

FIFTH QUESTION

What is the original sin contracted by the posterity of Adam?

By the name of original sin is here understood a defect not of action but by which human nature is rendered hateful to God and worthy of the punishment of loss. It is contracted by all, with the sole exception of the Mother of God through special privilege, who descend from Adam by natural generation. And it is called "original" not because it is the origin of other sins, but either because it is transfused by origin or natural generation, or because we contract it from our first origin, that is, from our first parent.

We presuppose here as a dogma of faith that this sin exists, contrary to Pelagius and his disciples Celestius and Julian, who said, according to Augustine in Heresy 84, that Adam by sinning harmed only himself, not his posterity, except by example, and that bodily death in us is a defect of nature, not a punishment for original sin, and that baptism is given to infants not to erase original sin but only so that they may attain the Kingdom of Heaven, which they cannot attain without baptism. Among all the Fathers, the most vigorous opponent of this heresy was especially Augustine in many places, since it arose in his time.

It is expressly gathered from many passages of Scripture, such as Job 14: "Who can make clean that which is conceived of unclean seed?" and Psalm 50: "In sins did my mother conceive me," and Romans 5: "As through one man sin entered into the world." These and similar passages are everywhere interpreted by the Fathers as referring to original sin, and this is the common understanding of the Fathers, which, after other Councils, was finally approved by the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 4.

From this it happened that other heretics, followers of Pelagius, admitted indeed that we contracted bodily death as a punishment from Adam's sin, but not the death of the soul or any sin that is called original. Their error was also condemned in the Second Council of Orange, Canon 2, with these words: "If anyone says that Adam's transgression harmed him alone and not his offspring, or certainly that only bodily death, which is the punishment of sin, but not also sin, which is the death of the soul, etc." After this definition, the Council of Trent, in the aforementioned session, Canon 5, also decreed that through baptism all that has the true and proper nature of sin is taken away. Therefore, from Adam's transgression we contracted not only the punishment of sin but also guilt, which in us is called original.

Moreover, since Durandus (2 dist. 30, q. 2 & 3), Rubion (dist. 32, art. 3, at the end), and some other older Scholastics said that original sin in a child, although it is a certain defect of nature, nevertheless does not have the true and proper nature of guilt because it is not voluntary, it is to be assumed that it is truly and properly sin. For thus speak the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Councils when they say that not only the punishment of sin, which is improperly called sin, is transfused from Adam to his posterity, but that sin is truly transfused. And the Council of Trent, teaching in the place cited that through baptism all that has the true

and proper nature of sin is taken away, plainly supposes that the original defect in us is truly and properly sin.

And the reason why it should be considered as such is that not only actual sin but also habitual sin is said truly and properly to be sin insofar as it is a stain left in the soul after the act of sin, constituting it hostile and inimical to God. Hence, one is no less properly said to have sin and to remain in sin, namely habitual sin, than to commit sin when one sins in act. And just as one is denominated sinning from actual sin, so one is called a sinner from habitual sin.

Moreover, Scotus teaches (2 dist. 32 B) that original sin is to be compared with sin remaining in the soul, that is, with habitual sin, not with actual sin, since it is not something physically produced or committed by us with actual awareness and our own freedom. For when a human is conceived in the womb, he does not sin by his own act. Hence, in this matter, no other actual sin is given except that very sin of Adam, by which posterity is said to have sinned only in Adam, who was constituted by God as their moral head, but not in themselves.

Just as, therefore, in each person actually sinning, a personal stain is left from actual sin, denominating him habitually a sinner, so from that sin of Adam there arises in all his posterity an original stain, denominating them sinners from their origin. And this is what we call original sin, and we assert that it has the true and proper nature of guilt.

Nor is it an obstacle that such sin is not voluntary for us, because, as the Doctor says (dist. 32 cited, ad 1, first question), "voluntary" is used in two ways: either in oneself or in another. In the first way, actual sin is voluntary; in the second way, original sin is voluntary, namely in our first head, Adam, as Augustine says in the book "On Marriage and Concupiscence," chapter 28, 1 Peter 33.

That this interpretative voluntariness in the head is sufficient for posterity to contract true offense and enmity with God and a stain of the soul, theologians are accustomed to explain by the example of a Prince making a covenant with a soldier to receive him and his posterity into his favor and friendship if he conducts himself well in war. If the soldier conducts himself badly, not only he himself but also his posterity incur the just offense and enmity of the prince, as well as a moral stain in their own person. If, therefore, a Prince can do this, how much more could God the Lord have the right over the will of all, compelling them with the will of one principle, all originating, which He also constituted as the moral head. Nor is any other notion of voluntariness more properly so-called required for the constitution of original guilt, since this is not in children a sin of action but of nature. This is extensively explained by St. Anselm in his work "On the Virgin Conception," chapters 22, 23, and 27.

Since, however, the whole difficulty of this question consists in assigning the quidditative reason for this sin, we must briefly reject some errors and some improbable opinions so that we may discuss more probable ones that are controversial in the schools without waste of time.

First, therefore, it must be said that original sin is not the substance of human nature itself as corrupted, as some Manicheans said, both because nothing is evil by its own nature and

because it is against the Council of Trent, which in the place cited says that through baptism the nature of all sin is taken away, and yet human nature is not destroyed.

Nor is it a stain contracted by the soul before it enters the body, as Origen thought, for it is certain from the common opinion of the Fathers that this sin is propagated to posterity from the first parent through generation, but the soul, before it informs the body, has no origin or consanguinity with the first parent.

Nor is it concupiscence, or the proneness to evil, as some heretics said, for this, in first act, is a natural power of man and would have been a condition in man if created in a state of pure nature, and that it is not sin in itself is clear from James 1: "Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, which, when it has conceived, brings forth sin." Therefore, in itself it is not sin, but at most inclines to sin. Hence this error was condemned in the Council of Trent in the place cited, where it teaches that through baptism all the nature of sin is taken away, and it still affirms that concupiscence remains as a trial, which was also the doctrine of Augustine in the book "On the Merits and Remission of Sins," chapter 28, and book 1 "On Marriage and Concupiscence," chapters 23 and 25.

Indeed, theologians teach that not only is concupiscence in first act and as a habit not formally sin, but neither is it in second act unless when man consents to it by his will. That the Apostle in Romans 6 and 7 and Hebrews 11 calls it sin, the Council itself in the place cited explains that it is not truly sin but is called sin because it is from sin and inclines to sin.

Nor is it a certain noxious quality, as some Scholastics said, which they called morbid and pestiferous, instilled in the flesh from Adam's sin, and from the flesh into the soul. For we experience in ourselves no such morbid quality inclining the sensitive appetite against the rule of reason to the delectable. Also, it cannot be explained how, since it has force, it can infect the soul, which is spiritual, and how Adam's sin had the power to cause such a morbid quality and not the other sins of parents over so long a period of time and through so many generations, so that it is not finally consumed. On this, the Doctor is to be seen in distinction 32, second article.

Nor, finally, can it be said that original sin is nothing other than that first sin committed by Adam, imputed then to posterity as if it were their own or common to each, and by that one sin all posterity are defiled just as Adam himself was, as Pighius, Catherinus, Salmeron, and some other Catholics said, which is gathered from Romans 5: "Through the disobedience of one, many were made sinners," and from the Fathers often saying that we are infected and stained by Adam's sin.

This opinion, I say, is rejected by theologians, who say that original sin is not only Adam's sin, as it were extrinsically denominating posterity sinners, but it must be granted that there is something peculiar in the infants themselves that is original sin. For this reason, they say that although the Blessed Virgin, with other men, sinned in Adam, nevertheless she did not contract original sin in herself. Hence, from the fact that all sinned in Adam, it does not follow that they thereby contracted original sin, but at most the debt of contracting it, which many for this reason also admitted in the Blessed Virgin, though not the original guilt itself.

Moreover, the definition of the Council of Trent cited in Canon 3 directly militates against this opinion: "If anyone says that this sin of Adam, which is one in origin and transfused by

propagation, not imitation, and is in all, proper to each," it expressly distinguishes original sin as it preceded in the head and as it is transfused and is in the members, and teaches that we are called sinners through sin transfused into us and inherent and proper to each, not by imitation but by propagation. If we are all called sinners not by some sin inherent in us but existing only in Adam, as this opinion asserts, the individuals could not be said to be sinners by sin transfused into them and inherent in them.

You will say: the same disobedience of Adam is transfused into posterity. For either by this is understood formally and according to itself, communicated by mere extrinsic denomination, and this does not satisfy the definition of the Council, because Adam's sin is not proper to each but is common to all. Or it is understood intrinsically and by inherence, and this cannot reasonably be asserted because Adam's actual sin immediately passed away and is not renewed in children by any action of theirs. Or Adam's sin is transfused not according to itself but as to the penalties that were born from it, and this pertains to the error of those Pelagians cited at the beginning of the question, who said that death is drawn from Adam, not sin. Or, finally, it is understood that Adam's sin is communicated to posterity causally and according to effect, so that original sin in us is said to be the effect of Adam's actual sin, and this is plainly true and intended by the Council and the Fathers and by the Apostle cited when he said, "Through the disobedience of one, many were made sinners," not that infants are constituted sinners formally through actual disobedience, as the opinion says, but only causally, insofar as that was the cause of the sin of infants, from which they are then intrinsically denominated sinners.

And that this was the sense of the Apostle is gathered from the comparison he introduces when he says there that we are constituted sinners by Adam's sin just as we are made just by Christ's justice. But we are not made just formally by Christ's justice extrinsically imputed to us, but by justice inherent in us, according to the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 and Canon 10, and infused from Christ's merits. Therefore, neither are we formally constituted sinners by Adam's sin extrinsically imputed to us, but by sin inherent in us. For just as no one can be denominated meritorious from another's merit unless he intrinsically participates it in himself, so neither can one be denominated a sinner from another's extrinsic sin unless he in some way participates it in himself, since nothing is so proper as sin or merit.

It remains, therefore, for us to examine the three more probable opinions that are frequent in the schools in the following articles, which we shall now do.

FIRST ARTICLE

Whether original sin is Adam's sin itself, morally transfused into us and persevering in the manner of a habit?

The affirmative part is held by many recent theologians who, speaking consistently with the doctrine they have handed down concerning personal habitual sin, assert that original sin is the transgression itself morally persevering in infants as long as it is not pardoned. For since habitual sin is the actual itself morally persisting while not pardoned, and the actual of this habitual, which is in the child, was Adam's transgression, the consequence is that it, morally

persevering in this child, is his original sin. Thus Curiel (p. 2, qu. 82, art. 3, dub. 4), Granadus (6 "On Sins," tract 8, disp. 3, sect. 1), Jo. de Lugo (disp. "On Habitual," sect. 7), Arriaga (disp. 51, sect. 4), Oviedo (tract 6, contriv. 5, punct. 9), and from among our own, Poncius (disp. 18, qu. 5, num. 28), Vulpes (140, art. 6), and many other moderns, claiming that this mode of speaking does not coincide with the opinion of Pighius already rejected, but optimally preserves the manner of speaking of Scripture and the councils, since they do not affirm that we are constituted sinners by Adam's sin itself formally, but by sin morally transfused into us and morally remaining in us until it is deleted in individuals through the remedy instituted by God. Indeed, Arriaga (cited sect. 1) is very much grieved that almost all authors have so severely criticized the opinion of Pighius and Catherinus as to consider it almost heretical because the Council defined that this sin is truly transfused into posterity and is proper to each, which two things do not cohere with the aforesaid opinion, teaching that there was only that one sin and by it we are extrinsically denominated.

Perhaps, he says, those authors themselves handed down the true opinion if when they say that denomination of sin is only extrinsic to us, they are not speaking in the genus of morals but rather intrinsic in this, as he himself later explains in sect. 4.

This opinion, however, although it is quite plausible among recent theologians, even of our school, is rejected by all who place the essence of actual sin in the privation of original justice due, which was the unanimous consensus of the older Scholastics, as will appear in article 3, and especially it is attacked by Galles among our own (in 3, qu. 1, prelude 4) and Gavatus (tract on stain, disp. 2, sect. 3).

First, therefore, it is argued from the words of the Apostle in Romans 5: "Through the disobedience of one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death," where the particle "through" signifies causality. If, therefore, Adam's sin is the root and cause of original sin in posterity, then Adam's actual sin itself cannot be the original sin of posterity insofar as it is not pardoned in them, for the same thing cannot be the cause of itself.

Poncius denies the consequence, for sin could be the font and origin of the original sin of posterity even though it itself is the original sin of posterity. For that it was physically committed by Adam was the reason and cause why the same would pass over morally and they would be infected by it as by original sin. Hence the same thing, as it is compared to one, can be the moral cause why it can apply to others according to another formality.

But against this, because not only is a physical cause adequately distinguished from its effect, but also a moral cause in its order is distinguished from its effect. Therefore, although Adam's actual sin is posited as only the moral cause of the original sin of posterity, this original sin cannot be said to be the very actual sin of the first parent.

Confirmation: Original sin of posterity is related to Adam's actual sin just as death is related to original sin, as the Apostle says in the same place. But although original sin is only the moral cause of bodily death, this is still an effect distinct from original sin. Therefore, likewise, although Adam's actual sin is only the moral cause of the original sin of posterity, this sin must still be posited as an effect distinct from it. For from the parity there introduced by the Apostle, the original sin of posterity is the effect of the actual sin of the first parent, just as bodily death is the effect of our original sin.

Finally, from the Apostle in the same place, Adam's sin and through it we are constituted sinners passes to us morally just as the merit and obedience of Christ, through which we are constituted just. But the same merit and justice of Christ does not pass to us morally so that by it we are made formally just, but something peculiar in us is assigned, infused from Christ's merits, by which we are called just, from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 7 and Canon 10. Therefore, likewise, Adam's sin does not so pass to us morally that by it, the very same, we are denominated originally sinners, whether this denomination is extrinsic, as Pighius said, or intrinsic in the genus of morals, as recent theologians say. But still something peculiar in infants must be granted, distinct from the actual sin of the first parent and caused by it, which is original sin in them and by which they are formally denominated sinners.

This reasoning has great efficacy, as it is founded on the comparison introduced there by the Apostle between the condemnation of the first parents and the redemption of Christ the Lord: "Just as through the disobedience of one, many were made sinners, so through the obedience of one, many are made just," etc.

Second proof from the Council of Trent:

Secondly, it is argued from the Council of Trent cited, saying that original sin is transfused into posterity through Adam's sin and is proper to each. Therefore, it cannot be Adam's sin itself, because sin committed by Adam neither is transfused into us, because it passed away, nor is it intrinsic to us but extrinsic, nor is it proper to each but common to all. This is also confirmed by Session 5, Canon 3, when it teaches that those who are born from Adam contract from him their own injustice. If, therefore, they contract their own injustice, not one common to all and to Adam himself.

Poncius also responds that although it is physically the same sin contracted by all, morally it can be said to be morally multiplied in all of them, because that one is equivalent to many, each of which would be contracted by each, as much as constituting them all sinners as if not one physical sin were contracted by all, but a different one by each. Granatus explains this by the example of a King who wishes to ennoble some knight and all who will be generated from him. For from this one and the same act of will can result in all sons generated from him their own nobility, numerically distinct and proper to each. So, therefore, in the proposition, from one and the same sin of Adam in number can result in all posterity descending from him his own stain, numerically distinct and proper to each.

Indeed, Poncius says that so much emphasis should not be placed on the word "proper" used by the Council, because it is not relevant, for it signifies that it is proper to each, not in such a way that it is not also another's, but that it is true and proper, that is, not fictitious or improper, the sin of each.

As for that about transfusion, he says that from that rather his own opinion is confirmed, because the Council says that Adam's sin, which is one in origin, is transfused into posterity. But certainly, if it were not that very sin in posterity but other sins, it could hardly or scarcely be said to be transfused into posterity and to be in all, proper to each, but rather it should be said that by reason of it other sins are contracted by posterity, and one proper to each.

Finally, regarding the objection that Adam's sin is extrinsic to us, whereas original sin should be intrinsic, Arriaga says this is of no moment, and the difficulty is only about the name. For many things are extrinsic to some subject physically and yet are reputed morally intrinsic to it, which he shows by various examples, and especially in the proposition, this whole must be admitted because, since all sin is in the genus of morals, no other inherence and reason of the intrinsic can be sought in it than within the genus of morals itself, which is also manifestly seen in actual sin itself. For the prohibition of the object, from which especially the act is called evil, is a certain extrinsic denomination and is not physically intrinsic to the act, yet it is considered intrinsic in the genus of morals. So, therefore, in the proposition, although Adam's first sin is physically extrinsic to us, it is nevertheless considered intrinsic to us in the genus of morals. For Adam's sin, committed in the name of posterity, is as it were transfused into his children and behaves as if it were intrinsic and proper to him, insofar as it so behaves as to place a right in God of reasonable aversion toward them as if it were now actually done by them, if it is not pardoned.

However, this response in no part of it satisfies. For although it is true that what is one in number physically in one can be morally multiplied in number in many, as is clear in the example given about nobility granted by the King to a soldier and all descendants through one and the same act in number existing in the King's will, so that that nobility is considered proper and intrinsic to each descendant in the genus of morals, it is nevertheless certain that the Council does not in this way only call original sin proper to each and intrinsic, nor did it understand in this way only that Adam's sin, which is one in origin, is transfused by propagation into all posterity and multiplied. For in the same way it teaches that guilt is transfused into us from Adam's sin, as are penalties, but penalties are transfused more properly. Therefore, so is guilt.

Moreover, because what it had said in Session 5, Canon 3, that Adam's sin, which is one in origin, is transfused by propagation into posterity and not by imitation only, so that it is proper to each, it later, in Session 6, chapter 3, declares should be understood as meaning that by propagation from Adam's injustice, all descending from him contract their own injustice, just as those later reborn in Christ contract their own justice from Christ's justice and His merits. But Christ's justice from the merits of His passion is not so transfused into us that it is only morally multiplied in us, so that from it or through it we are formally denominated just, either by denomination only extrinsic in the physical genus or even intrinsic in the genus of morals, but so that each one through peculiar justice proper to him and inherent in him is constituted just from Christ's merits, from the Council of Trent cited. Therefore, in exactly the same way, by propagation from Adam's seed, from his injustice, they are denominated unjust and sinners.

And it is plainly ridiculous what Poncius says, that when the Council attributes original sin to each of Adam's posterity, proper to each, it took "proper" as distinguished against common, but against fictitious and improper sin. For that phrase "to each" manifestly indicates that the Council took "proper" as distinguished against common, not against improper, as is sufficiently clear of itself.

What he also adds about transfusion is no less frivolous. First, because when the Council says that original sin, one in all, is transfused so that it becomes proper to each, it understands the same as that through propagation it is individually multiplied in all, not that

the same in number remaining is communicated to all and each, because then it would be common to all, not proper to each. Second, because human nature is also well said to be transfused into all posterity from Adam, even though it is not his nature, one and the same in number, communicated to all, but through the propagation of one from another and the numerical multiplication of nature. Therefore, also in the proposition, his actual sin can well be said to be transfused into all, even if that very sin is not said to be in posterity precisely because it was the root and cause of original sin, which each contracts in himself as proper to himself.

Finally, what Arriaga added, that this is a difficulty about the name, because we are called sinners from Adam's sin by denomination indeed extrinsic in the physical genus, but intrinsic in the genus of morals, in no way satisfies. For we do not contend that it is not sufficient that we are thus called sinners and unjust from Adam's injustice, even through intrinsic denomination in the genus of morals, but also through sin or injustice distinct from Adam's injustice, intrinsic and inherent to us, just as, conversely, we are denominated just by Christ's justice, not formally through any denomination, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, taken from it, but causally, through something else infused into us from His merits and distinct from it, inherent intrinsically, as is convincingly deduced from the comparison repeatedly urged both by the Apostle and by the Council of Trent between the condemnation of the first parent with all posterity and the redemption of Christ the Lord. For just as it is not sufficient, from the Council of Trent cited, that all are called just from Christ's justice by one formally just and only morally multiple or virtually, but necessarily there are required in individuals more formally just and in each one proper, so likewise, that we may be called unjust and sinners from the sin of the first parent, one formally unjust which is only morally multiple or virtually, as others speak, is not sufficient, but in individuals are required individual injustices originally contracted from that of the first parent and proper in each one and through something subjectively existing in them. Hence, just as infants through their own stain contracted from Adam and distinct from his sin are defiled, so in baptism they remain justified by their own justice and sanctity.

