

SUMMA SUMMAE

DISSERTATION IV

On the Justification of the Sinner

S. Th. Q. 113

There are two effects of grace, namely the justification and merit of the just person. Concerning the first in this Dissertation. Concerning the second we shall speak in the following.

ARTICLE I

Whether in the justification of the wicked, sins are truly deleted and taken away, and not merely covered?

I say: In the justification of the sinner, his sins are not only covered or not imputed, but are truly remitted, deleted, and taken away.

This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists, defined in the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 5.

Proof 1. By the most formal terms of Scripture. Psalm 50: "Blot out my iniquity." And "Blot out all my iniquities." Isaiah 43: "I am he who blots out your iniquities for my own sake." Hosea 14: "Take away all iniquity." Micah 7: "Who is a God like you, who takes away iniquity?" John 1: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world."

Proof 2. By other terms of Scripture. Man is interiorly stained and polluted by sin, as we have said concerning sins and all agree. But according to Scripture, man in his justification is cleansed, washed, purged, and sanctified from sins. Psalm 50: "You shall wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." Ezekiel 36: "I will pour clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your defilements." 1 John 1: "The blood of Christ his Son cleanses us from all sin." But if sins are only covered, it is falsely said that man is cleansed, washed, purged, etc., from them. For who would say that a man polluted with filth is clean and washed, because he covers the filth with a cloak?

Proof 3. From Augustine, the holy Doctor, book 1 to Boniface against two Letters of Pelagius, chapter 12. When the Pelagians said that Catholics teach that Baptism does not take away

crimes but scrapes them and their roots remain, he responds: "We say that Baptism grants indulgence of all sins and takes away crimes, not scrapes them." And in Homily 24 on Psalm 31, expounding those words "Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered," on which the Heretics chiefly rely, he says: "Do not understand that sins are covered as if they were there and living... Therefore God covers the wounds, not you. For if you wish to cover them out of shame, the physician will not cure them. Let the physician cover and cure, for he covers with a plaster; under the physician's covering the wound is healed, under the wounded person's covering the wound is concealed." Thus according to Augustine, God covers wounds so that by covering he heals them, just as a physician who covers a wound with a plaster and heals it. This is plainly decisive against the Heretics. See other Fathers, if you wish, in Bellarmine, book 2 on Justification, chapter 8.

Proof 4. From absurdities: If in the justification of the wicked sins remain and are only covered, but not truly deleted and destroyed, it follows **1.** That man will be at once just and unjust; just, because justified; unjust, because he remains in sin which is essentially injustice. **2.** It follows that God loves sinners as his friends and in order to eternal beatitude, contrary to that in Wisdom 14: "The wicked and his wickedness are hateful to God."

ARTICLE II

Whether for the remission of sin, which is the justification of the wicked, an infusion of grace is required?

I say: The remission of sins, which is the justification of the sinner, does not happen through an extrinsic imputation of the justice by which God is just, or of the justice of Christ; but through a true and intrinsic justice, or the infusion of habitual grace.

This is again a matter of faith against the Lutherans and Calvinists, decided in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 11.

Proof 1. From the Scriptures cited in the preceding Article, Proof 2, by which the sinner is said to be washed, purged, renewed, sanctified. For no one can be washed, purged, renewed, sanctified, except through something intrinsic by which he is denominated and made such.

2. Scripture frequently says that we have in us grace, charity, and the justice by which we are just. John 1: "Of his fullness we have all received, and grace upon grace." Romans 1: "Through whom we have received grace." Ephesians 4: "To each one of us grace has been given according to the measure of Christ's gift." Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us."

3. The justification of the sinner is an effect of God's love. But the love of God is not merely affective, but effective, making the object loved intrinsically pleasing and just, as we proved above in Dissertation 4, Article 1.

4. The formal cause is distinguished from the efficient cause. But the justice of Christ is the efficient cause of our justice. Therefore it is not its formal cause. Confirmation: Our justice now increases, now diminishes. But the justice of God and Christ is always equal. Therefore [it cannot be our formal justice].

The Heretics object 1. Certain texts of Scripture by which it seems to be implied that our justification happens formally through the justice of Christ. Romans 5: "Through the obedience of one, many are constituted just." And again, "Through the justice of one, unto all men unto justification of life." 1 Corinthians 1: Christ is said to be made "our justice and sanctification."

Response: These and similar passages are not to be understood in a formal sense, but in a causal sense, insofar as Christ is the efficient and meritorious cause of our justification; in which sense he is called there our Wisdom; John 11: "Resurrection and life." And in Deuteronomy 3 he is called "the life of men and length of days."

ARTICLE III

On the acts required for the justification of an adult sinner

The Council of Trent, Session 6, Chapter 6, assigns six acts by which an adult sinner ought to be disposed to justification: namely an act of Faith, of fear, of hope, of love of God, of penance or contrition, finally a resolve to receive the Sacraments instituted for the remission of sins, to begin a new life and to keep the divine commandments. This resolve is included in contrition itself. The principal question is about the faith required for justification against the Heretics.

The Lutherans and Calvinists distinguish a twofold faith: The first they call historical, by which we believe all things contained in the sacred Scriptures. We call it Christian and Catholic. The second they call faith in promises, by which we believe that God has promised the remission of sins. This second they subdivide into general and particular. They call general that by which we believe that God has promised remission of sins and salvation to all believers in common. They call special that by which each one believes or confidently trusts that sins have been remitted to him on account of the merits of Christ. For they wrongly confuse this faith with confidence, which pertains to hope and the will, not to the intellect. For confidence according to St. Thomas is strengthened hope. Therefore they contend that this faith or particular confidence is required for justification and that it alone justifies.

I say 1. The faith required for justification is not the confidence by which we believe or trust that sins have been forgiven us on account of Christ, but that by which we believe all truths revealed by God, on account of his authority and truth. Thus Trent defined, Session 6, Canon 12.

Proof 1. By the most open testimonies of Scripture. Mark, last chapter: "Preach the Gospel to every creature; he who believes (namely the Gospel and the truths contained in it) will be saved." Romans 10: "This is the word which we preach, that if you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart that God raised him up, you will be saved." Therefore Christ and his resurrection, not only the mercy of God remitting sins, are the object of saving faith. John 11, when the Lord had said to Martha: "I am the resurrection and life, he who believes in me shall not die forever," she responds: "Yes, Lord, I have believed that you are the Christ, the Son of the living God, who has come into this world." Therefore the faith required for eternal life is to believe the divinity of the incarnate Word. John, at the end of his Gospel, thus concludes: "These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of the living God, and that believing you may have life in his name." Therefore the same as before. I omit many other testimonies of Scripture, lest I be too lengthy.

Proof 2. From tradition: The Church, as from the beginning so now, when it requires faith from those to be baptized, requires no other than that by which we believe the articles of faith contained in the creeds, not that by which we believe or trust that sins have been forgiven us. For who ever of the Apostles, or Bishops, or other Ministers, taught one approaching him for the sake of justification thus: "Believe that sins are forgiven you, and immediately they will be forgiven"? Indeed such teaching would be absurd and offensive to pious ears.

Proof 3. Faith rests solely on the authority of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. But it has been revealed nowhere to me or to another particular person that sins have been remitted. Therefore I cannot believe this with certain faith.

4. Justifying faith must precede justification, for it is its cause. But that faith of the Heretics does not precede but follows justification, otherwise it would be false; for that faith is false by which I believe that sins have been forgiven me, if they have not yet been truly forgiven. If you say that by this faith it is not believed that sins have been forgiven, but that they are being forgiven here and now, it still remains that that faith is posterior to that remission; because that present remission is the object of this faith; but an act does not make or specify its own object, but presupposes it and is specified by it.

I say 2. Neither that special faith of recent Heretics, which is vain and null, nor true and Christian faith alone suffices for justification. Thus Trent defined, Session 6, Canon 9, against the Lutherans and Calvinists, whom Simon Magus had preceded, as Irenaeus testifies, book 1, chapter 20, who reports that Peter, John, James, and Jude wrote their Epistles against this error. Whence:

Proof 1. From these holy Apostles who wrote expressly against this error. St. James, chapter 2: "What does it profit, my brethren, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can faith save him?... Faith, if it does not have works, is dead in itself." After proving this with many

arguments, he concludes the chapter thus: "You see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith alone. For just as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead." These things are peremptory and do not need explanation.

St. Peter, 2 Epistle, chapter 1, after he exhorted to various good works, concludes: "Wherefore, brethren, strive to make your calling and election sure through good works." Therefore faith does not suffice if works are lacking.

These things are so clear against the present error that the Heretics denied that these Epistles are canonical, which however the Church acknowledges as Canonical in many Councils, lastly in Trent.

But also St. Paul, on whom the Innovators wrongly rely, openly combats this error. 1 Corinthians 3: "If," he says, "I should have all faith, so that I could move mountains, but do not have charity, I am nothing." Galatians 5: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which works through charity." Romans 2: "Not the hearers of the law are justified before God, but the doers of the law will be justified."

Finally Christ in the Gospel everywhere commends good works as necessary for justification and salvation. Matthew 5: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven." And below: "Unless your justice exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the Kingdom of Heaven." And chapter 7: "Every tree that does not bear good fruit will be cut down and cast into the fire." Chapter 19, to one asking "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" He does not say "believe only"; but "if you will enter into life, keep the commandments." And finally chapter 28, he not only commands the Apostles to preach the faith and baptize, but also wants them to teach to observe all things whatsoever he has commanded.

Now certain Heretics, oppressed by these testimonies, respond that the faith which they say suffices for justification is not faith alone, but faith joined with good works, not indeed that these good works cooperate in justification, but because they accompany justifying faith as its signs, or as properties and fruits following from it. Whence they say that the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture condemn those who formerly said that faith alone, dead and devoid of good works, suffices for salvation; but not those who attribute this to faith alone, but to faith that is living, active, and accompanied by good works.

