

DISPUTATION II

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On the Nature of Being and Its Divisions

We have previously discussed real being as the object of metaphysics. Now, we turn to the principal difficulties debated concerning it. For these, the first question arises:

QUESTION I

Whether real being expresses one concept, both formal and objective, perfectly precise from its inferiors?

Real being is commonly understood as that which is not repugnant to existence in reality, independent of any consideration of the intellect. In this, it differs from a being of reason, which exists only objectively in the intellect or as considered by the intellect, as we said in the *Logic*, Disputation 1, preliminary question 2.

For the understanding of this question, it is presupposed:

- A *formal concept* is the cognition of a thing or an act of the intellect, called a concept because it is the offspring of the mind, and formal because through it we formally understand.
- An *objective concept* is the thing itself conceived by the mind, called a concept by extrinsic denomination taken from the formal concept by which it is conceived. It is called objective because it is presented to the faculty and is not a form inhering in the faculty itself.

The formal and objective concepts differ in that:

1. The formal concept is always a true, positive thing inhering in the intellect, as is clear from what is said in *De Anima*. The objective concept, however, is not always a true and positive thing, since beings of reason and negations can also be presented to the intellect.
2. The formal concept is always singular in existence, though it can be universal in representation. The objective concept can be singular or universal in existence, since both universals and singulars can be presented to the intellect.

Several opinions circulate about this difficulty, both concerning the unity of the concept of being and its perfect or imperfect precision. These can be seen among recent authors, especially in our Master's *Metaphysics*, Disputation 2, questions 1 and 3. What must be held according to the Subtle Doctor (Scotus) we will propose through conclusions.

Conclusion 1: The formal concept of being is one.

This conclusion is almost common, though there is considerable variation in its explanation. However, since every act of a faculty is entitatively one in relation to its object, the formal concept of being, as an

act of the intellect directed to its object, is entitatively one. Since there is almost no controversy about the unity of the formal concept, we will not dwell on this further, so that we may focus on the controversy about the objective concept, which holds the principal place in this matter.

Conclusion 2: The objective concept of being is one.

This conclusion is held by all Scotists, with the Subtle Master (Scotus) in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, question 3, and distinction 8, question 3, and by many others, including our Master in *Metaphysics*, Disputation 2, question 1. It is proven by Scotus's reasoning: One who is certain of one thing and doubtful about another forms a concept of that about which he is certain, distinct from that about which he is doubtful. But our intellect can be certain that what it conceives is a being, while doubting whether it is God or a creature, a substance or an accident. Therefore, it forms a distinct concept of the ratio of being, separate from the ratio of God, creature, substance, or accident.

The major premise is evident. The minor is certain, for some philosophers were certain that quantity was a being, yet doubted whether it was a substance or an accident. Similarly, some pagans were certain that fire was a being but doubted whether it was God or a creature. It is evident that they formed one concept of being, distinct from the concepts of God, creature, substance, or accident.

If some say, with certain Scotists, that Scotus speaks of the unity of the formal concept, not the objective concept, this is nothing. For as will be clear to one examining his text, he speaks of the objective concept, not of acts but of the object of the intellect.

Moreover, even if this is admitted, a clear argument for our conclusion follows: There cannot be one formal concept, distinct from other formal concepts, unless there is also one objective concept, distinct from other objective concepts. This is proven because the formal concept is not only one in entity and distinct from others but also represents one object distinct from others. Consequently, the objective concept of being is one and distinct from the concepts of God, creature, substance, or accident, as represented by that one formal concept.

Now, the controversy is whether the aforementioned objective concept is adequately precise from God, creatures, substance, and accident. This controversy concerns the second part of the question. For its resolution, it is necessary to avoid equivocation:

1. A concept is *perfectly precise* when it abstracts from its inferiors by reasons, whether from the nature of the thing or at least as represented by the intellect, so that it in no way includes the reasons of its inferiors. Such a concept is perfectly one and expresses some common, contractible, and determinable ratio.
2. A concept is *imperfectly precise* when it does not so abstract from the reasons of its inferiors, either from the nature of the thing or as represented by the intellect, but at least implicitly and confusedly includes their peculiar reasons, though it abstracts from their explicit expression. Such a concept is not perfectly one, nor does it express a common ratio contractible and determinable by peculiar reasons, but it expresses many inferiors immediately and confusedly, as if conceived under one concept.

A perfectly precise concept is usually called *adequate* or *precise*, because through it the concept is abstracted as perfectly one, so that nothing of the peculiar reasons from which it abstracts is conceived, either explicitly or implicitly. An imperfectly precise concept is called *inadequate*, because through it the concept is abstracted as imperfectly one, so that at least implicitly it includes the peculiar reasons.

Conclusion 3: In order, being expresses one concept perfectly precise from God, creatures, substance, and accident.

This conclusion is held by the Scotists and is proven by many reasons from Scotus in the cited places. Among these:

If one can be certain that something is a being without having certainty about its peculiar ratio (e.g., whether it is God, a creature, substance, or accident), then the ratio of being so conceived expresses a concept perfectly precise from its inferiors. The consequence is proven because a ratio expresses a perfectly precise concept when it is conceived without the conception of any peculiar reasons. Thus, the ratio of being can be so conceived; therefore, it expresses a perfectly precise concept.

The Thomists commonly respond that this argument well proves that there is a precise concept of being, but not that it is perfectly precise. For, they say, although the concept does not explicitly express the peculiar reasons, it at least includes them implicitly. That is, the concept of being is not absolutely distinct objectively from the concept of the peculiar reasons but is the same objective concept, only distinct in a qualified sense, according to greater or lesser expression.

This is the principal and common response of the Thomists, and the understanding of the whole question depends on its refutation.

Against this:

1. The adversaries admit that the ratio of animal, conceived without the peculiar reasons of its inferiors, expresses a concept perfectly precise from them. Yet the concept of animal, though not explicitly, at least implicitly includes its inferiors in an assignable way. Similarly, the ratio of being expresses a concept perfectly precise from its inferiors.

The minor is proven because if the ratio of being at least implicitly includes its inferiors, then although these are not expressed through that concept, they can be expressed through another concept of being. But just as the inferiors are not expressed through the precise concept of animal, they can be expressed through another concept of animal.

2. The implicit inclusion of inferiors in the concept of being must be understood either formally, according to the ratio of being as formally conceived, or materially, according to the ratio of being as materially identified with the reasons of the inferiors. But in no way does this oppose our conclusion.

The minor is proven because, according to the adversaries, animality is included in its inferiors in such a way that it is in no way distinguished from their peculiar reasons (e.g., rationality and irrationality) by the nature of the thing. Yet despite this inclusion or indistinction by nature, the precise concept of animal does not implicitly include the peculiar reasons, so as not to express a perfectly precise concept. Therefore, even if the ratio of being is so included in its inferiors that it is in no way distinguished by nature from their peculiar reasons (e.g., finiteness and infinity, perfection

and imperfection), the concept of being does not implicitly include the peculiar reasons, so as not to express a concept perfectly precise from its inferiors.

3. All admit that the concept of animal is perfectly precise from its inferiors because we can clearly and distinctly conceive the ratio of animal without clearly and distinctly conceiving its inferiors, even if these are conceived obscurely and confusedly. But according to the adversaries, we can clearly and distinctly conceive the ratio of being without clearly and distinctly conceiving its inferiors, even if these are conceived confusedly. Therefore, the concept of being should also be admitted as perfectly precise from its inferiors.

These objections are extensively pursued by our Master in *Metaphysics*, Disputation 2, questions 1 and 3.

4. No inclusion of inferiors can be understood in the concept of being. Therefore, there is no such inclusion, and consequently, the concept of being is perfectly precise from them.

The antecedent is proven because it cannot be understood that being signifies all its inferiors conjunctively (e.g., God and creatures, substance and accident), as some say. For then propositions like "God is a being" and "Creature is a being" would be false, as they would mean "God is God and creature" and "Creature is creature and God," which are more than false—indeed, absurd, as no one concedes.

Nor can it be understood that being signifies its inferiors disjunctively (e.g., God or creature, substance or accident). For if it signified inferiors in this way, it would not signify one common ratio but several peculiar and diverse reasons of the inferiors, which are not ratios of agreement but of disagreement. But the name "being" is not imposed to signify diverse reasons of disagreement but only one common ratio in which all inferiors agree, wholly excluding their peculiar reasons.

Moreover, propositions like "Substance is a being" and "Accident is a being" would be false, for they would mean "Substance is substance or accident" and "Accident is accident or substance," which is plainly false.

Nor can it be understood that being signifies some particular being (e.g., God immediately and creatures by attribution to God, or substance immediately and accident by attribution to substance). For then the proposition "Creature is a being" (speaking of that precise concept) would be false, as it would mean "Creature is God, to whom all things are attributed." For according to this explanation, "being" would signify that which is not to be said.

Therefore, it is in no way understood how the precise concept of being includes inferiors or their peculiar reasons. Consequently, it is a concept perfectly precise from its inferiors.

The responses to the arguments will make this clearer.

Objections Against Our Conclusion:

Some adversaries raise objections against our conclusion, which can be reduced to the following:

1. Nothing is perfectly abstracted from that which is of its essence. But the inferiors and their differences are of the essence of being. Therefore, being is not perfectly abstracted from its inferiors.

The minor is proven because being is not contracted to its inferiors by something added to it but is contracted to them through differences or intrinsic modes. Therefore, the differences are of the

essence of being.

The consequence is clear, for whatever is not of the essence of being is extrinsic and added to being. Therefore, if the differences are not extrinsic or added to being, they are of its essence.

Response: The minor is denied. Just as "man" is not the essence of "animal," nor is its difference (e.g., "rational"), so too God and creature, substance and accident, and their differences (e.g., finiteness and infinity, perfection and imperfection) are not of the essence of being.

The consequence is denied, for just as "animal" is perfectly abstracted from its inferiors and their differences, so too "being" is perfectly abstracted from its inferiors and their differences.

The proof of the minor is denied: Being is contracted through finiteness and infinity, perfection and imperfection, which are something superadded to the common concept of being.

2. That by which being is contracted is either a being or not a being. If it is a being, it is of the essence of being, and thus being is not contracted by something superadded to it. If it is not a being, then being is contracted by nothing, which is not to be said.

Response: That by which being is contracted is a being *really and identically* (i.e., really identified with being), but not *formally* (i.e., it is not formally a being in its formal concept). Similarly, that by which "animal" is contracted is "animal" really and identically (really identified with "animal") but not formally (i.e., it is not formally "animal" in its formal concept).

Thus, the first consequence is denied: That by which being is contracted is not of the essence of being, for it is not required that it be formally a being, only that it be really a being.

From this, it does not follow that that by which being is contracted is nothing, for between "nothing" and "formal being," there is a medium: "real being."

The understanding of this solution depends on what will be said below when we inquire whether being is included *in quid* in the ultimate differences, intrinsic modes, and proper passions.

3. A concept perfectly one and perfectly precise from its inferiors is univocal to them. But being is not univocal to its inferiors. Therefore, it does not express a concept perfectly one and perfectly precise from them.

This argument militates only against those who assert that being expresses a perfectly precise concept but is not univocal. It does not militate against us, who affirm the univocity of the concept of being.

4. If the concept of being were so precise from God and creatures, there would be something prior and simpler constitutive of God. For the ratio of being so abstracted would stand as contractible and potential, and the differential ratio would stand as contracting and actualizing.

Similarly, God and creature would not be primarily diverse, for they would agree in the ratio of being perfectly precise. Between contradictories (e.g., created and uncreated), there would be a medium: the ratio of being so perfectly precise. These and similar consequences are absurd; therefore, the ratio of being, perfectly one and perfectly precise from its inferiors, should not be admitted.

Response:

1. Distinguish: Something would be prior to God in being or in reality—deny; in concept or in the consequence of subsistence—concede. For this involves no inconsistency, as all admit the proposition "God is a being," but not the converse "A being is God."

2. Distinguish: Something would be prior to God in simplicity opposed to resolvable simplicity—concede; in simplicity opposed to composition—deny. Or in other terms: in conceptual simplicity—concede; in real simplicity—deny. For God is irresolvable into many concepts, but our imperfect concepts of God are resolvable.

These responses are valid according to the common consensus.

Further responses:

- Distinguish: Composition in God would arise from act and potency in realities—deny; in our imperfect concepts of God—concede. This involves no inconsistency, as will be clear from what is said in the whole disputation.
- God and creature would not be primarily diverse in reality—deny; in concept—concede. Or in other terms: not primarily diverse subjectively—deny; objectively—concede.

God and creature are not contradictories or extremes of contradiction but are entities existing under the extremes of contradiction (e.g., under dependence and non-dependence, caused and uncaused). Although there is no medium between the extremes of contradiction, there is a medium between those things that exist under them, since the extremes of contradiction do not belong to God and creature through a common ratio of being but through their peculiar reasons. The common ratio of being formally taken is neutral and indifferent to either extreme.

Authorities of Aristotle:

Some adversaries cite Aristotle's authorities against our conclusion, especially *Metaphysics* IV, chapter 2, where he says: "Being is said in many ways, not equivocally but with reference to one nature," and *Metaphysics* VII, chapter 16, where he teaches that being as such is immediately substance, quantity, and quality, and thus being does not express a concept perfectly precise from them.

Response to the First Passage:

As Scotus says in *Sentences* IV, distinction 12, question 1, the similarity need not hold in all respects. For what is similar in all respects is rather the same than an example. In examples, both similarity and dissimilarity are found.

But truly, just as in urine and medicine there is an order to animal in being called "healthy," so in accident there is an order to substance in participating the ratio of being, which only opposes perfect univocity (about which in Question 3). However, this difference exists: The ratio signified by the name "healthy" is found formally and actually only in the animal, while in urine and medicine it is found only by extrinsic denomination taken from the health of the animal. But the ratio signified by the name "being" is found formally and actually in substance and accident.

Response to the Second Passage:

Aristotle only intends that being does not await something essentially superadded to it to descend into the ten categories. For according to Aristotle and our mode of conceiving, it descends into the categories not through proper differences but through intrinsic modes, which, as we will say in their place, add no essential grade to the things of which they are modes.

Aristotle does not intend that being, by its precise concept, expresses or signifies all its inferiors, which in no way opposes the concept of being perfectly precise from its inferiors.

Others respond that Aristotle intends that being does not descend into the ten categories through something really distinct. He argues against those who say that being descends into the categories through something really distinct.

QUESTION II

Whether the Predicate Concept of Being Is Precise from God and Creatures Before the Operation of the Intellect, or Whether It Is Distinguished from Them by Nature

This controversy can only occur among the Scotists, who admit a formal distinction by nature between the higher and lower predicamental grades or between the higher grades and the differences by which they are contracted.

The sense of the question is: Just as "animal" is by nature precise and distinguished from its inferiors or from the differences by which it is contracted to them, so too is the ratio of being by nature precise or distinguished from God and creature.

Some Scotists hold the affirmative part, but the stronger Scotists (e.g., Lychetus on Scotus, *Sentences* I, distinction 2, question 1; distinction 3, questions 2–3; distinction 8, question 3; and others) defend the negative part, with whom we agree.

Conclusion: The concept of being does not by nature abstract or distinguish from God and creatures, for it is not founded on any common reality that is one in God and creature by indifference by nature.

This conclusion is proven by many authorities of Scotus in the cited places, where he openly teaches that God and creature are primarily diverse in reality, though not primarily diverse in concept.

For example, in *Sentences* I, distinction 8, question 3, he says: "God and creature are not primarily diverse in concepts but are primarily diverse in reality, for they agree in no reality."

Since Scotus says this with great and subtle foundation, let us proceed to the arguments.

Proof of the Conclusion:

1. If the concept of being signified a reality common by nature to God and creature, there would be in God a composition of act and potency or of contractible and contracting. But such composition cannot be admitted in God, for it opposes the supreme divine simplicity, which is pure act without any potentiality.

The major is clear because a reality common by nature to many is necessarily potential and contractible by nature, and thus with the contracting ratio by nature, it effects composition.

Some Scotists respond that the argument well proves that the concept of being does not signify a subjective reality that, with the contracting ratio, effects metaphysical composition, but it does not

prove that the concept of being does not signify an objective reality, which, they say, is perfectly compatible with divine simplicity without any composition by nature.

This response is invalid, for they never sufficiently explain what they mean by "objective reality." If it is understood as something common independent of the intellect's consideration, it is nothing other than subjective reality, which they do not admit. Such objective reality does not avoid composition by nature.

If it is understood as something not common before the operation of the intellect, then they say nothing against us, for this is what we assert when we say that the concept of being is perfectly precise through the intellect.

2. Others respond that the reality of being is not contracted through differences but through intrinsic modes, and thus there is no composition in God.

This is invalid because:

- What is primarily contractive of some common ratio or reality must be of the essence of the inferior or its essential constitutive. But intrinsic modes are not of the essence of God and creature, nor are they essential constitutives, for they are extrinsic to the essence of God and creature.

Scotus does not stand for those responding thus, for when he says that being is contracted to God and creature through finiteness and infinity (which are intrinsic modes), he does not speak of a contraction by nature of some reality but only of a contraction according to our mode of conceiving, which is a contraction not of reality but of a concept precisely through intrinsic modes.

3. If a common reality by nature, contractible either through differences or intrinsic modes, were admitted, composition would always follow in God.

The antecedent is proven because such a reality would not be of itself singular but common and indifferent. The intrinsic mode would be something superadded to it and somehow distinct from it by nature, contracting it to the being of the inferior (e.g., God).

But when some reality that is not of itself singular but common is contracted by something somewhat distinct from it by nature to the being of an inferior, it necessarily stands as potency, and the contracting as act. Act and potency by nature necessarily effect metaphysical composition.

Therefore, the aforementioned reality of being by nature, contractible even through intrinsic modes, cannot be admitted, for this mode of speaking does not avoid metaphysical composition in God, which must be utterly rejected.

Scotus, as is clear to one examining his text, does not avoid metaphysical composition in God by saying that some reality by nature is contracted not through differences but through intrinsic modes. Rather, he avoids it by denying that any reality by nature is contractible to God and creature, with which it is compatible that there is a common abstract and precise concept that, according to our mode of conceiving, is contracted through intrinsic modes.

