in the natural order, I deny the Antecedent and the Consequence. For it is impossible that a thing however much it be augmented in its order, ever attain to the perfection of a superior order; thus however much a body be perfected in its order, it never attains the perfection of spirit, however much therefore the power of natural intellect be perfected, it never attains the perfection of intellect elevated to the supernatural order.

You object second. It does not imply contradiction for God to create a supernatural substance, but to this the light of glory would be connatural: Therefore. The Major is proved. The substance of God is not less participable in the supernatural order than His attributes, but God's attributes are participated in the supernatural order; thus divine love is participated by charity, divine wisdom by infused supernatural wisdom; and so of the rest: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Major from what has been said. To the proof, I distinguish the Major. The divine substance is not less participable than His attributes by accidental participation or under the mode of being of accident, I concede the Major. By substantial participation, or under the mode of being of substance, I deny the Major. For that which is substantially in God, says the holy Doctor, becomes accidentally in nature. Thus e.g., although sanctifying grace is a participation of the divine substance, it does not however participate its mode of being substantially, since it itself is an accident.

You will insist, the divine substance is participated in the natural order by substantial participation: Therefore the same can also in the supernatural order.

Response: I deny the Consequence. The disparity is that substance in the natural order says only transcendental order to God as to efficient cause like all other beings; not truly as to specifying object, as supernatural substance would say if it were given, as has been proved. You have again in the proofs of the conclusion other disparities and other inconveniences which would follow from supernatural substance, and which do not follow from natural substance.

You will reply: supernatural accidents are given de facto: Therefore at least a supernatural substance is possible which is their connatural subject. The Consequence is proved. Every accident says order to some connatural subject: but no other connatural subject of supernatural accidents can be assigned than supernatural substance: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Consequence. To the proof, I deny the Major. For although every accident says order to some subject, it is not however necessary that it respect a subject connatural to it as is evident in accidents which are educed from the violent potency of the subject. Whence in Philosophy a triple subject is distinguished, or triple receptive potency of accidents. **First** natural as of water with respect to cold. **Second** violent, as of water with respect to heat. **Third**obediential by which anything is subjected to God for receiving accidental forms; and thus supernatural accidents respect natural substance, not qua natural, but qua obediential and subject to God acting supernaturally.

§ V. How the light of glory and intellect concur to beatific vision?

I say first that both concur actively.

It is proved first for the light of glory. The light of glory relates to beatific vision as charity to beatific love, and other supernatural habits to supernatural acts: but charity and other supernatural habits concur actively to supernatural acts, insofar namely as they dispose, perfect, elevate and complete powers to elicit them: Therefore similarly the light of glory with respect to beatific vision.

It is proved second for the intellect. Beatific vision is the vital act of the Blessed, indeed their very blessed life: Therefore it must proceed effectively from a vital power intrinsic to it and moving from within, namely from that intellect.

I say second. The intellect does not produce beatific vision instrumentally but principally.

It is proved first. The intellect suffused with the light of glory relates to blessed vision, as the will informed with charity to the love of God: but the will informed with charity is the principal cause of the love of God and not merely instrumental: Therefore.

It is proved second. It is of the nature of instrument that it be elevated outside the latitude of its adequate object, as is evident in baptismal water which is elevated to produce grace: but God

seen is not outside the adequate object of the created intellect, but only outside the proportioned, as is evident from what has been said: Therefore.

It is proved third. It is of the nature of instrument properly said that it be moved by transient motion, not moving itself from within, as is evident in saw, axe, etc. but the intellect seeing God is not so moved by God by transient motion, that it does not also move itself vitally, as we were just saying: Therefore.

I say third. The intellect and light of glory concur as two total causes under diverse aspect; the light of glory as total proximate formal reason by which the intellect is elevated and proportioned to the act of vision; the intellect as total principle eliciting vision just as will and habit of charity with respect to love.

ARTICLE VI

Whether the divine essence is seen or can be seen through some likeness or species?

Note first. Our knowledge happens insofar as the cognitive power draws things to itself, conjoining them to itself, and because things on account of their materiality cannot entitatively enter the power, they need species which is their representation and formal likeness through which they are united to the power. Therefore species is in intelligible and representative being entirely the same as the object is in entitative being, nor does it add to the number with it; just as the image of Caesar is entirely the same in the being of image, as Caesar is in natural being, so that the species of horse, e.g., contains in itself the form and nature of horse entirely the same with that which is in the horse, not under natural mode, but under intelligible mode, and the species of this number man, is this number man in intelligible being; otherwise species would not represent the object as it is, and through it it could not be known.

Whence that saying of Aristotle 3 on the soul text 37. "The soul is in a certain way all things," because by reason of species it contains in itself the natures of all things, not in natural being, but intentional. Likewise also that of the Commentator: "From intellect and thing understood becomes more one than from matter and form; because matter does not pass into form nor form into matter, but from the union of both results a third composite; but truly from species and intellect does not result one third, but the intellect rather passes into the thing understood by means of species," at least according to many, of which somewhat more fully below.

Note second. A double species is distinguished, impressed and expressed. Impressed precedes knowledge as vicar of the object, and is its formal likeness by which as if by seed the intellect is made fruitful to elicit knowledge and produce the offspring which is expressed species, by

another name word of the mind. Whence that common saying taken from Augustine: "From object and power is born knowledge."

It is called impressed, because by the agent intellect, which effects it, it is impressed on the patient intellect, which elicits knowledge. Expressed is the term of knowledge, as I already said, and vital representation of the object produced by the intellect. It is called expressed, because through it the intellect expresses the object: for knowledge usually has two functions; it perceives the object, and under this aspect it is called Intellection; and it produces a word or vital representation of the object, under which aspect it is called Diction.

In this therefore impressed and expressed species differ: Impressed represents the object as cognoscible, expressed as known: Impressed moves to knowledge, expressed terminates it. This is the common doctrine not only of Aristotle and ancient Philosophers, but also of Saints Augustine and Thomas and after them of all Theologians, which certain recent Philosophers undeservedly attack.

Concerning therefore both these species the question is whether they are given, or can be given in the vision of God.

I say first. No impressed species is given nor can be given in beatific vision. The first part is common. The second is of Thomists and many others.

The first part is proved: Impressed species in beatific vision is superfluous: therefore it is not given. The Antecedent is proved: then impressed species is required when either the object does not exist, or is not per se present to the intellect, or is not sufficiently intelligible on account of its materiality: But the object of beatific vision, namely God essentially exists, is intimately per se present to any blessed intellect: and is supremely intelligible, because He is supremely immaterial: Therefore.

The second part is proved first. Impressed species must agree with the object in the same degree of immateriality, otherwise it will not represent it as it is in itself, because insofar as it is representative, insofar it is intelligible; and insofar as it is intelligible insofar as it is immaterial: Whence through material species we cannot know spirit: But no created or creatable species can attain to the degree of immateriality which befits God: Therefore.

It is proved second. Impressed species is the very quiddity of the object in intelligible being, as was said; but it implies contradiction that created species be the quiddity of God in intelligible being: Therefore. The Minor is proved. The quiddity of God is His being even in intelligible being: but it implies contradiction that created species be His being even in intelligible and representative being: Therefore.

It is proved third. Every creature however immaterial and perfect is circumscribed, and determined to some species, not only in the nature of being, but also in the nature of species, because under that and any other aspect it is creature: But the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and determined to no species, but supereminently comprehends every species and perfection and all things that can be understood: Therefore whatever is posited as created in the intellect will not represent God as He is in Himself.

It is confirmed: God is more distant from any created or creatable species even in the nature of species, than the substance of Angel from species abstracted from Phantasms: But the essence of Angel cannot be known as in itself through species abstracted from Phantasms: Therefore.

I say second. No expressed species is given nor can be given in beatific vision. It is more common among Thomists as to both parts.

The first part is proved first. For this expressed species is given, that the object which is intelligible through impressed species may become understood in act through expressed, and may stand within the intellect as its term: But the divine essence is united to the created intellect as understood in act making the intellect in act per se: Therefore. The Minor is of St. Thomas: and is evident because the divine essence is purest act in intelligible being, just as in other genera, and so is intellect in act and as such intimately present to the intellect: Therefore.

It is proved second by overturning the foundation of adversaries. Therefore according to them expressed species is given in beatific vision, because a term of that action produced by it must be assigned: but this reason is null: Therefore. The Minor is proved: It is not of the nature of immanent action to produce an effect, although this often happens to it: but beatific vision is immanent action: Therefore.

The Major is proved. **First** in this immanent action is distinguished from transient that this is for the sake of effect, but that is for the sake of perfection of the subject in which it remains. **Second** because the divine word sees and understands, nor yet produces another word or expressed species. **Third** when we contemplate purely speculating a word already formed in the mind, we feign no other, and then knowledge is simply intellection and not diction: Therefore.

The second part is proved by those foundations by which the second part of the first conclusion was proved: for if impressed species of such perfection and immateriality cannot be given, which represents God as He is in Himself: Therefore neither a fortiori expressed species, since this should be more perfect or at least equally perfect as impressed; for it is its function to represent the object as understood in second act, of impressed species to represent as intelligible only in first act: Therefore.

Objections are Solved

You object against the first Conclusion. It is more connatural, both on the part of God and on the part of our intellect, that God be seen through created species: Therefore He is so seen. The Antecedent is proved. On the part of God it is more connatural for God to act by means of created forms than immediately through Himself: on the part of the intellect, it is more connatural for the intellect to know an object through species inhering in it and subordinated as ordinarily happens: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent for both parts: For the first thus: it is more connatural for God to act by means of created forms, when they are virtues per se operative and proper to the created thing, I concede the Minor. When they are only representative of another and performing its function as are species, I deny. For then when the object is present, they are superfluous. For the second part similarly, I distinguish: it is more connatural for the intellect to know an object through species when the object is not per se present, as happens in created objects, I concede. When it is per se present, as happens in beatific vision, I deny.

Add that both these Antecedents are somehow true if created forms are possible: But in our opinion, species of the divine essence in its vision are impossible.

You object second against the same: If impressed species could not be given in beatific vision, it would be because it should be of the same immateriality with the divine essence: but the consequent is false: Therefore. The Minor is proved in many ways. **First** de facto the light of glory is given by which the created intellect sees God, which however is not of the same order with God. **Second** substance is known through species which is accident: Therefore. **Third** a lower Angel knows quidditatively a higher: but the species by which the lower knows the higher is not of the same immateriality with the higher: Therefore. **Fourth** similarly the separated soul knows Angels through species lower than them: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Minor. To the first proof, I deny the Consequence. The disparity is that the light of glory relates on the part of the power which it elevates to the supernatural order, and this suffices that it be proportioned to attain God in a finite manner. But species relates on the part of the object as its formal likeness representing it as it is in itself; but nothing can represent God as He is in Himself, unless it be immaterial and infinite like God Himself.

To the second, I deny likewise the Consequence. Because although the species representing substance is accident in the being of entity, it is nevertheless substance in representative being and of the same immateriality with the substance which it represents, otherwise it would not represent it as it is in itself.

To the third, John of St. Thomas, Gonet and many others respond that although superior and inferior Angel do not agree in the same species of immateriality, they nevertheless agree in the same genus, and understand in the same way, namely through infused species and not abstracted from phantasms; but it is not repugnant that species which is of the same order and genus with the object, although it differs in species, should represent it as it is in itself, although not with complete adequation: and hence it follows only that the inferior Angel does not attain the superior as perfectly, as he attains himself, not however that he does not attain as he is in himself, because in attaining a thing quidditatively, short of comprehension, latitude is given; but diversity of order totally removes proportion between species and object: The same they say of the separated soul, which either by separation itself, or by special grace is in some way elevated to the grade of being of Angels.

This solution is probable: perhaps however it could seem to some truer and more conformable to St. Thomas, that every species should be of the same immateriality, not only generic, but also specific with the object which it represents, otherwise since it does not represent it except insofar as it is intelligible, and insofar as it is intelligible insofar as it is immaterial, if it agrees with the object only in genus and not in species of immateriality, it will represent it only as to generic aspect, and not as to specific aspect, and so it will not be known quidditatively nor as it is in itself.

"If the likeness," says the holy Doctor, "be deficient from representation of species but not from representation of genus, that thing will be known according to the aspect of genus, not according to the aspect of species."

Therefore in this opinion the minor of the argument must be denied; for although the species, through which inferior Angel knows quidditatively the superior, is in entitative being, and as it is accident, inferior to the superior Angel, because as such it is proportioned to the substance of the inferior Angel in which it is as in subject; in representative being however, and as species, it is of entirely the same immateriality with the superior Angel, because as such it is not proportioned to the subject in which it is, but to the object of which it is likeness. And the same seems to be said of the separated soul.

If you say that the species of Angels are their properties, consequently they cannot be of greater immateriality than the natures of which they are properties.

Response: The species of Angels are not properly and rigorously properties flowing from their nature, but are infused by God, as John of St. Thomas, Gonet and others themselves teach in the Treatise on Angels to question 54 of St. Thomas. They are said however in some sense connatural, and for that reason properties insofar as they are connaturally due to Angels according to the perfection of their state, and they received them infused by God with their nature in the instant of their creation.

Hence St. Thomas says: "The separated soul understands through species which it receives from the influence of divine light, just as also Angels."

You object third. For the vision of God infinite species is not required: Therefore it is possible. The Antecedent is proved. The blessed vision for which it is given is not infinite: Therefore neither the species itself.

Response: I deny the Antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent. The blessed vision for which it is given taken entitatively, is not infinite, I concede the Antecedent. Taken objectively, I deny the Antecedent. For it immediately attains an infinite object. Whence I distinguish the Consequence. Therefore neither the species itself should be infinite from the merits of the effect, I concede; from the merits of the object, I deny. For since it is likeness of the object as it is in itself, it should be in the intelligible order what the object itself is in the order of nature.

You object fourth against the second Conclusion. John 3 it is said: "When He appears, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is." And Augustine 9 on the Trinity chapter 11 says: "When we know God, that knowledge... is a word, and that knowledge becomes some likeness of God": But expressed species is nothing other than likeness of God, which is called word: Therefore.

Response: To the first, that authority speaks of likeness which is through participation of the light of glory. For the light of glory is participation of the divine light by which the intellect proportioned to see God, enjoys the same happiness with Him, and has the same object with Him, and in these things the light of glory makes us like to God.

To the second, Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God which is had in the way, but he calls it word and likeness, not formally but causally, because it produces word and likeness.

You will insist: Augustine book 14 on the city chapter 17 speaking of beatific vision, says: "In this image then will be perfect likeness, when there will be perfect vision of God": Therefore.

Response: Augustine's sense is that in our mind, which is the natural image of God, there will be perfect likeness of God, when there will be perfect vision of Him, not because then there will be in our mind some species which is His formal likeness, but because the mind itself will then be most like to God, and as if deified, both on account of intimate union with the divine essence, and because, as I was already saying, it will enjoy the same happiness with God, and will have the same object of its intellection with Him.

If you say we cannot be like to God without likeness, just as something cannot be white without whiteness; I confess that we indeed will not be like to God without likeness, which is the relation of similars, but not which is species representing God. If you reply that this relation of likeness

should have a foundation which does not seem to be other than species. I deny the assumption; for the foundation of this relation is the very glorification of body and soul through intimate union with the divine essence.

You will insist again from Augustine who book 15 on the Trinity chapter 16 says: "When we shall be like Him, when we shall see Him as He is, then indeed our word will not be false, nor shall we lie, nor shall we be deceived."

Many respond, that Augustine by word does not understand species expressed from beatific vision, but everything that exhibits a thing, whether it be species, or the thing itself performing the function of species, such as is in beatific vision the divine essence, which therefore he calls our Word, because it is united to our intellect through the mode of word actuating and terminating it. This response is entirely probable. Yet according to Sylvius, Augustine understands generally word, which is said by those thinking and understanding, which then will not be false; as if he said that then no our thought or intellection will be false, because we shall understand all things, according as they are in reality; whence he adds: "Neither shall we lie, nor shall we be deceived." Thus the praised Theologian.

You object fifth against the same: St. Thomas below question 27 article 1 says: "Whoever understands, from this very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within him which is conception of the thing understood proceeding from intellective power": but the holy Doctor speaks of every intellection even beatific, otherwise he would badly prove from it against Arians and Sabellians that there is given word in God: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Minor: but the holy Doctor speaks of every intellection with distribution accommodated for the kinds of individuals, I concede; with absolute distribution for individuals of kinds, I deny the Minor. Therefore the sense of the holy Doctor is, that in whatever kind of intelligent beings, or in whatever intelligent nature, whether human, or angelic, or divine, there is given procession of word; although however this is not true of every individual intelligent, or at least of every its intellection: From which he legitimately infers against Arians and Sabellians that since God is of intelligent nature He must produce word. Some respond that the proof of St. Thomas is a certain congruence only (for mysteries of faith are not proved) taken from what more commonly happens in us.

You will reply St. Thomas question 4 on truth article 2 says: "Word is something really proceeding from another; and he adds: Which is universally true of everything that is understood by us, whether it be seen through essence, or through likeness": Therefore.

The common response is that St. Thomas speaks of knowledge of thing through essence which is not pure act, and so not understood in act of itself, such as is Angel and separated soul, who although they understand themselves through their substance performing the function of impressed species, nevertheless produce word.

But truly, saving better judgment, the sense of St. Thomas seems to me to be this. Every word in us is something really proceeding from another, and this is universally true (namely every word to be something really proceeding from another) of everything which we understand producing word; so that the holy Doctor does not want that in everything which we understand, we produce word, but that every word which we produce when we understand, be really proceeding from another; and this becomes manifest from the reason immediately subjoined; for St. Thomas adds: "For the very cognition (that is in St. Thomas's phrase the very word) is effect of the act of understanding," which reason proves every word to be really proceeding from another, because every effect really proceeds from cause, but not every intellection to produce word. And this becomes still more manifest from St. Thomas's scope: For he intends there to prove word to be said personally in the divine, because word according to its adequate concept imports not only to be understood in act, but to be expressed by another: From which it is evident that St. Thomas intends nothing other than that every word imports real procession from another, not truly that in every intellection one is produced.

You object sixth. Beatific vision is action: but it is of the nature of action that it produce effect or term: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major. Beatific vision is immanent action, I concede the Major. Transient action, I deny the Major. And with the Minor distinguished according to this sense, I deny the Consequence. The solution is evident from the second proof of the Conclusion.

You will insist first. If beatific vision did not produce word, it would be because God is intimately present to the intellect of the Blessed: but this reason is null; for Angel is intimately present to his intellect, and yet in knowledge of himself produces word: Therefore.

Response: the adequate reason why beatific vision does not produce word is, because the divine essence is intimately present to the intellect of the Blessed, not only as intelligible, but as understood in act, because it is purest act in every genus: but Angel to his proper intellect is intimately present as intelligible only, not as actually understood, because he is not purest act.

You will insist second against the given solution from double source. **First** the eternal Father understanding Himself produces word: but yet He is purest act: Therefore. **Second** the divine essence is not united to the blessed intellect as understood in act: Therefore. The Antecedent is proved. The divine essence is not actually understood with respect to the blessed intellect, unless when it is understood by it, otherwise from eternity it would be understood by the blessed intellect, which is absurd.

Response: to the first, the eternal Father understanding Himself produces word, not from need as if this were necessary that He be intellect in act, but from supreme fecundity, of which the created intellect is not capable.

To the second, I deny the Antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent. The divine essence is not actually understood denominatively extrinsically with respect to the created intellect, unless when it is understood by it, I concede; denominatively intrinsically, I deny. Indeed the divine essence is not denominated extrinsically understood by the created intellect unless when it is understood by it, but it has from eternity such actuality in intelligible being, as suffices for actual intellection of the created intellect without aid of expressed species; whence that it be denominated actually understood by the created intellect, it suffices that it present itself to it in that actuality without this that species be produced. Thus although a divine person from eternity does not terminate humanity, yet because it is pure act, it terminates in time immediately without middle nexus.

You will insist third. It is no less of the nature of intellection to produce word, than of the nature of love to produce impulse: but blessed love although it be about an infinitely perfect object, nevertheless produces impulse: Therefore.

Response: I deny the Major. The disparity is that impulse neither is the ultimate actuality of the beloved object, nor its perfect likeness; but is posited only in the will that it may perfectly complete and incline it about the beloved object. Whence however perfect the object may be, nothing is repugnant to its being produced. But truly word or expressed species is posited as ultimate actuality of the object in intelligible being, and must be of the same immateriality with the object, as being its expressed likeness: But for this to be produced by created intellect is repugnant about the divine object: Both because it is of itself its ultimate actuality even in intelligible being, and because it is repugnant to give any creature, which is perfect likeness of God and of the same nature, or immateriality with Him.

You object seventh. St. Paul in rapture formed expressed species: therefore. The Antecedent is proved. Afterward he remembered those things which he had seen; "for I heard," he says, "secret things which it is not lawful for man to speak": Therefore. The Consequence is proved. Recollection is had through species left in memory, and previously expressed through knowledge by which the thing was first known: Therefore.

Response: That the recollection which remained in St. Paul, was not of God clearly seen through species perfectly representing Him, otherwise he would always have been blessed: But it was recollection of the vision itself and of certain things which he saw in the Word, but of which he formed representations in their proper genus outside the Word, as the Blessed now do.

You object eighth. The Blessed see God through created vision: Therefore also through created expressed species. The Consequence is proved. Vision is the very expressed species.

Response: I deny the Consequence. To the proof, I deny the Antecedent. For in the principles of St. Thomas and Thomists expressed species is distinguished from vision or cognition, as term of action from action.

ARTICLE VII. Whether in the beatific vision the divine essence takes the place of both impressed and expressed species?

I say that the divine essence in the beatific vision takes the place of both impressed and expressed species, but in a certain respect and incompletely. This is common among Thomists with the Author in various places here a. 5. 0. When a created intellect sees God through essence, the divine essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. And 3. cont. gent. cap. 53. It is necessary that the divine essence be joined to the intellect as an intelligible species. This is for the impressed species. Here a. 2. ad 3. The divine essence is united to the created intellect as something understood in act, making the intellect in act through itself. This is for the expressed species. For both finally supplem. q. 92. a. 1. ad 2. That vision by which we shall see God through essence is the same as the vision by which God sees himself on the part of that which is seen, because just as he sees himself through his essence, so also we shall see him. q. 8 de verit. a.1.

It follows from what has been said: For in every intellection it is required **1º.** that the thing either through itself or through its similitude be united to the intellect as an intelligible form before cognition. **2º.** As understood through cognition, because from the intelligible and the one understanding it is necessary that they somehow become one in understanding; and as the common axiom holds: from object and potency knowledge is born. But in the vision of God, the divine essence cannot be united to the blessed intellect through species, whether impressed or expressed, as has been proven. Therefore it is united through itself, taking the place of both.

This is confirmed: Nothing is lacking to the divine essence to take the place of the impressed species and in a certain respect the expressed species, as I shall now explain. **1º.** For by reason of its infinite immateriality it is not only intelligible but actually understood. **2º.** By reason of the light of glory communicated to the blessed intellect, it is proportioned to it. **3º.** Finally, by reason of its immensity it is intimately present to it. Add that species, whether impressed or expressed taken incompletely, involves no imperfection in its formal concept, since as such it is precisely the similitude of the object, as will be clearer from the solution of objections.

I said that regarding the expressed species, the divine essence takes its place only in a certain respect and incompletely. Because if any of those things which belong to the nature of something is taken away, it will no longer be a proper and complete acceptance, but according to a certain respect it is incomplete. But the expressed species or word has two things of its nature, namely that it be actually understood, and that it be expressed by another, or really proceeding. But the divine essence is united to the blessed intellect indeed as actually understood, but not as expressed by it or really proceeding. Therefore it does not take the place of the expressed species or word simply and completely, but only in a certain respect and incompletely.

Objections Are Solved

You object **1º.** S. Thomas quodlib. 7. a. 1. 0. says: The light of glory does this with respect to the divine essence in the intellect, which it does with respect to other intelligibles, which are not light only, but species of the thing understood and light simultaneously. Therefore the divine essence is not united to the intellect in the nature of an impressed species.

I respond: The meaning of St. Thomas is that the light of glory in the beatific vision does what light and species do in our other intellections, insofar as species is an accident inhering in the intellect. For he places there a distinction between the vision of God and our other intellections, that in these a double principle inhering in the intellect is required, namely light and species, but in the blessed vision only one principle inhering in the intellect is required, namely the light of glory.

You object **2º.** The impressed species involves imperfection in its formal concept. Therefore the divine essence cannot take its place. The antecedent is proven: **1º.** It belongs to the nature of the impressed species that it inhere in the intellect. **2º.** That it be the form of the intellect, and by informing it make one third thing, and consequently that it compose as a dependent part with a co-part. **3º.** That it concur actively or efficiently to intellection, as a principle subordinated to the intellect, and by constituting the intellect in first act, or in potency to understanding; all of which involve imperfection.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof I distinguish the antecedent: It belongs to the nature of species as a physical accident that it inhere, I concede the antecedent. As it is precisely species, I deny the antecedent. For species formally as such, since it is held on the part of the object, taking its place in intelligible being, imports nothing else from its formal nature than that it be the similitude of the object itself. But it is accidental that it be substance or accident, and thus that it subsist through itself or inhere. Thus the divine essence itself is in place of species to the divine intellect, the substance of an Angel to the angelic intellect; yet neither is an accident, neither inheres.

To the second proof I respond with the same distinction, namely that it is true of species insofar as it is a created and incomplete accident, not of species precisely as it is species and similitude of the object, of whose nature it is only to represent the object to the intellect, to move it to understanding by this representation, and to determine it to this intellection. Therefore if the species or that which takes its place, for instance the object itself, is a complete substance and pure act, such as the divine essence is, it provides all these things, namely it represents itself to the intellect, and by this representation moves the intellect to understanding without being a dependent part with a co-part, and composing a whole more perfect than itself. Rather, on the contrary, since it is pure act and infinite perfection, it makes the intellect depend on itself while

remaining independent, and the whole which results from this, if it results, is not more perfect than itself, but begs all its perfection from such a form.

But whether from the union of the divine essence with the intellect there results some third thing distinct from the extremes? Some deny this with Cajetan, and hold that the intellect passes into the thing understood, and becomes one with it through identity, according to that saying of the Philosopher: "The intellect in understanding becomes all things." And that of the Commentator: "From intellect and object there becomes more of a unity than from matter and form," so that according to that opinion, the intellect of the Blessed is in intelligible being God, infinite, pure act, etc. Which others find difficult to conceive.

Therefore they admit with Ferrariensis that from the union of species or object with intellect there results one third thing, namely one total principle of intellection. Nor do they acknowledge any imperfection in this on the part of the divine essence united to the intellect, because it does not compose with the intellect as an imperfect and incomplete part depending on it in composing, but rather perfects and actuates it as most pure and complete act. Nor is the third thing which arises more perfect than itself, but borrows all its perfection from it. But when it is said that God cannot enter into composition with another, this is understood of composition in which he would be an incomplete and dependent material or formal part, and in which the whole would be more perfect than any part separately, but not if he composes as pure act, complete, perfecting and actuating without any potentiality and dependence, and the whole is not more perfect than any part separately. Thus, they say, the subsistence of the Word composes Christ with humanity. To the principle of Aristotle, it can be responded that the intellect in understanding becomes all things because it has the forms of all things which it understands. And to the saying of the Commentator, that from intellect and object there becomes more of a unity than from matter and form, because the intellect becomes one with the thing understood without losing its proper form, which does not happen in composition from matter and form. Both opinions are probable; the first is more common.

Regarding the third proof, again there is dispute among Theologians: For although all admit that species, insofar as it is a physical accident subjected in the intellect, concurs with it efficiently to intellection, because it has operation from that from which it has being, some nevertheless deny this of species formally as species and similitude of the object. For, they say, if species as species concurred efficiently to intellection, it would be held on the part of the potency, and thus the inconveniences deduced in the instance would follow. Thus Bannes, which Serra also considers probable. Others more commonly hold that species even as species concurs efficiently to intellection, both because it is compared by Philosophers to seed, but seed concurs efficiently to the production of offspring; and because species moves and determines the intellect to understanding, but to move and determine a potency to acting is to concur efficiently to action. Consequently they contend that the divine essence in the nature of impressed species concurs efficiently to the blessed vision.

But perhaps it is a question of name only. For all agree that species as species is not held on the part of the potency, but only on the part of the object of which it is precisely the similitude. Also all agree that species represents the intelligible object to the intellect, and by that representation moves it to understanding. But some call this motion efficiency, others deny it. Therefore for the reconciliation of both opinions, let it be said that it is not efficiency strictly so called which is held on the part of the efficient potency, but it is nevertheless some efficiency insofar as it moves the potency to effecting. And thus the divine essence taking the place of impressed species is not held as a principle subordinated to the intellect, because the efficiency of species as such is not held on the part of the potency; and although it constitutes the intellect in potency to understanding, it nevertheless does not provide this through an imperfect act on its part, but by representing itself simply to the intellect. Therefore the instance remains solved.

If you further urge that the substance of an Angel is in place of species to its own intellect, and yet does not concur efficiently to the intellection of the Angel, because according to Thomists substance is not immediately operative. Also if divine relations had the nature of species, they would not concur efficiently to intellection because they are not active.

I respond to the first: I deny the assumption. To its proof I admit that substance in the natural order is not immediately operative, because since in that order it immediately regards being, it cannot immediately regard operating. But truly in intelligible being under the aspect of species, it does not regard being first but operating, insofar as it regards first representing and by representing moving to operating, as we have said. To the second, it is commonly responded that divine relations cannot immediately be united to the intellect in the nature of species, because although they are something intelligible, they are nevertheless not active, and thus the concept of species is repugnant to them. But since the efficiency which we attribute to species is not held on the part of the potency, and thus does not seem to be efficiency strictly so called, but is said to effect insofar as by representing the object, it determines the intellect to its intellection, I do not see why such efficiency should be denied to divine relations, if they were united to the intellect by themselves. For thus united they would represent themselves to the intellect, and by that representation would determine the intellect to understanding them.

You object **3º.** If the divine essence were in place of the impressed species, it would make the intellect similar to God, and in some way God, namely in the intelligible order. But this is impossible. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proven: according to us an impressed species which is the similitude of God is impossible. Therefore also impossible is a created intellect similar to God and God.

I respond: Given the major, I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny the consequence. The disparity is that if there were given a species of God as he is in himself, it would have to be unlimited and infinite just like God himself, as much as is from itself, as I said in the preceding Article. Because species as such, since it is the natural similitude of the object, has nothing from

which it is limited except from the limitation of the object. And thus, as much as is from itself, it would equal God, and would represent him totally and totally, and thus infinitely, which can belong to no creature. But truly while the divine essence is united in the nature of species to a created intellect, it is not united to it totally and in an infinite mode, but according to the proportion of the light of glory. And thus although it makes the intellect similar to God and in some way God, nevertheless not in an infinite but finite mode, which is not repugnant to a created intellect.

It is asked here whether just as the Blessed see God through his essence taking the place of species, so they see him or can see him by his uncreated vision communicated to them? This was the opinion of certain ancients that the Blessed see God by his uncreated vision communicated to them, which opinion, long since antiquated, was revived some years ago by Master Bonae-Spei, against whom his Disciple Henry of St. Ignatius fights with broad pen. But because this opinion has not progressed much, but remains within certain Schools of the Calced Carmelite Fathers, and discourse will return to it when treating of Beatitude in 1. 2., therefore now briefly to the question.

I respond negatively. Because the beatific vision is a vital action, indeed the very life of the Blessed, according to that of John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God." But every vital act is essentially from an intrinsic principle of the living being. Therefore. The major seems to be of faith, the minor certain with natural certitude.

You will say: the blessed vision is the supreme good of man. But nothing created can be the supreme good of man. Therefore.

I respond: I distinguish the major. The blessed vision taken objectively is the supreme good of man, I concede the major. Taken formally and entitatively, I deny the major. Therefore the blessed vision is called the supreme good of man because through it he possesses God who is the supreme good and by whose possession he is blessed. More fully in 1. 2. when treating of Beatitude.

ARTICLE VIII. Whether the Blessed see God unequally, and whence arises this inequality?

I say **1º.** The Blessed see God unequally, one namely more perfectly than another. This is of faith against Jovinian, who since he wished with the Stoics that human merits and sins be equal, so also rewards and punishments be equal. St. Jerome defeated him with two books published against him. Also it is against Luther who, since he contended that men are justified not by their own justice, but by the justice of Christ imputed, and this is equal for all, consequently said that all men are equally blessed.

It is proven **1º.** by the authority of Scripture. 1 Cor. 15: "Star differs from star," by which words although the Apostle speaks of the unequal glory of bodies, he consequently also speaks of the unequal essential glory of souls from which flows the inequality of accidental glory of bodies. **2º.** John 14: Christ says: "In my Father's house there are many mansions," which should be understood of the Kingdom of Heaven, and not of the Church, as Jovinian interpreted, because Christ adds, "I go to prepare a place for you, that where I am, you also may be."

It is proven **2º.** by the authority of Councils. The Council of Florence in its last Session defines that the Blessed "behold God as he is, yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another." And Trent sess. 6. cap. 16. can. 32. strikes with anathema whoever says that justified men through good works do not merit increase of glory.

It is proven by reason founded in Scriptures. The vision of God in which glory and beatitude are placed is proposed to the Saints as the reward of good works to be distributed according to the laws of justice and proportion of merits, according to that of Matt. 5: "Your reward is abundant in Heaven." And 2 Tim. 4: "There is laid up for me a crown of justice which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me." Also Rom. 2: "He will render to each according to his works." But the merits of the Saints are not equal; for Martyrdom or perpetual virginity is to be valued more than simple observance of commandments; a work done with most fervent charity is worth more than one done with remiss charity. Therefore.

It is proven by another reason. The faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created intellect according to its nature, but through the light of glory. But he who has more charity participates more of the light of glory. Therefore. The minor is proven: Where there is greater charity, there is greater desire of seeing God. But where there is greater desire, there is greater light of glory. Therefore. The minor is proven: Desire makes the one desiring apt and fitted for the reception of the desired, and therefore where there is greater desire there is greater aptitude and preparation for the reception of the desired. But the light of glory is the form elevating and disposing to the reception of God. But form must correspond to aptitude and preparation. Therefore where there is greater desire of seeing God, there is greater light of glory.

Jovinian objected the parable of the vineyard Matt. 20, in which the first and last workers received an equal denarius. The common response of the Fathers and Interpreters is that by that equality of the denarius is signified equal beatitude as to substance, because all Saints will see God, but not an equal degree of this vision or beatitude. It can also very well be signified by this parable that the reward of eternal life is to be attributed not to the time for which one labored, but to the affection of charity with which he labored. For thus it happens that two, one of whom served God for ten years with remiss charity, the other for only one year with more fervent charity, are endowed with equal glory, because God weighs not how much, but from how much, not the payment but the affection.

From these you now have the moral cause of inequality in the vision of God being the inequality of merits. But the difficulty is about the physical cause of this inequality.

For which I say **2º.** The whole inequality of the beatific vision comes physically from the inequality of the light of glory alone and not of the intellects, so that two Blessed of whom one is more perspicacious than the other, if they are endowed with equal light of glory, will see God equally. This is common against the Scotists and a few others.

Although this Conclusion is certainly that of St. Thomas in the places cited in the margin, some nevertheless call his mind into doubt. But it is obvious to the reader: Behold his words a. 6. 0.: "The faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created intellect according to its nature but through the light of glory." From which he infers: "Therefore the intellect participating more of the light of glory will see God more perfectly." Ad 3: "The diversity of seeing God will be through diverse faculty not natural but glorified." A. 7. 0.: "Insofar as the created intellect is perfused with greater or lesser light, it knows the divine essence more perfectly or less perfectly." What could be clearer, what more express?

But Francis Henno says: "I know that through those words nothing else can be understood except that the intellect according to itself can do nothing regarding that vision, but only as glorified, or as elevated through the light of glory," which we freely concede. Therefore Cajetan, an excellent Thomist, thus understood St. Thomas. But the Reverend Father should have told us whence he knows this; otherwise since we read something else, we understand something else. And granted that St. Thomas said only what the Franciscan Theologian intends, that would suffice to overturn his opinion and establish ours, as I shall soon prove.

Regarding Cajetan, he does not have even one word here indicating that this is the sense of the cited texts. It is indeed true that in the third part q. 1. a. 4. ad 2., from these words of St. Thomas: "Degrees in vision according to perfection are attended to more according to the order of grace than according to the order of nature," he thinks it is also attended to according to the order of nature, because the comparative supposes the positive. But in this Cajetan, otherwise an excellent Thomist, all other Thomists desert him, and they teach that "more" (magis) in St. Thomas's phrase is not taken comparatively but adversatively, or exclusively, so that it is the same as "rather" (potius). In which sense the Apostle said Heb. 11 of Moses: "Rather choosing to be afflicted with the people of God than to have the pleasure of sin for a time." And that this is the sense of the Holy Doctor is clear from the context itself, for there he repeats that the vision of the divine essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, and refers to what he said in this question in which we are engaged, where he clearly expresses this sense as we have seen.

Therefore now the Conclusion is proven from the principles laid down by St. Thomas himself. The faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created intellect according to its nature, but through the light of glory. Therefore the faculty of seeing God more perfectly does not belong to

the created intellect according to its more perfect nature, but through more perfect light of glory. Therefore where there is not more perfect light of glory, God cannot be seen more perfectly. Therefore the whole inequality of the beatific vision comes from the inequality of the light of glory alone. The antecedent is of faith and established from what has been said, nor is it denied by adversaries.

The consequence is proven: Therefore the faculty of seeing God does not belong to the created intellect according to its nature, because this vision is supernatural and exceeding all powers of nature. But more perfect vision is not less, indeed more supernatural and exceeding all powers of nature. Therefore if the faculty of seeing God is not according to nature, but through the light of glory alone, all the more so the faculty of seeing more perfectly.

This is confirmed: The whole diversity of the beatific vision must be reduced to virtue not radical and remote, but proximate and immediate, because remote virtue does not act except according to the proportion of proximate virtue by which it is elevated and modified. But the proximate and immediate virtue influencing the beatific vision is not the created intellect, but the light of glory. Therefore. The minor is proven: The light of glory is a supernatural habit. But supernatural habits differ from natural ones in this, that supernatural ones, although they suppose a radical principle in nature, nevertheless give the whole proximate power of operating supernatural acts and simply being able to do so. But natural habits only help the proximate natural potency, and give only easier ability. Therefore the light of glory is the whole proximate virtue influencing the beatific vision. But the intellect influences only remotely and radically, namely through elevation by the light of glory.

It is proven **2º.** from inconveniences: if the inequality of the blessed vision came partly from greater or lesser perspicacity of the created intellect, as adversaries wish, it would follow **1º.** that with equal merits remaining, one would see God more perfectly than another, namely he whose intellect was more perspicacious. But the consequence is false, as being against the reason of the reward of justice, indeed against the adversaries themselves who admit with us that the inequality of the blessed vision comes morally from the inequality of merits.

Father Henno responds: "The vision of God as it is from God rewarding and regards merits, is reward and prize, but not precisely insofar as it regards the intellect from which it proceeds, for as such it has only the nature of an effect." But on the contrary: This Response makes a show but says nothing. For either the vision of God, as it is from the intellect, adds something to the same vision as it is from God rewarding, or not. If the first, then the inequality of vision does not come from the inequality of merits, against the adversary himself and the truth of the matter. If the second, then that this vision is from the intellect contributes nothing to its inequality. Moreover, the vision of God even as it is from the intellect is glory and beatitude; for it is impossible for man to see God, however this vision may come about, and not be blessed. But all glory and

beatitude is according to faith reward and prize. Therefore again the given distinction is futile, which is even more blunted by the following absurdity.

Therefore it would follow **2º.** that some degree of glory would not correspond to grace but to nature, and man would distinguish himself in spiritual things through natural things. For the greater activity and perspicacity of the created intellect, since it is of the natural order, is a benefit of nature and not of grace. But this is against that of Scripture: "The grace of God is eternal life," and that: "Who distinguishes you?" Indeed, as Theologians note, it is more than Pelagian; for it is worse to say that glory is given according to the powers of nature, and that in it man distinguishes himself through natural things, than that grace is conferred from the merits of free will.

The praised Theologian responds that this supernatural degree of grace does not correspond to nature left to itself, but as elevated through the light of glory. But on the contrary: either that elevation through the light of glory is the total cause of this supernatural degree or not. If the first, we have our intent. If the second, then some supernatural degree, or at least something of its supernaturality (for it is entirely and wholly supernatural) corresponds to nature as nature.

Molina responds otherwise to the whole argument, namely that in the case of equal merit and unequal intellect, either God will give less light of glory to the more perspicacious intellect, or if he gives equal, he will deny his concurrence to the more perfect vision. But on the contrary: In both cases the Blessed whose intellect was more perspicacious would be deprived of something due to him and would be of worse condition in supernatural things than the other. For the light of glory, just as glory itself, is owed and given according to merits. For more, says St. Thomas cited above, will participate of the light of glory who has more charity. Therefore to one having equal merit is also owed with congruity equal light of glory. But where there is equal light of glory, equal help is owed, so that without a miracle, God could not deny it, just as he could not, without a miracle, subtract something of his concurrence lest fire heat according to its whole virtue. Therefore in both cases the Blessed would be deprived of something due to him.

Objections Are Solved

You object with Father Henno: Where more perfect light of glory concurs, there the beatific vision is more perfect, as adversaries admit. Therefore similarly the beatific vision is more perfect where a more perfect intellect concurs. The consequence is proven: Therefore the beatific vision is more perfect where there is more perfect light of glory, because it proceeds from a more perfect cause. But where there is a more perfect intellect, it also proceeds from a more perfect cause. Therefore.

I respond: I deny the consequence. To the proof, I distinguish the major: Therefore the beatific vision is more perfect where there is more perfect light of glory, because it proceeds from a more

perfect proximate and immediate cause, I concede; from a radical and remote cause, I deny. And to this sense with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. The solution is clear from the proofs of the Conclusion.

Also for greater explanation I otherwise distinguish the same major: Therefore the beatific vision is more perfect where there is more perfect light of glory, because it proceeds from a more perfect cause acting as it is more perfect, I concede the major. Otherwise, I deny the major. Similarly, I distinguish the minor: But the vision proceeding from a more perfect intellect proceeds from a more perfect cause, and that cause acts as it is more perfect naturally, I deny the minor; and acts as elevated and according to the measure of elevation only, I concede the minor; and I deny the consequence. Therefore the greater or lesser natural perspicacity of the intellect, with respect to this supernatural vision, is held only materially and accidentally, since it has the whole power and proportion of eliciting this act from the light of glory.

You object **2º.** with the same: The more the total cause grows in perfection, the more perfect effect it produces. But the total cause of the beatific vision are the intellect and the light of glory. Therefore where there is a more perfect intellect, the vision should be more perfect.

It can be responded with the solution already given by distinguishing the major: The more the total cause grows in proximate virtue, the more perfect effect it produces, I concede; if it grows only in remote virtue, I deny. And to this sense with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. But it is better to say that the intellect and light of glory are neither one total cause of the beatific vision, nor two partial ones, but two total ones under diverse aspects, as we have said before. The light of glory is the total cause elevating and proportioning the intellect to supernatural vision; the intellect is the total cause vitally eliciting through elevation the supernatural vision. Therefore however much the natural power of the intellect grows, it contributes nothing to the perfection of the vision, because it does not influence it according to its specific nature, or as they differ in species, but as they agree in the nature of obediential potency elevable through the light of glory.

You object **3º.** with the same: A potency having more perfect activity produces a more perfect effect, as is clear in visual potency and in others. But a more perfect intellect has more perfect activity. Therefore.

I respond: I distinguish the major: If it acts according to the measure of its natural activity, I concede the major; if it acts according to the measure of its elevation, I deny the major; and to this sense with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said.

You will insist: A more perfect eye with equal species or light sees the object more perfectly. Therefore also a more perfect intellect with equal light of glory.

I respond: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that the eye has from itself and naturally the proximate virtue on the part of the potency required for seeing the colored object. But the created intellect does not have it for seeing God except through the light of glory.

You will infer: Therefore the intellect is an instrument of the light of glory with respect to the beatific vision.

I respond: I deny the inference. Because it belongs to the nature of an instrument that it be moved by the principal cause, by motion passing beyond the adequate sphere of its activity, nor does it assimilate the effect to itself. But truly the intellect in the blessed vision does not act as moved by the light of glory by passing motion, but as elevated by a permanent form, which becomes its own and through which it acts as through its proper form, assimilating the effect to itself within the adequate sphere of its activity. Compare what I said a. 5. §. 5.

You object **4º.** A more perspicacious intellect with equal habit of faith elicits a more perfect act of faith, for it penetrates the mysteries of faith more perfectly. Therefore similarly with respect to the beatific vision.

I respond: I deny the antecedent and its proof. For the act of faith is supernatural assent to the mysteries of faith, whose perfection therefore is measured according to the supernatural habit of faith. But a more perfect intellect brings it about that the motives of credibility are better perceived; nor is it surprising because this perception is natural.

You object **5º.** The intellect in the vision of God acts as a vital potency; for this vision is a vital act. Therefore through powers intrinsic to itself, because vitality is from an intrinsic principle moving itself.

I respond: I distinguish the antecedent: The intellect in the vision of God acts as a natural vital potency, I deny the antecedent. As an elevated and supernatural vital potency, I concede the antecedent. For this vision is vital with vitality, so to speak, supernaturalized. Therefore to the consequence likewise, I distinguish: Therefore it acts through powers intrinsic to itself which are natural, I deny; supernatural, I concede. For although vitality of act requires that it proceed from an intrinsic principle moving itself, it is nevertheless not necessary that this principle be constituted proportioned and proximately active through virtue coming from within, but this virtue can come from without and elevate and proportion the vital principle, provided it does not take away from such principle that it can be self-moving.

You object **6º.** A more perspicacious intellect with equal light of glory can strive more to see God. But where there is greater striving, there is more perfect vision, because it should be proportioned to the striving. Therefore.

I respond: This argument proceeds from a perverted understanding of striving. For striving is not, as perhaps is imagined, something preceding the act as if applying the potency to it, but it is the very act as emanating from its principle. Therefore the same must be judged of striving toward vision as of the vision itself. And since the intellect cannot elicit this supernatural vision except through the light of glory as proximate cause and according to its measure, so neither can it strive toward it. Therefore the major of the argument must be denied. When therefore you hear that the Blessed is carried with all striving toward seeing God, understand it of striving which comes from greater light of glory, not from greater perfection of nature. For to act according to the whole measure of proximate potency is to act with all striving. Thus one who has charity to four degrees and elicits an act of love to 4 acts with all striving, however much his will may be naturally more perfect otherwise.

From what has been said you will gather that all beatific visions, whether of men or of Angels, are of the same essential species, because they have the same formal object, namely the divine essence, the same mode of tending toward it, namely without species, and the same proximate principle, namely the light of glory. Nor does it matter that the angelic and human intellect differ in species; for they do not influence according to their specific nature, or as they differ in species, but as they agree in the nature of obediential potency elevable through the light of glory.

You ask whether at least in the degree or perfection of the beatific vision, all the Blessed are not unequal?

I respond: Some think that all are unequal, because, they say, men are assumed to fill the seats of the apostate Angels. But all Angels are unequal in glory. The opposite nevertheless seems more probable, which is especially clear in children dying after Baptism before the use of reason. Also because just as it does not contradict that some are equal in merits, so also in glory.

ARTICLE IX. Whether the Blessed seeing God comprehend him, or can comprehend him, at least by God's absolute power?

That the Anomoeans had arrogantly claimed comprehension, and that the Holy Fathers had risen sharply against this, Chrysostom, Basil, both Gregories and others, we have already said art. 2. of this dissertation. Therefore that the Blessed do not in fact comprehend God is held by Catholic faith; but that they cannot absolutely comprehend him is the common opinion of Theologians against Vasquez. But they disagree in assigning the reason for this incomprehension, because they do not have one notion of comprehension. For the elucidation of this difficulty:

Note that spiritual comprehension (which is distinguished from bodily comprehension) is taken in two ways: **first** broadly as it is opposed to non-attainment and is the same as attainment and obtaining of the thing which is desired, even though it is not grasped through the whole or adequately. Thus, for example, bodily, someone is said to comprehend a thief when he catches

him, even if he does not hold the whole but a part. In this way it is of faith that God is comprehensible and is in fact comprehended by the Blessed, according to that of 1 Cor. 9: "So run that you may comprehend." And to Phil. 3: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend." The reason is that the Blessed attain and possess God through the blessed vision. Therefore they comprehend him with comprehension taken broadly; and therefore they are called Comprehensors.

Second comprehension is taken strictly according to which something is included in the comprehending. Hence strict comprehension, of which we speak here, is cognition of an object adequating, not in the nature of nature or being, but in the nature of cognition, the intrinsic cognoscibility of the object; so that through it the object is known as much as it is naturally cognoscible and from its proper merits, not only extensively but also intensively.

I explained: I said **1º.** Cognition adequating, not in the nature of nature or being, but in the nature of cognition the cognoscibility of the object: Because it is irrelevant to spiritual comprehension that cognition and the thing cognized be adequate in the nature of being, provided they are adequate in the nature of cognoscible and cognitive. Otherwise no substance however imperfect could be comprehended by any created cognition however perfect, because created cognition is an accident. Just as it is irrelevant to bodily comprehension whether the containing vessel is golden or iron, provided it contains the whole, or agrees in the nature of comprehension or capacity.

I said **2º.** Cognition adequating the intrinsic and natural cognoscibility of the object: Because a twofold cognoscibility of the object is distinguished; one intrinsic which is commensurated to the entitative perfection of the object to be known, as its property. For every being insofar as it is being is cognoscible, and this cognoscibility is as perfect as the intrinsic entity of the thing to which it follows is perfect. Nor is it attended to only according to those things which constitute the thing or are in it, but also according to extrinsic things which pertain to it, insofar as it can either make them or receive them from and in the order of its nature; that is, not only according to those things which it formally has, but also according to those things which it eminently or virtually contains. Extrinsic cognoscibility is that which is not commensurated to the perfection of the cognoscible object, according to those things which it contains both formally and eminently or virtually, but to the virtue of the cognitive potency, or to various respects to extrinsic things which can be made through that thing or received in it not from and in the order of its nature, but obedientially through an extrinsic agent.

Therefore the notion of comprehension as to these particles, denies one thing, affirms another: It denies that comprehension requires that the thing be known as much as it is cognoscible with extrinsic cognoscibility. And rightly; because if comprehension imported adequation with the extrinsic cognoscibility of the object, surely neither a fly nor an atom could be comprehended by a created intellect even angelic, because by it it could not be known so perfectly that it is not

infinitely more perfectly known by God according to extrinsic cognoscibility, namely as to the various and infinite effects which he can make through the obediential power of such a creature. And thus the prerogative of incomprehensibility which Scripture, Fathers and Theologians attribute to God alone, would belong to all and even the vilest things, which is an intolerable absurdity.

The other thing which this notion of comprehension affirms is that the intrinsic cognoscibility which comprehensive cognition must adequately meet is attended to not only according to those things which it formally has, but also according to those things which it eminently or virtually contains. Otherwise if it were known only according to those things which it formally has, it would not be known as much as it is from itself and from its proper merits cognoscible, if indeed it would still be as much as is from itself and from its proper cognoscible according to those things which it eminently or virtually contains.

When therefore we say that comprehension is cognition adequating the cognoscibility of the object, we understand not of extrinsic but intrinsic cognoscibility; so that the object is known by perfect and adequate cognition such that it does not demand a more perfect one from itself, nor is it naturally suited to move objectively to a more adequate one from its proper merits. And St. Thomas teaches both of these, when he says that thing is comprehended which is perfectly known, and that thing is perfectly known which is known as much as it is cognoscible, but each thing is cognoscible according as it is in act. Now being is in act according to those things which it contains both formally and eminently or virtually, but not according to those things which can be made in it or through it by an extrinsic agent according to its obediential power. Therefore the most wise Master Tournely undeservedly denies this notion of comprehension to St. Thomas and the Thomists.

But we do not make force in these particles only for the adequate notion of comprehension, but especially in the following. Hence I said **3º.** So that the object through it is known as much as it is naturally cognoscible, not only extensively, but also intensively; that is, not only are all the perfections which are contained in it known as to number, whether formally, or eminently or virtually, but also they are known as clearly, as distinctly, as perfectly, as much as this object from its nature and intrinsic perfection is cognoscible. Because the quantity of science or cognition is attended to not only according to the number of knowables, but also according to the clarity of cognition. Hence when some demonstrable proposition, for example, is known through some probable reason, there is nothing of it which is not known, neither subject, nor predicate, nor composition, for the whole is known, but the whole is not known as perfectly as it is cognoscible, because it is still cognoscible through demonstration, and therefore it is not comprehended. Hence Augustine Epist. 112. to Paulinus c. 9, defining comprehension says: "The whole is comprehended by seeing, which is so seen that nothing is hidden from the one seeing, or whose limits can be surveyed." For then the limits of something are surveyed when an end is reached in the mode of knowing that thing.

Therefore in these last particles we especially place comprehension.

With these things premised, I say: The Blessed seeing God do not comprehend him with comprehension properly so called, nor can they absolutely comprehend him.

Both parts are proven together by the authority of Scriptures, Fathers and Councils. Jer. 32: God is said to be "great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought." Rom. 11: "How incomprehensible are his judgments and unsearchable his ways." 1 Tim. 6: "He dwells in inaccessible light," not by vision, as has been proven above, therefore by comprehension. Chrysostom in homilies against the Anomoeans and others among whom Aug. Serm. 38. on the words of the Lord c. 3: "To touch God somewhat with the mind is great beatitude, but to comprehend him is altogether impossible." The Lateran Council under Innocent III, year 1204: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one only true God, eternal, immense, unchangeable and incomprehensible." It is reported, c. Firmiter. de SS. Trinit. and cap. We condemn the following from the same Council: "But we with the sacred approving Council believe and confess with Peter Lombard that there is one certain thing incomprehensible." But Peter or the Master of the Sentences holds with the other Theologians that God is altogether and absolutely incomprehensible. The Council of Basel Sess. 22, before it was dissolved by Eugene IV, condemned this proposition of Augustine of Rome: "The soul of Christ sees God as clearly and intensely as God sees himself," which censure Nicholas IV, Eugene's successor, approved.

Vasquez responds that these testimonies are to be understood of the incomprehensibility of God through the powers of nature. But on the contrary: **1º.** The Holy Fathers against the Anomoeans cannot be so understood, as is clear from their writings, nor St. Augustine, nor the Lateran Council, as is clear from the cited texts. **2º.** According to this interpretation of Vasquez, God would not be more incomprehensible than invisible, for he is also invisible naturally and visible supernaturally. But according to Scripture, Fathers and Councils, incomprehensibility says some special prerogative above invisibility; and while they assert that God is naturally invisible, they simultaneously admit that he is supernaturally visible, which they never say of incomprehensibility.

It is proven by reason. To comprehend God is to know him only extensively and intensively as much as he is cognoscible from his proper merits, or intrinsic cognoscibility. But the Blessed neither so know God, nor can absolutely so know him. Therefore. The major is clear from what has been noted. The minor is proven: God from his proper merits is infinitely cognoscible. But no created intellect, neither through itself nor through the light of glory, can know God infinitely. Therefore. The major and minor are proven together: The root both of cognoscibility and of cognitive virtue is immateriality and act, as we have said and will say, and is supposed from Philosophy. But God is supremely immaterial and most pure act; but no created intellect, whether through itself or through the light of glory, is supremely immaterial and most pure act, otherwise it itself or the light of glory would be God. Therefore.

Objections Are Resolved

Objections can be raised from the Apostle in **1** Philippians 3 and 1 Corinthians 9, which are anticipated in the preliminary notes. Furthermore, you object from the same 1 Corinthians 13: "Then I shall know even as I am known." But the Apostle was known by God comprehensively. Likewise, many Fathers—Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and others—say that God is comprehended by the blessed. And Isidore in chapter 1 on Exodus says: "The divinity and the humanity assumed are known to Him alone in their entirety." Therefore.

Response to the first: The word "as" (sicut) in the Apostle's words does not signify complete parity, but only some similarity, consisting in this: that just as God knew the Apostle immediately in Himself without a medium, so the Apostle will know God immediately and in Himself, and no longer through a mirror and in an enigma.

To the second: The Holy Fathers are to be understood concerning comprehension taken broadly, as we explained in the preliminary notes. **To the third:** Isidore does not understand by "entirely" comprehension, but the most excellent and greatest knowledge among essential ones according to established law. For the opposite has been condemned in the Council of Basel, as we have seen. More extensively on this argument in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

You object secondly: That is comprehended which is seen so totally that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, as Augustine says as cited before. But if God is seen through essence, He is seen totally and nothing of Him is hidden from the one seeing, since God is most simple. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major premise. That is comprehended which is seen so totally that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, both as to the number of knowable things and as to the mode and perfection of their visibility—I concede. As to the number of knowable things only—I deny. Otherwise: what is seen totally both extensively and intensively—I concede. What is seen totally extensively only—I deny. Again otherwise: What is seen totally and totaliter (completely)—I concede. What is seen totally but not totaliter—I deny. These come to the same thing and are clear from what was noted above at the end.

You will insist: The blessed see God totally and totaliter. Therefore. The antecedent is proved. And indeed that they see Him totally is conceded. It is proved that they also see Him totaliter: either totaliter refers to the mode of the one seeing or the mode of the thing seen. If the latter, whoever sees God through essence sees Him totaliter, because he sees Him as He is. If the former, he also sees totaliter, because he sees with all his power and all his effort. Therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I say that totaliter imports both modes—of the one seeing and of the thing seen—not absolutely but comparatively to each other. That is, it

imports the mode of the one seeing by comparison to the thing seen whose knowability it equals, so that then something is said to be seen totaliter when the mode of vision of the one seeing is as perfect as the mode of visibility of the thing seen. And in this way a created intellect does not see God totaliter, because God is infinitely visible, and a created intellect sees Him only in a finite mode.

You will reply: God as comprehensively knowable is contained within the adequate object of created intellect. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. God as comprehensively knowable by the divine intellect is contained within the adequate object of created intellect—I concede the antecedent. As comprehensively knowable by created intellect—I deny the antecedent. Therefore, a created intellect can know that God exists from Himself infinitely and comprehensively knowably, and also His very comprehension, just as it can know His other perfections. But it cannot itself know Him infinitely and comprehensively, just as someone can probably know that some proposition is demonstrable, although he does not know it demonstratively.

Some respond to the principal argument that the blessed do not comprehend God because, although they see Him totally as to those things which He formally contains, they do not see Him as to all those things which He eminently or virtually contains, because they do not see all possible creatures which are contained in Him as in a cause. We do not disapprove of this solution, but because it suffers many and serious objections, and ours which is of St. Thomas suffices, we adhere to it, and the more willingly because although for comprehension knowledge of God as to those things which He virtually contains would not be required, and knowledge as to those things which He formally contains would suffice, still we would rightly deny, according to the given solution, that the blessed comprehend Him or can comprehend Him. Because although they would know Him totally extensively, they would not know Him totally and intensively—that is, with that clear and perfect intensive knowledge with which He is knowable as to those things which He formally contains.