But on the contrary **1.** This feigned response, devised to soften the horror of this monstrous error, openly conflicts with the principles of the Heretics. For they teach **1.** That man, while justified through faith, does not truly become just, but is only reputed so, nor are any of his works good, but all are mortal sins, although they are not imputed to him on account of Christ. With what face therefore do they say that not faith alone, but faith joined with good works justifies, when according to them there are no good works? **2.** They teach that a man once justified through faith cannot fall from justice by any crime. Thus Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, §11, and Luther in a Sermon on these words "God so loved," etc., excepting only unbelief. And thus once justified through faith, although he becomes a thief, murderer, adulterer,

Sodomite, he remains just. Therefore faith justifies without good works, indeed with evil and most wicked ones, which is an ancient heresy condemned in the Scriptures. Whence Luther in chapter 2 to the Galatians expressly says: "Faith without and before charity justifies." And in tome 1, Disputation "Whether works justify?" Proposition 3, he says: "Unless faith be without any even minor works, it does not justify, indeed it is not faith." And therefore the more rigid Lutherans frankly admit that good works are in no way required for justifying faith.

On the contrary **2.** Scripture attributes the function of justifying and saving to good works no less than to faith, as is clear from the cited passages and many others. Therefore if faith cooperates in justification, so also do works.

The Heretics argue principally from the Apostle, who, as seems to them, is entirely for asserting that faith without works suffices for justification. Romans 3 he says: "We reckon that a man is justified by faith without the works of the Law." Ibid. 4: "If Abraham was justified by works, he has glory, but not before God." Galatians 2: "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law." Philippians 3: "That I may be found in him, not having my own justice which is from the law, but that which is from faith."

Response 1. Even if the Apostle taught that faith without any works suffices for justification, this would in no way benefit the Heretics; because the Apostle means Christian and Catholic faith, by which we believe the divinity of the incarnate Word, his Resurrection, and other Mysteries contained in the Scriptures, not that ridiculous faith or confidence by which Heretics believe that sins have been forgiven them.

Response 2. The Apostle only excludes works which are done either before faith or after faith has been received, but without the grace of faith, that is, works which proceed from the powers of nature and free will alone, such as were certain honorable works of natural justice among the Gentiles, and the works of Jews who carnally observed the Mosaic Law, whence the Apostle frequently specifies "Works of the Law"; but he does not exclude works following faith and done by the grace of faith. Whence Augustine, in the book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 7, says: "Men, not understanding what the Apostle Paul himself says, 'we reckon that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law,' thought he said that faith suffices for man, even if he lives badly and does not have good works. May it be far from the vessel of election to think this."

Objection: Abraham and the Galatians had already been reborn and were working from faith at the time of which the Apostle speaks, and yet he excludes their works. Therefore.

Response: Granted the major. I distinguish the minor: He excludes their works which were done by the grace of faith - I deny. Works which were done before faith, or which after faith had been received were not done by the grace of faith - I concede. For nothing prevents one who has faith from sometimes not working from faith, as when he sins or does a morally good work without relation to God.

To the other arguments which the Heretics object, accept the following general Solutions. The first is: Justification is attributed to faith as to its beginning and root, not however excluding other

works disposing to it. Thus Trent, Session 6, chapter 8. Second: Living faith is to be understood, which works through charity, as the Apostle speaks in Galatians 5. Third: By faith is sometimes understood those things which are contained in the Gospel or Evangelical Doctrine, doing those things which according to this Doctrine are to be done. Fourth: When works are excluded, works before faith are to be understood, or works done without the grace of faith, not works which are done from the grace of faith itself, as I explained above; or works of the Mosaic Law, or external works, when the power of executing them is lacking.

SUMMA

DISSERTATION VII On the Justification of the Sinner D. Th. q. 113.

Thus far we have dealt with the Author concerning the necessity, essence, division, and cause of grace. It remains to treat its effects, of which there are two principal ones: namely, the justification of the impious and the merit of the just. Concerning the first we shall speak in this dissertation; concerning the second in the following one.

Justification is derived from justice. Taken passively, it signifies a movement toward justice, just as heating signifies a movement toward heat. Since justice by its very nature implies a certain rectitude of order, it can be understood in two ways. **First**, insofar as it implies right order in the very act of man in relation to another, and according to this, justice is a certain particular virtue, which is not dealt with here. **Second**, justice is said to imply a certain rectitude of order in the very interior disposition of man, insofar as the highest part of man is subjected to God, and the lower powers are subjected to the highest, namely to reason. This justice can come about in man in two ways. **First**, indeed, by way of simple generation, which is from privation to form; and in this way justification can belong to one who is not in sin, as it belonged to Adam and the angels. **Second**, this justice can come about in man according to the nature of movement, which is from contrary to contrary; and according to this, justification implies a certain transmutation from a state of injustice to the aforementioned state of justice. And in this way we speak here of the justification of the impious, concerning which three things especially can be asked. **First**, whether in justification sin is properly deleted. **Second**, whether it can be remitted without the infusion of grace. **Third**, what acts on the part of the sinner are required for justification.

ARTICLE I WHETHER IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPIOUS SINS ARE SO REMITTED THAT THEY ARE TRULY DELETED AND TAKEN AWAY, AND NOT ONLY COVERED?

To justify is to make someone just with that justice which we have just explained. It can be understood in two ways. **First**, improperly, as that which is to declare, pronounce, or repute someone as just, whether meanwhile he is truly just or not—namely, in the forensic sense, when a judge out of favor or ignorance declares someone just, even if he is guilty. **Second**, it is taken

properly for that which is truly to make someone just, right, holy, well ordered interiorly and exteriorly toward God, himself, and neighbor.

The heretics of our time take justification in the improper sense, and they contend that in the justification of the sinner, sins are not truly deleted nor taken away, but remain entirely in man, and are only covered and not imputed. So that justification on God's part consists only in this: that He does not impute sins, but as it were covers them with the merits and grace of Christ. On man's part, it consists in this: that he most firmly believes that the sins which he has committed and will commit are pardoned to him on account of Christ's merits, and are in no way to be imputed to the punishment of damnation. Against these,

I say: In the justification of the sinner, sins are not only covered or not imputed, but are truly remitted, deleted, and taken away.

Proof 1°, from the most formal terms of Sacred Scripture. Psalm 50 (51): "Blot out my iniquity," and "Blot out all my iniquities." Isaiah 43: "I am He who blots out your iniquities for my own sake." Hosea 14: "Take away all iniquity." Micah 7: "Who is a God like you, who takes away iniquity?" John 1: "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who takes away the sins of the world."

Proof 2°, from other terms of Sacred Scripture. Man is interiorly stained and polluted by sin, as we have said concerning sins, and all agree. But according to Sacred Scripture, man in his justification is cleansed, washed, purged, and sanctified from sins. Psalm 50 (51): "You shall wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow." Ezekiel 36: "I will pour clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your defilements." 1 John 1: "The blood of Christ His Son cleanses us from all sin." 1 Corinthians 6: "The unrighteous will not possess the kingdom of God. Do not err: neither fornicators... nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor thieves, etc., will possess the kingdom of God. And such indeed were some of you; but you have been washed, but you have been sanctified, but you have been justified." But if sins are only covered, it is falsely said that man is cleansed, washed, purged from them, etc. For who would say that a man polluted with filth is clean and washed because he covers the filth with a cloak?

Proof 3°, from St. Augustine, the Holy Doctor, Book 1 to Boniface against the Two Letters of Pelagius, chapter 12. When the Pelagians said that Catholics teach that baptism does not take away crimes but scrapes them and their roots remain, he responds: "We say that baptism gives pardon of all sins and takes away crimes, it does not scrape them, nor do the roots of all sins remain in evil flesh as if they were hairs scraped from the head, from which sins would grow again to be cut down." And Book 3, chapter 3, when the Pelagians slandered the Catholics as asserting that baptism does not truly make men new—that is, does not give full remission of sins, but that they are made sons of God in part and in part remain sons of the world, that is, of the devil—he replies: "They lie, they plot, they equivocate; we do not say this." And below: "Baptism therefore washes away all sins, absolutely all—of deeds, words, etc." And in his second conference on Psalm 31, expounding those words: "Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered"—in which the heretics especially trust—he says: "Do not understand that sins are covered as if they were there and alive... Therefore let God cover the wounds, not you; for if you wish to cover them out of shame, the physician will not cure

them. Let the physician cover and cure, for he covers with a plaster; under the physician's covering the wound is healed, under the wounded person's covering the wound is concealed." Thus according to St. Augustine, God covers wounds so that by covering He heals them, just as a physician who covers a wound with a plaster and heals it. Which is clearly decisive against the heretics. See other Fathers, if you wish, in Bellarmine, Book 2 on Justification, chapter 8.

Proof 4°, from the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 5, where it is said: "If anyone denies that by the grace of Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only scraped or not imputed, let him be anathema; for in those who are reborn, God hates nothing." And Session 6, chapter 7, it says that justification is the renewal of the interior man, and that he is made just from unjust.

Proof 5°, from absurdities. If in the justification of the impious sins remain and are only covered, not truly deleted and destroyed, it follows: **1°** that man will be simultaneously just and unjust—just because justified, unjust because he remains in sin which is essentially injustice. **2°** It follows that God loves sinners as His friends and in order to eternal beatitude, contrary to Wisdom 14: "The impious and his impiety are hateful to God." **3°** That Christ is not the Lamb taking away the sins of the world, that He does not free His sons from the servitude of sin, nor make them holy. **4°** That in John 3, He spoke falsely to the Apostles: "Now you are clean"—for how are they clean if they are still polluted with the filth of sins? **5°** That God's estimation is not right, estimating and reputing as just one who is in sin, and not estimating as worthy of punishment one in whom remains that which is worthy of punishment, namely sin—just as a forensic judge out of favor or ignorance erroneously and incorrectly pronounces or estimates as just one who is truly unjust and guilty.

The heretics object 1°: Psalm 31 (32): "Blessed are those whose sins are covered, blessed is he to whom the Lord has not imputed sin."

To this argument, which is the principal one of the heretics, the answer has already been given from St. Augustine: that God covers sins by healing them, just as a physician covers a wound with a plaster and heals it; and because He heals them, He does not impute them. Moreover, since all things are naked and open to the eyes of God, nothing is covered to God unless it does not exist.