For a fuller understanding of the contraction of being, our Master cites a beautiful explanation from Lychetus, which we transcribe here almost verbatim:

"Being does not import any common reality by nature precisely abstracted from God but the simplest concept immediately abstracted by the intellect from the particular reasons of God and creature

inadequately conceived. This concept is then referred back by the act of the intellect to its inferiors through the particular concepts of finite and infinite, which say 'what kind' or contract.

Thus, just as the concept of being is not prior by nature to God and creature (indeed, it is posterior, for it is abstracted from them already constituted in their being), so the contraction of being through finite and infinite is not a contraction from the prior to the posterior made by the intellect with a foundation in the thing.

The opposite occurs in predicamental predicates. For 'animal' is a reality by nature prior to man and brute, abstracting according to its adequate concept by nature and before the operation of the intellect from them or from rationality and irrationality, through which it is contracted. Thus, the contraction through these is a contraction from the prior and by nature, requiring no act of the intellect."

From this, it follows that in God, there is only a composition of reason or through our intellect inadequately conceiving, which in no way opposes divine simplicity in reality. Such composition only says an extrinsic denomination from the act of the intellect, imposing no imperfection in things but only in the intellect, which cannot grasp the eminent perfection of the object in one act and therefore first conceives it under one ratio, then under another, and finally composes the common and particular ratios.

In predicamental beings, since realities by nature are given according to their adequate concepts as contractible and contracting, composition is given, signifying imperfection on the part of the thing constituted.

Proof of the Second Conclusion:

If being signified a reality by nature precise and common to God and creature, there would be something by nature prior and independent of God. This is repugnant.

The consequence is clear because such reality would be constitutive of God as a part. But what is constitutive is prior and independent of the constituted, for the constituted depends on it, but it does not depend on the constituted.

Some Scotists respond that it is not inconsistent for there to be a reality prior to God in predication (i.e., something prior to God in reality and existence but not in subsistence).

This is invalid because although this response suffices to save the concept of being perfectly abstracted by the intellect from its inferiors, it does not suffice to save a reality by nature precise in the way that the reality of being, constitutive and perfectly precise by nature, precedes divinity.

Therefore, it precedes really and not only in predication or through the intellect. It precedes by real priority and not by priority of reason, which must in no way be admitted.

Moreover, if the reality of being by nature precise and distinct from its inferiors were admitted, the same must be said of it as is said of the reality of "animal" perfectly precise by nature and distinct from its inferiors.

But as is commonly held among Scotists, the reality of "animal" really and not through the intellect (or by real priority of nature and not priority of reason) precedes man, whom it constitutes together with the contracting difference. Therefore, such reality would precede God not only by priority of reason but by real priority of nature, which is in no way to be admitted.

Proof of the Third Conclusion:

The reality of being by nature precise would be either created or uncreated, participated or unparticipated. But each of these is inconsistent; therefore, no such reality of being by nature precise is to be admitted.

The minor is clear because such reality, according to the adversaries, is found by nature in God and creature. Therefore, it would be created and participated. But something created and participated would be really or by nature in God, which is absurd.

If it were uncreated and unparticipated, something uncreated and unparticipated would be really or by nature in creature, which is no less absurd.

Some Scotists respond that the aforementioned reality of being by nature is formally neither created nor uncreated, neither participated nor unparticipated but is indifferent to both. Really and identically, however, it is uncreated and unparticipated in God and created and participated in creature.

This is like what happens in any common realities that by nature abstract from their inferiors so that formally they do not express any peculiar ratio but really and identically express in man rationality and in brute irrationality.

But besides the fact that those responding thus do not easily assign the disparity by which "animal" is a genus respecting its inferiors and makes composition by nature with contracting reasons, while the reality of being is not a genus and does not make composition by nature with contracting reasons (which Scotus denies in many places), Scotus even uses an argument similar to ours in *Sentences* I, distinction 8, question 3, to prove that being is not a genus respecting God and creature.

Moreover, nothing exists in God by nature that is outside uncreated and unparticipated being, and nothing exists in creature by nature that is outside created and participated being. Therefore, no reality common by nature to God and creature is to be admitted.

The antecedent is proven because every reality found in God is intrinsically infinite, independent, and uncreated. Thus, as Scotus says in *Sentences* I, distinction 8, question 3, and distinction 2, question 6, every divine reality, in whatever abstraction, carries with it infinity, independence, etc.

Therefore, nothing exists in God by nature that is outside uncreated and unparticipated being.

Moreover, creature according to all its realities is intrinsically finite and has being participated and communicated by God. For according to all its formalities, both common and singular, it depends on God, so that no formality or reality of creature does not have being participated from God.

Therefore, no formality in creature is outside created and participated being. Thus, no reality by nature abstracting from created and uncreated, participated and unparticipated being can be assigned, and being does not signify a reality by nature common to God and creature.

Confirmation:

God, according to all his formalities and realities, is by nature and essentially singular, not through something superadded. Therefore, according to the reality of being found in him by nature, he is singular.

The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proven because if according to some reality God were not of himself singular but required something superadded by nature to determine him to singular being, there would be in God by nature a formality or reality contractible, determinable, or in potency, and a formality or reality contracting, determining, and actualizing, and consequently composition by nature.

Therefore, every reality found in God is essentially of itself singular and not through something superadded. But what is by nature singular cannot by nature signify a reality abstracting from singularity.

Therefore, no reality is given by nature in God that is still the reality of being, precise or distinct by nature from singularity or signifying something common.

Objection 1:

Whatever is presupposed to the act of the intellect signifies a reality precise by nature and independent of the intellect's consideration. But being, according to its proper concept, is presupposed to the act of the intellect. Therefore, it signifies a reality precise by nature and before the operation of the intellect.

The minor is proven because being, according to its concept, is the first and adequate object of the intellect. But the first and adequate object of the intellect necessarily has its being independent of the intellect's consideration.

Response:

The minor is denied. Being, according to its concept, is the first object of the intellect by primacy of origin—deny; by primacy of adequation—concede.

Similarly, the first object of the intellect has its being independent of the intellect's consideration—if it is first by primacy of origin, concede; if only by primacy of adequation, deny.

As we said in number 8 of this question, the concept of being is not prior by nature to God and creature, and similarly, the contraction of such a concept is not from the prior but from the posterior.

So now we say that being as such is not the first object of the intellect by primacy of origin or in being, for such a concept is not given by nature precise but only precise through the intellect.

Yet it is the first object by primacy of adequation because such a precise concept virtually contains all that is presupposed to the act of the intellect by primacy of origin or in being and can be attained by the

intellect as its proper objects.

Reply:

Being, according to its concept, is somehow the first and adequate object of our intellect. But the first and adequate object of our intellect must be real. Therefore, the concept of being must be real. But if such a concept did not signify a reality precise by nature, it would not be real, for it would depend on the act of the intellect. Therefore, it signifies a reality precise by nature and of itself common or indifferent to God and creatures.

Response:

The first syllogism is conceded; the minor is denied.

As for how the concept of being is called real, though it does not signify a reality precise by nature and common, this is variously explained by the Scotists.

For now, it is to be noted that "real being" can be taken in two ways:

1. As it signifies according to its proper concept a true entity by nature or outside the soul, and in this sense it is opposed to every being that has existence through the intellect or in the soul. In this sense, it is certain that the aforementioned concept of being is not a real being, for as often said, it signifies no reality precise by nature.
2. As it is opposed to fictive being, and in this sense it is opposed to a being of reason. In this sense, we say that the concept of being is something real, for the intellect, perceiving the common ratio of real being, does not simply feign something (which is required for a being of reason) but perceives the thing as it is, though inadequately due to its imperfection.

For the abstraction of abstractions is not a lie, especially since such abstraction has a foundation in the thing, as will be said below.

Objection 2:

The object of metaphysics would not be distinguished from the object of logic, so that metaphysics would be called a real science and logic a rational science.

The consequence is proven because, from what is said in logic, the object of logic is not a being of reason but a real intentional being. Similarly, from what is said, the real being that is the object of metaphysics is a real intentional being, since it is the concept of being, which signifies no reality by nature but one precise through the intellect.

Response:

The consequence is denied. For its proof, we say there is a maximal difference between the object of logic and metaphysics.

The object of logic is not the entity itself presented to the intellect but the extrinsic denomination arising from the act of the intellect, as sufficiently explained in logic.

This denomination is called real because it arises from a real form and intentional or rational because it arises from the act of the intellect, which is called rational power.

Thus, logic is called a rational science, for it reduplicates upon this extrinsic denomination, so that it treats of objects only as affected by such denomination.

But the object of metaphysics is the thing itself presented to the intellect, not caring about any denomination from the intellect nor treating of it, but treating of the real attributes that belong to being as expressed by such a concept and to its inferiors by nature.

For example, this syllogism:

"Every man is an animal; Peter is a man; therefore, Peter is an animal," pertains to the object of logic only as disposed by the intellect according to the rules of logic, which teaches.

Logic treats nothing of animal, man, and Peter as they are by nature.

But the concept "real being" is the object of metaphysics, not as signifying the ratio of precision extrinsically denominating, so that metaphysics would treat of precision itself, but as signifying the being itself represented, treating of it and all its real inferiors and attributing real attributes to them.

Objection 3:

It is impossible for many things to agree and differ simultaneously according to one and the same ratio, for similarity and agreement are founded on unity, and distinction and diversity on multitude.

But God and creature really agree in the ratio of being and really differ in their proper reasons. Therefore, the ratio of being by nature abstracts from the proper reasons of God and creature.

Response:

With our Master, distinguish the major: It is impossible for many things to agree and differ simultaneously according to the same ratio actually and formally—concede; fundamentally and aptitudinally—deny.

Similarly, distinguish the minor: God and creature really agree in the ratio of being and really differ in their proper reasons, both actually and formally—deny; they differ actually and formally in their proper reasons and agree fundamentally and potentially in the ratio of being—concede.

This seems to be what the Scotists must hold.

For in reality and by nature, there is no actual agreement between God and creature. As Scotus often holds, God and creature are primarily diverse in reality, agreeing in no reality by nature.

But since, as Scotus also often holds, diversity in reality best comports with agreement in concept (for things can be subjectively diverse and objectively agreeing), we say that although God and creature are primarily diverse in reality, they are agreeing in the objective concept of being.

But because such a concept of being has a foundation in the thing (i.e., that both God and creature are apt to cause that concept common to them in the ratio of being in the intellect inadequately conceiving), we say that God and creature agree really, not actually but fundamentally, in the ratio of being.

There is no contradiction that things according to the same ratio differ actually and formally and agree only fundamentally, virtually, or potentially, just as there is no contradiction that the sun, according to the same form, is virtually hot and not formally hot.

Against This Response:

Some Scotists object that this seems to destroy Scotus's foundation for positing common natures that by nature abstract from peculiar reasons and to which formal unity by nature belongs.

They prove this because the same agreement found between man and brute in the ratio of "animal" is found between God and creature in the ratio of "being."

But this agreement in the ratio of being is saved without the ratio of being signifying a reality by nature precise from the peculiar reasons of God and creature, to which formal unity by nature corresponds.

Similarly, that agreement can be saved without the ratio of "animal" signifying a reality by nature precise from the peculiar reasons of man and brute, to which formal unity by nature corresponds.

Response:

The assumption and major are denied, for the agreement between God and creature in the ratio of "being" is not the same as that between man and brute in the ratio of "animal."

The latter is an agreement in some reality by nature precise or in the inadequate concept of that reality. The former is only an agreement in the imperfect concept of reality, not in any reality by nature precise or in the perfect concept of some reality.

For "animal" signifies a reality by nature precise from the peculiar reasons of man and brute, but "being" does not signify a reality by nature precise from the peculiar reasons of God and creature, as often repeated.

The reason why "animal" and other predicamental natures signify realities by nature precise from the peculiar reasons of their inferiors, while "being," common to God and creature, does not signify such a reality by nature precise from their peculiar reasons, is taken from the fact that species and individuals are not primarily diverse but agree in something real.

But God and creature are primarily diverse, as Scotus often says, which primary diversity cannot stand with agreement in some reality by nature, though it can well stand with agreement in a common concept taken from the realities of God and creature imperfectly conceived.

Moreover, it is taken from the arguments for our conclusion above, for no reality by nature is found in God that does not determinately require (so to speak) being from itself independent, infinite,

unparticipated, and to which, from its own ratio by nature, being from another, participated, finite, and dependent is not repugnant.

Similarly, no reality by nature is found in creature that does not determinately require being from another, dependent, finite, and participated. Otherwise, something created by nature would be given that from itself is not dependent on and participated from God, which is utterly repugnant to right reason.

But in creature (e.g., in man), there is by nature some reality (e.g., animality) that does not determinately require being of man or to which, from its own proper ratio by nature, being of brute is not repugnant.

Thus, no reality of God can be perfectly conceived without being conceived as determinately requiring being uncreated, infinite, etc., nor can any reality of creature be perfectly conceived without being conceived as determinately requiring being created, finite, dependent, etc.

But some reality of man can be perfectly conceived without being conceived as determinately requiring being of man.

Therefore, the reality of being in God does not by nature abstract from created and uncreated being, nor similarly in creature, but only in a concept abstracted by the intellect imperfectly knowing the reality of God and creature.

But the reality of "animal" in man and similarly in brute by nature abstracts from being of man and brute.

This doctrine is expressly founded in Scotus in many places, where he affirmatively holds that God and creature agree in no reality, though it may seem insufficient to some for reconciling the authorities of the Subtle Doctor.

From what is said in this question, it is inferred, as our Master often cites from Bargius, that in the intellect perfectly conceiving (especially in the divine intellect), there is no common concept of being for God and creatures.

For the intellect perfectly conceiving conceives realities as they are by nature and with all the exigency (so to speak) they determinately require.

The aforementioned authors add that God knows the common concept of being for God and creatures as it is in our intellect imperfectly conceiving, even if no created intellect were actually given but only possibly.

Then God would know the common concept of being not as actual but as possible. If a created intellect were repugnant and no creature were given, God would not know such a common concept of being even as possible, yet from the part of the object, there would be a foundation in God and creatures for abstracting such a concept if a created intellect were possible.

If, finally, all creatures were utterly repugnant, God would in no way know the common concept of being, neither formally in himself nor fundamentally from the part of the object.

QUESTION III

Whether the Concept of Being Is Univocal to God and Creature, Substance and Accident

For the understanding of this question, it is necessary to recall what is commonly said about univocals, equivocals, and analogs, especially the grades of univocation:

1. That is called univocal in the first and most perfect grade which agrees according to the same name, and the ratio signified by it is the same in all with equal perfection, the same mode of being, and the same essential order. In this grade, the lowest species are called univocal to their individuals, for the same ratio signified by the name "man" is found in all individuals with equal perfection, since individual differences add no grade to specific natures and with the same mode of being (for no individual in being such depends on another).

With the same essential order: The specific nature of man does not descend to one individual before another, though one individual may be prior to another in time, not in participating the specific nature (e.g., humanity).

2. That is called univocal in the second, less perfect grade which agrees according to the same name, and the ratio signified is the same in all with the same mode of being and essential order but not with the same perfection. In this grade, genera are called univocal to their species.

For example, "animal" agrees according to the same name and signified ratio to man and horse, and the animality of the horse does not depend on the animality of man, nor is it prior in one than in the other.

Yet it is in man with greater perfection than in the horse, due to the more perfect difference (e.g., the rationality of man, which is more perfect than the whinnying of the horse).

3. That is called univocal in the third, less perfect grade which agrees according to the same name, and the ratio signified is the same in all with the same mode of being but not with the same essential order or perfection.

In this sense, number is commonly said to be univocal to its species, for the common ratio of number agrees to all numbers, and one number does not depend on another in the being of number.

Yet formally, it is prior in the binary than in the ternary, and more perfect in one species than in another by reason of the differences, for the differences and species, as commonly held, are not of the same perfection.

4. That is called univocal in the fourth and most imperfect grade which agrees according to the same name, and the ratio signified is the same in all but not with the same mode of being, essential order, or perfection.

In this sense, the Scotists, with Scotus, assert the univocity of the concept of being respecting God and creature.

For "being" is the same according to name and signified ratio in God and creature, yet in God the ratio of being is independent, and in creature it is dependent on God.

In God, it is prior to creature, and in God it is with infinite perfection, while in creature it is with limited and finite perfection.

The same is commonly said by the Scotists of being respecting substance and accident.

Three Opinions on This Difficulty:

1. Being is purely equivocal to God and creature, substance and accident. Thomas mentions this opinion in *De Potentia*, question 7, article 7, but it is commonly rejected by all.

For only that is purely equivocal which agrees to many according to the same name, while the ratio signified by the name is wholly diverse, without any dependence or attribution of one to another.

But being respecting God and creature, substance and accident, is not so, as is manifest. For in creature, being depends on God and is attributed to God, with whom it has some similarity.

Similarly, being in accident is ordered to substance and is similar to it. Therefore, being is not purely equivocal to God and creature, substance and accident.

2. Being is analogical and in no way univocal to God and creature, substance and accident.

Thus hold the Thomists with their Angelic Doctor.

3. The concept of being, as explained in the preceding questions, is univocal to God and creature, substance and accident.

Thus hold all Scotists with Scotus in the cited places. For this, we establish the following conclusions.

Conclusion 1: The concept of being is univocal in the fourth grade of univocation to God and creature, substance and accident.

The Scotists prove this conclusion with many reasons from Scotus in the cited places, which, if well inspected, prove not only the perfect precision of the concept of being but also its univocity.

To avoid prolixity, we will not repeat these but prove the conclusion with this single argument:

That is called univocal which agrees to many according to the same name and the ratio immediately signified by it. But the concept of being agrees to God and creature, substance and accident according to the name "being" and the ratio immediately signified by it.

Therefore, the concept of being is univocal to God and creature, substance and accident.

The minor is proven from what was said in Question 1, Conclusion 3, where we showed the perfect precision of the concept of being from its inferiors, which would not be given unless being signified something immediately signifying a common ratio to them.

This ratio immediately signified by the name "being" is the capacity for real existence independent of the intellect's consideration. But God, creature, substance, and accident really exist independent of the intellect's consideration.

Response:

Some distinguish the major: If such a ratio does not transcend the differences through which it is determined to inferiors, it is true; if it transcends, it is false.