From what has been said, certain other objections are resolved which are noted in the preliminary remarks, which we therefore omit here.

ARTICLE X. On the Object of the Beatific Vision

A twofold object of the beatific vision is distinguished for this reason: One is primary and formal, which is seen by reason of itself, and this is God Himself. The other is secondary and material, which is seen by reason of the primary, and these are creatures. We will speak of both through various paragraphs.

§. I. What Do the Blessed See of God?

The essence, attributes, and persons. This is the common opinion against the Nominalists.

I say first: The blessed see all things that are contained formally and necessarily in God, I said "which are necessarily contained in God" because as for free decrees, although they see them as to the reality they have in God, they do not always see them as to their free determination toward creatures, concerning which more below.

It is proved first from that passage in 1 John 3: "When He appears, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is." But God is in Himself one, three, just, wise, omnipotent, etc. Likewise from the Council of Florence in the letters of Holy Union, where it is said that God one and three is seen by the blessed. Therefore.

It is proved secondly: The beatific vision corresponds to faith as its reward. Consequently, the blessed see in the fatherland what they believed on the way. But faith on the way concerns those things that pertain to essence, attributes, and persons. Therefore. Another fundamental reason taken from the prerogatives of this vision is proposed in the following conclusion.

You will say with the Nominalists: Attributes that express respect to creatures, such as omnipotence, knowledge, ideas, etc., cannot be known essentially unless their terms are known. But their terms are not known by the blessed. Therefore. The minor is proved: Their terms are infinite, namely all possible creatures. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the major. Attributes that express respect to creatures cannot be known essentially unless their formal and primary terms are known—I concede the major. Their material and secondary terms—I deny the major. And with this sense the minor is distinguished, I deny the consequence. Therefore, in order that such attributes be known essentially, it is not necessary that their material and secondary terms be known, which are all possible creatures in particular, but it suffices that their formal and primary terms be known, such as with respect to omnipotence the notion of creatable being as such, with respect to knowledge the notion of knowable being as such, etc. Just as, for example, for the essential knowledge of matter it is not necessary that all forms in particular which it can receive be known, but it suffices to know the notion of informative form as such.

You will insist: Attributes or at least ideas in God are infinite. Therefore.

Response: Neither ideas nor attributes in God are really plural but the most simple entity of God. Ideas are indeed said to be plural not in reality but only in reason, for they are nothing other than the divine nature known by God as diversely and infinitely participable.

Whether by God's absolute power it could happen that the blessed see God's essence without seeing the attributes or persons is a more celebrated question among theologians, agitated with greater heat than fruit, and which nevertheless, according to the custom of the school, I undertake to discuss.

For which:

I say secondly: It is contradictory for the divine essence to be seen by the blessed without attributes and persons, or attributes or persons without essence, or one attribute without another, or one person without another. This is the common opinion against the Scotists, whose foundation is the formal distinction which they fabricate between the divine essence, attributes, and persons. Few assent to the Scotists.

This is of St. Thomas, as is gathered from **II-II**, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3, where he says: "The supreme goodness of God according as it is understood in itself as it is seen by the blessed, cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons." And **III**, q. 3, a. 3: "The intellect relates to divine things in two ways: in one way so that it knows God as He is, and thus it is impossible that anything be circumscribed by the intellect from God, and that something else remain, because all that is in God is one, saving the distinction of persons." These words provide the foundation for the following proofs.

Therefore, the fundamental reason which theologians are accustomed to employ is taken from the threefold prerogative of such vision, and is thus proposed: The knowledge of God in the blessed is intuitive, essential, and beatific. But from this threefold consideration it is repugnant for the divine essence to be seen by the blessed without attributes, persons, etc. Therefore. The major is certain.

The first part of the minor is proved: It is of the nature of intuitive knowledge that it sees a thing as it exists in itself subsisting and existing on the part of reality according to everything that can fall under the object of such knowledge. For this reason it is called intuitive and by this it differs from abstractive knowledge. But God is in Himself on the part of reality one, three, just, merciful, wise, and all these things fall under the object of intellective knowledge. Therefore.

The second part of the minor is proved: It is of the nature of essential knowledge that it attains all things that pertain to the essence of the thing. But attributes and persons pertain to the essence of God as He is in Himself. For God is essentially just, merciful, etc. Likewise He is essentially Father, Son, etc., since both attributes and relations are essentially identified in the divine essence, as we saw above when discussing Scotus's distinction. Therefore.

The third part of the minor is proved: 1° Because knowledge insofar as it is beatific must be intuitive, as all confess. But, as has been proved, it is of the nature of intuitive vision of God that it sees the essence of God, attributes, and persons. Therefore. **2°** It is of the nature of vision

insofar as it is beatific that it perfectly satisfies and quiets the rational appetite of the blessed. But the blessed person seeing the divine essence rationally desires to see the attributes and persons. Therefore. The minor is proved: whoever sees some essence naturally desires to see its properties and the mode in which it subsists and exists. But attributes are like properties of God, and He exists in three persons. **3°** Because if, the essence of God being seen, something that is formally in God were hidden from the blessed, the supreme good would both be hidden and not hidden. It would not be hidden, because he would see the divine essence; it would be hidden because that which he would not see is also the supreme good, indistinct from the essence, as being pure act, and therefore actually containing formally every perfection.

The conclusion is confirmed: God is pure act lacking all composition and parts. Therefore it is contradictory for something of God to be seen clearly and intuitively, and not for the totality of what is in God to be seen. The consequence is proved: That something which would be seen would either be pure act or having potentiality. If having potentiality, it will be a created being and not God nor a divine perfection. If it be pure act, therefore it is seen as being from itself and containing every perfection, and thus the totality of what is in God is seen, because pure act is in potency to nothing, but actually contains every perfection. And thus it is the same thing clearly and intuitively to see one person or one attribute as it is in itself—that is, as pure act—and to see the totality of what is in God.

You see, as I warned, these reasons are founded on these few words of St. Thomas: that the blessed see God as He is, and that the totality of what is in God is one. You see furthermore that our conclusion proceeds concerning clear and intuitive vision of God as He is in Himself and in reality. Otherwise, understanding generally about vision or intellection, nothing prevents God from being seen or understood obscurely and imperfectly according to something and not according to the whole.

Objections Are Resolved

You object first: The vision of the divine essence in the blessed, without seeing attributes or persons, does not contradict either because it is beatific, or because it is intuitive, or because it is essential. Therefore it does not contradict for any reason. The first part of the antecedent is proved: The divine essence without persons remains still the supreme good and ultimate end, and thus a beatifying object. Therefore it does not contradict because it is beatific. The antecedent is proved: The divine essence does not have from relations that it be the supreme good and ultimate end, but from this: that it is pure act and being through essence, which is entirely from absolute essence. Therefore.

The second part of the first antecedent is proved: Some color can be seen intuitively without seeing all generic predicates, such as the common notion of quality, inherence, etc., which

nevertheless are identified with that color itself. Therefore it does not contradict because it is intuitive.

The third part of the first antecedent is proved: For there to be essential vision of some essence, its properties need not necessarily be known, since they are not of its formal concept. Therefore it does not contradict because it is essential. Thus Father Henno with other Scotists.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, I distinguish the antecedent with John of St. Thomas: The divine essence does not have from relations that it is the supreme good, and has this without them—I deny the antecedent. And does not have this without them—I concede the antecedent. For from the same principle from which it is the supreme good (namely because it is being from itself and pure act), from this it is infinitely fecund and communicable within, consequently three in persons. And since it is of the nature of vision as it is beatific that it see God as He is in Himself, as we have proved, it is contradictory that it see God without persons.

To the second proof, I deny the consequence. The disparity is that the common notion of quality or inherence and similar things are not objects of bodily sight. Hence it is not surprising if sight does not attain them. But the attributes of God and relations are no less objects of the blessed intellect than essence, since they are being and pure act, no differently than essence. Another disparity is that the object of bodily sight is something composite and potential. Hence it can be seen according to something without the whole being seen. But God is pure act lacking all potentiality and composition, hence it is repugnant for something of God to be seen clearly and intuitively without the totality of what is in God being seen, as has been said.

To the third proof, I respond: The divine attributes according as they are in reality are not properties of God, but His essential and constitutive predicates. For all things in God are one and simple pure act. But they are called properties only according to our mode of conceiving. As for relations, granted that they are not constitutive predicates of the divine essence, they are at least its terms and essential modes pertaining to His infinite eminence and fecundity. For they are predicated essentially of God and are identified in His very essence, as I said elsewhere. Consequently it is contradictory for God to be seen essentially as He is in Himself and in reality, and for all these things not to be seen.

You will insist first: Against the first solution. In that prior sign in which we conceive the Father before He generates the Son, we conceive Him as blessed. But for then the Son or Holy Spirit is not yet conceived to be. Therefore the divine essence alone is the object of beatitude.

I respond first with the common solution, distinguishing the minor: But for then the Son is not conceived to be, and yet He is—I concede the minor. He is not conceived nor is the Son—I deny the minor. For in the same instant in which the Father is, the Son and Holy Spirit are, since they are from eternity with the Father and have the same essence with Him. But that we conceive the first person to be before we conceive Him generating comes from the fact that we cannot

perfectly attain the mode of divine generation. Hence that instant is not an instant in which and of duration, but an instant from which and of origin, and thus on the part of reality the Father is not blessed without the Son and Holy Spirit.

I respond secondly with John of St. Thomas, distinguishing the same minor: But for then the Son is not conceived to be as a term spoken and produced through notional knowledge—I concede the minor. He is not conceived to be the Son as object known through essential knowledge—I deny the minor. For this knowledge of the Father is virtually twofold. For beatitude, essential knowledge of the Word suffices; notional or generative knowledge is not required, if indeed the Son and Holy Spirit are blessed and yet do not know the Father with notional and generative knowledge.

You will insist secondly: If the divine essence could not beatify precisely abstracted from persons, it would not be the supreme good. Therefore. The antecedent is proved: It is of the nature of the supreme good to beatify. Therefore.

Response: I deny the consequence. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: It is of the nature of the supreme good to beatify in the mode in which it is on the part of reality—I concede the antecedent. Otherwise than it is on the part of reality—I deny the antecedent. Because beatifying vision is intuitive of a thing as it is on the part of reality and satisfying of appetite, as has been said, which it would not be if it did not see God as He is in Himself and exists on the part of reality. Therefore, that the divine essence without persons cannot beatify does not come from imperfection, but from His supreme simplicity and purity by which He essentially identifies persons to Himself in reality.

You will insist thirdly: God creates as one and not as three. Therefore He beatifies as one and not as three.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that creative action pertains to divine power, which belongs to God by reason of essence, and under this title is common to the three persons. Hence the nature of person contributes nothing to active influence, but is only concomitant. But beatific vision regards God as He is in Himself and in reality. But God in Himself and in reality is one and three.

You object secondly: Virtual distinction suffices so that the divine essence is communicated to the Son and not Paternity. Likewise so that the person of the Son is communicated to humanity and not the person of the Father. Likewise so that humanity is immediately united to the person of the Word and not to nature. Therefore all the more so that essence be seen without persons, or one person without another, because greater precision is usually made by intellect than by communication.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that vision of God in the blessed, since it is intuitive, essential, and beatific, as has been said, must see God as He is in Himself according to all things that identify themselves to Him. But God is in Himself and in reality three in persons. But communication does not necessarily occur of the thing according to all things that essentially identify themselves to it, but according to the capacity or requirement of the term to which it is communicated. Moreover, the Son, although capable of the divine essence, is not however capable of paternity, because as such He is relatively opposed to it. But the humanity of Christ does not require to subsist through three subsistences; hence it is not surprising if the person of the Son is communicated to it, with the other persons not being communicated. Finally, the same humanity is united to the Word so that it subsists through Him; for which it is not required that it be immediately united to nature, but it suffices that it be immediately united to person. Therefore the divine essence, as virtually distinct from paternity, is communicated to the Son, who from elsewhere is incapable of paternity. The person of the Son, as really distinct from the person of the Father, is communicated to humanity. And the person of the Son again, as virtually distinct from nature, is communicated immediately to humanity. But both the divine essence and persons are seen by the blessed, not as virtually or really distinct, but as they are in themselves and in reality.

You will insist: The divine essence can be perfectly understood without the Father or Son being understood. Therefore. The antecedent is proved: The divine essence has its intelligibility formally distinct from paternity or filiation. Therefore.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the antecedent. Because both essence and persons are intelligible and visible to the blessed through one divine essence playing the role of intelligible species with respect to all things that are in God.

You will urge: It does not contradict that the divine essence represent itself alone to the intellect of the blessed, with persons not being represented. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. It does not contradict, etc., in obscure and imperfect vision—let the antecedent pass. In intuitive, essential, and beatific vision such as the blessed have—I deny the antecedent. This is clear from what has been said.

You will reply: Persons and attributes are only the secondary object of beatific vision. But it does not contradict for the primary object to be seen without the secondary being seen. Therefore.

Cajetan, Sylvester, and certain others respond by denying the major. For they contend that from essence and persons one primary object of blessed vision is integrated, and it does not hinder that deity is that by which God is understood or seen. For they say that that by which and that which are not two objects of which one is primary, the other secondary, but from both one is as it were integrated. Thus, for example, the primary object of angelic knowledge is not his essence alone,

but the angel himself. Thus if God existed in only one person or supposit, the primary object of blessed vision would not be deity alone, but also this God or that supposit in which He would exist. So similarly the primary object of blessed vision is not deity only, but deity subsisting in three persons.

Others respond, granting the major, by distinguishing the minor: It does not contradict for the primary object to be seen without the secondary, if the secondary is not necessarily connected with the primary—I concede the minor. Otherwise—I deny the minor. Moreover, in the subject matter, the divine essence, since it essentially identifies persons and attributes to itself, has necessary connection with them, hence it cannot be seen as it is in itself without them.

Both solutions are good.

You will reply: Essence is something absolute, person something relative. But the absolute can be known without the relative, since it does not depend on it. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the minor. The absolute can be known without the relative in created things—I concede the minor. In divine things—I deny the minor, understanding this of intuitive and essential knowledge. The disparity is that in divine things absolute and relative are really and essentially identified without any distinction from the nature of the thing, otherwise in created things. Nor does it follow from this that essence depends on persons, but only that it is intrinsically connected with them.

§. II. Whether Those Seeing God See All Things That God Does and Can Do?

Note that creatures can be seen in the Word in two ways: **Formally** when they are seen by the same vision and the same light by which the Word itself is seen, so however that the Word is the proximate reason for seeing creatures, and thus seen in itself as medium leads to knowledge of creatures. **Causally** creatures are said to be seen in the Word when they are not seen by the very vision nor by the very light by which the Word is seen, but through special revelation or infused species outside the Word, communicated however by virtue of the state of beatitude or by the intuition and by reason of beatific vision, whence this vision is called causal in the Word—improperly indeed in the Word, if indeed it be properly outside the Word. Augustine calls the former knowledge Matutinal (morning), the latter Vespertinal (evening).

The question therefore is **1°** What do the blessed see of creatures? **2°** How do they see them—formally in the Word or causally? We will resolve the first question in this paragraph, the second in the following paragraph.

I say first: The blessed do not see all things that God does and can do. This is the common opinion.

It is proved first from Scripture. No one, whether angel or blessed, knows the day of judgment (Matthew 24). The angel of the Persians and the angel of the Jews were ignorant of God's will concerning the liberation of the Jews (Daniel 10). Therefore.

It is proved secondly: If the blessed saw all things that God does and can do, they would see them either in the Word or outside the Word. Not the first, because they would comprehend God, as we will prove below. Not the second, because there is no reason why God would reveal all things past, present, future, and possible to the blessed, since knowledge of all these things is not required for their beatitude. Add that according to a probable opinion, infinite created light would be required for this, as we will say below.

I say secondly: The blessed see of creatures past, present, and future whatever specially and particularly concerns them. This is commonly held with the Author.

It is proved first: The Council commonly called Senonense, but more properly called Parisian from the place where it was celebrated in the year 1528, in the decrees of faith chapter 13 says: "To the blessed is open... that omniform mirror of divinity in which whatever concerns them shines forth." The Holy Fathers agree, as will be clear from what follows.

It is proved secondly: Beatitude must perfectly satisfy every just and honest desire of the blessed. But the blessed justly and honestly desire to know those things that specially concern them. Therefore.

But to assign in particular what specially concerns the blessed is not easy. For which, theologians commonly observe that a blessed person can be considered in three ways: **1°** As elevated to the order of grace. **2°** As part of the universe. **3°** As such a public or private person—for instance, Pope, King, Founder of Religion, Paterfamilias, etc.—and they judge that he sees all those things that according to the requirement of this threefold status specially concern him.

Hence, from the **first** consideration, insofar as he is elevated to the order of grace, he sees the mysteries of faith which he believed on the way—namely of Incarnation, Resurrection, Redemption, light of glory, grace, predestination, etc.—and especially because beatific vision succeeds faith and is its reward according to that passage in Psalm 47: "As we have heard, so we have seen in the city of the Lord of hosts." And that of Augustine in book 20 of the City of God, chapter 21: "There we shall see God and all those things which now we do not see, but believing... we think." Add that everyone desires to see what he believes. It is not however necessary that they see those mysteries as to all circumstances of place and time, as is clear concerning the day of judgment which not even angels know, and concerning the time and various other circumstances of the Incarnation which angels knew only with the succession of time, although they knew that immediately as to substance. Nor is it necessary that they see all individuals in which those mysteries and the order of grace are completed, if there are many, for this does not seem required for beatitude—otherwise if there were one unique one or several

special ones like the humanity of Christ, the blessed Virgin with respect to the Incarnation. Hence although they know the mystery of the Eucharist, they do not see all consecrated hosts; although they know the mystery of Resurrection, they do not see or will see all who will rise, especially the damned. For concerning the truly blessed, it is more probable that all see themselves and each other's thoughts mutually and love each other as sharers of the same beatitude.

From the **second** consideration, insofar as the blessed person is part of the universe, he sees all genera and species of things, consequently all angels, because all, according to St. Thomas, differ in species. Likewise the principal parts of the universe—heaven, elements, stars, and other similar things which per se and principally pertain to the ornament and integrity of the world. Hence St. Bernard in his sermon on the triple kind of goods, number 7, exclaims: "O wisdom by which then we shall most perfectly know all things that are in heaven and on earth, drinking knowledge of all things in the very fountain of wisdom." As for individuals and singulars which have been, are, or will be done among us, likewise secrets of hearts, he sees some—namely those which are necessary for knowledge of species, or which concern him, as I will say now—not however all, because since they are not principal parts of the universe, nor intended per se, but for the conservation of species, nor under another special title as I suppose concern him, it would be more of curiosity than reason to desire their vision.

From the **third** consideration, the blessed see all or at least the principal things that pertain to their state, whether they be free acts or necessary, whether natural or supernatural, whether they happen in this life or in the other. Thus St. Peter and probably also the Pope see what pertains to the whole Church, a King to his Kingdom, a Patriarch of Religion to his Religion, a Paterfamilias to his family, etc. Likewise they see all prayers that are directed to them, since these specially concern them as intercessors. Hence it happens that the most blessed Virgin knows far more than other Saints, especially as to prayers and thoughts of men, because since she is their special advocate, she must know their state in many things so that she can opportunely help them. It does not seem however that she knows all thoughts or free acts of men, since these do not specially concern her, and this is the privilege of Christ, who since He is constituted Judge of all men, must know all who are to be judged—all and each of their acts and thoughts with all circumstances.

As for the free decrees of God according to the defectible determination they have toward creatures, the blessed know some, not all, because only some and not all specially concern their state and reasonable consolation.

I said "free decrees of God according to the determination they have toward creatures" because if they are considered according to the reality they have in God, since thus they are God Himself, it is certain that the blessed know them all, just as they know other things that are formally in God, as we noted above.

As for possible things, I will speak now.

You will say first: From what has been said it follows that a less holy person could be more blessed than another more holy one, if namely more things pertain to his state than to the state of the more holy one. The consequent seems absurd. Therefore. The consequence is proved: the more perfect is beatific vision, the more creatures are seen in the Word. Therefore.

Response: I deny the consequence. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: Beatific vision is more perfect the more creatures are seen in the Word by virtue of the light of glory as penetrating the divine essence—I concede the antecedent. By virtue of the light of glory as having power to manifest through revelation like prophetic light, or through infused species outside the Word—I deny the antecedent. But by this latter mode the blessed can see more creatures, and this vision of more does not argue greater essential beatitude. Add that God could compensate these more things seen by a lesser saint in a greater one through vision of more other things.

You will say secondly: The angel of the Persians and the angel of the Jews (Daniel 10) were ignorant of things concerning them, namely the future disposition of the peoples committed to them. Therefore the blessed do not see whatever specially concerns them.

Response: I deny the consequence in the sense of the conclusion. For it is to be understood concerning things concerning the blessed principally or as to substance, and not concerning all singular circumstances, especially concerning all reasons of divine counsel regarding them.

I say thirdly: The blessed see possible creatures—not all, but some, and so many more as beatific vision is more perfect. This is common with the Author.

The first part, that they do not see all possible creatures, is clear from the first conclusion.

The second part is proved: God seeing Himself comprehensively sees in Himself all possible creatures. Therefore the blessed seeing God essentially see in Him some possible creatures.

The third part is proved: The more perfectly a cause is penetrated, the more possible effects from it are known, just as one who more perfectly knows some principle knows the more conclusions deducible from it. Therefore the more perfect is the vision of God who is the cause of all things, the more possible effects are known in Him. These reasons, as you see, suppose that creatures are seen in God formally as in a cause, concerning which in the following paragraph.

§. III. How Do the Blessed See Creatures in God?

Note the twofold vision in the Word—formal and causal—concerning which in the chapter of the preceding paragraph.

Note furthermore that a twofold medium of knowledge is distinguished: one which, being first known as that which, leads to knowledge of another, and is called medium in which. Thus premises are with respect to conclusion, cause with respect to effect, effect with respect to cause, sign with respect to what is signified. The other is that which makes known without being first known as that which, but only by representing the object. Thus is the impressed species which should not be first known as that which, but is only the reason for representing the object: it is called unknown medium or medium by which.

Note again that a twofold being of creatures is distinguished: one in God which is eminential, and that is God Himself insofar as He eminently contains creatures; the other proper and formal which creatures have in themselves if they exist, or can have if they are possible.

The question is therefore whether the creatures which the blessed see, they see in the Word formally or only causally. Likewise, if formally in the Word, whether in it as in an unknown medium by which, or as in a medium which, being first known as effect in cause and as to proper and formal being?

For which:

I say first: The blessed see some creatures in the Word formally, some causally or outside the Word by virtue of the state of beatitude—all as to their proper and formal being. This is the Author's opinion in several places to be designated below.

The first and second parts are of St. Augustine in book 4 of Genesis according to the letter, chapter 23, where he distinguishes in angels a twofold knowledge: one matutinal by which they know creatures in the Word, the other vespertinal by which they know them outside the Word.

The first and third parts are proved: The knowledge of the blessed is exemplified from the knowledge by which God knows Himself. For it is its participation and imitation by which we are like Him according to Scripture (John 3). But God knowing Himself knows in Himself creatures according to their formal being, as we will prove more fully later. Therefore the blessed seeing God see in Him creatures according to their formal being—not indeed all because they do not comprehend Him as He comprehends Himself, but more or fewer according to the measure of the light of glory and the disposition of divine will, as I will say below. Add for the third part that if the blessed did not see creatures except according to the eminential being which they have in God, they would not properly see them, since that eminential being is nothing other than God Himself. A long series of testimonies from St. Thomas can be seen in Sylvester here, article 9.

The second part is proved: Those things which the blessed know in the Word formally, they know simultaneously from the beginning and not successively, as being by one intuition and one species, as I will say below. But the blessed did not know some things simultaneously from the beginning but successively. Thus in Daniel 10, the angel of the Persians and the angel of the

Jews were ignorant of the liberation of the Jews, for which reason they contended—not indeed by contrariety of wills, says St. Thomas, but of things. Thus no one of the blessed now knows the day of judgment which later he will know, as I already said. Thus angels did not know from the beginning certain circumstances of Christ's passion which they later knew. Therefore.

I say secondly: The blessed see creatures in the Word not as in a medium by which or species immediately representing them, but as in a medium in which, being first known, or as in an efficient and exemplar cause. So that God known under the aspect of cause is the medium leading to knowledge of creatures, in the way that now through cause we know effect, with this difference that the notion of cause and effect in heaven is had by one intuition or act because of the perfection of the light of glory and unity of species.

Both parts are proved simultaneously: Creatures are known in the divine essence in the way they are represented in it. But the divine essence as playing the role of species with respect to the intellect of the blessed does not represent creatures immediately but itself, and in itself as in efficient and exemplar or ideal cause—creatures. Therefore.

The minor is proved first: If the divine essence represented equally and equally primarily itself and creatures, God would not be more in intelligible being than creature, which is absurd. **Secondly:** Immediate representation of one through another occurs by reason either of likeness or identity. But the divine essence is infinitely dissimilar to creatures, nor is it identified with them, but contains them eminentially as cause. Therefore.

It is proved secondly: The knowledge of the blessed, as I was just saying, is exemplified from the knowledge by which God knows Himself. But God knowing Himself knows in Himself creatures not as in a species immediately representing them, but as in a cause virtually and eminentially containing them, as we will say more fully below. Therefore.

Augustine supports this in book 11 of the City of God, chapter 7, saying: "Knowledge of creature in itself is more colorless, so to speak, than when it is known in God's wisdom as in the art by which it was made."

You will say first: If the blessed saw some creatures in the Word, they would see all. But the consequent is false. Therefore. The consequence is proved: there is no reason why one should be seen rather than another, since all are equally contained in the divine essence as in cause. Therefore.

Response: I deny the consequence. To the proof, I deny it and assign reasons why some creatures are seen in the Word and not others nor all. The first is from the part of power, namely the light of glory, which since it is finite, does not confer power to see all things, but more or fewer according as it is more or less intense. The other is from the part of object, namely the divine essence as it is intelligible species, which although it is representative of all things,

actually represents only as many as the intellect has power to know according to the measure of the light of glory. But the reason why it represents these rather than those is the good pleasure of divine will. For the divine essence is not necessarily representative of creatures in itself as in efficient and exemplar cause, but freely and according to its will it represents what it wills and to whom it wills. Hence just as freely and according to good pleasure it uses its omnipotence for producing these rather than those, so freely and according to good pleasure it uses its essence as intelligible species for representing these rather than those to these rather than those, so however that they do not exceed the power of the light of glory. But we rightly presume that it wills to represent to each one what specially and principally concerns him, as we said.

You will say secondly: The divine essence is entirely absolute and independent from creatures nor does it refer to any from itself. Therefore it cannot be a medium in which, being known, creatures are known.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. The divine essence is absolute from creatures and nevertheless contains them eminently as cause—I concede the antecedent. And does not contain them eminently—I deny the antecedent, and the consequence. For in order that something be the reason for knowing another, it is not necessary that it have a properly called relation to it, for neither is one relative the reason for knowing the correlative, since they are simultaneous by nature and knowledge, but it suffices that one contain the other, and thus between them there be connection of producer and produced.

You will object: But the divine essence does not contain the totality of what is in creatures. Therefore. The objection is proved: It does not contain that by which creatures are distinguished from God. Therefore.

Response: I deny the objection. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: The divine essence does not contain formally that by which creatures are distinguished from God—I concede the antecedent. It does not contain eminently—I subdivide: It does not contain as to the negative—I concede; as to the positive—I deny. For the entire positive that imports that by which creatures are distinguished from God is in Him virtually and eminently. And to anticipate an objection: in order that creatures be known in God according to their formal being, it is not necessary that they be contained in God formally, because knowledge does not stop at the mode of being which they have in God, but extends to that which they have or can have in themselves. Hence although from the part of medium they are known in another, from the part of object nevertheless they are known as they are in themselves, as we will say more fully below concerning God's knowledge.

You will say thirdly: The blessed do not see in the Word the free decrees of God. Therefore neither creatures of which God is cause only through His free decrees.

The antecedent is proved first: Because free acts of our will are not known from essential knowledge, indeed not even from comprehensive knowledge of our will. Hence angels who

comprehend it do not know our thoughts, according to that passage 1 Corinthians 2: "For who among men knows (the same is said of angels) the things of man, except the spirit of man which is in him?" **Secondly:** Because the free decrees of God do not have necessary connection with the divine essence, for they could not be. But when a predicate does not have necessary connection with subject, the predicate cannot be known from knowledge of subject. Therefore.

Response: The free decrees of God as to their defectible determination toward creatures, concerning which is the question, are known by the blessed in the Word in the way the very creatures are known which are their terms—namely by virtue of the light of glory and by the very beatific vision, not absolutely and necessarily, but supposing as condition the law and will of God by which He wills to manifest them to the blessed, as I said in the solution of the first argument, which manifestation is a certain revelation, not outside the Word but made in the Word itself. Just as angel A by the same knowledge by which he knows the substance of angel B also knows his free concepts, by this very fact that angel B orders and wills them to be manifest to angel A, and by the same reason removes the moral concealment which internal thought has from the fact that it is free. Therefore the free decrees of God are not known by the blessed in the Word because they have necessary connection with the divine essence, but because they are in God and from His will manifested to those having by virtue of the light of glory sufficient power for seeing them. And thus the response to objections is clear. We will treat this matter more accurately with various other objections at question 14 concerning God's knowledge and in the Treatise on the Incarnation, where we discuss the blessed knowledge of Christ.

§. IV. Whether It Is Contradictory That All Things Which God Does and Can Do Be Known by the Blessed?

I say first: It is contradictory that all things which God does and can do be known by the blessed formally in the Word as in cause according to all their possible relations, modes, and aspects.

It is proved: To know in a cause all possible effects according to all their modes and aspects by virtue of knowledge of the cause is to comprehend that very cause. But it is contradictory for God to be comprehended by the blessed, as has been proved. Therefore.

The major is proved: To know all possible effects by virtue of knowledge and penetration of cause is to know how far the cause can extend and not beyond. Therefore it is to know it adequately as much as it is knowable, and thus to comprehend it.

You will say first: From this follows only extensive comprehension of God, which does not repugn, not however intensive.

Response: I deny the assumption. For it is contradictory that all possible things as to all their modes and aspects (for these too are possible) be known in the divine essence, so that it be the

reason for knowing them, without it being utterly penetrated and known as much as it is penetrable and knowable intensively, so that it not be penetrated and known more intensively and better even by God. Otherwise its knowledge would be false, since beyond all possible things nothing remains except the impossible. Just as it is contradictory that all conclusions whatsoever virtually contained in some principle be known in it and that it not be known as much as it is intensively knowable.

You will insist: The blessed know the Son and Holy Spirit, who are the adequate term of the Father's generative power, and yet they do not comprehend it. Likewise the soul of Christ sees in the Word all things that God knows through the knowledge of vision, and yet does not comprehend it. Therefore similarly.

Response: I deny the consequence. To the first, the disparity is that the blessed do not know all modes and eminences of the Son and Holy Spirit, just as a blessed person would know all modes and perfections of all possible things. Hence the blessed seeing the Son and Holy Spirit do not see the adequate term of generative power; but knowing all possible things they would know the adequate term of omnipotence. To the second, the disparity is that all existing and future things are not the adequate term of the knowledge of vision, because God could produce and see more; but all possible things are the adequate term of omnipotence.

You will say secondly: St. Gregory in book 4 of Dialogues, chapter 33: "What is there that they do not see, who see Him who sees all things?" Therefore.

Response: St. Gregory speaks as to the sufficiency of object, namely God, which as much as is in itself sufficiently contains all things. It does not follow however that one seeing God knows all things, because he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

You will say thirdly: One who understands what is greater can understand what is less. But all things that God does and can do are less than His essence. Therefore.

Response: Although it is greater to see God than all other things, nevertheless it is greater to see God so that all things are known in Him than to see Him so that not all but fewer or more are known in Him. For it has been shown that the multitude of things known in God follows from the mode of seeing Him more or less perfectly.

I say secondly: It is probable that it does not contradict that all possible things be known by the blessed outside the Word.

It is proved: If it contradicted, it would be either because the essence of God would be comprehended or because cognition would be infinite. But it does not contradict for either reason. Therefore.

The minor is proved for the first part: From the fact that all possible things would be known outside the divine essence, its comprehension would not follow, because the divine essence is knowable as cause of all things, but it would not thus be known. Therefore it would not be known as much as it is knowable, and thus would not be comprehended, but then it would only be known as cause of all things a posteriori through effects and not in itself.

The minor is proved for the second part: Knowledge is called infinite from the infinity of its primary object. But the primary object of knowledge is essence or quiddity. If therefore the object be not infinite in essence but in another genus—say quantity—the knowledge will not therefore be infinite. But all possible things, even if they were infinite in multitude, would nevertheless be finite in essence or quiddity, for they would be enclosed under a certain genus and difference. And granted that something were infinite according to essence, it would be known in a finite mode just like God, which does not argue infinite knowledge.

You ask whether it is absolutely impossible for God to be seen as He is in Himself with no creature seen in Him?

Response: It is absolutely impossible for God to be seen as He is in Himself without creatures being seen in Him according to the common notion of creatable being. Because God cannot be seen as He is in Himself without His omnipotence and eminential containing of creatures being seen, which it is contradictory to know without the notion of creatable being being seen.

It does not seem however absolutely impossible for God as He is in Himself to be known with no creature in particular being seen in Him. Because the essence of God is entirely absolute and independent from any creature in particular, for He could have created none. Therefore it does not contradict that He be seen with no creature in particular being seen, provided the notion of creatable being in common be seen, just as it does not contradict to know essentially a created power—say visual power—without my knowing any colored thing in particular, provided I know in common the notion of the colored. Add that creatures are only the secondary object of beatific vision. But it does not contradict for the primary object to be seen without the secondary.

And therefore St. Thomas said that if God alone were seen, who is the source and principle of all being and truth, He would so fulfill the natural desire of knowing that nothing else would be sought, and one seeing God would be blessed. Hence when in question 8 of Truth, article 4, ad 13, he seems to suppose this to be impossible, the most learned Sylvester judges that the Holy Doctor is to be understood concerning the impossible according to ordinary law and the present state, not concerning the impossible according to absolute power, since here he repeats the same things absolutely without the said clause.

If you say that a blessed person would at least see himself in God, since he would see and possess Him as his ultimate end:

The praised Sylvester responds that the resolution is to be understood under exception of the one seeing and his vision, in this sense namely that it is not impossible for God to be seen with no creature seen which is not the very one seeing or his vision.

However, Serra judges that this exception is not necessary, and that a blessed person can see God without seeing by that very vision in particular that God is his ultimate end, but it suffices for quieting him that by that very vision he see that God is the end of every creature, and by another vision outside the Word he know that God is his ultimate end in particular.

ARTICLE XI

Certain minor difficulties are resolved to complete the question of St. Thomas

I. It is asked whether those things which the Blessed see, they see through any likenesses?

Response under distinction: Those things which are seen in the Word formally are not seen through likenesses or proper species, but through the very essence of God by which God is seen, because they are not seen in their proper natures, but in God in whom their exemplar or ideal and efficient likeness pre-exists. But those things which are seen in the Word causally or rather outside the Word, are seen through proper species or likenesses for the opposite reason.

II. It is asked whether those things which the Blessed see in God, they see all at once from the beginning?

Response under the same distinction: Those things which are seen in the Word formally are seen simultaneously; because all things are seen by one act through one species entirely invariable both in representing and in being, namely through the essence of God. Hence Augustine in the last book *De Trinitate* chapter 16 at the end says: "Our thoughts will not be rolling, going from one thing to another and returning, but we shall see all our knowledge in one simultaneous view."

But those things which are seen in the Word causally through proper and diverse species are not seen simultaneously from the beginning but successively, for the opposite reason. And in this latter way it is most probable that the Blessed know prayers poured out to them; because if they saw simultaneously from the beginning all prayers of all people to be poured out to them in the Word formally, they would already know the day of judgment; because they would know who will be the last men to invoke them, what their last prayers will be, how ardent they will be in the very time of the world's conflagration, etc.

III. It is asked what is the measure of the beatific vision?

Response: The beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. This is proved: The beatific vision is measured neither by time, nor by aeviternity, nor by essential eternity: Therefore by participated eternity. The consequence is clear, because there are no other measures of the duration of things.

The antecedent is proved: Time is the measure of the duration of a thing successive and variable according to being and operation; aeviternity is the measure of a thing invariable according to being, variable according to operation; essential eternity is the measure of a thing invariable according to being and operation both intrinsically and extrinsically. But the blessed vision is in no way successive or variable from intrinsic principles; both because it is totally simultaneous, and because its principles, namely the light of glory and the divine essence serving in place of species, are not subject to succession or variation; it is however variable from the extrinsic, for just as it began to be, so it can cease, with God suspending His concurrence; indeed just as it is diverse in diverse subjects, so nothing prevents that by God's absolute power it might be diminished or increased in the same subject: Therefore.

IV. It is asked whether creatures are seen in God as in a mirror?

Response: This is sometimes affirmed by St. Thomas; but it must be understood of a mirror metaphorically and in a qualified sense, namely insofar as the divine essence represents creatures, which a mirror does; but not of a mirror simply and properly speaking: Because a mirror properly speaking receives species from things, not so God.

V. It is asked whether we can know God through natural reason in this life?

Response: We cannot through natural reason, whose knowledge arises from sensible things, know the essence of God, or what He is (quoad quid est); we can however know that He is (quoad an est) and that He is the first cause of all things. This is clear from what has been said here and elsewhere about the existence of God.

VI. It is asked whether the knowledge which is had of God through grace is more perfect and higher than that which is had through natural reason?

Response: Affirmatively: Because the natural light of the intellect is strengthened through the infusion of gratuitous light and sometimes phantasms are formed divinely in man's imagination which more express divine things. Concerning the time when the saints are given the beatific vision, we will speak in Book 1, Part 2, when treating of the ultimate end.

ARTICLE XII

On the Names of God

Since those things which St. Thomas teaches in the 12 articles of question 13 are treated sparingly in the schools, we will briefly resolve the principal points through certain small questions.

I. It is asked whether any name can be imposed on God which signifies Him as He is?

Response: No possible creature can impose on God a name which signifies Him adequately and comprehensively; however, Angels and the Blessed, but not wayfarers, can impose a name which signifies Him quantitatively. Finally, wayfarers can impose many names on Him which imperfectly signify His diverse perfections.

This entire response is proved by this reason founded in philosophy: that names do not signify things except through the concept of the one imposing or speaking, for they are signs and expressions of his concepts, and therefore he lies who speaks contrary to his mind: Therefore names spoken or imposed by someone signify the quiddity of a thing only as much and no more than he conceives it.

I add: But no possible creature can adequately and comprehensively know God: Angels and the Blessed however know Him quidditatively, but not wayfarers; wayfarers finally know Him and His various perfections imperfectly from creatures: Therefore.

From this you will gather **1st:** God is said to be ineffable, not because no discourse can be had about Him, or no name can be imposed on Him by creatures; but because no creature can impose a name comprehensive of His nature, nor wayfarers any name that perfectly signifies His quiddity in the sense of the first and second parts of the response.

You will gather **2nd:** That God can be known by us in a threefold way. **1st:** By the way of removal when we remove the imperfections of creatures from Him. **2nd:** By the way of collection, when we collect all perfections scattered in effects in Him as in the cause of all. **3rd:** By the way of excess when we attribute all perfections of creatures to Him in a more eminent manner. According to this threefold manner of knowing God we attribute three genera of names to Him.

According to the first mode, we call Him infinite, incorporeal, immaterial, immutable, impeccable, incomprehensible, etc. According to the second mode, we name Him omnipotent, first cause, provider, general governor, etc. According to the third mode we call Him super-substantial, super-excellent, super-beautiful, super-good, etc.

II. It is asked what are the principal names of God?

Response: There are three: namely, God, He Who Is, Jehovah or Jehova. Because these three names more properly than others signify the divine nature, though not in the same way. God signifies the divine nature simply, or as intelligent; He Who Is, as subsisting; Jehovah, as incommunicable and singular, as if "this God."

Moreover this name Jehovah, called the Tetragrammaton or Four-letter word because it consists of four letters, Yod, he, vau, he, was so sacred and venerable among the Hebrews, because they believed it to be proper and essential, that they never or rarely pronounced it; but when it occurred in reading, in place of it, from the custom received from their ancestors, they ordinarily used Adonai, which signifies Lord.

Besides these three assigned names, there are many other names of lesser note imposed on God among the Hebrews which Dionysius, Jerome and others relate. Gonet observes something noteworthy: that among almost all peoples the name of God is a Tetragrammaton, or consisting of four letters: Thus among the Hebrews Jehovah, among the Greeks Theos, among the Latins Deus, among the French Dieu, among the Italians Iddio, among the Spanish Dios, among the Germans, English and Flemish Goth or Goët, among the Egyptians Theu, among the Persians Syre, among the Magi Orsi, among the Armenians Vors, among the Arabs and Turks Allah.

III. It is asked whether all names said of God are synonymous?

Response: Negatively. This is proved **1st:** Synonymous names are those which signify the same thing and under the same aspect, or the same concept; like sword, blade, garment, clothing. For since names signify a thing through a concept, the first signified is the concept, the ultimate is the thing itself, consequently when several names signify the same thing under diverse concepts or aspects, they do not have the same signification at least first and immediate. But although several names of God signify the same thing, they nevertheless signify it under diverse aspects and concepts; for goodness in God does not signify the same aspect, the same concept, as justice; even if in God goodness and justice are the same: Therefore.

This is confirmed: Several synonyms joined to each other make a nugation (redundancy), just as if one said, "garment clothing, sword blade": but it must not be admitted that Scripture makes nugations when Jeremiah 33 says: "Most strong, great, mighty, Lord of hosts is thy name." Similarly elsewhere: Therefore.

DISSERTATION

On the Knowledge of God

After the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine substance, there remains to be considered those things which pertain to His operation; and **1st:** those things which pertain to immanent operations, which are understanding and willing. Let it not trouble you that we said above that divine understanding is constitutive of the divine nature, and thus pertains to the divine substance. For by this very fact that it is nature, it also pertains to operation, because nature is the radical principle of operation. Moreover, it so constitutes the divine nature that it is also operation under a diverse aspect, as we explained in the place cited and will be clear from what will be said.

Therefore in this Dissertation we will speak of those things which pertain to divine intellection; in the following ones, of those things which pertain to divine will.

ARTICLE I

Whether there is Knowledge in God?

Knowledge is taken in two ways: **1st:** Broadly for any certain and evident cognition. **2nd:** Properly for certain and evident cognition of things through causes. Concerning both it is asked whether it is in God?

§ I. Whether there is intellectual cognition in God and whether it is virtually distinct from the intellect

I say 1st: There is most perfect intellectual cognition in God. This is a matter of faith handed down in the Scriptures: Esther 14: "Lord who hast knowledge of all things." Psalm 32: "He understands all their works." Romans 11: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" and elsewhere throughout.

Indeed this truth so shines forth by the very light of nature, and has so prevailed among the nations, that they imposed the name on God from understanding: for as Damascene says in book 1 *On Faith* chapter 11, Theos which according to the Greeks signifies God, is said from *theasthai* (θεάσθαι), which is to consider or see.

Rightly indeed; for all understand God to be a supremely perfect being, the most orderly first mover, the most wise ruler of the world and the first cause of all things. But without intelligence He would not be a supremely perfect being, since this is the greatest perfection; He would be a blind mover and most imprudent ruler, nor would He be the cause of all things, since He would not confer on us the intelligence which He lacked.

Besides these, St. Thomas proposes one other and deeper reason here; which since it extends widely and is attacked by many, it is worth placing it in good light insofar as is permitted.

Therefore St. Thomas proves the power of knowing and understanding in God from His immateriality. To understand this more easily, it must be noted that cognition occurs insofar as the known is in the knower, not according to entity (for that is impossible), but according to its likeness or representation; so that the species of the known thing is entirely the same in intelligible being as the known thing is in entitative being; otherwise it would not represent it perfectly and adequately; consequently the species remains the form of the known thing, and does not become the form of the knower, but rather the knower, retaining its proper form, becomes the very known thing in intelligible being. Hence the Philosopher said that the understanding soul becomes all things.

And in this knowing beings differ from non-knowing ones: for non-knowing beings receive other forms entitatively and corruptibly, not as forms of other things but as their own, losing their proper forms; thus for example when water receives heat from fire, that heat is not the same heat which is in fire, but becomes proper to water, which simultaneously loses its proper form, namely cold. Thus when the matter of wood receives the form of fire, it loses its proper form, and that form of fire, distinct from the producing fire, becomes proper to it. But knowing beings are not like this. For these in a more elevated, incorruptible and more immaterial way receive forms—I do not say other forms, but forms of other things, because they receive them not losing their proper forms, nor as their own, but as of other things. Thus for example when I know a stone, the form of the stone is in my intellect, and remains the form of the stone in intelligible being, nor do I lose my own form, but with my own I become the stone intelligibly.

All this St. Thomas has encompassed in these few words here: "Knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing ones in this, that non-knowing beings have nothing but their own form only; but the knowing being is apt to have the form also of another thing: for the species of the known is in the knower."

With these things noted, the reasoning of St. Thomas is thus proposed: A being is cognitive insofar as it is immaterial or elevated above the conditions of matter; but God is at the summit of immateriality as pure act: Therefore He is supremely cognitive, consequently intelligent, because among the genera of cognitive beings, the first is the intelligent.

The Major is proved first: cognition occurs insofar as the knower has in itself the form of the known while retaining its proper form, as explained in the preliminary. But that something should have in itself the form of another while retaining its proper form comes from immateriality and elevation above the conditions of matter: Therefore.

The Minor is proved: That something should have in itself its proper form and the forms of others comes from its amplitude and unlimitedness: for the more things something encompasses, the more it is ample and unlimited. But that amplitude and unlimitedness comes from immateriality, for it is matter which limits form and prevents it from being communicated to another subject in the same individual nature, which is to make it its own only: Therefore.

The first Major is proved secondly: The greater or lesser faculty of knowing is distributed according to greater or lesser immateriality, greater or lesser elevation above the conditions of matter. Thus because the forms of elements and plants are entirely immersed in matter, and both in acting and in receiving follow the conditions of matter, namely cold, heat, dryness and humidity, they in no way know. The sensitive, although entitatively material, because however they are somehow elevated above matter and dominate it (for they move it at will and use it as an instrument), know imperfectly, and among the senses those which are less elevated know less, like touch; those which are more elevated know more, like sight, and especially imagination. The rational soul, because it is more immaterial, knows more perfectly; an Angel still more perfectly, because it is still more immaterial: Therefore.

You will object **1st:** Many things are immaterial which are not cognitive, like will, grace, charity and other infused habits. Conversely, there are material things which are cognitive, like the sensitive soul: Therefore.

Response to the first: the reasoning of St. Thomas proceeds maximally concerning spiritual substances, because to operate belongs to subsisting things. But immaterial accidents, although they are not cognitive formally and elicitively, nevertheless pertain to the cognitive order either as a property of the knower, or as something consequent upon or required for cognition. Thus will is an inclination following upon intellect, infused moral virtues are habits perfecting this inclination, grace is the root of supernatural cognition, and so concerning others. And this suffices for the truth of St. Thomas's principle. For it does not prove that all things which are in an immaterial substance are formally and elicitively cognitive, but that it itself knows and that other things which pertain to it are of the cognitive order.

To the second, we have already said that the sensitive soul is cognitive insofar as it is somehow elevated above the conditions of matter, not that it is not entitatively material, but because it begins to dominate matter by moving it as an instrument, and does not receive the forms of other things entitatively and corruptibly like a merely material potency, but in a more elevated way without its corruption or alteration and insofar as they remain forms of other things.

For immateriality can be taken in three ways: **1st:** For exclusion of the information of matter, and thus an Angel is immaterial. **2nd:** For independence from matter, and thus the rational soul is immaterial. **3rd:** For excess above the conditions of matter in acting and receiving, and thus the sensitive soul is immaterial; for it receives intentional species in a representative way without its alteration, and operates independently of the conditions of matter; thus vision, for example, is not elicited through heat or cold, humidity or dryness which are dispositions of matter. Now things are more apt for this manner of acting and receiving the more they are pure from matter.

You will insist: Air receives intentional species without its alteration, similarly a mirror, and yet they are not cognitive: therefore.

John of St. Thomas responds that species are not received in air and mirror as intentional and representative, but only as inherent and informative, no differently than other material accidents. The Salamanticenses respond with Gonet that air and mirror do not receive the forms of others through identity with them as cognitive beings receive them. This amounts to almost the same as the preceding response.

I respond with Goudin that the species of visible things are not received formally in air or mirror as they are received in the visual faculty, but only the power by which the object impresses the species is carried through air as through a medium, and is reflected from the mirror to the visual power, in which alone as in its proper seat the visible species is formed and resides.

You will object **2nd:** If immateriality were the reason for knowing, where there would be equal immateriality, there would be equal power of knowing: But the consequent is false: Therefore. The Minor is proved: All Angels are equally immaterial, for they all equally express negation of matter and independence from it: But nevertheless they do not possess equal power of knowing.

Response: I deny the Minor. To the proof, I distinguish the Major: All Angels are equally immaterial from the terminus from which (a quo), I concede the Major. From the terminus to which (ad quem), I deny the Major. For immateriality does not only express negation of matter, but something positive, namely greater or lesser participation of pure act. Although all Angels are equally independent from matter, they do not equally participate in pure act.

You will object **3rd:** It does not involve contradiction that God create an immaterial substance which is not cognitive: Therefore immateriality is not the reason for knowing.

Response: I distinguish the Antecedent: It does not involve contradiction that God create an immaterial substance which is not cognitive proximately, I concede the Antecedent, because a property can absolutely be separated from essence. Which is not cognitive radically, I deny the Antecedent. For its proper operation is to know, just as the proper operation of an animal is to sense. Hence just as it involves contradiction to create an animal which is not sensitive at least

radically, so also to create a spiritual substance which for the degree of its immateriality is not cognitive at least radically.

I say 2nd: Intellection and intellect in God are one and the same without virtual distinction. This is held by several Thomists.

This is proved **1st:** From what was said in Dissertation 2, article 1, concerning the constitutive of God, where we showed that only those things are distinguished virtually in God which are equivalent to several created things distinct from formal object and pertaining to diverse lines. But intellect and actual intellection pertain to the same line and are occupied about the same formal object: Therefore.

This is proved **2nd:** An intellect virtually distinct from intellection would be conceived with foundation in reality as potential to it and determinable and perfectible by it. But this cannot be conceived in God as most pure act: Therefore.

You will object **1st:** Against the first reason: Intelligence or intellect of first principles, wisdom, knowledge, prudence and art are virtually distinguished in God: but nevertheless they pertain to the same line, namely of understanding: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Minor: they pertain to the same line taken generically, I concede the Minor. Taken specifically, I deny the Minor. For the same genus of line is divisible into diverse species or modes from diversity of formal object. Moreover, the formal object of intellect and intellection is the same, namely the divine essence as it has the nature of truth and first intelligible. But the formal objects of intelligence, knowledge, prudence and art are diverse.

The formal object of intelligence is the divine essence as absolutely knowable in itself. The formal object of knowledge is the divine essence as cause; of prudence as the principle of things to be done; of art as the principle of things to be made. As for wisdom, it does not seem to be distinguished from knowledge in God, because divine knowledge is through the highest cause, and consequently wisdom. Although not every knowledge is wisdom, nevertheless some knowledge can be wisdom.

You will object **2nd:** Against the second reason: The nature of potency is preserved in God, both to notional acts and to the production of creatures, as St. Thomas teaches below. Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Antecedent: The nature of potency to acts, notional acts and to the production of creatures is preserved in God in order to the terms proceeding or produced, I concede the Antecedent. In order to the acts themselves, I deny the Antecedent. That is, the nature of potency is preserved in God as to this that it is the principle of effect, not as to this that it is the principle of action: Because potency to act is related as perfectible and actualizable by it; but to effect it is related as actuating and perfecting it.

You will object **3rd:** Things which differ by definition are distinguished at least virtually: but intellect and intellection differ by definition: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: things which differ by definition given concerning the thing as it is from the side of reality, differ virtually, I concede the Major. By definition given according to diverse modes of conceiving, I deny the Major. For thus intellect and intellection in God differ by definition.

§ II. Whether there is Knowledge properly so-called in God, and whether it is His attribute

I say 1st: There is given in God knowledge properly so-called. This is common against Vasquez.

This is proved **1st:** From Scripture: Psalm 138: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me." Romans 11: "O the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" And elsewhere frequently. Nor should you say these are to be understood of knowledge improperly so-called: Because according to the rule of Augustine in book 2 *On Christian Doctrine* chapter 10, the words of Scripture are to be understood in their proper sense, when nothing absurd follows from this. But that nothing absurd follows if these words are understood in their proper sense is clear from the following proofs.

This is proved **2nd:** by reason: Knowledge properly so-called is nothing other than certain and evident cognition of things through causes. But God knows things certainly and evidently through causes: For He knows them in every way they are knowable, but they are knowable through their causes: Therefore.

This is proved **3rd:** By overturning the foundation of Vasquez: Knowledge properly so-called is a perfection simply simple, involving no imperfection in its formal concept: Therefore it is to be attributed to God. The Antecedent is proved: If it involved any imperfection it would be formal discourse. But this knowledge does not import from itself, but only accidentally by reason of the state it has in men, just as for the same reason it imports that it be a quality and habit: Therefore.

The Minor is proved: Knowledge properly so-called can be infused in us without formal discourse; likewise in Angels there is knowledge properly so-called, which nevertheless is not formally discursive. Therefore virtual discourse suffices for knowledge properly so-called, by which namely cause and effect are known, and effect through cause, not by proceeding successively from knowledge of cause to knowledge of effect, but simultaneously by one act.

You will say: it is of the nature of knowledge that it know the less known through something more known: But all things are equally known to God: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: It is of the nature of knowledge that it know the less known through something more known from the side of the thing known, I concede the Major. From the side of the knower, I deny the Major. In this sense, I distinguish the Minor: But all things are equally known to God from the side of Himself, I concede the Minor. From the side of things known, I deny the Minor. For although God sees all things equally by one single intuition, He nevertheless sees that some things are in themselves more knowable, some less, some are causes, some are effects: And this is what we call virtual discourse.

I say 2nd: It is certain that God's cognition does not have the nature of knowledge with respect to His essence, because there is no cause of it; hence with respect to it He has only the nature of intelligence. It is equally certain that it has the nature of knowledge with respect to creatures, because they have causes, and God knows them through causes.

But whether it has the nature of knowledge with respect to attributes is not equally certain. Some deny this with Ferrariensis, because there is no real cause of attributes, since they are really the essence of God. Others however hold the contrary more probably and commonly: Because for the nature of knowledge it does not seem required that it proceed through actual cause, but it suffices that it proceed through virtual cause. But attributes, even if they do not have a really influencing cause, nevertheless have a virtual one, because they are so compared among themselves that if there were real distinction between essence and attributes, there would be real causality of essence in attributes, so that intellect would emanate from essence, will from intellect, etc. For this is what they call virtual cause, for which virtual distinction suffices; and that this virtual cause suffices for knowledge is clear in metaphysics, which is true knowledge, although it does not demonstrate the properties of being through actual cause, but only virtual; for the true and good are not really distinguished from being, but only virtually. Say the same concerning our Theology which has the nature of knowledge; although the attributes which it demonstrates concerning God have only virtual cause.

If you say that scientific cognition must distinguish between cause and effect, and know the latter through the former, but God does not distinguish as we do between essence and attributes.

Response: Although God does not distinguish between essence and attributes, He nevertheless knows the eminence of His nature, and that it provides to the human intellect the foundation for distinguishing between essence and attributes, which suffices that He know His essence as virtual cause of attributes.

I say 3rd: Knowledge in God is His attribute. This is proved: an attribute is an absolute relation formally existing in God and consequent upon the divine nature already constituted, and drawing it to a diverse line, as is clear from what has been said about attributes. But such is knowledge in God.

And **1st:** It is clear from the first conclusion that it is an absolute relation formally existing in God. It is proved as to the remaining parts: Divine understanding as constitutive of God regards the divine essence absolutely and precisely as intelligible; understanding as scientific regards the divine essence in a determinate way, namely under the aspect of cause: Therefore it follows upon nature already constituted, and by reason of diverse object draws to a diverse line.

You will say: divine understanding as constitutive of the divine nature is scientific: Therefore knowledge is not an attribute of God, but the very divine essence. The Antecedent is proved: Divine understanding as constitutive of the divine nature attains it as the principle of attributes and cause of creatures; for since it is infinite and comprehensive, it knows the divine nature in every way it is knowable: Therefore.

Goudin responds that divine understanding as constitutive of the divine nature regards indeed implicitly the divine nature as principle of attributes, but not explicitly. But on the contrary; it regards the divine nature explicitly, therefore explicitly as principle of attributes, for in this the concept of nature is situated.

Response: Partly with the Salamanticenses with Gonet, I deny the Antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: divine understanding as constitutive of the divine nature regards it as root of attributes as the principle which is attained, I concede the Antecedent. As the principle under which the attributes themselves are attained, I deny the Antecedent. For thus it is attained by knowledge, and this suffices that constitutive understanding and scientific understanding be virtually distinguished.

Thus knowledge in God attains the principle of things to be done and things to be made as *ratio quae* (principle which); but because prudence attains the principle of things to be done and art the principle of things to be made as *ratio sub qua*(principle under which), therefore prudence and art are virtually distinguished from knowledge.

You will infer: Therefore divine understanding as constitutive of the divine nature does not understand the divine essence in every way it is intelligible, and thus it is not infinite, nor comprehensive.

Response: I distinguish the first inference: it does not understand the divine essence in every way it is intelligible in the line of nature, I deny the inference. In another line, I concede the inference and deny the following inferences. For to infinite and comprehensive cognition, it suffices that the object be known in every way it is knowable in the line in which such cognition is infinite; hence since divine understanding constitutive of nature is not infinite in all ways, but in the line of nature only, it knows only those things which pertain to the line of nature, as it is *ratio quae* attainable; but *ratio sub qua* pertains to the nature of knowledge.

ARTICLE II

On the Object and Division of God's Knowledge

Note that in this article and the following there is no longer question about knowledge taken strictly, but about His cognition as such, whether it be scientific or not. And we ask three things here: first, how far divine knowledge extends. Second, what among known things is its primary object. Third, how manifold it is: which we will examine through the same number of sections.

§ I. How far does God's knowledge extend?

I say 1st: God knows Himself through Himself, indeed and comprehends Himself.

The reason for the first part is: because God, just as He is supremely intelligent, so He is supremely intelligible and most present and united to Himself, indeed as intelligent and intelligible He is one and the same in all ways: Therefore He knows Himself through Himself, and not through a species distinct from Himself.

The reason for the second part is: Because God knows Himself as much as He is knowable, for just as He is infinitely knowable, so He is infinitely cognitive, since from both sides He is pure and infinite act: Therefore. Hence the Apostle 1 Corinthians 2: "The things of God, no one has known except the Spirit of God." And there: "The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God."