They object 2°: The Apostle explains justification by this: that we put on Jesus Christ. Romans 13: "Put on the Lord Jesus Christ." Similarly Galatians 5 and Ephesians 4. But clothing does not take away but covers the deformity of the body. Therefore, etc.

Response: The Apostle there explains that to put on Christ is not to externally apprehend His merits merely for the non-imputation of sins, but to be interiorly changed from the state of sin to the state of innocence, putting off the old man and every affection of sin, and beginning a new and immaculate life. Romans 13 says: "Let us cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light; let us walk honestly as in the day, not in reveling, etc. But put on the Lord Jesus

Christ." And Ephesians 4: "Put off the old man who is corrupted according to the desires of error, be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man."

They indeed respond that sanctification implies interior reformation of the heart and purity, but justification, which they distinguish from sanctification, implies only the non-imputation of sin from the merits of Christ—just as a forensic judge is said to justify the guilty when he pronounces him free from crime on account of another's merit or from indulgence, and henceforth to be held as innocent.

Response 1°: The distinction between justification and sanctification is fictitious; for in the usage of Sacred Scripture, justice is not separated from holiness, and to be justified is to be sanctified. Thus 1 Corinthians 6: "You have been washed, you have been sanctified." Ephesians 4: "Put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness." Moreover, justice, as it is taken here, is the interior rectitude of the whole man, insofar as reason is subject to God and the lower powers are subjected to reason, in which holiness consists. Hence 2°, it is false what they say, that justice implies only the non-imputation of sin, since according to Sacred Scripture, only he is just who does what is just according to rectitude of heart. 1 John, Epistle 1, chapter 3, says: "Little children, let no one deceive you; he who does justice is just." 3° Likewise, it is false and very injurious to divine equity and truth that God, like a forensic judge, should pronounce and estimate as just anyone who is not truly just.

They object 3°: According to Sacred Scripture, no one is without sin. Therefore, if the destruction of sin is required for justification, no one is justified.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. No one is without venial sin—granted; without mortal sin—I deny. And this suffices that man be justified.

What the heretics oppose concerning justifying faith will be resolved below.

ARTICLE II WHETHER FOR THE REMISSION OF SIN, WHICH IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPIOUS, THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS REQUIRED?

We have to deal here with heretics and Catholics.

Lutherans and Calvinists, who do not acknowledge true and proper remission of sins in the justification of the sinner through their deletion, but only improper remission through their non-imputation, consequently say that it is not obtained through an intrinsically justifying form, but either through the justice by which God is just, or through the justice of Christ extrinsically imputed.

All Catholic theologians reject this doctrine as erroneous, but they dispute among themselves whether, at least by God's absolute power, there could be remission of sins and justification of the impious through God's extrinsic favor alone, or through acts of charity and contrition without the infusion of habitual grace.

§ I. Whether in fact justification is accomplished by the extrinsic imputation of the justice of God or of Christ without the infusion of habitual grace?

I say: The remission of sins, which is the justification of the sinner, is not accomplished by the extrinsic imputation of the justice by which God is just, or of the justice of Christ, but by true and intrinsic justice or the infusion of habitual grace.

This is a matter of faith decided in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 10, in these words: "If anyone says that men are justified without the justice of Christ by which He merited for us, or that by it they are formally just, let him be anathema." Canon 11: "If anyone says that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding the grace and charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, or even that the grace by which we are justified is only the favor of God, let him be anathema." And: "The sole formal cause (of the justification of the impious) is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just, by which namely, being given by Him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and not only are we reputed, but we are truly named and are just, receiving justice in ourselves."

Proof 1°, from the Scriptures cited in proof 2 of the preceding article, by which the sinner is said to be washed, purged, renewed, sanctified; for no one can be washed, purged, renewed, sanctified except through something intrinsic by which he is denominated and is such.

2° Sacred Scripture frequently says that we have in ourselves grace, charity, and justice by which we are just. John 1: "Of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace." Romans 1: "Through whom we have received grace." Ephesians 4: "To each one of us grace is given according to the measure of Christ's gift." Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us."

3° The Apostle there compares the justice and obedience of Christ with the sin and disobedience of Adam. But we contract the sin of Adam really and intrinsically, and not only by extrinsic imputation. Therefore, the justice which is opposed to it and by which it is expelled is intrinsic to us and not only extrinsically imputed. **Confirmation:** Christ restored to us what we lost in Adam; but in Adam we lost justice intrinsic to him, and which he would have transmitted to posterity if he had persevered in the good. Therefore, true and intrinsic justice is restored to us through Christ.

4° St. Augustine, Book on the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 32, concerning the previously cited words of the Apostle in Romans 5, says: "Charity is poured forth in our hearts, not by which He Himself loves us, but by which He makes us lovers of Him; just as the justice of God (so called) is that by which we are made just by His gift." And chapter 9, on these words of the Apostle, "The justice of God is manifested," he says: "The Apostle does not say the justice of man, but the justice of God, not that by which God is just, but with which He clothes man when He justifies the impious."

5° The justification of the sinner is the effect of God's love. But God's love is not only affective but also effective, making the beloved object intrinsically pleasing and just, as we proved above in Dissertation 4, Article 1.

6° The formal cause is distinguished from the efficient. But the justice of Christ is the efficient cause of our justice. Therefore, it is not its formal cause. **Confirmation:** Our justice now increases, now diminishes. But the justice of God and of Christ is always equal. Therefore, etc.

The heretics object 1°, certain texts of Sacred Scripture by which justification seems to be suggested as being accomplished formally through the justice of Christ. Romans 5: "Through the obedience of one, many will be constituted just." And again: "Through the justice of one, unto all men unto justification of life." 1 Corinthians 1: Christ is said to be made our justice and sanctification.

Response: These and similar passages are not to be understood in a formal sense, but in a causal sense, insofar as Christ is the efficient and meritorious cause of our justification. In this sense He is there called our wisdom; John 11: The resurrection and life. And Deuteronomy 3, He is called the life of men and length of days.

Insistence: The Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10, reproves those who wish to establish their own justice: "Being ignorant," he says, "of the justice of God, and seeking to establish their own, they are not subject to the justice of God." Therefore, etc.

Response: The Apostle reproves the Jews and Pharisees who presumed they could fulfill the law by the powers of nature and thus be justified without God's grace, as St. Augustine interprets in the Book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 12.

They urge: According to Sacred Scripture, no one is just before God. Psalm 142 (143): "In your sight no living person will be justified." And Job 9: "Man compared to God will not be justified." But these would be false if man had intrinsic justice. Therefore, etc.

Response: To the first, the meaning is either that no one is so just that he is not found to have failed in some slight matters; or that no one is just before God from himself and by his own power without God's gift. To the second, a similar response can be given, or it should be said that man's justice compared to God's infinite justice is as if it were not, on account of the infinite distance and inequality—just as stars, although they shine, nevertheless seem not to shine when the sun appears. Hence Job 25 adds: "Behold, even the moon does not shine, and the stars are not pure in His sight; how much more man, who is rottenness, and the son of man, who is a worm?"

They object 2°: That is called just which is adequate to the rule or law. But there is not in us such justice as is adequate to the law, since we sin at least in slight matters. Therefore, etc.

Response: I distinguish the minor. There is not in us such justice as actually is adequate to the law—granted; from which according to itself there is not apt to follow adequation—I deny. Therefore, that it does not actually be adequate is not by reason of itself, but by reason of the

way in which it is in an imperfect state for lack of the light of glory and beatific vision. From which it does not follow that it is not justice, but only that it is not perfect justice.

§ II. Whether by God's absolute power the justification of the impious can be accomplished through God's extrinsic favor alone, or through acts of charity and contrition alone without the infusion of habitual grace?

Because these questions concerning God's absolute power are more subtle than useful, I will dispatch this one and the following briefly.

I say 1°: The justification of the impious cannot absolutely be accomplished through God's extrinsic favor alone without intrinsic change of the sinner. This is against Scotus.

Proof 1°: Justification at minimum implies remission and pardon of the offense. But God cannot absolutely remit and pardon the offense without intrinsic change of the sinner. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the minor: It is impossible that God remit the offense to the sinner unless He becomes pacified toward him. But He cannot become pacified toward him without intrinsic change of that sinner. Therefore, etc. **Proof of the minor:** For God to be pacified toward us is to love us with special love; for nothing else can be assigned in which our peace with God consists. And the reason is clear, because that God from being offended becomes pacified toward us is from His special benevolence. But God cannot love the sinner unless through this love He impresses some effect in him and infuses a supernatural gift by which he is intrinsically changed.

Therefore, etc. **Proof of the minor:** From the Author's principle above, q. 110, a. 1, that God's love is not only affective but also effective, not presupposing but by His love effecting the good and pleasing one whom He loves, since He is the cause and author of all goodness. Therefore, etc.

Confirmation: In this, that God begins to love the sinner whom He previously held in hatred, some change intervenes. But this change cannot be on God's part, who is immutable. Therefore, it is on the part of the beloved object, which from unjust and hateful becomes just and pleasing.

They respond: God can be pacified toward the sinner not through positive love by which He wills to have him as a friend, but through negative love by which He only wills not to be offended by him any longer, as can happen among men. But from such love there does not follow a change of the sinner, but only that the evil of guilt is taken away from him and is no longer imputed to him.

But on the contrary: Even if this can happen among men, it cannot with God. **1°** Because man can pardon another's offense by his own change, not God. Hence the change that intervenes here is on man's part, as has been said. **2°** Because a man offending another man is not deprived of something intrinsic which he had received from the one offended, without the recovery of which the offended person's spirit is not considered fully pacified. But a man offending God is deprived of something intrinsic, namely the gift of grace, without the recovery of which God is not considered entirely pacified, as I will say more fully presently.

Proof 2°: Complete and perfect justification implies not only the pardon of the offense, but also the deletion of habitual sin. But habitual sin cannot be deleted without intrinsic change of the sinner. Therefore, etc. **Proof of the minor:** Habitual sin essentially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace as caused by the preceding actual sin, as we proved in the tract on sin, Dissertation 6. But privation cannot absolutely be removed except through the opposite form, just as blindness cannot be removed except through sight, and darkness except through light. Therefore, etc.

