COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART

(Secunda Secundae)

THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES ON FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY

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COMMENTARY

ON THE

SECOND SECONDÆ

OF THE

SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ

OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

DOCTOR ANGELICUS,

BY THE MOST REVEREND FATHER

FR. DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P.,

OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS,

PRIMARY PROFESSOR OF SACRED THEOLOGY

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA.

translated by thomisticus.scholasticus

TO THE MOST SERENE FRANCESCO MARIA II
Sixth Duke of Urbino

preserve and defend the patrimony received from my forefathers, and the reputation acquired in this craft of ours, but also, insofar as lay within my power and circumstances allowed, to enlarge and adorn it. Since, in my judgment, and according to the testimony of Isocrates, the wisest of orators, friendships, the patronage of princes, and perhaps even the bonds of household allegiance may rightly be reckoned among the rights of an inheritance, I have always taken the greatest religious care that those whom the diligence and devoted service of my ancestors had bound to themselves, or whose goodwill they had won by labor and study, should not through me lose that same goodwill; rather, I have striven with all my strength, and with even greater devotion, to preserve it and to honor it with perpetual remembrance. Among all the patronages of princes which, I do not deny, have in some measure been handed down to me by my fathers almost from hand to hand, none has ever been more sacred or more religiously binding to me than yours and that of your house. My ancestors regarded the honoring of you and the rendering of their services to you as a most sacred duty; and I have sought to add still more to what I received from them, so that by the greatness of my devotion whatever increase could be made might through me be brought to fullness and perfection. And in this, as it were, possession of honoring you and offering you my service, I have always remained. My printing house has often supplied a great abundance of books for the adornment of your most magnificent libraries, and it has itself derived no small advantage from your liberality. You have furnished those libraries with such abundance and variety of books that scarcely any place remains for further desire. In this matter-passing over for the moment, and reserving for another time, the fact that you have always had, and still have, men most excellent in every art at your court-

DEDICATION TO FRANCESCO MARIA II - CONTINUED

your learned men, and indeed almost all your courtiers, formed after your example, are distinguished not only by other ornaments of virtue but also by letters and the praise of study. One among many is Count Giulio of Thiene, who, by his own distinction and by imitation of your virtues, flourishes both in the arts of war-which he learned not merely by reading but by frequently engaging the enemy in person-and in the ornaments of peace, so that he seems worthy of immortality. Another is Bernardino Borgarucci, most eloquent among jurists and most learned in law among the eloquent, who displays toward you such fidelity, observance, and diligence in conducting your affairs that nothing seems capable of being added to it. In your cultivation of letters and libraries you have far surpassed all kings and princes, almost innumerable, who have ever fostered studies or founded libraries. Duke Federico, your grandfather, of your own house, erected at Urbino with such expense and labor a most magnificent manuscript library, leaving it to Your Highness to enlarge and bring to complete perfection. Although it would have been more than sufficient praise for a prince already covered with military glory simply to preserve it with dignity, you were not content with this. In order to equal the praises of all your predecessors-or rather to make them more illustrious by the splendor of your own virtues-you founded at Pesaro another library belonging peculiarly to yourself, filled with every kind of book, which may most justly be numbered among the libraries of the princes of Italy and of the whole world. For this reason, after long and serious reflection upon what I could best do to maintain my accustomed purpose and renew the memory of myself before you, I determined that nothing more fitting could proceed from me than to publish some excellent book under your Most Serene name, so that my hereditary devotion toward you might remain publicly attested among all men. While I was considering this matter privately, there most conveniently came into my hands the Commentaries of Domingo Bañez on the Second Part of the Second Part of St. Thomas, brought to us from Spain at great expense. I judged that they were most properly owed to Your Highness and would not be displeasing to you, both because I hear that you take great delight in this author's writings, and because, having been dedicated in Spain to the supreme King Philip, they seemed capable of being dedicated in Italy to no one more fittingly than to you, who among all the princes of Italy are his closest friend. Receive therefore, Most Serene Duke, with a cheerful countenance this small Venetian gift, a pledge of a most devoted spirit. If I learn that it has not been unwelcome to you, greater and more illustrious offerings will shortly follow. Farewell. Your most devoted servant, Francesco Ziletti.

TO THE CATHOLIC KING PHILIP

Great and Most Fortunate Monarch of the Spains, Most Deserving of Christ's Church Brother Domingo Bañez, professor of Sacred Theology, prays for him the happiness of the heavenly kingdom and dedicates to him this

treatise on the theological virtues. When that renowned preacher and divine prophet Isaiah, O great and

Catholic King, contemplated in prophetic spirit the Church of Christ already adorned by the multitude of the nations, supported by the protection of kings and princes, and daily increasing and spreading more widely, he raised the hopes of all mortals by these words: “Kings shall be your foster-fathers, and queens your nurses; with face bowed down they shall worship you and lick the dust of your feet.” And elsewhere: “You shall suck the milk of the nations, and shall be nursed at the breasts of kings.” By these words he foretold that kings and princes, casting aside the mute images and temples of the gods and flowing toward the Church of Christ, would embrace her faith with so strong and constant a spirit that they would carefully provide against whatever her enemies might devise, and would expend all their strength and power in her protection, lest her most prosperous course be hindered by hostile plots or arms. Thus it came about that the Church, like a city situated upon a lofty and precipitous mountain, offered a peaceful and secure refuge to those who approached, while standing inaccessible and terrible over her enemies. All who fled to her found most secure shelters and defenses by which they could protect themselves on every side from hostile assaults. Isaiah again wonderfully foretold this: “There shall be a tabernacle for shade by day from the heat, and for refuge and security from storm and rain.” He therefore predicts future security both from the heat of interior disturbances and from the assault of external enemies, so that men need fear neither burning heat, nor storm, nor overwhelming rain. For although in earlier

centuries there were giants and seditious men, proud through wealth and power, who, relying upon earthly wisdom, declared war against this city-monstrous men who dared take up arms against the Church of God, and who were encountered not without great danger to the faithful nor overcome without immense labors-nevertheless divine mercy breathing from above advanced against them. At length not only the ordered ranks of doctors and pastors, but also the virtue and power of emperors and kings, kept watch over the defenses of this city, and sometimes fought beneath her walls. Some even met a most beautiful death through their wounds. Such was the skill of these princes in fighting, their authority in governing, and their foresight in guarding, that they obtained not merely perpetual glory for their victories, but security for posterity. The attempts of the impious have never been lacking in the world; yet the Church has always been able to detect them by the splendor of the lights who went before her, and to remove and extinguish them partly by her own arms and partly by those of princes.

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This great happiness of the Church, most pious and Catholic King, began especially to arise in the time of Constantine, the most Christian emperor, who overcame Maximinus, Licinius, and Maxentius, emperors most hostile to the faith, and brought many barbarian nations under his rule, some by war and others by peace. Hence St. Jerome, who was born while Constantine was reigning and enjoyed this flourishing state of the Church, marveling at so great a spread of the faith, wrote in his epitaph of Nepotian that before the resurrection of Christ God was known chiefly in Judea and His name great in Israel, but that now, in the age of Constantine, the passion and resurrection of Christ were proclaimed by the voices and writings of all nations. Jerome adds that the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin peoples had been dedicated by the inscription of the Cross; that truths about the immortality of the soul, which Pythagoras dreamed of, Democritus denied, and Socrates debated in prison as consolation in his condemnation, were now discussed by Indians, Persians, Goths, and Egyptians; that the ferocity of barbarian peoples who formerly sacrificed men at funerals had broken its harshness into the sweet melody of the Cross; and that throughout the whole world there was now one voice: Christ. Elsewhere Jerome wrote that paganism suffered solitude even in the city; that the gods of the nations, once accompanied by owls and night-birds, remained only upon deserted roofs; that military standards now bore the sign of the Cross; that the saving image of the Cross adorned the purple of kings and the fiery jewels of their diadems; that even Egyptian Serapis had been made Christian; that monks came daily from India, Persia, and Ethiopia; that Armenians had laid aside their quivers, the Huns learned the Psalter, and the cold lands of Scythia burned with the heat of faith. The fair-haired army of the Goths carried with it the tents of the Churches, and perhaps for this reason fought against us on equal terms, because it trusted in the same religion. From these words it is more than sufficiently clear how greatly the Church of Christ, fortified by the protection of kings, filled the earth, extended her branches to the seas, and then beyond the seas illuminated new regions and even a new world. These princes are the strongest shields upon which the fiery darts of the enemies of the sacred faith are blunted and broken. I omit the two Theodosiuses, grandfather and grandson, the great emperor Heraclius, and many other most ardent defenders of the faith, who weakened the assaults of every enemy not only by military force and power but also by most illustrious miracles, and with immense glory carried away trophies and happy victories from all. Thus that peaceful age long before foreseen by the prophets came to pass: “They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into sickles; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they be exercised any more unto battle.” Princes, enjoying peace in the Church, were no longer occupied principally with conflict against enemies but with cultivating the vineyard of the Lord. But alas, in our own times-such has been our misfortune-tranquility passed into negligence, negligence into idleness, and idleness into sleep. While men slept, behold Germany brought forth a dreadful monster, than which scarcely anything more savage could have risen from the abyss. It stirred up a cloud of errors and recalled monstrosities long ago expelled. This indeed is the misery and calamity of our age, in which the stability of the Christian Church, because of the enormous sins of men, is shamelessly shaken by heretics, assaulted, and in part seemingly overthrown. Yet, O divine goodness, supreme clemency and mercy of God, who does not see that immortal thanks must be given to God Most High? For although He permits these evils to arise in the Church because of our crimes, He does not permit them to rule to our destruction and His dishonor. Rather, we now behold with our own eyes that ancient prophecy of Isaiah, according to which the Church of Christ would be strengthened and propagated by the protection of kings, being abundantly fulfilled.

16

DEDICATION TO KING PHILIP - CONTINUED

For the needs of the times were such, amid so great a ruin and misery of the Church, when her most cruel enemies and heretics, with necks raised, swords drawn, eyes flashing and burning, breathed fury and madness against the Catholic Church, while others, inwardly clothed with the rapacity of wolves and outwardly presenting the gentleness of sheep, plotted an interior destruction for the faithful. At that moment God wonderfully granted us you, a Catholic King, most powerful and invincible patron and light of the faith, that you might restrain the tumults stirred up everywhere against the Christian religion and, with incredible diligence, strive most severely and religiously to keep such contagion and destruction far from your kingdoms. Thus in so powerful a Catholic King there is preserved in these disastrous times an incorrupt faith, piety, religion, and a burning zeal for the restoration of religion. For there are two principal kinds of duty which the Church could desire and demand from Christian kings in this difficult age of the Christian commonwealth:

first, that whenever occasion arises for the celebration of a council they be present and favor it; second, that they preserve the kingdoms subject to them in the purity of the faith, in the ancient religion, and in obedience to the Apostolic See. In performing both duties you have always acted so strenuously, O great King, that although you inherited from your forefathers the glorious title of Catholic King, you have by your own merits obtained it in the highest degree above all others. When that sacred Council was celebrated at Trent, inflamed with zeal for the faith and seeing that the hope of the Church rested upon those most holy decrees, you never removed your eyes from it. As becomes a vigilant and religious king, you examined all things, carefully observed the counsels and attempts of the enemies, and frequently announced through your legates that, if necessary, you stood ready to station the strongest military protection and defend that sacred place. You immediately sent to Trent men most excellent in every kind of learning and virtue-the very flower of Spain-that they might determine what was most consonant with the Catholic faith. How great was your solicitude to keep the provinces and nations subject to your rule in their duty, lest they be drawn away from the unity of the Church! The clearest proof is that sincere religion and reverence for the Apostolic See shine most brightly among them. Spain herself is witness. You had before you the illustrious examples of preceding kings: your grandfather Philip, your great-grandfather Ferdinand, and your father Charles V, the greatest emperor, all most faithful defenders of religion. Remembering the ancient religion and fearing lest Spain be dishonored by any fault or negligence and the glory of your ancestors obscured, you used such vigilant care that amid neighboring provinces wounded and raging we still possess Spain safe and sound. You have therefore attained greater glory than many kings of old, insofar as it is more glorious to govern and preserve a ship in a great shipwreck than in harbor, and more illustrious to rescue Spain, already as it were smoking, from so destructive and nearby a fire and from the very claws of heretics. When you saw that a great danger from heretics threatened Spain, you fortified with vigilant guards all the maritime coasts washed by the Mediterranean Sea and the Ocean, so that no entrance might be open to such ministers of Satan. If, as heresy is deceitful, it happened to find some hidden place through which it might creep and insinuate itself, you placed industrious and vigilant inquisitors of heretical depravity throughout the kingdom and supported them by royal offices, that they might detect everything and examine it with watchful eyes, so that heresy could not rise against religion but would be crushed as soon as it appeared. Thus, by the clemency of God above all and by your industry, not only does faith flourish in Spain, but justice and abundance of peace are seen; religion is cultivated and purity of doctrine shines. I pass over the Indies, Naples, Milan, Sicily, the other islands and kingdoms contained within your vast dominion, in which ancient religion is preserved or restored by your counsel, zeal, and prudence. I also pass over foreign nations in which your intense and pious zeal for restoring religion has shone forth. All these matters would rightly require a much longer discourse.

17

DEDICATION TO KING PHILIP - CONCLUSION

For I have undertaken here not to enlarge the entire series of your deeds or to prolong my speech, but only to touch briefly upon certain things. Especially is this fitting because your virtue and royal providence-which, certainly, since the days of Solomon down to our own age has scarcely had an equal among kings-is so great that it cannot be contained within the limits of this age or of this kingdom. No antiquity will bury it, and no posterity will remain silent concerning it. Nor in this preface are we doing what some men are accustomed to do, who, in order to gain the favor of kings, invent many things and amplify and adorn many things beyond measure, all of which can easily be refuted. The things I have briefly recalled are established in the light and public knowledge of all, so that it would be the act of a most shameless man either to invent anything in this matter or to magnify it beyond what is fitting. Since this is so, most humane King, no one will be so far removed from the common judgment of men as not to see that these Commentaries on the Second Part of the

Second Part of St. Thomas, containing the doctrine of the three theological virtues-Faith, Hope, and Charity-ought to be dedicated to you as the singular patron of faith and religion. Moreover, the Dominican family, long bound by the greatness of the benefits received from Your Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty, openly acknowledges that it owes you very much. We recognize as a singular favor that you wished the distinguished Master Brother Diego de Chaves, formerly my teacher in Sacred Theology, to serve you as royal confessor. This strongly moved and impelled my mind to offer this very small service, and to dare to honor and adorn this work, dedicated to you, with your celebrated and great name. May Christ, King of kings and Lord of lords, preserve you safe for many years, as these calamitous times of ours and the whole Church of God rightly demand; and may He finally grant that, because of your most ardent zeal for spreading the faith, your singular piety toward religion, and the great justice and mercy which are joined in you by a holy covenant, you receive the crowns owed to you in that everlasting happiness. Amen.

AUTHORIZATION OF THE MOST REVEREND MASTER GENERAL

Permission granted to the author We, Brother Paul Constabili of Ferrara, professor of Sacred Theology and humble Master General and servant of the whole Order of Preachers: Solomon, that peaceful king, attempted to impress upon mortal minds that wisdom is to be preferred to every possession. Therefore it must be judged not merely fitting to the profession of Dominican preachers that they embrace wisdom above all things, but altogether necessary. For this reason, before others, the holy Fathers, Doctors, and Masters of our Order labored by watching, praying, reading, and writing, to draw wisdom from hidden things, to elucidate it abundantly for the faithful, and to communicate it without envy. The source of wisdom, the Word of God established in the highest heavens, willed that these men should shine with the most splendid laurels, saying: “He who shall do and teach, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.” He likewise willed that in this earthly house they should be held in special honor, raised by praise, and enriched with favors, when He said: “You are the salt of the earth; you are the light of the world.” Among these we have found the very Reverend Father Brother Domingo Bañez, renowned professor of Sacred Theology and most worthy moderator of the Primary Chair of Theology in the flourishing University of Salamanca, distinguished not only by private and public lectures but also by numerous illustrious writings, and a most brilliant teacher to his disciples. Lest the writings of so great a Father, which he has already published on almost the whole Summa of our Holy Doctor, should perish, and lest so bright a light remain longer hidden under a bushel, we, by the authority of our office, grant him permission to bring the said writings to light and, after observing what must be observed, to commit them to the press for the common utility of scholastics. And lest the merit of holy obedience be lacking to so glorious a work, we command this very thing of him in virtue of the Holy Spirit and under a formal precept of holy obedience, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Nothing to the contrary notwithstanding. Given at Bologna, in our convent of St. Dominic, on the sixth day of July, 1582. Brother Paul Constabili, as above, signed with his own hand. Brother Paul of Mirandola,
Master and Provincial of the Holy Land. On the reverse: To the very Reverend Father Brother Domingo Bañez, Master and moderator of the Primary Chair at Salamanca, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION OF BROTHER DIEGO DE CHAVES

Professor of Sacred Theology of the Order of Preachers and confessor to His Royal Majesty To the pious reader, greetings. By command and authority of the Royal Council I have read and carefully examined the Commentaries of Brother Domingo Bañez, holder of the Primary Chair of Sacred Theology in the Academy of Salamanca, on the Second Part of the Second Part of St. Thomas. I found nothing worthy of censure, but rather much worthy of admiration, so that the work will plainly be most useful and fruitful for theologians. There is a twofold intellect in man. One is called theoretical, that is, contemplative. It transcends corporeal things, seeks sublime realities, investigates the heavenly minds, searches into Angels, Cherubim, Seraphim, and God, and places its happiness in these things. St. Thomas treats these matters divinely in the First Part. In this part we testify that Master Brother Domingo Bañez has been born, as it were, a most worthy interpreter of the Saint, setting before everyone's eyes in easy and lucid discourse

questions which I would almost call inexplicable by human speech. The other human intellect is called practical, that is, operative. It governs human acts, directs thoughts by reason, moderates them by the reins of the virtues, orders the adornments and decorum of human life, handles the reins of commonwealths, and renders men-as the philosophers desired-worthy of God. St. Thomas treats this part divinely in the First Part of the Second Part and the Second Part of the Second Part. Here also beside St. Thomas as his diligent companion and most careful interpreter, a pupil nourished and educated in his doctrine and distinguished by most candid manners, bringing forth, as it were, the golden and jeweled fruit which moral doctrine is accustomed to produce. Thus, if Master Bañez has shown himself an admirable interpreter of the Saint in the contemplation of the highest things, he rises no less as commentator in this doctrine of morals. This is especially true in the three theological virtues-Faith, Hope, and Charity-to which the much-praised antiquity of the pagans could never attain, although it displayed some very faint traces of them. If himself admirable elsewhere, in these matters he surpasses himself by a great interval. Whoever continually turns the pages of Bañez will experience him as such a master. I pledge my faith to this judgment. Farewell, excellent reader. Madrid, 19 February 1584. Brother Diego de Chaves.

BROTHER DOMINGO BÁÑEZ TO THE READER

He wishes salvation in Christ, Savior of all, and explains the plan of this work I now bring forth, almost at the same time and for the common utility of theologians, two sets of commentaries upon two parts of the theological Summa of St. Thomas, which many years ago I had worked over in continual meditation and had diligently composed according to my ability, and which I have now polished with the greatest care. I freely confess that I was spurred to send to press sooner than I had intended my commentaries upon the first sixty-four questions of the First Part, because another man, enriched by our labors and those of our Order, was preparing to publish under his own name commentaries upon the First Part of St. Thomas. I had been waiting, not because I intended to meditate further upon those questions, as I learned some had falsely said, but because I wished to devote greater labor to elucidating and amplifying the remaining questions of the First Part, from Question 65 to the end, so that complete commentaries upon the whole First Part might appear together. With Christ the Lord favoring me, I promise soon to accomplish this. Meanwhile I have judged it fitting to print these old and new meditations upon the Second Part of the Second Part as far as Question 46, concerning the theological virtues, the gifts annexed to them, and the opposed vices, which I already had prepared. Nor was there lacking another person whose haste in bringing similar commentaries before the public immediately urged and, in a manner, provoked me to accomplish this. But I pass over these matters. Everyone is free, at his own risk, to publish his own labors or those of another. Let each abound in his own judgment, provided that truth is elucidated in many ways for the edification of the faithful and the glory of Christ. I considered it worthwhile, however, to warn the reader of certain things. First, if in this work I have not always followed the concise and Laconic scholastic style-and, as I might say, my native Cantabrian manner-the reason lies partly in the gravity of the subject matter and partly because this book contains many things useful not only to purely scholastic theologians, but also to interpreters of Sacred Scripture, preachers of the Gospel, and jurists. Whoever wishes to see examples should read the later commentaries written upon Article 10 of Question 1, and what we have written concerning charity, the works of mercy-namely almsgiving and fraternal correction-war, and many other matters of this kind. If a prudent and pious reader approaches all these things, he will judge our labor not lightly to be esteemed. I remember Quintilian's saying: it is easy for an orator to please his friends; to please everyone is impossible; to please very many is difficult. With the Lord's help I have already experienced that I overcame this difficulty once in the commentaries I published upon the First Part.

I stand

I show

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BÁÑEZ TO THE READER - CONCLUSION

Therefore it is neither surprising nor to be attributed to immodesty of mind if I have become more confident in offering to public judgment these things which I have worked out with such diligence. I am also encouraged by the judgment of my distinguished former teacher, Brother Diego de Chaves, an eminent Master of Sacred Theology and confessor to the Royal Majesty to whom I wished this work dedicated. Rejoicing greatly in the incorrupt judgment of this man, I shall glory in the Lord and shall never cease to give him immense thanks. Next-and although these things may seem smaller-I beg the reader to observe with how much zeal and diligence I have taken care that these commentaries, together with the complete text of St. Thomas and a summary of that text, might be conveniently contained and read in a compact book. I selected, as you see, paper of uncommon quality, so that a smaller volume might result. Likewise, in our own convent of St. Stephen at Salamanca I installed excellent presses at no small expense. I then hired distinguished and highly skilled craftsmen who would compose the prototype forms with new type most diligently, correct them in my presence, and see that they were printed with the greatest accuracy. I also added a very abundant index gathered through the labor of most learned men. Reader, I have undertaken no small labor in caring for your convenience. May we please Christ the Lord, author of every good. Whoever you are who approach this book, if you discover anything erroneous in any way, forgive it; and, if necessary, admonish me, for I am most ready to be corrected. Farewell now, and remember sometimes to assist me by your prayers before the Lord. Again farewell. Given at Salamanca, at St. Stephen's, on the eighteenth day of June, in the year of the Lord 1584.

CATALOGUE OF THE SUPREME PONTIFFS OF THE ROMAN CHURCH

Arranged by centuries; their decrees or deeds are frequently cited in this work. Century I Peter the Apostle, Galilean - 25 years, 2 months, 3 days. Linus, Tuscan. Cletus, Roman - 12 years. Clement I, Roman - 9 years, 6 months, 7 days. Century II Anacletus, Greek of Athens - 9 years, 2 months. Evaristus, Greek, whom others call Eucharistus - 8 years. Alexander I, Roman - 10 years. Sixtus I, Roman - 10 years. Telesphorus, Greek - 10 years. Hyginus, Greek - 4 years, 3 months. Pius I, of Aquileia - 11 years, 4 months. Anicetus, Syrian - 11 years, 4 months. Soter, of Fondi - 9 years, 3 months. Eleutherius, of Nicopolis - 15 years. Century III Victor, African - 10 years. Zephyrinus, Roman - 8 years. Callistus, Roman - 6 years. Urban I, Roman - 4 years. Pontian, Roman - 9 years. Anterus, Greek - 5 years. Fabian, Roman - 13 years. Cornelius, Roman - 3 years. Lucius - 3 years. Stephen, Roman - 8 years. Sixtus II, Athenian - 2 years. Dionysius, Roman - 4 years. Felix I - 6 years. Eutychian, Tuscan - 11 years. Caius, Dalmatian - 15 years. Century IV Marcellinus, Roman - 14 years. Marcellus. Some make Marcellinus and Marcellus only one person; let this not trouble you in the computation. Eusebius, Greek - 1 year. Miltiades, African - 4 years. Sylvester, Roman - 23 years. Marcus, Roman - 2 years. Julius I, Roman - 15 years. Liberius - 13 years. Felix II - 20 months. Damasus, Spaniard - 18 years. Century V Siricius, Roman - 15 years. Anastasius I, Roman - 3 years. Innocent I, Alban - 15 years. Zosimus, Greek - 1 year. Boniface I, Roman - 3 years. Celestine I, Campanian - 9 years. Sixtus III - 8 years. Leo I, Tuscan - 21 years. Hilary, Sardinian - 6 years. Simplicius, of Tivoli - 15 years. Felix III - 9 years. Gelasius I, African - 4 years. Anastasius II, Roman - 2 years. Symmachus, Greek - 15 years. Century VI Hormisdas, of Frosinone - 9 years, 4 months. John I, Tuscan - 2 years, 8 months. Felix IV, Samnite - 4 years. Boniface II, Roman - 2 years. John II - 1 year. Agapetus I - 1 year. Silverius, Campanian - 1 year. Vigilius - 17 years. Pelagius I - 11 years. John III - 11 years, 7 months. Benedict I - 14 years, 2 months. Century VII Pelagius II, Roman - 10 years, 6 months. Gregory I, Roman, surnamed the Great - 13 years. Sabinian, Tuscan - 1 year, 5 months. Boniface III - 3 months, 8 days. Boniface IV, Marsian - 16 years. Honorius I, Campanian - 13 years. After his death the See was vacant 1 year, 7 months, 13 days. Severinus, Roman - 2 months, 8 days. John IV, Dalmatian - 1 year. Theodore, Greek - 6 years, 5 months. Martin I, of Todi - 14 years. Eugene I, Roman - 4 years. Vitalian, Campanian. Adeodatus, Roman; after his death the See was vacant 4 months, 20 days. Donus, Roman - 2 years, 6 months, 4 days. Agatho, Sicilian - 10 months. Century VIII - opening Leo II, Sicilian. Benedict II. John V, Syrian. Conon, Thracian. Sergius I, of Antioch - continued on the next page.

ORDER OR SUCCESSION OF THE ROMAN PONTIFFS - CONTINUED

Century VIII: Sergius I of Antioch; John VI, Greek; John VII, Greek; Sisinnius, Syrian; Constantine I, Syrian; Gregory II, Roman; Gregory III, Syrian; Zachary, Greek; Stephen II, Roman; Paul, Roman; Constantine II; Stephen III, Sicilian; Adrian, Roman. Century IX Leo III, Roman; Stephen IV; Paschal, Roman; Eugene II, Roman; Gregory IV, Roman; Sergius II; Leo IV; Benedict III, Roman; Nicholas I, Roman; Adrian II, Roman; John

IX; Martin II, Gaul. Century X Adrian III, Roman; Stephen V, Roman; Formosus, of Porto; Boniface VI, Tuscan; Stephen VI, Roman; Romanus, Roman by name and Spanish by origin; Theodore II, Roman; John X, Roman; Benedict IV, Roman; Leo V; Christopher; Sergius III; Anastasius III; Lando, Roman; John XI, Roman; Leo VI; Stephen VII; John XII; Leo VII; Stephen VIII, German; Martin III; Agapetus II; John XIII; Leo VIII; John XIV; Benedict V, Roman. Here the papal See was vacant one year and twenty days because the cardinals were held captive by Emperor Frederick. Donus II, Roman; Boniface VII; Benedict VII, Roman; John XV; John XVI; John XVII; Gregory V; Sylvester II, a Gaul of Aquitaine. Century XI John XVIII; John XIX, Roman; Sergius IV, Roman;

Benedict VIII, Tusculan; John XX; Benedict IX; Sylvester III; Gregory VI; Clement II; Damasus II, Bavarian, who

occupied the papacy by force; Leo IX, German; Victor II; Stephen IX of Lorraine; Benedict X, Campanian; Nicholas II of Savoy; Alexander II of Milan; Gregory VII, Tuscan; Victor III; Urban II; Paschal II. Century XII Gelasius II of Gaeta; Callistus II, Burgundian; Honorius II of Imola; Innocent II; Celestine II, Tuscan; Lucius II of Bologna; Eugene III of Pisa; Anastasius IV, Roman; Adrian IV, English; Alexander III of Siena; Lucius III, Tuscan; Urban III of Milan; Gregory VIII of Benevento; Clement III, Roman; Celestine III; Innocent III of Anagni. Century XIII - opening Honorius III, Roman; Gregory IX; Celestine IV of Milan; Innocent IV of Genoa; Alexander IV, Campanian; Urban IV, Gaul; Clement IV of Narbonne; Gregory X of Piacenza; Innocent V, Burgundian - continued on the next page.

ORDER OF THE ROMAN PONTIFFS - CONCLUSION

Adrian V of Genoa; John XXI, Spaniard; Nicholas III, Roman; Martin IV, Gaul; Honorius IV; a vacancy of the papal See; Nicholas IV, Lombard; Celestine V; Boniface VIII; Benedict XI, Italian; Clement V, Gascon of Bordeaux. Century XIV: John XXII; Benedict XII; Clement VI of Limoges; Innocent VI; Urban V; Gregory XI of Limoges; Urban VI; Boniface IX. Century XV: Innocent VII of Sulmona; Gregory XII; Alexander V of Crete; John

XXIII; Martin V; Eugene IV, Venetian; Nicholas V; Callistus III, Spaniard; Pius II of Siena, formerly called Aeneas Sylvius; Paul II, Venetian; Sixtus IV, Franciscan; Innocent VIII, Genoese; Alexander VI of Valencia; Pius III of Siena; Julius II, Genoese. Century XVI: Leo X of Florence, son of Lorenzo de' Medici; Adrian VI, German of Utrecht; Clement VII of Florence; Paul III; Julius III, bishop of Palestrina, formerly called Giovanni Maria del Monte; Marcellus II, Tuscan; Paul IV Carafa; Pius IV; Pius V; Gregory XIII.

ORDER AND SUCCESSION OF ALL THE COUNCILS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

The testimonies of these councils are cited throughout this work. 1. Jerusalem The first council was celebrated at Jerusalem, an example of which is found in Acts 15, under Peter the Apostle and the other Apostles, in the time of Claudius Tiberius. 2. Roman Council against Novatian It consisted of sixty bishops and as many presbyters, with many deacons. It decreed that Novatian and those who followed him were alien from the Church, while those who had fallen in the conflict were to be treated with fraternal compassion and healed by the remedies of penance, under Decius and Pope Cornelius. 3. Ancyra Called from Ancyra in Galatia; celebrated after Pope Marcellinus and shortly before Nicaea, about A.D. 308. It was provincial, but was received by the Sixth General Synod held at Constantinople in Trullo. 4. Neocaesarea Held in the famous city of Neocaesarea in Cappadocia shortly before Nicaea. Seventeen Fathers assembled; its canons were approved by the Sixth Synod.

COUNCILS - CONTINUED

5. First Council of Nicaea, held at Nicaea in Bithynia: 318 Catholic bishops set forth the integral, holy, catholic, and immaculate faith and condemned Arius, Photinus, and Sabellius, under Constantine the Great and Pope Sylvester. 6. Second Roman Council Held within the Baths of Domitian with 275 bishops; Arius, Photinus, and Sabellius were again condemned, under the same rulers. 7. Elvira A provincial council at Elvira in Spain, of nineteen bishops, around the time of the First Council of Nicaea. 8. First Arles A provincial council in Gaul, confirmed, as appears from its preface, by the authority of the Roman Pontiff. 9. Gangra A provincial council in Paphlagonia, confirmed by the Sixth General Synod at Constantinople in Trullo. 10. Second Arles A provincial council under the same rulers. 11. First Carthage A provincial council at Carthage, with many bishops from diverse African provinces. 12. Roman Council against Arius One hundred sixteen bishops assembled against Arius, whose heresy was then growing strong; they condemned his doctrine and confirmed the acts of the Nicene Synod. 13. Cologne Held about the same time against Euphratas, a blasphemer and heretic who denied Christ to be God; he was condemned and deprived of his bishopric. 14. Antioch Thirty bishops subscribed; approved by the Sixth General Synod in Trullo. 15. Sardica Convoked by command of Emperor Constantius so that Athanasius could return to the church from which Arian bishops had expelled him. About three hundred Western and seventy-six Eastern bishops assembled. The Easterners withdrew and held another council after the Westerners refused to exclude the defenders of Paul and Athanasius. Hosius of Cordoba, who had attended Nicaea, was present. 16. Second Jerusalem Held shortly afterward by Maximus, bishop of Jerusalem, when Athanasius, supported by the letters of Constantius and Pope Julius, returned to his church. The only business was to restore Athanasius by common consent to communion and his former dignity.

COUNCILS - CONTINUED

17. Sirmium: shortly afterward Constantius ordered a council at Sirmium. The Fathers handed down orthodox rules of faith against Arius and interpreted Genesis 19, “The Lord rained from the Lord,” as meaning that the Lord the Son rained from the Lord the Father. 18. Laodicea A provincial council, confirmed by the Sixth General Synod in Trullo. Twenty-two Fathers from various provinces of Asia assembled in Laodicea of Phrygia Pacatiana and established fifty-nine canons containing ecclesiastical rules. 19. Constantinople I A council of 150 Fathers against Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, who denied that the Holy Spirit is God. It is one of the four principal councils, next after Nicaea. It established canons and issued a profession of faith differing in nothing from that now commonly sung in the Church, except that they added that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, without mentioning the person of the Son. 20-30. Provincial councils Valence in Gaul; Tele in Africa against Jovinian and his companions; Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Carthage; Turin;

First Toledo; Milevis against the Pelagians. The Carthaginian councils were later confirmed in the Sixth Synod at Trullo. The First Council of Toledo was confirmed by Leo I; Milevis was confirmed by Pope Innocent I and attended by Anselm, legate of the Roman Church. Historical rulers noted by the catalogue These councils are placed under Gratian and Theodosius, Damasus, Siricius, Anastasius, Innocent I, Boniface I, Ambrose of Milan, and Augustine of Hippo, according to the chronological columns of the original.

COUNCILS - CONTINUED

31. Ephesus, one of the four principal councils, was held against Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, by about two hundred bishops. Nestorius asserted that the one born of the Blessed Virgin Mary was a mere man, distinguishing the person of the flesh from that of the divinity and preaching one Son of God and another son of man. St. Cyril of Alexandria presided in the name of Pope Celestine. The synodal decrees were sent to Nestorius. The Nicene Creed was interpreted at length, so that the council may rightly be called a kind of summary of the whole Christian doctrine. 32-38. Provincial councils Riez, celebrated by thirteen bishops and issuing six canons; Agde in Gaul, by thirty-five bishops, chiefly treating discipline and ordination of clerics and bishops and the utility of churches; Aquileia against Palladius and Secundinus, defenders of Arianism; Orange, issuing twenty-five canons for the building and strengthening of the Church; Vaison, by eighteen bishops; Carpentras; Third Arles, by thirty-four bishops. 39. Chalcedon A general and ecumenical council, one of the four most celebrated, held by 630 Fathers against Eutyches, abbot of Constantinople, who asserted that after the assumption of humanity Christ did not exist from two natures but that only the divine nature remained in Him; and against Dioscorus of Alexandria, his defender. 40-42. Venice, Tours, Rome The provincial Council of Venice issued sixteen canons concerning ecclesiastical rule and discipline. The First Council of Tours, attended by eight bishops, contained thirteen canons urging clerics first to chastity, second to abstinence, and otherwise regulating clerical discipline. The Third Roman Council, with fifty bishops, chiefly decreed that the canons of Nicaea and decrees of the Apostolic See be observed.

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COUNCILS - CONTINUED

43. Tarragona: a provincial council of ten bishops. 44. Epaon: seventy bishops, issuing forty decrees. 45. Lleida: eight bishops. 46. Valencia in Spain: six bishops, in the fifteenth year of King Theodoric. 47. First Orleans Held in the time of Clovis, king of the Franks. His letter to the synod professed obedience to the commands of the Church and the Pope and addressed the protection of clerics, nuns, and servants of churches and the restoration of captives. The synod also replied to the king. 48-50 Girona; Zaragoza, with twelve bishops; Second Toledo, in the fifth year of King Amalaric. 51. Fifth Constantinople A general council of 165 Fathers against Peter, Anthimus, Severus, and Ibas. Peter, archbishop of Antioch, asserted that the Cross should be added to the Trisagion, as though the Trinity had been crucified: “Holy, Holy, Holy, who was crucified for us.” The error tended either to confuse the persons of the Trinity or to deny the two natures in Christ. 52-57 Second, Third, and Fourth Orleans; Auvergne; Second Tours; First Paris. These provincial councils treated observance of the Catholic law, new doctrines, peace, instruction, ecclesiastical discipline, and other matters under the Frankish kings and the contemporary Roman pontiffs.

COUNCILS - CONTINUED

58. Fifth Orleans: among other things the doctrines of Eutyches and Nestorius were again condemned, and annual councils were ordered. 59. First Seville. 60. Third Toledo under King Reccared of Spain, where Arianism was condemned. 61. First Macon. 62. Second Macon. 63. Auxerre. 64-70 Second Seville; Fourth Toledo, celebrated by all the bishops of Spain and Galicia under King Sisenand; Fifth Toledo, twenty bishops; Sixth Toledo, fifty-four bishops in the church of St. Leocadia; First Braga, which read an exemplar of the faith composed earlier by the bishops of Tarragona, Lusitania, and Baetica against the impious Priscillianist sect;

Second Braga on ecclesiastical discipline; Seventh Toledo. 71. First Lateran listed here Celebrated at Rome by 105 bishops against Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul, patriarchs of Constantinople, and against Cyrus of Alexandria and Theodore, who had introduced novelties against the immaculate faith. They were struck by anathema. Paul induced the emperor to bring Pope Martin to Constantinople; when Martin refused to yield, he was exiled to Cherson, where he died as a confessor of Christ and performed many miracles. 72-73 Eighth Toledo, fifty-five bishops; Ninth Toledo, sixteen bishops in the seventh year of King Recceswinth.

COUNCILS - CONTINUED

74. Tenth Toledo, in the eighth year of King Recceswinth. 75. Chalon in Gaul. 76. Toledo under King Wamba. 77. Third Braga. 78. Sixth Constantinople A general and ecumenical council held again at Constantinople against Sergius, Paul, Pyrrhus, Peter, Cyrus, and Theodore, all archbishops, who impiously taught one will and one operation in the dispensation of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Papal legates sent by Agatho presided. 79-80 Twelfth and Thirteenth Toledo under King Erwig. 81. Synod under St. Boniface Held by apostolic mandate by St. Boniface and the bishops of the Franks. 82. Second Nicaea Called by the Greeks the seventh general council, held against those who condemned and removed images from churches. It decreed the relative veneration and embracing of sacred images and the honoring of the relics of the saints. 83-86 Mainz for restoration of a fallen Church; Worms; Rheims; Eighth Constantinople, principally concerning the deposition of Ignatius, patriarch of Constantinople, and the unlawful elevation of Photius from the secular state in violation of the sacred canons. 87. Tribur A provincial council of twenty-two German bishops for reform of the morals and state of clergy and laity. 88. Lateran General Council Attended by the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Constantinople, seventy metropolitans, four hundred bishops, twelve abbots, eight hundred conventual priors, and legates of the Greek and Roman empires and of the kings of Jerusalem, France, Spain, England, and Cyprus. In this age the sanctity and doctrine of Blessed Dominic and Blessed Francis of Assisi greatly aided the Church; from them arose the Orders of Preachers and Friars Minor.

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COUNCILS - CONCLUSION

89. Council of Vienne: a general council in which the constitutions and definitions contained in the Clementines were approved. It ordered the feast of the Body of Christ to be celebrated on the Thursday after the octave of Pentecost, granting indulgences to those who attended the divine office or hours on the feast or within its octave. 91. Constance Begun during the disastrous Western Schism, when three claimants to the Roman pontificate were spoken of: John XXIII, Benedict XIII, and Gregory XII. In its eighth session sentence was pronounced condemning the doctrine of John Wycliffe and forty-five of his articles. 92. Basel Begun earlier at Siena and later transferred to Basel for many and definite reasons by Martin V. Cardinal Julian of St. Angelo presided as apostolic legate with lawful authority from Martin V and then from the newly elected Eugene IV. 93. Florence First celebrated at Ferrara in the presence of the Greek Emperor Palaeologus, the patriarch of Constantinople, and other Eastern bishops, abbots, monks, and crusaders. Because of plague it was transferred by Eugene IV to Florence, where it was completed. In twenty-five sessions Latins and Greeks disputed first about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son and the addition of the Filioque to the Creed; second, purgatory; third, papal primacy; fourth, unleavened and leavened bread; fifth, the transmutation of the bread in the Eucharist. The last dispute caused so much contention that they were forced to cease, and the matter was treated without further controversy. 94. Lateran A general council for reform of the Church and the establishment of peace among Christian princes, under Maximilian I and Popes Julius II and Leo X. 95. Trent The general and ecumenical Council of Trent, long desired by all the faithful, was first convoked by Pope Paul III to extinguish the heresies raised in Germany by Martin Luther. Mantua was first designated, then Vicenza, then Trent. At length Trent was again assigned in 1545, and with Christ favoring it the council began on 13 December of that year under papal legates. The
catalogue notes the emperors Charles V and Ferdinand and the pontificates of Paul III,
Julius III, Marcellus
II, Paul IV, Pius IV, and Pius V. End
End of the catalogue of general and provincial councils.

OTHER COUNCILS NOT FULLY CATALOGUED

Many other councils were celebrated under the same and other emperors and Roman pontiffs, but the compiler could not inspect them either because complete copies no longer existed or because they had not yet come into his hands. One was Vienne under Clement V, already mentioned, whose complete acts do not survive; another was Lyons under Gregory X, both general councils. Other councils cited by Gratian Auvergne; Varenne; Ephesus; Hermeria; Faenza; Alteum; Hippo; Genoa; Matianum; Manetum; Urbanum. Gratian drew decrees from these, although complete exemplars are not commonly preserved. Sirmium under Julius I By order of Emperor Constantius a council, partly sacred and partly sacrilegious, was held at Sirmium. Eastern Arian bishops condemned Photinus, while Catholics issued propositions of their faith. Hosius, the aged Spanish bishop, was compelled by severe torments and blows to subscribe to certain definitions. Later Hosius, Liberius of Rome, and other bishops were sent into exile because they refused to confirm the impious Arian decrees of the Council of Milan. Athanasius reports that the Arians held ten councils in an effort to establish their faith; one was at Seleucia in Isauria with 160 bishops. Second Ephesus Under Leo I, by order of Theodosius the Younger, the profane Second Council of Ephesus was convened under Dioscorus. He killed the holy Flavian, despised the legates of Pope Leo, refused even to allow Leo's letters to be read, defined the faith of Eutyches, and restored him to the priesthood. Against Dioscorus the holy Fourth Synod was held at Chalcedon in the second year of Emperor Marcian; it deposed and condemned both Dioscorus and Eutyches. Photian synods Under Leo II and Adrian II a synod was held by Photius, who had usurped the patriarchal see in the Church of the Apostles; it had seventeen canons. Another under the same Photius in the church of Holy Wisdom had three canons. Both were later rejected and condemned by the Eighth Synod. Other medieval councils Compiegne; St. Medard; Beauvais, from which Gratian cites decrees. End.

Question 1

On the object of faith.

Question 2

On faith with respect to its interior act, which is believing.

Question 3

On faith with respect to its exterior act, which is confession.

Question 4

On the habit of faith and faith itself.

Question 5

On the habit of faith with respect to those who possess it.

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Question 6

On the habit of faith with respect to its cause.

Question 7

On faith with respect to its effects.

Question 8

On what corresponds to faith: first, the gift of understanding.

Question 9

On what corresponds to faith: the gift of knowledge.

Question 10

On the vices opposed to faith.

Question 11

On heresy.

Question 12

On apostasy.

Question 13

On vices opposed to the confession of faith.

Question 14

On blasphemy, especially the sin against the Holy Spirit.

Question 15

On blindness of mind and dullness of sense, opposed to the gift of understanding.

Question 16

On the precepts pertaining to faith and the gifts of knowledge and understanding.

Question 17

On hope itself.

Question 18

On the subject of hope.

Question 19

On the gift of fear corresponding to hope.

Question 20

On despair.

Question 21

On presumption.

Question 22

On the precepts pertaining to hope and the gift of fear.

Question 23

On charity in itself.

Question 24

On charity in relation to its subject.

Question 25

On the object of charity.

Question 26

On the order of those to be loved.

Question 27

On charity’s principal act, which is love.

Question 28

On joy, the interior effect following charity’s principal act.

Question 29

On peace, an interior effect of charity.

Question 30

On mercy, an interior effect of charity.

Question 31

On beneficence, an exterior effect of charity.

Question 32

On almsgiving.

Question 33

On fraternal correction.

Question 34

On hatred, opposed to charity.

Question 35

On acedia, opposed to joy in the divine good.

Question 36

On envy, opposed to joy in the good of one’s neighbor.

Question 37

On discord, opposed to peace.

Question 38

On contention, opposed to peace in words.

Question 39

On schism, opposed to peace in deed.

Question 40

On war, opposed to peace in deed.

Question 41

On fighting, opposed to peace in deed.

Question 42

On sedition, opposed to peace in deed.

Question 43

On scandal, opposed to charity as beneficence.

Question 44

On the precepts of charity.

Question 45

On the gift of wisdom corresponding to charity.

Question 46

On folly opposed to wisdom. Arranged according to the Old and New Testaments. The number indicates the column and the letter the line. An asterisk marks passages explicitly explained by the author. Genesis 1: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” - 565.B. “God created him to the image of God.” - 566.A. “God saw all that He had made, and they were very good.” - 1026.B. 2: “This now is bone of my bones.” - 175.D; 162.A*. 3: Adam called his wife Eve because she was the mother of all the living - 242.C*. 4: “Everyone who finds me will kill me”… “that no one finding him should kill him.” - 33.C. The Lord regarded Abel and his gifts - 193.C. 6: “The end of all flesh has come before me.” - 298.C. 8: The sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from youth - 1026.A. 9: “Whoever sheds blood, his blood shall be shed.” - 1349.A. 11: Abraham was seventy-five years old when he went out from Canaan - 200.E*. 15: Abraham believed God and it was reputed to him unto justice - 434.D. 17: “Walk before me and be perfect.” - 869.E. “I have made you the father of many nations.” - 572.D*. “Do you think a son shall be born to a man a hundred years old?” - 198.B*. 20: “You shall surely die because of the woman whom you have taken.” - 40.B*. 22: “Wait here, and after we have adored we shall return to you.” - 33.D; 37.E*; 38.A-C*. “In your seed all nations shall be blessed.” - 237.B*. 25: “Two nations are in your womb… the elder shall serve the younger.” - 39.C. 27: “I am Esau your son.” - 33.D; 38.C-E*; 39.A-D*. 42: “By the life of Pharaoh, you are spies.” - 34.A; 41.A-D*; 201.E*. 49: “I shall await your salvation, O Lord.” - 417.C. “From the shepherd came forth the stone of Israel.” - 300.E*. Exodus 3: “I shall send you to Pharaoh.” - 267.E. 12: If a stranger wishes to pass into your colony, let him be circumcised - 242.E. 18: “You are not doing a good thing; you will be consumed by foolish labor.” - 197.E. 22: If you lend money to my poor people, do not press him as an exactor… “I shall hear him, for I am merciful.” - 1156.D. 23: If you meet your enemy’s ox or ass wandering, bring it back - 1011.B; 1157.D. If you see your enemy’s ass lying under its burden, do not pass by, but help him lift it - 1011.B; 1036.E; 1157.D; 1200.D*. “I shall be an enemy to your enemies.” - 1011.C. “You shall not kill the innocent and just.” - 1377.C. 25: “Look, and make it according to the pattern shown you on the mountain.” - 346.B; 480.D. 32: “Either forgive them this offense, or blot me out of your book.” - 1031.B; 1033.A-C*. “Whoever has sinned against me, him I shall blot out of my book.” - 1033.A. Leviticus / Numbers / Deuteronomy Leviticus 19: “You shall love your friend.” - 1011.B. “You shall not hate your brother in your heart, but shall openly rebuke him, lest you incur sin through him.” - 1241.D. Numbers 23: “God is not as man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should change.” - 35.E. Numbers 24: “A star shall arise out of Jacob, and a rod shall spring up from Israel.” - 237.D*. Deuteronomy 4: “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.” - 351.D. 6: “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and whole soul.” - 1021.E*; 1071.C. 17: On difficult judgment and recourse to the judges - 138.A; 307.A*; 310.C. 18: “Be perfect before the Lord your God.” - 1454.A. 20: When approaching a city to attack it, first offer peace - 1372.A; “You shall strike every male with the edge of the sword.” - 1374.A. 32: “Ask your father and he will tell you; your elders and they will teach you.” - 428.E.

SCRIPTURE INDEX - CONTINUED

Joshua 1: “This book of the law shall not depart from your mouth.” - 352.E. Judges: passages concerning the nations left to instruct Israel - 223.D. Kings 2 Kings 5: “You shall feed my people Israel; you shall be prince and leader over them.” - 334.A. 3 Kings 8: “There is no man who lives and does not sin.” - 1453.D*. 3 Kings 18: “He who answers by fire, let him be God.” - 41.B; 201.E*. 3 Kings 19: “I alone am left.” - 256.B. 3 Kings 22: “Who shall deceive Ahab king of Israel?” - 33.E; 40.C-D. 4 Kings 20: “You shall die and not live.” - 33.E; 40.B*. 4 Kings 25: “He spoke judgment with him.” - 1353.D*. Chronicles / Esdras / Tobit / Esther / Job 2 Chronicles 9: Solomon was magnified above all the kings of the earth - 247.A. 16 and 19: rebukes for aiding the wicked and joining friendship with those who hate the Lord - 1354.E-1356.B*. 4 Esdras 14: Moses was ordered to reveal certain things and hand others secretly to the wise - 366.E*. Tobit 4 and 12: almsgiving delivers from sin and death and purges sin - 1139.E; 1141.D*. Esther 13: no one can resist His will - 575.D. Job 7, 10, 12, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29, 33, 38, 40: God turns the hearts of princes; man’s hope; the harmony of the heavenly order; investigation of unknown causes; nocturnal instruction; the order of heaven; and other passages cited at the listed columns. Psalms - beginning Psalm 13: “All have turned aside; together they have become unprofitable.” - 197.C*. Psalm 17: “I shall be spotless with Him… With the perverse You shall be perverse.” - 266.B; 760.E*. Psalm 18: “The heavens declare the glory of God.” - 85.A*. “Their sound has gone forth into all the earth.” - 115.E; 732.D*. “The law of the Lord is immaculate, converting souls.” - 251.A*. “The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring forever.” - 763.C*. “From my secret sins cleanse me, O Lord.” - 1201.E. Psalm 21: “They have dug my hands and my feet… I shall declare Your name to my brethren; in the midst of the Church I shall praise You.” - 231.B*. “All the ends of the earth shall be converted to the Lord.” - 240.A*. Psalm 25: “I have hated the assembly of the wicked.” - 106.A. Psalm 31: confession and forgiveness - 187.C; 222.E*. Psalm 36: “Do not emulate the wicked.” - 1319.A,C*. “Hope in the Lord and do good.” - 758.C. “The just man is merciful and lends.” - 1142.D*; 1157.E. Psalm 43: “O God, we have heard with our ears; our fathers have declared to us.” - 367.A. Psalm 44: “The queen stood at Your right hand, clothed in variety.” - 117.E*. “You shall appoint them princes over all the earth.” - 84.E; 617.C,E.

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PSALMS - CONTINUED

Psalm 49: “From the rising of the sun to its setting… out of Zion the beauty of His splendor.” - 240.A-B. “Gather His saints unto Him.” - 180.E. “Shall I eat the flesh of bulls?” - 270.A. Psalm 50: “The uncertain and hidden things of Your wisdom You have made manifest to me.” - 67.E; 410.E; 518.A. “If You had desired sacrifice, I would indeed have given it… A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” - 270.A*; 269.A. Psalm 56: “Be exalted above the heavens, O God, and Your glory above all the earth.” - 240.B. Psalm 57: “Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun.” - 719.A. Psalm 59: “Gilead is mine and Manasseh is mine… into Idumea I shall stretch out my shoe.” - 240.C. Psalm 60: “From the ends of the earth I cried to You.” - 212.D. Psalm 61: “Hope in Him, all you assembly of the people; pour out your hearts before Him.” - 802.E. Psalm 65: “Let all the earth adore You, O God.” - 240.C*. Psalm 67: “In the churches bless God the Lord… Kingdoms of the earth, sing to God.” - 207.E; 240.C*. Psalm 71: “He shall rule from sea to sea… all nations shall serve Him.” - 240.B*; 243.B. Psalm 72: “They set their mouth against heaven… But for me it is good to adhere to God.” - 298.C; 765.D; 1033.C. Psalm 77: “What He commanded our fathers to make known to their sons.” - 367.A. Psalm 81: “God stood in the assembly of gods.” - 298.B. Psalm 84: “He shall speak peace to His people and to His saints.” - 218.C. Psalm 85: “All the nations You have made shall come and adore before You, O Lord.” - 240.C; 243.B. Psalm 86: “Glorious things are said of you, O city of God.” - 212.C*; 215.B; 240.C. Psalm 90: “Because he has hoped in Me, I shall deliver him.” - 732.D. Psalm 92: “Your testimonies are exceedingly credible.” - 58.D. Psalm 93: “He who teaches man knowledge.” - 456.A*. Psalm 95: “Sing to the Lord a new song… announce His glory among the nations.” - 240.D*. Psalm 97: “The Lord has made known His salvation… all the earth, rejoice in God.” - 240.D*. Psalm 98: “Avenging all their inventions.” - 187.D. Psalm 101: peoples and kings gathered to serve the Lord - 112.C*. Psalm 103: “You founded the earth upon its stability.” - 235.D*. Psalm 118: “Blessed are the undefiled in the way.” - 266.C; 1454.C. “Reveal my eyes and I shall consider the wonders of Your law.” - 362.B. “Forever, O Lord, Your word remains.” - 124.E. Psalm 120: “I lifted up my eyes to the mountains, whence help shall come to me.” - 750.C. Psalm 122: “As the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters, so are our eyes toward the Lord our God.” - 820.E. Psalm 134: “Whatever the Lord willed, He did in heaven and on earth.” - 575.D. Psalm 138: “Your friends are exceedingly honored by me, O God.” - 815.C. Psalm 144: “The Lord is faithful in all His words and holy in all His works.” - 6.E. Proverbs - opening Proverbs 1: “Because I called and you refused.” - 575.D. 3: “Blessed is the man who finds wisdom.” - 296.D. 6: the apostate and useless man devises evil with a depraved heart - 662.E; 683.E. 11: at the death of the wicked there shall be no further hope - 754.D. 14: “The wise man fears and turns away from evil; the fool passes on and is confident.” - 797.E. “He who has mercy on the poor shall be blessed.” - 1141.E. 20: “He who has mercy on the poor lends to the Lord.” - 1141.C-D. 21: he who stops his ear to the cry of the poor shall himself cry and not be heard - 1046.E*. 24: “Rescue those who are being led to death.” - 624.C; 1122.A,C.

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PROVERBS / ECCLESIASTES / CANTICLES

Proverbs 24: “The just man falls seven times.” - 987.E; 988.D*. 25: “If your enemy is hungry, feed him.” - 1011.C. 30: “Do not add anything to the words of God, lest you be reproved and found a liar.” - 380.E. Ecclesiastes 7: “There is no just man on earth who does good and does not sin.” - 1453.D. Canticles 1: “Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth.” - 817.E. “I am black but beautiful.” - 111.D; 189.D*; 205.D*. “Show me where you feed your flock.” - 236.E; 248.E*. 2: “As a lily among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters.” - 186.C*. “He has ordered charity in me.” - 1074.E*. “Arise, make haste, my love.” - 815.C. “My beloved is mine and I am his.” - 815.C; 1033.C. 4: “You are all fair, my love, and there is no spot in you.” - 179.A; 204.C; 209.B; 265.B,E; 266.A*. 6: “One is my dove, one is my perfect one.” - 211.D*; 213.A,C,D. 8: “Many waters could not extinguish charity.” - 992.C*. “My vineyard is before me.” - 235.A*. Wisdom 2: they did not know the mysteries of God nor hope for the reward of justice - 425.B. 6: “A most severe judgment shall be for those who rule.” - 1164.B. 7: Wisdom is an infinite treasure to men; those who use it become partakers of friendship with God - 815.C. Wisdom passes through nations into holy souls and makes friends of God and prophets - 412.C. 9: “Give me wisdom, the companion of Your throne.” - 1217.E. Human thoughts are timid and our counsels uncertain - 234.B. 15: “To know You is perfect justice, and to know Your justice and power is the root of immortality.” - 520.D. 17: wickedness, being fearful, condemns itself by testimony of conscience - 756.C. Sirach Prologue: an exhortation to attentive reading and a warning that translations differ - 363.D. 1: “The fear of the Lord drives out sin.” - 772.D. 2: “Son, when you come to the service of God, stand in fear and justice, and prepare your soul for temptation.” - 323.E*. “You who fear God, believe Him, and your reward shall not be made void.” - 533.C*. 3: “He who loves danger shall perish in it.” - 1363.D. “Water extinguishes a burning fire, and almsgiving resists sin.” - 1139.E; 1142.B; 1229.E. 6: “There is no comparison with a faithful friend.” - 812.A. 10: a kingdom is transferred from nation to nation because of injustices, injuries, insults, and diverse frauds - 618.E. 19: “He who quickly believes is light of heart.” - 53.C; 578.C. “Correct your friend, lest perhaps he did not understand and say, ‘I did not do it.’” - 1200.B. 21: after sinning, do not add sin again, but pray for forgiveness of former sins - 755.E. 25: “From a woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die.” - 215.E*. 29: “Toward the humble be stronger in spirit, and do not delay alms to him.” - 1157.E*. 30: “Have mercy on your own soul, pleasing God.” - 1129. 39: “The wise man shall seek out the wisdom of all the ancients.” - 87.A. 51: “God shall bring into judgment all things that are done.” - 940.E. Isaiah - opening 1: “Unless the Lord had left us a seed, we would have been as Sodom and like Gomorrah.” - 525.E*. “If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow.” - 233.D. 2: in the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared above the mountains and all nations shall flow to it - 238.A*. “Nation shall not lift sword against nation, nor shall they be exercised any more unto battle.” - 1344.D; 1349.C-E*.

ISAIAH - CONTINUED

2: the Lord alone shall be exalted and idols utterly destroyed - 60.D. 4: the Lord shall create protection over every dwelling of Mount Zion - 235.A*. 5: “What more should I have done to my vineyard that I have not done?” - 306.B. 6: the seraphim covered face and feet and flew; “Behold, send me”; “Hear indeed and understand not.” - 764.E*; 268.A; 263.B*. 7: “Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son.” - 91.B. 9: He shall sit upon the throne of David and His kingdom forever - 116.A*; 276.A. 11: “The spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him.” - 763.E. The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord - 238.A. 14: “How have you fallen from heaven, Lucifer?” - 496.E*. 25: the Lord shall make a feast of fat things on this mountain - 238.B*. 27: the great trumpet shall sound and they shall come to worship on the holy mountain - 238.B*. 29: the sealed book; the people honor God with lips while their heart is far away - 361.E*; 218.D. 32: “The work of justice shall be peace.” - 1097.C*. 33: “Faith shall be in his times, riches of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge.” - 456.A. 35: “Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped.” - 59.B. 40: they who hope in the Lord shall renew their strength - 757.E. 41: the Lord gives nations before Him - 238.C*. 42: “Behold my servant; I shall uphold him.” - 238.C*; 820.E. He shall bring forth judgment to the nations - 238.C*. 43: “When you pass through waters, I shall be with you.” - 234.C. From east and north He gathers His seed - 238.C. “Behold, I make all things new.” - 85.B. “I am He who blots out your iniquities for My sake.” - 233.D. 44: “I shall pour water upon the thirsty.” - 215.B*. 45: “Every knee shall bow to Me and every tongue shall swear.” - 238.D*. 49: “That you may be My salvation even to the farthest part of the earth.” - 238.D*; 327.E*. 50: the Lord gives the tongue of the learned to sustain the fallen by a word - 640.C. 52: “How beautiful are the feet of those who preach peace.” - 85.B. The ends of the earth shall see God’s salvation - 238.D*. 53: “He was afflicted for our sins, bruised for our crimes.” - 251.D*. 54: “Give praise, O barren one who does not bear”; enlarge your tent; the covenant like the days of Noah - 238.D*; 253.C*; 228.C*. 56: blind watchmen and ignorant shepherds - 272.D. 58: “Do not despise your own flesh.” - 1190.C*. 59: the covenant of the Spirit and word enduring forever - 232.E; 282.C*. 61-62: justice and praise sprouting before all nations; a new name; the redeemed called a holy people and sought city - 243.D*; 418.B*; 219.A; 229.D*. 63: “Why have You made us err from Your ways, O Lord?” - 34.A; 40.D-E*. 64: “Eye has not seen, O God, besides You, what things You have prepared for those who love You.” - 518.A. 65: “I was found by those who did not seek Me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask for Me.” - 569.E.

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PROPHETS - CONTINUED

Isaiah 66: the Lord comes in fire; all flesh comes to adore; He looks to the poor, humble, contrite, and trembling at His words - 270.E; 238.D*; 1448.C-1449.C*. Jeremiah 1: “I have given you as a prophet to the nations.” - 39.D. “Do not fear before them, for I am with you.” - 39.D. “I have appointed you over nations and kingdoms to root up and destroy.” - 317.E. 2: “You have seduced me, O Lord, and I was seduced.” - 39.D. 3: Jerusalem shall be called the throne of the Lord - 239.A. 5: the poor and the great alike broke the yoke - 271.E-272.A. 8: those who call themselves wise have no wisdom - 272.D. 18: God speaks concerning a nation to build or plant it and repents of the good if it does evil - 281.C. 25: nations drink the cup and fall before enemies - 236.B*. 26: “Let him die the death” / “This man is not worthy of death.” - 265.D*. 31: “I have loved you with an everlasting charity; therefore I have drawn you, taking pity on you.” - 812.C*. God writes His law in their hearts - 229.E. 33: covenant with day and night - 61.C*. 49: “I have heard a report from the Lord, and an ambassador has been sent to the nations.” - 252.E*. Lamentations 5: “Convert us to You, O Lord, and we shall be converted.” - 570.D*. Ezekiel 3: “The house of Israel will not hear you because they will not hear Me.” - 25.B. 14: “When a prophet errs, I the Lord have deceived him.” - 34.A. 16: God entered into a covenant and clothed His people - 234.E. 18: if the wicked man does penance, God will no longer remember his iniquities - 936.A; 944.E*. 28: the prince as seal of likeness, full of wisdom, perfect in beauty, once perfect in his ways - 496.D*. 33: the watchman who fails to sound the trumpet is accountable for blood - 1211.B*. 34: “Woe to the shepherds of Israel who fed themselves”; they did not heal the sick; “I myself shall feed my sheep”; one shepherd, David, shall be prince - 1164.C*; 1211.B; 304.A*; 61.D; 335.A,D. 36: God acts for His holy name and causes His people to walk in His precepts - 233.B-C*; 573.C. 37: God gathers Israel from the nations; one shepherd over them; His sanctuary in their midst forever - 239.A*; 214.B*; 230.B*. Daniel / Hosea / Joel / Amos / Abdias / Jonah / Micah Daniel 2: God reveals mysteries - 298.C. Daniel 4: “Redeem your sins with alms.” - 1141.C. Daniel 7: all tribes, peoples, and tongues serve Him - 239.B*. Daniel 12: the learned shine like the firmament and those who instruct many to justice like stars forever - 921.D*. Hosea 1-2: the people once not God’s people are called sons of the living God; Judah and Israel are gathered under one head; “I shall espouse you to Me in justice… mercy… faith.” - 239.B*; 214.B*; 126.A* etc. Hosea 7 and 13: mercy, corruption, and divine help - 1113.E; 1114.E*; 758.E*. Joel 2: “Turn to Me and I shall restore the years eaten by the locust.” - 936.B; 944.E*; 1448.D. Amos 4, 6, 7, 8, 9: sacrifice, preparation to meet God, detestation of pride, prophetic mission, oath, and restoration of David’s tabernacle - cited in the original columns. Abdias: the house of Jacob shall possess those who possessed them - 239.D*. Jonah 3: “Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed.” - 40.C. Micah 5: Bethlehem Ephrata, little among the thousands of Judah, and the ruler who shall feed in the strength of the Lord - 335.B*.

MINOR PROPHETS / NEW TESTAMENT BEGINS

Habakkuk: “The just man lives by faith” context and divine coming; references at 7.D, 420.C, 236.E, 249.A. Zephaniah: all the islands of the nations shall worship God; He shall restore a chosen lip to the peoples - 239.E*; 276.B. Haggai: “Yet one little while… and the Desired of all nations shall come.” - 239.E*. Zechariah: “Return to Me and I shall return to you.” - 570.D*. “Behold your king comes to you, meek.” - 1344.E; 1349.E*. “He shall speak peace to the nations.” - 239.E*; 1349.E*. “Strike the shepherd.” - 263.C. A fountain shall be opened for cleansing from sin - 233.E. Malachi 1: “If I am a father, where is My honor?” - 821.B. “From the rising of the sun even to its setting, My name is great among the nations, and in every place a clean oblation is offered to My name.” - 239.E*. 1 Maccabees 2: the Jews resolve to fight on the Sabbath when attacked - 1402.D-E*. 1 Maccabees 10: appointment to friendship and royal honors - 817.A. 2 Maccabees 12: money sent to Jerusalem to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking justly and religiously of the resurrection - 1135.B; 40.E. Matthew 1: all generations from David to the transmigration are fourteen; “That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit.” - 192.C*; 200.C*. 3: the axe lies at the root of the trees; every tree not bearing good fruit is cut down and cast into fire - 115.A. 5: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” - 834.D. “Blessed are the merciful.” - 1106.E; 1141.E. “Blessed are the poor in spirit.” - 87.D. “You are the light of the world… the salt of the earth.” - 84.D; 1163.A. “Let your light shine before men.” - 707.D; 1163.A. “Love your enemies and do good to those who hate you.” - 869.E; 1010.C*; 1079.B; 1190.D*; 1248.E. “If you love only those who love you, what reward shall you have?” - 1081.E. 6: “Forgive us our debts.” - 187.A. “Lead us not into temptation.” - 222; 234.B. 7: first cast the beam from your own eye; the Father gives good things; beware false prophets; a bad tree cannot bear good fruit; not everyone saying “Lord, Lord” shall enter - cited at 1242.B; 187.D; 197.E; 663.B*; 587.A; 190.C etc. 10: “Be prudent as serpents.” - 444.E*. “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.” - 445.A,E*; 772.E. He who receives a just man and gives even a cup of cold water shall not lose his reward - 1129.A*; 1190.D; 893.C; 959.D*. “He who perseveres to the end shall be saved.” - 992.C. “What I tell you in darkness, speak in the light.” - 257.A*. 11: “The poor have the Gospel preached to them.” - 479.E*. “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.” - 77.D. The Father hides from the wise and reveals to little ones - 68.A; 297.E. “No one knows the Son except the Father, nor the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son wills to reveal Him.” - 68.A*.

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12: “Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men, but blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven.” - 704.A; 713.E*. “I will have mercy and not sacrifice.” - 1113.E ff. 13: the separation of wicked from just at the consummation - 116.B. 14: Peter walks on water and is rebuked for little faith - 195.C; 746.B. 15: Christ is sent to the lost sheep of Israel - 328.B. 16: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven…” - extensively treated at columns 296 and following, with many additional references. “Get behind Me, Satan; you are a scandal to Me.” “If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself.” “What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer loss of his soul?” - cited at 1418.E; 1025.C; 1031.C; 1129.E. 17: faith like a grain of mustard seed - 446.E. 18: fraternal correction: “If your brother sins against you, correct him between you and him alone… take one or two… tell the Church.” - treated throughout columns 111, 118, 1200-1264 and elsewhere. “It is necessary that scandals come.” - 1413. “Whatever you bind on earth…” - 253.A etc. “Where two or three are gathered…” - 148.A; 151.A; 234.D. “Seventy times seven.” - 1241.B; 1244.B; 659.E*. 19: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” - 188.C; 758.C; 959.E; 1065.A; 405.E; 406.C. “We have left all and followed You.” - 1455.C*. 22: “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.” - 981.B; 1021; 1433.B; 1437.A. This is the first and greatest commandment - 188.D; 1435.C-E*. “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” - 1440.C. “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s.” - 1347.A*; 618.B. 23: “You are all brethren, and one is your Father in heaven.” - 1215.A; 327.D. “The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses; therefore whatever they tell you, observe and do.” - 126.E; 164.B; 272.D; 284.A. 24: warnings against false Christs and false prophets - 254.C-D*. 25: “To him who has, it shall be given”; judgment of the least brethren; “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.” - 901.D*; 909.E; 966.C; 1150.E*; 1153.A. 26: all shall be scandalized; “Father, if possible, let this chalice pass”; “Put your sword back into its sheath”; “All who take the sword shall perish by the sword.” - 177.A*; 196.D*; 1344.D; 1348.E; 1349.A-B*; 1390.C; 1391.A. 28: “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” - 89.E; 184.C; 233.E; 241.A*; 327.E; 257.B; 292.C; 341.E*. “Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” - 107.A; 116.B; 182.D; 233.A* etc. Mark - opening 6: take nothing for the way; no staff, bread, or money - 263.E*. 7: “In vain do they worship Me, teaching doctrines and precepts of men,” and making void God’s commandment by human traditions - 352.B; 381.E*; 355.D*. 9: “I believe, Lord; help my unbelief.” - 197.E*.
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If your eye or foot scandalizes you, cast it away - 253.A. 11: “Whatever you ask when you pray, believe that you shall receive.” - 8.B. 13: “What I say to you, I say to all: watch.” - 316.D. 14: “Though all be scandalized, yet not I.” - 195.D. 16: Christ reproached their unbelief and hardness of heart because they did not believe those who had seen Him risen - 439.A; 178.B; 197.C*. “Go into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature; he who does not believe shall be condemned.” - 85.E; 257.A; 316.A; 422.B and other references. Luke 1: Luke’s prologue concerning certainty of the words in which Theophilus was instructed - 258.D. “He shall reign in the house of Jacob forever.” - 116.B. “How shall this be, since I know not man?” - 91.B*. 2: the decree of Caesar Augustus for enrollment of the whole world - 247.D; Simeon sees God’s salvation - 241.A*. 3: “Bring forth fruits worthy of penance”; “He who has two coats, let him give to him who has none”; soldiers are told to be content with their pay - 115.A; 1149.E; 1346.E*; 1386.A*. 6: Christ chose twelve and called them Apostles - 255.C*. “Do good and lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” - 1158.A. 7: “Many sins are forgiven her because she loved much.” - 746.B. “Your faith has saved you.” - 469.B; 732.E; 747. 9: whoever is ashamed of Christ; no one putting hand to plow and looking back is fit for the kingdom - 445.E; 672.E*. 10: appointment of seventy-two; “He who hears you hears Me.” - 1161.D; 24.E; 126.E. 11: every kingdom divided against itself shall be desolated; “Give us this day our daily bread”; “Give alms of what remains”; woe to those who took away the key of knowledge - 181.E; 585.B*; 1065.E; 1146.B; 302.D*; 303.A*. 12: the servant who knew his master’s will shall be beaten with many stripes - 700.E. 13: unless you do penance you shall all likewise perish - 1140.E; 233.E; 407.A; 410.C. 14: one who does not hate father and mother cannot be Christ’s disciple; do not invite rich neighbors lest they repay you - 125.C; 1133.B*. 15: “Quickly bring forth the first robe and clothe him.” - 944.E*. 17: “If your brother sins against you, rebuke him; if he repents, forgive him.” - 1241.D. “Increase our faith.” - 54.B. “The kingdom of God is within you.” - 220.E; 118.E; 120.A*; 270.E*. 18: “We ought always to pray and not to faint.” - 224.E. “When the Son of Man comes, shall He find faith on the earth?” - 87.B*. 19: the Son of Man came to seek and save what was lost; Christ weeps over Jerusalem - 229.D; 182.E. 21: “I shall give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries will not be able to resist.” - 234.B; 256.D. “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away.” - 37.A; 488.A. 22: “Do this in memory of Me.” - 316.A*. “I have prayed for you that your faith fail not; and you, once converted, confirm your brethren.” - 104.B; 108.E; 133.E; 136.E* etc. 24: Christ opens the understanding of the disciples that they may understand Scripture; it was necessary that Christ suffer and remission of sins be preached to all nations - 84.D; 241.B*; 249.A; 327.E. John - opening 1: John was a man sent from God, coming as witness to the light, that all might believe through him - 268.A; 22.B. The true light enlightens every man coming into this world - 412.D*. To believers He gave power to become sons of God - 190.E*; 201.A; 821.C. “You are Simon son of John; you shall be called Cephas.” - 299.C. 3: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” - 200.D*; 215.B; 407.A; 410.C. “God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son.” - 817.B*; 1113.C. 4: true adorers shall worship the Father in spirit and truth - 210.D; 269.D*; 118.D; 119.C*. Many Samaritans believed because of the woman’s testimony - 22.C. “Unless you see signs and wonders, you do not believe.” - 439.A. 5: “Search the Scriptures.” - 362.B. 6: “No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him.” - 228.E; 216.A*; 297.E*; 569.E*.

JOHN - CONTINUED
6: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, you shall not have life in you.” - 40.C. “I shall no longer call you servants… I have called you friends, because all things I have heard from My Father I have made known to you.” - 84.C; 202.B*; 815.C. “The servant is not greater than his lord, nor the apostle greater than he who sent him.” - 292.D. “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin.” - 22.D; 63.B; 191.C*; 204.D*; 558.B,D*. “He who eats Me shall live because of Me.” - 214.E*. Peter confesses Christ when many withdraw - 334.A*. 8: “If you remain in My word, you shall truly be My disciples.” - 203.D*. “Unless you believe that I am, you shall die in your sin.” - 713.E*. “You are of your father the devil.” - 112.D. “When he speaks a lie, he speaks from his own.” - 37.A. “If anyone keeps My word, he shall not see death.” - 992.C*. 9: neither this man nor his parents sinned, but that God’s works be manifested in him - 89.B. 10: “I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd gives his life for his sheep.” - 304.A*; 1162.D*; 1211.B. The hireling flees - 1064.B. “Other sheep I have… there shall be one fold and one shepherd.” - 115.B; 203.E*; 212.A; 248.D*; 334.E. “My sheep hear My voice, and I give them eternal life.” - 178.E. 11: Christ gathers the scattered children of God into one - 202.C*. 12: “Now shall the prince of this world be cast out.” - 60.D. “If I be lifted up from the earth, I shall draw all things to Myself.” - 241.B. Many rulers believed but did not confess because they loved human glory more than God’s - 390.C; 521.C. 13: “What you do, do quickly.” - 40.D; 263.D*. “A new commandment I give you, that you
love one another as I have loved you.” - 1100.E. 14: “I go to prepare a place for you.” - 231.C*. “If you love Me, keep My commandments.” - 1432.E; 1436.B*. “I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father except through Me.” - 402.C; 252.C. The Paraclete shall remain forever and teach all things - 81.A; 107.A; 182.D; 256.E; 266.B; 280.C* etc. “In My Father’s house are many mansions.” - 906.B*. 15: “Without Me you can do nothing.” - 569.E. “If you keep My commandments, you shall remain in My love.” - 1432.E. “Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” - 817.C*; 933.E; 934.C*; 1034.E. 16: the Spirit of truth will teach all truth - 280.D. 17: “This is eternal life: that they know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.” - 296.E; 403.C; 432.C*. “That they all may be one.” - 113.A; 231.E. “Sanctify
them in truth; Your word is truth.” - 190.E* etc. 20: “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven; whose you shall retain, they are retained.” - 445.E*; 617.D-E*; 292.C; 326.B. Thomas and the blessing of those who have not seen and have believed - 503.D; 121.B; 271.A*; 434.D; 437.C; 439.D*. 21: “Feed My sheep.” - 115.B; 156.C; 182; 292.C; 293.A; 303.E*; 330.E*; 334.D-E*; 1429.E. John notes that the world itself could not contain all books if everything Jesus did were written - 359.D. Acts - opening 1: the times and seasons are in the Father’s power - 85.A. The Apostles receive the Holy Spirit and become witnesses - 257.B; 241.C*; 327.E. One must be chosen as witness of the resurrection - 20.A; 426.D. 2: Peter’s sermon and the promise of the Spirit - 241.C*; 426.D. 4: “There is no salvation in any other.” - 417.E. The believers had one heart and one soul - 212.E*. The faithful sold possessions and placed the price at the Apostles’ feet - 1160.C. 6: accusation that Stephen changed the traditions handed down by Moses - 354.E*. 8: all except the Apostles were scattered in Judea and Samaria; “How can I understand unless someone shows me?” - 24.C*; 362.B.
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The scattered disciples went about evangelizing - reference in the original. Peter's vision: "Arise, Peter, kill and eat"; his hesitation; Cornelius was religious and feared God; "In every nation he who fears God is acceptable to Him"; Christ appointed judge of the living and dead; God is no respecter of persons - 88.B* ff.; 430.E; 426.D; 92.D*. Acts 11: dispute over entering to uncircumcised men and eating with them - 88.C. Acts 13: the word was first to be preached to the Jews, but after their rejection the Apostles turn to the Gentiles - 328.D. Saul and Barnabas are set apart and sent with prayer and imposition of hands - 260.A. Acts 14: God permitted nations to walk in their own ways - 210.A. Acts 15: "Purifying their hearts by faith." - 7.D. Peter recounts that God chose that the Gentiles hear the Gospel through his mouth - 228.B. "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us." - 150.C. Acts 16: God moved Lydia's heart to attend to Paul's words - 25.B*. Acts 17: God commands all men everywhere to do penance, giving assurance by raising Christ from the dead - 426.E. Acts 19: disciples who had not heard whether there was a Holy Spirit - 422.C*. Acts 20: "Take heed to the whole flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you bishops to rule the Church of God, which He purchased with His blood." - 1161; 1211.B-C; 1226.C. Acts 28: the Christian sect is everywhere contradicted; hearing they shall hear and not understand - 635.C; 263.C. Romans 2: Gentiles who do not have the law naturally do the things of the law - 406.C; 411.A-C*; 566.C. "Not the hearers of the law are justified, but the doers of the law shall be justified." - 411.B*. God's goodness leads to penance; reward to those who seek glory and incorruption by patience in good works - 575.D; 893.C. 3: man is justified by faith; all have sinned and need God's glory; God is true and every man a liar - 7.D; 417.E*; 36.A,E*. 4: Christ was delivered for our offenses and rose for our justification; Abraham believed against hope - 426.E; 432.A; 408.E; 423.B; 453.A; 746.B. 5: "Hope does not confound"; God's charity is poured into our hearts; Christ died for us while we were sinners; where sin abounded grace superabounded - 757.E; 758.C; 812.A-B; 817.C; 944.E. 6: "The grace of God is eternal life." - 894. 7: the law of sin in the members and cry for deliverance from the body of death - 221.A-E; 222.A; 775.B; 847.A; 1023.D etc. 8: hope concerns what is not seen; if we live according to the flesh we shall die; the Spirit of adoption; those led by the Spirit are sons of God; all things work together for good for those who love God; those justified are glorified; nothing shall separate us from God's charity - numerous references. 9: "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy." - 935.A; 573.B*. 10: "With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." - 52.B; 100.C; 434.D; 443.D; 444.E. "Faith comes by hearing." - 365.B. 12: "If your enemy is hungry, feed him"; "Render to no man evil for evil"; do not avenge yourselves - 1010.C*; 1344.D etc. 13: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power except from God." - 343.E. "The fullness of the law is love." - 839.E*. The ruler is God's minister and does not bear the sword without cause - 1347.B; 1249.B*; 1339.B*. 14: "Whatever is not of faith is sin." - 7.C*; 1363.C. 15: Christ was minister of the circumcision; Gentiles glorify God for mercy - 181.E*.

FIRST CORINTHIANS

1: "God is faithful, by whom you were called into the fellowship of His Son." - 814.D. Not many wise or noble are called; God chose the weak things of the world - 615.A; 857.A*. "The Jews ask for signs and the Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified." - 67.C; 68.B. "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" - 62.A. "I shall destroy the wisdom of the wise." - 834.C; 488.C*. "That you all say the same thing and that there be no schisms among you." - 640.C*. "Is Christ divided?" - 211.E*. "He who glories, let him glory in the Lord." - 571.D; 857.A. 2: "We speak wisdom among the perfect." - 361.C. "Not in words of human wisdom, but in the doctrine of the Spirit, comparing spiritual things with spiritual." - 362.D*. "No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man that is in him." - 166.E. Faith rests not in human wisdom but in God's power - 518.A. 3: "As to little ones in Christ I gave you milk to drink, not meat." - 100.C*. The building on the foundation with gold, silver, etc., and salvation "as through fire" - 188.A; 480.A; 482.E; 767.C*. Each receives reward according to his labor - 893.C; 898.D*. "Other foundation no man can lay but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus." - 409.B*; 481.E. "You are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you." - 209.C. 4: "In Christ Jesus through the Gospel I have begotten you." - 201.A*; 253.B. Do not judge before the time until the Lord reveals hidden things - 654.D*. "What do you have that you have not received?" - 571.D*. 5: judging those outside the Church - 177.D. 6: "He who adheres to God is one spirit with Him." - 765.D. 7: marriage and the unbelieving spouse - 263.D*; 1202.E. 9: "Who serves as a soldier at his own expense?" - 263.E. "Woe is unto me if I do not preach the Gospel; necessity lies upon me." - 257.B; 1205.E. 10: "God is faithful, who will not permit you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but will make with temptation a way of escape." - 6.E; 234.B. "The rock was Christ." - 299.D; 576.C. The cup and one bread make the many one body - 214.E*; 115.A*; 414.A*. 11: "I praise you, brethren, because you remember me in all things and keep the ordinances as I delivered them to you." - 125.B; 367.C. "The rest I shall set in order when I come." - 125.B; 360.B; 377.E. "I received from the Lord that which I also delivered unto you." - 355.A. As often as you eat this bread and drink the chalice, you announce the Lord's death until He comes - 116.B; 184.A.

FIRST CORINTHIANS - CONTINUED

12: “I show you a more excellent way.” - 480.A; 839.D; 978.B. “In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body.” - 190.D. “To another prophecy, to another discernment of spirits, to another kinds of tongues, to another interpretation of speech; but all these things one and the same Spirit works.” - 362.A. “Then helps, governments…” - 338.E*; 350.E*. “No one can say, ‘Lord Jesus,’ except in the Holy Spirit.” - 892.A. 13: “If I speak with the tongues of men and angels…” - 839.D. “If I deliver my body so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.” - 933.B*. “If I have all faith… but have not charity…” - 476.E; 746.C; 514.B; 515.A. “Charity never falls away.” - 752.E; 981.C*; 992.C. “Charity acts not perversely.” - 992.A. “Charity is kind, patient, bears all things, believes all things.” - 1128.C. “Now remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” - 480.A*; 746.C; 839.E. “We know in part and prophesy in part… when that which is perfect comes, that which is in part shall be done away… We see now through a glass in an enigma, but then face to face.” - 585.A; 471.A; 50.C. 14: “Be zealous for spiritual things.” - 1316.B. 15: “As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive.” - 165.E; 417.E. “It is sown an animal body; it shall rise a spiritual body.” - 120.E*. “I delivered to you first that Christ died for sins and rose on the third day.” - 426.D.

Second Corinthians 1: God consoles us in all tribulation; as Christ’s sufferings abound in us, so consolation abounds through Christ - 234.C. “God is faithful, because my word among you was not Yes and No.” - 124.E*. “Have I used levity? Or do I plan according to the flesh?” - 298.D. 3: “Our sufficiency is from God, who made us fit ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter but of the Spirit.” - 84.D; 87.D. “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.” - 569.E. “With unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord, we are transformed into the same image from glory to glory.” - 84.D; 232.D. “Be perfect.” - 188.D. “You are the epistle of Christ… written on the fleshy tablets of the heart.” - 358.A. 4: “Let a man so regard us as ministers of Christ.” - 117.E. God commanded light to shine out of darkness in the face of Jesus Christ - 13.D*. If our Gospel is hidden, it is hidden in those who perish - 25.C. “Having the same spirit of faith, we also believe, therefore we speak.” - 62.C; 476.D*. Present light tribulation works an eternal weight of glory - 898.D. Though the outward man is corrupted, the inward is renewed day by day - 187.C. 5: “While we are in this body we are pilgrims from the Lord, for we walk by faith.” - 453.C. “We strive, whether absent or present, to please Him.” - 227.A*. “We must all be manifested before the tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ, that each may receive according to what he has done in the body, whether good or evil.” - 893.C; 960.D. 6: “What agreement has Christ with Belial?” - 112.D. 8: “Though He was rich, for our sake He became poor.” - 817.D. “When the will is ready, it is accepted according to what it has, not according to what it has not.” - 911.D; 931.C; 1142.E. 10: lest the greatness of revelations exalt me, an angel of Satan was given to buffet me; power is perfected in weakness - 226.C*; 222.D*. “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty in God… bringing the intellect into the obedience of Christ.” - 456.B; 488.B. 11: “I espoused you to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.” - 184.E; 212.C-D*; 219.E*; 821.A. 13: “Try yourselves whether you are in the faith; prove yourselves.” - 527.D*. Galatians - beginning 1: “Even if we or an angel from heaven preach another Gospel besides that which was preached to you, let him be anathema.” - 23.D; 253.B; 371.E; 488.C. “Immediately I did not acquiesce in flesh and blood.” - 298.D. 2: those who seemed to be pillars gave the right hands of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas; only that they should remember the poor - 1163.C. Paul went again to Jerusalem after fourteen years lest perhaps he run in vain - 91.E*. “When Cephas came to Antioch, I resisted him to the face because he was blameworthy.” - 92.E*. 3: “Before faith came we were kept enclosed unto that faith which was to be revealed.” - 415.B*. Scripture concluded all under sin so that the promise through faith in Jesus Christ might be given to believers - 417.D. “Having begun in the Spirit, are you now made perfect by the flesh?” - 991.E. “You are all one in Christ.” - 212.B*. 4: God sent His Son, made under the law - 817.C. “My little children, with whom I am again in labor until Christ be formed in you.” - 201.A; 253.B. 5: “Would that those who trouble you were cut off.” - 253.B. “If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.” - 87.E. “The flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.” - 222.D*. The works of the flesh are manifest, and those who do them shall not possess God’s kingdom - 1140.E*. “Faith which works through charity.” - 457.B; 540.B. 6: consider yourself lest you also be tempted - 225.E. Let him who is catechized communicate in all good things to him who catechizes him - 215.B*. Ephesians begins: divine grace has abounded in us in all wisdom and spiritual understanding - 62.D. “We were by nature children of wrath.” - 1028.A. “You were alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, strangers to the covenants…” - 190.E*;

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END

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author's notes (945). No one in this life reaches a degree beyond which charity cannot absolutely grow (973); charity has no intrinsic maximum of intensity according to its species and can always be increased by divine power (975). Charity: way and heaven / love of God and neighbor Charity is not educed from the natural potency of a creature but from obediential potency (976.C). Its natural state is in heaven; wayfarer's charity and heavenly charity are specifically the same, though their acts differ morally (978-981). The perfection of charity as friendship need not be formally free in heaven if it was free in its root (981.E). Whether charity can be effectively corrupted by sin and diminished by venial sins (986 ff.; 987.E). By the command of charity God must be loved appreciatively above all things (1022.A); every act elicited by charity tends more intensely toward God from the side of habit and divine help, though human sensible intensity toward a creature can be greater (1022-1023). It is impossible from charity to prefer a creature to God appreciatively (1023.A). Charity does not destroy particular reasons for love, such as kinship (1039.D). One in charity is benevolent to all but not beneficent to all (1040.A). Whether charity is better than grace (1059.D); charity and faith differ in their immediate attainment of God (1070.A). Joy follows charity's love of God as friendship and desire (1087.B). The special command of charity obliges to a real love of God above all (1438.C); whether two precepts of charity are needed and whether the order of charity falls under command (1440.D; 1457.E ff.). Christ / Clerics Christ did not know the Trinity by merely infused science; the Incarnation is related to beatitude in two ways (1403.B). Christ merited through an act corresponding to faith though He did not possess faith (72.D); He did not possess hope concerning His own salvation, with distinctions concerning the salvation of souls (738.C). His

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between knowing and loving God in this life (1068.C). The Apostolic Council of Jerusalem was not gathered to remove ignorance from the Apostles but to pacify believers (86.B). The claim that a council is above the Pope is called very rash and a seedbed of heresies (130.A). A council must employ due diligence before defining faith (145.A). Three reasons for general councils, when decrees define faith, and definitions of general, provincial and episcopal synods are given (146-149). A general council convoked and confirmed by papal authority cannot err in defining faith (150.E); provincial or episcopal councils confirmed by the Pope likewise cannot err in such definitions (152.D). Which councils were confirmed is discussed (153.B). A council with legates does not define faith before consulting the Pope (155.B). Fathers lawfully assembled in general council cannot collectively err in faith even before confirmation, but their decrees do not yet make certain faith before papal confirmation (156.A-B). Contradicting a council's definition made under papal authority and legates creates suspicion of heresy (157.B). Theological conclusions / Confessors All theological conclusions evidently inferred from a principle of faith pertain at least mediately to faith (71.D). Confessors, pastors, preachers and doctors must know the articles of faith explicitly enough to teach and correct others (427.E); confessors should ensure heads of households examine whether dependents know Christian doctrine (429.A), ask penitents whether they know the articles when necessary, and instruct those ignorant of faith (429.B). Confessors of the rich are not excused merely because the rich deny having superfluous goods (1151.C). They must diligently inquire when fraternal correction is obligatory (1201.E). A confessor need not always remove invincible ignorance, especially of fact, if he prudently judges instruction will not stop the act but increase sin (1232.E). Whether he may require disclosure of an accomplice for correction (1270.C ff.). The sacramental seal is absolute regarding sins learned only in confession and matters directly connected with the seal (1274.B-C). Preaching against particular sins learned from penitents can be imprudent and dangerous. It is ordinarily dangerous for a confessor to demand outside confession the identity of an accomplice for correction or denunciation. Seal of confession Extent of the seal (1274.A). Knowledge of a third party's crime falls under the seal when revealing it would also identify the penitent or confession (1274.C). Disclosing another sinner in sacramental confession is not a proportionate means for correcting that person, judicial denunciation, or better government by a superior-confessor (1275.A); neither is it by itself an effective or sufficient means for those ends (1276.E). Kin are not in every temporal benefit to be preferred to every friend (1045.D).
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Interpretive consent of superior, owner, or husband is defined (1188.A). Royal counselors must beware of restricting the ecclesiastical authority given by Christ to the Supreme Pontiff under pretext of temporal or political government (114.B). Conversion to God with the whole heart, unless something supernatural is added, never suffices for justification (560.A). Fraternal correction Correction and rebuke are distinguished (1195.C). Fraternal correction is an act commanded by charity and elicited by mercy (1193.D), very useful for sinners' conversion (1199.C), and at due time/place commanded under pain of mortal sin (1200.C); its precept is natural (1200.E). Many circumstances excuse omission from mortal fault (1201.C). The Gospel order in Matthew 18 and its relation to injury against oneself or any sin is examined (1241 ff.). The evangelical order is not a wholly new command added to natural law but is ordinarily the best natural order (1248.C; 1202.A). Correction does not bind regarding every venial sin (1202.B). One need not correct invincible ignorance when correction would not change conduct, except where third parties are harmed (1205-1207). One should correct when factual ignorance concerns divine/natural law and there is probable hope of amendment; human-law factual ignorance is treated differently (1206.C-1207.A). Fear of temporal loss may or may not excuse (1207.D). In doubt about benefit or harm, prudence governs; if correction certainly will not harm and may help, one should correct (1208.B). One need not investigate neighbors' lives scrupulously; avoiding such investigation is recommended (1202.A). Correction and sacrifice When a neighbor is in grave spiritual need, correction can bind despite temporal detriment (1220.B). In extreme spiritual necessity, one may be bound to expose bodily life to certain danger for the neighbor's spiritual life (1221.B). Ordinarily one need not perform penance merely as a means of correcting another (1230.A). One who scandalizes may be bound to cease the exterior scandal; in extreme spiritual necessity charity can require exterior amendment as a means of saving another (1230.B-D). Correction should cease when it is prudently feared the neighbor will become worse (1223.C ff.). The
Gospel order itself belongs, per se, to natural law, but is not determined so rigidly that it must be followed in every event (1249.D-1250.C). It may sometimes begin at the second or third stage, but skipping a probably useful private correction can be mortal sin (1250.D-1251.A). Purpose of witnesses (1255-1256); whether one may renounce the right to correction (1256.C). When all hope of amendment is lost, fraternal correction ceases (1262.B). A superior sins gravely if he turns a matter received through fraternal correction into public judgment when there is no hope of amendment (1261.C). When a penitent is bound to correct, denounce, or protect the common good, absolution should not be given unless he proposes to do so or has already done so when the confessor prudently suspects otherwise (1278.C). A rational creature has an immediate order to God even though men may be illuminated through angels (394.E). To believe is to think with assent (387.D). Perfectly to believe in God belongs only to the just (390.C). It is erroneous to claim that belief merely 'in the community' suffices for salvation (421.B). All faithful now are bound by divine and ecclesiastical precept explicitly to believe the articles as contained in the Apostles' Creed (421.C). One who believes sees that he believes (527.B), but no one is commanded to judge with certainty that his own act is supernatural faith (528.C). Condemned / Debtor / Delight / Demons / Demonstration Whether one must aid a condemned man sentenced to die by starvation if one can (1119.B). A debtor in extreme necessity need not restore to a creditor in similar peril; parent or close kin may be preferred in extreme necessity, with the case of brother or great friend treated as problematic (1123.B-C). Difference between delight and joy (1086.C). Demons and the damned do not possess infused faith (503.C). A theological demonstration is not merely a syllogism from revelation in signified act; theological demonstrations a priori and a posteriori are distinguished (70.E). God God under the aspect of deity transcending natural cognition is the subject/object concerning which faith believes whatever it believes (12.A). God or Deity, considered as first truth in being, is not by itself the specifying formal object of faith (12.C), though God has a formal-object relation to all other believed things (13.C). Absolute and ordained divine power are distinguished (35.C). It is an error in faith to say God can lie under ordained power (35.D); God cannot lie through a good or evil minister (36.C), and asserting that even by absolute power God can lie is erroneous (36.E). How Scripture says God deceives or causes error is explained (40.E). 'God exists' is not a proposition believed by faith by a Christian philosopher insofar as demonstrated naturally (71.C). The two most universal principles 'God exists' and 'He is a rewarder' do not virtually contain every revealed principle in the simplistic sense criticized (79.A), though as supernaturally knowable they can be said to contain other
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articles in a qualified way (79.D). When God acts outside the common law in justification He perfectly heals the person (525.C). God can supernaturally move the will toward good in two ways (560.B). A pagan's demonstrative natural knowledge of one first mover and cause is true (585.D). God deserves to be loved above every creature (1021.C); every natural appetite tends more fundamentally to God than to its own private good (1026.D). Loving God for reward or temporal goods can be lawful provided God remains the ultimate end (1064-1065). Difference between knowing and loving God here (1068.C); the divine object limits the mode of love (1075.B). Whether mercy is in our mode of understanding more excellent in God than charity (1113.B). Seeing God by essence and hatred of God are examined as to possibility and contradiction (1190.D-1191.B). The precept of loving God is a preamble to the Decalogue and supernatural love of God is the first and greatest special commandment (1434-1435). With grace and divine help man can fulfill the commandments in this life (1454.D). Love / Riches / Revelation One love can be greater than another intensively, appreciatively and objectively (1021.C). Whether a creature can be loved more intensely by human affection than God by charity (1023.A). Right self-love is not easier than love of God (1027.A). Love of a friend is absolutely more meritorious than love of an enemy (1080.C). From honestly acquired riches one may lawfully rise to a higher social status (115.D). Why divine revelation is called the formal object of faith (14.D-15.D). The gifts are habits disposing man to works of virtue insofar as he is moved by the Holy Spirit, and are distinguished from virtues (535.A). Understanding and knowledge correspond to faith; wisdom to charity (539.C). Whether the gift of understanding is above faith and its light (540.B); the gift of knowledge is not a discursive habit (550.C). Duel is in no way lawful (1386.C). Church The testimony of the Church insofar as governed by the Holy Spirit is that into which our faith finally resolves regarding distinction and explanation of what is to be believed (24.A). That the Church is an infallible rule for proposing and explaining truths of faith cannot itself be reduced simply to the Church's own authority (25.A). It is an error in faith to say later doctors or the Church after the Apostles can believe more matters of faith, or more explicitly, than the Apostles and inspired evangelical writers did in substance (84.C). Remoteness from apostolic times does not necessarily mean less perfect knowledge of mysteries (85.D); scholastic theology can nevertheless treat later definitions more abundantly and subtly (85.C). Authority of Church, Council and Supreme Pontiff (105.B). What the Church is (105.C; 179.C); difference between Church and synagogue (106.B; 180.D). 'Church' can mean the whole collection of men and angels. The Church cannot consist only of women or only of baptized infants (184.A-B). The Church is sometimes rebuked because of wicked members (205.D). Causes of Church unity (213.A ff.). Its holiness cannot be located merely in baptized children (230.C), and must endure to the end (231.A). It is and must be called Catholic and Apostolic; it is visible and marked by determinate signs (236.C; 256.E; 253.C; 256.B). Continuation The index continues with propositions concerning the Church's indefectibility, visibility, predestination, membership, government, and marks, with the original column references preserved on the following pages. Continuation of entries on the Church: its visible membership, unity, holiness, catholicity, apostolicity, indefectibility and government; relation of baptized sinners, heretics, catechumens and excommunicates to the Church; the Roman Church and See; and the authority by which doctrines are proposed. Entries also distinguish evidence, credibility, and the motives by which the intellect is prudently moved toward faith. Excommunication is treated as an ecclesiastical penalty, with distinctions concerning those who incur it, occult and manifest heresy, and effects in the external and internal forums. All original column references remain those printed in the source index. Faith - beginning Faith is considered as infused and acquired, explicit and implicit, formed and unformed; its formal object is first truth revealing, while its material object includes God and other things ordered to God. The necessity of external motives of credibility for ordinary reception of infused faith is treated, as is the Church's Spirit-guided testimony in the explanation of things to be believed. Supernatural faith has always been necessary as a means for justification and final salvation on the side of its object and mode of believing (408.B), and its act is also commanded (420.B). The precept can be inculpably unknown (413.A). Faith is implicit or explicit (413.C); explicit faith in the one mediator existed in every age in at least some persons (418.D). Explicit faith in Christ was not always necessary as an indispensable means for first justification under natural and written law (429.A), though it was commanded among the faithful and became necessary in a fuller way with the promulgation of the Gospel (419.B; 430.C; 431 ff.). For eternal salvation after sufficient promulgation, explicit faith in Christ's death and resurrection is required in the sense explained (432.A). The author rejects branding every qualification concerning this necessity as heresy or error (432.B). Faith and merit / confession An act of faith can be meritorious (434.C). Demonstrative reasons following a will already ready to believe do not necessarily diminish merit and may increase it (437); evidence concerning the particular object removes the merit of formal faith regarding that object (436.C), while non-evident testimony does not (438.D). It is heretical to claim one may verbally deny the truth of faith to avoid death (444.C). Public denial of being Christian or profession of another sect from fear of death is mortal sin (445.B). Silence under public authoritative interrogation concerning religion can also be gravely sinful, while private questioning is distinguished (445.E-446.C). Questions about changing Christian signs or dress while traveling through unbelieving lands are treated (446.E ff.). Faith as virtue The apostolic definition of faith is examined. Faith is simultaneously speculative and practical in an eminent or qualified sense (456.C-457.B), primarily speculative but secondarily practical, principally in speculative intellect and secondarily in practical intellect (458.B). Formed and

unformed faith are the same habit (462.E); saying mortal sin destroys the formed habit and creates a numerically different unformed habit is called rash and near error (464.A). Faith is a virtue in its essence (468.C), formed faith has the state of virtue (468.D), and faith perfects intellect beyond merely natural or acquired intellectual habits (469.C). Charity is called the extrinsic form of faith and gives formed faith a further moral perfection (469.C-470.C). A person in charity adheres to revealed truth more firmly from the infused habit than one in mortal sin, even if the latter formerly had more intense faith (471.C). Unformed faith can be intellectually more intense
in speculative understanding than formed faith in another Christian, yet lacks charity's command over the act (471.C ff.). An act of formed faith actually commanded by charity cannot be sinful even venially from an attached end; the corresponding question for merely habitually formed or unformed faith is distinguished (474.A-C). Faith is not first among all virtues by dignity, since charity is higher, but is first in the order of generation and has a certain metaphysical priority (479-481). Faith is a kind of material cause/foundation of the other virtues rather than their efficient cause (481.A). It is foundation and root of the spiritual edifice and fruit in distinct senses (482.C). Certitude / public judgment / perseverance Faith is in itself more certain than intellectual virtues resting on natural light (487.E), and questions of comparative subjective certitude are treated. Public judgments of faith distinguish neither Apostolic See from the Apostolic president nor Roman See from Roman Pontiff (136.C); authority to define faith resides first in the Supreme Pontiff and then in the Apostolic See (137.C), and the Supreme Pontiff cannot err when exercising the public judgment of faith in the sense defended. The opinion that during the triduum of Christ's death faith remained nowhere in the world except in the Blessed Virgin is judged near error if not erroneous (193.D). Faith and Church membership The index treats how faith remains or is lost in sinners, heretics and apostates; whether unformed faith remains around articles not denied; how pertinacity, doubt, ignorance and external profession relate to heresy; and how faith is required for Church membership and salvation. It also treats whether faith is 'the life of the soul,' the universal obligation to believe in one God, and the relation between faith, hope and charity. External judgments of faith may be recognized by rules cited from Melchior Cano (638.C); what pertains directly or indirectly to faith (638.A); whether 'faith is the life of the soul' is true (681.A). All men in every state are bound to faith in one God in the manner explained. Grace: distinctions between habitual and actual grace, first grace and increase, divine motion and free cooperation, and the restoration of sacramental grace after mortal sin are indexed here. Grace Man already constituted in grace cannot concur as principal efficient cause of the increase of grace/charity (889.A/879.A). Grace increases through more intense acts according to the excess of intensity, not the whole latitude of the act (914.C). Sacramental grace lost by mortal sin is restored to the penitent beyond the degree corresponding merely to present contrition, according to the account at 943.D. Whether grace is better than charity is treated at 1059.D. Transition The alphabetic index continues with Habits, Henry VIII, Heresy, Heretics, Man, Infidels, Enemies, Innocents, Justification, Law, Free Choice, Games, Mercy, Pope, Prelates, Hope, Tradition, Virtue, and related topics. To deny that infused habits exist in us as permanent qualities superadded to the soul is not formally heresy but is treated as erroneous or near error (825.C). Acquired habits from morally good acts are morally good and specifically like acquired virtues joined with charity (845.C); after the fall no one without grace and charity can, merely by multiplying morally good acts, acquire habits that are simply perfect virtues even in the order of human good (845). Henry VIII's alleged heresy that there are as many Churches as kingdoms is reported and refuted (1141.A). Heresy is a pertinacious error manifestly contrary to Catholic faith in one professing Christ's faith (635.B). How heresy may be incurred by disorderly words (639.D). Bishops can absolve from the sin of heresy in conscience in the stated circumstances notwithstanding the Bull In Coena (655.C). Heresy and apostasy are specifically the same, differing accidentally by more and less (663.C). Heretics How heretics pertain to the Church (109.C; 184.D; 198.C); heretics do not retain infused unformed faith concerning articles they do not deny, according to the position indexed (510.A). Error from even affected ignorance is distinguished from formal heresy (637.C); one who judges himself a heretic is not thereby necessarily a heretic (636.A). Heretics are justly punished by ecclesiastical spiritual penalties and, according to the historical juridical doctrine of the text, by temporal civil penalties (652-653). Purely mental heresy does not incur excommunication; external expression may (654.B-D). Doubt without pertinacity and simulated heresy under fear are distinguished (657 ff.). The source discusses persistent, negative, teaching and relapsed heretics and the then-current penalties (659 ff.), and whether they are objects of fraternal correction. It further treats heretical princes, declaratory sentence, loss of jurisdiction, subjects' obedience, confiscation and alienation of goods under the historical canon/civil law framework (685-691). Man The same man can be called citizen of Jerusalem and Babylon under different aspects (206.A). Only just men perfectly believe in God (390.E). Whether a man can be certain he has supernatural hope at least unformed
(530.C). Duties when reaching use of reason, conversion to God, and the first moral act (561.D; 563.C; 566.A). Before justification a man can perform many good acts that are not sins (588.E). Simple persons sometimes speak more usefully against heretics about faith (603.A). A justified man can fall away from beatitude by sin unless specially privileged (758.C). The special case of one receiving revelation of reprobation and what hope, prayer, charity and conformity to divine will remain possible is treated at 806-807. After the fall, without grace and charity man cannot acquire simply perfect virtues merely through repeated morally good acts (845.C). Whether natural powers can produce a love of God above all things materially similar to charity (853.C ff.).
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What makes a man perfect and his obligations to perfection (869 ff.). A man in grace is not principal efficient cause of increase (889.A); the justified can merit increase of grace and glory and eternal life if they persevere (899.C). A merely naturally good act not referred actually or virtually to the supernatural end does not merit increase of charity or essential glory, though it may correspond to accidental reward (923.A,E). Natural self-love and the relative ease of sensible inclination are treated (1027.B etc.). One may expose bodily life for a friend's bodily life in some cases (1034.E), and in extreme spiritual necessity the just must risk life or fortune for a neighbor's salvation (1037.C). Jacob / Idolatry / Indians Whether Jacob lied when saying he was Esau (38.B). Whether an idolater incurs excommunication (658.C). By what title the Indies are governed by the kings of Spain (625.A). Unbelievers An unbeliever is not universally bound to listen to every person claiming to teach supernatural truths (578.A). Even after hearing the Gospel from a true Christian preacher, the unbeliever does not immediately sin against faith unless sufficient credible testimony is proposed (578.C). Many Western Indians were excused from the sin of infidelity on the side of defective preaching (578.C). The Gospel must be shown more credible than rival religions before refusal is culpable in the specified sense (579.A-B). If sufficiently proposed and firmly believed, faith comes from supernatural divine assistance (579.E). Unbelievers who never received faith are divided into three classes (609.C). Unbelieving subjects of Christian princes cannot be compelled to faith (609.D), though rulers may compel observance of natural law in matters of one God and political morals, subject to prudential limits (612.D-613.B). Past offenses cannot simply be punished before a law is enacted (613.D). Non-subject unbelievers cannot be compelled to receive faith or punished merely for offenses against natural law (615.B), and rulers cannot force them merely to hear preaching (615.C), though later entries distinguish preventing persecution of the faith, human sacrifice, cannibalism, and jurisdiction over Christians (622-624). Non-subject unbelievers possess true dominion and jurisdiction over their goods (618.A). Goods instituted specifically for their rites may not lawfully be sold to them (627.C). Infidelity can exist as pure negation; many who never heard the Gospel do not incur the sin of infidelity in the sense explained (558-559). Three species of infidelity are distinguished (595.B ff.), and infidelity is said absolutely graver than blasphemy (700.B). Enemies How enemies may be loved and the precept of loving enemies (1009-1010). Duties of greeting, forgiving one who asks pardon, and beneficence toward public or private enemies are distinguished (1012-1118). A son need not defend an innocent person when doing so would directly endanger his father's life in the specified case, while he may defend an innocent against an unjust attacking father even if the aggressor dies as a consequence (1122.B). Innocents as innocents may never be directly and intentionally killed (1377.C); accidental unintended killing and captivity/despoiling in just war are separately treated (1378.C; 1379.A). Justification Supernatural faith has always been necessary as a means on the side of object and mode of believing (408.B). Explicit faith in Christ is not in every historical state absolutely necessary as an indispensable means for first justification (430.C). It is de fide that justifying grace is never conferred because of a merit or efficacy of a merely natural preparation that makes grace owed (569.C). Preventing divine mercy is so necessary that Catholic faith also confesses free choice is truly and freely moved and excited to consent to God calling and moving it (570.C). Justice once received can be preserved and increased by good works (899.C). Law / Judge Divine positive law, excluding natural law, did not expressly forbid every sin; the Old Law did not assign sacrifices for every sin (250.C; 251.B). Natural law contained both natural and certain supernatural precepts (413.E). Jews and Moors and their expulsion from Spain by the Catholic Monarchs are indexed (611.B). A judge in mortal sin does not sin mortally merely by judging
(1238.C). If a judge knows through confession that the accused has suffered an injustice and this can be proved, he must not proceed unjustly; distinctions are made between public judicial injury and private injury and the duty to remedy it (1265-1267). At the Last Judgment Christ will manifest free acts, good and evil, of faithful and unbelievers; natural good acts of those dying in sin may be praised but are not salvific reward (919.D). Natural law / free choice / gaming In the state of natural law faith, hope and charity were commanded in one who had mortally sinned; explicit supernatural belief in God as author of grace and reward and faith in one mediator, implicit or explicit, were necessary in the senses explained (416-417). Natural law binds baptized and unbaptized alike (577.C). Teachers of law must remove ignorance from subjects concerning what they are bound to know (1209.E), and anyone knowing such truth may have a duty to teach an ignorant neighbor in danger of mortal sin (1206.A). Whether free choice is essentially good (47.A); compatibility of liberty with efficacious divine help (575.C-D); whether free choice moved by God can dissent if it wills (575.D). Human acts can have true efficient causality under divine motion without thereby meriting first justification (887.A/877.A). Gaming transfers ownership under natural law when players may alienate their goods and fraud/violence are absent; those incapable of alienating cannot truly lose or gain ownership (1177-1187). Moderate sums may be risked in games by suitable persons; kinds of games are reduced to three (1178-1179). The text discusses transfer of ownership in prohibited games under common, pontifical, civil and Spanish royal law, rights of recovery, judicial restitution, pledged payment and special Castilian rules (1180-1184). Natural light can be impeded not only by bodily organ damage but by culpable causes such as drunkenness; privation of natural light can have the character of punishment or fault (718.A-B). Mary / Martyrdom / Jews and Moors / Physician / Lie It is an error in faith to say the Virgin Mary lost faith during Christ's Passion (198.A). How Mary is called Queen of Mercy and our hope (1101.B). Martin V's election is not reasonably doubtful. Whether martyrdom confers first grace on an attrite person suffering for confession of faith (739.E; 932.E). Jews and

Moors expelled from Spain: see 611.B. Whether a physician hired to care for the sick in every event is bound to do so at risk of life (1222.A). To lie is to assert what is false with intention to deceive (34.E); lying as such is not a punishment (41.D). Merit / Soldiers Merit as a moral disposition making reward due does not by itself make a subject physically capable of receiving a reward that requires a real disposition (906.C). When mortified merits revive through penance, all merits that once lived from charity revive (941.A); if one dies immediately after their revival, essential glory corresponds according to the distinctions at 942.A. Soldiers bound by stipend or subjection may in certain cases follow their prince despite personal doubt, while lower soldiers not admitted to war councils need not investigate justice and may trust superiors (1364-1365). Soldiers who are neither subjects nor stipendiaries may not fight when doubtful of justice; if they know the prince himself doubts, even subjects/stipendiaries may not fight (1365.D-1366.A). Those with no reason to **doubt need not investigate causes (1366.B). Mercenaries ready for any war solely for higher pay are in a state** of mortal sin and cannot be absolved while so disposed (1366). Those ready only for just war may follow a prince known as Christian (1366.D). Movables captured in actual conflict belong to captors in a just war (1375.C); a soldier may not kill one he knows innocent (1378.A); duties toward commanders and comrades (1385.E); a soldier may be bound under mortal sin to hold his assigned station even at risk of death (1386.B). Mercy / Nuns / Necessity How sin can be an object of mercy (1101.D). Divine mercy chiefly makes a man voluntarily detest what he formerly willed and do penance (1101.C). That mercy is a virtue is certain according to faith (1106.D); whether it is demonstrably a special virtue distinct from charity is debated, though judged very probable (1106.C-1107.B). Mercy principally resides in the will and secondarily in sensitive appetite (1108-1109); whether it is greatest of virtues (1111.D); relation of mercy and charity in God (1113.B); works of mercy commonly please God more than exterior works of religion (1114.B). The enclosure of nuns is praised as reformed by Trent, Pius V and Gregory XIII (168.D). Extreme spiritual and bodily necessity are defined, and public judges may compel citizens to aid in extreme necessity (1037.B; 1152.D; 1154.D). Extreme necessity and whether begging can supply it (1185.A). God often increases the name of one whom He wills to magnify (299.A). 'Object' is said in three ways; the formal aspect of the object of a cognitive habit is twofold (11.C-D). God under the aspect of deity beyond natural cognition is the subject concerning which faith believes (12.A); first truth as propositionally signifiable is principally what faith assents to (12.B); theology and faith share God under deity as subject, while theology's formal object (obiectum formale) is the virtually revealed (17.C-D). Hatred is divided into hatred of enmity and of abomination; hatred of God as direct enmity is the gravest sin and a special sin against the Holy Spirit (1294 ff.), graver than infidelity in the sense argued. Hatred of God and neighbor and their species are distinguished; hatred arises more directly from envy than anger (1304.E). Good works mortified by mortal sin revive through penance, though not necessarily in the same degree of grace previously possessed (940.B-941.C). Whether a probable opinion may always be followed after leaving the more probable is indexed (579.B). Pope That the papacy was instituted by Christ by divine right is de fide (129.C). 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The Pope judges suitable modes for religious institutes and cannot err in confirming an institute as to truth of doctrine and constitutions presented for approval, though prudential errors about multiplication or circumstances of institutes are possible without destruction of the Church (172-175). Whether a schismatic Pope is within the Church (185.B). The Pope does not formally succeed Peter in the entire authority of apostolate, but in its principal office, government of the Church (237.B). He cannot prohibit episcopal consecration in such a way as to destroy power necessary to shepherd entrusted sheep; yet as supreme pastor who grants jurisdiction he can restrict or remove jurisdiction as needed and alter diocesan assignments (348.A-E). A Pope can be schismatic (335.C). Spiritual and carnal parents/brethren are compared in duties of spiritual and temporal aid (1046.B; 1052.C). Peace unites appetites/wills rather than intellective opinions; definitions and whether peace is an act are treated (1093 ff.). Sinners / Sin against the Holy Spirit It is a probable opinion, though the opposite is said more probable, that faithful sinners are formally members of the Church and Christ, albeit imperfect members (112.B,D; 207.A). They can truly, though imperfectly, believe in God (390.C). A sinner, faithful or unbelieving or even idolater,

can perform many morally good acts that are not sins without supernatural help (589.A). A Christian sinner does not lose the habit of hope through every sin, and can have a supernatural act of hope (755.C). What sin against the Holy Spirit is, its six species, and how it is said not to be forgiven (710-713). Carnal sins especially disgrace doctors, theologians, preachers, confessors and priests (722.B). Every sin formally consists in aversion from God, as explained (788.E). It is never lawful to commit even venial sin for the spiritual good of the whole world (1031.B). Public and secret sin and fraternal correction (1168 ff.). Penitent / Peter / Roman Pontiff A penitent may, according to common opinion, mention another's sin in confession when otherwise unable to confess the species and gravity of his own sin, though Cajetan's stricter view is preferred (272.C). If bound to correct, denounce or protect the common good, he must intend to fulfill that duty before absolution in the stated case (1278.C). Peter never doubted whether Gentiles could be baptized; Acts 10 is explained. Peter did not lose faith during the triduum (194). Universal power over Christ's Church was conferred on Peter personally; Matthew 16 is explained (296 ff.). Peter first received
Christian baptism and baptized other disciples/Apostles according to the thesis indexed (304). Peter's primatial and universal power must remain in a particular prelate, not merely the Church collectively (306); his power differs from that committed to the other Apostles; Paul's rebuke of Peter is explained (328). Natural philosophers knew some truths of faith insofar as God is considered author of nature (97.A). The Roman Pontiff is by divine right supreme pontiff of the Church; the bishopric of Rome and universal primacy are joined by Christ's institution in the sense defended (130; 308.D; 321.E ff.). The fullness of power resides in the Roman Pontiff as universal pastor and successor of Peter (341.A). Preachers / Prelates - opening The Order of Preachers' service to the University of Salamanca is praised (81.D); preachers should conform themselves to the Church's manner of speaking (648.A). 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As spiritual father and prelate he may and sometimes must inquire for subjects' good, using proportionate means (1216.D). He may place watchers in common/public places (1216.C) but should not specially investigate an individual without reasonable special suspicion (1217.B). Matters capable of fraternal correction should not be carried to judgment under pretext of common good; public defamation can harm the community more than private correction helps (1217.D; 1254.A). Mendicant superiors, especially Dominicans, must foster spiritual works of mercy: teaching, preaching, confession and counsel (1218.D). Those with care of souls, especially bishops, may be bound even short of extreme necessity to risk life for their sheep (1221.E). How subjects may correct prelates and how visitation precepts are understood (1216.C; 1256.C). A prelate gravely sins by taking a matter received through fraternal correction to public judgment when amendment is hopeless (1261.C); strong rebuke and even corporal punishment at the third stage are discussed (1261.D ff.). Reward / Presumption / Christian prince Future reward is substantial or accidental (920.A); the least accidental reward in glory surpasses possession of all temporal goods even with present immortality (922.A). Whether those presuming on divine power for pardon without penance or glory without merits are unbelievers (797.D); presumption is from its object always mortal sin (797.E). A Christian prince may compel unbelieving subjects to observe natural law in worship of one God and political morals (612.D), though prudence may counsel not using this power in every case (613.B); he may not punish past offenses against natural law before promulgating law (613.D). Christian princes and even the Supreme Pontiff lack authority merely to compel non-subject unbelievers to receive faith or punish all natural-law offenses (615.B). A Christian prince may probably compel unbelieving subjects at least once to hear the Gospel so that they may freely believe or be left unpunished if they do not (616.A). As minister of the Pontiff, he may fight unbelieving rulers who prevent Gospel preaching (622.C). Other cases involving rulers tolerating idolatry or grave crimes are treated (623.A). Political authority / propositions The prince's power is from the commonwealth in the political account indexed (1351.C). The prince of a perfect commonwealth injured by another is judge/superior for vindicating the injury in the sense relevant to just war (1356). Whether sinister intention in declaring war creates mortal sin and restitution (1372.B). Priscillianist teaching that lying is lawful to conceal a secret is reported (34.C). Prophecy and faith are distinguished (14.E). Of contradictory propositions neither need be evident (57.B). A proposition can be immediately certain according to faith and also demonstrable theologically (71.A). Heretical, erroneous, savoring of heresy, ill-sounding/offensive to pious ears, rash, and scandalous propositions are distinguished (641-647). One may suffer some temporal or even limited spiritual detriment for a neighbor's temporal benefit, never sin itself (1031.A; 1033.D). Everyone must provide for a neighbor's spiritual salvation when this can easily be done without great personal or temporal loss (1046.E); in extreme spiritual necessity the just must expose life or fortune to
danger (1037.A). We must love neighbors from charity at least in common, willing them supernatural goods we will for ourselves (1441.C). Distinct actual love of a particular neighbor is not an indispensable means without

which no one can ever be saved, but love of neighbor is under a special precept that binds at times (1442.B). Prudence's dictate always inclines to truth (46.B). A child raised among barbarians who reaches use of reason and how God illuminates him by supernatural light of faith (412.B); whether he must then turn to God under pain of mortal sin (561.D). Metaphysical distinctions concerning the formal aspect of the object of a cognitive habit and the 'ratio sub qua' (11.D; 15.D); faith's specifying formal aspect cannot simpliciter be theology's specifying formal aspect (ratio formalis) (16.C). Relation / Victoria / Religious state A merely habitual relation to the ultimate end does not change the nature of an act (590.D). Master Francisco de Vitoria's relection on increase and decrease of charity with Bañez's annotations (945.C). That the religious state is not a human invention but an apostolic tradition is held certain according to Catholic faith (172.C). Papal confirmation of a religious institute's end and approved constitutions does not virtually approve every later statute made by its own superiors or chapters (175.B). Religious Cases of religious who remove or disguise their habit, take another order's habit, wander, act under superior's permission, or do so from necessity are distinguished with respect to excommunication (669-670). Religious should remember Christian perfection consists not in observance of counsels as such but in love of God (871.B), and procuring neighbors' salvation is an effect of perfect charity (871.C). A religious cannot donate goods without superior's consent, though minor alms from goods assigned to use may be allowed when the community suffers no notable harm (1187.D). By office and profession a religious must dispose himself to be fit for the principal duties of his order under pain of mortal sin (1219.A), and religious have a special obligation to works of mercy, always presupposing obedience (1229.B). Commonwealth / Returning from orders / Private revelations Commonwealths are perfect or imperfect (1351.C). Returning from an order received under legitimate papal dispensation and cause is not sinful, whether to marriage or military state; without dispensation and cause, returning from sacred order is mortal sin; minor orders are treated separately (672-673). Private supernatural revelations do not belong to the assent of theological faith in the same way as public revelation; what light suffices for assent is discussed (18-19). Mendicants transferring to monastic orders, appeal to higher superiors without leave, dispensations from religious life, and canonical penalties are indexed (667-669). Scripture sometimes introduces persons as if doubting what they actually know, speaks of future things as already done, and addresses mixed communities collectively; imperatives can function indicatively (90.E; 202.B; 263.B). Scripture signifies things in more than one figurative way (332.D). Not everything pertaining to Catholic faith, nor everything Christ and the Apostles taught for founding the Church and confirming faith, was committed to Sacred Scripture either openly or obscurely; the contrary is called heresy (359.A). Scripture is not so clear in all things that it can easily be understood without teacher; many passages are very difficult (360.C). Not all things necessary for salvation were committed to Scripture, and the reasons are treated (374.A). Correcting the Latin Vulgate by Hebrew or Greek in the condemned sense is called rash and near error (640.E). Some things are necessary for salvation as means, some as precepts, some as both (405). Three degrees of sanctity and whether found in the Church (221 ff.). Difference between wisdom and faith assigned by St. Thomas and whether it holds (1462.D); whether the higher degree implied by the gift of wisdom belongs to gratiae gratis datae (1466.B). What sin scandal is and when incurred (1416.C ff.); negative precepts of natural law may never be transgressed because of scandal, unlike affirmative precepts in some circumstances (1428.D). Which party to follow in a schism (290.A); nature of schism and how incurred (1333.B ff.). Burial / Simony That burying the dead is a good and zealous work is de fide (1134.C). Burial with due honor and moderate ceremony is pious; the contrary is erroneous (1135.A). Refusing burial when one can provide it without inconvenience and no one else will is mortal sin (1135.C). Whether simoniacal purchase/sale prevents transfer of ownership only by positive law (1172.C), and restitution of a simoniacal price before judgment (1173 ff.). Hope Meaning of hope (755.C). The theological virtue of hope does not remain in heretics in the same way; hope without charity is not a virtue simpliciter, though the habit/act
questions are distinguished (755.B-D). A Christian sinner does not lose
hope through every sin and can make a supernatural act of hope; whether hope remains in exactly the same specific manner as faith is less certain (756.B). Hope regards not only divine grace and mercy but also their effects in us by which glory
is merited (758.B). Christian hope is simply firm and infallible in the doctrinal sense explained (758.D). Whether hope is always lost by presumption as by despair (798.B). That hope is commanded is de fide (802.B); one reaching use of reason and doing what lies in him under divine illumination is bound to hope for beatitude (803.E), though exact frequency of the precept is difficult to define; temptations may trigger it and several acts yearly can suffice absent despair (803-804). One given revelation of reprobation is not bound to hope for beatitude but must still hope for divine aid against individual sins and pray for help (806.C-E). The first celestial sphere receives great perfection from its angelic mover (394.C). Spirit / Superfluous / Theology How the promise of the Holy Spirit teaching all truth is understood (282.D). Whether in spiritual goods one should prefer spiritual father/brethren to carnal relations (1046.B). What is superfluous property; superfluous goods are due to the poor, and things can be superfluous in cases where we do not think them so (1148.B; 1150.C; 1158.A). Hope's object is supernatural beatitude to be obtained by divine help; hope is a virtue and certain expectation of beatitude from grace and merits; no hope is a virtue except theological hope; hope is not in the blessed, while it is de fide in souls in purgatory in the sense explained (730-755). Theology's formal object (obiectum formale) is the virtually revealed; kinds of theological demonstrations and syllogisms are indexed
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(17.C; 70.B-C). The three Creeds - Apostles', Nicene, Athanasian - and the Apostles' Creed are treated (99.D; 101.D; 420.D ff.). How fear is an effect of faith (532.C). Fear is analogically divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly (763.A). Its object can be fault without reference to punishment; fault is not its immediate object under every intrinsic aspect (764.B). Fear of fault is fear of an involuntary evil (764.C). Filial fear has three acts or movements of differing perfection. Whether fear arising from worldly love is always another mortal sin besides the act committed through fear (769.A). Whether servile fear is always evil (771.C ff.); sinful servile fear can become a vicious habit through repeated acts (775). Servile fear as to substance/exercise is not entirely excluded in those possessing charity (782). Whether there is a positive precept of servile and filial fear (810.C). Tournaments: whether lawful (1386.D). Traditions Heretics are said to reject apostolic traditions received by the Church (353.D). 'Tradition' has several meanings; traditions are divine, apostolic, or ecclesiastical and are distinguished (356-357). Tradition is sacred doctrine first received orally, strengthened by the use of the faithful, and handed down from hand to hand without intervening writing (357.B). Denying divine traditions in the general sense is impious and foolish (357.C). Traditions were always necessary in every state of God's people - natural law, written law and Gospel - for government in faith and religion (364.C). The force of divine traditions (371.D); examples of apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions (377.C); criteria for distinguishing divine/apostolic traditions from human inventions (383.C ff.). Trinity / First Truth / Virtue The mystery of the Trinity cannot be known with intrinsic evidence through any revelation other than the light of glory in the sense stated (72.C). Trullan canons lack certain authority of faith (160.B). First truth existing in itself is the subject about which faith believes, namely God/Deity (12.B); first truth as propositionally signifiable is principally what faith believes and assents to; first truth in speaking - God's veracity or fidelity revealing certainly though obscurely - is the specifying formal reason (ratio formalis) of faith (12.A-B). Virtue broadly means a habit inclining intellect or will to good (467.E); philosophers often include not only essence but mode/perfection of virtue (468.B). Virtues are in man insofar as he is movable by human reason/mind, while the gifts regard motion by the Holy Spirit (535.B). The theological virtues have God as object and Faith, Hope and Charity are distinct according to faith (743.A; 746.B). Merely acquired moral virtue does not make a man simply good (834.C); whether virtues in pure nature would be simply perfect (845.D); Augustine's denial of true virtues among pagans is explained (846.A). An infused virtue is never actually exercised in the fully virtuous mode without charity also operating in the relevant sense (926.C). Theological virtues do not consist in a mean as to their proper specification because they are measured by an infinite object (1074.C). How one virtue can be greater or better; an inferior virtue cannot command the act of a superior, and ordering one virtue's act to another's end belongs to prudence (1130.C). Visions / Christian life / Will / Vow / Wife Spiritual visions may sometimes truly occur (582.B). Christian perfection essentially consists in charity (922.B). Motion of the will is necessary for the intellect to assent by Christian faith and even, ordinarily, for acquired faith (52.B; 53.A). God can supernaturally move the human will toward good in two ways (560.B). One natural act of will can materially include love, hope and sorrow

END OF INDEX

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART OF THE SUMMA

THEOLOGIAE of the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas Aquinas, with the Commentaries of Fr. Domingo Bañez of Mondragón, Primary Professor of Sacred Theology at Salamanca.

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PROLOGUE OF ST. THOMAS

After the common consideration of the virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matter, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral discourses are less useful, because actions are concerned with particulars. Something can be considered in particular in moral matters in two ways. In one way, on the part of the moral matter itself; for example, when this virtue or this vice is considered. In another way, with respect to the special states of men; for example, when subjects and prelates, the active and the contemplative, or any other differences of men are considered. Therefore, first we shall consider in particular those things which pertain to all states of men; second, those things which pertain to determinate states. Concerning the first, it must be considered that if we were to determine separately concerning virtues, gifts, vices, and precepts, it would be necessary to repeat the same thing many times. For he who wishes sufficiently to treat the precept, "You shall not commit adultery," must inquire concerning adultery, which is a certain sin, the knowledge of which also depends upon the knowledge of the opposite virtue. Therefore the way of consideration will be more compendious and expedient if, under the same

treatise, the consideration proceeds together concerning a virtue, the gift corresponding to it, the opposed

vices, and the affirmative or negative precepts. This mode of consideration will be suitable to vices according to their proper species. For it was shown above that vices and sins are diversified in species according to their matter or object, but not according to other differences of sins, such as sins of heart, mouth, and deed, or according to infirmity, ignorance, malice, and other differences of this kind. The matter concerning which virtue operates rightly is the same matter from whose rectitude the opposed vices depart. Thus, the whole moral matter having been reduced to the consideration of the virtues, all the virtues are further reduced to seven: three are theological, of which we must first treat; the other four are cardinal, of which we shall treat afterward. Of the intellectual virtues, one is prudence, which is contained and numbered among the cardinal virtues. Art does not pertain to moral science, which is concerned with things to be done, since art is right reason concerning things to be made, as was said above. The other three intellectual virtues - wisdom, understanding, and knowledge - also share their names with certain gifts of the Holy Spirit; hence they too will be considered together in the treatment of the gifts corresponding to the virtues. All the other moral virtues are in some way reduced to the cardinal virtues, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, in the consideration of each cardinal virtue, all the virtues pertaining to it in any way, together with the opposed vices, will also be considered. Thus nothing belonging to morals will be omitted.

FR. DOMINGO BAÑEZ PROFESSOR OF SACRED

THEOLOGY Meditation on the Prologue of St. Thomas We explained sufficiently the division of all sacred theology in our commentary on the Prologue of the First Part of St. Thomas, reducing all the parts of theology to the first principles of this divine science, which are the articles of faith. For we said that in the First Part all things pertaining to the five articles concerning the divinity are disputed. But in the Second Part, we said, there is discourse concerning the sixth article, namely concerning God the Savior. Because the Second Part exceeded the magnitude of a suitable volume, it was again divided into two parts, so that one was called the

First Part of the Second Part, and the other the Second Part of the Second Part.

FR. DOMINGO BAÑEZ - MEDITATION ON THE

PROLOGUE, CONTINUED

In the former part the disposition of man to be justified is investigated; and, as though the pulse of a fevered man were examined and the anatomy of all his members most exactly displayed, the infirmity of sin is laid open. Then, as we said in the place cited, the necessary medicine is prescribed to the sinner through the law and grace of God. But because a prescription of this kind was made in that former part in common, whereas the cure of the sick requires discourses in particular, St. Thomas therefore judged it necessary, after the common consideration of the virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matter, to consider each thing in particular. This is what is treated in this Second Part of the Second Part. St. Thomas therefore divides this work of the Second Part of the Second Part into two principal members. In the one he treats the seven virtues, namely the three theological and the four cardinal virtues, which indeed are necessary for salvation for every man. In the other member he considers those things which pertain to the special states of men; this

treatise begins from Question 171 and extends to the end of this book. The remaining subdivisions are so clear

that they do not require our observation. It seemed good to me, however, to publish only those commentaries which were more desired at this time, namely, concerning the first forty-six questions, in which the theological virtues, the gifts annexed to them, and the opposed vices are treated. The remaining matters from the moral virtues which were more necessary for the instruction of the Christian people, especially those which pertain to the matter of justice, have been sufficiently and abundantly treated by the most learned Master Fr. Domingo de Soto in his book On Justice and Right. It is certainly in my mind, if life accompanies me and the Lord favors me, to comment with the greatest diligence upon the remaining treatises of this Second Part of the Second Part. And I shall certainly be not a little encouraged to undertake such labor if I learn that these earlier commentaries please theologians, as I hope. May Christ the Lord grant that this labor of mine may in some way redound to His glory and the utility of the Church.

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QUESTION I ON FAITH Divided into ten articles.

Concerning the theological virtues, therefore, first faith must be considered; second, hope; third, charity. Concerning faith four considerations occur: first, concerning faith itself; second, concerning the gifts of understanding and knowledge corresponding to it; third, concerning the opposed vices; fourth, concerning the precepts pertaining to this virtue. Concerning faith itself, first its object must be considered; second, its act; third, the habitus of faith.

ARTICLE I Whether the object of faith is First Truth.

OBJECTION 1. It seems that the object of faith is not First Truth. For that seems to be the object of faith which is proposed to us to be believed. But not only those things which pertain to the divinity, which is First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also those which pertain to the humanity of Christ, the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore First Truth alone is not the object of faith. OBJECTION 2. Further, faith and unbelief concern the same things, since they are opposites. But unbelief can concern all things contained in Sacred Scripture; for whatever of these a man denies, he is judged unbelieving. Therefore faith also concerns all things contained in Sacred Scripture. But many things concerning men and other created realities are contained there. Therefore the object of faith is not only First Truth, but also created truth. OBJECTION 3. Further, faith is distinguished from charity, as was said above. But by charity we love not only God, who is supreme goodness, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of faith is not First Truth alone.

Dionysius says in chapter 7 of The Divine Names that faith concerns the simple and ever-existing truth. But this is First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is First Truth.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE I - CONTINUED

It must be said that the object of every cognitive habitus has two things: namely, that which is materially known, which is as the material object; and that through which it is known, which is the formal ratio of the object (ratio formalis obiecti). Thus, in the science of geometry, the conclusions are materially known, while the formal ratio of knowing consists in the media of demonstration through which the conclusions are known. Thus in faith, if we consider the formal ratio of the object, it is nothing other than First Truth. For the faith of which we speak assents to nothing unless because it is revealed by God. Hence faith rests upon divine truth as upon a medium. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, the object is not God alone, but also many other things. Yet these do not fall under the assent of faith except according as they have some order to God, insofar as through certain effects of divinity man is aided in tending toward the enjoyment of God. Therefore, even from this side, the object of faith is in a certain way First Truth, insofar as nothing falls under faith except in order to God; just as the object of medicine is health, because medicine considers nothing except in order to health.

Those things which pertain to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments of the Church, or to any creatures whatsoever, fall under faith insofar as through them we are ordered to God; and we assent to them because of divine truth. AD SECUNDUM. The same must be said concerning all those things which are handed down in Sacred Scripture. AD TERTIUM. Charity likewise loves the neighbor for God's sake; and thus its proper object is God Himself, as will be said below. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT St. Thomas, presupposing the distinction of the object of a habitus - for two things are considered in an object, namely that which is materially known and that through which it is known, which is the formal ratio of the object - establishes the first conclusion: FIRST CONCLUSION. The formal ratio of the object of faith is nothing other than First Truth. The reason is that faith assents to nothing unless it is revealed by God; therefore faith rests upon divine truth as upon a medium, and consequently divine and First Truth is the formal ratio of the object of faith. SECOND CONCLUSION. The material object (obiectum materiale) of faith is God and many other things. St. Thomas does not prove this, but leaves it as known. For Catholic faith believes many things concerning God and concerning other realities. THIRD CONCLUSION. Even on the part of the material object (obiectum materiale), First Truth is in a certain way the object of faith. The reason is that all things other than God do not fall under the assent of faith except through the order which they have to God, who is First Truth. These are the words of St. Thomas. ON THE NAME 'FAITH': ITS MULTIPLE SIGNIFICATIONS Before we approach the Scholastic disputations, it is worthwhile, lest we labor in equivocation, to distinguish the multiple signification of the name faith. The first signification of this name is gathered from its etymology. For faith (fides), as Augustine says in Epistle 9 to Jerome and Cicero in Book I of On Duties, is so called as though that which is said is done (fiat quod dicitur). Thus faith receives, as it were, its first syllable from the verb fio and the second from dico. According to the aforesaid etymology it is defined by the same authors under this form: faith is constancy and truth in things said and agreed upon. In this acceptation St. Thomas treats faith below, Question 109, and St. Augustine, Book IV of The City of God, chapter 20. In this same acceptation the name faith is frequently found in Sacred Scripture. Thus, Romans 3: "Shall their unbelief make void the faith of God?" that is, the veracity and constancy of the divine promise. And 1 Timothy 5: "If anyone has not care of his own, and especially of those of his household, he has denied the faith," that is, he has violated the fidelity which he owed to his household. Again in the same place: "They have made void their first faith." Moreover, in this signification God is very frequently called faithful in Scripture: Deuteronomy 32, "God is faithful and without any iniquity"; Psalm 144, "The Lord is faithful in all His words and holy in all His works"; and 1 Corinthians 10, "God is faithful, who will not permit you to be tempted beyond what you are able." And so elsewhere frequently.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE I - CONTINUED ON THE

MULTIPLE SIGNIFICATION OF 'FAITH'

From this first signification is derived another signification or acceptation of faith, so that faith is taken for an assent of the intellect, or for a habitus inclining to assent, by which we believe that faith in the first sense exists in another. For the name of the object is transferred, because of affinity, to signify the act concerning the object. Thus we say that we have faith because we judge someone to be faithful and endowed with faith in the first sense; and finally we say that we are faithful because we believe God to be faithful, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. St. Augustine recalls this varied acceptation in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 31. Hence a third signification is derived, more universal indeed, but perhaps less proper. Faith is said of an assent of the intellect, whether it be altogether certain or uncertain, evident or non-evident. In this acceptation Cicero and Boethius defined an argument as a reason producing faith concerning a doubtful thing. They assigned this definition not only to a topical but also to a demonstrative syllogism. Hence a fourth acceptation can be gathered, which does not seem to differ from the third except as the particular from the universal: namely, that faith is taken for conscience, as it is commonly said that someone possesses something in bad faith or in good faith, that is, with a bad or good conscience. In this acceptation the saying of the Apostle in Romans 14 is understood: "All that is not of faith is sin," namely, everything that is done against one's own conscience is sin. We said, however, that this fourth acceptation differs little from the third, because faith in this acceptation is nothing other than a man's own judgment concerning what is licit or illicit in a particular case. There is a fifth acceptation, sufficiently used, by which the name faith is taken for the very things believed by faith. Thus theologians frequently say: "It is of faith that God is three and one," "it is of faith that He is man," and so forth, because things of this kind are believed by faith. It must nevertheless be noted that there is a certain acceptation of the name faith which the Lutherans use very frequently - or rather abuse - in many places of Sacred Scripture, namely that faith is taken for confidence in divine mercy, through which sins are remitted. Thus they explain universally the testimonies of Scripture in which it is asserted that we are justified through faith, such as Habakkuk 2: "My just man lives by faith"; Romans 3: "We judge that a man is justified by faith"; Acts 15: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and many similar passages. Against their impious error it was defined in the Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 12: "If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing other than confidence in divine mercy, which remits sins for Christ's sake, or that this confidence alone is that by which we are justified, let him be anathema." There is a difference between these two propositions: "faith alone justifies" and "confidence alone justifies." If in the first proposition faith is understood according to its proper signification, the proposition can be received in a Catholic sense, insofar as faith is the beginning, foundation, and root of justification. But if confidence is posited as the sole thing justifying, the other dispositions seem to be excluded, because confidence is the strength of hope, as St. Thomas says below,

Question 129, Article 6.

The principal reason for this difference is that the Lutherans, through this second proposition - "confidence alone justifies" - express their heresy more explicitly than through the former proposition - "faith alone justifies"; indeed they explain the latter by the former, taking faith for confidence. Nevertheless, that faith is distinguished from confidence is plainly gathered from Ephesians 3, where Paul says: "In whom we have confidence and access in confidence through faith in Him." See how he says that faith is the cause of confidence. Therefore faith is distinguished from confidence as cause from effect. For this reason it is not unfitting that sometimes the name faith be taken for confidence, as certain Catholic writers explain James 1: "Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering," that is, in confidence concerning divine mercy, which will bestow upon us those things necessary and fitting for salvation; according to Mark 11: "Whatever you ask when you pray, believe that you shall receive, and it shall be done unto you." Confidence in divine mercy is pleasing to God, according to Hebrews 10: "Do not lose your confidence, which has a great reward." I know that the most learned Soto, Book II On Nature and Grace, chapter 6, in no way admits that faith is anywhere taken for confidence, especially in the cited testimony of James, "Let him ask in faith." He says that faith there is taken for certain and firm assent which we ought to give, and do give, to the words of Christ. But perhaps he asserts this deservedly out of opposition to the Lutherans. To us, however, according to what has been said, the Catholic explanation seems acceptable and more consonant with the sacred testimony. For he who asks with confidence also gives faith to the words of Christ; nevertheless not everyone who has faith at once asks with confidence. Here it is especially to be observed that, although faith is a cause of confidence, it is not necessary that whoever has faith be strengthened by confidence. For someone can despair without losing faith. Hence it follows that confidence is generated not from faith alone, but from faith working through charity. Therefore the proposition, "in whatever degree one believes, in the same degree he also trusts," which Soto himself asserted in the place cited, needs explanation; he himself, without my admonition, added it at the end of Book IV of the Sentences, namely that it is to be understood of faith working through charity. Finally, from what has been said the theologian can gather how foreign to the art and useless are many other acceptations of faith multiplied by certain Scholastics.

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Divine Revelation, the Formal Object, and the Light of Faith A distinction must be made between the formal reason which is on the
part of the object and the formal reason sub qua (ratio formalis sub
qua). On the part of the object, the specifying formal reason of faith is the divine veracity or fidelity (veracitas seu fidelitas divina) as revealing. The ratio formalis sub qua is the supernatural light under which the object appears and is judged. The lumen fidei and the habitus fidei are in the believer and elevate the intellect above its natural proportion. The lumen fidei is not a second object placed alongside divine truth, but an intrinsic elevation of the intellect by which it is proportioned to the supernatural testimony of God. For this reason the habitus fidei and lumen fidei are not to be posited as two really distinct qualities. The infused habitus itself is a participation in supernatural light. Through it the intellect is inclined to adhere to God revealing. Prophecy can also have divine revelation as object, yet it differs from faith because prophecy may give a clearer or even evident cognition of a revealed object, while faith essentially retains obscurity with respect to the mystery believed. Thus one and the same divine testimony can be related differently to distinct habitus according to the mode under which the object is attained. The Church, Motives of Credibility (motiva credibilitatis), and the Ultimate Resolution of Faith Ordinarily a man who receives infused faith anew does not do so without exterior motives by which he is prudently brought to hear and embrace the preaching of the Gospel. The preacher, the Church, miracles, prophecies, the holiness and continuity of Christian doctrine, and similar signs dispose the intellect and make the revelation evidently credible. Yet these motives do not become the formal rule (regula formalis) of supernatural assent. If our divine faith were finally resolved into an acquired human faith by which we believe the Church to be truthful, the act would remain formally human. Instead, the Church proposes and distinguishes the things revealed, while the believing intellect, elevated by infused faith and inwardly moved by God, adheres to First Truth itself. This does not diminish the authority of the Church. With respect to the distinction and explanation of those things which must be believed, our faith is ultimately referred to the testimony of the Church insofar as the Church is governed by the Holy Spirit. The Church is the visible rule which proposes the divine deposit without error. Yet, if one asks for the ultimate formal reason (ratio formalis) why a Catholic assents with divine faith, the answer is not a created authority taken by itself, but the testimony of God and the interior illumination of the Holy Spirit. Thus the exterior and interior testimonies are not rivals. The same Spirit who speaks through the Church inwardly inclines the faithful to receive what He proposes through her. It is therefore false to say that each believer is left to a merely private inspiration independent of the Church. The Spirit is not promised in order to establish as many rules of faith as there are private persons. Rather, the visible Church, governed by the Spirit, proposes the common doctrine, while the same Spirit gives the individual believer supernatural adherence to that doctrine. This distinction will become more important when the authority of the Church, councils, and the Supreme Pontiff is treated below. ARTICLE II - Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex in the Manner of an Enunciable Proposition St. Thomas It seems that the object of faith is not something complex. For faith is concerned with First Truth, which is supremely simple. Again, the act of faith is said to terminate in the thing and not in the enunciation. On the other hand, what is believed is ordinarily proposed to us under statements, for example, that God is one, that the Son became man, or that Christ rose from the dead. Therefore a distinction is required. I answer that the thing known is related to the knower according to the mode of the knower. The human intellect naturally knows truth by composing and dividing. Hence, on the side of the believer, the object of faith is proposed under the form of enunciable propositions. But faith does not finally terminate in the words or propositions as such; it terminates in the reality signified by them. Thus from the side of the thing believed, the object is simple reality, above all God; from the side of our mode of knowing, it is complex and enunciable.
This distinction prevents two opposite errors. We must not imagine that faith terminates merely in verbal formulas, as though Christianity were the assent to sounds or written marks. Nor may we despise dogmatic propositions, because the human intellect cannot receive revealed truth except through determinate conceptions and judgments. The proposition is therefore the necessary human mode in which the revealed thing is grasped. The believer says, for example, "the Word became flesh," but his act passes through the proposition to the very mystery of the Incarnate Word. The same principle explains why one may possess true faith regarding a revealed mystery without comprehending the intrinsic mode of the mystery. Faith determines the judgment with certainty because of God revealing, while the manner in which the predicate belongs to the subject may remain hidden. This is not an imperfection of the certainty of faith, but belongs to its obscurity during the state of the wayfarer. ARTICLE III - Whether Falsehood Can Fall Under Faith St. Thomas Nothing false can fall under faith. The formal object (obiectum formale) of faith is First Truth, and from First Truth no falsehood can proceed. Just as sight cannot be deceived concerning its proper object under the proper conditions of seeing, so faith cannot assent, as faith, to what is false. A believer can err from some other cause, but such error does not proceed from the habitus fidei. Whether God Can Lie or Deceive Because the certainty of faith depends upon divine veracity, the question must be treated carefully. A lie is the assertion of what one judges false with the intention of deceiving. This is intrinsically repugnant to the perfection of God. The Priscillianist claim that lying may sometimes be lawful for concealing a secret is false even in human morals; still less can any lie be attributed to God. It is erroneous in faith to say that God can lie by His ordained power (potentia ordinata), and it is likewise inadmissible to say that by absolute power (potentia absoluta) He could lie through Himself or through another. Divine omnipotence does not include contradictions or defects. To lie
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is not a positive perfection of speech but a defect of truth and rectitude. Therefore to say that God cannot lie does not limit His omnipotence, any more than saying He cannot sin, cease to be God, or make a contradiction true. He may permit a creature to be deceived as punishment, or order events in which an evil spirit deceives, but in such cases the falsity belongs to the creature; God Himself remains true. Scriptural Expressions of Divine "Deception" Passages in which Scripture says that God deceived a prophet or sent a lying spirit must be understood according to divine permission and judgment. God, as supreme Judge, may order the punishment of a sinner by permitting him to follow a deceiving spirit. He is the cause of the order of justice, not of the defect of falsehood. Thus in the history of Ahab, the lying spirit is evil by his own will; God justly permits his deception as punishment. Likewise, when God says through a prophet that a king shall die and the threatened evil is later withheld because of repentance, God has not lied. Prophecies of threat are often conditional even when the condition is not expressed in the grammatical surface of the statement. Their purpose is precisely to move the hearer to repentance. The same principle explains the prophecy to Nineveh and the words to Hezekiah: the divine intention includes the moral order under which the threatened event is announced. Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, and Similar Difficulties When Abraham told his servants, "after we have adored, we shall return to you," although he was preparing to sacrifice Isaac, he need not be accused of lying. He could speak according to hope, according to a conditional intention, or according to the mystery which God had promised concerning Isaac. Indeed, faith in the divine promise was so strong that, as the Apostle teaches, Abraham judged that God was able even to raise the dead. When Jacob, at his mother’s command, presented himself before Isaac and said that he was Esau, the Fathers and theologians explain the words in light of the prophetic mystery and the transfer of the blessing. The act must not be reduced crudely to the intention to deceive for an unjust end. Likewise Joseph’s words to his brothers, and the Israelites’ reception of vessels from the Egyptians, are to be understood according to the right which God, supreme Lord, could establish and according to the circumstances narrated in Scripture. From all these examples the rule stands firm: divine truth never moves faith toward falsehood. A false conclusion can arise in a believer when he adds a false human premise to something believed, but the falsehood then proceeds from the added premise, not from faith. The act of faith as such remains infallibly ordered to truth. ARTICLE IV - Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen St. Thomas Faith, according to its proper formal reason (ratio formalis), concerns what is not seen. The Apostle says that faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. What is scientifically or intuitively seen in the same respect is not believed by faith in that same respect. Thomas the Apostle saw Christ’s humanity and wounds; he believed the divinity which he did not see. Yet the things of faith can be evidently credible, for a man can see that there are sufficient signs requiring prudent assent without seeing the mystery itself. The Non-Seen as Intrinsic to the Formal Mode of Faith The obscurity or non-vision of the mystery belongs intrinsically to the formal mode under which faith attains its object during this life. It is not that "not being seen" constitutes a positive object added to First Truth; rather, the divine truth is attained under a non-evident mode. The obscurity is therefore on the side of our mode of cognition and belongs to the species of the act (species actus) precisely as faith. This is why one and the same truth cannot at the same time and under the same formal reason (ratio formalis) be both evident scientific knowledge and an act of faith in the same intellect. If a proposition is demonstrated from principles naturally evident to a philosopher, he does not believe that proposition by faith precisely under the same natural reason. Nevertheless the same material truth may be related to distinct habitus under distinct rationes formales, a point to be examined more fully in the next article. The Will in the Act (actus) of Faith The intellect does not assent to the mysteries of Christianity through evidence of the object itself. Therefore a motion of the will (motio voluntatis) is necessary. "No one believes unless he wills." This does not make faith irrational. The will does not arbitrarily command assent to whatever it pleases. Before prudent assent there must be some persuasion on the part of the intellect that the proposed revelation is credible. Such persuasion may arise from exterior signs or from a special interior illumination of God. The will then moves the intellect to adhere firmly to the divine testimony. This principle applies even to acquired faith in human testimony: ordinarily a man does not believe another unless he judges him worthy of belief and wills to trust him. In supernatural faith the process is elevated by grace. The pious affection of credibility and the movement toward belief are gifts of God, as the Councils of Orange and Trent teach against those who attribute the beginning of faith to unaided nature.

The Mysteries Are Evidently Credible, Not Evidently Seen Christian mysteries are not evident as true by natural demonstration, but they can be evidently credible. This is more than a merely practical judgment that it is useful or safe to believe. The intellect can judge from real signs that God has credibly attested the Christian revelation. Prophecies fulfilled, miracles, the conversion of nations, the constancy of martyrs, the continuity and unity of doctrine, the holiness of its moral teaching, the preservation and diffusion of the Church, and other signs provide a rational foundation for the judgment of credibility. The believer therefore does not leap from darkness into irrationality. He sees that the authority proposing the mystery is worthy of belief, while the intrinsic truth of the mystery remains unseen. This distinction preserves both the supernatural character of faith and the rational responsibility of the believer. ARTICLE V - Whether Things of Faith Can Be Scientifically Known St. Thomas Science produces assent through causes or principles that make the conclusion evident. Faith gives assent because of divine authority to a truth that remains non-evident in itself. Therefore in the same subject, under the same formal reason, the same proposition cannot

simultaneously be known by science and believed by faith. Yet the same proposition can be known by one man and believed by another. Some truths, such as that God exists, can be demonstrated naturally and are nevertheless proposed among the things to be believed, because not all men possess the demonstration and because such truths are presupposed to the supernatural mysteries. On the Relation of Faith and Science It is heretical to say that before a man can assent by faith he must first possess scientific knowledge resolving the mysteries into naturally evident principles. Such a requirement would destroy faith. Equally erroneous is the claim that the mysteries themselves, for example the Trinity or Incarnation, can be demonstrated by natural reason from natural principles. Revelation is necessary precisely because these mysteries exceed the proportion of the created intellect in the present state. At the same time theology is truly a science in its own mode. It proceeds from revealed principles received by faith and draws conclusions from them. Theological demonstration should not be reduced merely to a syllogism whose first premise says in a signified manner, "God has revealed that P." Rather, theology can reason from a revealed principle itself in actual exercise, combining it with another revealed or naturally certain premise and drawing a conclusion. In this way theological demonstrations may be a priori or a posteriori according to the structure of the argument. Can Faith and Theology Coexist in the Same Intellect About the Same Truth? It is very probable that the habitus of faith and theological science can coexist in the same subject regarding the same material proposition when the formal reasons (rationes formales) differ. The theologian may assent to a conclusion because it is contained in revealed principles and also adhere to the same truth as divinely revealed. The coexistence must not be understood as science making the mystery intrinsically evident by natural light. Theology does not transform the supernatural mystery into a naturally evident object. With respect to naturally demonstrable preambles, such as the existence of God, the Christian philosopher who possesses a demonstration knows them naturally. Whether he also has an act of infused faith concerning exactly the same proposition and under what formal distinction is debated. The safer explanation is that the habitus can coexist while their acts (actus) are formally distinguished by their respective rationes formales.

ARTICLE VI - Whether the Things to Be Believed Should Be Divided

into Definite Articles St. Thomas An article is so called from an articulation or distinct joint. In the matters of faith, a special article is required where a special difficulty of belief occurs. Those things which directly order us to eternal life and contain distinct mysteries are therefore articulated distinctly. Other truths contained in Scripture are believed under them in a secondary way because they serve to manifest the principal mysteries. The number of articles is not determined by the number of sentences in Scripture. Rather, the Church distinguishes

articles according to principal mysteries that possess a special difficulty

under the ratio of the non-seen (ratio non visi). This explains why innumerable historical truths are not each separate articles, while the personal properties of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and other principal works are distinctly proposed. The Eucharist presents a most special difficulty, even greater in some respects than several articles listed in the catechism. Yet it can be reduced to the divine omnipotence and to the sanctifying economy instituted by Christ, and it is taught continually through sacramental practice. Thus the distinction of articles is not a denial that other mysteries possess great depth, but a pedagogical and doctrinal ordering of the common faith. ARTICLE VII - Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased with the Succession of Times St. Thomas The substance of faith has not increased as though later generations believed a different saving truth. What has increased is explicitness. Later believers received a more determinate manifestation of mysteries that were contained implicitly in the faith of earlier ages. The two most universal principles are that God exists and that He has providence over human salvation and rewards those who seek Him. Under supernatural light these principles contain, implicitly (implicite), all that God has freely ordained for salvation. How the First Principles Contain the Other Articles It would be rash and erroneous to say that the two principles "God exists" and "God is a rewarder" as known merely by natural light virtually contain the Trinity, Incarnation, and other supernatural mysteries. If this were so, a man could possess implicit faith sufficient on the side of the intellect through natural knowledge alone, which is contrary to the necessity of supernatural faith. The principles contain the other mysteries virtually only insofar as they are believed under supernatural light. Even then the containment is not by a demonstrative consequence evident to us. From "God exists" it does not follow by natural demonstration that God is triune in persons. From "God has providence for human salvation" it does not follow by natural necessity that the Son of God became man. Rather, because God freely chose the Incarnation as the mode of salvation, one who supernaturally believes God’s special saving providence implicitly adheres to every mode which God has in fact ordained for that salvation. In this sense many of the ancient faithful possessed implicit faith in Christ. Did Later Ages Know More Explicitly Than the Apostles? A more difficult question follows: after the Apostolic age, can the faithful know the mysteries more explicitly than the Apostles themselves knew them? Arguments for the affirmative are drawn from the Council of Jerusalem, from later conciliar definitions such as the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, from the perpetual virginity of Mary, and from sacramental doctrine. If later councils explicitly defined matters not expressed with equal terminology earlier, one might think later Christians knew more distinctly than the Apostles. FIRST CONCLUSION. it is an error in faith to assert that after the Apostles the doctors of the Church, or the Church herself, believe more things

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pertaining to faith, or believe them more explicitly, than the Apostles and sacred writers of evangelical doctrine believed. Christ told the Apostles that He had made known to them all that He had heard from the Father; He called them the light of the world; after the Resurrection He opened their minds to understand the Scriptures; and the Apostle speaks of the first fruits of the Spirit and of the ministers of the New Testament transformed from glory to glory. The Church is built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. These testimonies are incompatible with placing later believers above the Apostles in the substance or explicit possession of evangelical revelation. The Salamanca Digression: Vitoria, Cano, Soto, and the Dominican Chair the fact that later scholastics can explain certain conclusions with greater dialectical or metaphysical precision does not mean that the Apostles lacked the revealed mysteries. Human scholastic science can grow through labor, method, and the accumulation of previous discoveries. "We are like children placed upon the shoulders of giants": we may reach higher in some technical questions because we stand upon the labor of the ancients, without therefore being greater than they. Concerning the public chairs of theology at Salamanca: The university itself was ancient, but public stipends for theology were established later. Dominican friars of St. Stephen’s convent long occupied the principal and vespertine chairs. He names the masters who held them and notes the public inscriptions commemorating them. Peter of Osma, a Paris-trained secular doctor, is mentioned as the exceptional non-Dominican holder of the primary chair; his condemned propositions concerning the power of the keys were judged at a council at Alcalá, and his writings were publicly burned. Francisco de Vitoria was, as it were, the restorer of Scholastic theology at Salamanca. Vitoria brought the doctrine of St. Thomas into a clear and learned method by his living lectures. He was succeeded by Melchior Cano, my own teacher, author of the learned and elegant work On Theological Places. Domingo de Soto followed, having already governed the vespertine chair for many years. Charles V sent Soto to the Council of Trent and later wished him as confessor. Soto, fearing the spiritual dangers of courtly office, relinquished that burden and even refused the bishopric of Segovia, preferring to return to St. Stephen’s. He later resumed the principal chair at the request of the university and completed the years required for jubilation. I myself was present at Soto's most happy death in 1560 and saw in him uncommon signs of predestination: most robust faith joined with the greatest humility and fear of God, and a vehement desire to depart from this age. He also praises Pedro de Sotomayor, Mancio de Corpus Christi, and Bartolomé de Medina, each distinguished by learning and teaching. Mancio, already celebrated at Alcalá, taught for years at Salamanca and was loved for humility and wit. Medina, my fellow student in religion and letters, acquired great theological learning through labor and constancy; his commentaries on St. Thomas bear witness to it. Finally, I myself, least of all these men in his own judgment, was raised to the primary chair in 1581, at fifty years of age, after more than thirty years of teaching dialectic, philosophy, and the theology of St. Thomas at Ávila, Alcalá, Valladolid, Salamanca, and elsewhere. He resolves to devote whatever talent and learning long exercise has given him to the common good.

Degrees of Illumination Through the Ages Returning to the question, two orders must be distinguished. One is the order of historical states, signified by the laborers called into the vineyard at different hours. The other is the order of individual persons within those states. St. Thomas’s comparison between those nearer and farther from Christ concerns the states as represented by specially illuminated teachers, not every individual. Abraham may have been more illuminated than other patriarchs of his age; Moses perhaps more than Abraham; David more explicitly than earlier prophets concerning the Incarnation; John the Baptist, nearest to Christ, was the greatest of the prophets. The Blessed Virgin must always be excepted in these comparisons, for she was nearest to the Incarnate Word both in body and in mind. A second conclusion follows: it is not necessary that, the farther the Church is removed in time from the Apostles, the less perfect its knowledge of the mysteries becomes. After the Apostolic age there were heroic martyrs, and later, when peace was granted under Constantine and Sylvester, there arose great doctors such as Leo, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Basil, Hilary, Athanasius, Gregory and many others. Later scholastics systematized and refined conclusions that the Fathers had treated more diffusely. In questions involving dialectic, philosophy, or metaphysics, later doctors can sometimes formulate conclusions more exactly. This does not mean that the revealed deposit increased.

Did the Apostles Receive Full Knowledge at Pentecost? A further controversy among scholastics concerns whether the Apostles received the full explicit knowledge of all evangelical mysteries immediately at Pentecost, or whether the Holy Spirit taught them successively as occasions arose. Some learned and pious theologians favor the latter opinion. They argue from Peter’s vision of the sheet in Acts 10, from the objection of Jewish Christians to Peter’s entering the house of Cornelius, and from the Council of Jerusalem in Acts 15 regarding circumcision and the Mosaic observances. I judge the contrary opinion much more probable: on Pentecost the Apostles received the fullness of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in such abundance that they knew every truth necessary for salvation, both concerning belief and action, though not every contingent future event. St. Thomas explicitly excepts future contingencies from the promise that the Spirit would teach them all truth. The cessation of the legal observances and the sufficiency of Baptism for the Gentiles were truths necessary to the salvation of those to whom the Gospel was to be preached. Therefore the Apostles, constituted as heads and teachers of the evangelical law, should be understood as possessing this knowledge at Pentecost. Peter’s vision, therefore, need not signify previous ignorance of the doctrine. It could instruct him how he should act here and now and how he should defend the divine economy before believers from the circumcision who would murmur at his conduct. Scripture frequently represents one as

questioning or appearing ignorant without true ignorance. Christ asked
questions whose answers He knew. The Blessed Virgin asked the
angel, "How shall this be?" not from unbelief but prudently examining the manner of fulfillment. John the Baptist sent disciples to Christ asking whether He was the One to come, not because John lacked faith, but for the instruction of his disciples. Paul went to Jerusalem and compared his Gospel with the Apostles not because he doubted the revelation received from Christ, but for ecclesial unity and the confirmation of others. Likewise, Peter's hesitation in Acts 10 concerned the concrete meaning of the vision and the present action to be taken, not the universal revealed truth that Gentiles could be admitted to grace without Mosaic observances. The Council of Jerusalem was therefore not gathered to remove ignorance from the Apostles. It was assembled by the Holy Spirit so that the same truth might be received in one confession by Jewish and Gentile believers and so that a form might be given to later successors for investigating and defining questions of faith.

ARTICLE VIII - Whether the Articles of Faith Are Conveniently

Enumerated St. Thomas: Objections and Answer Objection is made that the unity of God can be demonstrated by reason and therefore should not be an article of faith; that divine wisdom and providence should have distinct articles just as omnipotence does; that knowledge of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is one; that more articles should be given to the Father if several are given to Son and Spirit; that a work appropriated to the Son according to divinity should be separately named; and that the Eucharist has a special difficulty and therefore ought to have its own article. The authority of the Church stands on the contrary. St. Thomas answers that the things which principally pertain to faith are those whose vision constitutes eternal life and those by which we are led to that life. Two great orders are therefore proposed: the majesty of the Divinity and the mystery of Christ's humanity, the sacrament of piety through which we have access to glory. Concerning the Divinity, we believe the unity of God; the Trinity of Persons, expressed in three articles according to Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and the works of God. Creation concerns the being of nature. Sanctification concerns the being of grace. Resurrection of the flesh and eternal life concern the being of glory. Thus seven articles are placed concerning the Divinity. Concerning Christ's humanity, seven are distinguished: Incarnation or conception, Nativity from the Virgin, Passion and death with burial, descent into hell, Resurrection, Ascension, and coming to judgment. Hence fourteen in all. Others enumerate twelve by joining the three personal articles under one

article of the Trinity, dividing resurrection of the flesh and glory of the

soul, and joining conception and birth. Replies Many things held by faith concerning God could not be investigated by the philosophers under the supernatural aspect in which we believe them: divine providence, omnipotence in the order of grace, and the worship due to God as supernatural end are included under the

article of divine unity. Omnipotence, in an intelligent being, implies knowledge and providence

because power
acts through will and cognition. Knowledge of the three Persons is one as to unity of essence, but special errors can arise concerning each personal distinction; hence distinct articles are fitting. The Son and Holy Spirit are said to be sent for sanctification, and many mysteries are associated with these missions. The Eucharist, as sacrament, shares the formal reason (ratio formalis) of other effects of sanctifying grace; insofar as Christ's body is miraculously present, the mystery falls under divine omnipotence as do other miracles. Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of Providence and Omnipotence Cajetan warns that one must not call every rational proof a demonstration. Yet St. Thomas himself gives natural demonstrations of the unity, providence, and power of God. The solution lies in distinguishing the aspect under which the truths are considered. As author of nature, God can be naturally known as one first cause, as possessing power over what natural reason recognizes as possible, as providently ordering human affairs to a natural end, and as alone worthy of the worship which natural reason dictates. In this first mode certain philosophers truly knew these things. In the second mode, however, the same predicates are referred to God as author of grace and supernatural end: one author of grace, omnipotent in the order of supernatural effects, providence ordering men to eternal beatitude, and worship due in the supernatural covenant. These cannot be attained by unaided natural reason. Even concerning naturally knowable aspects, Christian philosophers, aided by faith and by the harmony of grace and nature, can often reach greater distinction and certainty than pagan philosophers, especially in difficult matters such as the compatibility of free choice with infallible divine providence.
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ARTICLE IX - Whether the Articles of Faith Are Conveniently

Collected in a Creed St. Thomas Sacred Scripture contains the truth of faith diffusely, in many modes and sometimes obscurely. Since all believers cannot devote themselves to the long study required to gather every point, it was necessary that the principal truths be collected briefly and clearly so that they could be proposed to all and retained in memory. This summary does not add to Scripture but gathers what Scripture and Apostolic doctrine contain. Several creeds do not signify several faiths. One and the same faith is taught in all; later creeds explain more fully what earlier ones contained implicitly when new errors arise. The Creed speaks in the person of the whole Church, whose faith is formed faith. Hence even sinners who possess unformed faith are called to conform themselves to that perfect ecclesial profession. The omission of the descent into hell from one later creed does not deny the article; it presupposes the earlier Apostolic profession. It is more exact to say "I believe the holy Catholic Church" than "I believe in the Church," because "to believe in" properly signifies movement by faith and charity toward an ultimate end, and only God is our ultimate end. Meaning and Necessity of the Creed Luther calls the ordering of a creed a great captivity, arguing that Scripture already contains all things to be believed. It is replied that the very abundance and diffusion of Scripture make a concise rule necessary. The Christian people must confess faith with heart and mouth, yet the common people cannot understand or retain all of Scripture. The Church therefore, following the Apostle’s example of giving milk to little ones in Christ, presents the common faithful with a brief and manifest sum while offering deeper doctrine to the more perfect. The Greek word symbolum has been variously explained. Some derive it fancifully from each Apostle contributing a morsel to a common composition. More soundly, the Fathers use the word for a sign or token by which soldiers recognize allies, and also for a common contribution made by many. The Creed is both: a sign distinguishing those who fight under Christ from His enemies, and a collection in which the Apostles or Fathers brought together their common confession. Augustine defines the Creed as a comprehension of our faith, simple, brief and full: simplicity assists the unlearned, brevity the memory, fullness doctrine. It is, therefore, a compact rule that instructs the mind without overburdening memory and says much in few words. Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Clement, Leo and other Fathers attest the Apostolic Creed. Whether each individual Apostle contributed exactly one clause is less certain, but the Apostolic origin of the substance is not lightly to be denied. The Three Creeds Three principal creeds are received in the Church. First is the Apostles’ Creed. Second is the Nicene Creed, composed at the first general council against Arius and more fully explained at Constantinople against Macedonius; the same profession was further explained at Ephesus. Third is the Creed of St. Athanasius, which, although composed by a private doctor rather than by a general council, has been received by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff and Church as a rule of faith. A writing does not become canonical Scripture merely because an Apostle wrote it. To belong to the canon it must be written under the special inspiration by which the Holy Spirit dictates sacred Scripture, not merely under a general divine assistance. Thus even if certain lost letters or familiar writings were truly apostolic, they would not for that reason necessarily be canonical. The Creed can therefore be Apostolic without being another book of Scripture: it was formed by the Apostles under the assistance of the Holy Spirit and by their own ecclesial industry, much as conciliar definitions are assisted by the Spirit without thereby becoming inspired Scripture. The Nicene profession is sung publicly in the Mass because it is an explicit declaration of the earlier Apostolic faith made when the Church had attained public peace and had to resist public heresy. The

Apostles’ Creed, formed in the time of persecution before the faith had been publicly manifested throughout the world, is used more privately in the traditional hours and catechesis. The later creed does not abolish the earlier one; it explains it.

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ARTICLE X - Whether It Belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to Order a Creed of

Faith St. Thomas A new edition of a creed is needed when rising errors require a more explicit declaration of what the Apostolic doctrine already contains. The authority to make such a public and binding definition belongs to the one who has final authority to determine matters of faith so that they may be held by the whole Church with unshaken assent. This belongs to the Supreme Pontiff, to whom the greater and more difficult questions of the Church are referred. Christ said to Peter: "I have prayed for you that your faith fail not; and you, once converted, confirm your brethren." The reason is the unity of faith. The entire Church must say the same thing and avoid schism. This cannot be preserved unless controversies of faith can be finally determined by the one who presides over the whole Church. For the same reason it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to convoke a general council and to confirm its sentence. The prohibition of Ephesus against composing another faith is directed against private persons or against introducing a different faith; it does not deprive a later legitimate council of authority to explain the same faith more fully against a new heresy. The Athanasian Creed, although not originally composed by a Pope, was received by papal authority. I: Why This Article Requires an Extended

Commentary I call this tenth article one of the most solemn questions among the scholastics of his time. Because too much is often

said in daily school lectures, he proposes two treatments: a shorter commentary suited to ordinary scholastic instruction, and a fuller treatment for more advanced theologians. The subject includes the authority of the universal Church, the Supreme Pontiff, and general councils. He cites, among many others, William of Paris, Torquemada, Cajetan, Albert Pighius, Driedo, Fisher, Clitoveus, Eck, Melchior Cano, Domingo de Soto, and earlier canonists and Fathers. The Meaning of Church Before determining whether Church, Pope, or council can err, we must explain what the Church is. The word ecclesia is Greek and signifies a convocation or assembly. By metonymy it also signifies the place in which Christians assemble, but here it means the multitude itself. Although any assembly can be called an ecclesia in a broad sense, Christian usage has appropriated the word to the collection of the faithful, and rightly so, because this collection is made through the calling of evangelical preaching: faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ. Synagogue is ordinarily applied to the faithful Jews of the Old Testament, while Church is proper to the faithful of the New. The distinction signifies the difference of the two states and, according to some, indicates that synagogue suggests a congregation as of a flock, whereas Church denotes a convocation of rational persons. The term Church can also be taken for the whole society of angels and men, including the blessed and wayfarers. In another division there is the Church triumphant in heaven, the Church militant on earth, and the Church suffering or being purified in purgatory. Our present discussion concerns the militant Church. The militant Church may be considered broadly as the congregation of all who profess faith in God from the beginning of the world to its end. More properly in the New Law, it is the visible congregation of baptized faithful professing Christian faith under one head, Christ in heaven and His vicar on earth. Baptism is the visible profession of evangelical faith and the door of the Church. Catechumens may belong by desire and merit to the invisible communion of Christ, but they have not yet entered the visible society simply speaking through the sacrament of faith.

Definition of the Militant Church Accordingly, the following definition is given: the Church is the visible congregation of baptized faithful under one head, Christ in heaven and His vicar on earth. "Congregation" expresses the genus, for the Church is a body and therefore includes many members. "Faithful" excludes pagans, Jews and heretics as such. "Baptized" distinguishes the New Testament visible Church from the faithful of the previous economies and from catechumens who have not yet made the sacramental profession. "Visible" is added against those who imagine a hidden and wholly invisible Church. The reference to one head indicates the visible ecclesiastical order under the vicar of Christ. Are Heretics Members of the Church? Cyprian, Gregory, Jerome, Augustine, the Lateran Council and common Catholic tradition speak of heretics as cut off from the Church. Union with Christ and His body is made through supernatural cognition and holy love; heresy destroys the integrity of faith and ordinarily charity also. Heretics can therefore be called severed members in the same way that a severed hand is called a hand only by reference to what it was. The Church retains jurisdiction to punish baptized heretics because through Baptism they were subjected to the Christian society and remain capable of restoration, but this does not make them living members. An occultly heretical Pope presents a special case. It will later be defended that before deposition he can remain head with respect to external government, although he lacks the invisible union of faith and charity. This is possible because the metaphor of membership can be taken according to different formal considerations: spiritual life, visible profession, or hierarchical government. Did Faith Remain Only in the Blessed Virgin During the Triduum? Some writers claimed that during the three days of Christ’s death the Blessed Virgin alone preserved faith, citing popular preaching, the custom of extinguishing candles, and the unbelief attributed to the disciples after the Resurrection. I judge the assertion rash, especially if it is applied to Peter. Christ explicitly prayed that Peter’s faith would not fail. Moreover, there were many religious Jews and Gentiles throughout the world who had true faith and had not even heard the news of the Passion. It would be rash to say they all lost faith. The extinguished candles are better explained symbolically of the prophets, while the one remaining light signifies Christ whose light was hidden, not extinguished, in death. The Apostles’ "unbelief" after the Resurrection need not mean the pertinacious unbelief by which infused faith is lost. It can mean difficulty, slowness, or failure of explicit assent to the reported Resurrection. The Fathers who say the Apostles lost faith can be understood of outward confession or of fidelity to the Master whom they abandoned or denied. Catechumens,

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Excommunicates, and Sinners Catechumens can be saved by baptism of desire and charity and can therefore belong by merit to the invisible Church, yet they are not simply numbered among the visible members until Baptism. Excommunicated baptized believers, on the other hand, remain within the visible society in an imperfect and penal manner because they retain Baptism and Christian profession, although they are deprived of sacramental participation and common ecclesiastical acts. The most difficult question concerns baptized sinners. The Cathars, Donatists, later Begards and certain Reformers restricted the Church to the holy; Wycliffe and Hus restricted it to the predestined. Against them the first conclusion is: baptized faithful sinners are truly parts of the militant Church. Christ compares the present kingdom to a net containing good and bad fish, to ten virgins of whom five are foolish, to a threshing floor containing wheat and chaff, and to a vine with branches that will be cut off. Paul speaks of a great house containing vessels for honor and dishonor. If only the just or predestined were members, the identity of lawful prelates and priests would become unknowable because no one certainly knows who is predestined.

A second, probable opinion says faithful sinners can formally be called members of the Church and even of Christ, though imperfect members. A third and, in my judgment, more probable opinion says that sinners, simpliciter, should not be called members of Christ because they lack spiritual life and are called children or members of the devil through mortal sin. Trent teaches that faith without hope and charity does not unite perfectly with Christ nor make one a living member of His body. St. Thomas likewise says sinners are actual members only imperfectly through unformed faith. Therefore the senses must be distinguished: sinners are parts of the visible Christian commonwealth and can be called members according to external union and profession, but not simply living members according to the invisible influx of Christ’s grace. Five Properties of the Church After the definition, five properties are enumerated rightly attributed to Christ’s Church: she is one, catholic or universal, holy, apostolic, and visible. First Property: Unity The Church is one because she is one body under one head, professes one faith, receives one Baptism, and is ordered to one God and one supernatural end. Paul’s words to the Ephesians gather these causes together: one body and one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all. The Eucharist signifies and strengthens the same unity: because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, all partaking of the one bread. This unity is more perfect after Christ than before His coming. Before Christ the faithful among the Gentiles were not all subjected to one visible earthly prelate or to the ceremonial law of Israel. Christ brought the two peoples together, removed the dividing wall, and formed one new man. He spoke of other sheep not of the Jewish fold whom He would bring so that there would be one fold and one shepherd. Peter, to whom He said "Feed my sheep," exercises the visible pastoral office over the one flock. Second Property: Catholicity The Church is catholic because, while remaining one, she is not confined to one nation or place. She is ready to embrace every people that desires salvation, preaches the Gospel to every creature, and extends throughout the world. She is also universal with respect to time: the one people of God has existed from the beginning and will endure until the consummation of the age. Christ promised to remain with His Church all days until the end. The Eucharistic sacrifice and sacrament remain until He comes. Finally, the Church is catholic with respect to doctrine because her faith is universally true and cannot contain doctrinal error in what she proposes as faith. Third Property: Holiness The Church is holy first by profession: in Baptism Christians profess a religion ordered to sanctity. Second, she is holy because she always contains just and good persons, even if they are not free from every venial fault. Third, she is holy through the exercise and cultivation of the works of all virtues. The grace of God has appeared teaching us to live soberly toward ourselves, justly toward our neighbor, and piously toward God. The Church therefore cultivates temples, altars, sacred times, ceremonies, prayer, sacrifice, and the works of mercy as exterior expressions proceeding from interior holiness. Fourth Property: Apostolicity The Church is Apostolic because she follows the doctrine and traditions of the Apostles and admits no novelty contrary to them. The Supreme Pontiff is called the Apostolic Lord because he is guardian and teacher of Apostolic doctrine. The Roman Church is especially adorned by the teaching and martyrdom of Peter and Paul and by the burial of their bodies. Apostolic traditions, whether written or handed down by living transmission, therefore form part of the rule by which the Church identifies herself.

Fifth Property: Visibility Against Wycliffe, Hus, Donatists, Begards and later Reformers, Catholics affirm that Christ’s Church is visible and, as it were, palpable. Christ commands that an incorrigible brother be reported to the Church; such a command would be unintelligible if there were no identifiable visible Church. John invites believers into fellowship with the visible Apostolic witnesses. The Church was visibly constituted at the beginning from the Apostles, the Blessed Virgin and disciples, and the same Church continues formally though its individual members change, just as a city remains the same while its citizens succeed one another. The Spirit came at Pentecost under visible tongues of fire; Baptism, the door of the Church, is a visible sacrament; the ecclesiastical government derived from Christ is exercised through visible ministers. Scripture portrays the Church as a queen adorned in visible variety, a city placed on a mountain that cannot be hidden, and a lamp set upon a stand to give light to all in the house. If the Church were wholly invisible, external worship, sacrifice, sacraments, temples, vocal prayer, determinate prelates, and ecclesiastical laws would become superfluous, and Christian society would be thrown into confusion. Replies to Protestant Arguments for an Invisible Church The words to the Samaritan woman, "the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and truth," do not abolish exterior worship. They teach, first, that exterior acts are nothing before God unless they

proceed from a true interior affection; second, that the strict local determination of worship to Jerusalem or the Samaritan mountain was ending, since temples and altars would be established throughout the world; and third, that New Testament worship would be especially spiritual and perfect, though it would still employ bodily signs and rites. Likewise, "the kingdom of God is within you" refers to the reign of grace and virtue in the soul, not to the nonexistence of a visible Church. Spiritual sacrifices in Peter do not exclude bodily acts. "Priest" and "sacrifice" can be used properly of ordained ministry and sacramental sacrifice, or metaphorically of all the faithful offering good works. A spiritual sacrifice can include bodily and visible elements because it proceeds from and is ordered to spiritual reality, just as a resurrected body is called spiritual without ceasing to be a true body. The New Law is called spiritual and written in hearts because its principal intention is inward sanctification; the Old Law is called a law of the letter or works insofar as it imposed many exterior observances that did not of themselves confer grace. These contrasts do not deny the exterior institutions of the New Law. Finally, Catholics both see and believe the Church under different respects. We see the visible congregation of men united in the profession of faith under the visible vicar of Christ; we believe the invisible realities present in her - divine faith, charity, supernatural power, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Thomas saw Christ’s humanity and believed His divinity; analogously we see the Church’s visible body and believe her supernatural mystery. It is not sufficient to confess in universal that there is one holy Church; rather, it is necessary for every Catholic man to profess in the singular and individual this Church, namely the Roman Church, over which the Vicar of Christ now presides. Yet I do not now intend to define that, according to Catholic faith, it must be held by divine right that the Roman bishop is Christ's Vicar and Peter's successor in such wise that the Apostolic See could never be transferred to another church. Although this is judged true by most learned and Catholic men, it is not itself Catholic faith, but a highly probable opinion consonant with divine right. What I now assert is not opinion but Catholic faith: namely, that this singular congregation which militates under the Roman bishop is the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church. It is argued from the name Christian and Catholic, from the unity, holiness, apostolicity and antiquity of the Roman communion, and from the fact that sects take names from later founders - Arians, Lutherans, Zwinglians, Calvinists, Anabaptists and the like - whereas Catholics trace their confession to Christ and the Apostles. He also argues from continuity of doctrine and ministry. my polemical judgments about the
moral and political consequences of the Reformation are stated with the sharpness characteristic of sixteenth-century confessional controversy; they belong to his historical argument, not to the formal definition of the Church. Can the Universal Church Err in Faith? I now turns to the first principal question. His first conclusion is that the Church which now exists, which existed before, and which will endure to the consummation of the age cannot err in the doctrine of faith. Scripture calls the Church the pillar and ground of truth. Christ promises that the gates of hell will not prevail against the Church built upon the rock. God promises to espouse His people in faith. If the Church could propose as faith something false, she would cease to be a certain rule and the faithful could no longer be required to adhere firmly to her definitions. A second conclusion is that the Church cannot even fall, through invincible and inculpable ignorance, into proposing as of faith something that is not in fact certain according to faith. If she could deceive in that manner, her authority as a rule would collapse: whenever she spoke, one could reasonably wonder whether she was now suffering the same invincible error. A third conclusion is that all the pastors and doctors of the Church taken together cannot err in matters of faith. The Church as a society acts and speaks especially through its principal governing and teaching members. Christ gave pastors and doctors precisely so that the faithful would not be carried about by every wind of doctrine. If all pastors and teachers together could fall into error, that error would necessarily be diffused through the whole Church, because the faithful are commanded to hear legitimate teachers. Objections Concerning the Golden Calf and the Consent of the Faithful The example of Aaron and the golden calf does not prove that the entire Church defected. Moses and Joshua, principal governors of the people, did not consent, and many of the sons of Levi likewise remained faithful. Even among those who outwardly participated, not all necessarily acted from formal idolatrous unbelief rather than fear. Moreover Aaron had not yet been consecrated as supreme high priest in the full sense relevant to the argument. Nor does the infallibility of the whole Church imply that, for every doctrinal inquiry, one must collect the individual vote of every believer. To say that the whole Church cannot err is not to say that the whole Church in each and every member is the practical tribunal for investigating disputed dogma. One who knows that the universal Church agrees on a doctrine as of faith can be certain of it; but ordinarily the faithful learn what the Church holds through the pastors to whom the public office of teaching is committed. Can the Supreme Pontiff Err in Defining Matters of Faith? I then poses the second principal question. Objections are drawn from the Great Western Schism and uncertainty of papal succession; from the fact that certainty that a particular man is baptized and validly elected is not itself an article of faith; from historical examples of Popes accused of heresy, especially Anastasius and Honorius; from the need of diligence and consultation before definition; from conciliarist claims that a council is above the Pope; from the apparent uselessness of councils if the Pope alone cannot err; and from cases where pontifical decrees or scriptural interpretations appear to differ. Preliminary Notes on the Papacy By Supreme Pontiff or Pope I understand the pastor of the universal Church, indeed in a certain respect of the whole Christian world, who is Christ’s vicar on earth and Peter’s successor in prelation. A vicar acts in the place of one absent in visible presence; a successor occupies the office of one who has died or been removed. Christ remains the supreme priest and invisible head
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in heaven; the earthly pontiff exercises a ministerial headship subordinated to Christ. Thus the Church does not have two coordinate heads. It is a dogma of Catholic faith that the supreme pontificate was instituted by divine law in the Church by Christ, especially in the words to Peter, "Feed my sheep," and in the promise, "You are Peter, and upon this
rock I will build my Church." Ecclesiastical government is therefore monarchical rather than a government of several equal supreme rulers. The Church cannot institute two or more equal universal pontiffs as ancient Rome had two consuls. I add that it is very rash, scandalous, and a seedbed of many heresies to assert that a council is above the Pope or that the authority by which the Pope feeds and governs the Church is derived from the Church that elects him rather than immediately from Christ. He hesitates to call the proposition formally heretical because he does not find it explicitly condemned in the precise terms he seeks, and because certain Parisian doctors were tolerated. He cites the Lateran Council under Leo X and the Florentine teaching on Petrine primacy as strong authorities against conciliarism. He further notes that many Catholic doctors hold that the Roman Pontiff is supreme by divine right and that the episcopate of Rome and universal primacy are joined by Christ's institution. Others, including Soto in a qualified discussion, hold that the primacy is of divine right while the permanent attachment to one particular local see may be more open to theological dispute. I submit this judgment and manner of speaking to the Roman See. Finally, neither Pope nor the whole Church can create a new article or dogma in substance, just as they cannot institute a new sacrament. The office of definition is explanatory and judicial: it manifests with authority what is already contained explicitly or virtually in the Apostolic deposit. A moral philosopher can explain a conclusion hidden in principles, but he does not bind the conscience by jurisdiction. The Pope, when defining as universal pastor, juridically declares the revealed truth and obliges the Christian faithful to hold it. Private Papal Error and Public Definition
The Supreme Pontiff must be distinguished as a private doctor from the Supreme Pontiff exercising the universal office. His first **conclusion is that the Supreme Pontiff as a private person can err in matters of faith, whether inculpably or** culpably, and can even
become pertinaciously heretical. He opposes the newer opinion of Albert Pighius that the Pope is personally confirmed in faith as soon as he is elected. The common older Scholastic and canonical tradition presupposes the possibility of personal papal heresy and asks what juridical consequences would follow. Historical examples are examined: Victor, Marcellinus, Liberius, Anastasius II and especially Honorius. I reject the careless denial of the documentary evidence merely to save a theory. Victor can be defended against sectarian accusations; Marcellinus, if he offered incense from fear, later repented and was venerated as martyr; Liberius and Anastasius are left to the historical authorities cited. Honorius is more difficult because the Sixth and Seventh Ecumenical Councils and Popes Agatho, Leo II, and Adrian II speak against him. I therefore judge it safer to admit the possibility of personal papal heresy than to accuse received councils of wholesale falsification. The privilege promised to Peter contains two aspects: one personal to Peter, that his own faith would not fail; another attached to the office, that in proposing the faith to the universal Church and confirming the brethren the public faith of Peter's office would not fail. Successors inherit the latter official privilege, not every personal prerogative of Peter. The analogy is the Apostles' universal missionary jurisdiction, which did not pass in the same universal form to every later bishop. A Heretical Pope Does Not Immediately Lose Office Before Deposition SECOND CONCLUSION. if the Supreme Pontiff falls into heresy, he does not immediately lose the pontifical dignity before being deposed by the Church. He recognizes that Torquemada and other illustrious men held the contrary, while Cajetan supports the position which I adopt. Other bishops who become heretics retain episcopal dignity until they are deposed; a merely interior heresy cannot be judged by the Church, and it would lead to intolerable uncertainty if hidden loss of faith automatically destroyed jurisdiction.
If a Pope who had internally fallen into heresy later repented, it would be excessively harsh to say he had secretly ceased to be Pope and required a new election. More gravely, if all papal jurisdiction depended upon an interior faith that no human judge could know, every law, judgment, and definition could be attacked by alleging secret heresy. Ecclesiastical government would fall into Babylonian confusion. This does not mean that an heretical Pope is a living member of Christ by grace and faith. The metaphor of "head" is here taken according to visible hierarchical government. He can remain head as minister of external ecclesiastical order until deposition, just as a civil magistrate remains head in the political order even if morally corrupt. Under the aspect of invisible supernatural life, he is not a living member. The Apostolic See and the Pope in Public Judgment of Faith THIRD CONCLUSION is that in the public judgment of faith one should not separate the Apostolic See from the Apostolic President or Supreme Pontiff, nor the Roman See from the Roman Pontiff. He rejects the opinion that infallibility resides only in the Pope together with the college of Cardinals. Christ gave the special promise to Peter personally: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona"; "You are Peter"; "I have prayed for you"; "confirm your brethren"; "feed my sheep." The faithful who seek instruction from the Apostolic See do not appeal to the Cardinals as a separate tribunal but to the Pontiff who presides there. Hence, the authority to define principally resides in the Supreme Pontiff and derivatively in the Apostolic See considered as the continuing chair of Peter. Properly speaking, the Apostolic See in this context signifies the successor of Peter in the primacy and governance of the Church. The Pope Cannot Err in a Public Definition of Faith my
fourth conclusion is that in the public judgment of faith the Supreme Pontiff cannot err. He attributes this doctrine to St. Thomas, Walden, Torquemada, Pighius, Eck, Cajetan, Cano and many other Catholic writers, and regards it as an Apostolic tradition. Until the conciliarist disturbances, he says, opposition was chiefly
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associated with Greek separation. He believes that if the matter were brought before a legitimate council, the conclusion would be defined as true faith and the contrary anathematized; he also sees Leo X’s condemnation of Luther as already strongly confirming it. The reason is ecclesial unity. Christ instituted a Church that would endure against the gates of hell and also instituted in Peter a continuing pastoral office. Questions of faith arise repeatedly and require a remedy ready at hand. A general council cannot be gathered every time, and even a council can be divided. Therefore the Church requires one living judge capable of finally composing controversies so that there are not perpetual divisions in faith. A merely conciliar remedy would not suffice in every case, because if the Fathers divided into competing parties there would have to be a final authority to which the dispute could be referred. FIFTH **CONCLUSION is that the Roman Pontiff, insofar as he is in fact the Supreme Pontiff, possesses this firm and** infallible authority
given to Peter and his successors. He adduces continuous Roman succession and ecclesiastical condemnations of the proposition that the Roman Church can err. He also invokes the practical fact that councils seek confirmation from the Roman See and that appeals from its supreme judgment are not admitted. The Great Western Schism and the Election of Martin V The long Western Schism does not make Martin V and later Popes doubtful. The Church by divine right possesses authority to elect a Supreme Pontiff, while positive ecclesiastical law determines the ordinary electoral body. If Pope and all Cardinals were to perish, authority to provide for election would remain in the bishops and Roman clergy or in a council representing the Church. At Constance the divided obediences were brought together, the competing claimants were removed or their claims extinguished, and a special electoral body including Cardinals and representatives of the nations elected Martin V with common consent.

Even supposing, for argument, that some electoral defect had existed, universal reception by the Church could supply the relevant public certainty and, in certain juridical hypotheses, jurisdiction through common error and peaceful acceptance. This is compared with civil-law cases in which acts of a publicly accepted magistrate retain validity. At minimum, once the whole Church receives a man as universal pastor, the faithful possess moral certainty sufficient for ecclesiastical government; the universal Church will not be permitted to adhere to a false rule of faith. Must It Be an Article of Faith That This Individual Man Is Pope? The argument that one cannot know by faith that a particular Pope is baptized or even that he is male is answered by distinguishing the formal rule (regula formalis) of faith from factual conditions. The individual Pope is a condition without which a particular act of papal definition would not occur; his humanly known identity is not itself the formal motive (motivum formale) of divine faith. The defined proposition is accepted because the universal Church, governed by the Spirit, receives it as certain in faith, and the Spirit inwardly moves believers to the truth. Therefore I concede that the judgment "this individual is truly Pope" can rest on human prudence and morally evident investigation rather than on an infused act of faith as such. Nevertheless it would be rash and scandalous, after peaceful universal acceptance, to deny his pontificate without grave evidence such as incapacity. The universal Church’s acceptance is itself a most powerful sign. If an entirely incapable person, such as one unbaptized, were unknowingly elected, God would not permit the whole Church to be definitively bound to false doctrine through him. Could a Personally Heretical Pope Define the Truth? Yes, according to the foregoing doctrine. Just as Caiaphas prophesied by reason of his office without understanding the full divine import of his words, a personally heretical Supreme Pontiff, while exercising the office of universal pastor, could be moved by the Holy Spirit to define a truth contrary to his own private opinion. Indeed he could understand that the definition contradicts his private view and nevertheless issue it as the official judgment of the Church. In this divine power is shown more clearly: God can bring forth an infallible public judgment through a minister personally defective in faith. Diligence Before Definition The Holy Spirit does not assist the Pope in the same manner as the inspired authors of Scripture, by immediate revelation dictating the words. Otherwise every papal definition would itself become inspired Scripture. Therefore diligent inquiry, consultation, theological disputation, and examination of tradition are necessary means preceding solemn definition. The historical practice of councils and Popes confirms this: general councils debate the question; Popes defining without a council consult theologians and advisers. Accordingly, the conditional statement is true: if a Pope attempted to define without the diligence required by the office, he could expose himself to error. But under the evangelical promise I hold that God will not permit the antecedent to occur in a definitive act: the same providence which guarantees the infallible end also guarantees the necessary means. This does not mean the Pope is impeccable or always prudent in ordinary government; it concerns the conditions of a genuine public definition of faith. Why Councils Are Still Necessary Papal infallibility does not make councils useless. First, the gravity of major heresies fittingly requires many bishops and doctors to advise and bear witness; the Council of Jerusalem is the prototype, where James confirmed Peter’s judgment from the prophets. Second, councils treat not only dogma but also reform of morals and discipline, where the common counsel of bishops is highly useful. Third, the common judgment of many bishops confounds heretics and makes definitions more readily and peacefully received by the Christian people.

How to Recognize a Definitive Papal or Conciliar Judgment Not every statement inserted in a decretal or uttered by a Pope is an infallible definition. The following signs indicate an intention to define: the condemnation of the contrary with anathema; the declaration that opponents are to be regarded as heretics; an express proposal that the doctrine be received and believed by all as a dogma of faith; or a formula declaring that the Pontiff defines by counsel of his brethren. If no such sign or equivalent intention is present, a statement may be authoritative without being an irreformable definition of faith. Nevertheless it is rash to

deny doctrinal determinations contained in the decrees of a general or papally confirmed provincial council merely because an explicit anathema formula is absent. The Authority of General Councils Can a Council Err in Defining Faith? It is now asked whether a council can err. Heretics have variously rejected councils: Arius rejected Nicaea; Dioscorus rejected Chalcedon; Photius rejected the Eighth Synod; Hus rejected Constance; Luther claimed even the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem erred. Against these claims Catholic writers such as Torquemada, Walden, Cajetan, Fisher, Cano and Alfonso de Castro defend conciliar authority. What Is a Council? A synod or council, in the present sense, is an assembly principally of priests and especially bishops, convoked by the authority of the proper head to treat faith, religion and morals. The Protestant proposal is rejected that a general council should consist indiscriminately of laymen and clerics merely because they are prudent and pious. The ancient and continuous use of the Church is that councils are assemblies of ecclesiastical pastors possessing jurisdiction. Councils are general, provincial, or episcopal/local. A general council is the synod of Catholic bishops called generally and celebrated by authority of the Supreme Pontiff. Bishops alone attend by necessity of office, though abbots and generals of religious orders may be summoned by privilege. Titular bishops without jurisdiction are treated differently because the business of a council - binding, loosing, judging doctrine, and making laws - is transacted through jurisdiction. All bishops of all regions are to be called, although not all must in fact attend; a sufficiently representative body under the universal convocation suffices. The Pope alone possesses authority to convoke a general council. A provincial synod gathers the bishops of a province or kingdom under the metropolitan or primate. An episcopal synod gathers priests under the local bishop. Councils can also be distinguished as convoked and confirmed by the Pope, convoked but not yet confirmed, confirmed after having been convoked otherwise, or neither convoked nor confirmed. Bishops Are Judges, Not Mere Advisers Bishops in a general council are not merely counselors. At Jerusalem James pronounced, "Therefore I judge..." and the Apostles and elders declared, "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us." Councils call their determinations decrees and canons, and bishops sign them as judges. This does not mean the Pope is bound to confirm whatever bare numerical majority says. In an ecclesiastical council assisted by the Spirit, the Pope can confirm the judgment of a minority if the majority has erred in the deliberative process.

First Conclusion: A General Council Convoked and Confirmed by the Pope Cannot Err in Defining Faith This conclusion is certain according to Catholic faith and is taught by the scholastics and Fathers. Gregory the Great venerates the first four ecumenical councils as he venerates the four Gospels, not because councils are inspired Scripture, but because their definitive authority in faith is certain. Augustine’s writings against the Donatists and the ancient conciliar tradition are also cited. The promise that where two or three are gathered in Christ’s name He is in their midst admits degrees of application. A private group of pious Christians gathered to discuss religion may receive divine assistance
and, if they innocently err in something necessary, God can later provide correction. But a solemn general council convoked in Christ’s name by the authority of the successor of Peter possesses assistance ordered to an infallible judgment of faith. If such a council as a whole could definitively err, there would be no higher earthly ecclesiastical body to which the Church could turn without requiring new revelation. The conciliar sentence in matters of faith is in this sense a sentence of the Holy Spirit. The form "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" at Jerusalem becomes a model for later councils when they say that the sacred synod, legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit, teaches or defines. A general council represents the universal Church because the bishops are heads of particular churches gathered under the head of the whole Church. Their infallibility does not arise from personal holiness or learning but from the assistance of the Spirit. Scripture alone, taken as a written letter without a living judge, cannot settle every controversy because controversies often concern the correct sense of Scripture itself, apparent conflicts, or the relation of passages. Therefore a living rule and judge is necessary to speak, interpret, and compose disputes. The authority of a general council is one principal manifestation of that living rule. Second Conclusion: Papally Confirmed Provincial or Episcopal Councils A provincial council confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff, and even an episcopal council confirmed in the relevant doctrinal judgment, cannot err in defining matters of faith in the sense of that confirmation. This is not quite as immediately certain as the authority of a general council, but I judge it most secure. The reason is that papal confirmation makes the doctrinal judgment an act of the same supreme authority which cannot err in defining faith. Historical examples include the condemnation of Pelagian errors at Milevis and Orange and their papal confirmations, the condemnation of Jovinian and Helvidius, the First Council of Toledo against Priscillian, and the council at Alcalá against Peter of Osma. Some councils are expressly confirmed by a Pope; others are received implicitly or interpretively when their decrees become part of the common doctrine and are approved by learned men and universities without rejection by the Roman See. General councils not originally convoked by a true Pope can likewise acquire full authority through later papal confirmation, as in the case of Constance under Martin V. Third Conclusion: A General Council Convoked by Papal Authority but Not Yet Confirmed A general council convoked by the Supreme Pontiff but not yet confirmed is not, considered simply as the juridical act of the council, an absolutely infallible rule of Catholic doctrine in the same completed sense as a confirmed council. Disputed historical cases are cited and reserves further discussion of the Trullan canons. Provincial councils not confirmed have in fact erred, as in the African controversy over rebaptizing heretics and in other local synods. Fourth Question: What Authority Does a Council Have Before convoked, with papal legates present, makes certain faith before papal confirmation, or whether confirmation
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must be awaited. The history of Chalcedon shows the practical importance of the question: Emperor Marcian urgently asked Leo I to confirm the acts because some doubted while confirmation was delayed. Constance likewise sought Martin V’s confirmation of decrees made before his election, and at Trent papal consultation preceded major doctrinal sessions such as the decree on justification. It is presupposed that the Fathers of a council ordinarily do not define a matter of faith without consulting the Pope or without legates instructed concerning the doctrine of the Apostolic See. Papal legates do not themselves receive a transferable personal gift of infallibly defining faith independent of the Pope. The privilege is attached to the office of the universal pastor and cannot simply be delegated as ordinary jurisdiction can. One Apostle cannot make another Apostle by delegation, nor can a prophet transmit the prophetic charism merely by juridical commission. Likewise, a legate cannot bind the Pope himself and all successors by an infallible act independently of the papal office.

FIRST CONCLUSION. For both subordinate questions: all the Fathers taken together in a legitimately gathered general council cannot err in faith, even before papal confirmation or even, in an extraordinary interregnum, before election of a Pope. The whole body of legitimate pastors cannot collectively defect without the universal Church defecting. SECOND CONCLUSION. the council as represented by the juridically effective majority does not yet make a final certainty of faith before papal confirmation. The majority can err; the promise to Peter and the practice of appeal to the Roman Pontiff show that the final public rule is not complete until the supreme judgment is given. Thus the moral impossibility must be distinguished of all legitimate Fathers collectively defecting from the juridical infallibility of a conciliar decree as such. An appeal from a council not yet confirmed to the Supreme Pontiff is possible; an appeal from a final rule of faith would not be. He cites the papal legates at Chalcedon who appealed to Leo. All councils celebrated without the Pope’s personal presence have sought confirmation from the Roman See, and Trent itself ordered its legates to request papal confirmation of the decrees at the close of the council. The discussion continues beyond the present checkpoint with further objections concerning councils celebrated by legates, councils during a papal vacancy or schism, and the precise force of confirmation.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X

Julian also, who was legate of Eugene IV at the Council of Basel, consented to the error of the council in Sessions 2, 3, and 18 concerning the authority of a council above the Pope. Moreover, a council without legates can err; but the Pope, as we have already said, cannot transfer to his legates his own infallible authority in defining matters of faith. Therefore a council, even with legates, can err. Finally, it is not necessary that in a council assembled to elect the Supreme Pontiff there reside the infallible authority of the Holy Spirit for defining matters of faith; it is sufficient that it possess authority to elect the Pontiff and to depose a heretical or schismatic one. Therefore, if before electing the Pontiff it should undertake to define matters of faith, it could err. The consequence is evident, because just as God does not fail in necessary things, neither does He abound in superfluous things. THIRD CONCLUSION. Whoever contradicts definitions of a council assembled by authority of the Pontiff and with his legates present will be suspected of heresy. This **conclusion is proved by the arguments made at the beginning of this doubt. It is further confirmed from the** acts of the Council of Chalcedon, action 4. When ten Egyptian bishops refused to subscribe to the sentence of the council, a great dispute arose and a tumult was stirred among the Fathers, who indignantly bore that ten men should prejudice the synod and the Catholic faith; and they contended that they should be anathematized. But when those ten bishops protested and asked mercy, a delay was granted for subscribing, because they had refused subscription with a mind opposed to the synod. And in action 3 of the same council there is the law of the Emperors Marcian and Valentinian against those who would not obey the council. Concerning this **conclusion, observe that certain theologians of ours, among whom was the most learned Soto, held that the** aforesaid definition of a council produces certainty of faith. But the opinion of Master Cano pleases us more: definitions of this kind are not a certain rule of faith until the confirmation of the Supreme Pontiff is added. Nevertheless, it would be rash and very near to error to deny definitions of this kind made by councils. It would therefore be more prudent if definitions of councils concerning matters of faith were not promulgated to the people before confirmation by the Supreme Pontiff. Turrecremata testifies that this was formerly done. Those who were present at the Council of Trent also testify that this was done with the decrees and definitions concerning justification in the sixth session. To the arguments proposed in opposition before the two appended questions, insofar as they militate against our conclusions, it is answered that councils assembled in the name of Christ are holy in their beginning, but not yet in their consummation until the confirmation of the Pontiff is added, to whom it was said: Confirm thy brethren. It must be noted that when a council says, 'It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us,' it asserts this by reason of its head. But when it does not have its head, the decrees of the council are not to be called decrees of the Holy Spirit. It must also be observed that from the sentence of a council one may not infer that, if the Pontiff is present, the council's sentence is immediately more the sentence of the Holy Spirit than the sentence of the Church, to which likewise the Spirit of truth was promised. And just as the sentence of the greater part of the Church can be false in a matter of faith, but not the sentence of the whole Church, so also the sentence of all the Fathers assembled in council will be certain; but it will not be certain merely because it was pronounced by the greater part of the council, unless the confirmation of the Pontiff is added. For then even a sentence pronounced by the lesser part will be certain. And by this the first argument is answered. To the second argument it is answered that definitions are not altogether infallible, although they are of greater authority when made with the legate of the Supreme Pontiff than without him. To the third argument it is answered that Sixtus IV is to be understood of acts and judicial proceedings which are mingled with a judgment of faith, for example, the convocation itself of a council, or the compulsion by which the Archbishop of Toledo compelled Peter of Osma to appear in the Council of Alcalá and retract his sentence; just as the Fathers who are inquisitors of heretical depravity often compel heretics and others who err to retract their propositions. Sixtus IV is not speaking of an altogether infallible judgment of faith, because this cannot be subdelegated. Or, even if he speaks of a judgment of faith, what he says can be explained in a true sense: 'Those things which are duly done by our mandate obtain the full firmness of their force,' that is, in their own grade and order they possess the firmness which they can have from the commission of the Pontiff. This is not small, since those who contradict are deservedly suspected of heresy, though it does not possess complete infallibility. Indeed Sixtus IV himself caused all the acts of the Council of Alcalá to be examined anew before him. He certainly would not have done this if they had once been established by a certain judgment of faith. This would also have been contrary to the decree of Gelasius I in the letter to Faustus, reported in 24, q. 1, c. Achatius, and in the other cited canons, and likewise to the law of Emperor Marcian. Therefore Sixtus IV rightly said in the same bull that he supplied all defects, if any had been committed in that Council of Alcalá. To the fourth argument the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that the inconveniences which can occur are sufficiently met even if pontifical confirmation is deferred, because proceedings can be taken against rebels, as was said above. And it would be a much greater inconvenience if there were not in the Church one foundation of the unity of faith and one infallible rule to which all dogmas of faith to be explained and proposed to the whole Church must be reduced.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To the fifth argument it is answered that in fact no council celebrated in this manner has erred; nevertheless, we do not possess this from any certain law. In the same way it can happen that some man has never sinned mortally, yet this comes from the mercy of God and not from a certain law. To the sixth argument I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered that although the pontifical power of confirming the brethren in faith is a power of jurisdiction, nevertheless it cannot be subdelegated, because it is of a higher order, inasmuch as it is, as it were, a participation in prophecy, by reason of which the Supreme Pontiff surpasses himself and obliges men to believe those things which have been defined by himself. Therefore it cannot be subdelegated. To the seventh and last it is answered that in such an event the Church ought first of all to provide herself with a head. If she does not do so, it is not surprising if she should err; nevertheless it is never admitted that the whole Church itself can err. To the arguments proposed at the beginning of this third and most grave question, it is easy to answer from the things we have defined. Nevertheless, for the sake of the novice theologian, they will briefly be resolved by us. To the first argument it is answered that the prelates who are assembled in council represent the whole Church. And just as the whole Church cannot err, so neither can all the Fathers of a general council. Hence they do not arrogantly usurp for themselves what belongs to the whole Church. Nevertheless, as was said in the third principal conclusion, the confirmation of the Pontiff is necessary in order that there be an infallible rule of faith. To the confirmation, enough has already been said concerning the necessity of assembling general councils. To the second argument, concerning the explanation of Matthew 18, 'If two of you shall consent,' etc., enough was said in the explanation of the first principal conclusion. As for the errors of councils cited both at the end of the second argument and in the third principal argument, it was already said in the explanation of the third conclusion that those councils either were not general but provincial, or, if they were general, they were acephalous. But concerning the canons made at Trullo, we promised that a special doubt would be resolved. FIFTH DOUBT. Whether the canons established at Trullo possess firm authority of faith. For the affirmative side it is argued first. Gratian continually cites those canons under the name of the Sixth General Synod, for example in distinction 16, chapters Placuit and Quoniam; distinction 31, chapter Quoniam; distinction 32, canon Si quis; distinction 93, the final chapter; On Consecration, distinction 1, chapter Iacobus; distinction 2, chapter Didicimus; likewise 27, q. 1, canon Si quis episcopus. But the Sixth Synod is accepted by all Catholics. Therefore those canons also ought to be accepted. It is argued second from Innocent III, De aetate et qualitate ordinandorum, chapter A multis, where he says that it was established in the Sixth Synod that if anyone entering the clergy wished to be joined to a woman by matrimonial right, he should do this before the order of subdiaconate. But it is certain that this is the sixth canon among the Trullan canons. Therefore, etc. It is argued third. Pope Adrian approves and receives these canons together with the synod, as is clear in distinction 16, chapter Sexta, and On Consecration, distinction 3, chapter Sexta. Therefore, etc. It is argued fourth from the Seventh Synod, action 3, where Tarasius says: 'I receive the right and divine decrees of the same Sixth Synod, and the canons issued and handed down.' And in action 4 Bishop Peter says: 'I have a codex containing the canons of the holy Sixth Synod.' This is found in distinction 16, chapter Habeo. Patriarch Tarasius then replied: 'What is this ignorance from which many suffer concerning these canons? For it is a scandal to doubt whether they belong to the Sixth Synod.' Epiphanius confirms this in action 6, where, answering the Iconoclasts in the name of the synod, he speaks in the same manner. But notwithstanding these things, let our conclusion be: THE TRULLAN CANONS DO NOT POSSESS CERTAIN AUTHORITY OF
FAITH.

This conclusion is held by Catholic and most grave Doctors. So thinks Anastasius, librarian of the Apostolic See, in the proem to the Eighth Synod, to which he had been sent by order of Adrian II. Mention of him is made in distinction 63, chapter 2. So thinks Theophanes, the Greek historian. So holds Humbert, Bishop of Silva Candida, whose book against the letter of Nicetas the Abbot is cited by Gratian under the name of Leo IX in distinction 16, chapter Clementis. Moreover, Theodore Balsamon, in his interpretation of those canons, and Matthew the monk, in his history of councils and illustrious men, report that these canons are not received by the Latins. It is proved secondly by reason. The Sixth Synod, assembled by Agatho under Emperor Constantine and confirmed by Leo II, issued no canons. But the synod afterward assembled under Emperor Justinian is neither rightly called the Sixth Synod, nor was the Roman Pontiff or his legates present at it, as is evident from the subscriptions of the bishops. There subscribed with Emperor Justinian certain bishops who had been present at the Sixth Synod, fewer in number and different in names; but there is no subscription there of the Roman Pontiff or of his legates. It is proved third from histories. Emperor Justinian is read to have twice assembled a synod at Constantinople, first under Pope Sergius and afterward under John VII. Concerning the former, Bede writes in his book On the Six Ages of the World that Justinian ordered Pope Sergius of the Roman Church to be carried to Constantinople because he refused to favor and subscribe to his erroneous synod. Yet afterward, because of the fault of his perfidy, Justinian was deprived of the glory of the kingdom and withdrew into exile in Pontus. Platina likewise says in the life of Sergius: 'Justinian held a synod in which some things were approved which were by no means consonant with the orthodox faith.' Concerning the later synod, Platina writes in the life of John VII that Justinian, vexed by the same folly by which he had been possessed before losing the empire, sent two metropolitans to Rome...

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

...who were to exhort John that, after holding a synod, whatever the Easterners believed concerning the homoousion the Westerners also should affirm, certain formularies being proposed to which he was to subscribe. The Pontiff, however, sent the men back to the Emperor without accomplishing the matter. From this it can easily be gathered what sort of councils were assembled by Justinian. This is confirmed from the words of the Trullan council itself, found in distinction 16, chapter Quoniam: 'Since the holy universal Fifth and Sixth Synods, having most fully disputed concerning the mystery of faith, made no canons, therefore we, assembling in this imperial city, have written sacred canons. For it was necessary that a universal synod promulgate ecclesiastical canons.' Thus far the council. If these words are carefully weighed, they readily show that those bishops assembled by their own spirit and impulse, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff, but in order to please Emperor Justinian, who was hostile to the Roman Church. Then, with sufficient arrogance and pride, they reprehend the Fifth and Sixth Synods as though they had been deficient and had acted imprudently, although the Fifth and Sixth Synods, once the most grave cause of faith for which they had assembled had been completed, were unwilling to burden the Church with unnecessary canons. It is argued

fourth from things defined in those same canons which disagree with the doctrine and customs of the Roman See. This can easily be shown one by one. In canon 2 of Trullo the eighty-five Canons of the Apostles are received and confirmed; yet the Apostolic See does not receive them, as Isidore says in distinction 16, chapter Canones, Leo IX in chapter Clementis, and Gelasius in distinction 15, chapter Sancta Romana. And rightly so, because in canon 84 of the Canons of the Apostles, in volume 1 of the councils at the beginning, three books of the Maccabees are admitted contrary to the consent of all the Churches. In particular, canon 2 of Trullo approves the synod of Cyprian concerning the rebaptizing of heretics. In canon 3 the law against ordaining bigamists is called excessively severe. In canon 13 it is commanded that subdeacons, deacons, and priests not be separated from their lawful wives. This custom was proposed to the whole Church contrary to the usage of the Latins. Hence Sergius rightly rejected those canons. Likewise, in canon 36 it is decreed that the See of Constantinople should enjoy equal privileges with the Apostolic See and should be preferred to Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The most holy Leo resisted this statute, and rightly, because it was not only an indication of ambition but could also become a cause of schism. Likewise canon 52 commands that on all the days of Lent, except Saturday and Sunday, no new hosts be consecrated, but that the sacrifice of the Presanctified be celebrated, as is done among us on the day of Parasceve, on which the sacrifice of a host consecrated the preceding day is offered. Yet this rite neither was received nor ought to have been received in the Latin Church. Then in canon 55 it is said: 'Since we have learned that in the city of the Romans, on the holy days of Lent, men fast on its Saturdays contrary to the ecclesiastical tradition handed down, it has seemed good to the holy synod that in the Roman Church, if any cleric is found fasting on Saturday, he be deposed; if a layman, he be separated.' This canon is plainly injurious to the Roman Church and contains a superstition never received in the Roman Church. Moreover, in canon 67 it is said: 'Sacred Scripture has commanded us to abstain from blood and from things strangled. Therefore we rightly condemn those who by some art prepare the blood of any animal and thus eat it.' Yet that statute is superstitious and contains ignorance of the Scriptures. The Latin Church interpreted the decree of Jerusalem concerning blood and things strangled as extending only for a brief time, until the customs of Jews and Gentiles should grow together and until the new Church should, with a certain honor, bury the synagogue. For these arguments the Trullan canons are rightly judged by Catholic Doctors of our time to possess no authority. Among them is the most learned Cano, book 5 De locis, final chapter, in reply to the sixth argument, where he most elegantly inveighs against those canons. To the arguments in opposition the answer is easy. To the first it is answered that Gratian followed the common opinion of the people, thinking those canons belonged to the Sixth Synod because they were found written after the Sixth Synod. And although they are not now circulated in that place in the great volumes of councils, they are nevertheless contained in the Summa of Councils of Bartholomew Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, and to some extent are defended and approved as having been made after the Sixth General Synod. To the second it is answered that Innocent reported Gratian's decree under the same title under which Gratian had cited it. The same thing happened to St. Thomas and other Doctors, who cite Gratian's decrees under the same titles. But the chapter cited by Innocent is found in distinction 32, canon Si quis eorum. And although Innocent cites that canon, it does not follow that he approved those canons; rather, he uses that statute as commonly received and confers new force upon it. To the third argument the antecedent is denied. Those words are found in the letter of Tarasius to Adrian, and not, as Gratian cites them, in the letter of Adrian to Tarasius. Thus Tarasius receives those canons, not Adrian, as is clear from actions 2 and 3 of the Seventh Synod. Adrian, however, recites the words of Tarasius in order to convict the Constantinopolitans from their own mouth that sacred images are to be venerated. For he says in this manner: 'If you confess those canons to be divine and lawful, and in canon 82 you concede that the image of Christ is to be venerated, why do you now fight against sacred images?' To the fourth argument it is answered that the Seventh Synod uses one canon in order to prove by the testimony of the Greeks that images are to be venerated. Concerning this Nicholas says in his letter to Emperor Michael: 'Providently the Synod of Constantinople' - he is speaking of the Seventh General Synod - 'is known to prohibit this in the sixth chapter of its canons. Yet this is not found among us, but is said to be held among you. We, however, instructed by apostolic documents, know that we may use even the opinions of pagans, how much more those of Christians, and against those whose life we do not follow nor

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whose erroneous mind we imitate. Finally, the Apostle Paul placed certain things from the books of pagans in his writings.'
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Does it therefore follow that all things which were uttered together with those testimonies must also be received? Thus far Nicholas. Behold, therefore, there is no argument that if Innocent, or the Seventh Synod, or Nicholas himself, or the Council of Florence in Session 5 uses some Trullan canon, it therefore appears immediately to have approved the rest. We say the same to the confirmation: Epiphanius was not deliberately treating the question whether the Trullan canons possessed firm authority. That was not what was being dealt with in the council; rather, discourse concerning those canons arose incidentally. Thus far concerning the third principal question. There remain, however, four other questions to be determined, common respectively to council and Pontiff according to the doctrine handed down by us in the preceding questions. SIXTH DOUBT. Whether the Supreme Pontiff or the Church can err in ordering the morals of the faithful by laws enacted, or by judicial sentences pronounced in judgment. It is argued first for the affirmative. The Lord prayed only for Peter that his faith should not fail. But from the fact that the Church or Pontiff errs concerning morals, the foundation of faith is not destroyed. Therefore such an error is possible. It is argued second. Whatever must be held with certainty of faith must necessarily have been divinely revealed to the Church. But laws and statutes of this kind concerning morals are not divinely revealed. Therefore they are not necessarily to be held with certainty of faith. It is argued third. It often happens that what one Pontiff establishes concerning the morals of the faithful another derogates. Therefore one of them errs in establishing a law concerning morals. For the decision of this doubt it must first be noted that ecclesiastical laws are of two kinds. Some are proposed to be observed by the whole Church. Others are enacted to be observed by some particular church; or a precept is imposed upon a particular person; or a sentence is pronounced in judgment concerning a particular action. It must be noted secondly that morals which can pertain to the governance of the faithful are of two kinds. Some are necessary for salvation; others are useful and fitting for the reformation of the faithful people. These things being supposed, let us propose several conclusions. FIRST CONCLUSION. The Supreme Pontiff or the Church cannot err in enacting laws which concern morals necessary for the whole Church. The conclusion is proved. Christ the Lord, in Matthew 16 and 18 and John 20, promised and handed over the keys of the kingdom of heaven to Peter and his successors, that they might open the heavenly gate to the faithful. But the kingdom of heaven is closed not only by ignorance of faith but also by ignorance concerning things to be done. Therefore in the Church there is the power of the keys for firmly determining the morals to be observed by the faithful. For example, the Church establishes that laymen communicate not under both species but under one species. A statute of this kind must be most certain. For if the Supreme Pontiff or the Church erred in a matter of this kind, the error would be pernicious no less than if it erred in faith. For if it said that for salvation it suffices to receive the Eucharist only under the species of bread, while in fact it were necessary to communicate under both species, it would plainly already err in faith. Therefore, if it commands such a practice to be observed by the whole Church, it would err no less perniciously. This is confirmed from what the Lord said to Peter: 'Feed my sheep.' But if the Pontiff erred in statutes of this kind, he would not feed Christ's sheep salutarily. Therefore, etc. Moreover, the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 3: 'These things I write to thee, that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth.' But it is certain that the Apostle wrote many things to him which pertained to the truth of morals. Therefore in these matters the Church cannot err; otherwise she would not be the pillar and ground of truth. The conclusion is likewise proved from what the Lord said in Matthew 23: 'The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses; all things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do.' Therefore much more infallible is that which the Supreme Pontiff or the pastors of the Church assembled in council, sitting as it were in the chair of Christ, establish and define concerning morals to be observed; otherwise the Church would have been left maimed and diminished in those things which are necessary for salvation. To this conclusion also pertain explanations of the natural law which are sometimes proposed by the Church in the manner of a statute and law, for example concerning the avoidance of usury or the flight from the vice of simony. For statutes of this kind seem rather to pertain to the doctrine of necessary truth than to the nature of positive law. SECOND CONCLUSION. When the Supreme Pontiff or the Church, in graver matters conducive to the formation of Christian morals, establishes laws for the whole faithful people, it cannot err in such a way as to command anything contrary to the Gospel or to the natural law. This conclusion is explained. We do not assert that all laws of this kind are necessary or enacted according to prudence. For sometimes perhaps Supreme Pontiffs multiply more laws than prudence requires, or enact them when they ought not, or where they ought not. A sign of this can be that another Supreme Pontiff, the same circumstances remaining, changes or abrogates laws of this kind enacted by his immediate predecessor. We assert only this: laws of this kind will never be pernicious or impious, or contrary to the Gospel or to natural right. This conclusion, thus explained, follows from the preceding one, because otherwise we would fall into the same inconveniences related in confirmation of the preceding conclusion. THIRD CONCLUSION. To assert that some universal custom of the Church is evil, or that some law of the same Church is unjust, is scandalous, exceedingly rash, and savors of heresy. The conclusion is proved. Although the Council of Constance in Session 13 established that those should be condemned as heretics who affirmed that the Church errs in the custom of communicating the people under one species only, nevertheless Martin V afterward, in the bull of confirmation, did not simply approve that article, but decreed more mildly that those who taught that the Church errs in a custom of this kind were to be condemned either as heretics or as savoring of heresy. But if

we attend carefully, someone can assert in two ways that the Church errs in a custom of this kind. In one way, by a pernicious error destroying a means necessary for salvation. In this sense I do not see why a theologian should hesitate to brand such an assertion with the censure of heresy. In another way one can assert that the Church...

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The Church may be said to err in the aforesaid custom because she imprudently commands it to be observed for the reverence of the sacrament. An assertion of this kind is worthy of the censure which we expressed in the conclusion. And for this reason I think that Martin V spoke disjunctively when he decreed that the aforesaid assertors were to be condemned either as heretics or as savoring of heresy, because he understood the twofold sense of that assertion explained by us. Therefore the hesitation of my teacher, Master Cano, does not please us in this matter, in Book V of the Places, in the final question, conclusion 2. For without the aforesaid distinction he seems to censure the assertion more mildly than he ought. It is true, however, that a little afterward he adduces an example more suitable to our conclusion. For example, the Lutherans condemn the custom of carrying the Sacrament of the Eucharist solemnly in procession through the public streets. If, therefore, we consider the origin of this condemnation, it is heresy; for they ridicule this custom because they deny the true presence of Christ in the sacrament. But if the aforesaid assertion is considered absolutely in itself, it savors of heresy and is rash impudence, yet it is not heresy. For even if the Church were to act imprudently in this custom, her authority in things necessary for salvation would not thereby be weakened. For the same reason, in the Council of Trent, Session XIII, canon 6, it is defined: "If anyone says that in the holy Sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is not to be adored with the worship of latria, even external, and therefore is not to be venerated with a special festive celebration, nor solemnly carried about in processions according to the laudable custom of the Church, let him be anathema." Observe that it does not simply strike with anathema those who condemn the rite of the Church, but those who condemn it because they deny the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist and therefore do not admit His adoration and worship. Likewise, it is not absolutely heretical to believe that the Church can sometimes err in the canonization of some saint or in the celebration of a feast, as we shall say afterward. But to assert that the Church errs in certain customs which she observes as handed down from Christ and the Apostles is plainly heretical. For he would be a heretic who asserted with the Iconoclasts that the Church errs in the veneration and worship of images. Our **conclusion, therefore, is to be understood of certain other customs introduced after the Apostles. FOURTH CONCLUSION. In matters of morals which are not common to the whole Church, but which concern private** persons, it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err through ignorance, or even through malice. This **conclusion is proved from Alexander III, On the Sentence of Excommunication, chapter A nobis 2, where he** says: "The judgment of God always rests upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows opinion, and it often happens both to deceive and to be deceived. Hence it sometimes happens that one who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence." Thus he speaks. The reason is manifest, because the judgment of the Church in matters of this kind depends upon human testimony, which is uncertain. Here, however, it must be observed that the Church or the Pontiff can much more easily be deceived and err in the judicial judgment of facts than in precepts and laws directed to some particular church. A forensic judgment can fall away from the truth through the ignorance, even inculpable, of the judging Pontiff, because it depends upon uncertain testimonies of men. A forensic judgment can also be perverted through the malice of the judge. Although such malice is not easily to be believed of a Pontiff, nevertheless, if it be admitted that some Pontiff through malice perverts judgment in a particular forensic sentence, the Apostolic See is not thereby derogated from, because an error of this kind in judgment is personal. For in that action he does not exercise the office of Supreme Pontiff toward the whole Church, but the office of judge concerning a particular cause between private persons; and therefore it will not be surprising if through avarice or some other human affection he perverts judgment. But in imposing laws upon some church, for example the diocese of Salamanca or another particular church, it is not credible that the Supreme Pontiff should err through malice or ignorance - I mean, should err perniciously against the Gospel or the natural law. The reason is that legislation of this kind does not depend upon the testimony of men, but upon the Pontiff's own motion, by which he judges such precepts and laws to be fitting. This is confirmed because such a church, by observing laws of this kind, would not seem to err, but would have an excuse before God, since the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ, commands that it be done. Just as the same reason applies when the Supreme Pontiff, having been questioned by some particular church, defines a dogma as if he had been questioned by the whole universal Church, so also, since there is one faith in the Church, it is necessary that the morals necessary for salvation be the same. Therefore I would not dare to affirm absolutely that the Supreme Pontiff can, even through ignorance, err in making laws and giving precepts to some particular and private church, except in the manner in which we conceded that he can err in making laws for the whole Church according to prudence, by multiplying laws which are unnecessary or not very fitting, indeed in some manner inconvenient, though not pernicious or unjust.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

And thus, it seems to me, a certain conclusion of Master Cano is to be understood, which he places third in the passage cited above, where he says: "In morals not common to the whole Church, but which are referred to private men or churches, the Church can err through ignorance." But certainly he does not sufficiently prove the conclusion unless it is restricted to forensic judgment concerning matters of fact. For what he adduces there concerning the canonization of saints does not pertain to one private church, but to the universal Church. Nor does he distinguish, concerning private churches, whether that error in making laws can be pernicious through ignorance. Moreover, when he says that the Church can err in laws of this kind, either he speaks of the Church as a legitimately assembled general council, or under the name of the Church he understands the Supreme Pontiff. If he speaks of a legitimately assembled council, there seems to be no difference, as regards its ability or inability to err, between making laws for the whole universal Church and making them for some private church; for in neither manner can it err perniciously, because in either manner it uses its authority in the name of the whole Church. Likewise, if he speaks of the Supreme Pontiff precisely insofar as he is Supreme Pontiff - in which capacity he can also make laws for private churches - it is false that through ignorance he can err perniciously. The reason is that then he uses the office of pastor of the Church. Indeed, I scarcely find any difference between laws made by the Pontiff for the whole universal Church and those made for some private church, provided that with respect to either he conducts himself as Supreme Pontiff and Vicar of Christ. Nevertheless, someone might assign this difference: it can happen that the Supreme Pontiff, not by his own motion but from false information concerning facts in some private church, is moved to make a universal law concerning that church, which law may be harmful to that private church. For example, if it were falsely reported to the Pontiff that in some bishopric all the priests were heretics or infected with some other scandalous vice, and the Pontiff, persuaded of this, were to make some law to be observed in that bishopric - for example, commanding under censures that for some time none of the faithful confess his sins to a priest - then a law of this kind would be observed perniciously. But concerning the whole universal Church such ignorance in the Pontiff does not seem admissible, so that he would impose a similar precept upon the whole Church. Yet this difference does not seem pertinent to the present matter, because precepts of this kind, which depend upon information concerning facts, seem more like judicial sentences than absolute laws. Consequently, in laws of this kind I do not see why the Supreme Pontiff could not err through ignorance, whether he imposes precepts upon the whole Church or upon a private church. Nevertheless, I shall never admit that the error would be pernicious. For if from the observance of laws of this kind something in fact follows which is contrary to divine or natural law, it is not the intention of the Pontiff that his precepts be observed; rather, the faithful themselves are bound to inform the Pontiff of the truth of the fact, according to the canonical decree in the chapter Si quando, On Rescripts, where it is said: "If at any time we direct to your fraternity certain things which seem to exasperate your mind, you ought not to be disturbed," etc. "Considering diligently the quality of the business concerning which we write to you, either reverently fulfill our mandate, or by your letters present a reasonable cause why you cannot fulfill it." Therefore laws of this kind will not be pernicious through the ignorance of the Pontiff, even if they are proposed to the whole Church. For the legislator himself already warns by a universal law that precepts of this kind, which depend upon information concerning facts, are not to be understood as absolutely binding. I therefore do not wish to admit that the Pontiff through ignorance makes pernicious laws. Much less is it to be admitted that the Supreme Pontiff errs perniciously in making laws absolutely and by his own motion. From what has been said it is easy to answer the arguments to the contrary. To the first argument it is answered that such an error can be imagined concerning morals necessary for the salvation of the Church that it would redound even to the destruction of faith. For example, if the Supreme Pontiff were to establish a law that no one receive Communion until the thirtieth year, or, at the other extreme, that all the faithful receive Communion every day. Either law would destroy the reverence of the sacrament and consequently endanger faith concerning it. But even granting that the foundation of faith were not destroyed, it nevertheless does not follow that the Supreme Pontiff can err in making laws concerning any morals whatsoever. For the unity of the Church consists not only in the unity of faith, but also in the worship and use of the sacraments necessary for salvation. Moreover, it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to provide the nourishment necessary for the salvation of the faithful. Therefore he can make no laws contrary to the Gospel or to natural reason. To the second argument it is answered that, although this law or another pontifical law is not divinely revealed, nevertheless it has been divinely revealed to us that to Peter and his successors there was given the power necessary for feeding the flock of the Lord, not only with the nourishment of true faith, but also concerning necessary morals, by fitting statutes and laws, and certainly never by laws contrary to the salvation of the faithful. To the

third argument it is answered that the Supreme Pontiff never revokes the statutes and laws of his predecessors if such revocation would be pernicious to the Church. Nevertheless, there can be many ecclesiastical laws which are prudently changed according to the variety of times. Statutes of this kind, even those made by the Apostles themselves which were fitting for their own time, have been abrogated. An example is Acts 15, where the Gentiles are commanded to abstain from things strangled and from blood. This was a positive law fitting for that time, lest the Gentiles should be an object of horror to the Jewish faithful with whom they lived. But afterward, with the passage of time, that law was abrogated. There are besides other laws which, although not unjust, concern matters not so necessary or fitting that human reason and

prudence cannot judge it more suitable to abrogate them. Indeed, perhaps changes of laws of this kind are sometimes most fitting for manifesting pontifical authority and for exercising the simplicity and obedience of the faithful toward the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ the Lord on earth. From what has been said it follows with how great veneration the decrees of the sacred Council of Trent concerning reform are to be received and esteemed. I say this especially because of those who, not without rashness, dare to call into doubt the decree of Session XXV, chapter 5, concerning the enclosure of nuns: whether the Supreme Pontiff can command perpetual enclosure to nuns who have not professed it. They try to confirm this by the following reason: a prelate neither ought nor can increase or diminish the vow of a subject, as is cited from St. Bernard; therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot by precept and censure compel nuns to that enclosure which they themselves have not professed. But it is astonishing that this reason should appear probable to men otherwise learned, and that on account of it they produce extraordinary glosses and interpretations of the aforesaid decree, although the Council and afterward the Supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII, by their own motions, leave no room for doubt. For they will and command that no congregation of women in which solemn religious profession is made may go outside its convent, and that no inferior prelate may grant permission to go out, except perhaps in one or another case in which the reason of natural law and charity seems to demand that permission. This statute is pious and holy, and is to be observed with that rigor which is commanded both in the Council and in the proper motu proprio documents of the Supreme Pontiffs.
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The theological reason by which a statute of this kind is shown to be just and holy is this: the Supreme Pontiff has full power to establish those statutes which are judged conducive to the common good of ecclesiastical discipline and to the observance of religion. But experience had shown that, after the multiplication of many communities of religious women, the solemn vow of chastity could scarcely be preserved as it ought if such a multitude of religious women had easy permission to leave their convents or monasteries; whence both religion and the name of religion suffered no small detriment and disgrace. Therefore, wishing to meet so great an evil, the Pontiffs could and ought to use their authority, commanding that henceforth no professed religious woman leave her monastery, convent, or congregation without the special faculty of the Supreme Pontiff himself. For the Supreme Pontiff is not only the supreme guardian and protector of the assembly of the faithful, but also of religious institutes; and therefore he can reserve to himself permission of this kind to go outside the convent. Indeed, if it were necessary for the good government of monks and other religious that they not easily wander away from their convents or outside their prescribed bounds, the Supreme Pontiff could and ought to enclose even us men within our convents, although we had never professed enclosure of this kind. For where the common good of the Church or of religion is endangered, it is most fitting that private persons suffer something, even if it seems contrary to their liberty. The argument to the contrary is easily answered from the theological reason by which we have shown that it is necessary, and that the Supreme Pontiff can do this. Nor does the Supreme Pontiff thereby increase the vow of a religious woman. For he does not command religious women to vow enclosure, but he uses their ancient vow of obedience, by which they are specially bound to obey superiors in lawful and honorable things according to their state. It is most fitting to the religious state that not only women, but also men, never leave the house without the permission of a superior; and this permission, when necessary, the supreme prelate can reserve to himself. SEVENTH DOUBT. Whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in the canonization of saints. It is argued first for the affirmative. No one can be so certain of the state and holiness of another as he can be of himself, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him." But no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love, as Ecclesiastes 9 has it. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot judge with certainty concerning the holiness of any man unless he is made certain by a special revelation. It is argued second. Every judgment which rests upon a fallible medium can be false. But in the judgment concerning the canonization of saints the Church rests upon human testimony, in which witnesses are questioned concerning the life and miracles of the one to be canonized. Therefore it seems that the Church can err in the canonization of saints. This is confirmed, for St. Thomas, Quodlibet IX, final article, and other Doctors, judge concerning the canonization of saints that it can piously be believed that the Church does not err in a matter of this kind. But to the contrary: an error of this kind in canonizing saints would be exceedingly pernicious if the whole Church venerated as holy and blessed one who is damned in hell. Therefore in so grave a matter the universal judgment of the Church cannot be false. On this question the heretic Wycliffe used to say that it was exceedingly presumptuous for the Pope or the Church, without a special revelation, to judge that anyone is holy and blessed, even if it were confirmed by miracles, because such things are not certain signs of holiness, since they can be deceptions of demons. Against this error Waldensis wrote elegantly in the second volume On the Sacramentals, from chapter 122. For the determination of the truth, let the FIRST CONCLUSION be: It is heretical to deny that there is authority in the Church and in the Pontiff for canonizing saints. This conclusion is also against Luther, who, as Cochlaeus reports in the acts and writings of Luther for the year of the Lord 1524, raging against Adrian VI because he had enrolled Benno, Bishop of Meissen, in the catalogue of saints, published a little book to which he gave in the German vernacular the title Against the New Idol and the Old Devil, in which he says that the office of the Pope is nothing other than to kill true saints and exalt false ones. The conclusion is proved, first, from the tradition and perpetual usage of the Catholic Church and from the common consent of all councils and Fathers from the beginning of the nascent Church. For authority of this kind has always been believed and committed to the Church and the Pontiff. It is confirmed from the Council of Florence in the decree on the union of the Armenians, where the Armenians are commanded henceforth to venerate the most blessed Leo I as a saint and as deservedly enrolled in the catalogue of the saints. The **conclusion is proved, second, because it is heretical to deny that the saints are to be invoked, as is evident** from many councils, from the decretals in Book VI of the Decretals, from the Clementines and Extravagantes concerning relics and the veneration of saints, and finally from the Council of Trent, Session XXV, in the decree concerning the invocation, veneration, and relics of saints. Therefore there is authority in the Church for canonizing saints. The consequence is clear, because otherwise it would not be heretical to deny that those whom the Church has canonized are to be invoked and venerated. It is proved, third, that from Sacred Scripture it is certain that many saints of both the Old and New Testaments are in heaven, whose

catalogue is given in Ecclesiasticus 44 and Hebrews 11. Likewise it
would be manifest heresy to deny that the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, St. Stephen, and others like them, of whom mention is made in Sacred Scripture and whose holiness is celebrated there, are in glory. Therefore authority of this kind had to remain in the Church for the confirmation of the Christian religion and the exhortation of the faithful, while there are proposed to them the examples of saints whose souls are judged already now to be in glory. This is also expedient in order to show that the hand of the Lord has not been shortened, but that just as in the primitive Church there were Christians of outstanding holiness, so now and always until the consummation of the age there are and will be faithful distinguished by holiness of life.

SECOND CONCLUSION. It is very rash and scandalous, and savors of heresy, to say that the Pope or a council
can err in the canonization of saints. The sense of the conclusion is not merely that the Pope cannot err by abusing his power - for we have already said that such an assertion would be heretical - but the sense is that to assert that some saint canonized by the Church or the Pontiff is not in heaven is very rash, scandalous, and savors of heresy.

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The aforesaid censure is proved. In the Council of Constance, Session 8, Wycliffe is condemned for having said that Augustine, Benedict, and Bernard were damned unless they did penance at the end of life. It is proved secondly because, as we have already said, Pope and council cannot err perniciously in making laws concerning morals common to the whole Church. But it very greatly concerns the common morals of the Church that there be no falsity in those who are canonized as saints. Therefore to assert that in a matter of this kind error can occur through ignorance or by another way is exceedingly rash, scandalous, and savoring of heresy. It is proved thirdly because such an error would redound to contempt of the Church and of divine honor. For even the demons themselves would mock the Church of Christ if they saw those whom they have with themselves in hell as companions of damnation and punishment honored by us throughout the whole Church and their patronage invoked before God. This is confirmed because the honor which is shown to saints is a certain profession of faith by which we proclaim the glory of the saints and eternal life. Therefore to assert that in this profession, so common in the Church, there is an error through ignorance is rash, etc. It is proved fourthly because he does injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr. Therefore he does greater injury who thinks that martyr to be in hell. Consequently he is very impious who denies that a martyr canonized by the Church is in heaven. But someone says: why do we not condemn such assertors as heretics? It is answered that in this censure we follow the common opinion of theologians, especially St. Thomas in Quodlibet IX, final **article, where he says: "Canonization of saints is a mean between two things, namely between the infallible** judgment of the Pope concerning matters of faith and his fallible judgment in civil and criminal causes. Nevertheless, because the honor which we exhibit to saints is a certain profession of faith by which we believe the glory of saints, it is piously to be believed that even in these matters the judgment of the Church cannot err." St. Antoninus asserts the same in Part III, title 12, chapter 8, and Cajetan in the opusculum On Indulgences addressed to Julius, chapter 8. Nevertheless because in recent times there have been heretics who ridiculed the Church in canonizing saints and denied her authority and infallibility, therefore more recent theologians rightly judge that to assert that the Church was false in the canonization of some saint savors of Lutheran heresy, even if the authority to canonize is not denied. To the arguments for the opposite it is answered. To the first it is said with St. Thomas in the place cited above that the Pontiff, whose office it is to canonize saints, can be made certain concerning someone's state through inquiry into his life and testimony of miracles, and especially through the instinct of the Holy Spirit, who searches all things, even the depths of God. Observe there that the Church's certitude concerning the holiness and beatitude of Augustine is greater than Augustine's judgment concerning himself was in this life, unless perhaps he was certain by special revelation. For the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest she err in a judgment of this kind, as St. Thomas indicates in the aforesaid solution. To the second argument it is answered that although the Church uses human testimonies, nevertheless she uses not just any, but those of many men of great authority. Furthermore she uses the testimony of miracles, whose discernment - whether they are from God or from the demon - belongs to the Church, which is governed by the impulse of the Holy Spirit. Therefore by no route is it credible that she errs in a judgment of this kind. For there are many similar things even in human matters which, although we do not see with our eyes or touch with our hands, nevertheless no one unless insane can deny if they are held certain by human testimonies. For example, that Titus and Vespasian existed and destroyed the city of Jerusalem, or that gold is born among the Indians, even we who have not seen this cannot doubt. So great is the force of the testimony of many men. Therefore, with Catholic faith presupposed, by which we believe the glory of saints who followed Christ's footsteps, and by which we also believe that in the Supreme Pontiff and Church there is authority for canonizing saints, no one except an insane person or a heretic should be believed to doubt whether a canonized saint is in heaven, since authority of this kind for canonizing uses the testimonies of so many and such trustworthy men and, in addition, miracles. Therefore rightly one who doubts the very fact comes under suspicion of heresy and savors of heresy. EIGHTH DOUBT. Whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in confirming religious institutes under diverse institutions and rules. It is worthwhile to define this difficulty briefly, without first placing arguments for the affirmative side, by the following conclusions. FIRST FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSION. It is certain according to Catholic faith that the state of religion is not an invention of men but an Apostolic tradition: that in Christ's Church there be a special state in which those who wish make solemn vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity and are received by the Church.

SECOND CONCLUSION, consequent upon the preceding. The Supreme Pontiff possesses authority for discerning and defining fitting modes by which the state of religion is promoted and preserved in the Church. This conclusion needs explanation more than proof. For if the Supreme Pontiff has authority concerning the state of bishops by dividing bishoprics and containing and governing the bishops themselves by certain laws and conditions, much more will he possess power concerning the state of religion, which is inferior to the state of bishops, so that he may direct its substance - which consists in the three essential vows - to different proximate ends, and thus make distinct orders and constitute fitting means for each order proportioned to its proper end. Thus power of this kind pertains to the Supreme Pontiff so that no one in the Church can institute a new order without the consent and confirmation of the Supreme Pontiff. Otherwise there would be in the Church not beauty but confusion of orders. THIRD CONCLUSION. The Supreme Pontiff can in no way err in confirming some particular religious institute as regards what pertains to the truth of its doctrine, institution, and constitutions which are proposed to him for confirmation.

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For example, blessed Dominic once approached the Supreme Pontiff so that he might confirm for him an order which would be called the Order of Preachers and would be ordered toward this end: that religious should prepare themselves to dispute against heretics and even to refute their errors. Behold the end of this religion. For all true and proper religious institutes agree in making the three solemn vows. Blessed Dominic added certain means fitting and proportioned to so excellent an end, namely that the religious who wished to serve God under the aforesaid institute should also profess the Rule of Blessed Augustine, which he himself had professed while he was a canon regular in the Church of Osma. He further added other stricter constitutions, through the exercise of which his brethren might progress in the charity of God and neighbor. Namely, that they abstain from meat, that they not use linen next to the flesh, that they fast almost throughout the whole year, that they first devote themselves to prayers and many vigils and to divine praises. He added very many other statutes by which his religious commonwealth might be fittingly governed. I say, therefore, in the **conclusion that the Supreme Pontiff could in no way err in confirming some religious institute with respect to** those things which are proposed to him verbally or in writing and which pertain to truth of doctrine. Thus constitutions approved by the Pontiff contain nothing contrary to the Gospel, right faith, or natural reason. In this sense the conclusion is so certain that I do not hesitate to call the opposite heretical. It is proved because the Supreme Pontiff, as was already shown above, cannot define anything contrary to truth. Otherwise he would not be a certain rule in defining matters of faith. FOURTH CONCLUSION. The Supreme Pontiff cannot err in approving some religious institute with respect to the constitutions and laws proposed to him in such a way that he approves laws pernicious or harmful to the salvation of souls. This conclusion is proved by the same reasons by which the third conclusion placed in the preceding seventh doubt was proved. It is further proved because when the Pontiff approves some religious institute, he uses the office of Supreme Pontiff, proposing to all the faithful such a religion not only as fitting for the salvation of those who wish to profess it but also as congruous for perfection of charity in those who observe it. Therefore if the Pontiff erred in an approval of this kind, he would perniciously deceive the faithful who desire their own salvation. Consequently whoever denies this conclusion is to be marked with the same censures as one who denied that third **conclusion cited above. From this conclusion follows a corollary: there is no religious institute approved in the** Church of God in which someone cannot, as far as concerns the state itself and the religion, tend toward perfection if he observes, together with the essential vows, its statutes approved by the Supreme Pontiff. I have said "as far as concerns the state itself and the religion," because for someone it may be unfitting to profess this or that religion because of personal circumstances, either his own or those of others. For it can happen that in such a religion fertile land has been turned into saltiness because of the malice of those dwelling in it. Thus it can happen that, although that religion is good, nevertheless for the weak it is harmful because of the conversation and example of many dwelling in it, because they are ambitious or avaricious or not so chaste as they ought to be. All these things can occur without a miracle because of the negligence and sometimes malice of prelates. FIFTH CONCLUSION. It is possible for the Supreme Pontiff through negligence, ignorance, or false information in some way to err according to prudence in approving and confirming more religious institutes than were needed in the Church of God. Nevertheless such error will never turn to the destruction of the Church, although it can be harmful to some. Both parts of the conclusion will easily be proved by us. The former because Innocent III in the Lateran Council, as is held in On Religious Houses, final chapter, says: "Lest excessive diversity of religious institutes introduce grave confusion into the Church of God, we firmly prohibit anyone henceforth from inventing a new religious institute," etc. There the Pontiff judged that at that time more religions ought not to be confirmed. The same is indicated under the same title in the Sixth Book, chapter 1, from Gregory X in the General Council of Lyons, where it is said: "The excessive diversity of religious institutes, lest it introduce confusion, the general council prohibited by a prudent prohibition," etc. Furthermore Celestine V confirmed the state of the Fraticelli by his privilege. Nevertheless afterward John XXII declared that privilege of confirmation invalid. Similarly Paul III is said by his letters to have approved the order which Brother Battista of Crema instituted in Italy. Nevertheless afterward that order was expelled by public edict by the Venetians, and the doctrine of Battista, to which the men of that order adhered, was condemned at Rome. Master Cano reports these arguments in Book V On Theological Places, chapter 5, near the end, in order to prove that the Supreme Pontiff can err in approval of religious institutes. He says that the argument taken from privileges of this kind of Pontiffs to prove that new religious institutes ought to be received as though fallen from heaven is weak. But in truth arguments of this kind do not prove that the Supreme Pontiff erred by approving an evil or false religion. It is concluded only that the founder, or rather inventor, and his followers did not preserve the state of religion according to the form which they proposed to the Supreme Pontiff for confirmation and which the Supreme Pontiff confirmed. For when a religious institute has been confirmed by the Pontiff, those who profess it are not thereby confirmed in grace or faith. Therefore it is not surprising if afterward Pontiffs deservedly dissolve religions confirmed by others because of the malice of those dwelling in them. Indeed this belongs to the office of the supreme pastor: to reform religious institutes, reduce them to a smaller number, or certainly dissolve some because those who profess them cannot be reformed or because some religion is useless. Our aforesaid conclusion, therefore, is to be understood in such a way that the error which can occur in confirming religious institutes is not greater

than that which can occur in multiplication of ecclesiastical laws concerning matters which are not necessary for salvation to be done in this or that way except only because of obligation of law.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Since therefore in common laws of this kind, according also to the common opinion of the Doctors, the Supreme Pontiff can proceed less prudently, there is no reason why we should fear to assert that even in confirming so many and such various religious institutes, from which confusion can arise in the Church and other inconveniences emerge for perfect and tranquil government of the Church, the Supreme Pontiff can also approve and confirm some one or more religious institutes less cautiously. Nevertheless I confess that in very many cases Supreme Pontiffs have a just excuse in confirming new religious institutes, lest perhaps they seem to extinguish the Spirit, especially because if afterward some inconvenience arises from some new confirmed religion, the Supreme Pontiff himself can provide a remedy by reforming that religion with new statutes or, if it is useless, can dissolve it. SIXTH CONCLUSION. After some new religious institute has been confirmed with its special end and with statutes or constitutions offered, examined, and approved by the Pontiff, nevertheless not for this reason are all statutes which are afterward made by the prelates or chapters of that same religion to be judged virtually confirmed and approved by the Supreme Pontiff. This conclusion is proved because the Supreme Pontiff confirms and approves only those things which are expressly proposed to him, and in addition grants to the prelates of that religion authority to govern. But he cannot transfer to them pontifical authority so that they cannot err perniciously in making laws concerning the morals of their commonwealth. For this privilege was granted by the Lord to the Pontiff alone. The aforesaid conclusion is so manifest to learned men that it does not need many arguments for its confirmation. But it was placed by me so that I might convict the ignorance of certain religious. For there are some who invent for themselves an excuse in sins, vain, not to say shameless. For if perhaps a learned and grave man, with zeal for God, prudently reprehends some customs of some religion or defects of particular persons, they immediately accuse the one reproving as though rash, because he condemns a religion approved by the Supreme Pontiff. As though the Supreme Pontiff had approved customs of this kind worthy of reprehension, and not rather the prelates themselves afterward through their incautious constitutions, admonitions, or permissions introduced such customs. How great evils formerly followed in Christ's Church from negligence or imprudence of prelates of religious institutes, as indeed they still follow in our times, experience itself has shown. For almost one hundred years ago nearly all religious institutes, even those of mendicants, were reformed by Supreme Pontiffs through the industry of the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella. In our times also, through the industry of Catholic King Philip, great monarch of all the Spains, very many religious institutes which were suffering shipwreck have been reformed by Supreme Pontiffs and are daily reformed and reduced to ancient observance. This matter is very necessary for the edification of the faithful people, according to the doctrine of blessed Gregory in Part I of the Pastoral Rule, chapter 2, where, explaining Ezekiel 44: "They became a stumbling block of iniquity to the house of Israel," which indeed was said by the Prophet concerning bad priests, he says: "No one harms more in the Church than he who, acting perversely, possesses the name or order of holiness. For no one presumes to reprove this delinquent, and the fault is vehemently extended into example when the sinner is honored because of reverence for his order." Thus far Gregory. Let what has been said by us concerning the matter of this tenth article suffice also in these first commentaries.

MORE EXTENSIVE COMMENTARIES ON ARTICLE X
OF QUESTION I

After the scholastic tract according to the manner which teachers in the schools are accustomed to observe in instructing disciples, it seemed good to me, because this article of St. Thomas is exceedingly fruitful, to add another more extensive tract. In it, indeed in scholastic style but more copiously, I have determined for the sake of more advanced theologians to dispute and define six graver doubts. FIRST DOUBT. Whether the Church is a collection of the faithful. It is first argued and proved that for the nature of the Church it is not required that she be a collection. For at the time when Adam alone existed there was a Church, and yet then there was no collection. The minor is manifest from the fact that one alone cannot be a collection. Before formation of Eve, however, Adam alone existed. The major is proved because Adam possessed faith in Christ when he said in Genesis 2: "This now is bone of my bones." Therefore at that time he pertained to the Church. For by faith someone is made a member of Christ's body, which is His Church. This argument is confirmed because Jerome upon Psalm 133 teaches that there is the true Church where true faith exists. But in Adam there was true and formed faith. Therefore. It is argued secondly. In Abel alone and in Enoch alone in their own times the Church existed. Therefore the Church does not require a collection of many faithful. The antecedent is evident from Augustine, who on Psalm 122 says: "At one time the Church was in Abel alone; at another time the Church was in Enoch alone." Therefore. It is argued thirdly. The opinion of many Doctors is that in the triduum of Christ's death faith remained in the Blessed Virgin alone, so that even the Apostles lost it. Therefore at that time the Church remained in her alone.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The antecedent is asserted by Abulensis on Matthew, chapter 16,
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question 67. And in the book called Rationale of the Divine Offices, in

the office of Thursday in the Lord's Supper, it is said that this is signified in that ceremony of the Church which is made in Holy Week when in the nocturnal office all lamps are extinguished and only one remains lit, namely that the lights of the Church, that is the Apostles, were extinguished and lost faith, the Blessed Virgin alone persevering with the splendor of faith. Torquemada thinks the same in Book III of his Summa, chapter 61. He proves it first because to the Apostles themselves those things which were said by the women concerning the Resurrection of the Lord seemed delirious words, Luke 24. And from Matthew 26: "All of you shall be scandalized in me this night." For it is written: "I shall strike the shepherd and the sheep of the flock shall be scattered." There the gloss explains "shall be scattered" from the unity, namely, of faith. He said all would be scattered. Likewise from Mark 16: "He reproached their unbelief and hardness of heart because they did not believe those who had seen Him risen." Therefore. And from many testimonies besides of Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and other holy Fathers. Alexander of Hales holds the same in Part III at the end, and the Archdeacon and Huguccio in their apparatus upon On Penance, distinction 1, section His auctoritatibus, upon chapter Quis aliquando. It is argued fourthly, presupposing from St. Thomas III, q. 8, a. 3 that this difference exists between a natural animal body and the mystical body of the Church: that the members of a natural body all exist simultaneously, but not the members of the mystical body, because the Church is constituted from men who existed from the beginning of the world to its end, who nevertheless do not coexist simultaneously. Hence he says: "The members of the mystical body are taken not only insofar as they are in act but also insofar as they are in potency." This being supposed, it is argued thus. For the nature of a mystical body it suffices to possess many members potentially and successively, and it is not required that it possess them actually. Therefore for the nature of the Church, which is Christ's mystical body, this actual collection is not required. Rather it will suffice that she gathers many faithful at diverse times. It is argued fifthly against the clause "of the faithful." Heretics are parts of the Church and are not faithful. Therefore the Church is not the collection of all the faithful. The antecedent is clear because they are punished by the Church. Therefore they are not outside her. For, as is said in 1 Corinthians 5, the Church does not judge those who are outside. This is confirmed. The head of the Church, namely the Pope, can be a heretic and unbeliever and remains head of the Church until he is deposed. Therefore a fortiori other heretics can be members of the Church. It is confirmed secondly because 2 Timothy 2 says that Hymenaeus and Philetus fell away from truth and subverted the faith of some. And it adds that in a great house, namely the Church, there are vessels of gold and clay, some unto honor and others unto dishonor. Because of these words Augustine in Book III On Baptism, final chapter, numbers those erring from faith in the Church. And in Book IV, chapter 12, he cites Cyprian in the letter to Antonian as thinking the same. Jerome holds the same on Galatians 5, saying: "But he who understands Scripture otherwise than the sense of the Holy Spirit demands, by whom it was written, even though he has not withdrawn from the Church, can be called a heretic." Likewise, we prove that sinners are in the Church because Paul recognizes such persons in those Churches to which he wrote, as is clear in 1 Corinthians and throughout the Epistle to the Galatians. Therefore. It is argued sixthly against the same clause, proving that not all faithful pertain to the Church. Catechumens possessing faith and charity before Baptism are truly faithful and in the state of salvation. Yet they are not of the Church. Therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved because if they fall away from faith they cannot be punished by the Church. Therefore they are not within her. The same argument is made concerning a child or adult pagan who at the instant of use of reason, or at any other time, is interiorly illuminated by God and receives faith with the desire for Baptism. For these are truly faithful, and yet they are not parts of the Church by the same reason. It is argued seventhly. Schismatics are truly faithful and nevertheless are not of the Church. Therefore the Church is not the collection of all the faithful. The antecedent is manifest. For schism does not destroy faith, as will be clear below. The minor is proved because the Church is one, but they are divided and separated from this unity. Therefore. Likewise because they do not possess the head of the Church. Therefore they are not of her body. It is argued eighthly. Excommunicated persons are truly faithful and nevertheless are not of the Church. Therefore. The minor is proved because in Matthew 18 it is said of those disobedient to the Church who are excommunicated that they are to us as heathens and publicans separated from the Church. It is argued ninthly. The Church is constituted from the predestined alone. Therefore she is not the collection of all the faithful.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The antecedent is asserted by Augustine in Book V Against the Donatists, chapter 27, where he teaches that the enclosed garden, sealed fountain, and well of living waters are constituted from the predestined alone, even though they are unbelievers. But these are attributes of the Church. He proves it because Noah's ark, which figured the Church, saved all whom it contained. Therefore those who are not saved are not to be reckoned within the ark, he says. And in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 9, he says that those are not truly numbered among the sons of God - who are also sons whom mother Church bears to Him - except those who persevere in good and are predestined. And in Book III On Christian Doctrine, chapter 32, he teaches that those who will not remain with Christ forever are not truly of Christ's body. But the predestined alone remain. Therefore. He proves this opinion also from testimonies of Scripture. First, the sons of God, whom we have said are sons of the Church, are heirs of God and coheirs of Christ, as is said in Romans 8. Therefore those who do not attain beatitude are not to be reckoned sons of the Church. Secondly, the Church is called Christ's sheepfold and her members Christ's sheep, over whom Peter is placed as shepherd, John 10. There Christ says concerning His sheep: "My sheep hear my voice, and I give them eternal life." Therefore. Thirdly, those alone pertain to the Church concerning whom it is said: "Christ is head of the Church and Savior of His body, which," namely in beatitude, "He will present to Himself glorious without spot or wrinkle," as is said in Ephesians 5. But the predestined alone are saved and will be without spot and wrinkle. Therefore. Fourthly, concerning those who are not saved John expressly says in his First Canonical Epistle, chapter 2: "They went out from us, but they were not of us, because if they had been of us they would certainly have remained with us." Therefore those who do not remain are not in the Church. It is argued tenthly. Among the faithful there are many sinners. Therefore these do not pertain to the Church concerning which it is said: "I believe the holy Church." And again: "You are all beautiful, my beloved, and there is no spot in you." Likewise John teaches in 1 John 3: "Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin and cannot sin because he is born of God. In this the sons of God and the sons of the devil are manifest." Therefore even a faithful sinner is not a son of God and consequently neither of the Church, His spouse, because he commits sin. This is confirmed from Augustine, who in Book II Against Petilian, final chapter; Book II Against Cresconius, chapter 21; the book On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12; Book IV On Baptism Against the Donatists, chapter 3; Book VI, chapter 3; and Book VII, chapters 49, 50, and 51, holds that the wicked do not pertain to the Church of God. Cyprian holds the same in the letter to Magnus. Jerome likewise on Ephesians 5, explaining "without spot or wrinkle." The Master of the Sentences, following Augustine, does so in Book IV, distinction 8 at the end, and Hugh of St. Victor, Book II On the Sacraments, Part II. The same consequence is also proved by reason. For if sinners, who are members of the devil, are enclosed in the Church, then because of them she could be called evil and the synagogue of Satan. Secondly, sinners are members of the devil and citizens of Babylon. Therefore they are not members of Christ or the Church nor citizens of Jerusalem. This is confirmed. Sinners are dead members. But a dead member is not properly but equivocally such, as is held in On the Soul II, text 9. Indeed St. Thomas in III Sentences, distinction 13, q. 2, a. 2 teaches that men of this kind are only equivocally members of Christ. But on the contrary is chapter Ecclesia, De Consecratione, distinction 1, where the Church is defined in this way. And the gloss upon 1 Timothy 3, "which is the Church of God," says: "The Church is the convocation of many to the worship of one God." For this dispute, since according to Aristotle it is necessary concerning the subject to suppose what it signifies, it must first be noted that this name "Church" signifies an assembly or gathering of many called together, and is a name used not only by Christians but also by ancient and pagan authors. As is clear in Aristotle, Politics II, saying that certain polities do not make an ecclesia, that is, a congregation or council. And because this notion of assembly and gathering can be found in diverse modes, hence the name Church according to its proper signification is used in various ways both in Sacred Scripture and in sacred canons.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

For sometimes there it is taken for men consecrated to divine worship, that is, for ecclesiastical men. Sometimes for the greater part of a chapter. Sometimes for the canons of the cathedral church. Similarly in Sacred Scripture sometimes it is verified of the universality of all the blessed and wayfarers possessing faith. The gloss notes this on Ephesians where: "He gave Him as head over the whole Church." There the gloss says: "Which," namely, "is in heaven and on earth." St. Augustine speaks of her in this way in the book On the City of God; see Book XI, chapter 1. Sometimes it is taken for men alone, Ephesians 5: "Christ is head of the Church; He is Savior of His body." And again: "Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself for her." It is clear that He is not Savior of angels nor did He deliver Himself for them. Sometimes it is taken only for wayfarers, as Augustine notes it is taken in Psalm 21: "My praise is with You in the great Church." Sometimes more strictly for the universality of one province, as is evident in 2 Corinthians 1: "The Church of God which is at Corinth." The gloss notes the same in the final chapter of Romans upon: "Gaius and the whole Church salute you." Sometimes again more strictly for the congregation of the just, Ecclesiasticus 3: "The sons of wisdom are the Church of the just." And because the predestined also constitute their own universality, sometimes it is taken for them alone, as is evident in the gloss upon 2 Timothy 2: "The Lord knows who are His." Sometimes for subjects, as can be seen Acts 15 and 20. Finally for an assembly of nobles, as in 3 Kings 8 and 1 Chronicles 29. According to figurative speech it is taken for the prelate of some congregation, by that kind of speech in which the most principal part is taken for its whole. Thus it is taken in Matthew 18: "Tell the Church," etc. Sometimes for the material house itself, by the trope in which container is taken for contained. This usage is frequent in Scripture and in sacred canons. In these and many other ways Church used to be taken. Nevertheless all these acceptions are derived from one in which Church is taken for a congregation of the elect. And with respect to this the other congregations are called Church by analogy of proportion to one end. For the prelate is called Church insofar as he orders others toward the just end. Subjects insofar as they are ordered toward it. The militant Church insofar as she attains or intends the glory of the blessed. And although according to this reason by extrinsic denomination all other things apart from the congregation of the blessed are called Church, nevertheless any congregation can formally be called Church when the term is taken commonly. But setting aside all these acceptions, it has been received by the usage of the faithful that it is used not for any gathering or universality whatsoever, but only for that which acknowledges the true God. And this we are accustomed to distinguish into the triumphant Church of the blessed and the militant Church of wayfarers who walk by faith. The present disputation is instituted concerning the latter, namely so that it be taken for the congregation of all living faithful. It must be noted secondly that there is this difference between the congregation of faithful existing in the time of revealed grace and that which existed in the time of the Mosaic law: that although the latter was sometimes called Church, nevertheless it was more commonly called Synagogue. The former, however, is never addressed except by the name Church. The reason for the distinction is the excellence of our state and of the new law above the old. For these terms "Church" and "Synagogue" are Greek names. Synagogue signifies the same as congregation. Church, however, is convocation. But voice and convocation properly belong to men. Congregation, although sometimes it is also said of just men, nevertheless is a term more proper to irrational animals, derived from a flock, and is properly said of them. Therefore to show the difference between the two states - that in the time of the Mosaic law the Jews were as it were cattle, while now they are rational men - those are called Synagogue and these Church. Augustine teaches this on Psalm 81, and Isidore, Etymologies VIII, chapter 1. The difference consisted in this: that that law induced men to its observance because of temporal promises, as is clear in Isaiah 1: "If you are willing and hear me, you shall eat the good things of the earth." Those who desire such things from God are cattle. For Augustine, speaking of that ancient people, says: "He became as it were a beast by desiring earthly things." Hence the voice of the synagogue is: "I have become like a beast before You." For one becomes a beast by desiring earthly things from one's God. For this reason we often read in Scripture that those who either desire earthly things greatly or ask them from God are addressed by names of animals. In these places Rupert should be seen concerning how these terms, to ruminate, to low, and others of this kind are properly attributed to animals lacking reason, but to men by transfer when they desire earthly things, because by desiring these they become beasts. But in the time of the new law we are induced to observance of precepts by hope of heavenly and spiritual reward. This belongs only to rational beings. Therefore as rational beings we are called together and are called Church.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Augustine notes this on Psalm 36: "Men and beasts You will save, O Lord; according as You have multiplied Your mercy." There he distinguishes sons of men from beasts or those assimilated to beasts, who desire from God those things which are given to beasts and pursue present goods together with them. The former, however, desire future goods together with the angels. The second difference is that that people was imperfect, but the new and evangelical law is perfect. Therefore for this reason those are called cattle but the Christian people men. For men imperfect in virtue are fed by God with hay and grass, food of animals, and therefore are numbered among beasts. The perfect, however, are fed with bread, man's proper food. Ambrose notes this elegantly in the final chapter of the book On Paradise upon Genesis 3, where first it is said to Adam: "You shall eat the herbs of the earth." And secondly: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread." For he eats herbs who is in progress and not yet perfect; he eats bread in whom justice has been consummated. Since therefore that law did not give justice perfectly as ours gives it, rightly they can be called cattle, while we are men and ought to be called so. Therefore we are rightly called a convocation. There is another reason why we are called Church and called together. For this note that in Scripture "to be called" signifies God's gratuitous will and mercy. Thus the interlinear gloss notes upon Romans 9: "Not from works but from the one calling it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." The Gentiles, however, from whom the Church is for the most part constituted, attained salvation, faith, and grace from God's mercy alone. The Jews, however, as though from a debt because of the faith given to their fathers. Paul explains this more elegantly and broadly in Romans 15. Therefore so that this gratuitous election of God might always be retained in the memory of the Gentiles, she is called Church. Hence also in Romans 9 Paul cites the first and second chapters of Hosea concerning the congregation of the Gentiles under the name of calling: "I shall call that which is not my people, my people, and her who was not beloved, beloved, and her who had not obtained mercy, one who has obtained mercy. And it shall be: in the place where it was said to them, you are not my people, there they shall be called sons of the living God." Behold, he always designates this Church of the Gentiles under the name of calling, so that by her own name she may be reminded of God's benefits and of her gratuitous election. Thirdly it must be noted that we can take this militant Church in two ways. Either for the universality of all who had, have, or will have faith in Christ, even if they do not agree in any other worship or exterior religion. St. Thomas speaks of the Church in this way in III, q. 8, a. 3, and the Doctors asserting that the Church now is the same as that which existed in the time of the law of nature and the Mosaic law. In this way she is also taken in chapter Firmiter, On the Supreme Trinity, and in the Extravagant Unam Sanctam, On Majority and Obedience, and chapter Ecclesia, De Consecratione, distinction 4. In these places it is said that outside the Church there is no salvation or remission of sins open to anyone. Or she can be taken for the collection of wayfarers whom faith unites and whose exterior profession is made in Baptism. If taken in the first way, she is well defined by Nicholas, as reported De Consecratione, distinction 1, chapter Ecclesia, as "the collection of all the faithful." If, however, she is taken in the second way, she can be defined as "the collection of baptized faithful." Or thus: "The visible collection of baptized faithful under one head, Christ in heaven and His vicar on earth." "Collection" is placed in the place of genus. For Church is a collective noun signifying a multitude. That she is contained under this genus is evident. For an animal body cannot be understood without many members, as Paul teaches Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12. But the Church is the body of the living Christ, as is said in Ephesians 4 and 5. Therefore she necessarily gathers many faithful. Secondly, Christ in the final chapter of Matthew, speaking with the Church, says: "Behold, I am with you all days." Therefore on all days there will be a collection of many. For "with you" signifies a multitude. The same is evident from John 14: "I shall give you another Paraclete, that He may remain with you forever." Paul designates this multitude of members in Ephesians 4: "Doing truth in charity, let us grow in Him in all things who is the head, Christ." And 1 Corinthians 12 from the middle of the chapter to the end. Thirdly, the Church is accustomed to be named house, city, kingdom. These names, although sometimes taken figuratively for a material place, properly are taken for a community of men.

Hence Luke 2: "Because he was of the house and family of David." And Luke 19: "Seeing the city, He wept over it, saying: If you also had known." And Luke 11: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be desolated." But none of these communities or collections is preserved in one man alone. Therefore neither is the Church, which properly is called the house of God, as in 1 Timothy 3: "How you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God." She is also called city, according to Revelation 21: "I saw the holy city descending from heaven," etc. And kingdom, as the gloss notes upon 1 Corinthians 15: "When He shall have delivered the kingdom to God and the Father." Indeed from this reason it is gathered that the Church is a collection of many existing simultaneously. For although a city or kingdom retains its unity through continual succession of men, nevertheless it always requires actually a multitude of several persons, such that in one alone the nature of city or kingdom is not preserved. Therefore neither will the nature of the Church be preserved if she gathers many only at diverse times and at some time is preserved in one alone. This is confirmed from St. Augustine in the book On Faith to Peter, chapter 43, saying: "Hold most firmly and **doubt in no way that the threshing floor of God is the Catholic Church, and within her until the** end of the age

chaff is contained with the wheat, that is, bad men are mingled with good through communion of the sacraments, and in every profession, whether of clerics, laymen, or monks, there are good and bad together." Thus he. Therefore the Church cannot at some time be preserved in one alone. Otherwise this mixture would not exist. Secondly this is confirmed from those things which will be said below, namely how there will always be bad men in the Church. And since otherwise we must also admit just men by necessity, it follows evidently that a collection must necessarily be posited. But what seems to move a doubt is whether this collection ought to be of many baptized faithful. Or would it be enough, for example, that it consist of one baptized person and other faithful who are not baptized, so that we preserve what faith teaches concerning the duration of the Church? The reason for the doubt is that the reasons and testimonies adduced show only that the Church will exist. And we would preserve her most properly by positing only one baptized person and other faithful not baptized. For no testimony or reason compels that there will be a Church of baptized persons. Indeed if someone were obstinate, saying that the Church is indeed to be preserved but in only one faithful person among those who live among us and in Enoch and Elijah, who are faithful and wayfarers, what censure would he deserve, since he shows a multitude and collection of many living faithful so as to preserve the Church? It is answered. It is of faith that the Church which we confess will endure is a Church of baptized persons, which in Spanish we call la Christiandad. And I judge the opposite heretical. It is proved first because, as we shall show below, the Church according to faith is visible, collected by some sensible sign. But the Church which these persons posit is not visible in this manner. For they are joined by faith alone, which is invisible. Therefore. Secondly it is proved. We confess by faith one holy Church and that her unity consists in the worship of one God and unity of faith and sacraments, which Paul comprehends under the name Baptism in Ephesians 4: "One Lord, one faith, one Baptism." And in chapter Est unitas, De Consecratione, distinction 4, the unity of the Church is placed in unity of the sacraments, in which nevertheless unity of worship and of things to be believed is included. But the unbaptized do not communicate in the same sacraments. For they lack the first door of the sacraments, namely Baptism. Therefore. Thirdly it is proved. The Church which Christ founded He built upon Peter and subjected to him, according to John 10: "There shall be one fold and one shepherd." But the unbaptized are not subject to him. Therefore. Fourthly. The unity of the Church is heterogeneous, as is clear from Sacred Scripture and especially from Paul, Ephesians 4, who posits the ecclesiastical hierarchy as enduring until the day of judgment when he says that He gave some Apostles, others Prophets, others Evangelists, others Pastors and Doctors, etc., until we all meet in a perfect man. But this distinction of bishops and ministers cannot be preserved in one baptized person alone. Therefore. From this reason it also follows that the Church cannot be preserved in women alone. For women are not permitted by Paul to teach, 1 Corinthians 14. Nor can a woman feed, since she cannot possess spiritual jurisdiction. Likewise the sacrament of the Eucharist will endure until the end of the age, 1 Corinthians 11: "As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall announce the death of the Lord until He comes," namely the Lord on the day of judgment. But the minister of this sacrament cannot be a woman. Therefore. From these things it also follows that the Church cannot be preserved in a multitude of baptized infants alone.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

We assert this against a certain Bartholomew of Majorca from the island of Minorca, around the year of the Lord 1363, who asserted that the Church in the time of Antichrist ought to consist only of baptized infants. For he said that all other Christians would be corrupted by Antichrist. Fifthly it is proved. We confess by faith that Church to whom God promised in John 14 the Spirit of truth who would teach all things necessary for salvation, and with whom He promised that He would remain until the consummation of the age, Matthew last chapter. But He promised this to no other congregation except that which in matters of faith to be believed possesses an external rule and is subject to it, namely the Church of baptized persons. Therefore. Sixthly. We confess the Apostolic Church which is founded upon the doctrine of the Apostles. But this is the Church of baptized persons: "Going," says Matthew in the final chapter, "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Therefore. Finally, this is the certain opinion of all the faithful, even rustics, that there will always be a multitude of baptized persons. Therefore. From these things those two clauses "collection of baptized persons" remain explained. The third clause is "of the faithful," which is placed to exclude heretics, who do not pertain to the Church. It is proved first from testimonies of the saints. Cyprian asserts this in Book I, Letter 3 to Cornelius and Letter 6 to Magnus; Gregory, Moralia XII, chapter 15; Jerome, Dialogue Against the Luciferians, and on Isaiah 7 and Hosea 1, where he also distinguishes them against the Church; and Augustine, Book On True Religion, chapter 5, and On Faith to Peter, chapters 38 and 39, and elsewhere frequently. The same is held in chapter Firmissime, On Heretics. It is proved by reason.

First, the Church which is espoused to Christ is a virgin, according to 2 Corinthians 11: "I espoused you to one husband as a chaste virgin." But God had said in Hosea 2: "I will espouse you to myself in faith." For virginity signifies integrity of faith. Therefore those who do not possess it, such as heretics, are not espoused to Christ and thus are not of the Church. Secondly, heretics are cut off from the Church. Therefore. The antecedent is proved because union with Christ and His Church is made through supernatural cognition and love. A heretic possesses neither. Therefore he does not pertain to the Church. This is explained more. Every member receives some influence from the head. Heretics have no supernatural influence of this kind, because they do not have faith, which is the principle of the rest. Therefore none. The consequence is proved because the Church, since she is a certain supernatural commonwealth, necessarily must be constituted by something supernatural. But the first foundation of supernatural being is faith. Therefore. It is also placed to exclude other unbelievers, such as Jews and pagans, whom it is much more certain do not pertain to the Church, as is held throughout the title On Jews and Saracens and in chapter Firmissime, On Heretics. The fourth clause is placed to exclude schismatics from the Church. For since they are not within the Church and are truly faithful and baptized, this clause is necessary, namely "under one visible head who is Christ's vicar on earth." That they are not within the Church is clear from cause 24, q. 1, chapter Schisma and chapter Pudenda, and expressly in the cited chapter Firmissime, On Heretics. Cajetan disputes this below in q. 39, and Torquemada, Book IV of his Summa, chapters 3 to 7. But it must be noted that because the Supreme Pontiff, who is head of the Church, can also be a schismatic, as will be disputed below q. 39, and he can defect and withdraw from himself who is head, the notion of head can be taken in two ways. Either materially, for the person who is Pontiff and Pope. Or formally, for the office of head, which is to rule, govern, and exercise some influence upon the members. Therefore a Pontiff who wishes to separate himself from the community of the Church, through which he falls into schism, is not subject even to one visible head formally. For he exercises no influence nor ministers anything to the Church from which he separates himself. Therefore he too is comprehended under the aforesaid clause. Indeed from this distinction it is explained how many who separate themselves from the head are members of the Church. For we have often seen wars waged against the Pontiff by Catholics and many kingdoms separated from him, indeed rising against him, which nevertheless we confess are contained within the unity of the Church because they do not separate themselves from the visible head formally with respect to his functions, namely to be fed by doctrine and truth, but materially from the person who is head. These things having been thus explained, this first assertion remains manifest: the Church is the collection of all baptized faithful who are subject to one visible head as Christ's vicar. But for greater elucidation of this let there be a SECOND

CONCLUSION.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

SECOND CONCLUSION. Whoever possesses the conditions placed above and explained in the definition of the

Church will pertain to her as a part and be contained in her bosom, even if he has nothing else. This conclusion is established as of faith against heretics who required many other things in men so that they might pertain to the unity of the Church and asserted that these were not sufficient. Some demanded integrity of life, perfection, and holiness of morals so that someone might be numbered among the sons of the Church. Thus the Donatists asserted, Augustine being witness in Book III Against the Letter of Parmenian, chapter 2 at the end. Of this faction seem to have been the Novatians, who were also called Cathars, that is "pure" and "holy." And among Lutherans, the Anabaptists. The Begards and Beguines also followed the same opinion. Others among the Lutherans, speaking more remissly, did not demand perfect justice and an altogether immaculate life in members of the Church, but only justifying grace, and excluded from her bosom those who were wicked and sinners. Others, among whom were John Hus and John Wycliffe, sought nothing supernatural in those who pertained to the unity of the Church except the grace of predestination. Thus they numbered only the predestined among members of the Church, even if in act they were unbelievers, while all others whom God foreknew, even if they were most just, they asserted to be outside the universality of the Church. With these, unless piously explained, Ferus seems to agree on John 17: "I have manifested Your name to men," asserting that none except the predestined believe and thus none except they pertain to the Church. But concerning this see the Sacred Library, Book VI, annotation 214. Others were divided into other opinions, which, because it would be too long to pursue, we omit, mentioning only the more illustrious errors. Against all these, therefore, we proposed the aforesaid conclusion. We shall refute them first by common reasons against all, then by special arguments and testimonies. First, therefore, it is argued against all. That servant who did not have mercy on his fellow servant and was delivered to torturers, Matthew 18, is reckoned to pertain to the Church of God, named the kingdom of heaven. And he who, while the master was absent, began to strike his fellow servants, whose portion was placed with unbelievers, Luke 12. And that man who entered the wedding without a wedding garment and therefore was cast into exterior darkness, Matthew 22. And those five foolish virgins to whom the door was closed and who before had slept and slumbered, Matthew 25. These were sinners, not perfect, and were not predestined. Therefore even imperfect and evil men pertain to the Church. Likewise the Church of God is compared in Matthew 3 to a threshing floor in which chaff to be burned is contained with the wheat. And chapter 13 she is likened to a net in which good and bad fish are gathered, which nevertheless afterward are cast out. Therefore. Again in the same chapter she is likened to a field in which cockle is sown together with good seed, which afterward was to be gathered into bundles and burned. Therefore. Likewise St. Paul, 2 Timothy 2, compares the Church to a great house in which are contained vessels of gold and silver, wood and clay, some unto honor and others unto dishonor. By honorable vessels of gold and silver he understands the good and just. Hence he adds: "If anyone shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor." But by the latter he understands bad men and those foreknown. Therefore. Likewise Genesis 15 and 22 the seed of Abraham, that is the faithful as Paul explains in Romans 4, is compared to the stars of heaven and the sand of the sea. But neither the just nor the perfect nor the predestined are so numerous. Indeed few are chosen. Therefore. Many other things could be brought forward, but let these testimonies suffice. Now it is argued by reason. First, otherwise it follows that the Church is not certain and visible, whose contrary we shall show below to be of faith. It is clear because no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love and much less whether he is predestined. Therefore since the good, perfect, or predestined cannot be recognized, the Church could not be recognized. This is confirmed. By the same reason it follows that no ecclesiastical jurisdiction would be certain. For since this jurisdiction cannot be possessed except by a son of the Church, and it is unknown whether the Pontiff or any bishop is predestined, good, or perfect, his jurisdiction will be uncertain and null. Likewise no one could be punished by the Church for his crimes, which is against Paul's doctrine in 1 Corinthians 5 delivering a certain man to Satan, and saying to others in 1 Corinthians 4: "Do you wish me to come to you with a rod?" The same reason makes the consequence clear. For the faithful cannot judge those who are outside. But it is unknown whether the one to be punished possesses the aforesaid conditions, namely predestination, grace, perfection. Therefore.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Specially against the first error it is argued from 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us." And he adds: "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins." Observe that he says "our sins," namely of the Apostles themselves. Christ also taught them in Matthew 6 to pray: "Forgive us our debts." This is confirmed from Daniel 9, where he himself says: "When I confessed my sins and the sins of my people." From this testimony those are more openly refuted who say that the Apostles spoke in this way not for themselves but for the people: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us," 1 John 1; and James 3: "In many things we all offend." For Daniel, concerning whose holiness testimony is rendered in Ezekiel 14, nevertheless distinguishes his own sins from the sins of the people. Likewise Hebrews 5: the priest, because he was surrounded by infirmity, had need to offer sacrifice for himself. And Galatians 2: Cephas is judged reprehensible by Paul. Likewise drunkenness overtook Noah, Genesis 9, and Job confesses many of his sins, chapters 13 and 14, and nevertheless in Scripture testimony is rendered concerning their holiness. Likewise Paul in 2 Thessalonians 2, 1 Corinthians 1 and 4, and 2 Corinthians 13, recognized a true Church in both peoples, and nevertheless afterward reprehends them and shows them subject to sins. Furthermore in Ephesians 4 the Apostle declares that the ecclesiastical hierarchy was given to the faithful until we all meet in a perfect man, etc., and are no longer children wavering. Therefore for as long as we do not meet, we are children defective in certain things. Furthermore Psalm 31: "I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and You forgave the impiety of my sin. For this every saint shall pray to You in a suitable time." Again 2 Corinthians 4: "Although he who is within, our man, is corrupted, nevertheless he who is without is renewed from day to day." If he is renewed from day to day, he has not been altogether perfectly renewed. Likewise Paul himself testifies of himself in Philippians 3: "Not that I have already received or am perfect." To this is added what is said of Moses, Aaron, and Samuel, whose virtues are greatly extolled in Scripture, in Psalm 98: "Taking vengeance on all their inventions." But vengeance is not inflicted by God except for sins, which he understands under the name inventions. And what Christ says to the just: "If you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more your heavenly Father," etc., Matthew 7. Certainly if they were not just, they would not be called sons of the heavenly Father. If they did not have sin, they would not be called evil. Likewise to Peter already clean and washed Christ says in John 13 that it is necessary for him to wash his feet, that is to wash away certain light faults. Likewise Revelation 1, 2, and 3, those bishops who are reported as just and concerning whom Scripture gives testimony that they have charity are admonished to do penance for certain sins for which they are there reproved. Likewise every branch bearing fruit is cleansed so that it may bear more fruit. Yet it would have nothing to be cleansed if it had no sin. We could refute this error by many other things, but let these suffice. Let those who wish read more in Augustine, Book On the Perfection of Justice, and Book II On the Merits and Remission of Sins, and Books III and IV Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, where in confirmation of this truth he reports Cyprian and Ambrose in many places of their works. Jerome should also be read in Book II Against Jovinian and Book I Against Pelagius. But it is argued by reasons. First. It follows that there will be no purgatory, which is contrary to the tradition of the Church, contrary to definitions of councils, and contrary to express Scripture, saying in 1 Corinthians 3: "He himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." The consequence is clear. For that fire purges the sins of imperfect sons of the Church. But there are many such. Therefore. Secondly it is proved. It follows that there would be no fraternal correction in the Church, which is against Matthew 18: "If your brother sins against you," namely he who is a son of the Church, "correct him between you and him alone," etc. The consequence is clear. For where there is perfect justice and no sin, there is nothing to be corrected. Thirdly it is proved. It follows that sacramentals are not necessary to the faithful, such as holy water, episcopal blessing, etc. The consequence is clear because these are established for remission of sins. But these sins would not be in the Church. Therefore they would not be necessary. Fourthly it is proved. It follows that one who keeps the commandments does not enter life, contrary to Matthew 19: "If you wish to enter life, keep the commandments." The consequence is clear because commandments can be observed by imperfect persons having some light sins. But these do not enter eternal life, according to the adversaries. Therefore. I prove the minor. No one enters there unless he is a son of the Church. But those imperfect persons are not such, since they do not have complete perfection of life which these men require in members of the Church. Therefore. But behold upon what foundation their madness rests.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED They say that it is

commanded that we be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect, Matthew 5. And the same, they say, is commanded by Moses, Deuteronomy 18, and by Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: "Be perfect." And 1 Peter 1: "Having girded the loins of your mind, sober, perfectly hope," etc. Therefore one who does not fulfill this precept, it is not surprising if he does not enter life, since he does not observe all the commandments. Again Matthew 22 says: "The first and greatest commandment is that we love God from the whole soul and whole mind, whole heart and all our powers." But in this consists total perfection. For one who loves in this way cannot sin. Therefore. Nevertheless these things do not compel us to deviate from Catholic faith. To the first, from the book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, and Jerome, Book I Against Pelagius, it is answered that those testimonies understand perfection in one virtue, not perfection simply in all. Or they understand perfection in knowledge of truth, especially this, that men cannot exist without sin. But because perfection simply spoken consists in charity, as St. Thomas teaches II-II, q. 184, a. 3, the text which simply commands perfection seems to command this. And since this cannot exist without perfection of the other virtues, it seems to speak of total perfection of affection. Therefore it is answered otherwise from St. Thomas in the place cited above, article 2, that perfection of Christian life, which consists in charity, since it imports a certain totality, this totality can be considered in three ways. First on the part of the object loved, so that one loves God as much as He is lovable in Himself. This is possible to God alone. Or on the part of the lover according to absolute totality, namely insofar as the affection according to its whole power is always actually borne toward God. This is possible only to the blessed. The third is considered only with respect to total exclusion of those things which are repugnant to charity or impede its progress and increase. With this many venial sins can coexist well, which are not opposed to charity but to its fervor. And Sacred Scripture brought forward above incites and exhorts us to this, and any others there are of the same meaning. To the second it is answered altogether the same: that to love from the whole heart according to the absolute totality of the lover excludes every sin. But not if "from the whole heart" is taken according to the third mode and species of perfection. According to this the precept is given. The solution is from the same St. Thomas below, q. 44, a. 4, ad 2. Against the second error also, besides those things which we said in common, there are certain others concerning which Augustine treats broadly in On the Unity of the Church and many other places; likewise Jerome in the Dialogue Against the Luciferians. Let us bring forward a few things. First there is Canticles 2: "As a lily among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters." Augustine frequently explains this that thorns, that is bad men and sinners, are also sons of the Church. For he does not say "among strangers" but "among other daughters." With this agrees the same chapter: "As an apple tree among the trees of the forests, so is my beloved among the sons," where he calls those also sons who are sterile in virtues. Likewise: "I am black but beautiful, like the tents of Cedar, like the skins of Solomon," chapter 1. Blackness and deformity could not be attributed to the Church unless sinners were contained in her. Likewise Revelation chapters 1, 2, and 3 commemorate not only light sins but even graver and mortal ones, and nevertheless it says those committing them are of the Church. Again Paul writes that there is a Church among the Corinthians and among the Galatians. Yet there he recognizes fornicators, incestuous persons, adulterers, seditious men, and those who from envy announce the word of God. Therefore he reckons these sinners to be within the Church. Furthermore Christ admonishes that we do what prelates say but not imitate their works, Matthew 23. Therefore Christ understands that bad men can be even principal parts in the Church. There are also added to the reasons made above other ones. First, otherwise there would be no excommunication in the Church, which is contrary to Matthew 18: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and publican." The consequence is clear because excommunication pertains only to faithful sinners. Likewise the king's servants gathered to the wedding whoever they found, good and bad, Matthew 22. It is established that under the name wedding faith by which we are espoused to Christ is signified. Therefore. Furthermore in that mystical sheet which Peter saw in ecstasy clean and unclean animals were contained, as also in Noah's ark, Acts 10. By these things according to the gloss the aforesaid truth was figured. Finally, certain branches adhere to Christ which do not bear fruit, which nevertheless are not immediately cut off but are to be cut off, John 15. Secondly it would follow that the sacrament of Penance is not necessary, which per se is required only for faithful sinners. Thirdly, from this follows the greatest consolation to the faithful when they know through faith that they are of Christ's family, and the greatest glory of Christ because from this the people of God is larger: "In the multitude of the people is the dignity of the king; in the smallness of the people the shame of the prince," Proverbs 14. Fourthly, sinners are truly Christians. Therefore they are of the Church. For after promulgation of the Gospel the Church is the collection of Christians. The antecedent is of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 28. Likewise it is argued. Both in political and monastic communities those are reckoned citizens who violate the laws of their own commonwealth. Therefore similarly in the Christian commonwealth he will be reckoned a citizen who professes her laws even if he violates them. Sixthly, the Apostle teaches in Romans 12 that there are many members in one body of the Church possessing diverse offices for the utility of others. But not all prophets nor all who work miracles are just. Therefore this is not required in order to be a member of the Church.

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The minor is proved from Matthew 7: "Did we not prophesy in Your name, cast out demons, perform many mighty works?" Yet to these it is said that they are workers of iniquity and that the Lord never knew them. Likewise Peter, when he denied the Lord, was an Apostle, and Judas, whom Christ calls a devil, is said to be from the twelve chosen Apostles. Therefore sinners pertain to the Church. Against the third error, besides the common places adduced, others can still be brought forward. First, 1 Corinthians 12 says: "In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body." Therefore through Baptism and profession of faith we pertain to the body of the Church, not through divine predestination. Secondly, the Lord says that He will cut off the branch not bearing fruit and cast it into the fire, John 15. Therefore if it is cut off, it was joined to the Church. Thirdly, 1 Peter 2 says: "Who once were not the people of God, but now are the people of God." Likewise Ephesians 2: "You were alienated from the way of life of Israel and strangers to the covenants; but now you are citizens of the saints and members of God's household." But if some were of the Church, which is the city and people of God, only through predestination, this variation could not be found, that one who was not the people of God became the people of God. For God's predestination is certain and unchangeable. Fourthly, John 1 says: "He gave them power to become sons of God, to those who believe in His name." Therefore through faith we are made sons of God. Again, if through divine predestination we attained this sonship, it would not be in our power to attain it, just as predestination does not depend upon our will. Fifthly, Matthew 13 says that from the kingdom of the Son of Man Christ all who do iniquity are to be gathered so as to be cast into the furnace of fire. But we said above that this kingdom is the Church. Therefore. Sixthly, Matthew 8 says that many will come from east and west into the kingdom of heaven, but the sons of the kingdom will be cast into exterior darkness. Therefore the sons of the kingdom, which is the Church, are not constituted through predestination. Seventhly, we said above that prophets and those possessing grace of miracles are of the Church. Yet it is said to them: "I never knew you," Matthew 7. Eighthly, Romans 8 says: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God." Therefore they are also sons of the Church, which is the spouse of God, whoever possesses His Spirit, even if they are not predestined. And 1 Thessalonians 5: "You are sons of light and sons of God." And immediately he shows in what consists being sons of day and of God, saying: "But we who are of the day, let us be sober, having put on the breastplate of faith and charity and the helmet, hope of salvation." Therefore. Again Ephesians 4: "Doing truth in charity, let us grow in Him in all things who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body compacted and connected by every joint of supply," etc. There all the holy Doctors assert that the bonds and connections of the members of Christ's body are made through faith and charity. Therefore predestination is not required for union of the Church. Furthermore 1 John 3 places the difference between sons of God and sons of the devil in that the sons of God are those who do justice, but the sons of the devil those who commit sin, that is unbelief, as Augustine explains. For in this manner "sin" is accustomed to be named in the Scriptures, according to John 15: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin." They would indeed have other sins, but would not have the sin of unbelief. Since therefore John distinguishes sons of God and of the devil according to unbelief and justice, they cannot be distinguished according to predestination and reprobation. Likewise the Apostles are called sons of the bridegroom, according to Matthew 9: "The sons of the bridegroom cannot fast for as long as the bridegroom is with them." He speaks expressly of the Apostles. Similarly it was said in refutation of the preceding error from Romans 12 that the Apostles are of the Church. Yet one of the Apostles, a son of the bridegroom and consequently of the bride, namely the Church, was damned, namely Judas. Therefore. Finally, this opinion was condemned in the Council of Constance, Session 15, where many other propositions of the same man which followed from the aforesaid opinion were also condemned. For example: that no one, when justified, begins to be a member of Christ if he was not one before, nor when he sins ceases to be a member of Christ if he was one before. Likewise that Paul and the thief when they were unbelievers were members of Christ, and that Judas also when he followed Christ in grace was a member of the devil. Nor is it necessary here to multiply reasons against this heresy, such as that being a member of the Church would be a mere being of reason, since predestination places nothing in the predestined, and that the fact someone is a part or member of the Church would in no way unite him to the head and other members, nor would he receive anything from the head or possess any life, even vegetative, and other things of this kind. For the proof brought forward from Scriptures and councils suffices. These things having been supposed, the arguments for the opposite are answered. To the first, the major is denied speaking of the Church of human wayfarers. To the proof the consequence is denied. For angels possessed true faith of the same species as ours and nevertheless were not members of this Church. I say secondly that a member, although it is something absolute constituted through something intrinsic, nevertheless also includes a relation of proportion to other parts of the body insofar as it receives from them or serves and ministers to them. Therefore when other members do not exist, it will not be a member according to the complete and absolute notion, though it will be so incompletely as regards intrinsic and absolute things. Therefore Adam before formation of Eve was in this manner a member as regards the absolute nature of member, yet not as regards the complete notion because of lack of other members. To Jerome it is answered that he speaks expressly of the formal constituent of the Church. For he says that the Church consists not in walls but in truth of dogmas. And he adds that there is the true Church where true faith exists. By this he does not exclude the other requisites as though from the side of matter or subject, which is

the collection of many. To the second it is commonly answered that the Master speaks of the Church of the just alone, for whose congregation we said above that this name Church is often taken.
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And to what he says, that the Church of the just then existed in Abel or Enoch because only they are reported as just, they adduce an example. For Hebrews 7 says that Melchizedek is without father, without mother, and without genealogy because his parents are not reported, not because he had none. In the same way we could say Elijah was without father and mother and without beginning of days because these things are not reported concerning him in Scripture, but with no mention of these matters he is suddenly introduced in 3 Kings 17, only his country being mentioned. We can adduce another example. Matthew 1 says that all the generations from David to the transmigration are fourteen. Nevertheless it is clear that there were more. For Joram, who there is said to have begotten Ozias, did not beget him, but Ochozias; Ochozias begot Joas; Joas Amasias; Amasias Ozias. Nevertheless because more are not reported there, it says all those generations were fourteen. Thus therefore they answer that Augustine said only those men were of the Church because only those are reported as just. But although we could in some manner sustain this concerning the time of Abel, when Adam and Eve themselves were already just - for Wisdom 10 says that wisdom brought Adam out from his crime, although in that history this is not reported but in another book - nevertheless the same is not so probably asserted concerning the time of Enoch. For as is clear in Genesis 5, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalaleel, and Jared lived in the time of Enoch. Yet these are reported to have been just. The major is clear because from the time Seth begot Enos until the birth of Enoch only 387 years elapsed, as is clear there. But Seth and the other aforesaid men lived after the aforesaid generation at least eight hundred years. Therefore they lived together with Enoch, Scripture reporting it. The minor is certain from reading St. Augustine in the books On the City of God, especially Books XV and XVI, where he shows by many things that this genealogy of Seth was the series of the just. For this reason they are called sons of God, distinguished against daughters of men, and in their generations the years in which they began to beget are noted, which is not done in the generations of sinners, sons of Cain. The other things which he there adduces concerning Seth and the common tradition of the saints show him to have been a just man. And concerning Enos Scripture says in Genesis 4 that he began to invoke the name of the Lord. Jerome on Joel 2 and Augustine on Psalms 30, 52, and 85 teach that to invoke God belongs properly to perfect men. Therefore many other answers could be given to Augustine. For the present, however, let it suffice to say that it is the manner and custom of Scripture and the Saints to enumerate only those things which are more principal. For example, in 1 Esdras 1, when the vessels carried away from Babylon are numbered, only the more precious, 2,469, are enumerated; and nevertheless many others were carried away, for it adds: "All the vessels, 5,400." Likewise in the same book, chapter 2, after the enumeration of the people ascending from Babylon it adds: "The whole multitude, 42,360." Yet if you compute the individual numbers, more than ten thousand are lacking, because only the more principal are enumerated individually, namely of the tribes of Judah, Benjamin, and Levi. And Augustine, City of God XV, chapter 20, asserts that in the generations of Cain, Genesis 4, only one son is named for each, although each had more, because only the principal persons were numbered there. That others were born is clear: Cain built a city, which requires a multitude, and each of these had wives, whose generation is not reported there. Thus therefore we could say that Augustine speaks according to this manner, enumerating only men of principal holiness in those ages. But whoever wishes to follow the first and common interpretation must say: concerning those alone it is said in Scripture that they were just, although there were others just who are not reported, as we have proved. To the

third argument, that opinion is denied. For it includes many propositions that are more than false and worthy of grave censure. The first proposition is: In no man of the whole world did faith remain except in the Blessed Virgin. The second: All the Apostles lost faith. The third special proposition concerning Peter: Peter lost faith. Each one therefore especially deserves examination and censure. The first is shown false from the refutation of the second and third propositions. Moreover, some just men expecting the kingdom of God remained at Jerusalem. Therefore they had faith. The antecedent is of faith. For Mark 15, Luke 23, and John 19 speak concerning the time of the Passion that Joseph, a councilor, was a just man and was awaiting the kingdom of God. The consequence is proved. The interlinear gloss upon Mark, "He was a noble councilor," says, noble in faith. And the ordinary gloss in the same places asserts that Joseph acquired great merit in the burial of Christ. But neither justice, nor hope, nor merit can exist without faith. Therefore. Secondly, in Galilee and other parts of Judea there were many faithful. From these St. Thomas thinks those five hundred brethren were gathered to whom the Lord appeared, 1 Corinthians 15. But it is rash and, as it were, blasphemous to accuse these of unbelief. Therefore. Thirdly, of Cornelius it is read in Acts 10 that he was religious and fearing God, praying always with his whole household, and that the prayers which he made pleased God. If he always prayed to God, he always had faith. Therefore faith did not remain in the Blessed Virgin alone. This is confirmed. There is no reason why we should deny that before Christ's Passion there were many faithful among the Gentiles, such as this Cornelius with his whole house. And among the Jews themselves who were scattered outside Jerusalem throughout the world we must assert that many were faithful and just who at the time of Christ knew nothing of His doctrine or miracles. To assert that these lost faith at the time of the Passion is rash. Fourthly, it seems little pious and little worthy of the majesty of God that He should have no servant or friend in the whole world except the Blessed Virgin. For Proverbs 14 says: "In the multitude of the people is the dignity of the king, and in the smallness of the people the shame of the prince." To this is added that if we believe Augustine in Sermon 81 On Time that Joseph, Christ's foster-father, lived at the time of the Passion, it would be blasphemy to assert that he was then an unbeliever. Finally, this proposition compels one to concede that at some time the Church

defected; but this cannot be maintained. The antecedent is proved because from what was said above the Church cannot consist of one faithful person alone. But this opinion reserves faith in the triduum of the Passion only in the Blessed Virgin. Therefore at that time the Church defected. For these reasons this opinion seems to us proximate to error, if it is not error. The second proposition, however, universally asserting that all the Apostles lost faith, is indecent and blasphemous against the honor due to the holy Apostles. For although of one it may be true that he lost faith, concerning the others no reason proves it, no testimony compels it, no authority persuades it. First, this seems contrary to the common opinion of the Saints, who upon 1 Corinthians 15, "then to James," say that James the son of Alphaeus vowed that he would take no food until he first saw Christ risen. Therefore he believed that He would rise, and thus does not seem to have lost faith in Him. Jerome is authority for this in the
catalogue of ecclesiastical writers, taking it from the
Gospel of the Hebrews. Likewise, in the final chapter of Matthew it is said that the disciples went into the mountain where Jesus had appointed them, and seeing Him they adored, but some
doubted. The Evangelist says that some doubted, not all.
Therefore to brand all of them with the note of unbelief, indeed of heresy, without which the Apostles could not have lost faith, is absurd and blasphemous. Nor does the solution of Torquemada suffice, defending them from heresy because they were not pertinacious in that error. For, as we shall teach more fully below, the pertinacity required for heresy is not hardness and obstinacy, but signifies consent contrary to that truth which we know to be of faith, whether this arises from passion, infirmity, or any other cause. Therefore, if the Apostles had lost faith, seeing those things which they thought were against the faith, the consequence would remain. The third proposition, that Peter lost faith, seems to some contrary to faith, and they oppose Luke 22: "I have prayed for you that your faith fail not." But to us it seems worthy of a milder censure, namely that it is false and ill-sounding among learned men. For that it is not contrary to faith is manifest because its falsity is not proved from any testimony except the cited one, and that testimony does not compel to this. It can be explained in several ways. First, so that it is not understood of Peter's personal faith, but of the faith which he

first expressly confessed when he said: "You are Christ, the Son of the living God." According to this explanation, which is that of Abulensis, the sense is: I have prayed that the faith which you first confessed should never fail. A similar exposition Augustine gives on John 17: "I pray not for these only, but also for those who will believe through their word." In this prayer, says Augustine, are included the good thief, Paul the Apostle, and others who believed without the preaching of the Apostles, because "through their word" signifies the word of faith which they preached in the world. Thus it is called their word because by them it was first preached and principally spread in the world. So also it is called Peter's faith because he first confessed it and it pertained especially to him, as universal pastor, to teach, explain, and defend it. In like manner at the end of the Council of Trent in the acclamations of the Fathers it is said: "This is the faith of Peter" - not that numerical faith which was in him, but that which he confessed.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To the seventh argument it has already been said how the clause 'of the faithful' in the definition signifies faithful persons subject to one visible head, which schismatics do not have. Otherwise that would not be the definition of the Church concerning which we are now disputing. For to be a member of this visible Church it is not enough to receive the influx of the first and invisible head, Christ, which schismatics can retain insofar as they do not lose faith and hope; there is also required an influx from the visible head and a fitting conjunction with the other visible members. Schismatics lack this. Therefore they are not simply reckoned members of this visible Church, although they can still pertain to her with respect to those things in which they agree with her, namely matters of belief and the use of the sacraments. To the eighth it is answered that excommunicated faithful are truly and properly members of the Church and can sometimes even be living members possessing charity. As to Matthew 18, 'let him be to thee as the heathen and publican,' the phrase does not signify that in the truth of the thing he is separated from the Church as a heathen is, but that he is to be regarded, treated, and held as a heathen. It is customary in Sacred Scripture for the verb 'to be' to signify 'to be held or esteemed.' Thus Genesis 42, 'By the life of Pharaoh, you are spies,' means, you shall be held and treated as such. And 3 Kings 18, 'The God who shall answer by fire, let him be God,' means, let him be held and worshiped as God. Augustine gives this explanation, Question 139 on Genesis. Excommunicates are held and treated as heathens in this respect: they are deprived of the fellowship of the other faithful and of the sacrifices and common prayers of the Church. To the ninth argument the antecedent is denied: the Church is not constituted from the predestined alone. To the proof from Augustine against the Donatists it is answered

first that Augustine himself, Retractations II, chapter 18, explains that in those and similar passages he understands the Church according to the state which she will attain in beatitude, not simply according to the state she now possesses. That he speaks in this way is clear from his words. Speaking of the wicked whom he excludes from the enclosed garden, he says: 'These nevertheless had Baptism in common with the just, although they did not have charity in common with them.' The words are in the past tense and indicate the future perfected state rather than denying their present exterior membership. When Augustine says that unbelievers and heretics, if predestined, pertain to the Church, this is to be explained not simply but according to God's foreknowledge. The solution rests upon a rule which Augustine often notes, especially in the letters to Paulinus and Dardanus and in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 9: Scripture often speaks of future things as though they were already done because they are certain in divine predestination. Common examples are 'They have dug my hands and my feet' and similar prophecies. More pertinent examples are John 15: 'All things whatsoever I have heard of my Father I have made known to you,' although elsewhere He says, John 16: 'I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.' The first is said in the hope and certainty of future accomplishment. This rule applies not only to verbs but also to names: those who will be in reality are sometimes named according to hope as though already such. Paul calls those to whom he writes 'saints,' not because all are already holy in reality, but because they are called to holiness and aspire to it. Likewise John 11 says that Jesus would die 'that He might gather together in one the children of God who were dispersed.' They were not yet children of God in actual grace, but were such in hope and according to divine foreknowledge. Similarly Romans 8 says: 'We know that to them that love God all things work together unto good.' And afterward: 'Whom He justified, them He also glorified.' Their glorification is still future, yet it is spoken of as accomplished because, as Augustine says, God disposed from eternity that it should be done. Hence Isaiah speaks of God 'who hath made the things that are to be.' Thus Augustine, speaking of the Church, attributes to her the aforesaid names according to her future state, as though she already possessed in reality what she hopes to attain. Secondly, there is a common rule of Scripture: it sometimes rebukes the wicked as though all in that people were wicked, and sometimes consoles the good as though all there were such; what belongs to some

part of a whole is frequently attributed to the whole. Augustine gives

this rule against the Donatists, chapter 20, and On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12; Jerome on Isaiah 63; Euthymius on Psalm 42; and the ordinary gloss on Matthew 20. Examples are easy. Psalm 104 says of the whole people: 'He brought them forth with silver and gold,' and 'He brought them into the mountain of His sanctuary.' Yet these things, in the sense of entering the promised land, properly belonged only to Joshua and Caleb, for the others died in the desert because of unbelief. Likewise Isaiah 43: 'This people have I formed for myself; they shall show forth my praise.' This belongs to the good; but immediately concerning the wicked it is added: 'Thou hast not called upon me.' Likewise 1 Corinthians 1 at the beginning the Apostle commonly praises all the Corinthians because they were made rich in Christ in all spiritual goods, so that nothing was wanting to them in any grace; yet these things said of all did not belong to all, for later in the same chapter he rebukes their schisms, in chapter 11 those who receive the Body of the Lord unworthily, and in chapter 15 some who denied the resurrection of the dead.

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Nor is this mode of speech unusual among us. We call a people noble, rich, learned, and so forth by reason of some of its members. Thus, although those attributes - enclosed garden, sealed fountain, and the like - properly belong to the good and predestined, by reason of them they are attributed to the Church as a whole. We must not therefore exclude from the Church those to whom those properties do not personally belong. To Augustine's proof from the likeness of Noah's ark it is answered first that the likeness consists in this: outside the Church no one is saved, just as outside the ark no one survived. It does not follow that all who in some way pertain to the Church will be saved. Secondly it is answered that the ark bears the type of the Church insofar as she saves all whom she receives through Baptism - not the washing away of the filth of the flesh alone, as Peter says in his first canonical epistle, chapter 3, but the interrogation of a good conscience toward God persevering unto the end of life. All such persons are saved. To the second passage of Augustine, from On Rebuke and Grace, it is answered that 'son of God,' and likewise 'sheep,' is said in two ways: in one way according to present justice, in another according to divine predestination. This is Augustine's doctrine in the same place and in Tractate 45 on John. Therefore the testimony adduced speaks of sons of God according to predestination and divine election. Examples of this diverse usage are found there. Secondly - and this solution also answers the testimony from On Christian Doctrine III - the word 'truly' sometimes signifies truth of essence; hence Augustine in the Soliloquies says, 'That is true which is.' Sometimes it signifies the consummation and perfection of a thing. In this sense the Master of the Sentences, III, distinction 31, explains Augustine saying that charity which is lost was never true, that is, never perfect with the perfection which belongs to the elect. Thirdly, 'truly' signifies permanence, continuation, or perseverance. Thus John 8 is understood: 'If you continue in my word, you shall truly be my disciples, and the truth shall make you free.' There only those who persevere are called truly disciples and are saved. Therefore Augustine says that the reprobate are not truly sons of God, or not truly of Christ's body, according to the truth of continuation and perseverance, not according to the truth of essence. That this is Augustine's meaning is clear in the same book On Rebuke and Grace, where he says: 'They were not sons of God even when they were in the profession and name of sons, not because they feigned justice' - behold truth of essence - 'but because they did not persevere in it' - behold the defect of truth of perseverance. From these things the testimonies of Scripture adduced are easily answered. Romans 8 and John 10 are understood of sons and sheep according to predestination, as Augustine explains in On Rebuke and Grace, not of all those who have received such a denomination according to present justice. This latter denomination is sufficient for being numbered among the parts of the Church. To Ephesians 5 it is answered that Christ is said to be Savior of the Church either according to sufficiency, though not according to efficacy in every individual; or, if understood according to efficacy, it is verified by reason of the elect, according to the principle already stated that some things are predicated of the whole Church by reason of a part. To the final text, 'They went out from us,' Augustine says, as noted above, that it means they were not of us finally. This seems immediately explained by the following words: 'For if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us.' Secondly, from Augustine On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8, 'of us' does not signify the faithful generally but the predestined. Thus the sense is not that they were never of the Church, but that they were not of the predestined. The interlinear gloss gives the same exposition. Others explain that John speaks of certain men who entered the Church with a simulated faith. Since they were not truly faithful, it is rightly said of them: 'They were not of us.' Or 'of us' may signify apostolic men to whom the Lord committed the preaching of the Gospel, so that John marks as false in name those who presented themselves to the people under the name of apostles in order to preach falsehoods. For if, he says, they had been from the true Apostles, they would have remained with us in the same doctrine. To the tenth argument the consequence is denied. To the first proof it is answered that, according to the rule proposed, the Church is called holy by reason of some holy persons who are in her. This will be treated more fully in the following

doubt. To the second proof Augustine, Retractations II, chapter 18; On the Perfection of Justice near the end;

On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapters 33 and 34; St. Thomas III, q. 8, a. 3, ad 2; and the interlinear gloss on Ephesians 5 answer that Paul's words about the Church without spot or wrinkle are referred to the future state of beatitude. Augustine proves this because the Apostle also says there that the Church is to be presented glorious; and since this is perfectly attained only in beatitude, the same is the time when the other properties will be fully verified of her. Secondly it is answered that the Apostle speaks of the effect of Baptism, through which we are regenerated into the new man. Baptism removes wrinkles and the oldness of sin and the stains of vices by the splendor of grace which it causes. By this grace the Church is also made glorious with that glory of which Psalm 44 says, 'All her glory is from within,' and Paul: 'Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience.' Or, as Cajetan explains, glorious by worthy merits, fame, and praise. To 1 John 3 it is answered from Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians III, chapter 3, that there 'sin' signifies unbelief, as also in John 15 concerning the sin 'because they believed not in me,' and in John 16, 'If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin.' It does not follow from this that those who have other sins besides unbelief do not pertain to the Church. Again, from Augustine On the Merits and Remission of Sins II, chapters 7 and 8, that text is to be verified according to the rule above of the future state of beatitude: in that state the sons of God neither commit nor can commit sin. But now, while they are still also sons of this age, they can sin. Finally, Bernard in the Sermon on Septuagesima whose beginning is 'It is a great consolation to me,' says that a son of God according to predestination does not sin finally, that is, does not die in sin. This

does not imply that those who sin during life are not sons of the Church. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 11, ad 1, also says that St. John means that sons of God do not sin insofar as they are sons of God and insofar as charity is in them, for charity of itself is able to overcome every sin. Yet insofar as they are sons of Adam they can sin from the remaining fomes. Augustine supplies this explanation in On the Perfection of Justice, Against the Letter of Parmenian II, chapter 7, and Tractate 4 on the First Epistle of John.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Thus understood, that passage does not prove that sinners are not parts of the Church. To the testimonies of the Saints it is answered as follows. To the first, from Augustine against Petilian, he denies that sinners pertain to the Church as living members joined by charity and receiving an increase of grace, as is manifest to anyone who reads the place attentively. To the second, from Against Cresconius, he speaks of unbelievers who, because they do not believe, are already judged and reckoned outside the Church. To the third, from the book On the Unity of the Church, the same answer is given: he speaks of unbelievers. For in the same chapter he acknowledges faithful sinners to be contained within the Church. The same explanation applies to the testimony from Book IV On Baptism Against the Donatists. Moreover, there, as also in Book VI, chapter 5, and Book VII, chapters 49 and 50, Augustine speaks of the Church insofar as she is the dove and immaculate, that is, of the part consisting of the just, to which he denies that robbers, the envious, the discordant, and those who are not wholly of one mind belong. The explanation of Cyprian is altogether the same. To Jerome it is answered that the commentary cited on Ephesians, as also those on all the Epistles of Paul, is not Jerome's, but either Pelagius's, as Ambrosius Catharinus thinks, or that of some Pelagian. For on Romans 7 it denies original sin; and in chapters 8 and 9 it teaches that the predestination of the elect arises from merits. All these things are most opposed to Jerome's own doctrine. To the reasons by which the consequence is proved, it is answered. To the first inference of the first reason it must be conceded that the Church is sometimes rebuked and reprehended because of sinners. Hence Canticles: 'I am black but beautiful.' Isaiah 1, because of the wicked, calls her the people of Gomorrha. Moses calls the people foolish and unwise, faithless children, and a perverse generation. Augustine is to be read on this in On Christian Doctrine, chapter 32, where he explains it more fully. The second solution which we gave to the ninth argument should also be recalled, where more was said concerning this. To the second inference, in which it is concluded, 'therefore she will be called the synagogue of Satan,' the consequence is denied. The proposition is condemned in the Council of Constance, Session 8, against John Wycliffe. The reason for denying the proposition is that it sounds as though Satan were the head of the Church and her founder. When we call her the Church of Christ, we attribute these same relations to Christ. Likewise, as Aristotle testifies, under the name of a community and commonwealth are principally understood its chief men and rulers. Therefore if by the proposition 'the Church is the synagogue of Satan' it were meant that she is possessed by Satan, it would be false, because the principal members of the Church are the just, who are possessed by God, not by the devil. To the second reason it must be admitted that the same man can be a citizen of Jerusalem and of Babylon under diverse aspects. Augustine admits this on the title of Psalm 51 and proves it. A man can be just and therefore a citizen of Jerusalem, while in an earthly kingdom he is an aedile, praetor, or king, and thus belongs to both kingdoms. He proves this by reason. For to constitute a citizen of the Church, which is spiritual Jerusalem, faith alone suffices, as is clear from what precedes. When Augustine says that love of God unto contempt of self constitutes citizens of Jerusalem, he understands citizens who are such by number and merit. A citizen of Babylon, however, as Augustine teaches, is constituted by love of self unto contempt of God. These two, namely faith in God and disordered self-love, can exist together in the same man. Therefore someone can simultaneously be a citizen of Babylon and of Jerusalem. Whether such men can also be called members of Christ and of the devil raises a substantial

question: whether sinners should be called members of the Church and of Christ. Cano, On Theological Places

IV, final chapter, reply to the ninth argument, following Torquemada, Summa I, chapter 8, reply to the seventh, and chapter 11, reply to the sixth, denies that sinners are properly members of Christ, though he admits that they are parts of the Church. For, he says, 'member' in its ratio includes life, which sinners do not possess. Others, however, learned men, hold the opposite: sinners ought to be called members of Christ. They prove it first from Augustine, who on Psalm 56 calls all the faithful members of Christ. He teaches the same in Tractate 108 on John at the end, Tractate 109, and Tractate 21, explaining 'Greater things than these He will show him, that you may wonder,' where all to whom God shows the mysteries of faith are called members of Christ. Secondly, in all political communities the ratio of a body and of members is preserved by this: the parts communicate certain actions and utilities to one another and depend upon a supreme governor as upon a head. But this communication and likewise dependence upon Christ the head exist among faithful sinners. Therefore they likewise are members of His body. The minor is proved from Paul, 1 Corinthians 12, where by analogy to the natural body, whose parts are called members because they exercise some action, he calls members of Christ's body those who communicate spiritual goods to one another, such as healing, doctrine, and so forth. Yet those who do this are sometimes sinners. Therefore. Thirdly, stupid or insensible members of an animal body which lack sensation are nevertheless truly members because they possess vegetative life. But sinners in the Church possess some vital and supernatural movements: attrition, faith, hope, fear, and so forth. Therefore. Fourthly, Ephesians 5 says: 'As the husband is the head of the wife, so Christ is the head of the Church.' But a husband remains head of a senseless or hateful wife. Therefore Christ also is head of sinners.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To me this question plainly seems to concern the name. For concerning the reality it is established how sinners pertain to the Church and what influx they receive from Christ. Therefore it must be said that, to preserve the ratio of a member at least imperfectly, the grade of sensitive life is not required; vegetative life suffices. Thus sinners are members of Christ because of faith and other supernatural movements, although imperfect members because of the defect of charity, as St. Thomas notes in III, q. 8, in the place cited above. There he teaches that sinners are members of Christ actually secundum quid and not simpliciter, that is, imperfectly and not according to the whole perfection belonging to the ratio of member. Likewise in I-II, q. 114, a. 1, he calls our merit merit secundum quid, that is, not altogether perfect, because it depends upon grace. And he proves the present point: sinners receive, he says, from Christ a certain act of life, namely to believe, just as a mortified member is moved in some manner by a man. These are his words. But mortified members, as we said above, properly though imperfectly participate in the ratio of member. Therefore faithful sinners also properly are members of Christ. From these things it is clear how St. Thomas, having become more exact, corrected what he had asserted in III Sentences in the place cited above. There he had said that just as actions can be performed through dry members for the benefit of another, such as striking, although operations of the soul are not in those members, so the wicked do not receive from the Holy Spirit an operation of spiritual life, though the Holy Spirit works life through them in others insofar as they teach them or administer the sacraments. He corrected this, I say, because from the place cited in the Third Part it is certain that such men also receive an influx of life in themselves, although not an operation according to the highest grade of spiritual life, which is through charity. Of this highest species of life the Council of Trent speaks in Session 6, chapter 7, when it teaches that a man in his justification receives through Jesus Christ, into whom he is grafted, faith, hope, and charity. For faith, unless hope and charity are added, neither perfectly unites him with Christ nor makes him a living member of His body. It speaks, I say, of this supreme species of life. For greater clarity we can distinguish secondly. If for the ratio of member union with the head, some life, and a vital operation suffice, sinners are members of the Church and of Christ. If, however, the most perfect life is required, they are not His members. From these things the arguments of Master Cano are answered. It is also clear how we need not fear to concede that those who are imperfectly members of Christ are, with respect to something, members of the devil. For the more imperfectly one thing participates in some formal ratio, the more it can be mixed with the ratio of the opposite. SECOND DOUBT. Whether the properties of the Church - that she is one, holy, Catholic, and visible - are rightly assigned by the Saints. It seems that they are not. First, speaking of the first property: in Scripture we frequently read of several churches. Hence Psalm 67: 'In the churches bless ye God the Lord.' In Apocalypse 1 we know of seven churches. Paul in Romans 16, 1 Corinthians 8, Galatians 1, 1 Thessalonians 2, and elsewhere frequently admits several churches. The gloss does the same on Canticles 4, 'A fountain of gardens,' etc. Secondly, the unity of the Church is not caused by unity of faith and the other virtues, nor by unity of the sacraments, nor by unity of a head. Therefore in no way can she be one. The consequence is proved because the holy Doctors attribute to her no other unity than the aforesaid. The antecedent is proved: that the faithful believe, hope, and love the same object and possess the same sacraments makes them similar, not one, just as in human matters the same habits about the same object would make their subjects similar, not one. Likewise that subjection to one head does not suffice for this unity is proved because that prelation only makes many persons be under one head, not one, just as many kingdoms can be under one king. The argument is confirmed. In civil matters it is not fitting that there be one kingdom encompassing the whole world under one prince, because he could not conveniently administer it either personally or through his ministers. For the prince is as it were the soul of the kingdom and ought to be present to his kingdom; therefore a determinate breadth of jurisdiction is required. On this Soto, De iustitia et iure IV, q. 4, a. 2, should be consulted more fully. Therefore neither in spiritual matters, by the same reason, ought there to be only one commonwealth encompassing the whole world under one head. The same ratio militates: it could not conveniently be administered by one. It is confirmed secondly. The fact that diverse kingdoms and commonwealths have the same head and the same prince and agree in the laws of the ius gentium does not make them one kingdom unless in addition they have the same native and particular laws, as is manifest in the kingdoms of Naples and Spain. But all the churches dispersed throughout the world agree only in what is as it were a most common law, namely the precepts of faith, hope, and charity, and are distinguished by particular and proper laws, as can be seen in the Church of the Jews, the Gentiles, and Christians. Therefore they are not one Church. It is confirmed thirdly. This union of many churches is an effect of charity. Therefore those who do not have charity will not be contained under this union; nevertheless they pertain to the Church. Therefore the Church of all the faithful is not one. Thirdly, it is argued from St. Thomas, Quodlibet XII, article 20. The Church which now exists does not use the same rules and laws which she used in the time of the Apostles. Therefore she is not the same Church. The antecedent is proved: at that time preachers of the Gospel did not carry silver or gold in their purses according to the Lord's command; nor did the Apostles possess castles or vassals as the Church now possesses. Therefore. Fourthly, it is argued against the second property, that the Church is not holy. When some accident can belong to both whole and part, if it belongs only to the part it is not predicated of the whole, as is clear in physical and logical disputations. But grace and holiness can belong to the whole Church and in fact belong only to some faithful. Therefore the whole itself, namely the Church, will not be denominated holy. It is confirmed: by the same reason these

propositions could be conceded: the Church is predestined; she is damned; she is confirmed in grace; and the like. For she is called holy because of some saints; therefore because of some predestined she could be called predestined, and because of others to whom the remaining attributes belong she would receive similar denominations. It is confirmed secondly. Good arises from an integral cause, evil from any particular defect. Therefore since there are many such defects in the Church...