For the ratio signified by the name "being," they say, transcends all differences, for all are and are said to be formally beings.

This response stands on this: For univocation, it is required that the univocal name signify a ratio simply one. But the ratio signified by the name "being" is not simply one, for through itself it is multiplex and not through something superadded, since the differences that are superadded are also formally beings and thus signified by the name "being."

This argument or response not only shows that being is not univocal to God and creatures, substance and accident, but also that being does not express a concept perfectly precise from them.

Yet it shows neither, for it is founded on what is in no way admitted by Scotus and the Scotists, namely, that being transcends all differences (about which in the following question).

Others respond that the major is true when the ratio signified by the name agrees to many with equal perfection, the same mode of being, and the same essential order, which is not the case with being and creature, substance and accident.

For it is in God with greater perfection than in creature, with a diverse mode of being (in God, it is independent; in creature, dependent), and with a diverse essential order (it is prior in God than in creature).

The same must be said of substance compared to accident.

This response rather intends to show that nothing is univocal except the species of individuals, as is clear from the explanation of the grades of univocation, which no one denies.

Moreover, it says nothing against our conclusion, for though it evidently shows that being is univocal in some grade, it does not show that being is not univocal in the fourth and most imperfect grade, in which our conclusion proceeds.

For to this grade, it suffices that the ratio signified by the name is the same in many, though it has diverse perfection, essential order, and mode of being in inferiors.

To prevent the question from being reduced to a question about the name, Scotus in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, question 2, says: "Lest there be contention about the name, I call univocal that which is so one that its unity suffices for contradiction, affirming and denying it of the same, and suffices for a syllogistic middle, so that from the extrinsic unity in the middle as one without the fallacy of equivocation, the extremes may be concluded as one."

Thus, it is certain that being is univocal because the ratio immediately signified by it is one. For these propositions are contradictory: "Being is one, true, good" and "Being is not one, true, good."

Similarly, in this syllogism, the unity of the extremes is well concluded:

"Every being is one, true, good; every stone is a being; therefore, every stone is one, true, good."

And similarly in this:

"Every being is true, one, good; God is a being; therefore, God is one, true, good."

Objections from Aristotle's Authorities:

The adversaries raise objections from Aristotle's authorities against our conclusion, which can be seen in our Master's *Metaphysics*.

For Aristotle only intends that being is not perfectly univocal but somewhat analogical, which we freely admit, since we attribute only the most imperfect univocation to being, which comports with some analogy, as will be clear from what is said below.

They also raise some arguments intending to prove that being is not univocal to God and creatures because it transcends all differences and would be a genus (which is not admitted).

We omit these here because we will dispute the transcendence and generic unity in the following questions.

Now, we propose other arguments.

Objection 1:

When an effect does not equal the virtue of its cause, the name common to them cannot be univocal. But creature is an effect of God and does not equal God's virtue. Therefore, the name "being," common to them, cannot be univocal.

The major is proven because when the effect does not equal the virtue of its cause, it does not receive its likeness according to the same ratio. But likeness according to the same ratio is required for univocation.

Response:

Distinguish the major: If the effect equals the virtue of its cause according to no ratio—concede; if not according to peculiar reasons but according to some common ratio signified by that name—deny.

Similarly, distinguish the minor: Creature does not equal God's virtue according to peculiar reasons—concede; according to the common ratio signified by the name "being"—deny.

Thus, the consequence is denied.

For creature equals God in the ratio signified by the name "being," if it is precisely considered, which suffices for imperfect univocation.

Especially since neither such equality nor univocation is by nature or in some reality but only in a precise concept, as often said.

Or in other terms: There is no physical and real agreement or equality independent of our intellect's consideration, and thus it constitutes no imperfection in God.

The same happens in the sun producing metals, which do not equal its virtue according to all the sun's peculiar reasons yet agree univocally with the sun in the ratio of substance and body.

Objection 2:

What is said of one inferior simply and of another in a qualified sense is not univocal to them. But being is said simply of God (as in Exodus 3: "I am who am") and of creature only in a qualified sense (as in Isaiah 40: "All nations are as if they were not before him").

Similarly, being is said simply of created substance and in a qualified sense of accident, as deduced from many places in Aristotle. Therefore, being is not said univocally of God and creature, substance and accident.

Response:

Distinguish the major: If "simply" means being in one formally and "in a qualified sense" not being in another formally—concede; if "simply" means being in one more perfectly and "in a qualified sense" being in another less perfectly—deny.

Similarly, distinguish the minor: It is true in the second sense, which is what sacred Scripture and Aristotle intend. It is false in the first sense.

Thus, the consequence is denied.

Other arguments only prove that the univocation of being is not perfect, which we freely admit, as is clear from the above.

For greater clarity, we add the following conclusion:

Conclusion 2: The univocation of being respecting God and creature, substance and accident, well comports with some analogy. That is, being is not purely univocal but univocally analogical to God and creature, substance and accident.

This conclusion is expressly held by our Master in *Metaphysics*, Disputation 2, question 5, and by Meron in *Logic*, Disputation on Predicables, who cite Scotus in *Sentences* II, distinction 12, question 1, and IV, distinction 12, question 1.

They also show this by many authorities of Aristotle usually adduced against the preceding conclusion.

Proof by Reason:

As we said in logic, speaking of analogy, that is called analogical by inequality which agrees to many

according to a ratio simply the same and in a qualified sense diverse by reason of unequal perfection of differences.

But being agrees to God and creatures according to the same ratio simply (as is clear from the above) and diversely in a qualified sense, for it is more perfect in God than in creature and more perfect in substance than in accident, as is manifest.

Therefore, being must be called analogical by inequality respecting God and creature, substance and accident.

Doubt:

Whether being can also be called analogical by attribution and proportionality, and it seems not.

For from what is said in logic, for any analogy, it is necessary that the ratio signified by the name properly belong to one of the analogs and improperly to the others.

For example, the name "healthy" is called analogical by attribution because it properly belongs to the animal and improperly to urine and medicine by attribution to the animal.

Similarly, the name "laughter" is called analogical by proportionality or proportion, for it properly belongs to man and metaphorically to the meadow, having this proportion: As man is to his laughter, so the meadow is to its flourishing, and each laughter has some metaphorical likeness.

But the ratio signified by the name "being" is found truly, really, and properly in God and creature, substance and accident. Therefore, none of the aforementioned analogies can belong to it respecting them.

Response:

To avoid contention about the name, it seems to be said that by extending the name "analogy of attribution" and "proportionality," so that analogy of attribution not only says that the ratio signified by the name belongs to one properly and to another improperly with attribution and order of one to another, but also says that the aforementioned ratio properly belongs to all with attribution or order of one to another.

Similarly, analogy of proportionality not only says that the ratio signified by the name belongs to one properly and to another improperly with metaphorical likeness between them, but also says that the ratio properly belongs to all with some likeness between them.

Thus, being can be called analogical by attribution and proportionality, as our Master and Meron hold.

Yet no analogy so taken opposes univocation, at least imperfect, for which it is only required that the ratio signified by the name be the same in all properly and formally, however it belongs to them.

On Analogy of Attribution:

It is clear because God is being by essence, cause, and end of creature; creature is being by participation, effect of God, ordered to him as to an end.

Substance is being per se; accident is being of something (i.e., of substance), for which it is called "being of a being," for it is either a disposition, instrument, or quasi-affection of substance.

Thus, creature is being by attribution to God, and accident is being by attribution to substance. Consequently, etc.

In this way, the authorities of Aristotle and Scotus must be understood when they say that being is said of inferiors with reference to one.

On Analogy of Proportionality:

It is also clear, for as being is in God, so it is in creature, and as in substance, so in accident. For in each of these, it is found intrinsically and essentially.

This analogy is rather improperly called analogy, for it stands with any equivocation, even the most perfect.

All these seem to have no controversy unless the question is reduced to a question about the name.

QUESTION IV

Whether Being Is Included Formally and Quidditatively in the Ultimate Differences

For the understanding of this question, which is very prolix and no less confusedly proposed by some Scotists, it is to be noted:

1. "Being," as it sounds, can be divided into "being which" (*ens quid*) and "being of a kind" (*ens quale*).
 - "Being which" is that which stands as contractible, potential, and determinable, and is predicated per se.
 - "Being of a kind" is that which stands as actualizing, contracting, and determining, and is predicated as adjacent to another.

This division has its foundation in Scotus when in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, question 3, he calls the ultimate differences and passions of being "qualitative concepts," though some Scotists refuse to admit the name "being of a kind," reducing the matter to a question about the name.

2. This division of being can be taken in two ways:
 - In the thing or in realities, as in animality and rationality. For animality is a perfect potential reality, contractible and determinable, and rationality is a perfect actualizing, contracting, and determining reality.
 - In imperfect concepts, as in the common ratio of being and the intrinsic mode. For as is clear from the preceding questions, the common ratio of being conceived by us stands as potential, contractible, and determinable, and the intrinsic mode stands as actualizing, contracting, and determining.

3. In other terms, this division is explained as "complete being" and "incomplete being," understanding for complete being "being which" and for incomplete "being of a kind."

This division can be taken:

- For complete and incomplete objectively, which coincides with the division by concepts.
- For complete and incomplete subjectively, which coincides with the division by realities.

For the object respects the concept, and the subject respects the thing.

4. It is to be noted that metaphysical resolution does not stop in the resolution of realities but proceeds further to more ample or ulterior resolution.

Thus, Scotus holds in many places, and with him all Scotists, that although something is altogether simple in reality so that it cannot be resolved into many realities, it can yet be resolved by our intellect imperfectly conceiving the reality into many inadequate concepts.

Hence, it well stands that some things in reality do not agree or are primarily diverse in reality, yet agree in some concept abstracted from the realities imperfectly conceived or are not primarily diverse in concept.

As is clear from what was said in the preceding questions about the common concept of being for God and creatures, though they are primarily diverse in reality, they are not so in an imperfect concept of the aforementioned reality.

For further clarity, this can be exemplified: Humanity, for example, according to the thing and reality, is resolved into animality and rationality, which are realities by nature mutually excluding.

For the genus excludes the difference perfectly from its formal concept, as we said in logic in its place.

But the metaphysician does not stop in this resolution, for animality is further resolved in reality into the generic ratio of living and the differential ratio of sensing as realities also mutually excluding.

Further, the ratio of living is resolved by nature into the generic ratio of substance and the differential ratio of body, similarly excluding.

In this resolution, the resolution according to perfect realities stops.

But the metaphysician proceeds further, resolving every perfect reality into inadequate concepts.

For he resolves substance into the most common concept of being and the concept of "per se-ness" (*per seitas*), from which the concept of being is called a concept *in quid* and the concept of "per se-ness" a concept *in quale*.

Not because by nature the concept of being is something potential and contractible and the concept of "per se-ness" something actualizing and contracting, but because according to our imperfect mode of conceiving, it is so taken, as often repeated in the preceding questions.

Similarly, the metaphysician resolves the reality of corporeity into the concept of being (which is a concept *in quid*) and the concept of "per se-ness" (which is a concept *in quale*).

Yet there is this difference between the concept of "per se-ness" by which being is determined to the formality of substance and the concept of "per se-ness" by which being is determined to the formality of corporeity:

Although both concepts are called *in quale* because both are contractive of being, the "per se-ness" by which being is determined to substance is called "per se-ness in quid" because it constitutes

substance, which is a formality *in quid*, contractible and determinable.

The "per se-ness" by which being is determined to corporeity is called "per se-ness in quale" because it constitutes corporeity, which is a formality *in quale*, contracting and determining.

Similarly, any other difference from the above (e.g., the ratio of sensing or sensibility and the ratio of reasoning or rationality) can be resolved by the metaphysician into the concept of being (which is a concept *in quid*) and the concept proportional to "per se-ness" *in quale* corresponding to it.

Thus, we can conceive rationality as distinguished from irrationality in a concept.

5. It is to be noted that every difference expressing a perfect reality can be compared:

- To that which it immediately contracts (e.g., rationality to animality).
- To the inadequate concept of being in common.

6. It is to be noted that something can be called first or last in two ways:

- By the order of composition.
- By the order of resolution.

For what is first in the order of composition is last in the order of resolution, and what is first in the order of resolution is last in the order of composition.

For example, according to the Scotists, in living things, the first act in the order of physical composition is the substantial form of corporeity, constituting the body together with prime matter.

The last act in the order of composition is the soul, which together with the body constitutes the living thing.

In the order of physical resolution, the first act is the soul, and the form of corporeity is the last.

Similarly, in metaphysical composition, the last act is haecceity or the individual difference, and the first act is the imperfect concept *in quale* mentioned above.

In the order of resolution, haecceity or the individual difference is first, and the imperfect concept is last.

7. It is to be noted that all differences expressing perfect realities (e.g., corporeity, sensibility, rationality) and even the ultimate differences in the order of constitution are haecceities that do not formally include "being which" (expressing a perfect reality) or what they immediately contract.

For example, rationality does not formally include animality, nor does the "per se-ness" of humanity.

In this, all commonly agree, because those that stand as act and potency, contracting and contractible, formally exclude each other and in Scotus's opinion are formally distinct by nature if they stand as act and potency by nature.

It is certain that animality and humanity stand as potency, and rationality and haecceity or individual difference stand as act.

In this, there is no controversy except what was touched on in logic about the formal distinction by nature.

The difficulty is whether the concept of being in common is formally and quidditatively included in the ultimate differences.

Two Opposing Opinions on This Difficulty:

1. One affirms that being is formally and quidditatively included in the ultimate differences. This opinion is defended by all Thomists.
2. The other denies that being is formally and quidditatively included in the ultimate differences. This opinion is held by all Scotists with Scotus.

For no Scotist does not confess that this is the greatest difficulty in Scotus's way. Therefore, in explaining what Scotus means by "ultimate difference," they speak variously.

But what seems to be held in such a great difficulty, with all possible clarity in so immense a difficulty, we will propose according to our understanding.

Conclusion 1: The ultimate differences in the order of constitution formally and quidditatively include the imperfect concept of "being which."

This conclusion seems to be Scotus's in some places explained by our Lychetus, especially in *Sentences* I, distinction 26, question 1, where he asserts a very subtle doctrine largely for our conclusion.

But since this conclusion proceeds not against outsiders but against some of our own according to Scotus's principles, we now intend to show this.

Scotus, in the cited place, responding to an argument intending to prove that nothing can be abstracted from the ultimate constitutive and distinctive differences distinct *in quid* from them (for the argument speaks of the divine personalities, which are the ultimate constitutive and distinctive differences of the divine persons, just as "Peter-ness" and "Paul-ness" are of Peter and Paul), has these words:

"I say that although some common concept can be had that is said *in quid* of divine generation and spiration (indeed, perhaps of divine paternity), yet no reality can be in the divine somehow distinct by nature from which this concept said *in quid* is taken, as if that reality were determinable by another reality, just as the common concept is determinable in the intellect by another concept."

And he proceeds:

"I say, therefore, that paternity and filiation are not two primarily diverse as to the intellect, so that the intellect cannot abstract from them some real common concept, but they are primarily diverse as to reality, so that they include no one grade of reality that is as it were potential to others and determinable by proper or quasi-proper differences, as whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same ratio determinable by their proper specific differences, from which their specific differences are taken."

"And then that major proposition—'What are primarily distinctive are primarily diverse only'—must be understood of the realities themselves that primarily constitute as to non-agreement in some one formal reality that both formally include."

From these words, our conclusion is easily deduced. For according to them, it well stands that the ultimate constitutive and distinctive differences are primarily diverse in reality in that they do not express

a reality in which they agree and a reality by which they differ, yet they agree in the intellect in some imperfect concept of that reality.

Nor is there any reason why such a concept should be denied to be the common ratio of being.

Therefore, explaining Scotus, Lychetus says:

"I say thirdly that when the Doctor says that from the ultimate differences a concept said *in quid* cannot be abstracted, he does not understand this absolutely, namely, that a common concept said *in quid* cannot be abstracted, which yet is not potential in reality to the contractive concept. For the Doctor says that these are called primarily diverse, i.e., not including the same reality, namely, that in reality before all abstraction there is something real in which they truly agree and something in which they truly differ."

"But the ultimate constitutive differences or ultimate differences so stand among themselves that they have nothing real in which they agree and something in which they differ, which reality in which they agree is in potency perfectible by that in which they differ."

And Lychetus proceeds, saying that the concept of being is said *in quid* of the ultimate differences, and otherwise Scotus does not seem to be understood.

Thus, it is clear that our conclusion is in the mind of the Subtle Doctor.

Nor does it oppose what we said in the treatise on universals, Disputation 7, question 2, about the individual. Indeed, if well weighed, it wholly coheres with what is said here.

Conclusion 2: The ultimate differences in the order of resolution do not formally and quidditatively include the concept of "being which," or the concept of being is not predicated *in quid* of the ultimate differences in the order of resolution.

This conclusion, speaking indifferently of the ultimate differences, is held by the Scotists with Scotus in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, question 3, where he says:

"I say that being is not univocally said *in quid* of all per se intelligibles, because not of the ultimate differences nor of the proper passions of being."

That Scotus must be understood in the sense of this conclusion is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion.

For since the ultimate differences are only in the order of constitution or resolution, and the preceding conclusion is understood of the ultimate differences in the order of constitution, this conclusion must necessarily be understood of the ultimate differences in the order of resolution.

Proof of the First Conclusion by Scotus's Reasoning:

If the ultimate differences included essentially and quidditatively the ratio of "being which" or potential,

they would necessarily agree in that ratio of being. Therefore, to differ among themselves, they would need other differences.

For whatever agrees in something potential and common to them differs by some differences, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics V* and *X*.

Then, of those differences by which they differ, we would ask whether they formally include the ratio of "being which" or not.

If not, this is what we assert, namely, that "being which" is not included in the ultimate differences.

If they do, then they also differ by other differences, and of these, the same would be asked, and there would be an infinite process.

Therefore, to avoid infinity, it must be said that "being which" is not included essentially and quidditatively in the ultimate differences; otherwise, there would be no ultimate differences.

Proof of the Second Conclusion by Scotus's Reasoning:

As physical resolution stands in physical entities, so metaphysical resolution stands in metaphysical concepts.