You will say: This minor is true concerning physical privation, which is the lack of a form which the subject ought to have from the nature of the thing; but not concerning moral privation, which is the lack of a form which the subject ought to have not from the nature of the thing but from divine ordination, such as the privation of grace. For this can be removed not only by the introduction of the opposite form, but from this precisely: that God's ordination is changed, and He establishes that this form is no longer due to this subject—which He would do if He removed man's ordination to the supernatural end.

But on the contrary, 1°: Although God can remove man's ordination to the supernatural end, and thereby make that grace is not now due to him, He cannot now absolutely make that when he sinned he was not ordained to the supernatural end and grace was not due to him—for there is no power over the past. But for the lack of grace to remain in the nature of moral privation, it suffices that at that time when man sinned he was ordained to the supernatural end and grace was due to him—just as for the moral privation of conformity to positive law to remain in one who has transgressed it, it suffices that at that time he was bound to observe it, even though he is not bound now, either because the law has ceased or because he has been dispensed from it. **2°** As long as the lack of grace which one ought to have had when he sinned remains in the nature of moral privation, it remains voluntary; for the voluntary is the foundation of morality. But this privation of grace cannot cease to be voluntary except through intrinsic change of the sinner retracting the prior volition, from which this privation has that it is voluntary. Therefore, etc.

The preceding reason is confirmed, or Proof 2° of its first minor, by overturning the foundation of the adversaries: Habitual sin implies not only liability to punishment or worthiness of punishment, as the adversaries wish, but also aversion from God, conversion to the creature, rejection of grace and friendship with God, and through these an offense inflicted on God, from which follows deformity and stain. But it is absolutely impossible that these be deleted by God's extrinsic pardon alone without intrinsic change of the sinner. For it is impossible that from being averted from God one becomes converted to God, from being converted to creatures averted from them, from despising the grace and friendship of God to requiring and recovering it, unless he is changed—as is evident in itself. Therefore, etc.

Do not say: These things are indeed implied in the act of sin, but pass away together with it, and there only remains in the sinner an obligation to punishment, and on God's part an offense and alienation from the sinner.

On the contrary: Although these things as to their exercise belong to the act and thus pass away with it, nevertheless by way of state and habit they pass to the person and remain in him

until they are retracted. For just as a body from the fact that by motion it has receded from another body, even when the actual motion ceases, remains in a state of distance until by contrary motion it approaches; so the soul from the fact that by its act, which is its motion, it has receded from God, approached the creature, and rejected God's grace and friendship, when that act ceases, remains in a state of aversion from God, conversion to the creature, and enmity and offense against God, until by contrary acts it is changed, and as it is said in 1 John 3, is transferred from death to life.

You will say: The obligation of a vow can be dissolved without change of the one vowing, through God's extrinsic remission. Therefore, so also can the liability of sin.

Response: I deny the consequence. The disparity is that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of the one accepting, and thus can be dissolved by him alone. But the nature of sin consists in voluntary aversion from God, which remains as long as it is not retracted.

From what has been said in the proofs, well considered, you will easily solve other arguments.

I say 2^o: In the hypothesis that God moves the sinner to acts of charity and contrition through actual help without infusing habitual grace, the sinner could absolutely through those acts be justified incipiently and imperfectly, but not completely and perfectly.

Proof of the first part: Sin implies man's aversion from God and God's aversion from man; hence it is removed insofar as man is united again to God and God to man and they are reconciled. But through acts of charity and contrition without habitual grace, man returns to God loved above all things and is united to Him, because love unites the lover to the beloved; and conversely God is united to him, because He loves those who love Him, and this love of man is the effect of divine love. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the second part: Perfect and consummated justification is not obtained unless the principal effect of divine love which was interrupted by sin is recovered. But this principal effect of divine love is sanctifying grace, by which man is made formally just, a partaker of the divine nature, a son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom. Therefore, etc. The minor is established. **Proof of the major:** Sin is not considered perfectly and completely remitted unless the spirit of the offended one is perfectly and entirely pacified. But God is not considered entirely pacified as long as He does not restore the principal effect of His love which we lost through sin—just as if a prince, deprived of his dignity by a citizen on account of an offense and asking pardon, dismissed the offense but did not restore the dignity, he would not be considered fully and entirely pacified, nor would the fault be fully and entirely remitted. Therefore, etc.

If you say: From this reasoning it follows that original sin is not perfectly remitted through baptism, since through it the defect of concupiscence and death which original justice removed is not taken away.

Response: In original justice the principal effect of divine love was sanctifying grace by which man was rendered formally just, a partaker of the divine nature, a son and heir—not however

the other gifts consequent upon it, such as the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower part to the higher, without which man can please God, be His son and heir.

Objection against the first part of this second conclusion, 1°: St. Thomas here, a. 2, says that "remission of fault could not be understood if there were not present the infusion of grace." **2°** The remission of sin is the formal effect of habitual grace; acts of love and contrition are dispositions to grace; but a disposition to a form does not give the formal effect of the form. **3°** Privation cannot be removed except through the opposite form. But sin consists in the privation of grace. Therefore, etc.

Response: To the first, St. Thomas speaks of the remission of sin that is perfect and consummated, not of that which is incipient and imperfect; or he speaks of the infusion of actual grace, not habitual. To the second, a disposition to a form indeed cannot produce the perfect and complete formal effect of the form, but it can give an incipient and imperfect one, since a disposition is an inchoation of the form. To the third, the privation of grace does not have the nature of sin except insofar as it is voluntary; but through the act of contrition it ceases to be voluntary; hence from this it in some way falls short of the nature of sin. Compare the following objection.

Objection against the second part of the same conclusion, 1°: From what has just been said, the privation of grace does not have the nature of sin except insofar as it is voluntary. But through the act of contrition it ceases to be voluntary. Therefore, etc. **2°** According to Sacred Scripture, the remission of sin is attributed to love. Luke 7: "Many sins are forgiven her because she has loved much." **3°** A man loving God with his whole heart is just. Therefore, he does not remain in a state of sin.

Response: To the first, I distinguish the minor. The privation of grace through the act of contrition ceases to be voluntary as to the present disposition—granted; as to the preceding disposition—I deny. But it suffices that this privation was previously voluntary for it to retain the nature of stain and sin until what was principally lost by sinning is restored—just as in the proposed example, the privation of dignity in the penitent citizen to whom the offense has been pardoned is always ignominious and has the nature of stain on account of the past offense, from which he is not considered fully purged until the dignity is restored to him.

To the second: The remission of sin is attributed to love not precisely by reason of itself, but by reason of the grace which always accompanies it; for Sacred Scripture speaks not according to the hypothesis of the conclusion, that God through actual help moves to an act of love without infusing grace, but according to the present state in which charity is always joined with grace.

To the third: He who loves God with his whole heart is just with a justice fulfilling the present duty, not one perfectly deleting past sin. For this it does not suffice that man is converted to God, but it is required that God be converted to man and restore to him the principal effect of His love, which is sanctifying grace.

If you insist: The act of charity is not of less efficacy for recovering grace than the act of sin for destroying it. Likewise, the act is more perfect than the habit.

Response: To the first, I deny the assumption; because the act of sin efficiently destroys the habit of charity and grace; but the act of charity does not efficiently produce the habit of charity—only God does, as we said in the preceding sections. To the second, whatever may be the case with other habits, the habit of grace is more perfect and noble than any supernatural act.

From what has been said in this second part of the conclusion, you will gather that the sole formal cause of perfect and consummated justification in this state of elevation to the supernatural end is habitual grace, as the Council of Trent also defined in Session 6, chapter 7, canons 10 and 11—see the preceding §.

I said "in this state of elevation to the supernatural end," because in the state of pure nature it seems that man without it could be perfectly justified according to the manner of that state. The reason is that man is perfectly and completely justified when he recovers all or at least the principal thing which he had lost through sin. But man in the state of pure nature by sinning would not lose sanctifying grace, because in that state it would not be given; but he would lose only the rectitude of natural order by which he would be acceptable for natural beatitude. But through acts of contrition and love of the natural order elicited with God's help, he would recover that rectitude and would be accepted as before for natural beatitude. Therefore, without grace, but through acts of contrition and love of the natural order alone, he would be perfectly justified.

What could be objected either from St. Thomas or from reason should be understood according to the present state of elevation, or concerning grace taken more broadly for some gratuitous gift, which in this hypothesis of pure nature would not be the same as now the gift of sanctifying grace.

ARTICLE III WHETHER BY GOD'S ABSOLUTE POWER SIN AND GRACE CAN BE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE SAME SUBJECT?

I say: Sin and grace cannot, even by God's absolute power, be simultaneously in the same subject.

The conclusion is to be understood both of actual and habitual sin. It is more common among theologians, against the Scotists and Suarez as to both parts, and against Lorca as to actual sin.

Proof: Sanctifying grace from its essence and nature is justice, holiness, and rectitude, whose primary and formal effect is to make him to whom it is given just, holy, and right. Sin, on the contrary, from its essential nature is iniquity, uncleanness, departure from rectitude and subjection to divine law. But justice cannot stand with injustice, holiness with iniquity and uncleanness, rectitude with departure from rectitude, even by God's absolute power. Therefore, etc.

Likewise, the formal and primary effect of grace is to constitute man a partaker of the divine nature, an adoptive son of God, an heir of the kingdom, pleasing to God and His friend. On the contrary, the formal effect of sin is to destroy in man the participation of the divine nature, to deprive him of divine sonship and right to the kingdom, to render him hateful to God and His enemy, to constitute him a son of the devil and worthy of eternal damnation. These effects, being privatively opposed, are absolutely incompatible. But those things whose formal effects are incompatible cannot absolutely be simultaneously; because the formal effect is the very form communicated. Therefore, etc.

And this Sacred Scripture clearly suggests in 1 John 3, where it is said: "Whoever is born of God does not commit sin, because His seed (that is, sanctifying grace) remains in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God." By these words he repeats the incompatibility of grace with sin, not from divine ordination, but from the very nature of grace, because it is a participation of the divine nature, or because he who has it is born of God and is His son.