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To me this question plainly seems to be one about the name. As to the reality, it is established in what manner sinners pertain to the Church and what influx they receive from Christ. It must therefore be said that, in order to preserve the ratio of a member at least imperfectly, the grade of sensitive life is not required, but vegetative life suffices. Thus sinners are members of Christ because of faith and other supernatural movements, imperfectly however because of the defect of charity, as St. Thomas notes in the Third Part in the place cited above. There he teaches that sinners are members of Christ actually secundum quid and not simpliciter, that is, imperfectly and not according to the whole perfection which pertains to the ratio of member. Thus in I-II, q. 114, a. 1, he calls our merit merit secundum quid, that is, not altogether perfect, because it depends upon grace. And he proves it: they receive, he says, from Christ a certain act of life, namely to believe, just as a mortified member is moved in some manner by a man. These are his words. But mortified members, as we said above, properly though imperfectly participate in the ratio of member. Therefore sinners of this kind also properly will be members of Christ. From these things it is clear how St. Thomas himself, having become more learned, corrected what he had asserted in III Sentences in the place cited above. For there he had said that just as operations can be performed through dried members for the benefit of another, as to strike, but not operations which belong to the soul in the members, so the wicked do not receive from the Holy Spirit an operation of spiritual life; nevertheless the Holy Spirit works life through them in others, insofar as they teach them or administer the sacraments to them. He corrected these things, I say, since from the passage adduced from the Third Part it is evident how men of this kind also receive an influx of life in themselves, although not an operation according to the supreme grade of spiritual life, which is through charity. The Council of Trent speaks of this species of life when, in Session VI, chapter 7, it teaches that in his justification a man receives through Jesus Christ, into whom he is grafted, faith, hope, and charity. For faith, unless hope and charity be added, neither unites him perfectly with Christ nor makes him a living member of His body, etc. It speaks, I say, of this supreme species of life. For greater clarity we can distinguish secondly. If union with the head, some life, and a vital operation suffice for the ratio of member, sinners are members of the Church and of Christ. If, however, the most perfect life is required, then they are not His members. From these things the arguments of Master Cano are answered. It is also evident how we need not fear to concede that those who are imperfectly members of Christ are also, with respect to something, members of the devil. For the more imperfectly a thing participates in some formal ratio, the more it has an admixture of the opposite ratio.

SECOND DOUBT. Whether those four properties of the Church which are commonly assigned by the Saints - namely, that she is one, holy, Catholic, and visible - are rightly assigned. It seems that they are not. First, speaking of the first property: in Scripture we often read of several churches. Hence Psalm 67: 'In the churches bless ye God the Lord,' etc. And in Apocalypse 1 we recognize seven churches. Paul in Romans 16, 1 Corinthians 8, Galatians 1, 1 Thessalonians 2, and elsewhere frequently admits several churches. The gloss likewise does so on Canticles 4, 'A fountain of gardens,' etc. Secondly it is argued: neither unity of faith and of the other virtues, nor unity of the sacraments, nor unity of a head causes the unity of the Church. Therefore she can in no way be one. The consequence is proved from this: the holy Doctors attribute to her only the aforesaid unity. The antecedent is proved. That the faithful believe, hope, and love the same object and possess the same sacraments makes them similar, not one, just as in human matters the same habits about the same object would make the subjects possessing those habits similar, not one. Likewise, that subjection to one head does not suffice for that unity is proved because that prelation only causes many to be under one head, not to be one, just as many kingdoms can be under one king. This argument is confirmed. In civil affairs it is not fitting that there be one kingdom embracing the whole world under one prince, because he could not conveniently administer it either personally or through his ministers. For the prince is as it were the soul of the kingdom and ought to be present to his kingdom; therefore a determinate extent of jurisdiction is required. Soto should be consulted more fully on this in De iustitia et iure IV, q. 4, a. 2. Therefore neither in spiritual matters, by the same reason, ought there to be only one commonwealth embracing the whole world under one head. The same reason militates, for neither could it conveniently be administered by one. It is confirmed secondly. That diverse kingdoms and commonwealths have the same head and the same prince and agree in the laws of the ius gentium does not make them one kingdom, unless in addition they have the same native and particular laws, as is manifest in the kingdom of Naples and that of Spain. But all the churches spread throughout the world agree only as it were in a most common law, namely in the precepts of faith, hope, and charity, and are distinguished according to particular and proper laws, as can be seen in the Church of the Jews, of the Gentiles, and of Christians. Therefore they are not one Church. It is confirmed thirdly. This union of many churches is an effect of charity. Therefore those who do not have charity will not be contained under this union; nevertheless they pertain to the Church. Therefore the Church of all the faithful is not one. Thirdly it is argued by the argument of St. Thomas in Quodlibet XII,

article 20. The Church which now exists does not use the same rules

and laws which she used in the time of the Apostles; therefore she is not the same. The antecedent is proved. At that time preachers of the Gospel did not carry silver and gold in their purses according to the Lord's command, nor did the Apostles possess castles or vassals as the Church now possesses. Therefore. Fourthly it is argued against the second property, that the Church is not holy. When some accident can belong both to a whole and to a part, if it belongs only to the part it is not predicated of the whole, as is clear in physical and logical disputations. But it is certain that grace and holiness can belong to the whole Church and in fact belong only to some faithful. Therefore the whole itself, namely the Church, will not be denominated holy. It is confirmed. It would follow by the same reason that these propositions could be conceded: the Church is predestined; she is damned; she is confirmed in grace; and others of this kind. The inference is clear: because of some saints she is conceded to be holy; therefore because of some predestined she will be called predestined, and because of some to whom the other attributes belong she will receive a similar denomination. It is confirmed secondly. Good arises from an integral cause, evil from any particular defect. Therefore, since there are many defects of this kind in the Church...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

...and since there are many such defects in the Church, and she does not possess grace and holiness in every part, she ought rather to be called sinful than holy. Add that a denomination ought to be taken from the greater part; but sinners in the Church exceed the just in number. Therefore because of them she should rather be called evil and sinful. Likewise, although in some part she possesses holiness, it seems false to say that she is wholly beautiful and holy. For this signifies that holiness is in her from every part, whereas it is in her only by reason of some members. This argument is further confirmed. Although Scripture frequently says of the Church that she is holy, the friend of God, beautiful and comely, it is not necessary that this be understood as though she were now actually such. It will suffice that she be such in hope and that sayings of this kind be verified of her future state, just as we said above that 'that He might present her glorious, not having spot or wrinkle' and similar words are verified. Thus 'Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee' will be explained of the future state. For if, according to Augustine's doctrine posited above, we can never here find saints without spot, 'there is no spot in thee' cannot be verified except for a future time. Likewise John 14, 'He will give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive,' can be explained in this way: the Holy Spirit ought to be with us to teach and illuminate, as the interlinear gloss has it there. It does not follow from this that He must be with us so as to sanctify us. In the same way 1 Corinthians 3, 'Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? For the temple of God is holy, which you are,' can be explained, as Augustine and the gloss explain it, of an indwelling through faith. And that holiness can be understood as holiness of the end, because we are ordered to holiness. In the same manner Apocalypse 21, 'I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband,' seems capable of explanation. Apart from the fact that the interlinear gloss understands this testimony of the future state of the blessed and of the triumphant Church, which is said to descend from heaven from God, who is the peace of those who see Him fully, nevertheless if it were understood of the militant Church it could be understood as holy in hope and in holiness of the end and as adorned by her husband with faith. For it was said: 'I will espouse thee to me in faith.' Elsewhere also it is frequently said that the Church is espoused to Christ in faith. By a similar reason the other passages which seem to prove the holiness of the Church can be understood. This argument is confirmed. Cyprian, in his exposition of the Apostles' Creed, refers the whole holiness of the Church to integrity of faith. Therefore we are bound to believe nothing more. It is confirmed lastly. The holiness which in the Church we are bound to believe is that which we explain when we say in the Creed, 'I believe in the holy Church.' But this is the holiness of God, not some created holiness of men. Therefore we are not bound to believe that this created holiness is in the Church. The minor is proved. Augustine, on John 14, 'You believe in God; believe also in me,' says that we believe Peter or Paul, but we are not said to believe in anyone except God. Therefore, if we believe in the holy Church, holiness of God is there understood, not any created holiness of men. Fifthly it is argued against the third property, that the Church is Catholic, that is, universal. The argument is this: the whole world has never believed at the same time. When Israel believed, the Gentiles were unbelievers. Hence Acts 14 says that God permitted all the nations to walk in their own ways. And when the Gentiles believed, the Jews were then blinded. Indeed among the Gentiles themselves who were illuminated, the Holy Spirit prohibited Paul and Barnabas from preaching in Asia and forbade them to go into Bithynia, Acts 16. Therefore the Church was never Catholic, and much less ought she now to be so called. It is confirmed. The Gospel has never been preached throughout the whole world. Therefore the whole world could not believe without a preacher. Hence faith or the Church was never Catholic and universal. It is confirmed secondly from 2 Thessalonians 3: 'Faith is not of all.' Therefore neither are all in the Church, into which we enter through faith; and thus neither is the Church Catholic and universal. It is confirmed thirdly. Idolatry reached all corners of the world; therefore it also ought to be called catholic. Likewise every sect is proposed as something to be received by all, and yet is not called catholic. Therefore neither ought the Church to be so called for this reason. Sixthly it is argued and proved that the Church ought not to be called Apostolic. For the Church existed before the doctrine and preaching of the Apostles, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore she ought not to be called Apostolic as founded upon their doctrine and preaching. It is confirmed. Not all the faithful believed because of the preaching of the Apostles, for example the Samaritans and Paul. Therefore for this reason she will not receive this denomination. Seventhly it is argued and proved that the Church is not visible. For the law, sacrifice, and priesthood of the Church are invisible. Therefore so is the Church. The consequence is clear because these ought to be proportioned. The antecedent is proved concerning the law: Jeremiah 31 places the difference between the Old Testament and the New in this, that in the New God says, 'I will put my law in their minds and write it in their hearts,' unlike the covenant which He had formerly made with the Jews by giving them the law written externally, as is clear in Exodus. Concerning sacrifice and priesthood it is proved from 1 Peter 2, where it is said to the faithful: 'You also as living stones are built up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices.' Therefore. It is confirmed. Adoration and the acts of religion required in the Church are spiritual, according to John 4: 'The true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.' Eighthly it is argued to the same effect. If the Church consisted of the predestined, the just, and the perfect, we said above that she would be invisible because those things are invisible. But faith is likewise invisible. Therefore the Church consisting of the faithful is invisible and hidden. Nor does it avail to say that an exterior and visible profession of faith, which is made in Baptism, suffices in

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order that we confess the Church to be visible. For this exterior profession does not make a man faithful; the interior assent does. Therefore, etc. It is confirmed. Exterior denial of faith does not make an unbeliever. Therefore neither does exterior profession of faith make a believer, since it can sometimes coexist with unbelief in the mind, as in heretics. Ninthly it is argued to the same effect. The Church is not known by any exterior and visible observation; therefore she is not visible. The antecedent is clear from Luke 17: 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation,' namely sensible observation, 'neither shall they say: Behold here, or behold there,' etc. 'For the kingdom of God is within you.'

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Tenthly it is argued. Faith concerns things not seen. But by faith a believer believes one Church. Therefore that Church is not sensible and exterior; otherwise a believer ought to say, 'I see one Church.' Secondly, the Apostle seems to insinuate this in innumerable places, as Romans 2, where he calls those faithful from the Jews 'Jews outwardly' according to circumcision in the flesh and according to the letter, but the faithful of the New Testament Jews inwardly, whose circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit and not in the letter. And chapter 3 he calls the old law the law of works because it consisted in exterior works, but the new law the law of faith, which consists in an interior act. And 2 Corinthians 3 he calls the ministers of the new law ministers of the vivifying Spirit and the New Testament itself a ministration of the Spirit; but the ministers of the Old Testament ministers of the letter and that testament itself a ministration formed by the letter. Lastly Brentz argues: the Church lay hidden in the time of Elijah, wherefore he thought that he alone was left. Therefore the Church is not always manifest and visible. But to the contrary is that we profess in the Creed: 'I believe one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.' Therefore she has these four properties. Again Matthew 18 commands the faithful to report the offenses of brethren to the Church. Therefore the Church is exterior and visible; otherwise we could not report the offenses of others to her. In this question the several proposed properties will be explained by their own conclusions more fully than in the earlier commentaries. Concerning the first property, therefore, let the first conclusion, certain among all Catholics, be this: THE CHURCH IS ONE. This **conclusion is proved from the symbol of faith and from the Scriptures already cited. We must, however, explain**

the ratio of this unity. And first it is to be noted that a multitude can be called one not only by numerical identity of substance but also by unity of order, relation, common operation, and common end. A political commonwealth is one although composed of many men because those many are ordered under one governing principle by common laws and toward one public good. The same must be asserted much more excellently of the faithful from the beginning of the world. All the faithful from the beginning of the world are one in number as one community and commonwealth which we call the Church. The major is clear because in temporal communities we find no other sufficient ratio of unity. The minor, as regards unity of prince, namely God, is certain. Nor should we here revive the ancient madness of some who asserted that the God of the Old and New Testaments is not the same. Against these Augustine writes at length in many places, especially in the book Against Faustus the Manichaean. As regards unity of laws, it is proved thus. All the faithful from the beginning of the world are bound to believe the same, hope for the same, and love the same; these are the proper precepts of this supernatural commonwealth. Therefore. And that by reason of these virtues and precepts several persons can be called one is proved first concerning faith from Ephesians 4: 'Until we all meet' - behold the multitude - 'in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God' - behold the cause which unites that multitude - 'unto a perfect man' - behold the unity caused by one faith. In this testimony observe that all who are to meet together, because of unity of faith, are called one mystical man or one commonwealth. Again Galatians 3: 'You are all one in Christ.' The gloss there, which seems taken from Augustine, Tractate 110 on John, says: that is, in the faith of Jesus Christ. Likewise Psalm 86: 'Behold the foreigners, and Tyre, and the people of the Ethiopians; this man was born there,' as the Hebrew has it. Cajetan excellently notes that this multitude and diversity of nations and peoples is called one by the singular 'this man,' because of unity of faith, through which, as we said above, men are reborn into the Church. The same thing is clear of hope and charity. By one hope the faithful tend toward one blessed end; by one charity they cleave to the same God and communicate spiritual goods among themselves. Thus the one supernatural end and the one principal object of the theological virtues constitute a true moral unity among the many faithful. Moreover, not only one God as invisible head but also, in the state of revealed grace, one visible head joins the faithful. Christ Himself willed one flock under one shepherd and committed His sheep to Peter. The diversity of particular pastors therefore does not divide the Church, because their powers are ordered under one supreme pastoral office. There are also common sacraments and common sacrifice. One Baptism is the door by which the faithful enter; one Eucharistic sacrifice and sacrament nourish the same body; and the remaining sacraments are ordered within the same ecclesiastical communion. Thus those who are many in persons are one by common supernatural laws, worship, and government.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The Church is therefore one also because the faithful of the Jews and Gentiles, who formerly were separated as two peoples, are made one in Christ. Paul says in Ephesians 2 that Christ 'made both one' and broke down the middle wall of partition, reconciling both in one body to God through the Cross. Hence Christ is compared to the cornerstone in which two walls are joined, namely the Jewish people and the people of the Gentiles. There is added another ratio why the Church ought to be called one: a certain communication of all the works of the members of the Church among themselves, which we confess in the Creed when we say 'the communion of saints.' For this it must be noted that husband and wife are said to be one flesh, Matthew 19, by a unity of community. For just as they place their goods in common and are one in that common possession, so male and female can use the flesh of one another. These are Cajetan's words on Matthew 19. By this unity many things which otherwise seem difficult in Scripture are explained. For example, Joseph's dream that the sun and moon, that is, his father and mother, were to adore him, was fulfilled in the adoration of Jacob alone, because his mother was then dead. Therefore, as Chrysostom says in Homily 66 on Genesis, because Jacob, who was the head and one flesh with his wife, adored, what he did is also said to have been done by his wife. Likewise, although sin is propagated from the man and through him we have the guilt of death, nevertheless Ecclesiasticus 25 says: 'From the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die.' Augustine explains this because husband and wife are one flesh, and what is done by the one can by reason of that union be attributed to the other. By the same mode, because there is a much greater communion among the faithful of Christ, they can and ought to be called one Church. For if that mutual communication between spouses suffices for unity, then where a greater communication is found among the faithful of the Church, and in all the works which they perform as members of the Church they communicate with one another, they can much more be called one Church. This ratio of unity is to be held so important that from it two not easy doubts are explained. The first is what kind of unity this is. The second is by what reason the unity of a mystical body, which is a very great unity, is attributed to the Church. For declaration of the first it must be noted that Albert Pighius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy II, chapter 2, by a long discourse maintains that no other ratio of unity is found in the Church except unity of order, in the manner in which an army is said to be one because it is under one commander. For, since it happens in only three ways that from two or more things one thing is made - first, from several perfect things but transformed, as from the elements a mixture is made; secondly, from certain imperfect things, as from soul and body a man is made; thirdly, from several perfect things remaining what they are, as in a household, army, or city - and since the Church is not made one from many faithful in the first or second mode, it remains that she is made one in the third mode, namely by unity of order. From that unity there results and is added in the faithful a certain relation of order to one head and of action and passion according to commanding and obeying. For they are moved by the Holy Spirit not only to believing, hoping, loving, and other supernatural acts, but also to obeying one and the same head, the Vicar of Christ. Cajetan, however, below q. 39, a. 1, is not pleased that this unity alone should constitute the Church. For, he says, if there were no other ecclesiastical unity among the faithful, they would not be called one, but merely under one. The faithful would then be like many kingdoms under one king. As though he wished to argue that having one head does not constitute one community or commonwealth, as is clear. For the kingdoms of Spain and Aragon have the same king and have an order to the same prince and head, and yet they are not called one kingdom. We can argue still further for Cajetan. In the Church there is so great a unity that one part can satisfy for another, as Catholic faith teaches. Moreover one part communicates in all the good works of the others, according to Psalm 118: 'I am a partaker with all them that fear thee.' But unity of order to the same head does not suffice for this, as is evident in an army and in a human commonwealth. Therefore some greater unity must be posited.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Cajetan therefore, whose opinion pleases us more, holds that the unity of the Church is the unity of one and the same mystical whole. Thus through that unity there is added to each of the faithful a certain relation of being a part of one numerically identical community or people. By this there is also added to each a dependence upon the whole and a proportion and communication with the other parts, for a

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part depends upon its whole.
And since everything operates according as it has being, each part of the Church will operate as a part of one whole, on behalf of that one whole and according to that unity. Thus when the faithful are moved by the Holy Spirit to love, believe, preach, obey, and so forth, they are moved not only as to the substance of the operation but also as to the mode, so that they perform these things as parts of one whole. No other reason for this can be given except the disposition of the Holy Spirit, who willed the Church to be one and therefore moves each of the faithful to operate inwardly and outwardly as parts of that whole. That this is so is confirmed by the usage of the faithful. Each one sees himself believing, receiving or administering the sacraments, or preaching the word, as a member of the Church and her part, and by that very fact for the sake of the whole of which whatever is a part belongs. We also see the proportion of diverse parts when one is deputed to this ministry and another to that, and each communicates its operation to the other, as has been shown. It is therefore necessary to posit in the Church this unity of one whole, by which they are not only ordered to one head - which diverse things having no order among themselves can possess - but also are ordered among themselves to constitute one whole. For this reason the Church is frequently called by Paul the body of Christ and the faithful are called members of this whole. The cause of this is evident from what has been said. A mystical body, as St. Thomas teaches in III, q. 8, a. 4, signifies a multitude ordered to one according to diverse acts and offices which tend toward that one and are mutually of advantage and assistance to one another. But we find these conditions in the Church, as has been shown above. Therefore by the best right she can and ought to be called a mystical body. From all these things I infer first that the Church in the time of Christ is more one than before His coming. This is evident because she has more causes of unity, namely the same visible head, the same sacrifices and sacraments, and the other things we have enumerated. It follows secondly that not all these causes of unity are necessary in the Church to constitute her as one. The proof is this: what gives being to a thing gives it the unity essential to itself. But charity and hope do not concur to constitute the Church, for in the preceding question we said that the Church is constituted through faith alone under one head. Therefore neither are charity and hope necessarily required for her unity. They serve, however, so that by more titles the Church is one, or so that she be more one by an accidental unity which proceeds from the aforesaid causes that are outside her essence. The first corollary likewise is to be understood of this accidental unity, not of essential unity. For essential unity is prior to hope and charity and does not necessarily say order to one mere man as visible head except when speaking of the Church according to the state of revealed grace. As we have said, the Gentiles and Jews did not have one head besides God and Christ. And these things concerning the first property of the Church. SECOND CONCLUSION, concerning the second property.
THE CHURCH IS HOLY AND OUGHT TO BE CALLED
HOLY.
For explanation of this it must be noted from St. Thomas and Cajetan below, q. 81, a. 8, that although holiness and religion are the same in a certain way, nevertheless they differ in this: religion directly regards those things which specially pertain to divine worship, such as ceremonies, sacrifices, and the like; holiness, however, directly regards the mind and through the mind the other works of religion and of the other virtues, because it uses them so as through them to apply the mind to God. The Psalmist explained this well, Psalm 84: 'He shall speak peace unto his people and unto his saints, and unto them that are converted to the heart.' Augustine reads it in this manner. There the Psalmist explains who the saints whom he had named are by saying: 'those who turn the heart to Him,' taking both expressions for the same. Likewise Psalm 148: 'A hymn to all his saints, to the children of Israel, a people approaching to him.' There he calls saints and children of Israel in spirit and promise those who approach God in mind, namely by withdrawing the mind from other things and applying it to God. For by bodily approach alone God would not say that they approach Him, according to Isaiah 29: 'This people honoreth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.' Hence holiness also signifies cleanness or purity, for the Greek hagios is explained as 'without earth.' Thus St. Dionysius defines it, Divine Names, chapter 12: 'Holiness is a purity free from every uncleanness, perfect and altogether immaculate.' The reason for this signification is that in order to apply the mind to God it is necessary to withdraw it from lower and earthly things. Approach to one terminus requires withdrawal from another. Therefore purity of mind is required. The mind of man is defiled by being joined to inferior things, just as any thing is soiled by mixture with something baser, as gold by mixture with lead. Therefore if you remove the heart from inferior things by which it is stained so that you may apply it to God, it remains clean. And because this purity proceeds from the merit of Christ's Passion, hence also in Latin usage 'holy' is taken for that which is tinged with blood. This manner...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

...one in the third way, namely by unity of order, from which there results and is added to the faithful a certain relation of order toward one head and of action and passion according to commanding and obeying. For they are moved by the Holy Spirit not only to believing, hoping, loving, and the other supernatural acts, but also to obeying one and the same head, the Vicar of Christ. Cajetan, however, below q. 39, a. 1, is not pleased that this unity alone should constitute the Church. For, he says, if among the faithful there were no other ecclesiastical unity, she would not be called one, but under one. The faithful would be like many kingdoms under one king. As though he wished to argue that having one head does not constitute one community or commonwealth, as is clearly evident. For the kingdoms of Spain and Aragon have the same king and have an order to the same prince and head; nevertheless they are not called one kingdom. We can still argue further for Cajetan. In the Church there is found so great a unity that one part can satisfy for another, as Catholic faith teaches. Moreover, one part communicates in all the good works of the others, according to Psalm 118: 'I am a partaker with all them that fear thee.' But unity of order to the same head does not suffice for this, as is evident in an army and in a human commonwealth. Therefore some greater unity must be posited. Cajetan therefore, whose opinion pleases us more, holds that the unity of the Church is the unity of one and the same mystical whole. Thus through it there is added to each of the faithful a certain relation of being a part of one numerically identical community or people; and by this there is added to each a dependence upon the whole and a proportion and communication with the other parts, for a part depends upon its whole. And since each thing operates according as it has being, each part of the Church will operate as a part of one whole, for the sake of that one whole and according to that unity. Thus when the faithful are moved by the Holy Spirit to loving, believing, preaching, obeying, and so forth, they are moved not only as to the substance of the operation but also as to the mode, so that they perform these things as parts of one whole. There is no other reason to be given for this except the disposition of the Holy Spirit, who willed the Church to be one and therefore moves each believer to operate inwardly and outwardly as parts of that whole. That this is so is confirmed by the usage of the faithful. Each one sees himself believing, receiving or administering the sacraments, or the word of preaching, as a member of the Church and a part of her; and by this very fact for the sake of the whole itself, to which belongs whatever belongs to a part. We see moreover the proportion of the diverse parts, while one is deputed to this ministry and another to that, and each communicates its operation to the other, as has been demonstrated. It is therefore necessary to posit in the Church this unity of one whole, by which they are not only ordered to one head - which diverse things having no order among themselves can possess - but also are ordered among themselves to constitute one whole. For this reason the Church is frequently called by Paul the body of Christ and the faithful are called members of this whole. The cause of this is evident from what has been said. For a mystical body, as St. Thomas teaches in III, q. 8, a. 4, signifies a multitude ordered to one according to diverse acts and offices which tend toward that one and are mutually of advantage and help to one another. But these conditions are found in the Church, as has been shown from what was written above. Therefore by the best right she can and ought to be called a mystical body. From all these things I infer first that the Church in the time of Christ is more one than before His coming. This is evident. For she has more causes of unity, namely the same visible head, the same sacrifices and sacraments, and the other things we have enumerated. It follows secondly that not all these causes of unity are necessary in the Church in order to constitute her as one. It is proved. What gives being to a thing gives to it the unity essential to itself. But charity or hope does not concur in constituting the Church; for in the preceding

question we said that the Church is constituted through faith alone

under one head. Therefore neither are they necessarily required for her unity. They serve, however, so that under more titles the Church may be one, or so that she may be more one by an accidental unity which proceeds from the aforesaid causes, which are outside her essence. The first corollary is likewise to be understood of this unity, not of essential unity. For that unity is prior to hope and charity, and does not necessarily imply an order to one mere man as visible head except only when speaking of the Church in the state of revealed grace. For, as we have said, the Gentiles and Jews did not have one head besides God and Christ. And these things concerning the first property of the Church. SECOND CONCLUSION, concerning the second property.

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THE CHURCH IS HOLY AND OUGHT TO BE SO CALLED.

For explanation of this it must be noted from St. Thomas and Cajetan below, q. 81, a. 8, that although holiness and religion are the same, nevertheless they differ in this: religion directly regards those things which specially pertain to divine worship, such as ceremonies, sacrifices, and so forth; holiness, however, directly regards the mind and through the mind the other works of religion and of the other virtues, because it uses them so that through them it may apply the mind to God. The Psalmist explained this well, Psalm 84, saying: 'He shall speak peace unto his people and unto his saints, and unto them that are converted to the heart' - thus Augustine reads it. There, by what he says, 'unto them that turn the heart to Him,' he explained who the saints whom he had named were, taking both for the same. And Psalm 148: 'A hymn to all his saints, to the children of Israel, a people approaching to him.' There he calls saints and children of Israel in spirit and promise those who approach God in mind, namely by withdrawing it from other things and applying it to God. For by bodily application alone God would not say that they approach Him, according to Isaiah 29: 'This people honoreth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.' Hence holiness also signifies cleanness, to which in Greek corresponds hagios, that is, 'without earth.' Thus St. Dionysius defines it in Divine Names, chapter 12: 'Holiness is a purity free from every uncleanness, perfect, and altogether immaculate.' The reason for this signification is that in order to apply the mind to God it is necessary to withdraw it from inferior and earthly things. Approach to one terminus requires withdrawal from another. Therefore purity of mind is required. The mind of man is defiled by this, that it is joined to inferior things, just as any thing is soiled by mixture with something baser, as gold by mixture with lead. Thus if you remove the heart from inferior things by which it is stained, in order to apply it to God, it will remain clean. And because this cleanness proceeds from the merit of Christ's Passion, hence also it comes about that according to Latin usage 'holy' is taken for that which is tinged with blood. This custom...

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This usage was common also among the ancients: when they wished to be purified they were sprinkled or tinged with blood, as Isidore notes in Etymologies X, chapter 18. To this signification agrees Isaiah 62: 'And they shall call thee a holy people, redeemed by the Lord,' as though holy because tinged with blood and redeemed. And 1 Peter 2: 'A holy nation, a purchased people.' The gloss: that is, sprinkled with the blood of Christ. Again, because this application of the mind to God as the last end, first principle, and Redeemer ought to be immovable, according to Romans 8, 'Christ Jesus, who died,' etc., 'Who then shall separate us from the charity of God?' where from the reason of the blood poured out firmness is inferred, hence also 'holy' can here be taken according to another Latin signification for that which is firm and immovable, as though sanctum were the same as sancitum, established. St. Augustine expressly teaches this in volume IV, Book II On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, near the end. Hence in antiquity those things were called sancta which were fortified by laws so that they ought not to be violated. For this reason something is said to be sancitum because it is made firm by law. From this it follows that holiness and 'holy' are said analogically of all these things according to an order to one final cause, which is to apply the mind to God, although according to the imposition of the name it may be said primarily of one of them. Secondly, it must be noted that this cleanness and firmness which is called holiness can exist either only with respect to the intellect by reason of faith, or also with respect to the will by reason of hope and charity. Taking 'holy' in the first way, it is equivalent to 'faithful.' Jerome teaches this in volume III in the letter to Paulinus beginning 'Your voice calls me,' Tertullian in On Monogamy, and Chrysostom, Homily 13 on the first chapter of John. It is proved from Deuteronomy 7: 'Overthrow their altars and break their statues, cut down their groves and burn their graven things, because thou art a holy people to the Lord thy God.' There holiness is insinuated to consist in integrity and cleanness of faith. And from Romans 1: 'Called to be saints.' There Chrysostom in Homily 1 calls all the faithful saints. Theophylact teaches the same, and on Romans 15, 'the poor of the saints,' and St. Thomas there also. Augustine on Psalm 85, at 'Because I am holy,' attributes holiness to all the faithful, so that each may say: 'Because I am holy.' This cannot be verified except of the holiness of faith. A threefold cause of this denomination can be assigned. The first is the same cause by which the faithful are called saints as that by which the Church is called a virgin. It is the custom of Scripture to call the congregation of the faithful a virgin. Hence 2 Corinthians 11: 'For I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ,' because, namely, she is stained by no defilement of unbelief or idolatry. For this reason Jerome on Matthew 25, Origen, Homily 32 on Matthew, and Augustine on Psalm 147 understand the parable of the ten virgins of all the faithful, whom Scripture calls virgins, just as, conversely, it calls unbelievers harlots and fornicators. Thus Ezekiel 16 reproves Jerusalem because she followed many lovers, opened her feet to every passer-by, and made a brothel in every place. The reason is this. Just as in bodily virginity, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 152, a. 3, there are two things - integrity of body, which is material in that virtue, and purity of mind, which is formal - so with respect to the soul there are two things: integrity of faith, which is as it were material, and purity of charity, which is formal. Therefore just as in a virgin integrity of body, although the mind may be corrupt, denominates her a virgin because virginity imports removal of bodily corruption, as Ambrose teaches in the book On Virginity, so in Christians integrity of inviolate faith, although stained by defect of charity, denominates them virgins by reason of that same integrity and cleanness from every stain of idolatry. For unbelief is thus called in Exodus 32 and Micah 2. Hence Augustine on Psalm 147: 'Virginity of flesh is an untouched body; virginity of heart is uncorrupted faith.' The second cause is that faith is the beginning and root of holiness. For this reason justification and remission of sins are frequently attributed to faith in Scripture as to a cause and root. It is customary in Scripture to denominate causes by the names of their effects. Thus 'hand' is used for the effect of the hands, as Psalm 118: 'I lifted up my hands to thy commandments,' that is, my works; and 'I turned my feet unto thy testimonies,' that is, my movements. Thus the finger of God is called the work of God. Conversely, the name of the cause is sometimes attributed to the effect, as death is called sin and a curse because it arose from sin and the curse. See Augustine, Against Faustus XIV, chapter 3. Thus likewise, because holiness originates from faith and is its effect, faith is called holiness. In this way Ambrose is to be understood on Romans 1, at 'called to be saints,' where he says: 'Although he writes to the Romans, nevertheless he signifies that he writes to those who are in the charity of God. Who are these except those who think rightly concerning the Son of God? These are they.' From the doctrine given above he is to be explained as calling the faithful saints because in faith there is the beginning of holiness. The third reason is that the faithful profess a holy and immaculate rule and are bound to observe it, and thus they are saints at least by state and profession, just as all are called religious who profess the rule of religion although in act they are not religious. And the Supreme Pontiff by reason of his state and obligation is called 'Most Holy,' even if in act he is not such. But we are not speaking of this holiness in the conclusion. We suppose it to be in the Church, as was explained in the clause 'of the faithful' in the preceding doubt. We speak rather of full holiness and holiness simpliciter, which applies both intellect and will to God, withdrawing these powers from every inferior thing capable of defiling them and freeing them from every uncleanness and stain, as we said from Dionysius. This holiness, as St. Thomas notes there, has three grades. The first is freedom from every uncleanness. Since freedom is opposed to servitude, and he is a slave of uncleanness who is wholly conquered and subjected by it, the first grade of cleanness will be that a man is freed from the servitude of uncleanness. For explanation of this it must be noted that, according to Augustine in the

Enchiridion, chapter 30, a slave is called one who does something compelled and unwilling; a free man one who acts willingly and spontaneously. There is also this difference between dominion over slaves and over freemen: the former cannot resist their lord and oppose the prince, whereas the latter can. Therefore he will be called free from uncleanness who willingly and spontaneously casts it away from himself and resists its motions, even though they sometimes arise.
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Paul expressed this willing desire of freeing himself from uncleanness when he said: 'Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' And again: 'The good which I will, I do not,' etc. Resistance of this kind to the rising movements of concupiscence and uncleanness is shown when he says: 'There was given me a sting of my flesh to buffet me. For which thing thrice I besought the Lord,' etc.; and in that other place: 'I chastise my body,' etc. The sense therefore is that the first grade of holiness and cleanness is not to be wholly subjected to uncleanness, but to resist it and restrain its rising movements. The second grade is that there be perfect cleanness. Since that is perfect to which nothing is wanting, it can happen that someone is not subjected to uncleanness, yet something is wanting to his cleanness insofar as he is disturbed by passions of uncleanness. When these are taken away, cleanness is perfect. The second grade therefore is not to be disturbed by the passions of sins. The third grade of cleanness is that it be altogether immaculate. A thing is said to be stained not from something intrinsic but by something external which befouls it. Therefore cleanness will be altogether immaculate when not only does someone possess purity in himself, but there is nothing external capable of drawing him to uncleanness. This second grade of holiness is placed before the

third because there is less cleanness and more of sin in being tempted by some intrinsic passion than by an exterior enemy through merely extrinsic suggestion. For temptation which comes from the flesh cannot exist without some sin, as St. Thomas teaches III, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3, because such temptation occurs through delectation and concupiscence. Augustine, City of God XIX, chapter 4, teaches that it is some sin when the flesh lusts against the spirit. He proves it: that the spirit lusts against the flesh is good; therefore that the flesh lusts against the spirit is its contrary and is evil. Likewise because it is contrary to reason: concupiscence and flesh ought to be subject to reason and spirit, not contrary to it. Therefore, as Cajetan well notes there, because 'to lust against the spirit' imports a movement contrary to reason, it is some sin. Although, as St. Thomas teaches I-II, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3, this proceeds from the fact that reason does not totally resist it. For if it actually resisted the lusting flesh, it would rather be matter for the exercise of virtue. If you say that the same is true of temptation proceeding from an exterior enemy, to whom if you do not resist you sin, it is answered that when St. Thomas and Augustine said that concupiscence is some sin, they do not mean a moral sin but a natural one, like lameness of the foot. For concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, even if it precedes reason, is an evil. Mere suggestion of an exterior enemy does not have this character. From this it is clear how these three grades of holiness correspond to three states. We shall now show that the first is found in the Church. The second together with the first was found in the state of integral nature and original justice, and outside that state only in baptized infants. The third will be found only in beatitude, as we are about to prove. The second conclusion therefore does not speak of holiness in the second or third mode. And concerning the

second it is clear: in this life no one, however perfect, is free from being sometimes disturbed by passions. Paul complains in Romans 7 that he sees in his members another law resisting the law of his mind and leading him captive into the law of sin, and that he himself does not perform the good which he wills but the evil which he does not will. Although Jerome, Daniel III and q. 8 to Algasius, Augustine I to Simplician, q. 1, and Origen there understand that passage not of Paul but of sinners, nevertheless Augustine himself on Psalm 118, sermons 2 and 3, in sermons 5 and 6 On the Words of the Apostle, Tractate 41 on John, and Jerome himself, volume II, Book II Against the Pelagians, explain it of Paul himself and of men constituted in grace. That it ought thus to be understood is proved from Augustine On Marriage and Concupiscence and Jerome Against the Pelagians II. For if Paul were speaking of sinners he would not say: 'The evil which I hate, that I do.' Nor would he say: 'I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man,' which, as Augustine teaches there, is an effect of great grace. Secondly, the same is proved from St. Gregory on Job 38, 'Hast thou shown the dawn its place?' where he calls all the just the dawn because in them the law of God is joined to the law of the members inducing to sin. Hence on Romans 13, 'The night is passed and the day is at hand,' he notes that the Apostle did not say 'the day has come,' but 'is at hand,' as though in the just there are always shadows of passions and concupiscence joined to the brightness of grace. St. Augustine should be seen on this in Against Two Letters of the Pelagians III, chapter 3, where he shows at length how the passions of vices still remain in the sons of God. Thirdly, the same is proved. The precept 'Thou shalt not covet,' although it can be fulfilled in this life in the sense that you do not obey concupiscences, nevertheless, as Augustine says in Tractate 41 on John, Letter 200 to Asellicus, Book XII On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 12, and Against Two Letters of the Pelagians III, chapter 7, if it is taken so as altogether to remove and prohibit rising passions and desires, it is fulfilled not in this life but in the other, where it will rather be the reward of those who triumph than the work of those who labor. This is confirmed. Augustine teaches in the book On the Perfection of Justice, in the reasoning on that precept, 'Thou shalt love the Lord with thy whole heart,' etc., that it cannot be perfectly fulfilled in this life, because there is always in this life something of carnal concupiscence which is restrained by being held in check. Therefore that second grade of cleanness and holiness which removes the passions cannot be possessed in this life. Fourthly, it is clearly proved from Paul: 'There was given me an angel of Satan, a sting of my flesh, to buffet me.' Therefore if we do not find this perfection in Paul, neither can it be found in others. Fifthly, from Galatians 5: 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.' St. Ambrose, St. Thomas, and others understand this to be true also in just men. Sixthly, this seems signified by Psalm 31: 'For this' - namely the grace of divine protection - 'shall every saint pray to thee in a seasonable time. Nevertheless in a flood of many waters,' etc. Cajetan says there that every saint prays to be protected by divine help against

concupiscences and temptations. If every saint prays for this, he is subject to temptations. It is confirmed from this, that Christ taught all the saints, even the Apostles, to pray: 'And lead us not into temptation,' Matthew 6. The same grace of divine help is sought there. Therefore. But arguments are made to the contrary. First, grace, however great and excellent, since it is a habitual gift, leaves room for actual use apart from grace. Therefore it is not necessary to exclude from the saints every slight excess of the passions...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Secondly, with acquired virtues, which subject the passions more than infused virtues do, it is compatible that disordered movements sometimes arise, as experience shows. Therefore it is compatible also with grace. Thirdly, such a position would take away from the saints that which is matter of virtue and of a crown; temptations are of this kind, according to the saying, 'He will make with temptation a way of escape.' Therefore. Fourthly, this is the difference between original justice and gratia gratum faciens: original justice subjected the appetite totally to reason so that it could not rise against it; gratia gratum faciens, although it gives strength to restrain all rising passions, does not altogether subject them to reason. Therefore it is not repugnant to grace that holy men of God be disturbed by movements of this kind. Fifthly, it is a privilege of the Blessed Virgin that in her first sanctification the fomes was through grace and divine providence totally bound so that it did not go forth into act, and that in the conception of Christ it was altogether removed and extinguished in her. Therefore to extend this to other saints seems rash. For there is no one, however holy, who does not confess himself a sinner, according to 1 John: 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,' etc. But every sin proceeds from concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, or pride of life. Therefore whoever has sin is impelled by one of these passions. This is Augustine's argument in Letter 29, where he proves that no one is without sin because no one is without the fomes; and Ambrose, Book X of the Letters, Letter 84 near the end. Seventhly, the same is proved from Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins I, final chapter, where he teaches that concupiscence and the passions of the flesh are in all even after Baptism so that we may fight against them, and that no one lacks that law except perhaps, he says, by an ineffable miracle of the almighty Creator; but neither ought we to posit this nor is it established that it has been done anywhere. Therefore we ought not to assert it. He teaches similar things in Book II, chapter 7, and on Psalm 84 at 'He shall speak peace to his people,' and City of God XIX, chapter 4: 'And who is so wise that he has no conflict at all against lusts?' Jerome likewise, volume I, to Eustochium On the Keeping of Virginity, says: 'It is impossible that the innate heat of the marrow should not break forth upon human sense.' Eighthly, it is proved. Otherwise, unless these passions arose, there would be no need for penance and mortification, by which first the harmful affections generated by the corrupt fomes are pruned away. Finally, if it is lawful to recur argumentatively to mystical meanings, this is signified, according to Augustine and St. Thomas, by Judges 3: 'These are the nations which the Lord left that he might instruct Israel by them, and that afterward their children might learn to fight with their enemies and have experience of battle,' namely that God leaves the passions even in the saints lest we become sluggish in His court. The same is said to be signified by the fact that Job's wife always remained with him persuading him to evil, as though she were a type and figure of concupiscence and the fomes, which always remains with us and impels to evil. Concerning the third grade of holiness, namely of those who are not tempted from without, it is certain that it is not found in the militant Church. There is no one who escapes the snares of the devil and whom he does not go about like a roaring lion seeking to devour. This is proved first from Ecclesiasticus 2: 'Son, when thou comest to the service of God, stand in fear and justice and prepare thy soul for temptation.' This at least must be understood of such temptation. Likewise Ecclesiasticus 4: 'At first he chose him. Fear and dread and trial he shall bring upon him, and he shall torment him in the tribulation of his doctrine until he tempt him,' etc., that is, permit him to be tempted. Secondly from Hilary on Matthew 3: 'The temptations of the devil rage most against those who are sanctified, because victory over the saints is more desired by him.' Chrysostom teaches the same in Homily 5 from various passages of Matthew. Hence Habakkuk 1 says of him that his food is chosen. And Job 40 that 'he shall eat hay like an ox.' For an ox, although it drinks turbid water, eats only clean hay. Therefore the devil, says Gregory, eats hay - that is, men, because truly all flesh is grass - like an ox, because he chooses the holier and cleaner in order to devour them. The same is signified when it is said that he has confidence and that Jordan, that is, the baptized and just, shall flow into his mouth. Gregory should be seen on this, as also on Job 40, 'He bindeth his tail like a cedar,' where he shows at length how he rages more in tempting those who are holier or desire to be so. He treats the same at length in chapter 41: 'Under him shall be the rays of the sun, and he shall strew gold under him like mud,' where he declares how he tempts and endeavors to subject to himself those who shine with virtues like the rays of the sun and glitter like gold. Chrysostom should also be seen on this, Homily 71 on Genesis at the beginning, where he is lengthy in persuading how the devil assaults and tempts the holier more. He treats the same in the homily On Job and Abraham, volume I, where he attempts to persuade that temptations belong especially to the perfect. Ambrose seems to harmonize with him on Psalm 118, sermon 10, where he seems to attribute temptations from an exterior cause only to the just. Origen should be seen on Exodus 17, 'Then Amalec came,' and chapter 18, 'Jethro therefore came,' where he likewise pursues at length how temptations were reserved for the stronger and holier; and Gregory, Moralia VIII, chapter 10, where for this reason he says that after 'Let there be light' there follows 'And there was evening,' because the shadow of temptation follows the light of righteousness. Thirdly, the same is proved from Augustine on Psalm 52 at 'Thy right hand hath received me,' where he excludes no one from the devil's temptation, saying: 'For who belonging to Christ is not agitated by various temptations, and does not the devil and his angels deal with him daily in order that he may be perverted by some desire, some suggestion, promise of gain, fear of loss, promise of life, terror of death, enmity of some powerful man, or friendship of some powerful man? In every way the devil presses how he may cast him down.' Thus Augustine. And in Book 50, homily [sermon], he shows the same, saying: holy Job did not say that there is temptation in this life, but called

this life itself a temptation, speaking thus: 'Is not the life of man upon earth a temptation?' And a little afterward - all of which is said to this purpose - he says: 'Lest anyone through Baptism, although justified from former sins, dare to be proud, even if he commits nothing for which he is separated from participation at the altar, as though already boasting of full security, but rather let him preserve humility, which is almost the whole Christian discipline, lest earth and ashes be proud, until this whole night pass in which all the beasts of the forest pass, the young lions roaring that they may seek food for themselves from God. In this food Job was sought. The Lord also: In this night, he says, Satan hath desired to sift you as wheat. Who therefore of sound mind does not groan until this whole matter of temptations and earthly shadow pass away and that eternal day which never fails shine upon us?'
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Likewise on Psalm 60 at the beginning Augustine speaks thus: 'Our life in this pilgrimage cannot be without temptation, because our progress is made through temptation. No one can be crowned unless he conquers; he cannot conquer unless he fights; he cannot fight unless he has enemies and temptations.' Likewise in the sermon on the vigil of Pentecost: 'Without temptation no just man is proved.' Ambrose agrees on Psalm 118, sermon 8, verse 6. Finally, to omit many things which could be brought forward here, Augustine on Psalm 148 distinguishes two times: one of temptations, namely this life; the other of security, namely the homeland. Chrysostom likewise distinguishes them in Homily 23 on Ephesians in the moral section. From this it is clear that if there is no full security and firmness here, neither can there be full holiness which imports this security. Jerome also looks to this on Galatians 6, saying: 'If Christ the Savior was tempted, who can be secure that he will cross the seas of this life untempted?' And Gregory, Moralia XXIII, chapter 23, confirms the same, saying: 'A man placed in this life, in whatever rank he be and in whatever retreat he lives, can in no way live without temptations.' At the end of that chapter St. Gregory concludes that by the pious counsel of God it comes about that the life of the elect is disturbed during the time of this pilgrimage. Fourthly, the virtues are called arms in Romans 13 and at the end of Ephesians because by them we fight against demons, as Jerome notes on the end of Ephesians, where he says there: 'Put on the armor of God, that you may be able to stand against the deceits of the devil. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spiritual wickednesses in heavenly places,' etc. Augustine, On the Christian Combat, chapter 5, explains this passage so as to show that we, of whom it is said 'Our conversation is in heaven,' being constituted in heavenly things, that is, walking in the spiritual precepts of God, fight against spiritual wickedness; as though he excludes no one from this war if even the just are attacked. And in the book On the Perfection of Justice after the middle he therefore says that the virtues are called arms because with them we are in some manner armored in this conflict. Hence he reads Job 29 thus: 'I was clothed with justice, and judgment encompassed me as with a cloak.' He adds that judgment is called a cloak because it is a military garment, because we are still being attacked and have not yet reached that place where justice will be full, without any enemy at all, when the last enemy, death, has been destroyed. Behold how he denies that in this life that grade of holiness is possible which excludes the exterior enemy impelling us toward uncleanness. To this is added that the Church is called in Canticles 6 'terrible as an army set in array,' to designate this battle and conflict which she daily suffers. Fifthly, it is argued by Jerome's argument on Galatians 6. There the Apostle teaches men eminent in virtue and holiness that if brethren are overtaken in some fault they should instruct them in the spirit of meekness. He adds the reason: 'Considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted.' From this it is argued thus. Paul counsels holy men to correct those who fall with meekness lest they also be tempted. Therefore no one here can be secure even from an exterior enemy attempting to stain him. Otherwise he would not be held by Paul's precept to instruct sinners gently, although Paul proposed a general doctrine to all spiritual and holy men. Sixthly, it is argued. To be tempted greatly conduces to the progress and spiritual utility of all men, even the holiest. Therefore God exempts no one from attacks of this kind. The antecedent is clear. Temptation preserves humility by showing us our own weakness and how infirm we are, lest we be lifted up by virtues, trust in ourselves, and attribute them to ourselves. Gregory teaches this in Moralia II, chapter 36, speaking of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, where he says: 'Very often our mind, when it is supported by the fullness and abundance of so great a gift, if it enjoys continual security in these things, forgets from whom it has them and thinks that it has them from itself, and never considers that they can be absent from it. Hence it comes about that sometimes this same grace is usefully withdrawn and shows to the presumptuous mind how weak it is in itself. For then we know whence our goods are when by losing them as it were we feel that they cannot be preserved by us.' He treats the same more fully on Job 10, 'Hast thou not milked me as milk and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh,' etc.; and more elegantly explaining Job 11, 'If he shall overturn all things or gather them together into one, who shall contradict him?' etc., 'For he knoweth the vanity of men, and the vain man is lifted up into pride,' where he shows how, for avoiding this pride in the hearts of the just, God joins highest and lowest things, virtues and temptations. And, not to wander through many things, the Apostle expressly teaches this in 2 Corinthians 12, saying: 'And lest the greatness of the revelations should lift me up, there was given me an angel of Satan to buffet me.' He adds the reason: 'For power is made perfect in infirmity.' Augustine, explaining this in Against Two Letters of the Pelagians III, chapter 7, says: 'What power, unless that to which it pertains not to be lifted up?' And below: 'Although therefore pride first cast down Satan himself, nevertheless that supreme Physician, who knows how to use even evils well, applied from the angel of Satan against the vice of pride a salutary although troublesome medicine, just as an antidote is customarily made even from serpents against the poisons of serpents.' The same Augustine should also be seen on Psalm 128, sermon 15, where at 'This was made for me,' etc., he teaches that the particle 'this' is to be referred not to the law but to the night according to Greek grammar, and the sense is that the night of temptation, in which we are sought by Satan to be sifted and in which the young lions roar seeking food, 'was made for me,' that is, for my utility, so that we may learn not to be proud of the virtues we have. It also renders a man more solicitous in preserving virtue and defending himself from enemies, and provides many other things of this kind. It also makes a man more glorious. For, as Augustine teaches in On Genesis to the Letter XI, chapters 4 and 5, it is more glorious for one who is tempted not to consent than not to have been able to be tempted; and then it is

praiseworthy to live well when there is someone who persuades one to live badly. Therefore, in order that the saints may acquire this glory, triumph, and victory, it must be believed that God has exempted no one from conflict of this kind. Augustine should be seen concerning the advantage of temptations in City of God XI, chapters 17 and 18. Finally, it is argued. If the devil dared to tempt man constituted in paradise and original justice, indeed the angels themselves in heaven, and, what is greater, Christ Himself, no one can be in this life who does not suffer his snares. This is so true that...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

...some, whom Jerome reports on Ephesians 6, wished to assert that even in the other life men are subject to the temptations of demons, indeed that when we depart from this world there will then be for us a stronger and more open struggle, the adversaries being present against us face to face. They prove this from Romans 8: 'I am sure that neither things present nor things to come,' etc., 'shall be able to separate us from the charity of God.' They say that these future things are the battles to be entered upon after this life. Likewise from 2 Corinthians 5: 'Wherefore we strive, whether absent or present, to please him,' as though 'absent' signified one life and 'present' another. Likewise Ephesians 6: 'That you may be able to resist in the evil day, and in all things to stand perfect.' For, they say, in the present life just as we see in part and prophesy in part, so we act in part, and thus in the future life we shall be able to stand perfect. But there is no need here for a long discourse concerning this error. For Christ says: 'Work while you have the light. The night cometh,' that is, the future life, 'when no man can work.' Let this testimony suffice to convict its falsity. Nor do the testimonies adduced persuade anything. Paul speaks, as Jerome explains there, of a future time after he was writing those things, not of a future after this life. These things being thus established, the second principal conclusion remains to be understood only of the first grade of holiness, which consists in formal and inhering charity, excludes consent to the rising passions, and produces exterior good works. We said that it is to be understood of inhering charity in order to refute Luther's error, who admits no justice and holiness inhering in men, but only non-imputation of sins. We said 'in charity' to exclude another error of his, because he asserts that men are made holy and just through faith. These errors are not to be attacked here. For here we intend only to prove the holiness of the Church as to the question an est, according to the grade explained; the other doubts are examined more fully elsewhere. With these things thus explained, the conclusion is proved from the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds saying: 'I believe in the holy Church,' or 'I believe the holy Church,' and from the common tradition of the Church herself, which has always been so certain of her holiness that scarcely anyone ever seems to have doubted it. Not a few testimonies of Scripture can be brought forward unless someone with a heretical spirit wishes to weaken their force. First, it is proved from Canticles 6, which Cyprian adduces: 'One is my dove, one is my perfect one to her mother.' In that she is called a dove her charity and grace are signified. For that word 'dove,' as we said above, denotes peace, which is an effect of charity. In that she is called 'perfect' holiness is designated according to the mode explained, as we said also in the preceding doubt. For in this life no other perfection is possible. And if that holiness consisted only in faith without charity, it would not be perfect, because one of the gifts which can belong to it would be wanting. This is confirmed from the interlinear gloss on the word 'perfect': 'Because she is perfected in all virtues and charismata,' or 'she is full.' She would not have this without charity, which brings all the virtues with it. Secondly, it is proved from what follows: 'Who is she that cometh forth as the morning rising, fair as the moon, chosen as the sun, terrible as an army set in array?' She is called chosen as the sun, as the interlinear gloss notes there, because she represents in herself the image of the true Sun, walking in all justice, holiness, and truth. Behold charity. She is called as the dawn because, as we said above, shadows are still mixed with light; rising passions are mixed with charity. She is called terrible as an army set in array to show what we proved, that she is always in conflict and battle with the devil. Finally she is said to be fair as the moon, as the interlinear gloss likewise notes, to declare what we said above, that this charity and holiness produces exterior good works. Hence it says: 'She shows the beauty of the moon in laborious action.' The same is noted on Canticles 6, 'Thou art fair, my love, sweet and comely': comely, it says, with the exterior comeliness of good works. These things are explained still more in Canticles 4: 'Thy shoots are a paradise of pomegranates with the fruits of apples, cypress with spikenard, spikenard and saffron, sweet cane,' etc., where the gloss says that it speaks of the fruits of good works which after the holiness of Baptism are performed in the Church, namely penance, mercy, wisdom, preaching, and so forth. Thirdly, it is proved from Matthew 16: 'Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' By the gates of hell Jerome and the ordinary gloss understand sins and vices, which are said not to prevail, according to the interlinear gloss, because they will not separate her from the charity of God. In that He says 'they shall not prevail,' He implies that they will indeed attack, so that what was said above may be verified; He only denies that they will conquer. Fourthly, the same is proved from Isaiah 54: 'As in the days of Noah this thing is to me, to whom I swore that I would no more bring the waters of the flood upon the earth; so have I sworn not to be angry with thee and not to rebuke thee. For the mountains shall be moved and the hills shall tremble; but my mercy shall not depart from thee, and the covenant of my peace shall not be moved, saith thy merciful one. O poor little one, tossed with tempest, without any comfort, behold I will lay thy stones in order, and will found thee with sapphires, and I will make jasper thy bulwarks and thy gates of graven stones and all thy borders of desirable stones. All thy children shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of thy children. And thou shalt be founded in justice.' Thus far Isaiah. The sense of this passage according to the gloss and Jerome is that the Lord swears and says that the mountains will more easily be moved than His sentence be changed - which is a sign of immutability. His sentence is that the covenant of His peace will not depart from the Church, namely that she will always be the friend of God. For God speaks peace only over His people and over His saints and those who are converted to the heart, as Psalm 84 says. And that He will lay her stones in order, etc., signifies abundance and diversity of charismata and graces; and she will be founded in justice, namely so that she may always remain in justice, just as a building cannot remain without a foundation. He further explains the largess of divine gifts with

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which He enriches the Church by saying: 'All thy children shall be taught of the Lord.' For explanation of this it must be noted that, as Jerome holds there, Christ used this passage when He said in John 6: 'No man can come to me unless the Father who sent me draw him. And everyone who hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to me.' And below: 'It is written in the prophets: They shall all be taught of God.' For understanding this, it must be noted from Augustine, Book I On the Grace of Christ, chapters 13 and 14, that...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

It is to be understood that someone is instructed and taught by God in two ways. In one way according to the letter and according to the law. This instruction consists only in this, that he is taught what he ought to do, but does not thereby accomplish the work. In another way he is taught according to the spirit and grace. This manner of learning consists in this, that we immediately put into practice the things which we learn and are taught. Augustine proves this from 1 Thessalonians 4: "Concerning the charity of the brotherhood we have no need to write to you; for you yourselves have learned of God to love one another; for indeed you do this toward all the brethren" - as though this were a certain indication that they had learned from God, because they did what they had been taught. Likewise from John 6: "Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me" - as though this were an infallible argument that those have learned from God who come to Christ through charity. This being supposed from Augustine: if all the sons of the Church - by "all," as we said above, he understands many - ought to be thus taught by the Lord forever, then there will always be just and holy persons in charity in the Church. And in order to show the variety of diverse good works which charity produces, Scripture makes mention of so many various stones, which Jerome teaches there signify diverse virtues. And lest it seem forgetful of the temptations which the Church suffers, it uses the expression, "jasper thy bulwark," to intimate how she drives away the phantasms and temptations of the demon. On this Jerome should be consulted there. This is confirmed from Isaiah 41: "I will open rivers in the high hills, and fountains in the midst of the plains. I will make the desert into pools of waters, and the impassable land into streams of waters. I will give in the wilderness the cedar, and the thorn, and the myrtle, and the olive tree; I will set in the desert the fir tree, the elm, and the box tree together." Jerome says there that by this it is shown how no virtue or gift of grace is said to be lacking in the Church. Fifthly, it is proved from Isaiah 62, where it is said to the Church: "Thou shalt no more be called Forsaken, and thy land shall no more be called Desolate; but thou shalt be called My pleasure in her, and thy land inhabited, because the Lord has been well pleased with thee." Here God promises the Church that He will never cast her out from His charity, but that His will shall always remain in her. By this the holiness of the Church is signified; for the will of God is our sanctification and our keeping His precepts, which two things are the same. It is confirmed from the same chapter: "And they shall call them the holy people, the redeemed of the Lord; but thou shalt be called a city sought after and not forsaken." Besides the phrase "holy people," her holiness is explained in the fact that she is called "a city sought after." For what Christ seeks He wills to save here by grace and in the fatherland by glory, as is clear in the lost sheep which the shepherd sought, Luke 15, and Luke 19: "The Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." Sixthly, it is argued most efficaciously from Jeremiah 31: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord ... I will give my law in their hearts, and I will write it in their inward parts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people; and all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest," etc. "Thus saith the Lord, who gives the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night, who stirs up the sea and its waves roar, the Lord of hosts is His name. If these ordinances shall fail before me, saith the Lord, then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before me," etc. From this passage the argument is as follows. The sense of Catholic faith is that it speaks of charity and grace, which God is to give to the faithful and to the Church signified by the seed of Israel according to the spirit. But the Lord promises that this largess will not fail unless first the order of day and night fails. Therefore we are bound by faith to confess that this grace and holiness will always be in the hearts of the faithful. Seventhly, it is proved from John 17: "Sanctify them in truth. I pray not for these only, but also for those who through their word shall believe in me." As we said above from Augustine, this embraces all the faithful. From this it is argued: this prayer of Christ was fulfilled, although not in every individual believer; therefore of necessity we must posit holy persons in the Church. The antecedent is proved, for He says of those in whom it is fulfilled: "They are not of the world," namely in affection, because they have their mind applied to God. Therefore they are holy, although they are daily sanctified more. Eighthly, it is proved from Ezekiel 37, where, speaking of the Church, He says: "I will give my sanctification in the midst of them forever." Therefore, etc. Ninthly, the Church is always called the friend and sister of Christ, as is clear in the Canticle of Canticles. Therefore she is always in grace and charity. The consequence is proved: one is not the friend of God except through charity, nor loved by God except through grace, which produces charity. Likewise, being Christ's sister also comes from grace. On this it must be noted from Augustine, Book XXII Against Faustus, chapters 38, 39, and 40, that the Church of God, signified by Sarah, possessed these conditions: she was Abraham's wife and likewise his sister on the father's side. In this, he says, there is commended not a kinship of earthly generation, which will pass away, but of heavenly grace, which will remain forever. For we received this grace, that we should be called and should be sons of God and brethren of Christ, not from the human nature proper to Christ's mother, but from God the Father. He explained this when He said: "Whoever does the will of my Father, he is my brother and sister and mother." By this saying, Augustine says, I call this kinship from God the Father, not from the side of humanity. This is confirmed. In Psalm 84 the people of God are called holy: "He will speak peace unto His people and unto His saints." The interlinear gloss teaches there that the people of God, which is the Church, are explained in the words "and unto His saints." This same conclusion is further proved by the testimonies which at the beginning of the

question we attempted to weaken in the objections; in the solutions we

shall show that they all corroborate the same truth. It is also argued by reason. Union requires likeness, for every animal is joined to one like itself. But Christ, who is holy and immaculate, is united to the Church as head to members and bridegroom to bride. Therefore He requires in her some likeness of Himself in holiness and purity. Cajetan should be consulted concerning this argument in the oration which he delivered at the Lateran Council upon Apocalypse 21: "I saw the holy city," etc. See also Augustine on Psalm 85, on "Keep my soul, for I am holy," concerning how the whole body of Christ, which is the Church, ought to say, "For I am holy." From what has been said I infer that it is not sufficient to place the holiness of the Church in baptized children and infants. For the tradition of the Church is not merely that there will be holy persons in the Church in any manner whatsoever, but that there are holy men who devote themselves to good works and apply their mind to God by their acts. Hence what we cited above from Psalm 84: "and unto His saints, and unto those who turn their heart to Him." It says "turn," which signifies a proper act that does not belong to infants.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Secondly, the diversity of good works which we have explained, and the conflict with internal and external enemies, can belong only to adults. I infer secondly from the same testimonies that this holiness of the Church must endure until the end. This is proved, for the testimonies cited from Isaiah 54 and Jeremiah 31 assert it. Secondly, it is also proved from the other testimonies if they are considered more attentively. For they are expressed in the future tense so as to signify this perpetuity. On this Rupert the Abbot is to be noted on Habakkuk 3, at "In indignation thou shalt tread the earth." The prophets announce by verbs of the past tense those things which were to be or to be done at some fixed time; but those things which would not cease to be done on all days until the end of the age they express with verbs of the future tense. For example, because until the end of the world God ought to have preachers who announce His future judgment, Habakkuk 3 says in the future: "Thou shalt mount upon thy horses; thou shalt raise up, thou shalt raise up thy bow." But because the power of the divinity was to lie hidden only for a fixed time beneath the humility of the Passion, he said in the past tense: "There His strength was hidden." Similarly Christ, speaking in Psalm 21 of His Passion, which had to occur only once, says in the past tense: "They dug my hands." But because His preaching and praise in the Church must endure until the end of the world, He added in the future: "I will declare thy name to my brethren." It is proved again from John 14, where Christ says: "I go to prepare a place for you; and if I shall go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself." These words belong not only to the Apostles but to all the faithful until the end of the world. Therefore He promises that He will always have those whom He will take to Himself, which cannot be without holiness. It is confirmed from John 17. Christ prays for those who through the word of the Apostles will believe in Him, that they may be one and sanctified in truth. Since that prayer extends to all ages of the Church, there will always be some in whom this sanctification is fulfilled. It is also proved from "the gates of hell shall not prevail against her." Therefore holiness will never be lacking; otherwise the gates of hell and sins would at some time have prevailed against her. Likewise from Hosea 2: "I will espouse thee to myself forever; I will espouse thee to myself in justice and judgment, and in mercy and in commiserations; and I will espouse thee to myself in faith." There these espousals are promised perpetually in the Church - with some indeed only in faith, with others in faith, justice, and holiness. To this may be added the argument which we brought forward among the objections: "Behold, I am with you all days even to the consummation of the age." If this is understood of illumination according to the spirit and not merely according to the letter, as we shall say below, it manifestly proves our intention. I infer thirdly: since it belongs to the same agent to induce a form and the dispositions which are of the same order as the form, and likewise to give the subject power to preserve itself from corruptive things, when we confess the holy Church we are bound to confess and believe not only that holiness itself exists in her, but also many other supernatural gifts preceding holiness and many helps of God by which she can walk rightly in all things and resist the temptations which occur. Among these dispositions is numbered not only a simple, even supernatural, knowledge of all things necessary for salvation, but also a certain affective knowledge which moves the will toward the things known. For Scripture calls that man learned by God who not only knows but does what he learns. There is also in the Church the preaching of the word, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and other helps by which the faithful are led to Christ. This is proved from Isaiah 59: "My spirit that is in thee and my words that I have put in thy mouth shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor out of the mouth of thy seed's seed, saith the Lord, from henceforth and forever." Behold, both the Spirit and doctrine are promised perpetually to the Church. Likewise John 10: "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me." Therefore the Church will always possess both the voice of Christ and sheep who hear and follow it. It is not enough that the words be sounded externally; there must also be an interior motion by which they are followed.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

This is confirmed from 1 John 2: "You have an unction from the Holy One and know all things"; and again: "The anointing which you have received from Him abides in you, and you have no need that anyone teach you; but as His anointing teaches you concerning all things." This does not exclude external Doctors, but signifies the inward teaching of grace by which external doctrine becomes fruitful. Among the supernatural gifts which belong perpetually to the Church must also be counted remission of sins. Ezekiel 36 says: "I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness; and I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you." These promises belong to the Church of the New Testament and signify not only Baptism but the continual grace by which sins are remitted. For this reason the sacraments themselves are perpetual helps of sanctification. Baptism cleanses and incorporates into Christ; Penance restores those who have fallen after Baptism; Confirmation strengthens; the Eucharist nourishes and unites; and Holy Orders provides ministers by whom these things are dispensed. Therefore the holiness of the Church is not an idle denomination but is sustained by divinely instituted instruments of sanctification. To these are added the antecedent motions and special aids of God by which men are called, strengthened in temptations, consoled in affliction, and moved to prayer and good works. No one can deny that helps of this kind are necessary if holiness is always to remain in the Church. And because Christ promised the end, He also promised the necessary means. The prayer of the Church is itself among these means. For she does not cease to pray that the faithful may be delivered from evil, strengthened in good, and brought to eternal life. Christ's promise concerning prayer cannot fail in the whole Church. Thus even when many individual members pray badly or are sinners, there are always some whose prayer proceeds from charity and is heard according to the order of salvation. Above all, the merits of Christ are an inexhaustible treasury from which the Church receives grace. He merited not for one age only but for His whole mystical body until the consummation of the world. Therefore it is impossible that the efficacy of His Passion should be so exhausted that no holy members remain. This is elegantly figured in Ezekiel 16, where the Lord describes Jerusalem as washed with water, anointed with oil, clothed and adorned, and afterward as enriched with gifts received from Him. Whatever defect she had from herself, her beauty came from the splendor which God placed upon her. Thus the Church's holiness is from Christ and not from herself. From this it follows that the presence of sinners does not destroy her holiness. For she is holy from her holy doctrine, sacraments, worship, supernatural gifts, and from those members who actually possess charity; sinners are contained in her imperfectly, as was explained above. Nor does their deformity become the formal denomination of the whole, because the form and end of this commonwealth are ordered to holiness.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

It remains to confirm the perpetuity and firmness of this sanctification. Zechariah 3 speaks of the seven eyes of the Lord upon the one stone, signifying God's most provident watch over His Church. In Canticles 8 the vineyard is committed to keepers, yet remains the vineyard of the peaceful one. Isaiah 4 says that over every place of Mount Sion and over her assemblies the Lord will create a cloud by day and smoke and the brightness of a flaming fire by night, and over all the glory a protection. Such testimonies show a divine guardianship by which the Church is preserved. If moreover the word "holy" be taken in the sense of something firm, established, and inviolable, the Church is holy also in this manner. Isaiah 33 says: "Look upon Sion, the city of our solemnity; thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle which cannot be transferred; neither shall the nails thereof be taken away forever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken." Scripture also calls the Church a mountain because, like a mountain, she remains stable and cannot be shaken. The Psalms say the same. "God is our refuge and strength"; and: "God is in the midst of her, she shall not be moved." Again: "He built His sanctuary like a unicorn in the land which He founded forever"; and: "Thou foundedst the earth upon its own stability; it shall not be moved forever and ever." Jerome and Augustine explain passages of this kind concerning the immobility of the Church. Fourthly, this is proved because she is said to be founded upon a rock and "the gates of hell shall not prevail against her," Matthew 16. Elsewhere she is compared not to a house built upon sand but upon a firm rock, against which winds and rivers rushed and did not overthrow it. Fifthly, it is proved from Zechariah 2, where the Lord says concerning the Church: "I will be to her a wall of fire round about." By this He signifies that just as fire is terrible to enemies but, when tempered, rather refreshes those within, so the Lord is a wall of fire against the enemies for the security of the citizens of His Church, while toward His own He is most gentle and refreshes them. Sixthly from Psalm 47 and similar passages, in which the secure city of God is celebrated. Thus the Church is both holy and stable, not because no member can fall, but because the commonwealth itself, sustained by God, cannot be destroyed.
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THIRD CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE THIRD PROPERTY. The Church is, and ought to be called, Catholic. This is proved from Augustine, On True Religion, chapter 7: "We must hold the Christian religion and the communication of that Church which is Catholic and is called Catholic not only by her own members but also by all her enemies and persecutors." For understanding and further proof of this conclusion it must be noted that the name "Catholic" is Greek and signifies the same as "universal" among the Latins. The universality of the Church can be considered in two ways: by reason of the matter, namely the faithful from whom she is gathered; and by reason of the form, namely faith, which gives them a certain supernatural being, namely to be members of the Christian commonwealth. From either side the Church can and ought to be called universal and Catholic. We say this against Donatus, who, as Augustine testifies in the conference of the third day against the Donatists, called the Church universal and Catholic from the fullness and universality of the sacraments, not from the universality of nations. For he held obstinately that the Church of Christ contained very few and was found only in that region of Africa where his followers dwelt. They attempted to prove this from Canticles 1: "Tell me where thou feedest, where thou liest at noon," as though the spouse's question ended there and the Bridegroom answered: "in the south." Likewise from Habakkuk 3: "God will come from Africa" - for thus they read it with Augustine, City of God XVIII, chapter 32 - as though by "south" and "Africa" their region were designated as the only place where Christ was worshiped. Secondly they argued: Enoch alone among all men pleased God and was translated; afterward Noah alone with his household, and Lot alone with his household in Sodom, were delivered. Likewise Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac with their households were few while all others remained in idolatry. Likewise among the people of Israel ten tribes defected and religion remained only in the tribe of Judah.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Finally, when all others of those who followed Christ had apostatized, only the twelve Apostles remained. Therefore, since the Church has always been small in number, she ought not to be called universal and Catholic by reason of all nations which she embraces. Against this heresy - in attacking which Augustine is very copious in his books against the Donatists - the aforesaid conclusion is posited in the sense explained: the Church is universal and Catholic because she is diffused throughout the whole world and embraces all nations. That she is named thus for this reason is clear from Augustine, Letters 48 and 170, from the place cited in the conference of the third day against the Donatists, chapter 4, and from his exposition of Psalm 65 at "Make a joyful noise to God, all the earth"; likewise from Boethius at the beginning of On the Trinity and Isidore, Book I On Ecclesiastical Offices. That the matter is so is proved by the most certain testimonies of Sacred Scripture, which we distinguish into four classes. In the first are testimonies from the Law; in the second from the Prophets; in the third from the Psalms, according to the division of the Old Testament made by Christ; in the fourth, passages from the New Testament. All agree and with one voice confess this truth. First, therefore, it is argued from Genesis 22, 26, and 28, where God promises Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that in their seed all nations shall be blessed. Paul in Galatians 3 explains this seed to be Christ. But no one is blessed in Christ except those who are His members and pertain to the Church. Therefore if all nations are blessed in Him, the Church embraces all nations. Secondly, as Augustine teaches in City of God XVI, chapter 26, a most manifest testimony concerning the calling of all nations was the birth of Isaac and the circumcision then commanded. Isaac signifies the sons of grace, as Paul teaches in Romans 9, because he was begotten by promise and not according to nature from an aged sterile woman. And because circumcision was then commanded not only for sons but also for servants, those born in the house and those purchased, all these things signified that the grace of the Church would pertain to all. Thirdly, Balaam prophesied this in Numbers 24: "A star shall arise out of Jacob and a rod shall spring up from Israel, and shall strike the leaders of Moab and shall waste all the children of Seth," etc. Not only Catholics, such as Origen, the ordinary gloss, and Nicholas of Lyra, but also Jews such as Rabbi Solomon understand this of Christ. Of Him it says that He shall waste all the children of Seth, that is, all men who descend from him - for those who drew origin from Cain were covered by the flood - with respect to sins, rescuing them from the power of darkness and subjecting them to His law, as the interlinear gloss has it. Fourthly, it is proved from Deuteronomy 32: "They have provoked me with that which was no god and have angered me with their vanities; and I will provoke them with that which is no people, and with a foolish nation I will anger them." The gloss by "nation" in the singular understands the multitude of the Gentiles to be assumed to the faith. Nicholas of Lyra should also be seen there. Scripture often uses the singular to show a very great multitude, as Augustine frequently teaches in the Psalms and in the Questions on Exodus, especially on Exodus 8, "there came a very grievous fly," where "fly" in the singular, he says, is put for a multitude of flies; and in Book V On Genesis Literally, chapter 10, he says: "I know not how, by the custom of speech, what is said in the singular often seems more to human senses than what is said in the plural." He adduces other examples. If it were lawful to use symbolic and mystical theology as demonstration, the same would be proved from Noah's ark containing every kind of animal, from Gideon's fleece completely moistened, from Solomon's temple built by many foreigners, and from other figures of this kind, by which the holy Fathers, taught by the divine Spirit, strive according to their powers to explain and signify the truth which we are proving. But let us proceed to the testimonies of the second class. They are almost innumerable. Isaiah 2 says concerning the Church: "In the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow unto it," etc. Micah 4 repeats almost all these things in the same words. Likewise Isaiah 11: "The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord as the covering waters of the sea. In that day there shall be the root of Jesse," etc.; "He shall lift up a sign unto the nations"; "they shall fly upon the shoulders of the Philistines," etc. All these, according to the Apostle in Romans 15, signify the multitude of nations subjected to the Church. And Isaiah 27: "In that day a great trumpet shall be sounded, and those who were lost shall come from the land of the Assyrians and those who were outcasts in the land of Egypt, and they shall adore the Lord in the holy mountain in Jerusalem." And in the same place: "Israel shall bud and blossom again, and they shall fill the face of the world with seed," namely with Christ, who according to faith is the seed of Israel. And chapter 25: "The Lord of hosts shall make on this mountain a feast of fat things," etc. - namely that supper to which all were admitted after the Lord swore that none of those who had been invited should taste it, Luke 14. And chapter 41: "He shall give the nations before him," etc.; "I the Lord am the first and the last"; "the islands saw and feared; the ends of the earth were astonished, they drew near and came." Again chapter 42: "Behold my servant," etc.; "He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles," and "the islands shall wait for His law" - a passage Matthew 12 adduces concerning Christ. And chapter 43: "From the east I will bring thy seed and from the west I will gather thee. I will say to the north: Give; and to the south: Do not hinder. Bring my sons from afar and my daughters from the ends of the earth." Chapter 45: "Every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall swear" - which certainly is done through the Christian religion. Chapter 49: "Hear, O islands, and attend, ye peoples from afar"; "I have given thee for a light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth"; and below: "Behold, these shall come from afar; behold, those from the north and the sea, and these from the southern land." Again: "Lift up thine eyes round about and see: all these are gathered together, they are come to thee"; "thy deserts and thy solitudes and the land of thy ruin shall now be too narrow by reason of the inhabitants";

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"the place is too narrow for me; make room for me that I may dwell." Many things are there concerning this general calling of the nations. Chapter 51: "A law shall go forth from me and my judgment shall rest for a light of the peoples. My arms shall judge the peoples; the islands shall wait for me and shall trust in my arm." Chapter 52: "The Lord has prepared His holy arm in the eyes of all the nations, and all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of our God." Chapter 53: "For this He labored," etc.; "therefore I will distribute to Him very many," etc. Chapter 54 explains who these many are: "Give praise, O barren, thou that bearest not"; "enlarge the place of thy tent"; "make thy cords long"; "behold, one shall come who was not with me," etc. And to bring the testimonies of Isaiah to an end, chapter 62 says: "The nations shall see thy just one and all kings thy glorious one." Finally in the last chapter he explains with more magnificent words almost throughout the multitude of all the nations coming to the Church, "as an overflowing torrent of the glory of the Gentiles."
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Isaiah continues: "I will set a sign among them, and I will send of those who shall be saved to the Gentiles, to the sea, to Africa, to Lydia," etc.; "and they shall bring all your brethren out of all nations," etc.; "all flesh shall come to adore before my face," etc. The other Prophets foretold the same. Jeremiah 3 says: "At that time they shall call Jerusalem the throne of the Lord, and all nations shall be gathered together to it in the name of the Lord at Jerusalem"; and: "in those days they shall come together out of the land of the north," etc. Ezekiel 37 likewise: "I will take the children of Israel from among the nations to which they are gone, and I will gather them on every side ... and I will make them one nation"; "and they shall be my people"; "and David my servant shall be their prince forever." These things cannot be verified of the Jews alone but of the faithful, sons of Israel according to the spirit, as the interlinear gloss and Augustine, City of God XVIII, chapter 34, note. Daniel 2 says that the stone cut from the mountain without hands became a great mountain and filled the whole earth, signifying that the faith of Christ would extend throughout the whole world. And chapter 7: "All tribes and peoples and tongues shall serve Him." Hosea 1 says: "It shall be in the place where it was said to them: You are not my people, there it shall be said to them: You are the sons of the living God." Paul, Romans 9, and Peter, 1 Peter 2, explain this to our purpose. According to Augustine, City of God XVIII, chapter 28, the following also concerns the same persons: "The children of Judah and the children of Israel shall be gathered together and shall appoint themselves one head," etc. Amos 9 most clearly foretells the same: "In that day I will raise up the tabernacle of David which is fallen, and I will rebuild the breaches of its walls, and the things that were fallen I will restore, and I will rebuild it as in the days of old, that they may possess the remnant of Edom and all the nations upon whom my name is invoked." Another reading has more clearly: "that the rest of men may seek the Lord, and all nations upon whom my name is called." James the Apostle reads and adduces it in this way in Acts 15. Obadiah likewise signifies the same universality of the Church: "The house of Jacob shall possess those who had possessed them, and the house of Jacob shall be a fire, and the house of Joseph a flame, and the house of Esau stubble; and they shall enter into them and devour them," etc. Augustine, City of God XVIII, understands by Esau all the Gentiles, as a part for the whole, who are consumed by the fire of the Holy Spirit and charity through the preachers who went forth from the house of Jacob. Micah 5 had prophesied the same, saying that Christ "shall feed His flock in the strength of the Lord, in the sublimity of the name of the Lord His God, and they shall be converted, because now He shall be magnified even to the ends of the earth." Zephaniah 2 likewise: "All the islands of the Gentiles shall adore Him, every man from his own place"; and chapter 3: "I will restore to the peoples a chosen lip, that all may call upon the name of the Lord and serve Him with one shoulder. From beyond the rivers of Ethiopia my suppliants, the children of my dispersed, shall bring me a gift." Haggai 2 says: "Yet one little while, and I will move heaven and earth and sea and dry land, and I will move all nations" - to faith, namely, as Augustine and others explain - "and the Desired of all nations shall come." Zechariah 9, after foretelling Christ seated upon an ass, adds concerning the universality of believers: "He shall speak peace to the Gentiles, and His power shall be from sea to sea and from the rivers even to the ends of the earth." Finally Malachi 1 testifies most clearly: "From the rising of the sun even to its setting my name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place sacrifice is offered and a clean oblation to my name, because my name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord." In these and other passages which might be adduced it is manifest how widely the bosom of the Church extends and how she includes all. If sometimes in the cited testimonies mention is made of only one or another region, a part is taken for the whole, as we said from Augustine, City of God XVIII, chapter 31. The third class of testimonies contains the prophecies of the Psalms, in which this truth is most especially proclaimed. Psalm 2: "Ask of me, and I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession." Psalm 21, as the reward of the Passion: "All the ends of the earth shall be converted to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the Gentiles shall adore in His sight." Psalm 18, according to Paul's exposition in Romans 10: "Their sound has gone forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world." Psalm 49: "From the rising of the sun to its setting, out of Sion the beauty of His glory." Psalm 56: "Be thou exalted, O God, above the heavens, and thy glory over all the earth." Psalm 71: "He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth. The Ethiopians shall fall down before Him"; "all kings shall adore Him; all nations shall serve Him." Psalm 59: "Galaad is mine and Manasses is mine"; "over Edom I will stretch out my shoe," plainly understanding the whole universality of the nations as explained above. Psalm 67: "Ambassadors shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God." Behold parts of the earth; and it follows concerning the whole: "Sing to God, ye kingdoms of the earth," where the gloss says "kingdoms of the earth," that is, the whole race of men. Psalm 85: "All the nations which thou hast made shall come and adore before thee, O Lord." Psalm 86: "Glorious things are said of thee, O city of God" - behold the Church is signified - "behold the foreigners and Tyre and the people of the Ethiopians, these were there." Psalm 65: "Let all the earth adore thee, O God, and sing to thee; let it sing a psalm to thy name." These words, in the prophetic manner of wishing, are taken for the future. And lest we wander through the many other passages which could be gathered from this book, let Psalm 95 suffice: "Sing to the Lord a new canticle; sing to the Lord, all the earth. Declare His glory among the Gentiles, His wonders among all peoples." Chrysostom should especially be seen on this Psalm, where he speaks wonderfully of this matter. Likewise Psalm 97: "The Lord has made known His salvation; in the sight of the Gentiles He has revealed His justice. He has remembered His mercy and His truth toward the house of Israel. All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God. Sing joyfully to God, all

the earth," etc. The fourth class contains testimonies from the New Testament confirming the same truth. First Matthew 8 and Luke 13: "They shall come from the east and the west and the north and the south and shall sit down in the kingdom of God." From this the argument is: none sit down in beatitude except those who have arrived at the Church; but from all nations men shall sit down in the kingdom of God; therefore all nations pertain to the Church. A similar argument is taken from Apocalypse 7, where, after the saints from the tribes of Israel are numbered, it adds: "After these things I saw a great multitude which no man could number, of all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne," etc. None pertain to glory except sons of the Church; but many from every nation reign in the fatherland; therefore they were sons of the Church.
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Secondly it is argued from Matthew 28: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Thirdly from the last chapter of Mark: "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature." No greater community and universality of the Church can be imagined than that she embrace every creature, that is, every man. Fourthly from Luke 2: "My eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples, a light to the revelation of the Gentiles." Fifthly from Luke 24: "Thus it behooved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead, and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations." Sixthly from John 12: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself," that is, every class of men into my Church through faith. This was signified by the net which drew from the sea 153 fishes, John 21. According to Jerome on Ezekiel 47, who received it from Oppian of Cilicia, a most learned poet, there are precisely 153 kinds of fishes. When Peter therefore caught so many, it signified that every kind and condition of men ought to be enclosed within the nets of the Church. Seventhly, the same truth is manifested more clearly than light in Acts 1: "You shall be witnesses unto me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and even unto the uttermost part of the earth." This is fulfilled in Acts 8. For when persecution arose under Stephen, all except the Apostles were scattered through the regions of Judea and Samaria, and it is added that they went about evangelizing the word of God even as far as Caesarea. And it is said that Samaria received the word of God. But that "unto the uttermost part of the earth" might be fulfilled, Saul was called, who was to carry the name of the Lord before kings and Gentiles. And Acts 2 Peter says to the Jews, Cretans, Arabians, proselytes, and others of various nations: "Men of Judea" - to the first - "and all you who dwell in Jerusalem" - for the other nations, as the interlinear gloss explains - "to you is the promise and to your children and to all who are far off, whomsoever the Lord our God shall call." He says "to all." Eighthly, Acts 10 records a sheet bound at the four corners in which were all unclean animals, which Peter was commanded to eat. The Apostle himself explains this as signifying that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he who fears God is acceptable to Him and receives the grace of the Gospel and its preaching. But such persons pertain to the Church. Therefore. Ninthly, this is signified in Acts 11, where Peter recalls the word of Jesus: "John indeed baptized with water, but you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence." This signifies that, just as John baptized men from the Gentiles and Jews indiscriminately, so the Holy Spirit was to descend indifferently upon all without exception. These pertained to the Church. Therefore. Tenthly, from Acts 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17 and from Paul's epistles we see many and diverse nations flowing into the Church: Cornelius with his whole house, others from Antioch, Athens, Lystra, Syria, Cilicia, Macedonia, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Rome, and not a few others, such as the Colossians, Galatians, Corinthians, and Achaians. Likewise Romans 15 shows how Paul preached the Gospel among many nations from Jerusalem even unto Illyricum. Peter in his first canonical epistle writes to the churches of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia. John in the Apocalypse addresses the seven Churches of Smyrna, Pergamum, Sardis, Thyatira, Philadelphia, Laodicea, and Ephesus. Finally it is proved from 1 Timothy 2: God "will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"; and Titus 2: "The grace of God our Savior has appeared to all men, instructing us," etc. If it has appeared to all and instructs all, it is most of all Catholic and universal. Behold therefore how the Church is Catholic and universal by reason of her matter, since we show that she extends to all nations. We have not mentioned the Jews; for it is certain from Acts 13 that the word of God had first to be spoken to them, and Acts 17 says many of them believed. The Prophets and Apostles, who in the Church are the remnants of that people, constantly confess that God has not cast off His people and that Israel is finally to be converted. Although several reasons can be assigned for this universality, one is enough here: that the grace of Christ may be manifested as much greater than the sin of Adam. For if Adam's sin extended itself to all, much more ought the grace of Christ to embrace all and, so far as concerns itself, to be derived to all. It is certain that all who attain grace pertain to the Church. As a sign of this Augustine teaches on Psalm 21, at "they cast lots upon my garment," that as soon as the dove brought in its beak the olive branch signifying grace and charity, it was brought into Noah's ark, that is, into the Church. Thus the Church extends herself to all. Augustine also explains in Psalm 26 the passage Genesis 3, "Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living," of the Church, because she generates all who live unto God and embraces them in her bosom. Concerning this conclusion, as regards this part of universality, it must first be noted that the Church is called Catholic and universal not only in the state which she has after Christ's Passion, but in every state of her existence - not because she actually extended to all nations and corners of the earth, but because she excluded none and always obliged all by her laws. It was said above that faith in Christ constitutes the ratio of the Church. Since the precept of this faith bound all men throughout the whole time from the creation of the world, even in the state of the law of nature and of the written law, and all who fulfilled it pertained to the Church, it follows that she was universal and Catholic at every time in this respect: all were bound to her and many professed her, as Job and others. From this it follows that some have spoken inadequately concerning the universality of the Church under the Mosaic law. They say that the Church was then Catholic because access was open to all men to be enrolled among that people and law, according to Exodus 12: "If any stranger will pass into your colony, let him be circumcised," etc. They speak inadequately, because the ratio of the Church even under the Mosaic law did not consist in the ceremonies and judicial precepts of that people, but

only in the ratio of faith; and the precept of this faith bound all. Therefore she is not called Catholic merely because anyone could subject himself to that people, but because all were bound by the faith.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The Old Law, in addition to what it added to the ratio of faith constituting the Church, can indeed be called universal for another reason; but that is not what makes the Church universal and Catholic. Secondly it must be noted that the Church is called universal and Catholic because she calls all indiscriminately, because she binds all without exception by her precepts, and because before the end of the world there will be no nation which is not to be converted to the faith; not because she actually extends to every individual at once, or because in past time she extended simultaneously or successively to every individual, or because in the future she must at the same time extend herself to all. This is proved. All are bound by the precept of faith, in which the ratio of the Church consists, as will be disputed in the following question and is certain of faith. That before the end of the world all nations ought to receive the faith of Christ is clear from Matthew 24 and Mark 13: "The Gospel must first be preached unto all nations." Otherwise what we cited above concerning the Church would not be verified: "From the ends of the earth I cried unto thee." Thirdly from: "He shall rule from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth." Again: "All the nations which thou hast made shall come and adore before thee, O Lord." This is understood of all nations, not of every individual man. Yet it is not required that every nation at the same time embrace the faith, nor that all the men of each nation be converted. The universality is that no nation is excluded and that the Church is able and obliged to receive men from every people and province. It is fitting that the Church should come to every nation rather than that every nation be forced to change its place in order to come to one local church. This seems also to be signified in Isaiah 61 at the end: "For as the earth brings forth her bud, and as a garden causes its seed to spring forth, so the Lord God shall make justice and praise to spring forth before all nations." By antithesis there is an allusion to man's expulsion from paradise. As he was cast out so that he could not return there, so in the regeneration of the world which is made by faith the Lord causes paradise, that is the Church, to be borne to all nations, so that there is no nation so barbarous that it has not had the faith of God and His Church drawing near to it. This is understood of the coming of the mind through faith, according to John 6: "No man can come to me" - namely through faith - "unless the Father who sent me draw him"; and again: "Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned comes to me." We have deliberately said "all nations" and not "all men." The Church is not called Catholic because she actually receives every individual man into the faith; for we see many die in their unbelief. Rather, she receives all nations and provinces, converting some from each. Augustine explains it thus in Letter 80 to Hesychius, and St. Thomas on Romans 10 at "Their sound has gone forth into all the earth." That the Church now does not actually extend to every nation we unhappily experience, seeing so many barbarous nations attack her faith. Whether in past time the faith reached all nations at once Augustine disputes in Book VI Hypognosticon. He proves the negative: Acts 14 says that in past generations God suffered all nations to walk in their own ways; then He chose for Himself one nation only, Jacob, and Israel for His possession, Psalm 134, which alone could say Psalm 147: "He has not done in like manner to every nation, and His judgments He has not made manifest to them." Likewise when Paul was chosen to carry God's name before all nations, then too the rejection of the Jews was accomplished. And when they passed through Phrygia and Galatia preaching, they were forbidden by the Holy Spirit to preach in Asia; and when they came to Mysia, the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them to go into Bithynia. This is also proved from 2 Thessalonians 3: "For faith is not of all." Nor does it appear that the faith in past ages successively reached every individual region of the earth in such a way that all nations were formally subject to ecclesiastical laws. Nevertheless the preaching and fame of the Gospel could have reached far more widely than the actual constitution of churches. If we speak only of the promulgation and fame of the preaching, it is certain that "their sound went forth into all the earth" and that the fame of evangelical doctrine filled the earth. Paul argues thus in Romans 10: the Jews are inexcusable for their unbelief because they heard of Christ's doctrine. Since the Jews were dispersed through the whole world, as is clear from Acts 2, he proves the antecedent by saying: "Their sound has gone forth into all the earth," etc. Colossians 1 likewise says: "You have heard in the word of the truth of the Gospel, which has come unto you, as it is also in the whole world and brings forth fruit and grows, as it does in you"; and below: "if so you continue in the faith, grounded and settled and immovable from the hope of the Gospel which you have heard, which is preached in all the creation that is under heaven." Likewise Matthew 24, and more clearly Mark 13, teach, as Augustine notes, that Christ, speaking of the overthrow of the Jews, said that before it the Gospel had to be preached throughout the whole world. And the last chapter of Mark says that the Apostles preached everywhere. Therefore the fame of the Gospel went forth into the whole world. St. Thomas teaches the same in the places cited above, Ambrose on Romans 10, and the author of Book II On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 6.

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The same author confirms that universal peace was granted in the time of Caesar Augustus for this purpose, that the preaching of the Gospel might run throughout the whole world. Certain more recent writers, less exercised in reading the Saints and investigating their opinions, are unwilling to understand these testimonies of the entire habitable region of the world, but only of the parts surrounding Palestine. They are moved by Jerome on Isaiah 13, who says that it is an idiom of Scripture to signify by "the whole earth" only that part of which the discourse is speaking. They confirm the same from Ambrose, Book III On the Calling of the Gentiles. Thus, they say, is to be understood 2 Chronicles 9: "King Solomon was magnified above all the kings of the earth"; and 3 Kings, where Abdias says: "As the Lord lives, there is no nation into which my lord has not sent to seek thee"; Acts 11, where Agabus signified by the Spirit that a great famine would be over the whole world, which occurred under Claudius Caesar; and Luke 2: "A decree went forth from Caesar Augustus that the whole world should be enrolled." In these places they do not understand the whole globe by the distributive signs, but certain neighboring regions of the province in question. In the same manner, they say, the testimonies cited concerning the Christian faith being announced throughout the whole world and the Gospel being preached to every creature under heaven ought to be understood of many regions near the Roman world. Thus they weaken the truth which we intend to prove from these passages. Augustine, however, in Letter 161 contends that these things ought to be understood of the whole world, and that they are demonstrative signs by which the promise made by Christ is shown fulfilled: "Ask of me, and I will give thee the nations for thy inheritance and the ends of the earth for thy possession." He should be consulted there. Nor is this argument valid: in other cited testimonies we do not understand the whole world universally; therefore neither in these.

First, because when without figure or trope we can understand Scripture, and that literal understanding yields a true sense according to the propriety of speech, it ought to be explained without such tropes, unless some absurdity or impossibility follows from the non-figurative understanding. Such an absurdity follows if Elijah were said to have been sought throughout the whole globe, or if the Lord were said to have destroyed every land without restricting the universality to Babylon alone, of which Isaiah 13 speaks. But if we posit the Christian faith to have been announced throughout the whole world, no such impossibility follows. Therefore we are not obliged to flee from the proper sense. Secondly, because the understanding of Scripture is to be sought from the explanations of the Saints. Since the holy Doctors cited above understand these testimonies in this manner, and the other passages which we have adduced against this interpretation do not compel the contrary, it follows that they ought so to be understood and that the demonstrated truth remains immovable. This is finally proved. Origen, Book III of his Expositions on Genesis; Nicephorus, Book III of his History; Eusebius of Caesarea, Book III of Ecclesiastical History, chapter 1; and St. Thomas on Romans 10 teach that the Apostles so poured forth this doctrine through the world that Peter first preached the word at Jerusalem, then in Galatia and Bithynia, and also in upper Asia and Cappadocia; John in Asia for many years; Andrew on the coasts near the Euxine, in Scythia, Byzantium, Macedonia, and Greece; Thomas among the Parthians, Indians, and in the island of Taprobane; another in Egypt and Libya; another again in the remote regions and islands of the Ocean, even Britain. Paul traversed almost the whole habitable world by preaching, beginning from Jerusalem and reaching Illyricum; he also went through Spain, as Jerome on Isaiah 11 and Amos 5, Theophylact on Hebrews 1, Chrysostom in the cited homilies, Epiphanius, Gregory, and Anselm teach. Although Gelasius does not believe the point concerning Spain, and Jerome, Epiphanius, and Sedulius express **doubt about it, nevertheless since the Apostles traversed all these parts of the world, it is not to be believed** that there was any region so hidden and remote that the fame of this preaching did not reach it. The argument is confirmed from Ambrose on Romans 10. The fame of the signs which God did in Egypt for His people reached all regions of the world, as Rahab the harlot says, Joshua 2. But, as Isaiah 43 says, the miracles which God worked in confirmation of evangelical preaching were not less. Therefore there will be no region so remote that their sound did not go forth to it. I have noted these things so that with St. Thomas and Jerome we may reconcile the opinions of the holy Fathers Augustine and Chrysostom, which seem to disagree. Augustine asserts that not all regions had been subjected to the Gospel. Chrysostom, Homily 76 on Matthew, and Abulensis, question 92 on Matthew 24, say that in the time of the Apostles it was not so preached that the Church was built in all nations and evangelical doctrine received. Chrysostom, however, understands that although the Church had not been built everywhere and not every region had been converted to Christ, nevertheless in the time of the Apostles, through them or their disciples, some fame of this preaching reached all parts of the world. It is enough to have touched this here. That in the future the Church must not at one and the same time extend herself to all parts of the world I persuade from this alone: no passage of Scripture or of the Saints proves it. If anyone adduces especially, "This Gospel shall be preached in the whole world for a testimony to them"; or, "There shall be one fold and one shepherd"; or, "Blindness has happened in Israel until the fullness of the Gentiles should enter," these do not compel. The first and third are sufficiently preserved if successively all nations of the Gentiles are converted to Christ. The second proves only that from each people one Church must be constituted, not that all of both peoples must simultaneously be converted to the faith. Soto, IV Sentences, distinction 46, q. 1, holds the same: there is no reason which proves the contrary. These things being supposed, the arguments of Donatus are answered. To the first: those words from Canticles are all the words of the bride, not the Bridegroom. Augustine proves this in On the Unity of the Church, chapter 14, from what follows. Where we read: "lest I begin to wander after the flocks of thy companions," another

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reading has: "lest I be as one covered over the flocks of thy companions." Thus the Bridegroom does not answer that He lies at noon and that His Church is there. The Church asks only who are the "noonday" persons, that is, those fervent with the charity of God or bright with the light of wisdom and divine grace, as Ambrose interprets, On Isaac, chapter 4, and Hexaemeron IV, chapter 5. Augustine should also be seen more fully in On Pastors, chapter 15.
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To the second, from Habakkuk, it is answered that since Luke 24 says that penance in Christ's name had to be preached to all nations beginning from Jerusalem, and Joshua 15 shows Jebus to have been situated toward the south, it is the same for God to come from the south or Africa and to come from Jerusalem. With this agrees what follows: "And the Holy One from the shady mountain," namely Mount Olivet, from which He ascended into heaven and from which He sent His disciples to preach the Gospel to every creature. To the third it is answered that although the examples prove the fewness of the just, they do not prove the fewness of the faithful. In the time of the flood the sons of God, that is, the sons of Seth, distinguished from the sons of men, that is, of Cain, were faithful. And in the time of Elijah the Lord says to him: "I have left to myself seven thousand men who have not bowed their knees before Baal," where the determinate number is taken for a very great and indefinite one. Secondly it is answered that we do not deny that the Church is at times small and few in number; we assert only that she is not so restricted to one nation of men that she cannot receive all others and bind them to her law. Let these things suffice concerning the universality of the Church by reason of the matter and subjects from which she consists. It remains to explain how she is universal and Catholic by reason of faith, which is her form. It must be observed that besides the community of faith which we explained by reason of its subject, on account of which it is called by the Apostle "the common faith," Titus 1, and by Augustine, Confessions XII, chapter 25, "Thy truth, O Lord, is neither this man's nor that man's, but belongs to us all, to whose communion thou terribly admonishest us, lest we wish to have it privately and thereby be deprived of it," there belongs to faith another community and universality according to its proper ratio, insofar as it is an intellectual form by which God purifies our hearts, Acts 15. To explain this briefly, it must be noted that faith, as also Theology whose principles faith hands down, is not only a speculative habit but also eminently practical; and by reason of either condition faith possesses a certain universality and community. Insofar as it is a speculative habit, it is universal because it is not related like the other sciences, which treat one object in such a way that they do not treat another - as Physics treats mobile being and not quantity. This comes from the weakness of their light, by reason of which each is borne to its own object and manifests and illuminates one ratio but not another. Faith, however, because it is borne to its object under a certain higher and greater light, namely divine revelation, which can extend to all things, thereby possesses a certain community and can be called universal and Catholic even as speculative. This is proved by comparison. If a certain internal sense, because under a more universal ratio it is borne toward the objects of all the external senses, is called the common sense, with much greater right our faith can be called common. It is proved by Augustine, Letter 3 to Volusianus, where, treating this doctrine, he says: "Here is Physics, because the causes of all creatures are in God the Creator; here is Ethics, because a good and honorable life is formed from nowhere else; here is Logic, because God alone is the truth and light of the rational soul; here also is the salvation of a praiseworthy commonwealth. For the best city is neither founded nor preserved except by the foundation and bond of faith." Thus Augustine. This could also be confirmed because in sacred doctrine revealed through faith there are contained many things pertaining to Geography, Cosmography, Astrology, and Architecture, as some have elsewhere disputed. But it will suffice for confirmation of this opinion to adduce what the ancient Egyptian sages and older Greeks philosophized. They called the complex of certain disciplines an Encyclopedia, namely because they represented the connection of these disciplines by a conjunction of circles comprehended within a larger circle. Within that larger circumference three other circles were drawn, so intertwined in centers and circumferences that the center of one was the beginning and circumference of another. By the three inner circles they designated the species of human sciences; by the outer circle which embraced the others in a wider compass they understood faith and Theology, so as to signify, as we teach, that faith and supernatural knowledge embrace the science of all natural things under a certain higher and eminent ratio. The same could be deduced from what some have commented concerning the books of Solomon, which are parts of this revealed doctrine, in which, they say, all things naturally knowable are contained. He composed three books: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Canticle of Canticles. In Proverbs they understand moral philosophy, in Ecclesiastes natural philosophy, and in Canticles speculative wisdom. They do not distinguish Logic from these because a mode of knowing accompanies every discipline and science. Moreover, beyond the things which we touch in Physics and natural philosophy, through faith we know many other and more excellent objects concerning God in Himself and His properties which no other discipline could investigate, for example the Trinity and predestination. Likewise the mystery of human restoration which faith reveals was unknown to previous generations. Therefore faith, insofar as it is a speculative habit, is rightly universal and common by reason of the matter about which it is occupied. Insofar as it is a practical habit, since its end is to purify men from sins and lead them to beatitude, its universality consists in ordering man with respect to all his interior and exterior acts, in proposing universal and common remedies against every kind of sin, and in this, that it purifies and cleanses the whole man with respect to every power of the soul. For explanation of this doctrine it must be observed that not only human law but also the divine Old Law, insofar as it is distinguished from or does not include the natural law, did not universally prescribe concerning all human acts, or at least did not expressly prohibit all sins, but prohibited exterior sins and among them not all, but those which disturb civil and domestic intercourse; it permits many others. On this see St. Thomas I-II, q. 96, a. 2. This is manifest. The Old Law permitted usury, a bill of divorce, and other

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things of this kind. In human laws we see that brothels are not prohibited and that intention and internal acts are not attended to, because they cannot judge concerning interior things.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

Augustine teaches this in Book I On Free Choice, chapter 5. Otherwise many goods would be removed and the common good impeded. But the law of faith permits no sin at all; it prohibits even all interior sins and is concerned to make its subjects good, not only with respect to external acts but also with respect to the intention from which they proceed. Of the first Psalm 18 says: "The law of the Lord is immaculate," because it permits no stain of sin. Of the second it adds: "converting souls," because it directs not only external works but also internal acts and intention. Hence it reproves those who, although present in body and lips, are nevertheless far from God in heart. And it teaches that not what enters the mouth but the things which proceed from the heart defile a man. It expressly prohibits the internal concupiscence of revenge, hatred, and lust. Indeed other laws do not consider whether their precepts are observed from love or from necessity and coercion; this law chiefly attends to that. For declaration of the second point it must be noted that the Old Law was mutilated and imperfect not only in this, that it justified no one by its sacrifices except through faith in the Mediator, but also in this, that it did not propose sacrifices for every sin by which they might be expiated, at least in the manner in which they were then purified. Hence for the greatest sin and iniquity, which the Hebrews call avah, no sacrifice was prescribed in the law by which it might be expiated. Likewise no sacrifice or remedy was established for pride. Rather, Numbers 15, after remedies and sacrifices had been applied for other sins, adds concerning pride that the soul of him who sins through pride shall perish from among his people. Rupert should be consulted on this, Book II on Numbers, chapters 1-4, where from the context he shows how the proud are punished by death and perish from their people, adducing the examples there of the man gathering sticks on the Sabbath, Korah and his followers, and Dathan and his household. But it is certain that the law of faith brings a universal remedy for all, namely Christ, who, as Isaiah 53 says, "was afflicted for our sins and bruised for our crimes." There the same word avah is used to signify that what was impossible to the law God accomplished by sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and condemning sin in the flesh. Likewise, although no sacrifice or remedy for pride was established in the Old Law, one is established in the law of faith, namely Christ Himself. This is signified in the same place. After the punishment of the proud, lest they despair of forgiveness of pride, Scripture places the rod that budded. Rupert explains this as signifying the Incarnation of Christ, or His Resurrection, as Gregory explains it, so that it may be intimated that He is the universal and common remedy against all sins. Augustine says much concerning this in On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 27, and later at length, and in On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 6; City of God X, chapter 22, and XIII, chapter 23. Rupert on Hosea 4 says that in the prophetic word "seven times" the sins of the Jews are repeated and as often forgiveness through Christ is promised. In Micah 1 he likewise says that in the prophetic word "three times" the same sins are repeated and as often salvation through Christ is promised. The attentive reader will find the same in Zechariah: all the sins which he reproves are followed in the same or the next chapter by Christ proposed as their remedy. Since therefore the law of faith applies to us the merits of Christ, through which remission of all sins is made, it follows that in this respect also it is universal and Catholic. This is confirmed: it is certain according to faith that Baptism and Penance remit all sins universally; but these remedies pertain to the law of faith, which is explained more fully in the Evangelical law. Therefore. For explanation, finally, of the third universality, it must be noted from Augustine, City of God X, final chapter and several preceding chapters, that ancient philosophers such as Porphyry, in the book On the Return of the Soul near the end, after examining many things by which the soul might be cleansed from the filth of sins, and considering theurgy, that is the divine operation of superior gods, although it seemed to effect some purification of the soul, nevertheless confessed that it neither brought about return to God nor was useful for purifying the intellectual part of the soul, and that this could not be obtained by any teletae, that is sacrifices. Finally he confessed that no one sect had yet been received which contained a universal way for liberating the soul. This way, as Augustine teaches there, is the Catholic and Christian faith, which contains the universal way of salvation and of liberating the whole soul, namely Him who said: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." He liberates not only the body, granting it immortality in the resurrection, but also the whole soul with respect to intellect and imagination, which parts the most powerful and truthful Purifier assumed for this purpose. Isidore, Book I On Ecclesiastical Offices, embraces these advantages when he says: "It is called Catholic because it is established throughout the whole world; or because in it Catholic, that is general, doctrine exists for the instruction of man concerning visible and invisible things, celestial and terrestrial; or because it succors every kind of men unto piety, both rulers and those who are ruled; or because generally it cures all sins which are committed through body and soul." Thus he. Boethius says more briefly at the beginning of On the Trinity: "It is called Catholic both because of the precepts of universal rules and because its worship is spread through almost all the ends of the world." Let these things suffice concerning this conclusion. There is no need to linger over explaining how the Church is universal in truth, since she mixes no falsity with her doctrine, as was shown above; nor how she is common and universal in duration of time, since she will endure always from the beginning to the end of the world, according to Matthew last chapter: "Behold, I am with you even to the consummation of the age." This was one of the strongest bonds among those which held Augustine in the Church of God, as he says in Against the Epistle of the Foundation, chapter 4. See St. Thomas I-II, q. 106, a. 4. FOURTH CONCLUSION. The Church is and ought to be called Apostolic. For explanation it must be noted that the name "Apostle" belongs not only to those whom Christ chose, but by antonomasia is also said of Christ Himself. Hebrews 3 says that Christ is "the Pontiff and Apostle of our confession." The reason of the

name proves this, for Apostle signifies the same as one sent or a legate. Christ is called both in Scripture. John 20 says: "As the Father has sent me," etc.; and Jeremiah 49 says: "I have heard a report from the Lord and a legate is sent to the nations."

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The same is found at the beginning of Obadiah, which Jerome and the interlinear gloss interpret of Christ the Lord. For the same reason Christ is called the Angel of great counsel. If therefore the word "Apostolic" be taken as denominative from Apostle said by antonomasia, it is certain that the Church is Apostolic because she was founded by Christ and instructed in His doctrine, according to Hebrews 1: "He has spoken to us in His Son"; chapter 2 says that salvation "began to be declared by the Lord"; and chapter 12: "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith." If Porphyry says in the chapter On Genus that the race of the Heraclids is so called because it descends from one Hercules, with much greater right the Church ought to be called Apostolic because she was founded and perfected by the one Apostle Christ Jesus. If, however, "Apostolic" is taken as denominative from Apostle in the common sense, the Church is called Apostolic for many reasons. First, because she will preserve until the end of the world the preaching and doctrine of the Apostles. That she was generated by the Apostles through the word of preaching Paul expressly asserts, 1 Corinthians 4: "Through the Gospel I begot you"; and again Galatians 4: "My little children, of whom I am in labor again." Isaiah likewise often demonstrates this truth, calling the Apostles the seed from which the other sons of the Church arise. That the Apostolic doctrine has been preserved in the Church by succession is attested by Irenaeus, Against Heresies III, chapter 3, against the Valentinians, and Augustine in Letter 19 to Jerome. We can discern which writings and doctrines are genuinely Apostolic, and which are contrary to them, by the testimony of the succeeding churches and holy Fathers. The Scriptures which the primitive Church received from the Apostles were thereafter received by the remaining churches throughout the world from the older churches according to the series of succession; and we in turn possess them, preserved by the diligence of the holy Fathers according to the succession down to our own times. By this way the Fathers before us - Dionysius, Clement, Polycarp, Ignatius, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Basil, Hilary, Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine, and the rest - judged holy and Catholic doctrine through the same succession. The Church also possesses Apostolic traditions which were not committed to writing, such as the ordering of the Lenten fast and many other things of this kind, concerning which a longer and more copious discourse must be held below in the final doubt. By them the Apostles governed the Church, establishing things which concern rites and ceremonies of religion. We confess all these things when in the Creed we say that we believe the Apostolic Church, as one governed and instructed by Apostolic writings and traditions. Secondly, she is called Apostolic because she possesses Apostolic authority to govern and correct her sons. Christ gave this authority to the Apostles and through them to their successors. Hence she excommunicates those disobedient to prelates, those who bring scandal upon the community, heretics, and those who persist in sin after correction and admonition of the Church. She learned all these things from Christ and the Apostles. Christ says: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican," and immediately gives the power of binding: "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth," etc. Concerning seditious and scandalous men Mark 9 says: "If thy eye or thy foot scandalize thee, cast it from thee," and Matthew 18 uses the Church as a body from which such men ought to be separated. Paul says Galatians 5: "I would they were even cut off who trouble you." Concerning heretics it is manifest: Galatians 1, "If anyone evangelize to you besides that which has been evangelized by me, let him be anathema"; Titus 3: "A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid." The same is clear from 2 Thessalonians 3 and the Second Canonical Epistle of John. Concerning the rest it is clear from the man whom Paul delivered to Satan, 1 Corinthians 5, and from Alexander and Hymenaeus whom he excommunicated, 1 Timothy 1. Thirdly, she is called Apostolic because she possesses the authority and form for defining matters of faith which the Apostles had. Concerning this a very extensive discourse was held above. Fourthly, she can be called Catholic - or here, in the present ratio, Apostolic - because in her there is the legitimate succession of bishops derived from the times of the Apostles to our own. To demonstrate this at length would be long; nevertheless it will become manifest in the following **conclusion. For this reason especially the successor of Peter is called "Apostolic," as is clear in the** prayers of
the Church and in the cited canons. This continuous succession has endured from Peter to our own times. Augustine should be seen on Psalm 44, at "Instead of thy fathers sons are born to thee," where he explains that bishops were constituted in place of the Apostles to succeed them lest the Church be left deserted.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

FOURTH CONCLUSION. The Church is visible and certain not only with respect to the matter and subjects of
which she consists, but also with respect to her form, and is manifest by determinate marks and signs. We posit this conclusion as of faith against Brentius, John Hus, Wycliffe, the Cathars, Donatists, Beghards, Beguines, and other heretics of our time who think that only the just, perfect, or predestined pertain to the Church. Since the collection of these is hidden and no one can know whether he is worthy of hatred or love, or whether he belongs to the number of the predestined or reprobate, they infer that the Church too is hidden and concealed. For explanation of the conclusion it must be recalled that we said above that the Church is a certain commonwealth consisting of men who profess in Baptism the faith which they possess. There we explained that the form of the Church is not faith absolutely, but faith as professed in Baptism; otherwise catechumens would be numbered in the Church. Moreover, that faith must be ordered to one visible head, which we added on account of schismatics. These things being supposed, the conclusion is proved as to the

first part. First by testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Matthew 18 says that the offenses of brethren are to be reported to the Church. But if the Church were invisible and uncertain they could not be announced to her. Therefore. Secondly Matthew 5 says of the Church: "A city seated on a mountain cannot be hidden." Therefore she is evident to the eyes of all. Almost the common exposition of the Saints understands this passage of the Church: Augustine, Against Cresconius III, chapter 36; Against the Epistle of Parmenian III, chapter 5; Against the Letters of Petilian II, chapter 32; Jerome on Ecclesiastes 9; and others. If Chrysostom and Theophylact understand it of the preaching of the Apostles, it comes to the same thing, for below we shall say that Church and preaching have always been joined. Likewise Acts 20 says bishops were placed to rule the Church of God. Paul writes of himself that he persecuted the Church of God, and Acts 8 says persecution was made against the Church. He likewise writes to the churches of the Corinthians, Thessalonians, Galatians, etc. But one could neither rule, write to, nor persecute what is invisible. Therefore the Church must be visible and manifest. Likewise Canticles 1: "Tell me where thou feedest, where thou liest at noon, lest I begin to wander after the flocks of thy companions"; or, as another reading which we cited from Augustine has it, "lest I be as one covered over the flocks of thy companions." But Christ remains in the Church. Therefore unless it be shown where she is and made manifest, the Church will incur what she feared, namely that she be hidden. The same is proved from the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Origen, homilies 29 and 30 on Matthew; Irenaeus, Against the Heresies of Valentinus III; Tertullian, On Prescription Against Heretics; Augustine in the places cited above; Vincent of Lerins; and others frequently confess the Church to be certain and manifest, to which it is necessary to flee in all doubts. It is further argued: Christ the Lord was most solicitous lest we be seduced in matters of faith and lest we follow the voice of strangers. This is clear from Matthew 24: "See that no man seduce you; for many shall come in my name saying, I am Christ, and shall seduce many"; and again: "If anyone shall say to you, Lo, here is Christ or there, do not believe. For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets and shall show great signs and wonders, insomuch as to lead into error, if possible, even the elect. Behold, I have foretold it to you"; and again: "If they shall say to you, Behold, He is in the desert, go ye not out; behold, in the closets, believe it not." But if the Church is not visible and certain by determinate marks and signs, God would not have sufficiently provided for us; for anyone could say: Christ is here, and the Church is there. Therefore He established a Church certain and determinate and manifest by her signs. Secondly, in the exposition of Sacred Scripture the explanation of the Church is proposed to us as a certain rule to which we must have recourse in doubts. If we wished to interpret Scripture by private spirit, nothing certain could be had, since each would accommodate it to his own sense. Therefore the Church must be certain and visible; otherwise we could not refer a doubt to her. This is confirmed. We regard as canonical only that Scripture which the Church proposes; there is no other reason for believing Matthew's Gospel and not Bartholomew's except that the Church proposes the former and not the latter. But she could not do this unless she were visible and certain. Therefore. Thirdly, in matters of faith to be believed the Church must intervene as an infallible rule proposing them, as was shown at length above when we disputed concerning the object of faith. But she could not do this unless she were visible. Therefore.

This is confirmed. Below we shall dispute at length how the Church possesses authority to determine Catholic truth which all are bound to believe. But if she were invisible, she could not propose it to us. Therefore. Fourthly, otherwise jurisdiction and priesthood would perish in the Church, no laws would bind anyone, and no hierarchy could be preserved. This is evident. Since all these things would be found only in members of the Church, if those members were uncertain, the whole matter would remain doubtful. Fifthly, the sacraments, which have proportion with the Church, are visible, such as Baptism and Penance. Therefore the Church is visible. Sixthly, the head and foundation of the Church, namely Christ, is something visible. Therefore the Church is also visible, for foundation and head ought to possess a proportion with the building and body. Seventhly, the Church both materially and formally is something visible; therefore she is simply visible. The antecedent is certain materially, for that material element is the congregation of all men possessing faith. Formally it is proved from what we supposed: the form of the Church is not faith absolutely but faith as manifested externally by exterior and sensible signs. Eighthly it is argued: all the principal members of the Church are certain, visible, and manifest. Therefore the whole Church ought to be such. Paul, Ephesians 4, numbers the principal offices of the Church: "He gave some Apostles, and others Evangelists, and others pastors and doctors." But all these have always been manifest. Christ sensibly and manifestly instituted the Apostles, Luke 6: "He called His disciples and chose twelve of them, whom He named Apostles, Simon Peter and Andrew," etc. The Evangelists are manifest, for their writings disclosed them. Concerning pastors and doctors it is clear from the epistles to Timothy and Titus and from the Apocalypse, where John writes to seven bishops who must be certain, determinate, and visible. The consequence is proved because since the Church is one body and one community living under the same laws, the same ratio ought to obtain for all; and otherwise these pastors would have no one whom they could feed and teach. Ninthly, the Church in the time of the Apostles was visible. Therefore she is visible now. The antecedent is clear from Acts 1 and 2, where it is certain that the Holy Spirit visibly descended upon certain persons, and it is also certain who were numbered among the Christian people. The consequence is proved because now and then she is the same Church and altogether of the same ratio. This argument is confirmed. From the time of Abel the Church was visible and certain, as is clear in the sons of Seth, Genesis 5, who are called sons of God for this reason, because they were visibly distinguished from the unbelieving sons of men. Likewise in the time of Abraham and afterward the people of Israel, in whom the Church was recognized, was visible. Tenthly it is argued. Christ admonishes us to associate ourselves with His Church, otherwise we shall not attain salvation. Therefore His Church is visible and certain. You will say with Brentius that it suffices to be joined to the Church by faith and other internal gifts, just as we confess that men come to the Church of God and to the Father not by bodily steps but by faith. Against this the consequence is proved. Augustine, Against Faustus XIX, chapter 11, teaches that men cannot be united under any name of religion, true or false, unless they are bound by fellowship in some visible signs or sacraments. The force of these sacraments is ineffably great; therefore to despise them makes men sacrilegious and impious. Eleventhly, it is argued against Brentius. He confesses that his princes are true and principal members of the Church. We call that assembly the Church of God which has been sanctified by Baptism in the name of Christ and by hearing the Gospel. Therefore Brentius recognizes princes to be members of the Church; therefore the Church is visible. Again, if she is invisible, there is no need to have recourse to these external signs, Baptism and hearing the Gospel. This is confirmed. Such visibility was most fitting to human nature and a consolation to the pious faithful. The Church is a commonwealth ordained for man toward supernatural ends. But man is something sensible as regards matter and even as regards form at least per accidens, as will be explained more fully in the solutions. Therefore, that this commonwealth may be proportioned to man, it ought also to be sensible with respect to the form of faith, at least as regards its profession and effect. Likewise, if this were not so, anyone could say with Elijah, 3 Kings 19: "I alone am left"; the parts of the Church would not be mutually known nor manifest to one another. The second part of the **conclusion, that the Church is determined by certain marks, remains to be explained. Augustine seems to** place the signs, marks, and symbols by which we recognize the Church in Against the Epistle Which They Call of the Foundation, chapter 4: "In the Catholic Church, to omit the most sincere wisdom, the consent of peoples and nations holds me; the authority begun by miracles, nourished by hope, increased by charity, confirmed by antiquity holds me; the succession of priests from the very See of Peter, to whom the Lord after His Resurrection committed His sheep to be fed, even to the present episcopate holds me; finally, the very name Catholic holds me." To explain all these things more clearly, let us reduce them to three marks: the preaching of the Apostles, whether by word or writing, which brought the whole world into the worship of one God and into an external profession; the legitimate succession of Pontiffs; and the recognition of one shepherd, the Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter. Augustine implicitly placed these. The first when he said "most sincere wisdom" - for thus Christ says to the Apostles who were to preach, Luke 21, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom." The second when he added "the consent of peoples." The third when he said: "to whom after the Resurrection He committed His sheep to be fed." For in that testimony He entrusted the care of all to Peter and his successor, as we shall demonstrate below. THE FIRST MARK OF THE CHURCH is therefore the preaching or doctrine of the Apostles, preserved from their time to ours. That this is a sign of Christ's Church is proved from 1 John 2: "Let that which you have heard from the beginning abide in you; for if that which you have heard from the beginning shall abide in you, you also shall abide in the Son and in the Father" - through

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faith as members of God, as the interlinear and ordinary gloss explain. Augustine pursues the same marks in On the Utility of Believing, chapters 16 and 17. The first sign and mark, therefore, by which we can recognize the visible Church is the sensible preaching of the Apostles preserved from their time until ours. For its explanation it must be supposed that external preaching of the faith will never be lacking in the Church. This is proved from Isaiah 59: "My words which I have put in thy mouth shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, saith the Lord, from henceforth and forever"; and John 14: "I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth," etc.
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The interlinear gloss says there, "that He may abide with you," that He may illuminate you; and this is signified by the addition "the Spirit of truth." For in Sacred Scripture it is customary to attribute epithets to God proportioned to the effect which He is said to produce. It is also proved because Christ imposed upon His disciples and their successors a precept that they should always preach His doctrine to the world. Therefore this manifestation of truth will always endure with the Church. The antecedent is proved first from Matthew 10: "That which I tell you in the dark, speak ye in the light; and that which you hear in the ear, preach ye upon the housetops." Likewise Matthew 28: "All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going therefore teach all nations, teaching them to observe all things," etc. And the last chapter of Mark: "Going into the whole world, preach," etc. John 20: "As the Father has sent me, I also send you." But the Father sent Him, as Isaiah 61 testifies, to evangelize the poor and to preach the acceptable year of the Lord. Acts 1: "You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto me," etc. Paul recognized this precept as imposed upon himself when he said, 1 Corinthians 9: "Woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel, for a necessity lies upon me." For this reason he instructed his disciples for the same ministry. 2 Timothy 4: "I testify before God and Christ Jesus ... preach the word, be instant in season," etc. 1 Timothy 4: "Attend to thyself and to doctrine; be earnest in them." Titus 2: "Speak the things that become sound doctrine"; and again: "These things speak and exhort," etc. That this precept is imposed upon the successors of the Apostles is easily proved. Otherwise the Church could not subsist. No one believes without one preaching, as is concluded from Paul, Romans 10; but all are bound to believe. Therefore there must be some who preach. The consequence is also proved because otherwise, if this precept were at any time omitted, the Church would fall from true obedience to Christ and the gates of hell, namely sin, would prevail against the whole Church while she failed to obey this precept. It must be noted secondly that to remain in this doctrine of the Apostles is a sign that someone pertains to the Church of Christ. This is proved first from 1 John 2: "Let that which you have heard from the beginning abide in you. If that which you have heard from the beginning shall abide in you, you also shall abide in the Son and in the Father," namely through faith, as the glosses explain. It is proved likewise from 2 Timothy 3, where Timothy is distinguished from heretics who seduce others and err in their doctrine by this alone, that he followed the doctrine of the Apostle. Thirdly it is proved from testimonies of the Saints. Irenaeus, Against the Valentinians III, chapter 3, speaking of the preaching of the Apostles and how it was preserved by their successors, says: "This demonstration is most complete: one and the same life-giving faith which is in the Church has been preserved from the Apostles until now and handed down in truth." Augustine likewise, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians IV, chapter 12, teaches that our faith is true and Catholic because the doctrine of the holy ancients is still preserved. Vincent of Lerins teaches the same at length. The same is proved by reason. The preaching of the Apostles is the seed by which we are begotten in the Church of God. Therefore if from the effect it is lawful to gather the cause, wherever that preaching is found we shall recognize the Church of God. Thirdly it must be noted that this preaching of the Apostles has always been, is, and will be most clear in the Church. Hence Isaiah 18 compares it to a trumpet whose sound is heard everywhere and to the noonday light which is never obscured; and Christ compares it to a city set upon a mountain, to a burning lamp upon a candlestick, and to lightning going forth from the east and appearing even unto the west. It is also proved by reason. Since this preaching must be made to men, who communicate among themselves only by sensible signs, a mere proposal of concepts as among angels does not suffice; doctrine of this kind must necessarily be manifested by external and sensible signs. Fourthly note that by this the doctrine of the Apostles is distinguished from others: it always remains unchanged in the Church just as it was handed down by the Apostles; but the doctrines or sects of heretics never agree with themselves nor remain stable in the same truth. Hence Tarasius teaches, as is reported in the Second Council of Nicaea, that in the Church of God there is not "is and is not," but always "is," according to 2 Corinthians 1. Experience shows how heretics themselves disagree with one another and even the same man with himself. Hence Duke George of Saxony used to say that he knew what the citizens of Wittenberg believed this year, but did not know what they would believe in the following year. We spoke of this more fully above when disputing concerning the credibility of the articles of faith. These things being supposed, it is easy to discern how the Church is visible. For if the preaching of the Apostles and the Church are never separated, and we can recognize the preaching everywhere sensibly, we can also recognize the Church. Concerning the doctrine of the Apostles which was not committed to writing but derived from them to us by the living voice, which we call traditions, we shall speak more fully at the end of this treatise: how it ought to be admitted in the Church and approved as a true sign. THE SECOND SIGN AND SECOND MARK OF THE CHURCH is the legitimate succession of bishops or ministers. For its explanation it must be supposed that legitimate succession of bishops is necessary in the Church until the end of the world, and it must be explained in what this legitimate succession consists. First, the first part is proved from the common consent of all nations. There has never been any people or nation so barbarous that, as soon as it exhibited worship to its god, true or false, it did not constitute priests and other ministers who instructed the people concerning the religion of their god. This is clear from sacred and profane writings, where we read of innumerable priests even of idols. This was so deeply implanted in the hearts of all that they instituted priests not only when worship of this kind was common to the city, but even when it was private to one household, as is clear in the house of Micah, Judges 17, who as soon as he had made a graven image sought a priest for his god. Therefore with much greater right

in our religion ought there to flourish the dignity of priests and a multitude of ministers. Secondly it is proved because otherwise the people and worship of God would perish. If there were no priest - from whose mouth, Malachi 2 says, the law is to be sought - to instruct the people concerning doubts which occur in our religion, and no priest to exhort them to increase it, the people could not be duly governed.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

If there were no priest who exhorted the people to increase religion - for this is his office, according to Titus 2, "These things speak and exhort" - the religion would grow weak and continually perish through the malice of men and the contrary sects daily arising. This is confirmed from John 10, where not only from the defect but even from the temporary absence of a shepherd the sheep are said to be seized by the wolf and scattered into various paths of error. Thirdly, Paul expressly defines this truth in Ephesians 4 and indicates the aforesaid causes: "And He gave some Apostles, and some Prophets, and others Evangelists, and others pastors and teachers" - behold those of whom we speak - "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, until we all meet in the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ, that henceforth we be no more children tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine in the wickedness of men," etc. In this passage Paul not only openly teaches the proposition but expressly explains that it must endure until the end of the world when he says, "until we all meet," etc. The same is proved from Matthew 24, where Christ foretells that when the Lord comes there will be servants appointed over the household of God to give them food in due season. That coming is understood of the day of judgment, of which the preceding words are verified. This is likewise confirmed from Matthew last chapter: "Behold, I am with you even to the consummation of the age," which according to the sacred gloss is said to the Apostles and their successors. Therefore until the consummation of the age there will be such successors of the Apostles, namely bishops and priests. The same can be proved by reason. Since it has been shown above that the Church will endure until the end of the world, and since, as we have now proved, she cannot subsist without ministers who instruct her in religion, these ministers must necessarily continue until the consummation of the age. Hence Jerome, Against the Luciferians, says that the Church cannot exist without a priest. For declaration of the second part I say first that legitimate succession does not consist in carnal propagation, as formerly under the law of nature the priesthood was preserved among firstborn sons. This is manifest, for in the Church in the time of revealed grace priests do not contract marriage. Secondly, even under the Mosaic law a son did not become a priest immediately because he was the son of a priest, without any other ordination and consecration; rather the son of a priest was afterward consecrated and thus remained in that grade and dignity. Therefore much more now, even if priests contracted marriage and their sons were to be ordained and deputed, another special consecration would be necessary for the exercise of such a ministry. Thirdly, it is clear from the common consent of the Church and the faithful, who do not regard as true priests any except those who are created by a special and sacred ordination. I say secondly that this succession is not continued because each man assumes such dignity for himself. Those who intrude themselves of their own accord are said in Scripture to come and not to be sent; they are called not shepherds but thieves and robbers and false prophets. This is confirmed from Hebrews 5: "Neither does any man take the honor to himself, but he who is called by God, as Aaron was." Secondly, the Church is the family and kingdom of God and the faithful are the sheep of God. Therefore it belongs to Him whose affair it is to send rulers and shepherds. If in a temporal commonwealth no one may assume a magistracy for himself, much less may he do so in the ecclesiastical and spiritual commonwealth. Thirdly, priestly power and jurisdiction exceed every force and created nature. Therefore no one can possess them unless they are communicated by God or His vicar. I say thirdly that this succession of priests is propagated through the sacrament of Order, by which the Apostles ordained certain men for certain Churches and gave them power to ordain and consecrate others, and so successively. The first part is proved. Since the Church is multiplied through the sacraments and doctrine, it is consonant that the succession of ministers also be propagated in the same manner. Secondly, even Paul, whom God had called from heaven and chosen as an Apostle, God willed to be ordained by the Apostles. Hence Acts 13, after God had said, "Separate unto me Saul and Barnabas," the Apostles prayed, imposed hands upon them, and sent them. In this imposition of hands ordination is signified, because it is certain that ordination was then so performed in the Church. Thirdly, the interlinear gloss on 2 Timothy 1, "I admonish thee that thou stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands," and the ordinary gloss on 1 Timothy 4, "Neglect not the grace which was given thee by prophecy with the imposition of the hands of the presbytery," understand by the imposition of hands the ordination by which episcopal dignity was conferred upon Timothy. That the Apostles created such bishops in particular cities is clear from histories, where we read that Peter gave Ignatius as bishop to Antioch, Mark to Alexandria, and Clement at Rome after himself; and similarly other Apostles appointed others, as Paul appointed Titus in Crete, Titus 1. Ecclesiastical History treats this succession at length. That those so ordained have power to transmit the same to others is proved first from 1 Timothy 5: "Impose hands hastily on no man," where the interlinear gloss says: do not ordain anyone hastily. Therefore Timothy possessed power to ordain. Secondly from Titus 1: "For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest appoint presbyters in every city." Thirdly by reason: bishops, as proved above, are necessary in the Church, and those instituted by Christ or the Apostles could not endure until the end of the world; therefore there must be a power which daily creates others anew, and this is no other than episcopal power. Theologians treat this more fully in the matter of the sacrament of Order. These things being supposed, legitimate succession of priests is proved to be a mark and sign for recognizing the Church. First from testimonies of the Saints: Irenaeus, Against Heresies III, chapter 3 and IV, chapters 43 and 63; Tertullian, On Prescription Against Heretics; Origen in the proem of Book I Peri Archon; Cyprian, Book I, Letter 6 to Magnus and Book IV, Letter 9; Augustine, Against the Epistle

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of Mani, chapter 4 and Letter 165 and elsewhere often; Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History V, chapter 6; Optatus of Milevis, Book II Against Parmenian. Secondly it is proved by reason. That is truly the Church of Christ to which God promised and gave true pastors and teachers who would strengthen her in faith, as is clear from what was said above. But this is only that Church which has the true succession of bishops legitimately propagated through the sacrament of Order. Therefore. From these things it is also proved that the Church is visible, for the true Church is that in which there is such ordination of bishops; but the Church in which there is such ordination is visible - we see it take place in this ecclesiastical community. Therefore.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

THE THIRD MARK is to recognize and be subject to one visible Pontiff. Two things are included in this. First, that there must be one universal shepherd of the whole Church, the head, Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter, to whom all the faithful are subject. Secondly, that this shepherd must be the Roman Bishop. We suppose these two things here as consonant with faith without further proof, for below these truths will be demonstrated. From this mark thus presupposed it is inferred that the Church is visible. That is the true Church which recognizes the Roman Pontiff as the true universal head; but the collection of faithful subject to such a head can be designated and is certain. Therefore the true Church is visible and certain. Before proceeding further it must be noted that for salvation it is not enough to know in common that the Church is visible; it is necessary to know which Church she is in particular and individually. This is proved because we are bound to observe the laws of the true Church and to be subject to her one particular shepherd. Therefore we are bound to recognize her in the singular. That we may recognize her in particular, we must know that this numerical commonwealth which in this year of the Lord 1584 lives under obedience to Gregory XIII, Roman Pontiff, is the true Church of Christ. This is proved because in her alone concur the signs and marks explained above by which we can recognize her: in her alone is observed the doctrine preached from the time of the Apostles, not only that which was written but also that which was preserved through tradition; in her alone is the legitimate succession of priests and especially of Roman Pontiffs; in her alone is subjection to one visible successor of Peter. Therefore she alone is the true Church of Christ. Secondly, as was said above, the Church is one by unity of faith. But in our Church all think the same and preserve the same faith. In the conventicles of heretics there are most diverse opinions concerning matters of faith. Lutherans disagree with Sacramentarians, Sacramentarians with Anabaptists, and Lutherans again among themselves. Melanchthon and others differ from their own companions concerning many dogmas. Therefore the unity which is a mark of the Church is found in our Church and not in theirs. Thirdly, the conventicles of heretics, especially the Lutherans, teach many things contrary to the light of nature, such as that sin is from God and that men do not possess free choice. Our Church asserts nothing of this kind. Therefore. The arguments proposed at the beginning of the question must now be answered. To the first it is easily said that in Scripture several particular Churches are numbered, distinguished by reason of province or place in which they exist, or by reason of the particular bishops to whom they are subject. Yet all these are one universal Church, which they compose as parts. There is no inconsistency in that which according to one particular ratio is divided and multiplied remaining undivided under another more universal ratio. Insofar as they concur to constitute one universal Church they have nothing by which they are distinguished, since they are subject to the same head and the same laws. In civil matters likewise each city is a particular community, but in the ratio of one kingdom all are one community, because under that ratio they have nothing distinguishing them. To the

second, it was said in the first conclusion whence that unity arises and how unity of head and of faith and the other virtues, not taken absolutely but insofar as they make me believe and hope as a part and subject me to one head as a part, causes this unity. Those who possess the same habits and tend to the same object, not as parts of one whole but as certain complete entities, are similar but not one. Diverse kingdoms do not obey one prince as parts, but as entities complete and total in their own genus; therefore they are not one but merely similar or under one ruler. To the first confirmation the consequence is denied. The disparity is that civil kingdoms are temporal, but the ecclesiastical kingdom is spiritual. It belongs to the nature of spirit to be able to contain things more unitedly without the bodily limitations that require many temporal princes. To the second confirmation it is answered that the particular ecclesiastical laws of diverse places do not destroy unity, because all are subordinate to the same universal faith, sacraments, and supreme government. Diversity in accidental discipline does not constitute diverse Churches in the formal ratio in which the Church is one. To the third confirmation I concede that the unity of many as parts of one whole is an effect of charity. For the Holy Spirit through charity moves individual faithful to will themselves to be parts of the one Catholic collection which He vivifies, and thereby to constitute one Catholic Church. Nevertheless charity need not be found in all those who remain in that unity. Effects of charity are of two kinds: some are always formed, such as contrition; others can be unformed, such as having mercy or giving alms. Thus the unity of the Church, although in herself always formed, can in a certain manner exist unformed in many who are in mortal sin.

To the third argument the consequence is denied. Many laws can be changed in one commonwealth according to variation of times and persons without removing the unity of that commonwealth, because those changes are ordered in their own manner to the same end and good of the same community. See St. Thomas I-II, q. 97, a. 1. Thus there is no inconvenience if some ecclesiastical laws are changed while the same unity is preserved. Secondly the antecedent is denied: the Church has now and had then the same laws in what pertains to the substance of her state. To the first proof concerning the command to carry neither gold nor silver it is answered that the imperative is taken variously in Sacred Scripture. Sometimes it is taken for the indicative and does not signify the affection of one commanding but of one predicting or announcing, as Psalm 108: "Set thou the sinner over him, and let the devil stand at his right hand, and let his days be few," etc.; these are prophetic words, not an execration. Isaiah 6, "Hear ye indeed, but understand not; blind the heart," is rendered by Luke in Acts 28 in the indicative: "Hearing you shall hear and shall not understand." Zechariah 13, "Strike the shepherd," is explained by Christ, Matthew 26, as future: "I will strike the shepherd." Augustine teaches this manner of speech in the Psalms. Sometimes the imperative is taken as a threat, as Jerome notes on Amos 4: "Sacrifice ye a sacrifice of praise of leaven, and proclaim free offerings"; "Prepare to meet thy God, O Israel" - as if He said: you have killed my servants whom I sent to you; I will send my Son, and according to your custom of resisting God's will, prepare yourself to answer. Likewise John 13: "That which thou dost, do quickly," and Ecclesiastes 11: "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth." A beautiful example is Canticles 1: "If thou know not thyself, O fairest among women, go forth after the footsteps of the flocks and feed thy kids," where "go" and "feed" are words of one threatening. Sometimes, and frequently, the imperative is optative: "Have mercy on me, O God"; "save me, O God," etc. Finally, omitting other acceptions, it is sometimes taken for a permission or grant, as 1 Corinthians 7: "Because of fornication let every man have his own wife," and: "Let her marry whom she will." According to the exposition of the Saints and the clear sense of the context these are not precepts but permissions. In the same way the words of the Lord Matthew 10, Mark 6, and Luke 9, "Take nothing for your journey, neither staff nor bread nor money in your girdles," and "possess neither gold nor silver," are to be explained as granting a right rather than imposing a perpetual precept. It is certain that Paul did not observe these words as a strict command, since he lived by the labor of his own hands lest he burden anyone. They are therefore taken as a permission: He sent them so that they might ask these things as due from those to whom they preached, according to 1 Corinthians 9: "Who serves as a soldier at his own charges?" and: "The Lord ordained that those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel." Augustine explains this in On the Harmony of the Gospels II, chapter 30. From this no variation of laws in the Church of Christ follows. Just as they could live from the Gospel, so can we; and just as it was not forbidden them to provide for themselves and seek sustenance without burdening others, neither is it forbidden to us. Thirdly, even if those imperative words signify a precept, it was not given to be observed perpetually but only in that

first mission in which Christ before His Passion sent the Apostles to evangelize the Jews, saying: "Go not into the way of the Gentiles." Among the Jews it was customary that their teachers should be supported by them, and therefore without scandal the Apostles could use the power given them to live by the Gospel. But when He sent them to the Gentiles, saying, "Teach all nations," among whom there was no such custom because they had no preachers of this kind, it would have been scandalous and burdensome if they had required support and they could have been suspected of preaching for food. Therefore Paul did not observe that manner among the Gentiles. For the same reason in the second mission the Lord said: "Now he that has a purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip." Many Saints explain it thus. Yet this does not prove that modern preachers ought to have gold and possessions. It proves only that the Gospel command did not abolish every lawful means of support. To the second proof concerning castles and temporal possessions it is answered with Augustine against the Donatists that there are two states of the Church. The first was when kings stood against Christ; in that time they not only did not give castles and temporal possessions to the faithful but killed them. The second is now, when kings understand and, being instructed, serve Christ; and therefore in this time kings are subjects of the Church and there is no inconsistency in her possessing some temporal dominion which she did not formerly possess, because this does not remove her unity but only enlarges the state which she formerly had. To the

fourth argument it is answered that the principle assumed is not universally true: when an accident can belong to whole and part, it does not follow that the whole cannot be denominated from what belongs to a principal part. We call a man ugly or unclean if this is found in his face, although it could also belong to the whole body. And in political communities the mode of predication differs: a city, people, or kingdom can receive a denomination from some principal members even though it does not belong to all or most of its parts. An army is called strong although many in it are cowardly because it has some brave and robust men; a city is called rich and opulent though it contains many needy and poor because it has some rich citizens. Thus in the present matter the Church is called holy by reason of some principal parts. To the first confirmation, on the assumption made, it can even be conceded that the Church is predestined by reason of the predestined who are principal and per se intended parts of the Church and are always in her. But the proposition "the Church is damned" must absolutely be denied, because such a denomination does not belong to her principal members. The proposition "the Church is confirmed" might in some sense be conceded if the term Church supposes simply for that part in which such a privilege exists; but it cannot be used without distinction.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To the second confirmation it is answered that good and evil are not predicated of these communities in precisely the same manner as of a moral action. We call a man beautiful even if he has some deformity in less principal bodily parts, and healthy though a hand or foot is somewhat diseased, provided that sickness does not overflow into the nobler members. Thus because of the more ignoble parts and sons of the Church we do not call her sinful, but because of the more worthy parts we call her holy. Such denomination is taken from the principal members and not from the greater numerical part, as the examples of a strong army and rich city clearly show. To the fourth confirmation it must first be noted that Brentius distinguishes a twofold Church: one congregation of the predestined and of those who have no spot or wrinkle but are altogether perfect and immaculate, of which he says Canticles 4, "Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee," can be understood; and this he wishes to be invisible. The other consists of those who by Baptism are joined in unity of faith, although stained by many spots; this he admits to be visible. This distinction has some foundation in Jerome, who at the beginning of the Epistle to the Galatians places a twofold acception of Church, imperfect and perfect, and similarly in the commentaries on 1 Corinthians and Ephesians 5 understands certain passages of the perfect members. But Brentius's division as used by him is not admitted by Catholic faith. It was shown above that the true Church of Christ is one, containing good and bad. Nor because Scripture says that she is beautiful and black do we divide her into two Churches, just as we do not divide Peter himself because Christ

first says to him, "Blessed art thou, Simon," and "upon this rock I will build my Church," and immediately afterward reproves him and calls him Satan. For explanation it must be noted secondly that distributive signs in Scripture are not always taken in one manner. Sometimes they distribute universally without exception, as "It is appointed unto all men once to die" and "In Adam all die." At other times they do not distribute thus universally, but only for a certain genus or for genera of individuals. Jeremiah 26 says that "all the people" rose against Jeremiah saying, "Let him die," and immediately says that "all the people" answered, "There is no judgment of death for this man." Here "all" does not distribute universally but first for those hostile to Jeremiah and then for his friends and defenders. Likewise 1 Corinthians 15, "In Christ all shall be made alive," if understood of attaining blessed life is not universally true, for the Apostle says all indeed rise but not all are glorified. It is true for the genus of those saved, and signifies either that all who are saved are saved through Christ or that from every race and kind of men some are vivified. In this way too is explained 1 Timothy 2, "Who wills all men to be saved," if understood of the consequent will. Therefore when Canticles says, "Thou art all fair, my love," it is understood either of a genus of men, namely the friends of God in whom there is no spot of mortal sin, or it is distributed through genera of individuals: in every state and grade of the ecclesiastical hierarchy there are friends of God, beautiful without the spot and wrinkle of mortal sin. To the fifth confirmation it is answered that the testimonies and reasons adduced in confirmation of the second conclusion show that the Church can be holy in this state. To the first contrary argument it is answered that although from Augustine we said in the preceding doubt that "not having spot or wrinkle" is perfectly verified of the future state, Fabian the Pope, Gelasius, the Sixth Council of Toledo, Sixtus III, Jerome on Ephesians 5, and others also refer it in a certain way to the present time. A distinction must therefore be used. If we speak of the

first or second grade of holiness explained in the conclusion, Augustine and the others cited refer "not having spot or wrinkle" principally to the fatherland. If of the third grade, it can rightly be understood of this state. Augustine teaches in On the Perfection of Justice that one is not absurdly said to be without spot if he lacks damnable crimes and does not neglect to purge venial sins. Scripture calls such persons immaculate: "I shall be immaculate with Him and shall keep myself from my iniquity"; "Blessed are the immaculate in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord"; "for they who work iniquity have not walked in His ways." To the argument from John 14 it is answered that even if the exposition of the gloss be admitted, the text speaks of illumination according to the spirit, not merely instruction according to the letter, as we taught from Augustine in the

second conclusion. To the other proofs it is enough that the holiness of the Church is confirmed by the other testimonies already given. To the argument from the Apocalypse it is answered that interpreting the passage of the triumphant Church does not prevent it from also being understood of the militant Church, as Bernard, Joachim, and others explain. If with the gloss taken from Augustine, City of God XX, we wish to hold it only of the triumphant, the holiness of the militant Church is sufficiently proved elsewhere. Indeed from the triumphant Church itself it clearly follows that holiness must be admitted in the militant, for no one there has virtue and holiness unless he acquired them here; and the passage speaks of the Church as extended to men: "Behold the tabernacle of God with men," and "God shall wipe away every tear," etc. To the confirmation from Cyprian it is answered that a negative argument does not avail: Cyprian said holiness is understood through faith; it does not follow that no other holiness is understood. Secondly, he speaks of living faith or indicates the effect from the cause, for the root of holiness is faith. To the final confirmation concerning the Creed, enough was said above concerning how we can say "I believe the holy Church." Even if God's holiness is principally understood, it is not understood absolutely as it is in Himself but as sanctifying us; thus we are bound to believe that the Church is holy. Some do not say "I believe in the holy Church" but simply "the holy Church," by which her holiness is more clearly confirmed.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To the fifth argument it was said under the third property that the whole world need not receive the Gospel simultaneously in order that the Church and faith be called Catholic. It is enough that faith bind all, that successively men from all nations receive it, as explained, and that its truths be universal by the modes set forth. To the first confirmation it was briefly said how the Saints differ in explaining the limits reached by the promulgation of the Gospel; and we said from Ambrose in what manner at least its fame traversed the whole world. Certain writers who without authority or foundation interpret the distributive signs in the passages cited above - "your faith is announced in the whole world," etc. - not universally but only of one

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part of the earth are not to be heard. Although, as I taught, universal signs are sometimes taken particularly, we may not always explain them by a part, especially when the holy Doctors protest against this, unless the place of Scripture itself or some absurdity or impossibility forces such a restriction. None of these things compels us to restrict the passages adduced more narrowly than we explained them in the conclusion. To the second confirmation it is answered first that, granting idolatry to have been more common with respect to the nations which it occupied, it did not bind all universally, did not endure universally nor will it endure, nor did it provide universal rules for human life and all occurring necessities, as we said of faith. The same answer applies to every other sect and doctrine. Secondly, although idolatry was universal, it was not one and the same everywhere, since we see different idols worshiped in each nation. But the faith and Church which we call Catholic is, was, and will always be one and the same. To the sixth argument it is answered: if "Apostolic" is denominative from the Apostle as signifying Christ, as was said in the fourth conclusion, the Church even in the time of the law of nature and the Mosaic law can properly be called Apostolic, because she was founded in the faith of Christ and all were bound to believe it at least implicitly. If "Apostolic" is denominative from the Apostles as signifying the Twelve whom Christ chose, I answer that it is a property of the Church in the present state, not of the Church taken absolutely. We see many properties of this kind which belong to things according to diverse states. Thus even if we distinguish the seven days of creation according to creation, distinction, and adornment, and say all things were created on the first day, the sun and planets then existed but did not yet possess the power of producing other things until in the subsequent days a generative and productive power was given them. Likewise a child is nourished in one way in the mother's womb and in another after birth; charity has one condition in the fatherland and another on the way because of the diversity of state. So although the Church before was not called Apostolic in this sense, after the preaching of the Apostles she can fittingly be called by this name because of the diversity of state and the diverse properties which she then received, as we said in the fourth conclusion. If one wishes, with Jerome at the beginning of the Epistle to the Galatians four kinds of Apostles may be noted. The first are sent neither by men nor through a man but through Jesus Christ and God the Father. Of this kind are Paul, who testifies of himself that he was sent not by men nor through man, and many ancient Prophets, such as Moses, to whom Exodus 3 says, "I will send thee to Pharaoh," and Isaiah, to whom chapter 6 says, "Behold I, send me," and God said, "Go." John the Baptist is also numbered in this genus, of whom John 1 says, "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John." The second kind are those who indeed are sent by God but through a man, as Augustine teaches Against Faustus XVI, chapter 12. Of this kind was Joshua, son of Nun, who was constituted an Apostle by God but through the man Moses. The third and fourth kinds, those who are chosen through favor or who come of themselves, do not concern our purpose. These things being supposed, I say secondly to the argument that the Church even under the written law could be denominated Apostolic according to the first and second acceptions of the name Apostle. For there faith was preached by Prophets who were at the same time Apostles, such as Moses, Isaiah, and Jeremiah; and the people were governed by Apostles such as Moses and Joshua or by their successors. Indeed in the time of the law of nature she could also in some manner be called Apostolic for the same reason. Since Christ establishes this difference between those who come and those who are sent - the former seek their own glory, the latter the glory of God - and many before the flood were just men who, for the glory of God, must be believed to have preached to others, they too could in some manner be called Apostles, and the congregation of faithful taught by them Apostolic. Moreover there were then Prophets such as Enoch and Job; Augustine numbers all Prophets among those sent and Apostles. Nevertheless the Church under the law of nature would not simply be called Apostolic, because not all the faithful of that time heard those Apostles. Rather, as Scripture says, divine wisdom carried herself through holy souls and herself instructed them without another doctor: one among many unbelievers in this region believed without a preacher, another in another region, and so with the rest. To the confirmation it was said from Augustine, Tractate 109 on John, how all may be said to believe through the preaching and word of the Apostles: either Apostolic preaching was the cause why we heard from others who had been instructed through their doctrine, or "their word" signifies the doctrine which they themselves preached. To the seventh it is answered first: I admit that grace, faith, and the principal gifts are spiritual and invisible. It does not follow that the Church herself is invisible, but only that what is principal in the Church is spiritual; just as what is principal in man, the soul, is invisible; what is principal in Christ, the divinity, is spiritual and invisible; and what is principal in the sacraments is spiritual grace. Yet Christ is sensible, man is sensible, and the sacraments are sensible. Secondly the antecedent is denied. Concerning the New Law, since each thing seems principally to be that which is most important in it, and what is most important in the New Law is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is invisible and written in hearts, the evangelical law is said to be written in hearts. Yet this law also possesses certain things disposing to the grace of the Holy Spirit and pertaining to the use of this grace, which are as secondary elements of the New Law, concerning which the faithful of Christ must be instructed by words and writings as things to be done and believed. Therefore secondarily it is a written and external law. Thus it has proportion with the Church, in whom what is principal is invisible, namely supernatural being, but she herself is externally manifested and visible.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

To the final argument concerning sacrifice and priesthood it is answered first that the Apostle Peter does not speak of sacramental priesthood but of a mystical priesthood, insofar as every faithful person, even a layman if he is just, is united to God by spiritual union through faith and charity, and thereby has a spiritual and mystical priesthood for offering spiritual victims, namely those of Psalm 50, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," and Romans 12, "Present your bodies a living sacrifice." If he were speaking of sacramental priesthood, it was shown in the final conclusion how it is visible, since such power is conferred by some sensible sign. Secondly it is answered with St. Thomas, IV Sentences, distinction 25, q. 3, a. 1, qla. 1, ad 3, that "spiritual" is taken in two ways. In one way by spiritual essence, as grace and virtues; Christian priesthood or sacrifice is not spiritual in this manner. In another way by spiritual causality, as the sacraments are called spiritual insofar as, though bodily, they possess the power of causing grace and other spiritual things. If Peter be understood of the sacrament of Order, priesthood and victims can be called spiritual causally. Thirdly it is answered that Scripture calls something bodily "spiritual" when it is subject to and serves the spirit. Hence men are called spiritual: "You who are spiritual, instruct such a one"; "The spiritual man judges all things"; and: "There shall rise a spiritual body." It must be noted secondly that the difference between the Old and New Law is that the former principally disposed concerning external acts and ceremonies and was especially occupied in them, while the evangelical law principally concerns grace and its good use. Hence, apart from natural precepts, there are no other precepts in the New Law except precepts of the sacraments which introduce grace. Since law and priesthood proportionately accompany one another, the priesthood of the law of grace, like the law itself, principally serves the spirit; and it not only intends through external ceremonies to lead us to God but much more strives to elevate the mind. Thus insofar as it serves the spirit and disposes concerning it according to its primary intention, it can be called spiritual, and its victims and sacrifices spiritual for the same reason. It does not follow that there is nothing visible and sensible. The Pontiff likewise possesses spiritual right over all kingdoms of the earth insofar as they can serve the spirit, yet that right and power is not therefore invisible. To the last from John 4 it is answered that Christ there did not condemn, as heretics think, external worship and adoration. He intended to prefer the worship which was to exist in the time of grace to the worships mentioned by the Samaritan woman. It must be noted that the Samaritans worshiped idols together with God and therefore thought God to be corporeal; they did not know Him truly. The Jews, because they adhered more strongly to external ceremonies, worshiped God chiefly with external worship, according to Hebrews 9 concerning "ordinances of the flesh imposed until the time of correction," with no mention there of the inward mind. Hence it is written: "This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me." God therefore wished to signify that in the time of grace these two defects were to be corrected: Christians were to worship God not only with external worship but also with the mind, to which the acts of religion principally belong, and so "in spirit"; for the mind insofar as it is elevated to higher things is called spirit. And at the same time through faith they were to attain a true knowledge of God without error and thus worship Him "in truth." Or "in truth" is said against the worship of the Jews, which was according to figures: their sacrifices did not please God as things in themselves, according to Psalm 49, "Shall I eat the flesh of bulls?" and Psalm 50, "If thou hadst desired sacrifice I would indeed have given it; with burnt offerings thou wilt not be delighted," but they pleased insofar as they were figures of the true victim and true sacrifice, according to Hebrews 10: "The law having a shadow of good things to come." Christian worship pleases God because it is in truth, that is, in things which please God according to themselves, namely acts of the mind. To infer from these words that Christ condemned external worship is heretical. He wished only to signify that inward worship is the cause and root from which exterior worship pleases. To the eighth argument the consequence is denied. Faith, by its very ratio, is a light and is placed to illuminate; grace and predestination are not so known from their own nature. Secondly, faith has an intelligible external rule and marks by which we can recognize it, as said above; charity and predestination do not. Therefore the Church is constituted visibly by faith, not by holiness. Above we explained that the form constituting the Church of this time is not faith insofar as invisible, but insofar as we externally profess it through Baptism and externally submit it to one Vicar of Christ, our head. This form is visible, and so the Church herself is not hidden. If you object concerning the Church under the law of nature that these exterior marks were not then required and therefore she was invisible, the answer is easy: the ancients manifested their faith by visible sacrifices and external worship; therefore even then the Church was visible, although not manifested by such determinate marks as we possess. To the ninth it is answered that Scripture frequently passes from the second coming of Christ to the first and conversely. Thus Malachi 3 treats the first coming in the flesh and immediately chapter 4 the second. Isaiah in the last chapter, after saying much of the first, passes to things future in the second: "Behold the Lord shall come in fire," and then returns to the first: "I will set a sign among them," etc. So Christ in Luke 17 first said of the second coming that it would not come with observation, because the day is altogether uncertain; immediately He passes to His first coming: "The kingdom of God is within you." The interlinear gloss says that by the kingdom of God He means Himself, because He was in their midst. Or if the text speaks of the coming to the soul through faith and grace, the kingdom is said to be within us because what is principal in it is within us. To the tenth it is answered that the Apostles believed in Christ whom they saw, as was said to Thomas, John 20: "Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed." He saw one thing and believed another: he saw manifest humanity and believed hidden divinity. Likewise in the Creed we say, "I confess one Baptism,"

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something we see externally; we see the washing and believe the interior effect. So too we see the Church in what is manifest and believe many things concerning her unknown to our senses: that in this assembly and not outside it are the elect, that she is governed by the Holy Spirit, that she cannot err; we believe as true all things which she proposes to us from Scripture according to the sense which she herself brings. Thus we see one thing and believe another. To the eleventh it is answered from what has been said that Paul's testimonies are understood of what is principal in the law of grace and of that to which the Old Law chiefly disposed. From the fact that what is principal in the Church is intrinsic and invisible it does not follow that she is invisible. To the twelfth it is answered that although in the ten tribes there were hidden faithful, nevertheless in the royal tribe of David and at Jerusalem the manifest worship of God flourished and there the Church was certain and known. Indeed for our purpose it would suffice that even in the time of Ahab, although the faithful were few and hidden, they were not judged to pertain to the Church except insofar as they professed their faith externally at least by some sacrifices, signs of a religious mind. Thus per se the Church was visible and manifest even in them. Let these things suffice concerning this question.

THIRD DOUBT. Whether this Church, whose nature and properties we have explained, can err in faith, so that she thinks something contrary to faith or holds something to be of faith which is not. For the affirmative side it is argued first. The Church can err if she wills; therefore she can err absolutely. The antecedent is evident because the will is not necessarily borne toward matters of faith to be believed, and nothing is so voluntary as believing. Therefore if she wills she can depart from faith. The consequence is proved because nothing is easier for man to execute than what depends upon his will alone. Secondly it is argued. The Church erred in the time of Moses; therefore now also she can err. The consequence is proved because the present Church is the same as that which then existed, as remains proved from above. The antecedent is proved from the deed of Aaron: when he proposed the calf to the whole people for adoration, the whole multitude worshiped it, Exodus 32. Thirdly it is argued. All the Pontiffs and Doctors of the Church can err in faith; therefore the whole Church can err. The consequence is clear because, since a city is that which is principal in it, as Aristotle teaches in Ethics IX, chapter 9, what the leading men do is said to be done by the city; and since the principal parts of the Church are the prelates, what they do will be said to belong to the whole Church. Secondly, the rest of the people are bound to follow the doctrine of their elders and pastors; therefore if these err the faith of the whole people will perish. The antecedent is proved. Jeremiah 2 says: "The house of Israel is confounded, they and their kings, their princes and priests and their prophets, saying to a stock: Thou art my father, and to a stone: Thou hast begotten me." Again chapter 5: "I said: Perhaps these are poor and foolish, ignorant of the way of the Lord and of the judgment of their God. I will go therefore to the great men and will speak to them, for they have known the way of the Lord and the judgment of their God. And behold, these have together broken the yoke," etc. This is confirmed. A commonwealth is said to do what the greater part of its leading men determine and do. But in the time of Ahab four hundred prophets erred while only Micah taught the contrary. Therefore at least then the pastors erred; hence they can now err. Likewise in Jeremiah 18 all thought against one Jeremiah. Therefore the same is not now impossible. Secondly, holiness is promised to the Church no less than faith; but it is not necessary that this holiness be found in the pastors and doctors of the faithful. Therefore neither is faith. The minor is proved because no passage of Scripture or other convincing testimony or argument obliges us to posit holiness in them. Nor does it avail to say that we are forced to do so because otherwise they would teach their error and thus the faith of the people would perish. For they could be unbelievers in their private opinion and yet be restrained by God from teaching it, just as below we shall say of a Supreme Pontiff that even if he were a heretic he could still always teach truth in a public definition. Thirdly it is proved: it is not contrary to faith, as we said above, that all the Apostles lost faith; therefore neither will it be contrary to faith to assert this of the other pastors. Fourthly it is argued. The consent of the Church is not an infallible rule of faith; therefore the Church can err. The antecedent is proved because a rule ought to be known, otherwise it could not make us certain. But there appears to be no possible way or mode by which we may investigate the common consent of the faithful in matters of faith. Especially by interrogation; but morally it is impossible to approach all individually, and they can deceive us in explaining their opinions or quickly change from one to another. Indeed this also seems vain because there are very many who are altogether ignorant of many things pertaining to faith. You will say: it will be sufficient to inquire from the pastors and doctors; their common opinion is the faith of the people, for the people are bound to follow them in believing, according to Matthew 23: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses; whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do." Against this it stands, first, that pastors often are ignorant, according to Isaiah 56: "His watchmen are all blind, they are all ignorant, dumb dogs not able to bark, seeing vain things, sleeping and loving dreams; the shepherds themselves have known no understanding." Jeremiah 8 likewise: "How do you say, We are wise and the law of the Lord is with us? Truly the lying pen of the scribes has wrought falsehood. The wise men are confounded; they have rejected the word of the Lord, and there is no wisdom in them." Therefore just as pastors then could err and be ignorant of matters of faith, so can they now. Secondly the greater part of priests has often erred, as was said in the third argument. Therefore now it could err, and from their dissenting opinions we could not gather the truth. Thirdly, even granting that this were true of priests and pastors constituted by the Church and an undoubted Pontiff, we ought not to consult those ordained by heretics and schismatics. But at some time a schism can exist in the Church and pastors be divided among themselves. Whom then must we consult? Certainly neither party, since truth was promised only to the one

dove and both had separated from unity. Fifthly it is argued. It is promised to the Church only that she shall not defect in faith; therefore she can have an inculpable error; therefore we are not bound to believe her sayings in every manner. The antecedent is clear because the testimonies and passages which speak of this attest only immobility in faith.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

The first consequence is proved because inculpable error does not destroy faith. The second because we would not know whether, in the matters proposed, she errs by an inculpable error. This is confirmed first. The universal Church can possess invincible ignorance concerning matters of faith; therefore she can possess inculpable error. The consequence is proved because just as truth of faith is promised to the Church, so also knowledge of all things pertaining to faith: "He shall teach you all things" and "the anointing shall teach you concerning all things." Yet, notwithstanding this promise, she is ignorant of some things; therefore this does not prevent error. The antecedent is proved because in the Church, with succession of time, many things have been defined as of faith which before were not known with such determination. It is confirmed secondly. Doubt concerning matters of faith is no less repugnant to faith than error; but doubt can exist in the universal Church concerning matters of faith. Therefore error can also. The major is clear, for both error and doubt destroy faith; one doubting in faith is an unbeliever. The minor is proved because a proposition before it is defined by the Church is of faith in itself if revealed, yet through definition it is only proposed as of faith, not made to be of faith. Take these propositions: "The Pope is above a council"; "the Pope is not above a council"; "the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin"; "the Blessed Virgin was not conceived in original sin." One member of each contradiction is in itself true and, if divinely revealed, of faith; yet before determination the Church can dispute concerning it and the schools hold diverse opinions. Therefore, they say, universal ignorance or doubt can exist without destroying the Church. Sixthly it is argued from councils and definitions, and seventhly from the possibility that the Pontiff himself errs; hence, they say, it is not evident that the whole Church is absolutely infallible in every proposition which is commonly held before a solemn definition. Eighthly, what the Church and Pontiff propose may depend upon human testimonies and historical facts, which are fallible. Ninthly, it is argued that the Church may believe some true theological conclusion to be of faith when it is not formally of faith. Tenthly, the Church may be ignorant which of two contradictory propositions is of faith before determination. Eleventhly, all pastors assembled in council can ask the Pontiff to confirm a proposition which they have previously thought to be of faith, although before his judgment it had not yet been determined as such. These objections are ordered toward one question: whether the Church can by invincible and inculpable ignorance hold as of faith something which is not of faith, or fail to hold as of faith something which is. Before determining, it must be supposed first that by the name "Church" we understand, according to the

first doubt, both the whole collection of baptized faithful and, by a common manner of speech, her pastors and doctors who, as the principal members, are themselves called the Church, just as the leading men of a city are called the city. FIRST CONCLUSION. The whole Church of Christ cannot err in faith by a culpable error. This **conclusion is manifestly proved from what has already been said. Since the Church must always** endure and

cannot subsist without faith in the manner explained above, it is necessary to confess that her faith cannot defect and consequently that it is impossible for her to admit a culpable error against faith which would destroy it. Secondly it is proved and confirmed from Scripture. Hosea 2 says: "I will espouse thee to myself forever" and "I will espouse thee to myself in faith." Therefore she will always possess faith and never a culpable error which destroys it. Thirdly Pope Leo proves this from Matthew last chapter: "Behold, I am with you all days even unto the consummation of the age." As we said above, this must at least be understood that He is with us teaching us. Therefore He teaches truth and the whole Church does not err. Fourthly Pope Julius proves the same from: "For this is our God forever and ever; He shall rule us forever." The same can be proved from many similar testimonies. The Fathers commonly demonstrate this truth also by reasons. First, St. Thomas III, q. 8 teaches that Christ is the head of the Church and the Holy Spirit as it were her heart. If the whole Church culpably defected from faith, the defect would seem to redound upon the head and heart from which she receives supernatural life. Secondly, the Church is one in faith; if all her members defected culpably, the formal bond constituting the Church would cease. Thirdly, Apostolic tradition has infallibility because it is held by the universal consent of the faithful. Fourthly, if the Church could err in faith the whole certitude of faith would be destroyed and we would no longer be bound to believe what she proposes. These are the reasons by which Doctors commonly demonstrate this truth.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X - CONTINUED

For greater confirmation of those reasons it is necessary to refute a solution by which someone might evade them. To the first it may be said that actions of a free body need not be attributed to its mystical head and heart, since the body itself is free and able to act of itself, especially when those actions do not require a power communicated from the superior faculty of the head or heart. Such would be an error of the whole Church, since for the Church to defect from matters of faith no power communicated from above is required; the defectibility of nature would suffice. Secondly, since Christ is also the head of each faithful person and the Holy Spirit his heart, if that argument proved that the Church cannot err because such a defect would redound upon Christ and the Spirit, it would likewise prove that no individual believer could defect from faith and charity. Yet individuals can defect. Thirdly, symbolic and mystical theology, they say, is not argumentative, especially for proving matters of faith; but that Christ is called head and the Holy Spirit heart is said mystically. Therefore this does not demonstrate the intended truth. They attempt also to dissolve the second reason by saying that it proves only that the whole Church cannot agree in one and the same error, but does not prove that the whole Church could not defect with each believer falling into his own error - this one denying the authority of the Pontiff, another rejecting the cult of images, and others erring differently. No special help of God would be required for the division of men's opinions in this manner. This is confirmed. Above we said that Christian faith merits the name Catholic rather than idolatry because idolaters do not all worship the same idol but many worship different idols. If all agreed in adoring the same idol, perhaps idolatry would be more "Catholic" with respect to subjects than Christian faith, since it has deceived more and endured longer. Yet all unbelievers agree in denying Christ's divinity; and no special divine work is necessary to produce such agreement. Therefore, they say, the mere fact that all faithful hold an error need not be attributed to God, especially because agreement in a defect can be attributed to defectible nature. By the same solution they evade the third and fourth reasons. They say tradition has infallibility because all the faithful agree in it, whereas if the Church erred in the manner proposed each would follow a diverse private sense. Likewise the certitude of faith depends upon a proposition conformed to the universal Church, and from this it possesses infallibility and force of obligation. One who asserted that the Church could defect through ignorance would not necessarily say that all agree in one error, but that each goes into his own sect; from this there would be no obligation to believe. This can further be confirmed. When all Saints and Doctors agree in one and the same opinion while asserting it only probably, it does not follow that the opinion is of faith; only when they hold it as a certain and irrefragable dogma without doubt. Similarly, when all faithful agree in one and the same proposition and hold it as of faith and necessarily to be believed, it is indeed argued that it is of faith. But from the fact that all faithful through ignorance or erroneous opinion err concerning some proposition, it will not follow that the proposition is of faith. Thus, they say, the argument from consent can remain certain for proving that one proposition is of faith and another not: they hold the former certainly, but concerning the latter they doubt. These things are easily refuted if we first note that in matters of faith we cannot always use necessary demonstrations, but often congruities, as was said above. Secondly it must be noted that "head" is not predicated in altogether the same modes of a civil prince and of Christ in the Church. A prince is called head because he directs and governs toward the intended end. Christ not only governs by proposing laws and decrees, but also pours in something spiritual and communicates to His members a certain supernatural being which a political prince does not communicate precisely as prince. The supernatural being which Christ communicates to His Church, as St. Thomas teaches, speaking of a form perfect in itself and not merely a disposition such as fear of hell or an inspiration to believe which can be in unbelievers, is threefold: the being of faith; the being of charity on the way; and the being of fruition in the fatherland. He communicates these in the order in which they have been placed. Thirdly, from Physics we have that every operation of the thing generated is attributed to the generator and giver of being until the generated thing has attained its perfect state. Thus the movement of the heart is attributed to the generator because without it the animal has not yet attained perfect state; and the first act of the angelic will is attributed to God because before it the angel had not yet arrived at perfect liberty. Hence, just as the operation is attributed to the generator, so a defect in that operation would redound upon him. For this reason we deny that the first act of an angel could have been sinful. From this it follows that if Christ is the head of the Church because He pours in a form, and the first of all is faith, then because He is the head of the Church the being of faith itself ought to be attributed to Him, and an intrinsic defect of that being would redound upon Him, because at least until its communication the operation depends upon Him.

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Hence the answer to the objection. Actions of a free body need not be attributed to the mystical head, nor their defects redound upon it - I distinguish. If we speak of actions which the body has after it has already arrived at its perfect state and of a head which did not cause that being, let it pass. If we speak of actions by which the body is constituted in its first supernatural being and of the head which gives that being, I deny it. Error in faith is a defect in the act constituting the Church in her first supernatural being, and therefore it would be attributable to the head causing that being. To the first confirmation it is answered that the head has one relation to the whole body and another to individual members. To the whole body the relation is necessary - under the law according to which we speak it cannot be head unless the body exists. To individual members severally the relation is contingent and not necessary. Hence it follows that it can fail to pour influence into some member and consequently that the member cease to be a member while the ratio of head remains; but it cannot fail to pour influence into the whole body. Thus in the Church the defect of error in an individual man removes him from the ratio of member, while the ratio of head remains in Christ; and the error of one man cannot be attributed to Christ or the Holy Spirit because that man can cease to be His member and consequently cease to receive the influx of supernatural being. But when it is inferred, "therefore the whole Church too can err and the error not be attributed to Christ," the consequence is denied. Christ has a necessary relation to the whole Church under the supposition of the law by which we speak; therefore a defect in the aforesaid constitutive acts would redound upon Him according to the ratio explained. By this the second confirmation is answered. What is there said concerning the charity of individual members has a very different ratio from faith. The faithful are already constituted in supernatural being by faith; therefore the actions which follow afterward are not attributed in the same way to the giver of that first being. To the third it is answered that although calling Christ "head" is symbolic and mystical, nevertheless that He pours supernatural being into the Church and regenerates her by faith belongs properly to Christ; therefore from this we can rightly argue. To the fifth objection it is answered by noting from what has been said that the Church of Christ is distinguished from other congregations of unbelievers precisely in this, that the latter are divided into diverse opinions, while the Church throughout the whole world sounds and teaches the same dogma. Thus in matters of faith all ought to agree, and what one believes all ought to believe. From this it follows that in anything which the faithful hold as of faith all must think the same. Since no one holds an error as faith unless he thinks what he holds to be of faith, it follows clearly that, if the whole Church erred as Church in a matter of faith, all would have to hold the same error in the relevant point; and thus it cannot be escaped by imagining each one erring in a different sect while still preserving the unity of the Church. As to unbelievers, not all know Christ and therefore not all explicitly attack His divinity. This is clear in idolaters newly converted from the Indies. Even those who, knowing it, reject it do not all agree in the reason for denying it or in other matters. Therefore their diverse opinions require no divine assistance to be conformed. To the argument from common consent it is answered that it is an argument from a sign. As explained above, divine assistance is signified by the conformity of the opinions and wills of all men in the same object of belief. Since each could proceed by his own way, that they are united into one same judgment seems the work of a superior ordering cause. When it is said that agreement in a defect cannot be attributed to God, the answer is that two things are involved in such conformity: that they agree in the same thing and think the same under the same ratio, and that the object in which they agree is an error. The latter cannot be from God; the former, especially if permanent and universal, is a sign of an ordering superior cause. For matters of faith must always be held and believed in the same way. Although men's opinions could at one time agree by chance, that they should always persevere in the same meaning seems the work of some superior ordering cause which directs these causes to one and the same end and preserves them in its attainment without dissension. By these things the solution to the third and fourth reasons is answered. It has now been shown that if an error of the Church as Church were admitted, it would have to be common in the relevant proposition. As to what was objected last, the solution is easy. An error which were held by the Church as a matter of faith would precisely by that fact be proposed certainly and firmly and would carry an obligation to believe. Our present conclusion concerns such an error: holding something to be of faith which is not, or holding something not to be of faith which is. Whether an erroneous opinion which is not proposed as faith can exist throughout the Church will be treated below. SECOND

CONCLUSION. The Church cannot err in matters of faith by an invincible and inculpable error which does not

destroy faith, by holding something to be of faith which is not, or holding something not to be of faith which in reality is. This conclusion is proved by all the arguments placed above, which also show this truth; especially by the fact that otherwise the certitude of faith would perish. For whenever the Church proposed something to be believed we could doubt whether she were then erring by an invincible and inculpable error. For the same reason we do not admit a lie in Sacred Scripture, because its certitude would perish, as was said in article 3. Therefore similarly the certitude of faith would perish if once error were admitted in the Church. Secondly, any error of the whole Church in a matter proposed as faith would itself be culpable. The Church is bound to believe nothing and propose nothing to be believed except what is contained expressly in Scripture according to the interpretation of the Saints, or in Apostolic traditions, or in decrees and definitions of Pontiffs or councils, and the like. If therefore she holds as faith something resting on none of these, she believes culpably because she does not believe according to the rule by which all credible things must be measured. But if she

consults these sources and believes nothing except what is contained in them, the supposed universal error is excluded. Therefore no such falsehood can be believed inculpably by the whole Church.
The Church can nevertheless exercise influence upon the Church and regenerate her by faith; this properly belongs to Christ, and therefore we cannot rightly argue from that against us. To the fifth argument it is answered, noting from what has been said above, that in this the Church of Christ is distinguished from the other congregations of unbelievers: these are divided into diverse sects, whereas the Church everywhere sounds and teaches the same dogma. Thus in matters of faith all ought to agree, and what one believes all ought to believe. From this it follows that, in that matter which the faithful hold to be of faith, all ought to think the same. And since no one holds an error as faith unless he thinks what he holds to be of faith, it follows clearly that all must hold the same, and thus the whole Church cannot err in diverse ways. Heretics, however, who are divided into diverse sects, need not all agree in one opinion, because the unity of the Church does not remain in them, which unity requires unity of things to be believed by all her children. As to unbelievers, not all know Christ, and therefore not all oppose His divinity. This is clear in idolaters who are now converted from the Indies. Even those who knowingly reject His divinity do not all agree either in the cause of denying it or in all other matters; and thus, since there is almost no concord or agreement in their opinions, they can think these things without divine assistance. To the other point it is answered that this argument is from a sign. It was explained above that divine assistance is argued from the fact that the judgments and wills of so many men are conformed to one and the same object to be believed. Since each could proceed by his own way, it seems to belong to some superior ordainer to unite them in one judgment. When it is said that agreement in defect is not to be attributed to God, the answer is that in such conformity and agreement there are two things: that they agree in the same thing and think the same thing for the same reason, and that what they think is an error. Although the latter cannot be from God, the agreement itself nevertheless seems a sign of divine operation. For since matters of faith must always be held and believed in the same way, although human judgments might sometimes agree by chance, that they should persevere always in the same sense and without dissension seems the work of some superior ordainer who directs these causes to one and the same end and preserves them in attaining it without disagreement. From these things it is clear how the solution to the third and fourth arguments is impugned. For we have now shown that, if error in the Church were admitted, it would have to be common to all. To the last objection the solution is also easy from what has been said. An error of this kind, held by the Church as a matter of faith, would have to be held and believed certainly and firmly, and consequently would involve infallibility and obligation to believe it. But in the proposed

conclusion we speak only of an error of the Church in holding something to be of faith which is not, or in

holding something not to be of faith which in reality is. Whether an erroneous opinion can exist in the whole Church will be treated below. SECOND CONCLUSION. The Church cannot err in matters of faith by an invincible and inculpable error which does not destroy faith, by holding something to be of faith which is not, or by holding something not to be of faith which in reality is. This conclusion is proved by all the arguments placed above, which also show this truth; especially this one, that otherwise the certitude of faith would perish. For whenever the Church proposed something to be believed, we could doubt whether the Church then erred by an invincible and inculpable error. For the same reason we do not admit a falsehood in Sacred Scripture, because its certitude would perish, as was said in article 3. Therefore likewise the certitude of faith would perish if once we admitted error in the Church. Secondly, because every error of the whole Church in a matter of faith would be culpable; therefore no invincible and inculpable error can be given. The antecedent is proved thus. The Church is bound to believe nothing and to propose nothing to be believed except what is contained expressly in Scripture according to the interpretation of the Saints, or in traditions of the Apostles, or in decrees and definitions of Pontiffs or councils, and the like. But if she holds by faith something which rests on none of these, she believes culpably, because she does not believe according to the proposed rule by which she ought to measure all things credible. Nothing believed according to this rule can be error. Therefore she can believe nothing false inculpably. The major is certain, for all things credible are reduced to one of these heads, as will be shown more fully below. The minor, as to its first part, is manifest. A culpable error is one which someone can conquer and repel by doing what he is bound to do in order to conquer it. But if he consults these heads in which credible things are contained and believes nothing except what is included there, he will manifestly expel the error. Therefore whatever error should occur in the whole Church from defect of this would be culpable. As to the second part, the same minor needs no proof, because all things determined in Scripture, councils, and the like are true and of faith. Thirdly, the same conclusion is proved by manifest testimonies of Sacred Scripture. John 14 says: "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom you shall know, because He shall abide with you." And below: "The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, He will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you." And chapter 16: "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." From these places the argument is taken thus: in these testimonies there is promised to the Church knowledge of every truth necessary to faith, and no exception is made that only what would culpably be ignored is to be known, or that some other truth could inculpably be unknown. Therefore from this promise we have that the Church will err concerning no truth, neither culpably nor inculpably. But heretics object against these passages. First, if these testimonies proved anything, they would prove that the whole Church never lacked knowledge of any truth of faith; the contrary seems evident, since new definitions are

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made daily concerning faith, and even now neither of these is universally held as of faith: "The Pope is above the council" or "The Pope is not above the council." Secondly, they object that the promise of these testimonies is to be referred only to the Apostles; therefore it cannot be gathered that the whole Church succeeding them is confirmed in faith by the same promise. They prove the antecedent because Christ there spoke only with them and made no mention of the future Church. Thirdly, if the promise is extended to other faithful of Christ, then by the same reason it must extend to all; therefore no individual could err in faith either culpably or inculpably. Nor, they say, does the expression "that He may abide with you forever" avail against this, as though He could not remain forever with the Apostles alone or with individual faithful severally, because "forever" can there be taken not rigorously but for a long time or for the whole life of each one.
They add the example of Deuteronomy 15: "You shall bore his ear, and he shall serve you forever," which is said of the servant who voluntarily remained in the house of his master and could serve only while he lived. Yet he is said to serve forever; indeed, according to Jerome and others, it is understood only until the fiftieth, or jubilee, year. They object fourthly. Many promises of God are not fulfilled because of the malice of men, who make themselves unworthy of the promised benefits. God promised the people of Israel whom He led out of Egypt that He would bring them into the land of Canaan, Exodus 3; nevertheless those who were led out did not enter because of their sins. Likewise He promised the twelve Apostles that in the regeneration they would sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel, yet this was not fulfilled in Judas because he made himself unworthy. Many similar examples could be brought forward. Finally they prove it from Jeremiah 18: "I shall suddenly speak concerning a nation and a kingdom, that I may build and plant it. If it shall do evil in my sight, that it hear not my voice, I also will repent of the good which I spoke that I would do to it." Therefore the promises made to the Church, her prelates, or the other faithful concerning knowledge of every truth and concerning never erring are to be understood on condition that they do not do evil in the eyes of the Lord, lest He likewise repent of the good which He had spoken. To these objections it is answered. Just as in divine promises, when some good is promised, it is understood that it will be conferred at a fitting and necessary time, whereas as regards removal of the contrary evil the promise is always fulfilled, so in these promises two things are included: that the Spirit will teach all truth, and that He will not permit any error. The latter is always fulfilled; the former, because it is affirmative, is fulfilled when the necessity of the Church requires it. Thus, if a sedition or heresy arose in the Church concerning whether the Pope is above a council, or whether he possesses authority from it, then there would be an opportune time for revealing this truth, because it would be necessary for strengthening the faith and extinguishing the rising errors; and therefore God would then intervene by illuminating and teaching this truth. But the negative contrary to this, whose removal is included in the same promise, is always fulfilled, and no error is permitted to creep through the whole Church.
To the second objection the antecedent is denied. It is certain that Christ's discourse is directed to all the faithful. Hence in John 17 He adds: "Sanctify them in truth; Your word is truth. For them I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth. And not for them only do I pray, but for those also who through their word shall believe in Me." Isaiah explained this, chapter 59: "My Spirit that is in you, and My words which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth, nor out of the mouth of your seed, nor out of the mouth of your seed's seed, from henceforth and forever." Furthermore, just as Christ speaks to the Apostles insofar as they represented the Church when He says, "Behold, I am with you all days even to the consummation of the age," so also these promises of the Spirit pertain to the Church enduring in their successors and in the faithful.
To the third objection it is denied that the promise made to the Church as a whole is thereby made to each individual believer in such a way that he cannot err. The Church is one moral and mystical body, and to the body as such there can belong a privilege which does not belong to every member. The promise is that the faith of the whole body shall not fail, not that no individual member can fall. Individual faithful can err, even culpably; nevertheless the whole Church cannot be led into error. To the explanation of the word "forever" it is answered that the meaning of Scripture is to be taken from clearer passages of the same Scripture and from the explanations of the Saints. What is said in John 14, "that He may remain with you forever," is explained by Matthew in the last chapter: "Behold, I am with you all days even to the consummation of the age." This cannot be understood only of the Apostles personally. All the Saints explain from that passage the perpetuity of the faith. Therefore it is to be understood as we have said and not merely for a long time. To this is added that if it were explained only for a determinate time, the saying "the gates of hell shall not prevail against her" would not be verified; for there the negation joined to a future verb designates perpetuity of time. To the objection concerning conditional promises it is answered that this is a common device of heretics, to elude dogmas of faith which are manifest from Scripture. Thus some explained "The Word was made flesh" merely according to appearance, and similarly what is said of Christ's crucifixion and burial. Therefore Tertullian rightly teaches in the book On the Prescription of Heretics that Scripture, taken by itself and alone, is unarmed to defend itself against the darts of heretics unless there be added the declaration of the Church and Pontiff. We see the same necessity in the explanation of civil laws and decrees; unless there be living justice to elucidate their proper sense, the government of the people perishes. Therefore, lest the passages adduced be eluded in this way, recourse must be had to the explanations of the Saints, who explain these promises in an absolute and not a conditional sense depending upon our merits. I answer secondly that, since this promise of the Holy Spirit directing us in faith was made immediately to the whole Church and not to individual faithful severally, and since in the whole Church, as was said above, we always acknowledge merits and charity, there will never be
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found in the whole Church such demerit that the promise made to her should fail, even if it had been posited conditionally. Thirdly, not all promises made by God are conditional in this way. Thus Paul teaches in Romans 3 that the sins of the Jews did not make void the fidelity of God in rendering His promises. And in Psalm 88 we read that the promise made to David would not be made void because of the crimes of his sons. In this way, therefore, the promise made here concerning perseverance of faith can be understood. As to Augustine, he is speaking of individual faithful with respect to receiving the Holy Spirit through the gift of grace and charity. We have already said that the absolute character of these promises is fulfilled only in the whole Church. From what has been said it follows that this second conclusion is of faith, so that the opposite is heresy. It is proved by all the arguments made, since unless they so conclude the certitude of faith would perish.

THIRD CONCLUSION. All the pastors and Doctors of the Church together cannot err in teaching. In this **conclusion we assert nothing concerning their personal faith, but concerning the faith which they teach the** people. The conclusion is proved first from Ephesians 4, where Christ the Lord is said to have given some Apostles, some Prophets, others Evangelists, others pastors and Doctors, that we may not be children wavering and carried about by every wind of doctrine. Therefore if they teach error in faith, the whole Church also would err. Furthermore, otherwise it follows that the whole Church can err, because the simple people are bound to follow the doctrine of the Doctors according to Matthew 23: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses; all things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do." See Gregory, Moralia II, chapter 25, upon Job 1, "The oxen were ploughing and the asses feeding beside them." If therefore they speak and teach false things, God would not have provided well for His Church by commanding us to follow their doctrine. Thirdly, as will be explained elsewhere, the consent of peoples from which dogmas of faith are to be sought is not the consent of all the faithful, even the simple, but that of the Doctors and pastors of the Church, both because these are bound to know matters of faith which the people may be ignorant of, for example that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit and that the Old Law did not justify; and because their opinion is more easily known. To consult the sense of all the faithful would be impossible. Therefore if the doctrine of these Doctors were false and erroneous, there would not be a certain rule for proving matters of faith. Fourthly, it is proved from the letter of the Council of Ephesus to Nestorius, from whom it was demanded that he swear that he held what all bishops throughout East and West and the princes of the peoples believed and taught. This letter was approved by the Sixth Synod, action 11. Fifthly, the Council of Trent, Session 4, defined that it belongs to the Church to judge concerning the true sense of Scripture. This is not referred to the whole congregation of simple persons, nor to certain bishops and Doctors separately, since these sometimes disagree among themselves. Therefore we must seek a judgment by which we are taught by these Doctors, and hold it as a certain rule. This is confirmed by the acclamations of the Fathers at the end of the same Council of Trent concerning confirmation of the dogmas of faith there decreed: "This is the faith of the Fathers." Therefore if the Fathers and Doctors could err in teaching, it would not follow from the fact that this was the faith of the Fathers that it was true and certain. Sixthly, Augustine, Against Faustus XXVIII, chapter 2, and XXXIII, chapter 9, judges a book to be true and canonical because all bishops succeeding the Apostles received it. Therefore the authority of them all is true. Likewise Hegesippus, who lived near the times of the Apostles about the year of the Lord 160, as Eusebius reports in Ecclesiastical History IV, chapter 22, sought the true faith diligently by this way alone, consulting what each and all bishops and Doctors thought and taught concerning dogmas of faith. Irenaeus likewise, Against Heresies III, chapter 3, and IV, chapters 43 and 63, judges the sense of all Doctors and bishops sufficient to show that some truth is of faith; and whoever resists their sense, he says, resists the judgment of the Catholic Church. Cyprian likewise says that he contradicts the Church who resists the judgment of the bishops, of whom God said: "He who hears you hears Me." The difficulty which arises in this conclusion is whether, granting that all Doctors and bishops cannot err in teaching, they can nevertheless err in their own interior judgment, so that faith would remain only among the simple and unlearned while the Doctors erred in faith. This **doubt is made clear by the example of the Supreme Pontiff. The** common opinion teaches that he can err in faith personally, but cannot teach a false judgment in faith, because the Holy Spirit assists him. In the same manner, therefore, it is asked whether all bishops and Doctors can err personally in faith while the Holy Spirit assists them so that they do not teach their heresy and thus seduce the people. The affirmative side seems true, because the arguments made prove only that they cannot teach falsehood, not that they cannot think it. From Ephesians 4, for example, it follows that the simple would err or fluctuate if the Doctors and pastors taught falsehood, because they would be bound to follow their doctrine; but it does not follow merely because the Doctors themselves thought falsehood. The same is true of the

second argument, because we are commanded to observe and follow what they teach, not what they think or do. Therefore, even if they are deceived, provided they teach truth, the people are not seduced by adhering to their preaching and doctrine. The third argument, that a dogma of faith is to be sought from the sense of all peoples and consequently from the sense of all pastors, proves no more. We similarly say that truths of faith are to be sought from the determination and decree of the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless it is certain that the private judgment of the Pontiff is not the rule of faith, but his determination by which he teaches the people as Pontiff. Therefore likewise, although the consent of bishops is sought for proving matters of faith, this must be understood of their consent in teaching the people, which belongs to them ex officio, not of their private judgment as singular persons.

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The letter of the Council of Ephesus proves no more, for it places as a rule of faith what the bishops believe and teach. If their belief alone sufficed, it would not have been necessary to add "and teach." The Council of Trent likewise proves only this: that it belongs to the Church and therefore to the bishops to pronounce judgment concerning Scripture by teaching and defining, not by their interior faith and belief alone. The acclamations, "This is the faith of the Fathers," also refer to the faith publicly taught and confessed. It is argued further for the possibility that all Doctors may err personally. The grace of the Doctorate and episcopate is given for the utility of the Church and does not of itself compose the man inwardly. Therefore by reason of those graces we are bound to attribute to them only that they rightly teach the people, not that they are rightly disposed in themselves concerning matters of faith. Nor is this reason solved by the fact that Paul in 1 Corinthians 12 numbers among graces given for the utility of others also "faith," which St. Thomas, I-II, q. 111, a. 4, ad 2, says is a certain eminent certitude of faith by which a man is rendered fit to instruct others concerning matters of faith. For, as is said there, no one can instruct another concerning any science unless the principles of that science are most certain to him; and so no one can teach matters of faith unless through this virtue the articles of faith are most certain to him. This does not conclude against our argument. Otherwise even the Pontiff could not determine in matters of faith against what he personally thinks. The same reason would proceed: if he cannot teach unless the principles of the conclusion are most certain to him, then, when the principles of faith are not certain to him because we suppose him to err personally in matters of faith, he could not determine and teach the truth of faith which he himself does not believe; but we confess this to be false. Secondly, although the order of things demands that by the same habit or form by which one is in act with respect to some truth he should also reduce others to act with respect to the same, nevertheless, since we use these habits freely, someone who knows a truth can, with an intention of deceiving another, teach the contrary error; and conversely many who through fear or some other cause conceal their error can teach what is true. FOURTH CONCLUSION. It is more probable that all the Doctors together cannot err in their interior judgment concerning matters of faith. This is proved first. By taking this way we do not flee to a new miraculous preservation of God, nor posit a new assistance of the Holy Spirit without urgent necessity. But if we did not admit this conclusion, we would have to posit such assistance in all the Doctors whenever they instruct the people concerning a truth, and nowhere is a promise of such special assistance made to them. Secondly, God thus disposes all things sweetly, so that he who is in potency to believing matters of faith is reduced to act by someone who actually believes them, which the order of producing things demands. Thirdly, the solutions given above do too much violence to the testimonies from the letter of the Council of Ephesus, from the inquiry of Hegesippus, from Irenaeus, Cyprian, and the others, by explaining them solely of the doctrine of pastors and not also of their belief, when manifestly some of them speak also of their belief. FIFTH

CONCLUSION. All theologians and Scholastic Doctors, even the more recent and present ones, cannot err in

teaching matters of faith; rather, what they have constantly taught is to be held as certain and indubitable truth. I add this conclusion beyond the third because heretics, although they defer honor to the ancient and holy Doctors, make nothing of later theologians. Chrysostom reproves such men in the first homily of the Opus Imperfectum, where those are rebuked who venerate the ancient dead Doctors and despise the living. Erasmus comes close to them, who often, but especially in a certain prologue circulated with St. Hilary, detracted so much from the authority of Scholastic Doctors that he strove to prove that no argument in matters of faith could be taken from their judgment. Against them the conclusion is proved first by the argument already made: that many men, who are ordinarily drawn into diverse judgments, should agree among themselves seems to be nothing other than the work of God, who, as Job says, "makes concord in His high places." This must be attributed to no lesser inspiration of the Holy Spirit than what all the ancients - Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Eusebius, Clement, Augustine, Justin, and others - said of the seventy translators: that, enclosed in different cells, they agreed in the same translation and in the same words without distinction or difference. Secondly, there is no dogma in which all theologians so agree which is not accepted by the Church as of faith. Thus by induction from all singular cases to the universal it is lawful to argue that whatever they have defined to be of faith is of faith. Thirdly, all theologians agree certainly and indubitably in no truth unless they infer it either from Scripture, or from the doctrine and tradition of the Apostles, councils, or Pontiffs. But all these, as we have sufficiently shown above, prove that something is of faith. Therefore, etc. Fourthly, if those who are given as masters and Doctors to all other preachers, confessors, and simple faithful could err, the whole Church would necessarily follow their error unless we imagined a new assistance of the Holy Spirit and a new miracle. Therefore it belongs to the providence of God, who promised that faith would remain in the Church and commanded us to follow those sitting upon the chair of Moses, not to permit them to err lest the people be seduced and the gates of hell prevail against the Church.

SIXTH CONCLUSION. All simple persons of the Church, who do not shine with the office of Doctor or bishop, cannot all err in faith. Thus not only is it impossible for all Doctors to err while faith remains among the simple, but neither can all the simple err while faith remains among the Doctors and bishops. The conclusion is proved. Ephesians 4 says that Christ gave to the Church Doctors, Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists so that we may not be carried about by every wind of doctrine and be children wavering, and that this will endure until the end of the world. Therefore it seems that He attains the end which He intends, lest we say He works in vain. And just as it is lawful to argue: Christ delivered Himself for the Church that she might be holy and that He might present her glorious, without spot or wrinkle; therefore He attained this end, otherwise He

would have worked in vain; so here it is lawful to argue that, from the positing of the means, He attained the end He intended, namely constancy of the simple in faith. Secondly, from what was said above it is manifest that the Church has her hierarchy and is a heterogeneous body having diverse members, as we learned from Paul. Therefore not all are Doctors and eyes in this mystical body of the Church; besides the eyes and head, namely the Doctors, there are feet and hands, namely the simple faithful. Thirdly, as we said in the preceding

doubt, Christ prayed with efficacious will for perseverance in faith not only of the Apostles and Doctors but

also of the simple who would believe through the word preached by them. For John 17 seems to distinguish this when He said: "Not for them only do I pray, but also for those who shall believe through their word." Therefore we must posit that these also will always remain in faith. And because the Church always includes women, excluding no sex, it is necessary to confess that there will always be other faithful besides the Doctors, for Paul does not permit women to teach. It must be noted, however, that although the simple faithful must always possess faith, we do not thereby free them from every invincible and inculpable error. They can possess such an error while faith remains. The reason is not the same in their case as in that of all the Doctors together and of the whole Church, whose doctrine and dogma proposed as of faith we are bound to believe. Yet they cannot all possess an inculpable error concerning those things which are commonly proposed each year by the Church as to be believed. For since the Church fulfills, as was said above, Christ's command of preaching and teaching what all are bound to believe, not all have excuse if they do not know and believe; although some brought up in forests or otherwise impeded can be excused. FINAL CONCLUSION. The error which we deny can happen to the Church is understood not only of the Church which now exists, but also of that which has existed and will exist. This is clear because the same reasons and testimonies by which we established the first and second conclusions prove it, and because the Church must endure from the beginning to the end. We now answer the arguments made at the beginning. To the first I deny the consequence. By the same argument it would be proved that God can sin, because to will to sin is sin. Just as it does not follow, "God can sin if He wills; therefore absolutely He can sin," because He cannot will to sin, so it must be said of the Church that she cannot will to lose the faith. Since faith depends upon, or requires, a pious affection of the will, by the same reason by which God promised the Church that He would always preserve her faith, He promised that He would never take away that pious affection. To the second I deny the antecedent. There were many who did not consent to that idolatry, namely Moses, Joshua, and the sons of Levi, who afterward slew the unfaithful. To the third, granting the consequence because of the second proof - for the first perhaps does not conclude; otherwise, as said above, the Church itself would be called evil if all Doctors and Pontiffs were sinners, which is not impossible - I deny the antecedent. To the proof it is answered from what has been said above that the particle "all" is often taken for "many," and it is the custom of Scripture thus to rebuke the wicked as though all were sinners. See Augustine, On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12, and what we have sufficiently said above. To the confirmation it is answered that we have not denied that many, indeed most, priests and pastors can err; but that all together can err we deny. When pastors disagree, whom we ought to follow will be said in the solution of the fourth argument. To the second confirmation it is answered, as was said there, that the error of the Doctors redounds upon the whole Church, but their iniquity and sin do not. Therefore in the promise made to the Church concerning perseverance of faith it is necessarily included that all Doctors do not err, at least in teaching, as has been said; but this is not included in the promise concerning sanctity, for we are admonished not to act according to their works. To the third confirmation it is answered that it confirms the second part of the fourth conclusion. For although the Apostles erred in faith, concerning which enough was said above, nevertheless they taught no error. Secondly it is answered that there is a different reason concerning the Apostles at that time and the Doctors now. They failed, as Augustine teaches on Psalm 114, when they were not yet leaders of the Church and the Holy Spirit had not yet come to confirm them in faith and charity. But now the Holy Spirit, who leads into all truth, has been given; therefore the Doctors cannot err in teaching.

To the fourth argument, some distinguish a twofold class of things to be believed: one consists of those proposed to all, even the simple faithful; the other of those which only Doctors and the principal men of the Church are bound to believe. In the former, they say, the consent of all is the rule; in the latter, only the consent of the Doctors. If they mean that the judgment and consent of all concur per accidens in matters of faith, they speak truly; but if they think the common judgment of all is necessary in order that we hold something as of faith, this is not required. It is enough to consult the Doctors. First, because, as Augustine says near the end of On the Utility of Believing, we ought not to seek the judgment and opinion of those whom we ourselves teach. Therefore the Doctors are not bound to seek the consent of the common people in order to prove something of faith, although that consent sometimes accompanies it and can easily be known without great inquiry. Secondly, because I am no less bound to assent to one proposition of faith than to another, as was shown above; but in many, indeed almost all, I am bound only to consult the Doctors and pastors. Therefore their assent suffices as the rule of things to be believed. Thirdly, because we said above that they cannot err in faith; therefore their consent in teaching, without the judgment of others, will be an infallible rule in all matters which are to be held as of faith. To the testimonies to the contrary it is answered that the universal propositions cited above have already been sufficiently explained. As to the time of schism, the opinion of those Doctors who were witnesses of ancient traditions and revelations or of the determinations of Pontiffs or councils ought to prevail and conquer in teaching matters of faith. If among them there be

disagreement, the simple faithful will be excused according to the common rules by following the opinions of either part. It does not follow that faith fails, for some of them will hold the true faith; nor that the judgment of Doctors who are witnesses of traditions is not a rule of faith, but only that in a certain case it may not be evident to me or another which men are such witnesses. To the fifth it is answered that it is not only promised to the Church that she will not fail in faith, but also that she will not have an inculpable error; for since she is the pillar and ground of truth, she can teach nothing false. This is also included in that promise because by it God wills to compel us to believe the Church. Therefore, most certainly, by the force of that promise He removes from her every error, even inculpable; otherwise we would not be bound to believe her. To the first confirmation it has already been said in this question how and when those promises are fulfilled. To the second confirmation the minor is denied. To the proof we say that one of those propositions, "The Pope is above a council" or "A council is above the Pope," even before it is newly defined by the Church, is of faith among many of the faithful; and the whole Church does not doubt concerning the one which ought to be defined. This is proved because when the Church defines something she ought not to have new revelations; rather, she must rest upon the doctrine of the Saints, who preserve and are witnesses of ancient tradition and Apostolic doctrine. Therefore those who have preserved this deposit down to a new determination do not merely opine or doubt concerning the truth to be defined, but hold it as certain. Again, if what we taught above is true, that the Church has always fulfilled the command of preaching truths necessary to faith lest the gates of hell prevail against her, and if one of these propositions is of faith, that truth has always been preached and believed by some; otherwise the proposed command would have been broken. That it is not held by all as of faith may arise from ignorance or forgetfulness of such a determination or tradition, or because they do not penetrate it. The fact that some Doctors teach something false without being unbelievers does not remove the contrary from being of faith, because they either do not penetrate the testimonies of Scripture or are ignorant of the tradition and teach what they think without pertinacity. To the sixth more must be said below. For now it is answered that a council which can err is neither the universal Church nor represents her universally, because the head is lacking, namely the Supreme Pontiff, to whose determination the faithful ought to adhere. Therefore from the fact that such a council errs, it does not follow that the Church errs, especially because not all in the council come to the same judgment. Hence, to determine something false there before the confirmation of the head, the erroneous judgment of many suffices while faith and true doctrine remain in others. To the seventh it will be said below how the Pontiff cannot err in teaching matters of faith when he determines as pastor, whom only then we are bound to follow. But when Pontiffs speak as private persons or as particular Doctors, nothing prevents them from teaching contrary and not altogether true things, as is clear in the example adduced in which Pontiffs spoke in this manner. To the eighth more will be said below. For now it is answered briefly that, granting that the proposing of matters of faith depends upon something human and fallible, it does not follow that the act by which things so proposed are believed is fallible. We see that an act concerning its proper object can possess greater certitude than the condition upon which that act depends. For example, the habit of first principles is more certain than any experience of the senses; nevertheless acts of that habit often depend upon sensory experience. Thus I know through the habit of first principles that fire is hot, if heat were of its essence or a proper passion, and yet that cognition depends upon the experience of the senses and induction by which the first principles are manifested. Likewise the condition upon which the cognition of a merely theological conclusion depends is the goodness of the consequence; yet I adhere more firmly to the conclusion itself than to that consequence, because I adhere through theology, which is more certain than all sciences. Therefore there is no inconvenience if the condition upon which my being borne toward an object of faith depends is less infallible than the act itself by which I assent to the proposition of faith. Thus, although the cognition that the Pontiff defines thus and all believe thus would be fallible - though morally it is not - it does not follow that the act is fallible; it possesses greater certitude than the condition itself.

To the ninth it is answered that our believing something to be of faith can occur in two ways. Either certainly and indubitably from ancient tradition or revelation; or only opinatively, from a fallible argument and testimony. In the first way the Church cannot believe something to be of faith which in reality is not of faith, because nothing can thus be believed unless it is revealed; but what is not of faith is not revealed and is not had by determination or tradition. Secondly, because the reply there made proceeds again, and the solution given does not avail. When we do not believe moved by one of the foundations there posited, we can believe nothing certainly and infallibly in this way. But believing in the second way is not prohibited, because that is rather a fallible opinion; and nothing prevents the whole Church from holding opinatively that something is of faith which in reality is not. Yet this will not happen, because we said above that the convergence of diverse human judgments into one is the work of God alone, who will not induce men falsely to opine that something is of faith which in reality is not. To the argument to the contrary, that to believe in this way is repugnant to the formal reason (ratio formalis) of faith, it is answered that the defect of the formal reason (ratio formalis) of faith in that object causes the faithful to be unable to believe it in the first way. To the tenth it has already been said how the faith of some proposition which is truly of faith will not fail in the whole Church, but will always be preserved in someone. To the eleventh it is answered that, while a Pontiff exists in the Church, even if all Doctors - which I do not admit - determined something false without anyone resisting, the faithful would not be bound to believe it, because it has not been proposed to them with sufficient motives, the determination

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of the universal pastor being lacking, to whom it belongs to direct the faithful infallibly in these matters. But if there is no Supreme Pontiff, all cannot err, for the reason given above in the conclusions. And let these things suffice concerning this question. FOURTH DOUBT. Whether in the Church we ought to posit one universal pastor. For the negative side it is argued as follows. All the Apostles had equal power from Christ and acknowledged no greater excellence in Peter. Therefore neither ought their successors to acknowledge it. The antecedent is proved first because in Matthew 18 the Savior repeated to all the Apostles what He had said to Peter alone in chapter 16: "Whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven," etc. This is confirmed. What is said to Peter in the final chapter of John, "Feed My sheep," was also said to all the Apostles. For either that feeding occurs by doctrine, and thus it was said to all the Apostles, Matthew 28: "Going into the world, teach all nations"; or by life, and thus all heard, "You are the light of the world," Matthew 5; or by correction of sins, and power of this kind all received in John 20, when it was said to them, "Whose sins you shall forgive," etc. Secondly, the same antecedent is proved because Christ sent all the Apostles with equal power, which He Himself possessed, according to John 20: "As the living Father sent Me, I also send you. Receive the Holy Spirit," etc. Therefore no one is superior in this power. Thirdly, Peter was sent by the Apostles into Samaria to preach the word of God, as is clear in Acts 8. Therefore he was not superior to the other Apostles. For John 15 says: "The servant is not greater than his lord, nor the Apostle than he who sends him." Likewise it is proved from the fact that Paul does not acknowledge himself inferior to Peter in Galatians 2 and confesses that he received from him no authority or power, but that Peter gave him the right hand of fellowship when he saw that the Gospel of the uncircumcision had been entrusted to Paul just as that of the circumcision to Peter. From this it seems to follow not only that Peter was not superior to Paul, but that he was Apostle only of the circumcision just as Paul of the Gentiles, and thus that he did not possess universal power. Again, when Paul came to Antioch he resisted Peter to the face because he was reprehensible. As Jerome notes upon Galatians, and as is reported in 2, q. 7, c. Paulus, Paul would not have dared to do this unless he judged himself not unequal. This is also confirmed because in the council concerning cessation of the legal observances James seems by authority to have preceded Peter, since his sentence was as though definitive. Finally it is confirmed from judgments of the Saints. Pope Anacletus, distinction 21, c. In novo, says: "The other Apostles, endowed with an equal fellowship with blessed Peter, received honor and power." Cyprian likewise, On the Unity or Simplicity of Pastors, says that Christ gave equal power to all the Apostles: "As the living Father sent Me, I also send you." And again: "The other Apostles were what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship of honor and power."

Secondly, it is argued principally that this greater excellence of Peter seems to be gathered only from one of two passages: either Matthew 16, "I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven," etc.; or the last chapter of John, "Feed My sheep," etc. But it is demonstrated by neither of these places. As to the first, if this place demonstrates and proves it, then, Luther says, this authority belongs only to just and holy men. For before it was promised to Peter that he would be the foundation of the Church and that the keys of the kingdom of heaven would be conferred upon him, it is premised that he is blessed, son of Jonah, that flesh and blood did not reveal it to him, and that he is Peter, that is, firm and solid. From this it is argued: these conditions are not premised to Christ's promise by chance and outside the purpose, but because the promises made pertain to him through the gift of beatitude, divine grace, revelation, and solidity in faith. Therefore where these conditions are absent we cannot acknowledge one universal pastor. This is confirmed from Origen upon Matthew 16, who first teaches that after Peter the Church is built upon those who do the works of Peter, because of which it was said to him, "You are Peter." Therefore where these conditions are absent we cannot acknowledge one pastor. Likewise, Origen says in the same place that the Church is not built more upon Peter than upon the others: "Every man who is an imitator of Christ is Peter, and upon every such man the Church is built. But if you think the whole Church is built upon that one Peter, what will you say of James and John or of each of the Apostles?" Secondly, these promises, they say, do not pertain to the person of Peter but to the Church. Therefore Peter's principate is not gathered from them. The antecedent is proved because after this promise Peter is rebuked and called Satan and did not remain solid in faith. Therefore it does not belong to him to be the rock, but to the Church. This is confirmed because Augustine on Psalm 108 says that certain things are said which seem to pertain to the Apostle Peter and nevertheless have no illustrious meaning unless they are referred to the Church, whose person he is recognized to have borne figuratively because of the primacy which he has among the disciples, such as, "To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." He asserts the same in On Christian Doctrine I, chapter 18, in Sermon 8 On the Words of the Lord, and in Tractate 50 on John: "If in Peter there were not a sacrament of the Church, the Lord would not say to him, 'To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.' If this was said to Peter alone, the Church does not do this. But if the Church also does it, Peter, because he received the keys, signified the holy Church." This judgment is also reported in 24, q. 1, c. Quodcumque. Thirdly, when the Pope is elected he does not bring the keys of the Church with himself, otherwise he would be Pontiff before election. Therefore he receives them from the Church, since no other can give them. Likewise when the Pope dies the keys remain, and nowhere except in the Church. Therefore they were promised by Christ to the Church. Fourthly, an argument is made similar to that which Paul forms in Romans and Galatians 4, where he argues that just as justice from faith was reputed to Abraham, so it will be reputed unto justice to all who believe. In the same manner it is argued here: to Peter, by reason of beatitude, revelation, and solidity

in faith, the keys were promised. Therefore to whomever these things occur they will likewise be given. But no one besides the Church possesses this solidity. Therefore the keys were given to the Church. Moreover, granting that Christ speaks to Peter, He nevertheless speaks not to him as a singular person but in the person of all the Apostles, and in him promises the keys to them. This is shown because He promised them to the one who confessed His divinity; but Peter, as Jerome and Chrysostom say, answered from the person of all the Apostles as their mouth and head. Therefore the keys were promised to all in Peter. Likewise, "Upon this rock I will build My Church" agrees with all, for the Apostle says to the faithful in Ephesians 2 that they are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. From the second passage, "Feed My sheep," the primacy is likewise not gathered. Because, since the sheep are placed there without distribution, the heretics say it is sufficient to feed some and not all; therefore universal monarchy is not gathered from it. This is confirmed from Galatians 2, where Peter is said to be pastor only of the circumcision. Luther further insists that feeding is the office of a minister, not of a prince; therefore Peter's principate over the other Apostles is not shown from this. Again he presses what he calls an unavoidable argument. If Peter or his vicar is bound to feed and preside over the whole world, it follows, he says, unavoidably that those who were not under him sinned, indeed were heretics. But then the whole primitive Church, at least for four hundred years, with so many martyrs and Saints, would have been heretical. Finally, one singular man cannot feed the whole world; but nothing impossible is commanded by God. Therefore, etc. Thirdly, it is principally argued: granting that these promises refer to the person of Peter, it does not follow that now there is some universal pastor of the whole Church. Gregory says, Register VII, chapter 30, that although from the testimonies adduced it is proved that care of the whole Church was committed to Peter, nevertheless he permits no bishop to be his successor in this care. This is confirmed because when the name "universal bishop" was offered to Gregory by the Council of Chalcedon, he refused it. The argument is further confirmed. If these words of Christ spoken to Peter extend to his successors, by the same reason other words spoken to him would extend to them, for example, "And you, once converted, confirm your brethren," and "Before the cock crows, you shall deny Me three times," and similar things; which is plainly false. For Peter's successor need not have first turned away in order afterward to be converted. And the argument is pressed. Christ expressly indicated when it was necessary that He spoke not only to the Apostles but also to their successors, as in the last chapter of Matthew: "Behold, I am with you all days even to the consummation of the age." Therefore if in these words He speaks also to Peter's successor, since this is one of the things necessary to be believed, it follows manifestly that it ought to have been explained by Christ; otherwise His teaching concerning matters of faith would have been deficient. Fourthly, none of the other Apostles has a successor in the Apostolate, but only in the episcopate of the churches which they received. Therefore neither will Peter have a successor except in the episcopate of his church, and not in the Apostolate and government of the whole universal Church.

There appears nowhere, they say, any manifest testimony of Scripture from which we are compelled to believe otherwise. Luther confirms this fifthly from Jerome, in the letter to Evangelus and upon 1 Timothy 1, where he says that all bishops are not greater but equal to presbyters. Therefore we ought not to attribute to one bishop, Peter's successor, a primacy over others. Fourthly, it is principally argued that, even granting Peter has a successor by divine right, it is not evident who he is, nor that the Roman Bishop must necessarily succeed him in the primacy. For the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given to the person of Peter insofar as he was one among the Apostles and a singular person, not to him insofar as he was Roman or Antiochene bishop. Therefore the Roman Bishop no more than the Antiochene ought to succeed him. This is confirmed first. By the evangelical word the Roman Church was not appropriated to Peter, but the whole Church was committed to him. Hence if Peter had persevered until the end as he began, without appropriation to any particular Church, or had remained in the See of Antioch which he first occupied, or afterward had transferred his see away from Rome, none of these things was prohibited to him by divine right. The Roman Bishop would not then succeed Peter; rather one man would be elected pastor of the whole world without appropriation to the Roman Church. Therefore by divine right the Roman Bishop is not his successor, and thus the Bishop of Paris or any other could be elected Peter's successor without determination to a particular Church. It is confirmed secondly. If the words of Christ spoken to Peter are understood of the Roman successor, it follows that he will always be a solid rock in faith and will never fall into heresy; below we shall show this to be false. The consequence is clear because the words of Christ spoken to Peter would also be spoken to his successors: "Upon this rock," that is, upon you solid and firm in faith, "I will build My Church," and, "I have prayed for you that your faith fail not." It is confirmed thirdly. From Scripture it is not certain that the Roman people will never defect from faith or be occupied by enemies, nor that its bishop will never lose his see. Indeed this seems to be signified in 2 Thessalonians 2, where among the signs preceding the final judgment is placed "the defection," that is, if we believe Lactantius, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, and others, the abolition of the Roman people. This seems to have been predicted much earlier by Balaam, Numbers 24: "They shall come in galleys from Italy, they shall overcome the Assyrians, devastate the Hebrews, and at last they themselves shall perish." The

first part of this testimony was fulfilled in the devastation of the Jews by Titus Vespasian; the latter is believed by some to be fulfilled in the destruction of the Romans themselves. Therefore at least then, since a universal pastor of the Church must not be lacking, he will not be the Roman Bishop. It is confirmed finally from Ecclesiastical History X, chapter 6, where it is said that the Council of Nicaea established that the Roman Bishop should bear solicitude only for the suburban churches, just as the Bishop of Alexandria for the churches

of Egypt. Therefore the Roman Bishop is not universal pastor, otherwise the council would not have prescribed a boundary to his solicitude. Jerome likewise writes in On Illustrious Men that Acacius, Bishop of Caesarea and disciple of Eusebius Pamphilus, at the command of Constantius deposed Pope Liberius and established Felix. But if Liberius the Pontiff were universal pastor, he could not be deposed by another singular bishop. In this

question five things must be treated. First, we shall show from Scripture, councils, and the holy Doctors that

the principate of the whole Church was conferred upon Peter singularly in his own person. Secondly, we shall show how it is necessary that this superior power remain in the Church. Thirdly, we shall declare who it is that succeeds Peter in this office, namely the Roman Pontiff. Fourthly, we shall explain by what right this power is joined to the episcopate of the city of Rome. Finally, in the fifth place, we shall solve the arguments proposed. As to the first, therefore, let the FIRST CONCLUSION OF FAITH be: To Peter in his singular person was conferred power over the universal Church of Christ. This conclusion is proved first from Scripture. Before all else two testimonies must be weighed, in which this truth is especially contained and which are therefore especially attacked by heretics. The first is Matthew 16: "Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed it to you, but My Father who is in heaven. And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven." This passage contains two parts. The first explains whence it happened that Peter possessed knowledge of the mystery which he had confessed: "You are Christ, the Son of the living God." The second contains the promise made to the person of Peter because of this confession. Although John Eck in his treatise On the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff and Cajetan in the opusculum under the same title have treated this testimony at length, it must nevertheless be explained briefly here. For declaration of the first part it must first be supposed that the beatitude of the other life, since it is a certain participation in the divine goodness, ought to consist in the same things in which God's beatitude consists, namely in knowledge of His essence and of the divine Persons. But for us, who are led to that beatitude through Christ, God and man, knowledge of the God-man Himself is also added to beatitude. The beatitude of this life, moreover, since according to Aristotle it consists in knowledge of the highest causes, which is wisdom, is such that Scripture says, Ecclesiasticus 14, "Blessed is the man who shall dwell in wisdom," and Proverbs 3, "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom." Since Christ, according to Paul, is the true and proper power and wisdom of God, and Peter, as is clear from his confession, knew Christ according to what is proper to Him, he will be blessed with the beatitude possible in this life. And since by supernatural cognition he also attained knowledge of the divine Persons and their processions - all of which, Cajetan briefly explains, are contained in the words "Christ, Son of the living God" - and since knowledge of the humanity is also included in the notion of Christ, it follows clearly that he is blessed also with respect to the beatitude of the future life, which consists in this knowledge according to John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know You and Jesus Christ whom You have sent." He is therefore blessed at least in hope, and because of the certitude of this hope he is called blessed absolutely. It must be supposed secondly that when a man has two names, one proper to him and due to his infirmity, the other conferred by the gift of God elevating him to a higher degree, when God wills to recall his former weakness to his memory He addresses him by the first and proper name, passing over the second, so that He may show what is due to his nature.

This is evident in Jacob, who also obtained the name Israel. The former name was used when, humble and poor, he fled from his father and served Laban; the latter when he was greatly enriched. But when God wished to admonish his people of their poverty and humility, He addressed them by the first name, saying Amos 6: "I abhor the pride of Jacob," and chapter 8: "The Lord has sworn against the pride of Jacob." Rupert should be consulted there. Thirdly, it must be supposed that it is God's manner, when revelations are made to men, to remind them of their weakness and ignorance, lest they attribute to themselves the knowledge of supernatural things which surpasses every human power and wisdom and which He communicates to them. Hence, when something is revealed to Ezekiel he is most often called "son of man," that he may be reminded of his weakness. For this reason, chapter 2, after the vision made to him he fell to the ground and could not be strengthened. The same happened to John in Revelation 1 and to Daniel and others. Chrysostom should be seen on Psalm 48, where, when the prophet has called all to hear divine things, he immediately reminds them of their weakness, saying, "Both earthborn and sons of men." By calling them sons of men he explains the weakness of nature. God is also accustomed to make men whom He thus instructs mindful of their ignorance, so that they may refer such knowledge to God. Hence Proverbs 30 says: "The vision which the man spoke, with whom God is." He who is strengthened by God dwelling with him says: "I am the most foolish of men, and the wisdom of men is not with me. I have not learned wisdom, and I have not known the knowledge of the Saints." For this reason Habakkuk 3 prefixes to that most clear vision which he had concerning Christ and His mysteries the title, "A prayer for ignorances," that by confessing his ignorance he might show that he did not attain knowledge of such great things by himself. Amos likewise confesses this, chapter 7: "I am not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, but I am a herdsman plucking sycamores; and the Lord took me when I followed the flock and said to me: Go, prophesy." There, from knowledge of the lowliness of his state, he confesses that prophetic light is not owed to his own wisdom but wholly to God. Finally, for this reason revelations were very often made to prophets in dreams, as to Solomon, Isaac, and others, lest they should be attributed to human wisdom, which at that time fails. Job 33 shows this to be the true cause: "By a dream in a vision by night, when

sleep falls upon men and they sleep in their bed, then He opens the ears of men, and teaching instructs them with discipline, that He may turn a man away from the things he has done and deliver him from pride." Fourthly, it must be supposed that, although cognition and revelation of divine things insofar as they concern wisdom are appropriated to the Son, nevertheless they are sometimes attributed to the Father insofar as some power is necessary for attaining things of this kind which surpass every created power. Hence it is said in John 6 concerning knowledge of faith: "No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him." There the instruction concerning matters of faith, by reason of the weakness of human reason for attaining them, which is explained in the words "no one can," is attributed to the Father. Hence it is common to say, Matthew 11: "I confess to You, Father, because You have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and have revealed them to little ones," and many similar places are found. It must also be added that epithets of God in Sacred Scripture are commonly placed according to the effect fitting to what is produced by God. Thus when Paul speaks in the last chapter of Romans concerning the mystery of the Incarnation hidden from every creature, he says that it was known to "God alone wise." In chapter 15, speaking of the hope which God causes, he says, "The God of hope." Isaiah 31 says: "Thus says the Lord, whose fire is in Zion and His furnace in Jerusalem," because the victory there promised by God was obtained through sacrifices consumed by that fire. Many similar places are found elsewhere. Hence the Doctors rightly note that the divine name Jehovah is accommodated to some things, Shaddai to others, Elohim to others, and so forth. For example, because Elohim signifies governor and judge, in Genesis 6, when sentence concerning the flood is pronounced, God is called Elohim: "Elohim said: The end of all flesh has come before Me." Psalm 49 likewise: "Elohim, the Lord, has spoken and called the earth," discerning His people; and Psalm 81: "Elohim stood in the assembly of gods; in the midst He judges the gods." It must be supposed, furthermore, that through faith we are generated as sons of God, concerning which enough was said above and many testimonies can be seen in Augustine, Against Faustus XXIV, chapter 1. Finally it must be known that when the expression "in heaven" is referred to God, it signifies God's efficiency and power and His supreme knowledge. Hence Psalm 32 says: "From heaven the Lord has looked," and Daniel 2: "There is a God in heaven revealing mysteries," as though being in heaven aided cognition. Again Daniel 5 says: "You also have been lifted up against the Lord of heaven," and Psalm 2: "He who dwells in the heavens shall laugh at them," and Psalm 72: "They have set their mouth against heaven," as though from God's dwelling in heaven His power is inferred, against whom no elevation can prevail and who can easily deride and destroy others. "Flesh and blood" likewise signify two things in Scripture. First, weakness, as Job 10: "You have clothed me with skin and flesh," and Psalm 77: "He remembered that they are flesh." They also signify human wisdom, as Galatians 1: "Immediately I did not acquiesce to flesh and blood," and 2 Corinthians 1: "Have I used levity, or do the things which I think, do I think according to the flesh?" These things being laid down beforehand, the understanding of this first part of the testimony is easy. Peter is called blessed for the reason stated. Lest he attribute this to himself, he is reminded of his proper infirmity, weakness, and ignorance: he is called by his proper name Simon, which signifies no dignity; and he is reminded whose son he is when it is said to him, "Bar-Jona," that is, son of Jonah, or more correctly son of John, according to the final chapter of John: "Simon, son of John," etc. Thus by being shown born from a lowly father he is admonished of his native defects and impotence for attaining so great a thing. Therefore it is said: "Flesh and blood has not revealed it to you," that is, your weakness or ignorance; "but My Father," to whom belongs the power that overcomes the aforesaid difficulty of knowing this matter and who, by regenerating you through faith into a son, has revealed it to you. It is added, "who is in heaven," so that, according to what has been said, it may signify that this is difficult to him who possesses all knowledge and power. Behold how in this first part nothing pertaining to the principate of Peter has yet been said; rather, the whole passage is occupied with approval of the confession which he made concerning Christ. In the remaining parts, however, following the doctrine of St. Thomas...

"Are all things therefore to be received which were uttered together with these?" Thus far Nicholas. Behold, therefore, there is no argument that if Innocent, or the Seventh Synod, or Nicholas himself, or the Council of Florence, Session 5, uses some Trullan canon, they thereby seem immediately to have approved the rest. And we say the same to the confirmation, that Epiphanius was not deliberately concerned to define whether the Trullan canons possessed firm authority. For that was not what was being treated in the Council, but discussion concerning canons of this kind arose incidentally. Thus far concerning the third principal question. There remain, however, four other questions to be defined, common respectively to council and Pontiff according to the doctrine handed down by us in the preceding questions.

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SIXTH DOUBT: WHETHER THE SUPREME PONTIFF OR THE CHURCH CAN ERR IN ORDERING THE MORALS OF THE FAITHFUL THROUGH LAWS ENACTED, OR IN JUDICIAL SENTENCES PRONOUNCED IN JUDGMENT

It is argued first for the affirmative side. The Lord prayed only for Peter that his faith not fail. But from the fact that the Church or Pontiff errs concerning morals, the foundation of faith is not destroyed. Therefore such an error is possible. It is argued secondly. Whatever must be held by certain faith must have been divinely revealed to the Church. But laws and statutes of this kind concerning morals are not divinely revealed. Therefore they are not necessarily to be held by certain faith. It is argued thirdly. It often happens that what one Pontiff establishes concerning the morals of the faithful another derogates. Therefore one of them errs in establishing a law concerning morals. For decision of this doubt it must first be observed that ecclesiastical laws are of two kinds. Some are proposed for observance by the whole Church. Others are enacted for some particular Church, or certainly a precept is imposed upon a particular person, or a sentence is pronounced in judgment concerning a particular act. It must be observed secondly that morals which can pertain to the government of the faithful are of two kinds. Some are necessary for salvation. Others are useful and fitting for reform of the faithful people. These things being supposed, let us propose several conclusions. First **conclusion. The Supreme Pontiff or the Church cannot err in enacting laws pertaining to morals necessary for** the whole Church. The conclusion is proved. Christ the Lord in Matthew 16 and 18 and John 20 promised and handed over the keys of the kingdom of heaven to Peter and his successors so that they might open the heavenly gate to the faithful. But the kingdom of heaven is closed not only through ignorance of faith but also of things to be done. Therefore in the Church there is a power of the keys for firmly establishing morals to be observed by the faithful. For example, the Church establishes that laymen communicate not under both species but under one species. A statute of this kind must be most certain. For if the Supreme Pontiff or the Church erred in such a matter, the error would be pernicious no less than if there were error in faith. For if it were said that for salvation it is enough to receive the Eucharist only under the species of bread, while it were necessary to communicate under both species, then plainly there would already be error in faith. Therefore if he commands such a practice to be observed by the whole Church, he would err no less perniciously. This is confirmed from what the Lord said to Peter: "Feed my sheep." But if the Pontiff erred in statutes of this kind, he would not feed Christ's sheep healthfully. Therefore. Furthermore in 1 Timothy 3 the Apostle says: "These things I write to you, that you may know how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and firmament of truth." But it is established that the Apostle wrote many things to him which pertained to truth in morals. Therefore in these things the Church cannot err, otherwise she would not be the pillar and firmament of truth. Likewise the conclusion is proved from what the Lord said in Matthew 23: "The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses; therefore all things whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do." Therefore much more is that which the Supreme Pontiff or the pastors of the Church gathered in council, sitting as it were upon Christ's chair, establish and define concerning morals to be observed, infallible. Otherwise the new law and Church would have been maimed and diminished in those things which are necessary for salvation. To this conclusion also pertain explanations of the natural law which are sometimes proposed by the Church in the manner of statute and law, for example concerning avoiding usury or fleeing the vice of simony. For statutes of this kind seem rather to pertain to doctrine of necessary truth than to the nature of positive law. Second conclusion. When the Supreme Pontiff or the Church establishes laws for the whole faithful people in graver matters conducive to forming Christian morals, he cannot so err as to command something contrary to the Gospel or natural law. This conclusion is explained. We do not assert that all laws of this kind are necessary or enacted according to prudence. For sometimes perhaps Supreme Pontiffs multiply more laws than according to prudence they ought, or when they ought not, or where they ought not. A sign of this can be that another Supreme Pontiff changes or abrogates laws of this kind enacted by his immediate predecessor while the same circumstances remain. We assert only this: that laws of this kind will never be pernicious or impious or contrary to the Gospel or natural right. This conclusion, thus explained, follows from the preceding one. Otherwise we would fall into the same inconveniences which were reported in confirming the preceding conclusion. Third conclusion. To assert that some universal custom of the Church is evil, or that some law of hers is unjust, is scandalous and very rash and savors of heresy. This **conclusion is proved. Although the Council of Constance, Session 13, established that those should be** condemned as heretics who asserted that the Church erred in the practice of communicating the people under one species only, nevertheless afterward Martin V in the Bull of confirmation did not simply approve that **article, but more mildly decreed that those who taught that the Church errs in a custom of this kind are to be** condemned either as heretics or as savoring of heresy. But if we consider diligently, someone can assert in two ways that the Church errs in a custom of this kind. In one way by a pernicious error destroying a means necessary for salvation. In this way I certainly do not see why a theologian should hesitate to brand such an assertion with the censure of heresy. In another way one can assert that the Church errs in the aforesaid custom because she commands it to be observed imprudently for reverence of the sacrament. An assertion of this kind is worthy of the censure which we expressed in the conclusion. Therefore I think Martin V spoke under a disjunction when he decreed that the aforesaid assertors were to be condemned either as heretics or

as savoring of heresy, because he understood the twofold sense of that assertion explained by us. For this reason the hesitation of my teacher Master Cano in Book V On Theological Places, final question, conclusion 2, does not please us in this part. For he seems without distinction to censure the aforesaid assertion more mildly than he ought. It is true, however, that shortly afterward he gives an example more accommodated to our **conclusion. For example, the Lutherans condemn the custom of carrying the sacrament of the Eucharist** solemnly in procession through public streets. Now if we consider the origin of this condemnation, it is heresy. For they ridicule this custom because they deny the true presence of Christ in the sacrament. But if the aforesaid assertion is considered in itself absolutely, it savors of heresy and is rash impudence, yet is not heresy. For even if the Church acted imprudently in this custom, nevertheless her authority in matters necessary for salvation would not thereby be weakened. For the same reason in the Council of Trent, Session 13, canon 6, it is defined in this way: "If anyone says that in the holy sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is not to be adored with the worship of latria, even external, and therefore is neither to be venerated with a peculiar festive celebration nor solemnly carried about in processions according to the laudable custom of the Church, let him be anathema." Observe here that it does not simply strike with anathema those who reprehend that rite of the Church, but those who reprehend it for this reason: because they deny Christ's bodily presence in the Eucharist and therefore do not admit the adoration and worship of the same. Similarly, it is not absolutely heretical to believe that the Church can sometimes err in the canonization of some saint or in celebrating a feast, as we shall say afterward. But to assert that the Church errs in certain morals which she observes as handed down by Christ and the Apostles is plainly heretical. For it would be heretical to assert with the Iconoclasts that the Church errs in veneration and worship of images. Our conclusion, therefore, is to be understood concerning certain other customs which were introduced after the Apostles. Fourth conclusion. In morals not common to the whole Church but pertaining to private persons, it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err from ignorance or even from malice. This conclusion is proved from Alexander III, On the Sentence of Excommunication, chapter A nobis, 2, where he says: "The judgment of God rests always upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows opinion, and it often happens that it deceives and is deceived. For this reason it sometimes happens that one who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by ecclesiastical sentence." Thus he. The reason is manifest because the judgment of the Church in matters of this kind depends upon human testimony, which is uncertain. Here, however, it must be observed that much more easily can the Church or Pontiff be deceived and err in judgment concerning deeds than in precepts and laws which are directed to some particular Church. For forensic judgment can fail from truth through ignorance, even inculpable, of the judging Pontiff, because it depends on uncertain testimonies of men. Forensic judgment can also be perverted by the malice of the judge. Although malice of this kind is not easily to be believed in the Pontiff, nevertheless if it is admitted that some Pontiff through malice perverts judgment in a singular forensic sentence, the Apostolic See is not thereby derogated, because an error of this kind in judgment is personal. For in that action he does not exercise the office of Supreme Pontiff toward the whole Church, but that of a judge concerning a particular cause between private men. Therefore it will not be surprising if from avarice or another human affection he perverts judgment.

But in enacting laws for some Church, for example Salamanca or another particular diocese, it is not credible that the Supreme Pontiff errs from malice or ignorance - errs, I say, perniciously against the Gospel or natural law. The reason is that legislation of this kind does not depend upon testimony of men but upon the Pontiff's own motion, who judges such precepts and laws fitting. This is confirmed because such a Church, by observing laws of this kind, does not seem to err but would have excuse before God, since the Supreme Pontiff, Christ's vicar, commands it to be done. In the same way also the reason is the same when the Supreme Pontiff defines some dogma when asked by some particular Church as if he were asked by the whole universal Church. Similarly, just as faith is one in the Church, it is necessary that morals necessary for salvation be the same. Therefore I would not dare to affirm absolutely that the Supreme Pontiff can through ignorance err in enacting laws and giving precepts to some particular and private Church, except in the manner in which we conceded that he can err in enacting laws for the whole Church according to prudence by multiplying unnecessary laws or laws not very fitting, indeed in some manner inconvenient, yet not pernicious or unjust. Thus it seems to me that a certain conclusion must be understood which Master Cano places third in the place cited above, where he says: "In morals not common to the whole Church but which are referred to private men or Churches, the Church can err through ignorance." But certainly he does not sufficiently prove the conclusion unless it pertains only to forensic judgment concerning deeds. For what he there adduces concerning canonization of saints does not pertain to one private Church but to the universal Church. Likewise he does not distinguish, concerning private Churches, whether that error in enacting laws can be pernicious from ignorance. Furthermore when he says that in laws of this kind the Church can err, he either speaks of the Church insofar as it is a general council legitimately gathered, or insofar as by the name Church the Supreme Pontiff is understood. If he speaks of a legitimately gathered council, there seems no difference as regards this point whether it can or cannot err in enacting laws for the whole universal Church or for some private Church. For in neither manner can it err perniciously, because in both manners it uses its authority in the name of the whole Church. Similarly, if he speaks of the Supreme Pontiff insofar as he is Supreme Pontiff, by which reason he can also enact laws for private Churches, it is false that through ignorance he can err perniciously. The

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reason is that then he uses the office of pastor of the Church. I indeed scarcely find a difference between laws enacted by the Pontiff for the whole universal Church and for some private Church, provided toward both he conducts himself as Supreme Pontiff, Christ's vicar. Nevertheless someone could assign this difference. It can happen that the Supreme Pontiff, not by his own motion but from false information of deeds in some private Church, is moved to enact a universal law concerning that Church which is pernicious to that private Church. For example, if it is falsely denounced to the Pontiff that in some bishopric all priests are heretics or infected with some other scandalous vice, and the Pontiff, thus persuaded, enacts some law to be observed in that bishopric, for example commands under censures that for some time none of the faithful confess his sins to a priest, then a law of this kind will be perniciously observed. But concerning the whole universal Church such ignorance in the Pontiff does not seem to be admitted, so that he would impose a similar precept upon the whole Church. Nevertheless this difference does not seem relevant to the present matter. For precepts of this kind which depend upon information of deeds seem rather to be judicial sentences than absolute laws. Accordingly in laws of this kind I do not see why the Supreme Pontiff cannot through ignorance err, whether he imposes precepts upon the whole Church or a private one. Nevertheless I shall never admit that the error will be pernicious. For if from observance of laws of this kind something happens in fact which is contrary to divine or natural law, it is not the intention of the Pontiff that his precepts be observed. Rather, the faithful themselves are bound to inform the Pontiff concerning the truth of the fact according to the decree of the canon in the chapter Si quando, On Rescripts, where it is said: "If at any time we direct certain things to your fraternity which seem to embitter your mind, you ought not to be disturbed," etc. "Considering diligently the quality of the business for which we write to you, either reverently fulfill our mandate, or by your letters, setting forth a reasonable cause, explain why you cannot fulfill it." Therefore laws of this kind will not be pernicious because of the Pontiff's ignorance, even if they were proposed to the whole Church. For the legislator himself already admonishes by a universal law that in precepts of this kind which depend on information of fact, such precepts are not to be understood as absolutely to be observed. Therefore I do not wish to admit that the Pontiff through ignorance enacts pernicious laws. Much less is it to be admitted that the Supreme Pontiff errs perniciously in enacting laws absolutely and from his own motion. To the arguments for the opposite it is easy from the foregoing to answer. To the first argument it is answered that such an error concerning morals necessary for the salvation of the Church can be imagined as would redound to destruction even of the faith. For example, if the Supreme Pontiff established a law that no one should communicate until the thirtieth year, or, at the other extreme, that all the faithful should communicate daily. For either law would destroy the religion of the sacrament, and consequently faith concerning it would be endangered. But let it be that the foundation of faith were not destroyed. Nevertheless it is not thereby gathered that the Supreme Pontiff can err in enacting laws concerning any morals whatsoever. For the unity of the Church consists not only in unity of faith but also in worship and use of sacraments necessary for salvation. Then it pertains to the Supreme Pontiff to supply necessary pasture for the salvation of the faithful. Therefore he can establish no laws contrary to the Gospel or natural reason. To the second argument it is answered that although this law or another pontifical law is not divinely revealed, nevertheless it has been divinely revealed to us that to Peter and his successors was given the necessary power to feed the Lord's flock, not only with pasture of true faith but also concerning morals necessary for salvation, by statutes and laws fitting and certainly never contrary to the salvation of the faithful. To the third argument it is answered that when the Supreme Pontiff revokes the statutes and laws of predecessors, such revocation is never pernicious to the Church. Nevertheless there can be many ecclesiastical laws which are prudently changed according to variety of times. Of this kind even statutes made by the Apostles, which were fitting for their time, have been abrogated. An example is Acts 15, where the Gentiles are commanded to abstain from strangled things and blood. That positive law was fitting for that time lest the Gentiles be a horror to the Jewish faithful with whom they associated. But afterward in succession of time that law was abrogated. There are moreover other laws which, although not unjust, concern matters not so necessary or fitting that it cannot be judged by some human reason and prudence to be more fitting to abrogate laws of this kind. Indeed perhaps changes of laws of this kind are sometimes most fitting for showing pontifical authority and for exercise of simplicity and obedience of the faithful toward the Supreme Pontiff, Christ the Lord's vicar on earth. From the things said it follows with what veneration the decrees of the sacred Council of Trent concerning reform are to be received and respected. I have said this because of those who not without rashness dare to call into doubt the decree of the twenty-fifth Session, chapter 5, where concerning the enclosure of nuns it was decreed, whether the Supreme Pontiff can command perpetual enclosure to nuns who have not professed it. They strive to confirm this by the following reason. A prelate neither ought nor can increase or diminish the vow of a subject, as is cited from St. Bernard. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot by precept and censure compel nuns to that enclosure which they have not professed. But it is astonishing that this reason should seem probable among men otherwise learned and that because of it they bring forward marvelous glosses and interpretations of the aforesaid decree, even though the Council and afterward the Supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII by their own motions leave no place for doubt. For they will and command that no congregation of women where profession of a solemn religious vow is made go outside its convent, nor may any inferior prelate grant faculty of going out, except perhaps in one or another event where the reason of natural law and charity seems to demand that faculty. This statute is pious and holy and is to be observed with that rigor which is commanded both in the Council and in the proper motions of the Supreme Pontiffs.

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Against the first error in particular, argument is made from 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." And he adds: "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins." Observe that he says "our sins," namely, those of the Apostles themselves. Christ also taught them to pray in Matthew 6: "Forgive us our debts." This is confirmed from Daniel 9, where he himself says: "While I confessed my sins and the sins of my people." From this testimony those are more openly refuted who say that the Apostles spoke thus not for themselves but for the people. James 3 likewise says: "In many things we all offend." Daniel, to whose holiness testimony is borne in Ezekiel 14, nevertheless distinguishes his own sins from the sins of the people. Hebrews 5 says that the priest, because he was encompassed with infirmity, had need to offer sacrifice for himself. In Galatians 2 Cephas is judged reprehensible by Paul. Drunkenness overtook Noah, Genesis 9; and Job confesses many of his sins in chapters 13 and 14, although Scripture bears testimony to their holiness. Paul, in 2 Thessalonians 2, 1 Corinthians 1 and 4, and 2 Corinthians 13, acknowledged the true Church among those peoples, yet afterward reproved them and showed them liable to sins. Moreover, in Ephesians 4 the Apostle declares that the ecclesiastical hierarchy was given to the faithful until we all meet unto a perfect man and are no more children tossed to and fro. Therefore, so long as we have not arrived, we are children, deficient in certain respects. Psalm 31 says: "I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. For this shall every saint pray to Thee in a seasonable time." Again, 2 Corinthians 4: "Although our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." If he is renewed day by day, he has not been wholly and perfectly renewed. Paul himself testifies in Philippians 3: "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Of Moses, Aaron, and Samuel, whose virtues Scripture greatly extols, Psalm 98 says: "Taking vengeance on all their inventions"; vengeance is not inflicted by God except for sins, which are understood there by the name inventions. Christ says to the just in Matthew 7: "If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more your Father who is in heaven..." If they were not just, they would not be called sons of the heavenly Father; and if they had no sin, they would not be called evil. Likewise Christ says to Peter, already clean and washed, in John 13, that it is necessary that He wash his feet, that is, cleanse away certain lighter faults. Likewise in Apocalypse 1, 2, and 3, those bishops who are reported as just and to possess charity are admonished to do penance for certain sins for which they are reproved. Likewise the palm bearing fruit is purged that it may bring forth more fruit; yet it would have nothing to be purged if it had no sin. Many other testimonies could refute this error, but these suffice. Let those who wish read Augustine, On the Perfection of Justice, after the sixteenth reasoning, tome 7; On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapters 7-16, tome 7; and Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapters 3 and 7 and book 4, chapters 10 and 11, where in confirmation of this truth he cites Cyprian and Ambrose in many places. Augustine should also be read on Psalm 118, "For they who work iniquity have not walked in His ways," tome 8, sermon 3; and Jerome, tome 3, book 2 Against Jovinian, from the beginning through many chapters, and in the same tome, book 1 Against the Pelagians. But it is also argued by reasons. First, it would follow that there is no purgatory, contrary to the tradition of the Church, the definitions of councils, and explicit Scripture, 1 Corinthians 3: "He himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." The consequence is clear, for that fire purges the sins of imperfect sons of the Church, and there are many such. Secondly, it would follow that there is no fraternal correction in the Church, contrary to Matthew 18: "If thy brother sin against thee" - that is, he who is a son of the Church - "go and reprove him between thee and him alone," etc. Where there is perfect justice and no sin, there is nothing to correct. Thirdly, it would follow that sacramentals are not necessary to the faithful, such as holy water and episcopal blessing. These are instituted for the remission of sins; if such sins are not in the Church, these would not be necessary, contrary to the tradition of the Church. Fourthly, it would follow that he who keeps the commandments does not enter into life, contrary to Matthew 19: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." For the commandments can be observed by imperfect persons having certain light sins; yet according to the adversaries these would not enter eternal life, since none enters unless he is a son of the Church, whereas such imperfect persons would not be sons of the Church if every kind of perfection of life were required in her members. But behold the foundation upon which their madness rests. They say it is commanded that we be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect (Matthew 5); likewise Deuteronomy 18, 2 Corinthians 13, "Be perfect," and 1 Peter 1, "Having the loins of your mind girt up, being sober, hope perfectly," etc. Therefore he who does not fulfill this commandment need not be wondered at if he does not enter into life, since he does not keep all the commandments. Again, Matthew 22 says that the first and greatest commandment is that we love God with our whole soul, mind, heart, and all our strength; but in this consists all perfection. He who loves in this way cannot sin. Nevertheless these arguments do not compel us to depart from the Catholic faith. To the first, from Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins, book 2, chapter 16, and Jerome, book 1 Against the Pelagians, it is answered that those testimonies are understood of perfection in one virtue, not of perfection simpliciter in all things. Or they are understood of perfection in the knowledge of truth, especially of that truth without which men cannot be without sin. But because perfection simpliciter consists in charity, as St. Thomas teaches in II-II, q. 184, a. 3, the command to be perfect simpliciter seems to command this perfection. And since this cannot exist without the perfection of the other virtues, it seems to speak of a total perfection of affection. Therefore another answer is given from St. Thomas in the same place, article 2: because the perfection of the Christian life, which consists in charity, imports a certain totality...

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The theological reason by which a statute of this kind is shown to be just and holy is this. The Supreme Pontiff possesses plenary power for establishing those statutes which are judged conducive to the common good of ecclesiastical discipline and observance of religion. But experience had shown that after multiplication of convents of very many religious women, the solemn vow of chastity could scarcely be preserved as it ought if a multitude of religious women of this kind easily possessed faculty of departing from their convents or monasteries. Hence both religion and the name of religion suffered no small detriment and infamy. Therefore the Pontiffs, wishing to meet so great an evil, could and ought to use their authority, commanding that henceforth without special faculty of the Supreme Pontiff no professed religious woman should leave her monastery, convent, or congregation. For the Supreme Pontiff is not only supreme conservator and guardian of the assembly of the faithful but also of religious institutes. Consequently he can reserve to himself a faculty of this kind for going outside the convent. Indeed, if it were necessary for good government of monks and other religious that they not easily travel from their convents or beyond a prescribed region, the Supreme Pontiff could and ought to enclose us men also within our convents, even if we had never professed enclosure of this kind. For where the common good of the Church or religion is endangered, it is a most fitting means that private persons suffer something even if it seems contrary to their liberty. To the argument for the opposite it is easily answered from the theological reason which we have shown to be necessary and to prove that the Supreme Pontiff can do this. Nor does the Supreme Pontiff thereby increase the vow of a religious woman. For he does not command religious women to vow enclosure, but uses their ancient vow of obedience by which they are specially bound to obey superiors in things lawful and honest according to their state. It is most fitting to the state of religion that not only women but even men never leave home without the faculty of a superior, which faculty the supreme prelate can reserve to himself when necessary.
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SEVENTH DOUBT: WHETHER THE SUPREME PONTIFF CAN ERR IN THE CANONIZATION OF SAINTS

For the affirmative side it is argued first. No one can be as certain concerning the state and holiness of another as concerning himself, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him." But no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love, as is held in Ecclesiastes 9. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot judge certainly concerning the holiness of any man unless he is made certain by special revelation. It is argued secondly. Every judgment which rests upon a fallible medium can be false. But the Church in judgment concerning canonization of saints rests upon human testimony, inquiring from witnesses concerning the life and miracles of the one to be canonized. Therefore it seems that the Church can err in canonization of saints. This is confirmed because St. Thomas, Quodlibet IX, final article, and other Doctors concerning canonization of saints judge in this way: that it can be piously believed that the Church does not err in a matter of this kind. But on the contrary is that an error of this kind in canonizing saints would be exceedingly pernicious if the whole Church venerated as holy and blessed one who is damned in hell. Therefore in so grave a matter the universal judgment of the Church cannot be false. To this question the heretic Wycliffe said that it was exceedingly presumptuous for the Pope or the Church without special revelation to judge someone holy and blessed even if miracles were proved, because things of this kind are not certain signs of holiness, since they can be tricks of demons. Against this error Walden wrote elegantly in volume II On the Sacramentals, from chapter 122. For decision of the truth let the first conclusion be this. It is heretical to deny that there is authority in the Church and Pontiff for canonizing saints. This **conclusion is also against Luther, who, as Cochlaeus reports in the Acts and Writings of Luther, in the year of** the Lord 1524, raging against Adrian VI because he had enrolled Benno, Bishop of Meissen, in the catalogue of saints, published a little book which he inscribed in the common German tongue: "Against the New Idol and the Ancient Devil." In it he says that the Pope's office is nothing other than to kill true saints and exalt false ones. The conclusion is therefore proved first from the tradition and perpetual usage of the Catholic Church and the common consent of all councils and Fathers from the beginning of the nascent Church. For a power of this kind has always been believed and committed to the Church and Pontiff. This is confirmed from the Council of Florence in the decree concerning union of the Armenians, where the Armenians are commanded henceforth to venerate the most blessed Leo I as a saint and rightly enrolled in the catalogue of saints. The **conclusion is proved secondly. It is heretical to deny that saints are to be invoked, as is evident from many** councils and from the decretals, Book VI of the Decretals, the Clementines and Extravagants On Relics and Veneration of Saints, and finally from the Council of Trent, Session 25, in the decree On Invocation and Adoration and Relics of Saints. Therefore there is authority in the Church for canonizing saints. The consequence is evident because otherwise it would not be heretical to deny that those canonized by the Church are to be invoked and adored. It is proved thirdly. It is established from Sacred Scripture that very many saints of both the Old and New Testaments are in heaven, whose catalogue is found in Ecclesiasticus 44 and Hebrews 11. Similarly it would be manifest heresy to deny that the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, St. Stephen, and others similar whose mention is made in Sacred Scripture and whose holiness is celebrated are in glory. Therefore a power of this kind had to remain in the Church for confirmation of Christian religion and exhortation of the faithful, when examples of saints are proposed to them whose souls are judged already now to be in glory. This is also expedient to show that the hand of the Lord is not shortened, but just as in the primitive Church there were Christians of extraordinary holiness, so also now and always until the consummation of the age there are and will be faithful distinguished in holiness of life. Second conclusion. It is very rash and scandalous and savors of heresy to say that the Pope or a council can err in the canonization of saints. The sense of the conclusion is not only that the Pope cannot err by abusing his power - for we have already said it is heretical to deny the authority to canonize - but the sense is that to assert some saint canonized by the Church or Pontiff not to be in heaven is worthy of the aforesaid censures. The conclusion is proved because in the Council of Constance, Session 8, Wycliffe is condemned for having said that Augustine, Benedict, and Bernard were damned unless they did penance at the end of life. It is proved secondly because, as we have already said, Pope and council cannot err perniciously in enacting laws concerning morals common to the whole Church. But it very greatly concerns the common morals of the Church that there be no falsity in saints canonized. Therefore to assert that in a matter of this kind error can occur from ignorance or another route is very rash, scandalous, and savoring of heresy. It is proved thirdly because such error would redound to contempt of the Church and divine honor. For even the demons themselves would mock Christ's Church if they saw those whom they have with themselves in hell as companions of damnation and punishment honored by us throughout the whole Church and their patronage invoked before God. This is confirmed because the honor exhibited to saints is a certain profession of faith by which we proclaim the glory of the saints and eternal life. Therefore to assert that in this profession so common in the Church there is error from ignorance is rash, etc. It is proved fourthly because he injures a martyr who prays for a martyr. Therefore one commits greater injury who thinks him to be in hell. Consequently one is very impious who denies that a martyr canonized by the Church is in heaven.

The aforesaid censures are worthy of what has been said. The conclusion is proved because in the Council of Constance, Session 8, Wycliffe is condemned for having said that Augustine, Benedict, and Bernard were

damned unless they performed penance at the end of life. It is proved secondly because, as we have already said, Pope and council cannot err perniciously in enacting laws concerning morals common to the whole Church. But it greatly concerns the common morals of the Church that there be no falsity in saints canonized. Therefore to assert that in a matter of this kind error can be found through ignorance or another way is very rash, scandalous, and savoring of heresy. It is proved thirdly because such an error would redound to contempt of the Church and divine honor. For even demons themselves would mock Christ's Church if they saw those whom they have with themselves in hell as companions in damnation and punishments honored by us throughout the whole Church and their patronage invoked before God. This is confirmed because the honor exhibited to saints is a certain profession of faith by which we proclaim the glory of saints and eternal life. Therefore to assert that in this profession so common in the Church there is error from ignorance is rash, etc. It is proved fourthly because he does injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr. Therefore a greater injury is done by one who thinks that martyr to be in hell. Consequently he is very impious who denies that a martyr canonized by the Church is in heaven. But someone says: Why do we not condemn such assertors as heretics? It is answered that in this censure we follow the common opinion of theologians, especially St. Thomas in Quodlibet IX, final article, where he says: "Canonization of saints is a mean between two things, namely between the infallible judgment of the Pope concerning matters of faith and his fallible judgment in civil and criminal causes. Nevertheless," he says, "because the honor which we exhibit to saints is a certain profession of faith by which we believe the glory of saints, it is piously to be believed that even in these matters the judgment of the Church cannot err." St. Antoninus asserts the same in Part III, title 12, chapter 8, and Cajetan in the opusculum On Indulgences addressed to Julius, chapter 8. Nevertheless because in recent times there have been heretics who ridiculed the Church in canonizing saints and denied her authority and infallibility, therefore more recent theologians rightly judge that to assert that the Church was false in the canonization of some saint savors of Lutheran heresy, even if the authority to canonize is not denied. To the arguments for the opposite it is answered. To the first it is said with St. Thomas in the place cited above that the Pontiff, whose office it is to canonize saints, can be made certain concerning someone's state through inquiry into his life and testimony of miracles, and especially through the instinct of the Holy Spirit, who searches all things, even the depths of God. Thus he. Observe there that the Church's certitude concerning the holiness and beatitude of Augustine is greater than Augustine's judgment concerning himself was in this life, unless perhaps he was certain by special revelation. For the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest she err in a judgment of this kind, as St. Thomas indicates in the aforesaid solution. To the second argument it is answered that although the Church uses human testimonies, nevertheless she uses not just any, but those of many men of great authority. Furthermore she uses the testimony of miracles, whose discernment - whether they are from God or from the demon - belongs to the Church, which is governed by the impulse of the Holy Spirit. Therefore by no route is it credible that she errs in a judgment of this kind. For there are many similar things even in human matters which, although we do not see with our eyes or touch with our hands, nevertheless no one unless insane can deny if they are held certain by human testimonies. For example, that Titus and Vespasian existed and destroyed the city of Jerusalem, or that gold is born among the Indians, even we who have not seen this cannot

doubt. So great is the force of the testimony of many men. Therefore, with Catholic faith

presupposed, by
which we believe the glory of saints who followed Christ's footsteps, and by which we also believe that in the Supreme Pontiff and Church there is authority for canonizing saints, no one except an insane person or a heretic should be believed to

doubt whether a canonized saint is in heaven, since authority of this kind

for canonizing uses the testimonies of so many and such trustworthy men and, in addition, miracles. Therefore rightly one who doubts the very fact comes under suspicion of heresy and savors of heresy.
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EIGHTH DOUBT: WHETHER THE SUPREME PONTIFF CAN ERR
IN CONFIRMING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTES UNDER DIVERSE
INSTITUTIONS AND RULES

It is worthwhile to define this difficulty briefly, without first placing arguments for the affirmative side, by the following conclusions. First fundamental conclusion. It is certain according to Catholic faith that the state of religion is not an invention of men but an Apostolic tradition: that in Christ's Church there be a special state in which those who wish make solemn vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity and are received by the Church.

Second conclusion, consequent upon the preceding. The Supreme Pontiff possesses authority for discerning and defining fitting modes by which the state of religion is promoted and preserved in the Church. This **conclusion needs explanation more than proof. For if the Supreme Pontiff has authority concerning the state of** bishops by dividing bishoprics and containing and governing the bishops themselves by certain laws and conditions, much more will he possess power concerning the state of religion, which is inferior to the state of bishops, so that he may direct its substance - which consists in the three essential vows - to different proximate ends, and thus make distinct orders and constitute fitting means for each order proportioned to its proper end. Thus power of this kind pertains to the Supreme Pontiff so that no one in the Church can institute a new order without the consent and confirmation of the Supreme Pontiff. Otherwise there would be in the Church not beauty but confusion of orders. Third conclusion. The Supreme Pontiff can in no way err in confirming some particular religious institute as regards what pertains to the truth of its doctrine, institution, and constitutions which are proposed to him for confirmation. For example, blessed Dominic once approached the Supreme Pontiff so that he might confirm for him...

...an order which would be called the Order of Preachers and would be ordered toward this end: that religious should prepare themselves to dispute against heretics and even to refute their errors. Behold the end of this religion. For all true and proper religious institutes agree in making the three solemn vows. Blessed Dominic added certain means fitting and proportioned to so excellent an end, namely that the religious who wished to serve God under the aforesaid institute should also profess the Rule of Blessed Augustine, which he himself had professed while he was a canon regular in the Church of Osma. He further added other stricter constitutions, through the exercise of which his brethren might progress in the charity of God and neighbor. Namely, that they abstain from meat, that they not use linen next to the flesh, that they fast almost throughout the whole year, that they first devote themselves to prayers and many vigils and to divine praises. He added very many other statutes by which his religious commonwealth might be fittingly governed. I say, therefore, in the conclusion that the Supreme Pontiff could in no way err in confirming some religious institute with respect to those things which are proposed to him verbally or in writing and which pertain to truth of doctrine. Thus constitutions approved by the Pontiff contain nothing contrary to the Gospel, right faith, or natural reason. In this sense the conclusion is so certain that I do not hesitate to call the opposite heretical. It is proved because the Supreme Pontiff, as was already shown above, cannot define anything contrary to truth. Otherwise he would not be a certain rule in defining matters of faith. Fourth conclusion. The Supreme Pontiff cannot err in approving some religious institute with respect to the constitutions and laws proposed to him in such a way that he approves laws pernicious or harmful to the salvation of souls. This conclusion is proved by the same reasons by which the third conclusion placed in the preceding seventh doubt was proved. It is further proved because when the Pontiff approves some religious institute, he uses the office of Supreme Pontiff, proposing to all the faithful such a religion not only as fitting for the salvation of those who wish to profess it but also as congruous for perfection of charity in those who observe it. Therefore if the Pontiff erred in an approval of this kind, he would perniciously deceive the faithful who desire their own salvation. Consequently whoever denies this conclusion is to be marked with the same censures as one who denied that third conclusion cited above. From this conclusion follows a corollary: there is no religious institute approved in the Church of God in which someone cannot, as far as concerns the state itself and the religion, tend toward perfection if he observes, together with the essential vows, its statutes approved by the Supreme Pontiff. I have said "as far as concerns the state itself and the religion," because for someone it may be unfitting to profess this or that religion because of personal circumstances, either his own or those of others. For it can happen that in such a religion fertile land has been turned into saltiness because of the malice of those dwelling in it. Thus it can happen that, although that religion is good, nevertheless for the weak it is harmful because of the conversation and example of many dwelling in it, because they are ambitious or avaricious or not so chaste as they ought to be. All these things can occur without a miracle because of the negligence and sometimes malice of prelates. Fifth **conclusion. It is possible for the Supreme Pontiff through negligence, ignorance, or false information in some** way to err according to prudence in approving and confirming more religious institutes than were needed in the Church of God. Nevertheless such error will never turn to the destruction of the Church, although it can be harmful to some. Both parts of the conclusion will easily be proved by us. The former because Innocent III in the Lateran Council, as is held in On Religious Houses, final chapter, says: "Lest excessive diversity of religious institutes introduce grave confusion into the Church of God, we firmly prohibit anyone henceforth from inventing a new religious institute," etc. There the Pontiff judged that at that time more religions ought not to be confirmed. The same is indicated under the same title in the Sixth Book, chapter 1, from Gregory X in the General Council of Lyons, where it is said: "The excessive diversity of religious institutes, lest it introduce

confusion, the general council prohibited by a prudent prohibition," etc. Furthermore Celestine V confirmed the state of the Fraticelli by his privilege. Nevertheless afterward John XXII declared that privilege of confirmation invalid. Similarly Paul III is said by his letters to have approved the order which Brother Battista of Crema instituted in Italy. Nevertheless afterward that order was expelled by public edict by the Venetians, and the doctrine of Battista, to which the men of that order adhered, was condemned at Rome. Master Cano reports these arguments in Book V On Theological Places, chapter 5, near the end, in order to prove that the Supreme Pontiff can err in approval of religious institutes. He says that the argument taken from privileges of this kind of Pontiffs to prove that new religious institutes ought to be received as though fallen from heaven is weak. But in truth arguments of this kind do not prove that the Supreme Pontiff erred by approving an evil or false religion. It is concluded only that the founder or rather inventor and his followers did not preserve the state of religion according to the form which they proposed to the Supreme Pontiff for confirmation and which the Supreme Pontiff confirmed. For when a religious institute has been confirmed by the Pontiff, those who profess it are not thereby confirmed in grace or faith. Therefore it is not surprising if afterward Pontiffs deservedly dissolve religions confirmed by others because of the malice of those dwelling in them. Indeed this belongs to the office of the supreme pastor: to reform religious institutes, reduce them to a smaller number, or certainly dissolve some because those who profess them cannot be reformed or because some religion is useless. Our aforesaid conclusion, therefore, is to be understood in such a way that the error which can occur in confirming religious institutes is not greater than that which can occur in multiplication of ecclesiastical laws concerning matters which are not necessary for salvation to be done in this or that way except only because of obligation of law. Since therefore in common laws of this kind, according also to the common opinion of the Doctors, the Supreme Pontiff can proceed less prudently, there is no reason why we should fear to assert that even in confirming so many and such various religious institutes, from which confusion can arise in the Church and other inconveniences emerge for perfect and tranquil government of the Church, the Supreme Pontiff can also approve and confirm some one or more religious institutes less cautiously. Nevertheless I confess that in very many cases Supreme Pontiffs have a just excuse in confirming new religious institutes, lest perhaps they seem to extinguish the Spirit, especially because if afterward some inconvenience arises from some new confirmed religion, the Supreme Pontiff himself can provide a remedy by reforming that religion with new statutes or, if it is useless, can dissolve it.

Sixth conclusion. After some new religious institute has been confirmed with its special end and with statutes or constitutions offered, examined, and approved by the Pontiff, nevertheless not for this reason are all statutes which are afterward made by the prelates or chapters of that same religion to be judged virtually confirmed and approved by the Supreme Pontiff. This conclusion is proved because the Supreme Pontiff confirms and approves only those things which are expressly proposed to him, and in addition grants to the prelates of that religion authority to govern. But he cannot transfer to them pontifical authority so that they cannot err perniciously in making laws concerning the morals of their commonwealth. For this privilege was granted by the Lord to the Pontiff alone. The aforesaid conclusion is so manifest to learned men that it does not need many arguments for its confirmation. But it was placed by me so that I might convict the ignorance of certain religious. For there are some who invent for themselves an excuse in sins, vain, not to say shameless. For if perhaps a learned and grave man, with zeal for God, prudently reprehends some customs of some religion or defects of particular persons, they immediately accuse the one reproving as though rash, because he condemns a religion approved by the Supreme Pontiff. As though the Supreme Pontiff had approved customs of this kind worthy of reprehension, and not rather the prelates themselves afterward through their incautious constitutions, admonitions, or permissions introduced such customs. How great evils formerly followed in Christ's Church from negligence or imprudence of prelates of religious institutes, as indeed they still follow in our times, experience itself has shown. For almost one hundred years ago nearly all religious institutes, even those of mendicants, were reformed by Supreme Pontiffs through the industry of the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella. In our times also, through the industry of Catholic King Philip, great monarch of all the Spains, very many religious institutes which were suffering shipwreck have been reformed by Supreme Pontiffs and are daily reformed and reduced to ancient observance. This matter is very necessary for the edification of the faithful people, according to the doctrine of blessed Gregory in Part I of the Pastoral Rule, chapter 2, where, explaining Ezekiel 44: "They became a stumbling block of iniquity to the house of Israel," which indeed was said by the Prophet concerning bad priests, he says: "No one harms more in the Church than he who, acting perversely, possesses the name or order of holiness. For no one presumes to reprove this delinquent, and the fault is vehemently extended into example when the sinner is honored because of reverence for his order." Thus far Gregory. Let what has been said by us concerning the matter of this tenth

article suffice also in these first commentaries.

MORE EXTENSIVE COMMENTARIES ON ARTICLE X OF

QUESTION I

After the scholastic tract according to the manner which teachers in the schools are accustomed to observe in instructing disciples, it seemed good to me, because this article of St. Thomas is exceedingly fruitful, to add another more extensive tract. In it, indeed in scholastic style but more copiously, I have determined for the sake of more advanced theologians to dispute and define six graver

doubts.

FIRST DOUBT: WHETHER THE CHURCH IS A COLLECTION OF THE FAITHFUL

It is first argued and proved that for the nature of the Church it is not required that she be a collection. For at the time when Adam alone existed there was a Church, and yet then there was no collection. The minor is manifest from the fact that one alone cannot be a collection. Before formation of Eve, however, Adam alone existed. The major is proved because Adam possessed faith in Christ when he said in Genesis 2: "This now is bone of my bones." Therefore at that time he pertained to the Church. For by faith someone is made a member of Christ's body, which is His Church. This argument is confirmed because Jerome upon Psalm 133 teaches that there is the true Church where true faith exists. But in Adam there was true and formed faith. Therefore. It is argued secondly. In Abel alone and in Enoch alone in their own times the Church existed. Therefore the Church does not require a collection of many faithful. The antecedent is evident from Augustine, who on Psalm 122 says: "At one time the Church was in Abel alone; at another time the Church was in Enoch alone." Therefore. It is argued thirdly. The opinion of many Doctors is that in the triduum of Christ's death faith remained in the Blessed Virgin alone, so that even the Apostles lost it. Therefore at that time the Church remained in her alone. The antecedent is asserted by Abulensis on Matthew, chapter 16, q. 67. And in the book called Rationale of the Divine Offices, in the office of Thursday in the Lord's Supper, it is said that this is signified in that ceremony of the Church which is made in Holy Week when in the nocturnal office all lamps are extinguished and only one remains lit, namely that the lights of the Church, that is the Apostles, were extinguished and lost faith, the Blessed Virgin alone persevering with the splendor of faith. Torquemada thinks the same in Book III of his Summa, chapter 61. He proves it first because to the Apostles themselves those things which were said by the women concerning the Resurrection of the Lord seemed delirious words, Luke 24. And from Matthew 26: "All of you shall be scandalized in me this night." For it is written: "I shall strike the shepherd and the sheep of the flock shall be scattered." There the gloss explains "shall be scattered" from the unity, namely, of faith. He said all would be scattered. Likewise from Mark 16: "He reproached their unbelief and hardness of heart because they did not believe those who had seen Him risen." Therefore. And from many testimonies besides of Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and other holy Fathers. Alexander of Hales holds the same in Part III at the end, and the Archdeacon and Huguccio in their apparatus upon On Penance, distinction 1, section His auctoritatibus, upon chapter Quis aliquando.

It is argued fourthly, presupposing from St. Thomas III, q. 8, a. 3 that this difference exists between a natural animal body and the mystical body of the Church: that the members of a natural body all exist simultaneously, but not the members of the mystical body, because the Church is constituted from men who existed from the beginning of the world to its end, who nevertheless do not coexist simultaneously. Hence he says: "The members of the mystical body are taken not only insofar as they are in act but also insofar as they are in potency." This being supposed, it is argued thus. For the nature of a mystical body it suffices to possess many members potentially and successively, and it is not required that it possess them actually. Therefore for the nature of the Church, which is Christ's mystical body, this actual collection is not required. Rather it will suffice that she gathers many faithful at diverse times. It is argued fifthly against the clause "of the faithful." Heretics are parts of the Church and are not faithful. Therefore the Church is not the collection of all the faithful. The antecedent is clear because they are punished by the Church. Therefore they are not outside her. For, as is said in 1 Corinthians 5, the Church does not judge those who are outside. This is confirmed. The head of the Church, namely the Pope, can be a heretic and unbeliever and remains head of the Church until he is deposed. Therefore a fortiori other heretics can be members of the Church. It is confirmed secondly because 2 Timothy 2 says that Hymenaeus and Philetus fell away from truth and subverted the faith of some. And it adds that in a great house, namely the Church, there are vessels of gold and clay, some unto honor and others unto dishonor. Because of these words Augustine in Book III On Baptism, final chapter, numbers those erring from faith in the Church. And in Book IV, chapter 12, he cites Cyprian in the letter to Antonian as thinking the same. Jerome holds the same on Galatians 5, saying: "But he who understands Scripture otherwise than the sense of the Holy Spirit demands, by whom it was written, even though he has not withdrawn from the Church, can be called a heretic." Likewise, we prove that sinners are in the Church because Paul recognizes such persons in those Churches to which he wrote, as is clear in 1 Corinthians and throughout the Epistle to the Galatians. Therefore. It is argued sixthly against the same clause, proving that not all faithful pertain to the Church. Catechumens possessing faith and charity before Baptism are truly faithful and in the state of salvation. Yet they are not of the Church. Therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved because if they fall away from faith they cannot be punished by the Church. Therefore they are not within her. The same argument is made concerning a child or adult pagan who at the instant of use of reason, or at any other time, is interiorly illuminated by God and receives faith with the desire for Baptism. For these are truly faithful, and yet they are not parts of the Church by the same reason. It is argued seventhly. Schismatics are truly faithful and nevertheless are not of the Church. Therefore the Church is not the collection of all the faithful. The antecedent is manifest. For schism does not destroy faith, as will be clear below. The minor is proved because the Church is one, but they are divided and separated from this unity. Therefore. Likewise because they do not possess the head of the Church. Therefore they are not of her body. It is argued eighthly. Excommunicated

persons are truly faithful and nevertheless are not of the Church. Therefore. The minor is proved because in Matthew 18 it is said of those disobedient to the Church who are excommunicated that they are to us as heathens and publicans separated from the Church. It is argued ninthly. The Church is constituted from the predestined alone. Therefore she is not the collection of all the faithful. The antecedent is asserted by Augustine in Book V Against the Donatists, chapter 27, where he teaches that the enclosed garden, sealed fountain, and well of living waters are constituted from the predestined alone, even though they are unbelievers. But these are attributes of the Church. He proves it because Noah's ark, which figured the Church, saved all whom it contained. Therefore those who are not saved are not to be reckoned within the ark, he says. And in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 9, he says that those are not truly numbered among the sons of God - who are also sons whom mother Church bears to Him - except those who persevere in good and are predestined. And in Book III On Christian Doctrine, chapter 32, he teaches that those who will not remain with Christ forever are not truly of Christ's body. But the predestined alone remain. Therefore. He proves this opinion also from testimonies of Scripture. First, the sons of God, whom we have said are sons of the Church, are heirs of God and coheirs of Christ, as is said in Romans 8. Therefore those who do not attain beatitude are not to be reckoned sons of the Church. Secondly, the Church is called Christ's sheepfold and her members Christ's sheep, over whom Peter is placed as shepherd, John 10. There Christ says concerning His sheep: "My sheep hear my voice, and I give them eternal life." Therefore. Thirdly, those alone pertain to the Church concerning whom it is said: "Christ is head of the Church and Savior of His body, which," namely in beatitude, "He will present to Himself glorious without spot or wrinkle," as is said in Ephesians 5. But the predestined alone are saved and will be without spot and wrinkle. Therefore. Fourthly, concerning those who are not saved John expressly says in his First Canonical Epistle, chapter 2: "They went out from us, but they were not of us, because if they had been of us they would certainly have remained with us." Therefore those who do not remain are not in the Church. It is argued tenthly. Among the faithful there are many sinners. Therefore these do not pertain to the Church concerning which it is said: "I believe the holy Church." And again: "You are all beautiful, my beloved, and there is no spot in you." Likewise John teaches in 1 John 3: "Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin and cannot sin because he is born of God. In this the sons of God and the sons of the devil are manifest." Therefore even a faithful sinner is not a son of God and consequently neither of the Church, His spouse, because he commits sin. This is confirmed from Augustine, who in Book II Against Petilian, final chapter; Book II Against Cresconius, chapter 21; the book On the Unity of the Church, chapter 12; Book IV On Baptism Against the Donatists, chapter 3; Book VI, chapter 3; and Book VII, chapters 49, 50, and 51, holds that the wicked do not pertain to the Church of God. Cyprian holds the same in the letter to Magnus. Jerome likewise on Ephesians 5, explaining "without spot or wrinkle." The Master of the Sentences, following Augustine, does so in Book IV, distinction 8 at the end, and Hugh of St. Victor, Book II On the Sacraments, Part II. The same consequence is also proved by reason. For if sinners, who are members of the devil, are enclosed in the Church, then because of them she could be called evil and the synagogue of Satan. Secondly, sinners are members of the devil and citizens of Babylon. Therefore they are not members of Christ or the Church nor citizens of Jerusalem. This is confirmed. Sinners are dead members. But a dead member is not properly but equivocally such, as is held in On the Soul II, text 9. Indeed St. Thomas in III Sentences, distinction 13, q. 2, a. 2 teaches that men of this kind are only equivocally members of Christ. But on the contrary is chapter Ecclesia, De Consecratione, distinction 1, where the Church is defined in this way. And the gloss upon 1 Timothy 3, "which is the Church of God," says: "The Church is the convocation of many to the worship of one God."

For this dispute, since according to Aristotle it is necessary concerning the subject to suppose what it signifies, it must first be noted that this name "Church" signifies an assembly or gathering of many called together, and is a name used not only by Christians but also by ancient and pagan authors. As is clear in Aristotle, Politics II, saying that certain polities do not make an ecclesia, that is, a congregation or council. And because this notion of assembly and gathering can be found in diverse modes, hence the name Church according to its proper signification is used in various ways both in Sacred Scripture and in sacred canons. For sometimes there it is taken for men consecrated to divine worship, that is, for ecclesiastical men, as is evident in distinction 63, chapter ... at the end. Sometimes for the greater part of a chapter, in which way it is taken in distinction 56, chapter Apostolica. Sometimes for the canons of the cathedral church, as can be seen in cause 10, q. 1, chapter Antiquos, and cause 12, q. 1, chapter Videntes. Similarly in Sacred Scripture sometimes it is verified of the universality of all the blessed and wayfarers possessing faith. The gloss notes this on Ephesians where: "He gave Him as head over the whole Church." There the gloss says: "Which," namely, "is in heaven and on earth." St. Augustine speaks of her in this way in the book On the City of God; see Book XI, chapter 1. Sometimes it is taken for men alone, Ephesians 5: "Christ is head of the Church; He is Savior of His body." And again: "Christ loved the Church and delivered Himself for her." It is clear that He is not Savior of angels nor did He deliver Himself for them. Sometimes it is taken only for wayfarers, as Augustine notes it is taken in Psalm 21: "My praise is with You in the great Church." Sometimes more strictly for the universality of one province, as is evident in 2 Corinthians 1: "The Church of God which is at Corinth." The gloss notes the same in the final chapter of Romans upon: "Gaius and the whole Church salute you." It is also taken in this way in chapter Cum super, On the Authority and Use of the Pallium. Sometimes again more strictly for the congregation of the just, Ecclesiasticus 3: "The sons of wisdom are the Church of the just." And because the

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predestined also constitute their own universality, sometimes it is taken for them alone, as is evident in the gloss upon 2 Timothy 2: "The Lord knows who are His." Sometimes for subjects, as can be seen Acts 15 and 20. Finally for an assembly of nobles, as in 3 Kings 8 and 1 Chronicles 29. According to figurative speech it is taken for the prelate of some congregation, by that kind of speech in which the most principal part is taken for its whole. Thus it is taken in Matthew 18: "Tell the Church," etc., and cause 7, q. 1, chapter Scire. Sometimes for the material house itself, by the trope in which container is taken for contained. This usage is frequent in Scripture, as is clear in Numbers 20, Deuteronomy 23, Judith 6, and 1 Corinthians 11, and in sacred canons, as can be seen in many chapters of De Consecratione, distinction 1. In these and many other ways Church used to be taken. Nevertheless all these acceptions are derived from one in which Church is taken for a congregation of the elect. And with respect to this the other congregations are called Church by analogy of proportion to one end. For the prelate is called Church insofar as he orders others toward the just end. Subjects insofar as they are ordered toward it. The militant Church insofar as she attains or intends the glory of the blessed. And although according to this reason by extrinsic denomination all other things apart from the congregation of the blessed are called Church, nevertheless any congregation can formally be called Church when the term is taken commonly. But setting aside all these acceptions, it has been received by the usage of the faithful that it is used not for any gathering or universality whatsoever, but only for that which acknowledges the true God. And this we are accustomed to distinguish into the triumphant Church of the blessed and the militant Church of wayfarers who walk by faith. The present disputation is instituted concerning the latter, namely so that it be taken for the congregation of all living faithful. But it must be noted secondly that there is this difference between the congregation of faithful existing in the time of revealed grace and that which existed in the time of the Mosaic law: that although the latter was sometimes called Church, as is clear in Numbers 20, nevertheless it was more commonly called Synagogue. The former, however, is never addressed except by the name Church. The reason for the distinction is the excellence of our state and of the new law above the old. For these terms "Church" and "Synagogue" are Greek names. Synagogue signifies the same as congregation. Church, however, is convocation. But voice and convocation properly belong to men. Congregation, although sometimes it is also said of just men, as Psalm 49: "Gather to Him His saints," and Matthew 24: "They will gather His elect," and Isaiah 49: "All these who are gathered have come to you," nevertheless is a term more proper to irrational animals, derived from a flock, and is properly said of them. As Psalm 102: "The sun arose and they were gathered." And Matthew 24: "Where the body is, there the eagles also will be gathered." And Matthew 23 a hen is said to gather her chicks. Therefore to show the difference between the two states - that in the time of the Mosaic law the Jews were as it were cattle, while now they are rational men - those are called Synagogue and these Church. Augustine teaches this on Psalm 81, and Isidore, Etymologies VIII, chapter 1.

The difference consisted in this: that that law induced men to its observance because of temporal promises, as is clear in Isaiah 1: "If you are willing and hear me, you shall eat the good things of the earth." This matter is disputed more broadly in the commentaries on I-II, q. 99, a. 6. Those who desire such things from God are cattle. For Augustine, Psalm 72, section 81, speaking of that ancient people says: "He became as it were a beast by desiring earthly things." Hence the voice of the synagogue is: "I have become like a beast before You." For one becomes a beast by desiring earthly things from one's God. For this reason we often read in Scripture that those who either desire earthly things greatly or ask them from God are addressed by names of animals. As Joel 1: "Why has the animal groaned?" etc. And Malachi 2: "You covered with tears and weeping and lowing," etc. And Hosea 7: "They did not cry to me," etc., "but they ruminated," etc. In these places Rupert should be seen concerning how these terms, to ruminate, to low, and others of this kind are properly attributed to animals lacking reason, but to men by transfer when they desire earthly things, because by desiring these they become beasts. But in the time of the new law we are induced to observance of precepts by hope of heavenly and spiritual reward. This belongs only to rational beings. Therefore as rational beings we are called together and are called Church. Augustine notes this on Psalm 36: "Men and beasts You will save, O Lord; according as You have multiplied Your mercy." There he distinguishes sons of men from beasts or those assimilated to beasts, who desire from God those things which are given to beasts and pursue present goods together with them. The former, however, desire future goods together with the angels. The second difference is that, as is held in the place cited above, that people was imperfect. But the new and evangelical law is perfect. Therefore for this reason those are called cattle but the Christian people men. For men imperfect in virtue are fed by God with hay and grass, food of animals, and therefore are numbered among beasts. The perfect, however, are fed with bread, man's proper food. Ambrose notes this elegantly in the final chapter of the book On Paradise upon Genesis 3, where first it is said to Adam: "You shall eat the herbs of the earth." And secondly: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread." For he eats herbs who is in progress and not yet perfect; he eats bread in whom justice has been consummated. Since therefore that law did not give justice perfectly as ours gives it, rightly they can be called cattle, while we are men and ought to be called so. Therefore we are rightly called a convocation. There is another reason why we are called Church and called together. For this note that in Scripture "to be called" signifies God's gratuitous will and mercy. Thus the interlinear gloss notes upon Romans 9: "Not from works but from the one calling it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." And St. Thomas on Romans there, "called Apostle." The Gentiles, however, from whom the Church is for the most part constituted, attained salvation, faith, and grace from God's mercy alone.

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The Jews, however, as though from a debt because of the faith given to their fathers. Paul explains this more elegantly and broadly in Romans 15: "For I say that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision," etc. "But the Gentiles over mercy," etc. Therefore so that this gratuitous election of God might always be retained in the memory of the Gentiles, she is called Church. Hence also in Romans 9 Paul cites the first and second chapters of Hosea concerning the congregation of the Gentiles under the name of calling: "I shall call that which is not my people, my people, and her who was not beloved, beloved, and her who had not obtained mercy, one who has obtained mercy. And it shall be: in the place where it was said to them, you are not my people, there they shall be called sons of the living God." Behold, he always designates this Church of the Gentiles under the name of calling, so that by her own name she may be reminded of God's benefits and of her gratuitous election. Thirdly it must be noted that we can take this militant Church in two ways. Either for the universality of all who had, have, or will have faith in Christ, even if they do not agree in any other worship or exterior religion. St. Thomas speaks of the Church in this way in III, q. 8, a. 3, and the Doctors asserting that the Church now is the same as that which existed in the time of the law of nature and the Mosaic law. In this way she is also taken in chapter Firmiter, On the Supreme Trinity, and in the Extravagant Unam Sanctam, On Majority and Obedience, and chapter Ecclesia, De Consecratione, distinction 4. In these places it is said that outside the Church there is no salvation or remission of sins open to anyone. Or she can be taken for the collection of wayfarers whom faith unites and whose exterior profession is made in Baptism. If taken in the first way, she is well defined by Nicholas, as reported De Consecratione, distinction 1, chapter Ecclesia, as "the collection of all the faithful." If, however, she is taken in the second way, she can be defined as "the collection of baptized faithful." Or thus: "The visible collection of baptized faithful under one head, Christ in heaven and His vicar on earth." "Collection" is placed in the place of genus. For Church is a collective noun signifying a multitude. That she is contained under this genus is evident. For an animal body cannot be understood without many members, as Paul teaches Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12. But the Church is the body of the living Christ, as is said in Ephesians 4 and 5. Therefore she necessarily gathers many faithful. Secondly, Christ in the final chapter of Matthew, speaking with the Church, says: "Behold, I am with you all days." Therefore on all days there will be a collection of many. For "with you" signifies a multitude. The same is evident from John 14: "I shall give you another Paraclete, that He may remain with you forever." Paul designates this multitude of members in Ephesians 4: "Doing truth in charity, let us grow in Him in all things who is the head, Christ." And 1 Corinthians 12 from the middle of the chapter to the end. Thirdly, the Church is accustomed to be named house, city, kingdom. These names, although sometimes taken figuratively for a material place, properly are taken for a community of men. Hence Luke 2: "Because he was of the house and family of David." And Luke 19: "Seeing the city, He wept over it, saying: If you also had known." And Luke 11: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be desolated." But none of these communities or collections is preserved in one man alone. Therefore neither is the Church, which properly is called the house of God, as in 1 Timothy 3: "How you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God." She is also called city, according to Revelation 21: "I saw the holy city descending from heaven," etc. And kingdom, as the gloss notes upon 1 Corinthians 15: "When He shall have delivered the kingdom to God and the Father." Indeed from this reason it is gathered...

...that the Church is a collection of many existing simultaneously. For although a city or kingdom retains its unity through continual succession of men, nevertheless it always requires actually a multitude of several persons, such that in one alone the nature of city or kingdom is not preserved. Therefore neither will the nature of the Church be preserved if she gathers many only at diverse times and at some time is preserved in one alone. This is confirmed from St. Augustine in the book On Faith to Peter, chapter 43, saying: "Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that the threshing floor of God is the Catholic Church, and within her until the end of the age chaff is contained with the wheat, that is, bad men are mingled with good through communion of the sacraments, and in every profession, whether of clerics, laymen, or monks, there are good and bad together." Thus he. Therefore the Church cannot at some time be preserved in one alone. Otherwise this mixture would not exist. Secondly this is confirmed from those things which will be said below, namely how there will always be bad men in the Church. And since otherwise we must also admit just men by necessity, it follows evidently that a collection must necessarily be posited. But what seems to move a doubt is whether this collection ought to be of many baptized faithful. Or would it be enough, for example, that it consist of one baptized person and other faithful who are not baptized, so that we preserve what faith teaches concerning the duration of the Church? The reason for the doubt is that the reasons and testimonies adduced show only that the Church will exist. And we would preserve her most properly by positing only one baptized person and other faithful not baptized. For no testimony or reason compels that there will be a Church of baptized persons. Indeed if someone were obstinate, saying that the Church is indeed to be preserved but in only one faithful person among those who live among us and in Enoch and Elijah, who are faithful and wayfarers, what censure would he deserve, since he shows a multitude and collection of many living faithful so as to preserve the Church? It is answered. It is of faith that the Church which we confess will endure is a Church of baptized persons, which in Spanish we call la Christiandad. And I judge the opposite heretical. It is proved first because, as we shall show below, the Church according to faith is visible, collected by some sensible sign. But the Church which these persons posit is not visible in this manner. For they are joined by faith alone, which is invisible. Therefore. Secondly it is proved. We confess by faith one holy Church and that her unity consists in the worship of one

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God and unity of faith and sacraments, which Paul comprehends under the name Baptism in Ephesians 4: "One Lord, one faith, one Baptism." And in chapter Est unitas, De Consecratione, distinction 4, the unity of the Church is placed in unity of the sacraments, in which nevertheless unity of worship and of things to be believed is included. But the unbaptized do not communicate in the same sacraments. For they lack the first door of the sacraments, namely Baptism. Therefore. Thirdly it is proved. The Church which Christ founded He built upon Peter and subjected to him, according to John 10: "There shall be one fold and one shepherd." But the unbaptized are not subject to him. Therefore. Fourthly. The unity of the Church is heterogeneous, as is clear from Sacred Scripture and especially from Paul, Ephesians 4, who posits the ecclesiastical hierarchy as enduring until the day of judgment when he says that He gave some Apostles, others Prophets, others Evangelists, others Pastors and Doctors, etc., until we all meet in a perfect man. But this distinction of bishops and ministers cannot be preserved in one baptized person alone. Therefore. From this reason it also follows that the Church cannot be preserved in women alone. For women are not permitted by Paul to teach, 1 Corinthians 14. Nor can a woman feed, since she cannot possess spiritual jurisdiction. Likewise the sacrament of the Eucharist will endure until the end of the age, 1 Corinthians 11: "As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall announce the death of the Lord until He comes," namely the Lord on the day of judgment. But the minister of this sacrament cannot be a woman. Therefore. From these things it also follows that the Church cannot be preserved in a multitude of baptized infants alone. We assert this against a certain Bartholomew of Majorca from the island of Minorca, around the year of the Lord 1363, who asserted that the Church in the time of Antichrist ought to consist only of baptized infants. For he said that all other Christians would be corrupted by Antichrist. Fifthly it is proved. We confess by faith that Church to whom God promised in John 14 the Spirit of truth who would teach all things necessary for salvation, and with whom He promised that He would remain until the consummation of the age, Matthew last chapter. But He promised this to no other congregation except that which in matters of faith to be believed possesses an external rule and is subject to it, namely the Church of baptized persons. Therefore. Sixthly. We confess the Apostolic Church which is founded upon the doctrine of the Apostles. But this is the Church of baptized persons: "Going," says Matthew in the final chapter, "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Therefore. Finally, this is the certain opinion of all the faithful, even rustics, that there will always be a multitude of baptized persons. Therefore. From these things those two clauses "collection of baptized persons" remain explained. The third clause is "of the faithful," which is placed to exclude heretics, who do not pertain to the Church. It is proved first from testimonies of the saints. Cyprian asserts this in Book I, Letter 3 to Cornelius and Letter 6 to Magnus; Gregory, Moralia XII, chapter 15; Jerome, volume IV, Dialogue Against the Luciferians, and on Isaiah 7 and Hosea 1, where he also distinguishes them against the Church; and Augustine, volume I, Book On True Religion, chapter 5, and On Faith to Peter, chapters 38 and 39, volume III, and Psalm 130 upon: "Like one weaned upon his mother." And elsewhere frequently. The same is held in chapter Firmissime, On Heretics. It is proved by reason. First, the Church which is espoused to Christ is a virgin, according to 2 Corinthians 11: "I espoused you to one husband as a chaste virgin." But God had said in Hosea 2: "I will espouse you to myself in faith." For virginity signifies integrity of faith. Therefore those who do not possess it, such as heretics, are not espoused to Christ and thus are not of the Church. Secondly, heretics are cut off from the Church. Therefore. The antecedent is proved because union with Christ and His Church is made through supernatural cognition and love. A heretic possesses neither. Therefore he does not pertain to the Church. This is explained more. Every member receives some influence from the head. Heretics have no supernatural influence of this kind, because they do not have faith, which is the principle of the rest. Therefore none. The consequence is proved because the Church, since she is a certain supernatural commonwealth, necessarily must be constituted by something supernatural. But the first foundation of supernatural being is faith, according to Colossians 1. Therefore. It is also placed to exclude other unbelievers, such as Jews and pagans, whom it is much more certain do not pertain to the Church, as is held throughout the title On Jews and Saracens and in chapter Firmissime, On Heretics.

The fourth clause is placed to exclude schismatics from the Church. For since they are not within the Church and are truly faithful and baptized, this clause is necessary, namely "under one visible head who is Christ's vicar on earth." That they are not within the Church is clear from cause 24, q. 1, chapter Schisma and chapter Pudenda, and expressly in the cited chapter Firmissime, On Heretics. Cajetan disputes this below in q. 39, and Torquemada, Book IV of his Summa, chapters 3 to 7. But it must be noted that because the Supreme Pontiff, who is head of the Church, can also be a schismatic, as will be disputed below q. 39, and he can defect and withdraw from himself who is head, the notion of head can be taken in two ways. Either materially, for the person who is Pontiff and Pope. Or formally, for the office of head, which is to rule, govern, and exercise some influence upon the members. Therefore a Pontiff who wishes to separate himself from the community of the Church, through which he falls into schism, is not subject even to one visible head formally. For he exercises no influence nor ministers anything to the Church from which he separates himself. Therefore he too is comprehended under the aforesaid clause. Indeed from this distinction it is explained how many who separate themselves from the head are members of the Church. For we have often seen wars waged against the Pontiff by Catholics and many kingdoms separated from him, indeed rising against him, which nevertheless we confess are contained within the unity of the Church because they do not separate themselves from the visible head formally with respect to his functions, namely to be fed by doctrine and truth, but materially from the

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person who is head. These things having been thus explained, this first assertion remains manifest: the Church is the collection of all baptized faithful who are subject to one visible head as Christ's vicar. But for greater elucidation of this let there be a second conclusion. Whoever possesses the conditions placed above and explained in the definition of the Church will pertain to her as a part and be contained in her bosom, even if he has nothing else. This conclusion is established as of faith against heretics who required many other things in men so that they might pertain to the unity of the Church and asserted that these were not sufficient. Some demanded integrity of life, perfection, and holiness of morals so that someone might be numbered among the sons of the Church. Thus the Donatists asserted, Augustine being witness in Book III Against the Letter of Parmenian, chapter 2 at the end, volume VII. Of this faction seem to have been the Novatians, who were also called Cathars, that is "pure" and "holy." And among Lutherans, the Anabaptists. The Begards and Beguines also followed the same opinion. Others among the Lutherans, speaking more remissly, did not demand perfect justice and an altogether immaculate life in members of the Church, but only justifying grace, and excluded from her bosom those who were wicked and sinners. Others, among whom were John Hus and John Wycliffe, sought nothing supernatural in those who pertained to the unity of the Church except the grace of predestination. Thus they numbered only the predestined among members of the Church, even if in act they were unbelievers, while all others whom God foreknew, even if they were most just, they asserted to be outside the universality of the Church. With these, unless piously explained, Ferus seems to agree on John 17: "I have manifested Your name to men," asserting that none except the predestined believe and thus none except they pertain to the Church. But concerning this see the Sacred Library, Book VI, annotation 214. Others were divided into other opinions, which, because it would be too long to pursue, we omit, mentioning only the more illustrious errors. Against all these, therefore, we proposed the aforesaid conclusion. We shall refute them first by common reasons against all, then by special arguments and testimonies. First, therefore, it is argued against all. That servant who did not have mercy on his fellow servant and was delivered to torturers, Matthew 18, is reckoned to pertain to the Church of God, named the kingdom of heaven. And he who, while the master was absent, began to strike his fellow servants, whose portion was placed with unbelievers, Luke 12. And that man who entered the wedding without a wedding garment and therefore was cast into exterior darkness, Matthew 22. And those five foolish virgins to whom the door was closed and who before had slept and slumbered, Matthew 25. These were sinners, not perfect, and were not predestined. Therefore even imperfect and evil men pertain to the Church. Likewise the Church of God is compared in Matthew 3 to a threshing floor in which chaff to be burned is contained with the wheat. And chapter 13 she is likened to a net in which good and bad fish are gathered, which nevertheless afterward are cast out. Therefore. Again in the same chapter she is likened to a field in which cockle is sown together with good seed, which afterward was to be gathered into bundles and burned. Therefore. Likewise St. Paul, 2 Timothy 2, compares the Church to a great house in which are contained vessels of gold and silver, wood and clay, some unto honor and others unto dishonor. By honorable vessels of gold and silver he understands the good and just. Hence he adds: "If anyone shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor." But by the latter he understands bad men and those foreknown. Therefore. Likewise Genesis 15 and 22 the seed of Abraham, that is the faithful as Paul explains in Romans 4, is compared to the stars of heaven and the sand of the sea. But neither the just nor the perfect nor the predestined are so numerous. Indeed few are chosen. Therefore. Many other things could be brought forward, but let these testimonies suffice. Now it is argued by reason. First, otherwise it follows that the Church is not certain and visible, whose contrary we shall show below to be of faith. It is clear because no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love and much less whether he is predestined. Therefore since the good, perfect, or predestined cannot be recognized, the Church could not be recognized. This is confirmed. By the same reason it follows that no ecclesiastical jurisdiction would be certain. For since this jurisdiction cannot be possessed except by a son of the Church, and it is unknown whether the Pontiff or any bishop is predestined, good, or perfect, his jurisdiction will be uncertain and null. Likewise no one could be punished by the Church for his crimes, which is against Paul's doctrine in 1 Corinthians 5 delivering a certain man to Satan, and saying to others in 1 Corinthians 4: "Do you wish me to come to you with a rod?" The same reason makes the consequence clear. For the faithful cannot judge those who are outside. But it is unknown whether the one to be punished possesses the aforesaid conditions, namely predestination, grace, perfection. Therefore.

Specially against the first error it is argued from 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us." And he adds: "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins." Observe that he says "our sins," namely of the Apostles themselves. Christ also taught them in Matthew 6 to pray: "Forgive us our debts." This is confirmed from Daniel 9, where he himself says: "When I confessed my sins and the sins of my people." From this testimony those are more openly refuted who say that the Apostles spoke in this way not for themselves but for the people: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us," 1 John 1. And James 3: "In many things we all offend." For Daniel, concerning whose holiness testimony is rendered in Ezekiel 14, nevertheless distinguishes his own sins from the sins of the people. Likewise Hebrews 5: The priest, because he was surrounded by infirmity, had need to offer sacrifice for himself. And Galatians 2: Cephas is judged reprehensible by Paul. Likewise drunkenness overtook Noah, Genesis 9, and Job confesses many of his sins, chapters 13 and 14, and nevertheless in Scripture testimony is rendered concerning their holiness. Likewise Paul in 2 Thessalonians 2, 1 Corinthians 1 and 4, and 2

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Corinthians 13, recognized a true Church in both peoples, and nevertheless afterward reprehends them and shows them subject to sins. Furthermore in Ephesians 4 the Apostle declares that the ecclesiastical hierarchy was given to the faithful until we all meet in a perfect man, etc., and are no longer children wavering. Therefore for as long as we do not meet, we are children defective in certain things. Furthermore Psalm 31: "I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and You forgave the impiety of my sin. For this every saint shall pray to You in a suitable time." Again 2 Corinthians 4: "Although he who is within, our man, is corrupted, nevertheless he who is without is renewed from day to day." If he is renewed from day to day, he has not been altogether perfectly renewed. Likewise Paul himself testifies of himself in Philippians 3: "Not that I have already received or am perfect." To this is added what is said of Moses, Aaron, and Samuel, whose virtues are greatly extolled in Scripture, in Psalm 98: "Taking vengeance on all their inventions." But vengeance is not inflicted by God except for sins, which he understands under the name inventions. And what Christ says to the just: "If you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more your heavenly Father," etc., Matthew 7. Certainly if they were not just, they would not be called sons of the heavenly Father. If they did not have sin, they would not be called evil. Likewise to Peter already clean and washed Christ says in John 13 that it is necessary for him to wash his feet, that is to wash away certain light faults. Likewise Revelation 1, 2, and 3, those bishops who are reported as just and concerning whom Scripture gives testimony that they have charity are admonished to do penance for certain sins for which they are there reproved. Likewise every branch bearing fruit is cleansed so that it may bear more fruit. Yet it would have nothing to be cleansed if it had no sin. We could refute this error by many other things, but let these suffice. Let those who wish read more in Augustine, Book On the Perfection of Justice after reasoning 16, volume VII; Book II On the Merits and Remission of Sins from chapters 7 to 16, volume VII; Books III Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapters 3 and 7, and Book IV, chapters 10 and 11, where in confirmation of this truth he reports Cyprian and Ambrose in many places of their works. Jerome should also be read in volume III, Book II Against Jovinian from the beginning through many chapters, and in the same volume Book I Against Pelagius. But it is argued by reasons. First. It follows that there will be no purgatory, which is contrary to the tradition of the Church, contrary to definitions of councils, and contrary to express Scripture, saying in 1 Corinthians 3: "He himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." The consequence is clear. For that fire purges the sins of imperfect sons of the Church. But there are many such. Therefore. Secondly it is proved. It follows that there would be no fraternal correction in the Church, which is against Matthew 18: "If your brother sins against you," namely he who is a son of the Church, "correct him between you and him alone," etc. The consequence is clear. For where there is perfect justice and no sin, there is nothing to be corrected. Thirdly it is proved. It follows that sacramentals are not necessary to the faithful, such as holy water, episcopal blessing, etc. The consequence is clear because these are established for remission of sins. But these sins would not be in the Church. Therefore they would not be necessary. The consequent is against the tradition of the Church. Fourthly it is proved. It follows that one who keeps the commandments does not enter life, contrary to Matthew 19: "If you wish to enter life, keep the commandments." The consequence is clear because commandments can be observed by imperfect persons having some light sins. But these do not enter eternal life. Therefore. I prove the minor. No one enters there unless he is a son of the Church. But those imperfect persons are not such, since they do not have complete perfection of life which these men require in members of the Church. Therefore. But behold upon what foundation their madness rests. They say that it is commanded that we be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect, Matthew 5. And the same, they say, is commanded by Moses, Deuteronomy 18, and by Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: "Be perfect." And 1 Peter 1: "Having girded the loins of your mind, sober, perfectly hope," etc. Therefore one who does not fulfill this precept, it is not surprising if he does not enter life, since he does not observe all the commandments. Again Matthew 22 says: "The first and greatest commandment is that we love God from the whole soul and whole mind, whole heart and all our powers." But in this consists total perfection. For one who loves in this way cannot sin. Therefore. Nevertheless these things do not compel us to deviate from Catholic faith. To the first, from the book On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16, and Jerome, Book I Against Pelagius, it is answered that those testimonies understand perfection in one virtue, not perfection simply in all. Or they understand perfection in knowledge of truth, especially this, that men cannot exist without sin. But because perfection simply spoken consists in charity, as St. Thomas teaches II-II, q. 184, a. 3, the text which simply commands perfection seems to command this. And since this cannot exist without perfection of the other virtues, it seems to speak of total perfection of affection. Therefore it is answered otherwise from St. Thomas in the place cited above, article 2, that perfection of Christian life, which consists in charity, since it imports a certain totality, this totality can be considered in three ways.

First on the part of the object loved, so that one loves God as much as He is lovable in Himself. This is possible to God alone. Or on the part of the lover according to absolute totality, namely insofar as the affection according to its whole power is always actually borne toward God. This is possible only to the blessed. The

third is considered only with respect to total exclusion of those things which are repugnant to charity or impede its progress and increase. With this many venial sins can coexist well, which are not opposed to charity but to its fervor. And Sacred Scripture brought forward above incites and exhorts us to this, and any others there are of the same meaning. To the second it is answered altogether the same: that to love from the whole heart according to the absolute totality of the lover excludes every sin. But not if "from the whole heart" is

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taken according to the third mode and species of perfection. According to this the precept is given. The solution is from the same St. Thomas below, q. 44, a. 4, ad 2. Against the second error also, besides those things which we said in common, there are certain others concerning which Augustine treats broadly in On the Unity of the Church, chapters 13-16; Book III On Christian Doctrine, chapter 3; upon the title of Psalm 8; the preface to Psalm 25 in the second exposition; Psalm 47 upon: "We have received Your mercy, O God," etc.; the preface to Psalm 51; Psalm 119 upon: "With the inhabitants of Cedar"; again Psalm 8 upon: "Also the beasts of the field"; and again Psalm 10 upon: "That they may shoot in darkness the upright of heart." He pursues the same most broadly in the books On the City of God, especially Books XV and XVI. See also the same author, Book III Against the Letters of Petilian and Book III Against the Letter of Parmenian, and Against the Donatists After the Conference, chapters 20 and 21. Jerome also in volume II, Dialogue Against the Luciferians near the end treats this. Let us bring forward a few things. First there is Canticles 2: "As a lily among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters." Augustine frequently, especially Psalm 99, volume VIII, explains this that thorns, that is bad men and sinners, are also sons of the Church. For he does not say "among strangers" but "among other daughters." With this agrees the same chapter: "As an apple tree among the trees of the forests, so is my beloved among the sons," where he calls those also sons who are sterile in virtues. Likewise: "I am black but beautiful, like the tents of Cedar, like the skins of Solomon," chapter 1. Blackness and deformity could not be attributed to the Church unless sinners were contained in her. Likewise Revelation chapters 1, 2, and 3 commemorate not only light sins but even graver and mortal ones, and nevertheless it says those committing them are of the Church. Again Paul writes that there is a Church among the Corinthians, 1 Corinthians 5, and among the Galatians, Galatians 5. Yet there he recognizes fornicators, incestuous persons, adulterers, seditious men, and those who from envy announce the word of God. Therefore he reckons these sinners to be within the Church. Furthermore Christ admonishes that we do what prelates say but not imitate their works, Matthew 23. Therefore Christ understands that bad men can be even principal parts in the Church. There are also added to the reasons made above other ones. First, otherwise there would be no excommunication in the Church, which is contrary to Matthew 18: "If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and publican." The consequence is clear because excommunication pertains only to faithful sinners. Likewise the king's servants gathered to the wedding whoever they found, good and bad, Matthew 22. It is established that under the name wedding faith by which we are espoused to Christ is signified. Therefore. Furthermore in that mystical sheet which Peter saw in ecstasy clean and unclean animals were contained, as also in Noah's ark, Acts 10. By these things according to the gloss the aforesaid truth was figured. Finally certain branches adhere to Christ which do not bear fruit, which nevertheless are not immediately cut off but are to be cut off, John 15. Secondly it would follow that the sacrament of Penance is not necessary, which per se is required only for faithful sinners. Thirdly, from this follows the greatest consolation to the faithful when they know through faith that they are of Christ's family, and the greatest glory of Christ because from this the people of God is larger: "In the multitude of the people is the dignity of the king; in the smallness of the people the shame of the prince," as is said Proverbs 14. Fourthly, sinners are truly Christians. Therefore they are of the Church. For after promulgation of the Gospel the Church is the collection of Christians. The antecedent is of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 28. Likewise it is argued. Both in political and monastic communities those are reckoned citizens who violate the laws of their own commonwealth. Therefore similarly in the Christian commonwealth he will be reckoned a citizen who professes her laws even if he violates them. Sixthly, the Apostle teaches in Romans 12 that there are many members in one body of the Church possessing diverse offices for the utility of others, all of which he commemorates there saying: "To one indeed through the Spirit the word of wisdom," etc., and some He placed in the Church, then Doctors. But not all prophets nor all who work miracles are just. Therefore this is not required in order to be a member of the Church. The minor is proved from Matthew 7: "Did we not prophesy in Your name, cast out demons, perform many mighty works?" Yet to these it is said that they are workers of iniquity and that the Lord never knew them. Likewise Peter, when he denied the Lord, was an Apostle, and Judas, whom Christ calls a devil, is said to be from the twelve chosen Apostles. Therefore sinners pertain to the Church. Against the third error, besides the common places adduced, others can still be brought forward. First, 1 Corinthians 12 says: "In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body." Therefore through Baptism and profession of faith we pertain to the body of the Church, not through divine predestination. Secondly, the Lord says that He will cut off the branch not bearing fruit and cast it into the fire, John 15. Therefore if it is cut off, it was joined to the Church. Thirdly, 1 Peter 2 says: "Who once were not the people of God, but now are the people of God." Likewise Ephesians 2: "You were alienated from the way of life of Israel and strangers to the covenants; but now you are citizens of the saints and members of God's household." But if some were of the Church, which is the city and people of God, only through predestination, this variation could not be found, that one who was not the people of God became the people of God. For God's predestination is certain and unchangeable. Fourthly, John 1 says: "He gave them power to become sons of God, to those who believe in His name." Therefore through faith we are made sons of God. Again, if through divine predestination we attained this sonship, it would not be in our power to attain it, just as predestination does not depend upon our will. Fifthly, Matthew 13 says that from the kingdom of the Son of Man Christ all who do iniquity are to be gathered so as to be cast into the furnace of fire. But we said above that this kingdom is the Church. Therefore. Sixthly, Matthew 8 says that many will come from east and west into the kingdom of heaven, but the sons of the kingdom will be cast into exterior darkness. Therefore the sons of the kingdom, which is the Church, are not constituted through predestination.
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Seventhly, we said above that prophets and those possessing grace of miracles are of the Church. Yet it is said to them: "I never knew you," Matthew 7. Eighthly, Romans 8 says: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God." Therefore they are also sons of the Church, which is the spouse of God, whoever possesses His Spirit, even if they are not predestined. And 1 Thessalonians 5: "You are sons of light and sons of God." And immediately he shows in what consists being sons of day and of God, saying: "But we who are of the day, let us be sober, having put on the breastplate of faith and charity and the helmet, hope of salvation." Therefore. Again Ephesians 4: "Doing truth in charity, let us grow in Him in all things who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body compacted and connected by every joint of supply," etc. There all the holy Doctors assert that the bonds and connections of the members of Christ's body are made through faith and charity. Therefore predestination is not required for union of the Church. Furthermore 1 John 3 places the difference between sons of God and sons of the devil in that the sons of God are those who do justice, but the sons of the devil those who commit sin, that is unbelief, as Augustine explains in Book III Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 3, volume VII. For in this manner "sin" is accustomed to be named in the Scriptures, according to John 15: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin." They would indeed have other sins, but would not have the sin of unbelief. Since therefore John distinguishes sons of God and of the devil according to unbelief and justice, they cannot be distinguished according to predestination and reprobation. Likewise the Apostles are called sons of the bridegroom, according to Matthew 9: "The sons of the bridegroom cannot fast for as long as the bridegroom is with them." He speaks expressly of the Apostles. Similarly it was said in refutation of the preceding error from Romans 12 that the Apostles are of the Church. Yet one of the Apostles, a son of the bridegroom and consequently of the bride, namely the Church, was damned, namely Judas. Therefore. Finally, this opinion was condemned in the Council of Constance, Session 15, volume II of councils, where many other propositions of the same man which followed from the aforesaid opinion were also condemned. For example: that no one, when justified, begins to be a member of Christ if he was not one before, nor when he sins ceases to be a member of Christ if he was one before. Likewise that Paul and the thief when they were unbelievers were members of Christ, and that Judas also when he followed Christ in grace was a member of the devil. Nor is it necessary here to multiply reasons against this heresy, such as that being a member of the Church would be a mere being of reason, since predestination places nothing in the predestined, and that the fact someone is a part or member of the Church would in no way unite him to the head and other members, nor would he receive anything from the head or possess any life, even vegetative, and other things of this kind. For the proof brought forward from Scriptures and councils suffices.

These things having been supposed, the arguments for the opposite are answered. To the first, the major is denied speaking of the Church of human wayfarers. To the proof the consequence is denied. For angels possessed true faith of the same species as ours and nevertheless were not members of this Church. I say secondly that a member, although it is something absolute constituted through something intrinsic, nevertheless also includes a relation of proportion to other parts of the body insofar as it receives from them or serves and ministers to them. Therefore when other members do not exist, it will not be a member according to the complete and absolute notion, though it will be so incompletely as regards intrinsic and absolute things. Therefore Adam before formation of Eve was in this manner a member as regards the absolute nature of member, yet not as regards the complete notion because of lack of other members. To Jerome it is answered that he speaks expressly of the formal constituent of the Church. For he says that the Church consists not in walls but in truth of dogmas. And he adds that there is the true Church where true faith exists. By this he does not exclude the other requisites as though from the side of matter or subject, which is the collection of many. To the second it is commonly answered that the Master speaks of the Church of the just alone, for whose congregation we said above that this name Church is often taken. And to what he says, that the Church of the just then existed in Abel or Enoch because only they are reported as just, they adduce an example. For Hebrews 7 says that Melchizedek is without father, without mother, and without genealogy because his parents are not reported, not because he had none. In the same way we could say Elijah was without father and mother and without beginning of days because these things are not reported concerning him in Scripture, but with no mention of these matters he is suddenly introduced in 3 Kings 17, only his country being mentioned. We can adduce another example. Matthew 1 says that all the generations from David to the transmigration are fourteen. Nevertheless it is clear that there were more, as can be seen in 3 Kings 22 and 2 Chronicles 21. For Joram, who there is said to have begotten Ozias, did not beget him, but Ochozias; Ochozias begot Joas; Joas Amasias; Amasias Ozias. Nevertheless because more are not reported there, it says all those generations were fourteen. Thus therefore they answer that Augustine said only those men were of the Church because only those are reported as just. But although we could in some manner sustain this concerning the time of Abel, when Adam and Eve themselves were already just - for Wisdom 10 says that wisdom brought Adam out from his crime, although in that history this is not reported but in another book - nevertheless the same is not so probably asserted concerning the time of Enoch. For as is clear in Genesis 5, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalaleel, and Jared lived in the time of Enoch. Yet these are reported to have been just. The major is clear because from the time Seth begot Enos until the birth of Enoch only 387 years elapsed, as is clear there. But Seth and the other aforesaid men lived after the aforesaid generation at least eight hundred years. Therefore they lived together with Enoch, Scripture reporting it. The minor is certain from reading St. Augustine in the books On the City of God, especially Books XV and XVI, where he shows by many things that

this genealogy of Seth was the series of the just. For this reason they are called sons of God, distinguished against daughters of men, and in their generations the years in which they began to beget are noted, which is not done in the generations of sinners, sons of Cain. The other things which he there adduces concerning Seth and the common tradition of the saints show him to have been a just man. And concerning Enos...

The Church may be said to err in the aforesaid custom because she imprudently commands it to be observed for the reverence of the sacrament. An assertion of this kind is worthy of the censure which we expressed in the conclusion. And for this reason I think that Martin V spoke disjunctively when he decreed that the aforesaid assertors were to be condemned either as heretics or as savoring of heresy, because he understood the twofold sense of that assertion explained by us. Therefore the hesitation of my teacher, Master Cano, does not please us in this matter, in Book V of the Places, in the final question, conclusion 2. For without the aforesaid distinction he seems to censure the assertion more mildly than he ought. It is true, however, that a little afterward he adduces an example more suitable to our conclusion. For example, the Lutherans condemn the custom of carrying the Sacrament of the Eucharist solemnly in procession through the public streets. If, therefore, we consider the origin of this condemnation, it is heresy; for they ridicule this custom because they deny the true presence of Christ in the sacrament. But if the aforesaid assertion is considered absolutely in itself, it savors of heresy and is rash impudence, yet it is not heresy. For even if the Church were to act imprudently in this custom, her authority in things necessary for salvation would not thereby be weakened. For the same reason, in the Council of Trent, Session XIII, canon 6, it is defined: "If anyone says that in the holy Sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is not to be adored with the worship of latria, even external, and therefore is not to be venerated with a special festive celebration, nor solemnly carried about in processions according to the laudable and universal custom of the Church, let him be anathema." Observe that it does not simply strike with anathema those who condemn the rite of the Church, but those who condemn it because they deny the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist and therefore do not admit His adoration and worship. Likewise, it is not absolutely heretical to believe that the Church can sometimes err in the canonization of some saint or in the celebration of a feast, as we shall say afterward. But to assert that the Church errs in certain customs which she observes as handed down from Christ and the Apostles is plainly heretical. For he would be a heretic who asserted with the Iconoclasts that the Church errs in the veneration and worship of images. Our conclusion, therefore, is to be understood of certain other customs introduced after the Apostles.

Fourth conclusion. In matters of morals which are not common to the whole Church, but which concern private persons, it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err through ignorance, or even through malice. This **conclusion is proved from Alexander III, On the Sentence of Excommunication, chapter A nobis 2, where he** says: "The judgment of God always rests upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows opinion, and it often happens both to deceive and to be deceived. Hence it sometimes happens that one who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence." Thus he speaks. The reason is manifest, because the judgment of the Church in matters of this kind depends upon human testimony, which is uncertain. Here, however, it must be observed that the Church or the Pontiff can much more easily be deceived and err in the judicial judgment of facts than in precepts and laws directed to some particular church. A forensic judgment can fall away from the truth through the ignorance, even inculpable, of the judging Pontiff, because it depends upon uncertain testimonies of men. A forensic judgment can also be perverted through the malice of the judge. Although such malice is not easily to be believed of a Pontiff, nevertheless, if it be admitted that some Pontiff through malice perverts judgment in a particular forensic sentence, the Apostolic See is not thereby derogated from, because an error of this kind in judgment is personal. For in that action he does not exercise the office of Supreme Pontiff toward the whole Church, but the office of judge concerning a particular cause between private persons; and therefore it will not be surprising if through avarice or some other human affection he perverts judgment. But in imposing laws upon some church, for example the diocese of Salamanca or another particular church, it is not credible that the Supreme Pontiff should err through malice or ignorance - I mean, should err perniciously against the Gospel or the natural law. The reason is that legislation of this kind does not depend upon the testimony of men, but upon the Pontiff's own motion, by which he judges such precepts and laws to be fitting. This is confirmed because such a church, by observing laws of this kind, would not seem to err, but would have an excuse before God, since the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ, commands that it be done. Just as the same reason applies when the Supreme Pontiff, having been questioned by some particular church, defines a dogma as if he had been questioned by the whole universal Church, so also, since there is one faith in the Church, it is necessary that the morals necessary for salvation be the same.

Therefore I would not dare to affirm absolutely that the Supreme Pontiff can, even through ignorance, err in making laws and giving precepts to some particular and private church, except in the manner in which we conceded that he can err in making laws for the whole Church according to prudence, by multiplying laws which are unnecessary or not very fitting, indeed in some manner inconvenient, though not pernicious or unjust. And thus, it seems to me, a certain conclusion of Master Cano is to be understood, which he places third in the passage cited above, where he says: "In morals not common to the whole Church, but which are referred to private men or churches, the Church can err through ignorance." But certainly he does not

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sufficiently prove the conclusion unless it is restricted to forensic judgment concerning matters of fact. For what he adduces there concerning the canonization of saints does not pertain to one private church, but to the universal Church. Nor does he distinguish, concerning private churches, whether that error in making laws can be pernicious through ignorance. Moreover, when he says that the Church can err in laws of this kind, either he speaks of the Church as a legitimately assembled general council, or under the name of the Church he understands the Supreme Pontiff. If he speaks of a legitimately assembled council, there seems to be no difference, as regards its ability or inability to err, between making laws for the whole universal Church and making them for some private church; for in neither manner can it err perniciously, because in either manner it uses its authority in the name of the whole Church. Likewise, if he speaks of the Supreme Pontiff precisely insofar as he is Supreme Pontiff - in which capacity he can also make laws for private churches - it is false that through ignorance he can err perniciously. The reason is that then he uses the office of pastor of the Church. Indeed, I scarcely find any difference between laws made by the Pontiff for the whole universal Church and those made for some private church, provided that with respect to either he conducts himself as Supreme Pontiff and Vicar of Christ. Nevertheless, someone might assign this difference: it can happen that the Supreme Pontiff, not by his own motion but from false information concerning facts in some private church, is moved to make a universal law concerning that church, which law may be harmful to that private church. For example, if it were falsely reported to the Pontiff that in some bishopric all the priests were heretics or infected with some other scandalous vice, and the Pontiff, persuaded of this, were to make some law to be observed in that bishopric - for example, commanding under censures that for some time none of the faithful confess his sins to a priest - then a law of this kind would be observed perniciously. But concerning the whole universal Church such ignorance in the Pontiff does not seem admissible, so that he would impose a similar precept upon the whole Church. Yet this difference does not seem pertinent to the present matter, because precepts of this kind, which depend upon information concerning facts, seem more like judicial sentences than absolute laws. Consequently, in laws of this kind I do not see why the Supreme Pontiff could not err through ignorance, whether he imposes precepts upon the whole Church or upon a private church. Nevertheless, I shall never admit that the error would be pernicious. For if from the observance of laws of this kind something in fact follows which is contrary to divine or natural law, it is not the intention of the Pontiff that his precepts be observed; rather, the faithful themselves are bound to inform the Pontiff of the truth of the fact, according to the canonical decree in the chapter Si quando, On Rescripts, where it is said: "If at any time we direct to your fraternity certain things which seem to exasperate your mind, you ought not to be disturbed," etc. "Considering diligently the quality of the business concerning which we write to you, either reverently fulfill our mandate, or by your letters present a reasonable cause why you cannot fulfill it." Therefore laws of this kind will not be pernicious through the ignorance of the Pontiff, even if they are proposed to the whole Church. For the legislator himself already warns by a universal law that precepts of this kind, which depend upon information concerning facts, are not to be understood as absolutely binding. I therefore do not wish to admit that the Pontiff through ignorance makes pernicious laws. Much less is it to be admitted that the Supreme Pontiff errs perniciously in making laws absolutely and by his own motion.

From what has been said it is easy to answer the arguments to the contrary. To the first argument it is answered that such an error can be imagined concerning morals necessary for the salvation of the Church that it would redound even to the destruction of faith. For example, if the Supreme Pontiff were to establish a law that no one receive Communion until the thirtieth year, or, at the other extreme, that all the faithful receive Communion every day. Either law would destroy the reverence of the sacrament and consequently endanger faith concerning it. But even granting that the foundation of faith were not destroyed, it nevertheless does not follow that the Supreme Pontiff can err in making laws concerning any morals whatsoever. For the unity of the Church consists not only in the unity of faith, but also in the worship and use of the sacraments necessary for salvation. Moreover, it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to provide the nourishment necessary for the salvation of the faithful. Therefore he can make no laws contrary to the Gospel or to natural reason. To the second argument it is answered that, although this law or another pontifical law is not divinely revealed, nevertheless it has been divinely revealed to us that to Peter and his successors there was given the power necessary for feeding the flock of the Lord, not only with the nourishment of true faith, but also concerning necessary morals, by fitting statutes and laws, and certainly never by laws contrary to the salvation of the faithful. To the

third argument it is answered that the Supreme Pontiff never revokes the statutes and laws of his predecessors if such revocation would be pernicious to the Church. Nevertheless, there can be many ecclesiastical laws which are prudently changed according to the variety of times. Statutes of this kind, even those made by the Apostles themselves which were fitting for their own time, have been abrogated. An example is Acts 15, where the Gentiles are commanded to abstain from things strangled and from blood. This was a positive law fitting for that time, lest the Gentiles should be an object of horror to the Jewish faithful with whom they lived. But afterward, with the passage of time, that law was abrogated. There are besides other laws which, although not unjust, concern matters not so necessary or fitting that human reason and prudence cannot judge it more suitable to abrogate them. Indeed, perhaps changes of laws of this kind are sometimes most fitting for manifesting pontifical authority and for exercising the simplicity and obedience of the faithful toward the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ the Lord on earth. From what has been said it follows with how great veneration the decrees of the sacred Council of Trent concerning reform are to be

received and esteemed. I say this especially because of those who, not without rashness, dare to call into doubt the decree of Session XXV, chapter 5, concerning the enclosure of nuns: whether the Supreme Pontiff can command perpetual enclosure to nuns who have not professed it. They try to confirm this by the following reason: a prelate neither ought nor can increase or diminish the vow of a subject, as is cited from St. Bernard; therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot by precept and censure compel nuns to that enclosure which they themselves have not professed. But it is astonishing that this reason should appear probable to men otherwise learned, and that on account of it they produce extraordinary glosses and interpretations of the aforesaid decree, although the Council and afterward the Supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII, by their own motions, leave no room for doubt. For they will and command that no congregation of women in which solemn religious profession is made may go outside its convent, and that no inferior prelate may grant permission to go out, except perhaps in one or another case in which the reason of natural law and charity seems to demand that permission. This statute is pious and holy, and is to be observed with that rigor which is commanded both in the Council and in the proper motu proprio documents of the Supreme Pontiffs.