But Vulpes (art. 3 cited, n. 7) replies that we too are bound to the solution of this argument if it were so argued by turning the argument: The habit of original justice first given to the parent by God through a real action was one in number, and its lack, demeritorious or physical, from one number of free eating of the forbidden tree. Therefore, it is not truly propagated and transfused. Just as, therefore, to the argument so formed, the consequence would be denied because, although by one number acceptance original justice was had by Adam and by one sinful action of the same demeritorious lost, nevertheless we all in him truly received original justice, and we all in him truly lost it, so in the proposition it should be said that Adam's actual disobedience was in him a sin of nature and was contracted by the unity of the same nature, so that it is contractible and virtually or potentially multipliable, like the same nature to which it was first subjectively present.

But although it is true that Adam received justice not only in his own name but also in the name of posterity, and likewise lost it in the common name, it is false that, if the state of innocence had persevered, posterity would have formally received the same justice that Adam had, and virtually multiplied. For, as he teaches (2 distinct. 29, question 1, D), singular justices would have been apposed to singular individuals, and really and formally multiplied in number, and therefore also now, in the state of fallen nature, each one, when conceived,

contracts his own lack, and from Adam's sin, original justices are lost in as many as sons of Adam are generated, as Gavatus correctly notes (sect. 3 cited, num. 88). Formally, therefore, and really, these lacks are multiplied in number, and not virtually only or potentially, as Vulpes was saying.

Moreover, it is inappropriate what he says, that Adam's disobedience is one by the unity of the same nature and therefore, like it, is virtually and potentially multipliable. For the proper unity of nature is called formal, less than numerical unity, from Scotus (2 distinct. 3, question 6), but the unity of the sinful action of the first parent was altogether numerical and individual, and therefore not multipliable and contractible like nature.

Finally, even when this parity is admitted, it in no way concludes that the original sin of posterity is one and the same in number formally with the sin of the first parent, only virtually multiplied in them. For Adam's nature is not so transfused and multiplied in posterity that it is only plurified virtually, but formally and really it is multiplied numerically. For since with formal unity numerical multiplicity stands, it is truly and properly multiplied numerically, formally and really, in all and singular, not only virtually, so that each one is called man by his own nature. If, therefore, Adam's sin is plurified in posterity like nature, it is now really and formally multiplied in number, and not virtually only, and Adam's posterity are not formally called sinners by his sin remaining in them morally, but each one by his own original contracted from it.

Third Proof from the Fathers:

Thirdly, it is argued from the Fathers. For Augustine (book "On Marriage and Concupiscence," chapter 26) expressly teaches that original sin is distinct from Adam's sin as effect from cause, when he says that the voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of original sin. And Anselm (book "On Virgin Birth," chapter 27) says that each one does not bear the sin of Adam, "for the sin of Adam was one thing, that of infants another; that was the cause, this the effect." And a little below: "Wherefore, when the infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for Adam's sin but for his own; if he himself did not have his own sin, he would not be condemned." Since, therefore, infants dying in original sin are condemned for their own sin, not for Adam's sin, it is necessary to confess that their sin is not Adam's sin itself morally remaining in them in the manner of habitual sin not pardoned by God.

This is confirmed because, if the infant's sin is not really different from the sin of the first parent, but the same remaining in him in the manner of habitual sin, when he dies in it, he should be punished not only with the punishment of loss, as is commonly thought, but also with the punishment of sense. For Adam's sin would also be punished with such a punishment if it had not been pardoned to him. This is clear because, since it is the same sin, although in different subjects, it should be punished with equal punishment.

You will say: In infants it is not voluntary as it was in Adam, and therefore they are not to be punished with the punishment of sense.

Against this: Although it is not equally voluntary, it is nevertheless equally grave, since it is altogether the same sin morally persevering in children. Since, therefore, God in punishing commensures the severity of punishment with the gravity of guilt, the infant dying with

original sin will be punished with equal punishment as Adam himself if he had died in his actual sin.

You will say: It is not equally grave in us as it was in Adam, because in him it was actual sin, but in us it is only original.

Against this: If Adam's actual disobedience is translated to posterity, even as to the act, in the way that the adversaries say, insofar as it so behaves as to place a right in God of reasonable aversion toward them as if it were actually then done by them, original sin in us would not only be original guilt but also personal and actual. The consequence is proved because, due to such moral perseverance, it is so imputed to us as if each one, when he is conceived, were actually sinning through his own actual disobedience elicited by his own will.

Fourthly, it is argued by reason: The sin committed by Adam has been forgiven by God, but the sin of infants has not been forgiven. Therefore, original sin is not Adam's sin morally persevering in us. This reason is used by Vasquez, Turrianus, Gavatus, and others from our school as very efficacious.

They respond, however, that Adam's sin has been forgiven by God in Adam, not in posterity. For the same sin perpetrated by Adam in his own name and ours can be pardoned by God to him and not remitted or pardoned to posterity, or pardoned in one of the posterity and not in another, since for God to remit Adam's sin is to cede His right, which He has to reasonably hate him, but He can do all this while retaining meanwhile His right toward posterity or toward someone from posterity and not another, as Lugo cited has it (num. 102). Gavatus (cited num. 85) rejects this response, but because the examination of this reasoning depends on what will be said below about the nature of habitual sin, I do not pursue it further.

Meanwhile, the stronger reason, as if from first principles, is derived from what has been said, because since the Council of Trent teaches that original sin is proper to each, it consequently signifies that original sin consists precisely in this: that everyone naturally descended from Adam exists as a sinner in himself and not merely in another. But through Adam's transgression all descendants are indeed said to have sinned, according to the Apostle's statement: "In Adam all have sinned." However, they did not sin in themselves. Therefore, our original sin cannot consist in that.

The minor premise is proven from St. Anselm, Chapter 7, saying: "Just as in Adam we all sinned when he sinned, because we sinned then—we who did not yet exist, but because we were of him—and then the necessity was created that when we would exist, we would sin, because through one man's disobedience, etc." These words should be carefully weighed. For he does not say that through Adam's actual disobedience we were made sinners, but only that a necessity was created in us so that when we would exist, immediately in our conception we would contract original guilt. So much so that Adam's sin, even morally, induces in his descendants merely the debt of contracting sin when they will exist, but not the original guilt itself. This is what Cajetan also noted in question 81, article 3, when he said that from that statement "in whom all have sinned," one can only deduce that all men are liable to original sin as to the debt of contracting it, but not as to the actual contraction of original guilt. This is why it is commonly said that although the Blessed Virgin sinned in

Adam with other humans, from this it can minimally be deduced that she contracted original sin, but only the debt of contracting it.

Therefore, from first to last, from the fact that sin itself is imputed to descendants and morally perseveres in them, it can at most be deduced that through such sin they are made debtors of contracting original sin, but not formally sinners.

Scotus, foreign to this opinion, fifthly and finally, since not only Poncius and Vulpes cited, but also Herrera, Cavellus, Hiquaeus, and others of our school defend the opinion as being the mind of the Doctor that original sin is the actual transgression of the first parents persevering in descendants, not forgiven by God, it is now necessary to show that this was entirely the opinion of our Doctor. Indeed, in distinction 30, 2, asking what original sin formally imports, and responding to the question in distinction 32, unique question, "As to the first," he says: "Anselm in 'On the Virgin Conception,' chapter 27: 'By the sin which I call original, I can understand nothing else in infants but the nudity of due justice made through Adam's disobedience, through which all are children of wrath.'" From this he concludes that original sin formally is nothing but the lack of original justice that is due. And thus afterward he always speaks consequently in distinction 3, question 1, and distinction 4, question 1, question 6, explaining original guilt through the lack of original justice that is due.

Nor is it satisfactory what Vulpes says, that Scotus in distinction 32, 2, was not speaking absolutely but comparatively to other improbable opinions that he rejects there, or especially in comparison to concupiscence, which is its material aspect, as Gavatus explains. For since he also always speaks in the same way about original sin, that it consists in the privation of original justice that is due, hence it is that in distinction 32, 2, where he treats the question from the beginning, explaining the formality of original sin, he speaks from his own mind and absolutely, not merely in comparison to other improbable opinions.

Other responses are refuted. Other Scotists respond that when the Doctor says that original sin is formally the privation of original justice that is due, he is speaking of the lack of actual original justice, not habitual. But such a lack is the actual sin committed by us in Adam, to whom all wills had been handed over by God. For besides the habit of original justice, through which the senses are subjected to reason, there is also actual original justice, which is the honesty of our works, and it would be called original because it would be transmitted through origin and would presuppose, besides the habitual gifts of justice and grace, also God's external protection, through which man in the state of innocence would be safe from all evils. In the absence of all these, the same actual justice and conformity with the law in our acts is not called original but personal. They took this explanation from more recent interpreters of Anselm in the cited place, as if he spoke of actual original justice, not habitual, as Granada extensively pursues in controversy 6, treatise 8, dispute 3, section 2.

That this exposition does not align with the intent of St. Anselm will be proven below. For he speaks of original justice which was to be transmitted to us through origin by God's covenant. Such was not that rectitude of act. For now, it is enough to show that it directly opposes Scotus's intent. For after he said in distinction 32 B that original sin consists in the privation of original justice that is due, he proves this because it is original, from which he infers that sin formally is injustice, therefore such sin is such injustice. That is, as Lichetus explains there, just as actual sin is actual injustice, so original sin is original injustice.

Therefore, from the fact that he denies original sin is actual sin, he consequently denies it is the privation of actual justice, however it is explained.

This is further clarified below, letter D, where for the solution of arguments he notes that justice can be due in two ways: one way because it is received in oneself and lost by the action of the receiver; another way because it is received in another and lost by the action of another. In the first way, actual sin is injustice and lack of justice; in the second way, it is more comparable to sin remaining in the soul after the passing act than it is comparable to actual sin elicited by the sinning will itself.

Finally, it is clear that when the Doctor in distinction 30, question 2, asks whether original sin is the lack of original justice, he speaks of original justice in exactly the same sense as he spoke of it in distinction 29, where he asks whether original justice in Adam was some supernatural gift. But there he asserts it was some supernatural gift in the form of an infused habit. Therefore, when immediately afterward, in distinctions 30 and 32, he determines that original sin is the lack of original justice, he is speaking of the lack of habitual justice, not actual justice. This is also clearly inferred from distinction 3, question 1, and distinction 4, question 1, question 6.

Finally, others respond that if Scotus speaks of the lack of original justice accepted in Adam in the form of a habit, he is not speaking according to his own opinion but the common opinion of that time. They deduce this because in distinction 32, F, he explains that original sin is removed by the removal of the debt of having original justice, commuted into the debt of grace. And not content with this doctrine, at the end of that distinction, answering an argument which proved that original sin is not formally remitted by grace, he says: "Let it be said that the debt of having original justice is precisely dissolved, and then it agrees with the other response, namely Henry's," as the Marginists noted outside the text. Wherefore at the end of that text, he explains that original sin is formally opposed to grace and formally destroyed by it, not because it was the lack of original justice in itself, but because it is an aversion from the ultimate end, to which is opposed conversion through grace.

However, it is false that Scotus there is not speaking according to his own opinion about the form of original sin, since he indicates no other opinion more agreeable to him, neither there nor elsewhere where he speaks of original sin, other than that concerning the lack of original justice, which in truth has been most widely accepted up to these times. Nor can the opposite in any way be derived from what he has in distinction 32, letter F, and at the end of the distinction. In both places, he intends to solve the difficulty proposed in question 4, whether original sin is remitted in baptism for the negative part, namely because guilt is not remitted unless opposing justice is restored, but original justice is not restored in baptism, therefore, etc. Wishing, I say, to solve this difficulty, first indeed as to article 4, letter F, he assigns the common way of responding, that some privation can be removed either by the directly opposed form or by an equivalent form according to the acceptance of justice or according to moral use, as if someone owing a silver coin pays a gold one, he will pay quite sufficiently and more. For although through such payment the privation of the silver coin is not formally removed, it is virtually and equivalently, indeed excessively, the debt is removed, which being removed, the negation of silver remaining without debt no longer has the character of privation. Because therefore grace in many ways exceeds original justice, as the Doctor declares there, especially in joining man to the ultimate end as to that according

to which original sin disjoins from it, therefore in baptism when grace is restored, that sin is simply dismissed more eminently than its own positive would be remitted. And although the lack of that positive remains, it is not guilt because that positive is not due; for the debt of having that gift is dissolved and commuted into the debt of having another gift.

Then at the end of the question, he does not abandon this response and doctrine but further clarifies it, again emphasizing the excellence of grace over original justice and concluding that although the lack of original justice absolutely speaking and grace for this state do not oppose each other, nevertheless they oppose each other insofar as that lack is guilt averting from the ultimate end. In what sense this should be understood, he sufficiently declares there, because although those gifts were distinct, and original justice by itself would not join man to God as a supernatural end nor give right to glory as grace does, nor consequently would its privation considered in itself be an aversion from the ultimate end, nevertheless in that state they had a necessary connection among themselves from God's supreme ordination. Therefore, original justice included grace by concomitance so that original justice could not be lost without the loss of grace concomitantly. Hence it followed, says the Doctor, that the lack of original justice would virtually include, from divine ordination, the lack of sanctifying grace and consequently in the same way would turn man away from the ultimate end. And in this sense, says the Doctor, original sin even as it imports the lack of original justice is guilt averting from the ultimate end, which is removed by grace bringing with it the opposed conversion, which is destined to be in the son of Adam for this state without the gift of justice. He had also given the same doctrine above regarding the fourth article when he said grace more perfectly joins man to God as the ultimate end than original justice from the ultimate end of which original sin disjoins man. Therefore, this doctrine given at the end of the distinction is not different from that which he had given above, letter F, but is clearer and more satisfying to the argument insofar as it declares in what sense original sin as the lack of original justice due is guilt averting from the ultimate end, which aversion is formally removed by grace in baptism, which had not been declared above, and this as to that according to which it disjoins.

SECOND ARTICLE

The arguments of the adversaries dissolved

In opposition, more recent writers argue, proving that original sin consists in the actual disobedience of Adam remaining in descendants in the manner of a habit. And first from the Apostle to the Romans 5: "Through one man sin entered into this world" and "through one man's disobedience many were made sinners" and "by one man's offense many died" and "in Adam all sinned." Therefore, original sin is nothing other than Adam's sin itself denominating us sinners.

This is confirmed because, as all admit, the sin of the first parent was also ours. Therefore, we can be denominating sinners from it, and consequently the character of original sin as it morally remains in descendants not forgiven by God will consist in it.

Finally, the Council of Trent, session 5, expressly says that this sin is one in origin.

I respond that the Apostle's statement should not be understood as if we were formally made sinners by Adam's actual sin, but only causally and effectively, as is evident from the comparison there introduced by the Apostle between Adam's disobedience and Christ's obedience. Since, therefore, through Christ's obedience we are not made formally just but only causally, so through Adam's sin we are not made sinners formally but only causally. Thus also men are not said to have sinned in Adam formally, as if they sinned then in reality when they did not yet exist, but because, since they would be from him, the necessity was created that when they would exist, they would be made formally sinners through some proper stain contracted in their conception from Adam's sin, as Anselm explains in the cited place.

To the confirmation, it should likewise be said that Adam's sin is also ours causally but not formally, for this denomination should be taken from another form different from Adam's sin.

To the last, Adam's sin is indeed one in origin but multiple in propagation, as is sufficiently clear from the Council's words themselves.

You will say: that is original sin through which death entered the world, from the Apostle in the same place. But through Adam's sin death entered the world, Genesis 2. Therefore, Adam's sin is original.

I respond that original sin has a double acceptance among theologians. For it is either taken for that which was the cause and origin of all other sins, which therefore is usually called originating original sin, or it is taken for that which everyone descended from Adam contracts in his natural conception, and it is called originated original sin. The major premise, therefore, is verified only of original sin in the first way. For through Adam's sin, which is called originating original sin, not only corporal death, which was the punishment of sin, entered the world, but also sin itself, as the Apostle says, which is the death of the soul. But it is false of original sin taken in the second way. For through this, death did not enter the world, speaking of the death of the soul, but rather it formally is the death of the soul itself, as the Councils of Orange and Trent say.

You will say: that is original sin which can harm others, for personal sin does not harm others. But Adam's sin harmed us. Therefore, it alone is original.

I respond again that the major premise is verified only of originating original sin, not of originated, because the former is the sin of the head, but the latter of the member.

Second, they argue by reason: for something to be truly and properly sin, it must be a voluntary act concerning a dissonant object. But original sin is truly and properly sin. Therefore, it should be voluntary. But there is no such act in descendants; otherwise, it would no longer be original sin in them but personal and actual. Therefore, what has the true and proper character of guilt in them is not something inherent in them but the same act elicited by Adam in the name of all. Whence those who place sin and impute it to one who committed nothing in reality confess that original sin is the sin of the first parent imputed to him insofar as it morally remains in him unforgiven.

I respond by denying the major premise absolutely speaking, since habitual sin has the true and proper character of guilt and yet does not formally consist in liberty, even if it

presupposes it as a cause. After a man has actually sinned, not freely but by contracting a stain therefrom which has the true character of guilt caused by the preceding act, wherefore for the stain remaining after the act of sin to participate in the character of guilt, it is enough that it be voluntary through the preceding act voluntarily elicited, either by the same person if it is the stain of personal guilt, or by another in whose will one is morally contained as in a head if it is original guilt, as in the present case.

Third, if God had not given original justice to Adam for himself and his descendants, and yet had obliged him and his descendants in the way He obliged them to keep the commandment about not eating the fruit, we would still contract original sin as we now contract it, and not through the privation of original justice, as is clear from the supposed fact. Therefore, original guilt does not consist in the privation of original justice but in the transgression of the law made by the first parent morally remaining in us.

This is confirmed because, in fact, Adam also had the commandment to preserve grace and justice not absolutely but only by keeping the law imposed on him. Therefore, his sin could not be the privation of original justice but the transgression of the law.

I respond by denying that in that case descendants would have contracted sin of the same character as that which is now contracted, and in the way it is now explained by Councils, namely through the transfusion and inherence of guilt in each of us. But then it would have been through mere extrinsic and moral denomination by the same sin in number that would have been committed by Adam in the name of all.

To the confirmation, I deny that Adam did not have an express commandment about preserving justice accepted for himself and his descendants. Some contend that it was not distinct from the commandment not to eat the forbidden fruit; otherwise, Adam would have committed two sins: one against the positive commandment about the conservation of original justice, the other against the negative "do not eat." He had it at least in the commandment itself about keeping the law imposed on him, as the Doctor hints in distinction 32, letter H, from God's covenant with Adam about preserving original justice for himself and his descendants, as in article 5 and dispute 6, question 9, article 2, number 259.

Fourth, original sin in descendants corresponds to the actual sin of the head, with only this difference: that in him it is personal because it is from a personal act, but in us it is called original because it is derived from the act of origin or the head. But that did not consist in the privation of habitual justice but only of actual conformity to the imposed law, for that former privation followed as a punishment from the transgression of the law in Adam himself. Therefore, original sin in descendants also does not consist in that privation, namely of habitual justice, but of actual justice or conformity to the imposed law by way of habit morally related to us. That former privation follows also in us as a punishment.

I respond by denying the minor premise, since, with original justice being no less a perfection than conformity to the imposed law, which Adam was bound to preserve, consequently his habitual sin involved both privations. But the privation of original justice transferred to us from Adam's sin has even more the character of original guilt in us than the privation of conformity to the law, both because original justice alone was to be transmitted to us from God's covenant, not that rectitude of act, and because that privation alone pertains to us subjectively and intrinsically, but this one only by way of extrinsic

denomination, which is not sufficient to constitute us formally and intrinsically sinners, as the Councils speak.

Fifth, Vulpes argues from the authority of Scotus, for in distinction 32, 2, answering the arguments of the questions, he posits original sin as voluntary if by it is understood what is primarily subjectively in the will, to which justice is aptly present either formally or elicitively, insofar as it is thus contracted from the first parent. But formally or elicitively voluntary to the first parent is precisely the first actual disobedience against that commandment "do not eat." Therefore, original sin is that actual disobedience.

Then, letter F, he teaches that we contract original sin from the first parents in such a way that it could only be avoided in them. But the sin in the first parents that took away justice was that first disobedience, and this is what could only be avoided in them, as it were, which in them was actual and personal, contracted by their own will, but in us only original and depending on them as from an origin and head. Therefore, etc.