You will say **1st:** Augustine in book 83 Questions, question 14, says that what comprehends itself is finite to itself: The same he repeats in book 12 *On the City of God* chapter 18. But God cannot be called finite in any sense: Therefore.

Response: that to comprehend, if taken properly, signifies something having and including another, and thus it is necessary that everything comprehended be finite, just as everything included. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this way, as if His intellect were other than Himself and contained and included Him; but such expressions are to be explained through negation: just as God is said to be in Himself because He is contained by nothing external, so He is said to be comprehended by Himself because nothing of Himself is hidden from Him.

You will say **2nd:** God comprehending Himself knows all His perfections, consequently His very comprehensive cognition of Himself, which is a great perfection of His: Again since the cognition by which He would know His comprehension of Himself would also be a perfection, He would have to know it equally, and so proceeding to infinity, which cannot be admitted: Therefore.

Response: God knows His comprehensive cognition not through another cognition, but through the very same, which since it is infinite, represents all things which are in God and itself, and thus is reflected upon itself.

I say 2nd: God knows all things other than Himself, whether possible, or present, or past, or future, even the smallest, not only according to the common nature of being, but also as to their proper and singular existence down to the ultimate differences.

This is against the Epicureans who contended that God, content with knowledge of Himself, neither cares for nor sees other things, to whom those referred in Job 22 had given precedence, saying: "What does God know? As if through darkness He judges, clouds are His hiding place, and He does not consider our things but walks around the hinges of heaven." Averroes follows these, who as St. Thomas relates, said that God indeed knows all things in common, not in particular.

This is a matter of faith handed down everywhere in the Scriptures: Hebrews 4: "There is no creature invisible in His sight, but all things are naked and open to His eyes." Psalm 138: "Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar... thou hast foreseen all my ways... thou hast known all the newest and oldest things." And throughout the whole Psalm. Psalm 32: "Who formed their hearts individually, who understands all their works." Wisdom 8: "He knows signs and wonders before they happen, and the events of times and ages." Psalm 68: "My sins are not hidden from thee." And elsewhere throughout.

The entire conclusion is proved simultaneously by reason: God perfectly knows Himself and His power. But power cannot be perfectly known unless all things to which it extends are known. But divine power extends to all things other than God, not only as to the common nature of being, but as to their formal and singular existence down to the ultimate differences; for it is the fullness of being and the effective and exemplar cause of all beings and of every difference and perfection of theirs: Therefore.

And this also becomes more evident if it is added that the very being of the first cause is His understanding: Hence whatever things are in God, as in the first cause, it is necessary that they be in His understanding, and consequently that they be understood by Him.

This is confirmed: The proper nature of each thing consists according as it participates in some mode the divine perfection. But God would not perfectly know Himself unless He knew in what way His perfection is participable by others: Nor would He perfectly know the very nature of being unless He knew all modes of being: Therefore He knows all things according to their proper natures and differences.

You will say **1st:** St. Jerome on chapter 1 of Habakkuk says: "It is absurd to reduce the majesty of God to this, that He should know by individual moments how many gnats are born and how many die": Therefore.

Response: Setting aside various solutions, St. Jerome denies only in God the knowledge which would found special providence around such vile things and inferior to man, such as He has toward men, not knowledge simply and which founds general providence: This is clear from what precedes and follows. For immediately he says: "Just as therefore in men also individually, God's providence runs, so in other animals we can understand a general disposition and order and course of things, for example, how the multitude of fish is born and lives in waters... But it is absurd," etc. as in the objection. And afterwards he immediately adds: "Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that while we detract His power to lowest things, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that there is the same Providence of rational as of irrational beings." Therefore Jerome denies to God only this knowledge of vile beings which would be with special providence such as He has concerning men, to each of whom among other things He grants a guardian Angel.

In the same sense St. Thomas below explains that saying of the Apostle 1 Corinthians 9: "Doth God take care for oxen?" Moreover that St. Jerome distinctly acknowledged even the knowledge of the smallest things in God is clear from his Commentaries on chapter 32 of Jeremiah and on chapter 10 of Matthew, in which latter place he says that small and vile animals do not fall without God as author, and in all things there is providence and those things which are about to perish in these do not perish without God's will.

You will say **2nd:** Both possibles and futures throughout all eternity are infinite: but the infinite cannot be known, for it is impassable: therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Minor: the infinite cannot be known by numbering successively part after part, or one after another, I concede the Minor; because, as is said in the objection, thus it is impassable. By one intuition comprehending all things simultaneously, as God does, I deny the Minor.

You will say **3rd:** Thus God knows things other than Himself as they are in Him: but they are not in God formally and distinctly according to their species and differences; for God is not man, stone, etc. but only virtually as in a common cause: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: God knows things other than Himself as they are in Him from the side of the knower, I concede the Major. From the side of the thing known, I deny the Major. This is explained: to know something thus as it is in the knower can be understood in two ways; in one way according as this adverb "thus" imports the mode of cognition from the side of the thing known, so that the sense would be that in things known only that being is known which they have in the knower: And this is false. For the eye does not know a stone according to the

being it has in the eye, but through the species of the stone which it has in itself, it knows the stone according to the being it has outside the eye; and the intellect indeed knows the stone according to the intelligible being which it has in the intellect, because it knows itself to understand. But moreover it knows the being of the stone in its proper nature.

In the second way, according as this adverb "thus" imports the mode from the side of the knower, so that the sense is that the knower does not know things except insofar as they are in it through their species and likenesses: and this is true. For the more perfectly and intelligibly the known is in the knower through its species, the more perfect is the cognition. Thus therefore it must be said that God not only knows things in Himself: but through that which He contains of things in Himself, He knows them in their proper nature, and so much the more perfectly as each thing is more perfectly in Him.

You will insist: The distinction of material singulars is from matter; but matter is not in God since it is mere potentiality: Therefore.

Response: Matter as to the reality which it has under form is in God creating and conserving, and thus it is known by Him.

You will say **4th:** At least God does not know beings of reason, nor privations, nor sins, since all these are neither caused by God nor contained in Him: Therefore.

Response: God knows beings of reason, not because He makes them, but because He makes and knows our thoughts and fictions by which beings of reason are made. But He knows privations through opposite forms: similarly evils whether physical or moral or sins through opposite goods; for each thing is knowable according as it is; hence since this is the being of evil, that it is privation of good, through this very fact that God knows goods, He also knows evils, just as through light darkness is known. Thus for example, by knowing the act of theft and the rectitude of justice, and that it is lacking to theft, He knows the malice of this act.

More things concerning this conclusion will recur in the subsequent Article, where we treat of the medium in which God knows things other than Himself.

§ II. What is the formal and primary object of divine knowledge?

It is established from the preceding section that God knows Himself and things other than Himself. It is now asked what among these is the formal and primary object of His cognition.

Durandus holds that it is being as such, as common analogically to created and uncreated. Others hold that it is something uncreated, namely God Himself: But these are divided into two parts: Some assign as the formal and primary object of divine cognition the divine essence as

distinguished from attributes and relations: others the divine essence with attributes and relations.

I say 1st: The formal and primary object of divine cognition is not created being, nor being as such abstracting from created and uncreated; but only uncreated being, namely God Himself.

This is proved **1st:** That is the formal and primary object of divine cognition which it attains per se first and by reason of itself. But that which divine cognition attains per se first and by reason of itself is not created being, nor being as such abstracting from created and uncreated, but God alone: Therefore.

The Minor is proved: **1st:** Because nothing is or can be conceived prior to God. **2nd:** Because God knows Himself as cause, and in Himself as cause He knows creatures as effects: Therefore He knows Himself first per se and by reason of Himself, creatures secondarily and dependently upon Himself. **3rd:** Because the divine essence is represented first per se to the divine intellect, creatures secondarily and by reason of it: Therefore the divine essence is attained per se first by divine cognition. The consequence is clear; because the intellect is carried to objects in the order in which they are represented to it.

The Antecedent is proved: The species which the divine intellect uses is the very divine essence. But the divine essence represents itself first, then creatures in itself, because if it represented itself and creatures equally, it would not be God rather than creature in intelligible being, as we have noted elsewhere: Therefore.

This is proved **2nd:** Intellectual operation has its species and nobility according to that which is per se and primarily understood, or according to its formal and primary object. But it is impossible that divine intellection should have its species and nobility according to that which is other than God, since His intellection is His very essence: Therefore it is impossible that what is understood by God first and per se should be other than God.

Understand here species not taken strictly (for in God there is no genus, nor species properly taken) but species taken for proper and essential and as it were specific nature. Say the same concerning the specifying principle.

You will say with Durandus: The more perfect a power is, the more universal ought to be its object. But being as such abstracting from created and uncreated is more universal than uncreated being: Therefore.

Response: I distinguish the Major: The more perfect a power is, the more universal ought to be its object with universality of predication, I deny the Major. With universality of causality and containment, I concede the Major. Because the universal of predication is only universal according to our mode of conceiving, but the universal of containment is universal according to

the truth of the thing. In this sense, I distinguish the Minor: Being as such is more universal with universality of predication than uncreated being, I concede the Minor. With universality of containment, I deny the Minor. For God is the total fullness of being, eminently containing every created thing.

You will reply: God knows being as such, not as secondary object: Therefore as primary.

Response: God does not know being as such as if abstractively and as distinguished from its differences, as we know it; for thus to know the nature of being is to know imperfectly and confusedly; but He knows it as if in the concrete as it is in God and in creatures: as it is in God, it is the primary object; as it is in creatures, it is the secondary object.

I say 2nd: If we attend to the mode by which we imperfectly know God through analogy to created things according to which essence is distinguished from attributes, as primary nature from secondary, the formal and primary object of divine cognition is the divine essence as virtually distinct from attributes and relations: In such a way however that attributes and relations are not secondary and material objects, but intrinsic modes of the primary object.

But if we attend to the mode by which God really knows Himself, the formal and primary object of divine cognition is divine being encompassing essence, attributes and relations. And thus perhaps the opposed opinions of Thomists are reconciled.

The first part is proved: What is virtually posterior to divine understanding cannot be its formal and primary object, because the formal and primary object is specifying, but the specifying is not posterior, but prior, or at least simultaneous with the specified. But according to our mode of conceiving, attributes and relations are something virtually posterior to divine understanding: Therefore.

The Minor is proved: Divine understanding in our opinion is the very essence of God. But attributes and relations are virtually posterior to essence: Therefore.

I said however that attributes and relations are not the material and secondary object, as creatures are, but intrinsic modes of the primary object, because they are not merely extrinsic to the divine essence like creatures, but transcendentally imbibed in it, nor do they have other intelligibility or immateriality from it, but the same, namely uncreated intelligibility and of pure act.

The second part is proved: The formal and primary object of divine cognition speaking of it as it is in reality, is not that concept of essence which we have, imperfectly expressing what God is, and thus prescinding from attributes, or not expressing them explicitly, but it is the quiddity of God as it is in itself and in reality perfectly known. But the quiddity of God as it is in itself perfectly known imports not only implicitly and radically, but formally and explicitly attributes and relations: Therefore.

The Major is clear; because God does not know His essence imperfectly as we do, but He knows it as it is in itself and in reality according to all its essentials. The Minor is also clear because the divine essence as it is in itself is most pure act formally importing all divine things in act, so that attributes and relations are in God one simple perfection, which is formally goodness, wisdom, Father, Son, etc. For this reason we proved above that the essence of God as it is in itself cannot be seen by the Blessed without attributes and relations.

Nor does it matter that attributes and relations are known through the intelligibility of essence, because since they do not have another quiddity from essence, the same intelligibility which is proper to essence is also proper to attributes and relations.

But this difficulty which some Thomists treat quite extensively does not seem to us of such importance that we should dwell on it longer.

§ III. On the Division of God's Knowledge

Although divine knowledge on God's part is one, simple, and unlimited, comprehending all things most perfectly in a single act, nevertheless on the part of objects and according to our mode of conceiving, it is divided in various ways.

1°. Into primary understanding and attributal or scientific understanding, concerning which see above. Here a. 16.

2°. Into speculative and practical knowledge: speculative is that which only contemplates things but does not effect them, such as that which is concerned with God himself or possible things. Practical is that which not only knows but also effects its object. Evil things, however, although they are not operable by God, nevertheless fall under his practical knowledge, just as good things do, insofar as he either permits, or impedes, or corrects, or orders them, just as diseases fall under the practical knowledge of a physician insofar as he cures them through his art.

3°. Into necessary and free knowledge. Necessary is that which precedes God's free determination and is concerned only with necessary objects, such as with the quiddities of things which cannot be otherwise. Free is that which supposes a decree and is concerned with objects depending on God's free will, such as existing or future things. Ibid.

4°. Into knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision: And this is the most celebrated division of all. Knowledge of simple intelligence is that which is concerned with those things which neither are, nor have been, nor will be, that is, with the quiddities of things in a state of mere possibility; it coincides with speculative and necessary knowledge. It is called knowledge of simple intelligence, not to exclude the relationship of knowledge to the known (which inseparably accompanies all knowledge), but to exclude the admixture of that which is outside

the genus of knowledge, such as the existence of things which the knowledge of vision adds, or the order of the will toward known things which the knowledge of approbation adds.

Knowledge of vision therefore is that which is directed toward those things which are, or have been, or will be; whence it adds, as I was just saying, above the knowledge of simple intelligence an order to the physical existence of the object, as present in eternity in the manner to be explained below. It is called knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), by a metaphor taken from the bodily eye which is said to see things when it attains them as present to itself.

Whether this division is adequate, or on the contrary there is given another knowledge mediating between them, which is called middle knowledge (*scientia media*), is a question most celebrated in all theology, which we shall endeavor to examine below in all its aspects against Molina and the Fathers of the Society who are assertors of this middle knowledge.

Knowledge of vision is subdivided into knowledge of approbation and disapprobation. Knowledge of approbation is that which is concerned with good things and supposes an approbative decree of the divine will concerning them. Knowledge of disapprobation is that which is concerned with sins and supposes a decree of the divine will concerning them, not approbative, but only permissive. And according to this division, God is sometimes said in Scripture to know and not know evils or sins - not to know them with knowledge of approbation, but to know them with knowledge of disapprobation.

ARTICLE III. Whether and What Knowledge in God is the Cause of Things?

Knowledge can be said to be the cause of things in two ways: **1°.** Directively, by proposing the modes in which things ought to be made or can be made, it directs the effective powers. **2°.** Effectively, so that it itself effects externally what it conceives internally.

I say first: Knowledge in God is the cause of things, not only directive but also effective, not formally and precisely as it is knowledge, but as it has will joined to it and is customarily called knowledge of approbation.

The first part is a matter of faith. Psalm 103: "In wisdom you have made all things." Psalm 135: "Who made the heavens in understanding." And elsewhere frequently as I shall soon say. It is also established by reason: For it is impious to think that an intellectual and most perfect agent acts in a blind and ignorant manner, and that it should be surpassed by its operations in knowledge. Moreover, knowledge in God is related to creatures as the knowledge of art in an artificer is related to the artifact: But the knowledge of art is at least the directive cause of the artifact: Therefore.

The second part, as proposed abstracting from knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision, is perhaps denied by few, at least Honoratus Tournely, who is our adversary in this

matter as in most things, expressly asserts as certain that knowledge of simple intelligence, if it has the decree of will joined to it, is the cause of things, not only directive but efficient, and he adds that concerning this there is the greatest agreement of the Schools: Therefore according to the concordant opinion of the Schools, some knowledge in God, with a decree joined, is the effective cause of things, nor does our conclusion say more; nor does it matter that I have added with Saint Thomas, "which is customarily called knowledge of approbation," because the adversaries contend with Tournely himself that knowledge of simple intelligence can be called knowledge of approbation.

It is therefore proved **1°** from Scripture. Proverbs 3: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth, established the heavens by prudence." John 1: "All things were made through him (the Word)." Wisdom 8: "Who of these things that are is more an artificer than she (wisdom)." Genesis 1: "God said, let there be light, and there was light." Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established." Hebrews 1: "upholding all things by the word of his power." And elsewhere similarly: but these terms - to found, to establish, to be an artificer more than others, to make and establish by command and word - express more than simple direction: Therefore.

It is proved **2°** from the Fathers. Saint Augustine, 15 *De Trinitate* ch. 13: "All creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, God does not know because they are, but therefore they are because he knows them." The same, 11 *De Civitate* ch. 10: "This world could not be known to us unless it existed; but to God it could not exist unless it were known." Saint Gregory, book 20 *Moralia* ch. 23: "Things that are are not seen by him from eternity because they are; but therefore they are because they are seen." And book 32 ch. 6: "He does not create by seeing existing things, he contains existing things by seeing." More still in the following conclusion.

It is proved **3°** by reason. **1°.** God is an intellective agent: but an intellective agent as such operates effectively through the intellect: Therefore God, who is the effective cause of all things, effects them through the intellect, consequently through cognition or knowledge. The major is certain. The minor is proved: every agent operates effectively through its proper form, so fire operates through heat, so an artificer who is an intellective agent operates through the intellect, and through his knowledge effects the artifact: Therefore.

2°. God's knowledge is the cause of things, as the knowledge of an artificer is the cause of artifacts: but the knowledge of an artificer is the cause of things not only directive but also effective: Therefore. The minor is proved, both because art properly speaking is an operative habit, says Saint Thomas, and not only perfects powers in order to operation, but also places the conceived form in the artifact, as the Holy Doctor also says in the place cited. It pleases me to quote his words because they bring light to this and the following conclusion. "Just as," he says, "the causality of an artificer through his art is to be considered, so is the causality of divine knowledge to be considered: therefore this is the process in the production of an artifact. First the knowledge of the artificer shows the end. Second, his will intends that end. Third, the will

commands the act (that is, radically as I shall soon say) by which the work is brought forth: concerning which work the knowledge of the artificer places the conceived form." Therefore the knowledge of the artificer not only shows and directs but also induces the artificial form into matter, which is truly to effect.

If you say that knowledge and art in God are distinct, which however here seem to be confused, I respond that some probably deny that knowledge and art in God are distinct, because they are distinguished in us: **1°** because knowledge is of universals, art of particulars; **2°** because knowledge proceeds through cause and art through use; but in God both knowledge is of particulars, and art proceeds not through use but through cause. But granted that they are virtually distinguished, they are not adequately distinguished as two attributes, but as two formalities of the same attribute, which insofar as it is terminated toward things to be produced in some artificial manner, is called art; but insofar as it is terminated toward things to be produced as to substance, is called knowledge: and this is preserved in our opinion.

3°. God effects things through an act of command formally immanent and virtually transient: but the act of command, although it is radically and presuppositively from the will, and therefore it is sometimes said that the will commands, is nevertheless formally and elicitively from the intellect: Therefore. The major is evident from the scriptures already cited, Genesis 1: "God said, let there be light, and there was light." Psalm 148: "He spoke, and they were made, he commanded, and they were created." It will be more evident from what will be said in the following conclusion. The minor is from Saint Thomas 1-2 q. 17, and is now proved briefly: to command is to intimate or to say, it is to order and to prescribe: but to intimate or to say and to speak spiritually pertains to the intellect, which is as the mouth of spiritual substance; whence that of Psalm 36: "The mouth of the just shall meditate wisdom." Likewise to order one thing to another belongs to the practical intellect and prudence. Finally to prescribe, since it belongs to a superior, pertains to the superior and nobler power, which is the intellect: Therefore. Compare what I shall say 1-2 to q. 17.

The third part of the conclusion is proved. **1°.** Knowledge insofar as it is knowledge does not denote an active cause, but is bare knowledge of the object; whence the act of knowledge as such is not to produce but to know: and therefore God knows many things of which he is not the cause, such as sins and merely possible things which will never be.

2°. Form, both natural and intelligible, does not denominate an actual principle of acting outwardly precisely insofar as it is a form remaining in that of which it is the form, or insofar as it gives it being in act, but insofar as it has order and inclination toward an effect, which is most true of intelligible form, because since it is related to opposites (for knowledge of opposites is the same), it would not produce this effect rather than another unless it were determined by inclination or appetite: but in God this inclination is his will: Therefore intelligible form in God

or his cognition is not the cause of things unless it has will joined to it: Whence to Ephesians 1 it is said: "Who works all things according to the counsel of his will."

3°. As I have already said and shall now say again, God does not cause things externally except through an act of command: but the act of command supposes a decree of the will from which it has efficacy: Therefore.

Let it not weary you, Reader, if we linger a little longer on this conclusion concerning which, according to our adversaries, there is the greatest agreement of the Schools. What we have said so far will be most profitable for what follows.

There remains therefore the more controversial difficulty: what knowledge in God is the cause of things, whether knowledge of simple intelligence or knowledge of vision? It must be carefully recalled what we said above, that the distinction of this twofold knowledge does not hold on God's part, but on the part of the material object. So that the same knowledge, insofar as it regards things in a state of possibility, is called knowledge of simple intelligence; insofar as it regards things under a state of existence or futurity, is called knowledge of vision: Whence it is rather an explanation of diverse terminations of the same knowledge than distinct knowledge.

I say second: Knowledge of simple intelligence is a cause actually directing things in the order of intention and effective in first act. Knowledge of vision is a cause directing and efficient in second act in the order of execution; not precisely as knowledge of vision, but as knowledge of approbation, as we explained in the first conclusion; so that it is true to say in a causal sense: therefore things exist or are future because God sees them, understanding by "because" the vision mentioned above as having will joined to it: It is not on the contrary true to say: therefore God sees things because they exist or are future, unless perhaps in some more subtle sense, concerning which in the solution of objections: And the conclusion is to be understood generally of all things which God makes, even those freely future.

For the understanding of the conclusion it should be observed that in intellective agents a twofold order is distinguished: one of intention which begins from cognition and intention of the end, and terminates inclusively at election and volition of means. The other of execution which begins from the act of command and terminates at the execution of the work or acquisition of the end.

To explain this briefly (for this pertains to the Treatise on human acts): first the intellect apprehends the end and proposes it to the will; the will acquiesces and intends this end; by virtue of this intention, the intellect inquires about means and discerns between the more and less apt; the will wills and selects the more apt, and here the order of intention stops. Then follows the order of execution; for by virtue of the election of the will, the intellect commands the execution of the willed means; by virtue of this command, the will applies the executive powers, which

application is called active use, which is followed by passive use of the executive powers, and finally the perfection of the work, or attainment of the end.

So therefore in the present matter (and this is the explanation and proof of the conclusion) the divine intellect according to our mode of conceiving apprehends the manifestation of his glory as good, and proposes it to the will. The divine will assents and intends this end; by virtue of this intention the intellect or divine knowledge inquires about means, and among innumerable things which it can do, discerns the more apt, and proposes them to the will as possible in its art; the will wills and selects them, and here the order of intention stops.

And hence it is evident **1°** that knowledge directing thus far by proposing the end and means is knowledge of simple intelligence, because thus far and while it directed before the election of the will, all things were still in a state of mere possibility, and although by the subsequent election they became inchoatively and as to effect future, not however completely and as to effect, nor did knowledge cooperate otherwise to this inchoate futurity than by directing.

It is evident **2°** that since it proposes means as possible to itself and as contained in the power of its art, it is effective in first act, or has the power of effecting them: And thus the first part of the conclusion remains proved.

Now indeed, the efficacious election of means being posited, by virtue of that election, the intellect commands their execution, and since God's command is most efficacious and does not need distinct executive powers, as I shall say at the end of the article, but in the same instant in which he commands, things are made, and on the other hand it happens, as we have proved, that it is an act of the intellect, it follows that by effecting he sees and by seeing he effects, and thus that the knowledge which is the effective cause of things in second act is knowledge of vision, as attaining things as existing or completely future, not precisely as knowledge of vision, as has been said, but as it has will joined to it and is customarily called knowledge of approbation.

Whence I argue formally thus: God is the effective cause of things in second act through command: but command is an act of the intellect pertaining to knowledge of vision and not of simple intelligence: Therefore. The minor is evident for the first part from what was said in the first conclusion. It is proved for the second part: This act of command supposes an efficacious decree and is founded in it, and is terminated toward things as existing, if indeed they are effected through it: Therefore.

Tournely responds **1°** that God's will itself is the immediately effective cause of things, because it is of itself most efficacious and therefore command is superfluous.

But on the contrary: This response **1°** is against Scripture which everywhere attributes the effection of things to divine command as we saw in the first conclusion. **2°** It is against Saint Thomas who here a. 8 says: "intelligible form is the principle of operation, as heat is the

principle of heating," with will joined however as he adds there. And in 1 d. 38 cited in the second reason of the first conclusion he says that "the will commands the act, or moves to the act, by which the work is brought forth": Therefore the will itself does not immediately bring forth the work, but the act to which it moves, namely the act of command. **3°** It is against reason: Because not only is intellect required directing and moving the will in the order of intention and toward willing, but also in the order of execution and toward doing; both because in execution more serious difficulties occur, and because otherwise he who willed wisely would execute imprudently and in a blind manner; And therefore the principal act of prudence concerning things to be done is command, and art which is a habit directing concerning the execution of things to be made is placed in the intellect and not in the will.

In God therefore besides the efficacious will of the work there must be distinguished, according to our mode of conceiving, command toward execution; not that God suffers difficulty in executing, but because of the distinction of objects, for the object to be committed to execution adds something to the object simply willed; and because just as we assign intellect directing in the order of intention, lest the will choose imprudently and blindly, so we must assign one directing in the order of execution, lest it execute imprudently and blindly.

Tournely responds **2°** that the act of command, supposing that it is given in God, does not regard an existing thing, but God's antecedent will which it intimates, or as others say, does not regard an existing thing as object but as effect.

But on the contrary: It implies a contradiction that an act of intellect by virtue of the will should intimate a thing to be made and make it, and not regard it as existing. Likewise it implies a contradiction that an act of intellect should be terminated toward something and not understand it as object, just as it implies a contradiction that the will should be terminated toward something and that not be willed; because just as the act of will is to will, so the act of intellect is to understand. But command is an act of intellect, as has been said. Moreover it would follow that the intellect would act not knowing what it was doing.

The conclusion is proved **2°**. If God saw things because they are, and by seeing them did not make them, his knowledge would be measured by things and would depend on them as to truth and certainty just as our knowledge does, as is evident: But it is repugnant to God that his knowledge should be measured by things and depend on them as to truth and certainty, since rather it itself is the measure of things: Therefore.

Nor should you say that God knows sins which he does not make and yet his knowledge does not depend on sins, because sin, since it is a privation, is not known in itself but in the opposite form.

It is proved **3°** by the authorities of Saint Augustine and Saint Gregory which we brought forward in proof of the first conclusion; but because Doctor Tournely says they can be understood of that knowledge by which God alone operates some things, such as those which are

brought forth from nothing, and the infusion of supernatural gifts, as he explained in the preliminaries, which, he says, can deservedly be called their cause (although these authorities, as is evident to the reader, speak generally of all and whatsoever creatures), we add others which speak specially of free acts which God operates with secondary causes, and which alone Tournely excepts from the effective causality of knowledge of vision.

Saint Augustine 5 *De Civitate* ch. 9, speaking of our wills, says: "Therefore whatever they are capable of, most certainly they are capable, and what they are going to do, they will entirely do, because he foreknew that they would be capable and would do, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived."

Boethius book 5 *De Consolatione Philosophiae* prose 3, quoted by Sylvius, treating of the harmony of divine foreknowledge with free will, says: "Nor do I approve that reasoning by which some believe they can dissolve this knot of the question. For they say that something is not therefore going to happen because providence has foreseen that it will be future; but on the contrary rather, because something is future, it cannot escape divine providence."

Moreover, with Tournely consenting, the Fathers say that things which are produced by God alone are future because God sees them: But free acts which he produces with secondary causes concurring depend no less essentially on his knowledge: Therefore.

Solutions to the Objections of the Honorable Tournely Concerning the Salians

Objection I

Tournely objects: A long series of Fathers—Eusebius, Damascene, Jerome, Augustine, Boethius—who say that things are not future because they are known by God, but rather are known by God because they are future: Therefore.

First. We also produce Fathers, indeed the same ones, who teach the opposite: By what right therefore does he explain our authorities, by that same right we explain those which he objects to us.

Second. Perhaps the praised Theologian does not remember that he said a little before that it is certain according to all Theologians that the science of simple intelligence (scientia simplicis intelligentiae), if it has the decree of the will joined to it, is the cause of things not only directive, but efficient: Therefore according to him and all Theologians, things are future because God knows them, and thus for him and other Theologians no less than for us, the authorities which he objects to us must be completely resolved.

If he says the Fathers are not to be understood concerning the science of simple intelligence but of vision, I with equal right will say they are not to be understood concerning the science of vision, but concerning the science of simple intelligence, for the Fathers speak absolutely and without distinction concerning the science of God; indeed with greater right I will say they are to be understood concerning the science of simple intelligence, and not concerning the science of vision, because as our Gonet aptly observes, the Holy Fathers in these places contend to prove against the Manicheans that the science of God does not harm our liberty; but there is greater danger lest our liberty be injured by natural and necessary science, such as is the science of simple intelligence, than by free science, such as is the science of vision, inasmuch as it is founded on the free decree of the divine will.

Meanwhile directly: **I respond First.** The Holy Fathers speak mostly of sins, of which, insofar as they are formally sins, the science of vision is not the cause; because, as has been said, the science of vision is not the cause of things as it is vision, but as it has the will joined to it, or as it is of approbation. But God does not approve sins, but only permits them.

But if sometimes the Holy Fathers speak of non-sinful acts, they intend only that science is not a cause inducing necessity in the thing known, so that from this something is compelled to happen because God knows it, and for that reason (to prevent the objection) sometimes the Holy Fathers use the example of our science, not making equality in this, that just as our science does not cause known things, so neither does God's science; but in this, that just as our science does not induce necessity in known things, so neither does God's science.

To these things: "We confess," says the Sorbonne Doctor, "that God's science does not induce necessity in known things: but whence do the Thomists prove this? Namely from the fact that science supposes future things and does not make them." By no means, and in this the man otherwise most learned shows himself a stranger to the principles of the Thomistic school. Therefore the Thomists prove that the science of vision, although it is the cause of things, does not bring necessity to known things, because it has its efficacy from the decree on which it is founded; but this decree not only decrees being, but all modes of being, of whose number are liberty and contingency; whence the science of vision which acts by virtue of this decree, effects being and the modes of being, consequently liberty, and therefore does not destroy it.

But with the peace of the most learned man, let me in turn inquire, whence does he himself prove that the science of simple intelligence with the decree joined does not bring necessity to things? He cannot respond, because it supposes things and does not make them, if indeed according to him, the science of simple intelligence with the decree joined is the efficient cause of things. He will doubtless take refuge in an indifferent decree, to elicit from it a determinate effect, which we will confute in its proper place according to merit; but meanwhile from this it is clearly apparent that it matters nothing for asserting or removing the liberty of things, whether they are caused by

the science of vision or of simple intelligence, but all this depends on the decree which precedes the former and follows the latter.

I respond Second. The Holy Fathers spoke thus attending only to the nature of science, to which the nature of causality does not belong, unless joined with the will, that is, they spoke of the science of vision as vision, not as approbation.

If you insist that they add: therefore things are known by God because they are future. **I respond** this is to be understood in the illative and not causal sense: that is; it follows that if some things are future, God foreknew them, yet future things are not the cause that God knows.

Indeed it can also without prejudice to our opinion, this saying of the Fathers be verified in a causal sense. For since the science of vision has two functions; for it simultaneously effects and sees, and since being effected or existing is conceived prior by nature than being seen; according to this precision it is verified in a causal sense that things are therefore seen, because they are. In this way also can be understood that of Genesis 1: "And God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good": More commonly however it is understood of conservative and not factive vision.

Objection II

Tournely objects: The science of vision is not the cause of things precisely as vision, because the science of vision under this formal aspect says only respect to future things; nor as approbation, because God certainly knows sins, which however he does not approve: therefore God's science is not the cause of things, neither as it is vision, nor as it is approbation.

Confirmation: it no more pertains to science to effect its object, than it pertains to effective power to understand its work; but effective power does not understand its work: Therefore.

I respond. The argument of the objector sins against the first rules of dialectics; because it proceeds from the undistributed to the distributed; for from the fact that the science of approbation is not the cause of some future thing, namely sin, he infers that it is the cause of no future thing, just as if I argued: Some animal is not a man: Therefore no animal is a man: he ought therefore to have inferred; therefore there is some future thing of which the science of approbation is not the cause; and this is most true, because the science of approbation is not the cause except of those things which God himself causes and approves. But God does not cause nor approve sin as to the formal aspect. Hence however it does not follow that of those things which God causes and approves, the science of approbation is not the cause.

To the confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent: It no more pertains to merely speculative science to effect its object than it pertains to active power to understand its work, I concede the antecedent. To science which is simultaneously speculative and practical, I deny the antecedent.

This is evident in us; our intellect by understanding produces the word and by producing understands. But the science of vision in God is simultaneously speculative and practical, as is evident from what has been said.

Moreover, given the Antecedent, I infer against the objector: Therefore the science of simple intelligence is not the cause of things.

Objection III

Tournely objects: Created liberty cannot stand with that science which by virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree is the cause of future action: But the science of vision by virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree is the cause of things: Therefore.

I respond First by retorting the argument: Created liberty cannot stand with that science which by virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree is the cause of future action: But the science of simple intelligence is the cause of things by virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree, namely of the things themselves: Therefore created liberty cannot stand with the science of simple intelligence. Tournely will undoubtedly respond that the decree is not absolute but indifferent; the Thomist will contend that it is absolute and determining. It is therefore impertinent to the assertion or overthrow of the liberty of our actions that they are caused precisely by the science of simple intelligence or of vision, if indeed neither causes except by virtue of a decree; but this must be repeated from the decree itself.

I respond Second. Created liberty cannot stand with that science which by virtue of an absolute and antecedent decree is the cause of things, if the decree is only of the substance of things, I concede the major. If it is of the substance and modes of things, consequently of liberty itself, such as is God's decree, I deny the major. But these things are not of the present controversy; they will be discussed at length below.

Objection IV

You object: Intuitive vision supposes its object: Therefore it does not make it.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent as above: Purely speculative vision supposes its object, I concede the antecedent. Vision eminently speculative and practical such as is God's vision, I deny the antecedent. Thus in supernatural things, the Father by seeing the Son generates him and by generating sees. Thus in natural things our intellect by knowing a thing produces the word and by producing it sees. Therefore it is not necessarily required for the vision of an object that it precede the vision, but it suffices that it accompany it.

You will insist **First.** The science of vision in God supposes future things: Therefore. The antecedent is proved: The science of vision supposes an efficacious decree concerning futurity: But by virtue of an efficacious decree things are future, otherwise it would not be efficacious: Therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the minor: But by virtue of an efficacious decree things are future inchoatively and as to affection or intention, I concede the minor. Completely and as to effect or execution, I deny the minor. When therefore it is said that the will is efficacious antecedently to the act of command or the science of vision; this is understood in the order of intention and according to affection only; for it is not yet understood as fully efficacious in the order of execution, unless some acts required for execution intervene; because although the will wills efficaciously, it does not however operate efficaciously except through executive powers, which it uses as instruments for operation ad extra (toward external things), of which in God the principal and unique one, as I will say below, is the commanding intellect.

You will insist **Second.** That efficacious decree does not abstract from the existence of things: Therefore through it they are completely future.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: That decree does not abstract from the existence of things as willed, I concede the antecedent. As executed, I deny the antecedent. Therefore it does not follow: It is efficaciously willed; therefore it is efficaciously executed for its time. Because the will does not command execution except through the mediation of command.

You will insist **Third.** Science in God is related as science in an artificer, as Saint Thomas often says: But the science of an artificer is not carried intuitively to the artifact unless after it has been made: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: It is so related etc. as to something, I concede the major. As to everything, I deny the major. For the disparity is that the artificer does not operate in an instant, nor by sole and naked command, but with delay of time and through executive powers which are not cognitive: Whence he does not produce the artifact by the vision itself, but supposes it made before he sees. But God operates in an instant and by naked and sole command, as I will now say; which command pertains to the science of vision; for in this very instant in which the will wills and the intellect commands, things are for that time when he wills them to be, and eternity by its amplitude already has them present.

Objection V

You object from Saint Thomas: According to the Saint Doctor here article 8, the science which is the cause of things, is that which has the will joined to it: but the will is joined to the science of simple intelligence: Therefore.

Also the Saint Doctor there and article 9 says that that science is the cause of things which, since it is indifferent to opposites, is determined by the will: but this is the science of simple intelligence: Therefore.

I respond. According to Saint Thomas, the science to which a decree is joined and which is determined through it, by this very fact becomes the science of vision. For it is called the science of simple intelligence, says the Saint Doctor question 3 *de veritate* (on truth) article 3 ad 8, insofar as it excludes the order of the will to the production of known things; by this very fact therefore that the order of the will to the production of things is joined to it, it ceases to be of simple intelligence and becomes of vision.

For whose fuller understanding, it must be recalled what we already observed before the conclusion, that the science of simple intelligence and the science of vision are not two sciences, but one and the same on God's part, but are distinguished only according to diverse termination; insofar as it is concerned with things in the state of mere possibility, it is called of simple intelligence; insofar as it is concerned with things in the state of existence or futurity, it is called of vision. By this very fact therefore that a decree is conceived by which the science which was of possibles and indifferent, is determined to the existence or futurity of some effect, it itself passes into the science of vision. But because by virtue of the decree alone things are only inchoatively future and as to affection, as I said before, but become completely future and as to effect through the act of command following the decree, we say that that act of command, which is an act of the intellect, simultaneously sees and makes things; whence the science which before was of simple intelligence and indifferent, is not by virtue of the joined decree the cause of things in second act, unless by passing into the science of vision.

Tournely occurs again from the mind of Saint Thomas, and contends that according to the Saint Doctor the science of approbation is not the science of vision; because the Saint Doctor question 3 *de veritate* cited in the above solution says: "Simple knowledge is said... to exclude the admixture of that which is outside the genus of knowledge; such as is the existence of things which the science of vision adds, or the order of the will to the production of known things, which the science of approbation adds." By these words, says Tournely, the Saint Doctor clearly distinguishes the science of vision from the science of approbation, which however the Thomists confuse with the science of vision entirely gratuitously and without reason.

I respond. It is denied that according to Saint Thomas, the science of approbation is not the science of vision, and that this can ever be gathered from the cited words. Nor however do we therefore confuse either science, as Tournely harshly and groundlessly reproaches us; but we distinguish between either with Saint Thomas, as between the more and less extensive, so that the science of vision extends more widely than the science of approbation, and although every science of approbation is the science of vision, yet not every science of vision is the science of approbation, because there is science of vision concerning sins which is not science of approbation; and therefore Saint Thomas accurately distinguished that the science of vision adds to the science of simple intelligence the existence of things, and the science of approbation adds the order of the will to their production. But Saint Thomas never said or dreamed that the science of approbation is not of vision. Indeed from the very words objected I briefly and most clearly prove against Tournely that according to Saint Thomas, both the science of approbation is the science of vision, and the science of simple intelligence is not the cause of things.

As to this latter I argue thus: the science of approbation, or that which has the will joined to it is the cause of things, so Tournely teaches; but Saint Thomas clearly asserts in the cited words that the science of simple intelligence is not the science of approbation but excludes it: Therefore according to Saint Thomas the science of simple intelligence is not the cause of things. The argument, unless I am mistaken, is demonstrative.

As to the other, I argue equally thus: **First.** According to Saint Thomas in the cited words, the science of approbation is not the science of simple intelligence: Therefore of vision. The consequence is evident; because God's science is adequately divided into the science of simple intelligence and the science of vision; at least Tournely does not dare to assert a middle one here ex professo (professionally).

Second. According to Saint Thomas in the cited place and all Theologians, the science of simple intelligence is said insofar as it regards precisely the essences of things and in the state of mere possibility: the science of vision is said insofar as it regards things in order to existence: but the science of approbation does not regard, according to Saint Thomas cited, precisely the essences of things and in the state of mere possibility, but in order to existence, namely as caused by itself, for it is itself according to Tournely and all, the cause of things: Therefore the science of approbation is the science of vision.

Therefore Tournely sought his own throat, while he objected these things to us from Saint Thomas: moreover what reason could there be even by a shadow for doubting the mind of the Saint Doctor, when the reasons of our conclusion are from him himself; and the argument taken from the authority of the Fathers, which Tournely with his followers values so highly, the Saint Doctor himself here article 8 ad 1, question 2 *de veritate* article 14 ad 1 objects to himself and solves in the way we solve?

Objection VI

You object: That science is the cause of things in second act, which is the cause of them in first act; because an effect cannot be produced in second act except by a cause having the power to produce it, which is to be effective in first act: but the science of simple intelligence according to us is the effective cause of things in first act: Therefore.

I respond from what has been said, by distinguishing the major: That science is the cause of things in second act which is the cause of them in first act, and is related in the same way, I deny the major; and is related in a diverse way, I concede the major. It is therefore the same science entitatively which effects things in first and second act; because on God's part there is one unique science; but by this very fact that things are transferred from the state of possibility to the state of existence or futurity, the science which was called the science of simple intelligence, is called the science of vision, as we explained before.

For the solution of several other objections, always keep before your eyes: First, that the science of simple intelligence is the directive cause of things in the order of intention and effective in first act. Second, that the science of vision has two functions, to see and to effect, and does not effect insofar as it is vision, but insofar as it is approbation and as applied through the decree of the divine will: For the other arguments which adversaries heap up prove only one or the other of these, and nothing else.

APPENDIX

Whether there is given in God an executive power virtually distinct from intellect and will?

Although we have hitherto proved that the divine intellect with the will joined is the effective cause of things, yet it does not therefore absolutely and necessarily follow that it effects immediately and without the concurrence of another power; for it can stand that it truly and indeed in an instant effects, yet by means of a distinct executive power.

For which: I say: Executive power in God is not distinguished virtually from intellect and will as a diverse power or as an attribute adequately distinct from them; but it is the same power with them under some distinction however to be explained below.

The first part is proved: **First.** Because in a purely intellectual nature no power ought to be admitted unless it pertains to the intellective grade: but no other powers besides intellect and will pertain to the intellective grade; for merely executive power is brute power, supposing no cognition from itself: And therefore Saint Thomas teaches that in Angels there is no executive

power distinct from intellect and will, and that they move the heavens by the efficacious concept of their intellect, that is by the act of command virtually transient.

Second. Because executive power distinct from moving and commanding power imports imperfection both on the part of the commander and on the part of itself. On the part of the commanding power it speaks inefficacy: For executive power distinct from moving and commanding power is required because this is not from itself sufficiently efficacious to subject things to itself and command execution; thus an artificer needs executive powers distinct, e.g. motive faculty, hand, hammer, etc. on account of the inefficacy of his command. On the part of itself, because executive power distinct from another moving one, does not relate as moving, but as purely moved by way of instrument.

The second part is explained: Executive power in God can be understood distinct from intellect and will in two ways: **First.** It is distinguished by way of including and included, insofar as executive power is not intellect precisely, nor will precisely, but imports both, intellect directly, will obliquely, and thus is distinguished in almost the way that a composite is distinguished from matter and form. **Second.** It is distinguished inadequately according to diverse formalities and connotations within the same power: For the same power attaining things as intelligible, is called intellect; attaining things by giving them being, is called omnipotence, or executive power; just as the same act of intellect is simultaneously intellection and diction under diverse aspects.

And thus various texts of Saint Thomas which seem contrary to themselves can be reconciled, and arguments solved.

Hence you will infer that the power immediately effective of things is the intellect not the will, because the will effects by means of command which is an act elicited by the intellect. Nor does it obstruct that Saint Thomas question 2 *de veritate* article 14 says that between God's science which is the cause of things and the thing itself caused there is given a medium, namely the divine will: Because the sense is that science does not cause things unless with the will intervening and joined, yet not that the science itself does not immediately cause; just as when the Saint Doctor says there that between God's science which is the cause of things and the created thing a second cause mediates; the sense is that God's science does not cause unless with a second cause concurring, yet not that the science itself does not immediately attain the created thing.

ARTICLE IV

In what medium does God know things other than himself?

Something can be known in two ways: In one way in itself, in another way in another. Something is known in itself when it is known through a proper species adequate to the

knowable itself, as when the eye sees a man through the species of man: And such a species is called the medium *quo* (by which) and unknown *ut quod* (as that which), because it makes known without being first known *ut quod* (as that which), but only by representing the object. But in another it is seen, which is seen through the species of another in which it is contained, as when a part is seen in the whole through the species of the whole, as a wall in a house through the species of the house, the ternary number in the senary through the species of the senary, or when an effect is seen in the cause through the species of the cause, or in whatever other way it happens that something is seen in another. And this medium is called the medium *in quo* (in which), which must first be known as it leads to the knowledge of another.

That God knows himself by nothing other than himself, that is, that the divine essence has simultaneously the nature of object and of species immediately representing itself, is evident from what was said in article 2 §1. Whence now there is only difficulty about the medium in which God knows things other than himself. And the question proceeds concerning creatures as such, abstracting from the state of past, present or future existence; but concerning future things there are graver difficulties, about which we will speak specially below.

Moreover the resolution of the present difficulty preludes to the position or overthrow of the famous middle science (scientia media); for if God does not know things other than himself except in himself as in a cause, middle science collapses. On the contrary if God knows things other than himself immediately in themselves, there will be place for middle science.

Concerning the present difficulty there are three principal opinions: The first which is common among the Fathers of the Society, holds that God knows things other than himself in both ways, both mediately in himself as in a cause, and immediately in themselves. The second which is Vasquez's stands for cognition that is immediate only. The third which is that of the Thomists on the contrary denies immediate cognition, and admits only mediate.

I omit another opinion which is commonly attributed to Scotus, according to which God knows creatures in some diminished and objective being which he produced from eternity. For besides the fact that this opinion is now antiquated, it seems less consonant with reason and faith. With reason, because that diminished being which is gratuitously feigned as created from eternity, would need another medium in which it would be known, just like other created things, and the difficulty would persist concerning in what medium it would be known. With faith, because according to faith, we acknowledge only a twofold production in God, one eternal of persons *ad intra* (inwardly), the other temporal of creatures *ad extra* (outwardly).

I say: God knows things other than himself mediately in himself as in a pre-known cause, not immediately in themselves.

The first part is proved: A cause cannot be perfectly comprehended unless its effects are known in it: But God perfectly comprehends his essence which is the adequate cause of all things: Therefore.

The major is proved: A cause cannot be perfectly comprehended unless it is known as much as it is knowable from itself: But a cause containing eminently and adequately its effects, is knowable as the reason of knowledge of those: Therefore unless it is so known, it is not known as much as it is knowable, and therefore is not comprehended.

Both parts are proved from the authority of the Fathers. Saint Dionysius or whoever is the ancient Author of the book *On the Divine Names* chapter 7 says: "For the divine mind does not know existing things by learning from existing things, but from itself and in itself it has anticipatory and pre-comprehended knowledge, science and essence of all things; not that it considers individual things through species, but that by one embrace of the cause it knows and contains all things... Therefore God knowing things, not by science of things, but by science of himself, knows them."

Saint Augustine book 83 Questions question 46 says it is sacrilegious to assert that God goes outside himself to know something. Which words Saint Thomas expounding here, says are to be understood not as if God beholds nothing which is outside himself; but because what is outside him he does not behold except in himself. Moreover Saint Augustine nowhere attributes to God evening knowledge by which things are known immediately in themselves, but only morning knowledge by which things are seen in the Word.

As to Saint Thomas, he voluntarily becomes blind who denies this opinion to him; and to omit many things which can be read in Sylvius article 5 of this question 8, his interpretation alone of Augustine's words proves it; also when he concludes the same article thus: "Thus therefore it must be said that God sees himself through his essence, but other things than himself he sees not in themselves, but in himself, insofar as his essence contains the likeness of others than himself."

Understand likeness not according to agreement in nature, but according to representation of effects in the cause: for the likeness of an effect pre-exists in its cause, since every agent acts like itself. And 1 *contra gentiles* cited in the margin, when he says that God knows himself as first and *per se* known, but other things as seen in his essence. This will again become more manifest from the following proofs taken from the Saint Doctor himself.

Adversaries respond that the Holy Fathers by these and similar words deny to God science of things which is received from the things themselves through their species; but not science by which he immediately knows things either through essence immediately representing them, or otherwise.

But on the contrary: If God knows things immediately in themselves, although not through species drawn from them, therefore he considers individual things, and knows them not only by knowledge of himself but of things, which is against Saint Dionysius: Therefore he beholds something outside himself and has evening knowledge, which is against Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas. Therefore God not only knows things in himself, but in themselves, which is again manifestly against Saint Thomas. Moreover that the divine essence cannot immediately represent things is evident from the following proof.

Both parts are proved again by reason: **First.** To know a thing immediately in itself is to know it through its proper species or one which immediately represents it: But to know a thing mediately in another is to know it through the species of another, that is through a species which represents another in which that thing is contained. This is evident both from the prenotation, which is Saint Thomas's, and because things are known in that mode and order in which they are represented through species: but God does not know things other than himself through species proper to them, but through the species proper to himself immediately representing him and other things than himself mediately, insofar as they are in him as in a cause: Therefore.

The minor is proved: There is no other species in God than his very essence, as is evident from what was said before: but God's essence as species does not immediately represent creatures, but himself and in himself creatures as effects contained in the cause: Therefore.

The minor is proved: **First.** God's essence is in intelligible being *per se* first God; this is evident from the terms; but if it immediately represented creatures, it would be in intelligible being equally God and creature: Therefore. **Second.** Immediate representation through species happens by reason of likeness in nature, or identity with the represented object: But God's essence is neither similar in nature, nor the same with creatures: Therefore. **Third.** God in the nature of object adequates his essence in the nature of species, for he is not less infinite in the nature of object than in the nature of species: Therefore as species, he can immediately represent nothing other than God himself, other things not except insofar as they are contained in God. The consequence is evident; because otherwise it would exceed in representing its adequate object, which implies in terms.

Vasquez, in order to extricate himself from this invincible argument, does not solve the knot, but cuts it: For he denies that God knows creatures through species. But on the contrary: This response **First.** Is against Augustine and all Theologians who receive from Augustine this principle: From object and power knowledge is born. **Second.** Is manifestly against Saint Thomas who here article 5 and ad 3 and elsewhere clearly asserts that essence is the intelligible species by which God knows himself and creatures. **Third.** Against reason, because cognition proceeds from power as its vital act with assimilation of the object: but if the intellective power is not actuated by the species of the object, there will be no reason why it should be assimilated to this object rather than another, why it should know this object rather than another; just as if

volition proceeded from the will without apprehension of the object, there would be no reason why it should will this object rather than another: just as therefore it implies that the will be the principle of volition of some object, unless through the mediation of its apprehension, so it implies that the intellect be the principle of intellection of some object without the concurrence of it or something taking its place.

And therefore others, abandoning this singular opinion of Vasquez, respond that the divine essence immediately represents creatures, which we have demonstrated to be false.

The second part of the conclusion is proved by another reason: If God attained creatures immediately in themselves independently from essence previously seen, creatures would be simultaneously with the divine essence the formal and specificative object of the divine intellect, which cannot be admitted: since to be specified by something is to receive species and perfection from it: Therefore.

The consequence is proved: that is the formal specificative object which is attained *per se* first, by reason of itself and not by reason of another: Therefore.

Solutions to Objections against the first part of the conclusion

You object with Vasquez: Between the medium of knowing and the thing known there must be a necessary connection, otherwise it will not be a medium of knowing certainly: but between God and creatures there is no necessary connection: therefore.

The minor is proved: If there were a necessary connection between God and creatures, it would follow **First.** That between God and creatures there would be mutual dependence; for necessary connection consists in this, that one cannot be without the other, which argues mutual dependence. It would follow **Second.** that if the possibility of creatures were removed, e.g. if one fly became impossible, God would be removed. It would follow **Third.** that the possibility of creatures would be equally necessary as God's omnipotence: but these are absurd: therefore.

I respond by denying the minor: for by this very fact that God is the source and necessary cause of all being, so that it implies that there be any being which is not from God, he is necessarily connected with all beings: whence to the first proof I deny the consequence: for necessary connection between two does not require mutual dependence, but it suffices that one so contain another that it essentially and necessarily demands that other thing depend on itself, for thus it is understood as necessarily connected with it, and cannot be without it: but God as the cause of all so contains creatures, that he essentially and necessarily demands that they depend on himself; consequently he is necessarily connected with them, without depending on them. Thus between essence and properties there is necessary connection although essence does not depend on properties, but properties only on essence.

To the second proof I distinguish the consequence: it would follow that if the possibility of creatures were removed, God would be removed *a priori*, that is that the destruction of the possibility of creatures would cause the destruction of God, I deny the consequence. *A posteriori*, in this sense that if the possibility of creatures were removed it could legitimately be inferred that God or his omnipotence was destroyed, I concede, since things are possible because God is omnipotent, if they were impossible it would follow that God was not omnipotent, consequently not God. True indeed it is that things are also denominated possible from the non-repugnance of terms; but since this non-repugnance is not something actually in the possible thing, it cannot be destroyed, except from the destruction of the cause.

To the third proof I deny the consequence: For it can happen that two are necessarily connected to each other, and yet one is more necessary than the other, because it rests on a firmer foundation: thus premises are more necessary than the conclusion, essence than properties, and yet these are necessarily connected to each other: For it cannot happen that the consequent be false, the antecedent remaining true, in a necessary consequence, nor that properties not be apt to follow from such an essence, it remaining.

You will insist: Between a demonstrative cause and the demonstrated effect there must intervene at least both mutual relation and perfect assimilation, for the dissimilar is not known in the dissimilar as in a medium: but neither intervenes between God and creatures: Therefore.

I respond to the first part of the major that if it proves anything, it proves not only that creatures are not knowable in God as in a cause, but not even that God is their cause, since between cause and effect, even abstracting from this that the effect is known in the cause, mutual relation intervenes: It must therefore be said that this is true only when cause and effect are of the same order, otherwise if they are of diverse order; then it suffices that what is of inferior order have relation to what is of superior order. Thus the blessed Virgin has relation to Christ, but Christ on account of the divine suppositum does not have relation to the blessed Virgin.

To the second part of the Major, **I respond** that it is true concerning immediate cognition through species, because species is the very thing known in intelligible being. But as to mediate cognition in a cause, the dissimilar can be known in the dissimilar, provided the dissimilarity comes not from defect but from excess; so that the medium of cognition contains all the perfections of the thing known and many others; thus we know the ternary number in the senary, animal in man; but God is dissimilar to creature, not because he lacks perfections which are in creatures, but because he has those and infinitely more.

You object **Second.** God is the cause of creatures insofar as he is omnipotent: but science in God, in our mode of conceiving, precedes omnipotence, for it is directive of omnipotence: Therefore God knows creatures before he knows them in himself as in a cause.

I respond by distinguishing the major: God is the cause of creatures insofar as he is omnipotent radically, I concede the major. But he has this through essence. Insofar as he is omnipotent formally, I subdivide: He is the proximate cause, I concede the major. The radical cause, I deny the major. Moreover, granted that science precedes formal omnipotence, because this is an attribute consequent to understanding, or rather understanding itself as practical, as I said in the preceding article, yet not radical. By this very fact therefore that God knows his essence, he knows creatures in himself as in a radical cause.

Moreover when we say that God sees creatures in his essence as in a cause; cause comprehends all the radical attributes which concur or can concur to the effection of creatures, such as ideas, art, directing intellect, moving will, executing power, which, as I said before, is nothing other than science itself practically practical; Whence speculative science knows things in science as it is practically practical and executive.

You object **Third.** To know something in a cause is to know discursively: but God does not discourse: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major: To know something in a cause by several acts is to know discursively, I concede the major. By one act, I deny the major. For then only is the intellect said to discourse from one to another, when by diverse apprehension it apprehends one and another, otherwise when it attains cause and effect, and effect in cause, by one simple act, as God does. And therefore we do not properly say that God knows things other than himself through a cause, but in a cause. And when we say that he knows things other than himself in himself as in a cause previously known: that "previously," does not speak priority of time, but of order and reason.

You object **Fourth.** An Angel comprehends his essence, and yet does not know all the intellections which he can form: Therefore neither does God know all the creatures which he can form.

I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that the essence of an Angel is not the adequate and complete cause of all the intellections which he can form, but needs to be completed for this through the species of all possible intellections; but God is the adequate and complete cause of all beings.

You will insist: God is not the adequate cause of vital acts: Therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent. For although God is not the formal cause of a vital act, under the formality of vitality, that is insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle moving itself—for when I see, God does not see through my vision; yet whatever is of entity and perfection in a vital act is from God and is contained eminently in him.

You will reply: God is not the adequate cause of the possibility of things: Therefore. The antecedent is proved: The possibility of things is repeated not only from God's omnipotence, but from the aptitude or non-repugnance of terms: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: God is not the adequate cause of the possibility of things by causality exercisable toward their possibility, I concede the antecedent. By causality exercisable toward their existence toward which they are possible, I deny the antecedent. For possibility, or non-repugnance of things is not for existing from themselves, but from God.

You will urge: God is not the cause of beings of reason, nor of privations, nor of sins: but yet he knows them: Therefore.

I respond. As to beings of reason, that God is their mediate cause, insofar as he is the cause of our intellections, by which we feign beings of reason; when therefore he knows intellections in himself as in a cause, he also knows their objects which are beings of reason.

As to privations, also and evils whether physical or moral, namely sins, which are also privations, God knows them in opposite forms; but he knows opposite forms, since he is their cause, in himself as in a cause, and thus it remains true that God knows things other than himself in himself as in a cause, whether mediately or immediately. Confer article 2 of this dissertation §1.

You say **Fourth.** Require also in the same § some other arguments pertaining to this.

Solutions to Objections against the second part of the Conclusion

You object **First.** God knows created truths in every way they are knowable: But they are knowable not only mediately in a cause, but immediately in themselves; for thus Angels, thus we know them: Therefore. This is the principal reason of the Adversaries.

I respond by distinguishing the major: God knows created truths in every way they are knowable on the part of the object known, I concede the major. On the part of the knower, I deny the major. There is therefore no knowability in creatures which escapes God's science, but it is not necessary that he know them in all the ways by which other knowers can know them; otherwise he ought to know them discursively and by abstracting from matter, since thus we know them. Just as therefore God does not know creatures discursively and by abstracting from matter, because such modes of knowing import imperfection; so he does not know them immediately in themselves, because such cognition also imports imperfection. **First.** For the divine intellect would have to be informed by a created species immediately representing creatures, since the divine essence cannot immediately represent them, as we proved. **Second.** It would have to be specified by the creatures themselves, as we also proved.

You will insist **First.** Cognition of a thing in itself is more perfect than cognition of it in another: Therefore this should not be denied to God. The antecedent is proved **First** from Saint Thomas here article 10 ad 4 saying that to know something through another only is of imperfect cognition, if that thing is knowable *per se*. **Second** from example: It is more perfect to see a man in himself than in a mirror. **Third** by reason, because cognition of a thing in another is abstractive, but cognition of a thing in itself is intuitive.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: Cognition of a thing in itself is more perfect than cognition of it in another, if the thing is contained less perfectly in the other than it is in itself, I concede the antecedent. If the thing is contained equally perfectly and more perfectly in the other than it is in itself, I deny the antecedent. But things in God as the first and universal effective and exemplar cause are contained more perfectly as to all their differences and perfections than they are in themselves, and therefore are seen more perfectly and clearly in God than in themselves. Whence Augustine calls the cognition of things in God morning, that is clearer, and the cognition of things in themselves he calls evening, that is more obscure.