The theological reason by which a statute of this kind is shown to be just and holy is this: the Supreme Pontiff has full power to establish those statutes which are judged conducive to the common good of ecclesiastical discipline and to the observance of religion. But experience had shown that, after the multiplication of many communities of religious women, the solemn vow of chastity could scarcely be preserved as it ought if such a multitude of religious women had easy permission to leave their convents or monasteries; whence both religion and the name of religion suffered no small detriment and disgrace. Therefore, wishing to meet so great an evil, the Pontiffs could and ought to use their authority, commanding that henceforth no professed religious woman leave her monastery, convent, or congregation without the special faculty of the Supreme Pontiff himself. For the Supreme Pontiff is not only the supreme guardian and protector of the assembly of the faithful, but also of religious institutes; and therefore he can reserve to himself permission of this kind to go outside the convent. Indeed, if it were necessary for the good government of monks and other religious that they not easily wander away from their convents or outside their prescribed bounds, the Supreme Pontiff could and ought to enclose even us men within our convents, although we had never professed enclosure of this kind. For where the common good of the Church or of religion is endangered, it is most fitting that private persons suffer something, even if it seems contrary to their liberty. The argument to the contrary is easily answered from the theological reason by which we have shown that it is necessary, and that the Supreme Pontiff can do this. Nor does the Supreme Pontiff thereby increase the vow of a religious woman. For he does not command religious women to vow enclosure, but he uses their ancient vow of obedience, by which they are specially bound to obey superiors in lawful and honorable things according to their state. It is most fitting to the religious state that not only women, but also men, never leave the house without the permission of a superior; and this permission, when necessary, the supreme prelate can reserve to himself. It is further asked, seventhly and consequently, whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in the canonization of saints. The first argument for the affirmative. No one can be so certain of the state and holiness of another as he can be of himself, according to 1 Corinthians 2: "No one knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him." But no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love, as Ecclesiastes 9 has it. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot judge with certainty concerning the holiness of any man unless he is made certain by a special revelation. The second argument. Every judgment which rests upon a fallible medium can be false. But in the judgment concerning the canonization of saints the Church rests upon human testimony, in which witnesses are questioned concerning the life and miracles of the one to be canonized. Therefore it seems that the Church can err in the canonization of saints. And this is confirmed, for St. Thomas, Quodlibet IX, final

article, and other Doctors, judge concerning the canonization of saints that it can piously be believed that the

Church does not err in a matter of this kind. But to the contrary: an error of this kind in canonizing saints would be exceedingly pernicious if the whole Church venerated as holy and blessed one who is damned in hell. Therefore in so grave a matter the universal judgment of the Church cannot be false.

On this question the heretic Wycliffe used to say that it was exceedingly presumptuous for the Pope or the Church, without a special revelation, to judge that anyone is holy and blessed, even if it were confirmed by miracles, because such things are not certain signs of holiness, since they can be deceptions of demons. Against this error Waldensis wrote elegantly in the second volume On the Sacramentals, from chapter 122. For the determination of the truth, let the first conclusion be: It is heretical to deny that there is authority in the Church and in the Pontiff for canonizing saints. This conclusion is also against Luther, who, as Cochlaeus reports in the acts and writings of Luther for the year of the Lord 1524, raging against Adrian VI because he had enrolled Benno, Bishop of Meissen, in the catalogue of saints, published a little book to which he gave in the German vernacular the title Against the New Idol and the Old Devil, in which he says that the office of the Pope is nothing other than to kill true saints and exalt false ones. The conclusion is proved, first, from the tradition and perpetual usage of the Catholic Church and from the common consent of all councils and Fathers from the beginning of the nascent Church. For authority of this kind has always been believed and committed to the Church and the Pontiff. It is confirmed from the Council of Florence in the decree on the union of the Armenians, where the Armenians are commanded henceforth to venerate the most blessed Leo I as a saint and as deservedly enrolled in the catalogue of the saints. The conclusion is proved, second, because it is heretical to deny that the saints are to be invoked, as is evident from many councils, from the decretals in Book VI of the

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Decretals, from the Clementines and Extravagantes concerning relics and the veneration of saints, and finally from the Council of Trent, Session XXV, in the decree concerning the invocation, veneration, and relics of saints. Therefore there is authority in the Church for canonizing saints. The consequence is clear, because otherwise it would not be heretical to deny that those whom the Church has canonized are to be invoked and venerated. It is proved, third, that from Sacred Scripture it is certain that many saints of both the Old and New Testaments are in heaven, whose catalogue is given in Ecclesiasticus 44 and Hebrews 11. Likewise it would be manifest heresy to deny that the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, St. Stephen, and others like them, of whom mention is made in Sacred Scripture and whose holiness is celebrated there, are in glory. Therefore authority of this kind had to remain in the Church for the confirmation of the Christian religion and the exhortation of the faithful, while there are proposed to them the examples of saints whose souls are judged already now to be in glory. This is also expedient in order to show that the hand of the Lord has not been shortened, but that just as in the primitive Church there were Christians of outstanding holiness, so now and always until the consummation of the age there are and will be faithful distinguished by holiness of life. Second conclusion. It is very rash and scandalous, and savors of heresy, to say that the Pope or a council can err in the canonization of saints. The sense of the conclusion is not merely that the Pope cannot err by abusing his power - for we have already said that such an assertion would be heretical - but the sense is that to assert that some saint canonized by the Church or the Pontiff is not in heaven is very rash, scandalous, and savors of heresy.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

[Continuation of the preceding argument.] This is also said by St. Dionysius, chapter 5 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: just as we see the universal hierarchy terminated in Jesus, so each function is terminated in its proper divine hierarch, that is, in the bishop; therefore this divine power is immediately from God. Finally it is argued: if bishops had power only from the injunction made by the Supreme Pontiff, as though derived from him, it would follow that the Supreme Pontiff could at will remove all bishops and designate no others. The consequent seems false, because the Pontiff has power not for the destruction of the Church but for edification; but it would be the destruction of the Church if bishops were removable merely at will. Therefore, when bishops are designated by the Pontiff, their power is immediately from God, just as when the Pontiff is elected by the Cardinals his power is immediately from Christ.

Pope Vigilius, in the epistle to

Eucherius, says: "The Church itself which is first"—for he is speaking of the Roman Church—"judged that its offices should be shared with the other Churches in such a way that they are called to a part of the solicitude, not to the fullness of power." This is found from Pope Gregory in Decretum, 2, q. 6, and from Pope Julius in c. Qui se scit, in the same cause and question. From these words it seems established that the governing power of bishops is derived and handed down from the power of the Supreme Pontiff. In resolving this difficulty I have determined to reduce the various assertions of the doctors to a compendium and to define the difficult **question as briefly as I can. Therefore, omitting innumerable arguments which could be brought forward for**

the various opinions, I shall divide the present treatment into three parts. In the first, certain foundations are to be laid down as principles received by all Catholics, or certainly by the doctors. In the second, I shall establish certain conclusions concerning the power of prelates, by which the truth may become clear. In the third and last, I shall satisfy the arguments for the opposite side. FIRST FOUNDATION. There is in the Church a certain spiritual power which necessarily depends upon a visible sign. It is evident to all that priests and bishops possess spiritual power which no one else can exercise unless he has been sacramentally consecrated. For example, to ordain presbyters and priests and to consecrate churches belong to consecrated bishops alone. And this kind of power is equal in all bishops, just as the character impressed upon simple priests for the exercise of their office is equal. For greater or lesser holiness does not make a priest more or less potent. Although this foundation could be confirmed in many ways against heretics, nevertheless, because our **disputation is among Catholics and tends elsewhere, it is to be passed over as most commonly received. The**

same is clear from what was said above. SECOND FOUNDATION, no less received. There is a certain spiritual power in the Church which in no way depends upon consecration, but is acquired solely from the commission of a superior. Such is the power which the vicar of a bishop has to pronounce judgments, to excommunicate, and to exercise the other offices which he performs as vicar of episcopal jurisdiction in determinate ecclesiastical causes. Likewise priors and abbots receive spiritual governing power from confirmation by superiors, no consecration intervening. Likewise a bishop-elect designated by the Pontiff as pastor, before he is consecrated, has true governing power, as the common consent and usage of the faithful proves. THIRD FOUNDATION. All the aforesaid spiritual power has its origin from divine institution, not only from God Himself as Author of the universe—for in this way every secular power also is from the Lord God, through whom all kings reign and legislators decree just things—but also in a special way from God Himself as Author of the supernatural order through Jesus Christ, who founded and built the new Church upon earth. Christ the Lord Himself instituted in His Church that there should be power of consecrating and ordaining ministers. He also gave the Apostles authority to judge human acts of the faithful in order to a supernatural end, and He instituted all the other things necessary and fitting for the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Therefore all such things derive their origin from the divine institution of Christ, although afterward they are handed down through human ministry. FOURTH FOUNDATION, most universally received by all the faithful and sufficiently explained by us above: there is one universal Church comprehending all churches and all the faithful, so that just as one body properly corresponds to one soul although it has many members from which the whole is composed, so the Church is one body whose principal members are the particular churches with their prelates and superiors. Since the Church of Christ was to be founded not in one or another place but throughout the whole world, it was necessary that there be distinct churches as distinct members of the same body. Just as there is one temporal kingdom of a prince containing cities, so there is one kingdom of Christ upon earth, although in this kingdom many churches are said to exist, as in Apocalypse 1 seven churches in Asia are enumerated which were governed by seven presiding bishops. FIFTH FOUNDATION. Since in the prelates of the Church there is a twofold power, namely governing power and the power of order, this difference exists between them: governing power, or the power of jurisdiction, is not restricted to determinate words nor to the presence of matter; thus it can cause its effect by words, writing, or signs, and not only in those present but also in the absent, as common usage teaches. But the power of order, in causing its effect, requires determinate words and determinate matter, as the sacerdotal character for consecrating the Eucharist is bound to determinate words and to the present matter of wheaten bread. Likewise the power of order is removed neither by one's own will nor by crime, but remains perpetually; but the power of jurisdiction is sometimes abolished. SIXTH FOUNDATION. Every prelate of the Church, supreme as well as inferior, has power over his subjects not only taken individually but also over the whole multitude. For example, a bishop has power not only over the individual persons of his diocese but also over the whole collection of his flock. Likewise a prior has power both over the individual brothers of his convent and over the whole convent; hence

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he can impose precepts both upon individuals and upon the whole community. Indeed, first and per se the prelate regards the multitude, and afterward the individual persons; just as the soul is first and per se united to the whole body and consequently, through the same conjunction, to the individual parts. Likewise a governor first and per se regards the multitude and the common good, and afterward the individual persons and their utility.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

These things being supposed, let the FIRST CONCLUSION be established. In the Roman Pontiff, who alone is the universal pastor of the Church and successor of Peter, there resides the fullness of power. This conclusion is explained. The fullness of power is not to be taken here as the fullness which we confess in God, to whom no word is impossible, that is, whatever is factible; nor as that which we place in Christ the Lord insofar as He is man, who instituted the sacraments and could have instituted others. For the Supreme Pontiff cannot change the sacraments, their forms, or their matters, nor institute new ones beyond those instituted. Rather, this fullness of power which is found in the Supreme Pontiff is ministerial, insofar as it is necessary for the government of the universal Church and the salvation of the faithful. And although this fullness of power is known from many things which belong to the Roman Pontiff, which Turrecremata diligently recounts in Book II of his Summa de Ecclesia, chapter 52, nevertheless it is briefly explained by this: he can exercise every act of ecclesiastical power concerning each of the faithful throughout the whole world. This is proved from c. Cum ex eo, Extra, de poenitentia et remissione: "Since the Roman Pontiff, who has the fullness of power," etc. Likewise, good political government requires that full power extending to all things necessary for the common good reside in the supreme ruler. But the Roman Pontiff is the supreme governor of the whole Christian commonwealth; therefore the fullness of power resides in him. It is confirmed: in a well-ordered commonwealth whatever an inferior governor can do, the superior can also do. But in his own diocese a bishop can exercise any act of ecclesiastical power over a subject, such as baptizing, confirming, ordaining, etc. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff can do the same concerning anyone in the whole world. SECOND

CONCLUSION. Besides the Roman Pontiff, the institution of the other bishops is by divine right. It is proved.

The hierarchical order and principate of the Church is by divine right; but a hierarchy cannot exist without a multitude and diversity of princes collected according to a certain order. The Supreme Pontiff is the supreme and absolute prince in this hierarchy, while bishops are certain particular princes under that supreme one, according to what is said of bishops in the person of the Apostles in Psalm 46: "The princes of the peoples are gathered together with the God of Abraham"—princes, I say, not of the whole world but of particular cities and peoples. Secondly, it is proved from what Christ did. For He chose not only Peter but also the other eleven Apostles, and indeed the other seventy-two, whom He sent to preach the kingdom of God. Thirdly, it is proved from the end of the election of the Apostles other than Peter, who represented bishops. For they were chosen to teach all nations, baptize, and preach throughout the whole world, Matthew 28: "Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." But this cannot be done by one man alone throughout the whole world. Therefore a plurality of bishops is by divine right. It is confirmed from Ephesians 4: "And He gave some indeed apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and doctors, for the edification of the body of Christ," etc., where it is taught that pastors of the Church are from the Holy Spirit Himself. We do not intend by this conclusion to teach that the other Apostles, when chosen by Christ the Lord or sent to preach, were thereby immediately instituted or ordained bishops by Him; for that is another question, which will presently be discussed. We assert only this: that bishops exist in the Church and that their institution is not from human right but divine, not a human invention but a divine one. It must also be observed that we assert bishops to be by divine right not only as regards the power of order, but also as regards the governing power of churches. For since a hierarchy consists not only in dignity of order but also in governing authority, it was necessary that the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which God instituted and the Most High Himself founded, should have certain princes intent upon the government of inferiors, according to the saying: "The Lord shall recount in the writings of the peoples and of these princes who were in her." This is also proved. Bishops can confer all the divine mysteries, as is clear from the first

conclusion; but governing power is quasi-dispositive of subjects for receiving the sacred mysteries. For a

governor by good government can induce and compel some, and restrain and repel others, from the reception of the sacraments according as their morals require. It is confirmed. In order to determine the progress of fraternal correction through the judgment of the Church, which the Lord commands—if he shall not hear the brother correcting him secretly, nor even when two witnesses have been employed, "tell the Church," that is, the ecclesiastical prelate by whom he is to be judged—so that this kind of judgment may be reached, which we shall show at great length and diligently below in Question 33 to be of divine right, it is neither necessary nor possible always to recur to the Supreme Pontiff, nor is the whole multitude of the faithful or a council to be assembled to judge the brother's fault. Therefore it is necessary that in individual bishops there be a power of judging, which pertains to jurisdiction and governing power. THIRD CONCLUSION. Although the institution of bishops is by divine right, nevertheless no one can be a legitimate bishop or pastor in the Church of God without the consent of the Roman Pontiff. For the understanding of this conclusion, note that since consent is twofold, one express or explicit, the other implicit and virtual, the Supreme Pontiff likewise can consent to the erection of a bishop in two ways. First, expressly, when the Apostolic See is actually consulted, as in the confirmation of bishops, who, until the Roman Pontiff has consented, even if nominated and elected, have no authority to govern. Secondly, implicitly, as if, for example, the Apostolic See had granted to someone that a person unanimously elected by the chapter should at once obtain authority, as perhaps formerly to certain patriarchs and primates there was conceded by the Apostolic See the power of confirming bishops. Therefore the conclusion is to be understood of either consent, express or implicit. It is proved. As is clear from the first

conclusion, the Roman Pontiff is the universal pastor of the Church; therefore no one can be set over the

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government of an ecclesiastical flock against his will. The consequence is proved, because it belongs to the universal pastor to have particular and determinate pastors subject to him, and, when it is expedient for the flock, to remove them; otherwise there would not be the order in the government of the flock which ought to exist.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

Moreover, those who are constituted bishops of churches are sheep of the Roman Pontiff; therefore it belongs to him to provide which of his subject sheep should be placed over others and which should take care only of himself and live a private life. Likewise, because the Roman Pontiff is the first ruler and, as it were, the first mover in the government of the Church, just as it is impossible for any particular cause to move while the heaven, upon which all depend, remains unmoved, so no one can become pastor or bishop of a particular church without the nod and consent of the Supreme Pontiff. Finally it is proved from c. Quis nesciat, dist. 11, where it is openly said: "Who does not know, or does not observe, that what was handed down to the Roman Church by Peter, prince of the Apostles, and has been preserved until now, ought to be observed by all, and that nothing is to be introduced or added which ought to receive general authority or example from elsewhere; especially since it is manifest that throughout Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, Sicily, and the intervening islands no one founded churches except those whom the venerable Apostle Peter or his successors constituted priests." The text is manifest for the present conclusion. It will afterward be adduced for proving another and more difficult point. These conclusions, as I believe, must necessarily be asserted by every skilled theologian. What makes difficulty in this part is whether the power of bishops is immediately from Christ the Lord, or whether it emanates from the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. Thus, just as a king residing in his kingdom immediately gives authority and governing power to the praetors whom he appoints, but if he withdraws to a remote province leaving a viceroy with the fullness of power to remove and institute governors and praetors of cities, those praetors have authority and power of governing mediately from the king but immediately from the viceroy; so we ask in the present matter whether bishops have ecclesiastical power immediately from the supreme King Christ, or mediately from Him and immediately from His vicar, the Roman Pontiff. In order to answer, men turn in every direction and devise certain metaphysical distinctions which, although elsewhere useful, in this matter conceal rather than open the truth. Therefore it is to be noted briefly for the resolution of this most grave and difficult matter that we do not here doubt that the power conferred upon bishops is from God Himself as from the first cause, from whom all power is, as is said in Romans 13: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power except from God." In this sense Bernard spoke when writing to Pope Eugene in De consideratione: "You err if you esteem your Apostolic power to have been instituted by God in such wise as though it were supreme and alone." Rather, we speak and doubt concerning the immediate cause: whether, just as the power of the Supreme Pontiff is from Christ as from an immediate cause, so also the power of the other bishops is to be reduced immediately to the same cause, or rather to the Roman Pontiff. Secondly, note the distinction taught by St. Thomas in I Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, a. 3, and III Contra Gentiles, c. 70, concerning an immediate cause. One thing is immediate by immediation of power (immediatio virtutis), another by immediation of suppositum (immediatio suppositi). Thus someone can have power from another immediately either as from an immediate cause by immediation of power, which, the higher it is and the less preceded by another, is the more immediate in this manner; or as from an immediate cause by immediation of suppositum, when between the one conferring power and the one receiving it there mediates no other suppositum from which he receives that power. With these things supposed, let the FOURTH CONCLUSION be established. Episcopal power is immediately from Christ by immediation of power (immediatione virtutis). Turrecremata asserts this conclusion as certain in Book II of the Summa de Ecclesia, chapter 61. It is proved. Every spiritual power depends upon Christ as upon the first font; therefore He concurs immediately, by immediation of power, in communicating such power to whomever it is communicated. The consequence is proved: just as the first sphere is said to concur in all motions of bodies by immediation of power because no body can be moved unless it has received power from that first sphere, which precedes all others and is preceded and impeded by none; so likewise no spiritual power exists in the Church in any prelate or ecclesiastical minister unless received from Christ as the first one concurring in its conferral, who is preceded or impeded by none. It is confirmed. All natural effects are immediately from God, the universal cause, by immediation of power; therefore all spiritual effects of the ecclesiastical hierarchy are immediately from Christ by immediation of power as from the supreme and universal cause. FIFTH CONCLUSION. The power of jurisdiction which resides in bishops—for of this we speak in these two conclusions, since concerning this lies the difficulty—is simpliciter and absolutely conferred and committed immediately by the Supreme Pontiff and Roman Bishop, and not immediately by Christ the Lord. Since this conclusion is the principal one and resolves this difficulty, it must above all be established so that this truth may remain conceded for the dignity of the Apostolic See. We shall therefore proceed in proving it as follows. First, the decrees of Pontiffs and Fathers will be adduced; then reasons; lastly the inconveniences which follow from the opposite opinion will be brought forward. First it is argued from c. Ita Dominus, dist. 19, where it is said: "The Lord willed the sacrament of this office so to pertain to the office of all the Apostles that He placed it principally in blessed Peter, the first of all the Apostles, so that from him, as from a certain head, His gifts might be diffused into the whole body." And from c. Sacrosancta, dist. 22: "Among the blessed Apostles there was a certain distinction of power, so that although all were Apostles, nevertheless it was granted by the Lord to Peter—and they themselves willed the same among themselves—that he should preside over all the remaining Apostles and should hold the Cephas, that is, the headship and principate of the Apostolate." And in 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur Dominus: "The other Apostles were indeed what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship of honor and power, but the beginning proceeds from unity," that is, from one Peter, "so that the Church of Christ may be

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shown to be one." And in c. In novo, dist. 21: "In the New Testament, after Christ the Lord, the sacerdotal order began from Peter, to whom first the pontificate in the Church of Christ was given." And in c. Omnes, dist. 22: "All patriarchs, whether at the summit of any primacy, or metropolitans, or the chairs of episcopates, or the dignity of churches of whatever order, the Roman Church instituted; but she alone the Lord Himself founded."
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He founded her upon the rock of faith as soon as she was born, and to blessed Peter, key-bearer of eternal life, He committed the rights of the earthly and heavenly empire. And from c. Quis nesciat, dist. 11, which we adduced above in the third conclusion; and in 2, q. 6, c. Decreto and c. Qui se scit, it is said that the Roman Church imparted her offices to the other Churches so that they might be called to a part of the solicitude, not to the fullness of power. From these texts, therefore, it seems established that the authority and power of bishops and particular churches flows from the Roman Pontiff. Moreover, it is argued from the authority of the saints. Augustine, Tractate 124 on John, says: "The Apostle Peter, because of the primacy of his Apostolate, bore in a figurative generality the person of the Church." Pope Leo, in Sermon 3 on the anniversary of his ordination, says: "It is fitting to celebrate this day chiefly in veneration of him"—he speaks of Peter—"who was so abundantly irrigated from the very fountain of charisms that, although he alone received many things, nothing passed to anyone without his participation." And again he adds: "The divine condescension granted Peter a great and wondrous fellowship in its own power, so that if it willed anything to be common with the other princes, it never gave except through him whatever it did not deny to others." And St. Thomas, IV Contra Gentiles, c. 76, says: "The Lord promised the keys of the kingdom of heaven to Peter alone, to show that the power of the keys was to be derived through him to others for preserving the unity of the Church." In the

second place reasons are adduced which confirm this truth. FIRST REASON. Among things ordered to one another in the order of causality, those which are immediate and secondary in that order receive power from the first of that order, as is clear from the first proposition of the Book of Causes. But bishops of particular churches and the Roman Pontiff are so related that the latter is supreme and first in the government of churches. Therefore the power of jurisdiction and government which bishops have is derived from the Supreme Roman Pontiff. The minor is clear from the foundations laid down above and is further strengthened by the authority of Cyprian, adduced in 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur Dominus, cited above, where at the end of the chapter he compares particular churches with the Roman Church as rays to the sun, streams to the fountain, and branches to the root. Therefore, just as rays have power from the sun, branches from the root, and streams are derived from the fountain, so particular churches and their bishops have power from the Bishop of the Roman See. SECOND REASON. In every monarchical principate, the power of jurisdiction is derived from one monarch and prince to all the other governors. But in the principate of the Church the Roman Pontiff is the supreme prince and monarch. Therefore power is derived from him to the other bishops. The major is from Dionysius, in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy and the book On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. The minor is clear from many things adduced above, especially from c. Sacrosancta, dist. 22, and in the office of blessed Peter the Church sings: "I have appointed you prince over my people." Chrysostom, upon the Acts of the Apostles, says that Peter received from the Son power over all who are sons, not as Moses over one nation but throughout the whole world. And in the Council of Constantinople it is said: "We venerate, according to the Scriptures and the definitions of the canons, the most holy Bishop of ancient Rome as first and greatest of all bishops." THIRD REASON. The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly hierarchy from which it is exemplated. But in the heavenly hierarchy the rays of divine light are derived immediately from God into the higher creatures, and from them proceed to the lower. Therefore likewise in the hierarchy of the Church militant, governing power is derived from Christ immediately to the Supreme Pontiff and thence to the other inferior bishops. The major is from St. Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 6: "For our hierarchy, disposed holily by orders handed down from God, is conformed to the holy and heavenly hierarchies." Concerning this likeness or conformity of the militant Church to the heavenly and triumphant Church, Exodus 25 says: "Look, and make according to the exemplar shown to you on the mountain." And Job 38: "Do you know the order of heaven, and will you set down its reason upon the earth?" where Gregory says: "The order of heaven is placed upon earth, that is, in the Church militant, when the militant is disposed according to the exemplar of the triumphant Church." For confirming this major and the whole argument, St. Bernard speaks excellently in Book III De consideratione to Eugene, adducing Apocalypse 21: "I saw the holy city Jerusalem," etc. He says: "Do not esteem as vile this form which is upon earth; it has its exemplar from heaven. He saw this who said: I saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, descending from heaven, prepared by God. I think this was said because of the likeness: just as there Seraphim and Cherubim and all the rest down to Angels and Archangels are ordered under one head, God, so here also under one Supreme Pontiff primates or patriarchs, bishops, presbyters, abbots, and the rest of this kind." FOURTH AND LAST REASON. The prince of the Church under the law of grace is much more excellent than was the prince and leader of the ancient synagogue, as is clear. For just as the Church and spouse of Christ, adorned and beautified by the blood of the Bridegroom, surpasses the old synagogue in many things, so also the prince and supreme leader, namely the Roman Pontiff, ought in many ways to surpass Moses. But from Moses all power of jurisdiction was derived to inferiors. Therefore from the Roman Pontiff, who presides over the Church, all power of jurisdiction or government is derived to inferior bishops. The minor is proved both from Exodus 18 and especially Numbers 11, where the Lord granted to Moses, who was bearing with difficulty the care and causes of so great a multitude, that he should choose certain men for governing the people. And it is added: "I will take of your spirit and give it to them, that they may bear with you the burden of the people." It must be observed that, although the Lord could have bestowed as much spirit as was necessary upon those seventy men for governing the people without derivation and, as it were, dependence upon the spirit of Moses, He willed to do it only by taking from

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his spirit, so that by this He might signify that prelates or bishops of particular Churches in the New Testament would have governing power from the Supreme Pontiff and pastor of the universal Church of Christ. In the third place the same conclusion is proved by drawing out the inconveniences which follow from the opposite opinion. The FIRST INCONVENIENCE: if the power of jurisdiction which resides in bishops were not immediately from the Roman Pontiff but from Christ, it would follow that the Supreme Pontiff could change nothing concerning the jurisdiction of bishops. The consequence is proved. For bishops would have received that jurisdiction immediately from Christ; therefore the Supreme Pontiff, who is Christ's vicar and subject to Him, could not change what Christ Himself had ordained.
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Just as the Supreme Pontiff can change nothing concerning the number of the sacraments or their forms and matters, so, on that supposition, he could change nothing concerning episcopal jurisdiction. Yet we see many changes made by the Roman Pontiff concerning the jurisdictions of bishops: dividing episcopates, joining them, enlarging them, restricting or extending cases, as is clear in 16, q. 1, c. Et temporis; likewise transferring episcopal sees from one place to another, as is clear Extra, de translatione Episcoporum, c. 1; likewise erecting new cathedral churches, as is clear in 16, q. 1, c. Felix and c. Praecipimus. Therefore this power of jurisdiction is conferred immediately upon bishops by the Roman Pontiff. The SECOND INCONVENIENCE is that otherwise inferior elected bishops would not need confirmation by the Supreme Pontiff, just as the Supreme Pontiff himself, canonically elected, does not need confirmation by another but is confirmed immediately by Christ Himself. But this is absurd and contrary to the peace and usage of the universal Church, in which parish priests are confirmed by bishops, and bishops and archbishops by the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, etc. This reasoning is confirmed. From the opposite opinion it would follow that the Supreme Pontiff could not call before his own judgment a matter which pertains to the jurisdiction of bishops, nor commit it to others; but this is absurd. The THIRD INCONVENIENCE is that otherwise the Supreme Pontiff could not bring it about by any excommunication or by any other way that a bishop should not exercise acts of jurisdiction over his own diocesans. The consequence is proved. The Supreme Pontiff cannot take away those things which are conferred immediately by God, whether naturally or supernaturally; just as he cannot take from fire the power of burning, nor at his own pleasure remove grace and virtues from a just man. Therefore, if the power of jurisdiction is given to bishops immediately by Christ, the Pontiff will not be able to impede it from proceeding into act concerning their subjects. If someone should say that the Supreme Pontiff can take away from an excommunicated bishop the people and subjects, and thus his sentence will not be valid because it is no longer borne upon a people subject to him, just as if he were to take away from a priest the matter of the Eucharist the priest could not consecrate—not because the power of character, once given, has any dependence upon the Supreme Pontiff, but because it cannot proceed into act except concerning present matter—against this it is argued: because present bread is the matter of the Eucharist by divine right, therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot bring it about that the priest, if he wills, should not consecrate that bread which is present. Therefore, if those subjects are the sheep of this bishop by divine right and he received immediately from Christ the power of jurisdiction over them, so long as they survive the bishop will be able to exercise acts of jurisdiction over them even if they are absent; for an act of jurisdiction does not always require the presence of the one upon whom it is borne. Finally, from the opposite opinion it would follow that the Apostolic See errs in the provision of churches and the conferral of bishoprics when it says: "We provide such a church with such a man, and we set him over it as father, pastor, and bishop of the same church, committing to him administration in spiritual and temporal things in the name of the Father and of the Son," etc. Likewise the Supreme Pontiff would err when he says: "I confer upon you the care of such a church," which Pontiffs commonly say in the conferral of churches. For to confer care is nothing other than to commit or give the power of jurisdiction in such a church. It is confirmed. It would likewise follow that the Supreme Pontiff could not by his word alone take away from a bishop the power of jurisdiction, remove him from his church, and degrade him; the contrary of which is taught by the most approved and ancient custom of the whole Catholic Church. Let it suffice to have adduced these inconveniences at present; many others can be seen in the most learned Turrecremata, Book I of the Summa de Ecclesia, chapter 56. Let there nevertheless be a SIXTH AND LAST CONCLUSION for the full clarification of this difficulty. The Supreme Pontiff cannot by right prohibit bishops from being consecrated; nor can he take away from consecrated bishops that power which is necessary for feeding the sheep entrusted to them. The first part of this conclusion is proved. The power of the Supreme Pontiff, like that of the other prelates, is unto edification and not unto destruction, as St. Paul teaches in 2 Corinthians 13. But to prohibit bishops from being consecrated would be to destroy the Church, for if they failed there would be no fitting ministers of the Church, the sacraments could not conveniently be administered, nor could the faithful people be sufficiently instructed, but like sheep without a shepherd they would wander through the precipices of vices. The second part of the conclusion is proved by the same reason. For the same inconveniences would follow if there were withdrawn from consecrated bishops that power which is necessary for governing the people committed to them. Secondly, the same second part is proved. Natural order demands that to one designated for an office there be given the aids necessary for executing it, as is held in c. Praeterea, de officio et potestate iudicis delegati, and c. Conquerente, de restitutione spoliatorum. Aristotle also says in Book I De caelo that if nature had given the heaven a progressive power, it would also have given it the suitable organs. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff cannot deny to consecrated bishops and pastors the fitting and necessary aids for governing their flocks, such as those which commonly occur in churches: the ordination of clerics, correction of delinquents, and disposition in many temporal matters. From these conclusions TWO THINGS FOLLOW. FIRST, since the Roman Pontiff is the supreme pastor and immediately gives to other bishops the power of jurisdiction, he can restrict their power and, if necessary, remove it entirely. It is proved: it belongs to the supreme governor to impose a mode upon inferiors subordinated to himself. Therefore by the best right he can reserve to himself certain graver crimes in the forum of conscience, dispensations from vows, and the granting of indulgences. SECONDLY, just as from the beginning the Supreme Pontiff could divide dioceses among bishops, so now he can withdraw this

diocese from one and constitute another in it. It is proved: the Roman Pontiff is bishop and pastor of the whole world, whose flock consists of all Catholics. Therefore it belongs to him to divide the sheep and commit their care to particular pastors according as the spiritual utility of those sheep requires. This is what Pope Gregory signifies in c. Decreto, 2, q. 6, speaking of the Roman Church: "Thus she imparted her offices to the other churches, so that they might be called to a part of the solicitude, not to the fullness of power." Now the arguments placed at the beginning must be answered. TO THE FIRST it is replied that although bishops...
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

TO THE FIRST it is replied that although bishops have governing power from God, nevertheless not immediately, but through the Supreme Pontiff. Again, even if in some respect they have this power immediately from God, it is by immediation of power (immediatio virtutis), as we said in the fourth conclusion. For the solution of the confirmation, in which the difficulty is raised whether the Apostles immediately received power from Christ, it must be noted that there are various opinions on this matter. The FIRST is that of Cardinal Turrecremata, upon c. Ita Dominus, dist. 19, and in Book II of the Summa de Ecclesia, chapter 61, and elsewhere, who says that the Apostles did not receive the power of jurisdiction immediately from the Lord, indeed not even the power of preaching after the Resurrection of Christ, but immediately from Peter, whom Christ had set over not only the other faithful but also the Apostles themselves. Another is the opinion of Cajetan, truer in our judgment, who in the opusculum De auctoritate Papae et Concilii, chapters 3 and 4, says two things. The FIRST is that if the Apostles are considered insofar as they are Apostles, all were equal and immediately received from Christ the power of jurisdiction over the whole world. The SECOND is that if they are considered insofar as they are sheep of Christ, Peter is pastor of them all. For the declaration of the first, it is to be observed from St. Thomas on 1 Corinthians 12, upon the words "And God indeed has set some in the Church, first apostles," etc., that three things pertain to the office of Apostles. First, authority for governing the faithful people, which properly pertains to the office of Apostolate. Secondly, the faculty of teaching. Thirdly, the power of working miracles for the confirmation of doctrine. Hence the argument is made. The Apostles, insofar as Apostles, had not only the power of order but also jurisdiction; for authority to govern the Church, which St. Thomas says is proper to the Apostolate, cannot exist without the power of jurisdiction. But the Apostles had the Apostolate immediately from Christ and not through Peter, as is clear from John 20: "As the Father has sent Me, I also send you"; and Matthew 10 and Luke 6, where it is said: "He called His disciples and chose twelve of them, whom He also named Apostles," etc. And in Galatians 1 Paul says that he is an Apostle "not from men nor through man, but through Jesus Christ." Therefore all the Apostles had equal power of jurisdiction over the whole world and immediately from Christ. For the declaration of Cajetan's second statement, it must secondly be noted that, just as in corporeal things some things occur in two ways—naturally, as when nature gives eyes to man for seeing and a sick man is healed by the power of nature; or miraculously and supernaturally, as when sight is restored to the blind—so also in the Church some things occur in two ways: first ordinarily, secondly by the special grace of the prince. Thus Christ, who is prince and head of the whole body of the Church, acted. According to ordinary right He constituted the monarchy of the Church, whose universal pastor and head He established as Peter, from whom by ordinary right the power of jurisdiction was to be derived ordinarily to all the other prelates. Secondly, however, by special grace He Himself immediately bestowed upon the Apostles authority to govern, ordain, preach, and judge the Church; which power they would indeed have received from Peter had not Peter been anticipated by Christ Himself. This detracts nothing from the authority and power of Peter, but manifests the grace of Christ toward the Apostles, whom He willed to be venerated by all as princes and foundations of the Church, upon which, as upon the foundations, the stones of the wall of the city Jerusalem are erected, according to Apocalypse 21: "The wall of the city having twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb." This is explained by a most fitting example. Just as other priests were to receive the power of order from Peter by ordinary right, nevertheless by special grace Christ in this part anticipated Peter with respect to the Apostles, ordaining them priests by Himself immediately, in which nothing is derogated from Peter's authority and excellence; so likewise it is no obstacle to the excellence of Peter's power of jurisdiction over all that Christ, the supreme Prince, gave to his subjects, namely the other Apostles, by grace that power which they were otherwise to receive from Peter by the ordinary way. Hence TO THE CONFIRMATION it is replied: the major and minor being conceded, the consequence is denied. For this grace was made to the persons of the Apostles, that they should receive the power of jurisdiction from Christ; but to bishops, their successors, Christ gave that power by the ordinary way, namely through Peter or his successor, the Roman Pontiff. TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT the consequence is denied. For its proof, the antecedent is denied. A bishop-elect, from the day of his confirmation and before he is consecrated, has the power of jurisdiction in his church. Hence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 39, a. 3, teaches that the power of jurisdiction is conferred upon a man by a simple injunction without any consecration. What is adduced in that argument from St. Thomas is no obstacle. For St. Thomas does not intend to teach that the power of jurisdiction is given to bishops through consecration alone; rather, because solemnity is employed to designate the sublimity of the episcopal state, the amplitude of its power, and the perpetuity of the obligation imposed, St. Thomas therefore says that to inferiors the power of jurisdiction is given by a simple injunction, but to bishops through consecration. For the same purpose he adduces the example of secular power, which is conferred upon a king and also upon other inferiors; the king alone receives a solemn benediction, while others such as praetors are instituted by a simple commission. Yet no one has said that kings receive governing power through that benediction. The same must be said in the present matter. TO THE CONFIRMATION it is replied that there is a great difference between parish priests and bishops. Bishops receive power immediately from the Supreme Pontiff, but parish priests from bishops, as is signified in c. Quicumque, 10, q. 1. Hence St. Thomas, adducing the authority of c. Cunctis, 16, q. 1, teaches in II-II, q. 184, a. 6, that parish priests are related to the bishop as bailiffs or praepositi to a king. TO THE

THIRD ARGUMENT it is replied that although from the passage of 1 Corinthians it is excellently gathered that

parish priests and other presbyters are inferior to bishops, nevertheless bishops are not the supreme ones in the hierarchy. Rather, there is one supreme pastor, in whom as in the head the function of the universal ecclesiastical hierarchy is terminated. Of him St. Dionysius, cited there, speaks. TO THE LAST ARGUMENT the answer is sufficiently clear from the last conclusion. Yet it is further replied that although the Supreme Pontiff could at his discretion remove one or another bishop and designate no one in his place, it is nevertheless not to be admitted that in the whole Church or in a great part of it he would so rashly abuse his power.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

Just as the more skilled theologians teach that it is necessary for the Supreme Pontiff to define matters of faith after prior consultation, and when it is objected, "Therefore, if he were to define without consultation, he could err," they reply that they do not admit the case; so also in the present matter it is not to be admitted that the Supreme Pontiff, although he has power to remove individual bishops, would remove them all and designate none. SIXTH DOUBT. Whether Apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions have as much force for proving dogmas of faith as we have hitherto defined the Catholic Church, the Supreme Pontiff, or a general council to possess.

FIRST, it is argued for the negative. All things which are to be believed by Catholic faithful with faith and which are necessary for their salvation are contained in the written Scriptures; therefore those things which are held by ecclesiastical traditions are necessary neither for faith nor for the salvation of the faithful, but ought rather to be regarded as certain human inventions. The antecedent, which is especially the foundation of those who despise ecclesiastical traditions, must be proved by many arguments. First, from that most celebrated testimony of Paul, 2 Timothy 3: "All Scripture divinely inspired is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished unto every good work." Behold, Sacred Scripture is said to be sufficient that the man of God may be perfect in every good work of justice. To this pertains Deuteronomy 17. The Lord commands the common people that in ambiguous and doubtful matters pertaining to religion they consult the priests; but He commanded them to obey the priests only in those things which they teach according to His law. Therefore in those things which priests and prelates teach beyond the law it will not be necessary to hear them; and thus all things necessary for salvation are contained in Sacred Scripture. Secondly, it is proved. The Holy Spirit most strictly forbids that anything be added to those things which are contained in Sacred Scripture; therefore He understands all things necessary for salvation to be contained in Sacred Scripture. The antecedent is proved from Deuteronomy 4: "You shall not add to the word which I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." And chapter 12: "What I command you, that only do to the Lord; neither add anything nor diminish." And Apocalypse 22: "If anyone shall add to these things, God shall add unto him the plagues written in this book." Thirdly, it is proved from testimonies of the Holy Fathers. St. Chrysostom, homily 1 upon the Epistle to Titus: "The Gospel contains all things: present things, the honor of future things, piety, faith; it comprehends all things together in the word of preaching." Augustine, Tractate 49 on John, tome 9, says: "The Lord Christ both did and said many things which are not written; but those things were chosen to be written which would suffice for the salvation of believers." And in Book II De peccatorum meritis et remissione, last chapter, tome 7, he says: "Where a most obscure matter is disputed, and certain and clear documents of the divine Scriptures do not assist, human presumption ought to restrain itself, doing nothing by declining to either side. For although I may be ignorant how either of these can be demonstrated and explained, nevertheless I believe that here too the clearest authority of the divine writings would exist if man could not be ignorant of it without loss of the promised salvation." Behold, by a most open testimony drawn from St. Augustine it is asserted that all things necessary for salvation are contained in the Scriptures, and indeed most clearly. These things are confirmed from what Constantine proposed to the Nicene Synod, as Theodoret reports in Book I of his Ecclesiastical History, chapter 7: "In disputations concerning divine things we have the doctrine of the Holy Spirit prescribed. For the evangelical and apostolic books, together with the oracles of the ancient prophets, fully show us the sense of the divine will. Therefore let us take from the sayings of the divine Spirit the explanations of the questions." And, as Theodoret writes there, all the bishops willingly embraced what the Emperor had said. Therefore the Fathers of the council understood that all things pertaining to our salvation are contained in Sacred Scripture.

SECOND ARGUMENT. Traditions were reproved by Christ the Lord as precepts of men; therefore so far are they from pertaining to faith and salvation that they are rather pernicious. The antecedent is proved from Mark 7, where Christ says of the Pharisees: "In vain do they worship Me, teaching doctrines and commandments of men. For leaving the commandment of God, you hold the traditions of men." Behold, traditions are there despised by Christ as useless and indeed condemned as pernicious. THIRD ARGUMENT. The holy and most ancient Fathers openly reject traditions and teach that recourse is to be made to Scripture alone; therefore traditions are not to be adduced for confirming the faith. The antecedent will be evident if we bring forward certain testimonies of the Fathers in which they seem most openly to remove and reject traditions. Theophilus of Alexandria, Book I, chapters 56 and 40, asserted that it belongs to demoniacal spirits to think anything divine outside the authority of the Scriptures. St. Jerome, on Haggai 1 and Matthew 23, rejects the opinion of those who from an old tradition held that the Zacharias slain between the temple and the altar was the father of John the Baptist, for this sole reason, that it has no authority from the Scriptures. Origen, Tractate 26 on Matthew, asserts that it is necessary to use the Holy Scriptures for the confirmation of dogmas. St. Cyprian, in the epistle to Pompeius, replying to a certain epistle of holy Pope Stephen and martyr, in which Stephen tried from Apostolic traditions to convict as false Cyprian's opinion concerning the rebaptizing of those who came to the Church from heretics, says: "Whence is this tradition? Does it descend from the Lord's and evangelical authority, or does it come from the mandates and Epistles of the Apostles?" And he adds that those things which are written are to be done, as God testifies and proposes to Joshua: "This book of the law shall not depart from your mouth," etc. And below he says: "If therefore either it is commanded in the Gospel, or contained in the Epistles or Acts of the Apostles, let this holy tradition of Stephen also be observed"—as though he were saying that if it is not written in Sacred Scripture, whatever is commanded by

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any tradition is not necessarily to be received. FOURTH ARGUMENT. Experience establishes that things handed down through the mouths of many, especially to those more distant in place, do not remain integral and inviolate. Therefore ecclesiastical traditions, which are transferred from predecessors to successors separated not only by place but by a great interval of time, cannot be preserved incorrupt and unviolated unless we recur to a miracle. But miracles are not to be admitted in the common government of the Church. Therefore, etc. It is confirmed. Sacred Scripture is much more faithful in preserving those things entrusted to it than the memory of men. Therefore in confirming matters of faith confidence is to be placed in Sacred Scripture rather than in traditions which depend upon human memory.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

FIFTH ARGUMENT. There is no certain rule or determinate way for knowing which are Apostolic traditions and distinguishing them from human institutions and inventions. Therefore, although in reality there are certain Apostolic traditions in the Church, nevertheless no firm argument can be drawn from them for confirming dogmas of faith, since it is not certainly established which particular traditions are of this kind. The antecedent is proved. Hitherto the Church has not defined any certain and determinate rule through which true and Apostolic traditions can be known. Therefore the whole foundation for discovering traditions must be referred to human discourse; but in human reasonings no firmness and certitude can consist, since "the thoughts of mortals are timid and our counsels uncertain," Wisdom 9. Therefore, etc. It is confirmed. Many most grave men were deceived, establishing vain and even pernicious dogmas as indubitable truths of faith because they thought them to be held from Apostolic traditions and did not know how to distinguish Apostolic traditions from vain inventions of men. Hence Papias, as Eusebius reports in Book III of the Ecclesiastical History, last chapter, taught as an Apostolic tradition that there would be a certain millennium of years after the resurrection, and under the shadow of traditions moved Irenaeus and many other learned men to his opinion. Likewise Irenaeus, from the tradition of John the Evangelist and the other Apostles, held that Christ the Lord died in the fortieth year from His birth—certainly a dogma alien from truth. Therefore this is a sign that no certain rule can be assigned for distinguishing Apostolic traditions. Divine and Apostolic traditions the Lutheran heretics strive with all their strength to cast out of the Church. Yet the Lutherans were neither the

first nor the only ones to introduce this most pernicious opinion into the Church of Christ; rather, they revived this mendacity rather than invented it. For the Eunomian heretics, as St. Basil testifies to Amphilochius, refused to confess the dignity of the Holy Spirit because they did not see it contained in the Sacred Scriptures, utterly deriding the traditions of the Church. Epiphanius, in his book Against Heresies, heresy 5, attributes this error also to the Arians. Tertullian in De praescriptione haereticorum and Irenaeus, Book III Against Heresies, chapter 2, report that Valentinus and Marcion were infected by the same error. Wycliffe was a most vehement assertor of this error, as Thomas Waldensis writes in his book De antiquitate fidei, chapter 19. St. Bernard, Sermon 66 on the Canticle, numbers certain heretics of his own time as imbued with the same error. Finally, it has always been familiar to all heretics to despise ecclesiastical traditions and to defer honor only to the canonical books in those things which pertain to confirming faith and religion. Their common intention has always been, by twisting Scripture with depraved interpretations, to introduce most pernicious falsehoods. Let the diligent theologian read Vincent of Lérins in his book Against the Profane Novelties of Heresies, about the middle of the book, where he elegantly explains how proper it has always been to all heretics to teach nothing, even the least thing, which they do not attempt to adorn with words of Scripture. But this most pestilent opinion of the heretics rests upon TWO FOUNDATIONS which among all heretics, especially the Lutherans, have been regarded as firm and indubitable and confirmed with great assertion. The FIRST is that in the sacred writings all those things which are necessary for faith, religion, and the obtaining of salvation are expressly contained, and that Christ or the Apostles taught nothing which is not written in the New Testament. The SECOND is that the sense of Sacred Scripture is so easy and open that, in order to draw it out, it is not necessary to recur either to the authority of the Church or to the antiquity of traditions, but anyone can most easily hunt out the true understanding of Sacred Scripture by his own spirit and private industry. From these two foundations the heretics conclude that only those things are to be believed by the faithful and only those things are to be brought forward for establishing religion which are found written in the canonical books by the express word of God. They further conclude that ecclesiastical traditions are most vain inventions of men which can hinder rather than profit salvation. But for the resolution of this most grave controversy, lest our whole disputation be weakened by the ambiguity of the word, it will be worthwhile first of all to explain the various acceptations of this word "tradition," so that from them it may be established concerning which traditions we are presently to speak. FIRST, therefore, tradition in a certain broad acceptation is taken for doctrine handed down in any manner by someone, whether orally or by writing. In this sense the Apostle, 2 Thessalonians 2, calls by the general name "traditions" the doctrine handed down either by epistle or by discourse. And Acts 6 calls the law of Moses a tradition in these words: "He shall change the traditions which Moses delivered to us," that is, he shall change the law delivered by Moses.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

SECONDLY, "tradition," taken somewhat more narrowly, is customarily used for doctrine first handed down orally, whether afterward it was committed to writing or not. In this sense the whole Gospel of Christ can be called a tradition, because it was first promulgated in the world by the living voice of Christ and the Apostles, although afterward it was committed to writing by the sacred Evangelists. In this sense Paul speaks in 1 Corinthians 11: "For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered unto you"—"delivered," that is, I preached orally the mystery of the Eucharist. That same mystery was then written down by the Apostle himself in the following words of the same Epistle. THIRDLY, more strictly and properly, and more suitably to our purpose, "tradition" is taken for the doctrine of the ancestors first received by living voice and derived by continual succession from fathers to sons, yet not inserted into books and writings. But under this third acceptation there is still an equivocation. For doctrine of this kind derived from antiquity and confirmed by ancient custom can pertain either to human intercourse and human polity—as in all commonwealths it is easy to find most ancient traditions which according to the custom of the country prescribe a political mode of living, whether they pertain to food, clothing, or civil contracts. Concerning these human traditions there is no present dispute with the heretics, since they do not conduce to the religion of Christ and perhaps are not rejected even by the heretics themselves, as can be gathered from the Augsburg Confession. Hence tradition according to that third sense is otherwise taken for doctrine handed down by the ancestors which pertains to the polity and religion of the faithful. But ancient doctrine of this kind can sometimes be pernicious and contrary to true religion, such as those traditions among the Jews which Christ the Lord in Mark 7 opposed to the Jews as superstitious and repugnant to the law of God: "You have made void the commandment of God that you may keep your traditions." Irenaeus speaks of these traditions in Book IV Against Heresies, saying: "The Jews mingled false traditions, corrupting the law," etc. Augustine rejects this kind of tradition in Book III Against the Donatists as pernicious inventions of men. Doctrine of this kind can also be useless to religion and burdensome to the faithful, although not pernicious. Traditions of this kind St. Augustine in the Epistle to Casulanus and St. Jerome agreeing with him command to be cut away wherever this can be done without scandal. Concerning these pernicious and useless traditions, whether they have at times crept into the Church, I do not wish to dispute at present. Let this alone be certain and established for us: pernicious traditions have by no means been accepted in the universal Church by all the faithful of the Church, although there is no inconvenience in admitting that in one or another part of the Church and in private provinces traditions of this kind may at times have crept in. For sound doctrine does not permit us to assert that the whole universal Church of Christ has ever erred either in doctrine or morals, even by an inculpable error and invincible ignorance, concerning which matter we spoke above. Nevertheless this does not prevent one or another part or province of the Church from being able to follow depraved customs or laws. Concerning useless and burdensome traditions or laws I define nothing. Nor will it seem strange if they have sometimes been found even in the universal Church. These traditions therefore being removed from the present disputation, only those are to be brought into the present controversy which contain sound, useful, and necessary doctrine concerning faith or morals; concerning these it must be disputed whether they are found in the universal Church. But so that the disputation concerning these most grave traditions may be made clearly, it must secondly be noted that of these useful and necessary traditions of the Church, some are universal and general to the whole Church, while others are particular, observed only in private churches or provinces. Concerning private traditions we are not at present to dispute, but only concerning universal traditions common to the whole Church. THIRDLY it must be observed that among the general traditions of the Church, some emanated from Christ the Lord, either immediately, He Himself teaching and handing them down by His preaching and doctrine, or mediately, so that the Apostles, from a special instinct and command of Christ and from a special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, handed them down to the Church to be preserved. Others came from the Apostles of Christ themselves, who, as supreme pastors and prelates of the Churches, commended them to the Church by Apostolic authority. Others finally were introduced by the authority of the Roman Pontiffs and the ancient Fathers and were received by the universal Church. Examples of all these will be set down below. Traditions of the Church of the FIRST KIND are rightly called divine, because they proceeded from the divine authority of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Traditions of the SECOND KIND we shall properly call Apostolic, because they are founded upon the authority of the Apostles. Traditions of the THIRD KIND are called by the general name ecclesiastical. FOURTHLY, the difference among these three kinds of traditions must be noted. The divine traditions of the Church possess complete immutability, for since they contain divine right itself, it is not given to ecclesiastical power either to abolish or change them; rather they must be preserved inviolate without any innovation whatsoever as pertaining to most certain dogmas of faith. Apostolic traditions, however, do not contain dogmas of faith to be believed, but pertain to laws, rites, and ceremonies of the Church. Their observance is indeed necessary for the faithful so long as those traditions remain in force. Nevertheless they can sometimes be changed and abrogated by Apostolic authority of the Church if, according to the variety of times and places, the utility of the Church should demand it. Indeed, even if no utility of the Church demanded it, if the Supreme Pontiff should attempt to abrogate them, the act would stand, because all that authority which Peter and the other Apostles possessed as prelates of the universal Church resides in the successor of Peter, the Roman Pontiff. And because an equal has no command over an equal, the Roman Pontiff himself can, according to his good pleasure, weaken and abolish all things of this kind which emanated

from the authority of the Apostles, since such power could not be taken away by the Apostles themselves, who equally were vicars of Christ. Yet there is no need to fear that so great an evil will ever happen to the Church of Christ; for it pertains to the continual assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ the Lord to the Church to free the Church from so great and pernicious an evil.
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Finally, ecclesiastical traditions can be changed and abolished by the Church and the Roman Pontiff much more easily, although even this ought not to be done without a reasonable and indeed most urgent cause, lest it be inexpedient for the Christian commonwealth. From what has been said concerning the various acceptations of traditions, it will not be difficult to gather that ecclesiastical traditions can scarcely be comprehended under one and the same definition. Rather, just as they themselves are diverse, so they are to be explained by diverse definitions. Nevertheless I wish to use in common that definition which belongs per se and principally to traditions of the first kind, and which, according to what we have said, can easily be accommodated to the other traditions of the Church: TRADITION is sacred doctrine first received by oral word, strengthened by the usage of the faithful, and transmitted from hand to hand to posterity without the mediation of writing. Lastly, it must be observed that although this doubt is principally instituted concerning traditions pertaining to the Church of Christ, nevertheless, because there is one and the same Church of Christ which existed in the state of the law of nature as though in its infancy and childhood, which in the state of the written law grew to adolescence, and which finally under the evangelical law was brought to perfection by Christ, for the completion of doctrine we shall explain in the following conclusions, one by one, that the Church in every state made use of divine traditions necessary for faith and morals. FIRST CONCLUSION. It would be impious and foolish to deny divine traditions if "tradition" is taken in those first and broadest acceptations concerning which we spoke above in the first notation. Concerning the prior acceptation, namely as divine doctrine received either by word or by writing, only Gentiles and pagans could doubt, who despise divine and supernatural revelations; to enter into dispute with them would be foreign to the present institute. Concerning the second acceptation, however, namely doctrine which was first handed down and received orally, although afterward it was committed to the canonical Scriptures, we must remain somewhat longer, because the heretics, especially the Lutherans, teach absolutely that nothing is to be believed which has not been committed to canonical Scripture. Hence they seem to insinuate that the doctrine of faith was not first handed down by word but received in Scripture. How false this is will not be difficult to show. Beginning from the higher things, the faithful of the Church which existed in the state of the law of nature believed many supernatural things, although no canonical Scripture yet existed. Indeed, chiefly for this reason that state was called the state of nature, because supernatural knowledge was not inscribed in writings but engraved in hearts through the interior inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as though by a mode of nature. Concerning this matter we shall say more below. Concerning the state of the written law, an argument cannot be brought forward so openly. For the law handed down through Moses was not promulgated to the people before it had been committed to writing, and for this reason that law is called by quasi-proper name the written law. Nevertheless, even before the law was given, many things were inspired by the Lord to Moses concerning knowledge of the true God Himself and concerning the liberation of the Israelite people from the dominion of the Egyptians; these were handed down to the people by the ministry of Moses and Aaron without any intervening writing. Finally, coming to the state of the law of grace, the matter is beyond all doubt: evangelical doctrine was first promulgated to the world by word and preaching before it was written in the canonical books, so that the prophecy of Jeremiah 31 might be fulfilled: "I will give My law in their inward parts, and in their heart I will write it." To this accords the saying of the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 3: "You are the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, and written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not in tables of stone but in the fleshly tables of the heart." Therefore the evangelical law was not from the beginning written in letters, but engraved in the souls of men; and for this reason it is called the law of the Spirit and not a written law. Moreover, we know that Christ the Lord preached the evangelical law by the oracle of His living voice, opened to the Apostles the understanding of the Scriptures, and that the Church has never heard that He wrote any book. Indeed, He did not even command the Apostles to write, but to preach orally: "Going," He says in the last chapter of Mark, "preach the Gospel to every creature." He says "preach," not "write." Hence the Apostles taught the Gospel by living voice before they committed it to letters. St. Irenaeus most excellently observes this in Book III, chapter 1, Against Valentinus: "For we knew the disposition of our salvation through none others than those through whom the Gospel came to us, which indeed they then preached, but afterward by the will of God committed to writing and handed down." Almost all the ancient Fathers taught the same opinion, though not obscurely: Chrysostom, Homily 1 on Matthew; Jerome in the catalogue of ecclesiastical writers on Matthew and John; Theophylact at the beginning of his commentaries on Matthew; and most clearly Eusebius, Book III of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 24. St. Luke gives us most certain testimony of this matter in the first words of his Gospel: "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a narration of the things that have been accomplished among us, according as they have delivered them unto us, who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, having diligently attained to all things from the beginning, to write to you in order, most excellent Theophilus, that you may know the truth of those words in which you have been instructed." Behold, therefore, St. Luke asserts that truth was preached before it was written. I omit that Matthew, first among the four Evangelists, composed an evangelical narration committed to pages, as St. Jerome says in the prologue upon the four Evangelists and in De viris illustribus, with whom Irenaeus and Eusebius in the places cited agree. From all these things we therefore have, first, that the supernatural doctrine of faith was entrusted to traditions before Scripture, and that the Church in every state was governed by the Holy Spirit through traditions before

writings. Secondly, we have that it is exceedingly heretical and foolish to assert that by Catholic faith we are bound to believe only those things which have been written in sacred and canonical books. For from that opinion it would follow that in that state of the Church when evangelical doctrine had not yet been committed to books, men were not bound to believe those things which were proposed to them for belief by Christ and the Apostles; to assert which would be great foolishness and an unheard-of heresy.
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SECOND CONCLUSION — CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

SECOND CONCLUSION. Not all things which pertain to the Catholic faith are contained in the canonical books, either expressly or obscurely; nor were all those things which Christ and the Apostles taught and established for the institution of the Church and the confirmation of faith committed to Sacred Scripture. The opposite is a manifest heresy. This conclusion could easily be extended to the Church as it existed under the written law, in which state the faithful believed many things which were not expressed in the five books of the Mosaic law, and indeed some of them were not even implicitly or obscurely contained there, as will be clear from what we shall say below in the fourth conclusion. But because the heretics, especially the Lutherans, particularly contend that in the Catholic Scriptures of the New Testament all things are expressly found which Christ and the Apostles taught as necessary for faith, therefore this conclusion must be proved by us only concerning those things which pertain to the Church of Christ. First, that not all things which Christ Himself preached and did were committed to writing is proved from this: the three Evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke omitted many things which were added by St. John. For those three narrate nothing concerning the beginnings of Christ's preaching, which John does. Nor is it to be thought that John added all things which had been omitted by the other Evangelists. For John himself expressly teaches in chapter 20 that he omitted many things, saying: "Many other signs also did Jesus in the sight of His disciples, which are not written in this book." And he adds: "But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God." From these words it is gathered that only those things were narrated by the Evangelists which seemed sufficient to them for producing faith concerning Christ, His divinity, and the benefit of the Incarnation; it was not their intention to write down everything pertaining to faith and religion. The same is gathered from the last chapter of John: "There are also many other things which Jesus did; which, if they were written every one, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written." It is confirmed. St. Luke, Acts 1, says that Christ appeared to the Apostles and disciples for forty days with many proofs and spoke to them concerning the kingdom of God. Certainly neither Luke himself nor the other Evangelists expounded to us everything which Christ said concerning the kingdom of God. In such frequent conversation there could not fail to be much discourse concerning the mysteries of faith and the sacraments; nevertheless scarcely five or six sayings uttered by Christ in those apparitions are reported in the whole New Testament. Therefore, etc. Moreover, that the Apostles did not put into writing everything which they themselves taught and instituted is most openly proved. First, because very few of the Apostles wrote canonical epistles; and those who did write, with the single exception of Paul, comprised little in their epistles. Nevertheless all of them, dispersed throughout the whole world, taught and decreed very many things for the erection and government of churches and for the dissemination of Catholic doctrine. Who, I ask, could believe that St. Peter, to whom as supreme pastor the care of the universal Church was committed by Christ the Lord, instituted or taught no more than those things which he collected in two very brief canonical epistles, which he certainly wrote when close to death? That he handed down many other dogmas and salutary institutions, St. Clement, an eyewitness of all the deeds of St. Peter, recounts in the books of the Recognitions; Clement afterward established these things in the Roman Church, and Anacletus, Evaristus, and Alexander, who were martyrs and Supreme Pontiffs, afterward commended them to the churches in their epistles. St. Paul also handed down innumerable precepts to diverse churches which were not reduced to writing. In 1 Corinthians 11, after saying certain things concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist, he added: "The rest I will set in order when I come." It is most certain that the Apostle fulfilled in deed what he promised in these words. Likewise, in 1 Thessalonians 4 he openly recalls many precepts which he had handed down to the Thessalonians without writing: "We ask and beseech you in the Lord Jesus, that as you have received from us how you ought to walk and to please God, so also you would walk, that you may abound the more. For you know what precepts I have given to you," etc. Innumerable similar passages are found in St. Paul, from which it is easy to gather that he instituted many things in the churches which are not found in Sacred Scripture. Moreover, who could doubt that St. John, who for sixty-five years ruled and governed the churches of Asia, taught and instituted very many things which he wrote neither in his Gospel nor in his canonical epistles nor in the Apocalypse? Let us now recount certain things in particular which are found partly not expressly, and partly not even implicitly, in the canonical Scriptures: the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mary, the baptism of infants, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and many others of this kind are not greatly expressed in the sacred letters. Likewise that prayers are to be made to the saints, that their images are to be venerated, that their memorials are to be solemnly celebrated in the Church, and that the sacraments of Order and Confirmation are not to be repeated are not taught expressly and in a fully unfolded manner by the sacred letters. And, as Innocent III observes in c. Cum Marthae, De celebratione missarum, many words of those which the Church uses in the form of consecration of the chalice, and which she believes Christ the Lord to have used, are found neither in the Gospel nor in the canonical epistles. Nowhere is it read that Christ said the words "mystery of faith," "of the eternal testament," etc. Therefore it is now sufficiently established that many things pertain to the Catholic faith which are not found in the sacred page. THIRD CONCLUSION. Sacred Scripture is not so clear in all things that it can easily be understood without a master and teacher; rather, in many things it has a most difficult understanding. This assertion indeed conflicts with all Lutheran heretics, as we have indicated above; nevertheless all theologians and Catholic doctors embrace it as a certain truth of faith.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

For establishing this conclusion, first let the most holy and most ancient Fathers be read, who frankly confess that they found very great difficulty in explaining the sacred letters. Origen, upon the Canticle: "It is necessary," he says, "that he who knows how to hear the Scriptures spiritually, or who certainly does not know but desires to know, strive with every labor, lest he converse according to flesh and blood, so that he may become worthy of spiritual secrets." He says the same more expressly in Homily 12 on Exodus. Jerome, on Ezekiel 44, says that the divine Scriptures are closed and bound by the key of David and by the seal of Him who gave them. Similar things are taught by the other most holy Fathers, whose testimonies I omit for brevity. Let Augustine be read in the proem of the books De doctrina Christiana and in Book V Super Genesim, chapter 3, where he says: "Sacred Scripture speaks in such a way that by its height it mocks the proud and by its depth terrifies the attentive." Let him especially be read in Epistle 3 to Volusian, especially toward the end. Let St. Jerome be read in the epistle to Paulinus and in the epistle to Damasus concerning three questions, question 2; also in the prologue upon the books of Paralipomenon. Gregory Nazianzen, Book I of his Theology; St. Basil, in the epistle De vita solitaria; St. Chrysostom, Homily 21 on Genesis; St. Cyril, Book V on Leviticus; St. Gregory, Homily 6 on Ezekiel; St. Isidore, Book I De summo bono, chapter 19; St. Bernard, Ad fratres de monte Dei; St. Ambrose, Book VII of the Epistles, epistle 44, where he calls Scripture a great sea having in itself an abyss of profound senses into which very many rivers enter. But let us now propose another more efficacious argument for our conclusion. St. Peter, 2 Peter 3, speaking of the epistles of Paul, says: "In which are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction." Behold a manifest testimony for confirming our conclusion and convicting the most foolish opinion of the heretics of falsehood. Moreover Paul, 1 Corinthians 2, says: "We speak wisdom among the perfect," and there he says that he speaks wisdom in mystery, which is hidden. And below he also says: "Which things also we speak, not in the words of human wisdom, but in the doctrine of the Spirit, comparing spiritual things with spiritual; but the sensual man perceives not these things which are of the Spirit of God," etc. He says many other things there by which he openly teaches that the sacred Scriptures, in which divine mysteries are contained, cannot be explained except by a divine spirit. Apocalypse 5 says that St. John saw a book written within and without, sealed with seven seals, and no one in heaven or on earth could open the book except the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the root of David, etc. Many most learned men interpret this book as sacred doctrine, said to be written within and without because it has a twofold sense, literal and mystical. To this pertains Isaiah 29: "And the vision of all shall be unto you as the words of a book that is sealed, which when they shall give to him that knows letters, they shall say: Read this; and he shall answer: I cannot, for it is sealed." For the understanding of Sacred Scripture it is not enough even to know letters unless there also be present the Spirit of Christ, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, who has the key of David for opening. The same truth is also confirmed from the experience of the whole Church and from the very nature of the Scriptures. For if anyone runs through the individual books of Sacred Scripture, he will find innumerable places whose understanding is not obvious, but requires labor, doctrine, languages, history, and the assistance of the Spirit of God. Therefore the sacred text is not in every part so clear that every private reader, without a teacher and without the judgment of the Church, can easily attain its genuine sense.

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Who, I ask, in the Old Testament—to pass over the rest—has hitherto fully penetrated the first chapter of Genesis? How many happy minds have sweated over the exposition of the six days of the divine Workman, and how variously have they explained it to us? If we come to the Prophets, their exceedingly abstruse sense terrified even all the ancient Hebrew interpreters. How many enigmas are there in the Prophets, how many parables, tropes, and figurative expressions; how many differences and circumstances of visions; how many comparisons to natural things which escape even the most learned? What diversity there is in their prophesying! In one and the same context of discourse, at one moment they prophesy by words, at another by deeds; now concerning future things, now past things; now they direct their discourse to the state of their own people, now they turn wholly to showing the future state of the Church of Christ. I omit the weeks of Daniel, the overturnings of monarchies, the construction of the temple, and the most hidden visions in Ezekiel, in whose first chapter there is so great a majesty and depth that the wise Hebrews permitted it to be read by few and those indeed advanced in age and learned. Jerome rightly calls the Old Testament the eastern gate upon Ezekiel 44, through which the Pontiff alone enters and returns, which is always closed and is open to Christ alone, who has the key of David and closes and no one opens. I pass over here the fact that knowledge of the Hebrew idiom, which is of great value for interpreting the Old Testament, is not obvious and easy to all. To know the phrases, tropes, proverbs, parables, etc. of a foreign language is wont to be difficult even after much exercise. Moreover, even for the Hebrews themselves who know the propriety of the language, the literal understanding of Scripture is not so easy. The Hebrew language is very narrow and poor in words; hence it is necessary that one and the same word, even in the same context, sometimes signify diverse things. From this arises such diversity among the learned Hebrews in interpreting and reading. The ancient Talmudists contend with the moderns, and almost all with the Cabalists concerning the understanding of the sense of Scripture. Jesus son of Sirach recognized this difficulty. In the proem of Ecclesiasticus, speaking of the work of his grandfather which he himself was composing, he says: "I exhort you therefore to come with benevolence and to make the reading with more attentive study, and to pardon us in those things in which, following the image of wisdom, we seem to fail in the composition of words. For Hebrew words are deficient when translated into another language. And not only these, but the law itself, the Prophets, and the other books have no small difference when they are spoken among themselves." St. Jerome, in the Apology to Pammachius against Rufinus, after recounting a great forest of names and words having ambiguous signification, adds: "This matter gives material for diverse interpretations, while each one, among doubtful things, translates that which seems to him more consequent." If finally we come to the New Testament, who does not see how many mysteries Christ the Lord enclosed under parables? Many most grave Fathers labored in their explanation, which cannot but be difficult. Moreover, in the epistles of Paul, especially that written to the Romans, how many and how great difficulties are involved? This matter did not escape St. Peter, who, as we said above, says that in the epistles of Paul certain things are found difficult to understand. Jerome, in the epistle to Hedibia,

question 10, says: "The whole Epistle to the Romans requires interpretation and is wrapped in such obscurities

that in understanding it we need the help of the Holy Spirit." If finally we come to the last of the books of the New Testament, namely the Apocalypse, Jerome will tell us that there are as many mysteries in it as words. All are words of vision, words of a sealed book, which if they are offered to those who know letters, they are bound frankly to confess—if they are wise—that they do not fully understand it because it is sealed and closed with seven seals, and therefore that for its understanding there is need of the Spirit of the Lamb slain from the origin of the world, who has the key of David to open. From all these things it is clearly established how true and Catholic our third conclusion is, and how shamefully the heretics are blinded who think that by their own spirit and with little labor they can attain the understanding of the Scriptures and that no ambiguity is found in them. FOURTH CONCLUSION. In the Church of God, always and in every state of the Church—of nature, of the written law, and of the Gospel—traditions were necessary by which the people of God might be governed in faith and religion. This conclusion, as it stands, is sufficiently established and certain among all Catholics, although for the state of the evangelical law it possesses greater certitude, as we shall presently say. It is proved first as regards the state of the law of nature. The faithful of that state knew many supernatural things which were necessary to them for salvation; but these were not handed down in canonical writings. Therefore they were possessed through traditions, derived from elders to juniors, from fathers to sons, and from seniors to younger men. There is no place at present for disputing the minor proposition; rather, as a common assertion of theologians we ought to suppose that the divine laws and dogmas of faith in that first state of the Church were not entrusted to writings but were implanted in the hearts of the faithful. For this reason that state was called the state of nature: although very many supernatural mysteries were known in it and the faithful of that state were bound by a supernatural law of faith, nevertheless none of these things was written down, but was engraved, as it were by a mode of nature, upon the hearts of the faithful. Returning to the major proposition, of whose truth it is not lawful to doubt: the Apostle in Hebrews 11 teaches that no one can ever please God without faith and that one approaching God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him. This passage must necessarily be understood of supernatural faith concerning the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, as St. Thomas teaches in the following

question, article 8.

Moreover, after the original sin of the first parent no one could ever be justified except through faith in Christ the Mediator. Therefore in the state of the law of nature faith in the Incarnation of Christ the Lord, either explicit or implicit, was necessary; concerning this St. Thomas teaches in the place immediately cited, in the body of the article. Likewise in that state knowledge of original sin was necessary. For if sin had been altogether unknown, the salvation and remedy of infants would have been lost: parents would not have sought a remedy for their children, nor could they have offered any sacrifice for their expiation if they were entirely ignorant of their misery and guilt.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

Therefore, since these and similar things were not written, it was necessary that they be confirmed by divine traditions. This argument is evidently efficacious for our conclusion. To it no answer can be made except that in the state of nature supernatural knowledge was not given through external preaching and doctrine, but through the internal suggestion of the Holy Spirit, by which to each one were given those things necessary for salvation; and therefore traditions were not then necessary, since internal inspiration sufficed. Against this solution it is argued first from what Paul says in Romans 10: "Faith is from hearing." By these words he explains that the regular mode of having faith is through doctrine and the teaching of one who teaches. Certainly it seems to pertain rather to miracle than to the ordinary providence of God that all men of that state should be taught immediately by the Holy Spirit without every persuasion of an external teacher. For it is natural to men to acquire internal doctrine through the ministry of the senses. Secondly, against the same solution: it is not probable that the first parent Adam, who infected all his offspring with the original stain and who knew by divine revelation that this could be abolished only by faith in the future Christ and His Passion manifested through some sign, did not teach his sons concerning original guilt itself and its necessary remedy. Therefore his sons received knowledge of original sin and likewise knowledge of the necessary remedy through the doctrine of the first parent, which it is probable they also derived to their posterity. He would inflict no slight injury upon the first parent, indeed upon the other fathers of that state, who should say that in so long a life they did not instruct their children concerning the supernatural mysteries of faith and things necessarily to be believed. It is confirmed first. St. Thomas, I, q. 94, a. 3, teaches that the first man received a certain excellent knowledge of supernatural things divinely infused into him, by which he could teach, instruct, and govern his children in order to the supernatural end. Therefore, since he was constituted by God a doctor and master of his children in the supernatural order, it cannot reasonably be asserted that he failed in so necessary an office. It is confirmed secondly. Without any doubt it must be asserted that all natural sciences were disseminated in the world from the first parent and the other most ancient Fathers. Augustine of Eugubium, Book II De perenni philosophia, hands this down at length and learnedly. Therefore it is likewise necessary to confess the same concerning supernatural knowledge, since it was much more necessary to the men of that state. Finally, it is confirmed thirdly. Sacred Scripture reports of the most holy Job that he both prayed daily and offered sacrifices for his sons, lest perhaps they had sinned. Therefore he had knowledge concerning sin, sacrifice, expiation, and the divine worship due to God; and it is not credible that such knowledge was peculiar to him alone and not received through the tradition of the Fathers. Thus the Church in the state of nature was governed through unwritten doctrine handed down from elders to successors. The same conclusion is also to be established concerning the state of the written law. For although the principal divine law was committed to writing by Moses, nevertheless not every thing necessary for the religious life and government of that people was written in the books of the law. Many things were preserved by legitimate tradition from the elders, provided always that such traditions were consonant with the divine law and not contrary to it. In this manner the distinction must be retained between true divine traditions and those corrupt human traditions by which the Pharisees later made void the commandment of God. In the evangelical state this conclusion is still more certain and manifest. For Christ and the Apostles first preached by living voice, and the Church received doctrine before the writing of the New Testament. The faithful therefore were governed by Apostolic teaching and tradition before the canonical books were gathered or dispersed among the churches. Hence tradition is not some accidental supplement added after Scripture as though the Church had first possessed a complete written rule and only afterward received customs. Rather, in the historical order, the living preaching of Christ and the Apostles preceded the written books, and the written books themselves were entrusted to a Church already believing, worshipping, and governed. This is why the testimony of the ancient Church concerning the Apostolic origin of a doctrine or rite has true theological weight when the matter cannot be reduced to a merely local or human custom.

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

The same truth is proved from the Apostle's command concerning the deposit received and to be guarded. The ancient Fathers unanimously understood that what had been handed down from the beginning was to be retained and what had been newly invented was to be rejected. For confirmation of this matter it is useful to recall what Clement of Alexandria writes in Book II of the Stromata: this Apostolic testimony had so great a force against heretics that they were compelled to reject the Epistles of Paul to Timothy, denying that they had been written by St. Paul. In the same sense the word "deposit" is to be taken below in 2 Timothy 1: "Hold the form of sound words which you have heard from me. Keep the good deposit." To this also pertains what John says in his second canonical Epistle: "Having more things to write unto you, I would not by paper and ink. For I hope that I shall be with you and speak mouth to mouth." From these words it is gathered that John preached and taught many things concerning faith and religion which he did not entrust to writings but to the memory of the faithful, so that by succession the doctrine might be derived from elders to the younger. Secondly, this truth is proved from most grave testimonies of the Fathers. It is taught by St. Dionysius, Book I of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 1; St. Ignatius, as Eusebius reports in Book III of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 36; Origen, Homily 5 on Numbers; Tertullian, in De corona militis and often elsewhere; Clement of Alexandria, Books I and V of the Stromata, whose words Eusebius reports in Book V of his History, chapter 11; Chrysostom, Homily 2 De Adam et Eva; Justin Martyr, question 118 proposed by the Gentiles; Papias, disciple of St. John, in Eusebius, Book III of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 39; Hegesippus, in the same Eusebius, Book IV, chapter 8; Irenaeus, Book III, chapters 3 and 4, also reported by Eusebius, Book IV, chapter 14, and Book V, chapter 6; Epiphanius in the book on heresies in various places, especially around heresy 79; Cyprian, De ablutione pedum; Jerome, Against the Luciferians; Augustine, Book II De baptismo contra Donatistas, chapter 7, and Book IV, chapter 24; Damascene, Book IV De fide orthodoxa, chapters 13 and 17; Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, chapters 27 and 29. All these most grave Fathers, with the greatest agreement and great veneration, honor the divine and Apostolic traditions of the Church. But it is necessary to report certain of their words especially, so that their mind may be more manifest to us. Let the first witness of this truth be St. Clement, disciple and successor of Peter, who in his last epistle to the Jerusalemites says: "It has been reported to us that certain men dwelling in your places oppose sound doctrines and, as it seems to them, say many things not according to the traditions of the Fathers but according to their own sense." And, as Irenaeus recalls in Book III, chapter 3, this most holy Clement, while he ruled the Church of Christ, most gravely composed no small dissension which had arisen among the Corinthians by traditions received from the Apostles, which he delivered to those Corinthians in a certain epistle. Hegesippus recalls this epistle, as Eusebius reports in Book IV of his History, chapter 23, and affirms that it was held in such veneration among the Corinthians that it was always read in the church on Sundays. Epiphanius says in the work on heresies: "It is necessary to use Apostolic tradition; for all things cannot be received from Scripture, because the Apostles commended some things to us from the sacred Scriptures and some from tradition." The seventh book of St. Augustine De baptismo contra Donatistas is to be read when he treats that difficulty much agitated in his time concerning the efficacy of the baptism of heretics. Likewise the same St. Augustine, in the book Against the Manichaeans, says: "It is manifest that in a doubtful matter the authority of the Church avails for certitude of faith, which from the most firmly founded sees of the Apostles even to the present day is strengthened by the succession of bishops one after another and by the consent of so many peoples." Irenaeus, Book III, chapter 4, writing against the Valentinians, says: "This is the entrance of life; but all the others are thieves and robbers, and therefore it is necessary indeed to avoid them, but to love with great diligence those things which belong to the Church and to apprehend the tradition of truth." And afterward he adds: "What if the Apostles had not left writings to us? Would it not have been necessary to follow the order of the tradition which they handed down to those to whom they committed the churches?"

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Thirdly, I prove this same truth by the authority of the Roman Pontiffs. First, that St. Peter taught this opinion will easily be understood by anyone who reads Book X of the Recognitions of St. Clement. There St. Peter is introduced teaching that the understanding of Scripture in doubtful matters is to be taken from the doctrine of the elders and from ecclesiastical traditions. St. Felix, martyr, first of that name, when proving equality of persons, has recourse to traditions. In his third epistle to Benignus, after persuading belief in the aforesaid **article, he immediately adds: "This is the living tradition of the Apostles, which must be preached, truly loved** and cherished, and confidently held by all." Likewise Fabian, speaking of the confection of chrism, of which no mention at all exists in Sacred Scripture, in his second epistle to the Eastern bishops has recourse to the traditions of the Fathers, by which he efficaciously proves that this holy and venerable rite emanated from Christ the Lord: "This," he says, "the holy Roman and Antiochene Church preached in the time of the Apostles; this the churches of Jerusalem and Ephesus hold, in which the Apostles presiding taught thus." And he adds: "If anyone should attempt to oppose, let him understand that he has closed to himself, before us and before all who understand rightly, the entrance of understanding." Sixtus II, martyr, in the second epistle to the bishops of Spain says: "We exhort you, brethren, and entreat that you in no way depart from the path of Apostolic tradition, but without hesitation hold the faith and order which the Apostles and Apostolic men handed down." What, I ask, could be said more suitably concerning the authority of traditions? Innocent I says that no new precepts are imposed, but that those things which through the sloth of some had been neglected are desired to be observed by all, things which nevertheless were constituted by Apostolic tradition. Celestine I confirms the rite of the sacrament of Baptism through the authority of traditions. Siricius also, a most ancient Pontiff, in his

first epistle to all the orthodox, rebukes by the universal tradition of the Church those who everywhere attempted to create laymen and neophytes presbyters. Likewise Cyril, in the synodical epistle sent to Nestorius and approved by the first Council of Nicaea, says: "It is not sufficient for your religion merely to confess the creed which was set forth by the largess of the Holy Spirit by the venerable council assembled at Nicaea; but it follows that by oath you confess that you anathematize your polluted faith, profane dogmas and opinions, and that you teach those things which all of us, whether throughout the East or throughout the West, bishops, masters, and presidents of peoples, believe and teach." Fourthly, this conclusion is proved by most efficacious reasons gathered from the two preceding conclusions, the second and third. In the second **conclusion we showed that very many of those things which are necessary for faith and religion are not written** in the canonical Scriptures. Therefore those things are possessed from the tradition of the elders, and their whole force depends upon divine traditions. The consequence is proved. For divine tradition is nothing other than doctrine pertaining to faith and religion which was never committed to Sacred Scripture, but was derived from elders to inferiors, from fathers to sons. Moreover, in the third conclusion we proved by many arguments, and indeed most efficaciously, so that we showed the opposite to be a dogma of heretics, that Sacred Scripture does not in all things possess an easy understanding; rather, in very many places it is very doubtful and difficult. Therefore, in order to draw out a certain and established understanding of Sacred Scripture, it will be necessary to have recourse to the divine traditions of the Church. Otherwise the Church of Christ would lack a certain rule of interpreting the Sacred Scriptures, which would deservedly be a great absurdity. And if the Church lacks the true and legitimate understanding of the Scriptures, the Sacred Scriptures would have been given to her idly and in vain by Christ the Bridegroom. Perhaps someone will say that the Church can possess the true understanding of Scripture without the aid of traditions because of the infallible assistance which the Pontiff has in defining matters of faith and which general councils also have. But this solution has no force. For when the Church defines something anew, it is necessary that she consult the traditions of the elders and the ancient monuments of the Holy Fathers. The Church does not construct a new faith in her definitions; rather, she explains anew to us and faithfully brings to light in her definitions that faith which Christ and the Apostles formerly taught the Church. Vincent of Lérins observes this in the place cited above, saying: "The Church, stirred by the novelties of heretics, brings forth by the decrees of her councils nothing other than that what she had previously received from the elders by tradition alone, she afterward consigns to posterity by the written hand of Scripture." Certainly that Scripture is to be expounded from traditions is taught more than once by most grave Fathers. Epiphanius, in the place cited above: "The Scriptures," he says, "need tradition and sense for recognizing the force and faculty of each thing; therefore tradition must be used." Augustine expressly taught the same in the testimony cited above against the Manichaeans. Tertullian likewise, in the book De praescriptionibus haereticorum, says: "There is the truth of the Scriptures where the Apostles preached and their successors taught what the Apostles preached; and what Christ revealed to them ought not otherwise to be proved except through those same churches which the Apostles themselves founded, preaching to them both by living voice, as they say, and by epistles." Irenaeus, speaking against Valentinus in Book III, chapter 2, says that the heretics themselves also sometimes flee to traditions in the understanding of Scripture, so that even from them the true understanding of Scripture may be gathered, when he says: "When we challenge them from the Scriptures, they say that tradition is necessary for its understanding..."

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"...for its understanding, which was handed down by living voice." But when we again appeal to that tradition which is from the Apostles and is preserved in the Churches through succeeding presbyters, they oppose tradition, saying that they are wiser not only than the presbyters but even than the Apostles, and that they alone have undoubtedly known the mysteries. Moreover, even if we were to grant freely to the heretics that in the canonical Scriptures all things which Christ and the Apostles taught are contained so expressly that they need no interpreter, nevertheless the necessity of the divine traditions of the Church would still remain. For whence, I ask, can the faithful know with certainty that these which the Church now venerates are the true canonical Scriptures which the Apostles and Evangelists left to us in writing, unless we recur to the traditions of the Church? Moreover, by what reason shall we refute a new book falsely inserted among the sacred and canonical books unless we consult the traditions of the Church and the ancient monuments of the Fathers? Thus, as Eusebius reports in Book IX of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 12, Serapion gravely excluded a Gospel fabricated by heretics under the name of Peter. This is what St. Augustine signified in these words: "I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." I would by no means know that these four which we now read are the true Gospels of Christ, namely those which the Church received from the Evangelists, unless the Catholic Church, fortified by the authority of the Fathers and elders through perpetual succession, gravely admonished me. Many other things which conduce to confirming this Catholic truth can be sought from those things which we shall immediately say concerning the following fifth

conclusion. FIFTH CONCLUSION. Divine traditions have as much force and authority for confirming dogmas

of faith as the Catholic Church has, as the definitions of Pontiffs and councils have, and finally the authority of traditions is as great as that of Sacred Scripture. This conclusion is a Catholic truth, according to which we ought to judge no less heretical and unbelieving one who resists the divine traditions of the Church than one who departs from the Sacred Scriptures and from the definitions of councils and Pontiffs. First, this conclusion is proved from the sacred letters. The Apostle, 2 Thessalonians 2, in the words cited above, "Hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word or by our epistle," most openly teaches the same truth and wills those dogmas which were committed to writing and those which came to the Church by tradition and ancient custom from the word of Apostolic preaching to have equal force among the faithful. Basil observes this in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 26. Likewise, in 1 Timothy 6 Paul says: "If anyone teaches otherwise and does not consent to sound words," etc. He does not say "sound Scriptures" but "sound words." And Galatians 1: "If anyone evangelize to you besides that which you have received, let him be anathema." "Received," namely whether by writing or by word received in the heart of the Church. From these passages Origen, in the commentary on the Epistle to Titus, defines as a heretic one who confesses that he believes Christ and yet believes something concerning the truth of the Christian faith other than what ecclesiastical tradition possesses. This testimony of Origen is found reported in the Apology of Pamphilus. Moreover Paul, 1 Corinthians 11, says: "But if any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, nor the Church of God." Behold, against certain contentious Corinthians, if there were any, denying that a woman ought to pray with her head veiled, he introduced from the custom of the Church an argument efficacious in his judgment. By this he plainly signified to us that an argument drawn from the custom and tradition of the Church has the same force among the faithful as though it were taken from Sacred Scripture and from the most grave definitions of the Church and the Fathers. To this accords what St. Chrysostom says in Homily 18 upon the Epistle to the Hebrews: Paul in that Epistle argued from Sacred Scripture and the more ancient traditions of the Fathers. SECOND ARGUMENT for this conclusion is taken from the definitions of councils, which attribute no less authority to sacred traditions than to the canonical Scriptures themselves. In the seventh General Synod, action 7, the Fathers of the council speak thus: "We confess that we unanimously wish to retain the ecclesiastical traditions, whether prevailing and decreed by writing or by custom, among which is the representation of images. Therefore, observing the traditions of the Catholic Church, we define that holy images are to be venerated. Those therefore who dare to think otherwise, or after the manner of impious heretics to contaminate ecclesiastical traditions, if they are bishops let them be deposed; if laymen, let them be deprived of communion." And at the end of the session it is said: "If anyone does not care for the traditions of the Church, whether prevailing without writing or by custom, let him be anathema." Behold, he equally pronounces anathema against one who contemns the traditions of the Church proved by custom and against one who contemns the Sacred Scriptures. Likewise, in the first Nicene Synod the Fathers, persuaded chiefly by the traditions of the ancient Fathers, sanctioned by firm definition both the consubstantiality of the divine Persons and the truth concerning the reception of heretics by imposition of hands. In the sixth Synod of Constantinople, which is contained in the third Council of Constantinople, Agatho, Roman Pontiff, explaining his faith concerning the error of the Monothelites, which the whole Synod received as an oracle, affirms that he holds it from the institution and tradition of the elders, adding after many grave things: "This is the pure confession of piety, this the living tradition of the Apostles of Christ." And in the same sixth Synod the error of the Armenians, who offered unmixed wine without water in the most holy mystery of the altar, was condemned for no other reason than that the holy Synod judged the opinion of the Armenians to contradict Apostolic tradition; this is seen in canon 32. Finally, the sacred Council of Trent, session 4, considering that the saving truth of the Gospel and the doctrine of morals are contained in written books and unwritten traditions of Christ Himself, received from the Apostles or from the Apostles themselves at the dictation of the Holy Spirit and as

though handed down from hand to hand to us, received and venerates with equal affection of piety and reverence, together with the sacred books, those traditions pertaining both to faith and morals, as dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit and preserved by continual succession in the Catholic Church. And afterward: "If anyone knowingly and deliberately contemns the aforesaid traditions, let him be anathema."

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

The THIRD ARGUMENT for the same fifth conclusion is from the authority of the Roman Pontiffs, who, in most grave matters which could not be proved at all by Scripture, confirm them through the ancient traditions of the Fathers, judging that they have brought forward the most solid foundation for Catholic truth. Nothing is more frequent in the epistles of the Roman Pontiffs, when they attempt to persuade something, than this expression: "This we have received from the holy Fathers; this is the living tradition of the Apostles," whom not to believe is certainly impious and rash. Let the holy Pontiffs cited by us above concerning the preceding **conclusion be read. Let Innocent III be read in c. Cum Marthae, De celebratione missarum,** which passage we also weighed above. Innocent I, in the epistle to Augustine, reduces the origin of schisms and errors to contempt of divine traditions, when he says: "Each one does not hold what has been handed down, but establishes that to be held which seemed good to himself; hence diverse things are observed or celebrated in diverse places, and scandal is caused among the peoples while they think contradiction has been introduced by Apostolic men." Fourthly, our conclusion is persuaded by the authority of the Holy Fathers. Origen, in the proem of the books Peri Archon, after certain things consonant with this purpose, adds: "Since there are many who think that they know the things of Christ, and some of them think differently from those who preceded them, nevertheless let the ecclesiastical preaching handed down by order of succession from the Apostles and remaining in the Churches to the present be preserved; that truth alone is to be believed which in no respect disagrees with ecclesiastical tradition." Ignatius, in the epistle to Hero: "Everyone," he says, "who speaks things besides those which have been handed down, although he be worthy of faith, although he fast, although he preserve virginity, although he perform signs, although he prophesy, let him appear to you as a wolf in the flock of sheep, working corruption." Therefore if he is a wolf, that is, a heretic, who does not consent to the traditions of the Church, it is manifest that the divine traditions of the Church are of no less authority in dogmas of faith than Sacred Scripture and the definitions of councils and Pontiffs. St. Basil, in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 27, says: "Of the dogmas and proclamations preserved in the Church, some we possess from doctrine handed down in writing, while others we have received from the tradition of the Apostles in mystery, that is, in secret; both have equal force for piety." Basil adds many other things there which conduce greatly to the truth of our conclusion. Irenaeus subscribes to the same opinion, Book III Against Heresies, chapter 4, and Book IV, chapter 43. Tertullian, in the book De corona militis, amplifies this same truth at length. Certain of his words are worth reporting here: "If no Scripture has determined the ancient observances of the Church, certainly custom has strengthened them, which without doubt flows from tradition." And if you ask for the law of these disciplines, "no tradition of law will be alleged to you; custom is the authoress, confirmer, and observer of faith, a suitable witness of ancient tradition." Custom also in civil matters has force of law; much more therefore can ancient and universal ecclesiastical custom testify concerning a tradition. The authority of the Fathers, therefore, does not introduce an extrinsic ornament merely added to the truth; it manifests that what the universal Church has preserved from antiquity has theological force as a witness of the Apostolic deposit. The conclusion is further confirmed from the fact that heretics themselves, when pressed by the authority of Scripture, are often forced either to distort the text or to deny the received rule by which the Church has always understood it. Hence the controversy returns necessarily to the question of which interpretation was handed down in the Churches founded by the Apostles and preserved through succession.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

There are also reasons of fittingness why Christ the Lord willed that not everything belonging to the government of His Church should be contained in written books, but that certain things should be preserved by living tradition. FIRST, the majesty and profundity of the mysteries were thus commended. It was not fitting that every sacred matter should be exposed indiscriminately in writing to all without distinction; rather certain mysteries were to be handed down by the elders to those capable of receiving them. In this way the Apostles themselves taught many things to their disciples orally. SECOND, the order of the Church was thereby preserved. If all the mysteries and all the profound senses of Scripture had been set down explicitly in books, there would have been less need for doctors and teachers in the Church. But Christ willed the members of His body to depend upon one another and the less instructed to receive doctrine from those appointed to teach. Hence either the Apostles would have had to compose commentaries upon their own writings, a thing always foreign to the custom of grave writers, or the true and profound understanding of the sacred Scriptures was to remain implanted in the heart of the Church through Apostolic or divine traditions. Therefore it was fitting that the Apostles should hand down by living voice to their disciples many things altogether necessary for drawing out the senses of Scripture. To this is added that by this way not only is the dignity and majesty of the Scriptures preserved, but ecclesiastical orders also remain in their proper place, while the elders of the Church, as wiser and more prudent and faithful guardians of the evangelical deposit to whom the divine traditions were committed, manifest and dispense to the younger and simpler faithful the sacred mysteries of Holy Scripture and the hidden spiritual things. THIRD CAUSE. Scripture can very easily be corrupted by additions and subtractions. For since it is a mute witness, it cannot defend itself nor testify for its own safety. And thus we have very often experienced attempts at this both from perfidious Jews concerning the Old Testament and from heretics, especially Lutherans, concerning both Testaments but chiefly the New. Both have very often attempted to add some things and remove others from the canonical books so that Sacred Scripture might patronize their errors. Thus Irenaeus, Book I, chapter 1, says: "Heretics rely upon the Scriptures to confirm their dogmas, lest they appear to be without a witness, but they deform the words of God and from the figure of a man render the figure of a fox or bear." Therefore it was necessary that sacred traditions remain, in which the expressed word of God and the living voice of the Gospel—within which, as Jerome says in the epistle to Paulinus, there is I know not what latent energy—should persevere preserved in the heart of the Church, according to that saying: "My Spirit who is in you, and My words which I have put in your mouth, shall not depart from your mouth, nor from the mouth of your seed," etc. Thus the living word preserved in tradition guards and defends the word in the Scriptures which is, as it were, lifeless. The Lutherans boast that in their opinions they follow only the express word of God. But where, I ask, is such a living word? Is it not in the ecclesiastical and divine traditions? In the Scriptures it lies, as it were, placed for examination. To this pertains the fact that even if Sacred Scripture could preserve itself inviolate without the protection of traditions, nevertheless it cannot explain itself in all things, since it can very easily be bent by depraved men to diverse and even contradictory senses, according to what Peter says in 2 Peter 3 concerning the epistles of Paul: "In which are certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction." Hence Scripture is compared to a waxen nose, which can be bent in any direction. Therefore aid had to be provided against so great an inconvenience through tradition, so that tradition might be, as it were, a Lydian or Heraclean stone placed in the hand of the Church by which we can discern false and true interpretations of the Scriptures. From these things it follows that for confuting heretics tradition has still greater practical force than Scripture, because, as Tertullian observes, the Scriptures are easily drawn into various senses, whereas traditions are not in the same way. Ignatius, in Eusebius, Book III of the Ecclesiastical History, chapter 32, teaches especially for this reason that the contagions of heretics can be avoided if one adheres more diligently and tenaciously to the traditions of the Apostles.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

FOURTH CAUSE. Christ willed to govern and dispose His Church in a certain human manner. No commonwealth contains in writing everything which pertains to its government; rather, many things are preserved solely by the tradition of the elders. Indeed, if all things were sanctioned in writing, they would become burdensome to subjects and would deter rather than invite them to observance. Many other reasons and causes for preserving tradition could be pursued, but let those which we have hitherto deduced in the course of this argument suffice. SIXTH CONCLUSION. The Church of Christ is governed and ruled not only by divine traditions, concerning which we have spoken hitherto, but also by Apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions. We explained above by what difference divine, Apostolic, and ecclesiastical traditions are distinguished. Certainly this conclusion, after what we said concerning the preceding conclusions, especially the fifth, does not need great proof. It will suffice to illustrate it by certain examples, although I do not wish to pursue a long enumeration of examples. For our disputation is concerned with the matter in common and does not descend to individual traditions; to enumerate them one by one would be laborious and sufficiently obstructive. Therefore, in disputing concerning Apostolic traditions we must first recur to the canons of the Apostles, which are commonly reckoned as eighty-five by most grave men. Indeed the sixth Synod of Constantinople commends them with great reverence in these words: "It has pleased the holy Synod that from now on the eighty chapters of the canons of the Apostles be confirmed and ratified." The Emperor Justinian also, as is fitting, venerates them greatly in the Authenticum. Very many traditions are contained in these canons. Moreover, the veneration of images is an Apostolic tradition, as is said in the second Nicene Synod. Likewise the forty-day fast was without doubt introduced by Apostolic tradition, as Jerome testifies in Epistle 4 to Marcella, and also Epiphanius when disputing against the Arian heretics. Likewise no one doubts that the veneration of the Lord's Day is an Apostolic tradition. Origen, Against Celsus, speaks in this way concerning the feast of Pentecost and the Lord's Day as things already received in the Church by the long usage of the elders. Innumerable ceremonies and very many religious rites which the Church has perpetually observed in celebrating and administering the sacraments, especially concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist, without **doubt pertain to Apostolic traditions. To these ceremonies pertain the words of Paul, 1 Corinthians 11, where** after saying many things concerning the sacrament of the altar he finally adds: "The rest I will set in order when I come." These things were disposed by Paul concerning the ceremonies which the Church observes in the ministry of this sacrament. Let the theologian read many other Apostolic traditions in the most learned Martin de Ayala, Book III De divinis et Apostolicis traditionibus. Moreover, by reason I confirm that Apostolic traditions are found in the Church. It is not probable that those first pastors and Fathers of the Church instituted nothing by Apostolic authority in the churches over which they presided which has remained preserved inviolate among us. I would not deny that some things were instituted and commanded by the Apostles not to endure perpetually but only for a time. Such was that statute in Acts 15 concerning abstaining from blood and things strangled. Jerome also, Against the Luciferians, says that it was an Apostolic tradition that on Sundays we should pray standing; nevertheless the Church does not now observe it. Likewise triple immersion in Baptism had its origin from Apostolic tradition, as is clear from canon 49 of the Apostles, although later it was abolished because of a contrary custom. Some Apostolic traditions of this kind are therefore found, which the Apostles perhaps established not because they regarded them as altogether necessary for the government of the Church and the spiritual advantage of the faithful, but because the condition of that time so demanded. Nor is it to be thought that the Apostles understood all things which they instituted to be altogether necessary; therefore there is no wonder if some of them were abolished by disuse. Nevertheless, at present we establish that very many things are preserved in the Church which had their origin from Apostolic traditions, such as the forty-day fast, the cult of images, and the other things which, because of the gravity of the matter joined with Apostolic institution, were accepted by the faithful as to be preserved inviolate. Concerning these things the Holy Fathers are to be understood when in most grave words they define it to be a great sacrilege to depart from Apostolic traditions. Zosimus the Pontiff is to be understood concerning these when he says: "To dare anything contrary to the statutes of the Fathers, or to change them, not even the authority of this See permits. Among us antiquity lives from the root unshaken, to which the decrees of the Fathers have sanctioned reverence." Certainly in that place the Pontiff was not speaking of divine traditions, concerning which we disputed in the preceding conclusion; for these are not called institutions of the Fathers but of God Himself. And concerning the word "can" it is not to be understood of absolute power, by which the Supreme Pontiff could abrogate all laws and all precepts of the Fathers which emanated from them as first and universal prelates of the Church; rather, the word signifies reasonable power consonant with the government of the Church, according to which the Pontiff not only cannot change the decrees and traditions of the Apostles, but not even those of the other ancient Fathers who after the Apostles labored happily in preserving and amplifying ecclesiastical discipline. Nicholas speaks of the same traditions in the epistle to Hincmar when he says: "It is a ridiculous and sufficiently abominable disgrace that we should allow the traditions which we received from the Fathers from antiquity to be broken." And John, Patriarch of Constantinople, in the epistle to Hormisdas the Roman Pontiff, says: "The first salvation is to guard the rule of right faith and in no way depart from the traditions of the Fathers." The great councils confirm this same truth more than once.

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The great councils confirm this same truth, and especially the Second General Council of Nicaea in these words: "We must preserve the ecclesiastical traditions retained in the Church either by writing or by custom." And the most ancient Synod of Gangra says in its final canon: "We condemn those who exalt themselves against the Sacred Scriptures and ecclesiastical rules and introduce new precepts." That by "ecclesiastical rules" the holy Synod understands the traditions of the Fathers is sufficiently clear from the words immediately added: "We exhort that all things be done in the Church which agree with Apostolic traditions and the precepts of the Sacred Scriptures." I would be lengthy if I wished to dwell upon reporting testimonies of this kind, for there are very many. Yet this should be observed: among most grave authors "Apostolic traditions" are not always taken in the same sense. Sometimes they are taken for divine traditions which the Apostles sanctioned by a special command of Christ; these pertain to our preceding fifth conclusion. Sometimes, however, according to the sense of the present conclusion, the expression is used for those Apostolic decrees and statutes which flowed from Apostolic authority itself, governing the Churches, as from their proper font and origin. The institution of these does not exceed the authority of the Church which resides in the Roman Pontiff and in general councils; therefore such traditions can be changed and abrogated by that authority. How these can be distinguished from the former will be explained in the solution to the fifth argument. Proceeding therefore to the second part of the conclusion, which speaks of the other general ecclesiastical traditions, it is shown very briefly that the Church observes traditions which had their origin from the Roman Pontiffs and from the other most ancient prelates and pastors of the Church. First it is proved. If we turn our eyes to the testimonies of Pontiffs, councils, and most grave saints which I have adduced in this **disputation, it will be manifest that in them the faithful are admonished not only to observe the traditions of** the Apostles but also those of the Fathers and elders. Therefore the Church venerates not only Apostolic traditions, but immediately after them holds in great esteem the traditions and institutions of the other ancient Fathers. Secondly it is proved. It is not probable that from the most ancient Roman Pontiffs and other ancient Fathers, wholly devoted to ecclesiastical discipline and the government of the Churches, there did not emanate many traditions and praiseworthy customs which conduce greatly to the spiritual utility of the faithful. Therefore it is unreasonable to deny traditions of this kind. If examples are sought, they are not lacking. Who does not see that many things which the universal Church uses in celebrating the sacrifice of the Mass are not to be referred to Apostolic institution, but to later Pontiffs and Fathers? Who doubts that the Major Litanies emanated from the Roman Pontiff Gregory? And many other things of this kind are found handed down by the elders, which contribute greatly to adorning and amplifying the majesty of the Church and promoting the salvation of the faithful. Since the Apostles were greatly intent upon erecting the Church and founding the faith, they could not institute and hand down everything which might conduce to the ornament and majesty of the Church, especially because the state of the primitive Church, still small and tender, living in extreme poverty and agitated by innumerable persecutions, did not permit it. Therefore, by the disposition of the Holy Spirit, this care pertained to later Fathers and Pontiffs of the Church, that both by writing and word they should command and hand down many things which greatly conduce to ecclesiastical discipline. The arguments proposed at the beginning must now be answered. TO THE FIRST, the antecedent is denied. To the

FIRST PROOF it is replied, first, that the passage of St. Paul is not to be taken universally of all the faithful but only of ministers and preachers of the Gospel. For "man of God" in that place is equivalent to "doctor of the Church." Therefore St. Paul's sense is that the preacher of the Gospel through the Sacred Scriptures is sufficiently instructed for every work of his ministry, namely for teaching, correcting, reproving, instructing, etc. Secondly it is replied that although divine Scripture does not teach in particular and specifically everything required for salvation, it teaches the way by which we can come to the knowledge of them. For it teaches and commands that we follow the Apostolic traditions which supply those things not found written in the Scriptures: "Hold," says Paul, "the traditions which you have learned, whether by epistle or by word." And in this third chapter, where the testimony which we are explaining is repeated, the Apostle says: "But you have followed my doctrine and institution." "Doctrine" refers to Scripture, "institution" to those things he handed down orally. He immediately adds: "But continue in those things which you have learned and which have been entrusted to you." Those things entrusted to Timothy are called by St. Paul the mysteries and dogmas which elsewhere he calls by the name "deposit": "O Timothy, guard the deposit," etc. Thirdly, by an easier solution, it is replied that Paul does not teach in those words that Scripture alone is sufficient that the man of God may be perfect, but that Scripture is useful for acquiring perfection. This is most true even if traditions are necessary together with Scripture. To what is adduced from Deuteronomy 17, it is replied that when priests teach us divine traditions they without doubt teach us according to the law of God, which those divine traditions themselves contain; for the law of God is not only received on pages but written in the inward parts. When priests teach Apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions of the Fathers, although they do not teach the divine law itself, nevertheless they teach according to it, because traditions of this kind rest upon it, interpret it, and amplify it.

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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

TO THE SECOND PROOF it is replied that all the things said in the testimonies cited there must be interpreted from Proverbs 30: "Add nothing to the words of God, lest you be reproved and found a liar." Divine traditions are not added to the words of God, for they themselves are the words of God; nor are they added to the law of God, because they themselves contain the divine law. Apostolic and ecclesiastical traditions are not properly additions to the law or Scripture, because they were not handed down by the Apostles and Fathers as containing the divine law, but rather a positive law which greatly conduces to observing the divine laws. Secondly it is replied that divine traditions, since they pertain to divine right, were not invented by men but instituted by God Himself; therefore, if they are added to the Sacred Scriptures, their addition is not made by men but by God Himself. In the cited testimonies only an addition made by human invention is prohibited. TO THE THIRD PROOF the testimonies of the Fathers adduced must be answered one by one. To the first, taken from St. Chrysostom, it is replied that by the name "Gospel" he understands not Scripture alone but the whole preaching of the Gospel, which is contained partly in Scripture and partly in traditions. In this sense it is most true that in the Gospel all things necessary for salvation are contained. If, however, the word "Gospel" is taken more strictly for canonical Scripture—and let this be freely granted—it is replied that the Gospel contains all things according to a certain general reason, insofar as it commands that we follow Apostolic traditions, in which many things are taught and commanded specifically. To the first testimony of Augustine it is replied that Augustine does not mean that the sayings and deeds of Christ the Lord written by the Evangelists are sufficient for the doctrine and salvation of the faithful; otherwise all other canonical Scripture would be superfluous and unnecessary for salvation. He means only that it was not necessary for the salvation of the faithful that more of the sayings and deeds of Christ the Lord be written than those which were written. To the

second passage of St. Augustine it is replied that Augustine there speaks of obscure matters concerning which sufficient certainty does not exist in the Church, not of those things which by divine and Apostolic traditions are not merely not obscure, but so manifest that it is not lawful to dispute about them. Therefore Augustine was not speaking in that place of truths of this kind which pertain to traditions. TO THE CONFIRMATION it is replied that in most grave sacred councils it is customary for the Fathers of the Synod prudently to dissemble those things which are said incidentally by someone who is not to make faith for the council, so that the matter chiefly under discussion may be defined more gently and without clamors. Thus it happened in the Nicene Council that the Fathers prudently dissembled those things which were proposed less learnedly by the most pious Emperor, because they did not greatly pertain to the most grave matters which were then chiefly being defined in the council. And when Theodoret says that the Fathers of the council assented to the Emperor, it is to be understood not concerning everything the Emperor said, but concerning the unity of peace and faith which he persuaded to the Fathers by a most grave discourse. Secondly it is replied that what the Emperor proposed to the council is true, namely that the Scriptures fully show us the sense of the divine will—not in the individual or in species as to all things, but in a certain common and general reason teaching us what we ought to follow and what to flee. Thus, as we have often repeated, the Sacred Scriptures teach us inviolably to observe the divine and Apostolic traditions, through which the sense of the divine will is opened to us. TO THE

SECOND ARGUMENT it is replied that Christ the Lord in Mark 7 does not reprove all traditions, but vain, superstitious, useless, and indeed those repugnant to the law of God, by which the elders of the Jews deceived the common people, as is clear from the context and from the occasion on account of which Christ was moved to utter those words. And according to the celebrated rule of Hilary, the understanding of sayings is to be taken from the causes of saying. But the Church of Christ does not venerate all traditions, but only those which emanated from the divine Spirit and are greatly consonant with the divine laws. TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT the antecedent is denied. We have indeed adduced innumerable testimonies of the Holy Fathers, and consulting brevity omitted very many others, in which the most ancient and learned Fathers venerate ecclesiastical traditions with the highest affection and confirm them with great assertion. To those passages by which the antecedent of the third argument was proved it is easy to reply. First, Theophilus, Jerome, and Origen state nothing against us. They spoke only against those who venerated certain human inventions adverse to the sacred letters, or certain fictitious and apocryphal histories, as certain and divine realities. Secondly it is replied that ecclesiastical traditions are consonant with the divine Scriptures. The things which they teach to be done or believed sufficiently agree with those things which are found written in the canonical books; moreover Sacred Scripture commands us to hear divine traditions. Fabulous, frigid, or superstitious traditions have nothing in common with divine Scripture; therefore those Fathers rightly rebuke and reject them. TO ST. CYPRIAN it is replied that, since he was greatly attached to that opinion concerning rebaptizing those baptized by heretics, and Stephen the Roman Pontiff vehemently pressed him with ecclesiastical traditions, it is no wonder that in the heat of disputation, in order to evade the force of the argument, for a time declining from traditions he fled to the Scriptures alone. For one who was consenting, perhaps inculpably, to one error, it is no wonder that he should incline somewhat toward another. But what Cyprian's judgment was in this matter, and how he agreed with the other Fathers in the veneration of traditions, is most openly clear from many places of his doctrine. In the book De simplicitate praelatorum he said that the unity of the episcopate is from the tradition of the Lord. In the epistle to Januarius he decreed that the washing of infants and anointing with holy oil are to be observed by tradition alone without testimony of Scripture. In the epistle to Caecilius he proves the mixing of water with wine in the chalice by the tradition of the Church. His

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epistles 8 and 10 are also to be read. From these places it is clearly established what St. Cyprian thought concerning traditions. Secondly I say that if the epistle to Pompeius cited in the argument is read attentively, it can easily be gathered that St. Cyprian pronounced nothing against the authority of traditions. Cyprian did not reject that tradition objected to him by Stephen because it was not found written in the canonical books, but because Cyprian thought it had been fabricated by Stephen, was contrary to divine Scripture and truth, and was far removed from Apostolic traditions. All this is signified by Cyprian's words: "What is this obstinacy? What presumption, to prefer human tradition to divine disposition and not to observe that God is angered whenever human tradition dissolves and passes over the divine precepts?"

QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

TO THE FOURTH ARGUMENT it is replied that its whole force rests upon this, that the heretics who attack us with this argument imagine the government of the Church as though it proceeded by human custom alone and were not disposed by the special providence of Christ and the Holy Spirit, and as though Christ had not said to the Church: "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." I say therefore to the argument that it comes not from miracle but from the special care of the Holy Spirit pertaining to the due government of the Church that divine and Apostolic traditions are preserved inviolate and incorrupt in the heart and mouth of the faithful. Nor does a greater miracle intervene concerning traditions than concerning the canonical Scriptures, which, if the protection of the Holy Spirit ceased, could not fail to be mutilated, truncated, and in great part corrupted, especially since heretics strive greatly to insert their private errors into the canonical books. Yet in this they have profited nothing hitherto, nor will they profit afterward, because the Holy Spirit defends the Scripture dictated by Himself. TO THE CONFIRMATION it is replied first that just as it is equally easy for God to save by few or by many, so, although traditions may be more exposed to change and falsehood than Sacred Scripture, nevertheless it is most easy for the Holy Spirit to preserve them inviolate. Secondly it is replied that Scripture is not less exposed to falsity and error than ecclesiastical traditions, and perhaps more: both because it can easily be bent by heretics to various senses, and because it is greatly subject to additions and subtractions; and since it is mute and lifeless it cannot defend itself. But sons are accustomed to retain with tenacious memory traditions received from the Fathers and continually to turn them over among themselves in faithful speech. This is established by continual experience even in human affairs. For in every commonwealth we experience innumerable customs and traditions received from ancestors which it is evident have been observed immutably through many ages. The LAST ARGUMENT requires that I explain by what way and rule we can distinguish divine and Apostolic traditions from other human inventions. In this matter FIVE WAYS AND RULES can be assigned, through which any skilled faithful man can proceed to recognizing traditions of this kind. FIRST RULE. Augustine establishes it in Book IV Against the Donatists, chapter 24: "That which the universal Church holds, and which was not instituted by councils but has always been held, is most rightly believed to have been handed down by Apostolic authority." This rule is to be explained thus. If, by making an induction from the present time back to the times of the primitive Church, we find mention made of some ecclesiastical custom in the epistles and monuments of the Fathers, and each of them speaks of that custom as of a thing already in use in the Church, while the beginning of that custom is not known, such a custom is to be judged an Apostolic tradition. For example, if the question is raised whether the minor orders are possessed in the Church from the tradition of the Apostles—as in fact they are—it is to be proved thus: if we recur to the most ancient Fathers of the Church, Ignatius in Epistle 8 to the Antiochenes, Dionysius, chapter 3 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Clement in the epistle to all, and Anacletus in his decrees, all make mention of these orders as of a thing most received in the Church; and from none of these Fathers can it be gathered from which Pontiff or from which definition of a council the institution of these orders had its origin. Therefore, etc. In the veneration of images, in monastic profession, in the forty-day fast, and in other customs of this kind of the Church, a similar induction can be made to prove that they are Apostolic traditions.
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QUESTION I, ARTICLE X — CONTINUED

[Continuation of the rules for discerning Apostolic traditions.] SECOND RULE. If a doctrine or rite is found received with great unanimity among ancient Churches widely separated in place, especially those founded by Apostles, and no later author of the institution can be assigned, this universal agreement is a grave sign of Apostolic origin. For it is not probable that Churches so distant, governed by different bishops and living under diverse peoples, should by chance conspire in one and the same religious observance unless they had received it from a common and more ancient source. THIRD RULE. The testimony of the most ancient Fathers, especially those close to the Apostolic age and those who explicitly say that they received something from Apostles or Apostolic men, carries singular weight. Their testimony is strengthened when later Fathers repeat the same tradition without disagreement and when the Roman Church or other Apostolic sees preserve it.

FOURTH RULE. When a universal and ancient custom is found to have been observed in the Church and is consonant with the rule of faith, the sacraments, and the worship of God, and no contrary decree of lawful ecclesiastical authority exists, it is safely to be numbered among ecclesiastical traditions; if the Fathers further refer it to the Apostles, it is to be held as Apostolic. FIFTH RULE. The judgment of the universal Church, especially when expressed through the Roman Pontiff or a general council, is the final and most certain rule for discerning which traditions are to be received. For the same Spirit who preserves the Church from error in defining matters of faith preserves her from proposing as divine or Apostolic a tradition which is in truth merely a corrupt human invention. By these rules the objection is dissolved. It is false that the knowledge of Apostolic traditions depends upon uncertain private conjecture alone. The Church possesses public, ancient, continuous, and universal testimonies by which traditions can be morally and theologically recognized; and where a controversy remains, the judgment of the Church supplies a certain determination. Nor do the examples of Papias or Irenaeus prove the contrary. A private Father's persuasion that he had received something from Apostolic tradition does not make the matter a universal Apostolic tradition. What is required is the consent and reception described above. Thus the error of the millenarians or a mistaken chronology concerning the age of Christ does not weaken the authority of true traditions received by the universal Church; it only shows that a private claim of tradition must be distinguished from a tradition publicly and continuously received by the Church. With this the treatment of the sixth doubt concerning traditions is sufficiently resolved.

QUESTION II

ON THE ACT OF FAITH

ARTICLE I

Whether believing is to think with assent. OBJECTION 1. It seems that believing is not to think with assent. For to think implies a certain inquiry; but Damascene says in Book IV that faith is an assent without inquiry. Therefore thinking does not pertain to the act of faith. OBJECTION 2. Further, faith is placed in reason, as will be said below; but thinking is an act of the cogitative power, which pertains to the sensitive part, as was said in the First Part. Therefore thought does not pertain to faith. OBJECTION 3. Further, believing is an act of the intellect because its object is the true. But assenting seems not to be an act of the intellect but of the will, as consenting also is. Therefore believing is not to think with assent.

Augustine thus defines

believing in the book On the Predestination of the Saints.

It must be said that "to think" can be

taken in three ways. First, commonly, for any actual consideration of the intellect, as Augustine says in Book XIV On the Trinity: "I now call that intelligence by which we understand when thinking." Secondly, thinking is said more properly for a consideration of the intellect which is with a certain inquiry before arriving at the perfection of the intellect through the certitude of vision. According to this Augustine says in Book XV On the Trinity that the Son of God is not called the thought of God but the Word of God. For our thought, arriving at that which we know and formed from it, is our word; therefore the Word of God must be understood without thought, as possessing nothing formable which could be formless. According to this, thought is properly called a motion of the deliberating mind not yet perfected by the full vision of truth. But because such motion can be either of the deliberating mind concerning universal intentions, which pertains to the intellective part, or concerning particular intentions, which pertains to the sensitive part, therefore "to think" in the second way is taken for the act of the deliberating intellect, and in the third for the act of the cogitative power. If therefore "to think" is taken commonly in the first way, when believing is said to be "to think with assent," the whole ratio of believing is not designated; for in this manner he who considers what he knows or understands also thinks with assent. But if "to think" is taken in the second way, the whole ratio of the act which is believing is understood. For some acts pertaining to the intellect have firm assent without such thought, as when one considers those things which he knows or understands; such consideration is already formed. Other acts of the intellect have thought not yet formed by firm assent: either they incline to neither side, as occurs in one who doubts, or incline more to one side but are held by some slight sign, as occurs in one who suspects, or adhere to one side yet with fear of the other, as occurs in one who opines. The act which is believing has firm adhesion to one side, in which the believer agrees with one who knows and understands, and yet his cognition is not perfected by manifest vision, in which he agrees with one who doubts, suspects, and opines. Thus it is proper to the believer that he think with assent.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE I — CONTINUED

Thus the act which is believing is distinguished from all acts of the intellect which concern the true or false. Faith does not have an inquiry of natural reason demonstrating that which is believed; nevertheless it has a certain inquiry concerning those things through which man is induced to believe, for example because they were said by God and confirmed by miracles. AD SECUNDUM. "To think" is not taken here insofar as it is an act of the cogitative power, but insofar as it pertains to the intellect, as was said. AD TERTIUM. The intellect of the believer is determined to one thing not by reason but by the will; therefore "assent" here is taken for an act of the intellect insofar as it is determined to one thing by the will.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. If "to think" is taken for any consideration of the intellect, the act of believing is not sufficiently defined by that definition. SECOND CONCLUSION. If "to think" is taken specially and properly for the consideration of the intellect which is with a certain inquiry before it arrives at the perfection of the intellect through the certitude of vision, then the definition is good. It is Augustine's, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, tome 7.

COMMENTARY

The doctors dispute concerning this question in III Sent., dist. 23. It is doubted concerning this article whether this definition is good: "To believe is to think with assent." It seems not. FIRST, because the Prophet, when he prophesies, judges with assent; for he does not see that which he prophesies. Yet that act is not an act of believing. Therefore the definition is false. SECONDLY, one who judges concerning something through the gift of understanding or wisdom or knowledge thinks with assent, and nevertheless that act is not an act of believing. Therefore believing is not to think with assent. THIRDLY, believing is an act elicited immediately by the habitus fidei, which is like the habitus of first principles inclining to assent without discourse; therefore without inquiry, and consequently without thought. For the solution of these arguments it must be noted first that although the name "assent" is customarily taken commonly for any judgment of the intellect, whether of opinion, human faith, or science, nevertheless in this definition it is taken more strictly for a constant and firm judgment of the intellect. By this the act of believing is distinguished from the act of one who opines or suspects. Secondly, it must be noted that this assigned definition seems in a certain manner common to infused faith and to some human faith which possesses very great certitude. Therefore it has seemed to some that something wholly proper to infused faith should be added to that definition, namely: "To believe is to think with an assent under which falsehood can in no way lie." Nevertheless that clause seems superfluous to us. For if assent is taken for an assent firm in itself on the part of the object, it is not necessary to add it. Human faith does not assent with so great certitude and firmness because in itself it rests upon human authority, under which falsehood can lie. But the assent of faith rests upon divine authority, under which falsehood can in no way lie. These things being presupposed, TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT it is replied that prophecy is with thought and assent by way of a transitory passion, whereas the assent of faith is through a habitual light by way of something permanent. Secondly it is replied that it is per accidens to the ratio of prophecy that what is prophesied not be seen; for Christ the Lord was a true Prophet and nevertheless perfectly saw the things He prophesied. But with respect to the assent of faith it is per se that what is believed not be seen. TO THE

SECOND ARGUMENT it is replied that, even per se speaking, the act of the gift of understanding and knowledge is not with obscurity, and in this it differs from the act of faith, as is clear also in Christ the Lord. TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT it is replied that if by the name "inquiry" discourse is understood, the act of faith is not essentially inquiry, but is concomitantly with a preceding inquiry; and thus such a definition is given through a certain concomitance. A more formal definition would seem to be if we said: "To believe is to assent with thought." Secondly it is replied that by the name of inquiry and thought it is not necessary to understand discourse, although commonly it is with discourse. It is called thought and inquiry so long as the intellect remains still suspended concerning the evidence of the object and is still on the way tending toward that evidence. And because "we walk by faith," as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 5, he rightly says that believing itself is to think and inquire; and therefore the faithful are also rightly called viatores.

ARTICLE II

Whether the acts of faith are fittingly distinguished by believing God, believing God [as speaker], and believing in God. [St. Thomas's text begins.] OBJECTION 1. It seems that the act of faith is unfittingly distinguished in this way. For one habitus has one act; but faith is one habitus since it is one virtue. Therefore several acts of faith are unfittingly posited. OBJECTION 2. That which is common to every act of faith ought not to be posited as a particular act of faith. But to believe God is found commonly in every act of faith, because faith rests upon

First Truth. Therefore it seems to be unfittingly distinguished from certain other acts of faith.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE II — CONTINUED

OBJECTION 3. Further, that which also belongs to unbelievers cannot be posited among acts of faith. But to believe that God exists belongs also to unbelievers. Therefore it ought not to be posited among the acts of faith. OBJECTION 4. Further, to be moved toward an end pertains to the will, whose object is the good and the end; but believing is not an act of the will but of the intellect. Therefore there ought not to be posited as one of its differences "to believe in God," which imports motion toward the end.

is Augustine, who

places this distinction in the book On the Words of the Lord and in his Tractates on John.

It must

be said that the act of any power or habitus is taken according to the order of the power or habitus toward its object. The object of faith can be considered in three ways. For since believing pertains to the intellect insofar as it is moved by the will to assent, the object of faith can be taken either on the part of the intellect itself or on the part of the will moving the intellect. If on the part of the intellect, two things can be considered in the object of faith, as was said above. One is the material object (obiectum materiale) of faith; and thus there is posited the act of faith which is to believe God, because, as was said above, nothing is proposed to us to be believed except according as it pertains to God. The other is the formal reason of the object (ratio formalis obiecti), which is as the medium on account of which assent is given to such a credible thing. And thus there is posited the act of faith which is to believe God [as revealing], because, as was said above, the formal object (obiectum formale) of faith is First Truth, to which man adheres so that on account of it he assents to things believed. But if the object of faith is considered in the third way, according as the intellect is moved by the will, then there is posited the act of faith which is to believe in God. For First Truth is referred to the will according as it has the ratio of an end.

Through these three there are not designated diverse acts of faith,

but one and the same act having a diverse relation to the object of faith. And through this the reply to the second objection is clear. AD TERTIUM. To believe God does not belong to unbelievers under that ratio under which it is posited as an act of faith. For they do not believe God to be under those conditions which faith determines. And therefore neither do they truly believe God, because, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IX, in simple things the defect of cognition consists only in not attaining the whole. AD QUARTUM. As was said above, the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul toward the end; and according to this there is posited the act of faith which is to believe in God.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. The answer is affirmative. SECOND CONCLUSION, in the reply to the first objection. Through these three there are not designated diverse acts of faith, but one and the same act having a diverse relation to the object of faith. THIRD CONCLUSION, in the reply to the third objection. Unbelievers do not truly believe God.

COMMENTARY

In this article there is a brief doubt whether believing in God belongs to Christian sinners. And the negative part seems true. First, from St. Augustine, Tractate 29 on John, tome 9, and Sermon 91 On the Words of the Lord, tome 10, and upon Psalm 77. In those places Augustine teaches that to believe in God is nothing other than by believing to love God, or by believing to go into God and to be incorporated into His members; hence he asserts that it is an act of living faith (fides viva). St. Thomas teaches the same above, Question 1, Article 6,

reply to the third objection, where he says that this confession, "I believe in God," is offered by sinners in the

name and person of the whole Church, in which there is always living faith through charity. And sinners are admonished by that confession to believe in such a way that they strive to have faith informed by charity (fides formata), according to 1 Peter 1: "Receiving the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls." It is also proved by reason. To believe in God signifies an act of the intellect moved by the will toward God Himself as toward the ultimate end. Therefore sinners do not believe in God, although they believe God and believe [what is said] by God. But on the contrary is what we read in John 12: "Nevertheless among the chief rulers also many believed in Him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess Him. For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God." Behold, John says that men existing in mortal sin believed in God. It is also proved by reason. Unformed faith (fides informis) intrinsically and essentially includes an order to the will. For formed and unformed faith are of the same species; but formed faith has an intrinsic order to the will. Therefore unformed faith also has such an order. But sinners themselves have true and proper faith; therefore through it they are moved by the will toward the believed object. Secondly, sinners have true hope. Therefore, while believing, they tend toward God, in whom they hope as those who are to attain eternal life; therefore while believing they are properly moved toward God. Finally, the argument is this: faithful sinners believe from a pious affection of the will and through a special help of God by which not only their intellect but also their will is aided, not only in the beginning of believing but also in the course of life so that they may preserve faith. Therefore they can properly say, "I believe in God," since the object of their faith has an order to the will. For the decision of this doubt let the FIRST CONCLUSION be: only just men perfectly believe in God. This

conclusion is proved by the arguments adduced for the negative part. It is further proved because to believe in

God perfectly is an act of perfect faith; but without charity faith is imperfect and dead. Therefore its act is not perfectly to believe in God. SECOND CONCLUSION. Although faithful sinners imperfectly believe in God, they can truly be said to believe in God.

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Cajetan follows this opinion in the place cited upon John, where he observes that among the Evangelists "to believe in Jesus" does not always signify an act of formed faith (fides formata); nevertheless, beyond merely believing the word spoken, it connotes a certain confidence in Him as Savior and Redeemer, although imperfect, together with a pious affection. And in this sinners differ from a demon: the demon in no way believes in God, but believes God or believes [what is said] by God. The arguments made for the affirmative part prove this conclusion. Hence the passage of St. Thomas is to be explained concerning the act of perfect faith. In that sense sinners do not say in their own proper name, "I believe in God," but in the name of the Church. Yet in the former sense it can fittingly be said that sinners believe in God. St. Bernard uses this manner of speaking in Sermon 24 on the Canticle, toward the end: "You believe in Christ; do the works of Christ, that your faith may live." St. Augustine likewise, in the book On Faith and Works, chapter 14 and the final chapter, tome 4, speaks thus: "Likewise Paul did not define just any faith by which one believes in God, but that plainly saving and evangelical faith whose works proceed from love." And this is a common manner of speaking: "sinners believe in God." In our time it is expedient to speak in this manner against the Lutherans, who say that sinners have no faith at all but are related to faith as demons are. Concerning the reply to the

first objection it must be observed that Durandus, in III Sent., dist. 23, q. 4, a. 3, reprehends the saying of St. Thomas, namely that one act is to believe God, to believe [what is said] by God, and to believe in God. For, he says, since there are two habitus from which they proceed—namely the habitus of faith and of charity—believing in God proceeds from both; but believing God or believing [what is said] by God does not always proceed from charity. Therefore the acts must be distinct. But Durandus is mistaken in this reasoning. For one and the same act can be elicited by one habitus and commanded by another; and such is the act of formed faith. Concerning the reply to the third objection it is to be noted that the proposition of Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, text 22, "In simple things the defect of cognition consists only in not attaining the whole," is explained by St. Thomas in I, q. 58, a. 5, in the body, and by Cajetan in the same place. Here Cajetan briefly observes that we can speak of God in two ways. First, on the part of God Himself. And thus, since He is altogether simple, He cannot be partly known truly and partly falsely; rather, the error of falsity occurs by not attaining God Himself. Thus, if someone were to think that God is not omnipotent while thinking Him to be pure act and wise, propositions of that kind would not be true of God secundum se according as He is represented to the intellect. The reason is that in the most simple God the whole and "something" do not differ, and in Him "nothing" and "not the whole" are equivalent; hence he who is deceived concerning something knows nothing of God under that false ratio, for there is no God who is not omnipotent and not wise. Secondly, God can be considered on our part, that is, according as He is represented to us. And thus, because He is represented to us under many rationes, it can happen that one errs in one proposition concerning God and truly assents in another. Cajetan says that St. Thomas speaks here of error concerning divine things on the part of God.

ARTICLE III

Whether believing something above natural reason is necessary for salvation. OBJECTION 1. It seems that believing is not necessary for salvation. For those things seem sufficient for the salvation and perfection of any thing which belong to it according to its nature. But the things of faith exceed man's natural reason, since they are not apparent, as was said above. Therefore believing does not seem necessary for salvation. OBJECTION 2. Further, man assents dangerously to those things concerning which he cannot judge whether what is proposed to him is true or false, according to Job 12: "Does not the ear judge words?" But man cannot have such judgment in those things which are of faith, because he cannot resolve them into first principles through which we judge concerning all things. Therefore it is dangerous to give faith to such things. Hence believing is not necessary for salvation. OBJECTION 3. Further, man's salvation consists in God, according to Psalm 39: "The salvation of the just is from the Lord." But the invisible things of God are seen, being understood through those things which are made, His eternal power also and divinity, as is said in Romans 1. But things which are seen by the intellect are not believed. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation that man believe anything.
is Hebrews 11: "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
It must be said that in all
ordered natures it is found that two things concur for the perfection of an inferior nature. One is according to its proper motion; the other according to the motion of a superior nature. Thus water according to its proper motion is moved toward the center, but according to the motion of the moon it is moved about the center according to ebb and flow. Likewise the spheres of the planets are moved by their proper motions from west to east, but by the motion of the first sphere from east to west. Created rational nature alone has an immediate order to God, because the other creatures do not attain to anything universal, but only to something particular, participating in divine goodness either only in being, as inanimate things, or also in living and knowing singulars, as plants and animals. Rational nature, insofar as by reason it knows the universal ratio of good and being, has an immediate order to the universal principle of being. Therefore the perfection of rational nature consists not only in that which belongs to it according to its nature, but also in that which is attributed to it from a certain supernatural participation of divine goodness. Hence it was said above that man's ultimate beatitude consists in a certain supernatural vision of God.
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To that vision man cannot attain except by way of one being taught by God as teacher, according to John 6: "Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to Me." Of this discipline man becomes a participant not immediately but successively, according to the mode of his nature. But every such learner must believe in order that he may arrive at perfect knowledge, as the Philosopher also says: "It is necessary that the learner believe." Hence, in order that man arrive at the perfect vision of beatitude, it is pre-required that he believe God as a disciple believes a master teaching.

Since human nature depends upon a higher
nature, natural cognition does not suffice for its perfection; rather, a certain supernatural cognition is required, as was said above. AD SECUNDUM. Just as by the natural light of the intellect man assents to first principles, so a virtuous man through the habitus of faith has a right judgment concerning those things which belong to that virtue. And in this manner, through the lumen fidei divinely infused into man, man assents to those things which are of faith, but not to their contraries. Therefore there is no danger or damnation for those who are in Christ Jesus and are illuminated by Him through faith. AD TERTIUM. Faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher manner and in more respects than natural reason proceeding from creatures to God. Hence Ecclesiasticus 3 says: "Many things above the sense of man have been shown to you."

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

The conclusion is affirmative, and the reason is clear in the article.

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COMMENTARY

Concerning this article it is argued first against the first foundation of St. Thomas, namely that in all ordered natures it is found that two things concur for the perfection of the inferior nature: one according to its proper motion, and the other according to the motion of the superior nature. Thus water according to its proper motion is moved toward the center, but according to the motion of the moon it is moved around the center according to ebb and flow. The argument is this. The first sphere of the heavenly orbs is not perfected by any superior nature; therefore the foundation is not universal. A similar argument can be gathered concerning the earth, which does not seem to receive any motion from a superior nature to which it is subordinated. Mixed bodies likewise have no perfection or motion communicated by a superior nature. Therefore the foundation is false. Secondly, it is argued against the second foundation, namely that the rational creature has an immediate order to God. For angels illuminate men; indeed superior angels illuminate inferior angels, as St. Dionysius teaches, chapter 12 of the Celestial Hierarchy. And St. Thomas, Article 6 of this question, teaches that divine revelation comes in a certain order to inferiors through superiors. Therefore not every rational creature has an immediate order to God, but only the supreme creature. Thirdly, it is argued against the consequence of the reasoning. From those two foundations it seems only to follow that man is moved by two motions according to the order of nature, not that he is moved by a certain supernatural motion of faith; for the first foundation is true concerning motions according to the order of nature. It is confirmed. If from those foundations we wish to gather efficaciously that man is moved by the motion of faith, we shall likewise gather that God clearly seen is the natural end of man, which many Thomists deny and which St. Thomas in I, q. 12, seems to assert otherwise. The consequence is proved. Man ought to be perfected according to nature. Therefore, if every thing for its perfection requires a twofold motion, one proper and the other communicated from a superior nature, it follows likewise that man naturally requires that twofold operation: one proper, the other communicated from a superior nature. Fourthly, I argue against what St. Thomas says, that this communication from the superior nature occurs by way of one learning successively. Baptized infants who die before the use of reason attain the vision of God without any successive discipline. Likewise Christ the Lord, insofar as He is man, did not successively but simultaneously and immediately receive the clear vision of God. To these arguments the following must be said. TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT it is replied that if the first heavenly sphere is physically considered as the first movable, it receives a great perfection from the angel moving it. For by the power of the angel communicated to it, it effects life in these inferior things although it does not have life in itself. It also receives perfection from a superior orb which theologians call the empyrean heaven, from which it has a certain constancy in containing all things and producing a certain rest in these lower things, since the empyrean heaven is supremely at rest. On this see St. Thomas, I, q. 66, a. 3, ad 2. If, however, the first sphere is taken for the empyrean heaven, then we say that it also participates in a very great perfection from the angels existing there and communicating a certain power and causality. The earth likewise receives from superior natures a great perfection, namely the power of germinating plants and gold. Finally, mixed bodies also receive a certain power from superior things, as St. Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 22, a. 13, where he says that the magnet has the power of attracting iron from the impression of a heavenly body; indeed from the same impression it has that it moves iron placed in equilibrium toward the pole. But Cajetan in this place says that St. Thomas speaks of simple bodies which are principal parts of the universe and which are not corrupted. TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT it is replied that, as St. Thomas excellently taught in I-II, q. 9, a. 6, God alone moves the intellect and will of man as efficient cause. Nevertheless, by proposing the object and illuminating, an angel illuminates a man and also one man another; indeed one angel also illuminates another after the manner of a moral or artificial cause, which always presupposes a nature determined in order to the end. Secondly, this solution is further explained. To have an immediate order to God is to have an immediate inclination toward the good in common (bonum in communi); and this arises from the fact that only the rational creature knows universal good. Therefore such an inclination is adequate to cognition and tends toward good universally and in common.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE III — CONTINUED

Nevertheless it stands together with this that some rational or intellectual creature which is more perfect illuminates and perfects another rational creature concerning certain means to the end. But this does not remove the fact that the inferior rational creature has an immediate order to God as to its end. And St. Thomas must be understood in this way in Article 6, where he teaches that not all are equally bound to have explicit faith, but those who are greater and principal in ecclesiastical office and dignity ought to have explicit faith so that they may perfect and illuminate inferiors. This is understood as regards the explanation of those things which are believed, not as regards the infusion of the lumen fidei; for as regards this every man is illuminated immediately by God and by the Holy Spirit. TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT it is replied that the consequence of St. Thomas holds from the lesser to the greater, supposing that God has ordained man to a supernatural end, as faith teaches. Then the argument proceeds well: other natural things, in order that they may be perfected in their natures and attain their natural ends, need to be moved by another superior nature; therefore much more is it necessary that man be moved by God in order to attain supernatural perfection. Hence from this reasoning it does not follow that the natural end of man is the beatific vision. TO THE FOURTH ARGUMENT some say that infants believe both through the habitus fidei and through an alien act, and that this suffices for the truth of the proposition of St. Thomas. But Cajetan says better in this article that St. Thomas here speaks of adults who have their own acts. For this question is inscribed concerning the act of faith, not concerning the habitus. What is objected in the same argument concerning Christ the Lord does nothing against the sentence of St. Thomas. For he speaks of men who are pure men and ought by their own act to arrive at the ultimate end; but Christ attained that end from the personal union with the humanity. Therefore that end is natural to Christ from the ratio of the suppositum.

ARTICLE IV

Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. OBJECTION 1. It seems that those things which can be proved by natural reason are not necessary to believe. For in the works of God nothing superfluous is found, much less than in the works of nature. But to that which can be done through one thing, another is superfluously added. Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith those things which can be known by natural reason. OBJECTION 2. Further, those things concerning which there is faith must be believed. But there is not science and faith concerning the same thing, as was held above. Since therefore science concerns all those things which can be known by natural reason, it seems that it is not necessary to believe those things which are proved by natural reason. OBJECTION 3. Further, all knowable things seem to be of one ratio. If therefore some of them are proposed to man as to be believed, by equal reason it would be necessary to believe all such things; but this is false. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be known by natural reason.

It is necessary to believe that God is one

and incorporeal, things which are proved by natural reason by philosophers.

It must be said that

it is necessary for man to receive by way of faith not only those things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason. And this for three reasons. FIRST, so that man may arrive more quickly at the cognition of divine truth. For the science to which it pertains to prove that God exists and other things of this kind concerning God is proposed to men to be learned last, after many other sciences have been presupposed. Thus man would arrive at the cognition of God only after a long time of his life. SECOND, so that the cognition of God may be more common. For many cannot progress in the study of science, either because of dullness of intellect, or because of other occupations and necessities of temporal life, or even because of sluggishness in learning. Such men would be wholly deprived of the cognition of God unless divine things were proposed to them by way of faith. THIRD, because of certitude. Human reason in divine things is very deficient. A sign of this is that philosophers, investigating even human matters by natural inquiry, erred in many things and held opinions contrary to one another. Therefore, so that there might be an undoubted and certain cognition of God among men, it was necessary that divine things be handed down to them by way of faith, as though spoken by God, who cannot lie.

The investigation of natural reason does not suffice for the human race for

the cognition of divine things, even those which can be demonstrated by reason; therefore it is not superfluous that such things be believed. AD SECUNDUM. Concerning the same thing there cannot be science and faith in the same person; but that which is known by one can be believed by another, as was said above. AD TERTIUM. Although all knowable things agree in the ratio of science, they do not agree in this, that they are equally ordered to beatitude; and therefore not all are equally proposed as to be believed.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

The conclusion is affirmative and is to be understood concerning certain things. Its threefold reason is given in the article. Concerning this matter, see what we said in Article 5 of the preceding Question.

ARTICLE V

Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE V

Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly. OBJECTION 1. It seems that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no one is bound to that which is not in his power. But to believe something explicitly is not in man's power. For Romans 10 says: "How shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. OBJECTION 2. Further, just as by faith we are ordered to God, so also by charity. But for observing the precepts of charity man is not bound to every determinate external act; rather, the preparation of the mind suffices, as is clear in that precept of the Lord in Matthew 5: "If anyone strike you on one cheek, offer him the other," and in other similar precepts, as Augustine explains in the book On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount. Therefore neither is man bound explicitly to believe anything; rather, it suffices that he have a mind prepared to believe those things which are proposed by God. OBJECTION 3. Further, the good of faith consists in a certain obedience, according to Romans 1: "For obedience to the faith among all nations." But for the virtue of obedience it is not required that man observe certain determinate precepts; rather, it suffices that he have a prompt mind for obeying, according to the Psalm: "I am ready and am not troubled, that I may keep Your commandments." Therefore it seems that for faith also it suffices that man have a prompt mind to believe those things which can be divinely proposed to him, without his explicitly believing anything.

is Hebrews 11: "He that comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him."

It must be said that the precepts of the law which man is bound to fulfill are given concerning acts of virtues, which are the way of arriving at salvation. But the act of a virtue, as was said above, is taken according to the relation of the habitus to its object. In the object of any virtue two things can be considered: namely, that which is properly and per se the object of the virtue, which is necessary in every act of the virtue; and again that which is per accidens or consequently related to the proper ratio of the object. Thus to the object of fortitude properly and per se pertains enduring danger of death and attacking enemies with danger for the common good; but that a man be armed or strike with a sword in a just war or do something of this kind is reduced to the object of fortitude per accidens. Therefore the determination of the virtuous act to the proper and per se object of the virtue falls under the necessity of precept, just as the act of the virtue itself does. But the determination of the virtuous act to those things which are accidentally or secondarily related to the proper and per se object of the virtue does not fall under the necessity of precept except according to place and time. It must therefore be said that the per se object of faith is that through which man is made blessed, as was said above. But all the things which are divinely handed down in Sacred Scripture, such as that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and other things of this kind, are related per accidens or secondarily to the object of the virtue. Therefore, as regards the first credibilia, which are the articles of faith, man is bound to believe explicitly, just as he is bound to have faith. But as regards the other credibilia, man is not bound to believe explicitly, but only implicitly or in the preparation of the mind, insofar as he is prepared to believe whatever Sacred Scripture contains. He is bound explicitly to believe things of this kind only when it becomes known to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.

If something is said to be in man's power excluding the help of grace, man is bound to many things which he cannot do without healing grace, such as loving God and neighbor and likewise believing the articles of faith. Yet he can do this with the help of grace, which help is mercifully given to whomever it is divinely given; to those to whom it is not given, it is not given justly in punishment for preceding sin, at least for original sin, as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace. AD SECUNDUM. Man is bound determinately to love those lovable things which are properly and per se the objects of charity, namely God and neighbor. But the argument proceeds concerning those precepts of charity which as it were consequently pertain to the object of charity. AD TERTIUM. The virtue of obedience properly consists in the will, and therefore for the act of obedience the promptness of the will subject to the one commanding suffices; this is properly and per se the object of obedience. But this or that precept is related per accidens or consequently to the proper and per se object of obedience.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. Man is bound explicitly to believe the first credibilia, which are the articles of faith.

SECOND CONCLUSION. All the remaining things which are handed down in Sacred Scripture—and the same ratio applies to things defined in councils and to Apostolic traditions—man is bound to believe implicitly and in the preparation of the mind.

ARTICLE VI

Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith. OBJECTION 1. It seems that all are equally bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as is clear concerning the precepts of charity. But the explication of things to be believed... [Continues on the following page.]

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE VI - CONTINUED

OBJECTION 1. It seems that all are equally bound to believe explicitly. For all are bound equally to those things which are necessary for salvation, as has been said. Therefore all are equally bound to explicit belief.

OBJECTION 2. No one ought to be examined concerning something which he is not bound to believe explicitly. But simple persons are sometimes examined even concerning the least articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe all things explicitly. OBJECTION 3. If lesser persons are not bound to have explicit faith but only implicit faith, they must have implicit faith in the faith of their superiors. But this seems dangerous, because those superiors could happen to err. Therefore lesser persons also seem bound to have explicit faith. Thus all are equally bound to explicit belief. ON THE CONTRARY, Job 1 says that "the oxen were ploughing and the asses feeding beside them"; because the lesser persons, signified by the asses, ought in matters of belief to adhere to the greater persons, who are signified by the oxen, as Gregory explains in the second book of the Moralia. I ANSWER THAT the explanation of things to be believed is made through divine revelation. For matters of belief exceed natural reason. Divine revelation reaches inferiors according to an order through superiors: to men through angels, and to lower angels through higher angels, as is clear from Dionysius in the Celestial Hierarchy. For the same reason, therefore, the explanation of faith must reach lesser men through greater men. Hence, just as the higher angels, who illuminate the lower, possess a fuller knowledge of divine things than the lower angels, so also superior men, whose office is to instruct others, are bound to possess a fuller knowledge of the things to be believed and to believe them more explicitly. REPLY TO OBJECTION 1. Explicit knowledge of the things to be believed is not equally necessary for salvation in all persons. Superiors, who have the office of instructing others, are bound explicitly to believe more things than others. REPLY TO

OBJECTION 2. Simple persons are not to be examined concerning subtleties of faith unless there is suspicion that they have been corrupted by heretics, who are accustomed in such matters to corrupt the faith of the simple. If, however, they are found not obstinately to adhere to perverse doctrine, and through simplicity are deficient in such matters, this is not imputed to them. REPLY TO OBJECTION 3. Lesser persons do not have implicit faith in the faith of their superiors except insofar as those superiors adhere to divine doctrine. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4: "Be imitators of me, as I also am of Christ." Human knowledge is therefore not the rule of faith, but divine truth. If some superiors depart from it, this does not prejudice the faith of simple persons who believe them to possess the true faith, unless they obstinately adhere to their particular errors against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot fail, according to the Lord's words in Luke 22: "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not."

SUMMA TEXTUS

The conclusion is negative. In the reply to the second objection, note what Cajetan says here.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VII WHETHER EXPLICIT BELIEF IN THE

MYSTERY OF CHRIST'S INCARNATION IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION FOR EVERYONE

OBJECTION 1. It seems that explicit belief in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation is not necessary for salvation for everyone. A man is not bound explicitly to believe things which the angels themselves do not know, since the explanation of faith comes through divine revelation, which reaches men through the mediation of angels, as has been said. Yet even the angels were ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation; hence they ask in Psalm 23: "Who is this King of glory?" and in Isaiah 63: "Who is this that comes from Edom?" as Dionysius explains. Therefore men were not bound explicitly to believe the mystery of Christ's Incarnation. OBJECTION 2. Blessed John the Baptist was certainly among the greater persons and was very near to Christ, of whom the Lord says in Matthew 11: "Among those born of women there has not arisen a greater than John the Baptist." Yet John the Baptist does not seem to have known explicitly the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, since he asked Christ: "Art thou he that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore even the greater persons were not bound to have explicit faith concerning Christ. OBJECTION 3. Many Gentiles attained salvation through the ministry of angels, as Dionysius says in chapter 9 of the Celestial Hierarchy. But the Gentiles did not have faith concerning Christ, either explicit or implicit, as it seems, because no revelation had been made to them. Therefore explicit belief in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation does not seem to have been necessary for everyone for salvation. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says in On Rebuke and Grace: "That faith is sound by which we believe that no man, whether of greater or lesser age, is freed from the contagion of death and the obligation of sin except through the one mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ." I ANSWER THAT, as was said above, that properly and essentially belongs to the object of faith through which man attains beatitude. Now the way by which men come to beatitude is the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion. Acts 4 says: "There is no other name given to men whereby we must be saved." Therefore the mystery of Christ's Incarnation had in some manner to be believed by all at every time, although in different ways according to the diversity of times and persons. Before the state of sin, man had explicit faith concerning Christ's Incarnation insofar as it was ordered to the consummation of glory, but not insofar as it was ordered to liberation from sin through the Passion and Resurrection; because...

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VII - CONTINUED

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1. The mystery of the kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis. Nevertheless, certain aspects of this mystery were more perfectly revealed to them when Christ accomplished them than they had been before. In this sense Dionysius introduces the angels asking
questions concerning Christ's mysteries.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 2. John the Baptist did not ask about Christ's coming as though he himself were ignorant of it, for he had expressly testified to Christ: "Behold the Lamb of God." Rather, he asked for the instruction of his disciples, so that by Christ's answer they might be confirmed concerning Him. Hence Christ referred them to the signs of His works. REPLY TO

OBJECTION 3. Many of the Gentiles received revelation concerning Christ. Thus Job says: "I know that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl also foretold certain things concerning Christ, as Augustine records. Roman history likewise relates that in the time of Constantine and Irene a tomb was discovered containing a man with a golden plate upon his breast on which was written: "Christ shall be born of a virgin, and I believe in Him. O sun, under Irene and Constantine you shall see me again." If, however, some were saved to whom no explicit revelation concerning Christ was made, they were not saved without faith in a mediator. For they believed in divine providence as liberating mankind in whatever manner should please God and according to what the Spirit might reveal to those who knew the truth.

SUMMA TEXTUS

The conclusion is affirmative. Explicit faith in Christ has always been necessary for salvation in some manner, although differently according to the diversity of times and persons.

COMMENTARY

Concerning this article there are several matters requiring explanation. First, it must be observed that St. Thomas distinguishes three states of mankind: the state before sin, the state after sin but before the promulgation of the Gospel, and the state after the promulgation
of the Gospel. In the state before sin, explicit faith in the mystery of the Incarnation was necessary insofar as Christ was ordained to the
consummation of glory. Adam, however, did not know beforehand the future sin as something that certainly would occur; therefore he
did not explicitly believe in Christ as Redeemer through the Passion. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas teaches, Adam had knowledge of the
mystery of Christ. The Apostle confirms this from Ephesians 5, where the words of Genesis, "For this cause shall a man leave father and
mother and shall cleave to his wife," are called a great sacrament in Christ and the Church. Hence Adam's words contained a prophetic
understanding of Christ and the Church. After sin, however, explicit faith in the mystery of Christ as Redeemer was necessary in a more
determinate manner for the greater persons, while the lesser persons believed this mystery implicitly in the faith of the patriarchs and
teachers. As the time of grace approached, the mystery was revealed more explicitly. The prophets knew and foretold not merely that a
Redeemer would come, but many circumstances of His birth, passion, resurrection, and the calling of the Gentiles. After the Gospel had
been sufficiently promulgated, explicit faith in the mystery of Christ is necessary for all who are capable of receiving the preaching of
faith. This necessity is not merely a necessity arising from an ecclesiastical precept, but belongs to the order established by God for salvation. A difficulty nevertheless remains concerning those to whom the Gospel has never been preached. They cannot be blamed for
failing explicitly to believe what has never been proposed to them. Yet no adult is saved without supernatural faith. Therefore, if anyone
follows the natural light and does what lies in him with the help of actual grace, divine providence will not fail him in those things necessary for salvation. God can provide an instructor, an angelic revelation, or some other supernatural illumination by which the necessary truths of faith are proposed. This does not mean that natural works merit the grace of faith. Rather, it means that God, by His
mercy and providence, does not abandon one whom He moves toward the supernatural end. The principal point is therefore maintained:
no one after sin is justified or saved merely through natural knowledge of God. The salvation of every adult requires supernatural faith
and, in the manner appropriate to his state and time, faith in Christ the Mediator.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

Concerning this article there is a difficulty, for St. Thomas seems to contradict himself. In

Article 5 he said that the object of faith per se is that through which man is made blessed;

here,
however, he says that the mystery of the Incarnation belongs per se to the object of faith. The argument is this. That through which man is made blessed is God alone, insofar as He is three and one, as St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 12, a. 8, ad 4, and St. Augustine, Confessions V, chapter 4. Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation does not belong per se to the object of faith. This is confirmed. If the Incarnation of Christ belongs per se to the object of faith because it is seen by the blessed in the Word, then many other things contained in Sacred Scripture, which are likewise seen by them in the Word, would for the same reason belong per se to the object of faith. For the solution it must be observed that Christ's Incarnation can be related to beatitude in two ways.

First, as a means and a way necessary for attaining beatitude. In this manner, in fact, because God ordained this means for the salvation of men, the Incarnation of Christ belongs per se to beatitude, according to John 14: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father but by me.” Under this consideration the mystery of the Incarnation belongs to the object of faith as a means per se necessary for the end, according to John 17: “This is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent”; that is, this is the way to eternal life. For there the Lord was speaking of knowledge through faith. Other things, however, which are handed down in Sacred Scripture and believed through faith do not per se regard beatitude as necessary means, and consequently do not in this way belong per se to the object of faith. Secondly, the Incarnation can be compared with beatitude objectively, so that the Incarnation is an object of beatitude as a reality seen in the per se object of beatitude. In this manner we say that, although the Incarnation is not of the essence of beatitude absolutely speaking, nevertheless it belongs to the essence of the beatitude which, in fact, man attains through the power of Christ the Head. Man is saved and beatified through a certain conformity to Christ as his Head and exemplar, according to Romans 8: “Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son.” There the Apostle places conformity to Christ as the terminus of predestination. He speaks of the Son not only insofar as He is God but also insofar as He is the God-man, for he adds: “That he might be the firstborn amongst many brethren.” Therefore the argument is answered by saying that in Article 5 St. Thomas speaks in the same manner as in this seventh

article. There he said that the first things believed are the articles of faith, among which it is certain that the

Incarnation is numbered. Thus we say that the Incarnation is that through which man is beatified, not only as a means but also as an object belonging to the beatitude of the blessed man. For it certainly pertains to his beatitude that man know the exemplar to which he is conformed through beatitude and the Head of whom he is made a perfect member. What St. Thomas says in I, q. 12, concerns the essence of beatitude absolutely speaking, considered so broadly that it extends also to the angels, who are not saved through faith in Christ nor made His members through such salvation. Although Christ our Lord perfects the angels in accidental beatitude and for this reason is also called their Head, St. Thomas is here speaking of the object of beatitude insofar as it is the object of the beatitude of man saved through Christ and assimilated to Him. Furthermore, concerning the second conclusion it must be observed that those who follow Scotus infer from it that even if Adam had not sinned, Christ would nevertheless have become man, since Adam knew that Christ would be man but did not know his own future sin. But this consequence does not follow. It can happen that an effect is revealed to someone without the cause and means necessary to that end being revealed. Therefore this consequence is invalid: “That known effect will occur; therefore it will occur even if the cause is not going to occur.”

ARTICLE VIII WHETHER EXPLICIT BELIEF IN THE TRINITY IS NECESSARY

FOR SALVATION

OBJECTION 1. It seems that explicit belief in the Trinity was not necessary for salvation. The Apostle says in Hebrews 11: “He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” But this can be believed without faith in the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to possess explicit faith in the Trinity. OBJECTION 2. The Lord says in John 17: “Father, I have manifested thy name to the men.” Augustine explains this not of the name “God,” but of the name by which God is called the Father of Christ. For that God made the world was known among all nations; that He alone, and not false gods, is to be worshipped was known in Judea; but that He is the Father of this Christ, through whom He takes away the sins of the world, was a name previously hidden and now manifested. Therefore before Christ's coming it was not known that there were paternity and filiation in the Godhead; hence the Trinity was not explicitly believed. OBJECTION 3. We are bound explicitly to believe in God that which is the object of beatitude. But the object of beatitude is the supreme goodness, which can be understood in God even without distinction of persons. Therefore it was not necessary explicitly to believe the Trinity. ON THE CONTRARY, in the Old Testament the Trinity of persons is expressed in many ways. Thus at the very beginning of Genesis it is said, as an expression of the Trinity: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Therefore from the beginning it was necessary for salvation explicitly to believe the Trinity. I ANSWER THAT the mystery of Christ's Incarnation cannot be explicitly believed without faith in the Trinity, because the mystery of the Incarnation contains this: that the Son of God assumed flesh, that through the grace of the Holy Spirit He renewed the world, and that He was conceived of the Holy Spirit.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - CONTINUED

I ANSWER THAT the mystery of Christ's Incarnation cannot be explicitly believed without faith in the Trinity, because it is contained in the mystery of the Incarnation that the Son of God assumed flesh, that through the grace of the Holy Spirit He renewed the world, and likewise that He was conceived of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in the same manner in which the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was explicitly believed before Christ by the greater persons, but implicitly and as though under a veil by the lesser persons, so also was the mystery of the Trinity believed. After the time of grace had been made known, however, all are bound explicitly to believe the mystery of the Trinity; and all who are reborn in Christ obtain this through the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matthew 28: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1. Those two truths - that God exists and that He is a rewarder - were at all times and for all persons necessary to be believed explicitly; nevertheless, they were not at every time and for every person sufficient. REPLY TO OBJECTION 2. Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity was hidden within the faith of the greater persons; through Christ, however, it was manifested to the world and through the Apostles. REPLY TO OBJECTION 3. The supreme goodness of God, according to the manner in which it is now understood through effects, can be understood without the Trinity of persons. But insofar as God is understood in Himself, as He is seen by the blessed, He cannot be understood without the Trinity of persons. Moreover, the very vision of the divine persons belongs to beatitude.

SUMMA TEXTUS

FIRST CONCLUSION. Before the birth of Christ, the greater persons possessed explicit faith in the Trinity; the lesser persons possessed it implicitly. SECOND CONCLUSION. In the time of revealed grace, all are bound explicitly to believe the mystery of the Trinity.

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COMMENTARY

Concerning this article, and similarly concerning the preceding articles, it must be noted that there is a disputed question which is customarily treated in III, q. 61, a. 3, and q. 68, a. 2. Master Soto discusses this question in IV Sentences, distinction 1, q. 2, a. 3, and distinction 5, q. 1, a. 2. Master Cano treats it in the second part of his Relectio on the Sacraments in general. The proper place for the **question in St. Thomas, however, is here. The first question to be disputed, therefore, is whether an act of**

supernatural faith is necessary

for salvation by necessity of means and of precept, or whether some knowledge of God obtainable by natural powers on the part of the intellect suffices for salvation. First, it should be noted concerning the necessity of faith in relation to the end that St. Thomas indicates the question when he asks whether believing is necessary for salvation. The perfect salvation of man is beatitude, which consists in the vision of God; man's imperfect salvation is through faith working by charity. Secondly, it must be noted that things necessary for salvation fall into three classes. Some are necessary only as means without which man cannot attain salvation, although there is no precept concerning them: such are the habits of the virtues, grace, and the actual assistance of God by which He moves us toward salvation. There is no precept concerning these, although they are necessary means to salvation. Others are necessary for salvation because they are commanded, whether by natural or positive precept, as the Lord said in Matthew 19: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Still others are necessary for salvation both as means and as things commanded. Such is the act of charity, without which no one can attain salvation. Thirdly, it must be noted that there is a difference between things necessary by necessity of means and those necessary only by necessity of precept. In the case of things necessary only by precept, it is sufficient that a man be prepared in his mind and universally ready to fulfill them when occasion requires - for example, to give alms, to fast, and so forth. But those things necessary for salvation both by necessity of means and by necessity of precept must be explicitly willed if a man is to attain salvation. Baptism, for example, is a necessary means and is also commanded; hence no one can attain salvation unless he has at least baptism in explicit desire. We understand this concerning a man to whom the Gospel has been preached. Whether someone who has no knowledge of the Gospel can attain eternal salvation is a matter disputed among theologians. It must therefore be disputed whether an explicit act of faith is necessary for salvation by necessity of precept and of means, and concerning which truths such an act must be possessed. FIRST ARGUMENT FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION, namely that natural knowledge suffices. In Romans 2 the Apostle says: "The Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law." The Apostle speaks there of justified Gentiles and says that the doers of the law are justified. Therefore they will be justified with natural knowledge of God. Likewise Christ says in Matthew 19: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." There He speaks of commandments known by natural light. Therefore natural knowledge together with observance of the commandments suffices. Again, in Hebrews 11 the Apostle says: "He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." But natural knowledge suffices for knowing that God exists, and likewise for knowing that He is a rewarder, insofar as a morally good act is by that very fact meritorious before the universal governor. Therefore supernatural faith would not seem necessary. SECOND ARGUMENT. A child raised among barbarians, when he comes to the use of reason, can by natural light turn himself toward God as author of nature and as his ultimate end. At that moment the child will be justified, as appears from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 6, ad 3. Therefore knowledge by natural light suffices for justification. The consequence is proved because supernatural faith is not obtained except by hearing and through preachers, as the Apostle says in Romans 10: "How shall they believe without a preacher?" But that child has no preacher. Therefore he will be justified without supernatural faith. If someone says that in such a case God will illuminate him through an angel or by Himself, the objection is made that miracles ought not to be posited when a man can be justified according to the common course. But to provide illumination through an angel in that case would be miraculous. Therefore God would not illuminate him through an angel or by Himself.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

FOURTH ARGUMENT. It is further argued, and it is proved that at least in the state of the law of nature a natural knowledge of God sufficed. For that state was called the state of the law of nature precisely because men were guided only by knowledge of the natural law. And St. Thomas, I–II, q. 98, a. 5, ad 3, says that under the knowledge of the natural law the Gentiles could be justified without observing the written law, just as now laymen can be saved without observing the clerical or monastic state. There is another argument. If the Gospel has not been preached to someone, a sinner could be justified and saved without any act of supernatural faith. For in some case a man can attain salvation without explicit and formal penance, as is also the common and probable opinion of certain theologians. Therefore in some case he could be justified without any explicit supernatural knowledge of God. The consequence is proved. Just as Hebrews 11 says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God,” so John 3 says, “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God”; and Luke 13, “Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.” Yet notwithstanding these general rules it is conceded that in some case a man is saved without explicit penance, and likewise that someone may be saved without baptism received in reality or explicitly desired. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it must be conceded that in some case someone may be saved without explicit faith.

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THE ADVERSARIES IN THIS QUESTION

In this question our adversaries are Gentile philosophers, heretics, and certain Catholics. The Gentile philosophers promised happiness to their followers without any supernatural knowledge. Those celebrated as wiser among them, such as the Peripatetics and Academics, placed human happiness in contemplation of God insofar as it can be attained by nature, and in the external exercise of moral virtues which can be acquired by human industry. The Manichaeans likewise promised a demonstration of everything they taught, as St. Augustine testifies, adding that he himself was deceived by them for a very long time. Abelard later followed the same error, against whom St. Bernard wrote. Against this heresy, what we said above at Question 1,

Article 5, is sufficient. Finally, the Pelagians said that supernatural knowledge was useful but not necessary.

On this see St. Augustine, On the Grace of Christ, book I, chapter 41, and book II, chapter 26. Among Catholics, however, there were certain doctors who taught that supernatural assistance on the part of the will is necessary for justification, and in this they differed from Pelagius; nevertheless, they said that on the part of the intellect the infused habit of faith together with charity suffices without an elicited supernatural act of faith. They held that this sufficed at every time for the justification of a man to whom neither the Gospel nor anything supernatural had been announced. This opinion is certainly either heretical or proximate to heresy, although Master Soto followed it in book II, chapter 11 of De natura et gratia in the Venetian edition. He later retracted it, as appears in the Salamanca edition at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences. Master Vega followed the same position, or certainly something worse, in his exposition of the sixth session of the Council of Trent, book VI, chapter 20, where he says that at every time there was a precept of supernatural faith, but that faith was never necessary by necessity of means, without which no one attains salvation; indeed, even now, according to him, anyone laboring under invincible ignorance of the Christian faith could be justified and saved without any act of supernatural faith.

A THREEFOLD SENSE OF "SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE"

For understanding this difficulty, it must be observed that knowledge can be called supernatural in three ways: first, from the object alone; second, from the mode alone; third, from both. Knowledge is supernatural from the object alone when someone, by merely acquired faith, believes that God is three and one, as a heretic may believe. The object believed then exceeds by its nature the faculty of nature, so that it cannot be believed proportionately by natural powers, although the person believes it by a certain merely human faith disproportionate to such an object. Knowledge is supernatural from the mode alone when a Catholic believes that God exists because God has revealed it. It is supernatural from both object and mode when a Catholic, through divine revelation, believes that God is three and one.

FIRST CONCLUSION

An act of supernatural faith, both on the side of its object and in its mode of believing, has at every time been, and is now, necessary as a means to justification and final salvation. This conclusion is proximate to the Catholic faith, or Catholic. We do not call the contrary opinion absolutely heretical because of the authority of those doctors and because they differ from Pelagius: they posit divine assistance on the part of the will and also an infused habit on the part of the intellect, although they deny an elicited act concerning a supernatural object; Pelagius denied both. The conclusion is proved by the strongest testimony of Sacred Scripture. Hebrews 11 says: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Notice that earlier in the same chapter the Apostle had defined faith: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not"; that is, the foundation of the things for which we hope, and an evidence of things not apparent, convincing the intellect without the appearance of the object and making it certain of an object not seen. Therefore when he says that without faith it is impossible to please God, he is speaking of supernatural faith. This is confirmed because in the same place the Apostle infers by a most evident consequence that Enoch possessed this supernatural faith from the fact that Sacred Scripture says that he pleased God and was taken up. Hence he proves the consequence because without faith it is impossible to please God. According to the opinion of the doctors just mentioned, however, this consequence would have no force: "He pleased God; therefore he had faith." The conclusion is also proved from Romans 4: "But to him that worketh not"—that is, does not merit—"yet believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice." Here the Apostle plainly teaches what the object of the faith necessary for justification must be: namely, God insofar as He justifies the ungodly, which pertains to the supernatural order and exceeds natural knowledge. The Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 3, likewise defines: "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration and assistance of the Holy Ghost man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema." Therefore supernatural assistance is necessary for the act of believing; consequently assistance is required on the part of the intellect, and not only on the part of the will.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

THE FIRST CONCLUSION — CONTINUED

If supernatural assistance were not required for the act of the intellect because the object about which that act is concerned need not be supernatural, it would follow that assistance would not be required on the part of the will either in order to believe with a pious affection. The consequence is clear, because with respect to a natural object the intellect is otherwise sufficiently convinced and determined. On this matter see Master Cano, Relectio de sacramentis in communi, part II, q. 2, conclusion 1; Master Soto, IV Sentences, distinction 1, q. 2, a. 3; St. Thomas, I–II, q. 113, a. 4, ad 2, and his commentary on Hebrews 11. See also St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, chapters 2, 5, 8, 10, and 11; the Second Council of Orange, canons 5, 6, 7 and following; and the Council of Milevis, canon 4, where it is taught that we must both know what we ought to do and love so that we may do it.

REFUTATION OF REPLIES TO SCRIPTURE

Because the doctors cited above offer certain solutions to the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, these must be refuted. First, they explain the Apostle's statement, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," as referring to habitual faith. Against this interpretation there is an argument: according to the faith it is not altogether certain that there are infused habits, whereas it is certain that there are acts. Therefore that testimony is not adequately explained as referring merely to a habit. This is confirmed because the Apostle says there, "He that cometh to God must believe." But the approach to God is made through a movement and act of the soul, not through a habit. Therefore the believing by which we approach God must also be an act. They reply, however, that "faith" is taken for knowledge of a thing which can be had through nature. But against this explanation there are still stronger arguments. In Sacred Scripture faith itself is called a gift of God. Ephesians 2 says: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God." Therefore it cannot be understood of natural knowledge, because this is from us. Likewise, in Hebrews 11, where the Apostle says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," he had defined faith as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." Natural knowledge, however, is an evident argument convincing us that God exists. Therefore the Apostle is not speaking of merely natural knowledge. Thirdly, they reply that an act of faith is necessary for final salvation, but not for justification. Against this there is an evident argument. The Apostle says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; he does not merely say that it is impossible to attain beatitude. But one who is justified pleases God. Therefore an act of faith is necessary not only for eternal salvation but also for justification. Romans 8 likewise says: "Whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." There the Apostle teaches that there is as necessary an order between vocation, which occurs through faith, and justification as there is between justification and final salvation. But no one can be saved unless he is justified; therefore neither can anyone be justified unless he has believed. Likewise 1 Corinthians 3 says: "Other foundation no man can lay but that which is laid, which is Christ Jesus," that is, faith in Christ, or Christ believed through faith. Moreover, the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 8, says that faith is the beginning of human salvation and the foundation of justification. But what is built upon this foundation belongs to the supernatural order and is a reality of great weight and importance. Therefore the foundation itself must be supernatural; otherwise the structure of the building would rest upon a weaker foundation. It belongs to a wise architect to place his house upon a firm rock. But a firmness proportionate to such a building is not found in natural knowledge. For who can firmly hope that God will give him the kingdom of heaven unless God has promised it by revelation? According to Psalm 118: "Be mindful of thy word to thy servant, in which thou hast given me hope." Certainly this hope was not received from natural reason. This is confirmed: if natural knowledge is the foundation of our justification, then the beginning of our salvation is from ourselves, which is Pelagian. Finally, the conclusion is proved by an excellent reason. The will can love or hope for nothing unless it is known as possible. But the will loves supernatural beatitude; therefore the intellect must know in some supernatural manner that supernatural beatitude is possible. Yet the whole power of rational nature cannot disclose this. Therefore supernatural light is necessary.

SECOND CONCLUSION

An act of supernatural faith is necessary by necessity of precept. The conclusion is proved. An act of faith is necessary by necessity of means. But every free act of ours which is necessary by necessity of means to an end is also necessary by necessity of precept. Therefore an act of supernatural faith is necessary by necessity of precept. The minor is proved because a prudent legislator gives precepts especially concerning necessary means when those means are acts of his subjects. This is confirmed from John 3, "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God"; John 6, "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man, you shall not have life in you"; and Luke 13, "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish." From these testimonies all the doctors infer that there are precepts concerning Baptism, the Eucharist, and Penance, because in those testimonies these things are declared necessary means to salvation and the end. But Sacred Scripture likewise says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Therefore there is also a precept of faith. The precept of faith will, however, be discussed below in Question 16.

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THIRD CONCLUSION

God acts mercifully toward us in imposing the precept of faith, even though it is above our natural powers. First proof. God acts mercifully in ordaining men to a supernatural end; but precepts of this kind concern the means necessary for that end. Therefore He acts mercifully in imposing them. This is confirmed because it is a perfection of every nature to be moved by a higher nature. Therefore it is a much greater perfection for the rational creature to be moved by God Himself toward a supernatural end, which is natural to God. Secondly, it is a great benefit of God that even those truths which can be known by nature are proposed to men through faith, so that they may be more common among men, more certain, and known more quickly. Therefore it was an even greater benefit of God that things which exceed all nature were handed down to men to be believed, according to Psalm 50: “The uncertain and hidden things of thy wisdom thou hast made manifest to me.” Thirdly, God most justly requires from men works consonant with rational nature. Therefore He justly requires supernatural precepts from those whom by His grace He makes partakers of the divine nature. This is confirmed because natural reason demands that the essence of a natural thing not remain idle but operate in conformity with its essence. In the same way, the order of grace demands that those who participate in the divine nature through grace also perform supernatural works. From this it follows that at every time God required men to fulfill not only natural precepts but also supernatural ones, although He did not impose those precepts in writing as He did in the Old Law.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

REPLY TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT

To the first argument it is answered that there are three explanations of that passage of the Apostle concerning the Gentiles. The first explanation is that the Apostle is speaking of Gentiles who were not yet justified. He does not say that each of them did all the things belonging to the natural law, but that they did certain things belonging to it. The second explanation is that he is speaking of justified Gentiles, of whom he says that they "naturally do those things that are of the law," because through nature healed by grace they fulfilled those things which naturally belong to the law, without any written law. This explanation is found in St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 26 and 27, and St. Thomas follows it in I-II, q. 109, a. 4, ad 1, and in his commentary on that passage of the Apostle.

And rightly so: that which is done through nature healed by grace, and which pertains to the natural law, is said to be possessed "naturally" by men - not because they do it by the powers of weakened nature, but by the powers of grace insofar as grace heals nature and perfects it so that it can universally perform every good to whose fulfillment the natural law obliges. The third explanation is that the Apostle intended there to signify that the state of the law of nature, so far as the Jewish nation was concerned, lasted only until Moses, to whom the written law was given by God Himself. In its observance the weakness of nature would be recognized and a more explicit profession of the future Redeemer would be made, through whose grace the whole law could be fulfilled. For the other nations, however, the state of the law of nature continued until Christ our Lord, the author and consummator of the law of grace. Therefore the meaning of the Apostle's assertion, "The Gentiles who have not the law naturally do the things that are of the law," is: the Gentiles who do not possess the written law, while remaining in the state of the law of nature in which there was no written law, perform those things belonging to the law - namely, the moral precepts of the natural law. According to the teaching of St. Thomas and Cajetan in I-II, q. 100, these also include the precepts of faith, hope, and charity.

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REPLY TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT

To the second argument it is answered that the child in such a case will be illuminated by God through the supernatural light of faith. Nor is this any more miraculous than God's concurring with that child through supernatural assistance so that he may love God supernaturally. Rather, this belongs to the universal providence of God insofar as He is the author of grace. Just as philosophers say that when a child dies before acquiring intellectual species, God, as author of rational nature, then impresses intelligible species upon him - because it belongs to the author of nature not to fail in providing what is necessary for the operation of the rational soul - so likewise we say that it belongs to the author of grace, at the moment when a man turns toward Him by divine assistance, to confer upon him those things which are simply necessary for justification: namely, assistance in intellect and will together with some infused light or habit, so that man can operate proportionately in relation to the supernatural end. This doctrine agrees greatly with Wisdom 7: "Wisdom conveyeth herself through nations into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets"; and John 1: "That was the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." Although this testimony is explained by some, such as Cajetan, as referring to natural light when a man comes to the use of reason, nevertheless it has a broader sense. Many saints and doctors explain it so that it also embraces supernatural illumination. Then the sense is an accommodated distribution: every man coming to the use of reason who is illuminated by God is illuminated by Him. In the same manner 1 Timothy 2, "Who will have all men to be saved," is commonly explained: whoever is saved is saved by His will. Likewise 1 John 2 says, "His anointing teacheth you of all things." This must certainly be understood of all things necessary both for justification and for salvation. Thus, if there should be no man who preaches or explains the Gospel, the Holy Spirit Himself will teach the soul of that man the things necessary for his justification. We have examples of this manner in which God provides what is necessary in Sacred Scripture. In Acts 8 Philip was sent to the Ethiopian eunuch. In Acts 10 Cornelius was inspired to seek Peter for his instruction. And in Acts 16 Paul was inspired by the Holy Spirit to pass into Macedonia in order to instruct in the faith of Christ certain persons already justified, especially Lydia the seller of purple. The same doctrine is gathered from the testimonies of the saints, especially Dionysius, chapter 9 of the Celestial Hierarchy, the passage cited by St. Thomas in **Article 7, objection 3.**

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

ST. THOMAS AND ST. AUGUSTINE ON DIVINE ILLUMINATION

St. Thomas follows the teaching that many among the Gentiles attained salvation through the ministry of angels, who revealed to them the mysteries of faith. St. Augustine likewise says, in the first book To Simplicianus, question 2, that Cornelius had already been justified before he was instructed by Peter concerning faith in Christ, and that he had been instructed concerning faith in God in certain hidden ways.

REPLY TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT

For the solution of the third argument it must be noted that all the precepts of faith can be unknown to someone through inculpable ignorance, so that not believing in God is not for him a new sin of infidelity, just as not believing in Christ may not be. Nevertheless, this is peculiar to the act of faith in God as justifier: such an act is necessary by necessity of the end, as a means without which man will not be justified, even though he does not sin because he does not believe, since he is excused from culpability in not believing by invincible ignorance. Other acts of faith — namely, explicit faith in Christ or in the mystery of the Trinity — even after the preaching of the Gospel, are not necessary for justification or eternal salvation in such a way that there cannot be a probable opinion that without those acts a man may be justified and saved. Indeed, this is the common opinion, although Master Cano holds the contrary position, namely, that explicit faith in Christ and in the Trinity is a means necessary for salvation. But there is no dispute concerning this: those acts are necessary for salvation at the time and place in which a man has sufficient knowledge of the Gospel, or can have it, and nevertheless resists.

REPLY TO THE FOURTH ARGUMENT

To the fourth argument it is answered by denying the antecedent. For if the argument proved anything, it would also make the Pelagian heresy true in the state of the law of nature. Therefore it is necessary to say that in that state there were not only natural precepts but also certain supernatural precepts. Nevertheless, that state was called the state of the law of nature because it had no precepts except those deduced from the nature of the thing: namely, from the fact that man was a rational animal and from the fact that he was ordered through his own actions to the end of eternal life. Hence, by necessary consequence, it is immediately gathered that there was a precept of faith, hope, charity, and of the virtue of penance for one who had sinned mortally, because these acts were certain necessary means to man's end insofar as he was ordered by grace to beatitude. That state of nature, however, excluded precepts by which some particular worship of God was immediately determined by God. It likewise excluded divine precepts determining the matter and form of a sacrament for justification, especially from original sin. It also excluded certain judicial and positive moral precepts immediately given by God. We do not deny, however, that in that state there were some positive human laws to which men were bound to obey because they were suitable for preserving the law of nature and grace. But because such laws were enacted by legislators through a certain rational discourse, that state was called the state of the law of nature, in distinction from the state of the written law and the law of grace, in which God Himself immediately established certain positive laws, namely concerning sacraments, sacrifices, judicial matters, and morals. To the confirmation it is answered that when St. Thomas asserts that the Gentiles could be saved under the natural law, he does not exclude supernatural knowledge, but only the written law. There is, however, a passage of St. Thomas in his commentary on Romans 2, lecture 3, where he seems to teach that supernatural assistance is required only on the part of the will. It is answered that St. Thomas there teaches that the natural law sufficiently manifests those things which belong to the natural law. Nevertheless, for all such precepts belonging to the natural law, assistance is required on the part of the will, because the will is more wounded by sin than the intellect. Therefore St. Thomas neither intended to teach nor actually said that natural knowledge alone suffices for justification.

SECOND DOUBT

It is doubted, secondly, which things to be believed must necessarily be believed by explicit supernatural faith and which may be believed implicitly, both by necessity of precept and by necessity of the end. For the explanation of this difficulty several things must be observed. First, faith can be considered in two ways. One faith is explicit and the other implicit. Explicit faith in some reality is that which is expressly terminated at that reality. Implicit faith in some reality is that which is not immediately and expressly terminated at it, but at something else in which that reality is contained as in a cause or in a genus. Hence it follows that the same faith can be explicit and implicit with respect to different things. For example, explicit faith in God as justifier is explicit with respect to that article, but implicit with respect to Christ. Secondly, it must be noted that implicit faith is not something indivisible, but admits of more and less. Hence we may say that explicit faith itself is still twofold: one is explicit and distinct; another is explicit but confused. Thus the faith in Christ the Savior which existed among the lesser persons of the Old Law was explicit faith in Christ, but confused, because they did not distinguish the divine and human natures existing in the same supposit. Under the law of grace, however, a Catholic has explicit and distinct faith in Christ. Similarly, a rustic Catholic who explicitly confesses three persons in one essence does not possess a distinct faith in this mystery in the same manner as a theologian, because the rustic does not understand how the Father does not proceed from another, how the Son proceeds from another through intellect, and how the Holy Spirit proceeds through will. Hence even in the possession of distinct faith there is a greater and a lesser degree.

FIRST CONCLUSION

Natural knowledge of God was at no time implicit faith in any mystery.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

FIRST CONCLUSION - CONTINUED

Natural knowledge of God was at no time implicit faith in any mystery. This conclusion is asserted against the doctors cited above, who maintained that natural knowledge of God as justifier and rewarder was implicit faith, because God Himself, who is known to exist by the light of nature, is also known by the light of faith, although by the light of faith the mysteries concerning Him which are necessary for us are known more explicitly. We regard our conclusion as practically Catholic. First proof. Implicit and explicit faith do not differ specifically, but as something enfolded differs from the same thing unfolded. Natural knowledge, however, belongs to another and inferior order than the supernatural knowledge of faith. Therefore supernatural knowledge cannot be contained in natural knowledge. Just as man cannot be said to be implicitly contained in the seed of a plant or of a horse, so also we say that God cannot in any way be contained in a predicament, because He belongs to a higher order than predicamental beings. The major premise is proved from Sacred Scripture. Galatians 3 says: "Before the faith came" - namely, evangelical faith with its explanation - "we were kept shut up unto that faith which was to be revealed." Here the Apostle places the difference between the faith of the ancient people and that of the new people in this: in the New Law faith is explained, whereas formerly it was implicit. Likewise in Galatians 4 the Apostle compares the faith of the present time with the faith of the ancients and says that the faith of the New Law is like the faith of a man already perfect, while the faith of the Old Law is like that of a child who is still under a pedagogue. But the same human being is first a child and later a man. Therefore the same faith is implicit and explicit. Likewise in 2 Corinthians 3 he places the difference between the new and the ancient Church in this: "We, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face," whereas the ancients had a veil placed before their face. St. Jerome teaches the same in book II of his Commentary on Galatians, chapter 4; St. Augustine in book XIX Against Faustus, chapter 14, and Letter 157; and St. Thomas in this question, Articles 7 and 8, and in I, q. 1, a. 7. It is also proved from what we said above: the Church has always been one from the beginning of the world to the end. Therefore its faith has always been one in specific and formal unity. Further proof. In order for something to be said to be implicitly contained in another, it must be known by a light of the same order, or by a light acquired from the former light. But the light of faith cannot be of the same order as natural light, nor is it acquired by virtue of natural light. Therefore the mysteries of faith are in no way implicitly contained in the knowledge of any natural principle. Again, it would follow that if the knowledge of faith were implicitly contained in some principle known by natural light, such natural knowledge would have to be called science of faith at least implicitly. And it is confirmed: it would equally follow that Aristotle and Plato, who naturally knew that God exists and is a rewarder, possessed implicit faith in Christ, which is plainly absurd. Again, it would follow that the natural love of God were implicitly the supernatural love of faith. The consequence is Pelagian. The inference is proved because supernatural love stands to natural love as supernatural knowledge stands to natural knowledge. Therefore if supernatural knowledge is implicitly contained in natural knowledge, supernatural love will likewise be contained in natural love.

AN OBJECTION AGAINST THE CONCLUSION

In the natural knowledge of God, by which divine providence is known, all things which God temporally disposes for leading man to beatitude are contained as in a genus. Therefore such knowledge is implicit faith. The consequence is proved: the object of that natural knowledge stands as a genus with respect to species, or as a whole confusedly conceived with respect to its parts. But a genus implicitly contains its species and a whole its parts. Therefore knowledge of the genus implicitly contains knowledge of the species. This is confirmed. A simple faithful Christian implicitly says that he believes everything contained in Sacred Scripture because he is prepared to believe all of it if it is proposed to him by the Church. But it can happen that one who possesses natural knowledge of God is similarly prepared. Therefore he will possess implicit faith.

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REPLY TO THE OBJECTION

The antecedent is denied. In that natural knowledge there are contained only those things which can be investigated by the light of nature from knowledge of creatures, according to Romans 1: "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." To the proof that the object of natural knowledge implicitly contains the object of faith as a whole contains its parts or a genus its species, the answer is this. If the object of natural knowledge is considered according as it exists in itself, without reference to the creature's manner of knowing, I concede it. The proposition "God exists" contains everything that can in any manner be known about God. But if it is considered as an object in relation to natural light, it contains only those things which can be known through investigation by natural light. The reason is evident: we do not know God as He is. Thus when St. Thomas, in **Article** 7 of the preceding question, asserts that in those two principles, "God exists" and "He is a rewarder," all things which can be known about God are contained, he understands those two principles insofar as they are known by supernatural light. To the confirmation it is answered that the simple faithful Christian possesses the supernatural light of faith and therefore is proximately prepared to believe everything contained in Sacred Scripture if it is proposed by the Church. A Gentile who possesses only natural knowledge cannot be prepared to believe those things except in remote potency.

SECOND CONCLUSION

In the time of the law of nature it was necessary, as a means necessary for salvation, explicitly to believe that God is the author of grace and a rewarder with a supernatural reward. The conclusion is proved from Hebrews 11. After saying, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," the Apostle adds: "For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Paul does not assert a lesser necessity of believing these two principles than of believing by faith itself. Moreover, the habit of faith must direct the intention of the person who is justified. Faith concerns the first supernatural principles just as natural light concerns first natural principles. But unless God is believed to be a supernatural rewarder, faith cannot direct the intention of the will toward a supernatural end. Therefore one cannot be justified without explicit faith in God as rewarder. The consequence is evident because the intention must be explicit in its ordering toward God as supernatural rewarder.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

SECOND CONCLUSION - CONTINUED

Explicit faith in Christ, as we shall immediately say, was at every time necessary for justification as a means. But faith in Christ cannot in any way be implicit unless some supernatural principle concerning God is known, namely, that He is the justifier through grace. Therefore it is necessary to possess explicit faith in this truth. The minor premise is proved. Christ Himself, in relation to our justification, acts ministerially insofar as He is man. Therefore He cannot be known implicitly except in that principle in which He is contained principally, namely: God is Savior. In the same way a brush which instrumentally produces an image is known implicitly when the art of the painter is explicitly known.

THIRD CONCLUSION

In the time of the law of nature, after Adam's sin, it was necessary both as a means and by precept to possess supernatural faith in the one mediator, Christ the Lord, whether implicitly or explicitly. Before sin, it is a very probable opinion that the grace conferred upon our first parent was not from the merits of Christ. Hence it follows that Adam's faith in Christ was not necessary by necessity of means for salvation, although perhaps it was necessary by necessity of precept. This conclusion is the teaching of the Scholastics with the Master of the Sentences, III, distinction 25, and IV, distinction 1; St. Thomas expressly in this article and Articles 4 and 7, and III, q. 61, a. 3; Master Soto, De natura et gratia II, chapter 11, and IV Sentences, distinction 1, q. 2, a. 4, and distinction 5, single

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question, a. 2; and Master Cano in the second part of his Relectio on the Sacraments in general, question 2.

They prove it by very many testimonies both of Sacred Scripture and of the saints and doctors. This conclusion asserts something against Pelagius, who said that Christ came merely as a teacher and not as Mediator and Redeemer through whose merits we are justified. Against this heresy is Genesis 49, where Jacob prophesied concerning Christ: "I will look for thy salvation, O Lord." It is further proved because throughout the Epistle to the Romans Paul strives to teach that neither natural knowledge nor the written law, but faith in Christ alone, suffices for justification so far as the intellect is concerned. He teaches the same in the Epistle to the Galatians, especially chapter 3: "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise, by the faith of Jesus Christ, might be given to them that believe." It must be observed here that the Scholastics cite many testimonies in confirmation of this conclusion in which it is not expressly asserted that faith in Christ is necessary, but rather that without Christ there is no salvation or justification. Such is Acts 4: "There is no salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved." Likewise 1 Corinthians 15: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." And 2 Timothy 1: grace "was given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the world." And Apocalypse 13, where Christ is called "the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world," because through the merits of Christ men were formerly saved. Nevertheless these testimonies are appropriately cited to prove the conclusion because the power and merit of Christ are applied to us through faith. Consequently those passages rightly prove that all of us are justified through faith in Jesus Christ. There is, however, an excellent testimony in Romans 3: "All have sinned, and do need the glory of God," that is, that God should will to be glorified in the salvation of men. Immediately follows: "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to the showing of his justice, for the remission of former sins." See St. Augustine on this matter in Letter 157; book I On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, chapters 7, 8, 9, 38, 39, and 40; book II, chapters 24, 25, and 26; and book III Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 4. In these places Augustine expressly teaches that all the ancient fathers, both under the law of nature and under the written law, were in reality and spirit Christians, although not in name. Eusebius of Caesarea likewise says in Ecclesiastical History I, chapter 1, that the name Christian is most ancient, although Isaiah 62 calls it a "new name" which the mouth of the Lord would name, namely, after the birth of Christ the Savior, whom the prophet there calls just and glorious. Furthermore, under the law of nature and the written law the sacraments were signs of Christ to come; under the law of grace the sacraments are commemorative signs. Therefore in every law a profession of faith in Christ was necessary.

AN OBJECTION AGAINST THE THIRD CONCLUSION

It follows by equal reasoning that at every time it was necessary for justification implicitly to believe everything contained in Sacred Scripture. The inference appears because all those things are implicitly contained in faith in Christ, which is explicit faith in God, since in the preparation of the faithful person's mind he ought to be prepared to believe them all.

REPLY

It is answered briefly that there is no great difficulty in conceding that in some manner men are bound implicitly and confusedly to believe everything contained in Sacred Scripture. Nevertheless there is not an equal reason concerning implicit faith in Christ and faith in Sacred Scripture. The reason for the difference is that, as we have already said, Christ is Himself an object believed by faith both as a means necessary to the end and as the end and exemplar to whom we are conformed through justification and beatitude. The other things contained in Sacred Scripture do not possess this necessity either as means or as end, although Sacred Scripture is useful.

FOURTH CONCLUSION

At every time, even in the state of innocence, there was explicit faith in Christ Jesus, the one mediator of God and men, in some persons or at least in one. This conclusion is proved by induction. Before sin there was such faith in Adam, as St. Thomas shows in Article 7. After sin Adam himself possessed explicit faith in the Incarnation insofar as Christ was ordained as a remedy for sin. He could know this without a new revelation because he had already known that the future Christ would be an efficacious cause leading men to eternal life; he also knew that he himself and all his descendants were sinners. Therefore by an evident consequence it followed that the future Christ would be the physician and Redeemer of men. Furthermore, Enoch before the Flood knew that Christ would judge the whole world. He could not possess this knowledge without explicit faith in Christ. The major premise is evident from the Epistle of Jude: "Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied, saying: Behold, the Lord cometh with thousands of his saints, to execute judgment upon all." Furthermore Job lived under the law of nature and said: "I know that my Redeemer liveth." Many Sibyls also possessed explicit faith in Christ, as St. Augustine teaches in City of God XVIII, chapter 23, and in his first sermon on the Vigil of the Nativity. Many Gentiles likewise obtained this faith, as the same Augustine teaches in City of God XVIII, chapter 47, and St. Thomas in Article 7, reply 3.

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FOURTH CONCLUSION - CONTINUED

A sign of this is that in John 4 the Samaritan woman said: "I know that the Messiah cometh." Thus she already possessed some knowledge of Him, although she did not possess true faith, since she was an idolater.

FIFTH CONCLUSION

In the state of the law of nature and of the written law, explicit faith in Christ was not necessary as a means to justification. This conclusion is found in St. Augustine, Against Faustus, book XIX, chapter 14, and is common among the Scholastic doctors in III Sentences, distinction 25, and in St. Thomas in this article. See also Hugh of St. Victor, III, treatise on the articles, chapter 3, and Masters Cano and Soto in the places cited above. The conclusion is also proved from Hebrews 11, where St. Paul says: "He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." The Apostle had already said that without faith it is impossible to please God; therefore, in what he immediately added, he explained what must be explicitly believed. He made no mention of a Redeemer and Mediator. Therefore someone could please God without explicit faith in Him. This conclusion is asserted against certain theologians who maintain that at every time explicit faith in the Savior was necessary with respect to four articles: His nativity, death, resurrection, and judgment. It is also against others who say that at every time it was necessary explicitly to believe that Christ would be the Son of God. It is likewise against theologians who require that explicit faith in Christ in a common and confused manner was necessary at all times, namely, that one had to believe in some reconciler of the human race, even though the dignity of His person and the particular means by which He would accomplish redemption were unknown.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FIFTH CONCLUSION

We have already said that all the just under the Old Law, both of nature and of the written law, were truly Christians in reality. Therefore in reality they possessed some explicit faith in Christ, although in a confused manner.

REPLY

It is sufficient for them truly to have been Christians that they possessed implicit faith in Christ, even though this would not have been sufficient for them to be called Christians by name. A second argument is drawn from St. Augustine, who appears to require for salvation faith in Christ concerning the articles mentioned above and this at every time. He says in Letter 157 and in The City of God, book XVIII, chapter 44, that no one ever attained salvation without an express revelation of the Savior. Some answer that Augustine spoke in those passages by a certain hyperbole against the Pelagians, who denied the grace of Christ. Others say that perhaps Augustine was speaking of perfect salvation whereby men attain eternal life. In that sense it is true that no one ever entered heaven unless he had first possessed explicit faith in Christ. For the fathers who were in Limbo before Christ descended to them had explicit faith in Him, since Blessed John the Baptist, Lazarus, and other just men had preached to them. Finally it may be answered that Augustine intended only to assert that explicit faith in Christ was necessary by necessity of precept, not by necessity of means.

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SIXTH CONCLUSION

Explicit faith in Christ was always necessary in the faithful people by necessity of precept, especially during the time of the written law. But because a precept can sometimes be invincibly unknown, it follows that men could be justified without explicit faith in Christ. This **conclusion is to be understood of explicit but confused faith in Christ, whereby Christ was believed to be the** repairer of the human race,

even though the dignity of His person and the particular manner in which He would repair the human race were unknown. The **conclusion is proved first. In both the law of nature and the written law there were sacraments signifying Christ** the Redeemer and

Repairer. Therefore at least the greater persons, who under the law of nature ministered such sacraments to the people and instituted them under divine instinct, and who under the written law ministered and taught the people, were bound explicitly to believe the faith which those sacraments signified. This seems to be the teaching of St. Thomas in Articles 7 and 8. The conclusion is also proved with respect to all. If explicit faith in the Mediator were proposed by some superior to a member of the faithful under the law of nature, he was bound to assent to that explicit faith. Otherwise, even if he held the contrary assent, he would not sin and would remain just; but this is false, because explicit faith in Christ cannot stand together with an expressly contrary assent. Further, the conclusion is proved especially regarding the written law, under which there was in particular a precept concerning explicit faith in Christ. In that period there were not only sacraments signifying Christ but also explicit prophecies of the prophets, handed down in writing so that they might be made known to the people concerning the Messiah. Moreover, the fathers under the written law were nearer to the law of grace than those under the law of nature. Therefore their faith in Christ was more explicit, as St. Thomas taught in the preceding question, Article 7. Habakkuk 2 also sufficiently expresses such a precept: "If he make any delay, wait for him: for he shall surely come, and he shall not be slack. Behold, he that is unbelieving, his soul shall not be right in himself: but the just shall live in his faith. And if he withdraw himself, he shall not please my soul." Therefore they had a precept explicitly to believe in the coming of Christ. Finally, when Christ came into the world, not only the leaders of the Jewish people but even the crowd said that He was truly the Prophet who was to come into the world, and frequently called Him the promised Messiah and Christ.

THE NECESSITY OF EXPLICIT FAITH IN THE PRESENT TIME

It remains to treat of the necessity of explicit faith in the present time. On this matter there are four opinions, two extreme and two intermediate.

FIRST EXTREME OPINION

In the time of grace it is not necessary explicitly to believe any particular article of faith; rather, it is sufficient to believe in a general way everything that Mother Church holds. Thus, if a Christian is asked whether Christ was born of a Virgin or whether God is three and one, he may answer: "I do not know, but I believe what the Church holds"; and with this faith he could be justified and saved.

SECOND EXTREME OPINION

In the present time explicit faith in Christ is necessary in such a way that without it a man cannot be justified and saved. Some even say that it is erroneous to assert that anyone can attain final salvation without such faith. The first opinion was held by William of Paris in his **treatise On Faith, by the Auxerre author in book III, treatise 3, question 5, by the Summa Rosella, and by other** canonists, as Sylvester

reports under the word Faith, question 3. The second opinion was held by St. Bonaventure in III Sentences, distinction 25, question 2, and by Durandus in the same distinction.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

THIRD OPINION

The third opinion is intermediate. It asserts that explicit faith in Christ is indeed commanded with respect to the four articles just mentioned. Nevertheless, it says that invincible ignorance of all these articles is possible and consequently that a man can be justified and saved without any explicit faith in Christ. Master Soto follows this opinion in De natura et gratia, book II, chapter 11, and in IV Sentences, distinction 5, single question, article 2; Master Vega also follows it in his exposition of the sixth session of the Council of Trent, book VI, chapter 20.

FOURTH OPINION

The final opinion asserts that explicit faith in Christ, after the Gospel has been preached, is a means necessary for attaining eternal life, but is not a means necessary for justification. Master Cano follows this opinion in his Relectio on the Sacraments in general, part II.

FIRST CONCLUSION

It is erroneous in faith to assert that at the present time it suffices for salvation to believe only in general what Mother Church holds, without any explanation of any particular article. This conclusion is opposed to the first opinion. It is proved from the Directorium Inquisitorum, part II, question 10, where the author reports certain propositions condemned by a particular definition of the Pontiff with the counsel of the Cardinals. Among them is this proposition: that a layman is not bound to believe any article of faith, but that it suffices for him to believe in general what the Church believes, and that he does not sin if through ignorance or some temptation he believes the contrary of some particular article. This conclusion is likewise the common teaching of theologians and saints, whose testimonies will be brought forward below.

SECOND CONCLUSION

All the faithful are now bound by divine and also ecclesiastical precept explicitly to believe all the articles of faith as they are contained in the Apostles' Creed. This conclusion does not possess the same degree of certainty with respect to all its parts. Concerning some articles it is Catholic truth that men are bound under precept to believe them explicitly; concerning all of them, however, this is not equally certain as a Catholic truth. It is proved first from the Athanasian Creed: "Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith." Therefore there is a precept of knowing that faith explicitly, for it immediately follows: "Now the Catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity," and so forth. This statement is not to be understood as though all the faithful were bound under precept to believe the articles of faith with all the explicitness with which they are set forth in the Athanasian Creed.

Nevertheless, it certainly follows that some degree of explicitness is necessary. It is proved secondly with respect to the individual articles.

THE FIRST FOUR ARTICLES: THE TRINITY

The first four articles concern the Trinity. Their substance is that every member of the faithful is bound explicitly to believe that there is only one God, who is three in persons - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit - and one in essence, with the persons so distinct that, if questioned, he is bound to answer that the Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit. This conclusion is proved first because our beatitude consists in the vision of God as He is in Himself. Therefore there is a divine precept that now, in the time of revealed grace, we believe that God is three and one. The consequence is proved because faith per se concerns those things which are the object of beatitude. Therefore the faithful person is now bound to believe that God is three and one. Further, the faith of Christians differs from the faith of the ancients chiefly in this: our faith is explicit, whereas theirs was implicit. Therefore according to the condition of our state we are bound explicitly to believe those things which have been proposed to us by God. Further, in the final chapter of Matthew the Apostles received the divine precept to teach all nations and to baptize them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the nations were bound to believe what the Apostles preached, and consequently to believe the Trinity which they preached. Otherwise the precept imposed upon the Apostles would have been useless if the nations were not bound by a divine precept to believe what was preached to them. This is confirmed from the final chapter of Mark: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned." It is proved again from Baptism. Baptism cannot worthily be received unless the mystery of the Trinity is explicitly known. Therefore there is a precept to believe the mystery explicitly. The antecedent is proved because to be baptized is nothing other than to confess the Trinity, in whose name Baptism is explicitly conferred. This is confirmed by the practice of the Church, which never baptizes an adult unless he has first explicitly believed the mystery of the Trinity. The same is confirmed from Acts 19. When Paul came to Ephesus he asked whether they had received the Holy Spirit after believing. They replied: "We have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost." Paul objected: "In what then were you baptized?" as though wondering that they were ignorant of the Holy Spirit.

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THE FIFTH ARTICLE: GOD THE CREATOR

Concerning the fifth article, that God is Creator of heaven and earth, we say that every one of the faithful is bound explicitly to believe this article. Its substance is that God made heaven and earth and all things contained in them. That the world was created at the beginning of time and thus began to exist, although this is Catholic faith as defined in the chapter Firmiter, is nevertheless not so certain to be an article of faith which every member of the faithful must necessarily believe explicitly with that same degree of explanation. The arguments commonly made to prove that the faithful are bound explicitly to believe the fifth article do not prove that they are bound to believe it with this fuller explanation. The argument is as follows. All the faithful are bound to render God the worship due to Him. But without explicit faith in the fifth article they cannot worship Him with the due worship of latria as Lord by title of creation. Therefore they are bound explicitly to believe Him to be Creator. The minor is proved because the worship of latria is due to the first principle and author of the whole being of all things. But this argument does not prove that the faithful are bound explicitly to believe that God did not create the world from eternity. For even if He had created the world from eternity, men would still be bound to render Him such worship, just as Aristotle asserted that worship is due to God while nevertheless holding that the world was eternal. It could, however, be proved in another way that the faithful are bound explicitly to believe that God made the world in time, especially men themselves. The faithful are bound to believe that God is the justifier and, consequently, to believe that they were conceived in original sin. But original sin was derived from the first parent and was not committed by one's own will.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

THE FIFTH ARTICLE - CONTINUED

Therefore, it would seem that the faithful are bound explicitly to believe that the first man was Adam, from whom we all descend, and consequently that the human race began in Adam. Yet even this argument does not demonstrate the point. Although the reasoning is good, every member of the faithful is not bound to work through such a discourse. It is sufficient that he believe himself to be a sinner and God to be the justifier. The strongest argument for proving that all the faithful are bound explicitly to believe that God created the world in time is that this is how the article is commonly explained and believed by the faithful. Indeed, even the most learned men have difficulty understanding how something could be made and yet not be made in time. Hence it seems more probable to us that this article must be explicitly believed in such a way that one affirms that God made the world at the beginning of time, especially because without this circumstance it is not an article of faith per se. Natural reason demonstrates that there is one author of the entire fabric of the world; but that the world had a beginning in time is taught by faith.

THE SIXTH ARTICLE: GOD THE SAVIOR AND JUSTIFIER

Concerning the sixth article of the divinity, in which it is said that God is Savior, that is, the justifier of the sinner, it must be said that at every time it was necessary to believe this explicitly, even for justification. This is clear from Romans 4: "But to him that believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly." It is also proved because it is necessary explicitly to believe that the precept of penance is divine, as is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture. But no one can do penance unless he expects pardon from God; otherwise his penance would be infernal. Therefore it is necessary to believe that God is the justifier. Indeed, this must be believed even by those who have no actual sin but only original sin, because they too are justified through the hope of pardon. Therefore they must believe that God is the justifier.

THE HOLY CHURCH AND COMMUNION OF SAINTS

From this it also follows that all the faithful are bound explicitly to believe in the holy Church. The meaning is that there is one congregation of the faithful under the Roman Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ. In this congregation there is holiness, not only because there are many just persons within it, but also because the sacraments which sanctify are in the Church. This explicit belief is necessary because, for us, explicit faith in the other articles is reduced to the authority of the holy Church, which expressly teaches them to us. Moreover, through the sacraments of the Church God forgives sins and sanctifies men. Therefore this Church must be explicitly believed. It must nevertheless be observed that the words of the Creed, "the communion of saints," are explained by some of the Church triumphant, where the saints communicate among themselves in one beatitude, pray for us, and are joined to us in charity. Others understand them of the Church militant, so that the sense is: "I believe the holy Church, which is the communion of saints." According to these, by "holy Church" is understood only the congregation of the just who are united with one Head, Christ, perfectly in charity and mutually communicate their works to one another, such as satisfaction and prayer. But to us the clearer sense of those words seems to be that they refer both to the Church militant and to the Church triumphant. For there is one communion of saints who are in heaven and who are on earth, because there is one charity which is the bond of this union, although they communicate their works to one another in different ways.

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THE SACRAMENTS WHICH MUST BE EXPLICITLY BELIEVED

It also follows from what has been said that all the faithful are bound explicitly to believe three sacraments: Baptism, the Eucharist, and Penance. The proof is that there is a precept concerning the reception of all these sacraments. But they cannot be received unless they are known and believed. Therefore there is a precept explicitly to believe these sacraments. If someone objects that an infant is baptized when he does not know the sacrament, the answer is that afterward, when he becomes an adult, he is bound to know that he has been baptized and consequently explicitly to believe the sacrament of Baptism. This is also proved from the Constantinopolitan Creed: "I confess one baptism for the remission of sins." There is also a special reason concerning the Eucharist. No one can distinguish that food from other food unless he expressly knows the dignity of that sacrament. Therefore the substance of faith concerning this sacrament is to believe that Christ is hidden there and that bread is not there. Concerning the sacrament of Penance, the reason is that all the faithful are bound by divine law to confess their sins. Therefore they are bound to possess explicit faith concerning this sacrament at least to this extent: that they are bound to confess all their sins after diligently examining their conscience, if this can be done; to sorrow for them above all things; to resolve not to commit them again; and to believe that in the ministers of the Church there is power to absolve sins. It is not necessary, however, that the faithful know what the form of this sacrament is, because this pertains to the minister. Concerning the other sacraments, the faithful person is bound explicitly to know them when he wishes to receive them. Thus one who wishes to marry must know that Matrimony is a sacrament conferring grace and that he must approach it not being in mortal sin. We say the same of one who wishes to receive Holy Orders, Extreme Unction, or Confirmation: he must know that these are sacred things and that he ought not to approach them in mortal sin. If someone objects that a person who has not sinned mortally is not bound explicitly to believe in the sacrament of Penance, because he is not bound to repent or seek medicine for his soul, the answer is that every man is capable of sinning even if he has not yet sinned. Hence he must know the remedy in case he should sin, namely the sacrament of Penance. Therefore even the innocent are bound explicitly to believe in Penance so that, if they should sin, they may be able to heal their souls.

THE DECALOGUE AND PRAYER

It follows further that all the faithful are bound explicitly to know the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue. We do not mean that every person must be able to recite from memory the Ten Commandments and the articles of faith. For a person of weak memory it is sufficient that, after doing what he can to remember them, he believe each of the things mentioned when they are proposed to him by the ministers of the Church, and that he know how to answer when asked whether God is three and one, whether the Son of God is man, whether stealing is a sin, and so forth. Finally, all the faithful are bound to know that God must be prayed to by us. The proof is that no one can persevere for long in observing the commandments of God without prayer, according to Luke 18: "We ought always to pray, and not to faint." Therefore, since there is a precept of prayer as a necessary means for observing the law, the faithful person must know and recognize such a precept. This is confirmed from Romans 10: "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." But man is bound to know the means necessary for salvation. Therefore he is bound to know that God must be prayed to.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

THE ARTICLE OF GOD AS GLORIFIER

Concerning the article of the glorifier it must be noted that the substance of this article is to believe that God is the glorifier of soul and body. Hence it pertains to this article explicitly to believe the resurrection of the flesh, eternal life, and also the condemnation of the wicked; consequently man is bound explicitly to know that the soul is immortal. The proof is that without such explicit faith human life cannot be rightly ordered, as experience makes clear in those who denied the immortality of souls. Secondly, it is proved because faith, as defined by the Apostle in Hebrews 11, is "the substance of things to be hoped for." If there were no future happy life to be believed, faith would not be for us the foundation of the things for which we hope. Further, it is proved from Wisdom 2, where it is said of the wicked: "They knew not the secrets of God, nor hoped for the wages of justice, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls." Finally, in every law it was necessary to believe that God is a rewarder. But this reward is most explicitly revealed in the New Law. Therefore the faithful are bound explicitly to believe this eternal reward of body and soul.

THE ARTICLES CONCERNING CHRIST'S HUMANITY

It remains now to treat the other seven articles concerning Christ's humanity.

FIRST CONCLUSION

By divine precept it must be explicitly believed that the Son of God alone - not the Father nor the Holy Spirit - became man; that He was incarnate in the womb of the Virgin by the power of the Holy Spirit; and that He was born of the Virgin Mary. This conclusion belongs to all the doctors and saints. On this matter see the Master of the Sentences in III, distinction 25, and IV, distinction 1; Master Soto in De natura et gratia II, chapter 11, and IV Sentences, distinction 5, single question, final doubt, conclusion 1; and Master Cano in his Relectio on the Sacraments,

part II, question 1.

Some nevertheless doubt whether the fact that Christ was born of a Virgin must be explicitly believed by precept. Some deny that all are bound by necessity of precept explicitly to believe this. Others say that it is necessary by necessity of precept to believe that Christ was born of a Virgin, but not that she remained perpetually a virgin. To us, however, both opinions seem false. We say not only that the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary is Catholic faith, but also that it is annexed to the article of the Incarnation and Nativity in such a way that it must be explicitly believed by precept that the Blessed Virgin was perpetually a virgin. This is proved first because in the article of the Incarnation it must be explicitly believed that by the power of the Holy Spirit the Son of God became man. Therefore He was incarnate of the Virgin Mary; otherwise there would be no miracle. Likewise the perpetual virginity of His Mother pertains to the dignity of the Son of God. A sign of this is that from the beginning of the nascent Church the faithful have always recoiled from hearing the contrary, and the Church has always proposed this article with such an explanation of Mary's virginity before birth, in birth, and after birth. Therefore there is a precept that it be explicitly believed in this manner. This is confirmed because, if there were no precept, ordinary persons would not be punished so severely when they deny the perpetual virginity of the Virgin Mary. Nor does the Church admit the sort of ignorance here that she admits in other matters of faith which ordinary people are not bound to know.

SECOND CONCLUSION

Among the other articles concerning Christ's humanity - namely His death, descent into hell, resurrection, ascension, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and coming to judgment - it must not be asserted with equal certainty that there is a precept of explicit faith concerning all of them. Concerning Christ's death and resurrection it is absolutely certain that such a precept exists, and the contrary is heresy. Concerning the other articles of His humanity, it is much more probable and safer that such a precept likewise exists. Before proving this, however, the substance of these articles must be explained. The substance of the article of Christ's death consists in this: Christ, true man, truly died through the separation of His soul from His body. The substance of the article of the resurrection is that the same soul of Christ was reunited to the body and that Christ, true man, rose in glorious and immortal flesh. The substance of the article concerning the descent into hell is that Christ's soul, united to the divinity as before, descended into hell to the place where the fathers were awaiting His coming. The substance of the article of the ascension and sitting at the right hand of the Father consists in this: Christ according to His body also ascended into heaven and is supremely blessed above all creatures. This is explained by the metaphor of sitting at the right hand of the Father, because the right hand signifies prosperity. Thus to sit at the right hand of the Father means to possess the highest goods above all creatures. It does not signify that Christ according to His body literally sits, because the perfection of a glorious body is that its position be stable. Finally, the substance of the article concerning His coming to judgment is explicitly to believe that He will come again visibly in glorious flesh to judge all men and render to each one according to his works, good or evil.

PROOF OF THE SECOND CONCLUSION

The Apostles, from the very beginning, preached to the unlearned and unbelieving peoples only those things which they were bound under precept to believe in order to be justified. But they expressly preached Christ's death, resurrection, and coming to judgment, as is clear from Acts 2 and 1 Corinthians 15: "I delivered unto you first of all ... that Christ died for our sins ... and that he rose again the third day." In Acts 1 Peter says that one of those men had to become with the Apostles "a witness of his resurrection." Romans 10 says: "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved." Concerning the Ascension Acts 2 says: "Being exalted therefore by the right hand of God, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this which you see." Concerning the coming to judgment Acts 10 says: "He commanded us to preach to the people, and to testify that it is he who was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead." Therefore, if the Apostles had a precept to preach Christ's coming to judgment, much more were the people bound to believe it. Likewise in Acts 17 Paul, preaching to the Athenians, says that God "now declareth unto men, that all should everywhere do penance, because he hath appointed a day wherein he will judge the world in equity, by the man whom he hath appointed," giving faith to all by raising Him from the dead. Further, Romans 3 says that God set forth Christ "to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood," through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. And Romans 4 says: "He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification." Therefore, in order to possess explicit faith in our redemption and resurrection, it is necessary to possess explicit faith in Christ's Passion and Resurrection.

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QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

ON THE PASSION AND RESURRECTION

For this reason the Church rightly instituted the forty-day fast in connection with the mystery of Christ's Passion and Resurrection, teaching us that our faith rests especially upon these two articles. As for explicitly believing the descent into hell, we judge the affirmative position to be the more probable. For by explicit faith in this article Christ is explicitly known as the universal Redeemer of the human race, including those who lived before Christ. The conclusion concerning all the articles together is further proved. All these are the first rudiments of the Christian school, as the Apostle appears to teach in Hebrews 5: “For whereas for the time you ought to be masters, you have need to be taught again what are the first elements of the words of God.” In chapter 6, explaining these elements, he names repentance from dead works, faith toward God, the doctrine of baptisms and imposition of hands, the resurrection of the dead, and eternal judgment. The Apostle therefore calls the articles of faith and Christian doctrine the elements of faith. But in every commonwealth it is most disgraceful to be ignorant of its first rudiments. Therefore all disciples of Christ are bound to know them. Moreover, all fourteen articles, as explained by us, are proposed to the whole people to be believed. Therefore the Christian people are bound explicitly to believe them. This is the common opinion of theologians in III Sentences, distinction 25, and St. Thomas teaches it in Articles 7 and 8 of this question and elsewhere. There is also an ecclesiastical precept to believe explicitly all the articles of faith, as appears from various canons concerning consecration and from the Councils of Laodicea and Braga. Pius V, desiring to execute the decree of the Council of Trent, ordered certain most learned theologians to compose a Catechism by which Christ's faithful might be instructed in those things which they must know, profess, and observe. In that Catechism the doctrine of the articles of faith contained in the Apostles' Creed is given first; afterward comes the doctrine of the sacraments, then of the commandments of the Decalogue, and finally of prayer. Hence there follows an ecclesiastical precept of learning and retaining in memory, as far as each person is able, the articles of faith contained in the Apostles' Creed.

Furthermore, it is commanded that no adult be baptized before he knows the Apostles' Creed and can render it from memory. Much more, therefore, is a baptized person bound to know the Creed and retain it in memory. Likewise, in many religious institutes the professed are more strictly bound to know their constitutions than novices. And in many synodal constitutions it has most justly been decreed that no one be admitted to marriage unless he first knows Christian doctrine, so that afterward he may know how to teach his children. Therefore it is a most certain sign that everyone in the Christian Church is bound to know the articles of faith, since the married state is among the ordinary states of Christian life.

THIRD CONCLUSION

Parish priests, confessors, preachers, and doctors are bound by the same divine and ecclesiastical precepts to know universally and explicitly everything pertaining to the articles of faith, so that they may instruct others and correct them if they err. Their faith and knowledge must therefore be more explicit than that which the people are bound to possess. This opinion is common among the Scholastics in III Sentences, distinction 25, and among the Summists under the title “Confessor.” See also the Decretals on the age and order of those to be promoted and Gratian, distinctions 23 and 38, where many testimonies of saints and councils are collected. It is also proved by reason. All the faithful are bound by divine and ecclesiastical law to know the things already stated. But the office of parish priests and the others is the office of a leader and head. Therefore they are much more bound to know and understand them. Likewise parish priests and confessors are bound to administer the sacrament of Penance. But they cannot fittingly administer it unless they understand what the penitent is bound to know concerning Christian doctrine. Therefore the confessor must be more learned than the penitent, since he must examine him.

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AN OBJECTION FROM ST. THOMAS

St. Thomas says in III Sentences, distinction 25, that it is not necessary for salvation that a man explicitly know all the articles of faith,
because without the explicit knowledge of some of them a man can possess a right intention toward the end. Sylvester follows this opinion. First reply: St. Thomas is speaking not of necessity of precept but of necessity of means absolutely necessary for salvation. A
person may therefore be saved without knowing many mysteries of Christ's Incarnation because of invincible ignorance. Second reply:
St. Thomas in this very question, Article 7, teaches that all are bound to possess explicit faith concerning the mysteries of Christ, especially those solemnized and publicly proposed in the churches. But all the articles of faith are publicly proposed in the Church, as is
clear from the catechism of children. Therefore all are bound to believe and know them explicitly. It follows from what has been said
that many of the faithful, both among the greater and the lesser, may be in mortal sin through ignorance. We concede the consequence.
Nevertheless invincible ignorance of articles of faith can occur, not only among barbarous nations but even among Christians — for example, if someone raised among Christians goes to church with the other faithful but is not taught by his parish priest or at home by
his parents. Even so, we say that ignorance of the faith, especially of those articles which theologians hold must explicitly be believed by
precept — such as Christ's Nativity, death, Resurrection, judgment, and explicit doctrine concerning the Sacrament of the Altar — is
rarely or hardly to be admitted as invincible. Since even the simplest faithful frequently adore that Sacrament, they are bound explicitly
to know what they adore. Christian doctrine is preached everywhere sufficiently at least so that rustic faithful persons are bound to ask
their superiors what they must know concerning religion and Christian doctrine, according to Deuteronomy 32: “Ask thy father, and he
will declare to thee; thy elders, and they will tell thee.”

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

DUTIES OF PASTORS AND CONFESSORS

Those who remain ignorant are often negligent in seeking instruction. Fourth, we say that parish priests and preachers are not bound personally to teach the rudiments of Christianity to every individual believer. It is sufficient that parish priests publicly explain in their
churches the mysteries of faith celebrated throughout the annual cycle; or arrange for someone among the people or a sacristan to teach
Christian doctrine to children; or admonish parents to teach their children the rudiments of faith. Much less are bishops personally bound
to teach such rudiments to each individual. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, III, q. 67, aa. 7–8. The reason is evident: this would require immense time and it would be almost impossible for a bishop to examine every individual concerning Christian doctrine.
Nevertheless confessors should admonish heads of households individually to examine whether their household members know Christian doctrine. They are fathers of families not merely of a gentile household but of a Christian household; therefore they must see
that the first rudiments are taught to their dependents, either by themselves or by others. Fifth, it follows that confessors, by reason of the
sacrament of Penance, should ask penitents whether they know the
articles of faith, unless it can probably be presumed that they know them.
If they find penitents ignorant, they are bound either to teach them explicitly or at least not to hear their confession. If, after the confessor
has instructed them, very unlearned penitents still grasp nothing of the doctrine, absolution should be deferred when the ignorance concerns especially those things which we have said are certainly necessary by precept, such as the mystery of the Trinity. The reason is
that one who possesses such ignorance either is in mortal sin or is in very great danger of mortally sinning because of that ignorance.
The confessor is therefore bound to defer completion of the confession so as to rescue him from the danger of sin. It must also be observed that, for someone to be said to possess explicit faith, it is not enough that he recite the
articles from memory. He must possess some understanding of them. A sign of this will be that, if questioned in an
order different from that in which he learned them, he answers correctly. Hence it follows that it is not sufficient for his salvation that a
Christian know the Creed in Latin unless he understands that language.

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FOURTH CONCLUSION

Bishops are bound to know the subtleties and greater mysteries of our faith sufficiently to be able to refute those who contradict it. This **conclusion is common among all theologians in III Sentences, distinction 25, and is taught by St. Thomas here in** Articles 6 and 7. See also the canonical titles concerning the age and qualifications of those to be promoted and Gratian, distinctions 25 and 38. It is proved from 1 Timothy 3: “A bishop must be a teacher.” Titus 1 likewise says that a bishop must embrace the faithful word according to doctrine, “that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers,” which is especially to be understood of heretics. In Ephesians 4, when Paul distinguishes Apostles from Prophets and Evangelists, he says that Christ “gave some pastors and doctors.” He did not separate pastors from doctors, but rather added “doctor” as an explanation of the pastoral office. Thus every Christian pastor ought to be a doctor, although the converse is not true. The Apostle insinuates the same in 1 Corinthians: “We speak wisdom among the perfect,” as if to say: we do not ignore the more sublime mysteries, although we do not teach them indiscriminately, but according to the capacity of our hearers. Romans 1 says: “I am a debtor both to the wise and to the unwise.” Christ in Matthew 5 teaches that the office of bishops is like lamps placed upon a lampstand so that they may give light to all who are in the house. Again, in the consecration of a bishop he is asked whether he knows both Testaments, and he answers: “I know them.” Bishops are also in the state of supreme perfection within the Church of God, as Dionysius teaches. Therefore they are bound to possess such learning that they can instruct even monks and religious in matters pertaining to their institutes. This is treated more particularly below in Question 184, Articles 5 and 7, where it is also usually discussed whether a canon lawyer can fulfill the episcopal office better than a theologian. In truth, a canon lawyer cannot fulfill that office unless he has also received something from theology, namely a substantial explanation of the articles and sacraments.

ON EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT FAITH AS NECESSARY MEANS

It is finally asked whether the same account of explicit and implicit faith applies to necessity of means for salvation as was stated concerning necessity of precept. On this question there are two probable opinions in the schools, even among Thomists. The opinion which seems more probable to us consists in three conclusions.

FIRST CONCLUSION

For the first salvation, namely justification, explicit faith in Christ the Lord is not now absolutely necessary as a means without which justification cannot occur. This conclusion is against the opinion of St. Bonaventure, although perhaps he speaks according to what regularly occurs. It is the conclusion of Master Cano in his Relectio on the Sacraments in general, part II, question 2, conclusion 3. It is proved from St. Thomas, III, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2, where he says that someone can obtain remission of sins before Baptism insofar as he has Baptism in desire explicitly or implicitly. St. Thomas is speaking of his own time, although he gives the example of Cornelius and others who obtained grace through faith in Christ and through an explicit or implicit desire for Baptism. Hence an argument is also taken from Cornelius: Cornelius was justified before he possessed explicit faith in Christ, because after his works were already pleasing to God Peter was sent to instruct him. Therefore by equal reason someone can now be justified through implicit faith. Some reply that Cornelius had not yet been justified, citing St. Augustine to Dardanus, who says that God did not yet dwell in Cornelius before he was incorporated through regeneration. But this reply cannot be sustained. Acts 10 says of Cornelius that he was a religious man and feared God, and Peter shortly afterward says: “In every nation, he that feareth God is acceptable to him,” which he certainly said on account of Cornelius the Gentile. To St. Augustine we answer that he speaks of the perfect indwelling which occurs through the sacrament externally received. Thus the Master of the Sentences says that Cornelius had been justified beforehand. Others deny the inference, saying that the case of Cornelius differs from that of people now because the Gospel had not yet been sufficiently promulgated. But this solution does not satisfy either. Even if the Gospel had not yet been sufficiently promulgated throughout the whole world in Cornelius's time, it had been sufficiently promulgated in the province where Cornelius lived, which belonged to the region of Jerusalem.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE VIII — END OF THE COMMENTARY

CORNELIUS AND IMPLICIT FAITH

Hence the Master of the Sentences and St. Thomas, in his exposition of the text, say that Cornelius was justified through explicit faith in the one Mediator, which he had received from Jews dwelling in that region, although implicit faith would have sufficed for justification. Our conclusion is further proved. When a man raised among barbarians comes to the use of reason, he can turn himself toward God and be justified from original sin. Yet at that moment he will not possess explicit faith in Christ, because explicit faith in Christ is ordinarily preached through men, according to Romans 10: “How shall they believe him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” Therefore implicit faith in Christ, contained in explicit faith in God as justifier and rewarder, suffices for justification.

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SECOND CONCLUSION

After the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated throughout the whole world, explicit faith in Christ is necessary as a means to the ultimate end, namely eternal salvation. Master Cano proves this in the place cited by innumerable testimonies of Sacred Scripture, councils, and saints. See also St. Augustine, To Simplicianus I, question 2, near the beginning, where he says that in some persons the grace of faith is so great that it is not sufficient merely to begin toward the kingdom of heaven, as in catechumens and in Cornelius before he was baptized by Peter. There are certain beginnings of faith like conceptions, but one must be born in order to arrive at eternal life. Augustine therefore appears to teach that a man once justified through implicit faith in Christ cannot enter the kingdom of heaven unless he is born through some explicit knowledge of Christ and through Baptism received in reality, or explicitly desired when there is no opportunity to receive it in reality. There is another testimony of Chrysostom in a homily on faith and the law of nature. He says that Cornelius's works before Peter instructed him concerning the faith were indeed admirable and pleasing to God, but were nevertheless “dead.” This cannot be understood of the death opposed to sanctifying grace, otherwise they would not have pleased God. It must therefore mean that Cornelius's works by themselves, without explicit knowledge of Christ, would never have brought him to eternal life. The conclusion is also proved by reason. All those whom we certainly know to have attained eternal life, whether from the New or Old Testament, did not attain it unless they first possessed explicit faith in Christ. Therefore the same reason applies to those whom we do not know with certainty, if in fact they attained eternal life. The antecedent is evident by induction in the Apostles, martyrs, confessors, and all the just of the Old Testament. All who were in Limbo received explicit faith in Christ when His coming was announced to them by Simeon the just and devout, Anna the prophetess, and John the Baptist. Hence there arises a substantial argument. If even the holiest Fathers were detained in Limbo until Christ the Lord came and bestowed upon them explicit faith, it is very probable that no one enters the kingdom of heaven unless he explicitly knows the Mediator through whom entry is made. We understand this of adults. Infants receive the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism. We say the same concerning implicit or explicit faith in the Trinity as concerning Christ, with respect to justification and the attainment of beatitude.

THIRD CONCLUSION

The explicit faith in Christ which we have said to be necessary for eternal life ought to concern Christ's death and Resurrection. The reason is that our salvation and redemption are consummated through His death and Resurrection, according to Romans 4: “He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification.” Therefore, if it is necessary explicitly to know the Redeemer before entering eternal life, it is very probable that it is necessary explicitly to know Christ's death and Resurrection, according to Romans 10: “This is the word of faith which we preach: if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.”

FOURTH CONCLUSION

It is not error or heresy, nor rash or scandalous, to assert that someone now may attain eternal life without explicit faith in Christ, but that what suffices for justification may suffice for entry into eternal life. We state this against Cano. Soto holds the opposite of Cano in IV Sentences, distinction 5, single question, article 2, final

doubt, where he establishes six sufficiently probable arguments.

Indeed this appears very probable: explicit faith is not required for the justification of such persons; therefore neither is it required for their entrance into eternal life. The antecedent is very probable, as we have said, and so is the consequence, because the grace of justification is the final disposition and acceptance for glory. Nevertheless, according to the opinion which seems more probable to us, we answer this argument by refusing to admit the case that a man justified with implicit faith should die before receiving explicit faith. For it pertains to the dignity of Christ that no member of His be admitted to the ultimate perfection of glory unless he is first disposed through explicit faith in Him. It therefore belongs to divine providence that such a man not die before he possesses explicit faith, just as it belongs to divine providence that a predestined person not die in mortal sin before being justified and receiving grace. There is no miracle in this; it pertains to the common order of grace. Likewise, that a man should now be justified through implicit faith in Christ belongs to the common order of grace. Many arguments against our conclusion are found in Master Cano. They are all solved by the distinction already made between explicit and implicit faith and between first and ultimate salvation.

ARTICLE IX

Whether believing is meritorious. The objections, contrary authority, and response of St. Thomas follow.
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QUESTION II, ARTICLE IX — WHETHER BELIEVING IS MERITORIOUS

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

It seems that believing is not meritorious. First, the principle of merit is charity, as has been said above. But faith is a preamble to charity, just as nature is. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not meritorious — because we do not merit by natural things — neither is an act of faith. Second, believing is intermediate between opinion and science, or the consideration of things known. But the consideration of science is not meritorious, and likewise neither is opinion. Therefore neither is believing meritorious. Third, one who assents to something by believing either has a cause sufficiently inducing him to believe or he does not. If he has a sufficient inducement, this does not appear meritorious, because it does not seem free to believe or not believe. If he lacks sufficient inducement, to believe is levity, according to Ecclesiasticus: “He that is hasty to give credit is light of heart.” Therefore believing does not appear meritorious in any way.

ON THE CONTRARY

Hebrews 11 says that the saints “through faith obtained promises.” This would not be so unless by believing they merited. Therefore believing itself is meritorious.

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Our acts are meritorious insofar as they proceed from free choice moved by God through grace. Hence every human act subject to free choice, if it is referred to God, can be meritorious. Believing is an act of the intellect assenting to divine truth at the command of the will moved by God through grace. Thus it is subject to free choice in its relation to God, and therefore the act of faith can be meritorious. To the first objection: nature is related to charity, which is the principle of merit, as matter is related to form. Faith, however, is related to charity as a disposition preceding the ultimate form. A subject or matter cannot act except by virtue of the form; nor can a preceding disposition act before the form arrives. But after the form arrives, both subject and preceding disposition act in virtue of the form, which is the principal principle of action, as the heat of fire acts in virtue of the substantial form. Thus neither nature nor faith without charity can produce a meritorious act. But when charity supervenes, the act of faith becomes meritorious through charity, just as acts of nature and of natural free choice can become meritorious. To the second objection: in science two things may be considered: the assent of the knower to the thing known, and the actual consideration of the thing known. The assent of science is not subject to free choice, because the knower is compelled to assent by the efficacy of demonstration. Therefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But actual consideration of a known thing is subject to free choice, for it is within man's power to consider or not consider. Therefore the consideration of science can be meritorious if referred to the end of charity, namely the honor of God or the utility of one's neighbor. In faith, however, both assent and consideration are subject to free choice; therefore with respect to both, an act of faith can be meritorious.

To the third objection: the believer has a sufficient inducement to believe. He is induced by the divine authority of doctrine confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the interior instinct of God inviting him. Hence he does not believe lightly, since he has sufficient inducement to believe; yet the nature of merit is not removed.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: an act of faith can be meritorious. Second conclusion, in the reply to the first objection: an act of faith without charity cannot be meritorious with respect to supernatural reward; with charity supervening it can. Third conclusion, in the reply to the second objection: because an act of faith is free both according to its specific assent and according to its exercise, it is meritorious in both respects.

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Concerning the first conclusion it must be observed that it is so certain that an act of faith is meritorious that the opposite is an error in
faith and rather a heresy. It is proved first and chiefly from Hebrews 11: “The saints through faith conquered kingdoms ... obtained promises.” Therefore through faith they merited the eternal promises. Likewise 1 Peter 1 says: “Receiving the end of your faith, even the
salvation of your souls.” Therefore salvation of the soul is the reward of our faith, since the act proceeds from free choice moved by grace. Other testimonies are also commonly brought forward, such as John 17: “This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only
true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent,” that is, eternal life consists in this as in merit, namely believing in God. And John 20:
“Blessed are they that have not seen and have believed,” that is, they merited beatitude through faith. Genesis 15: “Abraham believed
God, and it was reputed to him unto justice.” Romans 10: “With the heart we believe unto justice.” These testimonies directly prove that
man is justified through faith, rather than directly that he merits through faith. Nevertheless, if one considers them well, it follows that
man merits eternal life by believing, if he believes from the charity of God. Therefore the chief argument is St. Thomas's reason in the
article, which is a theological demonstration from a principle of faith. It is confirmed because it is Catholic
doctrine, as is clear from the
Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 16, that man merits eternal life through good works performed from charity. But one who believes
performs a good work from charity. Therefore he merits eternal life. See St. Augustine, Tractate 74 on John. Concerning the second
conclusion it must be noted that every good work, even when done without charity, is in itself good before
God, as is clear from I–II,
questions 20 and 21. Nevertheless it is not meritorious of a supernatural reward without charity. Therefore St. Thomas says in reply to
the first objection that faith without charity is not meritorious, because he is speaking with respect to supernatural reward.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE X — WHETHER A REASON INDUCING ONE TO BELIEVE

DIMINISHES THE MERIT OF FAITH

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

It seems that a reason inducing one to those things which are of faith diminishes the merit of faith. First, Gregory says in a certain homily that “faith has no merit where human reason supplies proof.” Therefore if human reason supplied sufficient proof, it would wholly exclude the merit of faith. Hence any human reason inducing one toward the things of faith seems to diminish the merit of faith.

Second, whatever diminishes the nature of virtue diminishes the nature of merit, because happiness is the reward of virtue. But human
reason seems to diminish the nature of the virtue of faith, because the nature of faith is that it concerns things not apparent. The more
reasons are brought forward for something, the less non-apparent it becomes. Therefore human reason introduced concerning the things
of faith diminishes the merit of faith. Third, contrary things have contrary causes. But that which is brought against faith increases the
merit of faith, whether persecution compels one to depart from faith or some argument persuades one to do so. Therefore a reason assisting faith diminishes its merit.

ON THE CONTRARY

1 Peter 3 says: “Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope which is in you.” The Apostle
would not induce us to do this if the merit of faith were thereby diminished. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
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ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

As has been said, an act of faith can be meritorious insofar as it is subject to the will, not only with respect to its exercise but also with respect to assent. A human reason inducing one to believe can stand in two ways toward the believer's will. In one way it precedes the will, as when someone either would not have the will to believe at all or would not have a prompt will to believe unless a human reason induced him. In this way the introduced human reason diminishes the merit of faith. Likewise it was said above that a passion preceding election in moral virtues diminishes the praise of the virtuous act. For just as a man ought to exercise acts of moral virtue because of the judgment of reason and not because of passion, so a man ought to believe the things of faith because of divine authority and not because of human reason. In another way human reason follows the believer's will. When a man already has a prompt will to believe, he loves the truth believed and thinks out and embraces any reasons he can discover in its support. In this respect human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit, just as a passion consequent upon choice in moral virtues is a sign of a more prompt will. This is signified in John 4, where the Samaritans said to the woman, through whom human reason is figured: “We now believe, not for thy saying.” To the first objection: Gregory speaks of the case in which a man does not have the will to believe the things of faith except because of the reason introduced. But when a man has the will to believe the things of faith from divine authority alone, even if he possesses a demonstrative reason for one of the preambles of faith — for example, that God exists — the merit of faith is not thereby removed or diminished. To the second objection: reasons brought forward in support of the authority of faith are not demonstrations capable of reducing the human intellect to an intelligible vision of the mysteries. Therefore the mysteries do not cease to be non-apparent. Such reasons remove impediments to faith by showing that what faith proposes is not impossible. Hence they diminish neither the merit nor the nature of faith. Demonstrative reasons concerning the preambles of faith, but not the articles themselves, may indeed diminish the aspect of faith insofar as they make what is proposed apparent; nevertheless they do not diminish charity, through which the will is ready to believe those things even if they were not apparent. Therefore the nature of merit is not diminished. To the

third objection: things opposed to faith, whether in a man's consideration or in exterior persecution, increase the merit of faith insofar as they show the will to be more prompt and firm in faith. Thus martyrs possessed greater merit of faith by not departing from faith because of persecutions; likewise wise men possess greater merit by not departing from faith because of arguments of philosophers or heretics brought against it. But things consonant with faith do not always diminish the promptitude of the will to believe; therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: if such a reason precedes the believer's will, it diminishes the merit of faith. Second conclusion: if such a reason follows the believer's will, it does not diminish the merit of faith, but rather is a sign of greater merit.

Against the first conclusion there is an argument. For someone to believe prudently, some reason must necessarily be proposed to him, namely an inducement by which the object of faith is shown to be evidently credible, as we said in Question 1, Article 4. But such a reason precedes the believer's will. Therefore it diminishes merit. The consequent seems absurd, because what is necessary for believing prudently cannot diminish the merit of faith. Secondly, there is an argument against the second conclusion. A demonstrative reason which follows the believer's will removes the formal nature of faith, because faith is to believe what one does not see. Therefore it removes the merit of faith. The consequence is clear, because there cannot be merit of faith where the formal nature of faith has ceased.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE X — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

A THIRD OBJECTION

If a demonstrative reason, as it seems, removes the merit of faith, then even a probable or dialectical reason which follows the believer's will must diminish the merit of faith to some extent. The consequence is clear because such a reason diminishes to some degree the formal character of faith, namely its obscurity.

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A FOURTH OBJECTION

An act is meritorious under two aspects: first because it is free, and secondly because it concerns something difficult. But scientific knowledge entirely removes the difficulty of assenting to matters of faith. Therefore it removes the merit of faith itself. Durandus, in III Sentences, distinction 24, question 3, holds that a demonstrative reason removes the whole merit of faith. Yet he says that a probable reason neither removes nor diminishes the merit of faith because it removes neither difficulty nor liberty. Cajetan, however, on III,

question 36, article 1, says that a demonstrative reason wholly removes the merit of faith; but a probable

reason, or any evidence through miracles, or a revelation made by God, angels, or men, provided that such revelation does not produce evidence, diminishes the merit of faith concerning that object, although it does not remove it. The reason for the first assertion of Cajetan and Durandus is our second argument. Cajetan proves the second assertion from John 20: “Blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed,” where the Lord appears to assert that it is of greater merit to believe without such signs than with them. St. Thomas also seems to favor this opinion in III, question 36, article 1, where he says that Christ's Nativity ought not to have been manifested to all the faithful as it was to the shepherds, because otherwise the merit of faith would have been diminished.

FIRST CONCLUSION

For the solution of this matter, let the first conclusion be: a demonstrative reason following a believer's will already determined and prompt to believe not only does not diminish merit, but can even be a cause of increased merit. This is proved because a special reward is promised to doctors who labor in explaining matters of faith, according to Ecclesiasticus 24: “They that explain me shall have life everlasting.” It is confirmed because such doctors by their reasons and demonstrations remove impediments to faith, which is especially pious and meritorious. It is confirmed again because, speaking absolutely, ignorance of science does not make a man better. If knowledge removed merit, the learned man would be in a worse condition precisely because he knows. Therefore it does not remove merit. It is proved secondly that such demonstration rather increases merit. Every thing which has goodness in itself, the more clearly it is known to be good, the more strongly it attracts the soul to love it. Therefore, other things being equal, God known through the evidence of demonstration attracts the soul of a believer more strongly than without such demonstration. Finally, if such demonstration diminished the merit of faith, this would especially be because faith were necessary for merit. But this is not necessary in every case, because Christ the Lord merited most perfectly and did not possess faith. Therefore demonstration does not remove merit. This is the teaching of St. Thomas in this article and in the solutions to the objections.

SECOND CONCLUSION

A demonstrative reason does not diminish even the merit of faith. This conclusion differs from the first. In the first we said that demonstration does not diminish merit in general; here we assert that it does not diminish the merit arising from faith itself. This is proved by the authority of St. Thomas in the reply to the first objection. When a man has the will to believe those things which are of faith from divine authority alone, even if he possesses a demonstrative reason concerning one of them — for example, that God exists — the merit of faith is neither removed nor diminished. It is proved by reason. A faithful philosopher, after possessing a demonstration, remains so disposed in soul that if all demonstrations failed, he would nevertheless believe that God exists. But the merit of faith is placed in this promptitude of soul. Therefore the merit is neither removed nor diminished. It is confirmed. The faithful philosopher assents more firmly and certainly to those truths which can be naturally known, and which he actually knows, than a pagan philosopher who knows them by demonstration alone. But this greater certainty in the faithful philosopher arises from faith. Therefore in this respect he possesses the merit of faith. It is proved secondly by analogy. A poor man can possess before God the merit of magnificence even though he lacks the acquired virtue of magnificence because he lacks riches, provided that in his deliberate disposition he proposes to perform magnificent deeds if he were able. Likewise the faithful philosopher has such a preparation of soul for believing even if demonstration should fail. Therefore he possesses the merit of faith. It is proved thirdly because all such reasons follow a will already determined toward the object. Therefore they cannot diminish the merit of faith.

THIRD CONCLUSION

A demonstrative reason removes the merit of an actual and formal act of faith concerning the particular object demonstrated. The proof is that demonstration removes the formal character of faith regarding that proposition, namely that the object be obscure. Therefore it removes the act of faith concerning it and consequently the merit of that particular act of faith.

FINAL CONCLUSION

No testimony or argument which does not produce evidence in the object removes or diminishes the merit of the formal act of faith, provided that the argument follows the will. Such an argument does not remove the formal character of faith, for the object still remains obscure. Therefore it does not remove the merit of actual faith. Nor does it diminish merit. If it did, this would chiefly be because it diminishes difficulty in believing. But this reasoning is invalid, since it would likewise follow that a passion consequent upon a determined will diminished the merit of virtue or vice merely because it diminishes difficulty. Rather, such facility is a most certain sign of greater merit, according to the Apostle: “God loveth a cheerful giver.” When it is said that virtue concerns what is difficult, this does not mean that difficulty constitutes the formal reason of a virtuous act. Rather, virtue is greater and more perfect in proportion as it operates more promptly and easily. Difficulty is considered as a condition of the object in relation to human weakness. Thus abstaining from venereal pleasures is difficult in itself, yet easy for one possessing the virtue of chastity, because it belongs to virtue to conquer that difficulty.

REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION

The reason necessary for prudent belief should not properly be said either to precede or to follow the believer's will; rather it accompanies and constitutes the prudent will to believe.

QUESTION II, ARTICLE X — END OF THE COMMENTARY

The reason is manifest. To believe before prudence dictates that one ought to believe is not an act of faith but rather proceeds from levity of heart. Therefore the reason necessary for prudent belief does not antecede the believer's properly formed will. Nevertheless, that reason is said to antecede the will when it is demanded because of hardness of heart after a man could already prudently have believed. This is what the Lord rebuked in His disciples in the last chapter of Mark: “He upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart.” Likewise John 4 says: “Unless you see signs and wonders, you believe not.” A reason properly follows the believer's will when, after faith has already been possessed, it is devised for elucidating the truth of faith and overcoming things contrary to it. This is certainly very pious and proceeds from a good affection.

REPLY TO THE SECOND OBJECTION

The consequence is denied. Although demonstration removes an actual act of faith concerning the proposition demonstrated, nevertheless the man remains prepared in soul to believe without such demonstration, especially because faith remains in him concerning other propositions. Indeed, even if faith did not remain, the merit associated with faith would not thereby be destroyed. Christ the Lord possessed the merit of faith although He did not possess faith, as St. Thomas teaches in III, question 7, article 3, especially in the reply to the second objection, because of His preparation of soul for obedience to God. The merit of faith is placed in obedience to God in assenting to things unseen. This obedience is nothing other than promptitude of will arising from charity. To the third objection the consequence is denied for the reason given in the final conclusion. The solution to the fourth is clear from the reply to the first objection and from the final conclusion.

REPLY TO CAJETAN

To Cajetan's argument we answer that the Apostle Thomas was reproved by Christ the Lord because he demanded testimonies antecedent to his will when, because of the sufficient testimonies he already possessed, he ought prudently to have believed. When Christ praises those “who have not seen and have believed,” this is not to be understood as meaning that we possess greater merit of faith than the Apostles who saw and believed. Rather those who did not see and yet believed are praised in a certain respect, namely from the aspect of difficulty. See St. Thomas on John 20, final lesson.

REPLY TO ST. THOMAS ON THE NATIVITY

The authority of St. Thomas in III must be explained according to his doctrine in the present place, where he treats this matter expressly. St. Thomas means that the merit of faith would have been diminished with respect to the formal act of believing the particular fact of the Infant's Nativity if it had been made evident to everyone. Nevertheless the shepherds and Magi had no less merit of faith concerning the other things they believed — namely, that this Infant was God — than others who did not see His humanity and believed it. See Cajetan on III in the place cited above.

QUESTION III

ON THE EXTERIOR ACT OF FAITH

We must next consider the exterior act of faith, which is confession.

ARTICLE I

Whether confession is an act of faith.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, it seems that confession is not an act of faith. The same act does not belong to diverse virtues. But confession belongs to Penance, of which it is assigned as a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith. Second, a man is sometimes deterred from confessing the faith by fear or shame. Hence the Apostle in the final chapter of Ephesians asks prayer for himself that he may confidently make known the mystery of the Gospel. But not to withdraw from a good action because of shame or fear belongs to fortitude, which moderates daring and fear. Therefore confession appears to be an act of fortitude or constancy rather than of faith. Third, just as the fervor of faith induces a man to confess the faith outwardly, so it also induces him to perform other external good works. Galatians 5 says that "faith worketh by charity." Yet those other exterior works are not called acts of faith. Therefore neither should confession be so called.

ON THE CONTRARY

On 2 Thessalonians 1, "the work of faith in power," the Gloss explains: "that is, confession, which is properly the work of faith."

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Exterior acts properly belong to that virtue to whose end they are referred according to their species. Thus fasting according to its species is referred to the end of abstinence, namely restraining the flesh, and therefore it is an act of abstinence. Confession of the things of faith, however, is according to its species ordered as to its end toward that which belongs to faith, according to 2 Corinthians 4: "Having the same spirit of faith, we believe, for which cause we speak also." Exterior speech is ordered to signify what is conceived in the heart. Therefore, just as the interior conception of the things of faith is properly an act of faith, so also is exterior confession. To the first

objection: Scripture praises three kinds of confession. One is confession of the things of faith, and this is properly an act of faith because

it is referred to the end of faith. Another is confession of thanksgiving or praise, which is an act of latria because it is ordered to giving external honor to God. The third is confession of sins, which is ordered to the destruction of sin, the end of Penance, and therefore belongs to Penance.

ST. THOMAS — REPLIES

To the second objection: removing an impediment is not a cause per se but per accidens, as the Philosopher teaches in Physics VIII. Therefore fortitude, which removes the impediment to confession of faith — namely fear or shame — is not properly and essentially the cause of confession but only accidentally. To the third objection: interior faith through charity causes all exterior acts of the virtues through the mediation of the other virtues, by commanding them rather than eliciting them. But it produces confession as its own proper act without another virtue intervening.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: confession of faith is an act of faith. The reason is that confession of faith according to its species is ordered as to its end toward that which belongs to faith. Second conclusion: interior faith produces confession as its own proper act without the mediation of another virtue, although charity commands this act just as it commands all other acts of virtue.

It is briefly doubted in this article whether these conclusions are true. First argument against the first conclusion: it belongs per se to the virtue of truthfulness that a man show himself outwardly in words and deeds as he is inwardly. But by vocal confession of faith a man protests outwardly that he believes inwardly what he outwardly declares. Therefore such a declaration belongs to the virtue of truthfulness. Second argument: publicly singing the Creed in church is a confession of faith, yet it is an act of the virtue of religion. The minor is proved because such public singing is part of the Divine Office. Therefore it is an act of religion. Third argument: the act of the will by which someone chooses to confess the faith cannot be an act of faith; therefore neither can the exterior confession which depends upon that choice. The antecedent is proved because faith is in the intellect as its subject, whereas choice is in the will. Therefore choice is not elicited by faith. Fourth argument: vocal denial of the faith is not in itself an act of unbelief; therefore confession of faith is not an act of faith. The antecedent is proved because if someone outwardly denies the faith from fear and pusillanimity, he is not necessarily inwardly an unbeliever.

RESPONSE

The conclusions of St. Thomas are most true. To the arguments we say that numerically the same act can belong to different virtues under different considerations. For example, the singing of the Creed, considered as music, belongs to the art of singing; considered as ordered to divine worship, it belongs to the virtue of religion; if exercised to avoid hypocrisy, it proceeds from the virtue of truthfulness; finally, if it is performed as an outward assent to God revealing — the voice being a sign of what is in the mind — then that very confession of faith is an act of the virtue of faith. By this answer we can reply to the first and second arguments. Alternatively and more briefly, we may say that confession of the things of faith is always elicited by faith according to its own nature, although it may sometimes be commanded by other virtues, such as charity, religion, truthfulness, and so forth. To the third argument the antecedent is denied. The inference offered for it is likewise denied. An act is called elicited by that habit from which it is immediately regulated and directed without the mediation of another habit, even though the act is not in the same power in which the habit resides. For example, prayer is an act elicited by the habit of religion, although prayer is an act existing in the intellect as its subject while the habit of religion is in the will. This is precisely what St. Thomas teaches in the

reply to the third objection: faith elicits exterior confession as its proper act because it

operates it without the

mediation of another habit of virtue. To the fourth argument we deny the antecedent. Speaking per se, vocal denial of faith is indeed an act of unbelief; only per accidens can it happen that the person speaking in that way does not possess inward unbelief. Conversely, a heretic can outwardly confess the faith. Such confession per se is reduced to faith, although per accidens faith does not exist in that subject.

ARTICLE II

Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, it seems that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. That by which man attains the end of a virtue appears sufficient for salvation. But the proper end of faith is the union of the human mind with divine truth, and this can exist without exterior confession. Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. Second, through exterior confession a man manifests his faith to another man. But this seems necessary only for those who have to instruct others in the faith. Therefore lesser or ordinary believers do not seem bound to confession of faith. Third, that which can result in scandal and disturbance of others does not seem necessary for salvation. The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 10: “Be without offence to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church of God.” But by confession of faith unbelievers are sometimes provoked to disturbance. Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation.

ON THE CONTRARY

Romans 10 says: “With the heart, we believe unto justice; but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.”

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Those things necessary for salvation fall under the precepts of divine law. Confession of faith, since it is something affirmative, can fall only under an affirmative precept. Hence it is necessary for salvation in the same manner in which it can fall under an affirmative precept of divine law. Affirmative precepts do not oblige at every moment, although they always retain their binding force. They oblige at the appropriate place and time according to the circumstances required for a human act to be an act of virtue.

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QUESTION III, ARTICLE II — WHETHER CONFESSION OF FAITH IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE CONTINUED

Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation always and in every place, but at a certain place and time: namely, when omission of this confession would withdraw honor due to God or the utility which ought to be afforded one's neighbor. For example, if someone questioned about the faith remained silent and from this it would be believed either that he had no faith, or that the faith was not true, or others through his silence would be turned away from the faith, then in such cases confession of faith is necessary for salvation. To the first objection: the end of faith, like the ends of the other virtues, must be referred to the end of charity, which is love of God and neighbor. Therefore, when the honor of God or the utility of one's neighbor requires it, a man ought not to be content merely to be joined by faith to divine truth inwardly, but ought to confess the faith outwardly. To the second objection: in a case of necessity where faith is endangered, everyone is bound to manifest his faith to others, either for the instruction or confirmation of other believers or for repressing the attacks of unbelievers. At other times, however, instructing men concerning the faith does not belong to all the faithful. To the third objection: if disturbance among unbelievers arises from public confession of faith without any utility to the faith or the faithful, publicly confessing the faith in such a case is not praiseworthy. Hence the Lord says in Matthew 7: “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine.” But if some utility to the faith is hoped for or necessity is present, the disturbance of unbelievers is to be disregarded and a man ought publicly to confess the faith. Thus Matthew 15 recounts that when the disciples told the Lord that the Pharisees were scandalized by His word, He answered: “Let them alone” — that is, let them be disturbed — “they are blind and leaders of the blind.”

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: confession of faith is necessary for salvation by necessity of an affirmative precept. Romans 10 says: “With the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” Every act necessary for salvation is the object of a precept. Second conclusion: this precept obliges when omission of confession would withdraw honor due to God or utility due to one's neighbor. Third conclusion, from the reply to the third objection: when disturbance of unbelievers arises from manifest confession of faith without any utility to the faith or faithful, it is not praiseworthy in such a case publicly to confess the faith.

In this article we must explain when the affirmative precept of confessing the faith obliges. The first doubt is whether, if someone is asked by an unbeliever or a tyrant whether he is a Christian, it is lawful for him to remain silent or to deny it.

FIRST ARGUMENT FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE

One who, when questioned, remains silent does not necessarily withdraw due honor from God nor utility due to his neighbor. Therefore it is at least lawful for him to remain silent. This is confirmed because we are not bound at every moment to exhibit worship and honor to God, but only at determined times. Therefore, when a Christian is questioned by a tyrant, he might be able by silence to escape death.

SECOND ARGUMENT

If in the proposed case it is lawful to remain silent, it will also be lawful to deny that one is a Christian, or at least such denial will not be a mortal sin. For such a lie would seem not pernicious but officious, ordered toward preserving life.

THIRD ARGUMENT

In the case described in St. Thomas's third conclusion, he says that it is not praiseworthy publicly to confess the faith. Therefore in that case it will be lawful, and even praiseworthy, to remain silent.

HISTORICAL ERRORS

It should be noted that there were once heretics called the Elcesaites who asserted that if someone under persecution and torture verbally denied Christ while confessing Him in his heart, he did not sin. These heretics existed around the year of the Lord 239, as Eusebius reports in Ecclesiastical History VI. See also Castro, Against Heresies, under “Martyrdom,” and Gabriel Prateolus. There was also an error of the Priscillianists, who asserted that even apart from persecution or blows it was lawful for anyone dealing with a man of another sect to pretend and simulate, and verbally affirm, that he belonged to that sect. They appealed in confirmation to 4 Kings 10, where Jehu feigned that he wished to worship Baal, assembled all Baal's priests, and commanded them solemnly to sacrifice, while intending to kill them all in Baal's temple. See Augustine, Against Lying, chapter 3, who reports this heresy and also mentions certain Catholics, with whom Consentius agreed, who asserted that a Christian could pretend to be a Priscillianist in order to convert a Priscillianist.

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DISTINCTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE DECISION

For resolving this difficulty, observe that a distinction must be made among three things: concealing one's own faith, denying one's own faith, and professing another faith. Secondly, these three things can occur by things or signs as well as by signifying words. But words hold primacy in signification because they signify more expressly and distinctly than other signs. In this first doubt concerning confession of faith, therefore, we are dealing with words. In the following doubt we shall speak about confession by signs or things.

FIRST CONCLUSION

It is heretical to assert that, in order to avoid death, it is lawful verbally to deny the truth of the faith. First proof: every affirmative precept includes a negative precept concerning the contrary act. For example, the precept of honoring parents includes the negative command never to dishonor them. But there is an affirmative precept of confessing the faith, gathered from Romans 10: “With the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” Therefore it includes the negative precept never to deny the faith. Secondly, Christ the Lord says in Matthew 10: “Be ye wise as serpents.” According to the common interpretation, just as a serpent exposes its whole body to danger in order to preserve its head unharmed, so Christ's disciples should despise their own lives for the honor of Christ their Head.

QUESTION III, ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

THE FIRST CONCLUSION CONFIRMED

Christ immediately explains this in Matthew 10: “Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul,” and later: “Every one therefore that shall confess me before men, I will also confess him before my Father who is in heaven. But he that shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven.” See Augustine in the place cited, Jerome in the canonical chapter Non solum and related texts, and Chrysostom, Homily 25 on Matthew, who discusses this elegantly, especially near the end, saying: “The root of confession is the faith of the heart, but confession is the fruit of faith.” He then concludes that neither confession of the mouth without faith of the heart nor faith of the heart without confession of the mouth suffices in the required case. The conclusion will also be confirmed by the arguments and conclusions which follow.

SECOND CONCLUSION

To deny that one is a Christian when publicly questioned whether one is a Christian, or to assert that one belongs to another sect — for example that one is a Jew, Turk, or Lutheran — is a mortal sin, even if this is done from fear of death. This conclusion is to be regarded in the same degree of certainty as the first. The proof is that one who denies being a Christian denies Christ and God; therefore he sins mortally. The antecedent is proved from Peter. At the time of the Passion Peter sinned mortally and denied Christ when he denied being Christ's disciple. The Lord had foretold to him: “Thrice thou shalt deny me.” Therefore one who denies being a Christian denies Christ.

Secondly, one who denies being a Christian appears consequently to profess himself a member of another sect. But this is a mortal sin.

The major is proved because no one is ordinarily believed to exist without some sect or religion. Thirdly, one who denies being a Christian signifies that he does not give faith to Christian doctrine and does not regard as true what the Church preaches. Fourthly, the martyrs suffered death rather than deny that they were Christians. If such denial were not sinful, perhaps they would have acted more prudently by denying that they were Christians. Augustine argues similarly: Christ is denied not only by one who says that Christ does not exist, but also by one who says that he himself is not a Christian. Although in the second conclusion we spoke of someone publicly questioned whether he is a Christian, the arguments show that it is a mortal sin even when someone privately asks him, if he directly denies being a Christian, although denial under public interrogation is graver.

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THIRD CONCLUSION

One who, when questioned by public authority concerning religion and the profession of his faith, remains silent, sins mortally, even if he is questioned privately by a judge or minister of public authority. If, however, he is questioned merely by private authority, it is probable that he does not sin mortally by remaining silent and that he may answer the questioner: “What is it to you? Why do you ask me?” The first part is proved from Matthew 10. There the words “he that shall deny me” are equivalent in context to “he that shall not confess me,” because after Christ first says, “he that shall confess me,” He adds as its contrary, “he that shall deny me.” A similar usage occurs in John 20: “Whose sins you shall forgive ... and whose sins you shall retain,” where “retain” is equivalent to “not forgive.” It is confirmed from Luke 9: “He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words...” A person who, when questioned in the case described, remains silent is ashamed of Christ and His words. Jerome likewise says that God denies the person who, when seized in persecution, refuses to confess God. Chrysostom teaches the same by examples and reasons, and St. Thomas comments similarly on Romans 10. Finally, vocal confession is necessary for salvation. If silence were always lawful in precisely such an event, no case would remain in which confession was necessary. Therefore the first part of the conclusion is true, although I note that it is not as certain as the first two conclusions. The second part is proved because from the silence of such a person, or from the response just mentioned, there need not follow any withdrawal of divine honor then due or of utility due to another. No reasonable person would infer merely from such silence or refusal to answer that the person is not a Christian. He would judge only that the person makes nothing of the interrogation and does not recognize the questioner's authority. For example, if an unknown person walking at night is asked by another, “Are you a Christian?” and answers, “Who made you judge over me?” or simply remains silent, it may prudently be judged that he answered in this manner. This opinion seems to be gathered from St. Thomas's second conclusion, where he does not universally assert that whenever someone is questioned about faith and does not answer he sins, but only when from this it would be believed that he had no faith or that the faith were not true.

FOURTH CONCLUSION

When someone is questioned by an unbeliever, even one possessing public authority, whether he is a Christian, but is not questioned out of hatred of the faith — rather, the unbeliever wishes merely to investigate his nation or other customs — then the Christian may remain silent. Indeed, in some circumstances he may without lying deny that he is a “Christian” when the interrogator uses that word in a different conventional sense. For example, when certain peoples of the West Indies formerly hated Spaniards because of cruelties and crimes committed in those regions, they designated Spaniards by the name “Christians.” If a religious man traveled among them and they asked, “Are you a Christian?” meaning by that expression “Are you a rapacious, homicidal, cruel Spaniard?”, he could prudently refuse to answer or deny that he was a “Christian” in that sense, until the Indians were taught the faith of Christ. The objections are easily answered from the preceding conclusions. To the first: when one is not questioned by public authority, or when the utility of one's neighbors which charity requires is not at stake, it can be lawful to remain silent. To the second: the consequence is denied. One who denies being a Christian lies perniciously against the honor of Christ, except in the special case described in the fourth conclusion. To the third: both antecedent and consequence are conceded.

SECOND DOUBT

It is asked whether a Christian traveling through provinces of unbelievers may assume the clothing of Turks or Jews, or use some sign proper to unbelievers, in order to conceal that he is a Christian lest he be recognized and killed. For deciding this doubt it must briefly be observed that clothing, or any other sign, can be said to be proper to a nation in three ways. First, it can be proper by the custom of a country or kingdom, as the Portuguese customarily dress differently from Castilians or Frenchmen, whether that usage exists merely by convention or by law. The discussion continues on the following page.

QUESTION III, ARTICLE II — SECOND DOUBT CONTINUED

A garment may be proper to a nation in three ways. First, by political law or custom, as a mark of nationality. Second, by law or custom instituted for distinguishing religion. Third, a garment or sign may be specially instituted for rendering worship and homage to the founder or object of a sect, as ecclesiastical vestments among Christians, the high-priestly ornaments among the Jews, or a special garment among the Saracens bearing an image of Muhammad or the moon in his honor.

FIRST CONCLUSION

If a garment is proper in the first way, Christians do not sin by using such signs and concealing themselves, provided the precept of confessing the faith does not then oblige. The proof is that such clothing signifies nation or homeland rather than religion. Moreover, if the whole province or nation were converted to Christ, they would not be bound to change their clothing but could serve Christ while retaining it. This is confirmed by the example of St. Sebastian, who after conversion did not cast off the clothing of unbelievers. Thirdly, Christian soldiers and sailors in naval warfare may lawfully place Saracen banners on their ships so that they are not recognized and may capture deceived Turks. Likewise scouts in war often wear Turkish clothing and speak their language without thereby sinning.

SECOND CONCLUSION

If a sign is proper to unbelievers in the second way — namely as a sign instituted for religious distinction — it can sometimes be lawful to use or omit such a sign in order to conceal one's faith and preserve life, according to the circumstances explained below. The reason is that a person who puts on such clothing does not necessarily profess the alien religion. For example, a layman who puts on a monastic habit to escape an officer, a monk or cleric who wears secular clothing while traveling through France or Germany lest Lutherans recognize and kill him, or a man who puts on women's clothing to escape death, does not for that reason lie or sin merely by the clothing itself. Although laws rightly prohibit laymen from wearing monastic habits, monks from secular dress, and men and women from assuming one another's dress, these laws concern the ordinary distinction of persons. Likewise, among the Babylonians a certain white head-covering may distinguish pagans from Christians, while Christians use another kind. A sign of this sort can be ambiguous and capable of different significations. A further argument is that witnesses or defendants questioned by an unjust judge may sometimes evade an unjust interrogation by ambiguous words without answering according to the judge's intended meaning. Much more, therefore, may a person sometimes conceal the faith by ambiguous things or deeds when no one is actually interrogating him.

CAJETAN'S POSITION

Cajetan makes four distinctions. First, if a law exists — even under tyrants — commanding all Christians to wear a certain garment expressly as a profession of Christian faith, or if a custom is universally observed by Christians for that purpose, then a Christian may not omit that garment even to preserve his life. The reason is that when one is questioned concerning religion and faith, the time for the precept of manifesting faith is present. But where such a law or universal custom exists, all Christians are virtually being questioned concerning their faith. Second, if there is no such law or universal custom, Cajetan says it can be lawful to omit the sign in order to preserve life, because no honor then due to God is thereby withdrawn. Third, if the law or custom is not directed toward religious distinction but toward a political good, or toward punishing Christians so that they are held infamous among unbelievers, it can be lawful to omit the garment, especially to save one's life, because such a law does not bind at the peril of life. Fourth, Cajetan says that it is not lawful for a Christian, even to save his life, to use a distinctive sign of unbelievers. For example, if at Rome Jews are commanded to wear a garment of a certain color to distinguish them from Christians, Cajetan judges it unlawful for a Christian to wear that sign, because by the very fact he would appear to profess himself a Jew.

JUDGMENT

This opinion of Cajetan appears too rigorous.

THIRD CONCLUSION

It can sometimes be lawful for a Christian under a tyrant to omit a sign commanded by law when no scandal to neighbors occurs and neither the utility owed to them nor the honor owed to God is withdrawn. Thus in Cajetan's first case a Christian could omit such a sign if this occurs without scandal to Christians and he is otherwise unknown among unbelievers as a Christian. This conclusion can hold even apart from danger of death, and likewise in Cajetan's fourth case. The reason is taken from St. Thomas in this article: the affirmative precept of confession binds when omission of confession would withdraw honor due to God or utility due to one's neighbor. But it can happen that neither is withdrawn in the cases described.

FOURTH CONCLUSION

To use a sign proper to unbelievers in the third way — namely one instituted precisely for the worship of their sect — is a mortal sin.

First, one using that garment or sign thereby professes an alien sect and renders worship to its author, because the sign was specially instituted for that end. Second, the unbeliever himself sins mortally whenever he uses such a garment or sign as an act of false worship; therefore a Christian would sin by doing so. Third, if a Christian burned incense upon a pagan altar he would sin mortally even if inwardly retaining the true faith, as Pope Marcellinus is said to have sinned. Just as burning incense there and then is determined to the worship of an idol, so such a garment in that time and place can be determined to the worship of Muhammad. Nevertheless this **conclusion does not prevent actors in comedies from wearing such garments when representing unbelieving** priests, because everyone understands that this use is not ordered to the profession of an impious sect but to dramatic representation.

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QUESTION III, ARTICLE II — END OF THE SECOND DOUBT

When the use of the clothing is plainly theatrical or representative, it is not ordered to the profession of an impious sect but to imitation or representation. Therefore no injury is done to God and no scandal is given to one's neighbor.

QUESTION IV

ON THE VIRTUE OF FAITH ITSELF

We must next consider the virtue of faith itself: first, faith itself; second, those who possess faith; third, the cause of faith; fourth, its effects.

ARTICLE I

Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.”

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, it seems that the definition given by the Apostle in Hebrews 11 is not fitting. No quality is a substance. But faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue. Therefore faith is not a substance. Second, different virtues have different objects. But things hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they ought not to be placed in the definition of faith as though they were its object. Third, faith is perfected more by charity than by hope, because charity is the form of faith. Therefore things to be loved should have been placed in the definition rather than things to be hoped for. Fourth, the same thing ought not to be placed in diverse genera. But substance and evidence or argument belong to diverse genera not subordinated to one another. Therefore faith is unfittingly called both substance and argument.

Fifth, an argument makes manifest the truth of that to which it leads. But that whose truth is manifested is said to be apparent. Therefore

there seems to be a contradiction in the phrase “evidence of things that appear not,” since evidence makes a thing apparent.

ON THE CONTRARY

The authority of the Apostle suffices.

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Some say that the Apostle's words are not a definition of faith, because a definition indicates the quiddity and essence of a thing. Nevertheless, if everything from which faith can be defined is rightly considered, all of it is touched upon in this description, although the words are not arranged in the formal manner of a definition. Since faith is a habit, it must be defined through its proper act in relation to its proper object. The act of faith is to believe. This act has an order both to the object of the intellect, which is truth, and to the object of the will, which is the good and the end. Because faith is a theological virtue, it has the same reality as object and end under proportionate aspects. It has already been said that First Truth is the object of faith insofar as it is unseen, together with those things adhered to because of First Truth. Accordingly First Truth stands toward the act of faith as an end under the aspect of something not yet seen. This belongs to the notion of something hoped for, according to Romans 8: “What we see not, we hope for.” To see the truth is to possess it; no one hopes for what he already possesses. Hope concerns what is not yet possessed. Thus the relation of the act of faith to the end which is the object of the will is signified by the words: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” “Substance” is commonly used for the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent reality is virtually contained in its first principle. Thus first indemonstrable principles may be called the substance of a science because they are the first thing of science in us and virtually contain the whole science. In this way faith is called the substance of things hoped for because the first beginning of the things hoped for in us is through the assent of faith, which virtually contains all things hoped for. We hope to be beatified by seeing with open vision the Truth to which we adhere by faith. The relation of the act of faith to the object of the intellect is signified by “evidence of things that appear not.” Here “evidence” or “argument” is taken for the effect of argument. By argument the intellect is induced to adhere to a truth; hence the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is here called “evidence.” Another reading has “conviction,” because by divine authority the believer's intellect is convinced to assent to what it does not see. Therefore, if one wishes to reduce the Apostle's words to the form of a definition, one may say: Faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things that do not appear.

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QUESTION IV, ARTICLE I — WHETHER THE APOSTOLIC DEFINITION OF FAITH IS FITTING

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE CONTINUED

By the phrase “things that appear not,” faith is distinguished from all other intellectual habits. By the word “evidence” or “argument,” faith is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, in which the intellect does not firmly adhere to something. By “things that appear not,” faith is distinguished from science and understanding, through which something becomes apparent. By “the substance of things to be hoped for,” the virtue of faith is distinguished from faith taken in a broad sense which is not ordered to hoped-for beatitude. All other definitions of faith are explanations of this definition given by the Apostle. Augustine says that faith is the virtue by which things not seen are believed. Damascene calls faith an uninquiring assent. Others call it a certainty of mind concerning absent things, above opinion and below science. These correspond to “evidence of things that appear not.” Dionysius says that faith is the abiding foundation of believers, establishing them in truth and showing the truth in them. This corresponds to “the substance of things to be hoped for.”

REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the first: “substance” is not taken here as the supreme genus divided against the other genera. Rather, in every genus there is something analogous to substance: the first thing in that genus which virtually contains the others may be called their substance. To the second: since faith belongs to the intellect insofar as it is commanded by the will, it must be ordered as to an end toward the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope. Therefore the object of hope is included in the definition of faith. To the third: love can concern things seen and unseen, present and absent. Therefore “things to be loved” are not so properly adapted to faith as “things to be hoped for,” since hope always concerns what is absent and not yet seen. To the fourth: substance and evidence, as used in the definition, do not signify diverse genera or diverse acts of faith, but diverse relations of one act to diverse objects. To the fifth: an argument drawn from a thing's own principles makes the thing apparent. But an argument drawn from divine authority does not make the thing apparent in itself. The latter is the kind of argument included in the definition of faith.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: in the Apostle's words in Hebrews 11 everything necessary for defining faith is contained. St. Thomas proves this by examining the Apostle's individual words and from them composing a definition according to logical art. Second conclusion: the Apostle's words can be reduced to formal definition as follows: “Faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things that do not appear.”

It is doubted whether the preceding definition is fitting.

FIRST OBJECTION

By faith we believe past things, but past things are not hoped for. Therefore faith is not always of things hoped for. This is confirmed because assent to the proposition “Christ was born” is an act of faith, yet it is not itself the substance of a thing hoped for.

SECOND OBJECTION

By faith we believe that eternal punishment is prepared for those dying in sin, yet we do not hope for such punishment. Therefore faith is not always the substance of things hoped for.

THIRD OBJECTION

Faith can exist without hope, as in a Christian who despairs. Therefore faith does not intrinsically include being the substance of things hoped for.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER HEBREWS 11

Theologians discuss this in II Sentences, distinction 25, in St. Thomas and in the Fathers commenting on Hebrews 11. Erasmus, in his annotations on the chapter, mocks the Scholastics for thinking that the Apostle's words are a definition of faith. Erasmus makes two claims. First, Paul does not define faith there but celebrates it with an encomium, just as one might say that wisdom is consolation in adversity and an ornament in prosperity. Second, Erasmus says that in this place “faith” does not mean the virtue by which we believe supernatural truths but confidence by which we certainly hope to see the truth we believe. The Master of the Sentences, in III, distinction 23, discusses whether the text might be a definition of hope, though he immediately adds that it may not improperly be said to belong to faith alone.

FIRST CONCLUSION

Erasmus's first assertion appears not only false but rash. It is opposed to the Scholastics and Fathers who teach in the cited places that the Apostle defined faith there. It is also opposed to Augustine, Jerome, and Bernard. We do not deny that the Apostle celebrates faith with praises throughout the chapter; but he first defines it and afterward extols it.

SECOND CONCLUSION

Erasmus's second assertion appears erroneous. First, it conflicts with the doctors and Fathers, including Basil and Augustine. Moreover, the perpetual consent of the Church has held that the Apostle speaks there of the faith by which we believe. This interpretation is expressed in councils, including the Second Council of Orange and the Council of Trent in its decree on justification.

The Apostolic context itself also plainly shows that Paul is speaking of believing faith. In the preceding chapter he had said, “The just man liveth by faith,” and immediately in chapter 11, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for...”

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

Unless we wish to agree with the Lutherans, the just man lives by the faith which works through charity. Elsewhere the Apostle says of the one who believes in Him who justifies the ungodly that his faith is reputed unto justice. Confidence, properly speaking, is not the foundation of hope but rather a mode by which hope is strengthened. Nor can confidence properly be called the “evidence of things that appear not,” that is, the firm assent of the mind, because confidence is in the will. In the same chapter the Apostle says: “By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God,” and shortly afterward: “Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe...” These statements manifestly cannot be attributed to confidence alone, through which we neither understand nor believe. Finally, it is certain that in this chapter the Apostle speaks of justifying faith. But justifying faith is not confidence, as the Council of Trent teaches in Session VI, canon 12: if anyone says that justifying faith is nothing other than confidence in divine mercy remitting sins for Christ's sake, or that this confidence alone is that by which we are justified, let him be anathema.

FINAL CONCLUSION ON ARTICLE I

Faith is most rightly defined in relation to beatitude. The reason is that faith is a certain movement and way toward beatitude, according to 2 Corinthians 5: while we are in the body we are pilgrims from the Lord, “for we walk by faith.” Beatitude is the terminus of this pilgrimage. Therefore faith is fittingly defined through beatitude as movement is defined through its terminus. Likewise, as stated earlier, that belongs per se to faith and its object through which man is made blessed, either as the beatifying object itself or as the means by which he arrives at beatitude. Finally, 1 Peter 1 says that believers rejoice with an unspeakable and glorified joy, “receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls.” Thus the salvation of souls is the end of faith, and faith is fittingly defined through beatitude.

REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the first: faith primarily and per se concerns those things which we hope to see, namely God Himself, Three and One. Faith concerning past events is held secondarily in their order to the end which we hope for. As to the confirmation, concede that “Christ was born,” considered merely according to the temporal event, is not itself something hoped for. But if the same truth is considered according to what is divine in it — namely, that the Son of God is He who was born of the Virgin — it remains an object which we hope to see. To the second: the punishment which we believe by faith is something we hope to escape; in this sense faith has an order to a hoped-for thing. A second answer is that because opposites are treated by the same discipline, when faith is called the substance of things hoped for it consequently concerns things feared. But because the object of hope belongs primarily and per se to the will, whereas the object of fear, evil, belongs to it secondarily, faith is more fittingly defined in relation to the object of hope. To the third: faith of itself generates hope and concerns things hoped for. It can happen accidentally that through his own malice a person retaining faith loses hope, just as a stone which by its nature tends toward the center may be violently held above it.

ARTICLE II

Whether faith is in the intellect as its subject.

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ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, it seems that faith is not in the intellect as its subject. Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints that faith
consists in the will of believers. But the will is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith is not in the intellect as its subject.

Second, assent of faith to something believed proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore the whole praise of faith seems to arise
from obedience. But obedience is in the will. Therefore faith also is in the will rather than the intellect. Third, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Faith does not seem to be in the speculative intellect because the speculative intellect says nothing about what is
to be pursued or avoided and is not a principle of operation. Yet faith "worketh by charity." Nor does faith seem to be in the practical
intellect, whose object is contingent truth capable of being made or done, whereas the object of faith is eternal truth.

ON THE CONTRARY

The vision of the heavenly homeland succeeds faith, according to 1 Corinthians 13: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but
then face to face." Vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is also in the intellect.

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Since faith is a virtue, its act must be perfect. When an act proceeds from two active principles, perfection is required in both. Cutting
cannot be done well unless the cutter possesses the art and the saw is suitably disposed. In powers of the soul capable of opposites, such
good disposition is produced by habit. Therefore an act proceeding from two such powers must have a habit perfecting each. Believing is
an act of the intellect insofar as the intellect is moved by the will to assent. Thus this act proceeds from both will and intellect, each of
which can be perfected by a habit. Accordingly, for the act of faith to be perfect, there must be a suitable habit in the will and also a habit
in the intellect.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE II — WHETHER FAITH IS IN THE INTELLECT AS ITS SUBJECT

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE CONTINUED

Just as for an act of the concupiscible appetite to be perfect there must be prudence in reason and temperance in the concupiscible power,
so the act of faith involves properly disposed principles. Believing, however, is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of
this act is truth, which properly belongs to the intellect. Therefore faith, which is the proper principle of this act, must be in the intellect
as its subject.

REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS

To the first: Augustine takes "faith" for the act of faith, which is said to consist in the will of believers insofar as, by command of the
will, the intellect assents to things credible. To the second: not only must the will be prompt to obey, but the intellect must also be well
disposed to follow the command of the will, just as the concupiscible appetite must be disposed to follow the command of reason.
Therefore a habit of virtue is required not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect. To the third: faith is in the speculative intellect as its subject, as is manifest from the object of faith. But because First Truth, the object of faith, is the end of all our
desires and actions, faith works through love. In this way the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion: for the act of faith to be perfect, some habit must exist both in the will and in the intellect. The reason is that believing
is an act of the intellect insofar as it is moved by the will; hence both principles of the act must be perfected by a habit. Second
conclusion: faith is in the intellect as in its subject. The reason is that believing is immediately an act of the intellect, since its object is
truth. Third conclusion, from the reply to the third objection: faith is in the speculative intellect as its subject. This follows from the nature of the object of faith, which is not something made by us. Fourth conclusion: faith becomes practical by extension. The reason is
that it works through charity.

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We shall discuss the first conclusion partly here and partly later. The second conclusion must be held according to the faith, at least with respect to the act of believing. It is opposed to the heretics of our time, the Lutherans, who say that the act of justifying faith is an act of confidence, which is a certain mode of hope existing in the will. The conclusion is proved because it is certain and Catholic that understanding, knowing, knowing scientifically, and believing belong to faith as proper acts; but natural reason establishes that such acts reside in the intellect as their subject. The major is proved from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Hebrews 11 says: “By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God.” Colossians 2 speaks of being instructed in charity and unto all riches of the fullness of understanding, unto the knowledge of the mystery of God the Father and of Christ Jesus, calling faith riches of the fullness of understanding. Psalm 93 says: “He that teacheth man knowledge.” The Council of Milevis explains these words so that “knowledge” is understood of faith. Isaiah 33 likewise speaks of faith as riches of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge. The Apostle in 2 Corinthians 10 speaks of “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.” Finally, believing through acquired faith manifestly pertains to the intellect.

DOUBT: WHETHER FAITH IS BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL

Concerning the third and fourth conclusions it is doubted whether faith is simultaneously speculative and practical.

FIRST ARGUMENT FOR THE NEGATIVE

Faith cannot be speculative and practical simultaneously either eminently or formally; therefore it cannot be so in any manner. If faith were eminently speculative and practical, it would be false simply to say “faith is speculative,” because predicates belonging to something only eminently are not predicated without qualification. Nor can faith be formally both speculative and practical, because speculative and practical are opposed differences dividing habit and virtue. Moreover, if faith were formally practical, this would especially be because it orders us to works as to an end. But this consequence is false, because faith is more excellent than every operation of every virtue except charity.

SECOND ARGUMENT

True faith can exist in a sinner, yet in such a person it does not operate practically. Therefore faith is not practical.

THIRD ARGUMENT

A practical habit is the proximate rule and immediate cause of an operation. But faith of itself is not the immediate rule of operation, as is evident from faith remaining in a sinner. Therefore it is not practical. This is confirmed by comparison with moral philosophy. Faith seems no more properly practical than the habit of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy shows what should be done, yet one possessing it can remain vicious. Likewise faith shows that certain good works are necessary for eternal life, yet a person can retain faith while acting badly.

DISTINCTION FOR THE SOLUTION

Speculative and practical can be understood in two ways. First, as opposed differences dividing a habit. On this point I refer to Aristotle and St. Thomas. Second, they can be taken after removing the imperfections by which created forms are mutually opposed, in the way in which they can belong to divine knowledge, which is truly both speculative and practical.

FIRST CONCLUSION

If speculative and practical are taken in the first manner, faith is simultaneously speculative and practical eminently. Cajetan proves this first a priori because the object of faith eminently contains both aspects. Secondly, because faith is a certain impression and participation

of divine knowledge, which eminently contains both speculative and practical knowledge. The argument continues on the following page.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

The first conclusion is further proved a posteriori. Theology, an acquired habit proceeding from the principles of faith, is both speculative and practical eminently, as St. Thomas teaches in I, q.1, a.4. Likewise the gifts of the Holy Ghost which belong to the intellect and flow by their nature from faith are both speculative and practical. Therefore faith itself is eminently speculative and practical. The beatific vision, which succeeds faith, is also eminently both; therefore faith is likewise. That faith is practical is also proved from Hebrews 11, where the Apostle attributes to faith the excellent works of the saints: through faith they conquered kingdoms and wrought justice. Galatians 5 says that faith works through charity; James 2 says that faith without works is idle, and that faith cooperated with Abraham's works and was consummated by works. Faith is given to us for attaining eternal life.

SECOND CONCLUSION

If speculative and practical are taken in the second sense explained above, faith is formally both speculative and practical. That it is formally speculative is easily admitted. That it is formally practical is proved because the same human intellect is formally speculative and formally practical: it is one power both for contemplating and for directing action. Faith, as it were a supernatural power with respect to supernatural truth, can therefore possess both formalities. Moreover, speculative and practical in this sense formally belong to divine knowledge and to the beatific vision; therefore they can belong to faith. Both are perfections simply speaking, and therefore belong formally to God in the manner proper to Him. Faith alone among supernatural habits can have the character of a habit of first principles, both speculative and practical. All other supernatural intellectual habits are posterior to faith. In natural things there are two habits of first principles: understanding for speculative principles and synderesis for practical principles. Faith fulfills the place of both in the supernatural order, containing in one simple habit what is divided between understanding and synderesis.

THIRD CONCLUSION

Nevertheless faith is primarily and per se speculative, and secondarily practical. The object of faith per se is divine truth and God Himself precisely as truthful and revealing truth. Under this consideration faith does not formally concern praxis. But the same object, God, is secondarily considered as the end of our actions; under this aspect faith is practical. Speculative truth is prior to practical truth because it is simpler and more abstract, whereas practical truth concerns motion and execution. Therefore if faith regards both, it must primarily regard speculative truth. The gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, and acquired theology, are primarily speculative and secondarily practical. St. Thomas teaches that theology is more speculative than practical. These habits concern things to be done insofar as such things are referred to the vision of God as means to an end. Therefore they primarily regard the end, namely the vision of God and speculative cognition. Thus the statement that faith is principally in the speculative intellect and secondarily in the practical intellect must not be understood as though there were two intellects. There is one and the same intellect, primarily ordered to speculation and secondarily to praxis.

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS

To the first, the antecedent is denied. Faith can be formally speculative and practical in the second sense, where these are not opposed differences dividing habit or virtue. To the second, faith in a sinner does not possess the state of perfect virtue; hence it is not surprising that it does not operate. Nevertheless by its nature it is operative unless hindered by man's malice. To the third, as synderesis remains a universal rule of good operation even in one who sins against it, and is applied here and now through prudence and right intention, so faith is a supernatural synderesis. It does not attain the supernatural end here and now in operation except through charity and infused prudence. The comparison with moral philosophy is denied. Moral philosophy can remain perfectly present in a vicious man, but faith cannot remain in its perfect state without right action and charity.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE III

Whether charity is the form of faith.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, each thing receives its species from its form. Things divided as opposed species of one genus cannot be forms of one another. Faith and charity are opposed divisions as distinct species of virtue; therefore charity cannot be the form of faith. Second, form and that of which it is the form are in the same subject, since from them one thing is constituted. Faith is in the intellect, charity in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith. Third, the principle of believing on the part of the will appears to be obedience rather than charity, according to Romans 1, “for obedience to the faith among all nations.” Therefore obedience rather than charity seems the form of faith.

ON THE CONTRARY

Everything operates through its form. Faith works through love. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Voluntary acts receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will. That from which a thing receives species has the character of form. Hence the end of every voluntary act is in a certain way its form, both because the act receives specification from it
and because the mode of action must correspond proportionately to the end. The act of faith is ordered to the good, the object of the will,
as to its end. The divine good which is the end of faith is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of faith insofar
as through charity the act of faith is perfected and formed. To the first: charity is called the form of faith insofar as it informs the act of
faith. Nothing prevents one act from being informed by diverse habits and thus being reduced in different respects to different species.

To the second: the objection proceeds concerning intrinsic form. Charity is not the intrinsic form of faith, but forms it insofar as it informs its act. To the third: obedience, hope, or another virtue can precede an act of faith, but charity gives the act its ultimate ordering
to the final end; hence charity is called its form.

SUMMARY

Charity is called the form of faith insofar as through charity the act of faith is perfected and formed. The reason is that the act of faith is
ordered to the object of the will as to an end, and the end of a voluntary act is in a certain manner its form. Charity is not an intrinsic form of the habit of faith.

For understanding this article it must first be noted that theologians commonly dispute whether charity is the form of all the virtues. St.
Thomas answers affirmatively elsewhere, but here there is a special reason for asking whether charity is the form of faith. Justification,
which is through charity, is in Sacred Scripture attributed in a special way to faith, especially in Romans and Galatians. From this heretics from the beginning of the Church took occasion to assert that man is justified by faith alone without works. Peter, John, James,
and Jude wrote against such errors, as Augustine observes in On Faith and Works. The Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 8, condemned the renewed Lutheran error and explained how we are said to be justified by faith: faith is the beginning and foundation of
salvation, but faith alone does not suffice unless it is vivified through charity. An objection says: if faith works through charity, faith seems superior to charity, as a king is superior to the minister through whom he acts. The answer is that “through” does not indicate an
instrumental cause here but a formal cause, as a body is moved and performs vital operations through the soul. Another objection says
that faith has the more formal object, supreme truth, while charity regards supreme goodness; truth is simpler than goodness. I answer
that charity regards supreme good as it is in itself, while faith does not apprehend supreme truth as it is in itself but under obscure revelation. Moreover faith can be considered merely as a speculative habit, but charity under its special nature immediately tends toward
the final end and therefore is more excellent.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE IV

Whether unformed faith can become formed faith, and conversely.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

> First, when that which is perfect comes, that which is imperfect is done away. Unformed faith is imperfect with respect to formed faith.

Therefore when formed faith arrives, unformed faith is excluded and cannot remain numerically the same habit. Second, what is dead
does not become living. But unformed faith is dead, according to James 2: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore unformed faith cannot become formed. Third, grace arriving in a believer should not have less effect than grace arriving in an unbeliever. In an unbeliever grace causes a habit of faith. Therefore in one already possessing unformed faith it should cause another habit. Fourth, Boethius says accidents cannot be altered. Faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot at one time be formed and at another unformed.

ON THE CONTRARY

On James 2, “faith without works is dead,” the Gloss says that by works it revives. Therefore the faith which was dead and unformed
becomes formed and living.

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ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

There were diverse opinions. Some said the habits of formed and unformed faith are different, and when formed faith arrives unformed faith is removed. Likewise, after mortal sin another unformed habit would be infused. But it is unfitting that grace should exclude a gift of God or that a divine gift should be infused because of mortal sin. Others said the habits are diverse but unformed faith remains when formed faith arrives. This too is unfitting, because the unformed habit would remain idle in one already possessing formed faith. Therefore the same habit is formed and unformed. Habits are diversified according to what belongs to them per se. Faith is a perfection of the intellect; what belongs to intellect belongs per se to faith. What belongs to will does not belong per se to faith so as to diversify its habit. The distinction between formed and unformed faith is according to charity, which belongs to will. To the first: when imperfection belongs to the essence of the imperfect thing, the perfect excludes it, as clear vision excludes faith because faith essentially concerns things unseen. But when imperfection is not essential, the numerically same thing can become perfect, as the same person who was a boy becomes a man. Unformedness is accidental to faith; therefore the same unformed faith becomes formed. To the second: the soul which makes an animal alive is its essential form, so a dead animal cannot become numerically the same living animal. Charity, however, is not of the essence of faith. Hence the comparison fails. To the third: grace causes faith both when faith begins and while it endures. God continually works man's justification as the sun continually illuminates the air. In one grace confirms and perfects existing faith; in another it creates faith anew. To the fourth: when formed faith becomes unformed, faith itself is not altered intrinsically; rather its subject, the soul, changes from possessing faith with charity to possessing faith without charity.

SUMMARY

The habit of formed and unformed faith is numerically the same. The distinction concerns charity and therefore the will, not what belongs per se to faith as an intellectual habit. When formed faith becomes unformed, faith itself is not intrinsically changed; the soul changes with respect to charity.

It is doubted whether the principal conclusion is true. The first objection says that the same animal cannot be now living and afterward dead, or conversely; therefore the same faith cannot successively be living and dead. A second objection argues that the same habit cannot now be a virtue and afterward cease to be a virtue; yet unformed faith is not a virtue, as will be discussed in the next article.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE IV — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

The second objection argues that a habit cannot remain numerically the same if it changes from virtue to non-virtue. Habit is the genus of virtue, and a thing cannot be corrupted according to species without corruption according to genus. Two ancient theological opinions are reported by St. Thomas. The Master of the Sentences held it possible that formed and unformed faith are distinct habits: when formed faith arrives, unformed faith is removed; when the just man sins mortally, formed faith is lost and another habit of unformed faith is given. Another opinion held that the two habits are distinct but that unformed faith remains together with formed faith. St. Thomas rejects this because the unformed habit would be idle.

FIRST CONCLUSION

The doctrine of St. Thomas is most true. He proves it by refuting the opposed positions and virtually demonstrating his own. An extrinsic form does not change the numerical essence of a thing. The same wax can be an image of a man and afterward an image of an animal; the same body can now be white and beautiful and afterward black and deformed. If by mortal sin the habit of formed faith were lost and another habit of unformed faith succeeded it, either the new habit would be of the same species or another species. If of the same species, the subject could not naturally change merely from one numerically distinct habit to another of exactly the same species without the first being wholly lost. If of another species, the sinner would not be faithful in the same formal sense as other believers and would not share the unity of faith. Catholic faith is not a genus divided into species; all the faithful possess the same spirit of faith and the same formal reason of assent.

SECOND CONCLUSION

It is exceedingly rash and proximate to error to assert that by mortal sin a believer loses the habit of formed faith and acquires another habit of unformed faith. The Council of Trent, Session VI, teaches that if anyone says that faith is always lost together with grace through sin, or that the faith which remains is not true faith, let him be anathema. If the formed habit were always destroyed by mortal sin, some true faith would always be lost together with grace, and it would become difficult to explain how the remaining faith is true faith univocally with formed faith. Such an account would dangerously favor the Lutheran assertion that true faith is lost through mortal sin.

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REPLIES

To the comparison with a living body: an animal lives through an intrinsic substantial form, whereas faith lives through charity as through an extrinsic form. James says “faith without works is dead, as the body without the spirit,” not “as a man without a soul.” A body without spirit is truly a body though not living. If it is objected that the numerically same living body does not remain after death, the consequence to faith is denied. In corruption of a living thing the same substantial form cannot remain, whereas the change of formed into unformed faith is accidental. Moreover “body,” taken as the material part of the composite under dimensions, can remain numerically the same matter through generation and corruption. Similarly faith can remain numerically the same with charity and afterward without charity, because the change concerns an extrinsic form. To the argument that the same habit cannot be virtue and afterward non-virtue, the major is denied. In acquired virtues an incipient habit can lack the state of virtue and later become perfected while remaining numerically the same. Much more can a habit whose status as virtue depends on an extrinsic perfection possess and lose that state without numerical destruction.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V

Whether faith is a virtue.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, virtue is ordered to good, since virtue makes its possessor good. Faith, however, is ordered to truth. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

Second, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Yet faith, because of its imperfection, is not numbered by Aristotle among acquired intellectual virtues. Much less, therefore, can it be an infused virtue. Third, formed and unformed faith are of the same species. But unformed faith is not a virtue because it lacks connection with the other virtues. Therefore formed faith is not a virtue either. Fourth, gratuitous graces and fruits are distinguished from virtues. Faith is numbered among gratuitous graces in 1 Corinthians 12 and among fruits in Galatians 5. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY

Man is justified through virtues, and Romans 5 says: “Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God.” Therefore faith is a virtue.

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

Human virtue is that by which a human act is rendered good. Any habit which is always a principle of a good act can therefore be called a human virtue. Formed faith is such a habit. Believing is an act of the intellect assenting to truth by command of the will. For this act to be perfect, two things are required: the intellect must infallibly tend toward its good, truth; and the will must infallibly be ordered to the ultimate end for whose sake it commands assent. Both are found in formed faith. By the nature of faith, the intellect is always borne toward truth, since falsity cannot fall under faith. Through charity, which forms faith, the will is infallibly ordered to the good end. Therefore formed faith is a virtue. Unformed faith is not a virtue simply speaking because, although its act possesses the perfection due from the intellect, it lacks the perfection due from the will. To the first: truth itself is the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection. Thus faith orders the intellect to a good. When formed by charity it is further ordered to the good as object of the will. To the second: the faith spoken of by Aristotle rests upon human reasoning which does not conclude necessarily and can be false. The faith considered here rests upon infallible divine truth and cannot be false; therefore it can be a virtue. To the third: formed and unformed faith do not differ as distinct species but as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Unformed faith, being imperfect, does not attain the perfect notion of virtue. To the fourth: the faith numbered among gratuitous graces is not simply unformed faith, since the gratuitous graces there enumerated are not common to all members of the Church. It signifies some excellence of faith, such as constancy or the discourse of faith. Faith is called a fruit insofar as its act contains delight because of certainty.

SUMMARY

Formed faith is a virtue because it is the principle of a good and perfect act of the intellect assenting to truth under the command of the will, both powers being suitably perfected. Unformed faith is not a virtue simply speaking because its act lacks the perfection due from the will.

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It is doubted whether both conclusions are true. Against the first: virtue ought to be the final disposition of a power toward its best act. But even formed faith is not the intellect's final disposition toward perfect cognition, because the best intellectual cognition is evident while faith remains intrinsically obscure. Second, the act of faith is not intrinsically more perfect as cognition with charity than without it. Charity gives faith no perfection belonging to the genus of cognition. Otherwise scientific knowledge too would become virtue simply speaking merely because charity orders it to the ultimate end. Third, temperance requires prudence because moral virtues are connected with prudence, but faith can remain without charity. Therefore the comparison does not seem parallel. Fourth, unformed faith can be more intense than formed faith: a highly perfected Christian who sins mortally can retain stronger faith than another Christian possessing weak charity. Against the second conclusion: the numerically same faith is formed and unformed; therefore if formed faith is virtue, unformed faith also seems virtue. Unformed faith firmly and infallibly inclines to a good act concerning First Truth. Moreover wisdom, science, and understanding are intellectual virtues, while unformed faith is a greater perfection of intellect than those naturally acquired habits.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

Durandus says “virtue” can be taken broadly for any praiseworthy habit inclining a power toward a good act, or strictly for a habit placing a power in its final due perfection with respect to its act. He says faith is virtue in the first sense, not the second, and does not possess a greater character of virtue with charity than without it. Cajetan says faith should not be called an intellectual virtue but a truth or perfection of the intellect; it is virtue with charity but not without it. St. Thomas elsewhere denies that faith is a purely intellectual virtue. For deciding the difficulty, note first that philosophers use “virtue” broadly for a habit inclining either intellect or will toward its proper good. Hence virtue is divided into intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue is not virtue simply speaking because it does not make its possessor simply good; moral virtue does. This division is analogical rather than strictly univocal. Second, moral virtue can be considered according to the essence of virtue alone or according to its perfected state. Its essence consists in being an operative habit acting from choice for a good end; its perfected mode consists in operating promptly and delightfully. Third, philosophers often use “virtue” so as to include both essence and perfected mode. Thus they say moral virtues are necessarily connected, although acquired virtues are not necessarily connected except insofar as they possess their perfect state.

FIRST CONCLUSION

Faith according to its essence is a virtue if “virtue” signifies the essence of virtue, and the contrary seems more than merely rash. This is proved first by the authority of all theologians with the Master of the Sentences and by the common confession of the faithful that there are three theological virtues, of which faith is first. Second, the act of faith is by its nature necessary for eternal salvation; therefore it is an act of virtue. Acts through which we are justified are acts of virtue. Third, faith is by its nature practical, as explained above; therefore by nature it is virtue. Fourth, unbelief is a grave vice; therefore faith is a great virtue, since vice is opposed to virtue. This is confirmed because precepts are given concerning acts of virtue, and there is a precept concerning faith: “He that cometh to God must believe.”

SECOND CONCLUSION

Faith, considered according to its nature, would always possess the state of virtue unless hindered by a defect of the subject and free will. The Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 7, says that in justification man receives through Jesus Christ faith, hope, and charity simultaneously infused. These theological virtues are by their nature infused together unless the subject's malice causes one to be absent. Moreover faith is a gift of God, and God's works are perfect. Therefore if faith is imperfect, the imperfection comes from the subject's malice.

THIRD CONCLUSION

Formed faith possesses the state of virtue. It operates promptly and delightfully; this is to possess the state of virtue. Hebrews 11 attributes heroic works to the saints through faith. Formed faith receives promptitude from charity, as do the other infused virtues. Scripture says, “Who shall separate us from the charity of Christ?” and “I can do all things in Him who strengtheneth me.” Further, faith formed by charity makes its possessor good, namely a good Christian. Aristotle defines virtue as that which makes its possessor good and renders his work good. Scripture repeatedly attributes salvation to faith: “The just man liveth by faith,” “Thy faith hath saved thee,” and “being justified by faith.” Finally, infused moral virtues possess the state of virtue; therefore formed faith does so even more, since theological virtue concerns the end itself and is more excellent than moral virtues concerning means. Thus although faith by its nature claims the character of virtue, charity in fact gives it the state and perfection of virtue: “Above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection.”

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

FOURTH CONCLUSION

Faith perfects the intellect far more than any other intellectual habit, whether natural or acquired, and consequently can truly be called an intellectual virtue. This conclusion also applies to unformed faith. The greatest perfection of the intellect is most certain knowledge of divine things. But the cognition of faith concerning divine realities is more certain than any other cognition. Therefore faith is a greater intellectual perfection. If someone answers that certainty is insufficient without evidence, the reply is that evidence is superior only insofar as it makes the intellect adhere more firmly to known truth. If certainty without evidence produces firmer adhesion, it is more excellent in that respect. The good of intellect is truth; therefore the intellect is more perfect when it adheres more firmly to truth. Among sciences, one can be more perfect because of a nobler object even if its procedure is less evident; metaphysics is superior to mathematics in this respect. Faith has the most excellent object and tends toward it with supreme certainty. Theology is acknowledged to be a science and intellectual virtue superior to other acquired sciences. Faith, which is the habit of theology's first principles, is therefore superior to the other intellectual virtues. I therefore does not accept Cajetan's statement that faith is a virtue of the intellect but not an intellectual virtue. When St. Thomas denies that it is an intellectual virtue, he means a purely intellectual virtue. Faith is a theological virtue ordered per se to perfecting conduct toward the supernatural end.

FIFTH CONCLUSION

Faith is denominated “formed” by charity as by an extrinsic form. A man is denominated clothed from clothing as from something extrinsic, because clothing lies outside his essence. Charity is likewise outside the essence of faith and exists in another power. Exterior acts are denominated from interior acts by extrinsic denomination; similarly the act of faith receives from charity the denomination by which it makes a good Christian.

SIXTH CONCLUSION

Nevertheless some perfection and goodness derived from charity is actually intrinsic to faith and its act insofar as faith possesses the state of virtue. This goodness is the relation and ordering of faith to the end of charity. The mode of an action exists in the action itself. To possess actually such an ordering is therefore an intrinsic mode of the act of faith; consequently the habit of formed faith possesses an intrinsic habitual mode toward charity's end. As active use of the powers belongs to the will while passive use belongs to the powers employed, so the active direction and formation belong intrinsically to charity, whereas the passive direction and formation received from charity belong intrinsically to formed faith.

FINAL CONCLUSION

The perfection just described as intrinsic to faith belongs to it as a perfection proper to the species — not because faith's species is destroyed without it, but because without it the species is not perfect even under the aspect of the cognition of faith. It belongs to the proper notion of faith that the intellect be moved by a pious affection of the will. Therefore it belongs to perfect faith that this pious affection be perfected by charity. The certainty which makes faith an intellectual virtue depends in great part upon the pious affection of the will. If this affection is not perfected by charity, the certainty of faith is not perfected in its mode; if charity perfects the affection, it also perfects faith with respect to certainty. Faith is practical according to its proper species, and practical action is perfected by rectitude of appetite. Hence the act of faith is perfected by charity, which rectifies the will toward the ultimate supernatural end. This explains why, other things being equal, those lacking a good conscience and friendship with God are more easily endangered in faith. We more readily trust friends than enemies. Jerome observes that Judah first rejected God's law and commandments and afterward was deceived by idols. Likewise the Apostle speaks of those who, rejecting faith and a good conscience, made shipwreck concerning the faith. From these principles one can see how rash is Durandus's assertion that formed faith is not properly and simply virtue and has no greater character of virtue than unformed faith.

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QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V — REPLIES AND SECOND DOUBT

To the first objection, the minor is denied. The act of formed faith is a perfect act of the wayfarer tending toward clear vision, although compared with that vision it is imperfect: “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.” In natural cognition, the best disposition of intellect toward perfect act normally causes evident knowledge because otherwise natural certainty is lacking. In the supernatural order, however, certain cognition of supernatural truth can coexist with obscurity. Therefore an intellectual disposition producing certain but non-evident assent can possess the character of virtue. To the second argument, the answer follows from the preceding conclusions. Natural science is not intrinsically perfected concerning its proper object by charity in the manner in which the act of faith is. To the third, faith as virtue simply speaking is connected with charity. Its ability to remain without charity comes from its character as a speculative intellectual virtue. To the fourth, I distinguish intensity. Simply speaking, one in charity adheres more certainly and firmly to the things of faith through infused faith than one in mortal sin, however intense the latter's previous faith may have been. Faith without charity remains dead and weak. Nevertheless under the aspect of a speculative habit, unformed faith in one person may coexist with greater acquired understanding than formed faith in another. One might say that such intensity comes from acquired faith or science rather than from greater intrinsic intensity of infused faith. Another possible answer is that just as hope is weakened when charity is lost, so faith after loss of charity remains less intense than before. These two virtues not only cease to be virtues simply speaking when charity is lost but may remain in a diminished mode. A further and preferable answer is that dead faith does not lose the intensity of the habit with respect to truth, its proper object, but loses in the exercise of its act the intensity which came from the command and motion of charity. Colors without light remain the same in their own intensity but lose actual brilliance insofar as they are made actually visible. Thus faith without charity remains in darkness and cannot issue into an act as perfect as when charity is present. To the fifth, the consequence is denied. The same man is boy and adult, but the adult state is more perfect. Likewise unformed faith lacks the state of virtue although by its nature it demands such a state. To the sixth, unformed faith is indeed a virtue of the intellect and even an intellectual virtue, but not virtue simply speaking because it does not make its possessor good simply speaking. The seventh argument proves the same fourth conclusion.

SECOND DOUBT

St. Thomas says that every habit which is always a principle of a good act can be called human virtue, and formed faith is such a habit. It is therefore asked whether an act of formed or unformed faith can ever be evil extrinsically, for example because it is ordered to vainglory. For the affirmative: unformed faith does not actually imply right appetite; therefore it might be ordered by a disordered appetite toward vainglory. Second, a just man might confess the faith before men for vainglory. Confession is an act of faith. Therefore even formed faith could concur in an act made evil by the circumstance of its end, since venial sin can coexist with charity. Third, faith is an intellectual and speculative habit; insofar as its act depends on will it is in some manner practical. Considered in itself, therefore, it might be referred by will to an evil end. Fourth, a theologian can assent to a theological conclusion for vainglory. Faith concurs as the habit of first principles to the assent to conclusions. It therefore seems that an act proceeding from faith could be ordered toward vainglory. Fifth, a man can misuse gratuitous graces such as healing or prophecy, even though they are supernatural gifts of God and can coexist with mortal sin. Therefore, it seems, he might misuse faith likewise. Three positions are possible: that formed or unformed faith can elicit an act extrinsically evil; that neither can do so; or a middle position associated with Cajetan.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V — SECOND DOUBT CONTINUED

Arguments for the stricter position are these. First, faith by its nature claims not merely the essence but also the state of virtue unless hindered by malice of the will; formed faith already possesses that state. But no human virtue pertaining to morals can concur toward evil. Virtue is a good quality of mind which no one uses badly. Therefore no one can misuse faith. Second, even in an act of unformed faith the Holy Ghost concurs by a special assistance ordered to the believer's good. The Holy Ghost does not concur by special assistance toward sin. But to believe for vainglory is sinful. Therefore such an act does not proceed from infused faith. Third, no one can misuse infused prudence, nor even acquired prudence. Faith also is an intellectual habit, and moreover eminently practical and per se ordered toward making man good as the foundation and intrinsic principle of his goodness. Therefore the same reason applies. Fourth, no one can misuse an acquired disposition toward prudence, temperance, or another moral virtue merely because it has not yet reached the perfect state of virtue. Such a disposition is ordered by its nature toward that state. Likewise infused faith by its nature can and ought to become perfect virtue. Moreover the perfect species of faith demands the character of true virtue, since the act of faith proceeds from two principles: infused light in the intellect and a pious affection of the will, which is not perfect without charity. Fifth, if one could misuse unformed faith by venial sin, it seems one could misuse it mortally, for example by constituting vainglory as one's ultimate end while believing God to be Three and One through infused faith. This seems absurd. And if unformed faith could be misused venially, why not formed faith, since charity does not exclude venial sin? I note that when he formerly interpreted St. Thomas he considered arguments of this kind, later taken into the commentary of his learned confrere Bartholomew de Medina. Medina chose as more probable the view that one can misuse infused faith by an evil circumstance of end.

CONCLUSIONS

FIRST CONCLUSION

An act of formed faith actually moved by charity cannot be sinful, not even venially, because charity actually refers that act to God as ultimate end. Therefore it is simply good and cannot become sinful from another end.

SECOND CONCLUSION

An act of faith habitually formed by charity cannot become a venial sin merely from the circumstance of its end. Otherwise charity would virtually concur toward venial sin, since the act of faith is virtually under charity's motion.

THIRD CONCLUSION

Although it may perhaps be maintained without danger and with probability that unformed faith can concur toward an act of believing made sinful by an extrinsic circumstance, the negative opinion is much more probable and safer. The arguments already given seem stronger and more difficult to answer.

REPLIES

To the first argument, distinguish the statement that unformed faith has no order to right appetite. If this means no virtual ordering arising from faith itself, it is false. Faith according to its proper species demands to be moved by a will perfected through charity. This is what St. Thomas indicates when he says unformed faith is not virtue because it lacks the perfection due from the will. If it means only that faith as speculative does not include an actual and explicit conformity to right appetite in every operation, it is true. Thus St. Thomas can say that the notion of faith consists in cognition, while prudence formally imports an order to right appetite. To the second, I deny that a confession of faith made for vainglory is elicited as such by infused faith; insofar as it is corrupted by that end, it proceeds from an acquired disposition. To the third, faith by nature is formally or eminently practical, and therefore it is repugnant to it to be the proper principle of an evil work. To the fourth, faith can concur mediately to a false conclusion with respect to the material substance of assent, but not with respect to falsity — just as God can concur to the entity of an act without causing its defect. A theologian may reason from a principle of faith together with a false premise believed true and assent to a false conclusion; the falsity does not come from faith.

QUESTION IV, ARTICLE V — END OF SECOND DOUBT

A theologian, insofar as his theology is an acquired habit, can theologize for vainglory. Nevertheless the assent to first principles which comes from infused faith is not thereby ordered to vainglory, although something acquired from those principles can be so ordered precisely insofar as it is acquired. Therefore the inference from the first principle all the way to the evil end does not hold. To the fifth argument the consequence is denied. Faith is given to each person for his own salvation; therefore no one can misuse this good in the same manner as certain gratuitous graces, just as one cannot properly misuse the habits of virtue even while they remain imperfect.

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ARTICLE VI

Whether faith is one virtue.

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS

First, faith is a gift of God, as Ephesians says. Wisdom and knowledge are likewise numbered among God's gifts. But wisdom and knowledge differ because wisdom concerns eternal things and knowledge temporal things, as Augustine teaches. Since faith concerns both eternal and temporal things, it seems not to be one faith but divided into parts. Second, confession is an act of faith, but the confession of faith is not one and the same among all. What we confess as accomplished the ancient Fathers confessed as future, as Isaiah 7 says: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Therefore there is not one faith. Third, faith is common to all Christ's faithful, but one accident cannot exist in diverse subjects. Therefore there cannot be one faith of all.

ON THE CONTRARY

Ephesians 4 says: “One Lord, one faith.”

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE

If faith is taken as a habit, it can be considered in two ways. First, from the object. In this respect faith is one, because the formal object of faith is First Truth, by adhering to which we believe everything contained under faith. Second, from the subject. In this respect faith is multiplied according to the different persons possessing it. Every habit receives its species from the formal character of its object but is individuated from its subject. Therefore the habit by which we believe is one in species but numerically diverse in different believers. If “faith” is taken for what is believed, faith is likewise one because the same thing is believed by all. Although there are diverse things believed, they are all reduced to one formal and principal object. To the first: temporal things proposed in faith belong to faith only in their order to something eternal, First Truth. Therefore the same faith concerns temporal and eternal things. Wisdom and knowledge, by contrast, consider temporal and eternal things according to their distinct proper reasons. To the second: the difference of past and future does not arise from a diversity in the thing believed but from the diverse relation of believers to the same reality. To the third: the argument proves numerical diversity in subjects, not diversity of species.

SUMMARY

If faith is taken for the habit, it is one virtue in species from the object but numerically diverse from the subjects. If faith is taken for what is believed, it is likewise one because there is one formal and principal object although there are many credibles.

The conclusions are manifest from what was said above concerning the object and formal reason of faith. One can contradict St. Thomas in three ways. First, by asserting that the faith of the ancient Fathers and ours differs in species because the things believed differ. This has already been refuted: the formal reason for believing is the same for us and for the ancient Fathers. Augustine appeals to “having the same spirit of faith,” and to the Fathers who drank from the spiritual rock, which was Christ. Second, one could assert that formed and unformed faith differ in species. This opinion has already been rejected. Finally, the heretics of our time distinguish three faiths: faith of promises, by which each person believes in particular that his sins are forgiven and which they call justifying faith; historical faith, concerning the things narrated in Sacred Scripture; and faith of miracles, by which miracles are worked, as in Matthew 17 and 1 Corinthians 13. They claim the second and third are not true faith. I call this opinion heretical and says it will be refuted below.

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QUESTION IV - ARTICLE VII

WHETHER FAITH IS THE FIRST AMONG THE VIRTUES

OBJECTION 1. It seems that faith is not the first among the virtues. A Gloss on Luke 12, on the words, "I say to you, my friends," says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. But a foundation is prior to that of which it is the foundation. Therefore fortitude is prior to faith.

OBJECTION 2. A certain Gloss on the Psalm, "Do not be emulous," says that hope introduces one to faith. But hope is a virtue, as will be said below. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

OBJECTION 3. It was said above that the intellect of the believer is inclined to assent to the things of faith through obedience to God. But obedience is itself a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue.

OBJECTION 4. Unformed faith is not the foundation; rather, formed faith is the foundation, as a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 3 says. But faith is formed by charity. Therefore faith has from charity that it is the foundation; charity is consequently a greater foundation than faith. Since the foundation is the first part of a building, charity would seem to be prior to faith.

OBJECTION 5. The order of habits is understood according to the order of acts. But in the act of faith the act of the will, which charity perfects, precedes the act of the intellect, which faith perfects, as a cause precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith, and faith is not the first virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY. The Apostle says in Hebrews 11 that faith is the substance of things hoped for.

Substance

has the character of what is first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. One thing can be prior to another in two ways: essentially, or accidentally.

Essentially, faith is the first among all the virtues. In practical matters the end is the principle, and therefore the theological virtues, whose object is the ultimate end, must precede the other virtues. But the ultimate end must

first be in the intellect before it is in the will, because the will does not tend toward anything except insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect. Since the ultimate end is in the will through hope and charity, but in the intellect through faith, faith must be the first among the virtues. Natural knowledge cannot reach God precisely as the object of beatitude toward whom hope and charity tend.

Accidentally, however, another virtue can be prior to faith. An accidental cause is accidentally prior, and removing an impediment belongs to an accidental cause. Thus some virtues can be called accidentally prior to faith insofar as they remove impediments to believing: fortitude removes disordered fear that obstructs faith; humility removes pride by which the intellect refuses to submit itself to the truth of faith. The same can be said proportionately of certain other virtues, although they are not true virtues unless faith is presupposed.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1. Fortitude is called a foundation of faith insofar as it removes an impediment to faith; it is not prior to faith essentially.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 2. Hope cannot universally introduce one to faith, for one cannot hope for eternal beatitude unless one first believes it to be possible, since the impossible does not fall under hope. But a person can be induced by hope to persevere in faith or to adhere to faith more firmly; in this sense hope is said to introduce one to faith.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 3. Obedience is spoken of in two ways. Sometimes it means the inclination of the will to fulfill the divine commands, and in this sense it is not a special virtue but is included generally in every virtue, because all virtuous acts fall under the precepts of the divine law. In this way obedience is required for faith. In another sense obedience denotes the inclination to fulfill commands precisely insofar as they have the character of something due; thus obedience is a special virtue and a part of justice, rendering to a superior what is owed. In this sense obedience follows faith, through which it is made known to man that God is his superior and must be obeyed.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 4. For the notion of a foundation it is required not only that something be first, but also that the other parts of the building be joined to it. The spiritual building is joined together through charity: "Above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection" (Colossians 3). Therefore faith without charity cannot be a foundation; yet charity need not therefore be prior to faith.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 5. An act of the will is presupposed for faith, but not an act of the will informed by charity. Such an act of perfect love presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend toward God with perfect love unless the intellect first possesses right faith concerning Him.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Simply speaking, faith is first among all the virtues. Virtues concerned directly with the end are prior to virtues concerned with the means; hence the theological virtues are prior to the moral virtues. Among the theological virtues, faith is first because it alone is in the intellect, and nothing is willed unless first known.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Accidentally, another virtue can be prior to faith insofar as it removes an impediment to belief: fortitude removes fear and humility removes pride.

THIRD CONCLUSION, in reply to the second objection. Hope is said to introduce one to faith insofar as hope can induce a man to persevere in faith.

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[Continuation from the preceding page] FOURTH CONCLUSION, to the fourth objection. Faith without charity is not the foundation of the spiritual edifice. The reason is that the connection of the spiritual edifice is through charity; therefore faith without charity is not the foundation, because without charity the other parts of the edifice do not cohere with it.

COMMENTARY

Concerning the first conclusion, it should be noted how not only erroneous but irrational is the opinion of those whom we refuted above, **Question 2, Article 3, who said that in the state of the law of nature—and even now—a person could be justified** through the charity of God without infused faith, together with natural knowledge. St. Thomas expressly teaches in this article that natural knowledge cannot attain God insofar as He is the object of beatitude, in the manner in which hope and charity tend toward Him. This is also shown from Romans 10: "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." And a little later: "How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?" And Hebrews 11: "Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." See Cyril on John, Book XI, chapter 16, on the words "This is eternal life"; and Augustine in the Prologue on Psalm 31, where he says: "I praise the fruit of a good work, but in faith I recognize the root." Finally, in the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 8, faith is asserted to be the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification. A DOUBT arises concerning the first conclusion: whether faith, simply speaking, is to be called the first of all the virtues.

First argument for the negative. Simply speaking, faith is not a virtue unless charity is presupposed; therefore it is not the first of the virtues. The consequence is clear, because to be a virtue in the unqualified sense belongs primarily to charity. Second argument. Faith is not prior to charity either in time or in dignity; therefore it is not essentially the first virtue. The antecedent is proved: speaking per se, the theological virtues are infused simultaneously, and charity is greatest in dignity. This is confirmed: if faith, speaking per se, were the first of all virtues, it ought to be their cause. But this is false, for charity is not an effect of faith or, as the Lutherans say, a kind of fruit of it. Third argument. Humility holds the first place among the virtues insofar as it disposes one to believe, as St. Thomas teaches below, **Question 161, Article 5, reply 2. Therefore, in the genus of material cause, humility is the first of the virtues.** This is confirmed. If faith is prior in some genus of cause, it would especially be in the genus of material cause, for faith stands as body with respect to charity, which stands as form. But in the genus of material cause humility is prior, according to Matthew 11, "The poor have the Gospel preached to them," that is, the humble receive the Gospel. For the resolution of this difficulty, let the first conclusion be stated. FIRST **CONCLUSION. If we speak of priority of dignity, faith is not the first of all virtues. Proof: charity is more** worthy, according to 1 Corinthians 13: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." That the Apostle is speaking of superiority of excellence is clear from what he had said at the end of chapter 12: "I show unto you a yet more excellent way"; and from Ephesians 3, concerning "the charity of Christ which surpasseth knowledge"; and Colossians 3: "Above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection." SECOND CONCLUSION. Excepting charity, faith is the most worthy virtue and consequently the first in dignity among the other virtues. It is proved first that faith is prior to all the infused moral virtues, because a theological virtue concerns the end, whereas the moral virtues concern the means. That faith is more worthy than hope is proved because both faith and hope are formed by charity and can exist unformed without it; but in addition faith, with respect to hope, has the character of a foundation: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Therefore faith stands with respect to hope somewhat as a form, furnishing it the certitude which belongs primarily to faith. THIRD CONCLUSION. Faith, speaking per se, is the first of all the virtues in the order of generation. Proof: nothing is willed unless it is first known. This is how St. Thomas is to be understood, and this is what his argument proves. FOURTH CONCLUSION. In the order of being, and speaking metaphysically, faith possesses a certain dignity above all the virtues. Proof: it agrees with the other theological virtues in having God for its object, but differs in formally regarding the First Truth. According to all metaphysicians, truth is simpler than goodness; therefore, from this standpoint, faith is more excellent than charity. But observe that faith attains the First Truth imperfectly—that is, obscurely—and does not know God as He is; charity, however, loves God as He is good in Himself. Therefore, simply speaking, charity is more excellent than faith and than every cognition of the present life. In heaven, however, simply speaking, the beatific vision will be more excellent. Finally, faith has a certain dignity in comparison with the other virtues because its object is, as it were, the exemplar to which each of the other virtues is assimilated in its own manner. Just as it was said to Moses, "See that thou make all things according to the pattern which was shown thee on the mount," so it can be said to the Christian: Do all things as faith teaches. To this pertains what the Apostle says in Hebrews 12: "And we, having so great a cloud of witnesses over our head, let us run by patience to the fight proposed to us, looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith." The Apostle calls the examples of the saints a "cloud of witnesses": through faith they conquered kingdoms and wrought justice while looking toward the reward. Hence, under the name of faith may fittingly be understood everything that faith teaches both to be believed and to be done. Thus we say that we are saved through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ: that is, by believing and doing all those things which the doctrine of Christ, which we hold through faith, teaches are to be believed and done.

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REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS

To the first, I answer that in the notion of virtue simply so called, faith is not the first of the virtues; and the argument proves this
effectively. Nevertheless, in the notion of virtue taken in a broad and extended sense, faith is first. [The replies continue on the
following page.]

QUESTION IV,

ARTICLE VII — CONTINUED Faith is the first of the virtues because it is the first intellectual virtue

with respect to the
supernatural end. REPLY TO THE SECOND. Faith can sometimes be prior to charity in time. In dignity, however, it is not simply prior, but only in a certain respect. To the confirmation: faith is a cause of all the virtues, not as an efficient cause, but in a certain way as a material cause. As the body is related to the spirit, so faith is related to charity in the constitution of a good Christian. It is also an exemplary cause, as we have said, although because of its imperfection faith is not more excellent than charity. Charity tends to God not under the aspect of obscurity, but insofar as He is openly lovable. Thus we can say that charity exceeds its exemplar insofar as that exemplar is proposed to us through faith. REPLY TO THE THIRD. Humility, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, disposes by removing an obstacle; in this sense it is first among the other virtues that dispose to believing by removing what hinders belief. Yet without the light of faith humility is not a true supernatural virtue. Faith teaches that we cannot acquire divine excellence from ourselves, but from the grace of God through Jesus Christ. To the confirmation, we have already explained in what genus of cause faith can be called first among all the virtues. SECOND DOUBT concerning the fourth conclusion: whether faith, either formed or unformed, is the foundation of the spiritual and Christian edifice, or whether charity is rather the foundation and root of that edifice and of spiritual fruit. FIRST ARGUMENT. Unformed faith seems to be the foundation. Gregory, Moralium XXV, c. 15, explaining Psalm 136, “Destroy it even to the foundation,” says that these words are the cries of demons urging their accomplices, after charity has once been destroyed in a sinner, to attempt also to dissipate the foundation, that is, the strength of faith.