Finally, original sin is called the sin of the whole nature. Only Adam's sin was per se first the sin of the whole nature, and secondarily the personal actual sin to the first parents themselves. Therefore, etc.

I respond that Scotus there only teaches that original sin is voluntary in another, namely in our first head Adam, insofar as it was in his power to preserve justice and grace for himself and us by keeping the commandment imposed by God. Hence, not only was that actual disobedience in Adam's free power to prevent it from happening, but also our original sin contracted from that disobedience, with this difference, however: that the former was immediately in his power, but our original sin only mediately, that is, through that disobedience.

To the second, the Doctor also teaches there that infants could not avoid original sin in themselves but only in Adam, from whom they contracted it. However, from this it is not well deduced that their original sin is the actual sin committed by Adam, but rather the opposite. For if original sin in infants is that which is contracted from Adam's sin, then it is not Adam's sin itself, since a cause is adequately distinguished from its effect, both in the genus of nature and in the order of morals.

To the last, the minor premise is denied. Indeed, the situation is entirely the opposite, that Adam's sin was per se first a personal sin and secondarily by demerit the sin of the whole nature, as Scotus himself teaches there when he says that Adam corrupted himself by personal sin and in this by demerit his whole posterity. Hence, when he says there that Adam did not corrupt this nature in number as he did this person in number, by "this nature in number" and "this person" he certainly does not understand Adam's nature and person, as Vulpes very carelessly understood, but he understands some individual nature or person of one of the descendants contracting sin. So the obvious and very clear sense of those words is, as Gavatus rightly notes, that Adam by his personal sin did not corrupt this or that man, but corrupted himself by personal sin and in this by demerit his whole posterity.

Perhaps in favor of Vulpes's opinion that original sin in us is Adam's sin itself as morally or theologically remaining in descendants according to the truth of divine law, another authority of Scotus would be more favorable, in the cited distinction 32, 1, where, declaring how

original sin happens in us and through what cracks it enters, he says that just as merit, when it passes in itself, nevertheless remains in divine knowledge and acceptance, because God rewards for it as if it were present, so demerit passes as to the act but remains in divine knowledge, because it is punished for it as if it were already present. Hence he concludes that God does not give original justice to the child because of Adam's demerit remaining in God's knowledge as if it were actually present.

But from this authority at most it could only be deduced that habitual sin in Adam, insofar as it was his personal sin, consists in actual sin morally and theologically remaining in the way explained there by Scotus, but not habitual sin in us, namely original. Indeed, the Doctor there expressly teaches that original sin is formally the lack of original justice that is due, of which he assigns a twofold cause there: one merely negative, which is God not giving the child original justice due to him; the other demeritorious, which is Adam's disobedience morally remaining in divine knowledge. Hence, since he wants original sin, which he establishes as the aforesaid lack, to enter, that is, to be caused in us because of Adam's demerit in God's knowledge, for which He does not give original justice, from this it is clearly deduced that original does not consist in Adam's actual sin morally remaining, but rather is caused and originated in descendants by demerit.

Sixth and finally, Poncius argues because Adam's descendants sinned in him when he transgressed God's commandment. But that sin is not forgiven to descendants until they are baptized. Therefore, it remains to them, and they are sinners by reason of it. But it is not actual sin, nor habitual sin presupposing their actual sin, and consequently not personal. Therefore, it is original. He proves the major premise from that passage "in whom all have sinned," from Augustine, epistle 23 to Boniface: "He therefore contracted guilt because he was one with him and in him," and from reason, because unless they had sinned, the privation of grace and justice would not be culpable for them.

I respond from what was said in number 82 that men are said to have sinned in Adam not formally, as if they had sinned in reality then when they did not yet exist, but, as Anselm explains there in the citation, causally, because since they would be from him, the necessity was created that when they would exist, they would be made formally sinners through some proper stain contracted from Adam's sin. This is also what Augustine meant to indicate when he said in the cited place that man contracted guilt, for he signifies that each man draws his own stain by which he is called a sinner, but is not formally called such by that same sin of the first parent. From the fact, therefore, that all sinned in Adam in the sense of the Apostle, at most it can only be deduced from this that all contracted the debt of contracting original sin when they would be in themselves, not that all in reality contracted it in sinning Adam.

Certain other arguments of Granada are resolved by Gallus, prelude 7, in what has already been reported and coincide in the cited chapter 4.

THIRD ARTICLE

Whether original sin is some kind of guilt

Theologians generally deny this, especially those of this age, and the principal foundation is that either guilt is taken for obligation and deputation to punishment, or for the worthiness

itself and deserving of punishment, and however it is taken, the guilt of punishment is not formally sin but follows from sin as its property. For punishment follows guilt, and therefore someone is deserving of punishment because he is a sinner, and not formally is anyone bad and a sinner because he is deserving of punishment, but being bad, he is consequently a debtor of punishment. Hence, a child should be understood to be affected by guilt before being worthy of punishment or deputed to punishment.

From this, they say this opinion coincides with the error of Pelagius, who denied original sin in Adam's descendants and only admitted they had incurred penalties and guilt of penalty.

However, the affirmative opinion was expressly that of Augustine in many places, as Gavatus extensively deduces in dispute 2, chapter 3, section 4. Hence it is not likely that this opinion, well understood and explained, coincides with Pelagius's, since Augustine wrote so many books and argued so excellently against the Pelagian error about original sin for Catholic doctrine. And indeed that it coincides with it will be sufficiently clear to one who knows what and of what kind Pelagius's view was concerning original sin. For although he conceded that descendants incurred some damages because of his sin, it is certain that among them he did not recognize the guilt of eternal punishment, since he said that infants dying without baptism would still attain eternal life outside Heaven, as Augustine reports in book 1 on the merits and remission of sins, chapter 20. And although he had also conceded such punishment's guilt in infants, he nevertheless did not concede this to be sin, as this opinion contends.

Therefore, from this it could only be deduced that this opinion approaches the Pelagian error insofar as it would not assign the true and proper character of sin, which nevertheless must be assigned in all of Adam's descendants, since the guilt of punishment is not properly sin. Hence, if it can be shown that guilt can truly and properly have the character of sin, at least habitual, this opinion will indeed be entirely distant from Pelagius's error.

However, for this to be worthily understood, it should be noted that Augustine distinguishes a twofold guilt in the infant, namely of fault and of punishment. For the obligation to eternal punishment of loss, which the infant contracts from Adam's disobedience left behind, can be compared to two things: namely, to Adam's guilt from which it is contracted, and to the punishment to which it is ordered. And indeed, only according to the first comparison is it said by Augustine to have the character of original sin, in which way it is called the guilt of fault, but not according to the second, according to which it is called the guilt of punishment. This is gathered from book 1 of the Retractions, chapter 15, when he says: "But because the sin which we are said to contract originally from Adam, that is, involved in its guilt and because of this held liable to punishment, etc." where when he says "involved in its guilt" he signifies the guilt of fault; when he adds "liable to punishment because of this" he indicates the guilt of punishment. And more clearly in Psalm 50: "No one is born except drawing punishment, drawing the merit of punishment," see how he distinguishes between the contraction of punishment and the contraction of the merit of punishment, for this signifies the guilt of fault in which he establishes original sin, but that the guilt of punishment which is the effect of that. Whence he immediately adds: "But the merit of punishment is sin."

From this it is manifestly clear that Augustine fully recognized iniquity in infants contracted from Adam's sin, but he asserted that this sin itself is nothing other than the merit of

punishment, that is, the guilt of fault, namely left from Adam's actual guilt for the punishment of loss. Therefore, whenever Augustine says that after the sinful act, guilt remains in the sinner, either habitual personal guilt in one who sinned actually, or habitual original guilt as in infants, by such guilt the obligation to punishment should be understood, not reduplicatively insofar as it tends to punishment, because thus it is the guilt of punishment, but insofar as it results from a past evil act, for thus it is the guilt of fault. These are not properly two guilts, but one and the same, which, compared to different things, also takes on different names, namely of fault and of punishment, unless it pleases to say they are two guilts, not physically but in the genus of morals.

In this sense, therefore, speaking of guilt, Augustine in many places establishes original sin in guilt contracted from Adam's disobedience in descendants, in which way it is called the guilt of fault, so that he never spoke of original sin except under the name of guilt. In epistle 23 to Boniface: "He therefore contracted guilt because he was one with him and in him from whom he drew when what he drew was committed." Sermon 36 in Luke, where: "I see where these perished, I seek the guilt, I hear from the Apostle: 'through one man';" and sermon 4: "where he found you sold under sin, lying in the death of the first man, having guilt before you could have choice"; and book 2 on original sin against Celestinus and Pelagius, chapter 4: "Therefore the guilt of the vice of which we speak will remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerated until it too is washed there by the bath of regeneration." He also speaks thus in book 1 on marriage and concupiscence, chapter 26, and book 6 against Julian, chapter 8, and often in other places, which can be seen in Gavatus in the cited place.

From these it is clear that Vasquez in dispute 132, chapter 3, Turrianus in dispute 3, doubt 3, and others who say that Augustine was very doubtful in this matter, were greatly mistaken. They try to gather this from some of his testimonies in the book on the morals of the Church, chapter 22, and book 3 on the merits of sins, chapter 4, and epistle 28 to Jerome, and sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle, which are not relevant. For when he humbly confesses there that he cannot satisfy many difficulties occurring concerning original sin, he certainly is not speaking of difficulties that can occur concerning the essence of original sin, but concerning its existence and the way in which it is transmitted to descendants, insofar as he could not perceive how infants who never sinned are culpable of another's sin. Although he might have been doubtful about the existence of original sin and its contraction to descendants, he was not about its essence and quiddity. And this is manifestly gathered from the very places adduced by Vasquez, since the controversy between St. Augustine and Pelagius was never about the quiddity of original sin but about its existence and the way in which it is contracted by children and through what cracks it enters the human race.

Therefore, Salas in treatise 13, dispute 11, section 2, number 32, confesses that Augustine was indeed of this opinion but was deceived and therefore his opinion should not be held, since he humbly confesses that he was overwhelmed by many difficulties in this matter.

But this cannot be said without enormous irreverence toward such a Father, whose doctrine the Church professes to follow against Pelagius and other heretics in so many Councils, and especially in the fifth general Synod, particularly since the reason given is very slight. For the difficulties that troubled Augustine in this matter about original sin were not about its quiddity and nature but about its existence and the way in which it is transmitted to descendants, as has been said.

Bellarmino in book 5 on the loss of grace, chapter 13, speaking more soberly, says that Augustine in the cited places was not concerned with explaining what original sin truly is in infants, what formally constitutes them sinners, nor how many and what things remain in the sinner after the passing act of sin, but only wanted to indicate that after the passing act, something remains by reason of which remission is necessary, which he explained by the name of guilt. Hence he thinks that Augustine did not hold that only the guilt of punishment from the disobedience of the first parents remains in children, but with its foundation, for which he cites the same Augustine in Psalm 50 and book 2 on the merits of sins, chapter 54, in which places he recognizes iniquity in infants.

But it is clearly established that Augustine in the cited passages not only shows that after Adam's sin something still remains in the infant by reason of which remission is necessary, but also expresses and explains what that thing is and what that guilt is which remains and is removed through baptism. And in Psalm 50 he indicated that there is indeed iniquity in infants contracted from the sin of Adam, but he asserted that this very iniquity is nothing other than the merit of punishment, that is, the habitual guilt of sin left from Adam's sin leading to the punishment of loss, as is clear from this very authority adduced and considered above. And in this sense he also speaks in Book 2 of *On the Merits of Sins*, chapter 54, when he says that man through original sin is turned away from God. For he is formally turned away from God through such guilt, which is removed by grace in baptism, by reason of which he remains newly turned toward God supernaturally.

Therefore, others respond that Augustine in the cited passages does not understand by the term "guilt" [*reatus*] liability to punishment, but rather the fault itself and the habitual deformity which is the same as the stain [of sin]. The reason for this is that in the common manner of speaking, just as "guilty" [*reus*] is the same as "culpable," so "guilt" [*reatus*] will be the same as "fault," which is a phrase also frequent in Scripture, which takes guilt to mean the habitual fault remaining after the sinful act that has passed away. As in Exodus 32: "God struck the people for the guilt of the calf," and in Deuteronomy 21: "And the guilt of blood shall be taken away from them." So Lezana, Tract 5, Disputation 12, Question 2, and Aversa, Question 81, Section 3, which he especially deduces from the cited passage in Retractions 2, chapter 5, where Augustine says: "The sin which we say infants originally derive from Adam, that is, being implicated in its guilt and on account of this being liable to punishment, etc." Here he clearly indicates that infants are liable to punishment because they are implicated in the guilt of sin. Therefore, by this guilt he did not understand merely liability to punishment, but something distinct from it and prior to it. Thus also Valencia, Meratius, and other recent writers explain Augustine.

But all this we also admit: that by guilt, in which the stain of original sin consists, Augustine did not understand only liability to punishment, but especially liability to fault, and this we also deduce from the same context adduced by Aversa. Not that these are two physically distinct liabilities, but insofar as the same obligation to punishment, compared to a past sin, is called liability to fault, while compared to punishment it is called liability to punishment. This is again expressly gathered from Book 1 of *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, chapter 32, where he says: "Therefore, as long as this remission of sins is not made in the offspring, if there is this law of sin in it that it is even imputed as sin, that is, that also its guilt is in one who has contracted it, which guilt holds him as a debtor of eternal punishment." These last words are to be noted, in which he again expressly distinguishes liability to fault from liability

to punishment, and establishes the notion of stain and sin in the liability to fault. For when he says "that also its guilt is in one who has contracted it," he expresses liability to fault, and when he adds, "which holds him as a debtor of eternal punishment," he indicates liability to punishment as an effect of the previous liability. For the debt of punishment in the sinner arises from liability to fault, which Augustine calls "sin imputed." Therefore, it cannot be denied that according to Augustine, the sin that remains, which is the habitual stain—not only personal but also original—consists in this kind of liability.

It must be said, therefore, that out of reverence owed to the great Father Augustine, it is very probable that original sin formally consists in liability to fault in the way already explained, namely, as it implies merit and worthiness of punishment consequent in posterity to the transgression of Adam now past. For this assertion, Salas cites many Scholastics, and he himself teaches that it is probable, although he considers the opposite more probable. Capreolus, in 4, distinction 14, question 1, at the end, where he says that man, after the evil act has passed, is called a sinner from the respect of unworthiness of glory and worthiness of punishment, or from liability; and in 2, distinction 30, at the end, where he says that liability with ordination to Adam's sin is original sin, although he also holds another opinion, which is common, that it consists in the privation of original justice. Zumel, on 1-2, question 113, article 2, disputation 2, after conclusion 7, where he defends that habitual sin, both original and personal, is worthiness of punishment. Ledesma, part 1, question 27, article 4, where he says that unworthiness of God's friendship and glory is the stain, offense, and habitual fault. And Azor, tome 1, book 4, chapter 26, question 2, who, although he holds the opposite, admits that it is no error to assert that original sin is liability.

First, therefore, it is proved from the manner of speaking of Scripture, which universally explains the state of sin through worthiness of punishment and wrath, as in Ephesians 2: "We were by nature children of wrath," and in Romans 2: "vessels of wrath." Also, when it teaches that sinners are punished for guilt, as in Exodus 32: "The Lord struck the people for the guilt of the calf," and in Ecclesiastes 9: "Man knows not whether he is worthy of love or hatred," and in other passages in which guilt is taken for sin. Hence Berchorius, in his moral repertory, under the word "Guilty," testifies that in Scripture guilt is the same as sin or obligation to punishment due to sin, and that man becomes a sinner or bound by guilt, and thus it is also found in the chapter "Majores" on Baptism: "But it is still asked," where the Pontiff says that men are tormented in hell because of the guilt of crime.

Second, the manner of speaking of the Fathers and Councils favors this. Besides Augustine, the standard-bearer of this opinion, Gregory in Book 3 on Job, chapter 3, says: "Whoever is not absolved by the waters of regeneration is bound by the chains of guilt." Dionysius, on *Divine Names*, chapter 4, quoted and followed by St. Thomas, question 86, article 1, reply to objection 2, and Cajetan, question 86, says: "To be punished is not evil, but to be worthy of punishment, in which worthiness consists the guilt of fault of which we are speaking here." The Council in the passage often cited, session 5, says: "If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism..." It is certain that original sin formally consists in that which is removed by grace in baptism. Since, therefore, original sin is remitted by grace to the extent that the guilt of the same is remitted, therefore it formally consists in such guilt left from Adam's sin.

Nor does it matter that in session 6, canon 30, it seems to distinguish guilt from liability to eternal punishment when it says that in justification, guilt and liability to eternal punishment are remitted, in which way it also speaks in session 5, canon 5. For there it only intends to distinguish guilt from liability to punishment, which consists in the destination to punishment made by God, which we most willingly admit is not habitual fault but follows from it, which will be more clearly explained later in disputation 6, number 215.

Likewise, the second Council of Orange, chapter 2: "He is convicted of attributing injustice to God who says that death, which is punishment, passes without sin, which is the merit of death." Therefore, that which is left from actual sin, through which man is constituted a sinner, is the merit of death. But the merit of death is not liability and obligation to the punishment of death contracted from that law, "On whatever day, etc." (Genesis 2).

Vásquez responds (cited in chapter 3) that although guilt can sometimes be taken for the obligation by which someone is held under sin, nevertheless it then presupposes in the one who is guilty some sin and fault. Otherwise, it would not be guilt of fault, for guilt is the binding and obligation of fault by which we are held. Therefore, there must be fault there, and beyond it, obligation or binding of the fault itself. For this binding is not the fault but the obligation of fault, by which reason one who has committed adultery, as long as he does not repent of the deed, is guilty of adultery, because from a past sin not retracted, he is truly said to be held as if constrained by it, by reason of which he is called guilty or constrained by sin as if by a chain and fetter. If, therefore, infants are said to be guilty of original sin, there must be given a fault distinct from guilt, of which they are said to be guilty and by which they are said to be constrained. But they are not said to be guilty of guilt itself, nor are they sinners by guilt itself. Therefore, guilt is of something else that is sin. Either, therefore, it is the sin of the first parent, in which all [sinned], and so we fall into the opinion of Pighius, or it is the sin by which infants are said to be constrained, and this must be something other than guilt itself, about which is the difficulty.

However, it is entirely false that when guilt is taken for that obligation by which one is held under sin, then guilt of sin and fault presupposes in the one who is guilty some sin and fault. For the worthiness of punishment or merit of punishment resulting from the nature of actual sin, which guilt understood in this way implies, is itself the habitual sin remaining in the sinner and itself denominating him a sinner, habitually and permanently, until it is removed through grace. And again, it is false that guilt in this sense is the binding and obligation of fault by which we are held, as is clear from the words quoted from Gregory in Book 4 on Job, chapter 3: "Whoever is not absolved by the waters of regeneration is bound by the chains of the first guilt." If, therefore, one "is bound by the chains of the first guilt," then guilt, of which we are speaking here, is not the binding and obligation of fault by which one is held, because then the sense would be that one is bound by the chains of the first chain. Rather, it is habitual fault itself, that is, worthiness and merit of punishment, by which one is bound and held and obligated to punishment.

You will say that guilt taken in this way, for worthiness and merit of punishment, results from the nature of sin by which we are rendered worthy of punishment. I respond that this only proves that this guilt presupposes some actual sin now past, not a habitual fault. And Vásquez inquires what would be that presupposed sin from which results the guilt formally imported by original sin. I say it is the actual sin of the first parent now past, nor do we

thereby fall into the opinion of Pighius, because we hold that this guilt still has the true and proper nature of fault, in the way that fault remains in the soul after the act has passed, although it does not have this from its own act; otherwise, it would not be habitual original sin but personal.

Third, it can also be proved from the mind of the Doctor [Scotus], for in distinction 29, single question, in reply to the third objection, he says: "I say that one existing in pure natural state is not equal to one who sinned existing in justice, because the latter has some crookedness which the former does not have, because the latter is a debtor of original justice which he received, the former is not; and therefore the latter is guilty, the former not; and if neither is granted the vision of God, nevertheless to one the lack of vision is punishment, to the other not; for the guilty one is deprived of it because of the guilt of sin, the other is deprived of it from the condition of nature." So the Doctor there, from which it can be deduced that in his opinion, the lack of original justice does not in just any way make man a sinner, but precisely insofar as it makes man guilty and therefore obligated to the punishment of loss, as Gavatius also observes in the cited place.