Suarez responds: The effects assigned are not the primary effects of grace, but only secondary ones. But secondary effects can by God's absolute power be separated from the form, as risibility, for example, from rationality.

But on the contrary, I deny the assumption, which is fictitiously contrived by Suarez. For, as I said, grace is from its essential nature justice, holiness, rectitude, participation of the divine nature. Therefore, its formal and primary effect is to make one just, right, holy, a partaker of the divine nature, and consequently to bestow all the other things we mentioned.

Father Henno responds: These things are indeed true of grace formally and reduplicatively taken in the nature of grace, or as it underlies God's ordination establishing that through that quality man is rendered pleasing to Him, dear, an heir of the heavenly kingdom; but not of grace materially taken in the nature of a supernatural quality.

But on the contrary, I repeat again: Sanctifying grace even as a supernatural quality is from its essential nature and independently of divine ordination a participation of the divine nature, justice, holiness, rectitude—or let the learned theologian say what else it is. Therefore, its formal effect as such is to constitute man from its own nature, and independently of God's ordination, a partaker of the divine nature, just, holy, right, etc.

Objection 1°: Grace and at least actual sin are not privatively opposed. Therefore, they can by God's absolute power be simultaneously. **Proof of the antecedent:** Grace is a habit, sin is an act. But act and habit are not privatively opposed. Therefore, etc. **Confirmation:** An act can stand with a contrary habit, as an act of intemperance with the habit of temperance.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the minor. Act and habit are not privatively opposed under the aspect of act and habit—granted; under diverse other aspects which they essentially involve—I deny. But the act of sin and habitual grace essentially and inseparably involve privatively opposed aspects, namely holiness and iniquity, justice and injustice, rectitude and departure from rectitude, participation and non-participation of the divine

nature, being a friend of God and not a friend, pleasing and not pleasing, the spiritual death of the soul and spiritual life, etc. Hence the response to the confirmation is clear. Add that if the argument were valid, it would prove that grace and sin can naturally be simultaneous, because an act can naturally be with a contrary habit—which, however, no one admits.

Note therefore that these aspects or effects do not follow sin because it is an act or habit, but because it is mortal fault, and as such it is privatively opposed to grace.

Hence various instances are also forestalled. For although grace is in the essence of the soul and sin in the will; likewise, granted that sin does not consist in the privation of grace but in the privation of rectitude; by this very fact that it is mortal, it follows that there is in the whole man injustice, iniquity, expulsion of the participation of the divine, extinction of the right to glory, departure from God as sanctifying and vivifying through grace and from the rectitude of divine law and death of the soul—and thus that it expels grace opposed to all these things.

Objection 2°: Sin does not expel grace physically, but only by way of demerit, insofar as he who sins is unworthy of grace; but God can give grace to the unworthy.

Response: I distinguish the major. Sin does not expel grace physically, that is, through a positive form physically acting on grace—granted. It does not expel it physically, that is, from its own nature, but only by way of demerit—I deny. For iniquity, injustice, rejection of God's friendship, departure from God, death of the soul, etc., physically—that is, from their own nature—expel justice, holiness, friendship with God, access to God, life of the soul, etc.

Insistence: God is not necessitated to take away grace from the sinner. Therefore, etc.

Response: I distinguish. God is not absolutely necessitated—granted. On the supposition that He permits man to fall into mortal sin—I deny. For God cannot will contradictory things.

You will reply: God alone is the cause of grace. Therefore, He alone and not sin destroys it.

Response: Sin, as I have already said, does not destroy grace by physically acting on it, but by withdrawing the subject from it and introducing a form or dispositions incompatible with grace—just as although God is the sole cause of the rational soul, man can nevertheless place dispositions incompatible with its union to the body.

Objection 3°: Sin is understood to be in the soul before God withdraws grace, the Council of Trent defining in Session 6, chapter 11, that God does not desert those once justified by His grace unless He is first deserted by them. Therefore, sin can be with grace.

Response 1°: This argument proves too much, namely that according to the ordinary course, grace and sin are simultaneous—which those objecting do not admit.

Response 2°: I distinguish the antecedent. Sin is understood to be in the soul before God withdraws grace with a priority of nature and causality—granted; with a priority of time—I deny. For sin and the privation of grace are simultaneous. Just as therefore, although the sun is

understood to illuminate the air before darkness departs, because the light of the sun is the cause of the departure of darkness, nevertheless the light of the sun and darkness do not exist simultaneously; so although sin is understood to be in the soul before grace departs, because it is the cause of the departure of grace, nevertheless there is no instant in which they exist simultaneously.

ARTICLE IV ON THE ACTS REQUIRED FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ADULT SINNER

That adult sinners ought to be disposed to justification by their own acts, St. Thomas proves here, a. 3, and we proved it in the preceding Dissertation, a. 3. But what those acts are, we inquire here with the same Holy Doctor and the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6. It assigns six, namely: an act of faith, of fear, of hope, of love of God, of penitence or contrition, and finally a purpose of receiving the sacraments instituted for the remission of sins, of beginning a new life and of keeping the divine commandments—which purpose is included in contrition itself. Therefore, being about to treat these, we shall speak first and especially of the faith required for justification against the heretics, then briefly of the others.

§ I. What faith is required for justification?

Lutherans and Calvinists distinguish a threefold faith. The first they call historical—they would have said better dogmatic—by which we believe all things contained in the sacred writings; we call it Christian and Catholic. The second they call the faith of miracles, through which miracles are wrought or obtained, by which namely we believe that nothing is impossible for God. The third they call the faith of promises, by which we believe that God has promised the remission of sins. But they subdivide this third into general and particular. General they call that by which we believe that God has promised remission of sins and salvation to all believers in common. Special they call that by which each one believes or confidently trusts that his sins are remitted to him on account of Christ's merits. For they wrongly confuse this faith with confidence, which pertains to hope and will, not to the intellect; for confidence according to St. Thomas is hope strengthened.

Therefore, they contend that this particular faith or confidence is required for justification and that it alone justifies, although some, to decline the odium of this most pestilential error, require love, contrition, good works—not as contributing to justification, but as signs and properties of justifying faith or confidence. We ask therefore in this §: what faith is required for justification; in the following, whether faith alone suffices?

I suppose as certain and admitted by all that some movement of faith is required in adults for justification. Sacred Scripture clearly testifies to this. Hebrews 10: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Mark, at the end: "He who believes will be saved; he who does not believe will be condemned"—and often elsewhere. And thus the Council of Trent declares, Session 6, cited. The reason is that, as we showed above, a movement of the soul converting itself to God is required for the justification of an adult, according to Hebrews 11: "He who comes to God must believe." But what is that faith?

I say: The faith required for justification is not the confidence by which we believe or trust that sins are remitted to us on account of Christ, but that by which we believe all truths revealed to us by God on account of His authority and veracity.

Thus the Council of Trent defines, Session 6, Canon 12, in these words: "If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than confidence in the divine mercy remitting sins on account of Christ, or that this confidence alone is that by which we are justified, let him be anathema."

Proof 1°, from the most clear testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Mark, at the end: "Preach the Gospel to every creature; he who believes (namely, the Gospel and the truths contained in it) will be saved." Romans 10: "This is the word which we preach: that if you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart that God raised Him up, you will be saved." Therefore, Christ and His resurrection, not only God's mercy remitting sins, are the object of saving faith. Hebrews 10, at the end, when the Apostle had said "The just man lives by faith," immediately at the beginning of the following chapter, explaining what is that faith by which the just man lives, he says: "Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." But this definition can in no way fit the confidence by which we believe that sins are remitted to us, but only that faith by which, as the Apostle there adds, "We understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that from invisible things visible things were made." Likewise, there he says the Apostle: "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he who comes to God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him." Therefore, the faith without which it is impossible to please God is not the confidence of the remission of sins, but that by which we believe that God exists and that He is the rewarder of those who seek Him. John 11, when the Lord had said to Martha: "I am the resurrection and the life; he who believes in me will not die forever," she responds: "Yes, Lord, I have believed that you are the Christ, the Son of the living God, who has come into this world." Therefore, the faith required for eternal life is to believe in the divinity of the incarnate Word. John, at the end of his Gospel, concludes thus: "These things are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Son of the living God, and that believing you may have life in His name." Therefore, the same as before. I omit many other testimonies of Sacred Scripture, lest I be longer.

Proof 2°, from tradition. The Church, as from the beginning so now, when it requires faith from those to be baptized, requires no other than that by which we believe the articles of faith contained in the creeds, not truly that by which we believe or trust that sins are remitted to us. For who ever among the Apostles, or bishops, or other ministers thus taught one coming to him for justification: Believe that sins are remitted to you, and immediately they will be remitted? Indeed, such teaching would be absurd and offensive to pious ears.

Calvin responds on chapter 3 of the Epistle to the Galatians: "In the creed we have: 'I believe in the holy Church,' which is nothing else than: I believe that there will be no more sin, no death in the Church."

But on the contrary, we believe the Church to be holy because it has a holy Spouse, holy dogmas, holy laws, many holy sons, and outside it no one is holy. But we know from Sacred

Scripture that the Church is a threshing floor in which there is chaff with wheat, a net in which there are good and bad fish.

Melanchthon responds in the Apology of the Confession: "The remission of sins is not omitted in the creed of faith, and that is what justifying faith properly looks to."

But on the contrary: The sense of this article is not, as the heretics feign, "I believe that sins are remitted to me." For the Church requires faith in this article from catechumens, and yet it does not believe that sins are remitted to them, but only that they are to be remitted through baptism. Therefore, the Catholic and genuine sense of this article is: "I believe that there is in the Church the power of remitting sins through baptism and other sacraments rightly received." Hence the Constantinopolitan Creed expresses this article thus: "I confess one baptism for the remission of sins."

As for the holy Fathers, see Bellarmine, Book 1 on Justification, chapter 9.

Proof 3°, by reasons. Faith rests on the sole authority of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. But it is nowhere revealed to me or to another particular person that sins are remitted. Therefore, I cannot believe it with certain faith.

They say that the particular promise is contained in the general. Hence He who said in John 3: "He who believes in the Son will be justified," signified that all who believe—that is, this one and that one—will be justified.