But in physical resolution, there is no progress to infinity, but it stops at two simply simple entities, one of which is so potential that it includes no physical act or formal act, and the other so actual that it includes no physical potentiality or subjectivity.

Therefore, in the physical line, they are called primarily diverse.

Similarly, in metaphysical resolution, it must stop at some concepts so primarily diverse that one is wholly potential and contractible, including no actuality of contraction, and the other wholly actualizing and contracting, including no potentiality or contractibility.

But if the ultimate differences formally included "being which" or contractible, there would be no arrival in metaphysical resolution at some concept purely determinative and contracting.

Nor does it seem how ultimate differences could be given. Therefore, it must be said that the ultimate differences do not formally and quidditatively include "being which."

From this argument, which Scotus adduces in *Sentences I*, distinction 3, it is clearly gathered that when he says being is not included essentially and quidditatively in the ultimate differences, he speaks of the ultimate differences in the order of resolution.

For he adduces a parity of physical resolution to metaphysical and says:

"That concept only determinable is the concept of being, and the only determining is the concept of the ultimate difference."

From which it is also deduced that every difference expressing a perfect reality by nature (e.g., rationality, sensibility) formally includes "being which," for every such is resolvable into imperfect concepts standing as contractible and contracting.

For example, rationality is resolved into the concept of "being which" or contractible and into the imperfect concept of rationality itself standing as "of a kind" or contracting.

Not because there is by nature a reality of being contractible and another of rationality contracting being, but because it is so conceived by us due to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

Just as we said being expresses a concept contractible and common to God and creatures, and the intrinsic modes express a concept per modum *quale* or contracting, not in reality but according to our mode of conceiving.

Further Explanation:

This axiom is quite common in Scotus's way: "Every difference of differents must be reduced to some primarily diverse."

This primary diversity can stand in two ways, as is also received in Scotus's way and is clear from the above:

1. By real matters.
2. By concepts.

For God and creature are differents (so to speak) so that they agree in no reality, for which they are called primarily diverse in reality.

But because God and creature are not irresolvable but are resolvable into many inadequate concepts respecting the intellect imperfectly conceiving, they agree in the concept of "being which," essentially and quidditatively said of them, and thus are not primarily diverse in concept.

Yet they still differ in concept through the intrinsic modes of finiteness and infinity.

Since the intrinsic modes are simply simple (i.e., further irresolvable into many concepts) and otherwise express concepts of differing and not agreeing, these intrinsic modes are called primarily diverse in concept or agreeing in no common concept.

Now, to the purpose:

Man and horse, for example, are in no way called primarily diverse, for they agree in many concepts and realities and in the concept of being, in the reality of substance, body, living, and animal.

Yet because they differ among themselves, their difference must be reduced to some primarily diverse or agreeing in nothing.

For example, it is reduced to rationality and irrationality, which are perfect and simple realities and thus among themselves irresolvable into many realities in which they agree and differ.

For which they are primarily diverse in reality, and thus the difference of man and horse is reduced to some primarily diverse in reality.

But because the aforementioned differences are not simply simple as to concept but are still resolvable into many concepts (e.g., into the imperfect concept of "being which," in which they agree, and into their peculiar concepts, in which they differ), to these peculiar reasons the ultimate difference of man and brute is reduced as to primarily diverse in concept.

For now, those peculiar reasons are irresolvable into many concepts and thus agree in no concept.

The same can be exemplified in any difference, whether specific or individual.

From which it is gathered that by "ultimate differences" not including "being which" essentially and quidditatively, only the intrinsic modes or those peculiar reasons of differences can be understood.

For only the intrinsic modes and those peculiar reasons, since they cannot be resolved into many concepts and are still in concept reasons of differing, agree in no concept and cannot include the ratio of "being which," which is a ratio of agreeing quidditatively and essentially.

Objections Against Our Conclusion:

The adversaries raise objections against our conclusion, which are almost of the same kind, so we will propose only some.

Objection 1: The concept of the ultimate difference is something existing in the nature of things or at least in a true and real concept. Therefore, it is being formally and quidditatively.

The consequence is proven because between being and nothing, there is no medium. The ultimate differences are not nothing but something.

Response: The antecedent is conceded; the consequence is denied.

Distinguish the proof: Between being really or formally and nothing, there is no medium—concede; between being formally precise and nothing, there is no medium—deny.

For we do not deny that the concept of the ultimate difference is being, but only deny that from its formal and precise concept it is being quidditatively.

Otherwise, it would be something contractible or would include in its precise concept something contractible, etc.

And since it is a ratio of differing, it would also include something contracting, and thus there would be an infinite process, as was said in our arguments.

This seems in no way to be conceded.

Reply: The ultimate difference from its formal concept is either something or nothing. But it is not nothing; therefore, it is something, and consequently, from its formal concept, it is being.

Response: The major is denied, for from its formal concept, it is neither something nor nothing, nor are these, with reduplication, contradictory.

Just as these are not contradictory: "Man from his formal concept is white or is not white," they would be if absolutely spoken: "Man is white or is not white."

For it stands well that the ultimate difference from its formal concept is neither something nor nothing, since this comports with its being really and identically.

Just as it stands well that man from his formal concept is neither white nor not white, since this comports with his being absolutely white.

Further Explanation:

This is clearer by this example in Scotus's way: These are not contradictory: "Human nature from its formal concept is singular or is not singular," because in its formal concept, it neither includes singularity nor includes something opposed to singularity.

Otherwise, singularity would be repugnant to it.

But these would be contradictory: "Human nature from its formal concept is singular or is not singular," because here the copula is affirmed and denied, not the first way.

Hence, one of these must necessarily belong to human nature with any reduplication.

For the negative proposition is true, namely, that human nature from its formal concept is not singular.

For this is not to deny absolutely that human nature is not singular but only to deny that the singularity that human nature absolutely has does not belong to it from its formal ratio or is not included in the formal ratio of it.

Similarly, these are not contradictory: "The ultimate difference from its formal concept is being or is not being," because in its formal concept, it neither includes being nor includes something opposed to being.

Otherwise, the ratio of being would be repugnant to it.

But these would be contradictory: "The ultimate difference from its formal concept is being or is not being," because here the copula is affirmed and denied, not the first way.

Hence, one of these must necessarily belong to the ultimate difference with any reduplication.

For the negative proposition is true, namely, that the ultimate difference from its formal concept is not being.

For this is not to deny absolutely that the ultimate difference is not being but only to deny that the ratio of being that the ultimate difference absolutely has does not belong to it from its formal ratio or is not included in the formal ratio of it.

Objection 2: The ultimate difference from its formal concept is possible. But nothing is possible unless it is being. Therefore, the ultimate difference from its formal concept is being.

This argument coincides with the preceding, so it is similarly responded to by denying the major.

For the ultimate difference from its formal concept is neither possible nor impossible, with which it comports that the ultimate difference is absolutely possible.

Thus, distinguish the minor: Nothing is possible unless it is being quidditatively or from its formal concept—deny; unless it is being absolutely—concede. And the consequence is denied.

Further Clarification:

It is to be observed here, as many Scotists (especially our Master, Lychetus, Meron, and Merin) observe, that it is one thing to be predicated univocally and another to be a univocal predicate.

For that is predicated univocally which not only agrees to many according to the same name and the same ratio signified by it but also such a ratio is predicated *in quid* or quidditatively of them, so that it is included in their formal concept.

Thus, "animal," for example, is said to be predicated univocally of man and brute, for it is included in their formal concept.

That is called a univocal predicate precisely which, though it agrees to many according to the same name and the same ratio, yet such a ratio is not predicated of them *in quid* or quidditatively, so that it is not included in their formal concept.

Thus, "white," for example, is called a univocal predicate respecting man and horse, for it is not included in their formal concept.

Thus, to be predicated univocally and to be a univocal predicate stand as superior and inferior.

For though all that is predicated univocally is a univocal predicate, not all that is a univocal predicate is predicated univocally, for it well stands that it is a univocal predicate and is not of the formal concept of those of which it is predicated.

Hence, Scotus only denies that being is predicated univocally *in quid* of the ultimate differences and proper passions, as his words clearly denote:

"Being is not univocally said *in quid* of all per se intelligibles, because not of the ultimate differences nor of the proper passions of being."

But he does not deny that it is a univocal predicate, for being is said according to the same name and the same ratio signified of the ultimate differences and proper passions, though it is not predicated of them *in quid* or quidditatively, since it is not included in their formal concept.

For the proposition "The ultimate difference is being" is valid, just as "Man is white" is valid, but "The ultimate difference is being quidditatively" or "Being is of the formal concept of the ultimate difference" is not valid, just as "Man is white quidditatively" or "Whiteness is of the formal concept of man" is not valid.

If this is well observed, many arguments are easily solved.

Other Explanations of the Ultimate Difference:

Because this acceptance of the ultimate differences is not admitted by all Scotists, it may be seen how others explain the ratio of the ultimate difference.

Some say that by "ultimate differences," only individual differences are to be understood, as can be seen from Scotus's mind by parity in physical things.

For example, in living things, there is prime matter, the form of corporeity, and the form of the living or soul.

Prime matter is pure subjective potency or determinable, since it is the act of no formal or determinative act.

The form of corporeity is neither pure potency nor pure act: not pure potency, for it is the act of matter; not pure act, for it constitutes the body, which is still in potency and determinable by the form of the living or soul.

The soul is pure act, for it so informs the body that the living constituted from it and the body is not in potency to any act.

Similarly, they say all differences constitute something still contractible and determinable by other differences and are not pure acts in the metaphysical line.

Only those that constitute something not further contractible and determinable by other differences (of which kind are only individual differences, constitutive of individuals in being such) are pure metaphysical acts.

The other differences are not of this kind, for only individuals as such are not further determinable or contractible by any differences.

The others constituted by other differences (i.e., genera and species) are further determinable and contractible by other differences.

Since, they say, only those that are pure metaphysical acts do not include in their formal concept "being which" or determinable (for then they would not be pure acts), it follows that by "ultimate differences" not including quidditatively or in their formal concept "being which," only individual differences are to be understood, and no other differences of any order.

But that this explanation cannot stand is sufficiently clear from the above and because those thus explaining firmly hold, as disciples of Scotus, that the intrinsic modes do not formally include "being which."

But this cannot stand with the aforementioned explanation, therefore they speak inconsistently.

The minor is proven because the intrinsic modes, at least respecting our mode of conceiving, are contractive of being and constitutive of inferiors further determinable by other differences.

Therefore, according to the aforementioned explanation, the intrinsic modes are not pure acts in the metaphysical line and consequently include "being which" in their formal concept, which no Scotist admits.

Thus, such explanation cannot stand in Scotus's way.

Further, that it is not according to Scotus's mind is clear, for Scotus in *Sentences* I, distinction 3, often cited, says that the ultimate difference not formally including "being which" is that which is taken from the ultimate form or from the ultimate reality of the form and is understood, as is clear in the text, of the form and essential reality.

But individual differences, as is confessed by all, are not essential nor pertain to the quiddity of the thing.

Therefore, in Scotus's way, by "ultimate differences" not formally including "being which," individual differences are not rightly understood.

Finally, from this, it would follow that not every difference of differents is reduced to some primarily diverse, which is in no way to be admitted.

Therefore, neither is the aforementioned explanation of the ultimate difference to be admitted.

The antecedent is proven because man and horse differ among themselves (who denies this?), and their difference must be reduced to some primarily diverse.

But what includes "being which" quidditatively are not primarily diverse, as is clear.

Therefore, it must be reduced to some not including quidditatively "being which."

But it is not reduced to individual differences, for we speak of man and horse according to themselves.

Therefore, some differences must be given that are not individual, by which some things ultimately differ, not including quidditatively "being which," and consequently, etc.

See what was said in number 21 and 22 of this question.

Other Scotists by "ultimate differences" not including quidditatively "being which" understand not only individual differences but also any other differences taken in the abstract.

If this explanation is reduced to the sense of our conclusion, as perhaps some Scotists understand it, we do not contradict it but support it.

If, however, it is understood so that any difference expressing a perfect reality taken in the abstract is called ultimate and not including quidditatively "being which," speaking of the ultimate difference in reality and of the non-inclusion of "being which" that it immediately contracts, this is true.

For rationality, for example, can be called the ultimate difference of man in reality and not including animal, which it immediately contracts, and this is clear from what was often said.

But if it is spoken of the ultimate difference properly so called and not including quidditatively "being which" in common and transcendently taken, as Scotus speaks, this explanation cannot stand in his way.

For in the cited place, number 33, he says that this proposition is true: "Rationality is being," where Scotus speaks of the inclusion of "being which" quidditatively and takes rationality in the abstract.

The same seems to be said of any difference expressing a perfect reality.

Therefore, according to Scotus's mind, not any difference in the abstract is called an ultimate difference excluding "being which" from its formal and quidditative concept.

Other explanations of the ultimate differences are usually adduced, so confused that they can scarcely be perceived, so we omit them, since they are easily impugned from what has been said.

QUESTION V

Whether Being is Included Quidditatively in Its Proper Passions

It is presupposed as certain among all that being has its proper passions, some of which are non-complex, such as unity, truth, goodness, etc., and others complex, such as distinction, division, etc. What pertains to unity, distinction, and division we have posited in the Logic, in the treatise on universals. Now, however, we will posit the remaining matters concerning the passions of being. But so that we may proceed with the greatest clarity and better satisfy the title of the question, it seems necessary to divide the question into two sections, of which the first is:

SECTION I

In What the Passions of Being Consist and How They Are Distinguished from Being and Among

Themselves

We say, first, that unity does not consist formally in a double negation—of indivision in itself and division from any other—but in some positive entity. This conclusion is held by all Scotists with Scotus in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book II, Distinction 3, Question 2. Therefore, I concede the letter D and below, and others in the places cited by the Master in *Metaphysics*, Disputation 5, Question 4, where he discusses the passions of being at length. It is usually proven by many reasons deduced from Scotus, some of which we will assign.

Therefore, third, it is proven:

1. Every negation, especially of repugnance, necessarily belongs to a thing by reason of some positive entity. But the negation of division into many, which is the negation of repugnance, belongs to being by reason of unity. Therefore, it belongs to being by reason of some positive entity. But this positive reason cannot be the very reason of being. Therefore, it is another positive reason superadded to being, in which the formal reason of unity consists.

The minor is subsumed and proven because the primary reason of being is only the reason of absolute being, not the reason of being one or many. For being abstracts from the reason of one or many. But the aforementioned negations must belong to being by reason of something that immediately and determinately expresses the reason opposed to many. This reason is precisely unity. Therefore, the positive entity of being is not the reason why the aforementioned negations belong to it. Rather, it is another positive entity superadded to being, which can only be unity. For unity formally signifies a positive entity superadded to being.

2. It is proven secondly because unity is the proximate reason for founding real relations of identity, equality, and similitude. But a negation cannot be the proximate reason for founding the aforementioned relations. Therefore, unity is not formally a negation but something positive.

The minor is proven because relations signify positive entities. But relations cannot have more or greater being than the foundation from which they receive their being. Therefore, a negation cannot be the reason for founding the aforementioned relations, and consequently, etc.

Nothing of any moment can be objected against this.

4. We say, second, that the truth of being consists not in some absolute entity but in a relative entity, which is explained by the conformity of being to the intellect insofar as being is knowable by the intellect or intentionally identifiable with it.

This conclusion is more common among Scotists. It is expressly held by the cited Master in Question 6, Article 3, and partly by Vulpes in Volume 1, Part 1, Disputation 10, Article 1, citing Scotus in many places, especially in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 3, Question 2, under letter E, and Book IV, Distinction 49, Question 4, under letter I.

It is briefly proven because the truth of cognition is explained by the conformity of cognition to the thing. Therefore, the truth of the thing ought to be explained by the conformity of the thing to cognition. The consequence seems to hold, for truth, as such, is said univocally of the truth of the thing and of cognition. Therefore, the truth of the thing ought to be explained by the relative concept of conformity, just as the truth of cognition is explained.

It can also be confirmed:

- Because the intellect is said to be formally true when it understands the thing as it is on the part of the thing. Similarly, the thing is said to be formally true because it is understood or is apt to be understood as it is on the part of the thing.
- Because being is not said to be true being because through the cognition by which it is made, something is understood as it is. Rather, real being is said to be formally true being because it is intelligible as it is.

5. Here it must be noted, with the cited Master and Vulpes, that the respect of conformity in which truth formally consists is not predicamental and actual but only transcendental and potential. For only when it actually terminates the cognition of being is it called an actual and predicamental respect, as was said in Logic when speaking of relations of the third genus. But the aptitude to found such an actual respect of conformity is the formal reason of truth and is a transcendental respect, just as when we say the receptive potency of prime matter signifies a respect to forms, which respect is transcendental and aptitudinal, yet becomes actual when it actually receives forms. This must be well noted to resolve some arguments.

6. We say, third, that the goodness which is a passion of being consists formally in the respect of appetibility, either for itself or for another.

This conclusion is held by Vulpes in Volume 1, Part 1, Disputation 11, Article 1. For its understanding, it must be noted from Scotus in Book IV, Distinction 49, Question 2, under letter X, that natural goodness (we are not speaking of moral or meritorious goodness) is twofold:

- Primary goodness, which is the very quiddity and essence of the thing. For every thing essentially has its own perfection and integrity, by which primary goodness is explained.
- Secondary goodness, which is explained by aptitudinal convenience in order to an appetite that it can move.

As Vulpes well notes, primary goodness can still be considered in two ways:

1. Fundamentally, and in this sense, it is called quidditative goodness and is the very quiddity of the thing.
2. Formally, and in this sense, it is called the intrinsic mode of that quidditative goodness.

In the first sense, Scotus is understood when in Book I, Distinction 1, Question 2, under letter K, he says that formal perfection or goodness is the quidditative entity. In the second sense, he is understood when in some places he says that the primary goodness of being, which is called essential goodness, is the

integrity and perfection of being in itself. This goodness, as is clear from itself, is not called a passion or property of being.

Secondary goodness is explained by aptitudinal convenience in order to an appetite that it can move. By reason of this goodness, every thing is said to be appetible either as an end or as a means leading to some end. In this sense, it is called the affection of being and thus is said to be the property of goodness. For it is delectability or appetibility in order to a delectable or appetitive potency.