This is confirmed because the Doctor says in distinction 32 that original sin is more similar to sin resting in the soul after the passing act, that is, to habitual sin, than to actual sin. But personal habitual sin, according to the same Doctor in 4, distinction 14, question 1, consists in the guilt of fault already explained, left from a past sinful act. Therefore, keeping the proportion, original sin should be explained in the same way, as consisting in such guilt left in posterity from Adam's past sin, since the same reason seems to apply to both, formally considered.

And thus Gavatius, cited, actually argues with Mairon, 2, distinction 31, who absolutely speaking contends that sin formally consists only in the aforementioned guilt, and not in the lack of original justice except materially, because he thinks that in Scotus's opinion one should speak uniformly about both kinds of habitual sin, personal and original.

But since the Doctor in the cited distinction 32 expressly held the common opinion about original sin, that it formally consists in the lack of original justice, as will be established in article five, the present opinion about guilt should not be held in such a way that the other is to be rejected as being from the mind of Scotus, as Gavatius thought, since the Doctor himself in 4, distinction 14, cited question 1, gives a sufficient parity between personal habitual and original sin, namely, why the latter can be explained by the privation of original justice, but not the former by the mere privation of the habit of grace, but necessarily must be explained also by the guilt of fault and worthiness of punishment. For since personal habitual sins in the sinner are multiplied and are of different and different natures, with great difficulty can their essence be expressed through the privation of habitual grace alone, which is removed all at once by the first mortal sin, because then one sin would not be graver than another, since any mortal sin demeritoriously destroys grace totally and adequately, nor would one who commits a thousand sins be said to be more of a sinner than one who commits one, since both would be equally deprived of sanctifying grace. These inconveniences do not follow for original sin if it is explained through the privation of original justice that is owed, since for all descendants of Adam it is one in species and of entirely the same nature and equal in all, because all contract it equally, nor is one said to be more of a sinner than another. And therefore it can be well explained through the lack of one and the

same supernatural habit, as will be more fully explained in disputation 6, numbers 258 and 259.

Fourth, finally, it can be proved by a reason deduced from the parity of merit, which is opposed to sin by reason of [their] contrariety, since the discipline of contraries is the same. Just as therefore habitual merit left in the one who merits after the meritorious act has passed away is nothing but right or worthiness to reward, so in the one who demerits by way of sin or habitual demerit, nothing is left but right or worthiness to punishment. Therefore, just as the nature of habitual merit consists in this right and worthiness to reward, so the nature of habitual demerit, whether it be personal or original, must be said to consist in the aforementioned worthiness or obligation to punishment.

You will say that the nature of habitual merit does not consist in right and worthiness to reward, since these follow rather the goodness of the act, but it is the meritorious act itself now past, morally remaining in the knowledge and acceptance of God, who rewards for it as if it were present. And so likewise it must be said of the nature of habitual demerit, that it does not consist in right and worthiness to punishment, since these follow the malice of the act, but rather in the sinful act itself now past, morally remaining in the knowledge of God, who punishes for it as if it were present, as the Doctor expressly indicated in the cited distinction 32, letter I.

I respond by denying the assumption, from the proof of which it is concluded that just as right and worthiness to reward follow actual and passing goodness, not habitual and permanent goodness, but rather formally constitute it, so right and worthiness to punishment follow actual and passing malice, not habitual and permanent malice, but formally constitute it. But Scotus in the cited place does not say that the nature of habitual merit consists in the past act itself morally remaining, and so likewise conversely the nature of habitual demerit, but only says that just as merit, when it passes away in itself, still remains in the knowledge of God who rewards for it as if it were present, so likewise conversely it must be said of demerit, which is plainly true and can be denied by no one, but this does not at all oppose our view.

ARTICLE FOUR

Objections Solved

In opposition, first, the reason for doubting proposed at the beginning of the article is objected, that worthiness of punishment of its nature follows worthiness of fault, for one is worthy of punishment on account of fault, keeping proportion. Therefore, a child is understood to be affected with fault before he is worthy of punishment.

Nor is it sufficient to say that infants become worthy of punishment because of Adam's sin, because according to this doctrine, there is not truly and properly sin in each of them, but only worthiness of punishment, which cannot have the nature of sin.

This is confirmed because when Scripture, Councils, and Fathers teach that there is original sin, they understand not only obligation to punishment because of Adam's fault, but the proper sin of posterity, especially where it is expressly said that not only the punishment of

sin but also sin itself passes to posterity, as in Romans 5: "Sin entered into this world, and by sin death," in which way also speak the cited Councils of Orange and Trent.

I respond easily from what has been said: that worthiness of punishment, which is habitual fault, presupposes worthiness of actual fault, and worthiness of punishment follows actual malice, either one's own or that of the head [i.e., Adam], as in the present case, but it is nevertheless habitual malice itself. Hence absolutely it is denied that worthiness of punishment left in the sinner, whether one's own or that of the head, cannot have the nature of sin and habitual fault.

And still, according to this doctrine, it is truly preserved that there is in each infant his own original sin, because in each is found worthiness of the punishment of loss, which we call guilt of fault, which he has contracted from Adam's actual sin.

And when it is insisted that a child is a sinner before he is worthy of punishment, because a sinner is not therefore a sinner because he is worthy of punishment, but conversely, Salas, in the cited place, and with him Gavatus, well responds that the particle "because" can make a double sense, namely, causal or formal. According to the first, it is true that one is not a sinner because he is worthy of punishment, but worthy of punishment because he is a sinner, that is, because he has sinned actually, either in person or in the head [i.e., Adam]. According to the second, it is false, for in the formal sense, the matter is the reverse, that one is formally called a sinner because he is worthy of punishment, that is, because from a past evil act he has contracted this obligation and worthiness to punishment, through which he is formally constituted in the habitual state of a sinner.

Therefore, a child is a sinner habitually because he is worthy of punishment, with the particle "because" expressing the formal cause, just as when we say that Peter is a man because he is a rational animal. But he is worthy of punishment because of Adam's sin causally, insofar as he is extrinsically denominated from it and is said to have sinned in Adam, which will be explained still more in the solution of the following argument.

Second, Vázquez objects: Those who assert that original sin is guilt for punishment posit something intermediate between sin and punishment. For guilt is not punishment itself but obligation to it, nor is it sin but the effect of it. Therefore, if children are guilty of punishment and obligated to it, they have contracted this obligation by some sin. Either, therefore, [the sin] of the first parent or their own. Not the first, because then there would be no proper sin in them. If their own, then it will be something distinct from obligation itself and prior to it, since it is its cause.

This is confirmed because obligation to punishment depends on the will of God, who could even not obligate or destine to punishment while sin and injustice remain. Also because obligation itself is not injustice or iniquity, therefore neither is it sin. For one is not evil and a sinner from the fact that he is obligated to punishment, although from the fact that he is evil it follows that he is obligated to punishment.

I respond that guilt and obligation to punishment can be taken in two ways, as Salas says in the cited place: either for destination and ordination to punishment, or for a relation of reason resulting in the soul from that divine act. Thus indeed it is not sin but something intermediate between fault and punishment. Or it is taken for worthiness and merit of punishment, and

thus although it is something intermediate between punishment and actual fault from which it results, nevertheless it is not something intermediate between punishment and habitual fault, but rather is habitual fault itself.

To the confirmation, likewise it must be said that by the name of guilt, Augustine does not understand obligation to punishment that depends on the will of God, but worthiness of it. This obligation does not depend on the will of God obligating us to punishment, but on the nature of sin by which we are rendered worthy of punishment. And when he says that one is not called evil and a sinner because he is obligated to punishment, but conversely, it has already been said above that this holds universally for obligation to punishment taken for divine ordination to punishment, not for the worthiness of punishment itself resulting from actual sin. For although in the causal sense it can be verified insofar as one is rendered worthy of punishment because he has sinned, nevertheless in the formal sense the matter is the reverse. Therefore, when it is commonly said that one is not called evil and a sinner because he is obligated to punishment or worthy of punishment, this is true of actual malice and sin, not of that which is permanent and original.

Third, Vásquez still insists that not even in this way can it be defended that original sin consists in obligation to punishment taken for worthiness of punishment. For worthiness of punishment is something posterior to all sin, because one is not a sinner because he is worthy of punishment, but rather conversely, he is worthy of punishment because he is a sinner.

This is confirmed because worthiness of punishment or reward is like something consequent to goodness or malice, for it is as it were the reason for merit. But this follows goodness or malice. Therefore, worthiness is not itself goodness or malice, and consequently worthiness of punishment is not the formal reason of sin, for this must be malice.

Finally, this worthiness in children is an extrinsic and rational denomination, not from some form existing in them, for then it would be intrinsic, but from some extrinsic form. But this can be nothing other than the sin of the first parent. Therefore, all would be denominated worthy and sinners from the sin of the first parent, which was the opinion of Pighius already rejected, because just as we cannot be truly just if we are only worthy of eternal life from the justice of Christ, so also we cannot be sinners if we are only worthy of punishment from the sin of the first parent.

I respond that worthiness of punishment is something posterior to actual and passing sin, not to habitual and permanent sin. To the objection that one is not a sinner because he is worthy of punishment, but conversely, this is true in the causal sense, not the formal sense, as is clear from what has been said.

To the confirmation, likewise it must be said that worthiness of reward or punishment is something consequent to actual goodness or malice, not to habitual. Although it is not actual malice, it is nevertheless habitual and permanent malice.

To the last, although that worthiness in children can be called an extrinsic denomination physically and in the genus of being, it is nevertheless intrinsic in the moral genus, since it is proper to each one and is contracted from Adam's sin as from a demeritorious cause. Nor do we thus fall into Pighius's opinion. He asserted that infants are formally denominated sinners

from Adam's sin and not causally only, and said that whatever descends from Adam's sin, being intrinsic in children, has only the nature of punishment, not fault. But we, although we admit that the original sin of posterity is derived from Adam's sin, nevertheless say that each one is a sinner by his own guilt, intrinsic to him in the moral genus, and unjust by his own injustice, just as we are also denominated just by our own justice through grace infused in baptism, depending on the justice of Christ and similar to it.

Fourth, Aversa, Meratius in the treatise on sins, difficulty 13, section 5, and others urge that original sin is properly sin, but guilt of punishment is not sin, because whether it is taken for obligation and deputation to punishment, or for worthiness of punishment, it cannot be called sin. For in either way it has the nature of good and pertains to justice. Therefore, it is not original sin.

This is confirmed because worthiness and obligation of punishment to be suffered can be in one who lacks sin, as is clear concerning the souls in purgatory and concerning one who has duly confessed all sins and been absolved.

Finally, because if it is taken for obligation to punishment, God is the author of such obligation. For the sentence of condemnation that he pronounces on the sinner obliges him to that punishment, yet he cannot be the author of sin. But if it is taken for worthiness of punishment that would befit the sinner even if God had otherwise decreed not to punish him, it would still be true that the impious man of his part is worthy of punishment. Nor in this sense can it be said to be formally original sin, for it is asked what this worthiness is in the sinner after sin has already passed away. Either it is a relation, and this would indeed be a relation of reason, because one could not think of a real relation left in man after sin. But sin must be explained according to what it is in reality. Therefore, one would have to go back to the foundation of the relation, which is past sin, from which by extrinsic denomination man is denominated a sinner. And thus speaking of original sin, we fall back into the opinion of Pighius already rejected.

I respond that guilt taken for divine ordination to punishment or for a relation arising from such ordination is indeed good and pertains to justice, and therefore is not sin. It is otherwise if it is taken for worthiness of punishment, as Salas rightly notes in the cited place. For this worthiness of punishment is habitual sin, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of *On Divine Names*: "To be punished is not evil, but to be worthy of punishment."

To the confirmation, I deny that obligation to punishment corresponding to sin is in one who lacks sin. For the guilt of which we are speaking here is not any obligation to punishment, but that which is proximately and immediately contracted from sin committed. For it is such a debt that one contracts through the act of sin to undergo punishment. And therefore obligation to punishment imposed by a priest and which remains to be paid in this life or in purgatory after the remission of fault does not have the nature of guilt or fault, since it is not immediately from sin. And the punishment to which a sinner is obligated from mortal sin is called the punishment of damnation; the punishment to which a penitent is obligated from the imposition of a priest is called satisfactory.

To the last, I concede that obligation to punishment taken in the second way, namely, for worthiness and merit of punishment resulting from past fault, is in the sinner habitual sin, whether personal or original, and I concede that it is a relation of reason, not indeed formal

but material, intrinsically denominating man a sinner. Nor does any absurdity seem to appear in constituting the formal aspect of original sin in a relation of reason materially taken, says Salas, since Vásquez, Canus, and others constitute the formal aspect of actual sin in a certain relation of reason. Also because, as Arriaga says in the cited place, since all sin is in the moral genus, no other inherence and intrinsic reason can be sought in it than within the moral genus itself. Nor can it be in any other way "as it is in reality" than befits intrinsic denominations in the moral genus, which we grant are given in their own way in reality with no intellect operating, as was said in logic. Otherwise, original sin would be something fictitious, but infants are not truly sinners.

Fifth, Salas in the cited place, having judged the reasons adduced so far ineffective, adds three others as more effective. The first is that worthiness of eternal punishment in an infant does not follow immediately from an evil act but from the lack of grace. For given grace, the infant would be worthy of eternal life; but with it removed through Adam's sin, he becomes unworthy. Therefore, the privation of grace is original sin rather than worthiness of punishment itself. For what suffices for habitual sin is that by reason of which man is worthy of eternal punishment.

The second is that original sin is the death of the soul, according to Trent, session 5, canon 2, and Orange, canon 2. But guilt or worthiness of punishment is not the death of the soul, since it is not privation of spiritual life. Therefore, etc.

The third is that original sin is not something fictitious; otherwise, infants would not be truly sinners. But worthiness of punishment is a relation of reason and fictitious. Therefore, etc.

I respond that neither are these reasons so effective that we are compelled by them to reject and consider false Augustine's opinion on original sin. And indeed the last, to begin with it, remains solved from what was said to the last confirmation of the preceding argument, with which it entirely coincides, which solution is from Salas himself and therefore ought not to displease him.

The second has an easy solution, for according to this way of speaking, the minor must be denied, that guilt or worthiness of punishment is not the spiritual death of the soul. For spiritual death of the soul can be most fittingly explained through passive obligation to punishment. For just as the spiritual life of the soul consists in its free conjunction with the ultimate supernatural end through habitual grace, so its spiritual death consists in the privation of such conjunction and consequently in guilt or obligation to the punishment of loss.

The first contains only some difficulty. However, Gavaius responds to it, disputation 2, chapter 4, section 5, by denying the assumption. For given Adam's sinful act and the divine covenant, as soon as an infant, a son of Adam, is born, he immediately contracts guilt and worthiness to the punishment of loss, through which he is formally made unworthy of beatitude and worthy of eternal punishment. But since in fact, by divine ordination, no one is ordained to eternal life except through the habit of grace, and through its privation he is said to be ordained to punishment, therefore he adds that the habit of grace concurs materially to original sin, and guilt of punishment or worthiness formally.

However, this solution is sufficient in itself. But perhaps Salas would reply that if in fact by divine ordination, through the privation of the habit of grace, each one formally remains ordained to punishment, just as through the same [habit] he formally remains ordained to eternal life, it follows directly that the privation of the habit of grace concurs not only materially but also formally to the constitution of original sin.

Rather, according to this way, it should be said that in the posterity of Adam, punishment does not follow from the lack of grace, but conversely, the lack of grace follows from worthiness of punishment, because children are worthy of lacking justice and sanctity because of Adam's sin. Hence such worthiness is prior to the privation of justice, and therefore in that worthiness will be the essence of original sin, while the lack of justice will have rather the nature of punishment in the posterity of Adam than of fault.

Salas must also admit this from the fact that he teaches in number 42 that if because of Adam's sin, God were unwilling to deprive someone of the quality of grace, but nevertheless [would deprive him] of beatitude, then habitual sin would remain in him, because he would remain worthy of privation of beatitude, not because of the lack of the quality of grace, but because of his own sin or that of the head [i.e., Adam], not forgiven as to the punishment of lacking beatitude.

Or better it can be said that just as in fact, by divine ordination, worthiness of reward or merit for glory is not given except through the habit of grace, even though absolutely speaking it could be given without it, so neither is worthiness and merit of punishment given except through the privation of the habit of justice and sanctity, such that in fact by divine ordination, the privation of justice is also required for the integrity of original sin. According to this way of speaking, it still must be denied that worthiness of punishment in an infant follows from the lack of grace, but rather through it is integrally constituted by divine ordination, just as neither does merit or worthiness of reward in the just follow from the possession of grace, but rather through grace itself is formally constituted in that state. Nor can it be called its effect except in the genus of formal cause. But it must be said and should be said to be an effect caused demeritoriously from the past act of sin, either one's own, as is the case with personal habitual sin, or that of the head [i.e., Adam], as is the case with original sin, which doctrine will be explained more in the following article.

Sixthly, the Author finally argues against controversies among Scotists in controversy 40, conclusion 4, but in his usual manner so entangled and confused that what he wishes to say cannot be perceived. However, he seems to prove from this that original sin cannot consist in guilt or ordination to punishment because no punishment corresponds to original sin—certainly not the punishment of sense, as is the common opinion, nor the punishment of loss, because the deprivation of divine vision in children is not a punishment, which he proves from Scotus, Distinction 29, 3, and claims that Gavatus himself admits this in the cited disputation 2, chapter 7, number 45. But that eternal punishment, at least of loss, corresponds to original sin will be shown in the following question. And indeed, the Doctor, in the place cited by him, rather teaches the complete opposite, since he says that for one perishing in a state of pure nature, the deprivation of divine vision is not a punishment; however, for a child dying in the state of fallen nature, this one would be a debtor to original justice which the first one in the first parent is not. And therefore, he says, this one is guilty, that one is not. If the vision of God is conferred on one, nevertheless, the deprivation of

vision is not a punishment. These very clear words from Scotus are also reported by that Author, from which I do not see how he could have deduced from the Doctor's mind that the deprivation of vision is not [a punishment] for a child dying in original sin. It is also false that Gavatus holds this same opinion in that chapter 7, section 1, number 437; he says it must be supposed as entirely certain that those dying with original sin are punished with the eternal punishment of damnation, which he proves there and we will show in the following question. That Author says certain other things deviating from the truth in his discourse, which there is no time to examine here, but it suffices to have indicated them.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether original sin consists in the privation of original justice and sanctity

It is evident from the preceding articles that many theologians, especially from among the more recent ones, have said that original sin does not consist in the privation of original justice, particularly if it is taken in the sense of a habit, and therefore they have assigned another explanation, as has been seen. Since, however, the opposite opinion has been common in every school up to these times, and all who have written on this subject have taught that original sin consists in the privation of original justice, as Arriaga admits, and even the principal authors of the Society of Jesus have taught it—Vasquez disp. 132 c. 8.6 9, Suarez disp. 9 on sins sect. 2, Salas disp. 11 cited sect. 2.6 2, Tannerus disp. 4 on sins 4, Montesin p. 2.9 83 art. 3.9 6—and what is of greater importance, the author of this opinion seems to have been St. Anselm, as Scotus testifies in 2 disp. 32.9, at the beginning of the book on the Conception of the Virgin, ch. 27, where speaking about original sin and investigating its formal nature, he says: "This sin, which I call original, I cannot understand in infants themselves to be anything other than the nakedness of justice due, which I have set forth above, caused by Adam's disobedience." For this reason, the aforementioned theologians, lest they should seem to resist against the current of all Scholastics, distinguish original justice into habitual and actual, and they want original sin to consist indeed in the privation of original justice, not however taken for habitual grace and other habitual gifts, as Scotus and other more ancient theologians understood, but taken for honest and supernatural acts subjecting the mind to God and the appetite to reason; and they call it original because it would be transmitted through origin and would presuppose, besides the habitual gifts of justice and grace, also the external protection of God, through which man in the state of innocence would be safe from all evils; where, in the absence of all these, the same actual justice and conformity with the law in our acts is not called original but actual justice. Thus Arriaga, Ovvedus, and other recent authors in the cited places, whom Granadus contr. 6 tr. 8 disp. 3 preceded, who seems to have been the first inventor of this subterfuge lest he should seem to contradict the most common opinion.