And hence is evident the response to the proofs of the antecedent. Therefore to the first **I respond** that Saint Thomas is to be understood in the sense of the given distinction, namely that cognition of one in another is imperfect, if it is imperfectly contained in the other. To the second the disparity is evident, because a man is contained less perfectly in a mirror than he is in himself. To the third **I respond** that cognition is not called abstractive from the fact that it knows a thing immediately or mediately; but abstractive is said which attains the essence of a thing and not its existence; Intuitive which attains the existence of a thing and the mode in which it is in itself, and thus it can be attained with a medium if in that the thing is represented as to existence and the mode in which it is in itself, and thus things are represented in God. Whence the cognition which God has of merely possible things is abstractive, but which he has of past, present or future things is intuitive.

You will insist: Things in God are not formally, for God is not formally man: Therefore he does not know them equally perfectly in himself as in themselves.

I respond First by denying the consequence. For although things are not in God formally, they are however in him causally and eminently and thus more perfectly than in themselves. Whence **I respond Second** by distinguishing the antecedent: They are not in God formally in entitative being, I concede the antecedent. In representative being, I deny the antecedent. For by this very fact that the divine essence is both the effective and exemplar and artificial cause of things, it represents them as they are *a parte rei* (from the side of the thing) in themselves.

You will reply from the contrary sense: Things are *a parte rei* subject to various defects: But in God they are pure from every defect, for none is found in God: Therefore God cannot know them as they are *a parte rei* through what they are in him.

I respond by distinguishing the minor: Things are as in God entitatively pure from every defect, I concede the minor. As they are in God representatively, I deny the minor. For since, as we said before, defects are known through opposite perfections, that defects may be represented to the knower, it is not necessary that they be in the medium in which they are known, but rather that there be opposite perfections: Thus e.g. in the number six I know three with the imperfection by which it falls short of six, and yet six does not contain this imperfection, but rather the opposite perfection.

You will urge: He who sees the idea of a perfect house and does not see the house in itself, does not see its defects, because there are none in such an idea, but they happen to the house as it is *a parte rei*: Therefore similarly God.

I respond by denying the consequence. The disparity is that God is the cause of everything that is in the thing, and therefore no defect can happen to it as it is in the thing, unless God permits and orders it to his ends, consequently unless he knows it. But not so the artificer or idea, for since they are not the cause of everything that concurs to the construction of the house, defects can happen to it from something which is not contained in the idea.

You object **Second** certain testimonies of Saint Thomas which seem to militate against both parts of the Conclusion. **First.** Saint Thomas 1 *contra gentiles* chapter 57 says that the divine essence is related to other things, not like a principle to conclusions, but like a species to known things: Therefore according to Saint Thomas God does not know things in himself as in a cause, but immediately in themselves. **Second.** The Saint Doctor here article 7 ad 2 says that God does not know through a cause previously known unknown effects, but knows them in the cause. Therefore the same as before. **Third.** Below question 20 article 2 ad 2 he says that God from eternity knew things in their proper natures... just as we through likenesses of things which are in us, know things existing in themselves. Therefore the same.

I respond. To the first: The sense of Saint Thomas is that the divine essence is not related like a principle to conclusions, with respect to creatures, as to the mode of discourse, because it does not manifest in an illative way, but by one and simple representation of cause and effect, and thus it has more the mode of species, although yet it does not immediately represent creatures, but the divine essence and through it mediately creatures. In the same sense is the second authority to be understood, for "through a cause" imports discourse, not "in a cause"; whence there the Saint Doctor concludes that God's cognition is without discourse. Wherefore I deny the consequent: Therefore according to Saint Thomas God does not know creatures in his essence as in a cause as to the mode of knowing, namely through discourse, I concede the consequent. As to the thing known, I deny the consequent; for the divine essence is the reason to which as to the thing known the cognition of creatures is reduced.

To the third **I respond** that Saint Thomas in this makes comparison only, that just as we through species know things in their proper natures, so God from eternity knows things in their proper natures and not only as to the essential being which they have in God: this is evident from the argument which he objects to himself, and to which the Saint Doctor responds, which demands nothing else: with this however it stands that he sees them in himself as in a cause. Confer article 2 §1 conclusion 2 and in the following objection.

DISSERTATION VI: On the Foreknowledge of Future Things

Since we have dealt with God's knowledge according to itself and the knowledge of simple intelligence, we must now treat the knowledge of future things, concerning which there are the most serious difficulties. **1.** We will discuss the knowledge of absolute futures, and afterwards the knowledge of conditional futures, and consequently middle knowledge (scientia media), which in all of theology is the most celebrated question between the Fathers of the Society [of Jesus] on one side with a few outsiders, and all other theologians, especially the Thomists, on the other.

We inquire therefore in this dissertation: **1.** In general, what and how manifold is the future. **2.** Concerning absolute futures, whether God knows them all certainly and infallibly. **3.** How they are present to him in eternity. **4.** In what medium he knows them. Concerning conditional futures we inquire: **1.** Whether God knows them. **2.** In what medium he knows them, and whether middle knowledge is admitted in the sense of the Fathers of the Society?

ARTICLE I: What and How Manifold Is the Future?

I say 1. The future is correctly defined: That which is determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time. The defenders of middle knowledge do not admit this definition, but rather attack it with all their strength, because they see that their system is overthrown by it.

Nevertheless, it is proven **1.** by authority. St. Augustine in book 6 of Genesis according to the literal sense, chapter 17, says: For God to make future things is nothing other than to prepare their causes. And in Tract 68 on John: God makes future things by predestining them. St. Thomas in question 2 on truth, article 12, reply to 7: When it is said "this is future," the order that exists in the causes of that thing for its production is designated. In this part, question 16, article 7, reply to 3: Everything that exists was future before it existed, because it was in its cause so as to be made; not in the cause as merely powerful, for this denominates only the possible; not in the cause as actually influencing, for this denominates the actually existing: Therefore in the cause as determined to produce in subsequent time. And from this the fundamental reason is derived.

Therefore, it is proven **2.** by reason. To be future is a real denomination, not intrinsic (for this does not belong to a non-existing thing), but extrinsic, and therefore taken from some real extrinsic form: but this can be nothing other than its cause as determined to give it being in subsequent time. For it cannot be the cause as merely able to produce, because this denominates only the possible; nor as actually producing, because this denominates the existing: Therefore.

It is confirmed: the future should be constituted by that through which it is extracted from the mass of possibilities and distinguished from the possible and the existing: but nothing else is assignable through which it obtains this, except the determination of that cause: Therefore. The minor is proven: The possible is indeed contained in a powerful cause but one indeterminate to produce it; the existing is outside causes: Therefore the future, which mediates between both, is constituted in a middle way, not through a merely powerful and indifferent cause, not through a cause actually producing, but through a cause determined to give it being for subsequent time.

Adversaries respond that the future is constituted by the relation to being for subsequent time, or from the fact that it will be. But on the contrary: I ask whence the contingent future, about which there is the greatest question, has a relation to being, or has that it will be rather than will not be? From itself or from a cause: Not from itself, otherwise it would not be a contingent future but necessary, and would be future in every sign of reason before it was conceived as possible or God as existing. If from a cause, not from a cause merely able to produce it, since this is indifferent to producing or not producing, it does not give a relation to being rather than to non-being, but constitutes only the possible, as has been said; nor from a cause as actually producing, because, as I also said, this makes the actually existing: Therefore from a cause determined to give being.

They object: According to our opinion it could happen that something would exist in fact that had never been future, namely if before it was made, the cause had not been determined to produce it; and conversely that something would be future that would never be made, if namely the determined cause were impeded from producing: But these two things seem absurd: Therefore.

I respond: These two things can happen with respect to secondary causes and this is not inconvenient, but not with respect to the first cause, because nothing exists in time that was not determined by God from eternity, and what is determined by God infallibly obtains being in time.

From what has been said it spontaneously flows that there is no contingent future independently of the determination of the first cause, because while the first cause remains indeterminate, no secondary cause is determinate, otherwise it would not be a secondary but a first cause. And from this the system of middle knowledge is fundamentally overthrown, as will be clear from what follows.

I say 2. Future is either necessary or contingent: necessary is that which by its nature seeks to be at some time, and is not naturally impedible, like tomorrow's sunrise. Contingent, if taken broadly, is indeed that which by its nature seeks to be at some time, but from the concurrence of other causes is naturally impedible, like long life from a robust temperament. Contingent properly and strictly taken is that which by its nature is indifferent to being and non-being, as are those things that depend on free will.

The properly contingent future is either absolute or conditional. Absolute is that which does not depend on any condition, unless perhaps on a condition to be posited, because if the condition is to be posited, although apparently and as to mode it is a conditional future, yet in reality it is absolute, like Peter's conversion, if Christ should look upon him. Conditional is that which depends on a condition not to be posited, like the conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians if the Gospel were announced to them.

Again, conditional future is either pertinent or impertinent, or disparate. Pertinent is that which has some connection, whether moral or physical, with the condition, like the conversion of the Tyrians if the Gospel were preached to them, the salvation of Judas if he should do penance. Disparate is that which has no connection with the condition, like "if a goat should leap, a tree will flower"; or that of Elisha to King Joash in 4 Kings 13: "If you had struck five or six or seven times, you would have struck Syria even to consumption."

ARTICLE II: Whether God Certainly and Infallibly Knows All Absolute Contingent and Free Futures?

Although in the preceding we have proven that God knows all things, none excepted, yet because there is a special difficulty about futures that depend on our will, by reason of preserving freedom, therefore we institute a special question about these.

Cicero in book 2 on divination, when he could not reconcile foreknowledge of futures in God with our freedom, to preserve this, denied that. From the same principle, on the contrary, the Stoics, and after them the Hussites at the Council of Constance, session 15, to preserve foreknowledge of futures in God, denied free will. Marcion denied foreknowledge of futures in God, because he allowed Adam to sin, which if he had known he should not have created him: The Socinians hold that free futures are known by God only conjecturally, thinking that they do not have objective truth, and thus are not in the genus of knowables.

Against all these I say: God certainly and infallibly knows all absolute, contingent and free futures, with freedom unimpaired. This is of faith.

The first part is proven from Scripture. Psalm 138: "You have understood my thoughts from afar, and you have foreseen all my ways." Isaiah 48: "I know that you will transgress transgressing,

and I have called you a transgressor from the womb." John 6: "Jesus knew from the beginning who were the non-believers, and who would betray him": And elsewhere throughout. In these, as is clear, it concerns free futures. Nor should you say with the Socinians that by these is signified only conjectural knowledge: For this is repugnant to the most perfect being, the first truth and supreme intelligence: Or that some things are indeed known by God but not all; for there is no reason why from many futures he should know one rather than another, as will be clear from the following reasons: Therefore he either knows none, or knows all.

Moreover, God revealed many things in the Scriptures through the Prophets concerning contingent futures: Whence Tertullian in book 2 against Marcion, chapter 5, says that God's foreknowledge has as many witnesses as he made Prophets. Indeed, foreknowledge of futures is assigned in Scripture as the most certain token of divinity. Isaiah 41: "Announce what things are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods." And therefore by common human sense, those who predict futures are called Divine, and their predictions, Divination, so that by this it is signified to be something proper to God: Hence Tertullian in the Apology, chapter 20: "Suitable," he says, "testimony of divinity is the truth of divination." And Augustine in book 5 of the City of God, chapter 9, against Cicero: "To confess that there is a God and deny foreknowledge of futures is most manifest madness." I refrain from citing more Fathers, because they are everywhere obvious.

It is proven **2.** by manifold reason. **1.** The knowledge of God as it has the will adjoined makes futures, as I said above: Therefore he knows them. And granted that God's knowledge does not make futures, it is certain at least that they are not made except with God willing or permitting: Therefore he knows them in his will as in their cause.

2. A contingent future, e.g., this one, "Antichrist will be," has determinate truth: Therefore it is known by the infinitely intelligent God. The antecedent is proven: This proposition, "Antichrist will be," has its truth about being and will sometime be as is signified by it: Therefore it is determinately true, no less than a proposition about the past which had its truth about being, like this, "Peter sinned."

3. God knows things while he actually produces them externally: Therefore he knew them beforehand, otherwise his knowledge would be changeable.

4. Although contingent things as they are considered in secondary causes cannot be certainly known, because thus they are indeterminate, yet when they are present, they can be certainly known: but what are future to us are present to God, insofar as his knowledge, since it is measured by eternity like his being, simultaneously embraces all differences of times, and thus his intuition is directed to all things that are in whatever difference of time as if present to him: Therefore. To all these add that to the supreme and most perfect intelligence should be attributed the most perfect knowledge, which is the certain and infallible knowledge of all futures.

Nor does it matter that predictions of freely future things are sometimes expressed in Scripture under the particle "perhaps" or "maybe." For this particle is not used to signify some uncertainty in God; but because Scripture speaks in the human manner, and signifies that what is predicted is always uncertain with respect to us and is to be posited freely by us; sometimes also it is used to signify the difficulty of the thing.

Nor does it matter that certain prophecies are read in Scripture that were not fulfilled, like the destruction of Nineveh in Jonah 3, the death of King Hezekiah in 2 Kings and Isaiah 38. For these prophecies were not absolute, but conditional, as are ordinarily the comminatory and promissory ones. Thus the destruction of the Ninevites was predicted if they should not convert, the death of Hezekiah if the ordinary course of secondary causes should remain, which God willed to be changed.

When however you hear some Fathers deny foreknowledge to God: Understand foreknowledge as to the name, because since what are future to us are present to God, as I shall now say, he does not have foreknowledge of them properly and rigorously, but knowledge.

The second part is also of faith as we shall prove elsewhere: Whence although our finite mind could not apprehend the reconciliation of both, yet it would not be permitted to deny either. But it is both proven and simultaneously the modes are explained by which our freedom can stand with divine foreknowledge.

1. From the principle already posited by St. Thomas: God sees futures not only according to the state they have in contingent causes before they are made, but he sees them in the now of eternity according to the state they have in their presentness: but knowledge of a present thing is certain and infallible, nor does anything of contingency harm it; for when I see Socrates sitting, my knowledge is infallible and certain, yet no necessity of sitting is imposed on Socrates from this: Therefore God, inspecting all things that are past, future, or present to us as if present, knows them infallibly and with certainty, yet in such a way that no necessity of existing is imposed on contingent things.

2. God foresees and provides future things, not only as to their substance, but also as to their mode of necessity and contingency, as St. Thomas often inculcates: Therefore from the fact that he certainly and infallibly knows contingent futures, it not only does not follow that they will happen necessarily, but rather it follows certainly that they will happen contingently and freely, otherwise his foreknowledge would be deceived: Therefore this foreknowledge does nothing to harm the contingency of things.

3. Certain and infallible foreknowledge of futures taken precisely under the office of foreknowledge changes nothing in future things or their causes, but has only to know what will happen and how: Therefore, notwithstanding this, what are contingent will happen contingently, and what are necessary necessarily, and it suffices for this certain and infallible knowledge that it

should have a certain and infallible medium in which what are future are represented to it: for the state of things in the mind of the knower is one thing, another in themselves, and just as what are necessary per se can be known contingently, so what are contingent in their causes can be known certainly, if namely the medium of knowledge is certain. Necessity or contingency is in things and from things, but certainty or uncertainty of knowledge is in the mind by reason of the medium: Therefore.

From these is solved the oft-repeated argument which so long fatigued the ancients and drove them into opposite errors, namely this: If God certainly and infallibly foreknows contingent and free futures, they are no longer contingent and free, but necessary; and if they are contingent and free, foreknowledge is not certain and infallible: Because certain and infallible foreknowledge cannot be deceived, and those things which it foreknows cannot happen otherwise.

It is clear, I say, from what has been said that both parts of the assumption should be denied, and to the proof sought from the certainty and infallibility of foreknowledge it is equally clear that neither part is proven by it. **1.** Because according to the second reason, foreknowledge is not only of the thing, but of the mode of contingency, and thus when it is certain and infallible, the thing will certainly happen contingently. **2.** Because according to the third reason, the certainty of foreknowledge is sought from the medium of knowledge, but the necessity or contingency of things from the things themselves, and thus it does not involve that a contingent thing be certainly foreknown. **3.** Because according to the first reason, the vision of a present thing, such as God has of the future, is completely unrelated to its necessity or contingency.

It is indeed true that while God sees a present thing, it is necessary that it be, insofar as it is subject to such vision; just as while I see Socrates sitting, it is necessary that Socrates sit, insofar as his sitting is subject to my vision; because what is, as long as it is, it is necessary that it be; but such necessity, as is clear, is only hypothetical and of consequence, not absolute and of the consequent. This is: if I see Socrates sitting, it follows necessarily that he sits, but it does not follow that he sits necessarily. Whence when it is added in the argument that things certainly foreknown cannot happen otherwise, it is true in the composite sense and consequent power, because it cannot stand simultaneously that I see Socrates sit and he not sit, otherwise he would simultaneously sit and not sit; but it is false in the divided sense and antecedent power, because while I see Socrates sit, he sits so freely that he can not sit. About this again elsewhere.

ARTICLE III: How Are Futures Present to God in Eternity?

That futures are present to God in eternity can be understood in two ways: objectively or intentionally, and physically or really. Objectively insofar as they are represented to the divine cognition as present according to that real being which they will have when they are produced. Physically, insofar as they really exist in eternity.

For eternity, although it is in itself indivisible and total simultaneously, nevertheless has a certain virtual extension, or virtually distinct parts corresponding by analogy to the diverse parts of past, present and future time; just as the divine being, although it is most simple, nevertheless is equivalent to several perfections dispersed and distinct in creatures.

It is inquired therefore whether futures are present to God not only objectively and intentionally, but physically and really in eternity, not according to itself as a whole, but insofar as it corresponds virtually to that difference of time in which futures will be produced and exist. It is not therefore a question whether futures are really present to God through their anticipated production in eternity, distinct from that by which they are produced in time; for this is a crude understanding and contrary to Faith, since it is certain of faith that nothing is produced from eternity, but all things in time; but, as I said, whether they are really present to God through the virtual coextension of eternity itself to that difference of time in which they will sometime exist.

That futures are present to God in eternity objectively and intentionally is not doubtful, since God contains in himself all ideas and reasons which future things will have in time, he knows them in himself according to that real being which they will have when they are produced; which is to have them present objectively and intentionally.

I say: Futures are present to God in eternity not only objectively and intentionally, but physically and really. This is common among Thomists, to whom are joined from the Society, Molina, Fonseca, Tiphanius and others.

It is proven **1.** by authority. St. Augustine in book 2 to Simplician, question 2, St. Gregory the Pope in book 20 of morals, chapter 23, and several others, deny **1.** foreknowledge in God rigorously. **2.** They deny that anything is future to God. **3.** Finally they deny as something most absurd that God should know something anew in time which he did not know before: But if futures were present to God only objectively and intentionally, not physically and really, **1.** he would have foreknowledge of them rigorously, as is clear in the Prophets, who notwithstanding the objective presence they have of futures, nevertheless have foreknowledge of them rigorously. **2.** Futures would be absolutely future to God, since not objective presence, but only real presence removes the reason of true futurity. **3.** Finally he would know something anew in time which he did not know before, namely things physically existing: Therefore.

As for St. Thomas, he seems entirely for this opinion although some ancients and several more recent interpreters understand him otherwise. Especially here in article 13 he says that eternity existing simultaneously embraces all time, whence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason by which he has the reasons of things present with himself, as some say; Behold objective presence: but because his intuition is directed from eternity upon all things as they are in their presentness, without doubt real, since there is no middle between objective and real; and especially because a little before in the same place he had said that God

knows all contingent things, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them is actually in itself: For objective presence is not that by which each thing is actually in itself, but by which it is in the intellect. In 1 distinction 38, question 1, article 5: Since therefore God with one eternal, non-successive intuition sees all times, he sees all contingent things in diverse times from eternity presentially, not only as having being in his knowledge: Therefore as having being in themselves. See the whole article.

Moreover the holy Doctor in the cited places and in question 2 on truth, article 12, in book 1 against the Gentiles, chapters 66, 67, and elsewhere a hundred times recurs to eternity which embraces all time and by which his knowledge is measured to prove that things are present to God: But if he understood only objective presence, there would be no need to recur to eternity by which his knowledge is measured, since a really absent thing can be objectively present to knowledge measured by time. Likewise in the same places he proves that things are seen by God intuitively, because they are present to him in eternity: But if he understood only objective presence, he would prove the same by the same, namely that things are seen by God because they are seen. Therefore.

It is proven secondly by reason. **1.** Eternity is infinite duration in the nature of duration, indivisible and total simultaneously, as is clear from its definition commonly received from Boethius: But by reason of infinity it contains all durations, past, present and future: By reason of indivisibility and simultaneity it contains those, although successively flowing, in an indivisible mode in the same now, without any succession: Therefore all times and things measured by time are really present to God by reason of eternity. Hence St. Bernard in sermon 80 on the Canticles: "Times pass under it (eternity) not past it, it does not expect the future, does not recollect the past, does not experience the present," namely by transient experience.

Adversaries respond that eternity indeed lacks intrinsic and entitative succession, but not extrinsic succession taken from things succeeding among themselves and successively coexisting with eternity itself. Hence they compare eternity to a tree planted on the bank of a river to which the flowing parts of water successively become present without change or succession on its part.

But on the contrary: From this response it would follow **1.** that eternity would not be infinite in the nature of duration, just as immensity would not be infinite in the nature of immensity, if it could not simultaneously coexist with all imaginable differences of places. It would follow **2.** that it would not be total simultaneously and perfect possession, as it is commonly defined: For from whatever source the defect of actual possession comes, whether from the intrinsic part of the possessor, or from the part of the thing to be possessed, it is not simultaneous and perfect possession, as is clear in one who does not possess riches from their defect. Whence eternity would be better compared to a tree planted in the middle of a river of such extension that it would contain the whole river, simultaneously and at once without succession coexisting with all

parts of the flowing water, nor should it await their passage to possess and measure them: Thus eternity.

Or with St. Thomas, God in eternity is compared to a man existing in a high watchtower from which he sees the whole road and all those passing through it; for although one walks after another, and the former does not see the latter, yet he who is in the watchtower sees all simultaneously and has them present to himself. Similarly God has all things present to himself in the watchtower of eternity, even past and future things, although they succeed among themselves and cannot simultaneously exist in their proper duration.

2. God's knowledge since it is most perfect should be invariable: But it would not be invariable if he did not see future things really present in his eternity: Therefore. The minor is proven: If things were not really present to God in eternity, he would begin to see them anew as really present in time, namely when they would be produced: Therefore, as Augustine argued above, he would know them twice, now as future, afterwards as really present, and something would happen anew in time to his knowledge, and thus it would be changed, just as God's will would be changed if he should begin to will something now which he did not will before: Therefore.

You will object: It is unintelligible that something should exist in eternity which does not exist in itself, for it is prior to exist in itself than in another: But futures do not exist in themselves now and from eternity, e.g., Antichrist does not exist in himself now: Therefore they do not exist in eternity. It is confirmed: It is impossible for any place to coexist with divine immensity unless it first exists in itself: Therefore by parity.

It is commonly responded by distinguishing the minor: Futures do not exist in themselves now in their proper duration, granted. They do not exist in themselves now in the superior duration of eternity, denied. For eternity according to virtual extension contains the difference of time in which Antichrist, e.g., will be in proper duration.

But so that this may be more explained and equivocation removed, it should be observed with our John of St. Thomas, disputation 9, article 3, that eternity does not measure created things immediately and supposing them already passively changed and produced in themselves, but precisely as they are contained in the divine action by which created things are attained and regarded as its terminus.

Therefore created being here should not be considered either as it is virtually within God and is God himself; nor precisely as it is in omnipotence and in created causes as possible, nor as it is in the will of producing as future, but as it is attained by God's action. But God's action is eternal, and yet has its effect in time, according to that of St. Thomas in question 1 on power, article 1, reply to 8: "God's power is always conjoined with operation, but effects follow according to the command of the will. Whence it is not necessary that it should always be conjoined with the effect, just as it is not necessary that creatures should have been from eternity." And in Prima

Pars, question 46, article 1, reply to 10: "In God's eternal action there does not follow an eternal effect, but such as God willed. In other causes, the action being posited, the effect immediately follows."

It is therefore special in God's action that it is eternal and its effect is passively changed in time. Wherefore (And this is the sum of the observation) the effect of God's action can be considered in two ways: in one way as passively changed and produced, and thus it founds its proper duration and is not from eternity: In another way as it is precisely the terminus connoted and respected by eternal action, and under this aspect it is drawn to a higher measure and is from eternity, because it is measured by the same measure by which the action is measured of which it is the terminus, not as changed by it, but as connoted by it. Thus the most profound Theologian, with few additions.

Therefore according to this explanation, I distinguish the minor of the argument: futures do not exist in themselves now and from eternity, as effects passively changed and produced, granted the minor. As termini connoted of actual eternal action, denied the minor. And hence also the response to the confirmation is clear: For the disparity is that for immensity to occupy some place, it should touch it with the contact of power operating in it, as we have said elsewhere, but in places which are not, it does not operate. But for futures to coexist with eternity, it suffices that they be sometime future, because from this very fact they become termini connoted of eternal action, and therefore measured by eternity like the eternal action itself. Add that immensity is infinite in the nature of placing only, from which it follows that it should fill all differences of present places, upward, downward, rightward, leftward, etc. But place as future or past under this aspect is not of the line of immensity, but of eternity.

If you insist: The effect precisely as terminus connoted of eternal action is nothing real outside causes: Therefore. I respond by distinguishing: Nothing real outside causes in this sense that it is not passively changed, granted. In this sense that it is only possible or future with respect to God, denied. Because as such it is no longer considered within the divine essence as merely powerful or willing to produce, but as actually producing, from which it is understood to have created being outside causes, not indeed as passively changed, nor yet as in first act possible or future only, but in second act as connoted by actually existing action as its terminus; and thus we say it is really present in eternity.

According to this understanding which Contensonus also follows, the difficulty seems to vanish and is reduced to a question of name, and simultaneously several difficult instances are forestalled, which therefore we omit.

From what has been said you will gather **1.** That possibles are not present to God in eternity, because they are not termini of eternal action. **2.** That when we say God sees futures as present in his eternity, the sense is not that he sees them immediately in themselves independently of the

essence or attributes previously seen, since as is clear from the solution of the objection, he sees them insofar as they are termini connoted of his action, and therefore by its mediation: Therefore he knows them as present in his essence as actually acting, although they are not passively changed except in time according to the good pleasure of the divine will.

You will ask **1.** Whether this real presence of things in eternity is necessary for the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge, as we said it is necessary for its invariability? I respond: That the real presence of things in eternity conduces maximally to the certainty of divine knowledge is not doubtful: because thence things contract a certain necessity, namely hypothetical; For what is, as long as it is, it is necessary that it be, as the common axiom holds. Supposing however that per impossibile things were not really present in eternity, and nevertheless the divine decree measured by eternity remained, more probably would be preserved, by reason of that decree, the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge, because since it is measured by eternity, efficacious and unimpedible, it is infallibly connected with the definite future; and thus there will be certain and infallible knowledge of it, if not by reason of the object at least by reason of the medium. Thus John of St. Thomas, Gonet and several other Thomists against the Salmanticenses and others.

You will ask **2.** Whether the real presence of things in eternity is necessary so that their divine cognition be intuitive? I respond affirmatively. Thus commonly the Thomists. The reason is that intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive in this alone, that the latter abstracts from existence as exercised in the object which it regards; but intuitive essentially requires to be terminated to an object really and exercitedly existing: whence St. Thomas says that vision adds upon simple cognition something outside the genus of knowledge, which is existence, not indeed objective and intentional existence, since this is in the understanding intellect, consequently not outside the genus of knowledge; therefore physical and real. Likewise he says: "Knowledge of vision is said in God in likeness to bodily sight which intuits things posited outside itself."

It is confirmed: objective and intentional presence is common to all cognition, both abstractive and intuitive, since no object can be known by the intellect unless it is present to it through an intentional species: Therefore not through intentional but real presence is intuitive knowledge distinguished from abstractive.

If you say that intuitive knowledge is distinguished from abstractive **1.** In that intuitive is clearer, abstractive more obscure. **2.** In that intuitive is through a proper species, abstractive through the species of another. Against the first: God most clearly sees possible things, and yet this knowledge of his is not intuitive. Against the second: God knows intuitively futures, present and past things not through their proper species, but through his essence as taking the place of a species. Likewise things through their proper essence can equally be known under a future or past state as under the actual exercise of existence: Therefore through a proper species they can be known abstractively.

You will say: knowledge infused to Peter in Paris about John existing in Rome, attaining John as existing with all his individual accidents, is intuitive, and yet John would not be locally present to Peter: Therefore real presence is not required for intuitive knowledge. I respond: Perhaps the antecedent could be denied, but granting it, I distinguish the consequent: Therefore real local presence is not required for intuitive knowledge, let it pass. Real presence in some duration is not required, denied the consequent. The reason for the disparity is that without local coexistence, knowledge can be terminated to an object as exercitedly existing outside causes, which is required for intuitive knowledge; but it cannot without coexistence in some duration.

ARTICLE IV: In What Medium Does God Know Absolute, Contingent and Free Futures?

Although we have said in the preceding article that absolute futures are present to God in eternity, yet because they do not exist in their proper duration, but are future in themselves, and on the other hand according to us, things are not known by God immediately in themselves, and the presence of a thing in eternity is not the medium in which it is known, as some falsely think, but the mode of the known object; we now inquire in what medium God knows absolute futures and especially contingent and free ones? About conditionals in the following dissertation.

This question is of the highest moment on which several others depend. We indeed from the principles posited resolve it without much difficulty: for if, as has been said in the preceding, God does not know things other than himself in themselves, but in himself or in their cause, and he is the cause of things in first act through his essence by which he can do all things, and in second act through his will by which he wills these things to be in fact rather than others, it is clear that just as he knows possibles in his essence precisely regarded, so he knows futures in his essence determined through his will, or in the decree of his will.

But because this doctrine paves the way for the assertion of grace efficacious per se and the overthrow of middle knowledge, the Fathers of the Society and their followers attack it with total and unanimous effort: but when they are pressed to assign another medium in which God knows futures, they are reduced to straits and disagreeing among themselves go into various inventions. Molina assigns the supercomprehension of secondary causes: Suarez a future decree: Theophilus Raynaudus a secondary cause left to itself: Among the more recent some assign formal truth of propositions, others objective truth: A recent Molinist writer Honoratus Tournely in question 16 on God's knowledge, article 3, conclusions 3 and 4, assigns the divine essence as an intelligible species infinite in representing. Another is an older opinion close to this which is attributed to Aegidius Romanus, according to which God knows futures in his ideas.

We will therefore first attack these various opinions, then establish the true opinion. Whence it follows.

§. I. Less True Opinions Are Rejected

I say 1. God does not know absolute free futures in his essence as it has the nature of idea or intelligible species before the decree. The first part is against Aegidius Romanus, if however he understood about ideas excluding the decree, which is not established. The second against Tournely.

Both parts are proven: In a cause indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, a future effect rather than non-future cannot be known, this is clear from the terms: but God's essence as it has the nature of idea or species before the decree is indifferent to a future or non-future effect; for it is the free cause of things in second act and through its will, so that they are not future except because he wills, and therefore before the decree it represents them indeed as possible, but not as future: Therefore.

Nor does it matter that the divine essence is infinite in representing, for it cannot therefore represent what is not representable; but before the decree, nothing is representable as future, because it is not future.

I say 2. God does not know contingent futures in the supercomprehension of secondary causes before the decree. This is against Molina who had few followers in this.

It is proven by the same reason: Because neither comprehension nor supercomprehension of any cause can apprehend in it what is not contained in it: but in a secondary cause before the decree of the divine will, the effect is not contained as determinately future, but indifferently to being or not being, for a secondary cause cannot be determined to futurity rather than non-futurity before the decree or determination of the first cause: Therefore. These are clear from what was said in Article 1 of this Dissertation and will be even clearer from what will be said.

You will object: St. Thomas in book 1 against the Gentiles, chapter 67, says that just as from a necessary cause a necessary effect is certainly known, so from a contingent cause not impeded a contingent effect is certainly known: Therefore.

I respond: St. Thomas speaks of a contingent cause taken broadly or non-free, which although it acts necessarily, can nevertheless be naturally impeded from the concurrence of other causes, as e.g., the combustion of fire: And in such a cause not impeded the effect can be certainly known. But such a cause cannot be known not to be impeded except in the decree.

You will insist: According to the Thomists, God knows futures certainly in secondary causes determined by decree or premotion: but nevertheless secondary causes even under decree or premotion are indifferent: Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the minor: Secondary causes under decree or premotion are indifferent with potential and passive indifference which imports suspension of act, denied the minor. With active indifference contained in the act itself, by which namely the secondary cause so acts that it can not act, granted the minor. For in the very instant in which the will is understood to be premoved to acting, it is understood to be acting, yet so that it can not act: Whence he who foresees the motion, certainly foresees the act, yet to be posited freely.

I say 3. God does not know contingent futures in a secondary cause left to itself in these or those circumstances. This is against Theophilus Raynaudus.

It is proven: To posit that God knows contingent futures in a secondary cause left to itself in these or those circumstances without any concourse of God, is to suppose that the secondary cause is God, for it is proper to God to act independently of any other. Moreover, if contingent futures cannot be known in secondary causes aided by simultaneous concourse, as we proved against Molina, a fortiori, neither in them left to themselves.

I say 4. God does not know contingent futures in his decree foreseen as future. This is against Suarez.

It is proven **1.** God's decree as eternal cannot be conceived with foundation in reality or virtually as future: Therefore. The antecedent is proven **1.** Because eternity since it is total and indivisible does not know past and future. **2.** Because just as for real future, real priority of existence and in which is required, and priority of dependence and from which does not suffice, as is clear in properties which although they depend on essence, nevertheless are not future to it, so for virtual future, virtual priority of existence and in which is required: but in God priority of existence or in which cannot be conceived with foundation in reality, since all things in God exist through one and indivisible existence, and mutually transcend each other: Therefore.

It is proven **2.** Granting freely that the decree can be conceived as future, at least so that God might know futures in it, there should be given a medium in which this decree as future would be represented, since in that prior it is not understood as existing, it cannot be known in itself: But before the decree there is no medium which would represent it as future: Therefore. The minor is proven: In that prior, God is indifferent to positing or not positing that decree, since the decree is that by which he determines himself: Therefore.

Suarez flees to the objective truth of the futurity of the decree: But this is to recur to another medium about which presently: Whence.

I say 5. God does not certainly know contingent and free futures before the decree in their truth whether formal or objective. This is against recent Professors of the Society.

Since the Jesuit Fathers now well sense that all media of knowing futures devised by their own are inept and insufficient, they have fled to another new one, until then unheard of in the schools, namely to the truth of propositions about the future: Whence they argue thus: God is omniscient, and no truth is hidden from him: But before the decree one of two contradictory propositions is determinately true, the other false: Therefore he knows this truth before the decree from eternity.

They distinguish a twofold truth; one formal of propositions, another objective of things; for if, as they contend, it was true from eternity what now is, so the proposition was true which affirmed the future; they call this truth formal, the first objective, because it is the object of this second. Some therefore say futures are foreknown by God in formal truth, some in objective truth, but both ways of speaking fall into nearly the same thing.

I will settle the matter therefore if I prove both that there is no truth whether formal or objective of futures before the decree, and even if there were, it would not be a medium in which futures could be known. Therefore.

The conclusion is proven **1.** Before God's decree nothing is determinately future: Therefore no truth of the future whether formal or objective. The consequence is clear, because truth follows upon being as its property. The antecedent is proven **1.** by authority: St. Augustine in tract 68 on John says: God makes futures by predestining them. And in book 26 against Faustus, giving the reason why he does not know whether something is future, he says: "Therefore I do not know, because what God's will has about this matter is hidden from me; yet that does not escape me which is without doubt future, if God's will has this." St. Ambrose in book 5 on faith, chapter 8: "God made what things are future... Because... Those things are future which he commanded to be." St. Thomas here in question 16, article 7, objecting to himself in the 3rd place the principle of adversaries, namely this: "What is true in the present always was true to be future." He responds: "To the third, it should be said that what now is, was future before it was, because it was in its cause so as to be made, whence the cause being removed, it would not be future that it be made. But the first cause alone is eternal. Whence from this it does not follow that what things are, it was always true that they would be future, except insofar as it was in the eternal cause that they would be future; which cause indeed is God alone." But God is not the cause of things except through his will: Therefore.

The same antecedent is proven by reason **1.** The future is what is determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time, as is clear from what was said in article 1 of this Dissertation. But before the determination of the first cause, no secondary cause is determined, otherwise the first would be secondary, and the secondary first.

2. If before God's decree something were determinately future, it would have this either from itself or from some cause: Not from itself, for what is not cannot give to itself that it be, much less a fortiori that it be future: Add that if it were future from itself, it would not be a contingent

future, about which there is the greatest question, but necessary, so that God could not decree the opposite. Not from some cause, because before the determination of the first cause, all secondary causes are indifferent and indeterminate to futurity or non-futurity.

3. That is the cause of the futurity of things which **1.** determines the principle of their possibility: But the divine decree is the first determining principle of the possibility of things: Therefore. The minor is proven: The principle of the possibility of things is God's omnipotence: But the first thing determining God's omnipotence is the decree of his will, for God is a free agent externally, consequently he does not act except as he wills: Therefore.

The conclusion is proven **2.** Granting freely that there is formal truth in propositions about contingent future independently of God's decree, yet this would not be a medium in which God could know what things are future: Therefore. The antecedent is proven: What depends on another in its truth and borrows it from that other, cannot be a medium for knowing that other thing, for the medium of knowing something else should be known before that other thing; but it is impossible that what depends on another in its truth and borrows it from that other should be known before that other thing, for it is knowable in the way it is true: But the truth of a proposition about the future, if granted, depends on the future event and borrows from it: Therefore it cannot be a medium in which God knows the future event.

The minor is proven: it is not that the event is truly future because the proposition enunciating it future is true; but on the contrary the proposition is true because the event is truly future, for from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is said to be true or false, as the common principle holds: Therefore the truth of a proposition about the future, if granted, depends on the future event and borrows from it.

Because of this argument which seems to us invincible, most of the adversaries, leaving formal truth, flee to objective truth, and say that from the fact that an event is now in time, it was truly future from eternity, and in that truth of futurity or in that being future, God knows the being present which he will sometime have.

But against objective truth the same argument equally presses: what depends on another in its truth and borrows it from that other, cannot be a medium for knowing that other thing: but according to the very doctrine of the adversaries, the objective truth of futurity depends on the truth of present being, no less than the formal truth of a proposition depends on the objective truth of futurity: Therefore just as the formal truth of a proposition cannot be a medium in which God knows the objective truth of futurity, so the objective truth of futurity cannot be a medium in which God knows the present being which he will have in time.

The minor is proven: the adversaries say that an event was truly future from eternity because it now is, or because it will be sometime in time, that is, from that present being which it has when it is, or will have in time when it will be, it was truly future for the whole preceding duration:

Therefore according to the doctrine of the adversaries, the objective truth of futurity depends on the truth of present being, just as the formal truth of a proposition depends on the objective truth of futurity. See Goudin in his posthumous work on God's knowledge, where he treats this argument extensively and learnedly.

I add in confirmation of the conclusion that this medium is new, and no trace of it is found either in Scripture, or in the Fathers, or in ancient Theologians. Whence Vasquez himself in Prima Pars, disputation 65, chapter 4, ingenuously confesses that he found no mention of this medium in the ancients, with one exception of Scotus, yet he produces no testimony of his.

Objections Are Solved

I will lightly touch upon the objections of adversaries, because since they all tend nearly to the same end, namely to prove the truth of propositions about contingent future before the decree, they are usually proposed and solved in Logic, and although they might prove what the adversaries claim, they would obtain nothing against our conclusion, as is clear from the second proof.

You will object 1. That proposition about the future is determinately true which enunciates a thing as it will be, or which is conformed to its object: but a proposition about the future uttered in a sign prior to the decree, e.g., this one, "Antichrist will be," enunciates the thing as it will be: Therefore. The minor is clear, because Antichrist will indeed be sometime, as is established by faith.

I respond by denying the minor. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: Antichrist will indeed be sometime by force of a decree posited in a subsequent sign, granted the antecedent. By force of a disposition made in that sign prior to the decree, denied the antecedent. For then Antichrist is still pending and indifferent to being and non-being, consequently the proposition enunciating that he will be is neither true nor false determinately.

And so that it may be clear how weak this argument is in which adversaries so trust, I thus retort it against them: A proposition enunciating what will be is true insofar as what it enunciates will be: but before God's decree about the future Antichrist, whether Antichrist will be or will not be is uncertain: Therefore it is also uncertain whether the enunciation about that future is true.

You will insist 1. Such is the nature of a proposition about the present that it induces or spreads its truth, earlier into a proposition about the future, later into a proposition about the past: Therefore just as from the fact that a thing is now, it will be true to say in all subsequent duration that it was; so from the fact that a thing is now, it was true to say in all preceding duration that the thing will be.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: such is the nature of a proposition about the present that it spreads its truth into a proposition about the future and a proposition about the past, verifying them dependently on the determination of the thing in itself, granted the antecedent. Showing that they would be or were true independently of the determination of the thing in itself or in its cause, denied the antecedent. Therefore from the truth of a proposition about the present, a proposition about the future is said to be true, not by truth which it would have in itself before the event posited or determined in its cause, but by truth which is spread into it from the present event, or its determination: or what is the same, a true proposition about the present does not show that a proposition about the future was true, but by force of the present effect it verifies it: in nearly the same way, says a recent Thomist, as subsequent marriage legitimizes offspring born before, not indeed showing that it was legitimate, for it was illegitimate, but so legitimizes it that according to rights it is understood always to have been legitimate.

To the consequence, I deny the parity: the disparity from what has been said is that a proposition about the past supposes its object invariably determined; for what once is or was, it is impossible that it was not. But a proposition about the future does not suppose but awaits its object, whence if it is supposed indeterminate to being or non-being, as it is before God's decree, the proposition about it will be equally indeterminate and indifferent to truth and falsity.

You will insist 2. This proposition, "Antichrist will be," does not affirm Antichrist to be determined in himself or in his cause, otherwise it would be about the present, but simply that he will be, in whatever way he may exist in his time: Therefore for the truth of this proposition "Antichrist will be," the determination of Antichrist in himself or in his cause is not required.

I respond by distinguishing the consequent: The determination of Antichrist is not required as the enunciated object, granted the consequent. As the foundation of true enunciation, denied the consequent. For so that a proposition about the future may be true, it does not suffice that the thing will sometime have existence, because this can be verified of a merely possible thing, but it is required as a condition sine qua non that it will have existence by force of a disposition made in that sign in which it is enunciated as future.

You will insist 3. From what has been said it follows that every affirmative proposition about contingent future before God's decree is false, and every negative one true. The consequence is proven: An affirmative proposition, e.g., this one, "Antichrist will be," affirms Antichrist to be future; a negative one, that he is not future: but according to us, before the decree Antichrist is not future: Therefore.

I respond by denying the consequence. To the proof I distinguish the major: this proposition, "Antichrist will be," affirms Antichrist to be future, that is, that there is now a determinate futurity of Antichrist, denied the major, for in this sense it would not be about the future but about the impossible present. That is, that Antichrist will sometime have existence, granted the

major. In this sense I distinguish the minor: but according to us, before the decree Antichrist is not future, that is, there is no determinate futurity of Antichrist, granted the minor. That is, Antichrist will not sometime have existence, denied the minor, for this is uncertain and pending, consequently the proposition enunciating it is uncertain and indeterminate to truth or falsity.

You will object 2. The law of contradictories is that one be determinately true, the other determinately false: but these propositions, "Antichrist will be," "Antichrist will not be," uttered before God's decree, are contradictory: Therefore.

It is confirmed: This disjunctive proposition, "Antichrist will be or will not be," is determinately true before God's decree, but for the truth of a disjunctive it is required that one part be true: Therefore.

I respond by denying the major taken universally; but the law of contradictories in general is that they conflict in truth and falsity, or that they cannot be simultaneously true and simultaneously false, from this principle on which it is founded: it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be. For this it suffices that one or the other be indeterminately true, one or the other indeterminately false, but it is not required that one be determinately true, the other determinately false. And I ask, from these two propositions, "Peter will convert," "Peter will not convert," why would the nature of contradiction assign truth to the affirmative rather than to the negative or vice versa, since they are equal in contradicting?

Moreover, if the determinate truth of contingent futures and propositions about them arose from the force and nature of contradiction, it would follow **1.** That it would be necessary and not contingent truth, as being founded on this necessary and immutable principle: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be. It would follow **2.** That propositions about the future would be true not only for a prior to the decree, but for every imaginable prior, so that something could be conceived as future before it was conceived as possible, indeed before God was conceived as existing, because that principle "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be," on which the law of contradiction is founded, is verified for every imaginable instant.

To the confirmation I similarly distinguish the minor: For the truth of a disjunctive it is required that one part be true indeterminately, granted the minor. Determinately, denied the minor. For just as this disjunctive is necessary and of eternal truth, and yet neither part is necessary, so for its determinate truth it is not required that one be determinately true rather than another, but that both cannot be simultaneously false, for which it suffices that one or the other be indeterminately true. Add that if from the truth of the disjunctive there followed the truth of some part determinately, the absurdities would recur which we deduced in the prior solution.

I omit more, both because, as I said, the custom has prevailed that they be treated in Philosophy when dealing with propositions about contingent future, where they can be seen; and because

granting freely that propositions about contingent future are true before God's decree, we have nevertheless proven that they cannot be a medium in which God knows futures.

II. The True Doctrine is Affirmed

I say: God knows future absolute contingent and free things in His decree determining their futurity, or in His essence as determined by such a decree.

Proof from Scripture and the Fathers

This is proved **1°.** by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. Isaiah 14: God, predicting through the Prophet the wars that the Assyrians would bring upon the Israelites, consequently free future events, and their destruction, adds: "The Lord of hosts has sworn saying: If it shall not be as I have thought, so it shall be, and as I have planned in my mind, so it shall come to pass: that I may crush Assyria in my land... This is the plan that I have planned... The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who can make it void?" By these words God openly bases the certain foreknowledge of these future events on the decree of His will.

Likewise the Apostle in Romans 11, discoursing about God's foreknowledge concerning the conversion of the Gentiles and the infidelity of the Jews, therefore concerning free acts, after exclaiming: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God," adds as the reason for this incomprehensible knowledge: "Because from Him and through Him and in Him are all things," as if to say, because He orders and makes them.

St. Hilary, book 3 on the Trinity: "What God has decreed to do, He has known in His will."

St. Augustine, book on the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: "By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do." And below: "When God promised Abraham the faith of the Gentiles, He promised not from the power of our will, but from His predestination: for He promised what He Himself was going to do;" where the discourse evidently concerns future free acts, namely the conversion of the Gentiles.

The Mind of St. Thomas is Examined

St. Thomas everywhere establishes two principles from which our Conclusion is constructed. **First,** that God sees nothing outside Himself, but all things in His essence as in their cause. Here q. 14, a. 5, 1 Contra Gentiles, chapter 68, which begins thus: "It must be shown that God knows the thoughts of minds and the wills of hearts by virtue of being their cause, since He is the universal principle of being," which, after proving by five reasons, he concludes the whole chapter thus: "The dominion which the will has over its acts, by which it is in its power to will and not to will, excludes the determination of power to one thing and the violence of an

externally acting cause, but does not exclude the influence of a superior cause from which it has being and operation, and thus causality remains in the first cause which is God, with respect to the movements of the will, so that God, knowing Himself, can know such things." Compare article 4 of the preceding Dissertation.

Second principle: that He is the cause of things through His will, here q. 14, a. 8, below q. 19, a. 4, and elsewhere. From these two principles, I say, it is concluded that God knows whatever future things, even contingent and free ones, in His will, which is our Conclusion.

Moreover, in 1 Sentences, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, he says: "Although being and knowing in God are the same according to reality, nevertheless knowing follows the will as commanded by it, but being does not: and therefore the being of things is not subject to the freedom of the will, as is the operative knowledge of creatures." We omit many other passages lest we be too lengthy.

Responses to Objections from St. Thomas

But adversaries raise two objections from St. Thomas. **First,** that the holy Doctor, acting professedly here in article 13 and in 1 Sentences, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, concerning the knowledge of future contingents, makes no mention of a decree, but has recourse to their presence in eternity. **Second,** that here in article 13 he teaches that a future contingent cannot be certainly known in its cause.

To the first, I have often wondered that this argument is considered by some to have any weight; as if St. Thomas, by founding the certain foreknowledge of future things on their presence in eternity, excluded a decree, and did not rather suppose and assert it: For indeed, future things are not present in eternity unless because they are future in their proper duration, but they are not future in their proper duration according to St. Thomas except through God's will, or as we said in the preceding article, they are not present in eternity except insofar as they are the terms of the divine will determining them and simultaneously actually producing them; consequently to see future things present in eternity is, in St. Thomas's way, to see them in the divine will.

And this is all the more true because according to the holy Doctor, God does not see things immediately in themselves, but in Himself as in their cause, and He is the cause of things through His will. Therefore, the decree and the presence of things in eternity are not two media in which God knows future things as some falsely imagine; but only the decree of the divine will or the divine will itself as willing and simultaneously actually producing is the medium in which God knows future things: but the presence of things is not a medium, but the very object or mode of the object as it is represented in the will actually producing, and thus it is the reason under which, not in which, the thing is known.

Moreover, it is false that St. Thomas in the cited places does not expressly mention the decree: For here in article 13 he says: "All things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by the reason that He has the concepts of things present with Him, as some say:" But the practical concepts of things are ideas determined through a decree of the will. And in the later place in 1 Sentences: "God from eternity not only sees the order of Himself to the thing, from whose power the thing was future. Behold the decree: But He gazed upon the very being of the thing. Behold the presence of things in eternity."

You will insist: If it is true that the knowledge of future things rests entirely on the decree alone as the medium in which they are known, why then did St. Thomas, acting professedly in the cited places concerning the knowledge of future things, touch so sparingly on the decree and devote himself entirely to establishing the presence of things in eternity as the foundation of that knowledge; in this he certainly seems to have been deficient, especially since the Thomists themselves, on the contrary, treat sparingly the presence of things in eternity and strive with all their might to establish the decree.

Response: St. Thomas in the cited places is not acting concerning the medium in which God knows future contingents; he had already done that in article 5, teaching generally that God sees things other than Himself in Himself as in their cause, and in article 8, that He is the cause of things through His will; but he is acting concerning the reconciliation of the certainty of divine foreknowledge with the contingency of things. And although the certainty of divine foreknowledge, with the contingency of things preserved, can be proved both from the part of the medium and from the part of the object, nevertheless St. Thomas was more concerned to prove it there from the part of the object than from the part of the medium: **1°.** Because, as I noted, he had already said enough about the medium. **2°.** Because the certainty of knowledge, with the contingency of the known thing preserved, is more clearly proved from the presence of the known thing than from its determination in its causes. For when I see Peter running before me, it is clearly perceived that my vision is certain, nor is the contingency of Peter's running thereby removed, whereas it would be more difficult to conceive that I certainly foreknow Peter will run, and nevertheless this running remains future contingent.

Moreover, divine knowledge from itself has the property of being measured by eternity, but not from itself the property of being the cause of things, but from the will: Therefore, so that the holy Doctor might proceed from proper principles, he proves here the certainty of divine knowledge from the presence of things in eternity rather than from the divine will, which he reserves for q. 19, where he treats of decrees.

But why do we Thomists more laboriously insist on proving the decree than on proving the presence of things in eternity? The answer is ready at hand: because our adversaries more laboriously and stubbornly deny the decree than the presence of things in eternity; because from

the position of a decree they properly sense that their system of middle knowledge (scientia media) and versatile grace is fundamentally overturned.

However, let it not escape you, what I warned above, that for God to see things present in eternity is, in St. Thomas's way, to see them in His will from eternity willing and producing them.

To the second I respond that when St. Thomas says a future contingent cannot be certainly known in its cause, he speaks of a created cause considered in itself, with respect to which the effect is contingent and future, not of His own will, to which nothing is future and contingent, but all things are present and infallible in eternity.

You will insist: St. Thomas in 1 Sentences, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, already cited, establishes this distinction between future necessary and contingent effects, that the necessary ones can be certainly known in their causes, but not the contingent ones; but this distinction cannot stand if the foreknowledge of future things rests on a decree: For either St. Thomas speaks of causes in themselves abstracting from the decree, or not. The first cannot be said in the opinion of the Thomists, who require a decree and physical predetermination even for necessary effects. Nor the second, because according to the Thomists an effect can be certainly known in second causes as they are subject to the divine decree.

Response: I deny the minor. To the proof I say that St. Thomas speaks of second causes in themselves prescinding from the decree: And as to what is objected concerning necessary effects, I say two things. **First,** that although according to the Thomists necessary effects, e.g., the rising of the sun, are not put into being independently of God's prior concurrence, because nevertheless this is owed to them naturally, nor can it be denied to them except by miracle and by God's extraordinary power, they can be said to be absolutely future and certainly known in their causes prescinding from the decree, not indeed by denying it, but by not attending to it; because what is certainly future according to God's ordinary power can be said to be absolutely future and as such certainly known.

Second, I say that according to the interpretation of many, St. Thomas establishes this distinction between necessary and contingent effects, that the necessary ones are determined at least as to species in their causes, but not the contingent ones, consequently that the necessary ones can be certainly known in their causes at least as to species, even abstracting from the decree, but not the contingent ones; because a decree or physical predetermination is required both for the species and for the individual of a contingent effect, but not for the species, but only for the individual of a necessary effect, because necessary causes are by their nature determined to species.

The Conclusion is proved by reason. The fundamental reason of our conclusion is none other than that which was proposed above from St. Thomas: namely this. God knows things other than

Himself in Himself as in their cause: But He is the cause of future contingents through the decree of His will: Therefore. The major is established from what was said in article 4 of the preceding dissertation. The minor from article 3 of the same Dissertation and is common and everywhere handed down in the Scriptures. Ephesians 1: "He works all things according to the counsel of His will." Wisdom 11: "How could anything remain unless you had willed it." Apocalypse 4: "You created all things, and by your will they existed and were created."

It is proved **2°.** by the refutation of other opinions. God does not know future absolute contingents before the decree in His essence as having the nature of an idea or intelligible species, not in the supercomprehension of second causes, not in second causes left to themselves, not in a future decree, not finally in the formal or objective truth of future things: Therefore in His decree. The consequence is clear from sufficient enumeration.

It is confirmed: The decree of the divine will has all the conditions required for it to be the medium in which God knows future contingents: Therefore. The antecedent is proved. The medium in which God knows future contingents must be eternal, because God does not begin in time to know what He previously did not know; it must be efficacious and infallible, otherwise He would not certainly know in it, yet in such a way that it could not have been, because God could not have known future things if He had not willed to make them: but the decree of the divine will is eternal, since God does not begin in time to will something He previously did not will, it is efficacious because it is omnipotent, and no one, as Scripture says, resists the divine will, yet it could not have been, because God freely willed whatever He willed externally, so that He could have not willed whatever has been, is, or will be in the world: Therefore.

Responses to Adversaries' Objections

To all these things adversaries respond in two ways. **1°.** That these things prove that God knows in His decree future things that depend on Him alone, but not free things that depend on human choice. **2°.** And even if God knew them in His decree, it does not follow that this decree is predetermining, and this seems all the more true because the Scotists, who admit that God knows future free things in His decrees, nevertheless reject predetermining decrees.

To the first, I respond **1°.** that Scripture and St. Augustine speak of future free things as is evident from the cited texts. As for St. Thomas, he says that God knows all things in Himself so that he excepts nothing: "Other things than Himself," he says, here in article 5, "He sees not in themselves but in Himself." And ad 1: "What is outside Himself He does not gaze upon except in Himself," and he specifically names free acts in 1 Contra Gentiles in the proof of the conclusion.

2°. Our free acts are no less caused by God than any other things, for He is the cause of the whole being, working all our works in us. Isaiah 26, and specifically our free acts, for He works in us both to will and to accomplish, Philippians 2.

To the second. By a predetermining decree we understand nothing other than a decree of the divine will efficaciously and infallibly determining the futurity of a thing, yet gently, because it also determines its free mode. Hence it is called predetermining by a double title. **1°.** Because it causes the future. **2°.** Because it causes certainly and infallibly, yet freely: but this alone and not something else indifferent or accompanying can be the medium in which God certainly and infallibly knows future things: Therefore.

The minor is proved: If it were indifferent to futurity or non-futurity, to consent being placed or not placed, it could not, as is evident, certainly and infallibly lead to knowledge of consent rather than non-consent; but if it were only accompanying, it would not be the cause of future things, for a cause, at least by nature, precedes its effect, and thus all the things recur by which we proved above that nothing is future except through God's decree: Moreover, this accompanying decree would not be more a medium of knowing the future than the future would be a medium of knowing such a decree.

What is objected about the Scotists: Whether they speak consistently with their principles? Let them see to it, not us.

Objections are Solved

You object 1°. with Honoratus Tournely: that decree cannot be a previously known medium in which future free things are known, which cannot be conceived and known before the very creatures to which it is directed: Such is God's free decree, for it implies that a free decree be known before those things are known through which it is constituted as distinct from a necessary act: But it cannot be known as distinct from a necessary act before the creatures to which it is directed are known, if indeed it is distinguished from a necessary act by that connotation alone to creatures: Therefore creatures are not known in the decree as in a previously known medium.

I respond 1°. that the Molinists concede that God certainly knows future things that depend on Him alone, such as the creation of the world, in His decree, as we saw above, and also (at least sometimes) future free things in an absolute decree of concurring supposing the prevision of things conditionally future. Let Tournely therefore draw his sword against his friends, and prove to them that their decrees are not media in which God knows future things, because they cannot be known before the creatures to which they are directed; their defense will be ours.

Meanwhile **I respond 2°.** Distinguishing the major: That cannot be a previously known medium in which future free things are known, which cannot be conceived and known before the very creatures to which it is directed, before in reason and nature, I concede the major; before in time, I deny the major. Moreover, God's free decree, although it is simultaneous in time with the creatures to which it is directed, is nevertheless conceived before in reason and nature, because,

as the objector himself admits, it is the cause of creatures, but a cause is known before in reason and nature than its effect.

You will insist 1°. God's free decree says two things: the divine substance and a relation of reason to creatures: as substance, it does not represent the future rather than the non-future; as a relation of reason, it can represent nothing really, because a being of reason can have no real effect: Therefore.

I respond 1°. as before, that this argument must be solved equally by adversaries: for concerning the decree of creating the world, and also concerning the decree of concurring to free acts supposing the prevision of the conditional future, in which, according to them, God knows these future things, it can equally be objected that it could not represent the future neither as it is God's substance, nor as it is a relation of reason to creatures.