7. Now the conclusion is easily proven similarly to the preceding conclusion, for the same seems to be the reasoning. Moreover, because no more suitable explanation of goodness, which is a property and proper passion of being, can be assigned.

It is also to be noted, as we noted before for the conclusion, that the respect of appetibility which this goodness imports is not predicamental and actual but transcendental and aptitudinal. When, however, the thing is actually desired, the respect becomes actual and predicamental, as was said in Logic when speaking of relations of the third genus.

But note lest any equivocation arise: when we say that the respects in which truth and goodness formally consist are not actual but aptitudinal, we do not intend that no actual respect is given. For in fact, the very aptitude, which is an actual transcendental respect, is given. But we only intend that it is not a predicamental respect actually but only aptitudinally, insofar as it is the foundation so that between the thing and the potency an actual predicamental respect may result, etc., pertaining to the third genus of relation.

8. For the second part of the section, it must be noted consequently to the aforementioned questions, with the often-cited Master in Disputation 9, Question 1, Number 9, and Vulpes in Disputation 10, Article 1, that just as being is taken either transcendently for the common concept of being, precise from its inferiors—which concept does not signify any precise formality from the nature of the thing but is an imperfect concept of some reality—or predicamentally for any being of some determinate genus, such as substance, quantity, etc., so similarly the passions of being are either taken transcendently and as they are properties of being taken transcendently—and in this sense, they do not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, precise and truly emanating from its subject, but just as that subject signifies in the thing many realities which are born to be conceived imperfectly by our intellect, so each property of being as such signifies in the thing many realities flowing from their subjects insofar as they can be conceived imperfectly and inadequately by our intellect.

The reason for this is that the passions cannot be of greater entity than their subject. For being in common does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, nor do the passions of that being.

Or they are taken predicamentally, i.e., as they are passions and properties of any predicamental being, and as such, they signify perfect realities truly emanating from their subjects with metaphysical resultancy.

9. We say, fourth, that in the order of predicamental being, the passions or properties are not really distinguished from it but are formally distinguished from it from the nature of the thing.

This conclusion is held by all Scotists and is clear as to both parts from what is said in the books *On the Soul* concerning the distinction of its potencies. For the same reasoning applies here and there. Let what is said there be seen lest it be repeated without necessity.

From this, it is deduced that the aforementioned properties are not really distinguished among themselves. For what is the same with a third is the same among themselves. Yet they are formally distinguished from the nature of the thing on account of the reasons of distinction of each from its subject, for in this there is no difference.

10. We say, fifth, that the passions and properties of transcendental being are not distinguished from it in any way from the nature of the thing.

This conclusion, though not proposed in terms by all, is deduced from the cited Master and Vulpes and is a consequence of what was said above.

It is briefly proven because those things which from the nature of the thing do not signify any reality cannot in any way be distinguished from the nature of the thing. But according to what was said above, being taken transcendently does not signify any reality from the nature of the thing but only an imperfect concept of reality. Nor similarly do the passions of being taken transcendently import a reality from the nature of the thing. Therefore, they are in no way distinguished from being by the nature of the thing.

Nor should you infer from this that the aforementioned passions are formally the same with being. For things that from the nature of the thing signify no entity or reality can neither be distinct nor the same from the nature of the thing.

11. We say, sixth, that the passions or properties of being taken transcendently are distinguished formally in concept and fundamentally from the nature of the thing.

This conclusion is also deduced from the authors cited for the preceding conclusion, and as to the first part, it will be clear in the following section, where we will show that the aforementioned passions do not include being quidditatively or in their formal concept. For in this consists the formal distinction in concept.

As to the second part, it is proven because just as our intellect, on account of its imperfection, takes a foundation from things to abstract by one concept the common and transcendental reason of being, so it takes a foundation from things to abstract by one concept the common and transcendental reason of any passion. And so that the aforementioned concepts may be formally distinguished among themselves, some foundation is given in things with respect to the intellect conceiving imperfectly.

This is clear beforehand because the foundation for the aforementioned concept of being is realities imperfectly conceivable by our intellect. But there are also realities imperfectly conceivable by our

intellect in the concept of the passion of being. Therefore, just as for one, so also for the other, a foundation is given in the thing.

13. But if you doubt from which realities the aforementioned passions are abstracted, it is easily responded that just as the concept of being taken transcendently is abstracted from particular beings, so the concepts of the passions taken transcendently are abstracted from the properties of particular beings. For just as the concept of being is abstracted from the realities of God and creatures, substance and accident, imperfectly conceiving them, so the transcendental concept of unity is abstracted from all unities which are the passions of particular beings, imperfectly conceiving the perfect realities which they present. The same must be said of the other passions of being, with due order and proportion observed.
14. Here it must be most noted that the aforementioned passions of being taken transcendently are called real not because they signify true realities from the nature of the thing but because what is from the part of the thing is truly conceived, though inadequately. For abstraction is not a lie. And thus they are distinguished from the passions of being of reason, just as real being in concept is distinguished from being of reason. For in being of reason and its passions, as we said in Logic in its place, it is known that it is not as if it were.

See what we said in Question 2 of this disputation, from number 17 up to 22, especially number 20.

From what has been said so far, it follows that the passions of being taken transcendently are neither distinguished nor are they the same from the nature of the thing. Yet they are formally distinguished from the nature of the thing fundamentally and formally in concept. For the same reasoning applies to them compared among themselves as compared with their subject.

Since the distinction of these conclusions is easily reconciled with some authorities of Scotus, let him who desires more consult the cited Master, who most broadly institutes a discourse on the properties of being, both in common and in particular.

SECTION II

In Which the Question Is Resolved

15. We say, first, that the passions of being taken transcendently do not include being quidditatively or in their formal concept.

This conclusion, speaking indistinctly of the passions, is held by all Scotists with Scotus, cited in the preceding question, number 16, where he holds it expressly.

It is proven by his reasons:

1. The first is that the subject, as the Philosopher holds in *Metaphysics* VII, texts 17 and 19, is posited as added in the definition of the passion. But what is posited as added in the definition of something is not of its essence. Therefore, being is not of the essence of its passion.

The minor is clear because what is posited as added in the definition presupposes and posits the quiddity and essence of that in whose definition it is posited as added.

Other reasons taken from authority usually prove the conclusion, as can be seen in Scotus himself and his Expositors, especially Lychetus and the Master. Therefore, we will adduce other reasons of Scotus, among which:

16. The second is that being is adequately divided into uncreated being and the ten genera as into those of which it is predicated quidditatively. But the transcendental passions of being are neither uncreated being nor any of the ten genera. Therefore, being is not predicated of them quidditatively.

The major is founded in this, that nothing is predicated quidditatively, or what is the same, through the mode of a superior, except of those which are related to it through the mode of inferiors. But only uncreated being and the ten genera are related through the mode of inferiors with respect to being taken transcendently, not the passions of being, since these are convertible with being. But superior and inferior are not convertible. For it is valid: "Every being is one," and conversely: "Every one is a being." But it is not valid: "Every being is uncreated," or "Every being is some of the ten genera," although it is valid: "Every uncreated being is a being," or "Every being of the ten genera is a being." Therefore, being is in no way predicated quidditatively of its proper passions taken transcendently, or what is the same, the aforementioned passions do not formally and quidditatively include being.

17. Lest any equivocation arise, it must be noted that when Scotus says being is adequately divided into uncreated being and the ten genera, it must not be understood so that it is predicated quidditatively only of the ten genera, as the name of genus sounds. Otherwise, he would contradict himself when he says, as is clear from what was said in the preceding question, that being ought to be predicated of some differences of genera. For it must be understood so that it is not predicated quidditatively of those with which it is convertible but only of those which are related through the mode of inferiors with respect to it. In this is founded the reasoning of Scotus. And it is certain not only that the ten genera, as the name of genus sounds, but also the differences not ultimate in the order of resolution, and other things to be said below, are related through the mode of inferiors with respect to being taken transcendently.

18. The third reason is: if the passions of being include being essentially and quidditatively, and they include something else besides being, the consequence is clear. For otherwise the same would be a passion of itself. Then concerning that other, it can be inquired whether it includes being essentially or not. If it does not include it, that will be the passion of being, or the same must be said of the passion. For the same reasoning seems to apply. If it includes being, and it includes something besides being, the same can be inquired concerning that, and so on to infinity, which is absurd. Or one must stop at something that does not include being essentially and quidditatively, and that will be the passion of being.

19. Many objections are usually made against our conclusion, some of which coincide with objections against the ultimate differences in the preceding question. But peculiarly, it can be argued:

20. No predication in the abstract is given which is not quidditative. But of unity, truth, and goodness taken in the abstract, being is predicated, and being is quidditatively included in them.

It can be responded first by denying the minor, and this response seems according to what was said in Logic, Tract on Universals, Disputation 3, Question 3.

Second, it can be responded by denying the major, because in the abstract not only can quidditative predication be given, or what is the same, predication between those which formally include each other, but also identical predication can be given, or what is the same, predication between those which, though they do not formally include each other, include each other really or identically. In this way, things are predicated in the Divine which do not formally include each other, and also transcendentals, yet with this distinction that the reason of such predication in the Divine is taken from the highest real identity coming from the actual infinity of one or both extremes, as was also said in the cited place in Logic. But the reason of such predication in transcendentals is taken from permissive infinity. For transcendentals are indifferent to finitude and infinity, or it is taken from the excessive community of them. For being is predicated quidditatively or identically or denominatively of all things however taken, as was said in the preceding question.

20. It is argued secondly: the quidditative reason of being says nothing else than that something is outside nothing. But the passions of being are outside nothing. Therefore, they include the quidditative reason of being.

This argument also seems to militate against the ultimate differences and also against the intrinsic modes. But for all, it is responded by distinguishing the major: the quidditative reason of being says nothing else than that something is outside nothing by itself and directly—I concede; indirectly and through another—I deny.

Similarly, the minor is distinguished: the passions of being are outside nothing by themselves and directly—I deny; indirectly and through another, i.e., by reason of that with which they are identified—I concede. And the consequence is denied.

21. It is replied: the reason of being consists in this, that something is outside nothing, whether directly or indirectly, whether by itself or through another, whether formally or identically. Therefore, only the passions of being are in some of these ways outside nothing. Therefore, they are beings formally and quidditatively.

Those who reply thus suffer a great equivocation and imply themselves in terms. For it is easily responded that although the major, if well considered, is true, and similarly the minor is true, yet the consequence is false. For thus it would be inferred that the passions of being are in some way beings, as the extremes of the premises would be united in the consequence. In this way, we would concede that. For we do not absolutely deny that the passions of being are beings, but we deny that they are beings quidditatively by themselves, directly, and formally. With this is composed that they are beings in some way, i.e., identically, indirectly, and through another, in the way recently explained. And also speaking of the ultimate differences, there we said with Scotus that being is univocally predicated with respect to all per se intelligibles, even the ultimate differences and passions of being, because the same reasoning applies. Yet it is not predicated univocally of all, for of some it is predicated quidditatively and formally, of others only identically or denominatively.

22. We say, second, that the passions of being taken predicamentally, which signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing and metaphysically emanate or spring from it, do not formally and quidditatively include that being from which they emanate.

This conclusion is received by all and is proven either from the formal distinction from the nature of the thing of those from their subject, in the opinion of the Scotists, or from the virtual or objective precise distinction in the opinion of others. And then from what was said for the preceding conclusion and for the differences which signify perfect reality in the preceding question, with due proportion observed.

23. We say, third, that the passions of being taken predicamentally include formally and quidditatively the common reason of quidditative being taken transcendentally.

This conclusion, though not commonly proposed in terms, seems a consequence to what was said about the differences signifying perfect reality or not ultimate in the order of resolution. For the same reasoning seems to apply, nor does anything seem to be able to be objected against these conclusions which is not easily resolved from what has been said so far.

QUESTION VI

In Which Some Doubts Leading to the Understanding of the Foregoing Are Resolved

1. You will doubt first whether the ultimate differences, which we said do not quidditatively include being, can truly be called "being quale."

This doubt is broadly controverted by some Scotists, especially by the often-cited Master in Disputation 2, Question 8. But as it is commonly circulated among Scotists, it seems to reduce to a question of the name, not of the thing. For all agree that there is nothing, but on account of the lack and need of words, negative and privative beings are said to be.

As we said in Question 4, in the notables deduced from Scotus, the denomination of being "quale" is deduced. Therefore, we say that if by "being quale" is understood some reason of being which is formally and quidditatively included in the ultimate differences, this must not be admitted. For either the ultimate differences include precisely that reason of being "quale," or something else superadded.

If they include precisely the reason of being "quale," the ultimate differences cannot be reasons of differing as they are conceived by the intellect. For the intellect would conceive only the reason of being "quale" in conceiving some ultimate difference, and similarly in conceiving another, it would conceive only the reason of being "quale." And the reason of being "quale," precisely conceived once and again, in no way says the reason of differing but rather the reason of agreeing, as is clear from itself.

If they include something superadded to the reason of being "quale," the same can be inquired concerning that, and so on to infinity, or one must stop at some concept which in no way formally and quidditatively includes the reason of being "quale."

2. But if by "being quale" is not understood some reason of being which is formally and quidditatively included in the ultimate differences, but only something qualifying that which formally and

quidditatively is being, in this way it can, indeed must, be admitted that the ultimate differences are truly called "being quale." And in this sense, it is commonly understood by Scotists, just as rationality and irrationality are said to qualify animal, though they do not formally and quidditatively include any reason of animal. Rather, they are something qualifying animal.

Hence, just as from rationality and irrationality no concept common to them entitatively qualifying animal can be abstracted (for each, according to its whole reality, diversely qualifies it—indeed, according to its whole reality, it constitutes some inferior of animal, distinguishing it from any other), so also from the ultimate differences no common concept qualifying being can be abstracted. For each, according to its whole concept, diversely qualifies being—indeed, according to its whole concept, it constitutes some inferior of being, distinguishing it from any other. And only a numerical concept can be abstracted by similitude. For just as some ultimate difference behaves in qualifying being and constituting some inferior of being and distinguishing it from any other, so any other ultimate difference behaves in exercising these functions.

For convenience in functions can well stand with complete inconvenience in entity or in the concept of entity. If you well observe this, you will easily resolve many arguments which have more appearance than reality.

The same must be said in its way about the proper passions of being.

4. You will doubt second: How is to be understood the division of being into "being quid" and "being quale," which we adduced in the notable of Question 4?

It is responded under distinction:

- If we speak of the division into "being quid" and "being quale" according to imperfect and inadequate concepts, it is not properly and rigorously a division but only certain diverse acceptations of being according to our imperfect mode of conceiving. For in this sense, both "being quid" and "being quale" are simply simple and irresolvable concepts into many concepts. And thus, in the ultimate concept, they are diverse, though on account of the poverty of words, we explain each by a double word. This is sufficiently clear from what was said in the whole disputation.
- But if we speak of the division into "being quid" and "being quale" according to perfect realities, it must still be distinguished:
 - Either it is taken for the divided "being quid" which is immediately qualified by "being quale," and thus it comes to the same as the preceding division, with due proportion observed. For animality and rationality, which are related as "being quid" and "being quale," agree in no reality or concept of animal, so that some reason of animal is common to them and is divided into animal in quid and animal in quale, as is clear from itself.
 - Or it is taken for the divided transcendental concept of being, and thus such division is univocal in the way being is said to be univocal to God and creatures, substance and accident. This is clear because, from what was said in Question 4, in the differences signifying perfect reality, being taken transcendently is included formally and quidditatively. And thus being is predicated univocally of them as of any other inferior. Therefore, animality, which is related through the

mode of "being quid," and rationality, which is related through the mode of "being quale," agree univocally and quidditatively in the concept of "being quid" taken transcendently. And consequently, the division into "being quid" and "being quale" in this sense is a univocal division.

The same you will say about any differences and proper passions of predicamental being which signify perfect reality.

6. You will doubt third: Whether being taken transcendently is said to be a genus with respect to God and creature.

It is responded negatively. Thus commonly respond all, both Thomists and Scotists, except Pontius, who in this departs from the way of all Scotists and perhaps from the way of the Subtle Doctor, who in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 2, Question 3, and Distinction 8, Question 3, firmly holds that neither is God in a genus, nor is anything said of God in quid, as the reason of being taken transcendently, able to be denominated a genus.

In assigning the reason of this resolution, authors vary:

- Thomists, consequently to their foundations, assign for the reason the analogy of being. For they say that a genus ought to be univocal, but being, on account of its transcendence, whose reason is not included formally and quidditatively in all per se intelligibles, even in the ultimate differences according to their proper concepts, is not univocal, nor is it a genus. But this reason remains impugned in Questions 3 and 4 of this disputation.
- Scotists, however, commonly respond that being is not a genus with respect to God and creatures because it is not contracted to God and creatures by true differences but by intrinsic modes.

This reason, if well understood, is sufficient. For that which has the reason of genus ought to signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, perfectly precise, and thus truly from the nature of the thing indifferent and contractible and in potency to constitute a metaphysical composition with a difference actuating, contracting, and determining. But being, which is contracted by intrinsic modes, does not signify from the nature of the thing a perfect reality indifferent, contractible, and in potency to constitute a metaphysical composition with reasons actuating, contracting, and determining.

This is sufficiently clear from what was said in Question 2. Otherwise, there would be given in God a true metaphysical composition, which, on account of the imperfection of potentiality which it includes, is to be entirely excluded from God. Therefore, being, which is contracted by intrinsic modes to God and creature, cannot have the reason of genus with respect to them.

8. Nor is it valid what some say with Pontius, namely, that although being, according to our mode of conceiving, is contracted by intrinsic modes, yet it is contracted in itself by some differences unknown to us. Hence, although according to our mode of conceiving it does not have the reason of genus, yet in itself it has the reason of genus.

This is not valid because this is to concede that the reason of being in itself signifies a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, precise, potential, and contractible by true differences. But this is to posit in God from the nature of the thing, though not thus conceived by us, a metaphysical composition, which is

to posit in God the imperfection of potentiality which is included in metaphysical composition in the thing. This is not to be admitted.

Therefore, neither is being contracted to God and creature by differences unknown to us, nor consequently is being a genus.