The opposite opinion, affirming that original sin consists in the privation of original justice and sanctity, is common in both schools, namely of the Thomists and the Scotists, although they do not sufficiently agree in the manner of explaining it. For the Thomists understand by original justice, of which they say original guilt is the privation, the very habit of sanctifying grace, which human nature received in its origin and beginning, either because it was

precisely the same gift as that which subjected the soul to God and the flesh to the spirit, or the appetite to reason. Thus the Thomists everywhere explain and understand this opinion in part 2.9 82 art. 2 6 2, where Cajetan, Medina, Conrad, Curiel, Suarez, Vasquez, Meratius, Salas, Lorca, Martinez, Alvarez, Hacquet, Turrianus, Aversa, Lezana, Morand, Caspensis, and others widely.

The Scotists, however, by original justice, in the absence of which they say original sin is placed, understand another supernatural gift distinct from sanctifying grace, whose function was to subject the flesh to the spirit and the appetite to reason. Indeed, for the greater tranquility of that state of innocence, God had not only granted to Adam the gift of sanctifying grace to make him pleasing and acceptable to God and to be in him a principle of merit, but furthermore, to suppress the motion and rebellion of the inferior powers regarding their own delectable object, he added the gift of original justice so that the appetite would obey reason and the flesh the spirit. Thus almost all the older Scotists: Antonius Andreas, Tataretus, Lichetus, Gratianus Brixiensis, Nicolaus de Nisse, Scotellus, Orbellius, Angelus Aretinus, Faber in 3 sent. disp. II, Callus in the cited place, and other followers of Scotus in 2 dist. 32. But in order that what was the opinion of Scotus may be more profoundly and clearly evident, the following conclusions must be established, from which his mind will be clearly shown.

First Assertion

I say first, original sin does not consist in the privation of actual original justice, namely as taken for the honest and supernatural acts subjecting the mind to God and the appetite to reason, as the aforementioned recent authors explained.

It is proven: for it would either be the privation of actual rectitude that ought to be present in the honest acts to be elicited by the children of Adam themselves, or to be elicited by the first parent himself. Not the first, because infants, while they contract original guilt in their conception, neither can have such acts nor ought to have them; moreover, if it were said this way, then their sin would be actual and personal rather than original, inasmuch as such rectitude would be due to their acts. If the second is said, then only the actual transgression of Adam himself would be original sin in them, imputed as morally remaining in them, not remitted nor pardoned by God, just as in fact the cited recent authors say under that manner of speaking; however, such an opinion falls back into the opinion of Pighius already rejected, as was shown in article 1. Therefore it must be admitted that original justice, in the privation of which original sin consists, is a certain habitual form and a supernatural habit, which ought to have been present in Adam and his descendants, and was lost by him for himself and his posterity through his actual disobedience.

Confirmation: because the Councils of Orange and Trent call original sin the death of the soul, but the death of the soul is the very privation of due justice and sanctity, just as the life of the soul is grace itself and habitual justice. Therefore, original justice, in the privation of which original sin consists, is not actual justice but habitual justice.

Nor should you say that the death of the soul is not only the privation of grace and habitual justice but also of actual justice. For life is something permanent and by way of a principle imparting life to all the works of the same subject, which only habitual justice suits. It is

evident: Moreover, with this admitted, original sin would still be poorly explained through the privation of the whole of actual justice, since it could also be explained and ought to be through the privation of habitual justice, not actual, as is sufficiently evident of itself.

Ovviedus responds, controversy 9 num. 64, that if this reasoning were valid, it would still manifestly convince that every mortal sin, even actual, not only as opposed to the original but also as to the habitual, consists in the privation of grace, because every mortal sin is the death of the soul. Therefore he responds that original sin is called and properly is the death of the soul just as any lethal sin, because in and of itself it first constitutes the soul hateful and inimical to God, which is to be dead, and because it inflicts, at least as a secondary effect, the privation of grace, which is the life of the soul. Hence in a twofold way the lethal is the death of the soul: one immediately and through itself, insofar as it constitutes the soul an enemy of God; the other through a secondary effect of the expulsion of the habit of grace, which is the life of the soul; and in both ways original sin can be called the death of the soul.

But against this: because actual sin is not the death of the soul formally but only causally, insofar as it is the cause of the privation of grace, which is the life of the soul; hence actual sin is said by the Fathers to kill the soul insofar as it induces the death of it, not however formally as the death itself, which has the character of a permanent privation, just as life. Moreover, if grace is formally the life of the soul, as the respondent concedes, so, on the contrary, only the privation of it will be formally death. Moreover, if actual sin is the death of the soul insofar as the expulsion of the habit of grace follows it as a secondary effect, from this it follows that it is the death of the soul only causally, not however formally. Nor can it even be called the death of the soul formally insofar as it formally constitutes it hateful and inimical to God, because the soul is formally constituted such not through the actual sin itself but through the guilt consequent to it, which is the worthiness and merit of punishment; and because in fact, by divine ordination, the soul is not constituted in such guilt except through the privation of grace, just as, on the contrary, it is not formally constituted in the state of merit bringing the right to glory except through the opposed habit. Hence it follows that in fact the soul is not constituted hateful and inimical to God except through the privation of grace; wherefore, from first to last, actual sin does not constitute the soul an enemy of God except causally.

Arriaga responds, disp. 51 n. 15, that the death of the soul is not properly the privation of grace, for if, according to the more common opinion, grace and sin are divinely placed simultaneously in the same subject, then there will not be a privation of grace, and yet there will be the death of the soul; for that soul will be hated by God and will be his enemy no less than if it did not have that grace. On the contrary, however, if God were to divinely take away grace from a child already baptized, that child would not properly be spiritually dead, for he would not displease God or be hated.

Nor is it valid to say that in the aforementioned cases there is not the privation of grace that they ought to have, but a pure negation, and that the death of the soul is the privation of grace. It is not valid because the very absence of grace in itself is entirely the same, whether I ought to have it or not; therefore, if that absence of grace in itself is the death of the soul, from wherever or from whatever cause it comes, it will kill the soul. Therefore, he responds that grace is said to be the life of the soul insofar as it makes man worthy of God's love and friendship and by its nature asks that death be taken away; hence, if grace is placed

simultaneously with sin, man will not live but will be dead. Hence it happens that through sin alone, even without the privation of grace, there is the death of the soul; but the absence of grace can be said improperly to be death insofar as man is not worthy of God's supernatural friendship. But this is not absolutely the death of the soul of which we are speaking at present; for man in a pure state of nature, as has been said, without any sin and without grace, would not be dead to God, but could be a natural friend of God and living with him.

But neither does this response satisfy, nor are the adduced instances relevant. For here the discourse is about original sin now existing and dependent on God's covenant already established with Adam, and supposing the law already decreed that man is not formally converted to the supernatural end and ordained to beatitude except through the supernatural habit of grace, nor turned away from it and ordained to punishment except through the privation of such a habit. Given this order of things, we say that the death of the soul consists formally in the privation of grace, whatever would happen in another order of things and by God's absolute power. We freely concede that this does not suit the habit of grace from the nature of the thing, and its privation, but only from divine ordination. Noticing this, Ocham quod. 3 quest. 3 aptly said that original sin in fact is nothing but the absence of due original justice, but in possibility it is unworthiness for eternal life coming from another's sin, which in the preceding article we were saying is the guilt of sin, which, although then it would denominate and constitute man formally a sinner independently of the privation of grace, nevertheless in this order of things it does not give such a denomination except through the absence of the habit of grace; hence, says Ocham in the cited place, question nine, original sin completely consists in the privation of the habit of grace and in the privation of the right to glory, which is now had through it, in which second alone it would consist if God had not promised the quality of grace to Adam's posterity dependent on his innocence, and then it could be completely remitted without the quality of grace through extrinsic condonation, but now it cannot be.

And so, in the first case, I concede that then there would be the death of the soul without the privation of grace, through the unworthiness alone for eternal life derived from one's own actual sin or that of another; but now the matter is not so because such unworthiness is not had in the soul except through the privation of grace from divine ordination; hence through this it is proven only that the privation of grace is not the death of the soul from the nature of the thing but only from divine ordination, which we freely concede, just as neither is the habit of grace the life of the soul from the nature of the thing, but only by divine law. In the second case also, that child would indeed not be called spiritually dead because then the absence of grace in him would not be the privation of some form due, but only a mere negation. Nor is the instance made against this valid, because although it would be the same absence in the nature of negation and physically, nevertheless not morally, because it would not be the absence of a due form; hence that instance proceeds as if we were saying that the absence of grace is the death of the soul from the nature of the thing, which we by no means assert.

Second Assertion

I say second, original sin does not formally consist in the sole privation of grace that makes one pleasing or of habitual sanctity, as the Thomists were saying.

Gavatus proves this, disp. 3 tit. chap. 2, sect. 9, where he strives to show that original sin does not consist in the absence of original justice however it is taken, whether for the habit of sanctifying grace or for a habit distinct from grace and charity. The reason is such: the stain of original guilt could be found in someone without the absence of any supernatural habit, whichever it might be, whether grace and charity or original justice. Therefore, etc. He proves the antecedent: for given the case that God had established the first man in a pure natural state without any supernatural habit of grace and charity or original justice, and nevertheless had destined him to eternal beatitude, if he had imposed some precept of not eating the apple or something similar under the same condition—namely, if he were to transgress that precept, not only he but all his posterity would be stripped of worthiness for beatitude—in such a case, given the transgression of that precept, each one would be born no less a sinner than now, since he would be judged no less unworthy of eternal life than now; and yet he would not have the absence of any supernatural habit. Therefore, original sin cannot formally consist in the absence of any supernatural habit.

However, Ovvedus, controv. 9 nu. 60, admits that this reasoning does not conclude the intended result, even though he agrees with Gavatus in the same assertion, because it can be said, as Salas in fact responds, that in that case there would be an original sin distinct from what now exists, just as the pact would be distinct; but the original sin now existing depends on this pact, and consists in the privation of grace, whatever might happen with another. Hence, beyond what would then be called original sin, now is added the privation of grace, without which Adam's sin would not bring us the privation of glory because God in this order of things willed no one to enjoy glory without grace. Therefore, to the argument I say that if, standing the law of not eating the apple, God had decreed not to give to Adam either original justice or sanctifying grace to be preserved for himself and his other descendants, and still had obliged his posterity to sin from the eating of the forbidden apple standing Adam's transgression, all posterity would indeed be born with original sin, and such original sin would not have been the absence of either original justice or sanctifying grace, because they would have had no debt of either, but it would have been a sin of a different nature. For the nature of this sin is not to be established from the nature of the thing, but from the diversity of the pact made by God with Adam, one must speak diversely about it. But in the proposed case, the question is about original sin now existing and dependent on such a pact made with Adam about preserving grace and original justice for himself and his posterity.

Gavatus, num. 143, rejects this response because the privation of habitual grace is a stain of the soul insofar as it, by depriving man of this kind of habit, deprives him of ordination, worthiness, and participation in glory. Therefore, the reason constituting man formally a sinner is not the absence of that in the nature of a habit, but of that insofar as it gives right to glory, and consequently insofar as the privation of it deprives of such right. If, therefore, God, without any habit of grace and charity, had ordained man to supernatural beatitude, he would be said to sin in every way if by sinning he deprived himself of this kind of right and ordination, just as now.

He confirms from what Ocham taught, cited quol. 3 qu. 3, saying that original sin in fact is nothing but the absence of due original justice, but in possibility it is unworthiness for life coming from another's sin. Which is as if he said, says Gavatus, that original sin is materially the absence of original justice, formally the unworthiness for life, for this is the same as saying it is the obligation to the punishment of loss arising from Adam's sin.

He confirms finally, n. 150, from the doctrine of Salas himself: only that is of the essence of habitual sin, whether it be original or personal, which would be found in a pure state of nature; but in a pure state of nature there would not be found the privation of grace as a habit, but only the privation of worthiness for beatitude; therefore, sin consists only in this privation and not in that.

I respond by conceding the antecedent with the first consequence and consequent, because indeed it is true that grace does not give right to glory from the nature of the thing or in the nature of a habit, but from divine ordination, as will be evident in the last disputation of this section. Nevertheless, I still deny the other consequence, that in that case man would be said to sin in precisely the same way as now, because in this order of things God decreed not to have right to glory and not to be called formally just and worthy of glory except through the habit of grace, whose formal effect this is from the divine law already decreed. So equally, on the contrary, he willed that man not be called formally a sinner, unjust, unworthy of glory except through the privation of the aforementioned habit. Those moral denominations, which then would be had through an extrinsic denomination arising both from the past act, good or bad, and from divine acceptance or abomination, he willed that in fact they be had through a form physically inhering in the soul or through its privation.

To the second, the consequence is also denied, since from that statement of Ocham the entire opposite is gathered, as we noted above, since he says in explicit words and with a full mouth that original sin in fact is nothing but the absence of due original justice, although in possibility, in the aforementioned cases, it would be only unworthiness for eternal life coming from another's sin. Speaking very consequently, quod. 3 cited 9 9, he says that original sin in fact consists in the privation of the habit of grace and the privation of the right to glory, in which second alone it would consist if God had not promised to Adam's posterity the habit of grace dependent on his innocence, but only the privation.

To the third, that major is verified only by accepting the habitual or original according to the generic and common notion to that which would happen in a pure state of nature and now happens in this order of things. But in another sense, it is denied because in that case there would be a sin of another specific nature, as has been said, from that which now happens. Indeed, now it arises from a different law and pact, which then would not exist, and since sin is because it is against the law, according to the diversity of the law, it is necessary that sin also be varied according to its specific nature. And so, these and similar arguments prove at most that original sin even in fact does not consist only in the sole privation of grace, but in it and in that other which in a pure state of nature would be original sin, inasmuch as in this order of things it is decreed that such a denomination cannot be had except through the privation of grace as the formal cause of such an effect.

Therefore, the conclusion is better proven because Adam by sinning deprived himself and his posterity no less of grace than of original justice, and he was bound to preserve this no less than that. Therefore, original sin cannot consist only in the privation of sanctifying grace. The consequence is evident because we are no less debtors of one gift than of the other. The antecedent is proven from the Council of Trent, sess. 5, decree on original sin, where it says in canons 1 and 2 that he lost the sanctity and justice received from God for himself and for us through the sin of disobedience, where by sanctity it understands sanctifying grace, and by justice it understands the gift of original justice, whether this imports a

supernatural habit distinct from the habit of grace, or only the peculiar providence of God by which the powers were governed in that state, so that the inferior ones would obey the superior ones, as Vasquez and other recent authors want. If therefore he lost for himself and for us not only grace but original justice, therefore he received it not only for himself but also for his descendants. Since, therefore, his posterity are debtors not only of sanctifying grace but also of original justice about which the Council speaks as about distinct gifts, whatever the latter imports, it evidently follows that original sin cannot consist in the privation of original grace alone.

Nor would it be rightly said that by sanctity and justice the Council understood the same, namely one and the same habit of grace, which is called sanctity and justice insofar as it renders man holy and just. For although this is true, nevertheless because the Fathers speak of original justice as a gift distinct from habitual grace, whether it imports a distinct habit, as Scotus thinks, or a peculiar providence in the governance of the powers, and they say that Adam received both gifts from God for himself and his posterity, and lost both for himself and for us through the sin of disobedience, it must be said that the Council spoke in the same sense and did not take justice and sanctity for the same gift.

Vasquez responds, c. 10 n. 43, that original sin can be placed only in the privation of grace, because only this privation is the death of the soul; for thus the same Council calls original sin. Hence, he infers that only this privation pertains to the essence of original sin, even if infants have contracted the privation of original justice and of other habits which they ought to have had together with the privation of grace.

Ovvedus, cited n. 62, shows the insufficiency of this response because, even if only the privation of grace is the death of the soul, nevertheless it is not only a sin to contract the habit which is life, but also the privation of any habit which is due. Just as the privation of Mass is a sin when Mass is due from a precept, so equally the same debt that falls upon grace, sufficient to constitute its privation in the nature of sin, falling upon the habit of justice or faith, would constitute it in the same way in the nature of sin. For every absence of any form due from a precept is dissonant to reason; indeed, it is dissonant to reason in any matter not to provide what is due.

Hence Amicus, disp. 25, Sect. 3, says that although he once held that not even by possibility could it happen that original sin would consist in the privation of anything other than grace, because no habit distinct from sanctifying grace is conversion to God, friendship with God, and the life of the soul, nevertheless, with the matter more carefully considered, he confesses that it is possible, although in that case original sin would have been of a different nature from what it is now. Because just as in Adam the privation of another habit distinct from grace could have had the true nature of habitual sin left from the actual, so also in us it could have had the true nature of original sin transfused from the same actual of Adam as head. The consequence is evident because if that had been a true personal sin in Adam, consequently the original sin contracted in us would be a true sin. The antecedent is proven: if a supernatural habit distinct from grace had been given to Adam to be preserved by precept, the actual privation of such a habit would have the true nature of sin.

But this whole discourse of Amicus runs not only on the possible but also on the fact: for in fact a supernatural habit distinct from grace was given to Adam, namely original justice,

under the precept of preserving it for himself and his posterity, and in fact he lost it for himself and for us through the sin of disobedience. Therefore, original sin even in fact does not consist in the privation of sanctifying grace.

You will say: such a privation would not be formal aversion, enmity, and death of the soul; therefore, it would not have the true nature of sin as original sin is. The consequence is evident, for the essence of mortal sin is aversion, enmity with God, and death of the soul. The antecedent is proven, for such a sin would not have been the privation of conversion and friendship with God or life of the soul, since these are only properties of sanctifying grace.

Amicus responds: such a privation in us in that case would have morally included Adam's capital sin, which, because it would have been the formal enmity of God and death of the soul, the very privation of the habit morally including such aversion, enmity with God, and death of the soul as cause and form per se connoted, would have denominated posterity averted and enemies of God.

This does not please me, for it seems to suppose that any actual sin includes formal aversion from God, which is false because sins against the precepts of the second table include virtual aversion from God, as Scotus teaches in 2 dist. 37, qu. un. from that, and in the reports 2 dist. 33, qu. un., where he notes that there is one formal aversion from God which, if it is positive, consists in the hatred of God, if that is possible; if negative, it consists in the absence of the love of God when you are bound to love him. The other is virtual, included in every sin at least mortal, because since the fulfillment of God's precepts is necessary to enjoy God, according to that of Matthew, "if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments," he who violates these is virtually turned away from the ultimate end. Since, therefore, from hypothesis even in the aforesaid case, the precept imposed by God on Adam would not have been immediately about the ultimate end, as are the precepts of the first table, but only about abstinence from the forbidden apple, clearly his sin was not a formal aversion from God but only virtual, insofar as it was about something that was necessary for the ultimate end.

The Doctor, therefore, responds in the reports, dist. 33 cited, that maintaining that original sin is the privation only of original justice as it is a habit distinct from grace and charity, indeed it would still be a mortal sin, yet it would not be formally opposed to grace, nor would it immediately turn away from God formally. For it is not necessary, therefore it immediately turns away from God, because sins opposed to the precepts of the second table are mortal, and yet none of these is immediately about the ultimate end, nor does it immediately turn away from it; nevertheless, they are opposed to the well-ordering to the end; hence it is necessary for salvation that man be well-disposed regarding those things which are necessary for the end, even if they are not immediately about the ultimate end. Thus in the proposed case, says the Doctor, original sin, if it is the privation only of original justice, is not primarily or immediately opposed to grace, but not formally, because now regularly moral justice is necessary for one working meritoriously; thus then original justice was prior and as it were a necessary means for thus working, although by itself alone it was not sufficient for working meritoriously.

From this doctrine to another instance, with the antecedent conceded, the consequence must be denied along with its proof, because it is not of the essence of mortal sin, whether it was actual or habitual, that it always be a formal aversion from God and formal enmity with God and death of the soul, but it suffices that it be virtual insofar as the privation of grace necessarily and immediately follows it, which is formal aversion from God, enmity with God, and death formally of the soul.

Third Assertion

I say third, neither does original sin formally consist in the sole privation of original justice due as it imports a habit distinct from sanctifying grace, as the older Scotists cited above were saying.

Gavatus holds this, chap. 2 cited against the older Scotists, and having first rejected in sect. 7 certain reasons as useless, afterwards in sect. 8 he proves it by the reasons which the Thomists use to prove that original sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace only, as can be seen in Vasquez, Suarez, Amicus, Aversa, and others, of which the first and principal is: original justice, absolutely considered, as it is a habit distinct from grace and charity, cannot properly be called the spiritual life of the soul; therefore, neither, on the contrary, can its privation be called the spiritual death of the soul. But according to the Councils of Orange and Trent, original sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved from Scotus, cited, teaching that original justice, as it was a habit distinct from grace, did not regard God as the supernatural end, nor did it join man to God except as he has the nature of a delectable and becoming end, nor did it have the nature of a gratuitous and meritorious principle, and consequently did not constitute man within the order of grace, taking grace strictly. Therefore, it was not the spiritual and supernatural life of the soul.