But on the contrary, 1°: Sacred Scripture says: "He who believes in the Son," not however "he who believes that his sins are remitted to him." **2°** No one knows with certain faith that he believes in the Son as he ought; for this is nowhere revealed. **3°** Justifying faith ought to precede justification, for it is its cause. But that faith of the heretics does not precede but follows justification; otherwise it would be false. For it is false faith by which I believe that sins are remitted to me if they are not yet truly remitted. If you say that by this faith it is not believed that sins are remitted, but are being remitted here and now, it still remains that that faith is posterior to that remission; because that present remission is the object of this faith. But an act does not make or specify its object; rather, it presupposes it and is specified by it.

4° That faith is justifying which Christ and the Apostles preached. But Christ and the Apostles never preached this special faith, or that each one ought to believe that sins are remitted to him; but they preached faith in the mysteries which they announced and penance. Therefore, etc.

The heretics object: Paul, Acts 13: "Let it therefore be known to you, brethren, that through this Christ remission of sins is announced to you... in this one, everyone who believes is justified"—that is, everyone who believes in the remission of sins announced to him is by this very fact justified.

Response: This gloss is false. For these words "In this one everyone who believes is justified" do not refer to the remission of sins as to an object, but to Christ and His resurrection which the Apostle was preaching there. So that the sense is: Through Christ remission of sins is

announced to you; and everyone who believes in Him will be justified. Hence justification is the effect of this faith, not the object—in which same sense the same Apostle said, Romans 10: "If you believe that God raised Christ from the dead, you will be saved."

Insistence: Matthew 9, it is said: "Jesus, seeing their faith, said to the paralytic: 'Be of good heart, son, your sins are forgiven you.'" And there: "Be of good heart, daughter, your faith has saved you." And the sense of these words seems to be: Trust that sins are remitted to you, and they are remitted.

Response: Both passages harm the heretics more than help them. For before the paralytic and the woman obtained remission of sins, they already had faith, and yet they did not yet believe that sins were remitted to them. Therefore, the remission of sins in a particular person is not the object of faith. Moreover, confidence is not required here by Christ as the reason or condition of the remission of sin; for He does not say: "Trust and they will be remitted," or conditionally: "If you trust, they will be remitted"; but absolutely: "Trust, they are remitted"—so that the remission is the cause of confidence, not confidence the cause of remission. As if He said: Be of good cheer because your sins are forgiven you. And to the woman: Trust or do not fear that you touched my garment, because your faith by which you believe in me has saved you—in which same sense He said to the trembling Apostles: "Do not fear, it is I." More in the following §.

§ II. Whether faith alone suffices for justification?

Thus of old Simon Magus taught according to Irenaeus, Book 1, chapter 20, and later Eunomius according to St. Augustine, On Heresies, heresy 54, and in the Book on Faith and Works, chapter 14—from the wrongly understood words of the Apostle Paul. To refute these, as those Fathers note, Peter, John, James, and Jude wrote their Epistles. Lutherans and Calvinists have revived this error, with this difference however: that those ancient heretics understood by the faith which they said sufficed for salvation that faith by which we believe all the articles of faith; but the new heretics understand that special faith by which each one believes or trusts that sins are remitted to him. Against both,

I say: Neither that special faith of recent heretics, which is vain and null, nor true and Christian faith alone suffices for justification.

Thus it is defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 9, in these words: "If anyone says that the impious man is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by a movement of his own will, let him be anathema." And Canon 19: "If anyone says that nothing is commanded in the Gospel except faith, that other things are indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited but free, etc., let him be anathema."

Proof 1°, from the Holy Apostles who, as we noted, wrote expressly against this error.

St. James, chapter 2: "What does it profit, my brethren, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can faith save him?... faith, if it does not have works, is dead in itself." After proving this with many arguments, he concludes the chapter thus: "You see that man is justified

by works and not by faith alone; for just as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead." These things are peremptory and need no gloss.

St. Peter, 2nd Epistle, chapter 1, after exhorting to various good works, concludes: "Therefore, brethren, be more diligent that by good works you make your calling and election sure." Therefore, faith does not suffice if works are lacking.

St. Jude exhorts the faithful to superadd good works to faith in order to obtain God's mercy and eternal life: "But you, most beloved," he says, "building yourselves upon your most holy faith, praying in the Holy Spirit, keep yourselves in the love of God, waiting for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto life eternal."

St. John, 1st Epistle, chapter 3: "Little children," he says, "let no one deceive you; he who does justice is just." Therefore, to be justified it does not suffice to believe, but it is necessary to do; and he teaches this throughout the whole chapter.

These things are so clear against the present error that the heretics have denied that these epistles are canonical, which nevertheless the Church acknowledges as canonical in many councils, lastly in Trent.

But also St. Paul, on whom the innovators wrongly rely, openly combats this error. 1 Corinthians 13: "If," he says, "I have all faith, so as to move mountains, but do not have charity, I am nothing." Galatians 5: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything nor uncircumcision, but faith that works through charity." Romans 2: "Not the hearers of the law are justified before God, but the doers of the law will be justified."

Finally, Christ in the Gospel everywhere commends good works as necessary for justification and salvation. Matthew 5: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven." And below: "Unless your justice exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven." And chapter 7: "Every tree that does not bring forth good fruit will be cut down and cast into the fire." Chapter 19, to one asking: "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" He does not say: "Believe only"; but: "If you will enter into life, keep the commandments." And finally, chapter 28, He not only commands the apostles to preach faith and baptize, but also wishes them to teach to observe all things that He Himself commanded. This is also proven by all those passages in which Christ is announced not only as Redeemer but also as Legislator: Matthew 5, 6, 7, and elsewhere—establishing rewards for the observers of laws (Matthew 19, Luke 10, Revelation 3), decreeing punishments for their transgressors (Matthew 5, 7, 25, and elsewhere).

The heretics try to elude so many and such clear testimonies in two ways. Some respond that faith alone without works indeed suffices for justification, but not for salvation.

But on the contrary, 1°: In many of the alleged testimonies—1 John, chapter 3; 1 Corinthians 13; Galatians 5; Romans 2—good works are required not only that man be saved, but also that he be just, or not be unjust. **2°** Salvation is everywhere promised in Sacred Scripture to every just person, and it is certainly established that no just person is to be damned by God, according

to Genesis 18: "Will you destroy the just with the wicked? Far be it from you to do such a thing." Therefore, if faith alone justifies, faith alone saves; and if it does not alone save, it does not alone justify.

Others respond, and more commonly, that the faith which they say suffices for justification is not faith alone, but faith joined with good works—not indeed that these good works cooperate toward justification, but because they accompany justifying faith either as its signs or as properties and fruits following from it. Hence they say that by the aforementioned testimonies of Sacred Scripture, those are condemned who formerly said that faith alone, dead and vacant of good works, suffices for salvation; but not those who attribute this indeed to faith alone, but to faith that is alive, active, and surrounded by good works.

But on the contrary, 1°: This response is deceptive and devised to soften the horror of this monstrous error, and it openly conflicts with the principles of the heretics. For they teach: 1° that man while he is justified through faith does not truly become just but is only reputed so, nor are any of his works good, but all are mortal sins, although they are not imputed to him on account of Christ. With what face then do they say not faith alone, but faith joined with good works justifies, when according to them there are no good works? 2° They teach that man once justified through faith can fall from justice by no crime, except unbelief. Thus Calvin, Book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, § 11, and Luther in his Sermon on these words "God so loved," etc. And thus once justified through faith, even if he becomes a thief, murderer, adulterer, sodomite, he remains just. Therefore, faith justifies without good works, indeed even with evil and worst works—which is the ancient heresy condemned in Sacred Scripture. Hence Luther in chapter 2 to the Galatians expressly says: "Faith without and before charity justifies." And in tome 1, Disputation whether works justify, proposition 3, he says: "Faith, unless it is without any even minor works, does not justify; indeed it is not faith." And therefore the more rigid Lutherans frankly admit that good works are in no way required for justifying faith.

On the contrary, 2°: Sacred Scripture attributes the office of justifying and saving to good works no less than to faith, as is clear from the cited passages and many others. Therefore, if faith cooperates toward justification, so also do works.

The heretics argue especially from the Apostle, who as it seems to them is entirely intent on asserting that faith suffices for justification without works. Romans 3, he says: "We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law." There, 4: "If Abraham was justified by works, he has glory, but not before God." Galatians 2: "Knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law." Philippians 3: "That I may be found in Him, not having my own justice which is from the law, but that which is through faith."

Response 1°: Granted that the Apostle teaches that faith without any works suffices for justification, this would in no way profit the heretics; because the Apostle understands Christian and Catholic faith, by which we believe in the divinity of the incarnate Word, His resurrection, and other mysteries contained in Sacred Scripture—not truly that ridiculous faith or confidence by which the heretics believe that sins are remitted to them.

Response 2°: The Apostle only excludes works which precede faith or which, after faith has been obtained, are done without the grace of faith—that is, works which proceed from the powers of nature and free will alone, such as were certain honest works of natural justice among the gentiles, and the works of the Jews who carnally observed the Mosaic law. Hence the Apostle often expresses "works of the law." But he does not exclude works following faith and done by the grace of faith. Hence St. Augustine, Book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 7: "Men," he says, "not understanding what the Apostle Paul himself says, 'We account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law,' have thought that he says it suffices for man to have faith, even if he lives badly and does not have good works—which is far from the sentiment of the Vessel of Election."

Insistence: Abraham and the Galatians had already been reborn and were working from faith at the time of which the Apostle speaks, and yet he excludes their works. Therefore, etc.

Response: Granting the major, I distinguish the minor. He excludes their works which were done from the grace of faith—I deny; which had been done before faith, or which after faith had been obtained were not done from the grace of faith—I grant. For nothing prevents one who has faith from sometimes not operating from faith, as when he sins or does a morally good work without reference to God.

They reply: The Apostle there, Romans 4, says: "To him who works, the reward is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt; but to him who does not work, but believes in Him who justifies, faith is reputed to him unto justice according to the purpose of the grace of God, as David also declares the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes justice without works." Therefore, that justification be gratuitous, no account of works is to be had in it, whether done before faith or after faith; otherwise justification would be rendered from debt.