9. But fully the reason for denying that being is a genus with respect to its inferiors is taken from this, that being is included quidditatively in some differences of the inferiors, or, as it is better said, in all proper differences which are those that signify perfect reality, as is clear from what was said in Question 4.

This reason is adduced by Scotus in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 3, Question 3, often cited. For against this, towards the beginning, under letter N, he has these words: "He removes from being the reason of genus not on account of equivocation but removes the reason of genus from being on account of excessive community, because, namely, it is predicated per se in the first mode of some difference." And by this it can be concluded that being is not a genus.

And there, towards seeing, under letter O, he has these: "And from this that such a difference is being in quid, it follows that being is not a genus on account of the excessive community of being. For no genus is said of some inferior difference in quid, neither of that which is taken from the form nor of that which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form, as will be clear in Distinction 8, that always that from which the concept of genus is taken is in itself potential to that reality from which the concept of difference is taken."

10. From which it is clear the reason why being cannot be contracted by true differences. For what is contracted by true differences ought to be totally in potency to all differences of the inferiors. But what is essentially and quidditatively included in the differences cannot be in potency with respect to them. Therefore, being, which is quidditatively included in the differences signifying perfect reality and which are properly differences, is not in potency to others. Therefore, neither can it be contracted by them, and consequently, neither can it induce the reason of genus with respect to its inferiors.

These things, if well perceived, sufficiently show that being, although it is univocal and is said univocally of God and creatures, is not a genus with respect to them.

QUESTION VII

How Being Is Divided

1. Several divisions of being are usually assigned. For leaving aside the division of being into "being quid" and "being quale," or into complete and incomplete being, because enough has been said about that, it is usually divided into real being and being of reason, into negative and positive being, into possible and impossible being—which divisions do not pertain to metaphysics per se but per accidens, since metaphysics per se institutes discourse only about real positive being.

Otherwise, being is divided into necessary and contingent, into per se and per accidens, into from itself and from another, into being in objective potency and in entitative act, or into possible being and actually existing being—which divisions are understood from the very understanding of the words, on account of which we do not dwell on them.

Real being is divided into quantum and non-quantum. Quantum is said to import some perfection in its formal reason. Non-quantum is said to import no perfection in its entity.

This is called by Scotists the division of real being, about which, as in its proper place, it is inquired in the matter of the Trinity whether the divine relations say formally perfection.

Quantum being is divided into finite and infinite being. Further, finite being is divided into substance and accident. Then accident is divided into absolute and respective. Then respective is divided into intrinsically and extrinsically adventitious. Further, intrinsically adventitious is divided into the six ultimate predicaments. And finally, each of the ten genera is divided into its species, either subalternate or lowest, as was said in their proper places in Logic.

From all these, especially those come to be examined which we will propose in the following sections.

SECTION I

What Kind of Division of Being into Real Being and Being of Reason Is

Concerning this difficulty, there are not lacking those who affirm that being is univocal to real being and being of reason. But the more common is the opposite opinion in both schools, holding that being is equivocal to real being and being of reason, yet not purely equivocal but equivocal by analogy.

For which opinion, among others, can be seen our often-cited Master in Question 9, Article 2, and Meron in Disputation on the Predicaments, Question 3, Number 1, although this author does not judge it wholly improbable that being is univocal to real being and being of reason, yet he resolves for the second opinion.

Therefore, for the sake of disputation, with him:

3. We say, first, that it can well be defended that being is univocal to real being and being of reason.

It is proven: that is said to be univocal with respect to some things which agrees with them according to the same reason signified by some name. But being agrees with real being and being of reason according to the same reason signified by the name "being." Therefore, being is univocal with respect to real being and being of reason.

The minor is proven in the question: because the reason signified by the name "being" is only "able to exist" or "capable of existence." But "able to exist" or "capability of existence" agrees as much to being of reason as to real being, though on account of special concepts it agrees to them diversely. For to real being it agrees independently of the consideration of the intellect, and to being of reason dependently

on the consideration of the intellect. Therefore, being agrees with real being and being of reason according to the same reason signified by the name, and consequently is univocal with respect to them.

Against this conclusion, which seems to be demonstrated by the reason posited for it, many things are usually adduced by some, from which we will propose the principal ones.

It is argued first: No concept can be given which is not formally real being or being of reason. Therefore, no concept of being common to real being and being of reason can be given.

The consequence is clear because the common and univocal concept of real being and being of reason ought formally not to be real being or being of reason, just as animal is common univocal to man and brute, is not formally man or brute.

The antecedent is proven because such a concept would either be such that it would be repugnant to it to exist really and independently of the consideration of the intellect, and thus it would be being of reason, or it would be such that it would not be repugnant to it to exist really and independently of the consideration of the intellect, and thus it would be real being. Therefore, no concept can be given which is not formally real being or being of reason.

5. It can be responded by denying the antecedent, and the antecedent is proven in the sense in which it is adduced. Therefore, that concept formally considered would be of such a nature that it would neither be repugnant to it to exist really and independently of the consideration of the intellect, nor would it not be repugnant to it to so exist, but only import capability to exist, whether really and independently of the consideration of the intellect, or by reason or dependently on the consideration of the intellect, or what is the same, in its formal concept it does not include anything on account of which it would be repugnant to it to exist really or it would be repugnant to it not to exist really.

Just as similarly animal does not include in its formal concept anything on account of which it would be repugnant to it to be rational or it would be repugnant to it not to be rational. Hence, just as animal is said to be indifferent to being rational and irrational, or to being conjoined with something on account of which it would be repugnant to it to be rational or irrational, so being is said to be indifferent to existing really and to not existing really, or to existing not really but by the intellect, or to being conjoined with something on account of which it would be repugnant to it to exist really or not to exist really, or to existing not really but by the intellect.

6. In other terms, it can be responded by distinguishing the proof of the antecedent: that to which it is not repugnant to exist really from the part of the thing is real being—if such non-repugnance agrees to it only by indifference, I deny; if it agrees to it by something intrinsic to it, I concede. Hence, the consequence is denied.

For it is true that to being as such it is not repugnant to exist really, but this non-repugnance does not come to being through something intrinsic to it opposed to real existence or existence by reasons, but from this, that it is indifferent to existing really and to existing by the intellect.

Just as to animal it is not repugnant to be rational not through something intrinsic to it opposed to non-rationality or irrationality, but from this, that it is indifferent to being rational or not rational or irrational. Hence, it is clear that the argument does not convict the proposed.

7. Then, it can further be responded that the argument sins by defect. For that proposition, "To that concept it is not repugnant to exist really," although it is true, is yet defective. For thus it would be complete: "To that concept it is not repugnant to exist really, nor is it repugnant not to exist really," or "to exist by the intellect."

Just as this proposition, "To animal it is not repugnant to be rational," although it is true, is yet defective. For thus it is complete: "To animal it is not repugnant to be rational, nor is it repugnant not to be rational," or "to be irrational."

Hence, just as from this proposition it is not licit to infer, "And animal is rational," so from that it is not licit to infer, "Therefore, being exists really," or "is real being."

8. It is argued second: No concept prescinding from real being and being of reason can in any way be explained. Therefore, no such concept can be given. Whatever is about the consequence, the Master denies it, because many things are or are given which on account of the imperfection of our intellect cannot be explained by us.

It is responded by denying the antecedent, for such a concept is well explained by "capable of existing," prescinding from existing really or by the intellect, as is clear from the reason adduced for the conclusion.

9. It is replied: When it is said that something is capable of existence without any addition, it is necessarily understood of existence simply or of real existence. Therefore, no concept of capability of existence prescinding from real existence and existence of reason can be given, and consequently, etc.

It is responded by denying the antecedent, for in this is the controversy. Hence, the argument begs the question. For although in analogues the analogue taken per se stands or supposes for the more famous significante, yet this does not happen in univocals.

The reason for this is that the proper analogue does not signify a common and precise concept from the analogues, but the univocal does signify such a concept. Hence, it is clear that in the argument a petition is committed, and thus it convicts nothing unless such a common concept is otherwise impugned.

10. It is argued third: A true man and a painted man agree in no univocal concept. Therefore, neither does being of reason, which is fictitious being, and real being, which is true being.

First, it can be responded by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence. The reason of the disparity can stand in this, that from the common acceptation this name "man" signifies a rational animal. For the reason of rational animal is in no way found in a painted man. But being, taken

absolutely and precisely, only signifies capability of existence, which agrees as much to being of reason as to real being, though diversely on account of their peculiar reasons.

Second, Meron responds that perhaps the antecedent could be denied, because, he says, perhaps to a true man and a painted man some common univocal concept determinable by the difference of living rational and by the negation of such life could be given. For what, he says, obstructs, I do not see.

11. It is responded third by distinguishing the consequence: being of reason and real being, or fictitious being and true being, do not agree in some univocal concept as such and distinct among themselves—I concede; as beings precisely taken and not considered as distinct among themselves—I deny.

Which also happens in whatever things agree in some common univocal concept. For man and brute do not agree in some univocal concept as such, yet well in the reason of animal taken precisely.

12. Although the aforementioned conclusion can be sustained for the sake of disputation, as many not of small moment think, yet with the common opinion we say that being does not signify a concept univocal to real being and being of reason but is equivocal with respect to them, yet with some analogy between them.

Thus Meron, cited, and the Master and Pontius among Scotists, resolve.

That it is equivocal is proven because otherwise there would be no way to destroy equivocation between some things as signified by a common name. This is not to be said.

The major is clear because anyone could say that this name "dog" signifies some common reason univocally to the celestial dog, terrestrial dog, and marine dog, and these differ by their peculiar reasons. And similarly, this name "healthy" signifies health common univocally to animal, urine, and medicine, and these differ only by the peculiar reasons by which they agree to them.

To the opposite, it could be adduced, just as it is said that being signifies a common reason univocally to real being and being of reason, and these differ by their peculiar reasons. Therefore, if it were conceded that being is univocal to real being and being of reason, the way to destroying univocation between some things as signified by some common name would be precluded.

13. Then, it is proven by a reason deduced from Scotus, [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 29, the only question, under letter A: "What is simply such and what is such in a certain respect cannot agree univocally in the reason of such. But real being is being simply, and being of reason is being in a certain respect. Therefore, real being and being of reason cannot agree univocally in the reason of being."

For the understanding of this reason and to occur to some responses, it must be noted that this particle "in a certain respect" can be taken in two ways: either as diminishing or as distracting.

Taken as distracting, it totally distracts from the reason of the form to which it is adjoined, and thus it is the cause of equivocation. In this sense, a painted man is said to be a man in a certain respect,

because by that particle he is totally distracted from the reason of man.

Also, the particle taken in this way is usually said to diminish absolutely and according to the form.

Taken as diminishing, it only diminishes the perfection of the form, as thus it is compatible with univocation. In this sense, accident is said to be being in a certain respect, not because it is not truly being, but because it lacks the perfection of substance, which is said to be being simply.

Now, to the intention: when Scotus calls being of reason "being in a certain respect," this particle is taken in the first sense, not in the second. Otherwise, he would not rightly prove that being is not univocal to real being and being of reason.

14. This reason is confirmed: when some things are compared to some predicate which belongs to one of them simply and absolutely, and to the other only as it is conceived according to the mode of the other, such a predicate cannot agree univocally to them.

But real being is said to be being simply and absolutely, and being of reason is only said to be being as it is conceived according to the mode of real being, nor can it have or be able to have anything else. Therefore, the predicate "being" cannot be said univocally of real being and being of reason.

The consequence is legitimate.

The minor is clear from what was said in Logic when speaking of being of reason.

But the major is clear from this, that the reason of something univocally common to many must agree to all according to itself, yet not to one of them by reason of another.

15. From this it is clear that being is equivocal by analogy with respect to real being and being of reason. Indeed, the reason of being is only found in being of reason by a certain proportion and attribution to real being. In this consists the analogy of proportion, as all commonly hold, and it can be exemplified in other analogues of proportion.

Hence, being is not purely equivocal but equivocal by analogy with respect to real being and being of reason.

Here the Master notes that although between real being and being of reason no proportion or similitude is given in the thing (for being of reason has no true entity in which a true proportion and similitude could be founded), yet from the force of the fiction of being of reason, or from the force of its fictitious entity, a foundation is given so that the intellect may feign a similitude and proportion between real being and being of reason, which suffices to construct between them an equivocation by analogy.

The Master also notes that although Scotus in the cited place expressly holds that nothing is common univocally to real relation and relation of reason, and consequently neither to real being and being of reason, yet in the reports on [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 29, he seems to hold both parts.

16. Here it can be doubted whether being is univocal to positive, negative, and privative being.

This doubt is pursued broadly by some in vain, for it is of easy resolution.

It is responded negatively.

The resolution is founded in this, that negation and privation are not beings but are removals of being. But to being and non-being nothing common univocal can be given.

17. Nor does it obstruct that negations and privations are usually called negative and privative beings, for this reduces to a question of the name, not of the thing. For all agree that there is nothing, but on account of the lack and need of words, negative and privative beings are said to be.

Nor similarly does the mode of speaking obstruct, namely, that negations and privations are given independently of the consideration of the intellect. For this is not said because negations and privations are something, but only from this, that there is not given a being to which they immediately contradictorily oppose. For contradictories are not versed between being and being but between being and non-being.

18. From which you will deduce that being is neither said to be an equivocal name with respect to positive being, negation, and privation (for an equivocal name signifies diverse natures in the equivocates), nor is negation or privation, since they have no entity in themselves, able to be signified by some name signifying some natures, unless this, as was said, is reduced to a question of the name.

SECTION II

Whether Finite Being Is a Genus with Respect to Substance and Accident

19. We have posited in the preceding question that being taken transcendently, although it is said univocally of God and creatures, is not a genus with respect to them. Now there is another difficulty: whether real finite being, which is divided into the ten predicaments and is inferior with respect to being taken transcendently, has the reason of genus with respect to substance and accident.

This difficulty, although by some is confounded with the preceding, is yet very diverse from it, as will be clear from what is to be said.

20. For its understanding, it must be noted that although being is commonly said to be transcendent because it is included formally and quidditatively in some differences of inferiors, as is clear from what was said in Question 4, yet this ought not to be the primary acceptance of the reason of transcendence. For that is properly said to be transcendent which is opposed to predicamental being.

And it is certain that many predicates are given which are not predicamental and yet are not included in some differences of inferiors. For whatever predicate is found in God is not predicamental; otherwise, God would be in a genus with respect to some predicate, which is by no means admitted.

Hence, it seems it must be said that that predicate is properly called transcendental (as transcendental is opposed to predicamental) which can with foundation in the thing be conceived as something common and indifferent to finite and infinite, that is, to God and creatures.

Hence, just as this predicate "being" is said to be transcendent, so similarly these predicates "substance," "spirit," "wisdom," and others of this kind. For all these can be conceived as common and indifferent to God and creatures.

See Scotus in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 8, Question 3, under letter O.

21. From which it evidently follows that it well composes that some predicate, according as it is precisely considered, does not have the reason of genus, and that according to some peculiar reason it can be denominated a genus.

For substance, considered according to itself and taken precisely, in no way has the reason of genus. For as such, it does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, precise, potential, and contractible by true differences. Otherwise, God and creature would not be primarily diverse in reality, and then there would be given in God a metaphysical composition.

For taken according to itself, it signifies an imperfect concept only according to our imperfect mode of conceiving by intrinsic modes, namely, by finitude and infinity, contractible in the way said of the common concept of being in Question 3 of this disputation.

And yet finite substance, as all unanimously confess, has the reason of genus with respect to its inferiors.

The same can be exemplified in many other predicates common to God and creatures.

This noted:

22. Concerning this difficulty, there is a twofold opinion:

- The first asserts that real finite being is in no way a genus with respect to substance and accident. This opinion is more common in both schools.
- The second attributes to real finite being the reason of genus with respect to substance and accident. This is held among Scotists by the Master in Logic, Disputation 6, Question 1, and in Metaphysics, Disputation 2, Question 4, Article 1, and Question 6, Article 2, in which places for this opinion many authors not of small moment are adduced.

For we confess this to be a maximum difficulty and not sufficiently explained thus far, not because it is not subtly touched by many, but on account of the nature of the difficulty itself, which seems to evade our grasp in this state.

Therefore, it would be better to hear about it than to speak. Yet because it is necessary not to leave it untouched, let it be permitted to propose something, for the greater part from the opinion of others, from some part, however small, from our own grasp.

Therefore, with the pardon of the more common opinion:

23. We say: No inconvenience appears in this, that real finite being is said to be a genus with respect to substance and accident.

This conclusion cannot be more aptly proven than by occurring to the foundations by which the contrary opinion is supported.

Therefore, some say that being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident because it is not univocal but analogous with respect to them. But this mode of speaking remains impugned in Question 3 of this disputation, where we have constructed the univocation of being.

24. Others say that being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident because it does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, precise and contractible by true differences, but only a precise and imperfect concept according to our mode of conceiving, contractible by intrinsic modes.

This is the common response of Scotists. But although this response suffices for this, that being is not said to be a genus with respect to God and creature (which indeed for this intention we have adduced in the preceding question, from number 7), yet in the present it does not seem sufficient.

The reason is that from this it suffices that being is not said to be a genus with respect to God and creature because then God and creature would not be primarily diverse in reality but would agree in some reality from the nature of the thing, potential, contractible, and determinable by other realities also signifying perfect realities. And thus necessarily there would be given in God a metaphysical composition from a double reality—contractible, namely, and contracting—which is an imperfection in God by no means to be constituted.

But that in creature there is given a perfect reality of finite being contractible by a true difference also signifying a perfect reality, and that these realities constitute a metaphysical composition in creature, is no inconvenience.

Therefore, if from elsewhere it is not proven that finite being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident, it is not well proven by saying that it does not signify a perfect reality contractible by true differences but only an inadequate concept contractible by intrinsic modes according to our mode of conceiving.

25. Others say that being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident as to its transcendence. For no transcendent predicate, they say, can be said to be a genus with respect to its inferiors.

This response is easily refuted from what was said in number 20 and 21. For it well composes that some predicate from itself is transcendent, that is, common to God and creatures, and as such is not a genus, and yet is a genus according to some peculiar reason.

For substance, as such, is a transcendent predicate, that is, common to God and creatures. Hence, as such, it does not have the reason of genus, for it does not signify a perfect reality contractible from the

nature of the thing by true differences, but only an imperfect concept contractible by our imperfect mode of conceiving by intrinsic modes.