Faber responds, lib. 3 sent. disp. 11, chap. 4, that although original justice was not a principle of meriting eternal life, it nevertheless made man holy and pleasing to God for that state, which he proves because the Doctor, 2 dist. 29, q. un. ad 4, approves the opinion of some saying that original justice joined man to God so perfectly that it did not admit venial sin with itself, and that in this it exceeded grace that makes one pleasing, which exists with venial sin. Moreover, because he says there that original justice was compared to habitual grace as exceeding and exceeded: it exceeded this because it joined the will to God more firmly than grace; this, however, exceeded and exceeds that because it joins man to God as the good and supernatural end and as supernaturally to be attained through merit.

However, Gavatus rightly refutes this response as wholly departing from the doctrine of Scotus, for that a habit makes man pleasing to God and holy and is not a principle of meriting in the state of the way is thoroughly made up; for grace is a principle of meriting for this reason, because it renders man holy and pleasing to God. And it is utterly false that Scotus in the cited place approved the opinion of those saying that original justice so perfectly joined the will to God that it would not admit venial sin with itself. Indeed, he refers to that opinion, but so far is he from approving it that he rather solidly refutes it in dist. 21, q. 1. And although he says there that grace and original justice are compared between themselves as exceeding and exceeded, yet he clearly explains this excess, saying that grace exceeds original justice in this, that the latter did not regard God as the supernatural end nor as to be attained supernaturally, but joined the will to him precisely as to the good

becoming and delectable; but to infer from this, as Faber argues, that it makes man holy and pleasing to God is entirely vain and arbitrarily said.

I respond, therefore, that this argument is adduced in terms by Scotus, though under other words, in the reports in the cited place, dist. 33, qu. un.: "there is another principal way," where, having stated the opinion that original sin consists in the privation of original justice due as it is a habit distinct from grace and charity, he objects against it: because original sin is mortal, therefore it is the privation of charity, therefore it immediately turns away from God. But such a sin opposed is opposed to grace, therefore original justice will not be other than grace.

To this argument, he assigns the response verbatim related above in n. 122, from which doctrine to the argument as formed by Gavatius, the Scotists would concede the first enthymeme, that just as original justice as distinct from the habit of grace is not properly and formally the life of the soul, so neither is its privation the proper and formal death of the soul. They would deny, however, that when the Councils call original sin the death of the soul, this must necessarily be understood of formal death and formally opposed to spiritual life, such as is the privation of grace alone. For it suffices for their purpose if they are understood also of only virtual death; for indifferently the Councils and Fathers call death sin, both actual and habitual, and yet it is certain that actual sin does not formally import the privation of sanctifying grace. If, therefore, original sin is placed to consist in the sole privation of original justice, then it will be virtually opposed to grace, not formally, and will be the virtual death of the soul insofar as the privation of grace itself, which is the formal death of the soul, necessarily and immediately follows its privation, and they will say this suffices for the nature of mortal sin, whether it be actual or habitual.

This is confirmed from Scotus's doctrine dist. 32, whose conclusion was related and explained above, and that although those gifts were distinct, neither did original justice join man to God as a supernatural end, nor was it formally the life of the soul giving right to glory as grace does, nor consequently would its privation, considered in itself, be the formal death of the soul and formal aversion from the ultimate end; because nevertheless in that state they had a necessary connection between themselves from divine ordination, therefore original justice included grace by concomitance, such that the former could not be lost without the latter. From which it follows that by reason of that necessary connection, for that state, the lack of original justice would virtually include the lack of sanctifying grace, and that just as by reason of this connection original justice can be called virtually the spiritual life of the soul, so also its privation is spiritual death, which suffices for the formality of original sin to be established. In this sense, says the Doctor in the cited place dist. 32 at the end, original sin even as it imports the lack of original justice is guilt turning away from the ultimate end, which is removed by grace bringing about the opposite conversion; which doctrine of Scotus was accurately noted by Vulpes tom. 2 p. 2 disp. 40 art. 3.

Furthermore, Gavatius argues: if the formal reason of original sin were placed in the sole lack of original justice, it would follow that by the mere position of this, original sin would be deleted from the soul; but this is false, therefore, etc. The major is evident; the minor is proven supposing what Scotus teaches dist. 32 at the end, that these two gifts were so ordered among themselves that original justice could exist without grace, if therefore God were to infuse original justice without the habit of grace into a child conceived in original sin,

since original justice considered in itself did not make man holy and a friend of God, still in such a case he would have original sin because justice [alone was insufficient].

I respond from the doctrine of Scotus brought forth, denying the minor with its proof, for although from the nature of things those gifts were not mutually connected, and speaking absolutely, original justice could have existed without grace, as the Doctor says there, he nevertheless adds that from its condition and from divine disposition they were so connected with each other that neither could be lost without the other, and the privation of the former necessarily included the privation of the latter, whence he says that if grace had been restored without original justice, man would not have had the perfect state of innocence, which demanded the connection of both gifts, although speaking absolutely and from the nature of things, one could exist without the other, as Vulpes notes in the cited place. Just as therefore by reason of the state and from divine disposition, the privation of the former gift virtually included the privation of the latter, so the position of the former virtually included the position of the latter, to the extent that original justice could not be infused without sanctifying grace as a companion, and because through the position of the latter, the virtual aversion from the ultimate end which the privation of original justice implied would be formally removed, consequently, original sin, which is formally placed in such privation, would be removed.

Gavatus also urges other arguments in the cited place against the common view of Scotists, which, because they not only prove that original sin does not consist in the sole privation of original justice and adequately, but neither inadequately and partially can it contribute to its constitution, will be more conveniently solved in the following article.

And so this third conclusion against the older Scotists should be proven just as the second was proven against the Thomists: because Adam by sinning deprived himself and his posterity no less of original justice than of the gift of sanctifying grace, as the Council of Trent teaches in the cited place, and he was bound to preserve this for himself and his posterity no less than the former. Therefore, original sin cannot consist only in the privation of the required original justice, for on this account it ought to imply no more the privation of original justice than of sanctifying grace, since he received both gifts from God to be preserved for himself and his posterity. Just as, therefore, for this reason the Thomists do not reason rationally when establishing original sin in the sole privation of sanctifying grace, so for the same reason neither do the Scotists when establishing it in the sole privation of original justice.

Fourth assertion responsive to the question:

I say, finally, fourth: original sin consists formally in the privation of both gifts, namely, both of original justice and of required sanctifying grace, so that each privation partially and inadequately contributes to constituting the integral and adequate notion of original sin. This conclusion follows from what has been said: for if neither privation by itself alone suffices to constitute original sin, as has been proved, it follows that it must adequately consist of both together; nor is there any reason for someone to say that from this it would follow that there would be several original sins in each person, for this is merely a difficulty of naming: for there would be several partial and inadequate original sins, but one total and adequate one.

That this is the mind of Scotus is clearly deduced from his doctrine just cited, which he has in dist. 32 at the end, where he clearly says that the privation of original justice virtually includes the privation of sanctifying grace, and that these privations in the posterity of Adam are connected, nor is one found without the other. Therefore, both equally contribute to the constitution of original sin. He also clearly indicated this in the same place when he said that although the lack of original justice and grace are not incompatible with each other, absolutely speaking, nevertheless for that state they are incompatible when that lack is guilt turning away from the ultimate end. Original justice is a virtual aversion from the ultimate end insofar as it has annexed to it the privation of habitual grace, which is formal aversion itself. Therefore, original sin formally consists in both privations: in one as in formal aversion from the ultimate end, in the other as in only virtual aversion.

It is also the mind of St. Anselm, whose doctrine in this matter Scotus professes to follow, who in the cited place teaches that by original sin nothing else should be understood in infants except the nakedness of justice due through the disobedience of Adam, through which all are children of wrath. He does not, therefore, intend original sin to be only the privation of original justice, but also of sanctifying grace, for through this especially and formally we are constituted children of wrath and sinners, and through that former one only virtually.

You might say that from this it is rather deduced that St. Anselm by nakedness of due justice understood the privation of habitual grace, as the Thomists say, for through this alone we are made children of wrath and sinners formally; or that he understood the privation of justice or actual rectitude, as others more recent explain. Nevertheless, that St. Anselm there by original justice properly understands the habit of original justice residing in the will and given to man to suppress the movement and rebellion of the lower power concerning its proper delight, and not the habit of sanctifying grace, nor even the rectitude due to the second act, is clearly deduced from the example he brings forth of a ship with a broken rudder and of a horse with a broken bridle which is left to itself, and from this makes a disordered movement which the bridle would prevent. "Thus," says Anselm, "the will, having lost original justice, which was its bridle, performs disordered acts and follows the sensitive appetite inordinately and against the proper relation."

From this example, I say, it is clearly deduced that Anselm by original justice in no way understands actual justice, which is the rectitude due to the second act, but speaks of habitual justice and rectitude pertaining to the first act, since the rudder of a ship and the bridle of a horse do not pertain to their direction in the second act, but only in the first act, for they are ordered to the direction of the ship and the horse. Nor does he speak of original justice taken for the habit of sanctifying grace, because it does not restrain or repress the rebellion of the powers against reason, as is evident enough. It remains, therefore, that by original justice he understands a special gift given by God to the first parent for the right governance of the powers and their mutual harmony, whether it consists in some habit distinct from sanctifying grace or in some special providence of God concerning the governance of the powers.

It can, however, be granted that by nakedness of due justice he understands not only the privation of original justice but also of sanctifying grace, so that under the name of justice he comprehends both justices, both original and sanctifying, so that the name is common to

both. Concerning this matter, he added that through this nakedness of justice we are all born children of wrath and sinners. Or if he speaks precisely of original justice when he says that through it we become children of wrath, it should be understood virtually and concomitantly, insofar as the privation of the latter gift necessarily follows the privation of the former gift, through the privation of which we are formally made children of wrath, as Scotus explains in the cited place, for which reason he also calls that privation there an aversion from God.

It is, finally, also the mind of the Council of Trent in the cited place, for when it says that the first man Adam, when he transgressed the commandment of God, immediately lost for himself and for us the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted, it clearly indicates that just as he received both gifts from God to be preserved for himself and for us, and lost both at the same time for himself and for us, so also the privation of both passed to us, which therefore double privation, remaining in us until it is deleted through baptismal grace, formally constitutes us debtors of both gifts and consequently denominates us children of wrath and sinners. Nevertheless, the custom of speaking has prevailed that under the one name of original justice both privations are signified, because the name of justice is common to both gifts, because the gift of grace rendered man just and holy, and the other constituted him just and right in the governance of the powers, and both were also called original, insofar as man from the first origin of his existence was constituted by God in both justices, as the Council says.

Finally, some add, and indeed reasonably, that for one or the other privation to constitute original sin, it is necessary that it be taken as connoting the actual sin of Adam from which it arises. Both because every sin would not be sin, even if it be habitual, unless it had a voluntary cause, and in relation to that it is sin; since, therefore, original sin cannot be voluntary by the will of infants, neither actual nor habitual, since they can elicit no act in that state, it can plainly be called voluntary only through order to the will of the first parent, in which the wills of all posterity were morally included, as in our first head, not only physical but also moral, as the Doctor says, letter G. Therefore, the privation of original justice in infants is not original sin except insofar as it stands under the will of Adam, from whose transgression it arose. Also because this kind of privation can be considered physically and morally, and indeed considered in the first way, it does not constitute original sin, because thus it is from God negatively, insofar as He does not confer those gifts on the posterity of Adam. Therefore, only considered in the second way does it constitute sin, namely, insofar as it is from created will demeritoriously, since it does not have the nature of guilt and stain except insofar as it is voluntary to the created will, but it cannot have this except in relation to the will of the first parent and head, as was said from Scotus, letter H. Therefore, it cannot have the nature of original sin except as it connotes the actual sin of Adam. Wherefore, that proposition of Michael Baius, forty-seventh in order, was justly condemned in the Bull of St. Pius V and Gregory XIII: "Original sin truly has the nature of sin without any relation and respect to the will from which it had its origin."

And all this Scotus expressly signifies in dist. 32, letter B, when he says that original sin is formally the lack of original justice due, and not due in any way whatsoever, but due because accepted in the first parent and lost in him, and therefore Adam did not have original sin, because that debt was not transmitted to him through any parent, but he himself accepted that justice in himself and lost it by his own act. With these words, the Doctor indicates clearly enough that the privation of original justice cannot receive the nature of guilt except

as it connotes the actual sin of Adam; otherwise, it would neither have the nature of sin nor could it receive the denomination of original.

ARTICLE SIX: The Objections of Adversaries are Resolved

FIRST, it is objected that the privation of original justice as a gift distinct from sanctifying grace in no way pertains to the nature of original sin. Man in a pure state would have this kind of lack, and yet he wouldn't have original sin. Therefore, original sin can consist neither adequately nor inadequately in such privation. This argument can be equally urged against the privation of habitual grace.

But it is easily answered that although man constituted in a pure natural state, or in a state of pure nature, would have neither original justice nor sanctifying grace, he would not therefore be said to be deprived of them by a moral and culpable privation, which presupposes a moral debt of the deficient form, but would have a mere negation of them insofar as they were not owed to him, because they were not received either in himself or in another. The opposite happens in us, since we received both gifts in Adam and lost them, according to the cited Council of Trent.

Against this solution Rubion replies (2 dist. 30, quest. 2): God does not will anyone to be obligated to have any of His gifts that were bestowed not on himself but on another, and were lost by the fault of that other, not his own. But original justice was a supernatural gift bestowed only on the first parents and lost by their fault. Therefore, the first parents alone should have been debtors of this original justice that was received and lost.

This is confirmed: God does not will anyone to be more obligated to that which he never lost by his own fault, nor received, nor in any way existed in his power, than to that which in some way existed in his power and which he received and lost by his fault. But no one other than the first parents lost or received original justice, nor did it in any way exist in his power. Yet many other virtuous moral habits existing in man's power have been received by many and lost by their fault, and yet God does not will them to be obligated to these habits, since He remits all their sins to them without restoring the virtuous habits that were lost, as is evident in penitents who still remain with vicious habits. Therefore, etc.

RESPONSE: The major premise is true if that gift was in no way bestowed on him, which is not the case in the matter at hand, because as Scotus teaches (dist. 32, as to 2), although God by antecedent will (that is, as far as depends on Him), insofar as He had promised by a pact made with Adam, if he kept the injunction given, to bestow those gifts on all his posterity, which He had given to him as our physical and moral head to be preserved for himself and for us. This bestowal by antecedent will, says the Doctor, was sufficient for the will of any child of Adam to be naturally a debtor of those gifts.

By this, the answer to the confirmation is also evident. For although Adam's posterity did not receive those gifts in themselves, they nevertheless received them in their physical and moral head, and even in some way in themselves, not indeed by consequent will but by

antecedent will in the manner already explained, which is sufficient to induce an obligation in them.

This is usually explained by the example of those who enter into a contract through proxies. They indeed also enter into it by the alien will of the proxy, in which they have placed their own, and they are obligated to whatever their proxy has bound himself. Thus, therefore, God placed our wills in that of the first parent as in our physical and moral head. Hence, because all the posterity of Adam were collected by divine ordination into one mystical body under the one head of Adam, when it was decreed that all would live a spiritual life by his justice, which would be derived from him meritoriously to all posterity, or they were gathered into one quasi-Republic, to which Adam was given as Prince, subject to the same law as he. It follows that when he transgressed such a law, all must be said to have transgressed together. And thus, just as he was bound to preserve that same original justice for all, which he would have derived to all by not sinning, so likewise he is said to have lost it in all by his transgression and to have left us debtors of that gift. And the Council of Trent plainly declares the matter thus in Session 5, Decree on Original Sin.

You will say: If, therefore, Adam was constituted as our head, not only physical but also moral, in the aforesaid manner, why, when Adam's sin was remitted and grace restored, was sin not also remitted to his posterity?

The reason is that, although Adam's posterity are considered physically joined with him insofar as they are propagated from his seed, nevertheless, morally speaking, after the state of sin they are no longer considered joined with him. For they were joined with him as head by divine pact only in the state of innocence, to live the same life or to die the same death. But after spiritual death and the fall, he lost his Principality, and another Head was given to men, by whose sanctity and innocence their life was to be repaired, who was Christ the Lord.

SECOND, Rubion argues that the lack of original justice is no less in man after baptism than before, but after baptism there is no original sin in man, since it has been remitted to him. Therefore, such a lack is not original sin.

The Doctor answers in the solution to the arguments for the second question, to the second, that in baptism the debt of having original justice is remitted and commuted into the debt of having grace, which is an equivalent and surpassing gift. Hence, although there still remains after baptism a lack of that gift, nevertheless, since the debt of having it no longer remains, because it has now been commuted, it no longer remains under the aspect of privation but only of simple negation. Therefore, since sin is a privation of original justice owed, when the privation is removed because of the removal of the debt, sin is also said to be removed, as was more fully explained above in number 85.

However, Rubion refutes this solution in the same place because one obligated to have something is not released from obligation by having something else distinct from it. But grace is really distinct from original justice. Therefore, if man is born obligated to have original justice, he is not released from obligation by the divine grace received in baptism.

This is confirmed because God does not will anyone to be more obligated now than before to that which is equally impossible for him now as afterward. But original justice is equally

naturally impossible for man before baptism as after it. Therefore, God does not will anyone to be more obligated to have the gift of original justice before than after baptism.

I RESPOND by the same doctrine that any privation can be removed either by a directly opposite form or by an equivalent form, or even by an exceeding one according to moral use, as was explained in number 81 cited, by the example of a gold and silver coin. For if someone owes a silver coin to another, and if he does not have it but gives a gold one instead, he will discharge the debt more than adequately, not because the privation of the silver coin is formally removed, but because the debt is removed equivalently or virtually or even exceedingly, and when the debt is removed, the negation of silver remaining without the debt no longer has the aspect of privation.

The major premise, therefore, is true when that other distinct thing does not exceed or at least equal that in place of which it is given; false when it exceeds or equals, as in our case. For although original justice with grace is related as exceeding and exceeded according to Scotus (2 dist. 29, qu. un. to 4), nevertheless grace simply exceeds, both because it tends toward God under the aspect of a supernatural good while original justice does so under the aspect of a delightful good, and because grace gives a right to the attainment of beatitude, which original justice does not.

And therefore, when grace is conferred through baptism, the debt of having original justice is removed and is commuted into the debt of having and preserving grace and performing works of grace for the appropriate place and time.

To the confirmation, it must likewise be said that the major premise is true, all else being equal, which is not the case in our matter. For the fact that man is more obligated before baptism than after does not arise from the fact that before baptism original justice is in his power and not afterward, but because after baptism he has something equivalent, namely, sanctifying grace, through which the debt of having original justice is discharged.

THIRD, Gavatus, having adduced this second argument in the cited place with the replies of Rubion and having shown it ineffective with them from the same doctrine of Scotus, nevertheless afterward takes it up again and undertakes to defend it, rejecting the adduced solution of Scotus, number 132.

For although, he says, it is accepted by all the more ancient Scotists as Scotus's response, it is not really Scotus's but rather Henry's, as the Margo notes at the end of the distinction where, finally acknowledging that that response hardly satisfies, he assigns another. Therefore he attacks it because if in baptism original sin is formally deleted by grace insofar as the debt of having original justice is thereby discharged and commuted into the debt of having an equivalent gift, namely, grace, then, just as before baptism the lack of original justice was formally original sin, so after it the lack of the habit of grace will be formally habitual personal sin, which is commonly rejected by Scotists against Thomists.

This is confirmed because privations are removed only by opposite habits. Therefore, if original sin consisted in the lack of original justice, it could be removed only by the positing of that same original justice. If you say, as above, that privation is removed either by a formally opposite form or at least by an equivalent form, such as grace is in this case, he objects against this because that form is said to be equivalent to another which can communicate to

the subject those effects which the other would communicate if it were formally found in that subject, as is said of the rational soul with respect to the vegetative and sensitive. But sanctifying grace communicates to the just man none of those effects which original justice used to provide. Therefore, etc.