SECOND ARGUMENT. The Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 8, when explaining the Apostle’s teaching that man is justified
by faith, says that faith is as it were the foundation and root of human salvation and the beginning of all justification. Therefore to faith according to itself it belongs to be foundation and root; and since unformed faith retains the proper nature of faith, it too will be called foundation and root. THIRD ARGUMENT. Otherwise it would follow that charity is first among all the virtues in the order of generation, if the character of foundation belongs to it; but this consequence is contrary to what was defined in the preceding doubt. The consequence is proved because a foundation in the order of generation is prior to the building. Consequently, if charity were destroyed, no foundation would remain in the Christian upon which he could build, which seems contrary to the common consent of theologians. ON THE CONTRARY is Ephesians 3: “Christ dwelling by faith in your hearts, being rooted and founded in charity.” There was once, in Augustine’s time, a heresy asserting that faith without charity is so much the foundation that, even if a Christian should build mortal sins upon it, he could be saved through the fire of purgatory. Thus they understood 1 Corinthians 3: “If any man build upon this foundation wood, hay, stubble, he shall be saved, yet so as by fire,” taking wood, hay and stubble to mean even mortal sins. Luther added to this error that man is saved by fiducial faith alone and not through purgatorial fire. For the decision of this difficulty note that the names “foundation” and “root” are transferred metaphorically to spiritual things. Hence the ratio of the metaphor can differ according to the different properties considered in a proper foundation and root. SECOND NOTE. In the foundation of a bodily building several things can be considered: first, that the building begins from it; second, that it has the nature of a part; third, that it actually sustains the whole building lest it fall, and communicates to the remaining parts the power of holding together in mutual connection. Likewise in a root we can consider two properties: first, that it is the first part of the tree, as the head is in man; second, that it gives to the tree the power of bearing fruit, and the fruit is attributed more to the root than to the branches. FIRST CONCLUSION. When faith is called foundation and root, the expression is rightly understood if the metaphor is taken according to the priority which foundation and root possess in the order of generation. In this way it belongs to faith according to itself to be foundation and root. The arguments proposed at the beginning of the

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doubt prove this.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Faith according to itself can also be called foundation and root insofar as it is the first part from
which the spiritual edifice is composed. This is clear because faith concurs in the justification of man as a necessary and
permanent part of that edifice, without which it is impossible to please God. THIRD CONCLUSION. Faith cannot be called
foundation and root according to the metaphorical aspect in which foundation and root are considered as possessing the
power of containing, connecting, and bearing fruit. This belongs properly to charity, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 23, a. 8,
ad 2. This conclusion must especially be observed by Catholics so that they differ from the most pestilential error of the
Lutherans, who think that faith itself, if it is true faith, immediately bears the fruit of charity and observance of the
commandments. Catholics do not deny that faith can operate, but they say with the Apostle, Galatians 5, that "faith works
through charity," just as the body performs vital operations through a vital principle. Ephesians 3 attributes comprehension
to charity as to a foundation and root: "rooted and founded in charity, that you may be able to comprehend with all the
saints." Hence also "Christ dwelling by faith in your hearts" is understood by the Fathers of formed faith. See Augustine, On
Faith and Works, cc. 14-16.

QUESTION IV,

ARTICLE VII — CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND DOUBT

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Even unformed faith can be called a foundation according to potency and a kind of material
aptitude with respect to the Christian edifice. The same faith which is now unformed can afterward, when formed by
charity, become an actual foundation. The antecedent was proved above and is asserted by all; the consequence is manifest.
The first argument at the beginning of the doubt also proves this. REPLIES. To the first argument: it proves this fourth
conclusion. To the second: I concede the consequence, namely that it belongs to faith
according to itself to be foundation
actually or potentially in the sense explained in the preceding conclusions. To the third: in the order of generation the
foundation exists first in aptitude before it exists actually; therefore charity is not first in the order of generation merely
because it is the foundation which actuates and perfects the whole edifice. To the argument of the heretics: by "wood, hay
and stubble" are understood venial sins, greater or less. This is the common explanation of the Doctors, especially Augustine
in the place cited above.
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ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER FAITH IS MORE CERTAIN THAN SCIENCE AND THE OTHER INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

OBJECTION 1. It seems that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. Doubt is opposed to certainty; hence that seems more certain which admits less doubt, as that is whiter which is less mixed with black. But understanding, science, and wisdom have no doubt about their objects, whereas a believer can sometimes experience a movement of doubt about the things of faith. Therefore faith is not more certain than the intellectual virtues. OBJECTION 2. Sight is more certain than hearing. But faith is from hearing, according to Romans 10, whereas understanding, science, and wisdom include a kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science or understanding is more certain than faith. OBJECTION 3. The more perfect something is in intellectual matters, the more certain it is. But understanding is more perfect than faith, because through faith we arrive at understanding, according to Isaiah 7, “Unless you believe, you shall not understand,” according to another reading. Augustine likewise says, De Trinitate XIV, that faith is strengthened by science. Therefore science or understanding seems more certain than faith. ON THE CONTRARY. 1 Thessalonians 2: “When you had received of us the word of hearing,” namely through faith, “you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Nothing is more certain than the word of God; therefore science is not more certain than faith, nor anything else. I ANSWER THAT, as was said above, two intellectual virtues concern contingent things, namely prudence and art. Faith surpasses them in certainty because of its matter, since faith concerns eternal truths which cannot be otherwise, whereas prudence and art concern contingent things. The three remaining intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, science, and understanding, concern necessary things. But wisdom, science, and understanding can be taken in two ways: first, as the intellectual virtues placed by Aristotle in Ethics VI; second, as gifts of the Holy Spirit. Taken in the first way, certainty can be considered in two respects. First, from the cause of certainty. In this way that is more certain which has a more certain cause; and thus faith is more certain than the three foregoing virtues, because faith rests upon divine truth, whereas they rest upon human reason. Second, certainty can be considered on the part of the subject. In this way that is called more certain which the human intellect attains more fully. Since the things of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the other three virtues are not, faith is in this respect less certain. Yet everything is judged simply according to its cause, while a disposition on the side of the subject gives a judgment only in a qualified sense. Hence faith is simply more certain, while the others are more certain in a certain respect, namely with respect to us. If the three are taken as gifts of the present life, each cooperates with faith as with a principle presupposed by it; and even in this sense faith is more certain than they are. REPLY 1. The doubt does not arise from the cause of faith but from us, insofar as we do not fully attain by intellect the things of faith. REPLY 2. Other things being equal, sight is more certain than hearing. But if the one from whom something is heard greatly exceeds the sight of the one seeing, hearing is more certain than sight. A man of little learning is more certain of what he hears from a learned man than of what appears to him according to his own reasoning. Much more is man more certain of what he hears from God, who cannot be deceived, than of what he sees by his own reason, which can be deceived. REPLY 3. The perfection of understanding and science exceeds the cognition of faith with respect to greater manifestation, but not with respect to more certain adherence. All the certainty of understanding or science, insofar as they are gifts, proceeds from the certainty of faith, as the certainty of conclusions proceeds from the certainty of principles. Insofar as science, wisdom, and understanding are intellectual virtues, they rest on the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certainty of the word of God upon which faith rests.

QUESTION IV,
ARTICLE VIII —

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. Faith is more certain than prudence and art, because faith concerns eternal things which cannot be otherwise, whereas prudence and art concern contingents. SECOND CONCLUSION. Faith is more certain than wisdom, science, and understanding considered as intellectual virtues in Aristotle, Ethics VI, because those virtues rest upon the natural light of reason, whereas the certainty of faith, from the side of its cause, is greater. THIRD CONCLUSION. Those three virtues are in a certain respect more certain than faith, namely from the side of the subject, because the human intellect more fully attains the things known by science, wisdom, and understanding. FOURTH CONCLUSION. Faith is more certain than the gifts of the Holy Spirit called wisdom, science, and understanding, because those gifts are compared to faith as to a principle which they presuppose. COMMENTARY The principal doubt in this article, concerning the second and third conclusions, is whether faith, simply speaking, is more certain than every natural cognition, even than the cognition of first principles. ARGUMENT 1 FOR THE NEGATIVE. It is impossible for anyone to dissent from the principle "anything either is or is not," or "the whole is greater than its part." But it is possible for a Christian possessing faith to lose it by knowingly and prudently eliciting dissent against faith. Therefore he is not as certain concerning believed things as concerning natural first principles. ARGUMENT 2. The certainty of a habit is considered from the fact that it makes the power firm in eliciting an act concerning the object of that habit. But faith does not make the intellect as firm in assent concerning credibles as science, wisdom, and understanding do concerning their objects. Therefore faith is not as certain. The minor is proved from St. Thomas's third conclusion: faith is less certain on the part of the subject than the intellectual virtues; therefore the intellect itself is less confirmed. ARGUMENT 3. The certainty of the cause, unless it passes into the subject itself, contributes little to the certainty of the effect. For example, if someone, from an evident principle by means of a merely probable consequence, assents to a conclusion, he does not assent more certainly than one who assents to the same **conclusion from a probable principle through an evident consequence, although the first principle, as a** cause of the assent, is more certain. Similarly, from the fact that God supernaturally operating and illuminating is the cause of the assent of faith, it does not follow that the assent of faith is simply more certain than natural cognition, if on the side of the subject the assent of faith is less certain than the assent to first principles. ARGUMENT 4. The assent of faith depends upon the free motion of the created will; no one believes unless willing. Therefore it is not as certain as assent to first principles. The free motion of the will is not as certain as the natural light, which is naturally determined to truth. ARGUMENT 5. Assent to a disjunctive proposition cannot be less certain than assent to one of its parts, especially where the disjunction consists of contradictories. A Christian assents to "The Son of God is man," and also to "The Son of God is man or the Son of God is not man." He is no less certain of the disjunction than of one part. Yet he assents to the disjunction by natural light, while he assents to the first part by faith. Therefore assent from faith is not more certain than assent from natural light. LAST ARGUMENT. That seems more certain which is less mixed with doubt. Yet the faithful person often experiences hesitations and scruples concerning matters of faith, while one who has science suffers nothing similar. Therefore science is more certain. Confirmation: in the assent of faith there is non-evidence with certainty; in assent to first principles there is certainty with evidence. Therefore the intellect adheres more firmly to first principles than to matters of faith, because natural light itself compels assent to first principles as soon as the terms are apprehended, whereas assent to faith requires the aid of the will. If it is said that the will adds greater certainty to faith, it is replied that by equal reasoning the obstinate heretic would be more certain of his error than the philosopher is of natural principles, for the heretic by his own will adheres most firmly to his sect, even preferring death to dissent. For the decision of this difficult question we must define what certainty of assent is. From St. Thomas, III Sentences, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4, we say: CERTAINTY IS THE FIRM ADHERENCE OF THE INTELLECT TO A TRUE OBJECT. Capreolus and Durandus explain similarly. That certainty imports firm adherence all must admit; it is almost a common conception. But such adherence must concern a true object, because intellectual certainty is a very great perfection of the intellect, and the intellect cannot be perfected by falsehood. If certainty could concern falsehood, obstinate heretics would simply be called certain of their heresies just as Catholics are certain of the articles of faith. Aristotle notes in Topics VII that some assent no less firmly to false opinions than others to science. Therefore certainty properly so called includes adherence to an object firm and stable in itself. Some theologians, such as Soto, distinguish two certainties: one on the side of the object, which cannot concern falsehood; another on the side of the subject, insofar as a man, with all fear and **doubt removed, firmly adheres to an object appearing true because of weakness of intellect or affection of** will. This latter is not certainty properly speaking, but only in a qualified and quasi-fictitious sense. Hence Trent, Session VI, c. 9, says that heretics boast of a confidence which they call certainty of the remission of their sins.

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QUESTION IV,

ARTICLE VIII —

COMMENTARY CONTINUED Against the foregoing definition two objections arise. FIRST. It can happen that someone

firmly adheres to a true object while the reason by which he adheres, although appearing firm and stable to him, is weak, as when he thinks a probable argument is a demonstration. He should not then be called simply certain, though he firmly adheres to a truth. Therefore the definition is defective. REPLY. The definition must be understood formally: certainty is firm adherence to a true object ACCORDING TO A FIRM AND STABLE REASON OF TRUTH. This is absent in the proposed case, because the man is deceived in his assent insofar as he thinks he possesses demonstrative cognition which he does not possess. SECOND. Many absurdities seem to follow if certainty belongs only to truth. No one would be certain by human faith of the things he hears; all human society, friendship, and piety toward parents and children would perish, since these rest on the certainty of human faith. Likewise no one would be certain about the sacraments he receives and venerates or the priests whom he honors, because in all these there can be falsehood: this man may not be a priest, this man may not truly be my father. Therefore we would not be certain of any of these. REPLY. There is a twofold certainty: practical and speculative. Practical certainty concerns a practical prudential truth; speculative certainty does not immediately consider singular things to be done. Speculative certainty is again twofold: one is simply and naturally certain, arising from proper principles or necessary effects; another is moral certainty, to which falsehood can sometimes be subject. Since all practical certainty presupposes some speculative cognition, we say that for practical certainty it is enough that the practical intellect be certain of a practical prudential truth, even if the speculative certainty presupposed is only moral certainty, to which falsehood can occur. Thus when Jacob approached Leah thinking her Rachel, he possessed a true and most certain prudential judgment: “Here and now I ought to approach this woman,” although he erred in the speculative judgment by which he judged her to be his wife. So too Innocent, in the chapter Veniens concerning a priest not baptized, says that the presumption by which someone believes himself baptized is to be held for certainty. This must be understood of certainty according to the dictates of prudence, insofar as he is not to be baptized again and similar practical decisions are to be made. Such certainty is enough for human society, religious worship, and similar matters. FIRST CONCLUSION. The doctrine of St. Thomas in the second and third conclusions of the article is most consonant with Catholic faith: FAITH, ACCORDING TO ITSELF AND SIMPLY SPEAKING, IS MORE CERTAIN THAN ALL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES WHICH REST UPON NATURAL LIGHT. Hence the opinion of Durandus, III Sentences, d. 23, q. 7, asserting that such intellectual virtues are simply more certain than faith, is rash, offensive to pious ears, and perhaps merits graver censure. This is proved first from the common teaching of the Doctors and of the Fathers. See Basil, Chrysostom, and Augustine. Luke 21 says: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away,” meaning that even if the whole of nature should fail, evangelical truth could not fail. Matthew 16: “Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Thus the certainty of the Church’s preaching prevails even against demons, who excel in natural cognition. 2 Corinthians 10 says that the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but powerful through God to destroy fortifications, “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.” Faith therefore is more certain and firm because it conquers and captivates the intellect together with all its natural virtues. 1 Corinthians 1 compares the word of the Cross with human wisdom: “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,” down to, “the weakness of God is stronger than men.” Faith, although in the divine order it is imperfect cognition compared with vision, is nonetheless stronger and more certain than all human cognition and wisdom. Galatians 1 likewise says: “Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema.” Evangelical faith is therefore firmer than every angelic cognition and persuasion. Finally, St. Thomas’s reason is compelling: the certainty of an assent must be measured from its proper cause; the cause and reason of certainty in the assent of faith is divine revelation and authority, which, though obscurely, is nevertheless most certainly impressed upon the minds of believers. SECOND CONCLUSION. FAITH, EVEN AS IT EXISTS IN US AND WITH RESPECT TO US, SURPASSES EVERY INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE IN CERTAINTY,

if we consider what comes from the virtue of faith itself and the assent which it causes in us. This conclusion is opposed to Durandus, who says that even with respect to us science is more certain than faith. Capreolus and Cajetan follow Durandus in interpreting St. Thomas here when he says that the others are “more certain in a certain respect, namely on the side of the subject and with respect to us.” I believe, however, that before deciding this interpretation we must remove an equivocation. Our conclusion is proved first from St. Thomas’s reply to the second objection: “Much more is a man certain of that which he hears from God, who cannot be deceived, than of that which he sees by his own reason.” St. Thomas says the same more expressly elsewhere; Marsilius and Gabriel hold the same conclusion. It is also confirmed from the Fathers cited above.
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QUESTION IV,

ARTICLE VIII —

COMMENTARY CONCLUDED Augustine, Confessions VII, c. 10, says to God: “You cried from afar: I am who am. And I

heard, as one hears in the heart, and there was no place from which I could doubt; I would more easily doubt that I was alive than that Truth was not.” Chrysostom, on Hebrews 11, says that faith cannot be spoken of except concerning things not seen; once someone has satisfaction from visible things, the matter is no longer faith in the same manner. Experience itself shows this. If a faithful philosopher thinks he possesses a demonstration of some conclusion, and nevertheless hears from a trustworthy theologian that the conclusion is contrary to faith, he immediately begins to doubt his science. Therefore, even on the part of the subject, he is more certain concerning matters of faith than concerning matters scientifically known. The

second conclusion is also proved by the first three arguments proposed at the beginning of the doubt; their solution will explain the legitimate meaning of St. Thomas when he says that science is more certain than faith on the part of the subject and with respect to us. REPLY TO ARGUMENT 1. I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. It follows only that from the natural resources of the subject the believer is less certain of believed matters than of first natural principles. For understanding this, there are two possible meanings of St. Thomas’s statement that “on the part of the subject the believer is less certain of matters believed through faith than of matters known by science.” One meaning would be that the Christian intellect, which is the subject of faith, is made less certain by the habit of faith in its assent than by science whenever it uses the habit of faith and the habit of science or demonstration. This meaning is more than false, as the arguments made at the beginning of the doubt prove. The other meaning is that the Christian intellect is not made as certain by its OWN NATURAL RESOURCES for assenting to matters of faith as it is for assenting to scientific truths. The reason is that for scientific truths it is made certain by the natural light necessarily implanted in it; for matters of faith it is made certain by a supernatural light infused and voluntarily received. In this sense St. Thomas’s third conclusion is to be understood. His own reason shows this when he says that the human intellect “more fully attains” the things of science, that is, it is more proportioned to them by its nature. But if the intellect is considered as already perfected by the supernatural light of faith, though voluntarily received, it is more firmly certified when it uses that light in the assent of faith than when it uses natural light or the habit of science in scientific assent. It is no objection that the use of faith depends upon a pious affection of the will. The supernatural light, from its nature, has a connection with that pious affection through the motion of the Holy Spirit, and by this motion the pious affection is efficacious for bringing the intellect into captivity to the obedience of Christ. Two examples illustrate this. Peter can by natural constitution have less acute sight than John; yet if Peter uses spectacles, he sees better, more certainly, and more distinctly than John. Likewise Peter unarmed can be weaker in combat than John; yet Peter armed can be stronger than John unarmed, although he voluntarily assumes the weapons. In the same way we say that faith is more certain because, when a man uses it, he is firmer in assent than when he uses natural or naturally acquired habits. These latter are “carnal,” according to Matthew 16: “Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee,” where flesh and blood signify every merely human cognition. Hence the Apostle calls faith a breastplate and a shield: “putting on the breastplate of faith”; “in all things taking the shield of faith.” This also explains the first and second objections and how St. Thomas’s third conclusion is to be understood when he says that faith on the part of the subject and with respect to us is less certain than science. REPLY TO ARGUMENT 3. It proves our second conclusion. REPLY TO ARGUMENT 4. I deny the consequence. Although the motion of the will is free, insofar as it proceeds from the Holy Spirit and accompanies infused light, the assent of faith is much more certain and firm than science. REPLY TO ARGUMENT 5. Granted the hypothesis, a Christian is certain in two ways of the disjunction “The Son of God is man, or the Son of God is not man.” First, by natural light, which immediately dictates that anything either is or is not. Second, he is certain because by faith he assents to one part, “The Son of God is man,” and thence it follows that the whole disjunction is true. Therefore insofar as he assents to the disjunction by the first reason, he is more certain only in a certain respect, namely from the side of natural power and the greater natural proportion of the subject to that object. Nevertheless, insofar as by faith he assents to one member of the disjunction, his intellect is more firmly established in assent to the whole than if he assented to the whole disjunction by natural light alone. Thus one who assents by faith to “God is three and one” is more certain also of “God exists,” even if he has a natural demonstration of the latter, than he would be if he possessed only the natural demonstration. It follows that the man who has faith is not only certain in more ways of the disjunction “The Son of God is man or is not man,” but also has a more intense certainty because he assents more intensely to one member. Even if the second member were not contradictory but merely disparate and impossible, as “The Son of God is man or man is a stone,” he would assent more firmly to the whole disjunction through faith in one member than to a disjunction of contradictories by natural light alone.

REPLY TO THE

LAST ARGUMENT. Distinguish the minor. If we speak of deliberate and voluntary hesitations, I deny that a believer suffers such doubts; one who is doubtful in faith is an unbeliever. If we speak of involuntary and indeliberate hesitations, then the major is true only if other things are equal. But the certainty of faith and natural certainty are not equal in their cause. Divine authority, even though
it reveals obscurely, surpasses every certainty of natural cognition, even when that cognition is evident. Those first movements of hesitation arise from the weakness of the natural intellect when it is carried above itself by the supernatural motion of God. To the confirmation, therefore, the consequence is denied. The difference between a heretic and a Catholic is that the heretic from a vicious will confirms his intellect in his sect, whereas the Catholic from a pious affection toward God and from the motion of the Holy Spirit
firmly adheres to the things believed. Thus far Question IV.

QUESTION V — ON THOSE WHO POSSESS FAITH

ARTICLE I — WHETHER AN ANGEL OR MAN IN THE FIRST STATE POSSESSED FAITH

OBJECTION 1. It seems that an angel or man in the first state did not possess faith. Hugh of St. Victor says that because man does not have the eye of contemplation open, he cannot see God and the things that are in God. But the angel before confirmation or fall had the eye of contemplation open; according to Augustine, he saw things in the Word. Likewise the first man in innocence seems to have had the eye of contemplation open. Hugh of St. Victor says that man in his first state knew his Creator, not merely by an external hearing, but by interior inspiration; not as God, absent, is now sought by believers through faith, but as more manifestly seen by a kind of present contemplation. Therefore man or angel in the first state did not possess faith. OBJECTION 2. The cognition of faith is enigmatic and obscure: “Now we see through a glass in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13). But in the first state there was no obscurity in man or angel, because darkness is a punishment of sin. Therefore faith could not exist in that state. OBJECTION 3. Romans 10 says that faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of God. But in the first state of angelic or human nature there was no hearing from another external speaker. Therefore there was no faith. ON THE CONTRARY. Hebrews 11: “He that cometh to God must believe.” But angel and man in their first condition were in the state of approaching God. Therefore they needed faith. I ANSWER THAT some say that in the angels before confirmation or fall, and in man before sin, there was no faith because of the manifest contemplation they then possessed concerning divine things. But since faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” and by faith we believe what is not seen, only that manifestation excludes faith by which the principal object of faith itself is seen. The principal object of faith is First Truth, the vision of which makes the blessed and succeeds faith. Since the angel before confirmation and man before sin did not yet possess that beatitude in which God is seen through His essence, it is manifest that they did not have a manifestation sufficient to exclude faith. Their knowledge could be manifest in many divine effects and mysteries without being the vision which takes away faith. If man and angel had been created in purely natural conditions, as some say, it might perhaps be maintained that faith was not in the angel before confirmation or in man before sin, because faith is above the natural cognition of God of both man and angel. But, as was said above, man and angel were created with the gift of grace. Therefore, through grace received but not yet consummated, there had to be in them a certain beginning of hoped-for beatitude. This beginning exists in the will through hope and charity, and in the intellect through faith. Hence it must be said that the angel before confirmation possessed faith, and likewise man before sin. Yet note that in the object of faith there is something formal, namely First Truth existing above every natural cognition of a creature, and something material, namely the truths to which we assent by adhering to First Truth. With respect to the formal element, faith is common to all wayfarers who possess cognition of future beatitude not yet attained by adhering to First Truth. With respect to the material objects proposed for belief, however, some things believed by one person can be manifestly known by another even in the present state. Accordingly it can be said that the angel before confirmation and man before sin knew by manifest cognition certain divine mysteries which we now cannot know except by believing.

REPLY TO

OBJECTION 1. Although Hugh’s words are authoritative, the contemplation which removes the necessity of faith is the contemplation of the heavenly homeland, by which supernatural truth is seen through its essence. Neither the angel before confirmation nor man before sin possessed this contemplation. Their contemplation was higher than ours; approaching God more nearly, they could know manifestly more divine effects and mysteries than we can. God was therefore more present to them through the light of wisdom than He is to us, although not present to them as He is to the blessed through the light of glory.

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QUESTION V,
ARTICLE I — CONTINUED

REPLY TO

OBJECTION 2. In the first state of man and angel there was no obscurity of guilt or punishment. Nevertheless there was a certain natural obscurity in the created intellect, because every creature is darkness when compared with the immensity of the divine light. Such obscurity suffices for the nature of faith.

REPLY TO

OBJECTION 3. In the first state there was no hearing from an external human speaker, but there was hearing from God inwardly inspiring, as the prophets heard according to Psalm 84: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is necessary to say that the angel before confirmation and man before sin possessed faith. First, Hebrews 11 says that one approaching God must believe that He is and is the rewarder of those who seek Him; but angel and man in their first condition were in a state of approaching God. Second, man and angel were created with the gift of grace, not in beatitude, which is consummated grace. The beginning of beatitude is in the will through hope and charity and in the intellect through faith. SECOND CONCLUSION. It can be said that the angel before confirmation and man before sin knew by manifest cognition certain divine mysteries which we cannot now know except through faith, because their contemplation was higher and they approached God more nearly. COMMENTARY The principal question to be examined here is that which we deferred from Question I, article 5, doubt 3: whether there was faith concerning supernatural mysteries in the angels. ARGUMENT 1 FOR THE NEGATIVE. The angel evidently knew that God was revealing supernatural objects to him, for example that God is the supernatural justifier and beatifier and is three and one. Therefore he could not simultaneously possess faith concerning those objects. The consequence follows from St. Thomas, q. 1, a. 4. The antecedent is

proved: it was evident to the angel that such a revelation was being made to him and that it came not from a creature; therefore it was evident that it came from God, and it was evident that God could not lie. This is Durandus's argument in III Sentences, d. 23, q. 9, where he entirely denies that angels possessed faith even if they were created in grace, and says their merit consisted in an act of obedience rather than an act of faith. ARGUMENT 2. A Christian philosopher who possesses a demonstration that God exists cannot assent to that same proposition by faith, because he possesses evidence at least from an effect. Much less, therefore, could the angel have faith concerning a mystery if he possessed evident a posteriori knowledge of

everything involved. His reasoning could be expressed thus: everything revealed by God is true; God reveals that He is three and one; therefore it is true. The consequence and major are evident, while the minor was known by the angel from experience and as it were from an effect. Hence the conclusion was evident to him. ARGUMENT 3. It belongs to the formal nature of faith that the intellect not be compelled to assent except with the addition of a free motion of the will. But the divine testimony was evident to the angel and compelled his intellect, as to the specification of assent, without a free motion of the will. Therefore the angel did not have an act of faith concerning what was revealed. Confirmation: that God cannot deceive is more evident than that man is risible, even by natural light. Therefore if it was evident to the angel in particular that God revealed these things, his intellect was necessitated as to specification so that he could not dissent even if he wished. ARGUMENT 4 FROM ST. THOMAS. In this article St. Thomas says that with respect to the formal nature of faith, faith is common to all who have knowledge of a future beatitude not yet attained. But the formal reason of faith, as gathered from

Question I, is First Truth revealing obscurely. Therefore it seems contradictory that someone should

have faith while at the

same time possessing evidence that First Truth is the one revealing. In the next article St. Thomas says that the believer assents not because he sees the thing itself or resolves it into first principles seen in themselves. But the angel evidently assented to the formal reason of revelation and resolved the revealed truth into the principles: everything revealed by God is true; God reveals this. Therefore it seems that the revealed mysteries were evident to him. For solving the question, some things must be presupposed and others determined explicitly. FIRST PRESUPPOSITION. Both angels and man before the fall possessed grace. This is Catholic doctrine. See Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia I, c. 5. SECOND PRESUPPOSITION. It is more probable that both angel and man received this grace together with nature, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 62, a. 3 and q. 95, a. 1. Concerning the faith of angels there are three opinions. The first is Durandus's, which denies that angels possessed faith. The second is Cajetan's subtle opinion. He holds, first, that angels, Apostles, Adam, and Prophets possessed faith insofar as they knew that God is three and one and supernaturally beatifies, but knew these mysteries in a certain enigmatic and obscure way, not through their proper reasons as they are in themselves.

QUESTION V,

ARTICLE I —

COMMENTARY CONTINUED Cajetan says, second, that the aforesaid faithful nevertheless possessed evident cognition of

all the articles of faith, not merely in the common reason of credibility, as we said above that the articles are evidently credible, but even in the particular reason of truth in God testifying: they evidently knew that God was testifying and revealing the articles. Third, he says that this is the difference between us and the angels, Adam, Prophets, and Apostles: we obscurely know and believe not only the revealed truths themselves but also the medium of revelation, namely First Truth as revealing; they, however, believed the revealed truths by faith while possessing evidence concerning the medium of revelation, namely God as revealing. Cajetan consistently holds this opinion. ARGUMENTS FOR CAJETAN. FIRST. St. Thomas in the present article says that only that manifestation excludes faith by which that which is principally believed is rendered apparent or seen. Thus only the vision of the divine essence removes faith. But evident cognition in the Testifier is not the vision of the divine essence. Therefore it can coexist with faith. Likewise in the next article St. Thomas says that through some sign or miracle the intellect can be compelled to know manifestly that something is said by God, although the thing itself is not evident; hence the nature of faith is not thereby removed. In the same article, reply 1, he says that the faith of demons is in a certain manner compelled through the evidence of signs. SECOND. It was evident to the highest angel that there was no creature superior to him from whom he could learn such supernatural objects. Therefore it was evident that he was illuminated by God, who cannot lie. THIRD. Angels evidently know the habits of faith infused in them. But it belongs intrinsically to the nature of the habit of faith that it cannot incline to falsehood, since it is infused by God Himself. Therefore they possessed evidence in the Testifier. The major is proved: angels evidently know their own essence, and therefore also those things which are really in their essence, especially accidents depending upon the subject. FOURTH. The evidence which removes faith is evidence either of the thing itself as it is in itself, or through an evident cognition of the cause, or through an effect necessarily connected with the cause. But evidence in the Testifier is none of these. Therefore it does not remove the obscurity of faith. FIFTH. Human and acquired faith can coexist with evidence of this kind in the witnesses. By acquired human faith we believe, without having seen it, that Rome exists; nevertheless we possess moral evidence in the many witnesses who have seen Rome, whose unanimous testimony is morally impossible to be false. The nature of faith is nevertheless preserved. Therefore likewise the nature of infused faith concerning the Trinity can be preserved together with evidence concerning God testifying through signs, miracles, or interior revelation. THIRD OPINION. No one in the state of wayfarer ever possessed simultaneously faith and evidence of the very same supernatural mysteries. This opinion can be proved by one reason. If someone possesses evidence of the truth “God is man,” he necessarily possesses evidence of the connection of predicate with subject. Therefore that connection cannot be obscure to him. What is evident under some reason cannot be called obscure with respect to the same person, even if under another reason which he lacks it could be evident. For example, one who evidently sees the moon eclipsed immediately has evidence that the earth is interposed between sun and moon, even if he does not possess evidence of the interposition considered in itself. This opinion can also be proved by the arguments proposed at the beginning of the doubt for the negative side. For deciding this question, which is much disputed among Scholastics and even Thomists, let our FIRST CONCLUSION be: THE OPINION OF DURANDUS DENYING THAT ANGELS EVER POSSESSED FAITH MUST BE ENTIRELY REJECTED. It seems to us rash against the common opinion of the Scholastics, and the reason given by St. Thomas in the article in confirmation of his

first conclusion is excellent. It will not do to say that Hebrews 11, “He that cometh to God must believe,” concerns men alone; for the same reason applies to angels and to those men to whom mysteries were immediately revealed by God and to whom power of working miracles was given in confirmation of the faith. If Durandus’s argument had force, it would likewise follow that Prophets and Apostles did not possess faith. This is confirmed by Revelation 21, where the same measure is said to belong to man and angel in the heavenly Jerusalem, because both are disposed to glory through faith living by charity. Moreover it is certain that angels possessed hope of future beatitude; therefore they also possessed faith, since “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” that is, the foundation of hope. It is also certain that angels possessed supernatural cognition of the mysteries of faith. But, as Durandus himself teaches in the prologue to the Sentences, q. 3, evident cognition of supernatural things cannot be communicated to a pure wayfarer. Therefore the angels possessed enigmatic and obscure cognition, and consequently cognition of faith. The major is proved from Ezekiel 28: “Thou wast the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom, perfect in beauty, in the pleasures of the paradise of God,” down to, “Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation”; and Isaiah 14: “How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning?” According to the common interpretation of the Scholastics and Fathers these texts are literally understood of Lucifer, although spoken prophetically under the figures of the kings of Tyre and Babylon. They could not be verified of an angel deprived of supernatural cognition. With respect to the first man, Ecclesiasticus 17 says: “He gave them a heart to devise, and filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit,” and afterward: “Their eye saw the majesty of his glory, and their ears heard his glorious voice.” These

words sufficiently show that our first parents received supernatural cognition. The SECOND CONCLUSION begins on the following
page.

QUESTION V, ARTICLE I — SECOND, THIRD, AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

SECOND CONCLUSION. Evidence of the articles of faith in the divine Testifier cannot stand simultaneously with faith. If it
were evident to me that God Himself reveals, “The Word was made flesh,” then it would be evident that this truth is in the divine mind; and because the divine mind is true and God speaks as He knows, the consequence to “therefore the Word was made flesh” would be evident. The premises and connections would be evident, and therefore the conclusion would no longer remain obscure in the manner required for faith. This is confirmed against Cajetan. To say that the proposition “The Son of God is man” is evidently true is to say that the predicate evidently belongs to the subject. Therefore, if evidence of the divine testimony generates evident assent to the truth of that proposition, it also generates evident assent to the connection of predicate and subject. Moreover, demonstrative knowledge from an effect excludes faith concerning the same object. A Christian philosopher who demonstrates that God exists cannot at the same time assent by faith to that proposition under the same evident aspect. Yet evidence in the Testifier is no less capable of generating evidence of the conclusion than an evident effect is. Indeed, created effects are more extrinsic to the divine being than God's own testimony is to the truths He reveals. If evident creatures can lead evidently to God as cause, much more would a divine testimony, if evidently known precisely as God's testimony, lead to the truth existing in the divine mind and thence to the truth of the thing revealed. Nor does the comparison with the blessed prove otherwise. The blessed may know certain future contingents because God reveals them, without intuitively seeing those contingents either in the Word or in themselves; nevertheless they do not possess faith. This shows that knowledge based on an evident divine Testifier is not the obscure knowledge of faith. Likewise, one who once
possessed a demonstration and afterward forgot its middle term, while retaining certain memory that he demonstrated the **conclusion, cannot simply elicit faith concerning that same conclusion. For these reasons, together with** the arguments placed
at the beginning of the doubt, the third opinion seems to me much more probable. THIRD CONCLUSION. Angels, Adam, Apostles, and Prophets possessed greater testimonies and a fuller, less obscure cognition than we ordinarily possess. They even had evidence concerning some matters which we hold by faith. Thus an angel could know evidently that the world was made from nothing at the beginning of time; Adam and the Apostles likewise experienced certain things which for us are matters of faith. FINAL CONCLUSION. Cajetan's opinion can nevertheless be defended with probability, since many very learned men hold and defend it; I, however, does not prefer it. REPLY TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT. It is denied that the angel necessarily had evidence that the supernatural revelation made to him was immediately from God. He could be certain by the obscure light of faith that God illuminated him without possessing evidence either of God revealing or of the revelation itself as such. A Catholic now can likewise be most certain that he is supernaturally illuminated by faith without seeing the divine Revealer. I therefore judge that there is no evidence of the divine Testifier in supernatural matters unless God Himself as Testifier is seen to be God.
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QUESTION V, ARTICLE I — REPLIES CONTINUED

It may be granted that an angel knew evidently that a supernatural communication was being made to him, while denying that he thereby
knew evidently that no created speaker or minister intervened. A creature could remain unknown to the angel, not as to its natural substance and natural operation, but as to a supernatural operation in which it served as an instrument. If it is objected that a supernatural
operation cannot proceed from a creature as principal cause and therefore must be from God, the answer is that an act can be supernatural as to its substance by God's power and yet possess a moral defect through the created agent. A person possessing a gratuitously given grace, such as the power of miracles, can abuse that gift for an evil end and attempt deception. Thus the angel did not
have evidence merely from the supernatural character of a communication that the speech could contain no falsehood. He was certain of
the proposed supernatural truths by the obscure light of faith, but he did not see their truth evidently. TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT.
The minor premise, “this is revealed by God,” was not evident to the angel, although it could be evident that a discourse concerning things surpassing natural cognition was being addressed to him. Whether the discourse was true was judged with the certainty of faith,
not with evidence. TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH ARGUMENTS. They likewise support SECOND CONCLUSION. Evidence of the
Revealing God would exclude faith; what the angel possessed was certainty through faith rather than such evidence. REPLIES TO CAJETAN. To the first: evidence in God as Testifier cannot exist unless God revealing is seen. This explains St. Thomas's statement in
the present article. What St. Thomas says in the following article about signs and miracles will be explained there. To the argument that
angels evidently knew their own infused habits: although they knew their own essence evidently, it does not follow that they knew with
evidence the specific supernatural nature of every quality existing in them. The specification of faith is taken from its formal object. A
created intelligible species might represent the habit, but evident cognition of its specific supernatural difference would require the light
of glory. The reason is that the power of a seed cannot be perfectly and evidently known without evident knowledge of the fruit it can
produce. Grace and the theological virtues are seeds of beatitude: “The grace of God, life everlasting.” A mere wayfarer can be certain
that he has faith, and by special revelation can even be certain that he has grace, yet he cannot possess evident knowledge of the specific
nature of grace and faith. This agrees with 1 John 3: “Now we are the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be; we
know that when he shall appear we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is.” The dignity of divine sonship, which is grace, is therefore not evidently comprehended except in the vision of God. I reject the opinion that Christ's infused knowledge, apart
from the light of glory, would have given evident knowledge of the Trinity as it is in itself. St. Thomas teaches that Christ knew the divine essence as it is through the light of glory, not merely through an infused created species. If no created species can represent the
divine essence as it is, it is still less plausible that one should represent the Trinity of Persons as it is. To the remaining argument: if divine revelation were evident precisely in God as Testifier, it would be no weaker than evidence from an effect. God's speech would be,
as it were, an effect of the truth existing in the divine mind; from an evidently truthful speaker we infer the truth of what is spoken. Hence such evidence would terminate the obscurity required for faith.
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QUESTION V, ARTICLE II — WHETHER THERE IS FAITH IN THE DEMONS

Before beginning the new article I reply to the comparison with human testimony. If the testimony of many witnesses were literally
evident as incapable of falsehood, assent would no longer be merely human faith; the existence of Rome would become evident from
that testimony. Ordinarily, however, the testimony of many independent persons who say they have seen Rome gives moral evidence,
not strict demonstrative evidence. ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS. First, Augustine says faith consists in the will of believers, and
the will by which one wills to believe God is good. Since demons have no deliberately good will, it seems there is no faith in them.

Second, faith is a gift of divine grace: “By grace you are saved through faith; for it is the gift of God.” Demons lost gratuitous gifts by
sin. Third, unbelief is a grave sin; if demons had faith, some unbelieving men would seem guilty of a graver sin than the demons. ON
THE CONTRARY. James 2 says: “The demons believe and tremble.” ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE. The believer's intellect assents
to what is believed not because it sees the thing in itself or resolves it into self-evident first principles, but because of the command of
the will. The will can move the intellect in two ways. First, because the will is ordered to the good; then believing is a praiseworthy
act. Second, because the intellect is so constrained by evidence that it judges something must be believed, although the will does not
lovingly adhere to the good proposed. A person can be compelled to believe something by evident signs without seeing the thing
itself. If a prophet, speaking in the Lord's name, foretold a future event and raised a dead man as a sign, the observer could be
convinced that the message came from God, although the future event itself remained unseen. The character of faith concerning the
unseen event would therefore remain. In Christ's faithful, faith is praised in the first way, from a will ordered toward the good. This
praiseworthy faith is not in demons. They possess faith only in the second manner. They see many manifest indications from which
they recognize that the Church's doctrine is from God, although they do not see the realities themselves, such as God being Three and
One. To the first objection: the demons' faith is in a certain manner compelled by evidence of signs and therefore is not praiseworthy
in their will. To the second: faith as a gift of grace inclines man to believe through an affection for the good, even when faith is
unformed. The demons' faith is not this gift of grace; they are rather compelled by the perspicacity of their natural intellect. To the

third: the demons are displeased that the signs of faith are so evident that they are compelled to believe; their malice is therefore not
diminished by their believing. SUMMARY. First, demons do not possess praiseworthy faith. Second, they possess an acquired and in
a certain manner compelled faith, because manifest signs and intellectual perspicacity force recognition that the Church's doctrine is
from God. Third, their malice is not diminished by this assent. I — FIRST DOUBT. Is infused faith, or can infused faith be, in
demons or the damned? James compares sinful believers with demons; Augustine also calls the faith of sinners the faith of demons.
These texts generate the difficulty whether the same infused but unformed habit might remain after damnation.
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QUESTION V, ARTICLE II — WHETHER INFUSED FAITH REMAINS IN THE DAMNED

Arguments for the affirmative continue. St. Thomas, citing Augustine, says unformed faith can in a certain sense be more compatible
with the damned than hope. Further, the damned who possessed infused faith in this life still know many supernatural truths in hell, and
natural inclination toward good as such is not destroyed. Faith, moreover, is lost during this life only by the sin of unbelief; many faithful
persons who are damned never committed formal unbelief. Finally, there seems to be some mark distinguishing those who were faithful
from those who were never faithful; if not baptismal character in every case, perhaps the faith they received. Durandus therefore held
that the faith once possessed remains in damned men and, if angels received faith at creation, even in demons. A gloss on the title
concerning the supreme Trinity and Catholic faith was also cited for the view that the unformed faith now existing in sinners remains in
the damned and demons. CERTAIN CONCLUSION. Infused faith is not in demons or in the damned. This follows from St. Thomas's
reasoning and his arguments against praiseworthy faith in demons. Infused faith, being God's gift, is praiseworthy even when it exists in
a sinner. If a man in this life were so disposed that he refused the Gospel unless forced by evident miracles, he would not possess infused
faith, because he would reject the formal reason of believing and assent only from the evidence of signs. Thomas the Apostle, while
saying “Unless I see ... I will not believe,” was for that interval disposed toward unbelief. The damned are similarly fixed and therefore
do not possess infused faith. Again, no damned person can attain the end of faith, eternal salvation: “Receiving the end of your faith, the
salvation of your souls.” Infused faith remains usefully in Christian sinners because it is a principle by which they may return to God
through penance with hope of pardon. In the damned no such hope is possible; therefore the supernatural gift ordered by God to that end
would remain in vain. Faith is the first aid of wayfarers — “we walk by faith” — but the damned have already reached their unhappy
terminus. I judge Durandus's position not merely false but dangerous and proximate to error. To compare the faith remaining in a mortal
sinner with the faith of the damned as though they were of the same species would virtually imply that mortal sin destroys infused faith,
which is a Lutheran error. REPLIES. James compares the faith of demons and sinful Christians only insofar as neither justifies without
charity and works. The same restriction applies to Augustine. St. Thomas's comparison with hope is analogical: both infused faith and
hope are incompatible with damnation, though hope is even more repugnant to that state. Acquired belief can remain in the damned,
while acquired hope of salvation cannot. No good supernatural affection remains in the damned. During this life a sinful believer still has
some good affection toward supernatural things and the potency of restoration. In the damned, natural inclination to good in general
remains, but every particular act is vitiated by the circumstance of their ultimate end. Faith is not ordinarily lost in this life except
through unbelief; at the terminus of damnation, however, the pious affection toward supernatural truth required by infused faith is
incompatible with their state. God also withdraws the ray of mercy by which He conserved the habit. The damned finally possess an
assent opposed to faith, refusing to believe except insofar as the evidence of signs compels them. Those damned faithful who were not
baptized are distinguished from infidels not by a remaining infused habit but by the stain associated with violated faith. SECOND
DOUBT. Does the acquired faith which St. Thomas attributes to demons truly deserve the name faith? The objection is that acquired
faith also requires free motion of the will determining the intellect, whereas demons appear compelled by signs. Moreover, if, as argued
in the preceding article, evidence in the divine Testifier cannot coexist with faith, how can demons possess faith if they recognize from
miracles that the Church's doctrine is from God?

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QUESTION V, ARTICLE II — THE DEMONS' ACQUIRED AND 'COMPELLED' FAITH

For understanding the difficulty, coercion of the intellect must be distinguished. One kind is perfect necessity, depending on no liberty at
all. The intellect is thus necessitated in assent to first principles and, at least as to specification, to a conclusion following from an evident demonstration; a man cannot dissent. Another kind is imperfect necessity or coercion. A man or angel can absolutely dissent, but
only with very great difficulty because powerful reasons and strong testimonies press the mind toward the truth. This is called coercion
in the same broad manner in which something exceedingly difficult is sometimes called impossible. A second distinction concerns a miracle or testimony proposed in confirmation of faith. One question is whether it is truly a miracle or testimony rather than a prodigy or
fiction. Another is whether that miracle is in fact performed by God precisely to confirm divine faith. An unlearned man can doubt both.
A wise man, and especially a demon, cannot doubt that a genuine miracle surpassing all created nature must be from God at least as principal cause. Yet he can absolutely retain doubt concerning the second point — the precise divine intention for which the sign is given — although with great difficulty. Third, neither infused nor acquired faith requires a will wholly free from every pressure. An imperfectly free will, mixed with a kind of necessity, suffices. A merchant casts precious goods into the sea during a storm to save his
life; absolutely he could refuse, yet he freely throws them away under pressure. A traveler hands money to a robber to avoid death. Aristotle and St. Thomas therefore call actions done through fear simply voluntary, though mixed with involuntariness. St. Thomas accordingly says the demons' faith is 'in a certain manner' compelled, not simply and absolutely compelled. In his commentary on the
Sentences he says demons do not assent altogether freely. Human acquired faith also often follows testimony so powerful that dissent is
extremely difficult. It is enough that the will still move the intellect in some manner. Finally, infused faith requires a pious affection toward divine things. Acquired faith does not. For acquired faith it suffices that the intellect assent under some free inclination of will,
even as one unwillingly judges that goods must be thrown overboard or money surrendered to a robber. Demons therefore assent to truths of our faith without any pious affection for the Testifier or the things testified. Rather, nothing is more hateful to them, and these
truths torment and sadden them. REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION. The major is conceded, but the motion of will need not be wholly free or proceed from pious affection. A liberty in some manner constrained suffices; thus it is not contradictory to say that someone believes and yet does not wish to believe. REPLY TO THE SECOND. Demons may possess evidence that genuine miracles
are produced by God as principal cause, but they do not evidently judge that God performs them precisely as testimony confirming this
particular doctrine. They can have very strong, indeed moral, certainty of that fact without strict evidence. It is objected that Christ and
the Apostles visibly performed miracles to testify that Christ is God; would it not then be evident that God performed those miracles for
the same end, lest God become the author of a lie? I reply that the argument establishes great moral certainty, not strict evidence. A gratuitously given grace such as the power of miracles can be abused by a created minister for an evil end. Hence the demon does not see
with metaphysical evidence that the miracle proceeds from God alone precisely as confirmation of the Christian doctrine, although he
possesses acquired faith and exceedingly strong certainty. The demons' experience of punishment likewise produces great moral certainty concerning Christian doctrine, but does not make the doctrine itself evident. Punishment proves that they acted against conscience; it does not by itself demonstrate every revealed mystery.
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QUESTION V, ARTICLE II CONCLUDED; ARTICLE III — WHETHER ONE WHO DISBELIEVES ONE ARTICLE CAN HAVE UNFORMED FAITH IN THE OTHERS

An objection remains: if demons are constrained only as to specification, could they not suspend the act of judgment and thereby suffer less? I reply that when good or evil judged to concern us immediately is presented, complete suspension of judgment is practically impossible or exceedingly difficult. A person hearing grave news concerning himself cannot simply suspend judgment merely to escape sadness. Much less can demons suspend judgment concerning the Christian doctrine by which the prince of this world is cast out and mankind delivered from demonic power. Perhaps divine power even compels the exercise of judgment. Nor would dissent reduce their torment. Natural powers are not destroyed in demons; there remains a natural inclination to know truth and avoid knowingly assenting to falsehood. To force themselves to dissent from the Gospel, whose signs are evidently most credible, would therefore do greater violence to their nature and expose them knowingly to the danger of false assent. Such degradation of intellect is itself repugnant to their pride.

ARTICLE III — ST. THOMAS. It seems that a heretic who disbelieves one article might retain unformed faith concerning the others.

The natural intellect of a heretic is not stronger than that of a Catholic; yet a Catholic needs the habit of faith to believe each article. Further, one science such as geometry contains many conclusions, and a person can know some while being ignorant of others. Finally, a man can obey some divine commandments while violating others. ON THE CONTRARY. As one mortal sin is contrary to charity, disbelief of one article is contrary to faith. Charity does not remain after one mortal sin; neither does faith remain after pertinacious disbelief of one article. ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE. In a heretic who pertinaciously disbelieves one article, neither formed nor unformed faith remains. The species of every habit depends upon the formal reason of its object; when that formal reason is removed, the species of the habit cannot remain. The formal object of faith is First Truth as manifested in Sacred Scripture and in the doctrine of the Church proceeding from First Truth. Whoever does not adhere to the Church's doctrine as an infallible and divine rule does not possess the habit of faith. He may hold propositions that belong materially to faith, but he holds them in another manner. A person who accepts a conclusion without knowing its demonstrative middle term does not thereby possess science of that conclusion; he has only opinion. So one who adheres to the Church as infallible accepts all that the Church teaches. If he selects what he wishes to hold and rejects what he wishes not to hold, he adheres no longer to the Church's doctrine as infallible rule but to his own will. Therefore the pertinacious heretic who rejects one article is not prepared to follow the Church in all things. If he is not pertinacious, he is not formally a heretic but an erring believer. The heretic's assent to the other articles is thus not theological faith but an opinion according to his own judgment. To the first objection: articles which the heretic does not deny are not held in the same way as by the faithful, who simply adhere to First Truth through the habit of faith. The heretic holds them by his own judgment. To the second: diverse conclusions of one acquired science may be proved through diverse middle terms; one may therefore be known without another. But all articles of faith are adhered to through one medium, First Truth proposed to us in Scripture according to the Church's doctrine. Whoever abandons this medium entirely lacks faith. To the third: diverse precepts can be referred to diverse proximate motives and one can be observed without another; but under the first motive of perfect obedience to God, whoever transgresses one departs from that perfect obedience: “Whosoever shall offend in one point is become guilty of all.”

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QUESTION V, ARTICLE III - ON HERESY AND THE HABIT OF FAITH

SUMMARY OF ST. THOMAS. The conclusion is negative. Whoever pertinaciously dissents from one article abandons the formal reason of the habit of faith. He is no longer prepared to follow the Church's doctrine in all things, but chooses by his own will what he will believe. I — DOUBT. Is St. Thomas's conclusion true, and is his reason demonstrative? First objection:

the formal reason might be removed with respect to one material object while remaining with respect to another. An error against one scientific conclusion does not destroy science concerning all other conclusions; one unjust act does not necessarily

destroy every acquired disposition of justice. Therefore denial of one article need not destroy faith concerning all the others.

Second objection: if a great theologian fell into one heresy, would he immediately lose the acquired habit of theology? Experience suggests that heretics can write excellent theological treatises concerning other articles. Theology depends upon the habit of its principles, namely faith; if faith were totally destroyed, it seems theology should also be destroyed. Yet an acquired habit is not ordinarily destroyed by one contrary act. Third objection: a heretic can assent promptly and easily to the articles he retains, just as before. Luther, for example, can easily assent that God is Three and One while denying purgatory. The heretic may even experience himself as believing the retained articles because God reveals them. Why then call this merely opinion? Durandus alone, in the cited place, held that a heretic dissenting from one article can retain infused faith concerning the others. A gloss on the title concerning the supreme Trinity and Catholic faith is cited similarly.

CERTAIN CONCLUSION. It is very rash and proximate to error to say that the infused habit of unformed faith remains in heretics with respect to the articles they do not deny. This is contrary to the common teaching of the Scholastics and appears determined by the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 15, which says that by unbelief faith itself is lost. A person who pertinaciously denies one

article is truly an unbeliever; therefore the habit does not remain concerning the rest.

Reason also proves it. If before receiving faith a man were disposed to refuse one definite article, he would never truly become

faithful even if he accepted the others. The same disposition after receiving faith destroys it. Conservation of faith is no less a gift of

God than its infusion; a disposition incompatible with infusion is also incompatible with conservation. Further, the contrary position

would imply that a heretic remains simply a part of the Church and an actual member joined to Christ, though imperfectly, because he

would still receive from Christ the influx of infused faith by which he believes. This is contrary to the common sense of the Church.

Christian sinners can remain imperfect members, but formal heretics are not simply parts of the Church. Durandus attempts to say that

such a heretic is faithful by reason of the habit and unfaithful by reason of the contrary act. He even allows repeated acts of unbelief

concerning one article to generate a habit of unbelief coexisting with the habit of faith concerning other articles. I see two errors here:

philosophically, contrary habits cannot coexist in the same subject under the same respect; theologically, it is openly erroneous to call

formal heretics 'faithful' merely because they retain some Christian propositions. Nevertheless, the narrower thesis that an isolated act

of unbelief could coexist momentarily with the habit before its loss is treated as less explicit, though still rash and proximate to error.

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QUESTION V, ARTICLE III — THE FORMAL MEDIUM OF FAITH; ARTICLE IV BEGINS

Following Cajetan, distinguish in an intellectual habit between a formal middle term, from which the habit receives its species and by
which it differs from other habits, and material middle terms, which can be multiplied according to the conclusions considered. In natural philosophy, for example, distinct definitions can serve as material means for distinct conclusions, while all fall under the formal
consideration of mobile being. Whoever errs concerning the formal medium cannot retain the habit, because the species of the habit is
dissolved. One may err concerning some material middle term and retain the habit concerning other matters. Thus one who denied mobility as belonging to natural being would cease to speak as a natural philosopher, although he might know many truths materially
belonging to physics; one who merely errs in the definition of a horse can still retain physical science concerning other truths. Applied to
faith: whoever rejects the formal medium — First Truth revealing through the ministry of the Church — cannot retain the habit of faith
or properly be called faithful. Acquired sciences have many materially distinct middle terms corresponding to the essences of things.
Faith, however, has one common medium for all revealed truths: divine revelation manifested through the Church's ministry.
REPLY
CONCERNING THEOLOGY. Some say theology does not per se depend upon infused faith, because acquired belief concerning revealed principles suffices. I reject this solution: such 'theology' would possess no greater certainty than human faith and would therefore be opinion rather than sacred science. Theology as science depends per se upon principles revealed by God, whether possessed
through faith in the wayfarer or through the light of glory in the blessed. If a theologian becomes a heretic, the acquired qualitative dispositions and memories generated by many previous theological acts do not vanish physically in an instant. Yet theology as a true
intellectual virtue ordered by its divine principles is corrupted when its foundation is destroyed. Something materially similar remains, as
a dead man is called a man equivocally or a severed hand is called a hand. The acquired quality may remain while the character of true
theological virtue is lost. This parallels acquired temperance: one mortal sin can destroy its character as virtue without instantly erasing
every acquired psychological disposition. To the experiential objection: those who once depart from one article of faith commonly fall
into many errors. Scripture speaks of Cain becoming a wanderer and of one who goes wandering in the errors of his heart. The Catholic's
certainty differs radically from the heretic's self-persuasion. The Catholic adheres to everything revealed by God and proposed by the
Church through God's testimony, and cannot be deceived in that formal adherence. The heretic may imagine that he believes because of

First Truth, but in reality he follows his own judgment where it selects among the Church's teachings.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER FAITH CAN BE GREATER IN ONE PERSON THAN IN ANOTHER

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS. The quantity of a habit is considered from its objects; whoever has faith believes all that belongs to
faith, since defect from one article destroys faith. Therefore faith seems equal in all. Again, what is at the maximum does not admit more
and less, while faith adheres to First Truth above all. Finally, faith in gratuitous cognition corresponds to the intellect of principles in
natural cognition; the latter belongs equally to human nature. ON THE CONTRARY. Christ says, “O thou of little faith, why didst thou
doubt?” and to the woman, “Great is thy faith.” Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another. ST.
THOMAS begins the response
by distinguishing the quantity of a habit according to its object and according to the participation of the subject. The formal object of
faith is one and simple, First Truth; from this side faith is specifically one in all believers.
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QUESTION V, ARTICLE IV — WHETHER FAITH CAN BE GREATER IN ONE THAN IN ANOTHER

ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE CONTINUED. The material objects proposed for belief are many and can be believed more or less explicitly. In this sense one person can explicitly believe more truths than another and thus possess greater faith according to greater explication of its material object. According to participation in the subject, faith can also be greater in two ways. The act of faith proceeds from intellect and will. On the side of intellect faith can be greater through greater certainty and firmness; on the side of will through greater promptness, devotion, or confidence. To the first objection: one who pertinaciously disbelieves something contained under faith lacks the habit; but one who does not explicitly know every article can possess faith if he is prepared to believe all that God and the Church propose. From the material object one therefore has greater faith insofar as he explicitly believes more. To the

second: all believers prefer First Truth to every contrary authority, but some subject themselves to it with greater firmness and devotion. To the third: the intellect of natural principles follows human nature, which is specifically common; faith follows the gift of grace, which is not equally participated by all. SUMMARY. First, from the formal object faith is not diversified among believers, since First Truth is one and simple. Second, from the material object faith can be greater because one explicitly believes more than another. Third, from the subject faith can be greater both intellectually, through greater certainty and firmness, and voluntarily, through greater promptness, devotion and confidence. I — DOUBT. Can a sinner possess greater faith than a person who has charity?

First argument for the affirmative: a sinner may possess a more explicit knowledge of the mysteries than a just man and therefore greater faith at least materially. Second: suppose two just men, one possessing greater faith; if the one with greater faith falls into mortal sin, he loses charity but does not thereby lose or diminish the infused habit of faith, for infused habits are either removed altogether or are not diminished by a contrary act. He would therefore retain a faith greater in some respect than that of the other just man. Third: unformed faith might be intensified in the subject through more intense acts of intellect. FIRST CONCLUSION. It is certain according to Catholic faith that one faith can be greater than another. Christ's words concerning little and great faith establish this, as does the Apostles' prayer, “Increase our faith.” Paul speaks of “all faith, so that I could remove mountains,” implying eminent degrees. The beatific vision corresponding to faith admits degrees; grace, charity, and the other infused virtues are also unequal in the just. Faith, which disposes toward and accompanies grace, can therefore differ in intensity. SECOND CONCLUSION. The least living or formed faith is simply greater than the greatest unformed faith. Every living faith is a virtue simply speaking, perfectly ordered toward its object and ultimate end; dead faith is not virtue simply speaking and does not attain the ultimate end in that perfect manner. The perfection of a habit consists in perfectly attaining its object. Moreover, the strongest adhesion of intellect to faith proceeds from the will determining the intellect; a will perfected by charity determines the intellect more firmly than a will without charity. THIRD CONCLUSION. Considered merely as a certain intellectual habit, unformed faith can be more intense than formed faith. If one just man has a more intense intellectual habit of faith than another and then falls into mortal sin, the intellectual intensity of his faith is not thereby diminished, although its character as living virtue is lost. FOURTH CONCLUSION. From the material object there is no doubt that unformed faith can be greater than formed faith: a sinful theologian may explicitly know and believe more revealed propositions than a simple just believer. Thus the claim that a sinner has 'greater faith' must always be qualified. Simply as supernatural virtue ordered perfectly to God, living faith is greater; under the restricted aspect of intellectual intensity or explicit material extension, unformed faith may be greater.

QUESTION V, ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; QUESTION VI — ON THE CAUSE OF FAITH, ARTICLE I

The perfection of faith simply speaking is considered according to faith as virtue, and that perfection cannot exist without charity. Paul confirms this: “If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.” How, then, can faith increase in a sinner? I answer that it can very probably increase according to participation in the subject on the side of intellect and, in a certain manner, even on the side of will, insofar as a sinner may be moved by the Holy Ghost to a more pious affection toward divine truth without yet possessing charity. Faith can be infused into a sinner without charity — for example, when one believes the Gospel and is baptized yet refuses to restore another's property. There is therefore no intrinsic repugnance to God's increasing faith in such a sinner. No greater power is required on the side of the subject for increase of an infused quality than for its

first infusion. The sinner does not increase faith meritoriously, because he lacks charity; nor does he increase it efficiently by his own power, since no infused virtue is efficiently augmented by us. Nevertheless God can increase faith proportionately, just as He increases it together with merit in one who possesses charity, insofar as the intellectual disposition is intensified through acts caused under the motion of the Holy Ghost. It may also be said that faith increases according to the proportion of the present disposition toward the habit, just as a newly infused habit can be given according to the disposition of the act of believing. Thus ends Question V.
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QUESTION VI — ON THE CAUSE OF FAITH ARTICLE I — WHETHER FAITH IS INFUSED INTO MAN BY GOD

ST. THOMAS — OBJECTIONS. Augustine says that through science faith is generated in us, nourished, defended, and strengthened. What is generated through science appears acquired rather than infused. Again, man comes to believe by seeing miracles and hearing the doctrine of faith: “Faith cometh by hearing.” What is reached through hearing and seeing seems acquired by man. Finally, Augustine says faith consists in the will of believers; what lies in human will seems capable of being acquired by man. ON THE CONTRARY. Ephesians 2 says: “By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves ... for it is the gift of God.” ST. THOMAS — RESPONSE. Two things are required for faith. First, the things to be believed must be proposed to man, which is required for explicit belief. In this respect faith necessarily comes from God, because the truths of faith exceed human reason and enter human cognition only through divine revelation. Some receive them immediately from God, as the Apostles and Prophets did; to others God proposes them through preachers whom He sends: “How shall they preach unless they be sent?” Second, the believer must assent to what is proposed. Concerning this assent there can be an exterior cause inducing belief, such as a visible miracle or a man's persuasion. Neither is sufficient. Of those who see the same miracle and hear the same preaching, some believe and others do not. Therefore another interior cause must be posited which moves man inwardly to assent. The Pelagians placed this interior beginning solely in human free choice. They said the beginning of faith is from us insofar as we prepare ourselves to assent, while its completion is from God insofar as He proposes what must be believed. This is false. In assenting to the truths of faith man is elevated above his nature; therefore this elevation must come from a supernatural interior principle moving him, namely God. Hence faith, as regards the assent which is its principal act, is from God moving inwardly through grace. To the first objection: science generates and nourishes faith by way of exterior persuasion, but the principal and proper cause of faith is that which inwardly moves the intellect to assent. To the second: seeing miracles and hearing preaching concern the exterior proposing or persuading cause, not the sufficient interior cause. To the third: believing indeed involves the believer's will, but the human will must be prepared by God through grace so that it can be elevated to realities above nature. The commentary on this article continues on the next page.

QUESTION VI - ON THE CAUSE OF FAITH. ARTICLE I CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II BEGINS

I note that this question concerns the efficient cause of faith, since its material and formal causes have already been sufficiently treated. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First conclusion: faith must be from God with respect to the proposal of the things to be believed, because the objects that fall under faith exceed human reason. Scripture repeatedly teaches that the mysteries of Christ were hidden in God and made known by revelation. The Pelagians themselves admitted that revelation of the mysteries had to be given by God, although they falsely held that man could assent by free choice without a new grace. Second conclusion: God does not immediately propose the mysteries to everyone. He revealed them immediately to the Apostles and Prophets, while to others He proposes them through preaching, because this is the order He freely chose. Third conclusion: God alone is the proper, principal, and sufficient cause of the assent of faith by inwardly moving the believer. The reason is that in believing man is elevated above his nature. COMMENTARY. An objection is raised from the heretic, who assents to certain articles without accepting them as proposed by the Church. I reply that the truths themselves were revealed by God to the Apostles, and a heretic can hear of them and hold them by a merely human faith or opinion. The conclusion concerns true supernatural faith. After revelation has once been given, a man may believe certain revealed propositions for human reasons without believing them in the manner required for eternal life. Thus some Platonists found things consonant with Christian doctrine in Hebrew writings and accepted them by a human kind of belief. A Christian does not experimentally perceive the supernatural principle from which his act of faith proceeds. He experiences himself believing the revealed truths, but he does not see the infused light by which he believes. Nevertheless he is certain by faith that supernatural belief depends upon God. Against the second conclusion it is objected that those who saw miracles and heard the Gospel yet did not believe are condemned; therefore exterior motives seem sufficient. I answer that miracles and preaching are sufficient in their own order as exterior causes. The unbelievers were not condemned merely for lacking efficacious grace, but because they resisted God sufficiently knocking and moving them so that they could believe if they willed. They received sufficient helps, though not the efficacious help by which they would actually believe. The act of believing is also efficiently elicited by our intellect together with God, since believing is a vital act. The infused habit is an operative principle only through the power in which it inheres.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER UNFORMED FAITH IS A GIFT OF GOD. The first objection says that God's works are perfect, whereas

unformed faith is imperfect. A second compares its lack of charity to the deformity of a sinful act. A third argues that God heals wholly, whereas one who receives unformed faith is not healed of every sin.

QUESTION VI,

ARTICLE II - WHETHER UNFORMED FAITH IS A GIFT OF GOD ST. THOMAS. The conclusion

is affirmative.

Unformed faith lacks an exterior perfection, charity, but this privation does not belong to the specific essence of faith itself. Therefore the cause of faith simply speaking - God - can also be the cause of unformed faith. A privation sometimes enters the

very species of a thing, and sometimes merely supervenes upon something already constituted in its species. Disorder of humors belongs to the species of sickness; darkness, however, does not belong to the essence of a transparent body. Thus one who is not the cause of darkness may still be the cause of the transparent body. In the same way, the absence of charity does not destroy the specific nature of faith. To the first objection: unformed faith is not perfect with the perfection of virtue simply

speaking, but it possesses the perfection sufficient for the nature of faith. To the second: the deformity of a sinful moral act belongs to that act precisely as morally disordered; hence God causes the act insofar as it is an act, but not its deformity. To the third: one who receives faith without charity is healed from unbelief in a qualified sense, because he ceases from that sin, although the guilt of his preceding sins is not removed. I. The conclusion is certain according to faith. Orange, Milevis, and especially Trent teach that true faith can remain in a sinner and that such faith makes him truly Christian. Hence, if being Christian is a gift of God and unformed faith can truly make a man Christian, unformed faith is itself a divine gift. I then opposes the Protestant claim that only a fiducial faith by which a man believes his sins are personally remitted is true faith, while assent to the Gospel and the articles would not make one Christian. I cite the scriptural texts they use - that knowledge of

God is justice, that whoever believes in Christ shall not perish, and that whoever says he knows God while not keeping His commandments is a liar - together with patristic expressions saying that true faith is manifested in works. Against this, Catholic authorities show that faith can exist without charity. Christ speaks of those who prophesied and worked miracles in His name but were workers of iniquity. John says that many rulers believed in Christ but would not confess Him because they loved the glory of men. Augustine, Gregory, and others explicitly admit faith in sinners. The theological reason is that faith does not essentially depend upon charity, but upon a pious affection of the will consenting to all that God has revealed as proposed by the Church. Such a pious affection can exist in a sinner. Moreover, formed and unformed faith can be numerically the same habit; therefore the habit that is God's gift while formed does not cease to be God's gift when charity is lost. Texts that ascribe justification to faith may be understood either of faith considered as the beginning, foundation, and root of justification, or by antonomasia of formed faith, which alone possesses the complete perfection of virtue. Trent accordingly calls faith without charity idle and the person possessing it empty. The word 'true' is also used in different senses. A sinner's faith is true according to the essence of faith, even though it lacks the added perfection by which faith operates through charity. For this reason the Fathers sometimes say that sinners are not 'true' Christians in the sense of perfect Christians. I warn that in the present controversy such language must be used carefully, lest it appear to concede the Lutheran error that true faith cannot remain in sinners.

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QUESTION VI, ARTICLE II - TRUE FAITH IN SINNERS

I continue answering patristic and scriptural objections. When the Fathers say that 'true faith' cannot contradict itself by wicked works,
they frequently use 'true' to signify the perfection added by charity, not the bare specific essence of supernatural faith. Just as one may
colloquially call a man 'not a true father' because he fails in paternal duties although he truly generated a child, so a sinner may be
called 'not a true believer' because his life contradicts his profession while the habit of faith remains. The name faith can also signify
moral fidelity residing in the will: keeping one's promises and fulfilling what one professed. In that sense God Himself is called
faithful because He fulfills His promises, and a sinner may be called unfaithful because he violates the baptismal profession by
returning to sin. This does not prove the loss of theological faith. I explain Ambrose's statement about having faith sufficient to move
mountains without charity. Ambrose meant that such extraordinary perfection of faith without charity is difficult, not absolutely
impossible. He also warns that Protestants often interpret biblical words for knowledge or cognition as though they always meant
theological faith. But knowledge through the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding cannot exist in its perfect supernatural
mode without charity; therefore such texts do not prove that the habit of faith disappears in every sinner. Nor is it impossible for a
man firmly to believe eternal punishment and nevertheless sin. When he deliberates about sin he may cease actually considering the
article of faith; or the consideration may remain merely speculative rather than practical. A
man can also believe punishment while
presumptuously imagining that he will escape it through divine mercy. Ecclesiasticus teaches that because sentence against evil is not
speedily executed, men commit evil without fear. I then turns to a further doubt arising from Aquinas's third reply: does true Christian
faith depend for its infusion upon sanctifying grace or at least upon baptism? Three opinions are distinguished. The first says that faith
is infused only together with grace and baptism, so that one baptized in mortal sin without sufficient disposition receives only the
baptismal character. The second says that the infusion of faith does not depend upon baptism or sanctifying grace; I see this as the
position suggested by Aquinas and Cajetan. The third allows acts of faith before grace and baptism but holds that the infused habit is
not given before baptism without grace, though it can be given in baptism without grace. Arguments for the stricter opinions appeal to
Trent's statement that in justification faith, hope, and charity are infused together; to Aquinas's objections; to Innocent III's teaching
that God does not remit one mortal sin while leaving another; to the dignity of faith as a great supernatural gift; and to the claim that
one in mortal sin before baptism is not yet Christian. I prepares his own determination: a person duly disposed toward faith receives in
baptism both the act and habit of faith even if sanctifying grace is impeded.
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QUESTION VI, ARTICLE II - WHETHER FAITH MAY BE INFUSED WITHOUT CHARITY OR BEFORE BAPTISM

I state his first conclusion: in a person disposed toward faith, baptism infuses faith as to both act and habit even when sanctifying grace is not infused because of an obstacle in the subject. The disposition to faith consists in a pious affection of the will toward everything God reveals through His Church together with intellectual assent, at least in common, to those truths. Augustine's work On Faith and Works assumes that persons baptized while remaining in mortal sin can nevertheless possess true faith. Reason also supports this: a person so disposed is genuinely faithful and Christian. The baptismal character alone cannot be sufficient to make a man Christian in this sense, since it also remains in heretics. Yet the person is neither pagan, heretic, nor Jew; therefore he is truly among the faithful. SECOND CONCLUSION. The habit and act of faith can be infused into a person thus disposed even without sanctifying grace and before baptism, and therefore much more can remain after baptism without charity. Augustine speaks of catechumens who possess faith before baptism, and the Councils of Orange and Trent teach that divine grace first inspires faith and love of God so that men seek baptism faithfully. Trent describes adults preparing for justification as hearing the Gospel, conceiving faith, freely moving toward God, believing what He has revealed and promised, fearing divine justice, hoping in mercy, beginning to love God, and detesting sin before baptism. Since perfect contrition is not required as an antecedent condition for baptism, this conciliar description shows that faith can precede the grace of justification. Trent also says that nothing preceding justification - whether faith or works - merits the grace of justification. I add a theological reason: a man still in mortal sin can invoke God before baptism; but no one invokes Him in whom he does not believe. Further, the intellect of such a believer is elevated above its natural power by assent to the revealed mysteries, which is precisely Aquinas's reason for positing supernatural faith. As a habit is given as a principle for eliciting the act, these arguments concern not merely a passing act but the infused habit itself. A Christian can be certain that he has faith even when he cannot possess equal certainty about whether his baptism was validly received; therefore baptism cannot be an absolutely necessary prerequisite for every infusion of faith. Faith's essential nature does not depend upon charity.

Therefore, just as it can be conserved without charity, it can be infused without charity when the subject is disposed. A pagan moved toward conversion may receive faith before baptism, whether or not he has yet received justifying grace. To the objection from Trent that faith, hope, and charity are infused together in justification, I reply with Cajetan: from the side of God who justifies, these gifts are bestowed together; but an impediment arising accidentally from the subject can prevent charity while faith is nevertheless given or retained. Conversely, when a Christian sinner is restored to grace, charity is infused while faith need not be newly infused because it already remains. Aquinas's statement that God heals perfectly is distinguished: when God acts extraordinarily He may heal at once, but according to the ordinary law He can employ a deficient created subject, and the imperfection is then attributed to the subject's defect, not to God.

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QUESTION VI, ARTICLE II - CERTAINTY THAT ONE POSSESSES FAITH

I complete the preceding discussion. The remission of mortal or original sin necessarily requires sanctifying grace, which is contrary to every mortal sin; the infusion of faith alone does not require the simultaneous infusion of all virtues. Nor is it unfitting that God should bestow something supernatural upon sinners and enemies. On the contrary, it greatly manifests divine mercy that faith should
remain as a divine seed in sinners who have not directly destroyed it by an act contrary to faith. Through this remaining faith they can
call upon God as the justifier of sinners. A final objection says that a man in mortal sin before baptism is neither Christian nor friend of God. I deny the first part: such a believer can truly be Christian and faithful before sacramental incorporation into the visible body
of the Church. He belongs to the Church invisibly through faith, although the Church cannot yet exercise over him all the external jurisdiction it exercises over the baptized. A NEW DOUBT. Is a Christian infallibly certain that he possesses supernatural faith? Arguments for the negative are proposed. First, Catholic faith directly inclines us to believe truths revealed to and proposed by the Church; the proposition 'I possess supernatural faith' is not itself one of those revealed objects. Second, a heretic believing the Trinity
may falsely judge that his assent comes from the Holy Spirit; therefore reflexive judgment about one's own supernatural principle can
err. A Catholic may also possess acquired faith based on histories and miracles and could mistake an act of acquired belief for an act proceeding from infused faith. Third, culpable ignorance concerning a matter of faith can lead to error, and a man may not be certain
that he is free of every such ignorance. Fourth, a trustworthy bishop could mistakenly propose as a matter of faith something false. The believer might then think he assents through the Holy Spirit just as he assents to a genuine article. This seems to show that he cannot always distinguish infused from merely human assent. Fifth, readiness to die for a proposition does not prove supernatural faith, because heretics may also be ready to die for what they falsely regard as truth. Sixth, even readiness to believe everything proposed by the visible Catholic Church might appear explainable by a firm human faith. I begin his solution. FIRST

CONCLUSION:

everyone who believes sees or experiences that he believes. Augustine says that each person sees faith itself in his own heart if he believes, and sees its absence if he does not. The difficulty concerns not the existence of the act but the formal principle from which he believes.

QUESTION VI, ARTICLE II - REFLEXIVE CERTAINTY ABOUT INFUSED FAITH

SECOND CONCLUSION. No Christian is certain by the very certainty of divine faith that he possesses an infused habit of faith. The existence of infused habits as such is not itself directly an article proposed by the Church in the same manner as the mysteries of faith, even though it would be rash to deny the common theological doctrine. THIRD CONCLUSION. Catholic faith directly and immediately concerns objects proposed by the Church. It is called catholic because it universally inclines the believer to assent to everything the Church believes. FOURTH CONCLUSION. The supernatural light of faith - whether conceived as a stable habit, according to the common opinion, or as an actual illumination whenever the faithful believe - can cause in the believer an infallible certainty that he is believing on account of the supernatural testimony of the Holy Spirit. I appeal to Aquinas's comparison with science: as science can make a man certain that he knows, so faith can make a man certain that he truly believes. Paul says, 'Try your own selves, if you be in the faith.' Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Lyra, Aquinas, and Cajetan are invoked in support. I formulate the practical argument: whoever assents to everything proposed by the Roman Church with such firmness that he is prepared to reject every contrary merely human certainty is truly Christian; I experience in myself such assent; therefore I can conclude that I possess faith. No merely human authority, he argues, can by itself produce precisely this supernatural adherence to the Church as divinely truthful.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. This reflexive certainty that I possess supernatural faith, although it can be infallible, is never equal to the certainty of faith concerning an object directly revealed by God and proposed by the Church. Faith directly causes assent to the revealed object; the judgment that I possess faith arises through reflection upon my own act and through an inference. No theological inference has the same immediacy as assent to the revealed principle itself. COROLLARIES. No one is commanded by the precept of faith explicitly to judge with reflexive certainty that he is believing by supernatural faith, because the precept concerns the truths proposed by the Church. A Catholic may, without losing faith, be ignorant of whether he possesses infused faith, doubt it involuntarily, or even form a false judgment about himself through scruple or ignorance. Such involuntary doubts do not flow back into his direct assent to the objects of faith. Likewise, denying that a particular reflexive argument is demonstrative is not itself an error against faith. One may hold that a person can accept all the Church teaches by a very firm human faith, or may doubt whether he himself actually possesses the absolute readiness described in the major premise. Thus the conclusion about one's own supernatural habit remains less immediate than the articles themselves.

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QUESTION VI, ARTICLE II - ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS; CERTAINTY OF SUPERNATURAL HOPE

I answer the argument that a true proposition about oneself must produce an infallible judgment. He denies the consequence. Many opinions happen to be true because their objects are true; what makes an assent infallible is not merely the truth of the object but the formal reason by which the mind assents. Otherwise one could argue that a man's judgment that he is in grace or predestined is infallible whenever it happens to be true. The objection from culpable ignorance is answered by distinguishing error from pertinacity.

Not every error about a matter connected with faith destroys the habit of faith. The believer remains prepared to submit to the Church and therefore is certain that he does not possess an ignorance joined with pertinacious resistance. If a bishop mistakenly teaches something false, the believer who follows him may err in the particular proposition without thereby becoming unfaithful, provided he remains ready to obey the Church. He was not mistaken when he previously judged himself moved by the Holy Spirit toward genuine revealed truth; his later inability to distinguish every particular case does not retroactively destroy faith. A further objection argues that one who doubts the certainty of his own assent must doubt the truth of its object. I say this strongly favors the more probable view that the believer can have infallible reflexive certainty, but the inference is not absolutely necessary. Defect can occur in reflection because of the weakness of the human intellect even while direct assent to the object remains firm. One can also distinguish doubt about the substance of assent from doubt about its formal supernatural reason. A man may be certain of a conclusion yet uncertain whether his demonstration is metaphysical or physical; similarly, a believer can be certain of the revealed object while uncertain whether the formal source of his certainty is his own will or a pious motion of the Holy Spirit with infused light. Aquinas's comparison between science and faith therefore proves that such reflexive certainty is possible, not that every believer always makes the reflection without error. Scientific assent is evident by natural light, while the act of faith remains obscure and so reflection upon it is more difficult. Readiness to die is more directly a sign of charity than a proof of faith and can be imitated by heretics dying for an error. The decisive disposition is rather an intellect piously determined to reject whatever contradicts the teaching of the Church. A heretic lacks this because he separates himself from the Roman Church. I finally argue that one who sincerely does what lies in him under divine assistance and wills to believe the Church as truthful above every human authority is not denied infused faith. Just as no one fulfills the whole natural law without grace, so no one firmly embraces all truths necessary for salvation in the required manner without infused faith. From the preceding discussion I add that a man can very probably be certain that he possesses at least unformed supernatural hope. If he is certain that he believes in God as justifier and experiences himself hoping for pardon through repentance which he proposes to make with God's help, such hope exceeds natural power and therefore manifests a supernatural principle.

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QUESTION VII - ON THE EFFECTS OF FAITH. ARTICLE I - WHETHER FEAR IS AN EFFECT OF

FAITH

ST. THOMAS. Fear is a movement of the appetitive power and therefore presupposes some apprehension of good or evil. Faith gives us knowledge of the penal evils which God will inflict according to divine judgment; in this way it causes servile fear. Faith also gives us an estimation of God as the immense and highest good, separation from whom is the greatest evil and equality with whom must be rejected with reverence; in this way it causes filial fear. Unformed faith can cause servile fear, while formed faith, operating through charity and making man adhere to God, causes filial fear. To the objection that fear precedes faith, Aquinas replies that fear of God cannot universally precede faith, since without some knowledge of divine rewards and punishments we could not fear Him. Given some prior faith concerning divine excellence, reverential fear may follow and dispose a man to further submission to God. Faith generates hope insofar as it makes us judge the rewards promised by God to the just; it generates fear insofar as it makes us judge the punishments threatened against sinners. The same thing can thus be cause of contrary movements under different aspects. I. Faith causes fear not only insofar as it is speculative but also insofar as it becomes practical. To believe God is triune is speculative when considered simply as a divine truth; to believe the triune God is our beatitude and the rewarder of good works is practical because it attracts the will toward good. Likewise, to believe God is just and punishes sinners is practical. Faith is not an efficient cause of fear in the strict sense in which efficient cause is distinguished from formal, final, and natural causes. No created cognitive habit efficiently moves the will as principal mover; God and the will itself are the movers of the voluntary act. Faith causes fear by proposing its object and thus its causality can be reduced to final, formal, or exemplary causality extrinsically considered. The

objection that unformed faith is not practical is answered by distinction. It is not perfectly practical in ordering man efficaciously to the supernatural good, which requires charity. Yet it is practical in a qualified way by directing him to flee his own evil through servile fear. I explain why Aquinas asks explicitly whether fear is an effect of faith but not whether hope is. Faith had already been defined as the substance or foundation of things hoped for, whereas fear presents the special difficulty that faith principally regards truth and good rather than evil. Aquinas therefore explains how faith can cause servile fear when unformed and filial fear when formed.

QUESTION VII, ARTICLE I CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II - WHETHER PURIFICATION OF THE HEART

IS AN

EFFECT OF FAITH

on Ecclesiasticus: 'You who fear God, believe Him, and your reward shall not be made void.' The command to believe confidence in divine mercy. But genuine confidence must be founded upon fear of God; otherwise it degenerates into presumption. I contrasts this with the Protestant confidence which, in his polemical account, removes salutary fear from justification. Trent counsels penitents to possess confidence in God while preserving the proper dispositions of repentance. ARTICLE II. Objections: purity of heart seems principally to concern affection, whereas faith resides in the intellect. Again, unformed faith can coexist with the impurity of mortal sin. Finally, faith itself is obscure and therefore seems unable to purify the intellect from darkness.

ON THE CONTRARY. Acts 15 says that God purified the hearts of the Gentiles 'by faith.' ST. THOMAS. The

impurity of a thing

consists in mixture with what is lower and less worthy. Silver is rendered impure by admixture of lead or tin, not by gold. The rational creature is nobler than temporal and bodily creatures and is made impure when it subjects itself to them through disordered love. It is purified by the contrary movement in which it tends toward what is above itself, namely God. The first principle of this movement is faith, because whoever approaches God must believe. Faith is therefore the first principle of purification of the heart. It removes the impurity of error; and when perfected by charity it causes perfect purification. To the first objection: intellectual apprehension is the principle of appetitive movement because the good apprehended by the intellect moves affection. To the second: even unformed faith excludes the impurity directly opposed to it, namely error arising when the human intellect attempts to measure divine things by sensible realities. When faith is formed by charity, no mortal impurity is compatible with it. To the third: the obscurity of faith is not culpable impurity but belongs to the natural limitation of the human intellect in the present life. I. This article explains Peter's words in Acts 15 and prevents the false inference that faith alone, apart from charity, constitutes the whole purification of the heart. Aquinas's first conclusion is that faith is the first principle of purification because it initiates the movement by which the soul tends above itself to God. His second is that even unformed faith removes the impurity of doctrinal error opposed to faith.

I comment

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QUESTION VIII - ON THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING. ARTICLE I - WHETHER

UNDERSTANDING IS A GIFT OF
THE HOLY SPIRIT

I introduce Questions VIII and IX by recalling Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts in I-II, q. 68. The gifts are habitual dispositions by which man is made readily movable by the Holy Spirit. The virtues perfect man according as he is moved through human reason elevated by grace; the gifts dispose him for a more special divine motion. ST. THOMAS. Isaiah 11 numbers the Spirit of understanding among the gifts. The word 'understanding' signifies an intimate cognition - as though 'reading within.' Sense remains at
exterior sensible qualities, whereas intellect penetrates to what lies within: under accidents to substance, under words to their meanings, under figures to the truth signified, and from exterior effects toward intelligible causes. Human cognition requires such penetration in many ways. Natural intellectual light suffices for naturally first-known principles, but supernatural truths require a supernatural light proportioned to them. Hence there is an infused gift of understanding by which the mind is enabled to penetrate the
meaning and credibility of divine truth under the motion of the Holy Spirit. The objections say that intellectual understanding belongs
naturally to man; that the human mode of knowing is discursive and therefore the gift should be called reason rather than understanding; and that, since intellect is divided from will, a supernatural gift should no more be named intellect than will. Aquinas replies that natural intellectual power remains, but supernatural objects require an added light just as natural principles are known through natural intellectual light. The gift does not destroy the human mode but perfects it. The name 'understanding' is especially fitting because it signifies excellence in penetrating inward truth, whereas 'will' merely names appetitive motion without expressing a
comparable excellence. I. The first conclusion is that man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate truths which natural light cannot attain, and this light is called the gift of understanding. The second is that this added supernatural light is proportioned to supernatural truths as natural intellectual light is proportioned to the truths naturally first known. A difficulty immediately arises: if infused faith already makes us assent sufficiently to supernatural truths, why is a distinct gift of understanding necessary? I postpone
the complete answer until the following articles, where the distinct function of the gift is clarified.

QUESTION VIII, ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING CAN COEXIST WITH

FAITH

ST. THOMAS distinguishes both faith and understanding. Some things fall directly and principally under faith and exceed natural reason, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation. Other things are ordered to faith, such as the contents and signs through which revealed truth is manifested. Understanding can likewise be perfect or imperfect. Perfect understanding penetrates the essence of the thing and sees the truth of a proposition as it is in itself. In the state of faith we cannot perfectly understand the mysteries that fall directly under faith, for then faith would cease to be faith. Yet matters ordered to faith can sometimes be perfectly understood. There
is also an imperfect supernatural understanding by which, although the essence of the mystery is not comprehended, the believer penetrates sufficiently to see that the exterior appearances and objections do not compel him to abandon revealed truth. In this sense the gift of understanding can coexist with faith even concerning the mysteries themselves. SUMMARY. First: the things directly under faith cannot be perfectly understood during the state of faith. Second: things ordered to faith can be perfectly understood.
Third:
the mysteries themselves can be understood imperfectly insofar as the mind sees that apparent difficulties do not contradict revealed truth and give no sufficient reason for departing from it. I. The office of the gift is not to comprehend the mysteries according to what
they are in themselves, but to penetrate them according to their credibility so firmly that no exterior appearance supplies a reason to abandon them. Thus the gift does not replace faith but perfects the believer's penetration of what faith receives. The gift is therefore not superfluous beside the light of faith. Faith determines the intellect to assent to what God reveals; understanding, under a further motion of the Holy Spirit, penetrates the meaning, coherence, and credibility of the revealed truth.
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QUESTION VIII, ARTICLE III - WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS ONLY SPECULATIVE OR ALSO PRACTICAL

ST. THOMAS. The gift of understanding principally concerns the truths that principally fall under faith and is therefore chiefly speculative. Yet good human operations are ordered to faith, since 'faith works through charity.' Accordingly the gift also extends secondarily to practical matters, not as its principal object but insofar as human acts are ruled by eternal reasons. Human actions considered merely in themselves are low and contingent, but considered in relation to the eternal law, divine beatitude, and revealed faith they acquire a higher intelligible order. The gift enables the superior reason to consult those eternal rules. SUMMARY. The gift of understanding is principally speculative and secondarily practical. I use this doctrine to answer the earlier question whether the gift stands above the habit and light of faith. The habit of faith, considered precisely in itself, determines the intellect to assent to truths revealed by God. The gift of understanding is given so that the believer may penetrate and understand what has been revealed under the special motion of the Holy Spirit. In natural knowledge one habit may suffice both for assent and for understanding because the natural light of first principles flows from the ordinary participation of human nature and operates under God's general motion as author of nature. Supernatural life is different. Grace, especially in the imperfect state of faith, requires special divine motion if man is to operate perfectly in proportion to his supernatural principle. The gifts are habitual dispositions making man apt to receive this special motion. A Christian sinner can believe and can even reason theologically about what he believes, but he does not possess the proportionate supernatural penetration proper to the gift as exercised in the just. The gift belongs to one whose whole judgment is ordered to God as ultimate end under grace.

ARTICLE IV begins: whether the gift of understanding is present in all who possess grace.

QUESTION VIII, ARTICLE IV - WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS IN ALL WHO HAVE GRACE

The objections note that Gregory says understanding is given against dullness of mind, yet many in grace remain intellectually dull; that faith alone seems necessary for salvation; and that some holy persons appear simple and without notable intellectual penetration.

ST. THOMAS replies that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with charity and sanctifying grace. Whoever has grace possesses the gift of understanding habitually, although not everyone exercises it with equal explicitness or in the same matters. The gift does not mean scholarly acuteness or the ability to explain every theological difficulty. Its essential act is a supernatural right judgment penetrating what is necessary for salvation so that the believer adheres firmly to revealed truth and does not allow appearances contrary to faith to separate him from it. A person in grace can therefore be naturally slow, uneducated, or unable to dispute with learned adversaries and nevertheless possess the gift. The perfection required is proportioned to his state and to what is necessary for his supernatural life. I emphasize the distinction between possessing a gift habitually and eliciting its act at every moment. Grace gives the stable supernatural dispositions by which the soul is readily movable by the Holy Spirit; actual exercise depends upon divine motion and the circumstances of the believer. He also distinguishes the gift of understanding from extraordinary theological learning.

The ability to unfold mysteries for others, answer subtle objections, or teach scientifically belongs to acquired theology or to gratuitously given graces, not to the gift as necessary for every just person. Thus the conclusion is that all who possess sanctifying grace possess the gift of understanding, although its manifestations differ greatly according to natural capacity, vocation, and the measure of divine motion.

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QUESTION VIII - THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IN RELATION TO FAITH

I continue clarifying how the gift perfects faith without destroying its obscurity. The believer does not receive vision of the divine essence or comprehension of the mysteries; rather, the Holy Spirit strengthens the mind to penetrate their supernatural credibility and
their harmony with the other truths of revelation. This explains why one can possess faith without the gift in its living exercise, as occurs in the sinner who retains unformed faith, while the just person possesses the gift habitually with charity. The sinner may defend a proposition by theological science and may even solve arguments against it, but such scientific ability is not identical with the infused gift. The gift's judgment is proportioned to supernatural finality. The just man judges divine things not merely as propositions to be demonstrated or defended but as truths ordered to God, his ultimate end, to whom he and all his acts must be subordinated. I distinguish three levels that must not be confused: simple supernatural assent through faith; discursive theological knowledge acquired by study; and the infused penetration supplied by the gift of understanding under the Holy Spirit's motion. The second may be present in a learned sinner; the third belongs properly to the life of grace. Accordingly the obscurity of faith remains.

The gift makes the mind more firmly and intimately perceive the credibility and fittingness of the mysteries, but it does not transform
faith into the evident vision possessed by the blessed. I also insist that the gifts are not superfluous additions. The virtues perfect man
for acts proceeding according to a supernaturalized human mode; the gifts make him docile to a higher divine motion. In the present life both are required for the full supernatural perfection of the just.

QUESTION VIII - FURTHER DETERMINATIONS CONCERNING UNDERSTANDING

The gift of understanding principally removes the spiritual dullness by which the mind fails to penetrate the meaning of divine truth. This dullness is not identical with lack of natural intelligence. A person can be intellectually gifted and spiritually obtuse, or naturally
simple and nevertheless possess a clear supernatural adherence to what is necessary for salvation. The object of the gift extends to the
truths of faith and to whatever is ordered to them. Thus it can illuminate Scripture, the signs and figures of revelation, the relation of created realities to divine truth, and practical judgments insofar as they are governed by eternal law. Its act is not a new public revelation and does not add new articles to the deposit of faith. Rather, it perfects the believer from within so that what has already been revealed is penetrated in the manner suitable to one moved by the Holy Spirit. I maintain the Thomistic distinction between comprehension and penetration. We do not comprehend the Trinity, Incarnation, or other mysteries in the state of faith. Yet the mind
can penetrate enough to understand what the Church means, to distinguish the mystery from contradictions falsely attributed to it, and
to see why objections drawn from created things do not overthrow divine testimony. The gift therefore strengthens rather than abolishes faith. It serves faith by making the believer's adherence more intimate, ordered, and resistant to appearances that might otherwise cause confusion. Where theological science proceeds by acquired habits and syllogistic reasoning, the gift supplies a supernatural judgment under divine motion. The two can cooperate, especially in the theologian, but they remain formally distinct.

QUESTION VIII - CONCLUSION OF THE TREATMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

I draws together the relation among faith, charity, grace, and the gift of understanding. Faith can remain unformed in a sinner because
its specific essence does not require charity. The gift of understanding, however, belongs to the ordered supernatural organism of the
just and therefore is connected with grace. This does not mean that every just person possesses equal theological insight. The gift is measured according to what is required for supernatural direction and according to the Holy Spirit's motion. A simple believer may possess it more truly as an infused gift than a learned sinner who can explain many scholastic questions. The gift chiefly concerns speculative divine truth, but because faith itself is ordered through charity to action, understanding also illuminates practical matters under the eternal law. Its practical extension remains secondary to its principal contemplative object. I repeatedly guards two extremes: reducing the gift to ordinary natural intelligence or acquired theology, and exaggerating it into evident comprehension of the mysteries. Against the first, it is a genuinely supernatural disposition and operation. Against the second, the state of faith remains
obscure and non-comprehensive. The believer therefore can be enlightened to understand Scripture and the mysteries without seeing them as the blessed see God. Christ's opening of the disciples' minds to understand the Scriptures provides the biblical model: illumination deepens the grasp of revealed truth while preserving dependence upon divine testimony. The discussion prepares the transition to the gift of knowledge, which also corresponds to faith but perfects judgment under a different aspect.

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ARTICLE V - WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND IN THOSE WITHOUT SANCTIFYING GRACE

ARTICLE VI - WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER GIFTS

ARTICLE VII - WHETHER THE SIXTH BEATITUDE CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

ARTICLE VIII - WHETHER FAITH AMONG THE FRUITS CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

QUESTION IX - ON THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE. ARTICLE I begin

I turns from understanding to knowledge. Understanding penetrates the intelligible meaning of revealed truth; knowledge perfects judgment concerning created things and their relation to faith, enabling the believer to discern rightly what is to be believed and how
creatures are to be evaluated under divine truth. ST. THOMAS asks whether knowledge is a gift of the Holy Spirit. An objection says
that science or knowledge is naturally acquired by demonstration and therefore seems not to require an infused gift. Another says that
the gifts are common to all the saints, whereas many holy persons lack learned science. A further objection argues that if understanding already perfects faith, a distinct gift of knowledge seems unnecessary. The answer rests upon the distinction between apprehension and judgment. For intellectual assent two things are needed: first, that the mind rightly apprehend what is proposed;

second, that it judge rightly concerning it. The gift of understanding principally perfects the first. The gift of knowledge perfects supernatural judgment, especially regarding created realities in their order to divine truth. Human acquired science reaches conclusions through discourse and demonstration. The infused gift does not consist precisely in possessing a body of scholarly conclusions. It is a supernatural participation in a higher divine mode of judgment, enabling the faithful to distinguish what accords with faith from what does not. Hence an uneducated saint can possess the gift even without the ability to teach theology. Conversely,
a learned theologian may possess extensive acquired science without the living infused gift if he lacks grace. I stress that the ordinary
gift common to the just must be distinguished from gratuitously given knowledge by which someone is enabled to explain, defend, and communicate the faith to others. The latter is not given to everyone; the former belongs to the supernatural perfection of the faithful in grace.

QUESTION IX — ON THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE. ARTICLE I — WHETHER KNOWLEDGE IS A GIFT.

I first warn that faith does not universally precede every kind of understanding. The gift of understanding, properly so called, presupposes faith at least by nature, because it signifies a perfected supernatural understanding proper to one who is in grace. Yet some understanding of what is believed is necessary even for unformed faith; God’s assistance illuminates the believer’s mind so that
he in some manner understands what he believes. ST. THOMAS. It seems that knowledge is not a gift, because gifts of the Holy Spirit
exceed natural faculty, whereas knowledge appears to be an effect of natural reason; demonstration is a syllogism producing science.
Again, the gifts are common to all the saints, whereas Augustine says that many faithful do not possess scientific learning. Finally, one gift would seem sufficient for perfecting one theological virtue, and the gift of understanding already corresponds to faith. ON THE CONTRARY. Isaiah 11 numbers knowledge among the seven gifts. RESPONSE. Grace is more perfect than nature and therefore does not lack the perfections by which man can be perfected naturally. When the intellect assents to truth it needs, first, rightly to apprehend what is proposed, and, second, to possess a certain and right judgment about it. The first belongs to understanding; for the second the gift of knowledge is necessary, so that a man may judge rightly about matters of faith and discern what is to be believed from what is not. Human acquired science reaches certain judgment through rational discourse and demonstration. In God there is certain judgment without discourse, by simple intuition. The knowledge which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is a participated likeness of this divine knowledge and therefore is not essentially discursive. There are two kinds of knowledge
concerning matters of faith. One enables a man to know what must be believed and to distinguish credenda from non-credenda; this is
the gift and belongs to all the saints. Another enables a man not only to know what must be believed but to manifest and defend it to others and refute opponents; this belongs to the gratuitously given graces and is not given to everyone. I. The gift of knowledge is not
a discursive habit. Any discourse made by a Christian theologian from supernatural truths belongs either to acquired theology, to a gratuitously given grace for instructing others, or to answering adversaries. For ordinary believers the gifts of knowledge and wisdom
suffice for a simple supernatural judgment by which they distinguish what is to be believed and remain firm in it.
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QUESTION IX —

ARTICLE II: WHETHER THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNS DIVINE THINGS;

ARTICLE III: WHETHER IT IS PRACTICAL. ST. THOMAS. The name “knowledge” signifies

certainty of judgment.

Judgment by the highest cause receives the special name wisdom; judgment through secondary causes retains the name knowledge. Since God is the absolutely highest cause, cognition of divine things is properly wisdom, while cognition of created

and human things is properly knowledge. Therefore the gift of knowledge is principally concerned with created things. Although the objects of faith are divine and eternal, faith itself is something temporal in the believer’s soul. To know what ought to be believed belongs to the gift of knowledge; to know the divine realities believed in themselves, through a certain union with them, belongs to wisdom. Hence wisdom corresponds especially to charity, which unites the mind to God.

ARTICLE III. The gift of knowledge is not merely practical. Faith principally consists in adhering

speculatively to First Truth,

but because First Truth is also the ultimate end for which we act, faith extends to operation: “faith working through charity.” Consequently the gift of knowledge primarily regards speculation—knowing what must be held by faith—and secondarily extends to action, directing us through knowledge of the credenda and what follows from them. Only those who, through infused grace, possess a right judgment concerning things to be believed and done, so that they do not depart from the rectitude of justice, possess the gift properly. This is the “knowledge of the saints.”

ARTICLE IV. The third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted,”

corresponds to the gift of

knowledge. Created things become an occasion of turning from God when a man falsely judges that perfect good is found in them. Through right judgment about creatures, supplied by the gift of knowledge, man recognizes this loss and mourns past error; afterward consolation follows when he orders creatures to divine good. I ask whether every person in grace, whenever he believes by infused faith, simultaneously exercises the gifts of understanding and knowledge. I answer no. A person may possess several connected supernatural habits without eliciting acts of all of them at once; just as one possessing charity may elicit an act of faith without at that moment eliciting charity.

QUESTION X — ON UNBELIEF IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER UNBELIEF IS A SIN. ST. THOMAS. Unbelief can be understood in two

ways. First, as pure

negation: a person is called an unbeliever merely because he does not have faith. Second, as contrariety to faith: a person resists hearing the faith or despises it. In this latter sense the proper nature of the sin of unbelief is completed. Purely negative unbelief, as in those who have heard nothing of the faith, is not itself a sin but rather a punishment following original sin. Such

persons are condemned for other sins that cannot be remitted without faith, not for a special sin of unbelief. Hence Christ says:

“If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin,” which Augustine interprets of the sin of refusing belief in Christ. To possess faith is not contained in human nature, but human nature is ordered so that the mind ought not to resist interior divine inspiration and exterior preaching of truth. In this sense culpable unbelief is contrary to nature. Culpable unbelief arises especially from pride, through which a man refuses to submit his intellect to the rules of faith and the sound understanding of the Fathers. The theological vices opposed to faith, hope, and charity need not be reduced to the seven capital

vices, just as the theological virtues are prior to the cardinal virtues.

SUMMARY. (1) Unbelief as contrariety to faith is sin. (2) Unbelief as pure negation is not itself sin but has the character of punishment. (3) Those who are unbelievers merely by negation are condemned for other sins, not for the special sin of unbelief.

(4) Culpable unbelief is contrary to human nature. I. Cajetan objects: no one sins by refusing something above his nature; faith elevates man above nature; therefore refusing faith should not be sinful. I answer with Cajetan that man is ordered by God from his creation to participation in the divine nature and therefore is bound to accept the laws proportioned to that supernatural end. I add that even if God had not destined human nature to supernatural glory, as Creator and conserver He could command supernatural acts provided He supplied the necessary supernatural power—just as, if God commanded man to fly, He would have to provide wings or an equivalent power.

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QUESTION X, ARTICLE I — FIRST DOUBT: WHETHER MERE ABSENCE OF FAITH SUFFICES FOR THE SIN OF UNBELIEF.

I ask whether, for unbelief to be sinful, it is enough that a man merely fail to possess faith, or whether some resistance to faith is required. Arguments for the stricter view appeal to St. Thomas's teaching that at the first use of reason a man must turn toward God. No one can turn efficaciously to God as justifier without believing in Him; therefore, it is argued, anyone who fails then to believe sins against faith even if he does not positively resist it. Interior divine inspiration would also seem no less sufficient than an exterior preacher. Finally, some theologians argue that ignorance of what is necessary for salvation is always culpable, since if a man did what lay in him God would illuminate him. I reject the universal claim associated with Adrian and Gabriel. FIRST CONCLUSION. If we speak of explicit faith in the Gospel, those who have never heard anything of it are certainly excused from the special sin of unbelief by ignorance. The contrary opinion is unsafe and appears erroneous. Christ's words in John 15 and Paul's argument in Romans 10—"How shall they believe him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?"—support this.

SECOND

CONCLUSION. Even regarding the faith necessary for justification, many unbelievers can be excused from the special sin of unbelief.

A person can possess implicit faith in Christ without an exterior preacher; but before the necessary supernatural truths are revealed or sufficiently proposed—either through an adequate preacher aided inwardly by God, or by interior supernatural inspiration—the person can be in invincible ignorance of them. Before such illumination he is immediately bound only by the natural law. Natural light by itself does not disclose that man is a child of wrath through original sin or that God is the supernatural justifier of the impious. Therefore absence of such supernatural knowledge is not automatically a special sin against faith.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE I — NEGATIVE UNBELIEF; SUPERNATURAL ASSISTANCE; CULPABLE RESISTANCE.

I distinguish two meanings of "unbelief by pure negation." In one, even aptitude for faith is denied; stones or the blessed in heaven could in this loose sense be called without faith. In another, the subject remains naturally capable of faith but lacks it with respect to its object; unbaptized infants can thus be called negatively unbelieving. When the object of faith is sufficiently proposed to a person, however, he is bound to accept it. If he then dissents or refuses to accept it, his unbelief is no longer merely negative. He resists faith at least interpretatively, just as a negligent shipmaster who fails to act when he can and must prevent a shipwreck is said interpretatively to will the wreck. A man arriving at the use of reason is naturally bound to turn to God with his whole heart insofar as natural powers permit. Such natural conversion does not itself suffice for justification unless a supernatural principle is added. Effective conversion cleansing from sin and joining man to God as ultimate supernatural end must proceed from supernatural faith, hope, and charity under God's operation. God can assist the will supernaturally in more than one way. I reject the idea that a merely extraordinary motion of the will toward a naturally known good, without supernatural illumination of the intellect, could justify. God can instead illuminate the intellect concerning a supernatural object and move the will to accept it; or He can propose the object so efficaciously that He infuses the light of faith together with a pious affection of the will. For culpable unbelief a positive speculative error contrary to faith is not always necessary. A natural philosopher who has never heard the faith may falsely judge the Trinity impossible without committing the special sin of unbelief, because he does not voluntarily resist a faith never proposed to him. Conversely, a gentile to whom the Trinity is sufficiently proposed can sin against faith merely by suspending assent and refusing to accept it, even without forming a contrary positive proposition. I therefore deny that every error which would destroy faith once possessed already constitutes the special sin of unbelief before faith has ever been proposed. An idolater may sin against natural reason and natural religion by positing many gods without yet committing the specific sin of resistance to Christian faith of which he has heard nothing.

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QUESTION X,

ARTICLE I — INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE AND THE FIRST USE OF REASON. I answer the claim: “If

unbelievers did
what was in them by observing natural law, God would illuminate them; therefore their ignorance is always their own fault.” I say a Pelagian error is hidden in the inference if it means that doing what lies in purely natural powers is a sufficient disposition which obliges God to illuminate the sinner. The sound doctrine is: if a man does what lies in him while PREVENTED by supernatural assistance, God illuminates him; but the human disposition is not the cause preceding divine illumination—rather divine illumination produces the disposition. St. Thomas’s statements denying invincible ignorance in certain matters of divine law concern those who already possess sufficient knowledge of the Gospel and nevertheless follow erroneous teachers. Augustine likewise says ignorance does not excuse such men from condemnation for other sins against natural law. Hence I hold that some can have invincible ignorance regarding matters of faith and nevertheless be justly condemned for natural-law sins. SECOND

DOUBT. Is a man, in the first completed moment of the use of reason, bound to turn himself toward God

under pain of mortal
sin? I lays out objections. The first argues from the angel: an angel could not sin in the first instant of creation because an operation beginning simultaneously with existence is attributed to the Creator, and God cannot cause sin. By analogy, perhaps a child cannot sin at the first use of reason. Another objection says that the precept cannot bind before it is promulgated. At that moment a child may not yet explicitly know that God exists, and therefore may not know a divine command to turn toward Him. A third objection notes that an affirmative precept does not bind at every instant, and asks why precisely this instant should be obligatory. A child may have some other legitimate object of deliberation. A fourth argues that the precept cannot be supernatural if no supernatural law has yet been promulgated, while natural law cannot command what exceeds natural power. In corrupted nature, man cannot by natural powers alone efficaciously turn to God in the supernatural manner required for justification. I also consider the practical difficulty that deliberation takes time and a child might be distracted during it, and the pastoral objection that Christians do not ordinarily confess a possible omission at the first use of reason.

QUESTION X,

ARTICLE I — CONCLUSIONS ON THE FIRST USE OF REASON.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Nothing absolutely certain and demonstrated can be established in this question solely from Scripture or the doctors. Difficulties follow on either side and the objections are not easily solved.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Not everyone who reaches the use of reason is immediately bound to turn explicitly, distinctly, and formally toward God. This is Cajetan’s position. No one is bound explicitly to love God before explicitly knowing Him, and explicit natural knowledge of God ordinarily comes only after some development. I use Cajetan’s analysis of the first end appearing to the child. In an end there is what is desired and the person for whom it is desired. A man naturally loves some good for himself by love of concupiscence and loves himself as the person for whom the good is desired. Thus the first “end for whom” appearing to the child is himself. After this natural movement by which he wills good for himself, he must deliberate about what is truly to be sought for himself. The child, as a whole person, naturally loves himself more than himself under any particular aspect. Consequently his first moral solicitude is what he should pursue according to the inclination of his whole rational appetite. This is the morally honorable good, at least in common. If he already knows God explicitly, it can also be God explicitly. I defines having the use of reason in the relevant moral sense as being master of one’s operation, which requires use of free choice. Speculative reasoning can precede this, as it can remain in some mentally impaired persons who retain scientific or artistic abilities without full moral liberty. A person can possess use of reason concerning one moral matter while passion deprives him of it concerning another. Likewise one can have the use of reason actually or only in proximate potency, as a sleeping adult retains it in potency. COROLLARY. Still less is every child naturally bound immediately to make the supernatural conversion necessary for justification, since this presupposes supernatural knowledge of God not naturally possessed by everyone at the first use of reason.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Everyone reaching the use of reason is bound to turn himself by some act toward GOOD ACCORDING TO REASON; this is an implicit turning toward God, whether or not God is yet explicitly known. I judge this a very probable and characteristically Thomistic opinion. At the beginning of human moral life the natural law is promulgated in common: good is to be done according to the rule of reason. The person must therefore accept, or at least propose to observe, that rule.

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QUESTION X, ARTICLE I — WHY THE FIRST MORAL DELIBERATION BINDS; THE ROLE OF SYNDERESIS.

I argue that when a man first becomes master of his acts, the first human action over which he must exercise dominion is deliberation about himself and the end toward which he will order his life. If he orders all desirable things to himself as though he were the absolutely ultimate end, without subordinating himself to honorable good, he sins mortally by constituting himself as last end. Man is made to the image of God especially through free choice, by which he acts for an end and governs lower things. Therefore the first exercise of moral dominion must be governed by synderesis, the naturally implanted rule which functions as a kind of vicar of God, promulgating the natural law and urging man to pursue good according to right reason. If a man refuses that rule, he governs himself as a usurper or tyrant who refuses the command of a superior. Even if he does not yet know God distinctly, he experiences in himself the presidency of synderesis commanding action according to a law written in the mind. I compare a simple citizen who does not know the king personally but knows the city magistrate and is bound to obey the magistrate's authority. What species of sin is committed if the person fails at this first completed use of reason? I first suggests it could be reduced to irreligion, recalling Romans 1: although such a person does not yet distinctly know God, synderesis acts within him in God's place. More properly, if he positively loves his own excellence while refusing subjection to synderesis, the sin is pride, analogous to the sin of the angels. If he merely suspends the required conversion after the dictate has been presented, it is an omission of the precept to subject himself to right reason. If he turns instead toward a particular temporal evil, the act receives its species from that chosen object while also carrying the circumstance of omitting the required ordering toward the final end. I distinguish the first instant of reason INITIATIVELY—the beginning of deliberation—from the first instant TERMINATIVELY—the completion of the practical discourse. At the initiating instant the person cannot yet sin in the relevant completed manner. At the terminating instant he can sin, because the free deliberation has now been completed.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE I — THE NATURAL LAW AT THE FIRST USE OF REASON.

At the initiating instant the intellect naturally assents to a most universal practical principle, which functions as the promulgation of natural law in common. The will also has a natural movement toward its own proper good. Neither movement is meritorious or demeritorious because full liberty is not yet present with respect to specification, although the person can afterward continue or suspend the movement. The practical reasoning can be expressed: "I naturally experience myself as bound to do this and avoid that; therefore I have a superior who binds and subjects me." Otherwise I would be supreme judge of good and evil and could not sin, since no superior would have imposed a law upon me. The child then searches for means to obtain the good naturally desired. If he subordinates himself and everything pertaining to him to the universal dictate of synderesis, he fulfills the precept of turning to God at least implicitly as the ultimate end of rational nature. This is the completed first use of reason. The interval between the beginning and completion of the deliberation, though brief, can vary according to intellectual speed and bodily disposition. This explains why some arrive at moral use of reason sooner than others. Education before that time matters greatly: although children do not yet possess free choice, images and inclinations received from parents can strongly help or hinder the later first free choice. I answer the objection from ignorance of God. Although a child may invincibly lack explicit knowledge of God, the natural law is represented through synderesis, which bears God's authority. From the obligation experienced within himself he can afterward demonstrate that there is a supreme judge. It does not follow that because an antecedent is invincibly unknown, every consequence of it is likewise unknown; experience itself can disclose the consequence. The first completed use of reason is a time of necessity for fulfilling the affirmative precept of ordering oneself to God explicitly or implicitly, because beginning moral life without the naturally known rule exposes the person to manifest danger of error regarding his ultimate direction.

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QUESTION X,

ARTICLE I — NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL PRECEPTS; “DO WHAT IS IN YOU.” Every

man is bound not only by
a natural precept but also by a supernatural precept to turn to God. The difference is that no one is excused from the natural precept once it is naturally promulgated through synderesis, whereas one can be excused from transgressing the supernatural precept if nothing supernatural has yet been promulgated to him. In that case he does not commit the special sins opposed to faith, hope, and charity. The natural precept does not command an impossibility. Even in corrupted nature a man who does not yet know his own weakness can desire, strive, and propose, as far as lies in him, to live according to right reason. Because of original corruption he cannot without justifying grace and merciful divine assistance fulfill the whole moral good for an entire life or even for a long time. If in that first deliberation he truly does what lies in him by turning toward the good according to reason, I say we piously believe that everyone acting thus is illuminated and justified by God through grace, following St. Thomas. But the maxim “God does not deny grace to one who does what lies in him” must be guarded against Pelagian interpretation. The question is whether the natural disposition, excluding prevenient supernatural help, must first be supplied by man as a necessary condition of justification, and whether everyone possessing such a disposition is infallibly justified according to the ordinary law. I say the full resolution would require a longer disputation. I nevertheless insist that the sound sense is not that purely natural effort earns or causes supernatural illumination. Divine grace precedes and produces the salutary disposition itself. The person’s free action remains genuinely his, but its salutary efficacy is rooted in God’s prior assistance. I continue the dispute over efficacious divine assistance. I reject as contrary to Catholic doctrine the proposition that, whenever two men receive an entirely equal divine assistance, one is converted and the other is not converted merely because the first, by free choice, adds the good use of that assistance. The very willing to be converted and the good use of grace are gifts of God. Thus the Apostle says: “Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish according to his good will” (Phil. 2). Augustine likewise teaches that in good works pertaining to salvation the human will follows grace rather than preceding it; and the Council of Orange teaches that in every good work we do not begin and afterward receive divine help, but God first works in us. my first argument is that, on the contrary opinion, the efficacy of supernatural assistance would ultimately be derived from free will. As medicine does not actually heal unless the nature of the sick man, assisted by the medicine, produces health, so—on that theory—the divine assistance would not be efficacious unless man supplied from his own powers the decisive good use. If equal assistance is present in the man who converts and the man who does not, no reason for the efficacy of the conversion can be assigned except
that the former willed to use the assistance. Hence he would add something not itself infallibly caused by the divine help. This
conflicts with St. Paul: “He who glories, let him glory in the Lord,” and, “Who distinguishes thee? What hast thou that thou hast not received?” If two receive equal help and one converts, he could boast: “Lord, you gave me no more than my neighbor;
I myself added the good use by which I am distinguished from him.” Christian ears recoil from such speech, because it makes man, rather than God, the ultimate distinguisher. Second, I argue from Ezekiel: “I will cause you to walk in my precepts, and to keep my judgments and do them.” A divine promise must be fulfilled through divine operation. Therefore, when God efficaciously converts a man so that he wills to believe, hope, love, and repent, God supplies means that infallibly attain that effect while preserving the proper mode of the free act. Otherwise fulfillment of the divine promise would remain in man’s power to frustrate. Augustine uses this reasoning concerning God’s promise to Abraham: God promised what He Himself would bring about, not merely what men might do independently after receiving a capacity.
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I continue: those who make men independent in this way make them proud and sacrilegious. Catholics must thank God not only because He gave the power by which the commandments could be fulfilled, but because we actually willed and fulfilled them. Otherwise salvation would be worked out not “with fear and trembling” but with arrogance, as though God did not work in us both the
willing and the accomplishing. A third principal argument comes from Romans 9: “It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but
of God who shows mercy.” Augustine explains that this does not exclude willing and running; rather, even the good will itself is prepared by God. The saying cannot mean merely that human willing is insufficient without mercy, for then one might equally say that
divine mercy is insufficient without human willing. The Apostle attributes the whole to God because God both prepares the good will
and assists it once prepared. I therefore insist that good use of free choice and divine mercy are not two partial agents, like Peter and Paul jointly carrying a stone neither could carry alone. Free choice is an inferior agent wholly subordinated to the superior divine agent. Nor is this subordination like that of a created universal cause whose influence remains indifferent until determined by a lower
cause. Divine assistance is not determined by free will to the effect of justification. Rather, providence and predetermination mercifully determine the assistance to the certain effect that the man freely wills to believe, hope, love, and repent. Against this, some
theologians object that they cannot understand how a man believes and loves freely if divine assistance is so efficacious that it cannot
stand together with the man’s failure to be converted. They appeal to Trent, Session VI, canon 4, which anathematizes anyone saying
that free choice, moved and excited by God, does nothing in cooperating with God who excites and calls, or that it cannot dissent if it
wills. I reply that inability to understand a mystery is no argument against what must be believed. As Cajetan says concerning providence, certainty on God’s side stands together with the exercise of free choice. If a free act had to be predetermined by man alone
and could not be predetermined by God, man would become the first deliberator of the act, and divine providence would fail to deliberate eternally about the noblest created goods—free and good human actions. Divine providence reaches “from end to end mightily and disposes all things sweetly.” God’s free choice, as first cause of the goods occurring in time, infallibly orders them according to the mode proper to each nature. Hence God causes not only the faculty of freedom but the free act itself, which is a greater perfection than the mere faculty. I then explain Trent. First, the cooperation of free choice is itself an effect of preparing grace
and of God efficaciously assisting; it is not an extrinsic contribution joined to divine aid as though the two were independent partial causes. Second, the proposition “free choice moved and excited by God can dissent if it wills” has two true senses and a third false sense. The first true sense concerns an excitation that precedes justification in time. A sinner can resist such a call and often does: “I called and you refused.” Yet this resistance is not resistance to God’s absolute will of good pleasure. If God absolutely willed the effect as something He Himself intended to bring about, no created will could frustrate omnipotence. The second true sense concerns
even an efficacious vocation. Absolutely and in the divided sense, the man retains the power to dissent if he wills; nevertheless, in the
composed sense it is impossible that God should move him with that efficacious aid and that he should at the same time fail to consent.

This is not the destruction of liberty. I compare it with the proposition that a person foreknown as lost can be saved: considered in himself he possesses the relevant power, while the conjunction “he is infallibly foreknown as lost and is saved” is impossible. Likewise, “what is white can be black” is true in the divided sense, but “what is white is simultaneously black” is impossible in the composed sense. The false third sense supposes that the very same equal divine assistance remains in place and that the man can, in the composed sense, either consent or resist solely by determining that assistance himself. I say Trent does not teach this. Returning to
the first use of reason, if a child, on arriving at rational use, is efficaciously converted toward the good of reason and thereby justified
according to St. Thomas’s opinion, he must have been prevented by supernatural divine help. He is not justified because he first did what lay in his purely natural powers; rather, because God moved and illuminated him, he effectively turned both toward supernatural
divine good and toward the good proportionate to natural reason. Thus “to one who does what is in him God does not deny grace” must be understood of a man already prevented by divine aid.

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I finish the preceding doubt by explaining that at the first use of reason man must complete a deliberation concerning himself and his
ordering to the rule of reason and to God. If the thought is naturally interrupted, there is no sin; but if he voluntarily diverts himself from the required deliberation, expressly or interpretatively, he sins. Baptism does not remove the obligation of natural law; baptismal
grace instead strengthens nature to fulfill it, and I hold that baptized children arriving at the use of reason receive special actual divine
assistance. THIRD

DOUBT AROUND

QUESTION X,

ARTICLE 1: Is an unbeliever always bound to listen whenever someone offers to preach the Gospel? First conclusion: an

unbeliever is not universally bound to give a hearing to every person who says, “Listen to me; I wish to teach you supernatural things and another religion.” The gentile possesses natural light, and natural reason does not dictate that every claimant concerning religion must be heard. Otherwise he would equally be obliged to hear a heretic, a Jew, or a teacher of any sect. If a barbarous nation refuses to hear a preacher, a Christian prince may not wage war merely to compel that nation to hear the preacher. He may defend the preacher and those who freely wish to hear him; if others violently attack them, force may be used in defense until the attack ceases. Second conclusion: even when a gentile explicitly hears the Gospel from a truly Christian preacher, he does not immediately commit the sin of unbelief by failing to believe unless the preacher presents signs and testimony sufficient to make the preaching credibly divine and strongly persuasive. “He who believes quickly is light of heart.” The Apostle also asks how men shall hear without a preacher and how preachers shall preach unless they are sent. The preacher therefore requires suitable credentials. Such suitability can be shown by miracles, gifts of tongues, trustworthy history, natural reasons showing the excellence of Christian teaching, the upright life of the preacher, and the examples of saints who shed their blood for the Gospel. I then draws a severe historical conclusion: many of the Western Indians were excused from the sin of unbelief, so far as the fault of the preachers was concerned, because men who were exceedingly cruel and avaricious preached the Gospel to them. Third conclusion: even when a suitable preacher shows the Gospel to be evidently credible, a gentile is not yet obliged to believe unless it is also shown to him as more credible than every rival sect or religion claiming the worship of the true God. Among two merely credible alternatives, a man is not obliged to embrace what appears less or only equally credible. Fourth conclusion: if the Gospel is proposed so that it appears more credible than every other religion concerning the worship of the true God, the hearer is bound to believe; refusal is then the sin of unbelief. In a matter involving man’s last end, he must follow what is most credible, lest he expose himself to the danger of error concerning the final end. I distinguish this from moral questions in which, under certain conditions, a merely probable opinion may be followed even when another is more probable. Where the truth of the thing itself is at stake and grave danger follows from error, the more probable judgment can bind. Fifth conclusion: whenever the Gospel is sufficiently proposed so that a man is bound to believe, if he actually believes firmly, Catholic faith teaches that he believes through supernatural divine assistance. If he does not believe, I judge that God nevertheless gave sufficient supernatural assistance enabling him to believe; otherwise he could not justly be condemned for unbelief, because no one sins in what he cannot avoid. Sixth conclusion: I add as at least probable that an antecedent interior supernatural assistance need not always be posited in precisely the same manner in order for condemnation to be just, because natural reason can judge that what a trustworthy preacher proposes is supremely credible. Yet the man could have received the interior aid offered to him had he not resisted through pride or another disordered disposition. Final conclusion: ignorance in such a case can be not only punishment but also fault—punishment in relation to preceding sins, and fault because at the decisive moment the man was bound and able to believe but did not. “Light came into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, for their works were evil.”

ARTICLE II — WHETHER UNBELIEF IS IN THE INTELLECT AS ITS SUBJECT. Aquinas answers

that every sin is in
the will as first and universal moving principle because every sin is voluntary, but a sin is also attributed to the proximate power that elicits its proper act. Dissent is the proper act of unbelief and is an act of intellect moved by will. Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as proximate subject and in the will as proximate mover.
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ARTICLE II CONTINUED. Objection: since contempt belongs to the will, unbelief seems to reside in

the will. Reply:

contempt in the will causes the intellectual dissent in which unbelief is formally completed; hence the cause is in the will, but unbelief itself is in the intellect. If a person mistakenly takes an evil angel for a good one while intending to adhere to a good angel, bodily sense may be deceived without the mind departing from the true rule; but if he adheres to Satan when Satan begins leading him into evil and falsehood, he is not without sin.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First: unbelief is in the intellect as its proximate subject and in the will as its proximate mover.

Second: the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is formally in the intellect.

COMMENTARY. I ask whether there is some habit in the will belonging to the nature of unbelief. Arguments for the

affirmative: where an act depends upon two powers, both seem to require habits perfecting or disposing them; and as the virtue of faith requires charity in the will for its perfect virtuous act, the vice of unbelief might seem to require a contrary habit. Moreover, repeated acts of refusing to believe can generate a habit in the will. Finally, a Christian who would assent to revealed dogma only because of human testimony and probable reasons seems unbelieving by a defect of will even if he verbally retains the propositions of faith. Reply: good requires integrity of causes, while evil can arise from a particular defect.

Therefore the two habits required for the perfection of virtuous faith do not imply two formally corresponding habits for unbelief. Hatred of God need not be formal and explicit in every act of unbelief; the participative hatred found in every mortal

sin suffices. Repeated bad acts can indeed generate habits of pride, pertinacity, or impiety in the will, and these nourish unbelief, but they are not formally unbelief. The person who believes only because of human reasons also has an intellectual error concerning the formal motive of faith: he does not judge that divine revelation is to be believed precisely because of God

revealing. Concerning visions in spiritual life, I discusses Cajetan's interpretation of Augustine. A suggestion toward a lesser good is not necessarily demonic in every case; the decisive issue is whether the suggestion leads to evil or falsehood. A person

should remain cautious because visions may proceed from a good or an evil angel. I add that the Holy Spirit does not necessarily impel a person at every moment toward what is absolutely the greatest good unless the person is already prudently

disposed toward it. Conversely, a demon can sometimes urge something objectively greater in itself for a corrupt motive—for example, stirring a man toward the episcopate through pride and the judgment that he is worthy of such a state.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER UNBELIEF IS THE GREATEST OF SINS. Aquinas objects that

Augustine hesitated to prefer

a Catholic of very wicked morals to a heretic whose life was otherwise blameless; unbelief can also diminish culpability through ignorance, as Paul says he obtained mercy because he acted ignorantly in unbelief; and Scripture sometimes threatens

baptized sinners with greater punishment because they trample upon graces already received. On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on John 15, treats unbelief as the great sin under whose general name other sins are retained. Aquinas answers that every sin formally consists in aversion from God; therefore the more a sin separates man from God, the graver it is. Unbelief separates man most radically in the order of knowledge because the unbeliever lacks true knowledge of God insofar as his false judgment concerns God. Hence unbelief is graver in kind than sins consisting merely in perversity of morals. Nevertheless circumstances can make an individual sin of another kind more grievous in a particular case. Ignorance joined to

unbelief can also have an excusing aspect when it does not proceed from malice.

SUMMARY. First: unbelief is, according to its genus, greater than sins against the moral virtues because it removes man more

radically from God. Second: this does not mean unbelief is simply greater than every sin against the theological virtues; despair and especially hatred of God require separate comparison.

COMMENTARY. I explain Aquinas's difficult statement that one who holds a false opinion of God does not, under that

false

conception, know God as He is. Since God is most simple, an error introduced into the conception of God can falsify the composite judgment. Yet this must not be taken to deny every partial or confused true knowledge of God, for Paul himself says

that we know in part and that the Gentiles knew God. I therefore distinguish clear and evident knowledge from confused knowledge, and the object as it is in itself from the several judgments formed by our intellect.

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I develop the distinction further. From the side of God, who is absolutely simple, one cannot affirm a contradictory complex such as
"the true God lacking free will." A man who denies divine freedom therefore does not know the true God under that false description.
From the side of our intellect, however, distinct judgments can be formed: one may be true when considered separately and another
false. Thus a gentile can arrive by demonstration at the true conclusion that there is one first mover and first cause, while simultaneously corrupting his conception through another false judgment about God. I then note Aquinas's principle that sin consists
in aversion from God, understood precisely under the aspect of culpable evil. Regarding the comparison of theological sins, despair is
not simply graver than unbelief according to Aquinas, whereas hatred of God is graver than unbelief.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER EVERY ACTION OF AN UNBELIEVER IS A SIN. Objections:

Romans 14 says, "Whatever is
not of faith is sin," and a gloss says the whole life of unbelievers is sin. Faith directs intention, and no action can be good without right intention. Moreover, the act of faith precedes the acts of the virtues; therefore where faith is absent no genuinely good action seems possible. On the contrary, Scripture says that the prayers and alms of Cornelius ascended before God.
Aquinas answers: mortal sin removes sanctifying grace but does not totally corrupt the good of nature. Hence unbelievers cannot perform good works proceeding from grace—namely meritorious works—but they can perform goods for which natural goodness is sufficient. It is therefore unnecessary to say that they sin in every action. They sin when they act precisely from unbelief. As a believer can commit an act that he does not actually refer to the end of faith, so an unbeliever can perform
a naturally good act that he does not refer to the end of unbelief. Faith directs intention toward the supernatural last end, but natural reason can direct intention toward a connatural good. Natural reason is not wholly destroyed in unbelievers; some knowledge of truth remains. Cornelius, moreover, possessed at least implicit faith before he was more fully instructed by Peter.
SUMMARY. Unbelievers cannot perform meritorious works from grace; they need not sin in every action; but whenever they
perform an action from unbelief as such, they sin.

COMMENTARY ON

ARTICLE IV. I first clarify that Aquinas is speaking of works meritorious on the part of the agent.

Such merit cannot belong
to one who is turned away from God. Nevertheless every morally good act has, considered according to the nature of the act, a
certain aptitude for divine reward. Therefore morally good works done even by an unbeliever, if free from an evil circumstance, can be praised by God at judgment, although the agent is not capable of the supernatural reward unless he is in grace. I then ask whether Aquinas's second conclusion—that unbelievers need not sin in every act—is true. Arguments against
it appeal to "A bad tree cannot bear good fruit"; if an unbeliever is a bad tree, it seems no act can be good. Luke's saying about the sound or evil eye is interpreted as referring to the intention concerning the end: if the fundamental intention is evil, the whole body of subsequent works seems evil. Romans 14 and several passages of Augustine are also invoked. Augustine says
no one lives rightly except through faith in Christ and denies true virtue to the Gentiles when their apparently good works are ordered to vainglory or self-exaltation. Another argument reasons from the last end. Aquinas says whatever man wills he wills
on account of the last end, and the force of the first intention remains in subsequent appetites. If an idolater has constituted a creature or idol as his last end, all later actions would appear virtually ordered to that evil end. A good act requires a morally good relation to the last end; merely saying that God as author of nature objectively orders the goodness of the act to Himself does not make the agent's relation moral, because moral relation must be voluntary. Gregory of Rimini therefore held that idolatrous unbelievers sin in every work, even in honoring their parents, because all is virtually referred to the false god. I note, however, that this position cannot be used against the defined Catholic truth that before justification a man can perform many works that are not sins. Trent, Session VI, canons 7 and 8, and the condemnation of an error of John Hus establish this. Gregory's distinctive claim was rather that such works could not be done without supernatural assistance.
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DECISION. Second conclusion: a sinner—whether believer, unbeliever, or even idolater—can perform many morally good
works that are not sins without a new actual supernatural assistance. I cite Augustine, Jerome, the Master of the Sentences, the
common school of theologians, St. Thomas, and Soto. Reason: an unbelieving or idolatrous sinner can see a poor man, be
moved by compassion, and, following the dictate of natural reason, assist him. Since natural reason truly dictates that the
needy man ought to be helped, the act can be morally good. Christ's parable of the Samaritan confirms the point: the
Samaritan's merciful action toward his neighbor is presented for imitation—"Go and do likewise." If a man is under a
command to give alms, it would be exceedingly harsh to say that he necessarily sins by obeying it unless he first passes from
mortal sin into justification. Likewise, suppose an idolater, without thinking of his false god, recognizes by natural reason that
a debt must be paid and pays it. If paying necessarily constituted a sin of unbelief because of a remote virtual reference to the
idol, it would follow absurdly that he sins more by paying than by refusing to pay, since refusal would be merely an injustice.
Aquinas's own demonstration is decisive: the good of human nature remains in unbelievers and is not obstinately fixed in evil.
Therefore they can perform some good operation. Demons are different because their wills are obstinately fixed in evil and
their acts are actually referred to hatred of God and supreme pride. For resolving the objections I distinguish three ways in
which an act is referred to God or to the last end. First, ACTUALLY, FORMALLY, AND EXPRESSLY: a person gives alms
while actually considering God's goodness and loving God. The moral reference does not consist merely in verbally saying "I
give this for God," but in the will actually ordering the work through love to the last end. Second, VIRTUALLY: an explicit
preceding act has ordered oneself toward a work later to be performed. When the later work is done, even without renewed
conscious consideration of the last end, it is virtually referred to that end through the force of the preceding intention. Third,
HABITUALLY: a person may possess sanctifying grace and charity without a preceding explicit act by which he consciously
referred all his works to God. A later naturally compassionate and morally good almsgiving is then habitually referred to God
because the agent possesses grace and charity. I hold that one explicit act of charity can suffice for subsequent morally good
works to be virtually referred to God so long as the person does not depart from grace. A merely habitual relation, however,
does not by itself change an act from evil to good or good to evil. For such a change an actual or at least virtual relation is
required. Thus a person in grace can commit a venial sin: habitual ordering to God remains, but it does not make the venially
sinful act good. Aquinas accordingly teaches that venial sin does not exclude the habitual ordering of the act toward the glory
of God.
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QUESTION X - ON UNBELIEF.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL SPECIES OF UNBELIEF ST. THOMAS asks

whether unbelief has
several species. Faith is one because its formal object is First Truth, and therefore it may seem that unbelief, as contrary to faith, should likewise be one. Again, errors against faith can be multiplied without limit, which would seem to produce infinitely many species. Finally, one person may err in many matters, whereas one individual act or vice should not belong simultaneously to many species.

ON THE CONTRARY, one virtue can have several opposed vices, since good occurs in one ordered way

while evil can depart
from order in many ways.

RESPONSE. A virtue attains a rule of knowledge or action in one determinate way. Vices opposed to it can be distinguished either by their different relation to the virtue or by the different corruptions of circumstances and matter. According to the

first mode there are determinate species. Unbelief consists in resisting faith, and this resistance occurs in three principal ways: against faith not yet received, which is pagan or gentile unbelief; against faith received in figure, which is Jewish unbelief; and against faith received in the manifestation of truth, which is heresy. If unbelief were divided merely according to the particular false propositions embraced, its species would be indefinitely multiplied, because errors can multiply without limit. To the first

objection, Aquinas distinguishes the formal object of sin according to the sinner's conversion and according to the evil of aversion. First Truth is the good from which unbelief departs, but the false proposition embraced is the object to which the unbeliever turns; from this side particular errors can diversify the sin. Nevertheless the three principal species arise from the mode of resistance to faith. To the third objection, just as one faith believes many truths in order to one First Truth, one unbelief can contain many errors ordered under one mode of resistance. I begin a difficulty: Aquinas seems at first to say that errors are indefinitely diverse, yet also teaches three determinate species. The reconciliation requires considering not only the false proposition embraced but also the formal mode by which the person resists the faith.

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QUESTION X, ARTICLE V - ON THE THREE SPECIES OF UNBELIEF

I say two things must be considered together. First is the false object to which the unbeliever turns. If species were taken only from
particular false propositions, there would indeed be indefinitely many species, since men can err in infinitely many ways. Second is
the resistance to faith accompanying that conversion to error. When this formal relation is included, unbelief falls under three
principal modes: resistance to faith never received; resistance to faith received under figure; and resistance to faith received in the
manifest Christian profession. Thus paganism, Judaism, and heresy are formally distinct. The resistance is not merely an accidental
terminus from which the sinner departs. It enters the formal character of the chosen error insofar as the person embraces a false
proposition precisely against the faith. I compare hatred of God: aversion from God is common to mortal sins, but in hatred of God
that aversion enters the sin per se and therefore specifies it. An objection says that a Jew, pagan, and heretic can all embrace the same
false proposition - for example, denial of the Trinity - and therefore should commit unbelief of the same species. I reply that the
material error is one, but formally the relation to faith differs because each resists from a different prior relation to the faith. Another
objection compares temperance: an act contrary to temperance does not change species merely because the virtue was once possessed
or never possessed. I reply that rejection of faith once received belongs intrinsically to the formal object of unbelief because faith
itself includes a pious affection of the will toward divine testimony. Rejecting what one has professed is a distinctive mode of impiety.
He compares fornication and adultery. A supervening relation can introduce a new species within the same genus when it adds a
special repugnance to the virtue's formal object. So too resistance to received faith can specify unbelief. A catechumen who truly
believed and afterward returns to his former sect raises another case. Although he has not yet received baptism and therefore is not
externally subject to all ecclesiastical penalties, I hold that before God he can properly be a heretic, because reception of faith does not
absolutely require baptism; baptism is required for visible ecclesial profession and jurisdiction. If a baptized infant is raised among
pagans and invincibly does not know that he was baptized, then on reaching reason and resisting the Gospel he is formally pagan
rather than heretical, because according to his conscience he does not resist a faith known to have been previously received.
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If he does not sin against the faith according to his conscience - just as one does not commit the sin of adultery who invincibly thinks that the woman with whom he sins is unmarried - nevertheless, if that man knows that he has been baptized, or has vincible ignorance of it, he is a heretic. Fourth objection. The fact that faith is received under a figure or in the manifestation of the truth does not vary the species of faith, because our faith and the faith of the ancient Fathers are of the same species. Therefore, for someone to resist faith received under a figure or in the manifestation of the truth will not vary the species of unbelief. The consequence is denied. Just as it belongs to the same virtue not to give more or less than one ought, it does not follow that giving more and giving less than one ought belong to the same vice. The reason is that vices can arise in more ways than virtues. Fifth objection. Jews who before the coming of Christ abandoned the faith and turned to the rites of the Gentiles were unbelievers. Likewise, those who at that time accepted one thing from the faith of the synagogue and rejected another were unbelievers; yet their unbelief seems incapable of being placed under any of the three species assigned above. It is answered that their unbelief was neither heresy nor paganism, but Judaism. The formal character of this species of unbelief does not consist in turning to Jewish rites, although this is what commonly happens now; rather, it consists in resisting faith once received under a figure, whatever may be that to which the person materially turns. Sixth objection. If a Jew of old had possessed explicit faith and afterward departed from it, his sin would not be the species of unbelief called heresy. Therefore it is accidental to heresy that someone receive faith in the manifestation of the truth. The consequence is proved: that Jew had received the faith not merely implicitly under figures, but had explicitly believed in Christ. If it is replied that "manifestation of the truth" is taken on the part of the object, namely that Christ has already been manifested, the contrary follows: Jews who never received Christ would then have sinned by heresy rather than Judaism, since they resisted the faith previously received at a time when the truth had already been manifested. It is answered that, for the unbelief which is heresy, it is not enough to have had explicit faith in Christ, nor that Christ Himself has been manifested; it is required that the man receive the faith in the manifestation of the truth. Seventh objection. If a Christian entirely apostatizes from the whole faith of the Gospel, he becomes an unbeliever; yet he does not seem to belong to any of these species, unless one says that he belongs to Judaism if he turns to the Jews, or to paganism if he turns to pagans. He does not seem to belong to heresy, since he rejects the whole Gospel. It is answered that such a man is formally a heretic, because he resists the faith which he once received in the manifestation of the truth. Materially, however, there will be Judaism if he turns to the Jews. Concerning apostasy and whether it differs specifically from heresy, we shall speak in the following question. Eighth objection. If one of the faithful and just who formerly were not bound by the Mosaic law were to depart from the faith, either before Christ's coming or afterward by refusing to receive the Gospel, he would be an unbeliever; yet he would not sin by Judaism, because he never received the faith under the figures of the Mosaic law; nor by heresy, because he never received faith in the manifestation of truth; nor by paganism, because he had already received faith. Therefore there are more species of unbelief. It is answered that this man's unbelief is of the same species as Judaism. He received faith in Christ professed by certain exterior signs and sacrifices which, under the law of nature, always existed among the faithful as figures and signs of the Christ to come. Thus it is accidental to the specific nature of Judaism that faith have been received under the figures of the Old Law. It is sufficient that it was received under figures of the law of nature. The name "Judaism," however, was derived from the Jewish nation because among that people the figures of the coming Christ were more numerous and more explicit. Two doubts remain. The first is whether the unbelief of the Jews who formerly possessed true faith and lost it when Christ came into the world because they did not receive Him is of the same species as the unbelief of present-day Jews, who never possessed true faith. The reason for doubting is that present Jews never received true faith under a figure; therefore, simply speaking, they do not seem to fall under Judaism. One might answer that it is enough that in their fathers they received the true faith which they themselves were bound to receive in the manifestation of truth. But this does not satisfy, because for their fathers to have received the faith is not for them themselves to have received it under a figure. A second and better answer is that present Jews receive the faith of Christ under a figure according to their own estimation. Since, once the truth has been manifested, they are bound to receive Christ and believe that He has already come, they sin by an unbelief formally of the same species as if they had truly received the true faith of Christ under a figure. To dishonor a king and to dishonor one whom a person sincerely judges to be king, although he is not, belong to the same species of sin; for one's estimation gives the object its moral character with respect to the species of the sin. The mode of resistance in present Jews is the same as it was in their ancestors who formerly possessed true faith. The other similar doubt is whether the children of heretics, who never possessed true faith but hold the same errors as their parents, commit the same species of heresy as one who was once truly Christian and afterward abandoned the faith. The reason for doubting is that the child of heretics never received true faith in the manifestation of truth. The answer continues on the next page.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE V - CONCLUSION; ARTICLE VI

It is answered that it is sufficient that, according to his own estimation, such a person should receive the Gospel of Christ already manifested, especially if he has been baptized. For the reception of Baptism itself is a profession of faith in the manifestation of the truth. In the reply to the third objection it should be noted how it can happen that the same man errs in diverse species of unbelief. Successively this is obvious: for example, if one who is now a Jew becomes a Christian and afterward becomes a Lutheran. But to sin
simultaneously by the sin of Judaism and by heresy seems impossible. For if he has once received faith in the manifestation of truth, then, if he abandons the faith, his sin is heresy even though he turns to the sect of the Jews. Nevertheless, it is answered that under diverse formal aspects the same sin can be formally Judaism and formally heresy: heresy because it resists faith once received in the manifestation of truth; Judaism because it resists the faith which had been received under a figure.

ARTICLE VI. Whether the unbelief of Gentiles or Pagans is graver than the others.

Objection 1. It seems that the unbelief of Gentiles or Pagans is graver than the others. Just as a bodily disease is graver insofar as it is
more contrary to the health of a more principal member, so a sin seems graver insofar as it is contrary to what is more principal in a virtue. But what is principal in faith is faith in the unity of God, from which the Gentiles depart by believing in a multitude of gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest. Objection 2. Among heretics, a heresy is more detestable insofar as it contradicts the truth of faith in more things and in more principal things. Thus the heresy of Arius, who separated the divinity from Christ, was more detestable than that of Nestorius, who separated Christ's humanity from the person of the Son of God. But Gentiles depart from the faith in more and more principal matters than Jews and heretics, since they receive nothing at all of the faith. Therefore their unbelief
is the gravest. Objection 3. Every good diminishes evil. But there is some good in the Jews, since they confess that the Old Testament
is from God; and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less than Gentiles, who reject both Testaments. On the contrary, 2 Peter 2 says: "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back." Gentiles did not know the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews, having known it in some fashion, abandoned it. Therefore their sin is graver. I answer that, as was said, two things can be considered in unbelief. One is its relation to faith. In this respect he sins more gravely against faith who resists a faith already received than one who resists a faith not yet received, just as he sins more gravely who fails to fulfill what he promised than one who fails to do what he never promised. Accordingly, the unbelief of heretics, who profess the faith of the Gospel and resist it by corrupting it, is a graver sin than that of the Jews, who never received the evangelical faith, but received its figure in the Old Law and corrupted it by interpreting it badly. Hence
their unbelief is graver than that of Gentiles, who in no way received the faith of the Gospel. The other thing considered in unbelief is
the corruption of those things which pertain to faith. In this respect, because Gentiles err in more things than Jews, and Jews in more than heretics, the unbelief of Gentiles is graver than that of Jews, and that of Jews than that of heretics - unless perhaps certain heretics, such as the Manichaeans, err concerning things to be believed even more than Gentiles. Nevertheless, of these two kinds of gravity, the first outweighs the second with respect to the nature of guilt. For unbelief has the character of guilt principally from resisting faith, rather than merely from lacking the things which belong to faith; the latter pertains more to the nature of punishment. Therefore, simply speaking, the unbelief of heretics is the worst. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First conclusion: considered according
to resistance to faith, the guilt of heretics is graver than that of Jews, and that of Jews graver than that of Pagans. Second conclusion: considered according to the corruption of the things pertaining to faith, the order is reversed; pagan unbelief is gravest, and Jewish unbelief occupies the second place. Third conclusion: nevertheless, simply speaking, the first conclusion is to be asserted absolutely.

ARTICLE VII. Whether one ought to dispute publicly with unbelievers.

The objections begin: the Apostle warns against contentious disputes of words; ecclesiastical law forbids reopening what sacred councils have already judged; and an argument concerns something doubtful, whereas the truths of faith are most certain.
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QUESTION X, ARTICLE VII - WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO DISPUTE PUBLICLY WITH UNBELIEVERS

On the contrary, Acts 9 says that Saul grew stronger and confounded the Jews, and that he spoke to the Gentiles and disputed with the

Greeks. I answer that two things must be considered in a disputation about the faith: one on the part of the disputant, the other on the part of the hearers. On the part of the disputant his intention must be considered. If he disputes as one doubting the faith, not presupposing the truth of faith as certain but intending to test it by arguments, without doubt he sins as one doubtful in faith and as an unbeliever. But if one disputes about the faith in order to refute errors, or even for exercise, it is praiseworthy. On the part of the hearers it must be considered whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in faith, or simple and wavering. Before men wise and firm in faith there is no danger in disputing about faith. Concerning the simple, however, a distinction is required. Either they are being solicited or attacked by unbelievers - Jews, heretics, or Pagans - who strive to corrupt their faith; or they are not being solicited in this matter at all, as in lands where there are no unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute publicly about the faith, provided that suitable and sufficient men can be found who are able to refute the errors. By this means the simple will be strengthened in faith, the unbelievers' power of deceiving will be removed, and the silence of those who ought to resist the corrupters of the truth of faith would itself become a confirmation of error. Hence Gregory says in the second book of the Pastoral Rule: just as incautious speech draws men into error, so indiscreet silence leaves in error those who could have been instructed. In the second case, however, it is dangerous to dispute publicly about the faith before simple people whose faith is firmer precisely because they have never heard anything different from what they believe. Therefore it is not expedient that they hear the words of unbelievers disputing against the faith. Reply to objection 1. The Apostle does not prohibit disputation absolutely, but disorderly disputation, which consists more in contention over words than in firmness of doctrine. Reply to objection 2. That law prohibits public disputation about faith which proceeds from doubt concerning the faith; it does not prohibit disputation directed to the confirmation of faith. Reply to objection 3. Things of faith must not be disputed as though they were doubtful, but for the manifestation of truth and the refutation of errors. At times it is necessary for the confirmation of faith to dispute with unbelievers: sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Peter 3, "Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you"; sometimes by convicting those who err, according to Titus 1, that a bishop be able "to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers." SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First conclusion: he who disputes about faith as one doubtful is an unbeliever. Second: one who disputes to refute adversaries or for exercise can dispute laudably and usefully. Third: there is no danger in disputing about faith with men wise and firm in it. Fourth: when simple hearers are being solicited by unbelievers and know their errors and arguments, prudent and learned men must dispute about faith before them. Fifth: when simple faithful people are not being solicited by unbelievers, it is dangerous to dispute about faith before them. COMMENTARY. Gregory, in the second part of the Pastoral Rule, chapter 4, teaches excellently with what intention a disputation concerning faith is to be undertaken. Concerning the first conclusion it should be observed that although disputation joined with doubt is always unlawful for a believer, it can be lawful for a pagan to enter into a

disputation with a Catholic in order to investigate the truth; indeed, when he begins to doubt his pagan error, he is already on the way

to receiving the faith and withdrawing from unbelief. But one who has once received the faith becomes an unbeliever as soon as he voluntarily doubts it. It should also be noted with Cajetan that after the death of St. Thomas a constitution was issued, found in the chapter Quicumque de haereticis, book VI, title Inhibemus, by which it is provided that no layman dare publicly or privately dispute concerning the faith; one who does otherwise is bound by the bond of excommunication. Cajetan notes that, because this is a penal law, it must be restricted to a formal disputation about faith - one undertaken against those who formally maintain something contrary to faith, or expressly to confirm the doubtful or refute error. A disputation undertaken merely as a scholastic exercise is material, and a layman may take part in it. Cajetan adds that if a layman were learned, he could formally dispute about faith, especially in a case of necessity. The intention of the law is to restrain laymen who commonly are unlearned; but it can happen that a layman is sufficient and suitable for disputation, and such a man is not to be treated as excommunicated. Indeed, by received custom in the Church learned laymen dispute not only orally but also in writing. Albert Pighius, a count, wrote thirteen books against Lutheran errors and Erasmus. Henry VIII, King of England, likewise published an assertion of the seven sacraments against Luther and presented it to Leo X; he was praised by the Pontiff and Cardinals, although afterward the unhappy man apostatized from the faith.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE VII - END OF COMMENTARY; ARTICLE VIII

Finally it should be noted that at times the Holy Spirit is accustomed to inspire simple men so that they speak more usefully against heretics concerning matters of faith and confound them more effectively than learned men. A celebrated example occurs in Book X, chapter 3 of the Ecclesiastical History: a simple but holy man at the Council of Nicaea overcame a most subtle heretic whom learned
men had not been able to convince by a long disputation. Experience also teaches how useless public disputations with heretics often
are unless they are directed to recovering simple people who have been seduced by them. In all these matters the footsteps of the Fathers must be followed, and one must proceed against heretics after taking counsel with prudent and learned men.

ARTICLE VIII. Whether unbelievers are to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 1. It seems that unbelievers are in no way to be compelled to the faith. Matthew 13 says that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" He answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it." Chrysostom says that the Lord said this to prohibit killings; for heretics ought not to be killed, lest many saints be destroyed with them. Therefore, by equal reason, unbelievers should not be compelled to the faith. Objection 2. The Decretals say concerning the Jews: "The holy Synod commands that henceforth no one inflict
force upon them in order that they believe." Therefore neither should other unbelievers be compelled to faith. Objection 3. Augustine
says: a man can do other things unwillingly, but he cannot believe except willingly. The will cannot be compelled. Therefore unbelievers should not be compelled to faith. Objection 4. Ezekiel 18 says in the person of God: "I desire not the death of the sinner."
We ought to conform our will to the divine will. Therefore neither ought we to will that unbelievers be killed. On the contrary, Luke 14 says: "Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled." Men enter the house of God, that is, the holy Church, through faith. Therefore some are to be compelled to faith. I answer that some unbelievers have never received the faith, such as Gentiles and Jews. Such persons are in no way to be compelled to believe, because believing is an act of the
will. Nevertheless, if the faithful possess the power, such unbelievers can be compelled not to impede the faith by blasphemies, evil persuasions, or open persecutions. For this reason the faithful of Christ frequently wage war against unbelievers, not in order to force
them to believe - for even if they conquered them and held them captive, they would leave it to their liberty whether they wished to believe - but in order to compel them not to impede the faith of Christ. Other unbelievers are those who at some time received the faith and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates. Such persons can even be compelled bodily to fulfill what they promised and
to retain what they once received. Reply to objection 1. The authority cited is understood as forbidding indiscriminate destruction when there is danger that the wheat be rooted up with the cockle. Augustine explains that when this fear is absent - when the crime is
so manifest and execrable to all that no schism can arise from its punishment - the severity of discipline ought not to sleep. Reply to
objection 2. Jews who have in no way received the faith are in no way to be compelled to it. But if they have received it, they must by
necessity be compelled to retain it. Reply to objection 3. Just as to vow is voluntary but to fulfill the vow is necessary, so to receive the faith is voluntary, but to retain the faith once received is necessary. Hence heretics are compelled to retain it. Augustine, writing to
Count Boniface, answers those who cry that belief must be free: let them recognize in Paul first being compelled by Christ and afterward willingly preaching Christ. Reply to objection 4. Augustine says in the same letter that none of us wills any heretic to perish. Yet the house of David did not merit peace except when Absalom, who waged war against his father, was destroyed. So too the Catholic Church, if by the loss of some she gathers others, heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the liberation of so many peoples. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First: unbelievers who never received the faith are in no way to be compelled to faith.
Second:
if the Church has the power, they can be compelled not to impede the faith by blasphemies, evil persuasion, or persecutions. Third: unbelievers who once received the faith can be compelled even corporally to retain what they once received.
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ARTICLE IX. Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. The article begins on this page.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE IX - WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO COMMUNICATE WITH

UNBELIEVERS

Objection 1. The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 10: "If any of them that believe not invite you to a meal, and you be willing to go, eat
of anything that is set before you." Chrysostom likewise permits going to the table of pagans. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. Objection 2. The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 5: "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Those without are unbelievers. Since communion with certain persons is forbidden to the faithful by the judgment of the Church, it seems that the faithful ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers. Objection 3. A master cannot make use of a servant without communicating with him at least by words, because he moves the servant by command. Christians may have unbelieving servants - Jews, Pagans, or Saracens. Therefore they can lawfully communicate with them. On the contrary, Deuteronomy 7 says: "Thou shalt not make a league with them, nor show mercy to them, neither shalt thou make marriages with them." The gloss on Leviticus 15 says that one must abstain from idolatry in such a way as not to touch idolaters or their disciples and not to have communion with them. I answer that communion with a person is forbidden to the faithful for two reasons: first, as a punishment of the person from whom the communion of the faithful is withdrawn; second, as a precaution for those who are forbidden to communicate with him. Both reasons are gathered from 1 Corinthians 5. After pronouncing the sentence of excommunication, the Apostle gives as a reason: "Know you not that a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump?" He then gives the reason on the part of punishment imposed by ecclesiastical judgment: "Do not you judge them that are within?" According to the first mode, the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers who never received the Christian faith, namely Pagans or Jews, because
she does not exercise spiritual judgment over them, though she may judge them temporally when they dwell among Christians and commit a fault subject to temporal punishment. But as punishment the Church forbids communion with those believers who depart from the faith once received, either by corrupting it, as heretics do, or by totally withdrawing from it, as apostates do; against both the
Church pronounces excommunication. According to the second mode, a distinction must be made according to persons, affairs, and times. If some faithful are firm in faith, so that from their communication with unbelievers the conversion of the unbelievers is more to be hoped for than the perversion of the faithful, they are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who never received the faith, especially when necessity urges. But if the faithful are simple and weak, so that their subversion may probably be feared, they must be prohibited from such communication and especially from great familiarity without necessity. Reply to the contrary. The
Lord's command concerned those nations into whose land the Jews were about to enter. Because the Jews were prone to idolatry, there
was danger that continual association would alienate them from the faith. Hence the text adds: "Because she will turn away thy son from following me." Reply to objection 2. The Church has no judgment over unbelievers as regards inflicting spiritual punishment, but she does have judgment over some unbelievers as regards temporal punishment; accordingly, for particular offenses she can withdraw from certain unbelievers the communion of the faithful. Reply to objection 3. It is more probable that an unbelieving servant
governed by a faithful master will be converted to the master's faith than the reverse. Therefore believers are not prohibited from having unbelieving servants. But if danger threatened the master from such communication, he should cast the servant away, according to Matthew 18: "If thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off and cast it from thee." SUMMARY. First: communion with unbelievers who never received the faith is not forbidden as a punishment of those unbelievers. Second: communion with unbelievers
who once received the faith is forbidden as punishment. Third: steadfast and prudent believers need not be prohibited from communicating with unbelievers who never received the faith. Fourth: simple and weak believers must be prohibited from such communication and familiarity.

ARTICLE X. Whether unbelievers can possess authority or dominion over the faithful.

The first objection cites 1 Timothy 6 and 1 Peter 2, where Christian servants are commanded to honor even unbelieving or harsh masters; therefore unbelievers can in some way be over believers.

QUESTION X, ARTICLE X - WHETHER UNBELIEVERS CAN POSSESS AUTHORITY OR

DOMINION OVER THE
FAITHFUL

Objection 2. Whoever belong to the household of a prince are subject to him. But some of the faithful belonged to the households of
unbelieving princes. Hence Philippians 4 says: "All the saints salute you; especially they that are of Caesar's household," namely Nero's, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can rule over believers. Objection 3. As the Philosopher says in Politics I, a servant is an instrument of his master in matters pertaining to human life, just as the minister of an artisan is the artisan's instrument in
the works of the art. Yet in such matters a believer can be subject to an unbeliever: believers can cultivate the lands of unbelievers. Therefore unbelievers can be set over believers even with respect to dominion. On the contrary, it belongs to one who presides to exercise judgment over those subject to him. But unbelievers ought not to judge believers. The Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 6: "Dare
any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust," that is, unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore unbelievers ought not to preside over believers. I answer that we can speak in two ways about the dominion or authority of
unbelievers over believers. First, concerning a dominion or authority to be newly established. This ought in no way to be permitted, because it would turn to scandal and danger of faith. Those subject to another's jurisdiction can easily be changed by those who rule them so as to follow their command, unless the subjects are men of great virtue. Likewise unbelievers despise the faith if they perceive defects in believers. Therefore the Apostle forbade believers to litigate before an unbelieving judge. Hence the Church in no
way permits unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers or to be set over them in any office. Second, we can speak of a dominion
or authority already existing. Dominion and authority were introduced by human law, whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers is from divine law. Divine law, which is from grace, does not destroy human law, which is from natural reason. Therefore
the distinction between believers and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not remove the dominion and authority of unbelievers over believers. Nevertheless, by a just sentence or ordinance of the Church, which possesses the authority of God, such a right of dominion or authority can be removed, because unbelievers, by reason of their unbelief, can merit the loss of power over believers who have been transferred into the liberty of the children of God. The Church sometimes does this and sometimes does not. With respect to unbelievers who are temporally subject to the Church or her members, the Church has established that a Jewish slave who becomes Christian is immediately freed from servitude without payment if he was a household-born slave, that is, born in slavery; similarly if, while an unbeliever, he had been purchased for service. If, however, he was purchased for purposes of trade, the owner must expose him for sale within three months. The Church commits no injustice in this, because the Jews themselves are servants of the Church, and the Church can dispose of their temporal matters. Secular princes likewise have enacted many laws in favor of liberty.

But with respect to unbelievers who are not temporally subject to the Church or her members, the Church has not in fact established this rule, although in right she could establish it. She refrains in order to avoid scandal. Thus the Lord in Matthew 17 showed that, as a
Son, He could be exempt from tribute, yet He commanded tribute to be paid to avoid scandal. Likewise Paul, after commanding servants to honor their masters, adds: "lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed." Reply to objection 1. This makes the answer clear. Reply to objection 2. Caesar's authority existed before the distinction of believers from unbelievers. Therefore it was
not dissolved by the conversion of some to the faith. It was useful that some believers should remain in the emperor's household to defend other Christians, as blessed Sebastian strengthened Christians whom he saw weakening under torture while he himself remained hidden beneath the military cloak in the household of Diocletian. Reply to objection 3. Servants are subject to masters for their whole manner of life, and subjects to governors in all public affairs, whereas artisans' ministers are subject only for particular works. Therefore it is more dangerous for unbelievers to receive dominion or authority over believers than for believers to receive from unbelievers employment in a particular craft. The Church therefore permits Christians to cultivate the lands of Jews, since this need not entail intimate association. Solomon likewise requested workmen from the king of Tyre to cut timber. Yet if such communication or living together threatened the subversion of believers, it would have to be entirely forbidden. SUMMARY. First: it
must not be permitted that unbelievers newly acquire dominion over believers. Second: conversion to the faith does not of itself abolish a previously existing dominion or authority of an unbeliever over the convert. Third: the Church can enact a law removing converts from unbelieving dominion and authority. Fourth: in fact she has enacted such a law with respect to unbelievers temporally subject to Christian rulers, but not with respect to unbelievers who are not temporally subject, although she possesses authority in principle to legislate concerning the matter.

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QUESTION X, ARTICLE X - COMMENTARY

It should be noted that the Fourth Council of Toledo, near the end, and the canon cited in 17, question 4, expressly prohibit the jurisdiction of Jews over the faithful. Concerning these three articles we must dispute about whether compulsion of unbelievers to the faith is lawful or unlawful, and about whether association and communication with them are to be permitted. First it should be noted, before proposing the question, that unbelievers who have never received the faith fall into three classes. Some are subject to Christian princes neither in fact nor in right, and do not inhabit lands ever subject to Christian princes. Others, although not in fact subject to Christian princes, are subject to them in right, either because they rebelled against a dominion which Christian princes possessed over them, or because they inhabit territories whose possession belongs to Christian princes, as Saracens and Turks sometimes occupy regions subject to the Church. Finally, others are subject both in right and in fact to the government of Christian princes, such as Jews and Saracens dwelling in Christian lands or persons captured in a just war. These things presupposed, the first question is whether unbelievers who never received the faith but are subjects of Christian kings can be compelled to the faith. Argument 1 for the affirmative. The Fourth Council of Toledo, canon 55, praises Sisebut, King of the Spains, because by compulsion he converted Jews subject to him to the faith. Argument 2. The Catholic Monarchs of Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella, expelled both Jews and Moors from Spain unless they converted to the faith. A still greater force seems to have been imposed upon the Moors, for if they wished to depart by sea they were commanded to depart only by the Cantabrian Sea, and if by land they were compelled to depart through the Pyrenees. Argument 3. Many goods follow from such compulsion. Some truly receive the faith. Others, even if they receive it fictitiously, nevertheless cease openly to blaspheme the name of Christ and honor it at least verbally; finally their children and grandchildren become Christians and are saved. Argument 4. These unbelievers are bound to believe the Gospel. Therefore the prince to whose authority they are subject can compel them by threats and terrors to believe what they are bound to believe. Confirmation: a prince can compel subjects to observe positive human laws which are not contrary to natural reason; therefore he can compel them to observe God's positive law, since that law is not contrary to natural law and natural reason shows the Gospel to be evidently credible. A second confirmation: every prince can establish in his commonwealth a law concerning divine worship which is not contrary to natural law; therefore he can command his subjects to observe the evangelical law in divine worship. Argument 5 against St. Thomas's reason. St. Thomas says in Article 8 that unbelievers are not to be compelled because belief ought to be voluntary. But it would follow that heretics also cannot be compelled. Faith must be voluntary not only when one first believes but whenever one believes. Moreover exterior violence does not destroy what is voluntary absolutely: a man who through fear of bodily harm, death, or loss of temporal goods receives the faith can still believe voluntarily absolutely, though unwillingly in a qualified sense. Scotus, in IV Sentences, distinction 4, last question, says that Christian princes act religiously and usefully when they compel unbelieving subjects to receive the Christian faith and religion. Gabriel follows Scotus. Nevertheless the opposite opinion is common among the theologians. Durandus, Paludanus, Richard of Middleton, and Soto are to be consulted. It is proved from Matthew 10 and Luke 10. When the Lord sent the disciples to preach, He armed them with the power of miracles so that they might convince the human intellect and show the Gospel credible; with meekness, so that they might move the will by offering peace to all; and with the power of example, so that by their own endurance of torments they might lead others to the faith. They were sent as sheep among wolves. Christ allowed them no vengeance against those who refused the faith except to shake the dust from their feet as a testimony, reserving public condemnation until the day of judgment. If it is said that this concerned only unbelievers who were then not subjects of the Church because she lacked temporal power, the reply is, first, that the Apostles were sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, who were bound by the law to receive the Messiah, yet Christ did not will them to use royal coercive power, but priestly power. He thus taught that His Gospel was to be accepted voluntarily in the world. Second, the custom of the Church is the best interpreter of the Gospel. The Church has never used such power to compel unbelieving subjects to faith; rather, even at Rome they have been permitted to live according to their own rite. Furthermore, if the Church and Christian princes possessed a lawful power to compel unbelieving subjects to faith, charity and the duties of Christian rulers would seem to require them to use it whenever possible, since unbelief is a grave misery. Yet the Church does not judge that such universal coercion is obligatory. Innocent III expressly says that it is contrary to the Christian religion for an unwilling and contradicting person to be compelled to Christianity.
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QUESTION X, ARTICLE X - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

To the arguments for the contrary position the following replies are made. To the first argument: the Council of Toledo actually confirms our position. It praises the zeal of King Sisebut but condemns his deed of compelling the Jews. To the second: some of our authors say that the zeal of Ferdinand and Isabella is to be praised but not the act. Nevertheless, because it is not very probable that in
Spain, where there were learned and religious men, princes so Catholic and devoted to truth would have been allowed to err in a matter so grave, a second answer is possible: either they followed the opinion of Scotus and Gabriel, or - what seems more probable to
me - the act was rendered lawful by other circumstances. A Christian king may expel unbelievers from his kingdom when there is danger that the faithful will be perverted. This cause is expressly given in the royal decree expelling the Jews, promulgated 31 March
1492, and in the decree expelling the Saracens in February 1502. The Sixth Council of Toledo likewise decreed, with the consent of the prince and leading men, that whoever attained the summit of the kingdom should promise before ascending the royal throne that he would permit no non-Catholic to dwell in his realm; violation of the promise incurred anathema. Our Catholic kings could therefore act upon such a provision. If it is objected that force was at least inflicted upon the Moors by requiring them to depart by a particular route, it is answered that this too was then necessary because there was a fierce war against the African Moors. Had the expelled Moors crossed the Mediterranean directly to them, they would have given great assistance to our enemies. To the third argument: evil must not be done that good may come. Moreover grave evils can follow conversions produced by fear, especially many
sacrileges against the sacraments of Christ, because such persons are baptized fictitiously and secretly teach their children to observe
the sect of Muhammad. To the fourth: the consequence is denied. These unbelievers are not, speaking per se, bound to believe the Gospel by the natural law, but by supernatural law; with respect to that supernatural order they have not yet been subjected to the Christian prince. Likewise the confirmation is denied. A prince cannot compel unbelieving subjects to observe a positive law of a superior supernatural order merely as prince; consequently he cannot punish their unbelief simply as a transgression of that supernatural law. To the fifth: the consequence is denied. "Voluntary" is said in several ways. First, something is voluntary insofar as
it is not imposed by necessity or by a divine or human precept. In this sense heretics and all unbelievers who sin against the command
of the Gospel do not receive the Gospel "voluntarily," that is, without an obligation; for all men are bound by God's supernatural law
to receive it. Second, voluntary is distinguished from what is absolutely violent. In this sense everyone who believes, believes voluntarily. Yet there is a difference between heretics and unbelievers who have never received Baptism. The latter are not subject to
the Church in the observance of ecclesiastical precepts; the Church therefore does not punish them as her subjects. Heretics, by the very fact that they are baptized, are subjected to the Church, guardian of the Christian religion; hence she can compel the baptized by
spiritual and corporal penalties to observe the divine law. Third, voluntary is distinguished from what is violent in a qualified sense. A
man who gives money to a robber through fear of death does not give it voluntarily in that qualified sense. Therefore, when St. Thomas says unbelievers are not to be compelled because believing is voluntary, his meaning is that evangelical faith is to be accepted
voluntarily, that is, without human compulsion. The sin of those who never submitted to the Church is left for the judgment of God. Heretics, however, are bound by ecclesiastical precepts and censures because they professed the faith in Baptism; they can therefore be compelled to keep the faith which they professed. A second doubt now arises: whether unbelieving subjects of Christian princes can be compelled to observe the natural law - for example, to worship one God, not to blaspheme or perjure themselves, and not to fornicate or steal. First conclusion. A Christian prince can compel unbelieving subjects to observe the natural law just as he can compel the faithful, both in matters pertaining to the worship of the one God and in matters of political morals. This is proved by the example of emperors excellent in religion. Constantine enacted a law against pagan temples and sacrifices; later emperors confirmed
it. Ambrose and Augustine highly praise such laws. All nations have likewise enacted laws against certain vices which disturb the peace of the commonwealth, especially blasphemies against their gods. Cicero and Plato bear witness to this; even the peoples of the
West Indies punished adultery, sacrilege, and blasphemy. Much more, therefore, may a Christian prince punish blasphemy against the
true God and offenses against natural law.
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QUESTION X, ARTICLE X - COMMENTARY CONTINUED

The natural law is promulgated inwardly to all men, although in particular matters it sometimes needs a teacher and interpreter. Therefore a prince can compel subjects to observe natural law and positive laws derived from it, and thus to preserve the peace and religion of the commonwealth. The prince is guardian of the laws necessary for public peace and for forming men in piety toward the
worship of the one God. If unbelieving subjects could not lawfully be compelled by Christian rulers to observe natural law, neither could they be compelled to observe any human law derived from natural law. Second conclusion. It is not expedient that Christian princes always use their power to compel observance of every precept of natural law. Even among faithful subjects it is not expedient
to punish every sin against natural law; some evils are prudently tolerated to avoid greater evils, as public prostitutes are tolerated. Therefore a Christian prince ought not to be harsher toward unbelievers, but rather milder, so that they may be attracted to the faith. This is proved also by the example of faithful and just kings who for a time refrained from punishing very grave crimes while awaiting a better opportunity. Jehoshaphat and Hezekiah did not immediately punish all the idolatry of their people. Philip, the first Christian emperor, enacted no law against pagan idolatry; Constantine afterward did. The reason why very grave vices are sometimes
temporarily tolerated among unbelievers is scandal: lest punishment turn them away from receiving the Gospel, or lest still greater evils follow. Augustine may be consulted on this point. Third conclusion. A Christian prince may not punish offenses against natural
law committed by unbelieving subjects before he has enacted a penal law concerning them. This is the common doctrine of the jurists.
Constantine and the other emperors first enacted laws against idolatry and afterward punished idolaters. A king who today established
a new temporal penalty for fornication would act unjustly if he applied that penalty to fornications committed before the law. When the prince has not enacted a penal law against certain crimes contrary to natural law, he is understood not to judge them as disturbances of public peace deserving that temporal penalty. Although ignorance does not excuse men from eternal punishment for mortal sin, the temporal prince ought first to threaten a temporal penalty so that many may abstain from sin through fear of it. The prince must preserve the commonwealth with the least possible injury to his subjects, as a surgeon seeks the health of the body with the least damage to its members. He should therefore proceed first by admonition, then by punishment; first by directive justice, proposing what is just, and afterward by vindicative justice. In this way he is guardian of natural law. A third doubt is whether a Christian prince can compel those same unbelieving subjects at least to hear the Gospel. The affirmative seems true. If there were an unbelieving prince into whose kingdom there came a suitable preacher of the Gospel, that prince could judge by natural reason that such a man was worthy of being heard concerning morals and divine worship, and could compel his subjects at least to hear him. Much more can a Christian prince, who knows how greatly it concerns men to hear the Gospel, do the same. The truth of this question
will become clearer from what follows. A fourth doubt therefore arises: whether a Christian prince can compel unbelievers who are not otherwise his subjects to hear or receive the faith of the Gospel. John Major, in II Sentences, distinction 44, question 3, says first that unbelievers who are not enemies of Christians should initially be treated by believers in such a way that they are attracted by benevolence and benefits to receive the faith voluntarily; he even judges it useful that towers and houses be built near their borders so
that commerce may arise. Second, he says that if this way does not succeed, another course is to be taken: they are to be attacked in war so that they perish or are converted and become subjects of the Christian commonwealth. He even adds, according to a report made to him, that our West Indians could be conquered merely because of their barbarity. Another writer, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, chronicler of Charles V and a man more learned in humane letters than in divine, taught that unbelievers who are not otherwise subjects - such as our West Indians - can, because of crimes against natural law, especially idolatry, be punished by war and despoiled
of all their goods, wives, and children. Hostiensis likewise held that all unbelievers, by the mere fact of unbelief, could be deprived by
war of dominion over temporal things, because he thought true temporal dominion existed only among the faithful. There are two relections of Master Francisco de Vitoria on this question; there is also a lengthy treatise by Brother Bartolomé de las Casas, Bishop of Chiapas and a most constant defender of the Indians until death; and a relection of Covarrubias, Bishop of Segovia. To proceed more briefly, let the first conclusion be this: even if faithful princes had a right to wage war against unbelievers who are not their subjects because of unbelief, idolatry, or crimes against nature, nevertheless it would not be expedient to use such a right. The Church
often refrains from exercising her rights to avoid scandal, lest the faith be blasphemed and the conversion of unbelievers impeded. Such a war produces grave scandal among unbelievers and obstructs their conversion. It is contrary to the preaching of the Gospel, which teaches the meekness and humility of Christ and is founded upon the testimony of the martyrs and Apostles who confirmed the
truth with their own blood.
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It is therefore contrary to the very manner of evangelical preaching that, at the first entrance among a people to whom the Gospel is to be preached, Christians should attack them, kill them, and seize their goods - especially when those people do not recognize that the Christian prince possesses any such right. This is confirmed by Christ's example in Matthew 17: He willed to pay the tribute in order to avoid scandal. Likewise the Apostle in 1 Timothy 6 admonishes Christian servants to regard their masters as worthy of all honor, lest the name of the Lord be blasphemed. The conclusion is proved secondly from 1 Corinthians 1: "See your vocation, brethren ... not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble ... but the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong." Therefore it is repugnant to the foundation of evangelical preaching that the Gospel be preached by the power of arms. Second conclusion. Christian princes, and even the Supreme Pontiff, do not possess a right to compel unbelievers of this kind to receive the faith, nor to punish sins committed by them against natural law merely as such. Both parts are proved from what was established above. If Christian princes cannot compel unbelieving subjects to receive the faith, much less can they compel those who are not their subjects. And if they cannot punish even their own unbelieving subjects for crimes against nature committed before a penal law has been enacted, much less can they punish non-subjects whom they could not bind by such a law. Sepúlveda objects against the second part that the children of Israel, by God's command, waged war against the Canaanites and killed them because of idolatry and other crimes. Therefore Christians may imitate that faithful people. The consequence is denied. God willed to punish those nations and to hand their land over to His people; therefore by a special command and revelation of God it was lawful to destroy them. By the same right they killed even children after the capture of Jericho, as Joshua 6 records - an act which would have been monstrous had it not been done at God's command. He argues secondly: if the King of Spain were now to invade Africans and conquer them, it would be lawful for him to punish them for sins previously committed; therefore the same is true of all barbarian nations. It is answered that the King of Spain has a right to vindicate only those offenses which are committed against the right of his kingdom, or, by commission of the Pontiff, those committed against the Church. For this reason he may wage war against Africans occupying lands formerly subject to the authority of the Church; but he may not kill them merely for unbelief or for other sins against natural law. Third conclusion. If an unbelieving prince and the other magistrates of a people refuse to hear the Gospel, they cannot be compelled to hear it. The conclusion is proved because the same inconveniences and scandals follow if they are compelled to hear as if they were compelled to believe. Secondly, they cannot be compelled to believe; therefore neither can they be compelled to the means which are per se ordered to believing. The argument is strengthened thus: they are more strictly bound to believe than merely to hear; therefore if they cannot be compelled to that which carries the greater obligation, neither can they be compelled to that which carries the lesser. Some weaken this reasoning by saying that it would follow that the Pontiff could not compel Christians to hear teaching concerning the evangelical counsels, nor could ministers of a crusade compel the faithful to hear a preacher of indulgences. But, if the argument is understood as we have proposed it, it is sound: if a prince has no authority to compel these unbelievers to believe, he has no authority to compel them to means ordered per se to belief. St. Gregory's teaching in the first book of the Register also supports this conclusion. Fourth conclusion. It seems probable to me that a Christian prince can compel unbelieving subjects at least once to hear the Gospel, so that, if they wish to believe, they may believe; if they do not, they are to be left unpunished. Proof: a Christian prince has power to compel these unbelievers to assemble for an audience of the king; therefore he may then use his right to propose, or cause others to propose, evangelical doctrine. Likewise an unbelieving prince could lawfully compel his own subjects to hear a preacher who came into the region and was worthy of a hearing because of miracles or other testimony; much more can a Christian prince do so. No injury is done to a people merely because their prince requires them to hear a learned man, nor does such a single hearing of itself create scandal against receiving the Gospel. This conclusion is understood provided the compulsion is not used indirectly to force reception of the faith - for example, if the prince compelled them every day to assemble to hear a preacher. Hence we said that he may compel them to come together once to hear. Likewise, if from such compulsion there were reason to fear hatred or scandal against the Gospel, they should not be compelled even once. Because this danger seems obvious to some theologians, they deny that it is lawful to compel unbelievers to hear the Gospel. The usage of the Church is also objected: she has never compelled such unbelievers to hear a preacher. It is answered that the Church does not use this compulsion because our unbelieving subjects, especially the Jews, already know the doctrine of the Gospel, so it would be superfluous to compel them to hear it. But if in some Christian commonwealth there were barbarians or other unbelievers - even captives - who had never sufficiently heard the Gospel, it would be lawful to compel them to assemble once. This conclusion accords with an assertion of Master Vitoria in his first relection On the Indians: barbarians are bound to hear a preacher who peacefully speaks to them about the Gospel when they have been requested and admonished. Such an obligation can arise under natural law when the one asking to be heard is reasonably judged worthy of a hearing by some divine or human testimony, especially where the hearers suffer from vincible and culpable ignorance concerning natural law. Just as a gravely sick man who reasonably judges someone to be a physician is bound

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to hear and consult him, so too in such circumstances are these men bound to hear a prudent and learned preacher.
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QUESTION X - ARTICLE X: FURTHER ARGUMENTS ON DOMINION AND THE

INDIES I continue

against the claim that Christian princes possess universal coercive jurisdiction over non-subject unbelievers merely because they are unbelievers. I note first that Gennadius waged war against peoples occupying lands subject to the Roman Empire. The whole of Africa had been under Constantine and Justinian; those peoples were rebels. Moreover they were enemies of God's Church and included heretics: Gregory says that Gennadius repaired churches that had been destroyed, and Prosper testifies that Vandals infected with Arianism and numerous Donatists still lived in Africa. They had fought the Church with arms. Thus the war had an independent just title; as a Catholic commander Gennadius also took care that the Gospel be preached. Constantine likewise prohibited pagan subjects under threat from sacrificing to idols in order to help their conversion, but he exercised jurisdiction that he truly possessed over his own subjects. Non-subject Gentiles are different. From this it follows that although Gentiles are bound to hear the Gospel and sin mortally if they refuse to hear a suitable preacher, it does not follow that they can be compelled by violence and arms. Priests and Christians are already subjects of the Church and can be compelled in matters in which they have submitted to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. FIFTH CONCLUSION RESTATED. Unbelievers not subject to Christian princes cannot, by reason of unbelief alone, be despoiled of their goods. They possess true temporal dominion. FIRST PROOF. Scripture calls unbelievers kings and lords: Psalm 2, 'The kings of the earth stood up'; Genesis 47, Joseph made Egypt tributary to Pharaoh; Matthew 22, 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's'; Luke 22, 'The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them'; Romans 13, 'Let every soul be subject to higher powers'; 1 Peter 2 commands subjection to the king, governors, and even froward masters. SECOND PROOF. The Council of Constance, session 8, condemned the error of Wycliffe and the Waldensians that no one in mortal sin possesses civil dominion. Therefore unbelief does not of itself destroy dominion. The council did not except any species of mortal sin. Indeed hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief, yet dominion is not thereby immediately lost. The opinion of Hostiensis and Armacanus that faith is the foundation of temporal dominion is therefore close to the condemned error. THIRD PROOF FROM REASON. If man had been created in pure nature he could have possessed temporal dominion just as he would have been master of his actions. Philosophers ignorant of faith recognized true dominion. This matter is treated later in Questions 62 and 66, and by Vitoria in the first Relection on the Indians, section 7, and Soto, On Justice and Right IV, questions 1-2. OBJECTION FROM THE POWER TO EVANGELIZE. The Church has the power and command from Christ to preach the Gospel throughout the whole world; therefore, it is argued, she can arrange that all hear it. Otherwise that power would seem weak and vain. Psalm 44 says, 'Thou shalt make them princes over all the earth.' Matthew 28 says, 'All power is given to me in heaven and in earth; going therefore preach the Gospel to every creature.' It appears that in order to the Gospel the Supreme Pontiff has full power even about temporal things. Likewise, from the same testimony from which one concludes that the Church must preach everywhere, one concludes that Gentiles must hear. From John 20, 'Whose sins you shall forgive,' one concludes that men are bound to confess; hence it is argued that men can be compelled to hear the Gospel as preachers can be compelled to preach. REPLY. The Church's power and precept of evangelizing are not vain merely because hearers cannot be compelled by force.

On the contrary it belongs especially to the dignity of the Gospel that its preachers be peaceful.

The principality

of the Apostles over all the earth is not ordinarily exercised temporally by violence but spiritually, for the Psalm immediately says: 'They shall remember thy name, O Lord'; that is, in the virtue of Jesus' name they preach, and peoples freely confess God. The words 'All power is given to me in heaven and earth' can indeed include plenary temporal power whenever use of it is necessary for preaching or preserving the Gospel. But it does not follow that compelling peaceful non-subject unbelievers by violence to hear or believe is a fitting use of that power. Those already subject to the Church, such as preachers and Christian penitents, stand in another relation. I then begin answering an argument from Ecclesiasticus concerning kingdoms transferred from nation to nation because of injustices and injuries. The text does not teach that unbelief or other mortal sin automatically extinguishes dominion; rather, God providentially permits kingdoms to be transferred as punishment, even while the human conqueror can act unjustly.

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE X: PRIESTHOOD, ROMAN EMPIRE, ALEXANDER VI; SIXTH CONCLUSION

The people of God were sometimes carried captive into Babylon because of their sins, as Jeremiah records, and nevertheless the Chaldeans could sin by enslaving them and waging war against them. Divine providential punishment does not by itself give every foreign prince a title to conquest. SECOND ARGUMENT FROM HEBREWS 7. 'The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law.' Since after Christ's death the priesthood was transferred to the new Church founded on Peter's confession, the law and jurisdiction might seem to have been transferred to Christians alone. REPLY: literally this argument concerns the Jews, from whom the priesthood and law were transferred. It does not show that they lost temporal dominion over their goods merely because they rejected Christ. What was taken from them was the kingdom of God, a spiritual kingdom given to the Gentiles. If Jews in fact lost temporal dominion, God justly permitted this for their sins, as Daniel had prophesied and Christ foretold when He wept over Jerusalem. Yet they could still be unjustly mistreated and despoiled by men. Vespasian and Titus, themselves unbelievers, destroyed Jerusalem because of rebellion against the Roman Empire, to which the Jews had been subjected by Roman power. See St. Antoninus, historical part I, title 7. THIRD ARGUMENT FROM ALEXANDER VI. Pope Alexander VI in a bull granted Ferdinand and Isabella dominion over the islands of the Ocean Sea already discovered and those to be discovered. Therefore the Pope could grant dominion over the Indians. REPLY. Paul III later expressly defined that the Western Indians are true men, capable of eternal life, and true owners of their possessions and jurisdiction, and that they are not to be deprived of these. Alexander could not give more than he himself possessed. We suppose, with Vitoria and Soto, that the Pope is not the temporal lord of the whole world, though he has plenary power about temporal matters in order to spiritual things when necessary. Such power is annexed to the pontifical office and cannot simply be abdicated and transferred to another as though the recipient became universal owner; at most another may act as minister and executor. Therefore Alexander granted the kings of Spain authority to act as temporal executors for the removal of impediments raised against Gospel preaching, not to destroy the Indians and strip them of property. Likewise, if those peoples converted, Spanish kings could act as protectors or tutors and possess a kind of imperial power similar to the limited authority the Emperor can have over certain princes and kings. Alexander did not simply depose the native kings and create others at will, except perhaps where conversion and the preservation of faith required a protective arrangement. FOURTH ARGUMENT FROM ROMAN IMPERIAL DOMINION. The Roman Caesars once had dominion over the whole world; therefore modern emperors, as successors, possess it. REPLY: if the argument proved anything it would prove that the Emperor is still lord of Gaul and Spain because those kingdoms were once subject to Rome. Both premise and consequence are false. Soto and Vitoria explain that Roman domination was neither universal nor always just. Modern emperors were later constituted especially as defenders of the Church, not as universal temporal owners of every people. The Indians had never been subject to nor even known by the Romans. SIXTH

CONCLUSION. Unbelievers not subject to Christian princes cannot be punished or attacked by war merely

because of idolatry or even because of the most abominable crime against nature, even after they have been admonished to abstain and refuse. Cajetan teaches this in the present question and below Question 66, Article 8; Vitoria, Soto, and the Bishop of Chiapa in his Apology against Sepulveda teach the same; all the theological masters in their chairs have followed this opinion down to our time. PROOF FROM AUGUSTINE. Augustine, Questions on Joshua VI and Questions on Numbers IV, says that just wars are ordinarily defined as those that avenge injuries. He adds that war is certainly just when God directly commands it, for then the leader is a minister rather than author of the war. Regarding Israel's war with the Amorites Augustine says the just cause was that passage, which should have been open by the law of human society, was denied. Therefore idolatry and sins against nature committed within an independent people do not of themselves injure a Christian prince. One citizen has no authority to punish another vicious citizen simply as such; similarly one republic has no authority to punish another unless the latter injures it. Otherwise Spaniards could punish Frenchmen for crimes in France and Frenchmen Spaniards for crimes in Spain, and every barbarian province could punish another, producing universal disturbance. REPLY TO THE CLAIM THAT ONLY ESPECIALLY HEINOUS CRIMES JUSTIFY FOREIGN PUNISHMENT. Hatred of God is an even greater sin, yet it does not give a foreign state jurisdiction. Nor does a commonwealth acquire jurisdiction merely because another allows such crimes to go unpunished. Otherwise every king could claim au

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE X: DEUTERONOMY, ARISTOTLE, CYPRIAN; WHAT

NON-SUBJECTS MAY

BE COMPELLED TO DO OBJECTION FROM DEUTERONOMY 20. God teaches the conditions of war and says that if a distant city refuses offered peace and resists, Israel may strike all its males; 'so shalt thou do to all cities that are very far from thee, which are not of these cities that thou shalt receive in possession.' This seems to show war not merely for injury to Israel but for idolatry; a gloss says 'cities far from thee,' that is, diverse in religion. REPLY WITH ABULENSIS AND LYRA. The Lord there teaches how Israel should conduct wars already just by the law of nations. The text does not grant a universal title to initiate war solely for idolatry. The cities in the promised land stand under a special divine command; Canaanites, Jebusites, and the other occupants of the promised territory were given to Israel by special divine title and Israel was commanded not to spare them. The gloss calling distant cities diverse in religion is mystical, not the literal foundation of a certain argument. If idolatry and crimes against nature alone justified killing those distant peoples, there would be no reason for God to spare women, for women too were idolaters and capable of such sins. Sepulveda gravely erred by supposing Israel received universal dominion over the entire earth from Deuteronomy 11, 'Every place that your foot shall tread upon shall be yours.' The same passage immediately gives geographical limits: from the desert and Lebanon, from the Euphrates to the western sea. Joshua 1 says the same. 'Every place' must therefore be understood within those boundaries. OBJECTION FROM CYPRIAN AND AUGUSTINE. Cyprian, Exhortation to Martyrdom, chapter 5, says that if ancient commands about fighting idolaters were observed by Israel, much more must Christians observe them. Augustine in letters 48 and 50 exhorts Christians against idolaters by examples of Ezechias and Nabuchodonosor. REPLY: these authorities concern idolaters subject to the same rulers. We have already conceded that Christian princes can punish subject unbelievers for crimes against natural law. OBJECTION FROM ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I. Aristotle says some men are slaves by nature and that rationally stronger men should rule those duller by nature; this seems to describe barbarians. Roman domination over barbarous nations is praised not only by pagan historians but by Augustine, City of God V, and St. Thomas, On Kingship III, because Rome subdued barbarians and taught them natural laws. REPLY. With St. Thomas, Aristotle speaks primarily of barbarians who are almost without the use of reason, like madmen, and who can be restrained for their own and others' safety. He may also include peoples living like wild beasts, such as those who eat human flesh; these can be resisted or killed when actually attacking innocents, by the right of defense. But no entire commonwealth has been discovered whose members are all naturally slaves in the strict sense. To say that intelligent persons are 'lords by nature' means they are naturally apt for rule, and dull persons are naturally apt for service; it does not mean that the former are already de facto owners of the latter. Just as intellectual aptitude does not make a person an actual owner without title, natural servile aptitude does not make a people another's property. Perhaps Aristotle also flattered Alexander the Great, who desired to subject the world. The Romans justly subdued some peoples when they had a legitimate cause, but tyrannically invaded others; they are praised insofar as they gave good laws and civilized badly ordered regions, not insofar as every conquest was just. FOURTH ARGUMENT. God does not fail to provide what is necessary. Someone must be judge and guardian against those who violate natural law. If an entire republic violates it, there must be some temporal judge able to correct and punish it; therefore a well-ordered Christian prince may assume this office. REPLY: God provided in accordance with human nature that each kingdom's own princes be judges and avengers of natural-law crimes. God Himself is Lord of lords and can punish nations in His own time, often even permitting a tyrannical prince to destroy another sinful nation, as He allowed Israel to be carried captive into Babylon. By natural means there need not be one supreme temporal king governing all kings; rather the world is better governed by many temporal rulers immediately subject to God in temporal matters. In spiritual matters, however, God willed one supreme earthly prince, making manifest the supernatural character of spiritual government. WHAT, THEN, MAY NON-SUBJECT UNBELIEVERS BE COMPELLED TO DO? FIRST CONCLUSION. Non-subject unbelievers may be compelled not to impede the faith of Christ by blasphemies or any other persecution. This is St. Thomas's teaching in Article 8, and Augustine's in letters 48 and 50. The Church has always praised defenders of Gospel preachers; it would be erroneous to deny this conclusion. Every perfect republic has a right to avenge injuries done to it. The Church of Christ is a perfect commonwealth according to faith. Just as a temporal king may vindicate injuries against his commonwealth in temporal matters, the Church can vindicate injuries against herself in spiritual matters. Hence if a Gospel messenger reaches an external barbarous nation and the princes of that nation prevent him from preaching to peoples who wish to hear, a Christian prince acting as minister of the Pontiff can wage war to prevent that obstruction. This is not compelling anyone to hear, but defending innocents: the preacher has a right to preach and willing hearers have a right to hear. If the rulers later repent and permit preaching, it may be inexpedient to puni

r because

reception of the Gospel.

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE X: BLASPHEMY, DEFENSE OF INNOCENTS, HUMAN SACRIFICE,

DOMINION OVER BELIEVERS SEPULVEDA'S ARGUMENT. Idolatry, St. Thomas says below Question 94,

Article 3, includes blasphemy insofar as it takes away God's unique dominion and impugns faith by

the deed
itself. If war can be waged for blasphemy, it should therefore be waged against all idolaters, including the Western Indians. REPLY. Proper blasphemy is principally in words, as Question 13, Article 1 teaches, and war may be waged against verbal blasphemy when it constitutes an injury to Christian religion - for example, when it impedes preaching, turns believers away, or publicly mocks the faith. Material 'blasphemy' in deeds is not enough. Otherwise every pagan or Jew could be attacked simply because by his rites he practically denies Christ's divinity. Indeed every sinner in a certain sense denies by his deed that God is the highest good, since he turns from God to a creature. SECOND ARGUMENT. Infidelity and idolatry are greater sins than blasphemy. If war may be waged for blasphemy, still more for idolatry. REPLY: the title of war against blasphemers is not merely the gravity of the sin but injury done to the Christian commonwealth and religion. Idolatry in an independent people is primarily an offense against God Himself, not an injury to our commonwealth. God wills us to vindicate injuries against Him when they are also injuries to the Christian republic; injuries against God alone He reserves to Himself. COROLLARY. Even if an unbeliever verbally denies articles of faith, if he does not thereby impede preaching, turn anyone away from hearing the Gospel, corrupt one already converted, or mock Christian religion, he cannot be punished by a foreign Christian prince merely for that speech. Punitive justice belongs to his own prince unless his republic injures another. SECOND CONCLUSION. If in an unbelieving republic some persons induce others to idolatry or abominable sexual crimes, and the unbelieving prince knows, permits, or consents, some wise doctors say any prince can wage war against them in defense of innocents. I distinguish. If those seducers use violence or fraud, persuading persons that the deed is no sin and coercing them, then the assertion is true: war has the character of defense of innocents, and even a prince who does not himself observe natural law could defend them. But if the seducers merely invite willing adults by requests, promises, or gifts, the assertion is not simply true. Injury is not done to one who knowingly and willingly consents; a foreign prince has no title of defense merely because willing persons sin. THIRD CONCLUSION. Non-subject unbelievers can be compelled not to sacrifice human beings to idols, even when the proposed victims willingly offer themselves. No man is absolute lord of his own life or another's life; each receives life from God to preserve it. Therefore an innocent person can be defended against death, and even a person wishing to kill himself can be restrained and bound. Ecclesiasticus 17 says God gave each man command concerning his neighbor; Proverbs 24: 'Deliver them that are led to death.' This conclusion presupposes prior admonition not to sacrifice humans, where verbal defense can suffice; otherwise war would look more like punishment of past crimes than present defense. It also presupposes that the proposed victims are not otherwise justly condemned to death by their own republic; if they are justly condemned, the sacrificers, though idolaters, are not thereby homicidal. Finally it presupposes that war would not cause the deaths of more innocents than the number of persons to be saved from sacrifice. COROLLARY ABOUT CANNIBALS. Barbarians who live like wild beasts by feeding on human flesh can be attacked when they are actual aggressors against mankind; no prior admonition is necessary where it would plainly be useless, because they may be killed in defense of innocents. If, however, by some other means they cease this practice and are no longer attacking, they may not be killed simply as punishment by a foreign state. FOURTH

CONCLUSION. Unbelievers not subject to Christian rulers can be deprived of dominion and

jurisdiction that
they possess over faithful Christians. St. Thomas teaches this in Article 10. Paul in 1 Corinthians 6 rebukes believers for litigating before unbelieving tribunals to which they had been subject, and the Church possesses authority to prohibit such jurisdiction when spiritual government requires it and Christian religion would otherwise be despised because unbelievers observe Christians' sins. Similarly, although the marriage bond is naturally indissoluble, in favor of faith divine positive law dissolves the bond when one unbelieving spouse converts and the other refuses peaceful cohabitation without injury to the Creator. Likewise divine positive law gives the Pontiff authority, when spiritual need requires, to remove unbelieving dominion over believers. The exercise of that power is left to ecclesiastical prudence. A child of a Christian mother can also in certain cases be removed from the power of an unbelieving father, as Toledo IV and the canons provide. Hence the Church sometimes rightly removes faithful subjects from unbelieving jurisdiction where scandal does not follow. She has enacted such laws concerning subject Jews and Saracens. I apply this to the Western Indians who had converted: Spanish kings could be made their protectors because unbelieving native rulers could easily draw the converted back from faith. This, he says, is a principal title under which the Spanish king governs Indians already converted. Over Indians who have not received faith, however, the king has no authority merely as such except to defend believers and prevent obstruction of the Gospel. An objection from Matthew 17, 'Then the children are free,' and

Article XI on tolerating unbelieving rites begin on the next page.

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE X CONCLUDED; ARTICLE XI - WHETHER THE RITES OF UNBELIEVERS

ARE TO BE TOLERATED OBJECTION TO THE FOURTH CONCLUSION. Christ says in Matthew 17, 'Then the children are free.' It may seem that believers by divine law are immediately free from unbelieving rulers, so the Church does not actually deprive such rulers but merely declares an already existing freedom. REPLY: literally the text concerns natural sons of kings and Christ Himself, natural Son of God. Adoptive sons of God are not by that fact immediately freed from servitude or jurisdiction of unbelieving masters; they may be liberated when necessary to preserve their adoption. SECOND OBJECTION. St. Thomas says unbelievers deserve to lose power over believers by reason of unbelief; therefore they lose it by the very fact. REPLY: the consequence is denied. A heretic deserves deprivation of property yet does not lose it simply at the instant of sin before the law's sentence. I note a distinction. Positive unbelief involving culpable resistance to faith truly merits deprivation of dominion over believers. Merely negative unbelief, which is not a sin, does not properly merit punishment. Nevertheless St. Thomas's statement can be extended to negatively unbelieving rulers in the sense that the Church can remove their dominion when spiritual necessity demands, not as a punishment for personal guilt but because it is unsuitable for the faithful to remain under such power. ARTICLE XI - WHETHER THE RITES OF UNBELIEVERS ARE TO BE TOLERATED FIRST OBJECTION. Unbelievers sin in observing their rites. Romans 1 says not only those who do evil but those who consent to those who do it are worthy of death. One who can prohibit sin but tolerates it seems to consent. Therefore their rites should not be tolerated. SECOND OBJECTION. Jewish rites are compared with idolatry. A gloss on Galatians 5, 'Be not held again under the yoke of bondage,' says the servitude of that law is not lighter than idolatry. Christian princes did not tolerate pagan temples but first closed and then destroyed them, as Augustine narrates, City of God XVIII. Therefore Jewish rites should not be tolerated. THIRD OBJECTION. Unbelief is a most grave sin. Other sins such as adultery and theft are punished by law rather than tolerated. Therefore rites of unbelief should not be tolerated. ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory says concerning the Jews, in the Decretum, distinction 45, chapter 'Qui sincera': they should have free license to observe and celebrate all their festivities as they and their fathers had held them for a long time. ST. THOMAS - RESPONSE. Human government is derived from divine government and ought to imitate it. God, though omnipotent and supremely good, permits certain evils in the universe which He could prevent, lest by removing them greater goods be taken away or worse evils follow. Therefore human rulers rightly tolerate some evils lest certain goods be impeded or greater evils incurred. Augustine says in On Order: remove prostitutes from human affairs and you will disturb everything with lust. Thus rites of unbelievers may sometimes be tolerated either because some good arises from them or because some evil is avoided. From Jews observing their rites - in which formerly the truth of the faith was prefigured - there comes this good: we possess testimony to our faith from our enemies, and what we believe is represented as in figure. Therefore Jews are tolerated in their rites. The rites of other unbelievers, which bring no such testimony or utility, should not be tolerated for that same positive good, but can sometimes be tolerated to avoid an evil: scandal, civil discord, or an impediment to the salvation of those who, being treated with moderation, are gradually converted. For this reason the Church sometimes tolerated even rites of heretics and pagans when the multitude of unbelievers was very great. REPLIES. To the first: one does not consent to evil merely by tolerating what prudence cannot remove without a greater evil. To the second: Jewish rites are not tolerated as salvific rites but because of the historical testimony and other goods described. Pagan rites can be prohibited when this can prudently be done without greater harm. To the third: the civil ruler does not punish every sin equally; punishment is measured according to the common good and the harms following from suppression or toleration. SUMMA TEXTUS. For the sake of preventing a greater good from being impeded or a greater evil from arising, the rites of unbelievers - Jews and, in some circumstances, pagans - can be tolerated. COMMENTARY BEGINS. Cajetan rightly observes that St. Thomas speaks of unbelieving subjects. 'To permit' evil is an act belonging to law and government. One who is neither legislator nor guardian of a community cannot properly be said to permit

ust as the king

of Spain is not said to permit prostitutes in France.

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE XI: I ON TOLERATION AND SELLING THINGS TO

UNBELIEVERS FIRST

NOTE. St. Thomas speaks of subject unbelievers. Since permitting an evil is an act of legislative rule, the Church does not properly 'permit' rites of non-subject unbelievers over whom she exercises no temporal jurisdiction; she simply does not govern those acts. SECOND NOTE. Even idolatry can at times be tolerated among subject unbelievers because of a greater good hoped for - especially their gradual conversion when they are treated more gently. Conversely certain lesser sins than idolatry are sometimes less tolerable in a commonwealth because they more directly disturb the public peace, which a ruler must especially preserve. DOUBT. Whether faithful Christians sin by selling unbelievers things which they use in their rites, for example a lamb which the Christian knows the unbeliever will sacrifice. I distinguish things sold into two classes. Some have an intrinsically good or indifferent use, such as ordinary clothing and common food. Others are by their institution per se ordered to superstition, such as the distinctive vestment of an unbelieving priest or an idol. FIRST CONCLUSION. The faithful may not lawfully sell unbelievers things that by their nature and institution are ordered to the unbelieving rite. St. Thomas teaches this in Question 169, Article 2, reply 4, and Cajetan in the same place and on Article 4 of the present question. The reason is clear: such selling cooperates in evil and assists the sinner toward his sin. COROLLARY. Christians may not build or repair synagogues or mosques for unbelievers when these buildings are per se ordered to the celebration of their rite. SECOND CONCLUSION. It is lawful to sell unbelievers other things whose use is good in itself, even when the Christian knows the buyer will misuse the thing in celebrating his rite. Cajetan places this conclusion above, Article 4. The seller neither directly nor indirectly wills the unbelieving rite: he does not intend that end, nor is he bound to impede it, because the rite is tolerated by the commonwealth and the seller has a right to sell goods ordered in themselves to good purposes. Therefore the seller performs an otherwise good act and adds no evil circumstance. OBJECTION FROM IDOLS AS ART OBJECTS. An idol too can be ordered to a good use, such as preserving a monument of a nation's antiquity or displaying a victory over unbelievers; indeed some idols brought from the Indies have been preserved. REPLY. The idol, considered according to its institution among idolaters, is per se ordered to superstitious worship. It is only accidentally and materially - as precious matter or an exceptionally artistic figure - that a faithful person can preserve it or sell it to another faithful person for a good end. SECOND OBJECTION FROM PAPAL CANONS CONCERNING SYNAGOGUES. The canons 'Iudaei' and 'Consului' allow Jews to repair old synagogues. Therefore a Christian builder should be able to repair them. REPLY: the inference is denied. Some have tried to say the word synagogue there means merely a Jewish residential house, but this contradicts the text, because the same canons prohibit building new synagogues. The law may tolerate the Jewish community's maintenance of an old place of worship without making it lawful for a Christian artisan personally to cooperate in its superstitious use. THIRD OBJECTION FROM SELLING POISON OR A SWORD. If a seller knows that the buyer will misuse poison or a sword to kill unjustly, he sins, although poison and swords can have good uses. Therefore a Christian who sells an ordinary object to an unbeliever for a rite against God's honor should likewise sin. REPLY:

the consequence is denied. When the evil is an injustice against one's neighbor, charity obliges us to defend the person suffering injury; supplying the instrument can therefore be unlawful. But when the sin is directed immediately against God alone, the faithful person is not always bound to prevent it, especially when the commonwealth tolerates it. Moreover a person is not generally bound to deprive himself of an otherwise licit action or utility in order to prevent another's sin. QUALIFICATION. If Christians knew or reasonably hoped that unbelievers would cease their rites because they lacked the necessary materials, charity could bind Christians not to sell them the things necessary for the sacrifices. An exception remains for things necessary for ordinary life, food, and clothing. Since unbelievers living among the faithful are not to be coerced into faith by deprivation of is needed for human life merely as indirect pressure to conversion.

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QUESTION X - ARTICLE XII: WHETHER CHILDREN OF JEWS AND OTHER

UNBELIEVERS ARE TO
BE BAPTIZED AGAINST THEIR PARENTS' WILL FIRST OBJECTION. The marriage bond is greater than a father's right of power over a child, because paternal power can be dissolved by emancipation whereas marriage cannot be dissolved by man: 'What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.' Yet because of unbelief the marriage bond can in a certain case be dissolved, according to 1 Corinthians 7: 'If the unbeliever depart, let him depart; for a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases.' Therefore much more paternal right over children can be removed for unbelief, and the children can be baptized against their parents' will. SECOND OBJECTION. One ought to assist a person more against danger of eternal death than danger of bodily death. If someone saw a person in immediate danger of bodily death and did not help when able, he would sin. Children of Jews and unbelievers are in danger of eternal death when left to parents who educate them in unbelief. Therefore they should be taken away, baptized, and instructed in faith. THIRD OBJECTION. Children of slaves belong under the power of their lords. Jews are civilly subject to kings and princes; therefore their children too are in royal power. The prince can therefore have them baptized without parental consent.

FOURTH OBJECTION. Every man belongs more to God, from whom he has his soul, than to his bodily father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust that children of Jews be taken from their bodily parents and offered to God through baptism. FIFTH OBJECTION. Baptism is more efficacious for salvation than preaching, because through baptism the stain of sin and debt of punishment are removed and the gate of heaven is opened. If a soul's death through lack of preaching is imputed to the preacher who failed to warn, according to Ezekiel 3 and 33, much more the damnation of an unbeliever's child for lack of baptism seems imputable to those who could baptize and did not. ON THE CONTRARY. Injury should be done to no one. Jews would suffer an injury if their children were baptized unwillingly, because they would lose the right of paternal power over children now Christian. Therefore children should not be baptized against their parents' will. ST. THOMAS - RESPONSE. The custom of the Church possesses the greatest authority and must always be emulated. Catholic doctors themselves receive authority from the Church; therefore one should stand more firmly by the Church's authority than by that of Augustine, Jerome, or any other doctor. The Church has never possessed the practice of baptizing children of Jews against their parents' will, although in former times there were most powerful Catholic princes - Constantine, Theodosius, and others - intimately advised by saintly bishops such as Sylvester and Ambrose, who would not have failed to obtain such a law if it were consonant with reason. It therefore appears dangerous to introduce a new assertion contrary to the practice hitherto observed. There are two reasons. First, danger to faith: if children without the use of reason were baptized and afterward reached mature age among their parents, they could easily be induced to abandon what they received unknowingly, which would cause greater injury to faith. Second, natural justice: a child is naturally something of the father. Before birth he is not even bodily distinct from his mother; after birth, before use of reason, he remains under parental care as under a kind of spiritual womb. While lacking use of reason he does not differ, as to self-government, from an irrational animal. Just as an ox or horse belongs to a person for use under civil law, by natural law a child before use of reason is under his father's care. Therefore it would be contrary to natural justice to withdraw him from parental care or determine something concerning him against his parents' will. Once the child begins to have the use of free choice he begins to belong to himself and can provide for himself in matters of divine and natural law. Then he should be induced to faith by persuasion, not coercion; he can consent to faith and baptism against his parents' will. Before use of reason he cannot. Thus children of the ancient Fathers are said to have been saved 'in the faith of their parents,' showing that provision for a child's salvation belongs principally to parents before use of reason. REPLY TO THE FIRST. In marriage both spouses have use of free choice, so either can assent to faith against the other's will. The same does not apply to a child before use of reason. Once the child has use of reason, the comparison holds and he may convert.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. When danger of natural death arises contrary to civil order,

for example a man
justly condemned by his judge, no private person may violently rescue him. Likewise one should not violate the natural-law order by which a child is under paternal care merely to remove a danger of eternal death.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Jewish civil servitude to princes does not abolish the natural or

divine order of
parental authority. REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Man is ordered to God through reason, by which he can know Him. Before use of reason the child is naturally ordered to God through the reason and governance of his parents, under whose care he naturally lies. The reply to the fifth and my conclusion follow on the next page.
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QUESTION XI - ON HERESY This matter is treated by the doctors in III Sentences,

distinctions 23-25, and IV
Sentences, distinction 13; by canonists in causa 24, question 3, and in the titles De haereticis; by the Summists under the word 'heresy'; especially by Torquemada, Summa IV, part 2, and Cano, De locis theologicis XII, chapters 8-11. ARTICLE I - WHETHER HERESY IS A SPECIES OF UNBELIEF FIRST OBJECTION. Unbelief is in the intellect, as said above. Heresy seems rather to belong to appetite. Jerome says, and the Decretum reports, that heresy is named in Greek from election, because each person chooses for himself that discipline which he thinks best. Election is an act of appetite. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

SECOND OBJECTION. A vice receives its species chiefly from its end. Aristotle says in Ethics V that one who
commits adultery in order to steal is more thief than adulterer. The end of heresy is temporal advantage, especially
principality or glory; Augustine, On the Utility of Believing, says a heretic is one who for some temporal advantage, and chiefly for his own glory and principality, generates or follows false and new opinions. Therefore heresy should be a species of pride or covetousness rather than unbelief. THIRD OBJECTION. Unbelief, being in
the intellect, does not seem to pertain to the flesh. But heresy is numbered among works of the flesh, Galatians 5: fornication, uncleanness, and later dissensions and sects - that is, heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief. ON THE CONTRARY. Falsity is opposed to truth. A heretic is one who generates or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth on which faith rests, and so falls under unbelief. ST. THOMAS - RESPONSE. The name heresy signifies election. Election concerns means to an end and presupposes
the end. In matters to be believed the will assents to a truth as its own good. The principal truth therefore has the character of an ultimate end in each form of belief, while secondary truths have the character of means. Whoever believes assents to someone's word; therefore in each belief the principal thing, as an end, is the person whose testimony one accepts, while the secondary things are the propositions one chooses to hold through that testimony. The Christian who has right faith voluntarily assents to Christ in those things truly pertaining to His doctrine. One can deviate from Christian faith in two ways. First, by refusing to assent to Christ Himself: this belongs to the unbelief of pagans and Jews. Second, by intending to assent to Christ but failing in choosing the truths by which to assent to Him, because the person does not choose what was truly handed down by Christ but what his own mind suggests. Hence heresy is a species of unbelief belonging to those who profess Christ's faith while corrupting His dogmas. REPLY TO THE FIRST. Election belongs to unbelief in the same way as the will belongs to faith: it is the moving principle by which the intellect assents to or rejects a proposed object. REPLY TO THE SECOND. Vices receive species from proximate ends and genus or causal origin from remote ends. A man committing adultery in order to steal has adultery as the proximate object/species of one act but theft as the remote governing end. Likewise the proximate end of heresy is adherence to a false opinion; from this it receives its species. Its remote cause may be pride or covetousness. REPLY TO THE THIRD. Just as heresy is named from choosing, so sect is named from following. Heresy and sect thus signify the same corruption and both are called works of the flesh, not because the proximate act of unbelief is bodily, but because its cause often lies in disordered appetite - pride, covetousness, or even a phantasmal deception depending upon bodily imagination. SUMMA TEXTUS. Heresy is a species of unbelief belonging to those who profess the faith of Christ but corrupt its dogmas. ARTICLE II begins: whether heresy is properly about matters of faith.
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II: WHETHER HERESY IS PROPERLY ABOUT MATTERS OF FAITH FIRST

OBJECTION. Just as there are heresies or sects among Christians, there were sects among Jews and Pharisees, as Isidore says. Their disagreements were not always about things belonging to Christian faith. Therefore heresy is not properly about matters of faith. SECOND OBJECTION. The matter of faith is the realities believed. Yet Jerome says one who understands Scripture otherwise than the sense demanded by the Holy Spirit, even if he has not departed from the Church, can be called heretical. Elsewhere he says heresy can arise from words spoken inordinately. Therefore heresy is not properly only about the matter of faith. THIRD

OBJECTION. Sacred doctors sometimes disagree about things touching faith - for example Jerome and Augustine concerning the cessation of legal observances - without the vice of heresy. Therefore heresy is not properly about matters of faith. ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine, Against the Manichaeans, says those in Christ's Church who savor something diseased and perverse and, when corrected, resist obstinately and refuse to amend their pestiferous and deadly dogmas, persisting in defending them, are heretics. Pestiferous dogmas are those opposed to dogmas of faith by which the just man lives. Therefore heresy has matters of faith as its proper matter. ST. THOMAS - RESPONSE. We speak of heresy insofar as it imports corruption of Christian faith. Christian faith is not corrupted by a false opinion in matters that cannot pertain to faith, such as geometry or similar sciences. Heresy occurs only when one holds a false opinion about something pertaining to faith. Something pertains to faith in two ways, as said above: directly and principally, as the articles of faith; or indirectly and secondarily, as those things from which corruption of an article follows. Heresy can occur about either class in the same manner in which faith extends to them. REPLY TO THE FIRST. As Jewish and Pharisaic sects concerned opinions pertaining to Judaism or Pharisaism, Christian heresies concern those things pertaining to Christ's faith. REPLY TO THE SECOND. A person interprets Scripture otherwise than the Holy Spirit demands when he twists the exposition to something contrary to what the Holy Spirit revealed. Ezekiel 13 speaks of false prophets who persisted in confirming their word by false expositions. Likewise by the words one speaks one professes one's faith, for confession is an act of faith. Therefore an inordinate way of speaking about matters of faith can occasion corruption of faith. Leo Pope wrote that enemies of Christ's Cross lie in wait for all our words and deeds, so that if we give even a slight occasion they falsely claim we agree with Nestorian meaning. REPLY TO THE THIRD. Augustine says, and the Decretum reports: one who defends his opinion, however false or perverse, with no pertinacious animosity but seeks truth with complete solicitude and is prepared to be corrected when he discovers it, is not to be numbered among heretics, because he lacks an election contradicting the Church's doctrine. Some doctors therefore disagreed either about matters irrelevant to faith or about matters related to faith that had not yet been determined by the Church. After universal ecclesiastical authority determines the matter, one who pertinaciously resists the determination is judged a heretic. This authority principally resides in the Supreme Pontiff. Whenever the reason of faith is debated, bishops and doctors must be referred to Peter's authority. Jerome wrote to Pope Damasus: 'This is the faith, most blessed Pope, which we learned in the Catholic Church. If anything has been placed less expertly or less cautiously, we desire that it be corrected by you, who hold the faith and See of Peter. If this confession is approved by the judgment of your Apostolate, whoever wishes to blame me will prove himself ignorant or malicious or not Catholic, not me a heretic.' SUMMA TEXTUS. First conclusion: heresy can concern things pertaining directly or indirectly to faith. Second: inordinate speech about matters of faith can result in corruption of faith. Third: one who holds a false opinion concerning faith without pertinacity, being prepared to be corrected by the Church, is not a heretic. COMMENTARY BEGINS. From these first two articles we must

first collect a definition of heresy. We say: HERESY, as theologians treat it, is a pertinacious error manifestly contrary to Catholic faith in one who professes the faith of Christ. For understanding this definition, first note that 'heresy' is Greek and properly means election. Jerome on Titus 3 and Isidore, Etymologies VIII, chapter 3, say so. Election is acceptance of one among two or more alternatives. Hence the Vulgate often translates the Greek hairesis by 'sect,' because one who chooses one way, leaving another, is as though cut off and divided from the other. Galatians 5 numbers 'sects' among works of the flesh where the Greek has 'heresies'; Acts 28 similarly says of 'this sect' that it is contradicted everywhere, where Greek has hairesis. Christian dogma itself should not be called a 'sect' or 'heresy,' even according to the primary etymology, because Christian doctrine is not our invention, nor do we choose by our private judgment what to believe and what not. It is determined for us by the Church, which by God's authority proposes what must be believed. Those who separate themselves from this universal doctrine are properly called heretics because they follow their own brain and choose what they will believe. Jerome, Isidore, Theophylact on Colossians 2, and Tertullian, On the Prescription of Heretics, note this. The definition places ERROR as genus. Although one could say more briefly that heresy is unbelief in one who received faith in the manifestation of truth, later theologians used more words in order to distinguish all conditions. Error is found in a judgment of intellect; mere perversity of will does not suffice. This agrees places the sin of unbelief in the intellect as proximate subject.

QUESTION XI - COMMENTARY: DEFINITION OF HERESY - ERROR, PERTINACITY, SCRUPLES

OBJECTION TO 'ERROR' AS REQUIRED. Suppose a Christian considers arguments against an article of faith and remains doubtful, neither assenting nor dissenting. He is already unfaithful, for the canons say one doubtful in faith is an unbeliever; yet he seems to have no positive error contrary to Catholic faith, since he neither assents to the contrary arguments nor expressly dissents from faith. REPLY. Just as one can err about a demonstrated **conclusion in two ways - either by asserting the contrary conclusion or by judging that the conclusion has** not been demonstrated even though one neither affirms nor denies the conclusion - so there can be two errors against a truth of faith. One is by asserting a contrary proposition, for example, 'God is not three and one.' The other is by judging that the divinely revealed truth proposed by Church authority is not most true and certain, even though the person does not directly assent to the contradictory. Either is an intellectual error sufficient for heresy if the remaining conditions are present. Augustine, Enchiridion chapters 17 and 19, says: to err is to think true what is false, false what is true, or to hold as uncertain what is certain, whether concerning truth or falsehood. COROLLARY FOR SCRUPULOUS PERSONS. If a person altogether suspends judgment while feeling himself tempted against faith, he is not thereby a heretic or one doubtful in faith. He does not assent erroneously about the truth. Indeed if a person is scrupulous he may prudently cease from intellectual examination and occupy himself with other matters, because anxious conflict often leads such persons toward involuntary blasphemous thoughts or desperation.

SECOND NOTE. Philosophers and Latin writers may speak of the Stoic 'sect' or the Peripatetic 'heresy,' but Christian dogma ought not be called a sect or heresy even etymologically. We do not invent Christian dogma or choose it according to our private judgment; it is proposed by the Church with divine authority. Hence those separating themselves from universal Catholic teaching are properly 'heretics' because they choose what to believe according to their own judgment. SECOND PART OF THE DEFINITION: PERTINACIOUS. A pertinacious person is one who is excessively tenacious of his own judgment; this excessive adherence is pertinacity. Therefore a person who knowingly abandons the Church's authority and testimony by which a truth of faith is proposed, and follows his own judgment, is truly pertinacious. 1 Timothy 6: 'If any man teach otherwise and consent not to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ and to that doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing.' PERTINACITY DOES NOT REQUIRE LONG DURATION. Sylvester erred when he said a long duration and some perseverance were necessary in order that one be called pertinacious. It is false. At the very instant someone knowingly assents to a proposition contrary to Church authority he is pertinacious in that assent. A man can by one act consent to adultery or homicide; likewise he can in an instant assent to heresy. An infused virtue can be entirely lost by one contrary act, as hope and charity are; so too faith. COROLLARY. No one can at the same instant truly be a heretic and judge himself to be a heretic precisely as such. If he judges himself a heretic, he judges that what he holds is an error; but the intellect cannot assent to something as false precisely under the aspect 'known by me to be false.' Therefore the genuine heretic commonly thinks his own judgment true and Catholic. It can happen that a scrupulous person falsely judges himself a heretic merely because a contrary thought or image occurs to him. Far from being a heretic, he may then be exercising faith precisely by judging that denying the article would be heretical. Cano, De locis theologicis XII, chapter 10, wisely supplies rules for quieting consciences of those who think they doubt faith when they merely suffer involuntary vacillations; a morally certain sign is the great pain they feel in the conflict, showing hatred of error and love of truth. SECOND COROLLARY. However long a person persists in an error truly contrary to faith, if he is ignorant that it contradicts the faith and Church teaching and remains prepared to be corrected, he is not pertinacious or heretical. St. Thomas teaches this here, in Question 2, Article 6, replies 2-3, and Question 5, Article 3; the Roman Catechism teaches the same in explaining 'I believe the holy Church.' The person can nevertheless sin mortally for vincible culpable ignorance, but his sin may be against studiousness - the duty to know what belongs to one's state - or against the precept of confession of faith or religion, rather than against faith received and never to be denied. He preserves the formal rule of faith by remaining prepared to be corrected by Church authority. I add an important distinction. It is heretical to deny that a layperson is bound explicitly to believe any article and to say it suffices to believe only in general whatever the Church holds; the Directorium Inquisitorum reports propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiff to this effect. But it does not follow that a person who through ignorance says something contrary to an article is formally a heretic if he is not pertinacious, even when he sins mortally through culpable ignorance. AFFECTED IGNORANCE. What if ignorance is deliberately affected? It seems such a person should be a heretic because affected ignorance reduces the act to the species of the form one deliberately avoids knowing. I reply: however affected the ignorance, if the person truly remains prepared to be corrected by the Church he is not formally a heretic - although in practice it is difficult to combine affected ignorance with such readiness. The error can be reduced to the species of heresy as inchoately disposed, without being formally heresy, just as an embryo is reduced to the human species without yet being formally a man. The rule that affected ignorance reduces an act to its moral species applies straightforwardly where the opposed virtue is intrinsically connected with prudence, for example justice: one who deliberately avoids knowing that the victim is a cleric and kills him can formally be guilty of homicide and sacrilege. But true supernatural faith can exist without prudence and charity; hence affected ignorance does not by itself supply formal pertinacity against the Church. The

commentary continues on the following page with further corollaries and the remaining clauses of the definition.

QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY CONTINUED: PERTINACITY AND

THE DEFINITION
OF HERESY I continue the explanation of the definition: heresy is a pertinacious error manifestly contrary to
Catholic faith in one who has professed the faith of Christ. A first consequence is that long duration is not required for pertinacity. If a person knowingly and deliberately rejects the authority of the Church in a matter of faith, he can lose faith in an instant, just as hope and charity can be lost by one contrary mortal act.

FOURTH CONSEQUENCE. No one can at the same instant truly be a heretic and at the same time judge himself, precisely as such, to be a heretic. If he judges, 'I am a heretic,' he judges that what he holds is error opposed to Catholic faith; but the intellect cannot adhere to a proposition precisely insofar as it is judged false.

Hence the formal heretic ordinarily judges his own opinion true and even thinks himself Catholic. This is important for persons troubled by scruples. A person can experience an involuntary thought against the Trinity
or another article and fear that he has become a heretic. The very judgment, 'This thought would be heresy if I
consented to it,' may instead show an act of faith. Cano, De locis theologicis XII, chapter 10, gives useful rules
for examining such consciences. One morally certain sign that a person does not voluntarily consent to the error is that the temptation causes him great sorrow and he detests it. FIFTH CONSEQUENCE. However long
a man remains in an error objectively contrary to faith, if he is ignorant that it contradicts the Church and is prepared to be corrected when the Church's doctrine is known to him, he is not formally a heretic. St. Thomas
teaches this in the present article and elsewhere. He can nevertheless sin gravely because of culpable ignorance if he was bound to know the matter. The sin then can be against the duty of learning, against confession of faith, or against another virtue, but he has not yet pertinaciously rejected the formal rule of faith.

I recall that it is itself an error to say laypersons need explicitly believe no particular articles and that it suffices merely to say in general, 'I believe whatever the Church believes.' Yet a simple Christian who through
vincible ignorance says something contrary to a particular article is not automatically a formal heretic if he has
not pertinaciously rejected the Church's judgment. AFFECTED IGNORANCE. It is objected that one who deliberately chooses ignorance should be treated as though he knew, because affected ignorance does not excuse. I answer that affected ignorance can aggravate sin and dispose toward heresy; nevertheless formal heresy requires pertinacity against the rule of faith. If the person truly remains ready to be corrected by the Church, he is not formally heretical merely from the affected ignorance - though in practice such affected ignorance is often difficult to reconcile with sincere readiness for correction. The moral maxim that affected ignorance reduces an act to the species of the fault one intentionally avoids knowing applies straightforwardly
where the relevant virtue is intrinsically connected with prudence. Faith is different in this respect because true
unformed faith can exist without prudence and charity. I then begin to explain the external forum. Inquisitors cannot see the heart and therefore judge pertinacity from exterior words and deeds according to legal presumptions. A person may be judged and punished externally as heretical even when, before God, lack of inward pertinacity would change the formal moral species. The rules for examining pertinacity continue on the
next page.

QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY: RULES FOR JUDGING

PERTINACITY; DIRECT AND
INDIRECT MATTERS OF FAITH CANO'S THIRD RULE. To examine whether an erring person is pertinacious it is necessary to consult skilled theologians, so that it may first be determined whether the error is expressly contrary to faith. The external judge must not invent the theological censure from private suspicion. I distinguish the judgment of conscience from the judicial external forum. In conscience a person who knowingly places his private judgment above the Church is formally pertinacious. In the external forum, however, the Church uses exterior signs, presumptions, prior admonitions, the clarity of the defined doctrine, and the circumstances of the person. WHAT PERTAINS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO FAITH? I reject the explanation that 'directly' means only an article of the Creed. Many revealed truths are directly believed without themselves being one of the principal articles - for example the truth of Sacred Scripture and many propositions defined by councils. I also reject the claim that 'directly' means the formal motive of faith, for individual mysteries such as Christ's death are objects believed, not the formal reason why we believe. Rather, a truth pertains DIRECTLY to faith when the habit of faith immediately assents to it because it is divinely revealed and proposed by the Church. A truth pertains INDIRECTLY when it is necessarily connected by a sound inference with something immediately revealed. Thus a proposition can be heretical by denying an immediately revealed truth, or by knowingly denying something whose contrary necessarily follows from revealed truth. INORDINATE SPEECH. Jerome is often cited for the saying that heresy may arise from words spoken inordinately. Cano objects that heresy consists in the meaning of the intellect, not in sounds. Jerome himself, writing to Damasus concerning the term hypostasis, shows that Catholic meaning can remain under differing words; Hilary similarly says that heresy is born from understanding, not from Scripture, and that the sense, not the sound, constitutes the crime. I reconcile the authorities. A Catholic can indeed use an unsuitable phrase while inwardly retaining Catholic doctrine; the bad wording by itself does not instantly make him a heretic before God. Nevertheless inordinate speech can corrupt faith in two ways. First, habitual divergence from the Church's language can eventually generate an erroneous meaning in the speaker or hearers. Second, if a man knowingly refuses the Church's prescribed formula because he judges that the Church can err in determining how a mystery is to be expressed, he already has an intellectual error against ecclesiastical authority and is formally heretical. The Church is an infallible rule not only in the realities of faith but in the legitimate form of public confession needed to signify them. Christ promised His ministers not only wisdom but a mouth; Paul commands Christians to speak the same thing and avoid schisms. Diversity of words can generate diversity of doctrine. Therefore the Church can determine formulas required for orthodox confession. THE VULGATE. I apply the principle to the Council of Trent's decree making the Latin Vulgate authentic for public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions. He argues that it is rash to treat a private reconstruction from Hebrew or Greek as a rule superior to the Church's approved public text. This does not mean human diligence in studying Hebrew and Greek is forbidden; it means such philological work cannot be made a tribunal over the Church's authority. The next page turns to St. Thomas's third conclusion and asks whether a proposition, considered in itself apart from the person asserting it, can properly be called heretical.
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY: CAN A PROPOSITION BE

HERETICAL IN ITSELF? I
ask what conditions are required for a proposition itself to be called heresy. FIRST OPINION. Ockham, Torquemada, Adrian, and Alfonso de Castro say that every proposition contrary to a truth of Catholic faith is heretical in itself, although the person asserting it is not formally a heretic unless he adds pertinacity. FIRST ARGUMENT. Falsity belongs to a proposition independently of who speaks. Heresy seems to be a determinate
kind of false proposition. Therefore the proposition should be heretical in itself. Confirmation: 'The Son of God
is man' is Catholic whoever says it; therefore its contradictory should be heretical whoever says it. SECOND ARGUMENT. If a theologian is asked whether a proposition is heretical, he answers yes or no without first asking who spoke it. Hence the proposition appears to possess the censure in itself. These authors also infer that a proposition now heretical was always heretical in itself; the Church does not make it heresy but declares the opposition already present. CAJETAN'S OPINION. No proposition is formally heretical in itself. Heresy includes pertinacious adherence of a Christian subject. The same material sentence can belong to paganism, Judaism, or heresy according to the speaker's relation to received faith. Thus 'the dead do not rise' is pagan unbelief in a pagan, Jewish unbelief in a Jew who never received evangelical faith, and heresy in a Christian. The bare sentence therefore does not carry the complete moral species. SECOND ARGUMENT FOR CAJETAN. Heresy is a vice and sin; its moral species includes voluntariness and pertinacity. A sentence abstracted from will cannot formally be a vice. THIRD: ecclesiastical councils distinguish propositions as heretical, erroneous, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, rash, and so on; the censure is not reducible to mere speculative falsity. FOURTH: canon law speaks of ancient and new heresies. The formal vice is historically realized when a Christian pertinaciously chooses the error, rather than existing as a moral vice in an abstract sentence from eternity. CANO'S RECONCILIATION. Cano says the dispute is largely verbal. Properly and formally Cajetan and St. Thomas are right: heresy includes relation to the pertinacious subject. Improperly or 'in sign' a proposition can be called heretical because it signifies an error which, if knowingly and pertinaciously held by a Christian, would make him a heretic - just as urine may be called healthy because it signifies bodily health. I approve this reconciliation but insists that in strict speech Cajetan's position is the more exact. A heretical proposition 'in itself' means objectively opposed to faith and apt to signify heresy, not that a piece of language is itself a moral sinner. REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT FROM THE CATHOLIC PROPOSITION. Materially 'The Son of God is man' is Catholic truth. But when a heretic assents to it solely from human testimony or his private judgment, his ACT is not an act of Catholic faith although the sentence is
Catholic in material content. The same distinction applies to contrary sentences. REPLY TO THE THEOLOGIAN'S ANSWER. When asked whether a sentence is heretical, the theologian commonly presupposes that the question means: is the signified error such that a Christian knowingly and pertinaciously adhering to it would be a heretic? Similar shorthand occurs when one says intercourse with another man's wife
is adultery, presupposing voluntariness and the relevant knowledge. CAJETAN'S ADDITIONAL DISTINCTION. A proposition can be CONTRARY TO FAITH IN ITSELF even when the opposition is not manifest to us. Other propositions are contrary both in themselves and 'as to us,' because Scripture or Church definition makes the opposition manifest. This distinction explains why a person can hold an objectively opposed statement without formal heresy when invincible ignorance removes pertinacity. I now proceed to other theological censures of propositions.
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY: ERRONEOUS PROPOSITIONS

AND THEOLOGICAL
CONCLUSIONS I ask whether, besides manifestly heretical propositions, there are other grades of propositions
opposed to Catholic doctrine. He refers to Cano, De locis theologicis XII, chapter 11, and Torquemada, Summa
IV, part 2. FIRST NOTE. Heresy itself can be direct or indirect according as the contradiction is immediately
against a revealed truth or against something necessarily connected with revelation. Either can destroy faith when
knowingly and pertinaciously held. SECOND NOTE. There are nevertheless lesser theological censures. The
analogy is bodily health: some injuries do not immediately cause death but weaken the body and dispose it
toward corruption. Likewise certain propositions do not manifestly destroy faith but wound or endanger it. THE
COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE distinguished among Wycliffe's and Hus's propositions: some notoriously heretical
and condemned by the Fathers; others not Catholic but erroneous; others scandalous and blasphemous; others
offensive to pious ears; others rash or seditious. ERRONEOUS PROPOSITION. Here 'error' is used as a species
distinct from formal heresy, not as the genus including it. A proposition is called erroneous when it contradicts
Catholic truth in a grave and proximate way but the opposition is not the immediate manifest denial that
constitutes a straightforward heretical proposition. One especially proper use among theologians is this: a
proposition is erroneous when it is manifestly contrary to a THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION evidently deduced
from a revealed premise, although the conclusion itself has not yet been directly defined by the Church or handed
down as Scripture/Apostolic tradition. The conclusion pertains indirectly to faith; the contrary is therefore very
close to heresy. EXAMPLE. Catholic doctrine teaches that infants are truly cleansed of original sin and justified
in baptism. From this theologians conclude that habitual grace is infused in them. To deny infused habitual grace,
while admitting baptismal justification, I call erroneous and proximate to the danger of reducing justification to
merely imputed justice. If the theological inference is not evident but only highly probable and morally
compelling, the contrary proposition can still be called erroneous in a lesser degree rather than heretical. The
degree of censure follows the certainty and proximity of the connection with faith. A further grade is a
PROPOSITION SAVORING OF HERESY. Some define this as one which at first appearance sounds heretical
but can be given a good sense. I say that is too narrow: sometimes a proposition savors of heresy even when no
good sense is easy, because its wording, circumstances, speaker, or controversy makes it resemble and favor a
known heresy without itself being a manifest denial of a dogma. Thus the censure partly depends on context. A
proposition may be materially capable of orthodox meaning but, uttered in the setting of a contemporary heresy,
prudently judged dangerous. The next page gives examples involving the Eucharist, the relation of the Father to
Christ, Lutheran language about justification, the Roman Church, and religious life.
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY: PROPOSITIONS 'SAVORING OF HERESY' AND

BAD-SOUNDING SPEECH EXAMPLE CONCERNING THE EUCHARIST. The proposition 'to carry the Sacrament of the Eucharist solemnly through public streets is ridiculous' admits no good Catholic sense if meant as ridicule of Eucharistic worship, yet in my context it especially savors of Lutheran denial of Christ's real presence and the worship due to Him. EXAMPLE: 'THE FATHER IS GREATER THAN CHRIST.' Taken from the Gospel and understood according to Christ's humanity, it is Catholic. Spoken by an Arian as an argument against the Son's equality with the Father, it savors of Arian heresy. EXAMPLE: 'FAITH JUSTIFIES.' In St. Paul or in a Catholic theologian who understands faith working through charity, the phrase is Catholic. In Lutheran books, where it is used to exclude charity and works from justification, it savors of the Lutheran error. Thus identical words can receive different theological sound from context. I note that prudent Catholics sometimes avoid even true formulas when current heretics have appropriated them in a misleading sense, unless an explanation is immediately added. The Church's public confession must preserve not merely abstract possibility of orthodox interpretation but also clarity for the faithful. BAD-SOUNDING OR OFFENSIVE TO PIOUS EARS. These censures are not reducible to a rigid verbal algorithm. The judgment of a prudent, learned, and pious theologian is needed. A statement can be offensive because it irreverently speaks about ecclesiastical things even when it stops short of formal doctrinal denial. CANO'S EXAMPLES DISCUSSED BY I. 'The Roman Church is the synagogue of Satan'; 'the election of the Pope by Cardinals was introduced by the devil'; 'the religious state is not piety'; 'the monarchy of Roman bishops began only after Jerome'; 'Phocas made the Roman Church head of all churches.' I thinks some of these, taken absolutely, deserve a harsher censure than merely bad-sounding. If 'Roman Church' means the universal Catholic Church or the Apostolic See as such, to call it the synagogue of Satan is heretical or erroneous. If the phrase means particular corrupt men living at Rome, it can be offensive and dangerously savor of heresy rather than directly deny indefectibility. To say the religious state as such is not piety is erroneous because the evangelical counsels and religious life are approved by the Church. If one merely criticizes particular religious persons, the proposition may be scandalous or offensive rather than doctrinally heretical. To say Roman primacy began only after Jerome is false and erroneous if it denies the divine institution of Peter's primacy and its succession in the Roman See. A softened historical meaning - that some external political recognition or exercise became more manifest later - might save the speaker's intention, while the bare wording remains dangerous. I therefore insist that censures are applied to the proposition as actually uttered in context, not merely to a charitable reconstruction that removes every dangerous implication. The following page treats RASH propositions, SCANDALOUS propositions, and whether the Church can err in such censures.

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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE II CONCLUDED: RASH AND SCANDALOUS

PROPOSITIONS; ARTICLE III
BEGINS RASH PROPOSITION. In the broad meaning every heresy and error is rash, but theologians use the
censure specially when someone in a grave matter contradicts the common judgment of the Church, Fathers, or
theologians without sufficient authority or reason. I give as examples denying the bodily Assumption of the
Blessed Virgin and denying the infusion of habitual grace and virtues into baptized infants.
SCANDALOUS
PROPOSITION. A proposition is scandalous when by its expression it furnishes an occasion of spiritual ruin. A
preacher can speak about real abuses surrounding confession in such a way that the faithful are driven from the
sacrament; he can speak of fasting and ecclesiastical ceremonies so contemptuously that hearers are moved
toward Lutheran rejection of them. Likewise publishing the sins of ecclesiastical ministers can be scandalous if
the manner of narration alienates simple people from Christ's true Church. DOUBT: CAN THE CHURCH ERR
IN DEFINING A PROPOSITION TO BE BAD-SOUNDING, SCANDALOUS, OFFENSIVE TO PIOUS EARS, OR SAVORING OF HERESY? my conclusion is negative. It is error, or at least proximate to error, to
say that the Church can err in such authoritative censures. If the Church is an infallible rule for proposing truths
of faith, she must also be able infallibly to judge the legitimate public confession of those truths and to reject
forms of speech that are dangerous to faith. Otherwise the Church could be compelled to command retraction of
a proposition when no real danger existed, which would undermine her role as rule of faith. Therefore
theologians and preachers ought to conform their language to ecclesiastical usage and the Fathers as received by
the Church. Paul commands Timothy to hold 'the form of sound words' and Titus to speak what becomes sound
doctrine. Augustine says philosophers may use freer expressions without fear of pious offense, but Christian
speech should be disciplined lest verbal liberty generate impious opinion. I note how Augustine changed his own
vocabulary according to controversies: when fighting Manichaeans he strongly emphasized free will; when
Pelagians later abused similar expressions he spoke more cautiously so as not to obscure grace. One must not flee
one heresy by falling into its opposite, but neither should one preserve an ambiguous formula merely because it
can theoretically be defended. ARTICLE III - WHETHER HERETICS ARE TO BE TOLERATED FIRST
OBJECTION. 2 Timothy 2 commands the servant of the Lord to correct opponents with modesty, hoping God
gives them repentance. Killing heretics would remove the opportunity of repentance. SECOND
OBJECTION.
Paul says, 1 Corinthians 11, 'There must be heresies, that they also who are approved may be made manifest.'
What is necessary in the Church seems to be tolerated. THIRD OBJECTION. Matthew 13 commands that cockle
grow until the harvest; the Fathers interpret cockle as heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated until the
end. ON T rst and second admonition, avoid, knowing that he that is such a one is subverted.'
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE III: WHETHER HERETICS ARE TO BE TOLERATED

ST. THOMAS -

RESPONSE. Regarding heretics two things are to be considered: what is due on their side, and what is due on
the side of the Church. On their side, the sin of corrupting the faith is so grave that under the medieval civil-ecclesiastical penal order they were judged to deserve not only separation from the Church by excommunication but also, after conviction, death by secular authority. St. Thomas argues by comparison: if counterfeiters of money, which serves temporal life, were put to death by princes, those judged guilty of knowingly and pertinaciously corrupting the faith, which gives life to the soul, were regarded as even more gravely harmful. On the Church's side, however, there is mercy ordered to conversion. Therefore the Church does not immediately abandon an erring person but first uses the first and second correction prescribed by Titus. If the person afterward remains pertinacious, the Church, no longer hoping for his conversion and providing for the salvation of others, separates him from communion by excommunication and then leaves him to secular judgment. Jerome's image is cited: putrid flesh is cut away and a scabby sheep removed lest the
whole body or flock be corrupted; Arius was one spark whose unchecked error spread widely. REPLY TO THE FIRST. Apostolic gentleness is fulfilled in the first and second correction. The same Apostle then says to
avoid the heretic who remains subverted. REPLY TO THE SECOND. The good that God brings from heresies
- manifestation of the approved and deeper investigation of Scripture - lies outside the intention of heretics. Their own intention is the corruption of faith. Moral judgment considers what belongs per se to the act, not merely accidental goods God draws from evil. REPLY TO THE THIRD. The parable forbids uprooting cockle
when doing so would uproot wheat. It does not forbid every ecclesiastical correction or excommunication. Where removal of the error can occur without the feared destruction of the innocent, the parable does not impose absolute toleration. SUMMA TEXTUS. First: heretics can deserve excommunication and, in the historical penal system presupposed by St. Thomas, secular capital punishment. Second: the Church first shows mercy by correction. Third: after obstinate persistence she separates the person from communion and leaves temporal punishment to secular authority. COMMENTARY. I note that earlier writers, including Augustine before later experience and some interpretations of Chrysostom, had opposed severe temporal coercion of heretics. Augustine explicitly says he once resisted such measures but was moved by experience of
the Donatists. John Hus later taught that heretics should not be handed over to secular death; the Council of Constance condemned this proposition. Luther likewise rejected the traditional penal doctrine. FIRST

CONCLUSION. Heretics can justly be punished by ecclesiastical spiritual penalties, especially
excommunication and deprivation of ecclesiastical offices and benefices. Matthew 18, Titus 3, 2 John, the canonical treatment of lepers as a figure, and numerous canons are cited. I distinguish the Church's DIVINE POWER to excommunicate from a concrete excommunication. By divine law the Church possesses the authority; the actual general censure or individual sentence is established by ecclesiastical law or judgment. ST. THOMAS'S WORDS 'THE CHURCH DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY CONDEMN.' I say they cannot mean that in St. Thomas's day no canonical excommunication existed before personal correction; the decretal Ad abolendam of Innocent III already existed. St. Thomas means the Church does not immediately impose the
final abandonment to secular judgment. The discussion of civil penalties and returning heretics continues on the next page.

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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE III COMMENTARY CONTINUED; ARTICLE IV -

RETURNING FROM
HERESY SECOND CONCLUSION OF THE COMMENTARY. Under the legal order I am describing, heretics can also be punished with temporal civil penalties in honor, goods, and life. I cite the Councils, papal legislation, Augustine, Jerome, and the civil customs of Catholic kingdoms. Such penalties changed historically: Arians were
exiled under Constantine; later laws imposed fines and confiscations; eventually obstinate relapsed heretics were handed to secular authority for capital punishment. I insist that the Church as ecclesiastical judge does not directly execute blood punishment. Inquisitors judge the theological crime and impose ecclesiastical censures, then leave the convicted person to secular authority. The secular prince applies the civil penalty. ARTICLE IV - WHETHER THOSE RETURNING FROM HERESY ARE TO BE RECEIVED BY THE CHURCH FIRST

OBJECTION. Jeremiah 3 says: 'Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to me, saith the
Lord.' Since the Church's judgment is God's judgment, returning heretics should always be received. SECOND

OBJECTION. Christ commanded Peter to forgive not seven times but seventy times seven. Therefore even repeated relapse should be forgiven. THIRD OBJECTION. Heresy is one species of unbelief, and pagans or Jews
who convert are admitted into the Church. Therefore heretics who return should be received similarly. ON THE CONTRARY. The decretal Ad abolendam says that those who, after abjuring error, are found to have relapsed into the same heresy are to be left to secular judgment. ST. THOMAS - RESPONSE. The Church's charity seeks two kinds of good for a person. The principal good is spiritual salvation, which charity wills for everyone, including enemies. Therefore a heretic who truly returns, however often he has relapsed, is admitted to penance and offered the way of salvation. The second class consists of temporal goods: bodily life, possessions, reputation, and ecclesiastical or secular dignity. Charity wills these for another insofar as they serve his eternal salvation and that of neighbors. If preserving such goods in one person gravely endangers the salvation of many, charity can require their removal. If repeated heretics were always preserved in every temporal good, their relapse
could infect others and the absence of penalty could make heresy seem safe. Therefore the Church, when someone returns for the first time, not only receives him sacramentally but ordinarily preserves his life and can sometimes restore dignities by dispensation when useful for peace. But when a person after reconciliation relapses, this is taken in the external forum as a sign of inconstancy. He is still admitted to penance, but under the
historical law is not thereby protected from the secular death penalty. REPLY TO THE FIRST. God sees the heart and knows genuine conversion; the Church cannot directly inspect the heart and therefore uses juridical presumptions in temporal penalties while never closing the sacramental way of salvation to the truly penitent.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Christ's command concerns especially personal forgiveness;
private persons are not
always authorized to remit sins that public law must punish for God's honor and neighbor's safety. REPLY TO THE THIRD. Converts who never previously professed Christian faith have not shown the same legal sign of inconstancy as relapsed heretics. SUMMA TEXTUS. Returning heretics are always received to penance;

first-time returners can be preserved in life and sometimes restored to dignity; relapsed persons can still receive
penance without thereby escaping temporal sentence. I begin a detailed commentary on just punishment, excommunication, and the classes of heretics who incur canonical penalties; it continues on the next pages.
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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE IV COMMENTARY: EXCOMMUNICATION AND

TEMPORAL

PENALTIES I ask first whether it is just to punish heretics, including under the historical law with capital punishment. I cite the condemnation of John Hus, the Bull against Luther, Augustine's later letters concerning

Donatists, Jerome, and the canonical tradition. FIRST CONCLUSION. Ecclesiastical spiritual penalties - excommunication, deprivation of benefices, and removal from offices - can justly be imposed on formal heretics. The Church's authority to bind and loose is divine; the particular censures are established by ecclesiastical legislation and judicial sentence. SECOND CONCLUSION. Civil temporal penalties can also be imposed by secular authority according to law. I recounts historical variations: exile, fines, confiscation, and in his own age the death penalty for certain obstinate or relapsed heretics. He mentions the Council of Constance and the executions of Hus and Jerome of Prague, and notes that Michael Servetus was burned at Geneva with Calvin's approval. my argument from natural political practice is that even pagan legislators severely punished public acts they believed destructive of the common religion; Plato in Laws X treats public

impiety as a grave civic crime. I therefore understand the Christian commonwealth's penal policy as an exercise of public justice and preservation of religious unity. He again distinguishes jurisdictions: the ecclesiastical tribunal judges the heresy and imposes ecclesiastical penalties; the secular judge carries out civil

punishments. SECOND QUESTION. Which persons incur the canonical penalties of heresy? I distinguish: purely mental heretics; those who inwardly believe and exteriorly express heresy; those who outwardly simulate heresy without inward error; persons whose heresy consists in doubt; positive dissenters; corrigible and incorrigible persons; true and feigned penitents; confessing and 'negative' accused persons; heresiarchs and ordinary followers. FIRST CONCLUSION. A PURELY MENTAL heretic does not incur the external canonical excommunication. I state this against a gloss and some jurists, with Sylvester, St. Antoninus, Cajetan, Paludanus, and Soto. The external forum does not directly impose penal censures on an act which by

its nature has no exterior manifestation. Paul says, 1 Corinthians 4: 'Judge not before the time... until the Lord

come, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and make manifest the counsels of hearts.'

SECOND CONCLUSION. If the mental heretic expresses the heresy by words or another exterior sign, he

incurs the censure even if accidentally no one hears or sees him. The act is exterior by nature; accidental secrecy does not make it purely internal. A law can attach a privative penalty to an external act even when public proof is absent. OBJECTION. Canon law sometimes speaks as though it punishes intentions - inquisitors acting from hatred or favor, religious who go to court with an intention to harm superiors, clerics commanded to pray attentively. REPLY: those interior acts are considered as forms, motives, or conditions of

exterior acts; the law does not thereby punish a purely internal act abstracted from any exterior operation. The

next page treats reservation of internal sins, secret external acts, and how outward expression must manifest the heretical assent.

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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE IV COMMENTARY: INTERNAL FORUM, EXTERNAL SIGNS, SECRET

HERESY OBJECTION FROM DISPENSING IN VOWS. The Pope can dispense from an occult vow; therefore he seems to possess jurisdiction over purely interior acts. REPLY. Dispensation belongs to spiritual governance and the internal forum; once the matter is manifested to the superior it can be regulated. This does not prove that an EXTERNAL PENAL censure attaches to an act that by nature is purely internal and incapable of external proof. OBJECTION FROM RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS. A superior can invalidate or suspend certain private vows of subjects even without previously knowing them, because he has jurisdiction over the subject's available activity and can require freedom for obedience. Again this is government over the person and matter, not punishment of an invisible act as such. OBJECTION FROM RESERVED MENTAL HERESY. Could the Supreme Pontiff reserve a purely mental heresy to himself for sacramental absolution? I say reservation in the internal forum is conceptually possible because the Pope can limit confessors' jurisdiction. Yet I judge it pastorally inexpedient ordinarily to reserve purely mental acts, since anxious persons often cannot know whether they fully consented to an interior temptation. The heresy reserved in the Bull In Coena Domini is therefore ordinarily understood as heresy exteriorly manifested. BISHOPS AND INQUISITORS. Trent, session 24, reform chapter 6, gives bishops faculties in the internal forum for certain occult cases. I discusses later bulls and argues that an episcopal faculty attached to office is not removed by a later reservation unless the superior clearly restricts it. Inquisitors also receive faculties, though public judicial absolution ordinarily requires juridical proof.

OBJECTION: THE CHURCH CANNOT FORCE SELF-ACCUSATION OF A SECRET EXTERNAL CRIME.

True; natural law ordinarily prevents compelling a man to betray himself. But it does not follow that an automatic censure cannot attach to an external act committed secretly. Public proof and actual incurrence of a privative censure are different questions. CASE OF A PERSON DOUBTFUL IN FAITH SEEKING INSTRUCTION. If the person remains pertinacious - knowingly doubting the Roman Church's authority - and merely asks one private teacher which side he prefers, the exterior profession of doubt manifests heresy and can incur the censure. A private doctor's opinion cannot be placed above the universal Church. If, however, the person remains sincerely prepared to submit to the Church and explains the troubling proposition to a Catholic teacher precisely to learn what the Church teaches, he does not incur excommunication. He is not PROFESSING the heretical judgment but submitting a difficulty for correction. The exterior sign to which the penalty attaches must signify the erroneous assent. I then argue against the idea that any utterance of heretical words is enough. Councils that say 'if anyone says or believes' speak of saying as a profession of what is held. Material reading, quoting, accidental misspeaking, or asking a question does not by itself make one a heretic. WHAT SIGN SUFFICES? Any word, gesture, nod, or deed which in its circumstances makes another understand that the person adheres to the heretical proposition can exteriorly manifest heresy. C appens to be a heretic.

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QUESTION XI - ARTICLE IV COMMENTARY: FEIGNED HERESY THROUGH

FEAR I consider a
baptized person who outwardly says or does something heretical but inwardly does not assent to the error.

THIRD CONCLUSION. One who through fear exteriorly FEIGNS himself a heretic while inwardly retaining
Catholic faith does not incur the canonical excommunication laid specifically upon HERETICS. I state this against Cajetan's stricter view and with Sylvester, St. Antoninus, and the common opinion of canonists. Penal
laws are to be restricted to their proper subjects. A merely apparent heretic is not formally a heretic. The person nevertheless sins gravely against the duty of confessing faith when confession is required. The **conclusion concerns the technical censure for heresy, not the moral innocence of the** exterior denial.

OBJECTION FROM THE FORMULA 'IF ANYONE SHALL SAY OR BELIEVE.' Councils sometimes anathematize those who 'say or believe' a condemned proposition. Therefore merely saying it seems sufficient.
REPLY. In such formulas 'saying' means professing by words the judgment one holds. Material quotation or outward simulation without intellectual error does not have the same moral form. OBJECTION FROM ADULTERY UNDER FEAR. A woman who commits adultery because of grave fear still commits adultery; therefore one who asserts heresy from fear should still be heretical. REPLY. The woman voluntarily consents
to the act that constitutes adultery. Formal heresy includes intellectual error and pertinacious assent. The frightened orthodox person lacks that formal element even though his exterior act is gravely sinful.

OBJECTION FROM ECCLESIASTICAL PRACTICE. Such persons can be punished by inquisitors as heretics. REPLY. The Church judges interior dispositions from exterior signs. If the outward conduct legitimately proves heresy, the external forum can presume it. But if it is established that inward assent was absent, the person is to be punished for the actual external sin, not as one who inwardly abandoned faith. IDOLATRY. I apply the distinction to a Christian who performs an exterior act of idolatry. Three cases are possible. First, he inwardly detests the idol but through fear exteriorly offers the sign of worship. Second, without speculative error he willingly performs demonic worship from greed, curiosity, malice, or another corrupt motive. Third, together with the external act he intellectually accepts the false religious doctrine. Only
the third is formally heresy under the canonical penalty against heretics, because the external cult then manifests an intellectual error opposed to received faith. The first two can still be true IDOLATRY because idolatry is formally a vice against religion in the will and exterior worship. I recall a special excommunication
reported in the Directorium Inquisitorum against worshippers of demons and idols. Such persons can incur penalties assigned to idolaters even when they are not formally heretical in the intellect. The same distinction
explains why words or deeds must be examined according to their complete moral meaning. A nod, gesture, or ceremonial act can manifest heresy if it naturally signifies assent to the error; yet the judge must distinguish
profession of false belief from coerced external denial of faith. The following page gives FOURTH **CONCLUSION concerning the legal treatment of persistent and relapsed heretics, and** then turns to the order
of fraternal correction.
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QUESTION XII - ON APOSTASY I say the Summists treat this under the title

'apostasy'; canon law under De
apostatis, especially apostasy from religion and order. ARTICLE I - WHETHER APOSTASY PERTAINS TO
UNBELIEF FIRST OBJECTION. Ecclesiasticus 10 says, 'The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from
God,' and then, 'Pride is the beginning of all sin.' If apostasy is a principle present in every sin, it should not belong specifically to unbelief. SECOND OBJECTION. Unbelief is in the intellect, but apostasy can appear in
exterior words and deeds or in the will. Proverbs 6 describes the apostate as a perverse man speaking, gesturing,
and sowing quarrels. A person circumcising himself or worshipping according to a false sect is called apostate.
Therefore apostasy seems broader than intellectual unbelief. THIRD OBJECTION. Heresy is a determinate species of unbelief. If apostasy were also a determinate species, the division of unbelief into paganism, Judaism,
and heresy would have been incomplete. ON THE CONTRARY. John 6 says that e are some of you that believe
not.' Therefore apostasy can pertain to unbelief.
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QUESTION XII - ARTICLE I: WHETHER APOSTASY PERTAINS TO UNBELIEF ST.

THOMAS -

RESPONSE. Apostasy means a going back or recession from God. Man is joined to God in several ordered ways. First and principally through faith. Second through a will subject to God's commandments. Third through special works of supererogation and states, such as religious profession or sacred order. What is later in this order can be removed while the earlier bond remains. A religious can abandon his institute and still keep

faith; a cleric can abandon his order and remain Christian; a sinner can resist a commandment while still believing. But if faith itself is abandoned, the principal bond by which the mind adheres to God in the present life is removed. Therefore APOSTASY SIMPLY SPEAKING chiefly means recession from faith, and in this sense belongs to unbelief. REPLY TO THE FIRST. Ecclesiasticus speaks of apostasy in the broader sense of the will's recession from obedience to God, which accompanies mortal sin and is connected with pride. REPLY

TO THE SECOND. Faith includes exterior confession as well as interior assent. Exterior words and deeds can therefore signify apostasy from faith. Proverbs' description is fitting: once the first foundation of supernatural life is removed, disorder spreads through the person's whole conduct, and the apostate can labor to separate others from faith. REPLY TO THE THIRD. Apostasy does not constitute a fourth determinate species of unbelief. It names the MOTION of going back from faith and so is an aggravating circumstance of an unbelief

whose formal species is otherwise determined. 2 Peter 2: 'It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than after they had known it to turn back.' SUMMA TEXTUS. First: simply speaking, apostasy is recession from faith. Second: in this principal sense it belongs to unbelief. Third: it does not add a fourth species but an aggravating circumstance. COMMENTARY. The Greek word apostasy signifies recession or departure. In theological usage it means recession from a good in which one was bound to persevere either by precept or by solemn profession. A mere change from an optional good work is not technical apostasy. Scripture can use the word broadly for every grave disobedience to God. Theologians and canonists ordinarily distinguish THREE technical kinds: apostasy from faith, apostasy from sacred order, and apostasy from religion. I first treat apostasy from faith under three questions: (1) whether it differs specifically from heresy; (2) what canonical penalties apostates from faith incur; (3) who is legally called an apostate for purposes of those penalties. QUESTION: ARE HERESY AND APOSTASY FROM FAITH DIFFERENT SPECIES? ARGUMENT FOR DIFFERENCE. Scripture and the Fathers commonly call HERETICS those who under the

Christian name corrupt some doctrines while retaining the profession of Christ. An apostate can reject the Christian name entirely. Augustine compares heretics to diseased members retaining some healthy parts, while

apostasy seems total. SECOND ARGUMENT. St. Thomas in Question XI says the heretic intends to adhere to

Christ but chooses wrongly among doctrines; the apostate seems to intend no longer to adhere to Christ at all.

THIRD ARGUMENT. Heresy is named from election, apostasy from recession or intention to depart; election

and intention can differ. FOURTH: apostasy can terminate in paganism or Judaism, which are species distinct from heresy. I lists Sylvester, Torquemada, Cano, Alfonso de Castro, Cajetan, and the Thomists. His determination follows on the next page.

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QUESTION XII - COMMENTARY: HERESY AND APOSTASY FROM FAITH my CONCLUSION. Heresy

and apostasy from Christian faith are of the SAME FORMAL SPECIES of unbelief; apostasy differs accidentally by greater extension and by the aggravating circumstance of total recession. This is Cajetan's position and common
among disciples of St. Thomas. PROOF. Question X, Article 5 defined heresy formally as resistance to faith RECEIVED IN THE MANIFESTATION OF TRUTH. A total apostate does exactly this. He differs from an ordinary heretic materially by rejecting more truths, not by a different formal relation to received faith. The definition of heresy as pertinacious error against Christian faith already includes the apostate. A person who denies
one article is a heretic; one who denies ten is a greater heretic; one who rejects them all does not thereby enter a fourth species. More and less do not of themselves change species. A Christian who becomes pagan is materially a
pagan in the errors he embraces, but formally his unbelief is resistance to faith once received and therefore heretical. He is not a pagan in the formal sense in which a person who never received Christian faith is pagan.

REPLY TO THE FATHERS. The Fathers commonly use 'heretic' according to the

etymology and the historical
adversaries before them: persons who retained the Christian name while choosing false dogmas. Their usage does not prove a distinct formal species for total apostasy. REPLY TO ST. THOMAS. His statement that apostasy does not signify a determinate species means it is not a new species alongside paganism, Judaism, and heresy. It names the recession by which one arrives at unbelief. REPLY FROM INTENTION AND ELECTION. Different acts of intention and choice can share one moral formal object. The theological species is determined by the formal relation to received faith, not by the etymological noun chosen to describe the motion. REPLY FROM THE TERM PAGANISM. The material term of the apostate's motion can be pagan or Jewish error, but formally the Christian's rejection remains a violation of received evangelical faith. COROLLARY. Total apostasy is nevertheless an aggravating circumstance and should be disclosed in confession because it manifests a greater contempt and broader rejection than denial of one article. SECOND QUESTION: PENALTIES. Apostates from faith incur the penalties assigned by law to heretics: excommunication, incapacity for ecclesiastical offices, and the
other penalties applicable under the historical canons. Canon Contra Christianos treats baptized persons who return
to Judaism in the same way as heretics. THIRD QUESTION: WHO COUNTS AS A LEGAL APOSTATE? The same distinctions already made for heretics apply: purely mental recession, exterior profession, simulation without
inward assent, true and feigned repentance, and public versus occult manifestation. I then turns to APOSTASY FROM RELIGION. FIRST CONCLUSION. One who, after SOLEMN religious profession, abandons the habit and community with the intention never to return is an apostate from religion. A person bound only by simple private vows can sin gravely by violating them but is not technically an apostate from the canonical state of religion in the same way. SECOND CONCLUSION. One who leaves the religious community without permission
and intends never to return is an apostate even if he keeps wearing the habit. The essence of religious life lies in the substantial vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity; by definitively rejecting obedience and communal subjection he recedes from the state itself. Further conclusions concerning the habit and transfer to another institute
follow on the next page.
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QUESTION XII - APOSTASY FROM RELIGION THIRD CONCLUSION. A religious

who temerarily lays
aside his habit but intends to return to the institute can incur the excommunication of the canon Ut periculosa, yet is not simply an apostate from religion, because he does not intend to abandon the essential state permanently. FOURTH CONCLUSION. A religious who puts off the habit of his own institute and assumes the habit of another institute is not simply an apostate from RELIGION if he continues in the substantial religious state, although an unauthorized transfer can be gravely sinful and canonically punished. I cite canon law and Trent, session 25, concerning illicit changes of institute. A transfer made without legitimate authority creates disturbance, violates obedience, and can incur censures. A lawful transfer made by competent authority
is not apostasy because the vows remain under ecclesiastical governance. FIFTH/RELATED

CONCLUSION.

If a religious leaves his monastery without permission but retains the habit and intends to return, he is neither technically an apostate nor automatically excommunicated by the canon directed at temerarious abandonment of the habit. Nevertheless I judge the unauthorized departure mortal by kind because it gravely violates solemn
obedience and can create scandal and disorder. OBJECTION FROM RECOURSE TO A HIGHER SUPERIOR. A mistreated religious sometimes must appeal beyond the immediate superior. I reply that legitimate canonical recourse is permitted, but one may not choose an intrinsically disobedient manner of appeal. Trent prohibits regulars from leaving convents under pretext of approaching superiors unless sent or called according to law. FINAL CONCLUSION ON DISPENSATION. If the Supreme Pontiff for legitimate cause permits a religious to live outside the cloister or as a secular cleric, this is not apostasy; but the person remains bound to the substantial vows insofar as the dispensation does not legitimately modify their mode of observance. I warn that one who uses a dispensation as a pretext to live entirely as though never professed may
gravely violate his state. He applies the same reasoning to clerics of military religious orders, canons regular, and others who solemnly profess the substantial vows while living in forms different from ordinary monastic cloister. DOUBT ABOUT THE EXCOMMUNICATION FOR PUTTING OFF THE HABIT. Does every illicit omission of religious clothing incur the censure? I report Vandelinus, Sylvester, and Cajetan. Cajetan requires a genuine laying aside, temerity or lack of reasonable cause, and a manner apt to provide opportunity for wandering. FIRST CONCLUSION. A merely venial irregularity in dress does not incur major excommunication. Major excommunication presupposes mortal sin. Penal laws can have light matter, just as a
trivial touching of a cleric is not equivalent to the grave violence contemplated by a censure. SECOND

CONCLUSION. One who removes his proper habit and assumes disguise specifically to

wander freely
through public places, even briefly, incurs the censure because the action is temerarious and directly creates the danger the canon intends to prevent. The role of custom, concealment of the habit, and exceptional just causes are treated on the next page.
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QUESTION XII - APOSTASY FROM RELIGION: THE HABIT AND CANONICAL

CENSURE Whether a
garment counts as the religious habit must be judged according to the custom of the institute and province. The law
concerns the formal sign by which the religious state is publicly recognized, not merely one piece of cloth considered materially. FIRST COROLLARY. One who removes some part of the habit privately, for heat, health, or another modest reason, without disguising himself to wander or conceal his state, does not incur the major excommunication merely from that act. The omission can still be venially or mortally sinful according to motive and circumstances. SECOND COROLLARY. If a religious removes his own habit and assumes another institute's habit in order to wander unrecognized or commit a crime, he can incur the censure. Wearing another sacred habit does not cure the formal abandonment of his own religious sign and can add a further deception. JUST CAUSE. If a change of clothing is reasonably necessary for preservation of life, honor, service of neighbor, or another proportionate good, and is authorized where authorization can be obtained, it is not 'temerarious' and the censure is not incurred. Penal law is not interpreted against acts the legislator would reasonably permit. FINAL

CONCLUSION. A religious can formally PUT OFF the habit even while some of the material

clothing remains on
his body, if he deliberately conceals it so thoroughly that those around him cannot recognize his religious state and he does so to wander or act secretly. I state this against the narrow opinion that a penalty naming 'putting off' applies only when the garment is physically removed. The form of the act lies in suppression of the public sign. This requires real concealment. If sufficient signs remain by which persons ordinarily recognize the institute, the habit is not formally removed in the same sense. I now turns to APOSTASY FROM SACRED ORDER. He proposes three questions: what apostasy from order is; what moral sin it contains; and what canonical penalties follow. DEFINITION. Apostasy from order is recession BY ONE'S OWN AUTHORITY from the perfected state of SACRED ORDER to a secular state incompatible with the obligations of that order. This can happen, for example, by contracting marriage contrary to the obligation historically annexed to sacred order or by entering a secular military state incompatible with clerical ministry. The phrase SACRED ORDER excludes first tonsure and minor orders from technical apostasy in the strict sense. Persons in minor orders are in an inchoative clerical state as novices are in an inchoative religious state; leaving such a state is not formally the same as recession after perfected sacred dedication. The phrase BY ONE'S OWN AUTHORITY excludes a lawful change under legitimate
papal dispensation. Ecclesiastical positive law can regulate obligations such as the historical Latin discipline of clerical continence and can dispense for legitimate causes where divine law itself is not contradicted. FIRST

CONCLUSION. Recession under legitimate papal dispensation and proportionate cause is not

sin. SECOND

CONCLUSION. Recession from sacred order without such dispensation and cause is mortal

by kind, especially
when it violates a solemn obligation of chastity or sacred ministry. Luke 9, 'No man putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God,' is applied analogically. The more difficult question of minor orders
begins on the next page.
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QUESTION XII - APOSTASY FROM ORDER: MINOR ORDERS AND

FRAUDULENT RECEPTION I

ask whether recession from MINOR orders, apart from formal contempt, is mortal sin. A cleric can recede in two ways: by entering a state that canonically renders him incapable of exercising former ministries, or by entering a state that does not create such incapacity. Cajetan judged the first mortal and the second venial. my

CONCLUSION AGAINST THE STRICTER CLAIM. Recession from minor orders by

choosing a lawful

state which happens to create canonical irregularity is not necessarily sin. A man not bound by sacred-order continence can lawfully marry, including under circumstances that produce canonical incapacity for ministry.

If the law permits the marriage, merely losing canonical aptitude is not moral fault. SECOND

CONCLUSION. Simply leaving minor orders without contempt, while remaining within

one's lawful rights,

is not mortal by kind but venial because the person departs from an ecclesiastical state already initiated but not perfected by sacred order. I compare a novice who may leave before solemn profession. REPLY FROM 'APOSTASY.' The technical vice presupposes recession from a perfected sacred state. Minor orders are preparatory. REPLY FROM INCAPACITY. The person is not bound by vow to remain perpetually capable of exercising the minor ministry. FINAL CONCLUSION. It is MORTAL SIN to receive minor orders with a

fixed prior intention to abandon them merely in order to obtain clerical privileges. Such a person deceives the

Church in a grave juridical matter. Trent, session 23, reform chapter 4, orders that tonsure not be conferred where there is no probable sign that the candidate chooses the clerical way to serve God rather than to escape

secular jurisdiction. The fact that one may later lawfully leave does not excuse fraud at the time of reception, just as a novice can later leave a convent but sins if he enters with a fraudulent purpose to exploit it. I next consider the obligation to wear CLERICAL HABIT AND TONSURE. He distinguishes omission as part of complete apostasy from order, which has already been treated, from omission by a cleric who remains in the clerical state. Panormitanus, Innocent III, certain glosses, and Sylvester were severe, sometimes treating secular dress even in minor clerics as grave. Cajetan is milder. I first note that tonsure is the principal historical sign of the clerical state; other details of color, length, beard, and dress vary with custom. FIRST

CONCLUSION. A person only in minor orders who retains the principal clerical sign

does not commit mortal

sin merely because some other clothing differs from customary clerical dress. SECOND CONCLUSION. A minor cleric without a substantial benefice or dignity does not ordinarily commit mortal sin merely by omitting both habit and tonsure, though deliberate omission against the ecclesiastical precept is venial. The state is still inchoative and the matter can be light. THIRD CONCLUSION. If such a cleric possesses a substantial ecclesiastical benefice or dignity from which he is supported, complete deliberate abandonment of

clerical habit and tonsure is mortal, because he receives ecclesiastical goods precisely as one publicly occupying the state while refusing its signs and obligations. The stricter obligation of clerics in sacred orders continues on the next page.

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QUESTION XII - CLERICAL HABIT IN SACRED ORDERS Panormitanus and

Hostiensis, cited by Sylvester,
hold that clerics in sacred orders who fail to maintain clerical tonsure and habit can sin mortally. Master Vitoria
taught that if a sacred cleric arranges himself so that by NO external sign he can be known as a cleric, he sins
mortally even if he retains a minimal or concealed tonsure. He argues from the grave penalties imposed by canon
law. CAJETAN'S POSITION. If the sacred cleric retains tonsure, omission of other external signs is only venial
before repeated judicial admonition; after a threefold admonition mortal sin follows through contempt and
contumacy. Cajetan treats tonsure as the essential sign and the other clothing as accidental. my

CONCLUSION. If

a cleric in sacred orders lays aside clerical habit so completely that by NO adequate external sign his clerical state
can be recognized, he sins mortally even before a particular judicial admonition. If sufficient signs remain
according to the custom of the province, omission of other accidental signs is not of itself mortal. FIRST PROOF.
Canon law imposes grave penalties - deprivation of fruits, suspension, and eventually deprivation of benefice - for
complete abandonment of clerical appearance. Such penalties indicate grave matter. SECOND. The reasons that
excused minor clerics do not apply. Sacred order places a person in the perfected ecclesiastical state and
dedication. Public manifestation of that state is a serious ecclesiastical good. THIRD. The dignity of sacraments
requires sacred ministers to appear honestly and distinctly. To hide the state altogether causes scandal and
contempt of sacred ministry. TWO EXCEPTIONS. Grave necessity can excuse, as when life, honor, or substantial
goods of self or neighbor require concealment and the law would not reasonably bind. Also a very brief omission
for an ordinary legitimate activity can lack grave matter where no scandal follows. SCANDAL. Even where some
sign remains, a mode of dress that gravely scandalizes the faithful can become mortal by reason of scandal. What
counts as sufficient clerical manifestation is judged according to local custom. FINAL CONCLUSION. A sacred
cleric who intentionally conceals his clerical state in order to wander freely, avoid recognition, or commit evil sins
mortally even if the concealment is brief. The formal injury lies in deliberate suppression of the public sacred state.
I reject the idea that three judicial admonitions are always needed to create grave obligation. The general
ecclesiastical law itself admonishes; later contumacy can aggravate but does not create the whole gravity.
PENALTIES FOR APOSTASY FROM ORDER. Apostates from sacred order can become legally infamous, lose
canonical privileges, be suspended or deposed, and if they contract marriage incur the penalties established by the
historical canons. Minor clerics also lose certain privileges when they fail the canonical conditions of clerical life.
The following page develops these penalties and then begins St. Thomas's Article II on an apostate prince.
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QUESTION XII - APOSTASY FROM ORDER: CANONICAL PENALTIES;

TRANSITION I continue the canonical consequences. Those initiated into sacred orders who apostatize from the state can become legally infamous and incapable of accusation or testimony; after admonition they can be deposed; they can lose the privilege of clerical forum; and marriage contrary to sacred-order obligations carries the censures specified by law. Certain clerics in minor orders also lose clerical privilege when they commit crimes specifically excepted by canon law, such as procuring homicide or becoming canonically bigamous. I discusses differences among glossators but follows the common view that the substance of the criminal act, not an artificial distinction about the status of the hired killer, determines the loss. Trent, session 23, reform chapter 6, regulates which tonsured or minor-order clerics enjoy clerical privilege. Mere tonsure without a benefice, church service, clerical habit, or approved clerical study does not suffice. Married minor clerics have additional canonical conditions. COROLLARY. Secular judges who prosecute a merely tonsured person lacking the canonical conditions for privilege do not by that fact incur the censure protecting clerics, even if they impose severe civil punishment for a proved crime. I then makes a doctrinal note before Article II. St. Thomas had said that FAITH IS THE LIFE OF THE SOUL. This expression must be understood correctly. FIRST SENSE, FORMAL. If one means that faith itself is the formal principle by which the soul is spiritually alive, the proposition is false. Charity is the form of supernatural life: 1 John 3, 'He that loveth not abideth in death.' I say Lutherans commonly abuse the phrase in this formal sense. SECOND SENSE, CAUSAL. If one means faith is the ROOT AND FIRST PRINCIPLE from which spiritual life begins, the proposition is true. Romans 1 says, 'The just man liveth by faith.' Faith is the foundation of things hoped for and disposes toward the charity that formally vivifies. St. Thomas is using the phrase in this causal sense. I therefore cautions theologians to explain older orthodox formulas when current heretics use the same words in an erroneous sense. ARTICLE II - WHETHER A PRINCE WHO APOSTATIZES FROM FAITH LOSES DOMINION OVER HIS SUBJECTS SO THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER BOUND TO OBEY FIRST OBJECTION. Ambrose says Christian soldiers obeyed Julian the Apostate when he commanded them for defense of the republic. Therefore apostasy did not dissolve his rule. SECOND OBJECTION. Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel Nebuchadnezzar, and Mordecai Ahasuerus. Holy men therefore obeyed unbelieving rulers. THIRD OBJECTION. Every mortal sin involves some recession from God. If apostasy destroyed civil dominion by the very fact, the same would follow from every mortal sin. ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory VII says those bound by fidelity to excommunicated persons n d forbidden to keep fidelity until satisfaction. Apostates are excommunicated.

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QUESTION XII - ARTICLE II: WHETHER AN APOSTATE PRINCE LOSES

DOMINION ST. THOMAS -

RESPONSE. Unbelief is not intrinsically incompatible with civil dominion. Dominion is introduced by human and
natural law; distinction of faithful and unbelieving arises from divine law. The law of grace does not simply abolish legitimate human-law rights. Therefore mere interior unbelief does not automatically annihilate every
temporal title. Nevertheless a person guilty of received-faith unbelief can be deprived of dominion by JUDICIAL
SENTENCE, just as legal rights can be lost through other crimes. The Church does not punish unbelief as such in
those who never received Christian faith: Paul says, 'What have I to do to judge them that are without?' But those
who received faith and afterward abandon or corrupt it are ecclesiastical subjects with respect to that profession
and can be punished. One fitting ecclesiastical punishment is deprivation of power over FAITHFUL subjects. An
apostate ruler can easily corrupt those subject to him. Proverbs 6 describes the apostate as devising evil and sowing
quarrels. Therefore, when a ruler is judicially declared excommunicated and deprived according to law, faithful
subjects can be released from obedience and from their oath of fidelity. REPLY TO JULIAN. In the infancy of the
Church the faithful lacked temporal power to restrain apostate emperors without grave danger. They therefore
tolerated obedience in civil matters not contrary to God. This does not prove the Church lacked authority later to
protect the faithful when sufficient power existed. REPLY TO PHARAOH AND OTHER UNBELIEVERS. They
were unbelievers who had not apostatized from Christian faith. The Church does not penalize mere pagan unbelief
as a broken Christian profession. REPLY FROM OTHER MORTAL SINS. Apostasy is special because it destroys
the public supernatural bond of faith and creates a direct danger to the Church's religious unity. Other mortal sins,
though grave, do not necessarily dissolve the profession of faith or ecclesial membership in the same way.
SUMMA TEXTUS. First: unbelief and civil dominion are not intrinsically incompatible. Second: the Church does
not punish simply for unbelief those who never received faith. Third: she can punish those who received faith and
abandon it, including by deprivation of authority over faithful subjects. Fourth: this punishment is fitting because
apostate government endangers faith. Fifth: after the appropriate ecclesiastical declaration, faithful subjects can be
released from fidelity. COMMENTARY BEGINS. St. Thomas's second conclusion must be carefully understood.
The Church can compel subject pagans and Jews not to blaspheme or persecute faith, as Question X established;
what she cannot do is punish them as APOSTATES for an unbelief that never violated Christian profession.
Likewise Question X, Article 10 allowed the Church to remove an unbeliever's jurisdiction over faithful Christians
when preservation of faith requires. That is not punishment of pagan unbelief as such but protection of believers. I
also extends St. Thomas's principle beyond total apostasy e

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Reply to the objection: although one can withdraw from minor orders without sin, it does not follow

that one may remain in the state
while laying aside its habit without sin. Ecclesiastical law grants the faculty of withdrawing from the state; it does not grant the
faculty of remaining in it while laying aside the habit, but commands the contrary. THIRD CONCLUSION. One constituted in minor
orders who possesses a rich benefice or ecclesiastical dignity sins mortally if he lays aside the habit and tonsure. In this case he is
bound under mortal sin to recite the canonical hours; likewise he is bound to wear the habit and tonsure, since both are annexed to the
benefice. Not wearing them would cause grave detriment to the ecclesiastical commonwealth and would deceive the Church in a
grave matter, since a substantial ecclesiastical reward is given to him on account of the state whose insignia he ought to bear. One
who merely retains a right of return to a benefice or dignity, however, is not bound under mortal sin to wear habit and tonsure, since
he is not maintained from ecclesiastical goods and is not then bound to recite the divine office. A greater difficulty is whether one
initiated into sacred orders sins mortally by laying aside the clerical habit. Panormitanus and Hostiensis, followed by Sylvester, hold
that unless those in sacred orders wear the tonsure in such a manner that the hair above the ears, the crown, and the beard are shaved,
they sin mortally. Master Vitoria teaches that if they conduct themselves so that they cannot be recognized by any external sign as
clerics, even if they retain the clerical crown, they sin mortally. He argues from the very grave penalties established in canon law
against clerics who abandon the habit: such penalties would be unjust unless the omission were mortal sin. Cajetan, in the Summa
under 'cleric,' says that if they retain the tonsure, even though they cannot otherwise be recognized externally as clerics, they sin only
venially before a threefold judicial admonition; after that admonition they sin mortally. His reasons are: garments and other external
signs are accidental to the clerical state, whereas tonsure or the clerical crown is essential; penalties of the law are not ordinarily
incurred before judicial admonition; and before admonition the matter is not grave because there is not yet contumacy, whereas after
admonition there is grave matter through obstinacy. FOURTH CONCLUSION. If a cleric in sacred orders lays aside the clerical habit
so completely that by no external sign can his state be recognized, he sins mortally, even if he does not do so in order to conceal his
person. If his state can still be recognized by some external sign, he does not thereby commit mortal sin. The first part is proved from
the severe canonical penalties and from the perfection of the sacred clerical state. The principal reason for the precept is the dignity
and excellence of the sacraments: their ministers ought to conduct themselves honorably and decently and be distinguished from the
laity by a special habit. To act contrary to this, insofar as it lies in the cleric, injures the sacraments and violates their dignity. This
must be restricted in two ways. First, necessity can excuse—for protection of life, honor, one's own property, or that of one's neighbor—because ecclesiastical laws do not bind in such cases. Second, laying aside the habit for a short time is not mortal sin, as
for some exercise, dramatic representation, or similar temporary reason.
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QUESTION XII, ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONTINUED

The second part of the preceding conclusion is proved from Cajetan. Whoever shows by some external sign that he belongs to the clerical state is distinguished from other men and does not inflict grave injury upon the sacraments; therefore he does not sin mortally. What sign suffices must be judged according to the custom of each province. This is understood apart from scandal. If scandal follows, then even though some external sign remains, failure to wear the whole decent clerical habit can become mortal through scandal—for example, one who shaves beard and hair but otherwise wears the clothing of common laymen. FINAL CONCLUSION. One constituted in sacred orders who lays aside the habit with the intention of wandering about and concealing his identity so that he may freely go through streets and public places to perpetrate some evil sins mortally, even if only for a short time. The same is true if with the same intention he conceals the habit so that those present cannot recognize him. Religious who abandon their habit in this way sin mortally; the obligation of clerics in sacred orders to wear the clerical habit is no less, both by law and by the nature of their perfect state. Such concealment naturally produces scandals, contempt for the sacraments, opportunities for crimes, and ridicule of the clerical state. As explained above concerning apostasy from religion, concealment of the habit with this intention is morally equivalent to abandoning it. To Cajetan's first argument: although shaving the hair or a particular garment is not of itself essential to the clerical habit, clerics are bound by ecclesiastical precept to manifest by some exterior sign that they belong to the clerical state; if they do not, they can sin mortally against the precept. To the second: a fresh judicial admonition is not always required either for mortal sin or for penalties incurred by the law itself; the admonition contained in the promulgated precept can suffice. To the last: it is a grave matter for the ecclesiastical commonwealth that one belonging to this state manifest it by an exterior sign; contumacy makes the matter still graver. Third, we must discuss the penalties incurred by apostates from orders. See Sylvester under 'apostasy,' 'cleric,' 'excommunication,' and 'bigamy,' together with the canonical titles on apostasy, bigamy, and clerical life and honesty. FIRST. Those initiated into sacred orders who apostatize from their order are infamous in law and cannot be witnesses or accusers. If after admonition by the prelate they do not correct themselves, they are to be deposed; until correction they do not enjoy the privilege of the canon Si quis suadente diabolo; and if they marry they are excommunicated by the fact itself. SECOND. Clerics, even those only in minor orders, lose the privilege of the canon in two cases: assassination and bigamy. A cleric who procures through a third person the killing of a Christian incurs the canonical penalties; the common opinion of canonists and theologians applies this whether the killing is carried out through unbelievers or believers. Bigamous clerics who wear clerical habit are likewise subject to the stated penalties. FINALLY. Clerics in minor orders, married or unmarried, who do not wear clerical habit and tonsure lose the clerical privilege. Boniface VIII and later provisions are cited. Alexander VI issued bulls at the request of the Catholic Monarchs concerning Spain; and Trent, Session XXIII, decree on reform, chapter 6, determined that one merely tonsured or in minor orders does not enjoy privilege of forum unless he has an ecclesiastical benefice, wears clerical habit and tonsure and serves a church by episcopal mandate, or studies in a seminary, school, or university with the bishop's permission as one proceeding toward major orders.

QUESTION XII, ARTICLE I — END; ARTICLE II

The Tridentine decree further requires married clerics to observe the constitution of Boniface VIII and to be deputed by the bishop to the service or ministry of a church, actually serving it and using clerical habit and tonsure. Hence after Trent secular judges are not excommunicated merely for laying hands upon clerics who lack the conditions of that decree, even if, according to the quality of their crimes, they impose capital punishment: such men have lost clerical privilege. On the reply to the second objection, where it is said that 'faith is the life of the soul,' note that the proposition has two senses. Formally it could mean that faith is the form by which the soul lives; this is false and heretical in the Lutheran sense, for charity alone is the form by which the soul lives: 'He who does not love remains in death' (1 John 3). Causally it means that faith is the root and cause through which the soul lives. In this sense it is true and Catholic. Augustine teaches it, and St. Thomas uses it here: faith is the first principle and foundation of things hoped for, and 'the just man lives by faith' means that faith is the first principle by which the just man lives. Although in St. Thomas's time the proposition could be uttered piously because it was commonly understood causally, in our time, if stated without qualification, it savors of Lutheran heresy, since Lutherans habitually use it in the formal sense. Some say St. Thomas means faith formed by charity; but this is not his intention here, because he is treating apostasy from faith simply, not merely apostasy from faith formed by charity. ARTICLE II. WHETHER A PRINCE LOSES DOMINION OVER HIS SUBJECTS THROUGH APOSTASY FROM THE FAITH, SO THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER BOUND TO

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OBEY HIM.

Objection 1. Ambrose says that Julian the Apostate, although an apostate emperor, had Christian soldiers who obeyed him when he ordered them to march for defense of the commonwealth. Therefore apostasy does not of itself release subjects from a prince's dominion. Objection 2. Faithful holy men served unbelieving rulers: Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel Nebuchadnezzar, Mordecai Ahasuerus. Therefore apostasy from faith does not of itself abolish obedience to a prince. Objection 3. Every sin is in some way a departure from God. If apostasy deprived princes of the right to command faithful subjects, by parity other sins would do the same, which is false. ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory VII declares, following the statutes of holy predecessors, that those bound by fidelity or oath to excommunicated persons are absolved by apostolic authority and forbidden to preserve fidelity until the excommunicated person makes satisfaction. Apostates, like heretics, are excommunicated. Therefore apostate princes are not to be obeyed. I ANSWER. Unbelief in itself is not incompatible with dominion, because dominion belongs to human law while the distinction between faithful and unbelieving is according to divine law, and divine law does not simply abolish human law. Yet a person can, by judicial sentence, lose dominion because of unbelief, as he can for other crimes. The Church does not punish unbelief in those who never received the faith: 'What have I to do to judge those who are outside?' But she can judicially punish the unbelief of those who received the faith; and they are fittingly punished by being unable to rule faithful subjects, since an apostate with a depraved heart can sow quarrels and seek to separate men from faith. Therefore, as soon as someone is by sentence declared excommunicated for apostasy, his subjects are by that fact released from his dominion and from the oath of fidelity by which they were bound. Reply 1. In the Church's infancy she did not yet possess temporal power to restrain earthly princes; she therefore tolerated obedience to Julian in matters not contrary to faith to avoid a greater danger. Reply 2. The case differs for unbelievers who never received the faith. Reply 3. Apostasy from faith totally separates a man from God in a way not found in every other sin. SUMMARY. (1) Dominion and unbelief are not intrinsically incompatible. (2) The Church does not have power to punish unbelievers who never received the faith merely for unbelief. (3) She can punish unbelievers who received the faith and deprive them of dominion over subjects. (4) This punishment is fitting for apostates. (5) When one is declared excommunicated for apostasy, he is deprived of dominion over subjects and they are released from their oath of fidelity.

QUESTION XII, ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY

Regarding the second conclusion, note that the Church can compel unbelieving princes who never received the faith not to blaspheme our faith, as was shown in Question X, Article X. St. Thomas is not denying that power here. An objection is drawn from the same St. Thomas, who taught above that the Church, having God's authority, can deprive unbelieving princes who never received Christianity of dominion over faithful subjects. The answer is that there he spoke of dominion over the faithful, from which the Church can remove unbelieving rulers for the protection of faith; here he speaks of dominion which unbelievers exercise over other unbelievers, of which the Church cannot simply despoil them. The conclusion extends not only to perfect apostates but also to princes who have fallen into heresy. This was done, I say, with Henry VIII of England and the Duke of Saxony. Second, princes are not deprived of dominion only through excommunication imposed for apostasy or heresy, but through any major excommunication, provided that they are manifestly excommunicated. If the excommunication is occult and the person is tolerated by the Church, he is not deprived of dominion; his acts and judgments remain valid in both internal and external forum. Canon law expressly releases subjects from manifestly excommunicated rulers until they repent. I reject Panormitanus and Felinus insofar as they claim every major excommunication, even occult, deprives a person of dominion and temporal goods. Such a rule would cause enormous disturbance and insecurity in judicial affairs. Third, if excommunication is imposed for a crime to which confiscation of goods is annexed by law, then once the person is declared excommunicated he is absolutely deprived of dominion over his goods and subjects; even after absolution he needs a new title to become prince and lord again, either formally through restoration by the Supreme Pontiff or virtually when, after absolution, he is tolerated in the former kingdom or possessions. But if excommunication concerns a crime without confiscation annexed by law, there is no absolute deprivation of temporal goods, only temporary deprivation of jurisdiction over subjects until satisfaction or obedience is rendered. Heresy is of the first kind: once the sentence is declared, confiscation and deprivation follow. Concerning the last conclusion, 'apostasy' can be taken strictly for total withdrawal from faith and from the Author of faith, or broadly for any unbelief in one who once received Christianity, even if not a total departure from Christ, as in Lutheran or Arian heresy. Inquisitors use the term in this broader sense when their sentences say that someone has 'hereticized and apostatized.' St. Thomas's conclusion is to be understood in this broader sense: once someone is declared excommunicated for any such withdrawal from faith, he is deprived of dominion over subjects. Canon law expressly releases those bound to manifest heretics by fidelity, lordship, or service, and deprives heretics even of paternal dominion over their children. I next distinguish manifest from occult crimes and asks whether an apostate or heretical prince incurs deprivation before a declaratory judicial sentence. If the crime is occult or can be concealed by some evasion, a declaratory sentence must first intervene; until then the prince is tolerated by the Church and his acts remain valid.

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QUESTION XII, ARTICLE II — WHETHER DEPRIVATION PRECEDES JUDICIAL SENTENCE

FIRST CONCLUSION. When the crime of heresy or apostasy is occult, or can be concealed by some evasion, a judicial declaratory sentence must precede deprivation of jurisdiction. Before that sentence subjects cannot withdraw from the prince's obedience. Canon law orders that confiscation not be executed before sentence by the bishop or other competent authority. Execution of a penalty requires public authority; private inferior subjects cannot themselves execute it. Likewise, if public justice tolerates an accused person before sentence, inferiors should not punish him on their own authority. Before declaratory sentence heretics and apostates lawfully possess other temporal goods; the same reasoning applies to dominion over subjects. Subjects must also continue to pay tribute before sentence. SECOND CONCLUSION. After a declaratory sentence for heresy has been issued, the prince unjustly possesses the kingdom and exercises jurisdiction; subjects are bound to withdraw from his obedience and, if they have sufficient strength, to wage war against him. The prince has been justly deprived by reason of the crime. Canon law expressly releases subjects from obedience. I add 'if they have sufficient strength,' because subjects are not bound to undertake war at the cost of grave danger of death or loss of goods unless there is a moral danger of falling away from the faith. Hence faithful Englishmen and Saxons who do not rise against their superiors can be excused when they lack the means and face grave dangers. A consequence is that commerce made with heretics who have been expressly named and condemned, considered in itself, creates an obligation of restitution to the fisc, because after sentence they have been deprived of dominion over subjects and other goods. Yet if the Church knowingly permits such commerce, she can be understood by an interpretative or virtual will to consent to it, and then faithful subjects are not obliged to restore to the fisc goods purchased from heretics. The harder question is whether, when the crime is so manifest that no evasion can conceal it, subjects may and must withdraw from the prince before a declaratory sentence. Panormitanus and Felinus affirm this. Many interpreters of St. Thomas and other canonists deny it; Cajetan favors a middle position. Arguments for requiring sentence: canon law forbids execution of confiscation before sentence; execution of a penalty belongs to public authority, not private subjects; subjects cannot enact the penal law and therefore ordinarily cannot execute its final complement; public order is perverted if inferiors punish one whom public justice still tolerates; and heretics retain dominion over other temporal goods before sentence, so by parity they seem to retain dominion over subjects.

They must also still receive taxes and tribute. THIRD CONCLUSION begins: when the crime is manifest with evident notoriety, subjects, provided they have sufficient power, may lawfully withdraw from the power of their prince even before a declaratory judicial sentence.

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QUESTION XII, ARTICLE II — MANIFEST HERESY OF A PRINCE

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the crime is so evident and notorious that it cannot be concealed, subjects, provided th y icient strength, may lawfully withdraw from the power of their prince before a declaratory judicial sentence.
this with Panormitanus and Felinus and says Cajetan follows it; it is the more common opinion among discip s of as. In such a case there is always an interpretative will and ratification of the Pontiff, and such a will has the force of a sentence. The evident notoriety of the fact can take the place of sentence. A military commander can lawfully punish a soldier caught in a notorious crime without waiting for formal witnesses; likewise the Christian commonwealth has a right to defend its faith against a prince who destroys it. Every commonwealth has a right to defend the just laws by which unity and peace are preserved; the Christian commonwealth is preserved in unity and peace through faith. If a negligent prince failed to defend a city against public enemies, the city could defend itself; much more may it defend itself against a prince who has become a public enemy of the faith. I add that this argument can stand even apart from presumed papal ratification, because the authority residing in a prince first resides in the commonwealth and is derived from it. Hence the commonwealth can expel a prince and deprive him of authority received from it when by his government and corrupt conduct he destroys the common good and the laws by which the commonwealth is rightly governed. Since an apostate or heretical prince destroys the laws by which the Christian commonwealth is governed, its citizens can by common authority expel him. Moreover deprivation has not only the character of punishment but also of a preservative medicine: separation from the heretical prince protects subjects from infection, since 'their speech spreadeth like a cancer' and inferiors commonly imitate the morals of superiors. FINAL CONCLUSION. Subjects are not bound, before declaratory judicial sentence, to expel their prince or withdraw from his dominion. It would be too severe to require inferiors to execute what the superior has not yet formally commanded. The Pontiff has a greater duty than private subjects to provide for the common good of the Christian commonwealth, yet execution is not commanded before declaration. A superior's sentence is needed not only because law or fact can be uncertain but so that what the law has begun may actually be executed by the living judge who guards the law. This conclusion is limited: if there is a moral danger to faith, subjects who are able are bound to expel the prince. Thus if by force and fear he attempts to separate subjects from the faith, they must remove him. To the objections: in the case of notorious crime inferiors do not act merely by private authority; papal ratification is presumed, and in addition they can act by the public authority of the commonwealth from which princely authority is derived. The deprivation is also medicinal and defensive, not merely punitive. Even if the Pontiff knowingly tolerated the apostate without sufficient reason, the Christian commonwealth could still defend itself, just as a city could defend itself against Turks if its king irrationally allowed them to devastate it. A further moral question follows: whether heretics and apostates are deprived of dominion over other temporal goods from the day the crime is committed, so that in conscience they must immediately surrender those goods to the fisc. Panormitanus, Felinus, Alfonso de Castro and others defend the affirmative; other grave authors, including St. Thomas as commonly interpreted, Cajetan, Soto, Adrian, the Archdeacon and John Andrew, defend the opposite.
I concede
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QUESTION XII, ARTICLE II — CONFISCATION OF A HERETIC'S GOODS

The affirmative opinion argues that the Church can punish heretics with the greatest lawful penalty and has in fact enacted laws
saying that their goods are confiscated 'by the fact itself' from the day of the crime. Penal law can sometimes bind before judicial
sentence, as excommunication and irregularity do. Otherwise a judge would have greater binding force than the law he merely
executes. It is also objected that contracts made by heretics before sentence are later rescinded by inquisitors, which seems to show
that the heretic had already lost dominion. FIRST CONCLUSION. A heretic or apostate is not bound to surrender his goods, nor may
the fisc despoil him of them, before judicial sentence. Canon law expressly orders this. A person cannot simultaneously be accused,
judge, executor, and sufferer of his own penalty. Natural law requires that no one be condemned unheard. The penal law is, as it were,
a dead rule that must be applied and vivified by the living judge; Aristotle therefore calls the judge 'animate justice.' A law requiring a
hidden heretic spontaneously to surrender enormous possessions before sentence would be intolerable. Experience also shows that a
secret heretic who reveals his offense to the inquisitors and asks for penance is not necessarily deprived of all goods; otherwise the
judges would have no discretion in the matter. SECOND CONCLUSION. Once sentence has been given, confiscation of a heretic's
goods is retroactive to the day the crime was committed: all goods which he possessed from that day are applied to the fisc wherever
they are found, provided their price is not still with the heretic. This is the rule of the inquisitors and of canon law. FINAL
CONCLUSION. Before judicial sentence, from the day of the crime, heretics retain true dominion
over their goods. I reject those who
concede them only use and possession. The conclusion is Soto's and common among disciples of St. Thomas. Canon law permits
them to possess their goods until sentence and forbids the fisc to take them beforehand; this implies true dominion. The same legal
text treats incestuous persons, robbers, and those carrying arms to Saracens, who admittedly are not deprived of dominion before
sentence. Heretics also have dominion over consumable goods; in consumables use and dominion cannot be separated in the relevant
way. If the fisc were already true owner, natural reason would oblige immediate restitution to it, contrary to the first
conclusion.
Likewise, if the fisc seized the goods by private force before sentence, it would owe restitution, just as anyone who takes his own
property from another by unlawful private violence can incur an obligation to restore possession. Therefore the heretic still possesses
true dominion. From this it follows that a heretic may maintain himself and his family from his own goods before sentence. He may
also alienate goods by gratuitous donation, because no injury is thereby done to the fisc, which can later pursue the goods wherever
found, nor necessarily to the recipient's own patrimony. But if it is probable that the crime will be manifested before a judge, the
heretic may not make onerous contracts—sale and the like—without disclosing the defect affecting the goods, because otherwise the
other party can suffer loss when the fisc later rescinds the transaction. If there is no probable danger that the heresy will be judicially
manifested, such onerous contracts can be lawful, since the goods are then not practically defective in that way and no injury is done
to the fisc.
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QUESTION XII, ARTICLE II — PENAL LAW AND DOMINION, CONCLUDED

To the first argument: the Church has punished heretics as gravely as she lawfully could, but she could not justly oblige them to surrender their goods before sentence, because that would make the same man accused and judge of himself. A founder may attach a condition to property—for example that a beneficiary loses it upon a certain event—but this is a condition of the grant rather than an ordinary penal law. To the second: Soto says penal laws are not incurred before sentence, while excommunication and irregularity are exceptions because they deprive a person of goods common to the Church rather than of his own particular goods. I judge this answer insufficient by itself, since ecclesiastical dignities and access to sacraments can also involve true particular rights. He therefore adopts Cajetan's distinction: penalties are of two kinds. Some require a positive action for their execution, such as death, mutilation, or confiscation. These are not incurred in execution before judicial sentence, because otherwise the accused would have to be both agent and patient. Others are mere privations requiring no positive act—excommunication, suspension, interdict, irregularity—and these can be incurred before sentence. Confiscation of goods belongs to the first class. To the confirmation: law binds immediately to guilt because law itself is the rule and sin consists in deviation from it. But a penalty whose execution requires a positive act cannot bind in the same immediate way; the law is a 'dead' rule and must await the living judge for execution. To the third argument: it does not follow that the judge has greater force than the law. The law itself binds to guilt, while the judge binds to the penalty only by reason of the law. To the fourth: contracts made by heretics before sentence can be firm at the time yet dependent upon the later judgment, and therefore are rescinded after sentence. Alternatively, certain contracts may be invalid even while the heretic retains dominion, just as the holder of an entailed estate can possess true dominion yet lack power to alienate it by certain contracts. To the last: I concede that heretics incur some penalties before sentence, but not penalties requiring a positive act for execution. Inability to alienate through certain onerous contracts is a mere privation. Returning to the last argument of the preceding question: it does not follow from the fact that heretics retain other goods before sentence that subjects must continue every form of obedience where faith itself is endangered.

Possession of ordinary goods does not by its nature or legal presumption create danger to faith; continued obedience to a manifest apostate ruler can. If withholding tribute is necessary in order effectively to deprive such a prince of dominion over subjects, subjects may lawfully withhold it before declaratory sentence in the circumstances already explained. Thus ends Question XII on apostasy.

QUESTION XIII — ON THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY IN GENERAL

Next we must consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith: first blasphemy in general, and secondly the blasphemy called the sin against the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE I. WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS OPPOSED TO THE CONFESSION OF FAITH.

The objections begin by asking whether blasphemy is really opposed to confession of faith, since blasphemy can concern saints and creatures as well as statements directly about God.

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QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE I — WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS OPPOSED TO CONFESSION OF FAITH

Objection 1. Blasphemy seems not to be opposed to confession of faith. Objection 2. On Ephesians 4, 'Let blasphemy be put away from you,' the Gloss says blasphemy may be against God or the saints. But confession of faith seems to concern only things pertaining to God, the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to confession of faith. Objection 3. Some distinguish three species of blasphemy: attributing to God what does not belong to Him; removing from Him what does belong to Him; and attributing to a creature what is proper to God. The last seems to concern creatures, whereas faith has God for its object. ON THE CONTRARY. Paul says, 1 Timothy 1, 'I was before a blasphemer and a persecutor,' and then adds, 'I did it ignorantly in unbelief.' Therefore blasphemy pertains to unbelief. I ANSWER. The name blasphemy signifies a derogation from some excellent goodness, especially divine goodness. God, as Dionysius says, is the very essence of goodness. Whatever belongs to God belongs to His goodness; whatever does not belong to Him is far from the perfect goodness which is His essence. Therefore whoever denies of God something which belongs to Him, or asserts of Him something which does not belong to Him, derogates from divine goodness. This can happen in two ways: by an intellectual judgment alone, or joined to a certain detestation of affection. Correspondingly, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. If such derogation remains in the heart it is blasphemy of the heart; if it proceeds outwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the mouth. In this way blasphemy is opposed to confession. Reply 1. One who speaks against God intending insult derogates from divine goodness not only through intellectual falsity but through a depraved will detesting and obstructing divine honor; this is perfect blasphemy. Reply 2. As God is praised in His saints insofar as the works which God effects in them are praised, so blasphemy directed against the saints redounds consequently against God. Reply 3. The three proposed forms are not properly distinct species. Attributing to God what does not belong to Him and removing what does belong to Him differ only as affirmation and negation, which do not of themselves diversify the species of the habit. Attributing what is proper to God to a creature is reducible to attributing to God what does not befit Him, because what is proper to God is God Himself; to attribute it to a creature is in effect to identify God with that creature. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First: whoever denies of God what belongs to Him or attributes to Him what does not belong to Him derogates from divine goodness and blasphemes. Second: derogation remaining in the heart is blasphemy of the heart; externally uttered it is blasphemy of the mouth and is opposed to confession of faith.

Third: perfect blasphemy derogates from divine goodness both intellectually and affectively. Fourth: blasphemy is not divided into specifically distinct species merely by the three verbal forms just listed.

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QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY; ARTICLE II BEGINS

First note that in its proper signification blasphemy imports a curse or execration of some good, especially an excellent good. Jerome uses the term in this way on Ephesians 4 and Titus 3, where it can extend to insults against men constituted in excellence. Yet in the common usage of the faithful the name is restricted to cursing or insulting divine excellence. Augustine gives the reason: the goodness of men can be doubtful, whereas divine goodness is indubitable; hence 'blasphemy' is commonly used principally of God.

Second, blasphemy is false speech against God by way of insult. 'Speech' distinguishes it from mere assent: not every utterance is assent, and we can sometimes utter words to which we do not inwardly assent. In this it differs from unbelief, which requires assent of the mind. The expression must be understood according to the intention of the blasphemer. A statement materially true can become blasphemous when the speaker intends by it to attribute an imperfection to God. Thus obscene naming of members of Christ or the Blessed Virgin, intended to derogate from their sanctity, becomes false according to the speaker's intention. The same principle appears in lying: speculative falsity is not the whole formal nature of a lie; intention matters, so one can lie while materially saying something true. Certain imprecatory expressions are reduced to blasphemy because, although not indicative propositions capable of formal falsity, the speaker intends to attribute to God something unfitting. The phrase 'by way of insult' distinguishes blasphemy from unbelief, whose formal nature does not necessarily include derogation from divine honor; a heretic can think that he is rendering service to God. Third, confession of faith can be taken in two ways: as a simple assertion of faith, or as divine praise and honor. In the

first sense unbelief is contrary to confession; in the second sense blasphemy is contrary to confession. Thus St. Thomas is to be understood here. Formally and primarily, blasphemy is even more directly contrary to religion and divine honor; it is forbidden by the

second commandment, 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.' Fourth, blasphemy retaining the species of blasphemy can be imperfect and unformed, or perfect and formed. The imperfect is uttered against God not from hatred and detestation of God but from some other passion, such as anger. Perfect blasphemy proceeds from hatred and detestation of God, just as faith is called perfect and formed when proceeding from charity. The former can be called blasphemy according to the intellect—not because the will contributes nothing, for then it would not be sin, but because the affection is not directly set against God. Finally, although blasphemies do not differ specifically according to the three forms mentioned by St. Thomas, they can differ notably in gravity, so that this circumstance should be explained in confession, just as the quantity of matter in theft can need explanation to manifest the gravity of the sin. I refer to canonical penalties and notes that in Spain judgment concerning blasphemies, especially heretical blasphemies signifying an error against faith, belongs to the Inquisitors. Other blasphemies are not heretical in themselves even though spoken with a false and irreverent intention.

ARTICLE II. WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

Objection 1 begins from the Gloss on Colossians 3: after prohibiting greater sins it appears to add blasphemy among lesser things, suggesting it may be venial.

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QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE II — WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN

Objection 1. The Gloss on Colossians 3 says that after prohibiting greater sins the Apostle prohibits lesser ones, and then mentions
blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy seems to be numbered among lesser, venial sins. Objection 2. Every mortal sin is opposed to some precept of the Decalogue. Blasphemy does not seem to be opposed to any one of them. Therefore it is not mortal. Objection 3. Sins committed without deliberation are not mortal; first movements are not mortal because they precede rational deliberation. Blasphemy
sometimes bursts forth without deliberation. Therefore it is not always mortal. ON THE CONTRARY. Leviticus 24 says: 'He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.' The death penalty is imposed only for mortal sin; therefore blasphemy is mortal.
I ANSWER. Mortal sin is that by which man is separated from the first principle of spiritual life, which is the charity of God. Whatever is contrary to charity is therefore mortal in its genus. Blasphemy by its genus is contrary to divine charity because it derogates from divine goodness, the object of charity. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin by its genus. Reply 1. The Gloss does not mean that everything subsequently listed is a lesser sin; after mentioning only greater sins above, the Apostle later adds some lesser things among which some greater sins are also included. Reply 2. Since blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith, its prohibition can be reduced to the prohibition of unbelief implied in 'I am the Lord thy God'; or it is prohibited by 'Thou shalt not take the name of
the Lord thy God in vain.' One who asserts something false of God takes His name in vain more gravely than one who uses God's name to confirm a falsehood. Reply 3. Blasphemy can arise without deliberation in two ways. First, a person may fail to advert that what he says is blasphemous—for example, suddenly under passion he bursts into words whose meaning he does not consider. Then the sin can be venial and does not possess the proper formal nature of blasphemy. Second, he adverts that the expression is blasphemous and considers the meaning of the words; then a sudden movement does not excuse from mortal sin, just as sudden anger
does not excuse one who knowingly kills the person beside him. SUMMARY. First conclusion: blasphemy is mortal sin by its genus.

Second: its prohibition is reduced either to the precept against unbelief or to the precept against taking God's name in vain.

COMMENTARY. The doubt is whether blasphemy can be venial because of smallness of matter, as theft can be. It can certainly be

venial because of imperfection of the deliberate act; this is common even to very grave kinds of sin. But blasphemy against God, or against the saints precisely insofar as they participate in divine holiness, is never venial merely because the matter is small. Whatever
is asserted blasphemously of God or the saints as participants in divine holiness is opposed either to divine intellect, divine will, or divine essence: against divine intellect it places error and falsity in God; against divine will it places malice in God; against divine essence it attributes a natural evil to God. These are all gravest matters. No assertory perjury is venial merely through smallness of matter; much less blasphemy, which is even more directly opposed to the second commandment. Likewise homicide does not become
venial merely through smallness of the life destroyed. Materially speaking, however, an insulting expression directed at a saint merely
insofar as he is a particular human being can be venial through smallness of matter, just as an insult against a non-saint can. Sanctity can then be accidental to the precise matter intended, although the friends of God ought to receive greater honor. In such a case there
can be a kind of material blasphemy that is venial because of smallness of matter. ARTICLE III begins: WHETHER THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY IS THE GREATEST SIN. Objection 1 argues that homicide seems more harmful because it destroys human life, whereas blasphemy cannot injure God.
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QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE III - WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS THE GREATEST SIN

The remaining objections compare blasphemy with perjury and with the vice of excusing one's sin. A perjurer seems to make God a witness to falsehood; nevertheless not every blasphemer goes so far as to assert that God is false. Again, the Gloss calls the excuse of sin a very great vice. On the contrary, the Gloss on Isaiah says that every sin is lighter when compared with blasphemy. I ANSWER. Blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith and therefore possesses the gravity belonging to unbelief; it is further aggravated when detestation of the will is joined to it, and still more when it breaks forth into words, just as the praise of faith is increased by love and confession. Since unbelief is, in its genus, the greatest sin, blasphemy also belongs to that gravest genus and aggravates it. Reply 1. If homicide and blasphemy are compared according to their objects, blasphemy is graver because it is directly against God, whereas homicide is against one's neighbor. If compared according to the effect of harm, homicide causes greater injury, because it harms one's neighbor while blasphemy cannot injure God. But the gravity of guilt is measured more by the intention of the perverse will than by the external effect; hence the blasphemer, who intends injury to divine honor, sins more gravely simply speaking. Homicide nevertheless holds the first place among sins against one's neighbor as regards punishment. Reply 2. The Gloss on Ephesians says it is worse to blaspheme than to swear falsely. The perjurer does not judge God to be a false witness; rather he calls God as witness to falsehood while hoping that God will not expose it by an evident sign. Reply 3. Excusing sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy, and in this sense it is called a maximum vice because it makes any sin greater. COMMENTARY. First

conclusion: unbelief, simply speaking, is graver than blasphemy because it is directly opposed to the theological

virtue of faith,

whereas blasphemy is reduced to unbelief through its opposition to confession and divine praise. Second: blasphemy proceeding from hatred of God can be graver than unbelief by reason of that added circumstance, not from its own proper object, because hatred of God is opposed to charity, the greatest virtue. Third: other things equal, blasphemy committed with knowledge of what is blasphemed is graver than blasphemy proceeding from culpable but non-affected ignorance, since there is more voluntariness toward the object. Affected ignorance does not excuse but aggravates, since it manifests a stronger will toward evil. I apply this distinction to the Pharisees and Jews blaspheming Christ and contrasts it with Paul's earlier blasphemy in ignorance.

QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE III CONCLUDED; ARTICLE IV

I ask whether a Lutheran who tramples images of Christ and the saints sins more gravely than a Catholic who does the same. If only the formal element proper to blasphemy is considered, the Catholic's act can be graver because he more directly intends contempt for Christ and the saints, while the heretic acts under an error of unbelief not necessarily affected in that particular act. But because the heretic's act also contains the sin of heresy - judging that sacred images are not to be venerated - his whole sin can be graver by reason of that circumstance. To the objection that blasphemy can coexist with Catholic faith, I reply that the demerit and gravity of blasphemy can contain what belongs to unbelief according to the intention of the will even when formal unbelief, which requires an act of the intellect, is absent. Blasphemy does not aggravate unbelief because it contains the whole formal malice of unbelief plus something else; rather, because it is reduced to the genus of unbelief, what it has in that order is aggravated by detestation of the will and by blasphemous speech. As faith and divine praise are perfected by charity, blasphemy is perfected by hatred of God. Yet the detestation required for blasphemy need not always be formal hatred of the divine goodness itself; detestation of some divine excellence, such as God's honor or justice, suffices, though the sin is more perfect and grave when hatred of God Himself is present. External action adds nothing beyond a will already absolutely determined to perform it as execution; nevertheless the external act considered as the object intended makes the interior willing graver. Thus one absolutely willing to utter blasphemous words, but physically prevented by paralysis, can sin as gravely as if he uttered them; one who blasphemes only inwardly while refusing to speak sins less. ARTICLE IV - WHETHER THE DAMNED BLASPHEME. Objection 1: fear of future punishment now restrains some from blasphemy; the damned experience punishment and should therefore be restrained still more. Objection 2: blasphemy is gravely demeritorious, but after death there is no state of merit or demerit. Objection 3: after death merit and guilt do not increase, yet many are damned who were not blasphemers in this life. ON THE CONTRARY. Apocalypse 16 describes men scorched with great heat who blaspheme the name of God who has power over the plagues. The Gloss applies this to those in hell who know they are punished for their deserts yet resent God's power and punishment. I ANSWER. Blasphemy includes detestation of divine goodness. The damned retain a perverse will turned away from divine justice: they love the sins for which they are punished insofar as they would still use them if able, and hate the punishments inflicted for them. They regret their sins not because they hate the sins themselves, but because they are punished for them. This detestation of divine justice is interior blasphemy of the heart. It is credible that after the resurrection there will also be vocal blasphemy among the damned, just as there will be vocal praise of God among the saints. Fear restrains men now because they hope to escape punishment; the damned have no such hope and act as desperate persons according to their fixed perverse will.

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QUESTION XIII, ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; QUESTION XIV BEGINS

Good acts in wayfarers are meritorious and evil acts demeritorious. In the blessed, good acts are no longer meritorious but belong to the reward of beatitude; similarly the evil acts of the damned are not new demerits but belong to the punishment of damnation. Whoever dies in mortal sin carries with him a will disposed, in some respect, to detest divine justice; in this way blasphemy can be present in him. COMMENTARY. The statement that detestation of divine justice is blasphemy must be understood causally rather than formally. Detestation in the will is the cause of blasphemous judgment or speech; it is not itself formally the intellectual speech that constitutes interior blasphemy. In this life hatred of God does not always cause actual blasphemy because the will is not fixed in evil. In hell, however, from a will obstinately fixed in evil there follows, by necessity of consequence, detestation of divine justice and

blasphemy. Love of sin and hatred of punishment, considered absolutely, do not yet constitute blasphemy; considered in relation to God as the One who forbids sin and inflicts its punishment, they issue in hatred of God and detestation of His justice. QUESTION XIV - ON BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT. I introduce the question through Matthew 12: every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men, but blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven; whoever speaks against the Son of Man may be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven either in this world or the next. I recall Augustine's rule that

where Scripture can bear several interpretations consistent with faith, one should not rashly bind oneself to a single interpretation before the matter has been carefully examined. ARTICLE I - WHETHER SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THE SAME AS SIN FROM CERTAIN MALICE. Objection 1: sin against the Holy Spirit is blasphemy, but many sins from deliberate malice are not

blasphemies. Objection 2: sin from certain malice is opposed to sin from ignorance and weakness, whereas Scripture contrasts sin against the Spirit with sin against the Son of Man; therefore the divisions seem different. Objection 3: sin against the Spirit is assigned

determinate species, whereas sin from malice seems a general condition that can occur in every genus of sin. ON THE CONTRARY.

The Master of the Sentences says that he sins against the Holy Spirit to whom malice pleases for its own sake; this is to sin from certain malice.

QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE I - SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT

I ANSWER. Doctors have explained sin or blasphemy against the Holy Spirit in three ways. First, Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome and Chrysostom understand it literally as blasphemous speech against the Holy Spirit, whether 'Holy Spirit' is taken essentially

for what is common to the Trinity or personally for the third Person. Christ did some things humanly - eating, drinking and the like - and others divinely - casting out demons, raising the dead and performing miracles through divine power and the operation of the Holy Spirit with whom His humanity was filled. The Jews first spoke against the Son of Man by calling Him a glutton, wine-drinker and friend of publicans; afterward they blasphemed the Holy Spirit by attributing His divine works to the prince of demons. Second, Augustine understands sin against the Holy Spirit as final impenitence: perseverance in mortal sin until death. This is not merely a word of the mouth but a word of heart and deed, not one act but many. It is against the Spirit because remission of sins is effected through the Holy Spirit, who is the charity of the Father and the Son. Christ did not say that the Jews had already reached final impenitence, but warned that their present speech could lead them to it. Third, other theologians take sin against the Holy Spirit as sin

against the good appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Power is appropriated to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit.

Thus sin through weakness is called against the Father, sin through ignorance against the Son, and sin through certain malice - deliberate election of evil - against the Holy Spirit. This occurs either from the inclination of a vicious habit, in which case it is not precisely the special sin against the Spirit, or because through contempt a person casts away what could restrain him from choosing sin: hope through despair, fear through presumption, and similar gifts and effects of the Holy Spirit. In this latter way, sinning from malice is properly sinning against the Holy Spirit. Reply 1. Just as confession of faith is made not only by the mouth but by deeds, blasphemy against the Spirit can exist in mouth, heart and deed. Reply 2. According to the third explanation, sin against the Spirit is distinguished from sin against the Son as malice from ignorance or weakness. Reply 3. Sin from malice arising merely from habit is a

general condition; arising from special contempt for an effect of the Holy Spirit it has the nature of a special sin. SUMMARY. (1) Sinning from malice merely through habitual inclination is not, as such, the special sin against the Spirit. (2) Choosing evil through contempt of those divine aids that draw a person away from sin is sin against the Spirit. (3) In this sense it is a special genus of sin. 360

QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE I COMMENTARY; ARTICLE II BEGINS

I note that the first explanation is found in Ambrose, Jerome and Chrysostom. The works in question are works of divinity insofar as God is Savior and author of grace; hence sins directed against these saving works are said to be against the Holy Spirit, through whom
remission is given. Augustine's explanation is found in his sermons and Retractations and is also applied to 1 John 5 concerning a 'sin
unto death.' St. Thomas's preferred third explanation is not wholly different from the first but a determination of it, because attributes
appropriated to the divine Persons are common according to the one divine essence through which God performs works ad extra.

Second, blasphemy against the Spirit can occur formally and directly, when someone intentionally speaks against God or performs an
act intended to signify interior blasphemy; or virtually and interpretatively, when a person intentionally says or does something which
in fact redounds to divine insult and which he was obliged to avoid, but fails to avoid through fault or culpable ignorance. Thus a heretic who tramples sacred images blasphemes in this interpretative way. Likewise one who causes others to blaspheme Christ's name participates in this order, as Paul says, 'The name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you.' Conversely, good works that cause others to glorify God can be confession of faith and divine praise. Third, final impenitence can be understood merely
negatively - dying without an act of repentance because death prevented it - or positively, as a deliberate purpose to persevere in sin until death, as in one who refuses confession at death or destroys himself in despair. In the first sense it is a circumstance of other sins
rather than a new species; in the second it is a special sin opposed to penance and, as St. Thomas explains, a species of sin against the
Holy Spirit. ARTICLE II - WHETHER SIX SPECIES OF SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED: DESPAIR, PRESUMPTION, IMPENITENCE, OBSTINACY, RESISTANCE TO KNOWN TRUTH, AND ENVY OF A BROTHER'S GRACE. The objections argue that despair and presumption look more like forms of unbelief; that impenitence and obstinacy differ only by past and future; that truth and grace came through Christ and therefore the last two might seem more properly
against the Son; and that disobedience, simulated penance and schism also seem directly opposed to the Spirit.

QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE II - THE SIX SPECIES

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine identifies despair of pardon, presumption upon mercy without merits,

obstinacy to the
end, impenitence, and envy that attacks the brotherhood as sins against the Holy Spirit. I ANSWER. Under the third meaning of sin against the Holy Spirit, the six species are fittingly assigned according to contempt or removal of those things by which a person can be restrained from choosing sin. These restraints come from divine judgment, God's gifts, or the sin itself. From divine judgment: consideration of mercy gives rise to hope, which is destroyed by despair; consideration of divine justice punishing sin gives rise to fear, which is destroyed by presumption - namely expecting glory without merits or pardon without repentance. From God's gifts: one restraint is knowledge of truth, opposed by resistance to known truth when a person attacks a truth of faith that he knows so that he may sin more freely; another is the interior help of grace, opposed by envy of a brother's grace, when a person envies not merely the brother but the grace of God increasing in the world. From the sin itself: its disorder and shame can move one to repentance, opposed by impenitence understood as a purpose not to repent; and the smallness and brevity of the good sought in sin can prevent the will from fixing itself there, opposed by obstinacy, whereby a person confirms his purpose to adhere to sin. Reply 1. Despair and presumption here do not consist formally in refusing to believe God's justice or mercy but in despising them. Reply 2. Obstinacy and impenitence differ not merely as future and past but by distinct formal aspects of sin: refusal to abandon adhesion to sin versus refusal to repent of committed sin. Reply 3. Christ gives grace and truth through the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Reply 4. Refusal to obey is reduced to obstinacy; simulated penance to impenitence; schism to envy of fraternal grace by which the members of the Church are united. COMMENTARY. Cajetan observes that 'sin against the Holy Spirit' is called a genus containing six species, not necessarily as a single univocal logical genus divided by intrinsic differences, since the immediate formalities of the six sins arise from different genera. It is nevertheless a common predicate of these sins insofar as all directly remove or despise what draws man away from sin. Considered under precisely this common ratio, it is reasonable to call them proper species under that genus. The discussion is therefore not of despair, presumption, and the rest absolutely, but precisely insofar as they are constituted as sins against the Spirit by contempt of the restraints against sin.
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ARTICLE III begins: WHETHER SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT IS UNFORGIVABLE.

QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE III - WHETHER SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT IS UNFORGIVABLE

Objection 1. Augustine says that no one should be despaired of while the Lord's patience leads him to repentance. If some sin were
absolutely unforgivable, one would have to despair of such a sinner. Objection 2. No sin is remitted except by God's healing of the soul, but no disease is incurable to divine omnipotence. Objection 3. Free choice remains capable of good and evil during this life; even an angel fell from heaven, so a man should be able to return from any sin to justice. ON THE CONTRARY. Matthew 12 says that whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven in this age or the next. Augustine says the stain of this sin is so great
that it cannot submit to the humility of asking pardon. I ANSWER. The sin is called unforgivable differently according to the three explanations. If it means final impenitence, it is unforgivable absolutely because mortal sin in which one perseveres until death is not
remitted by repentance in this life and will not be remitted in the next. Under the other two explanations it is not unforgivable in the sense that remission is impossible, but because from its own nature it has a special reason for not being remitted. As regards punishment, one who sins through ignorance or weakness has some ground for mitigation; one who sins from deliberate malice has none. Likewise one who blasphemed the Son of Man before His divinity was manifested could have some excuse from the weakness
of the flesh seen in Him; one who attributed manifest works of the Holy Spirit to the devil had no such excuse. Chrysostom therefore
says the Jews were punished both temporally and eternally. Athanasius compares the Israelites: God bore with complaints caused by bodily weakness, but punished more gravely when they attributed God's saving work to the idol. As regards guilt, a disease is called incurable according to its nature when it destroys the very principle by which healing normally occurs, even though God can cure it. So sin against the Spirit is called unforgivable because it directly casts away the things by which remission is obtained. Divine omnipotence and mercy are not thereby limited; God can sometimes heal such persons spiritually as by a miracle. Replies: no one should be despaired of in this life when God's omnipotence and mercy are considered. The language of incurability concerns the condition of the sin, not a defect of divine power. Free choice remains changeable, but a person can voluntarily cast away, as far as lies in him, the very means by which he would turn to good. I. It is a matter of faith that no sin in this life is beyond God's power to forgive. Yet some mortal sins not only destroy spiritual life but directly remove the supernatural remedies mercifully given through Christ for the healing of guilt.

QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE III COMMENTARY; ARTICLE IV BEGINS

An objection says that unbelief and hatred of God are graver than the six sins against the Spirit; therefore they should be more unforgivable. I reply that comparisons must be made according to proper objects. Perfect hatred is indeed graver than perfect blasphemy according to its own object; nevertheless perfect blasphemy can include hatred of God as an accompanying circumstance,
just as formed faith includes charity. In this life explicit hatred of God is scarcely found without at least interior blasphemy, since a will explicitly detesting divine goodness readily judges God unjust or otherwise speaks badly of Him inwardly. Thus hatred can be counted among sins against the Spirit in an eminent way. A sin can be graver absolutely and yet another can be more 'unforgivable' in
the special sense used here, because the latter more directly rejects the remedy of sin. Despair, for example, is especially dangerous because it explicitly rejects divine mercy. Unbelief itself can contain resistance to truth proposed as necessarily credible, and hatred of
God contains interior blasphemy; hence I concede that these are not less opposed to remission than the enumerated sins. The words of
Matthew - 'it shall not be forgiven' - signify not an impossibility that destroys freedom or divine efficacy, but the extraordinary difficulty of repentance and thereby mercifully urge men to seek God's mercy at once. I compare John 8, 'you shall die in your sins,' and Hebrews 6, which calls renewal 'impossible' yet immediately expresses confidence in better things and salvation. Such expressions emphasize danger without denying God's mercy or the possibility of conversion. ARTICLE IV - WHETHER A MAN CAN SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT IN HIS FIRST SIN. Objection 1. The natural order is to proceed from imperfect to perfect;
the sin against the Spirit is the most complete or grave form of evil, so one would seem to arrive at it through lesser sins. Objection 2.
Sinning from deliberate malice or election normally presupposes repeated acts forming a habit. Objection 3. Impenitence concerns past sin and therefore seems necessarily to presuppose another sin. ON THE CONTRARY. Just as God can suddenly honor the poor,
so through the malice of the devil's suggestion a person can be led at once to a gravest sin.
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QUESTION XIV, ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; QUESTION XV BEGINS

I ANSWER. Sinning from certain malice can occur in two ways. If it arises from inclination of a vicious habit, it cannot occur at the beginning, because acts must precede and cause the habit. If it arises by contemptuously casting away those things that restrain man from sin - which is properly sinning against the Holy Spirit - it too usually presupposes previous sins, since 'when the wicked man has
come into the depth of sins, he contemns.' Nevertheless a person can in his first sinful act sin against the Spirit through contempt, because of free choice, preceding dispositions, a vehement motive toward evil, or a weak affection for good. In perfect men this can scarcely or never happen suddenly, because a person does not ordinarily fall at once from the highest perfection. The same reasoning
applies if sin against the Spirit is taken literally as blasphemy against the Holy Spirit: the blasphemy described by Christ proceeds from malicious contempt. If it is taken as final impenitence in Augustine's sense, it necessarily presupposes a continuation of sins until
the end of life. Replies. Both in good and evil people ordinarily proceed from imperfect to perfect, but different persons can begin at different degrees. The argument from habit applies only to malice arising from habitual inclination. Impenitence understood as perseverance in sin until death presupposes sins; but impenitence understood as a settled intention not to repent can exist even before
the person has actually committed the sin contemplated - one who has never sinned can form a purpose that, if he sins, he will not repent. SUMMARY. (1) Malice from habitual inclination never occurs at the very beginning. (2) Malice from contempt of restraints against sin usually presupposes previous sins. (3) Yet a first sinful act can be a sin against the Holy Spirit. (4) In the perfect this scarcely or never happens suddenly. (5) Final impenitence necessarily presupposes previous sin. QUESTION XV - ON THE VICES
OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING. Since ignorance, opposed to knowledge, was treated earlier among the causes of sin, St. Thomas now treats blindness of mind and dullness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER BLINDNESS OF MIND IS A SIN. Objection 1: what excuses from sin does not seem

itself to be sin;
Christ says, 'If you were blind, you would not have sin.' Objection 2: punishment differs from guilt, and Scripture speaks of God blinding the heart of a people, which can only be by way of punishment. Objection 3: every sin is voluntary, but all naturally love to know shining truth. On the contrary, Gregory numbers blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.

QUESTION XV, ARTICLE I - BLINDNESS OF MIND

I ANSWER. Bodily blindness is privation of the principle of bodily sight; blindness of mind is privation of a principle of intellectual
sight. There are three such principles. First is the natural light of reason. Because it belongs to the species of the rational soul it is never removed, though its exercise can be impeded by defects of lower powers, as in madness. Second is a habitual light superadded to natural reason. This can be removed from the soul, and such privation can be a punishment - especially privation of the light of grace: 'their malice blinded them.' Third is an intelligible principle through which other things are understood. A person can fail to attend to it either because his will spontaneously turns away from considering it - 'he would not understand that he might do well' - or
because his mind is occupied with other things he loves more. In both ways blindness of mind is sinful. Reply 1. Blindness that excuses is blindness from a natural defect by which a person cannot see. Reply 2. The objection concerns blindness as punishment. Reply 3. Truth is lovable in itself, but can accidentally become hateful insofar as knowing it impedes something else a person loves more. SUMMARY. The natural light is never removed, though its use can be impeded. A superadded light can be removed, and this blindness can be punishment. Privation through culpable refusal to consider an intelligible principle is guilt. Such guilt occurs either through a will deliberately turning away or through the mind's occupation with more loved objects. COMMENTARY. Use of natural
light concerning immediate speculative and practical principles can be impeded not only by bodily damage without actual fault but by
a culpable cause such as drunkenness or lust. If the impediment was foreseen or culpably ignored, it aggravates the prior fault and does not excuse later acts that follow from it. Blindness regarding conclusions deduced from natural principles - for example that theft
or adultery is forbidden - can have the character both of punishment and guilt: punishment insofar as God withdraws a light of grace that would have prevented the blindness because of prior sin; guilt insofar as the person could have attended to the principles and refused, or followed passion or an evil habit. The superadded light can be supernatural, such as faith and the gift of understanding, or
acquired, such as theological science or moral philosophy. Loss of the former especially has the character of punishment; acquired knowledge can be lost through forgetfulness or contrary error, and even this temporal loss can sometimes be permitted as punishment.
An intelligible principle may be a law or a simple object such as divine justice, mercy, or a benefit. Failure to attend is sinful only when and insofar as the person is obliged to attend.
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QUESTION XV, ARTICLE I COMMENTARY CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II

I explain St. Thomas's two modes of culpable aversion. Both involve preference for something more loved. But in the first the aversion proceeds from a will not driven by passion, turning away from the principle from malice or an inward habit; St. Thomas calls
this 'spontaneously' turning away, meaning a fully interior and perfect voluntariness. In the second, the will is carried by passion and the mind is occupied by other objects, as the Psalm says, 'fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun.' ARTICLE II - WHETHER
DULLNESS OF SENSE IS A DIFFERENT SIN FROM BLINDNESS OF MIND. Objection 1: one thing has one contrary, but both dullness and blindness are opposed to the gift of understanding. Objection 2: Gregory calls dullness 'dullness of sense concerning understanding,' which seems simply to mean failure in understanding and therefore blindness. Objection 3: if they differ because blindness is voluntary while dullness is natural, dullness would not be a sin; yet Gregory numbers it among vices arising from gluttony. On the contrary, Gregory assigns them different causes: dullness from gluttony and blindness from lust. I ANSWER. Dull is
opposed to acute. A thing is called acute because it penetrates; dull because it is blunt and cannot penetrate. By analogy bodily sense is called acute when it can perceive an object from far away or discern very small and intimate features; dull when it perceives only what is near and large. There is similarly a 'sense' in intellectual matters concerning first and ultimate principles. An intellectually acute person quickly passes from a property or effect to the nature or cause of the thing and reaches even subtle conditions. A dull person reaches the truth only after many explanations and even then fails to consider perfectly all that belongs to the thing. Thus dullness of sense in intellectual matters signifies weakness of mind in considering spiritual goods; blindness of mind signifies complete privation of their cognition. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, by which man apprehends spiritual goods and penetrates subtly into their interior meaning. Dullness, like blindness, has the character of sin insofar as it is voluntary - for example when attachment to carnal things causes a person to be disgusted by or negligent in subtle consideration of spiritual things. SUMMARY. Dullness is a weakness of mind concerning spiritual goods; blindness is a more complete privation of their cognition. Both oppose the gift of understanding and both are sins insofar as voluntary.

ARTICLE III begins: WHETHER BLINDNESS OF MIND AND DULLNESS OF SENSE ARISE FROM

CARNAL SINS.

QUESTION XV, ARTICLE III - CARNAL SINS AS CAUSES OF INTELLECTUAL BLINDNESS

The objections argue that many morally impure persons can know many truths; that blindness and dullness are defects of the intellectual soul while carnal vices concern the body; and that spiritual vices are nearer to the mind than carnal ones and therefore seem more likely causes. On the contrary, Gregory says dullness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust. I ANSWER. Perfection of intellectual operation in man requires a certain abstraction from sensible phantasms. The more the intellect is
free from them, the better it can consider intelligible things and order sensible things. Pleasure fixes attention upon the things in which
one delights. Carnal vices - especially gluttony and lust - concern pleasures of touch, food and sex, which are among the most vehement bodily pleasures. They therefore fasten man's attention most strongly upon bodily things and consequently weaken intellectual operation regarding intelligibles. Lust does so more strongly than gluttony because sexual pleasures are more vehement. Hence blindness of mind arises from lust, while dullness of intellectual sense arises from gluttony. Conversely abstinence and chastity
especially dispose a person toward perfection of spiritual or intellectual operation. COMMENTARY. Ecclesiasticus says, 'wine and women make wise men fall away,' illustrating how unfitting these carnal sins are especially in theologians, preachers, confessors and
priests, whose offices demand great attention to divine things and whose errors can be especially dangerous in doctrine, counsel, or reverence toward the sacraments. I invoke Solomon as an old example: through love of women he was cast down from the stability of
his mind and came to worship idols. He also points polemically to errors among peoples given to drunkenness and other carnal vices.

To the objection that spiritual vices are nearer the mind and therefore should blind it more, St. Thomas replies that carnal vices, precisely because they concern things more remote from the mind, drag the mind's attention farther outward toward sensible objects.

Pride and envy can be greater sins in themselves, yet the particular effect considered here - immersion of attention in sensible and bodily pleasure - belongs in a special way to gluttony and lust. SUMMARY. Lust is assigned as a cause of blindness of mind; gluttony as a cause of dullness of intellectual sense. Abstinence and chastity, by contrast, dispose the intellect toward clearer spiritual
operation.

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QUESTION XVI - ON THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING; ARTICLE I

ARTICLE I - WHETHER PRECEPTS OF FAITH SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN IN THE OLD LAW.

Objection 1. A
precept concerns something due and necessary, and nothing is more necessary for man than faith: 'without faith it is impossible to please God.' Therefore precepts of faith should have been given. Objection 2. The New Testament is contained figuratively in the Old, and the New gives explicit commands of faith: 'You believe in God; believe also in me.' Objection 3. The Old Law gives many prohibitions against unbelief - 'You shall not have strange gods before me,' and commands against prophets who would turn the people from God; therefore affirmative precepts of faith should likewise have been given.

Objection 4. Confession is an act of faith and the Old Law commands confession and teaching of faith, as when fathers explain the Passover to their children. Objection 5. All the books of the Old Testament are contained under the law; Scripture repeatedly commands belief in God and His prophets. I ANSWER. Faith is presupposed to the precepts of the law. Approach to God is by faith: 'He that comes to God must believe that He is.' Therefore the law could not first command faith in the one God as though that faith did not already underlie reception of the law. Exodus begins from this presupposition: 'I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of Egypt,' and then gives the commandments. Nevertheless, once faith in one God is presupposed, particular things belonging to faith can be commanded and explained. In the New Law the mystery of the Incarnation is explicitly proposed: 'Believe also in me.' Negative precepts were fittingly given against particular acts that corrupt faith. Likewise commands concerning confession and teaching presuppose subjection to God through faith. Commands to believe God's prophets concern particular credible truths while already presupposing belief that God exists and speaks. SUMMARY. The Old Law does not give a first precept creating faith in the one God because that faith is presupposed to reception of divine law. It does, however, prohibit acts destructive of faith and command confession, teaching, and assent to particular revealed truths.

QUESTION XVI, ARTICLE I - COMMENTARY

I raise a difficulty against saying that there was no precept of faith in one God under the Old Law. The theologians commonly infer a
precept from the fact that failure to perform an act of virtue can be mortally sinful. If someone denied that there is one God, he would
sin mortally against faith in one God; therefore there seems to be a precept concerning that faith. Nor is it enough to say there is merely a negative precept not to deny God, because negative precepts are reduced to affirmative ones and a man can sin not only by explicitly denying one God but by failing to believe or confess Him when obliged. Hebrews 11 also says that one approaching God 'must believe that He is.' One might answer that God's existence and unity are demonstrable by natural reason and therefore the obligation belongs to natural law rather than faith. I does not consider this sufficient, because although God's existence is a preamble
of faith, divine revelation can also propose it under a supernatural formal object and unbelief can destroy faith. The solution is to distinguish the law of grace from the written Mosaic law. The supernatural obligation of faith belongs to the law of grace, which existed before and during the Old Testament and was participated by the faithful in every age. What St. Thomas denies is that the Mosaic law, precisely as a newly promulgated positive law, began by imposing faith in the one justifying God. That faith was already
presupposed in the faithful people receiving the law. More particular truths could then be explicitly commanded. I compare charity and hope. Not every primary theological obligation appears as a separate formula in the Decalogue, yet the prophets and the law explain acts of charity and hope. Faith in the one God as justifier is especially presupposed because the first movement of the mind toward God must already be present for the law to be received as divine. Thus obligations to believe that God rewards and justifies do
not arise for the first time from the Mosaic law but from the law of grace, while special revealed articles are later explained and commanded. This preserves both claims: there truly is a divine obligation of faith, and St. Thomas can still say that the Old written law presupposed rather than first instituted the fundamental faith by which Israel received God's commandments.
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QUESTION XVI, ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE OLD LAW FITTINGLY GAVE PRECEPTS

PERTAINING TO

KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING

St. Thomas distinguishes the acts needed for preserving and using divine knowledge. The faithful must receive divine teaching, meditate upon it, retain it in memory, and transmit it. Deuteronomy therefore commands that God's words be in the heart, be taught to

children, be spoken of at home and on the road, at lying down and rising, be bound as a sign upon the hand and placed before the eyes, and be written on the entrances of the house. These expressions signify continual meditation and remembrance of God's commandments. The precepts are fitting because intellectual gifts and knowledge serve faith and right action. Man must not merely possess revealed truth once but keep it present so that it can direct life. The command to teach children concerns transmission; speaking continually concerns meditation; signs on the hands and before the eyes symbolize remembrance in action and attention; inscriptions on doors signify preserving the divine law amid ordinary life. COMMENTARY. Precepts concerning knowledge and understanding do not mean that every person is commanded to possess theological science in the same degree. The obligation is proportioned to state, office and necessity. Pastors, teachers and those charged with directing others have a stronger obligation to acquire and preserve the knowledge required for their ministry. Ordinary believers are bound to know what is necessary for faith and

Christian life according to their condition. Ignorance can therefore be culpable when a person neglects the means by which he ought to learn or remember divine things. The Old Law's insistence on repetition, teaching and visible reminders shows that forgetfulness of

divine precepts is not treated as morally indifferent when it proceeds from negligence. Knowledge must issue into meditation and memory so that the intellect remains disposed to judge and act according to God's law. With this article St. Thomas completes the treatment of the precepts corresponding to faith and the gifts of knowledge and understanding and proceeds to the theological virtue of

hope.

QUESTION XVII - ON HOPE; ARTICLE I - WHETHER HOPE IS A VIRTUE

Objection 1. No one uses a virtue badly, but hope can appear excessive or presumptuous. Objection 2. Virtue arises from merits, whereas hope seems to precede merit. Objection 3. Virtue belongs to the perfect, but the one who hopes is imperfect because he does

not yet possess what he hopes for. ON THE CONTRARY. Scripture numbers hope with faith and charity, and by hope man is ordered

to God. I ANSWER. A virtue makes its possessor good and his act good. Every human act is good insofar as it attains its proper rule and measure. Hope, of which we speak here, attains God: its object is a future arduous good possible to obtain, and theological hope relies upon divine assistance for attaining eternal life. Therefore hope is a virtue because it makes the movement of the appetite conform to the supreme rule, God Himself and His help. Hope differs from a merely natural passion. The passion of hope can concern

any difficult future sensible good thought possible. The theological virtue concerns God and eternal beatitude under divine assistance.

It is infused, not acquired by repeated acts. Reply to the objections. Presumption is not an excessive use of true hope but a vice opposed to it because it expects in a disordered way what God has not promised or expects the end without the divinely appointed means. The habit of hope itself is not caused by merits but purely by grace. Acts of hope formed by charity can be meritorious once grace is possessed. The person hoping is imperfect with respect to the good not yet possessed, but can be perfect with respect to adhering rightly to God as helper and tending toward the end. SUMMARY. Theological hope is a true infused virtue because through

it the will tends toward eternal beatitude as a future arduous good attainable with God's assistance. Its habit comes from grace rather than merit.

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QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE I - COMMENTARY ON HOPE AS A VIRTUE

I emphasize that theological hope is not merely an expectation produced by calculation of one's own powers. Its formal reliance is upon God as omnipotent helper, faithful and merciful. The object is difficult relative to the creature but possible because of divine aid.

For that reason despair and presumption both destroy the proper proportion: despair treats the promised good as unattainable even with God's help; presumption expects it apart from the order established by God. He distinguishes the infused habit of hope from acts

that proceed from it. The habit cannot be merited before it is possessed; it is given with sanctifying grace according to God's gratuitous order. Once a person is in grace, acts proceeding from hope and charity can be meritorious of an increase of grace and of eternal life according to God's promise. Yet one must avoid circularly saying that an act merits the very first principle by which it becomes meritorious. A further question concerns whether one good act can merit another good act de condigno. I report Cajetan's interpretation but is reluctant to say that one act of charity merits, by strict condign merit, a later act simply as an act. If that were admitted without qualification, it could appear that perseverance itself could be merited merely by accumulating acts, contrary to the special gratuity traditionally attributed to the gift of final perseverance. Temporal and spiritual aids can fall under merit insofar as they

are ordered to eternal life, but they are not merited as though God became debtor independently of His promise. God can mercifully withhold temporal goods when they would hinder salvation. Such goods can be related to merit because of their usefulness for the final end, even though they are neither the principle of merit nor the meritorious movement itself. The essential point remains: hope as

an infused theological habit is from grace; the meritorious acts that later proceed from a person already justified presuppose that gratuitous gift.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE I COMMENTARY CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II BEGINS

I continue against an overly broad claim that one good act merits another good act by condign merit. If Peter's present charitable act strictly merited that he perform another charitable act immediately afterward, and that act another, the same reasoning could be extended toward a chain of future acts and seem to make perseverance a debt of condign merit. I therefore distinguish what is merited

as the end promised to charity from the gratuitous divine motions and helps by which later meritorious acts are actually elicited. External and temporal goods may be included under merit only insofar as, according to providence, they are necessary or useful for attaining eternal life, which is itself the principal object of merit. God may remove them mercifully when they would be harmful. Thus their relation to merit is subordinate and conditional, not that they constitute the principle of meriting. ARTICLE II - WHETHER ETERNAL BEATITUDE IS THE PROPER OBJECT OF HOPE. The objections ask whether the object should instead be God Himself, or any arduous future good, or whether beatitude can be hoped for when it exceeds our present comprehension. The

question turns on the proportion between divine help and the good expected. Hope rests on God's

assistance; therefore the principal

good expected from God must be proportioned to the power of the divine helper. Infinite power is ordered to an infinite good, and the

ultimate good God communicates to the rational creature is eternal life consisting in fruition of God. Hence eternal beatitude is the proper and principal object of theological hope. This does not separate God from beatitude as though hope had two unrelated ultimate

objects. God Himself clearly seen and possessed is the objective beatitude hoped for; the vision and fruition of God are the formal completion of the creature's beatitude. Thus one can say both that hope tends to God and that it tends to eternal life.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE II - ETERNAL BEATITUDE AS THE OBJECT OF HOPE

I ANSWER. Hope reaches God by relying on His help for obtaining the hoped-for good. An effect ought to be proportioned to its cause. Therefore the good that we properly and principally hope for from God is an infinite good proportioned to the power of God who assists us; it belongs to infinite power to lead to an infinite good. This good is eternal life, consisting in fruition of God Himself.

We should not hope from God for something less as our ultimate good than God Himself, because the goodness by which He communicates good to creatures is not less than His essence. Therefore eternal beatitude is the proper and principal object of hope.

Reply 1. Eternal beatitude has not entered perfectly into the heart of man so that the way and quality of it are comprehended by the wayfarer, but it can be apprehended under the common notion of perfect good; under that aspect hope rises toward it. Thus hope enters within the veil because what we hope for remains hidden. Reply 2. Other goods should be asked from God only in order to eternal beatitude. Hope therefore principally regards eternal beatitude and secondarily other things as ordered to it, just as faith principally regards God and secondarily things ordered to God. Reply 3. To one who longs for something supremely great, lesser things appear small. Relative to the principal hope of beatitude nothing else is ultimately arduous; nevertheless relative to our limited

faculties other goods can be difficult and can be objects of hope insofar as they are ordered to the principal object.

COMMENTARY.

St. Thomas can call beatitude both an effect of God and an infinite good because he is speaking of the integral object: God clearly seen is the objective beatitude, while our vision of Him is the created formal act. God and the vision of God are not two simply separate ultimate objects of hope: the vision is hoped for as vision of God, and God is hoped for as the One to be seen. Augustine teaches that the petitions of the Lord's Prayer fall under hope. Temporal goods are not wholly excluded but belong secondarily insofar

as, according to a due measure, they are useful for eternal beatitude. Thus daily bread and other necessities can be hoped for from God

in subordination to salvation.

ARTICLE III begins: WHETHER SOMEONE CAN HOPE FOR ANOTHER'S ETERNAL BEATITUDE.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE III - WHETHER ONE CAN HOPE FOR ANOTHER'S ETERNAL

BEATITUDE; ARTICLE

IV BEGINS

I ANSWER. Something can be the object of hope in two ways. Absolutely, hope concerns one's own arduous good, because hope is a

movement or stretching forth of appetite toward a good proportioned to the one moving. But on the presupposition of love's union with another, a person can hope for a good belonging to the other, because charity makes the other in a certain way one with oneself.

Thus, just as the same charity loves God, oneself and neighbor, the same virtue of hope can hope for eternal life for oneself and for another insofar as the other is united to the hoper by charity. The distinction between love and hope is important. Love directly produces union of lover and beloved and therefore directly regards another as another-self. Hope, as a movement toward an arduous terminus, primarily regards a good of the one hoping. Only through the union presupposed by charity does another's salvation become

in this qualified sense the hoper's concern. COMMENTARY. When we simply desire our neighbor's salvation, the act is principally charity rather than hope. When, however, we apprehend difficulty not only on the neighbor's side but also with respect to our own cooperation - for example that we must labor for his conversion - and our will strives toward overcoming that difficulty while relying

upon divine assistance, there can properly be an act of hope concerning the neighbor. The blessed in heaven do not possess theological hope of the same species concerning the future salvation of wayfarers, because they no longer confront an arduous uncertain good for themselves. Their desire and intercession proceed from charity; they behold God and can pray for us without the kind of difficulty and uncertainty belonging to the wayfarer's hope. Christ likewise did not possess theological hope for the salvation

of souls in the way a wayfarer does, since as Head He possessed the power and certainty of communicating saving goods. The sufferings by which He redeemed us involved difficulty in the lower sensitive part, overcome by fortitude, while His higher soul saw

our salvation in the Word and loved and desired it. SUMMARY. Absolutely speaking, hope is of an arduous good pertaining to oneself. Through charity's union with another, the same theological hope can extend to another's eternal salvation. In the blessed, expectation of our future good proceeds from charity rather than from the theological virtue of hope. ARTICLE IV begins: WHETHER SOMEONE CAN HOPE IN MAN - that is, whether theological hope may rest upon a human helper, or whether God alone is the principal foundation upon which hope relies.

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QUESTION XVII, ARTICLES IV-V - HOPE IN GOD AND THEOLOGICAL HOPE

Hope regards both the good expected and the help by which it is obtained. Eternal beatitude is the principal final object; divine assistance is the principal efficient cause. Therefore it is unlawful to hope in any creature as the first cause leading to beatitude, although one may hope in men and saints as secondary and instrumental helpers. This is how Christians invoke the saints and ask assistance from men. I note that this refutes Pelagian confidence in one's own merits apart from grace and the Lutheran denial that the
merits and prayers of the saints can assist us. The titles given to the Blessed Virgin - our life, sweetness and hope - signify the excellence of her ministerial intercession without excluding God as the supreme cause. ARTICLE V asks whether hope is a theological virtue. The objections say that hope also concerns created goods, seems to stand between presumption and despair, resembles longanimity, and tends toward the arduous as magnanimity does. Against this, Paul numbers hope with faith and charity. St.
Thomas answers that hope is theological because, insofar as it is a virtue, its principal object is God: it relies upon God as first efficient cause and expects beatitude in the fruition of God as ultimate end.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE V - COMMENTARY

A theological virtue does not have a mean with respect to its principal divine object: no one can rely too much upon divine assistance.
A mean can arise only regarding secondary things expected, where one may presume upon what exceeds due proportion or despair of
what is proportionate. The expectation included in hope does not necessarily mean delay; it signifies reliance upon divine assistance whether the hoped-for good is delayed or not. Magnanimity hopes for arduous things proportionate to one's own power; theological hope seeks an arduous good attainable through another's, namely God's, assistance. I disputes Durandus, who made God only a principal but mediate object of hope. I argue that God is also the immediate object under the formal aspect of merciful helper and beatifying goodness. The vision of God is the created act by which we possess the end, but the end immediately intended is God Himself. Grace and merits are means proceeding from God and ordered to that end.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE V - ON THE FORMAL OBJECT OF HOPE

Faith, hope and charity all have God immediately for object, but under different formal aspects. Charity tends to God as supreme goodness in Himself; faith to God as First Truth; hope to God as merciful helper and beatifying good. Created helps received in us are
effects by which we are applied to the object, not the formal object itself. Theology as a science is not therefore a theological virtue, because its formal mode proceeds through human demonstration rather than immediate adherence to First Truth. Religion honors God, but its immediate formal object is the honor rendered to God, and so it is closely allied to but distinct from the theological virtues. I also reject Durandus's claim that whatever is immediately desired must be something inhering in the desirer. A man can immediately desire wine, a friend, Christ, or God Himself. The act by which one is united to the desired object is not therefore the ultimate object desired. God can be immediately desired as our good without being reduced to a mere means for us.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE VI - WHETHER HOPE IS DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER

THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
The objections argue from the common divine object of faith, hope and charity. St. Thomas answers that distinct formal aspects of one
object suffice to distinguish habits. Charity adheres to God for His own sake by love; faith adheres to Him as the principle from whom
knowledge of truth comes; hope adheres to Him as the principle from whom the attainment of perfect goodness comes. Thus hope is specifically distinct from faith and charity. The expectation confessed in the Creed manifests faith through an act that presupposes faith but properly belongs to hope. I attacks the Lutheran confusion of faith with confidence or hope and of love with faith. Trent teaches that justifying faith is not merely confidence that divine mercy remits sins, and that faith, hope and charity are infused together in justification. Scriptural passages sometimes use the name of faith broadly for an effect flowing from faith, but this does not
abolish the real distinction of the virtues.
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ARTICLE VII begins: whether hope precedes faith.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLES VII-VIII - ORDER OF FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY

ARTICLE VII. Faith absolutely precedes hope. The object of hope is eternal beatitude and divine

assistance as future goods
possible to obtain; both are proposed to us through faith. One must first believe that God exists and rewards those who seek Him before one can hope in Him. Hope is called an 'entrance of faith' only because through hope one advances toward seeing what faith believes, or because hope stabilizes and perfects the believer. The definition of faith in Hebrews mentions things hoped for because the invisible object of faith is described through what follows upon faith. ARTICLE VIII asks whether charity precedes hope. According to the order of generation, imperfect precedes perfect: hope precedes charity. Hope arises from an imperfect love by which a person desires good for himself; through hope of reward he can be led toward love of God. According to the order of perfection, charity precedes and perfects hope, because we hope most confidently from friends. Hence formed hope proceeds from charity, although not every act of hope presupposes charity.

QUESTION XVII, ARTICLE VIII CONCLUDED; QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE I

I explain that the love preceding hope in the order of generation can be natural self-love, elevated and moved by supernatural divine help. Servile fear likewise begins from self-love yet can be from the Holy Spirit insofar as through it a sinner begins to withdraw from
sin. Charity itself cannot be the cause of the first hope in this order because charity follows that hope. QUESTION XVIII concerns the
subject of hope. ARTICLE I ask whether hope is in the will. Hope's object as a theological virtue is an intelligible, indeed supernatural, arduous good, not the sensible arduous good of the irascible appetite. Therefore theological hope is in the higher appetite, the will. Charity perfects the will with respect to loving; another virtue is needed to perfect it with respect to hoping. Acts of
hope and charity can coexist because they are ordered to one another. I reject the claim that confidence belongs to the intellect: confidence is strengthened hope, fortified by certain faith.

QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE I CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II - WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE BLESSED

I allow that materially one movement of the will may include loving, hoping and sorrow for sin, while the formal objective aspects remain specifically distinct and therefore require distinct habits. ARTICLE II. Hope is not in the blessed. A virtue receives its species
from its principal object; the principal object of hope is eternal beatitude as a future arduous good possible through divine help. Once
beatitude is possessed and present, this formal ratio ceases. Christ, although comprehensor in His soul, was also a wayfarer regarding
His passible nature and could expect bodily impassibility and immortality, but this was not the theological virtue of hope whose principal object is divine fruition. The blessed do not hope for continuation of beatitude as something future, because their participation in divine eternity transcends temporal succession. They desire and pray for the salvation of others from charity, not from
the virtue of hope.

QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE II COMMENTARY; ARTICLE III - HOPE IN THE DAMNED

I hold it certain that the act of theological hope does not remain in heaven: Romans 8 contrasts seeing with hoping, and 1 Corinthians
13 says charity alone remains forever. Nor does the habit remain merely as an ornament, because its formal object is incompatible with possessed glory. Cajetan notes that futurity is not the formal object itself but a necessary condition arising from the object's ratio.

ARTICLE III asks whether hope exists in the damned. It does not. Perfect punishment requires that the

damned know the perpetuity
of their state; therefore they know that beatitude is no longer possible for them. They cannot apprehend beatitude as a future possible
good. Faith can remain in an unformed or acquired way more readily than hope, because faith can concern truths good or bad, past, present or future, whereas hope concerns a future good attainable by the one hoping. Souls in purgatory, however, are still wayfarers with respect to possession of glory and therefore possess hope.

QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE III COMMENTARY; ARTICLE IV BEGINS

I answer objections concerning purgatory: certainty of eventual salvation does not destroy hope, just as the Blessed Virgin could possess firm certainty while still hoping; the arduous character is overcome by divine aid and promises rather than abolished. I ask whether Christian hope remains in sinners. It is certain that a sinner can elicit a supernatural act of hope: Trent teaches that sinners are
raised by hope to seek pardon, trusting that God will be propitious through Christ, and condemns the claim that fear of hell leading one to divine mercy is evil. I argue that heretics, insofar as they have lost true faith, do not possess Christian theological hope of the same species, because they err concerning the divinely appointed means to beatitude. A Christian sinner who retains faith, however, can retain the habit and acts of hope even without charity. Hope without charity is not a virtue simply speaking, but it retains the theological habit's object.

ARTICLE IV asks whether the hope of wayfarers possesses certainty.

QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE IV - THE CERTAINTY OF HOPE

The objections say certainty belongs to intellect rather than will, that we cannot know with certainty that we possess grace, and that many who hope nevertheless fail to attain beatitude. St. Thomas answers that certainty exists essentially in the cognitive power and by
participation in powers moved infallibly toward their end. Hope participates the certainty of faith and therefore tends certainly toward
its end. It does not rely principally upon grace already possessed but upon divine omnipotence and mercy, by which even one without
grace can obtain grace and eternal life. Failure occurs from free will placing the obstacle of sin, not from defect in divine power or mercy. I cite Trent: all ought to place the firmest hope in God's help. Hope also regards our merits, but precisely as effects and gifts of
divine grace, not as independently sufficient products of free choice. The possibility that we freely lose grace does not make God's promise false, just as a king's promise is not false if a subject negligently loses the token upon which the promised reward was conditioned.

QUESTION XVIII, ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE I - THE GIFT OF FEAR

Our merits are considered either as gifts of God's grace, by which they receive value and are preserved, or as depending upon our free
choice. Hope relies on them only under the former aspect, secondarily and instrumentally, while relying principally on God alone. Hence perdition is attributed to us, salvation to God's grace. The firmness of hope is not destroyed because the subject can freely abandon the divinely given means. QUESTION XIX treats the gift of fear. Fear may mean a passion fleeing evil, the vice opposed to
fortitude, or the gift of the Holy Spirit restraining the mind from presumption. ARTICLE I ask whether God can be feared. God as goodness itself cannot be feared as an evil. He can be feared as the one from whom just punishment may come, and by comparison with Him insofar as separation from Him through fault is the supreme evil. Divine justice gives rise to fear; divine mercy gives rise to
hope. The evil of fault is from us, while penal evil is from God insofar as it is just.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE I COMMENTARY; ARTICLE II - DIVISIONS OF FEAR

I clarify that God is not formally evil even when punishment comes from Him; He is called fearful extrinsically from the painful effect, whereas He is formally good in Himself. The phrase 'by comparison with God' includes the evil of fault: sin is not caused by God, but it separates us from Him and may follow upon permitted temptation or withdrawal of efficacious help. ARTICLE II divides
fear into worldly, servile, initial and filial. Worldly fear turns a person away from God because of temporal evils feared. Servile fear turns toward God from fear of punishment. Filial fear turns toward God through fear of fault, as a child fears offending his father. Initial fear includes both in an imperfect state and stands between servile and filial. Natural fear is not included because the division concerns moral relation to God. Chaste and filial fear are substantially the same, corresponding respectively to the relations of spouse
and child grounded in charity.
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QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE II - ON FILIAL FEAR AND ITS OBJECT

I note that the division is analogical because the evil of fault and the evil of punishment are not evil in precisely the same sense. Scripture distinguishes the spirit of servitude from the spirit of adoption and speaks of the holy or chaste fear of the Lord. Initial fear is substantially filial fear in an imperfect state. I ask whether fault itself can be the immediate object of filial fear. Fault, apart from punishment, can certainly be feared because it is man's greatest evil, separating him from divine grace. Yet fault considered in its complete intrinsic ratio is voluntary, and therefore is not feared precisely under that aspect. We fear it insofar as it may arise through passion, temptation, seduction, ignorance, or permitted withdrawal of help. Filial fear has degrees: fear of separation from God; fear of sin as contrary to God's honor; and highest reverential fear, by which the creature shrinks from presumptuously approaching the immense divine majesty. This last remains even in the blessed and was perfectly in Christ.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE II CONCLUDED; ARTICLE III - WORLDLY FEAR

The highest filial fear is reverence arising from knowledge of God's immense majesty and the creature's natural possibility of defect considered in itself. I connect it with Isaiah's seraphim covering their faces and with Job's pillars of heaven trembling at God's nod. Christ possessed this perfect reverential fear, even though sin was impossible in His concrete person. ARTICLE III asks whether worldly fear is always evil. Human reverence is good when directed to what is divine in persons, and fear of secular authority is good
when authority acts as God's minister against evil. Natural fear of bodily harm is not itself evil. But 'worldly fear' in the proper moral
sense arises from worldly love as ultimate end: a person abandons justice rather than lose temporal goods, honor, bodily safety, or favor. Because it springs from this disordered root, worldly fear is always morally evil. No fear should compel a person to commit acts that are worse than every punishment that might be suffered.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE III - ON WORLDLY LOVE

A sober and proportionate love of temporal things is not worldly love. Even excessive solicitude or intensity is not automatically mortal sin if temporal goods remain ordered as means and the person retains the purpose not to violate God's law. Worldly love becomes mortal when the creature is constituted as ultimate end, shown certainly when one is prepared actually or by explicit purpose
to commit mortal sin to retain it. Mere emotional intensity does not by itself prove this. I warn that excessive temporal attachment is dangerous because it can lead to neglect of precepts, forgetfulness of duties, and discovery that one's practical preference for a creature is greater than one's preference for God. He rejects the scrupulous claim that intense love of spouse, children, or possessions
is automatically mortal. Circumstances can nevertheless make intensity culpable when it foreseeably causes omission of a grave obligation.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE III CONCLUDED; ARTICLE IV - WHETHER SERVILE FEAR IS GOOD

I distinguish love that already explicitly makes a creature the ultimate end from otherwise lawful love that becomes the motive for a later sin. In the first case worldly fear can be a distinct prior mortal sin; in the second, the fear and love ordinarily do not add a distinct
mortal species beyond the sin committed under their influence. Passionate fear can even diminish voluntariness in the later act.

ARTICLE IV asks whether servile fear is good. Servility, insofar as a person acts only under external

compulsion and does not love
justice, is contrary to charity and bad. But servility is not essential to the species of servile fear. Its object is punishment, and fear of punishment can be morally good. Therefore servile fear according to its substance is good, though the attached servility is evil. It is from the Holy Spirit insofar as fear of punishment restrains from sin and prepares for conversion.
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QUESTION XIX,

ARTICLE IV - ON SERVILE FEAR Servile fear can be called 'servile' merely from the subject - fear existing in one

still a
servant of sin - or formally from an object in which punishment is treated as the principal evil because temporal or personal good is loved as ultimate end. In the first sense fear of hell is morally good; in the second it is morally evil like worldly fear. This distinction prevents confusion with the Lutheran condemnation of fear of hell. Trent anathematizes the claim that fear of hell by which sinners flee to God's mercy or abstain from sin is itself sinful or makes sinners worse. I therefore advises preserving St. Thomas's distinction. Scripture and the Fathers repeatedly use threats of punishment to move sinners to repentance. Fear of punishment can be a salutary needle introducing the thread of charity, although fear considered with formal servility is not itself charity or perfect virtue.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLES V-VI - SERVILE AND FILIAL FEAR

ARTICLE V. Servile and filial fear are not substantially the same habit. Habits are distinguished by objects: servile

fear
regards penal evil; filial fear regards the evil of fault and separation from God. Both can be called fear of God, but under opposite relations: God as inflicter of punishment versus God as the terminus from whom one fears separation. Formed and unformed faith, by contrast, retain the same object and differ through the extrinsic presence or absence of charity.

ARTICLE VI asks whether servile fear remains with charity. Augustine says charity casts out the fear that prepared

its place;
nevertheless fear of punishment can remain. Charity excludes servility, not every fear of punishment. The love of self can be contrary to charity when self is made ultimate end, included in charity when self is loved in God, or merely distinct yet orderable to charity when natural good is loved without making it the final end. Servile fear follows the same threefold pattern.

QUESTION XIX,

ARTICLE VI CONCLUDED;

ARTICLE VII BEGINS Fear of punishment can remain with charity when punishment is feared as harmful to a

subordinate
good without being treated as the supreme evil. Fear insofar as formally servile does not remain, but the substance of penal fear can. I ask whether this good servile fear is a habit. I consider it probable that repeated supernatural consideration of hell can generate a habit presupposing faith, though it is not a virtue simply speaking. Its acts diminish as charity becomes perfect.

ARTICLE VII asks whether fear is the beginning of wisdom. Faith is the beginning of wisdom according to its essence

because
the articles of faith are wisdom's first principles. Fear is the beginning according to effect. Servile fear externally disposes a person to wisdom by withdrawing him from sin; filial fear is wisdom's first interior effect because wisdom orders human life by divine reasons and therefore begins in reverent subjection to God.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLES VII-VIII - FEAR AS BEGINNING OF WISDOM; INITIAL FEAR Christian wisdom

is not
merely speculative knowledge of divine things but direction of human life according to divine reasons through participation in divine nature by grace. Thus faith is its essential beginning and fear its operative beginning. Servile fear is an external disposing principle; filial fear is the first effect of wisdom.

ARTICLE VIII asks whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. It does not. Initial fear is the filial fear

proper to
beginners in whom charity has begun but is not yet perfect. It relates to perfect filial fear as imperfect charity to perfect charity: the same species under different states of perfection. It may still have penal fear conjoined to it, because the beginner acts both from love of justice and fear of punishment. It is a mean between servile and filial fear not as a third species between two members of one genus, but as imperfect being stands between perfect being and non-being.

QUESTION XIX,

ARTICLE IX - WHETHER FEAR IS A GIFT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT Servile fear is not one of the seven gifts,

although
insofar as good it can be from the Holy Spirit. The gifts cannot coexist with a will to sin because they accompany charity. Filial or chaste fear, however, is the gift numbered by Isaiah. The gifts perfect the powers so that they are readily movable by the Holy Spirit, as moral virtues render appetitive powers movable by reason. The first requirement for such motion is humble subjection rather than resistance. Filial fear accomplishes this by revering God and refusing presumptuous self-exaltation; hence it holds the first place among the gifts in the ascending order and the last in the descending order. Filial fear does not oppose hope. Hope confidently expects divine assistance; filial fear fears withdrawing oneself from that assistance. The two therefore cohere and perfect one another. Fear is not a theological virtue because its principal object is the evil fled, whereas the theological virtues directly attain God as their principal good object. Fear nevertheless disposes to humility by excluding the beginning of pride, refusal of subjection to God.
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QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE X - WHETHER FEAR DIMINISHES AS CHARITY INCREASES

Filial fear increases with charity because the more one loves God, the more one fears offending Him or separating oneself from Him.
Servile fear insofar as servility is wholly removed by charity. Penal fear according to its substance can remain, but its exercise diminishes as charity grows, because the person attends less to private good and more firmly trusts the promised reward. Augustine's
statement that fear decreases as charity grows refers to fear of punishment, not filial fear. I explain 1 John 4, 'perfect charity casts out
fear,' chiefly of servile penal fear. In this life charity is imperfect, so fear of hell may still be usefully commanded by charity against violent passions or as an exercise of humility. Durandus objects that the more perfect person is in less danger and should therefore fear fault less. I reply that filial fear depends not only on probability of sin but on knowledge of the evil's magnitude, creaturely possibility, and increasing love of the contrary divine good.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE XI - WHETHER FEAR REMAINS IN HEAVEN

Servile or penal fear will not remain in heaven because the security of eternal beatitude excludes fear of punishment. Filial fear, however, is perfected with perfected charity. Its act changes: the blessed do not anxiously fear actually falling from God, but retain secure reverential subjection. The rational creature's natural order is to be under God; even when glory makes defection impossible, the creature remains infinitely beneath God. Gregory describes the heavenly powers as trembling in contemplation, not with painful fear but with admiration and reverence. Augustine allows this interpretation of the Psalm, 'the holy fear of the Lord remains forever.' Hope ceases because futurity of beatitude is removed; filial fear expresses the permanent creaturely distance and subjection that glory
does not remove. The blessed are unlike God in this respect because God has no superior, whereas their beatitude consists in perfect subjection to Him.

QUESTION XIX, ARTICLE XI CONCLUDED; ARTICLE XII - POVERTY OF SPIRIT

I distinguish fear of punishment as something within God's omnipotent power from fear of punishment as one's own future misery. The blessed reverence God's omnipotence and justice, but they do not fear punishment as a personal evil that may actually befall them. ARTICLE XII asks whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. Filial fear produces reverent subjection to God. From this follows refusal to seek self-magnification either in oneself through pride or in external goods through honors and riches. This voluntary emptying is poverty of spirit. All beatitudes concern spiritual perfection; contempt of earthly impediments is the beginning of the path to that perfection and therefore fittingly corresponds to fear, the first gift in the ascending order. Mourning corresponds only consequentially through restraint of carnal delight. The final beatitude corresponds more directly to
hope as the terminus; poverty of spirit to fear as departure from obstacles to divine subjection.

QUESTION XX - DESPAIR; ARTICLE I - WHETHER DESPAIR IS A SIN

Despair is a sin. Every appetitive movement conforming to a true intellectual judgment is good; one conforming to a false judgment is
evil. The true judgment concerning God is that salvation comes from Him and pardon is given to repentant sinners. It is false to judge
that God refuses pardon to the penitent or does not convert sinners by justifying grace. Hope conforms to the true judgment; despair conforms to the false. Theological sins principally involve aversion from the immutable good because God is their direct object. Other
mortal sins principally involve conversion to a mutable good, with aversion from God following. Despair can arise indirectly from good things badly used: fear of God or horror at one's sins can become an occasion of despair if distorted. In the damned lack of hope
is not new guilt but part of their punishment because return to beatitude is genuinely impossible. I stress that despair specifically concerns aversion from divine mercy and goodness.
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QUESTION XX, ARTICLE II - WHETHER DESPAIR CAN EXIST WITHOUT UNBELIEF

Yes. Unbelief belongs to intellect; despair to appetite. A person can retain the universal judgment of faith that sins are remitted in the
Church while, through passion or habit, forming a corrupt practical judgment about his own particular case - for example, that in his present condition he should not hope for pardon. Thus hope can be removed by corruption of the secondary particular judgment while
universal faith remains. The despairing Christian need not judge universally that divine mercy is finite, nor embrace the Novatian heresy that post-baptismal sins cannot be remitted. I distinguish speculative from practical particular judgment. If someone speculatively denied that a living individual could possibly be justified, this would contradict universal faith. But a sinner may practically behave and judge under passion as though pardon were unavailable to him, without formally denying the doctrine of faith.
This explains how despair can be present without heresy.

QUESTION XX, ARTICLE III - WHETHER DESPAIR IS THE GREATEST SIN

Sins opposed to theological virtues are graver in genus than other sins because they directly turn from God. Among them, unbelief and hatred of God are, according to their proper species, graver than despair: unbelief rejects divine truth, hatred opposes divine goodness, whereas despair refuses to hope for participation in God's goodness. Yet from our side despair is especially dangerous because hope restrains from evil and moves toward good; when hope is removed, people fall without restraint into vice and abandon difficult good works. Hence Scripture and the Gloss call despair execrable and compare it to descending into hell. I answer that unbelief destroys hope consequentially, but a heretic may still possess a false confidence according to conscience; despair immediately removes the practical bridle by which a sinner is recalled from evil.

QUESTION XX, ARTICLE IV - WHETHER DESPAIR ARISES FROM ACEDIA

Despair can arise from lust and from acedia, but more specifically from acedia. Hope's object is an arduous good possible to attain. Lust, through intense bodily pleasure, makes spiritual goods distasteful and therefore causes a person not to esteem beatitude as a great desirable good. Acedia, a dejecting sadness of spirit, causes a person to judge that the arduous good is not possible for him to attain. Since possibility is especially proper to hope's object, despair arises more directly from acedia. Hope naturally produces joy, and pleasure can in turn enlarge hope; conversely sadness disposes to despair. Neglect of considering divine benefits, especially the Incarnation as the supreme sign of God's love, can itself arise from acedia because a person dominated by sadness attends chiefly to sorrowful thoughts. QUESTION XXI begins the treatment of presumption. ARTICLE I ask whether presumption relies upon God or
upon one's own power.

QUESTION XXI, ARTICLE I - WHETHER PRESUMPTION RELIES ON GOD OR ON ONE'S OWN POWER

Presumption is an immoderation of hope. Something can be possible either through one's own power or through divine power, and presumption can occur in both orders. One who judges a good within his own power although it exceeds his capacity sins against magnanimity. The presumption opposed to theological hope occurs when one expects from divine power or mercy what cannot rightly
be expected - for example pardon without repentance or glory without merits. This is properly a species of sin against the Holy Spirit
because it despises the Spirit's aid by which man is recalled from sin. Presumption that relies inordinately on God is graver than self-presumption because it attributes to divine power something unfitting to God and thus diminishes the divine perfection. It includes disordered self-love, since the person desires his own good so excessively that he imagines God will provide it outside God's
ordained order. I distinguish this theological presumption from the jurists' intellectual 'presumption' and from the vice opposed to magnanimity.
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QUESTION XXI, ARTICLE II - WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS A SIN; ARTICLE III BEGINS

Presumption is a sin because, like despair, it is an appetitive movement conforming to a false judgment. It is false that God grants
pardon to those who intend to persevere without repentance or glory to those who cease from the works required by His order.
Presumption does not consist in hoping 'too much' from infinite mercy, but in expecting from God something contrary to what befits
His justice and wisdom; in that sense it actually diminishes the true conception of divine power. To sin with a settled purpose of
persevering while counting on pardon is presumption and aggravates the sin. To sin while still intending later to repent and hoping
then to obtain pardon is not, merely as such, presumption and can indicate a will less firmly fixed in evil. Presumption is less grave
than despair because mercy and pardon belong to God's goodness more directly than punishment does, though both errors are grave. I
note that presumption can coexist with faith when the sinner does not speculatively deny the necessity of repentance and merit but
practically behaves as if they were unnecessary. In Pelagian or Lutheran doctrinal errors it can be joined to unbelief. He also asks
whether every presumption destroys the infused habit of hope and answers that not every sinful omission or disordered act against
hope necessarily destroys the habit; a presumption that indefinitely excludes the divinely ordained means can destroy hope
interpretatively. ARTICLE III begins: whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. St. Thomas will argue that, although
presumption excludes fear, it is directly opposed to hope, as the opposite extreme to despair.

QUESTION XXI — ON PRESUMPTION (CONCLUSION)

RESPONSE. As Augustine says in Against Julian, book IV, not only are manifest vices opposed to all the virtues by a clear contrariety — as rashness is opposed to prudence — but there are also vices which are similar to virtues, not in truth but under a certain deceptive appearance, as cunning resembles prudence. The Philosopher likewise says in Ethics II that a virtue seems to have a greater affinity with one of the opposed vices than with the other; thus temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity. Presumption, therefore, seems manifestly opposed especially to servile fear, which regards the punishment proceeding from divine justice, whereas presumption hopes for remission of that punishment. Yet according to a certain false resemblance it is more directly contrary to hope, because it implies a disordered hope in God. And because things belonging to the same genus are more directly opposed than things belonging to different genera — for contraries are in the same genus — presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. Each regards the same object upon which it relies, but hope does so in an ordered manner and presumption in a disordered manner. Reply to the First. Just as “hope” is improperly said of evil but properly of good, so also “presumption.” In this way a disorder of fear may be called presumption. Reply to the Second. Contraries are those things which are most distant within the same genus. Presumption and hope imply a movement of the same genus, which can be ordered or disordered. Therefore presumption is more directly contrary to hope than to fear: it is contrary to hope according to its proper difference, as the disordered to the ordered; but to fear according to a difference belonging to its genus, namely hope. Reply to the Third. Presumption is contrary to fear by contrariety of genus, but to the virtue of hope by contrariety of difference. Hence presumption wholly excludes fear even as to the genus, whereas it excludes hope only as to the difference, by excluding its order. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT First

conclusion. Presumption has a more manifest opposition to fear, especially servile fear. Second conclusion. Presumption is

more directly opposed to hope than to fear. The reason is that opposites concern the same thing, and hope and presumption concern the same object.
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ARTICLE IV — WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS CAUSED BY VAINGLORY

Fourth objection. Presumption seems not to be caused by vainglory. Presumption seems especially to rely upon divine mercy; but mercy regards misery, which is opposed to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory. Second objection. Presumption is opposed to despair. But despair arises from sadness, as has been said. Since opposite effects have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, and consequently from carnal vices, whose pleasures are more vehement. Third objection. The vice of presumption consists in tending toward some good which is impossible as though it were possible. But judging an impossible thing to be possible proceeds from ignorance. Therefore presumption arises more from ignorance than from vainglory. ON THE CONTRARY, Gregory says in Morals XXXI that “presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.” RESPONSE. As was said above, presumption is twofold. One relies upon one’s own power, attempting something as possible to oneself which exceeds one’s own power. Such presumption manifestly proceeds from vainglory. For from a great desire of glory it follows that a man attempts a glory beyond his powers; and especially novel undertakings, because they provoke greater admiration. Hence Gregory significantly places presumption of novelties among the daughters of vainglory. The other presumption relies inordinately upon divine mercy or power, whereby a man hopes to obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. Such presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though a man esteemed himself so highly that he thought God would not punish him even while sinning, nor exclude him from glory. From this the replies to the objections are evident. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT First conclusion. Presumption which relies upon one’s own power and attempts what exceeds that power proceeds from vainglory, because a man who greatly desires glory aspires to it beyond his powers. Second conclusion. Presumption which relies inordinately upon divine mercy or power proceeds directly from pride, because such a man esteems himself so highly that he does not fear being punished by God for sin or excluded from glory.

QUESTION XXII — ON THE PRECEPTS PERTAINING TO HOPE AND FEAR Next

we must consider the precepts pertaining to hope and fear.

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QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE I WHETHER A PRECEPT CONCERNING HOPE OUGHT TO BE

GIVEN First

objection. It seems that no precept pertaining to the virtue of hope should be given. What can sufficiently be done through one thing need not be induced through another. But man is sufficiently inclined by nature itself to hope for good. Therefore he need not be induced to this by a precept of law. Second objection. Since precepts are given concerning acts of virtues, the principal precepts should concern acts of the principal virtues. The three theological virtues — faith, hope, and charity — are the most principal. Since the principal precepts of the law are the precepts of the Decalogue, to which all others are reduced, it seems that if a precept of hope were given it ought to be contained in the Decalogue. But it is not contained there.

Third objection. To command an act of virtue and to prohibit the act of the opposite vice belong to the same reason. But no

precept is found prohibiting despair, which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that no precept concerning hope should be given. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine, commenting on John 15, “This is my commandment, that you love one another,” says: “How many commandments are given us concerning faith, how many concerning hope!” Therefore precepts concerning hope are fittingly given. RESPONSE. Among the precepts found in Sacred Scripture, some concern the substance of the law and others are preambles to the law. Those are preambles without which the law cannot have place. Such are the precepts concerning the act of faith and the act of hope: by the act of faith the mind of man is inclined to recognize the Author of the law as one to whom he ought to submit; by hope of reward man is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts concerning the substance of the law are imposed upon a man already subject and prepared to obey, and they concern rectitude of life. Therefore these are proposed immediately in the legislation in the form of commands. But the precepts of hope and faith were not originally to be proposed in the form of commands; for unless a man already believed and hoped, the command itself would not move him. Hence, just as the precept of faith was first proposed by way of proclamation or remembrance, so the precept of hope in the first legislation was proposed by way of promise. He who promises rewards to the obedient thereby excites hope. Thus all the promises contained in the law are incentives to hope. After the law had been imposed, however, wise men and prophets, wishing not only to induce men to observe it but much more to preserve its foundation, repeatedly induced men in Sacred Scripture to hope, by admonition or command and not only by promise. Thus Psalm 61: “Hope in him, all you congregation of the people,” and many other passages. Reply to the

First. Nature sufficiently inclines man to hope for a good proportionate to human nature. But in order to hope for a supernatural good man had to be induced by the authority of divine law, partly by promises and partly by admonitions or precepts. Even concerning those acts to which natural reason inclines, such as acts of the moral virtues, precepts of divine law were necessary for greater firmness, especially because man’s natural reason had been darkened by the concupiscences of sin. Reply to the Second. The precepts of the Decalogue belong to the first legislation. Therefore no explicit precept of hope had to be placed among them; it was sufficient to induce hope through promises contained in them, as is evident especially in the first and fourth commandments. Reply to the Third. In matters whose observance binds by reason of a debt, an affirmative precept concerning what must be done is sufficient; prohibitions of the contrary are understood in it. Thus the command to honor parents is given, while their dishonor is prohibited through the penalty attached by the law. Since it is necessary for human salvation that man hope in God, he had to be induced to this in one of the aforesaid affirmative ways, in which the prohibition of the opposite is understood. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT There is one conclusion. There is a precept concerning hope, as there is concerning faith; it was not, however, placed in the first legislation in the ordinary form of a command, but stands as a preamble to the law. COMMENTARY Concerning both parts of this conclusion and its reasoning, see what was said above on Question 16, Article 1. From the doctrine of this article one can explain what St. Thomas said there. He seemed to assert that there is no precept concerning faith; what we explained there is true and consonant with his doctrine. FIRST DOUBT. Whether it is certain according to the Catholic faith that there is a precept of hope. It seems that such a precept is gathered from Sacred Scripture, where men are often admonished in the imperative to hope for pardon and recompense from God: Psalm 4, “Offer the sacrifice of justice and hope in the Lord”; Psalm 61, “Hope in him, all you congregation of the people; pour out your hearts before him”; and Titus 2, where the grace of God teaches us, renouncing impiety and worldly desires, to live soberly, justly, and piously while awaiting the blessed hope.

QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONTINUED From Titus 2 a precept of sobriety,

justice, and piety

can be gathered; therefore also a precept of hope. Likewise Hebrews 11: “He that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him.” The word “must” signifies a precept not only of faith but also of hope, whose object is divine recompense. The same follows by theological reason. Every action necessary for eternal life falls under precept. But to hope is necessary for eternal life. Therefore hope is commanded. The major is a maxim commonly received among theologians. The minor is proved from the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 6, where hope is placed among the dispositions necessary for justification; and canon 26 says that the just ought to hope for recompense from God for their good works. From what has been said it is clear that this is an affirmative precept including the negative precept not to despair, which binds always and at every time. SECOND DOUBT. Whether a determinate time can be assigned at which the precept of hope obliges. First conclusion. When a man first comes to the use of reason, does what lies in him, and is illuminated by God, he is bound to hope for beatitude from Him. We do not wish here to dispute the celebrated question whether, when a man first comes to the use of reason, he is bound by precept to turn himself toward God in such a way that if he does not do so he sins mortally. That question has been sufficiently disputed elsewhere. What we assert here is this: when a man comes to the use of reason, is prevented by supernatural divine assistance, and does what lies in him under that assistance, he will be supernaturally illuminated by God concerning supernatural recompense; and then he is bound to hope for such beatitude from God. For then he ought to establish and determine his last end, to which he refers himself and all his acts. This is also proved from Hebrews 11: “He that comes to God must believe that he is and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him.” If someone objects that from this opinion it follows that a man who then fails to turn to God commits three sins — one against faith, a second against hope, and a third against charity — I answer: I concede the consequence, because he is bound to those acts by the special precepts of faith, hope, and charity. Second conclusion. After a man has already been converted to God, it is not easy to define a certain and determinate time at which the special precept of hoping obliges. The reason is that it is likewise difficult to assign a determinate time for the precepts of believing or loving God by charity. Third

conclusion. A man will often be bound to hope by reason of another precept. For example, whenever he is

bound to do

penance, he will be bound to hope, because an act of penance cannot exist without hope of pardon. Yet if at that moment he does not hope, he does not therefore commit two numerically distinct sins — one against the precept of penance and another against the precept of hope — because at that moment the immediate obligation is to perform penance, and from that obligation arises the obligation to employ the means necessary for penance. Fourth conclusion. It may be said with sufficient probability that there is a special time at which a man is bound to hope: whenever temptations of despair arise which draw him toward despair. The reason is that by the same precept a man is bound both to hope and not to despair. Therefore, if an act of hope is then a necessary means for resisting despair, by that same precept he is bound to hope. Hence in the article of death, although a man has already been contrite and confessed, if movements of despair arise he is bound to stand firm by exercising acts of hope. Fifth conclusion. One who exercises an act of hope several times during the year may safely judge that he has fulfilled this precept, provided he never consents to despair. In the same way, those who pray several times fulfill the precept of prayer; nevertheless, if a special tribulation occurs, a man may be bound to pray by the same obligation by which he is bound to seek a remedy in such danger. THIRD PRINCIPAL DOUBT. If God were to reveal to a man his own reprobation, would that man still be bound to hope, or would despair then cease to be sinful? Arguments of no small weight are made for both sides, and there are differing opinions. For the affirmative — that the man would still be bound to hope — it is argued first: by that revelation God does not remove the precept of hope; therefore it still binds him. Confirmation: if God revealed to someone that he would commit homicide, just as Christ revealed to Peter that he would deny Him three times, the man would still be bound by the precept not to kill and would sin by killing; otherwise divine revelation and foreknowledge would be false. Therefore neither in our case is the obligation of the precept of hope removed. Second argument. It is possible for someone to be condemned solely because of a future sin of despair. God could reveal that future contingent sin to the same man. Yet the man would still be bound to hope; otherwise the revelation would be false, which is impossible. Third argument. Suppose the man to whom such a revelation is made is in charity. He can, speaking absolutely, persevere in charity; therefore he can, speaking absolutely, be saved and consequently hope for eternal salvation. The minor is proved because by such a revelation God does not remove the supernatural helps necessary or sufficient for salvation, just as He would not remove them if He had revealed nothing. Fourth argument. If that man were not bound to hope, neither would he be bound to observe the other precepts. For the Apostle says that he who plows ought to plow in hope of receiving the fruit; and Aristotle says that the good is lovable, but to each man his own good. If therefore he could hope for no reward as his own good, he could not will to observe any commandments. Fifth argument. If such a man were not bound to hope, it would follow that the reason the predestined and the foreknown now hope is merely their ignorance of their reprobation. But divine revelation only removes ignorance; it does not remove

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possibility. Divine foreknowledge imposes no necessity and does not destroy the contingency of things; therefore neither does our
foreknowledge destroy the possibility of an act whose opposite we know beforehand.

QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE I — THIRD DOUBT CONTINUED For the opposite side it is argued

first. Hope is defined
as a certain expectation of future beatitude. But a man to whom his reprobation has been certainly revealed cannot possess such an expectation. For that certain expectation is a judgment of the intellect, while he possesses the certain contrary judgment: “I shall not be saved.” Therefore he cannot have a certain expectation of his future beatitude. Second argument. Hope rests upon the divine promise. But God Himself, who promises beatitude to men in general, certainly reveals to this particular man that he will not obtain the promised good. Therefore he cannot hope for that promise as applying to himself. The reason is that he is bound to believe God revealing the contrary of what is the object of hope; thus the foundation of hope is destroyed in his case. Third argument. For hope it is not enough that an arduous good be conceived as possible absolutely; it must be judged possible here and now with all the circumstances known to the person. But such a man cannot judge that good possible for himself while at the same time judging that God, who reveals his condemnation, can neither lie nor be deceived. Therefore he cannot hope for that good as compossible with such a revelation. Fourth argument. The damned in hell cannot hope and do not sin by despairing, as St. Thomas says in Question 20, Article 3, reply 3. Therefore neither does a man to whom such a revelation is made. The reason is that the damned cannot hope and do not sin by despair because they possess the certain judgment that they will not be delivered. The man in our case likewise certainly judges that he will not escape condemnation. Confirmation. If I knew that another man were reprobate, I would not hope for beatitude for him, nor would I sin by despairing of his salvation. Therefore neither could he himself hope, nor would he sin by despairing. Augustine teaches in City of God XXI, chapter 24, that if the Church knew someone to be reprobate she would no more pray for him than for those in hell. Therefore we cannot have hope for the salvation of one known to be reprobate. The Doctors dispute this question in I Sentences, distinction 48, when treating whether the human will can conform itself to the divine will concerning what God does not will. Gregory of Rimini, at the end of the last question, doubts whether such a revelation can be made; but admitting the case, he says that the man would then be bound to will his own condemnation. The author of Auxerre, in III, tract 5, chapter 6, question 5, says two things. First, such a revelation must always be understood as made by way of threat and not from God’s absolute foreknowledge. Second, not even by absolute power can such a revelation be made. His reason is that the man would be perplexed: on the one hand he is bound to hope, while on the other he cannot hope because he judges beatitude impossible for himself. St. Thomas, however, De Veritate, question 23, article 8, reply 2, says two things. First, according to ordinary divine power such a revelation cannot be made; and if in fact one were made, it would have to be understood according to a prophecy of commination. Second, admitting a revelation proceeding from God’s certain foreknowledge, the man is not bound to will his condemnation absolutely, but only under the supposition of the order of divine justice, which eternally punishes sinners unless they repent. The reason is that God Himself does not will anyone’s damnation absolutely; He wills it under the supposition of the person’s fault. Therefore the man is not bound absolutely to will his own damnation in order to conform himself to the divine will. Indeed, he is bound absolutely not to will his damnation, since that would be to will the sin on account of which he is condemned. Concerning St. Thomas’s first statement, note the reason why according to ordinary power such a revelation cannot be made: the common law of hoping obliges every man as long as he is in this life; therefore its opposite will not be revealed to him. An objection arises because God has in fact revealed that a certain man, namely Antichrist, is to be condemned, and it is probable that Antichrist himself will recognize his condemnation as revealed in Sacred Scripture. The preceding arguments therefore require an answer. One may answer that perhaps Antichrist will not possess such a revelation concerning himself, or at least will not believe it with such certainty that he becomes altogether certain of his condemnation. Hence he will sin by not hoping, just as he will sin by not believing Christ to be the Son of the living God.

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DECISION OF THE QUESTION First conclusion. Admitting such a revelation, whether by God's absolute or ordinary power, that man is not bound to hope for beatitude. This is proved by the arguments made for the negative side. Second **conclusion. Even if that man ceases to hope for the attainment of beatitude, he does not sin merely on** that account. It must
be observed that "to despair" or "despair" can be taken in two ways. First, it can signify an act directly contrary to the act of the theological virtue of hope, just as unbelief is contrary to faith. In this sense despair is intrinsically a sin and vice opposed to hope, as intemperance is opposed to temperance. Second, despair can be taken negatively, insofar as someone simply ceases to hope. In this sense it is not intrinsically sinful, such that in no possible case could a man cease to intend a beatitude which he certainly judges he will not attain. Even if it implies a positive act whereby one wills to cease pursuing beatitude, that act is not directly and formally contrary to hope. The formal object opposed to hope would be to abandon beatitude because one judged, speculatively or practically, that divine mercy is insufficient to save man. But one who ceases from hoping for beatitude because he conforms himself to a true judgment received from divine revelation does not have an act formally opposed to the object of hope; therefore he does not sin against hope. Third conclusion. In the proposed case the man can and ought to hope for divine assistance to avoid individual sins, and ought to ask God for help not to sin. For by such a revelation he is not rendered incapable of observing the other precepts — "You shall not steal," "You shall not kill," and the like. Therefore he remains bound to observe them, and he cannot observe them for long without the help of grace.

QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE I — THIRD DOUBT CONCLUDED From the preceding conclusion it follows that the man

is bound to implore divine assistance. Someone may object: suppose it is revealed to him that tomorrow he will steal and that because of that theft he will be condemned; then he cannot hope for or implore God's assistance not to steal. I answer that even then he remains bound not to steal, just as Peter remained bound not to deny Christ although the contrary had been revealed to him. Nevertheless, the man can possess this certain speculative judgment: "I shall steal," and in that judgment he does not sin. Thus we concede that he is not bound to hope that he will not steal, and much less to hope for beatitude. Fourth **conclusion. It is not repugnant that the man to whom such a revelation is made should love God by** charity, and for the
present will to conform himself to the divine will according to the order of divine justice. Proof. A man can have such an act of charity toward God even if it were revealed to him that his father would be condemned; therefore he can have a similar act concerning himself when such a revelation is made about his own fate. Confirmation: such a revelation does not immediately cause him to lose charity. Therefore he can exercise charity and truly say: "The Lord is; let Him do what is good in His sight." Second proof. If a just man, ignorant of what will happen to him, supposes speculatively, "Perhaps I shall be condemned," he can nevertheless presently conform himself to the divine will as regards the order of justice, and truly say, "You are just, O Lord, and your judgment is right," while sincerely proposing to serve God for as long as this is granted to him. Such an act is of great perfection, humility, and charity. Therefore even if he knew with certainty by revelation that he were reprobate, he could have a similar and even more perfect act. Someone may say that the difficulty is not the perfection of the act but its possibility: could such a man restrain himself from hatred of God and from blasphemy? Fifth **conclusion. If we consider the weakness of human nature, it would be exceedingly difficult for such a** man not to fall into
despair, and even not to break forth into hatred of God. Nevertheless, by the power of charity and the help of divine grace it is possible for him to love God more than himself and to conform himself to the divine will as regards the order of justice, under the supposition of his own sin. There is no contradiction in this conclusion. Rather it follows from the definition of charity, by which God is loved above all things. Hence even in the least degree of true charity there is virtually contained this conditional act: "Even if I am to be condemned because of future sins, at present I love God above all things and conform myself to the order of divine justice which will be exercised upon me because of my sins." The reason is manifest: charity is a
certain participation in the divine will, and therefore a certain inclination toward all that God wills according to the order of divine justice. Confirmation. If someone presently had this conditional disposition, "If I knew that I were reprobate, I would not love God," he would sin mortally. Therefore, if he actually knew himself to be reprobate, he could love God; otherwise he
would not now sin by possessing that conditional disposition. From these statements it follows that far from sinning merely by "despair" in the second, negative sense explained above, such a man could at that time merit an increase of grace if, while ceasing to hope in that sense, he nevertheless loved God.
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REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPPOSITE OPINION

Reply to the First. Through such a revelation the formal reason of the object of hope is

destroyed with respect

to that man, because the probable estimation of attaining beatitude is entirely removed by the certain judgment that he will not attain it. Reply to the confirmation concerning homicide. The cases are not the same. A revelation that one will commit homicide does not destroy the formal reason of the object of justice which obliges one not to kill. Reply to the Second. The supposed revelation would imply a contradiction if the future despair revealed were understood in the second sense explained above, because a man cannot be condemned on account of the mere act whereby his will ceases to intend beatitude when, because of the revelation, that act is not sinful. But if the future despair is understood in the first sense, as an act directly contrary to hope, there is no contradiction in God revealing that someone will perish solely because of that sin. In that case, although the man is not bound to hope for his own beatitude, he is still bound not to despair in the first sense. He may simply refrain from an act of hope, or even have a licit positive act such as, “I will not hope for this,” or, “I will cease from this act of hope.” But if he despairs of divine mercy as though it were insufficient to save, he sins by despair and blasphemy, and perhaps also by unbelief if he speculatively judges divine mercy insufficient for salvation. Reply to the Third. The man can be saved speaking absolutely, and absolutely speaking can hope; but under the supposition, in the composite sense, he cannot be saved nor possess hope of salvation. He can nevertheless for a time love God by charity, because the formal object of charity contains no repugnance to such a revelation. Reply to the Fourth. The Apostle speaks according to the ordinary law. Yet, admitting such a revelation by God’s absolute power, the man can will for a time to observe other precepts which are not incompatible with the revelation. To Aristotle it is answered that even in such a case the man can conceive the observance of other commandments for a time as his own good. Reply to the Fifth. Ignorance in those who are foreknown to be lost but do not know their reprobation is not the formal reason why they hope, although it is a necessary condition for the practical possibility of the object of hope to be applied to them. In the proposed case divine revelation not only removes ignorance but also removes the practical judgment of the possibility of the object of hope. The confirmation is denied: in this case certain foreknowledge prevents the application of the formal object of hope. The arguments for the other side prove the second

conclusion we have established.

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QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE II WHETHER A PRECEPT CONCERNING FEAR WAS TO BE

GIVEN First objection.

It seems that no precept concerning fear should have been given in the law. Fear of God is among those things which are preambles to the law, since “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” But things which are preambles to the law do not fall under the precepts of the law. Therefore no precept concerning fear is given. Second objection. When the cause is posited, the effect follows. Love is the cause of fear, for every fear proceeds from some love, as Augustine says. Therefore once the precept of love is given, it was superfluous to command fear. Third objection. Presumption is in some way opposed to fear. But no prohibition of presumption is found in the law. Therefore neither should any precept concerning fear have been given. ON THE CONTRARY, Deuteronomy 10 says: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, except that you fear the Lord your God?” What God requires from us He commands us to observe. Therefore fearing God falls under precept. RESPONSE. Fear is twofold: servile and filial. Just as a man is induced to observe the precepts of the law by hope of rewards, so he is also induced to observe them by fear of punishments, which is servile fear. As was said above, in the first legislation a command concerning the act of hope was not to be given in the ordinary form of a precept; men were induced to hope through promises. Likewise no precept concerning fear of punishment had to be given in that form; men were induced to it by threats of punishment. This was done both in the precepts of the Decalogue and afterward in the secondary precepts of the law. But just as wise men and prophets, wishing afterward to establish men more firmly in the observance of the law, gave teachings concerning hope by admonition or precept, so they also gave teachings concerning fear. Filial fear, which renders reverence to God, is as it were a genus containing the love of God and a principle of all those things which are observed out of reverence for God. Therefore precepts concerning filial fear are given in the law just as precepts concerning love are given, because both are preambles to the exterior acts commanded in the law, to which the precepts of the Decalogue pertain. Thus in the authority cited from the law, fear is required of man so that he may walk in the ways of God, worship Him, and love Him. Reply to the First. Filial fear is a preamble to the law not as something extrinsic, but as a principle of the law, just as love is. Therefore precepts concerning both are given as common principles of the whole law. Reply to the Second. Filial fear follows from love, as do the other good works which proceed from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity there are precepts concerning other acts of virtue, so together there are precepts concerning fear and the love of charity. In demonstrative sciences it is likewise not enough to posit first principles unless the conclusions which follow from them, either proximately or remotely, are also posited. Reply to the Third. Induction to fear is sufficient to exclude presumption, just as induction to hope is sufficient to exclude despair. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

First conclusion. There is a precept concerning servile fear, or fear of punishment; it was not originally placed in the law in

the form of a command, but served as a preamble to the law. Second conclusion. There is a precept concerning filial fear placed in the law, just as there is concerning love. COMMENTARY Concerning these two conclusions a doubt arises: what determinate time is there for the fulfillment of these precepts, since they are affirmative precepts? First argument. The precept of fear of punishment may seem never to bind. A believer can be converted to God not from fear of punishment but solely because of the goodness of God. Therefore it is possible licitly to pass through one’s whole life without fear of punishment and nevertheless be saved; hence there would be no precept concerning fear of punishment. Second argument. Otherwise every fornicator and every thief would always commit two sins: one because he fornicates or steals, and another because he does not fear the punishment. Third argument against the second conclusion. No time can be assigned when the precept of filial fear obliges except by reason of the precept of charity. Therefore there is no special precept of filial fear. Confirmation: if someone loves God above all things, he consequently and virtually fears offending God above all evils; therefore the precept of fear is not distinct from the precept of charity. Fourth argument. No precept besides charity obliges as to the mode of charity, but only as to the substance of the act; the precept of charity itself also obliges as to its mode, which is intrinsic to charity, as St. Thomas teaches I-II, q.100, aa.9-10. But the precept of filial fear cannot be fulfilled except in charity. Therefore it is not distinct from the precept of charity.

REPLIES To the First. Fear of the pains of hell is not a means necessary for salvation in the way that believing or hoping is.
Hence we concede that a man can pass through his whole life without fearing the pains of hell and nevertheless be saved. But
there is an affirmative precept which binds in a time of necessity — namely, when fear of punishment is necessary for the
conversion of one who is not moved by love to abstain from sin. Such a man is then bound to dispose himself by considering
the pains of hell so that, at least shaken by fear of them, he may be converted.

QUESTION XXII — ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY CONCLUDED Reply to the Second.

One who fornicates, unless he
does so from a certain contempt of punishment, does not thereby commit a second distinct sin merely because he does not
fear punishment. It is common to every sin that man incurs liability to punishment; he is not bound by a special precept to
fear that punishment whenever he is bound to abstain from another sin. Reply to the Third. Filial fear sometimes obliges
under a precept when the precept of charity would not then oblige in the same explicit manner. For example, a man is bound
to avoid occasions of offending God out of fear of the offense itself. If he does not fear it, he sins, even though at that moment
he were not bound by a special precept to elicit an act of loving God. To the confirmation: one who loves God above all
things also virtually sorrows for his sins, yet he is nevertheless bound formally to sorrow by the special precept of contrition.
Likewise there can be a distinct special precept of filial fear, even though fear of fault is virtually contained in the love of
God. Reply to the Fourth. Perhaps the precept of filial fear can in some case be fulfilled as to the substance of the act without
charity; for example, if one existing in mortal sin thereafter avoids dangers lest he offend God further. A second answer is
that, just as the precept of contrition cannot be fulfilled without charity because contrition is the ultimate disposition to
grace, so neither can the precept of filial fear, which is the first effect of the gift of wisdom and does not exist without charity.
St. Thomas’s doctrine in I-II must be understood per se, not per accidens. When I say that the precept of contrition cannot
be fulfilled without charity, I mean outside the sacrament of Penance, which makes one who is attrite habitually contrite.
Finally, note that if someone denied that these precepts concerning filial or servile fear are special and distinct from the
precepts of other virtues — for example, if he said that the precept of filial fear is not distinct from the precept of charity,
and that the precept concerning fear of punishment is not distinct from the precepts of the virtues by which we are bound to
do good, avoid evil, and flee liability to eternal punishment — I do not see how such a position would be contrary to sound
doctrine. And thus much for the theological virtue of hope.
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QUESTION XXIII — ON CHARITY CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

Next charity must be considered: first charity itself, and secondly the gift of wisdom corresponding to it. Before all else, concerning the name “charity,” note that some hold this name to be Greek and derived from charis, “grace.” Remigius says this on John 21, “Do you love me more than these?” Others do not approve this derivation, because wherever our Latin translator of Sacred Scripture renders “charity,” the Greek does not have charis but agape; and wherever the Greek has charis, the Latin interpreter regularly renders it by “grace.” Examples are Romans 5, “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,” and Romans 1, “Grace to you and peace.” Those authors therefore maintain that caritas should be written without an aspirated h, and that friends are called cari because they are rare and are to be held at a great price, according to Ecclesiasticus 6: “There is no comparison with a faithful friend.” Nevertheless, I strongly suspect that the noun charitas, insofar as among the Latins it signifies love toward another, is derived from the Greek charis, meaning grace. For not every love is called charity, but rather gratuitous love, as Cicero testifies in On the Nature of the Gods III: “The charity of men is gratuitous.” This derivation is confirmed by the fact that in the most correct manuscripts the word is written with aspiration when it signifies the friendship of those who are mutually pleasing or gracious to one another. Second note. Just as the name “love” is said essentially of God, although it is sometimes appropriated to the Holy Spirit and called produced Love, so the name “charity” is said essentially of God, as in the ecclesiastical hymn to the Trinity: “You are charity, you are purity, you are peace and immortality.” Yet it can be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as Romans 5 says: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.” Augustine accordingly likes to explain 1 John 4, “God is charity,” as meaning: the Holy Spirit is Charity. Nevertheless it must be observed that if by charity we understand gratuitous and liberal love, it is said of God by relation to intellectual creatures, according to Jeremiah 31: “I have loved you with an everlasting charity; therefore have I drawn you, taking pity on you.” But divine love as it exists among the Persons of the Trinity is not gratuitous and liberal, but proceeds from the necessity of nature. Therefore it is not properly said that God has charity toward the Son or the Holy Spirit. Perhaps for this reason Dionysius, Divine Names IV, says that for theologians the name “love” is more divine than “dilection.” Love more clearly expresses an inclination of nature; dilection or charity, in us wayfarers, clearly signifies this gratuitous and liberal love. If someone objects that the same charity remains in heaven, where it is no longer exercised freely toward God, the answer is that it is exercised freely toward others whom God loves by charity. Moreover, by a free act of charity one arrives at the terminus of the fruition of God, where liberty in that respect must cease. It is therefore unnecessary that the love through whose freedom one arrived at that blessed connaturality with God remain free in the same manner. I concede, however, that considered as moral acts, charity in heaven and charity on the way are not of the same species with respect to the Supreme Good. Finally, works of mercy themselves are also commonly called “charity.” A banquet was called in Greek agape, that is, charity. Erasmus notes this on 1 Corinthians 11. Likewise Jude speaks of those “feasting in their banquets without fear,” where the same Greek word is used for feasts. Hence our country people call the bread and cheese distributed at funerals “la charidad.” St. Thomas therefore treats charity here insofar as it is a certain love by which God is loved by us.

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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE I WHETHER CHARITY IS FRIENDSHIP First objection. It seems

that charity is not
friendship. Nothing is so proper to friendship as living together with one's friend, as the Philosopher says in Ethics VIII. But charity is man's relation to God and to the angels, with whom men do not have ordinary bodily conversation. Therefore charity is not friendship. Second objection. Friendship does not exist without reciprocal love, as is said in Ethics VIII. But charity is possessed even toward enemies, according to Matthew 5: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.

Third objection. According to the Philosopher in Ethics VIII, there are three species of friendship: friendship of pleasure, of
utility, and of the honorable good. Charity is not a friendship of utility or pleasure. Jerome says in the letter to Paulinus that true kinship, joined by the bond of Christ, is established not by advantage of property, bodily presence, or flattering adulation, but by fear of God and study of the divine Scriptures. Nor does charity seem to be friendship of the honorable good, because by charity we love sinners, whereas friendship of the honorable exists only toward the virtuous. Therefore charity is not friendship. ON THE CONTRARY, John 15 says: "I will no longer call you servants, but my friends." This was said to them by reason of charity. Therefore charity is friendship. RESPONSE. According to the Philosopher in Ethics VIII, not every love has the character of friendship, but only love joined with benevolence — namely, when we love someone in such a way that we will good to him. If, however, we do not will good to the things loved but rather will their good for ourselves, as when we are said to love wine, a horse, or something similar, such love is not friendship but a kind of concupiscence. It would be ridiculous to say that someone has friendship toward wine or a horse. Nor is benevolence alone sufficient for friendship. A certain mutual love is required, because a friend is a friend to his friend. Such mutual benevolence is founded upon some communication. Since there is a communication between man and God insofar as God communicates His beatitude to us, some friendship must be founded upon this communication. Of this communication 1 Corinthians 1 says: "God is faithful, by whom you were called into the fellowship of his Son." The love founded upon this communication is charity. Hence it is manifest that charity is a certain friendship of man with God. Reply to the First. Human life is twofold. One is exterior according to sensible and bodily nature; according to this life we have no communication or conversation with God and the angels. The other is man's spiritual life according to the mind; according to this life we have conversation with God and the angels — imperfectly in the present state, whence Philippians 3 says, "Our conversation is in heaven," but perfectly in the heavenly homeland, when His servants shall serve God and see His face, as the final chapter of Apocalypse says. Hence charity is imperfect here but will be perfected in heaven. Reply to the Second. Friendship extends to someone in two ways. First, with respect to that person himself, and in this way friendship is only toward a friend. Second, it extends to someone by reason of another person. If a man has friendship toward someone, on account of him he loves all who belong to that friend — children, servants, or anyone connected with him. The love of a friend can be so great that for the friend's sake we love those who belong to him even if they offend or hate us. In this way the friendship of charity extends even to enemies, whom we love by charity in relation to God, toward whom the friendship of charity is principally directed. Reply to the Third. Friendship of the honorable good exists only toward a virtuous person considered as the principal person. Yet for his sake those belonging to him are loved even if they are not virtuous. Thus charity, which is supremely a friendship of the honorable good, extends to sinners whom we love by charity because of God. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT The conclusion is affirmative. It is proved from the definition of friendship. Friendship is mutual love with benevolence founded upon some communication. There is a communication between man and God, according to 1 Corinthians 1: "God is faithful, by whom you were called into the fellowship of his Son." Therefore a friendship must be founded upon this communication; this friendship is charity. COMMENTARY — PRINCIPAL DOUBT Whether, properly speaking, there is friendship between God and men. First argument for the negative. Aristotle in Ethics VIII, and Plato in the Phaedrus, teach that friendship is a kind of equality. Hence the common proverb: "Majesty and love do not dwell well together in one seat." But between God and us there is an infinite distance in every perfection. Therefore friendship cannot exist between us and God. Confirmation from Aristotle, Ethics IX: friendship according to virtue is dissolved not only if one becomes vicious, but also when one rises to such great virtue that a great distance arises between them. Since God is infinitely distant from man according to virtue, true friendship cannot exist between God and men.

Second argument. Friendship consists in communication and fellowship, as Aristotle teaches in Ethics IX and VIII. But men
cannot converse with God Himself. Therefore there cannot be friendship between them. Third argument. Friends ought to have all things in common, as Aristotle says. But we can contribute nothing to God, nor can God communicate to us His omnipotence or His infinite knowledge. Therefore we cannot be friends.

QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONTINUED Fourth argument. A friend

ought to do something
for the friend himself, as Aristotle says in Ethics VIII. But God works all things for Himself, according to Proverbs 16. Therefore He cannot be our friend. Finally, Aristotle and the philosophers wrote many things about friendship which cannot be found between God and men; therefore there is no true friendship between us and God. Friendship, for example, ought to be known and not hidden from the friends. Aristotle calls those who secretly love one another merely benevolent. But we do not know with certainty whether we love God or whether He loves us. Again Aristotle says that friendship is not toward a multitude, while charity extends to all, even enemies, and God loves all things that exist. He also says that friendship is dissolved by prolonged absence; but we are absent from God as long as we live. Indeed Aristotle in the Great Ethics expressly denies friendship between God and men. DECISION OF THE DOUBT First conclusion. According to the Catholic faith there is true friendship between God and just men. This is proved from the Old and New Testaments. Wisdom 7 calls wisdom "an infinite treasure to men, which they that use become the friends of God." Psalm 138: "But to me your friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." In the Hebrew there is a word signifying a certain fellowship such as exists among companions. Canticles 2: "My beloved to me, and I to him," and "Arise, make haste, my love." Canticles 5: "This is my beloved and this is my friend, O daughters of Jerusalem." The New Testament is clearer. John 15: "I will not now call you servants, but my friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father I have made known to you"; and, "You are my friends if you do the things that I command you." James 2 says that Abraham "was called the friend of God." The

conclusion is also proved from the definition of friendship. Friendship is mutual love with benevolence.

God loves us and is
benevolent toward us; men in turn love Him and will good to Him for His own sake. Therefore there is true friendship between God and men. To understand the character of this friendship, several points must be noted. First, benevolence is founded upon some communication. A person cannot will good to another for the other's sake unless he recognizes in him something in which he himself participates. Thus when we suddenly feel benevolence toward one of two otherwise unknown persons and desire a happier lot for one than for the other, the reason is undoubtedly some likeness — in temperament, beauty, modesty, virtue, or something similar — from which it arises that we wish him well more than the other. Second, according to the diversity of communications, different friendships are founded. Thus Aristotle divides friendship into three kinds according to the number of lovable goods in which communication is founded: friendship of the honorable good, of the useful good, and of pleasure. Various kinds of friendship can be reduced to these three. For example, the friendship of a parent toward a child is in its own way natural and can be reduced to pleasurable friendship insofar as the begetter naturally delights in knowledge and possession of the offspring. Perhaps Aristotle, however, speaks in this threefold division principally of acquired friendship. The friendship of soldiers can be reduced to friendship of the honorable good if they carry on military life honorably; otherwise it may be a friendship of pleasure or utility. Third, these "species" of friendship are not species dividing a univocal genus in the strict sense. They are called species in the sense of modes or diverse forms of friendship. The division is analogical, like the division of good into honorable, useful, and pleasurable. Friendship of utility and pleasure, Aristotle says, have a certain likeness to friendship of the honorable good, but are less stable because such friends do not love one another for themselves but for utility or pleasure. Perfect friendship, he says, is between the good and remains because it proceeds from virtue. Nevertheless it contains whatever is good in the other two: honorable friends are also especially pleasant and useful to one another, though this is not the reason for their friendship. Second conclusion. The friendship existing between God and just men is not a friendship merely of utility or pleasure, but friendship of the honorable good. First proof. The object of this friendship on both sides is not utility or pleasure but the good of the beloved, and especially the good of virtue. Therefore it is honorable friendship. God does not will good to us for His own utility: "We are unprofitable servants." Nor does He do so for pleasure, for Job 22 says: "What does it profit God if you are just? Or what do you give Him if your life is spotless?" Second, theologians therefore call God supremely liberal and magnificent, because from the goods He bestows upon us no advantage or utility accrues to Him. Thus He expects no advantage or pleasure from our friendship. This antecedent was known not only by theologians but by philosophers through natural light; Avicenna says that God alone can properly be called liberal. On our side the same is clear. The just by charity will good to God for His own sake. Although an act of hope precedes, by which we hope for beatitude and our own good from God, charity itself now tends toward God for His own sake and refers the man and his hope to Him. Therefore our friendship with God contains pleasure and utility in a more eminent way, but as means referred to the end, so that in all these things God may be honored and sought through Jesus Christ, just as the intention of the end is contained within the choice of means.
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REPLY TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT From Aristotle himself it is answered that within every

species of friendship,
whether of the honorable, useful, or pleasurable good, some friends are equal and others unequal. Thus in friendship of the honorable good there can be inequality between friends, provided a proportional equality is preserved. The more excellent friend ought to communicate his goods to the inferior so as, as far as possible, to make him like himself. A rich friend, for example, ought to give riches to a poor friend, and the greater the friendship the greater the gifts, until a possible equality is produced.

QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONTINUED We have an example in 1

Maccabees 10. Alexander,
desiring Jonathan's friendship, raised him as high as he could so that a certain equality might arise. He said: "You are fit to be our friend; and now we appoint you today high priest of your nation, that you may be called the king's friend," and he sent him purple and a golden crown. Behold a possible equality. Conversely, because the inferior friend cannot do the same, he ought to render to the superior honor, service, and offices worthy of a friend, so that a possible recompense may be made. In this way he in a sense returns the same goods received from his friend: he recognizes that they were received from him and manifests this by words and deeds. From this arose the Latin expression acceptum refero, "I acknowledge it as received," meaning "I give thanks." For one who gives thanks recognizes that he has freely received something from the gratuitous will of a friend and thereby, as it were, renders what was received. Our friendship with God, the Best and Greatest, is of this kind. By conferring benefits upon us He has, so far as possible, bound us to Himself as friends by the most just title. This benefit is explained in John 3: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." The greatness of this benefit is to be valued all the more because He is said to have loved "the world," that is, sinners. Paul explains this in Romans 5: "God commends his charity toward us, because when we were sinners Christ died for us." The greatness is expressed still more in the word "gave": He gave Him unto death, than which no greater love can be conceived, according to John 15: "Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends." These were not friends beforehand; rather, by His death He made them friends — an intransitive manner of speaking frequently found in Scripture. God also made Himself equal to us insofar as this was possible. Galatians 4 says, "God sent his Son, made under the law," and 2 Corinthians 8, "Although he was rich, for our sake he became poor." In these and similar places Scripture explains how God made Himself equal to us who were weak, poor, and living under the law. Men in turn refer all these benefits received back to God and together with them sacrifice all their temporal goods to His honor. Nor does the familiar proverb oppose this truth: "Majesty and love do not dwell well together in one seat." It was said of men. If we extend it to God, it must be understood of majesty considered in itself, not of majesty insofar as it has stooped and proportioned itself to the inferior, so that the inferior may dare to embrace the superior while always preserving reverence for majesty. This God has done with us. Of Him it is written that He "raises up the needy from the earth and lifts the poor from the dunghill" (Psalm 112), and Job 7 says, "You set your heart upon him." Dionysius gives the reason for all such expressions in Divine Names IV, saying that love is a power which does not permit the lover to remain his own, but transfers him wholly into the things loved. We therefore dare to embrace Majesty, according to Canticles 1: "Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth," and Canticles 8: "that I may kiss you." To the confirmation from Aristotle it is answered that he speaks of acquired friendship. A property of such friendship is, as it were, passibility, because it is founded upon a mutual communication of honorable operation. Such friendship cannot grow if the operations are utterly disparate. But a different reason is found in God. Without His gratuitous cooperation we can do nothing, small or great, pertaining to this friendship. Hence the better He is, the more He can be our friend. For example, the more learned a master is, the greater friendship he can exercise with his disciples, because that friendship is founded upon their reception of his teaching. Likewise our operation is subordinated to the divine operation; therefore the higher excellence of His power assists this friendship rather than impeding it.
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REPLY TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT — THIRD CONCLUSION

The second argument raises the difficulty whether, standing only in the light of nature, true friendship with God is possible for us. Third conclusion. Between God and men there is no other true and proper friendship besides supernatural charity. The love which man can possess by the powers of nature is not properly friendship toward God. First proof from St. Thomas's teaching. He distinguishes a twofold life of man: one exterior according to sensible and bodily nature, the other spiritual according to the mind. According to the latter alone do we have conversation with God and the angels — imperfectly in this present state and perfectly afterward. He says that this conversation is charity, imperfect in this life. Here it must be observed that by "sensible and bodily life" St. Thomas does not mean merely sensitive life precisely insofar as man shares it with brute animals. He means sensible and bodily life insofar as it naturally lies under reason, or rather rational life insofar as it can be possessed and exercised from sensible operations. Since from the knowledge of sensible things man cannot attain an operation which is an immediate conversation with God Himself, natural love, or love acquired by the powers of nature, cannot properly be friendship with God. Second proof. By the natural light implanted in us, or by knowledge acquired solely through its power, God does not liberally and gratuitously reveal to us some special secret. Therefore through such knowledge men do not have proper friendship with God. The antecedent is proved because the natural light as such is due to human nature, and all knowledge following upon such light is possessed through God's general concurrence by which He governs each creature according to the mode of its species. Therefore in this respect no special grace is made to men. The consequence is clear because proper friendship ought to be gratuitous. If someone says that it is enough that God gratuitously communicated existence itself to us by creation, and that friendship can be founded upon this gratuitous communication, the first reply is that Aristotle did not know a gratuitous creation of things, but held that the world naturally proceeded from God from eternity, as he frequently teaches in Physics VIII. According to Aristotle's own opinion, therefore, friendship cannot be founded upon this communication and divine operation. Secondly, God can naturally be known as the liberal author of nature, whether He produced the world from eternity or in time. Nevertheless existence itself is communicated even to inanimate things; therefore a special friendship toward God cannot be founded upon existence alone, since it is not a special gift bestowed upon men. If it is objected again that man has been given not merely existence but rational existence, the answer follows from St. Thomas, I-II, q.111, a.1, ad 2, and continues on the following page.

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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY CONCLUDED Reply concerning natural

rational perfection. St.
Thomas teaches that what belongs to nature or is due to nature is not called grace. Therefore the fact that rational existence is added to existence in man does not proceed from a gratuitous divine will in the same way as a special supernatural gift, but from the necessity of human nature itself, which is rational. This necessity is founded in the divine nature, in which the ideas and reasons of all creatures exist naturally. Thus it is impossible to communicate human existence without its being rational, since this belongs to man by his proper definition. If it is further urged that God could make a man foolish, dull, or blind, and therefore gratuitously gave him the perfections by which he is apt for learning and perfected in his senses and powers, the answer is that such perfections, insofar as they are conferred through natural causes or brought about by God in the natural order, are not special gifts of friendship. God concurs with such perfections, or with their absence, as universal governor of the natural order, just as He concurs with secondary causes in producing a sound and complete horse or a lame one. I do not deny that God, as author of grace, sometimes orders such natural perfections or defects to a supernatural end, as John 9 says of the man born blind: “Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him.” What we assert is that insofar as these things are naturally knowable they are not understood as gratuitous and special pledges of God’s friendship. For that there must be supernatural knowledge and that divine wisdom of which Wisdom 7 says: “She is an infinite treasure to men, which they that use become the friends of God.” Reply to the

Third Argument. With Cajetan we say that the goods which we will to God are of two kinds. Some are in God: wisdom, omnipotence, justice, and the like. We will these to Him by charity when we take complacency in the fact that God is wise and just. Other goods are directed toward God. We not only delight in these, but desire that they be done, and insofar as lies in us we do them and take care that others do them; and we are saddened if they are not done by all — for example, that God be honored by all and His commandments observed. This is enough for friendship: we truly do something belonging to God’s honor and will it because of His goodness, which we love above all, although He does not need our love. Apocalypse 7 expresses these goods: “Blessing and glory and wisdom and thanksgiving, honor and power and strength to our God forever and ever.” God in turn communicates His goods to us according to our capacity, and with them gives Himself to us as companion, as the price of our redemption, and as the reward of our merits. Reply to the Fourth. Although God works all things for Himself as the ultimate end, there is no love of concupiscence in Him with respect to us. He does not will us for Himself as though He became better through us or received greater delight; rather, He wills that we become better by being ordered to Him as our ultimate end. Therefore the nature of friendship is not destroyed if the friend who is the Supreme Good and ultimate end of all things refers to Himself the friend whom He loves. Reply to the Last Argument. Charity in this life is imperfect in comparison with charity in heaven. It is therefore neither strange nor unfitting that in its genus it lack the consummation required by perfect friendship. Our ignorance of whether we are friends of God does not destroy the species of friendship; it is a sign of its imperfection. Nevertheless, even in this state the just are in some manner certain through the testimony of a good conscience and good works. In human friendship likewise it is enough that from signs we know that we please our friend, since we do not see the hidden things of his heart. That charity extends to many does not oppose friendship, because per se it is directed to the one God, and to all others because of Him, just as Peter’s friend loves all Peter’s household for Peter’s sake. Absence also does not prevent charity from being friendship, because acts of charity toward the absent God can exist. God is absent only insofar as He is unseen; in reality He is present through grace, which He produces and preserves in us, and through the helps He gives His friends. Above all, Christ God is present in the Sacrament of the altar, whose body we eat and whose blood we drink. Human friendship grows cold through absence because its offices cannot be exercised so readily; but when they are exercised, absence may increase desire and mutual love. If it is finally objected that from our doctrine it would follow that man is not bound to worship, love, and thank God insofar as He is naturally knowable — contrary to Romans 1, where the philosophers are said to be without excuse because, knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God or give thanks — I deny the consequence. Worship and thanksgiving are owed to God insofar as He is Lord and governor of the universe, especially of men. Natural love is also due to Him, so that every creature tends toward Him according to the mode of its specific perfection because He is the Supreme Good participated by all. Man is therefore naturally bound to love God by acting in all things according to right reason. Yet this operation is not properly friendship. Not all subjects of a king who are bound to honor and love him are thereby his friends. Rather, those are called the king’s friends whom he draws to friendship by special gifts, personal association, or communication of secrets. Finally, concerning this divine friendship, observe that just as divine goodness eminently contains all perfections of creatures, so divine love and friendship embraces all the grades of love and friendship which are distinguished in creatures. Scripture therefore expresses the same divine friendship in many ways: the just are citizens and members of God’s household, servants of God, soldiers of God, and the spouse of Christ. Most fittingly, however, this friendship is explained by the relation of

children to a father, because the name of children expresses both the dignity of God's friends through participation in the divine nature
and their inequality and reverence toward God.

QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE II WHETHER CHARITY IS SOMETHING CREATED IN THE SOUL

The dignity of
divine friendship is especially expressed by calling God's friends His children. John says: "Behold what manner of charity the Father has bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be, the sons of God." Their inequality and reverence are expressed by Malachi: "If then I am a Father, where is my honor?" This also supplies the foundation for loving others as brothers and sons of God. Hence Peter exhorts those reborn, not from corruptible seed but incorruptible through the living and abiding word of God. In the New Testament, where God most clearly manifests His charity toward us, mention is frequently made of sonship: "He gave them power to be made the sons of God." ARTICLE II — WHETHER CHARITY IS SOMETHING CREATED IN THE SOUL First objection. Augustine says in On the Trinity VIII that whoever loves his neighbor consequently loves love itself; but God is love. Likewise in On the Trinity XV he says that "God is charity" just as "God is spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul but God Himself. Second objection. God is spiritually the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body: "He is your life." But the soul vivifies the body by itself. Therefore God vivifies the soul by Himself. He vivifies it through charity, according to 1 John 3: "We know that we have passed from death to life because we love the brethren." Therefore God Himself is charity. Third objection. Nothing created has infinite power; every creature is rather vanity. Charity, however, is not vanity but is opposed to vanity and has infinite efficacy because it leads the human soul to an infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine III: "I call charity a movement of the soul toward enjoying God for His own sake." A movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created. RESPONSE. The Master of the Sentences examines this question in distinction 17 of the first book and holds that charity is not something created in the soul, but the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in the mind. He did not mean that the very movement of love by which we love God is the Holy Spirit Himself, but that this movement proceeds from the Holy Spirit without the mediation of a habit, whereas the other virtuous acts proceed from the Holy Spirit through the habits of the other virtues. He said this because of the excellence of charity. But rightly considered, this position detracts rather than adds to charity's excellence. The movement of charity does not proceed from the Holy Spirit in such a way that the human mind is merely moved and is in no way a principle of the movement, as a body is moved by an exterior mover. That would contradict the nature of the voluntary, whose principle must be within the agent. It would follow that loving were not voluntary, which is contradictory because love by its nature is an act of the will. Nor can it be said that the Holy Spirit moves the will to love merely as an instrument is moved. Although an instrument is a principle of an act, it does not possess in itself the power to act or not to act. In that case voluntariness would again be removed, and merit excluded, although the love of charity is the root of meriting. Therefore the will must be moved by the Holy Spirit to love in such a way that the will itself efficiently produces the act. But no act is perfectly produced by an active power unless it is connatural to that power through some form which is the principle of action. God, who moves all things to their due ends, gives to individual things forms by which they are inclined to the ends appointed to them, and thus disposes all things sweetly. The act of charity exceeds the nature of the power of the will. Unless therefore some form were superadded to the natural power by which it is inclined toward the act of love, that act would be less perfect than natural acts and acts of the other virtues, and would not be easy and delightful. This is manifestly false, since no virtue has so great an inclination toward its act as charity, and none operates so delightfully. Hence it is especially necessary that there exist in us for the act of charity a habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining it toward the act of charity and causing it to operate promptly and delightfully. Reply to the First. The divine essence itself is charity, just as it is wisdom and goodness. We are called good by the goodness which is God and wise by the wisdom which is God, because the goodness by which we are formally good is a participation of divine goodness,
and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a participation of divine wisdom. Likewise the charity by which we formally love our neighbor is a participation of divine charity. This manner of speaking is customary among the Platonists, whose doctrines Augustine knew well; some, failing to notice this, took occasion from his words to fall into error.
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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY Reply to the Second. God is the life of the

soul effectively through
charity, just as the soul is effectively the life of the body. Formally, however, charity is the life of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body. From this it can be concluded that, as the soul is immediately united to the body, so charity is immediately in the soul. Reply to the Third. Charity operates formally. The efficacy of a form is according to the power of the agent which introduces the form. Hence charity is not infinite, but produces an infinite effect insofar as it joins the soul to God by justifying it; this manifests the infinity of the divine power which is the author of charity. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT First conclusion. For the act of charity there must exist in us a habitual form superadded to the natural power. St. Thomas proves this against the Master of the Sentences, who held that charity was the Holy Spirit inhabiting the mind, not that the act of love itself was the Holy Spirit, but that it proceeded immediately from Him without a created habit. St. Thomas rejects this because the human mind in charity is not merely moved; it also moves and acts by a vital and voluntary action whose principle must be intrinsic. Therefore a habitual form proportioning the will to the supernatural act must be posited. The same is proved against the suggestion that the will acts merely as an instrument of God. A man loving God acts as a voluntary and meritorious cause, not merely as an instrument. A voluntary cause acts from an intrinsic principle proportioned to its action. Since the act of charity exceeds the natural power of the will, some habitual form must be superadded to it. Second conclusion. Although charity is finite, it produces an infinite effect by joining the soul to God through the power of God the agent. COMMENTARY Two doubts common to charity and the other infused virtues may be disputed concerning the first conclusion. The first is whether it is certain according to faith that charity is an infused habit, like faith and hope. First conclusion. That charity is an infused quality superadded to nature is so true that the opposite is rash and proximate to error. Proof. Many testimonies of Scripture can scarcely be understood truly unless such infused habits are admitted. Romans 5 says: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.” The pouring forth of charity is hardly intelligible unless there is some participation of a divine quality. Titus 3 says that God saved us through the laver of regeneration and the Holy Spirit “whom he poured forth upon us abundantly.” How is the Holy Spirit poured forth abundantly except through His effect, which even baptized infants receive? This is confirmed by analogy with generation. In carnal generation man receives powers and qualities by which he is assimilated to the generator. Therefore in spiritual regeneration man receives something above nature by which he is assimilated to God who regenerates him. The chief assimilation is an inclination toward the supernatural end; this inclination superadded to the baptized is charity. Again, a sleeping man remains in charity; therefore there is something in him by which he remains in charity. Moreover, God loves one who is in charity; by His love He effects charity in him, since for God to love someone is to do good
to him. Some reply that these testimonies do not prove an inherent quality: just as a man is said to be pleasing to another and to be in his favor without a superadded quality, so we are reconciled to God and are in His grace. But this solution is neither pious nor a competent explanation of Scripture’s special manner of speaking. Among men one who pleases another is not called “full of his grace,” nor “born of him,” nor “partaker of his nature.” Yet the just are called full of God’s grace, born of God, and “partakers of the divine nature.” The cause of this difference can only be that no one is pleasing to God except by reason of some gift inhering in him, effected and preserved by God. The conclusion is further proved from the decretal Maiores on Baptism and its effect, where the theologians’ opinion that habits of grace and the virtues are infused into infants at baptism is approved. Still more clearly, the Council of Vienne selected as more probable and more consonant with the sayings of the saints and modern theologians the opinion that informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism upon both infants and adults.
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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY CONTINUED The Council of Trent, Session

VI, chapter 7, defines

that we are justified by inherent justice and that faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification; canon 11 says that charity inheres in us. These statements cannot conveniently be understood without habits. Since acts pass away, if no quality remained in the soul it would not be true that justice inheres in a just man while he sleeps. Third proof. It is rash in a grave matter to abandon the common opinion of theologians. Almost all accept Augustine's definition of virtue: "a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, which God works in us without us." From this it follows that infused virtue is not an action but a habit, because an action is not a quality, nor is an action infused without us; rather, we believe, hope, and love through acts produced by free choice and intellect with God's assistance. Fourth proof. St. Thomas's reasoning in I-II, q.62, a.1 for the infused theological virtues approaches a theological demonstration. From one proposition of faith — that natural principles do not suffice to love, hope in, and believe God as a supernatural end — and another known by natural light — that where a natural power lacks proportion to an act it must be perfected by something intrinsic so that it may be proportioned to the supernatural act — it follows that God infuses something into our powers so that they may be proportionate principles of supernatural acts. They do not concur merely as instruments in vital supernatural actions, but also as formal principles, because an agent must be in act if it is to be a cause proportioned to its effect. Second conclusion. It is not heresy or an express error against faith to deny that there are in us infused habits as permanent qualities superadded to the soul. Proof. If someone maintained that God's supernatural assistance together with a relation of the soul to God as ordered to a supernatural end suffices to verify the testimonies of Scripture and decrees of councils, he could not be convicted of an express error against faith, although he would be a bad philosopher and a rash theologian departing from the opinion approved at Vienne and in the decretal Maiores. A second doubt could be disputed here: whether by God's absolute power someone could love God with an act specifically the same as the love proceeding from the habit of charity. Because this dispute is common to all the theological virtues and even to the light of glory, I will not examine it fully here; I treated the light of glory more extensively in my commentary on the First Part, q.12, a.5. For the present I say briefly: an act of loving God specifically the same as one proceeding from charity cannot be elicited by the bare power of the will, however much God be considered as a special mover of that will. The chief reason is that supernatural love effectively attaining a supernatural object is not an instrumental action but an action of a principal, though secondary, cause. Therefore such a cause must operate through a proportionate principle by which it is formally constituted in first act so that it can place itself in second act. This follows from the difference between a principal cause and an instrument. It implies a contradiction that a man should run without a power of running, because running is a vital act proceeding from the runner as principal cause. Likewise it implies a contradiction that someone should love God by supernatural love as a cause of that love without a proportionate formal principle inhering in him. It does not suffice to say that God supplies this by His assistance, because divine assistance is extrinsic. It is not enough for making a principal cause that it be moved by God; God must confer upon the cause a principle proportionate to the effect. Thus God can heat through water as an instrument, but He cannot make water heat as a principal cause unless He gives it heat proportionate to the effect. This reasoning is stronger in vital actions, which by their nature demand a principle joined to the agent and proportioned to the vital action. Further observations. No virtue inclines toward its act as strongly as charity. Every virtue is a quality by which a power is inclined to act, but the first inclination is love. Therefore that virtue which in its essence is love inclines more strongly to its act. Charity is love essentially, whereas the other virtues participate in the character of love. This is how Augustine's saying that "every virtue is love" is to be understood: by participation. Hence charity inclines more to its proper act than the other virtues to theirs. Augustine's statements that "God is charity" are explained in the same way. Our charity is called the charity of God because it flows from God: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts," meaning the charity by which we love Him, not the charity by which He loves us. Concerning the reply to the Second, St. Thomas distinguishes grace and charity, although because of their close affinity many things are attributed commonly to both. Grace is the form of the virtues from the side of their root and origin; charity is their form from the side of act, because the act of charity is the first vital operation by which the acts of the other virtues receive the life through which they are led to the ultimate end.

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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE II CONCLUDED; ARTICLE III BEGINS Grace orders man to

union with the ultimate
end. Grace and charity are therefore called forms of the virtues under different aspects. Grace is their form radically and by origin, as the essence of a thing is radically the formal cause of its properties insofar as they flow from it. Charity is the form of the virtues from the side of act, because charity's act is first in the order of spiritual life and communicates that life to the acts of the other virtues by referring them to the ultimate end. St. Thomas says in De Virtutibus q.2, a.2, ad 7 that charity joins us to God through operation, whereas grace does so by assimilation. Thus, if St. Thomas here says formally that charity is the life of the soul, if he speaks of the habit of charity, it is life insofar as from it proceeds the first vital operation; if he speaks of the act of charity, charity is life in the sense of the first vital operation. Grace itself is the form, as it were essential, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature, and thus it is the first root of charity and all the virtues. A difficulty arises from St. Thomas's reply to the Third, where he says both that charity operates formally and that the efficacy of a form is according to the power of the agent introducing it. He uses this to explain how finite charity can produce an infinite effect, namely union with God. Cajetan objects that whether "to operate formally" means being an active formal principle, as the heat of fire is the formal principle of heating, or being a form from which a formal effect follows in the same subject, the difficulty remains: if the effect is infinite, the form seems necessarily infinite. From the infinity of the effect one infers infinity of the form, whether the form is an efficient principle or the formal reason of the effect. A second objection: St. Thomas expressly showed in the article that the movement of charity is not an instrumental movement. Therefore its effect ought to be proportioned to the form of the one loving God and not only to the form of the first mover, God. His reply to the

Third thus seems contrary to his earlier argument. Cajetan answers that St. Thomas did not intend to posit an infinity in charity's effect which is not also in charity itself. To explain the matter briefly, charity can be considered in two ways. First, as a created thing and accident or quality. Under this aspect it is altogether finite and produces a finite effect; this is the aspect under which the third objection proceeds. Second, charity can be considered according to its proper and specific character, insofar as it is a species ordered to such an object. Under this aspect charity possesses a certain infinity both in itself and in its formal effect — although only God is simply infinite in Himself. Every accidental form proceeding from a substantial form has power to act from that substantial form. Thus the heat of fire acts in the power of the substantial form and reaches not only the effect proportionate to heat as heat but also an effect of the substantial form in whose power it acts. Charity, however, is an accidental form which neither proceeds nor can proceed from any created substantial form; otherwise some creature by the powers of nature could love God as the end of supernatural beatitude, which is impossible. Charity therefore arises immediately from grace. Grace itself, although it behaves as a kind of essence in the supernatural order, is nevertheless an accident and quality which can be natural to no creature. The divine nature alone is the substance from which grace and charity arise, although they are received in the soul as light produced by the sun is received in the air. Hence charity according to its proper species can have a certain infinite effect because as such it belongs to the divine order, above every natural accident and even every creatable substance. Thus St. Thomas says in the following article that charity insofar as it is an accident is inferior to created substance, but according to the character of its species, insofar as it is caused by participation in a higher nature, it is more excellent than the subject in which it exists. Therefore a created form can in some way possess an infinite effect and belong to the supernatural order if by its nature it proceeds from infinite and uncreated substance as from a special agent. ARTICLE III — WHETHER CHARITY IS A VIRTUE First objection. Charity is a friendship. But philosophers do not number friendship among the virtues, neither among the moral nor intellectual virtues. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE III WHETHER CHARITY IS A VIRTUE Second objection. Virtue

is “the ultimate of a
power,” as is said in On the Heavens. But charity is not the ultimate thing; rather joy and peace seem to be its culmination. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Third objection. Every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is nobler than the soul itself, while no accident is nobler than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church: “Charity is a virtue which, when our affection is most rightly ordered, joins us to God, by which we love Him.” RESPONSE. Human acts have goodness insofar as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Human virtue, which is the principle of man’s good acts, therefore consists in attaining the rule of human acts. This rule is twofold: human reason and God Himself. Just as moral virtue is constituted by conformity with right reason, so attaining God constitutes the nature of virtue, as was said above concerning faith and hope. Since charity attains God because it joins us to God, charity is a virtue. Reply to the First. Aristotle does not deny that friendship is virtue; he says that it is virtue or “with virtue.” It can be said to be a moral virtue concerning operations toward another under an aspect different from justice. Justice concerns operations toward another under the aspect of legal debt; friendship under the aspect of a certain friendly moral debt or, more properly, gratuitous beneficence. It can also be said that friendship is not a virtue per se distinct from the others, because it has the character of the praiseworthy and honorable only from the object upon which it is founded. Not every friendship is honorable, as is evident in friendships of pleasure and utility. Virtuous friendship is therefore more something consequent upon virtue than a distinct virtue. Charity differs, because it is not principally founded upon human virtue but upon divine goodness. Reply to the Second. It belongs to the same virtue to love someone and to rejoice in him, since joy follows love. Love is therefore called the virtue rather than joy, which is love’s effect. “Ultimate” in the definition of virtue does not mean an effect occurring last but an excellence, as one hundred pounds exceeds forty. Reply to the Third. Every accident according to its mode of being is inferior to substance, since substance is being in itself while an accident is in another. But according to its specific character, an accident caused from the principles of the subject is inferior to the subject as effect to cause; an accident caused through participation in a higher nature can be nobler than its subject insofar as it is a likeness of that higher nature, as light is nobler than the transparent medium. In this way charity is nobler than the soul because it is a participation of the Holy Spirit. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT First conclusion. Charity is a virtue because it attains God, who is the supreme rule of virtuous action. Second conclusion. Human friendship can be called a moral virtue distinct from justice, but it can also be said not to be a virtue per se distinct from the others. Third conclusion. Charity is more excellent than the soul insofar as it is a participation of the Holy Spirit. COMMENTARY There is no dispute among Catholics concerning the first conclusion; charity is the greatest of all virtues. Concerning the second

conclusion it is asked which opinion is more probable: whether human friendship is a special habit of

virtue or is not distinct
from the other virtues. For the affirmative: first, there is a special difficulty in the act of friendship, since one can exceed or fall short in love and benevolence toward another; therefore a virtue establishing the mean seems necessary. Second, a man possessing prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, and the other virtues is not immediately apt to exercise acts of friendship promptly and delightfully. Many can easily lead a studious solitary life; exercise is required to determine the will in relation to another. Experience confirms that those repeatedly exercised in acts of friendship become more ready for friendship than others equally virtuous who have not been so exercised. Third, the object of friendship is special and distinct from the objects of the other virtues: the good of the friend formally as the friend’s good. This does not appear to be the object of another virtue toward another. If friendship were reduced to some virtue, it would especially be justice; but justice formally regards another’s good only under the aspect of what is due and equal. For these arguments some judge the affirmative more probable, including Paludanus, Buridan in Ethics VIII, and Henry of Ghent. For the opposite side: virtue makes its possessor good, whereas friendship presupposes that its possessor is already good, because the foundation of human friendship is communication in the honorable good. Second, no virtue depends upon another person’s will; but whether my love is friendship depends upon whether the other loves me in return. Friendship can also be dissolved by prolonged absence or by the friend becoming vicious. If friendship were a special virtue, one’s own virtue could thus be lost through another’s vice.

QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE III CONCLUDED; ARTICLE IV BEGINS Third argument for the

negative side. To will
all honorable goods to myself is not the act of a special virtue. It is an act of proper self-love or of the virtue whose good I desire: to will more justice for myself or to acquire the habit of justice is reducible to justice. The same can be said of each virtue. Therefore to will all such goods to my friend is not an act of a special virtue, because a friend is "another self." Of these two opinions, the latter pleases me more. St. Thomas seems to approve it more in the reply to the First, where he places it second as though it were the final resolution. He appears more explicitly to hold it in III Sentences d.27, q.2, a.2, ad 1 and De Virtutibus q.2, a.2, ad 1. Cajetan holds it here and other Thomists embrace it; see Capreolus. To answer the arguments for the affirmative, note with Cajetan that when we ask whether friendship is a special virtue, we do not speak of friendship insofar as it formally imports a relation; obviously no virtue is formally a relation to another. We speak rather of the foundation on the side of the subject from which that relation follows. To the First argument: in the exercise of friendship there is no difficulty except one concerning the objects of other virtues. A just, prudent, brave, temperate, liberal man endowed with the other virtues will not exceed or fall short in friendship except regarding the object of another virtue. To the Second: one adorned with all virtues does not choose a solitary life because he lacks a special virtue, but because he judges it difficult to find a friend who will assist him in exercising the virtues he possesses. If he finds such a friend, he will have no difficulty exercising friendship toward him. Naturally every man is bound to love his neighbor and benefit him when necessity presents the opportunity — as the comic poet said, "I am a man; I consider nothing human alien to me." But to exercise these human offices toward some particular person without obligation of a precept, and frequently and diligently to associate with him, belongs to true friendship. No additional special virtue is required; it is enough to regard the other as oneself and exercise toward him the offices of the virtues. The readiness produced by practice comes from frequent exercise of the virtues toward one's neighbor, not from acquisition of a special virtue. To the Third: the object of an act of friendship is not formally distinct from the objects of the other virtues. When we will the virtue of justice to a friend, it belongs to justice that a man should will and rejoice that others act justly. It belongs to the temperate man to rejoice not only in his own act of temperance but also another's. Friendship's object is therefore not reduced to one special virtue but generally to all virtues: friendship of the honorable exists insofar as a man wills to another every virtue and the other goods conducive to virtue. Anyone who chooses the affirmative position may answer the negative arguments in turn. We are enemies of problems, not of truth; we gladly allow ourselves to be convinced by the other side rather than have the mind entangled in contradiction merely for the sake of varying opinions. Supernatural friendship is different: charity is indeed a special virtue because it has a special object. St. Thomas therefore fittingly asks in the following article about charity's proper difference.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER CHARITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE First objection. Jerome says, to

comprehend briefly
every definition of virtue: "Virtue is charity by which God and neighbor are loved." Augustine says that virtue is the order of love. But no special virtue is placed in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue. Second objection. That which extends to the works of all virtues cannot be a special virtue. Charity extends to the works of all virtues: "Charity is patient, is kind," and "Let all your works be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

Third objection. The precepts of law correspond to acts of virtues. Augustine says that the general command is "You shall love," and the general prohibition "You shall not covet." Therefore charity is a general virtue. ON THE CONTRARY, what is general is not numbered together with special things. But charity is numbered with the special virtues faith and hope: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue. RESPONSE. Acts and habits are specified by their objects. The proper object of love is good. Where there is a special character of good, therefore, there is a special character of love. The divine good insofar as it is the object of beatitude has a special character of good. Hence the love of charity, which is love of this good, is a special love; therefore charity is a special virtue. Reply to the First. Charity is placed in the definition of every virtue not because it is essentially every virtue, but because all virtues in some way depend upon it, just as prudence enters the definition of moral virtues because they depend upon prudence. Reply to the Second. The virtue or art whose concern is the ultimate end commands the virtues or arts whose concern is secondary ends, as military art commands horsemanship. Because charity has as its object the ultimate end of human life, eternal beatitude, it extends to the acts of the whole human life by way of command, not by immediately eliciting every act.
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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE IV — COMMENTARY Reply to the Third. The precept of loving is

called a general
command because all other precepts are reduced to it as to their end: “The end of the commandment is charity.” SUMMARY OF THE TEXT First conclusion. Charity is a special virtue. Divine good insofar as it is the object of beatitude has a special character of good; therefore charity, the love of this good, is a special virtue. Second conclusion. Charity is placed in the definition of every virtue because every virtue depends upon it. Third conclusion. Charity extends to the acts of the whole human life by way of command. COMMENTARY Concerning the reason for the first conclusion, divine good insofar as it is the object of beatitude is called a special good. This can be understood in two ways. First, “special” might mean a particular aspect of goodness distinguished from another divine aspect, as we distinguish the divine attributes. Under this interpretation it is false that divine good as the object of beatitude is a special good. Rather, divine good as beatifying is understood to include every aspect of goodness, and charity tends toward it precisely in this fullness. Second, divine good as the object of beatitude can be called special insofar as it has a special formal character requiring a special and more eminent virtue, just as this good itself excels all other goods while containing in itself every character of goodness. In this way charity has God for its object under a special character of good, namely insofar as He is beatifying, although under that aspect He is something more universal than every other particular aspect of goodness. A common sense likewise has a special object specifying it, even though that object contains the objects of the particular senses because it is more universal. This is how St. Thomas’s reasoning must be understood. A second observation concerns the words “insofar as He is the object of beatitude.” If “insofar as” expressed the formal reason of the object, it would be false to say that divine good precisely as object of beatitude is the special object of charity, because formally as the object of beatitude it pertains to the intellect. Rather, “insofar as” may indicate a condition with respect to divine good, or the foundation from which arises the aspect of good toward which charity tends. The meaning is that divine good insofar as beatifying — as distinguished from divine good insofar as known by natural light — is the special good toward which charity tends. Divine good insofar as known by natural light is something toward which the will is naturally inclined. But divine good as a supernatural object, whose supernatural character is explained through its relation to the intellect as beatifying, is the special object of charity. This resolves Scotus’s objections. DOUBT: WHETHER CHARITY IN A REMISS DEGREE IS TRUE VIRTUE Argument for the negative. Moral virtues in the degree of beginners are not virtues simply speaking, as St. Thomas teaches I-II, q.65, a.1. Therefore neither is remiss charity true virtue. Second. It is proper to virtue to operate promptly and delightfully. But remiss charity fulfills the commandments only with difficulty and labor. Therefore it is not true virtue. Third. True virtue is not easily lost; remiss charity is easily lost, as experience shows. Therefore it is not true virtue. RESPONSE. The least charity, if it is truly charity poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the human heart, is properly and simply virtue — indeed more properly and simply than any acquired moral virtue however great. St. Thomas teaches this, showing that even the least charity loves God more than the desire of gold and silver and suffices for avoiding every mortal sin and observing all the commandments. Reason: the nature of perfect virtue consists in making its possessor good and rendering his work perfect. The least charity achieves this more perfectly than any acquired moral virtue. Charity immediately unites the human will to the ultimate end and refers all good works to Him as their first rule. From this the agent and the work are rendered good. This is confirmed by 1 Corinthians 1: “The weakness of God is stronger than men.” Even the least and imperfect charity is “of God” as to its end, efficient cause, and rule; therefore it is stronger than every acquired human virtue. Again, 1 John 2 says: “He that keeps his word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected.” John speaks of a perfection of sufficiency according to the nature of charity, found in everyone who observes the commandments, even though charity be remiss according to accidental perfection. Every least charity suffices to observe all the commandments; therefore it is perfect and simply virtue. Finally, a virtue immediately disposing to ultimate happiness cannot be virtue only in a qualified sense. Even the least charity does this: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” The purity required for beatitude is any true charity, even the least, because impurity comes from mixture with an inferior thing, whereas charity withdraws the human mind from inferior things and applies and joins it to God. Reply to the First objection. I deny the consequence if the antecedent concerns acquired moral virtues. Acquired moral virtue, although disposing a man to be good, does not make him good simply, nor does its act attain the rule according to the full mode of operating. Even the least charity makes its possessor good simply, renders his work good, and attains the ultimate end.
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QUESTION XXIII — ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; ARTICLE V Reply to the Second. The difficulty

experienced in
operations by a just man existing in charity arises from passions which are not directly and formally opposed to charity. Even if perfect charity were suddenly infused into a repentant sinner through great contrition, the passions of the sensitive appetite would not immediately be destroyed or wholly calmed. Nevertheless the man retains the power to moderate arising passions and reduce them to the rule of reason through acquired virtues. Reply to the Third. Charity considered in itself is most difficult to lose because by the power of the Holy Spirit it unites man with the ultimate end. Accidentally, however, because of rising passions, a man loses charity by mortal sin. This does not destroy its character as virtue even in a remiss degree, because charity of itself is capable of overcoming every temptation: “Whosoever is born of God commits not sin, for his seed abides in him; and he cannot sin because he is born of God.” St. John expresses the condition of charity considered in itself; he does not deny that a man possessing charity can through his own fault, by refusing divine assistance, lose it.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER CHARITY IS ONE VIRTUE First objection. Habits are distinguished

according to objects.
But charity has two objects, God and neighbor, infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Second objection. Different formal aspects of an object diversify habits even when the object is really the same. But there are
many reasons for loving God, since from each benefit received from Him we become debtors to love Him. Therefore charity is not one virtue. Third objection. Charity includes friendship toward neighbor. But Aristotle distinguishes various species of friendship. Therefore charity is not one virtue but is multiplied into various species. ON THE CONTRARY, as the object of faith is God, so also is the object of charity. Faith is one virtue because of the unity of divine truth: “One faith.” Therefore charity is likewise one virtue because of the unity of divine goodness. RESPONSE. Charity is a certain friendship of man toward God. Species of friendship are distinguished either according to diversity of ends — useful, pleasurable, and honorable friendship — or according to diversity of communications upon which friendships are founded, such as friendship of relatives, fellow citizens, or fellow travelers. Charity can be divided in neither way. Its end is one, divine goodness, and the
communication of eternal beatitude upon which this friendship is founded is one. Therefore charity is simply one virtue, not divided into several species. Reply to the First. The reasoning would be correct if God and neighbor were equally objects of charity. They are not. God is charity’s principal object; neighbor is loved by charity because of God. Reply to the Second. God is loved by charity for His own sake. Hence charity principally attends to one sole reason for loving, namely divine goodness, which is His substance: “Give praise to the Lord, for he is good.” Other reasons which induce love or establish a debt of love are secondary and consequent upon the first. Reply to the Third. Human friendships spoken of by Aristotle possess diverse ends and diverse communications. This does not occur in charity. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT Conclusion. Charity is one virtue, not divided into several species. Since charity is friendship of man toward God, its end is one — divine goodness — and the communication of eternal beatitude upon which it is founded is one. Different species of friendship arise from different ends or different communications. Second conclusion from the reply to the First. God and neighbor are loved by one charity because they are not equally objects of charity; one is loved because of the other. COMMENTARY A doubt arises concerning the second conclusion: whether charity with respect to neighbor is friendship. First argument for the negative. True friendship loves the friend for his own sake. But charity loves neighbor not for his own sake but because of God. Therefore charity with respect to neighbor is not friendship. Confirmation. In human friendship, when we principally love a friend and love his household for the friend’s sake, we love those dependents with love of concupiscence rather than friendship. The same seems to hold in divine friendship toward neighbor, whom we love because of God. Second argument. Reciprocal love belongs per se to friendship. But for charity toward neighbor it is irrelevant whether the neighbor loves us in return, since by charity we love even an enemy. Therefore charity toward neighbor is not friendship. Third argument. The habit by which we assent to first principles is not the same as the habit by which we assent to conclusions, even though we assent to conclusions because of principles. Therefore neither should the habit of charity by which we love God immediately be the same as that by which we love neighbor because of God.
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and principally is friendship toward God. Neighbor can stand in relation to it in two ways. First, when we will that a neighbor who is in sin be converted to God. With respect to such a sinner there is not actual friendship, because he does not love us in return from charity. Second, neighbor can be considered as already united to God by charity and consequently united with us who exist in charity. In this way there is true and proper reciprocal friendship among the friends of God. The reason is that they mutually will for one another all goods necessary or fitting for the end of beatitude. As far as lies in them they cooperate and assist one another both in temporal matters, when opportunity arises, and in spiritual matters, at least by praying for one another that they may be saved. Nevertheless this Christian friendship is in a certain sense a hidden communication among the friends of God in this life: many are absent whom we have never known, and we do not know whether those present are in God's charity. In the heavenly homeland, however, this friendship will be consummated among all the sons of God, because all will share in the same Supreme Good and will mutually rejoice in one another's beatitude.

Reply to the First argument. Charity loves neighbor both because of God and for the neighbor's

own sake. There is no
contradiction. God is the ultimate end and the first reason of the honorable good which all friends ought to participate. Just as loving truth or virtue more than one's friend does not destroy friendship, neither does loving God more than the friend and the friend because of God destroy divine friendship toward neighbor; rather it most greatly perfects it. To the confirmation: divine and human friendship are not alike in this respect. By the very fact that someone loves God through charity he is also united to all who love God through charity. This is an article of faith which we confess in the Creed: the communion of saints. Human friendship does not possess so efficacious a union of the same order toward the servants and household of a friend; it is enough that we love them with love of concupiscence because of the friend. Thus by charity we love heaven, earth, and all creatures incapable of the honorable good with love of concupiscence. Reply to the Second. Reciprocal love belongs to actual friendship. Charity with respect to those outside charity is friendship in potency. It is enough that the neighbor be capable of loving in return those who love through charity. Reply to the Third. I deny the consequence. St. Thomas teaches that things are known according as they are in us; therefore the difference between immediate and mediate assent requires distinct habits. But things are loved according as they are good in themselves. Since on the side of the thing the reason for loving is primarily and per se in God, and secondarily in neighbor, one habit of charity suffices, just as a stone by the same gravity is borne toward the center and through the intermediate places toward the center. ARTICLE VI — WHETHER CHARITY IS THE MOST EXCELLENT OF THE VIRTUES First objection. The virtue of a higher power is higher, just as its operation is higher. The intellect is higher than the will because it directs the will. Therefore faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity, which is in the will. Second objection. That through which another operates seems inferior to the latter, as a minister through whom a lord acts is inferior to the lord. But faith works through love, according to Galatians 5. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity. Third objection. That which adds something to another seems more perfect. Hope appears to add something to charity: charity's object is good, while hope's object is arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity. ON THE CONTRARY, 1 Corinthians 13 says: "The greatest of these is charity." RESPONSE. Goodness in human acts is measured by their regulation according to the due rule. Human virtue, the principle of good acts, must therefore consist in attaining the rule of human acts. This rule is twofold: human reason and God. God is the first rule, by which human reason itself must be regulated. Therefore the theological virtues, which attain this first rule because their object is God, are more excellent than the moral or intellectual virtues which attain human reason. Among the theological virtues, that one must be greater which attains God more immediately. What is per se is always greater than what is through another. Faith and hope attain God insofar as from Him there comes to us knowledge of truth or attainment of good. Charity, however, attains God Himself so as to rest in Him, not insofar as something comes to us from Him. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith and hope and consequently than all the other virtues. Likewise prudence, which attains reason according to itself, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason insofar as through it a mean is established in human operations or passions. Reply to the First begins. Intellectual operation is completed insofar as the thing understood is in the knower; therefore the nobility of intellectual operation is measured according to the intellect. The operation of the will and of every appetitive power, however, is perfected by inclination of the appetite toward the thing as its term; therefore the dignity of appetitive operation is measured according to the thing which is its object. The continuation follows on the next page.
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OF THE VIRTUES (continued) Reply to the First. Things below the soul exist more nobly in the soul, as known, than in themselves; hence with respect to things beneath us, knowledge is nobler than love. The Philosopher therefore preferred the intellectual virtues to the moral virtues. But things above the soul exist more nobly in themselves than in us. Therefore, regarding things above us - and especially God - love is preferred to knowledge. Thus charity is more excellent than faith. Reply to the Second. Faith does not work through love as through an instrument, as a master works through a servant, but as through its proper form. Hence the objection does not follow. Reply to the Third. Charity and hope have the same good for their object. Charity, however, implies union with that good, while hope implies a certain distance from it. Hence charity does not regard the good as arduous in the way hope does: what is already united is not arduous. Charity is therefore more perfect than hope. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. The theological virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues because their object is God, the first rule of human acts. Charity is more perfect than faith and hope because faith and hope attain God insofar as from Him come knowledge of truth and attainment of good, whereas charity attains God Himself for His own sake and rests in Him. Therefore charity is the most perfect of all virtues. COMMENTARY. Concerning this conclusion, note that it is a Lutheran error to make faith the most excellent of all virtues on the ground that man is justified through faith, while making charity an instrument of faith. Catholics hold that charity is the most perfect of the virtues. Paul proves this in 1 Corinthians 12-13, where after promising a more excellent way he compares charity with prophecy, faith, works of mercy, and martyrdom, and repeatedly concludes that without charity the other works profit nothing. He finally says: “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” Romans 13 calls love the fullness of the law; Colossians 3 calls charity the bond of perfection; and 1 Timothy 1 calls charity the end of the commandment. From this it follows that charity is more perfect not only than dead faith but also than living faith. Paul’s comparison concerns the three virtues existing together in this life. Faith lives through charity as a body lives through the soul. Just as a living body is not more perfect than the soul from which it receives life, so living faith is not more perfect than charity, which is itself the life that immediately unites man to the living God as ultimate end. Faith is living because of charity and through it works meritoriously for eternal life. Thus “faith working through charity” means not that charity is faith’s instrument, as the Lutherans falsely say, but that charity is the life or form from which faith lives and performs meritorious works. An objection arises from St. Thomas’s statement that for things below us knowledge is nobler than love, while for things above us love is nobler than knowledge. Charity cannot tend toward God unless He is known; in this life He is known imperfectly through faith. Therefore, it seems, He cannot be loved more perfectly than He is known. St. Thomas elsewhere also says that the more perfectly God is known, the more perfectly He is loved. The answer is that the order of knowing and loving is not identical, although nothing can be loved unless known. Charity immediately loves God even though faith does not know Him immediately. It is accidental to charity that its object is obscurely known: charity tends not to the cognition itself but to the thing known, which is the same whether known obscurely or clearly. Other things being equal, however, what is more perfectly known and present is more perfectly loved. Thus the charity of heaven is more perfect than charity on earth with respect to actual intensity arising from the presence of the object. Nevertheless a wayfarer may possess charity more perfect in power and, as it were, in seed than that of some blessed person; in this sense Paul’s charity could be more perfect than that of certain angels. Cajetan adds that natural love of God is not as perfect as naturally acquired wisdom, because such love is not a virtue attaining God as He is good in Himself. St. Thomas’s preference of love over knowledge therefore concerns virtuous love of realities above us, especially supernatural love of God. In heaven the vision of God is simply most perfect, because God is then seen as He is and not through a created species standing on the side of the object.

QUESTION XXIII - ARTICLE VII

WHETHER ANY TRUE VIRTUE CAN EXIST WITHOUT CHARITY

First objection. It belongs to virtue to produce a good act. Those without charity perform some good acts: clothing the naked, feeding the hungry, and similar works. Therefore some true virtue can exist without charity. Second objection. Charity cannot exist without faith, since it proceeds from unfeigned faith. Yet among unbelievers there can be true chastity, when they restrain concupiscence, and true justice, when they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue can exist without charity. Third objection. Science and art are virtues, as Aristotle teaches, and they are found in sinners without charity. Therefore true virtue can exist without charity. ON THE CONTRARY, Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13: “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.” True virtue is greatly profitable. Therefore true virtue cannot exist without charity. RESPONSE. Virtue is ordered to good, and good is principally the end; things directed to an end are called good only in relation to that end. There is a twofold end, ultimate and proximate, and therefore a twofold good: ultimate and universal, and proximate and particular. Man’s ultimate and principal good is the enjoyment of God: “It is good for me to adhere to God.” Man is ordered to this through charity. A secondary and particular human good can itself be twofold. One is truly good because, considered in itself, it can be ordered to the principal good, the ultimate end. The other is an apparent and not a true good because it draws away from the final good. True virtue simply speaking is therefore that which orders man to his principal good. Aristotle accordingly calls virtue “the disposition of the perfect toward the best.” In this sense no true virtue can exist without charity. But if virtue is considered in relation to a particular end, some virtue can be spoken of without charity insofar as it is ordered to a particular good. If that particular good is merely apparent, the habit ordered to it is not true virtue but a false likeness of virtue: the prudence of the avaricious by which they devise ways of gain, their justice by which fear of grave loss restrains them from taking another’s goods, their temperance by which they restrain costly lust, and their fortitude by which, as Horace says, they flee poverty through sea, rocks, and fires. Augustine gives such examples against Julian. If the particular good is a true good - preservation of the commonwealth, for example - the corresponding virtue is true, but imperfect unless it is referred to the final and perfect good. Thus simply speaking true virtue cannot exist without charity. Reply to the First. An act of one lacking charity can be considered in two ways. Insofar as it proceeds precisely from the defect by which he lacks charity and is ordered to the sinful end responsible for that defect, it is evil. Augustine says that an unbeliever’s act, insofar as it proceeds from his unbelief and is ordered to that end, is sin even if he clothes the naked. But the same man can act according to some other gift of God - faith, hope, or some natural good not wholly destroyed by sin. In this respect an act can be good in its kind without charity, though not perfectly good, because it lacks due order to the ultimate end. Reply to the Second. As the end is to practical matters what a principle is to speculative matters, there cannot be science simply speaking without a right judgment concerning first indemonstrable principles; likewise there cannot be justice or chastity simply speaking without due order to the end through charity, however rightly someone behaves in other respects. Reply to the

Third. Science and art by their nature imply order to a particular good, not to the ultimate end of human life as do the moral virtues which make man good simply speaking. Therefore the comparison fails. SUMMARY. (1) True virtue simply speaking does not exist without charity, because such virtue orders man to his principal good, the enjoyment of God. (2) A true but imperfect virtue ordered to a particular good can exist without charity. COMMENTARY. The question now is whether acquired moral virtues without charity should be called virtues simply and perfectly.

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QUESTION XXIII - ARTICLE VII - COMMENTARY

For the affirmative position. First: without charity a man can perform acts good simply speaking - for example, acting temperately, bravely, and justly. A habit acquired by repeated acts of this kind therefore seems to be a habit of true virtue simply speaking, since virtue is a habit inclining toward acts conformable to right reason and good simply speaking. Second: acts proceeding from such acquired habits appear perfect, because nothing required for their moral perfection as acts is lacking. It does not suffice to say that supernatural ordination to the end is lacking, since such ordination is not among the circumstances required for the act's moral being; otherwise every work done without charity would be sinful simply because that circumstance was absent. Third: the moral virtues whose connection St. Thomas treats in I-II q.65 a.1 are understood as perfect virtues, because imperfect virtues need not be connected. Yet their connection is explained not through their order to the supernatural end but through their common dependence upon one prudence in their proper matters. Therefore perfect moral virtues seem possible without charity. Fourth: Aristotle and many philosophers truly knew and defined perfect moral virtues although they did not know the supernatural end. Therefore moral virtues can seemingly be perfect simply speaking without such an order. Scotus, Gabriel, Durandus, and some other scholastics favor this affirmative position. Jerome also speaks of some Gentiles as good and studious who, ignorant of the law, naturally did the things of the law. For the negative position. First: virtue makes its possessor good and his work good. Acquired virtues never make a man without charity good simply speaking, because every man without charity is in sin and therefore is not simply good. Second: a man good simply speaking must at least be habitually ordered to his natural ultimate end. But one in mortal or original sin is habitually turned away from God, even as natural end. The same God is both natural and supernatural end. One cannot be simply ordered to Him under one aspect while habitually turned away from Him under another, just as a man who is another's enemy under one aspect cannot be simply his friend under another without reconciliation. Third: one mortal sin, even against a merely natural precept, turns man away from God as natural ultimate end in such a way that restoration requires grace. Therefore acquired virtues alone can never make him good simply speaking. St. Thomas teaches this in I-II q.109 a.7. Fourth: if a man in sin could be simply good and rectified toward the natural ultimate end, he would deserve the reward of natural happiness for his morally good works. Every morally good work is in some sense worthy of reward, and supreme governance renders reward to one worthy of it. But a sinner is unworthy to receive even natural beatitude because he is turned away from God as supernatural end. Therefore he is not simply rectified even toward the natural ultimate end. Virtues are also called the health of the soul. Without grace and charity the soul wounded by sin does not possess this health. Augustine retracts his earlier language about philosophers shining with the light of virtue without true piety. Against Julian he argues that no one possesses true virtue unless just, and no one is just unless he lives by faith. "He who says the wicked man is just shall be accursed among the people." He says that chastity is not true virtue in one whose soul commits fornication by turning from the true God, and asks how unbelievers can possess the companion virtues if they lack true justice. Augustine accepts the philosophers' definition of virtue as a habit of the rational soul consonant with nature, but denies that they knew what is consonant with a mortal nature needing healing. He says those whom the Gentiles magnified as virtuous often acted for vain glory. Jerome likewise says that without the virtue of God Paul could have had no virtues, and comments on "the just man lives by faith" that the chaste, wise, and brave likewise live by faith, against those who imagine fortitude without faith in Christ.
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QUESTION XXIII - ARTICLE VII - COMMENTARY CONTINUED Cajetan warns that St. Thomas should not be

understood as contradicting the philosophers or himself when he says acquired virtues are virtues in a qualified sense while infused virtues are virtues simply speaking. Cajetan explains the distinction this way: infused virtues perfect man in relation to

the ultimate end simply speaking; acquired virtues perfect him in relation to the ultimate end within the genus of human good,

namely the happiness treated by Aristotle in Ethics X. Thus, speaking as moral philosophers, acquired virtues may be called virtues simply speaking; speaking as theologians, infused virtues are virtues simply speaking and acquired virtues only in a qualified sense. Cajetan compares a physician who says from medical principles that a sick man will soon die with an astrologer who, from another science, says he will not die from that illness. Each, he says, can speak truly within his science because each judges from his own principles. I reply: this opinion of Cajetan seems simply false. FIRST CONCLUSION. Habits acquired from morally good acts are good habits and are of the same species as acquired virtues joined with charity. The arguments for the affirmative sufficiently prove this. SECOND CONCLUSION. If man existed in pure nature without sin

and without grace, such acquired habits would have more of the character of virtue than they now possess in a man turned away from God at least through original sin. In pure nature man would be simply turned toward God as natural ultimate end and rectified toward Him as the first rule of human acts. In the present fallen state he is turned away and not rectified; therefore acquired virtues do not suffice to rectify him simply toward the ultimate end. THIRD CONCLUSION. Even in a state of pure nature these virtues would not be simply perfect unless man were healed by some gift superadded to nature from the weakness arising through the conflict of the sensitive appetite. Through acquired virtues alone he could not preserve all natural precepts for a long time. The struggle between flesh and spirit would remain; prolonged exercise would also be required to acquire virtue, and before acquiring it man would already have sinned. Therefore such virtues would not be simply perfect. FOURTH CONCLUSION. After the fall of nature no one without grace and charity, however many morally good acts he multiplies, can acquire habits that are simply perfect virtues even within the genus of human good. This

conclusion is directly contrary to Cajetan, but I judge it established by the arguments for the negative

side. When Augustine

denies true virtues to Gentiles and philosophers without faith, his words can be understood in two ways. Often they added an evil circumstance of end, especially vain glory, and so Augustine calls them slaves of vain glory. Moreover Gentiles performed

very few morally good works without adding an evil circumstance of end, and therefore could scarcely acquire stable habits. Yet if one admits the rare or perhaps impossible case of a person without faith frequently exercising himself in morally good works without an evil end, he would acquire habits that are true - not fictitious - virtues, but imperfect and insufficient to denominate the man simply good. St. Thomas teaches this expressly at the end of the article. Replies. To the first affirmative argument, I deny that a man without charity can habitually and repeatedly exercise morally good acts without adding a bad circumstance. Even if a good habit is acquired, it is not perfect enough to make him simply good because he remains habitually

turned away from God, the natural ultimate end and first rule of human acts. To the second, acts from such habits are not perfect simply speaking because, as acts of this agent, they do not attain the ultimate end, even though by their proper object they are referable to the ultimate end by the Author of nature. Hence their habits are true but imperfect virtues. The defect is not merely the absence of a supernatural circumstance. If man were created with some gift healing nature, even without faith and grace, he could possess true acquired virtues perfect in the genus of human good though not ordered to the supernatural end. But in fact fallen man is not healed or rectified toward his natural end except through Christ's grace ordering him to the supernatural end. To the philosophers: they knew speculatively the definition of perfect virtue, but none without God's grace actually acquired a perfect virtue rectifying him toward the natural end. Jerome's "good" Gentiles are those naturally well inclined toward certain virtues. Against Cajetan's physician analogy: the physician who predicts death speaks not simply but conditionally - insofar as the illness itself is concerned, unless some superior cause intervenes. Likewise the philosophers' judgment that virtues acquired without charity are perfect virtues is not simply true, because their science does not comprehend fallen nature and the remedy by which wounded man is healed and rectified even toward his proper natural end: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ."

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QUESTION XXIII - ARTICLE VIII WHETHER CHARITY IS THE FORM OF THE VIRTUES

First objection. The form of a thing is either exemplary or essential. Charity is not the exemplary form of the other virtues, for then they would be of the same species as charity; nor is it their essential form, for then charity would not be distinguished from them. Therefore charity is in no way the form of the virtues. Second objection. Charity is compared to the other virtues as root and foundation: “Rooted and founded in charity.” But root and foundation have the character not of form but rather of matter, since they are first in generation. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues. Third objection. Form, end, and efficient cause do not coincide numerically in the same thing. But charity is called the end and mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form. ON THE CONTRARY, Ambrose calls charity the form of the virtues. RESPONSE. In moral matters the form of an act is principally taken from the end. The principle of moral acts is the will, whose object and, as it were, form is the end. The form of an act follows the form of the agent; hence in moral matters that which gives an act its order to the end gives it its form. Charity orders the acts of all other virtues to the ultimate end. Therefore it gives form to the acts of all other virtues and is called the form of the virtues. Reply to the First. Charity is not the exemplary or essential form of the other virtues, but their form effectively, insofar as it imposes form upon all of them by ordering their acts to the ultimate end. Reply to the Second. Charity is compared to foundation and root insofar as all the other virtues are sustained and nourished from it, not according to the material causality proper to a foundation or root. Reply to the Third. Charity is called the end of the virtues because it orders all the virtues to its own end. It is called their mother because a mother conceives from another; charity, from appetite for the ultimate end, conceives and commands the acts of the other virtues. SUMMARY. Charity is the form of the virtues because through charity the acts of all the virtues are ordered to the ultimate end, and in morals the form of an act is chiefly derived from its end. It is not their exemplary or essential form, but effectively gives them form. It is root and foundation because the virtues are nourished and sustained from it, and mother because from desire of the ultimate end it commands their acts. COMMENTARY. Cajetan, persisting in his view that moral virtues are simply virtues in their own genus without charity, says St. Thomas’s conclusion concerns the virtues insofar as they are ordered to the supernatural end and thus formed by charity; in their own genus, however, they are formed by prudence. I reply that charity is the form of all virtues, including acquired virtues, insofar as they are simply perfect virtues, in the manner explained by St. Thomas. This does not prevent prudence also from being the form of the moral virtues. Prudence forms them with respect to their proper objects by directing and commanding their acts concerning means to the end. Prudence is not itself about the end but presupposes intention of the end, which comes from the natural inclination of the will, from charity, or from both together. Second note. With Cajetan, charity forms not only effectively by commanding and ordering virtuous acts - something common to any commanding virtue - but also because the passive participation of charity’s command received in virtuous acts constitutes them in the complete being of virtue simply speaking. On my account this doctrine can extend also to acquired virtues: grace perfects nature and, through charity, makes the acts of acquired virtues attain not only the supernatural end, toward which they are directed above their proper proportion, but also the ultimate end naturally proportioned to them. QUESTION XXIII - ARTICLE VIII CONCLUDED; QUESTION XXIV BEGINS Third note. Charity is not called the form of the virtues because it formally and efficiently gives every virtue its most specific species. The virtues receive their proper species from their own objects. Charity gives them the being of virtue simply speaking. Fourth note. Hebrews 11 calls faith the substance or foundation of things hoped for, and Trent calls faith the root and foundation of human salvation and justification. This does not make faith the form of the other virtues in the same sense as charity. Faith is called foundation and root because it directs and shows the end, so that from it the edifice of Christian religion begins. Charity is foundation and root because by its motion it moves and vivifies the other works of virtue, including faith itself. Charity is a root insofar as it pours life into acts and makes them fruitful and meritorious of eternal life; faith is a root because its act is first: “He that comes to God must believe.” Hence the proposition “charity alone suffices for salvation” does not exclude the works of the other virtues. If charity is true, it possesses the other connected virtues and vivifies them. Augustine says in substance: have charity, and you have fulfilled the law. Nevertheless, because the times are dangerous and prone to scruple, I does not judge it prudent, especially before the uneducated, to say without qualification that charity alone suffices, lest exercises of other virtues such as penance and fasting seem excluded. Finally, when St. Thomas denies that charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, he means that the virtues are not generated in imitation of charity as an artisan makes one image after another. Elsewhere charity can be called exemplary insofar as the other virtues operate in a likeness to it, since every virtue is an inclination toward its object.

QUESTION XXIV - THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY

We must next consider charity in relation to its subject.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER THE WILL IS THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY

First objection. Charity is a kind of love. But according to Aristotle love is in the concupiscible appetite. Therefore charity is in the concupiscible appetite and not in the will. Second objection. Charity is the chief of the virtues. But the subject of virtue is reason. Therefore charity seems to be in reason and not in the will.

Third objection. Charity extends to all human acts: “Let all your things be done in charity.” But the principle of

human acts is free choice. Therefore charity seems principally to be in free choice rather than in the will. ON THE CONTRARY, charity’s object is good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject. RESPONSE. There is a twofold appetite: sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite, which is called will. The object of each is good, but in different ways. The object of sensitive appetite is good apprehended by sense; the object of intellectual appetite or will is good under the common aspect of good insofar as it is apprehensible by intellect. Charity’s object is not a sensible good but divine good, known only by intellect. Therefore charity’s subject is not sensitive appetite but intellectual appetite, namely the will. Reply to the

First. The concupiscible is part of the sensitive appetite, not the intellectual appetite. Love in the concupiscible is love of sensible good. The concupiscible cannot extend to divine good as intelligible; only the will can. Therefore it cannot be charity’s subject. Reply to the Second. According to Aristotle the will itself belongs to reason in a broad sense, and therefore charity’s presence in the will does not make it foreign to reason. Nevertheless human reason is not the rule of charity as it is of human virtues; charity is ruled by divine wisdom and exceeds the rule of human reason: “the charity of Christ which surpasses knowledge.” Hence charity is not in reason as its subject, as prudence is, nor in reason as its rule, as justice and temperance are, but in the will, which has a certain affinity with reason. Reply to the Third. Free choice is not a power distinct from the will. Yet charity is not in the will precisely under the aspect of free choice, whose act is choosing. Choice concerns means to an end, whereas willing concerns the end itself. Since charity’s object is the ultimate end, charity is more properly said to be in the will than in free choice.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE I CONCLUDED; ARTICLE II

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First conclusion: the will is charity’s subject, because divine good is apprehended by intellect and therefore belongs to intellectual appetite. Second: charity is related to reason neither as its subject nor as ruled by human reason, but through the affinity of will to reason; charity is ruled by divine wisdom and exceeds human reason. Third: charity is more properly said to be in the will than in free choice because free choice chooses means while the will tends to the end, and charity’s object is the ultimate end.

COMMENTARY. The first conclusion is common doctrine and its reason is compelling: charity is given for

loving, and loving is an act of the will. Romans 5 confirms this: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,” where “heart” is more properly taken for will than intellect. Regarding the second conclusion, St. Thomas touches the difficulty: the chief virtue ought to have the chief subject; charity is the chief virtue, while intellect seems a more perfect power than will. One may reply that charity is the chief virtue in this life while we walk by faith. In heaven the light of glory is a more perfect habit for the act by which the blessed see God. St. Thomas’s point, however, is that saying reason is the subject of virtue does not require every virtue to be in intellect as distinguished from will; it suffices that it be in a power belonging to the rational part by affinity. Regarding the third conclusion, charity on the way and charity remaining in heaven are of the same species, although in this life its exercise is free, while in heaven its exercise regarding the ultimate end is not free in the same way. It is accidental to charity as charity that its act toward its proper object be freely exercisable. Indeed charity is more perfect in its own species when it cannot fail to act toward its proper object, for then it is more assimilated to the divine love by which God naturally loves Himself. Yet considered precisely as a human, free, and meritorious act, love of God in this life and love in heaven do not have the same condition.

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ARTICLE II - WHETHER CHARITY IS CAUSED IN US BY INFUSION

First objection. What is common to all creatures belongs naturally to man. Dionysius says that the divine good, charity's object, is lovable and loved by all. Therefore charity is naturally in us and not by infusion. Second objection. The more lovable something is, the more easily it can be loved. God is supremely lovable because He
is supremely good. We do not need an infused habit to love other things. Therefore neither do we need one to love God. Third objection. Paul says: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith." These are human acts or dispositions. Therefore charity seems caused in us by preceding acts rather than infusion. ON THE CONTRARY, Romans 5 says: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us." RESPONSE. Charity is friendship of man toward God founded upon communication of eternal beatitude. This communication is not according to natural goods but gratuitous gifts: "The grace of God is eternal life." Charity therefore exceeds the faculty of nature. What exceeds nature cannot be natural or acquired by natural powers, because a natural effect does not transcend its cause. Hence charity is neither naturally in us nor acquired by natural powers, but is infused by the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and Son and whose participation in us is created charity. Reply to the First. Dionysius speaks of love of God founded upon communication of natural goods, which naturally belongs to all. Charity is founded upon supernatural communication, and therefore the comparison fails. Reply to the Second. God is in Himself supremely knowable but not supremely knowable by us because our knowledge depends upon sensible things. Likewise God is in Himself supremely lovable as object of beatitude, but under that aspect He is not most easily loved by us because our affections incline toward visible goods. Therefore charity must be infused into our hearts for us to love God in this supernatural way. Reply to the Third. When charity is said to proceed from a pure heart, good conscience, and unfeigned faith, this can refer to the act of charity excited from these dispositions; or such acts dispose a man to receive the infusion of charity. The same applies when Augustine says fear introduces charity and when a gloss says faith generates hope and hope charity.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY SUMMARY. Charity is infused. It is friendship

founded upon
communication of eternal beatitude, a communication impossible to us through natural goods alone. Therefore charity exceeds
nature's faculty and, if it exists in us, must be present by divine infusion. COMMENTARY. The conclusion is received by all as
Catholic truth. Romans 5 says that God's charity is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit. The doctrine was defined against the Pelagians: divine grace or supernatural assistance is not given merely so that we may more easily believe, hope, and
love God, as though these acts were possible without it, but so that we may believe and perform such supernatural acts at all. Trent likewise teaches that the charity required for justification comes from God's gift. Whether charity precisely as a habit superadded to the power is infused belongs to the broader dispute concerning the habits of faith, hope, and the other infused virtues. According to the common theological opinion approved at Vienne, these are infused habits in baptism. The general treatment belongs elsewhere. A further question - whether man can naturally love God above all without grace - belongs to I-II
q.109 a.3 and is passed over here. ONE DOUBT. Can an act of loving God produced by natural powers be the same "according
to the substance of the act" as an act proceeding from infused charity? Soto holds universally that every act elicited from an infused habit can, according to the substance of the act, be elicited by an acquired habit or even by natural principles without an acquired habit. Capreolus reports a similar view concerning a sinner retaining faith. Cajetan appears to favor it, and St. Thomas can appear to say that a habitual gift is needed for acts supernatural in mode rather than substance, such as loving God and knowing Him in the mirror of creatures. Melchior Cano judged this opinion dangerous because it seems to remove the necessity of infused virtues. If we can believe "God is Trinity" by an acquired act of faith of the same species according to
the substance of the act as infused faith, infused faith appears superfluous. The answer that infused faith is given only to believe better or more firmly seems contrary to Augustine, Ambrose, Philippians 1 ("To you it is given for Christ, not only that
you believe in Him..."), and the anti-Pelagian councils, which teach that supernatural help is given for believing simply, not merely for believing more easily. Moreover, a person in mortal sin who performs some love of God does not love God under the same formal reason as one possessing grace. Likewise one without infused faith who assents that God is triune does not assent under the same formal motive as one believing through infused faith. For resolving the difficulty I distinguish meanings
of "same according to the substance of the act." First, it may mean identity according to the specific substance of the act, which
is taken from the formal object. In this sense it is impossible for natural love to be specifically the same as love from infused charity. Infused charity's object is the Supreme Good precisely as beatifying above the whole order of nature, which natural powers cannot formally attain. Second, "same according to substance" may mean merely material identity. This can be considered on the side of the subject: one numerically identical act in the natural order may successively have the moral character of virtue and vice as circumstances change. In this material sense there is no great difficulty in saying that a naturally produced love of God may resemble love from charity. It can also be considered on the side of the material object. The same God is Author of nature and Author of grace. A man can therefore have a natural act and a supernatural act concerning materially the same object. In this sense an act from acquired faith assenting that God is triune and an act from infused faith have the same material object, though not the same formal object or species. This, I say, is how St. Thomas should be understood when he says that infused habits are given for acts whose likenesses man could have according to the substance of the act: he is speaking of identity of the material object, as his example of loving God and knowing Him through creatures indicates.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE III

WHETHER CHARITY IS INFUSED ACCORDING TO THE CAPACITY OF NATURAL POWERS

First objection. Matthew 25 says that the master gave to each “according to his proper ability.” Before charity there is no virtue in man except natural ability, since without charity there is no virtue simply speaking. Therefore God infuses charity according to the quantity of natural virtue. Second objection. Things ordered to one another are proportioned: in natural things form is proportioned to matter, and in gratuitous gifts glory is proportioned to grace. Charity, as a perfection of nature, seems related to natural capacity as second to first. Therefore charity seems infused according to natural capacity. Third objection. Men and angels participate beatitude according to the same general reason. In the angels, according to the Master of the Sentences, charity and other gratuitous gifts were given according to natural capacity. Therefore the same seems true in men. ON THE CONTRARY, John 3 says: “The Spirit breathes where He wills,” and 1 Corinthians 12: “All these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing to every one according as He wills.” Therefore charity is given not according to natural capacity but according to the will of the Spirit distributing His gifts. RESPONSE. The quantity of anything depends upon its proper cause, because a more universal cause can produce a greater effect. Charity exceeds the proportion of human nature and therefore does not depend upon natural power but solely upon the grace of the Holy Spirit infusing it. Thus the quantity of charity depends not upon the condition of nature or capacity of natural virtue, but upon the will of the Holy Spirit distributing His gifts as He wills: “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.” Reply to the First. The “ability” according to which God gives His gifts is the preceding disposition, preparation, or effort of the recipient of grace. But even this disposition or effort is prevened by the Holy Spirit, who moves the human mind more or less according to His will: “Who has made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light.” Reply to the Second. A form does not exceed the proportion of matter because both belong to the same genus. Grace and glory likewise are referred to the same supernatural order, since grace is a certain beginning of glory in us. Charity and nature, however, do not belong to the same genus or order. Therefore the comparison fails. Reply to the Third. The angel is of intellectual nature and according to his condition tends totally toward that to which he turns. Hence in the higher angels there was a greater effort both toward good in those who persevered and toward evil in those who fell; the higher persevering angels became better and the higher fallen angels worse. Man is rational by nature and can be sometimes in potency and sometimes in act; therefore one with better natural gifts can have less effort, and conversely. The comparison therefore fails. SUMMARY. First conclusion: the quantity of charity does not depend upon natural condition or natural capacity but solely upon the will of the Holy Spirit. Charity exceeds every natural faculty because it is friendship founded on participation in divine beatitude; therefore both charity itself and its quantity must be effected by the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, because the Holy Spirit effects charity and its quantity in proportion to the disposition of free choice, the same principal agent must also effect the kind and degree of preparation and effort of free choice required for that proportion. Thus there is proportion between the act and habit of charity and grace. Second conclusion from the reply to the First: the Holy Spirit prevenes the disposition and effort of free choice, moving the human mind more or less according to His will. Third conclusion: among the higher angels there was a greater effort both toward good and toward evil. COMMENTARY. The first part of the conclusion - that the quantity of charity does not depend on the condition of nature - is certain according to faith.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE III - COMMENTARY The proposition is certain in this sense: no natural

power or perfection

arising from the powers of nature is the cause or disposition of the infusion of charity or of its quantity. Besides St. Thomas's reasoning, which I call a theological demonstration, this is proved from 1 Corinthians 1: "See your vocation, brethren: not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty..." The Apostle teaches that God has made some of His most perfect friends from men naturally considered foolish and weak, so that no flesh should glory before Him and he who glories should glory in the Lord. The Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 7, teaches that we are truly called and are just, receiving justice within ourselves, each according to his measure, which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as He wills and according to each one's proper disposition and cooperation. The Council is not speaking of disposition and cooperation arising from unaided natural powers, but of that disposition and cooperation of which Philippians 2 says: "God is He who works in us both to will and to accomplish." A doubt nevertheless remains: in justification of the sinner, does the quantity of charity or grace correspond wholly to the quantity of the Holy Spirit's assistance and motion, or does it also correspond partially to the disposition and effort of free choice? First argument for the latter. Trent not only assigns the Holy Spirit's motion as the reason for the measure of grace by which we are justified, but also each person's disposition. The same session teaches that men are disposed by freely assenting and cooperating, so that when God touches the heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man himself does something in receiving the inspiration, since he can reject it. Therefore free choice together with divine assistance concurs in the disposition; with the same assistance, a greater or lesser effort might seem to be the cause of greater or lesser justification. Second argument. St. Thomas in I Sentences d.17 q.1 a.3 measures the quantity of charity according to the recipient's effort; and in III q.89 a.2 he says that forms capable of more and less are intensified or diminished according to the subject's diverse disposition. Hence according as the movement of free choice is more intense or remiss, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Third argument. Free choice is moved freely even under most efficacious assistance. Therefore, it is argued, not only could it fail to move, but while moving it could move more remissly. Hence greater or lesser disposition would depend upon free choice itself, and consequently infused charity or grace would receive some degree from an effort not corresponding to the divine motion considered in itself. Fourth argument. The angels received greater or lesser grace according to their natural perfection and their effort, according to the Master. Therefore among men too, one who strives more from his own powers would seem to receive greater grace and charity. I answer this doubt from Cajetan's doctrine. When St. Thomas says that the quantity of charity depends "solely" upon the will of the Holy Spirit, "solely" excludes natural capacities insofar as they have not been supernaturally disposed and determined by God; it does not exclude them insofar as God Himself supernaturally disposes and determines them. An analogy: if asked why one image is larger than another, one may answer that the artisan's will alone caused its size, although the larger image actually contains more matter. The quantity of matter was itself determined by the artisan's will; therefore that will is called the sole cause, not because it excludes the determination of matter, but because it causes that determination. Cajetan says similarly that the disposition of free choice is a cause of the quantity of grace "on supposition": supposing God wills to give one person greater grace than another, that person will be better disposed by God. Thus the principal agent who gives the greater grace also causes the greater preparation. Reply to the First argument. Every disposition, consent, and operation of free choice preparing for grace is an infallible effect of God's will efficaciously preparing free choice to receive grace. Trent must be understood in this manner unless we wish to fall toward Pelagian remnants by asserting that a man can have more merit before God when no more has been given him by God - indeed that one receiving less divine help might, through a superabundance of his own effort, acquire a greater disposition and greater grace than one more greatly helped by God. Reply to the Second. The greater or lesser effort likewise proceeds from the will of the Holy Spirit, who efficaciously prepares the human will according to the measure pleasing to Him. Reply to the Third. Given such-and-such efficacious divine assistance, it is impossible in the composite sense for man to be moved or strive otherwise than according to that determinate assistance; otherwise God's will, which wills to dispose free choice in this definite manner and measure, would be frustrated, and the greater disposition would not arise from the power of preparing grace. Otherwise grace would be indifferent in itself in such a way that with the least supernatural assistance a man through free choice could strive enough to reach the sanctity of Peter, which I call most absurd. In the divided sense, however, just as it is conceded that one predestined can be damned, so it is conceded that free choice which now consents to God exciting and preparing it can dissent or can move less. This is absolutely true, but not with the addition, in the composite sense, that while this very efficacious assistance of such a kind and degree stands, free choice does not consent in that corresponding way. That would imply a contradiction and, I say, would be an error against divine omnipotence. He appeals to Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints 8: God's teaching is a secret grace given inwardly to human hearts by divine generosity and rejected by no hard heart precisely because it is given so that hardness of heart may first be removed. He also appeals to Augustine's Enchiridion in explaining the Psalm: "Our God is in heaven and on earth; whatsoever He has willed He has done." The discussion continues on the next page.

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Augustine’s doctrine confirms the preceding reply: if God willed something and did not accomplish it because a human will prevented
Him, the very confession of faith in God the Father Almighty would be endangered. He is called omnipotent because whatever He wills
He can accomplish, and the effect of His omnipotent will is not frustrated by the will of any creature. Reply to the Fourth Argument.
Two things must be noted. First, in the creation of the angels grace was given together with an effort of free choice which disposed them
for it. Some theologians deny this and say grace was given to the angels and to Adam without a preceding disposition of free choice, as it
is given to infants in baptism. But St. Thomas teaches that the angels had an effort disposing them for grace; he says the same of Adam
and even of Christ, who from the first instant of His conception had the use of free choice and was sanctified according to His own
movement of free choice toward God. A difficulty arises concerning Christ. The movement of free choice toward God was an act of
charity; yet Christ’s act of charity followed from the beatific vision and therefore seems necessary rather than free. If it were not free,
how could it be meritorious? Thomist theologians answer differently. Some posit two acts of charity in Christ: one following the beatific
vision and therefore necessary, another following infused knowledge and therefore free. Others reject this because two acts of the same
species concerning the same formal object cannot suitably coexist in this way. I propose another solution. In Christ there was one habit
of charity and, in the relevant sense, one act of charity; yet the same act can be called necessary and free under different relations. Just as
God by the same act necessarily loves Himself while freely loving creatures, because creatures have no necessary connection with His
ultimate end, so Christ as man possessed a most perfect love of God which, considered immediately in relation to the Supreme Good,
was necessary both as to specification and exercise. But considered in relation to other objects which have no necessary connection with
the ultimate end except by supposition of God’s free will, the same love was free. Thus Christ freely tended to God through the
redemption of the human race, His obedience unto death, and all the works through which God was to be honored in Christ. The
command that Christ die does not destroy this liberty. A precept imposed upon an act naturally capable of freedom does not abolish its
freedom. Christ freely accepted obedience unto death and died voluntarily, even though, the divine command standing, it was impossible
in the composite sense for Him to disobey. The same is true proportionally of saints confirmed in grace. Second note concerning the
angels. Charity was bestowed upon each angel in a certain measure, not because the perfection of angelic nature was by itself the
disposition causing that measure, but from the sheer grace and providence of God. Divine wisdom nevertheless established an ordered
proportionality: generally, the more perfect angelic nature received the more perfect grace and disposition, and the less perfect nature a
lesser measure. Yet the proportion is not mathematical between things of the same order, because angelic natures differ specifically
whereas accidental grace differs by more and less within the same species.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE IV

WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE INCREASED

First objection. Nothing is increased unless it has quantity. Charity has no dimensional quantity because it is a spiritual perfection. Virtual quantity is measured according to objects, but even the least charity loves everything that ought to be loved by charity. Therefore charity cannot increase. Second objection. What is already at the summit receives no increase. Charity is the greatest of the virtues and the supreme love of the best good. Therefore it cannot increase. Third objection. Increase is a kind of motion. What increases essentially would be moved essentially; but essential motion seems to involve generation or corruption. Therefore charity cannot increase essentially unless it is newly generated or corrupted. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that charity merits to be increased so that, increased, it may merit to be perfected. RESPONSE. Charity in this life can increase. We are called wayfarers because we tend toward God, the ultimate end of our beatitude. We advance on this way insofar as we approach God, not by bodily steps but by the affections of the mind. Charity produces this approach because through it the mind is united to God. Therefore it belongs to charity as possessed by a wayfarer that it be capable of increase. If it could not increase, progress on the way would cease. Hence Paul calls charity a "way": "I show unto you yet a more excellent way." Reply to the First. Charity has not dimensional but virtual quantity. Virtual quantity is measured not only by the number of objects but also by the intensity of the act, according as something is loved more or less. In this manner charity's virtual quantity increases. Reply to the Second. Charity is supreme on the side of its object, because its object is the Supreme Good; hence it is more excellent than the other virtues. But every charity is not supreme in intensity of act. Reply to the Third. Some said charity does not increase in essence but only by greater rooting in the subject or by fervor. St. Thomas says they did not understand their own words. Since an accident's being is to inhere, for charity to increase essentially is nothing other than for it to inhere more perfectly in the subject, that is, to be more deeply rooted. Since charity is essentially a virtue ordered to act, to increase essentially is likewise to have greater efficacy for producing a more fervent act of love. It increases essentially not by beginning or ceasing to exist, but by existing more and more perfectly in its subject. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First: charity of the wayfarer can increase. Second: charity possesses virtual quantity and increases according to intensity of act. Third: charity is supreme as regards its object, not necessarily as regards intensity. Fourth: charity increases essentially, which means that it becomes more deeply rooted and more perfectly present in the subject. COMMENTARY. The first conclusion is certain according to faith. Scripture prays that charity "may abound more and more," and Ephesians commands growth in charity. Trent teaches that the justified are further justified through good works and that the Church asks for an increase of faith, hope, and charity. The common consent of the saints likewise gives many counsels for growing in divine love. The second conclusion is the common opinion of theologians. Charity, being a spiritual form, has no mathematical or physical dimension but a virtual quantity of perfection and power, manifested not only by extension to objects but by intensity of act.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; ARTICLE V

The third conclusion explains that increase of charity does not arise from acquiring a more perfect formal object. In this respect all who possess charity are equal: all love God under the same formal reason. The latitude of increase must therefore be considered in relation to charity's subject, which participates the same habitual form more perfectly and thereby becomes more capable of attaining the same object through more perfect love. Lest anyone suppose that only the subject is perfected while charity itself remains no more perfect, St. Thomas adds the fourth conclusion: charity itself increases according to its essence and essentially. A difficulty immediately arises because the essence and species of a thing seem indivisible. The following

s.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER CHARITY INCREASES BY ADDITION

First objection. As bodily quantity increases by addition, so should virtual quantity. Aristotle defines growth as an addition to pre-existing magnitude. Therefore charity's increase should occur by addition. Second objection. Charity is a spiritual light in the soul: "He who loves his brother abides in the light." Light in the air increases when another lamp is lit. Therefore charity likewise seems to increase through addition. Third objection. God causes the increase of charity just as He first creates or infuses it. In the first infusion He produces something in the soul which was not there before. Therefore in increasing charity He likewise produces something newly added. ON THE CONTRARY, charity is a simple form. A simple thing added to a simple thing does not make one simple thing greater. Therefore charity does not increase by addition. RESPONSE. Every addition is of one thing to another, and therefore presupposes at least an intelligible distinction between what is added and that to which it is added. If charity were added to charity, the added charity would have to be distinguishable at least in thought from the pre-existing charity. Distinction among forms is either specific or numerical. Specific distinction among habits follows diversity of objects; numerical distinction follows diversity of subjects. A habit can sometimes increase by addition through extension to new objects. Geometry, for example, increases when a man learns geometrical conclusions he did not previously know. This cannot be said of charity because even the least charity extends to everything that ought to be loved through charity. Therefore no specifically distinct charity can be added to it by extension to new objects. If the addition were numerical, it would require diversity of subjects, as whiteness is increased extensively when one white thing is added to another. But charity's subject is the rational mind. Such an increase would require one rational mind to be added to another, which is impossible; even if possible, it would make a greater lover, not one who loves more intensely. Therefore charity cannot increase by adding charity to charity. It increases solely because the subject participates charity more and more, is more fully reduced to its act, and becomes more subject to it. This is the proper mode of increase of every intensifiable form whose being consists in inhering in a subject. For such a form to be greater is for it to inhere more perfectly in its subject. Thus charity increases by being intensified in the subject, and this is what it means for charity to increase according to its essence, not for another charity to be added to it.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE V - REPLIES, SUMMARY, AND COMMENTARY

Reply to the First. Bodily quantity can be distinguished by position or number and therefore can increase
through addition. Considered as an accidental form, however, quantity also has a mode of increase like other accidental forms, namely intensification in the subject. Science likewise has a twofold quantity: with respect to objects it increases by addition when more conclusions are known; as an accidental form inhering in a subject it increases when the same truths are known more certainly. Charity has the same twofold consideration, but it cannot increase on the side of objects, since it already extends to all things lovable through charity. Therefore only increase by intensity remains. Reply to the Second. One may speak of light being increased by addition because different luminaries cause the light. In charity there is only one luminary or principal source pouring forth the light of charity; therefore that analogy does not establish addition of distinct charities. Reply to the

Third. The first infusion of charity changes a person from not having charity to having it, so something is present which previously was not. Increase changes the subject from having charity less to having it more. It does not require a new entity of charity to be added; rather, what was already present inheres more perfectly, and the likeness of the Holy Spirit is participated more perfectly in the soul. SUMMARY. (1) Charity does not increase by extension to new objects as science sometimes does, because even the least charity extends to everything that ought to be loved through charity. (2) It does not increase by addition of something specifically or numerically distinct. (3) Therefore charity in no way increases by addition of charity to charity. (4) It increases solely through greater intensity in the subject: the subject participates charity more perfectly, is more fully actuated by it, and more fully subjected to it. COMMENTARY. This article must be carefully observed for understanding Article VI. St. Thomas recognizes no increase of charity except through intensification of the same charity in its subject. First explanation: how can charity increase “according to essence” if a species seems indivisible? Aristotle compares species to numbers, which are intrinsically indivisible. Yet when a form is specified by relation to another, it can admit more and less within the same species. Health, for example, is specified by conformity to the suitable disposition of its subject, and that conformity can be greater or lesser. Motion likewise can be faster or slower while remaining of the same species because its terminus specifies it. Science can increase within the same species, not because its formal reason changes, but through additional conclusions participating the same formal reason. Thus one science becomes greater by extending to more conclusions demonstrated under the same formal light. Second note. Forms not specified by relation to another, such as whiteness, heat, and substantial forms, cannot increase in species because they do not approach or recede from themselves. They can nevertheless admit intensification in a subject when their specific nature does not positively exclude divisibility or degrees. Some forms, such as a substantial form or the figure of a triangle or circle, exclude such increase by their very specific ratio. Whiteness, however, although it does not increase in species, can be participated more intensely by its subject. 413

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE V - COMMENTARY CONTINUED Third note. Since the being of an

accident is to be in a
subject, and through the subject it exists and is individuated, when the subject is perfected by participating an accidental form more perfectly, the individual accidental form itself is perfected and increased according to its individual essence. Thus this individual whiteness becomes more intense according to its individuated essence, although “whiteness” considered abstractly does not become more whiteness. St. Thomas therefore says that to posit a quality as increasing in rootedness in the subject while denying that it increases in essence is contradictory, because a quality has no being apart from the being it has in its subject. Applied to charity: charity is a quality and accidental form in the soul. It cannot increase according to species, both because its formal object is indivisible and because even the least charity extends to all things lovable for God’s sake. The only remaining mode is increase in relation to the subject through intensity and deeper rootedness, whereby the subject is more fully actuated by the accidental form and participates more perfectly in the likeness of the Holy Spirit, the principal agent. A DOUBT concerning St. Thomas’s first conclusion: can charity increase by addition in the manner of science, through extension to objects to which it did not previously extend? I ask Thomists to attend carefully to this question because it is a foundation for understanding the next article, a doctrine he says has been insufficiently understood or neglected even by some Thomists. First argument for an affirmative answer. Science is said to increase when its formal ratio is newly applied to material objects to which it had not previously been applied. Likewise, charity might seem to increase when newly applied to works of virtue: loving an enemy, caring for lepers for God, giving large alms, or enduring death for God. The possessor of charity has the formal reason for loving God and everything lovable for God, just as the scientist has the formal reason of his science. Hence charity seems capable of extensive increase when newly exercised concerning additional virtuous works. Second argument. A man possessing a scientific habit has a virtual assent to conclusions belonging to that science, yet his science is still said to increase extensively when he actually learns new conclusions. Likewise
one possessing charity virtually tends toward all things lovable for God, but perhaps charity increases extensively when he actually exercises new works of other virtues for God. Third argument. Suppose Peter and Paul possess equal charity. Peter, from charity, wills to observe counsels and perform extraordinary works of virtue, whereas Paul performs only what is commanded. Peter seems to love God more, not necessarily more intensely but extensively, because he does more and greater things for God. Furthermore, perhaps minimal charity virtually extends only to things commanded, not to evangelical counsels, since a person is not bound to have an habitual intention of observing all counsels. my conclusion is certain: however widely charity is exercised in acts of other virtues, whether commanded or counseled, the habit of charity does not thereby increase extensively. The reason is that charity without any addition on the side of its object is already in proximate potency to command every virtuous act, whether commanded or counseled. St. Thomas teaches that even minimal charity can produce great merit with respect to accidental reward. The one observing counsels and precepts often merits more by the kind of works performed, but another with greater charity may merit more from the root of charity while performing only precepts. Therefore even the least true charity can resist every temptation and can command and exercise any work of virtue without extensive increase.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE V - COMMENTARY CONCLUDED Reply to the First argument. Science

and charity agree
insofar as each is applied under one formal reason to things contained under its object. They differ because a scientific habit without newly acquired intelligible species is not in proximate potency to assent to a conclusion never demonstrated. Charity, however, is of itself immediately in proximate potency not only to tend toward God but toward everything ordainable to God. When it actually tends toward such things, it does not extend itself to objects toward which it was previously only remotely capable. Reply to the Second. One possessing a scientific habit is not properly said to possess virtual assent to every possible

conclusion of that science, but only to conclusions whose demonstrations he already possesses. With respect

to others he has
merely a habitual aptitude; the habit must be extended through new demonstrations and intelligible species. Reply to the

Third. One who observes both precepts and counsels need not have greater charity than one observing precepts alone; indeed the latter can possess greater charity. Ordinarily the former may possess greater charity, but the magnitude is measured by intensity, not extension. No moral virtue increases extensively because every true virtue extends to all objects belonging to its species in every place and time. St. Thomas's statement that a man is perfect when prepared for every good work, including works of supererogation, can be understood in two ways. First, as the perfection charity gives every person possessing it: charity unites him to the ultimate end and gives him sufficient habitual readiness, if he wills, to perform not only things necessary for salvation but also works of supererogation. Second, it can refer to perfection of act, when someone through charity actually wills to observe both precepts and counsels; then he has not only substantial perfection but a certain accidental perfection. Simply speaking, however, the perfection of Christian life consists in charity. I then cite St. Thomas on the distinction between possessing perfection and possessing a state of perfection. Human perfection consists in charity, which joins man to God. With respect to love of God: "Walk before me and be perfect." With respect to love of neighbor, Christ says after commanding love of enemies: "Be therefore perfect." A state of perfection belongs to those solemnly obligated to something annexed to perfection. Something can be annexed to charity's perfection as preparation and instrument, such as poverty and chastity, which withdraw a person from secular cares so that he may attend more freely to divine things. These are instruments or preparations for perfection. Voluntary poverty or chastity by themselves do not constitute a state of perfection unless assumed through solemn profession and permanent obligation. Something can also be annexed to perfect charity as an effect, for example care of souls. It belongs to perfect charity to leave, for God's sake, the sweetness of contemplative life and accept occupations of the active life for the salvation of neighbors. One who does this possesses an effect of perfection; yet he does not thereby possess a state of perfection unless he is a bishop, who solemnly assumes care of souls through consecration. Parish priests and archdeacons have offices entrusted to them but are not thereby placed in a state of perfection. Thus religious and bishops are traditionally called persons in a state of perfection. When it is said that "the perfect are bound to what is better," this does not mean that every omission of the better is a sin. Rather, the perfect are bound by an interior law which obliges by inclining: according to the measure of their perfection, the Spirit of God inclines their will toward what is better. Bishops are bound to what pertains to the care they have received; religious to what their profession and vows bind them. Otherwise the obligation would be infinite, whereas nature, art, and every law have determinate limits.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE V CONCLUDED; ARTICLE VI I add several observations. "Perfect" can

mean one who
actually possesses perfection or one who possesses a state of perfection. Likewise "saints" may mean those who possess sanctifying grace or those who are in a state or calling of sanctity; in this latter way Paul commonly calls Christians saints because they are called to holiness and profess in baptism to receive it from Christ. Again, St. Thomas repeatedly teaches that human perfection consists in charity, which joins man to God. Things annexed to charity's perfection must be distinguished: poverty, chastity, and similar counsels are preparations and instruments of perfection, not perfection itself. Solemn profession makes such counsels matters of obligation and establishes a state of perfection, but the vow itself does not make the person actually perfect. Care for the salvation of souls is an effect of perfect charity insofar as, for love of God, one can leave the sweetness of contemplation and accept active labors for one's neighbor. Religious should therefore not presume that profession itself makes them perfect. Christian perfection consists essentially and substantially in love of God. Likewise one who works for souls may still fail personally in charity - even after preaching to others he may himself become reprobate. But one already perfect in charity can, without losing perfection, sometimes leave the sweetness of contemplation for God's sake and undertake active work for the salvation of neighbors, even outside a case of strict necessity. I say these points prepare the doctrine of the following article, whose elucidation he intends to pursue with all his strength, invoking Christ, the merits of the Blessed Virgin, and the prayers of St. Thomas.
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First objection. Whoever can merit the greater can merit the lesser. Every act of charity can merit eternal life, which is greater than a
simple increase of charity because eternal life includes charity's perfection. Therefore every act of charity should increase charity.

Second objection. As acquired virtues are generated from acts, so the increase of charity is caused through acts of charity. Every virtuous act contributes to generation of virtue. Therefore every act of charity should contribute to an actual increase of charity.

Third

objection. Gregory says that on the way of God to stand still is to go backward. No one acting from charity goes backward. Therefore
anyone moved by an act of charity advances on the way of God; hence charity seems increased by every act. ON THE CONTRARY,
an effect does not exceed the power of its cause. Sometimes an act of charity is performed with torpor and remission. Such an act does
not lead to a more excellent charity but rather seems to dispose toward something lesser. RESPONSE BEGINS. Spiritual increase of
charity is in a certain way like bodily growth in animals and plants. Bodily growth is not a continuous motion in such a way that the thing actually grows proportionally at every instant. Nature may operate for a time disposing toward growth without producing actual
increase, and afterward produces in act what it had prepared. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - RESPONSE, SUMMARY, AND

COMMENTARY St. Thomas continues: not by every act of charity is charity actually increased. Every act of charity disposes

toward
increase insofar as one act makes a person readier to act again according to charity. As this facility grows, the person breaks forth into
a more fervent act of love by which he strives toward progress in charity; then charity is actually increased. Reply to the First. Every act of charity merits eternal life, not as something to be immediately bestowed but in its proper time. Likewise every act of charity merits an increase of charity; nevertheless charity is not immediately increased by every act, but when a person strives toward such increase. Reply to the Second. In the generation of an acquired virtue not every act completes the generation of the virtue. Each act operates dispositively, and the last, more perfect act, acting in the power of the preceding acts, reduces the disposition to act - as many
drops eventually hollow out a stone. Reply to the Third. A person advances on God's way not only when charity is actually increased
but also while he is being disposed toward its increase. SEVEN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ARTICLE. First, charity is not increased by every act of charity. Second, every act of charity disposes toward charity's increase by making the person readier to act again according to charity. Third, when this readiness grows, the person proceeds to a more fervent act of love by which he strives toward progress; then charity is actually increased. Fourth, every act of charity merits eternal life, though not immediately bestowed.

Fifth, every act merits an increase of charity, though the increase is not immediately given, but when the person strives toward it.
Sixth, in generation of acquired virtue each act disposes, while the final more perfect act completes the generation in the power of the
preceding acts. Seventh, one progresses on God's way both in actual increase and in disposition toward increase. COMMENTARY. I,
following Cajetan, distinguishes two senses of the article's title. It does not ask whether our acts efficiently cause an increase of infused charity, because charity and the other infused virtues are not efficiently produced by our acts but infused by God alone; likewise they are not efficiently increased by us. This is universally received among Thomists. Rather, the question asks whether every act of charity increases charity meritoriously. This can mean merely meritoriously, without present increase, or meritoriously and efficaciously, with an increase presently conferred. Cajetan says the article principally concerns the latter sense, although the former is also treated in St. Thomas's reply to the First. In that sense every act of charity merits an increase, but charity is not immediately increased by every act.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - COMMENTARY CONTINUED Regarding the second conclusion, when St. Thomas

says every act of charity disposes toward increase, he clearly does not mean an adequate and immediate disposition; otherwise charity would be increased immediately by every act. He means an antecedent and imperfect disposition, as in the natural growth used by St. Thomas as an example. Regarding the third conclusion, I emphasize that St. Thomas never admits an actual increase of charity except through a more fervent act as the merit and adequate disposition for the actual increase. The fifth conclusion likewise confirms this. I reject as unsupported the claim that the required more fervent disposition may occur only in the next life; he promises to discuss this more fully. Regarding the sixth conclusion, St. Thomas

says that in the generation - not necessarily every increase - of acquired virtue each act disposes toward the completed habit. I suggests that remiss acts can actually diminish an already acquired virtue, because acquired virtue is efficiently generated by our acts and can likewise be weakened by acts that draw the power toward a less perfect disposition, as lukewarm water reduces hotter water toward tepidity. The same does not hold for infused virtues. Although acts disposing us toward their infusion and increase are vital acts efficiently proceeding from us, their character as dispositions for infusion or increase does not arise from our efficiency but from God, who infuses virtue in us without us as efficient causes, though not without our willing as He mercifully disposes us. Likewise, when an infused habit is to be increased, we efficiently elicit more fervent

acts, prevened by more efficacious divine assistance than before. But however much we strive, our effort never becomes an efficient cause that increases the infused habit. Rather, the effort has the character of an adequate disposition because it proceeds from that measure of divine assistance by which God intends to effect the corresponding increase. I now introduce several grave questions. FIRST DOUBT. Is the habit of charity efficiently increased, or can it be efficiently increased, by our acts? First argument for the affirmative. When man is justified through a disposition of free choice, he seems to be an efficient cause of grace, or at least of grace's union with the soul. Man through intellect and will efficiently concurs in acts of faith, charity, contrition, hope, and the other acts necessary for the final disposition to grace. Since these are vital acts, they must proceed efficiently from a vital principle. But one who efficiently produces the ultimate disposition for a form seems efficiently to cause the form or at least its union with the subject, as human generation efficiently reaches the dispositions immediately preceding the union of the rational soul with the body. Second argument. The human will is formally rectified through love of God above all. Man efficiently concurs through his will in this act of love. Therefore he seems efficiently to concur in his own rectification and justification; still more, then, could he efficiently concur in an increase of justification, grace, and charity. Third argument. Grant that God alone efficiently regenerates man into supernatural life by grace. Once regenerated and made participant in the supernatural order through grace and infused virtues, nothing seems to prevent him from efficiently increasing those pre-existing habits through supernatural acts produced by grace and virtue. A man who has acquired science later efficiently increases it through further acts. An animal cannot generate itself, yet once generated it efficiently increases itself through connatural powers. Likewise a man regenerated as a son of God might afterward efficiently increase grace and charity through acts of charity. Another analogy: man cannot merit first justification because grace is presupposed for merit, but once justified he can merit an increase of grace. By parity, although he cannot efficiently cause first justification, perhaps he can efficiently cause its increase. Fourth argument. Charity efficiently gives form to the other virtues by making them attain the supernatural ultimate end. Through this they become meritorious. Therefore charity efficiently concurs in the merit by which man merits increase of grace and charity. Fifth argument. Man efficiently concurs in his formal beatitude, the vision of God. Therefore he seems able to concur efficiently in justification and still more in its increase, since glory is consummated grace. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - FIRST

DOUBT CONTINUED Sixth argument. An act of charity is a reality more noble than the external

washing with baptismal

water. Yet baptismal washing, in the power of the Holy Spirit as principal agent, efficiently attains grace. Therefore, with greater reason, an act of charity might be elevated by God to produce or increase grace and infused habits as a physical instrumental cause. I note that sacramental acts can indeed be assumed by God to instrumental efficiency: the washing of baptism and, according to Thomists, the penitent's contrition insofar as it is part of the sacrament.

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FOR THE DECISION OF THE DIFFICULTY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. The argument immediately preceding shows the question concerns whether a human act can, by divine power, be assumed instrumentally to produce grace, as a physical instrumental cause.

SECOND CONCLUSION. It is impossible for a man, angel, or any creature to concur as a principal efficient cause - even as a
secondary principal cause - in the production of grace or supernatural virtues. By ·principal cause· I mean a cause operating according to its own form, to which the effect is assimilated, even if that cause is particular and subordinate to a higher cause, as fire is a principal cause of the generation of another fire although not the supreme cause. An effect cannot be more perfect than its principal cause. Every efficient cause acts insofar as it is actual through a form to which its effect is assimilated. But a
man who is to receive grace or charity cannot already be actual through a form to which the supernatural effect of being pleasing to God or possessing charity is assimilated. Grace is precisely that effect by which one who was not pleasing becomes
pleasing. Hence no superior created form can precede it in the recipient and serve as the principal efficient cause of it. Even Christ as man does not cause grace as a principal cause but as the conjoined instrument of the Word. God alone is principal cause of grace. [The page's columns preserve additional conclusions whose order in the scan is typographically interwoven.] A
further conclusion states that if infused virtue were efficiently produced by us, Augustine could not properly say that God works it in us "without us." St. Thomas nowhere attributes efficient causality to our acts in the generation or increase of infused virtues except to the act of penance precisely insofar as it is part of a sacrament.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. To assert some efficiency in acts of free choice, insofar as free choice is moved by God toward the
production or increase of grace and charity, is not itself an error of faith, provided one does not claim that these acts merit

first justification. I say neither Scripture, councils, nor the Fathers supply grounds for condemning such an assertion as heretical. The councils deny our merit with respect to first justification but affirm the necessity of acts of free choice. Orange teaches that God works in us and with us so that we may act. Trent teaches that man is disposed for justification by freely assenting to and cooperating with moving grace, and anathematizes the claim that free choice cooperates in no way and remains merely passive. Nevertheless, I carefully distinguishes this conciliar cooperation from physical efficient causality in producing infused grace. The councils say that man cooperates in disposing himself for grace; they do not define that he efficiently produces the infusion itself. Moral efficiency is sufficient for their language: one who freely disposes himself cooperates as a moral cause rather than being moved as an FIRST

DOUBT CONTINUED

FIFTH CONCLUSION. A man already constituted in grace cannot concur in the increase of grace or charity as a principal
efficient cause. First proof, from St. Thomas: habits are increased through the same kind of causes through which they are generated. But grace and charity are generated only by a divine act; therefore they are increased by a divine act. Second proof.
An infused habit, or the soul possessing it, cannot be the principal efficient cause of its own intensification. It has no form more
excellent than the charity that is itself to be intensified, through which it could be sufficiently actualized as a formal and proportionate principle for producing a more intense charity. Therefore God alone remains the principal efficient cause of the increase of grace and charity. Even the habitual grace of Christ, although more perfect than every increase of grace in us, causes grace only instrumentally. As through grace we are immediately assimilated to the divine nature, so through greater grace we are more perfectly assimilated to it. No creature can therefore be an efficient cause of grace or its increase except instrumentally. The same applies to charity, which is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit.
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REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS. To the first: although man efficiently concurs in the vital acts that dispose him for grace, ciency does not reach those acts precisely insofar as they are dispositions for grace. Under that aspect they are attributed to God, the principal agent, who supernaturally moves them so that they may dispose toward grace. We freely consent, and in this sense
cooperate in our justification. Thus contrition, considered prior to grace, has the character of a disposition insofar as it is from God. To
the second: although man efficiently concurs in an act of love insofar as it is a vital act of the will, he does not efficiently cause that act
precisely insofar as through it the will is sufficiently disposed and rectified for justification. To the third: the analogies fail. A man who
acquires and increases science already possesses the superior natural habit of first principles, by which he is sufficiently actualized to
be an efficient cause of science. An animal already generated is sufficiently in act through its natural form and powers to nourish and
increase itself. As for merit, a justified man truly is the meritorious cause of an increase of grace and charity, but merit and efficient causality are not the same. Merit rests upon God's gracious law by which acts proceeding freely from grace merit glory and an increase
of grace. Efficient causality, by contrast, requires a proportionate formal efficient principle in the nature of the cause. To the fourth: a
will informed by charity efficiently produces the act of love and through it moves itself and the other powers to acts of the infused virtues as regards the substance and exercise of the acts. Charity, as an accidental form inhering in an operative power, can thus concur
efficiently in acts. As regards specification, charity has a principal role because it participates in the Holy Spirit and immediately reaches God as object. But it does not follow that charity efficiently causes the reward - the increase of grace - which follows merit.

QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - FIRST

DOUBT CONCLUDED; SECOND

DOUBT BEGINS The fact that acts of the virtues attain the supernatural end does not formally constitute their

merit, for in
heaven virtuous acts attain that end most perfectly and yet are no longer meritorious. Even if charity efficiently concurred in producing meritorious acts, it would not follow that it efficiently produces the increase which is their reward. The light of glory is likewise a reward, yet God alone efficiently produces it. OBJECTION. The will together with charity efficiently produces acts of love; therefore by repetition of these acts some acquired habit must arise. REPLY. Granted: an acquired habit of love may be generated, but it is not the infused virtue of charity. It arises from exercise of the will insofar as the will is a natural power, whereas the supernatural act of divine love reaches God through the infused habit and the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas teaches that an acquired habit of love can be generated from acts of charity, and this acquired habit may remain even in sinners after infused charity has been lost through mortal sin. To the fifth argument: the beatific vision, which is formal beatitude, is a vital act and is therefore efficiently produced by the blessed person seeing God. Justification, however, formally consists in the infusion of grace, which God alone efficiently infuses. To the sixth: the argument establishes that a human act could be assumed instrumentally by God. Nevertheless the third conclusion remains true: in fact God does not assume our virtuous acts as efficient instruments of justification, except in the sacrament of Penance, where the acts of the penitent are integral parts of the sacrament. A NOTABLE COROLLARY. Theologians who say that, once a man possesses infused charity, only God's general concurrence is needed for acts of charity must consequently admit that charity and the man possessing it are sufficient causes for producing an increase of grace and charity. On their view there would be no other special efficient cause determining that increase. The excess of a more fervent act beyond the pre-existing habit could then be attributed neither to the infused habit nor to a special divine motion, but to the natural powers of the will. I call this false and contrary to natural reason: nature as such is not a proportionate cause of a more fervent supernatural act of charity without greater divine assistance. I therefore insist that no supernatural act can be exercised without actual and special supernatural help from God. General concurrence as Author and conserver of nature is insufficient. Scripture says, “No one can say, Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit,” and, “It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish.” Orange teaches: “As often as we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work.” It is therefore wrong, I argue, to reduce these texts to the same general concurrence by which God cooperates with merely natural actions. Nor is the already infused habit itself enough to explain the Apostle's words, because Paul speaks of God's actual operation. Orange likewise teaches that in every good work we do not begin by our own powers and only afterward receive divine help. I sharply rejects the view that the good use of free choice is not providentially predetermined by God because such predetermination is thought incompatible with liberty. Following Augustine and Thomas, he holds that divine grace, providence, and predestination do not destroy liberty but perfect it.
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For clarity, charity might be said to increase through our acts in four ways: efficiently; dispositively; meritoriously, with increase as reward; or dispositively and meritoriously together. Efficient causality has already been excluded as the preceding doubt explained. The present question asks whether every act of charity after justification increases the habit dispositively, meritoriously, or in both ways.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - SECOND DOUBT: ARGUMENTS FOR INCREASE BY EVERY ACT

First argument, from the Council of Trent. Session VI, canon 24 condemns the claim that received justice is merely preserved, but not also increased before God through good works, or that good works are only fruits and signs of justification and not a cause of its increase. Canon 32 teaches that the good works of the justified, done through God's grace and the merit of Christ, truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and an increase of glory. Therefore the justified merit an increase of grace by good works, and consequently an increase of charity, since grace and charity are proportioned. Second argument. St. Thomas says that every act of charity disposes toward an increase of charity, and also that every act merits an increase. It seems to follow that the increase should immediately be given. If one answers that not every act is a proximate and proportionate disposition, the objection continues. Third argument. If actual increase requires both merit and a present disposition equal and proportionate to the increase, then the increase merited by earlier remiss or merely equal acts could never be conferred. Suppose the pre-existing habit is as five, an earlier remiss act as two, and later, by special divine help, a fervent act as six. If the present disposition as six produces an increase as eight, adding two degrees for the earlier merit, the present increase would exceed the proportion of the present disposition. But if the increase must always equal the present adequate disposition, nothing remains to reward the preceding remiss acts. Thus either their merited increase is never given, or it must be given immediately when those acts occur. Fourth argument. Suppose one person has charity as four and produces a more fervent act as five, thereby receiving an increase; another already has charity as six and produces an equally intense act as five. Why should the latter not immediately receive the increase merited by the act as five? He should not be in a worse condition merely because his pre-existing habit is more intense. Fifth argument. If a man dies after producing several acts remiss in comparison with his habit, he nevertheless seems destined for greater glory than if he had never produced them. Glory is commensurate with the grace possessed in this life: “The grace of God is eternal life.” Since grace and charity are proportioned, it seems that he must have received an increase of grace and charity in this life. Sixth argument. If an act more intense than the habit were required for increase, this would seem especially necessary if our act efficiently caused the increase. But the preceding doubt established that it does not. The physical principle that a cause of lesser intensity cannot produce an effect of greater intensity therefore does not apply. Moreover merit is a moral disposition to reward, and even remiss acts of true charity are proportionate merits for an increase of charity, since St. Thomas says every act of charity merits such increase. Seventh argument. Indeed, if a habit as five could not elicit an act as six because the less cannot efficiently produce the more, then charity could never increase through a more fervent act elicited by the habit. If one says that God supplies the greater intensity, then with respect to that excess man would appear to act only as God's instrument. But merit belongs to a true moral cause, not merely to an instrument. Hence, the objector concludes, perhaps merit alone should suffice for immediate increase without requiring a more intense dispositive act.

I say scholastic opinions on this difficulty are extraordinarily diverse, even among professed followers of St. Thomas, but they can be
reduced to three. FIRST OPINION - Gabriel Biel and other Nominalists. Every act of charity, however remiss, immediately increases
grace and charity. Consequently, if the person dies in grace, he receives greater glory because of that act. I remark that this opinion appears favorable to good works and encourages even the tepid to act, since every good act would immediately increase grace, charity, and glory. He wryly adds that he wishes it were true, for it would be very agreeable to those who are tepid and remiss in charity, “such as most of us are.” SECOND OPINION - Scotus, followed by Richard of Middleton. Every act, however remiss, corresponds to greater glory, but in this life greater habitual grace or charity is not conferred because of remiss acts unless the person
disposes himself through more fervent acts. The principal reason is that eternal reward corresponds to merits: one who has more merits receives more reward. Yet grace and charity in this life increase only through a proportionate disposition of free choice, just as
in adult justification there is proportion between the acts disposing for grace and the grace infused. THIRD OPINION - St. Thomas. I
summarize it in four propositions: (1) charity is increased only through a more fervent act; (2) every act of charity merits an increase;
(3) the merited increase is not conferred until the person disposes himself through a more fervent act; (4) every act of charity merits eternal life. All four, I say, are expressly contained in the present article. A text in the Sentences says that not every meritorious act merits an increase of grace. Some disciples therefore claim that Thomas later retracted that statement. I reject the need for a retraction
and follows Cajetan's reconciliation. In the Sentences Thomas was considering an increase of grace as a concomitant reward - something bestowed together with the act - and in that sense not every act merits such an immediate increase. In the Summa he considers increase also as a reward that can be owed and conferred later, at the proper time when the person has disposed himself. Thus every act of charity, even a remiss one, can merit an increase which is subsequently conferred when the person breaks forth into
a more fervent act. I note that modern Thomists understand this teaching very differently from older Thomists. He points the reader to
the relecture of his teacher Francisco de Vitoria appended to the commentary, intending to show how difficult the modern interpretations become. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - CENSURE OF THE NOMINALIST OPINION I judge the Nominalist opinion entirely improbable. FIRST INCONVENIENCE. If every act immediately increases charity, the increase would have to correspond to the full latitude or intensity of the act. Suppose the pre-existing habit is as five and an act as one is performed: the habit
would become six. If an act as six follows, it would become twelve; if an act as twelve follows, it would become twenty-four, and so
forth. If an act equal in intensity to the habit doubled the habit, charity could reach an incredible intensity in a very short time. If instead an act as six produced only the same one-degree increase as an act as one, the more intense act would be no better disposed for
increase than the lesser. SECOND INCONVENIENCE. After justification, however a man acts - remissly or intensely - the habit would quickly become more intense than the acts. A habit as five with an act as one becomes six; an act as six then makes it twelve. I
find it strange that at justification a proportion should exist between the disposing act and the infused habit, yet afterward no such proportion should be maintained. THIRD INCONVENIENCE. The light of glory would cease to be proportioned to the intensity of acts and the habit of charity. I is speaking specifically of that intensity of the light of glory which corresponds as reward to our meritorious acts, not of sacramental increases conferred ex opere operato through Christ's merits. FOURTH INCONVENIENCE. There would be no finite proportion between the increase produced by an act exercised for one instant and the increase produced by the same act continued for a determinate period. Suppose Peter and Paul have equal charity as five. Peter elicits an act as five for only
an instant. Paul elicits the same act as five and continues loving God with the same intensity for half an hour. If every instant of the act produces a fresh increase corresponding to the act, Paul's increase would exceed Peter's without finite proportion. Some answer that this is merely a “calculator's” argument, comparing it to local motion: a moving thing occupies different places through infinitely
many instants without traversing infinite space. I reject this. Aristotle teaches that if a body actually traversed a determinate portion of
space in each instant, then in any finite time it would traverse infinitely much. Likewise, if an act as five exercised in one instant produces five degrees of increase, and the same is true in each successive instant, a continuously sustained act would generate an impossible accumulation of increases.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - NOMINALISTS CONCLUDED; CENSURE OF SCOTUS I

presses the preceding
argument. If defenders of the Nominalist position claim that the increase produced during a period has only a finite proportion to the increase produced in one instant, they should specify that proportion - a hundredfold, a thousandfold, or some other determinate ratio. Suppose it were a hundredfold. Let John, during the same half hour in which Paul continuously loves God, elicit 120 separate instantaneous acts of the same intensity. On the Nominalist theory John would merit more increase than Paul, even though Paul continued in actual love throughout the entire interval. I call this spiritually absurd: multiplying discrete acts within the same period should not be more meritorious merely as multiplication than persevering continuously in one act of divine love. If each of John's acts exceeded Paul's corresponding merit by some finite ratio, Paul's continuous exercise in all the other instants would still surpass it. It is metaphysically untenable to say that Paul's love merits less in an instant simply because he loved immediately before and will love immediately after. Hence the Nominalist opinion, although initially pious and attractive, is in JUDGMENT improbable and leads through evident consequences into serious difficulties. He adds that it may actually encourage tepidity rather than prevent it. CENSURE OF SCOTUS'S OPINION. I say Scotus's view, which once seemed probable to him, now appears altogether false and improbable. FIRST OBJECTION. In escaping the Nominalist difficulty of disproportionality between act and increased habit, Scotus introduces disproportionality between grace in this life and glory in the next. It could happen that one person dies with much less grace than another yet later possesses greater glory. Example: Peter has one act of love intense as one hundred and therefore grace as one hundred. Paul has one hundred remiss acts as two; on Scotus's view he may retain grace only as two in this life, yet each act merits two degrees of glory, so he would receive two hundred degrees of glory. Thus Paul,
dying with grace as two, would receive greater glory than Peter dying with grace as one hundred. Domingo de Soto objects that grace is an acceptance unto glory; therefore it seems contradictory for someone to be accepted to greater glory without being more pleasing to God through greater grace. A Scotist reply distinguishes grace as an infused supernatural quality from divine acceptance. As a quality, grace formally makes a man participant in the divine nature; as divine acceptance, God may accept someone to greater glory because of more numerous merits without giving him proportionately greater habitual grace. I reply that, once grace is admitted as an infused habit, one must speak consistently about its increase. At justification the amount of infused grace corresponds to the glory for which the person is accepted. Greater participation in divine nature naturally entails a proportionately greater acceptance to inheritance: “If sons, then heirs.” The same quantity of glory can correspond both to grace as the root of merit and to good actions as their formal reward. Hence Scotus's separation is inconsistent with the common theological doctrine of infused grace. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - CENSURE OF SCOTUS CONTINUED; MODERN THOMISTS I conclude that when a person is accepted to greater glory because of actual merits, the same increase ought proportionately to correspond to grace by which he becomes a greater participant in the divine nature. He appeals to the common doctrine, approved at Vienne and Trent, that grace and the virtues are infused and that justification occurs through inherent justice, including faith, hope, and charity. As justification stands to justification, so greater justification should involve more perfect participation in grace, faith, hope, and charity.

SECOND INCONVENIENCE against Scotus. No matter how intensely a justified person later loves God, grace and habitual
charity would never again be proportioned to the glory eventually received. If a man has charity as five and afterward loves with an act as six, Scotus permits the habit to rise only to six, while the future glory may include five degrees corresponding to the act at justification plus six corresponding to the later act, totaling eleven. The habit remains six while glory is eleven. I find it incredible that proportionality exists at justification but can never afterward be restored, however intensely the person acts. THIRD INCONVENIENCE. Glory would have to correspond to the whole latitude of intensity of each meritorious act. If every remiss act adds future glory, someone multiplying moderately intense acts could accumulate an implausibly enormous degree of glory. Thus I ends his censure of Scotus.
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Some modern Thomists, regarding Thomas's doctrine as too rigid but unwilling to appear to depart from him, adopted what I extraordinary gloss. In effect, they follow Scotus while presenting the position as the true interpretation of Thomas. I say they attempted something similar regarding the revival of merits through penance. Their view is this: charity is not presently increased by
remiss acts but only by more intense acts; nevertheless every act of charity merits an increase of grace and essential glory, and this
increase will be given after death even if throughout this life the person never disposed himself through a more fervent act. Example:
Peter has grace and charity as five, performs an act of love as one, and immediately dies. In the next life, they say, he receives a light
of glory as six and a beatific vision proportionately as six. They appeal first to Trent's teaching that good works truly merit increase of
grace and glory. Second, they cite Thomas's statement that every meritorious act merits an increase of grace just as it merits consummated grace, eternal life; just as eternal life is not immediately rendered but at its proper time, so the increase of grace can be
rendered later. They therefore say that if the person was not sufficiently disposed in this life, God will dispose him in the next so that
grace and charity correspond to the beatific vision and fruition.

QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - MODERN THOMIST VIEW AND my CENSURE Further arguments for the modern

interpretation: Third,
reward is owed to meritorious acts rather than to habits. If Peter performs two acts of charity equal in intensity while Paul performs only one, Peter seems entitled to double reward. Fourth, God is no less ready to reward than to punish. Every mortal sin increases eternal punishment even if the later sin is less intense; therefore every good act, even a remiss one, should increase eternal life, so that if the just person dies immediately he receives greater glory because of it. Fifth, Scripture promises
reward to all good works without expressly restricting the promise to more intense acts: Christ's promise concerning a cup of cold water, Paul's teaching about eternal life for those persevering in good work, judgment according to deeds, and “each shall
receive his own reward according to his labor.” Orange likewise says reward is owed to good works, though grace precedes them. Some modern theologians extend this so far that they assign a distinct degree of substantial glory even to acts commanded by charity over and above the degree corresponding to the commanding act of charity itself. Thus, if Peter and Paul possess equal love of God but Peter gives a larger alms, Peter would receive a more intense light of glory for seeing and enjoying God. I say he will show this to be alien to Thomas and to the truth. A final argument repeats the earlier parity case: if
a man with charity as ten elicits love as eleven and thereby receives an increase of essential reward, then a man with charity as
twenty who elicits love as fifteen and dies immediately should likewise receive an increase of substantial glory for that act. Otherwise the one possessing greater charity would seem worse off. my CENSURE OF CERTAIN MODERN THOMISTS. Before presenting his own judgment - which he says will simply be the explicit doctrine of St. Thomas - I argue that this modern opinion does not differ in substance from Scotus, differs greatly from the older Thomists, and is far removed from Thomas himself. Like Scotus, it does not posit in this life a disposition whose intensity is proportionate to the future reward of
glory. It also relies upon Scotus's principal argument, and therefore the objections already made against Scotus apply to it. I note that the older Thomist tradition includes Capreolus, Conrad, Cajetan, Peter of Bergamo, Paludanus, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and others, both on increase of charity and on revival of merits through penance. He promises to examine these authorities carefully. He then begins to produce St. Thomas's own texts verbatim. DOCUMENTS OF ST. THOMAS FROM THE SENTENCES. In I Sentences, distinction 17, question 2, article 3, ad 2, after teaching that charity is not increased by every act, Thomas says that the substantial reward of eternal life is ordered as an end to acts of charity, and act and reward are commensurated not by equality but by proportion. A greater act of charity receives a greater substantial reward. Every act, insofar as informed by charity, is ordered to substantial reward; but not every act is ordered to an increase of reward, just as not every act is ordered to an increase of charity.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - DOCUMENTS OF ST. THOMAS St. Thomas continues in I

Sentences: when an act of
charity is of the kind required for an increase of charity, then the substantial reward corresponding to the greater charity is
likewise increased. But not all acts are of this kind; therefore a mere multiplication of acts does not necessarily entail an increase of substantial reward. In II Sentences, distinction 27, Thomas distinguishes cases in which an act stands to reward
merely as merit from cases in which it also functions in some way as a dispositive cause, as in the increase of grace. Not every
meritorious act therefore merits an immediate increase of grace, because not every act contains the condition by which an
increase of the habit follows. That condition is present when a person uses received grace according to the proportion of its
powers and is not negligent with respect to God's grace. I reject the modern claim that a proportionate disposition can simply be supplied in the next life. Thomas's phrase “lest anyone fail the grace of God through negligence” plainly concerns
this life. In the present Article VI Thomas likewise says every act merits increase, but the increase occurs “when someone
strives toward such increase.” Such striving belongs to this life, for in the next life no one strives toward an increase of charity. From III Sentences I draws two points: first, the habit of charity does not increase once it has reached its terminus;

second, a person can truly merit a reward already owed to him by acquiring a new title or mode under which it is owed,
without necessarily increasing the root of merit. From IV Sentences Thomas teaches that the entire diversity in meriting substantial glory returns to diversity of charity. Charity in the wayfarer distinguishes the heavenly mansions by way of merit. Works receive attribution of glory only insofar as they are informed by charity; therefore diverse degrees of charity
correspond to diverse degrees of substantial glory, which consists in the vision and fruition of God. Thomas also distinguishes essential from accidental reward. Some excellence can arise from the kind of act with respect not to essential
reward - joy in God - but to an accidental reward, joy concerning a created good. Thus the “golden crown” signifies essential
reward, whereas an “aureola” is an eminent accidental reward owed, for example, to virgins, doctors, and martyrs. Even the
smallest reward corresponding to the merit rooted in charity is greater in its own order than an accidental reward corresponding merely to the kind of work. I say this distinction is crucial against contemporary theologians who place so
much merit in the difficulty or excellence of works of fortitude, justice, chastity, mercy, or almsgiving that a person with
equal or even lesser charity could supposedly receive greater substantial reward than one with greater charity. He observes
that some contemporaries, confronted with Thomas's clear Sentences texts, answer that Thomas merely followed common
opinions of his time. I consider this inadequate. Thomas may have followed common opinions, but no Thomist had traditionally said he embraced an absurd, rash, or near-erroneous position. His own teacher Melchior Cano spoke more modestly: Cano considered it quite probable from Thomas that acts which do not increase charity do not merit a new degree
of essential glory, though Cano personally preferred Scotus's opinion. I now turns from the Sentences to texts from the Summa Theologiae and Thomas's Pauline commentaries.
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COMMENTARIES I first

remarks that Francisco de Vitoria, although he called the older Thomist opinion rigid and introduced the contrary view into the Salamanca school, nevertheless presented the older view as probable and admitted that none of the competing opinions was free from serious difficulties. I therefore ask Thomists to attend directly to what Thomas teaches in the Summa. FIRST TESTIMONY: SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, q.12, a.6. Thomas asks whether one who sees the divine essence can see it more perfectly than another. He answers yes and reduces diversity of vision to diversity in the power of the light of glory; diversity in the light of glory is in turn related to diversity of charity. “He who has more charity will participate more in the light of glory.” Thomas is explicitly speaking of charity in this life, since he says that where charity is greater, desire is greater, and desire makes the one desiring in a certain way apt and prepared to receive the desired object. Since Thomas teaches in II-II, q.24, aa.4-5 that charity is not greater or lesser extensively but only intensively, I conclude that to “have more charity” means to love God more intensely and to possess a more intense habit of charity. I recounts an episode involving the Dominican master Mancio. While interpreting I, q.12, a.6, Mancio raised against himself the objection that, on Thomas's doctrine, someone who performs a remiss act of charity - even if he gives all his substance to feed the poor - would not thereby become more blessed. At the time Mancio reportedly answered only with a smile and later suggested that Thomas's position was false. Years afterward, when teaching this very Article VI, Mancio received my scholastic commentary and found the position so persuasive that, I say, he would have dictated it in his lectures had he not already publicly adopted the common modern view. Mancio nevertheless judged my position very probable and apparently Thomistic. SECOND TESTIMONY: SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, q.95, a.4. Thomas asks whether the works of the first man would have been less efficacious for merit than ours. He says the quantity of merit can be measured in two ways. First, from the root of charity and grace. This quantity corresponds to essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God. Whoever acts from greater charity enjoys God more perfectly. Second, merit can be measured from the quantity of the work. This quantity is twofold: absolute and proportional. The widow who placed two small coins in the treasury performed a smaller work absolutely than those who gave large gifts, but proportionally she did more because her gift exceeded her resources to a greater degree. These measures correspond especially to accidental reward, joy concerning a created good. In the state of innocence human works would have been more efficacious if merit is considered from the greater grace then available without the obstacle of fallen nature, and also in absolute magnitude because stronger human powers could perform greater works. But proportionally there can be a greater reason of merit after the Fall because of human weakness: a small work may exceed the power of one acting with difficulty more than a great work exceeds the power of one acting easily. Thomas adds that difficulty and struggle pertain to the quantity of merit according to the proportional quantity of the work and manifest promptness of will. Yet promptness itself is caused by the magnitude of charity. Someone with a very prompt will may perform an easy work with the same readiness with which another performs a difficult one, because he would be prepared to perform the difficult work as well. Actual difficulty, insofar as it is penal, can additionally have a satisfactory character for sin. THIRD TESTIMONY: COMMENTARY ON 1 CORINTHIANS 3, “Each shall receive his own reward according to his labor.” Thomas says this does not signify strict equality between quantity of labor and reward, but proportionality: where labor is more excellent, reward is more excellent. Labor can be more excellent in three ways. First, according to the form of charity. To this corresponds the essential reward of the divine vision and fruition. Therefore one who labors from greater charity, even if he endures less external labor, receives more essential reward. Second, according to the species or dignity of the work. As in human affairs an architect may be rewarded more than a manual worker because the work is nobler even with less bodily labor, so in divine things a nobler work can receive a special prerogative of accidental reward. Hence aureoles are assigned to doctors, virgins, and martyrs. Third, according to quantity of labor, which Thomas proceeds to distinguish further on the following page.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - RESOLUTION ON THE INCREASE OF CHARITY

St. Thomas further explains that greater labor can sometimes merit a greater reward, especially regarding remission of punishment or
the joy arising from greater labor: for example, fasting longer or making a longer pilgrimage. Yet sometimes greater labor arises from
a defect of the will, since things willingly done are experienced as less burdensome; such labor does not increase but rather diminishes
merit. I also refer to Thomas on Romans 8, where the same doctrine is expressly taught.

I say that anyone who reads these texts sincerely should not call this merely my private opinion. He would be troubled to be thought
singular in so grave a matter, especially since even in lighter questions he has not wished to depart from the doctrine of the Angelic
Doctor. He therefore turns to my own resolution of the controversy.

Two principal difficulties have been raised. The first concerns acts elicited immediately by charity, whose object is God Himself:
whether every elicited act increases the habit of charity, or merits an increase of charity, grace, and essential glory. The second
concerns acts of other virtues commanded by charity, such as temperance, fortitude, and almsgiving: whether every such act increases
charity or merits its increase, grace, and glory; and whether these acts receive a distinct essential reward beyond that corresponding to
the act of charity commanding them.

I say these questions must be distinguished and resolved according to St. Thomas, the Fathers, Scripture, and the Catholic Church.

Although the dispute contains much philosophical subtlety, it also concerns necessary spiritual doctrine, since Christians must know
how to advance in charity, which surpasses every science and is called the bond of perfection.

FIRST FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSION. According to Catholic faith, received justice is not only preserved through our good
works but can also be increased; the justified person can through good works merit an increase of grace and glory and the attainment
of eternal life, provided he perseveres. I establish this from Trent, Session VI, canons 24 and 32, together with Scripture.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Trent's definition does not decide the scholastic controversies among Catholic doctors concerning
precisely how charity and grace increase or how glory is merited. The Council's intention must be understood from the error
it meant to condemn: the Lutheran denial that the justified truly increase in inherent justice or merit through good works.

Therefore Trent does not define that every morally good work whatsoever performed by a person in grace immediately increases
grace, nor that every such act necessarily merits a new increase of supernatural reward. Catholic theologians commonly require, for
supernatural merit, that the act proceed from charity formally or virtually, and thus be elevated and referred to the supernatural end;
some require an actual reference.

Canon 24 condemns the universal denial that justice is increased by good works; it does not assert the universal contrary that every
good work immediately increases justice. Canon 32 likewise speaks of works done through God's grace and the merit of Jesus Christ.

I therefore reject the suggestion that Thomas would have retracted his teaching had he lived after Trent. The Council condemned the
Lutheran error; it did not settle every subtle scholastic question left open among Catholics.

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it did not settle every subtle scholastic question left open among Catholics.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - THIRD AND FOURTH CONCLUSIONS THIRD CONCLUSION. The earlier opinion

found in Thomas's commentary on the Sentences - that not every meritorious act merits an increase of grace - can be maintained without injury to faith, especially in Cajetan's interpretation: not every act merits an increase of grace or charity
as an immediately accompanying reward. Nevertheless I judge Thomas's formulation in II-II, q.24, to be more proper: although charity is not increased by every act of charity, every act of charity merits an increase of charity. Likewise in I-II,
q.114, a.8 Thomas speaks of merit for an increase of grace. Durandus denies that every act of charity merits such an increase, but I prefer Thomas's later manner of speaking because it accords more naturally with Trent's canon 32. Every act
of charity is performed through God's grace and Christ's merit and therefore merits eternal life; even a remiss act at least
makes eternal life owed under a new title. In the same way, considered on the side of the act, it merits an increase of grace
and charity, though the increase is not immediately conferred because the subject is not sufficiently disposed by an act less
intense than the already existing habit. FOURTH CONCLUSION. Suppose a man possesses grace and charity as ten and
performs a remiss act of charity as one, two, or three. Although that act merits an increase of charity considered from the
side of merit, he will never receive that increase unless, in this life, he subsequently breaks forth into an act more fervent
than the pre-existing habit. I regard this as highly probable according to Thomas's explicit doctrine in Article VI: as spiritual capacity grows, man breaks forth into a more fervent act of love, strives toward an increase of charity, and then
charity is increased. The time of actual increase is therefore when a man strives toward a more fervent act. Vitoria himself
admits that it is arbitrary to place the increase of habitual charity in the next life. I add Ecclesiastes: “Where the tree falls,
there it shall lie.” If the habit of charity has not been increased in this life through a suitable disposition of the lover, it will
not afterward be intrinsically intensified in glory. Every act of charity will indeed receive the perfection belonging to the
state of the blessed, but the intrinsic intensity rooted in the subject is not increased there beyond the seed possessed in this
life. Cajetan, Conrad, Capreolus, Paludanus, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Vincent are cited as supporting or favoring this reading. I then appeal to Scripture: “To him who has, more shall be given”; Augustine interprets this of one
who uses received graces well. Hence it is spiritually dangerous to love God remissly. Revelation's rebuke of the Church of
Ephesus for abandoning its first charity is interpreted as abandonment of its former fervor. Other passages command vigilance and progress in gifts received from God. Experience likewise shows, I say, that one who neglects small things gradually falls away.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - REPLIES TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS I say his

position is safer and more useful
for souls than the positions of Scotus, the Nominalists, or certain modern Thomists. If those opinions were true, holding Thomas's stricter doctrine in thought and practice would do no harm and would encourage fervor. But if Thomas's doctrine is
true, those who trust too much in the mere multiplication of good works while neglecting fervor of charity suffer real spiritual
loss. He now replies to the arguments proposed at the beginning of the second doubt. TO THE FIRST. The fundamental
conclusion already answers the appeal to Trent. Those who imagine Thomas's doctrine
contradicts the Council do an injustice
to the Angelic Doctor. TO THE SECOND. Although every act of charity merits an increase and is in some sense a disposition
toward increase, not every act is the proximate and necessary disposition. Just as in natural causality action does not proceed
from a proportion of lesser inequality, so God wills to use our acts in the generation, infusion, and increase of charity as proportionate dispositions to the effect. The same proportionality maintained at the infusion of charity should not simply
disappear when charity increases. TO THE THIRD. Nominalists, who hold that increase corresponds to the entire intensity of
every act, are aided rather than troubled by the objection. Scotists can say that only acceptance to greater glory increases with
remiss acts. But modern Thomists who admit that habitual grace and charity increase only according to the excess of the
present act over the preceding habit face a difficulty: the increase merited by earlier remiss acts would never be given in this
life if the whole later increase corresponded exclusively to the present fervent act. Thomas, however, says that the increase
corresponding to remiss acts is conferred when a man later breaks forth into a more fervent act. I explain that the same increase can correspond simultaneously to the present fervent act as merit and adequate disposition, and to preceding remiss
acts as merit and imperfect disposition. A single degree can be bestowed under several titles. The dignity of a reward can be
greater because the same reward is owed under multiple titles, just as Christ merited the redemption of mankind through
many merits of charity even though the one redemption answers sufficiently to them all. TO THE FOURTH. A person with
charity as six who acts as five is simply in a better condition than one with charity as four who acts as five, because the former
is more pleasing to God. Yet in one respect he is less well disposed: he does not use the infused habit according to its full
proportion, whereas the latter uses his lesser habit more fully. Thus an act can be equal in merit yet unequal as a disposition
for increase. Indeed, an act absolutely more intense can be a less proportionate disposition in one subject than a much weaker
act in another. If Peter has charity as twenty and acts as fifteen, while Paul has charity as four and acts as five, Peter's act is
absolutely three times as intense, yet it is not proportioned to increasing his habit as twenty, whereas Paul's act exceeds his
habit and is proportioned to increase.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - REPLIES CONTINUED TO THE FIFTH. Those

following Scotus can deny that
habitual grace and charity must be commensurate with glory in this life. I consider the Nominalists more consistent here
because they at least increase grace and charity in this life according to the meritorious acts to which future glory corresponds. Following Thomas, however, I answer that the retribution of glory is not measured by the number of operations but by diverse degrees of charity. One act of charity intense as five can merit more essential glory than seven or
even a hundred acts intense only as one. The reason is that an increase of charity means a more perfect participation in the
likeness of the Holy Spirit. Therefore greater essential glory belongs to the one who possessed in this life the more perfect
likeness of the Holy Spirit. Mere multiplication does not increase charity; intensity does. Consequently, however many
remiss acts a person multiplies, he does not thereby love God as greatly as one who possesses a single more intense act. The
former can nevertheless possess the same degree of glory under more numerous titles and therefore enjoy a certain greater
accidental perfection of reward. I say that if merely continuing an act of the same intensity through time does not produce
greater essential reward, neither does merely multiplying equal acts. He promises to establish this more fully in the next

doubt. TO THE SIXTH. Although an act more intense than the habit is not required as an

efficient cause of the increase of
the infused habit, it is required in the same proportion as though our act efficiently reached the increase. In justification, the
disposition of the act is proportioned to the habit infused; similarly the disposition of our acts should be proportioned to the
increase of that habit. “As simple is to simple, so more is to more.” Merit as a moral disposition makes a reward owed, but it
does not necessarily make the subject physically or formally capable of receiving every degree of that reward. I give an
analogy. A king promises faithful soldiers admission to his table for life. Fighting lawfully merits admission to the royal
table, but how much an admitted soldier can eat depends not only upon merit but upon the capacity of his stomach. So too,
no one is crowned unless he has lawfully fought, and no one enters the divine banquet unless he keeps God's commandments.
Yet no one sees and enjoys God more perfectly unless in this life he possessed a greater hunger and thirst - a greater desire of
divine charity. Thomas teaches that greater charity produces greater desire and thus greater capacity for the divine vision.
Augustine similarly says concerning the heavenly mansions: “The desire of love is the preparation of the mansion.” I stress
the difference between an earthly king and the heavenly King. Soldiers do not merit at an earthly banquet because they
hunger for the food, but because they fought. With the King of heaven, however, the principal root of merit is charity itself -
love hungering and thirsting for the food and drink of eternal life.
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QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL REWARD; SEVENTH REPLY In this hunger and

thirst of charity
consists the substantial perfection of Christian life. To it corresponds immediately and principally the quantity of substantial reward, proportioned to the greater or lesser love of God. Works of other virtues commanded by charity receive the same substantial reward insofar as they are informed and commanded by charity, and no further substantial reward merely from their own specific character. Nevertheless, beyond substantial reward, acts of the other virtues receive their own accidental rewards by reason of their specific objects, difficulty, and labor. Such reward is called accidental in comparison with the reward of charity, though considered according to the virtue's own specific object it belongs to the act per se and not merely accidentally. TO THE SEVENTH. Some readily concede that the pre-existing habit to be increased does not itself elicit the more intense act at least as regards the act's greater intensity; God produces that greater intensity by special assistance. I offer a different explanation because of the objection that this would make man merely instrumental. I say that in the same instant there exists both the more intense act, which merits the increase, and the habit of charity now more intense than before. Causes can be causes of one another in different genera. The intensified habit can be the effect of the more intense act in the order of merit and disposition, while at the same time the intensified habit is the formal efficient and elicitive principle of the more intense act. In the material or dispositive order, the habit is naturally prior to the greater intensity. Thus man does not concur merely as an instrument in the increase of charity. He acts through a proportionate principle that efficiently elicits the more intense act. Although this formal principle is itself from God, it formally actuates the man so that, as a true secondary cause, he produces the intense act through which he is disposed and merits the perfection of the habit. God alone efficiently causes that perfection of charity, but He causes it through our acts as merits and dispositions. I then reject the claim that the Nominalist opinion better favors good works. Rather, he says, it favors tepidity and negligence. His own position assigns good
works their proper reward while also stirring the sluggish to serve God with fervor if they wish to enjoy Him more perfectly in
heaven. REPLIES TO THE MODERN THOMISTS. The first appeal to Trent has already been answered. To the second, every act of charity merits an increase, but Thomas determines the time of that increase: when a man breaks forth into a more fervent act in this life. The comparison with eternal life concerns the fact that a merited reward need not be immediately conferred; it is given at its proper time. It does not prove that the disposition for increasing grace is supplied after death. To the third, reward is indeed owed to meritorious acts, but the quantity of substantial reward follows the intensity of charity. Two acts of equal intensity do not contain greater intensity than one; therefore their multiplication yields greater accidental, not greater substantial, reward. Against Scotus's underlying argument that more merits universally imply more reward, I distinguish: one merit can be greater than many. If several merits are equal in charity, the person can have a greater reward in an accidental sense and rejoice more because the beatific vision is owed under several titles, but the light of glory itself is not thereby more intense unless charity itself is more intense.
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answer that good arises from an integral cause, while evil can arise from a particular defect. Hence it is not surprising that
every mortal sin adds punishment. More precisely, following Thomas, hell contains an essential punishment consisting in
separation from God and the sorrow consequent upon it, and accidental punishments concerning other objects: affliction by
infernal fire, sorrow from evil companionship, and other evils besides the loss of God. Every mortal sin can increase these
accidental punishments. The pure punishment of loss - deprivation of the divine vision - is common to all the damned insofar
as it corresponds to the worst element in mortal sin, aversion from God. The punishment of sense corresponds to conversion
toward a mutable good. I note disputed questions about whether the sorrow consequent upon separation from God itself
admits greater and lesser degrees. He prefers the opinion that it is greater according as one has lost eternal life through
greater guilt, and that this sorrow is annexed to the punishment of loss in those who sin personally, not in infants dying in
original sin. Thomas likewise teaches that because the demons' guilt does not increase in intensity of malice, their essential
punishment does not increase, though accidental punishment increases with the multiplication of the damned. The scriptural
texts about reward according to works are, I say, best explained by Thomas on 1 Corinthians 3 and actually support his
doctrine. THIRD DOUBT. Before discussing acts of other virtues commanded by charity, I briefly asks whether charity
increases through the continuation of an act of charity, or whether by such continuation a man merits an increase. Argument
for the affirmative: “To him who has, it shall be given and he shall abound,” commonly understood as referring to one who
uses received graces well. If Peter is justified with an act of charity as five and an infused habit proportioned to it, and
continues that same act for half an hour or an hour, it seems the habit should increase. A second argument: if a remiss act in
one instant merits an increase, then continuing the same act through a period of time should merit still more. If acts in two
instants doubled merit, continuous action through time would appear to produce an enormously greater increase. Those who
say every act immediately increases charity can easily concede this, but they cannot explain the proportion between an act
sustained for half an hour and the same act existing in one instant. Vitoria says that a sufficiently long continuation can
double merit, but he does not determine how long is sufficient or why merit should not already double whenever the act
exists in two instants. FIRST CONCLUSION. Regularly speaking, one who continues an act of love for a notable time grows
in the intensity of charity. I consider this probable because, like a natural motion that becomes swifter as it proceeds
according to its connatural inclination unless impeded, an act proceeding according to the inclination of charity will
ordinarily become more intense through continued divine assistance, provided free choice does not impede it. Thus charity
grows when man does not fail the grace of God. SECOND CONCLUSION begins: if, whether in fact or by supposition,
someone continues an act of love with exactly the same intensity with which it began, he does not thereby merit a greater
increase of grace, charity, or substantial glory merely because of the temporal continuation.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - CONTINUATION OF AN ACT OF CHARITY SECOND CONCLUSION. If a person

continues an act of love through time with precisely the same intensity, he does not merit a greater increase of grace, charity,
or substantial glory than he would have merited had the same act existed only in one instant. The difference between the
continued act and the instantaneous act lies only in temporal duration, not in object or intensity. Duration adds a certain difficulty because the corruptible body burdens the soul, but this is an accidental difference. Hence the continued act exceeds
the instantaneous act only accidentally in goodness and merit. If two persons die with acts equal in charity's intensity, their
substantial reward is equal; the one who persevered longer receives a greater accidental reward. I confirm this from the efficacy of the will. Suppose Peter and Paul at the same instant form equally intense acts of love with the effective intention
of remaining in contemplation and love of God for two hours. Peter dies before the two hours pass, while Paul actually continues. Peter already possessed the efficacious will to persevere; only time, something extrinsic to that will, was lacking.
Therefore he is not deprived of essential reward, just as one who sincerely wills to give alms but lacks money can merit essentially as though he had given it. “When the will is ready, it is accepted according to what it has, not according to what it
has not.” Hence the maxim: the will is reckoned for the deed when the ability to perform is lacking. This resolves the sophisms comparing continuation and multiplication. Without an excess of intensity there is no difference in merit for substantial reward, because the heart is not more purified and the spirit is not more deeply united to God. Through multiplication one is united more frequently; through continuation, for a longer time; but not more intensely. Therefore it is
one thing to say that a person continuing an act merits an increase throughout that time, and another to say that he merits a
greater and greater increase merely because more time passes. The first is true; the second is false. He loves longer, not more
intensely, though he merits greater accidental reward. The same applies to multiplying acts of equal intensity: one loves more often, but not more intensely. To the second argument: Peter merits increase and substantial reward throughout the
period, but does not merit a larger increase than at the beginning; he merits for longer and perseveres in merit. Greater reward from duration is accidental. Doubling time or instants does not double the formal reason of meriting. AN

OBJECTION concerning accidental reward. If continuation or multiplication adds accidental reward, and there are infinitely many instants in any period, would even a tiny duration produce infinitely many degrees of accidental reward? I
answer no. An act of charity insofar as it exists in a single instant does not receive a distinct accidental reward from duration; its reward under that aspect is substantial. Accidental reward arises from circumstances added to an already existing act. Continuation is such an added circumstance, and its accidental reward is greater or lesser according to greater
or lesser duration. There is no smallest possible duration and therefore no smallest possible degree of this reward. Similarly,
multiplication of acts has proportion according to number: if multiplication in two instants receives a determinate accidental
reward, multiplication in four may receive a proportionately greater one. I then turns to the harder comparison between accidental reward from multiplication and accidental reward from continuation.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - END OF THIRD DOUBT; FOURTH DOUBT The accidental

reward corresponding to
multiplication and that corresponding to continuation need not be proportionable to one another as quantities of one species. I propose that they are accidental rewards of different species. This avoids the objection that continuation through any finite time contains infinitely many instants and therefore would have to yield infinitely greater reward than multiplication. He compares this to the aureola of virginity and the aureola of martyrdom. They are not proportioned as more and less within one species because they correspond to specifically different excellences. However much joy concerning virginity increases, it
does not thereby become specifically the joy belonging to martyrdom. Likewise the accidental joy corresponding to the continuation of charity differs specifically from that corresponding to the multiplication of acts because continuation possesses its own special difficulty. Although, within its own species, a multiplication of acts may sometimes be proportionally more meritorious than a short continuation, absolutely speaking and other things equal, continuation of love is more praiseworthy and merits a more excellent kind of accidental reward. This does not mean the love of God itself changes species. Essential reward concerns God Himself clearly seen, where differences among the blessed arise from greater or lesser intensity, not from specifically different objects. Accidental joys, however, can differ specifically because their created objects differ. Thus joy over the exercise of temperance differs specifically from joy over fortitude; similarly joy over charity exercised through continuation differs from joy over charity exercised through multiplication. FOURTH

DOUBT. When the habit of charity is increased through a more intense act, is it increased according

to the whole intensity of
the act, or only according to the excess by which the act surpasses the pre-existing habit? Vitoria gives two answers: charity increases only according to the excess of the act over the habit, while grace increases according to the whole latitude of the act, and glory likewise corresponds to the whole latitude. Thus if Peter has charity as twenty and elicits an act as twenty-one, charity would rise only to twenty-one, while grace and future glory would rise as though adding the whole twenty-one. I note that Vitoria ultimately defines none of these competing opinions as certain. FIRST CONCLUSION. The habit of charity increases through a more intense act only according to the excess of the act's intensity over the pre-existing habit. This accords with natural proportion. If something is hot as four and a heating cause as five acts upon it, it can raise it only from four to five. Even though our supernatural acts do not efficiently produce charity but serve as dispositions, natural dispositions themselves maintain proportion to the form for which they dispose. Therefore our acts as dispositions should likewise be proportioned to the increase of the infused habit. Second proof: in the initial infusion of charity and other habits through our dispositions, proportionality is maintained between disposition and infused habit. The same proportionality should therefore be maintained in increase. This directly opposes the Nominalists, who make every act add its whole intensity. SECOND CONCLUSION. Grace also increases through more intense acts not according to the whole latitude of their intensity, but only according to their excess. I see no adequate reason why grace and charity should follow different proportions, since the two infused habits are so closely related, charity proceeding from grace analogously as a power from an essence. Thomas speaks of the increase of grace in I-II, q.114, a.8 in the same way that he speaks here of charity: not every act increases it, though every act merits increase, and it increases when a man breaks forth into a more fervent act.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - GRACE AND CHARITY MUST INCREASE

PROPORTIONATELY; FIFTH DOUBT

I give another argument for the second conclusion. The habit of grace is the effect of God's love toward us, by which we are called loved and pleasing to God and made participants in the divine nature. The habit of charity is that by which we formally remain in love of God. It is impossible, I argue, that God should love more the person who loves Him less, or that the one who loves less should thereby be more pleasing to God. But if charity increased only by the excess of a fervent act while grace increased by the entire latitude of that act, precisely this disproportion could occur. Example: Peter is justified with an act of love as ten and receives charity and grace as ten. Paul is justified with an act as six and receives charity and grace as six. Later, while Peter does nothing, Paul elicits an act of love as nine. If charity increases only to nine but grace receives the whole nine added to the former six, Paul's grace becomes fifteen. Paul would then love God less than Peter, whose charity remains ten, while nevertheless being more pleasing to God and accepted to greater glory because his grace is fifteen. I consider this absurd. Some reply that Paul “loves more” because he has loved more times. I reject this: he never loves more intensely, either habitually or actually. At no moment does his love exceed Peter's. Mere multiplication cannot be called greater love unless one accepts the Nominalist account in which the habit itself accumulates the whole intensity of each

act. Augustine says that the soul is illumined with the light of glory according to the degree by which it adheres to God in charity. Therefore the person who adheres more intensely to God in charity should receive the greater light of glory. Others answer by appealing to divine acceptance: although Paul's acts have passed away, they remain in God's acceptance, and because of them Paul is accepted to greater glory. I reply that this gives too little weight to the infused habits by which we are justified through inherent justice. If a man becomes more justified, those habits must inhere more perfectly and therefore be more intense. Moreover divine love differs from the love of a human king. A king's love need place nothing intrinsically in the beloved; God's love produces a real effect. As Author of nature God loves more those creatures to whom He communicates greater natural goods; as Author of grace He loves more the just person to whom He communicates greater justice. This “more” and “less” is not a change in the divine act itself but in its effects. I distinguish this present order from eternal predestination. Considered according to predestination, a person presently in mortal sin may be destined to greater final glory than someone presently just. But speaking according to present justice and the glory corresponding to it, the person presently more just is more loved by God in the relevant sense because greater intrinsic supernatural goods are communicated to him. FIFTH DOUBT. Do acts of the other virtues commanded by charity increase charity, or merit its increase? First argument for the affirmative: every good act of a person existing in grace is meritorious of eternal life; therefore it also merits an increase of charity. Thomas teaches that every act of charity and every meritorious act merits eternal life and an increase of grace and charity. Second argument begins: at least more intense acts of other virtues seem to increase charity, because every virtue is increased through a more intense act. If the other virtues increase, charity seemingly must increase with them, since the virtues should preserve a proportion of intensity and the inclination toward means should not be stronger than the inclination toward the final end.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - FIFTH DOUBT: ACTS OF OTHER VIRTUES COMMANDED BY CHARITY The

second argument continues. The habits of the other virtues incline toward the means, while charity inclines toward the ultimate end. Therefore an infused virtue concerned with the means should not become more intense than charity concerned with the end. If someone replies that whenever another virtue performs a more intense act, charity simultaneously elicits a more intense act and thereby increases along with it, a third argument follows. It is not necessary that whenever a virtue acts concerning the means, the virtue concerning the end be actually elicited. Thomas teaches that one can actually will the means while willing the ultimate end only virtually. Therefore another virtue could be increased through a more intense act concerning its own object without an elicited act of charity; it would seem that charity must nevertheless increase because of the connection of the virtues. Confirmation: the moral virtues increase together through their connection with prudence and with one another. Since all infused virtues are also connected with charity, charity would seem to be intensified together with them. Fourth argument. More intense acts of other infused virtues belong by nature and object to the same supernatural order as charity. According to the more common opinion, the infused virtues are given so that the powers may be proportioned to supernatural means in relation to the supernatural end. It would therefore seem disordered if acts concerning means within charity's supernatural order increased their own virtues but did not increase charity. Fifth argument. We are often bound by a precept or counsel of charity to suspend an elicited act of love and attend to works of other virtues. It would seem unfitting that charity should command an exercise through which charity itself grows less than it otherwise might, since “the end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience.” Sixth argument. Common Christian judgment considers a person more perfect in charity who is greatly exercised in works of other virtues - large almsgiving, care of the sick, building churches, preaching the Gospel. Those heavily occupied in such works cannot constantly exercise elicited acts of charity. Therefore habitual charity seems capable of growing without frequent elicited acts of charity. Seventh and final argument. Martyrdom is an elicited act of fortitude, yet charity can be acquired or increased through martyrdom without an elicited act of charity. According to a common opinion, someone who is not contrite but only attrite, yet willingly suffers death for confession of the faith, can be saved. Such a person had no elicited act of charity, yet through the eminent act of fortitude receives charity. If martyrdom can dispose for the first infusion of charity, it seems it can also dispose for an increase of charity already possessed. I remark that many theologians, including some contemporary Thomists, speak inconsistently on this question. He resolves to follow St. Thomas throughout, because Thomas consistently follows the Fathers. Rather than rehearse every opinion, he will establish foundations and conclusions and then answer the arguments. FIRST FOUNDATION. Every morally good act - whether elicited from an acquired virtue or from free choice according to right reason - is in itself meritorious before God, whether performed by a Christian or by an unbelieving pagan, provided no evil circumstance is added. I grounds this in Thomas, I-II, q.21, aa.2-4: insofar as a human act is good, it is praiseworthy and worthy of reward before the one who has care of the community, at least before God, because every good act redounds to the glory of God as Author of the universe. Cajetan distinguishes two senses of merit. First, from the nature of the act itself: an act good in object and free from an evil circumstance possesses a reason of merit before God. Second, from the state of the person acting: in this sense not every good act is meritorious, but only the good act of one existing in grace. An objection says that no act can be meritorious unless the agent merits through it, while no one outside grace can merit even a temporal reward before God. I deny the major premise. An act can possess merit considered in itself without denominating the agent as meriting, because the agent may remain turned away from God through sin. The good act possesses goodness according to its proper object and proximate end, while lacking the goodness of

the ultimate end that belongs to an agent rightly ordered to God.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - FIRST AND SECOND FOUNDATIONS

A morally good act, considered merely according to the goodness of its species, does not suffice to denominate a sinful agent good or meriting, because the act's goodness does not reach or unite with the agent's ultimate end. If, however, a man existed in pure nature without sin and performed a morally good act, he would undoubtedly merit some reward from God, though not supernatural and eternal life consisting in the vision and enjoyment of God; that cannot fall under merit without grace or a supernatural gift. Thus natural reason can establish a future retribution of good and evil acts, though not the resurrection or the reward of glory consisting in the vision of God. Given faith in the future judgment, God will bring every work into judgment, and Christ the universal Judge will manifest every work of free choice, good or evil, of believers or unbelievers. Every truly good work will be praised. Yet if its agent finally died in mortal sin, that praise will not be a reward for him, but rather part of his confusion, because others will rejoice and glorify God as Author of the good works which the damned person once performed. SECOND FOUNDATION. The distinction frequently made by theologians, especially St. Thomas, between essential or substantial reward and accidental reward is necessary. Neglect of this distinction causes some modern theologians, whenever they hear of merit, reward, greater merit, or greater reward, immediately to think only of the vision and enjoyment of God through the light of glory, while undervaluing the rewards called accidental. There are therefore two rewards in the future life. Essential reward is essential beatitude itself, consisting in the vision of God and joy in God Himself. Accidental reward is something consequent upon that blessed state: the blessed rejoice not only in God but also in created goods, especially morally good works performed by rational creatures, and most especially in the good works which they themselves performed. This accidental joy has the proper character of reward particularly when it concerns acts personally performed - assisting the poor, fasting, exercising the moral virtues, and similar works. Accidental reward is further divided into accidental reward commonly so called and the aureola, a special accidental reward bestowed for works possessing the character of an excellent victory, such as those of virgins, doctors, and martyrs. Those who receive aureolae need not therefore surpass others in essential beatitude. The least reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity exceeds every reward corresponding merely to the specific kind of an exterior work. Hence “aureola,” the little golden crown, is named diminutively in relation to the “aurea,” the essential reward corresponding to merits insofar as they proceed from charity.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ACCIDENTAL REWARDS AND CHRISTIAN

PERFECTION I confirm accidental
rewards from Scripture. Christ promises a “good measure, pressed down and shaken together” (Luke 6), signifying the fullness of reward corresponding to every goodness and perfection found in merit. A meritorious work has goodness from
charity directing it to the ultimate end, goodness from its own specific object, and perfection from its exterior execution.
Accordingly, enjoyment of God corresponds to the work insofar as it is informed by charity, while a special reward corresponds to its particular kind of work. Scripture specifically mentions three special accidental rewards: those of virgins,
martyrs, and doctors. Revelation 14 describes the virgins as singing a canticle that no one else can sing and following the
Lamb wherever He goes. This indicates a special joy distinct from the enjoyment of God common to all the blessed.
Revelation 7 similarly gives martyrs white robes and palms, signifying a reward peculiar to martyrdom. Many non-martyrs
can nevertheless possess greater essential beatitude than many martyrs. Daniel 12 says that the learned shall shine like the
brightness of the firmament and those who instruct many unto justice like stars forever. This is commonly applied to the
special reward of doctors and preachers. Likewise, “He who shall do and teach, he shall be called great in the kingdom of
heaven.” Yet one devoted only to contemplation may be greater in essential beatitude than many teachers. The teacher therefore has a special excellence or aureola proper to teaching. From this I conclude that accidental rewards must be highly
esteemed. Even the least supernatural accidental joy added to essential beatitude is more excellent than possession of all
temporal goods together with immortality in this present life. Consequently, whenever Scripture promises a reward or a greater reward for particular works, one must not automatically interpret this as a greater degree of the vision and enjoyment of God; the promise may concern accidental reward. THIRD FOUNDATION. The perfection of Christian life is
measured especially by charity and consists essentially in charity. According to other virtues Christian perfection exists only
in a qualified or secondary sense. Thomas teaches in II-II, q.184 that substantial and essential perfection of Christian life
consists in the precept of charity; counsels belong secondarily and instrumentally to perfection. Everything is called perfect
insofar as it reaches its proper end, and charity unites us to God, the ultimate end of the human mind: “He who abides in
charity abides in God and God in him.” Charity is therefore “the bond of perfection,” binding the other virtues into a perfect
unity by causing them to attain the ultimate end. A thing can be perfect simply, according to what belongs to its nature, or
perfect in some respect according to something externally added. Thus Christian life is perfect simply according to charity,
but according to the other virtues only in a qualified respect. From this I infers that the substantial reward of the future life
should correspond proportionally to the essential perfection of Christian life, while accidental reward corresponds to its accidental perfections.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - CONCLUSIONS ON ACTS OF OTHER VIRTUES FIRST CONCLUSION. If a person

habitually exists in grace and performs a morally good act according to natural right reason, but does not actually or virtually refer it to the supernatural end, he does not through that act merit an increase of charity, grace, or essential reward. Example: Peter cheerfully invites a friend to dinner and behaves with the friendliness demanded by human friendship. The act is morally good but, considered in the proposed case, belongs to the natural order and is not commanded
by supernatural charity. Therefore it cannot dispose to or merit an increase belonging to a superior supernatural order. Some Nominalists hold that once a person in grace has by one act of charity referred himself and all his affairs to God, every
subsequent good work remains virtually referred to God through that first act. Others, including my teacher Melchior Cano,
require such morally good acts to be actually referred by charity in order to merit supernatural reward. I leaves that controversy aside. His conclusion concerns a good act which is neither actually nor virtually referred to the supernatural
end. Such a case can occur when a person is justified through the sacrament of Penance with attrition alone and afterward
performs an ordinary naturally good act. The habits of grace and charity have been infused sacramentally, but no preceding
elicited act of charity has referred this particular action to the supernatural end. SECOND CONCLUSION. Through such a
naturally good moral act the person can merit some accidental reward: a special joy in glory concerning the exercise of natural friendship. The act has merit according to its own moral goodness before God as Author of nature. Grace does not
destroy nature but perfects it; therefore the natural reward can be received in a more splendid manner because it is joined to
supernatural grace and glory. THIRD CONCLUSION. Through all works of the other moral virtues which are directed by
an act of charity to charity's own end, a person merits an increase of grace and charity and consequently of essential glory,
whether the commanding act of charity is intense or remiss. These works are informed by charity and attain charity's supernatural end; therefore they possess supernatural goodness and supernatural merit. Every meritorious act merits an increase of grace, and works performed in virtue of charity participate in charity's value. Thus almsgiving and fasting truly
merit essential reward, but they do so insofar as they flow from the root of charity and are informed by it as a body by its
soul. No separate quantity of essential reward corresponds to acts of moral virtue over and above the essential reward corresponding to the act of charity by which those works are actually or virtually ordered to the supernatural end. Some object that infused moral virtues, unlike acquired virtues, have an intrinsic proportion to the supernatural end and therefore
should merit a further degree of essential reward from their own infused principle. I answer that this does not follow Thomas. Even when Thomas discusses infused virtues, such as the patience of martyrs, he does not assign patience an additional degree of essential reward apart from that corresponding to the charity which commands it.
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QUESTION XXIV -
ARTICLE VI - FOURTH, FIFTH, AND

SIXTH CONCLUSIONS The essential perfection of Christian life does not consist in the operation of another infused moral virtue. Even infused moral virtues concern means rather than God Himself as ultimate end. Their supernatural proportion derives from infused prudence subordinated to and moved by charity. Acquired moral virtue presupposes an intention toward a naturally known rational good; infused virtue presupposes a will elevated by charity toward a supernatural end and therefore may select means surpassing natural reason. I note that some theologians deny infused moral virtues and hold acquired moral virtues together with infused theological virtues sufficient. I regard this opinion as false, but notes that it is not
censured as temerarious so long as infused grace and theological virtues are maintained. Thus the objection based on infused moral virtues cannot overthrow his conclusion.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Although through every good work performed from charity the just person merits eternal life and
an increase of grace and charity, the habits of grace and charity are not actually increased through every such work. They are increased only through works proceeding from more intense charity. This follows from my earlier conclusion concerning elicited acts of charity: if multiplication or continuation of elicited acts does not increase grace and charity unless charity itself
becomes more intense, still less will acts merely commanded by charity do so.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. When acts of other infused virtues are more intense than their preceding habits, charity also increases
in the same proportion. The will cannot tend more intensely toward means precisely as ordered to an end than toward the end which supplies the reason for willing those means. Hence an infused moral act concerning a means proportioned to charity's end presupposes charity at least equally intense. I cautions that acts of infused moral virtue do not increase charity as proximate dispositions. They function as instruments moved by charity. By nature the act of charity reaches the increase of charity before the act of another virtue does, not only with respect to charity's increase but even with respect to the increase of
that other infused virtue. The will is first intensified concerning the end and afterward concerning the means. It might be imagined that an infused moral virtue could elicit an act more intense than its preceding habit without a preceding more intense act of charity, because the moral act itself virtually contains charity. I reject this. If a man wills to suffer death because
of God supremely loved, that one act is materially an act of fortitude but formally an act of charity. Thomas teaches that an act
belonging materially to an inferior power or habit receives form and species from the superior habit insofar as the inferior is ordered by the superior. I nevertheless allow as possible that an infused moral virtue might sometimes be exercised without charity being formally elicited at that instant, but then a preceding act of charity must have commanded and referred the future act to the ultimate end; the later moral act cannot be more intense than that preceding charity.

SIXTH CONCLUSION. The quantity of essential glory or beatitude - whether considered as reward relative to merit or as ultimate perfection relative to proportionate disposition - is commensurate with the quantity of charity. Therefore whoever possessed greater charity in this life will possess greater essential beatitude in eternal life.

QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ESSENTIAL GLORY IS MEASURED BY CHARITY I explain

the sixth conclusion.

Charity can become more intense in two ways. First, through acts disposing a person to the infusion or increase of charity, as in an adult's justification or later growth in grace. Second, grace and charity can increase through reception of a sacrament ex opere operato. Sacramental increase is not simply measured by the recipient's merit and disposition but also by the power of the sacrament instituted by Christ. For the present argument I sets aside the additional quantity of grace attributable specifically to sacramental reception and considers essential glory insofar as it corresponds to acts of free choice as dispositions and merits. No matter how many excellent works of other virtues Peter multiplies, if he never possesses a more intense act of charity toward God, he will not thereby receive a more intense light of glory or see God more perfectly. Conversely, Paul, who possesses a more intense act of charity but performs fewer external works because he lacks ability, opportunity, or obligation, can receive a greater essential reward. The reason is Thomas's doctrine and my third foundation: the essential perfection of Christian life consists in charity. Essential reward must therefore be proportioned to that essential perfection. Charity is greater or lesser according to greater or lesser intensity, not mere multiplicity of works. Augustine similarly teaches that the soul is illumined by the light of glory according to the degree by which it adheres to God through charity. Hence one who performs fewer and lesser works of other virtues but adheres more intensely to God through charity will be illuminated by greater glory. I cite Gregory the Great on Peter and Andrew leaving their nets. One might ask how much they really abandoned, since they possessed almost nothing. Gregory replies that affection of heart rather than monetary value must be weighed. He leaves much who keeps nothing for himself; he leaves much who abandons everything he possesses, however little. God weighs the heart rather than the substance offered and considers not how much is offered but from how much it is offered. The kingdom of God, Gregory says, is worth whatever one has: for Zacchaeus it was half his possessions; for Peter and Andrew their nets and boat; for the widow two mites; for another a cup of cold water. I say this teaching contradicts certain innovations introduced into theological schools during the previous forty or fifty years by theologians heavily influenced by Nominalism. He specifically notes Vitoria's statement that one who gives his entire substance through a remiss act of charity merits more than one who gives a single coin through a more intense act. I respond with Gregory: God weighs the heart, not the substance. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ST. VINCENT FERRER AND THE FINAL CONCLUSION I next appeal to St. Vincent Ferrer. Explaining “the last shall be first, and the first last,” Vincent says that the merit of grace in this world and the reward of glory in the next arise more from affection of heart and fervor of spirit than from multiplication of good works. Suppose one person performs great penitential works - fasting, prayer, large alms - but without great affection or spiritual fervor, though remaining in grace. Another performs fewer works, observing the Church's fasts, confessing and communicating, hearing Mass, and giving some alms, but does these with great affection and charity, as though wholly inflamed. Vincent says the second has greater merit of grace here and greater reward of glory hereafter, because essential or principal merit is not measured by multiplication of works or duration of time but by greater or lesser charity. He cites Augustine: not number of works nor length of time, but greater charity and greater will increase reward. Vincent then gives the example of St. Sophia during the construction of a church at Constantinople. Wealthy donors gave enormous sums, while Sophia once gave grass or hay with great affection to exhausted oxen pulling a cart of stones. When the church was finished, golden letters were found saying, “Sophia made me.” Vincent uses the story to illustrate the superiority of fervent charity over mere material quantity. I note that Vincent calls this the common teaching of the holy doctors. He also cites Matthias de Paz at Salamanca in 1517 as teaching that the quantity of essential reward corresponds to the quantity of charity. FINAL CONCLUSION. Regularly and for the most part, other things being equal, the person who surpasses another in works of the other virtues - by number, duration, or excellence - also possesses greater charity. Example: Peter and Paul have equal wealth and household responsibilities and encounter equal need among the poor. Both fulfill the commandment of almsgiving, but Peter also gives many and abundant supererogatory alms. Ordinarily one should not suppose Paul possesses greater charity merely because he recites more prayers, attends more divine offices, fasts more, or appears outwardly more devout. This agrees with Thomas: one who observes both counsels and precepts generally merits more according to the kind of works, though not always according to the root of charity, since a person can sometimes fulfill only the precepts from greater charity than another fulfills both precepts and counsels. Nevertheless, as Thomas says following Gregory, “the proof of love is the exhibition of the work.” Gregory teaches that God's love is never idle: if it exists, it performs great things when occasion arises. This must be understood according to the condition of the love and the opportunity. If an occasion involves a commandment, charity acts or is lost through grave failure. If it concerns counsel and supererogation, fervent charity ordinarily produces great works when the opportunity occurs.

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I apply James's command to be doers of the word and not hearers only. Some hear God's word externally and internally through faith
and contemplation and imagine that they love God greatly, yet deceive themselves because either they do not keep the commandments
or, though remaining in grace, are very imperfect in works. He criticizes those who spend much time in what they call mental prayer
but are extremely remiss in bodily mortification and overly solicitous for bodily comfort, contrary to Paul's warning not to make
provision for the flesh in its desires. Likewise wealthy persons who give very little alms and scarcely fulfill the commandment should
not appeal to Thomas's statement that substantial Christian perfection consists in charity as though charity did not also command love
of neighbor, self-denial, and taking up the cross. Great interior perfection does not ordinarily harmonize with very little abstinence in
one capable of more, few vigils in one capable of more, or meager works of charity toward one's neighbor and religion toward God.
Nevertheless, where ability or opportunity is absent, the ready will is accepted according to what it has, not according to what it lacks.
Thus the common saying: the will is reckoned for the deed when the faculty or opportunity to act is absent. Consequently, a poor
hermit can merit more essentially than a wealthy man who gives many alms; a weak sick person who cannot fast or keep vigils can
merit more than a strong person who does many such works; and a non-martyr can merit more essential reward than a martyr if,
without ever receiving the opportunity for martyrdom, he possesses greater charity and readiness to die for God. Why then did I state
the final conclusion only “regularly and for the most part”? Because exceptions are possible. A person may have acquired greater
habitual charity earlier through good works or contemplation and later, on a particular occasion where no precept binds him, perform
a lesser work than someone with less charity. He may even commit a venial fault by failing to assist a poor person, without thereby
losing or diminishing charity. Thus greater habitual charity and a smaller exterior work can coexist, though I say this is uncommon.
REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS. To the first: not every morally good act is meritorious of supernatural life unless referred to God
through charity. Merely being habitually in grace is insufficient for every naturally good act to merit supernatural reward. The second
and third arguments are answered by the fourth and fifth conclusions. To the fourth: although acts of infused moral virtues belong to
the supernatural order, their greater intensity does not independently intensify charity; rather, they are effects of more intense charity.
To the fifth: suspending contemplation for the neighbor's salvation can belong to the highest perfection of charity. Charity itself can
command cessation from an elicited act of charity, sometimes even under precept. Such suspension may be more meritorious than
continuing contemplation. Therefore continuation as such does not receive greater essential reward; essential reward follows the
intensity of charity commanding the continuation or suspension according to prudence. The sixth argument confirms the final

conclusion and the doctrine already established concerning the second principal doubt.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - MARTYRDOM AND THE SIXTH AND FINAL DOUBT TO THE SEVENTH

ARGUMENT. The question is whether martyrdom confers first grace upon an attrite adult who dies for confession of the faith. Some theologians affirm this and others deny it. I say he has always followed the negative position: if the martyr previously committed mortal sin, before death he must possess an act of penance. His teacher Melchior Cano holds this position. I also reads Thomas as teaching it. Martyrdom without charity does not remit mortal guilt; the shedding of blood has the character of baptism only when it includes charity - baptism of blood includes baptism of desire. Since charity in one guilty of mortal sin does not remit that sin without penance, martyrdom likewise requires penance. Paul says: “If I deliver my body so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.” I admits that the contrary opinion is not wholly improbable, since something analogous occurs with infants killed for Christ who had not been circumcised yet are honored by the Church as martyrs through Christ's merit. Nevertheless, he thinks the privilege of martyrdom in adults consists in God's not permitting anyone to be killed for confession of the faith without first granting an act of charity and, when necessary, contrition. Formally answering the original objection: when martyrdom is elicited by infused fortitude, the person already exists in charity and has possessed an elicited act of charity no less intense than the act of fortitude. Therefore the future martyr's charity has already increased before death. Whether martyrdom afterward increases grace, charity, and the light of glory quasi ex opere operato may remain disputed. I does not think a martyr receives greater essential glory than corresponds to the charity from which he suffers, though he receives the aureola, an exceptionally excellent accidental reward for actually executing so excellent a work. An objection invokes Christ: “Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” If taken to mean every martyr necessarily has greater intensive charity than every non-martyr, it would imply that the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist possessed no greater charity than the least martyr, which I call erroneous. Many confessors - Augustine, Jerome, Bernard, Benedict, Francis, Dominic, Thomas, and others - can be greater in heaven than many martyrs. Thomas therefore interprets “greater love” first as the greatest exterior sign of love: among human acts nothing outwardly manifests love more strongly than laying down one's life for a friend. It can also be understood according to charity's species: even the least true charity loves God above all in such a way that the person is prepared to lose his life for Christ. One act of charity can nevertheless exceed another in intensity. I say the gravity of this material justified his lengthy treatment, because it matters both for scholastic disputation and for spiritual progress. He hopes Thomas's and the ancient Thomists' doctrine, freed from various novelties, will be renewed in theological schools. SIXTH AND FINAL DOUBT. When merits mortified by sin revive through penance, is a greater grace and charity conferred at the very moment of justification than corresponds to the present disposition, so that if the penitent dies immediately afterward he receives the same essential glory for his revived past merits as though he had never sinned? The affirmative argument is simple: all merits mortified by sin certainly revive through penance; therefore they regain efficacy for bringing their former subject to the degree of glory corresponding to them. I report four scholastic opinions, beginning with Henry of Ghent, who holds that all who rise from sin rise with equal grace regardless of whether they fell from great or little grace, because justifying grace is from God alone and God requires only non-resistance.

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QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - FOUR OPINIONS ON REVIVAL OF MERITS I reject Henry of Ghent's opinion as

erroneous. Trent teaches
that free will, moved and excited by God, truly cooperates by assenting to God and is not merely passive. Cooperation and assent are not mere non-resistance but real acts performed with divine assistance disposing the person to grace. Trent also speaks of preparation through faith, hope, charity, and penance, and says each receives justice according to the measure distributed by the Holy Spirit and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation. Grace is not given because our acts merit first justification. Rather, our cooperation functions as a disposition materially, and even this disposition is itself
God's gift, produced efficaciously by His prevenient mercy. Thus “it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy” means that natural powers alone cannot dispose us to grace; divine mercy precedes, disposes, and justifies us. SECOND OPINION: Scotus holds that everyone rising from sin rises to greater glory than before, though not necessarily to as much grace as he previously possessed. Glory is commensurate with merits, and the penitent regains the former merits plus the present meritorious disposition. Grace, however, is conferred according to the present disposition of free choice in detesting sin, which can be tepid. Soto sharply attacks this opinion, and I refer back to his earlier arguments against Scotus's theory of the increase of charity. THIRD OPINION: Ockham, followed by Gabriel, Almain, Major, and other Nominalists, holds that one rising from sin always rises to greater grace and glory than he possessed before. He receives his former grace plus an additional degree corresponding to present contrition. They appeal to Ezekiel: if the wicked does penance, God will no
longer remember his iniquities; “the wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him”; and Joel's promise to restore the years consumed by the locust. They argue that past merits are called “mortified” only because present sin blocks their reward; remove the obstacle and the merits should immediately recover their full effect. I postpone my attack on this opinion until treating Soto's fourth opinion, which I consider a newly invented compromise between Thomas on one side and Scotus and the
Nominalists on the other. FOURTH OPINION: Soto proposes three conclusions. First, anyone who rises from sin after previously possessing grace and merits always receives some new degree of grace because the former merits revive. Present contrition is not merely a disposition to new grace but also to the vivification of past merits. The amount restored is greater as present contrition is greater, not according simply to its absolute intensity but proportionally relative to the former merits.

Second, whoever rises with the highest effort possible to him under God's assistance recovers, besides the degree corresponding to present contrition, all the grace from which he had fallen, whether great or small. Soto appeals to Thomas's statement that penance by its nature has power to repair defects perfectly and promote a person to a further state, and to the gloss saying that the virtue of the just and the penance of sinners are equally pleasing to God, restoring David and Peter to their former degree when they repent perfectly.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - SOTO'S THIRD CONCLUSION AND my CRITIQUE Soto's

third conclusion is this: if
contrition falls short of the highest possible effort, former grace is restored in proportion to how close the contrition comes to that supreme contrition. If present contrition is one-half of the maximum, one-half of the lost grace is restored; if one-third, one-third; if one-quarter, one-quarter. Hence one rising from sin always rises to some degree of grace greater than the quantity corresponding merely to present contrition. Soto regards this as a middle position between those who deny that the penitent rises to any grace greater than present contrition and those who say he always rises to greater grace than he possessed before. I say this opinion is contrary to Thomas. FIRST ARGUMENT. Thomas compares the movement of free choice in justification to the ultimate disposition for the grace presently infused. Forms capable of more and less are intensified or remitted according to the differing disposition of the subject. Therefore a form of grace more perfect than the present disposition should not be infused; otherwise proportion between disposition and form is lost. Past merits do not presently dispose the man, since the acts no longer exist. Though they remain in divine acceptance, they cannot merit that

first justifying grace be greater than the present disposition; otherwise justification would be partly from merit rather than wholly gratuitous. SECOND ARGUMENT. Thomas says the same principle applies to the virtues following from grace as to grace itself. Suppose a man had charity as ten before sin but rises with contrition as five. The habit of penance should be as five, proportioned to its present act; charity likewise as five, because he sorrows according as he loves. If grace were greater than five, then grace and the virtues consequent upon it would not follow the same proportion. If some greater grace were given because of preceding merits, the same reason would seem to demand the whole former grace, because the additional amount would not correspond to the present disposition but to the past merits. That yields Ockham's position. I also reject the suggestion that present disposition as five could somehow be proportioned to a form as eight or ten merely because it bears a relation to previous merits. The present disposition neither causes those past merits nor is caused by them. THIRD AND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT. Soto's “highest effort” cannot be an indivisible maximum beyond which no penitent could ordinarily go. No Catholic can concede that a person's conversion through love of God and detestation of sin is so perfect that greater love and detestation are impossible. Therefore different persons can each rise with their “whole effort” relative to the divine assistance given to each, while one nevertheless has more intense contrition and love than another. The totality of effort is measured not merely from natural powers but from the efficacy of God's motion of free choice. Hence Peter and Paul can both rise with their whole effort and yet rise unequally. If so, the former grace corresponding to past merits cannot be restored equally to both merely because both used their “whole effort.” FOURTH ARGUMENT begins. Even granting for argument's sake that the highest effort were an indivisible maximum, Soto's position would still lead to difficulty. Suppose that maximum effort is as one hundred. Peter fell from grace as one hundred and Paul from grace as one thousand. Both rise with effort as one hundred. Soto's theory would restore to each all his former grace in addition to the grace corresponding to the present disposition: Peter would have two hundred, Paul eleven hundred.
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QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - FURTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOTO; MY OWN DECISION I complete the

fourth argument. If Paul had never fallen and, while possessing grace as one thousand, elicited an act only as one hundred, his grace would not increase because an act less intense than the habit does not increase charity or grace. Therefore after falling, the same effort as one hundred should not give him one hundred above the restored thousand; otherwise, other things equal, he would be better off after falling than before. The same reasoning applies to Peter. FIFTH ARGUMENT. I assume the Thomistic principle established earlier: when grace and charity increase through our meritorious and dispositive acts, they increase not according to the whole intensity of the act but only according to the excess of the act over the existing habit. If charity is ten and a person loves as fifteen, the habit does not become twenty-five; it rises from ten to fifteen, receiving an increase of five. Suppose Peter and Paul both possess grace as one hundred. Peter falls into sin and rises with a disposition as sixty. Paul, who never fell, has an act of love as one hundred. Paul receives no increase beyond one hundred. It would therefore be unreasonable for Peter, precisely after falling and with an act almost half as weak as Paul's, to receive more grace than Paul through restored merits. Otherwise Peter would be in a better condition because he sinned and fell, which I call unthinkable and ridiculous. He considers this argument insoluble unless one abandons the Thomistic premise and adopts Ockham's Nominalist theory. SIXTH ARGUMENT. Soto says that if someone fell from grace as eight and by a first contrition recovered four degrees of the former grace, then by another equal contrition he could recover the remaining four. I say this openly falls into Ockham's position. An equal second contrition should not increase the preceding habit according to Thomas. Moreover, if the first contrition restored four degrees of old grace and also received four corresponding to present disposition, then the same reasoning applied to the second contrition would add another eight. The person could thus reach grace as sixteen without ever having an act more intense than four. This makes the habit increase through remiss acts according to the entire latitude of those acts - precisely the Nominalist doctrine. Finally, Soto's opinion fails to explain Thomas's statement that one who rises through penance with lesser charity obtains essential reward according to the quantity of charity in which he is presently found. I therefore say another opinion must be held as the genuine doctrine of St. Thomas, as Cajetan understood Thomas in III, q.89, a.2. DECISION CONCERNING THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTY. The proposed doubt presupposes one thing as certain and asks another. First, therefore, a firm foundation must be established: good works “mortified” through mortal sin revive through penance. This truth is so certain among theologians that they commonly regard its denial as temerarious; I does not think the contrary can be demonstrated absolutely heretical, but judges it sufficiently shown to be proximate to error. He cites the common scholastic teaching, including Durandus and Alexander of Hales; Gratian; Augustine, who says that God does not give penitents less than the gift of life and salvation formerly bestowed and that faith requires us to believe that, when Christ's grace destroys former evils, it also rewards former good works; Jerome on Galatians, who says that works suffered for Christ are not lost if the fallen person returns to his former zeal; Chrysostom and the common commentators on the same passage; and Anselm on Hebrews, who encourages penitents because God does not forget their former works. Thomas interprets Paul's confidence as involving a certain merit de congruo contained in works done in charity, through which a man fittingly merits divine assistance to rise again after falling. I also argue from the final judgment: all works will be brought into judgment, and these formerly good works will be praised by God. A penitent restored to grace is capable of receiving reward for them. For these reasons, I judge denial of the revival of merits through penance to be highly temerarious and proximate to error.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - DECISION CONTINUED FIRST CONCLUSION. When

merits previously mortified
by mortal sin revive through penance, all and each of the merits which formerly lived from charity revive. As for other
morally good works not commanded by charity, a theologian may dispute more freely; nevertheless it is much more
probable that these too revive in their own manner, just as they were formerly good and consonant with right reason. The
reason is that, once the impediment of sin is removed by penance, there is no reason why some merits should revive while
others do not. Moreover, the person who rises through penance is owed eternal life not only by reason of the present work
but also by reason of the former merits; otherwise those merits would not truly revive. SECOND CONCLUSION. Whenever
mortified works revive through penance, it is not necessary that they revive in as much grace and charity as they formerly
possessed. The grace of justification is given according to the measure of the present disposition of free choice which the Holy
Spirit works in us, as Trent teaches: each receives his own justice according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes
as He wills and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation. Thus if Peter formerly had grace as ten but
after mortal sin rises with contrition and charity as six, he should not receive grace as twelve - six for his present disposition
plus six because of preceding merits. St. Thomas and theologians say that the same merits revive, not that the former habit
of grace or charity numerically revives. The merits regain efficacy, in the present grace, for leading the one who performed
them to eternal life. THIRD CONCLUSION. If a man dies immediately after his merits revive through penance, he does not
receive greater essential glory than corresponds to the merit and measure of his present disposition. St. Thomas teaches this
expressly: before sin a man merited glory according to the charity he then possessed; through sin he became another, and
through penance he may not yet be restored to his former degree. Therefore he does not receive the full effect of his former
merits with respect to essential reward, although he receives a greater accidental joy concerning the works formerly
performed in greater charity. An objection says that on this account merits revive only for accidental reward. I deny the
consequence. All the former merits together with the present merit and disposition recover efficacy for bringing their author
to eternal life, which is essential reward. Nevertheless the quantity of essential reward is not greater until the penitent is
equally disposed as he formerly was. If he rises in lesser charity, he receives essential glory in lesser quantity, but he
possesses that glory under the titles of many revived merits.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - COROLLARY AND SACRAMENTAL GRACE From St.

Thomas's doctrine I draws
an important confirmation of what he taught earlier: the same measure of eternal life can be the reward of two, three, or many works, so that the whole quantity of essential glory corresponds to each of them when all proceed from charity of equal intensity. The multiplication of titles increases accidental reward and joy, not necessarily the intensity of essential glory. Capreolus likewise teaches that a person can rise with more merits than before while those merits now rest upon lesser grace, and consequently receive lesser glory. Matthias de Paz explained the same doctrine in his 1517 relecture on the revival of merits. Jerome's warning is cited: those who do not preserve the dignity of the divine grade should be content to save their souls, for returning to the former degree is difficult. I praise this doctrine as more probable, pious, and spiritually safe, because it prevents sinners from imagining that the former state is effortlessly recovered through minimal contrition or mere attrition with the sacrament. LAST CONCLUSION. Sacramental grace lost through mortal sin is restored to the penitent beyond the degree of grace corresponding to contrition as disposition. Baptism received even in mortal sin obtains its effect when the obstacle is later removed; much more, therefore, a sacrament once worthily received recovers its effect when the person rises through penance. The effect is conferred ex opere operato and is not absolutely commensurated with the recipient's disposition, although a relative proportionality to devotion can exist. I note the very probable and common Thomistic opinion that sacramental grace is not indivisible but can increase according to the greater devotion of the recipient. Hence when sacramental grace is restored, it is restored in the quantity that would have been given had the person approached the former sacrament with his present disposition. A corollary follows: the whole sacramental grace of baptism is restored to one baptized before the use of reason, because this is the minimum quantity conferred through baptism without regard to a personal disposition. From this I further infers that an adult baptized and saved possesses greater glory than one who died as a baptized infant, because the adult's disposition allows a fuller participation of sacramental grace. REPLIES. The revival of merits does not mean that one who dies with lesser present disposition receives exactly the glory he would have received had he died in his former charity. Rather, the former merits recover efficacy for leading him to eternal life, while the degree of essential glory is commensurate with the present disposition at death. Against Scotus: although glory corresponds to merits, its actual conferral requires a proportionate disposition in the person. Since the penitent may not rise with the former disposition, he does not necessarily receive the same degree of glory. Against the Nominalist appeal to Ezekiel, Joel, Romans 5, Luke 15, and Augustine: these texts establish the remission of guilt and eternal punishment and the great restorative power of penance. They do not prove that every penitent, however remiss his present conversion, is immediately restored to the exact former degree. Penance can perfectly restore and even advance a man further, but this can be impeded by a remiss movement toward God and against sin. QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI CONCLUDED; RELECTURE OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA I continue the replies. Sin not only impeded the reward of former merits but destroyed the disposition to grace. Therefore removing sin through just any disposition does not suffice for restoration of the whole former quantity of grace; a disposition equal to the former one is required for equal grace. He says enough has now been said concerning this very grave question. I then explain why he inserts at this point the relecture of his celebrated teacher, Fr. Francisco de Vitoria, O.P., formerly first professor of Sacred Theology at Salamanca. He wants the theological reader to see how far certain modern Thomists differ from St. Thomas and to judge whether the doctrine carefully explained by the ancient Thomists and by I proceed more distinctly and consistently.
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CHARITY

The text chosen is Philippians 1: “I pray that your charity may abound more and more.” The relecture has two parts: first, the increase of charity; second, its diminution. Vitoria does not intend to treat every question concerning increase, which would require too much time. He selects the most celebrated and theologically important question: whether charity is increased by every act of charity. For the affirmative: every such act is meritorious of glory; therefore it is also meritorious of grace and consequently of charity. A good act referred to God is good and meritorious. St. Thomas teaches in I-II, q.21, a.4 that every good human act has the character of merit before God considered on the side of the act, since otherwise God would not exercise providence over human acts. Even a Muslim may perform a naturally good act without an evil circumstance; the act is praiseworthy before God, although the person dying in sin does not receive the reward due to it. For the negative: in natural agents a remiss agent does not produce an effect more intense than itself. Therefore a remiss act of charity should not increase an intense habit. In supernatural matters we ordinarily reason by proportion with natural things unless revelation establishes otherwise. Vitoria distinguishes three opinions.

First, the Nominalists, such as Gabriel Biel: every act of charity, however remiss, increases charity and grace.

Second, Scotus and Richard of Middleton: every act, however remiss, earns greater glory, but a remiss act does not increase grace or charity. Third, the opinion attributed to St. Thomas: charity is not increased by any act unless that act is more intense than the habit itself; according to one interpretation, no greater essential glory is given for a merely remiss act.

VITORIA'S RELECTURE - WHETHER A MORE INTENSE ACT INCREASES THE HABIT BY ITS WHOLE INTENSITY

Vitoria first examines what all three opinions share: a more intense act increases charity. A fundamental **question arises: does an act more intense than the habit increase the habit by the whole** latitude of the act, or only by the excess of the act over the habit? If the habit is four and the act eight, does the habit receive eight additional degrees, or only four? An argument for increase by the whole latitude appeals to proportionality between merits and rewards. Suppose Peter first has a meritorious act as four and grace as four, then a

second act as eight. If the second act raises the habit only to eight, his grace and corresponding glory would be eight, although his merits considered cumulatively are twelve. The reward would seem smaller than the merits. Again, if Peter and Paul both begin with merit and grace as four, and Paul afterward performs a second act as eight, Paul's grace would become only eight while Peter's remains four: a ratio of two to one. Yet Paul's total merits are twelve against Peter's four: a ratio of three to one. The proportion of rewards would not match the proportion of merits. Against this, Vitoria argues from natural agents. If something heating as eight is applied to something already hot as four, it does not make it hot as twelve but only raises it to eight. Therefore a more intense act should increase a lesser habit only according to the excess. He formulates the conclusion: A more intense act does not increase a habit by its whole latitude, but only according to the excess it has over the habit. He first considers acquired habits. If every act following from a natural power and habit increased the habit by the whole intensity of the act, the habit would increase at least approximately by doubling again and again. Since an operative power informed by a habit can produce an act corresponding to its acquired strength, each successive act could produce an extraordinary escalation. Vitoria illustrates this by numerical progression and concludes that later acts could soon exceed all preceding acts together in intensity and merit, which seems absurd. The same problem appears in infused habits if every more intense act adds its entire intensity. A saint living for many years could, by repeated acts, acquire a habit of almost inconceivable intensity. Vitoria compares the progression to the familiar story in which grains of wheat are doubled successively on the squares of a board: before long the number exceeds what entire kingdoms could supply.

Vitoria considers several possible replies. First, perhaps men ordinarily do not act with their whole effort, so their acts need not be more intense than their habits. He finds this insufficient: perfect men at least sometimes seem to act with their whole effort, and it would still be unreasonable if a single late act of Peter, Paul, Adam, John the Baptist, or the Blessed Virgin could surpass all preceding acts of their lives merely because of exponential increase. Second, perhaps even an act produced with one's whole effort does not reach the full latitude of a highly intense habit. A habit as one hundred might produce an act far below one hundred. Vitoria
again finds the reply difficult, because an operative habit is intelligible precisely in relation to act. If a luminous thing is called luminous as ten, it seems capable of producing light as ten; why should a habit as one hundred be incapable of an act corresponding to
its intensity? Third, perhaps we have no experience of the intensity of infused habits. Vitoria says this also does not completely satisfy, because we would at least experience the intensity of the acts proceeding from them, and, according to most theologians, repeated acts of infused virtues also generate or increase acquired habits. Such enormous intensity should therefore somehow appear in experience. Vitoria then returns to the natural analogy. A heating agent as eight applied to something hot as four raises it only by four degrees. He does not see why an act as eight should enjoy the special privilege of adding eight degrees to a habit as four. Some modern theologians answer that acts do not efficiently cause infused habits but concur meritoriously and dispositively. Vitoria replies
that this does not remove the need for proportionality of disposition: God infuses and increases these habits through a proportionate disposition of free choice. Vitoria then tries another route. He supposes, according to Thomistic principles, that grace is distinct from
charity and need not have exactly the same intensity. He even suggests, using Christ as an example, that grace could be greater than charity. I inserts a critical note: this supposition is false and contrary to St. Thomas. Grace is the quality by which man participates in
the divine nature, and charity flows from it as an inclination of the will toward God. Greater participation in filial grace should therefore correspond to greater charity: those who are more perfectly sons of God by grace are more perfectly moved by charity through the Holy Spirit. VITORIA'S RELECTURE - FOUR PROPOSITIONS ON GRACE, CHARITY, AND GLORY Vitoria proposes four statements to solve the problem of proportionality between merit and reward. FIRST. Every meritorious act increases grace according to the whole latitude of the act, not merely according to the excess over the preceding habit. If grace is four and the meritorious act eight, grace becomes twelve. His reason is that glory is owed according to the whole latitude of the act, and glory corresponds to grace. SECOND. Charity does not increase according to the whole latitude of the act but only according to the excess
by which the act surpasses the preceding habit. This, he says, is supported by the arguments already given. THIRD. At least in an adult, charity is never equal in intensity to grace. Since every meritorious act adds its whole latitude to grace while charity increases only by the excess, grace becomes greater than charity. FOURTH. Glory corresponds to grace rather than to charity. Through grace we are pleasing to God and worthy of glory; charity is given immediately for loving, as faith is given for believing. Thus, Vitoria thinks, proportionality between merits and rewards can be preserved without making charity increase by the whole latitude of every act. The explosive growth objection would not apply to grace in the same way because grace does not directly determine the intensity
of the following act; charity does. I immediately criticizes these statements. St. Thomas says in I-II, q.114, a.8 that every meritorious
act merits an increase of grace, yet grace is not immediately increased by every act but when the person is sufficiently disposed. Thomas speaks similarly in II-II, q.24, a.6 concerning charity. Therefore, on Thomas's way, there is no such difference between grace
and charity with respect to remiss and intense acts. I also reject the argument from Christ. Christ's habitual grace was not infinite in such a way that His charity remained merely finite while grace was infinite. If Christ's grace is called infinite because His acts possess
infinite value through the divine Person, the same can be said proportionally of His charity. The Gospel says: “If anyone loves me, he
will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him.” St. Thomas uses this to prove that essential reward corresponds to charity. Grace is the remote root of merit, charity the proximate principle eliciting the meritorious love of God. There
are not two different essential glories, one answering to grace and another to charity.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - THE REMISS ACT AND THE ACQUIRED HABIT Vitoria says that, whatever one concludes according to other schools, those who hold with Thomas, Durandus, Scotus, Richard, and others that the habit increases only through more intense acts must avoid the consequence that every increase more than doubles the preceding habit. If an act added its whole intensity, this absurdity would follow especially in long-lived saints. He then turns to the disagreement between the first opinion and the second and third opinions. The Nominalists say charity increases even through remiss acts; the others deny this. First argument against the Nominalists, from Durandus: one who negligently uses a benefit already received is not worthy of a new benefit. A person possessing intense charity who acts tepidly and remissly uses the received gift negligently; therefore he is not thereby worthy of an increase in grace. Vitoria admits this is not demonstrative but finds the analogy morally significant. In human friendship one who serves a lord or prince negligently does not ordinarily grow in favor merely because he avoids a direct offense. The invisible things of God may, within limits, be understood from created analogies. Second argument, from St. Thomas: an acquired habit is not increased by acts more remiss than itself; therefore neither is an infused habit. Although infused habits are increased by God rather than efficiently by our acts, it is plausible that God increases them according to a proportion analogous to acquired habits. The same acts by which, according to the opponents, an infused habit increases meritoriously also efficiently increase an acquired habit. If a remiss act cannot increase the acquired habit, it is reasonable to deny that it increases the infused habit. Vitoria supports the premise by Aristotelian principles: like acts cause like habits; an agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself; the patient begins unlike the agent and ends like it. An act as four should not intensify a habit already as five, just as heat as four does not increase something already hot as five. He adds a continuation argument. A remiss act does nothing further merely by being continued once agent and effect are proportioned; otherwise, if a definite degree were added at every instant, any small interval would generate infinite intensity. I note approvingly that this is a major argument and that he himself amplified it earlier in Article VI in defense of St. Thomas. VITORIA'S RELECTURE - CAN A WEAKER NATURAL AGENT INCREASE A STRONGER EFFECT? Vitoria next considers an objection to the natural analogy. Experience seems to show that several lamps together illuminate more intensely than one lamp, and several fires produce greater heat than a single fire. Therefore an equal or weaker agent can apparently increase an already more intense effect. He replies by distinguishing intensity from extension of activity. First, several natural agents do not produce at the nearest point of their sphere an effect more intense than the maximum intensity possessed by the strongest agent. If the strongest luminous body is as eight, the resulting light does not become more than eight merely because other equal or weaker lights are added. Second, increasing the quantity or number of agents enlarges the sphere over which a given intensity is produced. A larger luminous body or several lights can make a distant point brighter because the effective sphere has been extended. Thus where one light produced illumination as six, several may produce seven because the point now lies under a stronger combined extension of activity; but this does not mean that the produced light at the source surpasses the maximum intensity of the agents. Vitoria argues from division. If the sun were divided into two equal halves without any other change, each half would retain the same intensive luminosity, and the two halves together would not produce an effect of a higher intensive species than the original whole. Likewise, if a uniformly hot fire is divided, the separated halves do not thereby produce a heat more intense than the original fire. Similarly, ten luminous bodies each as four, whether separate or united, do not produce an intensive light above four at the point where the full intensity of each is realized. Otherwise one could produce something greater than the supposed maximum by simply adding another equal or lesser agent. He then applies the analogy to habits: however many acts as four are multiplied, they do not by mere multiplication produce a habit above four. Vitoria next raises another objection. If every remiss act fails to increase an acquired habit, then a habit would never increase unless the effort of the power itself increased. Yet it seems that the habit should allow the same effort to produce a greater act. He answers that, with equal effort, a greater habit can indeed produce a greater act; regular increase of inclination therefore normally yields more intense subsequent acts. Experience, he says, actually supports this: one who repeatedly acts tepidly does not find himself more prompt. Habitual tepidity tends instead toward cessation of action. Thus the principal argument remains: if an intense act increases a habit only according to its excess, an equal or lesser act should add nothing. 451

Vitoria gives a third principal argument: if, as already established, a more intense act increases a habit only by the excess over that
habit, then an equal or lesser act does not increase it. If an act as six increases a habit as four only by two, an act as three, which
contains no excess over the habit, appears unable to add anything. This is confirmed by the natural analogy: a weaker agent does not
intensify an effect already stronger than itself. Fourth argument: experience shows that one who acts remissly and tepidly easily loses
the habit. If the habit were really increasing through such acts, it should become firmer and more difficult to lose. Instead, one
accustomed to tepid action readily ceases to act altogether. Vitoria admits many more arguments could be made, but regards these as
the principal ones. He then returns to arguments for the first, Nominalist opinion against the second and third positions. First: even a
remiss act of infused charity is meritorious. Therefore some degree of glory corresponds to it; and if glory corresponds to charity, it
seems grace and charity must increase because of that act. Vitoria says the question is not certain simply from the diversity of earlier
authorities. Modern theologians appeal to St. Thomas in I Sentences, d.17, where Thomas says that multiplication of acts of charity
does not necessarily imply increase of essential reward. Scotus, on the other hand, appears to hold that a remiss act will receive a
degree of glory and consequently some corresponding grace at the end of life. Vitoria then proposes to answer through propositions
rather than by relying merely upon authorities. FIRST PROPOSITION. By every act of charity, however remiss, a person merits and
will have a greater reward. Regarding the first part - that every act of charity merits an increase - Vitoria cites St. Thomas, II-II, q.24,
a.6. But I inserts a correction: Thomas says every act merits increase, not that every remiss act immediately receives the increase.
Thomas adds that the increase is conferred when the person breaks forth into a more fervent act. Cajetan explains the same in I-II,
q.114, a.8. Vitoria's reason is that it seems repugnant for an act to be meritorious de condigno and yet receive no reward. He also
argues that it would seem harsh if an act formerly merited a great reward when the habit was weaker, yet an equal act performed later
received nothing merely because the habit had grown. VITORIA'S RELECTURE - REWARD FOR REMISS ACTS I answer the last
difficulty by distinguishing the kind and intensity of reward. The later remiss act does receive reward: it receives greater accidental
reward and gives a new title to essential reward. But it does not produce a more intense essential reward unless the person loves God
more intensely. Vitoria continues: since a more intense act, according to the position already defended, increases charity only
according to its excess over the habit, while glory seems to be owed proportionally to the whole latitude of the act, some glory should
likewise be owed for a remiss act. He says that, whatever one thinks of the arguments and opinions of recent theologians, he does not
doubt that Scripture promises heavenly reward for good acts proceeding from grace. If a man
perseveres to death, no Catholic
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kind of reward - whether accidental or essential - not whether good works are rewarded at all. I emphasize precisely this distinction. St. Thomas does not deny reward to remiss acts. He distinguishes essential reward, whose intensity corresponds to charity, from accidental reward and from the multiplication of titles by which the same essential beatitude is owed. Vitoria appeals to 2 Corinthians
5: each shall receive according to what he has done in the body, whether good or evil; and to Matthew 10: whoever gives a cup of cold water shall not lose his reward. He argues that it would seem unfitting for every remiss evil act to receive punishment while a remiss good act received no reward. I reply that the same distinction must be made regarding punishment. Essential punishment consists in privation of the divine vision; accidental punishment concerns the torment corresponding to conversion toward a created good. The essential punishment of loss is not indefinitely intensified by each sin merely as such, whereas accidental punishment can increase according to multiplied sins. SECOND PROPOSITION begins. Vitoria proposes that by every such act grace is increased. The further explanation and arguments for this proposition continue on the following page. At this point the relecture has moved beyond the initial question whether remiss acts deserve any reward. The precise dispute is now whether the reward promised to every
meritorious act requires an immediate increase of habitual grace and charity, or whether the act can be fully rewarded through accidental reward and additional titles to essential beatitude while the intensity of charity itself remains unchanged until a more fervent act occurs. VITORIA'S RELECTURE — SECOND AND THIRD PROPOSITIONS Vitoria continues the second proposition:
by every such meritorious act grace is increased, although charity is not. As he had said concerning an intense act, grace would increase according to the whole latitude of the act, while charity would increase only according to the excess; similarly, by a remiss act grace would increase although charity would not. I reject this directly: “This is not rightly said, and is contrary to St. Thomas, as has already been shown.” THIRD PROPOSITION. If charity is not increased immediately by a remiss act, it seems arbitrary to say that it is increased at the end of life, since nothing of this has been handed down to us. I approve this proposition as conformable to St.
Thomas, II-II, q.24, a.6. He opposes those who imagine that after this life a man must dispose himself by a single act of love whose intensity equals the multiplication of all his acts in this life. Thus, if Peter had one hundred acts each as two, they would say that in the
next life he must have one act as two hundred and thereby receive a light of glory as two hundred. I regard this construction as unreasonable. According to St. Thomas the sufficient disposition is attained when a man breaks forth into a more fervent act. A
SECOND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT FOR THE FIRST OPINION. A less intense act can be more meritorious than a more intense
act; therefore, if an infused habit increases through the more intense act, it should also increase through the less intense but more meritorious act. For example, giving one's entire substance to the poor through a remiss act can seem more meritorious than giving one coin through an intense act. I reply that this gravely confuses essential and accidental reward. He who loves God more intensely merits more with respect to essential reward. St. Thomas teaches this repeatedly. Vitoria asks whether the increase of an infused habit
should be proportioned not to the gradual intensity of the meritorious act but to the quantity of merit. He first says one could probably
maintain that only intensity is relevant, since an infused habit is increased meritoriously in an analogous way to how an acquired habit
would be increased efficiently. I note that Cajetan holds this and calls it the truest position according to St. Thomas, who recognizes no increase of charity except intensive increase. Vitoria nevertheless judges it more probable that charity and the other infused habits
increase according to the proportion of merit rather than merely according to the gradual intensity of the act, since infused virtues are
gifts of God and in a manner rewards of good acts. I objects that the merit belonging to charity is itself proportioned to the intensity with which man adheres to God. With respect to charity, there is no useful separation between “greater love appreciatively” and “greater love intensively” of the sort Vitoria's argument requires.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE — MULTIPLICATION AND CONTINUATION OF REMISS ACTS A THIRD IPAL ARGUMENT. Let Peter possess charity as eight and successively perform two meritorious acts each as six. Let Paul likewise possess charity as eight but perform one act as twelve. If Paul's charity increases, Peter's should also increase, because the two are said to merit equally. I deny the consequence according to St. Thomas. Peter does not merit equally merely
because he twice merits as six. One love as twelve is greater than any less intense love merely repeated. Vitoria himself will later acknowledge this in considering merit. A FOURTH ARGUMENT. An act continued through time remains meritorious. Therefore even a remiss act, if sufficiently continued, can seem to attain the merit of a more intense act. If a man has a habit as
eight and elicits an act as four, the act, continued long enough, might become meritorious as ten. Since longer continuation is more meritorious, it seems that a remiss act could eventually increase the habit. Vitoria says these arguments raise a further **doubt: even if one denies that a single remiss act increases the habit, can many remiss acts, or one** remiss act continued for a
long time, equal the merit of one intense act? He reports three opinions. FIRST OPINION. Whenever, through multiplication of remiss acts or continuation of one act, one reaches merit equivalent to an intense act, the infused habit increases. Against this stands St. Thomas's teaching that multiplication of remiss acts does not necessarily increase charity. SECOND OPINION.
Remiss acts, whether multiplied or continued, never increase charity. I comment emphatically that this indeed was St. Thomas's position and warns modern theologians not to canonize their own less probable and less intelligible opinions. An objection says that one who repeatedly or continually performs remiss good acts becomes better than one who performs only a
single intense act; it therefore seems unfitting that the former should not receive greater infused virtue. I answer that by mere continuation or multiplication a person is good more often in act, but is not simply a better or more virtuous man unless virtue
itself increases. According to St. Thomas the increase of virtue is intensive. THIRD, MEDIATING OPINION. Remiss acts do
not themselves increase the habit, but when a later intense act arrives, the habit increases not only for that act but also in reward for the preceding remiss acts. I say this can have a sound meaning. The increase proportioned to the final intense act corresponds to that act as the proximate and proportionate disposition; the preceding remiss acts are merits rewarded there, but they are not themselves the proximate proportionate disposition. Vitoria compares this to St. Thomas's example of drops hollowing a stone: the last drop hollows it by virtue of those preceding. I limits the comparison. St. Thomas never admits that anything except a more fervent and intense act increases the habit. Frequent remiss or equal acts dispose the power so that eventually it may break forth into a more fervent act. Vitoria then states his own propositions. First, against many scholastics: merit is not simply numerically proportioned to intensity as though love as three necessarily merits exactly as three and love as
four exactly as four. I say this is false according to St. Thomas. Second: not only is merit not reducible to a numerical measure
of intensity, but even a great multitude of remiss acts does not equal one intense and perfect act. I gladly accepts this with St. Thomas: one perfect love as ten is more meritorious than one hundred imperfect loves each as one.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE — WHY ONE FERVENT ACT EXCELS MANY TEPID ACTS Vitoria supports the preceding propositions. Difficulty contributes to merit, and it is more difficult to elicit one perfect love than one hundred imperfect loves. It is also more conformable to the commandment to love God with the whole heart to love Him once with great effort than many times tepidly and remissly. One prayer offered with great devotion and attention is more perfect than many tepid and remiss prayers. He illustrates this through ordinary valuation: one thing perfect in its species is often valued above many imperfect things. A single large
precious stone can be worth more than a hundred tiny stones even if their combined weight is greater; one excellent horse can be worth more than many weak and defective ones. Likewise one perfect act and exercise of virtue is of greater worth than many small and imperfect acts of the same kind. I remark that, if theologians followed this route, St. Thomas's doctrine would be valued more highly. Instead, some moderns favor the tepid and follow the Nominalist opinion, treating ten acts each as one as equivalent to one outstanding act as ten. THIRD PROPOSITION. The same must be said concerning continuation. Vitoria calls the scholastic calculation ridiculous which assumes that if a person merits as ten in eliciting an act, he merits another ten in every instant of its continuation. Unless continuation and perseverance are considerable, merit is not simply doubled. Continuation can indeed be so prolonged and persevering that its merit becomes greater than that of the initial elicitation. I distinguish again. Unless the act becomes
more intense during continuation, there is no greater disposition regarding essential reward, although there can be greater accidental reward because the person loves for a longer time. Duration as such adds time, not a higher intensity of love. Morally speaking, however, a notably continued act of charity will ordinarily become more intense, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit. FOURTH PROPOSITION. Whenever multiplication or continuation reaches merit equal to that of an intense act, the habit is undoubtedly increased. Vitoria argues that a person who becomes equally good should have equal virtue, and increase itself is in a manner a reward. I reject the inference as contrary to St. Thomas. Every act of charity merits increase, yet charity is not increased by every act.
The sufficient disposition, according to Thomas, is not simply the accumulation of an equivalent quantity of merit, but the breaking forth into a more fervent act. A FIFTH ARGUMENT asks whether, on the contrary view, even an act performed with one's whole effort could never increase the habit during its continuation. Suppose Peter has a habit as four and elicits an act as eight. At the first instant the habit becomes equal to the act. If the act then remains merely equal throughout its continuation, it can no longer increase the habit. Would perseverance then contribute nothing to habitual increase? Vitoria answers that, in the increase of infused habits, regard is had to merit; continuation can eventually attain greater merit than the latitude of the habit or than the merit of one more intense act, and thus the habit could increase. A SIXTH ARGUMENT concerns order. Suppose Peter has charity as eight and performs first an act as five and afterward one as ten. On Vitoria's rule the accumulated merit might seem to produce a larger increase
than if he performed the act as ten first and the act as five afterward. It would be absurd if the mere order of acts made such a large difference. I answer that he does not see why, after the same two acts, the final habit should differ. The act as five does not increase charity; when the act as ten arrives, the habit increases to ten. Vitoria himself admits that these difficulties show his opinion is not free
of perplexity and perhaps suggest a fourth opinion distinct from the three already recounted.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE CONCLUDED — I defend ST. THOMAS I comment that if St. Thomas's opinion is held as he has ed it in II-II, q.24, a.6, the difficulties are sufficiently avoided. Those who depart from it fall into the perplexities which Vitoria, despite being a most illustrious and learned man, openly acknowledges. Vitoria replies to the order-of-acts difficulty by analogy with
acquired habits and natural agents. If an acquired habit is eight and a man first performs an act as nine and then as ten, each act can increase the habit because each finds it weaker. But if the order is reversed, the act as ten increases it while the later act as nine finds the habit already stronger and does nothing. Likewise, heat as four applied before heat as eight can contribute to successive heating, while heat as four applied after an effect already raised by heat as eight adds nothing. I note that here Vitoria begins to incline toward
St. Thomas. Vitoria nevertheless distinguishes infused habits: a remiss and an intense act can be computed together with respect to merit and can contribute to one increase, which cannot be said in the same way of an acquired habit. I say Vitoria speaks obscurely. How are the remiss and intense acts counted as one with respect to merit, when the intense act is more meritorious? If the meaning is
only that both are meritorious, St. Thomas grants this; but he does not grant that both immediately increase the habit. A SEVENTH ARGUMENT. Suppose someone with an intense habit performs only one remiss act and never, even through continuation, reaches the
merit of an intense act. On Vitoria's opinion, he would never receive an increase of charity for that act, although through it he is in some sense better. Vitoria says this consequence must be conceded on his account; it is enough that grace increases. I respond that all
this is discordant with St. Thomas. Vitoria concludes several things. First, he thinks the position concerning increase of grace approaches that of the Nominalists or moderns, while differing from Scotus. I answer that nothing is more diverse than St. Thomas's doctrine and the Nominalist doctrine concerning the increase of grace and charity. Second, Vitoria confesses that it is not certain but very doubtful how charity and the infused virtues increase. He is not entirely satisfied even with the opinion attributed to St. Thomas
and cannot answer every difficulty arising from it. I call attention to the master's modest confession of perplexity. Third, Vitoria nevertheless judges it more probable that charity is not increased by every act. I say that, in all respects, this is the most probable doctrine. Fourth, Vitoria suggests one could perhaps defend that charity increases through every act, though not in the manner maintained by the adversaries—for example by assigning fractional increases to remiss acts. I reject this as highly improbable. Such a
rule would make charity as ten increase equally through an act as eleven and through an act as six under certain fractional calculations.
He says these imagined constructions show the difficulties into which men fall when they abandon St. Thomas. Vitoria finally says that in this matter it is easier for him to say what is false than what is true. I, preserving the authority due to so great a master, answers
that according to St. Thomas's doctrine it is easy to dissolve the opposing arguments and discern truth from falsehood, as the reader can see from my own treatment of q.24, a.6. SECOND PART OF THE RELECTURE: ON THE DIMINUTION OF CHARITY
Vitoria says charity could be imagined to diminish in only two ways: first through venial sin; second through mortal sin in such a way
that, after repentance, a person rises with less charity and grace than he possessed before. The first question is whether venial sin diminishes charity or grace. The affirmative argument is that, as offense increases, favor diminishes in civil friendship; venial sin is an
offense against God; therefore it seems to diminish grace and charity. Against this stands the consequence that multiplication of venial
sins would eventually destroy finite grace and charity. Vitoria reports the celebrated opinion of William of Auxerre that venial sins diminish charity. Although attacked by ancient and modern doctors, Vitoria says in a first proposition that it is not as improbable as commonly supposed.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE — WHETHER VENIAL SIN DIMINISHES CHARITY Vitoria develops arguments making William of Auxerre's position appear plausible. If grace were conceived not as a habit but simply as man's being pleasing to God by the divine will accepting him, analogous to a man being pleasing to a king, it would be easy to understand how small offenses could make a person less pleasing without entirely destroying friendship. Human friendship, even among good men, is plainly diminished by a multiplication of slight offenses. Why, Vitoria asks, should we simply assume that after innumerable venial sins we remain equally pleasing friends of God? Again, multiplication of venial sins makes a man less prompt for acts of charity and the other virtues. The doctors concede that venial sins diminish the fervor of charity. Since a greater habit produces greater promptitude and firmness, the contrary experience in those accustomed to venial sin seems to indicate diminution of the habit. The standard objection is that repeated venial sins would eventually destroy grace. Vitoria examines several replies. One reply says that when grace is reduced to the
point where one further venial sin would remove it entirely, that sin becomes mortal because of this circumstance. Vitoria objects that
this circumstance would be invincibly unknown: no one knows the exact degree of his grace. Yet if it made the sin mortal, it would have to be confessed. Experience and pastoral practice do not support such a requirement. Another reply says successive venial sins remove progressively smaller portions: the first a degree, the second half a degree, the third a quarter, and so on, so that grace is never
entirely exhausted. Vitoria criticizes this as arbitrary unless a reason is given why equal sins remove unequal amounts. He proposes another possibility: no venial sin need destroy grace even if each removes some part, because diminution itself is a punishment and the loss of the final degree would be disproportionately greater than preceding losses. Losing one's only remaining degree of grace is
worse than losing many degrees while remaining in grace. Thus the proportional loss could diminish as the remaining grace diminishes. Another possible answer is that the number of venial sins possible in one finite human life is itself finite. One might therefore suppose the minimum baptismal grace contains more divisible degrees than all venial sins a man could possibly commit, so
that each venial sin removes only a tiny part and the last degree is never reached. Vitoria admits this is speculative but says it is not intrinsically absurd. A further answer is that a person who lives long in grace without mortal sin will inevitably merit often and increase grace, so that the gains from meritorious acts exceed the diminutions caused by venial sins. But an objection remains: one could form a deliberate intention to commit many venial sins throughout life; then the diminution would be intended together, while no compensating increase need occur. Vitoria confirms the plausibility of the Auxerrean position by analogy with acquired temperance and other virtues: contrary venial acts can diminish acquired virtue without necessarily destroying it altogether.
VITORIA'S RELECTURE ENDS; QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — CAN CHARITY INCREASE WITHOUT LIMIT? Vitoria
says that, despite the preceding arguments, a SECOND PROPOSITION must be maintained: the common opinion against William of
Auxerre is far more probable and, in his judgment, true. He argues that the Auxerrean view seems to imply that charity can be increased and diminished at the same time, since a person might merit while also committing a venial sin. I inserts a qualification: it is
not certain that one and the same act of will can be simultaneously good and venially evil; theologians and metaphysicians commonly
deny that one can understand or deliberate about several objects simultaneously precisely as several. He thinks Vitoria unnecessarily favors the Auxerrean view. The alleged simultaneous increase and decrease also creates an unintelligible result. If charity is ten, a venial sin merits loss of one degree, and at the same time the person merits one degree of increase, no actual change would occur. Yet
it would be strange to say that an increase was merited but never given. Furthermore, when the venial sin is remitted, would the lost degree return? If yes, the supposed diminution seems idle, since remission restores the former state. If no, venial sin would be in a worse condition than mortal sin, because penance restores grace lost through mortal sin. Thus Vitoria judges the diminution theory unnecessary and fictitious. He says this suffices concerning the first mode of diminution. The second mode—concerning how one rises after mortal sin—must be disputed elsewhere because time does not permit it. This concludes Vitoria's relecture.
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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER CHARITY IS INCREASED INFINITELY St. Thomas raises

objections. FIRST

OBJECTION. Every movement tends toward some end and term. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it
tends toward a term and cannot increase indefinitely. SECOND OBJECTION. No form exceeds the capacity of its subject.
The rational creature, subject of charity, has finite capacity. Therefore charity cannot increase without limit. THIRD

OBJECTION. Any finite quantity, if continuously increased, can eventually reach another finite quantity however great,
unless the additions become perpetually smaller. If charity in the state of glory is finite and charity in this life could increase
without limit, charity in this life could eventually equal charity in heaven, which seems impossible. ON THE CONTRARY,
Paul says in Philippians 3 that he has not already attained or become perfect but presses forward. The Gloss says no faithful
person, however much he has advanced, should say “it is enough”; whoever says this leaves the road before reaching the end.
Therefore charity in this life can always increase further. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. A term can be assigned to the increase of a form in three ways: from the form itself, from the power of the agent, or from the capacity of the subject. None
of these imposes a limit on charity in the state of the wayfarer. Charity, according to its specific nature, has no intrinsic terminal measure, since it is a participation in the infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit. Its efficient cause is God, whose
power is infinite. Nor does the subject impose a terminal limit, because as charity grows, the subject's aptitude for further
increase also grows. Hence no terminal degree of charity is assigned in this life. To the first objection: charity has an end, but
that end is not in this life; it is in the future life. QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — ST. THOMAS'S REPLIES AND my

FIRST DOUBT To the second objection St. Thomas replies that the capacity of the rational creature is enlarged by charity
itself: “our heart is enlarged,” as 2 Corinthians 6 says. Therefore a further aptitude for greater increase remains. To the

third: the argument works only where the quantities compared are of the same kind. The quantity of charity in this life
follows the knowledge of faith; the quantity of charity in heaven follows open vision. Therefore one cannot infer that unlimited increase in the former simply reaches the quantity proper to the latter. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT FIRST

CONCLUSION. No term is imposed on the increase of charity in the state of the wayfarer. No

term arises from charity itself,
because it participates in the infinite charity of the Holy Spirit; none from the agent, whose power is infinite; and none from
the subject, because the aptitude for further increase grows as charity grows. SECOND CONCLUSION, from the reply to
the third objection. The quantity of charity in the way and the quantity of charity in the homeland are not of precisely the
same ratio, because the former follows the cognition of faith and the latter open vision.
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COMMENTARY — FIRST DOUBT I ask whether the first conclusion is certain even according to Catholic

faith. First objection against certainty: if charity in this life can always grow so that no one reaches a degree beyond which a greater cannot be attained, it seems any Christian could reach charity equal in intensity to that of Christ, or at least of the Blessed Virgin. This seems false and contrary to revelation. Second: divine predestination fixes for every predestined person a determinate term of glory; therefore a term of charity also seems fixed, beyond which, under ordinary providence, that person will not proceed. Third: charity according to its own nature is a creature and therefore finite. Saying it participates in infinite charity does not by itself solve the difficulty, since every created being and perfection participates in divine being and perfection, yet not every created perfection can increase without limit. DECISION: according to Catholic faith it must be held that no one in this life can arrive at such a degree of charity that, absolutely speaking, he can no longer increase. He supports this from Scripture: “He that is just, let him be justified still” (Apocalypse 22), and from Ecclesiasticus 18, urging continual prayer and justification until death. He discusses a textual reading meaning essentially: do not fear advancing further in the love of God, for nothing prevents further progress and God's reward remains forever. He also appeals to the Clementine Ad nostrum, which condemns the Begard error that a man can in this life reach a degree of charity at which he can no longer grow in charity or sin. Finally, the common mind of the saints assumes that while we live we can continue progressing in the way of God. REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION. St. Thomas speaks according to the ordinary law rather than according to God's absolute power considered apart from providential ordination. Something can be called possible under the common law even if divine predestination ensures it will not actually occur. Thus, under God's actual providence, one must not say that someone will reach the charity possessed by the Blessed Virgin. Yet if one considers the common revealed law according to which a living person can always progress, no intrinsic contradiction arises from further increase. One may also distinguish an extrinsic term fixed by divine ordination from an intrinsic term of the virtue itself. No intrinsic degree exists at which charity, by its own nature, becomes absolutely incapable of further increase. The predestined person's actual degree is fixed in the composite sense with divine predestination: it is impossible that God predestine Peter to one degree and that Peter actually possess a greater degree contrary to that decree. But this does not establish an intrinsic maximum within charity itself.

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QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — GOD'S ABSOLUTE POWER AND A MAXIMUM CHARITY

I reply to the third

objection of the preceding doubt. Charity is always finite in act, but this does not prove that it cannot, in potency, be increased beyond every assigned finite degree of intensive quantity. He distinguishes natural from supernatural perfections. Natural perfections participate in divine perfection according to the measure of a created substance, whose species is intrinsically finite. Supernatural realities—grace, faith, hope, charity, and the light of glory—participate in divine perfection according to the measure of God's will, who distributes to each as He wills. They do not arise from a created substance as their connatural source but from the divine nature; their effect is limited by God's will and by the creaturely disposition which God Himself produces. SECOND DOUBT. By God's absolute power, can there be a supreme charity such that a greater charity is impossible? For the affirmative, objections are drawn from creaturely finitude. Every creature is finite and limited because its existence is not its essence; therefore charity as a created quality seems to possess a specific maximum. A finite soul also seems incapable of receiving an unlimited perfection. Scotus had pressed such arguments. Against this stand St. Thomas's three reasons in the article, which collectively deny an absolute intrinsic term to charity's increase. I report Cajetan's position: just as natural qualities have a finite terminal degree, so supernatural qualities such as charity and the virtues do. Cajetan therefore holds that the charity in Christ's soul was the highest possible by God's absolute power within that species of quality. Durandus holds the first part of this view concerning finite terminal intensity. I give a FIRST

CONCLUSION. Although natural qualities have a term of intensity according to their species, charity

is different. Natural

qualities follow created substance and may therefore receive a finite intensive measure from that substance. Charity does not follow any created or creatable substance as a connatural emanation; therefore the same limitation does not follow.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Whatever may be true of natural qualities such as heat or light, charity, precisely as this supernatural quality, can always be increased by divine power. I say St. Thomas's arguments establish this and Capreolus holds the same. I add an analogy with the beatific vision. God's vision has no intrinsic maximum from the side of its supernatural participation: God can manifest Himself more and more, and the light of glory can therefore be greater and greater. The same reasoning applies to charity, by which man adheres to the Supreme Good. To the objection that every creature is finite, I answer that this proves no actually infinite created perfection exists; it does not prove that for every possible finite degree there cannot be a still greater finite degree. There need not be a “most perfect possible angel,” and similarly there need not be a greatest possible created intensity of charity. To the finite capacity of the soul, he distinguishes remote natural capacity from proximate capacity. The soul is remotely capable through obediential potency; a lesser charity can itself be a proximate disposition for greater charity, just as heat as four can be a disposition for heat as five. Charity is not educed from the creature's natural potency but received according to obediential potency, which refers to God's absolute power and therefore does not furnish an intrinsic maximum. I then qualify the discussion concerning Christ. Even if God could, considered merely intensively, produce another created habit of charity greater than Christ's habit as a quality, Christ's grace and charity possess an infinite dignity and value from their subject: the soul united personally to the Word. Christ's acts of charity possess infinite value in the order of merit because of the divine Person who acts. Whiteness in Christ does not receive infinite value from the dignity of the subject because the dignity of the person is irrelevant to the specific ratio of whiteness. But the dignity of the person is highly relevant to habitual grace precisely as grace and to the value of love and merit. Thus Christ's created habits possess a perfection from their subject which no mere increase of created intensive degrees could rival. THIRD DOUBT. Can charity in the state of the wayfarer attain the quantity of charity in the state of glory?

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QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — CHARITY OF THE WAY AND CHARITY OF THE

HOMELAND I raise arguments
that charity in this life can equal charity in heaven. First: if charity in the way can increase without intrinsic limit, it seems able to equal or exceed the charity of a particular blessed person. If a blessed person's charity is ten, why could a wayfarer not possess charity as twelve? Second: charity in the way and charity in heaven are of the same species because they have formally the same object. Therefore increase seems capable of bringing the former to equality with the latter. Third: even in this life charity is already directed to the Supreme Good; therefore its further increase is from the side of the subject through intensity. Since such intensity has no intrinsic limit in the way, it seems possible for the wayfarer's charity to exceed that of some blessed person. Indeed, the Blessed Virgin while on earth possessed charity more intense than that of some angels.

Fourth: charity immediately tends to the Supreme Good abstracting from whether God is known obscurely or clearly. In heaven the principal difference is that God is clearly seen. This seems not to create a different species of charity. If God withdrew the light of glory from a blessed person, it seems the quantity of the habit of charity would not thereby be destroyed. I examine Cajetan's noteworthy treatment. Cajetan says the natural state of charity is the homeland, because charity is friendship with God and friendship naturally tends to live with and enjoy the presence of the friend. In this life charity is in a comparatively preternatural, even quasi-violent, state of pilgrimage. According to these two states there are two perfections of charity's quantity: one proper to the way and another proper to the homeland. Neither is indivisible, but they differ in ratio. Cajetan distinguishes two intensities. One arises from the disposition of the subject; the other from the power's closer approach to its object. Thus, other things equal, vision is more perfect when the object is suitably near than when it is seen from afar. Cajetan therefore says that according to intensity considered from the subject, charity in the way can be more perfect than charity in heaven; but according to the intensity arising from proximity to the object, heavenly charity is always more perfect. I is not fully satisfied with Cajetan's distinction, especially if it is phrased as an increase of charity “with respect to the object,” since St. Thomas treats the increase of charity as intensive in the subject. I offer his own distinction. Charity's quantity can be considered, first, according to sufficiency on the side of the will determined by the habit together with the efficient aids of the Holy Spirit, by which the will is able to love. Second, it can be considered according to the perfection arising from a better application of the object. A strong man moves a weight strongly, but with the same strength moves it still more effectively if the object is more suitably applied. In heaven the application of the object is of another order because it is through the beatific vision. Therefore charity in the way cannot formally reach the quantity of charity in heaven under this second aspect. Yet virtually and radically the whole intensity that will exist there can pre-exist here in the habit, even though it cannot issue into the corresponding act because the object is not yet seen. FIRST

CONCLUSION. The charity of a wayfarer can be greater than the charity of a blessed person with

respect to the intensive
quantity of the habit and act insofar as this proceeds from the disposition of the subject. In this respect the charity is specifically the same and the habit remains the same when the person passes from way to homeland. SECOND

CONCLUSION. Absolutely and simply speaking, the quantity of charity in the way cannot equal the

quantity of charity in
the homeland. Charity in the way always concerns an absent object; charity in heaven possesses the object as present. Presence enables a more intense operation around the possessed good. Thus even a lesser subjective disposition in heaven can produce a more fervent act than a greater habit in the state of absence and hope. I connect this with the saying, “He who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than he,” while noting that Chrysostom gives a more literal interpretation of that Gospel text. St. Thomas can nevertheless say that a wayfarer may be more perfect in virtue than some comprehensor, though not in act. Paul similarly distinguishes the perfection of the way from the perfection of attainment in Philippians 3. To the first objection I reply that it concerns charity's quantity according to the disposition of the subject, not the perfection of actual operation arising from the presence of the object, which is of another ratio.
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QUESTION XXIV,

ARTICLE VII CONCLUDED;

ARTICLE VIII BEGINS To the second objection I reply that it is one thing to speak of charity

precisely according to its
species and another to speak of the perfection of intensity which constitutes its quantity. Identity of species does not imply identity of quantitative perfection. Every human being belongs to the same species, but a man three cubits tall does not have the same quantity as one four cubits tall. Thus heavenly charity can possess, in its natural state of fruition, a mode of intensive
quantity which charity in the way cannot formally possess, although the latter may contain it virtually and in hope, just as a child virtually contains the mature quantity of an adult. To the third objection I grants that, on the side of the object as terminus, even the least charity reaches the Supreme Good. Nevertheless the natural application of that object in heaven produces a greater intensity than occurs in the way. Some distinguish an “object as motive” from the “object as terminus” and attribute the greater intensity to the former. I prefer his previous distinction. Formally speaking, the same God is motive and terminus with respect to the will; the object does not efficiently move the will except insofar as God moves it as author of nature or grace. Therefore the distinction based on presence and application of the object is more satisfactory. To the fourth objection: clear vision and presence or absence of the object do not change the essential species of charity. Nevertheless, in the
presence of the object charity has an act possessing a perfection of intensity impossible in absence: the intensity of joy and, as it
were, the embrace of the good present. I illustrates this by imagining a stone capable of joy at reaching its center. Such joy in possession would be of a kind it could not have merely while moving toward the center, however swiftly and powerfully. If the
light of glory were withdrawn from a blessed person, this actual intensity arising from presence would cease, although it would
remain virtually in the habit.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE St. Thomas begins

with an objection: charity
cannot be perfect in this life because the more charity is increased, the more it can still increase; therefore it cannot reach perfection here.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that when charity has been strengthened it is perfected, and

when it comes to
perfection it says: “I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” This desire was possible in Paul during this life. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life. ST. THOMAS'S
RESPONSE. The perfection of charity can be understood in two ways: on the side of the thing loved and on the side of the lover. On the side of the thing loved, charity would be perfect if God were loved as much as He is lovable. God is lovable in proportion to His goodness, and His goodness is infinite. Therefore He is infinitely lovable. No creature can love Him infinitely
because every created power is finite. In this sense no creature's charity can be perfect; only God's charity, by which He loves Himself, is perfect. On the side of the lover, charity is perfect when the lover loves as much as he can. St. Thomas then begins
to distinguish three ways in which this can occur. FIRST MODE. The whole heart of man is actually and continually borne toward God. This is the perfection of charity proper to the blessed, whose actual love is uninterrupted.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ACCIDENTAL REWARDS AND CHRISTIAN PERFECTION

I confirm accidental rewards from Scripture. Christ promises a “good measure, pressed down and shaken together” (Luke 6), signifying the fullness of reward corresponding to every goodness and perfection found in merit. A meritorious work has goodness from charity directing it to the ultimate end, goodness from its own specific object, and perfection from its exterior execution.