And yet finite substance is a genus, for it signifies a perfect reality from the nature of the thing contractible by true differences, as all confess. Indeed, in this sense, it is now not a transcendent predicate.

Therefore, it can also compose that although this predicate "being," taken transcendently, that is, as it is common to God and creatures, is not a genus, nor does it signify a perfect reality contractible by true differences, but only an imperfect concept contractible by our imperfect mode of conceiving by intrinsic modes, yet that finite being is a genus and signifies a perfect reality from the nature of the thing contractible by true differences. Indeed, that in this sense it is not a transcendent predicate.

Hence, the aforementioned response does not convict that finite being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident.

26. Others, explaining transcendence otherwise, insist in the aforementioned response and firmly hold that finite being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident because it is transcendent.

For the transcendence of being, they say, consists in the excessive community of being, by which it is not only included in genera and species but also in some differences of inferiors, that is, of genera and species, according to what we have said in Question 4 of this disputation.

But this response, although it is optimal for showing that being is not a genus with respect to God and creature (and we have adduced it for this from the Subtle Doctor in the preceding question, number 9), yet it is not sufficient for the present intention.

Because Scotus speaks of being taken transcendently, as it is common to God and creatures, and of this he asserts that it is not a genus on account of its excessive community, because, namely, it is included quidditatively in some differences of inferiors.

Yet he does not speak of finite being as it is common to substance and accident, nor has he ever asserted that finite being is transcendent, nor that it is included quidditatively in some differences.

Hence, although it is true that the common concept of being common to God and creatures cannot be denominated a genus (because a genus ought to be so in potency that it is not included quidditatively in any differences of inferiors), yet finite being can be a genus because it is not included quidditatively in any differences of inferiors but signifies a perfect reality totally excluding from its formal concept from the nature of the thing any differences whatever. And thus it is truly from the nature of the thing potential and contractible by them, and consequently can be denominated a genus with respect to its inferiors.

27. That this is according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor is noted by the Most Learned Lychetus on [Scotus's commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 26, the only question, with these words:

"I say that in the way being is predicated in quid of God and the ultimate differences, he speaks of the ultimate differences in the order of constitution, as will be clear to the reader of the text, although of the ten predicaments it is predicated in another way. For as it is predicated of God and the ultimate differences, it is predicated in quid as signifying a concept not accepted from a reality perfectible by another. But as it is predicated of the ten predicaments, the predicate signifies a concept abstracted from a reality truly perfectible by another reality."

Otherwise, in my judgment, the Doctor cannot be saved.

These are the words of Lychetus, in which he clearly denotes that although being, as it signifies an imperfect concept and is common to God and creatures, is included quidditatively in the differences (on account of which it cannot be perfectible by true differences), yet being said of the ten predicaments, that is, of substance and accident (which is the same as finite being), is not included in the differences but signifies a perfect reality perfectible by true differences.

Hence, it follows that it is a genus with respect to substance and accident.

Behold how our conclusion has patrons not of small moment among Scotists. For of great authority are Lychetus and the Master, but of no less authority is reason itself.

28. Against this, thus it can be argued: In some differences, the quidditative reason of being is included. But such a reason of being is finite. Therefore, finite being is included quidditatively.

The major is supposed as certain from what was said.

But the minor is proven because the common reason of being to God and creatures is contracted in the way often said by the intrinsic mode of infinity to God, so that in God it is infinite being, and by the intrinsic mode of finitude to creature, so that in any reality of creature it is finite being.

Therefore, the reason of being included quidditatively in any difference is the reason of finite being.

But from this it follows that the reason of finite being cannot be a genus with respect to substance and accident, for what is included quidditatively in some differences of the inferiors of a genus does not have the reason of genus.

Therefore, the doctrine above handed down does not stand.

29. Although this argument thus disposed in form is not found, yet thus proposed, it seems at first glance to include no small difficulty, indeed to have efficacy for demonstrating the proposed.

Hence, we would willingly hear the responses of others. Yet necessity urges that we ourselves in some way according to our grasp intend to satisfy.

Therefore:

30. It is responded by conceding the whole argument except the subsumed minor, which we distinguish:

"From this it follows that the reason of finite being cannot be a genus with respect to substance and accident"—in the way that such a reason of finite being is conceived by us, it is true; in the way it is from the part of the thing, it is false.

Similarly, the proof included there can be distinguished:

"That which is included in the differences of inferiors in the way it is conceived by us cannot have the reason of genus"—also in the way it is conceived by us, it is true; "that which is included in the differences of inferiors in the way it is conceived by us cannot have the reason of genus in the thing or from its nature," it can be subdistinguished: if otherwise from the nature of the thing it is included quidditatively in those differences, it is to be admitted; if otherwise from the nature of the thing it is not included in those differences, it is false.

31. That you may grasp this, you must attentively note that finite being can be taken in two ways:

- First, as it is conceived by us, and as such it only signifies the most common reason of being and the intrinsic mode of finitude. And in this sense, any reality of creature and also the differences which we said include quidditatively being are called finite beings. Hence, finite being as it is conceived by us cannot be said to be a genus with respect to substance and accident, since it is included quidditatively in some differences of them.
- Second, it can be taken finite being according to what it signifies from the nature of the thing, and as such it does not signify precisely the most common reason of being and the intrinsic mode of finitude but signifies a certain perfect reality of creature from its nature prior to the intrinsic mode of finitude and modified by that intrinsic mode.

This is founded in this, that the intrinsic mode is posterior to the very reality which it modifies and supposes it constituted in its being, as is clear in God.

For although infinite being as it is conceived by us signifies nothing except the common reason of being and the intrinsic mode of infinity, by which, according to our mode of conceiving, it is contracted to the being of God, yet in the thing it signifies not only the common reason of being and the intrinsic mode of infinity but the very quiddity of God prior to such an intrinsic mode and modified by it. For such an intrinsic mode, since it is not a quidditative predicate of God, supposes God constituted in his being by his quidditative predicates.

In this second sense, finite being as it is common to substance and accident signifies a certain perfect reality modified by finitude, which reality is not included quidditatively in some differences.

For these are also perfect realities modified by finitude but are not the very reality which finite being as common to substance and accident signifies.

For this from the nature of the thing is as something contractible and potential, totally excluding from its formal concept from the nature of the thing any differences whatever, which are as something contracting and actuating.

32. Still more clearly this can be understood by these examples:

- Being per se, as it is conceived by us, only signifies the most common reason of being and the intrinsic mode of perfection, by which, according to our mode of conceiving, it is contracted to the being of substance. Yet in the thing, almost all confess that it signifies a perfect reality which is called substance, prior to the very perfection and modified by it, in which stands the formal constitutive reason of substance.

Because we do not know it according to its essence (for we do not know the essence of all things, but we explain them through something which we know), we explain it by the intrinsic mode of perfection.

That reality unknown to us is modified by the intrinsic mode of perfection, contractible and determinable by true differences, and is included quidditatively in none of them. And thus substance is said to be a genus with respect to its inferiors.

- So similarly that reality of finite being common to substance and accident, although unknown to us (on account of which, from the lack of words and our imperfect mode of conceiving it, we explain it by the common word "finite being"), is contractible and determinable by true differences and is included quidditatively in none of them. And thus finite being is said to be a genus with respect to substance and accident.

33. In another example: animal is a true reality contractible by rationality, although animal is finite being and rationality is also finite being.

For the reason of finite being agrees to both and is included in both, since each of them is a created reality. Yet the reality of animal, which is modified by finitude, is not included quidditatively in the reality of rationality, which is also modified by finitude.

And thus one reality can be in potency with respect to another.

So similarly, although any difference is being and finite being (since it is a created reality and modified by finitude, as is being and finite being), yet the reality unknown to us, which is signified by that which is common to substance and accident and which is modified by finitude, is not included quidditatively in the realities which are signified by the differences (which are also modified by finitude).

And thus the reality which is signified by finite being common to substance and accident can be in potency and contractible by any differences signifying perfect realities. And consequently, it can be a genus with respect to substance and accident.

34. We would dwell more on these things if the necessary lack of brevity did not obstruct. Yet it seems that if the said things are well perceived, nothing of any moment obstructs our conclusion, and the conclusion itself is recognized to be of easy defense.

35. From which it follows that accident is said univocally with a certain analogy, and consequently that it is a genus with respect to the nine predicaments of accident.

This from what has been said does not seem to need proof.

But against this as against the conclusion, many authorities can be opposed, both of Aristotle and of the Subtle Doctor, in which they seem to denote that finite being is not a genus with respect to substance and accident, nor is accident with respect to the nine predicaments of accident.

For they say that the ten predicaments are supreme genera, which could by no means be verified. For a supreme genus can have no genus above it. But if finite being were a genus with respect to substance and accident, and accident were a genus with respect to the nine predicaments of accident, now the ten predicaments would have some genus above them. Therefore, they would not be supreme genera.

Then, in many places the Philosopher intimates that finite being is contracted to the ten genera by intrinsic modes, not by differences, and similarly that accident is not contracted by differences but by intrinsic modes.

But what is contracted to inferiors by intrinsic modes and not by differences is not a genus with respect to the inferiors. Therefore, neither is being a genus with respect to substance and accident, nor is accident with respect to the nine predicaments of accident.

36. Omitting some solutions which can be seen with many other things conducing to this in the Master in the places cited above, especially in Logic:

First, it is responded that when Aristotle says that the ten predicaments are supreme genera and that finite being is contracted to substance and accident, and accident to the nine predicaments of accident, not by differences but by intrinsic modes, he speaks according to our mode of conceiving, in which sense it is true that being is contracted by intrinsic modes to substance and accident, namely, by perfection and imperfection.

For, as we have said above, we do not know through which the reality of finite being common to substance and accident is contracted in the thing, nor the constitutive differences of substance and accident, but we only know the common transcendental reasons and intrinsic modes.

And as such, it is true that neither is finite being a genus with respect to substance and accident, nor is accident with respect to the nine predicaments of accident. And consequently, it is true as such that the ten predicaments are supreme genera.

Yet this does not obstruct that in the thing they are not supreme genera, as is clear from our conclusion, that finite being in the thing is a genus above all predicaments, and accident above the nine genera of accidents.

In this sense, the authorities of Scotus must be explained, and in the same sense we have spoken in Logic when we said that being is not a genus, nor similarly is accident, and that the ten predicaments are supreme genera.

These suffice that the probability of our conclusion may be known. For we have only proposed it as probable. If to anyone the opposite seems better, let him teach us in the way of Scotus, and we will willingly hear.

QUESTION VIII

What an Intrinsic Mode Is and How It Is Distinguished from the Thing of Which It Is the Mode

1. Since we have often spoken in the whole disputation of intrinsic modes, it is worth knowing what an intrinsic mode is and in what way it is distinguished from the thing of which it is the mode.

This indeed is commonly explained confusedly by some. What seems to be held according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor and the consensus of some Scotists of great authority, we will here adduce as far as possible.

Therefore:

2. It must be noted first, with the common consensus, that intrinsic modes are given, distinct from extrinsic modes. But it is doubted in what intrinsic modes are distinguished from extrinsic.

And the reason for doubting is that mode, as the name sounds, is other than an adjacent determination of the thing modifying, by which is denoted that mode ought to be something extrinsic with respect to the modified thing. And consequently, that no mode can be given which is called intrinsic, distinguished from extrinsic.

For if it were distinguished, necessarily the extrinsic mode would be an adjacent extrinsic determination of the thing, and the intrinsic mode, as distinct from it, would be an adjacent intrinsic determination of the thing. But these terms "adjacent" and "intrinsic" fight among themselves. For "adjacent," as it sounds, signifies something extrinsic. Therefore, the name "intrinsic" cannot well be attributed to any mode as distinguished from an extrinsic mode.

3. But although this reason seems to have some appearance in terms, yet in the thing it has no difficulty. Therefore, it is true that mode is an adjacent determination of the thing, and that to the intrinsic mode is added that particle "intrinsic," and to the extrinsic mode that particle "extrinsic."

But it is false that these terms "adjacent" and "intrinsic" fight among themselves as they are here accepted. For by "adjacent" is denoted that mode is something supposing the essence and quiddity of the thing, and by "intrinsic" is understood that it is something really identified with the essence and quiddity.

By which it is clear that the aforementioned terms in no way fight among themselves, but it is clear well by this that the intrinsic mode is distinguished from the extrinsic.

For the latter not only supposes the essence and quiddity of the thing (which is denoted by "adjacent") but is also really distinguished from such essence and quiddity (which is denoted by "extrinsic").

Then, it is called an intrinsic mode because it in some way pertains to the first mode of per se predication of the thing which it modifies, as will be clear from what is said below.

But the extrinsic mode in no way pertains to the first mode of per se predication of the thing which it modifies. For the session which is called the extrinsic mode of Peter in no way pertains to the first mode

of per se predication of Peter but is wholly extrinsic with respect to it.

For what is desired about extrinsic modes, let the Master be consulted in Metaphysics, Disputation 2, Question 6, Article 1. For intrinsic modes, see Volume 4.

4. It must be noted second that just as being is divided by Scotists into "in quantum" and "non quantum" (by quantity, namely, of virtue or perfection), so by some the intrinsic mode is divided into "quantus" and "non quantus."

The "quantus" intrinsic mode is that which constitutes the thing in some perfect mode of being. The "non quantus" intrinsic mode is that which constitutes the thing in some non-perfect mode of being.

This depends on what is to be said in the matter of the Trinity in Theology when speaking of the divine relations.

Therefore, omitting the "non quantus" intrinsic mode and speaking of the "quantus" intrinsic mode, about which Scotists commonly speak:

5. It must be noted third that the intrinsic mode is usually divided into the intrinsic mode in genus and above genus.

The intrinsic mode in genus is said to be that which is applied to things contained under a genus or which are of some determinate genus.

The intrinsic mode above genus is said to be that which is applied to things which are not in a genus and to transcendental predicates.

For example, finitude and infinity, if they are compared to being taken transcendently, are said to be intrinsic modes above genus. But if they are compared to quantity and quality as predicamental, they are said to be intrinsic modes in genus.

Then, the intrinsic mode is also usually divided into essential and individual.

The essential is said to be that which modifies the essence of the thing, such as finitude, infinity, perfection, imperfection, and others of this kind. And it can be called essential transcendental, or generic, or specific, according to the nature of the thing which it modifies.

The individual is said to be that which modifies not some nature according to its essence but as individuated, such as intension and remission with respect to quality.

For one whiteness is not said to be more intense or more remiss than another with respect to essential perfection, but well with respect to individual perfection.

These noted, we will resolve the question through two sections.

SECTION I

For the First Part of the Question

6. We say, first, that the "quantus" intrinsic mode is thus defined by many Scotists:

"It is a determinate grade of perfection of any entity by which, made a comparison to another entity, it exceeds it or is exceeded by it."

This definition is deduced from Scotus in many places, and thus it is explained by him if this entity "whiteness" is taken and compared with another entity, e.g., with blackness, it exceeds it in double, and if it is compared with knowledge, it is exceeded by it in triple, and so with the rational soul, it is exceeded by it in decuple, and if with an angel, it is exceeded by it in centuple. And so, made a comparison in any beings, some proportion is always found in which the supreme exceeds the infimum until it comes to infinite being, which infinitely exceeds any finite being.

Hence, just as infinity is the intrinsic mode of God, explaining the excess of the perfection of God with respect to creatures, so the grade of perfection of any thing by which it exceeds another or is exceeded by it is said and is the intrinsic mode of any thing.

This definition thus explained and understood is denied by almost no Scotist, nor does anything appear to be objected against it.

7. We say, second, that the intrinsic mode is also thus usually defined:

"The intrinsic mode is that which, added to the thing of which it is the mode, does not vary the formal reason of it."

This definition, as deduced from Scotus in many places where he speaks of intrinsic modes, especially in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 8, Question 3, under letter Y, and Question 4, under letter Q, is commonly held by Scotists.

For its understanding, it must be noted that the intrinsic mode can be considered either comparatively to that which it contracts or comparatively to the constituted from it and the contracted.

For example, infinity and finitude can be considered in order to the common reason of being which they contract or in order to God and creature which are constituted from them and the reason of being contracted. And thus they are called intrinsic modes of being and intrinsic modes of God and creature.

Hence arises the doubt whether when it is said that the intrinsic mode does not vary the formal reason of the thing of which it is the mode, this ought to be understood of the common reason of being which is contracted by them or of the reasons of God and creature which are constituted by them.

8. In which difficulty, so that we may proceed more clearly, it must be observed from what has been often repeated above that the common reason of being as imperfectly conceived by us as something common to God and creatures does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing, precise, but only an inadequate concept of the reality of God and creature.

Hence, intrinsic modes, since they truly modify realities from the nature of the thing, are not rightly called intrinsic modes with respect to such a common concept of being. Indeed, as such, they are conceived by us in the manner of differences contracting and constituting the inferiors of being, and not as reasons modifying.

Thus, according to our mode of conceiving, something potential and contractible and some contracting and determining and a composition between the contracting and the contractible are given.

9. It must also be observed that to vary or not to vary the reason of the thing is not understood in the present for the distraction of the thing from its formal reason but for the contraction of the thing to constitute an inferior quiddity with it.

For example, rationality, which is the proper difference contracting animal, is not said to vary the formal reason of animal because it distracts animal from its formal reason (for animal remains in its most formal reason of living sensitive), yet it is said to vary the formal reason of animal because together with it it constitutes the quiddity of man, inferior to the quiddity of animal itself.

And in this sense, Scotus must be understood when he says that the intrinsic mode does not vary the reason of the thing of which it is the mode. For he opposes the intrinsic mode to the difference properly so called, as will be clear below.

These well observed:

10. It seems to be held first that when it is said that the intrinsic mode does not vary the reason of the thing of which it is the mode, it must neither be understood so that it does not vary the reason of being imperfectly conceived by us (which according to our imperfect mode of conceiving it contracts), nor so that it does not vary the reason of the constituted also according to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

This resolution seems evident.

And as to the first part, it is clear because according to our mode of conceiving, the intrinsic mode contracts the reason of being and with it constitutes a quiddity inferior to the quiddity of being taken precisely.