I respond 2°. that the divine decree does not represent future things, neither precisely as it is God's substance, nor as it is formally a relation of reason in our intellect, but as it is fundamentally a respect to creatures, and it is fundamentally a respect to creatures, insofar as it can eminently do without a real respect whatever a newly elicited act would do, which we explain through a relation of reason.

3°. However, whatever God's free decree may be, and in what it consists, which in every opinion is most difficult to define, as we shall see below; it is certain at least among all Theologians that it is something sufficient for the production of all creatures; a fortiori for their knowledge.

You will insist 2°. In a universal and remote cause, an effect cannot be certainly and infallibly known because the power of the universal cause is modified by the particular cause, and can be impeded by it, so in the power of the sun the flowering of a tree cannot be certainly known, because from a defect of generative power in the tree the power of the sun can be impeded: but God's decree is a universal and remote cause whose influx is modified and determined by second causes. Hence St. Thomas in 1 Sentences, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, compares God's influx to the motion of the sun, and thence proves that God, through necessary second causes, produces necessary effects, and through contingent second causes, contingent effects: Therefore.

I respond: Distinguishing the major: in a universal remote cause, which is not universally first, an effect cannot be certainly known, I concede the major, because it can be impeded by others. In a cause which is universally first, such as God, I deny the major. For such a cause, since it is of infinite and universal power, so accommodates itself to other causes that it also accommodates and subjects them to itself, so that it cannot be impeded by them.

As for St. Thomas, he does not compare God's influx with the sun's influx in this respect, that just as the efficacy of the sun's influx can be impeded by the defect of a particular cause, so the efficacy of divine influx can be impeded by the defect of second causes. For the holy Doctor

expressly denies this in the cited question, margin a. 8; but he intends only to prove that the infallibility of divine knowledge does not harm the contingency of things, because although He is an invariable cause of things through His will, He nevertheless so tempers His concurrence to second causes that He moves necessary ones by way of nature, free ones by way of freedom leaving the power to the opposite: and in this sense the concurrence and causality of God is said to be modified and determined by second causes, materially namely and objectively.

You will say: according to this doctrine, the science of vision will be an attribute distinct from the science of simple intelligence (which is not commonly admitted) because of each there will be a different virtual medium or motive, for the medium of the science of simple intelligence will be omnipotence; of the science of vision, the decree; but sciences are distinguished by diverse media or motives.

I respond: I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that the decree is not a formal medium or motive properly speaking, but only a condition applying the medium, but the medium is the divine essence or omnipotence. Therefore omnipotence is the medium of both sciences under a different aspect; considered in itself it is the medium of the science of simple intelligence; as determined and applied through a decree, it is the medium of the science of vision: and therefore I said in the conclusion that God sees future things in His decree, or in His essence determined by a decree.

You object 2°. If God certainly and infallibly knows future free things in His decree, that decree must be efficacious and infallible: but thence freedom is destroyed and future things cease to be free: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the minor, rather thence freedom is established, because the decree is not only for the substance of the thing but also for its mode, namely freedom: Hence from the fact that it is efficacious and infallible and nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only do those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen contingently or necessarily, because God so wills them to happen. Similarly St. Anselm, whose authority the Molinists abuse in this matter in Concordia praedestinationis, chapter 1, says: "Since what God wills cannot not be, if God wills human will to be coerced or prohibited by no necessity from willing, then it is necessary that the will be free and be what it wills."

But concerning this argument at length in Philosophy when treating of physical premotions, and below when treating of the efficacy of divine decrees.

You object 3°. At least God does not know sins in His decree, since He neither wills nor decrees them, but on the contrary most greatly detests and prohibits them.

I respond: Indeed God does not will sins to happen, but He wills to permit them: For nothing is future unless God wills or permits it, according to that of Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter

95: "Nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen, or by doing it Himself." And that of St. Thomas here, article 9, ad 3: "Only those things are future which God permits to be or wills to be." Therefore God knows future sins in His permissive decree, that is, in the decree of suspending or denying help to avoid sin.

You will insist: That decree of denying help to avoid sins does not have an infallible connection with sin: Therefore sin cannot be certainly known in it. The antecedent is proved: If it had an infallible connection with sin, the will destitute of such help would always have to sin; which is false: **1°.** Because otherwise it would be determined to evil, and consequently evil by its nature, which is the heresy of the Manicheans. **2°.** Because according to the Thomists themselves in the Treatise on Grace, the created will without special help with only general concurrence conferred to it according to the common laws of Providence, sometimes acts well: Therefore.

I respond: I deny the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish: if it had, etc., the will destitute of such help would always have to sin in those cases in which, because of bad dispositions, it requires that according to the common laws of Providence it be moved to an act conjoined with defect, I concede; in cases in which it does not require this, I deny.

Therefore I say that in those cases in which God decrees not to help with special aid the created will, and nevertheless to move it as it requires according to present dispositions, to an act conjoined with defect, it will certainly sin, and in this decree partly permissive and partly positive, God certainly knows future sin. But how and when the created will requires to be moved to a defective act we shall say when treating of divine decrees.

You will respond: According to the given solution, sin is not infallibly connected with the permissive decree unless a positive decree is added for the entity of sin: But in this hypothesis the permissive decree is useless for God to know future sin: Therefore. The minor is proved: Given the positive decree for the entity of sin to which malice is inseparably annexed, say for the act of hatred of God, there will certainly be the sin of hatred of God: Therefore the permissive decree is useless, and the Thomists, says Tournely, make a pretense when they put it forward to decline the odium of so harsh an opinion.

I respond: I deny the minor. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: Given the positive decree for the entity of sin, there will certainly be sin, by virtue of that decree, I deny the antecedent; by virtue of the created will failing itself permitted through the suspension of special help, I concede the antecedent.

Therefore God, by decreeing the entity of sin, does not decree nor cause its malice, but only tolerates and permits it, and in that permission which is always supposed for the effective decree, joined with it, God certainly knows sin. Compare what I shall say in Dissertation 7, article 5, toward the end.

You will reply: He who would apply fire to tow would inappropriately be said to permit the combustion of the tow: Therefore similarly.

I respond: I deny the consequence. The disparity is **1°.** That the combustion of tow follows from the application of fire as it is from the man applying it, but the malice of sin does not follow from the entity of sin as it is from God, but as it is from the created will, and therefore God is said to permit it and not will it, just as the soul moving a curved leg is said only to permit and not will lameness, because lameness is not joined to the motion of the leg as it is from the soul, but as it is from the curvature of the leg.

2°. The disparity is that in fire applied to tow there does not remain an antecedent power not to burn, but in man moved to an act of sin there remains an antecedent power not to place that act, a fortiori not to place the malice: And this suffices for God to be considered as permitting the malice whose act He decrees: just as in the opinion of the Molinists God, constituting man in those circumstances in which He foresaw through middle knowledge that he would sin; although he cannot not sin by consequent power and in the composite sense, for otherwise God's knowledge would be deceived; because nevertheless he can not sin by antecedent power and in the divided sense, God is considered only to permit and not will the malice of sin.

3°. There is nothing in tow that moves man as a general provider to apply fire to tow permitted to its bad disposition, as the created will unduly disposed objectively moves God as general provider to move it left to itself and permitted to an act of sin, which as is evident includes a permissive decree.

From these things it is clear that the Thomists do not make a pretense, nor put forward this permissive decree to decline the odium of their opinion as if it were harsher, therefore Tournely is to be corrected when he inconsiderately reproaches the Thomists with this. But concerning these things more fully when treating of decrees.

Article V: Concerning the Knowledge of Conditional Futures

Whether God knows them certainly?

Note 1°. A conditional future, as we observed before, is what will not actually be, but would be if something else were posited. It can be taken in two ways: **1°.** In an illative sense, so that "if" is the same as "therefore," explaining the connection of the antecedent with the consequent. **2°.** In an enunciative sense, so that "if" imports only the coexistence of the extremes.

A conditional proposition taken in the illative sense is necessarily true or necessarily false, because its truth consists in good consequence, but it is impossible in good consequence for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false. Hence all contingent conditional propositions

taken in the illative sense, such as these: if she is a mother, she loves her son; if Peter enters the Praetorium, he will sin; if Judas holds the purse, he will betray Christ; are false; because although both extremes are true, the consequent is not well inferred from the antecedent by virtue of the form, but only by reason of the matter: And conversely these impossible ones: if man is a horse, he is capable of neighing; if man flies, he has wings; are necessarily true, because although both extremes are false, the consequent is nevertheless well inferred from the antecedent by virtue of the form.

Conditional futures taken in this illative sense are certainly known by God and indeed through the science of simple intelligence, there is no doubt, since, as I said, they are necessarily true or necessarily false.

The question is therefore about conditional futures taken in the enunciative sense, as "if" imports only the coexistence of the extremes. And they can be distinguished into three kinds: Some have a necessary connection with the condition, such as: If Peter sins, he will lose grace; if fire is applied to tow, it will burn. Some have only a contingent connection with the condition, such as: If the Gospel is preached to the Tyrians, they will be converted. Some finally have no connection with the condition, but are entirely disparate; such as: If King Joas had struck the earth seven times, he would have destroyed Syria.

That necessary conditional futures are certainly known by God no one doubts, since these are known by us. Therefore the difficulty remains concerning contingent and disparate conditional futures.

Note 2°. That certain older Thomists denied certain knowledge of such conditional futures to God and conceded only conjectural knowledge, the assertors of middle knowledge claim, and they boast that they forced the reluctant Dominican Fathers in the famous congregations De Auxiliis to finally admit it, and thus they carried off the palm in this part.

But our John of St. Thomas vindicates the older Thomists from this calumny here in disp. 20, a. 1, proving that they indeed admitted in God certain knowledge of conditional futures which are mentioned in the Scriptures and which are necessary for the government of this universe, but not concerning all possible combinations, because they thought God decreed nothing about them, since nevertheless God can know them as future only in His decree alone, and this latter is the common opinion of the Thomists, as Ledesma truly said in the words which Tournely quotes from him; in this as in other things agreeing with the Molinists.

But the conjectural knowledge which they admit concerning these possible combinations, excluding decrees, does not hold from the part of God knowing, but from the part of the object known; that is, God knows that the futurity of these combinations, considering the order of second causes, is conjectural and probable; but God knows this certainly and not conjecturally;

just as when He sees me opining and an opinable object, He does not Himself opine, but certainly sees my opinion and the object's opinability.

But even granting freely that one or another of the older Thomists was of this opinion, it is nevertheless false and most false that the Dominican Fathers sustained this opinion in the congregations De Auxiliis; indeed it is false that there was any controversy about that opinion in these congregations. This is established from the Rescript of Clement VIII proposing to the congregation, which is of the following tenor: "Whether it is the opinion of Augustine that before the absolute decree of the divine will there is given in God certain and infallible knowledge of contingent things dependent on a free cause, such as Molina attributes to God through middle knowledge." You see that the question is not whether God certainly knows conditional futures, but whether He knows them before His decree.

And when Father Bastida, disputing for the Fathers of the Society in congregation 33, dwelt too long on establishing this knowledge of conditional futures in God; Father Thomas Lemos, acting for the Dominicans, replied that Father Bastida had not touched the summit of the difficulty with his lips: the point of difficulty lies in this, whether the knowledge of conditional futures in God is before the absolute decree of the divine will, such as Molina attributes to God, which both Cardinal de Monopoli and the Archbishop of Armagh also said.

Therefore the Molinists glory wrongly in this part, and they sing a fictitious triumph. See John of St. Thomas in the cited place and Father Graveson, tome 3 of Letters, p. 87.

I say: God certainly knows contingent and disparate conditional futures. This is against Cornejo, Curiel, Typhane of the Society, etc., who admit only conjectural knowledge in God concerning these things.

Proof from Scripture

It is proved **1°.** that God predicted many conditional futures in the Scriptures with certainty which have no connection or only a contingent one from themselves: but it is impious to say that God affirmed something as certainly future which He did not know to be certainly future: Therefore.

The major is proved: 1 Kings 23: When David asked the Lord whether the Keilites would deliver him to Saul if he remained with them? The Lord responded: "They will deliver you, namely if you remain." 3 Kings 11: The Lord said to the children of Israel: "Do not go in to them (daughters of the gentiles)... most certainly they will turn your hearts to follow their gods." 4 Kings 13: Elisha said to the King of Israel: "If you had struck the earth five, or six, or seven times, you would have struck Syria even unto consumption." Matthew 11: Christ said: "Woe to

you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida, because if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes."

Add the promises which God made about transmitting original justice to Adam's posterity, if he himself had not violated the pact; about confirming the Kingdom in David's house, if his posterity had kept the law, and many others: Therefore.

It is confirmed: it cannot be denied that God had some knowledge of these conditional futures: but not conjectural or probable, for this is uncertain and liable to error, and therefore unbecoming to God: Therefore certain.

It is proved **2°.** From Augustine, book on the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 9, where he says: "Can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have been willing to believe when miracles were done among them, or would not have been going to believe if they had been done; when the Lord Himself testifies to them that they would have performed great penance of humility, if those signs of power had been done among them?" Therefore Augustine acknowledges that Christ certainly knew the conversion of the Tyrians if signs and miracles had been done among them.

It is proved **3°.** By reason: there are no conditional futures in the opinion of the Thomists except through an absolute decree of God on the part of the subject and conditional on the part of the object, as we shall explain below: but such a decree is certain and infallible: Therefore God in it certainly and not conjecturally knows these futures.

Objections are Solved

You object: When Scripture treats of conditional futures, it often uses these or similar particles: "perhaps," "perchance," as in Matthew 11: "If the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Sodom, perhaps they would have remained until this day." Similarly elsewhere: but these and similar particles do not denote certain knowledge, but only conjectural: Therefore.

I respond 1°. To the major: in many places these particles are not used, indeed sometimes contrary ones, as "most certainly they will turn your hearts." **2°.** I deny the minor: for these particles in these cases do not denote doubt, but either God speaking in our manner, or the mutability of free will, or the contingency of second causes, or the magnitude or difficulty of the matter, or reproof. Thus teach Jerome on chapter 26 of Isaiah and Augustine, tract 37 on John.

So when God said to Moses in Exodus 24, as if doubting: "Neither shall you take wives for your sons from their daughters, lest after they themselves have committed fornication, they make your sons also to commit fornication to their gods." The same repeating in 3 Kings cited, asserts it as most certain: "most certainly," he says, "they will turn your hearts," from which it appears that

particles which literally import doubt are not always so taken in the Scriptures. Compare article 2 of this Dissertation.

You will insist: the conditional futures which are enunciated in Scripture can be considered spoken tropically and by exaggeration: so when Christ said in Matthew 11: "Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida," etc., as above, He did not want to assert certainly the future conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians if the Gospel had been preached to them; but He wanted only through exaggeration to rebuke the hardness of the Jews compared to the Tyrians and Sidonians who would have been less obstinate than they; just as if a preacher should say to Christian hearers, if I preached among the Turks, they would be moved by my words, and as Christ Himself said in Luke 10: "If these (disciples) should hold their peace, the stones would cry out:" for by these words He did not predict the future clamor of stones, but He wanted through a certain exaggeration to rebuke the Pharisees as harder than stones because, seeing so many signs and miracles, they were not yet moved to celebrate God's praises, as the disciples were celebrating: in such exaggerations there is no lie, but a trope and elegance of speech. Therefore nothing compels us to understand otherwise the conditional futures which are enunciated in the Scriptures.

I respond 1°. that this interpretation regarding the place in Matthew about the Tyrians and Sidonians is contrary to Augustine, who in the cited place says the Tyrians and Sidonians would indeed have been converted if the Gospel had been announced to them, and Christ attests this: Therefore as certainly true and not as spoken through exaggeration.

2°. Although it is not to be denied that God in the Scriptures often uses metaphors in the manner of men, nevertheless as regards conditional futures, some are predicted as certain, such as the Perversion of the Jews if they should go in to the daughters of the gentiles. Moreover, many there are in which there is no place for tropes and metaphors, e.g., what figure can be devised when God said to David that the Keilites would deliver him to Saul if he remained among them.

You will reply: some things in the Scriptures are predicted through the Prophets as future which were not really future, but were predicted as future only to declare the disposition of second causes, or to indicate some danger or something similar: So in 4 Kings 20, Isaiah said to King Hezekiah when he was sick: "Set your house in order, for you shall die and not live." And yet Hezekiah lived fifteen more years. So in Jonah 3, Jonah said: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown;" which nevertheless was not overthrown. By these, I say, nothing future is designated, but only that the King's illness was lethal, and that the demerits of the Ninevites demanded the subversion of their city: Therefore similarly concerning other revealed futures in which we make force. So e.g., when in 1 Kings 23 David asked whether the men of Keilah would deliver him to Saul if he remained among them: The Lord responded, "they will deliver," He did not want to signify the future betrayal of David which was none, but only the present disposition and will of the citizens, who indeed were meditating David's betrayal.

I respond: Distinguishing the antecedent: Some things in the Scriptures are predicted through the Prophets as threateningly future which were not really future, I concede the antecedent; Some things are simply predicted as future which were not really future, I deny the antecedent. This is explained from St. Thomas: Prophecy is a participation of divine foreknowledge impressed on the Prophet's intellect through revelation; but divine foreknowledge regards future things according to two aspects, namely according as they are in themselves, insofar as He gazes upon them presentially, and according as they are in their causes, insofar as He sees the order of causes to effects; but future contingents as they are in themselves and present to God in eternity are determined to one thing, but as they are in their causes, they are not so determined that they cannot happen otherwise: And although this double knowledge is always conjoined in the divine intellect, it is not always conjoined in prophetic revelation, because the impression of a free agent does not always adequately match its power.

Hence sometimes prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of divine foreknowledge as it regards future contingents in themselves, and such things happen as they are prophesied, such as that of Isaiah 7: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes indeed prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of divine foreknowledge as it knows the order of causes to effects, and then sometimes it happens otherwise than is prophesied, nor is there falsehood underlying the prophecy: For the sense of the prophecy is that the disposition of inferior causes, whether natural or of human acts, has this, that such an effect should happen, and such are threatening prophecies, such as these about which in the instance: So therefore the word of Isaiah saying: "You shall die and not live" is understood; that is, the disposition of your body is ordered to death: And what is said in Jonah 3: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown;" that is, its merits demand that it be overthrown.

Moreover, the predictions of futures in which we make force are not thus threatening and in the manner of the objected example, when the Lord said to David that the Keilites would deliver him, it was not a threat, but a response to David's inquiry; and David had not asked whether the Keilites were meditating or wanting to deliver him, but whether they would actually deliver: "Will the men of Keilah deliver me?"

You object 2°. St. Augustine, book on the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14, explaining these words: "He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding," says: "This is said according to the dangers of this life, not according to God's foreknowledge, who foreknew what was going to be future, not what was not going to be future." And book 1 on the Soul and its Origin, chapter 12: "Foreknowledge is completely emptied if what is foreknown will not be." And St. Prosper in his Letter to Augustine, speaking of the semi-Pelagians: "They fabricate futures which are not futures, and by a new kind of absurdity among them, both things not to be done are foreknown, and things foreknown are not done:" Therefore.

I respond: that St. Augustine and Prosper do not simply deny the foreknowledge of conditional futures, but only in the sense of the semi-Pelagians. The semi-Pelagians wanted God to know what good or evil little children snatched away by premature death would have done if they had lived long, and from this to be moved to confer the grace of Baptism on these rather than those. St. Augustine and Prosper consider this absurd, and say that God does not punish or reward merits or demerits which neither are nor ever will be, such as are the merits or demerits foreseen in little children dying prematurely, if they had lived longer; but that foreknowledge for punishing or rewarding must be absolute or of absolute futures.

In this sense therefore they deny it was said: "He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding," according to absolute foreknowledge, namely, such as is required for rewarding or punishing. Likewise in the same sense they say that absolute foreknowledge is emptied, namely, if what is foreknown will not be, and that it is absurd for things not to be done to be foreknown, always with this absolute foreknowledge which is for rewarding or punishing.

Otherwise that St. Augustine simply acknowledges in God the foreknowledge of conditional futures is evident from the proof of the Conclusion.

You will insist: St. Augustine not only says this: "He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding," was not said according to absolute foreknowledge as we understand it, but adds it was said according to the dangers of this life: Therefore God knew according to the dangers of this life that wickedness would have changed the understanding of him who was taken away, if he had not been taken away: But to know this according to the dangers of this life is not to know certainly, but only conjecturally; for not everyone who is in danger of sinning sins: Therefore at least Augustine does not acknowledge in God except conjectural knowledge of conditional contingents.

I respond: Distinguishing the minor: To know this according to the dangers of this life precisely and abstracting from every divine decree is not to know certainly but only conjecturally, I concede the minor; According to the dangers of life as they are subject to the divine decree ordering or permitting, I deny the minor. For that there are dangers in human affairs and from them various evils follow, this does not happen nor is it foreseen except from the divine disposition ordering or permitting those dangers; nor does St. Augustine deny this in that place, although he does not explain it, because he is entirely engaged in refuting the absurdity of the semi-Pelagians, by which they wanted God to judge merits or demerits which someone would have had if he had lived.

You object 3°. It cannot be said by what knowledge God knows these conditional futures. He does not know them through the science of simple intelligence, because this deals only with merely possible and necessary things; nor through the science of vision, because this deals only with those things which are, were, or will be, and are actually present in eternity, which does not

belong to conditional futures: But according to the Holy Fathers and all Theologians, except the Molinists, no other knowledge is given in God except that of simple intelligence and vision: Therefore.

I respond: that Thomists are divided on this: Some say conditional futures are known by God through the science of vision: And to the proof to the contrary they distinguish: The science of vision deals only with those things which will be and are actually present in eternity, insofar as it is formally of vision, I concede; insofar as it is free and of approbation, I deny. For thus it extends to all free and contingent objects, whatever they may be.

Others say they are known through the science of simple intelligence, because just as in God there is given a double science of vision, one natural and necessary, namely the vision of the divine essence, and another free, namely the intuitive vision of creatures, so there is given a double science of simple intelligence: One natural and necessary which deals with merely possible things, and one free which deals with conditional futures. And when it is objected that the science of simple intelligence is said by St. Thomas and the Theologians to be necessary; they respond that this is said because it is principally occupied with merely possible things, which God naturally and necessarily knows.

From these two opinions, choose whichever you prefer, it is a question of name; for whether you say it is of simple intelligence or of vision, it matters not, provided you do not say it is independent of God's actual decree, such as the Molinists feign as middle.

You ask: whether God certainly knows all conditional futures whatsoever?

I respond: As regards conditional futures revealed in the Scriptures, it is established from what has been said that God knows them certainly. As regards others not revealed, but which concern the government of this world and have order to those things which are actually future, such as these, e.g., If Peter had not entered the Praetorium, he would not have sinned; if Judas had not had the purse, he would not have betrayed Christ: or even these disparate ones: if Peter runs, John will sit; if a goat leaps, a tree will flower; Theologians commonly consider that these too are certainly known by God; because since His Providence is most perfect, He must foresee those things which in some way conduce to its perfection and have connection or order with those things which are foreseen: Add that by the very fact that they are supposed to be future in some way, they are decreed by God, for nothing is future even conditionally in our opinion except through a decree, and in the decree He certainly knows them.

Therefore the difficulty remains concerning conditional futures according to possible combinations in another order of things, e.g., if in a possible world an animal were hungry, it would use this food. If in another world a tree flowered, it would bring forth so many fruits. But, at least in our judgment, the question should not be proposed about conditional futures according to possible combinations, but about the possible combinations themselves; because, as I already

observed, by the very fact that they are supposed to be future, they are supposed to be decreed and known in the decree.

Hence it should rather be asked whether God decrees all possible combinations in another order of things? which concerns the matter of decrees. Some deny this, thinking it suffices that God has determined to determine nothing about them, but to conclude them under mere possibility alone, estimating both parts of contingency as probable. So John of St. Thomas, disp. 20 on God's knowledge, art. 2, in the solution of the second argument.

Others think that God has determined concerning individual possible combinations, because otherwise God's will would remain suspended, and His knowledge which depends on His decree would not be sufficiently full. So Anthony Goudin, Treatise 2 on God's will, q. 2, a. 1, Conclusion 3, concerning which perhaps in its place.

Article VI: Concerning Middle Knowledge

I. The Status of the Question is Explained

Note 1°. In the preceding article we said from the common sense of Theologians that God certainly knows conditional free futures: There remains the question, and that most celebrated among all in the schools, in what medium God knows them. The Thomists, consistently with their principles, say they are known by God in His decree subjectively absolute and objectively conditional, which is thus expressed: I will that this happen, if such a condition is posited: e.g., I will that the Tyrians be converted, if the Gospel is preached to them: For just as there is no absolute future except from God's simply absolute decree, so neither any conditional future except from God's objectively conditional decree, and just as God knows absolute futures in His absolute decree, so also conditional futures in His conditional decree: but that such decrees are given which are conditional on the part of the object and absolute on the part of the subject, we now suppose and shall prove below.

This the Fathers of the Society abhor as a horrible monster, immense, destructive of freedom and injurious to divine holiness: But if you urge them to assign another medium, you will scarcely find one you can believe; so they fight among themselves, some contending for the supercomprehension of second causes, others for a future decree, others for the created will left to itself, others for formal truth, others for objective truth: So that what our Gonet noted from St. Thomas is verified, lecture 4 on chapter 4 of St. Dionysius on Divine Names: That those who know the truth agree in one opinion, but those who are ignorant are divided through various errors: Understanding less true opinions, for we do not wish to mark adversaries' opinions with censure.

In this therefore the Fathers of the Society unanimously agree from the times of Luis Molina, that God does not know conditional free futures in any actual absolute decree, but before it; and they call this knowledge middle, either because, as they say, it mediates between the science of simple intelligence and vision and participates in both; for it is necessary on the part of God, since it precedes His decree, like the science of simple intelligence, it is free on the part of the object, because it concerns future contingents, like the science of vision. Or because it is concerned with conditional futures which hold a middle place between merely possible and absolute futures, or finally, if it pleases the gods, because it is a medium divinely invented to defeat the heresies of the Lutherans and Calvinists; as some boast.

Note 2°. Therefore middle knowledge according to its assertors is the cognition by which God, before the actual decree determining the conditional futurity of free acts, explores and certainly foresees what the created will would do from its innate freedom if it were placed in such or such circumstances with offered indifferent help, whether it would consent to it and act well? whether it would dissent from it and act badly? Which being foreseen, if He wishes it to consent and act well, He decrees to place it in such circumstances in which He foresaw it would consent and to offer it indifferent concurrence, if not, He decrees to place it in other circumstances; and in such an absolute decree, they say, God certainly knows consent as absolutely future; but this certainty, as is evident, does not come from the very efficacy of the decree, but from the very prior conditional knowledge.

I said, "Before the actual decree determining the futurity of conditionals:" Because these Theologians do not refuse to admit a general decree in God of concurring with free causes, if they wish or when they wish to determine themselves to act: For, they say, God does not foresee consent as future given the condition, except through concurrence. Although we said above that a conditional future is that whose condition would not be fulfilled; nevertheless this middle knowledge according to the mind of its authors abstracts from whether the condition is verified or not verified, since, according to them, God through it must be directed in forming His absolute decrees, which are about futures whose condition is to be verified.

Note 3°. Concerning the origin and source of middle knowledge, its Patrons again litigate among themselves. Some want it to be a happy and not sufficiently praiseworthy offspring of Molina, unheard of in the schools up to that point. Others, more cautious lest it be disapproved by its very novelty, contend that it is very ancient and drawn from the Fathers themselves: so the moderns with Suarez.

But as regards the truth of the matter, we say it is neither Molina's offspring nor drawn from the Fathers, but from the semi-Pelagians themselves, as is established from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, many fragments of which we shall relate below, and especially from that principle of Faustus of Riez, leader of the semi-Pelagians: "Unless foreknowledge explores,

predestination decrees nothing," which he asserts in book 2 on Nature and Free Will, chapter 3, and elsewhere continually repeats.

Note 4°. But the semi-Pelagians abused middle knowledge insofar as they said God through it foreknows in the human will that from which He would be moved to confer grace on these rather than those; for they thought God could not without unjust acceptance of persons decree grace for one before another, unless there were some at least beginning of faith on the part of the human will by which He would be moved to this: whether indeed they placed this beginning of faith in naked nature, or in nature aided by some interior help, I do not dispute now: concerning this elsewhere.

And when they were pressed by the example of little children who are snatched away by premature death, to some of whom the grace of baptism is conferred but not to others; they said God had foreseen what good or evil they would have done if they had reached adult age, and from this He is equally moved to confer the grace of baptism on these rather than those.

But this use or rather abuse of middle knowledge modern assertors reject; for they do not want the foreknowledge of a good work conditionally foreseen to be for God a motive cause why He confers grace on these rather than those, as is evident, they say, in the Tyrians and Sidonians, whom God foresaw as convertible if the Gospel were preached to them, and nevertheless He did not will it to be preached.

But in this they agree with the semi-Pelagians, that they admit it to reconcile human freedom with the infallibility of divine decrees; for since they think no differently than the semi-Pelagians that human freedom is destroyed if God infallibly predefines our wills, and nevertheless it cannot be denied that God by His eternal and infallible providence disposes all things even our free acts, they say that God, before He absolutely decrees anything, foresaw what the created will placed in these or those circumstances would do good or evil from its innate freedom under offered indifferent concurrence, which being foreseen He absolutely and infallibly decrees who will act well and who badly; because those whom He wants to act well He places in those circumstances in which He foresees from their innate freedom they will act well, if not, in others, and thus He infallibly disposes concerning all as He wills without prejudice to freedom.

Middle knowledge explained in this sense, raised up by Molina, the Society of Jesus made its own from the year 1598, when our men accused it of semi-Pelagianism in the famous congregations De Auxiliis before Clement VIII and afterwards before Paul V.

Note 5°. Outside the schools of the Society few are there who defend this middle knowledge. Among these few most recently appeared Honoratus Tournely, Doctor of Paris, in his lectures on God, q. 16, art. 5, first showing himself as if addicted to no party... "We," he says, "having laid aside all party zeal, will turn toward both sides, we will subject both systems to our eyes, what each bears, what each has difficult, what is usually objected and responded from each side, we

will touch briefly and summarily. Thus it will happen that we decline the vice of those who, when they take up one opinion rather than another to be defended, so depress and usually deform the opposite that it is scarcely recognized by its defenders."

Who would not certainly believe from these words that Tournely, according to his given faith, having truly laid aside party zeal, would expose both the Molinist and Thomist systems equally and fairly, each for its own merits? But how far from the truth! The new soldier attempts nothing that he might not, with the Thomistic school prostrated, erect a trophy for the Molinist. If it is right to believe him; the arguments of the Molinists against the Thomists are most grave in number and weight: on the contrary, the arguments of the Thomists against the Molinists arise mostly either from prejudices of a preoccupied mind or from ignorance of the system of middle knowledge: enemies of middle knowledge feign monsters for themselves so they might more easily defeat it: vain and gratuitously fabricated are the arguments against middle knowledge from inconveniences: These can be sold and prevail among the ignorant mob for deception and envy, not among sound Theologians. Objections against middle knowledge are malicious, inept. The mode of reconciling freedom with divine decrees and grace which the Thomists use is complicated, obscure, vague, indeterminate, asserting no light to our mind, indeed it complicates and obscures the matter more, nor does it seem suitable, indeed more harmful for explaining the harmony of freedom with grace. The History De Auxiliis of Father Serry is convicted of falsehood and fully confuted by another most ample History of Father Meyer. Know the lion from its claw.

Moreover, he carefully conceals the more solid principles of our School, but those which he relates, he attenuates and weakens. He has the responses of the Molinists as if oracles from the Tripod, he blows away the responses of the Thomists as jejune and cold: he flatters the Molinists everywhere, praises, approves: he argues against the Thomists everywhere, despises, disapproves, and what is the height of cunning, he almost always introduces the Molinists speaking last so that, with the Thomists silenced, they appear as victors. Thus Tournely liberates his faith. Thus having laid aside all party zeal he turns the matter toward both sides.

Therefore that this recent Writer, against the common and ancient sense of his School, has defected to the Molinists, we do not complain, as one of ours already said, for it is free for anyone to defend opinions not yet condemned by the Church. But that in this part he seems to proceed less sincerely than is fitting, that being a Molinist to the marrow he pretends to be addicted to no party, perhaps so that by that title he may think he has acquired the right of daring anything with impunity for the Molinist School against the Thomistic, and by that subtle art may procure greater authority for his audacities, neither does nor can a sound Thomist bear.

Let no one therefore justly be angry with me if I attack this Theologian or pure Molinist with my strength, and whatever he brings forward in the name of the Molinists, I pursue as his own.

II. The Aberrations and Dissimulations of Honoratus Tournely Concerning the Notion of Middle Knowledge are Briefly Corrected

Tournely defines middle knowledge with the rest: "Knowledge of conditionals independent of every absolute and efficacious decree, and prior to it." Article 5, "What is middle knowledge." But he so smears this common notion of middle knowledge with so many pigments, involves it in so many equivocations, restricts it with so many exceptions, that you scarcely recognize it. You would believe he blushes to defend this cause with open front.

I. He therefore wants the Molinist Doctor to remove the following from the system of middle knowledge. **1°.** That grace be prevented by free will. **2°.** That there be something to be attributed to the will from the forces of nature alone by which it distinguishes itself. **3°.** That preventing grace move the will only morally and objectively, and not effectively through physical influx. **4°.** That a good work be partly from free will and partly from grace. **5°.** That free will operate by nature before grace cooperates. "With these," he says, "excluded and rejected, we do not refuse to defend and champion middle knowledge otherwise." That is, he does not refuse to defend the chimera which he has fashioned for himself.

Therefore as to the first: In the system of middle knowledge grace prevents free will as to offering, but is prevented by free will as to causality: For indeed according to the definition of middle knowledge given by Tournely, God before He wills man to consent to grace de facto, sees him about to consent from his innate freedom: Therefore God's will or His grace is not the cause why man consents, but man's consent is the cause why grace coacts or concurs. And hence to the second, it follows that the consent of the will foreseen by God is to be attributed to the forces of nature alone and by this the human will distinguishes itself, as I shall say below: for the offered concurrence, which note well, is not that by its force it certainly efficaciously determines the will to consent, but that given consent it concurs with the will to the effect; hence although the effect is from God concurring partially, nevertheless the very consent of the will is not from God, but from nature.

As to the third, it is mere equivocation to decline the odium of this opinion. The help of preventing grace in the system of middle knowledge moves physically to indeliberate acts of illumination of mind and excitation of will to good; but as to the deliberate consent of the will obeying the divine motion or excitation, it moves only morally. So in terms Tournely himself, Treatise on Grace, q. 9, art. 1, which he prudently dissimulated here to make deception.

As to the fourth, another equivocation: In the system of middle knowledge a good work is partly from free will, partly from grace not by partiality of effect, but by partiality of cause, just as the passive drawing of a ship is partly from two horses partially drawing not by partiality of effect but by partiality of cause. So Molina himself, so commonly the Molinists and most recently

Livinus Meyer, most vehement defender of middle knowledge, throughout Dissertation 1 on the mind of the Council of Trent.

To the fifth, from what has been said it is evident that free will operates by nature before grace cooperates, because grace does not cooperate unless free will has first determined itself by nature.

II. In the same place he acknowledges that Lessius admits grace can be called efficacious in second act from the very consent of the will: "But," he says, "because grace in supernatural good work has the principal and nobler parts, in our judgment it should be said much more aptly and more worthily to commend the power of grace, simply and absolutely that free will does not render grace efficacious in second act." Let him therefore say by whom it is rendered efficacious in second act, not by itself, not by intrinsic force, for this Tournely abhors with the Molinists, therefore by another: But by what other, unless by the very consent of the will? And this very thing which this Doctor here denies, he openly teaches elsewhere: For indeed in the Treatise on Grace, q. 9, a. 2, n. 3, after he has explained various modes of the congruity of grace, speaking of the congruity which the Fathers of the Society commonly sustain, he says: "But if it is only external congruity of grace, and supposes the use of middle knowledge, grace does not seem efficacious from itself, but from the very consent of the will, at least as has been said, in second act, nor does that opinion differ from that which Molina maintains." But he had said before that Molina teaches grace to be efficacious in second act from consent or cooperation of the will. You see how Tournely plays and deceives his readers, now denying, now affirming the same thing, as suits his purposes. By design? I do not judge.

III. In the same place he contends that it is fabricated for odium that it is said in the system of middle knowledge that grace is versatile and subject to free will. By versatile grace subject to free will we understand indifferent and indeterminate divine concurrence flexible in either direction through free will. But such concurrence is essential to middle knowledge, through which God explores what the created will under offered indifferent concurrence would do from its innate freedom? whether good or evil? prepared to concur to whatever it wills to determine itself; and this expression is common to the defenders of this system: "I say," says Father Annat, disp. 4, chap. 3, § 2, n. 58, "that free causes demand, if God wishes to accommodate Himself to their freedom, that He exhibit to them indifferent and non-determined concurrence, as if to say, I will to concur to either of opposite acts, or I will so to concur that it be attributed to the freedom of such a cause why there is an act rather than no act."

Indeed there are those who express in formal terms what Tournely says is fabricated for odium: "It must be confessed," says Lessius, Apologetic Treatise on Grace, chap. 4, n. 16, apud Serry, scholastic Thomist vindicated, animadversion 37, "that God most certainly foreknows to what action the created will is going to determine itself and what concurrence it will have from the hypothesis of that general one, IF I PUT MY CONCURRENCE IN ITS POWER." And chapter

18, n. 1: "So that help may be said to have efficacy in second act, it awaits the consent of the will TO WHOSE USE IT IS SUBJECTED, so that this efficacy depends in some way on the use of the will."

Father Christopher Ortega, controversy 3 on decrees, disp. 2, q. 4, contest 3, apud the same, thus introduces God forming a decree: "I decree to concur to an action even depraved or its opposite, or not to concur to it at the pleasure of the created will; that is, I prepare and SUBJECT my omnipotence to it externally for concurring or not concurring, so that the created will may use it, not otherwise than the infused habits which I send inherent in it for supernatural acts." And contest 4, n. 6: "God by His decree applies and SUBJECTS the activity of His omnipotence to the choice of the created will... And with that activity of omnipotence applied and SUBJECTED to its choice, it uses it." And n. 7: "God SUBJECTS the activity of His omnipotence to the choice of the created will and to free DETERMINATION." Which assertions Innocent XI proscribed on November 23, 1679.

IV. In the same place, "Fifth argument," he says nothing is more false, nothing more alien from the right method of philosophizing, nothing finally more absurd than to say that in the system of middle knowledge the will determines grace, since it is itself a certain determination. Let those whom we cited in the preceding number respond to this objector. Let all who admit indifferent concurrence respond, for if it is indifferent, it needs to be determined, but all defenders of middle knowledge admit this.

Abundantly let Annat be heard again, ibid. num. 60, introducing God thus forming for Himself the object of middle knowledge: "If I wish to concur indeterminately or indifferently with the will to an act or non-act, in these circumstances, it will happen according to its freedom that I concur determinately to the act." Hence n. 68: "If anyone should infer in that concurrence of God and creature to one effect... that God is not the cause why one thing happens rather than another, but this is rather to be attributed to the created will, we will not resist."

Let Platelius also be heard, the most recent Writer of the Society, chapter 4 on God's will, § 2, n. 166: "This decree," he says, "about exhibiting concurrence in first act to second causes... exhibits God's power to either thing indifferently to the free cause, leaving to it full power of DETERMINING itself and God's power already addicted to it, in second act to either part of contrariety or contradiction at pleasure."

What therefore does the new Molinist sing to us? "But," he says, "grace itself is a certain determination." So indeed preventing grace is a certain determination insofar as it excites the will morally and determinately to good; but this does not prevent God in the system of middle knowledge from exhibiting Himself prepared to concur to whatever the will has determined itself, and this needs to be determined by the will.

Moreover, preventing grace determines the will, says Tournely himself in the same place, like a habit, e.g., of charity. But who does not know that the habit of charity indeed inclines the will habitually to its object, but must be determined by it so that here and now it may concur with it to an act of love.

V. In the same place he says that in the system of middle knowledge the hypothesis seems fictitious in which, with equal grace conferred on two, one consents, the other does not. But Molina admits this hypothesis in Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 12, § "From what has been said." And q. 23, a. 4 and 5, disp. 1, memb. 2, § "Finally." Suarez, Bellarmine admit it, the book of the Society on the method of studies apud Lemos, Tom. 1, Treatise 6, chapter 23. Tournely himself did not deny it a little before, § "First argument."

And indeed if grace is not efficacious from itself but from an external source, on what grounds would this hypothesis be problematic? But I suspect the evasion which he hints at a little later: "In the system of middle knowledge," he says, "he who consents always obtains greater grace from God in the nature of a gift, even if perhaps it is not greater in the nature of help; therefore he consents because God from pure mercy selected for him that grace to which He foresaw he would consent if it were given, which cannot be said of the other who does not consent."

Good: Therefore at least the hypothesis of equality of grace in the nature of help and moving power in two of whom one is converted, the other not, is not fictitious. Which suffices for us. Moreover, when God through middle knowledge sees this one about to consent to grace, to which the other is foreseen not to consent, the grace is then equal in every respect, for then it is not yet a question of grace in the nature of a gift, but this happens only in the following sign through the absolute decree: Therefore God sees under entirely equal grace one about to consent, the other not about to consent: Therefore this hypothesis is not fictitious in the system of middle knowledge.

Finally, attend the coherence of what has been said, when he argues against us from the reproof of the Jews before the Tyrians, he supposes entirely equal grace on both sides, otherwise, he says, the reproof would be unjust: but when we argue against him from that hypothesis of equal grace, the hypothesis is fictitious; indeed an expeditious method of extricating himself from difficulties!

We shall correct other fictions and dissimulations of Tournely as they occur. With these therefore premised in advance, we attack middle knowledge with every kind of argument.

§. III. Middle Knowledge is Challenged by the Authority of Scripture

The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4: "Do not go beyond what is written, lest one be puffed up against another in favor of another. For who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have

not received? If indeed you have received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?" From this I argue as follows: According to the Apostle, the distinction of one from another must be traced not to the part of human will, but to the part of God who distinguishes one from another through His grace. But middle knowledge supposes that one distinguishes himself from another, for example Peter from Judas, by his own will. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: Suppose Peter and Judas are prevented by equal grace in equal circumstances. God sees Peter consenting to that grace and thereby distinguishing himself from Judas who does not consent, not by reason of grace (for it is equal and indifferently offered to both), therefore by reason of the proper determination of his own will to accept grace.

This is confirmed: That Peter consents to grace in equal circumstances rather than Judas, he has this either from God giving this consent, or from his own will. If he has consent from God giving it, then before God decrees that He wills to give this consent, this consent will not be future, nor can God see it as future, and thus middle knowledge perishes. But if Peter has this consent from his own will, then he has what he did not receive and thereby distinguishes himself from Judas contrary to the Apostle.

The Molinists turn in every direction to extricate themselves from this argument. J. Tournely responds: Although equal grace is supposed, he who consents to it should not therefore be said to distinguish himself from another, because he does not consent without grace, without which he could not act well. But discretion should always be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause.

Against this, I renew the reason already given: What is equal in two does not distinguish one from another; this is self-evident. In the case of the argument, equal grace is supposed in Peter consenting and Judas not consenting. But it is proper to Peter that he consents to grace. Therefore Peter is distinguished from Judas not by equal grace, but by what he adds from himself, namely consent and use of grace. Thus, for example, if a King provides equal arms to Peter and Judas, and Peter using his wins while Judas not wanting to use his is conquered; although Peter would not have won without arms, he will not be said to have received everything from the King nor to be distinguished from conquered Judas by the King's gift, but by his own virtue's effort. So in our case.

Against this second point: if Peter is said to be distinguished by grace and to receive everything from it only because he does not operate without it partially concurring, by equal right grace can be said to be distinguished by Peter and to receive from him, because it also does not operate without Peter partially concurring. Thus the rights of Peter and grace will be equal, and as he is distinguished by grace, so it will be distinguished by Peter and receive from him, which is contrary to the Apostle.

As for what Tournely adds that discretion should be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause: First, I deny that in the system of middle knowledge grace is the principal cause, as if the will

were its instrument; but both grace and created will are two partial causes, as has been said. In partial causes, each of which contributes from its own, to each whether nobler or less noble, whether contributing more or less, its own praise remains according to the quantity of causality and influence in the effect.

Second, granted that discretion should be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause, certainly to the nobler and more principal not only by reason of dignity, but by reason of causality and influence, it would follow that the will would rather distinguish grace than grace the will. For since in that system the will determines grace and not grace the will, and discretion is made maximally through determination, consequently grace does not distinguish the agent from the non-agent, but rather man consenting from his own distinguishes his grace from the grace of the non-consenting, making it fruitful in himself, which remains sterile in another.

The Jesuits of Douai respond in their Dictates of the year 1723: grace alone distinguishes with radical discretion, not formal. For they say, "it is not obtained without Titius operating that he consents to grace which Caius resists; and it is from God's good pleasure alone that He calls him in the way He knows to be congruous, not this one."

Against this first point: This response remains refuted from what has been said. For what is equal in two does not distinguish, not even radically, one from another. And although from God's good pleasure alone this grace was given as He knew to be congruous for consent, He did not therefore give consent, but expected it from the creature, concerning which therefore as concerning his own he boasts. Hence.

Against this second point: This response succumbs to the argument and openly contradicts the Apostle, while it admits that the consenting man distinguishes himself formally through his consent. Therefore this one will be able to respond to the Apostle asking, "Who distinguishes you?" "I distinguish myself at least formally and maximally." "What do you have that you have not received?" "I have consent which I did not receive from grace, but from myself." "But God foresaw your consent, and called in the way He knew to be congruous for you to consent." "Granted, but He did not give consent, nor is it therefore less mine, and in this I glory and distinguish myself."

Moreover, if God is the author of consent and distinguishes the consenting from the non-consenting through this, that He gives grace to him in those circumstances in which He foresaw he would consent, equally He can be called the author of dissent with respect to the dissenting, through this, that He gives grace to him in those circumstances in which He foresaw he would dissent; which cannot be said.

Father Annatus responds thirdly that the Apostle does not speak there of supernatural gifts of divine grace, but of natural gifts of wisdom and eloquence in which some excelled others in announcing the Gospel, and from this they were puffed up and despised others.

Against this: I deny Father Annatus's assumption. For although the Apostle said these things on the occasion of those who boasted about natural gifts, his words are not restricted to these alone, but are general, and regard whatever gifts whether natural or supernatural; for he excepts nothing: "What do you have," he says, "that you have not received?" By these words therefore he wanted to lay the foundation of all Christian humility, and to fortify us against any vain glory, whether regarding natural or supernatural things. Thus the interpreters understand, and among the Holy Fathers Ambrose, Theodoret, Anselm according to Tirinus. Indeed Saint Augustine in his book "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 5 and in his book "On the Spirit and the Letter" chapter 34, and the Second Council of Orange canon 6, take this general sentence of the Apostle in particular concerning distinction through grace. And indeed it would be paradoxical in the Christian Religion that man could not boast about natural goods but could about supernatural goods, as if he had supernatural things from himself and natural things from God.

Following this authority of the Apostle, Saint Cyprian (according to Augustine in his book "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 3) says: "In nothing should we boast, since nothing is ours." And Saint Basil in Homily 22 on humility: "Nothing is left to you, O man, of which you can boast, for we live entirely in the grace and gift of God."

Many other places of Scripture could be brought forward against middle knowledge, but studying brevity, we note only these. The Apostle says in Ephesians 1 that God chose us, not because we were going to be holy, but that we might be holy. In 1 Corinthians 12, that God works all things. In Philippians 2, that He works willing. But if He chose us that we might be holy, then before He chose He did not know we would be holy, even under the aid of grace, to forestall Tournely's evasion. If He works all things and willing itself, then He gives willing itself and consenting; if He gives, how can He know the future before He decreed to give?

Tournely responds that He works willing because without grace which He grants freely, we do not will the good. But I ask: either grace determines my will to will and consent, or the consent of the will determines grace to concur with me. If the first, we have our intent, and God cannot foreknow this future consent except in the will to give that determining and efficacious grace. If the second, then consent to grace is not from grace but from me.

§. IV. The Mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas Concerning Middle Knowledge

Having omitted many Fathers, some of whom we praised in the preceding section against middle knowledge, we especially inquire into Augustine's mind, because his doctrine in this matter, especially what he teaches in the books "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance," is the doctrine of the Church according to that saying of Pope Hormisdas to Possessor: "What the Roman Church feels about grace and free will can be known from the books of Saint Augustine to Hilary and Prosper." This is also established from the fact that

Clement VIII in the famous Congregations on Aids ordered the doctrine of Molina on middle knowledge to be examined according to Augustine's mind, as we saw in the preceding article.

I suppose as certain that Saints Hilary and Prosper in their letters to Augustine proposed to him middle knowledge on the part of the semi-Pelagians. Saint Prosper in his Letter to Augustine has this: "This is their (the semi-Pelagians') definition and profession... That God foreknew before the constitution of the world those who would believe, or who would remain in that faith which would thereafter be aided by God's grace, and predestined to His kingdom those whom, called freely, He foresaw would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end... But this purpose of God's vocation (that is, the decree which Augustine admitted) by which either before the beginning of the world, or in the very condition of the human race, the distinction of those to be chosen and rejected is said to be made... both takes away from the fallen the care of rising again, and brings to the Saints an occasion of lukewarmness... removes all industry, and abolishes virtues, if God's constitution prevents human wills; and under this name of predestination, introduces a certain fatal necessity."

And lest you say that there the discourse is only about absolute foreknowledge, a little later Saint Prosper adds: "And when among these things the multitude of countless little ones is objected to them, who certainly except for original sin... having no wills yet, no proper actions, are not separated without God's judgment, so that before the distinction of good and evil, some are removed from the use of this life to be assumed among the heirs of the heavenly kingdom through regeneration; others pass among the debtors of perpetual death without baptism: They say such are lost, and such are saved, as divine knowledge foresaw they would be in their mature years, if they were preserved to an active age. Likewise when they are pressed by the example of so many nations to some of whom the Gospel has been announced, to others not announced: They say the Lord foresaw those who would believe, and times and ministries of teachers were so dispensed to each nation, as the credence of good wills was about to arise."

In these two examples most clearly appears the foreknowledge of future conditionals prior to the decree.

Similarly Saint Hilary in his Letter to Augustine says: "When it is said to them (the semi-Pelagians) why to some or somewhere it is preached or not preached... They say this belongs to divine foreknowledge, that at that time, and there, and to those, truth would be announced, or is announced, when and where it was foreknown that it would be believed." Which they attempted to confirm by testimonies of the Fathers and especially of Augustine. Hence Hilary immediately adds: "And this they testify to prove not only by testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the earlier disputation of your holiness... As is that which your holiness said in the question against Porphyry concerning the time of Christian Religion, that Christ wanted to appear to men then, and to have His doctrine preached among them, when He knew and where He knew there were those who were going to believe in Him."

Therefore Prosper at the end of his letter expressly asks Augustine to explain how the decree preventing our wills (which the semi-Pelagians were unwilling to admit) does not harm freedom. Or rather whether the decree relies on foreknowledge, finally that he respond to the objection taken from his and other Fathers' testimonies. "I beseech," he says, "that you deign to open... how through that preoperating and operating grace free will is not impeded. Then whether God's foreknowledge remains according to purpose (that is, decree) so that those very things which are purposed should be understood as foreknown? Or through kinds of causes and species of persons these things are varied; so that because callings are diverse, in those who will do nothing for salvation (that is, little ones) only God's purpose seems to exist; but in those who will do some good, the purpose can stand through foreknowledge? Or truly uniformly, although foreknowledge cannot be divided from purpose by temporal distinction, nevertheless foreknowledge is in some order subordinated to purpose... Also show how that is dissolved (here he touches the objection taken from the Fathers' testimonies) which, having retracted former opinions about this matter, almost all have the same and one opinion by which they received God's purpose and predestination according to foreknowledge, so that on this account God made some vessels of honor, others of dishonor, because He foresaw the end of each one, and under the very aid of grace foreknew in what will and action each would be?"

From all these things it is clear that Prosper and Hilary proposed to Augustine on the part of the semi-Pelagians middle knowledge, or the knowledge of future conditionals before the decree. Now it falls to us to prove that Saint Augustine disapproved of it, not only as to its abuse, or insofar as it exhibits to God a motive for conferring or denying grace (this the Molinists concede), but also that he disapproved of it as to its substance, that is, he taught that there is no knowledge in God of future contingents whether absolute or conditional independently of absolute and actual decree, abstracting from the abuse or use to which it can be applied.

But we prove this in many ways from the books "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance," by which the Holy Doctor responds to Prosper and Hilary.

First Proof: Saint Augustine in his book "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 9, responding to the objection of the semi-Pelagians taken from what the Holy Doctor had said in his book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans against Porphyry" or Letter 49, question 2, where he seemed to have insinuated middle knowledge, says thus: "But that which in my little work which against Porphyry under the title 'On the Time of Christian Religion' you remember me to have said: I said it so, that I might pass over this more diligent and laborious disputation about grace, certainly not omitting a signification that I had not wished to explain it in that place, which could be explained elsewhere or by others."

Then having recited what he had said in the said work against Porphyry, he adds: "Do you not see that I wanted to say this about Christ's foreknowledge without prejudice to God's hidden counsel and other causes, which seemed sufficient for convincing the infidelity of the Pagans

who had raised this question? For what is truer than that Christ foreknew who and when and in what places they were going to believe in Him? But whether they were going to have faith in Christ preached to them from themselves, or were going to receive it from God giving it, that is, whether God only foreknew them, or also predestined them, I did not think it necessary then to inquire and discuss. Therefore what I said, that Christ wanted to appear to men then, and to have His doctrine preached among them, when He knew and where He knew there were those who were going to believe in Him, could also be said thus: that Christ wanted to appear to men then, and to have His doctrine preached among them, when He knew and where He knew there were those who had been chosen in Him before the constitution of the world. But because if it were said thus, it would make the reader attentive to inquiring into those things which now from the warning of Pelagian error it is necessary to dispute more copiously and laboriously; it seemed to me that what was then sufficient should be said briefly, except, as I said, the height of God's wisdom and knowledge, and without prejudice to other causes about which I thought it should be disputed not then, but elsewhere more opportunely."

And in his book "On the Gift of Perseverance" chapter 9, expounding that place of Matthew 11: "If the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, etc.," which is the principal foundation of the adversaries, and where according to them there is mention of a future conditional, the Holy Doctor says: "This certainly we cannot say about Tyre and Sidon (namely what he had said in the cited work against Porphyry about the Pagans, that Christ was unwilling to appear to them because He foresaw they would not believe) and in them we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to those causes of predestination, without prejudice to which hidden causes, I said I then responded to those things."

Hence Saint Thomas in the Summa Theologica III, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, proposing to himself this difficulty why Christ did not come in earlier ages, and referring the response which Augustine had given in the cited book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans," says that Saint Augustine reproved this opinion in chapter 9 of the cited book "On the Gift of Perseverance."

Moreover, it is certain and most evident that Saint Augustine in these two cited places speaks of future conditionals; as to the last place the adversaries confess, and as to both it is clear; for he speaks of futures about which he had spoken in the often cited book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans," namely who would believe, who would not believe, if Christ appeared in these or other circumstances.

It is also certain that here he either reproves the knowledge of conditionals which he had admitted in the book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans," as Saint Thomas holds and is clear from these words: "About Tyre and Sidon we cannot say," namely what he had said about the Pagans in the book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans." Or at least he does not admit it except insofar as it supposes predestination or decree: for he wants this to have been said by him formerly without prejudice to God's hidden counsel. But it is equally certain that Saint Augustine

in the earlier book "On the Six Questions of the Pagans" did not teach middle knowledge as to its abuse or which would exhibit to God a motive for conferring grace or a good work without grace: both because this question was not being dealt with against the Pagans, and because this would have been erroneous and semi-Pelagian, and yet Augustine does not say that what he said there was erroneous, but only that he did not explain the more hidden causes of this saying. Therefore it is certain and most evident that Augustine in the books "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance" reproved middle knowledge, not only as to its abuse, but also as to its substance.

Tournely responds that Saint Augustine nowhere revoked what he had written in the Questions to the Pagans, but only expounded and declared that he had not taught that the grace of faith is conceded by God in time to those whom He foreknew from eternity would believe whether from grace or from some pious natural affection for believing; but that he had written these things without prejudice to God's hidden counsel, that is, of predestination by which He determined to concede the grace of faith to whom He willed.

To the authority of Saint Thomas he responds that Saint Thomas refers to the complete place of Saint Augustine which consists of two parts, in the first of which the Holy Doctor says that Christ wanted to appear to men then when He knew and where He knew there were those who were going to believe in Him; but in the last part all those to whom He had not come were foreseen by God to be about to be unbelieving if He had come to them. After Saint Thomas related this, he adds: "But Augustine reproving this response in the book 'On Perseverance' says: Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have wanted to believe in such mighty works done among them, or would not have been about to believe, when God Himself testifies to them that they would have done great penance of humility if those signs of divine powers had been done to them?" But it is manifest from these words of Saint Augustine that only the last part of the text cited by Saint Thomas is reproved, not the first. Therefore.

But against the first point, these words of Augustine cited earlier from the book "On the Predestination of the Saints" openly fight: "But whether they were going to have faith in Christ preached to them from themselves, or were going to receive it from God giving it, that is, whether God only foreknew them, or also predestined them," etc. By these words he signifies that he does not acknowledge foreknowledge independently of decree; for Augustine takes here and elsewhere often the name of Predestination in a broader signification for any decree. Likewise Tournely's response is more openly overturned by what the Holy Doctor says in the second cited place from "On Perseverance," where he expressly declares that he cannot say about Tyre and Sidon what he had said about the Pagans in the Questions to the Pagans, namely that Christ was unwilling to appear to those whom He foresaw would not believe, nor yet had he said in the Questions to the Pagans that God concedes or denies the grace of faith from foresight of consent or dissent, which was the abuse of middle knowledge among the semi-Pelagians. Therefore Augustine expressly reproves what he had said in the Questions to the Pagans.

Against the second point, Augustine's retractation affects also the first part of his proposition taken from the book "On the Questions to the Pagans." For if, as the Holy Doctor here acknowledges, Christ was unwilling to have His Gospel preached to the Tyrians and Sidonians whom nevertheless He knew would believe, then what he generally said in the first part of the proposition cannot stand, that He wanted to appear to those whom He knew would believe, since He knew the Tyrians and Sidonians would believe, to whom nevertheless He was unwilling to appear.

Second Proof: Augustine in the book "On the Gift of Perseverance" chapter 17, responding to Hilary's question whether those things which are foreknown by God are also predestined by Him, so that foreknowledge is subordinated to decree (which is the very question of middle knowledge as to its substance), establishes as a general principle that if our good works are not predestined by God, they are not given by God, or He did not know He was going to give them: "But if they are both given, and He foreknew He was going to give them, He certainly predestined them." And in "On the Predestination of the Saints" chapter 10: "By predestination," he says, "God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do."