Accordingly, enjoyment of God corresponds to the work insofar as it is informed by charity, while a special reward corresponds to its particular kind of work.

Scripture specifically mentions three special accidental rewards: those of virgins, martyrs, and doctors. Revelation 14 describes the virgins as singing a canticle that no one else can sing and following the Lamb wherever He goes. This indicates a special joy distinct from the enjoyment of God common to all the blessed. Revelation 7 similarly gives martyrs white robes and palms, signifying a reward peculiar to martyrdom. Many non-martyrs can nevertheless possess greater essential beatitude than many martyrs.

Daniel 12 says that the learned shall shine like the brightness of the firmament and those who instruct many unto justice like stars forever. This is commonly applied to the special reward of doctors and preachers. Likewise, “He who shall do and teach, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.” Yet one devoted only to contemplation may be greater in essential beatitude than many teachers. The teacher therefore has a special excellence or aureola proper to teaching.

From this I conclude that accidental rewards must be highly esteemed. Even the least supernatural accidental joy added to essential beatitude is more excellent than possession of all temporal goods together with immortality in this present life. Consequently, whenever Scripture promises a reward or a greater reward for particular works, one must not automatically interpret this as a greater degree of the vision and enjoyment of God; the promise may concern accidental reward.

THIRD FOUNDATION. The perfection of Christian life is measured especially by charity and consists essentially in charity.

According to other virtues Christian perfection exists only in a qualified or secondary sense.

Thomas teaches in II-II, q.184 that substantial and essential perfection of Christian life consists in the precept of charity; counsels belong secondarily and instrumentally to perfection. Everything is called perfect insofar as it reaches its proper end, and charity unites us to God, the ultimate end of the human mind: “He who abides in charity abides in God and God in him.” Charity is therefore “the bond of perfection,” binding the other virtues into a perfect unity by causing them to attain the ultimate end.

A thing can be perfect simply, according to what belongs to its nature, or perfect in some respect according to something externally added. Thus Christian life is perfect simply according to charity, but according to the other virtues only in a qualified respect. From this I infers that the substantial reward of the future life should correspond proportionally to the essential perfection of Christian life, while accidental reward corresponds to its accidental perfections.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - CONCLUSIONS ON ACTS OF OTHER VIRTUES

FIRST CONCLUSION. If a person habitually exists in grace and performs a morally good act according to natural right reason, but does not actually or virtually refer it to the supernatural end, he does not through that act merit an increase of charity, grace, or essential reward.

Example: Peter cheerfully invites a friend to dinner and behaves with the friendliness demanded by human friendship. The act is morally good but, considered in the proposed case, belongs to the natural order and is not commanded by supernatural charity.

Therefore it cannot dispose to or merit an increase belonging to a superior supernatural order.

Some Nominalists hold that once a person in grace has by one act of charity referred himself and all his affairs to God, every subsequent good work remains virtually referred to God through that first act. Others, including my teacher Melchior Cano, require such morally good acts to be actually referred by charity in order to merit supernatural reward. I leaves that controversy aside. His

conclusion concerns a good act which is neither actually nor virtually referred to the supernatural end.

Such a case can occur when a person is justified through the sacrament of Penance with attrition alone and afterward performs an ordinary naturally good act. The habits of grace and charity have been infused sacramentally, but no preceding elicited act of charity has referred this particular action to the supernatural end.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Through such a naturally good moral act the person can merit some accidental reward: a special joy in glory concerning the exercise of natural friendship. The act has merit according to its own moral goodness before God as Author of nature. Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it; therefore the natural reward can be received in a more splendid manner because it is joined to supernatural grace and glory.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Through all works of the other moral virtues which are directed by an act of charity to charity's own end, a person merits an increase of grace and charity and consequently of essential glory, whether the commanding act of charity is intense or remiss.

These works are informed by charity and attain charity's supernatural end; therefore they possess supernatural goodness and supernatural merit. Every meritorious act merits an increase of grace, and works performed in virtue of charity participate in charity's value.

Thus almsgiving and fasting truly merit essential reward, but they do so insofar as they flow from the root of charity and are informed by it as a body by its soul. No separate quantity of essential reward corresponds to acts of moral virtue over and above the essential reward corresponding to the act of charity by which those works are actually or virtually ordered to the supernatural end.

Some object that infused moral virtues, unlike acquired virtues, have an intrinsic proportion to the supernatural end and therefore should merit a further degree of essential reward from their own infused principle. I answer that this does not follow Thomas. Even when Thomas discusses infused virtues, such as the patience of martyrs, he does not assign patience an additional degree of essential reward apart from that corresponding to the charity which commands it.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH CONCLUSIONS

The essential perfection of Christian life does not consist in the operation of another infused moral virtue. Even infused moral virtues
concern means rather than God Himself as ultimate end. Their supernatural proportion derives from infused prudence subordinated to
and moved by charity. Acquired moral virtue presupposes an intention toward a naturally known rational good; infused virtue
presupposes a will elevated by charity toward a supernatural end and therefore may select means surpassing natural reason.

I note that some theologians deny infused moral virtues and hold acquired moral virtues together with infused theological virtues
sufficient. I regard this opinion as false, but notes that it is not censured as temerarious so long as infused grace and theological virtues
are maintained. Thus the objection based on infused moral virtues cannot overthrow his conclusion.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Although through every good work performed from charity the just person merits eternal life
and an increase of grace and charity, the habits of grace and charity are not actually increased through every such work. They are increased only through works proceeding from more intense charity.

This follows from my earlier conclusion concerning elicited acts of charity: if multiplication or continuation of elicited acts does not
increase grace and charity unless charity itself becomes more intense, still less will acts merely commanded by charity do so.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. When acts of other infused virtues are more intense than their preceding habits, charity also increases in the same proportion. The will cannot tend more intensely toward means precisely as ordered to an end than toward the end which supplies the reason for willing those means. Hence an infused moral act concerning a means proportioned to charity's end presupposes charity at least equally intense.

I cautions that acts of infused moral virtue do not increase charity as proximate dispositions. They function as instruments moved by
charity. By nature the act of charity reaches the increase of charity before the act of another virtue does, not only with respect to
charity's increase but even with respect to the increase of that other infused virtue. The will is first intensified concerning the end and
afterward concerning the means.

It might be imagined that an infused moral virtue could elicit an act more intense than its preceding habit without a preceding more
intense act of charity, because the moral act itself virtually contains charity. I reject this. If a man wills to suffer death because of God
supremely loved, that one act is materially an act of fortitude but formally an act of charity. Thomas teaches that an act belonging
materially to an inferior power or habit receives form and species from the superior habit insofar as the inferior is ordered by the
superior.

I nevertheless allow as possible that an infused moral virtue might sometimes be exercised without charity being formally elicited at
that instant, but then a preceding act of charity must have commanded and referred the future act to the ultimate end; the later moral
act cannot be more intense than that preceding charity.

SIXTH CONCLUSION. The quantity of essential glory or beatitude - whether considered as reward relative to merit or as
ultimate perfection relative to proportionate disposition - is commensurate with the quantity of charity. Therefore whoever
possessed greater charity in this life will possess greater essential beatitude in eternal life.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ESSENTIAL GLORY IS MEASURED BY CHARITY

I explain the sixth conclusion. Charity can become more intense in two ways. First, through acts disposing a person to the infusion or
increase of charity, as in an adult's justification or later growth in grace. Second, grace and charity can increase through reception of a
sacrament ex opere operato. Sacramental increase is not simply measured by the recipient's merit and disposition but also by the
power of the sacrament instituted by Christ.

For the present argument I sets aside the additional quantity of grace attributable specifically to sacramental reception and considers
essential glory insofar as it corresponds to acts of free choice as dispositions and merits.

No matter how many excellent works of other virtues Peter multiplies, if he never possesses a more intense act of charity toward God,
he will not thereby receive a more intense light of glory or see God more perfectly. Conversely, Paul, who possesses a more intense
act of charity but performs fewer external works because he lacks ability, opportunity, or obligation, can receive a greater essential
reward.

The reason is Thomas's doctrine and my third foundation: the essential perfection of Christian life consists in charity. Essential reward
must therefore be proportioned to that essential perfection. Charity is greater or lesser according to greater or lesser intensity, not mere
multiplicity of works.

Augustine similarly teaches that the soul is illumined by the light of glory according to the degree by which it adheres to God through
charity. Hence one who performs fewer and lesser works of other virtues but adheres more intensely to God through charity will be
illuminated by greater glory.

I cite Gregory the Great on Peter and Andrew leaving their nets. One might ask how much they really abandoned, since they
possessed almost nothing. Gregory replies that affection of heart rather than monetary value must be weighed. He leaves much who
keeps nothing for himself; he leaves much who abandons everything he possesses, however little. God weighs the heart rather than the
substance offered and considers not how much is offered but from how much it is offered.

The kingdom of God, Gregory says, is worth whatever one has: for Zacchaeus it was half his possessions; for Peter and Andrew their
nets and boat; for the widow two mites; for another a cup of cold water.

I say this teaching contradicts certain innovations introduced into theological schools during the previous forty or fifty years by
theologians heavily influenced by Nominalism. He specifically notes Vitoria's statement that one who gives his entire substance
through a remiss act of charity merits more than one who gives a single coin through a more intense act. I respond with Gregory: God
weighs the heart, not the substance.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - ST. VINCENT FERRER AND THE FINAL CONCLUSION

I next appeal to St. Vincent Ferrer. Explaining “the last shall be first, and the first last,” Vincent says that the merit of grace in this
world and the reward of glory in the next arise more from affection of heart and fervor of spirit than from multiplication of good
works.
Suppose one person performs great penitential works - fasting, prayer, large alms - but without great affection or spiritual fervor,
though remaining in grace. Another performs fewer works, observing the Church's fasts, confessing and communicating, hearing
Mass, and giving some alms, but does these with great affection and charity, as though wholly inflamed. Vincent says the second has
greater merit of grace here and greater reward of glory hereafter, because essential or principal merit is not measured by multiplication
of works or duration of time but by greater or lesser charity.
He cites Augustine: not number of works nor length of time, but greater charity and greater will increase reward. Vincent then gives
the example of St. Sophia during the construction of a church at Constantinople. Wealthy donors gave enormous sums, while Sophia
once gave grass or hay with great affection to exhausted oxen pulling a cart of stones. When the church was finished, golden letters
were found saying, “Sophia made me.” Vincent uses the story to illustrate the superiority of fervent charity over mere material
quantity.
I note that Vincent calls this the common teaching of the holy doctors. He also cites Matthias de Paz at Salamanca in 1517 as teaching
that the quantity of essential reward corresponds to the quantity of charity.
FINAL CONCLUSION. Regularly and for the most part, other things being equal, the person who surpasses another in works of the
other virtues - by number, duration, or excellence - also possesses greater charity.
Example: Peter and Paul have equal wealth and household responsibilities and encounter equal need among the poor. Both fulfill the
commandment of almsgiving, but Peter also gives many and abundant supererogatory alms. Ordinarily one should not suppose Paul
possesses greater charity merely because he recites more prayers, attends more divine offices, fasts more, or appears outwardly more
devout.
This agrees with Thomas: one who observes both counsels and precepts generally merits more according to the kind of works, though
not always according to the root of charity, since a person can sometimes fulfill only the precepts from greater charity than another
fulfills both precepts and counsels. Nevertheless, as Thomas says following Gregory, “the proof of love is the exhibition of the work.”
Gregory teaches that God's love is never idle: if it exists, it performs great things when occasion arises. This must be understood
according to the condition of the love and the opportunity. If an occasion involves a commandment, charity acts or is lost through
grave failure. If it concerns counsel and supererogation, fervent charity ordinarily produces great works when the opportunity occurs.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - PRACTICAL QUALIFICATIONS AND REPLIES

I apply James's command to be doers of the word and not hearers only. Some hear God's word externally and internally through faith
and contemplation and imagine that they love God greatly, yet deceive themselves because either they do not keep the commandments
or, though remaining in grace, are very imperfect in works.
He criticizes those who spend much time in what they call mental prayer but are extremely remiss in bodily mortification and overly
solicitous for bodily comfort, contrary to Paul's warning not to make provision for the flesh in its desires. Likewise wealthy persons
who give very little alms and scarcely fulfill the commandment should not appeal to Thomas's statement that substantial Christian
perfection consists in charity as though charity did not also command love of neighbor, self-denial, and taking up the cross.
Great interior perfection does not ordinarily harmonize with very little abstinence in one capable of more, few vigils in one capable of
more, or meager works of charity toward one's neighbor and religion toward God. Nevertheless, where ability or opportunity is
absent, the ready will is accepted according to what it has, not according to what it lacks. Thus the common saying: the will is
reckoned for the deed when the faculty or opportunity to act is absent.
Consequently, a poor hermit can merit more essentially than a wealthy man who gives many alms; a weak sick person who cannot fast
or keep vigils can merit more than a strong person who does many such works; and a non-martyr can merit more essential reward than
a martyr if, without ever receiving the opportunity for martyrdom, he possesses greater charity and readiness to die for God.
Why then did I state the final conclusion only “regularly and for the most part”? Because exceptions are possible. A person may have
acquired greater habitual charity earlier through good works or contemplation and later, on a particular occasion where no precept
binds him, perform a lesser work than someone with less charity. He may even commit a venial fault by failing to assist a poor person,
without thereby losing or diminishing charity. Thus greater habitual charity and a smaller exterior work can coexist, though I say this
is uncommon.
REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS. To the first: not every morally good act is meritorious of supernatural life unless referred to God through charity. Merely being habitually in grace is insufficient for every naturally good act to merit supernatural reward.
The second and third arguments are answered by the fourth and fifth conclusions. To the fourth: although acts of infused moral virtues
belong to the supernatural order, their greater intensity does not independently intensify charity; rather, they are effects of more
intense charity.
To the fifth: suspending contemplation for the neighbor's salvation can belong to the highest perfection of charity. Charity itself can
command cessation from an elicited act of charity, sometimes even under precept. Such suspension may be more meritorious than
continuing contemplation. Therefore continuation as such does not receive greater essential reward; essential reward follows the
intensity of charity commanding the continuation or suspension according to prudence.
The sixth argument confirms the final conclusion and the doctrine already established concerning the second principal **doubt.**

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - MARTYRDOM AND THE SIXTH AND FINAL DOUBT

TO THE SEVENTH ARGUMENT. The question is whether martyrdom confers first grace upon an attrite adult who dies for confession of the faith. Some theologians affirm this and others deny it. I say he has always followed the negative position: if the martyr previously committed mortal sin, before death he must possess an act of penance.

His teacher Melchior Cano holds this position. I also reads Thomas as teaching it. Martyrdom without charity does not remit mortal guilt; the shedding of blood has the character of baptism only when it includes charity - baptism of blood includes baptism of desire. Since charity in one guilty of mortal sin does not remit that sin without penance, martyrdom likewise requires penance. Paul says: "If I

deliver my body so that I burn, but have not charity, it profits me nothing."

I admits that the contrary opinion is not wholly improbable, since something analogous occurs with infants killed for Christ who had

not been circumcised yet are honored by the Church as martyrs through Christ's merit. Nevertheless, he thinks the privilege of martyrdom in adults consists in God's not permitting anyone to be killed for confession of the faith without first granting an act of charity and, when necessary, contrition.

Formally answering the original objection: when martyrdom is elicited by infused fortitude, the person already exists in charity and has possessed an elicited act of charity no less intense than the act of fortitude. Therefore the future martyr's charity has already increased before death. Whether martyrdom afterward increases grace, charity, and the light of glory quasi ex opere operato may remain disputed. I does not think a martyr receives greater essential glory than corresponds to the charity from which he suffers, though he receives the aureola, an exceptionally excellent accidental reward for actually executing so excellent a work.

An objection invokes Christ: "Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends." If taken to mean every

martyr necessarily has greater intensive charity than every non-martyr, it would imply that the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist

possessed no greater charity than the least martyr, which I call erroneous. Many confessors - Augustine, Jerome, Bernard, Benedict, Francis, Dominic, Thomas, and others - can be greater in heaven than many martyrs.

Thomas therefore interprets "greater love" first as the greatest exterior sign of love: among human acts nothing outwardly manifests love more strongly than laying down one's life for a friend. It can also be understood according to charity's species: even the least true

charity loves God above all in such a way that the person is prepared to lose his life for Christ. One act of charity can nevertheless exceed another in intensity.

I say the gravity of this material justified his lengthy treatment, because it matters both for scholastic disputation and for spiritual progress. He hopes Thomas's and the ancient Thomists' doctrine, freed from various novelties, will be renewed in theological schools.

SIXTH AND FINAL DOUBT. When merits mortified by sin revive through penance, is a greater grace and charity conferred at the very moment of justification than corresponds to the present disposition, so that if the penitent dies immediately afterward he receives

the same essential glory for his revived past merits as though he had never sinned?

The affirmative argument is simple: all merits mortified by sin certainly revive through penance; therefore they regain efficacy for bringing their former subject to the degree of glory corresponding to them.

I report four scholastic opinions, beginning with Henry of Ghent, who holds that all who rise from sin rise with equal grace regardless

of whether they fell from great or little grace, because justifying grace is from God alone and God requires only non-resistance.

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QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - FOUR OPINIONS ON REVIVAL OF MERITS I reject Henry of Ghent's opinion as

erroneous. Trent teaches
that free will, moved and excited by God, truly cooperates by assenting to God and is not merely passive. Cooperation and assent are not mere non-resistance but real acts performed with divine assistance disposing the person to grace. Trent also speaks of preparation through faith, hope, charity, and penance, and says each receives justice according to the measure distributed by the Holy Spirit and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation. Grace is not given because our acts merit first justification. Rather, our cooperation functions as a disposition materially, and even this disposition is itself
God's gift, produced efficaciously by His prevenient mercy. Thus “it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy” means that natural powers alone cannot dispose us to grace; divine mercy precedes, disposes, and justifies us. SECOND OPINION: Scotus holds that everyone rising from sin rises to greater glory than before, though not necessarily to as much grace as he previously possessed. Glory is commensurate with merits, and the penitent regains the former merits plus the present meritorious disposition. Grace, however, is conferred according to the present disposition of free choice in detesting sin, which can be tepid. Soto sharply attacks this opinion, and I refer back to his earlier arguments against Scotus's theory of the increase of charity. THIRD OPINION: Ockham, followed by Gabriel, Almain, Major, and other Nominalists, holds that one rising from sin always rises to greater grace and glory than he possessed before. He receives his former grace plus an additional degree corresponding to present contrition. They appeal to Ezekiel: if the wicked does penance, God will no
longer remember his iniquities; “the wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him”; and Joel's promise to restore the years consumed by the locust. They argue that past merits are called “mortified” only because present sin blocks their reward; remove the obstacle and the merits should immediately recover their full effect. I postpone my attack on this opinion until treating Soto's fourth opinion, which I consider a newly invented compromise between Thomas on one side and Scotus and the
Nominalists on the other. FOURTH OPINION: Soto proposes three conclusions. First, anyone who rises from sin after previously possessing grace and merits always receives some new degree of grace because the former merits revive. Present contrition is not merely a disposition to new grace but also to the vivification of past merits. The amount restored is greater as present contrition is greater, not according simply to its absolute intensity but proportionally relative to the former merits.

Second, whoever rises with the highest effort possible to him under God's assistance recovers, besides the degree corresponding to present contrition, all the grace from which he had fallen, whether great or small. Soto appeals to Thomas's statement that penance by its nature has power to repair defects perfectly and promote a person to a further state, and to the gloss saying that the virtue of the just and the penance of sinners are equally pleasing to God, restoring David and Peter to their former degree when they repent perfectly.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - SOTO'S THIRD CONCLUSION AND my CRITIQUE

Soto's third conclusion is this: if contrition falls short of the highest possible effort, former grace is restored in proportion to how close
the contrition comes to that supreme contrition. If present contrition is one-half of the maximum, one-half of the lost grace is restored;
if one-third, one-third; if one-quarter, one-quarter. Hence one rising from sin always rises to some degree of grace greater than the quantity corresponding merely to present contrition.
Soto regards this as a middle position between those who deny that the penitent rises to any grace greater than present contrition and those who say he always rises to greater grace than he possessed before.
I say this opinion is contrary to Thomas.

FIRST ARGUMENT. Thomas compares the movement of free choice in justification to the ultimate disposition for the grace presently infused. Forms capable of more and less are intensified or remitted according to the differing disposition of the subject. Therefore a form of grace more perfect than the present disposition should not be infused; otherwise proportion between disposition and form is lost.
Past merits do not presently dispose the man, since the acts no longer exist. Though they remain in divine acceptance, they cannot merit that first justifying grace be greater than the present disposition; otherwise justification would be partly from merit rather than wholly gratuitous.

SECOND ARGUMENT. Thomas says the same principle applies to the virtues following from grace as to grace itself. Suppose a man
had charity as ten before sin but rises with contrition as five. The habit of penance should be as five, proportioned to its present act; charity likewise as five, because he sorrows according as he loves. If grace were greater than five, then grace and the virtues consequent upon it would not follow the same proportion.
If some greater grace were given because of preceding merits, the same reason would seem to demand the whole former grace, because the additional amount would not correspond to the present disposition but to the past merits. That yields Ockham's position.
I also reject the suggestion that present disposition as five could somehow be proportioned to a form as eight or ten merely because it
bears a relation to previous merits. The present disposition neither causes those past merits nor is caused by them.

THIRD AND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT. Soto's “highest effort” cannot be an indivisible maximum beyond which no penitent could
ordinarily go. No Catholic can concede that a person's conversion through love of God and detestation of sin is so perfect that greater
love and detestation are impossible.
Therefore different persons can each rise with their “whole effort” relative to the divine assistance given to each, while one nevertheless has more intense contrition and love than another. The totality of effort is measured not merely from natural powers but
from the efficacy of God's motion of free choice. Hence Peter and Paul can both rise with their whole effort and yet rise unequally. If
so, the former grace corresponding to past merits cannot be restored equally to both merely because both used their “whole effort.”

FOURTH ARGUMENT begins. Even granting for argument's sake that the highest effort were an indivisible maximum, Soto's position would still lead to difficulty. Suppose that maximum effort is as one hundred. Peter fell from grace as one hundred and Paul from grace as one thousand. Both rise with effort as one hundred. Soto's theory would restore to each all his former grace in addition
to the grace corresponding to the present disposition: Peter would have two hundred, Paul eleven hundred.
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QUESTION XXIV -

ARTICLE VI - FURTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOTO; MY OWN DECISION

I complete the fourth argument. If Paul had never fallen and, while possessing grace as one thousand, elicited an act only as one hundred, his grace would not increase because an act less intense than the habit does not increase charity or grace. Therefore after falling, the same effort as one hundred should not give him one hundred above the restored thousand; otherwise, other things equal, he would be better off after falling than before. The same reasoning applies to Peter. FIFTH ARGUMENT. I assume the Thomistic principle established earlier: when grace and charity increase through our meritorious and dispositive acts, they increase not according to the whole intensity of the act but only according to the excess of the act over the existing habit. If charity is ten and a person loves as fifteen, the habit does not become twenty-five; it rises from ten to fifteen, receiving an increase of five. Suppose Peter and Paul both possess grace as one hundred. Peter falls into sin and rises with a disposition as sixty. Paul, who never fell, has an act of love as one hundred. Paul receives no increase beyond one hundred. It would therefore be unreasonable for Peter, precisely after falling and with an act almost half as weak as Paul's, to receive more grace than Paul through restored merits. Otherwise Peter would be in a better condition because he sinned and fell, which I call unthinkable and ridiculous. He considers this argument insoluble unless one abandons the Thomistic premise and adopts Ockham's Nominalist theory. SIXTH ARGUMENT. Soto says that if someone fell from grace as eight and by a first contrition recovered four degrees of the former grace, then by another equal contrition he could recover the remaining four. I say this openly falls into Ockham's position. An equal second contrition should not increase the preceding habit according to Thomas. Moreover, if the first contrition restored four degrees of old grace and also received four corresponding to present disposition, then the same reasoning applied to the second contrition would add another eight. The person could thus reach grace as sixteen without ever having an act more intense than four. This makes the habit increase through remiss acts according to the entire latitude of those acts - precisely the Nominalist doctrine. Finally, Soto's opinion fails to explain Thomas's statement that one who rises through penance with lesser charity obtains essential reward according to the quantity of charity in which he is presently found. I therefore say another opinion must be held as the genuine doctrine of St. Thomas, as Cajetan understood Thomas in III, q.89, a.2. DECISION CONCERNING THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTY. The proposed doubt presupposes one thing as certain and asks another. First, therefore, a firm foundation must be established: good works “mortified” through mortal sin revive through penance. This truth is so certain among theologians that they commonly regard its denial as temerarious; I does not think the contrary can be demonstrated absolutely heretical, but judges it sufficiently shown to be proximate to error. He cites the common scholastic teaching, including Durandus and Alexander of Hales; Gratian; Augustine, who says that God does not give penitents less than the gift of life and salvation formerly bestowed and that faith requires us to believe that, when Christ's grace destroys former evils, it also rewards former good works; Jerome on Galatians, who says that works suffered for Christ are not lost if the fallen person returns to his former zeal; Chrysostom and the common commentators on the same passage; and Anselm on Hebrews, who encourages penitents because God does not forget their former works. Thomas interprets Paul's confidence as involving a certain merit de congruo contained in works done in charity, through which a man fittingly merits divine assistance to rise again after falling. I also argue from the final judgment: all works will be brought into judgment, and these formerly good works will be praised by God. A penitent restored to grace is capable of receiving reward for them. For these reasons, I judge denial of the revival of merits through penance to be highly temerarious and proximate to error.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - DECISION CONTINUED

FIRST CONCLUSION. When merits previously mortified by mortal sin revive through penance, all and each of the merits
which formerly lived from charity revive. As for other morally good works not commanded by charity, a theologian may
dispute more freely; nevertheless it is much more probable that these too revive in their own manner, just as they were
formerly good and consonant with right reason.
The reason is that, once the impediment of sin is removed by penance, there is no reason why some merits should revive while others
do not. Moreover, the person who rises through penance is owed eternal life not only by reason of the present work but also by reason
of the former merits; otherwise those merits would not truly revive.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Whenever mortified works revive through penance, it is not necessary that they revive in as
much grace and charity as they formerly possessed. The grace of justification is given according to the measure of the
present disposition of free choice which the Holy Spirit works in us, as Trent teaches: each receives his own justice according
to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes as He wills and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation.
Thus if Peter formerly had grace as ten but after mortal sin rises with contrition and charity as six, he should not receive grace as
twelve - six for his present disposition plus six because of preceding merits. St. Thomas and theologians say that the same merits
revive, not that the former habit of grace or charity numerically revives. The merits regain efficacy, in the present grace, for leading
the one who performed them to eternal life.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If a man dies immediately after his merits revive through penance, he does not receive greater
essential glory than corresponds to the merit and measure of his present disposition.
St. Thomas teaches this expressly: before sin a man merited glory according to the charity he then possessed; through sin he became
another, and through penance he may not yet be restored to his former degree. Therefore he does not receive the full effect of his
former merits with respect to essential reward, although he receives a greater accidental joy concerning the works formerly performed
in greater charity.
An objection says that on this account merits revive only for accidental reward. I deny the consequence. All the former merits together
with the present merit and disposition recover efficacy for bringing their author to eternal life, which is essential reward. Nevertheless
the quantity of essential reward is not greater until the penitent is equally disposed as he formerly was. If he rises in lesser charity, he
receives essential glory in lesser quantity, but he possesses that glory under the titles of many revived merits.
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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI - COROLLARY AND SACRAMENTAL GRACE

From St. Thomas's doctrine I draws an important confirmation of what he taught earlier: the same measure of eternal life can be the
reward of two, three, or many works, so that the whole quantity of essential glory corresponds to each of them when all proceed from
charity of equal intensity. The multiplication of titles increases accidental reward and joy, not necessarily the intensity of essential
glory.

Capreolus likewise teaches that a person can rise with more merits than before while those merits now rest upon lesser grace, and
consequently receive lesser glory. Matthias de Paz explained the same doctrine in his 1517 relecture on the revival of merits. Jerome's
warning is cited: those who do not preserve the dignity of the divine grade should be content to save their souls, for returning to the
former degree is difficult. I praise this doctrine as more probable, pious, and spiritually safe, because it prevents sinners from
imagining that the former state is effortlessly recovered through minimal contrition or mere attrition with the sacrament.

LAST CONCLUSION. Sacramental grace lost through mortal sin is restored to the penitent beyond the degree of grace corresponding
to contrition as disposition.

Baptism received even in mortal sin obtains its effect when the obstacle is later removed; much more, therefore, a sacrament once
worthily received recovers its effect when the person rises through penance. The effect is conferred ex opere operato and is not
absolutely commensurated with the recipient's disposition, although a relative proportionality to devotion can exist.

I note the very probable and common Thomistic opinion that sacramental grace is not indivisible but can increase according to the
greater devotion of the recipient. Hence when sacramental grace is restored, it is restored in the quantity that would have been given
had the person approached the former sacrament with his present disposition.

A corollary follows: the whole sacramental grace of baptism is restored to one baptized before the use of reason, because this is the
minimum quantity conferred through baptism without regard to a personal disposition. From this I further infers that an adult baptized
and saved possesses greater glory than one who died as a baptized infant, because the adult's disposition allows a fuller participation
of sacramental grace.

REPLIES. The revival of merits does not mean that one who dies with lesser present disposition receives exactly the glory he
would have received had he died in his former charity. Rather, the former merits recover efficacy for leading him to eternal
life, while the degree of essential glory is commensurate with the present disposition at death.

Against Scotus: although glory corresponds to merits, its actual conferral requires a proportionate disposition in the person. Since the
penitent may not rise with the former disposition, he does not necessarily receive the same degree of glory.

Against the Nominalist appeal to Ezekiel, Joel, Romans 5, Luke 15, and Augustine: these texts establish the remission of guilt and
eternal punishment and the great restorative power of penance. They do not prove that every penitent, however remiss his present
conversion, is immediately restored to the exact former degree. Penance can perfectly restore and even advance a man further, but this
can be impeded by a remiss movement toward God and against sin.

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QUESTION XXIV - ARTICLE VI CONCLUDED; RELECTURE OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA

I continue the replies. Sin not only impeded the reward of former merits but destroyed the disposition to grace. Therefore removing sin through just any disposition does not suffice for restoration of the whole former quantity of grace; a disposition equal to the former one is required for equal grace.

He says enough has now been said concerning this very grave question.

I then explain why he inserts at this point the relecture of his celebrated teacher, Fr. Francisco de Vitoria, O.P., formerly first professor of Sacred Theology at Salamanca. He wants the theological reader to see how far certain modern Thomists differ from St. Thomas and to judge whether the doctrine carefully explained by the ancient Thomists and by I proceed more distinctly and consistently.

RELECTURE OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA ON THE INCREASE AND DIMINUTION OF CHARITY

The text chosen is Philippians 1: “I pray that your charity may abound more and more.”

The relecture has two parts: first, the increase of charity; second, its diminution. Vitoria does not intend to treat every question concerning increase, which would require too much time. He selects the most celebrated and theologically important question: whether charity is increased by every act of charity.

For the affirmative: every such act is meritorious of glory; therefore it is also meritorious of grace and consequently of charity. A good act referred to God is good and meritorious. St. Thomas teaches in I-II, q.21, a.4 that every good human act has the character of merit before God considered on the side of the act, since otherwise God would not exercise providence over human acts. Even a Muslim may perform a naturally good act without an evil circumstance; the act is praiseworthy before God, although the person dying in sin does not receive the reward due to it.

For the negative: in natural agents a remiss agent does not produce an effect more intense than itself. Therefore a remiss act of charity should not increase an intense habit. In supernatural matters we ordinarily reason by proportion with natural things unless revelation establishes otherwise.

Vitoria distinguishes three opinions. First, the Nominalists, such as Gabriel Biel: every act of charity, however remiss, increases charity and grace. Second, Scotus and Richard of Middleton: every act, however remiss, earns greater glory, but a remiss act does not increase grace or charity. Third, the opinion attributed to St. Thomas: charity is not increased by any act unless that act is more intense than the habit itself; according to one interpretation, no greater essential glory is given for a merely remiss act.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - WHETHER A MORE INTENSE ACT INCREASES THE HABIT BY ITS WHOLE INTENSITY

Vitoria first examines what all three opinions share: a more intense act increases charity. A fundamental question arises: does an act more intense than the habit increase the habit by the whole latitude of the act, or only by the excess of the act over the habit? If the habit is four and the act eight, does the habit receive eight additional degrees, or only four?

An argument for increase by the whole latitude appeals to proportionality between merits and rewards. Suppose Peter first has a meritorious act as four and grace as four, then a second act as eight. If the second act raises the habit only to eight, his grace and corresponding glory would be eight, although his merits considered cumulatively are twelve. The reward would seem smaller than the merits.

Again, if Peter and Paul both begin with merit and grace as four, and Paul afterward performs a second act as eight, Paul's grace would become only eight while Peter's remains four: a ratio of two to one. Yet Paul's total merits are twelve against Peter's four: a ratio of three to one. The proportion of rewards would not match the proportion of merits.

Against this, Vitoria argues from natural agents. If something heating as eight is applied to something already hot as four, it does not make it hot as twelve but only raises it to eight. Therefore a more intense act should increase a lesser habit only according to the excess.

He formulates the conclusion: A more intense act does not increase a habit by its whole latitude, but only according to the excess it has over the habit.

He first considers acquired habits. If every act following from a natural power and habit increased the habit by the whole intensity of the act, the habit would increase at least approximately by doubling again and again. Since an operative power informed by a habit can produce an act corresponding to its acquired strength, each successive act could produce an extraordinary escalation. Vitoria illustrates this by numerical progression and concludes that later acts could soon exceed all preceding acts together in intensity and merit, which seems absurd.

The same problem appears in infused habits if every more intense act adds its entire intensity. A saint living for many years could, by repeated acts, acquire a habit of almost inconceivable intensity. Vitoria compares the progression to the familiar story in which grains of wheat are doubled successively on the squares of a board: before long the number exceeds what entire kingdoms could supply.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE INTENSITY OF HABITS

Vitoria considers several possible replies.

First, perhaps men ordinarily do not act with their whole effort, so their acts need not be more intense than their habits. He finds this insufficient: perfect men at least sometimes seem to act with their whole effort, and it would still be unreasonable if a single late act of Peter, Paul, Adam, John the Baptist, or the Blessed Virgin could surpass all preceding acts of their lives merely because of exponential increase.

Second, perhaps even an act produced with one's whole effort does not reach the full latitude of a highly intense habit. A habit as one hundred might produce an act far below one hundred. Vitoria again finds the reply difficult, because an operative habit is intelligible precisely in relation to act. If a luminous thing is called luminous as ten, it seems capable of producing light as ten; why should a habit as one hundred be incapable of an act corresponding to its intensity?

Third, perhaps we have no experience of the intensity of infused habits. Vitoria says this also does not completely satisfy, because we would at least experience the intensity of the acts proceeding from them, and, according to most theologians, repeated acts of infused virtues also generate or increase acquired habits. Such enormous intensity should therefore somehow appear in experience.

Vitoria then returns to the natural analogy. A heating agent as eight applied to something hot as four raises it only by four degrees. He does not see why an act as eight should enjoy the special privilege of adding eight degrees to a habit as four.

Some modern theologians answer that acts do not efficiently cause infused habits but concur meritoriously and dispositively. Vitoria replies that this does not remove the need for proportionality of disposition: God infuses and increases these habits through a proportionate disposition of free choice.

Vitoria then tries another route. He supposes, according to Thomistic principles, that grace is distinct from charity and need not have exactly the same intensity. He even suggests, using Christ as an example, that grace could be greater than charity.

I inserts a critical note: this supposition is false and contrary to St. Thomas. Grace is the quality by which man participates in the divine nature, and charity flows from it as an inclination of the will toward God. Greater participation in filial grace should therefore correspond to greater charity: those who are more perfectly sons of God by grace are more perfectly moved by charity through the Holy Spirit.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - FOUR PROPOSITIONS ON GRACE, CHARITY, AND GLORY

Vitoria proposes four statements to solve the problem of proportionality between merit and reward.

FIRST. Every meritorious act increases grace according to the whole latitude of the act, not merely according to the excess over the preceding habit. If grace is four and the meritorious act eight, grace becomes twelve. His reason is that glory is owed according to the whole latitude of the act, and glory corresponds to grace.

SECOND. Charity does not increase according to the whole latitude of the act but only according to the excess by which the act surpasses the preceding habit. This, he says, is supported by the arguments already given.

THIRD. At least in an adult, charity is never equal in intensity to grace. Since every meritorious act adds its whole latitude to grace while charity increases only by the excess, grace becomes greater than charity.

FOURTH. Glory corresponds to grace rather than to charity. Through grace we are pleasing to God and worthy of glory; charity is given immediately for loving, as faith is given for believing.

Thus, Vitoria thinks, proportionality between merits and rewards can be preserved without making charity increase by the whole latitude of every act. The explosive growth objection would not apply to grace in the same way because grace does not directly determine the intensity of the following act; charity does.

I immediately criticizes these statements. St. Thomas says in I-II, q.114, a.8 that every meritorious act merits an increase of grace, yet grace is not immediately increased by every act but when the person is sufficiently disposed. Thomas speaks similarly in II-II, q.24, a.6 concerning charity. Therefore, on Thomas's way, there is no such difference between grace and charity with respect to remiss and intense acts.

I also reject the argument from Christ. Christ's habitual grace was not infinite in such a way that His charity remained merely finite while grace was infinite. If Christ's grace is called infinite because His acts possess infinite value through the divine Person, the same can be said proportionally of His charity.

The Gospel says: “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him.” St. Thomas uses this to prove that essential reward corresponds to charity. Grace is the remote root of merit, charity the proximate principle eliciting the meritorious love of God. There are not two different essential glories, one answering to grace and another to charity.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - THE REMISS ACT AND THE ACQUIRED HABIT

Vitoria says that, whatever one concludes according to other schools, those who hold with Thomas, Durandus, Scotus, Richard, and
others that the habit increases only through more intense acts must avoid the consequence that every increase more than doubles the
preceding habit. If an act added its whole intensity, this absurdity would follow especially in long-lived saints.

He then turns to the disagreement between the first opinion and the second and third opinions. The Nominalists say charity increases
even through remiss acts; the others deny this.

First argument against the Nominalists, from Durandus: one who negligently uses a benefit already received is not worthy of a new
benefit. A person possessing intense charity who acts tepidly and remissly uses the received gift negligently; therefore he is not thereby
worthy of an increase in grace. Vitoria admits this is not demonstrative but finds the analogy morally significant. In human friendship
one who serves a lord or prince negligently does not ordinarily grow in favor merely because he avoids a direct offense. The invisible
things of God may, within limits, be understood from created analogies.

Second argument, from St. Thomas: an acquired habit is not increased by acts more remiss than itself; therefore neither is an infused
habit. Although infused habits are increased by God rather than efficiently by our acts, it is plausible that God increases them according
to a proportion analogous to acquired habits.

The same acts by which, according to the opponents, an infused habit increases meritoriously also efficiently increase an acquired habit.

If a remiss act cannot increase the acquired habit, it is reasonable to deny that it increases the infused habit.

Vitoria supports the premise by Aristotelian principles: like acts cause like habits; an agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself; the
patient begins unlike the agent and ends like it. An act as four should not intensify a habit already as five, just as heat as four does not
increase something already hot as five.

He adds a continuation argument. A remiss act does nothing further merely by being continued once agent and effect are proportioned;
otherwise, if a definite degree were added at every instant, any small interval would generate infinite intensity.

I note approvingly that this is a major argument and that he himself amplified it earlier in Article VI in defense of St. Thomas.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - CAN A WEAKER NATURAL AGENT INCREASE A STRONGER EFFECT?

Vitoria next considers an objection to the natural analogy. Experience seems to show that several lamps together illuminate more intensely than one lamp, and several fires produce greater heat than a single fire. Therefore an equal or weaker agent can apparently increase an already more intense effect.

He replies by distinguishing intensity from extension of activity.

First, several natural agents do not produce at the nearest point of their sphere an effect more intense than the maximum intensity possessed by the strongest agent. If the strongest luminous body is as eight, the resulting light does not become more than eight merely because other equal or weaker lights are added.

Second, increasing the quantity or number of agents enlarges the sphere over which a given intensity is produced. A larger luminous body or several lights can make a distant point brighter because the effective sphere has been extended. Thus where one light produced illumination as six, several may produce seven because the point now lies under a stronger combined extension of activity; but this does not mean that the produced light at the source surpasses the maximum intensity of the agents.

Vitoria argues from division. If the sun were divided into two equal halves without any other change, each half would retain the same intensive luminosity, and the two halves together would not produce an effect of a higher intensive species than the original whole. Likewise, if a uniformly hot fire is divided, the separated halves do not thereby produce a heat more intense than the original fire.

Similarly, ten luminous bodies each as four, whether separate or united, do not produce an intensive light above four at the point where the full intensity of each is realized. Otherwise one could produce something greater than the supposed maximum by simply adding another equal or lesser agent.

He then applies the analogy to habits: however many acts as four are multiplied, they do not by mere multiplication produce a habit above four.

Vitoria next raises another objection. If every remiss act fails to increase an acquired habit, then a habit would never increase unless the effort of the power itself increased. Yet it seems that the habit should allow the same effort to produce a greater act. He answers that, with equal effort, a greater habit can indeed produce a greater act; regular increase of inclination therefore normally yields more intense subsequent acts.

Experience, he says, actually supports this: one who repeatedly acts tepidly does not find himself more prompt. Habitual tepidity tends instead toward cessation of action. Thus the principal argument remains: if an intense act increases a habit only according to its excess, an equal or lesser act should add nothing.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE - FURTHER ARGUMENTS FOR THE THOMISTIC POSITION

Vitoria gives a third principal argument: if, as already established, a more intense act increases a habit only by the excess over that habit, then an equal or lesser act does not increase it. If an act as six increases a habit as four only by two, an act as three, which contains no excess over the habit, appears unable to add anything.

This is confirmed by the natural analogy: a weaker agent does not intensify an effect already stronger than itself.

Fourth argument: experience shows that one who acts remissly and tepidly easily loses the habit. If the habit were really increasing through such acts, it should become firmer and more difficult to lose. Instead, one accustomed to tepid action readily ceases to act altogether.

Vitoria admits many more arguments could be made, but regards these as the principal ones.

He then returns to arguments for the first, Nominalist opinion against the second and third positions.

First: even a remiss act of infused charity is meritorious. Therefore some degree of glory corresponds to it; and if glory corresponds to charity, it seems grace and charity must increase because of that act.

Vitoria says the question is not certain simply from the diversity of earlier authorities. Modern theologians appeal to St. Thomas in I Sentences, d.17, where Thomas says that multiplication of acts of charity does not necessarily imply increase of essential reward.

Scotus, on the other hand, appears to hold that a remiss act will receive a degree of glory and consequently some corresponding grace at the end of life.

Vitoria then proposes to answer through propositions rather than by relying merely upon authorities.

FIRST PROPOSITION. By every act of charity, however remiss, a person merits and will have a greater reward.

Regarding the first part - that every act of charity merits an increase - Vitoria cites St. Thomas, II-II, q.24, a.6. But I inserts a correction: Thomas says every act merits increase, not that every remiss act immediately receives the increase. Thomas adds that the increase is conferred when the person breaks forth into a more fervent act. Cajetan explains the same in I-II, q.114, a.8.

Vitoria's reason is that it seems repugnant for an act to be meritorious de condigno and yet receive no reward. He also argues that it would seem harsh if an act formerly merited a great reward when the habit was weaker, yet an equal act performed later received nothing merely because the habit had grown.

ST. THOMAS continues his distinction of the perfection of charity on the side of the lover. The FIRST mode is the perfection omeland: the whole heart of man is actually and continually borne toward God. This is impossible in the present life because, on account of the weakness of human life, it is impossible always actually to think of God and be moved by love toward Him. The

SECOND mode is that a man devote his principal care to being free for God and divine things, setting other matters aside except insofar as the necessities of the present life require them. This perfection of charity is possible in the state of the way, although it is not

common to everyone who possesses charity. The THIRD mode is that a man habitually place his whole heart in God, so that he thinks

or wills nothing contrary to divine love. This perfection is common to all who possess charity. To the first objection: Paul denies of himself the perfection of the homeland. The Gloss therefore says that he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet arrived at the perfection which is the end of the journey. To the second: the imperfection spoken of arises from venial sins. These do not oppose the

habit of charity but its act. Hence they do not contradict the perfection possible in the way, although they do contradict the perfection

of the homeland. To the third: the perfection of the way is not perfection simply and absolutely; therefore it always remains capable of

further growth.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First, if perfection is considered on the side of the lovable object, only God's charity is perfect, because God alone loves Himself as much as His infinite goodness is lovable. Second, on the side of the lover charity is perfect when one loves as much as one can. Third, this occurs in three ways: perfectly and continually in heaven; by devoting one's principal care to God and divine things in the present life; and habitually by willing nothing contrary to divine love.

COMMENTARY. I refer the reader to Augustine, On the Perfection of Justice, and to my own discussion above. He says this

doctrine explains the command, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” Religious can possess charity even if they have not attained the second kind of perfection; nevertheless, they do not live according to their religious profession unless they possess the intention of advancing according to it.

DOUBT: ARE CHARITY IN THE WAY AND CHARITY IN THE HOMELAND OF THE SAME

SPECIES? I now ask about

the act itself, not the quantity discussed in Article VII. An objection says they are not specifically the same, because heavenly charity is not free as to exercise—the blessed will is necessitated—whereas charity in this life is a free act. Against this stands 1 Corinthians 13: charity never falls away but remains in heaven, the same habit specifically and numerically. Hence its act appears specifically the same. From St. Thomas, I-II, q.10, a.2, I note that the will is never necessitated by the object precisely as object with respect to exercise. Nevertheless, the will of the blessed is necessitated to exercise by God as author of nature and grace. God likewise necessitates the intellect to the exercise of the beatific vision, not merely as object but as author and efficient cause of the light of glory.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Simply speaking, charity in the way and charity in the homeland are of the same species, because their formal object is the same: the divine goodness immediately loved.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Their acts are not of the same genus in moral being, because the act in the way is formally free with respect to its immediate object, while the act in heaven is not formally free in this manner.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Nevertheless, even in moral being they are in a certain respect of the same species, because the charity of the blessed is free in its root. The blessed freely arrived at this most happy necessity, just as one who freely throws himself into the sea voluntarily accepts the necessary submersion following upon his choice.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. For the perfection of charity as friendship it is not required that the immediate love of God always be formally free; it suffices that liberty remain in its root or in the offices rendered to the beloved. Thus Christ, although always blessed and necessarily loving God under the beatific vision, freely willed to die and freely obeyed unto death, and could merit through love commanding these free offices for the sake of God necessarily loved.

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ARTICLE IX — WHETHER THREE DEGREES OF CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY

DISTINGUISHED: BEGINNERS,
PROFICIENT, AND PERFECT FIRST OBJECTION. Between the beginning of charity and its final perfection there are many intermediate degrees; therefore only one middle degree, “the proficient,” should not be assigned. SECOND

OBJECTION. As soon as charity begins to exist it also begins to advance. Therefore progressing charity should not be distinguished from beginning charity. THIRD OBJECTION. However perfect a person's charity may be in this world, it can still increase. But to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity should not be distinguished from progressing charity.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that when charity is born it is nourished, which pertains to

beginners; when
nourished it is strengthened, which pertains to the proficient; and when strengthened it is perfected, which pertains to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Spiritual growth in charity can be compared with bodily growth. Bodily growth can be divided into many parts, yet it has determinate stages according to the characteristic operations or pursuits to which a person is brought. Infancy precedes the use of reason; another stage begins when the child speaks and uses reason; another at puberty; and so on until maturity. So too the degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different principal pursuits to which a person is brought by its increase. The BEGINNER'S principal care is to withdraw from sin and resist the concupiscences which move against charity. Charity must first be nourished and protected lest it be corrupted. The PROFICIENT'S principal care is to advance in good, so that charity may be strengthened by increase. The PERFECT person's principal care is to adhere to God and enjoy Him. Hence the perfect desire “to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” St. Thomas compares these three to bodily motion: first, recession from one terminus;

second, approach toward the other; third, rest in the terminus. To the first objection: all determinate distinctions which can be made in the growth of charity are comprehended under these three, just as every continuous division is embraced under beginning, middle, and end. To the second: beginners certainly make progress, but their more pressing care is resistance to the sins whose assaults disturb them. Once this warfare is felt less severely, they can more securely direct themselves to positive advancement, like the builders of Jerusalem who worked with one hand while keeping the other at the sword. To the

third: the perfect also continue advancing in charity, but increase is no longer their principal preoccupation. Their chief study is adhesion to God. Beginners and proficient likewise seek God, but beginners are more occupied with avoiding sin and the proficient with advancing in virtue. my SUMMARY affirms the division. In his COMMENTARY he points to Augustine, St. Bernard's work on degrees of charity, Richard of St. Victor's writings on the words “I am wounded with love,” and St. Thomas's opusculum on the love of God and neighbor. ARTICLE X — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE DIMINISHED The

first objection argues from contraries: increase and diminution concern the same subject. Since charity can increase, it seems it can also diminish. A second objection appeals to Augustine: “He loves Thee less who loves something together with Thee,” and “the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity.” Therefore, if cupidity can increase, charity seems capable of decreasing. A third objection argues from God's manner of preserving grace. God does not justify a man in such a way that the just man remains just independently when God withdraws; rather God continually preserves what He produces. Since, in the first infusion of charity, one who disposes himself less receives less charity, it seems that in conservation also one who disposes himself less should have less charity preserved. ON THE CONTRARY, Scripture compares charity to fire: its lamps are lamps of fire and flame. Fire, so long as it remains, tends upward. Therefore charity, so long as it remains, can ascend but cannot descend. ST. THOMAS begins by distinguishing charity's quantity in relation to its object and in relation to its subject. In relation to its proper object it can neither increase nor decrease. The question therefore concerns its intensity in the subject.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE DIMINISHED (continued) ST. THOMAS'S

RESPONSE. If charity could diminish in the subject, this would have to happen either through an act or merely through cessation from acts. Acquired virtues can diminish and eventually be corrupted through cessation from their acts, because their conservation depends upon the human acts which caused them. Aristotle similarly says that many friendships are dissolved through lack of intercourse. This does not apply to charity. Charity is not caused by human acts but by God alone. Consequently, if there is no sin in the cessation itself, mere cessation from acts neither diminishes nor corrupts charity. Therefore diminution would have to be caused either by God or by sin. God causes no defect in us except by way of punishment, withdrawing grace as punishment for sin. Thus if charity were diminished, sin would have to cause the diminution either efficiently or meritoriously. Mortal sin does not merely diminish charity; it destroys it entirely. It does so efficiently because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, and meritoriously because one who acts against charity deserves that God withdraw charity. Venial sin likewise does not diminish charity either efficiently or meritoriously. It does not do so efficiently because it does not reach charity itself. Charity concerns the ultimate end; venial sin is an inordination concerning means to the end. A man can greatly love health while behaving inordinately regarding his diet. Likewise false opinions about
conclusions do not diminish certainty regarding first principles. Nor does venial sin merit diminution of charity. One who fails
in a lesser matter does not deserve damage in the greater. God does not turn away from man more than man turns away from God. One who is inordinate concerning means does not thereby deserve damage to the charity ordering him to the ultimate end. Therefore charity cannot be diminished directly. Indirectly, however, one may call a “diminution of charity” a disposition
toward its corruption produced by venial sins or by cessation from exercises of charity. To the first objection: contraries concern the same thing where the subject is equally related to both. Charity can have an increasing cause but has no diminishing cause; therefore the inference fails. To the second: there are two kinds of cupidity. One establishes the final end in
creatures; this is mortal and totally destroys charity. In this sense one loves God “less than one ought,” not by diminishing charity but by abolishing it. Augustine's statement concerns loving something not for God's sake. Venial cupidity is different: it is itself diminished by charity but cannot diminish charity. To the third: a movement of free choice is required for the infusion of charity. Therefore something which diminishes the intensity of this disposition can dispose a person to receive less
charity. But the continued preservation of charity does not require a continuous act of free choice—otherwise charity would not remain in a sleeping person. Therefore an impediment to the intensity of such an act does not diminish already infused charity.

SUMMARY. First, charity cannot diminish from the side of its object. Second, from the side of the subject it does not directly
diminish: either it remains whole or is entirely corrupted. Third, venial sins and cessation from charitable works may be called
an indirect diminution insofar as they dispose toward charity's destruction.

COMMENTARY — FIRST

DOUBT. I ask how St. Thomas can say mortal sin “efficiently” corrupts charity. Nearly all other

doctors, I say, hold that
charity is destroyed only demeritoriously. Moreover, mortal sin is a natural act while charity is a supernatural quality; and since charity comes efficiently from God alone, it seems God alone could efficiently destroy it. Finally, an omission seems unable to corrupt efficiently because an omission is not a positive act. I answer by clarifying accidental forms. Forms dependent on a subject are not generated or corrupted per se as independent substances are. Heat, strictly, is not “made”; rather, a hot thing is made. When the subject ceases to be actuated by heat, heat is said consequently to be corrupted. Likewise, an agent that efficiently produces in a subject a disposition contrary to a form is said efficiently to expel or corrupt that form. Fire, by burning a man, efficiently expels the soul from the body in this derivative sense, even though the soul depends immediately upon God. Thus St. Thomas speaks of mortal sin efficiently corrupting charity because the sinner produces in charity's subject a contrary disposition.

ARTICLE X — I ON THE EFFICIENT CORRUPTION OF CHARITY AND VENIAL SIN I answer

the objections to St.

Thomas. To the first: the authority of St. Thomas together with his reason outweighs the scholastic doctors who maintain the contrary. To the second: heat does not act directly upon coldness as though coldness were a separate object; it acts upon the cold subject and introduces a contrary quality. Likewise, the voluntary act which is mortal sin reaches the subject of charity and introduces a disposition contrary to charity's end. In this sense it efficiently corrupts charity. The “seed of the devil” is the contrary disposition accepted by free choice, making the sinner like the devil; sin does not directly attack charity as an isolated supernatural quality. To the third I deny the inference from creation to corruption. Annihilation is the total cessation of a substance according to form, matter, and accidents and therefore belongs to God alone. Corruption is the cessation of a particular form in a subject and can be brought about by a particular agent. We can efficiently destroy many things which we cannot efficiently construct. Although the act of being as such depends upon God alone for production and conservation, a determinate mode of being—being this lion, this horse, this man—also depends upon the dispositions associated with the specifying form. When these dispositions are corrupted, that determinate being is corrupted. Analogously God produces charity in dependence upon a free subject capable of admitting contrary dispositions. To the

fourth, concerning sins of omission: it is enough that St. Thomas's statement be verified clearly of sins of commission. Nevertheless an omission also involves an exercise of free choice causally responsible for the omission, and the will can positively turn habitually toward a creature. By reason of this conversion it can concur efficiently in charity's corruption in the manner already explained. Both mortal sins of commission and omission agree in aversion from God and privation of rectitude. From the side of aversion and privation sin is not an efficient but a deficient cause; from the side of the positive conversion of the will, it can have an efficient causal aspect. SECOND DOUBT: CAN CHARITY BE DIMINISHED BY VENIAL SINS? I refer to St. Thomas, I-II, q.88, aa.3–4. First objection: Proverbs says “the just man falls seven times.” If this refers to venial sins, it seems his charity must be diminished; otherwise how is he said to “fall” if he remains as elevated as before? Second: human friendship grows cold and diminishes through daily faults against a friend. Third: after venial sins a man often does the things of God less promptly and delightfully; the effect therefore seems to indicate a diminished habit. I report William of Auxerre's position that charity can be directly diminished by venial sins, though never wholly destroyed, because each successive diminution removes a proportionally smaller part. Auxerre supposes that one with greater charity sins more gravely in committing a venial sin than one with less charity, so that as charity decreases the gravity and therefore the diminution also decreases. I call this opinion most false, and questions whether it is not rash and dangerous. Stealing one egg is not a smaller sin merely because the thief lacks charity than because he possesses it. Nor is it reasonable that a man with less charity could never commit a graver venial sin than a man with greater charity. He then reports another Parisian doctor who held that venial sins can diminish charity until the final sin becomes mortal precisely because it would destroy the remaining charity and man is obliged to preserve charity. I judge this still worse. An idle word cannot become mortal without violating a grave precept. A man with minimal charity is not bound by a new special precept distinct from God's law merely to preserve that numerical degree. Otherwise a newly justified person with very little charity could not commit any venial sin at all, because every such sin would destroy charity. Moreover, a binding precept must be knowable when it obliges, but no one can know when his charity has reached such a minimum. my replies: the “fall” of the just man is not a fall from the habit of charity or habitual perfection, but from actual love through remission and from complete rectitude of action; venial sin can also leave temporal punishment delaying entrance into glory. Human friendship differs because it is efficiently acquired by our acts and therefore can be diminished by them, whereas divine friendship is founded upon God's grace and remains unless we destroy grace by mortal sin. Venial sins impede the fervor of charity's act but do not diminish the habit, just as bodily illness can impede the exercise of knowledge without immediately diminishing the science itself.

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ARTICLE XI — WHETHER CHARITY ONCE POSSESSED CAN BE LOST

FIRST OBJECTION. If charity is lost, it is lost through sin. But one who possesses charity seems unable to sin,
according to 1 John 3: “Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because His seed remains in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” Charity distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. Therefore one possessing charity cannot lose it. SECOND OBJECTION. Augustine says that if love is not true it should not be called love, and elsewhere that charity which can fail was never true charity. Therefore, if charity is once truly possessed, it cannot be lost. THIRD OBJECTION. Gregory says that the love of God, if it exists, works great things; if it ceases to work, it is not charity. But no one seems to lose charity while doing great works. Therefore charity cannot be lost. FOURTH OBJECTION. Free choice is inclined to sin only by some motive toward sin. But charity excludes the motives to sin—self-love, cupidity, and the like. Therefore charity cannot be lost. ON THE CONTRARY, Apocalypse 2 says: “I have a few things against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity.” ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Through charity the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Charity can therefore be considered in three ways. FIRST, from the side of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to love God. Under this aspect charity has impeccability through the power of the Holy Spirit, who infallibly accomplishes whatever He wills. These two cannot both be true: that the Holy Spirit wills efficaciously to move someone to an act of charity and that the person at that same time loses charity by sin. The gift of perseverance is among the divine benefits by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated. SECOND, charity can be considered according to its own proper nature. Under this aspect charity can produce only what belongs to charity. Charity cannot sin any more than heat can cool or injustice as injustice can produce a good act. THIRD, charity can be considered from the side of its subject, which remains changeable according to freedom of choice. St. Thomas compares this with the relation of form to matter and habit to power. A form is losable when it does not fill the whole potentiality of its matter, leaving the matter in potency to another form. The forms of corruptible bodies are therefore losable. A heavenly body's form, according to the old cosmology presupposed in the text, was considered to fill the whole potency of its matter and therefore to be inseparable. Likewise charity in the homeland fills the whole potentiality of the rational mind, because every actual movement of the blessed is borne toward God. It is therefore unlosable. Charity in the way does not fill the subject's whole potentiality, because the wayfarer is not always actually borne toward God. When charity is not actually operating, something can occur by which it is lost. The nature of habit confirms this. A habit inclines the power toward action by making what agrees with the habit appear good and what opposes it appear evil. As Aristotle says, “as each one is, so does the end appear to him.” Charity is therefore unlosable where what agrees with charity cannot appear except as good—namely in the homeland, where God, the very essence of goodness, is seen through His essence. In the state of the way, where God's essence is not seen, charity can be lost. To the first objection: John's text speaks according to the power and preserving motion of the Holy Spirit. To the second: charity which contained within its own intention a temporary love destined later to cease would not be true charity. But charity can be lost through the mutability of the subject contrary to charity's own intention without thereby having been false charity. To the third: love of God always purposes great things according to charity's nature, but because of the condition of the subject it does not always actually perform great things. To the fourth: charity, while actually operating according to its own nature, excludes every motive to sin. But sometimes charity is not actually operating; then a motive to sin can intervene, and if consent is given, charity is lost.
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ARTICLE XI —
COMMENTARY;
ARTICLE XII BEGINS

SUMMARY OF ST. THOMAS. First, from the side of the Holy Spirit moving the will, man cannot lose charity or sin while that efficacious motion stands. Second, charity according to its own proper nature cannot be lost, because according to that nature it cannot sin. Third, charity in heaven cannot be lost from the side of its subject because it fills the whole potentiality of
the will. Fourth, charity in the way can be lost from the side of its mutable subject because it does not always actually tend toward God. I say the first conclusion is manifest and is St. Thomas's interpretation of 1 John 3. I add a pointed doctrinal observation against those who say they cannot understand how a human act remains free while, under the divine help called efficacious, the person cannot fail to love. If they do not understand it, I say, they should nevertheless believe it. Regarding the
inamissibility of heavenly charity, I refer to St. Thomas's doctrine that beatitude cannot be lost. Therefore the charity of the blessed is likewise inamissible. Regarding charity in the way, I say the conclusion that it can be lost is certain according to faith. It was defined against the Begards and is confirmed by the Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 23. Jovinian had taught that one who sins after baptism thereby shows that he never received grace and charity in baptism; Jerome wrote against him, and Augustine reports a related Pelagian error. Scriptural examples also prove the conclusion. Saul was circumcised and justified and afterward sinned. David likewise fell. Peter was clean at the Last Supper and afterward denied Christ. Galatians asks whether those who began in the Spirit are now being perfected in the flesh. First John itself tells Christians not to sin and adds that if anyone sins, “we have an advocate with the Father.” The many texts showing that forgiveness remains possible until death likewise show that grace can be lost and recovered. HERETICAL MISREADINGS OF 1 JOHN. “Everyone born of
God does not sin, because His seed remains in him, and he cannot sin.” I approve St. Thomas's formal interpretation: just as one says “the hot cannot cool” insofar as it is hot, one born of God does not sin insofar as he acts according to the divine seed and charity. He also reports Augustine's explanations: the born of God person has the hope of reaching impeccability in heaven, just as we are said to be blessed or saved in hope; and “he cannot sin” may mean “it is not lawful for him to sin,” since
in juridical language we are sometimes said to be able to do only what we may rightfully do. The heretics also appeal to “everyone who sins has not seen Him nor known Him.” I reject the idea that this simply means the sinner never possessed faith
or any good affection. Rather, when a man sins he ceases from affective consideration of God: he does not then approve God practically as his supreme good, but turns toward a creature. Scripture similarly uses “I know you not” to signify rejection rather than absence of all prior cognition.

ARTICLE XII — WHETHER CHARITY IS LOST THROUGH ONE ACT OF MORTAL SIN

FIRST OBJECTION. Origen
says that if satiety ever seizes one who stands at a high and perfect degree, he does not think such a man is emptied and falls suddenly, but gradually and by parts. Therefore charity would not be lost through one mortal sin. SECOND OBJECTION. Leo the Great, addressing Peter's denial, says the Lord saw not faith destroyed nor love turned away, but constancy disturbed; tears abounded where affection had not failed. Bernard accordingly says that in Peter charity was not extinguished but only put to sleep. Yet Peter's denial was mortal sin. Therefore charity seems not to be lost through one mortal act.
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ARTICLE XII — WHETHER ONE MORTAL SIN DESTROYS CHARITY

THIRD OBJECTION. Charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. But an acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary act. Therefore charity should much less be destroyed by one mortal sin. FOURTH OBJECTION. Charity includes love of God and neighbor. A person committing a mortal sin can appear to retain love of God and neighbor. An inordination concerning things ordered to the end does not necessarily remove love of the end. Therefore charity toward God might remain despite a mortal inordination concerning some temporal good. FIFTH OBJECTION. The theological virtues have the ultimate end as object. Faith and hope are not destroyed by every mortal sin; they can remain "unformed." Therefore charity too might remain unformed after one mortal sin. ON THE CONTRARY, mortal sin makes man worthy of eternal death: "the wages of sin is death." But whoever has charity possesses a title to eternal life, for Christ promises manifestation of Himself to the one who loves Him, and eternal life consists in knowing God. No one can simultaneously be worthy of eternal life and eternal death. Therefore charity cannot coexist with mortal sin and is removed by one mortal act. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. One contrary is removed by the arrival of its contrary. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity according to charity's proper nature: charity consists in loving God above all things and in subjecting oneself wholly to Him by referring all things to Him. It therefore belongs to charity that man will to submit to God in all things and follow the rule of His commandments. Whatever contradicts God's commandments is contrary to charity and, of itself, is capable of excluding it. If charity were an acquired habit dependent on the subject's natural power, one contrary act would not necessarily remove it immediately. An act is directly contrary to another act, not to the habit, and an acquired habit can remain despite interruption of its acts. But charity is an infused habit depending upon God's action in infusing and conserving it. St. Thomas compares God to the sun illuminating the air. As light immediately ceases in the air when an obstacle is placed before the sun's illumination, charity immediately ceases in the soul when an obstacle is placed against God's influx of charity. Every mortal sin places such an obstacle because by choosing the sin a person prefers it to divine friendship, which requires following God's will. Consequently, through one mortal sin the habit of charity is immediately lost. Augustine accordingly says that man is illuminated when God is present to him and immediately darkened when God is absent—not through spatial distance but through aversion of the will. To the first objection: Origen may be understood as saying that a perfect man does not ordinarily proceed suddenly to a mortal act without preceding negligence. Venial sins can dispose toward mortal sin. Yet if he actually commits one mortal sin, he falls by losing charity. Origen's additional language about a brief lapse followed by rapid recovery can also mean that complete ruin is especially characteristic of one who falls through settled malice rather than through a sudden weakness. To the second: charity can be lost directly through actual contempt; Peter did not lose it in that manner. It can also be lost indirectly when something contrary to charity is committed under the force of concupiscence, fear, or another passion. Peter acted against charity in this latter way, lost charity, and quickly recovered it. To the third, the answer follows from the difference between infused and acquired habits just explained. To the fourth: not every inordinate affection concerning created goods constitutes mortal sin. Only an inordination repugnant to the divine will is mortal; such an inordination directly opposes charity. To the fifth: charity imports a union with God which faith and hope do not import in the same manner. Every mortal sin includes aversion from God and therefore contradicts charity. Not every mortal sin directly contradicts faith or hope; only determinate sins destroy those habits. Charity therefore cannot remain "unformed," since charity is itself the final form of the virtues by referring them to God as ultimate end. SUMMARY. The conclusion is affirmative. The argument from the consequence is that mortal sin makes man worthy of eternal death whereas charity makes him worthy of eternal life. St. Thomas's deeper a priori argument is the incompatibility between mortal sin's obstacle to divine friendship and the divine conservation of infused charity.

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ARTICLE XII —

COMMENTARY;

QUESTION XXV BEGINS I say the conclusion of Article XII is certain according to faith. I cite James 2,

"whoever offends in
one has become guilty of all," and the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 15, against the Lutheran claim that unbelief alone is mortal sin. I then note two points from Cajetan concerning St. Thomas's comparison of God preserving charity with the sun illuminating the air. First, when a person places an obstacle before the sun, the positive act of placing the obstacle efficiently expels the light, while the privation or opposition constituted by the obstacle formally excludes illumination. Analogously, when mortal sin is actually committed, the sinner's positive action or affection efficiently expels charity, while the privation and contrary stain obstructing God's conservation of charity formally excludes it. Second, I reconcile St. Thomas's statements that charity may be lost "indirectly" through a mortal sin arising from passion and that every mortal sin is "directly contrary" to charity. From the side of the psychological cause, not every mortal sin arises from a direct contempt of charity; some arise indirectly through passion. But from the side of the disorder formally contained in the sin, every mortal sin directly contradicts charity because it contradicts the order of divine friendship, which requires God to be preferred to all other loved things. In every mortal sin something else is preferred contrary to that order.

QUESTION XXV — ON THE OBJECT OF CHARITY I remark that this entire question is particularly

useful for preachers.
Two matters are to be considered: first, the things which are to be loved from charity; second, the order among the things to be loved.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER THE LOVE OF CHARITY STOPS AT GOD OR EXTENDS ALSO TO

NEIGHBOR FIRST

OBJECTION. We owe God both love and fear. But the fear of man is distinct from the fear of God, which may be servile or filial. Therefore the love by which God is loved should likewise differ from the love by which neighbor is loved. SECOND

OBJECTION. Aristotle says that to be loved is to be honored. But the honor due to God is latria, while the honor due to a creature is dulia. Therefore the love of God and love of neighbor appear specifically distinct. THIRD OBJECTION. Hope generates charity, according to a Gloss, yet hope is so directed toward God that those who place their principal hope in man are condemned: "Cursed is the man who trusts in man." Therefore charity too should terminate in God rather than extend to neighbor.

ON THE CONTRARY, 1 John 4 says: "This commandment we have from God, that he who loves God love

also his brother."
ST. THOMAS'S
RESPONSE. Habits are diversified when the species of their acts is diversified. The species of an act is taken from its object under its formal ratio. An act directed toward the formal ratio itself and an act directed toward an object under that same ratio belong to one species: the same kind of sight sees light and sees color under the ratio of light. Now God is the formal reason for loving our neighbor. What charity loves in our neighbor is that he be in God. Therefore the act by which God is loved and the act by which neighbor is loved are specifically the same, and the one habit of charity extends to both. To the first

objection: a neighbor can be feared or loved because of what belongs to him personally—for example, a tyrant feared for cruelty or a benefactor loved for gain. Such human fear or love differs from the fear or love of God. But a man can also be feared or loved because of what belongs to God in him—for example, legitimate authority feared because of its divine ministry of punishing wrongdoing, or a just man loved for justice. Such fear and love do not constitute a species distinct from the corresponding God-directed virtue.

QUESTION XXV, ARTICLES I–III

ARTICLE I, REPLIES CONTINUED To the second objection: love regards good in common, whereas

honor regards the
proper good or excellence of the person honored and is offered as testimony to that person's virtue. Consequently, love is not specifically diversified merely because the loved persons possess different degrees or kinds of goodness, provided they are referred to one common good. Thus by the same charity we love all our neighbors insofar as they are referred to the one common good, God. But different honors are rendered according to the proper excellence of different persons, and singular worship of latria is rendered to God because of His singular excellence. To the third: those who hope in man as the principal author of salvation are rightly condemned, but not those who hope in a man as a ministerial helper under God. Likewise it would be blameworthy to love one's neighbor as the principal final end, but not to love him for God's sake, which belongs precisely to charity.
SUMMARY. The habit of charity extends to love of both God and neighbor because the formal reason for loving both is one and the same.
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ARTICLE II — WHETHER CHARITY ITSELF IS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

FIRST OBJECTION. The things to be loved from charity are contained under the two commandments of love of
God and neighbor. Charity itself is neither God nor neighbor. Therefore charity does not appear to be loved from charity. SECOND OBJECTION. Charity is founded upon the communication of beatitude, but charity itself cannot be a participant in beatitude. Therefore charity is not an object of charitable love. THIRD OBJECTION. Charity is friendship. One cannot have friendship toward charity or toward an accident because such things cannot love in return, and reciprocal love belongs to friendship. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that whoever loves his neighbor consequently loves the love itself. Since neighbor is loved from charity, charity itself is consequently loved from charity. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Charity is a kind of love. Love, from the nature of the power whose act it is, can reflect upon itself. Since the will's object is universal good, whatever falls under the ratio of good can be willed; and since willing itself is a good, one can will oneself to will. Likewise the intellect can understand that it understands. Love also has, from its own specific nature, a reflexive tendency because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover toward the beloved. In loving, a person in some way loves his own loving. But charity is not merely love; it has the ratio of friendship. In friendship something is loved in two ways: first, as the friend toward whom friendship is borne and to whom we will good;

second, as the good which we will for the friend. Charity itself is loved by charity in the second manner, not the first. Charity is among the goods we desire for those whom we love from charity. The same general reasoning applies to beatitude and the virtues. To the first objection: God and neighbor are those toward whom we have friendship. But in loving them is included love of charity itself, because in loving God and neighbor we will that we and our neighbor love God—and this is to will the possession of charity. To the

second: charity is the spiritual communion of life through which one arrives at beatitude; hence it is loved as a good desired for all whom we love from charity. To the third: the objection works only if charity were to be loved as a friend toward whom friendship is directly borne. SUMMARY. Charity is loved by charity not as a friend to whom we will good, but as a supreme spiritual good which we will for the friend.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER IRRATIONAL CREATURES ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

FIRST OBJECTION. Through charity we are especially conformed to God. But God loves irrational creatures: “He loves all things that are.” Whatever God loves He loves in Himself, who is Charity. Therefore we too should love irrational creatures from charity. SECOND OBJECTION. Charity principally tends toward God and extends to other things insofar as they belong to God. Rational creatures belong to God through the likeness of image, but irrational creatures belong to Him through the likeness of a vestige. Therefore charity seems to extend also to irrational creatures. THIRD OBJECTION. Faith, like charity, has God as object, yet faith extends to irrational creatures insofar as we believe heaven and earth were created by God and the various animals and plants produced by Him. Therefore charity likewise seems to extend to irrational creatures.

QUESTION XXV, ARTICLE III — IRRATIONAL CREATURES; ARTICLE IV BEGINS ON THE

CONTRARY, the love
of charity extends to God and neighbor. An irrational creature cannot properly be called our neighbor because it does not communicate with man in rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures in the same way it extends to persons. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Charity is a kind of friendship. Through friendship something is loved in two ways: first, as the friend toward whom friendship is borne; second, as a good which we will for the friend. In the FIRST manner no irrational creature can be loved from charity. St. Thomas gives three reasons. First, friendship is directed toward one for whom we will good. Properly speaking, we cannot will a good to an irrational creature as to one possessing and using the good through free choice. Only a rational creature is master of the use of the good it possesses. Hence Aristotle says that we speak only by similitude when we say that things go well or badly for such non-rational beings in the properly moral sense. Second, every friendship is founded upon some communion of life. Irrational creatures cannot share in human life according to reason. Therefore there can be no proper friendship with them, except metaphorically. Third, and proper to charity: charitable friendship is founded upon communication in eternal beatitude. Irrational creatures are not capable of eternal beatitude. Therefore they cannot be loved as friends with the friendship of charity. Nevertheless irrational creatures CAN be loved from charity in the SECOND manner: as goods which we will for our friends. From charity we can will that they be preserved for the honor of God and the utility of human beings. In this way God also loves them. To the first

objection: the preceding distinction gives the answer. God wills their good in the order of His providence, but this does not
make them participants in charitable friendship as rational persons are. To the second: likeness as a vestige does not give a creature capacity for eternal life, whereas the likeness of image belongs to the rational creature and grounds such capacity. Therefore the cases are not parallel. To the third: faith can extend to anything whatsoever insofar as it is true and divinely revealed. The friendship of charity, however, extends as friendship only to beings naturally capable, under grace, of the good of eternal life. Therefore the analogy with faith fails. SUMMARY. Irrational creatures can be loved from charity, not as friends to whom we will the supernatural good of beatitude, but as goods which we will to be preserved for our friends, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor. I directs the reader to Cajetan and to his own earlier discussion at q.23, a.5.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF FROM CHARITY FIRST

OBJECTION. Gregory
says charity cannot exist among fewer than two. Therefore no one has charity toward himself. SECOND OBJECTION. Friendship by its nature implies reciprocal love and a certain equality, as Aristotle teaches. These do not appear to exist between a man and himself. Since charity is friendship, a man seems unable to possess charity toward himself. THIRD

OBJECTION. What belongs to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity “does not act perversely.” But self-love is blamed in 2 Timothy 3: in the last days perilous times shall come and men will be lovers of themselves. Therefore a man does
not love himself from charity. ON THE CONTRARY, Leviticus commands: “Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself.” Since we
love our friend from charity, we must also love ourselves from charity. ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Because charity is a kind of friendship, we can speak of it in two ways. First, under the common ratio of friendship. Properly speaking, friendship is not toward oneself; one's relation to oneself is something greater than friendship. Friendship imports a certain union, while each person possesses unity with himself, which is prior to and stronger than union with another. Dionysius calls love a unitive power. As unity is the principle of union, so the love by which one loves oneself is the form and root of friendship with others. The friendly relations we have toward others arise from those which we first have toward ourselves.

Second, charity can be considered according to its proper supernatural ratio: principally the friendship of man with God and consequently with the things belonging to God. Among those things is the very man who possesses charity. Therefore, among the things he loves from charity as belonging to God, he also loves himself from charity. To the first objection: Gregory is speaking of charity under the common ratio of friendship, which as friendship is between distinct persons. The

second objection proceeds in the same way: reciprocal love and equality characterize friendship between distinct friends, while self-love is the more fundamental unity from which such friendship proceeds. To the third: those who are censured as “lovers of themselves” love themselves according to their sensible nature, obeying disordered appetite. That is not truly to love oneself according to rational nature. True self-love wills for oneself the goods belonging to the perfection of reason, and it is especially in this latter way that charity requires a man to love himself. SUMMARY. If charity is considered merely under the common ratio of friendship, it is not properly friendship toward oneself, because friendship is toward another and self-unity is more fundamental. But considered according to charity's proper supernatural ratio, a man truly loves himself from charity insofar as he belongs to God and wills for himself the goods leading to rational and supernatural perfection.
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QUESTION XXV — ON THE OBJECT OF CHARITY ARTICLE IV — WHETHER A MAN

OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF

FROM CHARITY (conclusion) FIRST CONCLUSION. If charity is considered under the common notion of friendship, it is not properly directed toward oneself, because friendship is toward another; toward oneself there is something greater than friendship, namely unity. SECOND CONCLUSION. If charity is considered according to its proper nature, as principally the friendship of man with God and consequently with the things belonging to God, then a man loves himself from charity. I note from Cajetan that a man loves himself as a friend of God, whereas he loves his neighbor as both God's friend and his own.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS OWN BODY FROM CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. (1) Those

possessing charity desire to be freed from the body: “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” and Paul desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” (2) The body cannot itself know and love God and therefore cannot directly participate in divine fruition. (3) Charity is friendship, but the body cannot love us in return. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine numbers one's own body among the four things to be loved from charity. RESPONSE. Our body can be considered according to its nature or according to the corruption of fault and punishment. Its nature was created by God, not by an evil principle as the Manicheans imagined, and it can be used in God's service: “Present your members as instruments of justice unto God.” Therefore, from the charity by which we love God, we ought also to love our body. But we ought not to love the infection of sin

or penal corruption in it; charity instead desires their removal. Paul did not reject bodily nature itself. He wished to be freed from concupiscence and corruption, which burden the soul and impede the vision of God. Although the body cannot enjoy God

by knowing and loving Him, through bodily works we can reach perfect divine fruition, and from the soul's fruition a certain beatitude overflows into the body: health, incorruption, and vigor. Reciprocal love is required in friendship toward another, not in the relation one has to oneself, whether according to soul or body. SUMMARY. The conclusion is affirmative.

COMMENTARY. I note that punishments which entice toward sin, such as movements of concupiscence against reason, are

not to be loved; but other penal things may be embraced for Christ, such as death, fasting, and disciplines. ARTICLE VI — WHETHER SINNERS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY (begins) The objections appeal to David's hatred of the wicked, punishments inflicted on sinners, Scriptural imprecations, the discord between the wills of the just and sinners, and the command to avoid sinful company. Augustine, however, teaches that every human being is our neighbor; sin does not destroy human nature.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER SINNERS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY (continued)

RESPONSE. Two things may

be considered in sinners: nature and fault. According to the nature they have from God, they remain capable of beatitude, in whose communication charity is founded. Therefore they are to be loved according to their nature. Their fault, however, is contrary to God and an impediment to beatitude; according to the fault they are to be hated. Even in father, mother, or kindred, we ought to hate what is sinful and love what remains human and capable of beatitude. This is truly to love sinners from charity for God's sake. To the objection from hatred: the prophet hated the wicked precisely insofar as they were wicked,

that is, he hated their iniquity. To hate another's evil and to love his good are compatible; such “perfect hatred” belongs to charity. Benefits of friendship should not be withdrawn from sinful friends while hope of healing remains; rather, aid should be given for recovery of virtue even more than for recovery of money. When men become gravely harmful and incorrigible, familiar friendship may rightly be withdrawn. St. Thomas further argues, within the juridical framework presupposed by the text, that public authority may punish grave offenders for the common good; the judge acts not from private hatred but from love of the common good. Scriptural imprecations may be understood in three ways: as predictions rather than wishes; as desires for the justice manifested in punishment rather than delight in another's misery; or as desires that sin itself be destroyed while the person remains. We love sinners not by willing what they sinfully will or rejoicing in what they rejoice in,

but by seeking to bring them to will and rejoice in the good. Living with sinners is to be avoided by the weak when there is danger of corruption. For the perfect, who do not reasonably fear such corruption, association can be praiseworthy when directed to conversion, as Christ ate with sinners. Participation in their sin, however, must always be avoided. SUMMARY. In

sinners we must hate that they are sinners and love that they are human beings capable of beatitude. COMMENTARY. I call this article especially important for knowing how to conduct ourselves toward sinners, whether friends or strangers.

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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER SINNERS LOVE THEMSELVES

OBJECTIONS. Self-love is said by Augustine to be the principle of the earthly city; sin does not destroy the natural tendency to one's own good; and many sinners regard themselves as good. ON THE CONTRARY: “He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.” RESPONSE begins by distinguishing three senses of self-love: one common to all, one proper to the good, and one
proper to the wicked. Everyone loves what he judges himself to be. All naturally love themselves according to substantial nature, composed of soul and body, and seek self-preservation. But what a man regards as principal in himself differs.

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER SINNERS LOVE THEMSELVES (continued)

The principal thing in man is the rational mind; the sensitive and bodily nature is secondary. The Apostle accordingly distinguishes
the interior and exterior man. Good men judge their rational nature to be principal and therefore truly know and love themselves. The
wicked make sensitive and bodily nature principal; not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly love themselves but love what
they mistakenly suppose themselves to be. Aristotle gives five marks of friendship: a friend wills his friend to exist and live; wills
good things for him; works good for him; lives pleasantly with him; and agrees with him in joys and sorrows. The good exhibit these
toward their interior man. They desire its integrity, spiritual goods, and the works by which those goods are attained; they return
pleasantly into their own heart, finding good present thoughts, memories of past goods, and hope of future goods; and their will is
internally concordant. The wicked do the contrary. They do not preserve the integrity of the interior man, desire his spiritual goods, or
work for them. They dislike returning into themselves because conscience presents evils past, present, and future; and they suffer
internal discord. Thus the wicked love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man, while the good do not love themselves in that disordered manner. REPLIES. The self-love which is the principle of sin is the wicked man's love extending even
to contempt of God. Natural self-love is not wholly removed in sinners but is perverted. Sinners who judge themselves good retain
some apparent self-love, but it is not true self-love. SUMMARY. (1) All men love themselves according to what they judge themselves to be. (2) The good, truly knowing themselves, truly love themselves. (3) The wicked, not rightly knowing themselves, do
not truly love themselves. COMMENTARY. I recommends Aristotle, Ethics IX, Augustine, and Cajetan's five signs for daily examination of conscience. He stresses that St. Thomas is speaking not of merely speculative knowledge—wicked men can know
speculatively that reason is superior to sense—but of practical estimation. DOUBT: WHO LOVES HIS BODY MORE, THE JUST
MAN OR THE SINNER? If love means right love according to reason, sinners do not truly love their bodies: they inflict present evil
by refusing the body's proper subjection to reason and future evil by disposing it toward punishment. The just subject the body to
reason and dispose it toward immortal life. If “love” means the passion of sensitive appetite toward present sensual goods without
reason's rule, sinners love their bodies more intensely, like beasts. But because rational love is nobler and more useful to the body,
simply speaking the just man loves his body more.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO CHARITY THAT ENEMIES BE LOVED

(begins)
The objections argue that Augustine treats love of enemies as an extraordinary good; nature hates what is contrary to itself; and loving
enemies seems as perverse as hating friends. Christ, however, commands: “Love your enemies.”
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ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER LOVE OF ENEMIES IS NECESSARY TO CHARITY

RESPONSE. Love of enemies may be considered in three ways. First, to love enemies precisely insofar as they are enemies is perverse and contrary to charity, because it would mean loving another's evil. Second, to love them according to their human nature and under the universal love of neighbor is absolutely necessary to charity: one who loves God and neighbor may not exclude his enemies from the universality of neighbor-love. Third, to be moved by a special act of love toward this particular enemy is not absolutely necessary, just as charity does not require a distinct actual movement toward every individual human being. It is, however, necessary by preparedness of soul: one must be ready to love the particular enemy should necessity arise. Outside necessity, actually moving oneself to a special love of an enemy for God's sake belongs to the perfection of charity. The more intensely one loves God, the more one's love extends to neighbor without being impeded by enmity—like one who, for love of a man, loves even that man's children who are personally hostile to him. Nature hates what is contrary precisely insofar as it is contrary. Thus we ought to dislike the fact that an enemy is hostile to us; but insofar as he is a human being and capable of beatitude, he must be loved. Charity does not make us love enmity itself. SUMMARY. (1) It is contrary to charity to love an enemy insofar as he is an enemy. (2) It is necessary to charity to love him insofar as he is neighbor. (3) Particular love of an enemy is not always required, except when necessity calls for it. (4) One must habitually be prepared to love him particularly should necessity arise. (5) Outside necessity, particular love of an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity. I tells preachers to note this doctrine carefully.

ARTICLE IX — WHETHER SALVATION REQUIRES THAT ONE SHOW AN ENEMY SIGNS AND

EFFECTS OF
LOVE

OBJECTIONS appeal to “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and truth,” Christ's joining “Love your enemies” with “do good to those who hate you,” and Gregory's statement that divine love cannot remain idle. ON THE CONTRARY, the Gloss on Matthew calls doing good to enemies a summit of perfection; what belongs to perfection is not for that reason absolutely necessary. RESPONSE. Exterior effects and signs are proportioned to interior love. Interior love of an enemy in common is absolutely commanded; special love is required not absolutely but according to preparedness of soul. The same distinction therefore governs external signs and benefits.

ARTICLE IX — SIGNS AND BENEFITS TOWARD ENEMIES (continued)

Some signs and benefits of love are given to neighbors in common—for example, prayer for all the faithful or a benefit granted to an
entire community. It is necessary by precept that enemies not be excluded from such common benefits. To exclude them simply from
spite or vengeance would violate the command against revenge. Other signs and benefits are given particularly to determinate persons.

Such special benefits need not ordinarily be shown to enemies, except according to preparedness of soul and especially in a case of necessity: “If thy enemy be hungry, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink.” Beyond necessity, bestowing such benefits belongs to perfection: one not only refuses to be conquered by evil but seeks to conquer evil with good and, by benefits, to draw the enemy toward love. SUMMARY. Common signs and benefits shown to neighbors must include enemies. Special signs and benefits are not absolutely required except in necessity, although they belong to perfection.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES VIII–IX

I distinguish three senses of “enemy”: one who reciprocally bears enmity; one who is an opponent or rival without sin, as may occur in a just war or litigation; and one who sinfully harms his neighbor. The first conclusion of Article VIII concerns the third sense when
it says enmity itself is not to be loved. The remaining conclusions extend to an enemy as to any neighbor. DOUBT: IS LOVE OF ENEMIES A PRECEPT? I answer yes. Christ says, “Love your enemies and do good to those who hate you, that you may be children
of your Father.” Peter and Paul likewise command that evil not be returned for evil. Augustine and the common teaching of the saints
support the same conclusion. The reason is simple: the command concerns love of neighbor, and an enemy remains a neighbor and a
human being capable of beatitude. SECOND CONCLUSION. The command, in its natural dimension, belongs to natural law. I appeal to the natural maxim that one ought not do to another what one reasonably does not wish done to oneself. A person reasonably
wills not to suffer injury, not to receive private evil in return for evil, and to receive necessary aid. The supernatural love ordered to eternal life is a supernatural precept and was explicitly expressed in the Gospel. He answers the objection from Matthew 5 by distinguishing the command to love enemies as neighbors from evangelical counsels that can be proposed in the same discourse. The
perfection of charity sufficient for salvation is commanded; the perfection proper to counsels is not.

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COMMENTARY ON LOVE OF ENEMIES (continued) I explain that the Mosaic law never simply commanded “hate your

enemy.” The Jews inferred this from “love your friend.” Yet the Old Testament itself commands assistance to an enemy's wandering ox or burdened ass and says, “If thy enemy be hungry, feed him.” “Hating” an enemy may also be understood as hating sinful enmity or as punishment according to the order of justice. Love of an enemy in common and preparedness to aid him in grave necessity is not excessively difficult compared with other commandments; heroic special acts outside necessity belong to evangelical perfection. I then treat practical cases. In many matters something may be lawful considered strictly and in itself, yet become unlawful because of circumstances, scandal to oneself, or scandal to others. If a person sees that he is strongly inclined toward hatred or revenge and that reflecting on an enemy's good qualities, inclining the heart toward him, or praying for him is needed to avoid sinful hatred, he is bound to use such remedies by the very precept forbidding hatred and vengeance. MUST ONE GREET AN ENEMY? Theologians commonly say one is not bound absolutely to give a special greeting merely because the person is an enemy, since one is not bound to greet every other neighbor. Yet circumstances can make charity require it—for example, where a simple greeting could reconcile the enemy to God and oneself without notable loss of honor, or where customary signs of respect are due to a person such as one's bishop or prelate. Refusing an enemy's greeting can be mortally sinful when, according to custom and the persons involved, it constitutes notable contempt or scandal. Prudence and careful examination of intention are necessary. Sylvester says that if one greets everyone present except the enemy precisely so as to single him out, this is ordinarily grave because of scandal. Likewise one is not absolutely bound to converse familiarly with an enemy, even if one did so before; yet scandal may arise if others interpret the refusal as hatred. If conversation with him puts one in danger of sin, prudence may dictate a middle course: greet him briefly in public while avoiding frequent association. MAY AN ENEMY BE EXCLUDED FROM COMMON BENEFITS? If a benefit is granted to the whole community, the enemy may not be excluded merely as an enemy, because this can violate charity through scandal and distributive justice by depriving him of what belongs to him as a member of the community. A legitimate judge or prelate may, however, exclude a person as punishment when the offense justly merits deprivation of that benefit.

COMMENTARY — FURTHER PRACTICAL DOUBTS

If a benefit is granted not to the whole community but only to many particular members, an enemy may sometimes be omitted along with other non-enemies, provided scandal is excluded. If an enemy asks forgiveness, is the offended person bound to show signs of love?

I answer yes, because the request itself creates a time of necessity for reconciliation. Failure then to show that one is placated can produce new scandal. The signs required vary with the condition of the persons; greater or lesser signs can suffice. David's treatment of

Absalom is given as an example of prudential differentiation by a father and judge. Must the offended person remit the injury and a penalty fixed by law? I distinguish justice from charity. First, if the law is just, it is not evil simply to will that justice be observed.

Second, hatred of heart and a desire of vengeance arising from hatred must be laid aside. Third, one may demand a monetary penalty

legally owed, just as one may demand a debt from a friend. Fourth, I say it is morally very difficult to imagine someone refusing to remit

a severe corporal penalty while remaining wholly free of hatred or vengeance, although a case could exist—for example, where failure to

punish would leave the offended family under serious infamy. Where little or no harm follows from remission, he doubts the good spiritual state of one who refuses, insofar as it lies within his power, to remit such a penalty.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE THE ANGELS FROM CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Augustine speaks of a twofold charitable love, God and neighbor; angels are neither God nor members of our human species. Brute animals share a nearer genus with us and yet are not loved as friends from charity. Friendship especially involves living together, but angels do not visibly live with us. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that whoever either renders us or ought to receive from us an office of mercy is rightly called neighbor; the command to love neighbor therefore includes the holy angels, from whom we receive many merciful offices. RESPONSE. The friendship of charity is founded upon communication in eternal beatitude. Men and angels communicate in participation of the same eternal beatitude: in the resurrection men shall be “as the angels in heaven.” Therefore charitable friendship extends to the angels. “Neighbor” can be understood through communication of benefits pertaining to eternal life. Brute animals share sensitive nature with us, but eternal beatitude belongs to rational mind, in which we communicate with angels. Angels do not live with us by exterior sensitive intercourse, but we live with them according to mind—imperfectly here and perfectly in heaven. SUMMARY. We ought to love the angels from charity because men and angels share in the participation of eternal beatitude.

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ARTICLE XI — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE DEMONS FROM CHARITY (begins)

The objections argue from the demons' remaining intellectual nature, their resemblance to sinful men, and the providential benefits that arise from their temptations.

ARTICLE XI — WHETHER DEMONS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

ON THE CONTRARY, Scripture speaks of the covenant with death and agreement with hell

being destroyed.

The perfection of peace and covenant is charity; therefore charity is not friendship with the demons, inhabitants of hell and sinners unto death. RESPONSE. In human sinners we love nature and hate sin. But the name “demon” signifies a nature deformed by sin; under that description demons are not to be loved from charity. If, however, the question concerns the spirits themselves who are called demons, the earlier distinction applies. Something is loved from charity in two ways. First, as one toward whom charitable friendship is borne. In this way we cannot love the demons. Friendship requires willing good to one's friend, but we cannot from charity will the good of eternal life to spirits eternally condemned by God; this would contradict charity toward God, by which we approve His justice. Second, something can be loved as a good which we will to remain for another's sake. In this way we love irrational creatures from charity insofar as we will their preservation for God's glory and human utility. Likewise we can love the demons' created nature insofar as we will those spirits to remain in their natural being for the glory of God. The angelic mind is not incapable of beatitude as the demonic mind is after definitive condemnation; charitable friendship is founded more upon communication in eternal life than upon mere natural similarity. Human sinners in this life retain the possibility of reaching beatitude, unlike the damned; in this respect the damned and demons stand alike. The benefit we derive from demons does not arise from their intention but from divine providence, which turns their perverse intention to our utility. This should lead us to friendship with God, not with them. SUMMARY. (1) We cannot love demons with charitable friendship because the demonic nature is considered as deformed by sin and, as damned, cannot receive eternal beatitude. (2) We can nevertheless will the preservation of their created natural being for God's glory, just as we love irrational creatures in an ordered way.

ARTICLE XII — WHETHER THE FOUR THINGS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY ARE

FITTINGLY ENUMERATED: GOD, NEIGHBOR, OUR
OWN BODY, AND OURSELVES

OBJECTIONS. Love of oneself seems included in love of God; one's body is part of oneself and should not be divided against the whole; and if our own body is separately numbered, the neighbor's body seemingly should be separately numbered as well. ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine enumerates four: what is above us, God; what we ourselves are; what is beside us, neighbor; and what is below us, our own body. RESPONSE begins from the foundation of charitable friendship in communication of beatitude. In this communication there is: God, the principle who causes and communicates beatitude; rational creatures—men and angels—who directly participate in it; and the human body, to which beatitude flows by a certain redundancy from the soul.

ARTICLE XII — THE FOUR OBJECTS OF CHARITY (conclusion)

That which causes beatitude, God, is loved because He is its principle and cause. A participant in beatitude is lovable in two ways: because it is one with us, or because it is associated with us in participation of beatitude. Hence two objects are distinguished here: oneself and one's neighbor. The different relation of the lover and of the lovable thing constitutes a different formal reason for loving. Our relation to God differs from our relation to ourselves, and therefore God and self are enumerated distinctly, even though love of the one is causally connected with love of the other. The subject of charity is the rational mind, which is directly capable of beatitude. The body does not directly attain beatitude but receives it by overflow from the soul. Therefore a man according to his rational mind loves himself from charity in one way and loves his body in another. We love our neighbor both according to soul and body under one formal reason: association with us in beatitude. Therefore the neighbor's body does not constitute a fifth distinct object. SUMMARY. The fourfold enumeration is fitting: God above us as the principle of beatitude; ourselves as directly participating and one with ourselves; neighbor as associated with us in that participation; and our body as receiving beatitude by overflow.

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QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY

ARTICLE I — WHETHER THERE IS AN ORDER IN CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Charity is a virtue, yet no special “order” is assigned to the other virtues. Faith has First Truth as object, yet all things of faith are believed with equal assent. Charity is in the will, whereas ordering seems to belong to reason. ON THE CONTRARY: “He brought me into the wine cellar; he set charity in order in me.” RESPONSE. Aristotle says prior and posterior are said by relation to a principle. Order includes some mode of priority and posteriority; wherever there is a principle, therefore, there is some order. Charity tends toward God as the principle of beatitude, in whose communication charitable friendship is founded. Consequently, among the things loved from charity there must be an order according to their relation to the first principle of this love, which is God. To the first objection: charity tends to the ultimate end precisely under
the aspect of ultimate end, which belongs to no other virtue in the same way. The end has the nature of a principle in appetible
and practical matters. Charity therefore has a special relation to the first principle, and order is especially considered in it. To the second: faith belongs to the cognitive power, whose operation is according as known things exist in the knower. Charity belongs to the appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending toward the things themselves. Order is more principally in things themselves and is derived from them into our cognition. Therefore order is more especially attributed to charity than to faith, although faith too has an order: principally concerning God and secondarily concerning things referred to God. To the third: order belongs to reason as ordering, but to appetite as ordered. In this latter way order is found in charity. SUMMARY. (1) There is an order among things loved from charity because charity tends to God as the principle of beatitude, to whom all other charitable objects are referred. (2) Order belongs more especially to charity than to the other virtues because its object bears the character of first principle in the appetitive order. (3) Order is in charity as in something ordered. COMMENTARY. I note that the Master of the Sentences treats this question in Book III. On St. Thomas's foundation that order includes prior and posterior, I explain that this is to be understood of order in creatures or toward creatures. In the persons of the Trinity there is order without priority or posteriority in reality, except according to our manner of understanding, in which the producing person may be conceived before the person produced. He refers the reader to Cajetan.

QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY

ARTICLE II — WHETHER GOD IS TO BE LOVED MORE THAN OUR NEIGHBOR

OBJECTIONS. John says that one who does not love the brother whom he sees cannot love God whom he does not see; vision
is a beginning of love, and our neighbor is more visible than God. Again, likeness causes love, and man appears more like his neighbor than like God. Finally, what charity loves in the neighbor is God; yet God is not greater in Himself than when present
in the neighbor. ON THE CONTRARY. That for whose sake other things must sometimes be hated is to be loved more. Christ
commands us to “hate” father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters when they draw us away from God. Therefore God is to be loved more than neighbor. RESPONSE. Every friendship principally regards that in which principally exists the good whose communication grounds the friendship. Political friendship principally regards the ruler insofar as the city's common good depends upon him. Charity is founded upon communication in beatitude. Beatitude exists essentially in God as its first principle and is derived from Him to all capable of it. Therefore God is principally and supremely loved by charity: He is loved
as the cause of beatitude, while neighbor is loved as one who participates beatitude together with us. Vision is a cause of love as
a way of acquiring love, not as the formal reason why something is lovable. The visible neighbor therefore first presents himself to us, but God is more lovable because His goodness is greater. Our likeness to God is prior to and causes our likeness
to neighbor, since both receive from God what makes them alike. God's goodness is essential in Him and participated in the neighbor. SUMMARY. God is to be loved more than neighbor because He is the principle and cause of beatitude.

COMMENTARY. I emphasize that cognition is not the formal reason of willing but the way by which the object and end are

presented. He reconciles the claim that the visible neighbor first occurs to us with St. Thomas's teaching that charity itself begins with God: in charity as such, God known by faith is first loved; in natural love generally, visible goods such as ourselves
and neighbor first present themselves to us.

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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE II — HOW GOD IS LOVED MORE

I distinguish the order of knowing from the order of loving. Natural knowledge begins from creatures and terminates in God; even faith uses created testimony and created likenesses in conceiving divine mysteries. But charity immediately loves God as He is good in Himself. DOUBT: Must God always be loved more intensely than a creature? “God is more to be loved” can mean either that God
is worthy of greater love because He is more excellent, or that charity's precept requires greater love of God. Doctors commonly distinguish greater love as intensive, appreciative, and objective. Objective love is sometimes described as willing a greater particular
good to one person; appreciative love as valuing one more and being prepared to abandon another rather than offend him; intensive love concerns the subject's effort, attention, and fervor. I accept this distinction only with qualification, arguing that the so-called objective and appreciative dimensions cannot be cleanly separated in the proposed manner. FIRST CONCLUSION. God is worthy of
being loved in every way more than any creature because in Him is infinite goodness and the fountain of every created goodness. Charity's immediate formal object is God. Hence: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, soul, and mind.”

SECOND

CONCLUSION. By the precept of charity man must love God appreciatively above everything else: he

must be prepared to abandon
all things rather than abandon God or violate His commandments. THIRD CONCLUSION. Every act elicited by charity, insofar as it
proceeds from the infused habit and the Holy Spirit's assistance, tends more intensely toward God than toward a creature. A habit inclines more immediately toward its formal object than toward material objects. Charity assimilates the will to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit cannot incline it more intensely toward a creature than toward God. I compare this with the light of first principles, which principally inclines assent toward principles rather than conclusions. An objection says a charitable person can exert more human effort in loving a neighbor than in an act explicitly directed to God. I report that some, including the Dominican John de la Peña, therefore rejected his third conclusion. I nevertheless hold that using charity itself to love neighbor more intensely than God is contradictory. FOURTH CONCLUSION. Human factors—attention to a sensible person, sensible affection, and natural effort—can make the will's total experienced movement toward neighbor more intense. But the surplus intensity arising from these human causes
is not attributable to charity as charity. When one loves neighbor from charity “as five,” the same act principally loves divine goodness “as five,” since divine goodness is the formal reason for loving the neighbor.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE II — CONCLUSION

I therefore hold that, from charity itself, it is impossible to love a creature more than God either intensively or appreciatively. With respect to God, he does not regard intensive and appreciative charity as two separable quantities; St. Thomas assigns charity's increase
to intensity. Can one nevertheless love a creature more intensely by a merely human love than one explicitly loves God by charity? I first say the smallest intensity of charity is more excellent and actualizes the will more nobly than every intensity belonging to another
species of love. Proportionately speaking, however, a person's natural powers can sometimes produce a more intense human affection
toward a creature than his experienced act of charity toward God. This need not always be mortal sin, provided he simply values God
above all; yet I thinks excessive voluntary attachment to a creature will scarcely occur without at least venial disorder because it disposes one to difficulty when the creature must be surrendered for God. Purely natural intensity not subject to choice is not itself sinful.

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ARTICLE III — WHETHER MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE GOD MORE THAN HIMSELF

OBJECTIONS. Aristotle says friendship toward others derives from friendship toward oneself; a cause is greater than its effect. Again, everything is loved as one's own good, and the reason for loving appears more loved than what is loved for that reason. Finally, to love God includes loving one's own enjoyment of God, which is one's supreme good. ON THE CONTRARY.

Augustine says that if you ought not love yourself for yourself but for God, the most righteous end of your love, then the same

applies to another man. What is the reason for loving another is loved more; therefore God is loved more than self.

RESPONSE. From God we receive the good of nature and the good of grace. Natural love is founded on God's communication

of natural goods. In integrity of nature, man naturally loves God above all and more than himself; indeed every creature in its own mode loves the common good of the whole more than its particular private good. This appears in natural parts acting for the whole and in citizens enduring loss for the common good. Much more does this hold in charity, founded on communication

of grace. God is the common, fontal principle of beatitude for all capable of it. Aristotle's principle concerns friendship with another in whom the relevant good exists particularly, not the relation to one in whom it exists as the universal whole. A part loves the whole's good as fitting to it, not by referring the whole to itself, but by referring itself to the whole.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS LOVED MORE THAN SELF (continued)

To desire enjoyment of God belongs to love of concupiscence. But God is loved more by love of friendship than by love of concupiscence, because God's goodness in Himself exceeds the good we receive by enjoying Him. Therefore simply speaking man loves

God from charity more than himself. SUMMARY. (1) By natural love every creature loves God more than itself because every part

loves the common good of the whole more than its particular good. (2) Much more does man by charity love God more than himself.

COMMENTARY. I note contrary positions attributed to Auxerre, Bonaventure, and Gabriel, but defends St. Thomas. Every

inclination

flowing per se from principles of nature is good, since God's creation is good and God cannot be the cause of evil. Natural inclinations of

earth, water, and human appetite are therefore good considered according to their proper nature. SECOND CONCLUSION. Every truly

natural appetite is principally ordered to God rather than to a contrary private good. I cite Scotus, Durandus, and others in relation to the

thesis, while defending St. Thomas's reasoning: God acts intimately in every agent and gives being to all; therefore every natural motion,

insofar as it proceeds from nature, is principally ordered to God. God is the ultimate end of all things. He raises objections. Self-love is

founded on unity, which seems stronger than union with another. Man appears naturally to love himself more easily than God. Parents

naturally love children intensely. In danger of death, natural appetite seeks preservation whereas charity may command sacrifice.

Sensitive appetite also appears naturally inclined toward goods contrary to reason. I reply that divine goodness is the root upon which

our own goodness depends in being and preservation; hence natural love principally tends toward God. It is easier to know and formally

love oneself distinctly because self-experience is immediate, but easier does not mean greater. A stone outside its proper place passes

more immediately through an intermediate point while nevertheless being principally inclined toward its final center.

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COMMENTARY ON NATURAL LOVE OF GOD (continued) It is also easier for fallen man to follow sensitive appetite

because sensible things are known first. Yet sensitive appetite, considered absolutely as a natural appetite toward sensible good, is good; disorder appears when it is considered in fallen rational man insofar as the lower part resists the governance of reason. The claim that parents naturally love children more than progenitors does not prove that man loves himself more than God. Man has a more excellent mode of being insofar as his being depends upon and is contained in God than merely in himself. As water may naturally rise for the preservation of the universe, so creatures are naturally ordered toward the universal good. Regarding Christ's prayer that the chalice pass: every good love includes God as principal end. Preserving life is naturally good considered absolutely, but when God's command or counsel requires risking life, an unconditional refusal would be sinful or imperfect. In Christ there was a good conditional inclination toward preservation together with an absolute will to die in obedience to the Father. Sensitive appetite can be considered as created by God and as a nature in its genus, or as

belonging to fallen man. In the first way it tends toward sensible good; in the second, concupiscence can incline contrary to reason because original justice is absent. Scripture's language about man's inclination to evil signifies this inherited weakness, not that nature as created is intrinsically evil. DOUBT: Is a special acquired virtue required for natural love of God? Some contemporary Thomists, I say, posit such a virtue because fallen man is not promptly disposed to explicit natural love of God. I

judge it more probable that there is no special acquired virtue for this purpose. St. Thomas never posits one, and if the will is naturally more inclined to God than to man himself, its difficulty comes not from the will's intrinsic incapacity but from disordered appetite. Religion differs because worship of God under a distinctly known excellence follows rational discourse and can therefore require an acquired habit disposing acts of worship. The first natural movement of will is love toward God confusedly known as universal good; once God is distinctly known, no additional special acquired habit of love need be posited.

I cite Cajetan and St. Thomas in support.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE HIMSELF MORE THAN HIS NEIGHBOR

OBJECTIONS. A neighbor may be holier and more closely united to God than oneself. A man sometimes bears loss for a friend. Charity “seeketh not her own,” suggesting that it does not prefer self. ON THE CONTRARY. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Love of self is presented as the exemplar of love of neighbor, and exemplar is prior to exemplified. RESPONSE. In man there are spiritual and bodily natures. A man is principally said to love himself insofar as he loves himself

according to spiritual nature. In this respect, after God, he ought to love himself more than any other. The reason lies in charity's formal order. God is loved as the principle of the good upon which charity is founded. Man loves himself as a participant in that good; neighbor is loved as one associated with him in its participation. Participation in oneself has the character of unity; association with another has the character of union. Since unity is prior to union, one's own participation gives a stronger reason for charitable self-love than another's association does for neighbor-love. A sign of this order is that a man may never commit sin—thereby injuring his own participation in beatitude—in order to free his neighbor from sin. A holier neighbor may be closer to God objectively, but charity's quantity also depends upon the lover. Another is not as immediately united to my act of charity as I am to myself. Bodily losses may be endured for a friend, and in doing so one can love oneself more according to spiritual good, because virtuous sacrifice perfects the mind. Spiritual loss through sin may never be accepted to free another from sin. “Charity seeketh not her own” means that it prefers common goods to merely private goods. SUMMARY. (1) According to spiritual nature, after God, man ought to love himself more than any other person. (2) Bodily detriment can be endured for a friend because virtue thereby perfects one's spiritual self. (3) One may never

suffer the spiritual detriment of sin to free another from sin. COMMENTARY begins with the objection that this seems to imply loving oneself more than the Blessed Virgin, the whole heavenly court, or even Christ's human soul.

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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE IV — SELF, NEIGHBOR, AND SPIRITUAL SACRIFICE

Further objections argue that charity participates in the Holy Spirit's love, and the Holy Spirit loves better persons more; that one may
remain outside religious life for others' spiritual or temporal benefit even if one expects greater personal merit in religion; and that Moses and Paul seemed willing to lose their own spiritual good for their people. FIRST CONCLUSION. It is never lawful to suffer spiritual detriment by committing sin for the spiritual good of the whole world, even if the sin were only venial. One may never “do evil that good may come.” I reject a misuse of the maxim “of two evils choose the lesser”: it does not authorize choosing intrinsic moral evil as a means to good. SECOND CONCLUSION. Without sin one may accept some loss in spiritual progress for a neighbor's
good, even temporal good. A person is not commanded at every moment to perform the act that maximally increases charity; therefore
he may for a legitimate reason forego some optional opportunity for greater progress. THIRD CONCLUSION. Per se, one is never obliged to accept a true loss in the increase of charity for the common spiritual good of the world. Yet per accidens circumstances can
oblige one to leave an otherwise more advantageous state or occupation. For example, someone able to support impoverished parents
in the world may be bound for the present not to enter religion. This is not properly a loss contrary to charity, because charity itself then requires the duty. FOURTH CONCLUSION. If there is equal doubt whether remaining in the world or entering religion is better
and no precept requires remaining, it is safer to enter religion and attend to one's salvation. FIFTH CONCLUSION. It can sometimes
be better, even without strict precept, to remain in the world when one performs notably great works—supporting many poor people or other major works of piety—that entrance into religion would prevent. Prudence must judge the circumstances; if one's own spiritual salvation is notably endangered, one should leave everything, whereas without such danger the needs of the poor may justify
remaining. I answer that the charity formally in me first and immediately unites me to God. Hence I ought by my own charity to will
God for myself before willing Him for the Blessed Virgin; this self-union is itself the foundation from which I will God for others. Christ is exceptional because, as Head, our charity depends upon Him in its production and preservation. I therefore hold that Christian charity inclines us toward Christ—God united personally to human nature—more than toward ourselves united to God by adoptive grace.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE IV — MOSES, PAUL, AND TEMPORAL SACRIFICE

I offer three interpretations of Moses' “blot me out of thy book” and Paul's wish to be anathema for his brethren. Jerome understands the “book” in relation to temporal life. Chrysostom interprets Moses and Paul as expressing extraordinary zeal for God's glory and, conditionally, willingness to forego divine fruition if that were required for God's honor. Augustine interprets Moses as arguing from
confidence in divine friendship: “Either forgive them or blot me out; but You will not blot me out; therefore forgive them.” The comparison between spiritual and bodily loss fails because spiritual evil is not intrinsically ordered as a means to another's spiritual good, whereas bodily goods can sometimes be sacrificed for common temporal good. Immediate spiritual good has an order directly to God. HOW MUCH TEMPORAL LOSS MAY ONE ACCEPT FOR A NEIGHBOR? I say it can be lawful to lose temporal possessions over which one has dominion—wealth and honor—for a neighbor in a case of genuine necessity, especially for a friend. But this is not required or prudent for every person and every need. Duties to one's family, danger of inherited infamy, stronger obligations toward other persons, and proportion between the goods at stake must be considered. It is still more clearly lawful to lose
temporal goods for another's spiritual good when prudence permits. Sometimes one is obliged even to expose one's life to danger for another's spiritual salvation—for example, where a person in extreme spiritual necessity cannot otherwise receive necessary instruction or sacraments. “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” One may also risk life to save a public person gravely necessary to the commonwealth, unless oneself is still more necessary, because in such a case a part is exposed for the whole.

DOUBT: May one expose one's bodily life to certain danger to save the bodily life of an equal friend?

Arguments against appeal to
the duty of preserving one's own life, Augustine's language that one who loses his life for another seems to love the other more than himself, and the maxim that well-ordered charity begins with oneself. Durandus denies that one may expose one's life to certain danger for an equal friend, though he allows risk where hope of escape remains. my conclusion is affirmative in some circumstances.
He cites St. Thomas, Lactantius, Augustine, Aristotle, Cicero, and Christ's saying: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay
down his life for his friends.”
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COMMENTARY — GIVING ONE'S LIFE FOR A FRIEND (continued) In a case where friendship itself ought virtuously

to
be honored, one who dies to save a friend exercises a virtue highly necessary to society. Therefore such sacrifice can be lawful.
But life is not to be exposed rashly or for every friend. If one is especially useful to the commonwealth, or has children and family who cannot be provided for without him, prudence may require preservation of one's own life. Per se, one's own bodily
life is more to be loved than the friend's bodily life. One's body is not naturally a mere instrument ordered to preserve another's body as an arm is ordered to preserve the whole person. But when the virtue of friendship itself is at stake, bodily life
may be surrendered for virtue; the friend's danger then supplies the matter and occasion of the virtuous act. In that very sacrifice one loves oneself more according to virtue.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS NEIGHBOR MORE THAN HIS OWN BODY

OBJECTIONS. “Neighbor” includes the neighbor's body, so the thesis seems to require loving another's body more than one's
own. One's own body is closer to one's own soul than the neighbor. And not everyone is bound to expose his body for another's
salvation; Christ calls this the greatest charity and a mark of the perfect. ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says neighbor is to
be loved more than one's own body. RESPONSE. That is more to be loved from charity which has a fuller reason for being lovable by charity. Association in the full participation of beatitude—the reason for loving neighbor—is greater than the body's participation in beatitude by overflow from the soul. Therefore the neighbor, with respect to the salvation of his soul, is
to be loved more than one's own body. By “neighbor” here St. Thomas principally means the neighbor according to soul, since
the principal part gives the person his chief designation. Our body is closer to our soul in constituting our individual nature, but in participation of beatitude the neighbor's soul is more fully associated with ours than our body is. Not every person bears
office for every neighbor's salvation; therefore charity does not always require exposing one's body for another, except when one is bound to provide for that person's salvation. Voluntary self-offering beyond obligation belongs to charity's perfection.
SUMMARY. The neighbor's spiritual salvation is to be loved more than one's own body. Exposure of one's body is obligatory
only where one is responsible for the neighbor's salvation; spontaneous offering beyond that belongs to perfection.

COMMENTARY begins by distinguishing extreme spiritual necessity from lesser necessity and persons who have pastoral

office from private persons bound only by the common law of charity.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE V — DUTY TOWARD A NEIGHBOR'S SPIRITUAL SALVATION

FIRST CONCLUSION. Everyone must provide for a neighbor's spiritual salvation when he can do so easily and without great
loss to himself or his temporal goods. I cite “God gave to every one commandment concerning his neighbor,” Christ's command of fraternal correction, and the Mosaic requirement to help even an enemy's burdened animal. Since we are members one of another, one member ought to assist another where it can do so without its own serious harm. SECOND

CONCLUSION. A just man is bound to expose his life or fortune to danger for a neighbor's spiritual salvation in a case of

extreme necessity. I cite St. Thomas and “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” THIRD CONCLUSION. Outside extreme necessity, one is not ordinarily bound to expose one's life, entire substance, or a great portion of one's substance. Means must be proportioned to the end. Extreme spiritual necessity exists when the neighbor cannot, or can scarcely, escape the danger otherwise—for example, a simple believer being seduced by heretics, or a dying person who lacks someone able to
administer Baptism or Penance when salvation would otherwise be gravely endangered. FOURTH CONCLUSION. Bishops and pastors, because of their office, are often bound outside strict extreme necessity to risk life or temporal goods for their subjects, since they must provide doctrine and sacraments when pastoral duty requires it.
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ARTICLE VI — WHETHER ONE NEIGHBOR IS TO BE LOVED MORE THAN ANOTHER

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says all men are to be loved equally, though since we cannot benefit everyone we should especially
assist those joined to us by circumstances. The formal reason for loving every neighbor is the same—God. And to love is to will
good; we will the same generic good, eternal life, to all neighbors. ON THE CONTRARY. Sins against some relationships are
graver than sins against others; Scripture, for example, assigns special gravity to cursing father or mother. Therefore some
neighbors ought to be loved more than others. RESPONSE. Some held that all neighbors are equally loved in interior affection, with order existing only in external beneficence. St. Thomas rejects this. The affect of charity, an inclination of grace,
is no less ordered than natural inclination. Since external acts of beneficence must be proportioned differently to different
persons, the interior inclination of charity must likewise be proportioned. Therefore one neighbor is to be loved more intensely
than another according to greater proximity to one of charity's principles: God and the person who loves.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER ONE NEIGHBOR IS TO BE LOVED MORE THAN ANOTHER (continued)

Augustine's statement that all are equally to be loved can mean equality with respect to the generic good wished for them: charity wills
eternal beatitude to all. It does not require equal intensity of every act of love. Another distinction is that no neighbor may simply be
excluded from benevolence, although actual beneficence cannot be extended to everyone. Augustine excludes the inequality whereby
some are loved and others not loved at all; he does not exclude the inequality whereby some are loved more than others. Not all
neighbors stand equally near to God. Some are nearer through greater goodness and, under that aspect, are more lovable from charity
than those less near. The objection from willing the same eternal good concerns equality on the side of the good wished, not equality in
the intensity of the loving act. SUMMARY. FIRST CONCLUSION. It is unreasonable to say that all neighbors must be equally loved in
affection while inequality exists only in external effects. Charity's interior inclination itself is ordered and proportioned to the acts it
produces. SECOND CONCLUSION. One neighbor ought to be loved more than another even according to interior affection, because
neighbors possess different relations of proximity to God and to the lover. THIRD CONCLUSION. With respect to the generic good
wished—eternal life—all neighbors are loved equally; but charity need not will this good to every person with an equally intense act.

COMMENTARY. I say this article and the two following must be read very attentively against those who, under the

pretext of spiritual
perfection, consider only charity's formal object and therefore think it less perfect to be moved toward greater love by blood relationship
or other human friendship. Such particular natural grounds of affection, he insists, are not simply to be destroyed by charity; grace
perfects nature. St. Thomas's doctrine wonderfully and catholically explains the order of charity among all those who are to be loved. I
refer to the Master of the Sentences, Book III, distinction 29.
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QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE BETTER PERSONS MORE THAN THOSE

MORE CLOSELY
CONNECTED TO US

OBJECTIONS. It seems that better persons should be loved more than those closely connected to us. Those related to us can, insofar as they impede us from God, become objects of hatred according to Luke 14; but good men as good are not to be hated.

Again, charity most of all assimilates man to God, and God loves the better person more. Finally, every friendship chiefly loves
what participates more fully in the good upon which that friendship is founded. Since charity is founded upon participation in beatitude, the better person seems more lovable than the person merely more closely connected to us. ON THE CONTRARY.

1 Timothy 5 teaches that one who does not care for his own, especially his household, has denied the faith. Interior affection should correspond to exterior charitable action; therefore charity has a special intensity toward those closer to us.

RESPONSE. Every act is proportioned both to its object and to its agent. From the object it receives its species; from the power of the agent it receives the mode of its intensity. Thus charitable love has God for its object and the human lover for its subject. With respect to the good wished, the one nearer to God is to be wished a greater good, because eternal beatitude admits diverse degrees and charity wills divine justice to be observed. But with respect to intensity arising from the lover, those
more closely connected to the lover are loved with a more intense affection toward the good charity wills to all. Moreover, natural relationships are stable, whereas virtue can increase or decrease. Thus I may charitably wish that one closely related to
me become better than another and attain a higher degree of beatitude. We also love those connected to us in more ways, because besides charity there are other honest friendships—kinship, citizenship, companionship, and the like. Since their proper goods can be ordered to charity's end, charity can command the acts of those friendships.

ARTICLE VII — SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. (1) To the person nearer to God we ought from charity to wish a greater good. (2) Those nearer to us are loved with a more intense affection. (3) We may charitably wish that a person closely connected to us become holier than others and
attain greater beatitude. (4) Those joined to us are loved in several legitimate modes of friendship. COMMENTARY. I warn that St. Thomas's statement about diversity of love “according to species” must not be taken to mean that the act by which we wish greater glory to a better person belongs to a different species of charity from the act by which we wish lesser glory to another. The diversity is considered in relation to charity's object, from which charity is specified; it is not thereby a specific multiplication of charity itself. Diversity arising from proximity to the lover is considered from the subject's side. I note Durandus's view that charity may will unequal goods by complacency but not by desire; he judges the arguments weak and refers to Cajetan's replies. He also notes that St. Thomas's conclusion about wishing a connected person to become better applies to the present life. In heaven our will is absolutely conformed to God's manifested will and predestination. Finally, St. Thomas is principally explaining charity's nature and inclination, not imposing in every such comparison a mortal-sin precept.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER THE PERSON MOST CLOSELY CONNECTED TO US BY

CARNAL ORIGIN IS TO BE
LOVED MOST

OBJECTIONS. Chosen friendship can appear stronger than blood relationship; Ambrose says spiritual children may be loved no less than bodily children; and in military matters one must obey the commander rather than one's father. ON THE CONTRARY. The Decalogue specially commands honor toward parents. Therefore those joined to us by natural origin possess a special claim. RESPONSE. Those more closely connected to us are loved more intensely and under more titles. Yet different relationships must be compared according to what properly belongs to each. Consanguinity is founded on natural origin; civic friendship on civil communion; military friendship on military communion. In matters belonging to nature, relatives are preferred; in civil matters, fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers. Natural origin is prior and more immovable because it pertains to substance, whereas other relationships supervene and may cease. Hence kinship is more stable, although another friendship can be stronger regarding its own proper matter.

ARTICLE VIII — KINSHIP AND OTHER FRIENDSHIPS (continued)

Spiritual children may rightly be preferred in benefits belonging to spiritual generation, such as instruction in morals, while bodily children have a stronger claim to bodily provision. Obedience to a commander rather than one's father in war proves only that military friendship takes precedence in specifically military matters, not that one's father is simply less loved. SUMMARY. (1) In things pertaining to nature, blood relatives are to be preferred to persons joined to us in another way. (2) In matters proper to another particular relationship, those joined by that relationship can be preferred to blood relatives. (3) Kinship is more stable, though other friendships can be stronger within their proper sphere. COMMENTARY. St. Thomas speaks per se, from charity and from the things considered in themselves. Circumstances can alter the practical order. For the order to bind gravely in a concrete case, the neighbor's necessity must be sufficiently serious; otherwise departing from it may be no sin or not mortal sin. I reject the view, reported through Buridan, that blood relationship has no such priority. Natural inclination itself shows how inhuman it would ordinarily be to abandon a good father or one's children in order to aid private friends, however distinguished. No benefactor's benefit ordinarily equals that of parents; therefore parents hold a special priority in repayment, unless extreme necessity or the common good of Church or commonwealth intervenes. No universal rule settles every case; prudence is required. An impious or cruel parent, or an ungrateful child, can alter the comparison. Can another bond surpass consanguinity even in temporal benefits? I answer that not every relative must be preferred to every friend, because degrees of kinship differ. A friend who has conferred enormous temporal or spiritual benefits and is in grave necessity may have a stronger claim than a third- or fourth-degree relative, perhaps even a second-degree relative, in equal necessity. An extraordinary benefactor may even have a claim exceeding that of siblings. Yet ordinarily no such benefits overcome the temporal duty toward parents unless the parents have behaved with exceptional cruelty or impiety. In specifically spiritual exercises, spiritual relationships have their proper priority. A religious should, other things equal, cooperate with a member of his own order in matters belonging to that religious communion. But regarding the ultimate end itself, charity's common bond embraces all neighbors, and the special intimacy of natural parenthood remains. Thus, provided duties of one's state are fulfilled, one may and should specially desire beatitude and pray for one's natural parents. I add that merely desiring a greater or lesser degree of beatitude for one person than another will not ordinarily be mortal sin, provided duties imposed by prayer, almsgiving, beneficence, and the other virtues are fulfilled.

ARTICLE IX — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE HIS SON MORE THAN HIS FATHER

OBJECTIONS. We seem to love more those to whom we owe greater beneficence, and parents provide for children rather than children storing up for parents. Nature also shows parents loving children more than children love parents. Finally, charity conforms us to God, and God appears to love children more insofar as He bestows benefits upon them. ON THE CONTRARY. Ambrose gives the order: first God, then parents, then children, then household members. RESPONSE. The degree of love can be measured from two sides. From the side of the object, that which has the character of a more excellent good and greater likeness to God is more lovable. Thus the father is more lovable insofar as he is loved under the aspect of a principle, which is a more eminent good and more Godlike. From the side of the lover's conjunction, however, the son is more intensely loved. Parents love children as something of themselves; parental love therefore resembles self-love. Parents know more certainly that the children are theirs, the child is in a sense a part proceeding from the parent, and the parent begins loving the child before the child begins loving the parent. Long-standing love is stronger. To a principle are due subjection, reverence, and honor; to an effect belongs the reception of the principle's influence and provision. Hence children owe parents more honor, while children ordinarily receive more provision. Yet in a case of parental necessity, gratitude for benefits received binds children strongly to provide for parents. SUMMARY. (1) From the side of the object, the father is more lovable. (2) From the side of the lover, the son is more intensely loved. (3) In a case of necessity, the child is especially obliged by benefits received to provide for parents. COMMENTARY. Bonaventure and Gabriel are reported as holding that natural love favors the child over the father, whereas supernatural charity favors the father because one owes one's very being to him. I reject a sharp opposition between natural and supernatural orders: grace perfects rather than destroys nature. The natural reason itself recognizes the debt toward parents. St. Thomas's distinction between the objective reason of good and the subjective intensity of conjunction is therefore necessary.

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COMMENTARY ON

ARTICLE IX (continued) I consider an objection: if parents ordinarily owe greater provision to children, why

should a child
in extreme necessity prefer a parent? I answer that St. Thomas's rule about parents storing up for children concerns ordinary circumstances, not extreme or very grave necessity. When a parent falls into such necessity, merely verbal honor is insufficient; the child must provide what is necessary. The debt of gratitude and filial piety toward parents is prior and must be discharged when its proper occasion arises. The fact that a child is "something of" the parent does not make child and parent identical, so it does not overturn this duty.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS MOTHER MORE THAN HIS FATHER

OBJECTIONS. The
mother supplies the bodily matter of generation, while the rational soul is created by God; therefore it may seem that the child receives more from the mother. Mothers are commonly more affectionate toward their children and bear greater labor in generation, childbirth, and education.

ON THE CONTRARY. Jerome places the father immediately after God in the order of this natural relation and

then mentions
the mother.
RESPONSE. Such comparisons must be understood per se: father precisely as father compared with mother precisely as mother, other things being equal. Differences in virtue or vice can diminish or dissolve friendship in a particular case. Considered according to natural generation, father and mother are loved as principles of origin. St. Thomas, following the biology available to him, assigns the father the more excellent aspect of active principle and the mother the aspect of receptive material principle. Therefore, per se and under that historical account of generation, he concludes that the father is more to be loved. The mother supplies the bodily matter, while the formative power attributed to the paternal seed disposes the matter for reception of the rational soul. The fact that the mother may love more pertains to another title of friendship—the love owed to one who loves us—rather than the precise title of generator under discussion.
SUMMARY. Per se, father is loved more than mother under the formal aspect of principle of natural generation, according to the Aristotelian biological framework used in the text.

COMMENTARY ON

ARTICLE X With Cajetan, I stress that the conclusion is formal and assumes other things equal. Absolutely

speaking, the
reason for loving the father as father is said to outweigh the reason for loving the mother as mother under the biological premises adopted by St. Thomas. Nevertheless circumstances can make one obliged to aid or wish a greater good to the mother—for example, where the mother has been exceptionally beneficent in temporal and spiritual matters while the father has been vicious and negligent. Considerations of the common good can likewise alter the concrete judgment. These cases are accidental to St. Thomas's formal comparison.

ARTICLE XI — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS WIFE MORE THAN HIS FATHER AND

MOTHER
OBJECTIONS. Genesis says a man leaves father and mother for his wife. Ephesians commands husbands to love their wives as themselves, and self is loved more than parents. Marriage also includes multiple titles of friendship: utility, pleasure, and virtue when spouses are virtuous.

ON THE CONTRARY. A husband loves his wife as his own flesh, but one's own body is loved less than

neighbor in the
spiritual order; among neighbors parents have a special priority.
RESPONSE. Again the degree of love is measured by the good that is the object and by conjunction with the lover. According to the reason of objective good, parents are more lovable because they are loved under the aspect of principle and a more eminent good. According to conjunction, the wife is loved more intensely because husband and wife become "one flesh." Thus the wife is loved more intensely, while greater reverence is shown to parents. Leaving father and mother does not mean abandoning them in every respect. In some matters one must assist parents more than spouse; Genesis concerns the union of marital cohabitation. "As himself" does not mean strict equality of love but identifies self-love as a reason for loving the spouse united to oneself.
SUMMARY. Parents possess priority according to the objective title of principle; the wife possesses greater intensity according to marital conjunction. Hence the wife is loved more intensely, while parents receive greater reverence.

COMMENTARY. I clarify that bodily conjunction is not the ultimate end of marital love but a kind of union causing love. The

chief good wished to a spouse is not merely bodily union but honest good. Drawing on the preceding discussion, I judge that, per se, in extreme temporal necessity one is more strictly bound to assist a parent than a spouse, because the debt to the parent is prior and the parent's title as principle is more eminent.
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ARTICLE XII — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE A BENEFACTOR MORE THAN ONE WHOM HE HAS BENEFITED

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says no greater provocation to love exists than being loved first; therefore the benefactor, who first bestows love and benefit, seems most lovable. Failure to love a benefactor is also a graver sin than ceasing to love one whom we have benefited. God and parents, who stand highest among those loved, are our supreme benefactors. ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle observes that benefactors commonly love those benefited more than the latter love their benefactors. RESPONSE. Something is loved more either because it has the reason of a more excellent good or because of greater conjunction. Under the first aspect, the benefactor is more lovable because he is a principle of good in the recipient, as was said of a father. Under the second aspect, the benefactor often loves the beneficiary more intensely. Aristotle gives several reasons: the beneficiary is like the benefactor's work, and each naturally loves his work because his own activity and life are manifested in it; the benefactor beholds an honest good in the recipient, while the recipient chiefly beholds a useful good in the benefactor, and honest good is more excellent and enduring than utility; loving belongs to acting and conferring good, whereas being loved belongs to receiving good; and giving benefits is more difficult than receiving them, while we tend to love more what costs us labor. The beneficiary's love toward the benefactor is more strictly owed, so hatred or ingratitude is more sinful. The benefactor's love toward the beneficiary is more spontaneous and therefore commonly readier. SUMMARY. (1) Under the title of more excellent good, the benefactor is more lovable. (2) Under the title of conjunction through one's own work, the beneficiary is often more intensely loved by the benefactor. I also add from St. Thomas's reply that spontaneous love arising from oneself has a certain priority over love elicited by another's prior benefit.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE XII AND COMPARISON OF SON AND WIFE

I say the principal difficulty is resolved by St. Thomas's distinction: love of a beneficiary toward a benefactor is more due, so its contrary involves greater sin; love of a benefactor toward the beneficiary is more spontaneous and prompt. Nor is it universally true that every beneficiary is loved more than every benefactor. God and parents, from whom we receive the greatest benefits, are preferred to persons upon whom we ourselves have bestowed lesser benefits. Cajetan asks whether son or wife is more lovable, a comparison St. Thomas did not explicitly treat. I give two conclusions. First, according to the objective reason of good, the wife is more lovable because she is a co-principle with the husband in the generation of children, while the son is an effect; a co-principle has the character of a more excellent good than an effect. Second, according to conjunction, the son is loved more intensely because he is something of the parent's substance, whereas the spouse is not a part but a partner and co-principle. Hence spouses more especially honor one another, while parents often love children more intensely. I points to the ordinarily greater grief at a child's death, other things equal, as a sign of this intensity.

ARTICLE XIII — WHETHER THE ORDER OF CHARITY REMAINS IN HEAVEN

OBJECTIONS. Perfect charity seems to love greater goods more and lesser goods less; therefore in heaven one might love a better person more than oneself or a stranger more than a relative. Every blessed person wills the good possessed by each according to God's will, and the better possess greater glory. Finally, in heaven God will be “all in all,” so proximity to God appears to become the sole measure. ON THE CONTRARY. Glory does not destroy nature but perfects it. The order of charity previously established proceeds from nature, and natural things love themselves with a special immediacy. Therefore the order remains. RESPONSE. The order certainly remains insofar as God is loved above all, for in heaven man perfectly enjoys God as ultimate end. Regarding self and others, however, distinguish the degree of good wished from the intensity of love. According to the good wished, the blessed love the better more insofar as they perfectly will each to possess the degree assigned by divine justice. The time of meriting greater reward has ended, so the blessed will rests in what God has determined. According to intensity of love, however, each still loves himself more intensely than another, even a better neighbor, because the intensity of the act arises from the loving subject and charity first orders one's own mind to God.

ARTICLE XIII — THE ORDER OF CHARITY IN HEAVEN (continued)

With respect to the blessed considered among themselves, proximity to God becomes incomparably more decisive. The entire blessed
life consists in the mind's order to God. Thus, among neighbors, the one nearer to God will simply be loved more according to charity.
The practical need for temporal provision, which in this life requires us to give special care to those dependent upon us by various relationships, will have ceased. Nevertheless honest causes of natural affection do not vanish from the souls of the blessed. A blessed
person can still love someone connected to him under more titles than another person; but all such titles are incomparably surpassed by
the title derived from proximity to God. SUMMARY. (1) God remains loved above all in heaven. (2) According to the degree of objective good wished, each blessed person wills the better person the greater good divinely assigned to him. (3) According to intensity
of self-love, each loves himself more intensely than another because charity first orders his own mind to God. (4) Among other blessed
neighbors, the better and more Godlike is simply loved more. (5) Natural and honest relationships remain as additional titles of love, though subordinate to proximity to God.

QUESTION XXVII — ON THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS LOVE

ARTICLE I — WHETHER IT IS MORE PROPER TO CHARITY TO BE LOVED THAN TO LOVE

OBJECTIONS. Charity is better in better persons, and better persons ought to be loved more. Many people desire to be loved rather than to love. Augustine also says that being loved first is a powerful provocation to love. ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle says friendship consists more in loving than in being loved; charity is a friendship. RESPONSE. To love belongs to charity precisely insofar as charity is a virtue, for every virtue essentially inclines to its proper act. To be loved is not the act of the charity in the person who is loved; it belongs to him because his goodness moves another person to an act of love. Therefore loving belongs to charity more properly than being loved. Friends are praised especially because they love, and those who are loved without loving in return are blamed. Mothers, who exemplify intense love, characteristically seek more to love than to be loved.

QUESTION XXVII, ARTICLE I — WHETHER LOVING IS MORE PROPER TO CHARITY

(continued)
People seek to be loved and honored because these manifest some good existing in themselves. Thus being loved is desired for the sake
of something else—the recognition of good in the beloved. But those possessing charity seek to love for its own sake, because the act of
loving is itself charity's proper good. Hence charity more properly wills to love than to be loved. Being loved may provoke a person to
love, but it is not the final end of the act of loving; it is an occasion or path inducing love. SUMMARY. It is more proper to charity to
love than to be loved, because loving is charity's own elicited act, whereas being loved comes to the beloved from another person's act.

COMMENTARY. I apply St. Thomas's reply even to our love of God. We may love God while intending to be loved more by Him,

but
God's love for us is not the final end of our charity. God's prior love is the principle of our love: “not as though we had loved Him, but
because He first loved us.” A person may also intend, through loving God, an increase of grace, which is an effect of God's love toward
us. Yet charity does not terminate in wishing greater grace for oneself; increased grace is itself desired so that one may become able to
love God more for His own sake. An objection says grace, by which we become partakers of the divine nature, is better than charity and
its act; therefore charity should love grace more than its own act. I distinguish. Grace and charity considered as supernatural qualities can
be compared such that grace is the root and in that respect the more fundamental gift. But charity considered in its act toward its proper
object has a higher terminus: through its act it loves God Himself as good in Himself, whereas in loving grace it loves God as participated by us. The direct tendency toward God therefore possesses the higher formal good.
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ARTICLE II — WHETHER LOVE, INSOFAR AS IT IS AN ACT OF CHARITY, IS THE SAME AS BENEVOLENCE

OBJECTIONS. Aristotle defines loving as willing good to someone, which appears identical with benevolence. Charity is a habit of the will and its act tends toward good. Aristotle also enumerates willing good and willing existence and life to a friend among the first features of friendship. ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle says benevolence is neither friendship nor love but a beginning of friendship. Since charity is friendship, benevolence cannot simply be identical with charity's act of love. RESPONSE (beginning). Benevolence properly means an act of will by which we will good to another. This differs from actual love both in sensitive appetite and in intellectual appetite. Sensitive love is a passion involving an impetus toward its object and ordinarily arises through repeated consideration of the beloved, whereas benevolence can arise suddenly from a judgment of reason—for example, when watching two contestants and spontaneously wishing victory to one. Intellectual love likewise differs from bare benevolence because love implies an affective union with the beloved: the lover regards the beloved as in some way one with himself or belonging to him and is thereby moved toward him. Benevolence, by contrast, is the simple willing of good to another even before such affective union is presupposed.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE — SECOND AND THIRD PROPOSITIONS

Vitoria continues the second proposition: by every such meritorious act grace is increased, although charity is not. As he had said concerning an intense act, grace would increase according to the whole latitude of the act, while charity would increase only according to the excess; similarly, by a remiss act grace would increase although charity would not. I reject this directly: “This is not rightly said, and is contrary to St. Thomas, as has already been shown.”

THIRD PROPOSITION. If charity is not increased immediately by a remiss act, it seems arbitrary to say that it is increased at the end of life, since nothing of this has been handed down to us.

I approve this proposition as conformable to St. Thomas, II-II, q.24, a.6. He opposes those who imagine that after this life a man must dispose himself by a single act of love whose intensity equals the multiplication of all his acts in this life. Thus, if Peter had one hundred acts each as two, they would say that in the next life he must have one act as two hundred and thereby receive a light of glory as two hundred. I regard this construction as unreasonable. According to St. Thomas the sufficient disposition is attained when a man breaks forth into a more fervent act.

A SECOND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT FOR THE FIRST OPINION. A less intense act can be more meritorious than a more intense act; therefore, if an infused habit increases through the more intense act, it should also increase through the less intense but more meritorious act. For example, giving one's entire substance to the poor through a remiss act can seem more meritorious than giving one coin through an intense act.

I reply that this gravely confuses essential and accidental reward. He who loves God more intensely merits more with respect to essential reward. St. Thomas teaches this repeatedly.

Vitoria asks whether the increase of an infused habit should be proportioned not to the gradual intensity of the meritorious act but to the quantity of merit. He first says one could probably maintain that only intensity is relevant, since an infused habit is increased meritoriously in an analogous way to how an acquired habit would be increased efficiently.

I note that Cajetan holds this and calls it the truest position according to St. Thomas, who recognizes no increase of charity except intensive increase.

Vitoria nevertheless judges it more probable that charity and the other infused habits increase according to the proportion of merit rather than merely according to the gradual intensity of the act, since infused virtues are gifts of God and in a manner rewards of good acts.

I objects that the merit belonging to charity is itself proportioned to the intensity with which man adheres to God. With respect to charity, there is no useful separation between “greater love appreciatively” and “greater love intensively” of the sort Vitoria's argument requires.

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A THIRD PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT. Let Peter possess charity as eight and successively perform two meritorious acts each as six. Let Paul likewise possess charity as eight but perform one act as twelve. If Paul's charity increases, Peter's should also increase, because the two are said to merit equally.

I deny the consequence according to St. Thomas. Peter does not merit equally merely because he twice merits as six. One love as twelve is greater than any less intense love merely repeated. Vitoria himself will later acknowledge this in considering merit.

A FOURTH ARGUMENT. An act continued through time remains meritorious. Therefore even a remiss act, if sufficiently continued, can seem to attain the merit of a more intense act. If a man has a habit as eight and elicits an act as four, the act, continued long enough, might become meritorious as ten. Since longer continuation is more meritorious, it seems that a remiss act could eventually increase the habit.

Vitoria says these arguments raise a further doubt: even if one denies that a single remiss act increases the habit, can many remiss acts, or one remiss act continued for a long time, equal the merit of one intense act?

He reports three opinions.

FIRST OPINION. Whenever, through multiplication of remiss acts or continuation of one act, one reaches merit equivalent to an intense act, the infused habit increases. Against this stands St. Thomas's teaching that multiplication of remiss acts does not necessarily increase charity.

SECOND OPINION. Remiss acts, whether multiplied or continued, never increase charity.
emphatically that this
indeed was St. Thomas's position and warns modern theologians not to canonize their own l
and less intelligible
opinions.

An objection says that one who repeatedly or continually performs remiss good acts becomes better than one who performs only a single intense act; it therefore seems unfitting that the former should not receive greater infused virtue.

I answer that by mere continuation or multiplication a person is good more often in act, but is

not simply a better or more virtuous man unless virtue itself increases. According to St. Thomas the increase of virtue is intensive.

THIRD, MEDIATING OPINION. Remiss acts do not themselves increase the habit, but when a later intense act arrives, the habit increases not only for that act but also in reward for the preceding remiss acts.

I say this can have a sound meaning. The increase proportioned to the final intense act corresponds to that act as the proximate and proportionate disposition; the preceding remiss acts are merits rewarded there, but they are not themselves the proximate proportionate disposition.

Vitoria compares this to St. Thomas's example of drops hollowing a stone: the last drop hollows it by virtue of those preceding. I limits the comparison. St. Thomas never admits that anything except a more fervent and intense act increases the habit. Frequent remiss or equal acts dispose the power so that eventually it may break forth into a more fervent act.

Vitoria then states his own propositions. First, against many scholastics: merit is not simply numerically proportioned to intensity as though love as three necessarily merits exactly as three and love as four exactly as four. I say this is false according to St. Thomas.

Second: not only is merit not reducible to a numerical measure of intensity, but even a great multitude of remiss acts does not equal one intense and perfect act. I gladly accepts this with St. Thomas: one perfect love as ten is more meritorious than one hundred imperfect loves each as one.

I comment

VITORIA'S RELECTURE — WHY ONE FERVENT ACT EXCELS MANY TEPID ACTS

Vitoria supports the preceding propositions. Difficulty contributes to merit, and it is more difficult to elicit one perfect love than one hundred imperfect loves. It is also more conformable to the commandment to love God with the whole heart to love

Him once with great effort than many times tepidly and remissly. One prayer offered with great devotion and attention is more

perfect than many tepid and remiss prayers.

He illustrates this through ordinary valuation: one thing perfect in its species is often valued above many imperfect things. A

single large precious stone can be worth more than a hundred tiny stones even if their combined weight is greater; one excellent horse can be worth more than many weak and defective ones. Likewise one perfect act and exercise of virtue is of greater worth than many small and imperfect acts of the same kind.

I remark that, if theologians followed this route, St. Thomas's doctrine would be valued more highly. Instead, some moderns

favor the tepid and follow the Nominalist opinion, treating ten acts each as one as equivalent to one outstanding act as ten.

THIRD PROPOSITION. The same must be said concerning continuation. Vitoria calls the scholastic calculation ridiculous

which assumes that if a person merits as ten in eliciting an act, he merits another ten in every instant of its continuation. Unless continuation and perseverance are considerable, merit is not simply doubled. Continuation can indeed be so prolonged

and persevering that its merit becomes greater than that of the initial elicitation.

I distinguish again. Unless the act becomes more intense during continuation, there is no greater disposition regarding essential reward, although there can be greater accidental reward because the person loves for a longer time. Duration as such

adds time, not a higher intensity of love. Morally speaking, however, a notably continued act of charity will ordinarily become

more intense, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

FOURTH PROPOSITION. Whenever multiplication or continuation reaches merit equal to that of an intense act, the habit is

undoubtedly increased. Vitoria argues that a person who becomes equally good should have equal virtue, and increase itself is

in a manner a reward.

I reject the inference as contrary to St. Thomas. Every act of charity merits increase, yet charity is not increased by every act.

The sufficient disposition, according to Thomas, is not simply the accumulation of an equivalent quantity of merit, but the breaking forth into a more fervent act.

A FIFTH ARGUMENT asks whether, on the contrary view, even an act performed with one's whole effort could never increase the habit during its continuation. Suppose Peter has a habit as four and elicits an act as eight. At the first instant the habit becomes equal to the act. If the act then remains merely equal throughout its continuation, it can no longer increase the

habit. Would perseverance then contribute nothing to habitual increase?

Vitoria answers that, in the increase of infused habits, regard is had to merit; continuation can eventually attain greater merit

than the latitude of the habit or than the merit of one more intense act, and thus the habit could increase.

A SIXTH ARGUMENT concerns order. Suppose Peter has charity as eight and performs first an act as five and afterward one

as ten. On Vitoria's rule the accumulated merit might seem to produce a larger increase than if he performed the act as ten first

and the act as five afterward. It would be absurd if the mere order of acts made such a large difference.

I answer that he does not see why, after the same two acts, the final habit should differ. The act as

five does not increase

charity; when the act as ten arrives, the habit increases to ten. Vitoria himself admits that these difficulties show his opinion is

not free of perplexity and perhaps suggest a fourth opinion distinct from the three already recounted.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE CONCLUDED — I defend ST. THOMAS I comment that if St. Thomas's opinion is held as he has explained it in II-II, q.24, a.6, the difficulties are sufficiently avoided. Those who depart from it fall into the perplexities
which Vitoria, despite being a most illustrious and learned man, openly acknowledges. Vitoria replies to the order-of-acts difficulty by analogy with acquired habits and natural agents. If an acquired habit is eight and a man first performs an act as
nine and then as ten, each act can increase the habit because each finds it weaker. But if the order is reversed, the act as ten increases it while the later act as nine finds the habit already stronger and does nothing. Likewise, heat as four applied before
heat as eight can contribute to successive heating, while heat as four applied after an effect already raised by heat as eight adds nothing. I note that here Vitoria begins to incline toward St. Thomas. Vitoria nevertheless distinguishes infused habits: a
remiss and an intense act can be computed together with respect to merit and can contribute to one increase, which cannot be
said in the same way of an acquired habit. I say Vitoria speaks obscurely. How are the remiss and intense acts counted as one
with respect to merit, when the intense act is more meritorious? If the meaning is only that both are meritorious, St. Thomas
grants this; but he does not grant that both immediately increase the habit. A SEVENTH ARGUMENT. Suppose someone with an intense habit performs only one remiss act and never, even through continuation, reaches the merit of an intense act.
On Vitoria's opinion, he would never receive an increase of charity for that act, although through it he is in some sense better.
Vitoria says this consequence must be conceded on his account; it is enough that grace increases. I respond that all this is discordant with St. Thomas. Vitoria concludes several things. First, he thinks the position concerning increase of grace approaches that of the Nominalists or moderns, while differing from Scotus. I answer that nothing is more diverse than St. Thomas's doctrine and the Nominalist doctrine concerning the increase of grace and charity. Second, Vitoria confesses that it
is not certain but very doubtful how charity and the infused virtues increase. He is not entirely satisfied even with the opinion
attributed to St. Thomas and cannot answer every difficulty arising from it. I call attention to the master's modest confession
of perplexity. Third, Vitoria nevertheless judges it more probable that charity is not increased by every act. I say that, in all respects, this is the most probable doctrine. Fourth, Vitoria suggests one could perhaps defend that charity increases through
every act, though not in the manner maintained by the adversaries—for example by assigning fractional increases to remiss
acts. I reject this as highly improbable. Such a rule would make charity as ten increase equally through an act as eleven and
through an act as six under certain fractional calculations. He says these imagined constructions show the difficulties into which men fall when they abandon St. Thomas. Vitoria finally says that in this matter it is easier for him to say what is false
than what is true. I, preserving the authority due to so great a master, answers that according to St. Thomas's doctrine it is easy
to dissolve the opposing arguments and discern truth from falsehood, as the reader can see from my own treatment of q.24, a.6. SECOND PART OF THE RELECTURE: ON THE DIMINUTION OF CHARITY Vitoria says charity could be imagined to diminish in only two ways: first through venial sin; second through mortal sin in such a way that, after repentance, a person rises with less charity and grace than he possessed before. The first question is whether venial sin diminishes charity or grace. The affirmative argument is that, as offense increases, favor diminishes in civil friendship; venial
sin is an offense against God; therefore it seems to diminish grace and charity. Against this stands the consequence that multiplication of venial sins would eventually destroy finite grace and charity. Vitoria reports the celebrated opinion of William of Auxerre that venial sins diminish charity. Although attacked by ancient and modern doctors, Vitoria says in a first
proposition that it is not as improbable as commonly supposed.
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VITORIA'S RELECTURE — WHETHER VENIAL SIN DIMINISHES CHARITY

Vitoria develops arguments making William of Auxerre's position appear plausible.

If grace were conceived not as a habit but simply as man's being pleasing to God by the divine will accepting him, analogous to a man being pleasing to a king, it would be easy to understand how small offenses could make a person less pleasing without entirely destroying friendship. Human friendship, even among good men, is plainly diminished by a multiplication of slight offenses. Why, Vitoria asks, should we simply assume that after innumerable venial sins we remain equally pleasing friends of God?

Again, multiplication of venial sins makes a man less prompt for acts of charity and the other virtues. The doctors concede that venial sins diminish the fervor of charity. Since a greater habit produces greater promptitude and firmness, the contrary experience in those accustomed to venial sin seems to indicate diminution of the habit.

The standard objection is that repeated venial sins would eventually destroy grace. Vitoria examines several replies.

One reply says that when grace is reduced to the point where one further venial sin would remove it entirely, that sin becomes mortal because of this circumstance. Vitoria objects that this circumstance would be invincibly unknown: no one knows the exact degree of his grace. Yet if it made the sin mortal, it would have to be confessed. Experience and pastoral practice do not support such a requirement.

Another reply says successive venial sins remove progressively smaller portions: the first a degree, the second half a degree, the third a quarter, and so on, so that grace is never entirely exhausted. Vitoria criticizes this as arbitrary unless a reason is given why equal sins remove unequal amounts.

He proposes another possibility: no venial sin need destroy grace even if each removes some part, because diminution itself is a punishment and the loss of the final degree would be disproportionately greater than preceding losses. Losing one's only remaining degree of grace is worse than losing many degrees while remaining in grace. Thus the proportional loss could diminish as the remaining grace diminishes.

Another possible answer is that the number of venial sins possible in one finite human life is itself finite. One might therefore suppose the minimum baptismal grace contains more divisible degrees than all venial sins a man could possibly commit, so that each venial sin removes only a tiny part and the last degree is never reached. Vitoria admits this is speculative but says it is not intrinsically absurd.

A further answer is that a person who lives long in grace without mortal sin will inevitably merit often and increase grace, so that the gains from meritorious acts exceed the diminutions caused by venial sins.

But an objection remains: one could form a deliberate intention to commit many venial sins throughout life; then the diminution would be intended together, while no compensating increase need occur.

Vitoria confirms the plausibility of the Auxerrean position by analogy with acquired temperance and other virtues: contrary venial acts can diminish acquired virtue without necessarily destroying it altogether.

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VITORIA'S RELECTURE ENDS; QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — CAN CHARITY INCREASE WITHOUT
LIMIT?

Vitoria says that, despite the preceding arguments, a SECOND PROPOSITION must be maintained: the common opinion against William of Auxerre is far more probable and, in his judgment, true.

He argues that the Auxerrean view seems to imply that charity can be increased and diminished at the same time, since a person might merit while also committing a venial sin. I inserts a qualification: it is not certain that one and the same act of will can be simultaneously good and venially evil; theologians and metaphysicians commonly deny that one can understand or deliberate about several objects simultaneously precisely as several. He thinks Vitoria unnecessarily favors the Auxerrean view.

The alleged simultaneous increase and decrease also creates an unintelligible result. If charity is ten, a venial sin merits loss of one degree, and at the same time the person merits one degree of increase, no actual change would occur. Yet it would be strange to say that an increase was merited but never given.

Furthermore, when the venial sin is remitted, would the lost degree return? If yes, the supposed diminution seems idle, since remission restores the former state. If no, venial sin would be in a worse condition than mortal sin, because penance restores grace lost through mortal sin. Thus Vitoria judges the diminution theory unnecessary and fictitious.

He says this suffices concerning the first mode of diminution. The second mode—concerning how one rises after mortal sin—must be disputed elsewhere because time does not permit it. This concludes Vitoria's relecture.

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER CHARITY IS INCREASED INFINITELY

St. Thomas raises objections.

FIRST OBJECTION. Every movement tends toward some end and term. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends toward a term and cannot increase indefinitely.

SECOND OBJECTION. No form exceeds the capacity of its subject. The rational creature, subject of charity, has finite capacity. Therefore charity cannot increase without limit.

THIRD OBJECTION. Any finite quantity, if continuously increased, can eventually reach another finite quantity however great, unless the additions become perpetually smaller. If charity in the state of glory is finite and charity in this life could increase without limit, charity in this life could eventually equal charity in heaven, which seems impossible.

ON THE CONTRARY, Paul says in Philippians 3 that he has not already attained or become perfect but presses forward. The Gloss says no faithful person, however much he has advanced, should say “it is enough”; whoever says this leaves the road before reaching the end. Therefore charity in this life can always increase further.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. A term can be assigned to the increase of a form in three ways: from the form itself, from the power of the agent, or from the capacity of the subject.

None of these imposes a limit on charity in the state of the wayfarer. Charity, according to its specific nature, has no intrinsic terminal measure, since it is a participation in the infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit. Its efficient cause is God, whose power is infinite. Nor does the subject impose a terminal limit, because as charity grows, the subject's aptitude for further increase also grows. Hence no terminal degree of charity is assigned in this life.

To the first objection: charity has an end, but that end is not in this life; it is in the future life.

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QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — ST. THOMAS'S REPLIES AND my FIRST DOUBT

To the second objection St. Thomas replies that the capacity of the rational creature is enlarged by charity itself: “our heart is
enlarged,” as 2 Corinthians 6 says. Therefore a further aptitude for greater increase remains.
To the third: the argument works only where the quantities compared are of the same kind. The quantity of charity in this life
follows the knowledge of faith; the quantity of charity in heaven follows open vision. Therefore one cannot infer that unlimited increase in the former simply reaches the quantity proper to the latter.
SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

FIRST CONCLUSION. No term is imposed on the increase of charity in the state of the wayfarer. No term arises from charity itself, because it participates in the infinite charity of the Holy Spirit; none from the agent, whose power is infinite; and none from the subject, because the aptitude for further increase grows as charity grows.

SECOND CONCLUSION, from the reply to the third objection. The quantity of charity in the way and the quantity of charity in the homeland are not of precisely the same ratio, because the former follows the cognition of faith and the latter open vision.

COMMENTARY — FIRST DOUBT

I ask whether the first conclusion is certain even according to Catholic faith.

First objection against certainty: if charity in this life can always grow so that no one reaches a degree beyond which a greater
cannot be attained, it seems any Christian could reach charity equal in intensity to that of Christ, or at least of the Blessed Virgin. This seems false and contrary to revelation.

Second: divine predestination fixes for every predestined person a determinate term of glory; therefore a term of charity also
seems fixed, beyond which, under ordinary providence, that person will not proceed.

Third: charity according to its own nature is a creature and therefore finite. Saying it participates in infinite charity does not by
itself solve the difficulty, since every created being and perfection participates in divine being and perfection, yet not every created perfection can increase without limit.
DECISION: according to Catholic faith it must be held that no one in this life can arrive at such a degree of charity that, absolutely speaking, he can no longer increase.
He supports this from Scripture: “He that is just, let him be justified still” (Apocalypse 22), and from Ecclesiasticus 18, urging
continual prayer and justification until death. He discusses a textual reading meaning essentially: do not fear advancing further
in the love of God, for nothing prevents further progress and God's reward remains forever.
He also appeals to the Clementine Ad nostrum, which condemns the Begard error that a man can in this life reach a degree of
charity at which he can no longer grow in charity or sin. Finally, the common mind of the saints assumes that while we live we can continue progressing in the way of God.

REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION. St. Thomas speaks according to the ordinary law rather than according to
God's absolute power considered apart from providential ordination. Something can be called possible under the common law even if divine predestination ensures it will not actually occur.
Thus, under God's actual providence, one must not say that someone will reach the charity possessed by the Blessed Virgin. Yet if one considers the common revealed law according to which a living person can always progress, no intrinsic contradiction arises from further increase. One may also distinguish an extrinsic term fixed by divine ordination from an intrinsic term of the virtue itself. No intrinsic degree exists at which charity, by its own nature, becomes absolutely incapable
of further increase.
The predestined person's actual degree is fixed in the composite sense with divine predestination: it is impossible that God predestine Peter to one degree and that Peter actually possess a greater degree contrary to that decree. But this does not establish an intrinsic maximum within charity itself.
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QUESTION XXIV,

ARTICLE VII — GOD'S ABSOLUTE POWER AND A MAXIMUM CHARITY I reply to the

third objection of the
preceding doubt. Charity is always finite in act, but this does not prove that it cannot, in potency, be increased beyond
every assigned finite degree of intensive quantity. I distinguish natural from supernatural perfections. Natural perfections participate in divine perfection according to the measure of a created substance, whose species is intrinsically finite. Supernatural realities—grace, faith, hope, charity, and the light of glory—participate in divine perfection according to the measure of God's will, who distributes to each as He wills. They do not arise from a created substance as their connatural source but from the divine nature; their effect is limited by God's will and by the
creaturely disposition which God Himself produces. SECOND

DOUBT. By God's absolute power, can there be a supreme charity such that a greater charity

is impossible? For the
affirmative, objections are drawn from creaturely finitude. Every creature is finite and limited because its existence is
not its essence; therefore charity as a created quality seems to possess a specific maximum. A finite soul also seems incapable of receiving an unlimited perfection. Scotus had pressed such arguments. Against this stand St. Thomas's three reasons in the article, which collectively deny an absolute intrinsic term to charity's increase. I report Cajetan's position: just as natural qualities have a finite terminal degree, so supernatural qualities such as charity and the virtues do. Cajetan therefore holds that the charity in Christ's soul was the highest possible by God's absolute power within that species of quality. Durandus holds the first part of this view concerning finite terminal intensity. I give a

FIRST CONCLUSION. Although natural qualities have a term of intensity according to their species, charity is different. Natural qualities follow created substance and may therefore receive a finite intensive measure from that substance. Charity does not follow any created or creatable substance as a connatural emanation; therefore the same limitation does not follow.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Whatever may be true of natural qualities such as heat or light, charity, precisely as this
supernatural quality, can always be increased by divine power. I say St. Thomas's arguments establish this and Capreolus holds the same. He adds an analogy with the beatific vision. God's vision has no intrinsic maximum from the side of its supernatural participation: God can manifest Himself more and more, and the light of glory can therefore be greater and greater. The same reasoning applies to charity, by which man adheres to the Supreme Good. To the objection that every creature is finite, I answer that this proves no actually infinite created perfection exists; it does not prove that for every possible finite degree there cannot be a still greater finite degree. There need not be a “most perfect possible angel,” and similarly there need not be a greatest possible created intensity of charity. To the finite capacity of the soul, he distinguishes remote natural capacity from proximate capacity. The soul is remotely capable through obediential potency; a lesser charity can itself be a proximate disposition for greater charity, just as heat as four can be a disposition for heat as five. Charity is not educed from the creature's natural potency but received according to obediential potency, which refers to God's absolute power and therefore does not furnish an intrinsic maximum. I then qualify the discussion concerning Christ. Even if God could, considered merely intensively,
produce another created habit of charity greater than Christ's habit as a quality, Christ's grace and charity possess an infinite dignity and value from their subject: the soul united personally to the Word. Christ's acts of charity possess infinite value in the order of merit because of the divine Person who acts. Whiteness in Christ does not receive infinite
value from the dignity of the subject because the dignity of the person is irrelevant to the specific ratio of whiteness. But the dignity of the person is highly relevant to habitual grace precisely as grace and to the value of love and merit.
Thus Christ's created habits possess a perfection from their subject which no mere increase of created intensive degrees could rival. THIRD

DOUBT. Can charity in the state of the wayfarer attain the quantity of charity in the state of

glory?
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QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII — CHARITY OF THE WAY AND CHARITY OF THE HOMELAND

I raise arguments that charity in this life can equal charity in heaven.

First: if charity in the way can increase without intrinsic limit, it seems able to equal or exceed the charity of a particular blessed person. If a blessed person's charity is ten, why could a wayfarer not possess charity as twelve?

Second: charity in the way and charity in heaven are of the same species because they have formally the same object. Therefore increase seems capable of bringing the former to equality with the latter.

Third: even in this life charity is already directed to the Supreme Good; therefore its further increase is from the side of the subject through intensity. Since such intensity has no intrinsic limit in the way, it seems possible for the wayfarer's charity to exceed that of some blessed person. Indeed, the Blessed Virgin while on earth possessed charity more intense than that of some angels.

Fourth: charity immediately tends to the Supreme Good abstracting from whether God is known obscurely or clearly. In heaven the principal difference is that God is clearly seen. This seems not to create a different species of charity. If God withdrew the light of glory from a blessed person, it seems the quantity of the habit of charity would not thereby be destroyed.

I examine Cajetan's noteworthy treatment. Cajetan says the natural state of charity is the homeland, because charity is friendship with God and friendship naturally tends to live with and enjoy the presence of the friend. In this life charity is in a comparatively preternatural, even quasi-violent, state of pilgrimage.

According to these two states there are two perfections of charity's quantity: one proper to the way and another proper to the homeland. Neither is indivisible, but they differ in ratio.

Cajetan distinguishes two intensities. One arises from the disposition of the subject; the other from the power's closer approach to its object. Thus, other things equal, vision is more perfect when the object is suitably near than when it is seen from afar. Cajetan therefore says that according to intensity considered from the subject, charity in the way can be more perfect than charity in heaven; but according to the intensity arising from proximity to the object, heavenly charity is always more perfect.

I is not fully satisfied with Cajetan's distinction, especially if it is phrased as an increase of charity “with respect to the object,” since St. Thomas treats the increase of charity as intensive in the subject.

I offer his own distinction. Charity's quantity can be considered, first, according to sufficiency on the side of the will determined by the habit together with the efficient aids of the Holy Spirit, by which the will is able to love. Second, it can be considered according to the perfection arising from a better application of the object. A strong man moves a weight strongly, but with the same strength moves it still more effectively if the object is more suitably applied.

In heaven the application of the object is of another order because it is through the beatific vision. Therefore charity in the way cannot formally reach the quantity of charity in heaven under this second aspect. Yet virtually and radically the whole intensity that will exist there can pre-exist here in the habit, even though it cannot issue into the corresponding act because the object is not yet seen.

FIRST CONCLUSION. The charity of a wayfarer can be greater than the charity of a blessed person with respect to the intensive quantity of the habit and act insofar as this proceeds from the disposition of the subject. In this respect the charity is specifically the same and the habit remains the same when the person passes from way to homeland.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Absolutely and simply speaking, the quantity of charity in the way cannot equal the quantity of charity in the homeland. Charity in the way always concerns an absent object; charity in heaven possesses the object as present. Presence enables a more intense operation around the possessed good.

Thus even a lesser subjective disposition in heaven can produce a more fervent act than a greater habit in the state of absence and hope. I connect this with the saying, “He who is least in the kingdom of God is greater than he,” while noting that Chrysostom gives a more literal interpretation of that Gospel text.

St. Thomas can nevertheless say that a wayfarer may be more perfect in virtue than some comprehensor, though not in act. Paul similarly distinguishes the perfection of the way from the perfection of attainment in Philippians 3.

To the first objection I reply that it concerns charity's quantity according to the disposition of the subject, not the perfection of actual operation arising from the presence of the object, which is of another ratio.

QUESTION XXIV, ARTICLE VII CONCLUDED; ARTICLE VIII BEGINS

To the second objection I reply that it is one thing to speak of charity precisely according to its species and another to speak
of the perfection of intensity which constitutes its quantity. Identity of species does not imply identity of quantitative perfection. Every human being belongs to the same species, but a man three cubits tall does not have the same quantity as one
four cubits tall.

Thus heavenly charity can possess, in its natural state of fruition, a mode of intensive quantity which charity in the way
cannot formally possess, although the latter may contain it virtually and in hope, just as a child virtually contains the mature
quantity of an adult.

To the third objection I grants that, on the side of the object as terminus, even the least charity reaches the Supreme Good.

Nevertheless the natural application of that object in heaven produces a greater intensity than occurs in the way.

Some distinguish an “object as motive” from the “object as terminus” and attribute the greater intensity to the former. I prefer
his previous distinction. Formally speaking, the same God is motive and terminus with respect to the will; the object does not
efficiently move the will except insofar as God moves it as author of nature or grace. Therefore the distinction based on
presence and application of the object is more satisfactory.

To the fourth objection: clear vision and presence or absence of the object do not change the essential species of charity.

Nevertheless, in the presence of the object charity has an act possessing a perfection of intensity impossible in absence: the
intensity of joy and, as it were, the embrace of the good present.

I illustrates this by imagining a stone capable of joy at reaching its center. Such joy in possession would be of a kind it could
not have merely while moving toward the center, however swiftly and powerfully. If the light of glory were withdrawn from
a blessed person, this actual intensity arising from presence would cease, although it would remain virtually in the habit.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE

St. Thomas begins with an objection: charity cannot be perfect in this life because the more charity is increased, the more it
can still increase; therefore it cannot reach perfection here.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that when charity has been strengthened it is perfected, and when it comes to
perfection it says: “I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” This desire was possible in Paul during this life.
Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. The perfection of charity can be understood in two ways: on the side of the thing loved and on
the side of the lover.

On the side of the thing loved, charity would be perfect if God were loved as much as He is lovable. God is lovable in
proportion to His goodness, and His goodness is infinite. Therefore He is infinitely lovable. No creature can love Him
infinitely because every created power is finite. In this sense no creature's charity can be perfect; only God's charity, by
which He loves Himself, is perfect.

On the side of the lover, charity is perfect when the lover loves as much as he can. St. Thomas then begins to distinguish
three ways in which this can occur.

FIRST MODE. The whole heart of man is actually and continually borne toward God. This is the perfection of ch
per
blessed, whose actual love is uninterrupted. The further distinctions of perfection continue on the following
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ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE (continued) ST.

THOMAS continues
his distinction of the perfection of charity on the side of the lover. The FIRST mode is the perfection of the homeland:
the whole heart of man is actually and continually borne toward God. This is impossible in the present life because, on
account of the weakness of human life, it is impossible always actually to think of God and be moved by love toward Him. The SECOND mode is that a man devote his principal care to being free for God and divine things, setting other
matters aside except insofar as the necessities of the present life require them. This perfection of charity is possible in the state of the way, although it is not common to everyone who possesses charity. The THIRD mode is that a man habitually place his whole heart in God, so that he thinks or wills nothing contrary to divine love. This perfection is common to all who possess charity. To the first objection: Paul denies of himself the perfection of the homeland. The Gloss therefore says that he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet arrived at the perfection which is the end of the journey. To the second: the imperfection spoken of arises from venial sins. These do not oppose the habit of charity but
its act. Hence they do not contradict the perfection possible in the way, although they do contradict the perfection of the homeland. To the third: the perfection of the way is not perfection simply and absolutely; therefore it always remains capable of further growth.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First, if perfection is considered on the side of the lovable object, only God's charity is perfect, because God alone loves Himself as much as His infinite goodness is lovable. Second, on the side of the lover
charity is perfect when one loves as much as one can. Third, this occurs in three ways: perfectly and continually in heaven; by devoting one's principal care to God and divine things in the present life; and habitually by willing nothing
contrary to divine love.

COMMENTARY. I refer the reader to Augustine, On the Perfection of Justice, and to his own discussion above. He

says this doctrine explains the command, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” Religious can possess charity even if they have not attained the second kind of perfection; nevertheless, they do not live according to
their religious profession unless they possess the intention of advancing according to it.

DOUBT: ARE CHARITY IN THE WAY AND CHARITY IN THE HOMELAND OF THE

SAME SPECIES? I now
ask about the act itself, not the quantity discussed in Article VII. An objection says they are not specifically the same, because heavenly charity is not free as to exercise—the blessed will is necessitated—whereas charity in this life is a free
act. Against this stands 1 Corinthians 13: charity never falls away but remains in heaven, the same habit specifically and numerically. Hence its act appears specifically the same. From St. Thomas, I-II, q.10, a.2, I note that the will is never necessitated by the object precisely as object with respect to exercise. Nevertheless, the will of the blessed is necessitated to exercise by God as author of nature and grace. God likewise necessitates the intellect to the exercise of
the beatific vision, not merely as object but as author and efficient cause of the light of glory.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Simply speaking, charity in the way and charity in the homeland are of the same species, because their formal object is the same: the divine goodness immediately loved.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Their acts are not of the same genus in moral being, because the act in the way is formally
free with respect to its immediate object, while the act in heaven is not formally free in this manner.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Nevertheless, even in moral being they are in a certain respect of the same species, because
the charity of the blessed is free in its root. The blessed freely arrived at this most happy necessity, just as one who freely throws himself into the sea voluntarily accepts the necessary submersion following upon his choice.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. For the perfection of charity as friendship it is not required that the immediate love of God
always be formally free; it suffices that liberty remain in its root or in the offices rendered to the beloved. Thus Christ,
although always blessed and necessarily loving God under the beatific vision, freely willed to die and freely obeyed unto
death, and could merit through love commanding these free offices for the sake of God necessarily loved.

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ARTICLE IX — WHETHER THREE DEGREES OF CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED: BEGINNERS, PROFICIENT, AND PERFECT

FIRST OBJECTION. Between the beginning of charity and its final perfection there are many intermediate degrees; therefore only one middle degree, “the proficient,” should not be assigned.

SECOND OBJECTION. As soon as charity begins to exist it also begins to advance. Therefore progressing charity should not be distinguished from beginning charity.

THIRD OBJECTION. However perfect a person's charity may be in this world, it can still increase. But to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity should not be distinguished from progressing charity.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that when charity is born it is nourished, which pertains to beginners; when nourished it is strengthened, which pertains to the proficient; and when strengthened it is perfected, which pertains to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Spiritual growth in charity can be compared with bodily growth. Bodily growth can be divided into many parts, yet it has determinate stages according to the characteristic operations or pursuits to which a person is brought. Infancy precedes the use of reason; another stage begins when the child speaks and uses reason; another at puberty; and so on until maturity.

So too the degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different principal pursuits to which a person is brought by its increase.

The BEGINNER'S principal care is to withdraw from sin and resist the concupiscences which move against charity. Charity must first be nourished and protected lest it be corrupted.

The PROFICIENT'S principal care is to advance in good, so that charity may be strengthened by increase.

The PERFECT person's principal care is to adhere to God and enjoy Him. Hence the perfect desire “to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” St. Thomas compares these three to bodily motion: first, recession from one terminus; second, approach toward the other; third, rest in the terminus.

To the first objection: all determinate distinctions which can be made in the growth of charity are comprehended under these three, just as every continuous division is embraced under beginning, middle, and end.

To the second: beginners certainly make progress, but their more pressing care is resistance to the sins whose assaults disturb them. Once this warfare is felt less severely, they can more securely direct themselves to positive advancement, like the builders of Jerusalem who worked with one hand while keeping the other at the sword.

To the third: the perfect also continue advancing in charity, but increase is no longer their principal preoccupation. Their chief study is adhesion to God. Beginners and proficient likewise seek God, but beginners are more occupied with avoiding sin and the proficient with advancing in virtue.

my SUMMARY affirms the division. In his COMMENTARY he points to Augustine, St. Bernard's work on degrees of charity, Richard of St. Victor's writings on the words “I am wounded with love,” and St. Thomas's opusculum on the love of God and neighbor.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE DIMINISHED

The first objection argues from contraries: increase and diminution concern the same subject. Since charity can increase, it seems it can also diminish.

A second objection appeals to Augustine: “He loves Thee less who loves something together with Thee,” and “the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity.” Therefore, if cupidity can increase, charity seems capable of decreasing.

A third objection argues from God's manner of preserving grace. God does not justify a man in such a way that the just man remains just independently when God withdraws; rather God continually preserves what He produces. Since, in the first infusion of charity, one who disposes himself less receives less charity, it seems that in conservation also one who disposes himself less should have less charity preserved.

ON THE CONTRARY, Scripture compares charity to fire: its lamps are lamps of fire and flame. Fire, so long as it remains, tends upward. Therefore charity, so long as it remains, can ascend but cannot descend.

ST. THOMAS begins by distinguishing charity's quantity in relation to its object and in relation to its subject. In relation to its proper object it can neither increase nor decrease. The question therefore concerns its intensity in the subject.

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ARTICLE X — WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE DIMINISHED (continued) ST. THOMAS'S

RESPONSE. If charity could diminish in the subject, this would have to happen either through an act or merely through
cessation from acts. Acquired virtues can diminish and eventually be corrupted through cessation from their acts, because their conservation depends upon the human acts which caused them. Aristotle similarly says that many friendships are dissolved through lack of intercourse. This does not apply to charity. Charity is not caused by human acts but by God alone. Consequently, if there is no sin in the cessation itself, mere cessation from acts neither diminishes
nor corrupts charity. Therefore diminution would have to be caused either by God or by sin. God causes no defect in us except by way of punishment, withdrawing grace as punishment for sin. Thus if charity were diminished, sin would have
to cause the diminution either efficiently or meritoriously. Mortal sin does not merely diminish charity; it destroys it entirely. It does so efficiently because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, and meritoriously because one who acts against charity deserves that God withdraw charity. Venial sin likewise does not diminish charity either efficiently or meritoriously. It does not do so efficiently because it does not reach charity itself. Charity concerns the ultimate end; venial sin is an inordination concerning means to the end. A man can greatly love health while behaving inordinately regarding his diet. Likewise false opinions about conclusions do not diminish certainty regarding first principles. Nor does venial sin merit diminution of charity. One who fails in a lesser matter does not deserve damage in the greater. God
does not turn away from man more than man turns away from God. One who is inordinate concerning means does not thereby deserve damage to the charity ordering him to the ultimate end. Therefore charity cannot be diminished directly. Indirectly, however, one may call a “diminution of charity” a disposition toward its corruption produced by venial sins or by cessation from exercises of charity. To the first objection: contraries concern the same thing where the
subject is equally related to both. Charity can have an increasing cause but has no diminishing cause; therefore the inference fails. To the second: there are two kinds of cupidity. One establishes the final end in creatures; this is mortal and totally destroys charity. In this sense one loves God “less than one ought,” not by diminishing charity but by abolishing it. Augustine's statement concerns loving something not for God's sake. Venial cupidity is different: it is itself
diminished by charity but cannot diminish charity. To the third: a movement of free choice is required for the infusion of charity. Therefore something which diminishes the intensity of this disposition can dispose a person to receive less charity. But the continued preservation of charity does not require a continuous act of free choice—otherwise charity would not remain in a sleeping person. Therefore an impediment to the intensity of such an act does not diminish already infused charity.

SUMMARY. First, charity cannot diminish from the side of its object. Second, from the side of the subject it does not directly diminish: either it remains whole or is entirely corrupted. Third, venial sins and cessation from charitable works
may be called an indirect diminution insofar as they dispose toward charity's destruction.

COMMENTARY — FIRST

DOUBT. I ask how St. Thomas can say mortal sin “efficiently” corrupts charity. Nearly all other

doctors, I say, hold that
charity is destroyed only demeritoriously. Moreover, mortal sin is a natural act while charity is a supernatural quality; and since charity comes efficiently from God alone, it seems God alone could efficiently destroy it. Finally, an omission
seems unable to corrupt efficiently because an omission is not a positive act. I answer by clarifying accidental forms. Forms dependent on a subject are not generated or corrupted per se as independent substances are. Heat, strictly, is not “made”; rather, a hot thing is made. When the subject ceases to be actuated by heat, heat is said consequently to be corrupted. Likewise, an agent that efficiently produces in a subject a disposition contrary to a form is said efficiently to expel or corrupt that form. Fire, by burning a man, efficiently expels the soul from the body in this derivative sense, even
though the soul depends immediately upon God. Thus St. Thomas speaks of mortal sin efficiently corrupting charity because the sinner produces in charity's subject a contrary disposition.

ARTICLE X — I ON THE EFFICIENT CORRUPTION OF CHARITY AND VENIAL SIN

I answer the objections to St. Thomas.

To the first: the authority of St. Thomas together with his reason outweighs the scholastic doctors who maintain the contrary.

To the second: heat does not act directly upon coldness as though coldness were a separate object; it acts upon the cold subject
and introduces a contrary quality. Likewise, the voluntary act which is mortal sin reaches the subject of charity and introduces
a disposition contrary to charity's end. In this sense it efficiently corrupts charity. The “seed of the devil” is the contrary disposition accepted by free choice, making the sinner like the devil; sin does not directly attack charity as an isolated supernatural quality.

To the third I deny the inference from creation to corruption. Annihilation is the total cessation of a substance according to form, matter, and accidents and therefore belongs to God alone. Corruption is the cessation of a particular form in a subject and can be brought about by a particular agent. We can efficiently destroy many things which we cannot efficiently construct.

Although the act of being as such depends upon God alone for production and conservation, a determinate mode of being—being this lion, this horse, this man—also depends upon the dispositions associated with the specifying form. When these dispositions are corrupted, that determinate being is corrupted. Analogously God produces charity in dependence upon a
free subject capable of admitting contrary dispositions.

To the fourth, concerning sins of omission: it is enough that St. Thomas's statement be verified clearly of sins of commission.

Nevertheless an omission also involves an exercise of free choice causally responsible for the omission, and the will can positively turn habitually toward a creature. By reason of this conversion it can concur efficiently in charity's corruption in the
manner already explained.

Both mortal sins of commission and omission agree in aversion from God and privation of rectitude. From the side of aversion
and privation sin is not an efficient but a deficient cause; from the side of the positive conversion of the will, it can have an efficient causal aspect.

SECOND DOUBT: CAN CHARITY BE DIMINISHED BY VENIAL SINS?

I refer to St. Thomas, I-II, q.88, aa.3–4.

First objection: Proverbs says “the just man falls seven times.” If this refers to venial sins, it seems his charity must be diminished; otherwise how is he said to “fall” if he remains as elevated as before?

Second: human friendship grows cold and diminishes through daily faults against a friend.

Third: after venial sins a man often does the things of God less promptly and delightfully; the effect therefore seems to indicate
a diminished habit.

I report William of Auxerre's position that charity can be directly diminished by venial sins, though never wholly destroyed, because each successive diminution removes a proportionally smaller part. Auxerre supposes that one with greater charity sins
more gravely in committing a venial sin than one with less charity, so that as charity decreases the gravity and therefore the diminution also decreases.

I call this opinion most false, and questions whether it is not rash and dangerous. Stealing one egg is not a smaller sin merely
because the thief lacks charity than because he possesses it. Nor is it reasonable that a man with less charity could never commit a graver venial sin than a man with greater charity.

He then reports another Parisian doctor who held that venial sins can diminish charity until the final sin becomes mortal precisely because it would destroy the remaining charity and man is obliged to preserve charity.

I judge this still worse. An idle word cannot become mortal without violating a grave precept. A man with minimal charity is
not bound by a new special precept distinct from God's law merely to preserve that numerical degree. Otherwise a newly justified person with very little charity could not commit any venial sin at all, because every such sin would destroy charity.

Moreover, a binding precept must be knowable when it obliges, but no one can know when his charity has reached such a minimum.

my replies: the “fall” of the just man is not a fall from the habit of charity or habitual perfection, but from actual love through
remission and from complete rectitude of action; venial sin can also leave temporal punishment delaying entrance into glory.

Human friendship differs because it is efficiently acquired by our acts and therefore can be diminished by them, whereas divine friendship is founded upon God's grace and remains unless we destroy grace by mortal sin. Venial sins impede the fervor of charity's act but do not diminish the habit, just as bodily illness can impede the exercise of knowledge without immediately diminishing the science itself.

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ARTICLE XI — WHETHER CHARITY ONCE POSSESSED CAN BE LOST

FIRST OBJECTION. If charity is lost, it is lost through sin. But one who possesses charity seems unable to sin, according to
1 John 3: “Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because His seed remains in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” Charity distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. Therefore one possessing charity cannot lose it.

SECOND OBJECTION. Augustine says that if love is not true it should not be called love, and elsewhere that charity which
can fail was never true charity. Therefore, if charity is once truly possessed, it cannot be lost.

THIRD OBJECTION. Gregory says that the love of God, if it exists, works great things; if it ceases to work, it is not charity.
But no one seems to lose charity while doing great works. Therefore charity cannot be lost.

FOURTH OBJECTION. Free choice is inclined to sin only by some motive toward sin. But charity excludes the motives to
sin—self-love, cupidity, and the like. Therefore charity cannot be lost.

ON THE CONTRARY, Apocalypse 2 says: “I have a few things against thee, because thou hast left thy first
charity.”

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Through charity the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Charity can therefore be considered in three ways.

FIRST, from the side of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to love God. Under this aspect charity has impeccability through the
power of the Holy Spirit, who infallibly accomplishes whatever He wills. These two cannot both be true: that the Holy Spirit
wills efficaciously to move someone to an act of charity and that the person at that same time loses charity by sin. The gift of
perseverance is among the divine benefits by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated.

SECOND, charity can be considered according to its own proper nature. Under this aspect charity can produce only what
belongs to charity. Charity cannot sin any more than heat can cool or injustice as injustice can produce a good act.

THIRD, charity can be considered from the side of its subject, which remains changeable according to freedom of choice.
St. Thomas compares this with the relation of form to matter and habit to power. A form is losable when it does not fill the whole potentiality of its matter, leaving the matter in potency to another form. The forms of corruptible bodies are therefore losable. A heavenly body's form, according to the old cosmology presupposed in the text, was considered to fill the whole potency of its matter and therefore to be inseparable.
Likewise charity in the homeland fills the whole potentiality of the rational mind, because every actual movement of the blessed is borne toward God. It is therefore unlosable. Charity in the way does not fill the subject's whole potentiality, because the wayfarer is not always actually borne toward God. When charity is not actually operating, something can occur by which it is lost.
The nature of habit confirms this. A habit inclines the power toward action by making what agrees with the habit appear good
and what opposes it appear evil. As Aristotle says, “as each one is, so does the end appear to him.” Charity is therefore unlosable where what agrees with charity cannot appear except as good—namely in the homeland, where God, the very essence of goodness, is seen through His essence. In the state of the way, where God's essence is not seen, charity can be lost.
To the first objection: John's text speaks according to the power and preserving motion of the Holy Spirit.
To the second: charity which contained within its own intention a temporary love destined later to cease would not be true charity. But charity can be lost through the mutability of the subject contrary to charity's own intention without thereby having been false charity.
To the third: love of God always purposes great things according to charity's nature, but because of the condition of the subject it does not always actually perform great things.
To the fourth: charity, while actually operating according to its own nature, excludes every motive to sin. But sometimes charity is not actually operating; then a motive to sin can intervene, and if consent is given, charity is lost.
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ARTICLE XI —
COMMENTARY;
ARTICLE XII BEGINS

SUMMARY OF ST. THOMAS. First, from the side of the Holy Spirit moving the will, man cannot lose charity or sin
while that efficacious motion stands. Second, charity according to its own proper nature cannot be lost, because according to that nature it cannot sin. Third, charity in heaven cannot be lost from the side of its subject because it fills
the whole potentiality of the will. Fourth, charity in the way can be lost from the side of its mutable subject because it does not always actually tend toward God. I say the first conclusion is manifest and is St. Thomas's interpretation of 1 John 3. I add a pointed doctrinal observation against those who say they cannot understand how a human act remains free while, under the divine help called efficacious, the person cannot fail to love. If they do not understand it, I say, they should nevertheless believe it. Regarding the inamissibility of heavenly charity, I refer to St. Thomas's doctrine that beatitude cannot be lost. Therefore the charity of the blessed is likewise inamissible. Regarding charity in the way,
I say the conclusion that it can be lost is certain according to faith. It was defined against the Begards and is confirmed
by the Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 23. Jovinian had taught that one who sins after baptism thereby shows that he never received grace and charity in baptism; Jerome wrote against him, and Augustine reports a related Pelagian error. Scriptural examples also prove the conclusion. Saul was circumcised and justified and afterward sinned. David likewise fell. Peter was clean at the Last Supper and afterward denied Christ. Galatians asks whether those who began in the Spirit are now being perfected in the flesh. First John itself tells Christians not to sin and adds that if anyone sins,
“we have an advocate with the Father.” The many texts showing that forgiveness remains possible until death likewise
show that grace can be lost and recovered. HERETICAL MISREADINGS OF 1 JOHN. “Everyone born of God does not sin, because His seed remains in him, and he cannot sin.” I approve St. Thomas's formal interpretation: just as one says “the hot cannot cool” insofar as it is hot, one born of God does not sin insofar as he acts according to the divine seed and charity. He also reports Augustine's explanations: the born of God person has the hope of reaching impeccability in heaven, just as we are said to be blessed or saved in hope; and “he cannot sin” may mean “it is not lawful for him to sin,” since in juridical language we are sometimes said to be able to do only what we may rightfully do. The heretics also appeal to “everyone who sins has not seen Him nor known Him.” I reject the idea that this simply
means the sinner never possessed faith or any good affection. Rather, when a man sins he ceases from affective consideration of God: he does not then approve God practically as his supreme good, but turns toward a creature. Scripture similarly uses “I know you not” to signify rejection rather than absence of all prior cognition.

ARTICLE XII — WHETHER CHARITY IS LOST THROUGH ONE ACT OF MORTAL SIN

FIRST OBJECTION.
Origen says that if satiety ever seizes one who stands at a high and perfect degree, he does not think such a man is emptied and falls suddenly, but gradually and by parts. Therefore charity would not be lost through one mortal sin.

SECOND OBJECTION. Leo the Great, addressing Peter's denial, says the Lord saw not faith destroyed nor love turned away, but constancy disturbed; tears abounded where affection had not failed. Bernard accordingly says that in Peter charity was not extinguished but only put to sleep. Yet Peter's denial was mortal sin. Therefore charity seems not
to be lost through one mortal act.

ARTICLE XII — WHETHER ONE MORTAL SIN DESTROYS CHARITY

THIRD OBJECTION. Charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. But an acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary act.

Therefore charity should much less be destroyed by one mortal sin.

FOURTH OBJECTION. Charity includes love of God and neighbor. A person committing a mortal sin can appear to retain

love of God and neighbor. An inordination concerning things ordered to the end does not necessarily remove love of the end.

Therefore charity toward God might remain despite a mortal inordination concerning some temporal good.

FIFTH OBJECTION. The theological virtues have the ultimate end as object. Faith and hope are not destroyed by every mortal sin; they can remain "unformed." Therefore charity too might remain unformed after one mortal sin.

ON THE CONTRARY, mortal sin makes man worthy of eternal death: "the wages of sin is death."

But whoever has

charity possesses a title to eternal life, for Christ promises manifestation of Himself to the one who loves Him, and eternal life consists in knowing God. No one can simultaneously be worthy of eternal life and eternal death.

Therefore charity cannot coexist with mortal sin and is removed by one mortal act.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. One contrary is removed by the arrival of its contrary. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity according to charity's proper nature: charity consists in loving God above all things and in subjecting oneself wholly to Him by referring all things to Him. It therefore belongs to charity that man will to submit to God in all things and follow the rule of His commandments. Whatever contradicts God's commandments is contrary to charity and, of itself, is capable of excluding it.

If charity were an acquired habit dependent on the subject's natural power, one contrary act would not necessarily remove it immediately. An act is directly contrary to another act, not to the habit, and an acquired habit can remain despite interruption

of its acts.

But charity is an infused habit depending upon God's action in infusing and conserving it. St. Thomas compares God to the sun illuminating the air. As light immediately ceases in the air when an obstacle is placed before the sun's illumination, charity immediately ceases in the soul when an obstacle is placed against God's influx of charity.

Every mortal sin places such an obstacle because by choosing the sin a person prefers it to divine friendship, which requires following God's will. Consequently, through one mortal sin the habit of charity is immediately lost.

Augustine accordingly says that man is illuminated when God is present to him and immediately darkened when God is absent—not through spatial distance but through aversion of the will.

To the first objection: Origen may be understood as saying that a perfect man does not ordinarily proceed suddenly to a mortal act without preceding negligence. Venial sins can dispose toward mortal sin. Yet if he actually commits one mortal sin, he falls by losing charity. Origen's additional language about a brief lapse followed by rapid recovery can also mean that

complete ruin is especially characteristic of one who falls through settled malice rather than through a sudden weakness.

To the second: charity can be lost directly through actual contempt; Peter did not lose it in that manner. It can also be lost indirectly when something contrary to charity is committed under the force of concupiscence, fear, or another passion. Peter acted against charity in this latter way, lost charity, and quickly recovered it.

To the third, the answer follows from the difference between infused and acquired habits just explained.

To the fourth: not every inordinate affection concerning created goods constitutes mortal sin. Only an inordination repugnant

to the divine will is mortal; such an inordination directly opposes charity.

To the fifth: charity imports a union with God which faith and hope do not import in the same manner. Every mortal sin includes aversion from God and therefore contradicts charity. Not every mortal sin directly contradicts faith or hope; only determinate sins destroy those habits. Charity therefore cannot remain "unformed," since charity is itself the final form of the

virtues by referring them to God as ultimate end.

SUMMARY. The conclusion is affirmative. The argument from the consequence is that mortal sin makes man worthy of eternal death whereas charity makes him worthy of eternal life. St. Thomas's deeper a priori argument is the incompatibility between mortal sin's obstacle to divine friendship and the divine conservation of infused charity.

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ARTICLE XII —

COMMENTARY;

QUESTION XXV BEGINS I say the conclusion of Article XII is certain according to faith. I cite

James 2, “whoever
offends in one has become guilty of all,” and the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 15, against the Lutheran claim that unbelief alone is mortal sin. I then note two points from Cajetan concerning St. Thomas's comparison of God preserving charity with the sun illuminating the air. First, when a person places an obstacle before the sun, the positive
act of placing the obstacle efficiently expels the light, while the privation or opposition constituted by the obstacle formally excludes illumination. Analogously, when mortal sin is actually committed, the sinner's positive action or affection efficiently expels charity, while the privation and contrary stain obstructing God's conservation of charity formally excludes it. Second, I reconcile St. Thomas's statements that charity may be lost “indirectly” through a mortal
sin arising from passion and that every mortal sin is “directly contrary” to charity. From the side of the psychological cause, not every mortal sin arises from a direct contempt of charity; some arise indirectly through passion. But from the side of the disorder formally contained in the sin, every mortal sin directly contradicts charity because it contradicts
the order of divine friendship, which requires God to be preferred to all other loved things. In every mortal sin something else is preferred contrary to that order.

QUESTION XXV — ON THE OBJECT OF CHARITY I remark that this entire question is

particularly useful for
preachers. Two matters are to be considered: first, the things which are to be loved from charity; second, the order among the things to be loved.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER THE LOVE OF CHARITY STOPS AT GOD OR EXTENDS

ALSO TO NEIGHBOR

FIRST OBJECTION. We owe God both love and fear. But the fear of man is distinct from the fear of God, which may
be servile or filial. Therefore the love by which God is loved should likewise differ from the love by which neighbor is
loved. SECOND OBJECTION. Aristotle says that to be loved is to be honored. But the honor due to God is latria, while
the honor due to a creature is dulia. Therefore the love of God and love of neighbor appear specifically distinct.

THIRD

OBJECTION. Hope generates charity, according to a Gloss, yet hope is so directed toward God that those who place
their principal hope in man are condemned: “Cursed is the man who trusts in man.” Therefore charity too should terminate in God rather than extend to neighbor.

ON THE CONTRARY, 1 John 4 says: “This commandment we have from God, that he who

loves God love also his
brother.” ST. THOMAS'S
RESPONSE. Habits are diversified when the species of their acts is diversified. The species of an act is taken from its object under its formal ratio. An act directed toward the formal ratio itself and an act directed toward an object under that same ratio belong to one species: the same kind of sight sees light and sees color under the ratio of light. Now God
is the formal reason for loving our neighbor. What charity loves in our neighbor is that he be in God. Therefore the act
by which God is loved and the act by which neighbor is loved are specifically the same, and the one habit of charity extends to both. To the first objection: a neighbor can be feared or loved because of what belongs to him personally—for example, a tyrant feared for cruelty or a benefactor loved for gain. Such human fear or love differs from the fear or love of God. But a man can also be feared or loved because of what belongs to God in him—for example, legitimate authority feared because of its divine ministry of punishing wrongdoing, or a just man loved for justice. Such fear and love do not constitute a species distinct from the corresponding God-directed virtue.
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ARTICLE I, REPLIES CONTINUED

To the second objection: love regards good in common, whereas honor regards the proper good or excellence of the person honored and is offered as testimony to that person's virtue. Consequently, love is not specifically diversified merely because the loved persons possess different degrees or kinds of goodness, provided they are referred to one common good.

Thus by the same charity we love all our neighbors insofar as they are referred to the one common good, God. But different honors are rendered according to the proper excellence of different persons, and singular worship of latria is rendered to God

because of His singular excellence.

To the third: those who hope in man as the principal author of salvation are rightly condemned, but not those who hope in a man as a ministerial helper under God. Likewise it would be blameworthy to love one's neighbor as the principal final end, but not to love him for God's sake, which belongs precisely to charity.

SUMMARY. The habit of charity extends to love of both God and neighbor because the formal reason for loving both is one and the same.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER CHARITY ITSELF IS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

FIRST OBJECTION. The things to be loved from charity are contained under the two commandments of love of God and

neighbor. Charity itself is neither God nor neighbor. Therefore charity does not appear to be loved from charity.

SECOND OBJECTION. Charity is founded upon the communication of beatitude, but charity itself cannot be a participant in

beatitude. Therefore charity is not an object of charitable love.

THIRD OBJECTION. Charity is friendship. One cannot have friendship toward charity or toward an accident because such

things cannot love in return, and reciprocal love belongs to friendship.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that whoever loves his neighbor consequently loves the love itself.

Since

neighbor is loved from charity, charity itself is consequently loved from charity.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Charity is a kind of love. Love, from the nature of the power whose act it is, can reflect upon itself. Since the will's object is universal good, whatever falls under the ratio of good can be willed; and since willing itself is a good, one can will oneself to will. Likewise the intellect can understand that it understands.

Love also has, from its own specific nature, a reflexive tendency because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover toward the beloved. In loving, a person in some way loves his own loving.

But charity is not merely love; it has the ratio of friendship. In friendship something is loved in two ways: first, as the friend toward whom friendship is borne and to whom we will good; second, as the good which we will for the friend.

Charity itself is loved by charity in the second manner, not the first. Charity is among the goods we desire for those whom we

love from charity. The same general reasoning applies to beatitude and the virtues.

To the first objection: God and neighbor are those toward whom we have friendship. But in loving them is included love of charity itself, because in loving God and neighbor we will that we and our neighbor love God—and this is to will the possession of charity.

To the second: charity is the spiritual communion of life through which one arrives at beatitude; hence it is loved as a good desired for all whom we love from charity.

To the third: the objection works only if charity were to be loved as a friend toward whom friendship is directly borne.

SUMMARY. Charity is loved by charity not as a friend to whom we will good, but as a supreme spiritual good which we will for the friend.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER IRRATIONAL CREATURES ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

FIRST OBJECTION. Through charity we are especially conformed to God. But God loves irrational creatures: “He loves all

things that are.” Whatever God loves He loves in Himself, who is Charity. Therefore we too should love irrational creatures from charity.

SECOND OBJECTION. Charity principally tends toward God and extends to other things insofar as they belong to God.

Rational creatures belong to God through the likeness of image, but irrational creatures belong to Him through the likeness of

a vestige. Therefore charity seems to extend also to irrational creatures.

THIRD OBJECTION. Faith, like charity, has God as object, yet faith extends to irrational creatures insofar as we believe

heaven and earth were created by God and the various animals and plants produced by Him. Therefore charity likewise seems

to extend to irrational creatures.

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QUESTION XXV, ARTICLE III — IRRATIONAL CREATURES; ARTICLE IV BEGINS

ON THE CONTRARY, the love of charity extends to God and neighbor. An irrational creature cannot

properly be called
our neighbor because it does not communicate with man in rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures in the same way it extends to persons.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Charity is a kind of friendship. Through friendship something is loved in two ways: first, as the friend toward whom friendship is borne; second, as a good which we will for the friend.

In the FIRST manner no irrational creature can be loved from charity. St. Thomas gives three reasons.

First, friendship is directed toward one for whom we will good. Properly speaking, we cannot will a good to an irrational creature
as to one possessing and using the good through free choice. Only a rational creature is master of the use of the good it possesses. Hence Aristotle says that we speak only by similitude when we say that things go well or badly for such non-rational beings in the properly moral sense.

Second, every friendship is founded upon some communion of life. Irrational creatures cannot share in human life according to reason. Therefore there can be no proper friendship with them, except metaphorically.

Third, and proper to charity: charitable friendship is founded upon communication in eternal beatitude. Irrational creatures are not
capable of eternal beatitude. Therefore they cannot be loved as friends with the friendship of charity.

Nevertheless irrational creatures CAN be loved from charity in the SECOND manner: as goods which we will for our friends. From charity we can will that they be preserved for the honor of God and the utility of human beings. In this way God also loves them.

To the first objection: the preceding distinction gives the answer. God wills their good in the order of His providence, but this does not make them participants in charitable friendship as rational persons are.

To the second: likeness as a vestige does not give a creature capacity for eternal life, whereas the likeness of image belongs to the rational creature and grounds such capacity. Therefore the cases are not parallel.

To the third: faith can extend to anything whatsoever insofar as it is true and divinely revealed. The friendship of charity, however, extends as friendship only to beings naturally capable, under grace, of the good of eternal life. Therefore the analogy with faith fails.

SUMMARY. Irrational creatures can be loved from charity, not as friends to whom we will the supernatural good of beatitude, but as goods which we will to be preserved for our friends, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor. I directs the reader to Cajetan and to his own earlier discussion at q.23, a.5.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF FROM CHARITY

FIRST OBJECTION. Gregory says charity cannot exist among fewer than two. Therefore no one has charity toward himself.

SECOND OBJECTION. Friendship by its nature implies reciprocal love and a certain equality, as Aristotle teaches. These do not
appear to exist between a man and himself. Since charity is friendship, a man seems unable to possess charity toward himself.

THIRD OBJECTION. What belongs to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity “does not act perversely.” But self-love is
blamed in 2 Timothy 3: in the last days perilous times shall come and men will be lovers of themselves. Therefore a man does not love himself from charity.

ON THE CONTRARY, Leviticus commands: “Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself.” Since we love our

friend from
charity, we must also love ourselves from charity.

ST. THOMAS'S RESPONSE. Because charity is a kind of friendship, we can speak of it in two ways.

First, under the common ratio of friendship. Properly speaking, friendship is not toward oneself; one's relation to oneself is something greater than friendship. Friendship imports a certain union, while each person possesses unity with himself, which is prior to and stronger than union with another. Dionysius calls love a unitive power. As unity is the principle of union, so the love by which one loves oneself is the form and root of friendship with others. The friendly relations we have toward others arise from those which we first have toward ourselves.

Second, charity can be considered according to its proper supernatural ratio: principally the friendship of man with God and consequently with the things belonging to God. Among those things is the very man who possesses charity. Therefore, among the things he loves from charity as belonging to God, he also loves himself from charity.

To the first objection: Gregory is speaking of charity under the common ratio of friendship, which as friendship is between distinct persons.

The second objection proceeds in the same way: reciprocal love and equality characterize friendship between distinct friends, while self-love is the more fundamental unity from which such friendship proceeds.

To the third: those who are censured as “lovers of themselves” love themselves according to their sensible nature, obeying disordered appetite. That is not truly to love oneself according to rational nature. True self-love wills for oneself the goods belonging to the perfection of reason, and it is especially in this latter way that charity requires a man to love himself.

SUMMARY. If charity is considered merely under the common ratio of friendship, it is not properly friendship toward oneself, because friendship is toward another and self-unity is more fundamental. But considered according to charity's proper supernatural ratio, a man truly loves himself from charity insofar as he belongs to God and wills for himself the goods leading to rational and supernatural perfection.

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QUESTION XXV — ON THE OBJECT OF CHARITY ARTICLE IV — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF FROM CHARITY (conclusion)

FIRST CONCLUSION. If charity is considered under the common notion of friendship, it is not properly directed toward oneself, because friendship is toward another; toward oneself there is something greater than friendship, namely unity.

SECOND CONCLUSION. If charity is considered according to its proper nature, as principally the friendship of man with God and consequently with the things belonging to God, then a man loves himself from charity.

I note from Cajetan that a man loves himself as a friend of God, whereas he loves his neighbor as both God's friend and his own.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS OWN BODY FROM CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. (1) Those possessing charity desire to be freed from the body: “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” and Paul desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” (2) The body cannot itself know and love God and therefore cannot directly participate in divine fruition. (3) Charity is friendship, but the body cannot love us in return.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine numbers one's own body among the four things to be loved from charity.

RESPONSE. Our body can be considered according to its nature or according to the corruption of fault and punishment. Its nature was created by God, not by an evil principle as the Manicheans imagined, and it can be used in God's service: “Present your members as instruments of justice unto God.” Therefore, from the charity by which we love God, we ought also to love our body.

But we ought not to love the infection of sin or penal corruption in it; charity instead desires their removal. Paul did not reject bodily nature itself. He wished to be freed from concupiscence and corruption, which burden the soul and impede the vision of God. Although the body cannot enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, through bodily works we can reach perfect divine fruition, and from the soul's fruition a certain beatitude overflows into the body: health, incorruption, and vigor.

Reciprocal love is required in friendship toward another, not in the relation one has to oneself, whether according to soul or body.

SUMMARY. The conclusion is affirmative.

COMMENTARY. I note that punishments which entice toward sin, such as movements of concupiscence against reason, are not to be loved; but other penal things may be embraced for Christ, such as death, fasting, and disciplines.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER SINNERS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY (begins)

The objections appeal to David's hatred of the wicked, punishments inflicted on sinners, Scriptural imprecations, the discord between the wills of the just and sinners, and the command to avoid sinful company. Augustine, however, teaches that every human being is our neighbor; sin does not destroy human nature.

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ARTICLE VI — WHETHER SINNERS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

(continued)

RESPONSE. Two things may be considered in sinners: nature and fault. According to the nature they have from God, they remain capable of beatitude, in whose communication charity is founded. Therefore they are to be loved according to their nature. Their fault, however, is contrary to God and an impediment to beatitude; according to the fault they are to be hated. Even in father, mother, or kindred, we ought to hate what is sinful and love what remains human and capable of beatitude. This is truly to love sinners from charity for God's sake.

To the objection from hatred: the prophet hated the wicked precisely insofar as they were wicked, that is, he hated their iniquity.

To hate another's evil and to love his good are compatible; such “perfect hatred” belongs to charity.

Benefits of friendship should not be withdrawn from sinful friends while hope of healing remains; rather, aid should be given for recovery of virtue even more than for recovery of money. When men become gravely harmful and incorrigible, familiar friendship may rightly be withdrawn. St. Thomas further argues, within the juridical framework presupposed by the text, that public authority may punish grave offenders for the common good; the judge acts not from private hatred but from love of the common good.

Scriptural imprecations may be understood in three ways: as predictions rather than wishes; as desires for the justice manifested in punishment rather than delight in another's misery; or as desires that sin itself be destroyed while the person remains.

We love sinners not by willing what they sinfully will or rejoicing in what they rejoice in, but by seeking to bring them to will and rejoice in the good.

Living with sinners is to be avoided by the weak when there is danger of corruption. For the perfect, who do not reasonably fear such corruption, association can be praiseworthy when directed to conversion, as Christ ate with sinners. Participation in their sin, however, must always be avoided.

SUMMARY. In sinners we must hate that they are sinners and love that they are human beings capable of beatitude.

COMMENTARY. I call this article especially important for knowing how to conduct ourselves toward

sinners, whether friends or strangers.

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER SINNERS LOVE THEMSELVES

OBJECTIONS. Self-love is said by Augustine to be the principle of the earthly city; sin does not destroy the natural tendency to one's own good; and many sinners regard themselves as good. ON THE CONTRARY: “He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.”

RESPONSE begins by distinguishing three senses of self-love: one common to all, one proper to the good, and one proper to the wicked. Everyone loves what he judges himself to be. All naturally love themselves according to substantial nature, composed of soul and body, and seek self-preservation. But what a man regards as principal in himself differs.

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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER SINNERS LOVE THEMSELVES (continued)

The principal thing in man is the rational mind; the sensitive and bodily nature is secondary. The Apostle accordingly
distinguishes the interior and exterior man. Good men judge their rational nature to be principal and therefore truly know and
love themselves. The wicked make sensitive and bodily nature principal; not rightly knowing themselves, they do not truly
love themselves but love what they mistakenly suppose themselves to be.
Aristotle gives five marks of friendship: a friend wills his friend to exist and live; wills good things for him; works good for
him; lives pleasantly with him; and agrees with him in joys and sorrows. The good exhibit these toward their interior man.
They desire its integrity, spiritual goods, and the works by which those goods are attained; they return pleasantly into their
own heart, finding good present thoughts, memories of past goods, and hope of future goods; and their will is internally
concordant.
The wicked do the contrary. They do not preserve the integrity of the interior man, desire his spiritual goods, or work for them.
They dislike returning into themselves because conscience presents evils past, present, and future; and they suffer internal
discord. Thus the wicked love themselves according to the corruption of the exterior man, while the good do not love
themselves in that disordered manner.
REPLIES. The self-love which is the principle of sin is the wicked man's love extending even to contempt of God.
Natural self-love is not wholly removed in sinners but is perverted. Sinners who judge themselves good retain some
apparent self-love, but it is not true self-love.
SUMMARY. (1) All men love themselves according to what they judge themselves to be. (2) The good, truly knowing
themselves, truly love themselves. (3) The wicked, not rightly knowing themselves, do not truly love themselves.

COMMENTARY. I recommends Aristotle, Ethics IX, Augustine, and Cajetan's five signs for daily examination

of
conscience. He stresses that St. Thomas is speaking not of merely speculative knowledge—wicked men can know
speculatively that reason is superior to sense—but of practical estimation.

DOUBT: WHO LOVES HIS BODY MORE, THE JUST MAN OR THE SINNER? If love

means right love according
to reason, sinners do not truly love their bodies: they inflict present evil by refusing the body's proper subjection to
reason and future evil by disposing it toward punishment. The just subject the body to reason and dispose it toward
immortal life. If “love” means the passion of sensitive appetite toward present sensual goods without reason's rule,
sinners love their bodies more intensely, like beasts. But because rational love is nobler and more useful to the body,
simply speaking the just man loves his body more.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO CHARITY THAT ENEMIES BE

LOVED (begins)
The objections argue that Augustine treats love of enemies as an extraordinary good; nature hates what is contrary to itself;
and loving enemies seems as perverse as hating friends. Christ, however, commands: “Love your enemies.”
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ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER LOVE OF ENEMIES IS NECESSARY TO CHARITY

RESPONSE. Love of enemies may be considered in three ways. First, to love enemies precisely insofar as they are
enemies is perverse and contrary to charity, because it would mean loving another's evil. Second, to love them
according to their human nature and under the universal love of neighbor is absolutely necessary to charity: one who
loves God and neighbor may not exclude his enemies from the universality of neighbor-love. Third, to be moved by a
special act of love toward this particular enemy is not absolutely necessary, just as charity does not require a distinct
actual movement toward every individual human being. It is, however, necessary by preparedness of soul: one must
be ready to love the particular enemy should necessity arise.

Outside necessity, actually moving oneself to a special love of an enemy for God's sake belongs to the perfection of charity.

The more intensely one loves God, the more one's love extends to neighbor without being impeded by enmity—like one who,
for love of a man, loves even that man's children who are personally hostile to him.

Nature hates what is contrary precisely insofar as it is contrary. Thus we ought to dislike the fact that an enemy is hostile to us;
but insofar as he is a human being and capable of beatitude, he must be loved. Charity does not make us love enmity itself.

SUMMARY. (1) It is contrary to charity to love an enemy insofar as he is an enemy. (2) It is necessary to charity to
love him insofar as he is neighbor. (3) Particular love of an enemy is not always required, except when necessity calls
for it. (4) One must habitually be prepared to love him particularly should necessity arise. (5) Outside necessity,
particular love of an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity.

I tells preachers to note this doctrine carefully.

ARTICLE IX — WHETHER SALVATION REQUIRES THAT ONE SHOW AN ENEMY SIGNS AND EFFECTS OF LOVE

OBJECTIONS appeal to “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and truth,” Christ's joining “Love your
enemies” with “do good to those who hate you,” and Gregory's statement that divine love cannot remain idle.

ON THE CONTRARY, the Gloss on Matthew calls doing good to enemies a summit of perfection; what belongs to
perfection is not for that reason absolutely necessary.

RESPONSE. Exterior effects and signs are proportioned to interior love. Interior love of an enemy in common is
absolutely commanded; special love is required not absolutely but according to preparedness of soul. The same
distinction therefore governs external signs and benefits.

ARTICLE IX — SIGNS AND BENEFITS TOWARD ENEMIES (continued)

Some signs and benefits of love are given to neighbors in common—for example, prayer for all the faithful or a benefit
granted to an entire community. It is necessary by precept that enemies not be excluded from such common benefits. To
exclude them simply from spite or vengeance would violate the command against revenge.
Other signs and benefits are given particularly to determinate persons. Such special benefits need not ordinarily be shown to
enemies, except according to preparedness of soul and especially in a case of necessity: “If thy enemy be hungry, feed him; if
he thirst, give him drink.” Beyond necessity, bestowing such benefits belongs to perfection: one not only refuses to be
conquered by evil but seeks to conquer evil with good and, by benefits, to draw the enemy toward love.
SUMMARY. Common signs and benefits shown to neighbors must include enemies. Special signs and benefits are not
absolutely required except in necessity, although they belong to perfection.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES VIII–IX

I distinguish three senses of “enemy”: one who reciprocally bears enmity; one who is an opponent or rival without sin, as may
occur in a just war or litigation; and one who sinfully harms his neighbor. The first conclusion of Article VIII concerns the
third sense when it says enmity itself is not to be loved. The remaining conclusions extend to an enemy as to any neighbor.

DOUBT: IS LOVE OF ENEMIES A PRECEPT? I answer yes. Christ says, “Love your

enemies and do good to those
who hate you, that you may be children of your Father.” Peter and Paul likewise command that evil not be returned
for evil. Augustine and the common teaching of the saints support the same conclusion. The reason is simple: the
command concerns love of neighbor, and an enemy remains a neighbor and a human being capable of beatitude.

SECOND CONCLUSION. The command, in its natural dimension, belongs to natural law. I appeal to the natural
maxim that one ought not do to another what one reasonably does not wish done to oneself. A person reasonably wills
not to suffer injury, not to receive private evil in return for evil, and to receive necessary aid. The supernatural love
ordered to eternal life is a supernatural precept and was explicitly expressed in the Gospel.
He answers the objection from Matthew 5 by distinguishing the command to love enemies as neighbors from evangelical
counsels that can be proposed in the same discourse. The perfection of charity sufficient for salvation is commanded; the
perfection proper to counsels is not.
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COMMENTARY ON LOVE OF ENEMIES (continued)

I explain that the Mosaic law never simply commanded “hate your enemy.” The Jews inferred this from “love your friend.” Yet
the Old Testament itself commands assistance to an enemy's wandering ox or burdened ass and says, “If thy enemy be hungry,
feed him.” “Hating” an enemy may also be understood as hating sinful enmity or as punishment according to the order of justice.

Love of an enemy in common and preparedness to aid him in grave necessity is not excessively difficult compared with other
commandments; heroic special acts outside necessity belong to evangelical perfection.

I then treat practical cases. In many matters something may be lawful considered strictly and in itself, yet become unlawful
because of circumstances, scandal to oneself, or scandal to others. If a person sees that he is strongly inclined toward hatred or
revenge and that reflecting on an enemy's good qualities, inclining the heart toward him, or praying for him is needed to avoid
sinful hatred, he is bound to use such remedies by the very precept forbidding hatred and vengeance.

MUST ONE GREET AN ENEMY? Theologians commonly say one is not bound absolutely to give a special greeting merely
because the person is an enemy, since one is not bound to greet every other neighbor. Yet circumstances can make charity
require it—for example, where a simple greeting could reconcile the enemy to God and oneself without notable loss of honor, or
where customary signs of respect are due to a person such as one's bishop or prelate. Refusing an enemy's greeting can be
mortally sinful when, according to custom and the persons involved, it constitutes notable contempt or scandal. Prudence and
careful examination of intention are necessary.

Sylvester says that if one greets everyone present except the enemy precisely so as to single him out, this is ordinarily grave
because of scandal. Likewise one is not absolutely bound to converse familiarly with an enemy, even if one did so before; yet
scandal may arise if others interpret the refusal as hatred. If conversation with him puts one in danger of sin, prudence may
dictate a middle course: greet him briefly in public while avoiding frequent association.

MAY AN ENEMY BE EXCLUDED FROM COMMON BENEFITS? If a benefit is granted to the whole community, the enemy
may not be excluded merely as an enemy, because this can violate charity through scandal and distributive justice by depriving
him of what belongs to him as a member of the community. A legitimate judge or prelate may, however, exclude a person as
punishment when the offense justly merits deprivation of that benefit.

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COMMENTARY — FURTHER PRACTICAL DOUBTS

If a benefit is granted not to the whole community but only to many particular members, an enemy may sometimes be omitted
along with other non-enemies, provided scandal is excluded.
If an enemy asks forgiveness, is the offended person bound to show signs of love? I answer yes, because the request itself
creates a time of necessity for reconciliation. Failure then to show that one is placated can produce new scandal. The signs
required vary with the condition of the persons; greater or lesser signs can suffice. David's treatment of Absalom is given as an
example of prudential differentiation by a father and judge.
Must the offended person remit the injury and a penalty fixed by law? I distinguish justice from charity. First, if the law is just, it
is not evil simply to will that justice be observed. Second, hatred of heart and a desire of vengeance arising from hatred must be
laid aside. Third, one may demand a monetary penalty legally owed, just as one may demand a debt from a friend. Fourth, I say
it is morally very difficult to imagine someone refusing to remit a severe corporal penalty while remaining wholly free of hatred
or vengeance, although a case could exist—for example, where failure to punish would leave the offended family under serious
infamy. Where little or no harm follows from remission, he doubts the good spiritual state of one who refuses, insofar as it lies
within his power, to remit such a penalty.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE THE ANGELS FROM CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Augustine speaks of a twofold charitable love, God and neighbor; angels are neither God nor members
of our human species. Brute animals share a nearer genus with us and yet are not loved as friends from charity.
Friendship especially involves living together, but angels do not visibly live with us.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that whoever either renders us or ought to receive

from us an office of mercy is
rightly called neighbor; the command to love neighbor therefore includes the holy angels, from whom we receive many
merciful offices.
RESPONSE. The friendship of charity is founded upon communication in eternal beatitude. Men and angels communicate in
participation of the same eternal beatitude: in the resurrection men shall be “as the angels in heaven.” Therefore charitable
friendship extends to the angels. “Neighbor” can be understood through communication of benefits pertaining to eternal life.
Brute animals share sensitive nature with us, but eternal beatitude belongs to rational mind, in which we communicate with
angels. Angels do not live with us by exterior sensitive intercourse, but we live with them according to mind—imperfectly here
and perfectly in heaven.
SUMMARY. We ought to love the angels from charity because men and angels share in the participation of eternal
beatitude.

ARTICLE XI — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE DEMONS FROM CHARITY

(begins)
The objections argue from the demons' remaining intellectual nature, their resemblance to sinful men, and the providential
benefits that arise from their temptations.
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ARTICLE XI — WHETHER DEMONS ARE TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY

ON THE CONTRARY, Scripture speaks of the covenant with death and agreement with hell being destroyed. The
perfection of peace and covenant is charity; therefore charity is not friendship with the demons, inhabitants of hell
and sinners unto death.

RESPONSE. In human sinners we love nature and hate sin. But the name “demon” signifies a nature deformed by
sin; under that description demons are not to be loved from charity. If, however, the question concerns the spirits
themselves who are called demons, the earlier distinction applies.

Something is loved from charity in two ways. First, as one toward whom charitable friendship is borne. In this way we cannot
love the demons. Friendship requires willing good to one's friend, but we cannot from charity will the good of eternal life to
spirits eternally condemned by God; this would contradict charity toward God, by which we approve His justice.

Second, something can be loved as a good which we will to remain for another's sake. In this way we love irrational creatures
from charity insofar as we will their preservation for God's glory and human utility. Likewise we can love the demons' created
nature insofar as we will those spirits to remain in their natural being for the glory of God.

The angelic mind is not incapable of beatitude as the demonic mind is after definitive condemnation; charitable friendship is
founded more upon communication in eternal life than upon mere natural similarity. Human sinners in this life retain the
possibility of reaching beatitude, unlike the damned; in this respect the damned and demons stand alike. The benefit we derive
from demons does not arise from their intention but from divine providence, which turns their perverse intention to our utility.

This should lead us to friendship with God, not with them.

SUMMARY. (1) We cannot love demons with charitable friendship because the demonic nature is considered as
deformed by sin and, as damned, cannot receive eternal beatitude. (2) We can nevertheless will the preservation of
their created natural being for God's glory, just as we love irrational creatures in an ordered way.

ARTICLE XII — WHETHER THE FOUR THINGS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY ENUMERATED: GOD, NEIGHBOR, OUR OWN BODY, AND OURSELVES

OBJECTIONS. Love of oneself seems included in love of God; one's body is part of oneself and should not be divided
against the whole; and if our own body is separately numbered, the neighbor's body seemingly should be separately
numbered as well.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine enumerates four: what is above us, God; what we ourselves are; what is beside us,
neighbor; and what is below us, our own body.

RESPONSE begins from the foundation of charitable friendship in communication of beatitude. In this communication there is: God, the principle who causes and communicates beatitude; rational creatures—men and
angels—who directly participate in it; and the human body, to which beatitude flows by a certain redundancy from
the soul.

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ARTICLE XII — THE FOUR OBJECTS OF CHARITY (conclusion)

That which causes beatitude, God, is loved because He is its principle and cause. A participant in beatitude is lovable in two
ways: because it is one with us, or because it is associated with us in participation of beatitude. Hence two objects are distinguished here: oneself and one's neighbor.
The different relation of the lover and of the lovable thing constitutes a different formal reason for loving. Our relation to God
differs from our relation to ourselves, and therefore God and self are enumerated distinctly, even though love of the one is causally connected with love of the other.
The subject of charity is the rational mind, which is directly capable of beatitude. The body does not directly attain beatitude but
receives it by overflow from the soul. Therefore a man according to his rational mind loves himself from charity in one way and
loves his body in another.
We love our neighbor both according to soul and body under one formal reason: association with us in beatitude. Therefore the
neighbor's body does not constitute a fifth distinct object.
SUMMARY. The fourfold enumeration is fitting: God above us as the principle of beatitude; ourselves as directly participating and one with ourselves; neighbor as associated with us in that participation; and our body as receiving beatitude by overflow.

QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY ARTICLE I — WHETHER THERE IS

AN ORDER IN
CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Charity is a virtue, yet no special “order” is assigned to the other virtues. Faith has First Truth as object, yet all things of faith are believed with equal assent. Charity is in the will, whereas ordering seems to belong to reason.

ON THE CONTRARY: “He brought me into the wine cellar; he set charity in order in me.”

RESPONSE. Aristotle says prior and posterior are said by relation to a principle. Order includes some mode of priority and
posteriority; wherever there is a principle, therefore, there is some order. Charity tends toward God as the principle of beatitude,
in whose communication charitable friendship is founded. Consequently, among the things loved from charity there must be an
order according to their relation to the first principle of this love, which is God.
To the first objection: charity tends to the ultimate end precisely under the aspect of ultimate end, which belongs to no other
virtue in the same way. The end has the nature of a principle in appetible and practical matters. Charity therefore has a special
relation to the first principle, and order is especially considered in it.
To the second: faith belongs to the cognitive power, whose operation is according as known things exist in the knower. Charity
belongs to the appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending toward the things themselves. Order is more principally in things themselves and is derived from them into our cognition. Therefore order is more especially attributed to
charity than to faith, although faith too has an order: principally concerning God and secondarily concerning things referred to
God.
To the third: order belongs to reason as ordering, but to appetite as ordered. In this latter way order is found in charity.
SUMMARY. (1) There is an order among things loved from charity because charity tends to God as the principle of beatitude, to whom all other charitable objects are referred. (2) Order belongs more especially to charity than to the other virtues because its object bears the character of first principle in the appetitive order. (3) Order is in charity as in something ordered.

COMMENTARY. I note that the Master of the Sentences treats this question in Book III. On St. Thomas's foundation

that order includes prior and posterior, I explain that this is to be understood of order in creatures or toward creatures. In the persons of the Trinity there is order without priority or posteriority in reality, except according to our manner of understanding, in which the producing person may be conceived before the person produced. He refers the reader to Cajetan.

QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY ARTICLE II — WHETHER

GOD IS TO BE LOVED MORE
THAN OUR NEIGHBOR

OBJECTIONS. John says that one who does not love the brother whom he sees cannot love God whom he does not see;
vision is a beginning of love, and our neighbor is more visible than God. Again, likeness causes love, and man appears
more like his neighbor than like God. Finally, what charity loves in the neighbor is God; yet God is not greater in
Himself than when present in the neighbor.

ON THE CONTRARY. That for whose sake other things must sometimes be hated is to

be loved more. Christ
commands us to “hate” father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters when they draw us away from God.
Therefore God is to be loved more than neighbor.

RESPONSE. Every friendship principally regards that in which principally exists the good whose communication grounds the
friendship. Political friendship principally regards the ruler insofar as the city's common good depends upon him. Charity is
founded upon communication in beatitude. Beatitude exists essentially in God as its first principle and is derived from Him to all
capable of it. Therefore God is principally and supremely loved by charity: He is loved as the cause of beatitude, while neighbor
is loved as one who participates beatitude together with us.

Vision is a cause of love as a way of acquiring love, not as the formal reason why something is lovable. The visible neighbor
therefore first presents himself to us, but God is more lovable because His goodness is greater. Our likeness to God is prior to
and causes our likeness to neighbor, since both receive from God what makes them alike. God's goodness is essential in Him and
participated in the neighbor.

SUMMARY. God is to be loved more than neighbor because He is the principle and cause of beatitude.

COMMENTARY. I emphasize that cognition is not the formal reason of willing but the way by which the

object and
end are presented. He reconciles the claim that the visible neighbor first occurs to us with St. Thomas's teaching that
charity itself begins with God: in charity as such, God known by faith is first loved; in natural love generally, visible
goods such as ourselves and neighbor first present themselves to us.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE II — HOW GOD IS LOVED MORE

I distinguish the order of knowing from the order of loving. Natural knowledge begins from creatures and terminates in God;
even faith uses created testimony and created likenesses in conceiving divine mysteries. But charity immediately loves God
as He is good in Himself.

DOUBT: Must God always be loved more intensely than a creature? “God is more to

be loved” can mean either that
God is worthy of greater love because He is more excellent, or that charity's precept requires greater love of God.
Doctors commonly distinguish greater love as intensive, appreciative, and objective. Objective love is sometimes described
as willing a greater particular good to one person; appreciative love as valuing one more and being prepared to abandon
another rather than offend him; intensive love concerns the subject's effort, attention, and fervor. I accept this distinction only
with qualification, arguing that the so-called objective and appreciative dimensions cannot be cleanly separated in the
proposed manner.

FIRST CONCLUSION. God is worthy of being loved in every way more than any creature because in Him is infinite
goodness and the fountain of every created goodness. Charity's immediate formal object is God. Hence: “Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, soul, and mind.”

SECOND CONCLUSION. By the precept of charity man must love God appreciatively above everything else: he
must be prepared to abandon all things rather than abandon God or violate His commandments.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Every act elicited by charity, insofar as it proceeds from the infused habit and the Holy
Spirit's assistance, tends more intensely toward God than toward a creature. A habit inclines more immediately
toward its formal object than toward material objects. Charity assimilates the will to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy
Spirit cannot incline it more intensely toward a creature than toward God. I compare this with the light of first
principles, which principally inclines assent toward principles rather than conclusions.
An objection says a charitable person can exert more human effort in loving a neighbor than in an act explicitly directed to
God. I report that some, including the Dominican John de la Peña, therefore rejected his third conclusion. I nevertheless hold
that using charity itself to love neighbor more intensely than God is contradictory.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Human factors—attention to a sensible person, sensible affection, and natural
effort—can make the will's total experienced movement toward neighbor more intense. But the surplus intensity
arising from these human causes is not attributable to charity as charity. When one loves neighbor from charity “as
five,” the same act principally loves divine goodness “as five,” since divine goodness is the formal reason for loving
the neighbor.

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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE II — CONCLUSION

I therefore hold that, from charity itself, it is impossible to love a creature more than God either intensively or appreciatively.

With respect to God, he does not regard intensive and appreciative charity as two separable quantities; St. Thomas assigns
charity's increase to intensity.

Can one nevertheless love a creature more intensely by a merely human love than one explicitly loves God by charity? I first
say the smallest intensity of charity is more excellent and actualizes the will more nobly than every intensity belonging to
another species of love. Proportionately speaking, however, a person's natural powers can sometimes produce a more intense
human affection toward a creature than his experienced act of charity toward God. This need not always be mortal sin,
provided he simply values God above all; yet I thinks excessive voluntary attachment to a creature will scarcely occur without
at least venial disorder because it disposes one to difficulty when the creature must be surrendered for God. Purely natural
intensity not subject to choice is not itself sinful.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE GOD MORE THAN HIMSELF

OBJECTIONS. Aristotle says friendship toward others derives from friendship toward oneself; a cause is greater
than its effect. Again, everything is loved as one's own good, and the reason for loving appears more loved than what
is loved for that reason. Finally, to love God includes loving one's own enjoyment of God, which is one's supreme
good.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says that if you ought not love yourself for yourself but for God, the most righteous
end of your love, then the same applies to another man. What is the reason for loving another is loved more; therefore
God is loved more than self.

RESPONSE. From God we receive the good of nature and the good of grace. Natural love is founded on God's
communication of natural goods. In integrity of nature, man naturally loves God above all and more than himself;
indeed every creature in its own mode loves the common good of the whole more than its particular private good. This
appears in natural parts acting for the whole and in citizens enduring loss for the common good. Much more does this
hold in charity, founded on communication of grace. God is the common, fontal principle of beatitude for all capable
of it.

Aristotle's principle concerns friendship with another in whom the relevant good exists particularly, not the relation to one in
whom it exists as the universal whole. A part loves the whole's good as fitting to it, not by referring the whole to itself, but by
referring itself to the whole.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS LOVED MORE THAN SELF (continued)

To desire enjoyment of God belongs to love of concupiscence. But God is loved more by love of friendship than by love of
concupiscence, because God's goodness in Himself exceeds the good we receive by enjoying Him. Therefore simply speaking man
loves God from charity more than himself.

SUMMARY. (1) By natural love every creature loves God more than itself because every part loves the common good of
the whole more than its particular good. (2) Much more does man by charity love God more than himself.

COMMENTARY. I note contrary positions attributed to Auxerre, Bonaventure, and Gabriel, but defends St.

Thomas.

Every inclination flowing per se from principles of nature is good, since God's creation is good and God cannot be the
cause of evil. Natural inclinations of earth, water, and human appetite are therefore good considered according to their
proper nature.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Every truly natural appetite is principally ordered to God rather than to a contrary private
good. I cite Scotus, Durandus, and others in relation to the thesis, while defending St. Thomas's reasoning: God acts
intimately in every agent and gives being to all; therefore every natural motion, insofar as it proceeds from nature, is
principally ordered to God. God is the ultimate end of all things.

He raises objections. Self-love is founded on unity, which seems stronger than union with another. Man appears naturally to love
himself more easily than God. Parents naturally love children intensely. In danger of death, natural appetite seeks preservation
whereas charity may command sacrifice. Sensitive appetite also appears naturally inclined toward goods contrary to reason.

I reply that divine goodness is the root upon which our own goodness depends in being and preservation; hence natural love
principally tends toward God. It is easier to know and formally love oneself distinctly because self-experience is immediate, but
easier does not mean greater. A stone outside its proper place passes more immediately through an intermediate point while
nevertheless being principally inclined toward its final center.

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COMMENTARY ON NATURAL LOVE OF GOD (continued)

It is also easier for fallen man to follow sensitive appetite because sensible things are known first. Yet sensitive appetite,
considered absolutely as a natural appetite toward sensible good, is good; disorder appears when it is considered in fallen
rational man insofar as the lower part resists the governance of reason.
The claim that parents naturally love children more than progenitors does not prove that man loves himself more than God. Man
has a more excellent mode of being insofar as his being depends upon and is contained in God than merely in himself. As water
may naturally rise for the preservation of the universe, so creatures are naturally ordered toward the universal good.
Regarding Christ's prayer that the chalice pass: every good love includes God as principal end. Preserving life is naturally good
considered absolutely, but when God's command or counsel requires risking life, an unconditional refusal would be sinful or
imperfect. In Christ there was a good conditional inclination toward preservation together with an absolute will to die in
obedience to the Father.
Sensitive appetite can be considered as created by God and as a nature in its genus, or as belonging to fallen man. In the first
way it tends toward sensible good; in the second, concupiscence can incline contrary to reason because original justice is
absent. Scripture's language about man's inclination to evil signifies this inherited weakness, not that nature as created is
intrinsically evil.

DOUBT: Is a special acquired virtue required for natural love of God? Some

contemporary Thomists, I say, posit such
a virtue because fallen man is not promptly disposed to explicit natural love of God. I judge it more probable that
there is no special acquired virtue for this purpose. St. Thomas never posits one, and if the will is naturally more
inclined to God than to man himself, its difficulty comes not from the will's intrinsic incapacity but from disordered
appetite.
Religion differs because worship of God under a distinctly known excellence follows rational discourse and can therefore
require an acquired habit disposing acts of worship. The first natural movement of will is love toward God confusedly known as
universal good; once God is distinctly known, no additional special acquired habit of love need be posited. I cite Cajetan and St.
Thomas in support.
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ARTICLE IV — WHETHER MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE HIMSELF MORE THAN HIS NEIGHBOR

OBJECTIONS. A neighbor may be holier and more closely united to God than oneself. A man sometimes bears loss for a friend. Charity “seeketh not her own,” suggesting that it does not prefer self.

ON THE CONTRARY. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Love of self is presented as the exemplar of love of neighbor, and exemplar is prior to exemplified.

RESPONSE. In man there are spiritual and bodily natures. A man is principally said to love himself insofar as he loves himself according to spiritual nature. In this respect, after God, he ought to love himself more than any other.

The reason lies in charity's formal order. God is loved as the principle of the good upon which charity is founded.

Man loves himself as a participant in that good; neighbor is loved as one associated with him in its participation.

Participation in oneself has the character of unity; association with another has the character of union. Since unity is prior to union, one's own participation gives a stronger reason for charitable self-love than another's association does for neighbor-love.

A sign of this order is that a man may never commit sin—thereby injuring his own participation in beatitude—in order to free his neighbor from sin.

A holier neighbor may be closer to God objectively, but charity's quantity also depends upon the lover. Another is not as immediately united to my act of charity as I am to myself. Bodily losses may be endured for a friend, and in doing so one can love oneself more according to spiritual good, because virtuous sacrifice perfects the mind. Spiritual loss through sin may never be accepted to free another from sin. “Charity seeketh not her own” means that it prefers common goods to merely private goods.

SUMMARY. (1) According to spiritual nature, after God, man ought to love himself more than any other person. (2) Bodily detriment can be endured for a friend because virtue thereby perfects one's spiritual self. (3) One may never suffer the spiritual detriment of sin to free another from sin.

COMMENTARY begins with the objection that this seems to imply loving oneself more than the Blessed Virgin, the whole heavenly court, or even Christ's human soul.

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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE IV — SELF, NEIGHBOR, AND SPIRITUAL SACRIFICE

Further objections argue that charity participates in the Holy Spirit's love, and the Holy Spirit loves better persons more; that
one may remain outside religious life for others' spiritual or temporal benefit even if one expects greater personal merit in
religion; and that Moses and Paul seemed willing to lose their own spiritual good for their people.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is never lawful to suffer spiritual detriment by committing sin for the spiritual good of the
whole world, even if the sin were only venial. One may never “do evil that good may come.” I reject a misuse of the
maxim “of two evils choose the lesser”: it does not authorize choosing intrinsic moral evil as a means to good.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Without sin one may accept some loss in spiritual progress for a neighbor's good, even
temporal good. A person is not commanded at every moment to perform the act that maximally increases charity;
therefore he may for a legitimate reason forego some optional opportunity for greater progress.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Per se, one is never obliged to accept a true loss in the increase of charity for the common
spiritual good of the world. Yet per accidens circumstances can oblige one to leave an otherwise more advantageous
state or occupation. For example, someone able to support impoverished parents in the world may be bound for the
present not to enter religion. This is not properly a loss contrary to charity, because charity itself then requires the
duty.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. If there is equal doubt whether remaining in the world or entering religion is better and no
precept requires remaining, it is safer to enter religion and attend to one's salvation.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. It can sometimes be better, even without strict precept, to remain in the world when one
performs notably great works—supporting many poor people or other major works of piety—that entrance into
religion would prevent. Prudence must judge the circumstances; if one's own spiritual salvation is notably endangered,
one should leave everything, whereas without such danger the needs of the poor may justify remaining.

I answer that the charity formally in me first and immediately unites me to God. Hence
I ought by my own charity to will God
for myself before willing Him for the Blessed Virgin; this self-union is itself the foundation from which I will God for others.
Christ is exceptional because, as Head, our charity depends upon Him in its production and preservation. I therefore hold that
Christian charity inclines us toward Christ—God united personally to human nature—more than toward ourselves united to God
by adoptive grace.
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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE IV — MOSES, PAUL, AND TEMPORAL SACRIFICE

I offer three interpretations of Moses' “blot me out of thy book” and Paul's wish to be anathema for his brethren. Jerome
understands the “book” in relation to temporal life. Chrysostom interprets Moses and Paul as expressing extraordinary zeal for
God's glory and, conditionally, willingness to forego divine fruition if that were required for God's honor. Augustine interprets
Moses as arguing from confidence in divine friendship: “Either forgive them or blot me out; but You will not blot me out;
therefore forgive them.”
The comparison between spiritual and bodily loss fails because spiritual evil is not intrinsically ordered as a means to another's
spiritual good, whereas bodily goods can sometimes be sacrificed for common temporal good. Immediate spiritual good has an
order directly to God.
HOW MUCH TEMPORAL LOSS MAY ONE ACCEPT FOR A NEIGHBOR? I say it can be lawful to lose temporal
possessions over which one has dominion—wealth and honor—for a neighbor in a case of genuine necessity, especially for a
friend. But this is not required or prudent for every person and every need. Duties to one's family, danger of inherited infamy,
stronger obligations toward other persons, and proportion between the goods at stake must be considered.
It is still more clearly lawful to lose temporal goods for another's spiritual good when prudence permits. Sometimes one is
obliged even to expose one's life to danger for another's spiritual salvation—for example, where a person in extreme spiritual
necessity cannot otherwise receive necessary instruction or sacraments. “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”
One may also risk life to save a public person gravely necessary to the commonwealth, unless oneself is still more necessary,
because in such a case a part is exposed for the whole.

DOUBT: May one expose one's bodily life to certain danger to save the bodily life of an

equal friend? Arguments
against appeal to the duty of preserving one's own life, Augustine's language that one who loses his life for another
seems to love the other more than himself, and the maxim that well-ordered charity begins with oneself. Durandus
denies that one may expose one's life to certain danger for an equal friend, though he allows risk where hope of escape
remains.
my conclusion is affirmative in some circumstances. He cites St. Thomas, Lactantius, Augustine, Aristotle, Cicero, and Christ's
saying: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
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COMMENTARY — GIVING ONE'S LIFE FOR A FRIEND (continued)

In a case where friendship itself ought virtuously to be honored, one who dies to save a friend exercises a virtue highly
necessary to society. Therefore such sacrifice can be lawful. But life is not to be exposed rashly or for every friend. If one is
especially useful to the commonwealth, or has children and family who cannot be provided for without him, prudence may
require preservation of one's own life.
Per se, one's own bodily life is more to be loved than the friend's bodily life. One's body is not naturally a mere instrument
ordered to preserve another's body as an arm is ordered to preserve the whole person. But when the virtue of friendship itself
is at stake, bodily life may be surrendered for virtue; the friend's danger then supplies the matter and occasion of the virtuous
act. In that very sacrifice one loves oneself more according to virtue.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS NEIGHBOR MORE THAN HIS OWN BODY

OBJECTIONS. “Neighbor” includes the neighbor's body, so the thesis seems to require loving another's body more
than one's own. One's own body is closer to one's own soul than the neighbor. And not everyone is bound to expose
his body for another's salvation; Christ calls this the greatest charity and a mark of the perfect.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says neighbor is to be loved more than one's own body.

RESPONSE. That is more to be loved from charity which has a fuller reason for being lovable by charity.
Association in the full participation of beatitude—the reason for loving neighbor—is greater than the body's
participation in beatitude by overflow from the soul. Therefore the neighbor, with respect to the salvation of his
soul, is to be loved more than one's own body.
By “neighbor” here St. Thomas principally means the neighbor according to soul, since the principal part gives the person
his chief designation. Our body is closer to our soul in constituting our individual nature, but in participation of beatitude the
neighbor's soul is more fully associated with ours than our body is. Not every person bears office for every neighbor's
salvation; therefore charity does not always require exposing one's body for another, except when one is bound to provide
for that person's salvation. Voluntary self-offering beyond obligation belongs to charity's perfection.
SUMMARY. The neighbor's spiritual salvation is to be loved more than one's own body. Exposure of one's body is
obligatory only where one is responsible for the neighbor's salvation; spontaneous offering beyond that belongs to
perfection.

COMMENTARY begins by distinguishing extreme spiritual necessity from lesser necessity and persons

who have
pastoral office from private persons bound only by the common law of charity.
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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE V — DUTY TOWARD A NEIGHBOR'S SPIRITUAL SALVATION

FIRST CONCLUSION. Everyone must provide for a neighbor's spiritual salvation when he can do so easily and without great loss to himself or his temporal goods. I cite “God gave to every one commandment concerning his neighbor,” Christ's command of fraternal correction, and the Mosaic requirement to help even an enemy's burdened animal. Since we are members one of another, one member ought to assist another where it can do so without its own serious harm.

SECOND CONCLUSION. A just man is bound to expose his life or fortune to danger for a neighbor's spiritual salvation in a case of extreme necessity. I cite St. Thomas and “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”

THIRD CONCLUSION. Outside extreme necessity, one is not ordinarily bound to expose one's life, entire substance, or a great portion of one's substance. Means must be proportioned to the end. Extreme spiritual necessity exists when the neighbor cannot, or can scarcely, escape the danger otherwise—for example, a simple believer being seduced by heretics, or a dying person who lacks someone able to administer Baptism or Penance when salvation would otherwise be gravely endangered.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Bishops and pastors, because of their office, are often bound outside strict extreme necessity to risk life or temporal goods for their subjects, since they must provide doctrine and sacraments when pastoral duty requires it.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER ONE NEIGHBOR IS TO BE LOVED MORE THAN ANOTHER

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says all men are to be loved equally, though since we cannot benefit everyone we should especially assist those joined to us by circumstances. The formal reason for loving every neighbor is the same—God. And to love is to will good; we will the same generic good, eternal life, to all neighbors.

ON THE CONTRARY. Sins against some relationships are graver than sins against others; Scripture, for example, assigns special gravity to cursing father or mother. Therefore some neighbors ought to be loved more than others.

RESPONSE. Some held that all neighbors are equally loved in interior affection, with order existing only in external beneficence.

St. Thomas rejects this. The affect of charity, an inclination of grace, is no less ordered than natural inclination. Since external acts of beneficence must be proportioned differently to different persons, the interior inclination of charity must likewise be proportioned. Therefore one neighbor is to be loved more intensely than another according to greater proximity to one of charity's principles: God and the person who loves.

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ARTICLE VI — WHETHER ONE NEIGHBOR IS TO BE LOVED MORE THAN ANOTHER (continued)

Augustine's statement that all are equally to be loved can mean equality with respect to the generic good wished for them:
charity wills eternal beatitude to all. It does not require equal intensity of every act of love. Another distinction is that no
neighbor may simply be excluded from benevolence, although actual beneficence cannot be extended to everyone. Augustine
excludes the inequality whereby some are loved and others not loved at all; he does not exclude the inequality whereby some
are loved more than others.
Not all neighbors stand equally near to God. Some are nearer through greater goodness and, under that aspect, are more lovable
from charity than those less near. The objection from willing the same eternal good concerns equality on the side of the good
wished, not equality in the intensity of the loving act.
SUMMARY. FIRST CONCLUSION. It is unreasonable to say that all neighbors must be equally loved in affection
while inequality exists only in external effects. Charity's interior inclination itself is ordered and proportioned to the
acts it produces.

SECOND CONCLUSION. One neighbor ought to be loved more than another even according to interior affection,
because neighbors possess different relations of proximity to God and to the lover.

THIRD CONCLUSION. With respect to the generic good wished—eternal life—all neighbors are loved equally; but
charity need not will this good to every person with an equally intense act.

COMMENTARY. I say this article and the two following must be read very attentively against those

who, under the
pretext of spiritual perfection, consider only charity's formal object and therefore think it less perfect to be moved
toward greater love by blood relationship or other human friendship. Such particular natural grounds of affection, he
insists, are not simply to be destroyed by charity; grace perfects nature. St. Thomas's doctrine wonderfully and
catholically explains the order of charity among all those who are to be loved. I refer to the Master of the Sentences,
Book III, distinction 29.

QUESTION XXVI — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY ARTICLE VII — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE BETTER PERSONS MORE THAN THOSE MORE CLOSELY CONNECTED TO US

OBJECTIONS. It seems that better persons should be loved more than those closely connected to us. Those related to us can, insofar as they impede us from God, become objects of hatred according to Luke 14; but good men as good are not to be hated. Again, charity most of all assimilates man to God, and God loves the better person more. Finally, every friendship chiefly loves what participates more fully in the good upon which that friendship is founded. Since charity is founded upon participation in beatitude, the better person seems more lovable than the person merely more closely connected to us.

ON THE CONTRARY. 1 Timothy 5 teaches that one who does not care for his own, especially his household, has denied the faith. Interior affection should correspond to exterior charitable action; therefore charity has a special intensity toward those closer to us.

RESPONSE. Every act is proportioned both to its object and to its agent. From the object it receives its species; from the power of the agent it receives the mode of its intensity. Thus charitable love has God for its object and the human lover for its subject. With respect to the good wished, the one nearer to God is to be wished a greater good, because eternal beatitude admits diverse degrees and charity wills divine justice to be observed. But with respect to intensity arising from the lover, those more closely connected to the lover are loved with a more intense affection toward the good charity wills to all.

Moreover, natural relationships are stable, whereas virtue can increase or decrease. Thus I may charitably wish that one closely related to me become better than another and attain a higher degree of beatitude. We also love those connected to us in more ways, because besides charity there are other honest friendships—kinship, citizenship, companionship, and the like. Since their proper goods can be ordered to charity's end, charity can command the acts of those friendships.

ARTICLE VII — SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. (1) To the person nearer to God we ought from charity to wish a greater good. (2) Those nearer to us are
loved with a more intense affection. (3) We may charitably wish that a person closely connected to us become holier
than others and attain greater beatitude. (4) Those joined to us are loved in several legitimate modes of friendship.

COMMENTARY. I warn that St. Thomas's statement about diversity of love “according to species” must

not be taken
to mean that the act by which we wish greater glory to a better person belongs to a different species of charity from the
act by which we wish lesser glory to another. The diversity is considered in relation to charity's object, from which
charity is specified; it is not thereby a specific multiplication of charity itself. Diversity arising from proximity to the
lover is considered from the subject's side.
I note Durandus's view that charity may will unequal goods by complacency but not by desire; he judges the arguments weak and
refers to Cajetan's replies. He also notes that St. Thomas's conclusion about wishing a connected person to become better applies
to the present life. In heaven our will is absolutely conformed to God's manifested will and predestination. Finally, St. Thomas is
principally explaining charity's nature and inclination, not imposing in every such comparison a mortal-sin precept.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER THE PERSON MOST CLOSELY CONNECTED TO

US BY CARNAL ORIGIN IS
TO BE LOVED MOST

OBJECTIONS. Chosen friendship can appear stronger than blood relationship; Ambrose says spiritual children may
be loved no less than bodily children; and in military matters one must obey the commander rather than one's father.

ON THE CONTRARY. The Decalogue specially commands honor toward parents.

Therefore those joined to us by
natural origin possess a special claim.
RESPONSE. Those more closely connected to us are loved more intensely and under more titles. Yet different relationships must
be compared according to what properly belongs to each. Consanguinity is founded on natural origin; civic friendship on civil
communion; military friendship on military communion. In matters belonging to nature, relatives are preferred; in civil matters,
fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers. Natural origin is prior and more immovable because it pertains to substance,
whereas other relationships supervene and may cease. Hence kinship is more stable, although another friendship can be stronger
regarding its own proper matter.
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Spiritual children may rightly be preferred in benefits belonging to spiritual generation, such as instruction in morals, while bodily
children have a stronger claim to bodily provision. Obedience to a commander rather than one's father in war proves only that
military friendship takes precedence in specifically military matters, not that one's father is simply less loved.

SUMMARY. (1) In things pertaining to nature, blood relatives are to be preferred to persons joined to us in another way.
(2) In matters proper to another particular relationship, those joined by that relationship can be preferred to blood
relatives. (3) Kinship is more stable, though other friendships can be stronger within their proper sphere.

COMMENTARY. St. Thomas speaks per se, from charity and from the things considered in themselves.

Circumstances
can alter the practical order. For the order to bind gravely in a concrete case, the neighbor's necessity must be sufficiently
serious; otherwise departing from it may be no sin or not mortal sin.

I reject the view, reported through Buridan, that blood relationship has no such priority. Natural inclination itself shows how
inhuman it would ordinarily be to abandon a good father or one's children in order to aid private friends, however distinguished. No
benefactor's benefit ordinarily equals that of parents; therefore parents hold a special priority in repayment, unless extreme necessity
or the common good of Church or commonwealth intervenes.

No universal rule settles every case; prudence is required. An impious or cruel parent, or an ungrateful child, can alter the
comparison.

Can another bond surpass consanguinity even in temporal benefits? I answer that not every relative must be preferred to every
friend, because degrees of kinship differ. A friend who has conferred enormous temporal or spiritual benefits and is in grave
necessity may have a stronger claim than a third- or fourth-degree relative, perhaps even a second-degree relative, in equal
necessity. An extraordinary benefactor may even have a claim exceeding that of siblings. Yet ordinarily no such benefits overcome
the temporal duty toward parents unless the parents have behaved with exceptional cruelty or impiety.

In specifically spiritual exercises, spiritual relationships have their proper priority. A religious should, other things equal, cooperate
with a member of his own order in matters belonging to that religious communion. But regarding the ultimate end itself, charity's
common bond embraces all neighbors, and the special intimacy of natural parenthood remains. Thus, provided duties of one's state
are fulfilled, one may and should specially desire beatitude and pray for one's natural parents. I add that merely desiring a greater or
lesser degree of beatitude for one person than another will not ordinarily be mortal sin, provided duties imposed by prayer,
almsgiving, beneficence, and the other virtues are fulfilled.

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ARTICLE IX — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT FROM CHARITY TO LOVE HIS SON MORE THAN HIS FATHER

OBJECTIONS. We seem to love more those to whom we owe greater beneficence, and parents provide for children rather than children storing up for parents. Nature also shows parents loving children more than children love parents. Finally, charity conforms us to God, and God appears to love children more insofar as He bestows benefits upon them.

ON THE CONTRARY. Ambrose gives the order: first God, then parents, then children, then household members.

RESPONSE. The degree of love can be measured from two sides. From the side of the object, that which has the character of a more excellent good and greater likeness to God is more lovable. Thus the father is more lovable insofar as he is loved under the aspect of a principle, which is a more eminent good and more Godlike. From the side of the lover's conjunction, however, the son is more intensely loved. Parents love children as something of themselves; parental love therefore resembles self-love.

Parents know more certainly that the children are theirs, the child is in a sense a part proceeding from the parent, and the parent begins loving the child before the child begins loving the parent. Long-standing love is stronger.

To a principle are due subjection, reverence, and honor; to an effect belongs the reception of the principle's influence and provision. Hence children owe parents more honor, while children ordinarily receive more provision. Yet in a case of parental necessity, gratitude for benefits received binds children strongly to provide for parents.

SUMMARY. (1) From the side of the object, the father is more lovable. (2) From the side of the lover, the son is more intensely loved. (3) In a case of necessity, the child is especially obliged by benefits received to provide for parents.

COMMENTARY. Bonaventure and Gabriel are reported as holding that natural love favors the child over the father, whereas supernatural charity favors the father because one owes one's very being to him. I reject a sharp opposition between natural and supernatural orders: grace perfects rather than destroys nature. The natural reason itself recognizes the debt toward parents. St. Thomas's distinction between the objective reason of good and the subjective intensity of conjunction is therefore necessary.

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COMMENTARY ON

ARTICLE IX (continued) I consider an objection: if parents ordinarily owe greater

provision to children, why should a
child in extreme necessity prefer a parent? I answer that St. Thomas's rule about parents storing up for children
concerns ordinary circumstances, not extreme or very grave necessity. When a parent falls into such necessity, merely
verbal honor is insufficient; the child must provide what is necessary. The debt of gratitude and filial piety toward
parents is prior and must be discharged when its proper occasion arises. The fact that a child is "something of" the
parent does not make child and parent identical, so it does not overturn this duty.

ARTICLE X — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS MOTHER MORE THAN

HIS FATHER OBJECTIONS.
The mother supplies the bodily matter of generation, while the rational soul is created by God; therefore it may seem that
the child receives more from the mother. Mothers are commonly more affectionate toward their children and bear
greater labor in generation, childbirth, and education.

ON THE CONTRARY. Jerome places the father immediately after God in the order of

this natural relation and then
mentions the mother.
RESPONSE. Such comparisons must be understood per se: father precisely as father compared with mother precisely as
mother, other things being equal. Differences in virtue or vice can diminish or dissolve friendship in a particular case.
Considered according to natural generation, father and mother are loved as principles of origin. St. Thomas, following
the biology available to him, assigns the father the more excellent aspect of active principle and the mother the aspect of
receptive material principle. Therefore, per se and under that historical account of generation, he concludes that the
father is more to be loved. The mother supplies the bodily matter, while the formative power attributed to the paternal
seed disposes the matter for reception of the rational soul. The fact that the mother may love more pertains to another
title of friendship—the love owed to one who loves us—rather than the precise title of generator under discussion.
SUMMARY. Per se, father is loved more than mother under the formal aspect of principle of natural generation,
according to the Aristotelian biological framework used in the text.
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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE X

With Cajetan, I stress that the conclusion is formal and assumes other things equal. Absolutely speaking, the reason for loving
the father as father is said to outweigh the reason for loving the mother as mother under the biological premises adopted by St.
Thomas. Nevertheless circumstances can make one obliged to aid or wish a greater good to the mother—for example, where
the mother has been exceptionally beneficent in temporal and spiritual matters while the father has been vicious and negligent.
Considerations of the common good can likewise alter the concrete judgment. These cases are accidental to St. Thomas's
formal comparison.

ARTICLE XI — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS WIFE MORE THAN HIS FATHER AND MOTHER

OBJECTIONS. Genesis says a man leaves father and mother for his wife. Ephesians commands husbands to love
their wives as themselves, and self is loved more than parents. Marriage also includes multiple titles of friendship:
utility, pleasure, and virtue when spouses are virtuous.

ON THE CONTRARY. A husband loves his wife as his own flesh, but one's own body is loved less than neighbor in

the spiritual order; among neighbors parents have a special priority.
RESPONSE. Again the degree of love is measured by the good that is the object and by conjunction with the lover.
According to the reason of objective good, parents are more lovable because they are loved under the aspect of
principle and a more eminent good. According to conjunction, the wife is loved more intensely because husband and
wife become “one flesh.” Thus the wife is loved more intensely, while greater reverence is shown to parents.
Leaving father and mother does not mean abandoning them in every respect. In some matters one must assist parents more
than spouse; Genesis concerns the union of marital cohabitation. “As himself” does not mean strict equality of love but
identifies self-love as a reason for loving the spouse united to oneself.
SUMMARY. Parents possess priority according to the objective title of principle; the wife possesses greater intensity
according to marital conjunction. Hence the wife is loved more intensely, while parents receive greater reverence.

COMMENTARY. I clarify that bodily conjunction is not the ultimate end of marital love but a kind of union causing

love. The chief good wished to a spouse is not merely bodily union but honest good. Drawing on the preceding
discussion, I judge that, per se, in extreme temporal necessity one is more strictly bound to assist a parent than a
spouse, because the debt to the parent is prior and the parent's title as principle is more eminent.
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ARTICLE XII — WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE A BENEFACTOR MORE THAN ONE WHOM HE HAS BENEFITED

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says no greater provocation to love exists than being loved first; therefore the benefactor, who first bestows love and benefit, seems most lovable. Failure to love a benefactor is also a graver sin than ceasing to love one whom we have benefited. God and parents, who stand highest among those loved, are our supreme benefactors.

ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle observes that benefactors commonly love those benefited more than the latter love their benefactors.

RESPONSE. Something is loved more either because it has the reason of a more excellent good or because of greater conjunction.

Under the first aspect, the benefactor is more lovable because he is a principle of good in the recipient, as was said of a father.

Under the second aspect, the benefactor often loves the beneficiary more intensely. Aristotle gives several reasons: the beneficiary is like the benefactor's work, and each naturally loves his work because his own activity and life are manifested in it; the benefactor beholds an honest good in the recipient, while the recipient chiefly beholds a useful good in the benefactor, and honest good is more excellent and enduring than utility; loving belongs to acting and conferring good, whereas being loved belongs to receiving good; and giving benefits is more difficult than receiving them, while we tend to love more what costs us labor. The beneficiary's love toward the benefactor is more strictly owed, so hatred or ingratitude is more sinful. The benefactor's love toward the beneficiary is more spontaneous and therefore commonly readier.

SUMMARY. (1) Under the title of more excellent good, the benefactor is more lovable. (2) Under the title of conjunction through one's own work, the beneficiary is often more intensely loved by the benefactor. I also add from St. Thomas's reply that spontaneous love arising from oneself has a certain priority over love elicited by another's prior benefit.

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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE XII AND COMPARISON OF SON AND WIFE

I say the principal difficulty is resolved by St. Thomas's distinction: love of a beneficiary toward a benefactor is more due, so
its contrary involves greater sin; love of a benefactor toward the beneficiary is more spontaneous and prompt. Nor is it
universally true that every beneficiary is loved more than every benefactor. God and parents, from whom we receive the
greatest benefits, are preferred to persons upon whom we ourselves have bestowed lesser benefits.
Cajetan asks whether son or wife is more lovable, a comparison St. Thomas did not explicitly treat. I give two conclusions.

First, according to the objective reason of good, the wife is more lovable because she is a co-principle with the husband in the
generation of children, while the son is an effect; a co-principle has the character of a more excellent good than an effect.

Second, according to conjunction, the son is loved more intensely because he is something of the parent's substance, whereas
the spouse is not a part but a partner and co-principle. Hence spouses more especially honor one another, while parents often
love children more intensely. I points to the ordinarily greater grief at a child's death, other things equal, as a sign of this
intensity.

ARTICLE XIII — WHETHER THE ORDER OF CHARITY REMAINS IN HEAVEN

OBJECTIONS. Perfect charity seems to love greater goods more and lesser goods less; therefore in heaven one might
love a better person more than oneself or a stranger more than a relative. Every blessed person wills the good
possessed by each according to God's will, and the better possess greater glory. Finally, in heaven God will be “all in
all,” so proximity to God appears to become the sole measure.

ON THE CONTRARY. Glory does not destroy nature but perfects it. The order of charity previously established
proceeds from nature, and natural things love themselves with a special immediacy. Therefore the order remains.

RESPONSE. The order certainly remains insofar as God is loved above all, for in heaven man perfectly enjoys God
as ultimate end. Regarding self and others, however, distinguish the degree of good wished from the intensity of love.

According to the good wished, the blessed love the better more insofar as they perfectly will each to possess the degree
assigned by divine justice. The time of meriting greater reward has ended, so the blessed will rests in what God has
determined. According to intensity of love, however, each still loves himself more intensely than another, even a
better neighbor, because the intensity of the act arises from the loving subject and charity first orders one's own mind
to God.

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ARTICLE XIII — THE ORDER OF CHARITY IN HEAVEN (continued)

With respect to the blessed considered among themselves, proximity to God becomes incomparably more decisive. The entire
blessed life consists in the mind's order to God. Thus, among neighbors, the one nearer to God will simply be loved more
according to charity. The practical need for temporal provision, which in this life requires us to give special care to those
dependent upon us by various relationships, will have ceased.
Nevertheless honest causes of natural affection do not vanish from the souls of the blessed. A blessed person can still love
someone connected to him under more titles than another person; but all such titles are incomparably surpassed by the title
derived from proximity to God.
SUMMARY. (1) God remains loved above all in heaven. (2) According to the degree of objective good wished, each
blessed person wills the better person the greater good divinely assigned to him. (3) According to intensity of self-love,
each loves himself more intensely than another because charity first orders his own mind to God. (4) Among other
blessed neighbors, the better and more Godlike is simply loved more. (5) Natural and honest relationships remain as
additional titles of love, though subordinate to proximity to God.

QUESTION XXVII — ON THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS LOVE

ARTICLE I — WHETHER

IT IS MORE PROPER TO CHARITY TO BE LOVED THAN TO LOVE
OBJECTIONS. Charity is better in better persons, and better persons ought to be loved more. Many people desire to
be loved rather than to love. Augustine also says that being loved first is a powerful provocation to love.

ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle says friendship consists more in loving than in being

loved; charity is a friendship.
RESPONSE. To love belongs to charity precisely insofar as charity is a virtue, for every virtue essentially inclines to
its proper act. To be loved is not the act of the charity in the person who is loved; it belongs to him because his
goodness moves another person to an act of love. Therefore loving belongs to charity more properly than being loved.
Friends are praised especially because they love, and those who are loved without loving in return are blamed.
Mothers, who exemplify intense love, characteristically seek more to love than to be loved.
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QUESTION XXVII, ARTICLE I — WHETHER LOVING IS MORE PROPER TO

CHARITY (continued)

People seek to be loved and honored because these manifest some good existing in themselves. Thus being loved is desired for the sake of something else—the recognition of good in the beloved. But those possessing charity seek to love for its own sake, because the act of loving is itself charity's proper good. Hence charity more properly wills to love than to be loved. Being loved may provoke a person to love, but it is not the final end of the act of loving; it is an occasion or path inducing love.

SUMMARY. It is more proper to charity to love than to be loved, because loving is charity's own elicited act, whereas being loved comes to the beloved from another person's act.

COMMENTARY. I apply St. Thomas's reply even to our love of God. We may love God while intending to be

loved more by Him, but God's love for us is not the final end of our charity. God's prior love is the principle of our love: “not as though we had loved Him, but because He first loved us.” A person may also intend, through loving God, an increase of grace, which is an effect of God's love toward us. Yet charity does not terminate in wishing greater grace for oneself; increased grace is itself desired so that one may become able to love God more for His own sake.

An objection says grace, by which we become partakers of the divine nature, is better than charity and its act; therefore charity should love grace more than its own act. I distinguish. Grace and charity considered as supernatural qualities can be compared such that grace is the root and in that respect the more fundamental gift. But charity considered in its act toward its proper object has a higher terminus: through its act it loves God Himself as good in Himself, whereas in loving grace it loves God as participated by us. The direct tendency toward God therefore possesses the higher formal good.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER LOVE, INSOFAR AS IT IS AN ACT OF CHARITY, IS THE

SAME AS

BENEVOLENCE

OBJECTIONS. Aristotle defines loving as willing good to someone, which appears identical with benevolence. Charity is a habit of the will and its act tends toward good. Aristotle also enumerates willing good and willing existence and life to a friend among the first features of friendship.

ON THE CONTRARY. Aristotle says benevolence is neither friendship nor love but a

beginning of friendship. Since charity is friendship, benevolence cannot simply be identical with charity's act of love.

RESPONSE (beginning). Benevolence properly means an act of will by which we will good to another. This differs from actual love both in sensitive appetite and in intellectual appetite. Sensitive love is a passion involving an impetus toward its object and ordinarily arises through repeated consideration of the beloved, whereas benevolence can arise suddenly from a judgment of reason—for example, when watching two contestants and spontaneously wishing victory to one. Intellectual love likewise differs from bare benevolence because love implies an affective union with the beloved: the lover regards the beloved as in some way one with himself or belonging to him and is thereby moved toward him. Benevolence, by contrast, is the simple willing of good to another even before such affective union is presupposed.

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QUESTION XXVII — ON THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS LOVE

ARTICLE II — WHETHER

LOVE, AS AN ACT OF CHARITY, IS THE SAME AS BENEVOLENCE (continued)

RESPONSE. Benevolence is properly an act of the will by which we will good to another. Love, however, adds something beyond bare benevolence. In sensitive appetite love is a passion carrying an impulse toward the beloved; it normally arises through a certain continued consideration or familiarity. Benevolence, by contrast, can arise suddenly from the judgment of reason—as when spectators, seeing two contestants, suddenly wish that one of them win.

Intellectual love likewise differs from benevolence. Love implies a certain affective union of the lover with the beloved: the lover regards the beloved as in some way one with himself or belonging to himself, and thus is moved toward him. Benevolence is simply willing some good to another even without presupposing this affective union. Therefore charity's love includes benevolence but adds union of affection. Hence Aristotle calls benevolence a beginning of friendship.

REPLIES. Aristotle's definition, “to love is to will good to someone,” does not express the whole essence of love, but something belonging to it in which love is especially manifested. Love is indeed an act of the will tending toward good, but with a union to the beloved that bare benevolence does not imply. The features Aristotle assigns to friendship—willing the friend's good and existence, living pleasantly with him, choosing the same things, grieving and rejoicing with him—belong to friendship insofar as they proceed from the love by which one treats a friend as oneself.

SUMMARY. Charity's act of love includes benevolence, but adds affective union with the beloved. I note that materially the same act can be called an act of charity and benevolence, yet “charity” or “love” signifies something more divine because it includes the union and impetus of affection tending toward God.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY FOR HIS OWN SAKE

OBJECTIONS. Gregory says that from known things the soul learns to love unknown divine things; God is known through created things; and hope and fear dispose us toward charity by expected rewards and feared punishments. It therefore seems that God is loved because of something else.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says that to enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake, and God is to be enjoyed.

RESPONSE. “Because of” can signify four kinds of cause: final, formal, efficient, or material/dispositive. We love medicine because of health as final cause; a man because of virtue as formal cause; someone because he is the son of a certain father as efficient-causal title; and a person because benefits received disposed us to love him, as a material disposition. In the first three senses God is not loved because of another: He is the ultimate end; His goodness is not received from a form other than Himself; and His goodness is not caused by another. In the fourth sense, however, other things can dispose us to advance in God's love—benefits received, rewards hoped for, or punishments we seek to avoid.

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ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS LOVED FOR HIS OWN SAKE: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. First, if “because of” denotes final, formal, or efficient cause, God is not loved because of another, since He is not ordered to another end, does not receive His formal goodness from another, and His goodness is not efficiently caused. Second, if it denotes a disposition reduced to material causality, God can be loved because of other things insofar as benefits, hoped-for rewards, or feared punishments dispose us to progress in divine love. Third, principally and formally, God is to be loved for Himself because He is the ultimate end and the supreme good by His very substance.

COMMENTARY. I clarify that St. Thomas deliberately distinguishes these senses. He then asks whether it is lawful to love God for temporal or eternal reward, or to avoid temporal or eternal punishment, and similarly whether one may observe the commandments for such motives.

He distinguishes two kinds of “mercenary love.” The first loves solely for wages, with the wage not itself ordered to the person giving it as final end—like a hired laborer cultivating a rich man's vineyard only for his private gain. This is mercenary love simply speaking. The second loves someone while hoping for a reward from him, yet with the present disposition that one would still love him even if the reward were removed. This is better called “love of reward” than mercenary love in the strict sense.

I also distinguish two questions: whether God Himself, the beloved reality, is ordered to something else as an end; and whether our created act of loving God can itself be ordered toward our happiness or some temporal good. Ends too are distinguished: God alone is the absolutely ultimate end, whereas a proximate end may be principal within a particular action, as health is the principal end of medication without excluding the absolutely ultimate end.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is sinful to love God with mercenary love in the first sense. Such a person attempts to enjoy a creature as ultimate end and thus overturns right order. I compare this with servile fear joined to servility: just as punishment is feared solely as one's own evil, so reward is sought as one's own good apart from due reference to God.

SECOND CONCLUSION. It can never be lawful to order God Himself to a created thing as either ultimate or proximate end in the way medicine is ordered to health. God is in no way orderable to a creature; intending to subordinate Him to a creature derogates from divine majesty.

THIRD CONCLUSION (introduced). It is lawful to love God while ordering the created act of loving Him toward our eternal happiness and reward as a means, provided our happiness itself remains ordered to God as the absolutely ultimate end.

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ARTICLE III — LOVE OF GOD, REWARD, AND TEMPORAL GOODS

THIRD CONCLUSION (proof). Eternal happiness is truly an end of human life, and by God's ordinance our meritorious operations are directed toward salvation and happiness. “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt. 19). Merit by its nature is ordered toward reward; therefore the love of God, insofar as meritorious, can be ordered toward eternal life. Scripture likewise speaks of receiving “the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls” (1 Pet. 1). The beatific vision is the most excellent created act, so our other excellent acts can
be ordered toward it.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. According to the Catholic faith it is lawful to do good and love God with a view to eternal
reward—that is, the second kind of “mercenary” love previously distinguished is lawful. I appeal to Psalm 118/119: “I
have inclined my heart to perform your justifications forever, because of the reward,” to Hebrews' praise of Moses for
looking to the recompense, and to Christ enduring the cross for the joy set before Him. He cites the common teaching
of the Fathers, St. Thomas and Capreolus, and invokes the Church's doctrinal judgment, especially the Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 31: one must not say that the justified person sins by acting well with a view to eternal reward. Friendship itself supports this: a friend rightly desires the presence and company of his friend; therefore God's friends may act in order to attain God's presence and beatitude.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. It is also lawful to love and serve God with a view to temporal goods, provided such goods are
not constituted as the absolutely ultimate end. The Church herself asks God for health, rain, and other temporal goods
and offers acts of worship in petition for them. The Old Law promised temporal goods to those observing God's commandments; the New Law teaches us to ask for daily bread. Temporal goods can serve as instruments for virtuous
action and can fall under merit in their due order.

Thus an intention such as “I will give alms, pray, or love God so that He may grant me health” can be good in its object and
need not be corrupted by its circumstance of end. There is no inversion where the lesser good remains orderable to the ultimate
end; the agent need not at every moment make that ultimate reference explicit.

I note that Durandus appears at first to oppose this, but qualifies his position where temporal goods are not aids to spiritual
good. I add that even when temporal goods are not directly spiritual aids, serving God for them need not be mortal sin so long
as they are not ordered toward mortal sin. Seeking a superfluity of temporal goods can, however, introduce venial disorder, just
as almsgiving for vainglory may be venially defective.

REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS. Love of reward is not mercenary love simply speaking and therefore is not contrary to
charity. “Loving God for reward” must be distinguished: if “for reward” determines the action of loving, the act may
be ordered to obtaining a reward which itself is ordered to God; this is lawful. If it determines God as the thing loved—so that God Himself is loved merely as a means to reward—it is unlawful and would make the reward more
loved than God.

Likewise, obeying God in order to escape hell or temporal evils does not universally mean loving oneself more than God. If
one positively cuts off the order to God as ultimate end, the order is perverted. But if one simply intends, “I wish to escape hell,
and for this I will keep God's commandments,” without excluding God as ultimate end, the act is not contrary to charity,
although it manifests imperfect charity, since perfect charity casts out fear.

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ARTICLE IV — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED IMMEDIATELY IN THIS LIFE

OBJECTIONS. Unknown things cannot be loved, and in this life God is not immediately known, since we see
“through a glass in an obscure manner.” Further, loving God is in a way greater than knowing Him, because he who
adheres to God by love becomes one spirit with Him; if immediate knowledge is impossible, immediate love seems still
more impossible. Finally, sin separates man from God and belongs especially to the will, suggesting that immediate
union through love is less possible than immediate knowledge.

ON THE CONTRARY. Our mediated knowledge of God is called enigmatic and will

cease in heaven, but charity does
not cease. Therefore the charity of the wayfarer adheres immediately to God.

RESPONSE. Cognitive acts are perfected by the known object existing intentionally in the knower; appetitive acts are
perfected by the appetite's inclination toward the thing itself. Hence cognition follows the mode of the knower, while
appetite tends toward things according to the condition they have in reality. In themselves, God is knowable and
lovable through Himself, as subsistent Truth and Goodness. But for us, knowledge begins from sense, so creatures
nearer to sense are first known and from them our knowledge rises to God. Love, however, once God is known, can
terminate in God Himself as He is good in Himself. Thus charity tends first and immediately to God and from God is
extended to other things. Knowledge proceeds from creatures to God; charity proceeds from God, as ultimate end, to
creatures.

Therefore although the order of knowledge and love cannot be wholly separated—nothing unknown can be loved—they need
not be identical. Where cognition terminates in the thing known through another, love can immediately begin in that very
reality. Charity removes the aversion from God caused by sin and unites the soul immediately to God by a spiritual bond.

SUMMARY. God can be loved immediately even in this life because appetitive movement tends to the thing as it is in
itself. Charity therefore tends to God as He is good in Himself, although our present cognition reaches Him through
created effects.

COMMENTARY. I say St. Thomas intends precisely to mark the difference between present knowledge

and present
love of God. God in Himself needs no medium to be knowable or lovable; nevertheless our present knowledge arises
from sense and reaches God through creatures, whereas charity's appetitive movement can terminate immediately in
God Himself and only afterward extend from Him to other things.

I raise difficulties. If the reason for mediated knowledge is that human cognition begins from sense, would an angel—whose
cognition does not begin from sense—know God immediately in the state of the way? And if appetitive motion tends to the
good as it exists in reality, would both angels and men naturally love God immediately even without supernatural charity?

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ARTICLE IV — COMMENTARY ON IMMEDIATE LOVE OF GOD (continued)

I presses the second difficulty: if appetitive movement reaches the good as it exists in reality, it seems that even natural love in
angel and man would immediately terminate in God, who is good through Himself. Yet man and angel naturally love
themselves first, since their own goodness is first known; Aristotle's doctrine that friendship toward another derives from
friendship toward oneself seems to confirm this.
A third difficulty asks whether St. Thomas is comparing natural knowledge with supernatural charity. If both are natural, the
discussion misses the present subject; if both belong to grace, the claim that cognition begins from sense seems inappropriate; if
natural cognition is compared with supernatural love, the comparison appears disproportionate. Moreover faith itself is a
theological virtue whose object is God. Theology proceeds from God to creatures, unlike philosophy, which proceeds from
creatures to God. Does this not also give faith immediate contact with God?

I answer that St. Thomas sufficiently proves the conclusion and speaks of cognition in

common—natural or supernatural in this
life, excluding beatific vision. “Immediately” can refer to an immediate terminative object, an immediate motive object, or
both. Our cognition can also be distinguished as apprehension of the object and assent/judgment concerning it.
As to natural love, if “immediately” means that God can be the terminus reached by love, I grants that an intellectual creature
can, from self-love as a motive, reach the supreme good as loved for its own sake. But if it means the first act in the order of
natural love, he denies it: natural angelic and human love is more immediate and prior toward self than toward God.
He then emphasizes the singular excellence of charity. Faith's formal object is indeed First Truth speaking, but in the wayfarer's
state it is apprehended under the obscure light of faith; it does not manifest God as He is in Himself. Faith therefore presupposes
created modes of apprehension, even though its assent and judgment immediately concern divine truths. Charity's most formal
object, by contrast, is the supreme good as supernatural end—God's own goodness as it is in Him. Charity therefore produces
an immediate union of the will with God, not merely habitual union through grace but actual union when God is actually loved.
Charity first loves God and then neighbor, though after both have been loved the love of neighbor can in turn become a motive
for renewed love of God.
The objection “nothing is willed unless first known; therefore if God's goodness is not known as it is in itself, it cannot be loved
as it is in itself” is denied on the basis of St. Thomas's distinction between the mode of cognition and the terminus of appetite.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED TOTALLY

OBJECTIONS. Love follows knowledge, but we cannot comprehend God totally. Love is a kind of union, but the
human heart cannot be totally united to God, who is greater than our heart. Finally, God loves Himself totally; if a
creature loved Him totally in the same sense, it would seem to love God as much as God loves Himself.

ON THE CONTRARY. Deuteronomy commands: “You shall love the Lord your God with

your whole heart.”
RESPONSE (beginning). Since love stands between lover and beloved, “totally” can be understood in three ways.
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ARTICLE V — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED TOTALLY (continued)

First, totality may refer to the thing loved. In this sense God is to be loved totally: everything belonging to God is to be loved.

Second, totality may refer to the lover. In this sense too God is to be loved totally: man must love God with his whole power
and order everything he possesses toward divine love, according to Deuteronomy 6, “You shall love the Lord your God with
your whole heart.” Third, totality may express an equality between the lover's mode of loving and the beloved's measure of
lovability—loving God as much as He is lovable. This is impossible. Since a thing is lovable insofar as it is good, God's
infinite goodness is infinitely lovable; every natural or infused power of a creature is finite and cannot love infinitely.

SUMMARY. God is totally lovable both with respect to the whole reality loved and with respect to the lover giving
his whole power. But no creature can love God with an intensity proportionately equal to God's infinite lovability.

COMMENTARY. I points the reader to the following article and to earlier discussions for how the precept of
loving
God can be fulfilled in this life.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER THERE IS ANY MODE OR MEASURE TO BE OBSERVED IN DIVINE LOVE

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says goodness consists in mode, species, and order, and charity is the highest good in man;
therefore it seems charity must have a mode. Augustine also explicitly asks what the mode of loving God is. Finally,
reason measures human will and exterior action; therefore it seems interior divine love also must be measured by
reason.

ON THE CONTRARY. Bernard says: “The cause of loving God is God; the mode is to love without mode.”

RESPONSE. “Mode” signifies a determination of measure. Such determination exists differently in a measure and in
the thing measured. The measure is determinative of other things through itself; measured things possess mode
insofar as they attain their measure. In appetible and practical matters, the end is the measure, because what we
desire and do receives its proper ratio from the end. Thus an end, as end, is not limited in the same manner as means
to the end. A physician does not set a limit to health as though one could have too much health; he limits medicine
according to its proportion to health. Too much or too little medicine would be immoderate.

The love of God is the end of all human actions and affections, by which we especially attain the ultimate end. Therefore
divine love does not have mode as a measured means having an upper limit; rather it has mode as measure itself, in which
there is no excess. The more perfectly the rule is attained, the better. Hence the more God is loved, the better the love.

REPLIES. Goodness belonging to the measure through itself is higher than goodness belonging to the measured
through another; thus charity, having mode as measure, excels virtues measured by it. Augustine's “mode” of loving
God is to love Him with the whole heart—as much as one can. An affection whose object falls under reason's
judgment is measured by reason; but God, the object of divine love, exceeds reason's judgment. Interior charity
therefore is not measured by reason in the same way as exterior acts, which are means and must be proportioned
both by charity and prudence.

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ARTICLE VI — THE MODE OF DIVINE LOVE: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. First, no mode is assigned to the love of God as though charity were a measured thing in which one could simply take too much or too little, because divine love functions as the measure and end of human actions.

Second, charity possesses mode as a measure: there can be no excess in approaching its proper rule, and therefore the more God is loved, the better.

COMMENTARY. I remark that Cajetan passes quickly over this article, but he finds it difficult and worthy of examination. I ask whether St. Thomas's conclusions are true and sufficiently proved.

First objection: every vital act is referred to its object and end as measure; therefore love of God itself is measured by its object and end, and thus appears to have mode as a measured thing.

Second objection: divine love in this life is a deliberate human act and therefore must be measured by reason and prudence as to when and where it should be exercised. If someone persists in an explicit act of contemplation when a precept requires him to care for a sick person, he sins through a defect in the circumstance of time. Thus reason seems to place a mode upon divine love.

Third objection: something can be a measure relative to one thing while measured relative to another. Even if charity measures other human actions, could it not itself be measured relative to beatitude, toward which it disposes man as an end? I note that Thomists hold the essence of beatitude to consist in the vision of God, so one cannot simply answer that charity itself is the absolutely final created act.

Fourth objection: St. Thomas says charity has mode as a measure and thereby excels other virtues. Does this imply that its "mode" is not without mode, or that there is no more and less in divine love? Yet plainly one person can love God more than another, and the same person can later love more intensely than before.

For interpretation, I appeal to St. Thomas's teaching on whether the theological virtues consist in a mean. They do not have a mean according to their proper species because they are measured by an infinite object: faith by First Truth, hope by divine mercy, charity by supreme goodness. One cannot exceed these objects by tending "too much" toward them. Nevertheless, acts of the theological virtues can have a rational mode from other aspects: circumstances, the subject's condition, and duties imposed at a given time. In this life an act of charity is free on the subject's side and therefore prudence regulates when it is exercised so that another commanded act is not impeded. Charity itself can command that an explicit act cease so that a man sleeps and preserves his life.

But from its proper object—supreme good and ultimate end—charity is not regulated by prudence or limited by rational measure. Rather, charity is the general leader ordering all things to its end. I evokes the Song of Songs: God "ordered charity" in the soul, and divine love is like the standard-bearer of the army of virtues, ordering the soul's advance toward God.

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ARTICLE VI — RESOLUTION (continued)

To the first objection I distinguish. If “mode” means a fixed limit imposed by reason, divine love has no such mode from its
proper object. If “mode” means the specification received from its object, then it does have mode; but precisely in this respect
its mode is “without mode,” that is, without a limiting terminus. God's infinite goodness does not impose an upper boundary
upon charity's intensity, duration, or other perfection arising from its proper object.
To the second objection he grants that, from the side of circumstances and the human subject, an act of divine love can have a
mode prescribed by prudence.
To the third, he says divine love is not limited from the side of its object by a proportion to some finite degree of beatific
vision. The concrete degree of glory is instead proportioned through the disposition of free will and divine predestination, God
disposing a person through a certain intensity of love toward a corresponding degree of vision. Cajetan explains St. Thomas's
statement that love is the end of human actions by comparing charity's interior act with exterior or commanded acts that are
means to the end. St. Thomas is not comparing charity with the beatific vision considered as a naturally caused act of the
glorified intellect. The vision has, in one respect, more of the ratio of end than the act of love. Yet the beatific vision does not
exclude the will's adhesion to God; rather the will's adherence belongs to the complete attainment of the end. Thus St. Thomas
is not contradicting his doctrine that essential beatitude consists in vision.
To the fourth objection, charity has mode as a measure that excels other virtues, but “the mode of loving God is without mode”
means without limitation arising from charity's proper formal object. There is an equivocation in “mode”: charity's mode as
specification comes from its formal object, while “without mode” denies a limiting maximum such as moral virtues have in
objects ordered as means. Likewise, when St. Thomas denies a “more and less” in divine love, he means that the proper object
does not establish a rational mean between excess and defect. He immediately adds that the more God is loved, the better.

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE AN ENEMY THAN A FRIEND

OBJECTIONS. Christ asks what reward there is in loving those who love us, while commanding love of enemies. Augustine associates enemy-love with the perfection of God's children. Finally, loving an enemy requires greater effort and Scripture says each receives reward according to labor.

ON THE CONTRARY. What is better is more meritorious; a loving friend is better than a hating enemy, and it seems

better to love the better person.
RESPONSE (beginning). The reason for loving one's neighbor from charity is God. The two acts can be compared from the side of the neighbor loved or from the reason for which he is loved. From the side of the neighbor, love of a friend excels: the friend is better and more closely united, and therefore is more suitable matter for charity. Hence hatred of a friend is worse than hatred of an enemy. From the side of the reason for loving, however, enemy-love has a
certain excellence: love of a friend can have another accompanying motive besides God, while under the precise aspect of enemy the charitable reason for loving is God alone. Further, charity's strength is manifested when divine love extends the soul to what is more remote and difficult.
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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER LOVING AN ENEMY IS MORE MERITORIOUS

(continued)

St. Thomas compares charity to fire: the stronger the fire, the farther its heat can extend and the less combustible the matter it can
burn. Likewise divine love is shown stronger when for God's sake we accomplish more difficult things, such as loving an enemy.

Yet the same fire acts more intensely on what is near than on what is remote. So charity, considered according to its proper
inclination, loves those joined to us more fervently than those remote from us. In this respect love of friends, considered in itself,
is more fervent and better than love of enemies.

Christ's statement that love of friends has no reward is to be understood per se of friends loved merely because they are friends,
especially where this natural friendship excludes love of enemies. Love of friends is meritorious when they are loved for God's
sake and not solely because they are friends.

SUMMARY. (1) From the side of the neighbor loved, love of a friend excels love of an enemy because the friend is better
and more closely united. (2) From the side of the reason for loving, love of an enemy has a certain excellence: under the
aspect of enemy, God alone supplies charity's reason for loving, and the extension of charity to the more remote
manifests greater strength. (3) Nevertheless, love of friends considered according to charity's own inclination is in itself
more fervent and better, since charity acts more intensely upon those more closely united.

COMMENTARY. I ask whether St. Thomas's reasoning is sound. First, if the discussion concerns infused

charity, the
formal reason for loving both friend and enemy is the same—God. So how can St. Thomas say that a friend may be loved
for another reason, while an enemy is loved for God alone? If he were speaking of natural love, the discussion would no
longer concern charity. Moreover, even an enemy might be loved because he is the son or brother of someone naturally
loved.

Second, every act of divine charity extends at least in preparedness of soul to every neighbor, including enemies. How, then, can
actual love of enemies uniquely manifest a stronger love of God?

Third, if enemy-love excels from the side of the reason for loving while friend-love excels only from the material object, it might
appear that enemy-love is simply superior, contrary to St. Thomas's third conclusion.

I reply that St. Thomas compares two numerically distinct acts of the same species elicited by the same habit of charity, differing
in their material objects. He is speaking not of merely virtual or habitual love, but of actual and explicit love directed to a neighbor
known as friend and to a neighbor known as enemy.

The acts are not compared according to the specific formal reason in which they agree. Rather, they are compared according to
what differs: love of a friend bears upon a materially better object more closely connected to charity's object; love of an enemy,
precisely under the title “enemy,” presents a simpler and purer motive, because the enemy as enemy supplies no attractive title
from the material object and even includes something naturally repugnant.

The fact that charity universally includes enemies in preparedness of soul does not answer St. Thomas, because he is speaking of
actual and express love of the particular neighbor known to be an enemy.

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ARTICLE VII — I ON FRIEND-LOVE AND ENEMY-LOVE (continued)

I explain the third difficulty. St. Thomas does not say that love of an enemy simply excels because its formal reason specifies
a higher kind of charitable act; both acts share the same formal specification from God as charity's object. Rather,
enemy-love has a superiority secundum quid: its motive appears simpler and purer, and, as a sign taken from the effect, it
more clearly manifests the strength of divine love because charity extends to a more remote object. Love of a friend is not so
certain a sign of stronger divine love because the human will is also naturally attracted by friendship.
These considerations establish a qualified excellence of enemy-love, not a simple superiority according to charity's own
inclination and order. St. Thomas's image of fire makes the distinction clear: fire's power is manifested by reaching distant or
resistant matter, yet the same fire acts more strongly upon what is nearer. So too charity may display heroic strength in
explicit love of enemies while, according to its ordered inclination, loving suitable and closely united objects more fervently.
I report that because of the preceding arguments many scholastics nevertheless hold that loving an enemy is more meritorious
than loving a friend, and that enemy-love is the more excellent act. He names Durandus (III Sent., dist. 30, q. 2), Albert the
Great, Thomas of Strasbourg (Thomas de Argentina), Gabriel Biel, and St. Bonaventure among those associated with this
position.
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QUESTION XXVII - ARTICLE VII (continued) WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO

LOVE AN ENEMY
THAN A FRIEND

I continue the proof of his conclusion. Love of an enemy tends toward the enemy only insofar as he is potentially a friend of God and of ourselves; but love of a friend tends toward him insofar as he is actually a friend. Therefore, simply speaking, the object of the love of a friend is more perfect, and consequently the act itself is better and more meritorious. Again, in loving a friend there is a greater aspect of debt, and therefore a greater conformity with law and the dictate of reason. Hatred of a friend
is also a greater sin than hatred of an enemy; since sin implies privation of rectitude, the contrary act - love of a friend - possesses greater rectitude and perfection.

I appeal to St. Thomas on 1 Corinthians 3: in human affairs a person engaged in the nobler work receives the greater reward, as
the architect is rewarded more than the manual laborer although he may labor less bodily. Likewise, in divine matters the work
nobler according to the form of charity receives more of the essential reward. Therefore, since love of a friend is the more excellent work from the side of its object, it merits a greater reward. If love of friend and enemy are equally intense with respect
to God, the difference concerns an accidental prerogative of reward; if love of the friend is also more intense - as ordinarily occurs - it is more meritorious even with respect to essential reward. If, however, love of the enemy proceeds from a more intense love of God, then that particular act is simply better and more meritorious, but this is accidental to the comparison because the conditions are no longer equal.

Replies to the objections. Christ exhorts all Christians to a love extending even to enemies, so that all men are regarded as neighbors. “If you love only those who love you, what reward shall you have?” concerns a merely natural love of friends, not charity toward God. Romans 5 likewise shows the greatness of God's charity because, while we were enemies, He did not destroy us but gave His Son to make us friends. It does not follow that God loves enemies more than friends with respect to effects; indeed the Apostle says that, having been reconciled, we shall much more be saved by Christ's life.

Love of neighbor, whether friend or enemy, falls under precept when necessity requires it. The counsels do not therefore make
enemy-love simply superior. Christian perfection consists essentially in the precepts of love of God and neighbor, while the counsels serve that perfection instrumentally and secondarily. Enemy-love is called more wonderful because of its difficulty, not because it is simply better.

Difficulty alone does not determine the excellence of virtue. Where all else is equal, an act concerning an object difficult by its
nature may be more meritorious; but difficulty arising from imperfection of the subject can diminish rather than increase merit.

Martyrdom manifests the excellence of charity with special clarity, but it does not follow that every martyr necessarily possesses greater charity than every non-martyr. Before God, the will can be accepted for the deed when the opportunity for the
deed is absent, although actual martyrdom has a special value of satisfaction for purgatorial punishment.

The Fathers who praise enemy-love are therefore understood as praising it as a sign of more perfect charity. Loving a friend does not furnish as certain a sign, since one may be moved by merely human motives. Gregory praises saints distinguished in the difficult love of enemies. Bernard's statement that Christ showed greater charity by dying for enemies concerns the manifestation of His love: He died for enemies in order to make them friends. Finally, Christians admire especially difficult works because in them supernatural love of God is more clearly manifested; easier works may truly proceed from greater charity even though observers cannot discern this as readily.

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ARTICLE VIII - WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE ONE'S

NEIGHBOR THAN TO LOVE GOD

OBJECTIONS. First, the Apostle appears to have preferred love of neighbor to love of God when he says in Romans 9
that he could wish himself anathema from Christ for his brethren. Second, the preceding discussion said that love of a
friend can in some respect be less meritorious; but God is supremely our friend, having first loved us. Third, the more
difficult act seems more virtuous and meritorious, and loving one's neighbor appears more difficult than loving God:
all things naturally love God, and in God there is nothing unlovable, whereas defects are encountered in our neighbor.

ON THE CONTRARY. That for the sake of which something is such is itself more so. Love

of neighbor is meritorious
only because the neighbor is loved for God's sake. Therefore love of God is more meritorious.

RESPONSE. The comparison can be understood in two ways. If each love is considered separately, there is no

doubt that love of

God is more meritorious. Reward is due to it for its own sake, and the ultimate reward itself is the enjoyment of God, toward
whom divine love tends. Hence Christ promises Himself to the one who loves Him: “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my
Father, and I will manifest myself to him.”

But the comparison can be made differently: love of God may be considered insofar as God alone is actually loved, while love
of neighbor is considered insofar as the neighbor is loved for God's sake. In this case love of neighbor includes love of God,
whereas the isolated act of loving God does not actually include love of neighbor. The comparison is then between a more
complete love of God, extending also to neighbor, and an insufficient or imperfect act that does not actually extend to neighbor.

For we have the command that he who loves God should also love his brother. In this sense love of neighbor takes precedence.

REPLIES. Concerning Romans 9, one interpretation holds that Paul had wished such separation while still in unbelief, not in the
state of grace. Chrysostom instead explains that Paul did not love his neighbor more than God, but loved God more than
himself: he was willing temporarily to lose his own enjoyment of God so that God's honor might be advanced in his brethren.

Loving God for Himself does not diminish merit; rather, this constitutes the whole formal reason of merit. Finally, goodness
contributes more to virtue and merit than difficulty; therefore not everything more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is
more difficult while also being better.

COMMENTARY. Love of God considered “separately” is not genuine charity if it does not virtually extend to

neighbor. St. Thomas therefore does not mean a love of God lacking every virtual order to neighbor, but an act that at
that moment does not actually extend to him. Such an act is more meritorious than an isolated act of love of neighbor
that is not actually referred to God, because of the excellence of the object and because the neighbor's charitable
lovability derives from God. But if the neighbor is actually and expressly loved for the sake of God supremely loved,
that act contains both objects expressly, one for the sake of the other, and in that respect it surpasses the isolated act of
loving God. This conclusion presupposes equal intensity. If the isolated act of love of God is more intense, it can simply
be more meritorious because a greater essential reward corresponds to greater charity.

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ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY (conclusion)

If the intensity of the isolated love of God and the love of neighbor expressly for God's sake is equal, the latter is more meritorious
in the relevant comparison, although with respect to essential reward they may be equal insofar as that reward is measured
principally by the intensity of charity toward God. I especially call attention to St. Thomas's reply to the third objection against those
who make difficulty the whole or principal measure of merit.

QUESTION XXVIII - ON JOY St. Thomas now considers the effects following charity's

principal act, which is love: first
the interior effects, in the next three questions, and afterward the exterior effects.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER JOY IN US IS AN EFFECT OF CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. The absence of a beloved thing ordinarily produces sorrow rather than joy, and while we are in the body
we are absent from the Lord. Again, mourning is numbered among the acts by which beatitude is merited: “Blessed are
they that mourn.” Finally, charity is distinct from hope, while Scripture says, “rejoicing in hope”; therefore joy seems to
arise from hope rather than charity.

ON THE CONTRARY. The charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit,

and the kingdom of God is
“justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.” Therefore charity causes joy.

RESPONSE. As explained in treating the passions, both joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. Joy is caused by
love either through the presence of the beloved good or because the good proper to the beloved exists and is preserved in him. The
latter especially belongs to benevolent love: a person rejoices at a friend's prosperity even while the friend is absent. Sorrow, on the
contrary, arises either from absence of the beloved or because the beloved, to whom we wish good, is deprived of his good or
oppressed by evil.

Charity is love of God. God's good is immutable, since He is His own goodness. Moreover, through the very fact that He is loved,
God is present in the lover by a most noble effect: “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” Therefore the spiritual
joy we have concerning God is caused by charity.

We are pilgrims from the Lord only in comparison with the presence by unveiled vision; nevertheless He is present to those who
love Him even in this life through the indwelling of grace. The mourning that merits beatitude concerns things contrary to beatitude,
and therefore arises from the same charity that causes spiritual joy in God: to rejoice in a good and to grieve over what opposes it
have the same root. Spiritual joy concerning God can be twofold: rejoicing in the divine good considered in itself, which is the
higher joy and proceeds principally from charity; and rejoicing in the divine good insofar as it is participated by us, which also
proceeds from hope, through which we await enjoyment of the divine good.

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QUESTION XXVIII -

ARTICLE I,

COMMENTARY First, I distinguish joy (gaudium) from sensible delight (delectatio). Delight is common to rational

and irrational animals; joy properly belongs to a rational creature. What in brute animals is sensible delight is, in man's intellectual appetite, joy. Second, joy should not most properly be identified with willing itself. If “volition” is taken broadly as acceptance or complacency, joy may in a loose sense be called volition and sorrow nolition. More properly, however, joy is an effect of willing and especially of love. It follows naturally upon the presence or possession
of the beloved good, as delight follows in a well-disposed sense from contact with what is sweet. Hence joy as such is not
meritorious simply in itself; it suffices that its proximate cause be free and meritorious. I compare the pain of hunger in
one who freely fasts: the pain follows naturally from lack of food, yet belongs to a freely undertaken meritorious act.

Third, I say that an excellent indication for judging whether a man is in grace is that he rejoices in divine goods and
grieves over evils opposed to them. Following Cajetan, I add that charity, precisely as love of God, produces joy under
both aspects of love: benevolence or complacency in God Himself, and the joy associated with God's presence to the lover. God's own good is immutable and can suffer no loss, and therefore always supplies matter for joy to the one who
loves Him. Charity also makes God present in the soul by its most noble effect - grace and charity elevating the creature to participation in the divine nature - and this presence likewise produces great joy. The first joy is greater and more essential to charity because it concerns God directly in Himself; the second can increase the first when God's
presence and sanctifying action in the soul are referred back to His glory.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY CAUSED BY CHARITY ADMITS AN

ADMIXTURE OF
SORROW OBJECTIONS. Charity makes us rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep, so charitable joy appears mixed with sorrow. True repentance, which requires charity, includes mourning for past sins. And charity makes one desire to depart and be with Christ, while the delay of that desire produces sorrow: “Woe is me,
that my sojourning is prolonged.”

ON THE CONTRARY. The joy of charity is joy in divine wisdom, whose companionship has no

bitterness.
RESPONSE. Charity causes two kinds of joy concerning God. The principal joy proper to charity is joy in the divine good considered in itself. This joy admits no admixture of sorrow, because the divine good itself can admit no admixture of evil; hence, “Rejoice in the Lord always.” The second is joy in the divine good insofar as it is participated
by us. Such participation can be hindered by something contrary to it, and therefore this joy can be accompanied by sorrow when a person grieves over what impedes participation in the divine good either in himself or in neighbors whom he loves as himself. Thus we grieve at a neighbor's evil insofar as his participation in the supreme good is impeded. We mourn sins because they divide us from God. And although in this life we participate in the divine good by knowledge and love, our present misery prevents the perfect participation found in heaven; sorrow over delayed glory therefore concerns an impediment to the full participation of the divine good.
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ARTICLE II - SUMMARY

First conclusion: the joy by which we rejoice in the divine good considered in itself admits no admixture of sorrow, because the
divine good in which it rejoices cannot contain evil. Second conclusion: joy in the divine good insofar as it is participated by us
can be mixed with sorrow, because that participation can be hindered by something contrary to it.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY CAUSED BY CHARITY CAN BE FULL IN US

OBJECTIONS. The more we rejoice in God, the more our joy is filled; but no creature can rejoice in God as much as
His infinite goodness deserves. Again, what is full cannot become greater, yet the joy of one blessed person can be
greater than another's. Finally, comprehension appears to mean fullness of knowledge, and no finite creature can
comprehend God; likewise, then, no finite appetitive power should be capable of full joy in God.

ON THE CONTRARY. Christ says to His disciples: “That my joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled.”

RESPONSE. Fullness of joy can be understood in two ways. First, from the side of the thing rejoiced in: one would
rejoice in it as much as it deserves. In this sense God's joy in Himself alone is full, because His joy is infinite and
proportioned to His infinite goodness. Every creature's joy is finite.

Second, fullness can be understood from the side of the one rejoicing. Joy is related to desire as rest to movement. Rest is full
when nothing remains of the movement; joy is therefore full when nothing remains to be desired. As long as we are in this
world, desire does not cease, because we can still draw nearer to God through grace. But once perfect beatitude is attained,
nothing remains to be desired: there will be full enjoyment of God, and in Him man will possess whatever other goods he
rightly desired. All desire will therefore be at rest, and the joy of the blessed will be perfectly full - indeed superabundant,
because they receive more than they could have adequately desired: “Eye has not seen... what God has prepared for those who
love him.” Yet no creature can contain joy proportioned to God Himself; rather, in the Gospel image, the man enters into “the
joy of your Lord.”

At beatitude each person reaches the terminus assigned by divine predestination. Nothing further remains for him to tend
toward, although one blessed soul may attain a greater participation of God than another. Thus each one's joy is full from the
side of the one rejoicing, while one person's joy can still be greater because of a fuller participation in divine beatitude.

Likewise, although no creature comprehends God from the side of the object known, cognition can possess a fullness from the
side of the knower; the same distinction applies to joy.

SUMMARY. Charity's joy cannot be fully completed in the state of the way, but will be completed in heaven as the
repose of every rightly ordered desire.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER JOY IS A VIRTUE (beginning)

It seems so because sorrow can be a vice, because love and hope are passions yet also name virtues, and because Scripture
commands us to rejoice in the Lord. But joy is not numbered among the theological, moral, or intellectual virtues.

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ARTICLE IV - WHETHER JOY IS A VIRTUE

RESPONSE. Virtue is an operative habit and therefore has, according to its proper nature, an inclination toward an act. Several
ordered acts of the same general line can proceed from one habit, with later acts following from an earlier one. Since those later
acts proceed from the habit through the prior act, a virtue is defined and named from the prior act rather than from every
consequent act.
Love is the first affection of the appetitive power; desire and joy follow from love. Therefore the same virtuous habit inclines a
person to love, to desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But because love is prior among these acts, the virtue is named
from love - charity - rather than from desire or joy. Joy is therefore not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act or effect of
charity, and for this reason is numbered among the fruits of the Spirit.
Sorrow that is vicious can arise from disordered self-love, which is not one special vice but a general root of vices; consequently
particular forms of sorrow such as sloth and envy can be numbered as special vices. Love of God, however, already has its
special virtue, charity, to which joy is reduced as its proper consequent. Hope differs because it adds a special formal aspect on
the side of its object - the arduous good possible to attain - and therefore is a distinct virtue. Joy adds no such new formal aspect
to the object beyond love. The command to rejoice is given insofar as joy is an act of charity, though not charity's first act.
SUMMARY. Joy is not a virtue distinct from charity; it is an act or effect of charity.

COMMENTARY. With Cajetan he notes that sorrow would fail to constitute a special vice if there were

already a
special vice in the prior act from which that sorrow followed. Disordered self-love is general rather than a special vice,
so particular vicious sorrows can be special vices. If there were a special vice of hatred corresponding to the same good
whose loss produces a particular sorrow, that hatred would stand to sorrow as charity stands to joy, and sorrow would
not need to constitute a separate special vice.

QUESTION XXIX - ON PEACE

ARTICLE I - WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD

OBJECTIONS. Augustine defines the peace of men as ordered concord. Concord is a union of wills, and Dionysius
says peace is unitive and productive of consent. Moreover, dissension is opposed to both. Therefore peace appears
identical with concord.

ON THE CONTRARY. Wicked men can agree together in evil, but “there is no peace

to the wicked.” Therefore peace
is not simply the same as concord.
RESPONSE (beginning). Peace includes concord but adds something to it. Wherever there is peace there is concord, but not
wherever there is concord is there peace, if “peace” is taken properly. Concord properly concerns different persons whose wills
come together in one consent. But within a single person the heart can itself tend toward diverse things.
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QUESTION XXIX - ARTICLE I, WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD

(continued)

Conflict within one person can occur in two ways: between different appetitive powers, as when sensitive appetite tends against rational appetite - “the flesh lusts against the spirit” - or within one and the same appetitive power when it tends toward goods that cannot be possessed together. Peace requires the union and quieting of these movements. A man does not have a peaceful heart while there remains something he wills but cannot possess together with what he already wills. This interior union is not included in concord as such. Concord signifies union among the appetites of different persons; peace adds the union of the appetites within the individual himself.

Augustine's “ordered concord” concerns peace of one man with another. It must be ordered: if a man agrees with another unwillingly, under coercion or fear of an impending evil, this concord is not true peace because the proper order of the persons is disturbed. Hence Augustine first calls peace “the tranquillity of order.” Agreement with another likewise does not give complete peace unless the person's own appetitive movements are also united. Peace is opposed both by dissension within oneself and dissension with another; concord is opposed only by the latter.

SUMMARY. Properly speaking, peace adds to concord the union of the appetitive movements within one and the same person.

COMMENTARY. He directs the reader especially to Augustine, City of God XIX, where peace is defined

in its many forms: the peace of the rational soul is ordered agreement of knowledge and action; peace of body and soul is the ordered life and health of the living being; the peace of mortal man with immortal God is ordered obedience in faith under the eternal law; and the peace of all things is the tranquillity of order, order being the disposition assigning to equal and unequal things their proper places.

Cajetan notes that inability to possess several desired things together can arise either because the objects themselves are contradictory or because of some defect or impediment in us. St. Thomas's text chiefly concerns the latter: a person may desire health, beauty, riches, and similar goods that could coexist in themselves, yet he lacks them; the appetite remains unquiet insofar as it fails to attain what it desires.

Cajetan also notes that peace between persons requires both concord and order. Agreement extorted by force or fear is not true peace, because the will still tends toward breaking the imposed agreement when it can attain what it prefers. This explains the common expression that there can be “peace” outwardly while ill will remains inwardly.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER ALL THINGS DESIRE PEACE

OBJECTIONS. Peace, according to Dionysius, involves unitive consent, which things without knowledge cannot possess.

Many people desire wars and dissensions. Some peace can apparently be evil, since Christ says He did not come to send peace. Finally, if everything desired peace, peace might seem to be the supreme good and ultimate end; yet imperfect peace exists even in this life.

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ARTICLE II - WHETHER ALL THINGS DESIRE PEACE (continued)

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine and Dionysius teach that all things desire peace.

RESPONSE. From the very fact that a thing desires something, it consequently desires to attain what it desires and to remove whatever could impede that attainment. The attainment of a desired good can be hindered by a contrary appetite either within oneself or in another, and both kinds of opposition are removed by peace. Therefore every appetitive being necessarily desires peace insofar as it desires to arrive tranquilly and without impediment at what it seeks. This is the “tranquillity of order” of Augustine.

Peace includes not only union of intellectual or sensitive appetites, where consent properly occurs, but also union in natural appetite. Dionysius therefore says peace produces both consent and connaturality: consent signifies union in appetites proceeding from cognition, connaturality union in natural appetites.

Even those who seek war and dissension seek some peace that they judge themselves not to possess. If agreement with another conflicts with what a person most wants, it is not peace in the full sense. Men therefore break such concord by war in order to reach a peace in which nothing opposes their will. Thus all who wage war seek through war some peace they regard as more perfect than the peace they previously possessed.

Peace can be true or merely apparent, just as appetite can tend toward true good or apparent good. True peace exists only around true good. Evil may appear good under some aspect and quiet the appetite in part, but it contains defects that leave appetite disturbed. Hence the “peace” of the wicked is only apparent. Perfect true peace consists in perfect enjoyment of the supreme good, in which all appetites are united and quieted; this is the ultimate end of the rational creature. Imperfect true peace is possible in this world: the soul's principal movement may rest in God even though interior and exterior opposition still disturbs that peace.

SUMMARY. Every appetitive being necessarily desires peace, because every appetite desires to reach its object tranquilly and without impediment.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER PEACE IS A PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Peace is sometimes found among pagans who lack sanctifying grace. Dissension can coexist with charity, as holy Doctors such as Jerome and Augustine disagreed in opinions, and Paul and Barnabas disagreed. Finally Isaiah calls peace the work of justice, so it may not be a proper effect of charity.

ON THE CONTRARY. “Great peace have they that love thy law.”

RESPONSE. Peace includes two unions: the ordering of one's own appetites into one, and the union of one's appetite with another's. Charity produces both. The first arises because God is loved with the whole heart and all our desires are referred to Him, thus tending toward one end. The second arises because we love our neighbor as ourselves and consequently will the fulfillment of our neighbor's rightly ordered will as we will our own. Hence among the marks of friendship is identity of choice: friends will and reject the same things.

Without sanctifying grace there cannot be true peace in the full moral and supernatural sense, because sin turns man from his due ultimate end toward an undue apparent end. Such peace is apparent rather than true.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER PEACE IS A PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY (continued)

Disagreement in opinions need not destroy charity or the imperfect peace of this life. Aristotle observes that friendship does not
require agreement in every opinion but concord concerning goods important for life, especially great matters. Small disagreements
can arise because one person judges that a disputed matter belongs to the common good in which both agree, while another judges
otherwise. Such disagreement is incompatible with the perfect peace of heaven, where truth will be fully known and every appetite
fulfilled, but not necessarily with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
Peace is the work of justice indirectly, insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace. It is the work of charity directly, because
charity by its own nature causes peace. Love is a unitive power, while peace is union of appetitive inclinations.
SUMMARY. Peace is properly an effect of charity.

COMMENTARY. He emphasizes St. Thomas's reply that peace can coexist with disagreement of intellect because

peace
principally unites appetites, not intellectual opinions. Friendship does not require friends always to agree in matters of lesser moment, just as venial sins do not simply destroy friendship with God. He also highlights St. Thomas's explanation
of Isaiah 32, “the work of justice shall be peace.”

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER PEACE IS A VIRTUE

OBJECTIONS. Precepts concern acts of virtue, and Christ commands, “Have peace among you.” Making peace is meritorious - “Blessed are the peacemakers” - and dissensions opposed to peace are numbered among vices. Therefore peace seems to be a virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY. Virtue is not the ultimate end but a way to it, whereas Augustine calls

peace in a certain sense an
ultimate end.
RESPONSE. When several acts follow one another according to the same formal principle and proceed from the same agent, they
need not arise from distinct virtues. Fire, by its single heating power, can heat, melt, and rarefy; it does not need one power for
melting and another for rarefying. Since peace is caused by charity precisely according to charity's love of God and neighbor, there
is no virtue distinct from charity whose proper act peace would be. The same was said of joy.
The command to possess peace exists because peace belongs to charity's activity and is therefore meritorious. It is also placed
among the beatitudes as an act of perfected virtue and among the fruits insofar as it is a final spiritual good possessing sweetness.
One virtue can have several opposing vices according to its several acts: hatred opposes charity as love, sloth or envy oppose its
joy, and dissension opposes its peace.
SUMMARY. There is no virtue distinct from charity whose proper act is peace.

COMMENTARY. I note a possible question whether peace should strictly be called an “act.” Some consider it more

probable that peace is in the soul as health is in an animal: health is not a quality distinct from the harmonious proportion
of humors and qualities, but that proportion itself. Similarly peace would be the concord and proportion of appetites and virtues within the person. St. Thomas himself calls peace a union of appetitive inclinations. Since love is unitive and the virtues flowing from divine charity bring appetites into concord and proportion with their end, spiritual health or peace is
an effect consequent upon charity. On this reading, when St. Thomas calls peace an act of charity, he may be speaking causally rather than describing a distinct elicited act. I say Cajetan follows this interpretation.
He closes by recommending the doctrine of the preceding questions on spiritual joy and peace especially to spiritual men and
preachers of the word of God.

QUESTION XXX - ON MERCY

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QUESTION XXX - ON MERCY ARTICLE I - WHETHER EVIL IS PROPERLY THE MOTIVE OF MERCY

OBJECTIONS. Fault is a greater evil than punishment, yet fault as such provokes indignation and punishment rather than mercy. Things called cruel or hard seem to involve an excess of evil, yet Aristotle says what is “terrible” or “hard” can repel pity. Finally, signs of evils are not themselves real evils, yet signs can provoke mercy strongly. Therefore evil as such does not seem properly to move mercy.

ON THE CONTRARY. Damascene says mercy is a species of sorrow; what moves sorrow is evil.

RESPONSE. Augustine says that mercy is compassion in our heart for another's misery, by which we are compelled, if we can, to come to his aid. “Mercy” (misericordia) signifies, as it were, having a miserable heart over another's misery. Misery is opposed to happiness. Happiness involves possessing what one wills while willing nothing evil; conversely, misery involves suffering what one does not will.

A person can “will” something in three ways. First, by natural appetite: all men naturally will to exist and live. Second, by deliberate choice. Third, not in itself but in its cause, as one who voluntarily eats harmful food can in a certain sense be said to will the illness caused by it.

Accordingly, the evil that moves mercy is principally an evil contrary to natural appetite - corruptive and saddening evils whose contraries men naturally desire. Aristotle therefore defines pity as a kind of sorrow over an apparent destructive or painful evil.

Such evils provoke mercy still more when they are contrary also to deliberate choice, as when an evil occurs where good was reasonably expected. They are especially pitiable when contrary to the person's whole will, as when one has consistently pursued good and nevertheless suffers evil. Aristotle therefore says mercy is especially moved by the evils of one who suffers undeservedly.

Replies. Fault is voluntary precisely as fault, and under that aspect it has the character not of something pitiable but of something punishable. Yet fault can itself possess something of punishment insofar as consequences contrary to the sinner's will are joined to it; under this aspect sinners can be objects of compassion. Gregory therefore says true justice does not have contempt for sinners but compassion, and the Gospel says that Jesus, seeing the crowds distressed and lying like sheep without a shepherd, had mercy on them.

Mercy properly concerns another rather than oneself. With respect to one's own evil there is properly sorrow; and where persons are so closely united to us as to be almost part of ourselves - children or parents - their evils can be experienced more as our own sorrow than as mercy toward another. This helps explain Aristotle's statement that what is excessively terrible or “hard” can drive out pity.

Just as hope and memory of goods can produce delight, hope and memory of evils produce sorrow, though less vehemently than present sensation. Signs of evils therefore move us to mercy insofar as they represent pitiable evils to us as though present.

SUMMARY. Involuntary evil is the motive of mercy because such evil belongs to misery, which is the object around which mercy is exercised.

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QUESTION XXX - ARTICLE I (COMMENTARY CONTINUED)

I presses the difficulty: we pity the sinner more because he is in guilt and turned away from God than merely because he incurs
punishment. Divine mercy is likewise manifested more greatly in the remission of guilt than in the remission of punishment; and
fraternal correction, a work of mercy, is ordered principally to freeing our neighbor from the evil of guilt. Hence guilt itself
seems the greatest motive of mercy. Again, we reasonably pity a merchant who throws his goods into the sea although he does so
voluntarily; Christ and the martyrs also suffered voluntarily, yet were fitting objects of compassion.

I answer that St. Thomas's conclusion is entirely true: misery properly concerns an evil suffered unwillingly, while what is
voluntary has the aspect of good precisely insofar as it is voluntary. We do not exercise mercy toward the damned as such, since
they are obstinate in evil and the order of divine justice is fulfilled in them. Yet because we love their nature insofar as it is from
God, there can arise in us a conditional movement or velleity that they be freed from misery if that were possible.

Guilt can be considered involuntary in several respects: the aversion from God is in a way against the sinner's deepest good; guilt
entails liability to eternal punishment, itself unwanted; and sin carries deformity and dishonor of soul. Moreover, one mortal sin
can become punishment for another by divine permission. Especially in relation to divine mercy, the fallen sinner cannot by the
powers of free choice alone rise again after falling. The great work of divine mercy is to make him voluntarily detest what he
formerly willed, repent, and efficaciously return to God.

The merchant is pitied not because he voluntarily casts away his goods, but because he unwillingly suffers the storm that makes
the loss necessary. Christ and His martyrs likewise suffered in one respect unwillingly. Christ sorrowed over death as the greatest
natural evil to His most precious human life and prayed that the chalice might pass; in that respect His suffering could greatly
move compassion. Insofar as He voluntarily offered Himself through obedience for the redemption of mankind, His act was
rather a cause of joy. The same proportion holds for martyrs: spectators may rejoice in their victory while pitying their pain.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER DEFECT ON THE PART OF THE ONE PITYING IS A REASON FOR MERCY

Objections appeal to God, in whom there is no defect although mercy is especially His; to those overwhelmed by misery who
may cease to pity; and to the angry or insulting disposition that also does not readily pity. St. Thomas answers that mercy is
sorrow over another's misery. Since sorrow is properly over one's own evil, another's misery moves us insofar as we apprehend it
as somehow our own. This occurs either through union of affection - love makes the friend's evil one's own - or through a real
likeness and possibility that the same evil could befall us.

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ARTICLE II - WHETHER DEFECT IN THE ONE PITYING MOVES MERCY

(continued) Thus Aristotle says men
pity those joined or similar to themselves because they judge that the same things might happen to them. The old, the
prudent who recognize the possibility of misfortune, the weak, and the fearful are often more compassionate. Those
who imagine themselves so fortunate or powerful that no evil can touch them are less moved to pity. Defect therefore
always enters the reason for mercy, either because through love another's defect is regarded as one's own or because
one recognizes the possibility of suffering something similar. God pities not from defect in Himself but from love,
insofar as He loves creatures as belonging to Him. Those already sunk in extreme evils may not pity because they no
longer fear further suffering; likewise those under excessive fear are absorbed in their own passion. Anger and
audacity elevate the spirit toward an arduous object and can suppress pity. Pride likewise makes men despise others
and judge their suffering deserved; Gregory therefore says false justice has indignation rather than compassion.

COMMENTARY. Although St. Thomas speaks after Aristotle of mercy as a passion in men, he elevates

its formal
account: the “defect” required on the side of the merciful person need not exist subjectively in him. It is enough that
through love the misery of the miserable person pertain to him. In this sense God has mercy because He loves the
creature as something belonging to Himself - indeed as belonging to Him as Creator, conserver of all being, and
Savior. I add that the Incarnation makes divine mercy still more wonderful: God chose to assume passible human
flesh so that even the saying “one who has suffered similar things pities us” could be verified in Christ. I cite Bernard
and Hebrews concerning Christ learning through what He suffered.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER MERCY IS A VIRTUE Objections: mercy as passion may

impede deliberation;
Aristotle's nemesis seems contrary to pity while itself praiseworthy; joy and peace are effects of charity rather than
special virtues, and mercy also follows charity; and mercy does not seem to fit neatly among the moral means
enumerated by Aristotle. Augustine, however, praises Cicero's statement that no virtue is more admirable or weighty
than mercy. St. Thomas distinguishes mercy as a movement of sensitive appetite, in which respect it is a passion and
not a virtue, from mercy as a movement of intellectual appetite or will by which another's evil displeases us. This
latter movement can be ruled by reason and can regulate the lower appetite. When mercy serves reason so that justice
is preserved - whether by giving to the needy or pardoning the penitent - it has the character of virtue.
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ARTICLE III - WHETHER MERCY IS A VIRTUE (continued)

Sallust's warning concerns unregulated passion that obstructs rational judgment and can lead one away from justice. Aristotle
treats mercy and nemesis as passions: the merciful grieves because he judges someone to suffer undeservedly; the person moved
by nemesis is saddened when undeserving people prosper and in the appropriate case recognizes deserved suffering. Properly,
envy is opposed to mercy. Joy and peace add no special aspect to the good that is charity's object, but mercy concerns a special
aspect - another's misery. As virtue, mercy is a moral virtue concerned with passions and is related to the mean associated with
nemesis.
my first doubt: Is mercy a special virtue? Arguments against: Aristotle's standard enumeration does not list it; St. Thomas places
mercy among effects following charity together with joy, peace, beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction; charity itself
makes us grieve over our neighbor's evil; and there seems no special difficulty in relieving a miserable neighbor beyond the
difficulty of beneficence generally. If mercy were a special moral virtue, it might also seem that St. Thomas should have treated
it under a cardinal virtue rather than before finishing charity.
I state three preliminary conclusions from St. Thomas: mercy as sensitive sorrow is a passion, not a virtue; mercy as a rationally
regulated displeasure at another's evil is virtue; and as moral virtue it concerns passions and is reduced to the mean called
nemesis.
For my own resolution, I first say Catholic faith certainly teaches mercy to be virtuous in the broad sense: a praiseworthy, good,
and meritorious act when performed with due circumstances. Scripture repeatedly praises mercy, for example “Blessed are the
merciful,” and condemns judgment without mercy; almsgiving and fraternal correction are likewise praised as works of mercy.