But from this, the difference in the thing is said to vary the formal reason of the thing of which it is said to be the difference because in the thing it contracts that reason and with it constitutes a quiddity inferior to the quiddity of that reason which it contracts in the thing.

Therefore, similarly, the intrinsic mode according to our imperfect mode of conceiving varies the formal reason of that which according to our mode of conceiving it contracts. And consequently, "not to vary the formal reason of the thing of which it is the mode" must not be understood so that it does not vary the reason of being imperfectly conceived by us, which according to our imperfect mode of conceiving it contracts.

11. The second part is also clear because the difference does not vary the formal reason of the constituted from it and the common reason which it contracts in the thing.

For rationality does not vary the formal reason of man but constitutes the formal reason of man.

So the intrinsic mode does not vary the reason of the constituted from it and the common reason which it contracts according to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

For finitude does not vary the formal reason of creature but constitutes creature according to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

But the intrinsic mode is said not to vary the formal reason of the thing of which it is the mode so that it may be distinguished from the difference, which varies the formal reason of the thing of which it is the mode.

Hence, "not to vary the formal reason of the thing of which it is the mode" must not be understood so that it does not vary the reason of the constituted from it and the common reason which it contracts according to our imperfect mode of conceiving.

12. Hence, it seems to be held second that the intrinsic mode is said not to vary the thing of which it is the mode, made a comparison with the thing which from the nature of the thing it modifies, so that it may be distinguished from the difference.

Which is thus explained: the difference, e.g., rationality, is said to vary the formal reason of animal to which it is added from the nature of the thing because, as was said, it constitutes with animal a certain quiddity inferior to the quiddity of animal, namely, the quiddity of man, so that it enters into the very quidditative reason of man. For it is a quidditative predicate of man itself.

But the intrinsic mode does not vary the formal reason of the thing to which from the nature of the thing it is added because it does not constitute with it any quiddity inferior to the quiddity of the reason to which it is added, nor does it signify any quidditative predicate to any quiddity or pertaining quidditatively.

Whether this must be understood of all intrinsic modes is still a controversy. But for that:

13. It seems to be said that this must be understood of all intrinsic modes, both in genus and above genus, both essential and individual.

This is clear because infinity is an intrinsic mode above genus and modifies in the thing the quiddity of God to which it is added and does not constitute with the deity any quiddity inferior to the quiddity of God. For no grade or quidditative predicate does it signify but only modifies the quiddity of God to which it is added and which it supposes.

The same is said of the intrinsic mode of finitude, which modifies the quiddity of creature.

Again, perfection is an intrinsic mode in genus, essential, and modifies in the thing the quiddity of substance to which it is added and does not constitute with substance any quiddity inferior to the quiddity of substance. For no grade or quidditative predicate does it signify but only modifies the quiddity of substance to which it is added and which it supposes.

Finally, the grade of intension, as four or five, is an individual intrinsic mode of quality and modifies in the thing the individual quality to which it is added and does not constitute with such a quality any individual quiddity (if it is licit to so speak) inferior to the individual quiddity of such an individual quality. For no grade or individual quidditative predicate does it signify but only modifies the aforementioned individual quality to which it is added and which it supposes.

Behold how "not to vary the formal reason of the thing" agrees to all intrinsic modes.

14. This can still be explained by some similitude taken from what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* VIII, text 10, speaking of numbers, that differences with respect to quiddities behave as numbers.

For as by the addition or subtraction of some unity, the species of number are immediately varied (admitting for now that species of number are given), by the addition of some unity to the ternary, e.g., immediately the quaternary is made, and by the subtraction the binary, which are diverse species from the ternary.

So it happens in the quiddities of things. For example, animated sensitive substance is the quiddity of animal, and if to it is added rational, immediately the quiddity of man is made. But if from it is taken away sensitive, only the quiddity of plant remains.

Not so does it happen in intrinsic modes. For whether to some is added or from it is taken away, the quidditative state of the thing is never varied, as is clear from the aforementioned.

This can still be more clearly shown from what is to be said, for which let it be.

SECTION II

For the Second Part of the Question

15. It is not a little controverted among Scotists whether the intrinsic mode is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the thing of which it is the mode.

And it is presupposed as certain that the intrinsic mode is truly and really given from the part of the thing independently of the consideration of the intellect.

For truly and really God is infinite by infinity, which is his intrinsic mode, and similarly substance truly and really is being per se by perfection, which is its intrinsic mode. The same must be said of intension and of any other intrinsic mode.

Now through the following conclusions, we will propose what seems to be held according to the mind of the Subtle Doctor.

Therefore:

16. We say, first, that the intrinsic mode does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing distinct from the thing of which it is the mode.

This conclusion is held by almost all Scotists with Scotus in the places cited below.

It is proven by a principle received in the whole subtle school: perfect realities or formalities are those of which any can be conceived by a perfect and adequate concept distinct from another perfect and adequate concept by which the other is conceived.

But the thing cannot be perfectly and adequately conceived without its intrinsic mode. Therefore, the intrinsic mode pertains to the perfect concept of the reality which it modifies. Consequently, the intrinsic mode does not signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing distinct from the reality of which it is the mode.

17. The minor, in which is the difficulty, is proven from Scotus. For we speak with Scotists in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 8, Question 3, towards the response, under letter Y, where he has these words:

"When some reality is understood with its intrinsic mode, that concept is not so simply simple that that reality can be conceived without that mode. But then it is an imperfect concept of that thing. It can also be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing."

Therefore, from the mind of Scotus, no reality can be perfectly conceived without its intrinsic mode.

And Scotus proceeds thus exemplifying:

"If whiteness were under the tenth grade of intension, it could be conceived under the reason of such whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived by a concept adequate to that thing. Or it could be conceived precisely under the reason of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect and deficient concept from the perfection of the thing."

Behold how from the mind of Scotus, the concept of whiteness with the intrinsic mode of intension is perfect, and without such a mode is imperfect. Therefore, by no means does the intrinsic mode signify a perfect reality from the nature of the thing distinct from the thing of which it is the mode.

Almost similar words are repeated by Scotus in many places.

18. We say, second, that the intrinsic mode is in some way distinguished from the nature of the thing from the thing of which it is the mode.

This conclusion is held everywhere by Scotists, but in explaining it, they behave diversely.

For some say that this distinction is not a formal positive distinction but only a formal negative distinction, because the intrinsic mode does not signify its own proper formality and perfect reality.

But although it is true, as was said in the preceding conclusion, that the intrinsic mode does not signify a perfect reality or formality, yet on account of this it is not to be said that the aforementioned distinction is not positive.

For the intrinsic mode signifies from itself something positive. Therefore, if it is in some way distinguished from the nature of the thing from the thing of which it is the mode, such a distinction must be called positive.

Hence, the Master in Volume 1, Metaphysics, Disputation 2, Question 6, holds that this distinction cannot be called a formal distinction from the nature of the thing positive, understanding for a formal distinction from the nature of the thing positive a distinction of reality from reality or of formality from formality.

Yet it can be called positive insofar as it is a distinction of reality from its intrinsic mode positive.

Hence, he says that just as a real distinction is versed either between thing and thing (and thus it is called absolutely a real distinction) or between thing and extrinsic mode (and thus it is called a real modal distinction, because it is deficient from the perfection of the thing on the part of one extreme, namely, of the extrinsic mode), so similarly a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is versed either between reality and reality or between formality and formality (and thus it is called absolutely a formal distinction from the nature of the thing) or between reality or formality and intrinsic mode (and thus it is called a formal modal distinction from the nature of the thing, because it is deficient from the perfection of reality or formality on the part of one extreme, namely, of the intrinsic mode).

Almost similarly, Vulpes understands this distinction in Volume 1, Part 1, Disputation 8, Article 3.

19. The conclusion is deduced from the Subtle Doctor in the cited place, number 17, where among other things he has these words:

"Therefore, a distinction is required between that from which the common concept is taken and that from which the proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and its proper and intrinsic mode."

Where it must be well noted that Scotus speaks of a distinction from the nature of the thing. For he does not say that a distinction is required between the common concept and the proper concept (for this is a distinction through the intellect, as has been often said in the preceding), but he says that a distinction is required between that from which the common concept is taken and that from which the proper concept is taken.

And it is certain that those from which the aforementioned concepts are taken are given from the nature of the thing and independently of the consideration of the intellect. And consequently, from the mind of Scotus, the distinction assigned by Scotus between the intrinsic mode and the thing of which it is the mode is a distinction from the nature of the thing.

20. Then, the conclusion can be proven from the same Doctor in [his commentary on] the *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 2, Question 2, from these to the question, under letter B, towards "I say that no," letter C says this proposition: "God is being," is known through this, but this: "God is infinite," is not known through itself, since it is demonstrable a priori and propter quid through this medium: "to be from itself primarily and quidditatively belongs to the divine nature."

But what is demonstrable a priori propter quid about something cannot be a quidditative predicate of it but something posterior to the quiddity and in some way outside the quiddity.

Therefore, infinity, which is the intrinsic mode of God, is not a quidditative predicate of it but something posterior to the quiddity of God and in some way outside it. And consequently, in some way distinguished from it from the nature of the thing.

21. Nor is it valid what some respond, namely, that it well stands that some proposition is known through itself and another not, without any distinction between the extremes except according to the explicit and implicit concept of the same thing.

For this proposition, "Man is animal," is not known through itself, but this, "Man is living sensitive," is known through itself, and yet animal and living sensitive are not distinguished in the thing but only according to the explicit and implicit concept.

Hence, from this that this is known through itself, "God is," and this is not, "God is infinite," it does not follow that infinity is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the deity, but only according to the explicit and implicit concept.

22. But against is that the Doctor does not precisely say that this proposition, "God is," is known through itself, and this, "God is infinite," is not known through itself, but also assigns the reason, namely, that therefore this proposition, "God is," is known through itself because it is immediate and explains the quiddity of God or what pertains to the quiddity of God.

But this proposition, "God is infinite," is not known through itself because it is not immediate or pertaining to the quiddity of God in this way but is mediate and demonstrable about God through "to be from itself," which is of his essence as through a medium, in the way that passions or quasi-passions are demonstrated about some subject.

Therefore, Scotus holds that infinity is outside the quiddity of God and something posterior to it, as a passion or quasi-passion of God itself. And consequently, from the mind of Scotus, infinity is in some way distinguished from the nature of the thing from the deity, though not as a reality from a reality, at least as a mode from a reality.

23. Then, the conclusion can still be proven by some reasons by which we have proven in Logic that a formal distinction from the nature of the thing is given, which indeed can be applied here in a proportionate way.

And certainly, with this distinction between the intrinsic mode and the thing of which it is the mode admitted as Scotistic, better foundations are rooted for proving and defending the formal distinction from

the nature of the thing in others.

And perhaps, that denied, as some Scotists deny, not easily are the Scotistic principles about the formal distinction from the nature of the thing firmly held, nor are the opposed arguments so satisfied that the contraries cannot easily retort them against the Scotists.

24. Yet some Scotists argue: Circumscribed everything which is not formally deity, God is infinite. Therefore, infinity does not signify something formally distinct from deity.

The antecedent is clear because circumscribed everything which is not formally deity, God is formally perfect, but not finitely perfect. Therefore, infinitely. And consequently, etc.

It is responded by denying the antecedent. And the major of the proof is distinguished:

"God, circumscribed everything which is not formally deity, is formally perfect"—I concede; "but not finitely perfect"—I deny.

For God, circumscribed everything which is not formally deity, is only fundamentally perfect, not formally.

For deity from its most formal concept is the necessary foundation of infinity, not formally infinite.

25. Nor from this should you infer that deity is an indifferent and potential concept.

For although according to our imperfect mode of conceiving, some common and quasi-potential concepts are abstracted from God and determinable by the intrinsic mode, yet in the thing nothing potential is given in God, since deity and all the realities and formalities of God are the necessary foundation of infinity.

Hence, the divine intellect and the intellect of the blessed, intuitively cognizing the divine essence and the attributes of God see no reality in God as indifferent. Rather, they see the divine essence as the necessary foundation of infinity and as modified by infinity itself, which is modally distinct from the essence by the nature of the thing. And they know God to be infinite because He has His quidditative being from Himself.

This is what Scotus intends when in the cited place (n. 17, towards "This can," before letter Z) he says that although with respect to an intellect conceiving perfectly, there are two formal objects (the reality of the genus and the reality of the difference), yet the thing and the intrinsic mode are not two formal objects but one formal object modified.

See there, for while speaking of the distinction between reality and its intrinsic mode, he proposes:

26. Argument 2:

God, by His quiddity, is that than which nothing greater can be thought (this proposition is deduced from Anselm, *Proslogion* 2). Therefore, infinity is formally included in His quiddity taken precisely.

Response 1:

Anselm did not describe God by His quiddity taken precisely but as He is conceived by us through infinity. Hence, the consequence is denied.

Response 2:

The consequence is also denied because when God is said by His quiddity to be that than which nothing greater can be thought, it is not required that in His quidditative concept infinity be included. Rather, it suffices that He be the necessary foundation of infinity, and this also suffices for God by His quiddity to be called the ocean, root, and origin of all infinite perfections.

See Scotus, *Quodlibet*, Question 5, under letter X.

27. Argument 3:

The divine essence is said to be formally infinite, and similarly the perfections of the divine attributes are said to be formally infinite. But the relations of origin, in the Scotist opinion, are not said to be formally infinite. Yet if infinity is something from the nature of the thing distinct from the divine essence and attributes and only really identified with them, there is no reason why the relations of origin should not also be said to be formally infinite, since they too are really identified with infinity.

Response:

The major is conceded, but the minor is denied.

For there is a maximum difference between the essence (the same is said of the attributes) and the relations.

The essence is not said to be formally infinite precisely because it is really identified with infinity (for this would not suffice for it to be called formally infinite), but because from its formal concept it is the necessary foundation of infinity, and thus it intrinsically requires to be modified by infinity so that it cannot be perfectly conceived without infinity.

The same is said of the attributes.

But the relations of origin, from their formal concept, are not such a necessary foundation of infinity, nor do they intrinsically require to be modified by infinity. Rather, they can be perfectly conceived without infinity, and thus they are not said to be formally infinite but only really and identically, insofar as they are really identified with the divine essence, which is formally infinite in the way said.

COROLLARIES FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID**28. First Corollary:**

Although the intrinsic mode agrees in the thing with the difference in this, that both are outside the quiddity of that to which they are applied (e.g., rationality, which is a difference, is outside the quiddity of animal; and intension, which is an intrinsic mode of whiteness, is outside the quiddity of whiteness), yet they differ in many ways:

1. **First**, the intrinsic mode intrinsically perfects the reality of which it is the mode, whereas the difference only extrinsically perfects.

For whiteness, with respect to its entity, is perfected by the grades of intension, whereas animal is not intrinsically perfected with respect to its entity but extrinsically by rationality.

2. **Second**, they differ in that a reality cannot be perfectly conceived without its intrinsic mode, whereas the reality of a genus can be perfectly conceived without its difference.

For animal, although it is conceived in the most perfect way with respect to its quidditative being, does not yet include the concept of rationality, which is its difference.

3. **Third**, they differ in that from the same reality, the objective concept of the intrinsic mode and the concept of the thing of which it is the mode are taken.

But the concept of the difference is taken from a diverse reality than that from which the concept of the genus is taken. Otherwise, wherever the reality from which animal is taken is found, there would also be found the reality from which rationality is taken—which is false.

4. **Fourth**, they differ in that the difference, added to the genus, varies the formal and quidditative reason of it, whereas the intrinsic mode does not vary the formal and quidditative reason of the thing of which it is the mode.

All these remain sufficiently explained throughout the question.

29. Second Corollary:

The intrinsic mode also differs in many ways from a passion, although they agree in this, that both are outside the quiddity.

1. **First**, they differ in that the passion signifies a perfect reality distinct from the essence, whereas the intrinsic mode does not.

2. **Second**, in that the essence can be perfectly conceived without the passion, but not without the intrinsic mode.

3. **Third**, in that the passion emanates from the essence constituted in its perfect being, whereas the intrinsic mode is a grade of perfection of the essence itself and not something emanating from the essence perfectly constituted.

4. **Fourth**, in that the passion has its intrinsic mode as a grade of perfection modifying it, whereas the intrinsic mode does not have another intrinsic mode modifying and perfecting it but is the pure modification of the thing of which it is the mode.

These differences are deduced from Scotus in many places, cited above and in others, where he firmly holds that infinity is not an attribute of God but only an intrinsic mode. There he assigns the difference between an attribute and an intrinsic mode.

And it is certain that the attributes in God behave in the way that passions behave in created essences.

Expressly also in *Quodlibet*, Question 5, under letter C, he says that the intrinsic mode must not be confused with a passion but is more intimate to the essence than a passion.

These are the words of Scotus:

"Intensive infinity signifies an intrinsic mode of that entity of which it is so intrinsic that, circumscribing everything which is a property or quasi-property of it, its infinity is not excluded."

What could be clearer?

30. From this, some deduce with Smising, Tract 2, Disputation 1, that the intrinsic mode does not pertain to the second mode of *per se* predication, as a passion does.

For the intrinsic mode is more intimate to the essence than a passion, nor does the intrinsic mode make one concept quasi-*per accidens* with the thing of which it is the mode, as a passion does with its subject.

Rather, the intrinsic mode makes with the thing of which it is the mode one *per se* perfect concept. Hence, it is more correctly said to pertain to the first mode of *per se* predication than to the second.

But lest any equivocation arise, it must be noted with the Master, Part 2, *Institutiones Logicae*, Tract 1, Chapter 3, that in the first mode of *per se* predication, some grades can be assigned:

1. The first is when the whole definition is predicated of the defined.
2. The second is when a part of the definition is predicated of the defined.
3. The third is when the mode is predicated of the thing of which it is the mode.

Hence, it is clear that the intrinsic mode is predicated in the third grade of the first mode of *per se* predication.

This is because it in some way pertains to the quiddity of the thing of which it is the mode, since without it the thing cannot be perfectly conceived.

But it is not predicated in the first and second grades, for in these grades only quidditative predicates are said, and the intrinsic mode is not a quidditative predicate.

CONCLUSION

These suffice for this disputation, whose difficulties we confess to be almost insuperable.