But with this general principle established, middle knowledge cannot stand, according to which good things are foreknown by God and not predestined. To make this clearer, I argue thus: that Peter, if placed in these circumstances, would consent to grace rather than dissent, will either be from God giving it, or from the innate liberty of choice. If it will be from God giving it, according to Augustine's principle this could not be foreknown before or outside the decree, and thus there is no middle knowledge, at least concerning that consent. If it will not be from God giving it but from innate liberty, then what most conduces to salvation, namely to consent to grace rather than reject it, will not be God's gift but the fruit of free will; which is not only contrary to Augustine but also contrary to faith.

Third Proof: Augustine in the same book "On Perseverance" chapter 18, responding to the objection of the semi-Pelagians taken from testimonies of other earlier Fathers, which Hilary and Prosper had proposed, after he showed that the earlier Fathers by the name of foreknowledge did not understand mere foreknowledge prior to God's decrees, but including decree and founded on it, concludes in the following chapter by establishing this other general rule: "What therefore prevents us, when we read God's foreknowledge among some expounders of the word of God, and it concerns the calling of the Elect, from understanding the same predestination?"

By this other principle it is equally plain that middle knowledge is utterly overturned, according to which there is given a foreknowledge of good pertaining to the calling of the elect, namely of consent to grace conditionally future, which is not predestination.

By these and many other principles of Augustine which we omit for brevity's sake, and some of which will recur below especially when dealing with the inconveniences of middle knowledge, the adversaries respond variously.

First, they say that Augustine, when he rejects foreknowledge of good work anterior to decree, speaks of absolute foreknowledge or of absolute futures, not conditional ones. Thus Tournely with his followers.

But against this first point: This response openly contradicts the texts of Augustine praised in the first proof, as we showed there.

Second, Augustine teaching that foreknowledge of futures is founded on decree, or rejecting foreknowledge anterior to decree, either always spoke of absolute futures, never of conditional ones, or sometimes of conditional ones. If the first, then Augustine omitted to respond to the principal difficulty proposed to him by Prosper at the end of his letter on the part of the semi-Pelagians, namely whether uniformly, that is both in adults and in little ones concerning whom there was certainly a conditional future, foreknowledge is in some order subordinated to purpose. Third, the Molinists mock when they here distinguish between absolute and conditional futures, since in their principles God knows neither absolute futures in His actual decree, but either in the supercomprehension of causes, or in a future decree, or in formal or objective truth, or in His essence as an intelligible species in representing infinite things, as we saw in article 4 of the present Dissertation. And indeed in that system neither the decree of concurring which they call concurrence in the first act, nor the concurrence itself in the second act can be the reason for knowing determinately a free act whether absolutely or conditionally future, as Father Annatus ingenuously confesses and proves in disputation 4 "On Middle Knowledge" chapter 3, section 2, number 62. For, he says, if it is taken in the second act, that concurrence is the very thing known (for it is identified with the creature's concurrence). But if it is taken in the first act for the decree of concurring, its supposition is indeed the reason without which nothing can be known conditionally and freely future; but it is not the reason for knowing this future rather than that (because namely it is a decree of concurring at the nod of the created will and dependently on its determination). But neither is there any other such reason: for such free futures whether absolute or conditional have nothing which is to them the reason that they are seen determinately; and therefore they are said to be seen in that presentness which they either have if they are absolute, or would have if they are conditional.

And yet, which you should note, Augustine not only said that good things foreknown by God are predestined by Him, but also that God foreknows them in His predestination or decree.

Second, they respond that Augustine in these and other places rejected middle knowledge in the semi-Pelagians only as to its abuse.

But against this first point: This response is impugned no less than the preceding one from what was said in the first proof; see there.

Second, it is confuted from Augustine's general principles related in the second and third proofs. For if according to Augustine nothing good can be foreknown by God which is not predestined by Him, nor except in predestination itself, it is evident that middle knowledge cannot stand as to its substance; for this is the foreknowledge of futures independently of decree and prior to it.

Third, it is established from what was said at the beginning of this section that middle knowledge even as to its substance and legitimate use of reconciling human freedom with divine decrees through it was proposed to Augustine on the part of the semi-Pelagians. Hence Prosper at the end of his letter asks Augustine to explain how through that preoperating grace free will is not harmed, as the semi-Pelagians complained. Also whether through foreknowledge purpose can stand, or on the contrary whether foreknowledge is subordinated to purpose. Which is to propose middle knowledge in terms not as to its abuse but as to its substance.

Augustine therefore in his responses to Prosper and Hilary either approved, or omitted, or disapproved middle knowledge thus proposed and the semi-Pelagians' complaints about the crushing of freedom and fatal necessity. If the last, we have our intent. The second cannot be said without injury to so great a Doctor. If the first, let the adversaries show where and how he approved it. But that this argument may be clearer:

Fourth Proof: If Augustine approved middle knowledge as to its substance as the Molinist Schools now teach, I ask why he did not propose it to the semi-Pelagians to restrain their complaints and to calm the scandals arising on the occasion of his doctrine. For we see above, as Prosper reports, them complaining that all industry is removed and virtues abolished if God's constitution, as Augustine taught, prevents human wills, and under this name of predestination fatal necessity is introduced, and a little before that purpose of God's vocation takes away from the fallen the care of rising again and brings to the saints an occasion of lukewarmness. Why, I ask, for calming these complaints and solving these objections did Augustine not employ middle knowledge? For nothing was more expeditious for removing these inconveniences, since it was devised for this purpose. Yet that he nowhere admitted it in his responses to Hilary and Prosper is established and confessed by Tournely, Gabriel, Daniel with other Molinists. Therefore Augustine most certainly did not approve it, or if he approved it, he is most blameworthy because he omitted to heal so many evils and scandals with such an easy and prompt remedy, neglected to defend his cause and that of Religion, and fostered dissensions in the Church from mere love of dispute, which is certainly wicked to suspect of so great a Doctor.

To this argument by which the adversaries are not a little pressed, Tournely responds, saying that Augustine therefore did not employ middle knowledge against the complaints of the semi-Pelagians because he understood that he could profit nothing by it among them. For middle

knowledge as to its substance, he says, and as Catholics defend it, supposes that grace which prevents the will is necessary, but the semi-Pelagians denied that grace precisely because they could not conceive in what way the freedom of the will would stand if it needed preventing grace.

But against this first point: Tournely is refuted by his leader Molina, when in the Concordia q. 23, a. 4 & 5, disp. 1, final member (Ulissiponian Edition), accusing all the ancients and Augustine himself as if of negligence, he says that if the four principles which he establishes, among which he places middle knowledge in the third place, had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen... nor from Augustine's opinion and disputations with the Pelagians would so many faithful have been troubled and defected to the Pelagians, and easily those remains of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, would have been extinguished. Therefore, according to Molina's own testimony, Augustine would have profited among the semi-Pelagians if he had employed against their complaints middle knowledge as Catholics defend it.

Against this second point: It is false that at least all the semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of interior preventing grace as the Molinists defend it. We will prove this elsewhere, and meanwhile it is established from the fact that they taught all are called freely; but it is certain that not all are called by external grace of preaching, exhortation, etc. Therefore by interior grace.

Against this third point: Granted that all the semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of interior preventing grace as the Molinists defend it, they did not therefore deny it because they believed freedom was abolished by it. For who unless mentally deranged could suspect that grace given indifferently to all, permitted to free will, and expecting the consent of the will (as the Assertors of middle knowledge defend) would even minimally harm freedom? The semi-Pelagians, men otherwise subtle and learned, never dreamed of such a thing. But they denied such grace (if they denied it) lest God be said to be an acceptor of persons, if according to His nod without any motive on the part of man, He assumed one and left another. "They think themselves to believe God an acceptor of persons," says Augustine in Letter 105 to Sextus, "if they believe that without any preceding merits He has mercy on whom He wills."

Therefore if Saint Augustine had declared that God decrees nothing absolutely concerning the salvation of men except after first exploring what the will would do under offered grace, and that this grace which he said prevents wills is not efficacious and determinative infallibly by itself, but indifferent, common to all and permitted to their free will, it is most certain that all the semi-Pelagians to a man would have acquiesced in this part, nor would they have complained any longer from Augustine's opinion that industry is removed, virtues abolished, free will taken away, and fatal necessity introduced.

Fifth Proof: Catholic defenders of middle knowledge object against the absolute and antecedent decrees of the Thomists the same things which the semi-Pelagians formerly objected against Augustine's decrees, namely that freedom is abolished by them and fatal necessity introduced. Therefore the Holy Doctor felt what the Thomists feel, and disapproved in the semi-Pelagians what the Thomists disapprove in the Molinists.

Tournely responds first that therefore the semi-Pelagians attacked Augustine's decrees because they falsely thought that freedom was extinguished by the preventing grace which the Holy Doctor required. But we have already said there would have been no place for this objection if indeed Augustine required no other grace than the Molinist.

He responds second that from this argument it follows only that the semi-Pelagians labored under an error of fact concerning Augustine's mind and doctrine which they did not know; for indeed nowhere did Augustine admit such decrees.

But Tournely does not notice that, carried away by excessive zeal for defending Molinist doctrine, by this response, while he tries to excuse the semi-Pelagians, he accuses Augustine. For if the semi-Pelagians labored under an error of fact concerning Augustine's mind and doctrine, if indeed the Holy Doctor himself did not feel what they thought he felt, why did he not teach them, why did he not open his mind in the responses given to Hilary and Prosper who questioned him about this matter, so as to calm the scandals and dissensions arising from a false understanding of his doctrine? Augustine will therefore be guilty, according to Tournely, of the same crime which the Apostle once reproached the Ethnic Philosophers with, namely of truth held back through injustice, and necessary for establishing the peace of the Church.

Finally it is proved: Why does Tournely apply so many useless efforts to drag Augustine, even unwilling, to his side, and why do we linger so long in refuting him, when we have confessing adversaries? The very Prince of that school, Molina, ingenuously acknowledges that middle knowledge, as he teaches it, was not known to Augustine (he would have said better, approved). This is clear from what was said in the fourth proof. Also in the Summa Theologica I, q. 23, a. 4 & 5, when he had taught that predestination was not in God without His foreseeing what free will would do, he says: "But meanwhile under that quasi-darkness Augustine did not attend to this."

Vasquez in the Summa Theologica I, disp. 97, c. 3, n. 19 & 20, according to the Salamancan Compilation, says: "I confess indeed that the testimonies of Prosper and Fulgentius are suspect to me (in the matter of grace) because they are most diligent and exact disciples of Augustine, and they seem to follow the opposite opinion (to what Vasquez himself holds)."

This will be further proved below when we impugn middle knowledge from its novelty.

Concerning Saint Thomas

First, the Holy Doctor nowhere mentions middle knowledge nor distinguishes between simple intelligence which regards merely possible things, and vision which intuits futures supposing a decree.

Second, whenever the Holy Doctor proposes to himself the arguments which the adversaries heap up concerning the harmony of freedom with divine decrees, he never takes refuge in middle knowledge exploring the consent or dissent of human freedom before the decree, but with Augustine he recurs to the most efficacious power of the divine will itself. Thus here in q. 19, a. 3: "Since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen in the way God wills them to happen. But He wills some things to happen necessarily, and some contingently and freely." Similarly elsewhere.

Third, He rejects middle knowledge who denies its object. But Saint Thomas denies the object of middle knowledge. Therefore. The Minor is proved: The object of middle knowledge is a conditional future before God's actual decree. But according to Saint Thomas there is no future before God's actual decree. Therefore. The Minor is from Saint Thomas here in q. 16, a. 7. See the place cited in article 4 of this Dissertation, section 1, conclusion 5.

Nor does it avail if you say that Saint Thomas is to be understood of absolute futures, not conditional ones, because the same reason applies to conditional as to absolute futures, proportion being maintained, as will be clear in the following section.

Fourth, He rejects middle knowledge who teaches that creatures cannot be known by God immediately in themselves, but in His very essence. For through middle knowledge, if it were given, God would not see man's consent conditionally future in His essence as able to produce it, because from this nothing is said to be future but only possible; nor in His essence as determined by decree, because it would be prior to that decree, but immediately in itself, and thus the adversaries contend. But Saint Thomas perpetually teaches that creatures are not known by God immediately in themselves, but in His very essence. Thus here in q. 14, a. 5, and elsewhere frequently. See the preceding Dissertation, article 4.

Many other principles of Saint Thomas by which middle knowledge is overturned the Authors relate. Consult Gonet if you wish.

§. V. Middle Knowledge is Impugned by Various Reasons

First fundamental reason: There is no object; therefore there is no middle knowledge. The Antecedent is proved: The object of middle knowledge according to its assertors is a free

conditional future before God's decree actually exercised and independent of it. But before God's decree actually exercised and independently of it there is no conditional free future. Therefore.

The Minor, in which lies the difficulty, is proved: If something in contingent things were conditionally future before God's decree, it would have this either from itself, or from the force of the condition, or from indifferent concurrence offered, or finally from some other cause. But not from itself, otherwise it would not be contingent future but necessary and natural; and moreover just as nothing can give itself existence, so it cannot give itself conditional futurity. Not from the force of the condition: for either the condition is disparate, as in this proposition, "If you had struck the earth seven times, you would have struck Syria unto consumption," and then it is more than manifest that that condition, namely the sevenfold striking of the earth, by its force does not infallibly infer the future consumption of Syria; or the condition is comparative or pertinent, as "if preaching is done there will be conversion," and then it is also manifest that such a condition does not render conversion infallibly future, since often preaching is done without conversion, and otherwise it would follow that preaching alone would suffice for conversion, which was condemned in Pelagius.

Not from offered concurrence, because that general and indifferent concurrence has no infallible connection with the event, say with consent, since it can stand with consent or dissent according to its Authors. Not finally from some other cause, because all other causes are indifferent and indeterminate to futurity or non-futurity prior to God's decree determining one or the other, since they do not determine themselves independently of the determination of the first cause, otherwise they would not be second causes but first, and the first would be second. Therefore there remains only God's decree by which a contingent thing becomes conditionally future and as such is known by God.

First Confirmation of this Minor: An absolute future is that which is absolutely determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore a conditional future is that which is conditionally determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time. I add: But before the decree or determination of God, as the first cause, no other cause is determined to the futurity of anything even under condition. Therefore.

Second Confirmation of the same Minor: For a thing to be conditionally future is not an intrinsic denomination (for this cannot belong to a thing not yet existing) but extrinsic, consequently proceeding from some form extrinsic to the future thing. But not from a cause as able to produce it, for this denominates the thing only as possible; not from a cause as actually producing, for this denominates the thing as existing. Therefore from a cause as determined to give it existence under condition. I add: But before God's decree no other cause is determined, as we have already said. Therefore before God's decree nothing is conditionally future.

Third Confirmation of the same Minor: Conditional futurity does not leave a thing in the state of mere possibility, but transfers it to the state of some futurity (for it mediates between possibility and absolute futurity). It is also something real, something true and knowable, and finally speaks of some actuality which possibility does not speak of, namely an order to existence if the condition is posited. But first, a thing cannot pass from the state of possibility to the state of some futurity through itself, nor through the divine will precisely as able, since this leaves the thing in the state of possibility. Therefore through the divine will otherwise disposed than it was in that prior sign in which the thing was conceived as only possible; but it is disposed otherwise through its decree.

Second, that reality, that truth and actuality which conditional futurity speaks of cannot escape divine causality; but God causes nothing outside Himself unless freely determined to it.

To this fundamental reason the adversaries respond variously.

First, some say that something is conditionally future because it will be if. But this response is a most manifest begging of the question. For this is what we ask: whence does a non-existing thing have that it will be rather than will not be if a condition is posited having no infallible connection with it from itself? Nothing else is assignable than a decree, as we have proved.

Second, others respond that futurity does not signify something positive but mere lack of existence, to which a decree is not required. But on the contrary: If the future were constituted by lack of existence alone, it would not be distinguished from the purely possible, and many things do not exist now which are nevertheless in no way future. They reply that the future is distinguished from the possible by lack of existence with an order to existing. I infer: Therefore it is no longer something purely negative. Moreover the argument returns, and this is what is asked: from whom does a non-existing thing have that it speaks an order to existing rather than to not existing? Nothing else can be assigned than the divine decree, as is clear from what has been said.

Third, they respond, and more commonly, that between conditional and absolute future there is this difference: that the absolute indeed requires a decree actually existing in God; but the conditional requires a decree not which is actual, but which would be if the condition were posited (for they always want a subjectively conditional decree to be imported on the part of the condition, which is not but which would be if the condition were posited. Hence in that proposition "If Peter were in those circumstances he would do penance," they always understand, they say, "and if God wills to offer him His concurrence"). But they prove their assumption by this argument: A cause should be proportioned to its effect, so that to an effect which is, a cause which is should be assigned; to an effect which will be, a cause which will be; to an effect which would be if a condition were posited, a cause which would be if a condition were posited. But conditional futures neither are nor will be, but only would be if the condition were posited.

Therefore it suffices if a decree is assigned to them not which is actual, but which would be if the condition were posited.

But on the contrary: This response, which Tournely urges in q. 6, a. 3 toward the end and in which the adversaries chiefly trust, is a mere evasion. Hence, I deny the difference alleged in the first proposition between absolute and conditional future; and to its proof I distinguish the Minor: Conditional futures neither are nor will be, etc., as to the actual exercise of the existence to which they are future, I concede the Minor. They are not, nor will be, etc., as to the actual truth or reason of conditional futurity, I deny the Minor. And in this lies the great hallucination of the adverse opinion.

The solution is explained: It is indeed true that conditional futures do not exist actually, that is, they do not exist in reality with that existence to which they are sometime future to have, nor do absolute futures thus exist: otherwise they would not be future but present. For conditional futures thus taken, a cause should be assigned which would be if the condition were posited, just as for absolute futures thus taken a cause should be assigned which will sometime be.

But they exist actually as to the truth or reason of conditional or absolute futurity. For they are truly actually future conditionally or absolutely, and for that actual absolute or conditional futurity, which is not a being of reason nor pure possibility, a cause should be assigned which is actual, and just as for absolute futurity the adversaries themselves in the objection assign an absolute decree actually existing, so for actual conditional futurity a conditional decree actually existing should be assigned.

Hence I argue ad hominem: Although absolute futures do not exist actually, because nevertheless they are actually future absolutely, you assign for the truth of this absolute futurity a cause which is actual, namely an absolute decree actually existing. Therefore equally, although conditional futures are not actual, because nevertheless they are actually future conditionally, a cause which is actual should be assigned to them, namely a conditional decree actually existing.

Second reason akin to the preceding, or its major explanation: Middle knowledge is that by which God independently of a posited decree sees an infallible connection between human will and this act rather than another in certain circumstances posited. But there is no such connection before God's posited decree. Therefore there is no object of middle knowledge.

The Major is clear from the definition of middle knowledge. The Minor is proved: There is no infallible connection between things which are connected neither through themselves nor through another. But before God's posited decree the will is connected infallibly with this act rather than another neither through itself nor through another. Therefore.

Not through itself, for the will is indifferent to this or that; and otherwise if it were connected through itself with one act, it would be a natural and necessary connection, and thus a necessary

future, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Not through another: For what would be that other? Not the divine will, because no decree is supposed in it by which He de facto wills them to be connected; not the conditional decree or offered concurrence, both being indifferent to this or the opposite act; not circumstances, for they are disparate or contingent, and therefore not infallibly connected from themselves with one act.

This reason is extensively pursued by Father Goudin.

Third reason by which the preceding are confirmed and various ways of speaking of the adversaries are exposed: The assertors of middle knowledge do not entirely deny that some decree of God intervenes in their middle knowledge, as we have already observed, but they explain it variously. Some and more frequently with Vasquez place the decree on the part of the antecedent or condition, thus for example: "If I call Peter in such circumstances and if I will to concur with him, he will consent." Thus Honoratus Tournely and commonly the more recent. Others less frequently with Arrubal place it on the part of the consequent or effect; thus for example: "If I call Peter in these circumstances I will concur with him and he will consent." But neither way of speaking satisfies. Therefore.

As to the first, it is proved: Either they understand concurrence indifferently offered under condition to consent or dissent, or concurrence determined to consent; similarly a conditional decree of concurring either indifferently to either part, or determinately to one part. But neither can be said. Therefore.

The first part of the Minor is proved: **First,** in indifferent and indeterminate concurrence to consent or dissent, there is no more connection with consent than with dissent, therefore in it consent cannot be seen as certainly future rather than dissent, as we argued above. **Second,** consent cannot be seen as determinately future under condition unless all causes without which it would not be in reality are seen, the condition being posited; for under the conditional state, it should be seen as determinately future so that only the purification of the condition is lacking for it to pass into the absolute state. But with the conditions posited, namely vocation and indifferent concurrence to consent or dissent, there would not be consent absolutely and in reality except through simultaneous concurrence determined to consent. Therefore for it to be seen as determinately and de facto proceeding in the conditional state, if the condition is purified, that determined concurrence without which it does not proceed in reality should be seen, and thus indifferent concurrence does not suffice.

The Minor is clear, both because indifferent concurrence to either is not that through which the thing de facto proceeds, but is offered antecedently so that the thing may be done freely, and the opposite may be able to proceed; and because the simultaneous concurrence by which the thing de facto proceeds is identified with the operation of the second cause. Hence just as in the object

of middle knowledge the determined influx of the creature should shine forth, so also the determined concurrence of God should be seen.

The second part of the first Minor is proved: namely that concurrence offered cannot be said to be determined to consent. With concurrence determined to consent posited on the part of the condition, the object of middle knowledge is destroyed, for it then becomes a necessary object, but middle knowledge according to its authors is of contingent and free acts and objects. Therefore.

The Antecedent is proved: **First,** this proposition or consequence, which is the object of middle knowledge, "If I call Peter and concur determinately with him to consent, he will consent," reduced to the absolute state, e.g., "I call Peter and concur determinately with him to consent, therefore he consents," is necessary. Therefore posited in the conditional state it is a necessary conditional, just as if this absolute consequence, "The sun shines, therefore it is day," is necessary, the conditional also consisting of the same terms, "If the sun shines, it is day," is necessary.

Second, the simultaneous concurrence determined to Peter's consent is identified with that consent, or at least is simultaneously influencing with it, for Peter does not consent without simultaneous concurrence, and God does not concur simultaneously except with Peter consenting. Hence the sense of this proposition, "If I concur with Peter determinately to consent, he will consent," is this: "If I place my concurrence with Peter's consent there will be Peter's consent"; or, "If concurrence identified with Peter's consent is given, there will be Peter's consent." And such will be the object of middle knowledge, which, as is clear, nothing is more necessary, indeed utterly useless since it is attributing to God such knowledge as simple children have.

As to the second way of speaking it is also proved not to suffice: when they introduce God saying, "If I call Peter, I will concur with him and he will consent," either God sees Peter's conditional consent prior to the collation of His concurrence or not. If the first, then the concurrence is uselessly employed for God to foresee Peter's future consent. But if not previously foreseeing Peter's consent, He employs His concurrence, or decrees to employ it, either He will be bound to subject the created will to Himself and determine it so that it infallibly wills what He wills (and this will be to posit physical predetermination, from which the adversaries so abhor), or certainly He will concur rashly and fortuitously with human will, and expose Himself to the danger of frustrating both His decree and concurrence and all His knowledge. For when two free causes simultaneously concur to the same effect, if one does not subject and subordinate the other to itself, or otherwise does not foreknow what the other will do, it proceeds by chance and fortuitously, joining itself to it, and is exposed to the danger of not attaining the effect if the other is unwilling. Therefore.

Fourth reason: The divine intellect knows nothing except what the divine essence represents to it. The adversaries do not deny this, for although they contend against us that God knows other things immediately in themselves, they do not so understand this as if God knew them through species drawn from them (for the divine intellect cannot be informed by created species), but through His essence immediately representing them in themselves, and not, as we say, mediately only in Himself as in a cause previously known. It is established therefore in both schools that the divine essence is the adequate species of the divine intellect. But the divine essence does not represent the object of middle knowledge, namely this act as determinately future in these circumstances before a decree actually posited concerning its futurity. Therefore.

The Minor is proved: What does not belong to a thing through itself nor through another, does not belong to it at all. But to represent this act as rather future than not future before a decree does not belong to the divine essence through itself nor through another. Not through itself, for it is from itself indifferent to represent this act or its opposite as future since either can equally be future. Nor through another; for what would be that other which would determine the divine essence, from itself indifferent to representing this act as future rather than not future from all eternity before a decree, to it rather than to another mode of representation?

Nor can the adversaries here say what they are accustomed to say about conditional futurity, that it does not require a cause which is but which would be if, because it does not speak of something which is, but which would be if: they cannot, I say, say this here; because that representation, if any occurs, was always actually as something existing in God. Hence something existing should be assigned as the reason of that representation, namely either the divine essence itself, or something else contained in it; and since nothing such can be assigned except a decree, it remains that this determinate representation does not belong to it except through a decree. Thus the most learned Father Goudin with a few additions.

These four fundamental reasons which the Thomists commonly use, Honoratus Tournely passed over in profound silence: cautiously for himself, because he had nothing to respond. Yet he had promised that, setting aside all partisan zeal, he would sincerely expound the considerations of both systems. Where is the faith?

§. VI. Most Serious Inconveniences of Middle Knowledge

First inconvenience: Middle knowledge takes away from God the nature of first cause and prime mover. It is proved: It is of the nature of the first cause and prime mover that it moves other causes, and none of them is moved except moved by the first. But in the system of middle knowledge the second cause moves itself not moved by the first, for it determines itself not determined by God. Therefore.

Tournely responds that the nature of first cause and prime mover is preserved in God because: **First,** He receives the power of acting from no other cause, but others have the power of acting from Him, and He preserves that power by continual influx. **Second,** because the second cause can do nothing without Him cooperating, while He can do all things absolutely without the second cause. **Third,** because His concurrence is universal, but the concurrence of the second cause is particular.

But on the contrary: None of these things preserves in God the nature of first cause and prime mover in causing and moving, which is what we are dealing with. And first, from the fact that He conferred on the second cause the power of acting and preserves it, it follows that He is the first and immediate cause of this virtue, not however of its action. Second, that the second cause can do nothing without God cooperating follows that He is a co-cause, not the first cause. Third, that God's concurrence is more universal follows that He can do more than the second cause, but not that He is the first cause in causing and moving, of whose nature it is that the second cause is not moved except moved by it.

Thus, for example, although a Father conferred on his Son the virtue of carrying a burden, suppose also that he preserves it; although he carries this burden with his Son; although finally his virtue extends more widely than the Son's virtue, he will in no way be said or be the first and immediate cause or prime mover of the Son's carrying, but only then if he moves the Son himself and applies him efficaciously to the burden.

Second inconvenience: Middle knowledge takes away from God the nature of universal cause, since in that system some being, namely the determination of the creature, escapes His causality. For it is not caused by preventing grace, since this, as Tournely and other Molinists confess, moves only morally to determination; not by cooperating grace or simultaneous concurrence, both because it would no longer be only simultaneous but also previous (for the cause is prior, at least by nature, to the effect), and also because simultaneous concurrence does not act on the will so as to determine it, but only on the effect. It does not make us will, but acts when we will, as is clear in two simultaneously drawing a ship: neither influences the other, but each partially influences the passive traction of the ship.

Third inconvenience: Middle knowledge curtails God's omnipotence and supreme dominion which He has over our wills. It is proved: It is the constant doctrine of Augustine and all, I think, who think catholicly, that God can convert the wills of men to good in any circumstances whatsoever. "Who," says the Holy Doctor in the Enchiridion chapter 97, "is so impiously mad as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men which He willed, when He willed, where He willed, to good?" Which he repeats frequently and from this proves that God is omnipotent. But in the system of middle knowledge God cannot, with freedom preserved, incline the will to consent in those circumstances in which it was foreseen to be about to dissent, nor decree

anything certainly about our free acts unless He first explored what we ourselves are going to will. Therefore.

If you say God can place the will in other circumstances in which it will obtain consent, this being granted now, concerning which in what way; at least in the former He will not be able to obtain it, and thus He will not be able to convert the will to good when and where He willed, nor will He have dominion over the will itself, but only over circumstances.

"But," says Honoratus Tournely after Father Daniel, "how can it happen that that knowledge which represents to God various and multiple modes which He can use to bend and overcome our wills when and where He willed, such as middle knowledge is, detracts from divine omnipotence and His supreme dominion over our wills?"

But in his manner Tournely mocks and falsely feigns to make a show: for it is most false what he supposes, namely that middle knowledge represents to God multiple modes by which He can certainly and infallibly as He wills and when He wills bend our wills and determine them to consent. For it exhibits only, according to its Authors, graces permitted to free will, or means by which God only morally invites and excites the will to consent which He expects from innate freedom under indifferent concurrence; otherwise, according to Tournely himself and all Molinists, that consent would not be free, and the will would behave passively toward it.

But as if he had given a decisive solution, the Molinist Doctor, somewhat moved by the argument, continues thus: "For it is not from ignorance or from impotence that God uses that knowledge of conditionals to foreknow what man constituted in these or those circumstances will do. Who so mad and impious as to assert this?"

Indeed mad and impious would be he who asserted this; nor do we say that the Molinists positively assert this; but this, as it seems to us, follows from their opinion. For before God through middle knowledge explores what pleased human will from its innate freedom, He does not know what it will do; and after He foresaw what it will do from itself, He cannot decree otherwise with its freedom preserved; that is, He cannot decree that it not consent in those circumstances in which He foresaw it would consent, nor that it consent in those circumstances in which He foresaw it would dissent; otherwise, according to that system, consent would not be free. Therefore it seems that God uses this knowledge of conditionals from ignorance and from impotence.

Indeed, it is not repugnant in that system for there to be a man whom God even by His absolute power cannot convert in any circumstance. For it is not repugnant from the nature of the thing for there to be a man who in no circumstances wills to be converted, or to consent to previous graces moving only morally; for these whether jointly or separately have no infallible connection with consent, nor will they ever by their force overcome the resistance of the will. But grace efficacious per se which by its force would soften that pervicacious heart and most invincibly

convert it, the defenders of this system abhor as the destruction of freedom. Therefore it remains that God does not have the most omnipotent power of inclining hearts, as Augustine speaks, or cannot turn the heart of man whithersoever He wills, as Scripture says; in one word, that He is not omnipotent.

Fourth inconvenience: In the system of middle knowledge God is no more the Author of good works than of evil ones, contrary to that of Trent, session 6, canon 6: "If anyone says that evil works, just as good ones, are worked by God, not only permissively, but also properly and per se, let him be anathema."

It is proved: In the system of middle knowledge God is a cause of good works insofar as He places man in those circumstances in which He foresaw him about to use well the offered grace, and simultaneously concurs with him to the good work. But equally He places him who acts evilly in those circumstances in which He foresees him about to use badly the offered grace, and concurs simultaneously with him to the evil work. Therefore.

Nor does it matter that God intends the good work and not the evil, because here it is not asked what God intends, but what He does. Otherwise, although God does not intend evil, He often nevertheless intends to permit it so as to elicit good from it. Nor does it matter that through moral graces He excites to good work, for God cannot be said properly to work good and to be its cause properly so called from these, because moral causality is improper and metaphorical. Add that God not rarely constitutes His own, to test them, among most serious temptations in which there are lesser moral motives to good.

Fifth inconvenience: Middle knowledge takes away for the most part the necessity of prayer. It is proved: We ask from God that which we believe is given by Him and not what depends on us. For petition is mocking, says Augustine, when what is known not to be given by Him is asked from Him, but with Him not giving, to be in man's power. But what is principal in the business of salvation, namely consent to grace offered indifferently to all, in the system of middle knowledge is not from God but from us. Therefore we should not ask it from God.

What then will the Molinist ask from God? Not efficacious grace which makes one will, which takes away the stony heart, which compels the rebellious will to itself, as the Church prays; for all this is his own, and God will be able to respond to him: make yourself the grace efficacious by consenting to it. Therefore he will be able to ask this one thing only, that God constitute him in those circumstances in which He foresaw he would consent to grace.

Tournely responds that the Molinists teach that grace is owed to no one, but is conferred freely by God. Granted. But they also teach that it is offered to all; and even if it were not offered, they should ask only for grace, not indeed for the good use of grace which depends on them.

He insists that the good use of grace is not so in the power of free will that it does not need more abundant aid to work well. But these also are words and nothing more. For in that system, if I consent to offered grace from myself, will not God infallibly concur with me to the good work to which grace will be offered, and did He not foresee this through middle knowledge? And if I need more abundant aid for a further work, is not this also offered? And granted it is not offered, I will ask that it be offered, but not that it be efficacious nor that it make me will and consent, for that is mine.

Hence:

Sixth inconvenience: From what has been said it follows: **First,** that in the system of middle knowledge we should not give thanks to God for what is the head in the business of salvation, namely for our determination to good, which is elicited from our own store. **Second,** that we should not rely on the hope of His grace alone, as the Church sings, but chiefly on our freedom. **Third,** that it is not necessary to fear so much for our salvation, nor so anxiously, so assiduously to watch over it, since it is up to us to consent to grace offered to all at any time and to render it efficacious. **Fourth,** finally that the foundation of Christian humility is shaken, since one distinguishes himself from another not consenting through consent to grace, and can boast over him, as we argued above from the Apostle.

Seventh inconvenience: Middle knowledge paves the way for the principal error of the semi-Pelagians, and renders the arguments of Augustine and Catholics against them ineffective. It is proved: The principal error of the semi-Pelagians was that there are in us the beginnings of faith and good will (whether so as not to admit some previous grace even internal, I do not dispute now), whence they inferred that God, from these foreseen beginnings of good, is moved to give us grace, not indeed as from merit properly so called, but as from occasion, as is clear from Cassian in his book of Collations chapters 13 and 16. Hence in chapter 14 he says: "God is ready from the occasion only of our will offered, to all these things to be referred." From which Saint Prosper against the Collator chapter 8 infers that this is some merit: "For," he says, "the faith of the petitioner, the piety of the seeker, the insistence of the knocker cannot be held of no merit." Which, if Cassian had positively asserted, Saint Prosper would not infer by arguing.

But although the defenders of middle knowledge deny that God is moved from foreseen consent to grace whether as merit or as from occasion to give grace, they nevertheless cannot deny that there is nothing absurd, nothing repugnant, indeed that it is fitting that God be moved by these at least as from occasion, as Cassian said, to give grace to those whom He foresees spontaneously consenting, rather than to others whom He foresees abusing it. Just as, for example, in an artificer no one will consider it absurd but most fitting that from instruments he choose that one before others by which he knows a work will be accomplished far more perfectly under the same motion of his; for the good use of grace,

VII. Scientia Media Should Be Rejected for Its Very Novelty

Ancient is the truth, as Augustine testifies, novel and temporal is falsehood. "O Timothy!" says the Apostle in 1 Timothy 6, "guard the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words." Vincent of Lérins, explaining this in Commonitorium 1, chapter 27, says: "What is the deposit? That is, what has been entrusted to you, not what has been invented by you; what you have received, not what you have devised; a matter not of genius, but of doctrine; not of private usurpation, but of public tradition; a matter brought to you, not brought forth by you; in which you ought not to be the author, but the guardian."

Many other passages from Scripture, the Fathers, and Theologians are brought forward against novel opinions. Therefore, that doctrine is deservedly rejected in theological matters especially which suffers from the vice of novelty. Moreover, that scientia media (middle knowledge) is new in Catholic Schools, unknown to the Fathers and ancient Theologians, is openly professed by its very Assertors themselves.

First of all, Molina himself in Concordia question 23, articles 4 and 5, Disputation 1, final member, Lisbon Edition 1588, boasts himself as the inventor of this: "I was longer in this disputation than I thought, because nevertheless the matter is of great moment and very slippery, and this our method of reconciling free will with divine predestination has been handed down by no one whom I have seen up to this point, therefore I thought it better to explain these things somewhat more fully."

Likewise there: "Which, namely four principles of reconciling freedom with divine decrees," among which he places scientia media in the third place, "if they had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor from Augustine's opinion and contentions with the Pelagians would so many faithful have been disturbed and defected to the Pelagians, and easily the remains of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the Letters of Prosper and Hilary, would have been extinguished... finally the contentions among Catholics would have been settled."

Tournelius shows himself singular here while he attempts to wipe away this stain of novelty from his Molina: He contends indeed that Molina did not say that scientia media had not been given and explained before, but rightly his method of reconciling freedom with divine predestination, and concerning that method, he says, not concerning scientia media, Molina adds "which if they had always been given and explained." And thus according to Tournelius this will be the construction of Molina's text: "WHICH METHOD IF THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN." The laws of grammar do not permit this. But the impotent zeal of defending scientia media drags him to this.

Therefore, not concerning his method of reconciling freedom, but concerning his four principles among which, as I said, he places scientia media, Molina said: "Which if they had always been given and explained," not ignorant of the first elements of Grammar which he doubtless taught. Nor does he only say "explained," but also "given": Therefore scientia media was not given before; therefore he himself first gave it and brought it into the Schools.

But even granted that Molina understood by these words his method of reconciling freedom with divine grace and predestination, and that he acknowledged it as new and invented by himself, as he indeed expressly acknowledges in the previous words, Tournelius does not thereby escape nor save his Molina. For what, I ask, is among Molina and the Molinists that method of reconciling freedom with divine grace and predestination, if not scientia media? This the Molinists cry out both in pulpits and in the streets, and they contend that without scientia media our freedom would be finished. From which it follows that what Tournelius asserted is completely false, that Molina did not innovate in dogma, but in the method of expounding it. For scientia media, if it is granted, is a true dogma and the foundation of the entire theological system concerning the most serious matters of God's knowledge, will, and grace, and human freedom.

And indeed it seems neither fair nor urbane that this recent writer should want to steal from his Molina the glory which not only Molina himself claims for himself but also which very many of his companions attribute to him, as will appear from those about to be cited.

2. Father Fonseca, as if envying the glory of invented scientia media to his student Molina, in his Metaphysics which he published after Molina's Concordia, Volume 3, book 6, chapter 2, question 6, section 8, declares that scientia media was devised by himself 30 years before, and why he did not publish it before his student Molina he gives this reason: "One thing caused scruple, lest by this method something new might perhaps be introduced, which would not agree in every part with the common doctrine of the Fathers or the diligent examination and accurate polishing of the scholastics: For there was no one who in this way had openly reconciled the freedom of our will with divine foreknowledge or providence, and as it is said, in terms."

3. Vasquez, most celebrated writer of the same Society, 1st part, Disputation 67, chapter 4, says thus: "That the ancient Scholastics who have written up to now have only mentioned simple science of vision and simple intelligence matters little; both because they disputed nothing at all about this conditional science or mentioned it. What then if we posit another of which they made no mention nor denied?"

4. Granado, another Theologian of the Society, 1st part, Tract 5, Disputation 3, section 2, attacks Suarez because he confirms scientia media with testimonies of St. Thomas and the ancient Theologians: "I confess," he says, "that none of these testimonies press much." And he adds: "Nor is it surprising if something has been devised by more recent Theologians in the course of time."

5. Father Valentine Herice of the same Society, 1st part, Tract 1, Disputation 7, chapter 1, numbers 7 and 8: "The leaders," he says, "of scientia media are Patrons from our Society. Among them Prince Molina... Then Father Peter Fonseca." But what is most amusing, he contends that scientia media was revealed to his Society from the singular benefit of providence against the pestiferous dogma of Luther concerning freedom. "In which matter," he says, "I humbly venerate divine providence and acknowledge the singular benefit of it conferred on the Masters of our Religion... and the most learned Writers of the same family... [divine providence] suffused with heavenly light and illuminated with this science by which freedom of will can be defended against Luther and Calvin and other sectarians... Therefore as with singular obedience Ignatius healed the poison of disobedience which men imbibed, so by this conditional science the Satanic dogma against freedom is utterly overturned."

6. The Jesuit Tiphanius, Chancellor of the University of Pont-à-Mousson, in his book on order and on the prior and posterior, chapter 24, says that no other Theologian before Molina had even thought about scientia media in his dreams, nor had anywhere either supposed it or employed it for resolving any difficulty either of Scripture or of Scholastic Theology.

7. Father Henry Henriques, Jesuit, Suarez's teacher, in that censure which he published in the year 1594 against Molina, speaks thus: "Against sound, firm, and most received doctrine among many for years and at this time among the most holy Theologians of all Spain, indeed of the whole world, (Molina) speaks irreverently and dangerously; blasphemously and shamelessly in the manner of heretics he fights against the wisest Fathers, and those opinions of theirs which Theologians assert to be certain and undoubted, he says are dangerous and are the occasion of many errors and take away the freedom of our will, and that neither by them nor by Councils was the truth concerning predestination, grace, and freedom of will declared or plainly understood, before the author composed this book."

8. Finally John Mariana, another Jesuit, in the book on the Rule of the Society which he composed while congregations concerning Auxiliaries were being held in Rome, speaks thus of Molina's system: "From this excellent source (love of novelty) emanated those whirlwinds and storms by which our Society attempted to agitate the wisest Theologians of the Dominican family whom it rather ought to have venerated as guardians of purer doctrine, than to follow the novel fictions of Luis Molina. Whose book was brought from the examination of Theologians of the sacred Inquisition to Rome, where now free will most keenly struggles against grace for the palm. What the Jesuit Fathers oppose to these testimonies of Henriques and Mariana, you have refuted in Hyacinth Serry, more briefly in the work inscribed in French 'Thomism Triumphant' article 6, §3, and in its Apology §VIII."

VIII. Scientia Media Historically Attacked

I enter this contest unwillingly, because I will not speak pleasant things, but the false and injurious things to our school which we read everywhere both in published books and in public lectures compel me to this. Therefore I use the right of defense and repel force with force, preserving the moderation of blameless protection.

Concerning the Roman Censors

When the controversy aroused in Spain against Molina had matured for judgment, Clement VIII, harassed by the prayers of the Society, summoned congregations to Rome, instituted censors who would weigh Molina's opinions, over whom he placed the Most Eminent Cardinals Luis Madruzzo and Pompey Arrigoni. That these Censors, with one or two exceptions, constantly condemned Molina's scientia media is established from the following.

In the congregation held March 6, 1598, they say: "The absurdities which follow from scientia media are more serious than can be tolerated Catholically." In the congregation of March 19, 1601: "It seems the same as that which the Massilienses devised to exterminate efficacious grace of good will and to attribute to free will what they would subtract from grace lest they would harm it: whence it is indeed attacked by Augustine... with the error of the Massilienses." They define the same on October 29, 1604, and thus conclude, "and therefore it is especially fitting that it be exterminated." See Serry book 2, chapters 2 and 18, and book 3, chapter 39.

The Jesuit Fathers formerly denied these things, now forced by truth they concede with Father de Meyer, but they contend that these censors were hasty in giving a censure from which once given they pertinaciously refused to withdraw, that they labored from ignorance of matters and Molina's doctrine, that they were more than fairly addicted to the Dominican party against the Jesuits. But that these are the consolations of those litigating badly, while they fail in their cause, to speak ill of their judges, everyone knows.

And indeed anyone will easily detect these calumnies as badly constructed and illiberally hurled if he observes: **1.** that these censors were most serious men of whom some were Archbishops, others Bishops, others Vicars or Procurators General of Orders, others Doctors, and for ten continuous years they performed the same office, with Clement VIII commanding and afterward Paul V, which indeed neither would have commanded nor would those most just Pontiffs have permitted, if they had known them to be such as adversaries paint them in such dark colors. **2.** That the same calumnies were already then objected by Father Bastida to Clement VIII, from whom he suffered repulse. **3.** That the Molinists did not always maintain the same manner of speaking toward the praised censors: for while the less instructed contended that their greater and better number was in favor of scientia media, they praised them as most illustrious and most learned men, most commendable in probity, offices, experience, doctrine. Thus the Jesuit

Sherlogue under the masked name of Paul Leonard concerning scientia media, 1st part, section 3, to whom Coronello, secretary of the congregations, Peter of St. Joseph the Molinist, and the Jesuit Ortega sing in harmony: but now, when it is certain to them that all, with one exception of Bovius, went for Molina's condemnation, Judge Livin de Meyer, they are destitute of all their virtue, and have passed into alien vices: so that good or bad feeling toward the Molinian cause is among some the most certain token of merit or demerit, indeed confers all merit or demerit. See more fully on this matter Thom. Triumph. article 6, §6, and its Apology article 19.

Concerning Clement VIII

That Clement VIII was at some time of alien mind against Molina's doctrine, Father Livin de Meyer the Jesuit, author of the false history of the congregations, confesses, but contends that finally he inclined to his parts; we say that he persevered constantly in that up to death, and that it was proposed to him to condemn it, unless he had been prevented by death: which will appear from the following.

1. When the third examination of the Molinian cause was completed, the censors offered their censure to Clement VIII, who showed the greatest offense of mind against Molina, both because of the trampled authority of the most holy Fathers and ancient Theologians, and because of the novelty invented to the supreme damage of the Church: and he added, not without indignation, that he would throw Molina into the prisons of the sacred Inquisition, if he might happen to come to Rome: And when, with permission given to the Consultors to speak, Bovius, who had once professed the Society, undertook Molina's defense, the Pontiff replied: "Father, all those reasons are trifles, and these responses which you bring are the same ineptitudes which we already observed in Suarez." From the fifth relation of Pegna in Serry book 2, chapter 12.

2. When the Jesuits complained that many things were attributed to Molina, and that nothing was asserted by him which could be marked with Pelagianism, to suppress their clamors, so that he might leave nothing unattempted to free Molina's reputation if possible, the excellent Pontiff orders a fourth examination at the beginning of 1601, in which it would be inquired even more diligently: "In which chapters Molina agrees with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians." Bellarmine, certainly foreseeing this consonance to be provable, attempted to divert the matter elsewhere, and said to the Pontiff that Pelagius could be understood in many ways: the Pontiff replied with offense: "Do you then wish to defend Pelagius himself?" From the acts of Coronello and Pegna's diary in Serry book 2, chapter 14.

3. When the Duke of Sessa was urging the definition of the cause in the name of the Catholic King, the Pontiff warned the called Prepositius of the Society on December 31 about the intention of passing condemnation, that he should leave Molina undefended. From Pegna's diary in Serry book 2, chapter 24, and book 5, section 5, chapter 2.

That this was the mind of the Supreme Pontiff is also testified by the Society's own writers Fuligato and Pietrasanta in book 6 of Bellarmine's life, chapter 7, where they relate that he replied to Cardinal Montalto saying that the Holy Pontiff could and would pronounce concerning this controversy: "I do not deny that he can and will, but I pronounce that it will be that he will not define." Ibid.

4. When the Jesuits saw that Clement VIII had certainly decided to define the cause against Molina, they attempted everything to deter him from his preconceived intention. They petition that a general council be convened. They beg commendatory letters in favor of Molina from everywhere. At Complutensian public theses they maintain that it is not of faith that Clement VIII is the Holy Pontiff and Peter's successor, and many other things which I pass over in silence for love of peace. From Pegna and Lemos in Serry book 2, chapters 25 to 3.

5. In all the congregations of the fifth examination at which the Holy Pontiff was present as president up to January 22, 1605, in which year he dies in March, by all Consultors, with one or two exceptions, Molina's doctrine was always branded with some censure, the Holy Pontiff himself often attacked it, sometimes rebuked adversaries, especially Valencia, because he had interpolated a passage of Augustine, concerning which see Thom. Triumph. article 6, §6, and its Apology article 20, he published a great writing from Augustine's doctrine against the Molinian, which he wanted to be a witness of his opinion concerning the controverted dogmas up to his death, since according to Coronello the secretary, after the last session 68, he ordered that each party respond whether that writing contained the true doctrine of St. Augustine. To which afterward in the second congregation under Paul V the Preaching Brothers assented in all things, but the Jesuits resisted concerning certain principal chapters, especially that grace would have efficacy from God's omnipotence.

6. Finally the same thing is proved by the bitter expostulations of the Society's writers against Clement VIII, namely that he was of evil mind toward the Society: circumvented by the Spanish in favor of the Preachers: less skilled than worthy of the dignity of the argument, not sufficiently learned in the mysteries of Molinian doctrine and especially of scientia media, and other similar accusations against the excellent and most erudite Pontiff which are read in John Martinez de Ripalda, Annato, Paul Leonard. See Serry book 3, chapter 45, and book 5, section 6, chapter 5.

But our Professor of the Society at Douai far surpasses all in whose lectures we read these things: "It should not seem surprising that Clement VIII adhered to the Dominicans by private knowledge, since he was assumed to the Pontificate from their order." In response to these things, with me silent, the stones will cry out.

Concerning Paul V and His Opinion to Be Given Against Molina

When Clement VIII died and Leo XI was taken away within a month of his election, Paul V is elected Pontiff from the Borghese family. He restores the congregations, which being completed, he deliberates with 12 Cardinals on March 8, 1606, concerning the opinion to be given about the controverted matters.

I say therefore that in this Council held March 8, 1606, it was decided that an opinion was to be given, and that against Molina.

The first part is proved. **1.** From the mandate which Paul V gave on the following day to the Secretaries of the congregations by which he ordered that the Consultors separately commit three things to writing: First, what should be held by faith in this matter, what should be condemned and by what reason. Second, in what part Catholics differ from Heretics in this matter: Third, what method should be observed in the BULL which is to be instituted, or Apostolic constitution: and particularly whether mention should be made in the preface of the Doctors who published books on this argument, and of both orders of St. Dominic and the Society. From Coronello's acts. Therefore it was decided to give an opinion and issue a Bull.

It is proved **2.** The Holy Pontiff, having received at the end of August the separate votes of the Consultors, agreeing as one concerning the substance of the propositions to be condemned, with the exception of one Bovius, on October 5 following mandated from the counsel of the General Cardinals Inquisitors that the DD. Consultors should now come together at the residence of the Archbishop of Armagh, and there all together: "What propositions they judged should be condemned to settle the controversy concerning divine auxiliaries so long agitated, they should select with diligent study: what also should be expressed in the Bull, what should be touched upon, they should accurately observe and reduce to true and apt form." Ibid. Therefore the same as before.

3. The Consultors convened nine times up to November 19 and subscribed to the Canons elaborated by the Archbishop of Armagh for condemning Molinian doctrine, all except one Bovius the Carmelite, who had once professed the Society, who separately exhibited his mind to the Pontiff through letters, in which he indicated that nothing should be defined concerning the principal dogma of the efficacy of grace, at the same time he exhibited a specimen of the Pontifical Bull to be published.

Having received these Canons, the Pontiff committed to two Archbishops, of Armagh and Trani, and two Secretaries that they should polish them again and arrange them in a more distinct method for the condition of the Pontifical Bull, nevertheless committing their lucubrations to the judgment of the others.

The Archbishop of Armagh outlined an exemplar of the Pontifical diploma beginning "Gregis dominici" distributed into three parts: The first consisted of a prologue. The second contained nine chapters of doctrine to be held. The third comprised 50 propositions of Molina to be condemned.

Moreover, the other Censors with the Secretaries, leaving the Bull's Prologue untouched, concerning the second part judged all the doctrine contained in the said chapters to be sound and catholic, but obscurely handed down and beyond the mandate of the Holy Lord our Pope. Note carefully that "beyond the mandate of the Pontiff" affects only the second part of the outlined Bull, namely the nine chapters of doctrine to be held, not the Bull itself as some of the adversaries less sincerely contend; for although the Pontiff had ordered this in the first mandate of March 9, nevertheless in the following ones he had not ordered this, but only signified concerning the propositions to be condemned.

Furthermore, they judged the third part concerning the propositions to be condemned less exact: Therefore the Pontiff mandated the Archbishop that either he himself should polish his work, or allow it to be polished by Gregory Coronello: The Most Illustrious Bishop assented, and he himself corrected his lucubration with second cares, which Coronello also corrected separately, who, leaving the chapters of doctrine to be defended, sweated only in correcting the propositions to be condemned. His lucubration being approved by the censors, was accepted by the Holy Pontiff and preferred to the Archbishop's lucubration. Whence on July 8 he ordered that copies of it be exhibited to the most illustrious Cardinals so that they might weigh the matter and form of the propositions to be condemned and give their opinion when asked.

Therefore it clearly appears that it was decreed to give a final opinion and issue a Bull; indeed it was mandated to the Consultors that they outline it; for, independently of the terms of the Pontiff's mandates, to what purpose and by what authority would the Censors, both those who judged Molina should be condemned and Bovius who favored him, have dared to outline that Bull and offer it outlined to the Holy Pontiff, unless they had received that mandate from him? See more fully Thom. Triumph. article 6, §7, and its Apology article 21.

The second part of the assertion, namely that that opinion was decreed against Molina, is proved. **1.** It is established from what was just said that it was decided in the Congregation of Cardinals before the Holy Pontiff on March 8, 1606, that a final opinion should be given concerning the matters controverted and discussed up to that point; but not against the Thomists, for the Jesuit Fathers do not say this: therefore against the Molinists: For these alone were in the cause with the Thomists.

2. The opinion to be given was decreed against him whose condemnation the idea of the Bull offered to the Holy Pontiff carried; otherwise the Pontiff would have protested that he be condemned whom he did not want to condemn, nor would he have ordered these writings to be

polished repeatedly, but would have absolutely rejected them: But the idea of the Bull offered to the Supreme Pontiff, and all the Censors' lucubrations, except Bovius, carried Molina's condemnation: Therefore.

3. When the Rescript of Paul V began to be published abroad by which the promulgation of judgment was suspended to another time, with the Preachers consternated, the Spanish Jesuits sang triumph, holidays granted to all students for three days, festive apparatus of fireworks, scenic actions, triumphal arches on whose front was inscribed in golden letters: "Molina Victor," and among those solemnities sacred offerings were made in thanksgiving actions: Whence, I ask, so much sadness for the Preachers, so much joy for the Jesuits, from the suspension of the promulgation of judgment, unless these certainly omened it unfavorable to themselves, those favorable?

4. The second condition of the peace initiated between the Dominicans and Jesuits through the help of Philip III King of Spain was that both parties, with joined votes, should supplicate the Supreme Pontiff for the definition of the controversy of auxiliaries: The Order of Preachers stood by the condition, as appears from the supplicatory libel extended for that purpose to Paul V on June 12, 1612, by the General Chapter convened in Rome: The Jesuits opposed on the contrary; the Dominicans repeated the same supplication often to the Holy Pontiffs Gregory XV in 1620, Urban VIII in 1627, Innocent XI in 1681, and most recently to Benedict XIII, with the Jesuits always opposing, demanding that the judgment be wrapped in eternal silence, as was especially apparent in these recent years during the reign of Benedict XIII. By which argument indeed, even if others were lacking, it is openly apparent which party was superior by right in the controversy, and which the suspended judgment favors. See Thom. Tri. and its Apology at the places cited above.

They object **1.** The Fathers of the Society after their Livin de Meyer: in Paul V's first mandate it was commanded to the Censors that they direct their mind to truth alone and the cult and honor of the divine deity, and setting aside human reasons, they should consign to writing what they had judged: but this does not suppose a judgment rendered but to be rendered: Therefore.

2. On July 8 the Pontiff ordered that copies of the Censors' lucubration be handed to the Cardinals, so that they might weigh the matter and form of the propositions to be condemned and give their opinion when asked: Therefore nothing had yet been defined.

3. In the last congregation of all Cardinals on August 28, 1607, the Pontiff inquired about the mode of ending this controversy, and whether it would be expedient in these times especially to come to an Apostolic definition: Therefore nothing had yet been defined.

4. Finally three days after this congregation Paul V gave the Rescript by which he terminated the whole litigation, dismissing the consultors and parties to their own places, to whom he said: He would promulgate his declaration and determination at an opportune time; and meanwhile how

seriously he enjoined that in the treatment of this argument, no one should dare to mark the other party with any note or censure. From which it appears that the condition of both parties is equal, indeed that of the Jesuits is better, since Molina, accused by the Dominicans, escaped unharmed, therefore the Dominicans fell in the cause, not the Jesuits.

To the solution of these objections, note that we do not assert that in this Congregation of Cardinals on March 8, 1606, it was decided how many and which propositions of Molina individually, or by what censure they should be condemned, but only that it was decided that Molina's doctrine in general should be finally condemned consequently to the deliberations held in the preceding Congregations both under Clement VIII and under Paul V, in which it had always been noted with some censure. Whence.

To the first, I distinguish the Major. Paul V in his first mandate commands the consultors that they consign to writing what they had judged concerning Molina's doctrine in general and absolutely to be condemned, I grant, for they had constantly condemned it in all Congregations; and so regarded, the Holy Pontiff had decreed it should be condemned in the Congregation of Cardinals held March 8, 1606, that they consign to writing what they had judged concerning the three things enumerated in this his first mandate, especially concerning the first, I concede. Since therefore for ten years various propositions of Molina had been disputed, nor were all worthy of the same censure, nor of the same moment, but some can be referred to others as appendices or corollaries, the Pontiff requires from the Consultors that they note all these things distinctly and reduce them to brief and apt form; therefore he commands them that, setting aside all human affection, they consign to writing what they had judged concerning these three things: 1. What should be held by faith in this matter, what should be condemned and by what reason. 2. In what part Heretics differ from Catholics. 3. What method could be observed in the Bull to be published.

To the second, the same solution applies. Similarly to the first part of the third; and to the second part, I say that by "definition" should be understood solemn, namely through promulgation; for the Pontiff's definition is not considered solemn and absolute unless promulgated.

To the third, I absolutely deny the Antecedent. That the litigation namely was terminated, indeed on the contrary from the words of the Pontifical Rescript subjoined it most clearly appears that his decision is suspended meanwhile until the promised promulgation: Whence I deny that the condition of both is equal, but that which was superior by right in the process of litigation remains in the same: Similarly I deny that Molina escaped absolved or unharmed, but that his condemnation is only delayed to another time: Whence it is entirely false that the Dominicans fell in the cause, but they await and demand with all their vows the judgment, not yet solemnly rendered but promised, which may the Fathers of the Society also provide: The cause would be finished in brief.

If you ask what was the cause why Paul V deferred the promulgation of the sentence to another time? I respond that the most likely cause was the exile which the Jesuits were then suffering from the Venetian Senate because of the observance of the interdict laid on this state by Paul V. See Serry book 4, chapter 22.

They object moreover and especially: All the things which we said in this § concerning the Roman Censors, concerning Clement VIII, concerning Paul V and his censure to be given, rest on the acts of Pegna, Coronello, Lemos and other Prelates or Theologians who were present at the Congregations concerning Auxiliaries: but Innocent X declared in the general Congregation of the Holy Roman and universal Inquisition on April 23, 1654, that no faith should be given to these acts nor could they be alleged by anyone: Therefore whatever arguments of fact can be deduced from them against scientia media are of no weight: Thus Honoratus Tournelius with the Jesuit Fathers.

This principal weapon of the adversaries to which they especially trust, crushed to its very fibers with all its fortifications, you have in Serrius in Preface 2, Edition § 12, and in book 5, section 1, chapter 5, and most recently in Thom. Triumph. article 5, §2, and its Apology article 7, so that it can seem surprising that this antagonist, who here calls Serrius himself, objects to us this argument as if untouched. Therefore I will dispatch it briefly.

I respond, I distinguish the Minor. Innocent X declared that no juridical or legal faith should be given to these acts, I concede; historical, I deny: similarly: They cannot be alleged by anyone in judgment to make certain and juridical faith, I concede; outside judgment for historical truth, I deny; this to be the true and genuine sense of Innocent's decree will not deny whoever knows the style and usage of the Roman Curia in such decrees.