Second, he says theology does not demonstrate with sufficient certainty that mercy is a special virtue really distinct from charity.
It is not adequately shown that relieving a miserable neighbor involves a special difficulty beyond doing good to one's neighbor
generally, and St. Thomas will teach that beneficence is not a special virtue distinct from charity. Indeed, other things equal, it is
often easier to do good to one in misery than to one in prosperity.
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ARTICLE III - I ON MERCY AS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

I reinforces the preceding point from 1 John 3: the Apostle speaks of one who sees his brother in need and “closes his bowels”
against him, suggesting that human compassion naturally opens toward misery; he then asks how the charity of God can
remain in such a man, suggesting that the act belongs closely to charity.
Nevertheless THIRD CONCLUSION is that it is very probable that mercy is a special virtue, chiefly because of St. Thomas's
reasoning and Cajetan's explanation. When we see our neighbor's misery, a movement of appetite can arise before rational
judgment; we may be carried excessively toward relieving him, or held back excessively by cruelty or by nemesis when we
judge him to suffer deservedly. A stable elective habit is therefore needed to bring these passions to the mean of reason. This
gives a proper role to a virtue of mercy.
I concede that, considered simply in the will already rightly disposed by friendship with God and neighbor, he does not see a
special difficulty in helping a miserable neighbor distinct from beneficence generally. Still, it is probable that, just as doing
good under the aspect of debt belongs to justice, doing good under the aspect of relieving another's misery belongs to a special
virtue of mercy. In that case mercy is found not only in sensitive appetite but also in rational appetite.
He answers the objections accordingly. Aristotle could still speak of mercy and nemesis as passions while an elective habit
regulates them. Mercy's proximity to charity explains why St. Thomas numbers it among charity's effects. As a special virtue
mercy includes not merely sorrow over the neighbor's evil but an endeavor to relieve the misery, just as penance includes not
merely sorrow for sin but an endeavor to make satisfaction to God. St. Thomas fittingly treats mercy in the context of charity
because of their close affinity; if reduced to a cardinal virtue, mercy can be reduced to justice in the broad way that liberal
giving to another is related to justice.

Second doubt: Is mercy subjectively in sensitive appetite or in the will? Arguments for the will: mercy belongs most perfectly
to God, in whom there is no sensitive appetite; it is a virtue “toward another,” and the will needs rectification toward another's
good; liberality and magnificence are also associated with the will; and St. Thomas expressly says that mercy, insofar as it
names a movement of intellectual appetite displeased at another's evil, is a virtue. Arguments for the sensitive appetite arise
from St. Thomas's description of mercy as a moral virtue about passions and from Aristotle's treatment of mercy and nemesis
as passions requiring moderation.
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ARTICLE III - WHERE THE VIRTUE OF MERCY RESIDES (conclusion)

FIRST CONCLUSION: mercy, according to the formal character of virtue, is principally and per se in the will. This follows from the preceding arguments and from the fact that angels truly exercise mercy toward us. It is also supported by the following article, where mercy is called in a certain respect the greatest virtue; such excellence cannot principally consist in sensitive appetite. Second conclusion: insofar as mercy belongs to human beings, it is secondarily also connected with sensitive appetite. There is difficulty in exercising mercy rightly because the passion of compassion does not of itself always remain at the rational mean; one can exceed or fall short in relieving another's misery. Thus a habit can regulate compassion and hardness of heart. I say this is very probable and parallels the way some Thomists analyze liberality and magnificence. I reject Cajetan's denial that liberality and magnificence can be properly in God. Aristotle says it belongs to the liberal person to look least to himself; since God in His gifts seeks not His own utility but ours and presupposes no benefit received from us, He is supremely liberal. I therefore places mercy principally in the will as an effect of charity toward neighbor, while admitting a secondary habit in sensitive appetite regulating compassion or hardness. Although the etymology of misericordia suggests an affection of the “heart,” philosophers and especially theologians use the term principally for what is most praiseworthy in the merciful person: the will to relieve another's misery. In this sense mercy is a virtue and is most properly found in God. I consider it incredible that St. Thomas, in treating divine attributes in I, q.21, would speak only metaphorically of mercy while speaking properly of justice and other attributes, especially since Scripture so frequently celebrates divine mercy.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER MERCY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES

Objections say mercy seems greatest because God prefers mercy to sacrifice; Christian discipline is summarized in mercy and piety; and mercy especially makes man like God, whose mercies are above all His works. Against this, Colossians commands “above all these things have charity.” St. Thomas answers that a virtue can be greatest in two ways: in itself, or in comparison with its possessor. In itself mercy is greatest in the sense that it belongs to one who pours out good upon others and, more importantly, supplies their defects - an act especially characteristic of a superior. Hence to have mercy is proper to God, and His omnipotence is said especially to be manifested in mercy. But in relation to the person possessing it, mercy is not greatest unless that possessor is himself supreme and has none above him.

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ARTICLE IV - WHETHER MERCY IS THE GREATEST VIRTUE (continued) For

one who has a superior, it is
greater and better to be united to that superior than to supply the defect of an inferior. Therefore in man, who has God
above him, charity by which he is united to God is greater than mercy by which he relieves neighbors. Among virtues
directed toward neighbor, however, mercy is the greatest, because supplying another's defect belongs, as such, to one
who is better or superior. External sacrifices are not offered because God needs them, but for our devotion and our
neighbor's utility. Therefore mercy relieving another's defects can be more acceptable to God than external sacrifice
because it more immediately promotes the neighbor's good. The “sum” of Christian religion consists in mercy as
regards exterior works, but the interior affection of charity joining us to God surpasses love and mercy toward
neighbors. Through charity we are assimilated to God by union of affection; through mercy by likeness of operation, so
charity remains higher for us.

COMMENTARY. He formulates four conclusions: (1) mercy considered in itself is greatest because it

supplies others'
defects, which belongs especially to a superior; (2) considered relative to its possessor, it is greatest only when the
possessor is supreme; (3) for human beings charity is better and higher because it unites us to God; (4) among virtues
concerning neighbor, mercy is highest. I then ask how St. Thomas can call mercy “greatest in itself” when charity has
the most excellent object. Cajetan explains that “greatest in itself” here concerns the perfection the virtue, absolutely
considered, requires in its possessor, not merely the dignity of its object. Mercy absolutely and without qualification
tends to require immunity from misery in the merciful one, because it is ordered to supplying misery in others. Since
every potentiality is in some way a misery or defect, mercy in its absolutely complete notion points toward a subject
above every potentiality - pure act, the supreme nature, God Himself. Hence mercy is attributed as proper to God and
His omnipotence is especially manifested by mercy. I judge Cajetan's reading extremely subtle, useful, and true,
especially for magnifying divine mercy, whose full notion exists integrally in God alone and who alone can rescue from
the misery of sin. I note another Thomistic interpretation: different virtues can each be called “greatest” under some
aspect - prudence in directing, legal justice in ordering to the common good, religion in divine worship, obedience in its
sphere, humility in its own excellence. On that reading mercy would be greatest only secundum quid. I nevertheless
prefer Cajetan's interpretation.

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ARTICLE IV - my FURTHER QUESTIONS ON MERCY

To the objection from charity, I say that if “in itself” is taken in St. Thomas's special sense, charity need not be called greatest in
that same way. Charity can exist in us simply and absolutely though finite; mercy simply and absolutely cannot, because our
mercy is not immune from every misery. St. Thomas's reasoning does establish that mercy absolutely considered, insofar as it
can relieve every misery, requires immunity from every misery. If mercy is considered as a moral virtue in a human possessor,
however, prudence - and even justice insofar as it must moderate mercy - can be superior.
Is the divine attribute of mercy, according to our mode of understanding, more excellent than charity in God? I answer that in
God no attribute is really greater than another, since all are the one God. According to our mode of conceiving, if charity and
mercy are considered separately, divine charity is the more excellent attribute: it concerns God Himself, the supreme good, and
divine love is associated with the procession of the Holy Spirit. If divine mercy is conceived as intrinsically including charity
and then considered in relation to effects ad extra, there is something especially excellent in the power to relieve every misery.
Yet overall, according to our mode of understanding, charity and divine love retain a special excellence because of their
immediate order to the supreme good and the personal procession of the Holy Spirit.
Is mercy in us a more excellent virtue than religion? I distinguish. Absolutely, religion is better than mercy as existing in us and
ordered to its object, because religion more immediately joins us to God. The contemplative life also surpasses the active, and
works of religion remain where works relieving misery cease. The sacrifice of the Mass, considered from the side of the thing
offered and the opus operatum, is of incomparable value.
Nevertheless, in ordinary human circumstances works of mercy frequently please God more than exterior works of religion,
because works of mercy are often commanded by grave spiritual or temporal necessity. Even an act of external worship may
have to be omitted to assist a gravely endangered neighbor. I qualify this: where religion itself and external divine worship are
under attack - for example by heretics - external acts of religion may need special preference as public witness. He invokes
Christ's defense of the woman who anointed Him: there are occasions when the opportunity and necessity of honoring Christ
takes precedence over giving to the poor.
Interior worship remains supremely necessary because it preserves us in grace and from sin: “we ought always to pray and not
faint.” The saying “I will have mercy and not sacrifice” therefore concerns the proper ordering of exterior observances when
grave need demands mercy.
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QUESTION XXX - ARTICLE IV (conclusion)

I distinguish the sacrifice of the Mass in two ways. Considered from the thing offered and the opus operatum, it has infinite value
and cannot be compared with ordinary works of mercy. Considered as the minister's exercise of the virtue of religion, it can be
compared with acts of mercy and may sometimes be omitted when a neighbor is in grave bodily or spiritual necessity and one
can assist him. If the need is slight, celebrating Mass or supporting its celebration can be better than distributing money to poor
persons otherwise adequately sustained. Christian prudence must govern the circumstances; in practice there are always gravely
poor persons, so Christians should both provide for Masses and assist the poor from their own substance.

QUESTION XXXI - ON BENEFICENCE St. Thomas turns to exterior acts or effects of

charity: first beneficence, then
almsgiving as a part of beneficence, then fraternal correction as a kind of spiritual almsgiving.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS AN ACT OF CHARITY

Objections: charity is chiefly toward God, but we cannot benefit God; giving gifts seems to belong to liberality; and benefits
given as due belong to justice while gratuitous relief of misery belongs to mercy, leaving no distinct role for charity. Against
this, charity is friendship, and Aristotle numbers doing good to friends among acts of friendship.
RESPONSE. Beneficence means doing good to someone. The good can be considered under the common aspect of good, and
beneficence under that common aspect is an act of friendship and consequently charity. Love includes benevolence, by which
one wills good to a friend; when the ability is present, the will tends toward effecting what it wills. If the good done to another is
considered under some special aspect, however, beneficence receives a special formal character and can belong to a special
virtue.
We cannot benefit God because nothing can be added to His good; our relation upward is to honor and submit to Him, whereas
from His love He benefits us. In gift-giving, liberality principally moderates the interior attachment to riches and removes
excessive retention. A man can give a great gift while inwardly clinging to it, and such giving is not liberal; yet if he gives what
he desires to retain because of love, this can manifest the perfection of friendship. Justice considers the aspect of debt in the
benefit; mercy considers the aspect of relieving misery.
SUMMARY. Beneficence under the common aspect of good is an act of friendship or charity. Under a special aspect -
paying what is owed, relieving misery, benefiting precisely as a friend - the same exterior action can belong formally to
justice, mercy, or friendship/charity.
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QUESTION XXXI - ARTICLE I, COMMENTARY

The quality of benevolence and beneficence follows the quality of friendship. If I give to a friend or neighbor according merely to
human friendship, the act is one of human friendship, not specifically Christian charity. If I give insofar as he is a friend in God,
the act is Christian charity. I also note with Cajetan that beneficence can belong to divine charity in God, man, or angel, though
created charity cannot benefit God because no good can accrue to Him.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DO GOOD TO EVERYONE

Objections: we cannot actually benefit everyone; Ecclesiasticus says “give to the good and receive not the sinner”; and benefiting
enemies of the commonwealth or excommunicates can itself be disorderly. Against this, Galatians commands: “While we have
time, let us work good to all.”

RESPONSE. Beneficence follows love as love moves a superior toward provision for an inferior. Human ranks are mutable: one
who is superior in one respect can be inferior in another and all can suffer many defects. Since charity extends to all, beneficence
should likewise extend to all, though according to due place and time. We cannot benefit everyone individually at every moment,
but no person is such that a case could never arise in which we ought to benefit him. Charity therefore requires at least a readiness
of soul to do good to anyone when the proper occasion occurs. Some benefits can be offered universally, such as prayer for all
faithful and unbelievers.

In a sinner we distinguish nature from guilt. We should sustain his nature but not nourish his sin. Benefits may be withheld from
excommunicates and enemies of the commonwealth insofar as such withholding restrains guilt; nevertheless, if nature itself is in
danger - for example of death by hunger or thirst - aid may be required unless the order of justice determines otherwise.
enemies of the commonwealth. Whenever it is lawful in war to kill an enemy, it can likewise be lawful not to preserve him, as in
depriving the enemy of supplies. If a private soldier encounters a private enemy in extreme necessity, circumstances matter.
During a truce he must aid him; even outside a truce, if he can capture rather than kill him, I say this is better. St. Thomas's
statement about aiding enemies is understood subject to the order of justice.

Private enemy. If there is no reasonable fear that the enemy will afterward kill me, I am bound to assist him in extreme need. But
if, according to sound human prudence rather than imagination, I probably fear that preserving his life will expose my own life to
serious danger, I say I am not bound to assist. One is not ordinarily obliged to preserve another's bodily life at grave danger to
one's own. There is a difference between positively killing and omitting aid when one is not bound to give it.
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QUESTION XXXI -
ARTICLE II,
COMMENTARY (continued) I apply the distinction between direct and indirect voluntariness. Death is

indirectly
voluntary to me when I can and am bound to prevent it but fail to do so; when I am not bound to intervene, the death
is not imputed to me in the same way. Ambrose's dictum, “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you
have killed him,” is true where the duty to aid exists. Even then the death can be imputed morally as sin without
necessarily producing every juridical consequence that follows from direct killing. Third doubt: a person condemned
by justice to die of hunger. Ministers charged with executing the sentence may not frustrate it by supplying food, just
as they may not open the prison so the condemned man can escape. A private person, however, may lawfully give him
bread because the private person is not the custodian of justice and the condemned man himself may lawfully eat. I
say the private person is not bound to feed him. I add that, against some authors, I judge it more probable with
Cajetan that the condemned person himself remains bound to eat if able.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER WE SHOULD BENEFIT MORE THOSE MORE

CLOSELY UNITED TO US
Objections appeal to Christ's instruction to invite the poor rather than friends and relatives, to the soldier's duty to
aid a fellow soldier rather than a relative fighting as an enemy, to the priority of repaying benefactors, and to the fact
that parents are loved more while children may receive more material provision. Augustine replies in principle that
when we cannot help all, we should chiefly care for those whom circumstances of place, time, or other relations bind
more closely to us.
RESPONSE. Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature established by divine wisdom. A natural agent first and
more abundantly diffuses its action to what is nearer: fire heats what is near more strongly, and God diffuses gifts
more abundantly to creatures nearer Him. Benefiting others is an action of charity; therefore, other things equal, we
should be more beneficent toward those more closely united to us. Human closeness has different forms: blood
relatives through natural communion, fellow citizens through civil communion, the faithful through spiritual
communion, and so on. Different benefits should therefore be distributed according to the relevant kind of union. The
rule can vary with place, time, need, and circumstance. An outsider in extreme necessity may deserve assistance before
one's father who suffers only a lesser need. Thus closeness has priority ceteris paribus, not mechanically in every case.
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ARTICLE III - ORDER OF BENEFICENCE (continued) Christ does not absolutely

forbid inviting friends or relatives;
He condemns doing so from the mercenary intention of being invited in return. Outsiders can be preferred where their
need is greater. No universal rule can determine every conflict between degree of closeness and degree of need; prudent
judgment is required. The common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Thus in war a soldier who
aids a fellow soldier for defense of the commonwealth does not aid him merely as a private person but as serving the whole
political community. For that reason a stranger can rightly be preferred to a blood relative fighting against the common
good. There are two kinds of debt. A strict debt concerns something already belonging to another - stolen property, a loan,
deposit, and the like - and normally must be restored before gratuitous benefits are given to relatives. Extreme necessity
can alter the use of goods, but such cases require prudence. Another “debt” is one of moral equity arising from benefits
freely received. No benefactors equal parents; therefore parents normally have priority in repayment of benefits unless a
more urgent necessity or the common utility of Church or commonwealth outweighs it. Children receive provision because
parents stand as superiors, while children owe parents honor; yet in extreme necessity parents cannot simply be
abandoned.

COMMENTARY: defending an innocent person against one's father. If one's father unjustly attacks an

innocent person, I
judge with Vitoria that the son is probably not bound to defend the innocent at the grave cost of causing his father's death.
No one is ordinarily bound to defend another's bodily life with the gravest personal loss, and killing one's father would
constitute a tremendous personal loss to the son. Nevertheless it is lawful to defend the innocent even if the attacking
father's death follows, because by his unjust aggression the father loses, in that case, the protection attached to paternal
right against proportionate defense. If the father were not himself the aggressor but an innocent third party whose death
would result, the son could not prefer the other innocent person to his own innocent father. The command to rescue those
led to death is affirmative and binds when rescue can be given without disproportionate grave danger. I extend the same
reasoning proportionally to spouse, children, and others upon whom a person greatly depends in honor or temporal
goods. With more remote relatives such as brothers, I consider it probable that one can be bound to defend the innocent
even at danger to the attacking relative.
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ARTICLE III - EXTREME NECESSITY, DEBT, AND KINSHIP

I ask whether a debtor in extreme necessity must restore property to a creditor who is likewise in extreme necessity, and whether
the debtor may instead assist a parent or close relative in equal peril. Scotus and Gabriel hold that the debtor must restore. Others
distinguish between property unjustly acquired and property justly received. Cajetan and Soto hold that in neither case is
restoration required while the debtor himself is in extreme necessity.

I adopt Cajetan's view as most true. The law of nations by which goods are divided and appropriated cannot derogate from
natural law. In extreme necessity goods become common as regards necessary use, so that the necessary thing belongs for use to
the one first possessing it. If the debtor is in extreme necessity and the necessary object is already in his hands, he has the right to
its necessary use. Thus the creditor's extreme need does not simply execute the ordinary precept of restitution when another more
urgent natural-law claim to preservation is simultaneously present.

Even if the debtor originally acquired the property unjustly, present extreme necessity can give him a right to necessary use. But
one may not violently seize the necessary good from another who is already in the same extreme necessity, because the other's
primary natural right of necessary possession is then violated.

Could a person of exceptional importance to the commonwealth seize bread from a socially less important person equally near
death? I say no, just as one may not kill an innocent person for the safety of the commonwealth. The private holder may be
bound by charity and piety to give it, but this does not automatically authorize private coercion. A legitimate ruler or
commonwealth could, under appropriate public authority, command assistance to the indispensable public person and punish
disobedience.

SECOND CONCLUSION: a debtor can in the same extreme situation prefer father, mother, child, or spouse and not
restore to a creditor equally endangered. Soto calls this problematic, but I regard it as certain from St. Thomas's
refusal to give a universal rule. The debt of piety toward the closest family can outweigh a debt of particular
commutative justice in such an extraordinary conflict. He considers it at least genuinely disputable whether a brother,
or a singular friend who saved one's life at risk of his own, may likewise be preferred; Vitoria favored the affirmative
regarding the exceptional friend.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

The objections point to a distinct command to do good, special vices such as theft and robbery opposed to beneficence, and the
many species of benefits. But interior benevolence and exterior beneficence differ as intention and execution, and therefore need
not require different virtues.

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QUESTION XXXI - ARTICLE IV, WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

RESPONSE. Virtues are diversified according to different formal aspects of their objects. Charity and beneficence, considered generally, have the same formal object: the common aspect of good. Therefore beneficence is not a virtue distinct from charity but names an act of charity. Distinct precepts can concern distinct acts without implying distinct habits. Likewise, all harms considered under the common aspect of evil are reduced to hatred, while special aspects of harm or benefit belong to special vices or virtues. This also explains the different species of benefits.

QUESTION XXXII - ON ALMSGIVING

ARTICLE I - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS AN ACT OF CHARITY

Objections: almsgiving can occur without charity, as Paul says one may distribute all one's goods to feed the poor yet lack charity; alms are works of satisfaction and therefore seem acts of justice; Scripture calls beneficence a sacrifice and therefore it seems an act of religion; and Aristotle assigns giving to liberality.

ON THE CONTRARY. 1 John asks how the charity of God remains in one who sees his brother in need and closes his heart against him.

RESPONSE. Exterior acts are referred to the virtue to which their proper motive belongs. The motive for almsgiving is relief of a person suffering need. Hence almsgiving is defined as a work by which something is given to one in need out of compassion for God's sake. This motive belongs properly to mercy. The very Greek word for alms derives from mercy. Since mercy is an effect of charity, almsgiving consequently is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy.

An act can be called an act of virtue materially or formally. A materially just deed can be performed without the habit of justice, from natural reason, fear, or hope of gain. A formal act of virtue is performed in the virtuous manner - promptly, fittingly, and with the proper disposition. Thus alms can materially be given without charity; formally Christian almsgiving, done for God in the proper virtuous manner, is not without charity.

An act elicited by one virtue can be ordered and commanded by another toward its end. Thus almsgiving belongs among satisfactory works insofar as mercy toward the needy is ordered to satisfaction for sin; insofar as it is ordered to honoring and placating God it has the aspect of sacrifice and is commanded by religion. Liberality also contributes by removing excessive love of riches that would obstruct giving.

QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I, COMMENTARY

I recall the scholastic definition: almsgiving is a work in which something is given to a needy person out of compassion for
God's sake. He points to St. Thomas's fuller treatment in the Sentences and to patristic and canonical texts praising almsgiving
and mercy.
He first distinguishes the proper formal motive of an act from other motives that efficiently prompt the agent. The formal
motive of almsgiving is relief of the poor person's misery; accidental motives such as reward, friendship, fear, or other
inducements do not determine its species. Likewise penance is specified by satisfaction for offense and removal of sin even if
servile fear also moves the penitent.
Augustine confirms that almsgiving is a work of mercy. Ambrose sometimes calls it a work of liberality. I reconcile this by
distinguishing liberality broadly - any right giving, due or gratuitous - from liberality as a special virtue distinct from mercy.
In the broad sense mercy can fall under liberality. In the strict sense liberality abstracts from misery while mercy regards
misery as its proper object. Liberality can also be said to remove an impediment by moderating attachment to money, thereby
making exterior giving easier.
Why is almsgiving especially called an act of charity when many virtues are commanded by charity? Because mercy is itself
an effect especially close to charity as friendship and benevolence toward neighbor, and beneficence is charity's exterior
work. Almsgiving therefore has a particularly close affinity with charity. I even notes the ordinary expression of asking alms
as asking someone to “do me charity.”
He then asks whether almsgiving is formally a virtuous act in a person who lacks sanctifying charity. A person in mortal sin
can perform morally good acts and works of justice or temperance; why not mercy? I answer that in the specifically
theological and infused order under discussion, formal meritorious almsgiving is not without charity, because infused mercy
is connected with charity and charity is the form of the virtues. Natural mercy and naturally good giving can of course exist
outside sanctifying charity.
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QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I, I ON COMMAND OF VIRTUES

St. Thomas's statement that formal almsgiving is “for God” is explained especially in relation to merit of eternal life. Christian
mercy is charity-formed; natural mercy is common also to those without infused charity.
I next ask whether an inferior virtue can command an act of a superior virtue. Cajetan had distinguished an act of superior virtue
materially and formally, allowing an inferior virtue to command the material act but not the formal act. I say either he does not
understand this sufficiently or Cajetan is mistaken. St. Thomas does not explicitly say that an inferior virtue commands a
superior virtue; he says that an act properly elicited by one virtue can be attributed to another insofar as the latter orders and
commands it to its own end. Thus almsgiving can be satisfactory when mercy is ordered to satisfaction for guilt, and sacrificial
when ordered to placating God.
Religion is plainly superior to mercy and can order an act of mercy toward divine worship. Penance likewise need not be
regarded as inferior to mercy: converting oneself to God by penance is not less excellent than the merciful work of converting
another sinner. Charity rightly ordered begins with oneself.

FIRST CONCLUSION is therefore that no inferior virtue, precisely as inferior, commands the act of a superior virtue.
Command belongs to the superior in an ordered hierarchy, as a commander does not receive military command from a
common soldier.

Second conclusion: when the act of one virtue is ordered to the end of another virtue that is not formally its hierarchical
superior, the ordering command belongs properly to prudence, to which the moral virtues are connected and subordinated.
Prudence judges that, at a given time, exercising one virtue is a fitting means for the end demanded by another. In this way
infused prudence can direct the exercise of charity insofar as charity's act in this life is free with respect to its exercise, without
making charity's formal object a mere means to the object of another virtue. Charity, considered formally with respect to its own
ultimate object, cannot be subordinated as a means to another virtue.
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QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I (conclusion) / ARTICLE II

I conclude that the doctrine agrees with St. Thomas's earlier teaching: if the formal character of charity's act with respect to its
proper object is considered, it cannot be ordered as a means to an act of another virtue. Among virtues whose proper objects are
not intrinsically subordinated to one another, one virtue does not command another's act merely because it is more excellent;
prudence supplies the ordering because all are connected and subordinated to it in the practical direction of action.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE KINDS OF ALMS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED

The traditional enumeration gives seven corporal works: feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, receive the
stranger, visit the sick, redeem the captive, and bury the dead. It also gives seven spiritual works: teach the ignorant, counsel the
doubtful, console the sorrowful, correct the sinner, forgive the offender, bear the burdensome and troublesome, and pray for all.

Objections question burial of the dead because the dead no longer suffer bodily sensation; they note many other human needs
such as guidance of the blind, support of the lame, and money for the poor; correction seems an act of severity rather than
mercy; and since everyone is ignorant of something it might follow that everyone must teach everyone else.

RESPONSE. The division corresponds to the various defects of neighbors. Some defects concern the soul and are relieved by
spiritual works; others concern the body and are relieved by corporal works. Bodily defects either occur during life or after
death. During life, universal needs include interior nourishment - hunger and thirst - and exterior assistance - clothing and
shelter. Special defects arise intrinsically through sickness or extrinsically through captivity and oppression. After death the
body receives burial.

Spiritual defects are relieved either by asking God's help through prayer or by human assistance. Intellectual defects are relieved
by teaching in speculative matters and counsel in practical matters. The chief painful passion, sorrow, is relieved by consolation.

Disorder of action is addressed in three ways: the sinner himself is corrected; an offense against us is forgiven; and burdens
resulting from another's weakness or disorder are patiently borne.

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Burial does not benefit the dead through bodily sensation, but what is done to the body still pertains to the deceased in two
respects: through his continuing memory among men, which can be dishonored by leaving him unburied, and through the
affection he had for his own body while alive, to which the pious affection of survivors should conform. Scripture praises Tobias
and those who buried the Lord. Other bodily needs reduce to the listed works: blindness and lameness to care of the sick; external
oppression to redemption of captives; wealth is sought as a means of supplying these concrete defects.
Correction is severe in execution insofar as justice may be involved, but merciful in intention insofar as the corrector seeks to free
a man from the evil of guilt. Not every ignorance is a defect requiring another to teach; only ignorance of what a person ought
fittingly to know. Even then person, place, and time must be observed.

COMMENTARY. Scripture mentions works of mercy in many places - Job, Isaiah, Matthew 25, and

elsewhere - and
although it does not always give the complete list in one place, the traditional enumeration can readily be gathered from
Scripture, the definition of mercy, and the Church's common catechetical tradition.
He asks specifically whether burying the dead is a work of mercy. Objections say an unburied corpse cannot itself be miserable
and the separated soul does not suffer merely because the corpse is exposed; burial ultimately gives the body to worms and
corruption anyway; the need supplied seems to concern honor rather than bodily or spiritual misery; burial does not appear always
to bind under mortal sin; Chrysostom criticizes excessive funeral pomp; and Christ in Matthew 25 names only six works
concerning the living.

FIRST CONCLUSION is that, according to Catholic faith, burial of the dead is a good and pious work. Tobias is praised
for burying the dead; the patriarchs cared for burial; Joseph and Nicodemus honorably buried Christ; the women came
to anoint His body; and Christians historically risked even martyrdom to bury martyrs. Scripture also presents denial of
honorable burial as a punishment. The constant custom of Christians confirms the practice.
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ARTICLE II - BURIAL OF THE DEAD (continued)

SECOND CONCLUSION: not only burial itself but burial with due honor and moderate solemnity is pious. Honorable
Christian burial gives strong testimony to faith in the resurrection. Hence the ancient Christian burial place was called
a “cemetery,” a sleeping place, and offerings and sacrifices for the dead fittingly accompany their memory. I cite
Augustine and Ambrose and the example of Judas Maccabeus sending money for sacrifice for the dead while thinking
rightly of the resurrection.

Third conclusion: where a person can bury a corpse without serious inconvenience and no one else will do so, refusal can be
grave matter. Works of mercy bind in cases of necessity, and deliberate abandonment of a human corpse in such circumstances
can manifest grave inhumanity.

To the objections, I say the deceased can still suffer loss in human honor and burial removes a bodily source of that dishonor.
Even where the dead person's identity is unknown, burial honors human nature itself and continues the reasonable affection the
deceased had for his own body. Chrysostom condemns excess and luxury in sepulchers, not moderate honorable burial. Christ
omitted burial in Matthew 25 either because people already naturally recognized the duty and needed restraint rather than
encouragement in funeral expense, or because He listed the works of most evident necessity.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS ARE GREATER THAN SPIRITUAL ALMS

Objections argue that the body is more needy than spirit, that spiritual alms often benefit the giver too and so involve a kind of
recompense, and that a poor person may experience more consolation from bodily aid. Against this, Augustine says one
sometimes gives something better by correcting an unjust request than by granting what was requested; correction is spiritual
almsgiving.

RESPONSE. Simply speaking, spiritual alms excel for three reasons. First, the thing given is nobler - a spiritual good rather than
bodily good. Second, the recipient is assisted in the nobler part, the spirit rather than the body. Third, the acts by which spiritual
aid is given are themselves nobler than bodily acts, which are in a certain respect servile. In a particular case, however, corporal
aid can take precedence: a man dying of hunger should be fed before he is instructed in philosophy. Need can therefore reverse
the order in concrete circumstances.

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ARTICLE III - SPIRITUAL ALMS VERSUS CORPORAL ALMS (continued)

Other things equal, helping the more needy is better. But if the less needy person is better disposed or needs a nobler good,
assistance to him may be better. Recompense does not diminish the merit of spiritual almsgiving unless it is intended in a
disordered way; prayer for another can benefit the one praying without thereby reducing charity. The merit of the giver is
measured according to what the recipient ought reasonably to find good, not according to a recipient's disordered preference.
SUMMARY. Spiritual works of mercy are simply more excellent; nevertheless, in a particular case a corporal work can
rightly take precedence.

COMMENTARY. Comparisons of virtues should be made according to their proper specifying objects, not

according to
a greater or lesser accidental command of charity. Augustine therefore remarks that it would be foolish to think it more
urgent to fill a hungry stomach with bread than to instruct a mind with the word of God, simply speaking.
Following Cajetan, I consider whether it is better to give to the more needy person or to a less needy but better person. Unless the
disparity of need is very great, Cajetan says it can be better to give to the less needy just man than to the more needy sinner,
because although greater need supplies more matter for mercy, goodness in the recipient supplies more matter for charity; charity
is the greater virtue and form of the others.
On Luke 14 (“when you make a dinner or supper...”), I note St. Thomas's interpretation that a banquet given chiefly to obtain
repayment has little or no merit. Ambrose calls such an intention avaricious. I say a banquet with the intention of gain is not
necessarily mortal sin, though it can be venially disordered because the social institution of feasting is naturally ordered to
fostering friendship, just as play is naturally ordered to recreation rather than gain. Cajetan alternatively says Christ does not
simply condemn ordinary reciprocal banquets but emphasizes that inviting the poor has special merit.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS HAVE A SPIRITUAL EFFECT

Objections: an effect cannot be nobler than its cause; exchanging a bodily thing for a spiritual one sounds like simony; and if larger
bodily alms produced larger spiritual effects, the widow's two mites would seem inferior, contrary to Christ's judgment.
Ecclesiasticus, however, attributes spiritual preservation to almsgiving.
St. Thomas distinguishes corporal alms according to substance, cause, and effect. In their substance they directly remedy bodily
defects. From their cause, when given through love of God and neighbor, they bear spiritual fruit and merit before God. From their
effect, they can move the recipient to pray for the benefactor.
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ARTICLE IV - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS HAVE A SPIRITUAL EFFECT

(continued) The giver does not
attempt to purchase spiritual goods with bodily goods; he knows spiritual goods infinitely exceed bodily ones. Rather,
through an effect of charity he seeks spiritual fruit by merit. The widow who gave less in absolute quantity gave more
proportionally to her resources, revealing a greater affection of charity; it is from charity that corporal almsgiving
receives spiritual efficacy.

SUMMARY. Corporal alms considered merely in their substance have a corporal effect. Considered from their cause
- charity - they have a spiritual effect, namely merit before God. Considered from their effect upon the recipient, they
can also bear spiritual fruit through the recipient's prayer and gratitude.

COMMENTARY: Does almsgiving remit sins and confer grace like a sacrament? Sacred Scripture and

the Fathers
praise almsgiving in language so strong that it can appear sufficient by itself for salvation. Ambrose says almsgiving
extinguishes sin as water extinguishes fire and even compares it to a cleansing laver; Cyprian and Chrysostom speak
similarly. Cyril numbers almsgiving among remedies associated with remission of sins. Scripture says that water
extinguishes burning fire and alms resist sin; Tobias says alms deliver from sin and death and purify sins; Christ says,
“Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.” I therefore formulate the question whether almsgiving remits
sins and confers grace in the manner of the sacraments. I note that in Augustine's time certain heretics taught that
works of mercy alone sufficed for salvation even while a person remained in mortal sin without repentance, and that
omission of mercy alone was the decisive cause of damnation. They appealed to Matthew 25 and to the Lord's Prayer
and Christ's promise concerning forgiveness. Augustine reports and condemns this error. For clarification, I
distinguish almsgiving according to its substance and according to its formal character. He also distinguishes four
senses in which almsgiving might be said to remit sin: instrumentally, as the sacraments do; formally, as love of God
or contrition excludes sin; satisfactorily, by remitting punishment due to sin; and dispositively or as a motive
disposing one to receive divine mercy. His first conclusion begins here: it is heretical to say that almsgiving remits
mortal sin in such a dispositive way that a person can be saved in this life or the next without repentance. Augustine
and St. Thomas explicitly oppose this error, and Scripture teaches that those persisting in the works of the flesh do not
possess the kingdom of God, that grave offense makes one guilty, and that without repentance sinners perish. my
further conclusions continue on the next page.

QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE IV, COMMENTARY (continued)

Second conclusion. Almsgiving according to its mere substance does not remit sins as a sacrament does. This privilege belongs to the sacraments, and in the Church of Christ there are only seven sacraments. If someone says that almsgiving remits sins by a special privilege as martyrdom does, I answer that to assert this would be more than rash. Martyrdom has a special character because it is a baptism of blood; moreover, it is not even simply certain that martyrdom without any repentance remits every fault.

Third conclusion. Almsgiving does not remit sin formally, whether almsgiving is taken materially or formally. Material almsgiving can be performed by someone in mortal sin and therefore can coexist with mortal sin. Formal almsgiving, however, presupposes true repentance and charity, through which a man is justified, since charity is the form of almsgiving.

Fourth conclusion. Almsgiving formally taken greatly increases grace, preserves it, and remits sin with respect to punishment. Although all meritorious works have such effects, works of mercy possess this in a special way. St. Thomas says that among satisfactory works almsgiving is especially satisfactory. Hence Daniel says: “Redeem your sins with alms.” I also refer to Augustine on Psalms 36, 102, and 125, and Proverbs: “He that hath mercy on the poor lendeth to the Lord.”

Fifth conclusion. Almsgiving, whether taken materially or formally, is not an infallible disposition guaranteeing that the one who gives it will be saved. Many who perform alms are nevertheless damned. Scripture speaks similarly about faith: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved,” which must be understood with the conditions required for salvation, including perseverance in justice. The same qualification applies to Scriptural promises concerning almsgiving.

Sixth conclusion. Merciful persons who from piety and for God's sake continually perform alms will, as a general rule, be converted by God and obtain remission of sins. I say this even of those who perform such works while in mortal sin, especially if their sins proceed from frailty rather than contempt and malice. He regards this as the common teaching of theologians and as the proper sense of the Fathers' strong praises of almsgiving. “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” Almsgiving disposes a person toward eventual repentance.

The comparison “as water extinguishes fire, so alms extinguish sin” expresses proportion and likeness, not equality of causal power. The Church interprets such language differently from sacramental language, and that ecclesial interpretation must be followed.

I finally ask whether a small alms given with greater charity merits more than a large alms given with less charity. Following St. Thomas, he distinguishes essential and accidental reward. The essential reward is always proportioned to charity; therefore one who gives a small alms with greater charity merits more of the essential reward. A greater exterior work can nevertheless merit a greater accidental reward in another respect. For the consolation of the poor who cannot perform exterior works, I cite Augustine:

> one whose heart is full of charity always has something to give. A prompt good will is accepted according to what one possesses; hence the maxim that when the ability to act is lacking, the will is reckoned for the deed.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS UNDER PRECEPT

The objections begin: Daniel appears to propose almsgiving as counsel; everyone may use and retain his own property; and if almsgiving were commanded, there would have to be a determinate time when omission constituted mortal sin.

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ARTICLE V - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS UNDER PRECEPT

A further objection says that all commandments are reduced to the Decalogue, yet no explicit command concerning almsgiving appears there. Against this, no one is punished eternally for omitting something that is merely counsel; yet Matthew 25 teaches that some are condemned for omission of works of mercy. Therefore almsgiving falls under precept.

RESPONSE. Since love of neighbor is commanded, everything without which that love cannot be preserved must also fall under command. Love requires not only willing our neighbor's good but acting for it: “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth.” Hence when our neighbor's necessity requires relief, almsgiving is commanded.

Because commands concern acts of virtue according to right reason, circumstances must be considered both in the giver and the recipient. On the giver's side, what is distributed should be superfluous, according to Luke: “That which remaineth, give alms.” Superfluous means not only what exceeds one's own individual necessities but also what exceeds the necessities of persons entrusted to one's care. A person must first provide for himself and his dependents, then from the remainder relieve others. “Necessary” includes what is reasonably required according to one's personal condition and social state.

On the recipient's side there must be necessity. Since one individual cannot relieve every needy person, not every necessity imposes the command on every giver. The necessity that most clearly binds is that without relief the person cannot be sustained. Here Ambrose's saying applies: “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him.”

Therefore St. Thomas concludes that giving alms from one's superfluous goods is commanded, and giving to a person in extreme necessity is commanded. Other almsgiving is counsel, as are other acts of a better good beyond strict obligation.

Daniel spoke to a king who did not profess the divine law and therefore could have commandments proposed to him under the form of counsel; alternatively Daniel may have spoken about a circumstance in which the particular alms was not commanded. Temporal goods are indeed one's own as regards ownership, but their use ought not be exclusively one's own when others can be sustained from one's surplus. Basil says in substance: the bread you retain belongs to the hungry, the garment stored away belongs to the naked, the shoes wasting in your possession belong to the barefoot, and buried money belongs to the needy.

There is a time when omission of alms is mortal sin. On the recipient's side this is especially when necessity is evident and urgent and no other ready helper appears. On the giver's side it is when he possesses goods genuinely superfluous according to his present state and according to a probable, prudent estimate. One need not reserve everything against every imaginable future event; Christ forbids such anxious thought for tomorrow. Necessity and surplus are judged according to what ordinarily and probably occurs.

Finally, aid to one's neighbor is reduced to the commandment honoring parents, since piety extends analogically to works by which we support those to whom human fellowship binds us.

ARTICLE V - SUMMARY

First: almsgiving is under precept. Second: giving alms from superfluous goods is commanded. Third: giving alms to one in
extreme necessity is commanded. Fourth: other almsgiving is counsel.

ARTICLE VI - WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO GIVE ALMS FROM WHAT IS

NECESSARY

Objections argue from the order of charity: because a person ought to love himself more than his neighbor in the relevant order,
he seems to sin by depriving himself of necessities for another. Further, one who dissipates necessities appears prodigal; and Paul
says that one who does not care for his own, especially his household, has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.

Against this stands Christ's counsel to the rich young man: “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor.”

Such a man gives not merely surplus but things otherwise necessary.

RESPONSE. “Necessary” is said in two ways. First, something is necessary without which a person or those dependent upon him
cannot live. Such necessities must not ordinarily be given away, because doing so would withdraw life from oneself and one's
dependents. An exception can occur where by depriving oneself one preserves a person of exceptional importance through whom
the Church or commonwealth is sustained. For the common good one may laudably expose oneself and one's family to grave
danger.

Second, something is called necessary because without it one cannot live conveniently according to one's condition and state. The
boundary of such necessity is not mathematically indivisible: many additions may still not make something clearly superfluous,
while some subtraction may still leave enough to live fittingly according to one's state. Giving from these goods is ordinarily good
and falls under counsel rather than command.

It would be disorderly to give so much that one could no longer live suitably according to one's state and fulfill the business
attached to it. Three exceptions are noted. First, a person may change state, as when entering religious life and giving all away for
Christ. Second, one may give things useful to one's condition when they can easily be replaced and no great inconvenience
follows. Third, in another's extreme necessity or a grave necessity of the commonwealth, one may laudably omit things otherwise
belonging to the decency of one's state in order to meet the greater necessity.

SUMMARY. One may not ordinarily give away what is absolutely necessary for the life of oneself and dependents,
except for a sufficiently grave common-good case. Giving from what is necessary merely for convenient maintenance of
one's state is ordinarily counsel. Giving so much that one cannot fittingly maintain one's state can be sinful, except in the
special cases explained.

COMMENTARY on Articles V-VI. The first conclusion of Article V is a matter of faith: to say that a

person is never
bound to give alms is heretical. Matthew 25, 1 John 3, Proverbs 21, and the universal consent of the Church establish the
obligation; St. Thomas's reason is a moral demonstration.

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MUST SURPLUS BE GIVEN OUTSIDE EXTREME NECESSITY? I first ask whether a person must give alms from surplus goods even when the neighbor is not in extreme necessity, and what St. Thomas himself held. Some authors - including Panormitanus, the Rosella and Pisana Summas, Gabriel, and Antoninus - interpret St. Thomas as saying that surplus need never be given under command unless extreme necessity simultaneously exists in the recipient. They argue from the structure and wording of Articles V and VI. I reject this interpretation emphatically. I say St. Thomas's teaching is perfectly clear: whoever has true surplus, precisely insofar as it is surplus, is bound to give in ordinary necessities short of extreme necessity.

Cajetan holds the same. I cite St. Thomas on the Sentences, where two distinct propositions are expressly joined: giving alms from surplus falls under precept, and giving to someone in extreme necessity falls under precept. The conjunction does not make one condition dependent on the other. The same follows from St. Thomas's answer in Article V and elsewhere. When

Article VI says giving from necessities belonging to one's state is counsel, it speaks

ordinarily; extreme necessity can create an exception. Likewise St. Thomas's word “laudably” does not necessarily exclude obligation: something commanded can also be laudable. Indeed St. Thomas uses the same language about exposing oneself for a public person indispensable to Church or commonwealth, where sufficiently grave circumstances can create genuine obligation. I then raise the more difficult question: does one who possesses surplus have a strict precept to give alms in common necessities below extreme necessity? Objections say this would condemn many rich people and their confessors; it would prevent social advancement because surplus would always have to be distributed instead of saved for a higher state; it would condemn sumptuous banquets, hunting, clothing, and other expenditures; and affirmative precepts bind only at a time of necessity, whereas by hypothesis the neighbor is not in extreme necessity. Before deciding, I explain “surplus.” What is necessary for one's person or state is not fixed at an indivisible point. Goods prudently reserved for children's dowries and for reasonably foreseeable sickness, war, famine, and similar needs can belong to what is necessary for one's state. But this does not justify anxious provision against fictitious future necessities contrary to Christ's warning against worrying about tomorrow. He notes two schools. Alexander of Hales and several later authors hold that natural equity urges the possessor of surplus to give, but failure outside grave necessity does not amount to mortal sin. I prepares to defend the contrary Thomistic position.

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I identify the contrary position as St. Thomas's and says it is followed by weighty authorities: Cajetan, Paludanus, Richard of Middleton, Nicholas of Lyra, Adrian, and especially the Salamanca masters Vitoria, Soto, Cano, and Sotomayor. He also presents it as consonant with the ancient Fathers.

Augustine repeatedly exhorts Christians to give alms and says that, apart from moderate food and clothing, what God gives beyond need is given through us for distribution to the poor. Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, Bede, and Theophylact use similarly severe language against retaining excess while others lack necessities. Their statement that “the surplus of the rich is the necessity of the poor” must not be understood as denying the rich person's ownership. As St. Thomas explains, surplus remains theirs as to property, but its use ought to become common in the relevant necessities.

Scripture confirms this. John the Baptist says, “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none,” where one coat represents what is necessary and the other what is superfluous. The context concerns fruits worthy of repentance and judgment upon the tree bearing no good fruit, indicating command rather than mere counsel. James condemns riches that rot unused and treasures amassed for the last days. Luke says, “That which remaineth, give alms.” The rich fool of Luke 12 is condemned for storing abundant surplus. Matthew 25 condemns omission of works of mercy, which would concern very few people if obligation existed only in the rarest extreme necessity.

my natural-law argument is especially strong. By natural law goods are in some sense common; their division into private ownership arose through the law of nations and human arrangement. Such division would be contrary to right reason unless it implicitly preserved the condition that surplus be made available to the needy. It would be unreasonable for one person to starve while another indulges in excess. Hence the Fathers call the rich “God's stewards” regarding use.

He also argues from charity. The order of charity itself is commanded. A person ought to value the fitting condition and serious welfare of his neighbor more than his own superfluous riches. Human friendship would be broken if a friend with excess refused assistance to a needy friend; Christian charity is friendship extending to one's neighbors in God. 1 John asks how God's charity remains in one who sees his brother in need and closes his heart.

Thus I conclude that the surplus of Christians is genuinely owed to the poor in the order of charitable use, although not in the simple sense that ownership has already transferred to a particular poor person.

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DEGREE OF OBLIGATION AND EXTREME NECESSITY

Second conclusion, which I call most certain: when one's neighbor suffers grave necessity short of absolute extreme necessity,
one who possesses surplus is bound under precept to give alms. This follows especially from the authorities and reasons
already given.

Third conclusion. To say that in more common and lighter necessities the rich are not bound to give their surplus is not an
improbable opinion because respectable doctors defend it, although I judge St. Thomas's contrary position more probable.

The “time of necessity” for an affirmative command is not restricted to the recipient's imminent death. It can arise because an
act is necessary for preservation of the virtue itself. In justice, for example, a person holding another's property must restore it
even when the creditor is not needy, because right reason demands restitution. Similarly, when someone possesses surplus and
common necessities exist in the community, right reason can make it a time for almsgiving. On the recipient's side, extreme
necessity produces the clearest and strongest obligation.

I reject the inference that the poor may therefore steal from any rich person who is obliged to give surplus. Outside extreme
necessity the rich person is not obliged to give to this particular poor person; he retains prudent discretion regarding whom
and when to assist.

He answers the example of Joseph in Egypt, who accumulated great stores and later sold rather than freely distributed grain
during famine. Extraordinary examples of saints and patriarchs that appear to exceed ordinary rules are not automatically
imitated, because we may not know the special divine or prudential reason. Ambrose explains that Joseph opened the
granaries for purchase lest gratuitous reception make people abandon cultivation and neglect their own work.

I then ask whether in extreme necessity a person must give from goods necessary to his social state. First, anyone with surplus
certainly must give in extreme necessity; the contrary would be erroneous and all doctors agree. Second, a person need not
ordinarily give what is absolutely necessary to preserve his own life, except where the common good requires preservation of
an indispensable public or ecclesiastical person. A person may nevertheless voluntarily expose his life for a friend in some
circumstances.

The disputed point concerns goods necessary not for bare life but for maintaining one's state. Some deny obligation unless
there is surplus; I call that position inhuman. “Extreme necessity” does not mean only the instant before death. It includes a
condition from which, unless assistance is given, one is probably expected to fall into disease or another danger leading to
death. It also includes danger of losing a bodily member or sense, since such mutilation is reduced morally to homicide, and
danger of falling into insanity.

Therefore the true and common position, I say, is that a person is bound to assist someone in extreme necessity even from
goods otherwise necessary for maintaining his social state.

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EXTREME NECESSITY, PROPERTY, AND RESTITUTION

I prove the obligation from 1 John 3, Matthew 25, Ambrose's “if you did not feed him, you killed him,” the commonality of goods in extreme necessity, and the order of charity. A person in extreme necessity may take what is necessary even in the manner externally resembling theft or robbery, and others cannot justly prevent him; this indicates that the possessor had a grave duty to permit the necessary use.

An objection says this could require a rich man to consume his entire patrimony, even a great estate or social dignity, whenever public famine creates many urgent needs. I answer that although a human life is nobler than a sum of money considered absolutely, wealth can have greater importance in relation to the common good because it is an instrument for maintaining families, offices, and public necessities. A private person is not necessarily bound to spend his entire estate even to cure his own illness if doing so would destroy the state and provision of his children. Prudence and the common good set limits.

Necessity may arise intrinsically, as from illness, or extrinsically through another's malice, as when someone threatens death unless money is paid. In the first kind, relatively limited expenditures and the contributions of many citizens may suffice, and public authority can compel citizens to contribute. The individual who sees the necessity must help according to his ability, but is not bound to liquidate his entire estate when that would create a greater social harm. In externally imposed necessities no universal numerical measure can be given because human malice can grow without limit. All such cases must be governed by prudence with due regard for human frailty.

I then ask whether a rich person who culpably fails to assist someone in extreme necessity is bound to restitution for the temporal damages resulting from the poor person's death. One argument says yes: Ambrose calls the omission a kind of killing, and a killer ordinarily owes restitution for resulting damages. Another canonical text says one is proved to inflict death when he can prevent it but does not.

The opposing argument is that almsgiving is formally an act of charity and mercy; omission can be mortal sin without becoming an injustice that generates restitution.

I distinguish two ways one may be bound to preserve another's life. First, by office and commutative justice: a judge, physician paid to serve a hospital, hospital administrator, and similarly a bishop as administrator of goods for the poor can have an office-based duty. Failure in such a duty can generate restitution. Second, an ordinary person can be bound by the common obligation of charity according to the order of charity. Even if omission here is mortal sin, it does not ordinarily generate restitution.

Legal justice does not change this. Like charity, legal justice is a kind of general virtue ordering the virtues toward the common good. It can move mercy to aid a citizen in extreme necessity without converting every omission into a commutative debt of restitution. Nevertheless public secular or ecclesiastical judges may compel citizens to assist extreme necessities.

I add a qualification: if the needy person specifically demands what natural necessity gives him a right to use and the possessor unjustly resists, the case for restitution becomes stronger. He says it would not be absurd to hold that the rich are bound to restitution in such a case, especially when the poor person expressly asks.

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I ask whether, when one is under a command to give alms, the command can be fulfilled merely by lending or selling with payment expected later. Adrian holds that lending fulfills the command and that the recipient, once his fortune improves, must repay, because the obligation is merely to relieve present necessity.

I call this opinion false if applied to absolute extreme necessity. He distinguishes two kinds of extreme necessity. One is absolutely extreme: the needy person has no resources at all. The other is extreme only in a qualified sense: a person possesses wealth but cannot presently access it, for example because his property is in Rome while he is elsewhere.

In the second case Adrian's view can be true because the recipient possesses his own substance. Likewise, if a person presently lacks resources but ordinarily earns his living through labor and is capable of repayment, a rich person need not necessarily make an outright gift and may assist under an obligation of later repayment, depending on circumstances.

But in the first case - absolute extreme necessity and no substance from which repayment can reasonably be made - the giver must give gratuitously. The command then is specifically the command of almsgiving, which is a gratuitous donation of what is necessary to relieve misery. A mere loan is not a gratuitous gift and does not satisfy that command. Where one has surplus and only common needs are involved, one may lend to this particular person provided there remains a genuine intention to give alms to others at another time and the loan is not a fraudulent evasion of the command.

A person in absolute extreme necessity who takes what is necessary does not thereby become bound to repay simply as a borrower. St. Thomas says without qualification that in extreme necessity one may take another's property in the manner of theft, because necessity makes it common as to use. If after the necessity passes something of the taken good remains, restitution is due for the reason already explained.

Fourth doubt: Are there cases beyond the two principal cases in which almsgiving is commanded?

I ask whether one can be obliged to give even from goods fitting to one's state when the recipient is not in absolute extreme necessity. St. Thomas's wording appears restrictive: other alms are counsel, and only necessity in which the sufferer cannot otherwise be sustained seems to impose the precept from the recipient's side.

I note, however, that Vitoria, Soto, Cano, and Sotomayor held that almsgiving can be commanded beyond those two cases.

Adrian likewise says that not only absolute extreme necessity but also “straitened” or grave necessity can oblige a person to give from goods pertaining to his state. I regard this as more consonant with Scripture, the Fathers, Christian piety, and natural reason.

Examples include a person in danger of losing his social state with consequent great misery to himself and his family, when another can prevent this by surrendering only a marginal portion of goods not clearly necessary or superfluous; a prisoner whose prolonged confinement will reduce his wife and children to severe misery when a moderate alms could free him; or a captive who can be redeemed at moderate cost.

Thus I distinguish absolute extreme necessity from necessity “extreme in its genus,” such as imminent loss of one's state or exposure to another grave evil. This second kind too can activate the command of mercy.

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ALMSGIVING IN GRAVE NECESSITIES SHORT OF DEATH

I appeal to Exodus 22: a creditor must not oppress a poor debtor and must return the garment taken in pledge before sunset because it is the debtor's only covering. God's declaration, “If he cry to me, I will hear him, because I am compassionate,” indicates a command of mercy even where there is not literal imminent death. Isaiah likewise condemns merciless exaction from
debtors. Matthew 18 condemns the servant who imprisoned his fellow servant for debt: “Shouldst not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow servant?” Here neither the debtor's extreme necessity nor the creditor's surplus is expressly presupposed, yet failure of mercy is gravely condemned.

1 John 3 speaks generally of seeing a brother “have need,” not only of seeing him at the point of death. Augustine interprets this
in cases where a brother is exposed to serious molestation or hardship and asks whether one's heart can refuse money that would
prevent such suffering. I understand the Fathers' language about surplus not with mathematical rigidity but according to the circumstances in which one's neighbor has sufficient reason to require assistance.

Christian charity demands that I value the preservation of my neighbor's whole condition more than a small portion of the convenience belonging to my own condition. Human friendship itself could scarcely survive if friends refused one another assistance in such cases; Christian charity is friendship with God and neighbor. James 2 speaks of a brother or sister naked and
lacking daily food - a need grave but not necessarily absolutely extreme - and condemns the empty response, “Go in peace, be warmed and filled,” without supplying bodily necessities.

I add professional examples. A lawyer can be bound under precept to assist a poor person whose cause otherwise cannot be defended. If one can save a neighbor from substantial robbery merely by shouting or spending a modest amount, omission can be mortally sinful. Exodus commands one to return even an enemy's wandering ox and to help raise an ass fallen beneath its burden. These are commanded works of assistance despite not involving immediate danger of death. Physicians likewise can have obligations toward poor patients extending beyond only the gravest illnesses.

From this I draws a first conclusion: in such grave cases a person may be bound either to give gratuitously or at least to lend, depending on the nature of the necessity. Scripture joins mercy with lending: the just man “is merciful and lendeth,” and Ecclesiasticus praises giving, lending, and becoming surety as works by which one assists another.

Second conclusion. I say he is completely convinced that many things are genuinely “superfluous” in circumstances where
people ordinarily do not think them so. Surplus is relative to circumstances. During notable poverty and famine, for example, elaborate clothing for the servants of a nobleman may become superfluous even though at another time it fittingly belongs to the
splendor of his state.

Accordingly, in the present matter something can count as surplus when spending it would provide a very great remedy to one's
neighbor while causing little or no real detriment to the giver. This can involve money, favor, personal assistance, or intercession. A person who can easily help his neighbor's animal fallen under a burden but refuses while serious damage follows
can sin gravely; similarly one who can intercede with a rich man and free a poor person from great misery places himself in grave moral danger by refusing without reason.

St. Thomas's restriction to “evident and urgent necessity” can include necessities extreme in their own genus - such as imminent
loss of one's state - and not merely immediate danger of death. Alternatively, St. Thomas may be speaking of alms precisely as a
gratuitous donation: in some lesser grave necessities one can fulfill the command by lending rather than giving outright.

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QUESTION XXXII - COMMENTARY: PRUDENCE AND ECCLESIASTICAL GOODS

I conclude the preceding discussion by insisting that charity, individual prudence, and human piety must govern these cases.

Proverbs says the just man knows the lives or needs of those belonging to him, whereas the bowels of the impious are cruel;

Paul therefore urges Christians to put on “the bowels of mercy” and piety. The rich should especially remember Paul's warning that those who desire to become rich fall into temptation, the snare of the devil, and many useless and harmful desires that plunge men into destruction. One such temptation is refusing alms in the serious cases just discussed.

Final doubt: Are bishops and ecclesiastics bound by a stronger obligation to give alms than other faithful?

The first objection says the obligation of almsgiving arises from charity, and the commandments of love of God and neighbor

bind all equally; therefore clerics do not seem specially bound. The second says the obligation arises either from the giver's surplus or the recipient's necessity. The recipient's necessity is the same whether compared with a cleric or layman, while clerics are not uniformly richer: many possess no surplus and some are poor. Thus the general rules seem the same.

A third objection argues that if ecclesiastics have a special obligation it would chiefly be because ecclesiastical goods are deputed to the poor. But tithes are owed in justice as legitimate stipends assigned by law to ecclesiastical ministers, and St. Thomas even teaches that the poor are bound to pay tithes. Therefore such revenues can appear to become the ministers' proper goods. Moreover, if some ecclesiastical property is strictly assigned to the poor, distributing it would seem an act of commutative justice and faithful administration rather than almsgiving from one's own goods; failure would generate restitution.

I say the subject has been extensively treated by learned contemporaries, especially Martín de Azpilcueta (Navarrus), Bishop

Francisco Sarmiento, and Domingo de Soto in De iustitia et iure, Book X, q.4, especially article 3, on whether bishops and priests possess true dominion over ecclesiastical goods. I intends to treat the disputed ownership question only briefly because, for his purpose, the magnitude of clerics' obligation to give alms does not finally depend upon whether they are called full owners of ecclesiastical property.

First foundation: five kinds of temporal goods reaching clerics. Following Soto, I distinguish: (1) goods anciently placed in

the common ecclesiastical deposit for the sustenance of clergy and poor, a custom originating in Acts 4 when Christians sold

possessions and laid the proceeds at the Apostles' feet; (2) goods subsequently offered not merely for poor relief or church fabric but as the endowment or stipend of perpetual chaplaincies, anniversaries, episcopal sees, castles, vassals, and similar foundations; (3) daily offerings and stipends, whether for celebrating sacred rites or placed at the altar; (4) tithes commanded

by ecclesiastical law for ministers of churches; and (5) hereditary patrimony or other goods acquired by a cleric through his

own labor, skill, or industry.

Second foundation. The manner of offering, receiving, and distributing ecclesiastical goods has varied over time. At the

beginning not only clerics but the faithful at Jerusalem lived in common, with the Apostles and deacons as administrators. This represented in an exemplary way the communal life later preserved perpetually in the religious state. As the Christian people and clergy increased, such common life could no longer be maintained universally. Ecclesiastical goods therefore came to be divided into portions: one for bishops, another for clergy, another for church fabric and necessities, and another for the poor. my historical discussion continues on the following page.

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QUESTION XXXII -

ARTICLE VI,

COMMENTARY (continued) I continue the historical account of ecclesiastical revenues. The ancient

fourfold division of
ecclesiastical goods—one portion for the bishop, another for the clergy, another for the fabric and necessities of the
church, and another for the poor—was confirmed by ecclesiastical legislation. In my own time, however, the portion once
separately designated for the poor was no longer visibly set apart; rather, by conjecture it was believed to have become
joined or mixed with the portion of the bishop, clergy, church fabric, or with all of them collectively. First

conclusion.

Bishops, by reason of the state of perfection they profess, are bound by a stricter bond of charity toward their own flock
and must be merciful not only in spiritual things but also in temporal things insofar as these are ordered toward spiritual
welfare. This obligation remains whether they possess patrimonial goods or ecclesiastical goods, whether they are owners
or merely administrators; indeed, even if they possess nothing themselves, they are bound to seek alms from wealthy
persons and distribute them to the poor. I lament that this conclusion seems hidden from many bishops of my age,
although I consider it evident from Scripture, the Fathers, and the nature of the episcopal state. The episcopate signifies
an office and ministry of superintendence. Bishops are successors of the Apostles and pastors of the Church, entrusted
with care for everything capable of contributing to the salvation of souls. Because the episcopal state is, according to St.
Thomas, a kind of “magisterium of perfection,” the bishop must provide his flock with an eminent example of virtue,
especially mercy and charity. Christ therefore examined Peter concerning charity before entrusting the sheep to him:
“Lovest thou me more than these?” To feed the sheep includes strengthening believers and providing what is necessary
for them. A second argument follows from the pastoral office itself. Bishops are directly pastors of souls and in some
circumstances must expose even their own lives for the salvation of the flock, beyond what is demanded of ordinary
Christians. Yet the spiritual salvation of souls is frequently endangered through temporal poverty. Therefore bishops
must, insofar as they can, remedy such temporal distress lest persons oppressed by poverty succumb to sin. The “wolf”
from which the good shepherd protects the flock includes not only heresy but adversities used by the devil to destroy
souls. Gregory the Great teaches that the pastor must first expend his exterior goods for the sheep and, if necessary,
eventually his life. Since one's life is incomparably greater than temporal substance, one who refuses his substance for the
sheep cannot plausibly claim readiness to surrender his life for them. Thus a pastor who loves earthly substance more
than his sheep forfeits the reality of the pastoral name.
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THE BISHOP AS EXAMPLE OF MERCY

I summarize two foundations for the bishop's special obligation. First, the dignity of the episcopal state makes him a teacher and exemplar of perfection; religious are, in a certain respect, disciples relative to this magisterium of perfection. Therefore a bishop must furnish an outstanding example in works of mercy. Second, his office gives him superintendence over the salvation and advancement in virtue of souls, which temporal adversity often impedes.

Matthew 5 applies with particular force to the Apostles and their successors: “You are the light of the world,” “the salt of the earth,” “a city seated on a mountain,” and a lamp placed upon a lampstand. Consequently it is not sufficient that a bishop be an excellent doctor, an eloquent preacher, or merely free from public sin; he must also be publicly beneficent and make himself an example of good works.

St. Paul likewise devoted great solicitude to collecting alms in Macedonia and Corinth for the poor at Jerusalem. He did not regard care of the poor as foreign to the apostolate, but as contributing to the salvation of both poor and rich. Paul says that Peter and John imposed upon him the charge that “we should be mindful of the poor.”

St. Peter commands pastors to feed the flock of God willingly and to become examples to the flock. St. Paul similarly tells Timothy, a bishop, to be an example to the faithful “in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity,” to exercise himself unto godliness, and to make his progress manifest to all. A bishop's example is indispensable to spiritual fruit because when a man's life is despised, his doctrine is easily despised as well.

How, I ask, can a bishop command the rich not to place hope in uncertain riches but in God, and command them to be rich in good works, ready to distribute and communicate, if the bishop himself keeps granaries full of grain waiting for a higher selling price, accumulates treasures, and builds magnificent houses to leave to a wealthy relative? I deplores that so evident a truth is obscured from certain prelates.

The examples of the holy pastors of the primitive Church are so frequent that I consider it unnecessary to enumerate them.

Bishops read these examples daily in the lives of the saints and admire them, yet few imitate them, excusing themselves by saying such examples are to be admired rather than imitated. I reject this evasion: these deeds are not miracles requiring a special supernatural gift unavailable to others. The episcopal obligation is fundamentally the same, the Judge is the same, and “a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule.”

He points especially to Ezekiel 34's terrible denunciations of the shepherds of Israel who fed themselves rather than the flock, Augustine's extensive work On Pastors, and Gregory's Pastoral Rule. Pastors should keep these works before their eyes and meditate upon them seriously rather than treating the question as an idle scholastic controversy.

Second conclusion. Where it is certain that temporal ecclesiastical goods have been specifically assigned to the use of the poor, those goods are owed to the poor by justice, whether collected by a bishop, parish priest, or any other administrator.

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Third conclusion. The bishop or another ecclesiastical minister is not the owner of immovable ecclesiastical goods specifically constituted as the permanent endowment or stipend of ministers. Such property was, as it were, bound by its former owners and deposited with the Church so that ministers might be sustained from it. It cannot be alienated except for a greater good of the Church and according to pontifical law or with authorization of the Supreme Pontiff.

Fourth conclusion. A bishop or other non-religious ecclesiastical minister who has a right to receive the annual fruits assigned to his office is truly owner of those fruits. They are his proper goods and, considered simply as property, he can consume, alienate, or give them without committing an injury against another's ownership. St. Thomas nevertheless says that if a prelate retains an immoderate amount for himself and fails to relieve others according to the debt of charity, he sins through immoderate affection and use. I praise Soto's extensive defense of this point.

The central disputed question is whether, after ecclesiastical revenues ceased to be divided into four visible portions and instead were divided into portions for bishop, clergy, and church fabric, ecclesiastics remain bound in justice to separate for the poor the old fourth portion. I judge Martín de Azpilcueta overly scrupulous on this matter and follows Soto.

Fifth conclusion. It is not sufficiently proved that the ancient fourth portion was originally separated by strict justice as though the faithful made offerings under the juridical condition that exactly one quarter be distributed as alms. I find it more probable that bishops, as distributors of those goods, separated that fourth part through charity, mercy, and the desire to give the faithful a good example. Once separated and entrusted to a clerical administrator, however, that administrator was bound in justice to distribute it according to the bishop's or chapter's prescription.

Sixth conclusion. No sufficiently certain argument or testimony proves that bishops in my own age were bound by commutative justice to separate a definite portion of their annual revenues for the poor. The principle that in doubtful matters the condition of the possessor is better supports the bishops' possession where the contrary arguments amount only to conjectures and pious suspicions.

I insist that this juridical conclusion does not weaken the bishops' moral obligation. It is useless to urge bishops to almsgiving on a doubtful theory that they owe exactly a quarter in restitution when they are already bound by the much stronger and more certain bond of charity and pastoral office. They must render an account of their stewardship to Christ, and charity can require such abundant almsgiving that little remains even where strict restitution is not owed.

Other ecclesiastics likewise, all else equal, are more strongly obliged to abundant almsgiving than lay faithful because they are sustained from goods offered to Christ and occupy a more perfect state. Parish priests are especially bound because they share in pastoral care of souls. Their sacramental ministry deserves a fitting stipend in justice, but richer revenues also furnish greater opportunity and obligation for mercy.

I remark that bishops would perhaps be held in greater honor if they possessed ample revenues chiefly so that they could exercise charity and mercy, rather than displaying great household furnishings, richly dressed attendants, silver and gold vessels, sumptuous tables, horses, riders, carriages, and litters.

Final conclusion concerning bishops taken from religious life. Such bishops do not acquire ownership of ecclesiastical goods as personal property but remain dispensers of them, because the solemn vow of poverty is not destroyed by accession to the episcopate.

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St. Thomas's reason is that the religious state is related to the episcopal state as a disposition toward perfection. A disposition
is not removed when perfection arrives except insofar as something in it would conflict with that perfection; what agrees
with perfection is instead strengthened. The solemn vow of poverty does not conflict with episcopal office because a religious bishop can perform everything required of the office through prudent administration of ecclesiastical goods without
acquiring personal ownership.
From the whole discussion, and especially the first conclusion, I say that no fixed fraction can be assigned such that a bishop
who spends that amount in alms is thereby free from every further obligation. The office of a good shepherd cannot be
limited in that way. The perfection of the state can demand, if necessary for souls, the expenditure of all one's substance and
even one's life.
Because such extraordinary cases are rare, I give a severe practical judgment for ordinary circumstances. Bishops, as fathers
of the poor and widows, must exercise notable almsgiving proportionate to their resources and the abundance of their
revenues. I say that he personally would not absolve any bishop of Spain unless at least a fourth part of his revenues were
expended in alms in ordinary necessities. This is not presented as a universal juridical fraction owed in commutative justice,
but as my confessional judgment concerning the demands of episcopal charity under the circumstances he knew.
In graver necessities—such as famine, pestilence, or widespread disease—the obligation increases according to the necessities of the poor, who are the bishop's own sheep. At times he may be bound to give even from his household furnishings and silver vessels.
A second consequence is that bishops must actively investigate the poor within their dioceses so that alms may be given or
procured for them. It is insufficient merely to be merciful toward poor persons who happen to appear, since ordinary Christians already have that obligation. The bishop is a spiritual father charged with procuring the salvation of his subjects,
which poverty can obstruct.
I does not mean that a bishop must personally know every poor individual. Rather, he must know generally the condition of
each town in his diocese—whether there are many rich, many poor, and how assistance can be organized. Parish priests can
easily conduct such inquiries, just as they transmit information concerning those who have received the sacraments at Easter.
I declares that he cannot understand how bishops can truly be fathers of the poor, or how they can safely regard themselves
as being in a state of salvation, unless they exercise this care: if they can relieve the poor, they must do so; if they cannot,
they must at least compassionate them and implore God's mercy where human aid fails. He compares this duty with the
prelate's obligation, treated later, to inquire whether scandalous sinners among his subjects require correction.
He then answers the objections. Charity does not impose numerically identical acts upon everyone; it obliges each person to
more or fewer acts according to the condition of his state. The two general titles creating an obligation of almsgiving—surplus in the giver and necessity in the recipient—apply to everyone, but impose a greater burden on bishops
because surplus is more frequently found among them and because they must feed the flock by example. If a bishop is
genuinely so poor that he can barely provide necessities for himself and his household, exhorting others to almsgiving may
suffice.
I closes the treatment of bishops and ecclesiastics and turns to Article VII: Whether alms may be given from goods unjustly
acquired.
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ARTICLE VII - WHETHER ALMS MAY BE GIVEN FROM ILL-GOTTEN GOODS

The first objection cites Luke 16: “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Since mammon signifies riches, it
appears that a person can make spiritual friends by distributing as alms riches unjustly acquired.
The second objection notes various kinds of “base gain.” Money earned through prostitution is shameful, and Deuteronomy
forbids offering the hire of a prostitute in God's house; yet such money can in some circumstances be given as alms. Likewise
goods obtained through simony, gambling, and similar practices raise the question whether their immoral origin prevents
almsgiving.
The third objection argues from the hierarchy of evils. Retaining another's property is less evil than allowing homicide through
refusal to aid a person in extreme necessity. Ambrose says: “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you have
killed him.” Thus there seems to be at least some case in which another's ill-gotten property can be used for alms.
Against this, Augustine commands alms to be made from just labors and warns against attempting to “corrupt” Christ the
Judge by giving to the poor from goods taken from others. One should not give alms from usury while withholding restitution
from those injured.
St. Thomas's response. Something can be illicitly acquired in three ways. First, it can be acquired illicitly and remain owed in
justice to the person from whom it was taken, as in robbery, theft, and usury. Because restitution is owed, alms cannot be made
from such property.

Second, something can be illicitly acquired in such a way that the acquirer may not retain it, yet it is not owed back to the giver
because both giving and receiving violated justice. St. Thomas gives simony as the example. In such a case restitution is not
made to the giver; the goods are instead distributed in alms.

Third, the acquisition itself can be valid even though the activity from which the money arose is sinful. The classic example is
money received by a prostitute. The prostitution is against God's law, but the woman does not act unjustly merely in receiving
the agreed payment. Consequently she can retain it and can give alms from it.
Regarding gambling, St. Thomas distinguishes natural/divine-law defects from merely positive-law prohibitions. One may not
validly win from persons unable to alienate their goods, such as minors or the insane; nor through fraud; nor by drawing
another into gambling through avaricious pressure. In these cases restitution is owed and the winnings cannot be given as alms.
Positive civil law may impose further prohibitions and restitution upon those subject to it.
In extreme necessity, however, goods become common as regards necessary use. A person in such necessity may take what is
required for his sustenance when no one will give it, and another may similarly take what is necessary to relieve him, though if
possible the owner's will should first be sought.
Summary of St. Thomas. (1) Property owed to another in justice cannot be given as alms. (2) Property illicitly received that
neither party may retain, as in the legal treatment of simony, is to be applied to alms. (3) Property whose acquisition is not
itself unjust, despite arising from a sinful activity, can be retained and given as alms.
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COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE VII

I say there is no real difficulty concerning the first conclusion: an act of almsgiving must itself be virtuous and according to right reason; therefore another person's property must first be restored to its owner. Evil may not be done so that good may result.

First doubt: Is there, by divine law alone, a difference between payment received for prostitution or fornication and payment received through simony?

I present arguments denying a difference. If the money itself is the giver's own and voluntarily handed over, the payment is not materially "another's property" in the way stolen goods are. If illegality comes instead from the sinful act for which payment is made, prostitution, adultery, simony, murder, and judicial corruption all seem structurally similar.

For example, if someone receives money to kill a man by private authority, why should he not acquire ownership of the payment even though the killing is wicked? Likewise, a judge paid to subvert justice receives money in connection with an unjust action. And Judas is said in Acts 1 to have "possessed a field from the reward of iniquity," suggesting acquisition of ownership from a wicked act.

Cajetan answers by distinguishing the malice of an act in itself from the malice of an act insofar as it is commanded by another vice. Receiving another's property against the owner's will is intrinsically unjust. By contrast, receiving a loan in order to commit fornication is not intrinsically unjust as a receipt; its wickedness derives from lust's command over the action.

In simony, however, Cajetan says the very giving and receiving constitute buying and selling something intrinsically unsalable. The sacred thing is not a legitimate object of sale. Similarly, the "subversion of justice" cannot be sold. This gives a special intrinsic defect to the exchange.

Cajetan's sign is that giving a woman payment for the use of fornication is sinful because the payment is ordered by lust; nevertheless, after the fornication has occurred, paying what was promised can be an act of justice. But payment for sacred things or for the subversion of justice remains evil before and after the deed, because the object itself is not legitimately saleable.

I nevertheless presses an objection against Cajetan. Money promised to an assassin appears capable of passing into his ownership once the murderous act is completed; similarly, sacrilegious action does not obviously prevent transfer of ownership merely because the act is against religion. Hence some authors plausibly judge that only positive ecclesiastical law prevents the transfer of ownership in a simoniacal purchase.

St. Thomas's language nevertheless favors the stronger view, since he says that in simony both giver and receiver act against the justice of divine law and therefore restitution is not made to the giver but the price is distributed as alms. I postpone a fuller treatment to Question 100, Article 6.

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I clarify that even if the sacred object is intrinsically incapable of legitimate sale and therefore the simoniacal seller does not
acquire ownership of the price by natural or divine law, it does not automatically follow that the giver loses his original ownership
merely by committing the sin. Under natural or divine law alone, no one is ordinarily deprived of ownership of his own property
merely as a punishment for sin. Thus the further rule that neither party retains the price and that it is applied to the poor depends, I
say, upon ecclesiastical penal law.
Ecclesiastical law fittingly imposed this penalty so that those who violate divine law by buying or selling sacred things are
punished by preventing either party from keeping the simoniacal price and directing it instead toward the poor.
I therefore state a first conclusion. If one considers divine law alone and assumes the opinion that the simoniacal seller never
acquires ownership of the price, the money must be restored to the giver rather than distributed as alms. But if the alternative
opinion is true—that by divine law alone the seller can acquire ownership of money voluntarily paid for his sacred action—then
he could give alms from it as from his own property and would have no greater obligation to do so than from his other property.

Second conclusion. Under existing ecclesiastical positive law, if someone receives a price for a sacred thing but the simony has
not yet been consummated because the sacred thing has not been transferred, the price cannot be distributed as alms; it must be
returned to the giver. Cajetan, Vitoria, Soto, and many Dominican masters hold this. Ecclesiastical penalties do not apply in the
same way to an incomplete simoniacal transaction.

Third conclusion. After consummated simony, it is highly probable that the price should not be restored to the giver but should be
given to the Church or the poor. Once such restitution has been made to the Church or poor, no further restitution to the giver is
required in conscience. I call this the common teaching of theologians and jurists and cites Sylvester, Cajetan, John of Medina,
Navarrus, Covarrubias, and the canon-law chapters De hoc and Audivimus.
I note, however, a fourth and in his judgment more likely opinion: before a judicial sentence, the price may still be returned to the
giver, and once restored to him the conscience does not require another restitution to the Church or poor. The reason is that
pontifical penal laws do not ordinarily deprive the guilty person of possession or ownership of his property before judicial
condemnation. Penal laws can prevent a new right from being acquired, but they do not necessarily confiscate an already
possessed right before sentence.
The simoniacal seller, by contrast, can be made incapable by ecclesiastical law of acquiring ownership of the price even before
sentence, because the law is then preventing a new acquisition rather than confiscating an existing possession. After sentence the
seller may be condemned to pay according to the canonical penalty.

SIMONY CONCLUDED; GAMBLING INTRODUCED I answer the arguments supporting the preceding conclusions.
Pontifical laws can deprive the buyer of a right to reclaim the price in the external forum and, after judicial sentence, deprive
him of ownership; meanwhile they can prevent the simoniacal seller from acquiring ownership from the outset. The canonical
requirement of a doubled payment after condemnation also indicates that some penalties presuppose judicial sentence. Final
conclusion on simony. After judicial sentence, restitution must be made according to
the judge's decree, applying the
simoniacal price to the Church or to the poor according to pontifical law. I note a special canonical case concerning payment
for entrance into religious life, where the price is ordered returned to the person who paid it. I then turns to St. Thomas's
treatment of gambling winnings. Cajetan observes that Article VII discusses three sources of gain in relation to almsgiving:
prostitution, simony, and gambling. Simony has now been treated. Concerning prostitution, I add that an offering from such
earnings should not be made at the altar where the contemptible source is publicly known and would cause scandal or
diminish reverence for divine worship. If, morally speaking, the shameful source is not known, the mere material origin does
not necessarily make the offering sinful. St. Thomas makes three points concerning gambling. First, if someone wins from
persons incapable of alienating their property—such as minors or the insane—he cannot give those winnings as alms but
must restore them. Second, if a person draws another into gambling through greed for gain, he is bound to restitution and
cannot give away the winnings as though they were his own. Third, positive civil law can make gambling winnings illicit and
impose restitution, subject to the persons and jurisdiction governed by that law. Cajetan explains the second point by
interpreting “drawing” another to gambling as involving some degree of mixed involuntariness. Invitations, repeated
requests, insults, reproaches, or social pressure can make refusal burdensome or dishonorable. Gambling exchanges ought to
arise from genuinely free consent because play is ordered to recreation; when a person is effectively coerced, the voluntary
character required for transfer of ownership is defective. But someone who merely invites another person, who then freely
and willingly chooses to play, does not thereby “draw” him in St. Thomas's condemned sense. If no fraud or other defect is
present, winnings from such a freely consenting player may be retained and can be given as alms. Because gambling was
extremely common in Spain, I decide to treat the justice of gambling at greater length so theologians can have ready
principles for resolving cases of conscience. I cite Alexander of Hales, Cajetan, Adrian, Alfonso de Castro, Soto, Navarrus,
Covarrubias, canonists and civil jurists, and several authors of special treatises on gambling.
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ON GAMBLING ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW

Two questions can be asked about gambling. First, whether gaming itself is virtuous or vicious and whether gain from it is shameful or honorable. This belongs chiefly to St. Thomas's treatment of recreation in Question 168.

Second, regardless of whether the game or its profit is morally honorable, whether ownership is transferred through gambling. This second question is my present concern.

Because some rules arise from natural law and others from human positive law, I first consider natural law.

First conclusion. Under natural law, gambling truly transfers ownership provided the players are capable of alienating their property and all fraud and violence are absent. The doctors cited by I commonly agree with this.

A prodigal who rashly gives away money nevertheless transfers ownership to the recipient. Much more, therefore, can a gambler transfer ownership, since gambling is not generically sinful in the same way prodigality is. Moreover, gambling involves a reciprocal agreement: each player voluntarily exposes his money to the same agreed risk. Although other sins can become mixed with gaming, the contract as such need not violate commutative justice.

The conclusion contains three important qualifications. First, persons who cannot alienate their goods through sale or gift cannot ordinarily transfer ownership through gambling either. I enumerates minors, sons under paternal power, monks and nuns, wives in the relevant juridical condition, the insane, and similar persons who either lack ownership of the stake or possess ownership without free administration of it.

Second, fraud prevents legitimate transfer. Yet not every strategic device is fraud: a player may employ tactics permitted by the recognized rules and customs of the game according to the judgment of persons skilled in it.

Third, violence or coercion prevents the pure voluntariness required for transfer of ownership. Excessive importunity, insults, and reproaches can be reduced to violence when they place such pressure on a person that refusal would expose him to serious embarrassment, loss, or social disgrace. I understand St. Thomas's statement about “drawing” another into play in this sense.

The Latin idea of “drawing” itself suggests pulling the unwilling, whereas one “leads” the willing.

Second conclusion. Persons who cannot transfer ownership through gambling because they lack the power to alienate their goods likewise cannot acquire ownership through that same invalid contract. As they cannot lose, so they cannot win. Every contract requires a certain equality between the parties, including equality of juridical capacity and exposure to risk; a contract absolutely null on one side cannot serve as a valid source of ownership on the other.

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LIMITED GAMBLING CAPACITY AND POSITIVE LAW

Third conclusion. Natural law permits persons whose administration of property is limited to expose to play a moderate amount appropriate to their condition. Within such a lawful game, I judge it more probable that they may win a larger sum than the amount they themselves were capable of losing.

His example is a son under paternal authority who receives one hundred gold pieces annually from his father for maintenance while studying at a university. He may reasonably be understood to have permission to risk, for example, five gold pieces in recreation. If he plays with an independent person and fortune favors him, I hold that he may acquire a sum greater than five pieces even though he could not lawfully have risked a correspondingly large amount of his own.

The reason is that a superior—father, mother, prelate, master, or other administrator—who grants money for ordinary life can reasonably be understood to permit moderate expenditures for recreation. Play is a kind of relaxation needed in mortal life for rest from labor and restoration of the mind. Soto, Navarrus, and others support the basic permission to expose a moderate amount.

my further claim that such a person can win more than he could lose is defended by analogy with contracts involving minors: some contracts ineffective insofar as they harm the minor can nevertheless operate insofar as they favor him and burden the legally capable party. He also compares the case with a poor man playing with a very wealthy person. If the poor man possesses only twenty gold pieces, nothing prevents him, when fortune favors him, from winning a hundred or even a thousand from the wealthy player merely because he himself could never have risked that amount.

The equality required in gaming does not mean that both parties must be capable of losing the same maximum quantity. It means principally that each owns or legitimately administers the money he actually stakes and that the agreed risk is genuinely accepted. Indeed, I remark that the practical inequality may favor the wealthy player, who can continually increase the stake and expose himself to fortune with greater security than the poor player.

An objection argues that a son's winnings become bona profectitia, goods acquired through the use of property received from the father, and therefore remain under paternal administration. I reply that when the father permits the son to expose a limited sum to the fortune of gaming, he tacitly permits him to expose to subsequent play whatever profit arises from that sum according to the rules of the game. I distinguish military or quasi-military property and certain adventitious goods, which may be administered differently.

This concludes my discussion of gaming under natural law.

Gambling under Spanish and common positive law. I next distinguish three kinds of games. First are games in which skill or natural ability predominates and chance has little or no role, such as chess-like strategic games, wrestling, ball games, and similar contests. Second are games in which chance predominates and skill contributes little or nothing, such as pure dice and certain card games. Third are mixed games in which chance has the principal role but reason and counsel also contribute, such as tables/backgammon and certain card games. The latter two classes are broadly called games of chance (alea).

Games can also be played either for money already placed down or on credit, with payment promised afterward. Skill-based games were not absolutely prohibited but were regulated as to excess, including maximum sums that could be lost and restrictions on playing on credit. Games dominated by chance were more broadly prohibited by canonical, imperial, and Spanish royal law, with rules applying to clerics, religious, and laypersons. I cite the apostolic canons, canon law, the Council of Trent, imperial law, the Partidas, Spanish royal ordinances, and legislation of Charles I.

He finally raises the next disputed question: do these positive laws prohibiting games absolutely or regulating their manner invalidate the transfer of ownership of gambling winnings? Authorities disagree. One opinion says prohibited games do not transfer ownership and the winnings must be restored, though authors disagree whether restitution goes to the loser or to the poor and whether judicial sentence is required. Another opinion says ownership really passes through the game but positive law grants the loser a later right of recovery before a judge.

I begin my own resolution with the proposition that, under the common civil and pontifical law, ownership is in fact transferred through even a prohibited game when the game is played with money actually present. His proof continues on the following page.

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QUESTION XXXII — ARTICLE VII — GAMBLING UNDER POSITIVE LAW

(continued)

"First conclusion. Under the common civil law, when gambling is carried on with money actually placed down, ownership is transferred even in a prohibited game. I say this is the teaching commonly received by the doctors of my age and by earlier authorities. The laws do not generally render the winner incapable of acquiring ownership; rather, they impose penalties and give the loser a legal action for recovery. St. Thomas therefore must be understood either of laws which expressly invalidate transfer of ownership, or according to the juridical interpretation current in his own time.

"Second conclusion. The same is true under the royal law of Spain, except for the special case expressly established concerning soldiers who gamble at dice or tables while serving under the standards during the period in which they receive military pay. In that case the royal ordinance commands immediate restitution to the loser. "Third conclusion. Spanish royal law grants the loser in a prohibited game a right to recover the money within eight days. If he neglects to do so, another person or the judge acting by reason of office may recover it within the period established by law. I judge these Spanish provisions more equitable than the older imperial constitution that allowed recovery for an extremely long period, since such a rule left the winner in prolonged uncertainty and generated litigation.

"Fourth conclusion. The recovery must be sought before a legitimate judge. A private demand does not of itself oblige the winner in conscience to restore money whose ownership has already passed to him. I consider this certain, because the obligation to restore in this case arises from civil law, and that law grants a judicial action rather than a private power of self-help.

"I then turns to play on credit. Under the common civil law authors disagree whether one who has lost after giving his word is bound to pay. Adrian, Soto, Covarrubias, and Navarrus are cited for the negative; John of Medina and Alfonso de Castro for the affirmative. I judge the affirmative more probable under common law: a mutual promise naturally binds in conscience unless positive law invalidates it, and he finds no common-law text that simply annuls the promise. The fact that the loser may afterward have an action to recover what he paid does not by itself prove that the prior promise was null. 620

QUESTION XXXII —

ARTICLE VII — GAMBLING UNDER POSITIVE LAW (continued) First conclusion.

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gambling is carried on with money actually placed down, ownership is transferred even in a prohibited game. I say this is the
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what he paid does not by itself prove that the prior promise was null.
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ARTICLE VII — PLAY ON CREDIT AND THE SPANISH LAW The objection is that one

who pays gambling money has an
action for recovery; therefore, according to the juridical maxim that retention belongs to one who possesses an action, he
should also be able to retain the money before paying. I reply that the argument would apply equally to money actually placed
down, although the opposing authors admit that such money is owed once lost. Moreover, the legal circuit of first paying and
afterward seeking recovery is not useless: it preserves fidelity to promises while the civil penalty discourages prohibited
gaming. Spanish royal law. Among Spaniards governed by the laws of Castile, however, no one is bound to pay money lost in a
game played on credit. I cite the pragmatic sanction of Charles V issued at Madrid in 1528, which declared null the
obligations, writings, and promises made for payment of money lost in such games. He praises the equity of the law because
gambling on credit allows men, once heated by play, to risk sums they would never risk if the money had to be physically
present. If the loser swore an oath to pay, I distinguish the oath from the underlying promise. An oath can bind where
fulfillment remains licit even though the civil law has deprived the bare promise of civil force; he compares this with an oath
concerning usury. From this he explains the Spanish proverb that what is not put down is not paid: without the special force of
an oath, the credit loss is not owed under the Castilian law. A further controversy concerns what happens if the loser
nevertheless voluntarily pays. Some say ownership still does not pass. I judge it more probable that ownership does pass before
judicial sentence. By paying knowingly, the loser appears to renounce the legal benefit, or at least voluntarily donates the
money. Furthermore, I say the older rule denying transfer was not received, or had been abrogated by contrary custom.
Spanish honor itself made it nearly unthinkable that a man who had voluntarily paid a gambling debt would afterward accept
the money back. Confessors likewise did not ordinarily compel restitution before a secular judgment. Nevertheless, the loser
can use the benefit of the law and seek recovery within the period established. If he renounces the legal benefit as to payment,
he is reasonably understood also to renounce it as to recovery. Finally I reject Adrian's claim that the loser may privately seize
an equivalent sum from the winner. Since ownership passed, taking the winner's property against his will would be theft. The
right of recovery is a legal penalty and must be exercised through the legal order, not by making oneself judge in one's own
cause.
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ARTICLE VII CONCLUDED;

ARTICLE VIII BEGINS I conclude the discussion of gaming by returning to St. Thomas's

reply concerning extreme necessity.
In extreme necessity goods become common as regards necessary use. I ask whether a person is still in extreme necessity when
he can remedy it by begging. If he is of a condition in which begging can be done without notable injury to honor, or can
obtain necessities by honest work, he is not yet to be judged in extreme necessity. But if, because of his state, begging would
impose very grave degradation and no other means of necessary sustenance is available, some theologians allow him secretly to
take what is necessary. I consider it even more probable that, when the possessor unjustly refuses relief, the person in extreme
necessity can take the necessary food or clothing even against resistance. Natural law gives him a right of necessary use; the
possessor cannot justly prevent the exercise of that right, and the law of nations cannot abolish it. Thus Article VII is
concluded.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER ONE SUBJECT TO ANOTHER'S POWER MAY GIVE

ALMS St. Thomas raises examples
of religious under prelates, wives under husbands, sons under parents, and servants under masters. Since almsgiving is an
excellent work of religion and charity, it appears that subjection should not entirely prevent it. Against this, Augustine teaches
that alms should be given from one's own just labor, not from another's property. Response. One who is subject to another
must be regulated by the superior in those matters in which he is subject. Therefore he may not give alms from property
placed under the superior's power except according to permission, whether express or reasonably presumed. But if he
possesses something in a respect in which he is not subject to that superior, he is his own master as to that thing and may give
from it. A monk with delegated administration may give according to the commission received; without it he cannot give
monastery property without the abbot's express or presumed permission, except in extreme necessity. A wife may give
moderate alms from goods legitimately under her free disposition, but she must not impoverish the household or dispose of
goods legally governed by the husband without consent. Sons and servants likewise may give only moderate things for which
the superior's consent can reasonably be presumed, unless they have been entrusted with independent administration.
623

ARTICLE VIII —

COMMENTARY Summary. First, one subject to another cannot give alms from the matter in which he is subject

without the
superior's consent. This follows from the natural order by which inferiors are regulated by superiors. Second, regarding
property in which he is not subject, he may give alms because he acts from what is truly his own. I propose a general rule: no
one can donate a thing of which he is not owner except with the true owner's consent. A religious therefore cannot donate
community property except by the consent of the prelate who represents the community. Yet express permission is not always
necessary; interpretative consent can suffice. Thus religious traveling on legitimate business may ordinarily give small alms
from things assigned to their use when the community suffers no notable loss. Ownership alone is not always sufficient,
because administration can be subjected to another. I apply this especially to married women according to the Spanish civil
law of my day. I note that St. Thomas's juridical example cannot simply be transferred without qualification to Spain, where
civil law restricted a wife's independent contracting and alienation of property. What counts as interpretative consent must be
judged by prudence according to persons and circumstances: not what an unusually harsh superior or husband happens to
want, but what a prudent superior or prudent husband ought reasonably to permit. On this basis I strongly defends a wife's
ability to make ordinary alms that do not damage the family. He even says he would have no scruple in allowing a wealthy
wife, without her husband's knowledge, to distribute a modest portion of annual profit in legitimate alms, because a good
husband ought reasonably to consent. If a husband fails to provide necessities through avarice or dissipates the household
goods through gambling or sexual vice, the wife may secretly take what is necessary to sustain the family and children. Sons
under paternal authority are to be judged proportionately. Goods acquired in military service or certain other independently
administered goods may allow greater liberty. I finally discusses Cajetan's reconciliation of St. Thomas with Aristotle. The
wife can possess genuine domestic authority while the husband remains head in the universal ordering of the household.
Giving away goods to outsiders is not simply identical with internal household administration. Nevertheless a good husband
should entrust a prudent wife with the ordinary interior government of the home and with reasonable freedom to distribute
customary alms.
624

ARTICLE IX — WHETHER ALMS SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE TO THOSE MORE CLOSELY RELATED

Objections
appeal to the apparent priority of the holy over the merely related and to the fact that alms merit eternal reward. Against
them stands 1 Timothy 5: one who does not care for his own, especially those of his household, has denied the faith and is
worse than an unbeliever. Response. Augustine teaches that those joined to us by a closer bond are, as it were, assigned to us
by providence so that we may care for them more readily. Yet prudence must consider the different kinds of union: kinship,
holiness, necessity, and usefulness to the common good. A much holier person in greater necessity, or one whose preservation is
especially important to the common good, can therefore take precedence over a more remote relative whose necessity is slight.
Alms given from charity merit by the root of charity, and charity ordinarily requires preference for those more closely united
to us, other things being equal. Ambrose therefore praises liberality that does not neglect needy relatives, especially those
ashamed to beg from strangers. Alms can also receive an accidental reward through the merit and prayers of the holy
recipient; this explains Augustine's exhortation to make friends who will receive us into eternal dwellings. I say the affirmative
conclusion is supported by natural law, the command to honor father and mother, Isaiah's admonition not to despise one's
own flesh, and Ambrose's teaching concerning relatives. But because the command is affirmative, it binds according to
circumstances rather than mechanically. He rejects an error according to which alms should not be given to sinners. A sinner
is not to be supported precisely in his sin, but he remains a human being whose nature may need sustenance and whom charity
commands us to love. Christ commands beneficence even toward enemies. I also cautions against excessive investigation into
the moral life of every poor person. The biblical counsel to know to whom one gives means that substantial alms should be
distributed prudently to genuine need; it does not command a suspicious examination of every beggar. The popular maxim 'do
good and do not look at whom' has a sound sense when it means that one should not give merely in hope of temporal
repayment.
625

ARTICLE X — WHETHER ALMS SHOULD BE GIVEN ABUNDANTLY St. Thomas

distinguishes abundance on the side of
the giver and on the side of the recipient. On the giver's side it is praiseworthy to give much in proportion to one's resources, as
Christ praised the widow who gave all her living, provided the rules concerning necessary goods are observed. On the
recipient's side abundance is praiseworthy when it sufficiently supplies genuine need; it is not praiseworthy when it creates
superfluity and luxury, for then it is better to distribute to several needy persons. Summary. First, abundant almsgiving in
proportion to the giver's means is laudable. Second, it is laudable to relieve the recipient's need fully. Third, it is not laudable
to give so excessively that the recipient is carried beyond necessity into superfluity, unless another honorable title justifies the
gift. I say great prudence is required because the circumstances of giver, recipient, and common good must all be weighed. I
ask whether it is better to give small alms to many, none of whose necessities is fully relieved, or larger alms to one or a few
whose necessity is thereby removed. No universal mathematical answer can cover every case. First practical rule. Other things
equal, the common good is more divine and more worthy than a merely private good; sometimes it should be preferred even
when not every circumstance is equal. Second rule. A well-ordered commonwealth should have different modes of almsgiving.
Some distributions should be small and frequent for ordinary beggars; others should be larger and discreet for the respectable
poor who are ashamed to beg and whose condition requires more substantial assistance. Third rule. Where ordinary begging is
already commonly relieved, it is often better to give larger assistance to fewer persons so that real necessities are actually
removed. I apply this to dowries for poor but honorable young women: it can be better to provide a sufficient dowry to fewer
than an inadequate fragment to many, unless special circumstances require broader distribution. I conclude the whole tract on
bodily alms by noting that the precept of almsgiving belongs not merely to the Gospel but also to natural law, perfected by the
evangelical law. The stronger obligation of bishops, however, arises from Christ's special institution of pastors, who must
spend themselves and their goods for the salvation of souls.
626

QUESTION XXXIII — ON FRATERNAL CORRECTION —

ARTICLE I Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity. The objections say correction

appears to proceed from zeal for
justice or from prudence in giving counsel, while bearing with a sinner is an act of charity and seems contrary to correcting
him. Against this, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms, and almsgiving is an act commanded by charity. St. Thomas's
response. A person's sin can be considered in two ways: as an evil of the sinner himself, or as harmful to others and to the
common good. Correction directed to removing the sinner's own evil and reforming him is properly fraternal correction. Since
removing a friend's evil belongs to the same love by which we procure his good, this correction is an act of charity. Indeed
spiritual correction is more properly an act of charity than bodily healing or relief of exterior poverty because the good of
virtue is closer to charity's final end. A second correction regards sin insofar as it harms others or the common good. Such
correction belongs to justice and can include punishment, not merely private admonition. Prudence directs the execution of
correction, but the principal virtue is determined by the end: when the end is the brother's spiritual good, the act is principally
charitable.

COMMENTARY. This matter is grave and highly necessary. Fraternal correction is a spiritual work of mercy,

more excellent
than bodily alms, yet few possess the spiritual prudence and willingness necessary to exercise it well. I points to the scholastic
doctors, Gratian, and the moral summists. He distinguishes 'correction' and 'reproof' in older usage: properly, one reproves
when intending amendment and 'corrects' when amendment is actually achieved. Scholastic usage, however, calls the act
fraternal correction from its intended end even if the sinner does not in fact amend. Finally, just as bodily almsgiving is
commanded by charity but elicited by mercy, fraternal correction is commanded by charity and elicited by spiritual mercy,
because through it we seek to free our neighbor from spiritual misery.
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QUESTION XXXIII —

ARTICLE II — WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION IS UNDER PRECEPT

Objections say an impossible act cannot
be commanded; all divine precepts must be reducible to the Decalogue; holy men sometimes omit correction; and if correction
were a strict debt we would have to seek out every sinner as a debtor seeks his creditor. Against these stands Augustine: if you
neglect to correct, you can become worse than the one who sinned. Response. Fraternal correction falls under precept.
Negative commands prohibit acts evil in themselves and therefore bind always and at every time. Affirmative commands
require virtuous acts with their due circumstances; they bind when the act is necessary for the virtue's end. Correction is
ordered to the brother's amendment and therefore is commanded when it is reasonably necessary for that end, not at every
place and time. Omission can occur in three ways. It can be meritorious when charity itself counsels delay because another
time is more opportune or immediate correction would make the sinner worse or harm the weak. It can be mortally sinful
when one probably knows that correction could withdraw the brother from grave sin but omits it because fear or cupidity is
preferred to charity. It can be venially sinful when fear or cupidity merely makes a person slower without reaching such
dominance. A benefit owed to a determinate person must be actively sought and rendered. But benefits owed generally to
neighbors need not be distributed by searching out recipients; it is enough to provide them to those who providentially come
before us. Therefore Christians need not become investigators of everyone's life. Those who have special spiritual care of
another, however, must exercise the diligence proper to that office. I. He clarifies that St. Thomas means an omission of a
circumstance that destroys the substance of the virtuous act. Accidental sinful circumstances can coexist with fulfilling the
external substance of a command, although the agent sins through those added circumstances. The deeper
question is when
omission of correction becomes mortal sin; I now begin to treat it.
628

ARTICLE II — THE GRAVE OBLIGATION OF CORRECTION I ask whether fraternal

correction is commanded under
pain of mortal sin. I note the practical difficulty: many notorious sinners are never privately corrected, and few penitents
accuse themselves of omitting this precept. Yet negligence in this matter is not therefore innocent. First

conclusion. Fraternal

correction is highly useful for the conversion of sinners. Natural reason itself supports admonition and counsel as means by
which a rational person can be led from evil to good. Aristotle treats friendship as requiring aid toward moral improvement,
and Scripture repeatedly commands correction. Augustine's On Correction and Grace likewise defends its usefulness. Second

conclusion. At the due place and time, fraternal correction is a true command binding under

mortal sin. I appeal especially to
Matthew 18 and Luke 17: “If thy brother sin, rebuke him; and if he do penance, forgive him.” The ordinary Gloss says that
one who sees his brother sin and remains silent can sin just as one who refuses forgiveness. The precept is rooted in natural
law, though explicitly confirmed and explained in the Gospel. “If thy brother sin against thee” does not restrict the command
merely to personal injuries. Augustine interprets it both as an injury committed against oneself and as sin committed in one's
presence against God: an offense against one's Father is also, in a real sense, an injury to the son. If charity requires forgetting
one's own injury in order to rescue the offender, much more does it require concern where no personal injury clouds the
matter. I answer that not every failure to correct a public sinner means every observer sins mortally. Many circumstances
excuse: the corrector may lack authority or good standing with the sinner; there may be little hope of amendment; the matter
may be uncertain. Nevertheless confessors should not entirely neglect inquiry concerning this command, especially with
prudent and influential penitents capable of helping others. He also warns scrupulous persons not to investigate the lives of
neighbors merely to find things to correct. Very few people welcome correction, prudent private persons often lack certain
knowledge of another's sin, and indiscreet zeal can disturb peace. The ordinary Christian should attend first to his own
salvation rather than become an explorer of other people's faults.
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ARTICLE II — ANSWERS AND FURTHER CONSEQUENCES I answer the objection from

prostitutes and unbelievers.

Public authority may prudently tolerate certain evils to avoid greater ones; this does not abolish the natural precept of charity.

A preacher who has reasonable hope of converting a particular sinner can still be bound to admonish. But ordinarily there

may be little hope of effect from indiscriminate private correction. Correction concerns not only a brother already in mortal

sin but also one who, through ignorance or another cause, is in proximate danger of falling into mortal sin. I discusses a gloss

distinguishing future from past sins. If a sin is completely past and the sinner has already left it, punishment belongs to the

competent superior rather than to private fraternal correction; correction properly seeks present or future amendment.

Concerning unbelievers, Christians are ordinarily excused from private correction where there is no religious fraternity, little

hope of success, and danger of scandal. Yet if someone can prudently correct even a non-Christian concerning violations of

natural law, charity can oblige him. The Supreme Pontiff, by office, has a duty to provide preaching to unbelievers where there

is reasonable hope of conversion; other faithful may share this work when it can be done safely and fruitfully. The objection

that the sinner voluntarily possesses his spiritual misery does not remove the duty. Human friendship naturally uses counsel

and admonition precisely because passion and bad custom obscure the good. A person may have temporal means at hand and

therefore not require material alms, while still needing another's counsel to escape moral misery. Nor does the fact that a

sinner himself may delay repentance mean his neighbor can always delay correction. The sinner has dominion over his own

acts; I, however, am appointed by charity as a keeper of my brother in the circumstances where the command binds.

Moreover, the opportunity to correct may pass. Finally, divine grace is necessary for conversion, but this does not make

correction useless. God commands us to use the means He has established. If the brother does not convert after we have done

what was required, our reward is not lost. The hidden withdrawal of special grace in God's judgments would equally fail to

prove that prayer or counsel is useless.

630

ARTICLE II — WHETHER WE MUST CORRECT VENIAL SINS I first complete the

discussion of Matthew 18. The
command is not limited to an offense “against you” in the narrow sense. Augustine explains that when a man sins against God
in my presence he also, in a derivative sense, sins against me, just as one who insults a father before his son also injures the son.
Thus the Gospel reveals a broader natural duty to seek the brother's good. Still, prudence is essential. Those not charged with
special care should not become explorers of other men's lives. Few desire correction, fewer are known with certainty to be
disposed to profit from it, and excessive zeal without knowledge can destroy peace. Doubt: Are we bound by precept to correct
a brother concerning venial sins? An argument for the affirmative says that venial sin is spiritually worse than the loss of
temporal goods, and we are sometimes bound to relieve temporal misery. Origen also interprets Matthew 18 as including
venial sins. Conclusion. The solemn precept and process of Matthew 18 concerns grave sin. “If he hear thee, thou hast gained
thy brother” implies that the brother was spiritually lost, which points to mortal sin. The common teaching of the saints and
doctors agrees. If every venial fault required this process, community life would become intolerable, since “in many things we
all offend,” and constant mutual correction would itself disturb friendship and peace. I argue further: inducing another to a
venial sin is ordinarily venial; therefore merely failing to withdraw him from such a sin cannot normally be more grave. The
solemn evangelical escalation—private admonition, witnesses, and finally the Church—is disproportionate to an isolated venial
fault. He nevertheless distinguishes customary or dangerous venial faults. Superiors of religious communities can be bound to
remove customs that, though involving faults light in individuals, damage religious observance and the common discipline.
Civil rulers likewise can regulate abuses that disturb public order, though I reject an excessively rigorous theory making them
mortally responsible for eliminating every habitual venial imperfection.
631

ARTICLE II — IGNORANCE AND THE DUTY TO INSTRUCT I reject the idea that

because venial sin is spiritually worse
than temporal loss we must always correct it. Temporal and spiritual evils must be compared proportionately, not abstractly.
Venial sin is voluntary and can ordinarily be removed by the sinner himself without another's intervention; human life also
cannot pass entirely without venial faults. Third doubt: Must we correct a brother who sins through invincible ignorance? I
distinguish ignorance of law from ignorance of fact, divine or natural law from human law, and vincible culpable ignorance
from invincible ignorance that excuses from fault. Teaching the ignorant is itself a distinct spiritual work of mercy, though it
overlaps with correction when instruction removes danger of sin. First conclusion. One whose office is to teach the law is
bound to see that subjects are instructed in those things they are obliged to know. Paul says, “Woe is unto me if I preach not
the Gospel.” A pastor who neglects necessary instruction can sin gravely by failing his office. Second conclusion. Any person
who knows a truth of divine or natural law can be bound to instruct a neighbor who ignorantly lacks knowledge necessary for
salvation or is thereby in danger of mortal sin. I extend the principle, with due proportion, to ecclesiastical laws whose
observance belongs to common Christian life, such as principal precepts of the Church, feasts, and fasts. Third
conclusion. If it

is certain that instruction will not cause the ignorant person to cease the sinful conduct, there is ordinarily no obligation to
teach merely for his own sake, because the intended work of mercy would not attain its end. But if his ignorance harms a third
party, one can still be bound to instruct him for that third person's sake—for example, where ignorance causes unjust
exactions or spreads erroneous teaching. Fourth conclusion. When ignorance of fact concerns something contrary to divine or
natural law and there is reasonable hope that instruction will prevent the act, one must ordinarily warn the person. I give
examples involving an invalid or prohibited marriage: if Peter mistakenly believes a woman is free to marry him and I
certainly know of an impediment, charity can oblige me to warn him.
632

ARTICLE II — HUMAN LAW, INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE, AND PRUDENCE I give a

final conclusion concerning
ignorance of fact under merely human law. We are not ordinarily bound to remind every neighbor of every forgotten
positive-law obligation—for example, a priest companion who has innocently forgotten a part of the Office—because human
laws do not normally impose so extensive a burden upon every bystander. This conclusion changes where the omission would
cause scandal, irreverence toward God or religion, or another serious disorder. Thus one should warn a person about to
violate a fast publicly through forgetfulness, perform servile work on a feast in scandalous circumstances, or approach sacred
worship lacking what reverence clearly requires. I reject a scrupulous objection: perhaps the person's ignorance is culpable,
and warning him would at least make him recognize what to confess. One need not manufacture such anxieties. If his
ignorance was invincible, he does not sin; if culpable, his prior negligence already has its moral character. Confession includes
forgotten and unknown faults in the appropriate way. Still, I personally counsels warning when it can be done easily and the
person will readily comply. He then returns to omission of correction. If one knowingly recognizes that the brother ought here
and now to be corrected and deliberately omits it when the grave command binds, the omission is mortal. If he simply fails to
consider the matter through natural forgetfulness, he can be excused; if the failure to consider is itself culpable in
circumstances where he could and should have adverted, the usual principles governing omission of precepts apply. Fourth

doubt. If I am uncertain whether correction will help, am I still bound to correct? First conclusion: if it is more probable that

correction will harm the brother, I should not correct; this will be established more fully later. Second: if I am certain
correction cannot harm and may help, I am bound to act. I compare a physician obliged to apply a medicine that cannot hurt
and may cure. Third: where the probabilities of help and harm are equal, it is very probable that there is no obligation, outside
extreme spiritual necessity. But when the sinner is at the point of death, even a correction more likely to fail can be required if
it retains a real probability of saving him: without it he is already in danger of damnation, while with it there remains hope of
repentance.
633

ARTICLE III — WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION BELONGS ONLY TO

PRELATES St. Thomas's objections say
priests or prelates appear specially charged with correction; spiritual alms seem to belong to those spiritually superior just as
bodily alms belong to the materially rich; and in nature inferiors are moved by superiors. Against this, canon law says both
priests and all the faithful should care for those who perish, correcting them where possible. Response. Two corrections must
again be distinguished. Simple admonition directed to the brother's personal amendment is an act of charity and belongs to
every person capable of charity, whether subject or prelate. Correction directed to the common good through punishment is
an act of justice and belongs to superiors who possess authority not merely to admonish but to punish. Even in fraternal
correction the prelate has a graver care, because temporal and spiritual benefits should be given especially to those committed
to one's charge. A person with sound judgment in a matter is, in that respect, superior to the one who errs and can therefore
correct him even if he is not absolutely superior in office.

COMMENTARY. When St. Thomas says correction belongs to everyone “having charity,” he does not exempt

sinners who
lack charity. The meaning is everyone who ought to possess charity and ought not act against it. I ask whether ecclesiastical
prelates have a special obligation to correct subjects for the subjects' own spiritual good. Arguments against say the Gospel
speaks of brother correcting brother; the act remains specifically the same act of charity; secret sins are not simply within the
judicial forum of a prelate; and subjects can react more painfully to correction from a superior. First conclusion. Ecclesiastical
prelates are bound by a greater obligation to correct their subjects insofar as correction is ordered to the salvation of souls. I
cite St. Thomas, Augustine, Cajetan, Adrian, Ezekiel's watchman, Christ's command to Peter to feed His sheep, the good
shepherd who gives his life, Acts 20, 1 Peter 5, and Paul's command that one who presides do so with solicitude. A spiritual
pastor has undertaken care of souls and therefore must exercise greater diligence than a private person.
634

ARTICLE III — THE PRELATE'S SPECIAL OBLIGATION Second conclusion. The

greater obligation of the prelate arises
directly from the office he has accepted and from the justice and fidelity by which he owes its execution. Cajetan argues that
becoming a prelate does not create new duties except those belonging to the office, and such official duties are debts of justice. I
nevertheless qualify Cajetan. Third conclusion: the precept of charity and mercy also binds prelates more strongly concomitantly and indirectly. The office places the prelate in circumstances where mercy requires actions it would not require
from an ordinary private person. I compare the episcopal obligation of bodily alms already treated in Question 32. Soto
prefers to say that the stricter bond arises from mercy itself because the prelate, by his state, is more closely united to subjects
and must love them with paternal charity. I judge Cajetan's formulation more formal if understood with the qualification just
given: the new obligation originates directly from justice of office, while charity is intensified by that same official and paternal
relation. Final conclusion. A prelate who omitted a correction owed specially as prelate should not confess merely, “I omitted
correction of my neighbor.” He must disclose that he was the person's prelate, because either the omission violates the special
justice of office or the circumstance of being a pastor notably aggravates the sin against mercy. The objections are answered
accordingly. A prelate is not only a brother but also a father. His paternal authority can be used benignly even concerning
secret faults known to him, not as a public judicial punishment but as paternal correction. Subjects who resent such gentle
paternal correction resent it unreasonably; often resentment arises because superiors correct harshly rather than in the spirit
of meekness. The evangelical process does not become impossible merely because the prelate himself begins the correction. His
paternal intervention can actually be a milder remedy because fewer persons are involved. The shame felt before a spiritual
father can itself become effective medicine for amendment.
635

ARTICLE III — MUST PRELATES INVESTIGATE THE LIVES OF SUBJECTS? I ask

whether the prelate's greater
obligation requires him to investigate and explore the lives of subjects in order to correct them fraternally. Objections appeal
to Proverbs: “Do not lie in wait and seek wickedness in the house of the just.” If investigation were a work of perfection,
private Christians could imitate it, which would destroy communal peace. Investigation also risks distrust, hatred, and abuse
of knowledge connected with the forum of conscience. Cajetan notes the difficulty arises because two commands meet in the
prelate: fraternal correction, which seeks the particular good of the brother, and correction belonging to office, which seeks
both the individual and common good. A prelate is bound to provide sacraments and pastoral care to this particular subject as
well as to govern the community. Cajetan's first point is that merely becoming a prelate does not make the evangelical
command of fraternal correction itself include a universal duty to search for faults. The command of almsgiving presupposes
known need; it does not by itself command everyone to search out every needy person. Likewise correction ordinarily
presupposes knowledge of the fault. Nevertheless the prelate's office separately requires vigilance. According to occurring
cases and reasonable signs, he may have to inquire whether a particular fault requires correction. This belongs not to a rigid
scientific formula but to prudence concerning particulars: how, when, and whose fault ought to be investigated for healing. I
accept this and expands it. In an ecclesiastical prelate three relations must be considered: he is a brother under the one
heavenly Father; a spiritual father charged to teach, give example, and administer sacraments; and a prelate and judge with
authority in the external forum for the common good. These roles are distinct in reason but should mutually assist one
another. The prelate must govern as one who remembers that he is both father and brother. His office as prelate directly
regards the common good; fatherhood and fraternity more immediately regard the particular good of the neighbor.
Fatherhood stands between pure equality of brothers and juridical superiority of a ruler, because it exercises superiority
through affection and love for the child.
636

ARTICLE III — LAWFUL PASTORAL INQUIRY First conclusion. A prelate considered

merely as a brother is not bound to
investigate how subjects live in order to perform evangelical fraternal correction. As brothers all Christians are equal, and
private Christians are not commanded to search for persons upon whom to exercise generally owed works of mercy. Second

conclusion. Persons who are neither fathers nor prelates do not ordinarily have a right to

investigate a brother's private life for
the purpose of correcting him. Augustine warns Christians not to become explorers of other people's lives, seeking something
to condemn rather than seeing what providence actually places before them to correct. Third conclusion. A prelate insofar as
he is spiritual father and ruler can, and sometimes must, inquire into the life of subjects for their own good when paternal and
official responsibility reasonably calls for it. His greater spiritual resources and authority can make him better able to apply
correction than an ordinary brother. This does not authorize arbitrary surveillance. The means used must belong legitimately
to the office of father and prelate and must be proportioned to the end of healing the brother. Otherwise the supposed zeal for
correction becomes an invasion of another's office and a disturbance of common peace. I give practical examples. A superior
can appoint persons to watch over common and public places and report disorders. A religious superior who has reasonable
signs of improper conduct can prudently assign a discreet companion, not necessarily as a spy commanded to observe every
movement, but as a trustworthy brother who can act prudently if something serious occurs. Superiors can likewise appoint
officers in common areas of a convent to report matters genuinely requiring correction. Fourth conclusion. Inquiry must
always be proportioned to its pastoral end. A superior should not interpret my teaching as permission to investigate any
subject at will. Special inquiry into an individual should ordinarily rest upon a special reasonable suspicion arising from
reasonable indications, and the superior should use only means consistent with paternal and official authority. 637

ARTICLE III — PRUDENCE BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE AND INQUISITIVENESS I

emphasize that lawful pastoral
inquiry is a matter of prudence, not a universal mechanical rule. The superior can use means proper to his office, but private
persons who imitate those means without authority can become disturbers of peace rather than evangelical correctors. He
warns against two opposite extremes. Some prelates imagine the community is at peace so long as no offenses appear in the
external forum. Because they do not watch over the flock and correct no one fraternally, hidden vices gradually spread until
they injure the common good. Other prelates go to the opposite extreme, laying traps for individual subjects through
extraordinary means, accumulating knowledge that should have been left to God's judgment, and dragging secretly
correctable faults into public judicial punishment under pretext of the common good. Such rulers solicit accusations and
witnesses, publicly infaming a subject who could have been corrected privately. They claim to protect the community while
actually harming it. Offenses that are neither public nor dangerous to the common good are often better buried in the depths
than made notorious merely so they can be punished. I therefore ask with Solomon for wisdom capable of finding the mean
between negligence and oppressive scrutiny. The objection from Proverbs supports the restriction on private investigators but
does not eliminate legitimate pastoral vigilance. A prelate using lawful and proportionate means is not an ambusher seeking
wickedness in the house of the just, but a guardian of the common good. I admits the difficulty of defining every permissible
method. Even Cajetan suspended an exact determination. Hence I ask pardon if his own common rules fail to resolve every
singular case. The practical rule remains: never investigate an individual's life specially without a reasonable and particular
indication, and never exceed the laws and limits of paternal and pastoral office. He then raises another question: besides
prelates and those with direct care of souls, are some Christians bound by office or profession to a special exercise of fraternal
correction? He has in mind especially the mendicant religious orders whose institutes are particularly ordered to the salvation
of souls.
638

ARTICLE III — RELIGIOUS ORDERS AND WORKS FOR THE SALVATION OF SOULS

I recall the old controversy in
which opponents of the mendicant orders denied that religious could preach or hear confessions even when bishops
commissioned them. St. Thomas answered these attacks in his work against those who impugn the religious life.

First
conclusion. Superiors in mendicant orders, especially the Order of Preachers, are bound
under precept to foster special
exercise in spiritual works of mercy—doctrine, preaching, confession, and spiritual counsel—because the superiors are
guardians of the rule and observances, and observance of the institute's proper end is more important than secondary
ceremonies. Second conclusion. Individual religious subjects do not sin merely because they are not constantly engaged in these
external ministries, provided they maintain readiness to obey when such an office is legitimately assigned. Religious profession
is fundamentally a profession of obedience according to rule and constitutions. A subject may also explain genuine weakness or
incapacity to the superior when a burden exceeds his strength. Third conclusion. A religious is bound by office and profession
to dispose himself so as to become suitable for the principal ministries of his institute. For an order devoted to preaching and
doctrine, this creates a special obligation toward study, since study is a necessary disposition for competent ministry. I points
to St. Thomas's treatment of religious study. Fourth conclusion. Religious institutes founded for works of mercy have a special
obligation to those works, always under obedience. As bishops and parish priests are bound by office, religious can be bound
by their vow and institute. The same principle applies proportionately to orders founded for corporal works of mercy and to
military religious orders instituted for defense of the Christian commonwealth. I add that if a religious institute simply
abandoned its proper end in order to pursue another end—even one objectively more excellent—without legitimate pontifical
dispensation, this would be gravely disordered. The institute's vowed and approved form determines the works to which its
members are specially ordered.

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ARTICLE III — MUST CORRECTION BE GIVEN DESPITE DANGER TO LIFE? I raise a

fourth doubt: when a subject or prelate is otherwise bound to correct, does the obligation remain despite danger even of death? I give the example of knowing that a man's concubine would amend if admonished, while reasonably fearing that the man would defame, strike, or kill the corrector. One extreme opinion, which I associate with a position followed by Vitoria from Francis of Meyronnes, holds that omission because of such danger is never mortal sin for a private person and is at most venial for a prelate. The opposite opinion, defended by Cajetan, Lyra, Adrian, and supported by texts of St. Thomas, holds that the order of charity can sometimes require exposing bodily life for the neighbor's spiritual salvation. St. Thomas says that a person has direct care of his own body but can have spiritual care of another in a case of necessity; then he may be bound to expose bodily life for the other's spiritual good. Elsewhere Thomas says we ought to love the neighbor's spiritual salvation more than our own body.

The argument is that charity's order is itself commanded: God is loved above all; one's own spiritual good is loved above the neighbor's; but the neighbor's spiritual salvation is a greater good than one's own bodily life. Therefore some case must exist in which bodily danger is to be accepted for the neighbor's salvation. The case of urgently necessary correction appears to be such a case. Scripture says: “In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” I therefore treat the issue not as a license for reckless intervention but as a serious question of the hierarchy of goods under charity. I also present objections. If one were always bound to risk death for another's spiritual life, it might follow that one must expose oneself to death to baptize a child in danger, or that self-defense against an unjust aggressor would become illicit because killing the aggressor could endanger the aggressor's

QUESTION XXXIII — ON FRATERNAL CORRECTION

ARTICLE III — WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION BELONGS ONLY TO PRELATES (continued)

SECOND CONCLUSION. In the same spiritual necessity, a private person is not bound to expose his bodily life for the spiritual life of the

second kind; indeed, neither is he bound to correct his neighbor with grave danger of losing his honor or his state, but he may defer the correction to another time or omit it altogether. The reason is that it seems harsh that, while the neighbor has in his own power an easy means of repairing his evil, every other person should be bound to lose his own bodily life, which cannot be restored.

We therefore do not judge such a case to be an article of necessity obliging a man to succor his neighbor at so great a temporal detriment. Each thing must be compared with its proportionate counterpart, and temporal goods must be ordered proportionately to the neighbor's spiritual goods. If the neighbor's spiritual necessity is common within its genus, common and graver temporal dangers may have to be borne for the love of the brother who is to be corrected. If the spiritual necessity is graver or most grave, one will proportionately be bound to undergo a greater danger.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Everyone is bound to expose his bodily life even to certain danger for the spiritual life of his neighbor when the

neighbor is in extreme necessity of the first kind. This conclusion is proved by the arguments for the second opinion, and in moral matter they seem to me demonstrative. St. Thomas asserts it in Opusculum 18, chapter 14: we ought to love the spiritual life of our neighbor more than our own body; hence in an article of necessity there is a necessity of precept to place one's life in danger for the neighbor's spiritual salvation—for example, if someone is deceived by heretics and drawn into error against the faith, the person who sees this and is able to help him is bound to teach and admonish him even with danger to his own life.

This is confirmed because it is altogether reasonable that the supreme temporal good, bodily life, be exposed to danger for the highest spiritual good, eternal life. Yet, although bodily life is in itself exposable for the brother's spiritual life, circumstances are so various that a private person will rarely be bound actually to die in order to correct a brother and restore him to spiritual life. A private person may inform a bishop or prelate so that he may correct him. Moreover my bodily life is ordered to my own spiritual good, namely to doing penance and increasing in charity; and since I am not certain of my own spiritual disposition, I may preserve my life and provide for the salvation of my soul. Thus St. Thomas says that when we know that a brother can be freed by our bodily death from the death of his soul without danger to our own soul, to lay down one's life for him is not merely of perfection but of necessity—that is, not only of counsel but of precept.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Prelates who have the care of souls, especially bishops, are bound in many cases short of extreme necessity of

the first kind to expose their bodily life to danger for the salvation of their sheep. This is the common teaching and is taught by St. Thomas, and it is proved from John 10: “The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.” Bishops, as proper shepherds, have a greater obligation to lay down their lives for their sheep than other neighbors have; therefore they are bound in more cases in which others are not. This is strengthened by the special bond assumed in episcopal consecration to the care of souls.

This conclusion must nevertheless be understood according to the prudence of the spirit, not the prudence of the flesh. The saints sometimes fled persecution and preserved their lives because their continued life served a greater common good; many others exposed their lives when they judged that death would contribute more to the glory of Christ and the edification of the Church. St. Thomas prudently explains when it is lawful for a bishop to flee, and St. Athanasius wrote his apology against those who accused him because he had often fled persecution.

From these principles our preceding doctrine concerning temporal goods is confirmed. A prelate is bound to expend his own revenues whenever he prudently judges this necessary for the spiritual good of his flock—for example, to redeem Christian virgins held captive by unbelievers when their chastity or faith is manifestly endangered; to resist an imminent danger of heresy, exposing even his whole estate and life if necessary; or during pestilence to provide ministers of the sacraments, even at great expense. Parish priests are likewise bound to remain unless another suitable minister is ready to assume the care of souls. Religious who lack such a pastoral office are not bound to remain in a place struck by pestilence; if they remain voluntarily, it is a work of perfection.

To the arguments in the contrary sense: Augustine's omission of correction must be understood outside extreme necessity. The same applies to the corporal alms with which the case was compared. If bodily assistance is a proportionate and necessary means for relieving the neighbor's misery, it can fall under precept even when the giver himself is not bound to expose his life—for example, a wealthy man may be bound to pay for care during a pestilence although he is not bound personally to nurse the sick. A physician who has bound himself by stipend to attend them can have a stricter obligation, provided his service remains useful to the community.

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ARTICLE III — WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION BELONGS ONLY TO PRELATES (concluded)

A physician is not bound for the sake of one sick person to abandon the entire community when he can benefit the community from a distance by his counsel and
medical prescriptions. St. Thomas is therefore to be understood outside the case of extreme spiritual necessity already distinguished.
To the second argument: a “heroic act” is spoken of in two ways. In one way an act is heroic because it is extremely difficult and remains under counsel, as perpetual chastity; not everyone is bound to it, but “he who can take it, let him take it.” In another way an act is called heroic because, in a case of grave necessity, one is bound to a most difficult act even though it falls under precept. Martyrdom is heroic, yet sometimes charity commands a man to undergo death
rather than deny Christ.
To the third argument, distinguish whether the needy person is merely private or is a public person highly necessary to the commonwealth. For a private person I
am not bound to expose my life to danger merely to save his bodily life. But if the person is gravely necessary to the commonwealth, I can be bound to expose
both temporal goods and life for his preservation under the title of the common good. Still, not all temporal goods are to be spent for the bodily life of a neighbor.
A rich man is not universally obliged to dissipate his whole estate for an extraordinarily expensive medicine intended to preserve a single corruptible bodily life.
Temporal possessions are instruments for exercising virtue; it can be better to exercise piety by leaving goods for one's heirs, by which daughters may marry and
many others be sustained, than to expend everything for the preservation of one man's bodily life. Proportionately, neither must all temporal goods be dissipated
for every act of fraternal correction and every private spiritual good, unless the spiritual good at stake is the common good itself.
Thus heavy public tributes can be just when truly necessary to defend the Christian commonwealth against enemies prepared to invade and destroy it.
Concerning the objection from an unjust aggressor, the consequence is denied. In legitimate self-defense I use my own right, while the aggressor is not in an
article of involuntary necessity but in an article of his own voluntary iniquity. Nevertheless it can be an act of great
perfection to permit the aggressor to kill me
so that he may afterward have time for penance. This must be undertaken prudently and only when one has good testimony of conscience; otherwise refusing to
defend oneself would be temerity. Yet it can probably be judged that one who in such circumstances permits himself to be killed out of patience and for the aggressor's salvation will obtain from divine mercy a grace of repentance; such patience has a great likeness to martyrdom.
From the preceding doctrine we can resolve a question proposed by Almain: if my father, a good and just man who has recently received the sacraments, is in
extreme bodily necessity, and another man who is a sinner is in the same bodily danger, am I bound to aid the sinner rather than my father because the sinner is
endangered both temporally and spiritually? Almain answers affirmatively. I judge the contrary to be most true.
Food is a means per se and immediately ordered to bodily life. Therefore through this means I ought to aid my father rather than the other man. The proportionate
means to the spiritual life of the sinner is counsel and exhortation to penance. I ought not take food from the person to whom it is primarily due and give it to one
to whom it is only secondarily due. Nor should I appoint myself judge whether my father, whom I ought to assist bodily, is in the state of grace. Otherwise his
being just would make his condition worse than if he were a sinner. The precept of corporal almsgiving must then be exercised according to the order of charity,
which commands preference, other things equal, for one more closely united and better.
If, however, a little child is in danger of death and I alone can baptize him, a private person is bound to baptize even though he probably fears being killed by a
tyrant. This is a case of extreme spiritual necessity, and then the precept, “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren,” is verified. Indeed the child's necessity is even more urgent than that of an adult sinner, because the adult has another remedy: through his own acts, with God's assistance, he can be disposed
and justified. The infant has no other remedy than baptism, and I am certain that if baptism is conferred he will be saved. This is understood unless my own life is
itself necessary to the spiritual common good that would perish with me.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER ONE IS BOUND TO CORRECT ONE'S OWN PRELATE

OBJECTIONS. It seems one is not bound to correct one's prelate. Scripture condemns touching the mountain and the ark, by which prelates are signified. A Gloss
on Galatians 2 says Paul resisted Peter “as an equal”; a subject is not equal to his prelate. Gregory also says one ought not presume to correct the life of saints
unless he judges himself better, which would be presumption.
ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says in the Rule that we must have mercy not only on ourselves but also on the prelate,
“who, the higher the place he holds
among you, the greater the danger in which he stands.” Fraternal correction is a work of mercy; therefore prelates too are to be corrected.
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ARTICLE IV — WHETHER ONE IS BOUND TO CORRECT ONE'S OWN PRELATE

I ANSWER THAT correction by coercive punishment, which is an act of justice, does not belong to a subject with respect to

his prelate. But fraternal correction,
which is an act of charity, belongs to every person with respect to any other person whom he is bound to love by charity, whenever something corrigible is found
in him. An act proceeding from a habit or power extends to everything contained under its object. Yet a virtuous act must be moderated by due circumstances;
therefore a subject who corrects a prelate must employ a mode congruent with the persons involved, not with insolence and harshness but with meekness and reverence. Thus the Apostle says: “An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father.” Dionysius reproved the monk Demophilus because he corrected a
priest irreverently, striking him and casting him out of the church.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. A prelate is touched inordinately when he is irreverently rebuked or detracted from; this is

signified by the condemned touching of the
mountain and the ark.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. To withstand a prelate “to his face” before all exceeds the ordinary mode of fraternal

correction. Paul would not have reproved Peter
in that manner unless he were in some respect equal as regards defense of the faith. But to admonish secretly and reverently can be done even by one who is not
equal. Hence subjects are told to admonish their prelate: “Say to Archippus: Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfill it.”
Where danger to the faith is imminent, however, prelates are to be reproved publicly even by subjects. Thus Paul, although subject to Peter, publicly rebuked Peter because of imminent danger of scandal concerning the faith. Augustine says that Peter thereby gave an example to superiors that, if they should abandon the
straight path, they ought not disdain correction even from inferiors.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. To presume oneself simply better than one's prelate is presumptuous pride. To judge oneself

better in some particular respect is not
presumption, since no one in this life lacks every defect. Nor does one who charitably admonishes a prelate thereby judge himself greater; he gives assistance to
one who, because he stands in a higher place, is in greater danger.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Correction insofar as it is an act of justice does not belong to subjects with respect to the prelate. St. Thomas leaves this as manifest,
because a judge must possess superiority over the one whom he judges and punishes.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Fraternal correction insofar as it is an act of charity belongs to everyone with respect to every person whom he must love by charity,
if something corrigible is found in him.

THIRD CONCLUSION. When subjects correct prelates, the mode must be congruent with the condition of the persons: the correction must be made with
reverence and the decorum owed to the prelate.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning the first conclusion, it must be noted that it is certain according to faith. Wyclif's error, condemned by the Council of Constance, was that subjects,
even laymen, could judge and punish their delinquent prelates and temporal lords. This arose from the further error that superiors lose dominion and power through mortal sin. The Lutherans likewise confused all order by making bishops servants or slaves of the peoples. They abused Paul's language that the Apostles
are ministers. Against this, Acts 20 commands bishops to attend to the flock in which the Holy Spirit placed them to rule the Church of God; Paul commands Timothy to “reprove, entreat, rebuke with all patience,” and “them that sin reprove before all.” Sacred Scripture everywhere manifests the great authority of ecclesiastical prelates.

Concerning the second conclusion, recall what we said above in Question 26, article 8, concerning the obligation of spiritual children toward spiritual fathers in
matters pertaining to spiritual goods.

Concerning the third conclusion and St. Thomas's replies regarding the reverence to be preserved in correcting prelates, see the ancient canonical and patristic
authorities cited there. Above all it should be carefully noted, with Cajetan, that in two cases it is lawful to reprove a prelate publicly: first, when he errs in the
faith and teaches others his error; second, when by his conduct he notably scandalizes the people. In such cases he publicly destroys charity and can therefore be
corrected publicly when this ordinarily benefits the people and does not produce greater harm.

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ARTICLE IV — COMMENTARY (concluded); ARTICLE V

Outside those cases, preachers of the word of God must beware of “setting their mouth against heaven,” especially by imprudently inveighing against ecclesiastical prelates whose authority is highly necessary to the common good. Unless prelates are manifestly pernicious to the community, they ought not be
publicly rebuked. Cajetan speaks most prudently on public correction of prelates. Preachers of our time should keep this doctrine before their eyes; they would
perhaps restrain themselves from certain public reproaches, especially against ecclesiastics and religious, which too often arise from vanity, ambition, envy, or
rivalry rather than from the Spirit of God and pious zeal for the common good. Instead of edifying the Christian people, such conduct can dispose them toward
the Lutheran error that, because of personal defects of prelates, calls the Church of Christ a synagogue of Satan and separates from her obedience.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER A SINNER OUGHT TO CORRECT ONE WHO OFFENDS

OBJECTIONS. No one is excused from observing a precept merely because he has sinned. Fraternal correction is under precept. Spiritual alms are more excellent than corporal alms, and a sinner should not cease to give corporal alms. Again, if “we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves”; if every sinner
were prevented from correcting, no one could correct anyone.

ON THE CONTRARY. Isidore says one subject to vices ought not correct the vices of others; Romans 2 says: “Wherein

thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself: for thou dost the same things which thou judgest.”

I ANSWER THAT correction belongs to a man insofar as right judgment of reason flourishes in him. Sin does not destroy

the whole good of nature, and
therefore some right judgment remains in a sinner; in this respect he can correct another. Yet a preceding sin can impede correction accidentally in three ways.

First, it can render the sinner unworthy to correct, especially if he is guilty of a greater sin and corrects another for a lesser one: “Why seest thou the mote in thy
brother's eye?” Second, correction can become indecent because of scandal, when the corrector's sin is manifest and his correction appears to proceed not from
charity but from ostentation. Third, it can proceed from the corrector's pride, when he makes little of his own sins and prefers himself to his neighbor, judging the
neighbor's sins with austere severity as though he himself were just.

Augustine therefore teaches that accusing vices belongs to good and benevolent men; when evil men do it, they act another's part. Before reproving someone, let
us consider whether the vice is one we never had; then remember that we are human and could have had it. Or if we once had it and now do not, let common frailty move the memory so that mercy, not hatred, precede correction. If we find ourselves in the same vice, let us not rebuke harshly but groan together and invite each other to strive equally. Hence a sinner who humbly corrects another does not sin by the correction or acquire a new condemnation, although he shows
himself condemnable for his former sin.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. A sinner, merely because he is a sinner, is not exempt from the precept of fraternal correction, because sin does not abolish rational
judgment.

SECOND CONCLUSION. A sinner can accidentally be excused from fraternal correction in three ways: through unworthiness caused by his sin, through
scandal, or through pride. In such cases either the end of correction fails or the act is exercised with grave harm to the corrector.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If a sinner, humbly acknowledging his infirmity, corrects his neighbor, he does well.

COMMENTARY.

A sinner can correct another in two ways: authoritatively as judge or prelate, or fraternally from charity and mercy. Some have thought that if he corrects in the

first mode while in mortal sin he sins mortally, and that if he fails to correct when office requires it he also sins mortally, as though his case were like that of a
parish priest who sins both by unworthy sacramental ministry and by omission of a required ministry. This opinion is false. A sinful judge, speaking per se, does
not sin mortally merely by publicly judging or fraternally correcting, except accidentally because of scandal. A person in habitual mortal sin can perform morally
good acts of other virtues when he does not add an evil circumstance. Otherwise he would sin in every action, even in giving alms, believing, hoping, invoking
divine mercy, or fearing hell—an evident error. Therefore, whether he corrects authoritatively or fraternally, he does not sin mortally from the mere fact that he is
in mortal sin, although he must remove scandal whenever his office obliges him to correct.

A further doubt is whether a sinner is bound to do penance when he hopes that his own repentance will correct his brother.

ARTICLE V — COMMENTARY: WHETHER THE SINNER MUST REPENT IN ORDER TO CORRECT ANOTHER

The first argument for the affirmative is that the sinner is bound by precept to correct his brother; therefore he is bound to employ suitable means for correction,
and his own amendment appears to be such a means. Second, if he has scandalized his neighbor and induced him to sin, he has a greater obligation to do what he
can to withdraw him from sin. Third, if the neighbor were in extreme spiritual necessity at the point of death, and my own repentance were an efficacious means
for his conversion, I would be bound to correct myself in order to correct him.
Two extremes must be avoided. First, the sinner should not rashly intrude himself into correcting others, since this can scarcely be done without danger of pride
or contempt of neighbor. Second, he should not become pusillanimous from the testimony of a bad conscience, so that because he knows himself to be a sinner he
omits the correction and salvation of others when charity obliges him; this can itself be mortal sin. Temporarily abstaining from such correction when no danger
exists can be lawful.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Ordinarily a man is not bound to perform penance merely in order that he may correct another. This follows from what has been said
and is held by Soto.

SECOND CONCLUSION. If a man's sin is scandalous, he is bound to cease from it at least exteriorly in order to correct the brother whom he scandalizes. The
reason is evident: “not to scandalize” is a negative precept binding always; and the precept of correction, which we suppose then binds, is affirmative. Therefore
he must remove the scandal so that correction can be effective. Otherwise it would be better for him, as Christ says, that a millstone be hung around his neck and
he be drowned in the depth of the sea.
The greatest difficulty arises when my sin is not scandalous but is known to the brother whom I am bound to correct, and I am morally certain that if he knows I
have done penance he will be converted from his own sin. Am I then bound by the precept of fraternal correction to cease from my sin and do penance?

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the neighbor is not in extreme necessity, no one is bound by the special precept of fraternal correction to employ the means of
interior contrition for his own sin. Otherwise intolerable scruples would be introduced into the consciences of the faithful. Interior repentance, insofar as hidden,
cannot itself be a means of correcting the brother.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. In the same case no one is bound by the special precept of fraternal correction to cease from an exterior sin merely in order to make
himself capable of correcting his brother, unless another precept independently obliges him to cease. Otherwise everyone committing an exterior sin would simultaneously commit a sin of omission against the precept of correction until he immediately ceased and made himself fit to correct all other sinners whose sins
he knew. Proportionately, a poor man is not bound to acquire surplus property merely so that he can give alms to another poor person, unless perhaps the latter is
in extreme necessity.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. When the neighbor is in extreme spiritual necessity and my exterior amendment is a suitable and efficacious means for the salvation of
his soul, I am undoubtedly bound by charity to correct myself at least as regards exterior signs of sin. If I am bound to love my neighbor's spiritual good more
than my bodily life in extreme necessity, much more must I deprive myself of a convenience or pleasure rather than allow my brother to perish eternally.
If my earlier scandal contained injustice—for example, if by price and importunate solicitations I pressured a virgin who originally did not wish to consent—I can
be bound not only by charity but also by justice to do what lies in me to withdraw her from sin, insofar as violence was done to her will.
The first argument is answered by distinguishing suitable means: the sinner's own amendment can be a fitting means by counsel and perfection without always
being commanded by the precept of correction. It would be too severe to oblige a man to penance for another's sake in circumstances in which, considered merely
with respect to himself, he is not then under a determinate affirmative precept to make that act. The second argument is answered by distinguishing scandal involving injustice from other scandal. The third is admitted by the fifth conclusion.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO DESIST FROM CORRECTION THROUGH FEAR THAT THE OTHER WILL BECOME WORSE

The objections say one should not abandon a sick soul because of resistance; truth of life is not to be omitted because of scandal; and good should not be omitted
lest evil follow, just as evil may not be done that good may come. Against this, Proverbs says: “Reprove not a scorner, lest he hate thee,” and the Gloss explains
that we ought to guard especially against making him worse through correction.
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ARTICLE VI — WHETHER CORRECTION IS TO BE OMITTED WHEN THE SINNER WOULD BECOME WORSE

I ANSWER THAT correction of a delinquent is twofold. One belongs to prelates, is ordered to the common good, and possesses coercive force. Such correction
is not to be omitted because the one corrected is disturbed: if he will not voluntarily amend, he can be compelled through punishments to cease sinning; and if he
is incorrigible, the common good is still served by maintaining the order of justice and deterring others by his example. A judge therefore does not omit a
sentence of condemnation merely because he fears the disturbance of the offender or his friends.
The other correction is fraternal correction, whose end is amendment of the delinquent and which does not possess coercive force but simple admonition. Where
it is probably judged that the sinner will not receive the admonition but will fall into worse things, correction is to be omitted, because things ordered to an end
must be regulated by the exigency of the end.
REPLIES. A physician can use a kind of coercion upon a delirious patient; in this he resembles coercive correction by prelates, not simple fraternal correction.
The precept of fraternal correction binds insofar as correction is an act of virtue proportioned to its end. When it impedes the end by making the man worse, it no
longer belongs to the truth of life nor falls under precept. Nor is a good omitted so that evil may come, because correction that frustrates its proper end no longer
retains the moral character of the good act then required.
SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Correction as an act of justice is not to be omitted from fear of this kind, because one unwilling to amend can be compelled by
punishment and the common good is thereby protected.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Where it is probably judged that the sinner will not accept admonition but will become worse, fraternal correction is to be omitted
because its end is the spiritual good of the delinquent.

COMMENTARY.

The conclusions are most certain and universally received. The second was already established above from Augustine, who says that in such a case omission of
correction is itself an act of charity. The reason is that correction then ceases to be an act of virtue because its proper end fails and a contrary effect follows.
Similarly correction should be omitted when it is wholly useless, even if no positive worsening follows. Hence if a blasphemer, when corrected, immediately
blasphemes again, correction should cease unless it is useful for the sake of bystanders, so that they see that divine honor does not lack defenders.
From this doctrine it follows that a confessor who knows a penitent to labor under invincible ignorance, especially ignorance of fact, should not instruct him if he
prudently judges that after learning the fact he will nevertheless continue the same conduct and thereby begin to sin formally. For example, if I know that a
woman lives with a man whom she invincibly but falsely believes to be her lawful husband, and I judge with moral probability that she would refuse to separate
even after learning the truth, I would act imprudently by making known the fact without proportionate reason.
A doubt therefore arises concerning the second conclusion: if I probably know that by correcting the brother now he will immediately become worse, but later
will finally amend and be saved, am I nevertheless bound to correct him?
The first argument for the negative appeals directly to St. Thomas: correction should be omitted when the sinner will become worse; in the proposed case he
becomes worse for the present. Second, evil is not to be done so that good may come; through my correction the neighbor becomes worse at present. Third, if I
probably fear that a perjurer will become a blasphemer, or an envious man a murderer, by occasion of my correction, even though I hope he will later come to a
better mind, I am presently bound to protect divine honor and the life of the innocent insofar as I can.
Adrian holds that in fraternal correction the principal intention is the brother's eternal salvation, and therefore in the doubtful case one should correct if there is
sufficient probability that later salvation will follow. Vitoria and Soto followed this opinion. Adrian argues that it is much better for Peter ultimately to be saved
after committing many sins than to be damned after one sin, and more to God's honor that he ultimately be saved. He also compares a physician who applies
medicine although he knows that a fever will initially become worse when he expects later health.
For the resolution I establish the following conclusions.
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ARTICLE VI — COMMENTARY: RESOLUTION OF THE DOUBT

FIRST CONCLUSION. Ordinarily one must always cease from fraternal correction when one prudently fears that the neighbor will become worse for the present. It is nearly a metaphysical case that the corrector should be morally certain that the sinner will later become better or finally be saved, since the gift of final perseverance is most hidden and the heart of man inscrutable. Therefore it will scarcely or never happen that the corrector possesses moral certitude of the future good sufficient to set aside the present evil.

SECOND CONCLUSION. When the sin that the neighbor will commit by occasion of my correction is directly against divine honor, harmful to a third person, or scandalous, it is not lawful to correct him even if the corrector probably judges that the sinner will afterward become better and be saved. The present grave harm to God or to the innocent is not to be caused or prudently occasioned under an uncertain forecast of later good.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If it is not morally certain that the neighbor will later become better or be saved, it is not lawful to correct him now when the corrector is morally certain that the sinner will become worse for the present. An evil that certainly impends is to be avoided rather than an uncertain future good intended.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. When the future good and the present evil are estimated with equal probability, correction is nevertheless to be omitted. Our providence first concerns what more immediately impends when the other circumstances are equal. Prudence therefore commands us first to avoid the evil that is at hand and to leave the later future event to divine providence. “Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.” This argument seems to me strong in confirmation of the first conclusion.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. If the future good is morally certain, especially the sinner's salvation, and the sin he will commit through occasion of the correction is likewise certain, Adrian's opinion is probable, provided the impending sin is not harmful to a third person, does not scandalize the innocent, and is not notably and directly against divine honor—for example, trampling a sacrament or uttering grave public blasphemies. Adrian's arguments competently prove this probability, although to me they do not amount to demonstrations, nor do they make the contrary opinion improbable.

A person could reasonably maintain that our providence principally obliges us to prevent present and imminent sins in our neighbor and not to perform an act of correction that presently lacks its proper proximate end, even if later a greater good should arise from other causes. For in the proposed case the act of fraternal correction lacks the proximate end from which it is specified and immediately occasions the contrary. If later the sinner becomes better, perhaps this occurs because the new offense results in his apprehension by a judge, punishment, repentance, or even execution, or through some other providential event—not through the power of my correction. If, however, later amendment is reasonably expected precisely from a deeper consideration of my admonition, Adrian's opinion becomes more probable, and the example of the physician strengthens it.

To the first argument: it proves our first conclusion. To the second, insofar as it is directed against the fifth conclusion, distinguish doing evil from permitting evil. It can be lawful to permit evil so that a greater good may providentially arise from its occasion; in the proposed case the neighbor sins by his own malice, without my cooperating formally in his sin. My own sinful act, by contrast, is always within my power and must always be avoided.

To the third argument: it proves the second conclusion, concerning harm to a third person or notable injury to divine honor. Although every sin is “against God” under the common notion of sin, not every sin is directly against divine honor according to its proper species. Fornication, theft, and gluttony differ in this respect from public blasphemy. A perjurer can commonly be understood as sinning from avarice, ambition, or fear while still intending to invoke God as witness of truth; but one who publicly blasphemes directly attacks divine honor. Thus each person is bound, insofar as he can, to prevent such notable direct dishonor.

The conclusion is not that every possible sin of another must be prevented at every cost, but that when preventing one evil would certainly bring about a greater evil, prudence must compare them according to their formal objects, the rights of third persons, scandal, divine honor, and the probability of the expected spiritual good.

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER IN FRATERNAL CORRECTION SECRET ADMONITION MUST BY NECESSITY

OF PRECEPT PRECEDE
DENUNCIATION begins.
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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER SECRET ADMONITION MUST PRECEDE DENUNCIATION

OBJECTIONS. First, God sometimes publicly punishes without preceding secret admonition; therefore imitation of God does not appear to require the evangelical order in every case. Second, the deeds of the saints sometimes show immediate public denunciation of an occult sin: Joseph accused his brothers before their father; Peter publicly exposed Ananias and Sapphira; Christ revealed Judas without a recorded prior secret admonition. Third, accusation is graver
than denunciation, yet accusation can proceed without prior secret admonition. Fourth, religious chapters commonly proclaim faults without prior secret correction. Fifth, religious are bound to obey prelates, and prelates sometimes command subjects to report whatever they know to be corrigible.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine, explaining "Correct him between thee and him alone," says: "Studying his correction,

spare his shame." A man can begin to
defend his sin out of shame, so that one makes worse the person whom one wished to make better. Charity therefore requires the order of correction that preserves the brother's reputation when possible.

I ANSWER THAT a distinction must be made regarding public denunciation. If sins are public, the remedy must be applied

not only to the sinner but also to
others who know the sin, lest they be scandalized. Therefore public sins are publicly reproved: "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear."

If sins are occult, further distinction is necessary. Some occult sins are harmful to neighbors corporally or spiritually—for example, secretly plotting to betray a
city to the enemy, or privately seducing men from the faith. Such a sinner does not sin against the corrector alone but against others; therefore one must proceed
immediately to denunciation to prevent the harm, unless one firmly judges that the harm can at once be prevented through secret admonition.

Other occult sins are harmful principally to the sinner and to the individual against whom he sins. In these the sole end is to aid the sinning brother. As a physician preserves a diseased member without amputation if possible and removes the lesser member only when necessary to preserve life, so the person correcting should restore his brother's conscience while preserving his reputation when possible. Reputation is useful both temporally and spiritually. Loss of reputation can expose a man to many temporal harms and can remove a restraint against sin, since one who sees himself already infamous can sin without shame.

Reputation must therefore be preserved insofar as compatible with salvation of conscience.

Hence, when the sin is occult and does not threaten others, it belongs to the necessity of precept that secret admonition ordinarily precede public denunciation.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. All occult things are known to God; therefore occult sins stand before divine judgment as

public sins stand before human judgment. Yet
God too commonly uses a kind of secret admonition by interior inspiration, whether waking or sleeping, before public punishment.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Christ, as God, knew Judas's sin as public to Himself, yet even He admonished Judas in

obscure words before publicly manifesting
him. Peter exposed Ananias and Sapphira as executor of God, knowing the sin by revelation. Joseph can reasonably be understood to have first admonished his
brothers, although Scripture does not record every detail; alternatively their crime was public among the brothers.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. When danger to a multitude impends, the evangelical words about private correction do not

apply in the same manner, because the
offender then does not sin merely "against thee."

REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Religious proclamations in chapter commonly concern lighter faults that do not destroy

reputation; they are reminders of faults
rather than accusations. If the matter were such that the brother would thereby be infamed, one who publicly revealed an occult sin contrary to the evangelical
order would act against the Lord's precept.

REPLY TO THE FIFTH. A prelate is not to be obeyed against a divine precept. A command to report whatever requires

correction must be understood while
preserving the order of fraternal correction. If a prelate expressly commanded subjects to violate that order concerning truly occult sins, both the commander and
the obedient subject could sin. A prelate is not judge of purely occult matters as such, though public infamy or reasonable indications can place a matter within
the external forum.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. When a sin is public, secret admonition need not precede, because the scandal of those who know it also requires remedy.

SECOND CONCLUSION. When an occult sin threatens serious harm to others, denunciation can be immediate unless the danger can with confidence be
removed through private admonition.

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the sin is wholly occult and concerns principally the sinner's own spiritual evil, the precept of charity requires preservation of his
reputation by first attempting private admonition.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER THE INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES OUGHT TO PRECEDE PUBLIC

DENUNCIATION begins.

ARTICLE VIII — WHETHER WITNESSES OUGHT TO PRECEDE PUBLIC DENUNCIATION

OBJECTIONS. Occult sins ought not be made known to others, lest the corrector become a betrayer rather than a healer of the brother. To bring witnesses seems
to reveal the fault. Again, we must love our neighbor as ourselves, yet no man needs witnesses in order to correct his own secret fault.

Third, witnesses are
ordinarily brought for proof, but an occult sin cannot yet be proved by witnesses. Fourth, Augustine's Rule says the fault should first be shown to the prelate
before it is shown to witnesses.

ON THE CONTRARY. Christ says: “Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three

witnesses every word may stand.”

I ANSWER THAT passage from one extreme to another fittingly occurs through a mean. In fraternal correction

the Lord willed the beginning to be secret,
“between thee and him alone,” and the final stage public, when the Church is told. Therefore witnesses are fittingly introduced in the middle, so that the brother's
sin is first disclosed to a very few who can help rather than harm, and so that he may amend without infamy before the multitude.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. After secret admonition once or several times, as long as probable hope remains

that the brother will be corrected privately, one should
continue by that means. But once it is prudently known that private admonition does not suffice, one should proceed to the introduction of witnesses, however
occult the sin may have been, unless that step itself is reasonably expected to worsen the sinner—in which case correction should cease, as already explained.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. A man does not require witnesses for amendment of his own sin, whereas they

may be necessary for the amendment of his brother;
hence the cases differ.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Witnesses can be introduced for three reasons: to show that the matter for which

he is corrected is truly sinful; to witness the act if the
sin is repeated; and to testify that the correcting brother did what lay in him.

REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Augustine means that in certain circumstances the prelate can be informed

before judicial witnesses are gathered, insofar as the
prelate is one singular person more capable of helping than others, not necessarily insofar as he sits as “the Church” in a public judicial forum.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Witnesses are to be introduced between private admonition and public denunciation according to Matthew 18.

SECOND CONCLUSION. After one or more secret admonitions, while probable hope remains of amendment through secrecy, private correction continues.
Once it is prudently clear that secrecy does not suffice, witnesses can be introduced even concerning an occult sin.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If the introduction of witnesses would probably make the sinner worse and would not aid his amendment, correction should cease
altogether, for the end of fraternal correction is the brother's spiritual good.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES VII–VIII.

The conclusions of these articles cannot be perfectly examined separately, since both concern the order of fraternal correction established in Matthew 18. Several
difficult questions arise from the Lord's words, “If thy brother shall offend against thee…”
The first doubt, already indicated above, is whether the Lord's sentence concerns only a sin committed properly as an injury against the corrector, or every mortal
sin known to the corrector.
The argument for restriction to personal injury is strong from context. After Christ's instruction Peter immediately asks: “Lord, how often shall my brother offend
against me, and I forgive him?” Likewise Luke 17 says: “If thy brother sin against thee, rebuke him; and if he do penance, forgive him.” The phrases “against
thee” and “if he turn to thee saying, I repent” naturally concern an injury committed against the person who forgives. Many Fathers and commentators explicitly
explain the literal text this way.
Yet the scholastic doctrine is not thereby overthrown. The primary literal sense can concern injury against us while the precept extends by necessary consequence
to every mortal sin of a brother known to us, because the formal reason for correction is not the vindication of our private injury but the misery of the sinner and
the mercy by which charity seeks his spiritual healing.

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ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: WHETHER MATTHEW 18 EXTENDS TO EVERY MORTAL SIN

Augustine supplies the decisive principle. When a brother sins in my presence, even if he injures another, the wrong ought not be regarded as alien to me. If I alone know that he has sinned, “he has sinned against thee” in the sense that his sin has come to my knowledge and charity makes his misery my concern.

Augustine therefore extends the doctrine beyond private injuries and gives examples of homicide and adultery known to a brother.

The same follows by necessary reason. Wherever the same—or a greater—reason exists for correcting a brother for his spiritual good, the order of correction prescribed by Christ is to be observed insofar as it is proportionate. When my neighbor sins specially against me, I am bound to exercise the order of meekness not principally because I have been injured, but because he has wounded himself spiritually. Therefore, much more, when he has not injured me but I know of his mortal sin, charity and mercy require me to seek his amendment in an orderly way.

The precept of correction is an act of charity and mercy, not an act of private vindictive justice. Peter's question about forgiving injuries belongs to mercy, not private vengeance. Christ therefore calls the offender “thy brother” precisely so that the injured person, remembering their common Father in heaven, may attend more to healing the brother's mortal wound than to demanding satisfaction for his own injury. This is fully consonant with the doctrine of love of enemies. God commends His love toward us in that while we were enemies Christ died for us; He wills that we likewise love those who injure us.

CONCLUSION. Although Matthew 18 primarily and expressly speaks of a sin committed against us, by necessary consequence its rule extends to every mortal sin which a neighbor commits with another neighbor's knowledge, insofar as fraternal correction is possible and prudent. This is the legitimate scholastic interpretation: not a violence done to the literal text, but a consequence drawn from the formal reason of the precept, namely charitable mercy toward the sinner.

A recent author argued that the passage can in no way be the foundation of a duty to correct every mortal sin and reproached the common scholastic school. I cannot follow that position. St. Thomas and the scholastics read the Fathers, especially Augustine, precisely in light of the formal reason of mercy. It would be astonishing to suppose that the entire theological school simply failed to notice the literal commentators.

To the objections from Jerome, Chrysostom, Hilary, Bede, Ambrose, Theophylact, and others: they rightly explain the primary formal and express sense concerning an injury against the corrector. The virtual or consequential extension to other mortal sins is not thereby denied. Augustine himself makes it explicit enough for the school to draw the conclusion.

The second doubt concerns whether the entire order—first secret correction, then one or two witnesses, then denunciation to the Church—is itself under precept.

The first argument for the negative is that the New Law imposes no wholly new moral precepts beyond those concerning the sacraments newly instituted.

Precepts of faith, hope, charity, and penance existed under every law as necessary for salvation, although more explicitly proposed in the New Law. The detailed procedure of Matthew 18 does not appear as a distinct precept of the natural law, especially because “tell the Church” presupposes a supernatural institution not known by natural reason.

Second, where a precept exists, the time of its obligation must in some way be determinable; yet theologians themselves disagree over many circumstances of this process. Third, if everyone were bound to employ all possible means necessary to execute it perfectly, all would appear bound to acquire theological learning sufficient to judge numerous difficult cases. Fourth, rigid observance could sometimes harm the common good—especially in heresy, crimes dangerous to the state, or religious discipline—by warning dangerous offenders and allowing them to conceal themselves more effectively. Fifth, involving witnesses can itself endanger reputation and provoke retaliation. Sixth, Augustine's Rule sometimes directs that the prelate be informed before other witnesses. Seventh, ecclesiastical practice, especially inquisitorial edicts and religious visitations, sometimes commands immediate reporting of certain crimes.

These objections require distinctions. The question is not whether Christ's order is mechanically obligatory in every case, but whether, as the ordinarily most proportionate mode of mercy, it belongs under the natural-law precept of fraternal correction whenever prudence judges it suited to the end.

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ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: FIRST DOUBT ON THE SCOPE OF MATTHEW 18

Many difficulties arise around the doctrine of these articles, all requiring an exact understanding of the Lord's sentence in Matthew 18: “If thy brother sin against
thee…” The first doubt, already indicated above, is whether this sentence is to be understood only of a brother's sin that is properly an injury committed against
us, rather than of every sin.

Several arguments support the narrower literal sense. The immediate context culminates in Peter's question: “Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me,
and I forgive him?” Christ answers concerning forgiveness. Likewise Luke 17 joins “If thy brother sin against thee, rebuke him” with “if he turn to thee, saying, I
repent, forgive him.” Theophylact therefore observes that if a man sins directly against God, I do not possess authority to remit that offense unless I possess God's
sacramental ministry. The ancient Gloss and many Fathers likewise expound the passage principally of an injury committed against the corrector.

Jerome says that if a brother has sinned against us and injured us in any cause, we have both the power and necessity of forgiving; if he sins against God,
however, the matter is not simply left to our private remission. Chrysostom, Hilary, Bede, Ambrose, Basil, and many recent interpreters give similar readings.

The canonical texts also often cite Matthew 18 precisely in disputes concerning an injury committed against the one who corrects.

Nevertheless, OUR CERTAIN CONCLUSION is this: although the evangelical text in Matthew 18 is understood per se and primarily of a sin committed
against us, by necessary consequence its meaning extends to every mortal sin committed by our neighbor when another neighbor knows it. The first part follows
from the textual and patristic evidence just given. The second part is supported especially by Augustine and by the formal reason of fraternal correction itself.

Augustine, in a sermon devoted to these words, says that correction must be used not only when a man sins against us but also when he sins without another
person's knowledge. He gives the example of homicide and adultery. Again he asks, “What is, ‘he has sinned against thee’?” and answers in substance: if you
know his sin, then, as regards the duty of mercy, it has come against you because his misery is now known to your charity. If someone insults my brother in my
hearing, God forbid that I should account that injury wholly alien to me.

Thus the school rightly follows Augustine in extending the text to every grave sin known to a neighbor. The necessary reason is that the obligation to correct does
not arise formally from the fact that I personally was injured, but from the sinner's spiritual misery. Correction is a work of mercy. If I must exercise meekness
and seek my brother's spiritual healing even when he has injured me, much more should I seek his healing when no private passion of injury stands in the way.

The passage therefore must be read not only according to the bark of the letter but according to its spirit. Christ calls the offender “brother” so that one injured
may remember the common heavenly Father and attend to curing his brother rather than exacting satisfaction for himself. This belongs to the same evangelical
perfection as love of enemies. Hence the scholastic conclusion is neither arbitrary nor violent: the literal case is private injury, while the moral ratio of the precept
extends to mortal sin generally.

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ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: DEFENSE OF THE SCHOLASTIC

INTERPRETATION

A certain pious and learned author denied that Matthew 18 can in any way ground an obligation to correct a brother for every mortal sin and even reproached the
common scholastic interpretation. I do not follow him. If the tract attributed to him truly expresses his own judgment, it does not seem everywhere to display the
moderation and humility for which he was otherwise deservedly admired. It is especially difficult to believe that St. Thomas, who had read the Fathers so
thoroughly, simply misunderstood Augustine and the other ancient authorities.

Augustine says plainly that if a brother sins with me alone knowing it, I am to correct him in secret, and he gives cases not reducible to an injury done to me
personally. The rationale is also necessary: correction is not an act of private vindictive justice, but of charity and mercy. The Lord's words, “If he hear thee, thou
hast gained thy brother,” identify the intended good as the salvation of the sinner.

Suppose someone asks whether Christ intended us in Matthew 18 to exercise an act of justice or of mercy. It cannot principally be an act of justice, for the
described process is not a private exercise of vindictive judgment. The private injured party does not thereby become judge and punisher. It is therefore certainly
a work of mercy: the sinner's misery is to be healed. Once this formal reason is recognized, the extension beyond personal injury is unavoidable.

Peter's question “How often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?” likewise concerns mercy. If the Lord had said merely, “If thy brother sin, correct
him,” someone might perhaps doubt whether one who had personally suffered injury could first pursue his own satisfaction rather than the sinner's salvation. By
adding “against thee,” Christ intensifies the evangelical demand: even when passion has a reason to be stirred by personal injury, charity must regard the offender
as a brother and seek his spiritual health.

This is how the scholastic Doctors legitimately gathered the mind of the Fathers and the evangelical text. Therefore whenever a brother commits mortal sin with
our knowledge, we ought, insofar as possible and opportune, to correct him according to the due order of charity.

The contrary arguments are easily answered. The primary textual context indeed concerns an injury against us; nevertheless a conclusion can follow a fortiori
from the formal reason. Theophylact's point—that I cannot remit a sin committed directly against God in the way a priest can sacramentally remit—does not
prevent me from admonishing the sinner. The several Fathers often emphasize the literal sense because they chiefly wish to persuade injured persons to meekness
and forgiveness; they do not thereby deny the broader duty of mercy. The canonical texts likewise commonly cite the passage in cases of injury without
excluding its moral extension.

Thus the first doubt is resolved: the literal primary case is injury against the corrector; the precept, under the ratio of mercy, extends by necessary
consequence to every mortal sin known to a neighbor.

A second doubt now arises: whether the order of fraternal correction—private admonition, then witnesses, then denunciation to the Church—is itself under
precept.

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SECOND DOUBT — WHETHER THE ORDER OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION IS UNDER PRECEPT

Arguments for the negative are substantial.

FIRST. The New Law has not imposed a wholly new class of moral precepts beyond those connected with the sacraments newly instituted. The precepts of faith, hope, charity, and penance are rooted in natural and divine law and existed before, although more explicitly proposed by Christ. But the exact procedural order—secret correction, witnesses, denunciation to the Church—does not seem derivable in all its details from natural reason, especially the final reference to "the Church," whose supernatural constitution is not known by natural light.

SECOND. Where a precept is imposed, there must be a reasonably knowable time when it binds. Yet it is most difficult to determine when this process is obligatory, and theologians themselves disagree over numerous conditions and modifications. A doubtful and obscure obligation of this sort would generate scruples among the simple.

THIRD. Whoever is bound to fulfill a precept is bound to employ means without which it cannot be fulfilled. But to judge exactly when and how the evangelical procedure must be followed requires serious knowledge of theology and prudence. It would seem to follow that everyone is bound to acquire theological science, or else that only theologians are bound to correction.

FOURTH. A rigid requirement could harm the common good. If a secret heretic had first to be privately admonished, then corrected before one or two witnesses, he could use the warning to conceal his activity more effectively. The same difficulty occurs in crimes dangerous to the commonwealth or in religious communities where hidden disorders must sometimes be prevented by superiors before they become public scandals. The laws of Christ are ordered to the common good and cannot reasonably mandate a process that nourishes greater evils.

FIFTH. Introducing witnesses itself risks damaging the offender's reputation and can expose the corrector to retaliation. A sinner can deny everything before those witnesses and accuse the corrector of calumny. Thus a step intended for charity can appear to disturb peace.

SIXTH. Augustine's Rule says that certain sins are first to be shown to the superior; Basil likewise commands faults to be referred to the superior when those who know them cannot themselves cure the matter according to the Lord's command.

SEVENTH. Ecclesiastical practice must be considered. Apostolic inquisitors of heretical depravity command under censures that anyone knowing specified crimes report them immediately, often forbidding consultation with others. Religious visitors and constitutions can impose analogous duties. If Matthew 18 imposed an inflexible prior sequence by divine precept, such ecclesiastical laws and customs would be unlawful.

These arguments persuaded the author mentioned above to deny entirely that the evangelical order is a precept and even to judge its observance frequently pernicious. He considered the scholastic school deceived. I cannot accept that conclusion.

FIRST CONCLUSION. The order of fraternal correction described by Christ is not a new positive precept superadded to natural law as though it constituted a distinct moral species independent of the natural precept of charity. In this sense the first negative argument is correct.

SECOND CONCLUSION. The mode described by the Lord is, speaking per se, the best and most proportionate mode according to natural reason. Christ, the perfect teacher and expositor of the natural law, did not come to destroy but to fulfill. As in Matthew 5 He perfected and explained the precepts against homicide, adultery, hatred, and the like, so in Matthew 18 He teaches the manner in which solicitude for the salvation of a brother should ordinarily be exercised. The very fact that Christ explicitly proposed this order is sufficient reason to prefer it when it is possible and suited to the end.

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The contrary author argued that the sequence is ordinarily pernicious and therefore cannot be commanded. Yet if it were truly so harmful, it would hardly remain the "best counsel" either. Christ's own prescription would become unintelligible. The better judgment is that the procedure is per se excellent, while circumstances can make one or another degree imprudent or unnecessary.

THIRD CONCLUSION. The evangelical order, speaking per se, falls under the precept of the natural law in the same manner as love of enemies and other natural precepts whose perfection Christ explicitly taught. We are naturally bound to rescue our neighbor from the misery of mortal sin by a means proportioned to the end, as mild as possible, and involving no greater detriment than necessary. The order described by Christ is precisely such a means. Therefore, whenever circumstances do not impede it and it can be observed without disproportionate harm, it binds under the natural precept of mercy and charity.

This reason seems demonstrative in moral matter. If anyone denies the minor premise, let him exhibit another mode that, speaking per se, is gentler and ordinarily less harmful than first admonishing the brother alone, then with one or two suitable persons, and finally, if necessary, involving a superior.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. The evangelical order is not determined by precept in such a way that every degree must be followed in every event. It binds only when right reason judges that by observing the degrees there is reasonable hope of relieving the neighbor's spiritual misery. Affirmative precepts have their times and circumstances determined by prudence. If private correction is reasonably expected to harm rather than help, that is not the time for the first degree. If the

first degree is useless but the second may help, one may begin with the second as though the useless first step had already been tried. If the first and second are useless while an appropriate paternal denunciation can benefit the sinner, the process can begin at that later step. Likewise one can stop after the first degree and not proceed further when experience prudently shows that subsequent steps will make the sinner worse. The whole ratio of fraternal correction is taken from its proximate end: the brother's amendment.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. If one prudently judges that private admonition would benefit the brother, yet skips it and immediately introduces another person, he can sin mortally because he needlessly exposes the brother's reputation. This is understood when the disclosure is grave enough to constitute serious injury. If the person to whom the fault is disclosed cannot meaningfully damage the offender's reputation, the fault may be venial or absent. The same principle applies to one who jumps directly to public denunciation while earlier degrees could have achieved amendment with less detriment.

This is St. Thomas's doctrine: secret admonition can be of necessity of precept before public denunciation, and correction must cease entirely when it is prudently judged that further steps will not profit the brother.

From these conclusions follows an important corollary. To determine whether this order binds in a particular event and which step should be used, we must employ natural reason and prudence. Whatever contradicts right natural reason cannot be demanded by the Gospel; what, in this matter, genuinely corresponds to the Gospel must likewise correspond to the rational ordering of mercy.

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SECOND DOUBT — THE RULE OF PRUDENCE IN THE ORDER OF CORRECTION

Christ's order is to be exercised according to place, time, and circumstance. Consider a simple example from another affirmative precept: “If thine enemy hunger, feed him.” If he asks for food while suffering a condition in which the offered food would seriously worsen his illness, the precept does not bind one to give that food at that moment. The end controls the means. So too, if solitary correction is reasonably judged harmful to the sinner, it should not be used merely because it is the first step named in Matthew 18.

Accordingly, one can sometimes begin with the second degree when the first is prudently useless or harmful; sometimes with a paternal denunciation to the superior when the preceding steps cannot attain the end. Conversely, after one degree has been tried and teaches us that further correction will cause deterioration, charity can command us to stop.

The objection that such a precept would force every Christian to study theology is sophistical. Whoever is bound to a precept is bound to proportionate ordinary means within his capacity, not to every possible extraordinary means. A Christian is bound to corporal works of mercy according to his means, but is not thereby bound to acquire wealth so that he may always have surplus to give. Likewise every Christian is bound to fraternal correction according to his ability, but not to make himself an expert theologian capable of resolving every difficult case. The prudent and educated can judge many cases themselves; humble persons of timid conscience can ask good and prudent men how to proceed.

Christ's precepts are light and sweet to the humble and spiritual, not because every act lacks difficulty, but because grace and ordered charity make the yoke sweet. Almsgiving is difficult for the avaricious, chastity for the lustful, fortitude for the timid. It does not follow that these are not divine precepts. “Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart…and you shall find rest for your souls.”

The further objection—that an affirmative precept must always have an obvious determinate time—is false. It is certain that prayer is commanded, yet difficult to determine in every singular case exactly when failure to pray becomes mortal sin. Almsgiving is certainly commanded even outside the rarest extreme necessity, yet theologians dispute its precise binding circumstances. So too with correction: the general obligation is clear, while singular application belongs to prudence.

Nor do ecclesiastical institutions contradict the evangelical order. Positive divine law can establish the Church and prelates; once such institutions exist, natural law itself commands obedience to legitimate superiors. Thus Christ can say “tell the Church,” presupposing the supernatural institution, while the rational obligation to employ a suitable superior for the brother's healing remains consonant with natural reason.

Finally, the assertion that the evangelical process necessarily destroys communities is false. St. Thomas himself distinguishes occult crimes which directly threaten others or the common good. A secret plot to betray a city or private heretical seduction can require immediate denunciation to prevent harm. His qualification—that one may first admonish privately if one firmly judges that the danger can thereby be immediately removed—expresses a rare exception in such public-danger cases, not a universal delay of justice.

Thus the true doctrine avoids both extremes: the evangelical order is neither an inflexible procedural ritual binding mechanically in every case, nor a merely optional counsel that can be ignored at pleasure. It is the ordinary rational form of the natural precept of fraternal mercy, binding whenever prudence judges it proportionate to the end.

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The claim that few Christians actually observe the evangelical order does not prove that it is not commanded. Many faithful do observe it according to prudence:
wise persons judge when, where, and how to correct; humble persons seek counsel from prudent men. Failure of widespread practice cannot repeal natural and
divine law.

As to the case of a dangerous secret heretic, St. Thomas expressly distinguishes occult sins harmful to others from those concerning principally the sinner. When
a heretic privately turns men from the faith, the common good requires immediate protection; denunciation can precede the ordinary degrees unless one firmly
and prudently judges that a secret admonition will at once remove the danger. Indeed it will rarely be morally credible that one private admonition will reclaim
someone contumaciously attached to heresy. Ecclesiastical laws therefore justly command immediate denunciation of crimes that threaten the Christian
commonwealth.

This does not mean that every occult sin belongs to the external tribunal. Prelates must remember that many things are reserved to God's judgment. Some
superiors, under the pretext of zeal, strive excessively to drag every hidden fault of subjects into public judgment. They can become destroyers rather than
guardians of the common good. Ecclesiastical pastors should correct many faults paternally and, as it were, cast them into the depth of the sea rather than publish
them, because a man's reputation is a great temporal good and often useful to spiritual welfare.

The example of a religious who falls secretly with only his companion knowing must be governed by prudence. If the fall arose from weakness and occasion, a
private admonition can readily suffice. If the fault proceeds from habit and private admonition does not work, other degrees may be used. If the crime
immediately endangers the religious community, it can be reported to the superior at once, at least as father, so that he can watch and judge how to protect the
common good with the least possible detriment to the delinquent.

The argument from alleged “experience” that no offender is ever corrected by private admonition must simply be denied. Even if not everyone reforms, many
persons give reasonable hope of reform when privately corrected, and that suffices for the order to bind in appropriate cases.

As to the danger of infamy through witnesses: disclosure to one or two prudent persons for the offender's own spiritual healing is not automatically a grave injury
to reputation. A moderate diminution of reputation can be proportionate to so great a good as liberation from mortal sin. If, however, the danger to the corrector is
grave enough, he may be excused. Many nevertheless tremble where there is no proportionate danger and become negligent concerning the salvation of
neighbors—and thereby endanger their own charity.

If prudent judgment shows that revealing the matter only to the prelate as father would cause less harm than involving other witnesses, it can be lawful to pass
directly from the first to the third degree. Yet ordinarily it is a graver thing for a subject that his prelate know his grave fault than that one faithful friend know it;
therefore the intermediate degree should not be omitted without reason.

There is no valid inference from lawful limited disclosure for correction to a right to beat, rob, or otherwise punish the brother. Punitive coercion belongs to the
superior. A private corrector cannot usurp another office under the pretext of charity. Even so, if a very small temporal expenditure belonging to the offender
were strictly necessary to carry out the correction for his own grave spiritual good, the moral analysis would follow the common principles governing necessary
use and the owner's reasonable will—not the private exercise of punishment.

The authorities of Augustine and Basil concerning reporting to a superior are to be read in harmony with this doctrine: they do not abolish the Lord's order; rather,
they explain how a superior can be involved when private correction is insufficient or circumstances make him the more proportionate healer.

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SECOND DOUBT — ECCLESIASTICAL GOVERNANCE AND THE EVANGELICAL ORDER

The evangelical order does not obstruct public justice. A crime that is already public, scandalous, or specially destructive of the common good can be brought directly to the proper tribunal. Heresy furnishes the clearest example: one who secretly spreads heresy threatens many souls, and the Christian commonwealth cannot safely wait through an ordinary sequence of repeated private admonitions while the poison spreads.

Hence inquisitorial legislation requiring prompt denunciation of specified heretical crimes is just. Such crimes, after grave consideration and experience, are judged specially destructive of the Christian common good. The law can therefore require that they be reported to the apostolic inquisitors. This does not mean that a scrupulous Christian may not privately open his conscience to a discreet confessor. A confessor who sees that the matter belongs to the Holy Office should direct the penitent to seek competent counsel. Likewise inquisitors ought prudently to distinguish an ignorant or scrupulous reporter from one bringing a true juridical denunciation, so that subjects are not needlessly trapped in formal procedure.

Public edicts are issued to govern and punish crimes, not to teach the whole people the complete theology of fraternal correction. They need not reproduce every theological qualification. Their correct application presupposes the prudence of judges and confessors.

Religious visitations are to be understood proportionately. Superiors do not intend subjects to violate divine or natural charity. Many faults in religious life can fittingly be denounced to the superior as father because he has special charity and responsibility toward subjects, especially when the faults are public outside the monastery, scandalous, habitual, or dangerous to the community. But entirely singular and secret sins that create no public danger should not be needlessly revealed if the brother can be corrected by the first degree.

Can religious by their constitutions renounce the right to have this order observed toward them? Insofar as each man is master of his own reputation and can voluntarily permit another to disclose what otherwise should remain secret, there is no intrinsic contradiction. One who secretly committed homicide can voluntarily accuse himself publicly; what another could not lawfully reveal against his will he can himself make known. Therefore, in principle, a religious can consent that certain faults be directly reported to a prelate.

Yet not everything lawful is expedient. It seems harsh for an entire religious community to profess such rigor universally. Unless the members are highly perfect, constant awareness that hidden faults may be immediately made known to the superior can disturb peace. Still worse would be to defend such a constitution on the false ground that no community can otherwise be well governed; that would amount to saying that Christ's evangelical and natural order is pernicious to communities and thus neither precept nor counsel.

The example of Joseph accusing his brothers does not overthrow the doctrine. It is not recorded that he failed first to admonish them; their crime was already known among the brothers; or prudence may have judged a private correction useless because of the gravity of their corruption and envy. St. Bonaventure's statement that the first degree is sometimes of congruity rather than absolute necessity likewise accords with us, because we do not claim that every degree must be followed in every sin.

Thus, rightly understood, the order of Matthew 18 is compatible with ecclesiastical government, religious discipline, public justice, and inquisitorial procedure.

The principle is always the same: preserve the brother's reputation as far as the end permits, protect the innocent and the common good, and use the least harmful means that prudently promises genuine amendment.

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SECOND DOUBT — CONCLUSION; THIRD DOUBT INTRODUCED

Augustine's rule that a matter can sometimes be shown first to the prelate does not deny that one or two brothers can be used before a formal judicial denunciation. The “witnesses” Augustine has in view can be persons who observe the repeated offense so that it may later be proved judicially. The prelate, considered as father, can sometimes be informed earlier when he is more capable of healing the subject than ordinary brothers.

Likewise Basil expressly presupposes the Lord's commanded mode when he says that if those who know a fault cannot cure it in the manner commanded by the Lord, it should be referred to the superior. This testimony favors rather than opposes the doctrine.

Ecclesiastical inquisitorial edicts are justified by the danger of the crimes specified. They concern public governance and offenses judged specially destructive of the faith. Yet pastoral prudence must guard against abuse: a judge, especially an ecclesiastical judge, must not use public authority to investigate by every means whatsoever purely hidden matters reserved to God. Ambitious zeal can injure innocent reputation under the pretext of serving princes or the common good. St. Thomas's distinctions must therefore be attentively observed by every prelate and judge.

The same applies in religious communities. Superiors can require reports necessary to the common observance, but not on the assumption that every occult fault automatically belongs to the external forum. If a subject freely renounces a certain protection of reputation, a different material circumstance is introduced; the precept itself is not dispensed with, but its matter changes because no injury is done to one who knowingly and willingly permits the disclosure.

One final warning is necessary. Some governors of souls, including religious superiors, truly do observe the evangelical order with great attention and prudence. Many persons who possess public reputation and edify the Church by doctrine and example are nevertheless secret sinners known to very few. An indiscreet prelate who destroys their reputation without necessity can do exactly what the devil desires: impede the salvation and edification of others. The injury spreads beyond the one sinner to companions of the same order and office and can scandalize the faithful. Augustine's warnings about the danger of indiscreet zeal deserve careful reading.

THIRD DOUBT. For what purpose are the one or two witnesses introduced at the second degree of fraternal correction? Are they brought merely to assist the one who already knows and corrects the fault? Are they brought first to observe whether and when the brother sins, so that afterward he may be corrected before two or three? Or are they brought so that afterward they may convict him before the prelate understood as “the Church”?

The first argument seems to show they are not brought merely as assistants. Christ says: “Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand.” If they know only that an admonition was made but do not know whether the offender committed the sin, their testimony would not establish the crime if he denied it.

Second, if they are merely assistants, the corrected person can easily become confused, deny the accusation, and turn against the corrector before the same persons, charging him with calumny. This seems a poor means of correction.

Third, it appears wrong to appoint men to spy upon another's hidden life merely to obtain proof, since Augustine warns us not to be explorers of others' lives. Such surveillance can itself damage reputation and disturb peace.

Fourth, if the witnesses are brought principally in order to convict the offender judicially, the procedure seems no longer ordered immediately to the offender's spiritual good but to the common good through punishment. Fraternal correction, however, is distinguished from judicial accusation and inquiry.

To resolve the doubt, a distinction among accusation, inquiry, and denunciation is necessary.

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THIRD DOUBT — ACCUSATION, INQUIRY, AND DENUNCIATION

There are three principal ways by which one comes to the punishment of an offense: accusation, judicial inquiry, and denunciation. Under human law they differ in several respects.

FIRST, accusation must ordinarily be made in writing according to the laws; denunciation need not be written; inquiry is undertaken by the judge ex officio when public infamy or another legitimate juridical basis has preceded.

SECOND, an accuser is bound to prove the accusation and, if he fails under the conditions established by law, can be liable to the penalty of retaliation. A denouncer or reporter does not in the same way assume the full burden of an accuser.

THIRD, an accuser ordinarily cannot at the same time be a witness in the very offense which he prosecutes in the same juridical mode, whereas a denouncer can also be a witness to what he reports. The Gospel itself seems to insinuate this when it says: “Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand,” namely your testimony and that of the persons whom you have brought.

FOURTH, accusation and judicial inquiry are per se ordered to the common good and public vindication of justice whether or not the offender personally amends. The final cause is public justice and deterrence: “that the rest also may have fear.” Denunciation, by contrast, can be per se ordered to the good of the brother as the continuation of private correction. An ecclesiastical judge is not merely judge but can also act as father. Therefore a report to him can aim principally at the offender's amendment rather than immediate public punishment.

This distinction also explains why a denunciation can at times lead to a broader inquiry if the person reported is already under public infamy; but one private assertion does not give a judge the right to investigate arbitrarily all of a person's hidden life. Without appropriate juridical grounds such singular inquiry would injure the person reported.

From these distinctions follow three points. First, because means are specified and judged by their end, and the denunciation placed at the third degree of fraternal correction has the brother's spiritual health as its proper end, all the means used at that stage must remain proportionate to correction rather than be transformed silently into penal accusation.

Second, the prelate can be told as father and can correct the delinquent privately or before two or three suitable persons; he can afterward watch over the offender.

Whether he can proceed to severe punishment, excommunication, or other penalties under this same title requires a further distinction treated in the following

doubt.

Third, the witnesses of Matthew 18 can have more than one function according to circumstances: they can strengthen the admonition, clarify that the matter is truly sinful, observe a repeated act, and later testify if a legitimate judicial process becomes necessary. It is therefore false to restrict their function to only one juridical purpose.

The objection from “spying” is answered by distinguishing curiosity from medicinal vigilance. After a grave sin has already come to the knowledge of a brother, prudent attention directed solely to the sinner's amendment is not the same as becoming an explorer of another's life. Yet if surveillance itself makes the sinner worse or causes disproportionate harm, it must cease.

Likewise the limited loss of reputation before one or two prudent persons is not necessarily a disproportionate evil in comparison with liberation from mortal sin.

Nevertheless it must be minimized, and the persons introduced should be chosen because they can help and not harm.

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Denunciation can therefore be ordered per se to the good of the brother in continuity with secret fraternal correction. The ecclesiastical prelate, precisely because he is also spiritual father, can receive the report not immediately as a public penal judge but as one who is especially capable of curing a subject.

If appropriate, the prelate can correct the delinquent privately, or before the same one or two prudent persons, and can afterward keep watch lest the sin be repeated. If the offense is repeated and the witnesses then directly observe it, they can—if necessary—testify before the prelate in a proper judicial forum. Thus the evangelical order can organically pass from medicinal charity to external justice without confusing the two formal ratios.

To the objection that this makes the corrector an “explorer” of another's life: after the sin has already been discovered, prudent diligence aimed at the brother's cure is not vicious curiosity. It is rather the work of a spiritual physician. The confirmation from danger of infamy is answered by proportion: a limited disclosure to one or two prudent persons is not counted a grave injury when ordered to so great a spiritual good as liberation from mortal sin. But if the brother becomes worse from this remedy, we have already established that the remedy must be abandoned.

To the objection that the route of fraternal correction is ordered only to the individual good and therefore should never culminate in punishment: the consequence is denied. A report can be made to a prelate as father for the sinner's good, and the prelate can correct without immediately instituting public proceedings. If the matter afterward becomes public, repeated, scandalous, or destructive of the common good, the same material fact can enter another formal order, namely public justice.

Therefore witnesses may be introduced for several legitimate ends: (1) to support the brother who admonishes; (2) to make clear to the offender that his act is objectively sinful; (3) to observe a repetition when prudent vigilance is justified; (4) to attest that charitable admonition was truly made; and, in a later external process when lawful, (5) to testify concerning what they actually know.

This resolves the principal question of the evangelical witnesses. We must now inquire more precisely into the authority of the prelate after denunciation and whether the third degree of fraternal correction permits or requires him to proceed to public or coercive punishment in particular cases.

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QUESTION XXXIII — ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: WHETHER THE PRELATE MAY PROCEED

BEYOND THE THIRD
DEGREE

Public correction and chastisement can sometimes conduce to the salvation of the offender's spirit, as the Apostle teaches when he commands the Corinthian offender to be delivered to Satan “for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of our
Lord Jesus Christ.” Augustine likewise says that if the brother denies his fault, others are to be brought in so that he may be convicted by
two or three witnesses.

A special opinion of Panormitanus holds that one should not cease at denunciation even when it is feared that the offender will become
worse rather than amend, because he should nevertheless be denounced so that others may fear. Canon law likewise warns that pardon
should not be made so easy that facility of pardon becomes an incentive to delinquency.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Wherever all hope of amendment of the delinquent has disappeared, fraternal correction as such must cease.

This is St. Thomas's conclusion in article 6. Every means within the formal order of fraternal correction is disposed to its proper end,
namely the spiritual good of the brother. Therefore, if all such means are fruitless, they are no longer to be used under that formal ratio.

SECOND CONCLUSION. A prelate would sin gravely if he transferred to the public judicial forum a crime which came to his knowledge
solely through the route of fraternal correction, when there is no hope that the denounced person will amend and the crime is not harmful
to the commonwealth. In that case neither public infamy nor a juridical accusation supplies a title for public process. To transfer a matter
received medicinally and paternally into the penal forum without another just title would violate charity and justice.

If, however, the crime is harmful to the community, the case changes. Then even the original denouncer may be bound to accuse or inform
the fiscal procurator so that the common good be protected.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Remaining within the third degree of fraternal correction, a prelate may vehemently rebuke the delinquent
when gentle admonition does not suffice; he may frighten him with threats and warn that he will watch him in the future. If prudent, he
may admonish him before a few grave men who can help and not harm. Soto teaches this.

Soto denies that bodily blows may be used. I do not think this universally true. Given the quality and youth of the offender and the paternal authority of the prelate, I do not see why a spiritual father may never secretly use a moderate chastisement analogous to that
which a natural father may use. Soto himself grants that a confessed delinquent can be struck with a discipline fraternally, not as punishment of the past but as a deterrent for the future. Likewise, even if a subject promises amendment, prudent and moderate chastisement can sometimes still be useful. These matters are to be left to the prelate's prudence.

A subject questioned by his prelate as father can be bound to answer truthfully because the prelate then has a paternal right of inquiry.

Yet the subject should beware of making a public confession before witnesses if there is danger that an imprudent prelate will transform
the paternal correction into a formal accusation and judicial condemnation.

The prelate may even impose a command under pain of a latae sententiae excommunication forbidding a dangerous familiarity or access
to a certain place. If the subject violates the command, the Lord's saying “If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen
and the publican” can be verified privately: not because the secretly excommunicated person must be publicly shunned as though judicially notorious, but because in certain actions one may have to separate from him so that shame may bring him to repentance.

The great question remains whether, after the medicinal degrees fail, one may transfer the crime to a public tribunal solely for the offender's spiritual good. Some doctors answer affirmatively where competent witnesses exist and juridical proof is possible. Soto restricts
this: if a juridical process can be lawfully undertaken and there is prudent hope of amendment, the process of fraternal correction ends
and the judicial process begins. If there is no hope and the crime harms only the offender, he says punishment should cease. Cajetan substantially agrees. This is probable, but further distinctions are required.

ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: PUBLIC JUDGMENT AND THE COMMON GOOD

It seems harsh that a worse and more obstinate sinner should thereby become juridically better situated merely because there is no hope of his amendment, while another who can still be cured may be publicly prosecuted. One might answer that the curable man is in fact better situated, because even severe medicine can heal him, whereas the incorrigible man is beyond such medicinal help. Yet this reply does not wholly resolve the matter.

A public correction is a means proportionate principally to the common good. St. Thomas distinguishes correction as charity from coercive correction as justice precisely on this basis. Therefore public judicial punishment ought not be used merely as a private spiritual medicine unless the act is independently proportionate to public justice and the common good.

Moreover, publication of crimes is itself ordinarily harmful to the community, because public knowledge can become an example and occasion for imitation.

Public punishment remedies an evil already made public, but it would invert the order to publish a secret crime merely in order to punish it unless the very publication and punishment are independently justified by the common good.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. It is not lawful to transfer to the public forum the crime of one who remains incorrigible through all three degrees of fraternal correction, unless there exists some other title under which bringing the person to judgment is lawful for the common good. This conclusion seems to me much more probable and safer than the opposite.

Many cases exist in which accusation is lawful even though not strictly commanded. The nature of lawful accusation will be treated below in Question 68. Here it is enough to state that where accusation is independently lawful because it is immediately ordered to the common good, it can also be used by charity as an occasion for the incorrigible person's spiritual good. Indeed, in extreme spiritual necessity, charity can sometimes command a lawful act of accusation that justice by itself would merely permit, because charity commands us to succor a neighbor through a means otherwise licit according to another virtue.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. Whether accusation is lawful does not depend upon whether there is hope that the accused will spiritually amend. The lawfulness of accusation is determined by its proper formal object, namely the promotion or defense of the common good. Therefore where the common good renders accusation lawful, it remains lawful whether or not the accused later repents. His refusal to amend is imputable to himself.

SIXTH CONCLUSION. Nevertheless there is a difference as regards whether I am bound to accuse. If accusation is otherwise lawful and there is hope that through it a neighbor in grave spiritual danger can be reclaimed, charity can bind me to use this lawful remedy. If there is no hope of his amendment, that additional obligation from his private spiritual necessity disappears, unless accusation is commanded on another ground, for example because the crime directly harms the community or because a legitimate superior commands its denunciation under grave penalty for a proportionate public reason.

The Lord's phrase “let him be to thee as the heathen and publican” can be verified in two ways. First, within the private order of fraternal correction, a prelate can impose a medicinal ecclesiastical separation or even a secret excommunication under suitable conditions, so that the obstinate person be treated privately as one separated until he repents. Second, when a legitimate public cause transfers the matter to the external forum and the person is publicly judged and perhaps excommunicated, the phrase is more fully verified. Yet even then he remains our brother by baptism and should be mourned more than a heathen.

St. Thomas's “public denunciation” should therefore not be restricted to a formal accusation in open court. It can also include the report made by a correcting brother to a prelate, with one or two persons present, when the formerly secret matter has by the evangelical process become known to those few for medicinal purposes.

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ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY: UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURE AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

Augustine's instruction concerning witnesses applies where a public judgment is actually required for protection of the common good. He was speaking of a
public and habitual immodesty that dishonored a religious community and could infect many. Such a person, if incorrigible, could be expelled “not cruelly but
mercifully, lest by pestiferous contagion he destroy many.” The same proportion must govern other sins: love the men, hate the vices, and distinguish what
belongs to private cure from what belongs to public justice.

FIFTH DOUBT. If, through the ignorance or malice of a person who failed to preserve the order of fraternal correction when bound to do so, a brother's crime
comes to the prelate's knowledge by way of an accusation, may or must the prelate admit the accusation juridically and proceed against the accused?

The argument for the negative is that no right is born from an injury; if the judge knows that the accusation arose from an unjust disclosure, it seems he cannot
use that injustice as a title against the injured accused.

For the affirmative, public order requires crimes to be corrected in court according to allegations and proofs. Therefore it may appear that once legally sufficient
proof is presented, the judge must proceed even though the original disclosure was wrongful.

Three distinctions are necessary. First, the judge can be considered as a private person or as minister of the commonwealth. Second, the injury to the accused can
have been committed by a private person or by the judge himself. Third, the injury can exist in the external forum because legal procedure was violated, or only
in conscience because divine or natural law was violated although the external forum does not take notice of that defect.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Whenever a prelate knows that a public proceeding against someone has arisen from an injury, he is bound in conscience, under charity
as a private person, to prevent completion of the process against the injured party if he can do so without scandal or detriment to the common good and while
preserving the laws governing his judicial office. The fact that a man is a judge does not release him from natural and divine duties that bind him as a person.

Everyone must defend a neighbor from unjust injury when this can be done without disproportionate harm.

SECOND CONCLUSION. In a Christian commonwealth, if a judge knows that the injury to the accused arose from violation of the seal of confession, and that
fact can be established, he cannot proceed further but must set aside the whole process. To proceed from such a sacrilegious foundation would cause a scandal
more pernicious than leaving the particular crime unpunished and would deter Christians from the sacrament of confession. A confessor hears crimes in God's
place in the forum of conscience; his testimony should no more be admitted to condemn the penitent in the external forum than God's private knowledge alone
can be used as human proof.

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the judge himself, as public person, wrongfully injures the accused by violating substantial juridical order and through that
unlawful process obtains knowledge of the crime, he cannot continue. “From acts done inordinately, an orderly process cannot arise.” The process must be
restored to the point before the injustice.

The injury on the judge's part need not be some monstrous tyranny; if it is grave matter and violates the substantial natural or legal order required for
condemnation, it suffices. I therefore reject the opinion that an enormous crime always allows the judge to proceed after grave injustice merely to avoid scandal.

No innocent man may be killed for the safety of the whole commonwealth; juridically, one against whom guilt has not been legitimately proved must be treated
as innocent, even if before God he is in fact guilty.

An extorted confession does not solve the difficulty. A confession that convicts in court must itself be juridically valid and not extorted through unlawful violence
by the commonwealth or its minister. Just as a robber does not acquire ownership of money obtained by unjust violence or threats, so a republic does not acquire
a juridical right to condemn through a confession unlawfully forced from the accused. Rather, as far as possible, the accused must be restored to his juridical
immunity.

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FIFTH DOUBT (concluded); SIXTH DOUBT — WHAT MAKES A SIN PUBLIC OR SECRET?

Some maintain that juridical procedure is merely human positive law and therefore can be abrogated by contrary custom. They are gravely mistaken. An abusive practice of certain judges is not legitimate custom. Moreover, some norms of procedure determine matters so substantial that they are explanations of natural law itself. A man cannot be publicly condemned without public juridical knowledge of his crime in the manner proportioned to the chosen process. If the judge proceeds by inquiry without an accuser, public infamy ordinarily must precede and supplies the place of an accusation. If he proceeds by accusation, the requisite witnesses or other legally sufficient proof must exist. To violate such essentials is not merely to violate a dispensable human ceremony, but natural justice.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. If a judge as a private person, outside judicial acts, wrongfully causes injury to the accused—for example by bribing false witnesses, with the result that an innocent man is later condemnable according to the allegations and proofs—the judge is bound to use every proportionate means, even at serious personal danger, to free the accused, because restitution cannot otherwise be made. If, despite every effort, no effective remedy remains, the judge in his public capacity can still be bound to decide according to legally established allegations and proofs; by doing so he performs the office of the commonwealth and does not commit a new injustice, although he remains bound to restitution for the earlier private injury that caused the harm.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. If a judge knows that the accused suffers an injury in the external forum through a false or unlawful accusation, whether or not an officer of justice is responsible, he is bound insofar as his office allows to have the injustice manifested so that proceedings do not continue unjustly. The judge is custodian of justice. If, however, he cannot prevent the accusation either as judge or as private person and the accusation is juridically presented, he can be bound to admit it because orderly reception of accusations belongs to the common good.

The maxim “from injury no right arises” means that the wrongdoer does not acquire a right against the injured person by his own wrong. It does not mean that an entirely distinct public right can never arise from facts subsequently and independently established in a lawful forum. Nevertheless a process founded immediately upon violation of the sacramental seal or upon grave procedural injustice remains vitiated.

SIXTH DOUBT. St. Thomas distinguishes a public crime from a secret one. What precisely makes a sin public or secret? Exact treatment belongs later to Questions 67 and following, concerning judges, accusers, and witnesses, but some principles are necessary here because the distinction controls whether fraternal or judicial correction is appropriate.

FIRST CONCLUSION. A sin is not called public merely because three or four people know it.

SECOND CONCLUSION. A sin is simply public when a person has been convicted of it in judgment, or when it is commonly reported throughout a neighborhood, community, college, or comparable body, or when public infamy concerning it exists. This is the common opinion.

THIRD CONCLUSION. A sin is simply secret when it is not simply public. Yet several grades of secrecy are useful to distinguish.

The first grade occurs when only God and the sinner know the sin. To this can be reduced the case where several accomplices alone know the same crime, provided they are not so numerous that concealment is morally impossible. In the first strict form, ordinary fraternal correction by another has no place because no other brother knows; the priest alone can judge and correct sacramentally in confession. Where several accomplices know, one who repents can exhort the others, but he is not thereby bound to betray and infame himself before new witnesses or the prelate.

The second grade occurs when many have committed a crime and one outsider knows it. Here fraternal correction especially has place because the outsider possesses knowledge but lacks sufficient public proof for accusation.

The third grade occurs when two, three, or four know the crime in such a way that their testimony could suffice in court. Here either fraternal or juridical correction can become possible according to the formal object and circumstances.

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Even a crime known by enough witnesses for juridical proof can remain materially secret until brought into the proper forum. Judicial correction can nevertheless
be lawful for two principal reasons. First, the sin itself can be directly destructive of the community and dangerous delay may require immediate denunciation.

Second, even sins principally directed against private persons—such as theft, adultery, and similar offenses—can become so frequent that public punishment of
particular offenders is necessary to deter others and promote the common good. In such circumstances one who knows a singular crime can sometimes be bound
to bring it to judgment.

Yet however public and punishable a sin becomes, the precept of fraternal correction does not thereby cease whenever there remains hope that the sinner will
repent before God. The exact sequence of the three evangelical degrees may no longer apply to a crime already public, but charity still commands concern for the
sinner's soul.

Whether a judge can initiate a special inquiry against a particular person merely from indications, without prior public infamy or accusation, belongs more
properly to the later tract on judgments. I do not follow Soto where he allows such singular inquiry from indications alone; the canonical texts concerning inquiry
require more. God willing, this will be discussed at greater length in its proper place.

SEVENTH DOUBT. Is a cleric bound to denounce a plot to betray a city, a planned homicide, robbery, or a similar crime harmful to the commonwealth or
innocent persons when he knows that denunciation will probably lead to bloodshed?

Cajetan resolves this well. Ecclesiastical law perfects natural and divine law as grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it. Charity and natural law bind us, when
possible, to aid a commonwealth or neighbor in danger. If the danger of treason, homicide, or robbery can be prevented only by disclosing the plot, no
ecclesiastical statute is to be understood as forbidding what natural law otherwise commands.

Thus ecclesiastical prelates possessing temporal jurisdiction incur no irregularity merely by committing execution of justice to a secular minister when their
office requires vindictive justice, provided canonical law is observed. Likewise a cleric who can protect the innocent or the commonwealth only by revealing a
prepared crime does not incur irregularity merely from making the necessary disclosure, provided he expressly protests that he intends only lawful defense and
precaution, not bloodshed.

This does not prove that every cleric who physically kills in defense of another incurs no irregularity. Although natural law may permit or even in some cases
oblige defense, ecclesiastical law can attach irregularity to bloodshed because of the indecency of blood for sacred ministry without forbidding the defensive act
itself. The distinction will be treated below under war and homicide.

After the tract on fraternal correction, another question seems highly useful for theologians of our time: what, by force of the precept of fraternal correction, must
a confessor observe toward a penitent and toward a third person who was an accomplice in the penitent's sin?

EIGHTH DOUBT. Is a confessor bound by the precept of fraternal correction to require a penitent to reveal the identity of an accomplice or of another sinner
whose offense becomes incidentally known in the penitent's confession?

Arguments for the affirmative begin from the penitent's own duty of correction. If the penitent is bound to correct a mortal sinner but lacks authority or ability to
do so, perhaps the confessor can oblige him to identify the sinner so that the confessor, by greater prudence and authority, can pursue the correction. Again, the

third person's crime can be harmful to the community or to an innocent person; if the confessor is himself a prelate or judge, knowledge of the identity might
appear necessary to discharge his own office. Finally, absolution can be withheld from a penitent who refuses to perform a genuinely obligatory correction or
denunciation; therefore it may seem absurd to say the confessor can command the act outside confession but cannot require the relevant identity within
confession.

These arguments are serious, but the sanctity of the sacramental forum requires a more exact distinction.

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EIGHTH DOUBT — WHETHER THE CONFESSOR MAY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF AN ACCOMPLICE

Additional arguments for the affirmative are proposed. According to a common theological opinion, a prelate can become more prudent through knowledge of sins acquired in confession and can thereby watch over his flock more carefully without revealing particular confessions. Some even allow a prelate, because of indignity learned in confession, to remove an official whose office is revocable at will. It can therefore appear that the confessor may require information concerning third persons for better government.

Again, a penitent can sometimes lawfully mention another person's sin in confession when necessary to explain adequately the species or gravity of his own sin.

If he may do so for his own spiritual good, why not for the spiritual good of the third person or of the community? Finally, requiring such disclosure may seem to injure neither the penitent nor the third person: the penitent is relieved of a burden of correction by the confessor's intervention, while the third person's fault remains under the great secrecy of confession.

For the negative, two principal objections are urged. First, if the confessor uses knowledge acquired in confession to correct or denounce the third person, he can violate the inviolable seal not merely by words but by deeds that reveal the source of his knowledge. Second, the practice would introduce a dangerous novelty into a matter of the highest gravity.

Defenders of the affirmative reply that the penitent's own sins alone are directly enclosed by the seal, whereas the third person's offense is mentioned incidentally and not as the penitent's sacramental matter. They also appeal to the opinion that, with the penitent's permission, a confessor can sometimes speak outside confession about what he heard within it for a legitimate good.

For clarity I divide the full difficulty into three parts. In the first I shall show that revealing the identity of an accomplice in sacramental confession is not a proportionate means for correcting that person, denouncing him, or governing a community. In the second I shall expose the grave inconveniences that can arise from the contrary practice. In the third I shall show how the practice can injure the sacrament of Penance itself.

FIRST PART — TWO FOUNDATIONS.

FIRST FOUNDATION. According to the common opinion, a penitent may mention another's sin in his own confession when otherwise he cannot adequately confess the species or notable gravity of his own fault. St. Thomas and many scholastics teach this. For the present I concede that common opinion for purposes of argument, although Cajetan's more restrictive view pleases me better. Cajetan provides many ways by which the penitent can conceal the other person's identity. If this is impossible and confession cannot safely be deferred, he judges that one must weigh the neighbor's reputation very carefully.

Even on the common opinion, the right to mention another is not unlimited. It is justified only insofar as necessary for integrity of one's own confession. It is not a general permission to disclose third persons for purposes extrinsic to the sacrament.

SECOND FOUNDATION. Although the seal of confession directly extends to matters that are properly sacramental matter, it extends indirectly to everything whose revelation would disclose the penitent or his sins or otherwise cause harm arising from the confession. St. Thomas expressly teaches this. The seal must therefore be interpreted broadly enough to preserve confidence in the sacrament and protect both penitent and implicated persons from disclosure traceable to confession.

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EIGHTH DOUBT — THE SEAL OF CONFESSION AND THIRD PERSONS

No event permits a priest to reveal sins heard only in confession, nor matters indirectly included under the seal when their disclosure can reveal the sinner. This is
forbidden by divine law because otherwise the sacrament, so necessary to the Church, would become hateful and men would be deterred from approaching it.

Canon law therefore commands the priest to beware lest he reveal the sinner.

A necessary corollary follows: the accomplice in a crime can himself be indirectly protected by the seal when the confessor knows his identity solely from the
penitent's confession and when correcting or approaching the accomplice would evidently manifest that the confessor learned the matter from another person's
confession. In such a case the priest who acts upon that knowledge can practically reveal the penitent's confession without naming it. Therefore, unless the priest
knows the accomplice's crime by another independent route, he acts sacrilegiously if he approaches the accomplice in a manner that makes the sacramental
source evident.

The same danger exists when confessors use particular sins learned from penitents as material for sermons in such a manner that hearers can identify or
reasonably suspect the individual concerned. Even if no name is spoken, one can violate the secrecy of confession by circumstances and deeds.

A further question concerns when a penitent's own complete confession necessarily reveals a third person's identity. The common opinion permits such disclosure
when it is genuinely necessary to express the penitent's own species of sin or a notably aggravating circumstance. Yet the common opinion must be understood
with qualifications.

If the only harm to the third person is a minimal loss of reputation before the single priest, who is absolutely bound by the seal, the need for integral confession
can outweigh that slight harm. Thus a young unmarried man confessing fornication may in some contexts be unable to express his own circumstance without
allowing the priest to infer another person, where the reputational loss is morally slight. But where disclosure would gravely infame a woman, affect a
contemplated marriage, or otherwise cause notable injury, the situation changes substantially.

Cajetan's stricter position—that one must avoid revealing the third person whenever possible—has much force. Cano moderates the common opinion by saying
that when injury to the other is at least moderate, the penitent need not and should not make the disclosure merely to state an aggravating circumstance that can
otherwise be morally communicated. This moderation pleases me.

I do not accept a further qualification proposed by some, namely that at the point of death the penitent must reveal even a third person's identity despite moderate
reputational harm merely for the consolation of making a maximally explicit confession. If outside danger of death charity can oblige me to protect my neighbor's
reputation and omit a circumstance whose disclosure would moderately injure him, much more should charity govern at death when I can still make an integral
confession of my own sins insofar as morally possible. The sacrament does not command us to violate the neighbor's rights without necessity.

For present purposes, therefore, I concede the common doctrine only within this limit: a penitent can reveal what is genuinely necessary for the integrity of his
own sacramental accusation, provided no disproportionate harm to a third person follows. This concession makes the principal negative conclusion stronger,
because disclosure for correction, denunciation, or governance has a far weaker sacramental title than disclosure necessary for one's own confession.

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FIRST PART — PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

FIRST CONCLUSION. To reveal in sacramental confession the identity of another sinner is not, of itself, a proportionate means either for fraternal correction of that person, for juridical denunciation, for a prelate's better government of the community, or for similar natural ends.

The first proof is from the order of moral acts. Natural moral ends are ordinarily attained through natural moral means proportionate to them. The precepts of fraternal correction, denunciation, and political or ecclesiastical government belong to the natural moral order. Sacramental confession, however, is a supernatural means instituted by Christ's positive will and superadded to nature. Therefore confession is not of its own nature the ordinary instrument for executing those natural precepts.

This does not mean that charity can never command a supernatural act toward a lower natural end. Charity commands all virtues and can sometimes order a supernatural act toward a natural good that is itself ordered to charity. For example, if I knew that a priest would be corrected by the example of my humble confession to him, it could be holy and praiseworthy intentionally to make my confession in such a way as to edify him, provided the sacrament's nature and integrity are preserved. The point is that sacramental confession as such was not instituted as an information-gathering apparatus for correction, denunciation, or government.

Second, Christ legislated concerning Penance primarily for the spiritual good of penitents who had lost baptismal grace. He commanded them to confess their own sins. He did not institute the sacrament so that penitents would identify other sinners in order that confessors might correct, prosecute, or administer them.

Third, the natural precepts of correction, denunciation, and good government bound men under the natural law and written law before sacramental confession existed; they also bind non-Christians according to their natural content. Hence no means is to be asserted as intrinsically destined to those ends in the Christian law if the means did not exist at all outside the sacramental economy.

Fourth, an innocent person is bound to fraternal correction no less than a sinner, yet an innocent person is not bound to confess venial sins merely so that his confessor can acquire information useful for correcting someone else. Therefore a sinner too is not bound by the precept of correction to use confession as a means to that extrinsic end. Otherwise it could become mortal sin to omit a confession at times not otherwise commanded simply because another person's correction would thereby become easier—an intolerably severe conclusion.

Fifth, sacramental confession is already the most difficult of the evangelical sacramental duties because a man must accuse himself of secret sins and undergo salutary shame before another man. This difficulty is compensated by the immense spiritual good of the penitent's own reconciliation. We must not superadd a new burden requiring him to reveal friends, relatives, superiors, or other persons unless such disclosure is genuinely required by the sacrament or another grave natural duty outside the sacramental act.

Finally, compelling the penitent to identify an accomplice can expose the priest himself to temptation: the accomplice may be the priest's relative, friend, superior, or a person of dignity. The confessor may come to hate, despise, fear, or imprudently pursue the person. The sacrament must not be transformed into an occasion for such dangers.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Disclosure of a third person's sin within confession is not an efficacious or sufficient means for juridical denunciation or good government. The reasons are even clearer from the law of proof and from the seal, as follows.

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SECOND CONCLUSION — WHY SACRAMENTAL DISCLOSURE CANNOT GROUND JUDICIAL ACTION

The law of fraternal correction presupposes that the person who corrects possesses morally sufficient knowledge that the brother sinned: “If thy brother sin against thee,” that is, as Augustine explains, with you knowing it. But a confessor who knows a third person's alleged sin solely from the penitent's accusation lacks the kind of certitude by which he can confront and convict that person. He did not witness the act, and he cannot produce the penitent as a witness without violating the sacramental forum. To confront the third person as though judicially certain would therefore risk grave injustice.

The defect is still clearer regarding juridical denunciation. A crime cannot lawfully be proved by a confessor's report of what a penitent said in confession, nor can ordinary judicial order be preserved. Civil and canon law regulate who may accuse, denounce, or testify; how witnesses are examined; what degree of proof is required; and how the accused may know enough of the circumstances to defend himself. A sacramental report defeats all these safeguards.

Certain persons are disqualified from accusation or testimony because of infamy, complicity, age, affection, dependence, or another just cause. If every such person could convey his accusation anonymously through confession, all these exclusions would be frustrated. Likewise a denouncer or witness can be required to swear to good faith or truth; a confessor cannot swear to the penitent's interior good faith, which God alone knows, nor to the truth of a fact he knows solely from the penitent's report. Nor can he force the penitent within confession to provide a juridical oath or appear as a public witness.

At least semiplena probatio or other legally sufficient indicia are ordinarily required before an accused person can be subjected to more severe examination. A confessor cannot lawfully supply such proof when he neither witnessed the act nor can identify or present the sacramental witness. Before a right judge, such a denunciation would be juridically inept; a judge who treated it as sufficient to interrogate or punish the accused would act gravely against justice.

The accused also has a right to such knowledge of times, places, circumstances, and witnesses as the law permits for defense. But if the entire proceeding must conceal the penitent's identity and the sacramental origin of the information, ordinary rights of defense become impossible. The judge could not rigorously examine the originating witness, test credibility, ask the reason for the testimony, or expose contradictions without endangering the seal.

The public harm is obvious. If sacramental accusations could initiate penal cases while the actual reporter remained unknowable, a malicious penitent could pursue another with calumnies, insinuate false proofs, and then safely disappear from the case because the judge could never reveal who gave the original information. I do not believe any Catholic doctor should approve such a judicial method.

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the penitent himself is independently bound to correct, denounce, or protect the common good, he cannot be absolved if he obstinately refuses to perform that duty or at least sincerely promises to do so. But he must perform it through an appropriate route outside the sacramental disclosure. If he personally lacks prudence or ability, he should outside confession make the delinquent known to the confessor or another grave and prudent person able to carry out the needed correction or denunciation. Natural law binds him to employ natural and proportionate means; sacramental confession is not the substitute.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Ordinarily it is dangerous for the confessor to require a penitent to identify the accomplice outside confession specifically so that the confessor himself may proceed to correct or denounce that person. This conclusion moderates the preceding one and prevents abuse by confessors moved by indiscreet zeal or curiosity.

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FOURTH CONCLUSION — THE CONFESSOR SHOULD NOT MAKE HIMSELF THE ORDINARY CORRECTOR OF PERSONS IDENTIFIED IN CONFESSION

Some confessors, under the pretext of fraternal correction, demand from penitents the identity of every accomplice and confidently undertake personally to correct or denounce them. From such indiscreet zeal very grave inconveniences and scandals can arise in the Christian commonwealth.

Even if the penitent later repeats the name outside confession, everyone who knows that the priest is his confessor will naturally suspect that the priest's information arose from confession. If the person corrected is the accomplice, he can readily infer that the priest first learned the crime through the confession of the other party. In this way the penitent can be practically revealed even without a verbal breach of the seal.

Moreover, the sacrament itself becomes odious if men see that secret crimes confessed for spiritual healing are followed by interventions, investigations, corrections, or denunciations traceable to the confessional. Fear of such consequences would deter the weak from confession. Confessors of timorous conscience must therefore abstain from personally pursuing third persons merely because their crimes were disclosed sacramentally.

When a penitent is genuinely bound to correction or denunciation, the confessor should counsel and, if necessary, oblige him to perform the duty himself insofar as he can. If he cannot prudently do it personally, another grave and prudent person should ordinarily be employed outside confession.

Only when the matter has been reduced to such necessity that no other suitable person exists except the confessor himself can it be admitted, without intrinsic contradiction to the seal, that the confessor require the penitent to reveal the third person to him outside confession for the necessary correction. Even then this must be done with extreme caution.

I earnestly beg ministers of the sacrament of Penance to observe this qualification: such a course is never to be used when it would cause scandal among the ignorant or timid by creating the appearance that the sacramental secret is violated or by deterring them from confessing their sins. That danger can outweigh the good expected from correction so greatly that, if correction cannot otherwise be made, it must sometimes be left undone.

From the foregoing we can gather the following corollary. It is never lawful for a penitent to reveal the identity of a delinquent third person within sacramental confession merely for the end of fraternal correction, juridical denunciation, or good government of a community. We have shown in the first conclusions that such manifestation is not a proportionate or efficacious sacramental means for those purposes and can instead be gravely pernicious.

The common opinion permitting incidental mention of another person's sin in confession must be restricted to what is morally necessary for explaining the penitent's own sin, and even then the rights and grave reputation of the third person must be preserved. If through the priest's malice, ignorance, relationship, or other circumstances the disclosure would probably cause the third person notable infamy or temporal loss beyond the unavoidable sacramental context, the penitent is not bound—and can be forbidden—to identify that person.

This concludes the first part. The second part considers in greater detail the scandals and harms that arise from the contrary practice.

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QUESTION XXXIII — ARTICLE VIII — COMMENTARY

SECOND PART — INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM USING SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION AS A MEANS OF CORRECTION OR DENUNCIATION

A further inconvenience is that from this method many false suspicions can arise within families. Suppose, for example, that a wife mentions in confession something concerning her husband and the confessor, using knowledge acquired in the sacramental forum, proceeds to correct or denounce him. The husband will be greatly disturbed and may pursue his wife with hatred, believing her to have accused him. Indeed the very admonition can become an occasion of temptation, so that the husband completes in deed what before was only suspected or imperfectly intended.

The same indiscreet zeal can infame innocent persons. Suppose a priest, from reports made by penitents in sacramental confession, compiles a catalogue of women said to be infected with the French disease, and, under the pretext of consulting the common good, communicates it to the civic ruler so that a physician and public officer may investigate them lest they infect others. It is entirely possible that women of good reputation would be included, who would rightly complain that they had suffered grave injury. This shows where indiscreet zeal can lead when sacramental knowledge is ordered to external government.

A THIRD INCONVENIENCE is that this practice gives wicked men an easy occasion to infame innocent persons while avoiding ordinary judicial examination. Suppose Peter, moved by vengeance, wants Paul to fall under suspicion of heresy before the Holy Office but fears that if he denounces Paul personally his testimony will be examined and his falsehood discovered. He could instead tell an indiscreet confessor in confession that he has a scruple because he knows Paul to be a heretic but cannot himself denounce him. If the confessor then denounces Paul from that sacramental report, Paul suffers grave injury while the original testimony cannot be examined. Worse still, a dishonest confessor could pretend that he learned a charge in confession and denounce someone without the ordinary possibility of testing the allegation.

For this reason such testimony is rightly not admitted in the tribunal of the Holy Inquisition unless the confessor can say that he knows the relevant testimony outside confession. I myself would not absolve a penitent who knows a heretic and is bound to denounce him unless the penitent either denounces personally, employs a third person who can identify him as witness, or gives me authority outside sacramental confession to transmit his name to the tribunal as the source of an extra-sacramental statement. Otherwise the inquisitors would rightly reprove me.

A FOURTH INCONVENIENCE is equally harmful to the commonwealth. If, immediately after hearing a penitent, the confessor asks for the identity of a third person whom the penitent is bound to denounce because of danger to the community, the person to be denounced can turn out to be the priest's friend, relative, or acquaintance. Human affection can then induce the priest to assume the matter to himself and suppress or weaken the denunciation that he would otherwise have required. It is therefore safer to impose the burden on the penitent himself to denounce according to the obligation arising from the circumstances and quality of persons.

A FIFTH INCONVENIENCE follows. If sacramental confession were a lawful and sufficient route for correction and denunciation, Christians would increasingly make evangelical and juridical denunciations through confession precisely because the denouncer could avoid hatred, examination, and other burdens arising from ordinary process. Much of the written law governing accusation, denunciation, witnesses, and defense would effectively become useless, and a new procedural order would have to be invented.

A SIXTH INCONVENIENCE is that religious superiors could use confession as an instrument of visitation and government. They could learn not only the sins of the penitents themselves but the faults of other religious incidentally disclosed in their confessions, and then use that knowledge to reform morals, compose disputes, remove officials, deprive some of favors, and promote others. Such a method would immediately disturb the whole community and would provide ambitious or imperfect subjects an occasion to confess their own minor faults while accusing grave faults, true or false, in others. Many sacrileges and scandals would follow.

It is therefore inadmissible to enact a law requiring that faults, whether one's own or another's, be manifested in sacramental confession for the purpose of governing a community. Such a law would be contrary to the ancient practice of the Church and to the procedural norms established by councils and pontiffs for the visitation and correction of subjects. The forum of conscience must not be converted into an instrument of the external forum.

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SECOND PART — FURTHER INCONVENIENCES

A SEVENTH INCONVENIENCE would follow: bishops could “visit” an entire diocese through confessors, receiving from them information learned in sacramental confession and then punishing or removing persons whose alleged unworthiness was known only through the confessions of others. By the same principle a Catholic king could send confessors into secular tribunals and remove civil judges on the basis of sacramental reports. If ecclesiastical offices may be removed in this way, why not civil offices also? The absurdity reveals the falsity of the principle.

An EIGHTH INCONVENIENCE is that visitors who govern through sacramental knowledge would no longer be accountable to their superiors. If asked why a certain official was removed, they could answer that the reason cannot be disclosed because it was known in confession. In this way the ordinary duty of rendering an account of government would be frustrated.

A NINTH AND GREATEST INCONVENIENCE is that the seal of confession would at least indirectly be broken. If men judged worthy in the external forum are suddenly removed from office after a visitation conducted through sacramental information, observers will immediately infer that hidden unworthiness was learned in confession. Likewise a confessor who has heard the confessions of two accomplices could denounce each from the other's confession and then sophistically answer each one: “I did not speak from your confession but from another's.” This would permit a priest who really revealed Peter's confession to pretend that he learned the matter from someone else. The sacramental seal would become practically unverifiable and odious.

A prudent man can easily imagine further inconveniences. Those already stated are sufficient to show that the contrary doctrine should be rejected by pious and religious men animated by zeal for Christ.

THIRD PART — HOW THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE INJURES THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

For a perfect determination of the truth, it remains to show in how many ways the contrary doctrine acts injuriously toward the sacrament of Penance. This will be manifested under three principal causes. The first is the novelty of the doctrine. The second is the dangerous contempt or weakening of the sacred secrecy of confession, by which men would be deterred from the frequent and necessary use of the sacrament. The third is that the doctrine subjects the spiritual forum of this sacrament to the exterior ecclesiastical or civil forum.

Concerning the first cause, the Council of Trent teaches in Session XIV, chapter 5, that the penitent is bound to confess his own mortal sins and the circumstances changing their species or notably aggravating them. It does not impose an additional burden that the penitent must identify an accomplice or another sinner merely so that the confessor can correct, denounce, or govern.

This manner of imposing the burden is novel. The scholastic doctors, who are accustomed to examine difficult sacramental questions with the greatest exactness, never taught that a penitent is obliged beyond the integrity of his own confession to manifest the person of an accomplice for correction or denunciation. Rather, they presupposed the contrary when debating the genuinely difficult question whether the penitent may identify an accomplice when otherwise he cannot adequately explain the species or gravity of his own sin.

Indeed all the scholastics hold that, where possible, a penitent should seek another confessor before revealing an accomplice whose identity would otherwise become known; the same principle can apply even where the third person was not an accomplice. Many grave doctors go further and judge that if no confessor can be found before whom the third person's identity can be concealed, the penitent must omit the identifying circumstance rather than gravely infame the neighbor.

Marsilius, Cajetan, Innocent, Hostiensis, and other canonists and modern theologians are cited for this more restrictive position. It pleases me more, although the contrary opinion is more common.

Whatever position one takes in that older debate, the entire theological school agrees on this: if a third person's identity is necessarily manifested in confession for the integrity of the penitent's own accusation, the confessor is bound to conceal that third person's sin under the same inviolable secrecy. Otherwise the common opinion would be intolerable and the yoke of the Lord would become exceedingly harsh.

It would therefore be rash to assert that until our own age the Catholic Church had somehow failed to discover an ordinary sacramental method of correcting, denouncing, or governing third persons from information supplied in confession. The silence and practice of the whole school are powerful evidence against such novelty.

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THIRD PART — THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE SEAL

Before treating the second cause, one document must be established. There is common consent throughout the theological school that in no case may the seal of
sacramental confession be broken, even if one feared calamity to the whole commonwealth or the spread of pestiferous heresy. Not even the Supreme Pontiff
possesses authority to dispense from the sacramental seal. The school rightly abandoned the contrary opinion attributed to William of Auxerre.
With the penitent's legitimate permission, however, a confessor may sometimes speak with others about matters that were previously received under the seal,
because by such permission the penitent can in certain matters remove what belongs to his own secrecy and the confessor then possesses the knowledge by another
title. This principle itself requires important limits, especially where the rights and reputation of a third person are involved.
From the inviolability of the seal it follows that the divine precept of sacramental confession would not bind a Christian to confess to a priest whom he probably
judges unwilling or unable to preserve the secrecy of those things that necessarily belong to confession. He can wait until he has access to a confessor who
faithfully observes the sacred seal. Public confession has at times existed in the Church, but no sinner is bound by divine or human precept to make a confession
whose publication he reasonably fears.

FIRST ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF THE SEAL. As a material seal encloses everything written within the document, so the venerable
sacramental seal must conceal everything necessarily said within confession whose disclosure would render the sacrament hateful, intolerable, or excessively
difficult. Therefore one who teaches that a penitent can be obliged to manifest another guilty person in confession precisely so that the confessor may correct or
denounce that person misunderstands what it means to manifest sins within the sacramental forum. What is manifested there is manifested in order to be hidden
beneath the sacramental seal, not in order to become information for another tribunal.
It is therefore contradictory to will to receive knowledge of a sin under the seal of confession and at the same time to order that very knowledge toward an external
manifestation of the sin. Such an intention is perverse and sacrilegious. Everything that the judge of the divine forum of conscience lawfully requires from the
penitent under the authority of that forum must be hidden under the same sacred seal.
The contrary practice would make the sacrament exceedingly hateful. Many people would rather have their own offense made known than betray the grave sin of
a friend, relative, superior, or other person whom they honor. Men naturally bear their own humble self-accusation more readily than learning that another person
disclosed them. If sins of third persons could be used externally merely because they were mentioned by penitents, confession would become an object of fear
rather than a refuge of repentance.

SECOND ARGUMENT — THE PENITENT CANNOT ALWAYS GIVE VALID PERMISSION. If someone says that the penitent can simply authorize the
confessor to reveal and act upon the third person's sin, this is false in the cases under dispute. The penitent neither necessarily wills such permission nor always
can licitly give it. Ignorance and fraud can make consent involuntary: if the confessor persuades a penitent that it is lawful or necessary to identify another person
so that the confessor can correct or denounce him, the resulting “permission” can be vitiated by the confessor's error.
More fundamentally, the penitent is not master of another person's reputation. He cannot authorize an injury to a third person merely because he may dispose of
his own secrets. Nor, if disclosure were truly a proportionate means required by natural or divine law, would such permission even be necessary; the confessor
would already be bound to act. The very fact that defenders rely upon permission reveals the instability of the theory.

THIRD ARGUMENT. A penitent is not even bound to tell the confessor his own name or every circumstance by which the priest could identify him personally,
provided the integrity of confession is preserved. Much less is he bound to identify a third delinquent whose spiritual welfare is not itself the sacramental matter of
his confession.
After the sacramental process is complete, the confessor cannot simply reopen with the penitent those same matters heard under the seal, even when they concern
an accomplice. Much less can he act upon them with the accomplice himself unless he possesses the information from an independent legitimate source.
These arguments confirm the second principal cause: the sacramental seal must be interpreted and preserved in a manner that makes confession secure, not in a
manner that secretly converts it into a channel for the external forum.

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THIRD PART — WHY THE CONTRARY DOCTRINE SUBORDINATES THE INTERNAL FORUM TO THE EXTERNAL FORUM

The third principal cause by which the doctrine is injurious to sacramental confession is that it subjects the divine forum of conscience to an exterior ecclesiastical or secular forum. The Supreme Pontiff with the power of the keys presides over the forum of conscience under Christ; judgments of this forum are made before God and are ordered immediately to reconciliation and salvation. To make sacramental information the ordinary material of an external correction or prosecution reverses the hierarchy of the two forums.

This is shown first from the final cause. In every judicial order, a tribunal in which a cause begins is functionally subordinated to a tribunal in which the cause is finally terminated if the first tribunal exists as a mere information-gathering stage for the second. If a penitent were required to identify a third sinner in confession so that the confessor could carry the matter into an external tribunal, then the sacramental forum would be reduced to a preliminary stage serving the external forum.

The same perversion appears in fraternal correction. If, once secret admonition and witnesses seem unlikely to profit, a penitent identifies a third person in confession precisely so that the confessor can proceed at once to the third degree and bring the person before a prelate, the sacramental forum becomes the feeder of an external correction which can culminate in excommunication. In judicial denunciation the inversion is still more obvious: the confessor becomes denouncer and actor against a third party on the basis of sacramental knowledge and asks the external judge to terminate a cause whose evidence arose in confession.

The same is true when a superior uses confessional information to govern a community, remove the unworthy from office, and substitute others. The sacramental forum then directly supplies material for the external jurisdiction of government.

Second, the truth is proved from the efficient cause. The confessor is judge in the forum of conscience. A judge who, merely because of causes heard in his own tribunal, must immediately become witness or denouncer before another judge would thereby subordinate his tribunal to the second. The confessor must not become the external witness of what he learned as sacramental judge.

Third, the same follows from the exemplar cause, namely the law and science governing each forum. In every tribunal its own law is the rule by which human acts are judged. The confessor in sacramental confession judges by a divine and supernatural science belonging to the forum of Penance and exercises the keys by divine authority. If he then petitions an external human judge to proceed under human evidentiary law against a person known only through sacramental confession, the divine knowledge and authority of the internal forum are effectively made servants of the human external forum.

The same person can indeed be judge in both forums, for example a bishop who is also confessor. But even then he must distinguish the capacities. He may not take a sentence, knowledge, or fact received solely as judge of conscience and make it evidence for what he does as judge of the external forum.

Many further arguments could be added, but these suffice.

We now answer the arguments proposed for the affirmative at the beginning of the doubt.

To the first, I concede that a penitent can be bound to correct another and that the confessor can be bound to urge him to fulfill that duty. But distinguish the consequent: if it means that the confessor may oblige the penitent to reveal the third person within sacramental confession as sacramental information, I deny it. If it means that the penitent can be bound to reveal the person outside confession when the duty cannot otherwise be fulfilled, the consequence is granted according to the moderation stated in our fourth conclusion.

To the second, likewise concede that in grave cases the penitent can be obliged to protect the common good or the innocent. The confessor, as judge of conscience, can oblige him to make a proportionate disclosure outside confession to the appropriate person. Then our third conclusion applies.

To the third, if during confession the penitent mentions another's sin, he can afterward, by a new and lawful act outside confession, communicate the relevant information under a non-sacramental title when this is truly permitted and required. What is denied is that the information, while retained under the sacramental seal, can itself be used by the confessor as external judge.

To the fourth, I do not deny the received doctrine that a prelate may become more prudent through things known in confession in a general way. But while he acts as confessor he should not interrogate beyond what the penitent is bound to say in the sacramental forum; nor should he require the penitent to say outside confession what no divine or natural precept obliges him to reveal.

The singular opinion that a prelate may remove an official from office because of unworthiness known only in confession must, if held at all, be restricted to cases where this can be done without scandal or injury to the sacrament. Even then it seems to me exceedingly harsh and scarcely practicable, because the penitent can easily perceive that he has lost public honor because of a sin confessed sacramentally and will thereafter fear confession to his own prelate.

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QUESTION XXXIV — ON HATRED

ARTICLE I — WHETHER ANYONE CAN HATE GOD

It remains to consider the vices opposed to charity.

OBJECTION 1. Dionysius says that the First Good and the Beautiful are lovable and desirable to all. But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

OBJECTION 2. All invoke truth and delight in its works; but God is Truth itself. Therefore all love God and no one can hate Him.

OBJECTION 3. Hatred is a kind of aversion. But God, as Dionysius teaches, converts all things to Himself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

ON THE CONTRARY. Psalm 73 speaks of "the pride of them that hate thee," and Christ says: "Now they have

both seen and hated both
me and my Father."

I ANSWER THAT hatred is a movement of the appetitive power and therefore presupposes an apprehended

object. God can be
apprehended by man in two ways. First, in Himself, as when He is seen through His essence. Second, through His effects, because "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

God in His essence is goodness itself. No one can hate goodness precisely as goodness, for the notion of good includes appetibility and love.

Therefore it is impossible for one who sees God through His essence to hate Him under that manifestation. Certain divine effects likewise cannot as such be contrary to the human will—being, living, and understanding are naturally desired and loved by all. Therefore God, insofar as He is apprehended as author of these goods, cannot be hated under that ratio.

Other divine effects, however, are contrary to a disordered will: the prohibition of sin and the infliction of punishment. A sinner can therefore hate God insofar as God is apprehended as prohibitor of sin and inflictor of punishment.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. The argument proceeds concerning those who see the divine essence, which is the

essence of goodness.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. It proceeds insofar as God is apprehended as cause of effects naturally loved by

all, including truth and the
knowledge it gives.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. God converts all things to Himself insofar as He is the principle of being; all

beings, insofar as they are, tend
toward likeness to Him who is Being itself.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is impossible that one who sees God through His essence should hate Him under that beatific manifestation, because God is goodness itself.

SECOND CONCLUSION. God cannot be hated insofar as He is author of effects toward which the will is naturally determined, such as
being, living, and understanding.

THIRD CONCLUSION. God can be hated insofar as He is apprehended as prohibitor of sin and inflictor of punishment, because these divine effects are contrary to a disordered will.

COMMENTARY.

Concerning the first conclusion, Cajetan rightly notes that it admits two readings. One reading is false if the conclusion is taken to mean that hatred can never terminate in God Himself but only in some displeasing effect. A perverse will can positively wish, so far as lies in it, that God not be, even while knowing this to be impossible. Hatred is directly contrary to charity; charity loves God as He is in Himself and wills to Him the good which He possesses. Since contraries concern the same object, hatred can terminate in God Himself by malevolently willing evil to Him, even though no such evil can actually occur.

The true sense is that the motive formally moving the will to hatred cannot be God as He is openly seen in Himself, because such an object is good under every aspect. The motive of hatred arises when God is apprehended through effects displeasing to the disordered will, for example as legislator, judge, or punisher. Yet once the sinner is moved by that extrinsic motive, the hatred can terminate upon God Himself; this is the most perfect form of hatred of God. A less perfect hatred terminates only in God under the ratio of cause of the displeasing effect.

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ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY: WHETHER, BY ABSOLUTE DIVINE POWER, ONE COULD SEE GOD AND HATE HIM

A doubt arises concerning the first conclusion: could God by absolute power cause someone to see Him as He is, yet not love Him, or even permit hatred of Him?

The first argument for the affirmative is that God could concur with the intellect so that it sees Him and withhold concurrence from the will, leaving the will to its natural condition. Since the will is not naturally necessitated to an elicited act of divine love as regards exercise, it might appear that it could fail to love or even hate.

The second argument says that by absolute power God might appear able to cause the damned in hell to see Him while leaving their sin and punishment intact. Since they now hate God as author of their punishment, perhaps the same motive would remain under vision.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It does not seem to involve a contradiction that God should manifest Himself intellectually to someone and, by suspending the corresponding motion of the will, that no elicited act of love follow at that instant. The first argument sufficiently establishes this much concerning mere suspension of volition.

SECOND CONCLUSION. It does appear to involve an intrinsic contradiction that a person should possess the vision of God as He is and at the same time positively hate God. The beatific vision is not a bare speculative apprehension of divine truth; it contains the most perfect practical judgment that God is supremely lovable. Positive hatred of God presupposes a contrary practical judgment under which God is to be rejected. These two contrary practical judgments cannot coexist in the same intellect concerning the same object under the same ratio.

If one says that God could suspend His concurrence with the will so that, while vision remains, no act of love is elicited, I grant the possibility of suspension of the will's act under absolute power; but it does not follow that God could permit a positive act of hatred. Hatred would require a contrary practical judgment, whereas the beatific vision intrinsically includes the judgment of God's supreme lovableness.

The conclusion is confirmed because it is contradictory that the same person be essentially blessed and at the same time miserable in the state of damnation. Whoever sees God possesses essential beatitude; whoever remains under eternal punishment for sin is miserable. Therefore it is contradictory that one remain formally damned while enjoying the beatific vision.

A further objection concerns the effects of God—being, living, and understanding. Can these ever be hated by a human will? Cajetan answers by distinguishing them as considered formally in themselves from them as considered with an attached misery. Being and life as such are naturally loved; but a miserable mode of life can be hated because of the misery conjoined to it. Thus a suicide does not properly hate being as being but wishes to remove a life apprehended under a burdensome evil. Therefore St. Thomas's conclusion remains true: God cannot be hated formally as author of being and life considered precisely under their connatural goodness, whether the will is ordered or disordered.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER HATRED OF GOD IS THE GREATEST OF SINS

The objections argue that the most grievous sin is sin against the Holy Spirit, while hatred of God is not enumerated as one of its six species; that unbelief seems to place a man farther from God than hatred in a believer; and that God is hated chiefly as author of punishment, whereas hatred of punishment is not itself the greatest sin.

ON THE CONTRARY. The worst is opposed to the best. Hatred of God is opposed to the love of God, in which man's highest good consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's worst sin.

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ARTICLE II — WHETHER HATRED OF GOD IS THE GREATEST SIN

I ANSWER THAT the defect of sin consists in aversion from God. Such aversion has the ratio of guilt only insofar as

it is voluntary; therefore the essence of guilt
consists in voluntary aversion from God. In hatred of God this voluntary aversion is contained per se and directly. In other sins it is contained as it were
participatively and under another ratio.
The will by itself adheres to what it loves and by itself recoils from what it hates. When a man hates God, therefore, his will as such turns away from God. In
fornication and other sins the sinner does not directly will aversion from God as such; rather, he wills an inordinate created good to which aversion from God is
annexed. What is per se is more principal than what occurs through another. Hence hatred of God is graver than other sins.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Gregory distinguishes failing to do good from hating the Giver of good, and sinning

from sudden passion from sinning through
deliberation. To hate God, giver of all goods, belongs in a most eminent way to malice by choice and therefore to sin against the Holy Spirit. It is not separately
numbered among the six species because its formal malice is found generally and eminently in the sins against the Holy Spirit.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Unbelief has the ratio of guilt only insofar as it is voluntary, and its voluntariness

arises because the unbeliever hates or rejects the
truth proposed to him. Thus hatred stands to culpable unbelief as a deeper appetitive cause. The cause is more principal than the effect; hence hatred of God is
graver than unbelief considered under this ratio.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Not everyone who hates punishment hates God as author of punishment. Many dislike

suffering while reverently submitting to divine
justice. But to pass from hatred of punishment to hatred of the punishing God—namely to hate divine justice itself—is among the gravest sins.
SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Hatred of God is the greatest sin because voluntary aversion from God is contained in it directly and per se, whereas in other mortal sins
aversion is contained indirectly or participatively.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Hatred of God belongs in the highest degree to sin against the Holy Spirit insofar as such sin designates malice by choice.

THIRD CONCLUSION. It is not separately enumerated among the six species because its formal ratio is participated generally in every species of sin against the
Holy Spirit.

COMMENTARY.

For understanding the article, distinguish two modes of hatred corresponding analogically to the two modes of love: hatred of enmity and hatred of abomination.
Hatred of enmity is to will evil to a rational creature precisely as evil to him. Hatred of abomination is to flee or reject something because it is harmful or
displeasing to oneself; in this way we “hate” a bitter drink. The second can gradually lead to the first. A man who first hates his master's discipline and correction
by hatred of abomination can eventually come to hate the master himself absolutely by hatred of enmity.
So too in sinners with respect to God. At first, because they love themselves with a love of concupiscence and desire something contrary to God's law, they hate
the law and Legislator participatively, as occurs in every mortal sin. As attachment to sensible goods increases, they can expressly hate the law and God as
Legislator; this becomes a special sin. Finally some reach hatred of God Himself as terminus, malevolently willing evil to Him precisely because it would be His
evil. Such hatred properly belongs to the damned and to certain utterly desperate sinners in this life who have handed themselves over to all iniquity.
This formal hatred of enmity directly opposes charity and is the greatest of sins. As far as lies in the sinner, he wills that God not be God, not be good, or not
possess His divine perfection—an impossible object in reality, but a possible object of a perverse malevolent will.
The first conclusion should therefore be understood principally of formal hatred of enmity toward God and secondarily of formal hatred of abomination directed
against God as Legislator. A person who abominates God under that ratio would, if he could, remove the Legislator just as one who hates a neighbor by
abomination because the neighbor's life harms him would, if he could, remove that life.
Concerning whether hatred of God is itself one determinate species of sin against the Holy Spirit or a genus containing the six species: hatred is a special vice
directly contrary to the special virtue of charity, and thus is itself a special sin against the Holy Spirit. Yet its formal malice is participated in an exemplary and
general manner in the other sins against the Holy Spirit, which explains why it is not separately counted among them.
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ARTICLE II — COMMENTARY (concluded); ARTICLE III

Cajetan raises from Martin of the Masters whether unbelief might nevertheless be graver than hatred. Much that can be said here is not necessary. St. Thomas's
reason is sufficient: culpable unbelief has its voluntariness from hatred or rejection of the divine truth proposed, and "that for the sake of which another is such is
itself more such." Hatred is therefore more grievous than unbelief under the ratio in which voluntary aversion is the root of guilt. See also St. Thomas above,

Question 10, article 3.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER EVERY HATRED OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR IS A SIN

OBJECTION 1. Luke 14 says: "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother…he cannot be my disciple." Therefore not every hatred of neighbor is
sinful.

OBJECTION 2. God is said to hate detractors and sinners; what imitates God cannot simply be sinful.

OBJECTION 3. It is natural for every thing to hate what is contrary and seek its removal. Therefore hatred of an enemy seems natural rather than sinful.

ON THE CONTRARY. "He that hateth his brother is in darkness." Spiritual darkness is sin;

therefore hatred of neighbor cannot simply be without sin.

I ANSWER THAT hatred is opposed to love. Hatred has the ratio of evil in the same measure

that love has the ratio of good. Our neighbor is due love according
to what he has from God, namely his nature and grace. He is not due love according to what he has from himself or the devil insofar as this is sin and defect of
justice. Therefore one may and ought to hate the sin in one's brother and whatever pertains to defect from divine justice; but one cannot hate the brother's nature or
grace without sin.

Indeed to hate the brother's guilt and defect is itself part of loving the brother, because to will a person's good and to hate his evil arise from the same benevolent
love. Hence, speaking simply, hatred of the brother is always sinful; hatred of his sin is not hatred of the brother simply but an effect of properly ordered charity.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Parents are to be honored according to nature and kinship, but

"hated" insofar as they become an impediment to the perfection of divine
justice. Christ commands not enmity against their nature but rejection of whatever in them draws us from God.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. God hates the fault in detractors, not their nature. We can

imitate God by hating their guilt without hating the good of nature He
created.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Men are not contrary to us according to the goods they have

from God; under that ratio they are to be loved. They can be contrary to us
insofar as they exercise enmity through sin; what belongs to the sin is to be hated, not the person as a creature of God.

SUMMARY.

Speaking simply, hatred of one's brother is always accompanied by sin. St. Thomas's distinction gives the reason: hatred directed against the brother's defect
opposed to divine justice is not "hatred of the brother" simply; hatred of the brother precisely according to what he possesses from God, either by nature or grace,
is sinful.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER HATRED OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR IS THE GRAVEST SIN

COMMITTED AGAINST THE NEIGHBOR begins.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER HATRED OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR IS THE GRAVEST SIN AGAINST THE

NEIGHBOR

OBJECTIONS. First, “whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer”; murder is among the gravest sins against a neighbor. Second, the worst is opposed to the best,
and love is the best thing we render to a neighbor. Third, Chrysostom appears to say that exterior violations such as homicide and adultery are greater in the act of
sin, while interior movements such as anger and concupiscence are in some sense less.

ON THE CONTRARY. Evil is called evil because it harms. Theft, homicide, adultery, and similar exterior acts

often inflict greater harm on the neighbor than
internal hatred alone.

I ANSWER THAT a sin against one's neighbor has the ratio of evil from two sources: first, from the disorder of

the sinner; second, from the harm inflicted on the
person against whom he sins.

Under the first ratio, hatred is a greater sin than exterior acts harmful to the neighbor, because hatred immediately disorders the will, which is principal in man and
the root of sin. If an exterior disordered act occurred without disorder of the will, as when a man unknowingly causes another's death or acts from due zeal for
justice, the material exterior effect would not possess the same ratio of guilt. Whatever culpability belongs to exterior sins is rooted in the interior will.

Under the second ratio, namely harm inflicted, exterior sins can be worse than internal hatred because they directly damage life, property, marriage, reputation, or
other goods.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. On the side of the sinner's affection and formal disorder of will, hatred of neighbor is among the gravest sins against neighbor.

SECOND CONCLUSION. On the side of the harm inflicted upon the neighbor, other exterior sins can be graver.

COMMENTARY.

Several points must be clarified against misunderstandings. When St. Thomas compares hatred with “exterior sins,” he does not separate an exterior human act
from the will that commands it, as though homicide were merely bodily motion. Exterior homicide together with the will to kill constitutes one morally complete
human act. “Exterior sins” are called such because their species is consummated in an exterior act or is naturally ordered toward one—homicide, theft, adultery,
and the like. Hatred, by contrast, can be fully complete in its own species within the affection of the will without any further exterior act.

Charity likewise is formally perfected in affection, although it commands the acts of all other virtues toward its end. Hatred, which is directly contrary to charity,
is perfected in the affection but can imperatively extend to all acts of vice harmful to the neighbor.

In this way all sins committed against a neighbor participate something of hatred, whether explicit and formal or participative and interpretative. St. Thomas says
that all acts of virtue participate something of charity insofar as they are ordered to the good of the friend; proportionately, sins against the neighbor receive part of
their malice from the disordered aversion or hatred implicit in the will's rejection of his due good. Just as Augustine calls virtue briefly “the order of love,” one can
say that sin, under this aspect, is a disorder of hatred: ordered love orders virtuous acts to their end; disordered hatred, explicitly or interpretatively, disorders
vicious acts from the ultimate end.

This answers the objection that avaricious theft or homicide is not consciously committed “from hatred.” Such sins need not proceed from an explicit emotion of
hatred; nevertheless, insofar as the will knowingly prefers an incompatible private good to the neighbor's due good, the act contains a participative or interpretative
aversion. The exterior act receives guilt from this interior voluntary disorder.

Finally, when St. Thomas says that the will is “most principal in man,” he is not contrasting will with intellect as though intellect were insignificant. He contrasts
the rational voluntary principle with lower powers, or he speaks of the will as principally ordered or disordered with respect to the final end through merit and
demerit.

ARTICLE V — WHETHER HATRED IS A CAPITAL VICE begins.

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ARTICLE V — WHETHER HATRED IS A CAPITAL VICE

OBJECTION 1. Hatred is directly opposed to charity, which is the most principal virtue and mother of the others. Therefore hatred seems to be the greatest capital
vice and principle of the others.

OBJECTION 2. Other passions appear to follow love and hatred; therefore hatred seems naturally capable of being a capital source of sins.

OBJECTION 3. Vice is moral evil, and hatred principally regards evil. Therefore hatred seems especially suited to be a capital vice.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory does not enumerate hatred among the seven capital vices.

I ANSWER THAT a capital vice is one from which other vices commonly arise as from a beginning.

Vice is contrary to human nature insofar as man is a rational
animal. In corruptions contrary to nature, what is first in the natural constitution is last to be destroyed: what is first in construction is last in dissolution. What is

first and most natural to man is love of good, especially divine good and the good of one's neighbor. Therefore hatred directly opposed to this love is not ordinarily

first in the destruction caused by vice, but last. Hence hatred is not numbered among the capital vices.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Virtue consists in being well disposed according to nature; therefore what

is first in the natural order is first among virtues, and charity is
most principal. Hatred, precisely because it destroys something most primary and natural, cannot normally be the first vice in the process of corruption.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Hatred of an evil contrary to natural good can indeed be first among

passions, as natural love of good is first. But hatred of a
connatural good cannot be first; it presupposes a nature already corrupted.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. There are two kinds of “evil” in this context. True evil is contrary to

natural good, and hatred of such evil can be naturally prior and
even virtuous. Apparent evil can in reality be a true and connatural good mistakenly regarded as evil because nature has been corrupted. Hatred of this apparent
evil comes late in corruption; this is vicious hatred.

SUMMARY.

The conclusion is negative. A capital vice is one from which other vices frequently arise; but before a man reaches hatred opposed to love of God and neighbor he
is ordinarily corrupted through other vices. Therefore hatred, although it can be exceedingly grave, is not called a capital vice.

COMMENTARY.

For understanding St. Thomas's reason, note that hatred once generated can indeed become, as it were, the head of many subsequent vices. Nevertheless the ratio
of a capital vice is taken insofar as a vice stands at the beginning as a frequent source of many others. Hatred opposed to connatural love is rather a terminal depth
to which a corrupted will descends through bad habits; in this sense one could call it a “final” vice rather than a capital one.

An objection arises from pride. Pride is numbered among the greatest sins and yet is a capital or even universal root. Therefore it seems false to say that a very
grave sin cannot be capital because it comes late in corruption.

The answer, following Cajetan, is that St. Thomas does not exclude hatred from the capital vices merely because it is grave. He excludes it because hatred
formally destroys a good that is maximally natural: that man love good, especially divine good and the good of his neighbor. Pride does not formally and directly
destroy this natural love. Rather, pride is closely joined to love of an apparent good, namely one's own excellence; it sins because it seeks that good beyond the
order of reason. Therefore pride can stand very early as a source of many vices, while formal hatred of connatural good commonly presupposes deeper corruption.

See also St. Thomas, I-II, Question 84, articles 3 and 4.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER HATRED ARISES FROM ENVY begins.

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QUESTION XXXIV — ON HATRED

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER HATRED ARISES FROM ENVY

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory says in the thirty-first book of the Moralia that hatred arises from envy.

I ANSWER THAT, as has been said, hatred of one's neighbor stands last in the progress of sin because it is

opposed to the love by which a
neighbor is naturally loved. A man recedes from what is natural because he intends to avoid something naturally to be shunned. Every animal naturally flees sadness as it seeks delight. Therefore, just as love arises from delight, hatred arises from sadness. We are moved to love things that delight us because by that very fact they are apprehended under the ratio of good; similarly we are moved to hate things that sadden us because they are apprehended under the ratio of evil. Since envy is sadness concerning the good of one's neighbor, the neighbor's good becomes hateful to the envious man. Hence hatred arises from envy.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. The appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, can reflect upon its own acts;

hence there is a certain
circularity in appetitive movements. From love there proceeds desire, and when the desired good is obtained, delight; because delight in a loved good itself has a ratio of good, delight can in turn increase love. Proportionately, sadness can produce hatred.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Love and hatred differ here. The object of love is good, which is derived from

God into creatures; therefore
love is first of God and secondarily of neighbor. The object of hatred is evil, which has no place in God Himself but only in creatures or effects. God is hated only insofar as He is apprehended through effects displeasing to a disordered will. Therefore hatred of neighbor is prior to hatred of God, and envy of neighbor can consequently cause hatred of God insofar as God is apprehended as author of the neighbor's good.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Nothing prevents one effect from arising from diverse causes under diverse ratios.

Hatred can arise from anger
and from envy. More directly, however, it arises from envy, because envy makes the very good of another saddening and consequently hateful. Anger produces hatred dispositively and by increase: anger first desires a measured evil for another under the ratio of vengeance; continued anger can pass into an absolute desire of the other's evil, which belongs to hatred.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Hatred arises from envy because envy is sadness at the neighbor's good, and as delight moves to love, sadness moves to hatred.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Envy of neighbor can consequently cause hatred of God insofar as God is apprehended as author of the neighbor and his good.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Hatred can arise both from anger and envy: from envy formally according to the ratio of the object; from anger
dispositively.

COMMENTARY.

The conclusion itself creates little difficulty. The difficulty concerns St. Thomas's reasoning that hatred of neighbor is opposed to the love by which the neighbor is naturally loved. The hatred discussed in this question directly opposes supernatural charity toward God and, consequently, charity toward neighbor. Why then does St. Thomas ground the argument in natural love?

Recall what was said above in Question 23. Charity is a supernatural friendship toward God and consequently toward neighbor for God's sake. We also maintained it to be very probable that there is no special acquired natural virtue of friendship with God, although a natural love is implanted in us by which, in willing the good, we virtually love God. From natural knowledge of God the will can be moved to honor, thanksgiving, and worship; yet these do not necessarily constitute a special natural friendship-virtue.

Proportionately, concerning neighbor there is certainly natural love, although whether a special natural virtue of human friendship exists can be disputed. What must be distinguished in any case is supernatural charitable friendship from natural love. Hence theologians must distinguish hatred directly opposed to supernatural charity from hatred directly opposed to natural love or friendship.

ARTICLE VI — COMMENTARY: SPECIES OF HATRED

FIRST CONCLUSION. The division of hatred into hatred directly opposed to supernatural charity and hatred directly opposed to natural love or friendship is necessary. These loves differ by more than species, since one belongs to the supernatural order and the other to the natural order; therefore the vices directly opposed to them are specifically diverse.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Hatred directly and per se opposed to charity also consequently, and indeed eminently, opposes natural love. If anyone hates Peter by desiring for him privation of the divine vision or the pains of hell, it is impossible that he simultaneously retain true natural friendship toward him. Such hatred wills an evil touching the person's nature so profoundly that it excludes even natural beatitude.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Hatred directly opposed to natural love or friendship consequently opposes supernatural charity. Grace perfects nature; a will destroying the rectitude of natural love cannot at the same time possess charity as though grace perfected a nature whose contrary voluntary disposition it leaves intact. St. Thomas's reasoning therefore requires only that the hatred under consideration oppose, formally or eminently, the love by which the neighbor is naturally loved.

The objections are answered accordingly. The hatred in the present question is not only that which directly opposes charity toward God, but also that which consequently conflicts with it through the destruction of due natural love.

A further way of understanding St. Thomas is to note with Cajetan that “natural” can mean “according to nature.” Under this broad ratio every virtue is according to nature and every vice contrary to nature, although some virtues are more and some maximally according to nature.

SECOND DOUBT — IS HATRED ONLY ONE SPECIES OR ARE THERE SEVERAL SPECIES?

The reason for one species is that charity, to which hatred is directly contrary, is itself one species, and to one contrary there is one contrary. Furthermore sins are specified by formal, not merely material, diversity of objects. Just as different evils desired under the one formal ratio of vengeance belong to anger, perhaps all evils willed absolutely under the formal ratio of another's evil belong to one vice of hatred.

Against this, one who from anger wishes to kill differs specifically from one who from anger wishes merely to seize goods; homicide and robbery differ in species.

Likewise it can seem that hatred commanding homicide differs from hatred commanding robbery. And if hatred were only one species absolutely, hatred of God and hatred of neighbor would appear to be the same species.

Cajetan first distinguishes hatred as a passion in the concupiscible appetite from hatred as a vice. We are considering hatred as a vice.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Hatred of God, insofar as it formally and directly opposes the one charity by which God and neighbor are loved for God's sake, is of one species. The love of God and the love of neighbor for God's sake belong to the same supernatural charity; therefore the hatred formally opposed to that charity retains one specific formal ratio.

SECOND CONCLUSION. If hatred of God is taken as directly opposed to supernatural charity while hatred of neighbor is taken as directly opposed to natural friendship, they differ by more than species because their opposed loves belong to diverse orders.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Hatred of God and hatred of neighbor, considered under the generic division of sin “against God” and “against neighbor,” differ in species insofar as the sins are directly and immediately terminated at these diverse formal objects. But if a man formally hates his neighbor precisely on account of God, this does not automatically introduce another species beyond the formal hatred of God already considered.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Hatred of neighbor formally considered is one species, even though the evils it commands can materially differ—homicide, robbery, and the like. When these distinct exterior acts are willed under the one formal ratio of evil to the neighbor as such, the commanding movement of hatred can remain specifically one. This follows the general doctrine of St. Thomas on the specification of human acts.

Finally, why does hatred arise more formally from envy than from anger? Anger regards another's evil not simply as his evil but under a certain ratio of just or quasi-just retribution; envy regards another's good itself as an evil to the envious person. Envy is therefore formally closer to hatred, which treats another's good as hateful. Moreover envy is itself essentially sadness at another's good, and what saddens under that ratio immediately produces the hateful. Anger can dispose toward hatred by continued irritation, but envy is formally more proximate in the order of the object.

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QUESTION XXXV — ON ACEDIA

We must next consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. The joy of charity concerns divine good and the good of neighbor. To joy in divine good is opposed acedia; to joy in the neighbor's good is opposed envy. Therefore we consider first acedia and afterward envy.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER ACEDIA IS A SIN

OBJECTION 1. We are not praised or blamed for passions as such. Acedia is a passion, namely a species of sadness. Therefore it does not
seem to be a sin.

OBJECTION 2. Cassian says that acedia especially attacks a monk around the sixth hour like a bodily fever arriving at a stated time. A bodily defect arising at fixed hours is not a sin.

OBJECTION 3. Cassian says acedia can arise when a man groans that he has no spiritual fruit and magnifies distant monasteries. Such thought can appear to arise from humility.

OBJECTION 4. Every sin is to be fled; yet Cassian teaches that the temptation of acedia must not be fled but overcome by resistance.

ON THE CONTRARY. Scripture forbids acedia: "Bow down thy shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands." What
Sacred Scripture forbids under this ratio is sinful.

I ANSWER THAT according to Damascene acedia is a certain weighing sadness (tristitia aggravans) which so depresses the mind that
nothing pleases it to do, as sour things are also cold. Acedia therefore imports a certain weariness or disgust concerning action. A Gloss says it is "a torpor of mind neglecting to begin good things."

Such sadness can be evil in itself and in its effect. Sadness is evil in itself when it concerns something truly good that is apprehended as evil. Spiritual good is truly good; therefore sadness at spiritual good is evil in itself. Even sadness at a true evil can become evil in its effect if it so weighs down a man that it withdraws him altogether from good action. Thus Paul warns that the penitent not be swallowed up by excessive sorrow.

Acedia, as taken here, names sadness concerning spiritual good. It is therefore evil both according to itself and according to its effect, and hence is a sin.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Passions considered simply as passions are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, but become morally
qualified by application to due or undue objects. Moderate sorrow over evil is praiseworthy; sorrow over good or immoderate sorrow over evil is blameworthy. Under this ratio acedia is a sin.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Motions of sensitive appetite can themselves be venially sinful and can incline toward mortal sin. Because
sensitive appetite uses a bodily organ, bodily changes occurring at certain times can make a man more prone to a particular temptation. Every bodily defect disposes toward sadness; hence fasting monks around midday, beginning to feel lack of food and the heat of the sun, can be more strongly attacked by acedia. The bodily disposition is not itself the formal sin.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Humility considers one's defects so that one is not exalted; it does not despise the genuine goods received from
God. To contemn divine gifts in oneself belongs rather to ingratitude, and from such contempt acedia follows because we grieve over things judged vile or evil.

REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Some temptations are conquered by flight when continued attention increases their incentive, as in lust:
"Flee fornication." Others are overcome by resistance and consideration because careful reflection removes the false appearance producing the temptation. Acedia is of this latter type: the more deeply we consider spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become and the sadness recedes.

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ARTICLE I — SUMMARY; ARTICLE II — WHETHER ACEDIA IS A SPECIAL VICE

SUMMARY OF ARTICLE I. Acedia, as understood in this tract, is sadness concerning spiritual good; it is sinful both in itself, because divine or spiritual good
is truly good, and in its effect insofar as it weighs down action.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER ACEDIA IS A SPECIAL VICE

OBJECTION 1. Every vice makes a man grieve at the spiritual good opposed to that vice: the lustful man at continence, the glutton at abstinence. Therefore
sadness at spiritual good seems common to all vices, not a special vice.

OBJECTION 2. Acedia, being sadness, is opposed to joy; but joy is not one special virtue. Therefore acedia should not be one special vice.

OBJECTION 3. “Spiritual good” is a common object. A special vice would require a contracted formal object. If that contraction is the laborious or burdensome
character of spiritual good, acedia would reduce simply to bodily laziness, which seems false.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory distinguishes acedia from the other vices; therefore it is special.

I ANSWER THAT if spiritual good be taken commonly, acedia would not have the ratio of a special vice, since
every vice flees the spiritual good of its opposite
virtue. Nor is acedia special merely insofar as spiritual good is laborious, burdensome to the body, or an impediment to bodily pleasure; under that ratio it would
not differ adequately from carnal vices seeking bodily rest or delight.

There is, however, order among spiritual goods. The goods of the acts of individual virtues are ordered to one spiritual good, namely divine good, around which
charity principally turns. Each virtue rejoices in its proper spiritual good; charity specially rejoices in divine good. Therefore sadness concerning the spiritual good
belonging to individual virtues is reduced to the respective vices, but sadness concerning divine good under the ratio in which charity rejoices in it belongs to the
special vice called acedia.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. If “spiritual good” is taken universally, acedia is not thereby a special vice.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Acedia is not made special merely by fleeing spiritual good as laborious or bodily burdensome.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Sadness at divine good under the ratio in which charity rejoices in it belongs to the special vice of acedia.

COMMENTARY.

Cajetan asks whether acedia is sadness at divine good as it exists in God, as it exists in us, or under both ratios. The question is necessary. Sadness at divine good
in God Himself seems to belong to hatred of God, just as wishing evil to God or rejoicing in what one perversely supposes to be His evil belongs to hatred.

Sadness at divine good merely insofar as it is participated by us can seem to belong more to love of concupiscence than to friendship-charity. Sadness concerning
both under one and the same formal ratio is also not immediately obvious.

A further difficulty arises because St. Thomas elsewhere places acedia among the capital vices concerning one's own good, while here he places it concerning
divine good and directly opposite to the joy of charity. In Article III he says acedia saddens at things incumbent upon us to do for God's sake, and in Article IV that
the spiritual goods over which acedia grieves include both the end and the means to the end.

Cajetan harmonizes these texts. Charity principally rejoices in divine good as it exists in God; secondarily and consequently it rejoices in divine good and God as
participated in the lover and in neighbor. Although one charity rejoices under these related ratios, the opposite disorders need not be only one vice because evil can
arise in more ways than good.

Thus three vices are opposed to charity's joy under different determinations: hatred rejects divine good in God or absolutely; envy is saddened by divine or other
good insofar as possessed by a neighbor under its proper ratio; acedia is saddened by divine good as participated in oneself and by the spiritual goods one ought to
possess or exercise for God's sake. Acedia therefore directly opposes the joy of charity insofar as charity secondarily includes a love of concupiscence for divine
good in us. Hence despair can arise from acedia because despair removes God from us as attainable good.

Because every good possessed through charity is finally referred to God loved by friendship, acedia can also concern goods that are means to the end—spiritual
exercises and works we ought to perform for God's sake. The texts are therefore concordant.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER ACEDIA IS A MORTAL SIN

OBJECTION 1. Every mortal sin is contrary to a commandment of God's law. Acedia does not immediately appear contrary to any commandment of the
Decalogue.

OBJECTION 2. To omit an individual spiritual work leading to God is not always mortal, otherwise failure to follow every counsel would be mortal. Therefore
interior sadness withdrawing from such a work need not be mortal.

OBJECTION 3. Cassian says acedia is especially experienced by solitary and even perfect men in the desert. Mortal sin cannot be characteristic of the perfect.

ON THE CONTRARY. "The sorrow of the world worketh death." Acedia is not sorrow according

to God but is opposed to it. Therefore it can be mortal.

I ANSWER THAT a mortal sin is one which removes spiritual life, which consists in charity by

which God dwells in us. A sin is mortal by genus when according
to its proper ratio it is contrary to charity. Acedia is of this kind. The proper effect of charity is joy in God; acedia is sadness at spiritual good insofar as it is divine
good. Therefore acedia is mortal according to its genus.
Nevertheless sins mortal by genus are actually mortal only when they reach the perfection of a human act, namely consent of reason. A beginning of the motion
merely in sensuality, without consent of reason because of imperfection of act, is venial. Thus an initial movement of concupiscence toward adultery or an initial
movement of anger toward homicide can be venial. Proportionately, an imperfect movement of acedia in sensuality can arise from the repugnance of flesh against
spirit and remain venial. When it reaches reason and reason consents to flight, horror, or detestation of divine good, the flesh having prevailed over spirit, acedia is
manifestly mortal.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Acedia is contrary to the precept of sanctifying the Sabbath insofar

as the moral substance of that command includes rest of the mind in
God. Sadness of mind at divine good is opposed to such spiritual rest.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Acedia is not merely mental recession from any particular

spiritual work whatsoever. It is recession from divine good to which the
mind must adhere by necessity. If a person is saddened because someone urges him to perform a work of virtue to which he is not bound, this is not thereby
acedia. Acedia concerns sadness at things incumbent upon him to do for God's sake or at divine good itself.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Holy men can experience imperfect first movements of acedia which

do not reach rational consent.

COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE II (concluded).

The distinctions just given explain how acedia can be said at once to concern the ultimate end and things ordered to the end. Charity, while principally
friendship-love of God, secondarily contains desire for participation in divine good; acedia is contrary to this secondary joy in the divine good that ought to be
present in us. From acedia therefore arises despair, which removes God as attainable good, and acedia can also make the means to God burdensome and hateful.

ARTICLE III — SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Acedia is a mortal sin according to its genus because by its formal object it is contrary to charity.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Acedia can be venial when only an imperfect movement exists in sensuality without consent of reason.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Acedia is contrary to the moral precept of sanctifying the Sabbath, understood as spiritual rest in God.

ARTICLE III — COMMENTARY: SUBJECT OF ACEDIA; ARTICLE IV

For this matter see Cajetan under the word acedia in the Summa and Cassian, Book X of the Institutes of the Coenobia.
A doubt can be raised whether acedia is formally in sensuality or in the will. St. Thomas speaks of an “inchoation of the sin in sensuality,” which can suggest that
acedia itself is partly in sensuality.
The answer is brief. Acedia formally is in the will, where the joy concerning divine good, to which it is opposed, is also found. In sensuality there can
antecedently be a sadness that recoils from the exercise of divine good, especially because in this life such exercise requires bodily and imaginative activity. This
sadness in sensuality is more properly an occasion or disposition to acedia than acedia itself.
There can also be a sensitive sadness consequent upon a perfected act of acedia in the will, just as joy of charity can redundantly overflow into sensitive appetite.
Such sensitive movements then have the ratio of effects of charity or acedia rather than their formal acts.
It must be noted that not every movement of sensuality is automatically a venial sin even when it concerns the matter of mortal sin. For venial fault there must be
some imputable lack of prompt repression or another moral condition in the higher power. The fuller treatment belongs to the tract on sin in the Prima Secundae.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER ACEDIA SHOULD BE NUMBERED AMONG THE CAPITAL VICES

OBJECTION 1. A capital vice moves to acts of sin. Acedia seems rather to withdraw from action. Therefore it does not appear capital.

OBJECTION 2. Isidore distinguishes sadness from acedia and assigns different daughters to each. Gregory, by contrast, gives six daughters of acedia: malice,
rancor, pusillanimity, despair, torpor concerning precepts, and wandering of the mind around illicit things. The lists appear inconsistent.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory expressly numbers acedia among the capital vices.

I ANSWER THAT a capital vice is one from which other vices readily arise under the ratio of

final causality. Just as men do many things for delight, either to
attain delight or from its impulse, so they do many things on account of sadness, either to escape it or because under its burden they break out into other acts. Since
acedia is a certain sadness, it is fittingly numbered among the capital vices.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Acedia weighs down the mind and impedes works that cause its

sadness; nevertheless it also induces the mind to acts consonant with the
sadness or to acts by which the sadness is escaped.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Gregory's daughters are fittingly assigned. Since no one can

remain long in sadness without delight, a man burdened by spiritual
sadness either flees the saddening spiritual goods or transfers himself to other things in which he seeks delight.
Spiritual goods are both the end and means to the
end. Flight from the end produces despair. Flight from arduous goods of counsel produces pusillanimity. Flight from goods of common justice and command
produces torpor concerning precepts.
The attack against the saddening spiritual goods is directed either against persons who lead us toward them, producing rancor, or against the spiritual goods
themselves, producing malice. Finally, insofar as a man transfers himself from spiritual goods to exterior illicit delights, there arises wandering of the mind
around illicit things.
Gregory's list therefore contains not arbitrary effects but determinate modes by which sadness at divine good seeks escape.
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ARTICLE IV — WHETHER ACEDIA IS A CAPITAL VICE (concluded); QUESTION XXXVI — ON ENVY

Isidore's apparently different list can be reduced to Gregory's. Bitterness is an effect of rancor. Idleness and sleepiness reduce to torpor concerning precepts: the
idle person omits them altogether and the sleepy person performs them negligently. Importunity of mind, curiosity, verbosity, bodily restlessness, and instability
reduce to wandering of the mind around illicit things. Cassian also distinguishes sadness from acedia, but Gregory more fittingly calls acedia itself a special
sadness, because not every sadness constitutes a vice distinct from others; only sadness concerning divine good has the formal ratio of acedia.

SUMMARY OF ARTICLE IV. Acedia is a capital vice because other vices arise from it under final causality, especially as ways of fleeing spiritual sadness or
seeking compensating delight.

COMMENTARY.

This article deserves careful attention even from preachers of the word of God. Spiritual men especially should understand how much it matters to serve God with
a certain spiritual delight. No one can long remain simultaneously deprived of delight and burdened by sadness. Those who cannot rejoice in spiritual delights will
naturally tend to transfer themselves toward bodily or illicit delights. St. Thomas's reply concerning the daughters of acedia should therefore be studied attentively.

QUESTION XXXVI — ON ENVY

We must next consider envy.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER ENVY IS SADNESS

OBJECTION 1. The object of sadness is evil; the object of envy is another's good. Therefore envy does not seem to be sadness.

OBJECTION 2. Likeness ordinarily causes delight, yet envy especially arises among persons similar in genus, knowledge, stature, condition, or reputation.
Therefore envy seems not to be sadness.

OBJECTION 3. Sadness arises from defect, while those in extreme defect often do not envy. Rather, men lacking only a little, lovers of honor, and those reputed
wise are especially envious.

OBJECTION 4. Memory of former goods causes delight; yet philosophers say men envy those who now possess goods which they themselves once possessed or
ought to possess.

ON THE CONTRARY. Damascene places envy among the species of sadness and defines it as sadness at another's goods.

I ANSWER THAT the proper object of sadness is one's own evil. Yet another person's good can be apprehended as one's own evil in two ways. First, one can fear
that the other's good will cause harm to oneself or to goods one loves—for example, sadness at the exaltation of an enemy because he may injure us. Such sadness
is not envy but rather an effect of fear and can be without sin.

Second, another's good can be judged a diminution of one's own glory or excellence. Under this ratio envy is saddened by another's good. Hence envy chiefly
concerns goods in which glory and honor are found and especially those possessed by persons whom the envious man wants to equal or surpass.

The replies follow. Another's good can be apprehended as one's evil under a comparative ratio. Envy is chiefly toward those near or similar because one ordinarily
does not strive to equal persons vastly above or below oneself. A common man does not seriously compete in glory with a king, nor a king with the most obscure
commoner. A person who lacks very much often gives up comparison; one who lacks only a little believes equality attainable and is saddened when another
surpasses him. Lovers of honor are therefore especially prone to envy. Former goods cause delight insofar as remembered as once possessed, but sadness insofar
as lost and envy insofar as now possessed by others.

The formal definition is therefore: envy is sadness at another's good insofar as that good is apprehended as diminishing one's own glory or excellence.

ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY: FOUR MODES OF SADNESS AT ANOTHER'S GOOD

Four distinct ratios of sadness concerning another person's good must be carefully distinguished.

FIRST. A man can grieve at another's good because he fears that the other, strengthened by it, will harm him. This sadness is reduced to fear. It can sometimes be
sinful and sometimes not, according to whether the feared harm and the mode of sadness are rightly ordered.

SECOND. A man can grieve at another's good, not because the other possesses it, but because he himself lacks the same good. This is properly zeal or emulation
(zelus, aemulatio). In spiritual goods it is praiseworthy: “Be zealous for spiritual gifts.” In temporal goods it can be good or sinful according to circumstances.

THIRD. A man can grieve at the prosperity of an unworthy person precisely because he is unworthy. Aristotle calls this nemesis or indignation and treats it as
morally praiseworthy. St. Thomas corrects this from the standpoint of faith because Aristotle attributed too much absolute importance to temporal goods.
Temporal prosperity of the unworthy is disposed by divine providence either toward correction, punishment, or another just purpose; and temporal goods are
almost nothing compared with eternal goods. Sacred Scripture therefore forbids sinful emulation of the prosperity of the wicked.

FOURTH. A man grieves at another's good because the other's prosperity makes him comparatively less glorious or honorable. This is properly envy. It
especially concerns equals or near-equals, because where there was previously a relation of equality or similarity, the other's advancement establishes a relation of
superior and inferior and the inferior is saddened.
This explains why envy is said to exist among equals: not because mathematical equality is required, but because men greatly distant in condition do not ordinarily
compare themselves as rivals. A citizen does not envy a prince merely as prince.
Two arguments of Martin of the Masters can now be answered. He appealed to Aristotle's statement that envy concerns the good of one's “neighbor” and inferred
that envy wills evil to the neighbor simply because it is his evil. He misunderstood Aristotle's word “neighbor.” Aristotle does not use it here for every man whom
charity commands us to love, but for one near in condition, equal or nearly equal. To will another's evil precisely because it is his evil belongs to hatred, not envy.
He further argues that envy must reduce to fear because the envious man is saddened by another's prosperity insofar as it diminishes his honor and thus “harms”
him. The difference is substantial. Fear regards a future evil expected from the other's increased power. Envy regards a present good of another apprehended under
a comparative ratio as one's present evil, namely diminution of glory. The other's prosperity is not an efficient cause that truly takes away my honor; the envious
man interprets comparison itself as a loss. Hence fear can be rightly ordered, while envy is always morally disordered in its proper object.
SUMMARY. Envy is one specific sadness at another's good, distinct from fear, emulation, and properly ordered concern over disorder. Its formal object is
another's prosperity apprehended as diminishing one's own excellence or glory.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER ENVY IS A SIN begins.

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ARTICLE II — WHETHER ENVY IS A SIN

OBJECTION 1. Jerome advises that a girl have companions from whom she may learn and whose praises may stimulate her; such “envy” cannot be sinful if
recommended for progress.

OBJECTION 2. Sometimes men rightly grieve when the wicked obtain power and the people suffer. Therefore sadness at another's good is not always sinful.

OBJECTION 3. “Envy” can name zeal, and zeal can be good: “The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up.”

OBJECTION 4. Envy itself can be a punishment, and punishment is distinguished from guilt. Gregory describes the bodily and mental torment of the envious
man. Therefore envy need not be sin.

ON THE CONTRARY. Galatians condemns men “provoking one another, envying one another.”

I ANSWER THAT sadness at another's goods occurs in four ways.

First, when the other's good is feared as likely to harm oneself or other good persons. This is not envy and can exist without sin.

Second, when one grieves not because the other has the good but because oneself lacks it. This is emulation or zeal. If it concerns honorable or spiritual goods, it is
praiseworthy; in temporal goods it can be lawful or sinful according to circumstances.

Third, one can grieve that an unworthy person possesses a good. Aristotle calls this nemesis and assigns it to good morals. Yet according to the doctrine of faith,
temporal goods of the unworthy are disposed by God's just providence and are as nothing compared with future goods reserved for the good. Therefore a sadness
that, in effect, rebels against providence or overvalues temporal prosperity is forbidden: “Fret not thyself because of evildoers.”

Fourth, one grieves at another's good precisely insofar as the other exceeds oneself in good. This is envy properly speaking and is always evil, because it grieves
over what ought to be a cause of rejoicing, namely the good of one's neighbor.

REPLIES. Jerome uses “envy” in the broad sense of emulation by which one is stirred to progress with better companions. The second objection concerns sadness
under the first ratio, because the power of the wicked can harm the innocent. Good zeal is distinct from envy. That envy is also penal does not prevent it from
being sinful; a sinful act can itself be a punishment or carry punishment annexed to it.

COMMENTARY.

The article is clear from the preceding distinctions. One brief difficulty concerns nemesis, sadness over the prosperity of the unworthy. St. Thomas appears to say
Sacred Scripture forbids it, whereas elsewhere he speaks of it, following Aristotle, as a studious or morally ordered passion. Moreover good and prudent men
frequently grieve at the prosperity of unworthy persons; and it is lawful to impede an unworthy man from receiving an office or honor he ought not possess. How
can sadness at his obtaining it be sinful?

Cajetan resolves the matter by distinguishing two modes. First, sadness can regard the disorder absolutely: it is fitting to the rational order that dignity be
conferred upon the worthy, and just as we are naturally saddened by a bodily monstrosity, we can be saddened by a moral-political monstrosity in which an
unworthy man is exalted. This need not be sinful.

Second, sadness can regard the event together with all its circumstances in such a way that one murmurs against divine providence, as though God either did not
govern human affairs or unjustly distributed temporal goods. Such sadness is sinful. It also contains an excessive estimate of temporal goods and can entice men to
imitate the wicked merely because the wicked prosper. This is the sadness Scripture condemns.

Thus to grieve that offices are distributed by unjust human rulers to the unworthy is not sinful, provided divine providence is preserved and one does not measure
ultimate human good by temporal advancement. Aristotle, who did not possess the theology of providence in the Christian manner, spoke according to common
human moral judgment. Properly ordered temporal sadness can be lawful, though compared with perfect supernatural joy it still belongs to the imperfection of the
present state.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER ENVY IS A MORTAL SIN begins.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER ENVY IS A MORTAL SIN

OBJECTION 1. Envy is sadness and therefore a passion of sensitive appetite. Mortal sin is not formally located in sensuality alone. Therefore envy seems not
mortal.

OBJECTION 2. Infants can display jealousy or envy before the use of reason. Augustine describes an infant who, unable to speak, looked pale and bitterly at his
foster-brother. Infants cannot commit mortal sin.

OBJECTION 3. Every mortal sin is contrary to a virtue. Envy appears contrary rather to nemesis, which Aristotle treats as a passion rather than a virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY. "Envy slayeth the little one." Nothing spiritually kills except mortal
sin; therefore envy is mortal.

I ANSWER THAT envy according to its genus is a mortal sin. The genus of a sin is taken from
its object. Envy, according to its proper object, is contrary to
charity, by which the soul spiritually lives. Charity and envy concern the same good of neighbor under contrary movements: charity rejoices in the neighbor's
good, envy is saddened by it. Therefore envy in its complete formal act is mortal by genus.
Nevertheless, as in every genus of mortal sin, imperfect movements can exist in sensuality that remain venial. In the genus of adultery an initial movement of
concupiscence can be venial; in homicide an initial movement of anger; so too in envy there can be first sensitive movements, even in perfect men, that do not
reach rational consent and are venial.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Envy insofar as it is merely an imperfect passion of sensuality is
an imperfect human act and is not mortal. Complete envy receives its
formal moral character from consent of reason and will.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. The jealous movements of infants lack the use of reason and
therefore do not possess the formal ratio of mortal sin.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. According to Aristotle envy is opposed both to nemesis and to
mercy, but in different respects. It is directly contrary to mercy
according to the principal object: the envious man is saddened by the neighbor's good, while the merciful man is saddened by the neighbor's evil. Hence the
envious are not merciful and the merciful are not envious under the same ratio. Envy is opposed to nemesis from the side of the person whose good is considered:
nemesis grieves at prosperity of one judged unworthy; envy grieves at the good of those who are worthy or simply at another's excellence. The first
contrariety—to mercy—is more direct, and mercy possesses the ratio of virtue.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Envy, according to its proper genus and complete formal object, is mortal sin because it directly opposes charity's joy in the neighbor's
good.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Imperfect first movements of envy in sensuality without rational consent are venial and can occur even in the perfect.

COMMENTARY.

The preceding distinction resolves the objection from infants and sensitive passion. The formal vice is not the involuntary sensitive disturbance but the rationally
accepted sadness at the good of one's neighbor. A further question concerning the relation of envy to mercy and to the so-called nemesis of Aristotle must be
treated according to the distinctions already made: Christian mercy and charity determine the principal formal opposition.

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QUESTION XXXVI — ON ENVY

ARTICLE III — WHETHER ENVY IS A MORTAL SIN (concluded); ARTICLE IV

The preceding doctrine establishes that envy according to its proper object is contrary both to mercy and to charity, since charity rejoices in the neighbor's good while envy grieves over it. Therefore envy is mortal according to its genus, although imperfect movements can remain venial through defect of deliberation.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER ENVY IS A CAPITAL VICE

OBJECTION 1. Capital vices are distinguished from their daughters. But envy is called a daughter of vainglory, since lovers of honor are
especially envious. Therefore envy seems not itself capital.

OBJECTION 2. Capital vices seem lighter than the more atrocious sins arising from them, because, as Gregory says, the first vices insinuate themselves under some appearance of good, while those following them drag the mind toward manifest madness. Envy, however, seems among the gravest sins; Gregory says the ancient enemy pours his venom through every vice, but in envy the serpent shakes all his entrails and vomits the whole pest of malice. Therefore envy seems too grave to be capital.

OBJECTION 3. Gregory assigns as daughters of envy hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in a neighbor's adversity, and affliction at his prosperity. But affliction at another's prosperity appears identical with envy itself, while exultation at adversity seems merely its contrary effect. Therefore the daughters appear badly assigned.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory expressly numbers envy among the capital vices and assigns these daughters to it.

I ANSWER THAT, as acedia is sadness concerning divine spiritual good, so envy is sadness concerning the good of one's neighbor. Acedia
is capital because it moves a man to acts either to flee sadness or to satisfy it. By the same reason envy is a capital vice.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Gregory observes that the capital vices are mutually connected and can arise from one another. Pride first
produces vainglory, and vainglory readily produces envy because one desiring superiority of name grieves lest another attain the same excellence. It is not contrary to the ratio of a capital vice that it arise from another vice; what is required is that it possess a principal formal ratio from which many other sins commonly proceed. Isidore and Cassian, because envy so manifestly arises from vainglory, did not always number it separately among the capitals; Gregory does.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. The quoted words do not mean that envy is absolutely the gravest of all sins. They show that when the devil
suggests envy he introduces man into a vice especially consonant with the devil's own disposition, for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world.” Yet one form of envy is among the gravest sins: envy of a brother's grace, when a man is saddened at the increase of God's grace precisely as divine grace. Such envy is a sin against the Holy Spirit because in it a man in some manner envies the Holy Spirit glorified in His works.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. The daughters of envy can be ordered as beginning, means, and term. The beginning is the endeavor to
diminish another's glory: secretly by whispering or openly by detraction. The middle consists in the outcome of that endeavor: if the envious man succeeds, there is exultation in the neighbor's adversity; if he fails, there is affliction at the neighbor's prosperity. The term is hatred, because as delight causes love, sadness causes hatred.
Affliction at prosperity can name envy itself when it signifies the original sadness at the neighbor's glory; as a daughter it signifies the renewed sadness arising because the attempt to impede that prosperity has failed. Exultation in adversity is not envy itself but follows from it.

SUMMARY. Envy is fittingly numbered among the capital vices because, as a special sadness concerning the neighbor's good, it generates several sins as ways of diminishing that good, rejoicing at its destruction, grieving at its persistence, and finally hating the person who possesses it.

QUESTION XXXVII — ON DISCORD, WHICH IS OPPOSED TO PEACE

We now consider the sins opposed to peace: first discord, which exists in the heart; second contention, which is in speech; then those
belonging to exterior deed, namely schism, brawling, sedition, and war.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER DISCORD IS A SIN

OBJECTION 1. To disagree with another is to recede from his will; yet another man's will is not the rule of mine, but God's will alone.
Therefore disagreement does not seem sinful.

OBJECTION 2. Paul intentionally produced dissension between Pharisees and Sadducees by crying out that he was a Pharisee and was
judged concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead. Therefore producing discord is not always sinful.

OBJECTION 3. Discord existed even among holy men: Acts 15 records a dissension between Paul and Barnabas so great that they
separated. Mortal sin is not characteristic of saints.

ON THE CONTRARY. Dissensions are numbered among the works of the flesh of which Paul says that

those who do such things shall not
obtain the kingdom of God. Therefore discord can be mortal sin.

I ANSWER THAT discord is opposed to concord, and concord is caused by charity insofar as charity

unites the hearts of many in one
good: principally divine good and secondarily the good of one's neighbor. Discord is sinful insofar as it opposes this charitable concord.
Concord can be destroyed by discord in two ways: per se and per accidens. A man disagrees per se when knowingly and intentionally he
dissents from divine good or the neighbor's good in which he ought to consent. Such discord is mortal according to its genus because it is
contrary to charity, although imperfect first movements can be venial.
Discord is per accidens when each person intends a good pertaining to divine honor or the neighbor's welfare, but one judges one course
good while another judges the contrary. Such disagreement is not of itself contrary to charity, for charitable concord is principally union
of wills concerning the good, not uniformity of every opinion. It becomes sinful if joined to culpable error concerning things necessary for
salvation or to undue pertinacity.
Thus discord can be sinful in one party only—for example, where one wills the good and another knowingly resists it—or in both when
each inordinately prefers his own private good.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Another man's will considered merely as his own is not my rule. But insofar

as his will adheres to God it
becomes a regulated rule participating the divine rule; to dissent from it under that ratio can be sinful.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. To sow discord that destroys good concord is gravely sinful; Scripture

condemns one who sows discord
among brethren. But to break an evil concord is praiseworthy. Paul therefore lawfully produced dissension among men who were united
in evil, not by intending their obstinacy but by proposing the truth of the resurrection and using the resulting division to defend himself. It
is lawful to permit another's evil and to use the occasion it supplies for a good end, while not formally intending his sin.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. The disagreement of Paul and Barnabas was per accidens. Each intended

good, but one judged one course
expedient and the other another, a defect arising from human limitation rather than opposition to something necessary for salvation.
Divine providence also ordered the event to subsequent utility.
SUMMARY. Discord is sinful insofar as it opposes the concord caused by charity. Discord intentionally opposing divine or neighborly
good is mortal by genus; accidental difference of judgment between those intending good need not be sinful unless joined to culpable error
or pertinacity.

QUESTION XXXVII — ARTICLE I, COMMENTARY; ARTICLE II

Concerning St. Thomas's final conclusion, Cajetan notes that error about things necessary for salvation can occur culpably or without
fault. The error of Jews and others who negligently fail to seek truth incumbent upon them is culpable; the error of a simple person who
does what he can to know necessary truth can be inculpable. Therefore accidental discord following such error will be sinful or excused
according to the culpability of the error itself.
Concerning Paul's action before the Pharisees and Sadducees, Cajetan asks whether Paul induced them into their own obstinate opinions.
Evil may not be done that good may come. The answer is that one thing was intended and another foreknown and permitted. Paul intended to arouse the Pharisees to defense of the resurrection and consequently to his own defense. He foreknew and permitted the obstinacy with which the parties would afterward attack each other from their own wills. Since they were already disposed to that evil,
Paul did not formally cause their sinful pertinacity.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER DISCORD IS A DAUGHTER OF VAINGLORY

OBJECTION 1. Proverbs says an irascible man provokes quarrels. Therefore discord seems a daughter of anger rather than vainglory.

OBJECTION 2. Augustine says, “Envy separates, charity joins.” Discord is separation of wills. Therefore it appears to arise principally
from envy.

OBJECTION 3. Many great evils arise from discord: “By concord small things grow; by discord the greatest fall apart.” Therefore
discord itself seems capital rather than a daughter of vainglory.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory numbers discord among the daughters of vainglory.

I ANSWER THAT discord imports a division of wills: one person's will stands in one thing, another's in
another. A man inordinately
insists upon what is his own when he prefers his own things to those of others. This belongs to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord,
insofar as each person clings to his own and refuses to yield to another, is fittingly numbered as a daughter of vainglory.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Brawling is not the same as discord. Brawling is an exterior deed and can be
caused by anger, which moves a
man to harm another. Discord is primarily the separation of voluntary movements caused by pride or vainglory's attachment to one's own judgment or excellence.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. In discord there is a terminus from which, namely recession from another's will,
and a terminus toward
which, namely attachment to one's own will. According to recession it has affinity with envy; according to adherence to one's own it has
affinity with pride and vainglory. Because in motion the terminus toward which is more principal than the terminus from which, discord
is more properly assigned to vainglory, although it can arise from envy under another ratio.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. The fact that concord strengthens and discord weakens belongs to the proper
effect of union and division, not
to discord as a principal source producing many specifically distinct vices. Therefore it does not establish discord as a capital vice.

COMMENTARY.

Cajetan asks whether discord arises from vainglory or envy under efficient or final causality. The derivation of one vice from another in
the scheme of capital vices is chiefly under the ratio of final cause: one appetite arises from another insofar as the good or apparent good
sought by the first supplies an end for the second. Therefore discord ordinarily arises from vainglory because a man insists upon his own
judgment or will for the sake of his own excellence. Nothing prevents discord on particular occasions from arising from some other vice.
SUMMARY. Discord is fittingly a daughter of vainglory, principally under final causality, because the contentious attachment of each
will to its own proceeds from inordinate desire of proper excellence.
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QUESTION XXXVIII — ON CONTENTION

ARTICLE I — WHETHER CONTENTION IS A MORTAL SIN

OBJECTION 1. The disciples of Christ disputed among themselves concerning which of them was greater; therefore contention can be
found in imperfect but holy men and need not be mortal.

OBJECTION 2. Paul says that some preach Christ "out of contention," yet adds, "in this I rejoice and will rejoice." Therefore contention
need not be mortally sinful.

OBJECTION 3. Men can contend in judgment or disputation intending a good—for example Catholics disputing against heretics.
Therefore contention is not always mortal.

OBJECTION 4. Job is said to "contend with God," yet he is praised by God. Therefore contention can be without mortal sin.

ON THE CONTRARY. Paul commands, "Contend not in words," and numbers contentions among the

works of the flesh excluding from
the kingdom of God.

I ANSWER THAT to contend is, as the word signifies, to tend against another. As discord imports

contrariety in will, contention imports
contrariety in speech. This contrariety can be considered according to the intention of the one contending and according to the mode.

Regarding intention, one must ask whether the speaker opposes truth, which is blameworthy, or opposes falsehood, which is praiseworthy. Regarding mode, one must ask whether the manner of opposition is fitting to the persons and the matter. Cicero describes
rhetorical contention as discourse suitably ordered to confirmation and refutation.

Therefore, if contention imports impugnation of truth together with an inordinate mode, it is mortal sin. Ambrose accordingly defines
contention as "impugnation of truth with confidence of clamor." If contention means impugnation of falsehood with due vigor, it is praiseworthy. If it means impugnation of falsehood with an inordinate mode, it can be venial unless the disorder is so grave that scandal
or another mortal evil follows.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. The disciples did not intend to impugn truth; each defended what appeared

true to him. Their disorder
concerned the matter—primacy of honor—and their ambitious manner. They were not yet fully spiritual, and Christ corrected them.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Those who preached Christ from contention were blameworthy, not

because they impugned the truth of
faith—they preached it—but because they maliciously intended to afflict Paul. Paul rejoiced not in their contentious will but in the good
fruit accidentally following from it, namely that Christ was preached.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. In the complete ratio of mortally sinful contention, one in court contends by

impugning truth of justice, and
one in theological dispute by intending to impugn doctrinal truth. Catholics who defend truth against heretics are therefore not contentious under this formal ratio. Mere sharpness or acrimony in legitimate disputation can be disordered without necessarily being
mortal.

REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Job's "contention" is taken broadly for disputation or inquiry. He did not

intend to impugn divine truth and
did not use an inordinate mode of soul or speech.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Contentious impugnation of truth with an inordinate mode is mortal sin.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Vigorous impugnation of falsehood with due mode is praiseworthy.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Impugnation of falsehood with an inordinate mode can be venial unless grave disorder or scandal makes it
mortal.

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ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY; ARTICLE II

This article deserves particular attention from scholastic theologians, so that disputations may be exercised for the glory of God in the manifestation of truth rather
than for victory of self.
Cajetan distinguishes three ways in which the intention can bear upon impugnation of truth: materially, formally, and virtually.
It is material when a man argues against a true proposition not precisely because it is true but for exercise, examination, or another legitimate dialectical reason.
This does not belong to the vice of contention, whose formal tendency is suppression of truth.
It is formal when a man knows a proposition to be true and intends precisely to impugn it. This is formal contention.
It is virtual, according to Cajetan, when a man proposes to attack assertions without caring whether they are true or false. Such an intention extends virtually even
to truth itself and therefore contains the true formal ratio of contentious sin.
The truth involved need not be only truth of faith or morals. It can be universal speculative truth perfecting the intellect, or a particular factual truth concerning the
neighbor's good or evil. Yet the gravity depends upon the matter. One who absurdly insists that a straw is not on the ground does not thereby sin mortally because
the matter is negligible, just as lying in such matter need not be mortal.
It nevertheless seems to me that Cajetan has not fully expressed every form of virtual intention. A heretic who impugns a truth of faith because through culpable
ignorance he judges it false does not intend indifferently to attack propositions whether true or false. Yet he virtually intends to impugn truth, because his culpable
error does not excuse the attack. Therefore mortal contention is also found when a man attacks truth which through his own culpable fault he judges to be false.
This contention is less formal than knowingly attacking truth, but it is truly contained within the vice.

ARTICLE II — WHETHER CONTENTION IS A DAUGHTER OF VAINGLORY

OBJECTION 1. Contention has affinity with zeal, and zeal can belong to envy. Therefore it seems to arise more from envy than vainglory.

OBJECTION 2. Contention is accompanied by clamor, and clamor arises from anger. Therefore contention seems a daughter of anger.

OBJECTION 3. Knowledge seems especially to furnish matter for pride and vainglory, yet contention often arises from lack of knowledge. Therefore contention
does not seem a daughter of vainglory.

ON THE CONTRARY. Gregory numbers contention among the daughters of vainglory.

I ANSWER THAT, as discord is a daughter of vainglory because each dissenter stands in his own

judgment and refuses to acquiesce in another, so contentious
speakers defend verbally what appears to them precisely because each clings inordinately to his own sense. Seeking one's own excellence belongs to pride and
vainglory; hence contention is fittingly a daughter of vainglory.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Like discord, contention has affinity with envy according to the

person from whom one recedes or whom one opposes, but with pride
and vainglory according to the thing in which the contending man stands—his own judgment and excellence.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Clamor is assumed in contention as an instrument toward the end

of impugning another's position; it is not the principal formal
element. Therefore contention need not arise from the same vice from which clamor arises.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Pride and vainglory can take occasion even from goods opposite to

them; a man can be proud of humility itself. Therefore nothing
prevents a vice that arises per se from vainglory from being occasioned per accidens by defects such as ignorance.
SUMMARY. Contentious attachment to one's own opinion is fittingly a daughter of vainglory under the same formal ratio by which discord is so classified.
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QUESTION XXXIX — ON SCHISM

We now consider exterior sins opposed to peace: schism, brawling, sedition, and war.

ARTICLE I — WHETHER SCHISM IS A SPECIAL SIN

OBJECTION 1. “Schism” signifies a tearing or division, and every sin divides man from God. Therefore schism does not seem special.

OBJECTION 2. Those who disobey the Church appear schismatic, yet every sin is disobedience to heavenly commands. Therefore every
sin would be schism.

OBJECTION 3. Heresy divides from unity of faith. If schism means separation, it would seem indistinguishable from unbelief or heresy.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine distinguishes schism from heresy: schismatics can believe the same

things and use the same rites as
Catholics while delighting in separation of congregation; heresy holds doctrines different from those believed by the Catholic Church.

I ANSWER THAT Isidore derives “schism” from a tearing of souls. Division is opposed to unity. In

moral things, as in natural things,
what follows accidentally and outside intention does not determine the proper species. Therefore the proper special sin of schism consists
in intending separation from the unity made by charity.
Charity unites not only one person to another by a spiritual bond of love but the whole Church in unity of spirit. Properly called
schismatics are therefore those who voluntarily and intentionally separate themselves from the principal unity of the Church.
Ecclesiastical unity is considered in two things: first, the connection or communion of the members of the Church with one another;

second, the order of all members to one head. Christ is the invisible Head; the Supreme Pontiff acts as His vicar in the Church. Therefore
schismatics are those who refuse submission to the Supreme Pontiff and those who refuse communion with members of the Church
subject to him.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. Separation from God following every mortal sin is ordinarily not

intended per se; it follows from inordinate
conversion to mutable good. Therefore every sin is not schism properly speaking.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Not every disobedience constitutes schism. Schism requires rebellious

refusal of ecclesiastical subjection
itself: pertinacious contempt of the Church's precept together with refusal to submit to her judgment or to recognize the relevant ecclesial
authority as such.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Heresy and schism differ by what each directly opposes. Heresy opposes

faith; schism opposes ecclesiastical
unity of charity. As faith and charity are distinct virtues, so heresy and schism are distinct vices. Every heretic is consequently schismatic
because loss of faith destroys ecclesial unity, but not every schismatic is formally a heretic. Jerome says heresy holds a perverse dogma,
whereas schism separates from the Church. Yet schism disposes toward heresy, because one who leaves ecclesial unity commonly invents
some doctrinal justification for having separated.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Schism is a special sin consisting properly in voluntary and intentional separation from the principal unity of the
Church.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Schismatics are those who refuse subjection to the Supreme Pontiff as head of the Church and communion
with the members subject to him.

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ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY: THE FORMAL RATIO OF ECCLESIASTICAL UNITY

A doubt arises whether St. Thomas's first conclusion and definition are true. Charity formally considered does not appear to constitute ecclesiastical unity, since a baptized person can belong visibly to the unity of the Church while lacking charity through mortal sin. Further, refusal to obey the Roman Pontiff appears formally opposed to obedience rather than charity. Finally, the unity of the Church cannot be destroyed before the end of the world; how then can schism be defined by destruction of ecclesiastical unity?

For understanding, note with Cajetan that the militant Church is one numerical congregation of the faithful. Its numerical unity cannot consist merely in an absolute perfection possessed separately by each person; it requires relations, actions, and passions by which distinct members are joined as parts of one whole.

Three kinds of unity are found among the faithful.

FIRST is unity of theological virtues and sacred realities. The faithful believe one God, hope in one end, love one God, and profess the same sacraments. Without this commonality the Church would not be one in the relevant sense.

SECOND is unity of head—not only Christ in heaven but His vicar on earth. From this unity there arises in each faithful person a relation of order to one ecclesiastical head. The Holy Spirit moves the faithful not only toward acts of theological virtues but toward obedience under the one vicar of Christ.

THIRD is the unity of collection of all the faithful. By this unity each faithful person possesses the relative being of a part of one people, city, household, and body, and therefore depends upon the whole as every part depends upon its whole. This unity has its own mode and rule of action and reception: the faithful believe, hope, love, sanctify and are sanctified, teach and learn, command and obey not merely as isolated persons but as parts of one Catholic Church.

The Holy Spirit willed the Catholic—that is, universal—Church to be one and not many. Therefore He moves each member to operate interiorly and exteriorly as a part of that one whole according to the faith, tradition, sacraments, and government of the Church.

This is the unity directly opposed by schism. A man becomes schismatic when he refuses to operate as a part of the Church—whether from diversity of opinions, disordered affection, avarice, or another cause—so that he wills to sanctify or be sanctified, teach or be taught, govern or be governed not as a part of the Catholic Church.

To the first objection: charity formally and simply is not identical with visible ecclesiastical unity. Rather, ecclesiastical unity is an effect of charity. Some effects of charity necessarily require formed charity in the subject, such as supernatural contrition; other works can materially remain “unformed,” such as mercy or almsgiving done for Christ while the agent is in mortal sin. Ecclesiastical unity, although the Church as a whole is always holy and formed by the Spirit, can be possessed visibly by an individual who is in mortal sin. Thus a man can lack interior charity yet still will the ecclesiastical effect of unity; he becomes schismatic when he wills to withdraw himself precisely from that effect.

To the second objection: pertinaciously refusing a particular command of the Pope is not by itself schism if the offender still recognizes the Pope as superior and the Church as the authority to which he is subject. Schism consists in refusing subjection to the Pope as head of the whole Church, not every grave act of disobedience.

To the third: a schismatic does not remove unity from the Church universally. He removes himself from that unity, just as one who hates God cannot remove God's goodness in reality but, as far as lies in him, rejects it. The Church remains one; the schismatic ceases to be ordered as a part under that unity.

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ARTICLE I — COMMENTARY: WHETHER THE SUPREME PONTIFF CAN BE SCHISMATIC

Sin against ecclesiastical unity can occur intellectually or voluntarily. Intellectually, a man can deny that the Church is one in head or in collection; this belongs to unbelief. Voluntarily, he can intend destruction of unity from anger or hatred, or he can choose conduct incompatible with acting as a part of the Church rather than abandon his private purpose. Thus schism can be incurred not only by one who expressly wills division but by one who knowingly chooses an act whose formal condition is withdrawal from the Church's unity—for example, attempting to constitute universal ecclesiastical authority apart from the order established for the Church.

A second doubt arises: can the Supreme Pontiff himself be schismatic?

An argument for the negative says that the Pope cannot defect from unity of head because he himself is the earthly head; nor from ecclesiastical unity because, as Cyprian says of the bishop, the Church is in the bishop and the bishop in the Church.

Cajetan unhesitatingly answers affirmatively, and this is the common opinion. Turrecremata treats the matter at length.

FIRST. As said above in Question 1, article 10, the Pope can personally become a heretic; since every heretic is schismatic, it follows that he can become schismatic.

SECOND. Even without heresy the person of the Pope can dissolve his own moral union with the Church. The Church can remain one when the Apostolic See is vacant; therefore the personal union of this particular Pope with the Church is not constitutive in such a way that his person cannot separate himself. If he deliberately refused to communicate with the Church as one of its members and as its spiritual head, behaving only as a temporal lord, he would be schismatic.

Likewise if he attempted to separate himself entirely from the Church, excommunicate the whole Church, foster schism, or refuse to repress those seeking to rend ecclesiastical unity, he could sin schismatically.

The person of the Pope is bound by the laws of the papal office insofar as they define what it is to act as Pope and head of the Church. Thus one must distinguish the person from the office.

Cajetan gives a useful threefold distinction concerning refusal of a papal command or judgment.

FIRST. A man who pertinaciously refuses to execute a particular papal sentence or command—for example to abstain from a war or restore a state—sins gravely, but is not thereby schismatic if he still recognizes the Pope as superior and remains willing in principle to submit to the papal office.

SECOND. A man who refuses a particular judgment because he reasonably suspects the personal judge of bias or tyranny, while remaining willing to accept non-suspect judges or another legitimate mode supplied by the same authority, does not thereby commit schism. Natural law permits one to guard against serious danger from a suspect judge, provided scandal and contempt of office are excluded.

THIRD. A man who refuses the papal judgment precisely from the side of the office—not recognizing the Pope as his superior under that ecclesiastical headship—properly incurs schism, even if he intellectually admits that the Pope is in some abstract sense a superior judge.

Thus St. Thomas's statement concerning rebellious disobedience must be understood: not every pertinacious disobedience is schism, but disobedience joined to rebellion against the ecclesiastical office and subjection itself.

The objection from Cyprian is answered: the Church is “in” the Pope when the Pope acts as Pope and head of the Church; when his person refuses the formal order of that office, the Church is not thereby contained in his private rebellion, nor does ecclesiastical unity perish with him.

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ARTICLE II — WHETHER SCHISM IS A GRAVER SIN THAN UNBELIEF

OBJECTION 1. Greater sins receive graver punishment. In Scripture schism was punished extraordinarily, as when the earth opened beneath Korah and his companions; the ten tribes separating from David's kingdom also suffered grievous punishments. Therefore schism seems graver than idolatry or unbelief.

OBJECTION 2. The good of the multitude is greater and more divine than the private good of one individual. Schism opposes ecclesiastical unity, the spiritual good of the multitude, while unbelief seems to corrupt the faith of one person. Therefore schism appears graver.

OBJECTION 3. Schism is opposed to charity, which is greater than faith. Therefore schism seems graver than unbelief, which is opposed to faith.

ON THE CONTRARY. Heresy adds a perverse dogma to schism and is therefore more evil.

Hence schism is less grave than unbelief or heresy.

I ANSWER THAT gravity of sin can be considered according to species or according to

circumstances. Particular circumstances are innumerable and can vary gravity in countless ways. When we ask universally which of two sins is graver, the comparison concerns the gravity of the species, which is taken from the object.

The sin opposed to a greater good is graver by genus. Unbelief is directly against God under the ratio of First Truth, upon whom faith rests. Schism is directly against ecclesiastical unity, a participated created spiritual good. Therefore unbelief is graver by species than schism, although a particular schismatic can sin more gravely than a particular unbeliever because of greater contempt, danger produced, scandal, or another circumstance.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. The Israelite people already possessed abundant revelation that there

is one God and that idols are not to be worshiped. Their idolatry therefore did not always require a new miraculous punishment to manifest its gravity. The permanence of Moses' principality, however, was not equally manifest; rebellion against it was punished in a novel miraculous way in order to certify the divine order. Moreover the people were especially prone to sedition and schism, and a more severe punishment can be medicinally imposed for a sin toward which a community is specially inclined. The ten tribes were punished not merely for schism but also for idolatry.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. The common good of a multitude is greater than the private good

of one member, but the common good to which the entire multitude itself is ordered is still higher. The unity of an army is less than the good of its commander as commander. Likewise ecclesiastical unity, although a great spiritual common good, is less than divine First Truth itself, the formal object of faith.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Charity has two objects: principal, divine goodness; secondary, the

good of neighbor. Schism and other sins against neighbor oppose charity chiefly under the secondary object. Unbelief opposes God Himself under First Truth. Therefore it is graver than schism. Hatred of God, which opposes charity under its principal object, is not less grave than unbelief.

Among sins committed against neighbor, however, schism appears the greatest because it attacks the spiritual common good of the multitude.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Unbelief is graver by genus than schism because its formal object is directly opposed to First Truth.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Among sins against neighbor, schism is especially grave because it attacks the spiritual good of the ecclesial multitude.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER SCHISMATICS RETAIN ANY SPIRITUAL POWER begins.

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ARTICLE III — WHETHER SCHISMATICS RETAIN ANY SPIRITUAL POWER

OBJECTION 1. Augustine says that those ordained before separation are not reordained when they return to the Church. Holy Orders is a power. Therefore
schismatics retain some spiritual power.

OBJECTION 2. Augustine says a separated minister can confer a sacrament just as he can retain it. Therefore schismatics, although separated from the Church,
retain sacramental power.

OBJECTION 3. Pope Urban commands that men ordained by bishops once Catholic but later separated in schism can, upon return to ecclesiastical unity, be
mercifully received in their proper orders if life and learning commend them. This presupposes that sacramental power remains.

ON THE CONTRARY. Cyprian says that Novatian, who does not preserve unity of spirit or peace of

communion and separates from the bond of the Church and
college of priests, cannot possess episcopal power and honor in the legitimate sense.

I ANSWER THAT spiritual power is twofold: sacramental power and power of jurisdiction.

Sacramental power is conferred through consecration. Ecclesiastical consecrations imprint an enduring reality upon the subject; therefore sacramental power
remains according to its essence in a man who has received it as long as he lives, whether he later falls into schism or heresy. This is shown by the fact that one
returning to the Church is not consecrated or ordained again.

Nevertheless an inferior power should not proceed to act except under motion and authorization of the superior power. Hence schismatics and heretics can lose the
licit use of sacramental power even though the power itself remains. If they illicitly use it, sacramental effects that depend upon Christ's institution and operate
through the minister as God's instrument can nevertheless be valid; no mere moral fault of the minister destroys the sacramental character or the power derived
from it.

Jurisdictional power differs. It is conferred by assignment or commission of a superior and does not adhere immovably through sacramental consecration.

Therefore jurisdiction as such does not remain in schismatics and heretics once legitimate ecclesiastical communion and commission are lost. They cannot by their
own separated jurisdiction validly absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform comparable jurisdictional acts unless the Church supplies jurisdiction
under some separate title established by law.

When Fathers say that schismatics possess “no true priesthood,” “no true honor,” or similar things, such sayings are to be interpreted either concerning legitimate
use and ecclesiastical exercise or concerning the spiritual fruit of grace received by those who knowingly communicate in separation, not as a denial of the
sacramental character itself. See St. Thomas III, Question 82, article 7, and Question 64, articles 5 and 6, concerning evil ministers and sacramental validity.

SUMMARY.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Sacramental power remains in schismatics because it is conferred through consecration and is enduring.

SECOND CONCLUSION. They lose the licit use of that power by separation from the superior ecclesiastical order.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If they exercise sacramental power illicitly, the power can still produce valid sacramental effects where no jurisdictional act is
intrinsically required.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Jurisdictional power, which depends upon ecclesiastical commission, does not remain in schismatics simply as a personal possession
independent of communion.

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER SCHISM IS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR EXCOMMUNICATION begins.

The article argues that schismatics sin both by
separating from the communion of the Church and by refusing subjection to her head. Therefore excommunication is a fitting punishment for the first disorder,
while temporal coercion can be added for the second when spiritual censure does not suffice. Baptism may be received from a schismatic only in an article of
necessity; medicinal communication aimed at restoring a separated person to unity is not forbidden by excommunication; and temporal punishments can be added
to spiritual censures because punishments in this life are medicinal and can be multiplied when one remedy does not suffice.

QUESTION XXXIX - ON SCHISM

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER SCHISM IS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR EXCOMMUNICATION (concluded)

The article's conclusion is affirmative. Schismatics offend in two ways: first, because they separate themselves from the communion of the Church, and for this excommunication is a fitting penalty; second, because they refuse submission to the head of the Church, and when they will not be restrained by the Church's spiritual power, it is just that temporal power also restrain them.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. It is not lawful to receive baptism from schismatics except in an article of necessity,

because it is better to depart
this life bearing the sign of Christ, from whomever it is received - even from a Jew or pagan - than without the sign conferred by baptism.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. Excommunication does not forbid that communication by which a person, through

salutary admonitions, brings
those who are divided back to the unity of the Church. Indeed the separation itself can be medicinal, since shame at their separation sometimes leads them to penance.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Penalties in this life are medicinal. Therefore, when one penalty does not suffice to

restrain a man, another can be
added, just as physicians apply diverse bodily medicines when one is ineffective. Thus when some are not sufficiently restrained by excommunication, the Church can employ coercion of the secular arm; but if one penalty is sufficient, another should not be added.

COMMENTARY.

The reply to the first objection should be noted carefully: in an article of necessity baptism may be received from a schismatic. Cajetan observes that, just as one who asks a loan from a usurer does not sin merely by asking for a good act from one able to perform it rightly if he wills, so a person in necessity can ask baptism from a schismatic without sin, because he asks a sacramental good from one who can confer it validly. Whether the same reasoning applies to Penance or the Eucharist is treated by theologians in their proper places, especially in III, q.64, aa.5-6, concerning wicked ministers generally.

Regarding penalties of schismatics, see Cajetan in the Summa, s.v. excommunicatio, from chapter 7, and Turrecremata, Book IV of his Summa, chapter 18. It should be noted that schismatics are excommunicated in the Bull In Coena Domini; consequently this excommunication is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.

QUESTION XL - ON WAR

We now consider war.

On this matter the theologians dispute in IV Sentences, distinction 15, when treating restitution necessary for penance. Adrian treats it in a special question on war; Henry of Ghent in Quodlibet XV, q.15; Master Vitoria in his second Relection De Indis, in the question on the right of war. Canonists treat it with Gratian, C.23 q.1 onward. Covarruvias discusses war extensively in his relection on the rule Peccatum, part II, sections 9-11, and Alfonso de Castro in Book II of De iusta haereticorum punitione, chapter 14. St. Thomas in the present question determines exactly what pertains per se to the ratio of war.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS SINFUL TO WAGE WAR

OBJECTION 1. Punishment is inflicted only for sin; but the Lord threatens punishment to those who take the sword: "All who take the sword shall perish by the sword." Therefore every war is unlawful.

OBJECTION 2. Whatever is contrary to a divine precept is sinful. But war seems contrary to "resist not evil" and "avenge not yourselves, dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful.

OBJECTION 3. Nothing is contrary to an act of virtue except sin; but war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always sinful.

OBJECTION 4. Every exercise ordered to a lawful thing is itself lawful, as in the exercises of the sciences. But tournaments and similar military exercises are forbidden by the Church, and those who die in them are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore war seems simply sinful.

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says that if Christian discipline absolutely condemned war, the Gospel would have

instructed soldiers
seeking salvation to cast away their arms and abandon military service. Instead they were told: "Do violence to no man; be content with your wages." Therefore military service is not absolutely forbidden.

I ANSWER THAT three things are required for a war to be just: authority of the prince, a just cause, and right

intention. A private person
may pursue his right in the judgment of a superior and cannot on his own convoke the multitude necessary for war. Since care of the commonwealth is entrusted to princes, they defend it against internal disturbers by the material sword and against external enemies by the sword of war. Secondly, those attacked must deserve attack because of some fault. Thirdly, those waging war must intend either promotion of good or avoidance of evil.

QUESTION XL - ARTICLE I - ST. THOMAS'S TEXT AND SUMMARY

Augustine says that natural order adapted to the peace of mortals requires that the authority and counsel for undertaking war belong to princes. A just cause exists when injuries are avenged - for example when a nation or city has neglected to punish what its members wickedly
did or to restore what was unjustly taken. Right intention requires that war be undertaken for peace and justice, not from desire to harm, cruelty in revenge, implacable spirit, ferocity of rebellion, or lust of domination.

REPLY TO THE FIRST. He "takes the sword" who arms himself against another's blood without superior

or legitimate authority
commanding or permitting it. But one who uses the sword by authority of the prince, or as a public person by zeal of justice and therefore under divine authority, does not take the sword from himself but receives it from another. Nor do all who sin by the sword literally die by the
sword; they perish by their own sword in the spiritual sense, being eternally punished for the sin unless they repent.

REPLY TO THE SECOND. The evangelical precepts of non-resistance must always be retained in the

preparation of the soul, so that a man
is ready not to resist or defend himself when charity requires it. Yet action can differ for the common good or even for the good of those against whom one fights. Augustine says that many must be corrected by a certain benevolent severity even against their will, because the impunity of sinners is often more harmful than punishment.

REPLY TO THE THIRD. Those who wage a just war intend peace. War therefore is not contrary to peace

except to an evil peace. Augustine
says: "Peace is not sought in order that war may be waged, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained." One should therefore be peaceful even while fighting, so that by victory those conquered may be brought to the utility of peace.

REPLY TO THE FOURTH. Military exercises are not universally forbidden. What is prohibited are

inordinate and dangerous exercises
from which killings and other dangers arise. Among the ancients, military exercises without such dangers were called meditations of arms or
bloodless wars.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT.

War is lawful when three conditions are present: authority of the prince, a just cause of war, and right intention. The reason for each condition is evident from the text.

COMMENTARY - FIRST DOUBT: WHETHER WAR IS LAWFUL AMONG CHRISTIANS

The first doubt is whether war is lawful among Christians.

The first argument for the negative: war is instituted either to repel injury or to inflict vindication. But, it is argued, among Christians neither
repelling one's own injury nor vindicating it is lawful. As to repelling injury, the Gospel says: "Resist not evil; if one strike thee on one cheek,
offer the other," and Paul says: "Avenge not yourselves." Christ also told Peter, who wished to defend Him: "Put thy sword into thy sheath."

As to vindication, Scripture says: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

The second argument appeals to Isaiah 2: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they be exercised any more unto battle," and Zechariah 9: "Behold thy king cometh to thee meek... and the bow of war shall be destroyed, and he shall speak peace to the nations." Together with the New Testament texts already cited, these seem to manifest the divine will that war, especially among Christians,
be abolished.

A third argument is drawn from the Fathers. Origen on Matthew appears to say that evangelical doctrine abominates military revenge, and Ambrose on Luke 22 asks why Christ commands a sword to be bought if He forbids it to be carried, interpreting the sword spiritually. Tertullian likewise speaks as though bodily warfare were forbidden to Christians who should use the spiritual sword.

A fourth argument: war is opposed to peace, and peace is an effect of charity. Therefore war seems opposed at least mediately to charity.

A fifth argument: human actions are judged by what happens regularly and for the most part; war regularly brings great detriments to a commonwealth. Therefore it seems unlawful.

A final argument attacks the requirement of princely authority: to make war is the act of one possessing right and power over another. But one prince has no jurisdiction over an equal prince. Therefore no prince could lawfully attack another equal sovereign.

ARTICLE I - FIRST DOUBT: THE LAWFULNESS OF WAR AMONG CHRISTIANS

Various heretics erred on this question. Alfonso de Castro recounts several. The Manichaeans condemned all wars and attributed them to an evil god, even rejecting
the authority of the Old Testament. John Wyclif also appears to have condemned war and the use of arms. Luther went still further by condemning Christian wars
against the Turks and other enemies of the Christian name, claiming that to resist them was to resist God chastising our sins through them. Other Lutherans, such as
Oecolampadius and Cornelius Agrippa, condemned wars waged by Christians against Christians. Erasmus defended this error at length in his annotations on Luke 3
and 22 and elsewhere. John Arboreus and Sixtus of Siena refuted him.
For explanation, note first that a thing can be considered in two ways: according to its species and nature abstractly, apart from accompanying circumstances; or as
existing in an individual together with its circumstances. The same distinction applies to human acts. St. Thomas says that some acts are per se and intrinsically good
by reason of their object, such as love of God; others intrinsically evil by reason of their object, such as lying; still others are indifferent from their object and become
good or bad from circumstances; while some, although taken in themselves they seem dissonant from reason, can be rendered honorable by their end and
circumstances. We must determine to which class war belongs.

FIRST CONCLUSION. War is not per se and intrinsically evil. When the just conditions are observed, it has always been lawful under every law and against any
enemies of the commonwealth. To assert the opposite is manifest heresy.
This is proved first from Sacred Scripture. Abraham waged war in Genesis 14 and, after victory, was blessed by Melchizedek; Scripture plainly presents that war as
just and holy. From Genesis through the books of the Maccabees, many saints - Moses, Gideon, Joshua, and others - waged most just wars. To condemn those wars
would be impious, especially since Hebrews 11 praises saints who "through faith conquered kingdoms."

Second, the New Testament proves the same. In Luke 3 John the Baptist approves the military office when he tells soldiers seeking what is necessary for salvation:
"Do violence to no man, and be content with your wages." Augustine repeatedly uses this testimony to prove that military service is not sinful. Erasmus's reply - that
John belongs only to the Old Testament and that warfare ceased once the Gospel shone forth - is false. John belongs much more to the New Testament than to the Old;
and even if he did not, all the Fathers of the New Testament receive his judgment as applicable under the Gospel.
Christ Himself says: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," including tributes from which soldiers are supported. Augustine uses this against Faustus. Paul
says of the earthly ruler in Romans 13: "He is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Therefore when one commonwealth is injured by
another, the prince can vindicate the injury.

Third, the Fathers teach the justice of war. Ambrose in De officiis teaches that true justice can be preserved in wars and adduces many examples from Scripture
commending the just wars of saints against enemies of the fatherland. The universal patristic tradition speaks in the same way.

Fourth, natural reason proves it. By natural law the prince has power to vindicate subjects from injuries and to recover things unjustly taken from them because care of
the commonwealth and citizens has been committed to him. When princes have no temporal superior, the prince who inflicted injury becomes subject, by reason of
the injury, to the judgment of the injured prince in the vindicative act, as will be explained further.
The end of just war is peace and tranquility of the commonwealth: wars are waged so that we may live in peace, as Aristotle and Augustine teach. When the honest
conditions are preserved, war is therefore lawful and just.

Fifth, the Church has instituted religious orders for fighting with arms against enemies of the faith. Since the end of a religious institute approved by the Church is
holy, war against enemies of the faith can be holy. The experience of the Christian people confirms this: from Constantine onward Catholic emperors, often with the
counsel of the Supreme Pontiffs, waged wars against enemies of the Church, and in imperial coronation the sacred sword is given for defense of the Church and
faithful, just as Jeremiah gave a sword to Judas Maccabaeus in 2 Maccabees 15.