Response: I deny the consequence. For the sense of these words of the Apostle is this: "To him who works," etc.—that is, if our works done without the grace of faith and from natural powers alone, as the pagans do, obtained justification, it would not be gratuitous, but a reward owed to such works; for to everyone working from his own powers, a reward is owed. "But to him who does not work," etc.—that is, the justification of him who is justified not from his own works according to the powers of nature, but from faith in Christ, is gratuitous, both because faith itself is grace, and because faith from itself does not merit so great a gift, although it disposes to it.

They urge: The Apostle excludes merits lest anyone glory; but if man is justified through the works of faith, he could glory in them. Therefore, etc.

Response 1°: From this it follows that neither through faith could he be justified, because also of the very act of faith he could glory. Hence **Response 2°**, I distinguish the minor. He could glory in God—granted; in himself—I deny. For faith itself, as I was just saying, is a gratuitous gift of God, and consequently also the works emanating from it. But the Apostle does not intend to exclude glorying in God, but in oneself. Hence he says: "He who glories, let him glory in the Lord."

The heretics object many other things both from Sacred Scripture and from the Fathers, which it would be too long to discuss. You have these solved in Bellarmine, Book 1 on Justification, from chapter 20 to 25. Meanwhile, accept the following general solutions. **First:** Justification is attributed to faith as to its beginning and root, not however excluding other works disposing to it—thus Trent, Session 6, chapter 8. **Second:** Living faith is to be understood, which works through charity, as the Apostle says in Galatians 5. **Third:** By faith is sometimes understood those things which are contained in the Gospel or evangelical doctrine—doing those things which according to this doctrine are to be done. **Fourth:** When works are excluded, those works are to be understood which are done before faith or without the grace of faith, not truly works which are done from the very grace of faith, as I explained above; or works of the Mosaic law, or external works when the power of executing them is lacking.

§ III. On other acts required for the justification of the adult

We said at the beginning of this article from the Council of Trent that besides faith, five other acts are required on the part of the sinner for his justification, namely an act of fear, of hope, of love of God, of contrition, and a purpose of receiving the sacrament and keeping the divine commandments. But these acts are thus deduced.

Faith, illuminating the mind of the sinner, exhibits to him on one hand divine justice preparing punishments for him, on the other hand divine mercy offering pardon. Hence there arises in his will fear of divine justice, then hope or confidence of obtaining pardon.

After hope follows an incipient love of God as the font of all justice. For from the fact that merciful God offers pardon to the sinner fearing punishment, not only is hope excited, but also love of such great goodness, at least incipient—concerning whose necessity for justification with the sacrament there is a famous controversy to be resolved in its place.

From faith, fear, hope, and incipient love is born detestation of sin; because by this very fact that the sinner knows that punishments are prepared for his sins, and from the fact that he begins to love God who is prepared to pardon them to him, he is moved to hatred of sin as harmful to him and offensive to divine goodness. But this hatred is called contrition—perfect indeed if sin displeases principally as offensive to God, imperfect if it displeases principally as harmful to the sinner. But this contrition necessarily has adjoined to it a purpose of beginning a new life and keeping the divine commandments; for there is not in anyone sincere sorrow for sins unless he wishes henceforth to avoid them.

It is asked whether it is necessary that all these acts required for justification be formal, or whether it suffices that they be virtual and implicit—that is, contained in something more eminent.

Response: The acts of faith and love must necessarily be formal, because neither in the intellect nor in the will are there more excellent and eminent acts in which these can be virtually contained.

As for the act of hope, when one proceeds in conversion gradually from imperfect to perfect, it is required that it be formal; but if man is suddenly moved by God from sin to justice from the sole consideration of God and of sin as it is injurious to God Himself, not attending to that sin as evil for him, nor to the goods promised by God, it seems that virtual hope contained in the more eminent act of charity suffices.

As for the act of penitence or contrition, it seems that it ought to be formal; because man ought to grieve for sin not only as it is contrary to divine goodness, but also as it is injurious to divine right. For right reason requires that he who has injured another's right should grieve for this injustice and injury and repair it as much as he can. But sorrow for sin as it is injurious to divine right properly pertains to penitence, not to charity, which only has to hate sin as it is opposed to divine goodness, as is explained more fully in the tract on Penance. Therefore, etc. Accidentally, however, if a man invincibly ignorant that he is in sin, or thinking nothing about sins, should elicit an act of perfect charity, he would be justified without an act of formal penitence, but with only a virtual one implicitly contained in the act of charity. But the purpose, as I said, is always included in the act of penitence; hence the penitent who is wholly attentive to the detestation of sins from most fervent love of God would not attend to an explicit purpose, would be justified.

§ IV. From what principle effectively do the acts of contrition and charity proceed which ultimately dispose to habitual grace?

It may perhaps seem remarkable that theologians labor and are so tortured in explaining this difficulty, when they themselves admit it is more subtle than useful. We therefore, who pursue usefulness more than subtlety, will briefly expound the various opinions on this matter and leave them to the judgment of readers.

Therefore, among theologians dissenting on this point, some say that these further dispositions to habitual grace are effectively from actual help transiently communicated—thus among Thomists John of St. Thomas, Sylvius, Contenson with many others. Some say they are effectively from habitual grace itself—thus Gonet, Serra, and others. St. Thomas seems to favor both opinions, and hence the difficulty is increased. A third opinion which tries to reconcile both says that these acts ultimately disposing to justification are effectively from the infused virtue of charity and penitence, not communicated permanently by way of habit, but transiently by way of actual help and motion. Thus most recently our most wise Goudin.

Foundations of the first opinion:

1° The Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 5, and canons 3 and 4, refers the disposition to justification to God's motion and grace exciting, helping, and preventing, as to the efficient cause. Therefore, it does not proceed from the infusion of habitual grace as from an efficient cause. Likewise, the Council there, chapter 7, says that justice and habitual grace are given to each according to each one's disposition and cooperation. But if such disposition proceeded from habitual grace, it would rather be said that the disposition is according to the proportion of habitual grace. Therefore, etc.

2° St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 62, a. 2, ad 3, says: "The third conversion is that by which someone prepares himself to have grace, and for this no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God converting the soul to Himself." Here q. 109, a. 6: "In another way the preparation of the human will can be understood as to obtaining the very habitual gift of grace. But in order that man prepare himself for receiving this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose some other habitual gift in the soul, because thus we would proceed to infinity; but it is necessary to presuppose the gratuitous help of God interiorly moving the soul or inspiring a good purpose." Ibid. q. 112, a. 2: "Whatever preparation can be in man is from the help of God moving the soul to good." And 3 p. q. 86, a. 2, ad 2: "The first act of the penitent is related as the ultimate disposition to obtaining grace; but the other following acts of the penitent proceed already from grace and virtues." Therefore, he holds that the first, which is the ultimate disposition, is not from habitual grace, but from actual help.

3° Habitual grace necessarily presupposes effected and produced dispositions, since it is not received except in a disposed subject. Therefore, it does not effect them.

4° It is unintelligible that some act should be effected by some form and yet dispose the subject for its reception; for if it is effected by it, it already presupposes it as existing and received in the subject; for no efficient cause acts unless it exists, and the being of an accident, such as habitual grace is, is to be in the subject. Therefore, this act effected by it cannot dispose the subject for its reception.

The patrons of the second opinion except all these and other arguments by one distinction. For they say that habitual grace can be considered in two ways: **1°** in becoming and as it flows from God, having flowing being and in an imperfect mode; **2°** in having been made, as received in the soul, having permanent being in it and complete. In the first way considered, they say, it has the notion of help moving and is the efficient cause of the disposition. In the second way considered, it is a permanent form which presupposes dispositions already made and does not make them. Therefore, they explain everything that the defenders of this first opinion bring forward concerning habitual grace considered in the first way.

But Contenson sharply attacks this distinction. He says **1°** that it brings incredible confusion into the doctrine of St. Thomas, since when the Holy Doctor says in infinite places that the preparation for habitual grace is from God's help moving, if by God's help moving he understood habitual grace, he confused actual grace with habitual a thousand times, which nevertheless he is accustomed to distinguish carefully. **2°** He says that not only grace in having been made, but also in becoming considered, requires a disposed subject; for grace, he says, does not become in the air or in the hollow of the moon, nor does it remain suspended at the door of the soul, but becomes in the subject and in a subject disposed through proper acts inseminated by divine help.

Foundations of the second opinion:

1° St. Thomas here, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1: the ultimate disposition is meritorious, not of the grace which is already had, but of glory; but it would not be meritorious if it did not proceed from grace,

without which an act even proceeding from actual help is not meritorious, as we will say below. Likewise here, q. 113, aa. 6, 7, and 8, he attributes the disposition to the infusion of grace or infused grace as to an effective principle: "The disposition of the subject," he says, a. 8, ad 2, "precedes the reception of the form in the order of nature, but it follows the action of the agent by which even the subject itself is disposed; and therefore the movement of free will by natural order precedes the obtaining of grace, but follows the infusion of grace."

2° It is of the nature of a vital act that it proceed from a proximate principle of life as joined to the radical principle, as is clear in all vital acts both bodily and spiritual, which proceed from a power joined to the soul. But the acts of charity and contrition are vital with supernatural life; for the just man lives by faith working through love. Therefore, they proceed from the habits of charity and penitence as joined to habitual grace.