Thus Urban VIII by Decree given August 2, 1631, proclaimed that to the declarations of the Congregation of the Council of Trent "both printed and to be printed, as well as manuscript, no faith should be given in judgment and outside by anyone; but only to those which in authentic form, with the accustomed seal and subscription of the Most Eminent Cardinal Prefect and Secretary of the same Congregation for the time being, had been fortified." A similar decree he issued on August 11, 1632, concerning the declarations, decrees or decisions of the Congregation of Rites.

Despite these decrees, even stricter than Innocent's decree, the more illustrious interpreters of Canon Law, Fagnan, Barbosa, Jordan, Lezana, Pignatelli, indeed all, transferred into their commentaries on Canon Law all the declarations or decisions of these Congregations, although they lacked the seal and signature of the Cardinal Prefect and Secretary, and had nowhere been published according to the prescription of law, with untroubled step and without anyone's reproach.

And what touches our very matter, after Innocent's decree issued in 1654, Francis Macedo of the Order of Minors, inserted a lengthy fragment of Clement VIII's oration delivered on March 20, 1602, to the Religious disputants, inserted in Coronello's acts, into the work which he published in 1667. Cardinal de Noris excerpted part of the same oration in 1672 in the Augustinian Vindications, and yet the first work was approved by the supreme Roman Inquisition, the second by the Venetian.

The Jesuit Fathers themselves inserted excerpts from these acts into their works after Innocent's decree; thus Father Annato praised the idea of the Bull outlined by Bovius, Father Germont Bastida's Memorial, Livin de Meyer the disputations of the Molinists held in the Congregations, which nevertheless are all referred to in the acts of Coronello and others either of Prelates or of Theologians who were present at the Congregations, to which acts Innocent declared that no faith should be given; so evident it is to all that juridical not historical faith should be understood, or, as Fagnan Secretary of the Congregation of the Council and Lezana consultor of the Index say concerning Urban VIII's Decrees: "No faith should be given: understand certain and undoubted; for at least they merit probable faith, if they are referred by a trustworthy man." Fagnan in decree 1 on constitutions, chapter "Quoniam." Lezana in summary, Regular Questions, word Sacred Congregation.

Indeed the Holy Pontiffs do not make truths but declare them; nor can they effect that what has been done or said has not been done or said, nor that a transcript conforming to its original be non-conforming, indeed nor can they declare this, unless they have seen, examined and compared the transcripts with their originals; which in the present case Innocent did not do, nor those who formed the decree in his name, since they do not speak from sight but from hearing; "Since," they say, "both at Rome and elsewhere certain alleged manuscript acts are circulated, and perhaps printed"; indeed nor could they do it, since they speak of acts which are circulated both at Rome and elsewhere, that is in any part of the world.

If you say that before Innocent's Decree the acts of the Congregations did not make juridical faith; therefore that decree would have been useless, if it only wanted to take away this juridical faith from them, leaving the truth of History.

I respond, I deny the Consequence. Although before Innocent's Decree the acts of the Congregations did not make juridical faith, nevertheless some attributed or were said to attribute it to them, to traduce the Molinists, which to prevent the Holy Pontiff, indeed did not take away from them the faith which they did not have, but declared that they really did not have what they did not have and what some attributed to them, they do not have: And thus his decree was not useless. Just as Urban VIII's decrees concerning the decisions of the Congregations of the Council and Rites mentioned above were not useless: for although such decisions which were not in authentic form nor fortified with the seal and subscription of the Cardinal Prefect and Secretary, cannot make faith in judgment according to the Rules of Law concerning the faith of

instruments Chapter "Si Scripturam" and chapter "Scripta": because nevertheless some either attributed or could attribute it to them, the Pontiff prudently declared that they do not have it. And this by greater right Innocent did in our case because not only transcripts cannot make juridical faith from defect of authenticity, but nor the originals themselves from defect of promulgation according to the prescription of law.

More other things concerning this argument see, if you please, in the authors cited.

Having now left Innocent's Decree, the Molinists rise up from elsewhere against the praised acts.

They object therefore again that the first Trumpeters of this Bull and of those Acts were Sanctamor and other Jansenists; at least no one dared to whisper about them while Paul V lived or any of the Consultors or Cardinals who had been present at the last Congregation on March 8, 1606, in which we say Molina's condemnation was decreed: Therefore it is a fable equal to a dream.

I respond that the Antecedent of this argument is everywhere false, Serrius proved in Preface 2, Edition of his History §6, and Thom. Triumph. article 5, §2, from which I briefly gather these few things summarily.

Sanctamor was delegated to Rome by the Jansenists in 1652. In 1612 the General Chapter of the Preaching Brothers offered to Paul V himself a Memorial libel for the promulgation of this so long expected sentence, and in it continual mention is made of the Acts of the Congregations. In 1620 Fulgentius Galluce, General of the Augustinians, largely excerpted Coronello's Acts which he deposited in the Library of the Convent of Monte Giorgio where they are also now preserved. In 1622 D. le Goulu, General of the Feuillants, transferred from Rome to Gaul Diary of D. le Bossu, Consultor of the Congregations: Peter of St. Joseph the Feuillant Molinist saw it and suppressed it, because as he ingenuously confesses in his Concordia Disputation 4, section 4, number 4, it openly favors the Dominicans. In 1630 D. Gibieuf, Priest of the Oratory, praised the aforesaid acts in the Work on Freedom dedicated to Urban VIII. In the same year the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca praised them. Similarly John of St. Thomas in 1637.

Moreover, omitting Paul V himself, to whom the Dominicans praised both the sentence itself to be promulgated and the Acts themselves: After the year 1637 Cardinal Anthony Zapata still lived who had been present at the secret Congregation on March 8, 1606, for he died according to Ciaconio's Continuators on May 6, 1638, aged 86, and what is greatest he was living in Spain as Prefect of the supreme Inquisition, where the Salamancan and John of St. Thomas openly praised the aforesaid Acts: Mutius Vitelleschi, Prepositius General of the Society, lived, who had played his parts in the Congregations, as Allegambe testifies, for he ruled the Society in 1640. Why could not others still have lived? Therefore it is most false that Sanctamor and other Jansenists were the first Trumpeters of the Bull and Acts, or at least that no one had dared to whisper about these things while Paul V lived or any of the Consultors or Cardinals.

They insist. Natalis Alexander of the Order of Preachers at Century 5, chapter 3, article 8, says that those who accuse scientia media of Semi-Pelagianism are either ignorant of Semi-Pelagian dogmas, or led astray by partisan zeal: But such was not Paul V. Therefore.

I respond that Natalis Alexander retracted this in his Letters to Father Daniel the Jesuit, Letter 5, and asserts that this his proposition was disapproved at Rome. See Thom. Tri. article 6, §7, and its Apology article 21 at the end.

They reply: The Author of the Bull which is attributed to Paul V reproves in Molina a proposition which Pius V absolves by condemning its contradictory in Baius: Therefore it is not from the Pontiff. I prove the Antecedent. He reproves this proposition of Molina in his concordia: "In the state of fallen nature man can with the general concourse of God alone, effect a morally good work which in order to man's natural end is a work of true virtue, referring it to God as it could and ought to be referred in the natural state." But the proposition of Baius condemned number 76 is: "He feels with Pelagius who acknowledges some natural good, that is, which draws its origin from the powers of nature alone." Therefore.

I respond **1.** These propositions are not contradictory, because they are not about the same object entirely: For the Baian speaks only of a naturally good work: But the Molinian of a morally good work which is a work of true virtue. I respond **2.** Some Baian propositions according to the Pontifical Bull can be sustained in some sense: Thus many interpret it, especially the primates from the Society, Suarez Volume 1 on grace, Prolegomenon 6, chapter 2, Vasquez in 1 part 2, Distinction 190, chapter 18, in Serry book 4, chapter 2.

They urge finally: We gather all these things from Serry, an unfaithful and fabulous Historian, whose book was polished and corrected with the help of Quesnel, condemned by the Spanish Inquisition and to whom meanwhile some defenders of prevenient grace and Jansenian grace trust no less than the Turks trust their Quran. Thus modestly the Professor of Douai in his Lectures of the year 1723.

But wretched is not he who suffers but he who does injury: Therefore, dismissing these inept insults, although he proves nothing of what he brings forward, nevertheless I will respond briefly to each.

To 1. That Serry is neither a fabulous nor unfaithful Historian, but on the contrary that the History of Father Livin Meyer is unfaithful and fabulous, Thom. Tri. article 5, §1, and Apology article 7 invincibly proves, chiefly because Hyacinth Serry's History rests on the firmest and entirely trustworthy testimonies, namely, the very Acts of the Secretaries of the Congregations, Writings of Cardinal Madruzzo Prefect of the Congregations, various Writings of Consultors, Diary of D. le Bossu the Consultor, Diary and other Writings of the most illustrious Pegna who played his parts in this cause in the name of the King of Spain, and many others of the same moment of faith concerning which see Serry in the Preface §6 and following.

But what the Professors of Douai babble about the implacable hatred with which Pegna burned against the Society, the calumny refutes the work which Pegna himself published against the Edict of the Parisian Senate by which the Jesuits were exiled from Gaul: In that work indeed he most keenly defends the rights of the Society and extols it with immoderate praises: Would an implacable enemy of the Society have thus extolled and defended it?

But Father Livin Meyer's History on the contrary is built on entirely weak and falling foundations, namely commendatory letters of Princes and Bishops begged, declamations and writings of Molina's own defenders, acts and testimonies of certain Jesuit Academies or in which Jesuits dominate and other moments of the same flour; and Serry in the fifth Apologetic book added to the second Edition of his History everywhere and openly convicts it of falsehood and fully confutes it.

If you say that to this fifth Apologetic book of Serry, Livin Meyer opposed vindications of his History to which Serry fell silent.

I respond **1.** Not here, as among quarreling little women, is he to be judged victor who speaks last: in many things the Fathers of the Society fell silent, nor do they therefore confess themselves conquered in these.

I respond **2.** Serry for most just causes did not deign Livin Meyer's History vindications worthy of response. **1.** Because Father Meyer did not fulfill the condition which Serry had most justly demanded; "If anyone," he says §12 of preface 2 of Edition of his History, "wishes to attack this my History again, it is permitted by me. Nevertheless let whoever attempts this remember that he must deal with me from proven documents, and especially from the records of those congregations. If he acts otherwise, I will allow him to feed on winds and fables, but I will not deign him worthy of the honor of response; lest I seem to oppose the wise oracle: 'Do not answer a fool according to his folly.' For I think it a kind of folly to want to pronounce and define about historical matters otherwise than from their documents." Moreover Livin Meyer's vindications rest on those entirely unfaithful, weak, and falling documents as his vindicated work. **2.** Because the aforesaid vindications are almost nothing other than mere repetition of the prior History in which de Meyer boldly and sometimes syllable by syllable recantsthe same trifles which Serry had utterly crushed as if they were untouched, and what is more worthy of indignation or laughter, he not rarely adds this mendacious clause: "To these things the adversary has responded nothing so far." But if sometimes he seems to bring something new, which is rare, it either bears the appearance of a solution, or Serry had anticipated it in his fifth apologetic book and in his other works composed in French.

All these things the Apology of Thom. Triumph. exhibits to the eye everywhere and it is apparent to anyone comparing both works.

Therefore Serry was silent to Livin Meyer's vindications, if nevertheless they ought to be called vindications, and not rather bare transcription of the prior work already dissolved; he was silent, I say, he did not fall silent as if he had nothing to respond, as the Molinists boast ad nauseam, but he was silent, because he had said more than sufficiently before, and his response would have been useless and idle: he was silent, because the adversary brought forward nothing which merited further response.

To the second, I deny that Serry's book was polished and corrected with the help of Quesnel, concerning which see Serry himself book 5, section 1, chapter 1, where he does not indeed deny that his manuscript work, with himself entirely unconsulted, fell into Quesnel's hands, the Typographer communicating, so that he might learn from him, as is customary, whether he would easily find merchants of this merchandise, but he proves from Quesnel's own testimonies and others that nothing whatever was added by him.

Furthermore, granted what is false, that this work was printed by Quesnel's care, should it therefore be rejected? The Dutch daily take care to have Jesuits' books printed, should they therefore be rejected? Indeed, granted that this entire History is the work of some Jansenist, should it therefore be condemned as false? Are all things which condemned Authors write to be condemned? Jansenius wrote catholically on the Pentateuch and four Gospels, Arnauld for the faith of the Eucharist; and this is especially true where it concerns historical matters, whose faith rests not on the authority of the speaker, but on the true and certain testimonies brought forward by him.

To the third, granted that Serry's History is truly condemned by the Spanish Inquisition, as the adversaries narrate, for we receive this from them alone, I respond that it was condemned not because it contains false things but because by the narration of certain facts, although true, it seemed injurious to the holy Office and the great Inquisitor. This appears from the very words of the censure, which the Professor of Douai himself relates, where no note of falsehood is branded, but, as he himself says, it is condemned as full of various scandalous, seditious propositions, injurious to the Supreme Pontiffs, the Holy Office, the great Inquisitor, etc.

Whence the most efficacious argument is drawn for the sincerity and veracity of this History, that being discussed by rigorous examination of the Inquisition, nothing false was detected in it; for if the judges had detected this, they would doubtless have branded it with the note of falsehood. Furthermore, whatever may be about that censure of the Spanish Inquisition, to which we are not bound, the book runs unharmed through all other Provinces of the Church, even at Rome, received with the applause of all the Learned, except the Molinists.

Concerning the Ancient Censures of Louvain and Douai Against Leffius and Hamelius, Jesuits, Pre-assertors of Molinian Doctrine at Louvain, and Various Other Things Pertaining to the Present Matter

In the year 1587, September 9, the Academy of Louvain struck thirty-four propositions of Leffius and Hamelius, especially concerning versatile grace and scientia media and other related matters, with grave censure. In the following year 1588, January 20, the Academy of Douai constructed a harsher censure against Leffius, having been asked for an opinion by the Most Illustrious Prelates of Cambrai, Mechlin, and Ghent.

Many Bishops and other most serious men approved these censures, and little was lacking that Leffian dogmas should be condemned by synodal decrees: passing over other witnesses, the Society itself bears witness to this fact in the Image of the First Century book 6, chapter 4, page 848: "With adversaries incessantly urging our disgrace," it says, "the greater part of Bishops, and certain Colleges of Canons had added their vote to the twin Censures of the two Academies. But the Metropolitans of Mechlin and Cambrai were preparing a synod of Bishops who would discuss our dogmas condemned by the two faculties, and would proscribe the same from all Belgium, as impious remains of the Massilienses or Pelagius; and so would brand the Society with the mark of heretical pravity."

The Academy of Louvain has firmly adhered to this Censure up to these times, which also most recently in 1723 it declared on the occasion of the more recent Censure of Douai: you have the declaration in Thom. Triumph, page 86. Similarly the University of Douai declared that it adhered to its prior censure in 1648 and 1690: you have the declarations in Apology Thom. Triumph. pages 79 and 80.

Add to these the Academy of Salamanca which condemned the same doctrine in 1581 in Prudentius de Monte Mayor, and in 1593 in Molina: It appears from its Censures. See Thom. Triumph. article 6, §4, and its Apology article 12, Serry book 5, section 3, chapter 1.

What should be thought of the other Academies, Bishops and Theologians will appear from the response of the adversaries.

Therefore the Professor of Douai objects in question 5 on scientia media §1, after Theodore Eleutherius or Livin Meyer. **1.** The Louvain Doctors were sharply criticized by the Most Illustrious Nuncio immediately as he came to knowledge of the censure. **2.** The Louvain Faculty could not so induce the Sorbonne into its parties as it had hoped, that the Sorbonnists who flourished with principal praise concerning these things, Duval, Isambert, Gamache, etc., rejected physical predeterminations. **3.** Various Academies of Germany had disapproved the Louvain Censure: Trier, Mainz, Ingolstadt. **4.** Distinguished Theologians in Belgium and many Bishops rose up against that Louvain censure as iniquitous and abusive, among others John

Strienus Bishop of Middelburg, Thomas Stapleton. **5.** Leffius sent those propositions of his condemned by the Louvain Faculty to the Holy Pontiff Sixtus V with his Apology: But the Pontiff, having convoked an assembly of Cardinals after long and profound discussion, called all those propositions articles of sound faith, and mandated his Nuncio Octavio Calatino Bishop the office of pronouncing this his opinion and commanding under penalty of excommunication that no one should condemn or note those same articles with any censure, as can be seen in the letters of Sixtus V printed at Mainz 1588, July 1. **6.** Moreover the Douai Censure was suspended and disapproved by the same votes of Universities and Theologians, the same Pontifical Rescript, the same authority of the Apostolic Nuncio as the Louvain one. It is added that when new dissensions arose at Douai in 1590, by a new edict sent to Douai the Apostolic Nuncio in 1591 vindicated the pristine freedom of teaching for the Fathers of the Society, prohibited under penalty of excommunication that their controversial doctrine be noted with any censure... And in 1722 the same Douai Faculty declared that the aforesaid censures should not be adhered to. **7.** Finally Molina's book on concordia was received with the common vote and approbation of almost all Religious orders in Spain where it was first made public, the doctrine of scientia media and congruous grace was defended there in various Academies, various Academies there then bore apt and undoubted suffrage for the book of concordia, none for physical predeterminations: at the same times the Theological Faculty of Paris approved the Society's doctrine, rejected the Dominicans'; seven Universities of Germany Mainz, Würzburg, Ingolstadt, Dillingen, Vienna, Graz, Trier, and Pont-à-Mousson in Lorraine sent judgments for the same doctrine and censures for the opposite to Clement VIII at the time when disputations concerning Auxiliaries were being agitated. The University of Bologna in Italy also gave suffrage for our opinion.

These things, I say, the Professors of the Society at Douai simply narrating and asserting without any proof, as if for making faith the authority of the speaker alone would suffice. But that in these there are almost as many falsehoods or dissimulations as words with which they nourish the souls of inexperienced youth, Serry long since proved with so many invincible reasons and testimonies in book 1 of History chapters 4 to 12, book 5 section 2 chapters 4 to 11 and section 3 chapters 3 to 8 and in other works composed in French. Thomism Triumphant article 6 §§3, 4 and 5, its Apology from article 10 to 18, and as much as concerns the Censures of Louvain and Douai, Assertion of the Censure of Louvain and Douai by Steyart, opuscule Volume 1. Also the recent work inscribed in French, "Apology of R.P. Pierre Soto and of the ancient Censures of Louvain and Douai," etc. Avignon Types 1738, from page 170 to the end, so that it is surprising that the obstinacy of adversaries in refurbishing these things has not yet been able to be broken.

Therefore from these I will collect a few things, if not that the adversaries may be silent, at least that those deceived by error may be relieved, and the incautious may be forewarned, to whom there is no abundance of the praised works.

Therefore. To 1. I respond that the Nuncio only signified to the Louvainists that if concord could not be entered with the Fathers of the Society, they should commit the definitive sentence to the

Holy See: He exhorted the Fathers of the Society in turn that they should not so rashly provoke the Theologians of so erudite an Academy. Thus from the narration of the Apostolic Nuncio transmitted to Cardinal St. Severina in Serry book 1, chapter 4, and book 5, section 2, chapter 4. Is this to sharply criticize the Louvainists?

To 2. I respond that it is false that the University of Louvain sent its Censure to Paris to draw it into its parties, but so that it might become aware of things done at Louvain, which office of urbanity it also performed to various Bishops and the University of Douai: This moreover did not keep silent, because it was invited by the Archbishops of Cambrai, etc. to give opinion, that one was silent because it was not invited, and from elsewhere the most sad days of troubles were then being conducted (les Barricades) in which it was more incumbent on them to treat their own wounds than to cure alien ones.

No faith should be given to Isaac Habert asserting the contrary in this, **1.** Because he was a man thoroughly Molinist. **2.** Because he wrote this 60 years later. **3.** Because he brings forward open falsehood, while he says that both Academies Louvain and Douai invited Paris to do the same: "They together invited the Faculty of Theology of Paris to do likewise, but it refused": Defense of the Faith Chapter 14. For it is certain that only Louvain directed its Censure to the Parisians, and this several months before the Douai scholars would adorn theirs. More in Serry book 1, chapter 3, and chapter 11, volume 1 of French Defense.

That the Sorbonnists did not then reject physical predeterminations will appear below.

To 3. I respond that these three Academies are nothing other than Colleges of the Society, or at least the Jesuits fully dominate in them. Furthermore these three Academies did not bear sentence concerning the Louvain Censure nor concerning the 34 condemned propositions of Leffius, but concerning six Antitheses in which Leffius had contracted his and the Censure's doctrine, as he himself narrates in Eleutherius: Moreover this synopsis of both doctrines was craftily and unfaithfully constructed, the Academy of Louvain complained in letters given to the Mainz scholars on September 10, 1588. Serry book 1, chapter 3, and book 5, section 2, chapter 4, and other places cited there.

To the fourth, I respond that far more both Bishops and Theologians subscribed to the Louvain censure, the Society itself bears witness in the Image of the First Century cited above. See Serry ibid. page 688, Apology Thom. Triumph. article 18.

To the fifth, I respond that this narration rests on the authority of Leffius alone, actor and witness in his own cause, which the Professor of Douai does not even faithfully relate; for Leffius says: "The Pontiff received the propositions, and afterward in Consistory ordered them to be read before himself and the Cardinals: Which being read, the Pontiff, as he was an outstanding Theologian, said he felt the same, and asked the Most Illustrious Cardinals what seemed to them. Who approved the same propositions as articles of sound doctrine." You see that Leffius does

not say his propositions were approved by Sixtus after long and profound discussion, as the Professor of Douai says; but immediately with them only read: which indeed smacks of fable that so many most serious difficulties should be resolved by a single glance.

But it is also most false that both the Pontiff and the Nuncio called Leffius's propositions articles of sound faith: "I do not know," says Steyart wittily, "how those who object these things have a sound head." Therefore they said only that controversies had arisen concerning or about certain articles of sound doctrine. These are the words of both decrees both of the Pontiff and of the Nuncio: by which no more is signified the doctrine of Leffius than of the Louvainists, (for the latter had sent their censure to Rome with his propositions, as Leffius himself testifies in letters given to Coster December 13, 1587, and the Jesuits had earlier stigmatized the doctrine of the Louvainists with Calvinism) but they signify only doctrine in general and its general chapters, concerning Scripture, concerning grace, concerning predestination: as if it were said that controversy had arisen concerning certain chapters of Theology or of Christian Doctrine.

Thus Rithovius responded in the Apologetic of 1589 to Deckerius the Jesuit of Douai: Thus also Lemos in the solemn congregation of March 22, 1604, to Bastida objecting the same words of the Pontiff. Add that these words were not uttered by the Holy Pontiff from his own opinion and defining, but only reciting and narrating as he had received from the Apostolic Nuncio: The matter is evident per se: "Venerable Brother," says Sixtus V, "from your Fraternity's letters recently brought to us we have learned that controversies between the Theologians of the University of Louvain and Priests of the Society of Jesus arose concerning certain articles of sound doctrine."

Furthermore that neither the Pontiff nor the Nuncio ever defined or censured Leffius's propositions to be sound appears clearer than light from the words of both. For the Pontiff commands Bassaeus the Nuncio that he send all writings and documents of both parties to him: "So that," he says, "with the Holy Spirit as leader and author we may define those things of which it is fitting that they have certain doctrine": Then he orders both parties under penalty of excommunication that they abstain from contentions.

Octavio the Nuncio having arrived at Louvain June 22, 1588, put the Pontiff's mandate into execution, received the documents of both parties and imposed silence on all these matters under penalty of excommunication, "until they shall have been maturely defined by Apostolic authority," in the decree given at Louvain July 10, 1588. From all of which it is evident that neither the Pontiff nor the Nuncio either disapproved the Louvain Censure or approved Leffius's doctrine, but ordered only that all things be in suspense until the holy See should define them.

Moreover the litigation thus brought to Rome was buried in silence, by what reason? Uncertain. This one thing we know from Henriques the Jesuit that Leffius received secret reproof from the Pontiff, or at least another of the same opinion. For thus he speaks in book 1 on the ultimate end,

chapter 12, defending gratuitous predestination: "A certain Learned man (tacitly indicating Leffius more probably) preached the opposite in the Academy of Louvain, with great scandal to the Academy: and the matter having been brought to Sixtus V Pope, he sustained grave reproof for his temerity."

This other thing we know: that the Jesuit Fathers from this time did not dare anymore to teach in their Schools the first three propositions of Leffius concerning Sacred Scripture condemned by the two Academies. Moreover if it had been declared by the Holy Pontiff and Nuncio that they were sound doctrine, what prevents them from being defended even now; it would indeed be most honorable for them to teach doctrine approved by the Holy See as sound.

Add to the heap that the Louvain Censure offered to the Holy Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Innocent XII and submitted to their judgment, always escaped unharmed, and no iniquity was found in it: As the praised Steyart testifies, enemy of the Jansenists, third among the Academy of Louvain's Deputies to Innocent XI on this cause in the Assertion cited earlier.

To 6. concerning the Douai Censure I say the same as concerning the Louvain as much as concerns the Nuncio's decree and the votes of Universities and Theologians. But as much as concerns the new dissensions arisen at Douai and the other decree of the Nuncio. I respond that this new decree was never promulgated at Douai according to legal formulas; nor by that, even if it had been promulgated, are Leffius's propositions approved, nor is the University's censure condemned, but it is only decreed: "For the assertors of both opinions there remains their freedom of feeling and teaching... until the questions arising concerning such matters are defined and determined by the Apostolic See." See Serry book 1, chapter 5, book 5, section 2, chapter 8, and Apology of Soto number 36.

What the Father Professor adds that the same Douai faculty, that is four Doctors in their recent censure given in 1722, declares that the ancient censure should not be adhered to. I respond that this recent censure of the year 1722 having been condemned several times already by the Bishop of Arras, was finally crushed by Vatican lightning July 18, 1729.

To the seventh, many things are heaped together cumulatively in it whose full refutation would require longer discussion, but, with what facility they are asserted, with the same they can be denied, briefly, I say **1.** concerning Religious Orders, that none either at the time of the Congregations or at another, professed Molinism, but on the contrary almost all profess Thomistic doctrine, Thom. Tri. article 4, §2, and its Apology article 5 proves at length. What can be opposed from certain letters which seem to assert that at the time of the Congregations the Benedictines and Augustinians assented to Molina, is proved there from the testimonies of the most illustrious Pegna and D. le Bossu the Consultor and others, that these letters were begged, and for various titles worthy of no faith: Also from the letters of D. Cornejo Abbot of St. James in Galicia, that they related only the sense of certain private persons, not of the Order: Moreover

that these two Orders now are most distant from the Molinian School no one does not know. See at the places cited and Serry book 5, section 3, chapter 3.

2. Concerning Academies. It is already established from what was said that the Louvain, Douai and Salamancan, which among the Academies of the Christian world hold no lowest place, noted Molina's opinions with censure; but no one of any name can be brought forward which adopted them: for what they narrate about seven German Academies is rather worthy of laughter than serious confutation, since these seven Academies are nothing other than Colleges of the Society with the title and rights of University; so that out of 50 subscribers, 40 Jesuits are numbered, who nevertheless, lest fraud appear, kept silent about their profession. From elsewhere these 7 Academies with Pont-à-Mousson, which is also, as all know, a College of the Society, condemned Calvinistic doctrine, not Thomistic doctrine badly exposed in a poorly sewn writing. See Serry at the places cited, Thom. Tri. article 6, §4, and its Apology article 16.

To these eight Universities of obscure name, Father Professor adds two other most celebrated ones as favoring Molina at that time, namely Paris and Bologna. Concerning Paris, the contrary is established from two letters of Duval, Doctor and Royal Professor in the Sorbonne, to DD. Crellius and Bossuet, also Doctors of the Sorbonne then staying in Rome; in the first of which, given January 20, 1602, the Most Learned Duval says: "I bear it ill that anyone staying in Rome should have babbled that our Academy wanted to decree something in Molina's favor; for this is false... We will provide through our Syndic that meanwhile none of our Bachelors defend anything of Molina's opinions in their Theses." In the second given July 22, 1602, he says that the Dean and Syndic of the Faculty were unwilling to subscribe to the Molinian Theses of Anthony Rosa Bishop of Sylvanectensis. See Serry book 2, chapter 26, and book 5, section 3, chapter 3, Thom. Tri. article 6, §4, and its Apology article 17.

But if in following times some departed from the Thomistic opinion, it does not matter; for the private opinions of some must be distinguished from the doctrine of the whole order. But what was formerly and what now is the doctrine of this Academy, you have at the places cited.

Concerning the University of Bologna, the Apology Thom. Tri. article 15 clearly proves two things. First, that the suffrage which is obtruded is not of the University itself, but of some private persons, whose signatures were begged from door to door: and this is proved both from the subscriptions themselves, which were not appended in the Academy's assembly, but separately and privately, and fortified not with the University's seal, but private ones: and because nothing concerning this matter is found in the public records of the Academy. Second, that the writing to which some Bolognese Doctors subscribed lied that Molina's doctrine was approved by all Universities of Spain, Germany and France, by all Religious orders at Salamanca, Valladolid and elsewhere; that the University of Louvain itself had retracted its censure; also that it viciously and adulterinely exposed Thomistic and Molinistic doctrine: these

appear from its text. See at the places cited. The same writing the Jesuit Fathers exhibited to other Universities of Italy, from which they suffered repulse.

I will add for a crown many Prelates to whom Molina's doctrine became known in its birth, and the most outstanding Theologians of that time not only foreign, but also of the Society, disapproved it.

First of all the Most Eminent Cardinal Baronius disapproved it both in the Annals at the year 490, number 36, and especially in the Letter to D. de Villars Archbishop of Vienna: The Most Eminent Cardinal de Bérulle, as Father Gibieuf testifies in the dedicatory Letter to Urban VIII: The Most Eminent Cardinal Quiroga Archbishop of Toledo, as witnesses the Most Eminent Cardinal Baronius in his commentaries and the Jesuit Henriques in his Censure of the Year 1594: The Bishop of Coria in his censure of 1595: The Bishop of Nova Cartagena: The Bishop of Mondoñedo in his censure of 1596: The Bishop of Lugo: The Bishop of Sitia in Crete, and almost all the Belgian Bishops who gave suffrage to the Louvain and Douai censures. Add the Inquisition of Valladolid, indeed also the general Inquisition of Spain.

Among Theologians, omitting now Estius, Gravius and other Doctors of the universities of Louvain, Douai and Salamanca, this also nascent doctrine was disapproved by Francis Zumel, celebrated Theologian General of the Order of Mercy: Coqueus, Crellius, Bossuet, Doctors of Paris, what of other Doctors of this primary Academy? It is established from Duval's letters just praised. John Cartagena of the Order of Minors, John de Rada Procurator General of the Franciscans, Michael Salon the Augustinian, and many others.

From the Society, Mariana in the book on the Rule of the Society chapter 4, Henriques in the book on the ultimate end of man, but especially in two censures, one of 1594, the other of 1597, in which he keenly criticizes Molina's positions, and in the last of which he adds that the same care, namely of giving opinion concerning Molina's book, was committed to most learned men in Spain, to whom almost the entire doctrine of the book seemed to revive the ancient errors of Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians concerning the natural power of the will. And Francis Macedo, outstanding Franciscan Theologian who had professed the Society for 20 years and of whom he was always most studious, says in collation 10, page 368, that with Henriques almost all other Doctors of Spain felt the same. See more in Thom. Tri. article 6, numbers 2, 3, and 5, and in its Apology articles 9, 10, and 18.

Section IX: The Foundations of Middle Knowledge Are Overturned

First, with Tournelius and other Molinists from Scripture, that famous passage from Matthew 11: "Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida: for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." From this they argue as follows: Christ rebukes the Jews comparatively with the Tyrians

and Sidonians because they did not do penance having seen his miracles and heard his preaching, which the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done if they had seen the same miracles of Christ and heard his preaching; but this rebuke would have been unjust if God had known the future penance of the Tyrians in his absolute and efficacious decree from the hypothesis of miracles and Christ's preaching, and not rather by decree through middle knowledge: Therefore.

The Minor is proved. That rebuke is unjust to which a just response can be made: But in the opinion of the Thomists, the Jews could have justly responded to this rebuke of Christ by saying: Lord, if you had efficaciously decreed our penance supposing Christ's preaching, just as you had decreed the penance of the Tyrians under the same condition, we would have done penance just as they would have done; therefore you unjustly rebuke us before them. This argument which the Molinists so extol, and which they use everywhere as sword and shield, is proved to waver in every part by what follows.

Second Response: The Apostle in Romans 9 objects this very argument to himself: for when he had shown gratuitous predestination by the example of Jacob and Esau, and had said that it is not of him who runs or wills, but of God who shows mercy, who has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens: Immediately he objects to himself: "You will say to me then: Why does he still find fault? For who has resisted his will?" As if he were saying: Why does God complain and rebuke me that I, being hardened, do not convert, if he wished to show mercy by granting grace, as to others, I would be converted; for no one resists his will. Behold the very argument of the adversaries: But the Apostle does not solve this, as they do, through the willing or not willing of free will, but chastises it as arrogant: "O man," he says, "who are you that reply against God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or has not the potter power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel to honor and another to dishonor?"

From this it is evident that the Apostle thinks differently than the Molinists think, and that he did not acknowledge middle knowledge, otherwise he could have and should have met the scandal through it and solved the difficulty by saying to the objector: why do you complain, if you are not converted, as others are converted, it depends on yourself, you have sufficient grace like others whose efficacy depends on your free will. But not so the Doctor of the Gentiles, who solves this grave difficulty in no other way than by exclaiming and recurring to the most omnipotent will of God.

Third Response: By retorting the argument. According to the system of congruous grace, which the Fathers of the Society more commonly support, and which all are bound to support according to their laws, the Jews could equally have responded to Christ rebuking them comparatively to the Tyrians: Lord, if you had placed us in other circumstances in which through middle knowledge you had foreseen us about to do penance, we would have done it, just as the Tyrians would have done it whom you had placed in those opportune circumstances, from the hypothesis

that there had been done among them the mighty works which were done among us, or more briefly, which is the same, if you had given us congruous grace, just as you had decreed to give to the Tyrians, we would have done penance no differently than they.

Tournelius responds that in the opinion of the Assertors of middle knowledge the response of the Jews would not be just, since in those circumstances in which they were, nothing was lacking to them of those things which are necessary for conversion. But the Molinist Doctor either deceives or is deceived; for congruous grace was lacking to them; namely grace greater morally and in the nature of benefit; but congruous grace is no less necessary in this system for conversion than per se efficacious grace in the Thomistic system. Therefore this argument which the Congruists so magnify must be solved equally by them as by us, and by anyone thinking catholically about grace, since the Catholic truth is that those who are converted are prevented by grace either physically, or morally, or congruously more potent than those who are not converted.

Fourth Response: Directly to the argument, I deny the Minor. To the proof, I again deny the Minor, and I say in our opinion there was no cause of just excuse for the Jews comparatively to the Tyrians, that they did not believe and did not do penance, for a double reason:

First, because although they did not have efficacious grace giving them to act, or a decree to it, they at least had sufficient graces giving them the ability, but to one able to do that to which he is obligated and not doing it, it is sin to him.

Second, because that they did not have efficacious grace was their fault, namely because they showed themselves more unworthy of it than the Tyrians would have shown themselves because of greater blindness, greater hardness and ingratitude. This reason is from St. Augustine in De Dono Perseverantiae (On the Gift of Perseverance) chapter 14, where he says: "The eyes were not so blinded, nor the heart so hardened of the Tyrians and Sidonians, because they would have believed, if they had seen such signs as these (Jews) saw." It is also from St. Thomas in 3 Contra Gentiles chapter 159, where he says: "Although someone through the motion of free will can neither merit nor acquire divine grace: he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it... And since this is in the power of free will to impede the reception of divine grace, or not to impede: not undeservedly is it imputed as fault to him who presents an impediment to the reception of grace. For God as far as he is concerned is prepared to give grace to all; for he wills all men to be saved... But those alone are deprived of grace, who present an impediment to grace in themselves: Just as when the sun illuminates the world, it is imputed as fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follows from this: although he cannot see, unless he is prevented by the light of the sun."

Objection: That comparative rebuke may be just, there must be equality between the extremes of comparison: for example, if Peter equipped with stronger and more suitable arms conquers, but John instructed with weaker or less suitable ones is conquered, the King would unjustly rebuke

John comparatively to Peter that he did not conquer: But in the opinion of the Thomists there would not be equality between the Jews and Tyrians, since these would have had efficacious grace, those not: Therefore.

Having premised the retortion of the argument about congruous grace as above, I respond according to both reasons given in the preceding solution: First, I distinguish the Major: That comparative rebuke may be just there must be equality between the extremes of comparison, as to duty and power to fulfill it, I concede the Major; as to actual fulfillment, I deny the Major. For then there would be no place for any rebuke. Moreover, in the Jews and Tyrians there was equal duty of repenting, equal power, since both had sufficient helps giving them the ability: But in the example cited, arms are on the part of first act or power.

Second, I distinguish the same Major: there must be equality between the extremes of comparison, if the defect of equality does not come from the fault of that extreme which lacks the requisites for equality, let the Major pass; if it comes from his fault, I deny the Major. Thus John conquered would be justly rebuked, if he had refused arms equal to those with which Peter conquered. Now that the Jews did not receive helps such as the Tyrians would have received was their fault, because of the greater impediments which they placed to the reception of grace, as has been said.

What Tournelius opposes to these things remains partly solved from what has been said, and will return below concerning decrees.

These are the common solutions among Thomists of this difficult argument and indeed most well-founded. Nevertheless, I will not be reluctant to propose a fourth from our most wise Massoulié, Volume 2 On Divine Grace, Dissertation 3, question 6, because I hear that it pleases not a few.

Fourth Response: There was no reason for just excuse for the Jews, if indeed they did not have lesser helps than the Tyrians would have had, and by which these would actually have been converted, although they were not converted by them, for this reason namely that greater was their resistance, which the same helps would not overcome, which nevertheless would have overcome the lesser resistance of the Tyrians. For although grace by its power or from God's will is efficacious and not from man's consent, nevertheless greater force of grace is required to overcome greater resistance and opposition than to overcome lesser, just as although heat is combustive of itself, more active is required to burn wood more resistant to combustion because of excessive humidity, than less humid, for this reason commonly received in Philosophy that proportion must be preserved between cause and effect, and that a cause however efficacious it may be, nevertheless produces different degrees of effects greater or lesser according to different greater or lesser dispositions of the subject.

Hence in this subject matter we commonly think and say, the graver the temptation that assails, or the more vehement the passion that urges, the more potent grace is needed that it may be overcome. This mode of explaining the efficacy of divine grace seems easy and apt for unraveling the most intricate difficulties, and the praised Massoulié extensively establishes it from the principles of Saints Augustine and Thomas in the cited question 6 through four articles: This also our González seems to teach whom our Bancel cites and follows in question 5 on middle knowledge, article 4, §2. Nevertheless it also suffers its own difficulties, and against it both Molinists and Anti-Molinists rise up on both sides.

First, the Anti-Molinists object: This mode of explaining the efficacy of divine grace seems to coincide with the mode in which the Jesuit Fathers explain it, for it places it in a certain congruity, just as the praised Fathers explain: Therefore.

I distinguish the Antecedent: This mode places the efficacy of grace in a certain congruity, the same as the Molinist, I deny. Far different, I concede. It is explained: The congruity in which the Fathers of the Society place the efficacy of grace, is that it is given accommodated to the circumstances of person, place and time in which it is foreseen to be about to have effect from innate liberty, from which it happens that one consents to it, another not consenting equally hardened and sinful, and that through such consent he renders it efficacious, which by its power was not efficacious. For although they admit that grace is greater in the nature of benefit in him who is converted, than in another who is not converted, because namely it is given from singular benevolence of God that it may be congruous, nevertheless they deny that it is greater physically or in efficacy of acting: Whence they do not place the efficacy of grace in the power of acting of grace itself, but rather in the very consent of the will which subjects itself to grace: For they do not attribute to grace any true physical causality which naturally precedes and physically causes the very consent of the will, nor consequently do they want there to be infallible connection between grace and the consent of the will from the power and efficacy of grace itself: For they think both to be destructive of liberty.

But truly the congruity in which the opinion, which we here expound, places the efficacy of grace, is situated in this, that to one more resistant and hardened stronger grace is given, which does not merely shake him in any way, but completely conquers him by its power and effects consent. Whence it follows: First, in this opinion that grace is efficacious of itself. Second, that it never happens that of two equally hardened with equal grace, one is converted another not. Third, that grace has true and physical causality in the consent of the will. Fourth, that by its power and efficacy it has infallible connection with it: Which things all are repugnant to the system of congruous grace of the Jesuits.

They respond: At least this mode of explaining the efficacy of grace cannot stand without middle knowledge by which God explores the disposition of the will that he may confer greater or lesser

grace to it; otherwise he could be deceived by giving lesser grace to a will, which would require greater because of its greater hardening: Therefore.

I deny the Antecedent: For that God may be directed infallibly in the proportionate conferring of his grace, it is not required that through middle knowledge he explore what the will is or is not about to do from innate liberty, if such or such grace is conferred to it, but it suffices that on one part through the knowledge of simple intelligence he know the various degrees of his grace which he can confer; and on the other that through the knowledge of vision he know the present disposition of the will, to which he selects a tempered degree of motion which can by its power convert that will and de facto converts it.

On the contrary the Molinists object with Tournelius in question 3 on grace at the end and four Doctors of Douai in their censure of the year 1722 proscribed by the judgment of the Apostolic See, that this mode of explaining is Jansenist, because according to it sufficient grace is nothing other than grace inferior to cupidity: But Jansenius admitted such sufficient grace: Therefore.

I deny the assumption. I distinguish the Major: According to this mode of explaining sufficient grace is nothing other than grace inferior to necessitating cupidity, I deny the Major. To non-necessitating cupidity, I concede the Major. With the Minor thus distinguished, I deny the Consequence. In this therefore Jansenius erred that he understood it of cupidity by which the will would necessarily be carried away according to that of Augustine badly understood: "According to that which more delights, it is necessary that we act." According to this grace is not truly sufficient. But no error seems to be there, if it is understood as we understand it of cupidity to which the will serves from mere malice and full liberty: Whence the example which Massoulié uses of fire and other physically acting causes and passively resisting subjects does not have complete parity: For although on both sides the cause acts more or less according to greater or lesser resistance of what suffers, and in this there is parity, nevertheless there is disparity because a naturally and physically moving cause or one resisting moves or resists necessarily, but grace and passion move freely. Grace indeed, because although it acts physically, it causes nevertheless not only the act, but also the mode of the act namely liberty itself; passion, because it only moves morally, for God alone as author of our will, can act physically on it: Whence in that system grace is truly sufficient even relatively, because the will truly can act with it, insofar as it truly can not follow the contrary passion by which it is in no way necessitated.

See our opuscule inscribed in French: Letter to Messieurs the Doctors of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Douai. For the rest we propose this mode of explaining only abundantly as probable, and insofar as it seems to us to save the rights of liberty and the sufficiency of grace, without which we dismiss it: for the previous solutions entirely suffice, and we insist on those chiefly, as more commonly received in the Thomistic School.

Second, Tournelius objects from the authority of Augustine. St. Augustine in the book On the Predestination of the Saints chapter 10 says God foreknows those things which he does not predestine: "But he can foreknow," he says, "things which he himself does not do, such as whatever sins are." Therefore that knowledge is not supported by God's decree nor does it suppose it, but knowledge which does not suppose an absolute and actual decree of God is called middle knowledge: Therefore.

The words of Augustine are not reported completely: For the Holy Doctor says: "By predestination indeed God foreknew those things which he himself was about to do: But he can foreknow even those things which he himself does not do, such as whatever sins are." Moreover by the prior words the throat of middle knowledge is sought: For I subsume: but God does all our good things, therefore he foreknows all our good things in his predestination or decree: which being posited, middle knowledge falls. But what God does not do, such as sins, these he foreknows not in an effective or approbative decree, but permissive; according to that other saying of St. Augustine in De Dono Perseverantiae chapter 6: "Nothing happens (nor therefore can it be known as about to be done) unless what either (God) himself does, or permits to be done." See the following objection from St. Thomas.

Tournelius insists: St. Augustine in book 11 On Genesis to the Letter chapter 22, solving that question so often proposed by the Gentiles, why God created an Angel whom he knew would sin: He responds: "Foreknowing him about to be evil by his own will, he nevertheless made him, not abstaining his goodness in providing life and substance to a future harmful will also, at the same time foreseeing how many good things he was about to make from him by his wonderful goodness and power." He raises the same question in book 22 On the City of God chapter 1 about the Angel and first man, and dissolves it in the same mode: From which the Sorbonne Doctor thus argues: That foreknowledge of which Augustine there speaks is itself conditional knowledge by which God foreknows the Angel about to operate badly if he were created: But he did not foreknow this in any efficacious decree (he should have said absolute) on his part, and conditional on the part of the object: Therefore. The Minor is proved: Because that foreknowledge is such that it standing, God could not create the Angel: But it cannot happen that absolute knowledge of vision standing concerning the evil will of the Angel to be posited, God does not create the Angel, since this knowledge necessarily presupposes the creation of the Angel: Therefore God did not foreknow in any absolute decree on his part and conditional on the part of the object the Angel about to operate badly if he were created.

I deny the first Minor, and I say God foreknows the sin conditionally future of the Angel in this decree subjectively absolute and objectively conditional: if I create the Angel, I will permit his fall. To the proof, I deny the Supposition of the Minor: For we do not say God by knowledge of vision foreknows the sin of the Angel absolutely future before he decreed to create him, but only conditionally future, namely if he is created.

Tournelius insists again. Augustine in book 1 to Simplicianus question 2 says: "If God wished to have mercy on those (namely who being called do not come) he could so call them in the way that would be apt for them that they might both be moved and understand and follow... of whom he has mercy he so calls him, in the way he knows to be congruous that he may not reject the caller." From which he thus forms the argument: God could not call those who do not come, in the mode in which it would be apt for them that they might come, unless he certainly knew how they are to be called that they may come: but that knowledge is not absolute knowledge of vision, because it does not deal with those who are absolutely about to come, but who would come, if they were called in such a mode, therefore it is conditional, and indeed before every decree predefining, because it is supposed in God there is no will to call them thus.

I concede the Major and Minor, I deny the Consequence, and I say that that knowledge is knowledge of simple intelligence by which God knows in the treasures of his omnipotence infinite modes and graces, by which, if he wished, he would compel rebellious wills to himself. Here Tournelius rather poorly stops with Augustine, but other Molinists press further both from the said book to Simplicianus and from other works of Augustine, and they say: Augustine there to Simplicianus thus says: "Although many were called in one mode, nevertheless because not all were affected in one mode, those alone follow the vocation who are found suitable for receiving it: Those elect who are congruently called... of whom he has mercy he so calls him in the way he knows to be congruous to him that he may not reject the caller... since therefore one is moved to faith in this way, another in another way, and the same thing often said in one mode moves, said in another mode does not move, and moves one person and does not move another, who would dare to say that the mode of calling was lacking to God by which even Esau would apply his mind and join his will to that faith in which Jacob was justified." And in the book On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 14, speaking of the Tyrians to be converted if they had seen Christ's miracles, he says: "From which it appears that some have in their very genius a divine gift of intelligence naturally by which they may be moved to faith if they hear words congruous to their minds or see signs."

From which the Molinists infer that predestination and vocation, according to Augustine, are made according to middle knowledge by which God before he calls and predestines foreknows and explores what modes, what circumstances are congruous for obtaining man's consent, or what man himself would will in these circumstances, especially since in the opinion of the Thomists it cannot happen that many called in one mode, that is with equal grace, one is converted, another not.

I deny the Consequence. For these authorities favor nothing to middle knowledge, because if God knows consent conditionally future from the congruity of means, through that knowledge he knows by which he knows what is congruous to each that he may consent; but this he knows, as I already said, through knowledge of simple intelligence, and not through middle knowledge, whose unique object is free consent not foreseen in anything other than in its futurity and not in

the congruity of grace: For the defenders of middle knowledge do not say consent is foreseen future, because congruous grace is foreseen; but on the contrary grace is foreseen congruous, because consent is foreseen future in its objective truth. Therefore these authorities help nothing to middle knowledge.

You will say: They help at least congruous grace such as the defenders of middle knowledge now champion.

It seems so to some looking at the rind of words, but not attaining the legitimate sense, which, before I expound it, I premise that it is wonderful and preposterous that the Molinists in asserting congruous grace place so much indeed almost total force in these books of Augustine to Simplicianus, which he wrote as a young man, namely in the second year of his Episcopate before the heresy of Pelagius and semi-Pelagians arose; when it would be far better to seek the mind of the Holy Doctor concerning this matter from the Books which he wrote after those heresies arose and directly against them, such as On the Grace of Christ, On Correction and Grace, On the Predestination of the Saints, On the Gift of Perseverance, Epistle 107 to Vitalis, Epistle 105 to Sixtus. Especially since Augustine himself in the book On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 21 says that in these Books to Simplicianus he wrote "advancing by God's mercy," but had not begun from perfection: And Bellarmine, distinguished ornament of the Society, in book 2 On Grace and Free Will chapter 15 confesses that Augustine, when he wrote the Books to Simplicianus, was still young, nor had he found much in this most difficult question, which afterwards he investigated and found with greater diligence.

Nor does it hinder that the Holy Doctor himself in book 2 of Retractions chapter 1, likewise in the book On the Predestination of the Saints chapter 4 and On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 21 refers adversaries to the Books inscribed to Simplicianus, that they would perceive sound doctrine there; for Augustine does not say this universally about all things which he wrote in these Books, but only about gratuitous vocation to faith without previous merits, and about grace necessary for the beginning of Faith, as is clear from his own words: "Let them see," he says, "whether in the later parts of the first book of those two which I wrote at the beginning of my Episcopate, before the Pelagian heresy appeared, to Simplicianus Bishop of Milan, there remained anything by which it might be called doubtful, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, and whether I did not sufficiently accomplish there, that even the beginning of Faith is the gift of God."

Therefore as regards the more difficult controversies of grace, such as by what middle God foreknows the future conversion of man, by what force, how grace is efficacious, we can say of those Books inscribed to Simplicianus before the heresy of the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, what the Holy Prelate himself says of the writings of the ancient Fathers in the book On the Predestination of the Saints chapter 14: "What need is there therefore, that we should scrutinize their little works, who before this heresy arose, did not have the necessity of being engaged in

this difficult question to solve: which they would doubtless do, if they were compelled to respond to such things?"

These things being premised, now for the understanding of the Texts objected, it must be carefully noted that St. Augustine in these speaks only of external congruous grace or vocation: it is clear both from his cited words, "Since the same thing often said in one mode moves, said in another mode does not move": and "if they hear words congruous to their minds or see signs." As well as from the various examples of external vocation which he brings forward there, such as that Nathanael believed at one sentence of Christ, the disciples believed at the miracle done in Cana of Galilee: from the cross and death the disciples terrified wavered, the thief believed, many who despised Christ working miracles believed disciples doing such things, and similar, in which St. Augustine mentions nothing beyond signs, miracles and words.

Moreover it is most certainly certain that the Holy Doctor never taught or thought external vocation to be congruous and efficacious in the elect for this one reason, that it responded to their genius, inclination and natural affections; otherwise he would have taught purest Pelagianism, namely that external vocation alone, excluding internal grace, suffices for faith. Therefore Augustine must be understood of the congruity which grace not nature makes.

Therefore the Holy Doctor teaches and we with him that God according to the ordinary laws of his providence, that he may dispose man to the reception of interior and efficacious grace, uses certain helps or external graces, such as preachings, exhortations, rebukes, examples, miracles, etc. in which there is a certain external power of moving and persuading morally and objectively, and of which some are more apt and more congruous for moving certain men, according to certain natural dispositions of theirs and other circumstances; so that it often happens, as Augustine says and experience testifies that "The same thing said in one mode moves, said in another mode does not move, and moves one person and does not move another": But that these external graces from this precisely that they are tempered and congruous to genius, natural affections or other circumstances, gain effect and work consent, without the help of interior grace efficaciously inclining the will, Augustine never dreamed, unless, as I said, you want him to have taught the most putrid heresy, ascribing salvation to external graces alone.

When therefore he said that of many called externally in one mode some follow, others do not follow; likewise that the Tyrians would believe having seen Christ's miracles, because the gift of natural intelligence was not extinct in them, he said this doubtless without prejudice to that interior grace through which God makes this external vocation congruous and works consent, and by which it happens in our opinion, that of two equally called externally, one is converted another not. Therefore the sense of his words is: Although many may be called externally in one mode, because nevertheless not all are affected in one mode through grace, those alone follow the vocation who are found; that is are made through grace suitable for receiving it: And he calls his elect in the way he knows to be congruous to them that they may follow, insofar as he

perfectly knows the power and efficacy of his grace by which it happens that both the vocation is congruous to them, and they themselves consent.

Thus our Lemos responded in the 2nd congregation before Paul V on September 20, 1605, to Bastida objecting this place of Augustine from book 1 to Simplicianus question 2. And that this is his mind Augustine openly signifies in many places thus in On the Predestination of the Saints chapter 8: "When the Gospel is preached," he says, "some believe, some do not believe: But those who believe with the preacher sounding outwardly: inwardly they hear and learn from the Father... This is, it is given to them that they may believe." And in the book On Correction and Grace chapter 14 he says external corruption is made salutary inwardly, insofar as "God acts inwardly, holds hearts, moves hearts, and draws them by their wills, which he works in them." In conformity to these St. Prosper in the poem On the Ungrateful: "Let the Apostle run through the world, preach, exhort, plant, water, rebuke, insist; yet that the hearer may be advanced by these studies, neither Doctor nor disciple, but grace alone accomplishes it..."

But why should we inquire elsewhere for the mind of Augustine, when in that very place which is objected to us namely book 1 to Simplicianus question 2 he openly declares it, and distinctly asserts external vocation to have from interior grace what makes it congruous and efficacious: For when in that question he had attributed much to this external vocation, he thus concludes it: "Who can believe, unless he is touched by some vocation, that is, by some testimony of things? But who embraces anything in his mind which does not delight him, or who has it in his power that either what can delight him may occur, or may delight when it has occurred? Since therefore those things delight us by which we are perfected unto God, this is inspired and provided by the grace of God, not acquired by our nod and industry or merits of works: Because that there may be a nod of the will, that there may be industry of study, that there may be works fervent with charity, he gives, he bestows: Therefore we are commanded to ask, that we may receive."

Whence in book 1 of Retractions chapter 2, speaking of the two books to Simplicianus, he confesses that he indeed attributed much to free will, but so that in the end, he referred all things to divine grace: "In the solution of which question," he says, "labor was indeed undertaken for the free will of human will; but the grace of God conquered. Nor could it be arrived at except to that, that it might be understood that the Apostle spoke with most clear truth: 'For who makes you to differ? and what do you have that you did not receive?' which the Martyr Cyprian also wishing to attend to, defined this whole thing by the very title, saying: 'In nothing must we glory, when nothing is ours.'"

Which indeed cannot be understood of congruous grace either external or internal in the Molinist sense, but of grace alone making itself efficacious, as we have proved elsewhere.

To this solution, which is common among Thomists, Massoulié adds another according to the system proposed in the first argument, saying the congruity of which Augustine speaks is

situated in this that to the more hardened to be converted more potent grace should be conferred, lesser to the less hardened. From which it happens that although many are called in one mode, nevertheless not all follow, because not all are affected in the same mode, but some are more hardened than others and resist more. Likewise that God so calls him of whom he has mercy, in the way he knows to be congruous to him that he may not reject the caller, insofar as he confers to him grace which he knows to be stronger than his resistance. See more broadly the praised Theologian in the cited question 6 article 4.

They press again from Augustine. The Holy Doctor there in book 1 to Simplicianus question 2 says: "That we may will is both God's will and ours, his by calling, ours by following." In On the Spirit and Letter chapter 33: "God acts by persuasions of things seen either extrinsically or intrinsically, but to consent or dissent is of proper will." And in book 12 On the City of God chapter 6, responding to the question by which it is asked concerning two called with equal vocation, equally affected in body and mind and struck with equal temptation; why it happens that one stands, another falls? he says: "What else appears, except that one willed, another was unwilling to fall away from chastity." Therefore according to Augustine grace has from our consent what makes it efficacious, therefore not by grace itself is consent foreseen, but from consent itself foreseen efficacious grace is foreseen, consequently through middle knowledge.

To the first two places and similar, I respond that Saint Augustine wants nothing other than that vocation is both from God alone and not from us, but consent indeed is from us; but that it is so from us that it is not also from God himself working it in us, Augustine does not say, rather he affirms the contrary: in On Correction and Grace chapter 2: "Let them understand," he says, "if they are sons of God, that they are led by the Spirit of God, that what must be done they may do, and when they have done it, let them give thanks to him by whom they are led: For they are led that they may act, not that they themselves may do nothing." In the book On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 13: "We will, but God works in us both to will: We work, but God works in us both to work for good will: This is expedient for us both to believe and to say, that confession may be humble and submissive and everything may be given to God." Thus hundreds of times.

To the third, similarly Augustine truly said there is no externally apparent cause why one stood another not, except the proper will of each; but that he who stood, willed this, the Holy Doctor does not deny to be from another hidden cause, namely the grace of God which works the very willing, as he continually teaches with the Apostle.

Finally it should seem wonderful to anyone that modern Molinists so pertinaciously contend that St. Augustine acknowledged and approved middle knowledge; when Molina himself their Leader and the Primary Jesuits freely confess it was unknown to Augustine. See §4 proof 4 and the last and §7.

Third Objection from other Fathers. Chrysostom in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews says: "We must first choose the things that are good, and then God introduces what are his; for he does not precede our wills, lest free will be injured": Therefore before he decrees good things of his own, he explores our wills through middle knowledge. Whence in homilies 31 and 65 on Matthew he says God then called (Matthew and Paul) when he knew they would consent. St. Damascene in book 2 On the Faith, last chapter: "God indeed foreknows virtues and vices and those things which are from our will, but does not predetermine them." Therefore he does not foreknow them in a decree, but outside through middle knowledge: Therefore.

To Chrysostom I respond that he only wants God not to bestow habits of virtues on adults unless they prepare themselves for them, but that this preparation is also from God he does not deny, for when he says God does not precede our wills, he does not understand of every antecedence, nor do the Molinists themselves so understand it, for it would be semi-Pelagian, but of necessitating antecedence; whence he adds, "lest free will be injured." But when he says God called the Apostles when he foresaw they would obey, he must be understood when he foresaw he would work in them that they might obey; according to the Rule of Augustine in On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 19, of which above: "What prohibits us, when we read among some Tractators of the word of God of God's foreknowledge, and predestination of the elect is treated, to understand the same predestination?" And unless you understand the doctrine of Chrysostom thus, says Cardinal Toletus of the Society of Jesus, Annotation 54 on chapter 5 of Luke, "I do not consent to him, but think the contrary entirely true."