If you say that, although grace is not a form equivalent to original justice in itself and by its own nature, it is nevertheless equivalent as far as divine acceptance is concerned, and therefore, by divine acceptance, original sin is removed through grace, he still objects against this. For even supposing divine acceptance, sanctifying grace communicates to the just man none of those effects which original justice used to provide. Therefore, not even in relation to divine acceptance can it be said to be equivalent to it.

If, finally, you say that grace is therefore said to be equivalent to original justice because it more perfectly joined the soul to God Himself than original justice, and therefore in baptism, when grace is restored, that sin is dismissed more simply and more eminently than it would be remitted through the proper positive, he further replies that original justice, considered in itself, did not join man to God with respect to that from which original sin disjoins him, because it did not regard God except under the aspect of a suitable and delightful end, not under the aspect of an honest and supernatural end. Therefore, even with respect to this effect, grace cannot be said to be equivalent to it.

RESPONSE: It is sufficiently clear from what was said in numbers 85 and 86 that that response concerning the discharge and commutation of the debt of original justice into the debt of having grace is in accordance with the mind of the Doctor, and that he did not revoke it at the end of dist. 32, but rather further explained it.

But that argument is also pressed by Poncius (disp. 18 3. 24), who proves that consequence because neither could original justice itself be more owed to be present than grace, nor is there any reason at all why the privation of justice owed to be present would be sin rather than the privation of grace owed to be present.

And indeed, for this very reason, we said above that original sin should be constituted adequately in the privation of both gifts, and not of one only, since both are equally owed. Hence, when we say that in baptism the debt of having original justice is discharged and commuted into the debt of having grace, this is not to be understood as if man before baptism had only the debt of original justice and not of grace, but it is to be understood thus: that by divine acceptance, through the payment of only one debt, both are remitted. As if someone owed a hundred gold pieces and a bushel of wheat to another, and the creditor were pleased to remit the lesser debt through the payment of the greater. Thus, in baptism, through the payment of the greater debt, namely, grace, which was the greater gift, the lesser debt is also remitted to us, namely, that of original justice, which never returns again, but only the debt of grace if we have lost it through actual sin after baptism.

And when it is argued that after baptism such a lack of habitual grace would be habitual personal sin, just as before it was original sin together with the privation of original justice, I respond in the same way as Gavatus himself had responded to the same argument (sect. 7), which Vulpio directed against the Scotists:

First, by denying the parity, because the case is different for habitual personal sin and original sin, as is clear from what was said in number 101. Or, gratuitously granting, admitting the parity, that the privation of grace also in some way pertains to the essence of habitual personal sin now existing and in this order of things, in which it has been decreed by divine law that habitual grace should in fact have annexed to it an ordination to glory, as will be explained from the institute below in disp. 6, quest. 9, when treating of habitual sin.

To the confirmation, it is said, as there, that the privation of original justice is removed by an equivalent form, indeed an exceeding one, namely, by grace. To the objection, I say again, as there, that grace is not said to be an equivalent form as if it provided all the effects of original justice, but only by the acceptance of God remitting the lesser debt also through the payment of the greater debt in the manner already explained. Hence, in this sense only, grace is said in this case to be equivalent to original justice insofar as, when grace is restored in baptism, the entire original sin is so dismissed through it alone as to both privations it involves, which removes not only the privation of itself but also of the other gift insofar as, by divine acceptance, it removes the debt of having it, just as it would be removed by the proper positive restored. And this is the effect equivalently provided by grace, which original justice itself would provide formally, which explanation is from the same Doctor (3 dist. 3, quest. 1).

FOURTH, Vulpes argues in multiple ways from Scotus, art. 5, all of which are reduced to these two:

The lack of original justice was not formally or in itself sin in the first parent, otherwise it would have been a sin specifically distinct from the transgression of the precept not to eat of the forbidden tree, contrary to Scotus (2 dist. 21, quest. 2, to 1), and this sin of forbidden eating took that gift away from him only demeritorious, not formally, and thus such a lack was in him only a penalty demeritorious following from his mortal act, not a sin, as Scotus teaches (dist. 32, at the end of art. 1).

Which he further explains there under 1, calling the lack of justice an effect of the sin of the first parent, related to the eating of the forbidden tree as the privation of habitual grace is related to theft or homicide. But the lack of grace in us is a penalty demeritorious following from actual sins, not a sin in itself distinct from them, because it is not in itself voluntary, nor is the lack of original justice.

This is confirmed from Scotus (dist. 37, quest. 3): the privation of a good owed especially to the will agreeing with it in the first act as such is not formally voluntary; such is the lack of original justice, a good especially agreeing with nature in the first act; therefore it is not formally a sin.

The Doctor there states the major premise: because just as the will as a subject has a form immediately inhering to it in its power, so the lack of that form will not be immediately in its power, and therefore neither voluntary in the first parent.

I RESPOND that the lack of original justice was indeed not a sin in the first parent, but it was a habitual sin left by the actual one, and therefore it does not follow that it was a sin distinct from the forbidden eating, both because it was not an actual sin but only a habitual one left by it, and because he did not have a precept of preserving the justice he had received for

himself and his posterity distinct from the precept not to eat of the forbidden tree, but only included in it.

I also concede that the sin of forbidden eating did not take away original justice formally but only demeritorious, and from this it only follows that it was not in him an actual sin, not however that it was not a habitual one. And although such a lack is in one sense a penalty, it is nevertheless not incongruous that in another sense it is also a sin, as Scotus himself declares in the place cited by Vulpio himself (dist. 87, ad 9.7, lit. C), where he says with the Master that insofar as it is a lack of good proceeding actively from the will, it is a sin, and insofar as it is passively received in the will itself, it is a penalty.

This, he says, is to be explained thus: that sin itself is from the will as from an active cause, but nevertheless deficient, and the penalty itself is in the will as in a subject which is deprived of a suitable good by sin, etc. The same lack of grace or original justice, as it is from the deficient will, is evil with the evil of sin, and it has the same evil numerically, but at least of the same moral nature, which was in the sinful person. But by comparison to the will in a subject, it is evil with the evil of a penalty.

The answer to the confirmation is clear from what has just been said. That authority, as argued, is not faithfully adduced. For although the Doctor there says that the privation of grace compared to the will in the subject is not in its power, he nevertheless says that it is in its power if the will is actively considered. Therefore, the major premise is true with respect to the will considered in the first way, that is, in the subject, not in the second way.

To this is added that it is not of the nature of habitual sin that it be immediately in the power of the will, but only mediately and in a cause, insofar as the will could have acted for the rectitude owed to it and did not act, from which evil act is left sin itself, habitually, which is called a stain, as the Doctor explains in the same place.

And indeed, that the privation of original justice is actively from the created will demeritorious is clear (dist. 32 H to 3 quest. 1), where, explaining through what cracks original sin comes to Adam's posterity, he says that such a privation, physically considered as it is from God not giving justice to Adam, is not sin, because God would be the cause of sin. But insofar as it proceeds demeritorious from Adam sinning, for that reason he does not give original justice to posterity, because Adam sinned. Thus, the lack of original justice, as it was demeritorious from Adam's sinful act, was in him habitual personal sin, but in us it is original sin, at least inadequately.

Note also that the authorities adduced by the arguer from 2 dist. 32 are not faithfully referred to as sin, the Doctor expressly says.

FIFTH, the Thomists argue, proving that original sin consists only in the privation of habitual grace. For so the Council of Trent expressly teaches (sess. 5 and 6, cap. 7), where it explains original sin in us through the privation of justice and sanctity which by sinning he lost for himself and for us.

Moreover, because this sin is called by Councils, Fathers, and Scriptures the death of the soul, aversion from God, from the ultimate end, by reason of which we are said to be enemies, hostile, turned away from God, and children of wrath. Therefore, it formally

consists in the privation of that gift which would have rendered us friends and turned toward God as a supernatural end, and this is the role of grace alone, not of original justice, as is clear from what has been said.

Also, because sin consists only in the privation of that gift which is removed by baptism, as the cited Council of Trent teaches, saying that through baptism is removed whatever has the true and proper nature of sin. But through baptism is removed only the privation of subjection and conversion to God, not the privation of original justice, for even after baptism there remains in the baptized the rebellion of the lower part against the higher, as is evident. Therefore, etc.

Finally, because that which is original in us is what was habitual in Adam from the actual. But this in Adam was not the lack of due subordination of the lower appetite to the higher, but only the privation of due sanctity by which his soul remained perfectly united to God as a supernatural end. Therefore, this alone will be original sin. So says Amic.

I RESPOND that these and similar arguments indeed prove that the privation of habitual grace pertains to the integrity of original sin, but not that it totally and precisely constitutes it. And from the Council of Trent, rather the opposite is deduced, because by justice and sanctity it embraces both gifts. For since Adam received from God no less original justice than habitual grace, to be preserved both for himself and for posterity, he lost both for us and left us the debt of both gifts equally.

To the second, it is answered from what was said in numbers 122 and 124 that when Councils and Fathers call original sin the death of the soul, aversion from God, etc., this should be understood not only of formal death and aversion formally opposed to life and formal conversion, which is had through the habit of grace, but also of virtual death and aversion, such as is also the privation of original justice insofar as it virtually includes the lack of sanctifying grace.

To the third: although after baptism there still remains a lack of original justice, nevertheless, since the debt of having it no longer remains but is commuted into another of having grace, namely, sanctifying grace, therefore it no longer remains under the aspect of privation, under which aspect alone it has the nature of sin, but only of simple negation, and therefore through baptism both privations which integrate the nature of original sin are removed in the manner already explained in numbers 132 and 134.

To the last: the minor premise is denied, for not only that had the nature of sin in Adam which turned him away from God immediately and formally, but also what turned him away mediately and virtually. Because it is not always the case concerning mortal sin, whether it be actual or habitual, that it is a formal aversion from God, but it suffices that it be virtual, as is the case in our matter concerning the privation of original justice from what was said in number 122. For this reason, the Doctor at the end of dist. 32 said that original sin, as it involves the lack of original justice, is a sin turning away from the end.

Amic insists: If grace alone were conferred on infants through baptism, the whole of original sin would be deleted in them. On the contrary, if all other supernatural habits were conferred, sanctifying grace alone not being conferred, original sin would not be deleted, since there would still remain in them formal aversion and enmity with God, as well as the death of the

soul. Therefore, the privation of grace alone is original sin, because in precise causes, just as affirmation is the cause of affirmation, so negation is the cause of negation (1 Post.).

I RESPOND by denying the consequence, the proof of which is valid only in forms and privations directly and formally opposed, not virtually, eminently, or equivalently. Hence, it is not valid to say: the rational alone is the life of the animal, therefore the privation of it alone is the death of the same. For also the privation of the sensitive is death in brutes. So in our case, although grace alone suffices to remove original sin because it is the most excellent gift of all, by the rendering of which, therefore, the debt of having original justice is removed and commuted, because it is accepted by God in place of that and other gifts owed. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that the privation of grace alone precisely and adequately constitutes original sin, because also the privation of the other gift can concur partially and inadequately to constitute it, just as the privation of the soul can be the death of the animal, even if by some alone, virtually containing others, it could enjoy life. And this is the more potent difficulty which can be brought forward for the opinion of the Thomists.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Recent Arguments Against the Thomists and Scotists

The recent authors cited in the first article of this controversy contend to prove that original sin can in no way consist in the privation of original justice, whether this is taken solely for sanctity as the Thomists take it, or for another gift distinct from it as the Scotists do, or as it embraces both gifts together as we accept in the present discussion. Although they adduce many arguments, they seem to agree in this as their common and principal foundation: that this privation of original justice is a punishment in us, not a fault, which they prove thus: this privation in Adam was a punishment inflicted on him by God for actual sin. For he was deprived of original justice because he violated the covenant. Therefore it is also a punishment in his descendants. The consequent is proved because the privation of justice is in us in no other way than it was in Adam as in our head. For that same privation which was in him as in the head, with the same condition, was derived to us as members morally joined to the head. The assumption is proved because that privation proceeds neither from Adam nor from his descendants, but from God who does not wish to communicate that justice to Adam nor to his descendants. Therefore that privation is not a fault but a punishment.

If you reply, as was answered above to the arguments of Vulpes, no. 136, that it proceeds indeed from God that there is a lack of justice in Adam and in his descendants, but it does not proceed from Him that this lack is a privation—under which aspect alone it has the nature of fault—but rather under such an aspect it proceeds from man who ought to preserve justice and in whom it would be preserved unless he had transgressed God's command. For it does not proceed from God that there is that lack unless because Adam

deserved that He would deprive him and his descendants of justice, which is the doctrine of Scotus, distinction 32, to the 3rd question 1.

Against this, Poncius argues, cited, because although if God inflicted some punishment for sin, that punishment would not be inflicted except because of demerit, and although it would not have the nature of a punishment due and inflicted unless because man by sinning merited that it be inflicted, nevertheless it would be very badly said that this punishment is sin, because in itself it is not free to man and proceeds from God alone immediately. Therefore, although that lack would not be from God except because of sin, and although it would not have the nature of privation except because of the debt of Adam and his descendants, nevertheless it ought not therefore to be called sin, but rather the effect of sin.

I respond that it is sufficiently clear from what was said to the arguments of Vulpes 136 what should be said to this difficulty. For given the doctrine of Scotus cited there from dist. 37 below, that the same privation of good can be both punishment and fault through different relations, it is perfectly given to understand how the same privation of justice could be in Adam both punishment and fault, and thus similarly it must be said in us descendants, maintaining proportion. But besides what was said there, it must still be noted that many falsehoods are contained in this discourse. First, it is false that the very same privation which was in Adam was derived to us as his members, if one is speaking of the same privation with numerical identity, because we are not made sinners by the same numerical sin of Adam, as was said in article 1. For as I argued there, just as now we do not receive the right to eternal life from the justice of Christ as from its proximate cause, but from justice derived to us from his actual merit, so also infants have a worthiness for punishment proximately and immediately from this numbered justice, which they contract in themselves by origin, derived to them from the actual demerit of the first parent.

It is moreover false that this privation passes to descendants with entirely the same condition as it was in the head, so that if it was a punishment in him it is also necessarily a punishment in us. For as Vasquez argues, one punishment does not make a man worthy of another punishment, if we are speaking properly, but one is made worthy of punishment by fault alone. But the defect of grace and justice due in infants makes them worthy of the privation of glory, which is a punishment. Therefore such a defect cannot be a punishment in them, but rather will be a fault, whose property it is to make someone worthy of punishment. Then, because if in descendants such privation is a punishment, it should rather be called a punishment of Adam's actual sin, not a punishment of original sin which is contracted in each one. For indeed, in the infants themselves, there can be nothing prior by which they are made worthy of the privation of grace, since all such worthiness must proceed from some defect, and no defect or privation can be prior to the privation of grace, through which they are formally made worthy of punishment—which worthiness is imported by the guilt in which original sin consists, as was said above, no. 145.

But if infants are said to be guilty and worthy to be deprived of grace, they are not said to be such because of some defect and sin proper to them, because there is no defect in them prior to the lack of grace and sanctity, but only by the sin of the first parent, and they are said to be worthy of such privation by something entirely extrinsic, just as they are also worthy to contract original sin, as the same Vasquez notes in the cited place. In this way, some say

that the Blessed Virgin contracted the debt of contracting original sin, although she did not actually contract the sin.

To the objection of Poncius against the response of Scotus brought forward, I respond with Vasquez in the same place, no. 42, that this is the difference between the evil of punishment and the evil of fault: that although the evil of punishment requires an order to the voluntary which it follows so that it is a punishment (because it is inflicted for fault), nevertheless the voluntary is not the foundation of the evil of punishment so that the punishment itself is evil, but so that it is said to have the nature of punishment, which would otherwise be evil. Thus, burning is evil and harmful to a brute animal even if it cannot properly be called a punishment with respect to it. But the evil of fault requires the voluntary itself as a foundation in order to be evil, since freedom is the foundation of the whole moral order, by reason of which evil there now begins to be in man a worthiness for punishment. But with the aspect of the voluntary removed, the evil of morals and the nonconformity with rational nature as it is rational cannot remain. Therefore, the evil of fault says a more immediate order to the voluntary than the evil of punishment does, because the latter in the aspect of evil does not depend on the voluntary, and in the aspect of punishment does not depend on the voluntary except by the mediation of the fault for which it is inflicted, which, just as it was freely done by the sinner, so it was also free for him to avoid the punishment that followed from the fault. And this is the reason why the evil of punishment, insofar as it is punishment, cannot be called fault, because it does not state an order to the voluntary as immediate as fault does.

Then, as Scotus said, cited in dist. 37, the evil of punishment is called such by comparison to the will passively relating and in the mode of a subject with respect to it, but not as it proceeds from it as from a deficient and demeritorious cause, because in this sense it can sometimes take on the nature of fault as well, as is the case in our subject regarding the privation of justice due in infants. And in this sense, it is denied that such punishment is very badly called sin, for although it is not free immediately and in itself as is required for actual fault, nevertheless it is mediately free and in its cause, as much as suffices for habitual fault. And although physically considered and in the mode of a simple negation it proceeds from God alone, nevertheless morally and demeritoriously it also proceeds from man, and therefore it can be called both sin and the effect of sin—habitual sin, I say, and the effect of actual sin.

You might say: the privation of grace in personal habitual sin has only the nature of punishment and the effect of sin, not of habitual fault. Therefore the same should be asserted about original sin.

One could first deny the antecedent because Scotus, dist. 37 cited, implies that the privation of grace can also in some way have the nature of fault in personal habitual sin, although the voluntary privation of sanctity included in the voluntary transgression of the law itself does not make a distinct sin unless it is expressly intended, because it is a general circumstance included in any mortal sin, which, unless expressly intended, does not confer a specific malice distinct from the malice of the transgression of the precept. For it is probable that everyone in the very precept of keeping the law simultaneously accepts the precept of preserving sanctity for themselves, because we are bound not only to observe moral conformity to the law, but also physical conformity, which is through habitual grace to God as supernatural end. But whatever the case may be about this, about which later in disp. 9, qu. 9, art. 2, no. 257, the parity can be denied because it is not entirely certain that we have a

special precept of preserving habitual grace, but Adam, according to the common sense of the Fathers, had a special precept of preserving original justice for himself and his descendants, as Vega shows in his exposition of the Council of Trent, sess. 5, although some contend that it was not distinct from the precept of not eating from the forbidden tree, as he himself judges, but was included in it. Therefore, transgressing this precept, he sinned also by depriving himself and his descendants of such justice, and because he did this voluntarily, at least interpretatively, therefore such privation of justice was habitual sin in him and is original sin in us.

Secondly, they principally argue: that privation of original justice is not voluntary for infants. Therefore, it does not pertain to the nature of original sin, because no sin exists unless it is voluntary, according to Augustine in *On True Religion*.

The Doctor responds, cited, to the 1st, p. 9, that this privation is voluntary to infants not by their own will but by the will of the first parent, in whom all have sinned. For as the Doctor shows there, God made a covenant with Adam that if he sinned by transgressing His precept, he would lose original justice for himself and his descendants, as the Council of Trent and Augustine, 16 *City of God*, c. 27, also say. For by this covenant he was constituted head of the whole human race, and in his will were morally included the wills of all his descendants, as explained above, no. 131. Consequently, that privation is voluntary in all by the will of the first parent, and such a precept was necessary, because if natural propagation from him alone sufficed for the transmission of original sin, then also other sins of Adam, if he committed others, would be imputed to his descendants; indeed, universally, all children would be infected with the stains of their parents by the very fact that they descended naturally from them, which is false.

You might say: therefore, in children such privation does not have the nature of sin, because from them it does not have the nature of the voluntary.

I respond: indeed, it does not truly and properly have from them the nature of the voluntary, but from Adam, and therefore neither does it have from them the nature of sin. Nevertheless, it has in them the nature of the voluntary and of sin because the lack of original justice is contracted in them with the debt of having it, depending on the will of Adam, who ought to have derived such justice to them and by sinning voluntarily did not derive it, just as sin is voluntary in the sensitive appetite, although it does not have from it the nature of the voluntary. But Arriaga objects, disp. 51, no. 6, that from this it manifestly follows that infants are therefore in no way at all worthy of hatred, but only Adam who did not transfer that justice to them.