3° A principle received in philosophy is that causes are mutually causes of each other; and therefore they mutually precede and follow each other in a different genus of cause—understanding namely concerning material and formal causes, likewise concerning efficient and final compared to each other; but not concerning efficient cause compared to material and formal. For the efficient cause in execution is prior simply and in all modes to the material and formal cause; for it transmutes the material that it may receive the form, and introduces the form into the matter. Therefore, they say that the acts of charity and contrition effected by grace in becoming considered precede the same grace in the genus of material and dispositive cause, not as efficient cause, but as a form permanently affecting the soul; and this in turn precedes those dispositions in the genus of formal cause informing and dignifying them. Thus, they say, it happens in natural things: thus heat to eight degrees produced by fire disposes the subject for the form of fire, and in that genus precedes it—which nevertheless it follows in the nature of a form from which it flows as a proper passion. "Heat," says St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 7, a. 13, ad 2, "which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an effect flowing from the already pre-existing form of fire." And q. 9, a. 3, ad 2: "Matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, which nevertheless when it arrives, the heat does not cease, but remains as a certain effect of such form." Likewise, the organization of the body is a disposition to the reception of the soul, yet the body does not have being ultimately organized except from the soul, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 76, a. 4, ad 1. They also bring forward the example of wind entering through a window into a room. The impulse of the wind or air, because it efficiently opens the window, is prior in all modes to the opening of the window and to the entrance of the wind or air. But the entrance of the wind or air and the very opening of the window mutually precede and follow each other in the genus of material and formal cause; for the air would not enter unless the window were opened, nor would the window be opened unless the air entered. Moreover, if it is so in natural things, why not in supernatural things? Therefore, they say, habitual grace as it is in being infused and as it has the notion of help moving, under which aspect it efficiently causes—namely radically—the acts of contrition and charity, simply and in all modes precedes them and is in no way posterior to them. But according to another formality which it has, namely as it is a form affecting the subject and constituting it just and pleasing to God, it is both prior and posterior to those acts in a different genus of cause; for it precedes them in the genus of formal cause and follows them in the genus of material and dispositive cause.

Almost all the arguments that are opposed against this opinion are solved by its defenders, as I said, through this distinction of "grace in becoming and in having been made."

The third opinion is expounded:

This opinion observes and supposes three things. **It observes 1°** that the ultimate disposition to grace is the free act of man accepting it or the consent by which he detests sin and loves God above all things, from St. Thomas in this q. 113, a. 7, ad 1.

It observes 2° that supernatural habits have this above natural habits: that they are not only habits which give the easy ability, but virtues or powers which give the ability simply; hence just as it is repugnant that an agent understand without the intellective power, so it is repugnant that man elicit a supernatural act without some supernatural virtue communicated to him in some way.

It observes 3°, from St. Thomas, 2-2 q. 175, a. 2, ad 3, that supernatural virtue can be participated in two ways: **1°** by way of a transient passion; **2°** by way of a permanent form. In the latter way it takes on the nature of a habit or habitual gift; in the former way it has the nature of a transient motion or actual help. Yet in reality it is the same thing in both cases, differing only according to the mode of being on the part of the subject—as light permanently inhering in the sun and transiently impressed on the air is the same light. According to St. Thomas, 2-2 q. 171, a. 2, this is seen in the rapture of Paul, to whom the light of glory was given by way of a transient impression and not by way of a habit or permanent form as in the Blessed. For in reality it was the same light of glory, differing only in mode; since it is essentially an active virtue with respect to vision, it is repugnant that this act be effected without it, just as any effect without the virtue that effects it.

From these it again observes that when it is said that man lacking the habit effects a supernatural act through actual help, by the name of actual help is not understood pure applicative motion, as is that by which God moves man endowed with the habit of charity to its act, but it must be understood as a motion which simultaneously confers the very virtue of acting, and thus includes the supernatural virtue whose act it is, not indeed by way of habit and permanent form, but of transient impression.

These things being thus supposed and observed, it establishes that the act of conversion ultimately disposing to habitual grace effectively proceeds from the infused virtue of charity and penitence, not however communicated by way of habit, but by way of help or motion—and thus disposes to grace and to obtaining the very infused virtues by way of habit.

The reason for the first part is taken from observations 2 and 3, because, as has been said, a supernatural act cannot proceed except from its own proper supernatural virtue communicated either by way of permanent form or by way of transient motion. But contrition or love of God above all things is the proper act of charity. Therefore, these acts in man disposing himself to grace cannot proceed except from the infused virtue of penitence and charity. Nor can it be said that such acts can proceed from some other actual help eminently containing the virtue of

charity; because a motion received in man does not seem possible which is more eminent than charity; and even if it were possible, it would not be given to man before charity—otherwise he would be of better condition and more highly elevated than through charity itself.

The reason for the second part is: Because the terminus of a movement cannot be its effective principle, as is clear from the terms; for the terminus of a movement is posterior to it, and the principle is prior to it. But charity and penitence under the aspect of habit are the terminus of the movement of preparation to grace. Therefore, under the aspect of habit they are not its effective principle. **Proof of the minor:** The notion is the same for the habit of charity and grace, for both are infused simultaneously. But the habit of grace is the terminus of the movement of preparation and justification from St. Thomas here, q. 113, a. 1. Therefore, etc.

The commended Father Goudin judges this his middle opinion to be handed down by St. Thomas, when the Holy Doctor in this q. 113, a. 8, ad 2, says "that the movement of free will precedes the obtaining of grace, but follows the infusion of grace." For, according to him, by "infusion of grace" the Holy Doctor understands God's motion or help given by way of motion, because there he says that "the disposition of the subject follows the action of the agent by which the subject itself is disposed," which seems to import actual motion. But truly by "obtaining of grace" he understands grace received by way of habit—that is, permanently; for we are said to obtain that which we have permanently and not by way of something transient. And this also requires the condition of the adult, namely that he not have the gift of grace permanently unless by freely accepting—which acceptance, however, is not except through the help of divine grace. Hence grace by way of help prevents that act which grace by way of habit follows; although all these things are in the same real instant.

Hence the most commended author infers that this ultimate disposition can in some sense be said to proceed quasi-materially from a supernatural habit, but more exactly it is said to proceed from actual help and to dispose to obtaining the habit both of grace and of infused virtues. Because in reality it is the same grace in both cases, diverse only as to state. Insofar as God through it moves free will to the ultimately preparatory act, it has under that respect the nature of actual help and is pre-understood to the act; but insofar as through that act it is accepted, it is now understood to be given by way of permanent habit and to follow the preparatory act. Hence this act can be said to proceed from supernatural virtue which in the same real instant has the nature of a habit; because nevertheless as it is pre-understood to the act it does not have the nature of habit but of actual help, more exactly this act is said to proceed not from a supernatural habit but from actual help. And through this something seems to be conceded to each preceding opinion.

But because he considers his opinion as quasi-middle between both, and through it to have satisfied the moments of each, he objects to himself the following single argument:

You will say: This preparatory act is meritorious. Therefore, it proceeds from the habit of grace, which is the root of merit. **Confirmation:** If that act preceded the habit of grace, it could merit it; for it is an act of charity worthy of glory, and consequently also grace itself, if it preceded it.

Hence St. Thomas here, a. 2, ad 1, says that this act does not merit grace only because it is already had.

He responds: The act is not meritorious unless it proceeds from grace at least as from the form giving merit; but it is not required that it proceed from grace as from an effective principle. Therefore, this act is meritorious because it effectively proceeds from actual grace and in the same instant is informed by habitual grace. For in the same instant in which God moves man to convert himself to Him, He simultaneously infuses the habit of grace into him, by which He makes both the person and the act pleasing to Himself and thus meritorious—not indeed of the grace from which it has the nature of merit, but of glory which is not yet had. Through which also the response to the confirmation is clear: since the habit of grace is the principle of merit of that act, it does not merit grace, because the principle of merit does not fall under merit.

These and other things which we have omitted, the commended Goudin brings forward for the conciliation of both prior opinions. Whether it is so, let the reader judge, and let him choose which opinion he wishes from these three. For it does not matter greatly. But if he delights in subtleties, let him go to John of St. Thomas and Contenson for the first opinion; to Serra and Gonet for the second.

ARTICLE V CERTAIN LITTLE QUESTIONS ARE BRIEFLY RESOLVED TO COMPLETE THE QUESTION OF ST. THOMAS

You ask 1°: Whether the justification of the impious is accomplished in an instant?

Response 1°: The justification of the impious taken for the infusion of grace and remission of sins is accomplished in an instant; because that a form is produced successively comes from this: that either the subject is not in the ultimate disposition, or because the agent, being of finite power, needs time to overcome the resistance of the subject and introduce the form. But here we suppose the ultimate disposition, since there is question of the justification of the impious as it simply signifies the infusion of grace; and on the other hand, since God requires no disposition except what He Himself makes, He can effect it in the instant in which He produces the grace itself, as He did in Paul. And since He is of infinite power, He does not need time to overcome the resistance of the subject.

Confirmation: When between the extremes of a change or movement there is no medium through which one arrives from one extreme to the other, the transition from one to the other is accomplished in an instant. But between the extremes of justification, which are grace and the privation of grace, there is no medium. Therefore, etc.

Response 2°: But if justification is taken not only for the infusion of grace but also for the dispositions by which the sinner is prepared, although it can be accomplished in an instant, as in Paul and Magdalene, ordinarily however it is accomplished successively; because these dispositions which the Council of Trent requires, Session 6, chapters 5 and 6, ordinarily precede in time the very infusion of grace.

You ask 2°: Whether justification is the greatest work of God?

Response: If justification is considered from the part of the mode of acting, creation is a greater work than justification; because the most excellent mode of operating is to make something from nothing.

If justification is considered from the part of the thing produced, it is a greater work than creation, not however than glorification. Because the good to which creation is terminated is the good of changeable nature; the good to which justification is terminated is eternal good in hope; but the good to which glorification is terminated is eternal good in reality.

If finally justification is considered according to the proportion of him who is justified, it is a greater work than glorification; because the gift of grace exceeds the dignity of the impious man who was worthy of punishment more than the gift of glory exceeds the dignity of the just man who was worthy of glory.

You ask 3°: Whether the justification of the impious is a miraculous work?

Response: The justification of the impious, as it is commonly accomplished, can be called admirable; because things which can be done by divine power alone have a hidden cause, and for this reason are wonderful. However, it cannot be called miraculous, because for a miracle properly so called it does not suffice that it can be done by God alone, but it must be beyond the common course of divine providence, such as the resurrection of the dead, the illumination of one born blind. But justification as it is commonly accomplished is according to the common course of supernatural providence. For it is the common and customary course of justification that, with God moving the soul interiorly, man converts himself to God, first indeed with imperfect conversion, that afterwards he may arrive at perfect conversion. But when God beyond this common course suddenly moves to perfect justification, as with Paul and Magdalene, then justification can be called miraculous.