To Damascene I respond with St. Thomas that Damascene calls predetermination the imposition of necessity, as it is in natural things which are necessarily determined to one, which is clear from what he adds: "For he does not will malice, nor compel to virtue." Nor can adversaries understand it of every predetermination, since they themselves do not deny that we are predetermined by God in some mode at least morally.

Objection from St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor in On Truth question 12 article 10 both in the body and to 1 and 3 teaches that foreknowledge extends more widely even in good things than predestination: For he says predestination is only of those things which are done by God alone, and not of those things which are done through secondary causes either natural or voluntary, but of these there is only foreknowledge. And in 3rd part question 1 article 3 to 4 he says that "predestination supposes foreknowledge of future things." Therefore.

To the first I respond that the doctrine which is here obtruded to us as St. Thomas's, if crudely understood, is open error, namely that good things which are done by us are in no way predestined and willed by God. Therefore the sense of St. Thomas is far different. The Holy Doctor there explains a certain division of prophecy by St. Jerome into Prophecy of threatening, predestination, and foreknowledge, so that according to Jerome Prophecy of threatening is prediction of the order of causes to effect, which order can be impeded, as is clear in the

prediction of Jonah about the subversion of Nineveh. Prophecy of predestination, prediction of those things which are done by God alone. Prophecy of foreknowledge, prediction of those things which are done by secondary causes either natural or free.

Therefore St. Thomas says predestination taken in that sense of St. Jerome is not per se about those things which are done by us, but only per accidens (by accident) and indirectly, insofar as they are from God. Whence it is established that predestination, if taken more broadly, as we take it, is also of good things which are done by us.

To the second, St. Thomas there intends to prove that Christ would not have been incarnated if Adam had not sinned, and therefore the predestination of the Incarnation supposes foreknowledge of Adam's sin. Whence when he says that predestination supposes foreknowledge of future things, he understands of future things which are not constituted through predestination, such as sins. Thus Cajetan and after him others.

Sylvius rightly adds that this text of St. Thomas, if well inspected, imports no more than that predestination supposes him who predestines to be foreknowing of future things.

For the solution of similar objections either from St. Thomas or from other Fathers, note that predestination is taken in two ways: Strictly for a decree specially ordaining a rational creature to a supernatural end; Broadly for any decree effective of some good: when therefore sometimes the Fathers say foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination, they mostly take predestination in the first sense, according to which it is true that foreknowledge extends more widely even in good things than such predestination, because goods of the natural order are not made through it, but through decrees of natural providence, in which therefore they are known.

The moments of reason which Tournelius objects are taken from the impossibility and uselessness of decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional, from the injury both of human liberty and divine sanctity, from the insufficiency of sufficient grace in our system. The first we will dilute in the following section, the rest in the following Dissertation on Decrees of the divine will.

What remains of lighter moment I will briefly dispatch. Therefore:

Fourth Objection from reason. **First**, God does not know conditional free future things through knowledge of simple intelligence, because this deals only with possibles, nor through knowledge of vision, because this deals only with existents: Therefore through middle knowledge. **Second**, God's knowledge is called wonderful in the Scriptures and Fathers: but there is nothing wonderful that God should know in his will what he has decreed to do: for thus men know. **Third**, God certainly knows this conditional future: if I shall have decreed efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent: but he does not know this in an actual decree, since it is supposed not yet to have been posited: Therefore before the decree through middle knowledge. Similarly God

knows before the decree this conditional future, if God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it: For this is true even in a sign prior to the decree: Therefore.

To the first, I respond that it is a mere question of name, about which even Thomists are divided. Some refer the knowledge of conditional free future things to knowledge of vision; because, they say, although, insofar as it is of vision, it regards only existents, nevertheless insofar as it is free and of approbation, it regards all free objects which say some order to existence. Others refer it to knowledge of simple intelligence, because, they say, just as there is given in God double knowledge of vision, one natural and necessary by which he sees himself, another free by which he sees creatures; so there is given double knowledge of simple intelligence, one natural and necessary which regards merely possibles, another free which regards conditional futures: but that it is commonly called necessary by St. Thomas and Theologians, is therefore because it is chiefly occupied about possibles.

From these two opinions, choose whichever you will, and call this knowledge by whatever name you wish, it matters equally, nor does it pertain anything to the present controversy, provided you do not say this foreknowledge precedes the decree, for about this alone the question is treated.

To the second, I distinguish the Minor: there is nothing wonderful that God should know in his will what he has decreed to do, stopping there, let it pass: with other things added, I deny it. This therefore is wonderful in God's knowledge and proper to him alone that through it God knows all things in his essence as in a cause, and since he is the free cause of all created and creatable things, as he wills and insofar as he wills, he sees all these things in the free decree of his will: whence it follows that this knowledge founded in decree, is itself also the cause of things, that it is eminently speculative and practical, that it is intuitive of things present in eternity without expense of their contingency and futurity, that it is the measure of things and not measured by things, certain and infallible, universal and extending to all things.

To the third, I respond that this conditional future, "if I shall have decreed efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent," is not a contingent future about which the question proceeds; but a necessary future, not by necessity of the consequent, but of the consequence, therefore it is known through knowledge of simple intelligence: just as in these propositions: "If I see Peter sitting, Peter sits; if God foreknows Peter about to consent, Peter will consent," although the extremes are free, nevertheless the connection between them is infallible and necessary, and therefore pertaining to knowledge of simple intelligence. The same could be said of that other: "If God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it," by reason of Christ's impeccability. Or it should be said that it involves on the part of the condition a decree as supposed, for from this that Christ is impeccable, it implies that God imposes a precept on him only if at the same time he decrees to move his will to the fulfillment of this precept.

Objection: From a determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily: Therefore the connection between it and the consent of the will is not infallible and necessary.

I distinguish the Antecedent as before: from a determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily by necessity of the consequent, I concede; by necessity of the consequence, I deny. Or it does not follow necessarily consent, as if it were posited coercively and without liberty, I concede; it does not follow necessarily in the mode in which it is willed by God, I deny. For since God's will is most efficacious, if he wills Peter to consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely; just as if he foreknows Peter about to consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely; if I see Peter sitting freely, it follows necessarily that Peter sits freely.

You will infer: From the given solution it follows that God's knowledge with respect to conditional futures has a necessary object which is contrary to the hypothesis and which Thomists deny. The sequence is proved: from an efficacious decree to a conditional future there is necessary consequence from what has been said, therefore if that conditional future is known in that efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary.

I deny the sequence. To the proof I distinguish the consequent: if the conditional future is known in an efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary, if the decree enters on the part of the condition or antecedent and is part of the object, I concede; but thus we do not dispose. If it is only the medium which God uses that in it he may infallibly know the conditional future, as we dispose, I deny. Therefore according to us the object of conditional knowledge is precisely a contingent conditional future, e.g. "If the Gospel is preached to the Moors, they will be converted," where there is no necessary connection of the consequent with the antecedent. But the decree is established by us as a medium on the part of the subject, in which he infallibly knows this object or this connection contingent of itself of the preaching of the Gospel with the conversion of the Moors: and because the decree is about conversion future contingently and freely, hence it happens, that although it infallibly infers it, it does not remove, but on the contrary infers that it is future contingently and freely under such condition, otherwise it would not be efficacious.

What can be opposed about the truth of propositions about the future independently of decree or about the law of contradictories, we have anticipated above when treating of knowledge of absolute futures.

Section X: Decrees in God Subjectively Absolute and Objectively Conditional Are Asserted

Since hitherto we have proved that God does not know conditional futures through middle knowledge before decree, but in the very decree subjectively absolute and objectively

conditional, determining the conditional futurity of things; but adversaries attack such decrees with all their might, denying that they are given in God, it remains for the complement of this celebrated controversy that we should show by invincible reasons that they are to be admitted.

For which **Note First**: A decree in God, which is also called predefinition, and predestination, (taking predestination in a broad sense) is nothing other than a free volition or efficacious and infallible, yet sweet, determination of the divine will, concerning future events. It is twofold, absolute and conditional: Absolute, which depends on no condition either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the object and is expressed absolutely by the verb "I will": e.g. I will create the world, I will save Peter. Conditional which depends on some condition and is expressed under it: And this again is twofold: Conditional on the part of the subject, and on the part of the object.

Conditional on the part of the subject is when the person decreeing, does not indeed have actual will of doing such a thing, but would have, if a certain condition were posited: as when I say: I would wish to hunt if I were not a Cleric: I would wish to go to Rome if I were not gouty. Whence such a decree is only a velleity (mere inclination), by which indeed nothing is actually decreed, but decreeing is remitted to the future if the condition is posited.

Conditional on the part of the object only is when the person decreeing has actual volition of doing something, but execution is suspended, until a certain condition is posited: as when someone says: I will give a thousand florins to Titius, if he takes my daughter in marriage. I will give my horse to Caius, if he meets me tomorrow.

Note Second: That there are given in God absolute decrees concerning future events, no one denies: Because God does nothing in time, which he did not will from eternity, since he does not begin to will something in time. But as to our free acts there is disparity between us and the Molinists, that according to us, the absolute decree is certainly and infallibly determining and causing their futurity, consequently is an apt medium in which God certainly knows absolute futures. But according to the Molinists it is not a determining decree, but only of concurring to the act to which God through middle knowledge saw man determining himself by innate liberty, prepared to concur to the opposite if man wished to determine himself to this: Whence the certitude of the future event is not repeated from that absolute decree, but from middle knowledge, and thus that decree is not the medium in which God certainly knows absolute futures, but only a condition without which nothing can be known to be freely future, as Annatus says. See §4 proof 2. Nor do the Molinists commonly assign it as a medium as we saw in article 4 of this Dissertation. Sometimes however when they are pressed by arguments, they flee to it to escape. See the cited § and elsewhere.

Moreover it is certainly established that there are not given in God decrees conditional on the part of the subject, because since they involve the imperfection of potentiality and suspension,

they are repugnant to God. Therefore the question is only about decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional determining the conditional futurity of things.

I say: There are to be admitted in God decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional determining the conditional futurity of things.

Proved First from Scripture. God in the Scriptures promises that he will do many things if a certain condition were posited: e.g. he promised to Adam that his posterity would be born in original justice, if he himself did not sin. He promised to the Children of Israel that he would introduce and preserve them in the promised land if they observed the law. He promised to David and Solomon that their sons would sit forever upon the Throne of Israel, if they obeyed his commandments. Likewise he promised to Abraham that he would spare Sodom if there were ten just men in it, and many other similar things.

When therefore God made these promises, either he had the will of fulfilling the promise the condition being posited or not: If the first, we have what is intended, for there is there a will or decree on the part of the subject absolute and on the part of the object conditional. If the second, therefore God lied, promising that he would do what he really did not will to do.

Likewise: Many conditional futures are revealed as certain in the Scriptures, e.g. that King Joash would have struck Syria unto consumption, if he had struck the earth seven times with the javelin: That the Tyrians and Sidonians would be converted, if Christ were announced to them: That King Zedekiah will live, if he goes out to the King of Babylon: That the eternal Father would send ten legions of Angels to the Son, if he were asked by him, and others.

Either therefore the divine will was determined concerning these futures, the condition being posited, or not. If the first, again we have what is intended: If the second, therefore these futures were also indeterminate and suspended, nor could they be said in the Scriptures to be certainly future, if the condition were posited; since indeed, the divine will remaining indeterminate and suspended on which they depended, they themselves also remain indeterminate and suspended.

Nor should you say with Tournelius and other Molinists that these are affirmed certainly future under condition, not from a decree which already was, but from a decree which would have been if the condition had been posited: For since between the decree and condition there would be no connection from the nature of the thing, it cannot be said that a decree would have been posited, unless God himself had decreed to posit the decree thus, and thus unless there were a decree of a decree, which is absurd. See §5 of the preceding dissertation.

If you say moreover that in all these futures the condition depends not on God decreeing but on human will: But that adversaries do not entirely flee conditional decrees, provided the condition does not depend on the one decreeing; for they admit a decree of saving all men, if they themselves will; a decree of concurring with man, if he himself wills.

First Response: This being granted, the arguments of adversaries fall away in great part: For they can no longer oppose that decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional are novel and useless; that no change follows in the creature from these which founds a relation of reason in God, as every decree imports: that a conditional future cannot be the object of the divine will, and others.

Second Response: I deny the assumption. First the condition required for the conversion of the Tyrians, namely to send preachers to them, to work miracles, depended on God alone. In others the conditions so depended on created will, that equally at least also in the opinion of adversaries, they depended on the will of God, since without his concurrence at least, they would not have been to be posited.

Proved Second from Saints Augustine and Thomas. Augustine, as is established from the preceding, says God makes things future by predestining them, and that he knows these in his predestination: but the same reason proportionally preserved is of absolute and conditional futures: Therefore just as God makes absolute futures by predestining them absolutely, so also conditional ones, by predestining them conditionally.

St. Thomas in 1 dist. 46 question 1 article 1 to 2, here question 19 article 6 to 1, and in 1 to Timothy 2 acknowledges in God an antecedent will of saving all men: and in Question 23 On Truth article 3 this will to be sincere and of good pleasure; but according to St. Thomas this antecedent will is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional with a condition not depending on human will: Therefore.

The Minor is proved. The Holy Doctor in the cited place in 1 says: "Antecedent will can be called conditional, nor nevertheless is it imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the willed; which is not taken with all the circumstances which are required for right order in salvation." The same here in article 6 cited so that according to St. Thomas the decree of saving all men should be understood thus in God: I will save all men if this does not conflict with the manifestation of my attributes, the order of my universal providence, the contingency and defectibility of men: Therefore.

Proved Third by reason. Certainly there are many conditional futures as is clear from Scripture, nor do adversaries deny: but these are not except through decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional: for as we have proved broadly in §5 of this article they are not conditional futures from themselves, otherwise they would not be free but necessary, contrary to hypothesis, and moreover nothing can extract itself from the mass of possibility and give itself some actuality, such as is order to existing under condition. Nor from the condition to be posited, since between it and the future there is no, or only contingent connection, as between the preaching of the Gospel and the conversion of the Tyrians, between the striking of the earth and the devastation of Syria. Nor from secondary causes, for excluding the decree or determination

of the first cause, secondary causes are indeterminate and indifferent to positing or not positing the effect. Nor finally from a decree which would be if the condition were posited because of actual futurity must be assigned a cause which is and which would not be: and moreover, as we just said, since between the decree and condition there is no connection from the nature of the thing, it cannot be said that a decree would be posited if the condition were posited, unless it were so constituted in the divine will: Therefore. See more in the cited place.

Likewise: God certainly knows conditional futures: but he does not know them except in his decree subjectively absolute and objectively conditional; for he does not know them, neither in supercomprehension of causes, nor in decree as future, nor in formal or objective truth, as we have proved broadly in the preceding: therefore there remains only the decree in which he knows them.

Solutions to Objections

First Objection. Decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional in the Thomistic sense, **First** are novel, of which namely neither in the Scriptures, nor in the Fathers is there any mention, and which have been invented only from the beginning of the last century. **Second** They are useless: for what does it contribute to God's perfection, the government of the world, or anything else, that God should decree futures under a condition which will never be? **Third** They are plainly illusory and nugatory, if indeed they are about futures under a condition which entirely depends on the one decreeing, and which he establishes not to posit: would not he be thought to be mocking and trifling, says Tournelius, who for example would say, I will give Peter 100 coins, if he visits me tomorrow, yet that man establishes with himself to depart from home very early in the morning, and not to wait for Peter: or as others argue: if he says: I will give you a hundred coins if you fly through the stars. **Fourth** They are contradictory: for through them God wills and does not will the same object, e.g. he wills the betrayal of David by the Keilites; and does not will, because he does not will David to remain among them. He wills the conversion of the Tyrians, and does not will, because he does not will the Gospel to be preached to them.

First Response: All these things can be retorted against conditional decrees in the Molinist sense, depending namely on the consent of free will. **First** They are novel and unheard of before Molina, unless perhaps among Pelagians and semi-Pelagians. **Second** They are useless, illusory, nugatory, contradictory: because they depend on a condition intrinsically and from the nature of the thing repugnant, which namely cannot be fulfilled without that very thing which is promised: for since God according to them thus decrees: I will give you my concurrence, if you determine yourself; it is just as if he said: I will give you light if you see this object, I will give you existence if you do that: Which is entirely nugatory and contradictory: Because God's

concurrence is no less necessary to man for determining himself, than light for seeing, and existence for acting.

Second Response to individual points. **First** These decrees are not novel, but founded in Scripture, Saints Augustine and Thomas, as is clear from the first and second proof. But if recent writers have spoken more fully and distinctly about them than the ancients, the raised question about conditional knowledge impelled them to this. Indeed our Gonet shows these to have been proved formerly by more illustrious Writers of the Society, Suarez, Arrubala, Henriquez and others.

Second They are not useless, because although they lack their ultimate effect, nevertheless they are useful for many other things. **First** They conduce to the perfection of God's knowledge who without them would not know certainly, conditional contingent futures, as we have sufficiently proved both here and in the preceding. **Second** They conduce to the providence of the supreme and universal Governor of the entire universe, as I will now say. **Third** Through them secondary causes are ordained and inclined to certain effects, indeed some are sometimes produced; thus from the antecedent and conditional will of saving all men sufficient helps for salvation are provided to all. **Fourth** Through them the liberty of will, defectibility and contingency of creatures, dispositions of secondary causes are manifested. Thus through the decree of conversion of the Tyrians, if signs had been done among them which were done among the Jews, we know the Jews to have been harder and more obstinate than the Tyrians. **Fifth** Finally divine promises are founded in them: For God could sincerely promise nothing under condition, unless he truly so willed.

Third They are not illusory and nugatory. It is clear **First** from this very fact that they are useful. **Second** Because although it is nugatory to will something under a condition intrinsically and from the nature of the thing impossible, such as is that which adversaries feign, "I will give you a hundred if you fly through the stars," or even that which they themselves defend, "I will give you concurrence if you determine yourself," as we saw in the first response; it is otherwise however when the condition is only extrinsically and from accidental supposition impossible, as in our case: For it pertains to the universal provider of the entire universe, who contains causes mutually contrary among themselves, that he should will certain things considered under one respect, which according to another face inspected he does not will, and thus that he should will certain things under condition, which condition nevertheless for other reasons sometimes hidden, sometimes manifest he does not will to be posited: For we ought not to measure the supreme numen by our standard.

Thus, for example, he wills to subvert the Ninevites as sinners, whom as penitents he wills to save. He wills to spare Sodom, if there are ten just men in it, which, that condition not being fulfilled, he wills to destroy. Thus he wills the salvation of all if it does not conflict with higher ends, but because it conflicts, he wills efficaciously only the salvation of some. Likewise he wills

to save all, some through humiliations, afflictions, persecutions or martyrdom; this indeed he cannot will efficaciously, unless he permits the sins of Tyrants and vexers, whom therefore he justly wills to damn. Thus finally he wills to save all if they persevere finally in good; and nevertheless he does not give to all grace either efficacious or congruous necessary for final perseverance: And so of others.

Therefore this objection comes from the limited intelligence of our mind which considers the supreme numen after the manner of a particular agent, nor can it rise to the unlimited providence of the universal provider, whose it is to permit many evils either physical or moral for higher and known ends to himself, and not only to order diverse but also contrary things among themselves: according to that of Ecclesiastes 33: "Behold the works of the Most High; two and two, one against another."

Fourth They are not contradictory. Because it is false that through them God wills and does not will the same object formally, but only materially the same, and this moreover in a diverse mode namely efficaciously and inefficaciously: in which there is no contradiction. Thus he wills the salvation of all considered in itself, and this inefficaciously; he does not will the salvation of all attending to all circumstances, and this efficaciously. He wills inefficaciously the conversion of the Tyrians if the Gospel is preached to them, he does not will it efficaciously, because for higher ends, he does not will the Gospel to be preached to them: He wills inefficaciously to destroy the Ninevites as sinners, he wills efficaciously to save the Ninevites as penitents.

Thus, for example, a traveler has efficacious will of giving money to an assassin threatening death, and inefficacious and conditional will of not giving, if namely the danger of death did not threaten.

Objection: Grant that conditional decrees concerning things regarding this universe are tolerable, at least it is ridiculous and absurd to establish them concerning infinite combinations of possible things, such as this, "if in a possible world this animal were hungry, I will that it use such food. If this possible tree were flowering, I would make so many of its flowers fruitful. If a bird were singing in a possible world, a goat would leap there," and infinite other similar things.

Whether or not conditional decrees are given concerning combinations of possible things does not pertain to the present question, in which we inquire only about conditional futures, not regarding possible worlds, but regarding this present one, consequently about decrees concerning them, and not concerning possibles.

But whether truly conditional decrees are given in God concerning combinations of possible things, consequently whether they are conditionally future, some deny some affirm, as I already said in article 5 of this Dissertation at the end: But even if they were given, that they would not be absurd and ridiculous the following observation shows.

Therefore for the more efficacious and clearer solution of these objections it will not be irrelevant to note here briefly, what the most learned Goudin observes and explains more broadly, namely that conditional decrees are not to be considered as entirely disjunct from absolute decrees, but as contained in them. For there is one simple free determination in God concerning the entire collection of creatures, which is understood by the name of providence, by virtue of which one thing is ordained to be absolutely, another to be conditionally, another not to be, and thus as it is variously compared to objects it undergoes the nature of decree, both absolute and conditional, both of volition and nolition, and in this one simple determination of the entire being he sees not only what will be absolutely future, but also what would conditionally be.

The matter will be clarified by example. Suppose an Architect who conceives the idea of a house to be constructed in mind and has destined various parts of matter to various places of the house: He sees absolutely the stone which will be in the roof, about to have such a figure, and the one which will be in the foundation, such; he also sees that if that one which will be in the roof, had been to be placed in the foundation, it would not have had that figure which it will have, but another such figure; nor is there need for this of any special and separate determination by which he says, I do not will that this stone be in the foundation, but I will that if I wished it to be in the foundation, it should have such a figure, as adversaries feign in God; for this seems idle and in some way absurd; but it suffices that he prudently and wisely decreed the entire house to be disposed in such a way that in this decree he sees, what each part will be like in its place, and what it would have been like, if it had been in another place.

Thus the supreme artificer of things freely determined a certain disposition of the entire being, which although it is absolute in itself, nevertheless has the nature of conditional with respect to objects otherwise regarded: whence in it he certainly sees not only what is absolutely future, but also what would happen in some other hypothesis: Thus, for example, Genesis 18, God predicted to Abraham absolutely the future subversion of Sodom, he asks, whether it would be to be destroyed, if at least twenty or ten just were in it? God responds that in this hypothesis it would not be to be destroyed, looking namely not to some idle conditional decree, such as adversaries feign and attack, which he had thus established separately: I do not will to spare the Sodomites: I will however, that if there were ten just men in that city, it should not perish; but looking to that eminent reason of his providence, according to which both that City was absolutely to be destroyed because there were not even so few just in it, and nevertheless was not to be destroyed, if they had really been there. Which same has place in all other hypotheses.

Conditional decrees thus explained are manifestly rational and worthy of God. Whence what adversaries object falls away of itself; for they are not useless, nugatory or contradictory, but manifestly contained in the very perfection and latitude of the divine disposition embracing all things. Nor likewise are they novel, but most ancient, since nothing is more ancient and more

celebrated among the ancients than that God determined and knows all things in the reasons of his providence.

These things, I say, the praised Theologian treats more fully both here Tract. 1 question 2 article 1, see if you please.

Second Objection. No decree is given in God unless some change follows on the part of the creature: but from a conditional decree no change follows in the creature, since it is inefficacious, unless the condition is posited which will never be. Therefore. The Major is proved: from any decree of God there results in him a new relation of reason, but this cannot result from a change made in God: Therefore from a change made in creatures.

First Response: This argument which is proper to Vasquez and in his judgment inexpugnable, displeases his companions Suarez, Granada, Arrubala and others, and deservedly, since they and he admit in God a decree of concurring with the creature if it wills; which decree operates no greater change in the creature, when the creature is unwilling, than ours.

Second Response: Granting the Major for the sake of argument, to the Minor I respond that from a conditional decree follows sufficient change in the creature to found a new relation of reason in God. For **First** through it the thing passes from the state of possibility to the state of some futurity, which is a certain objective or moral change. **Second** Just as from an absolute decree follows absolute real change, so from a conditional decree follows conditional change; so that by virtue of it it would be really changed if the condition were posited: and this either change suffices that God be compared in another mode than before to creatures, and that our intellect conceive in him a new relation of reason. It can be added from the observation premised that real and absolute change also truly follows from a conditional decree, because it is really contained, indeed formally is the same as the absolute decree by which things are produced in being, as has been said.

Third Objection. A conditional future since it does not actually exist, is not good, therefore it cannot be the object of the divine will.

I respond that neither does an absolute future actually exist in reality, and nevertheless it is the object of the divine will, therefore for this it suffices that it be good with present or future goodness. Nor does it hinder that an object which is not actually colored but would only be, could not be the object of visual power. For the disparity is that visual power because of its materiality cannot attain except an actually existing and present object: but the will since it is a spiritual power can attain the future and absent provided it be objectively present and in some way future, as is clear from acts of hope and desire.

Third Objection from other Fathers. Chrysostom in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews says: "We must first choose the things that are good, and then God introduces what are his; for

he does not precede our wills, lest free will be injured": Therefore before he decrees good things of his own, he explores our wills through middle knowledge. Whence in homilies 31 and 65 on Matthew he says God then called (Matthew and Paul) when he knew they would consent. St. Damascene in book 2 On the Faith, last chapter: "God indeed foreknows virtues and vices and those things which are from our will, but does not predetermine them." Therefore he does not foreknow them in a decree, but outside through middle knowledge: Therefore.

To Chrysostom I respond that he only wants God not to bestow habits of virtues on adults unless they prepare themselves for them, but that this preparation is also from God he does not deny, for when he says God does not precede our wills, he does not understand of every antecedence, nor do the Molinists themselves so understand it, for it would be semi-Pelagian, but of necessitating antecedence; whence he adds, "lest free will be injured." But when he says God called the Apostles when he foresaw they would obey, he must be understood when he foresaw he would work in them that they might obey; according to the Rule of Augustine in On the Gift of Perseverance chapter 19, of which above: "What prohibits us, when we read among some Tractators of the word of God of God's foreknowledge, and predestination of the elect is treated, to understand the same predestination?" And unless you understand the doctrine of Chrysostom thus, says Cardinal Toletus of the Society of Jesus, Annotation 54 on chapter 5 of Luke, "I do not consent to him, but think the contrary entirely true."

To Damascene I respond with St. Thomas that Damascene calls predetermination the imposition of necessity, as it is in natural things which are necessarily determined to one, which is clear from what he adds: "For he does not will malice, nor compel to virtue." Nor can adversaries understand it of every predetermination, since they themselves do not deny that we are predetermined by God in some mode at least morally.

Objection from St. Thomas. The Holy Doctor in On Truth question 12 article 10 both in the body and to 1 and 3 teaches that foreknowledge extends more widely even in good things than predestination: For he says predestination is only of those things which are done by God alone, and not of those things which are done through secondary causes either natural or voluntary, but of these there is only foreknowledge. And in 3rd part question 1 article 3 to 4 he says that "predestination supposes foreknowledge of future things." Therefore.

To the first I respond that the doctrine which is here obtruded to us as St. Thomas's, if crudely understood, is open error, namely that good things which are done by us are in no way predestined and willed by God. Therefore the sense of St. Thomas is far different. The Holy Doctor there explains a certain division of prophecy by St. Jerome into Prophecy of threatening, predestination, and foreknowledge, so that according to Jerome Prophecy of threatening is prediction of the order of causes to effect, which order can be impeded, as is clear in the prediction of Jonah about the subversion of Nineveh. Prophecy of predestination, prediction of

those things which are done by God alone. Prophecy of foreknowledge, prediction of those things which are done by secondary causes either natural or free.

Therefore St. Thomas says predestination taken in that sense of St. Jerome is not per se about those things which are done by us, but only per accidens (by accident) and indirectly, insofar as they are from God. From which it is established that predestination, if taken more broadly, as we take it, is also of good things which are done by us.

To the second, St. Thomas there intends to prove that Christ would not have been incarnated if Adam had not sinned, and therefore the predestination of the Incarnation supposes foreknowledge of Adam's sin. Whence when he says that predestination supposes foreknowledge of future things, he understands of future things which are not constituted through predestination, such as sins. Thus Cajetan and after him others.

Sylvius rightly adds that this text of St. Thomas, if well inspected, imports no more than that predestination supposes him who predestines to be foreknowing of future things.

For the solution of similar objections either from St. Thomas or from other Fathers, note that predestination is taken in two ways: Strictly for a decree specially ordaining a rational creature to a supernatural end; Broadly for any decree effective of some good: when therefore sometimes the Fathers say foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination, they mostly take predestination in the first sense, according to which it is true that foreknowledge extends more widely even in good things than such predestination, because goods of the natural order are not made through it, but through decrees of natural providence, in which therefore they are known.

The moments of reason which Tournelius objects are taken from the impossibility and uselessness of decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional, from the injury both of human liberty and divine sanctity, from the insufficiency of sufficient grace in our system. The first we will dilute in the following section, the rest in the following Dissertation on Decrees of the divine will.

What remains of lighter moment I will briefly dispatch. Therefore:

Fourth Objection from reason. **First**, God does not know conditional free future things through knowledge of simple intelligence, because this deals only with possibles, nor through knowledge of vision, because this deals only with existents: Therefore through middle knowledge. **Second**, God's knowledge is called wonderful in the Scriptures and Fathers: but there is nothing wonderful that God should know in his will what he has decreed to do: for thus men know. **Third**, God certainly knows this conditional future: if I shall have decreed efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent: but he does not know this in an actual decree, since it is supposed not yet to have been posited: Therefore before the decree through middle knowledge. Similarly God

knows before the decree this conditional future, if God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it: For this is true even in a sign prior to the decree: Therefore.

To the first, I respond that it is a mere question of name, about which even Thomists are divided. Some refer the knowledge of conditional free future things to knowledge of vision; because, they say, although, insofar as it is of vision, it regards only existents, nevertheless insofar as it is free and of approbation, it regards all free objects which say some order to existence. Others refer it to knowledge of simple intelligence, because, they say, just as there is given in God double knowledge of vision, one natural and necessary by which he sees himself, another free by which he sees creatures; so there is given double knowledge of simple intelligence, one natural and necessary which regards merely possibles, another free which regards conditional futures: but that it is commonly called necessary by St. Thomas and Theologians, is therefore because it is chiefly occupied about possibles.

From these two opinions, choose whichever you will, and call this knowledge by whatever name you wish, it matters equally, nor does it pertain anything to the present controversy, provided you do not say this foreknowledge precedes the decree, for about this alone the question is treated.

To the second, I distinguish the Minor: there is nothing wonderful that God should know in his will what he has decreed to do, stopping there, let it pass: with other things added, I deny it. This therefore is wonderful in God's knowledge and proper to him alone that through it God knows all things in his essence as in a cause, and since he is the free cause of all created and creatable things, as he wills and insofar as he wills, he sees all these things in the free decree of his will: whence it follows that this knowledge founded in decree, is itself also the cause of things, that it is eminently speculative and practical, that it is intuitive of things present in eternity without expense of their contingency and futurity, that it is the measure of things and not measured by things, certain and infallible, universal and extending to all things.

To the third, I respond that this conditional future, "if I shall have decreed efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent," is not a contingent future about which the question proceeds; but a necessary future, not by necessity of the consequent, but of the consequence, therefore it is known through knowledge of simple intelligence: just as in these propositions: "If I see Peter sitting, Peter sits; if God foreknows Peter about to consent, Peter will consent," although the extremes are free, nevertheless the connection between them is infallible and necessary, and therefore pertaining to knowledge of simple intelligence. The same could be said of that other: "If God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it," by reason of Christ's impeccability. Or it should be said that it involves on the part of the condition a decree as supposed, for from this that Christ is impeccable, it implies that God imposes a precept on him only if at the same time he decrees to move his will to the fulfillment of this precept.

Objection: From a determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily: Therefore the connection between it and the consent of the will is not infallible and necessary.

I distinguish the Antecedent as before: from a determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily by necessity of the consequent, I concede; by necessity of the consequence, I deny. Or it does not follow necessarily consent, as if it were posited coercively and without liberty, I concede; it does not follow necessarily in the mode in which it is willed by God, I deny. For since God's will is most efficacious, if he wills Peter to consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely; just as if he foreknows Peter about to consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely; if I see Peter sitting freely, it follows necessarily that Peter sits freely.

You will infer: From the given solution it follows that God's knowledge with respect to conditional futures has a necessary object which is contrary to the hypothesis and which Thomists deny. The sequence is proved: from an efficacious decree to a conditional future there is necessary consequence from what has been said, therefore if that conditional future is known in that efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary.

I deny the sequence. To the proof I distinguish the consequent: if the conditional future is known in an efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary, if the decree enters on the part of the condition or antecedent and is part of the object, I concede; but thus we do not dispose. If it is only the medium which God uses that in it he may infallibly know the conditional future, as we dispose, I deny. Therefore according to us the object of conditional knowledge is precisely a contingent conditional future, e.g. "If the Gospel is preached to the Moors, they will be converted," where there is no necessary connection of the consequent with the antecedent. But the decree is established by us as a medium on the part of the subject, in which he infallibly knows this object or this connection contingent of itself of the preaching of the Gospel with the conversion of the Moors: and because the decree is about conversion future contingently and freely, hence it happens, that although it infallibly infers it, it does not remove, but on the contrary infers that it is future contingently and freely under such condition, otherwise it would not be efficacious.

What can be opposed about the truth of propositions about the future independently of decree or about the law of contradictories, we have anticipated above when treating of knowledge of absolute futures.

§. ULTIMUS (Final Section)

What should be thought about other opinions different from ours and the Molinist opinion concerning God's foreknowledge of future conditionals?

Response: It can be shown that none should be refuted which do not follow from established principles.

First, the opinion of certain Scotists which says that God knows future things in an accompanying decree, understood in a sense distinct from ours, you have seen exploded in article 4 of this dissertation, §. 2, immediately before the solution of arguments.

Another is the opinion which teaches that God knows future things in a decree, whether absolute or conditional, of multiplying so many graces until the creature consents. But:

1°. According to this opinion, God will not be able to know either sins, or naturally good acts, or future conditionals whose condition will never be posited, but only those good acts for which grace is necessary.

2°. Nor will He be able to know these certainly and distinctly: for in this struggle of the will with so many multiplied graces, from where can certainty be had? It is plainly uncertain what the outcome will be, uncertain which grace will conquer and when: all things are uncertain. Therefore, from where can God certainly foreknow whether and when man will consent?

You will respond that God certainly foreknows this from the moral infallibility which so many accumulated graces imply; just as it is morally infallible that a just person, among so many temptations of venial sins, will sometimes sin venially, and that one who is assailed on all sides by weapons will sometimes be wounded.

But on the contrary: God knows with far greater certainty and distinction which grace will have effect in particular circumstances than we know that a just person will sometimes sin venially, or that one struck by weapons will sometimes be pierced. Otherwise it would follow that God only foreknows in general that man is to be converted, but not in particular by whom and when. Which Saint Thomas rightly considers erroneous here, question 14, article 6, saying: "Some have erred in saying that God knows other things than Himself only in general."

3°. Finally, that grace to which the will succumbs among so many accumulated ones will obtain this either by its own power, or (which is the same thing) by the power of the divine will, or from the innate freedom of the human will which prefers to consent to this grace rather than to others. If the first, therefore God knows this future consent in His will of giving grace efficacious per se (by itself), and this is what we intend. If the second, therefore He knows this future consent through middle knowledge (scientia media), which we reject.

Another opinion again is that of certain more recent authors who say that future conditionals are known in something similar. But either in the similar case God foresaw consent as conditionally future by virtue of His decree, or He expected it from the will. If the first, we have our intent; if

the second, it is middle knowledge. Moreover, in what similar case could God have known that the good Angels and Adam would consent to penitential grace?

Finally, note that whatever we have said thus far against the Molinists should equally be said against the Jansenists regarding the state of innocence; for they admit middle knowledge for this state, just as the Molinists do for both states.

And let these things about middle knowledge now suffice for our purpose. As for other matters which also concern it, especially arguments drawn from the injury to divine freedom and holiness, and from the insufficiency of aids, seek below concerning decrees.

ARTICLE VII - On the Ideas, Truth, and Life of God

D. Thomas Questions 15, 16, 18

Since everything known is in the knower according to intelligible being, and that being is called an idea; again, because knowledge is of truths, and finally, understanding is the most perfect grade of life, after consideration of divine knowledge, Saint Thomas treats of the ideas, truth, and life of God.

§. I - On Divine Ideas

Question 15, article 1: Idea is called *form* in Greek, *forma* in Latin. Hence by ideas are understood the forms of other things existing apart from the things themselves, and an idea is usually defined as: "A form existing in the mind to which the artificer looks while working."

Its office is twofold. **First,** that it be an exemplar according to whose norm the ideated thing is made. **Second,** that it be the reason for knowing it, for through the idea in the mind we know the ideated thing in reality.

You ask 1°: Whether there are ideas in the divine mind?

Response: Affirmatively. Because whoever does not act by chance or blindly but from intention, acts according to a form preconceived in the mind. This is evident in itself: thus an artificer who does not act by chance or blindly but from the intention of constructing a house, has the form of the house preconceived in his mind to which he looks while working. But God does not act by chance or blindly, for He did not produce this universe and all things contained in it by fortune or blind impulse. Therefore [He acts according to preconceived forms].

You ask 2°: What are Ideas in God?

Response 1°: Ideas in God are not the creatures themselves according to the diminished being which they have from eternity outside God, produced by an act of the divine intellect, as Scotus wishes. This is because nothing is created from eternity; also because whatever is in God is God; and finally because an idea is the real cause of things and the principle of knowledge and operation, but it is repugnant that a creature, taken in any way, should be the cause of itself, or that it should be the reason by which God knows and operates. Therefore [this opinion is false].

2°. Neither are they the divine essence itself as it takes the place of an impressed species, as certain more recent authors wish. Because the idea of what is to be worked is in the mind of the worker as something understood, not as that by which understanding occurs, for it is the form to which the artificer looks while working. Thus the form or idea of a house in the mind of the builder is something understood by him, not something by which his intellect is informed and understands. But an impressed species is not that which is understood, but that by which understanding occurs. Therefore [this opinion is also false].

3°. Therefore, ideas in the divine mind are the divine essence itself as known or as an expressed species, not indeed insofar as it expresses God precisely according to what He is in Himself, but insofar as it expresses the divine essence itself according to how it is participable and imitable according to some mode of likeness by creatures. For thus God is the exemplar of this or that creature, which is nothing other than an imperfect imitation and participation of God.

If you say that an idea is the formal likeness of the ideated thing; indeed, that it is formally the ideated thing itself in intelligible being, thus the idea of a house is the house itself in intelligible being, but the divine essence is neither formally similar to creatures, since it far exceeds them, nor can it be said to be a creature even in intelligible being, or in any other sense: Therefore [how can this be]?

Response: To the first [objection], that an idea is the formal likeness of the ideated thing, not in entitative being but in intelligible and representative being; thus the divine essence can be understood as formally similar to a creature. Because although it far exceeds it, it can nevertheless be considered, not according to that eminence, but according to how it precisely contains this particular thing, understanding in what that particular thing imitates it and in what it falls short of its perfection.

To the second [objection]: Although an idea is the ideated thing in the intelligible order, it is not so in the entitative order, with respect to which the idea is only the reason of the ideated thing and not the ideated thing itself; for indeed the idea of a house is not the house itself in the entitative order. And since this name "creature" implies entitative order, for it expresses that in which the ideated thing differs from the idea, namely that it is derived and participated from it, hence it is that it cannot be said that an idea is a creature even in intelligible being. But it can be

said that it is man, because this name "man" expresses nothing but the species of man, and not the state which it has in reality. Nor is it said to be simply man, but archetypal or original man.

You ask 3°: Whether there are many ideas in God?

Response: Affirmatively. Because God, in working, intends per se (by itself) the order of the universe, for that order is something ultimate and best in things effected by God, and what is ultimate and best in an effect is intended per se by the agent. But the reason of any whole cannot be had unless the proper reasons of those things from which the whole is constituted are had, just as a builder could not conceive the species of a house unless he had the proper reason of each of its parts. Therefore [there are many ideas in God].

This is confirmed: God does not make one thing but many and diverse things. Therefore He has many and diverse ideas according to whose likeness He produces these diverse things externally.

You will say 1°: From what has been said, an idea in God is the divine essence as known or as an expressed species. But the divine essence as known, or as an expressed species, is one. Therefore [there is only one idea].

Response: That an idea does not name the divine essence as known only, but as known as imitable. Hence according to the multiple imitability understood in the divine essence on account of the fullness of its perfection, there is a plurality of ideas.

You will say 2°: Just as an idea is the principle of knowledge and operation, so are art and science, but in God there are not many arts and many sciences. Therefore neither are there many ideas.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that art and science are that by which God understands, but an idea is that which God understands. But God understands many things with one intellect, not only according to how they are in themselves on the part of reality, but also according to how they are in the intellect, which is to understand many reasons of things or ideas. Just as an artificer, when he understands the form of a house in matter, is said to understand the house, but when he understands the form of the house as speculated by himself (from the fact that he understands himself to understand it), he understands the idea or reason of the house. But God not only understands many things through His essence, but also understands that He understands many things through His essence; and this is to understand that many reasons of things, or many ideas, are in His intellect as understood.

You will say 3°: And especially: The plurality of ideas offends the simplicity of God, in whom faith recognizes only the plurality of persons. Therefore [there should not be many ideas].

Response: I deny the antecedent. Because the plurality of ideas in God consists in this: that the divine essence is understood as imitable in diverse ways by creatures, but from the fact that it is understood as imitable in diverse ways by creatures, it does not follow that it is really multiple, since from one and the same eminent cause diverse effects can flow forth imitating it. Therefore many ideas are not to be conceived in God as really distinct, formally affecting the divine essence, as there are many personal relations in Him, but they are said to be many in God quasi-objectively and as understood by Him, so that the plurality of ideas is in the divine intellect and not in His nature itself. For an idea and a divine perfection are not in God in the same way, e.g., the form of a horse and life; the form or idea of a horse is not in God except as an understood reason, but the reason of life is in God not only as in an intellect, but also as established in nature. Consult the following response.

You ask 4°: Whether the ideal relations by which ideas are constituted and multiplied (for an idea of a horse cannot be conceived without order to a horse) are relations of reason apprehended in the divine essence compared to creatures? The reason for doubt is the authority of Saint Thomas who here, article 2, to the 3rd, and elsewhere says that these ideal relations are not caused by things but by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things.

Response: More probably negative, with the more common opinion of Thomists. For understanding the text of Saint Thomas, it should be observed that the divine intellect can be understood to compare its essence to things in two ways:

1°. By apprehending in it a relation to things, as if it existed when nevertheless it does not exist, which is to make a relation of reason. But Saint Thomas never said this, and it is repugnant to God, because to apprehend non-being as if it were being implies imperfection, as our Logicians teach.

2°. By understanding His essence as a principle imitable by creatures and as the term of the relation of imitability which creatures really express toward it, without conceiving any relation to creatures in His essence, since in reality there is none. And in this second way, according to Saint Thomas, the divine intellect compares its essence to things, and by comparing causes ideal relations, insofar as by understanding His essence as participable by creatures in many ways, He understands the real relations of creatures to Himself, consequently He causes them, not so that they exist in creatures, but so that they exist in His intellect as understood, for thus alone they are ideal.

That this is his meaning, Saint Doctor declares openly in question 3 on Truth, article 2, where he says: "The divine essence is the idea of things not indeed as essence, but as it is understood. But created things do not perfectly imitate the divine essence; hence the essence is not taken absolutely by the divine intellect as the idea of things, but with the proportion of the creature to be made to the divine essence itself, according to how it falls short of it or imitates it. But diverse

things imitate it in diverse ways... And therefore the divine essence itself, with diverse proportions of things to it co-understood, is the idea for each thing. Hence since there are diverse proportions of things, it is necessary that there be many ideas. And it is indeed one for all things on the part of the essence, but plurality is found on the part of the diverse proportions of creatures to it."

And in the response to the 8th: "The relation which is between God and creature is not in God according to reality, yet it is in God according to His intellect, insofar as He understands the relations of things to His essence, and thus those relations are in God as understood by Him."

Nothing clearer than this can be said. Therefore according to Saint Thomas, ideal relations are in God as understood by Him, and in this sense caused by His intellect, not that He understands or feigns some relation of His essence to creatures, but because He understands the real relations of creatures to His essence, and compares it to them as related by them, so that the relative is held on the part of creatures, but is not conversely feigned in God toward creatures, although we, from the imperfection of our intellect, cannot otherwise conceive it.

You ask 5°: Of what things does God have ideas?

Response: God has a proper idea of all things which are made by His proper action or can be made, but in diverse ways. For of those things which He makes or is about to make, He has actually practical ideas, because they are determined to operation by decree of the divine will. But of those things which He can only make, He has ideas only virtually and potentially practical, because they are not applied to operation through the purpose of the divine will. Hence when Saint Thomas here and to the 2nd says that with respect to possibles there is no idea in God according as idea signifies an exemplar of making, but only according as it signifies a reason of knowing; he is to be understood of an idea actually and not only virtually practical, as he explains himself in the cited place on Truth. For nothing prevents an artificer from being truly able to form an idea not only of the thing which he makes or wishes to make, but also of that which he can make, although he does not wish to.

I said "Of those things which are made by Him"; because of those things which He Himself does not make, such as sins and privations, He does not have an idea not only as it is an exemplar of making (since He Himself does not make them), but neither as it is a reason of knowing, because He does not know these through their proper reason, but through the reason of the opposed good.

I also said: "Of those things which are made by proper action," because things which are not made by proper action, but toward the production of another, such as matter and form which are produced by the production of the composite, and properties which follow upon the production of the essence, although they have an idea in God, nevertheless they do not have one proper and distinct from the idea of that with which or in which they are produced.

Finally, if you ask what is the causality of an idea? **Response:** properly and principally it is extrinsic formal causality; for just as a natural form by communication of itself formally constitutes intrinsically a composite of such species, so an idea presented to the mind of an artificer formally determines extrinsically through passive imitation of itself the agent to an effect of such species. It can also be said that it has in some way and consequently the character of efficient cause, insofar as the artificer operates through it as through an actual form, and also of final cause insofar as by apprehension of its perfection it moves the artificer to effect something similar.

§. II - On the Truth and Life of God

I say 1°: In God there is truth, indeed the highest and supreme truth, indeed He Himself is the first truth.

This is explained and proved: Truth can be distinguished as threefold:

First, truth in being, and it is a property of being according to which it has fixed and stable existence such that it is conformable to the divine intellect knowing things as they ought to be. But divine being is not only conformable to its intellect, but is its very understanding itself; therefore not only is there truth of being in God, but He Himself is truth.

Second, truth in knowing, which is the conformity of knowledge with the thing known. But divine knowledge or understanding not only most perfectly attains all things as they are, but is itself also the measure of all things, of all intellects and of all understandings, and there is no measure of it; therefore not only is there truth of knowledge in Him, but He Himself is the first and supreme truth.

Third, truth in speaking, which is called veracity, is the conformity of speech with knowledge. But it is impossible for God to lie, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 6, because He is the first and essential truth. Therefore [He possesses this truth as well].

I say 2°: Life belongs perfectly to God, because there belongs to Him perfectly to operate from Himself and to be moved by no other, in which consists the nature of living things insofar as they are distinguished from non-living things. Indeed, God is essentially His own living, because to live in God is to understand, since He lives in the most perfect grade of life, but to understand in God is essentially His being, as has been said elsewhere. Hence Christ says in John 14: "I am the way, the truth, and the life."

I say 3°: All creatures according to the ideal being which they have in God are life in Him. Because since the life of God is His understanding, as has been said, and in Him are the same: both the intellect, and what is understood, and the very understanding itself, it follows that whatever is in God as understood, is His very living or His life. Therefore since all things which

are made by God are in Him as understood, or according to their ideal being, it follows that all things according to the ideal being which they have in Him, are the divine life itself.

Hence it is said in John 1: "What was made, in Him was life." Thus at least Saint Thomas reads with the Latin Fathers Augustine, Jerome, and others, although Chrysostom and other Greek Fathers, placing a period after "What was made," read: "without Him nothing was made that was made."

We omit many things which Saint Thomas treats in these two questions, as well as the entire question 17, both for the sake of brevity, and because nearly everything pertains to Philosophy, to which we refer.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME

Translated by vertiasluxmea on X

DISSERTATIO PROOEMIALIS

On Sacred Doctrine or Theology

- Art. I. What and how manifold is Theology?
- Art. II. Whether, besides philosophical or natural disciplines, Theology is necessary?
- Art. III. On the antiquity, usefulness, and necessity of Scholastic Theology.
- Art. IV. Whether Theology is truly a science, and a subalternated science of God and of the Blessed?
- Art. V. What is the object of Theology?
- Art. VI. Whether Theology is a habit of supernatural entity?
- Art. VII. Whether Theology is nobler than other sciences; where its certitude lies.
- Art. VIII. Lighter difficulties remaining from St. Thomas's question are briefly resolved.
    - Query 1. Whether Theology is one species of science.
    - Query 2. Whether Theology is both speculative and practical.
    - Query 3. Whether our Theology is wisdom.
    - Query 4. Whether Theology is argumentative.
    - Query 5. Whether Theology argues so as to prove its own principles.
    - Query 6. From what loci Theology draws its arguments, and how many and what the theological loci are.

DISSERTATIO I

On the Existence of God

- Art. I. Whether the existence of God is self-evident, or demonstrable.
    - Objections against the second part of the first conclusion are resolved.
- Art. II. Whether God exists, and by what reasons this is shown.
    - Objections are resolved.
- Art. III. Whether Descartes's demonstrations of God's existence are admissible.
    - § I. On Descartes's first demonstration.
    - § II. On Descartes's second demonstration.
- Art. IV. Whether invincible ignorance of the existence of God can occur.

DISSERTATIO II

On the Nature or Quiddity of God, and His Attributes in General

- Art. I. What constitutes the divine nature?

    - § I. The state of the question is set forth with various opinions of theologians.
    - § II. The difficulty is resolved.
    - § III. Objections against the first conclusion are resolved.
    - § IV. Objections against the second conclusion are resolved.
- Art. II. On the divine attributes in general: what an attribute is and how many kinds there are.
- Art. III. How the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence.
    - § I. What the distinction is and how many kinds there are.
    - § II. The various opinions of heretics and Catholics concerning the proposed difficulty are set out.
    - § III. The question is resolved.
    - § IV. Objections are resolved.
    - Appendix.
        - Query 1. Whether all the attributes in God are equal.
        - Query 2. Whether God and the Blessed also make a distinction of reason between essence and attributes.

DISSERTATIO III

On the Attributes in Particular that Pertain to the Divine Being

- Art. I. On the simplicity of God.
    - Query 1. Whether God is a body.
    - Query 2. Whether there is composition of matter and form in God.
    - Query 3. Whether in God His essence is the same as His nature; that is, whether God lacks any substantial composition of essence and supposit.
    - Query 4. Whether in God essence and existence are the same; that is, whether God is so simple as to lack substantial composition of essence and existence.
    - Query 5. Whether God belongs to any genus or predicament.
    - Query 6. Whether there are any accidents in God, i.e., whether there is composition of accidentals in Him.
    - Query 7. Whether God is so simple as to admit no composition whatsoever.
    - Query 8. Whether God can enter the composition of other things as a part—formally, materially, or in any other way.
    - Appendix. On the system of Benedict Spinoza.
    - Historical Digression. Whether Tertullian held that God is corporeal (on Query 1 of the preceding article).
- Art. II. On the perfection of God.
    - Query 1. Whether God is perfect.
    - Query 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God.
    - Query 3. How all perfections are in God.

    - Query 4. Whether God together with all creatures is more perfect and better than God alone.
    - Query 5. Whether any creature can be said to be more perfect than God.
- Art. III. On the good in general.
    - Query. In what precisely the formal notion of the good consists.
- Art. IV. On the goodness of God.
    - Query 1. Whether it befits God to be good.
    - Query 2. Whether God is the supreme good.
    - Query 3. Whether to be good essentially is proper to God.
- Art. V. On the infinity of God.
    - Query. Whether God is infinite according to essence and the notion of being.
- Art. VI. On the immensity of God.
    - § I. Preliminary notes.
    - § II. Whether God is present according to substance in all things.
    - § III. Whether the substantial presence of God in things is efficaciously demonstrated from His virtually transient operation; and what kind of demonstration.
        - Objections are resolved.
        - Query 1. Whether God is not only in all things, but also in all places—places taken formally.
        - Query 2. Whether to be everywhere (ubiquity) is proper to God.
    - § IV. Whether God is actually in imaginary spaces.
        - Objections are resolved.
- Art. VII. On the immutability of God.
    - Query 1. Whether God is absolutely immutable.
    - Query 2. Whether being immutable is proper to God.
- Art. VIII. On the eternity of God.
    - Query 1. What is eternity.
    - Query 2. Whether God and He alone is eternal.
    - Query 3. Whether eternity has the notion of true duration with respect to God.
    - Query 4. Whether eternity has the notion of measure with respect to God and to creatures.
    - Query 5. Whether eternity has the notion of measure with respect to creatures.
- Art. IX. Whether God is one.

DISSERTATIO IV

On the Knowability and Vision of God by Us, and on His Names

- Art. I. Whether the divine essence can be seen by the bodily eye.
    - Objections are resolved.
- Art. II. Whether a created intellect can by its natural powers see God as He is in Himself.

- Art. III. Whether a created intellect can be supernaturally elevated to see God as He is in Himself.
    - Objections are resolved.
    - Appendix. Whether the possibility of the beatific vision can be demonstrated or known by natural light alone.
- Art. IV. Whether anyone in this life can see God as He is in Himself.
    - Objections against the second part of the second conclusion are resolved.
- Art. V. On the light of glory.
    - § I. Whether a created intellect needs the light of glory to see the divine essence.
        - Objections are resolved.
    - § II. What the light of glory is.
    - § III. Whether by God's absolute power a created intellect can see God without the light of glory.
    - § IV. Whether by God's absolute power there can be created an intellect to which the light of glory is connatural—and consequently connatural the vision of God.
    - § V. How the light of glory and the intellect concur in the beatific vision.
- Art. VI. Whether the divine essence is seen—or can be seen—by some likeness or species.
    - Objections are resolved.
- Art. VII. Whether in the beatific vision the divine essence takes the place of an impressed or expressed species.
    - Objections are resolved.
    - Query. Whether, just as the Blessed see God through the essence taking the place of a species, they can also see that very vision by the uncreated vision of Him communicated to them.
- Art. VIII. Whether the Blessed see God unequally, and whence such inequality arises.
    - Objections are resolved.
- Art. IX. Whether the Blessed, seeing God Himself, comprehend Him—or can comprehend Him—at least with respect to God's absolute power.
    - Objections are resolved.
- Art. X. On the object of the beatific vision.
    - § I. What of God the Blessed see.
        - Objections are resolved.
    - § II. Whether those who see God see all that God does and can do.
    - § III. How the Blessed see creatures in God.
    - § IV. Whether it follows that all that God does and can do is known by the Blessed.
        - Query. Whether it is absolutely impossible for God to be seen as He is in Himself without any created vision in Him.
- Art. XI. Certain lighter difficulties are resolved for the completion of St. Thomas's question.
    - Query 1. Whether the things the Blessed see are seen through any similitudes.
    - Query 2. Whether the things the Blessed see in God they see all at once from the beginning.
    - Query 3. What the measure of the beatific vision is.
    - Query 4. Whether creatures are seen in God as in a mirror.

    - Query 5. Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life.
    - Query 6. Whether the knowledge of God had by grace is more perfect and higher than that had by natural reason.
- Art. XII. On the names of God.
    - Query 1. Whether any name can be imposed upon God that signifies Him as He is.
    - Query 2. What the principal names of God are.
    - Query 3. Whether all names said of God are synonymous.

DISSERTATIO V

On the Knowledge (Science) of God

- Art. I. Whether there is science in God.
    - § I. Whether there is intellectual cognition in God, virtually distinct from the intellect.
    - § II. Whether there is properly so-called science in God, and whether it is His attribute.
- Art. II. On the object and division of God's science.
    - § I. How far God's science extends.
    - § II. What is the formal and primary object of divine science.
    - § III. On the division of divine science.
- Art. III. Whether—and which—knowledge in God is the cause of things.
    - Objections of Honoratus Tournely and others are resolved.
    - Appendix. Whether there is in God an executive power virtually distinct from intellect and will.
- Art. IV. In what medium God knows things other than Himself.
    - Objections against the first part of the conclusion are resolved.
    - Objections against the second part of the conclusion are resolved.

DISSERTATIO VI

On the Foreknowledge of Future Things

- Art. I. What and how manifold the future is.
- Art. II. Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future things—absolute, contingent, and free.
- Art. III. How future things are present to God in eternity.
    - Query 1. Whether this presence of things in eternity is necessary for the certitude and infallibility of divine science, as we said it is necessary for its invariability.

    - Query 2. Whether the real presence of things in eternity is necessary, or whether their cognition by God is merely objective.
- Art. IV. In what medium God knows future absolute, contingent, and free things.
    - § I. Less true opinions are rejected.
    - Objections are resolved.
    - § II. The true sentence is asserted.
        - The mind of St. Thomas is explained.
        - The conclusion is proved by reason.
        - Objections are resolved.
- Art. V. On the knowledge of future conditionals: whether God knows them.
    - Objections are resolved.
    - Query. Whether God certainly knows absolutely all future conditionals.
- Art. VI. On middle knowledge.
    - § I. The state of the question is set forth.
    - § II. The aberrations and dissimulations of Honoratus Tournely concerning the notion of middle knowledge are briefly corrected.
    - § III. Middle knowledge is impugned by the authority of Scripture.
    - § IV. The mind of SS. Augustine and Thomas concerning middle knowledge.
    - § V. Middle knowledge is attacked by various arguments.
    - § VI. The very grave inconveniences of middle knowledge.
    - § VII. Middle knowledge is rejected by its own novelty.
    - § VIII. Middle knowledge historically impugned.
        - On the Roman censors.
        - On Clement VIII.
        - On Paul V and the judgment to be delivered against Molina.
        - On the ancient censures of Louvain and Douai against Lessius and Hamelius, Jesuits, the Molinist prelectors of Louvain, and various other matters pertaining to the present subject.
    - § IX. The foundations of middle knowledge are overthrown.
    - § X. Decrees in God are asserted to be subjectively absolute and objectively conditional.
        - Objections are resolved.
    - § (ult.). What is to be thought about opinions other than ours and the Molinist regarding God's foreknowledge of future conditionals.

- Art. VII.On the ideas, truth, and life of God.

- § I. On divine ideas.
    - Query 1. Whether ideas are posited in the divine mind.
    - Query 2. What ideas are in God.
    - Query 3. Whether there are many ideas in God.
    - Query 4. Whether the ideal respects by which ideas are constituted and multiplied are relations of reason apprehended in the divine essence with reference to creatures.
    - Query 5. Of which things God has ideas.
- § II. On the truth and life of God.