"Let us suppose," he says, "the case that some creature has the power of taking away habitual grace from my soul or from an infant's, and that God commanded it under sin not to take it away from me or from the infant. Certainly, if in such a case that creature, transgressing the precept, took away grace from the infant, no one would say that the infant would then be worthy of God's hatred and would contract habitual sin, any more than if it had been created in a state of pure nature. For the fact that another creature by its wickedness had stripped this one of grace without any will of the one stripped does not harm the one stripped any more in the order of sin than if it had lawfully taken away grace. For the harm done to the infant is the same in both cases, but the fault belongs to the one who takes

away, not to the infant." Therefore, that taking away must be voluntary not only to Adam but also to infants so that it can have with respect to infants the true nature of sin. We must resort to the fact that children truly morally transgressed the law in Adam, and that such sin morally persisting in them and not forgiven to them by God is called original sin in them.

He says the same argument can be made if we posed the case in this way: that God, without imposing an obligation on Adam, had said to him, "If you love me at such an hour, for which however I do not oblige you under any sin, you will transfer grace to your children; otherwise not." Given this, then there would be in infants a privation of grace and of spiritual life if Adam had not loved God.

Then he asks whether infants would sin now more than then. If not, then since at that time this privation would not be sin in them, even though it would be as harmful to them as it is now, even now infants will not be said to sin through it. But if they would sin more now, it must be said that not only the voluntary privation of grace, but the transgression of the precept is now voluntary for the children themselves, since on the part of the privation there would be no difference in either case.

I respond by denying the conclusion. To the first proof from the first case, with the whole antecedent granted, I distinguish the consequent: that taking must be voluntary to infants in itself and in the mode of actual sin—I deny; in another as in a cause, in which way only habitual sin is usually said to be voluntary—I concede. Thus, when we say that privation is not voluntary to children by their own will but only by the will of the first parent, we do not intend that it was in no way voluntary to them but only to Adam, as the objector deduces. For since the wills of all descendants were included in the will of the first parent as in their moral head, that privation is said to be voluntary to them, at least interpretatively. But we only intend that it is not formally and immediately voluntary to them in themselves in the mode of actual sin or personal habitual sin, and such a nature of the voluntary suffices for original sin because it is not a sin of action and operation but of nature and origin. Nor do I see any other mystery in this argument that Arriaga considers so evident to himself.

To the other proof from the second case, I deny that in that case infants would have a lack of grace in the mode of privation, because such a gift would not be due to them by virtue of any preceding covenant. I also deny that in that case that lack would be as harmful as it is now, because then it would not have the nature of fault or punishment, whereas now it has the nature of fault or at least of punishment. I deny that on the part of the privation there would be no difference in either case, because in our case it has the nature of privation and fault or at least of punishment, whereas in that case it would have the nature of a simple negation.

I concede, however, that now also not only the voluntary privation of grace but also the transgression of the precept is voluntary to children, at least interpretatively, and in the case I deny that this could be called original sin of the children, for the reasons brought forward in article 1. For the Fathers and Councils teach that this is something intrinsic to children and proper to each one from the sin of Adam. But descendants are said to have sinned by the sin of Adam only by extrinsic denomination from one and the same sin common to all, not proper to each one. Whence, by placing original sin in the aforesaid privation, the way of speaking of the Fathers and Councils is better preserved. For thus there truly is in children, not only by extrinsic denomination but really, the privation of original justice.

Nor is it absurd that children have in themselves the proper and true nature of sin by which they are said to be born children of wrath and sinners, and yet are not said to be born sinning nor to have sinned except by extrinsic denomination. The reason is that their original sin is habitual sin which is properly and intrinsically in them, by which they are called sinners. They do not, however, properly and intrinsically have actual sin by which they would properly be called sinning.

Nor is it absurd that one subject has in itself a sin by which another has sinned. For also in actual sin, the sensitive appetite has in itself a sin by which the will has sinned. And furthermore, children contract original sin insofar as they are, by divine ordination, certain members of one mystical body constituted under one head, Adam, as was said in no. 131.

Objections of Arriaga

Thirdly, Arriaga argues that the privation of grace with respect to infants would be in the same way the death of the soul whether it came from a venial sin alone or from another mortal sin of a species or genus different from that which Adam in fact committed. And yet it is certain among all that in the nature of sin and worthiness for hatred, we would not then have the same sin nor the same worthiness for hatred. Therefore, original sin does not consist formally in that privation.

The consequent is clear. The assumption is proved that whether Adam had the same or a different sin is something extrinsic with respect to infants according to this opinion. But the variety of an extrinsic cause, if it puts nothing distinct in the entity of the effect, cannot make the effect different. Therefore, the privation of grace in infants, if it in no way includes Adam's sin as a component part of original sin, but regards it as entirely extrinsic, will be entirely the same and consequently the same original sin, whether Adam's sin was of gluttony or hatred of God or heresy or mortal or venial, which is very difficult to accept.

I respond by denying the assumption, because since we do not place original sin in such a privation as it is precisely the lack of such a habit, namely of grace or original justice—for in this way it would also proceed from God as from a negative cause—but principally as it arises demeritously from the sin of the first parent, consequently that same privation physically considered will be morally different in the nature of fault according to the diversity of the actual sin of the first parent, because, speaking universally, habitual sin has the same specific malice that the actual sin from which it arises has. To the proof of the assumption, it should be said that although Adam's sin is something extrinsic with respect to infants and also with respect to the privation of grace found in them as it constitutes the nature of original fault, nevertheless its relation to Adam's sin itself is intrinsic to it, because such privation does not have the nature of fault in children except insofar as it proceeds demeritously from the actual sin of the first parent, and therefore according to its specific diversity, original sin will also be diverse.

As for what he was saying, that the same privation of grace would be in children, and the death of the soul, whether Adam's sin was mortal or venial, I by no means admit this, because venial sin is compatible with grace according to all, nor could original sin be derived to descendants from venial sin alone, as Turrian notes, dub. 4.

Fourthly, he argues: it does not contradict God, while retaining hatred for the infant because of original sin, to infuse into him the habit of grace, according to the more common opinion that admits that grace can be infused without the remission of habitual mortal sin. Therefore, the nature of original sin does not include the actual privation of grace, even inadequately, because no whole can remain, even divinely, if even a single essential part of it is taken away.

It is confirmed because the hatred that we incur because of original sin cannot be the lack of grace. For men would lack it in the same way in the state of pure nature, and they would in no way be children of wrath because of it. Therefore, we must posit something else that is the foundation of hatred and that can divinely remain with grace, just as we discourse in personal habitual sin. Nor does it help to say that then that original sin would be different. For the foundation of hatred and enmity is not changed by the fact that something of the punishment is remitted. Therefore, although that privation which is founded in the nature of voluntary aversion, and which by that very fact is the punishment of aversion, is taken away, the foundation of hatred and enmity in which sin formally consists will not therefore be diminished.

This is confirmed from the common doctrine concerning actual sin, e.g., external sin is not sin except insofar as it is voluntarily perpetrated. Therefore, if the same interior volition remains, although the external action, which is called voluntary from the interior, is impeded from elsewhere, nevertheless the whole foundation of hatred and enmity and the whole gravity of sin remains. But the privation of grace is not otherwise voluntary to us in the sin committed than external homicide is in internal volition. Therefore, although divinely that privation of grace does not follow from that voluntary antecedent, still the whole foundation of hatred and enmity that is included in sin will remain in it.

I respond from what was said in no. 116 and 118, that in that case there would be an original sin distinct from what now exists, just as the covenant would be distinct. For not from the nature of things, as was said there, is the nature of this sin to be established, but from the diversity of the covenant made by God with Adam, one must speak of it in different ways. To the confirmation, it must likewise be denied that the lack of grace that men now have and that they would have in the state of pure nature is the same, because then it would be a pure negation, since it would not be due, but now it is truly and properly a privation that has the nature of sin, since it is due from the covenant made with Adam.

To the first objection against this solution, with the antecedent granted (which could also be denied), the consequent is denied, because the privation of grace that is founded in the nature of voluntary aversion does not have only the nature of punishment, as the objector maintains, but also the nature of fault, as was said to the first objection.

To the confirmation, the major is denied as to the second part. For as will be established in the following disputation, the exterior act within the same genus adds a distinct species of malice to the malice of the interior act, and therefore it is false that if the same interior volition remains, although the exterior is impeded, the whole foundation of hatred and enmity and the whole gravity of sin also remains. The argument deduced from this similarity is rather to the opposite: that just as the external act within the same genus of sin has its own malice distinct from the malice of the internal act, so original sin in us, as an effect following

from the actual sin of the first parent within the same species of malice, has its own malice distinct from the sin of Adam, because of which each of his descendants is said to contract sin in himself dependently on that sin, as the Council of Trent speaks, saying that Adam's sin, which is one by origin and propagation, not being transfused by imitation, is in each one as his own, which way of speaking cannot be sufficiently preserved if descendants are said to be sinners from that one and the same sin of Adam morally persevering in them in the mode of habitual sin.

Fifthly, the same Arriaga argues: the reason we go beyond Adam's sin to privation is so that in each of Adam's descendants something intrinsically physical is found that has the nature of sin, to preserve the way of speaking of the Council. But by the very fact that we say that privation itself is not adequately sin but a part of it, the other part being the nature of the voluntary taken extrinsically, namely from Adam's sin itself, we do not satisfy the Council. For the Council did not say that only one part is intrinsic to man, but absolutely said sin. Therefore, if the Council is to be understood in the physical sense, it must be said that the whole essence of sin consists in privation alone, because this alone is intrinsic to man, and the nature of the voluntary, which is entirely extrinsic, should not be posited as pertaining to it.

Then, neither is this saved by positing that the nature of sin consists in that privation alone, excluding the voluntary, because privation is truly and properly nothing. Therefore, it is not something intrinsic, nor something proper. Indeed, to conceive it as something intrinsic and proper is to make a being of reason. Whence, he wonders that many supporters of our opinion judged that such an efficacious argument can be drawn from the passage of the Council for privation, not remembering that in physics they taught that privation is nothing at all, nor can it without fiction be conceived as inhering in and intrinsic to a subject.

I respond that we by no means assign the nature of the voluntary and free as an essential part of original sin. For if in actual sin itself, which participates much more in the voluntary, the nature of the voluntary and free does not concur as an intrinsic part constituting its malice, but only as its foundation, for the reason that freedom is a prerequisite and necessary foundation of the whole moral order, as will be established in the following disputation, much more is this to be thought of original sin, which participates much less in freedom and among all sins is the least voluntary. Therefore, we place the whole and adequate nature and essence of original fault in that two-fold privation, of original justice and sanctifying grace, as the two gifts that principally among others constituted the state of innocence. But we say that the nature of the voluntary derived from the actual sin of Adam into those privations concurs as a necessary condition or prerequisite foundation of all morality.

And when it is objected that not even by this is it saved that original sin is something intrinsic and proper in infants, because privation is not truly and properly something inhering in a subject and intrinsic to it, and to conceive it thus is to make a being of reason, I respond that although privations and negations are not real beings, they are therefore not to be formally counted among beings of reason, since they are truly given on the part of the thing, not because they are real beings, positive or even privative or negative, as some imagine, but they are given on the part of the thing as real removals of beings, insofar as with no intellect thinking, air is truly dark and man is black, not white, as was expressly said in disp. 7, Log. 9,

7 from Scotus 1, dist. 23, 9, un., where he distinguishes a double genus of negations. Some are negations of reason that belong to things through the intellect alone, such as the negation of subject in man placed on the part of the predicate. But some are real negations that are found in things without anyone considering them, such as the negation of "horseness" in man, for man is not a horse from the nature of the thing. And about these we assert that they are not beings of reason, since they belong to things without any work of the intellect, which is similarly to be asserted about privations. For truly on the part of the thing, man is blind, air is dark. So it is in our subject: the privation of justice in infants is a real lack, although it is not a real being, which belongs to them on the part of the thing, and it is a lack of some real and physical form, not of some form of reason or moral denomination, such as the lack of episcopacy in me. Whence, although blindness puts as much reality in Peter as does the lack of episcopacy, nevertheless with better right blindness is called in him a real lack than the negation of episcopacy, because blindness is the lack of a real and physical form, but the negation of episcopacy is the lack of a certain moral and extrinsic denomination in the moral order. Consequently, with better right also blindness in the genus of negation and privation more on the part of the thing and more intrinsically denominates someone blind than the other negation denominates Peter as not-bishop.

Therefore, when the Council says that original sin is in each one as his own, it explains it by means of the aforesaid privation of justice rather than by Adam's sin itself morally persevering in his descendants, both because that is not the sin proper to anyone but common to all, whereas the privation is proper to each one, just as they would have had their own justice had Adam not sinned, and also because the privation of justice says in its own way something physical, namely the lack of a real and physical form, whereas Adam's sin now posits nothing intrinsic in his descendants in the physical order, but at most in the moral order insofar as it is conceived to be morally in them. Therefore, the way of speaking of the Fathers and Councils is better preserved in our opinion than in the opposite.

Sixthly, the same Arriaga urges: sin as such is the free transgression of the divine precept. Therefore, just as actual sin is the actual transgression, so habitual sin will be the habitual transgression. But in the point of transgression, the privation of grace has no place. For just as grace is not a free operation, even if it is the physical beauty of the soul, so its lack is not the transgression of the law that is found in sin. Therefore, original sin cannot be constituted by privation.

Then he argued, but the privation of grace is the sin of the child either insofar as Adam had to transfuse it into children, or insofar as they themselves had to have it. Not the first, because although Adam had that debt and obligation and violated it, this is not formally sufficient for children to be constituted sinners and hateful to God. For no one is constituted guilty of some fault because of the transgression of an alien obligation that it is not incumbent on himself to fulfill. If the second, then children are constituted sinners because they transgressed that debt or obligation. Therefore, that positive or negative thing on which the obligation immediately fell will be formally sin. But the obligation was not immediately to the habit, because it was not to be immediately placed by children. Therefore, sin does not consist formally in the privation of such a habit, but before the privation of that, the transgression of the debt or obligation is formally understood, in which formal original sin consists.

Finally, others argue that if Adam had not had original justice and yet had sinned in the person of the whole human race, as he now sinned, we would no less be born in original sin than we are now born. And yet we would not be born with the privation of original justice. Therefore, original sin does not consist in that privation.

I respond that the assumption is to be understood of actual sin, not of habitual, or of the sin of action and person, not of origin and nature. Wherefore it suffices that just as actual sin is actual transgression, so habitual is habitual transgression, connoting the actual transgression, proper or of the head, from which it arose—understanding by habitual transgression not properly some violation of the law, but the defect of the habit of original justice that children were bound to have. But if you contend that every sin as such is some transgression of the law, then a distinction must be made of a two-fold law: one commanding, the other establishing and disposing about the end or the lack of grace, which according to divine law is necessary for attaining beatitude. Actual sin is against the first law, habitual against the second, which should not be called so much against the law as against the end of the law.

To the second objection of Oviedo, I say that the privation of original justice in children is original sin from both principles assigned there. And first, indeed, causally from the first parent, I deny the assumption. For although no one is constituted guilty because of the transgression of an obligation that is entirely alien, one can nevertheless be constituted at least causally if the obligation of another in some way also pertains to him, as happens in our subject concerning the descendants of Adam, in the way already explained in no. 131. To the objection to the second principle, with the first consequent granted in this sense, that children are constituted sinners because they transgressed that debt, that is, they do not have the original justice they were bound to have, the other consequent is denied. For although that habit would not be to be placed immediately by children, nevertheless they were immediately bound to have it transfused from the first parent, in whom alone the transgression of the obligation is understood to precede such privation resulting in his descendants from such a transgression.

To the last objection, it is clear from what was said in no. 118 that in that case there would be an original sin of a different specific nature from that which now occurs in the descendants of Adam.

Objections of Gavatius

Seventhly, Gavatius argues, ch. 3, sect. 5: original sin is not the privation of grace except insofar as it is sanctity and the life of the soul. Therefore, it is not the lack of grace in the nature of habit and in the physical genus, but as it has the nature of sanctity and spiritual life of the soul. But it is not such except insofar as it gives right and worthiness to glory. Therefore, the formality of original sin consists in the lack of right and worthiness to glory contracted from Adam's sin. Then he subsumes, but such a lack is nothing other than guilt or obligation to the punishment of loss. Therefore, original sin ought to formally consist in guilt and obligation to the punishment of loss contracted from Adam's sin.

It is confirmed because aversion from the ultimate end contracted from one's own sinful act is formally habitual personal sin, but the privation of the habit of grace relates only as

material. Therefore, aversion from the ultimate end contracted from Adam's transgression will be formally original sin, and the lack of that habit will be material. Since, therefore, aversion from the ultimate end is nothing but guilt or obligation to the punishment of loss left from the sinful act of Adam as from sin, it follows that original sin is nothing but the passive obligation to the punishment of loss left in his descendants from Adam's sin.

I respond by conceding the entire first discourse from what was said in number 118, because it is certainly true, as we were saying to you, that grace gives a right to glory from the nature of things or in the nature of habit and quality, but by divine ordination. I also concede that this kind of lack of right and worthiness to glory, in which original sin formally consists, is nothing but guilt and passive obligation to the punishment of loss insofar as contracted from Adam's sin. But because in fact this kind of lack of right entirely coincides with the lack of grace, just as in fact it is grace itself that formally gives the right to glory, so the lack of grace formally removes that right. Hence, we say that original sin now existing, and as it is in fact contracted by the posterity of Adam, formally consists in the privation of grace and original justice.

You will say that this only proves that the privation of grace is materially related to the essence of original sin, insofar as the guilt and obligation to the punishment of loss contracted by posterity from Adam's sin, in which it formally consists, now has annexed to it the privation of grace, without which, however, it could retain all its formality. I respond that from this it is deduced that the privation of grace formally constitutes original sin in fact, because through it alone, in the genus of formal cause, man is formally constituted guilty of the punishment of loss and through intrinsic denomination in the manner explained in number 149, where without any privation he would be constituted guilty by the sole extrinsic denomination taken from Adam's sin.

Hence when St. Augustine, whose opinion we defend in article 3, teaches that original sin consists in guilt contracted from the sin of the first parent, he speaks in this same sense insofar as it involves the privation of grace, or rather as it is now in fact formally constituted through it. For this reason it was said there in number 108 that truly Augustine's opinion about guilt does not differ from this common opinion if it is correctly understood. For now one and the same thing is formally imported: the guilt of the punishment of loss and through the privation of due justice existing in little ones.

To the Confirmation, I concede that habitual personal [sin] formally consists in aversion from the ultimate end contracted from one's own sinful act, and that this coincides with the guilt to the punishment of loss contracted by the same act. But because such guilt in the sinner is not held except by means of the privation of grace, it cannot be said that the privation of grace is materially related to habitual sin, insofar as, absolutely speaking, such guilt in which habitual sin consists could be given without the privation of grace through the sole extrinsic denomination taken from one's own sinful act. And insofar as the privation of grace is found in every mortal habitual sin, and therefore through it, as thus precisely considered, one habitual sin cannot be specifically distinguished from another. Whence it happens that habitual personal sin cannot be explained by the sole privation of grace unless something else is added, as we shall say in its place. This inconvenience does not follow concerning original sin, since it is one in species and of the same nature in each of Adam's posterity and equal in all. Hence, it happens that it can be well explained by the privation of due justice,

although habitual personal sin cannot be so conveniently explained through it, as was said in 101 and as we shall expressly say in disputation 9.9, article 2, number 157.

Finally, it is objected that not only grace and original justice were to pass from Adam to his posterity, but also the other infused supernatural habits. Therefore, original sin does not consist in the privation of grace and original justice, but also of the other supernatural habits. They respond by denying the consequence, since original sin consists only in the privation of that gift which is formal aversion and enmity of God and death of the soul, as is held from the Councils, Fathers, and Scriptures. And only the privation of grace is formal aversion, enmity of God, and death of the soul. However, this response is not sufficient, because then the privation of original justice, as it is a gift distinct from grace, would not contribute to the integrity of original sin. Yet this is false, since we are no less debtors of original justice than of grace.

It must be said, therefore, that the reason is not the same concerning grace and original justice on the one hand, and concerning faith, hope, and other similar virtues on the other. For original sin is not the lack of any supernatural habit indiscriminately, but only of that which is true sanctity of the soul and spiritual, which belongs only to grace and original justice: to the former formally, to the latter virtually, due to the necessary connection it had with the former in the state of innocence. For this reason the Doctor says in distinction 32 at the end that the privation of the latter virtually included the privation of the former. But faith, hope, and other supernatural virtues do not have such necessary connection with sanctifying grace, since they remain in the sinner. And therefore original sin does not necessarily consist in their privation as it does in the privation of grace and original justice.