SECOND CONCLUSION. War, considered in itself and abstracted from justifying circumstances, appears dissonant from reason because many evils and
inconveniences are annexed to it - killings, disturbances, and the like. In this respect it "sounds toward evil," much as homicide does. Nevertheless it can be rendered
morally good by end and circumstances.
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ARTICLE I - FIRST DOUBT: REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS

Although war has many evils annexed at the beginning, these can be proportionately ordered to the end of peace and tranquility of the commonwealth, just as bitter
medicines initially afflict the sick and disturb humors but afterward expel them and restore health. Augustine therefore says that as death seems contrary to life, so war
seems contrary to peace; St. Thomas likewise places war among things opposed to peace. Yet the end of just war is tranquility of the commonwealth, for whose sake
those temporary evils are tolerated. Thus although war considered by itself has an appearance of evil, its circumstances can render it lawful.
We now answer the initial arguments.
To the first, I deny the minor in both parts. As to "resist not evil," St. Thomas replies from Augustine that these precepts must always be retained in the preparation of
the soul: a man must be ready not to resist or defend himself if necessity of charity requires. The same applies to Romans 12. Augustine's texts and St. Thomas below,
q.188, a.3 ad 1, teach the same.
For fuller explanation, some pagans thought the Gospel opposed the common good because of such passages. If "resist not evil" is taken as a negative precept, it must
be understood formally: no one may return evil for evil from hatred of enmity. Yet materially a public authority can inflict an evil of punishment to vindicate injuries.
God Himself vindicates injuries in this manner. If the words are taken as an affirmative precept commanding endurance of evils inflicted upon us, they bind at the time
of necessity like other affirmative precepts.
Cajetan on Matthew 5 rightly notes that the precept is regularly given to private persons and with respect to private injuries, not to public persons who by public
authority must vindicate injuries and punish crimes of the commonwealth. Augustine nevertheless also understands the evangelical counsel in the higher perfection
exhibited by Apostles and martyrs, who for Christ and the Gospel endured persecution without resistance; such endurance surpasses the victories of princes.
Regarding Matthew 26, St. Thomas answers from Augustine that Christ speaks of one who uses the sword by private authority. Augustine elsewhere says Christ also
taught the Apostles by word and example to endure persecutions. Cajetan interprets "all who take the sword" as signifying the law of retaliation against private
homicidal violence. None of these interpretations excludes use of the sword by public authority; indeed Romans 13 expressly confirms it.
As to "Vengeance is mine," St. Thomas below q.108, a.1 ad 1 answers that one who exercises vindication according to the grade of his office does not usurp what
belongs to God but uses power divinely committed to him.
The prophetic texts of Isaiah and Zechariah are prophecies of the peace accompanying Christ's advent and of the propagation of faith not by the arms of the Apostles
but by preaching, patience, and endurance. Origen, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Ambrose interpret them accordingly; some also understand them spiritually of Christ's
victory over the hostile spiritual powers. Therefore it is frivolous to infer that every war is contrary to the divine will, just as it would be absurd to say that medicine
against a plague sent in punishment for sins is contrary to the divine will.
The Fathers who condemn warfare condemn either private, unjust, or tyrannical uses of the sword, or they commend the higher evangelical perfection of patiently
enduring persecution. Jerome's contrast - formerly "gird thy sword," now Peter hears "put thy sword into the sheath" - can be understood in this latter sense.
War is not opposed to peace as its contrary but is ordered to acquiring peace, according to St. Thomas and the second conclusion.
As to actions that are evil for the most part, distinguish. Some are evil for the most part from their own nature and object - such acts are intrinsically evil. Others are
evil for the most part because of the vice of subjects or accompanying circumstances; these are not intrinsically evil and can be made morally good by circumstances.
War belongs to the second class. Fornication differs because the disorder follows from its very object and nature, whereas the evils annexed to a just war do not flow
per se from the nature of just war but from circumstances and human vice.
Finally, as to equal princes: a commonwealth or prince that has inflicted injury thereby incurs a relation of subjection to the injured prince with respect to the act of
vindication. Hence the injured prince can possess a right of war, as the next doubt explains.
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ARTICLE I - SECOND DOUBT: WHO POSSESSES AUTHORITY TO DECLARE WAR?

The second doubt concerns the first condition of a just war: whether authority to declare war belongs only to a prince who has no temporal superior.

The first argument for the negative: by natural law everyone has the right to defend himself and his goods. But often a prince cannot defend himself and his goods except by waging war. Therefore every prince appears to possess authority to declare war. Moreover St. Thomas contrasts "prince" with "private person," and not every prince is without a superior. Again, those whose office permits use of the material sword against internal enemies seem likewise empowered to use the military sword against external enemies.

The second argument: every prince is charged with defending his commonwealth from internal and external enemies; therefore he can take up arms against both.

If one replies that these arguments prove only defensive, not aggressive war, a third argument is made: a prince cannot adequately defend his commonwealth from enemies who injure it unless he can attack and punish them. If enemies know they will never be punished by aggressive war, they will become bolder against the commonwealth.

A fourth argument supposes two dukes under the same king, one injuring the other while the king refuses or is unable to vindicate the injury. The injured duke cannot defend his commonwealth well unless he can exercise vindication by aggressive war.

A fifth argument: kings are not supreme princes in every sense, for they were often said to stand under the Emperor, and the Emperor himself under the Pope in a certain order. Yet kings and emperors can wage aggressive war. Therefore lack of all superiority cannot be required.

For explanation note first a distinction between a perfect commonwealth and an imperfect commonwealth. A perfect commonwealth does not depend upon a higher temporal commonwealth and has within itself everything necessary for proper government, terminating its causes and controversies within itself - for example the kingdoms of Spain and France, Venice, and similar polities. An imperfect commonwealth depends upon another superior, for example the state of a duke or count within Spain. Consequently the prince of a perfect commonwealth is prince simply; the prince of an imperfect commonwealth is prince only in a qualified sense.

Second, the temporal power of a prince is from the commonwealth, whether through election or succession. This differs from the spiritual power of the Supreme Pontiff, which is immediately from God. Temporal power is immediately from the commonwealth, according to the common teaching of disciples of St. Thomas.

Therefore a prince possesses no greater temporal power than the commonwealth transferred to him.

Third, as already insinuated, the prince of a perfect commonwealth that has suffered injury becomes judge and superior with respect to the prince who inflicted the injury. Since a perfect commonwealth must contain everything necessary to its proper government and preservation, it must also possess vindicative justice. War is the supreme act of vindicative justice; therefore the prince who wages it must behave as a just judge and measure the penalties inflicted according to the gravity of the offense, so that the measure of the blows corresponds to the measure of the fault.

Finally, war is twofold: aggressive and defensive.

FIRST CONCLUSION. An imperfect commonwealth or its prince may use defensive war against enemies without waiting for the permission of the supreme prince.

This is common to theologians and jurists and follows from natural law: if a private person has authority to repel force by force, much more does a commonwealth, whose common good is more excellent and more divine.

SECOND CONCLUSION. An imperfect commonwealth cannot wage aggressive war without authority of the supreme prince. Two subordinate princes stand toward their supreme prince as two citizens toward a judge: since they have a superior before whom their controversy can be terminated, neither may become aggressor against the other. To do so would usurp the superior's authority and would lead to the destruction of public security.

War of aggression is the supreme act of vindicative justice; the consummate act of that justice belongs to one possessing public authority as judge. Therefore aggressive war belongs only to the supreme temporal authority or perfect commonwealth, not to subordinate princes considered in this respect as private persons.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Every perfect commonwealth, or its prince, can wage aggressive war against enemies. Such war is sometimes necessary and just, and there is no other temporal authority to whom the commonwealth can appeal for recovery and vindication of its right.

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ARTICLE I - SECOND DOUBT: PERFECT AND IMPERFECT COMMONWEALTHS

The third conclusion is further proved. A perfect commonwealth that has suffered injury can demand due satisfaction from enemies; when there is no superior
temporal judge and no other path remains except aggressive war, it must possess that right, otherwise it would not be sufficient and complete in what pertains to
government.
Moreover, if impious men knew that kings could never attack robbers or aggressors by vindicative war, robberies and homicides would be encouraged. Every
commonwealth has a natural inclination to repel harms. It repels imminent injuries by defensive war and injuries already inflicted by vindicative war, not from an
intention to harm, but to remove injury and satisfy the commonwealth. A perfect commonwealth therefore has this natural power.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. A perfect prince who has suffered injury is truly judge with respect to the prince or commonwealth that committed it. War is the supreme
act of vindicative justice, and in war men are punished by the gravest penalties - death, servitude, loss of goods - all of which belong to vindicative justice. Augustine
defines just wars as those that avenge injuries. Scripture likewise describes Nebuchadnezzar's dealing with Zedekiah after capture as "speaking judgments with him,"
language expressing the office of superior and judge.
To the first argument: it proves defensive war, which is lawful even to an imperfect commonwealth.
To the first confirmation: Cajetan rightly says that St. Thomas uses "prince" as opposed to private person, but his doctrine concerns a public person in a complete and
perfect sense. Imperfect princes, because they are not supreme, stand in a middle position: compared with private persons they participate public authority, but
compared with the supreme prince they bear the ratio of private persons. Therefore St. Thomas's text extends only to perfect princes in the matter of declaring
aggressive war.
To the second confirmation: the office of defending against internal and external enemies belongs by nature to the same sovereign authority, but power to use the
sword against internal wrongdoers can be delegated to many who are not thereby authorized to declare war against foreigners - for example city magistrates and
subordinate lords with jurisdiction in causes of blood.
To the second argument: it proves defensive war.
To the third: it proves the point for a perfect commonwealth, not for an imperfect one, because the imperfect commonwealth can recur to a superior.
To the fourth: subordinate dukes have a superior who can vindicate injuries. They may not declare aggressive war; if the superior fails to do justice, the inferior prince
has no further remedy except patiently to endure the injury for the common good.
To the fifth: the superiority attributed to the Emperor over kings is only in a qualified sense, for example in certain matters pertaining to the common good of
Christendom. Likewise kings are not directly subject to the Supreme Pontiff in temporal matters but only indirectly in order to spiritual good, as treated elsewhere.
Innocent III acknowledges that kings do not recognize a temporal superior in this direct sense. The kings of France and Spain therefore possess perfect temporal
sovereignty for present purposes.

THIRD DOUBT - WHETHER A CHRISTIAN PRINCE MAY EMPLOY INFIDEL SOLDIERS IN A JUST WAR AGAINST ANOTHER CHRISTIAN
PRINCE

The first argument for the negative appeals to 2 Chronicles 16, where King Asa is rebuked because he called upon the Syrian army against the king of Israel: "Thou
hast done foolishly, and therefore from this time wars shall arise against thee." Likewise Jehoshaphat is reproved for aiding the impious King Ahab: "Shouldst thou
help the wicked, and join friendship with them that hate the Lord? therefore thou didst deserve the wrath of the Lord." St. Thomas later says Jehoshaphat sinned from
weakness of human affection.
The second argument is historical: Francis I of France was widely blamed among Christian princes because he called the Turks to his aid against Charles V. Therefore
such aid appears unlawful.
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ARTICLE I - THIRD DOUBT: INFIDEL AUXILIARIES IN A JUST WAR

A common doctrine of theologians must be presupposed: many things are lawful per se and absolutely but become unlawful by reason of scandal or other
circumstances. Eating meat, for example, is lawful in itself but can become unlawful when it scandalizes a brother.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Speaking absolutely and per se, it is lawful to call foreign and even infidel soldiers to assist in a just war. Cajetan teaches this in the present
article when he says it is lawful to call foreign soldiers to aid a just war. Sylvester, John Major,
and the common teaching of doctors agree.

This is proved first from 1 Maccabees 8: Judas Maccabaeus entered an alliance with the Romans for mutual military aid; Jonathan and Simon later renewed it. Charles
V, with the counsel of theologians, used German soldiers who were Lutheran unbelievers in war against the French.

Second, in a just war one may use the assistance of animals such as elephants or lions; therefore, a fortiori, one can use the military assistance of unbelievers, provided
no contrary circumstance intervenes.

Third, speaking per se, Christian princes can even give aid to infidels in a just war against Christians. Abraham aided the king of Sodom against his enemies, although
he also acted to free Lot. David served Achish, king of the Philistines, in military matters; Jonathan sent soldiers to aid King Demetrius, an unbeliever. Therefore there
is no intrinsic unlawfulness in the mere fact that an infidel is an ally.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Per accidens, because of scandal and other circumstances, it can become unlawful and a very grave sin to call infidel soldiers to aid
against Christians.

The initial scriptural arguments prove this qualification. Such alliances regularly generate grave scandal in the Christian commonwealth and can harm even the
Christian prince who invited the infidels, since infidel troops often do not observe the law of war, show no reverence to sacred places, profane everything, carry away
children into captivity to induce apostasy, and inflict many other calamities. For this reason Francis I of France was rightly blamed among Christians.

Regarding Asa and Jehoshaphat, one may first answer that they sinned at least because of scandal and harm to divine honor. More precisely, Asa was obliged to trust
in the Lord's help after having recently defeated the immense army of the Ethiopians by divine assistance. His sin consisted in placing confidence in the Syrian king
rather than in God; Scripture later notes similarly that in sickness he sought physicians "not seeking the Lord." Jehoshaphat sinned because he contracted and
exercised friendship with the impious king Ahab, and also because he supplied aid and necessities for Ahab's war.

FOURTH DOUBT - WHETHER SOLDIERS WHO WAGE WAR BY PRIVATE AUTHORITY ARE BOUND TO RESTITUTION

The doubt concerns those who, without princely authority, attack Turks or other unbelievers, seize booty, or otherwise wage hostilities, while such men are often
praised rather than compelled to restitution.

FIRST CONCLUSION. To wage aggressive war against any enemies without authority of the prince is mortal sin. The authority to declare and wage war resides in
the prince of the commonwealth. To usurp this authority is mortal sin, just as it would be mortal sin for a private person to execute one who deserves death merely
because the person is guilty.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Soldiers may not by private authority devastate or burn towns. If they do so, they are bound to restore the damages inflicted. They are not
legitimate judges but executors of the prince, who is the true judge. St. Thomas and Cajetan below q.66, a.8 teach that it is never lawful by private authority to take the
goods even of unbelievers; those who do so commit robbery and are bound to restitution.

ARTICLE I - FOURTH DOUBT: PRIVATE WAR AND RESTITUTION

A qualification is necessary. If soldiers merely recover their own goods from pirates who unjustly took them, they do not sin against commutative justice toward those
pirates and are not bound to restore the recovered goods. Even among fellow citizens, recovery of one's own unjustly taken goods is not in itself contrary to justice,
although the person can still sin by failing to observe the juridical order when recourse to a superior is readily available. A fortiori the same material recovery from
enemies is not injustice toward them.

THIRD CONCLUSION. Those who fight without authority of the prince are bound to restore all damages that follow from such a war in their own commonwealth.
They wage war against the will of the superior and are causes of the losses suffered by their own republic; the cause of damage is bound to make satisfaction.
To the argument from common practice: speaking per se, private soldiers are bound to restore goods captured from unbelievers by private authority. Yet they can
sometimes be excused by the interpretative will of the prince - for example when an urgent opportunity exists, the enemies are public enemies of Christians, and the
prince cannot easily be reached for express permission. In that case the action can proceed virtually from the prince's permission or subsequent ratification; the
soldiers can be excused not only from restitution but perhaps from sin.
Even then the spoils should ordinarily be manifested to the prince so that he may dispose of them at his judgment - by donation, remission, retention toward
satisfaction of the just war, or otherwise. Ambrose relates that Abraham, after victory in Genesis 14, retained nothing from the spoils but preserved everything for the
king of Sodom, thereby teaching military discipline: everything is preserved for the king. Princes rarely grant formal general authority to private men to wage such
war, lest under pretext of defending the commonwealth they become tyrants and exercise robbery even against Christians.
ON THE SECOND CONDITION OF A JUST WAR: JUST CAUSE
St. Thomas, following Augustine, assigns two principal causes. First, when a city, commonwealth, or prince neglects to vindicate what its subjects have wickedly
done; for this reason David waged war against the king of the Ammonites. Second, when a commonwealth neglects to restore what was unjustly taken. Sacred and
profane histories show many wars justly undertaken for these causes, and theologians and jurists agree.

Second, friends and allies are to be judged as ourselves in this matter. War can lawfully be waged to vindicate injuries done to friends or allies or to recover their
goods. A friend is "another self," and the goods of friends are in a certain way common; therefore an injury to friends is in a certain way our own injury.

Third, because the prince declaring a just war is judge with respect to the opposing prince, he must temper the punishment according to the measure of the offense, in
accordance with Deuteronomy 25. If the injury is light, war - a most grave and terrible punishment - must not be declared. Yet an injury that at first appears slight can
be grave by reason of the future danger and its opening toward greater evils. If, for example, the king of France were to seize by arms a Spanish town from which he
could readily occupy other cities, the injury would be grave and a just cause of war, especially if that city were, as it were, the key and wall of the whole kingdom.

Fourth, even when a grave cause exists, peace is a matter of will whereas war is a matter of necessity. The injured prince must therefore first seek satisfaction for the
injuries rather than immediately wage war. He should send legates; if this does not suffice, he may then lawfully proceed to war. Deuteronomy 20 and Judges 20
furnish examples.
Whether injuries done to God by unbelief, idolatry, or blasphemy can themselves constitute just cause of war against unbelievers has already been treated above in
q.10, aa.8 and 10.

FIFTH DOUBT - WHETHER A PRINCE WHO IS DOUBTFUL OF THE JUSTICE OF HIS CAUSE MAY DECLARE WAR begins.
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ARTICLE I - FIFTH DOUBT: WAR IN A DOUBTFUL CAUSE

The first argument for the affirmative: in a doubtful civil cause it is lawful for one citizen to summon another to court even though he knows the other will incur great
expense. Similarly, war between sovereign princes is ordered so that each may pursue and receive his right, since neither has a superior before whom he can convene
the other.

Second, where neither party is in possession and the doubt is equal, a judge can divide an inheritance according to distributive justice. Since the sovereign prince
declaring war is judge, perhaps he could assign himself half the disputed thing. One may add that if he warns the other prince not to claim beyond half and the other
refuses, the refusal itself becomes an injury justifying war for the half.

Third, if the evidence is more probable for the non-possessor than for the possessor, perhaps the non-possessing prince may declare war for some part of the
inheritance because the possessor is then bound to restore that part, and refusal would constitute injury.

Fourth, suppose the right is doubtful and the opinions on both sides equally probable. If a judge may follow whichever of two equally probable opinions he prefers,
perhaps a prince may declare war even for the whole inheritance against a possessor. But that consequence is false, because in equal doubt the condition of the
possessor is better.

For explanation, suppose that the province in dispute either is in the legitimate possession of another prince or has no legitimate possessor because of the death of the
true lord or another cause.

Second, war always presupposes an injury done to some prince or commonwealth. War is the supreme act of vindicative justice, and vindicative justice intrinsically
presupposes an injury, just as penance presupposes sin.

FIRST CONCLUSION. A prince is bound to examine and investigate with the greatest diligence, personally and through others, the causes of a just war, employing
the counsel of wise men. He acts as judge in a matter of the utmost gravity, and a judge must diligently examine what pertains to judgment before pronouncing
sentence. Indeed he must investigate also what favors the opposing prince, who has not been formally summoned before a common superior and cannot defend
himself in an ordinary tribunal.

The reason is strengthened by analogy with episcopal elections: because a bishop must choose the more worthy, he is bound to make diligent inquiry concerning
worthiness. Much more must a prince inquire diligently where war, the gravest criminal act of vindicative justice, is concerned.

Job says: "The cause which I knew not, I searched out most diligently." Gregory praises this judicial diligence. Jurists likewise say proofs in criminal cases must be
clearer than the midday light. Vitoria expressly teaches that it does not suffice for a prince merely to believe he has a just cause, otherwise every belligerent would
deem his war just; the justice and causes of war must be examined with great diligence, and the adversaries' reasons heard if they are willing to dispute according to
equity and right reason. In so grave a matter, where the peril and calamity of many neighbors whom we are bound to love are involved, culpable error will not easily
excuse those who authorize war.

SECOND CONCLUSION. If after sufficient examination and deliberation the justice of the war remains equally doubtful, and the other prince is in possession, war
cannot be declared against him. This is the common opinion. Thus if the king of France is in legitimate possession of a city or province and there is equal doubt
whether he has title, the king of Spain may not recover it by arms.

The reason is that when the rights of the parties are obscure, the defendant or possessor is to be favored. "In equal fault or cause, the condition of the possessor is
better." Therefore, while the justice remains equally doubtful, the law stands rather for the prince who possesses and against whom war would be declared.

A further proof: in a doubtful criminal cause a judge sins mortally if he pronounces a capital sentence. To declare war is to pronounce a criminal sentence involving
life; therefore it cannot be done while the cause remains doubtful.

Finally, war cannot be just on both sides per se, apart from ignorance. But if equal doubt gave each prince a right of war, war could be just on both sides. Since war is
an act of vindicative justice, it must be exercised against one who has committed an offense.

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ARTICLE I - FIFTH DOUBT: FURTHER PRINCIPLES ON A DOUBTFUL WAR

The first conclusion must be held firmly: a prince cannot discharge his duty merely by embracing a favorable opinion. Because he stands as judge in the most serious
criminal matter, he must investigate not only his own reasons but those that favor the other prince. The other party has no common superior before whom he can
ordinarily defend himself; therefore the prince who would wage war must supply, as far as morally possible, the diligence that a just judge would employ before
condemning another.

The requirement of diligence is not a counsel of perfection but a demand of justice. Where war threatens death, captivity, destruction of goods, and calamity to many
innocents, ignorance resulting from negligence does not excuse the authors of war. The greater the public danger, the more grave the obligation to examine the title
and the alleged injuries.

When a disputed right remains equally doubtful after this examination, possession creates a decisive juridical presumption. The prince in possession stands as
defendant; the prince seeking to dislodge him stands as actor. Since in doubtful rights favor is given to the possessor, the non-possessor has no sufficiently certain
injury to vindicate by war.

This principle also answers the proposal that a prince may simply divide the disputed inheritance as a judge might do. The sovereign prince is not a neutral common
judge over both parties in the ordinary sense; he is judge only under the limited title arising from a certain injury. Where the injury itself is doubtful and the other has
legitimate possession, that title to vindicative judgment is lacking. The possessor does no manifest injury merely by retaining what he possesses under an equally
probable title.

Likewise the proposal that a more probable claim of the non-possessor automatically licenses war must be treated with great caution. Probability can increase the
obligation of the possessor to investigate or perhaps to compose the dispute, but war, because it is the gravest execution of vindicative justice, requires a title
proportioned to such punishment. A merely probable superiority of reasons is not by itself equivalent to a judicially certain injury when the opposing prince is already
in legitimate possession.

The maxim that a judge can sometimes follow one of two probable opinions must not be transferred without distinction to the declaration of war. In ordinary
judgments the judge acts within a constituted legal forum and under procedural rules. In war the prince himself executes the gravest sentence upon another sovereign
and upon multitudes of subjects. Therefore the standard of practical certainty must be correspondingly severe.

Consequently, the safer and common doctrine is that when the opposing prince is in possession and, after diligent examination, the right remains equally doubtful, the
prince who is not in possession must abstain from aggressive war and seek peaceful composition, arbitration if available, or another lawful means. The possession
itself supplies the juridical advantage until a sufficiently certain contrary title is established.

The discussion continues by distinguishing cases in which neither party is in possession, or in which one party's title becomes morally more certain, and by
considering how probability, possession, and the obligation to avoid unjust bloodshed interact in the judgment of a prince.

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QUESTION XL — ON WAR

ARTICLE I — FIFTH DOUBT: WHETHER WAR MAY BE DECLARED IN A DOUBTFUL CAUSE

(continued)

Augustine says that no war is without some fault on one side, for although one side fights justly, the other fights because of a fault. He had already said that if men were perfect, the good would not fight against the good, but either the wicked would fight against the wicked or the good against the wicked. Hence, if a prince could justly declare war while the other prince could also justly defend himself, apart from ignorance there would be a just war on both sides, which is impossible per se.

Another proof is taken from possession. If someone doubts whether a thing is his and, after employing sufficient diligence, still remains in **doubt, he nevertheless possesses it legitimately. Though speculative doubt remains, there is practical moral** certitude that he may retain the thing. In the same way, when another prince is in legitimate possession and after sufficient examination the doubt remains equal, there is moral certitude that the disputed thing is to be treated as belonging to the possessor. Therefore the other prince may not attack him.

A further confirmation: if two subjects litigated before this very prince concerning some thing, the prince would not dispossess the legitimate possessor while the doubt remained equal, because in doubtful matters the condition of the possessor is better. Therefore, when the prince himself occupies the place of judge in his own international controversy, he cannot despoil the other of what he justly possesses while the cause remains equally doubtful.

From this it follows that, if while the right remains doubtful the possessor is violently despoiled of a fortress or province, he may recover it by war until the justice of the other party becomes established. An injury has now been inflicted upon him, and therefore he has a just cause of war. It follows further that the one who took the province is bound to restore it, unless he reasonably fears that if he returns it the other will refuse restitution even after the right is shown; in that case the disputed thing should be deposited with a neutral custodian.

It follows also that if the prince who does not possess, before sufficient examination, wishes to have the cause examined and proposes arbiters, and the possessor refuses, the refusal itself can become an injury. The non-possessing prince has a right that the cause be examined. If he cannot examine the justice of the claim without the cooperation of the other prince, he is bound to send legates requesting that the whole cause be examined by arbiters; if the other refuses the legation, war can then become lawful.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If the disputed thing has no legitimate possessor, the doubt is equal, and one prince offers either an equal division or an equivalent compensation, the other may not wage war or seize the whole by force. A just judge would not assign the whole to one party in such a case, but would divide it equally. Since the prince occupies the place of judge in war, he must proceed according to the same form of distributive justice.

Note, however, that this conclusion presupposes an equal doubt. If the doubt is unequal and there is greater verisimilitude for one side, the thing is to be divided according to the quality of the doubt: the greater portion should be conceded to the party for whom the greater probability stands. A judge must observe the form of distributive justice and assign to each according to the merits of the cause.

A difficulty remains when the possessor's claim is less probable and the non-possessor's claim more probable. It may seem that the non-possessing prince still cannot declare war for any portion, because the possessor stands as defendant and in obscure rights the defendant is favored. Yet I establish the following.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. If, after sufficient diligence, the doubt is unequal and the greater probability favors the prince who does not possess, he may demand from the possessor a portion proportionate to that probability; if the possessor refuses, war may be declared for that portion. A private person who possesses under such an unequal doubt is bound to restore proportionately according to the quality of the **doubt; therefore the same obligation applies here. By refusing the due portion the possessor becomes a** wrongdoer and the injury becomes manifest.

If the probability for the possessor were so attenuated that none remained, he would be bound to restore the whole. Where some probability remains but the greater probability favors the other side, proportionate restitution is due. Thus the possessor is not favored absolutely merely because he possesses; possession prevails in equal doubt, not against a morally superior title requiring proportional satisfaction.

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ARTICLE I — FIFTH DOUBT CONCLUDED; SIXTH DOUBT

The initial arguments are now answered. To the first: I deny the consequence from civil litigation to war. In ordinary litigation the inquiry of law and judgment still
remains before sentence is executed, and therefore doubt suffices to begin the suit. To declare war, however, is already to pronounce a sentence and put it into execution
against another prince. Consequently the justice of the war must first be made manifest, just as a civil judge must have the justice of the cause sufficiently manifest before
pronouncing and executing sentence.

A second reply is that the first argument does prove our third conclusion: while the right remains doubtful, one prince can summon the other through legates to an
examination of the cause, just as one citizen can summon another before a judge.

To the second argument, what was said there is sound according to the distinctions already given.

To the third, which was a rejoinder against the solution of the second, the answer is according to the fourth conclusion.

To the fourth: whenever there are diverse probable opinions concerning ownership of a thing, because the prince in declaring war must conduct himself as a judge, the
principles later stated concerning a judge in q.63, a.4 must be observed.

SIXTH DOUBT — WHETHER SOLDIERS ARE BOUND TO EXAMINE THE JUSTICE OF THE WAR, OR MAY FIGHT WHILE THEY DOUBT IT

An argument for the negative answer — that they may not fight — is drawn from the prince: the prince himself may not declare war while the justice of the cause remains
doubtful, as established in the preceding doubt. Soldiers are executors of the prince's sentence, and it is gravely sinful to execute an unjust sentence; therefore they should
not fight while doubtful.

Second, soldiers who doubt the justice of the war have a doubtful conscience. To act against a doubtful conscience is sinful, as is shown in I-II, q.19, aa.5-6, and Romans
14 says: “All that is not of faith is sin.” Moreover one who doubts whether the war is just exposes himself to the danger of injuring another prince; “he that loveth danger
shall perish in it.”

Third, a witness interrogated concerning another's crime who doubts whether the judge proceeds juridically is not bound to answer and, in certain circumstances, would
injure the accused by answering. The soldier seems to stand similarly.

For explanation note first that soldiers are of two kinds. Some are subjects: vassals of the prince or soldiers receiving his stipend, even if foreigners. Others are not
subjects: men of another kingdom who receive no stipend from that prince.

Second, if the cause of war is manifestly just, all soldiers — hired or unhired, subjects or foreigners — may aid the king. If the cause is manifestly unjust, no soldier, even
a subject or stipendiary, may assist him, just as an executioner may not execute a sentence manifestly unjust.

The difficulty concerns a war whose justice is doubtful.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Soldiers who are bound to military service by stipend or are subjects of the prince may fight and follow him even when they themselves doubt
the justice of the war.

Augustine teaches that a just man serving even under a sacrilegious king may lawfully fight at the king's command when either what is commanded is certainly not
contrary to God's precept or it is not certain whether it is contrary. In that case the iniquity of commanding can make the king guilty while the order of service manifests
the soldier innocent.

The reason is that examining the cause of war does not pertain to ordinary soldiers but to the prince and his counselors. Soldiers are executors of the prince's judgment. An
executioner may execute a judge's sentence even while doubting its justice when examination does not pertain to his office. Likewise the soldier may follow the prince.

In doubtful matters the safer course must indeed be chosen; but for a subject soldier the safer practical course is to follow the right of his own prince, to whom he owes
obedience or from whom he receives lawful stipend, unless injustice is manifest.

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ARTICLE I — SIXTH DOUBT: SOLDIERS AND DOUBTFUL WAR (continued)

The conclusion is confirmed by analogy with marriage. A woman who speculatively doubts whether a man is truly her husband can nevertheless, while the juridical bond
stands and the contrary is not proved, be practically certain that she may — and in due circumstances must — render the marital debt. Likewise the subject soldier can
have speculative doubt concerning the justice of the cause while possessing practical certitude that he may obey his prince.
Another confirmation comes from the common good. It would gravely harm the commonwealth if the prince were required to render to every soldier an account of the
justice of the war. It would be impossible for so great a multitude to convene and examine the cause. The conscience of ordinary soldiers is sufficiently provided for when,
in a doubtful case not manifestly unjust, they follow their legitimate prince.
Finally, whenever a subject is commanded to do something in which he bears the ratio of an instrumental cause toward the effect of the principal agent, he can be bound
to obey even though he doubts whether the superior commands justly. The principal cause acts through its own form and deliberation; the instrumental cause acts insofar
as it is moved by another. In moral matters, therefore, the principal agent must act from his own counsel and deliberation, while the instrumental agent can operate
according to legitimate motion received.
A preacher is a principal cause with respect to the doctrine he preaches and cannot preach something while doubting whether it is sound doctrine merely because the
bishop commands it. But a public crier can proclaim an episcopal edict even if he doubts its doctrinal soundness, because examination does not belong to the crier's office.
Soldiers in war stand analogously as instruments with respect to the king.
Hence soldiers of inferior rank who are not admitted to councils of war are not bound to investigate the justice of the cause; they can fight trusting those above them.
Besides the fact that a prince is not bound to disclose reasons of state to everyone, the public declaration of war by legitimate authority and counsel ordinarily supplies a
sufficient presumption of justice. Higher-ranking soldiers, however, who are admitted to councils of war and act in a manner closer to principal causes, are bound to know
and examine the cause of the war. Vitoria teaches this, and it is the common opinion of theologians and jurists.
Adrian appears to teach the contrary. He interprets Augustine's “or whether it is contrary to God's command is not certain” as meaning that the soldier must actually or
virtually believe that it is not contrary to God's command. He also answers the juridical analogies by saying that they concern the external forum, where a marriage or
sentence is presumed valid until the contrary is proved, but not the forum of conscience. This does not fit Augustine's intention. Augustine had just explained the various
ways in which a war may be unjust and then says that, so long as it is not evident to the soldier that the command is against God, he may fight. Nor do the cited decretals
concern only the external forum; they also govern conscience.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Soldiers who are neither subjects nor stipendiaries of the prince may not fight if they themselves doubt the justice of the war.
The reason is that one who without necessity intrudes himself into a matter not pertaining to him is not without fault. Such soldiers are free not to fight; by fighting they
expose themselves to the danger of injuring the opposing prince, while by abstaining they violate no duty owed to the prince. In doubtful matters, therefore, they must
choose the safer course.
The comparison with a witness confirms this. A witness who doubts whether a judge proceeds juridically can sometimes remain silent when testimony would expose
another to injury and the witness is not otherwise bound. The free foreign soldier likewise has no duty of obedience that would counterbalance the danger of injuring
another.

THIRD CONCLUSION. If soldiers are certain that the prince himself remains doubtful concerning the justice of the war, they may not fight, even if subjects or
stipendiaries. The war is then unjust because the prince has failed to attain the practical certitude required of the judge before pronouncing so grave a sentence. Soldiers
who know this may not execute a sentence which they know has been unjustly pronounced.
It follows first that soldiers who neither doubt the justice of the war nor know its causes are not bound to investigate them. They may presume their Christian princes to be
God-fearing men with just reasons and may follow them.
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ARTICLE I — SIXTH DOUBT CONCLUDED; SEVENTH AND EIGHTH DOUBTS

It follows secondly that soldiers prepared to fight in any war whatever, without attending to the justice or injustice of the cause but only to greater or lesser pay, are in a
state of mortal sin and cannot be absolved while retaining that disposition. They have a will prepared for unjust war, just as one prepared to approach any woman without
caring whether she is his wife is disposed to adultery, or one prepared to swear whether the statement be true or false is disposed to perjury.
Finally, soldiers who are prepared to fight only in a just war, whether subjects or not, may follow a prince whom they know to be a Christian man and not manifestly
injuring anyone. Otherwise almost all ordinary soldiers would remain in mortal sin, contrary to reasonable military practice. They act prudently by following their
superiors. Nevertheless injustice can sometimes be so manifest that even private soldiers are bound to recognize it and are not excused by ignorance.
The objections are answered. The prince, as judge, must diligently examine the justice of the war before pronouncing sentence; the ordinary soldier's office is to execute a
sentence already pronounced, so the same degree of certitude is not required in both. The doubtful conscience of the subject soldier is speculative rather than practical:
practically he is certain that he does not sin by obeying his prince in a case not manifestly unjust. The witness differs because he can be a principal cause of condemnation,
whereas the ordinary soldier is instrumental.

SEVENTH DOUBT — IF THE CONDITIONS OF A JUST WAR ARE LACKING, ARE ALL THINGS TAKEN AND ALL DAMAGES SUBJECT TO
RESTITUTION?

FIRST CONCLUSION. When it is certain that the war is unjust, it is most certain that everything taken and all damages inflicted must be restored, not only by the prince
but by every soldier who participated, according to the rules governing several persons concurring in one theft or homicide. A qualification must be observed: if a soldier
probably judges that his particular aid or counsel contributed nothing to the additional loss that would not otherwise have occurred, he is bound to restore only what he
himself seized and the damages he personally inflicted.

SECOND CONCLUSION. When the war is unjust through ignorance, that ignorance is regularly culpable in the prince and regularly inculpable in ordinary soldiers. The
prince is bound to employ the greatest diligence in examining the cause because he is judge in so grave a matter. If, after due diligence, the truth ordinarily could have
been known, negligent ignorance is imputable to him. Ordinary soldiers are not bound to perform that examination and in doubt can follow their prince; therefore their
ignorance is commonly inculpable.

THIRD CONCLUSION. When the ignorance is culpable, all things taken and all damages inflicted are subject to restitution. Culpable ignorance does not excuse
injustice.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. When the ignorance is inculpable, only those things are subject to restitution by which the possessor has become richer; animals killed,
houses burned, and similar consumed damages are not to be restored by one who acted without fault merely because he materially caused them. One who in inculpable
ignorance consumes another's thing is bound to restitution only insofar as he was enriched, as will be treated in q.62.

EIGHTH DOUBT — IF A WAR BECOMES UNJUST BECAUSE THE PRINCE REFUSES CONDIGN SATISFACTION, WHAT MUST BE RESTORED?

The negative argument says that a judge who justly punishes a criminal is not bound to stop merely because the criminal offers an equivalent satisfaction. The prince
waging war is judge and the enemy prince stands as defendant; therefore perhaps he need not accept satisfaction.

FIRST CONCLUSION. If condign satisfaction is offered before the war has begun, the injured prince is bound to accept it and dismiss an army already assembled. If
he refuses, the subsequent war is unjust and restitution is owed as in any unjust war.
War is a matter of necessity, not of choice. Once condign satisfaction is offered, the necessity ceases and with it the just cause for war. Because just wars avenge injuries,
full satisfaction removes the injury to be vindicated. Moreover the injured prince is judge only accidentally because no superior tribunal is available; once the opposing
prince willingly provides the due satisfaction, that accidental judicial title ceases.
Condign satisfaction includes reimbursement of reasonable expenses already incurred in assembling an army when those expenses were made necessary by the original
injury.

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ARTICLE I — EIGHTH DOUBT: SATISFACTION OFFERED AFTER HOSTILITIES HAVE BEGUN

A graver question remains: if war has already begun and deaths have followed, must the offended prince accept condign satisfaction then offered?

Arguments for the affirmative are strong. The arguments proving the first conclusion appear still to apply. If the prince refuses satisfaction, the opposing side can seemingly defend itself; otherwise it would have to open the city gates and submit its necks to the sword. If both sides then fought justly, a just war would exist on both sides, which seems impossible. Again, after victory the offended prince cannot take more than condign satisfaction; therefore if sufficient satisfaction is offered even after war has begun, further violence seems unnecessary. War is of necessity, and where necessity ceases war should cease. If an impartial arbiter were appointed, he would judge that the satisfaction should be accepted, especially since innumerable evils to both commonwealths would thereby be avoided.

Arguments for the contrary: once a just war has begun, the offended prince has entered into the actual exercise of vindicative justice. The opposing prince is no longer merely in a condition of making satisfaction but of suffering satisfaction according to the sentence brought upon himself by his prior refusal. A criminal judge can punish the guilty according to the law even when the guilty offers another satisfaction; likewise a prince already executing a just vindicative sentence may continue.

A further confirmation: the prince waging a just war is not equal to the prince against whom the war is made but superior with respect to the vindicative title. St. Thomas gives the same ratio for the sword used against internal and external disturbers of the commonwealth.

Three opinions are found.

FIRST OPINION — Sylvester. If an adversary offers satisfaction for all the injury, damages, and labor of the offended party, anything taken beyond that is to be restored. Sylvester appears therefore to hold that the very offer of satisfaction makes further war unjust even after hostilities have begun.

SECOND OPINION — Cajetan. Once war has begun and killings have followed, the prince is not bound in justice to accept satisfaction although it is offered; he may continue the war. Cajetan teaches this in his Summa, s.v. Bellum, and seems to insinuate it in the present article.

THIRD, MIDDLE OPINION. Some masters distinguish two states of a begun war. If armies are not presently in actual combat, though fighting has occurred before, the offended prince must accept sufficient satisfaction. If the armies are already in actual conflict, he need not accept it. They distinguish an ordinary judge from a prince: the ordinary judge can punish according to the full rigor of law because that is expedient to the common good and he is custodian of the laws; the prince in international war is only an occasional judge, constituted for provision of his own commonwealth because no higher judge is available.

SECOND CONCLUSION. This third opinion is probable; nevertheless Cajetan's opinion is more probable. The necessity that justified beginning the war can continue in the execution once the opposing prince culpably refused due satisfaction at the proper time. Those now suffering the execution must impute the resulting evils to their earlier refusal. In this state they do not justly defend themselves against the execution of the vindicative sentence any more than a condemned criminal justly resists the ministers of justice.

From this it follows that the offended prince is not bound in justice to restore damages inflicted after refusing the later offer of satisfaction, although charity can often bind him to accept satisfaction and cease hostilities when circumstances make this the better course for the common good.

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ARTICLE I — THIRD CONDITION OF A JUST WAR: RIGHT INTENTION

Regarding the third condition of just war — that it proceed from the prince's right intention — note first that this is most necessary because intention of the end gives goodness or malice to human acts, as St. Thomas teaches in I-II, q.18, a.4 and q.19, aa.7-8.

The end of war is the peace and good, spiritual and temporal, of the commonwealth. Because war is an exceedingly severe remedy and many evils commonly follow from it, all lighter means must first be attempted before war is declared, just as a skillful physician first applies lighter medicines before grave and dangerous ones used for desperate diseases. Deuteronomy 20 commands that peace first be offered to the city to be attacked; Judges 20 shows Israel first sending legates to Benjamin demanding that the guilty be handed over before fighting.

“War from right intention” can be understood in two ways. First, according to the common ratio of virtue: every good work requires a right intention. In this sense the condition is common to all morally good acts. Second, according to the peculiar end of war: war is waged so that we may live in peace. In this second sense peace is the proper end required in the belligerent.

A ninth doubt therefore arises: does a sinister intention in the prince declaring war make the act a mortal sin obliging restitution, for example when he declares an otherwise just war from hatred or lust of domination?

First presuppose that if the prince's hatred makes the war itself unjust, because it no longer proceeds from a just cause, what was said above applies: the war is gravely sinful and all damages and goods taken must be restored, including damages inflicted upon his own commonwealth by unjustly burdening it.

Second, suppose the war remains objectively just and only the prince's intention is sinister. That intention can nevertheless cause additional harms either to the enemy commonwealth or to his own.

FIRST CONCLUSION. If by reason of the sinister intention only evils are inflicted upon the enemy commonwealth, while everything inflicted remains within what justice permits, the act of waging war is mortal or venial according to the malice of the intention, but there is no obligation of restitution. If the prince acts from hatred, the sin can be mortal; if from vainglory, it can be venial. The operation is morally corrupted by the bad intention, but no injustice is done to the enemy when only the punishment objectively due is inflicted. A judge who from hatred imposes upon a criminal precisely the penalty deserved sins in his intention but is not thereby bound to restore.

SECOND CONCLUSION. If the depraved intention causes harms to the prince's own commonwealth, he not only sins mortally but is bound to repair those damages.

By office he is bound to conserve the good of his commonwealth. If through his culpable intention he brings greater evils upon it than the injuries for which war was undertaken, he violates justice toward his own polity and must make satisfaction.

From this doctrine it follows that a prince who induces allies by command or counsel to enter an unjust war can be bound to compensate those allies for damages they suffer when they proceeded in good faith and would not otherwise have entered the war. Authors disagree in the case of allies who knowingly enter a wicked war at his command: Sylvester denies an obligation where they volunteered in bad faith, while others argue that the mandate can still ground restitution for losses. The distinction depends upon the precise causal and juridical title.

We have now explained the conditions necessary for a just war. We turn to the ius belli, the law of war: what evils can lawfully be inflicted upon enemies by a prince waging a just war.

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ARTICLE I — TENTH DOUBT: WHAT HARMS MAY BE INFLICTED UPON THE GUILTY IN A JUST WAR?

Arguments for a broad affirmative are drawn from Scripture and the law of nations. Judges 20 records Israel striking the Benjamites even after victory. Deuteronomy 20 commands in certain cities that every male be struck with the edge of the sword, and Deuteronomy 11 speaks of the land upon which Israel's foot shall tread. Roman law says that what is captured in war becomes booty, and the Institutes state that things taken from enemies become ours by the law of nations. Gratian likewise numbers occupation of territory, wars, captivities, and servitudes among institutions of the ius gentium. The common saying of the doctors is that what is taken in a just war belongs to the captor; Ambrose says booty taken in war is in the power of the victor. Practice in wars against the Turks is also invoked.

Against an unlimited right stands the nature of war itself: war is an act of vindicative justice, and therefore punishment must be measured according to fault: “according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.”

For explanation, first distinguish the enemy population. Some are guilty by common estimation and by the law of war: those who are the cause of the war and others who, because capable of bearing arms and participating in the war, are presumptively treated as guilty unless the contrary is known. Others are innocent by positive law, such as priests, monks, farmers, pilgrims, and similar persons protected by rules of truce and peace, though particular custom can affect some positive-law privileges.

Second, three principal kinds of evils are commonly inflicted in war: spoliation of movable goods, reduction into servitude or captivity, and killing.

Adrian and Abulensis say generally that things captured in a just war belong to the captors and that killing can be lawful, but they do not determine precisely how much devastation may be inflicted. Gabriel distinguishes defensive war from war under authority of a prince, but that distinction does not by itself resolve the question because a just war requires both legitimate authority and just cause.

FIRST CONCLUSION. In a war that is merely defensive, it is lawful to injure the enemy only so far as is sufficient for defense or recovery of one's own goods, even when the commonwealth defends itself by its own immediate authority. A commonwealth defending itself stands toward the attacking commonwealth as a private person defending himself against another private person: only what is necessary to repel force with the moderation of blameless defense is permitted.

Per accidens, however, broader vindicative action can sometimes become lawful where the commonwealth possesses the interpretative will of its prince, the aggressors are public enemies, and easy recourse to the prince is impossible. After victory, aggressors found within the territory can also be punished as malefactors who, by committing crimes there, have become subject to the commonwealth.

SECOND CONCLUSION. In a just aggressive war, all those harms may be inflicted which are necessary for full satisfaction and establishment of stable peace. It can therefore be lawful to destroy fortresses, build new ones, occupy kingdoms, and punish malefactors when these acts are necessary to compensate the injury and establish peace.

The reason is that the prince waging the just war stands as judge with respect to the offending prince and can impose what vindicative justice requires. The end of war is peace and tranquility; the means necessary to that end are lawful when proportionate. War is undertaken to restore equality and compensate losses.

The measure of sufficient satisfaction must be left to prudent judgment. In actual combat it is scarcely possible to maintain mathematical equality in punishment. A useful rule is taken from the intention of prince and soldiers: if they intend a just vindication and some excess occurs accidentally in the conflict, scruple should not be multiplied; but after victory, deliberate excess beyond just satisfaction creates injustice and an obligation of restitution. 717

ARTICLE I — TENTH DOUBT CONCLUDED; ELEVENTH DOUBT

THIRD CONCLUSION. Movable goods taken by soldiers in the actual conflict of a just war belong, according to the received law of war and legitimate custom, to those
to whom the law or prince assigns the booty; they are not automatically computed as part of the civil satisfaction owed for the principal injury. St. Thomas later, q.66, a.8
ad 1, Sylvester, Vitoria, Deuteronomy 20, and Ambrose are cited in support of the received law concerning spoils.
If, however, belligerents proceed at will in inflicting evils and exceed what justice demands so gravely that the war becomes unjust in its execution, prince and soldiers are
bound to restore the damages inflicted beyond the just measure. The measure of stripes must correspond to the offense; once the measure is exceeded, an injury is newly
done to the enemy and restitution follows.
The earlier scriptural arguments establish only a proportionate authority under a just title, not an unlimited license.
Regarding Judges 20, the sons of Israel appear to have sinned gravely by indiscriminately killing the Benjamites, including many innocents, unless ignorance excused
them according to the distinctions to follow.
ELEVENTH DOUBT — WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL IN A JUST WAR TO KILL THE INNOCENT
Arguments for the affirmative are drawn first from Deuteronomy 20, Joshua 6, and 1 Samuel 15, where divine commands concerning entire hostile populations are
recorded. If these are answered as special divine mandates, it is objected that Deuteronomy also speaks of ordinary hostile cities in a manner that seems to permit killing
many who did not personally cause the war.

Second, military practice sometimes permits a city to be given over to sack or assaulted with fire and sword when this is necessary for victory, deterrence of the enemy, or
encouragement of soldiers; in such events many women, children, and other innocents are foreseeably killed.

Third, if every means necessary for just satisfaction and stable peace is permitted, it can seem that after victory innocents could sometimes be killed in order to prevent
future danger — for example children of hostile peoples who are expected to become enemies worse than their parents.

Fourth, if innocent persons cannot be killed, perhaps neither can they be despoiled or carried into captivity, since taking an innocent person's goods is ordinarily
intrinsically unjust as theft or robbery. Yet the law of nations recognizes some spoliation and captivity in war.
A fifth objection: if direct killing of innocents is forbidden but indirect killing permitted, it might follow that — apart from ignorance — there could be a just war on both
sides. Innocents within a fortress can justly defend themselves against soldiers attacking it, while those soldiers may justly attack the fortress even foreseeing the
innocents' deaths.
Against these arguments, St. Thomas below q.64, a.6 expressly teaches that it is never lawful directly to kill an innocent person: “the innocent and just person thou shalt
not put to death,” and children are not to be put to death for their parents. The foundation of just war is injury; an innocent person has inflicted no injury precisely insofar
as he is innocent. The same authority that governs punishment of internal citizens and external enemies therefore cannot directly punish an innocent with death merely for
another's crime.
For resolution presuppose that killing the innocent can occur in two ways: directly and per se from intention, or per accidens and outside the intention.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is never lawful directly, per se, and intentionally to kill innocent persons as innocent, unless God Himself, the Lord of life, specially
commands it. Such killing is intrinsically evil. Vitoria and Driedo teach this, and the arguments just given prove it.
From this it follows that Israel sinned gravely by indiscriminately killing the Benjamites unless excused by ignorance; that a soldier may not kill one whom he knows to be
innocent even because he foresees that the person will later become guilty; and that future crimes may not be prevented by presently killing the innocent, because evil may
not be done that good may come.
Vitoria likewise concludes that in a just war, even against the Turks, infants may not be directly killed because they are innocent, nor women insofar as they are presumed
innocent in war, nor peaceful farmers, pilgrims, guests, clerics, or religious unless the contrary is established — for example if they actually fight.
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ARTICLE I — ELEVENTH DOUBT: KILLING THE INNOCENT (continued)

The Emperor Theodosius was therefore rightly reproved by Ambrose for ordering the Thessalonians to be killed without discrimination, so that many innocents were slain.

SECOND CONCLUSION. To kill innocent persons per accidens and outside the intention is not sinful when a city may justly be assaulted and cannot otherwise be taken except by engines of war or similar means, even though it is foreseen that many innocents will die. Vitoria, Soto, and the common opinion teach this.

The first reason is supplied by the arguments already given and by the common practice of princes waging just wars.

Second, the killing of the innocent is not voluntary in the morally imputable sense as an intended object. Their death is voluntary only in causa, but the soldiers are not bound to omit a just and necessary cause merely because an unintended death follows. What one is not bound to avoid is not voluntarily imputable as fault under that ratio.

Third, in legitimate self-defense one may sometimes act against an aggressor whose personal fault is absent through ignorance, when the defensive act is otherwise necessary and the aggressor's death occurs outside the defender's intention. In like manner a prince is not always bound to desist from a just war because innocents will perish accidentally.

The analogy with medicine confirms this doctrine. A physician may not administer medicine to a pregnant woman with the intention of producing abortion, even if the woman's health would follow. But he may administer necessary medicine to purge harmful humors with the intention of curing her, while an abortion is foreseen and follows per accidens. Likewise in a just war the death of innocent persons may follow outside the intention from an act directly ordered to the just military object.

This doctrine requires proportion. If a town contains very many innocents and only a few guilty persons, it can be unlawful to destroy the town because the evil foreseen would be greater than the good intended. The principle of indirect effect does not dispense from weighing necessity and proportion.

THIRD CONCLUSION. In a just war it can be lawful to despoil and carry into captivity innocent persons, including those known to be innocent, when this is genuinely required by the law and necessities of a just war. Vitoria treats this at length.

The reasons differ from those governing life. Innocent persons are parts of the hostile commonwealth and can, under a just public title, bear certain temporal burdens following from the fault of the polity or of those to whom they are juridically joined. The law can impose loss of goods upon children for crimes of parents in certain public offenses, and the maxim that no one is punished without fault admits punishment where another just public cause exists. Moreover victory sometimes cannot be obtained without temporal spoliation and captivity.

I accept Vitoria's qualification: this is to be understood only when the war, victory, or condign satisfaction cannot conveniently be secured otherwise. If the innocent city's inhabitants neither consented to nor aided the unjust war, the title for despoiling them can fail.

I do not accept Sylvester's assertion that, after victory, a prince must necessarily restore whatever remains of the spoils taken from innocents merely because they were innocent. If those goods were lawfully and justly acquired under the title of war, they are not automatically subject to restitution afterward.

If the hostile prince refuses to restore goods unjustly taken and the injured commonwealth cannot otherwise recover them, its soldiers under princely authority can take condign satisfaction from other goods within the hostile kingdom, even from innocent subjects. The title is the public debt of the offending commonwealth whose prince refuses justice; it is analogous to taking satisfaction from another asset of a debtor when the specific stolen thing cannot be recovered.

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ARTICLE I — ELEVENTH DOUBT CONCLUDED; TWELFTH DOUBT

The scriptural texts concerning hostile cities can be understood according to the presumption of the law of war: adult males capable of bearing arms in a hostile city are presumed guilty unless the contrary is manifest. The prince and soldiers are not bound after victory to investigate individually every combatant's interior guilt. This appears to be the most probable understanding of the command that exempted women and children. Where innocent persons can be clearly distinguished as having given
neither aid nor counsel to the war, they may not be directly killed. A just war must be conducted with the least injury to innocents compatible with necessity, as charity toward neighbor requires.

Ordinarily and commonly it is not lawful to deliver a city indiscriminately to sack, fire, and sword because of the many temporal and spiritual evils that follow. Where victory cannot otherwise be obtained, the common opinion permits the assault, but then harms to innocents must be outside the intention and per accidens.

Nor may innocent children be killed merely because they will probably become future enemies. It is intolerable to punish someone for a future crime. A prince has other
means of securing the commonwealth — exile, custody, removal, or other proportionate measures. We may not presently kill one whom we know will later become our
enemy merely because of that prediction.

The difference between life and temporal goods answers the objection concerning spoliation. A commonwealth can possess public authority over certain temporal goods
of its members and can impose temporal burdens for public causes; it does not possess dominion over the lives of innocent citizens as though life were a transferable possession. Hence a just enemy may under the law of war take temporal goods under a public title where direct killing would remain intrinsically forbidden.

The case of a just war on both sides per accidens is not impossible under diverse titles. Innocents in a fortress may defend themselves insofar as they are personally innocent and have not caused the unjust war, while the attacking soldiers can lawfully assault the fortress under the public title against the guilty commonwealth and foresee innocent deaths only per accidens. The war is not just on both sides under the same formal title; the parties act under diverse titles, just as an innocent person condemned by a judge according to legally sufficient but false evidence can, in certain circumstances, defend himself while the judge proceeds justly according to the external proofs.

TWELFTH DOUBT — WHETHER, IN A JUST WAR AGAINST SARACENS WHO ARE REBELS AND GUILTY OF LESE-MAJESTY AGAINST BOTH DIVINE AND HUMAN AUTHORITY, INNOCENT PERSONS MAY BE REDUCED TO SERVITUDE

The case especially concerns the recent war of Granada and similar wars.

An argument for servitude is that by the law of nations captives taken in a just war become slaves of the captors and may be sold. Among Christians this severe form of servitude has fallen out of use in favor of the faith: Christian captives are commonly detained only until redeemed. Apostates and rebels who have deserted the Christian
faith might therefore seem to forfeit the privilege introduced in favor of Christian religion.

The point is reinforced by the distinction between apostates and heretics. Heretics, while retaining the name and end of Christianity, choose erroneous means concerning
faith. Apostates abandon the faith and deny Christ, the very end of Christian religion. Thus even if heretics retain the Christian privilege against enslavement, apostates seem less worthy of it.

For the contrary, baptized children who have committed no evil retain true faith received in baptism and cannot lose it before the use of reason. It is not apparent how, without fault, they could be reduced to servitude. Baptism regenerates them as free children of the Church. Liberty also belongs to nature in a manner different from hereditary nobility or civil patrimony.

Presuppose as certain that enemies captured in a just war can, according to the ancient ius gentium, be reduced into captivity. Among Christians, however, the common Christian usage is that captives in a just war do not become slaves of the captors in the ancient strict sense but can be detained until redeemed by money. The question is
therefore whether baptized children of apostate rebels share the Christian privilege or the condition of other infidels.

One opinion allows adult apostate rebels, innocent children, women, and the aged to be reduced to the stricter servitude of the law of nations. Another distinguishes: adult
rebels can be enslaved because they have rebelled both against their lawful king and against Christ; children who could not think evil cannot justly be subjected to such personal punishment; adults proven innocent likewise cannot; children could perhaps be subjected if an express condition of submission had previously provided that rebellion would bring such servitude upon descendants; and some add that extreme public necessity for the expenses of war might justify sale under a separate title.

MY FIRST CONCLUSION. It seems most certain to me that adult apostate rebels may, by the law of war, be reduced to servitude like other unbelievers who never received the faith. They have not only raised the standard against their lawful king but against the Author of faith whom they received in baptism.

MY SECOND CONCLUSION. It seems to me that infants and innocent persons who have thought no evil may not, merely by the law of war, be reduced to that servitude. Personal deprivation of natural liberty requires a proportionate personal or juridical title. The mere fault of parents or commonwealth does not, without more, supply a sufficient title for imposing this gravest personal servitude upon innocent baptized children.

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QUESTION XL - ON WAR

ARTICLE I - TWELFTH DOUBT: WHETHER, IN A JUST WAR AGAINST SARACENS WHO ARE

REBELS AND GUILTY OF LESE-MAJESTY AGAINST BOTH DIVINE AND HUMAN AUTHORITY, IT IS LAWFUL TO REDUCE INNOCENT PERSONS TO SERVITUDE To the fifth argument it is answered by conceding that, just as through ignorance there can be a just war on both sides, as we said above, so also per accidens this can occur without ignorance, as in the case proposed in the argument. For those who assault the fortress consider those innocent persons as parts of the commonwealth which is at fault; but the innocent persons who defend themselves consider themselves precisely as truly innocent and as neither being the cause nor sharing the fault of the unjust war. Therefore there is not a just war on both sides with respect to the same cause or title, but with respect to diverse titles; and this presents no difficulty. It is similar to the case of an innocent man condemned to death by a sentence that is just according to the things alleged and proved: apart from scandal he can defend himself, while the judge can condemn him. Thus a just conflict can arise on both sides per accidens, but not per se. To the confirmation it is answered that a physician may never give medicine to a pregnant woman with the intention that an abortion occur, even though the woman's health should consequently follow. In the same way it is not lawful intentionally to kill innocent persons even though the safety of the commonwealth should follow. But it is lawful for a physician to give a pregnant woman medicine for purging harmful humors even though an abortion is feared, because the abortion then follows per accidens and outside the intention. In the same way, in a just war the death of innocent persons follows per accidens, as we said in the second conclusion, and does not follow per se from the intention of the one waging the just war. In the twelfth place it is asked whether, in a just war against Saracens who are rebels and guilty of lese-majesty, both divine and human - for example in the recent war of Granada and in other wars of this kind - it is lawful to reduce innocent persons to servitude. In this doubt it must be presupposed as most certain, as we intimated in the fourth and tenth doubts, that enemies can by the law of war be reduced into captivity; and this belongs to the law of nations, as is stated in the canon Ius gentium, distinction 1, together with the gloss there. Among Christians, however, those captured in a just war do not become slaves of their captors; they can nevertheless be detained until they are redeemed with money. This is clear from the common usage of Christians. The question, therefore, is whether the children of those rebels, who are baptized and subjects of a Christian prince, share the condition of other infidels, or rather enjoy the privilege of Christians in this matter. For the affirmative side it is argued first that they enjoy the privilege of Christians. The faithful enjoy this privilege because of the reception of baptism; but these persons also received true baptism. Therefore they enjoy the privilege. If someone replies that Christians enjoy this privilege not by reason of baptism but because of the faith, which those apostates do not possess, the contrary is argued: true faith does not remain in a heretic, as was said above in q.5, a.3 and q.11, and nevertheless heretics enjoy this privilege, as appears from the wars waged against the Lutherans. Therefore the reply does not suffice. It is argued secondly that innocent children who are the offspring of these apostates retain the true faith which they received in baptism and could not have lost it before the use of reason. Therefore at least these enjoy the privilege. It is argued thirdly that apostates enjoy the privilege of Christians in the matter of marriage; therefore similarly in the law of war. The antecedent is proved: a marriage contracted between a believer and an infidel who has never received the faith is null, whereas a marriage contracted between a believer and one who once received the faith is a true marriage, as Master Soto shows in IV Sentences, d.39, q.unica, aa.3-4. Therefore the same appears to follow here. Finally it is argued that no reason appears why children who have thought no evil can be subjected to servitude. Since the Church has regenerated them through baptism as free children, I do not see how they can be made slaves without fault. If it is said that, just as the descendants of heretics are deprived of paternal inheritance and nobility in favor of the faith, so these can be deprived of liberty, the contrary is argued: there is a great difference. The descendants of heretics have no right to their father's goods while the father is alive, and therefore the goods taken away belong to the delinquents themselves; nobility, moreover, is acquired by the favor and beneficence of princes, and therefore they can be deprived of nobility. Liberty, however, is from nature. For the opposite side it is argued first that it belongs to the law of nations that those captured in a just war become the slaves of their captors, so that they can be sold, as is clear from the canon Ius gentium, distinction 1. Among Christians this right has been modified in favor of the faith, so that those captured in war are not punished with so miserable a servitude. But these rebels and apostates deserve to be deprived of that privilege by princes. The minor is proved: this privilege, or dispensation from the law of nations, was introduced in favor of the faith and religion, because it was unfitting that a servant of Christ captured in war should become a slave of men in that manner. But those apostates deserted the Christian faith and religion by denying Christ. Therefore the privilege ceases in their case. Secondly it is argued: when the end and cause cease, the effect ceases. But this privilege or dispensation arose from the cause that the Christian religion should be loved and shown more worthy than other sects; that cause and end cease in those apostates. Therefore the privilege ceases. Thirdly it is argued from what we said above, q.11, a.12: an apostate differs from a heretic in this, that the heretic, while retaining the end - namely Christ - chooses diverse means and diverse errors contrary to the faith; but the apostate abandons the faith itself and denies Christ, who is the end of the whole Christian religion. Therefore, although heretics can enjoy this privilege and dispensation in favor of the faith, apostates are altogether unworthy of it. On this doubt there are diverse opinions. The first opinion holds that by the law of war it is lawful to reduce these apostates to servitude as slaves, just like other infidels who never received the faith. Indeed, according to this opinion, not only the adult rebels but also children who are innocent by the law of nature can, by the law of war, be reduced to that servitude, whether they were baptized by their parents or not. Likewise those who by the law of war are presumed innocent and unfit to bear arms, such as women and the aged, can be reduced to this servitude. We have called these aged persons and women innocent by the law of war because, before the king's tribunal, they are presumed guilty of lese-majesty, and before the tribunal of the Inquisition they are presumed guilty of apostasy against the faith: in so great a multitude of conspirators it is not credible, according to this opinion, that the conspiracy and rebellion against the faith and the king were unknown to them. A second opinion makes five assertions. First, it says that adult rebels could with full right be reduced to servitude. For they raised the standard not only against their own king but also against the Author of the faith whom they received in baptism. Hence, just as they could be killed as perfidious persons and heretics, so they could be condemned to the galleys perpetually and oppressed by the yoke of servitude. Nor do we read that the contrary has been established by canon law; rather, it is established only that Christian slaves may not be sold to infidels. Indeed, as the first opinion says, by the law of war they can be reduced to servitude just like those who never received the faith. Second, this opinion says that in the case of children who could think no evil, no sufficient reason appears why they should be subjected to servitude; in this it contradicts the first opinion. Third, adults who sinned neither against the king nor against the faith cannot be reduced to servitude. For it is a personal punishment that one who is already his own master should be deprived of his liberty; but it seems contrary to reason that an innocent person should be punished with a personal punishment, especially one who has deserved well of the king and religion. Therefore he cannot justly be reduced to servitude. If any such persons are found among the rebels whose innocence cannot be publicly established, they will stand like an innocent person who is proved guilty according to the external form of judgment. The discussion of this second opinion continues on the following page.
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QUESTION XL - ON WAR

ARTICLE I - TWELFTH DOUBT (continued) The second opinion says five things. First. Adult rebels could

with full right be reduced to servitude. For they raised the standard not only against their own king, but also against the Author of the faith whom they received in baptism. Hence, just as they could be killed as perfidious men and heretics, so they could also be condemned perpetually to the galleys and oppressed under the yoke of servitude. Nor do we read that the contrary has been established by the canonical laws; only this is established, that Christian slaves may not be sold to infidels. Indeed, as the first opinion says, by the law of war they can be reduced to servitude just like those who never received the faith. Second. In the case of little children, who could think no evil, no reason appears why they can be subjected to servitude. In this the present opinion contradicts the first. Third. Adults who have sinned neither against the king nor against the faith cannot be reduced to servitude. For it is a certain personal punishment that one who is already his own master should be deprived of his liberty. But it seems contrary to reason that an innocent person should be punished by a personal punishment, especially one who has deserved well of the king and of religion. Therefore he cannot justly be reduced to servitude. If any such persons are found among the rebels whose innocence cannot be publicly established, they will stand as does an innocent man who is proved guilty according to the exterior form of judgment. Fourth. If, at the time when the people of Granada surrendered themselves to the Catholic Kings, they were received upon this condition - that if at any time they rebelled, their descendants should be oppressed by captivity and servitude - then even their children could now with full right be reduced to servitude. The reason is that liberty was given to them through the clemency of the princes; therefore, just as it could have been given absolutely, so it could have been given under this most just condition. That the condition is just is evident. If a manumitted slave is ungrateful to his former master, according to the laws he is reduced again to his former servitude. How much more, therefore, may those be reduced who have been ungrateful both to Christ and to their kings? Hence even children could without scruple be reduced to servitude if that agreement is established. But if no such agreement is established, can there be another title? Fifth. If their booty were not sufficient to sustain the expenses of the war, perhaps their children could be sold. For if by natural law, because of grave necessity, a father may sell a son who is still innocent, much more may the commonwealth do so for a common cause. And no cause seems more public than religion. According to the first opinion, the first argument is answered by saying that this privilege and dispensation introduced into the law of nations was established not only because of baptism but also because of the confession of Christ, at least with respect to the end of the Christian religion. Heretics retain that end, whereas apostates do not retain it. Therefore heretics enjoy that privilege which apostates do not enjoy. To the second argument it is answered that innocent children, because of the sins of that commonwealth of which they are parts and because of the sins of their parents, incur this grave servitude; for in this miserable servitude they follow the condition of their parents, just as in the other matters of which we spoke above in the tenth and eleventh doubts of this article. To the third argument the consequence is denied. First, because matrimony is a sacrament of the Church, and therefore it is sufficient for that marriage to be valid that the parties have the sacraments of the Church. Second, because the invalidation of marriage between a believer and an unbeliever exists solely by positive law. But this positive law never invalidated a marriage contracted between a believer and an apostate. Therefore the ratio is not the same in matrimony and in the law of war.

THIRTEENTH DOUBT - WHETHER THOSE CAPTURED IN A JUST WAR MAY FLEE FROM THEIR MASTERS WITHOUT SIN AND WITHOUT AN OBLIGATION OF RESTITUTION It is then asked whether those who have been captured in a just war may flee from their masters by whom they were captured, without sin and without an obligation of restitution. For the negative side it is argued first: if it were lawful for them to flee, consequently it would also be lawful to counsel them to flee. But the consequent is false; therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved because what slaves may lawfully do without sin may consequently also be counseled to them. The minor is proved from the Council of Gangra, canon 3, whose words are reported in 17, q.4, c. Si quis servum, where such counsel to depart from the service of masters is forbidden even under the pretext of religion. Such counsel is likewise prohibited in the civil law, ff. de servo corrupto and ff. de servis fugitivis. Second, it is argued: one condemned to prison cannot flee from it, but is bound to remain there, as the commentators on St. Thomas say below, q.69, a.2, because he has been condemned to this by a just sentence which he is bound to obey. But one captured in a just war has been condemned by a just sentence to servitude, since the prince who wages a just war is a judge, as we said above. Therefore it seems that the captive is likewise bound not to flee.

QUESTION XL - ON WAR

ARTICLE I - THIRTEENTH DOUBT: WHETHER CAPTIVES TAKEN IN A JUST WAR

MAY FLEE (concluded)

For the determination of the truth there is one conclusion. Those captured in a just war, if an opportunity presents itself and they flee from their masters, neither sin nor are they bound to restore any price to them. We began to indicate this conclusion in the third doubt.

Covarruvias teaches it in Book II of the Variae Resolutiones, chapter 2, no. 10, and in his relection on the rule Peccatum, part II, section 11, no. 6, especially concerning servants captured by unbelievers even in a just war.

The conclusion is proved universally regarding all who are captured in a just war. First, from the Institutes, De rerum divisione, where it is said that enemies captured in war become captives by the law of war, and that if they escape our power and return to their own people they recover their former status. Second, the servitude introduced by the law of nations is accompanied by the same law of nations under which those who escape from their masters are considered free, even if they restore no price. This is proved from the universal custom of nations waging war: no one has ever demanded such a price from fugitive captives, nor have fugitives ordinarily paid it. Third, the servitude incurred through capture in a just war is a most noble species of servitude and differs greatly from servitude incurred through sale; therefore such captives may flee.

This conclusion is nevertheless understood only from the force of capture in a just war. Another title can bind a captive not to flee. If a captive has pledged his faith that he will not escape, he may no longer flee. For the captor, relying on that pledge, does not employ the same diligence in guarding him that he otherwise would; the captor therefore ought not suffer loss because he trusted the captive. We also noted another exception above in the third doubt.

To the first objection: the same law of nations that approves the fugitive's escape disapproves counsel given by another to induce that escape. Therefore, although the captives themselves may flee, others may not without sin counsel or assist them to flee, especially when the masters are unbelievers, because such conduct under the pretext of religion would give them an occasion to blaspheme the Christian religion. Perhaps the Council of Gangra spoke chiefly of slaves bought for a price rather than those captured in war. Those bought for a price cannot safely in conscience flee their masters, because by justice they are bound to preserve the agreement originally made.

There is no valid inference: “it is lawful for them to flee; therefore it is lawful for another to counsel them to flee.” Cajetan gives a parallel case below, q.69, a.4: prisoners can sometimes lawfully escape from prison, while ministers of justice may not counsel or aid such escape.

To the second objection: the consequence from a criminal prison sentence to captivity in war is denied. Captivity produced by war is a peculiar and more noble kind of servitude and imprisonment, and by the law of nations the captive may flee.

To the third: just as escaped prisoners may be punished for the public good even where the escape itself was not culpable under the precise title considered, so a master may coerce a captive for the preservation of his own right. The captive can therefore be punished without fault under that title, but not without cause, according to the legal maxim.

FINAL DOUBT OF ARTICLE I - THE LAW OF SOLDIERS

The final doubt in this article concerns military law and the rules soldiers are bound to observe. The doctors of canon law treat the matter at Distinction 1, chapter Ius militare.

FIRST CONCLUSION. The rules given by St. John the Baptist in Luke 3 must be observed before all else: “Do violence to no man, and be content with your wages.” From this it follows that the prince is bound to pay soldiers the customary stipend, and soldiers may not take from enemies more than the prince has lawfully determined. If the prince commands the contrary, he is bound to restitution of the things unjustly taken. Cajetan teaches this in the Summa, s.v. Bellum, point 4.

From this Cajetan also gathers that soldiers who oppress private persons, peasants, and guests by robberies sin mortally. They are not excused because stipend has not been paid, since the goods of peasants and citizens are not thereby made liable to them.

SECOND CONCLUSION. No one universal rule can be fixed for division of booty after victory. The approved laws and customs of each kingdom must be observed. In the kingdoms of Spain this matter is regulated especially by the laws of Partida II, title 26.

THIRD CONCLUSION. A soldier is bound under mortal sin to keep the assigned position or station even when danger of death intervenes. Cajetan treats this excellently in his tract on the bond of obedience. The reason is that by his military office the soldier is obliged to an act of fortitude for the common good. Therefore he must maintain the post despite danger of death. The practice of well-ordered armies openly confirms the conclusion. The same applies proportionately to guards entrusted with defensive positions.

Concerning tournaments, the Decretals contain a special title depriving of ecclesiastical burial those who die in such exercises. This is to be understood when the tournaments are intrinsically dangerous, inordinate, and quasi-hostile, from which deaths and dangers to souls frequently arise. If someone dies unexpectedly and merely per accidens in an otherwise lawful military exercise, he is not for that reason deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Lawful and non-dangerous exercises are useful preparations for the fortitude needed in defense of the commonwealth.

The same discussion suggests the question of the duel. In our age no substantial doubt remains, because the Council of Trent, Session XXV, chapter 19 on reform, gravely prohibits dueling.

I say briefly that a duel is in no way lawful. A private person is permitted only to repel force by force. To provoke another to a duel is not to repel force but to seek private vindication. To accept a duel is likewise not simple defense, but voluntarily to place oneself in danger either of killing one's neighbor or of being killed.

If it is objected that the challenger has no other means of recovering his honor, or that one challenged suffers violence to his reputation unless he accepts, the answer is that this loss of honor exists only among worldly and vain men who pursue vain glory. Among good and God-fearing men a person loses no true honor by refusing private vengeance for God's sake. He can answer lawfully: “Wherever you attack me, I am prepared to defend myself; but I do not accept a duel, because it is impious and condemned by just laws.” If dueling were lawful merely for preservation of reputation, there could be a just war on both sides apart from ignorance, and the nature of dueling would also generate enormous scandals and disturbances in the commonwealth.

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QUESTION XL - ON WAR

ARTICLE II - WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR CLERICS AND BISHOPS TO FIGHT

It seems that it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.

OBJECTION 1. Wars are lawful and just insofar as they defend the poor and the whole commonwealth from injuries of enemies. But this defense seems especially to belong to prelates. Gregory says in a homily that when the wolf comes upon the sheep - that is, when any unjust man and robber oppresses the faithful and humble - he who appeared to be a shepherd but was not leaves the sheep and flees because, fearing danger to himself, he does not presume to resist the other's injustice. Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

OBJECTION 2. Pope Leo writes that, because Saracens were often said to be secretly approaching the port of Rome, he ordered the people to be assembled and to descend to the maritime shore. Therefore bishops may proceed to wars.

OBJECTION 3. It seems of the same ratio that a man do something himself and that he consent to another's doing it: Romans 1 says that not only those who do such things are worthy of death but also those who consent to those who do them. Most of all one consents who induces others to act. Yet bishops and clerics may lawfully induce others to fight. For it is said in the Decretum that by the exhortation and prayers of Adrian, Bishop of Rome, Charles undertook war against the Lombards. Therefore clerics themselves may also fight.

OBJECTION 4. What is in itself honorable and meritorious is not unlawful for prelates and clerics. But to wage war can sometimes be both honorable and meritorious. It is said in the Decretum that if anyone dies for the truth of the faith, the salvation of the fatherland, and defense of Christians, he will obtain a heavenly reward from God. Therefore bishops and clerics may fight.

ON THE CONTRARY. To Peter, in the person of bishops and clerics, it is said in Matthew 26: “Put thy sword into its sheath.” Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

I ANSWER THAT many things are necessary for the good of human society. Diverse things are better and more expediently performed by diverse persons than by one, as the Philosopher shows in the Politics. Some occupations are mutually incompatible and cannot fittingly be exercised at the same time; therefore those deputed to greater things are forbidden lesser occupations. Thus human laws forbid commercial occupations to soldiers who are deputed to military exercises.

Military exercises are especially repugnant to the offices to which bishops and clerics are deputed for two reasons.

First, by a general reason. Military exercises contain the greatest disquiet and therefore greatly impede the mind from contemplation of divine things, from the praise of God, and from prayer for the people, which belong to the clerical office. Therefore, just as commercial business is forbidden to clerics because it greatly entangles the mind, so military exercises are forbidden according to 2 Timothy 2: “No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses.”

Second, by a special reason. All clerical orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, in which under the sacrament the Passion of Christ is represented: “As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord until he come.” Therefore it does not become clerics to kill or shed blood, but rather to be prepared to shed their own blood for Christ, so that in deed they imitate what they minister sacramentally. For this reason those who shed blood, even without sin, incur irregularity. No one deputed to an office may lawfully do what makes him incongruous for that office. Therefore clerics are altogether forbidden to wage wars ordered toward shedding blood.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 1. Prelates ought to resist not only wolves who spiritually kill the flock but also robbers and tyrants who bodily afflict it. They do so, however, not by personally using material arms but by spiritual arms: salutary admonitions, devout prayers, and, against the obstinate, sentences of excommunication.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 2. Prelates and clerics may, by authority of a superior, be present in wars, not so that they fight with their own hands, but so that they spiritually assist those who fight justly by exhortations, absolutions, and similar spiritual helps. Under the Old Law priests were commanded to sound sacred trumpets in war. It was first under this title that bishops or clerics were permitted to proceed to wars. That some personally fight with their own hands is an abuse.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 3. As said above, every power, art, or virtue to which an end belongs also disposes concerning the things ordered to that end. Carnal wars among the faithful are to be referred to spiritual divine good as their end, and clerics are deputed to that spiritual good. Therefore it belongs to clerics to dispose and induce others to fight just wars. They are not forbidden to fight because fighting is simply sinful, but because such an exercise is incongruous to their persons.

REPLY TO OBJECTION 4. Although to exercise just war can be meritorious, it is nevertheless rendered unlawful to clerics because they are deputed to more meritorious works. In the same way, marital intercourse can be meritorious and yet is sinful for those bound by a vow of virginity because they are obligated to a greater good.

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ARTICLE II - SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. The conclusion is negative. The reason is both that military exercises are especially repugnant to the offices of clerics, and that all clerical orders are destined to the ministry of the altar, where the Passion, patience, and meekness of Christ are represented sacramentally; ministers of the altar ought to imitate these things. Gregory Nazianzen also explicitly teaches that arms are forbidden to bishops and clerics.

COMMENTARY - FIRST DOUBT: WHETHER FIGHTING IS FORBIDDEN TO ALL CLERICS WITHOUT DISTINCTION

Concerning this article it is first doubted whether fighting is forbidden universally to all clerics. On this doubt and the whole article see Gratian, C.23 q.8. By the name “clerics” I understand universally all who possess any ecclesiastical order, even first tonsure. Sylvester says this, and it follows from the Decretals concerning the quality and age of those to be ordained.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Clerics constituted only in the minor orders do not sin mortally by fighting.

First, this is proved from common usage, which is not reproved by learned men. Second, such clerics do not sin mortally by contracting marriage; therefore neither by fighting. The consequence follows because marriage is no less repugnant to the clerical office than fighting.

Third, although all orders are directed toward the sacrifice of the altar, the minor orders are directed to it only mediately and remotely.

This is confirmed because clerics are forbidden to pursue secular honors and likewise to judge causes of blood, yet clerics in minor orders who pronounce sentence in a capital cause do not therefore sin mortally. Hence the laws prohibiting warfare to clerics must either be understood of those in major orders or, as regards minor clerics, have ceased through contrary legitimate usage. Nevertheless some learned men maintain that minor clerics who fight sin venially, because although they are not immediately ordered to the sacrifice of the Mass, they are mediately ordered and disposed toward it.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Clerics constituted in major orders sin mortally if, without permission of the Supreme Pontiff, they fight either in offensive or defensive war.

First, this is the common opinion of theologians and jurists. Second, clerics who fight are punished in law by the gravest penalties, which presuppose grave fault: they are deprived of the exercise of their orders and can be perpetually enclosed in a monastery. If such a cleric dies in battle, the canons command that offerings and prayers not be made for him under the legal discipline there prescribed. The conclusion is extended also to monks, even lay monks, according to the cited canons.

SECOND DOUBT: BY WHAT LAW IS WARFARE FORBIDDEN TO CLERICS? IS IT FORBIDDEN BY DIVINE LAW?

An affirmative argument is drawn from Matthew 26, where Christ said to Peter: “Put thy sword into its place.” The words seem to have been spoken to Peter in the name of clerics and bishops; therefore warfare appears prohibited by divine law.

The argument is confirmed from Gratian, who says that it is easily proved from Matthew 26 and Romans 12 that bishops and clerics may not take arms either by their own authority or by authority of the Supreme Pontiff. If not even the Pope can authorize them, the prohibition seems to be divine rather than merely human, since the Pope can dispense from human ecclesiastical law.

Because of these arguments some canonists maintain that warfare is prohibited to clerics by divine rather than human law. Turrecremata is cited for this position.

FIRST CONCLUSION. Warfare is not forbidden to clerics by divine or natural law, but by positive ecclesiastical law alone.

This positive law is found in C.23 q.8, where many pontifical decrees prohibit clerical warfare.

First, the conclusion is proved because nowhere in the Gospel is clerical warfare prohibited as such by an express divine precept. Second, a cleric can by pontifical dispensation pronounce judgment in a cause of blood, as occurs at Rome; therefore the Pope can likewise dispense a cleric to fight, since the two activities are prohibited under comparable ecclesiastical discipline. Third, this is the common opinion of theologians and jurists.

SECOND CONCLUSION. This ecclesiastical law has a great foundation in natural and divine law.

The reasons given by St. Thomas in this article show the fittingness of the ecclesiastical prohibition: the contemplative and sacramental office of clerics is strongly incongruous with the shedding of blood. Therefore the Pope may dispense individual clerics to fight when a grave necessity requires it; but he would act badly if he dispensed commonly and absolutely with all clerics, because warfare remains gravely indecorous to the clerical state.

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To the argument it is answered first that these words of Christ are not to be restricted to clerics alone. St. Thomas teaches this in article 1, reply to the first objection, following the mind of St. Augustine, Agai
book 22, chapter 70; rather, they are to be understood of all who take up
the sword by private authority. But because St. Thomas in the
adduces those words concerning bishops and clerics, it is answered
secondly that they are to be understood not as imposing an ab
sity, but only as a matter of fittingness. For it is unbecoming that the
ministers of Christ, who are to minister at His altar, should devote themselves to warfare or to the shedding of blood, for the reasons given by St. Thomas in the article. Hence, to the confirmation it is answered that what Gratian says is false unless it is understood as a matter of fittingness; for the cited text has no greater authority than Gratian himself.

A third doubt is raised: whether clerics may ever fight without the permission of the Supreme Pontiff. On this point note that someone may wage war in two ways: first, with his own hand; secondly, through others, as does one who initiates war and summons soldiers. Likewise one may exhort
others to fight in several ways: first, by exhorting them to virtue and to conduct themselves bravely in war; secondly, by admonishing them to kill the enemy.

FIRST CONCLUSION. If the commonwealth were in extreme or most grave necessity, it is lawful for a cleric to fight with his own hand in a defensive war even without a dispensation of the Pontiff. For example, suppose a city is besieged by enemies and there is great probability that it will be defended if the clerics fight, whereas otherwise it will be captured: then clerics may fight. This conclusion is Cajetan's in this article. It is proved first: by natural law everyone ought to defend his commonwealth; but positive law does not derogate from natural law. Therefore, although by positive law warfare is prohibited to clerics, they may fight in this case. Secondly: if the legislator were present, he would will the cleric to fight
in such a case; therefore he may fight. This is confirmed because, just as grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, so ecclesiastical law does not
destroy natural law nor conflict with it. But natural law inclines this man to fight here and now; therefore he may do so. The major is clear, for ecclesiastical law is a determination of natural or divine law.

From this it follows that in such a case the cleric not only may fight, but is even bound to do so. Ecclesiastical law does not free anyone from what he is bound to do according to the law of nature; but by natural law everyone is bound to defend his commonwealth. Therefore clerics also, in such
cases, may and must fight. The major is proved because, as Cajetan well says above, q. 33, a. 7, the clerical or monastic state does not exempt a man
from the obligation of natural law: grace perfects nature, it does not destroy it.

What has been said in the conclusion about defensive war must be extended to offensive war if there were an extreme or most grave necessity of the
Church, or when from it would result the peace of the Church or the greatest utility of the Christian state. For example, the King of Spain wages war
against a heretical king, and victory over him is supremely necessary for the peace and tranquillity of the ecclesiastical commonwealth; yet, to obtain it, the fighting of a cleric is necessary according to what has been said above. In such a case he could fight. For if the legislator or dispenser were present, he would certainly dispense and would will him to fight; and, moreover, everyone is bound to assist the Church in her necessities.

SECOND CONCLUSION. Regularly speaking, it is not lawful for a cleric to fight in an offensive war merely in order to obtain victory. This is
Cajetan's conclusion in this article. The commonwealth is not then in extreme or most grave necessity, and clerics are otherwise prohibited from fighting; therefore they may not fight. For such a war is then necessary only for recovering possessions, punishing enemies, or expelling them from
the kingdom; but this is not, of itself, extreme necessity. I said “regularly speaking” because of the case placed at the end of the preceding
conclusion.

It may be objected that in such a case the safety of many persons, and even the honor and reputation of the prince, are endangered; if he remains defeated, he and his commonwealth may suffer great disgrace. Therefore a cleric may then assist his prince for the same reason. I answer that the case can stand in two ways. First, the cleric's fighting is not simply necessary for obtaining victory but only for obtaining it better and more easily. In that case it is in no way lawful for him to fight, for otherwise clerics could ordinarily fight, since victory is more easily gained when they fight together with others. Secondly, the cleric may be simply necessary for obtaining victory, so that without him it would not be obtained. Then it is very probable that the cleric may assist his prince, because this appears to be a most grave necessity of the prince and commonwealth. If the Supreme Pontiff were present he would perhaps dispense from the law; indeed it seems that the cleric would then be bound to fight for the reasons already given.

THIRD CONCLUSION. A cleric who possesses temporal dominion in a perfect commonwealth may declare a just war and appoint a commander to
conduct it. Sylvester holds this under Bellum, 3, q. 1. A perfect commonwealth must possess the power to wage wars; but all the power of the commonwealth resides in the prince. Therefore a clerical prince may declare war and appoint a commander. Otherwise such a cleric—for example,
a bishop—would not be a perfect prince, since he would not be sufficient for himself if he could not wage just wars. Hence it is to be believed that when the Pontiff entrusts such temporal dominion to a bishop, he dispenses with him so that, although a bishop, he may wage wars. Secondly, although clerics are forbidden to pronounce judgment in a cause of blood, a cleric possessing temporal dominion may appoint a judge who exercises
such matters; therefore similarly in war.

FOURTH CONCLUSION. Any cleric, even one who does not possess temporal dominion, may summon a secular prince to wage war in defense of
his Church. This is found in 23, q. 3, c. Maximianus, where it is said that the bishop Maximianus sought aid from the emperor for the protection of the Church entrusted to him. Had he omitted this, his patience would not have been praised; rather, his negligence would rightly have been blamed.

From these two conclusions it follows first that such clerics may exhort their soldiers toward victory before the actual conflict and may furnish them
counsel, skill, and support.

ONTRARY

ONTRARY

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All the doctors hold that clerics may furnish their soldiers counsel and support. The reason is that he who may lawfully intend victory may also employ lawful means for obtaining it.

Secondly, it follows that clerics may much more assist soldiers by spiritual means—prayers, fasts, and the like—and exhort them to repentance. This is lawful to all clerics, even those without any temporal jurisdiction.

FIFTH CONCLUSION. No cleric, whether possessing temporal dominion or not, may, speaking per se, say to soldiers, “Kill the enemies,” either before the conflict or during the actual fighting. This is the common opinion of all the doctors and is clear from the laws cited, in which clerics are not only forbidden to kill, but are also forbidden to be the cause of killing. I said “speaking per se,” because if a case arose in which, for the defense of the commonwealth or of oneself, it were simply necessary to kill the enemies, then, just as the cleric may himself kill with his own hand, so it would be lawful for him to say to another, “Kill him.”

SIXTH CONCLUSION. It is probable that any cleric may, before the actual conflict, persuade soldiers to bear themselves bravely in war, and even during the conflict itself. This conclusion is that of Doctor Navarre in the Manual, ch. 27, n. 211. He says it is the common opinion of the jurists, and it appears to be gathered from the chapter Quicumque, 23, q. 8, where it is said that priests ought not to take up arms with their own hands, but may exhort others to take them up for the defense of the oppressed and for attacking the enemies of God.

An objection is drawn from Innocent III in the chapter Quod in dubiis, where a cleric who incites others to fighting is said to sin enormously. Therefore a cleric may not exhort others to war. Secondly, a cleric may not persuade a soldier to kill an enemy, as we said in the fifth conclusion; therefore neither may he persuade him to fight bravely, since brave fighting regularly results in many being killed. Sylvester, citing Innocent, holds that during the actual conflict it is not lawful to exhort soldiers to fight bravely, even for clerics possessing temporal dominion, except in a defensive war. Panormitanus holds the same, and Sylvester follows him.

We answer that the cited text concerns one who, in inciting to battle, has a formal or virtual intention that the soldiers kill the enemy, or one who incites them to an unjust war. The inference of the second argument is denied. When a cleric counsels another to fight bravely, he exercises his own right; therefore, even if death follows, it is not imputed to him nor considered voluntary in his regard. For it would have to be something he could and ought to avoid in order to be morally attributable to him. An apt example is one who appoints a judge: he is not thereby judged to will the death of criminals, although such a judge regularly must kill or mutilate criminals, because in appointing the judge he exercises his own right. Likewise inquisitors who hand heretics over to the secular arm are not thereby judged to will their burning. In the same manner I speak in the present matter.

Indeed, according to Doctor Navarre, clerics may furnish soldiers not only defensive but also offensive arms, provided they do not have the intention of killing the enemies.

A fourth and very grave doubt is raised: whether clerics who fight without the permission of the Supreme Pontiff become irregular. We say “without the permission of the Pontiff,” because if they fight with his permission, whether the war be just or unjust, they do not become irregular. Since irregularity is a penalty of positive law, when the Pontiff grants a cleric permission to fight he is understood to dispense him from irregularity, whether or not he expressly mentions it. For when a prelate grants permission to do something, he is understood to remove all impediments that obstruct its lawful exercise. Sylvester holds this under Homicidium, 3, q. 8.

The question, therefore, is whether those who fight without pontifical permission become irregular.

FIRST CONCLUSION FOR RESOLVING THIS DIFFICULTY. In an unjust war, when death or mutilation follows, all who fight in it become irregular. Sylvester teaches this under Bellum, 3, q. 3, adducing the laws from the chapter Praesentium, De clerico percussore, and the chapter Continebatur, Extra, De homicidio. Sylvester adds, according to his own opinion and that of others, that if no killing or mutilation was done by the clerics themselves, a bishop can dispense them from that irregularity.

This, however, does not seem true to me; neither usage nor reason teaches it, but rather the opposite. If the war was just and no particular causal contribution to a killing or mutilation was made, those who serve in the war do not become irregular merely because others kill or mutilate. The reason is that they are not regarded as in any way concurring in those particular killings or mutilations. But if in a particular case they were causes of a killing, they become irregular, and a bishop cannot dispense them from it. Sylvester says that bishops may dispense from irregularities arising from an occult offense; but a killing done in war either is not an occult offense, or is not an offense at all.

Nevertheless, I believe Cajetan's opinion in the Summa, under Irregularitas, near the end, to be true: prelates of the mendicant orders may dispense from the irregularity of those who have killed enemies in a just war. For they possess the faculty to dispense from every irregularity except those arising from bigamy or voluntary homicide. Killing in a just war, properly speaking, is not homicide, although it is the killing of a man. Therefore, since favors are to be interpreted broadly, they may dispense from the irregularity arising from a lawful killing of a man.

From this conclusion it follows that if a cleric fights unlawfully without the authority of the Pontiff, he incurs irregularity if he kills or mutilates someone; and even if he himself does not kill, he incurs it if others kill or mutilate and he is a moral cause of those acts. This is the common opinion among theologians and jurists.

That one who with his own hand mutilates or kills becomes irregular is manifest: all who unlawfully kill or mutilate become irregular; but such a cleric is of this kind. The major is expressly contained in the chapter Episcopum, distinction 45; the chapter Aliquantos, distinction 51; 23, q. 8, chapters Clerici and Quicumque; and many chapters Extra, De homicidio.

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The second part of the corollary is proved because such a cleric is either a cause or at least a concause of the killing or mutilation. The whole army is, in a certain sense, a total cause, while this cleric is a part of the army; but a cause of killing or mutilation becomes irregular, as is stated in the chapter De cetero, Extra, De homicidio. Indeed, he becomes irregular not only if he fights with his own hand in a just war, but also if he is present on the side of those waging an unjust war in order to furnish them counsel, assistance, or arms, whenever killings or mutilations result. This is the common opinion of the jurists, gathered from the chapter Quod in dubiis, Extra, De poenis, and the chapter Clericos, De homicidio. This is certain.

The entire difficulty at present is whether, when a cleric does not sin by fighting, he nevertheless incurs irregularity.

For the affirmative side it is argued first: irregularity does not follow sin precisely as sin, but follows voluntary killing or mutilation. In the present case the killing or mutilation is voluntary; therefore irregularity is incurred.

Secondly, nowhere in the law is he excepted who kills another in defense of his commonwealth or of another neighbor; only he who kills another in his own defense is excepted. Therefore all the others remain irregular.

Thirdly, this irregularity may be incurred through a good and obligatory act, as is clear in the judge who pronounces sentence upon criminals, which sentence he is bound by justice to pronounce; likewise in one who kills another in defense of his father, whom he is certainly bound to defend. Therefore also he who fights in defense of the commonwealth incurs irregularity.

For the opposite side it is argued first: no one is rendered incapable of exercising his office by fulfilling a divine precept. Therefore, at least when a cleric is bound to fight, he does not become irregular and incapable of exercising his office. Otherwise it would not be lawful for him to fight if by doing so he were rendered incapable of his office, as St. Thomas teaches in the body of the article.

Secondly, one who kills another in his own defense with due moderation does not incur irregularity, as is clear from the Clementine Si furiosus, De homicidio. Therefore neither does one who kills another in defense of the commonwealth. The inference is proved because a man is bound by a greater bond to defend the commonwealth than to defend himself, since the common good is more divine and more excellent, as is clear from what was said above, q. 26, a. 5.

Thirdly, irregularity in these cases has the character of a penalty, indeed of a very severe penalty; but a penalty is in no way incurred except because of sin. The major is proved: deprivation of an act that is due to someone by reason of his office is undoubtedly a penalty. But irregularity deprives clerics in sacred orders of the action and use of orders that belong to them by office. Therefore it is a penalty. This is confirmed by comparison with suspension, which deprives an ecclesiastical person of the exercise of orders, wholly or in part, either temporarily or perpetually, and is certainly a penalty; but irregularity perpetually deprives an ecclesiastical person of the exercise of orders. Therefore it is likewise a penalty.

Fourthly, irregularity in these cases cannot be incurred because of fault, as is clear, nor because of signification. The latter is proved because irregularity by reason of signification is contracted on account of a defect in representing perfect meekness and gentleness. But no one can be called less perfectly meek and gentle because he kills when he is bound by precept to kill. Killing in such a case is an act of virtue falling under a precept; meekness and gentleness are themselves virtues; but virtue is not opposed to virtue. This is confirmed: no precept can forbid what divine and natural law command. But, as we suppose, divine and natural law command the defense of the commonwealth.

On this question there are various opinions.

The first opinion is that clerics who fight, even when they are bound to fight, become irregular if they kill or mutilate. Nearly all the doctors commonly hold this. Cajetan teaches it above, q. 33, a. 7, and Navarre follows this opinion in the Manual, ch. 27, n. 215, together with many others.

The second opinion is opposed to this: in such a case irregularity is not incurred. Sylvester teaches this under Bellum, 3, q. 3, and Diego de Covarrubias on the Clementine Si furiosus, De homicidio, part 2, §3, n. 2, and elsewhere. He says that homicide committed by a private person is never imputed toward irregularity unless it contains the malice of sin. He treats this much more fully elsewhere, and many others follow this opinion.

The third opinion is intermediate. It says that clerics in sacred orders, if they kill another in a case in which they are bound to do so for the defense of the commonwealth or of another neighbor, do not become irregular. But if they kill when they are not bound to kill, although they may lawfully do so, they incur irregularity.

For explaining the matter I establish this conclusion: the second and third opinions are probable, but the first is the most probable.

The first part is proved by the arguments made in the second place; the second by those made in the first place, and these may be further confirmed.

First, this is how the matter is handled in practice in the Roman Curia, where a cleric who kills in defense of the commonwealth is judged irregular.

Secondly, it is argued especially against the third opinion: from it would follow that a cleric in sacred orders who, not from the obligation of a precept but from free charity, defends his neighbor and kills an aggressor would sin mortally. The consequent is false and contrary to St. Thomas below, q. 64, a. 7. The inference is clear because such a cleric, according to this opinion, incurs irregularity; yet according to the same opinion this irregularity is incurred only because of fault, which must mean mortal fault. Therefore he would sin mortally.

Thirdly, against the same opinion: from it would follow that when someone lawfully kills in defense of another, although he is not bound to defend him, he does not incur irregularity. For he does not incur it by reason of fault, since there is no fault; consequently it does not have the character of punishment. Nor does he incur it by reason of signification, since no one is said to be less perfectly meek and gentle when he defends his neighbor from free charity.

Hence, to the arguments for the opposite position, it is answered that they would prove equally that irregularity is not incurred when someone kills another in defense of his neighbor from counsel rather than from precept; for in that case also he merits before God, acts zealously according to virtue, and merits glory.

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To the arguments for the opposite opinion it is answered that they would equally prove that irregularity is not incurred when someone kills while defending another from counsel rather than precept; for then also he merits before God, acts earnestly according to virtue, and merits glory.

To the first argument in particular it is answered that such irregularity does not have the ratio of punishment, but rather of a certain indecentia or unfitness. There is no absurdity in someone's becoming incapable of exercising a certain office because of an act of virtue that falls under a precept, just as one may become incapable of receiving an office. The reason is that ecclesiastics ought not only to possess meekness before God and in the heart, but also to represent it in exterior action by not killing or mutilating. Hence, although an act may not inwardly be contrary to meekness, nevertheless in the external forum and as a representation it does not represent meekness. Nor should it seem harsh that, out of reverence for divine worship, someone should be barred from the exercise of orders without fault of his own.

To the second argument the consequence is denied. When someone kills in his own defense, the law expressly provides that he does not incur irregularity, as is clear from the Clementine Si furiosus; but this is not so when he kills in defense of the commonwealth or of another. Indeed the law provides that he incurs it, and therefore the ratio is not the same. Navarre, however, in the Manual, ch. 27, n. 209, says that the Clementine Si furiosus does not contain a new law but declares the ancient law, and he holds this against Cajetan, II-II, q.64, a.7, ad 3. He does not assign the reason for his assertion. If a reason can be given, it is this: by pontifical law irregularity is incurred from voluntary homicide, or from casual homicide when one gives himself to an unlawful act or fails to employ due diligence. But killing an enemy while defending oneself, one's possessions, or one's neighbor with the moderation of blameless defense is not voluntary homicide, since the death is outside the intention; nor is it casual in the juridical sense, since it is foreseen; nor does the defender give himself to an unlawful act. Therefore by the law he does not incur irregularity, and consequently the Clementine Si furiosus would not be a new law.

It is answered that according to the ancient laws only a wholly casual killing or mutilation was excepted from irregularity, as appears in the chapters on homicide, and this is the common opinion. But everyone who killed or mutilated while exercising even a lawful action from which he knew killing or mutilation would follow became irregular. Hence the Clementine Si furiosus was a true exception. Otherwise, if it merely declared that one defending himself is not irregular, by parity of reason one who lawfully defends his neighbor or his neighbor's substance and kills someone would not be irregular.

To the third argument the answer is clear from what has been said: irregularity in these cases does not have the ratio of punishment, but of signification and unfitness. The same answers the confirmation and the fourth argument.

FIFTH DOUBT: WHETHER CLERICS IN A JUST WAR MAY DESPOIL ENEMIES OF THEIR GOODS

Sylvester treats this under Bellum, 3, q.4. I say first: whenever it is lawful for a cleric to fight, it is also lawful for him to take the goods of the enemy. The reason is that the cleric then has a right to wage war, and therefore has a right to the end of war as other soldiers do; but other soldiers may despoil enemies of their goods, therefore clerics may also do so.

I say secondly: when it is not lawful for the cleric to fight, it is not lawful for him to take the enemy's goods. We may despoil enemies of their goods only by the right of war; but such a cleric has no right to the war, therefore he has no right to despoil enemies.

I say thirdly: if a cleric serves as a soldier by authority of a prince who has the right to wage war, he may take the goods of enemies just as other soldiers may. The prince could take those goods and confer them upon the cleric; therefore the cleric himself may immediately take them. By granting him the power to fight, the prince also grants him the power to take what belongs to the lawful spoils of war.

I say fourthly: if a cleric takes such goods without the prince's authority, he is bound to restore them to their owners, unless they were goods previously taken from those clerics, or unless the prince who possesses the just title to the war grants those goods to them; otherwise the cleric takes them unjustly.

From this it follows that apostate monks, and likewise clerics who are found in wars, are bound to restitution of what they take. For regularly speaking they fight without the prince's authority; indeed the commander ordinarily orders such persons to depart from his army. But if the formal or interpretative will of the prince were established, they could receive stipends and the spoils of the enemy.

LAST DOUBT OF THIS ARTICLE: WHETHER SOLDIERS MAY TAKE THE GOODS OF CLERICS AND ECCLESIASTICS

For explaining this matter I say first concerning churches: churches may not be attacked per se, but they may be attacked per accidens, and if necessary even given to the flames, when enemies flee into them in order to defend themselves there and fight against the soldiers. In such a case whatever evils follow, even to sacred things - such as the burning of the Eucharist or something similar - are outside the intention of those who wage the just war, as we said in the preceding article, doubt 11, concerning the killing of innocents. Sylvester treats this under Bellum, 3, qq.6 and 8, and this is the common opinion.

But if those who flee to a church receive themselves and their goods there, not in order to fight but in order to obtain the benefit of ecclesiastical immunity, they cannot then be despoiled, but enjoy that privilege just as other accused persons who flee to a church. St. Augustine relates the celebrated example in City of God, I, chs.1 and 4: when the Goths captured Rome, all who fled to the churches escaped safe and unharmed.

I say secondly: speaking per se, it is not lawful to take the goods of a church or of clerics, because such goods are exempted by law, in the chapter Innovamus, De treuga et pace.

I say thirdly: per accidens soldiers may take ecclesiastical goods, kill clerics, and overthrow churches, because in a just war soldiers may do whatever is necessary for obtaining victory; and it may sometimes be necessary for this purpose to kill clerics or overthrow churches, as has been said. Note, however, that if clerics fight in the actual conflict, they may be despoiled and killed, because then from clerics they have made themselves enemies. Once victory has been obtained, however, it would not be lawful to kill or despoil clerics, because outside the actual conflict the prince is not the judge of clerics.

I say fourthly: if enemies flee to a church in order to defend themselves, and no future danger threatens the one waging the war, the enemies enjoy ecclesiastical immunity; they cannot be dragged from the church nor killed there except in cases permitted by law.

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QUESTION XL - ON WAR - ARTICLE II (conclusion) AND ARTICLE III

The reason is that a prince does not possess greater power over enemies than over his own subjects; but he cannot drag his own subjects out of a church contrary to ecclesiastical immunity; therefore neither can he drag out enemies. This is gathered from the chapter Sicut antiquitus, 17 q.4. The goods of enemies also enjoy this immunity, as is gathered from the same chapter. See St. Augustine, City of God, I, ch.1.

I say fifthly: if enemies who are within a church fight from it against those waging a just war, they themselves and their goods may be taken out of the church. They first violated ecclesiastical immunity, and therefore ought not to enjoy it. Sylvester holds this under Bellum, 3, q.8.

I say lastly: if future danger from the enemies is feared, even though they do not fight from the church, they may lawfully be removed from the church and may be killed within it; and, if necessary, the church itself may be burned. The reason is that this may then be necessary for acquiring peace and tranquillity, which is the end of war. Nevertheless, before a church is burned or destroyed, every other means must be attempted; otherwise it would be impious to burn the sacrament, sacred images, and other relics. If no other means can be found, this may be done while protesting that there is no intention of burning the sacrament or injuring sacred things. Although the sacramental species may be burned, no injury is thereby done to Christ in His proper person, any more than when the species are corrupted by natural heat.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO USE STRATAGEMS IN WAR

It would seem that it is not lawful to use stratagems in war. For Deuteronomy says: "Thou shalt do that which is just and right." But stratagems, since they are a kind of fraud, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore stratagems ought not to be used even in a just war.

Further, stratagems and fraud seem opposed to fidelity, just as lies are. Since we ought to keep faith with everyone, as Augustine says, no one ought to use stratagems against an enemy.

Further, Matthew 7 says: "All things therefore whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no one wishes stratagems or fraud to be used against himself. Therefore no one ought to wage war by stratagems.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine says that when a just war has been undertaken it makes no difference to justice

whether one fights openly or by stratagems. He also praises Joshua for setting ambushes against the inhabitants of Ai by the command of the Lord.

I ANSWER THAT, stratagems are ordered toward deceiving the enemy. A person may be deceived by another's word

or deed in two ways. First, because something false is told him or a promise is not kept; this is always unlawful, and no one ought in this way to deceive enemies. There are certain rights of war and covenants that must be observed even among enemies, as Ambrose teaches in De officiis.

Secondly, a person may be deceived by our word or deed because we do not disclose our purpose or thought to him. We are not always bound to disclose these. Even in sacred doctrine many things are to be concealed, especially from unbelievers lest they mock them, according to Matthew 7: "Give not that which is holy to dogs." Much more, therefore, ought things prepared for attacking enemies to be concealed from them. Among the precepts of military affairs, concealment of plans lest they reach the enemy holds a principal place. Such concealment belongs to the ratio of stratagems which it is lawful to use in just wars. Properly speaking these stratagems are not frauds, nor are they opposed to justice or to an ordered will. It would rather be an inordinate will if someone wished nothing to be concealed from him by others.

The replies to the objections are clear from this distinction.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. First conclusion: it is not lawful to deceive enemies by stratagems through saying what is false or failing to keep a promise. Second conclusion: it is lawful to deceive enemies by stratagems by concealing from them our thought and purpose.

COMMENTARY. C

is article see St. Augustine, book 6 of Questions on the Old Testament, where the
words of the argument
are found; and 23 q.2 and 23 q.1, where the canonical authorities concerning warfare
are collected.

For explaining the article, note that an enemy may be deceived either by a lie or by a breach of faith; this is never lawful. But he may be deceived because what we are not bound to reveal is hidden from him; this is lawful. Hence military stratagems, ambushes, feigned movements, concealment of counsels and similar devices are lawful so long as they contain no lie and violate no pledged faith or treaty.

The reason is that an enemy has no right that our counsels be made manifest to him. Justice requires that agreements and promises be observed; it does not require that the plans by which a just victory is sought be disclosed. Thus Joshua's ambush was lawful, and the same principle is confirmed by the usage of nations and by military prudence.

ONTRARY

ONTRARY

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QUESTION XL - ARTICLE III (continued) AND ARTICLE IV

A difficulty is raised whether one may employ signs, words, or actions capable of being understood in a false sense in order that the enemy may be deceived. The answer must preserve the distinction already given. It is never lawful formally to signify a falsehood with the intention of asserting it; but it is lawful to conceal one's intention and to perform acts which of themselves do not signify a false assertion, even though the enemy from his own conjecture draws a false conclusion. The enemy is then deceived, but he is not lied to.

Hence it is lawful to simulate flight, to change camps, to conceal soldiers, to prepare an ambush, or to employ other military devices of this kind, provided no promise is violated and no intrinsically false assertion is made. The same reason applies: there is no obligation to reveal to an enemy the counsel by which he may be defeated.

But if a sign has been instituted by agreement between enemies precisely as a pledge of security or truth, to use that sign deceitfully would violate faith and would therefore be unlawful. The rights of war must be kept even toward enemies.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO FIGHT ON FEAST DAYS

It seems that it is not lawful to fight on feast days. Feasts are ordained to divine things; war brings the greatest disturbance and therefore appears to impede divine worship. Moreover Isaiah reproves those who exact their debts and engage in contention on the day of fasting. Finally, ecclesiastical laws forbid certain secular works on holy days.

ON THE CONTRARY, it is written in 1 Maccabees 2 that the Jews deliberated rightly, saying:

"Whosoever shall
come up against us to fight on the sabbath day, we will fight against him."

I ANSWER THAT, the observance of feasts does not exclude those things which are necessary for

human safety. Thus
our Lord reproved the Jews for saying that a man ought not be healed on the sabbath. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to fight on a feast day when necessity requires it for the defense of the commonwealth. To omit fighting in such a necessity would tempt God. But apart from necessity one ought not undertake war on a feast day merely from contempt of the feast or in such a way that divine worship is needlessly impeded.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Conclusion: it is lawful to fight on feast days when necessity requires it. The reason is that works necessary for the preservation of human life and of the commonwealth are not forbidden by the precept concerning the sanctification of feast days.

COMMENTARY. Cajetan raises first whether it is lawful to fight on a feast day only in a defensive war or also in an

offensive war. I say first that when there is necessity, it is lawful in either kind. The necessity of war is not measured solely by the fact that the enemy is presently attacking; an offensive war may also be necessary for recovering things unjustly taken, vindicating injuries, or securing the commonwealth against future danger.

The text of the Maccabees proves this at least for defense. Yet the ratio extends to offensive war whenever delay would seriously prejudice the just cause. The end of war is peace and the defense of the commonwealth, and the precept of a feast was not instituted to destroy that end.

A second doubt raised by Cajetan is whether to fight on a feast day without necessity is a mortal sin. For example, suppose the prince will obtain victory equally well if he waits until the following weekday, but nevertheless chooses to fight on Sunday.

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QUESTION XL - ARTICLE IV (conclusion)

The Pontiff cited in the canonical texts is not speaking simply of the time when fighting is lawful; rather, he intends what we said in Article I, namely that war ought to be a matter of necessity. This also answers the passage from the Maccabees.

Cajetan further asks whether fighting on a feast day without necessity is a mortal sin: for example, when a prince would acquire victory equally well by postponing battle until the following weekday as by fighting on Sunday.

I say first: provided Mass is not omitted, this is not a mortal sin. Fighting is not a servile work; it belongs not only to servants but also to masters and princes. But on a feast day it is servile works, as such, that are forbidden. Therefore fighting in these circumstances is not by that fact a mortal sin.

I say secondly - and this seems to be gathered from Cajetan - that it is a venial sin. The act is opposed to the end of the precept concerning the sanctification of feasts. The end of that precept is that men be free for divine things; but war prevents and impedes a man from attending to divine things, because it brings with it great disturbances and occupations. Therefore, where necessity does not excuse it, fighting on a feast day is venially sinful.

QUESTION XLI - ON FIGHTING [RIXA]

We must next consider fighting or brawling.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER FIGHTING IS ALWAYS A SIN

It seems that fighting is not always a sin. Fighting appears to be a kind of contention. Isidore says in the Etymologies that a quarrelsome man is so called from the snarling of a dog: he is always ready to contradict, delights in wrangling, and provokes one who contends. But contention is not always a sin; therefore neither is fighting.

Further, Genesis 26 says that the servants of Isaac dug another well and that there was a quarrel over it. We should not believe that Isaac's household publicly fought sinfully while he did not oppose them. Therefore fighting is not always sinful.

Further, fighting seems to be a particular kind of war. But war is not always sinful. Therefore neither is fighting.

ON THE CONTRARY, Galatians 5 places fightings among the works of the flesh, and those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. Therefore fightings are not only sins, but can be mortal sins.

I ANSWER THAT, just as contention imports a contradiction in words, so fighting imports a contradiction in deeds.

Hence the gloss on Galatians 5 says that fightings occur when persons strike one another. Fighting therefore appears to be a kind of private war carried on between private persons, not from public authority but from an inordinate will; and for this reason fighting always imports sin.

In the person who unjustly attacks another, it is a mortal sin, for to inflict bodily injury upon one's neighbor is not without mortal sin. In the person who defends himself, however, it can be without sin, or with venial sin, or with mortal sin, according to the diverse movement of his mind and the diverse manner of defending himself. If his sole intention is to repel the injury inflicted and he defends himself with due moderation, there is no sin, and properly speaking there is no fighting on his part. If he defends himself from a motive of vengeance or hatred, or exceeds due moderation, there is always sin: venial when a slight movement of hatred or vengeance intrudes or when he exceeds moderation only slightly; mortal when with a fixed intention he rises against his attacker in order to kill or gravely injure him.

To the first objection: fighting does not simply mean any contention. Isidore's words indicate three disorders: readiness to contradict whether another speaks or acts well or badly; delight in the contradiction itself; and provocation of others to contradiction.

To the second: the text does not mean that Isaac's servants themselves sinfully fought, but that the inhabitants of the land fought against them. The inhabitants sinned; Isaac's servants suffered the injury.

To the third: a just war requires public authority, as was said above. Fighting arises from the private affection of anger or hatred. If ministers of a prince or judge by public authority attack persons who resist, the ministers are not said to brawl; rather those who inordinately resist public authority are the ones who fight sinfully.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. The conclusion is affirmative: fighting, precisely as rixa, always includes disorder and therefore sin.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER FIGHTING IS A DAUGHTER OF ANGER

It seems that fighting is not a daughter of anger. James 4 says: "Whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not from your concupiscences which war in your members?" But anger does not belong to the concupiscible power. Therefore fighting seems rather to arise from concupiscence.

QUESTION XLI - ARTICLE II

Further, Proverbs 28 says that he who boasts and enlarges himself stirs up quarrels. But boasting and self-exaltation seem to pertain to pride or vainglory. Therefore fighting seems to be a daughter of pride or vainglory rather than of anger.

Further, Proverbs 18 says: "The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife." But folly is opposed to wisdom, whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore fighting does not seem to be the daughter of anger.

ON THE CONTRARY, Gregory numbers quarrels among the daughters of anger.

I ANSWER THAT, fighting, properly speaking, involves one person's bodily attack upon another.

Such an attack is
most properly ordered to harming the other; and the appetite for vengeance belongs to anger. Therefore fighting is properly a daughter of anger. Concupiscence or vainglory may command an act of fighting by ordering it to their own ends, but from this it does not follow that fighting is their daughter properly and directly.

To the first objection: all the irascible passions arise in some way from the concupiscible passions; hence wars and fightings can ultimately arise from concupiscences, while nevertheless fighting is immediately and properly a daughter of anger.

To the second: vainglory can procure discord and cause men to fight, just as any sin can command the act of another sin by ordering it to its own end. But this does not make fighting properly and directly a daughter of vainglory.

To the third: folly disposes a man toward anger because it removes the judgment by which anger is moderated. Thus the fool's lips lead to fighting, not because fighting is formally a daughter of folly, but because folly disposes toward the anger from which fighting proceeds.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Fighting is properly a daughter of anger, although other vices may command or occasion it.

QUESTION XLII - ON SEDITION

We must next consider sedition.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER SEDITION IS A SPECIAL SIN

It seems that sedition is not a special sin. Isidore says that a seditious man is one who causes dissension among minds and gives rise to discord. But discord is not a special sin distinct from the other sins against charity. Therefore neither is sedition.

Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Schism likewise denotes division. But schism is a special sin. Therefore sedition either is the same as schism or is not distinct from it in a special manner.

Further, every special sin has some special vice opposed to it. But no special virtue appears to be opposed to sedition. Therefore sedition is not a special sin.

ON THE CONTRARY, 2 Corinthians 12 distinguishes seditions from other sins: "Lest perhaps there

be contentions,
emulations, animosities, dissensions, detractions, whisperings, swellings, seditions among you." Therefore sedition is a special sin.

I ANSWER THAT, sedition has something in common with war and fighting, because all three imply

opposition. But
they differ. War is properly against external enemies, nation against nation. Fighting is between one private person and another, or a few against a few. Sedition is properly between parts of one people disagreeing with one another, one part of the city or commonwealth contending against another. Therefore sedition has a special ratio because it is opposed to a special good, namely the unity and peace of the civil multitude.

As the unity of the Church is a special good opposed by schism, so the unity of the political community is a special good opposed by sedition. Hence sedition is a special sin, distinct according to its proper object.

To the first: discord can be taken generally for any disagreement of wills; sedition adds a special disorder, namely the division of a political multitude into opposing parts.

To the second: schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity; sedition to civil or political unity. They are therefore specifically distinguished by the goods they attack.

To the third: sedition is opposed to justice and to the common good, and especially to legal justice insofar as it orders the parts of the community toward the common good.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Sedition is a special sin because it directly opposes the unity of a people or commonwealth, a special good distinct from the unity attacked by schism.

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QUESTION XLII - ARTICLE I - COMMENTARY

Concerning the definition of sedition, note that it is not every disagreement among citizens. It requires an opposition of one part of the commonwealth to another concerning the political order or common good. Hence private quarrels remain under rixa, while a public division of the multitude pertains to sedition.

Sedition is accordingly opposed immediately to the unity of the commonwealth. This unity is not merely an accidental agreement of private persons, but the order of the parts toward one political common good. For this reason sedition is reduced to injustice, and especially to legal justice, which directs the acts of the virtues toward the common good.

The comparison with schism must be carefully retained. Schism divides ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition divides civil unity. The material acts may sometimes resemble one another, but the formal object is diverse. Therefore the sins are specifically distinct.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER SEDITION IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN

It seems that sedition is not always a mortal sin. Sedition is a kind of division among men; but some divisions can occur

without mortal sin. Further, those who resist tyrannical or unjust power may appear seditious and yet act justly. Finally, acts directed toward a good end do not seem necessarily mortal.

ON THE CONTRARY, the Apostle numbers seditions among works that exclude from the

kingdom of God.

Moreover, sedition is contrary to the unity and peace of the multitude, which are great goods of charity and justice.

I ANSWER THAT, sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, that is, to the unity of a

people, city, or kingdom.

This unity is a good of justice and of the common good. Therefore sedition, according to its genus, is a mortal sin. It is graver than a private quarrel insofar as the common good is more excellent than the private good attacked in an ordinary fight.

However, the guilt of sedition does not necessarily fall upon every person involved in an armed civil conflict. Sedition properly belongs to those who unjustly disturb the unity and peace of the commonwealth. Those who defend the common good against unjust aggressors are not for that reason seditious, just as one who defends himself with due moderation is not properly the author of a fight.

A tyrannical government is not ordered to the common good but to the private good of the ruler. Consequently the disturbance of such a government does not have the same ratio as sedition against a just political order. Nevertheless, because the overthrow of a tyrant can produce greater evils and disturbances, it is not therefore lawful for any private person at will to attempt it. The matter must be judged according to legitimate authority, the common good, and the dangers that follow.

The principal authors of sedition sin most gravely, because they are the causes of the division of the multitude and of the many evils that ordinarily follow from it. Those who follow them can also sin mortally according to their knowledge, intention, and participation.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Sedition is mortal according to its genus because it directly attacks the unity of the commonwealth. Those who justly defend the common good against seditious aggressors do not thereby incur the sin of sedition.

COMMENTARY. The first point to be observed is that St. Thomas places the malice of sedition principally in

opposition to the common good. Hence the gravity is not measured simply by the number of blows or deaths but by the political good attacked.

Second, one must distinguish the author of sedition from the defender of public peace. The same external conflict may

materially contain violence on both sides, yet formally one side may attack the common good while the other defends it. Moral species follows the object and intention under due circumstances, not the mere physical appearance of conflict.

Third, concerning tyrants, the doctrine must not be understood as granting indiscriminate license to private persons. A

tyrant may be resisted according to the order of justice and legitimate public authority; but private vengeance and actions likely to produce a worse injury to the commonwealth remain unlawful.

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QUESTION XLII - ARTICLE II - COMMENTARY (continued)

A doubt is therefore raised concerning those who oppose a ruler and whether they are always to be judged seditious. The answer depends upon whether the ruler possesses legitimate authority and whether the resistance is ordered according to justice toward the common good. The name of sedition formally signifies an unjust division against the unity of the commonwealth; therefore an act which truly preserves that unity and common good is not formally sedition merely because force is used.

The distinction between a king and a tyrant is relevant here. A king governs for the common good; a tyrant orders rule toward his own private advantage. Yet even against tyranny the manner of resistance must be just. It does not follow that because tyranny is unjust every private act against the tyrant is lawful. Otherwise the commonwealth would be exposed to continual disturbances under the judgment of private persons.

The common good therefore remains the measure. Public authority may sometimes remove or restrain a tyrannical ruler according to the constitution and laws of the community. But one must avoid remedies from which greater destruction of the commonwealth would probably follow.

QUESTION XLIII - ON SCANDAL

We must next consider scandal: first scandal itself, and then those to whom scandal especially pertains.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER SCANDAL IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS A WORD OR DEED LESS RIGHT THAT PROVIDES AN OCCASION OF SPIRITUAL RUIN

It seems that scandal is not fittingly defined as "something less rightly said or done that affords an occasion of spiritual ruin." Scandal is a stumbling-block; but a stumbling-block can be something wholly external and without moral fault. Further, a person's spiritual fall can arise from his own disposition rather than from another's word or deed. Finally, scandal sometimes follows from an act that is good.

ON THE CONTRARY, Augustine and the sacred doctors use the name scandal for that which places before another an occasion of falling in the spiritual life.

I ANSWER THAT, as in bodily movement an obstacle placed in the path can cause a fall, so in the progress of the spiritual life something may dispose another to spiritual ruin. Such a thing is called a scandal. The phrase "less right" is used because the scandalous word or deed need not always be intrinsically evil in itself; it may be deficient by reason of circumstances or because of the condition of the person who observes it.

Scandal is therefore an occasion, not necessarily the sufficient cause, of another's sin. The one scandalized retains his own will; hence the external act provides an occasion, while the spiritual fall is completed through the will of the person who falls.

Scandal may be active or passive. Active scandal is in the one who by word or deed affords the occasion of another's fall. Passive scandal is the fall or disorder arising in the person who takes that occasion.

A good act can sometimes be the occasion of another's sin, but insofar as it is truly good and rightly performed it does not have the formal ratio of active scandal. The evil may arise solely from the malice or weakness of the observer; this is called scandal of the Pharisees or merely passive scandal.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Scandal is fittingly defined by reference to a word or deed that provides an occasion of spiritual ruin. The definition distinguishes the occasion supplied by one person from the voluntary fall of another.

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QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE I - COMMENTARY (continued)

For understanding the definition, observe that "occasion" is not the same as a necessary cause. An occasion is something from which another, through his own disposition, takes an inducement toward sin. Thus the scandalizer does not destroy the liberty of the person scandalized.

Likewise "less right" does not signify only what is intrinsically sinful. A deed may be materially good or indifferent and

yet, because of circumstances, be performed without due rectitude in relation to the neighbor. Conversely, an entirely right act may occasion another's sin solely through that other's malice; then there is passive scandal without active scandal.

The Gospel phrase "It must needs be that scandals come" must not be understood as imposing necessity upon the will of

the sinner. It can be understood conditionally or in the composed sense: given the divine permission and the actual order of causes, scandals will occur, while each voluntary sin remains free in its proper cause. The necessity of the consequence does not destroy the contingency and liberty of the consequent considered in its proximate cause.

This is the same doctrine treated elsewhere concerning divine providence and free acts. A certain modern theologian confidently - not to say rashly - mocks this "composed sense," because he does not understand how the truth of liberty in human acts is compatible with such necessity. But this has been explained elsewhere, in I, q.23, a.5; q.19, aa.8 and 10; and in this II-II, q.10.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER SCANDAL IS A SIN

It seems that scandal is not a sin. Sins do not occur from necessity, whereas Matthew 18 says: "It must needs be that scandals come." Further, no sin proceeds from piety, yet our Lord called Peter a scandal when Peter, from a certain affection of piety toward Christ, wished to impede His Passion. Finally, scandal can be merely the occasion taken by another and thus appears not to be in the agent.

ON THE CONTRARY, scandal is opposed to charity, since charity wills the spiritual good of

one's neighbor, whereas

scandal occasions his spiritual fall.

I ANSWER THAT, passive scandal always involves some sin in the person scandalized, at least

venial, because no

one falls spiritually unless he is in some way retarded in his progress toward God. Active scandal also involves sin when the word or deed lacks due rectitude and thereby provides an occasion of another's fall. Nevertheless, if another takes scandal solely from an act that is perfectly right, there is no active scandal in the agent; the disorder is only in the one taking scandal.

To the first objection, the necessity spoken of in the Gospel does not remove voluntariness, as has just been explained. To the second, Peter's affection had something materially pious in it, but was inordinate insofar as it opposed the divinely ordained Passion. To the third, no one spiritually stumbles unless he is at least somewhat retarded from the way of God, which occurs through at least venial sin.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Both passive and active scandal involve sin in the manner explained: passive scandal in the fall of the person scandalized; active scandal in an inordinate word or deed that gives occasion to that fall.

COMMENTARY. Note especially the threefold and excellent explanation of Matthew 18, "It must needs be that

scandals come." In the first explanation St. Thomas's phrase is equivalent to what we commonly call the composed sense. This sense does not deny liberty. The free act remains contingent with respect to its proximate created cause even

while, under the supposition of the divine decree and providence, the consequence is infallible.

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The commentary therefore insists that the composed sense must not be ridiculed or treated as though it made human acts violent or compelled. The necessity is not a necessity of coercion in the will, but the infallibility of the order supposed. The will acts voluntarily according to its own mode.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER SCANDAL IS A SPECIAL SIN

It seems that scandal is not a special sin. Scandal is something said or done less rightly; but this is common to every sin.

Therefore scandal does not constitute a special species.

Further, every sin can provide another with an occasion of falling. If scandal were therefore a special sin, every sin would be scandal, which is false.

Further, a circumstance does not ordinarily give a moral act a new species unless it introduces a special deformity opposed to a special virtue. But that another takes an occasion of sin from my act seems merely a circumstance.

Therefore scandal is not a special sin.

ON THE CONTRARY, scandal is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal

of a special spiritual

harm from one's neighbor is intended. Therefore scandal, which intends or produces the contrary harm in the relevant manner, has the ratio of a special sin.

I ANSWER THAT, passive scandal, in the person scandalized, is not a special sin merely by

reason of taking occasion

from another's word or deed. That circumstance does not introduce a special deformity opposed to a special virtue. The sin is specified by the object of the act into which the person falls.

Active scandal can be taken in two ways: per accidens and per se. It is active scandal per accidens when the occasion of another's fall is outside the agent's intention; for example, someone performs an inordinate word or deed intending only to satisfy his own will, not to draw another into sin. In this case active scandal is not a special sin, because what is per accidens does not constitute a species.

Active scandal is per se when someone by his inordinate word or deed intends to draw another into sin. Then, from the intention of this special end, it receives the ratio of a special sin. The end gives species in morals. Just as theft or homicide is a special sin because a special injury to the neighbor is intended, so scandal is a special sin because a special spiritual injury of the neighbor is intended. It is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of such spiritual injury is intended.

To the first objection: every sin can stand materially toward active scandal, but the formal ratio of the special sin comes from the intention of the end.

To the second: active scandal can be found separately from other sins, for example when someone scandalizes his neighbor by an act which of itself is not sinful but has the appearance or species of evil.

To the third: scandal does not possess the ratio of a special sin merely from the circumstance that another falls, but from

the intention of the special end, as has been said.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Passive scandal is not a special species of sin. Active scandal per accidens is likewise not a special species. Active scandal per se, when the spiritual fall of another is intended as a special end, is a special sin opposed directly to fraternal correction.

COMMENTARY. From this doctrine it follows that when someone intends another sin as an end, the formal species is

taken from that intended end. The material act may belong to another species, but the intention can give the whole voluntary act an additional formal ratio.

Thus if someone counsels a woman toward sin in order to satisfy lust, or does something else from which others are scandalized when he was bound to avoid that scandal, the circumstance of scandal can require confession according to the manner in which it enters the voluntary act. Yet the underlying sin is not automatically placed formally in the species of scandal unless the spiritual fall of another is intended as such.

If, for example, someone persuades a woman to consent in order that he may satisfy his lust, or does some other thing from which others are scandalized when he was bound to avoid that scandal, he will also be bound to confess that circumstance, although his sin is not thereby formally placed in the species of scandal.

Note the reply to the first objection against certain modern Thomists who say that if someone wills to steal in order to commit adultery, that will is per se and essentially a sin of theft. St. Thomas, however, says that such a will stands materially; the formal ratio of the special sin is taken from the intention of the end. This distinction between the material act and the formal specification from the end must therefore be retained.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER SCANDAL IS A MORTAL SIN

It seems that scandal is a mortal sin. Every sin contrary to charity is mortal, as was said above; but scandal is contrary to

charity. Therefore scandal is mortal.

Further, eternal damnation is due only to mortal sin. But eternal punishment is threatened for scandal, according to Matthew 18: "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea." Jerome says that it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a fault than to be reserved for eternal torments. Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

Further, every sin committed directly against one's neighbor seems mortal when it inflicts grave spiritual harm. Scandal is ordered to another's spiritual fall. Therefore it appears to be mortal.

ON THE CONTRARY, scandal can arise from a venial act and can also consist in a slight

indiscretion. Therefore it is

not always mortal.

I ANSWER THAT, passive scandal may sometimes be venial and sometimes mortal according to

the sin into which

the person scandalized falls. If he takes occasion to commit a mortal sin, passive scandal is mortal; if he falls only into venial sin, it is venial.

Active scandal per accidens is likewise sometimes venial and sometimes mortal. It is venial when the act that has the appearance of evil is committed with some slight indiscretion and no grave contempt of the neighbor's salvation. It is mortal either when the agent commits an act that is itself a mortal sin in circumstances in which scandal is foreseeably given, or when he gravely contemns the neighbor's salvation - for example, when for the sake of doing what pleases him he refuses to omit something that he is bound to omit for the preservation of his neighbor.

If active scandal is per se, namely when one intends to induce another to sin, then if he intends to induce the other to mortal sin, the scandal is mortal. Likewise it is mortal if he intends to induce the neighbor to venial sin through an act that is itself mortally sinful. But if he intends to induce the neighbor to venial sin through an act that is only venially sinful, the scandal is venial.

The replies to the objections are evident from these distinctions.

SUMMARY OF THE TEXT. Passive scandal and active scandal can each be venial or mortal. The gravity follows the intended or occasioned sin and, in active scandal, the gravity of the agent's act and his contempt or care for the neighbor's spiritual good.

COMMENTARY. Concerning this conclusion, observe that scandal which is the special sin directly opposed to

fraternal correction is mortal from its genus, although by smallness of matter it can become venial.

A first doubt is raised concerning the preceding articles: in order that scandal be a special sin, is it required that a man by an express and formal intention will to induce his neighbor to sin, or is it enough that he perform an evil act, or an act having the appearance of evil, from which his neighbor takes an occasion of ruin?

For understanding the question it must be observed that one person can scandalize another in three ways. In one way, by directly intending the spiritual fall of the other. In another way, by intending some other end while foreseeing the other's fall as connected with his act. In a third way, the fall can follow outside his intention from an act which, because of circumstances, he was nevertheless bound to omit. These modes must be distinguished carefully, because the formal species of scandal does not arise in precisely the same way in each.

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Cajetan's second point is proved because the act has no other ratio of evil except that of scandal; therefore, insofar as it is evil, it must be reduced to that species. His third point appears to be the express teaching of St. Thomas in Article III, where he says that active scandal per accidens - for example, when a man by his word or deed does not intend to give an occasion of another's ruin, but intends merely to satisfy his own will - is not a special sin of scandal.

Sylvester gives another opinion. He holds that whenever a man knowingly and deliberately performs an evil act, or one having the appearance of evil, from which he knows that others will be scandalized, there is a special sin of scandal even though he does not formally and expressly intend their ruin. The learned Victoria held this opinion, and several Thomists of our time follow it, thinking it to be St. Thomas's own doctrine. They appeal to Article I, reply to the fourth objection: another's word or deed may cause sin either per se or per accidens; and per se in two ways, either because the agent intends to induce another to sin, or because, although he does not intend this, the deed is of such a nature that of itself it induces to sin. This latter is properly to give an occasion of ruin and is active scandal.

Yet this passage does not prove Sylvester's intended conclusion. St. Thomas says that the deed is per se a cause of the neighbor's ruin, but it does not follow that the moral act is formally specified by that ruin. As Cajetan correctly notes, it is one thing for a deed to be per se the cause of another's fall, and another for the act to receive its formal species from that fall. A human act is formally specified by the object intended per se. Thus if one steals or fornicates precisely in order to scandalize another, materially he is a thief or fornicator, but formally, according to the intended end, he is a scandalizer.

A third opinion therefore says that scandal is a special sin when one directly intends the brother's ruin, or directly induces him to an act that is sinful; but not merely because others are scandalized by his example, even when he foresaw that this would happen. In the first two modes he is per se cause of the neighbor's sin; in the third he is not in that same formal manner.

First conclusion. For contrition and confession it matters little whether scandal was intended materially or formally. If a person was bound to abstain from a word or deed lest his neighbor be scandalized and did not abstain, he must confess that he scandalized his neighbor, distinguishing the greater or lesser gravity: whether he intended the neighbor's ruin, induced him through passion to sin, or negligently gave bad example. Scripture itself commands us not to scandalize the little ones and pronounces woe upon the man through whom scandal comes; it does not restrict this obligation to a metaphysically explicit intention.

Second conclusion. If we speak of the formal specification of the moral act, scandal is never a special sin except through a direct intention of the neighbor's spiritual ruin. This follows from St. Thomas on the end specifying the human act.

Third conclusion. If the word or deed has no moral evil except from the neighbor's ruin which the agent was bound to prevent, then it is reductively a special sin of scandal. Thus eating meat at a time when it would otherwise be lawful can belong to the species of scandal if its sole moral disorder is that the neighbor is thereby scandalized.

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QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; ARTICLE V

A second doubt asks whether dissuading a man from a good, or from a greater good, is a sin of scandal. Suppose Peter wishes to give
alms or enter religious life and Paul persuades him not to do so. The Gospel gives an argument for the affirmative: when Peter tried
to dissuade Christ from the Passion, the Lord said, "Go behind me, Satan; thou art a scandal unto me." Peter was not inducing Christ
to sin, but trying to turn Him from a greater good.

The answer requires distinctions. A man may dissuade his neighbor from a good because he prudently judges that such a state or
work is not fitting for him; then there is no sin. He may do so by disparaging a state of perfection or a work of virtue; then he sins
gravely, and if he believes his own false disparagement he may fall into heresy, while if he knowingly speaks against the truth he
sins by blasphemous contempt. Thirdly, he may act from excessive attachment to a friend because he wants to retain his company. I
judge that to dissuade such a friend from religious life, especially when the friend has already formed the purpose of entering, can be
mortal sin against the charity owed to God and neighbor, although not ordinarily against justice. Religion has not acquired a strict
right over the candidate merely from his intention, and therefore there is not, on that account alone, an obligation of restitution.

The fact that the friend himself might abandon the better work without mortal sin does not excuse the one who persuades him to
abandon it. A man is in a certain sense his brother's keeper. Likewise, if a sinner intends immediately to repent and confess, another
may sin by persuading him not to do so even though the sinner does not necessarily commit a new mortal sin merely by delaying for
a short time. The same distinction applies to almsgiving. If the alms are of no notable importance and the poor man is not in grave
necessity, dissuading the gift will not ordinarily be mortal; but if the alms are important and the poor man's need grave, the
persuasion may be mortal against charity. Restitution follows only where deceit or fraud violated a right.

A final doubt asks whether every exterior sin carries at least the circumstance of scandal. First, there is no scandal when a sin is
committed so secretly that, morally speaking, it cannot come to anyone's knowledge. Second, if it is committed before determinate
witnesses whom the sinner reasonably judges will not be scandalized, there is no circumstance of scandal that must be confessed.

Third, one who sins publicly without such circumspection must confess the circumstance of scandal insofar as, by his example, he
gives an occasion of falling to the weak and the little ones.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER PASSIVE SCANDAL CAN BE FOUND IN PERFECT MEN

The conclusion is negative, understood according to the ordinary course of things. Passive scandal implies a movement of the mind
away from the good. The perfect adhere firmly to God, and even when they adhere to prelates they do so only insofar as the prelates
adhere to Christ. Therefore the disorderly words or deeds of others do not ordinarily turn them from rectitude. "Great peace have
they that love thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block." Christ's words to Peter, "Thou art a scandal unto me," use scandal
broadly for an impediment. Perfect men can also be impeded in exterior works, but not thereby separated interiorly from charity.

Venial sins may occur in them through human frailty, yet this is not passive scandal in the proper sense.

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QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE V CONCLUDED; ARTICLE VI

The conclusion concerning perfect men must be understood regularly speaking. Every man in this life, however perfect, provided he
has not been confirmed in grace, can fall into mortal sin, especially when confronted by a grave occasion. Augustine is cited
concerning lofty contemplatives - "cedars of Lebanon" - whose falls he had no more expected than those of Jerome or Ambrose. The
example concerns the danger that can arise from imprudent familiarity with women. Thus a perfect man can fall unless preserved by
special divine assistance, even though the ordinary disposition of perfection resists passive scandal.

ARTICLE VI - WHETHER ACTIVE SCANDAL CAN BE FOUND IN PERFECT MEN

It seems that it can. The Pharisees were scandalized by Christ's words; Peter, after receiving the Holy Spirit, acted in a manner that
scandalized Gentile converts; and venial sins, which can occur in perfect men, may sometimes be active scandal.

On the contrary,

active scandal is even more opposed to perfection than passive scandal.

I answer that active scandal properly occurs when someone says or does something which of

itself is apt to induce another to
spiritual ruin. Such a deed is necessarily inordinate. But perfect men characteristically order their acts according to reason, especially
where their conduct could become an occasion of offense to others. If through human weakness something is lacking in this
moderation, the defect is ordinarily slight and not so grave that another can reasonably take from it an occasion of sin.

Passive scandal is always caused by something active, but not always by another person's active scandal: sometimes the scandalized
person scandalizes himself. Concerning Peter, St. Thomas follows Augustine and Paul in holding that Peter was reprehensible for
withdrawing from the Gentiles to avoid the scandal of the Jews; nevertheless his fault was not so grave that the Gentiles could
reasonably make it an occasion of sin. Hence passive scandal occurred in them, without active scandal in Peter in the strict sense.

The venial faults of perfect men principally consist in hidden first movements; if they commit exterior venial faults, these are
ordinarily too slight of themselves to possess the power of scandalizing.

Summary. The conclusion is negative and is to be understood with the same qualification as the preceding article. that
St. Thomas here follows Augustine concerning Peter. Elsewhere Bañez had defended as sufficiently probable the Chrysostomian
interpretation according to which Peter did not sin in withdrawing from the Gentiles.

I note

QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE VII - WHETHER SPIRITUAL GOODS ARE TO BE RELINQUISHED BECAUSE OF SCANDAL

The objections appeal to the suspension of ecclesiastical punishments where schism is threatened, the command not to cast pearls before swine, the omission of fraternal correction when it would harm rather than amend, Jerome's rule that whatever can be omitted while preserving the truth of life, justice, and doctrine should be omitted because of scandal, and finally the suggestion that one might commit a venial sin to prevent another's mortal sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says: "If scandal arises from the truth, it is more useful that scandal be permitted to arise than that the truth be abandoned."

I answer that the question concerns passive scandal, since nothing may ever be done with active scandal. Among spiritual goods some are of the necessity of salvation and cannot be omitted without mortal sin. No one may sin mortally to prevent another's sin, because according to the order of charity a man must love his own spiritual salvation more than another's. Therefore goods necessary for salvation must never be omitted merely to avoid scandal.

Among spiritual goods not necessary for salvation a further distinction is required. Sometimes scandal proceeds from malice, when men deliberately stir up scandal in order to impede spiritual goods. This is the scandal of the Pharisees and is to be disregarded. At other times scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance; this is the scandal of the little ones. Because of it, non-necessary spiritual goods may be concealed or deferred, provided no urgent danger is present, until the reason for the action has been explained and the scandal ceases. If scandal persists after adequate explanation, it now appears to proceed from malice and the spiritual work need no longer be omitted.

Punishment is medicinal and belongs to justice insofar as it restrains sin; if its imposition would manifestly cause more and greater sins, it ceases in that circumstance to fall under the truth of justice. In doctrine one must distinguish the truth taught from the act of teaching. Falsehood may never be taught to avoid scandal. The act of teaching, however, is a spiritual work of mercy and can sometimes be prudently deferred. Fraternal correction is ordered to amendment; when correction would defeat that end by scandalizing the brother, omission of the correction is not abandonment of a spiritual good.

QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE VII CONCLUDED; ARTICLE VIII

The truth of life, doctrine, and justice includes not only what is strictly necessary for salvation but also what leads more perfectly to
salvation. Therefore the evangelical counsels and works of mercy are not simply to be abandoned because of scandal, although they
may sometimes be concealed or deferred because of the scandal of the little ones. At times their observance itself becomes necessary
for salvation: for example, in one who has vowed a counsel, or in one bound by office or by another's grave necessity to relieve
temporal or spiritual need.

Some have said that a venial sin may sometimes be committed to avoid scandal. This is contradictory. If an act ought to be done here
and now, it is not evil here and now and therefore is not a sin. A circumstance can indeed make lawful what, without that
circumstance, would have been venially sinful; a playful word spoken without reasonable usefulness may be idle and venially sinful,
while the same kind of word uttered for a reasonable purpose is not sinful. Although venial sin does not destroy grace, it disposes
toward mortal sin and therefore tends toward the detriment of salvation.

Summary of Article VII. (1) Nothing is to be done with active scandal. (2) Spiritual goods necessary for salvation are not to be
omitted because of passive scandal. (3) Non-necessary spiritual goods are to be omitted or deferred because of the scandal of the
little ones until the reason for the act is explained. (4) If scandal remains after sufficient explanation, it appears to arise from malice.
(5) Counsels and works of mercy are not simply to be abandoned, though they may be concealed or deferred for the weak.

an important qualification: sometimes the little ones are incapable of understanding the reason that has been given. In
that case, even after explanation, one may still need to abstain from a non-necessary spiritual work, because their scandal continues
to arise from ignorance or weakness rather than malice. St. Thomas therefore carefully says that after explanation the scandal
appears to arise from malice.

ARTICLE VIII - WHETHER TEMPORAL GOODS ARE TO BE RELINQUISHED

BECAUSE OF SCANDAL

The objections argue that the neighbor's spiritual salvation is worth more than temporal goods; that Jerome's rule favors
relinquishing what can be omitted; that even food is to be omitted rather than destroy a brother; that lawsuits over temporal goods
may themselves cause scandal; and that even temporal goods annexed to spiritual things, such as ecclesiastical stipends or tithes,
have sometimes been renounced to avoid an impediment to the Gospel.

I add

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On the contrary, St. Thomas Becket reclaimed the goods of the Church even though the king was

scandalized. The answer
distinguishes temporal goods that are our own from goods entrusted to us for others. Ecclesiastical goods are committed to prelates,
and common goods to rulers of the republic. Their preservation is imposed as a duty, like the preservation of a deposit; therefore they
are not simply to be abandoned because of scandal, any more than other things necessary for salvation.
Goods of which we ourselves are owners may sometimes be given away, or not reclaimed from another, in order to avoid scandal. If
the scandal arises from ignorance or weakness - the scandal of the little ones - the goods may have to be surrendered or the scandal
quieted by instruction. Augustine says that what is given should harm neither oneself nor another as far as a man can reasonably
judge; when one refuses an unjust request, one should explain the justice of the refusal, thereby giving the petitioner something
better by correcting him.
If scandal arises from malice - the scandal of the Pharisees - temporal goods should not be surrendered merely because malicious
men stir up scandal. Otherwise the common good would be harmed, the wicked would receive an occasion for plunder, and the
plunderers themselves would be harmed by remaining in sin. Gregory therefore says that some who seize our temporal goods are to
be tolerated, while others must be restrained in equity, not merely lest our possessions be taken but lest the robbers destroy
themselves.
The Apostle's teaching about food does not command total abandonment of nourishment, which is necessary for life, but abstention
from a particular food when its use scandalizes the weak. Likewise, the Church may for a time abstain from exacting tithes in lands
where the faithful are not accustomed to pay them, until they have been instructed.
Summary. First, ecclesiastical goods entrusted to prelates and common goods entrusted to civil rulers are not to be abandoned
simply because of scandal. Second, temporal goods of which we are owners should sometimes be relinquished because of the
scandal of the ignorant or weak. Third, they are not to be relinquished merely because another maliciously creates scandal.
raises a doubt common to Articles VII and VIII: can even commanded spiritual goods sometimes be omitted because of scandal? He distinguishes negative precepts of natural law, affirmative precepts of natural law, means divinely necessary for
salvation, and positive-law precepts. Negative natural-law precepts - such as prohibitions of murder or fornication - may never be
violated for any scandal. Affirmative natural-law precepts bind according to due circumstances and may cease to bind here and now
when their performance would produce disproportionate scandal. Means divinely necessary for salvation, such as baptizing a dying
unbaptized child, must not be omitted. Positive ecclesiastical precepts can sometimes cease to bind when the legislator cannot
reasonably be understood to impose them amid grave contrary harm.
Then I
744

QUESTION XLIII - ARTICLE VIII COMMENTARY CONCLUDED; QUESTION XLIV BEGINS

Cajetan at length concerning ecclesiastical temporal goods. A crucial distinction must be maintained between the community itself and its rulers. The ruler is, as it were, a depositary and dispenser of common goods; the community is the owner.

Likewise, neither the Pope nor another prelate is owner of ecclesiastical property as a private proprietor. Donors transfer their goods to the Church, not to the person of the Pope or prelate. Hence prelates are bound to preserve and administer ecclesiastical goods, and arbitrary alienation for private enrichment is not true distribution but dissipation.

The Pope's plenitude of ecclesiastical power is principally spiritual. He has authority over temporal things in their order to spiritual ends, but the keys are the keys of the kingdom of heaven, not a title to treat the temporal patrimony of the Church as private property. Those who receive ecclesiastical goods merely at a prelate's whim for their own enrichment can therefore incur an obligation of restitution.

Yet this doctrine must not be abused so that, under pretext of preserving ecclesiastical property, the poor are oppressed and charity inverted by preferring temporal goods to spiritual ones. The poor include not only those who lack bare food and clothing but also those who lack what is reasonably required by their state. Since the precept of recovering ecclesiastical goods is affirmative, it does not bind at every instant; recovery can be prudently delayed because of the scandal of the little ones or another proportionate cause.

Sometimes it would be more pleasing to God to procure a lawful remission of temporal claims when this clearly serves the spiritual good of the people.

Cajetan also stresses St. Thomas's words "because of those who thus stir up scandals" and "if it were permitted everywhere." Goods are not to be abandoned merely because malicious persons create scandal, but they can be abandoned for the spiritual salvation of the people. If, for example, a prince would rather lead a people into infidelity than surrender property seized from the Church, the goods may have to be relinquished, not for the prince's malice but for the people's salvation. Likewise, permitting seizure in a particular case can sometimes serve the common spiritual good, even though allowing plunder indiscriminately would destroy justice.

QUESTION XLIV - ON THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY

Having treated charity and the vices opposed to it, St. Thomas next considers the precepts of charity.

I cite

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QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE I - WHETHER ANY PRECEPT SHOULD BE GIVEN

CONCERNING CHARITY

It seems no precept should be given. Charity is the form of the virtues and gives their acts their mode, while the mode of a virtuous
act is commonly said not to fall under precept. Again, charity makes us free, whereas precept seems to impose necessity. Finally, if
charity is chief among the virtues, a precept concerning it should have been numbered among the chief commandments of the
Decalogue, yet no distinct commandment of charity is listed there.

On the contrary, whatever God requires of us falls under precept, and God requires that man love Him.

I answer that a precept signifies something due. Something may be due for its own sake or for the sake of another. In every matter
the end is due for its own sake, because it has the character of the good in itself; what is ordered to the end is due for the sake of the
end. The end of spiritual life is union with God, which is effected by charity. All other things belonging to spiritual life are ordered
to this as to their end. Hence the Apostle says: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,
and an unfeigned faith." The virtues concerning passions purify the heart; those concerning operations preserve a good conscience;
those concerning divine worship preserve true faith. These dispose man to love God. Therefore the greatest commandment is the
commandment of charity.

The mode of charity is not included under every commandment concerning another virtue; for example, "Honor thy father and thy
mother" does not of itself command that the act be elicited from charity. But the act of love itself falls under special precepts. The
obligation of a precept is contrary to freedom only in one whose will is averse from what is commanded. The commandment of love
cannot be fulfilled except willingly and therefore does not destroy the freedom proper to charity. The precepts of charity are not
separately numbered among the Decalogue because they are included in all of them as their end.

Bañez's first doubt. Is the first conclusion true? An objection says that precepts concern means, not the end; a physician commands
medicines, not health itself.

that although no precept can command the ultimate possession of the end as though it
were an act freely chosen by us - for example, the beatific vision - there can certainly be a precept concerning an act directed
immediately to the end, especially when that act is itself the most necessary means to attaining the end. The supernatural act of
charity is such an act.

I answer

with Augustine that the Decalogue is properly ten precepts, given on the two tablets. Catholic authors differ in their
enumeration, but the commandments concerning God belong to the first table and those concerning the neighbor to the second. He
rejects the opinion that the first commandment is simply "believe that God is one." The truth that God exists and is one is rather a
preamble presupposed to the commandments, just as St. Thomas calls faith and hope, in their foundational relation to the legislator
and promised end, preambles to the Decalogue. The explicit first commandment is the worship of the one God. From this
a first conclusion: the commandment of the love of God is likewise, in a certain respect, a preamble to the Decalogue. Faith recognizes the legislator and the end; hope regards that end as our attainable good; love inclines the will toward
God and thereby toward observance of His law. This does not mean that supernatural charity lacks its own special commandment,
but explains why it is not counted as an additional eleventh commandment.
A second conclusion concerns natural love of God.
it probable that there is not a special natural virtue of loving God
distinct from religion, and therefore probably no separate natural precept distinct from the precept of divine worship. Aristotle does
not posit such a distinct acquired virtue; friendship with God in the strict supernatural sense belongs to infused charity; and once God
is naturally known as the supreme good, the special acquired difficulty lies principally in ordering the means and passions, which is
the work of moral virtue and religion. St. Paul condemns philosophers who knew God but did not glorify Him as God or give thanks:
the immediately arising natural duty is expressed in divine worship and gratitude.
Bañez does not insist dogmatically on this probable thesis and is willing to admit the contrary if the arguments are answered. His
third and firm conclusion is that supernatural love of God is the object of a special precept and is the first and greatest
commandment. Charity is a special virtue whose act is necessary for salvation; therefore its act is specially commanded. It is first not
necessarily in the order of generation - faith precedes as the beginning of approach to God - but in the order of perfection, finality,
dignity of object, and merit. Charity commands and moves all other virtues toward the ultimate end and gives their acts their full
supernatural ordering.
I judge
I note
I draw
747

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE I COMMENTARY: WHEN DOES THE PRECEPT OF

CHARITY BIND?

The precept of supernatural charity is the greatest because its matter and object are supreme and because the merit of charity bears
directly upon the essential reward. The substantial perfection of Christian life consists in charity.
To the objection that precepts concern means rather than ends,
that the beatific vision cannot be commanded as a
means chosen by us, since it is the attainment of the end itself. The act of charity, however, while terminating upon the last end, is
also a most necessary means by which we tend to that end. The fact that charity gives form to other acts does not abolish its own
special precept. "If you love me, keep my commandments" expresses the necessary connection between love of God and obedience,
not the absence of a special commandment of love.
A difficult question remains: at what times does the affirmative precept "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" oblige?
it difficult to determine every precise time, just as with the precepts of faith and hope. St. Thomas's principles suggest that when a
person first comes to the use of reason he is bound to turn himself toward the good of reason and refer himself and his life toward the
supreme good. Yet before faith is known he cannot be bound to an explicitly supernatural act of infused charity, since nothing is
willed unless first known. A pagan who has never heard the supernatural faith may therefore be excused from omission of an act
whose object has never been proposed to him.
Soto held that around the first use of reason a man is bound to love God above all things.
this very probable if one
speaks of a Christian who has knowledge of the supernatural God and of supernatural love. He doubts, however, that the special
precept of charity is fulfilled merely by receiving baptism: infants love habitually rather than by elicited act, and adults can receive
baptism fruitfully with attrition before possessing a fully elicited act of charity. Since the precept commands an act, not merely
possession of the habit, baptism as such does not necessarily constitute the special fulfillment of this commandment.
The opinion that the precept binds only in danger or at the article of death is rejected as absurd. A divine law of friendship ordered to
the merit of eternal life cannot reasonably bind only at life's final moment.
that one may safely judge that a person who
worthily receives the Eucharist at least once a year also fulfills the special precept of charity, since worthy sacramental communion
ordinarily requires and exercises a living orientation of love toward God.
I consider
I reply
I judge
I add
748

asks whether the precept of loving God can be fulfilled only as to the substance of the act while lacking the proper mode of charity - for example, if a person says sincerely, "I wish to please God in all things," while nevertheless remaining in mortal
sin. Some distinguish between the external work commanded by charity and the interior act itself. An external work belonging
principally to another virtue can be performed as to its substance outside the state of grace: one can give alms or perform an act of
religion while lacking charity. But an act that principally and formally belongs to charity cannot remain numerically the same act
while lacking charity's intrinsic supernatural mode.
The movement of a will tending to God with the whole heart under the motion of the Holy Spirit through infused charity differs from
a movement that does not proceed with the whole heart and from that supernatural principle. Thus, although outward expressions
may look alike, the formal acts are not identical.
to St. Thomas and to Soto on the distinction between fulfilling the
substance of another commanded work and fulfilling the special precept of charity itself.
He concludes that the special commandment of charity requires a true act by which the will effectively tends to God in the
supernatural order. It is not enough merely to perform an exterior work that charity might command. At the same time, we should
not fall into scrupulosity by trying to assign mathematically every instant at which the affirmative precept binds. There may be
hidden omissions of this commandment, just as there may be hidden omissions of the duty of prayer; hence the fitting petition of the
Psalmist: "From my hidden faults cleanse me, O Lord."
This completes Bañez's principal discussion of Article I. The essential points are these: charity is truly commanded; its act is the end
and perfection of the other commandments; it has a special precept even though that precept is contained virtually in the whole law;
and its fulfillment requires an elicited supernatural act of love, not merely an exterior deed or the bare possession of the infused
habit.
I appeal
I further
749

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE II - WHETHER TWO PRECEPTS OF CHARITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN

St. Thomas asks whether the law fittingly gives two precepts of charity, one concerning the love of God and one concerning the love of neighbor. The objections argue that charity is one virtue and therefore might seem to require only one precept; that love of neighbor is contained in love of God; and that many distinct neighbors exist, which would seem to require many commandments rather than one.

I answer that precepts are to acts as propositions are to conclusions in speculative science. The love of God is first and principal, while the love of neighbor follows from it and is ordered to it. Yet because not everyone immediately perceives all that is virtually contained in first principles, what is necessary for conduct must also be explicitly proposed. Hence the law fittingly commands both:

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

The love of God and love of neighbor belong to one virtue because the formal reason of loving the neighbor is God: we love the neighbor in God and for God. Nevertheless the acts are materially distinct and the law fittingly expresses both. The precept of love of neighbor does not diminish the primacy of the love of God; rather, it manifests one necessary effect of that love.

Summary. Two precepts are fittingly given because charity has two principal acts according to its two immediate objects in the order of love: God as the principal object, and the neighbor as loved for God's sake.

Commentary.

whether the distinction of these precepts is truly specific. The distinction of precepts need not always follow a distinction of virtues, since one virtue can have several acts and objects that must be commanded separately. Religion, for example, contains diverse commanded acts. Likewise, even though one infused habit of charity formally regards God as the reason for loving all things, the elicited act terminating in God and the act terminating in the neighbor are sufficiently distinct in their immediate matter to warrant two commandments. The law therefore expresses separately what the one virtue requires in relation to its principal and secondary object.

I ask

750

the formal reason of charity from the immediate material object of its acts. The same formal reason - the divine goodness and our supernatural friendship with God - extends to all who are loved in charity. Yet a new material object can introduce
a distinct commanded act without requiring a new virtue. Thus the distinction of commandments is broader than the distinction of
habits.

First conclusion. We are bound by a special precept to love God with supernatural charity. This was established in the preceding
article.

Second conclusion. The love of our neighbors is not merely an accidental consequence but a necessary extension of charity.
Whoever truly loves God must love those who belong to God and are capable of sharing His beatitude. The formal motive remains
God, but the act truly terminates upon the neighbor.

Third conclusion. This love of neighbor falls under a special precept which obliges at determinate times. The commandment is not
satisfied merely by refraining from hatred. Positive acts of love become due when circumstances require them, especially when the
neighbor's spiritual or temporal necessity calls for assistance, prayer, correction, reconciliation, or another work of charity.
that prelates have a more determinate obligation toward those committed to their care because their office adds a special title of duty. Private persons are not bound to exercise the same acts toward every neighbor at every moment, but no one is
exempt from the universal precept of charity. The affirmative commandment binds according to the order of reason: when, where,
toward whom, and in the manner that charity and prudence require.
Thus the two commandments are neither redundant nor two unrelated laws. The second unfolds the necessary social and ecclesial
consequence of the first. Love of neighbor is commanded precisely because the neighbor is to be loved in relation to God, and the
perfection of the second commandment remains subordinate to the first.
I distinguish
I observe
751

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE III - WHETHER TWO PRECEPTS OF CHARITY SUFFICE

It seems that two do not suffice, because acts of all virtues require precepts and charity extends to many kinds of persons and acts.

Yet charity is a friendship, and friendship is principally expressed through love of the friend and beneficence toward him. The two commandments of love of God and neighbor contain the root from which the remaining works of charity proceed.

St. Thomas answers that all the commandments concerning acts of the virtues are ordered to charity. The precepts of charity therefore need not enumerate every work that charity commands. The love of God contains the orientation of the whole man to his last end; the love of neighbor contains the universal disposition by which we will the neighbor's true good for God's sake. Particular works such as almsgiving, fraternal correction, forgiveness, and the duties of justice are specified by their own circumstances and virtues, but receive their ultimate supernatural order from charity.

Summary. The two precepts suffice as the universal and principal commandments of charity. Other precepts determine particular works that flow from them.

Commentary.

asks whether beneficence requires an additional universal precept distinct from love. He answers that love, as an act of charity, is the interior root, while beneficence is commanded through the particular duties in which the neighbor's good must be effected. The law does not need a third commandment saying in general "do good to your neighbor" as though this were independent of love; the command to love already includes the readiness of will from which beneficence proceeds, while particular positive duties are determined elsewhere.

The sufficiency of the two precepts therefore rests on the architectonic character of charity. God is loved as the supreme good and final end; the neighbor is loved as one ordered with us to that end. All other relations of charity are contained under these two headings.

Briefly, I

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QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE IV - WHETHER GOD IS FITTINGLY COMMANDED TO

BE LOVED WITH THE
WHOLE HEART

The commandment says: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." An objection might say that the heart is a bodily
member and therefore cannot properly love; or that no created act can equal the infinite goodness of God; or that the phrase seems to
demand an intensity impossible in this life.

St. Thomas explains that "whole" signifies that nothing in us is to be intentionally reserved against God. God is to be loved as the
universal end of our life, so that all our powers and actions are ordered to Him. The commandment does not require that every act of
love possess the highest possible psychological intensity, nor that the mind think actually of God without interruption. Rather, it
excludes a divided ultimate end: nothing may be loved contrary to God, and everything else must be loved under the order of God.

Summary. The totality commanded concerns the ordering of the whole person to God. It is compatible with the limitations of the
present life, while tending toward the perfect fulfillment found in heaven.

Commentary.

that the precept is not a counsel reserved for contemplatives. Every Christian is bound to love God as
his supreme end with an undivided heart in the sense that no mortal sin may be preferred to God. The commandment is perfectly
fulfilled in the blessed, where every movement of the will is actually ordered to God; in the wayfarer it is fulfilled according to the
condition of this life, with habitual and effective subordination of all things to God.

This distinction also guards against a rigorist interpretation that would make every distraction or remiss act a mortal violation of the
greatest commandment. The law commands totality of final orientation, not the maximum possible degree of fervor in every instant.

I stress

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE V - WHETHER THE WORDS "WITH THY WHOLE

HEART, WHOLE SOUL, WHOLE
MIND, AND WHOLE STRENGTH" ARE FITTING

Scripture multiplies expressions of totality in describing the love of God. St. Thomas explains them according to the principal
powers and dimensions of human life. The heart signifies the intention or will; the soul, the whole life and sensitive appetite as
ordered by reason; the mind, intellectual knowledge and remembrance of God; strength, the exterior powers and works by which
love is carried into action. The point is not to divide charity into four virtues but to signify that no part of human life is excluded
from its order.

The wording is therefore especially useful for preaching and examination of conscience. A man loves God with the whole heart
when his final intention is not divided by a contrary ultimate end; with the whole soul when his life and passions are subordinated to
God; with the whole mind when his understanding assents to divine truth and returns to God in thought; and with all his strength
when his external works serve the divine good according to his state.

Commentary.

whether these words impose a determinate intensity of charity. He answers negatively. No fixed degree of intensive fervor is required in such a way that every lesser intensity would violate the commandment. Every true act of charity
adheres to God as supreme good and therefore has the required formal totality, though acts can differ greatly in fervor and
perfection. Growth in charity is commanded in the broader sense that the Christian life must tend toward perfection, but the special
precept is not measured by an arithmetically fixed intensity.

This explains how beginners, proficient persons, and the perfect can all truly fulfill the commandment while loving with unequal
degrees of charity.

I ask

754

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE VI - WHETHER THE PRECEPT OF LOVE OF GOD CAN BE PERFECTLY FULFILLED IN THIS LIFE

St. Thomas distinguishes several senses of perfection. The commandment can be considered according to the end intended by the legislator, according to the substance of the act, and according to the manner in which the act is exercised. Perfect uninterrupted actual love, with every movement of every power wholly fixed on God, belongs to the state of glory and cannot be possessed in this mortal life. Yet the commandment is truly fulfilled here insofar as nothing contrary to charity is admitted and the whole life is habitually ordered to God.

the inference that because perfect fulfillment belongs to heaven the commandment would be impossible or unjust. A law can command an end toward which the subject must continually tend, while admitting degrees of fulfillment according to the subject's state. The precept does not impose upon the wayfarer the mode proper to the blessed.

He also rejects the claim that a determinate maximum intensity is required. Charity is capable of increase throughout life. No created degree exhausts the divine goodness as object, and therefore the commandment's phrase "with thy whole heart" cannot mean "with the greatest degree of charity that could possibly exist." It means with an undivided final adherence to God.

The familiar Thomistic principle that God does not command the impossible must be read with the distinction between the substance of the precept and its consummate perfection. Grace makes the essential act possible; the consummation is promised as the reward toward which the command itself directs us.

I reject

755

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE VI CONTINUED

First conclusion. The precept of divine love is fulfilled in this life as to what is necessary for salvation: the will must adhere to God
as supreme end and exclude everything contrary to charity.

Second conclusion. The commandment also impels the faithful toward increasing perfection. Charity is not static; because the
object loved is infinite good, there is always room for greater created participation and more fervent exercise.

Third conclusion. The perfect fulfillment in which the mind is always actually borne toward God belongs to heaven. The wayfarer
cannot, because of bodily needs and the multiplicity of legitimate duties, exercise an uninterrupted act of contemplation and love.

Commentary.

whether the first conclusion conflicts with Augustine's severe statements concerning the
commandment. It does not. Augustine distinguishes the perfection of the present state from the consummation of the future state. An
imperfect degree of a quality can possess the same specific nature as its perfect degree: imperfect whiteness is still whiteness.
Likewise true charity in the wayfarer is specifically the same supernatural love that will be consummated in glory, although its
exercise is not yet uninterrupted or fully intense.
The commandment therefore remains one and the same, but its formal obligation is accommodated to the state of the subject. In this
life it requires the acts and order possible under grace amid the conditions of the way; in heaven it reaches its complete term without
distraction or contrary movement. The distinction is essential for understanding how the Gospel can command perfection without
making every Christian continually guilty of an impossible omission.
I examine
756

upon the Catholic doctrine that even the just can commit venial sins in this life. St. John says, "If we say that we have
no sin, we deceive ourselves." The Blessed Virgin is excepted by singular privilege. Therefore the commandment of love cannot be
interpreted so rigorously that every venial defect would amount to failure of the substance of the precept and consequently to mortal
sin.
The Pelagian error of attainable sinless perfection by natural power is excluded. The just need divine assistance even to persevere in
grace, and the present state remains one of combat. St. Paul himself says, "Not as though I had already attained, or were already
perfect; but I follow after." Christian perfection is real, yet it is the perfection of a wayfarer tending toward a higher consummation.
From this
a practical consequence: venial sins are genuine disorders and impede the fervor and growth of charity, but
they do not necessarily destroy the essential order by which God remains the last end. Mortal sin, by contrast, places a created good
above the divine friendship and therefore contradicts the totality required by the precept.
Thus the commandment is both demanding and possible. It excludes mortal aversion from God, requires acts of supernatural love at
due times, and obliges the Christian to tend toward greater perfection; yet it does not impose the condition of the blessed upon those
still living in mortal flesh.
I insist
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757

QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE VII - WHETHER THE PRECEPT CONCERNING LOVE

OF NEIGHBOR IS
FITTINGLY EXPRESSED

The command is: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The measure "as thyself" does not require equal intensity of affection
toward every person. Rather, natural love of self supplies a model: as a man wills true good to himself, so he must will true good to
his neighbor for God's sake. Charity corrects disordered self-love but presupposes a legitimate love of one's own nature and
supernatural salvation.

The neighbor is called "neighbor" not merely by bodily proximity but by the common capacity for beatitude and the relation of
rational creatures to God. Therefore the command extends universally, even to enemies, although different persons are loved
according to a due order and different titles of union.

Summary. The precept is fittingly expressed because self-love is naturally known and supplies an intelligible rule for benevolence
toward another.

ARTICLE VIII - WHETHER THE ORDER OF CHARITY FALLS UNDER PRECEPT

Since the order of charity belongs intrinsically to the virtue, it falls under the commandment. God must be loved above all; one's own
spiritual good has priority over another's in the order of salvation; among neighbors, those more closely united to us by the relevant
title are ordinarily preferred, while the common good can impose higher claims than a merely private good. The precept "love thy
neighbor as thyself" therefore does not abolish order but presupposes it.

The fact that a man sometimes loves one person more intensely through natural affection does not necessarily violate charity,
provided his effective choices respect the supernatural order when duties conflict.

that "order" can be considered in several ways. Some order is intrinsic to charity's very formal object; some arises from
the nature of the habit; some concerns the elicited interior act; and some concerns external works commanded by charity. These must
not be confused when asking what exactly falls under precept.
St. Thomas's conclusion concerns the order of charity insofar as it is morally due in acts. The law commands God to be loved above
all and the neighbor according to the proportion of the lover to the lovable object. Yet the command does not require that every
interior affection always exhibit the same sensible intensity or that every legitimate preference be consciously calculated.
Cajetan's distinctions are especially useful. The order intrinsic to the formal reason of charity cannot be reversed without destroying
the act's species: if one prefers a creature to God as last end, the act is no longer charity. Other orders, especially among neighbors,
can admit variation according to necessity, office, common good, kinship, spiritual advantage, and other circumstances. A parent
may owe one kind of preference to a child, a prelate another to his subjects, a citizen another to the commonwealth, and a Christian
another to a person in extreme spiritual need.
Thus the precept of order is not a simplistic command always to feel more affection for one person than another. It is a rational and
supernatural ordering of willing and action. The interior and exterior acts of the virtues are governed by this order in the measure
proper to each act.
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QUESTION XLIV - ARTICLE VIII COMMENTARY CONCLUDED; QUESTION XLV BEGINS

several conclusions. First, if the order of charity is considered in the formal reason of the virtue itself, it is necessary and cannot be reversed while charity remains. Second, if the nature of the infused habit is considered, it inclines according
to the hierarchy of goods established by God, though the intensity of particular acts can vary. Third, in elicited acts toward different
neighbors the precise order can depend upon circumstances and may be difficult to determine. Fourth, in commanded external
works the order is regulated by justice, office, necessity, and the common good as well as by charity.
He notes that difficult cases concerning whom to prefer have long been disputed among learned theologians. The secure rule is to
preserve the order that arises from the proper reason of charity and from the relevant moral titles, without reducing charity to mere
emotional intensity.

QUESTION XLV - ON THE GIFT OF WISDOM CORRESPONDING TO CHARITY

ARTICLE I - WHETHER WISDOM SHOULD BE NUMBERED AMONG THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

It seems not, because wisdom is commonly numbered among intellectual virtues, whereas the gifts are distinct from the virtues; and
Scripture can speak of a worldly or evil "wisdom." On the contrary, Isaiah explicitly numbers the spirit of wisdom among the seven
gifts.

I answer that wisdom denotes a right judgment according to the highest cause. One may judge according to the highest cause by
acquired or infused intellectual knowledge, but the gift of wisdom adds a connaturality with divine things produced by charity. The
Holy Spirit moves the soul so that it judges divine realities not merely from abstract reasoning but through a certain spiritual
sympathy and union with God. Therefore wisdom is fittingly a gift corresponding especially to charity.
that this does not abolish theological science. The theologian can reason scientifically from revealed principles; the gift of wisdom perfects judgment under the motion of the Holy Spirit and gives a connatural savor of divine things.
I formulate
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760

Wisdom takes its name from judgment according to the highest cause. He who knows the highest cause in an unrestricted sense is
wise simply; one who knows the highest cause only within a particular art is wise in that limited genus. God is the absolutely highest
cause. Therefore the gift by which man judges according to divine things deserves the name wisdom in the highest supernatural
sense.

This wisdom is received through the Holy Spirit. Charity unites the soul to God, and from this union arises a connatural judgment
about divine things. St. Paul says that "the spiritual man judgeth all things." The gift is therefore not merely speculative information
but a perfection of judgment arising from supernatural union.

Summary. First, wisdom is rightly numbered among the gifts. Second, the gift judges according to the divine cause through a
connaturality rooted in charity.

Commentary. Bañez has little to add to St. Thomas's clear doctrine, but he highlights the difference between

knowledge gained
through discourse and judgment arising from connaturality. A chaste man can judge rightly about chastity not only because he has
learned moral propositions but because his appetite has been rectified and is connatural with the good of chastity. Analogously, one
who possesses charity is disposed to judge divine things with a certain spiritual taste under the Holy Spirit's motion.

This explains why the gift can be found in persons without advanced academic theology, while a learned theologian lacking charity
may possess theological science without possessing the gift of wisdom in its living supernatural mode.

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QUESTION XLV - ARTICLE II - WHETHER WISDOM IS IN THE INTELLECT AS ITS SUBJECT

Wisdom involves judgment, and judgment is formally an act of the intellect. Therefore the gift of wisdom is in the intellect as its
subject. Yet its connatural mode of judging is caused by charity in the will. The affective union with God belongs to charity; the
judgment that proceeds according to that union belongs to wisdom.

This distinction preserves both the intellectual character of wisdom and its intimate connection with love. The gift is not reduced to
an emotion or affection, because it truly judges; nor is it reduced to speculative science, because its mode depends upon the will's
supernatural union with God.

St. Thomas compares this with moral judgment arising from virtue. The virtuous appetite disposes a man to judge rightly about what
is fitting. In the supernatural order charity makes the soul connatural with divine goodness, and wisdom judges according to that
connaturality.

Bañez's note. The word "taste" used in explaining wisdom must be understood analogically. Wisdom does not dispense with truth or
intellect. Rather, the intellect perceives and judges divine truth with a sweetness and experiential conformity produced by charity.

Thus the ancient etymological play between sapientia and sapor is useful provided it is not taken to make wisdom a merely sensitive
experience.

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QUESTION XLV - ARTICLE III - WHETHER WISDOM IS SPECULATIVE OR

PRACTICAL; ARTICLE IV BEGINS

Wisdom as a gift is both speculative and practical. Since it judges according to the highest divine cause, it contemplates divine things
in themselves; but because the highest cause is also the rule of human action, wisdom directs human acts according to God. The gift
therefore extends from contemplation to conduct.

This is more excellent than a merely practical prudence or a merely speculative acquired science, because the same divine light
orders both judgment about truth and judgment about action. The gift's practical efficacy follows from its contemplative height:
because the wise man judges things in relation to God, he can order lower goods to their proper end.

Summary. The gift of wisdom is principally contemplative but also practical by extension, since it judges and orders human actions
according to divine reasons.

the reader to his treatment of sacred doctrine in the First Part, where theology is likewise said to be one science embracing speculative and practical matters under one formal light.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER WISDOM CAN EXIST WITHOUT GRACE AND WITH

MORTAL SIN

The answer is no. The gift of wisdom depends upon charity for the connaturality by which it judges divine things. Mortal sin
destroys charity; therefore it destroys the gift of wisdom as a living gift of the Holy Spirit. A sinner may retain theological
knowledge, memory of divine truths, or even great natural intellectual ability, but not this gift in its proper supernatural perfection.

I refer

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QUESTION XLV - ARTICLE IV CONCLUDED; ARTICLE V

Because charity cannot coexist with mortal sin, neither can the gift of wisdom which follows charity. The loss of the gift does not
mean that every true proposition formerly known is forgotten. Science and faith can remain in an unformed state, but wisdom as a
gift includes a rectitude and connaturality of judgment incompatible with aversion from God as last end.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER WISDOM IS FOUND IN ALL WHO HAVE GRACE

It seems not, because wisdom appears to imply extraordinary perfection and the ability to order and teach others, while many in
grace are simple and imperfect. Yet the gifts of the Holy Spirit accompany sanctifying grace and charity. Therefore all who possess
grace possess the gift of wisdom habitually, though not all possess the same degree or the same manifest exercise.
St. Thomas distinguishes what is necessary for one's own salvation from a higher exercise ordered to the instruction of others. Every
person in grace receives the gift sufficiently for supernatural judgment according to his state. Some receive a more eminent degree
by which they can contemplate, teach, counsel, and direct others in divine things.
Summary. The gift is in all who possess charity as to what is necessary for salvation; it is not equally eminent or equally exercised
in all.
This explains why a simple believer can possess genuine supernatural wisdom while lacking theological erudition, and why a
learned scholar can lack the gift if he lacks charity.
764

how the gift can be universal among the just if its acts are so unequal. The answer lies in the distinction between the habit
and its intensive degree and exercise. All who have charity possess the gift habitually, because the gifts are infused with grace; but
the Holy Spirit moves different persons in different degrees and for different offices. Increase in charity is accompanied by a
proportionate perfection of the gifts, though not every just person is called to the public exercise of teaching or governing.

ARTICLE VI - WHETHER THE SEVENTH BEATITUDE, "BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS," CORRESPONDS TO WISDOM

The answer is affirmative. Wisdom orders things according to the highest cause; peace is the tranquility of order. Therefore the
making of peace is a fitting effect of wisdom. The wise man first possesses interior order by subjecting his powers to God and then
promotes right order among others.
The reward, "they shall be called the children of God," also fits wisdom. The Only-begotten Son is the generated Wisdom of the
Father. Those who participate in the gift of wisdom receive a likeness to the Son and are fittingly called children of God. Charity
unites them to God, and wisdom reveals and judges the divine mysteries according to that union.
Peace here is not mere absence of conflict. It is order under the true highest good. A false concord founded upon injustice cannot be
the proper fruit of divine wisdom. The peacemaker establishes or restores the order of charity and justice in himself and, according to
his office, among others.
I ask
765

QUESTION XLVI - ON FOLLY, OPPOSED TO WISDOM

ARTICLE I - WHETHER FOLLY IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM

Folly denotes dullness or perversion of judgment concerning the highest cause and the ultimate end. It is therefore opposed to
wisdom. The fool is not simply one who lacks technical knowledge; in the moral and theological sense he judges ultimate things
badly because his mind is not rightly ordered to God.

St. Thomas distinguishes natural lack of intellectual capacity from culpable folly. A person of limited natural intelligence may
nevertheless possess supernatural wisdom through charity. Conversely, a brilliant person can be foolish in the scriptural sense if he
makes a created good his ultimate standard and refuses to judge according to God.

The "wisdom of this world" can thus be called folly before God when it treats a lower cause or temporal end as though it were
highest. Worldly prudence may be subtle in choosing means while remaining radically foolish about the final end.

The gift of wisdom gives a subtle spiritual perception; folly produces a blunted taste for divine things. This opposition is principally
moral and spiritual, not a comparison of natural IQ or academic learning.

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QUESTION XLVI - ARTICLE II - WHETHER FOLLY IS A SIN; ARTICLE III

Folly can be taken in two ways. If it arises from a natural defect that is not voluntary, it is not a sin. But if a man voluntarily
immerses himself in earthly things so that his spiritual judgment becomes dull, the resulting folly is sinful. A man may not directly
will the blindness or dullness as such; he wills the pleasures or attachments that produce it, and the culpable effect follows from that
voluntary cause.
Thus Scripture can rebuke fools morally while charity requires compassion toward those whose intellectual limitations are
involuntary. The theological vice is not mere stupidity but a culpable aversion of judgment from the divine rule.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER FOLLY IS A DAUGHTER OF LUST

St. Thomas answers that folly is especially connected with lust because intense carnal pleasure fixes the attention upon sensible
goods and weakens the mind's taste for spiritual and intelligible goods. The more the appetite is immersed in bodily pleasure, the
more difficult it becomes to judge according to the highest spiritual cause. Hence lust can generate blindness of mind,
thoughtlessness, inconstancy, and a foolish estimate of the final end.
This does not mean that every kind of folly proceeds only from lust. Pride, avarice, and other vices can also distort judgment. The
attribution to lust identifies a particularly fitting causal connection: bodily pleasure strongly absorbs and drags down the mind from
contemplation of divine things.
that the opposition should be understood according to the dulling of spiritual perception. Wisdom makes the divine
good spiritually "savory" through charity; lust, by fastening desire upon sensible delight, produces a contrary heaviness and
incapacity for that taste.
I note
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the treatment of folly by connecting it with the earlier discussion of blindness of mind and dullness of sense. The distinction is useful. Blindness concerns the failure to perceive the principles or light by which divine truth is seen; dullness concerns
a heaviness or obtuseness in penetrating spiritual things; folly concerns defective judgment according to the supreme cause and final
end. These defects can overlap because the same disordered attachment to sensible goods can weaken perception, penetration, and
judgment.
Lust is especially apt to produce this effect because the vehement delight of touch binds attention to the lowest sensible pleasure and
thereby makes the mind less free for spiritual consideration. Yet the moral responsibility depends upon voluntariness. Natural
slowness of mind is not the vice condemned here; culpable immersion in lower goods is.
The contrary virtue and gift are therefore not mere erudition. True supernatural wisdom arises from charity, judges all things under
God as highest cause, orders action toward the last end, and bears fruit in peace. Folly is its moral contrary when the will's disorder
causes the intellect to judge the hierarchy of goods falsely.
END OF QUESTION XLVI
With this question
the section of the Secunda Secundae treated in this volume: faith, hope, charity, their
corresponding gifts, the principal acts and effects of charity, the vices opposed to them, the precepts of charity, the gift of wisdom,
and folly opposed to wisdom.
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QUESTION XXVII — ON THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS LOVE

ARTICLE II — WHETHER LOVE, AS AN ACT OF CHARITY, IS THE SAME AS BENEVOLENCE

(continued)

RESPONSE. Benevolence is properly an act of the will by which we will good to another. Love, however, adds something beyond bare benevolence. In sensitive appetite love is a passion carrying an impulse toward the beloved; it normally arises through a certain continued consideration or familiarity. Benevolence, by contrast, can arise suddenly from the judgment of reason—as when spectators, seeing two contestants, suddenly wish that one of them win. Intellectual love likewise differs from benevolence. Love implies a certain affective union of the lover with the beloved: the lover regards the beloved as in some way one with himself or belonging to himself, and thus is moved toward him. Benevolence is simply willing some good to another even without presupposing this affective union. Therefore charity's love includes benevolence but adds union of affection. Hence Aristotle calls benevolence a beginning of friendship. REPLIES. Aristotle's definition, “to love is to will good to someone,” does not express the whole essence of love, but something belonging to it in which love is especially manifested. Love is indeed an act of the will tending toward good, but with a union to the beloved that bare benevolence does not imply. The features Aristotle assigns to friendship—willing the friend's good and existence, living pleasantly with him, choosing the same things, grieving and rejoicing with him—belong to friendship insofar as they proceed from the love by which one treats a friend as oneself. SUMMARY. Charity's act of love includes benevolence, but adds affective union with the beloved.

that materially the

same act can be called an act of charity and benevolence, yet “charity” or “love” signifies something more divine because it includes the union and impetus of affection tending toward God.

ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS TO BE LOVED FROM CHARITY FOR HIS OWN SAKE

OBJECTIONS. Gregory says that from known things the soul learns to love unknown divine things; God is known through created things; and hope and fear dispose us toward charity by expected rewards and feared punishments. It therefore seems that God is loved because of something else. ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine says that to enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake, and God is to be enjoyed. RESPONSE. “Because of” can signify four kinds of cause: final, formal, efficient, or material/dispositive. We love medicine because of health as final cause; a man because of virtue as formal cause; someone because he is the son of a certain father as efficient-causal title; and a person because benefits received disposed us to love him, as a material disposition. In the first three senses God is not loved because of another: He is the ultimate end; His goodness is not received from a form other than Himself; and His goodness is not caused by another. In the

fourth sense, however, other things can dispose us to advance in God's love—benefits received, rewards hoped for, or punishments we seek to avoid.

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ARTICLE III — WHETHER GOD IS LOVED FOR HIS OWN SAKE: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. First, if “because of” denotes final, formal, or efficient cause, God is not loved because of another, since He is not ordered to another end, does not receive His formal goodness from another, and His goodness is not efficiently caused. Second, if it denotes a disposition reduced to material causality, God can be loved because of other things insofar as benefits, hoped-for rewards, or feared punishments dispose us to progress in divine love. Third, principally and formally, God is to be loved for Himself because He is the ultimate end and the supreme good by His very substance. COMMENTARY.

that St. Thomas deliberately

distinguishes these senses. He then asks whether it is lawful to love God for temporal or eternal reward, or to avoid temporal or eternal punishment, and similarly whether one may observe the commandments for such motives. He distinguishes two kinds of “mercenary love.” The first loves solely for wages, with the wage not itself ordered to the person giving it as final end—like a hired laborer cultivating a rich man's vineyard only for his private gain. This is mercenary love simply speaking. The second loves someone while hoping for a reward from him, yet with the present disposition that one would still love him even if the reward were removed. This is better called “love of reward” than mercenary love in the strict sense.

distinguishes two

questions: whether God Himself, the beloved reality, is ordered to something else as an end; and whether our created act of loving God can itself be ordered toward our happiness or some temporal good. Ends too are distinguished: God alone is the absolutely ultimate end, whereas a proximate end may be principal within a particular action, as health is the principal end of medication without excluding the absolutely ultimate end.

FIRST CONCLUSION. It is sinful to love God with mercenary love in the first sense. Such a person attempts to

enjoy a creature as ultimate end and thus overturns right order.

this with servile fear joined

to servility: just as punishment is feared solely as one's own evil, so reward is sought as one's own good apart from due reference to God. SECOND CONCLUSION. It can never be lawful to order God Himself to a created thing as either ultimate or proximate end in the way medicine is ordered to health. God is in no way orderable to a creature; intending to subordinate Him to a creature derogates from divine majesty. THIRD

CONCLUSION (introduced). It is lawful to love God while ordering the created act of loving

Him toward our

eternal happiness and reward as a means, provided our happiness itself remains ordered to God as the absolutely ultimate end.

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ARTICLE III — LOVE OF GOD, REWARD, AND TEMPORAL GOODS

THIRD CONCLUSION (proof). Eternal happiness is truly an end of human life, and by God's ordinance our meritorious operations are directed toward salvation and happiness. “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt. 19). Merit by its nature is ordered toward reward; therefore the love of God, insofar as meritorious, can be ordered toward eternal life. Scripture likewise speaks of receiving “the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls” (1 Pet. 1). The beatific vision is the most excellent created act, so our other excellent acts can be ordered toward it. FOURTH CONCLUSION. According to the Catholic faith it is lawful to do good and love God with a view to eternal reward—that is, the second kind of “mercenary” love previously distinguished is lawful.

to Psalm 118/119: “I have inclined my heart to perform your

justifications forever, because of the reward,” to Hebrews' praise of Moses for looking to the recompense, and to Christ enduring the cross for the joy set before Him. He cites the common teaching of the Fathers, St. Thomas and Capreolus, and invokes the Church's doctrinal judgment, especially the Council of Trent, Session VI, canon 31: one must not say that the justified person sins by acting well with a view to eternal reward. Friendship itself supports this: a friend rightly desires the presence and company of his friend; therefore God's friends may act in order to attain God's presence and beatitude. FIFTH CONCLUSION. It is also lawful to love and serve God with a view to temporal goods, provided such goods are not constituted as the absolutely ultimate end. The Church herself asks God for health, rain, and other temporal goods and offers acts of worship in petition for them. The Old Law promised temporal goods to those observing God's commandments; the New Law teaches us to ask for daily bread. Temporal goods can serve as instruments for virtuous action and can fall under merit in their due order. Thus an intention such as “I will give alms, pray, or love God so that He may grant me health” can be good in its object and need not be corrupted by its circumstance of end. There is no inversion where the lesser good remains orderable to the ultimate end; the agent need not at every moment make that ultimate reference explicit.

that Durandus appears at first to oppose this, but

qualifies his position where temporal goods are not aids to spiritual good.

that even when temporal

goods are not directly spiritual aids, serving God for them need not be mortal sin so long as they are not ordered toward mortal sin. Seeking a superfluity of temporal goods can, however, introduce venial disorder, just as almsgiving for vainglory may be venially defective. REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS. Love of reward is not mercenary love simply speaking and therefore is not contrary to charity. “Loving God for reward” must be distinguished: if “for reward” determines the action of loving, the act may be ordered to obtaining a reward which itself is ordered to God; this is lawful. If it determines God as the thing loved—so that God Himself is loved merely as a means to reward—it is unlawful and would make the reward more loved than God. Likewise, obeying God in order to escape hell or temporal evils does not universally mean loving oneself more than God. If one positively cuts off the order to God as ultimate end, the order is perverted. But if one simply intends, “I wish to escape hell, and for this I will keep God's commandments,” without excluding God as ultimate end, the act is not contrary to charity, although it manifests imperfect charity, since perfect charity casts out fear.

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DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P. — COMMENTARY ON THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

ARTICLE IV — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED IMMEDIATELY IN THIS LIFE

OBJECTIONS. Unknown things cannot be loved, and in this life God is not immediately known, since we see "through a glass in an obscure manner." Further, loving God is in a way greater than knowing Him, because he who adheres to God by love becomes one spirit with Him; if immediate knowledge is impossible, immediate love seems still more impossible. Finally, sin separates man from God and belongs especially to the will, suggesting that immediate union through love is less possible than immediate knowledge. ON THE CONTRARY. Our mediated knowledge of God is called enigmatic and will cease in heaven, but charity does not cease. Therefore the charity of the wayfarer adheres immediately to God. RESPONSE. Cognitive acts are perfected by the known object existing intentionally in the knower; appetitive acts are perfected by the appetite's inclination toward the thing itself. Hence cognition follows the mode of the knower, while appetite tends toward things according to the condition they have in reality. In themselves, God is knowable and lovable through Himself, as subsistent Truth and Goodness. But for us, knowledge begins from sense, so creatures nearer to sense are first known and from them our knowledge rises to God. Love, however, once God is known, can terminate in God Himself as He is good in Himself. Thus charity tends first and immediately to God and from God is extended to other things. Knowledge proceeds from creatures to God; charity proceeds from God, as ultimate end, to creatures. Therefore although the order of knowledge and love cannot be wholly separated—nothing unknown can be loved—they need not be identical. Where cognition terminates in the thing known through another, love can immediately begin in that very reality. Charity removes the aversion from God caused by sin and unites the soul immediately to God by a spiritual bond. SUMMARY. God can be loved immediately even in this life because appetitive movement tends to the thing as it is in itself. Charity therefore tends to God as He is good in Himself, although our present cognition reaches Him through created effects. COMMENTARY.

St. Thomas intends precisely to mark the difference between present

knowledge and present love of God. God in Himself needs no medium to be knowable or lovable; nevertheless our present knowledge arises from sense and reaches God through creatures, whereas charity's appetitive movement can terminate immediately in God Himself and only afterward extend from Him to other things.

difficulties. If the reason for mediated knowledge is that human cognition begins from sense,

would an angel—whose cognition does not begin from sense—know God immediately in the state of the way? And if appetitive motion tends to the good as it exists in reality, would both angels and men naturally love God immediately even without supernatural charity?

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P. — COMMENTARY ON THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

ARTICLE IV — COMMENTARY ON IMMEDIATE LOVE OF GOD (continued)

the second difficulty: if appetitive movement reaches the good as it exists in reality, it seems

that even natural love in angel and man would immediately terminate in God, who is good through Himself. Yet man and angel naturally love themselves first, since their own goodness is first known; Aristotle's doctrine that friendship toward another derives from friendship toward oneself seems to confirm this. A third difficulty asks whether St. Thomas is comparing natural knowledge with supernatural charity. If both are natural, the discussion misses the present subject; if both belong to grace, the claim that cognition begins from sense seems inappropriate; if natural cognition is compared with supernatural love, the comparison appears disproportionate. Moreover faith itself is a theological virtue whose object is God. Theology proceeds from God to creatures, unlike philosophy, which proceeds from creatures to God. Does this not also give faith immediate contact with God?

that St. Thomas sufficiently proves the conclusion and speaks of cognition in

common—natural or supernatural in this life, excluding beatific vision. "Immediately" can refer to an immediate terminative object, an immediate motive object, or both. Our cognition can also be distinguished as apprehension of the object and assent/judgment concerning it. As to natural love, if "immediately" means that God can be the terminus reached by love,

that an intellectual creature can, from self-love as a

motive, reach the supreme good as loved for its own sake. But if it means the first act in the order of natural love, he denies it: natural angelic and human love is more immediate and prior toward self than toward God. He then emphasizes the singular excellence of charity. Faith's formal object is indeed First Truth speaking, but in the wayfarer's state it is apprehended under the obscure light of faith; it does not manifest God as He is in Himself. Faith therefore presupposes created modes of apprehension, even though its assent and judgment immediately concern divine truths. Charity's most formal object, by contrast, is the supreme good as supernatural end—God's own goodness as it is in Him. Charity therefore produces an immediate union of the will with God, not merely habitual union through grace but actual union when God is actually loved. Charity

first loves God and then neighbor, though after both have been loved the love of neighbor can in turn become a motive for renewed love of God. The objection "nothing is willed unless first known; therefore if God's goodness is not known as it is in itself, it cannot be loved as it is in itself" is denied on the basis of St. Thomas's distinction between the mode of cognition and the terminus of appetite.

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ARTICLE V — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED TOTALLY

OBJECTIONS. Love follows knowledge, but we cannot comprehend God totally. Love is a kind of union, but the human heart cannot be totally united to God, who is greater than our heart. Finally, God loves Himself totally; if a creature loved Him totally in the same sense, it would seem to love God as much as God loves Himself. ON THE CONTRARY. Deuteronomy commands: “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.” RESPONSE (beginning). Since love stands between lover and beloved, “totally” can be understood in three ways.

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P. — COMMENTARY ON THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

ARTICLE V — WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED TOTALLY (continued)

First, totality may refer to the thing loved. In this sense God is to be loved totally: everything belonging to God is to be loved. Second, totality may refer to the lover. In this sense too God is to be loved totally: man must love God with his whole power and order everything he possesses toward divine love, according to Deuteronomy 6, “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.” Third, totality may express an equality between the lover's mode of loving and the beloved's measure of lovability—loving God as much as He is lovable. This is impossible. Since a thing is lovable insofar as it is good, God's infinite goodness is infinitely lovable; every natural or infused power of a creature is finite and cannot love infinitely. SUMMARY. God is totally lovable both with respect to the whole reality loved and with respect to the lover giving his whole power. But no creature can love God with an intensity proportionately equal to God's infinite lovability. COMMENTARY. the reader to the following article and to earlier discussions for how the precept of loving God can be fulfilled in this life.

ARTICLE VI — WHETHER THERE IS ANY MODE OR MEASURE TO BE OBSERVED IN DIVINE LOVE

OBJECTIONS. Augustine says goodness consists in mode, species, and order, and charity is the highest good in man; therefore it seems charity must have a mode. Augustine also explicitly asks what the mode of loving God is. Finally, reason measures human will and exterior action; therefore it seems interior divine love also must be measured by reason. ON THE CONTRARY. Bernard says: “The cause of loving God is God; the mode is to love without mode.” RESPONSE. “Mode” signifies a determination of measure. Such determination exists differently in a measure and in the thing measured. The measure is determinative of other things through itself; measured things possess mode insofar as they attain their measure. In appetible and practical matters, the end is the measure, because what we desire and do receives its proper ratio from the end. Thus an end, as end, is not limited in the same manner as means to the end. A physician does not set a limit to health as though one could have too much health; he limits medicine according to its proportion to health. Too much or too little medicine would be immoderate. The love of God is the end of all human actions and affections, by which we especially attain the ultimate end. Therefore divine love does not have mode as a measured means having an upper limit; rather it has mode as measure itself, in which there is no excess. The more perfectly the rule is attained, the better. Hence the more God is loved, the better the love. REPLIES. Goodness belonging to the measure through itself is higher than goodness belonging to the measured through another; thus charity, having mode as measure, excels virtues measured by it. Augustine's “mode” of loving God is to love Him with the whole heart—as much as one can. An affection whose object falls under reason's judgment is measured by reason; but God, the object of divine love, exceeds reason's judgment. Interior charity therefore is not measured by reason in the same way as exterior acts, which are means and must be proportioned both by charity and prudence.

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ARTICLE VI — THE MODE OF DIVINE LOVE: SUMMARY AND BÁÑEZ'S COMMENTARY

SUMMARY. First, no mode is assigned to the love of God as though charity were a measured thing in which one could simply take too much or too little, because divine love functions as the measure and end of human actions. Second, charity possesses mode as a measure: there can be no excess in approaching its proper rule, and therefore the more God is loved, the better. COMMENTARY.

that Cajetan passes quickly

over this article, but he finds it difficult and worthy of examination. He asks whether St. Thomas's conclusions are true and sufficiently proved. First objection: every vital act is referred to its object and end as measure; therefore love of God itself is measured by its object and end, and thus appears to have mode as a measured thing. Second objection: divine love in this life is a deliberate human act and therefore must be measured by reason and prudence as to when and where it should be exercised. If someone persists in an explicit act of contemplation when a precept requires him to care for a sick person, he sins through a defect in the circumstance of time. Thus reason seems to place a mode upon divine love. Third objection: something can be a measure relative to one thing while measured relative to another. Even if charity measures other human actions, could it not itself be measured relative to beatitude, toward which it disposes man as an end? Thomists hold the essence of beatitude to consist in the vision of God, so one cannot simply answer that charity itself is the absolutely final created act. Fourth objection: St. Thomas says charity has mode as a measure and thereby excels other virtues. Does this imply that its "mode" is not without mode, or that there is no more and less in divine love? Yet plainly one person can love God more than another, and the same person can later love more intensely than before. For interpretation,

to St. Thomas's teaching on

whether the theological virtues consist in a mean. They do not have a mean according to their proper species because they are measured by an infinite object: faith by First Truth, hope by divine mercy, charity by supreme goodness. One cannot exceed these objects by tending "too much" toward them. Nevertheless, acts of the theological virtues can have a rational mode from other aspects: circumstances, the subject's condition, and duties imposed at a given time. In this life an act of charity is free on the subject's side and therefore prudence regulates when it is exercised so that another commanded act is not impeded. Charity itself can command that an explicit act cease so that a man sleeps and preserves his life. But from its proper object—supreme good and ultimate end—charity is not regulated by prudence or limited by rational measure. Rather, charity is the general leader ordering all things to its end.

the Song of Songs: God "ordered charity" in the

soul, and divine love is like the standard-bearer of the army of virtues, ordering the soul's advance toward God.

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P. — COMMENTARY ON THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

ARTICLE VI — BÁÑEZ'S RESOLUTION (continued)

To the first objection

. If "mode" means a fixed limit imposed by reason, divine love has no

such mode from its proper object. If "mode" means the specification received from its object, then it does have mode; but precisely in this respect its mode is "without mode," that is, without a limiting terminus. God's infinite goodness does not impose an upper boundary upon charity's intensity, duration, or other perfection arising from its proper object. To the second objection he grants that, from the side of circumstances and the human subject, an act of divine love can have a mode prescribed by prudence. To the third, he says divine love is not limited from the side of its object by a proportion to some finite degree of beatific vision. The concrete degree of glory is instead proportioned through the disposition of free will and divine predestination, God disposing a person through a certain intensity of love toward a corresponding degree of vision. Cajetan explains St. Thomas's statement that love is the end of human actions by comparing charity's interior act with exterior or commanded acts that are means to the end. St. Thomas is not comparing charity with the beatific vision considered as a naturally caused act of the glorified intellect. The vision has, in one respect, more of the ratio of end than the act of love. Yet the beatific vision does not exclude the will's adhesion to God; rather the will's adherence belongs to the complete attainment of the end. Thus St. Thomas is not contradicting his doctrine that essential beatitude consists in vision. To the fourth objection, charity has mode as a measure that excels other virtues, but "the mode of loving God is without mode" means without limitation arising from charity's proper formal object. There is an equivocation in "mode": charity's mode as specification comes from its formal object, while "without mode" denies a limiting maximum such as moral virtues have in objects ordered as means. Likewise, when St. Thomas denies a "more and less" in divine love, he means that the proper object does not establish a rational mean between excess and defect. He immediately adds that the more God is loved, the better.

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ARTICLE VII — WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE AN ENEMY THAN A FRIEND

OBJECTIONS. Christ asks what reward there is in loving those who love us, while commanding love of enemies. Augustine associates enemy-love with the perfection of God's children. Finally, loving an enemy requires greater effort and Scripture says each receives reward according to labor. ON THE CONTRARY. What is better is more meritorious; a loving friend is better than a hating enemy, and it seems better to love the better person. RESPONSE (beginning). The reason for loving one's neighbor from charity is God. The two acts can be compared from the side of the neighbor loved or from the reason for which he is loved. From the side of the neighbor, love of a friend excels: the friend is better and more closely united, and therefore is more suitable matter for charity. Hence hatred of a friend is worse than hatred of an enemy. From the side of the reason for loving, however, enemy-love has a certain excellence: love of a friend can have another accompanying motive besides God, while under the precise aspect of enemy the charitable reason for loving is God alone. Further, charity's strength is manifested when divine love extends the soul to what is more remote and difficult.

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ, O.P. — COMMENTARY ON THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

ARTICLE VII — WHETHER LOVING AN ENEMY IS MORE MERITORIOUS (continued)

St. Thomas compares charity to fire: the stronger the fire, the farther its heat can extend and the less combustible the matter it can burn. Likewise divine love is shown stronger when for God's sake we accomplish more difficult things, such as loving an enemy. Yet the same fire acts more intensely on what is near than on what is remote. So charity, considered according to its proper inclination, loves those joined to us more fervently than those remote from us. In this respect love of friends, considered in itself, is more fervent and better than love of enemies. Christ's statement that love of friends has no reward is to be understood per se of friends loved merely because they are friends, especially where this natural friendship excludes love of enemies. Love of friends is meritorious when they are loved for God's sake and not solely because they are friends. SUMMARY. (1) From the side of the neighbor loved, love of a friend excels love of an enemy because the friend is better and more closely united. (2) From the side of the reason for loving, love of an enemy has a certain excellence: under the aspect of enemy, God alone supplies charity's reason for loving, and the extension of charity to the more remote manifests greater strength. (3) Nevertheless, love of friends considered according to charity's own inclination is in itself more fervent and better, since charity acts more intensely upon those more closely united. COMMENTARY.

whether St. Thomas's reasoning is

sound. First, if the discussion concerns infused charity, the formal reason for loving both friend and enemy is the same—God. So how can St. Thomas say that a friend may be loved for another reason, while an enemy is loved for God alone? If he were speaking of natural love, the discussion would no longer concern charity. Moreover, even an enemy might be loved because he is the son or brother of someone naturally loved. Second, every act of divine charity extends at least in preparedness of soul to every neighbor, including enemies. How, then, can actual love of enemies uniquely manifest a stronger love of God? Third, if enemy-love excels from the side of the reason for loving while friend-love excels only from the material object, it might appear that enemy-love is simply superior, contrary to St. Thomas's third conclusion.

that St. Thomas

compares two numerically distinct acts of the same species elicited by the same habit of charity, differing in their material objects. He is speaking not of merely virtual or habitual love, but of actual and explicit love directed to a neighbor known as friend and to a neighbor known as enemy. The acts are not compared according to the specific formal reason in which they agree. Rather, they are compared according to what differs: love of a friend bears upon a materially better object more closely connected to charity's object; love of an enemy, precisely under the title “enemy,” presents a simpler and purer motive, because the enemy as enemy supplies no attractive title from the material object and even includes something naturally repugnant. The fact that charity universally includes enemies in preparedness of soul does not answer St. Thomas, because he is speaking of actual and express love of the particular neighbor known to be an enemy.

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ARTICLE VII — BÁÑEZ ON FRIEND-LOVE AND ENEMY-LOVE (continued)

the third difficulty. St. Thomas does not say that love of an enemy simply excels because its formal reason specifies a higher kind of charitable act; both acts share the same formal specification from God as charity's object. Rather, enemy-love has a superiority secundum quid: its motive appears simpler and purer, and, as a sign taken from the effect, it more clearly manifests the strength of divine love because charity extends to a more remote object. Love of a friend is not so certain a sign of stronger divine love because the human will is also naturally attracted by friendship. These considerations establish a qualified excellence of enemy-love, not a simple superiority according to charity's own inclination and order. St. Thomas's image of fire makes the distinction clear: fire's power is manifested by reaching distant or resistant matter, yet the same fire acts more strongly upon what is nearer. So too charity may display heroic strength in explicit love of enemies while, according to its ordered inclination, loving suitable and closely united objects more fervently. that because of the preceding arguments many scholastics nevertheless hold that loving an enemy is more meritorious than loving a friend, and that enemy-love is the more excellent act. He names Durandus (III Sent., dist. 30, q. 2), Albert the Great, Thomas of Strasbourg (Thomas de Argentina), Gabriel Biel, and St. Bonaventure among those associated with this position. The page then continues Báñez's examination of this scholastic dispute beyond the present translated range.

QUESTION XXVII - ARTICLE VII (continued)

WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE AN ENEMY THAN A FRIEND

the proof of his conclusion. Love of an enemy tends toward the enemy only insofar as he is potentially a friend of God and of ourselves; but love of a friend tends toward him insofar as he is actually a friend. Therefore, simply speaking, the object of the love of a friend is more perfect, and consequently the act itself is better and more meritorious. Again, in loving a friend there is a greater aspect of debt, and therefore a greater conformity with law and the dictate of reason. Hatred of a friend is also a greater sin than hatred of an enemy; since sin implies privation of rectitude, the contrary act - love of a friend - possesses greater rectitude and perfection.

to St. Thomas on 1 Corinthians 3: in human affairs a person engaged in the nobler work receives the greater reward, as the architect is rewarded more than the manual laborer although he may labor less bodily. Likewise, in divine matters the work nobler according to the form of charity receives more of the essential reward. Therefore, since love of a friend is the more excellent work from the side of its object, it merits a greater reward. If love of friend and enemy are equally intense with respect to God, the difference concerns an accidental prerogative of reward; if love of the friend is also more intense - as ordinarily occurs - it is more meritorious even with respect to essential reward. If, however, love of the enemy proceeds from a more intense love of God, then that particular act is simply better and more meritorious, but this is accidental to the comparison because the conditions are no longer equal. Replies to the objections. Christ exhorts all Christians to a love extending even to enemies, so that all men are regarded as neighbors. “If you love only those who love you, what reward shall you have?” concerns a merely natural love of friends, not charity toward God. Romans 5 likewise shows the greatness of God's charity because, while we were enemies, He did not destroy us but gave His Son to make us friends. It does not follow that God loves enemies more than friends with respect to effects; indeed the Apostle says that, having been reconciled, we shall much more be saved by Christ's life. Love of neighbor, whether friend or enemy, falls under precept when necessity requires it. The counsels do not therefore make enemy-love simply superior. Christian perfection consists essentially in the precepts of love of God and neighbor, while the counsels serve that perfection instrumentally and secondarily. Enemy-love is called more wonderful because of its difficulty, not because it is simply better. Difficulty alone does not determine the excellence of virtue. Where all else is equal, an act concerning an object difficult by its nature may be more meritorious; but difficulty arising from imperfection of the subject can diminish rather than increase merit. Martyrdom manifests the excellence of charity with special clarity, but it does not follow that every martyr necessarily possesses greater charity than every non-martyr. Before God, the will can be accepted for the deed when the opportunity for the deed is absent, although actual martyrdom has a special value of satisfaction for purgatorial punishment. The Fathers who praise enemy-love are therefore understood as praising it as a sign of more perfect charity. Loving a friend does not furnish as certain a sign, since one may be moved by merely human motives. Gregory praises saints distinguished in the difficult love of enemies. Bernard's statement that Christ showed greater charity by dying for enemies concerns the manifestation of His love: He died for enemies in order to make them friends. Finally, Christians admire especially difficult works because in them supernatural love of God is more clearly manifested; easier works may truly proceed from greater charity even though observers cannot discern this as readily.

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ARTICLE VIII - WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE ONE'S NEIGHBOR

THAN

TO LOVE GOD

OBJECTIONS. First, the Apostle appears to have preferred love of neighbor to love of God when he says in Romans 9 that he could wish himself anathema from Christ for his brethren. Second, the preceding discussion said that love of a friend can in some respect be less meritorious; but God is supremely our friend, having first loved us. Third, the more difficult act seems more virtuous and meritorious, and loving one's neighbor appears more difficult than loving God: all things naturally love God, and in God there is nothing unlovable, whereas defects are encountered in our neighbor. ON THE CONTRARY. That for the sake of which something is such is itself more so. Love of neighbor is meritorious only because the neighbor is loved for God's sake. Therefore love of God is more meritorious. RESPONSE. The comparison can be understood in two ways. If each love is considered separately, there is no doubt that love of God is more meritorious. Reward is due to it for its own sake, and the ultimate reward itself is the enjoyment of God, toward whom divine love tends. Hence Christ promises Himself to the one who loves Him: “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will manifest myself to him.” But the comparison can be made differently: love of God may be considered insofar as God alone is actually loved, while love of neighbor is considered insofar as the neighbor is loved for God's sake. In this case love of neighbor includes love of God, whereas the isolated act of loving God does not actually include love of neighbor. The comparison is then between a more complete love of God, extending also to neighbor, and an insufficient or imperfect act that does not actually extend to neighbor. For we have the command that he who loves God should also love his brother. In this sense love of neighbor takes precedence. REPLIES. Concerning Romans 9, one interpretation holds that Paul had wished such separation while still in unbelief, not in the state of grace. Chrysostom instead explains that Paul did not love his neighbor more than God, but loved God more than himself: he was willing temporarily to lose his own enjoyment of God so that God's honor might be advanced in his brethren. Loving God for Himself does not diminish merit; rather, this constitutes the whole formal reason of merit. Finally, goodness contributes more to virtue and merit than difficulty; therefore not everything more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult while also being better. Báñez's commentary. Love of God considered “separately” is not genuine charity if it does not virtually extend to neighbor. St. Thomas therefore does not mean a love of God lacking every virtual order to neighbor, but an act that at that moment does not actually extend to him. Such an act is more meritorious than an isolated act of love of neighbor that is not actually referred to God, because of the excellence of the object and because the neighbor's charitable lovability derives from God. But if the neighbor is actually and expressly loved for the sake of God supremely loved, that act contains both objects expressly, one for the sake of the other, and in that respect it surpasses the isolated act of loving God. This conclusion presupposes equal intensity. If the isolated act of love of God is more intense, it can simply be more meritorious because a greater essential reward corresponds to greater charity.

ARTICLE VIII - COMMENTARY (conclusion)

If the intensity of the isolated love of God and the love of neighbor expressly for God's sake is equal, the latter is more meritorious in the relevant comparison, although with respect to essential reward they may be equal insofar as that reward is measured principally by the intensity of charity toward God.

calls

attention to St. Thomas's reply to the third objection against those who make difficulty the whole or principal measure of merit.

QUESTION XXVIII - ON JOY

St. Thomas now considers the effects following charity's principal act, which is love: first the interior effects, in the next three questions, and afterward the exterior effects.

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ARTICLE I - WHETHER JOY IN US IS AN EFFECT OF CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. The absence of a beloved thing ordinarily produces sorrow rather than joy, and while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. Again, mourning is numbered among the acts by which beatitude is merited: “Blessed are they that mourn.” Finally, charity is distinct from hope, while Scripture says, “rejoicing in hope”; therefore joy seems to arise from hope rather than charity. ON THE CONTRARY. The charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, and the kingdom of God is “justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.” Therefore charity causes joy. RESPONSE. As explained in treating the passions, both joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. Joy is caused by love either through the presence of the beloved good or because the good proper to the beloved exists and is preserved in him. The latter especially belongs to benevolent love: a person rejoices at a friend's prosperity even while the friend is absent. Sorrow, on the contrary, arises either from absence of the beloved or because the beloved, to whom we wish good, is deprived of his good or oppressed by evil. Charity is love of God. God's good is immutable, since He is His own goodness. Moreover, through the very fact that He is loved, God is present in the lover by a most noble effect: “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” Therefore the spiritual joy we have concerning God is caused by charity. We are pilgrims from the Lord only in comparison with the presence by unveiled vision; nevertheless He is present to those who love Him even in this life through the indwelling of grace. The mourning that merits beatitude concerns things contrary to beatitude, and therefore arises from the same charity that causes spiritual joy in God: to rejoice in a good and to grieve over what opposes it have the same root. Spiritual joy concerning God can be twofold: rejoicing in the divine good considered in itself, which is the higher joy and proceeds principally from charity; and rejoicing in the divine good insofar as it is participated by us, which also proceeds from hope, through which we await enjoyment of the divine good.

QUESTION XXVIII - ARTICLE I, BÁÑEZ'S COMMENTARY

First,
joy (gaudium) from sensible delight (delectatio). Delight is common to rational and
irrational animals; joy properly belongs to a rational creature. What in brute animals is sensible delight is, in man's intellectual appetite, joy. Second, joy should not most properly be identified with willing itself. If “volition” is taken broadly as acceptance or complacency, joy may in a loose sense be called volition and sorrow nolition. More properly, however, joy is an effect of willing and especially of love. It follows naturally upon the presence or possession of the beloved good, as delight follows in a well-disposed sense from contact with what is sweet. Hence joy as such is not meritorious simply in itself; it suffices that its proximate cause be free and meritorious.
the pain of hunger in one who freely fasts: the pain follows naturally
from lack of food, yet belongs to a freely undertaken meritorious act. Third,
that an excellent
indication for judging whether a man is in grace is that he rejoices in divine goods and grieves over evils opposed to them. Following Cajetan, he adds that charity, precisely as love of God, produces joy under both aspects of love: benevolence or complacency in God Himself, and the joy associated with God's presence to the lover. God's own good is immutable and can suffer no loss, and therefore always supplies matter for joy to the one who loves Him. Charity also makes God present in the soul by its most noble effect - grace and charity elevating the creature to participation in the divine nature - and this presence likewise produces great joy. The

first joy is greater and more essential to charity because it concerns God directly in Himself; the second can increase the first when God's presence and sanctifying action in the soul are referred back to His glory.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY CAUSED BY CHARITY ADMITS AN

ADMIXTURE OF SORROW

OBJECTIONS. Charity makes us rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep, so charitable joy appears mixed with sorrow. True repentance, which requires charity, includes mourning for past sins. And charity makes one desire to depart and be with Christ, while the delay of that desire produces sorrow: “Woe is me, that my sojourning is prolonged.” ON THE CONTRARY. The joy of charity is joy in divine wisdom, whose companionship has no bitterness. RESPONSE. Charity causes two kinds of joy concerning God. The principal joy proper to charity is joy in the divine good considered in itself. This joy admits no admixture of sorrow, because the divine good itself can admit no admixture of evil; hence, “Rejoice in the Lord always.” The second is joy in the divine good insofar as it is participated by us. Such participation can be hindered by something contrary to it, and therefore this joy can be accompanied by sorrow when a person grieves over what impedes participation in the divine good either in himself or in neighbors whom he loves as himself. Thus we grieve at a neighbor's evil insofar as his participation in the supreme good is impeded. We mourn sins because they divide us from God. And although in this life we participate in the divine good by knowledge and love, our present misery prevents the perfect participation found in heaven; sorrow over delayed glory therefore concerns an impediment to the full participation of the divine good.

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I compare
I distinguish
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ARTICLE II - SUMMARY

First conclusion: the joy by which we rejoice in the divine good considered in itself admits no admixture of sorrow, because the divine good in which it rejoices cannot contain evil. Second conclusion: joy in the divine good insofar as it is participated by us can be mixed with sorrow, because that participation can be hindered by something contrary to it.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY CAUSED BY CHARITY CAN BE FULL IN US

OBJECTIONS. The more we rejoice in God, the more our joy is filled; but no creature can rejoice in God as much as His infinite goodness deserves. Again, what is full cannot become greater, yet the joy of one blessed person can be greater than another's. Finally, comprehension appears to mean fullness of knowledge, and no finite creature can comprehend God; likewise, then, no finite appetitive power should be capable of full joy in God. ON THE CONTRARY. Christ says to His disciples: “That my joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled.”

RESPONSE. Fullness of joy can be understood in two ways. First, from the side of the thing rejoiced in: one would rejoice in it as much as it deserves. In this sense God's joy in Himself alone is full, because His joy is infinite and proportioned to His infinite goodness. Every creature's joy is finite. Second, fullness can be understood from the side of the one rejoicing. Joy is related to desire as rest to movement. Rest is full when nothing remains of the movement; joy is therefore full when nothing remains to be desired. As long as we are in this world, desire does not cease, because we can still draw nearer to God through grace. But once perfect beatitude is attained, nothing remains to be desired: there will be full enjoyment of God, and in Him man will possess whatever other goods he rightly desired. All desire will therefore be at rest, and the joy of the blessed will be perfectly full - indeed superabundant, because they receive more than they could have adequately desired: “Eye has not seen... what God has prepared for those who love him.” Yet no creature can contain joy proportioned to God Himself; rather, in the Gospel image, the man enters into “the joy of your Lord.” At beatitude each person reaches the terminus assigned by divine predestination. Nothing further remains for him to tend toward, although one blessed soul may attain a greater participation of God than another. Thus each one's joy is full from the side of the one rejoicing, while one person's joy can still be greater because of a fuller participation in divine beatitude. Likewise, although no creature comprehends God from the side of the object known, cognition can possess a fullness from the side of the knower; the same distinction applies to joy.

SUMMARY. Charity's joy cannot be fully completed in the state of the way, but will be completed in heaven as the repose of every rightly ordered desire.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER JOY IS A VIRTUE (beginning)

It seems so because sorrow can be a vice, because love and hope are passions yet also name virtues, and because Scripture commands us to rejoice in the Lord. But joy is not numbered among the theological, moral, or intellectual virtues.

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ARTICLE IV - WHETHER JOY IS A VIRTUE

RESPONSE. Virtue is an operative habit and therefore has, according to its proper nature, an inclination toward an act. Several ordered acts of the same general line can proceed from one habit, with later acts following from an earlier one. Since those later acts proceed from the habit through the prior act, a virtue is defined and named from the prior act rather than from every consequent act. Love is the first affection of the appetitive power; desire and joy follow from love. Therefore the same virtuous habit inclines a person to love, to desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But because love is prior among these acts, the virtue is named from love - charity - rather than from desire or joy. Joy is therefore not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act or effect of charity, and for this reason is numbered among the fruits of the Spirit. Sorrow that is vicious can arise from disordered self-love, which is not one special vice but a general root of vices; consequently particular forms of sorrow such as sloth and envy can be numbered as special vices. Love of God, however, already has its special virtue, charity, to which joy is reduced as its proper consequent. Hope differs because it adds a special formal aspect on the side of its object - the arduous good possible to attain - and therefore is a distinct virtue. Joy adds no such new formal aspect to the object beyond love. The command to rejoice is given insofar as joy is an act of charity, though not charity's first act. SUMMARY. Joy is not a virtue distinct from charity; it is an act or effect of charity. Báñez's commentary. With Cajetan he notes that sorrow would fail to constitute a special vice if there were already a special vice in the prior act from which that sorrow followed. Disordered self-love is general rather than a special vice, so particular vicious sorrows can be special vices. If there were a special vice of hatred corresponding to the same good whose loss produces a particular sorrow, that hatred would stand to sorrow as charity stands to joy, and sorrow would not need to constitute a separate special vice.

QUESTION XXIX - ON PEACE

ARTICLE I - WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD

OBJECTIONS. Augustine defines the peace of men as ordered concord. Concord is a union of wills, and Dionysius says peace is unitive and productive of consent. Moreover, dissension is opposed to both. Therefore peace appears identical with concord. ON THE CONTRARY. Wicked men can agree together in evil, but “there is no peace to the wicked.” Therefore peace is not simply the same as concord. RESPONSE (beginning). Peace includes concord but adds something to it. Wherever there is peace there is concord, but not wherever there is concord is there peace, if “peace” is taken properly. Concord properly concerns different persons whose wills come together in one consent. But within a single person the heart can itself tend toward diverse things.
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QUESTION XXIX - ARTICLE I, WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD (continued)

Conflict within one person can occur in two ways: between different appetitive powers, as when sensitive appetite tends against rational appetite - “the flesh lusts against the spirit” - or within one and the same appetitive power when it tends toward goods that cannot be possessed together. Peace requires the union and quieting of these movements. A man does not have a peaceful heart while there remains something he wills but cannot possess together with what he already wills. This interior union is not included in concord as such. Concord signifies union among the appetites of different persons; peace adds the union of the appetites within the individual himself. Augustine's “ordered concord” concerns peace of one man with another. It must be ordered: if a man agrees with another unwillingly, under coercion or fear of an impending evil, this concord is not true peace because the proper order of the persons is disturbed. Hence Augustine first calls peace “the tranquillity of order.” Agreement with another likewise does not give complete peace unless the person's own appetitive movements are also united. Peace is opposed both by dissension within oneself and dissension with another; concord is opposed only by the latter. SUMMARY. Properly speaking, peace adds to concord the union of the appetitive movements within one and the same person. Báñez's commentary. He directs the reader especially to Augustine, City of God XIX, where peace is defined in its many forms: the peace of the rational soul is ordered agreement of knowledge and action; peace of body and soul is the ordered life and health of the living being; the peace of mortal man with immortal God is ordered obedience in faith under the eternal law; and the peace of all things is the tranquillity of order, order being the disposition assigning to equal and unequal things their proper places. Cajetan notes that inability to possess several desired things together can arise either because the objects themselves are contradictory or because of some defect or impediment in us. St. Thomas's text chiefly concerns the latter: a person may desire health, beauty, riches, and similar goods that could coexist in themselves, yet he lacks them; the appetite remains unquiet insofar as it fails to attain what it desires. Cajetan also notes that peace between persons requires both concord and order. Agreement extorted by force or fear is not true peace, because the will still tends toward breaking the imposed agreement when it can attain what it prefers. This explains the common expression that there can be “peace” outwardly while ill will remains inwardly.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER ALL THINGS DESIRE PEACE

OBJECTIONS. Peace, according to Dionysius, involves unitive consent, which things without knowledge cannot possess. Many people desire wars and dissensions. Some peace can apparently be evil, since Christ says He did not come to send peace. Finally, if everything desired peace, peace might seem to be the supreme good and ultimate end; yet imperfect peace exists even in this life.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER ALL THINGS DESIRE PEACE (continued)

ON THE CONTRARY. Augustine and Dionysius teach that all things desire peace. RESPONSE. From the

very

fact that a thing desires something, it consequently desires to attain what it desires and to remove whatever could impede that attainment. The attainment of a desired good can be hindered by a contrary appetite either within oneself or in another, and both kinds of opposition are removed by peace. Therefore every appetitive being necessarily desires peace insofar as it desires to arrive tranquilly and without impediment at what it seeks. This is the “tranquillity of order” of Augustine. Peace includes not only union of intellectual or sensitive appetites, where consent properly occurs, but also union in natural appetite. Dionysius therefore says peace produces both consent and connaturality: consent signifies union in appetites proceeding from cognition, connaturality union in natural appetites. Even those who seek war and dissension seek some peace that they judge themselves not to possess. If agreement with another conflicts with what a person most wants, it is not peace in the full sense. Men therefore break such concord by war in order to reach a peace in which nothing opposes their will. Thus all who wage war seek through war some peace they regard as more perfect than the peace they previously possessed. Peace can be true or merely apparent, just as appetite can tend toward true good or apparent good. True peace exists only around true good. Evil may appear good under some aspect and quiet the appetite in part, but it contains defects that leave appetite disturbed. Hence the “peace” of the wicked is only apparent. Perfect true peace consists in perfect enjoyment of the supreme good, in which all appetites are united and quieted; this is the ultimate end of the rational creature. Imperfect true peace is possible in this world: the soul's principal movement may rest in God even though interior and exterior opposition still disturbs that peace. SUMMARY. Every appetitive being necessarily desires peace, because every appetite desires to reach its object tranquilly and without impediment.

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ARTICLE III - WHETHER PEACE IS A PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY

OBJECTIONS. Peace is sometimes found among pagans who lack sanctifying grace. Dissension can coexist with charity, as holy Doctors such as Jerome and Augustine disagreed in opinions, and Paul and Barnabas disagreed. Finally Isaiah calls peace the work of justice, so it may not be a proper effect of charity. ON THE CONTRARY. “Great peace have they that love thy law.” RESPONSE. Peace includes two unions: the ordering of one's own appetites into one, and the union of one's appetite with another's. Charity produces both. The first arises because God is loved with the whole heart and all our desires are referred to Him, thus tending toward one end. The second arises because we love our neighbor as ourselves and consequently will the fulfillment of our neighbor's rightly ordered will as we will our own. Hence among the marks of friendship is identity of choice: friends will and reject the same things. Without sanctifying grace there cannot be true peace in the full moral and supernatural sense, because sin turns man from his due ultimate end toward an undue apparent end. Such peace is apparent rather than true.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER PEACE IS A PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY (continued)

Disagreement in opinions need not destroy charity or the imperfect peace of this life. Aristotle observes that friendship does not require agreement in every opinion but concord concerning goods important for life, especially great matters. Small disagreements can arise because one person judges that a disputed matter belongs to the common good in which both agree, while another judges otherwise. Such disagreement is incompatible with the perfect peace of heaven, where truth will be fully known and every appetite fulfilled, but not necessarily with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer. Peace is the work of justice indirectly, insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace. It is the work of charity directly, because charity by its own nature causes peace. Love is a unitive power, while peace is union of appetitive inclinations. SUMMARY. Peace is properly an effect of charity. Báñez's commentary. He emphasizes St. Thomas's reply that peace can coexist with disagreement of intellect because peace principally unites appetites, not intellectual opinions. Friendship does not require friends always to agree in matters of lesser moment, just as venial sins do not simply destroy friendship with God. He also highlights St. Thomas's explanation of Isaiah 32, “the work of justice shall be peace.”

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER PEACE IS A VIRTUE

OBJECTIONS. Precepts concern acts of virtue, and Christ commands, “Have peace among you.” Making peace is meritorious - “Blessed are the peacemakers” - and dissensions opposed to peace are numbered among vices. Therefore peace seems to be a virtue. ON THE CONTRARY. Virtue is not the ultimate end but a way to it, whereas Augustine calls peace in a certain sense an ultimate end. RESPONSE. When several acts follow one another according to the same formal principle and proceed from the same agent, they need not arise from distinct virtues. Fire, by its single heating power, can heat, melt, and rarefy; it does not need one power for melting and another for rarefying. Since peace is caused by charity precisely according to charity's love of God and neighbor, there is no virtue distinct from charity whose proper act peace would be. The same was said of joy. The command to possess peace exists because peace belongs to charity's activity and is therefore meritorious. It is also placed among the beatitudes as an act of perfected virtue and among the fruits insofar as it is a final spiritual good possessing sweetness. One virtue can have several opposing vices according to its several acts: hatred opposes charity as love, sloth or envy oppose its joy, and dissension opposes its peace. SUMMARY. There is no virtue distinct from charity whose proper act is peace.

whether peace should strictly be called an “act.” Some consider it more probable
that peace is in the soul as health is in an animal: health is not a quality distinct from the harmonious proportion of humors and qualities, but that proportion itself. Similarly peace would be the concord and proportion of appetites and virtues within the person. St. Thomas himself calls peace a union of appetitive inclinations. Since love is unitive and the virtues flowing from divine charity bring appetites into concord and proportion with their end, spiritual health or peace is an effect consequent upon charity. On this reading, when St. Thomas calls peace an act of charity, he may be speaking causally rather than describing a distinct elicited act.

Cajetan follows this interpretation. He closes by recommending the doctrine of the preceding
questions on spiritual joy and peace especially to spiritual men and preachers of the word of God.

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COMMENTARY. I note

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QUESTION XXX - ON MERCY

QUESTION XXX - ON MERCY

ARTICLE I - WHETHER EVIL IS PROPERLY THE MOTIVE OF MERCY

OBJECTIONS. Fault is a greater evil than punishment, yet fault as such provokes indignation and punishment rather than mercy. Things called cruel or hard seem to involve an excess of evil, yet Aristotle says what is “terrible” or “hard” can repel pity. Finally, signs of evils are not themselves real evils, yet signs can provoke mercy strongly. Therefore evil as such does not seem properly to move mercy. ON THE CONTRARY. Damascene says mercy is a species of sorrow; what moves sorrow is evil. RESPONSE. Augustine says that mercy is compassion in our heart for another's misery, by which we are compelled, if we can, to come to his aid. “Mercy” (misericordia) signifies, as it were, having a miserable heart over another's misery. Misery is opposed to happiness. Happiness involves possessing what one wills while willing nothing evil; conversely, misery involves suffering what one does not will. A person can “will” something in three ways. First, by natural appetite: all men naturally will to exist and live. Second, by deliberate choice. Third, not in itself but in its cause, as one who voluntarily eats harmful food can in a certain sense be said to will the illness caused by it. Accordingly, the evil that moves mercy is principally an evil contrary to natural appetite - corruptive and saddening evils whose contraries men naturally desire. Aristotle therefore defines pity as a kind of sorrow over an apparent destructive or painful evil. Such evils provoke mercy still more when they are contrary also to deliberate choice, as when an evil occurs where good was reasonably expected. They are especially pitiable when contrary to the person's whole will, as when one has consistently pursued good and nevertheless suffers evil. Aristotle therefore says mercy is especially moved by the evils of one who suffers undeservedly. Replies. Fault is voluntary precisely as fault, and under that aspect it has the character not of something pitiable but of something punishable. Yet fault can itself possess something of punishment insofar as consequences contrary to the sinner's will are joined to it; under this aspect sinners can be objects of compassion. Gregory therefore says true justice does not have contempt for sinners but compassion, and the Gospel says that Jesus, seeing the crowds distressed and lying like sheep without a shepherd, had mercy on them. Mercy properly concerns another rather than oneself. With respect to one's own evil there is properly sorrow; and where persons are so closely united to us as to be almost part of ourselves - children or parents - their evils can be experienced more as our own sorrow than as mercy toward another. This helps explain Aristotle's statement that what is excessively terrible or “hard” can drive out pity. Just as hope and memory of goods can produce delight, hope and memory of evils produce sorrow, though less vehemently than present sensation. Signs of evils therefore move us to mercy insofar as they represent pitiable evils to us as though present. SUMMARY. Involuntary evil is the motive of mercy because such evil belongs to misery, which is the object around which mercy is exercised. Báñez's commentary (beginning).

asks whether the conclusion is universally

true. The damned suffer many involuntary evils and yet are not objects of mercy; therefore involuntary evil alone seems insufficient. Again, mercy is shown toward sinners, although the sinner voluntarily made himself a sinner.

examining St. Thomas's distinction that guilt, insofar as voluntary, is punishable rather

than pitiable, whereas insofar as guilt also has the character of punishment through something contrary to the sinner's will, it can become an object of compassion.

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QUESTION XXX - ARTICLE I (COMMENTARY CONTINUED)

the difficulty: we pity the sinner more because he is in guilt and turned away from God than merely because he incurs punishment. Divine mercy is likewise manifested more greatly in the remission of guilt than in the remission of punishment; and fraternal correction, a work of mercy, is ordered principally to freeing our neighbor from the evil of guilt. Hence guilt itself seems the greatest motive of mercy. Again, we reasonably pity a merchant who throws his goods into the sea although he does so voluntarily; Christ and the martyrs also suffered voluntarily, yet were fitting objects of compassion.

that St. Thomas's

conclusion is entirely true: misery properly concerns an evil suffered unwillingly, while what is voluntary has

the aspect of good precisely insofar as it is voluntary. We do not exercise mercy toward the damned as such, since they are obstinate in evil and the order of divine justice is fulfilled in them. Yet because we love their nature insofar as it is from God, there can arise in us a conditional movement or velleity that they be freed from misery if that were possible. Guilt can be considered involuntary in several respects: the aversion from God is in a way against the sinner's deepest good; guilt entails liability to eternal punishment, itself unwanted; and sin carries deformity and dishonor of soul. Moreover, one mortal sin can become punishment for another by divine permission. Especially in relation to divine mercy, the fallen sinner cannot by the powers of free choice alone rise again after falling. The great work of divine mercy is to make him voluntarily detest what he formerly willed, repent, and efficaciously return to God. The merchant is pitied not because he voluntarily casts away his goods, but because he unwillingly suffers the storm that makes the loss necessary. Christ and His martyrs likewise suffered in one respect unwillingly. Christ sorrowed over death as the greatest natural evil to His most precious human life and prayed that the chalice might pass; in that respect His suffering could greatly move compassion. Insofar as He voluntarily offered Himself through obedience for the redemption of mankind, His act was rather a cause of joy. The same proportion holds for martyrs: spectators may rejoice in their victory while pitying their pain.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER DEFECT ON THE PART OF THE ONE PITYING IS A REASON

FOR MERCY

Objections appeal to God, in whom there is no defect although mercy is especially His; to those overwhelmed by misery who may cease to pity; and to the angry or insulting disposition that also does not readily pity. St. Thomas answers that mercy is sorrow over another's misery. Since sorrow is properly over one's own evil, another's misery moves us insofar as we apprehend it as somehow our own. This occurs either through union of affection - love makes the friend's evil one's own - or through a real likeness and possibility that the same evil could befall us.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER DEFECT IN THE ONE PITYING MOVES MERCY (continued)

Thus Aristotle says men pity those joined or similar to themselves because they judge that the same things might happen to them. The old, the prudent who recognize the possibility of misfortune, the weak, and the fearful are often more compassionate. Those who imagine themselves so fortunate or powerful that no evil can touch them are less moved to pity. Defect therefore always enters the reason for mercy, either because through love another's defect is regarded as one's own or because one recognizes the possibility of suffering something similar. God pities not from defect in Himself but from love, insofar as He loves creatures as belonging to Him. Those already sunk in extreme evils may not pity because they no longer fear further suffering; likewise those under excessive fear are absorbed in their own passion. Anger and audacity elevate the spirit toward an arduous object and can suppress pity. Pride likewise makes men despise others and judge their suffering deserved; Gregory therefore says false justice has indignation rather than compassion. Báñez's

commentary. Although St. Thomas speaks after Aristotle of mercy as a passion in men, he elevates its formal

account: the “defect” required on the side of the merciful person need not exist subjectively in him. It is enough that through love the misery of the miserable person pertain to him. In this sense God has mercy because He loves the creature as something belonging to Himself - indeed as belonging to Him as Creator, conserver of all being, and Savior.

that the Incarnation makes divine mercy still more wonderful:

God chose to assume passible human flesh so that even the saying “one who has suffered similar things pities us” could be verified in Christ. He cites Bernard and Hebrews concerning Christ learning through what He suffered.

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ARTICLE III - WHETHER MERCY IS A VIRTUE

Objections: mercy as passion may impede deliberation; Aristotle's nemesis seems contrary to pity while itself praiseworthy; joy and peace are effects of charity rather than special virtues, and mercy also follows charity; and mercy does not seem to fit neatly among the moral means enumerated by Aristotle. Augustine, however, praises Cicero's statement that no virtue is more admirable or weighty than mercy. St. Thomas distinguishes mercy as a movement of sensitive appetite, in which respect it is a passion and not a virtue, from mercy as a movement of intellectual appetite or will by which another's evil displeases us. This latter movement can be ruled by reason and can regulate the lower appetite. When mercy serves reason so that justice is preserved - whether by giving to the needy or pardoning the penitent - it has the character of virtue.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER MERCY IS A VIRTUE (continued)

Sallust's warning concerns unregulated passion that obstructs rational judgment and can lead one away from justice. Aristotle treats mercy and nemesis as passions: the merciful grieves because he judges someone to suffer undeservedly; the person moved by nemesis is saddened when undeserving people prosper and in the appropriate case recognizes deserved suffering. Properly, envy is opposed to mercy. Joy and peace add no special aspect to the good that is charity's object, but mercy concerns a special aspect - another's misery. As virtue, mercy is a moral virtue concerned with passions and is related to the mean associated with nemesis. Báñez's first doubt: Is mercy a special virtue? Arguments against: Aristotle's standard enumeration does not list it; St. Thomas places mercy among effects following charity together with joy, peace, beneficence, almsgiving, and fraternal correction; charity itself makes us grieve over our neighbor's evil; and there seems no special difficulty in relieving a miserable neighbor beyond the difficulty of beneficence generally. If mercy were a special moral virtue, it might also seem that St. Thomas should have treated it under a cardinal virtue rather than before finishing charity.

three preliminary conclusions from St. Thomas: mercy as

sensitive sorrow is a passion, not a virtue; mercy as a rationally regulated displeasure at another's evil is virtue; and as moral virtue it concerns passions and is reduced to the mean called nemesis. For his own resolution,

says Catholic faith certainly teaches mercy to be virtuous in the broad sense: a

praiseworthy, good, and meritorious act when performed with due circumstances. Scripture repeatedly praises mercy, for example “Blessed are the merciful,” and condemns judgment without mercy; almsgiving and fraternal correction are likewise praised as works of mercy. Second, he says theology does not demonstrate with sufficient certainty that mercy is a special virtue really distinct from charity. It is not adequately shown that relieving a miserable neighbor involves a special difficulty beyond doing good to one's neighbor generally, and St. Thomas will teach that beneficence is not a special virtue distinct from charity. Indeed, other things equal, it is often easier to do good to one in misery than to one in prosperity.

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ARTICLE III - BÁÑEZ ON MERCY AS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

the preceding point from 1 John 3: the Apostle speaks of one who sees his brother in need and “closes his bowels” against him, suggesting that human compassion naturally opens toward misery; he then asks how the charity of God can remain in such a man, suggesting that the act belongs closely to charity. Nevertheless Báñez's third conclusion is that it is very probable that mercy is a special virtue, chiefly because of St. Thomas's reasoning and Cajetan's explanation. When we see our neighbor's misery, a movement of appetite can arise before rational judgment; we may be carried excessively toward relieving him, or held back excessively by cruelty or by nemesis when we judge him to suffer deservedly. A stable elective habit is therefore needed to bring these passions to the mean of reason. This gives a proper role to a virtue of mercy.
that, considered simply in the will already rightly disposed by friendship with God and neighbor, he does not see a special difficulty in helping a miserable neighbor distinct from beneficence generally. Still, it is probable that, just as doing good under the aspect of debt belongs to justice, doing good under the aspect of relieving another's misery belongs to a special virtue of mercy. In that case mercy is found not only in sensitive appetite but also in rational appetite. He answers the objections accordingly. Aristotle could still speak of mercy and nemesis as passions while an elective habit regulates them. Mercy's proximity to charity explains why St. Thomas numbers it among charity's effects. As a special virtue mercy includes not merely sorrow over the neighbor's evil but an endeavor to relieve the misery, just as penance includes not merely sorrow for sin but an endeavor to make satisfaction to God. St. Thomas fittingly treats mercy in the context of charity because of their close affinity; if reduced to a cardinal virtue, mercy can be reduced to justice in the broad way that liberal giving to another is related to justice. Second doubt: Is mercy subjectively in sensitive appetite or in the will? Arguments for the will: mercy belongs most perfectly to God, in whom there is no sensitive appetite; it is a virtue “toward another,” and the will needs rectification toward another's good; liberality and magnificence are also associated with the will; and St. Thomas expressly says that mercy, insofar as it names a movement of intellectual appetite displeased at another's evil, is a virtue. Arguments for the sensitive appetite arise from St. Thomas's description of mercy as a moral virtue about passions and from Aristotle's treatment of mercy and nemesis as passions requiring moderation.

ARTICLE III - WHERE THE VIRTUE OF MERCY RESIDES (conclusion)

Báñez's first conclusion: mercy, according to the formal character of virtue, is principally and per se in the will. This follows from the preceding arguments and from the fact that angels truly exercise mercy toward us. It is also supported by the following article, where mercy is called in a certain respect the greatest virtue; such excellence cannot principally consist in sensitive appetite. Second conclusion: insofar as mercy belongs to human beings, it is secondarily also connected with sensitive appetite. There is difficulty in exercising mercy rightly because the passion of compassion does not of itself always remain at the rational mean; one can exceed or fall short in relieving another's misery. Thus a habit can regulate compassion and hardness of heart.
this is very probable and parallels the way some Thomists analyze liberality and magnificence. He rejects Cajetan's denial that liberality and magnificence can be properly in God. Aristotle says it belongs to the liberal person to look least to himself; since God in His gifts seeks not His own utility but ours and presupposes no benefit received from us, He is supremely liberal.
places mercy principally in the will as an effect of charity toward neighbor, while admitting a secondary habit in sensitive appetite regulating compassion or hardness. Although the etymology of misericordia suggests an affection of the “heart,” philosophers and especially theologians use the term principally for what is most praiseworthy in the merciful person: the will to relieve another's misery. In this sense mercy is a virtue and is most properly found in God.
it incredible that St. Thomas, in treating divine attributes in I, q.21, would speak only metaphorically of mercy while speaking properly of justice and other attributes, especially since Scripture so frequently celebrates divine mercy.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER MERCY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES

Objections say mercy seems greatest because God prefers mercy to sacrifice; Christian discipline is summarized in mercy and piety; and mercy especially makes man like God, whose mercies are above all His works. Against this, Colossians commands “above all these things have charity.” St. Thomas answers that a virtue can be greatest in two ways: in itself, or in comparison with its possessor. In itself mercy is greatest in the sense that it belongs to one who pours out good upon others and, more importantly, supplies their defects - an act especially characteristic of a superior. Hence to have mercy is proper to God, and His omnipotence is said especially to be manifested in mercy. But in relation to the person possessing it, mercy is not greatest unless that possessor is himself supreme and has none above him.
I say
I reinforce
I consider
Therefore I
I concede
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ARTICLE IV - WHETHER MERCY IS THE GREATEST VIRTUE (continued)

For one who has a superior, it is greater and better to be united to that superior than to supply the defect of an inferior. Therefore in man, who has God above him, charity by which he is united to God is greater than mercy by which he relieves neighbors. Among virtues directed toward neighbor, however, mercy is the greatest, because supplying another's defect belongs, as such, to one who is better or superior. External sacrifices are not offered because God needs them, but for our devotion and our neighbor's utility. Therefore mercy relieving another's defects can be more acceptable to God than external sacrifice because it more immediately promotes the neighbor's good. The “sum” of Christian religion consists in mercy as regards exterior works, but the interior affection of charity joining us to God surpasses love and mercy toward neighbors. Through charity we are assimilated to God by union of affection; through mercy by likeness of operation, so charity remains higher for us. Báñez's commentary. He formulates four conclusions: (1) mercy considered in itself is greatest because it supplies others' defects, which belongs especially to a superior; (2) considered relative to its possessor, it is greatest only when the possessor is supreme; (3) for human beings charity is better and higher because it unites us to God; (4) among virtues concerning neighbor, mercy is highest.
asks how St. Thomas
can call mercy “greatest in itself” when charity has the most excellent object. Cajetan explains that “greatest in itself” here concerns the perfection the virtue, absolutely considered, requires in its possessor, not merely the dignity of its object. Mercy absolutely and without qualification tends to require immunity from misery in the merciful one, because it is ordered to supplying misery in others. Since every potentiality is in some way a misery or defect, mercy in its absolutely complete notion points toward a subject above every potentiality - pure act, the supreme nature, God Himself. Hence mercy is attributed as proper to God and His omnipotence is especially manifested by mercy.
Cajetan's reading extremely subtle, useful, and true,
especially for magnifying divine mercy, whose full notion exists integrally in God alone and who alone can rescue from the misery of sin. He notes another Thomistic interpretation: different virtues can each be called “greatest” under some aspect - prudence in directing, legal justice in ordering to the common good, religion in divine worship, obedience in its sphere, humility in its own excellence. On that reading mercy would be greatest only secundum quid.
prefers Cajetan's interpretation.

ARTICLE IV - BÁÑEZ'S FURTHER QUESTIONS ON MERCY

To the objection from charity,
that if “in itself” is taken in St. Thomas's special sense, charity need
not be called greatest in that same way. Charity can exist in us simply and absolutely though finite; mercy simply and absolutely cannot, because our mercy is not immune from every misery. St. Thomas's reasoning does establish that mercy absolutely considered, insofar as it can relieve every misery, requires immunity from every misery. If mercy is considered as a moral virtue in a human possessor, however, prudence - and even justice insofar as it must moderate mercy - can be superior. Is the divine attribute of mercy, according to our mode of understanding, more excellent than charity in God?
that in God no attribute is really
greater than another, since all are the one God. According to our mode of conceiving, if charity and mercy are considered separately, divine charity is the more excellent attribute: it concerns God Himself, the supreme good, and divine love is associated with the procession of the Holy Spirit. If divine mercy is conceived as intrinsically including charity and then considered in relation to effects ad extra, there is something especially excellent in the power to relieve every misery. Yet overall, according to our mode of understanding, charity and divine love retain a special excellence because of their immediate order to the supreme good and the personal procession of the Holy Spirit. Is mercy in us a more excellent virtue than religion?
Absolutely, religion is better than mercy as existing in us and ordered to its object, because
religion more immediately joins us to God. The contemplative life also surpasses the active, and works of religion remain where works relieving misery cease. The sacrifice of the Mass, considered from the side of the thing offered and the opus operatum, is of incomparable value. Nevertheless, in ordinary human circumstances works of mercy frequently please God more than exterior works of religion, because works of mercy are often commanded by grave spiritual or temporal necessity. Even an act of external worship may have to be omitted to assist a gravely endangered neighbor.
this: where religion itself and
external divine worship are under attack - for example by heretics - external acts of religion may need special preference as public witness. He invokes Christ's defense of the woman who anointed Him: there are occasions when the opportunity and necessity of honoring Christ takes precedence over giving to the poor. Interior worship remains supremely necessary because it preserves us in grace and from sin: “we ought always to pray and not faint.” The saying “I will have mercy and not sacrifice” therefore concerns the proper ordering of exterior observances when grave need demands mercy.
I say
Nevertheless I
I qualify
I answer
I judge
Then I
I distinguish.
I distinguish.
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QUESTION XXX - ARTICLE IV (conclusion)

the sacrifice of the Mass in two ways. Considered from the thing offered and the opus operatum, it has infinite value and cannot be compared with ordinary works of mercy. Considered as the minister's exercise of the virtue of religion, it can be compared with acts of mercy and may sometimes be omitted when a neighbor is in grave bodily or spiritual necessity and one can assist him. If the need is slight, celebrating Mass or supporting its celebration can be better than distributing money to poor persons otherwise adequately sustained. Christian prudence must govern the circumstances; in practice there are always gravely poor persons, so Christians should both provide for Masses and assist the poor from their own substance.

QUESTION XXXI - ON BENEFICENCE

St. Thomas turns to exterior acts or effects of charity: first beneficence, then almsgiving as a part of beneficence, then fraternal correction as a kind of spiritual almsgiving.

ARTICLE I - WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS AN ACT OF CHARITY

Objections: charity is chiefly toward God, but we cannot benefit God; giving gifts seems to belong to liberality; and benefits given as due belong to justice while gratuitous relief of misery belongs to mercy, leaving no distinct role for charity. Against this, charity is friendship, and Aristotle numbers doing good to friends among acts of friendship. RESPONSE. Beneficence means doing good to someone. The good can be considered under the common aspect of good, and beneficence under that common aspect is an act of friendship and consequently charity. Love includes benevolence, by which one wills good to a friend; when the ability is present, the will tends toward effecting what it wills. If the good done to another is considered under some special aspect, however, beneficence receives a special formal character and can belong to a special virtue. We cannot benefit God because nothing can be added to His good; our relation upward is to honor and submit to Him, whereas from His love He benefits us. In gift-giving, liberality principally moderates the interior attachment to riches and removes excessive retention. A man can give a great gift while inwardly clinging to it, and such giving is not liberal; yet if he gives what he desires to retain because of love, this can manifest the perfection of friendship. Justice considers the aspect of debt in the benefit; mercy considers the aspect of relieving misery. SUMMARY. Beneficence under the common aspect of good is an act of friendship or charity. Under a special aspect - paying what is owed, relieving misery, benefiting precisely as a friend - the same exterior action can belong formally to justice, mercy, or friendship/charity.

QUESTION XXXI - ARTICLE I, BÁÑEZ'S COMMENTARY

The quality of benevolence and beneficence follows the quality of friendship. If I give to a friend or neighbor according merely to human friendship, the act is one of human friendship, not specifically Christian charity. If I give insofar as he is a friend in God, the act is Christian charity.

notes with Cajetan that

beneficence can belong to divine charity in God, man, or angel, though created charity cannot benefit God because no good can accrue to Him.

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ARTICLE II - WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DO GOOD TO EVERYONE

Objections: we cannot actually benefit everyone; Ecclesiasticus says “give to the good and receive not the sinner”; and benefiting enemies of the commonwealth or excommunicates can itself be disorderly. Against this, Galatians commands: “While we have time, let us work good to all.” RESPONSE. Beneficence follows love as love moves a superior toward provision for an inferior. Human ranks are mutable: one who is superior in one respect can be inferior in another and all can suffer many defects. Since charity extends to all, beneficence should likewise extend to all, though according to due place and time. We cannot benefit everyone individually at every moment, but no person is such that a case could never arise in which we ought to benefit him. Charity therefore requires at least a readiness of soul to do good to anyone when the proper occasion occurs. Some benefits can be offered universally, such as prayer for all faithful and unbelievers. In a sinner we distinguish nature from guilt. We should sustain his nature but not nourish his sin. Benefits may be withheld from excommunicates and enemies of the commonwealth insofar as such withholding restrains guilt; nevertheless, if nature itself is in danger - for example of death by hunger or thirst - aid may be required unless the order of justice determines otherwise. Báñez: enemies of the commonwealth. Whenever it is lawful in war to kill an enemy, it can likewise be lawful not to preserve him, as in depriving the enemy of supplies. If a private soldier encounters a private enemy in extreme necessity, circumstances matter. During a truce he must aid him; even outside a truce, if he can capture rather than kill him,

this is better. St. Thomas's statement about

aiding enemies is understood subject to the order of justice. Private enemy. If there is no reasonable fear that the enemy will afterward kill me, I am bound to assist him in extreme need. But if, according to sound human prudence rather than imagination, I probably fear that preserving his life will expose my own life to serious danger,

I am not bound to assist. One is not ordinarily obliged to preserve another's bodily life at

grave danger to one's own. There is a difference between positively killing and omitting aid when one is not bound to give it.

QUESTION XXXI - ARTICLE II, BÁÑEZ'S COMMENTARY (continued)

the distinction between direct and indirect voluntariness. Death is indirectly voluntary to me

when I can and am bound to prevent it but fail to do so; when I am not bound to intervene, the death is not imputed to me in the same way. Ambrose's dictum, “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him,” is true where the duty to aid exists. Even then the death can be imputed morally as sin without necessarily producing every juridical consequence that follows from direct killing. Third doubt: a person condemned by justice to die of hunger. Ministers charged with executing the sentence may not frustrate it by supplying food, just as they may not open the prison so the condemned man can escape. A private person, however, may lawfully give him bread because the private person is not the custodian of justice and the condemned man himself may lawfully eat.

the private person is not bound to feed him. He

adds that, against some authors, he judges it more probable with Cajetan that the condemned person himself remains bound to eat if able.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER WE SHOULD BENEFIT MORE THOSE MORE CLOSELY

UNITED TO US

Objections appeal to Christ's instruction to invite the poor rather than friends and relatives, to the soldier's duty to aid a fellow soldier rather than a relative fighting as an enemy, to the priority of repaying benefactors, and to the fact that parents are loved more while children may receive more material provision. Augustine replies in principle that when we cannot help all, we should chiefly care for those whom circumstances of place, time, or other relations bind more closely to us. RESPONSE. Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature established by divine wisdom. A natural agent first and more abundantly diffuses its action to what is nearer: fire heats what is near more strongly, and God diffuses gifts more abundantly to creatures nearer Him. Benefiting others is an action of charity; therefore, other things equal, we should be more beneficent toward those more closely united to us. Human closeness has different forms: blood relatives through natural communion, fellow citizens through civil communion, the faithful through spiritual communion, and so on. Different benefits should therefore be distributed according to the relevant kind of union. The rule can vary with place, time, need, and circumstance. An outsider in extreme necessity may deserve assistance before one's father who suffers only a lesser need. Thus closeness has priority ceteris paribus, not mechanically in every case.

I say

I say

I say

I apply

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ARTICLE III - ORDER OF BENEFICENCE (continued)

Christ does not absolutely forbid inviting friends or relatives; He condemns doing so from the mercenary intention of being invited in return. Outsiders can be preferred where their need is greater. No universal rule can determine every conflict between degree of closeness and degree of need; prudent judgment is required. The common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Thus in war a soldier who aids a fellow soldier for defense of the commonwealth does not aid him merely as a private person but as serving the whole political community. For that reason a stranger can rightly be preferred to a blood relative fighting against the common good. There are two kinds of debt. A strict debt concerns something already belonging to another - stolen property, a loan, deposit, and the like - and normally must be restored before gratuitous benefits are given to relatives. Extreme necessity can alter the use of goods, but such cases require prudence. Another "debt" is one of moral equity arising from benefits freely received. No benefactors equal parents; therefore parents normally have priority in repayment of benefits unless a more urgent necessity or the common utility of Church or commonwealth outweighs it. Children receive provision because parents stand as superiors, while children owe parents honor; yet in extreme necessity parents cannot simply be abandoned. Báñez's

commentary: defending an innocent person against one's father. If one's father unjustly attacks an innocent

person,
with Vitoria that the son is probably not bound to defend the innocent at the grave cost of causing his father's death. No one is ordinarily bound to defend another's bodily life with the gravest personal loss, and killing one's father would constitute a tremendous personal loss to the son. Nevertheless it is lawful to defend the innocent even if the attacking father's death follows, because by his unjust aggression the father loses, in that case, the protection attached to paternal right against proportionate defense. If the father were not himself the aggressor but an innocent third party whose death would result, the son could not prefer the other innocent person to his own innocent father. The command to rescue those led to death is affirmative and binds when rescue can be given without disproportionate grave danger.
the
same reasoning proportionally to spouse, children, and others upon whom a person greatly depends in honor or temporal goods. With more remote relatives such as brothers, he considers it probable that one can be bound to defend the innocent even at danger to the attacking relative.

ARTICLE III - EXTREME NECESSITY, DEBT, AND KINSHIP

whether a debtor in extreme necessity must restore property to a creditor who is likewise in extreme necessity, and whether the debtor may instead assist a parent or close relative in equal peril. Scotus and Gabriel hold that the debtor must restore. Others distinguish between property unjustly acquired and property justly received. Cajetan and Soto hold that in neither case is restoration required while the debtor himself is in extreme necessity.
Cajetan's view as most true. The law of nations by which goods
are divided and appropriated cannot derogate from natural law. In extreme necessity goods become common as regards necessary use, so that the necessary thing belongs for use to the one first possessing it. If the debtor is in extreme necessity and the necessary object is already in his hands, he has the right to its necessary use. Thus the creditor's extreme need does not simply execute the ordinary precept of restitution when another more urgent natural-law claim to preservation is simultaneously present. Even if the debtor originally acquired the property unjustly, present extreme necessity can give him a right to necessary use. But one may not violently seize the necessary good from another who is already in the same extreme necessity, because the other's primary natural right of necessary possession is then violated. Could a person of exceptional importance to the commonwealth seize bread from a socially less important person equally near death?
no, just as one may not kill an innocent person for the safety of the commonwealth. The
private holder may be bound by charity and piety to give it, but this does not automatically authorize private coercion. A legitimate ruler or commonwealth could, under appropriate public authority, command assistance to the indispensable public person and punish disobedience. Báñez's second conclusion: a debtor can in the same extreme situation prefer father, mother, child, or spouse and not restore to a creditor equally endangered. Soto calls this problematic, but
it as certain from St. Thomas's refusal to give a
universal rule. The debt of piety toward the closest family can outweigh a debt of particular commutative justice in such an extraordinary conflict. He considers it at least genuinely disputable whether a brother, or a singular friend who saved one's life at risk of his own, may likewise be preferred; Vitoria favored the affirmative regarding the exceptional friend.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

The objections point to a distinct command to do good, special vices such as theft and robbery opposed to beneficence, and the many species of benefits. But interior benevolence and exterior beneficence differ as intention and execution, and therefore need not require different virtues.
I say
I regard
I extend
I judge
I adopt
I ask
792

QUESTION XXXI - ARTICLE IV, WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE

RESPONSE. Virtues are diversified according to different formal aspects of their objects. Charity and beneficence, considered generally, have the same formal object: the common aspect of good. Therefore beneficence is not a virtue distinct from charity but names an act of charity. Distinct precepts can concern distinct acts without implying distinct habits. Likewise, all harms considered under the common aspect of evil are reduced to hatred, while special aspects of harm or benefit belong to special vices or virtues. This also explains the different species of benefits.

QUESTION XXXII - ON ALMSGIVING

ARTICLE I - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS AN ACT OF CHARITY

Objections: almsgiving can occur without charity, as Paul says one may distribute all one's goods to feed the poor yet lack charity; alms are works of satisfaction and therefore seem acts of justice; Scripture calls beneficence a sacrifice and therefore it seems an act of religion; and Aristotle assigns giving to liberality. ON THE CONTRARY. 1 John asks how the charity of God remains in one who sees his brother in need and closes his heart against him. RESPONSE. Exterior acts are referred to the virtue to which their proper motive belongs. The motive for almsgiving is relief of a person suffering need. Hence almsgiving is defined as a work by which something is given to one in need out of compassion for God's sake. This motive belongs properly to mercy. The very Greek word for alms derives from mercy. Since mercy is an effect of charity, almsgiving consequently is an act of charity through the mediation of mercy. An act can be called an act of virtue materially or formally. A materially just deed can be performed without the habit of justice, from natural reason, fear, or hope of gain. A formal act of virtue is performed in the virtuous manner - promptly, fittingly, and with the proper disposition. Thus alms can materially be given without charity; formally Christian almsgiving, done for God in the proper virtuous manner, is not without charity. An act elicited by one virtue can be ordered and commanded by another toward its end. Thus almsgiving belongs among satisfactory works insofar as mercy toward the needy is ordered to satisfaction for sin; insofar as it is ordered to honoring and placating God it has the aspect of sacrifice and is commanded by religion. Liberality also contributes by removing excessive love of riches that would obstruct giving.

QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I, BÁÑEZ'S COMMENTARY

the scholastic definition: almsgiving is a work in which something is given to a needy person out of compassion for God's sake. He points to St. Thomas's fuller treatment in the Sentences and to patristic and canonical texts praising almsgiving and mercy. He first distinguishes the proper formal motive of an act from other motives that efficiently prompt the agent. The formal motive of almsgiving is relief of the poor person's misery; accidental motives such as reward, friendship, fear, or other inducements do not determine its species. Likewise penance is specified by satisfaction for offense and removal of sin even if servile fear also moves the penitent. Augustine confirms that almsgiving is a work of mercy. Ambrose sometimes calls it a work of liberality.

this by distinguishing liberality broadly - any right giving, due or gratuitous - from liberality as a special virtue distinct from mercy. In the broad sense mercy can fall under liberality. In the strict sense liberality abstracts from misery while mercy regards misery as its proper object. Liberality can also be said to remove an impediment by moderating attachment to money, thereby making exterior giving easier. Why is almsgiving especially called an act of charity when many virtues are commanded by charity? Because mercy is itself an effect especially close to charity as friendship and benevolence toward neighbor, and beneficence is charity's exterior work. Almsgiving therefore has a particularly close affinity with charity.

notes the ordinary expression of asking alms as asking someone to “do me charity.” He then asks whether almsgiving is formally a virtuous act in a person who lacks sanctifying charity. A person in mortal sin can perform morally good acts and works of justice or temperance; why not mercy?

that in the specifically theological and infused order under discussion, formal meritorious almsgiving is not without charity, because infused mercy is connected with charity and charity is the form of the virtues. Natural mercy and naturally good giving can of course exist outside sanctifying charity.

I reconcile

I answer

I recall

I even

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QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I, BÁÑEZ ON COMMAND OF VIRTUES

St. Thomas's statement that formal almsgiving is “for God” is explained especially in relation to merit of eternal life. Christian mercy is charity-formed; natural mercy is common also to those without infused charity.
asks whether an inferior virtue can command an act of a superior virtue. Cajetan had distinguished
an act of superior virtue materially and formally, allowing an inferior virtue to command the material act but not the formal act.
either he does not understand this sufficiently or Cajetan is mistaken. St.
Thomas does not explicitly say that an inferior virtue commands a superior virtue; he says that an act properly elicited by one virtue can be attributed to another insofar as the latter orders and commands it to its own end. Thus almsgiving can be satisfactory when mercy is ordered to satisfaction for guilt, and sacrificial when ordered to placating God. Religion is plainly superior to mercy and can order an act of mercy toward divine worship. Penance likewise need not be regarded as inferior to mercy: converting oneself to God by penance is not less excellent than the merciful work of converting another sinner. Charity rightly ordered begins with oneself. Báñez's first conclusion is therefore that no inferior virtue, precisely as inferior, commands the act of a superior virtue. Command belongs to the superior in an ordered hierarchy, as a commander does not receive military command from a common soldier. Second conclusion: when the act of one virtue is ordered to the end of another virtue that is not formally its hierarchical superior, the ordering command belongs properly to prudence, to which the moral virtues are connected and subordinated. Prudence judges that, at a given time, exercising one virtue is a fitting means for the end demanded by another. In this way infused prudence can direct the exercise of charity insofar as charity's act in this life is free with respect to its exercise, without making charity's formal object a mere means to the object of another virtue. Charity, considered formally with respect to its own ultimate object, cannot be subordinated as a means to another virtue.

QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE I (conclusion) / ARTICLE II

that the doctrine agrees with St. Thomas's earlier teaching: if the formal character of
charity's act with respect to its proper object is considered, it cannot be ordered as a means to an act of another virtue. Among virtues whose proper objects are not intrinsically subordinated to one another, one virtue does not command another's act merely because it is more excellent; prudence supplies the ordering because all are connected and subordinated to it in the practical direction of action.

ARTICLE II - WHETHER THE KINDS OF ALMS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED

The traditional enumeration gives seven corporal works: feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, receive the stranger, visit the sick, redeem the captive, and bury the dead. It also gives seven spiritual works: teach the ignorant, counsel the doubtful, console the sorrowful, correct the sinner, forgive the offender, bear the burdensome and troublesome, and pray for all. Objections question burial of the dead because the dead no longer suffer bodily sensation; they note many other human needs such as guidance of the blind, support of the lame, and money for the poor; correction seems an act of severity rather than mercy; and since everyone is ignorant of something it might follow that everyone must teach everyone else. RESPONSE. The division corresponds to the various defects of neighbors. Some defects concern the soul and are relieved by spiritual works; others concern the body and are relieved by corporal works. Bodily defects either occur during life or after death. During life, universal needs include interior nourishment - hunger and thirst - and exterior assistance - clothing and shelter. Special defects arise intrinsically through sickness or extrinsically through captivity and oppression. After death the body receives burial. Spiritual defects are relieved either by asking God's help through prayer or by human assistance. Intellectual defects are relieved by teaching in speculative matters and counsel in practical matters. The chief painful passion, sorrow, is relieved by consolation. Disorder of action is addressed in three ways: the sinner himself is corrected; an offense against us is forgiven; and burdens resulting from another's weakness or disorder are patiently borne.
I say
I conclude
Next, I
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ARTICLE II - THE CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL WORKS OF MERCY (continued)

Burial does not benefit the dead through bodily sensation, but what is done to the body still pertains to the deceased in two respects: through his continuing memory among men, which can be dishonored by leaving him unburied, and through the affection he had for his own body while alive, to which the pious affection of survivors should conform. Scripture praises Tobias and those who buried the Lord. Other bodily needs reduce to the listed works: blindness and lameness to care of the sick; external oppression to redemption of captives; wealth is sought as a means of supplying these concrete defects. Correction is severe in execution insofar as justice may be involved, but merciful in intention insofar as the corrector seeks to free a man from the evil of guilt. Not every ignorance is a defect requiring another to teach; only ignorance of what a person ought fittingly to know. Even then person, place, and time must be observed. Báñez's commentary. Scripture mentions works of mercy in many places - Job, Isaiah, Matthew 25, and elsewhere - and although it does not always give the complete list in one place, the traditional enumeration can readily be gathered from Scripture, the definition of mercy, and the Church's common catechetical tradition. He asks specifically whether burying the dead is a work of mercy. Objections say an unburied corpse cannot itself be miserable and the separated soul does not suffer merely because the corpse is exposed; burial ultimately gives the body to worms and corruption anyway; the need supplied seems to concern honor rather than bodily or spiritual misery; burial does not appear always to bind under mortal sin; Chrysostom criticizes excessive funeral pomp; and Christ in Matthew 25 names only six works concerning the living. Báñez's first conclusion is that, according to Catholic faith, burial of the dead is a good and pious work. Tobias is praised for burying the dead; the patriarchs cared for burial; Joseph and Nicodemus honorably buried Christ; the women came to anoint His body; and Christians historically risked even martyrdom to bury martyrs. Scripture also presents denial of honorable burial as a punishment. The constant custom of Christians confirms the practice.

ARTICLE II - BURIAL OF THE DEAD (continued)

Báñez's second conclusion: not only burial itself but burial with due honor and moderate solemnity is pious. Honorable Christian burial gives strong testimony to faith in the resurrection. Hence the ancient Christian burial place was called a “cemetery,” a sleeping place, and offerings and sacrifices for the dead fittingly accompany their memory.

Augustine and Ambrose and the example of Judas Maccabeus sending

money for sacrifice for the dead while thinking rightly of the resurrection. Third conclusion: where a person can bury a corpse without serious inconvenience and no one else will do so, refusal can be grave matter. Works of mercy bind in cases of necessity, and deliberate abandonment of a human corpse in such circumstances can manifest grave inhumanity. To the objections,

the deceased can still suffer loss

in human honor and burial removes a bodily source of that dishonor. Even where the dead person's identity is unknown, burial honors human nature itself and continues the reasonable affection the deceased had for his own body. Chrysostom condemns excess and luxury in sepulchers, not moderate honorable burial. Christ omitted burial in Matthew 25 either because people already naturally recognized the duty and needed restraint rather than encouragement in funeral expense, or because He listed the works of most evident necessity.

ARTICLE III - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS ARE GREATER THAN SPIRITUAL ALMS

Objections argue that the body is more needy than spirit, that spiritual alms often benefit the giver too and so involve a kind of recompense, and that a poor person may experience more consolation from bodily aid. Against this, Augustine says one sometimes gives something better by correcting an unjust request than by granting what was requested; correction is spiritual almsgiving. RESPONSE. Simply speaking, spiritual alms excel for three reasons. First, the thing given is nobler - a spiritual good rather than bodily good. Second, the recipient is assisted in the nobler part, the spirit rather than the body. Third, the acts by which spiritual aid is given are themselves nobler than bodily acts, which are in a certain respect servile. In a particular case, however, corporal aid can take precedence: a man dying of hunger should be fed before he is instructed in philosophy. Need can therefore reverse the order in concrete circumstances.

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ARTICLE III - SPIRITUAL ALMS VERSUS CORPORAL ALMS (continued)

Other things equal, helping the more needy is better. But if the less needy person is better disposed or needs a nobler good, assistance to him may be better. Recompense does not diminish the merit of spiritual almsgiving unless it is intended in a disordered way; prayer for another can benefit the one praying without thereby reducing charity. The merit of the giver is measured according to what the recipient ought reasonably to find good, not according to a recipient's disordered preference. SUMMARY. Spiritual works of mercy are simply more excellent; nevertheless, in a particular case a corporal work can rightly take precedence. Báñez's

commentary. Comparisons of virtues should be made according to their proper specifying objects, not

according to a greater or lesser accidental command of charity. Augustine therefore remarks that it would be foolish to think it more urgent to fill a hungry stomach with bread than to instruct a mind with the word of God, simply speaking. Following Cajetan,

whether it is better to give to the more needy

person or to a less needy but better person. Unless the disparity of need is very great, Cajetan says it can be better to give to the less needy just man than to the more needy sinner, because although greater need supplies more matter for mercy, goodness in the recipient supplies more matter for charity; charity is the greater virtue and form of the others. On Luke 14 (“when you make a dinner or supper...”),

St.

Thomas's interpretation that a banquet given chiefly to obtain repayment has little or no merit. Ambrose calls such an intention avaricious.

a banquet with the intention of gain is not necessarily mortal sin,

though it can be venially disordered because the social institution of feasting is naturally ordered to fostering friendship, just as play is naturally ordered to recreation rather than gain. Cajetan alternatively says Christ does not simply condemn ordinary reciprocal banquets but emphasizes that inviting the poor has special merit.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS HAVE A SPIRITUAL EFFECT

Objections: an effect cannot be nobler than its cause; exchanging a bodily thing for a spiritual one sounds like simony; and if larger bodily alms produced larger spiritual effects, the widow's two mites would seem inferior, contrary to Christ's judgment. Ecclesiasticus, however, attributes spiritual preservation to almsgiving. St. Thomas distinguishes corporal alms according to substance, cause, and effect. In their substance they directly remedy bodily defects. From their cause, when given through love of God and neighbor, they bear spiritual fruit and merit before God. From their effect, they can move the recipient to pray for the benefactor.

ARTICLE IV - WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS HAVE A SPIRITUAL EFFECT (continued)

The giver does not attempt to purchase spiritual goods with bodily goods; he knows spiritual goods infinitely exceed bodily ones. Rather, through an effect of charity he seeks spiritual fruit by merit. The widow who gave less in absolute quantity gave more proportionally to her resources, revealing a greater affection of charity; it is from charity that corporal almsgiving receives spiritual efficacy. SUMMARY. Corporal alms considered merely in their substance have a corporal effect. Considered from their cause - charity - they have a spiritual effect, namely merit before God. Considered from their effect upon the recipient, they can also bear spiritual fruit through the recipient's prayer and gratitude. Báñez's commentary: Does almsgiving remit sins and confer grace like a sacrament? Sacred Scripture and the Fathers praise almsgiving in language so strong that it can appear sufficient by itself for salvation. Ambrose says almsgiving extinguishes sin as water extinguishes fire and even compares it to a cleansing laver; Cyprian and Chrysostom speak similarly. Cyril numbers almsgiving among remedies associated with remission of sins. Scripture says that water extinguishes burning fire and alms resist sin; Tobias says alms deliver from sin and death and purify sins; Christ says, “Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.”

formulates the question whether almsgiving remits sins and

confers grace in the manner of the sacraments. He notes that in Augustine's time certain heretics taught that works of mercy alone sufficed for salvation even while a person remained in mortal sin without repentance, and that omission of mercy alone was the decisive cause of damnation. They appealed to Matthew 25 and to the Lord's Prayer and Christ's promise concerning forgiveness. Augustine reports and condemns this error.

For clarification,

almsgiving according to its substance and according to its formal

character. He also distinguishes four senses in which almsgiving might be said to remit sin: instrumentally, as the sacraments do; formally, as love of God or contrition excludes sin; satisfactorily, by remitting punishment due to sin; and dispositively or as a motive disposing one to receive divine mercy. His first conclusion begins here: it is heretical to say that almsgiving remits mortal sin in such a dispositive way that a person can be saved in this life or the next without repentance. Augustine and St. Thomas explicitly oppose this error, and Scripture teaches that those persisting in the works of the flesh do not possess the kingdom of God, that grave offense makes one guilty, and that without repentance sinners perish. Báñez's further conclusions continue on the next page.

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I distinguish

I consider

Therefore I

I note

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QUESTION XXXII - ARTICLE IV, COMMENTARY (continued)

Second conclusion. Almsgiving according to its mere substance does not remit sins as a sacrament does. This privilege belongs to the sacraments, and in the Church of Christ there are only seven sacraments. If someone says that almsgiving remits sins by a special privilege as martyrdom does,
that to assert this
would be more than rash. Martyrdom has a special character because it is a baptism of blood; moreover, it is not even simply certain that martyrdom without any repentance remits every fault. Third conclusion. Almsgiving does not remit sin formally, whether almsgiving is taken materially or formally. Material almsgiving can be performed by someone in mortal sin and therefore can coexist with mortal sin. Formal almsgiving, however, presupposes true repentance and charity, through which a man is justified, since charity is the form of almsgiving. Fourth conclusion. Almsgiving formally taken greatly increases grace, preserves it, and remits sin with respect to punishment. Although all meritorious works have such effects, works of mercy possess this in a special way. St. Thomas says that among satisfactory works almsgiving is especially satisfactory. Hence Daniel says: “Redeem your sins with alms.”
refers to Augustine on Psalms 36,
102, and 125, and Proverbs: “He that hath mercy on the poor lendeth to the Lord.” Fifth conclusion. Almsgiving, whether taken materially or formally, is not an infallible disposition guaranteeing that the one who gives it will be saved. Many who perform alms are nevertheless damned. Scripture speaks similarly about faith: “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved,” which must be understood with the conditions required for salvation, including perseverance in justice. The same qualification applies to Scriptural promises concerning almsgiving. Sixth conclusion. Merciful persons who from piety and for God's sake continually perform alms will, as a general rule, be converted by God and obtain remission of sins.
this even of
those who perform such works while in mortal sin, especially if their sins proceed from frailty rather than contempt and malice. He regards this as the common teaching of theologians and as the proper sense of the Fathers' strong praises of almsgiving. “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” Almsgiving disposes a person toward eventual repentance. The comparison “as water extinguishes fire, so alms extinguish sin” expresses proportion and likeness, not equality of causal power. The Church interprets such language differently from sacramental language, and that ecclesial interpretation must be followed.
asks
whether a small alms given with greater charity merits more than a large alms given with less charity. Following St. Thomas, he distinguishes essential and accidental reward. The essential reward is always proportioned to charity; therefore one who gives a small alms with greater charity merits more of the essential reward. A greater exterior work can nevertheless merit a greater accidental reward in another respect. For
the consolation of the poor who cannot perform exterior works,
Augustine: one whose heart is full
of charity always has something to give. A prompt good will is accepted according to what one possesses; hence the maxim that when the ability to act is lacking, the will is reckoned for the deed.

ARTICLE V - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS UNDER PRECEPT

The objections begin: Daniel appears to propose almsgiving as counsel; everyone may use and retain his own property; and if almsgiving were commanded, there would have to be a determinate time when omission constituted mortal sin.
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Finally, I
I cite
I also
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ARTICLE V - WHETHER GIVING ALMS IS UNDER PRECEPT

A further objection says that all commandments are reduced to the Decalogue, yet no explicit command concerning almsgiving appears there. Against this, no one is punished eternally for omitting something that is merely counsel; yet Matthew 25 teaches that some are condemned for omission of works of mercy. Therefore almsgiving falls under precept. RESPONSE. Since love of neighbor is commanded, everything without which that love cannot be preserved must also fall under command. Love requires not only willing our neighbor's good but acting for it: “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth.” Hence when our neighbor's necessity requires relief, almsgiving is commanded. Because commands concern acts of virtue according to right reason, circumstances must be considered both in the giver and the recipient. On the giver's side, what is distributed should be superfluous, according to Luke: “That which remaineth, give alms.” Superfluous means not only what exceeds one's own individual necessities but also what exceeds the necessities of persons entrusted to one's care. A person must first provide for himself and his dependents, then from the remainder relieve others. “Necessary” includes what is reasonably required according to one's personal condition and social state. On the recipient's side there must be necessity. Since one individual cannot relieve every needy person, not every necessity imposes the command on every giver. The necessity that most clearly binds is that without relief the person cannot be sustained. Here Ambrose's saying applies: “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him.” Therefore St. Thomas concludes that giving alms from one's superfluous goods is commanded, and giving to a person in extreme necessity is commanded. Other almsgiving is counsel, as are other acts of a better good beyond strict obligation. Daniel spoke to a king who did not profess the divine law and therefore could have commandments proposed to him under the form of counsel; alternatively Daniel may have spoken about a circumstance in which the particular alms was not commanded. Temporal goods are indeed one's own as regards ownership, but their use ought not be exclusively one's own when others can be sustained from one's surplus. Basil says in substance: the bread you retain belongs to the hungry, the garment stored away belongs to the naked, the shoes wasting in your possession belong to the barefoot, and buried money belongs to the needy. There is a time when omission of alms is mortal sin. On the recipient's side this is especially when necessity is evident and urgent and no other ready helper appears. On the giver's side it is when he possesses goods genuinely superfluous according to his present state and according to a probable, prudent estimate. One need not reserve everything against every imaginable future event; Christ forbids such anxious thought for tomorrow. Necessity and surplus are judged according to what ordinarily and probably occurs. Finally, aid to one's neighbor is reduced to the commandment honoring parents, since piety extends analogically to works by which we support those to whom human fellowship binds us.

ARTICLE V - SUMMARY

First: almsgiving is under precept. Second: giving alms from superfluous goods is commanded. Third: giving alms to one in extreme necessity is commanded. Fourth: other almsgiving is counsel.

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ARTICLE VI - WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO GIVE ALMS FROM WHAT IS NECESSARY

Objections argue from the order of charity: because a person ought to love himself more than his neighbor in the relevant order, he seems to sin by depriving himself of necessities for another. Further, one who dissipates necessities appears prodigal; and Paul says that one who does not care for his own, especially his household, has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever. Against this stands Christ's counsel to the rich young man: “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor.” Such a man gives not merely surplus but things otherwise necessary. RESPONSE. “Necessary” is said in two ways. First, something is necessary without which a person or those dependent upon him cannot live. Such necessities must not ordinarily be given away, because doing so would withdraw life from oneself and one's dependents. An exception can occur where by depriving oneself one preserves a person of exceptional importance through whom the Church or commonwealth is sustained. For the common good one may laudably expose oneself and one's family to grave danger. Second, something is called necessary because without it one cannot live conveniently according to one's condition and state. The boundary of such necessity is not mathematically indivisible: many additions may still not make something clearly superfluous, while some subtraction may still leave enough to live fittingly according to one's state. Giving from these goods is ordinarily good and falls under counsel rather than command. It would be disorderly to give so much that one could no longer live suitably according to one's state and fulfill the business attached to it. Three exceptions are noted. First, a person may change state, as when entering religious life and giving all away for Christ. Second, one may give things useful to one's condition when they can easily be replaced and no great inconvenience follows. Third, in another's extreme necessity or a grave necessity of the commonwealth, one may laudably omit things otherwise belonging to the decency of one's state in order to meet the greater necessity. SUMMARY. One may not ordinarily give away what is absolutely necessary for the life of oneself and dependents, except for a sufficiently grave common-good case. Giving from what is necessary merely for convenient maintenance of one's state is ordinarily counsel. Giving so much that one cannot fittingly maintain one's state can be sinful, except in the special cases explained. Báñez's commentary on Articles V-VI. The first conclusion of Article V is a matter of faith: to say that a person is never bound to give alms is heretical. Matthew 25, 1 John 3, Proverbs 21, and the universal consent of the Church establish the obligation; St. Thomas's reason is a moral demonstration.

BÁÑEZ - MUST SURPLUS BE GIVEN OUTSIDE EXTREME NECESSITY?

asks whether a person must give alms from surplus goods even when the neighbor is not in extreme necessity, and what St. Thomas himself held. Some authors - including Panormitanus, the Rosella and Pisana Summas, Gabriel, and Antoninus - interpret St. Thomas as saying that surplus need never be given under command unless extreme necessity simultaneously exists in the recipient. They argue from the structure and wording of Articles V and VI.

this interpretation emphatically. He says St. Thomas's teaching is perfectly clear: whoever has true surplus, precisely insofar as it is surplus, is bound to give in ordinary necessities short of extreme necessity. Cajetan holds the same.

St. Thomas on the Sentences,

where two distinct propositions are expressly joined: giving alms from surplus falls under precept, and giving to someone in extreme necessity falls under precept. The conjunction does not make one condition dependent on the other. The same follows from St. Thomas's answer in Article V and elsewhere. When Article VI says giving from necessities belonging to one's state is counsel, it speaks ordinarily; extreme necessity can create an exception. Likewise St. Thomas's word “laudably” does not necessarily exclude obligation: something commanded can also be laudable. Indeed St. Thomas uses the same language about exposing oneself for a public person indispensable to Church or commonwealth, where sufficiently grave circumstances can create genuine obligation.

raises the more difficult question: does one who possesses surplus have a strict precept to give alms in common necessities below extreme necessity? Objections say this would condemn many rich people and their confessors; it would prevent social advancement because surplus would always have to be distributed instead of saved for a higher state; it would condemn sumptuous banquets, hunting, clothing, and other expenditures; and affirmative precepts bind only at a time of necessity, whereas by hypothesis the neighbor is not in extreme necessity. Before deciding,

“surplus.” What is necessary for one's person or state is not fixed at an indivisible point. Goods prudently reserved for children's dowries and for reasonably foreseeable sickness, war, famine, and similar needs can belong to what is necessary for one's state. But this does not justify anxious provision against fictitious future necessities contrary to Christ's warning against worrying about tomorrow. He notes two schools. Alexander of Hales and several later authors hold that natural equity urges the possessor of surplus to give, but failure outside grave necessity does not amount to mortal sin.

to defend the contrary Thomistic position.

I explain

I prepare

I reject

I cite

First, I

Then I

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the contrary position as St. Thomas's and says it is followed by weighty authorities: Cajetan, Paludanus, Richard of Middleton, Nicholas of Lyra, Adrian, and especially the Salamanca masters Vitoria, Soto, Cano, and Sotomayor. He also presents it as consonant with the ancient Fathers. Augustine repeatedly exhorts Christians to give alms and says that, apart from moderate food and clothing, what God gives beyond need is given through us for distribution to the poor. Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, Bede, and Theophylact use similarly severe language against retaining excess while others lack necessities. Their statement that “the surplus of the rich is the necessity of the poor” must not be understood as denying the rich person's ownership. As St. Thomas explains, surplus remains theirs as to property, but its use ought to become common in the relevant necessities. Scripture confirms this. John the Baptist says, “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none,” where one coat represents what is necessary and the other what is superfluous. The context concerns fruits worthy of repentance and judgment upon the tree bearing no good fruit, indicating command rather than mere counsel. James condemns riches that rot unused and treasures amassed for the last days. Luke says, “That which remaineth, give alms.” The rich fool of Luke 12 is condemned for storing abundant surplus. Matthew 25 condemns omission of works of mercy, which would concern very few people if obligation existed only in the rarest extreme necessity. Báñez's natural-law argument is especially strong. By natural law goods are in some sense common; their division into private ownership arose through the law of nations and human arrangement. Such division would be contrary to right reason unless it implicitly preserved the condition that surplus be made available to the needy. It would be unreasonable for one person to starve while another indulges in excess. Hence the Fathers call the rich “God's stewards” regarding use. He also argues from charity. The order of charity itself is commanded. A person ought to value the fitting condition and serious welfare of his neighbor more than his own superfluous riches. Human friendship would be broken if a friend with excess refused assistance to a needy friend; Christian charity is friendship extending to one's neighbors in God. 1 John asks how God's charity remains in one who sees his brother in need and closes his heart. Thus
that the surplus of Christians is genuinely
owed to the poor in the order of charitable use, although not in the simple sense that ownership has already transferred to a particular poor person.
I conclude
I identify
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Second conclusion, which
most certain: when one's neighbor suffers grave necessity short of
absolute extreme necessity, one who possesses surplus is bound under precept to give alms. This follows especially from the authorities and reasons already given. Third conclusion. To say that in more common and lighter necessities the rich are not bound to give their surplus is not an improbable opinion because respectable doctors defend it, although
St. Thomas's contrary position more probable. The “time
of necessity” for an affirmative command is not restricted to the recipient's imminent death. It can arise because an act is necessary for preservation of the virtue itself. In justice, for example, a person holding another's property must restore it even when the creditor is not needy, because right reason demands restitution. Similarly, when someone possesses surplus and common necessities exist in the community, right reason can make it a time for almsgiving. On the recipient's side, extreme necessity produces the clearest and strongest obligation.
the inference that the poor may therefore steal from any rich person who is
obliged to give surplus. Outside extreme necessity the rich person is not obliged to give to this particular poor person; he retains prudent discretion regarding whom and when to assist. He answers the example of Joseph in Egypt, who accumulated great stores and later sold rather than freely distributed grain during famine. Extraordinary examples of saints and patriarchs that appear to exceed ordinary rules are not automatically imitated, because we may not know the special divine or prudential reason. Ambrose explains that Joseph opened the granaries for purchase lest gratuitous reception make people abandon cultivation and neglect their own work.
asks whether in extreme necessity a person must give from goods necessary to his
social state. First, anyone with surplus certainly must give in extreme necessity; the contrary would be erroneous and all doctors agree. Second, a person need not ordinarily give what is absolutely necessary to preserve his own life, except where the common good requires preservation of an indispensable public or ecclesiastical person. A person may nevertheless voluntarily expose his life for a friend in some circumstances. The disputed point concerns goods necessary not for bare life but for maintaining one's state. Some deny obligation unless there is surplus;
that position inhuman. “Extreme necessity” does not mean only
the instant before death. It includes a condition from which, unless assistance is given, one is probably expected to fall into disease or another danger leading to death. It also includes danger of losing a bodily member or sense, since such mutilation is reduced morally to homicide, and danger of falling into insanity. Therefore the true and common position,
, is that a person is bound to assist someone in extreme
necessity even from goods otherwise necessary for maintaining his social state.
I say
I reject
I judge
I call
I call
Then I
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the obligation from 1 John 3, Matthew 25, Ambrose's “if you did not feed him, you killed him,”
the commonality of goods in extreme necessity, and the order of charity. A person in extreme necessity may take what is necessary even in the manner externally resembling theft or robbery, and others cannot justly prevent him; this indicates that the possessor had a grave duty to permit the necessary use. An objection says this could require a rich man to consume his entire patrimony, even a great estate or social dignity, whenever public famine creates many urgent needs.
that although a human life is nobler than a sum of
money considered absolutely, wealth can have greater importance in relation to the common good because it is an instrument for maintaining families, offices, and public necessities. A private person is not necessarily bound to spend his entire estate even to cure his own illness if doing so would destroy the state and provision of his children. Prudence and the common good set limits. Necessity may arise intrinsically, as from illness, or extrinsically through another's malice, as when someone threatens death unless money is paid. In the first kind, relatively limited expenditures and the contributions of many citizens may suffice, and public authority can compel citizens to contribute. The individual who sees the necessity must help according to his ability, but is not bound to liquidate his entire estate when that would create a greater social harm. In externally imposed necessities no universal numerical measure can be given because human malice can grow without limit. All such cases must be governed by prudence with due regard for human frailty.
asks whether a rich
person who culpably fails to assist someone in extreme necessity is bound to restitution for the temporal damages resulting from the poor person's death. One argument says yes: Ambrose calls the omission a kind of killing, and a killer ordinarily owes restitution for resulting damages. Another canonical text says one is proved to inflict death when he can prevent it but does not. The opposing argument is that almsgiving is formally an act of charity and mercy; omission can be mortal sin without becoming an injustice that generates restitution.
two ways one may be bound to preserve another's life. First, by office and commutative
justice: a judge, physician paid to serve a hospital, hospital administrator, and similarly a bishop as administrator of goods for the poor can have an office-based duty. Failure in such a duty can generate restitution. Second, an ordinary person can be bound by the common obligation of charity according to the order of charity. Even if omission here is mortal sin, it does not ordinarily generate restitution. Legal justice does not change this. Like charity, legal justice is a kind of general virtue ordering the virtues toward the common good. It can move mercy to aid a citizen in extreme necessity without converting every omission into a commutative debt of restitution. Nevertheless public secular or ecclesiastical judges may compel citizens to assist extreme necessities.
a qualification: if the needy person specifically demands what natural
necessity gives him a right to use and the possessor unjustly resists, the case for restitution becomes stronger. He says it would not be absurd to hold that the rich are bound to restitution in such a case, especially when the poor person expressly asks.
I distinguish
I answer
I prove
I add
Then I
802

whether, when one is under a command to give alms, the command can be fulfilled merely by lending or selling with payment expected later. Adrian holds that lending fulfills the command and that the recipient, once his fortune improves, must repay, because the obligation is merely to relieve present necessity. this opinion false if applied to absolute extreme necessity. He distinguishes two kinds of extreme necessity. One is absolutely extreme: the needy person has no resources at all. The other is extreme only in a qualified sense: a person possesses wealth but cannot presently access it, for example because his property is in Rome while he is elsewhere. In the second case Adrian's view can be true because the recipient possesses his own substance. Likewise, if a person presently lacks resources but ordinarily earns his living through labor and is capable of repayment, a rich person need not necessarily make an outright gift and may assist under an obligation of later repayment, depending on circumstances. But in the first case - absolute extreme necessity and no substance from which repayment can reasonably be made - the giver must give gratuitously. The command then is specifically the command of almsgiving, which is a gratuitous donation of what is necessary to relieve misery. A mere loan is not a gratuitous gift and does not satisfy that command. Where one has surplus and only common needs are involved, one may lend to this particular person provided there remains a genuine intention to give alms to others at another time and the loan is not a fraudulent evasion of the command. A person in absolute extreme necessity who takes what is necessary does not thereby become bound to repay simply as a borrower. St. Thomas says without qualification that in extreme necessity one may take another's property in the manner of theft, because necessity makes it common as to use. If after the necessity passes something of the taken good remains, restitution is due for the reason already explained.

Fourth doubt: Are there cases beyond the two principal cases in which almsgiving is commanded? whether one can be obliged to give even from goods fitting to one's state when the recipient is not in absolute extreme necessity. St. Thomas's wording appears restrictive: other alms are counsel, and only necessity in which the sufferer cannot otherwise be sustained seems to impose the precept from the recipient's side. that Vitoria, Soto, Cano, and Sotomayor held that almsgiving can be commanded beyond those two cases. Adrian likewise says that not only absolute extreme necessity but also “straitened” or grave necessity can oblige a person to give from goods pertaining to his state.
this as more consonant
with Scripture, the Fathers, Christian piety, and natural reason. Examples include a person in danger of losing his social state with consequent great misery to himself and his family, when another can prevent this by surrendering only a marginal portion of goods not clearly necessary or superfluous; a prisoner whose prolonged confinement will reduce his wife and children to severe misery when a moderate alms could free him; or a captive who can be redeemed at moderate cost. Thus
absolute extreme necessity
from necessity “extreme in its genus,” such as imminent loss of one's state or exposure to another grave evil. This second kind too can activate the command of mercy.
I distinguish
I regard
I call
I ask
I ask
I note, however,
I note, however,
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ALMSGIVING IN GRAVE NECESSITIES SHORT OF DEATH

to Exodus 22: a creditor must not oppress a poor debtor and must return the garment taken in pledge before sunset because it is the debtor's only covering. God's declaration, “If he cry to me, I will hear him, because I am compassionate,” indicates a command of mercy even where there is not literal imminent death. Isaiah likewise condemns merciless exaction from debtors. Matthew 18 condemns the servant who imprisoned his fellow servant for debt: “Shouldst not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow servant?” Here neither the debtor's extreme necessity nor the creditor's surplus is expressly presupposed, yet failure of mercy is gravely condemned. 1 John 3 speaks generally of seeing a brother “have need,” not only of seeing him at the point of death. Augustine interprets this in cases where a brother is exposed to serious molestation or hardship and asks whether one's heart can refuse money that would prevent such suffering. Báñez understands the Fathers' language about surplus not with mathematical rigidity but according to the circumstances in which one's neighbor has sufficient reason to require assistance. Christian charity demands that I value the preservation of my neighbor's whole condition more than a small portion of the convenience belonging to my own condition. Human friendship itself could scarcely survive if friends refused one another assistance in such cases; Christian charity is friendship with God and neighbor. James 2 speaks of a brother or sister naked and lacking daily food - a need grave but not necessarily absolutely extreme - and condemns the empty response, “Go in peace, be warmed and filled,” without supplying bodily necessities.

professional examples. A lawyer can be bound under precept to assist a poor person whose cause otherwise cannot be defended. If one can save a neighbor from substantial robbery merely by shouting or spending a modest amount, omission can be mortally sinful. Exodus commands one to return even an enemy's wandering ox and to help raise an ass fallen beneath its burden. These are commanded works of assistance despite not involving immediate danger of death. Physicians likewise can have obligations toward poor patients extending beyond only the gravest illnesses. From this

a first conclusion: in such grave cases a person may

be bound either to give gratuitously or at least to lend, depending on the nature of the necessity. Scripture joins mercy with lending: the just man “is merciful and lendeth,” and Ecclesiasticus praises giving, lending, and becoming surety as works by which one assists another. Second conclusion.

he is completely

convinced that many things are genuinely “superfluous” in circumstances where people ordinarily do not think them so. Surplus is relative to circumstances. During notable poverty and famine, for example, elaborate clothing for the servants of a nobleman may become superfluous even though at another time it fittingly belongs to the splendor of his state. Accordingly, in the present matter something can count as surplus when spending it would provide a very great remedy to one's neighbor while causing little or no real detriment to the giver. This can involve money, favor, personal assistance, or intercession. A person who can easily help his neighbor's animal fallen under a burden but refuses while serious damage follows can sin gravely; similarly one who can intercede with a rich man and free a poor person from great misery places himself in grave moral danger by refusing without reason. St. Thomas's restriction to “evident and urgent necessity” can include necessities extreme in their own genus - such as imminent loss of one's state - and not merely immediate danger of death. Alternatively, St. Thomas may be speaking of alms precisely as a gratuitous donation: in some lesser grave necessities one can fulfill the command by lending rather than giving outright.

I say

I appeal

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the preceding discussion by insisting that charity, individual prudence, and human piety must govern these cases. Proverbs says the just man knows the lives or needs of those belonging to him, whereas the bowels of the impious are cruel; Paul therefore urges Christians to put on “the bowels of mercy” and piety. The rich should especially remember Paul's warning that those who desire to become rich fall into temptation, the snare of the devil, and many useless and harmful desires that plunge men into destruction. One such temptation is refusing alms in the serious cases just discussed. Final doubt: Are bishops and ecclesiastics bound by a stronger obligation to give alms than other faithful? The first objection says the obligation of almsgiving arises from charity, and the commandments of love of God and neighbor bind all equally; therefore clerics do not seem specially bound. The second says the obligation arises either from the giver's surplus or the recipient's necessity. The recipient's necessity is the same whether compared with a cleric or layman, while clerics are not uniformly richer: many possess no surplus and some are poor. Thus the general rules seem the same. A third objection argues that if ecclesiastics have a special obligation it would chiefly be because ecclesiastical goods are deputed to the poor. But tithes are owed in justice as legitimate stipends assigned by law to ecclesiastical ministers, and St. Thomas even teaches that the poor are bound to pay tithes. Therefore such revenues can appear to become the ministers' proper goods. Moreover, if some ecclesiastical property is strictly assigned to the poor, distributing it would seem an act of commutative justice and faithful administration rather than almsgiving from one's own goods; failure would generate restitution.

the subject has been extensively treated by learned contemporaries, especially Martín de Azpilcueta (Navarrus), Bishop Francisco Sarmiento, and Domingo de Soto in De iustitia et iure, Book X, q.4, especially

article 3, on whether bishops and priests possess true dominion over ecclesiastical goods.

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treat the disputed ownership question only briefly because, for his purpose, the magnitude of clerics' obligation to give alms does not finally depend upon whether they are called full owners of ecclesiastical property. First foundation: five kinds of temporal goods reaching clerics. Following Soto,

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(1) goods anciently placed in the common ecclesiastical deposit for the sustenance of clergy and poor, a custom originating in Acts 4 when Christians sold possessions and laid the proceeds at the Apostles' feet; (2) goods subsequently offered not merely for poor relief or church fabric but as the endowment or stipend of perpetual chaplaincies, anniversaries, episcopal sees, castles, vassals, and similar foundations; (3) daily offerings and stipends, whether for celebrating sacred rites or placed at the altar; (4) tithes commanded by ecclesiastical law for ministers of churches; and (5) hereditary patrimony or other goods acquired by a cleric through his own labor, skill, or industry. Second foundation. The manner of offering, receiving, and distributing ecclesiastical goods has varied over time. At the beginning not only clerics but the faithful at Jerusalem lived in common, with the Apostles and deacons as administrators. This represented in an exemplary way the communal life later preserved perpetually in the religious state. As the Christian people and clergy increased, such common life could no longer be maintained universally. Ecclesiastical goods therefore came to be divided into portions: one for bishops, another for clergy, another for church fabric and necessities, and another for the poor. Báñez's historical discussion continues on the following page.

I say

I conclude

I distinguish

I intend

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the historical account of ecclesiastical revenues. The ancient fourfold division of ecclesiastical goods—one portion for the bishop, another for the clergy, another for the fabric and necessities of the church, and another for the poor—was confirmed by ecclesiastical legislation. In Báñez's own time, however, the portion once separately designated for the poor was no longer visibly set apart; rather, by conjecture it was believed to have become joined or mixed with the portion of the bishop, clergy, church fabric, or with all of them collectively. First conclusion. Bishops, by reason of the state of perfection they profess, are bound by a stricter bond of charity toward their own flock and must be merciful not only in spiritual things but also in temporal things insofar as these are ordered toward spiritual welfare. This obligation remains whether they possess patrimonial goods or ecclesiastical goods, whether they are owners or merely administrators; indeed, even if they possess nothing themselves, they are bound to seek alms from wealthy persons and distribute them to the poor.
that this conclusion seems hidden from many bishops of his age, although he
considers it evident from Scripture, the Fathers, and the nature of the episcopal state. The episcopate signifies an office and ministry of superintendence. Bishops are successors of the Apostles and pastors of the Church, entrusted with care for everything capable of contributing to the salvation of souls. Because the episcopal state is, according to St. Thomas, a kind of “magisterium of perfection,” the bishop must provide his flock with an eminent example of virtue, especially mercy and charity. Christ therefore examined Peter concerning charity before entrusting the sheep to him: “Lovest thou me more than these?” To feed the sheep includes strengthening believers and providing what is necessary for them. A second argument follows from the pastoral office itself. Bishops are directly pastors of souls and in some circumstances must expose even their own lives for the salvation of the flock, beyond what is demanded of ordinary Christians. Yet the spiritual salvation of souls is frequently endangered through temporal poverty. Therefore bishops must, insofar as they can, remedy such temporal distress lest persons oppressed by poverty succumb to sin. The “wolf” from which the good shepherd protects the flock includes not only heresy but adversities used by the devil to destroy souls. Gregory the Great teaches that the pastor must first expend his exterior goods for the sheep and, if necessary, eventually his life. Since one's life is incomparably greater than temporal substance, one who refuses his substance for the sheep cannot plausibly claim readiness to surrender his life for them. Thus a pastor who loves earthly substance more than his sheep forfeits the reality of the pastoral name.
I continue
I lament
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two foundations for the bishop's special obligation. First, the dignity of the episcopal state makes him a teacher and exemplar of perfection; religious are, in a certain respect, disciples relative to this magisterium of perfection. Therefore a bishop must furnish an outstanding example in works of mercy.

Second, his office gives him superintendence over the salvation and advancement in virtue of souls, which temporal adversity often impedes. Matthew 5 applies with particular force to the Apostles and their successors: “You are the light of the world,” “the salt of the earth,” “a city seated on a mountain,” and a lamp placed upon a lampstand. Consequently it is not sufficient that a bishop be an excellent doctor, an eloquent preacher, or merely free from public sin; he must also be publicly beneficent and make himself an example of good works. St. Paul likewise devoted great solicitude to collecting alms in Macedonia and Corinth for the poor at Jerusalem. He did not regard care of the poor as foreign to the apostolate, but as contributing to the salvation of both poor and rich. Paul says that Peter and John imposed upon him the charge that “we should be mindful of the poor.” St. Peter commands pastors to feed the flock of God willingly and to become examples to the flock. St. Paul similarly tells Timothy, a bishop, to be an example to the faithful “in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity,” to exercise himself unto godliness, and to make his progress manifest to all. A bishop's example is indispensable to spiritual fruit because when a man's life is despised, his doctrine is easily despised as well. How,
, can a bishop command the rich not to place hope in uncertain riches but in God, and command them to be rich in good works, ready to distribute and communicate, if the bishop himself keeps granaries full of grain waiting for a higher selling price, accumulates treasures, and builds magnificent houses to leave to a wealthy relative?
that so evident a truth is obscured from certain prelates.
The examples of the holy pastors of the primitive Church are so frequent that
it unnecessary
to enumerate them. Bishops read these examples daily in the lives of the saints and admire them, yet few imitate them, excusing themselves by saying such examples are to be admired rather than imitated. Báñez rejects this evasion: these deeds are not miracles requiring a special supernatural gift unavailable to others. The episcopal obligation is fundamentally the same, the Judge is the same, and “a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule.” He points especially to Ezekiel 34's terrible denunciations of the shepherds of Israel who fed themselves rather than the flock, Augustine's extensive work On Pastors, and Gregory's Pastoral Rule. Pastors should keep these works before their eyes and meditate upon them seriously rather than treating the question as an idle scholastic controversy. Second conclusion. Where it is certain that temporal ecclesiastical goods have been specifically assigned to the use of the poor, those goods are owed to the poor by justice, whether collected by a bishop, parish priest, or any other administrator.
I summarize
I consider
I deplore
I ask

Third conclusion. The bishop or another ecclesiastical minister is not the owner of immovable ecclesiastical goods specifically constituted as the permanent endowment or stipend of ministers. Such property was, as it were, bound by its former owners and deposited with the Church so that ministers might be sustained from it. It cannot be alienated except for a greater good of the Church and according to pontifical law or with authorization of the Supreme Pontiff. Fourth conclusion. A bishop or other non-religious ecclesiastical minister who has a right to receive the annual fruits assigned to his office is truly owner of those fruits. They are his proper goods and, considered simply as property, he can consume, alienate, or give them without committing an injury against another's ownership. St. Thomas nevertheless says that if a prelate retains an immoderate amount for himself and fails to relieve others according to the debt of charity, he sins through immoderate affection and use.

Soto's extensive defense of this point. The central disputed question is

whether, after ecclesiastical revenues ceased to be divided into four visible portions and instead were divided into portions for bishop, clergy, and church fabric, ecclesiastics remain bound in justice to separate for the poor the old fourth portion.

Martín de Azpilcueta overly scrupulous on this matter and follows

Soto. Fifth conclusion. It is not sufficiently proved that the ancient fourth portion was originally separated by strict justice as though the faithful made offerings under the juridical condition that exactly one quarter be distributed as alms.

it more probable that bishops, as distributors of those goods, separated that

fourth part through charity, mercy, and the desire to give the faithful a good example. Once separated and entrusted to a clerical administrator, however, that administrator was bound in justice to distribute it according to the bishop's or chapter's prescription. Sixth conclusion. No sufficiently certain argument or testimony proves that bishops in Báñez's own age were bound by commutative justice to separate a definite portion of their annual revenues for the poor. The principle that in doubtful matters the condition of the possessor is better supports the bishops' possession where the contrary arguments amount only to conjectures and pious suspicions.

that this juridical conclusion does not weaken the bishops' moral

obligation. It is useless to urge bishops to almsgiving on a doubtful theory that they owe exactly a quarter in restitution when they are already bound by the much stronger and more certain bond of charity and pastoral office. They must render an account of their stewardship to Christ, and charity can require such abundant almsgiving that little remains even where strict restitution is not owed. Other ecclesiastics likewise, all else equal, are more strongly obliged to abundant almsgiving than lay faithful because they are sustained from goods offered to Christ and occupy a more perfect state. Parish priests are especially bound because they share in pastoral care of souls. Their sacramental ministry deserves a fitting stipend in justice, but richer revenues also furnish greater opportunity and obligation for mercy.

that bishops would

perhaps be held in greater honor if they possessed ample revenues chiefly so that they could exercise charity and mercy, rather than displaying great household furnishings, richly dressed attendants, silver and gold vessels, sumptuous tables, horses, riders, carriages, and litters. Final conclusion concerning bishops taken from religious life. Such bishops do not acquire ownership of ecclesiastical goods as personal property but remain dispensers of them, because the solemn vow of poverty is not destroyed by accession to the episcopate.

I remark

I insist

I praise

I judge

I find

RELIGIOUS BISHOPS AND THE PRACTICAL DUTIES OF ALL BISHOPS

St. Thomas's reason is that the religious state is related to the episcopal state as a disposition toward perfection. A disposition is not removed when perfection arrives except insofar as something in it would conflict with that perfection; what agrees with perfection is instead strengthened. The solemn vow of poverty does not conflict with episcopal office because a religious bishop can perform everything required of the office through prudent administration of ecclesiastical goods without acquiring personal ownership. From the whole discussion, and especially the first conclusion,

that no fixed fraction can be assigned such that a

bishop who spends that amount in alms is thereby free from every further obligation. The office of a good shepherd cannot be limited in that way. The perfection of the state can demand, if necessary for souls, the expenditure of all one's substance and even one's life. Because such extraordinary cases are rare,

a severe practical judgment for ordinary circumstances. Bishops, as fathers of the poor and widows, must exercise notable almsgiving proportionate to their resources and the abundance of their revenues.

that he personally would not absolve any bishop of Spain unless at least a fourth part of his revenues were expended in alms in ordinary necessities. This is not presented as a universal juridical fraction owed in commutative justice, but as Báñez's confessional judgment concerning the demands of episcopal charity under the circumstances he knew. In graver necessities—such as famine, pestilence, or widespread disease—the obligation increases according to the necessities of the poor, who are the bishop's own sheep. At times he may be bound to give even from his household furnishings and silver vessels. A second consequence is that bishops must actively investigate the poor within their dioceses so that alms may be given or procured for them. It is insufficient merely to be merciful toward poor persons who happen to appear, since ordinary Christians already have that obligation. The bishop is a spiritual father charged with procuring the salvation of his subjects, which poverty can obstruct. Báñez does not mean that a bishop must personally know every poor individual. Rather, he must know generally the condition of each town in his diocese—whether there are many rich, many poor, and how assistance can be organized. Parish priests can easily conduct such inquiries, just as they transmit information concerning those who have received the sacraments at Easter.

that

he cannot understand how bishops can truly be fathers of the poor, or how they can safely regard themselves as being in a state of salvation, unless they exercise this care: if they can relieve the poor, they must do so; if they cannot, they must at least compassionate them and implore God's mercy where human aid fails. He compares this duty with the prelate's obligation, treated later, to inquire whether scandalous sinners among his subjects require correction. He then answers the objections. Charity does not impose numerically identical acts upon everyone; it obliges each person to more or fewer acts according to the condition of his state. The two general titles creating an obligation of almsgiving—surplus in the giver and necessity in the recipient—apply to everyone, but impose a greater burden on bishops because surplus is more frequently found among them and because they must feed the flock by example. If a bishop is genuinely so poor that he can barely provide necessities for himself and his household, exhorting others to almsgiving may suffice.

the treatment of bishops and ecclesiastics and turns to Article VII: Whether alms may be given

from goods unjustly acquired.

I say

I say

I declare

I close

I give

ARTICLE VII - WHETHER ALMS MAY BE GIVEN FROM ILL-GOTTEN GOODS

The first objection cites Luke 16: “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Since mammon signifies riches, it appears that a person can make spiritual friends by distributing as alms riches unjustly acquired. The second objection notes various kinds of “base gain.” Money earned through prostitution is shameful, and Deuteronomy forbids offering the hire of a prostitute in God's house; yet such money can in some circumstances be given as alms. Likewise goods obtained through simony, gambling, and similar practices raise the question whether their immoral origin prevents almsgiving. The third objection argues from the hierarchy of evils. Retaining another's property is less evil than allowing homicide through refusal to aid a person in extreme necessity. Ambrose says: “Feed the man dying of hunger; if you have not fed him, you have killed him.” Thus there seems to be at least some case in which another's ill-gotten property can be used for alms. Against this, Augustine commands alms to be made from just labors and warns against attempting to “corrupt” Christ the Judge by giving to the poor from goods taken from others. One should not give alms from usury while withholding restitution from those injured. St. Thomas's response. Something can be illicitly acquired in three ways. First, it can be acquired illicitly and remain owed in justice to the person from whom it was taken, as in robbery, theft, and usury. Because restitution is owed, alms cannot be made from such property. Second, something can be illicitly acquired in such a way that the acquirer may not retain it, yet it is not owed back to the giver because both giving and receiving violated justice. St. Thomas gives simony as the example. In such a case restitution is not made to the giver; the goods are instead distributed in alms. Third, the acquisition itself can be valid even though the activity from which the money arose is sinful. The classic example is money received by a prostitute. The prostitution is against God's law, but the woman does not act unjustly merely in receiving the agreed payment. Consequently she can retain it and can give alms from it. Regarding gambling, St. Thomas distinguishes natural/divine-law defects from merely positive-law prohibitions. One may not validly win from persons unable to alienate their goods, such as minors or the insane; nor through fraud; nor by drawing another into gambling through avaricious pressure. In these cases restitution is owed and the winnings cannot be given as alms. Positive civil law may impose further prohibitions and restitution upon those subject to it. In extreme necessity, however, goods become common as regards necessary use. A person in such necessity may take what is required for his sustenance when no one will give it, and another may similarly take what is necessary to relieve him, though if possible the owner's will should first be sought. Summary of St. Thomas. (1) Property owed to another in justice cannot be given as alms. (2) Property illicitly received that neither party may retain, as in the legal treatment of simony, is to be applied to alms. (3) Property whose acquisition is not itself unjust, despite arising from a sinful activity, can be retained and given as alms.

there is no real difficulty concerning the first conclusion: an act of almsgiving must itself be virtuous and according to right reason; therefore another person's property must first be restored to its owner. Evil may not be done so that good may result. First doubt: Is there, by divine law alone, a difference between payment received for prostitution or fornication and payment received through simony?
arguments denying a difference. If the money itself is the giver's own and voluntarily handed over, the payment is not materially “another's property” in the way stolen goods are. If illegality comes instead from the sinful act for which payment is made, prostitution, adultery, simony, murder, and judicial corruption all seem structurally similar. For example, if someone receives money to kill a man by private authority, why should he not acquire ownership of the payment even though the killing is wicked? Likewise, a judge paid to subvert justice receives money in connection with an unjust action. And Judas is said in Acts 1 to have “possessed a field from the reward of iniquity,” suggesting acquisition of ownership from a wicked act. Cajetan answers by distinguishing the malice of an act in itself from the malice of an act insofar as it is commanded by another vice. Receiving another's property against the owner's will is intrinsically unjust. By contrast, receiving a loan in order to commit fornication is not intrinsically unjust as a receipt; its wickedness derives from lust's command over the action. In simony, however, Cajetan says the very giving and receiving constitute buying and selling something intrinsically unsalable. The sacred thing is not a legitimate object of sale. Similarly, the “subversion of justice” cannot be sold. This gives a special intrinsic defect to the exchange. Cajetan's sign is that giving a woman payment for the use of fornication is sinful because the payment is ordered by lust; nevertheless, after the fornication has occurred, paying what was promised can be an act of justice. But payment for sacred things or for the subversion of justice remains evil before and after the deed, because the object itself is not legitimately saleable.
presses an objection against Cajetan. Money promised to an assassin appears capable of passing into his ownership once the murderous act is completed; similarly, sacrilegious action does not obviously prevent transfer of ownership merely because the act is against religion. Hence some authors plausibly judge that only positive ecclesiastical law prevents the transfer of ownership in a simoniacal purchase. St. Thomas's language nevertheless favors the stronger view, since he says that in simony both giver and receiver act against the justice of divine law and therefore restitution is not made to the giver but the price is distributed as alms.
a fuller treatment to Question 100,

Article 6.

I say
Nevertheless I
I postpone
I present

that even if the sacred object is intrinsically incapable of legitimate sale and therefore the simoniacal seller does not acquire ownership of the price by natural or divine law, it does not automatically follow that the giver loses his original ownership merely by committing the sin. Under natural or divine law alone, no one is ordinarily deprived of ownership of his own property merely as a punishment for sin. Thus the further rule that neither party retains the price and that it is applied to the poor depends,
, upon ecclesiastical penal law. Ecclesiastical law fittingly imposed this penalty so that those who violate divine law by buying or selling sacred things are punished by preventing either party from keeping the simoniacal price and directing it instead toward the poor.
states a first conclusion. If one considers divine law alone and assumes the opinion that the simoniacal seller never acquires ownership of the price, the money must be restored to the giver rather than distributed as alms. But if the alternative opinion is true—that by divine law alone the seller can acquire ownership of money voluntarily paid for his sacred action—then he could give alms from it as from his own property and would have no greater obligation to do so than from his other property. Second conclusion. Under existing ecclesiastical positive law, if someone receives a price for a sacred thing but the simony has not yet been consummated because the sacred thing has not been transferred, the price cannot be distributed as alms; it must be returned to the giver. Cajetan, Vitoria, Soto, and many Dominican masters hold this. Ecclesiastical penalties do not apply in the same way to an incomplete simoniacal transaction. Third conclusion. After consummated simony, it is highly probable that the price should not be restored to the giver but should be given to the Church or the poor. Once such restitution has been made to the Church or poor, no further restitution to the giver is required in conscience.
this the common teaching of theologians and jurists and cites Sylvester, Cajetan, John of Medina, Navarrus, Covarrubias, and the canon-law chapters De hoc and Audivimus.
, however, a fourth and in his judgment more likely opinion: before a judicial sentence, the price may still be returned to the giver, and once restored to him the conscience does not require another restitution to the Church or poor. The reason is that pontifical penal laws do not ordinarily deprive the guilty person of possession or ownership of his property before judicial condemnation. Penal laws can prevent a new right from being acquired, but they do not necessarily confiscate an already possessed right before sentence. The simoniacal seller, by contrast, can be made incapable by ecclesiastical law of acquiring ownership of the price even before sentence, because the law is then preventing a new acquisition rather than confiscating an existing possession. After sentence the seller may be condemned to pay according to the canonical penalty.
I say
I clarify
Therefore I
I note
I call

the arguments supporting the preceding conclusions. Pontifical laws can deprive the buyer of a right to reclaim the price in the external forum and, after judicial sentence, deprive him of ownership; meanwhile they can prevent the simoniacal seller from acquiring ownership from the outset. The canonical requirement of a doubled payment after condemnation also indicates that some penalties presuppose judicial sentence. Final conclusion on simony. After judicial sentence, restitution must be made according to the judge's decree, applying the simoniacal price to the Church or to the poor according to pontifical law.
a special canonical case concerning payment for entrance into religious life, where the price is ordered returned to the person who paid it.
turns to St. Thomas's treatment of gambling winnings. Cajetan
observes that Article VII discusses three sources of gain in relation to almsgiving: prostitution, simony, and gambling. Simony has now been treated. Concerning prostitution,
that an offering from such
earnings should not be made at the altar where the contemptible source is publicly known and would cause scandal or diminish reverence for divine worship. If, morally speaking, the shameful source is not known, the mere material origin does not necessarily make the offering sinful. St. Thomas makes three points concerning gambling. First, if someone wins from persons incapable of alienating their property—such as minors or the insane—he cannot give those winnings as alms but must restore them. Second, if a person draws another into gambling through greed for gain, he is bound to restitution and cannot give away the winnings as though they were his own. Third, positive civil law can make gambling winnings illicit and impose restitution, subject to the persons and jurisdiction governed by that law. Cajetan explains the second point by interpreting “drawing” another to gambling as involving some degree of mixed involuntariness. Invitations, repeated requests, insults, reproaches, or social pressure can make refusal burdensome or dishonorable. Gambling exchanges ought to arise from genuinely free consent because play is ordered to recreation; when a person is effectively coerced, the voluntary character required for transfer of ownership is defective. But someone who merely invites another person, who then freely and willingly chooses to play, does not thereby “draw” him in St. Thomas's condemned sense. If no fraud or other defect is present, winnings from such a freely consenting player may be retained and can be given as alms. Because gambling was extremely common in Spain,
to treat
the justice of gambling at greater length so theologians can have ready principles for resolving cases of conscience. He cites Alexander of Hales, Cajetan, Adrian, Alfonso de Castro, Soto, Navarrus, Covarrubias, canonists and civil jurists, and several authors of special treatises on gambling.
I answer
I decide
I add
Then I

ON GAMBLING ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW

Two questions can be asked about gambling. First, whether gaming itself is virtuous or vicious and whether gain from it is shameful or honorable. This belongs chiefly to St. Thomas's treatment of recreation in Question 168. Second, regardless of whether the game or its profit is morally honorable, whether ownership is transferred through gambling. This second question is Báñez's present concern. Because some rules arise from natural law and others from human positive law,

considers natural law. First conclusion.

Under natural law, gambling truly transfers ownership provided the players are capable of alienating their property and all fraud and violence are absent. The doctors cited by Báñez commonly agree with this. A prodigal who rashly gives away money nevertheless transfers ownership to the recipient. Much more, therefore, can a gambler transfer ownership, since gambling is not generically sinful in the same way prodigality is. Moreover, gambling involves a reciprocal agreement: each player voluntarily exposes his money to the same agreed risk. Although other sins can become mixed with gaming, the contract as such need not violate commutative justice. The conclusion contains three important qualifications. First, persons who cannot alienate their goods through sale or gift cannot ordinarily transfer ownership through gambling either. Báñez enumerates minors, sons under paternal power, monks and nuns, wives in the relevant juridical condition, the insane, and similar persons who either lack ownership of the stake or possess ownership without free administration of it. Second, fraud prevents legitimate transfer. Yet not every strategic device is fraud: a player may employ tactics permitted by the recognized rules and customs of the game according to the judgment of persons skilled in it. Third, violence or coercion prevents the pure voluntariness required for transfer of ownership. Excessive importunity, insults, and reproaches can be reduced to violence when they place such pressure on a person that refusal would expose him to serious embarrassment, loss, or social disgrace.

St. Thomas's statement about “drawing” another into play in this sense. The

Latin idea of “drawing” itself suggests pulling the unwilling, whereas one “leads” the willing. Second

conclusion. Persons who cannot transfer ownership through gambling because they lack the power to alienate

their goods likewise cannot acquire ownership through that same invalid contract. As they cannot lose, so they cannot win. Every contract requires a certain equality between the parties, including equality of juridical capacity and exposure to risk; a contract absolutely null on one side cannot serve as a valid source of ownership on the other.

I understand

First, I

LIMITED GAMBLING CAPACITY AND POSITIVE LAW

Third conclusion. Natural law permits persons whose administration of property is limited to expose to play a moderate amount appropriate to their condition. Within such a lawful game,
it more probable
that they may win a larger sum than the amount they themselves were capable of losing. His example is a son under paternal authority who receives one hundred gold pieces annually from his father for maintenance while studying at a university. He may reasonably be understood to have permission to risk, for example, five gold pieces in recreation. If he plays with an independent person and fortune favors him,
that he may
acquire a sum greater than five pieces even though he could not lawfully have risked a correspondingly large amount of his own. The reason is that a superior—father, mother, prelate, master, or other administrator—who grants money for ordinary life can reasonably be understood to permit moderate expenditures for recreation. Play is a kind of relaxation needed in mortal life for rest from labor and restoration of the mind. Soto, Navarrus, and others support the basic permission to expose a moderate amount. Báñez's further claim that such a person can win more than he could lose is defended by analogy with contracts involving minors: some contracts ineffective insofar as they harm the minor can nevertheless operate insofar as they favor him and burden the legally capable party. He also compares the case with a poor man playing with a very wealthy person. If the poor man possesses only twenty gold pieces, nothing prevents him, when fortune favors him, from winning a hundred or even a thousand from the wealthy player merely because he himself could never have risked that amount. The equality required in gaming does not mean that both parties must be capable of losing the same maximum quantity. It means principally that each owns or legitimately administers the money he actually stakes and that the agreed risk is genuinely accepted. Indeed,
that the practical
inequality may favor the wealthy player, who can continually increase the stake and expose himself to fortune with greater security than the poor player. An objection argues that a son's winnings become bona profectitia, goods acquired through the use of property received from the father, and therefore remain under paternal administration.
that when the father permits the son to expose a limited sum to the fortune of
gaming, he tacitly permits him to expose to subsequent play whatever profit arises from that sum according to the rules of the game.
military or quasi-military property and certain adventitious goods,
which may be administered differently. This concludes Báñez's discussion of gaming under natural law.
Gambling under Spanish and common positive law.
distinguishes three kinds of games. First are
games in which skill or natural ability predominates and chance has little or no role, such as chess-like strategic games, wrestling, ball games, and similar contests. Second are games in which chance predominates and skill contributes little or nothing, such as pure dice and certain card games. Third are mixed games in which chance has the principal role but reason and counsel also contribute, such as tables/backgammon and certain card games. The latter two classes are broadly called games of chance (alea). Games can also be played either for money already placed down or on credit, with payment promised afterward. Skill-based games were not absolutely prohibited but were regulated as to excess, including maximum sums that could be lost and restrictions on playing on credit. Games dominated by chance were more broadly prohibited by canonical, imperial, and Spanish royal law, with rules applying to clerics, religious, and laypersons. Báñez cites the apostolic canons, canon law, the Council of Trent, imperial law, the Partidas, Spanish royal ordinances, and legislation of Charles I. He finally raises the next disputed question: do these positive laws prohibiting games absolutely or regulating their manner invalidate the transfer of ownership of gambling winnings? Authorities disagree. One opinion says prohibited games do not transfer ownership and the winnings must be restored, though authors disagree whether restitution goes to the loser or to the poor and whether judicial sentence is required. Another opinion says ownership really passes through the game but positive law grants the loser a later right of recovery before a judge.
his own resolution with the
proposition that, under the common civil and pontifical law, ownership is in fact transferred through even a prohibited game when the game is played with money actually present. His proof continues on the following page.
I distinguish
I reply
I remark
I judge
I begin
I hold
Next, I